This thesis maintains that, in spite of many differences and
criticisms between the theologies of Paul Tillich and Karl Barth, so far
as the problem of authentic humanity is concerned, the two theologians
complement rather than exclude each other. Furthermore, the thesis shows
that their understandings of humanity, though deeply rooted in the
Christian tradition, can provide a genuine dialogue with non-Christian
approaches to the realization of authentic humanity.

The first chapter is a comparative survey of the two theologians'
encounters with human inauthenticity during the First World War. After
this 'Introductory' part, the following two chapters are concerned with
divine intervention as the foundation and beginning of authentic humanity.
This consists of a study of Barth's interpretation of the doctrine of
reconciliation and of Tillich's interpretation of the doctrine of
justification. The study demonstrates that Barth's Christological
objectivity and Tillich's existential concern complement each other, so
that together they build up a more comprehensive understanding of God's
salvific act in Christ and its transforming power in human experience
than does either in its own. The next two chapters are concerned with
the realization of authentic humanity. Tillich's idea of unambiguous
life is studied from an interdisciplinary perspective and compared with
Martin Heidegger's philosophy, Abraham H. Maslow's humanistic psychology,
Karl Marx's politics and Zen Buddhism. Then Barth's doctrine of the
Christian life as the realization of man's ontological determination is
studied under the categories of the God-man and man-man relationships.
Again we find that Tillich's interdisciplinary concern and Barth's
delineation of the Christian life in the presence of a living God and
guided by a personal Spirit also complement each other, so that together
they constitute a comprehensive picture of authentic humanity, which may
be called a 'Christian personalist' view of anthropology.
ABSTRACT

'AUTHENTIC HUMANITY IN THE THEOLOGY OF PAUL TILLICH AND KARL BARTH'

Milton Wai-yiu Wan
Christ Church, Oxford
Submitted for the D.Phil. degree in Trinity Term, 1984

Paul Tillich and Karl Barth, literally contemporaries (both of them born in the same year, 1886), can be regarded as the two Protestant theological 'giants' of our time. The present thesis seeks to demonstrate that in spite of many differences and oppositions between their theologies, so far as the problem of authentic humanity is concerned, the two theologians complement rather than exclude each other. Furthermore, we also have tried to show that their understandings of humanity, though deeply rooted in the Christian tradition, can provide the foundation for a genuine dialogue with the non-Christian approaches.

Chapter One ('A Touch of Inauthenticity: Tillich, Barth and the First World War') presents a comparative survey of Tillich's and Barth's encounters with the problem of human authenticity during the First World War. Their different experiences during the war resulted in different ways of approaching the problem of humanity. As a battlefield chaplain, Tillich experienced the death of human persons and of the European culture. Thus he set his mind upon the existential and cultural problems of man. But for Barth, the experience of the death of a theological era pushed him to seek for new ground in theology. Thus to him, anthropology as an understanding of humanity must be seen from a theological perspective. This demonstrates how two different modes of encounter with human inauthenticity during the First World War shaped Tillich's and Barth's theological orientations in different ways. The remaining task of the thesis, then, is to examine how they applied their different approaches to the authenticity of manhood.
We separate Tillich's and Barth's theologies of authentic humanity into two parts. The first part is concerned with divine intervention as the foundation of authentic humanity. It contains chapters on Barth's doctrine of reconciliation and on Tillich's doctrine of justification. Part two also consists of two chapters. After we have laid the 'foundation' in the former chapters, this second part of our study is concerned mainly with the realization of authentic humanity.

We begin our discussion of the foundation of authentic humanity with Barth's understanding of 'real humanity'. From his Christological perspective, Barth furnishes a picture of 'real man' in a fourfold relationship: Man's relationship with God, man's relationship with other men, man's relationship with himself, and man's relationship with temporality. His Christological anthropology explores the threefold unreality of humanity on the one hand, and offers a threefold new beginning of real humanity. For, through the 'mirror' of the real man Jesus Christ, the unreality of manhood is manifested as 'ignorance', 'incompleteness' and 'distortion'. Reconciliation, which is the incarnation of the real man Jesus Christ, 'disclosed' the 'complete' image of man and 'reconstituted' manhood through the vicarious humanity of Christ. But Barth's Christological anthropology is based on his idea of the 'ontological determination' of humanity. Thus in the second half of Chapter Two, we examine his doctrine of election. There are four basic themes which characterize Barth's interpretation of election. They are: 1. The doctrine of election is part of the doctrine of God who elects Himself. 2. God's self-election has been fulfilled in Jesus Christ who is the electing God and elected man in One. 3. God's election is a gracious election, in freedom and in love. 4. God's election is a concrete happening sprung from the divine act of a living God. We discover two main threads from our study of these four major themes: On the one hand, the God who elects man in Jesus Christ is a personal and living God.
Yet on the other hand, divine election as a God-man encounter is an impersonal one. These two ideas constitute both the strength and the weakness of Barth's interpretation of the doctrine of election. The impersonal character of his doctrine of reconciliation is due to his inadequate concern for the subjective and existential dimension of this 'divine change' in man.

At this point, our study leads to Tillich's doctrine of justification as God's acceptance of the unacceptable. For in Tillich's doctrine, the existential dimension of God's salvific act has received serious attention. Applying psychotherapeutic studies to the phenomenon of 'acceptance', Tillich delineates the psychodynamics of how the objective declaration of righteousness from God can become the subjective power that brings forth a transformation of human existence. But Tillich does not only apply psychotherapeutic findings to Christian doctrines, he also seeks to go beyond psychotherapy and introduce his idea of healing through the New Being. The divine acceptance in justification 'overcomes' the psychotherapeutic healing because the New Being on the one hand can provide the ultimate source of love and power to accept the unacceptable, and on the other hand, the same New Being also provides for the person the ultimate source of courage, which enables him to accept the acceptance. The question 'can Tillich resolve the tension between the transcendent and the immanent character of the New Being?' then leads us to examine his understanding of 'God as the Unconditional'. 'Divine transcendence' refers to God's freedom, which goes beyond any fixation or determining factor from finite beings; and 'divine immanence' means that God is the Ground of Being, so that every finite being can participate in being-itself through the state of being grasped by that which concerns him ultimately. By means of this understanding of God as the 'unconditional' who goes beyond any boundary and particularity of finite beings, Tillich endeavours to break
through the boundary between the sacred and the secular. But in this attempt, it becomes difficult for him to define the distinctiveness of the Christian experience. Tillich claims that we can work out the distinctiveness of the Christian experience of the Spiritual Presence only when we enter into concrete dialogues with other religions and disciplines of human-sciences. This leads us directly to the topics of Chapters Four and Five.

Chapter Four is concerned with 'Tillich's Doctrine of Unambiguous Life.' It carries on the quest suggested in the preceding chapter and offers an interdisciplinary study of Tillich's idea of authentic humanity. According to Tillich, an unambiguous life is characterized by life's dynamics as self-integration, self-creativity and self-transcendence. Tillich's interpretation of self-integration is compared with Martin Heidegger's existential analytic of anxiety and authentic existence as Being-towards-death. Heidegger's analysis has provided an in-depth understanding of authentic individualization, but his inadequate attention to communal participation can be complemented by Tillich's discussion of 'courage to be a part.' In his later works Heidegger became more convinced that the realization of human authenticity should be regarded not as an achievement of a merely subjective power of human self-will, but as a 'releasement' through which Being reveals itself as a 'gift'. It demonstrates that the acquiring of authentic humanity as self-integration has to point beyond mere human endeavour and call for the presence of that which transcends. Tillich's idea of self-creativity is compared with the humanistic psychologists' studies on creativity and Karl Marx's concept of man and self-creation. We have chosen Marx's vision of the communist society and Abraham H. Maslow's 'Eupsychian society' as the examples of man's search for the realization of authentic humanity on the communal level. A critical analysis of the two ideal societies shows that, due to their
inadequate accounts of human nature, their visions turned out to be utopias. At this point, Tillich's idea of theonomous culture and the 'kairos' of religious socialism are introduced as the ultimate fulfilment of authentic humanity on the communal level. Finally, we examine Tillich's idea of self-transcendence by comparing it with the Zen Buddhist notion of *satori* (enlightenment). The Zen idea of *satori* can be regarded as a radical attempt to achieve self-transcendence because it requires one to live out an ordinary life while at the same time maintaining a non-attached mind. But such an understanding of self-transcendence is still inadequate in Tillich's view. For, although the Zen Buddhist makes a radical attempt at self-transcendence in the 'vertical' dimension, he tends to separate self-transcendence from serious concerns for morality and socio-political transformation. According to Tillich, an unambiguous unity of the 'vertical' and the 'horizontal' dimensions in life can only be fulfilled within the Spiritual Community under the impact of the Spiritual Presence. Thus, through an interdisciplinary dialogue with various approaches to the realization of authentic humanity, Tillich penetratingly demonstrates that the ultimate fulfilment of human selfhood by man himself is impossible. The problems manifested in all such approaches point to the quest for a theonomous transforming power which can only be created by the Spiritual Presence and realized in the Spiritual Community. But since Tillich is so preoccupied with the universal character of the Spiritual Presence and tends to overlook its distinctiveness in Christian experience, his 'answer' to the problems concerning the realization of authentic humanity is still inadequate. What distinguishes the Christian experience of the Spiritual Presence from other ontological grounds of universal-subjective reality in the non-Christian approaches to authentic humanity is the *personal* character of God's presence. At this point, our study turns again to Barth's delineation of the Christian life in the presence of a living God and under the guidance of a personal Spirit.
Chapter Five ('Barth's Doctrine of the Christian Life') begins with a discussion of Barth's fundamental principles of the Christian life. The divine-human encounter in Christian growth, according to Barth, is characterized by the presence of a living God who is an 'objectival subject' and is guided by a personal Spirit who can direct and teach a Christian how to grow after the image of Jesus Christ the real man. In this way, the distinctiveness of the divine breakthrough in Christian experience is fully elaborated. Then we come to Barth's 'blueprint' of authentic humanity in concreto. It can be categorized under a twofold relationship, viz., man's existence in the presence of God and in the presence of other men. From his critical analysis of human freedom, self-identity, self-acceptance, self-integration and life in prayer, Barth concludes with his thesis that 'to be man is to be with God.' Authentic humanity in the man-man relationship begins with Barth's ontology of fellow-humanity. Fellow-humanity is not only an ontological principle, for the idea can concretely be applied to the Christian community, marriage, family and politics. Yet due to Barth's rejection of analogia entis and his conviction of the validity of analogia fidei, Barth's 'picture' of authentic humanity is weakened by not considering any insight from other disciplines of human study. At this point, the study leads us back again to Tillich's conviction of the value of an interdisciplinary approach in constructing a theological anthropology.

Thus we saw that Tillich's and Barth's anthropologies complement each other in two particular ways. First, concerning the doctrine of reconciliation as the foundation and beginning of authentic humanity, Barth's Christological objectivity and Tillich's existential concern together build up a more comprehensive understanding of God's salvific act in Christ and its transforming power in human experience. And second, concerning the realization of authentic humanity, Tillich's interdisciplinary concern and Barth's delineation of the Christian life in the presence of a
living God and guided by a personal Spirit also complement each other. Together they constitute a more satisfactory and comprehensive view of authentic humanity than does either on its own.

This picture of authentic humanity may be called a Christian personalist view of anthropology. It is formulated in six statements:

1. Man is a personal agent. 2. God is a personal Subject. 3. There is a personal encounter between God and man. 4. There is a personal encounter between man and man. 5. A personal divine-human encounter is the foundation of man's self-realization and his authentic encounter with other men. 6. An authentic divine-human encounter must be realized within the personal encounter between man and man. Such an outline for a Christian personalist anthropology is suggested as a possible framework for future research -- a framework in which the relevant contributions of both Paul Tillich and Karl Barth can be duly recognized.
PREFACE

There are a number of people without whose help my thesis could never have been accomplished.

Professor John Macquarrie, my supervisor, has kindly offered his time to discuss and comment on many of the main ideas in this study. Nearly a decade ago when I first read and was so impressed by his Twentieth-Century Religious Thought, I hardly dreamt of such an opportunity to study under this learned man and even to write a doctoral dissertation. Mr. Stephen Palmquist has also offered endless hours to help me polish my writing style. His friendship and assistance has been one of the most unforgettable aspects of these years of my study abroad.

Also during my two visits to Tübingen, I benefited a great deal from several different people through their hospitality or discussions: Dr. Gerhard Maier of the Albrecht-Bengel-Haus, Mr. Wai-kwong Sun and Dr. Birger Ortwein of Tübingen University, and Mr. Markus Wildi of Aargauische Kantonsbibliothik in Switzerland.

Many thanks are due to Mrs. Nai-tsung Wong, who volunteered to come over from Belgium and type the whole thesis for me. She did the work with high precision and efficiency. To her I must express my deepest gratitude.

The thesis has brought me much joy as well as much pain; but my family has shared all these feelings. My wife Ellen has had to take care of the whole family during the day time and type my drafts at night. Without her sacrificial love and support I would have given up long before I eventually finished my work. And my two little angels, Flora and Aurora, who wake me up early every morning with cheerful smiles and songs, always
teach me something about authentic humanity which I could never learn from books or lectures. Thus to my family this thesis is dedicated.

M. W. Y. Wan

Oxford, 1984
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### ABBREVIATIONS

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Journal of American Academy of Religion

Journal of Humanistic Psychology

Journal of Liberal Religion

The Journal of Religion

The Journal of Religious Thought

Journal of Religion and Health

The Journal of Theological Studies

Kenyon Alumni Bulletin

Kerygma und Dogma

Mind (Edinburgh)

Monatsschrift für Pastoraltheologie. Zur Vertiefung des gesamten pfarramtlichen Wirkens

New Blackfriars

New Testament Studies

Neue Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society

Pastoral Psychology

Proceedings of the British Academy

Philosophy East and West

Philosophy. The Journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy

The Philosophical Review

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

Psychiatry

Pastoraltheologie, Wissenschaft und Praxis

Religion in Life

Religious Studies

The Review of Politics


Review of Religion
WORKS BY PAUL TILlich

**BR**
Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality

**BRU**
Der Begriff des Übernatürlichen, sein dialektischer Charakter und das Prinzip der Identität, dargestellt an der supranaturalistischen Theologie vor Schleiermacher

**CEWR**
Christianity and the Encounter of the World Religions

**Construction of the History of Religion**
WORKS BY KARL BARTH

Against the Stream
Against the Stream (Shorter Post-War Writings, 1946-1952)

CD
Church Dogmatics

ChD
Die christliche Dogmatik im Entwurf: Die Lehre vom Worte Gottes. Prolegomena zur christlichen Dogmatik

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Introductory
CHAPTER ONE

A TOUCH OF INAUTHENTICITY: TILLICH, BARTH AND THE FIRST WORLD WAR

Like most members of the European '1914 generation', Tillich and Barth experienced an 'historical change of phase,' a sense of loss and pessimism towards Western culture. Man's capacity to be inhuman, revealed through the War, gave rise to 'innumerable passionate questionings and probings.' The War shook the foundation of almost every cultural form. Yet at the same time, the collapse of the old orders demanded new adventures. As D. H. Lawrence laments in his 'Epilogue' to Movements in European History:

The War, called now the Great War, came in 1914, and smashed the growing tip of European civilisation ... We all know it. We none of us believe in our ideals any more. Our ideal, our leading ideas, our growing tip were shot away in the Great War ... No, the old ideal, the old leading tip was shot to smithereens, and we have got no new one. Nothing really to believe in. Only now, having lost our belief, we know inwardly that it would have been better to lose a war. Men cannot live long without a belief.

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1 See R. Wohl, The Generation of 1914 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1980). Wohl furnishes an historical and sociological study (what he calls the 'generational theory') of the people born between 1880 and 1900, drawing resources from novels, poems, memoirs, autobiographies, philosophical essays, sociological studies, university lectures, private letters, personal notebooks, newspaper articles, political speeches, and records of conversations.


4 Spengler, Decline of the West, pp. 47-48.


The situation in theology was no exception. The destruction of the War, which was so 'unparalleled in previous human history in its scale,' hurled 'a black question mark against the confidence in the onward and upward progress of Christian civilisation which had so strongly characterised Liberal Theology, and forced the bitter question whether the advanced theological thought of the nineteenth century as a whole had not been far too unaware of the darker side of human nature, too optimistic about innate human capacity for good, too willing to take contemporary culture at its own high evaluation of itself, and overall too disposed to take God for granted, and to assume that he was somehow simply "given" in what it regarded as the highest ethical, spiritual and religious values of mankind.'

Such an opposition against the Liberal's 'positive theology' gave birth to the movement of 'dialectical theology', which became a 'caesura' and then a 'flood' within Protestant theology from the year 1920 to 1933. Obviously Barth was a leading figure. And Tillich, though working quite separately within his 'Kairos Circle' since 1920, later admitted that he was one of the '"subterranean" group of fellow-laborers' who 'attached themselves to the school [viz., 'dialectical theology'] for which Barth had prepared the way.' But the split between Tillich and Barth (in 1922) occurred far

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9 The other leading figures involved were Friedrich Gogarten, Emil Brunner, Eduard Thurneysen and Rudolf Bultmann.


earlier than the later decomposition of the movement due to the problem of Natural Theology. Why did they start with the same confrontation (with Liberal Theology) but seek different ways to rebuild Protestant theology? To answer this question, we have to go into some detail of their personal experiences during the First World War. For the different modes of human inauthenticity which they encountered during the War essentially shaped their theological 'ways' in the later years.

Serving as an army chaplain, the War brought Tillich out of his 'world of bliss and innocence untouched by reality.' As Ronald H. Stone rightly describes:

Deeply scarred by the heavy artillery of World War I ... Tillich's mind was marked by exploding shells, bayonet charges, the numbing cold, the eternal mud, and the massive dying of his comrades in arms ... The idealist philosopher of the nineteenth century had been thrown into the existence of the twentieth century.

The existential shock of individual deaths caused Tillich's nerves to breakdown twice. 'In one sense,' Wilhelm and Marion Pauck remark, 'Tillich never fully recovered from his intense suffering in the face of death.' Tillich lamented in his letter to Maria Klein on 27 November 1916:

I have constantly the most immediate and very strong feeling that I am no longer alive. Therefore I don't take life seriously. To find someone, to become joyful, to recognize God, all these things are things of life. But life itself is not dependable ground. It isn't only that I might die any day, but rather that

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12 For a comprehensive survey of the decomposition of the 'dialectical movement', which was mainly due to the conflicting understandings of 'nature and grace' between the leaders, see C. Gestrich, Neuzeitliches Denken und die Spaltung der dialektischen Theologie. Zur Frage der natürlichen Theologie (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1977).

13 Tillich's letter to Johannes Tillich, his father (30 May 1917), quoted by Pauck, Tillich, p. 53.


15 Pauck, Tillich, p. 51.
everyone dies, really dies ... and then the suffering of mankind ... not that I have childish fantasies of the death of the world, but rather that I am experiencing the actual death of this our time.16

'What at all here do we really possess in the culture of spirit and man, boy friends and girl friends! And yet, the war is so hopeless!!'17 Not only did the War seem hopeless, but nineteenth century European civilization as a whole also seemed hopeless to Tillich. 'The awareness of endless individual death and of the death of an entire order of civilization were parallel. Tillich later described this as his "personal kairos," meaning that something new and unexpected had broken into his life at a time when he was ripe to be changed by it and to act on account of it.'18 The tension between despair and will to live19 pushed him to a radical reconstruction of traditional Christian faith:

And now Christmas! By this I mean the theological problem we touched upon! Having consistently and thoroughly thought over the idea of Justification, I finally arrived at the paradox of "faith without God," a closer definition and development of which constitutes the content of my present thinking in the philosophy of religion ... "Life" as a concept, "infiniteness" as an object are [not] philosophical, problematic concepts of God; rather, they are concerned with the inner infiniteness of life as actus, the infinite liveliness, the transcending of every object and all which can be objectified.20

16 ENGW 5: 119; E.T. according to Pauck, Tillich, p. 51. See also Tillich's letter to Klein on 22 February 1915 (ENGW 5: 114) and letter to Johannes Tillich on 2 April 1918 (ENGW 5: 109). Cf. also Tillich's letter to Klein on 25 October 1915 (ENGW 5: 115-16); id., 'Autobiographical Reflections' in TPT, p. 12.

17 Tillich's letter to Klein on 25 October 1915, ENGW 5: 116. See also his letter to Johannes Tillich on 14 December 1914, ENGW 5: 86.

18 Pauck, Tillich, pp. 51-52. Cf. also UC, p. 153; Stone, Tillich's Social Thought, pp. 34-35. Tillich, 'Autobiographical Reflections' in TPT, pp. 7-8, 12.


20 Tillich's letter to Klein on 5 December 1917, ENGW 5: 121. See also id., 'Bericht über die Monate November und Dezember 1915' in GW 13: 78-79. He also expressed his ambivalence towards his commitment to the church (see Tillich's letter to Klein on 14 October 1917, ENGW 5: 120). Cf. also his letter to Johannes Tillich on 2 April 1918, ibid., p. 109.
Such an idea undoubtedly anticipated his later formulation of the 'God above God' in man's radical doubt. In Tillich's own words: 'It takes seriously the radical doubt experienced by many people. It gives one the courage of self-affirmation even in the extreme state of radical doubt. In such a state the God of both religious and theological language disappears ... The source of this affirmation of meaning within meaninglessness, of certitude within doubt, is not the God of traditional theism but the "God above God," the power of being, which works through those who have no name for it, not even the name God.' The reading of Nietzsche's Also sprach Zarathustra in the battlefield provided Tillich with the 'final liberation' from the traditional concept of God as well as nineteenth century bourgeois culture. Survival in 'radical doubt' and 'absolute faith' became Tillich's passionate diagnosis of Western society after the War:

At first he felt that the end of European culture had come, and was depressed and pessimistic. But now he started to think clearly about all that had happened ... And as the nightmares of war slowly turned into shadows obscured by the looming outline of the immediate future, he knew that he wanted to be a partner in rebuilding Western civilization. Since then, there was only one thing which grasped Tillich's concern: How to reinterpret the traditional Christian faith in order to answer the existential questions in human life, whether they are cultural or individual.

21 ST-2: 12. For further discussions, see infra, ch. 3, pp. 119-26.
22 Pauck, Tillich, p. 52; also Stone, Tillich's Social Thought, pp. 35-36. Cf. also Tillich, 'Autobiographical Reflections' in TPT, p. 13; and CTB, pp. 37-40.
23 Pauck, Tillich, p. 56. See also UC, p. 153.
24 Tillich, 'Autobiographical Reflections' in TPT, pp. 13-14, 'In the years after the revolution [viz., the revolution in Berlin after the War] my life became more intensive as well as extensive. As a Privatdozent of theology at the University of Berlin (from 1919 to 1924), I lectured on subjects which included the relation of religion to politics, art, philosophy, depth psychology, and sociology. It was a "theology of culture" that I presented in my lectures on the philosophy of religion, its history and its structure. The situation during these years in Berlin was very favorable for such an enterprise. The political problems determined our whole existence ... The social structure was in a state of dissolution ... Revolutionary art came into foreground ... Psychoanalytic ideas spread ...
Whereas Tillich experienced the hopelessness of the nineteenth century bourgeois culture, Barth saw the hopelessness of nineteenth century Liberal Theology through the outbreak of the First World War. We should start with Barth's oft-quoted autobiographical description of the event on the first day of August, 1914:

For me personally one day at the beginning of August of that year stamped itself as the dies ater ['black day']. It was that on which 93 German intellectuals came out with a manifesto supporting the war policy of Kaiser William II and his counsellors, and among them I found to my horror the names of nearly all my theological teachers whom up to then I religiously honoured. Disillusioned by their conduct, I perceived that I should not be able any longer to accept their ethics and dogmatics, their biblical exegesis, their interpretation of history, that at least for me the theology of the 19th century had no future.25

But as Wilfried Härle rightly points out, the outbreak of the First World War should not be regarded as the beginning of Barth's 'turn' against Liberal Theology.26 His suspicion towards the validity of nineteenth century positive theology goes back to the time between October 1910 and December 1911.27 The reasons, according to Härle, were the inadequacy of the Liberal answers to social questions, his encounter with the thoughts of Leonhard Ragaz, Hermann Kutter and Martin Rade, and finally, the death of his father, Johann Friedrich Barth.28 Then what is the significance of

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The participation in these movements created manifold problems, conflicts, fears, expectations, ecstasies, and despairs, practically as well as theoretically. All this was at the same time material for an apologetic theology.'

25 Barth, 'Evangelical Theology in the Nineteenth Century' in God, Grace and Gospel, p. 58. A similar recollection can be found in Barth, 'Postscript on Schleiermacher' in Schleiermacher, pp. 264-65, where he describes his feeling: '... An entire world of theological exegesis, ethics, dogmatics, and preaching, which up to that point I had accepted as basically credible, was thereby shaken to the foundations, and with it everything which flowed at that time from the pens of the German theologians.'
26 See W. Härle, 'Der Aufruf der 93 Intellektuellen und Karl Barth's Bruch mit der liberalen Theologie,' ZThK 72 (1975): 207-224.
27 Ibid., p. 220.
the War which marks such a deep impression on Barth's memory? We would suggest that, for Barth, the outbreak of the War was a conclusive affirmation of what he had been suspecting. The driving force to make such a conscious break was the moral depravity of the politicians as well as the theologians. Barth saw a 'double madness' through the outbreak of the War:

On the one hand, the teaching of all my theological teachers in Germany, who seemed to me to have hopelessly compromised with the war-ideology by their failure; on the other hand, Socialism, from which I had expected -- even more than from the Church -- a distance from that ideology, and yet to my horror I saw it doing just the opposite in all countries.\(^2^9\)

The encounter with human inauthenticity abolished his hope in Liberal Theology and German Social Democracy. It is their 'ethical failure' which caused Barth to reject the whole theological tradition which he inherited.\(^3^0\) In this way, moral considerations decisively influenced Barth's theological considerations.\(^3^1\) Thus the moral dimension, the inauthenticity of manhood, did play a vital part in Barth's final break with the Liberal Theology.\(^3^2\) And it would be misleading if we suppose that Barth's 'turn' from liberal to dialectical theology was solely a theological matter. In fact, one can also discover an equally deep concern for morality and humanity from the sermons he preached during the outbreak of the War. To Barth, the War revealed the reality of human nature. As Jochen Fähler rightly


\(^{3^0}\) Barth, 'Rückblick' in Das Wort sie sollen lassen stahn. Festschrift für Albert Schädelin. Quoted in Busch, Barth, p. 81. Harle observes that among the 93 intellectuals who signed the 'Manifesto' on 1 August 1914, not 'all' but only 'two' of Barth's theological teachers (viz., Harnack and Herrmann) were on the list. See Harle, 'Der Aufruf der 93 Intellektuellen,' ZThK 72: 208-219. That is to say, when Barth recalled the happening, he did not regard it as a decision of individual theologians but nineteenth century Liberal Theology as a whole.

\(^{3^1}\) Cf. Barth's letter to Eduard Thurneysen on 4 September 1914, in RevT, pp. 26-27.

comments in his Der Ausbruch des I. Weltkrieges in Karl Barths Predigten 1913-1915: 'Barth arrives at a radical judgement of human nature [through the War]. Whereas his Anthropology before the War was still evolutionary and optimistic, he finds now in reformatory depth that even the virtues of man are in fact an expression of his bondage to evil.'\textsuperscript{33} The promise of the Kingdom of God is our only hope, where man's solidarity will be manifest through brotherliness, righteousness and freedom in love.\textsuperscript{34}

However, the mode of Barth's encounter with human inauthenticity during the War was not the same as Tillich's. Unlike Tillich, Barth did not spend the years of the War on the battlefield. He did not have the experience of holding dead bodies covered in blood, or 'dragging wounded men from the front, running back and forth like a madman between the wounded and the dying.'\textsuperscript{35} Rather, Barth spent most of his time in the village of Safenwil, reading theological literature and preparing his commentary on the Epistle of Romans.\textsuperscript{36} What he experienced was not the existential death of human lives but the death of a theological and political era. What grasped him most in those years was the question of theological reconstruction:

\begin{quote}
We are not yet quite at an end. We have found in the Bible a new world, God, God's sovereignty, God's glory, God's incomprehensible love. Not the history of man but the history of God! Not the virtues of men but the virtues of him who hath called us out of
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., p. 138, see also pp. 90-102.
\textsuperscript{34} See ibid., pp. 151-59, 165-70, 172.
\textsuperscript{35} Pauck, Tillich, p. 51. Also Tillich, 'Bericht über die Monate November und Dezember 1915' in GW 13: 77-78.
\textsuperscript{36} See Busch, Barth, pp. 92-109. Also RevT, pp. 26-48.
darkness into his marvelous light! Not human standpoint but the standpoint of God! 37

Thus when the War was finished in 1919, Tillich began his lectures on the 'theology of culture', doing his apologetic with politics, art, philosophy, depth psychology and sociology, whereas Barth 'got hold of the bell rope' 38 of the church in the dark and published his Der Römerbrief.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty once remarked that 'experience anticipates a philosophy and philosophy is merely an elucidated experience.' 39 The assertion might be too strong, but it does suggest certain realities. We can sum up our preceding survey of Tillich's and Barth's experiences during the First World War with some observations. The encounter with human inauthenticity during the War was the driving force of their 'turns' in theological thinking. But since they had different Sitz im Leben, they encountered different aspects of human inauthenticity, which led them to different results. As a German patriot, it seemed natural for Tillich to support his government when war was declared. 40 His 'kairos' began with the existential encounter with the deaths of his fellow comrades. As a Swiss village pastor, Barth condemned the moral depravity of the War from

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37 Barth, 'Die neue Welt in der Bibel' (Autumn 1916). Quoted from E.T. in WGM, p. 45. T. F. Torrance rightly comments in his Karl Barth: An Introduction to his early Theology, 1910-1931 (London: SCM, 1962), pp. 39-40 that, 'There can be no doubt that the tremendous factor in this development [viz., theological development of Barth since the War] was the discovery that God is God, and that this is the God whose Word we hear in the Bible and whose Word the preacher has to take upon his lips and announce to the congregation, an announcement which is accompanied at once by the lightning of the divine illumination and judgment and by the rainbow of the divine promise and faithfulness in everlasting mercy.'

38 Barth, 'Vorwort' in ChD, p. ix. Reflecting on his publication of Römerbrief, Barth writes, 'Blicke ich auf meinen Weg zurück, so komme ich mir vor wie einer, der, in einem dunklen Kirchturm sich treppaufwärts tastend, unvermutet statt des Geländers ein Seil ergriffen, das ein Glockenseil war, und nun zu seinem Schrecken hören mußte, wie die große Glocke über ihm soeben und nicht nur für ihn bemerkbar angeschlagen hatte.'


40 See Pauck, Tillich, pp. 40-41.
the very beginning. The War as a whole was a moral issue as well as a theological problem to him. To judge his theological teachers' conduct was to judge their theological foundation. As a battlefield chaplain, Tillich experienced the death of human lives and the European culture. Thus he set his mind upon the existential and cultural problems of man.\footnote{See J. R. Stumme, Socialism in Theological Perspective, pp. 20-23.} The apparent eclipse of God in the face of the deaths forced him to think of the paradox of 'faith without God.'\footnote{Tillich's letter to Klein on 5 December 1917, ENGW 5: 121.} Theology can stand only when it provides the 'answer' to the tragic 'questions' in cultural and existential human life. The task of a theologian is to stand 'on the boundary'. Thus the existential and interdisciplinary approach to humanity became Tillich's 'way' of theological Anthropology. But for Barth, the experience of the death of a theological era pushed him to seek for new ground in theology. If the 'God' of nineteenth century theology is no more than an 'intellectual 42cm cannon,'\footnote{Barth's letter to W. Spoendlin on 4 January 1915, quoted in Busch, Barth, p. 81.} Barth's task is to proclaim once again the 'Godness of God ... God's absolutely unique existence, power and initiative above all in His relationship to man.'\footnote{Barth, 'The Humanity of God' in God, Grace and Gospel, p. 34. Cf. D. R. White, 'Karl Barth's Reaction to Liberalism: Barth's Response to the Theology of Schleiermacher, Ritschl, and Herrmann as reflected in their Theological Method' (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1964), pp. 110-33.} Thus to him, Anthropology as an understanding of humanity must be seen from a theological perspective.

We have seen how the different modes of encounter with human inauthenticity during the First World War shaped the two theologians' theological orientations. Our remaining task in this study is to examine how they apply their different approaches to the authenticity of manhood -- a vital question for every theologian who has experienced the two greatest wars in human history.
PART I

Divine Intervention as the Foundation and Beginning of Authentic Humanity
CHAPTER TWO

BARTH ON RECONCILIATION:
THE FOUNDATION OF REAL HUMANITY

I. THE REALITY OF HUMANITY IN BARTH'S DOGMATICS

As suggested by one of his interpreters, 'Barth's discussion of humanity is among the most profound in Western literature'. The richness of his discussion can be found not only in its profoundity, but also in its originality and creativity. Since Barth's dogmatics is an organic body rather than a static system, a full exposition of his doctrine of humanity must be seen from the whole context of his theology. According to the


4 As a matter of fact, early interpreters could only discuss Barth's concept of humanity according to his KD III/2 'Das Geschöpf' (e.g. E. Brunner, 'Der neue Barth,' ZThK 48 [1951]: 89-100; R. Prenter, 'Die Lehre vom Menschen bei Karl Barth,' ThZ 6 [1950]: 211-22; H. Vogel, 'Ecce Homo. Die Anthropologie Karl Barth's,' VF [1949/50 + 51/52]: 102-128; Ebneter, Mensch; W. A. Whitehouse, 'The Christian View of Man: An Examination of Karl Barth's Doctrine,' SJTh 2 [1949]: 57-73). Yet there are more recent studies which still paid little attention to Barth's later writings, viz., the doctrine of Reconciliation (e.g. McLean, Humanity; E. H. Friedmann, Christologie und Anthropologie. Methode und Bedeutung der Lehre vom Menschen in der Theologie Karl Barth's [Münsterschwarzach: Vier-Türme-Verlag, 1972]; G. Hummel, Theologische Anthropologie und die Wirklichkeit der Psyche [Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1972], pp. 5-37). But as we shall see in our discussions, to see man as a creature represents only one of the many perspectives in Barth's theology (viz., God reveals Himself to man as the Creator). However, there are also interpreters who notice the significance of Barth's later writings for an understanding of his Anthropology. For example, R. E. Willis, The Ethics of
basic 'architecture' of Barth's dogmatics,\(^5\) man's humanity can also be understood within the matrix of a trinitarian framework (viz., God as the Creator, the Reconciler and the Redeemer) and the Christological foundation.\(^6\)

In an answer to his students' question about the real man, Barth gave a concise summary on his doctrine of humanity.\(^7\) Since the passage leads to most of the discussions in our study, it is worth quoting it in full:

> Jesus Christ is the only real man for God. Everything depends on what we mean by "real". Here I do not mean that we men do not exist, but that there is a kind of existing that lacks reality. Man in sin exists, but is not "real reality". He does not accomplish what it means to be a man. Yes, Christ is the only real man before God. He fulfils the real existence of man. We do not. We have an incomplete or lost reality. My point in anthropology is that every man is a virtual brother of Christ, because the whole world is healed in and through Christ... Because there is no man without Christ... we may say that there is no reality of manhood apart from Him. However, humanity does not begin only in Christ. If it begins there, it is only because man discovers truth, because he discovers Christ... Even before he

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\(^5\) Barth himself did not like the word 'architecture' very much, see *Table Talk*, p. 13. However, the word here is used only for a conventional purpose. Cf. E. Jüngel's usage of the word in his article 'Barth, Karl (1886-1968)' in *TRE* 5: 266.

\(^6\) When Barth recalled his theological development between 1928-38, he said, 'In these years I had to learn that Christian doctrine... has to be exclusively and conclusively the doctrine of Jesus Christ -- of Jesus Christ as the living Word of God spoken to us men.' (How I Changed my Mind, p. 43. Italics mine) A direct consequence of this so-called 'positive factor' in theological reconstruction is Barth's deviation from F. Gogarten on the issue of 'true anthropology', which he summarized in CD I/1: 125-31. Barth concluded that 'there is a way from Christology to anthropology, but there is no way from anthropology to Christology.' (p. 131) And this 'christologische Grundlegung', as Barth calls it (KD III/2: 83), becomes the approach to his doctrine of Anthropology in the whole Dogmatics. For a comprehensive study of how Barth built his Anthropology upon Christology, see Friedmann, Christologie und Anthropologie. For a detailed discussion, see G. H. Kehm, 'The Christological Foundation of Anthropology in the Theology of Karl Barth' (Th.D. dissertation, Harvard Divinity School, 1966), pp. 86-149.

\(^7\) *Table Talk*, p. 15.

becomes a Christian he is in continuity with God in Christ, but he has not yet discovered it. He realises it only when he begins to believe.

Since Barth consistently maintains his rejection of natural theology, his completely different approach to Anthropology has to face a series of questions. One may notice at least three fundamental issues emerged in this passage: 1. What are the different levels of meaning of the word 'real' in Barth's Christological Anthropology? 2. What are the continuity and discontinuity between man's humanity and Christ's? 3. How does real humanity begin? These questions cannot be answered from this passage alone, and we have to see them from Barth's whole dogmatics.

Christological Anthropology within the Context of the Doctrine of Creation

Barth spends nearly the whole section of 'Phenomena of the Human' in his Church Dogmatics III/2 (pp. 75-132) to defend the thesis that a true account of man's being cannot be attained from human self-understanding. It is, as Barth calls it, only a 'vicious circle'. For 'how does he reach the platform from which he thinks he can see himself?' 8 Men can speak only 'about certain human characteristics in which each will recognise traits of his own nature, but in which no one will discover himself, or what he truly is. They are speaking only about knives without edges, or handles without pots, or predicates without subjects.' 9 But if man's self-understanding cannot offer genuine information about himself, from what 'platform' should man look at himself? Furthermore, how should those findings about the phenomena of the human from a naturalistic or philosophical approach be interpreted?

8 CD III/2: 75.
9 Ibid., p. 76.
The answer to our first question is quite straightforward: From God's revealing Word. 'If by the Word of God we are denied any capacity of our own to recognize our human nature as such, it is the same Word of God which enables us to know it, in a free demonstration of the free grace of God apart from and against our own capacity.'\(^{10}\) To put it more precisely: 'As the man Jesus is Himself the revealing Word of God, He is the source of our knowledge of the nature of man as created by God.'\(^{11}\) Thus for Barth, Anthropology is founded on Christology.\(^{12}\) For Jesus is the only real man:\(^{13}\)

Who and what man is, is manifest in its fullest significance in the fact that the Son of God has become man in Jesus, and that man is placed so wholly at the disposal of God in Him. It is in this that He is real man, and may be known in His reality.\(^{14}\)

This leads to the consideration of our second question: If it is only Jesus who is the real man, then all other men are 'not real' -- 'der Schattenmenschen', in Barth's term.\(^{15}\) Barth never intends to mean by this that man does not exist in his particularity as a human creature.\(^{16}\) What he means by the 'unreality' of human existence must be understood in terms of relationship. From the perspective of the real man Jesus, it consists

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10 Ibid., p. 40.  
11 Ibid., p. 41.  
12 Ibid., pp. 44, 208. See also supra, p. 12, n.6.  
14 CD III/2: 64; see also pp. 68-71, 73-75.  
15 KD III/2: 87.  
16 See Barth's discussion in CD III/4, esp. pp. 326-32; and CD III/1: 344-65.
in four dimensions, viz. man's relationship with God, with other men, with himself and with temporality.

1. Man's relationship with God.

The beginning of a new quest for real manhood arises out of the failure of man's autonomous self-knowledge. Barth makes a sharp contrast between the 'phenomena' and the 'reality' in our understanding of the human. For, on the one hand the human characteristics discovered by man himself are inevitably incomplete and thus any attempt to form a whole picture with these 'traits' is only 'an arbitrary investigation'. On the other hand, as a sinner, the phenomena man knows about himself are 'in the corruption and distortion of his being, how can we even begin to answer the question about his creaturely nature?' At this point Barth provides his own answer: The only alternative for a true understanding of real humanity is to start not with man's self-knowledge but with the real man Jesus. Once we invert our perspective, we enter into a new path of interpreting humanity. The first and basic implication of this is: Since the man Jesus is for God (viz. for His presence, His divine deliverance, and therefore for His own glory, freedom and love), man as the being in the history

17 See CD III/2: ix-x ('Preface'), 21-41; also supra, p. 13.
18 Ibid., p. 133, 'We have thus been warned against confusing the reality of man with mere phenomena of man.'
19 Ibid., pp. 75-76.
20 Ibid., p. 27.
21 The argument of his alternative has been discussed in supra, p. 14. Also CD III/2: ix, 'the way of a theological doctrine of man proposed here is not only possible, but the only one possible.' (Italics mine)
22 See ibid., pp. 68-71.
(Geschichte) of Jesus' humanity also shares this 'ontological determination' (ontologische Bestimmung). Therefore, 'to be a man is to be with God,' and there is 'no man without God in an absolute sense' (keine absolute Gottlosigkeit des Menschen). From this standpoint, 'a godless explanation of man, which overlooks the fact that he belongs to God, is from the very outset one which cannot explain real man, man himself. Indeed, it cannot even speak of him. It gropes past him into the void.' Also according to this ontological necessity of man, when one chooses evil and enters into conflict with God, he is 'making himself impossible.' It is an 'ontological impossibility' (ontologische Unmöglichkeit) to be a godless man, and 'we can never acknowledge the genuinely godless man to be real man.'

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23 KD III/2: 69, 'Jesus nicht nur eine Geschichte hat, sondern selber diese seine Geschichte ist, daß er sein Werk nicht nur tut, sondern ist ...' (Italics mine). The reason for the emphasis of Jesus' humanity as Geschichte are: (i) The humanity of Jesus is dynamic, not fixed and static. (See Willis, Ethics, p. 205). (ii) The unity of Jesus' person and work (KD III/2: 71, 'sein Werk selbst seine wirkende Person und also er der Täter und seine Tat, seine Tat und er der Täter, eines sind.') See also infra, p. 18, n.37.

24 CD III/2: 132.


26 CD III/2: 203.

27 Ibid., pp. 26, 146-47.


29 'Den real gottlosen Menschen werden wir nie und nimmer als den wirklichen Menschen anerkennen können.' (KD III/2: 84). Barth names such an unreality of human existence as 'impossible possibility' — a mode of existence which contradicts one's ontological determination. Cf. Barth's ontological definition of 'impossible possibility' as 'unreal' and 'demonic reality' in CD II/1: 532-33.
2. Man's relationship with other men.\textsuperscript{30}

One of the main consequences of Barth's rejection of natural theology is his reinterpretation of man as an image of God.\textsuperscript{31} For Barth, the \textit{imago Dei} cannot be some fixed qualities in humanity, but God's appointed purpose for man's existence, life and action.\textsuperscript{32} If it is only by grace that man becomes an image of God, the analogy between God's being and man's is by no means an \textit{analogia entis}.\textsuperscript{33} The analogy (viz., \textit{analogia gratiae}) must be found in a relationship (\textit{analogia relationis}), an act (\textit{analogia actionis}).\textsuperscript{34} This \textit{analogia relationis}, according to Barth, consists in different corresponding relationships.\textsuperscript{35} But what is fundamental in the

\textsuperscript{30} A detailed discussion of the significance and implications of Barth's Anthropology for authentic humanity will be found in chapter five. In this section we are only concerned with Barth's understanding of fellow-humanity within the context of the reality and unreality of manhood.


\textsuperscript{32} \textit{Service of God}, pp. 41-42.

\textsuperscript{33} \textit{CD III/2}: 220.

\textsuperscript{34} Barth defines 'grace' as 'the distinctive mode of God's being in so far as it seeks and \textit{creates fellowship} by its own free inclination and favour, \textit{unconditioned} by any merit or claim in the beloved ...' (\textit{CD II/1}: 353. Italics mine). So if 'grace' is a personal matter, the analogy between God and man should be dynamic and relational with God's own divine freedom. See \textit{Table Talk}, p. 66. See also Pöhlmann's discussions of 'Panaktualismus' in Barth's concept of analogy, \textit{Analogia entis oder Analogia fidei}, pp. 116-19; also J. Y. Lee, 'Karl Barth's Use of Analogy in his Church Dogmatics,' \textit{SJTh} 22 (1969): 146-47. For a discussion of the ontological difference between \textit{analogia entis} and \textit{analogia relationis}, see Härle, \textit{Sein und Gnade}, pp. 205-226.

God-man relationship is the eternal Covenant that God participates in and makes Himself responsible for man. And this eternal Covenant is 'revealed and effective in time in the humanity of Jesus.' So if we are to perceive our real manhood in the light of Jesus' humanity, we encounter a humanity of Covenant. In The Humanity of God, Barth said,

In him [Jesus Christ] we encounter the history, the dialogue, in which God and man meet together and are together, the reality of the Covenant mutually contracted, preserved and fulfilled by them. Jesus Christ is in His one Person, as true God, man's loyal partner, and as true man, God.

Here we have another 'ontological determination' of man's humanity. A humanity which is ontologically covenantal cannot be something individual or a substance closed in itself, but a being in togetherness, a fellow-humanity (Mitmenschlichkeit). 'Thus the formula: "I am inasmuch as Thou art [Ich bin, indem Du bist]", tells us that the encounter between I and Thou is not arbitrary or accidental, that it is not incidentally but

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36 CD IV/1: 22, 'The fellowship which originally existed between God and man, which was then disturbed and jeopardised, the purpose of which is now fulfilled in Jesus Christ and in the work of reconciliation, we describe as the Covenant.' For a discussion of the precedence of the Covenant in Barth's theology, see J. L. Scott, 'The Covenant in the Theology of Karl Barth,' SJTh 17 (1964): 182-98. See also Barth's theological interpretation of the seventh day in God's creation history, CD III/1: 213-28.

37 CD III/2: 218. Jesus Christ's fulfilment of the Covenant, for Barth, is not only its saving effect. But the being of Jesus itself is the fulfilment of God's eternal purpose of entering into relationship with man, viz., 'God with us'. See CD IV/1: 3-21, 122-28, where Barth argues the unity of the 'work' and the 'person' of Christ. The radical character of this doctrinal reconstruction has been discussed by B. Klappert in his Die Auferweckung des Gekreuzigten. Der Ansatz der Christologie Karl Barth's im Zusammenhang der Christologie der Gegenwart (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1971), pp. 85-102.

38 Humanity of God, p. 46.

39 If man's relationship with God is the 'vertical', then man's relationship with other men is the 'horizontal' necessity in man's ontological reality. See Barth, 'Die Aktualität der christlichen Botschaft' in Humanismus, pp. 8-9.

40 CD III/1: 183-87, 194-200, 288-90; CD III/2: 222-96; Table Talk, p. 57.
essentially proper [wesentlich eigentümlich] to the concept of man."\textsuperscript{41} From this criterion, 'every supposed humanity which is not radically and from the very first fellow-humanity is inhumanity.'\textsuperscript{42} Barth elucidates this with Nietzsche's idea of isolated humanity.\textsuperscript{43} But egoism is not the only symptom. According to Barth, the inauthenticity also appears in bureaucracy which lacks openness and the empty words behind human communication.\textsuperscript{44}

3. Man's relationship with himself.\textsuperscript{45}

Barth once complained that the genuine constitution of man's being in itself has usually been omitted by the Anthropology of traditional Christian dogmatics. Since the human soul was so strongly emphasized, the human body was almost always emphatically disregarded.\textsuperscript{46} Yet if we perceive our being reflected in the mirror of Jesus Christ, we discover a different picture:

He [Jesus] is one whole man, embodied soul and besouled body [einiger und ganzer Mensch, leibhafte Seele, beseelter Leib]: the one in the other and never merely beside it; the one never without the other but only with it, and in it present, active and significant; the one with all its attributes always to be taken as seriously as the other.\textsuperscript{47}

The explanation of Jesus' wholeness in humanity leads Barth to introduce his Spirit Christology. For as we look beyond the 'meaningfully ordered

\textsuperscript{41} CD III/2: 248. E.T. is modified according to the original text.
\textsuperscript{42} CD III/2: 228. Also Barth, Humanismus, p. 8, 'Das Ich ohne Du ist kein Mensch ... Menschlichkeit ist Mitmenschlichkeit. Was nicht Mitmenschlichkeit ist, ist Unmenschlichkeit.' CD IV/2: 434-39.
\textsuperscript{43} CD III/2: 231-42.
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., pp. 252, 260.
\textsuperscript{45} Further accounts of the implications of man's inseparable unity of soul and body will be discussed later in chapter five. In this chapter we shall be concerned only with its doctrinal implication with respect to the reality and unreality of manhood.
\textsuperscript{46} CD III/2: 325.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., p. 327.
unity' of Jesus' soul and body which is 'fashioned, structured and determined from within,' we find 'an absolutely unique' relationship between the human person and the Holy Spirit.\textsuperscript{48} He exists in the fullness of the Holy Spirit which is not 'occasional, transitory and partial,' but 'lastingly and totally' bestowed. The seeking of an understanding of how the 'creative movement of God', viz., the Holy Spirit, united Jesus' existence as soul and body is important for Barth's theological Anthropology because 'for all theological knowledge of man as such we must begin with the picture of this man.'\textsuperscript{49} As Philip J. Rosato expresses it: Barth insists 'that life in the Spirit is a subjective possibility for Christians only because it was an objective possibility for Jesus Christ.'\textsuperscript{50} But Barth is careful enough not to let his inquiry of the constitution of Jesus' existence lapse into adoptionism, which is the usual tendency of the pneumatological approach to Christ's human person.\textsuperscript{51} He overcomes it by emphasizing two distinctive features of Jesus' unique relationship with the Holy Spirit:

\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., pp. 332-34. Italics mine.

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., p. 344.


\textsuperscript{51} 'Jesus as the bearer of the Spirit' might be the earliest formulation of Christology (see the study of H. Windisch, 'Jesus und der Geist nach synoptische Überlieferung' in Studies in Early Christianity, ed. S. J. Case [New York: Century Co., 1928], pp. 209-236; more recently P. J. A. M. Schoonenberg, 'Spirit Christology and Logos Christology,' Bijdragen 38 [1977]: 351-55; but it was soon suppressed and replaced by a Logos Christology because of its possible danger of adoptionism. The notion remained in the Apostolic Fathers like Ignatius of Antioch (e.g. Eph. vii, 2), 2 Clement ix, 5 and especially Hermas, Similitudes v, 6, 5; ix, 1, 1. But the pneumatological approach to Christological gradually died away around the middle of the second century. Explicit examples of a lapse from Spirit Christology into adoptionism can be found in Ebionite Christology (see P. J. Rosato, 'Spirit Christology: Ambiguity and Promise,' ThSt 38 [1977]: 431-35) and in Dynamic Monarchianism (especially Theodotus the cobbler around the beginning of the third century, see Hippolytus of Rome, Philosophumena vii, 35; and later in Paul of Samosata, see Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History vii, 30, 11 and J. Stevenson, ed., A New Eusebius [London: SPCK, 1968], pp. 277-79). For a general discussion of the adoptionist tendency in Spirit Christology, see W. Pannenberg, Jesus -- God and Man, trans. L. L. Wilkins & D. A. Friebe (London: SCM, 1968), pp. 120-23.
First, the wholeness of Jesus' soul and body in the efficacy of the Holy Spirit is the subsequence, not the cause, of the divinity of Jesus Christ.

It is not this special relationship to the Holy Spirit which makes this man the Messiah and the Son of God. On the contrary, it is because this man is the Messiah and the Son of God that He stands to the Holy Spirit in this special relationship.52

Secondly, man exists as he has Spirit. The Holy Spirit comes to man, but is not essentially his own. The unity and order of man's being derives from and is maintained by the Spirit.53 But Jesus 'not only has the spirit, but primarily and basically He is Spirit as He is soul and body.' Thus he is the only 'perfect Recipient and Bearer of the Holy Spirit.'54

With these two unique features of Jesus' humanity, Barth can maintain his Logos Christology and avoid a lapse into the danger of adoptionism.55 But in this way, he is also putting a deep gulf between Jesus' humanity and the Spirit.

52 CD III/2: 333. Here Barth makes himself very clear that his Christological approach begins with the eternal Logos and not from below up, viz., from the humanity of Jesus. Cf. also CD I/1: 323-24. (For a discussion of these two different ways of approaching the Christological question, see J. Macquarrie, 'The Humanity of Christ,' Theology 74 [1971]: 243-50.) The unction of the Spirit for the Messianic office, for Barth, refers to the Person and not to the humanity of Christ.

53 CD III/2: 354, 347.

54 Ibid., pp. 334, 335. The radicality of Barth's interpretation here is not the absolute bestowal of the Spirit in Jesus. Since among the contemporary revitalized Spirit Christologies few would doubt the completeness of Spiritual presence in Jesus Christ (for example, see P. Tillich, Systematic Theology [London: SCM, 1978] 3: 144-49; W. Kasper, Jesus the Christ, trans. V. Green [London: Burns & Oates, 1976], esp. pp. 251-52, 256; Rosato, 'Spirit Christology,' ThSt 38: 438-47; H. Berkhof, The Doctrine of the Holy Spirit [London: The Epworth Press, 1965], pp. 19-29; N. Hook, 'A Spirit Christology,' Theology 75 [1972]: 228-32). What makes Barth's interpretation radical is his complete rejection of any intrinsic spirit in man as a human state. 'The Holy Spirit does not dwell lastingly in men; He comes to them.' Thus there is no such term as 'the spirit of man' (CD III/2: 334, also 344-66; for a discussion of the consistency of Barth's claim, see A. B. Come, Human Spirit and Holy Spirit [Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1959], pp. 83-88). Under such an anthropological understanding, Jesus is simply unique because he is the only one who has the Spirit as his own constitution of being. In this way, Barth again excludes the possibility of adoptionism, since no divinized man is possible.

55 For Barth's affinity with Alexandrian Christology, see C. T. Waldrop, 'Karl Barth's concept of the Divinity of Jesus Christ,' HThR 74 (1981): 241-63. Further details can be found in id., Karl Barth's Christology to Basic Alexandrian Character (Amsterdam & New York: Mouton Publishers, 1982).
humanity and ours. The dissimilarity is not a matter of degree, but of a distinctive mode of existence. So again, if only Jesus' humanity is 'authentic and normative for the theological doctrine of man's nature,' man 'in general and as such' inevitably cannot be truly human so far as the wholeness and orderliness of his soul and body is concerned.56

4. Man's relationship with temporality.

Like Martin Heidegger, Barth fully acknowledges the essentiality of time for the meaning of human existence.57 But unlike Heidegger, who conceives authentic existence as anticipatory resoluteness (vorlaufende Entschlossenheit) in the equal primordiality and unity of the triple 'ecstases' of temporality (viz., past, present, and future),58 Barth argues

56 CD III/2: 327, 344.
57 Ibid., pp. 437-39, 512-24. At least one similarity should be mentioned: Neither of them begin from the question 'what is time'; rather, 'what is the manner of human existence in time' grasps their concern.
58 See M. Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978), secs. 65, 68, 74. While the unity of temporal ecstases makes 'the authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole of anticipatory resoluteness' possible (pp. 374, 437), equal primordiality determines the authentic-inauthentic distinction which occurs in each of the ecstases (pp. 385-89). We should notice that 'unity of temporality' itself cannot provide authenticity, since the inauthentic mode of existence in temporality also occurs in an ecstical unity: 'The awaiting which forgets and makes present [note: 'awaiting', 'making-present', and 'forgetting' are the three corresponding inauthentic modes of past, present and future] is an ecstical unity in its own right, in accordance with which inauthentic understanding temporalizes itself with regard to its temporality. The unity of these ecstases closes off one's authentic potentiality-for-Being, and is thus the existential condition for the possibility of irresoluteness.' (p. 389) Rather, the unity of temporality serves as the horizon for the projection of being (for a further elaboration, see M. Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. A. Hofstadter [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982], pp. 227-330). The idea of equal primordiality is well expressed by T. Langan, The Meaning of Heidegger (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1959), p. 43, 'The authentic form of each ekstasis, consequently, will derive its full reality from its openness to and union with the complementary dimensions grasped actively.' At this point, we might involve ourselves in the discussion between an ontological or an existentialist interpretation of Heidegger. Although the present writer's quotation from Langan shows his preference, the distinction should not be exaggerated. For a discussion, see J. Macquarrie, 'Heidegger's Earlier and Later Work Compared' in Thinking about God (London: SCM, 1975), pp. 194-98.
that the enigma of man in time comes from the impossibility of identifying oneself with either of the three temporal dimensions. We can neither identify ourselves with the past which has ceased to belong to us, nor the future where our identity is only a guess. Moreover, we cannot 'take our ease and enjoy in impregnable security our being and having, and our identity with ourselves' at the moment which we regard as our present. For 'it is the moment we can never prevail upon to stay, for always it has already gone or not yet come.'

If man who is a creature has to live in an 'inauthentic temporality', the 'authentic temporality' which is the source of all time can be found only in God's eternity. Eternity is not timelessness, nor is it

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59 CD III/2: 513-14. Here we find an essential difference between Barth and Heidegger. For Heidegger, an inauthentic mode of existence is caused by the 'imbalance' (a word used by J. Macquarrie, Existentialism [Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973], pp. 200-202) of temporal ecstases when one is preoccupied and absorbed in concern for either of the three temporal dimensions (see Heidegger, Being and Time, sec. 68). But for Barth, it is simply impossible for man to identify with -- not to say to be preoccupied or absorbed in -- any temporal dimension at all. It is because they work out their interpretation of temporality from very different perspectives: Heidegger proceeds from his existential analytic, claiming that selfhood and temporality generate each other. Thus '[time] is more objective than all objects and simultaneously it is subjective, existing only if subjects exist.' (Heidegger, Phenomenology, pp. 254-55) Consequently, the notion of time as an infinite sequence of 'nows' which flows on independently of the subject is alien to Heidegger's hermeneutical analysis of 'being and time'. (For an important discussion which Heidegger dissociates his concept of time from that of Aristotle's, see ibid., pp. 229-55) On the other hand, Barth proposes that time is given to man and subsequently is in a sense independent of human existence. Thus Barth can say that 'we have no control over time and our being in it ... We cannot either take it or keep it. Do we really have it [time] at all? Would it not be better to say that time has us? ... In relation to its movement past us or over us we have no option but to go with it.' (CD III/2: 524) Although Barth once wrote that 'humanity is temporality. Temporality, as far as our observation and understanding go, is humanity' (ibid., p. 522), he seems to give no further elaboration of the second statement. For a conclusive remark on their different conceptions of time, see CD I/2: 45-46.

60 CD III/2: 437-38.

61 CD II/1: 617, 614; CD III/2: 526, 558.
a negation of time. Rather, God's 'eminent temporality' is a divine simultaneity. 'Eternity is the simultaneity of beginning, middle and end, ... without separation, distance of contradiction.' Since this unity of temporality belongs solely to God's eternity, He Himself is the only 'absolutely real time.' And hence the incarnation of the divine Word in Jesus Christ can bring a turn to our 'absolute uncertainty' in the 'riddle of time'. For 'the fact that the Word becomes flesh undoubtedly means that, without ceasing to be eternity, in its very power as eternity, eternity became time.' It is because of Jesus, 'of His life and death, of His existence,' that God, 'as the eternal One who as such has and Himself is absolutely real time, ... gives us the relatively but in the way genuinely real time proper to us.' He turns to us in order to deliver and preserve us, and to secure us against destruction. Thus our being in time has not ceased (and will not cease) 'to be real in His eyes and therefore in truth.'

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62 Ibid., pp. 610, 613, 615.
63 A title used by C. E. Gunton to signify the inclusive character of eternity towards (created) time. See C. E. Gunton, Becoming and Being: The Doctrine of God in Charles Hartshorne and Karl Barth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 177-81. Barth's intention of emphasizing the non-opposing character of God's eternity, as Gunton understands it, 'is manifestly twofold': i) To retain the dynamic understanding of God derived from the event character of the 'repetition'. ii) Towards a positive understanding of the relation between divine time and created time. (p. 198).
65 CD II/1: 608.
66 Ibid., p. 616; italics mine. Also CD III/2: 518-19, 440. Jesus is the fullest manifestation of our true being in time. 'He is temporal in unity and correspondence with His eternity,' in His time 'present, past and future are simultaneous.' 'For Him the past is not being which is gone, and lost, and the future is not just being which is not yet.'
67 CD II/1: 613; italics mine. CD III/2: 519.
68 CD III/2: 536-37.
5. **Imago dei** and reconciliation.

From our foregoing discussion we can see that the 'unreality' of man for Barth refers to man's inauthentic relationships with God, with his fellow men, with himself and with temporality. Some interim conclusions can be drawn before we move on to our further discussions.

We have seen that any discussion of humanity as a doctrine of Creation must be derived and based on Christology. So if we quest for a real humanity, we can but only go back to the humanity of Jesus Christ. He is the only real man. And we men, in this sense, do not accomplish what it means to be a man. From our preceding survey, we can see that this 'unreality' is twofold: First, from the 'ontological determination' of humanity which is grounded in the man Jesus -- that 'man is to be with God' and 'humanity is fellow-humanity' -- one who is ignorant about his own ontological reality is inhuman. Second, since there is an 'irremovable difference' between Jesus and ourselves (especially in His personal wholeness and existence in time), man as the creature of God the Creator is bound to be incomplete. From this Christological Anthropology, there are two particular features in Barth's theology of humanity at which we should have a closer look. The first one is concerning the *imago Dei*; and the other, the doctrine of Reconciliation.

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70 *Table Talk*, p. 15.

71 See *supra*, pp. 15-16, 18-19.

72 See *supra*, pp. 22, 23. *CD* III/2: 71, 'Between the man Jesus and ourselves as men there stands not only the mystery of our sin, but primarily and decisively the mystery of His identity with God.' (Italics mine) Also ibid., pp. 222, 344, 512. Thus Barth asserts repeatedly that 'Anthropologie kann nicht Christologie, Christologie kann nicht Anthropologie sein,' although the 'christologische Grundlegung' can afford us certain criteria to define the nature of man. (*KD* III/2: 82).
Barth was well aware of the sensitivity of the *imago Dei* doctrine when he wrote *Dogmatik III/2*. In his introductory discussions, he indicates his awareness explicitly:

We must insist on two points. On the one hand, the realisation of the total and radical corruption of human nature must not be weakened ... On the other hand, the question of human nature as constituted by God is reasonable and necessary. We have no right to be frightened by the difficulty which seems to make the answering of this question almost hopeless ... In this event, how can we succeed in distinguishing between the depravity which conceals and the nature which is concealed, between the inhumanity and the humanity of man?

The reconstruction of Barth's answer, as we have seen, starts with the rejection of the *imago Dei* as any given quality. The conviction that humanity must be understood in terms of dynamic relationships is equally affirmed throughout his earlier and later writings. Thus when Barth

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73 See *CD III/2*: ix-x. In view of his early radical rejection of any point of contact between man and God, Barth's new treatise (viz., *CD III/2*) might be conceived as a change in his Anthropology. In fact, it did have such an impression among Barth's interpreters. See for example, Brunner, 'Der neue Barth,' *ZThK* 48: 89-90; and D. Cairns, *The Image of God in Man* (London: SCM, 1953), pp. 164-67. In the following paragraphs we shall also try to explore the continuity and discontinuity between Barth's earlier and later doctrines of the *imago Dei*.

74 *CD III/2*: 29-30.

75 *Supra*, p. 17.

writes that 'the image of God [as 'the point of contact'] is not just, as it is said, destroyed apart from a few relics; it is **totally annihilated**, he is not thinking of any substantial entity in human nature; and the statement is to be understood, therefore, in the light of its **dynamic implications**: 1. In a dynamic context, any 'point' of contact presupposes the **movement** of approaching it -- a movement from God to man, or, from man to God. The 'tangential touch' to the 'circle' of 'the old world of the flesh' is not a touch if we move 'from below' (viz., from human religion), yet it does touch when the 'point' is declared and interposed 'from above' (viz., from the disclosing of Jesus as Christ). 2. In a similar manner, when Barth pronounced his angry *Nein!* to Emil Brunner, his main concern was the 'capacity for revelation' (Offenbarungsmächtigkeit), not the existence or non-existence of the 'point' itself. Barth's objection to Brunner's idea of an undestroyed 'formal imago' must be understood within his rejection of analogia entis. It is not Brunner's idea that there is a continuity in humanity before and after man's fall which annoyed Barth.

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77 CD I/I: 238. Italics mine.

78 Romans, p. 30. As T. F. Torrance, 'The Problem of Natural Theology in the Thought of Karl Barth,' RelSt 6 (1970): 122 comments, 'to do Barth justice, however, it must be said that his stress upon the infinite qualitative difference between God and man was intended to throw into sharp relief the fact that while there is no way of man's own devising from man to God, there is indeed a bridge between man and God created through the invasion of God in his Godness into time and human existence and his activity within them.' For a good elaboration of this paradox in Barth's Römerbrief, see Jenson, God after God, pp. 3-92. In fact, our last quotation from CD I/I: 238, which seems to suggest that there is no point of contact, is itself situated in the very paragraph where Barth is trying to show the capability of hearing and knowing God's Word (pp. 227-47)!


80 CD I/I: 238-40.

81 When he discusses Brunner's idea that in the 'formal sense the original image of God in man is not destroyed,' Barth comments, 'Indeed not, we may well say. Even as a sinner man is man and not a tortoise.' (Natural Theology, p. 79).
According to Barth, what becomes really damaging is that 'the "formal imago Dei" meant that [men] can "somehow" and "to some extent" know and do the will of God without revelation.' 82

From this point of view, there is no 'neue Barth' when he asserted that man as God's creature 'has not changed into something else by the fall,' 83 or that 'we can see in it [viz., the creaturely nature of man] a continuum unbroken by sin, an essence which even sin does not and cannot change,' 84 provided that Barth had no intention to imply any possibility of an Offenbarungsmächtigkeit from this continuum in humanity. 85 And furthermore, one also should not be surprised when he reads Barth's statement that 'a knowledge of man which is non-theological but genuine is not only possible but basically justified and necessary even from the standpoint of theological anthropology.' 86

Yet there is still a deeper ground for Barth's assertion of a continuum in humanity in his later writings, and it does indicate a shift in Barth's theological concern, though not a change of his position. This 'deeper ground' is Barth's ontological concern for humanity in its Christological determination. When Barth published his Dogmatik III/2, his

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82 Ibid., p. 90.
84 CD III/2: 43. Similar positive statements can be found in CD III/1: 189, 200-201; CD III/2: 27-31, 226, 347; CD IV/1: 480-82.
85 See supra, pp. 13-15. We can take a passage cited by Brunner as an example: When Brunner quoted the statement that '[man as God's creature] has not changed into something else by the fall' to support his thesis of a 'New Barth' in KD III/2 (Brunner, 'Der neue Barth,' ZThK 48: 90), we should notice that immediately follows the very statement Barth said, 'This does not mean that by ascribing to man this secret of his humanity as an indestructible determination of his nature we concede to him a power to save himself or even to co-operate in his salvation. This is where the false propositions of Roman Catholicism and humanism arise, and we must be on our guard against them.' (CD III/2: 275)
86 CD III/2: 202; also p. 226. See J. G. Gibbs's discussion of 'the secondary point of reference' (viz., the non-Christological material and picture of man) in his article 'A Secondary Point of Reference in Barth's Anthropology,' SJTh 16 (1963): 132-35.
theological position was believed to be changed because the volume seems to pay less attention to the place of sin, which was a kernel of his earlier Anthropology. In fact we have already seen such particular feature when we discussed Barth's notion of real humanity in its fourfold relationship: If man's authentic relationship with God and his fellow-men is an 'ontological determination', sin can only exist as an 'impossible possibility' and bring no ontological alteration to man's humanity. In a similar manner, if man's relationship with himself and temporality is inevitably incomplete in the light of Jesus' humanity, this incompleteness is already there and does not wait until man's sin and fall. But does this mean that Barth changed his attitude towards the significance of sin in human? In order to answer this, one must seek to understand the main theological concern in Barth's later Anthropology. As indicated in his preface, Barth's concern in Dogmatik III/2 'is with the nature of man as God created it good.'

But in order to trace back to man's original constitution, Barth must go beyond the reality of sin and discover the unperverted aspect in humanity. This does not indicate an overlooking of the place of sin in human nature, but a focalization upon the Christological unveiling of real

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87 See for example, Cairns, Image of God, pp. 166-67, 169.
88 CD III/2: x. Italics mine.
89 Thus also in his preface to CD III/2: x, Barth said, 'But I give them [viz., those who try to attack Barth's theology with the new presentation in that volume] warning that in the next volume (amongst other and better things) I shall have a few things to say about demons, so that I may well have occasion to return them.' Also ibid., p. 38, 'What God knows of man beyond his sin, relativising even the sin of man in the freedom of His grace, looking above it and through it, is the real creaturely nature of man which is the subject of our inquiry.' (Italics mine) Thus even in the same volume, sin has not been overlooked, see ibid., pp. 26-29.
humanity which is prior to our relationship to Adam:90

We are real men in our relationship to Adam, only because Adam is not our head and we are not his members, because above Adam and before Adam is Christ. Our relationship to Christ has an essential priority and superiority over our relationship to Adam ... Our human nature is preserved by sharing Adam's nature, because Adam's humanity is a provisional copy of the real humanity that is in Christ. And so as Adam's children and heirs, in our past as weak sinners, godless, and enemies, we are in this provisional way still men whose nature reflects the true human nature of Christ.91

Barth's Christological Anthropology not only affirms an ontological continuum in man's humanity; it also indicates the particular feature of his interpretation of the relationship between Creation and Reconciliation. According to our previous survey, it would not be a surprise to know that Barth gives no independent status to Creation, for in his theological interpretation 'the reality of divine grace includes the truth of the

90 A comparison between Barth's interpretations of Romans 5:12-21 in the first edition (1919), the second edition of Der Römerbrief and Christus und Adam nach Römer (1952) might exemplify his shift to an ontological interest in humanity. In Römerbrief, Barth's main emphasis in the passage was on man's crisis as he stands between the two worlds: The focus was man's death in Adam and man's righteousness and life in Christ, and the contrast is condemnation and grace (see Römerbrief 1, pp. 124-67; Romans, pp. 164-87). In his Kurze Erklärung des Römerbriefs (1940/41), E.T. by D. H. van Daalen as A Shorter Commentary on Romans (London: SCM, 1959), p. 62, Barth started exploring Christ's precedence over against Adam so far as human 'reality' was concerned (cf. Romans, pp. 175-76 on the exposition of the same verse). When we come to Christus und Adam (E.T. by T. A. Smail as Christ and Adam: Man and Humanity in Romans 5 [Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1956]) the ontological interest in humanity reached its full bloom (e.g. see pp. 3-11, 41-45, see also Friedmann, Christologie und Anthropologie, pp. 194-201). Thus we can see that there is an 'ontological shift' in Barth's exposition of Romans which also exemplifies his change of emphasis. Thus R. E. Willis, after a brief review of the so-called 'change' in Barth's Anthropology, concludes that 'it is possible to view the ostensible shift or development in Barth's anthropology as primarily a matter of emphasis, rather than substance.' (Willis, Ethics, pp. 214-15, n.4).

91 Christ and Adam, p. 10; see also pp. 41-45. Cf. CD III/2: 319-24, 345, 347, 357, 370.
creation and brings it to its fulfilment.'

Thus Incarnation, as Barth sees it, is not simply a 'wretched expedient' in the face of human sin."
but a realization and fulfillment of God's eternal will and decree to be 'Emmanuel', God with man. In this respect, if the 'unreality' of manhood is because of its ignorance and incompleteness, the coming of Jesus Christ the Reconciler discloses the possibility of completeness by fulfilling God's eternal covenant of grace.

Christological Anthropology within the Context of the Doctrines of Reconciliation and Redemption

Although Barth shows little favour in systematization and stresses that 'Christian truth is a living whole,' his doctrine of Reconciliation has a highly structural character. From its architectonic, two features

see, Barth never excludes this 'Reaktion' aspect (see Klappert, Die Auferweckung des Gekreuzigten, p. 235) of the broken covenant resulted from man's sin and Fall when he discusses the doctrine of Incarnation and Reconciliation. For a further discussion, see W. Kreck, 'Die Lehre von der Versöhnung,' ThLZ 85 (no.2, 1960): 84-87; also Jenson, Alpha and Omega, pp. 54-64.

94 CD IV/2: 100, 'Already in the eternal will and decree of God He was not to be, nor did He will to be, God only, but Emmanuel, God with man, and, in fulfilment of this "with," according to the free choice of His grace, this man, Jesus of Nazareth.' For Barth's discussions of Incarnation as a realization and fulfilment of God's eternal will to be with man, see also CD IV/2: 38-43; CD IV/1: 4-6, 12-18; Humanity of God, pp. 46-52. At this point, Barth's 'realized' interpretation of the Incarnation may be compared with post-Chalcedonian Eastern Christology, especially Issac of Nineveh, Maximus the Confessor and John of Damascus (see J. Meyendorff, Christ in Eastern Christian Thought [New York: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1975], pp. 131-172, 210-213; V. Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, E.T. [Cambridge & London: James Clarke & Co. Ltd., 1973 reprint], pp. 135-155; K. Ware, The Orthodox Way [London & Oxford: Mowbray, 1979], pp. 91-97). Yet Barth would certainly dissociate himself from the Eastern Christological implication of the idea of Deification (cf. CD IV/2: 84-104).

95 Table Talk, pp. 12-13; also CD I/2: 861-70.

96 The 'beauty' of Barth's architectonic in his doctrine of Reconciliation has been carefully schematized by E. Jüngel in his article 'Barth, Karl' in TRE 5: 265. The matrix of its overall structure is first founded by three 'vertical' columns which correspond to the three 'movements' in the Person of Christ, viz., 'the Lord as servant' (downward), 'the servant as Lord' (upward), and 'the true Witness' (downward and upward). And according to these three categorizations, each related doctrine can also be analyzed respectively into three elements in the corresponding 'horizontal' cross-sections: (i) Christological Offices become, correspondingly, 'priest' (munus sacerdotale and status exinanitionis), 'king' (munus regale and status exaltationis), and 'prophet' (munus propheticum and unity
can be observed: First, the whole doctrine is Christologically grounded, as shown by its 'vertical' structure. Second, for the first time in the Dogmatik Hamartiology receives its full account, explicitly and systematically. The phenomena of human sin are concretely described as 'pride' (sec. 60), 'sloth' (sec. 65) and 'falsehood' (sec. 70). As we have

of both status); (ii) Hamartiology becomes 'pride and fall', 'sloth and misery', and 'falsehood and condemnation'; (iii) Soteriology, correspondingly, becomes 'justification', 'sanctification', and 'vocation' of man; (iv) Pneumatology (in Christian community and the individual) becomes 'gathering and faith', 'upbuilding and love', and 'sending and hope'; (v) Ethics (viz., Christian life as the Command of God the Reconciler) correspondingly can also be analyzed into 'Baptism as the foundation of the Christian life', 'the Lord's Prayer as the execution of the Christian life', and 'the Eucharist as the renewal of the Christian life'. See also Küng, Justification, pp. 24-27.

Barth's presentation of the doctrine is so well structured that R. S. Wallace praises: 'Now that we see his Doctrine of Reconciliation as a completed whole, we can understand the application of the adjective 'beautiful' to Barth's theology. It certainly gives the impression of a great massive and new architectural achievement in the theological field.' (R. S. Wallace, 'Barth's Doctrine of Reconciliation,' ET 74 [1962/63]: 22). See also comments by G. W. Bromiley, Introduction to the Theology of Karl Barth (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1979), p. 179; Come, Barth for Preachers, p. 75.

97 See Kreck, 'Versöhnung,' ThLZ 85: 83-84.

98 See D. F. Ford, 'Conclusion: Assessing Barth' in Karl Barth: Studies of his Theological Method, ed. S. W. Sykes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), p. 201. In answer to A. B. Come's charge (Barth for Preachers, p. 75) that '[There is] a certain beauty in the architectonics of the Dogmatics, especially if you like the number three. But this kind of schematization makes one nervous when he thinks that there may be a fourth character of sin that is being totally overlooked;' one should be reminded that as far as the 'ontological directionality' (viz., downward, upward, and the both -- which also implies 'outward') is concerned, Barth's treatment is complete in its structure.

99 To say that Barth 'concretely describes' the phenomena of human sin in his Dogmatik IV might arouse some objections. For in his 'Preface' to CD IV/1 (p. ix) Barth clearly indicates that 'throughout I have found myself in an intensive, although for the most part quiet, debate with Rudolf Bultmann.' Thus there should be an anti-existentialist spirit in his discussion of the doctrine of Reconciliation. Yet P. Jacobs points out in his article 'Barth in den Sielen der existentialen Interpretation. Der Zweite Teil seiner Versöhnungslehre als Antwort und Beitrag zum Programm von Existentialismus und Entmythologisierung,' EvTh 16 (1956): 310-19 that although Barth clearly distinguishes himself from the Bultmannian interpretation of Soteriology, 'Darüber hat Barth nun seinerseits eine eigene Existentialinterpretation, sozusagen eine Interpretation Barthscher Pragung, in der Durchführung seiner soteriologischen Christologie bzw. christologischen Soteriologie vorgelegt.' (p. 319) Cf. also H. Diem, 'Christologie und Rechtfertigung bei Karl Barth,' EvTh 23 (1963): 197-213.
seen, these three elements of sin are not derived from the horizon of human morality, but correspondingly contrast with the three Christological bases on one hand, and Christian existence as faith, love and hope on the other hand. So if Jesus Christ represents not only 'the image of God' but also 'the image of man', the human modes of existence as 'pride, sloth and falsehood' which are in antithesis to the reality of manhood revealed in Jesus' humanity, manifest a humanity in distortion. Here we see a third form of human unreality in Barth's Anthropology, perceived within the context of Reconciliation. We shall proceed to discuss the three situations separately.

'Pride' (Hochmut) means the unbelief and disobedience of man. Man seeks to exalt himself and to be like God. But 'he can never do it. He does not have the freedom or power.' 'He will always fall back on himself and still be man.' And when this striving is set in contrast with God's condescension to man, the unreality of humanity becomes apparent:

It is not paradoxical or absurd that God becomes and is man. It does not contradict the concept of God. It fulfils it. It reveals the glory of God. But it is certainly paradoxical and absurd that man wants to be as God. It contradicts the concept of man. It destroys it. Man ceased to be man when he wants this.

Such a distortion in humanity, like the case we have seen in Barth's doctrine of Creation, is not only exemplified in one's relationship with God, but also developed in two other dimensions -- a distorted relationship with

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100 See supra., n.96; also CD IV/1: 140-44.
102 Or in Barth's own words, 'the human disorder which is the antithesis of the divine order of grace.' (CD IV/1: 418. Italics mine).
103 CD IV/1: 414, 419, 478.
104 Ibid., p. 419.
105 Ibid. Italics mine.
oneself and other men. No summary can substitute for his powerful words:

In this role and function [in pride] he is in every respect opposed to the will of God. He denies God, because Jesus Christ against whom he offends is God meeting in the flesh in eternal love and for his salvation. He murders his brother because Jesus Christ is the fellow-man in whose image God has made every man, in whom as the Head of the human race every man is either honoured or despised, and is now actually despised and denied and rejected and put to death. He destroys

106 Three other forms of distortions Barth mentions under the sin of pride are: 1. Whereas 'the being and activity of Jesus Christ' is 'the Lord became a servant,' the man in pride is the very opposite — the servant who wants to be lord.' (Ibid., p. 432); 2. Whereas 'the being and activity of Jesus Christ' is the Judge who 'caused Himself to be judged,' the man in pride 'is the very opposite of all this, the man who sets himself in the wrong by wanting to be his own judge instead of allowing that God is in the right against him.' (Ibid., p. 445); 3. Whereas Jesus Christ 'gave Himself to the depth of the most utter helplessness,' the man in pride is 'in clear antithesis to the One who in this way humbled Himself for him,' 'and still thinks that he can help himself and that in this self-help he has a claim to the help of God.' (Ibid., p. 458, Italics in the above quotations are mine) Here Barth clearly conceives these modes of human existence not as only 'ignorant' or 'incomplete', but utterly distorted and antithetical to God's divine activity in Jesus Christ, viz., what a real man should be.

107 Concerning man's denial of God, Barth mentions four entailed errors: (i) he makes God 'the God he wants to be like' (ibid., p. 422); (ii) he completely misunderstands God and supposes Him to be a tyrannical lord (ibid., pp. 436-37); (iii) he thinks that God is a God who needed to be completed by him and helped by his counsel and assistance (ibid., pp. 452-53); (iv) he cannot understand that God is a 'true helper' who is at 'any point or purpose in trying to help' (ibid., pp. 466-67).

108 Concerning man 'murders' his brother, Barth mentions also four entailed errors: (i) he 'thinks he can be his own source and standard, the first and the last, the object of a diligere propter seipsum' (ibid., p. 421); (ii) he disorders 'the basic relationship of all created being' (ibid., p. 436); (iii) he conceives himself to be right when he is doing wrong, good when it is bad, 'and there begins the whole misery of the moral battle of everyone against everyone else' (ibid., p. 451); (iv) 'he is not really a man who thinks and speaks and acts independently, but simply a marionette pulled by wires in a group of men who all share the same illusion of independence ... And the society which is made up of such individuals will always be a society which is a prey to dissolution' (ibid., pp. 465-66).
himself because Jesus Christ is the eternal Word of God by whom all things are made, and by the suppression of this Word man causes himself to fall and delivers himself up to judgment -- as we see from the example of Judas.10

The second aspect of man's sin in antithesis to the being and activity of Jesus Christ is 'sloth' (Trägheit). Sloth means 'sluggishness, indolence, slowness or inertia.'11 And sin in the form of sloth crystallizes in the rejection of the man Jesus.12 Again we can perceive the attitude of sloth from its fourfold relationship with God, others, self and temporality:13 In man's relationship with God, sin as sloth causes him to refuse the Word of God and thus to end up in folly and stupidity.14 In his relationship with his fellow men, sin as sloth leads to reluctance which is the source of 'the notorious inhumanity of human life and society.'15 In his relationship with himself, sin as sloth brings dissipation and thus self-destruction and concealment from freedom.16 Finally, in his relationship with temporality, sin as sloth entails anxiety 'and therefore the prisoner of care.'17 Thus in the light of Jesus' existence as exalted and sanctified man, which includes our own true and authentic

109 Concerning 'man destroys himself', Barth mentions again four entailed errors: (i) when 'he thinks he can love and choose and will and assert and maintain and exalt himself,' 'he misses the very thing that he seeks' and 'becomes something which is not human but supremely non-human' (ibid., p. 421); (ii) he is 'in the process of a most serious self-alienation and self-destruction' because 'in the very act of revolt the servant becomes a slave' and 'in his pride he makes himself despicable' (ibid., pp. 435-36); (iii) in the desire of wanting to judge, man 'completely misunderstands himself and can only confuse and conformed himself' (ibid., p. 449); (iv) he becomes 'self-contradicting' when he attempts at 'self-help' because he cannot see 'his dependence on the grace of God and therefore his own helplessness' (ibid., pp. 463-64).

110 The quotation is from ibid., p. 399. Italics mine.

111 CD IV/2: 403.

112 Ibid., p. 406.

113 Ibid., p. 409.

114 Ibid., pp. 409-420.

115 Ibid., pp. 432-45. Cf. D. Hooker's discussions from a psychologist's point of view, in Hooker, Healthy Personality, pp. 73-82.

116 Ibid., pp. 452-64.

117 Ibid., pp. 467-75.
existence, 'we must consider our false and inauthentic existence as those commit acts of sloth.'\textsuperscript{118}

'Falsehood' (\textit{Lüge}) is the third aspect of Barth's anatomy of man's sin. It 'consists in a movement of evasion by attempting another kind of truth.' It is 'the untruth of man in relation to the truth of Jesus Christ encountering him.'\textsuperscript{119} As was the case with our last two forms of sin, falsehood not only contradicts the true witness of Jesus Christ's God-manhood,\textsuperscript{120} but also entails one's distorted relationship with others and himself: 'As man becomes a liar in the encounter with Jesus Christ, he becomes a liar at every point.' 'The original alteration irresistibly carries with it that of the whole panorama.'\textsuperscript{121} Sin as falsehood also 'deforms, distorts and corrupts' his whole being. 'Man is thus forced to live with this distorted image which he has set up by his falsehood and which corresponds to it.'\textsuperscript{122} The result of man's falsehood, as Barth conceives it, is 'incomparably sharper' than the misery of pride and sloth. What man chooses and draws upon himself with his falsehood is his 'condemnation'. For he attempts to change the truth into untruth and untruth into truth:

The threat under which he comes to stand and indeed places himself as he lies, is that he will be nailed to his lie, that he will be treated seriously as a liar, that he will be granted and finally assigned to a life by and in untruth as the portion which he himself has chosen, a life which as such can only be a lost life, and can only be described as such.\textsuperscript{123}

\textsuperscript{118} Ibid., p. 483. Italics mine.

\textsuperscript{119} CD IV/3.1: 434.

\textsuperscript{120} Ibid., pp. 378-421. The true witness manifested in Jesus Christ's prophetic office is His 'true existence' as God-man, His suffering and His speaking of truth. For a comprehensive discussion of Barth's interpretation of Jesus Christ's Prophetic Office (in KD IV/3) and its entailed problems in historicality and the Church-world relationship, see G. Gloege, 'Zur Versöhnungslehre Karl Barths' in \textit{Heilsgeschehen und Welt} (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1965), pp. 133-73.

\textsuperscript{121} CD IV/3.1: 451-52.

\textsuperscript{122} Ibid., pp. 468-73.

\textsuperscript{123} Ibid., p. 462. Italics mine.
Now we can see more clearly from our survey that the unreality of humanity perceived from Barth's doctrine of Reconciliation exists not only in the forms of ignorance and incompleteness (which we have seen in Barth's doctrine of Creation), but also negatively as the distortion of man's whole being. Here the doctrine of Reconciliation comes not only as disclosure of the real through the incarnation, but as a reconstitution of man's being through the vicarious humanity of Jesus Christ. This is 'an alteration of the human situation [eine Veränderung der menschlichen Situation], the result of which is an altered being of man, a being of man divinely altered.'

124 Thus after our survey of his Anthropology, we can understand more comprehensively why Barth, when he was asked about the reality and unreality of humanity, answered that 'we [as human being] have an incomplete or lost reality ... However, humanity does not begin only in Christ. If it begins these, it is only because man discovers truth, because he discovers Christ.' (Supra, pp. 12-13, n.7).

125 CD IV/1: 90-122; CD IV/2: 264-319; CD IV/3.1: 165-237. Obviously Barth's assertion of Jesus Christ's vicarious alteration of man's being demands further elaborations and discussions; but we shall leave it to our next section, within the context of the discussions of Barth's doctrine of Election. Also, how Barth thinks the reconciled Work of Christ becomes noetically realized in Christian life as knowledge and experience will be our main concern in chapter five of the present study.

126 CD IV/1: 91. The reason why we do not include a detailed discussion of Christological Anthropology within the context of Barth's doctrine of Redemption is plainly because it is still fragmentary in Barth's works. Certain fundamental conceptions about Barth's Eschatology remain unsettled (see for example, the discussion of G. C. Berkouwer, The Triumph of Grace in the Theology of Karl Barth, trans. H. R. Boer [London: The Paternoster Press, 1956], pp. 328-40). Barth would definitely have provided a comprehensive -- or even surprising, as he did in his earlier volumes -- picture in his Dogmatik V; yet it was never written. However, we shall try, in this footnote, to outline some essential ideas related to our discussion: 'God as the Redeemer', as Barth conceives it, is mainly concerned with the 'entire future' when God will fulfill and consummate 'what is promised in His creative and reconciling work' (see CD I/2: 875-76, 882-83; CD IV/3.2: 916-17; Holy Ghost, pp. 72-73; Resurrection, pp. 110-11. For a discussion of Barth's Eschatology in his earlier works, see T. Stadtland, Eschatologie und Geschichte in der Theologie des jungen Karl Barth [Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1966]; for Barth's later works on Eschatology, see Berkouwer, Triumph of Grace, pp. 151-65). When the idea of final realization and consummation is applied to man's humanity, the 'eschatological reality of man' means 'the goal of man' where God's command for man will be 'in his total reality, in his total divinely willed reality, for real man.' (Ethics, pp. 461-63) At this final consummation, 'the child of God does not sin. The child of God believes, loves, and hopes, but does not
Problems concerning 'Ontological Determination' and 'Reality'

From the above exposition of Barth's Christological Anthropology, we can see the threefold unreality of humanity (ignorance, incompleteness and distortion). And Reconciliation, which is the incarnation of the Reconciler, provides the foundation for the threefold new beginning of real humanity, (viz., the 'disclosure' of 'completeness' and the 'reconstitution' of the distorted manhood). Thus it is clear that, for Barth, Reconciliation is the ground and foundation for the beginning of a real manhood (authentic humanity).

But Barth's presentation, as 'beautiful' and 'structural' as it is, raises some questions that demand further consideration. We can begin with his understanding of 'reality'. As we have seen, the word 'reality' in Barth's vocabulary has a technical meaning. As far as the problem of humanity is concerned, 'reality' definitely cannot be attained from human self-understanding. Furthermore, as 'Barth has disposed of subjectivity ('existentialism' characteristic of the Christliche Dogmatik of 1927) and an objectivity related to the perceived structures and being of the external world (the basis of the tradition of analogia entis, the

sin. There applies to the child of God not only posse non peccare (like Adam before the fall) instead of posse peccare, but non posse peccare (and here we stand at the end of the ways of God)' (ibid., p. 465). Yet this 'eschatological reality' does not only denote a pure (viz., chronological) future which is a 'distance, remoteness, transcendence, nonpresence,' but also a reality 'completed in Jesus Christ' (CD III/2: 633). Thus it is the 'future truth that comes to us. We are not in ourselves the eternal children of God; we become so as the Son of God comes to us, as the Word of God is spoken to us.' (Ethics, pp. 465-67) In this sense Barth's Anthropology within the context of Redemption is still Christologically grounded (CD III/4: 33). For as 'reconciliation in its transition to consummation in redemption,' our 'only full and perfect hope' has already been present 'in the concrete form of appearance and work of Jesus Christ.' (CD IV/3.1: 263, 315, 327-28; CD III/2: 633).


128 See supra, pp. 11-15.
analogy of being),' 129 he moves towards an 'ontological realism'. 130 Such an understanding of reality clearly entails some epistemological problems. As Joseph C. McLelland puts it: If Kant's philosophical question is 'How are synthetic a priori judgments possible?' Then 'Barth's theological question' is 'How are analytic a posteriori judgments possible?' 131 There are different critics of Barth who express their doubts from different perspectives. 132 But for our present interest, viz., the reality of humanity, we have to focus our attention upon Barth's contrast between the 'ontological determination' of humanity and its 'impossibly possible' phenomena in concrete human life. Yet a definite answer cannot be attained until we have a closer examination of Barth's doctrine of Election.

II. THE ONTOLOGICAL DETERMINATION OF MAN IN BARTH'S DOCTRINE OF ELECTION

In his discussion of the nature of real man, Barth firmly asserts that 'the being of man as a being with Jesus is founded upon the election of God.' 133 The grounding of man's humanity upon God's election can be understood in a threefold perspective: First, the doctrine of Election, for Barth, 'is the summa evangelii, the key to the understanding of God's whole


130 As D. D. Williams calls it. See D. D. Williams, 'The Concept of Truth in Karl Barth's Theology,' RelSt 6 (1970): 142; also Küng, Justification, pp. 61-62.

131 J. C. McLelland, 'Philosophy and Theology -- A Family Affair (Karl and Heinrich Barth)' in Footnotes to a Theology, p. 34.

132 For example, the three critics we just quoted. There are also Catholic theologians, who perceive the problem from discussions between analogia entis and analogia fidei. For a summary of their views, see G. Foley, 'The Catholic Critics of Karl Barth,' SJTh 14 (1961): 136-55.

133 KD III/2: 170, '... das menschliche Sein als Zusammensein mit Jesus ein Sein, das auf Gottes Erwahlung beruht ...' (E.T. and italics are mine), see also ibid., pp. 170-76, 188.
Revelation in creation, reconciliation, and redemption. 134 And concerning Anthropology, it provides an ontological foundation and understanding of man's real humanity in Barth's theological interpretation. 135 Secondly, in our previous discussions we have seen that, for Barth, Incarnation is far more than a remedial device to restore the broken God-man relationship, but a realization and fulfilment of God's eternal will and decree to be with man, even before man's sin and Fall. 136 This naturally leads to a consideration of Barth's idea of Supralapsarianism. And thirdly, the problem of man's ontic determination and its noetic realization are crystallized into Barth's discussion of God's election of man in Christ and election of men as individuals. The tension between the objective and subjective side of man in Barth's doctrine of Election, as we shall see, exemplifies a critical problem in his Christological Anthropology. 137

The Basic Characters of Barth's Doctrine of Election

In his prolegomena to the study of Election, Barth said, 'There can be no Christian truth which does not from the very first contain within itself as its basis the fact that from and to all eternity God is the electing God. There can be no tenet of Christian doctrine which if it is to be a Christian tenet does not necessarily reflect both in form and

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136 See supra, pp. 31-32.

137 Cf. Stock, Anthropologie der Verheißung, pp. 50-52.
content this divine electing.' In order to understand the rationale behind Barth's high regard of the doctrine, we have to examine closely the particular features that make him 'alone' in his work among the dogmaticians. It would be best to start with Barth's own formal definition:

The doctrine of election is the sum of the Gospel because of all words that can be said or heard it is the best: that God elects man; that God is for man too the One who loves in freedom. It is grounded in the knowledge of Jesus Christ because He is both the electing God and elected man in One. It is part of the doctrine of God because originally God's election of man is a predestination not merely of man but of Himself. Its function is to bear basic testimony to eternal, free and unchanging grace as the beginning of all the ways and works of God.

From this definition, together with the discussions followed, there are at least four basic themes which characterize not only Barth's interpretation of the doctrine, but also his whole Dogmatics. They are: 1. The doctrine of Election is part of the doctrine of God who elects Himself. 2. God's self-election has been fulfilled in Jesus Christ who is the electing God and elected man in One. 3. God's election is a gracious election (Gnadenwahl), in freedom and in love. 4. God's election is a concrete happening sprung from the divine act of a living God, not 'an abstraction from or fixed and static result of' some theoretical systems. In the following paragraphs we shall proceed to discuss each of these in further details.

1. God who elects Himself.

One of Barth's radical reinterpretations of the doctrine of Election, through which he departs from previous dogmatics, is about its

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139 See CD II/2: x.
140 Ibid., p. 3.
141 Ibid., p. 181, also pp. 44-51, 175-86.
subject matter. In contrast to the traditional understanding of the doctrine, which is mainly concerned with men elected or reprobated and its causality,\textsuperscript{142} Barth announces that the doctrine of Election is first about God, who is 'in Himself, in the primal and basic decision in which He wills to be and actually is God, in the mystery of what takes place from and to all eternity within Himself, within His triune being, God is none other than the One who in His Son or Word elects Himself, and in and with Himself elects His people.'\textsuperscript{143} The reason for taking Election as an integral part of the doctrine of God's own Being is twofold:

First, Election as God's 'primal decision' (Urentscheidung) is the beginning of all the ways and works 'of God's dealings with the reality which is distinct from Himself.'\textsuperscript{144} In this respect it is not surprising that Barth shows his favour to the Supralapsarians, although he is not

\textsuperscript{142} For example, R. Garrigou-Lagrange lists the two main problems of the doctrine of Election in his Predestination, trans. D. B. Rose (St. Louis & London: B. Herder, 1939), pp. 24-25: (i) 'How can predestination, which is infallible in its effect, be reconciled with the will to save all mankind, since the salvation of many will not be realized?' and (ii) 'Why has God placed in the number of the elect this person and not that other?' See also his 'synthesis' after an historical survey of the doctrine (pp. 183-229). See also Barth's critical studies of the place of the doctrine of Election in various dogmatic systems since the Reformation (CD II/2: 77-78), where he concludes that 'the doctrine of election was never regarded or treated as an integral part of the doctrine of God' (ibid., p. 79; also p. 81).

\textsuperscript{143} CD II/2: 76. Italics mine. Also ibid., pp. 10, 22, 90-91; CD II/1: 442-43, 'It is He [God] alone who lives. It is He alone who loves. He alone is gracious, merciful and wise. He alone is holy, righteous and patient. And He alone is also free, with all that this involves ... [men] experience it as God's election in virtue of His freedom, an election in which God not only chooses them for Himself, but in doing so chooses Himself for them, and marks Himself out as the one, true and therefore unique God.' (Italics mine). Thus C. E. Gunton, after his survey of Barth's concept of Election, said that '[Election, for Barth] is God's self-ordaining, his self-determination, his self-limitation, his self-giving. Therefore, even though it entails a commitment of himself, it is free because God is its sole author.' (C. E. Gunton, 'Karl Barth's Doctrine of Election as Part of his Doctrine of God,' JThS 25 [1974]: 384) Cf. also W. Sparn, "Extra Internum". Die christologische Revision der Prädestinationslehre in Karl Barth's Erwähnungslehre in Die Realisierung der Freiheit. Beiträge zur Kritik der Theologie Karl Barths, ed. T. Rendtorff (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1975), pp. 45-47.

\textsuperscript{144} CD II/2: 3, 89-90, 102.
without reservation to their idea of *decretum absolutum* and their lack of Christological grounding.\textsuperscript{145} For prior to God's election of His creatures, from all eternity there was a *self-determination* within the triune Being (i.e. 'an act of his self-relatedness as Father, Son and Holy Spirit'\textsuperscript{146}) which elects Himself to be the *electing One*. And as an inseparable aspect of this self-election, God, from His own Being, reaches out to something beyond and determines men to be the *elected*.\textsuperscript{147} But what is it that even goes beyond God's self-election as the electing One? It leads to our second reason for taking Election as part of the doctrine of God -- viz., God's Being is in His acts.

In an attempt to define the statement 'God is *Gott ist*', Barth said, 'We are dealing with the being of God: but with regard to the being of God, the word "event" or "act" is final, and cannot be surpassed or compromised.'\textsuperscript{148} The understanding that '"the Reality of God" ... holds together being and act, instead of tearing them apart like the idea of "essence"'\textsuperscript{149} constitutes a fundamental structure of Barth's doctrine of God.\textsuperscript{150} For from the outset Barth rejects a dualism of will and act: 'Predestination is the divine act of will itself *göttliche Willensakt*

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{145} Ibid., pp. 135-36, 139-45.
\item \textsuperscript{146} See Jüngel, *Trinity*, p. 70. Also CD II/1: 450-51; CD I/2: 90-91.
\item \textsuperscript{147} CD II/2: 76-77, 90-91, 168. Here we can see how Reconciliation is founded upon Election. For if Reconciliation means 'Emmanuel', 'God with us' (see *supra*, pp. 31-32), it must be first based upon God's divine self-election to be the electing One who relates Himself with man.
\item \textsuperscript{148} CD II/1: 263.
\item \textsuperscript{149} Ibid., p. 262. Italics mine.
\item \textsuperscript{150} An explicit expression of such a conception can be found in Barth's writing as early as 1929 in 'Schicksal und Idee in der Theologie' (reprinted in Theologische Fragen und Antworten, pp. 64-72), where he states, 'Akt heißt *Sein* und Sein kann nur *Akt* heißen.' (p. 66) E. Jüngel's substantial study *Gottes Sein ist im Werden* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1966; E.T. as *The Doctrine of the Trinity*, op. cit.) has provided a comprehensive investigation of this particular feature in Barth's theology. But for a discussion of whether Jüngel's idea of 'Gottes Sein ist im Werden' means exactly the same as Barth's understanding of 'Gottes Sein als Akt', see Härle, *Sein und Gnade*, pp. 46-52.
\end{itemize}
selber and not an abstraction from or fixed and static result of it.' 151
So if God's act is still continued in time, divine predestination is thus
'an eternal happening' and 'can never belong only to the past.' 152 'God
willed this course [Kreislauf], willed it from all eternity, and continues
to will it.' 153 Thus Barth can conclude his understanding of God's Being
by saying that 'to its very deepest depths God's Godhead consists in the
fact it is an event -- not any event, not events in general, but the event

151 CD II/2: 181. Also Service of God, pp. 70-71.
152 Ibid., p. 184.
153 Ibid., p. 186. E.T. is modified according to the original text.
By affirming that God's Being is in His act, Barth tries to rule out at
least two implicit presuppositions in classical discussions of
Predestination which will usually end up with an incompatibility of ideas
or some negative assessments about God's perfection (for an example, see
W. A. Copinger's discussion of 'Predestination and Foreknowledge' in his A
Treatise on Predestination, Election, and Grace [London: James Nisbet,
1889], pp. 115-78): (i) That God who 'exists outside of time' has a non­
inferential foreknowledge of what is going to happen: An assumption of a
'timeless God' in Predestination is common in most of the past theological
thinkers (see N. Pike, God and Timelessness [London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1970], esp. pp. 53-86, 130-188, where he discusses Boethius,
Augustine, Anselm and Schleiermacher; also R. Young, Freedom, Responsibility
this presupposition entails hard determinism as well as linguistic diffi­
culties, especially concerning the concept of 'Omniscience' and 'Personhood'
(see Young, Freedom, Responsibility and God, pp. 177-80). Barth's alter­
native to this is: '[God's predestination] is not left behind by time, but
as that which is above time (for there is only one eternity with God) it
accompanies time, and as that which is beyond time it outlasts it. It not
only was but is and will be ... it not only happened; it does happen and
will happen.' (CD II/2: 183) (ii) Most classical discussions of
Predestination so easily become 'hard determinism' because they implicitly
adopt an 'event-causation theory', viz., 'every event that is involved in
an act is caused by some other events'. And that once God willed and
decreed in the beginning, the stream of events runs in its destined pro­
cess. As a result, there is virtually no room for either human freedom or
divine act. Barth rejects also this 'Deist' tendency because 'in predes­
tination God became His own prisoner.' (CD II/2: 182, 184) In this res­
pect Barth shows his affiliation with the 'agent-causation theory' that
the causes of action are not antecedent events but agents (for a
discussion of the theory, see R. M. Chisholm, 'Human Freedom and Self' in
35; and more recently, J. Bishop, 'Agent-causation,' Mind 92 [1983]: 61-79).
In Barth's own words, 'It is not the case, then, that God did will but that
now He no longer wills, or wills only the effects of His willing. To speak
in causal terms, God does will the effects, but in so doing He does not
cease to will the cause. And He does not cease to be the living God in the
case.' (CD II/2: 183) For a discussion of the validity of Barth's claim
and its implication, see infra, pp. 74-77.
of His action, in which we have a share in God's revelation. A 'pure subject' (viz., 'God is God') without act is only a tautology and no longer

154 CD II/1: 263; italics mine. Also ibid., pp. 262-72. The statement that 'God's being is event, the event of God's act' (p. 271) exemplifies at least two particular features in Barth's doctrine of God's Being -- its dynamic character and its concrete character: (i) 'Event' means a change in the spatio-temporal condition of reality; and in this context, caused by the act of God (for a discussion of the phenomenological connection between 'events' and 'acts', see N. Rotenstreich, Theory and Practice [The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977], pp. 154-60). Barth's oft-repeated proposition 'God as event, as act and as life' (CD II/1: 264-68) indicates plainly his resistance against 'the threatened absorption of the doctrine of God into a doctrine of being.' (p. 260; also pp. 287-97) 'The particularity of the divine event, act and life is the particularity of the being of a person. We speak of an action, of a deed, when we speak of the being of God as a happening.' (p. 267; italics mine) Thus Jenson, God after God, p. 125, 'He is an event which cannot be transcended, which is inescapable in all temporal dimensions ... Because there is no way past the temporality of God's action, there is no static "essence" of God behind God's act.' (ii) 'Event' means God's act reaches out to concrete spatio-temporal situations. CD II/1: 265, 'The event of revelation as described for us in Scripture has everywhere a natural, bodily, outward and visible component -- from the creation (not only of heaven but also of earth), by way of the concrete existence of the people of Israel in Palestine, the birth of Jesus Christ, His physical miracles, His suffering and death under Pontius Pilate, His physical resurrection, right down to His coming again and the resurrection of the body.' With respect to God's election, it is a 'concrete history'. And 'because it has pleased God to let it be a concrete decree, it never ceases to be event.' (CD II/2: 184).

155 Cf. Jüngel, Trinity, p. 64, 'God in his being is indeed to be thought of as subject, but subject in no other sense than as active subject. God is active.' Also CD II/1: 260-68, where Barth asserts that 'seeking and finding God in His revelation, we cannot go beyond God's act to an actionless God [über Gottes Handeln nicht hinauskommen zu einem nichthandelnden Gott]. This is not only because we ourselves cannot, but because there is no surpassing or bypassing at all of the divine action, because a transcendance of His action is nonsense.' (p. 263; E.T. is modified according to the original text and italics mine). At this point, J. Macmurray's introduction of the idea 'Self-as-agent' instead of the 'Self-as-subject' in traditional philosophy is particularly helpful to our discussion (see J. Macmurray, The Self as Agent [New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957], esp. pp. 84-103). After a critical evaluation of the traditional philosophic understanding of personhood (especially those of Descartes and Kant), Macmurray concludes that 'we have to substitute for the "I think" as our centre of reference, the "I do"' (p. 89). For a full elaboration of such an idea in Barth's theology, see T. W. Currie's comprehensive study in his 'Being and Act: Ontology and Epistemology in Karl Barth's Doctrine of God' (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Edinburgh, 1976).
a living God. 156 Thus by affirming that 'God is in His acts', we come to an understanding of a God who is living, dynamic and in concreto, in contrast to a merely abstract and static idea of 'essence'. 157 And it is this living Person who wills and acts -- from all eternity and yet happens in time -- the divine election.

2. God's self-election has been fulfilled in Jesus Christ who is the electing God and elected man in One.

The grounding of divine Election upon Christology represents another radical aspect in Barth's theological reinterpretation of the doctrine. It is not a mere extension of his Christological emphasis in the Dogmatics, but, as a critic suitably calls it, a 'Christological revision' of the doctrine. 158 The radicality of Barth's statements can be summed up in his own words:

Starting from Jn. 11f., we have laid down and developed two statements concerning the election of Jesus Christ. The first is that Jesus Christ is the electing God [Jesus Christus ist der erwählende Gott]. This statement answers the question of the Subject of the eternal election of grace. And the second is that Jesus Christ is elected man [Jesus Christus ist der erwählte Mensch]. This statement answers the question of the object of the

156 Cf. Jüngel, Trinity, p. 67. Also CD II/1: 268, 'we reject a false spiritualising on the one hand and a false realism on the other, and have to understand God's being as "being in person" ... God's being is being which knows, wills and decides of itself, and is moved by itself. Inasmuch as God's being consists in God's act, it reveals itself as being which is self-moved. It is self-moved in that it differentiates itself both from the abstractly observed being of nature and from the abstractly comprehended being of spirit.' See also ibid., p. 263, 'God's being is life. Only the Living is God ... Thus it is quite right when the older theology described the essence of God as vita, and again as actuositas, or more simply as actus.' Cf. also CD II/1: 284, see CD II/1: 284-97.

157 For a detailed discussion of 'God as a living person' where Barth defines it as 'a knowing, willing, acting I' (CD II/1: 284), see CD II/1: 284-97.

eternal election of grace. Strictly speaking, the whole dogma of predestination is contained in these two statements. 159

Here we confront at least three contentions which depart radically from the traditional teachings on Predestination. The first is the place and office of Christ in the doctrine of Predestination. The second is concerned with the proposition that Jesus Christ is the electing God, the Subject of Election. This violates the theological tradition that God the Father is the Subject of divine Election. And it thus also entails a reinterpretation of the trinitarian understanding of the Godhead. Thirdly, the proposition that Jesus Christ is the elected man suggests again a vicarious Christological Anthropology. From this standpoint, God's election of both the community and the individual are to be radically reinterpreted. We shall discuss each of these in further detail below.

After detailed historical surveys of the place of Christology in the traditional teaching of Predestination, Barth concludes that to affirm a Christological basis for the doctrine means to expose oneself 'to the risk of a certain isolation.' 160 But why was the Christological basis so neglected in the classic doctrine of Predestination? Barth contends that it is because the dogmaticians did not build their doctrinal foundations utterly upon the Holy Scripture. 161 And accordingly, they could only

159 CD II/2: 145. See also Gottes Gnadenwahl, pp. 13-17.
160 Ibid., p. 155; also pp. 60-76, 106-115, 154-55. In an appreciating foreword to P. Maury's essay on Predestination (E.T. by E. Hudson as Predestination and other Papers [London: SCM, 1960]) Barth refers to Maury's presentation of Predestination as 'one of the best contributions made towards the understanding of the problem' because of his Christological grounding of the doctrine. Then Barth lists 'the rare theologians' who also belong to this 'solid ground'; they are Athanasius, Augustine, John Knox and Johannes Coccejus. (Ibid., p. 16) See also J. K. S. Reid's careful and critical investigation of the Office of Christ in the classic doctrine of Predestination which includes those of Calvin, Calvinism, Lutheranism and German Protestantism (J. K. S. Reid, 'The Office of Christ in Predestination,' SJTh 1 [1948]: 5-19, 166-83). Reid's conclusion runs along the same line as Barth's.
161 For Barth's historical survey, see CD II/2: 36-51.
understand the doctrine in *abstracto.* For 'all such approaches to the doctrine of election deal with God-in-general and man-in-general.' Here Barth provides his 'corrective theology': if we are really attentive to the biblical witness, we have to admit that 'from first to last the Bible directs us to the name of Jesus Christ.' Moreover, as we have seen in

162 Ibid., 49-51.

163 Jenson, *Alpha and Omega,* p. 143.

164 Here I borrow a catch word from P. L. Lehmann, 'The Changing Course of a Corrective Theology,' *ThTo* 13 (1956/57): 322-57, where he surveys Barth's Christological reorientation of Christian doctrines.

165 CD II/2: 53. The chief biblical passages Barth cites to support his Christological grounding are Eph. 1:4-5, 11; 3:10; Rom. 8:29-30. But the key words upon which he most heavily depends are those from Eph. 1:4a, 'καὶ Ἡμᾶς ἐξελέξατο ἡμᾶς ἐν αὐτῷ (viz., ἐν Χριστῷ) ἵνα καταληκτῇ κόσμῳ ...' (CD II/2: 60; also pp. 66, 67, 72, 88, 110-11, 116-17; also Gottes Gnadenwahl, p. 13; *Service of God,* p. 78). It is interesting to compare Barth's theological interpretation of 'ἐν αὐτῷ' with the New Testament commentators. Except for M. Barth's and Reid's explicit support (M. Barth, Ephesians 1-3 [New York: Doubleday, 1974], pp. 105-109; Reid, 'Predestination,' *SJTh* 1: 179-83), commentators show divergence in their interpretations of the 'ἐν αὐτῷ' formula. Pauline usage of 'in Christ' is by no means unitary (see F. Neugebauer, 'Das paulinische "IN CHRISTO,"' *NTS* 6 [1957/58]: 125-26; and id., 'IN CHRIUSTUS'. Eine Untersuchung zum paulinischen Glaubensverständnis [Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1961], esp. pp. 18-130). Even M. Barth has no objection to this: 'The impossibility of elaborating a final definition of the meaning of "in Christ" may well have a simple cause: namely that Paul used the formula in more than one sense.' (op. cit., p. 69; also J. K. S. Reid in his *Our Life in Christ* [London: SCM, 1963], pp. 25-28) 'The problem can be solved only by detailed exegesis of each particular instance.' (C. C. Caragounis, *The Ephesian Mysterion*: Meaning and Content [Lund: CWK Gleerup, 1977], p. 153) Thus to assert 'ἐν αὐτῷ' in Eph. 1:4 as dative of sphere would be an over-simplification of exegetical questions. Moreover, even if we confine ourselves to the study of Ephesians itself, exegetical uncertainties still remain. On the one hand, the usage of the phrase 'in Christ' in Ephesians has its own particular character and is different from other Pauline writings (see for example, J. A. Allan, 'The "in Christ" Formula in Ephesians,' *NTS* 5 [1958/59]: 54-62; C. L. Mitton, *The Epistle to the Ephesians* [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951]: 8; Neugebauer, *IN CHRIUSTUS,* pp. 175-81; A. Oepke, 'ἐν' in *TDNT* 2: 541; F. W. Beare, "Exegesis" to the Ephesians' in *IB* 10: 615). Thus Paul's particular usage of the 'in Christ' phrase indicating Christ's corporate and inclusive personality does not necessarily extend to the interpretation of Ephesians. On the other hand, as far as 'ἐν αὐτῷ' in Eph. 1:4 is concerned, 'dative of sphere' is not the only alternative among the commentators. The phrase can also include an *instrumental* use which means the election is carried into effect through Christ's salvific act (see for example, T. K. Abott, Ephesians in ICC, p. 6; E. F. Scott, *Colossians, Philemon and Ephesians* in Moffatt N. T. Commentary, pp. 139-40; G. Schrenk, 'ἐξάγωγα' in *TDNT* 4: 175). At least one commentator (Allan, op. cit., p. 57) strongly suggests that it is 'used in a purely instrumental sense.' No matter which position one might take, a 'dative of sphere'
our foregoing discussions, the divine Election must be understood in concreto. 166 'Thus when we think of the origin of grace and the beginning of all things, we cannot and must not think either of divine caprice or divine loving-kindness, for these are both general and therefore without real content. What we must think of is Jesus Christ.' 167

From his Christological concentration Barth pronounces his first basic proposition on divine Election: 'Jesus Christ is the electing God, the Subject of the eternal election of grace.' 168 No doubt this is a usage should not be simply assumed. Accordingly, we might suggest that Barth's interpretation of Election, which is exclusively and conclusively Christological, is built rather upon his theological scheme than on an exegetical ground, especially when the idea is extended to assert that Jesus Christ is the Subject and the Object of divine Election.

166 See supra, pp. 45-47.

167 CD II/2: 112; also pp. 107-108. For a discussion of Barth's 'konkrete Christologie' as a decisive factor in his reinterpretation of Election, see Gloege, 'Prädestinationslehre,' KuD 2: 209-217; also Sparn, '„Extra Internum"' in Die Realisierung der Freiheit, pp. 49-58. Moreover, from a wider perspective, since for Barth any knowledge of God must begin with Jesus Christ the incarnate Word, divine Election as a central aspect of the divine-human encounter is understood in no way but Christologically. Thus in the opening statements of his discussions on 'Jesus Christ as the electing and elected' Barth writes: 'Between God and man there stands the person of Jesus Christ, Himself God and Himself man, and so mediating between the two. In Him God reveals Himself to man. In Him man sees and knows God. In Him God stands before man and man stands before God, as is the eternal will of God, and the eternal ordination of man in accordance with this will. In Him God's plan for man is disclosed, God's judgment on man fulfilled, God's deliverance of man accomplished, God's gift to man present in fulness, God's claim and promise to man declared.' (CD II/2: 94).

168 Here again we have to discuss another 'biblical witness' proposed by Barth, viz., Jn.1:1-2 (CD II/2: 95-99). We will not go into the detail of exegetical problem as we did in n.165. Few commentators would deny that the pre-existent Christ had the simultaneity 'in the beginning' and shared the same divine nature with the Father. But this does not necessarily entail the affirmation that Jesus Christ is the Subject of election. (cf. Barth's earlier Einzelexegesis on the same prologue in his Erklärung des Johannesevangeliums, Kapitel 1-8 [1925/26, 1933] in GA 2: 22-35; Christ's 'Im-Anfang-bei-Gott-Sein' did not lead to any implication to identify Jesus Christ as the Subject of divine election). Even the classical economic Trinitarianism will not deny the co-existence of the Father and the Son, but it is the Father who willed the divine plan of world creation and redemption (see J. N. D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines [London: Adam & Charles Black, 1980], pp. 104-115; G. L. Prestige, God in Patristic Thought [London: William Heinemann, 1936], pp. 57-68, 98-103). Thus we would like to suggest again that the 'biblical witness' Barth cites can only supply a necessary condition and is not sufficient in itself to govern the
startling statement in view of the traditional doctrinal teaching. For to assert the Second Person in the divine Triad as the active Subject of election definitely violates the traditional 'economic Trinitarianism' which declares that 'with regard to the Trinitarian economy, divine election is called election by the Father simply, and is attributed to the Son on account of His being the solemn promise on behalf of the elect, and to the Holy Spirit on account of His being their attestation.' Then how can Barth support his case? Eberhard Jüngel suggests that it is the doctrine of *perichoresis* (περιχώρησις) which provides the grounding of Barth's Trinitarian theology, and also his doctrine of Election. The doctrine means that 'the divine modes of being mutually condition and permeate one another so completely that one is always in the other two and the other two in the one.' Here we confront a different concept of 'Person' than that in traditional Trinitarian theology, in which *Persona est naturae rationabilis individua substantia.* But for Barth, the inner life of proposition that 'Jesus Christ is the electing One.' Or, if Barth thinks he really does, it is because he is presupposing a different trinitarian understanding, viz., the idea of *perichoresis*, as we shall see in our later discussions. Also concerning other passages in the Gospel of St. John (13: 18; 15:16, 19) Barth cites for support (CD II/2: 106), one has to ask whether all those passages can be applied to the doctrine of Election in general, or should they be confined to Jesus' selection of the disciples during his earthly ministry (Cf. C. K. Barrett, *The Gospel According to St. John* [London: SPCK, 1960], pp. 370, 398, 400; also R. Schnackenburg, *The Gospel According to St. John*, trans. D. Smith & G. A. Kon [London: Burns & Oates, 1982] 3: 23-24, 111, 115). Since the 'biblical witnesses' employed by Barth seem insufficient to provide the case for a radical revision of the doctrine of Election concerning Jesus Christ as the active Subject, one has to seek an answer within Barth's theological scheme.


172 CD I/1: 370.

173 See Barth's critical review of the word *persona* in the history of Trinitarian doctrine, ibid., pp. 355-58. As a result, Barth prefers to use the word 'Seinsweise' instead of 'Persona'.
God (God's divine ontology) is an 'uninterrupted cycle of the three modes of being' which is not Nebeneinander, but Miteinander and Ineinander.¹⁷⁴ 'None would be what it is (not even the Father) without its co-existence with the others ... but all three "in-exist" or exist only in concert as modes of being of the one God and Lord who posits Himself from eternity to eternity.¹⁷⁵ Under this 'Being-with' ontology, the dialectic of 'unity in trinity' and 'trinity in unity' becomes not only uncontradictory but necessary.¹⁷⁶ But then where is the 'threeness' in the Trinity? Again this leads us back to our previous point that 'God's Being is in His acts.' God's three Seinsweisen is His threefold repetition in acts as God the Creator, the Reconciler and the Redeemer, a repetitio aeternitatis in aeternitate.¹⁷⁷ Robert W. Jenson provides us with a good summary of this doctrine of the repetitio:

[The threeness in God must] be understood not as three instances of one deity but as three events of one deity: God is God, and then is God again and again, each time in a different way. Barth's entire position can be stated in one sentence: "The name of Father, Son, and Spirit says that God is the one God in a triple repetition, and in such a way that this repetition itself is grounded in his deity, that is, in such a way that ... only in this repetition is he the one God."¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁵ CD I/I: 370.
¹⁷⁶ See a good discussion of Barth's concept of Person in his Trinitarian theology (with an emphasis on the 'Begriff relationes substantiales' and a comparison with British Trinitarian theologians like Leonard Hodgson) by Z. Trtík, 'Der Personbegriff im dogmatischen Denken Karl Barth's,' NZSTh 5 (1963): 263-77. See also supra., pp. 17-19, our discussion of Barth's ontology of fellow-humanity, which is an analogia relationis from his Trinitarian understanding. As stated in CD III/I: 185, 'the co-existence and co-operation in God Himself being repeated in the relation of man to man ... This is first constitutive for God, and then for man created by God. To remove it is tantamount to removing the divine from God as well as the human from man.' See also Trtík, 'Personbegriff,' NZSTh 5: 272-73, 277-95.
From the doctrines of *perichoresis* and *repetitio* Barth can fully assert his personalistic understanding of God as the 'indissoluble Subject'. And at the same time they provide the ground for the statement that 'Jesus Christ is the electing God': From a *perichoretic* point of view, when God elects from the beginning, 'He [viz., Jesus Christ] too, with the Father and the Holy Spirit, is the electing God.' For 'there is no such thing as Godhead in itself. Godhead is always the Godhead of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit ... There is no such thing as *decretum absolutum*. There is no such thing as a will of God apart from the will of Jesus Christ.' Also, if God's Being is in His acts, 'He, Jesus Christ, is the free grace of God as not content simply to remain identical with the inward and eternal being of God, but operating *ad extra* in the ways and works of God.' And thus according to the doctrine of *repetitio*, divine election as God's act cannot be conventionally divided into parts, viz., the Father as the active Subject and the Son as a passive Object. Of course, Barth's Christological statement of Election is not merely an implication of or just another way to stress the radicality of his Trinitarian understanding. To be more precise, Jesus Christ as the active Subject in divine election means that 'God in the second mode of being (the Son's) determines himself to be the God who elects the man Jesus and chooses oneness with him, makes the Son the object of an election taking place in God himself ... The eternal Son *elects* his election by the Father. Thus in the intratrinitarian being he elects *obedience*.' Here the actual manner of God's self-election is concretely manifested, and the whole picture of divine election is furnished within the intratrinitarian Being. That is to say,

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179 See CD I/1: 348.  
180 CD II/2: 105, 115.  
181 Ibid., p. 95.  
182 Jüngel, *Trinity*, p. 73. Also CD II/2: 103, 105.  
183 CD II/2: 105.
if the Son elects obedience to be the elected One, 'then, as the Subject whose election is always absolutely right. And it follows that its election is absolutely unconditioned, or is conditioned only by the Subject in and for itself and as such.'\footnote{184} Thus the election of God as 'an act of unconditional self-determination \([\text{unbedingte Selbstimmung}]\)' is stressed again through the affirmation of 'Jesus Christ as the Subject of divine election.'

Barth's Christological interpretation of election as God's self-determination leads to our consideration of his second assertion, viz., 'Jesus Christ is the elected man.' For the concept of God's self-election implies a 'double reference -- to the elector and to the elected.'\footnote{185} If Jesus Christ is the electing One who elects Himself 'independently of all outward constraint, conditioning or compulsion,'\footnote{186} then the second assertion is not only self-evident but also demands an \textit{all-inclusive} connotation, viz., Jesus Christ 'is not merely one of the elect but the elect of God ... He does not stand alongside the rest of the elect, but before and above them as the One who is originally and properly the Elect.' As the God who wills Himself (as man), the election of Jesus Christ 'is the original and all-inclusive election; the election which is absolutely unique, but which in this very uniqueness is universally meaningful and efficacious, because it is the election of Him who Himself elects.'\footnote{187} According

\footnote{184} Ibid., p. 100. Italics mine.  
\footnote{185} Ibid., p. 103. Since the divine election is God's \textit{self-election}, the first assertion (concerning the Subject) and the second assertion (concerning the Object) are logically interconnected. 'Thus the second assertion rests on the first, and for the sake of the second the first ought never to be denied or passed over.' (Ibid., p. 116).  
\footnote{186} Ibid., p. 100.  
\footnote{187} Ibid., pp. 116, 117; italics mine. Barth's 'biblical witness' for this 'second assertion' is surprisingly weak. Except for Eph 1:4 (which we have critically discussed in \textit{supra}, p. 49, n.165), all the passages Barth provides are only indirect references (see \textit{CD II/2}: 117-18). At least there is no passage which can be pushed to such an extent as in Barth's elaboration. For a general discussion of the relationship between 'systematischer Darlegung' and 'exegetischer Begründung' in Barth's doctrine of Predestination, see Buess, \textit{Prädestinationslehre}, pp. 42-52.
to this all-inclusive Election, Barth declares his 'vicarious theory' of Reconciliation:

As He [viz., the Son of God] became [wurde] Christ, so we become [werden] Christians. As He became [wurde] our Head, so we become [werden] His body and members. As He became [wurde] the object of our faith, so we become [werden] believers in Him. What we have to consider in the elected man Jesus is, then, the destiny of human nature, its exaltation to fellowship with God, and the manner of its participation in this exaltation by the free grace of God. 188

The contrasting tenses employed in our last quotation (viz., 'wurde' and 'werden') indicate clearly Barth's definite position in Christ's all-inclusive representation of man's destiny and the universal efficacy of His reconciled act. Here we can see how Barth's entire doctrine of Reconciliation is rooted in Election: If Jesus Christ is in His one Person the electing God and elected man, we 'in Him' are elected 'with His own election.' 189 Thus God's reconciliation with man is furnished not only with the Work of Christ (the atonement) but also through His Person (the incarnation). In another words, there is no way to separate the Person and the Work of Christ in Barth's doctrine of Reconciliation. 190 In fact, one can see how Barth's schematization of Reconciliation is predominantly governed by his perspective on the twofold Person of Jesus Christ, viz., 'the reconciling God who became man,' 'the very man who is exalted and therefore reconciled by God,' and 'in the unity of the two the guarantor and witness of our atonement.' 191 And the grounding of these 'downward' and 'upward' movements in Jesus Christ's one Person, as we have seen, are correspondingly originated in God's eternal self-election in Christ that the electing One became the elected, and the elected is exalted to fellowship with the

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188 Ibid., p. 118; italics mine. See also ibid., pp. 104, 120-27.
189 Ibid., p. 117.
190 The unity of Christ's 'work' and 'person' has been mentioned in our previous discussions, see supra, pp. 16, 18, n.23, 37.
191 See CD IV/1: 79, the title statements. Also supra, pp. 32-33. n.96.
Elector. Thus as we are elected 'in Him' all-inclusively, through the vicarious humanity of Jesus Christ we are also inclusively reconciled to God.\footnote{See the discussion of Stock, *Anthropologie der Verheißung*, pp. 65-72.} This alteration in the human situation has already taken place \[geschehene Veränderung\]. This being is self-contained. It does not have to be reached or created. It has already come \[auf den Plan geführte\] and cannot be removed.\footnote{CD IV/1: 90.} The vicarious character of God's reconciling act is explicitly expressed in the following quotation:

"Jesus Christ for us" means that as this one true man Jesus Christ has taken the place of us men, of many, in all the authority and omnipotence and competence of the one true God, in order to act in our name and therefore validly and effectively for us in all matters of reconciliation with God and therefore of our redemption and salvation, representing us without any co-operation on our part ... It has happened fully and exclusively in Him, excluding any need for completion. Whatever may happen in consequence of the fact that Jesus Christ is for us cannot add to it. It can only be the consequence of that which has taken place fully in Him and needs no completion. We can speak of it only as we look back to the fact that this One has acted as very man and very Son of God, that He has acted as our Representative and in our name, that His incarnation, His way of obedience has had and has fulfilled as its ultimate meaning and purpose the fact that He willed to do this and has done it: His activity as our Representative and Substitute.\footnote{Ibid., p. 230; italics mine; also pp. 249-52, 548-55, 'It [viz., God's reconciled act] happened for us, but it happened without us, without our co-operating or contributing. Even the intellectual activity of our understanding and explaining cannot add to what happened and is effective.' (p. 249) CD II/1: 155-56; see also *Christ and Adam*, pp. 3-4, 6, 10, 23-24, 41-45.}

But two questions may be raised at this point: First, how does this ontologically predestinated being of man find its actualization in concrete human phenomena? Second, would there be any philosophical position to which Barth's doctrine corresponds, in view of its theological history?\footnote{The question itself seems 'unbarthian' enough. But since we are in a critical interpretation, it is legitimate to go beyond Barth's own criteria. In fact, Barth himself once also recognized that 'linguistically theologians have always depended on some philosophy and linguistically they always will' (CD I/1: 378), although he tries to be an exception. However, Barth also talks about 'philosophical stands' when he interprets historical figures in theology. For example, see *From Rousseau to Ritschl*, pp. 306-309, 331-32, 340 (on Schleiermacher); 391-92 (on Ritschl).}
We shall start with the latter question.

Barth's emphasis on the objective side of Jesus Christ's vicarious atonement can be traced back to Anselm's *Cur Deus Homo* before the revival of Aristotelianism in the thirteenth-century. In his endeavours to establish the universal validity of Christ's offering to all men, Anselm logically presupposes the vicarious character of Christ's Person. As Richard W. Southern rightly comments, 'this agrees with his general tendency to think of the species [viz., a single representative of the race] as more real than its individual components.' Although one can hardly place Barth within the medieval Realists, as far as Christ's vicarious humanity in Reconciliation is concerned, Barth's understanding is

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196 Perhaps Barth's theological relationship with Anselm is usually shadowed by his study *Anselm: Fidei Quaerens Intellectum*. But we can discover a surprising affinity between their doctrines of Atonement regarding the vicarious humanity of Christ, in spite of Barth's explicit rejection of Anselm's 'satisfaction theory' (see, for example, *CD IV*: 253).


Platonic. But how could this classical 'ontological realism' appeal to the modern mind? We shall proceed to discuss it towards the end of this chapter. But before we move on to our next section, we must seek to answer the first question we raised above; viz., in what manner does man's ontologically predestinated being find its actualization in concrete human phenomena?

For Barth, the actualization of God's eternal will in human phenomena can be seen in two categories, viz., the community (Israel and the Church) and the individual. But first what is the 'eternal will' of God? In contrast to the 'older exponents', who confine their attention to the consideration of how among all mankind God wills that some 'should be predestinated to salvation and others to destruction,' Barth sees a much

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200 J. Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion III, 21, 1 (E.T. by H. Beveridge [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1981 reprint] 2: 202). See also Garrigou-Lagrange, Predestination, pp. 24-31, which summarizes the 'principle questions' of Predestination (from a Catholic point of view) in two points: (i) 'How can predestination, which is infallible in its effect, be reconciled with the will to save all mankind, since the salvation of many will not be realized?' (p. 24) (ii) 'Why has God placed in the number of the elect this person and not that other? Why has He chosen Peter rather than Judas, and not vice versa?' (p. 25)
wider perspective in the light of Jesus Christ who accomplishes the election all-inclusively as being the Subject and the Object. First, if Jesus Christ in his one Person represents all mankind, rejection (judgement) and election (mercy) are only the two sides of the one eternal will of God.201 'The content of the eternal divine predestination' took place 'in the incarnation of the Son of God, in His death and passion, in His resurrection from the dead.'202 Thus if judgement and mercy together belong to the 'history' of Jesus Christ, it also belongs to all mankind -- not election to some and reprobation to others. But what is this one (and not two) eternal will we find in the knowledge of Jesus Christ? The answer has no ambiguity: Jesus took the condemnation and death so that man as sinner is justified and sins are forgiven in Christ. It is the way from Golgotha to the glory of resurrection, from humiliation to exaltation, from divine No to the divine Yes, and not vice versa.203 From this we can see a disproportionate and asymmetric praedestinatio gemina. The eternal will of God in the election of Jesus Christ is not an equilibrium of rejection and election, but from rejection to election; not to life or death, but from death to life.204 Here Barth's Christological revision of the classical doctrine of double Predestination is explicit: Instead of speculating the 'secret counsel' of God's foreordination to some for eternal life and others for eternal damnation which is a 'mystery' between 'the unknown God and unknown man,'205 the two-edged nature of Predestination is revealed and also furnished through the one Person's history of Jesus Christ. 'We have a right understanding,' Barth says, 'in God's eternal purpose it is God Himself who is rejected in His Son ... in order that we might not be rejected.'206

201 CD II/2: 162.
202 Ibid., p. 161.
203 See ibid., pp. 161-75.
204 Ibid., pp. 174-75.
205 See ibid., pp. 146-54.
206 Ibid., pp. 167-68.
With this revealed will of God's election in Jesus Christ, Barth tries to show that within the realm of concrete human phenomena -- as community and as the individual -- man's existence is destined to be nothing other than a reflection and repetition of the twofold determination of Jesus Christ Himself. Concerning the election of the community as the necessary mediating election, the twofold form of Jesus Christ's 'double predestination' corresponds to the existence of Israel and the Church. Thus the existence of Israel reflects the form of 'judgement', 'man's hearing of God's Word yet unbelieving' and 'resisting God's mercy in process of passing away.' And the Church contrastingly reflects the form of 'mercy', 'man's believing the Word of God' and 'the coming of the new man for fellowship with God.' Moreover, since there is only one eternal will of God in the election of Jesus Christ (viz., from judgement to mercy), Barth contends from his exposition of Romans 9-11 that the Jews are not 'rejected', but through their failure God shows His pure grace and mercy. Thus the decisive factor in the case of Israel is 'human turning away from the electing God,' and in the case of the Church is 'the turning of the electing God towards man. These are the two forms of the elected community, the two poles between which its history moves (in a unilateral direction, from here to there), but in such a way that the bow of the one


208 CD II/2: 205-305.

covenant arches over the whole.' Along with this twofold yet unified form of the elected community, Barth again furnishes his thesis of Christ's vicarious election: 'the election of the community is included in the election of Jesus Christ, if in and with Jesus Christ it is the object of this primal act of the free love of God, then we must inevitably expect that in its election too we will encounter this twofold (and in its twofoldness single) direction of the eternal will of God.'

When we come to Barth's treatise on the election of the individual, we encounter a similar picture:

It is strictly and narrowly only in the humanity of the one Jesus Christ that we can see who and what an elect person is ... It is He who is the elect individual. If there are others who are also elect, it is as a result of and in virtue of the fact that He is originally and properly elect, and that they are included in His election ... As the election of Jesus Christ finds its scope and completion in His representative rejection, and as conversely this very representative rejection confirms His election, so the elect and the rejected do not stand only against one another, but also alongside and for one another ... It is for this reason that the elect and the rejected, in spite of the greatest dissimilarities, can see that in many respects they are only too similar.

As the representative, Jesus Christ's vicarious rejection and election includes every individual. And since the eternal will of God in the election of Jesus Christ is one and not two, the twofold form (viz., judgement and mercy) finds its convergence in one divine Yes in the love and grace of God. Therefore even a 'rejected' man 'who isolates himself' and is 'against' and 'ungrateful' to God, 'can only have been rejected with

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210 CD II/2: 200; italics mine. There is another argument by Barth which attempts to show the unity in the twofold election of Israel and the Church. It is Barth's contention of a temporal pre-existence of the Church in Israel (ibid., pp. 212-13; 239-40; 266-67). We will not discuss this in detail here. For a critique, see O'Grady, Church in Catholic Thought, pp. 35-42.

211 CD II/2: 197. Italics mine.

212 Ibid., pp. 350-54. Italics mine.

213 Ibid., p. 499.
Jesus Christ. He cannot be rejected any more.\textsuperscript{214} They are also fulfilling God's electing will by representing man's desperate need for the Gospel and the overcoming power of God's grace against what is denied.\textsuperscript{215} From this perspective, Judas Iscariot 'did share actively even in the positive task of the apostleship by his very παραδόσων, viz., the 'handing-over' of Jesus to the death.\textsuperscript{216}

In concluding this section, a particular feature in Barth's endeavour should be mentioned again: We have seen that the actualization of God's eternal will in concrete human phenomena as the community and the individual is precisely a repetition of what has happened in the history of Jesus Christ's election. God's predestinated decree is carried out unmistakably because it should be, for we are elected 'in Him' all-inclusively. In this respect, Barth's methodology tends to be deductive, rather than a realistic consideration of the concrete phenomena. The issue might be clarified as follows: There are two kinds of consideration we should distinguish when we are asked 'what will happen when man is disobedient to God's election?'\textsuperscript{217} The first consideration is 'what will happen to the person himself (or the community herself) who performs the act of disobedience?' And the second consideration can be: As an event within the realm of causal relations, what will happen to the 'world' (the universe of human existence) when a certain act of disobedience is performed?\textsuperscript{218} In view of Barth's discussions, his concern is predominantly with the latter.\textsuperscript{219} For Israel's disobedient existence, for Barth, serves the duty (as a community) of

\textsuperscript{214} 'Es kann der verworfene Mensch mit Jesus Christus als Verworfener nur gewesen, nur nicht mehr da sein.' (KD II/2: 502)
\textsuperscript{215} CD II/2: 455-58.
\textsuperscript{216} Ibid., p. 482.
\textsuperscript{217} Barth's discussion of this question can be found in ibid., pp. 205-210; 235-37; 262-64; 453-58; 480-506.
\textsuperscript{218} That is to say, the results of a disobedient act upon the agent himself or upon the realm of history -- taking the act as a causal entity -- belong to different categories of consideration and should not be confused.
\textsuperscript{219} See passages quoted in supra, n.217.
'reflecting' and 'demonstrating' God's judgement, and is also the 'special witness to the passing of the old man and his world.' And the distinctive purpose of the existence of the rejected individual is 'to manifest that which is denied and overcome by the Gospel.' While it is undoubtedly correct that 'the purpose of the election is service' and 'the vessel of dishonour which the potter makes is still something that he wants, and has a definite use,' what happens to the disobedient agent himself should not be overlooked. But when we push our inquiry into this particular area of concern, we encounter a dilemma: On the one hand, Barth asserts that 'with Jesus Christ the rejected can only have been rejected. He cannot be rejected any more.' Yet on the other hand, 'as a wrong-doer' man should be 'condemned and rejected and abandoned by God.' Also concerning Israel's disobedience, Walther Eichrodt rightly observes that the idea of a covenant which is 'bound up with certain conditions, already 223 In fact, to perceive from an historical scale that God can show His mercy even through His judgement of man's disobedience, doctrinally speaking, is more like a problem of divine Providence, than of divine Election. Although Barth shows his awareness of the difference between the two when he says that '[predestination] is a matter of the eternal decree ... Providence, however, belongs to the execution of this decree' (CD III/3: 5; cf. also CD II/2: 45-48), his attention always moves quickly from discussing the immediate consequence upon the one who disobeys, to its function of demonstrating (and thus witnessing) God's sovereign love and mercy in human history (see passages quoted in supra n.217). Thus it is not surprising to find nearly all the main topics concerning God's mercy in His judgement are taken up again in CD III/3 where the doctrine of Providence is discussed (cf. CD II/2: 206-213, 278-84; and CD III/3: 210-26 [concerning history of the Jews]; CD II/2: 224, 352-409; and CD III/3: 351-65 [concerning God's judgement as opus alienum in His 'left hand' and God's mercy as opus proprium in His 'right hand', which is God's one divine act in twofold nature]). But even though one cannot deny the close connexion between Election and Providence, what happens to the disobedient person himself is a genuine question -- at least in doctrinal history -- which cannot simply be replaced by an affirmation in Providential doctrine.
implies the possibility of annulment."226 How could we reconcile the two apparently contradictory propositions that 'in Jesus Christ we have been judged, so that man is not under God's judgement any more' versus 'God did judge when man disobeyed'? Three alternatives may be suggested: First, instead of taking the first proposition as an 'universal affirmative', one interprets it as a hypothetical statement.227 But in view of our previous discussion of the vicarious character of God's election in Jesus Christ,228 any proposal which conditions its universal efficacy is to be rejected. If so, another alternative is to understand the words 'judgement\textsubscript{1}' and 'judgement\textsubscript{2}' in the two propositions with different connotations. While 'judgement\textsubscript{2}' is conceived as the immediate consequence of human disobedience, the 'judgement\textsubscript{1}' has to be conceived in an eschatological sense. Barth pronounces that even 'the man who is isolated over against God' still 'belongs eternally to Jesus Christ and therefore is not rejected, but elected by God in Jesus Christ.'229 But in doing so, Barth is charged by his critics to be bearing a doctrine of apokatastasis.230 Yet regarding


227 Viz., an antecedent is added, and the statement becomes 'in Jesus Christ we have been judged, so that man is not under God's judgement any more; provided that ... ('man has faith,' or, 'man accepts God's salvific act in Christ,' etc.))

228 Supra, pp. 54-56.

229 CD II/2: 306. Italics mine.

this charge, it seems that Barth also rejects. So we come to our final alternative: If the first proposition which defines man's ontological determination should be maintained, then our second proposition which is a concrete consideration of human phenomena is an 'illusion'. That is to say, the so-called 'human disobedience' has no genuine existence, an 'impossible possibility' without ontological status; and God's judgement

231 See CD IV/3.1: 477. Also J. D. Bettis, 'Is Karl Barth a Universalist?' SJTh 20 (1967): 423-36. Further discussion will be found in infra, pp. 74-77.

232 On defining the election of the individual, Barth writes that the choice of the godless man is 'void' (nichtig), for 'he belongs eternally to Jesus Christ and therefore is not rejected.' (CD II/2: 306) Since the adjective 'nichtig' is employed here to describe godless man's disobedience, it is natural for us to associate the idea with Barth's discussion of 'Gott und das Nichtige' in KD III/3, sec. 50, where he uses the paradoxical expression 'impossible possibility' (CD III/3: 531). Here Barth is employing an expression containing two levels of existence: while the first word, 'impossible', is talking about an ontological realm, the second word, 'possibility', concerns concrete human phenomena. Thus when Barth comes to a more specific discussion of human disobedience, he uses the expressions 'Godlessness is not, therefore, a possibility, but an ontological impossibility for man [die ontologische Unmöglichkeit des Menschenseins]' and 'sin is for man an ontological impossibility [ontologische Unmöglichkeit der Sünde]' (CD III/2: 136, 146). But why is human disobedience as sin ontologically impossible? The answer is again rooted in divine Election. As G. C. Berkouwer observes, 'Barth, in speaking about the ontological impossibility of sin, continually uses the expression "beforehand". Man was destined beforehand, he was from the beginning appointed, to participate as conqueror in the history of the struggle against the enemy of creaturely being in "the history of victory which Jesus Christ has unfold." Sin is ontologically impossible because sin means a falling away from grace and it is precisely God's premordial will that our unfaithfulness should not put to nought His faithfulness.' (Berkouwer, Triumph of Grace, p. 227) Thus man is 'ontologically determined' to be with God, and when one chooses evil and enters into conflict with God, he is making himself impossible (see supra, pp. 15-16). But here comes the problematic: If human disobedience is without ontological status, why does it become 'possible'? As we have seen (supra, pp. 26-30, 32-38), Barth never tends to play down the significance of sin: The 'ability for which there is no reason, the mad and incomprehensible possibility of sin, is a sorry fact;' 'man is able to sin, and actually does so' (CD III/2: 205). But can this peculiar paradox of 'impossible possibility' only be understood as 'no reason', 'mad' and 'incomprehensible'? Semantically the expression 'possible to' implies 'can' and indicates what is capable of being so (cf. A. R. White's careful scrutiny of the adjective 'possible' in his Modal Thinking [Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1975], pp. 5-18, esp. 5-7, 16). In fact Barth seems to be holding an even stronger position when he declares that "whosoever committeth sin is the servant of sin" (Jn. 8:34). In this briefest of biblical formulations we have the whole doctrine of the bondage of the will. Non potest non peccare is what we have to say of the sinful, slothful man. His sin
as a response to man's disobedience is merely God's opus alienum of mercy. Perhaps our last alternative is the nearest to Barth's understanding. But if this is the case, Barth seems to extend his ontological definition deductively into the noetic realm, and regard those human phenomena as simply 'non-actual' (unwirklich). In this respect,

excludes his freedom, just as his freedom excludes his sin. There is no middle position.' (CD IV/2: 495) But in this case, how can we reconcile the logically contradictory statements that 'ontologically man is non potest peccare' and 'non potest non peccare'? Perhaps the only alternative is to place the two statements in two very different planes of reality, which one would find it very difficult to bridge. That is to say, if Barth maintains that man's ontological determination is 'really' real, then the concrete human phenomena are only 'apparently' real. Cf. Barth's reply to Berkouwer's critique in CD IV/3.1: 173-80, where he reaffirms that evil as an 'impossible possibility' belongs to a completely different kind of reality (esp. pp. 176-79). See also Cone, 'Man in Theology of Barth,' pp. 146-55.

233 The apparent character of God's judgement as a strange work of His love can be found in Barth's discussion of God's opus alienum and opus proprium on the Left Hand and the Right Hand (CD III/3: 349-68). Certainly the idea that God shows His mercy even in His judgement is clearly implied in the biblical teaching, especially in God's covenantal relationship with Israel. As Th. C. Vriezen rightly remarks, 'He [God] always shows His mercy in one way or another, there always remains a call to repentance and with it the possibility of repentance, and there is always a remnant that is saved. Even though some prophets consider the possibility of being saved problematical at a certain moment (Amos v. 15, and elsewhere), yet they always keep hoping for a restoration.' (Th. C. Vriezen, An Outline of Old Testament Theology, trans. S. Neuijen [Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958], p. 274) But while undoubtedly emphasizing the faithful and initiating character of God's mercy even when He punishes, the Scripture never goes so far to assert the 'insubstantiality', 'no perpetuity' and emptiness of God's jealousy, wrath and judgement on His left hand as the opus alienum (cf. CD III/3: 360-63). Perhaps Berkouwer is right when he comments that "Barth does indeed acknowledge the "reaction" of God against sin, but his emphasis on the a priori power of God's "initiative" threatens to swallow up this acknowledgement. Barth speaks of the fearful reality of sin, but at the same time he holds to the ontological impossibility of sin because a transition from wrath to grace in history has already been excluded and has been changed into a conception in which wrath is no more than "the form of grace." The initiative of grace wholly absorbs the full historical significance of evil ...' (Triumph of Grace, p. 253).

McLelland's charge that Barth is working on an 'analytic a posteriori' is not unjust. 235

3. God's election is in freedom and grace.

For Barth, the function of Election 'is to bear basic testimony to eternal, free and unchanging grace as the beginning of all the ways and works of God.' 236 Thus in Barth's understanding, 'freedom' and 'grace' constitute the essential character of divine Election. 237 These ideas have already emerged in our foregoing discussions. In this section we are going to work out a brief summary of them, in order to see their theological implications.

The idea of divine freedom finds its clearest expression in Barth's discussion of God's self-determination in His eternal self-election. 238

235 McLelland, 'Philosophy and Theology,' Footnotes to a Theology, p. 34. To cite just one example: In discussing the illusive character of man's freedom to sin or not to sin, Barth maintains that 'it cannot be either proved or disproved by empirical findings or a priori reflections. As a corollary to the confession of the freedom which has been won for us and granted to us in the man Jesus it is a theological statement -- a statement of faith.' (CD IV/2: 494. Italics except 'a priori' are mine)

236 It cannot be either proved or disproved by empirical findings or a priori reflections.

237 If 'the confession of freedom' is neither 'synthetic' (viz., 'empirical findings') nor 'a priori', then what kind of logical status this 'theological statement' belongs to? Perhaps to call it 'analytic a posteriori' would not be unjust. (The word 'analytic' here is not used in a strictly Kantian way. Rather, it emphasizes the definitional and unconditional character of a truth statement. Cf. McLelland, op. cit., pp. 38-39) Cf. also KD II/l: 3, 'Wo die Wirklichkeit ist, da ist auch die entsprechende Möglichkeit. Die Frage nach dieser kann dann nicht mehr in abstracto, sondern nur noch in concreto, nicht mehr a priori, sondern nur noch a posteriori gestellt werden.' (Italics mine) Here we can see the manner of Barth's theological methodology: It is always a move from the defined reality to the corresponding possibility, and not vice versa (though it is done not in abstracto, but working as a posteriori). Thus D. F. Ford dramatically describes that 'Barth] leaves his magnum opus standing like a ... formally simple and consistent sculpture -- a spiral round and round the self-expression of God in time.' ('Conclusion: Assessing Barth' in Barth: Theological Method, p. 201. See also R. H. Roberts's more critical assessment in 'Ideal and Real' in New Studies, pp. 178-79).

238 As Gloege, 'Prädestinationslehre,' KuD 2: 203 rightly remarks, when Barth employs the term 'Gnadewahl', the ideas of 'grace' (Gnade) and 'freedom' (Wahl, which implies 'Freiheit') have already suggested.
Divine freedom is rooted in and springs from God's own Being who is in His acts: 239

Freedom is, of course, more than the absence of limits, restrictions, or conditions ... But freedom in its positive and proper qualities mean to be grounded in one's own being, to be determined and moved by oneself. This is the freedom of the divine life and love. In this positive freedom of His, God is also unlimited, unrestricted and unconditioned from without. He is the free Creator, the free Reconciler, the free Redeemer. 240

The ground of divine freedom is God's glory: 241 'God's glory is God Himself in the truth and capacity and act in which He makes Himself known as God. This truth and capacity and act are the triumph, the very core, of His freedom.' 242 And out of this glory, perfect sovereignty and 'innertrinitarian freedom', there is God's freedom im opus ad extra. 243 Concerning God's freedom towards what is outside Himself, Barth's concept of 'God's self-determination' also has its dialectical character of negative and positive aspects. Negatively, 'self-determination' means 'God's freedom from external conditions;' viz., God's freedom means 'that of the unconditioned or absolute [den des Unbedingten oder Absoluten].' 244 Yet

239 See supra., pp. 44-47.
240 CD II/1: 301; italics mine. Here Barth distinguishes what he calls the 'essential positive quality' (eigentliche Positivität) from the 'negative aspect' (negative Seite) of God's freedom. If the 'negative aspect' is concerned with God's 'action towards what is outside Himself,' there is a 'positive aspect' of God's freedom within 'His own inner being.' (Ibid., pp. 302-304).
242 CD II/1: 641. Also ibid., 'God's glory is not only His right but His power to do all this. It is the power of His divine being to be in control and to act as God.' For a discussion of 'freedom as energy' in Barth's theology, see Hendry, 'Freedom of God,' SJTh 31: 235.
243 For a survey of God's innertrinitarian freedom, see Hedinger, Freiheitsbegriff, pp. 33-38. CD II/1: 309, 'The freedom of God is primarily and fundamentally defined as God's freedom in Himself, and only from that point of view understood as His independence of the world ... If, then, the freedom of God is understood secondarily in His relationship to that which is other than Himself, which exists through Him and in subordination to Him, as His true immanence as well as His true transcendence.'
244 CD II/1: 302, 303; see also CD II/2: 99-101. Thus Härle, Sein und Gnade, p. 61, 'Gottes („negative“) Freiheit im Akt seiner Offenbarung ist demnach zu verstehen als seine Unverfügbarkeit für den Menschen.' Also pp. 64-65.
diagonically, it is because of this 'radical autonomy', God can -- in the exercise of His freedom -- give Himself and enter into communion with the reality other than Himself. And in faithfully maintaining the communion, 'God must not only be unconditioned but, in the absoluteness in which He sets up this fellowship, He can and will also be conditioned.' But this never means a diminishing of God's freedom as self-determination, for the initiative is always on God's side. And concerning God's freedom in His divine election, we find the strongest claim of absolute self-determination and the unconditional character:

In electing, God decides according to His good-pleasure ... and the decision itself, are independent of all other decisions, of all creaturely decisions. His decision precedes every creaturely decision. Over against all creaturely self-determination it is pre-determination -- prae-destinatio ... Nor can it be held up or rendered nugatory and ineffective by any contradiction or opposition on the part of the creature ... We can put it more simply: They aim at an understanding of grace as grace. For what kind of


\[246\] CD II/1: 303. Italics mine. Also when Barth discusses God's act upon the prayers, he declares that 'we need not hesitate to say that "on the basis of the freedom of God Himself is conditioned by the prayer of faith" ... He wills not only to hear but to hearken, that He does actually hearken, that His own can meet Him in what is finally not a passive but a supremely active attitude ... God's glory is not diminished by the fact that He gives this new activity to His creatures on the basis of His new work, being manifested as the One who is so free, so much the Master and Worker of all things, that He can limit Himself and let Himself be conditioned by faith in Him.' (Ibid., pp. 510-12; italics mine) Cf. also Hedinger's discussions of the 'nominalistic' and the 'non-nominalistic' characters in Barth's concept of divine freedom, in Freiheitsbegriff, pp. 23-46.

\[247\] It only shows a concrete understanding of God's freedom which is always in His love, in contrast to a general and abstract description of the divine attributes (see CD II/1: 320-21). Thus Barth concludes that 'the freedom of God and the love of God have become comprehensible to us in all their comprehensibility as the basic determinations of His being ... neither of them is lost in any single moment of His being and life. Thus both are His self-determination. Both are God Himself. And in both He is and remains one and the same.' (Ibid., p. 658; italics mine) Thus Härle, Sein und Gnade, p. 62, concludes, 'Gottes ("positive") Freiheit im Akt seiner Offenbarung ist demgemäß zu verstehen als die realisierte Möglichkeit seiner Zuwendung zum Menschen.'
grace is it that is conditioned and constrained, and not free grace and freely electing grace? 248

With this concept of God's absolute freedom as self-determination in His divine election, Barth rejects any possibility of Arminianism, which contends 'for the dignity of man standing over against Jesus Christ in an autonomous freedom of decision.' 249 Thus 'it is palpable that what the Remonstrants [viz., Arminians] brought ... [was] a feeble postlude to the Catholicism of the late Middle Ages, and a feeble prelude to rationalist-pietistic Neo-Protestantism.' 250

The concept of grace denotes another central idea in Barth's doctrine of Election: 251

[Church doctrine] must always give glory to God and bear witness to God as the gracious God. But the gracious God is the One who

248 CD II/2: 19.

249 Ibid., p. 68. The Arminians' idea of human responsibility over against God's divine sovereignty can be seen from the following Articles in the 'Articuli Arminiani sive Remonstrantia' of 1610: Art. 1: Concerning the conditional Predestination which depends on the foreseen faith or unbelief of man. Art. 2: Concerning the salvability of sinners, 'That, agreeably thereto, Jesus Christ, the Saviour of the world, died for all men and for every man ... Yet that no one actually enjoys this forgiveness of sins except the believer ...' Art. 4: Concerning the resistible grace, 'That this grace of God is the beginning, continuance, and accomplishment of all good ... But as respects the mode of the operation of this grace, it is not irresistable ...' For a complete version of the Five Arminian Articles, see P. Schaff, The Creeds of Christendom, vol. 3: The Evangelical Protestant Creeds, with Translations (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1877), pp. 545-49; italics mine. Cf. also ibid., vol. 1: The History of Creeds, pp. 516-19. Against these articles, Barth criticizes that for the Arminians, 'in the understanding of God and His relationship with man, in the question of the formulation of Christian doctrine, the criterion or measure of all things must always be man, i.e., man's conception of that which is right, and rational, and worthy, therefore, of God and man.' (CD II/1: 67) Also ibid., pp. 112-13; CD III/3: 115-16.

250 CD II/1: 332. See also ibid., pp. 67, 111, 113.

251 Barth's concept of grace, as H. Hartwell conceives it, 'is the light in which we have to understand Barth's theology as a whole as well as every individual part of it, and for that reason must be regarded as the key to the true understanding of his theology ... all theological concepts, or rather the actions and realities adumbrated by these concepts, have in the last analysis their origin or motive-power in the grace of God or at least receive from that grace their essential character as a work of grace.' (H. Hartwell, The Theology of Karl Barth: An Introduction [London: G. Duckworth, 1964], p. 167.)
is God in the beginning, and therefore in the self-determination which is the specific concern of the doctrine of election.252

Thus Barth should agree with the 'Irish Articles' of 1615 which states that 'the godlike consideration of Predestination, and our Election in Christ, is full of sweet, pleasant, and unspeakable comfort to godly persons.253

But why, in Christian history, did this joyful good news always become associated with 'resentment against the "pathetic inhumanity" of the doctrine,' or 'against the danger of dialectical ambiguity,' or become a shadow 'to give rise to confusion, to savage hostility, to well-meant but fatal misrepresentations of what ought to be received'?254 Here we encounter the central motif of Barth's Christological revision of the doctrine.

The gracious character of Barth's doctrine of Election can be seen from a threefold perspective: First, as we have seen, freedom and grace form an inseparable unity in divine election, and the key notion which unites them is 'unconditioned'. As Barth puts it by a questioning: 'What kind of grace is it that is conditioned and constrained, and not free grace and freely electing grace?'255 The idea of grace as 'unconditioned' points to Barth's special contribution to the doctrine of grace, where he explicitly confronts the Roman Catholic teachings, viz., on the issue of the personal and indivisible character of divine grace.256 What the Catholic understanding of grace annoys him is threefold: First, the divisibility between God's grace and our own possession is 'the negation of the unity of grace as

252 CD II/2: 93.
253 Ibid., p. 15. Italics mine.
254 Ibid., p. 13.
255 Ibid., p. 19. Also p. 10, '[In the divine election, the] love of God is His grace. It is love in the form of the deepest condescension. It occurs even where there is no question of claim or merit on the part of the other. It is love which is overwhelming, free, unconstrained, unconditioned.' See also CD II/2: 27-30.
256 See CD II/1: 353-58; CD IV/1: 84-88. Whether Barth's attack is justifiable in the view of a Roman Catholic is beyond the scope of our study here (for a discussion, see Küng, Justification, pp. 195-207); what we are trying to investigate is Barth's own understanding of the issue.
always God's grace to man.' 257 Second, concepts such as gratia creata, gratia habitualis and gratia cooperans, which provide a status of man's part in God's salvific act, are utterly inconceivable to Barth. And third, in their division of grace, the Catholics are suggesting a 'third reality' which 'mediates between the will of God and the will of man.' 258 For Barth, the grace of God is always a personal act solely dependent on God's sovereign will, and thus non-substantial and indivisible. 259 With this rejection of the substantiality of grace which implies 'some process or condition within man,' Barth unambiguously maintains God's 'overpowering supremacy' and 'freest grace' in divine election. 260

The second aspect of Barth's concept of grace in Election is his rejection of the so-called 'secret will' or 'hidden decree' of God in the Reformers' doctrines of Election. 261 If the mystery of this decretum absolutum rests upon 'the sovereignly determinative will of the unknown God, and then finally and at the very lowest level to the predestination of unknown man,' then the doctrine remains obscure and horror. 262 Against this arbitrary speculation in abstracto, Barth contends that 'in the mystery of election we have to do with light and not darkness, that the electing God and elected man are known quantities and not unknown.' 263

257 CD IV/1: 84. Barth attacks the Roman Catholics' 'division of grace' between gratia increata and gratia creata, gratia externa and gratia interna, gratia actualis and gratia habitualis, gratica medicinalis and gratia elevans, gratia praeventis and gratia concomitans, gratia operans and gratia cooperans, gratia sufficientis and gratia efficax, gratia supernaturalis and gratia naturalis (ibid., pp. 84-86).

258 Ibid., p. 86. See also Berkouwer, Triumph of Grace, p. 190; Küng, Justification, p. 198; Hartwell, Barth, p. 168.

259 Ibid., p. 84, '[We have] to let the grace of God be exclusively His grace, His sovereign act, His free turning to man as new and strange every morning, so that it does not know anything higher or better or more intimate or real than the fact that quite apart from anything, that he can contribute to God or become and be in contrast to Him ...'

260 Küng, Justification, pp. 28-29.

261 CD II/2: 65-67; see also pp. 146-47, 157-58.

262 Ibid., pp. 148, 155-61. Italics mine.

263 Ibid., p. 146.
Then Barth provides his idea of 'concrete decree' in divine election: 'The will of God is Jesus Christ, and this will is known to us in the revelation of Jesus Christ.' Since the election of Jesus Christ is the content of God's will, it 'is not obscure, but clear.' And '[this election] removes our idle horror and [idle] peace of the knowledge about which in fact we can know nothing.'

Barth's concept of God's 'concrete decree' in Jesus Christ's election leads to the third aspect of God's perfect gracious act in divine election, which is also his particular contribution to the doctrine. It is Barth's Christological reinterpretation of praedestinatio gemina. Double predestination, for Calvin, means 'that of the great body of mankind some should be predestinated to salvation, and others to destruction.' But Barth sees a different picture in God's concrete decree in Jesus Christ's election -- an asymmetric and disproportionate relation between the divine Yes and No. Barth contends that the classical doctrine of double Predestination can only 'awaken in us the mixture of terror and joy which would be in order if we were confronted partly by promise and partly by threat.' And according to this dualism, the grace of divine election is partial and shadowed. But since in the revealed will of God's election of Jesus Christ we can see an irreversible transition from Golgotha to the glory of resurrection, the triumph of mercy against judgement, 'it can awaken only joy, pure joy.' And 'in the light of this end [of the irreversible transition] there is no place for anything but joy ... and grace.'

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264 Ibid., pp. 158, 160; cf. KD II/2: 175.
265 Calvin, Institutes III, 21, 1.
266 See supra, pp. 58-59.
267 CD II/2: 174.
268 Ibid., pp. 171-75. See also supra, pp. 60-67 for a discussion of 'the triumph of grace' in the divine election of the community and the individual.
269 CD II/2: 174.
election, Barth pronounces that the traditional doctrine of double Predestination must be opposed 'with all the emphasis of which we are capable.'

4. Foreknowledge, determinism and the living God.

In an essay concerning whether Barth is a Universalist, Joseph D. Bettis contends that Barth holds no doctrine of *apokatastasis*, even though Universalism seems to be the only alternative after Barth rejects Arminianism and Calvinist double Predestination. Bettis's argument is that Barth makes a sharp distinction between 'theological proposition' and 'a real possibility for God.' For holding Universalism presupposes a static view of God's election as a system of theological propositions, which Barth would definitely deny. Since God is a living God and His act is *in concreto*, there is always a possibility for both permanent rejection and universal reconciliation. In this section we shall attempt to offer a philosophical consideration of whether Barth's concept of a living God can save him from the charge of Universalism.

We begin with Barth's understanding of divine foreknowledge. From his discussions of God's omniscience and *praescientia*, one can see that Barth is holding an incompatibilist position of divine foreknowledge and human freedom: 'God's knowledge, as omnipotent knowledge, is complete in its range, the one unique and all-embracing knowledge.' Since it is

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270 Ibid., p. 171.


272 CD IV/3.1: 477-78.

273 At this point one must be reminded that for Barth, 'a living God' never means 'an arbitrarily chosen subject by an arbitrarily chosen predicate.' (CD II/1: 493) A living God is still an 'immutable' God. 'At every place He is what He is continually and self-consistently ... For at no place or time can He or will He turn against Himself or contradict Himself, not even in virtue of His freedom or for the sake of His love.' (ibid., pp. 494-95; italics mine)

274 CD II/1: 552-97.
'infinite in its power,' there is 'nothing hidden from God.'

Furthermore, since God is also eternal, 'God has always known everything that happens, has happened, or will happen in the created world. Thus for everything that happens, has happened, or will happen, it is true to say that God knew it was going to happen before it happened.'

That is to say, if God believed at $T_1$ that a person $A$ would perform an act $X$ at $T_2$ (let $T_1$ be a time preceding $T_2$), then it was not within $A$'s power to refrain from doing $X$. Otherwise God would have held a false belief, or God would not have held that belief. But either of these statements contradicts God's omniscience: God held a false knowledge or He did not know at $T_1$. Accordingly, divine omniscience and human freedom are incompatible.

Thus Barth, while holding firmly to God's omniscience, concludes that

'...the possibility out of the apparently infinite other possibilities of choice simply does not exist, not even as a possibility. We cannot will at all if we are not willing to decide within the sphere fixed by the will of God.'

That is to say, $A$ cannot do the thing otherwise and his choice is

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275 Ibid., pp. 552-53. In a more formal way, we can render the statements as: 'To say that God is omniscient is... to make two claims about Him. The first is that God holds no false beliefs -- that is, if God believes that $p$, then $p$. The second is that God's knowledge is complete; and therefore, if $p$, then God believes that $p$. Thus God is said to know everything that happens in the created world.' (M. Adams, 'Is the Existence of God a "Hard" Fact?' PhRev 76 [1967]: 494. Italics mine)

276 CD II/1: 608-615.


279 CD II/1: 556. Italics mine.
pseudo in terms of God's omniscience and omnipotent will. 280

Now we apply our foregoing discussions to Barth's doctrine of Predestination. We have seen that God's eternal will in Jesus Christ is unambiguously a gracious decree:

In the beginning, before time and space as we know them, before creation, before there was any reality distinct from God which could be the object of the love of God or the setting for His acts of freedom, God anticipated and determined within Himself (in the power of His love and freedom, of His knowing and willing) that the goal and meaning of all His dealings with the as yet nonexistent universe should be the fact that in His Son He would be gracious towards man, uniting Himself with Him. 281

If God's will, 'being omnipotent will, is in its sphere a complete and exhaustive will, embracing and controlling not only being which has no will but all other wills ... [and] there is no will which conditions or hinders God's will,' 282 and if in election and predestination 'God at all events remains unchanged and unchangeably the same,' 283 then as far as God's gracious will is concerned it is as 'unchangeable as God Himself and God's eternal will.' 284 Furthermore, even God is a living Person who actively involves Himself in time of the created sphere, this will not change whether A will do X at T₂ as God believed at T₁ which precedes T₂. This is not a matter of whether 'in predestination God became His own prisoner,' 285 but of maintaining the validity of God's omniscience. For if A did X' otherwise at T₂ because of God's active 'encounters and decisions within the sphere of creaturely reality,' 286 divine omniscience would have to be

280 For if A chose to do X' at T₂ otherwise, we would have to conceive a 'possible world W*' (as suggested by A. Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1980 reprint], pp. 70-73) in which A does X' and not X. But since this possible world W* is hidden from God's belief at T₁, it simply cannot exist at all. Barth definitely argues such a case: 'Anything hidden from God would constitute a realm of being or non-being independent of Him, and therefore the realm of a second god. If all second gods are rejected and excluded by God Himself ... Anything hidden from God would not be something but nothing.' (CD II/1: 553)

281 CD II/2: 101.
282 CD II/1: 555.
283 CD II/2: 182.
284 Ibid., p. 185.
285 Ibid., p. 184.
286 Ibid.
That is to say, no creaturely will whatsoever can alter what God believed and preordained from eternity. Now if God's eternal will for a universal reconciliation with man (against double Predestination) remains unchanged because of His constancy and omnipotence, and if no creaturely will can condition or alter what God willed from all eternity (against Arminianism), one can find no other reason to accept an eternal condemnation in Barth's theological understandings. This does not require an abandonment of conceiving God as a living Person; but one can find no good reason in this case to reject apokatastasis with regard to the concept of living God.

Whether or not Barth's intention to remain ambiguous to Universalism is justifiable in terms of philosophical inquiry, one thing is certain: He is making his fullest effort to maintain a personalistic view of God as living and happening, in contrast to an abstract and static Deism.

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287 At this point some might argue, as the Ockhamists, for the hard/soft facts distinction of God's prior belief (see for example, J. T. Saunders, 'Of God and Freedom,' PhRev 74 [1966]: 219-25; Adams, "Hard Fact?" PhRev 76: 492-503; also J. T. Saunders, 'The Temptations of Powerlessness,' APQ 5 [1968]: 100-108), so that God's foreknowledge may be saved. But since Barth indicates no trace of holding such a distinction, the discussion is beyond our consideration here. Rather, for Barth, while holding an identical view of eternity and sempiternity (see CD II/1: 608-615; also cf. M. Kneale, 'Eternity and Sempiternity,' PAS 69 [1968/69]: 223-38), 'the relation between God's knowledge and any event in time is always one of simultaneity. Consequently, a contingent event, as it comes to God's knowledge, is not future but present; and as present it is necessary; for what is the case, is the case, and is beyond anyone's power to alter.' (A. Kenny, 'Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom' in Aquinas: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. A. Kenny [London: Macmillan, 1969], p. 26).

288 God's condemnation, for Barth, as we have seen (supra, pp. 65-66), can be perceived as God's strange works on the Left Hand in order to show His mercy on the Right Hand. But eternal condemnation is an act without end, viz., no other event will happen thereafter; one simply cannot see any 'strangeness' in such a happening that God can still grant mercy upon the one who is suffering.

289 See supra, pp. 44-47. Also CD II/1: 44-49, 181-88.
The Personal and Impersonal in Barth's Doctrine of Reconciliation as the Foundation of Real Humanity

In the foregoing studies we have seen that, for Barth, the 'reality' and 'unreality' of humanity depend on whether one is authentic to his 'ontological determination', which we can see only in the real man Jesus Christ. Thus Reconciliation, the incarnation of the Reconciler, provides the unique foundation for the beginning of real humanity. But both a justification for defining 'real' humanity as God's ontological determination upon man and a quest for the mode of God's reconciling act with man, which is the beginning of human authenticity, point to a deeper dimension in the God-man relationship, viz., God's eternal election in Jesus Christ. Hence in our last section we furnished a critical analysis of Barth's doctrine of Election. Now we have a clearer picture to offer a general assessment of this *summa evangelii* which has been called 'the heartbeat of Barth's theology.'

In reviewing our discussions of the basic themes which characterize Barth's interpretation of Election, we can see that two main threads have emerged: On the one hand, the God who elects man in Jesus Christ is a personal and living God. Yet on the other hand, divine election as a God-man relationship (or we might call it 'encounter') is an impersonal one. We shall discuss them separately in the following paragraphs.

The idea of a personal God has always been a persisting emphasis in Barth's theological construction. One can even trace it back to Barth's 'pre-Römerbrief' era. And in our foregoing exposition of Barth's

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291 See K. Barth, 'Der Glaube an der persönlichen Gott,' ZThK 24 (1914): 21-32, 65-95. Even in this so-called 'Liberal' period of Barth, he already saw a dilemma between 'die transzendente Seite' and 'Persönlichkeit ist das individuell geistige Ich,' when we try to attribute personality to God. In this essay we can see that Barth, though still immensely influenced by Schleiermacher, already showed his doubt when he wrote, 'Wenn wir von Gottes Gedanken und Willen reden, so meinen wir damit: Er, ein ganz bestimmter Er denkt und will. Wenn Gott Forderungen an uns
doctrine of Election, the 'personal-living God' motif becomes explicitly clear: Barth's 'personal God' is conceived as a living and autonomous Agent who wills (initiates), acts and causes events (happens) in concreto. The statement can be illustrated by the following summary of what we have seen in the course of our previous investigation. First, from the very outset Barth makes it clear that the subject-matter of Election is not man but God Himself. And divine election is divine self-election. God's self-determination within the triune Being as the beginning of all the ways of God's dealings with the creaturely sphere strongly emphasizes the divine initiative of God. God always takes the active and initial part and never becomes a mere causal power in world-process. From this we moved to the whole section on 'God's Being in His acts'. A personalistic understanding of God, which distinguishes it from an abstract concept of theism, is to see the Being of God as a happening in concreto. One cannot go beyond God's actions to His 'abstractly observed being.' That is, God remains

\[\text{stellen, wenn er uns richtet und frei macht, wenn wir zu ihm beten, so stehen wir damit zu ihm in einem Verhältnis von Ich und Du. Nicht mit einem neutralen, sondern mit einem charakterisierten individuellen Geist stehen wir in Beziehung in der Religion.' (Op. cit., p. 67; italics mine)}\]

Supra, pp. 42-44.

G. S. Hendry rightly points out that for Barth, unlike the Eastern Orthodox theologians, 'there is no real distinction between the divine essence and the divine energy; the essence of God is energetic, and the energy of God is essential. His thought may be seen as an attempt (whether successful or not, remains to be considered) to overcome the consequences of a radical separation of the being of God from his works.' (Hendry, 'Freedom of God,' SJTh 31: 235, n.7) Or, in G. D. Kaufman's expression, God's primal decision in election is 'the master act of God' which means that it is the whole source of history, from its initiation in God's creative activity to its consummation when God ultimately achieves his purposes, that should be conceived as God's act in the primary sense.' (G. D. Kaufman, 'On the Meaning of "Act of God"," HTHR 61 [1968]: 191)

Supra, pp. 44-47.

See supra, p. 46, n.154. The idea of 'happening', which can be described as 'dynamic' and 'concrete', is set in contrast with the concepts of 'static' and 'abstract'.

See supra, pp. 46-47, ns.155, 156. D. Bonhoeffer's penetrating description is worth quoting, 'Gott ist verstanden als der rein Akt. Freiheit Gottes ist die im konkreten Akt ergriffene Möglichkeit -- aber
'indissolubly Subject'. He is always a non-objectified 'Thou'. When we came to Barth's doctrine of *perichoresis*, once again we encountered his personalistic understanding of the triune God: both His divine Being and His act (in this case, the election) never lose their subjectivity and remain undivided. The two essential characters, 'freedom' and 'grace', also exemplify Barth's endeavour to present a personal picture of *Gottesgedanke*. God's freedom in divine election indicates God's 'radical autonomy' which is absolutely unconditioned and independent of all outward constraint, conditioning or compulsion. God maintains His 'newness' and 'unpredictability' with respect to the created realm, and in this way He maintains His personal will and subjectivity. God's grace in divine election, for Barth, also has a personalistic character. In his antithesis to the Roman Catholic teaching, Barth's concept of grace demands a non-objectified and thus indivisible and personal understanding. Grace is

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297 Thus Bonhoeffer, *Akt und Sein*, p. 61, 'Gott bleibt immer der Herr, immer Subjekt, so daß, wer ihn als Gegenstand zu haben meint, nicht mehr ihn hat; er ist immer der „kommende", nie der „daseiende" Gott.' Cf. also op. cit., pp. 102-104. Also as an excursus (*supra*, n.153), we have seen how Barth contends that God is not 'timeless' (viz., outside time) but actively involves Himself in time, in historical happenings. Moreover, with his inclination to the 'agent-causation theory', Barth expresses a contention similar to Kaufman's personalistic conception of divine transcendence (cf. Kaufman, '"Act of God"," HThR 61: 184-89). All these point to an unambiguous assertion: God is a living Person.

298 *Supra*, pp. 51-54.

299 *Supra*, pp. 67-70. Also *CD II/2*: 100.


301 *Supra*, pp. 71-72. Thus *CD II/1*: 74, 'Grace is the majesty, the freedom, the undeservedness, the unexpectedness, the newness, the arbitrariness, in which the relationship to God and therefore the possibility of knowing Him is opened up to man by God Himself.'
the presence of the living God Himself. So we came to our last consideration of Barth's ambiguity towards Universalism. Though philosophically questionable, his intention is undoubtable: Throughout his argument, Barth maintains his understanding in concreto and not in abstracto. This is what Dietrich Bonhoeffer calls the 'unsystematic thinking' of Barth. For Barth, 'all genuine theological concepts do not bind to an undialectical system; if it were otherwise, the "act-concept" [Aktbegriff] in a system would become hardened as a "being-concept" [Seinbegriff], so that the concept of contingency would be eliminated, and the "coming" God become the "existing [daseienden]" God.'

From the foregoing summary, it is evident that Barth's understanding of God in Election is overwhelmingly personalistic. But here our second observation arises. While Barth's idea of God is highly personal, the God-man encounter in Election (and thus Reconciliation) is an impersonal one. We begin with Barth's concept of divine self-election and the doctrine of perichoresis. As we have seen, these ideas offer a personalistic understanding of God. Yet at the same time, they also suggest a dubious relationship between God and man. While emphasizing the divine initiative of God's self-determination which already provided for the whole course of election within the triune Being, it leaves no place for man in this scenario. What man can do is only to admire and contemplate what has been provided. And it seems very difficult for one to find a personal relationship when he encounters an enclosed realm of self-determined

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302 Küng, Justification, pp. 197-98.
303 Supra, pp. 74-77.
304 Bonhoeffer, Akt und Sein, pp. 63, 62.
305 Supra, pp. 43-44, 53-54.
When we use 'newness' and 'unpredictability' to describe a personal God in His act, we see an opposite picture in Barth's description of man in divine Election: Concerning the actualization of God's eternal will in human life (in the community and the individual), Barth says, '[since the election] is included in the election of Jesus Christ, if in and with Jesus Christ it is the object of this primal act of the free love of God, then we must inevitably expect that in its election too we will [stoßen werden] encounter this twofold (and in its twofoldness single) direction of the eternal will of God.'

There is no 'newness', no 'unpredictability' for man; all are 'inevitably expected'. In this case, one may dare to call it, in Martin Buber's terminology, an 'I-It relation'. For it is a one-sided relation, without reciprocity, mutuality and involvement.

At this point, some might reply that we should expect to find

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306 At this point, J. Macquarrie's remark is illuminating when he discusses the necessity of man's part in the works of God: If there is nothing left for man to participate, then God's work, though it 'can be an object to be admired and contemplated for its interest, ingenuity and beauty,' 'there is no personal communion with it, no response.' (J. Macquarrie, In Search of Humanity: A Theological and Philosophical Approach [London: SCM, 1982], p. 23)

307 Supra, p. 80.

308 CD II/2: 197. Italics mine.

different situations between man-man relationships and the God-man relationship. If this is the case, we have to inquire further into Barth's own understanding of the 'I-Thou relationship'. We have seen that Barth's doctrine of analogia relationis consists in a manifold correspondence. But whether it is an innertrinitarian relationship, or a 'divine-human' relationship of Jesus' Person, or a 'Jesus (as a man)-man' relationship, or a 'man-man' relationship; each affirms a reciprocal and a mutual character as the authenticating factor. Now if this is how Barth himself defines an authentic relationship, then one has to admit that the 'God-man' relation (especially, we have seen, in Election and Reconciliation) appears to be a 'missing-link' in his doctrine of analogia relationis. And if it is Barth's own definition that an authentic 'I-Thou' relationship should be in


310 Supra., p. 17, n.35.

311 Concerning the 'innertrinitarian relationship', we have seen Barth's doctrine of perichoresis, which holds a strong idea of mutuality (see supra, pp. 51-53). Concerning the 'divine-human' relationship in Jesus' Person, we have to recall that 'the inner relationship in this man [Jesus] is a relationship of clear agreement ... as God's image' and that the Imago Dei is a repeat of God's 'inner divine being' which is 'a co-existence, co-inherence and reciprocity' (CD III/2: 217-22; also CD IV/2: 36-116). Concerning the 'Jesus (as a man)-man' relationship, Barth says, '[the man Jesus'] orientation to others and reciprocal relationship with them are not accidental, external or subsequent, but primary, internal and necessary.' (CD III/2: 210; also pp. 203-217) Concerning the 'man-man relationship', the stress on reciprocity and mutuality is clearly expressed (see CD III/2: 250-85; also CD III/1: 183-87, 194-95, 288-329 [on male and female as an account of the divine likeness of man]).

312 Although Barth is trying to imply an analogia relationis from 'God-man relationship' to 'man-man relationship' by suggesting that 'man in his determination as the covenant-partner of God' (see, especially, CD III/2: 203-324), we have seen that the 'man-man relationship' as an 'I-Thou' reciprocity and mutuality is so radically different from that of 'God-man relationship' (whether it is in divine election, in the covenant of grace, or in Reconciliation). Thus the validity of this analogia is doubtful. For a similar critique, see Come, Human Spirit and Holy Spirit, pp. 83-88, 147-51; also Willis, Ethics, pp. 433-34.
'mutual openness', 'reciprocal reception', 'mutual assistance' and 'mutual limitation',\(^{313}\) then the God-man relationship that lacks all reciprocity and mutuality simply cannot belong to the same mode. It is a matter of one's own experience of (what Barth has called) 'supreme inhumanity' if all these essential criteria are absent in an encountering situation, whether his co-partner is another fellow-man or God. And if the 'I-Thou' encounter constitutes Barth's defined 'ontological determination' of real humanity, it is difficult to see how, as the foundation and beginning of human authenticity, the God-man encounter in Election and Reconciliation could be so inauthentic.

When we talked about 'man's own experience' in the God-man encounter, we were already taking a step into the question of Barth's doctrine of vicarious Reconciliation, viz., the proposition that 'Jesus Christ is the elected man.' The point is: How significant is the existential dimension in Barth's doctrine of Reconciliation? At this point Barth is clearly indicating his antithesis to Rudolf Bultmann.\(^{314}\) Thus it is not surprising that the subjective and anthropological dimensions are intentionally suppressed in the course of discussions.\(^{315}\) These we have seen clearly in our

\(^{313}\) CD III/2: 250-85.

\(^{314}\) In his 'Foreword' to CD IV/1: ix, Barth writes, 'The present situation in theology and also the peculiar themes of this book [viz., the doctrine of Reconciliation] mean that throughout I have found myself in an intensive, although for the most part quiet, debate with Rudolf Bultmann.' (Italics mine)

\(^{315}\) An explicit account of Barth's objection can be found in the essay Rudolf Bultmann. Ein Versuch, ihn zu verstehen published in 1952, just a year before his KD IV/1 (Die Lehre von der Versöhnnung). One can observe the following ideas (the essay was translated by R. H. Fuller as 'Rudolf Bultmann -- an attempt to understand him' in Kerygma and Myth: A Theological Debate, vol. 2, ed. H.-W. Bartsh [London: SPCK, 1962], pp. 83-132; hereafter the passage numbers will refer to the English translation): (i) Barth charges that Bultmann is falling into the danger of 'abstract subjectivism', because he put too much emphasis upon 'man's subjective experiences' and relegates 'God's saving act which is the foundation of Christian existence to a secondary position' (pp. 92-95). (ii) Bultmann does so because he adopts the philosophical position of Martin Heidegger's existentialism. This is why Bultmann's concern is immensely existential and anthropological (pp. 113-15). (iii) Thus concerning 'faith', Barth
previous investigation: Jesus Christ as the elected man must have an all-inclusive connotation which is universally meaningful and efficacious. Thus through the vicarious humanity of Jesus Christ we are all inclusively reconciled to God. Since Jesus Christ's activity is 'our Representative and Substitute,' all has been done 'fully and exclusively in Him, excluding any need for completion.' But is this the only alternative to Barth's anti-Bultmannianism? At this point, I think the British theologians have something to say. While working on the other side of the theological world which has not been dominated by Ritschlians, they came to many conclusions which are similar to Barth's. Yet they provided a more balanced picture, with which Barth shows little evidence of acquaintance. We will take

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argues that we should 'include faith in ... God's incomprehensible -- and we might even say paradoxical -- act of salvation.' In this way, Barth contrasts his idea with Bultmann's emphasis on the importance of decision. 'For the New Testament asserts,' Barth writes, 'that in faith the believer attaches himself to something which is wholly and entirely outside himself, something without him and in spite of him, something which took place for him on God's initiative in the death of Jesus Christ.' (p. 99; italics mine) (iv) But after all, what 'disturbs' Barth most is Bultmann's reversion of the priority between Christology and Soteriology. For Barth, 'Christology is prior to soteriology.' And Soteriology 'is part and parcel of Christology, is nevertheless secondary to it and derivative from it' (p. 96). But Bultmann, while concerning himself with the soteriological happening of man's transition from inauthentic to authentic existence, makes Christology to be absorbed into Soteriology. (Pp. 96-100, 116-17)

316 Supra, pp. 54, 56.
317 CD IV/1: 230; italics mine. See also supra, pp. 55-56, 61. For a critique of Barth's 'attempt to include human subjectivity within the divine objectivity' in his doctrine of Reconciliation, see P. H. Gertmenian, 'Objective and Subjective in Karl Barth's Doctrine of Reconciliation' (Th.D. dissertation, Princeton Theological Seminary, 1960), pp. 260-78.
318 G. S. Hendry's observation is worth quoting at this point: 'Barth pays little attention to voices from the contemporary theological world, and almost none to any form outside the German-speaking section of Europe ... In part this is due to Barth's own increasing sense of isolation ... In part it is due to his linguistic limitation. He has himself deplored the fact that he was ignorant of English until he was forty, and his writings show little evidence of acquaintance with the theological thought of the English-speaking world. This insularity is specially marked in the volumes dealing with the atonement, in which Barth has chosen to develop his own interpretation with almost no reference to traditional theories and none to current thought (except, implicitly, to Bultmann), and no account is taken of the notable contribution which the English-speaking world has
John McLeod Campbell and R. C. Moberly as examples. 319 Campbell's doctrines of Election and Reconciliation are in many aspects similar to Barth's. 320 While discussing what he calls 'the retrospective aspect of the Atonement,' Campbell also emphasizes the vicarious humanity of Jesus Christ in his doctrine of vicarious confession and repentance. 321 But he is never satisfied with a merely substitutionary language. What he is championing is the 'prospective aspect' of man's personal participation through Christ's 'moral and spiritual' witness of what God feels. 322 As Robert S. Paul puts it,

made to this theme since McLeod Campbell opened a new chapter in the debate a hundred years ago. To any one who is acquainted with the thought of McLeod Campbell and Bushnell and Moberly and Denny and Forsyth (to name only a few), Barth's interpretation, for all its power and profundity, is curiously unsatisfying, just because of his failure to face some of the questions they raised and his somewhat ingenuous use of concepts, such as penal suffering, which they showed to bristle with problems and difficulties. (Hendry, 'Dogmatic Form,' ThTo 13: 301-302. Italics mine)


320 For example, while standing in a Calvinistic tradition, he fought against double Predestination (Campbell, Atonement, pp. 51-57); and mainly for this reason he was charged and condemned by the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland. Also he 'gives priority to the incarnation over the atonement.' (J. Macquarrie, 'Campbell on Atonement' in Thinking about God, p. 176; cf. supra, pp. 30-32).


322 Campbell, Atonement, p. 262, 'He [viz., Christ] who endured the cross, despising the shame, did so as He tasted death, for which the cross was for this reason the selected form, in that oneness of mind with God which rendered His doing so truly a fitting element in the atonement; and thus in respect even of all that was most physical and external, the real value and virtue was strictly moral and spiritual: for the tasting of death for us was not as substitute, -- otherwise He alone would have died: nor as a punishment, -- for, tasted in the strength of righteousness and of the Father's favour, death had to Him no sting; but as a moral and spiritual sacrifice for sin. And thus, as I have said above, while death taking place simply as such, and the wages of sin, had been no atonement, neither could come to be through the subjection to it of the countless millions of our sinful race, death filled with that moral and spiritual meaning in relation to God and His righteous law which it had as tasted by Christ, and passed through in the spirit of sonship, was the perfecting of the atonement.' (The italics 'the real value and ... sacrifice for sin' are mine)

Macquarrie rightly observes that the most important characteristic feature of Campbell's doctrine of Atonement 'is his consistent use of personal categories, as opposed to the legal categories in which the atonement had
[Traditional substitutionary theory] had concentrated upon describing the objective fact of what God in Christ had done for our salvation, but most of the views that have followed since McLeod Campbell have put their primary emphasis upon what God in Christ is doing and will do to save us from sin and have interpreted the facts of the Gospel as the supreme example of general moral and spiritual principles. 323

Here we see an effort and possibility to reconcile the 'substitutionary' and 'moral' theories in Atonement. Although we might not completely agree with Campbell's reconstruction of the doctrine, his endeavour to stress the personal and existential dimensions in Atonement cannot be overlooked. 324

Barth's solution to this 'prospective aspect', as we have seen, rests upon his understanding of 'humanity' -- Christ's vicarious humanity is our Representative and Substitute, that what has happened in Him is what we are. 325 Here we encounter a very similar idea given by Moberly. 326 But...
Moberly, unlike Barth, does not simply regard the idea of ontological determination as the only and final answer. Rather, he puts forward a further point by arguing that any idea of 'punishment', 'penitence' or 'forgiveness' must be understood in a person to person relationship.²⁷ 'No explanation of atonement can be adequate which is not, at every point, in terms of personality.'²⁸ Here we touch the heart of our critical analysis of Barth's 'Realist' interpretation. At this point Hastings Rashdall's critique seems classic:

The universal "humanity" is supposed to have a concrete existence so independent of its individual manifestations that the "universal" can be credited with the guilt of one of its particulars and can endure the punishment which all but one of the particulars do not endure ... [But] if the universal is so real and independent that it can be punished without each particular being punished, it cannot also be true that such a punishment endured by the universal can imply and involve its endurance by each and every particular.²⁹

Dorothee Söllle's careful scrutiny between 'representation' and 'substitution' is also helpful to our discussion. 'To represent someone' means 'to assume conditioned responsibility for him, in the hope that one's decision will meet with his approval;' thus 'representation' is 'a temporary, conditional, and incomplete act.' On the contrary, 'substitution' demands 'oblivion' and 'permanence, not a merely provisional status. The replacement represents the other person completely and unconditionally.'³³⁰

³²⁷ See Moberly, Atonement and Personality, pp. 1-73.
this case, an authentic form of 'personal identity' should be that 'man is irreplaceable yet representable.'\textsuperscript{331} From such a perspective, Sölle's criticism of Barth, though unkindly, is suggestive:

\begin{quote}
[In his doctrine of Atonement, Barth] fails to indicate any distinction between representation and substitution. Our place is "occupied" by Christ. I have been "relegated" by Christ and "placed" in another sphere. Barth speaks of our "deposition" and of our being "forced". These are substitutionary terms. Barth equates representation and substitution, and impelled by his objectifying tendency, turns Christ into a replacement. The relationship -- established by the act of representation between Christ the Representative and us who are presented -- is not conceived in personal terms ... Barth emphasizes -- the truth that Christ died "without us", and helpless as anyone is who needs representation -- this helplessness and weakness cannot be absolutized without furthering the depersonalization of man.\textsuperscript{332}
\end{quote}

This criticism leads to our final consideration, viz., does Barth really neglect human responsibility in his interpretation of Election and Reconciliation?

In a sense Barth does talk about man's 'faith' and 'freedom'. And his doctrine of Pneumatology is supposed to be the mediating principle to bridge the subjective and objective dimensions.\textsuperscript{333} But the issue certainly requires some clarification. As we have seen, Barth's notions of 'freedom'

\textsuperscript{331} Ibid., pp. 43-50. Cf. also p. 22, 'The disappearance of the distinction between representation and substitution from current linguistic usage is therefore indicative of the existence of a depersonalized world in which things and persons can be arbitrarily interchanged. The loss of the dimension of time is one mark of this depersonalization.'

\textsuperscript{332} Ibid., pp. 89, 90. Or, as H. R. Mackintosh puts it, in a more traditional way, 'Pardon is the establishment of right mutual relations; and mutual relations, of a personal kind, cannot be restored in absence of a willingness on both side to have them rectified. As it has been put: "Forgiveness, like any other gift, may be refused; the will to forgive must meet the will to be forgiven." ... It is for this reason that pardon without penitence (if for the moment we assume its psychological possibility) demoralizes, like indiscriminate charity.' (H. R. Mackintosh, The Christian Experience of Forgiveness [Glasgow: Collins Fontana Books, 1961], p. 205. Italics mine except 'cannot'.) Cf. also A. L. Pate, Jr., 'Man with God: A Study of the Doctrine of Man in the Theology of Karl Barth' (Th.D. dissertation, Pacific School of Religion, 1968), pp. 93, 248-49.

\textsuperscript{333} For example, see the discussion by Rosato, Spirit as Lord, pp. 17-22. A detailed discussion of Barth's Pneumatology will be found in chapter six of the present thesis. In the present context we are only concerned with the act of the Holy Spirit in Election and Reconciliation.
and 'grace' in Election imply double consequences. We start with the concept of grace. On the one hand, Barth emphasizes the 'non-objectified' and 'indivisible' grace which characterizes a personalistic understanding of God as a living Person. Yet on the other hand, the idea of grace as 'free' and 'unconditioned' indicates man's perfect passivity in God's intervention:

The grace of God in the atonement is God's triumph in the antithesis, in the opposition of man to Himself ... in which He acts quite alone, doing miracle after miracle ... Reconciliation is God's crossing the frontier to man ... It is not merely a frontier, but a yawning abyss ... It happens when God gives Himself to man and to be known by man, to the one who has the faculties to receive and know Him, but has no will or capacity to use these faculties ... This man does not even know how it comes about or happens to him ... Even afterwards he cannot explain what has happened by any point of contact which has found in him.\(^{334}\)

Thus the grace of God in Reconciliation is completely foreign and irresistible to man. But if unconscious passivity on the side of man is so strongly stressed, the personal relationship between God and man becomes very obscure. This 'one-sided personal relationship', as Leonard Hodgson calls it, is more suitable to describe the relationship between God and the sub-human physical universe and cannot be the whole story of the God-man relationship.\(^{335}\) 'The activity of God is always fully personal,' but man

\(^{334}\) CD IV/1: 81-82. Italics mine.

\(^{335}\) See L. Hodgson, The Grace of God in Faith and Philosophy (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1936), pp. 114-18, 161-73. Hodgson distinguishes the stages of relationship as 'mutual impersonal' (within the sub-human physical universe), 'mutual personal relationship' (in which there is conscious purposive activity on both sides) and 'one-sided personal relationship' (in which there is conscious purposive activity on the one side and unconscious passivity on the other). While theologians scarcely deny the divine initiative in Reconciliation as the grace of God, this does not necessarily entail a total abolition of human response. At this point, E. Brunner's comments seem to be more acceptable: 'Concerning conversion and repentance, we have said that this correspondence between God and man is not equal on both sides. God is always first and the Giver; man always second, the one receiving ... To die with Him [viz. Christ] is therefore the work of grace; it is not man's own work. But this does not mean an occurrence in which man is merely involuntary and passive. Man must go to this death himself, and with his whole self. He himself must consent to what happens to him; indeed, it takes place only by means of his consent. God's gift is of such a nature that it must become actual in a voluntary
should also be 'personal enough to be able to receive from God that kind of help which does not negate but confirms his own free personal growth.'

We find a similar problem in Barth's understanding of freedom. While emphasizing God's freedom in His divine election in order to protect a fully personalistic view of God, human freedom, on the other hand, tends to be regarded as an illusive phenomenon. From the outset, Barth never acknowledges any 'neutral freedom' (viz., choice between alternatives) as such for sinful man:

How can sinful man believe? If we tried to give an answer to the question as put, to posit some supreme possibility of faith, our answer would be mistaken from the very outset ... Who is to choose between them? Who is the man who will choose aright and therefore choose the possibility of faith? The only man who enters into the picture at all is the man who not only can go in the opposite direction, but actually does go in that direction ... The whole idea of a possibility of faith confronted by that of unbelief, the whole concept of man as a Hercules at the crossroads able to choose between faith and sin (and therefore unbelief), is a pure illusion. Whatever may be the possibility of faith, this Hercules has always already chosen unbelief.

act of man, in obedience and trust ... the death of Christ is the actual stimulus in this happening to man, and yet at the same time it must happen as man's own decision; he himself must consent to this death.' (E. Brunner, The Divine-human Encounter, trans. A. W. Loos [London: SCM, 1944], p. 109).

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337 Supra, pp. 67-70, 76-77. At this point we should make a clarification. As indicated by Hendry, 'Freedom of God,' SJTh 31: 233-36, the word 'freedom' in Barth's usage has different connotations. Concerning 'human freedom', Barth's main concern is 'freedom as power'. That is, man's 'freedom' to obey God, freedom for God. For example, we can frequently come across the following -- or a similar -- description by Barth: '
... as the freedom given to man (let us put it this way) by Jesus for Jesus, it is his freedom for intercourse with God, his freedom to be both from God and to God ... And this does not have only the negative meaning that they are independent, but the positive that they are able and powerful. In the determination and limitation given them in their intercourse with God they are men of unconditional and unlimited capacity.' (CD IV/2: 242) In this respect, Hedinger is certainly correct when he claims that we have to distinguish between Christian freedom (viz., 'die Freiheit der Kinder Gottes') and human freedom in general (viz., 'die Freiheit des menschlichen Geschöpfes') in Barth's theology of freedom. (Cf. Hedinger, Freiheitsbegriff, pp. 93-96) We will leave a detailed discussion of Christian freedom as a sign of human authenticity in Barth's theology for chapter five of the present thesis. In the present context, we confine ourselves to the consideration of human freedom in his doctrines of Election and Reconciliation.

338 CD IV/1: 746. Italics mine.
Then how can man as a sinner become a believer? For Barth, the whole course is accomplished by 'the object of faith' (viz., 'the living Lord Jesus Christ' who has 'taken place for all men' objectively, really and ontologically) and 'the power of the Holy Spirit'.\textsuperscript{339} Now if we bring together our earlier consideration that for Barth there is no 'human spirit' as such and accordingly man can only receive the Spirit of God,\textsuperscript{340} then it is not surprising that when Barth discusses the 'who' in the 'decision of faith' he says:

Who decides here? Without hesitation we must confess that, first of all and fundamentally, it is not we ourselves who decide. In every case, if we believe, we believe in the consummation of the sovereign act of the Word of God. In every case, it is the work of the Holy Spirit which happens to us ... We have no power over it; it is not at our disposal. We have no claim upon it and we have done nothing to earn it. For in that it happens, in the adoring choice of the truth, in that we believe -- all such claims (as that we have the power to be able to believe) and also all such demands (as that we must accomplish our own believing) are struck to the ground.\textsuperscript{341}

In such a case, one can only come to the conclusion that the part which the human self plays in the whole happening is a sheer passivity. Yet 'creation would lose its value if there were not free decision or commitment on the part of man, even if God that makes this decision possible for him by putting it within his grasp.'\textsuperscript{342}

\textsuperscript{339} Ibid., pp. 747-49.
\textsuperscript{340} Supra, p. 21, n.54.
\textsuperscript{342} J. Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology (New York: Charles Scribner's Son, 1977), pp. 335-36. However, there are passages in which Barth tries to assume 'an active, spontaneous attitude' which corresponds to the divine possibility 'in certain circumstances' (for example, CD I/2: 265-70). But due to the overwhelming majority of the type of passages we have examined, one has to say that there is a certain ambiguity regarding what this 'in certain circumstances' is. At least we cannot find any explicit indication in the passage we quoted. Rather, in an occasion when Barth pushes his inquiry towards a phenomenological description of 'faith' as 'the readiness of man' for the knowledge of God, his answer is quite
Perhaps we have to conclude our chapter on Barth's doctrine of Reconciliation as the foundation of real humanity with the paradox of personalism and impersonalism. But is this paradox necessary? Should a

disappointing: 'There is no sense in going further into this phenomenon. Indeed it is dangerous to do so. For it is identical with the phenomenon of our enmity against God's grace. This phenomenon will, of course, continually emerge. But this phenomenon no longer applies to us. It is not a subject we can possibly consider. Consider it just a moment too long, and, like Lot's wife, we become a pillar of salt.' (CD II/1: 159. At this point, we have to regard Barth's latest fragment on Baptism in CD IV/4: 141-94 as a new development in his theological thinking. For in that work Barth clearly acknowledges the necessity of human decision and rejects infant Baptism. But unfortunately he did not live long enough to furnish a new picture of his Anthropology. The significance of such a 'turn' has been observed by his interpreters, e.g. T. Rendtorff, 'Der ethische Sinn der Dogmatik. Zur Reformulierung des Verhältnisses von Dogmatik und Ethik bei Karl Barth' in Die Realisierung der Freiheit, pp. 119-34; Galloway, 'Review on Barth's "CD" IV/4,' JTSH 21: 259-60. Even Barth himself foresaw such a 'reorientation' would arise controversial reactions [CD IV/4: x-xiii]. For an illustration of the reactions, see F. Viering, ed., Zu Karl Barth's Lehre von der Taufe [Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1971]. Cf. also Ch. 5 of the present study n.169) For the completeness of our discussion we have to offer a brief account of Barth's delineation of faith in the final section of his CD IV/1. Concerning this section, even G. W. Bromiley comments that 'in tacit reply to Bultmann, Barth lays a tremendous emphasis upon the objective reality of the atonement as accomplished in and through Jesus Christ. But this treatment of the subjective application is correspondingly weakened, especially in the final and rather disappointing section on the individual faith of the Christian.' (G. W. Bromiley, 'The Doctrine of Atonement: A Survey of Barth's "Kirchliche Dogmatik" IV. 1,' SJTh 8 [1955]: 175) In fact one can feel Barth's uneasiness in his attempt to offer a description of how faith as a human activity makes a man a Christian. On the one hand, Barth emphasizes the passive and retrospective character of the act of faith by affirming that faith as a human act 'has no creative but only a cognitive character. It does not alter anything. As a human act it is simply the confirmation of a change which has already taken place, the change in the whole human situation which took place in the death of Jesus Christ and was revealed in His resurrection and attested by the Christian community.' (CD IV/1: 751; italics mine) Yet on the other hand, he has to recognize that faith is not only a 'belief that' but also a 'belief in'. (H. H. Price's careful scrutiny between 'belief in' and 'belief that' is very helpful at this point, see his 'Belief "in" and Belief "that"' in The Philosophy of Religion, ed. B. Mitchell [London: Oxford University Press, 1971], pp. 143-67) But how can Barth avoid the element of existential decision in a transition from the 'factual sense' of 'belief in' to the 'evaluative sense' of 'belief in'? Where do the 'commisive force' (viz., deciding-to) and the 'verdictive force' (viz., deciding-that) come from if Barth has to recognize that faith is more than a 'flat constative' but an 'onlook'? (For an analytical discussion of 'onlook', cf. D. D. Evans, The Logic of Self-involvement [London: SCM, 1964], pp. 124-41) Barth supplies his answer by arguing about the 'inevitably orientating power' whenever one confronts his object of faith (the living Jesus Christ). In such an occasion 'man ceases to be in control.' (CD IV/1: 742-47. Concerning 'the awakening power of the Holy Spirit,' the
personal God in Reconciliation demand an impersonal encounter with man? The present writer, for one, finds no good reason to accept it. But then what would be the resolution of this unnecessary paradox? This leads to our concluding remark towards the end of the second part of this thesis. But before we draw our conclusion, we have to consider another theologian who dedicates his effort to offer an interdisciplinary concern for the subjective dimension in the doctrine of Justification.

problem becomes even more intricate when Barth seems to acknowledge an existence of 'the spirit of man', or 'man's own spirit' [ibid., p. 646] which contradicts his earlier position. Also when Barth says that when one confronts the divine decision of the Holy Spirit, as a human decision 'he can only receive' [ibid., p. 748]; he is confusing the levels of 'acceptance' and 'belief'. For 'receiving' is not a sufficient condition of 'belief'. Cf. B. Williams's careful distinction in his 'Deciding to Believe' in Problems of the Self: Philosophical Papers 1956-1972 [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973], pp. 140-41). Here Barth seems to make an over-simplification. Man's internal struggle from distrust to trust is a highly complicated human phenomenon (Cf. D. Evans, Struggle and Fulfillment: The Inner Dynamics of Religion and Morality [New York: Collins, 1979], pp. 19-107). To assert that there will be a 'profound spontaneity ... but also with an inevitability in face of His [Jesus Christ's] actuality' (CD IV/1: 744) is only a simplified version and an attempt to eliminate the 'individual difference' in human religious experience. For a more detailed critique, see R. T. Voelkel, 'The Conception of Faith in the Theology of Karl Barth: A Critique of the Barthian Theology' (Th.D. dissertation, Union Theological Seminary, 1962), pp. 214-37, 294-334.
TILLICH ON JUSTIFICATION: 'ACCEPT ACCEPTANCE' AS A SUBJECTIVE DIMENSION OF DIVINE INTERVENTION

In an essay written in 1960 on the impact of pastoral psychology on theological thought, Paul Tillich complained that the real meaning of the doctrine of Justification has been distorted in the present-day Protestant preaching and teaching: the spirit of the good news has been 'buried under doctrinal rigidity and aridity' or 'moral legalism'. It is an urgent task to rediscover it in a new way so that the doctrine can be rehabilitated as 'the center of the Christian message and the theological foundation of preaching and pastoral counseling.' Since the intellectual and ideological atmosphere has changed enormously since the age of Reformation, a reinterpretation of the doctrine, for Tillich, has to consider the impact of the wars, the existentialist movement and psychotherapy on the world situation. 'But in spite of these contributing causes, the impact of the psychotherapeutic ideas and experiences on the theological interpretation of the Christian message is considerable.' The significance of the psychotherapeutic influence upon Tillich's doctrine of Justification becomes apparent when he employs the expression 'acceptance' as the key notion of his interpretation:

Justification brings the element of "in spite of" into the process of salvation ... Like Regeneration, Justification is first an

objective event and then a subjective reception. Justification in
the objective sense is the eternal act of God by which he accepts
as not estranged those who are indeed estranged from him by guilt
and the act by which he takes them into the unity with him which
is manifest in the New Being in Christ ... [But Luther's and
Melanchthon's formulation of the "forensic" idea is only] a way of
stating a doctrine of Justification which leaves out of considera-
tion the subjective side, namely, the acceptance. Indeed, there
is nothing in man which enables God to accept him. But man must
accept just this. He must accept that he is accepted; he must
accept acceptance.4

But how can the idea of 'acceptance' in therapeutic research be applied
validly to a doctrinal interpretation of Justification? And what contribu-
tion does Tillich make in his endeavour to offer such an interdisciplinary
dialogue? These questions will be answered in the first part of this chap-
ter, before they lead us into a closer examination of related notions in
the doctrine.

I. ACCEPTANCE AS HEALING IN TILLICH'S
DOCTRINE OF SALVATION

It is no exaggeration to say that 'Tillich's dialogue with depth
psychology is not accidental, but an essential element in his theology.'5
His earlier interest in the post-Freudian psychoanalysis and later involve-
ment in psychotherapeutic research was a continuous shaping force of his
theological construction, especially of his interpretation of man.6

5 H. Elsässer, 'Paul Tillich's Lehre vom Menschen als Gespräch mit der
For a more detailed discussion of how psychological findings contribute to
Tillich's theological thought, see F. Elmo, 'The Concept of Self
Actualization in the Theology of Paul Tillich and the Psychology of Abraham
Maslow' (Ph.D. dissertation, Fordham University, 1974), pp. 48-76.
6 See the discussion of H. Elsässer, 'Paul Tillich und die
Tiefenpsychologie in theologischer Sicht,' WzM 21 (1969): 201-202. Also
E. A. Loomis, 'The Psychiatric Legacy of Paul Tillich' in The Intellectual
Legacy of Paul Tillich, ed. J. R. Lyons (Detroit: Wayne State University
Press, 1969), p. 85. For memorial articles as tributes to his contribution
to depth psychology and psychotherapy, see the two particular issues in
Tillich once said that depth psychology 'is of infinite value for theology' because it 'brought to theology something which it always should have known but which it had forgotten and covered up.' It also 'helped to discover the immense depth psychological material which we find in the religious literature of the last two thousand years and even beyond that.' Among the ideas belonging to theology of which it needs to be reminded by depth psychology are the meaning of grace and forgiveness -- the fundamental concepts in the doctrine of Justification which are 'the first and basic expression of the Protestant principle itself.' Since 'the description of the religious idea of justification by faith' has already become 'a term which is hardly understandable to theological students and not understandable at all to the majority of people,' it must be reinterpreted and replaced by an understandable language. Here, according to Tillich, the psychotherapeutic notion of 'acceptance' contributes a particular insight.

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11 The idea of 'acceptance' in the interpretation of Justification has been used since the thirties. For example, when Tillich discussed the doctrine of Justification in the essay 'Die protestantische Verkündigung und der Mensch der Gegenwart' (1928) in RV, pp. 36-37, the idea of 'Annahme' or its equivalence did not appear. But in another essay 'Protestantisches Prinzip und proletarische Situation' written in 1931, Tillich writes, '„Rechtfertigung" ist der Paradoxie ... Der Mensch braucht sich über sich selbst nichts vorzumachen, denn er ist angenommen so wie er ist, in der totalen Wesenswidrigkeit seiner Existenz.' (GW 7: 93-94; italics mine). But the basic idea of acceptance was not therapeutic but 'Erwartung'. A clearer indication of the association between Tillich and psychotherapeutic findings in the use of the concept 'acceptance' emerged in the essay 'Estrangement and Reconciliation in Modern Thought,' RR 9 (1944): 5-19. Tillich notices that in C. G. Jung's personality theory of estrangement and reconciliation there is a discovery that a self-estranged personality can be reconciled only when he is entirely accepted in spite of how he is: 'How can the self-estranged personality be reconciled, how can he regain his freedom? Jung, in his chapter, "Psychotherapists or the Clergy" (in
'Acceptance' in Psychotherapy and Tillich's Reinterpretation of Justification

Although the idea of 'acceptance' has been used ever since the post-Freudian therapists, it is more a therapeutic technique than an essential theory of psychotherapy. It is Carl R. Rogers who first explored

Modern Man in Search of a Soul, answers that it is impossible to heal anybody else without accepting him entirely. "Yet the patient does not feel himself accepted unless the very worst in him is accepted too" (p. 270) ... This is the idea of reconciliation in modern thought, and it is surprisingly consistent in all the representatives we have mentioned [where fundamental Christian ideas are presupposed]' (pp. 17-18). The idea became crystallized in his famous sermon 'You are Accepted' published in The Shaking of the Foundations (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948), pp. 153-63. And an explicit attribution of his interpretation to psychotherapy can be found in his 'Psychotherapy,' RR 13 (1949): 267 when he says, '[the religious idea of justification by faith] must be reinterpreted, and the idea of self-acceptance which has much a significance in psychotherapy can be used for this purpose.' And since his 'Dwight H. Terry Foundation Lectures' at Yale University in October/November 1950 (later published as The Courage to Be in 1952), the psychotherapeutic interpretation of 'acceptance' became a formula in Tillich's interpretation of Justification.

12 There are certain ambiguities concerning from which psychological school Tillich gained his idea of acceptance. Basically they are due to his loose usage of the terms 'depth psychology', 'psychoanalysis' or 'psychotherapy.' (Cf. Elsässer, 'Gespräch mit der Tiefenpsychologie,' p. 8; also J. M. Perry, 'Tillich's Response to Freud's Understanding of God and Religion' [Ph.D. dissertation, Marquette University, 1972], p. 15) In his 'Existentialism and Psychoanalysis' in TC, p. 112, Tillich uses the term 'psychoanalysts' to denote 'people like Horney, Fromm, Jung and Rank.' In this particular sense the term 'psychoanalysts' includes 'neo-Freudian psychoanalysis' (K. Horney and E. Fromm), 'analytical psychology' (C. G. Jung) and 'genetic psychology' (O. Rank). And in the following paragraph of the same essay, Tillich introduces two more terms: 'However, there are two other words which indicate something about the matter itself and could be used here: "therapeutic psychology" is one term often used, and another is "depth psychology."' (Ibid., italics mine) But 'therapeutic psychology' bears a more general meaning which includes both psychoanalysts and non-psychoanalysts. (Cf. V. Varma, ed., Psychotherapy Today [London: Constable, 1974]) And on different occasions Tillich seems to attribute the idea of acceptance to both psychotherapists (e.g. Tillich, 'Impact,' PastPsy 11: 19-20) and psychoanalysts (e.g. 'Paul Tillich and Carl Rogers: A Dialogue,' PastPsy 19 [Feb 1968]: 59). In spite of the ambiguity of Tillich's attribution, one can see at least two general points of agreement between the post-Freudian psychoanalysts and Tillich's theological interpretation: First, the intersubjective dimension is essential to both interpretations of self-affirmation. For the psychotherapist, the personal relationship between the therapist and the patient is both external and internal, viz., the relationship can be internalized in one's character which appears as his subjective aspect. Jung talks about the 'collective unconsciousness' (the social significance of Jung's psychological theories has been studied by I. Progoff, Jung's Psychology and Its Social Meaning [London: Routledge
the significance of acceptance in the psychotherapeutic process in his personality theory. Through Rogers's investigation the idea became theoretically and experimentally grounded.

According to Rogers, the therapist's acceptance of a client (he prefers to use the word 'client' instead of 'patient') means 'unconditional', or in Rogers's own terminology, 'unconditional positive regard'. The idea is that the healing helper should admit the validity of the client's position, respect him as he is. Rogers says, 'By acceptance I mean a warm regard for him as a person of unconditional self-worth -- of value no matter what his condition, his behavior, or his feelings ... It

& Kegan Paul, 1953]) and the neo-Freudians (for example, Horney and Fromm) stress the significance of social factors in neurosis (see J. A. C. Brown, Freud and the Post-Freudians [Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1964], pp. 129-64). Likewise, for Tillich, 'the interdependence of ego-self and world is the basic ontological structure and implies all the others.' (ST-1: 169-71; also Tillich, CTE, pp. 89-93; id., 'Reply' in TPT, p. 342). Second, since the interpersonal relationship is so significant in psychotherapy, the 'dialectical procedure' of a dialogue between the two persons (viz., the therapist and the patient) is strongly emphasized in therapeutic treatment and hence an atmosphere of 'acceptance' is presupposed (see C. G. Jung, The Practice of Psychotherapy, trans. R. F. C. Hull [London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966], also K. Horney, New Ways in Psychoanalysis [New York: Norton & Co., 1966 reprint; first published in 1939], pp. 276-305). Although an open and personal attitude of the therapist towards the patient is stressed in the post-Freudian psychoanalysts' therapeutic process, the concept of 'acceptance' has not yet occupied a central position and become a separate item of investigation.


14 In spite of Tillich's disagreement with Rogers's humanistic presupposition, the concept of acceptance is an idea to which Tillich finds no objection. In a conversation between Tillich and Rogers, broadcasted on March 7, 1965, when Rogers claimed that 'I believe that the person can only accept the unacceptable in himself when he is in a close relationship in which he experiences acceptance. This, I think, is a large share of what constitutes psychotherapy ... I don't know too much of your thinking about interpersonal relationships, but I wonder how that sounds to you?' Tillich's answer was: 'I believe that you are absolutely right in saying that the man-to-man experience of forgiveness, or better, acceptance of the unacceptable, is a very necessary pre-condition for self-affirmation ... I believe that this is really the center of what we call the "good news" in the Christian message.' ('Tillich and Rogers,' PastPsy 19: 59; italics mine) Cf. also D. Browning, 'Analogy, Symbol, and Pastoral Theology in Tillich's Thought,' PastPsy 19 (Feb 1968): 50-54.
is only as I understand the feelings and thoughts which seem so horrible to you, or so weak, or so sentimental, or so bizarre -- it is only as I see them as you see them, and accept them and you, that you feel really free to explore all the hidden nooks and frightening crannies of your inner and often buried experience.' Tillich gives a similar description when he explains the meaning of 'acceptance' in the psychotherapeutic situation: '[In the psychoanalytic situation the healing helper] accepts the patient into his communion without condemning anything and without covering up anything.' Tillich draws this analogy to explain the experience and 'genuine meaning of the Paulinian-Lutheran doctrine of "justification by faith":' the Lutheran formula that "he who is unjust is just" (in the view of the divine forgiveness) can be rendered into the 'more modern phrasing that "he who is unacceptable is accepted";' here 'the victory over the anxiety of guilt and condemnation is sharply expressed.'

What happens when one experiences such an 'unconditional acceptance'? In this respect the Rogerian therapists have done a substantial amount of research. According to Albert Mehrabian, the effects of an unconditional acceptance can be expressed in two operational propositions. The first one is: the degree of unconditional positive regard is correlated with the degree of positive self-regard. That is to say, the therapist's attitude of unconditional acceptance can be internalized by the client and becomes his own self-regard. In Rogers's elaboration,

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17 Ibid., p. 160.
18 For a longitudinal analysis of the correlation between 'conditional positive regard' and 'conditional positive self-regard', see A. Mehrabian, An Analysis of Personality Theories (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1968), pp. 41-44.
The client moves from the experiencing of himself as an unworthy, unacceptable, and unlovable person to the realization that he is accepted, respected, and loved, in this limited relationship with the therapist. "Loved" has here perhaps its deepest and most general meaning -- that of being deeply understood and deeply accepted.\(^{19}\)

The second operational proposition is: the degree of positive self-regard a person exercises towards himself is correlated with the degree of positive regard he exercises towards others.\(^{20}\) Using Rogers's technical expression, this means that the person moves in the direction of greater degree of 'congruence' between his phenomenal and organismic experiences.\(^{21}\)

Concluding from his experimental research, Rogers summarizes the alteration of one's personality structure as follows:

- An increased unification and integration of personality; a lessened degree of neurotic tendency; a decreased amount of anxiety; a great degree of acceptance of self and of emotionality as a part of self; increased objectivity in dealing with reality; more effective mechanisms for dealing with stress-creating situations; more constructive feelings and attitudes; and a more effective intellectual functionings.\(^{22}\)

In this respect, Tillich uses a forceful title -- 'struck by grace'. He draws Paul's experience as an exemplar:

In the picture of Jesus as the Christ, which appeared to him at the moment of his greatest separation from other men, from himself and God, he found himself accepted in spite of his being rejected. And when he found that he was accepted, he was able to accept himself and to be reconciled to others. The moment in which grace struck him and overwhelmed him, he was reunited with that to which he belonged, and from which he was estranged in utter strangeness.\(^{23}\)

\(^{19}\) Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy, p. 159; also pp. 160-71.

\(^{20}\) See Mehrabian, Personality Theories, pp. 44-50.

\(^{21}\) 'Congruence' is a technical term used by Rogers to refer to a person's honesty and openness with oneself and others. Or in operational terms, it is the degree of actual awareness of experience towards what is being experienced. See Rogers, Becoming a Person, pp. 339-42.

\(^{22}\) Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy, p. 178; see also pp. 194-95. Also id., Becoming a Person, pp. 109, 183-96, 305.

\(^{23}\) Tillich, 'You are Accepted' in SF, pp. 160-61. Tillich goes on to describe that once a person is experienced and struck by grace, 'in the light of this grace we perceive the power of grace in our relation to others and to ourselves.' (Ibid., pp. 162-63)
So it is evident that 'the experience of acceptance' itself is an internalized healing power which causes genuine transformations. And Tillich's existential interpretation of Justification is indeed congruent with the findings in the field of psychotherapeutic studies.

We have seen in our last chapter that a 'forensic' interpretation of Justification must be complemented with a subjective and existential consideration. God's justifying act upon man can never be separated from man's personal existence. Christ is in nobis as well as pro nobis. The righteousness of the Christian is not a merely imputed righteousness, it is also an imparted one. In fact such a claim has been a persisting reaction against the 'lawcourt' interpretation or substitutionary understanding of Justification since the post-Reformation period. But Tillich's concern is not only the necessity of a subjective dimension, but an 'apologetic' meaning of the doctrine, viz., the question of 'Christianity and the modern mind.' F. W. Dillistone once remarked that in the face of such a world situation today which can be characterized by the symbols of 'void, the Abyss, Angst, the Alone,' the Pauline doctrine of Justification by faith should be proclaimed afresh and take on new relevance. As far as communicating the Christian idea of Justification to the modern world is concerned, Tillich's concepts of anxiety, courage and acceptance are

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24 See supra, chap. 2, pp. 84-89.
26 For example, from the post-Reformation period down to the nineteenth century, there was Puritanism and the Pietist movement on the one hand and ethical-idealistic Liberalism on the other which had a serious concern for the subjective dimension of the doctrine.
27 Cf. ST-1: 6-8.
undoubtedly successful. For example, his *The Courage to Be* has received high regard in the field of psychotherapy, especially among the Existential psychotherapists.

There is another side of Tillich's contribution to the reinterpretation of Justification as 'acceptance'. For Tillich, 'the method of correlation' is concerned with 'the interdependence of existential questions and theological answers.' Thus the task of a theologian is not only to announce a theological answer to the existential situation, but also to participate 'with his whole being in the situation of the question, namely, the human predicament ... In formulating the answer, he must struggle for it.' Since Tillich is convinced that a theologian should participate in the existential situation where the 'question' arises. His own interpretation of the Christian message, as we can see, is always preoccupied by a concern for man's *existential experience*; and the doctrine of Justification is no exception. At this point Tillich offers his particular insight to the doctrine. He starts with an existential-psychotherapeutic

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32 *ST-2*: 15.
analysis of the anxiety of man which leads to a desperate need for self-affirmation. Then he provides his therapeutic answer by introducing the notion of 'courage': 'Courage is self-affirmation "in-spite-of", that is in spite of that which tends to prevent the self from affirming itself.' And 'the highest form of it' is 'self-affirmation on the basis of being accepted in spite of being unacceptable.' Throughout his discussion of Reconciliation, Tillich keeps his attention on the existential experience -- the feeling -- of man from anxiety to self-affirmation through acceptance. Here Tillich catches a rather ignored dimension of the traditional Christian doctrine of Justification. For even though a correlative idea of the objective and subjective sides of the doctrine has been emphasized by some theologians, the actual dynamics of how the objective declaration from God becomes the subjective power that brings forth a transformation of existence is usually substituted by a discussion of the regenerating work of the Holy Spirit. Such a leap can only provide a generic explanation of what has happened, not the phenomenological description of the change. This is partly due to our inadequate understanding of the human psychic structures and operations before the development of modern depth-psychology. But, 'possibly no modern theologian has given such serious attention to the writings of depth-psychologists as has Paul Tillich.' Thus by introducing psychotherapeutic findings, Tillich goes beyond the substitutionary theory or the moral influence theory and delineates the psychodynamics of

33 CTB, pp. 41-68.
34 Ibid., p. 41.
35 UC, p. 207.
36 At least, for example, in Barth's interpretation of Reconciliation, as we have seen (supra, ch. 2, pp. 84-94), a concern for man's existential experience is intentionally suppressed.
37 For example, see R. C. Moberly, Atonement and Personality (London: J. Murray, 1907), pp. 136-255.
the existential experience from one's anxiety of guilt to the self-affirmation of acceptance. 39

Healing through the New Being: An 'Overcoming' of Psychotherapy

In this section, we are going to discuss the relation between psychotherapeutic healing and salvation through the New Being in Tillich's theology. When Tillich talks about the notion of 'acceptance' in the psychotherapeutic situation, he does not intend to suggest a mere analogy to the God-man encounter in the doctrine of Justification. For Tillich, 'salvation is derived from salvus, "healthy" or "whole," and it can be applied to every act of healing: to the healing of sickness, of demonic possession, and of servitude to sin and to the ultimate power of death.' 40

Here the meaning of healing is extended to the whole realm of the doctrine of salvation. 41 And every psychotherapeutic healing which features the reunion of what is estranged participates in the healing impact of the Spiritual Presence. 42 For 'in some degree all men participate in the

39 Williams, 'Doctrine of Forgiveness,' PastPsy 19: 22-23, remarks that 'the importance of this insight into forgiveness as participation in healing power is immeasurable. One can only ask what suffering and misunderstanding might have been avoided in the history of the church if the moralistic calculating view of forgiveness as sheer cancellation of debts had been supplanted by this doctrine of its healing and creative function as Tillich sees it. Perhaps what Aulen calls the classical doctrine of atonement came closest to appropriating this standpoint in its understanding of the divine forgiveness, but none of the traditional doctrines has been adequate.' See also the whole essay (pp. 17-23); and A. A. Wettstein, 'The Concept of Participation in Paul Tillich's Thought -- with studies in its historical background and present significance' (Ph.D. dissertation, McGill University, 1968), pp. 230-32.

40 ST-1: 146; italics mine.

41 ST-2: 166, 'With respect to both the original meaning of salvation (from salvus, "healed") and our present situation, it may be adequate to interpret salvation as "healing". It corresponds to the state of estrangement as the main characteristic of existence. In this sense, healing means reuniting that which is estranged, giving a center to what is split, overcoming the split between God and man, man and his world, man and himself.'

42 See ST-3: 279-82. A brief clarification should be made of the difference between the ideas of 'New Being' and 'Spiritual Presence': 'New Being is essential being under the conditions of existence, conquering the gap between essence and existence.' (ST-2: 118-19) While 'Jesus as the
healing power of the New Being. Otherwise, they would have no being.'

Then what is the precise relation between psychotherapeutic healing and salvation through the New Being? The question can be answered in terms of their difference and continuity. In terms of difference: 'The healing impact of the Spiritual Presence does not replace the ways of healing under the different dimensions of life [including psychotherapeutic healing]. And, conversely, these ways of healing cannot replace the healing impact of the Spiritual Presence.'

That is to say, 'the ways of healing do not need to impede each other, as the dimensions of life do not conflict with each other. The correlate of the multidimensional unity of life is the multidimensional unity of healing.'

In terms of continuity, individual acts of healing can be 'designated as a fragmentary, ambiguous, anticipatory realization of the cosmic wholeness. Each of these terms carries some special connotations: "Fragmentary" indicates the fact that every specific state of health or salvation represents the cosmic wholeness in a being which is a fragment of the whole, and whose wholeness is, therefore, always conditioned, threatened, imperfect, and pointing beyond itself. "Ambiguous" indicates the fact that, from the point of view of the whole, all partial healing is doubtful in its ultimate value ... "Anticipatory" indicates the preliminary character of healing and salvation in comparison with the eschatological fulfillment for which many religions are Christ the bearer of the New Being in the totality of his being,' 'to experience the New Being in Jesus as the Christ means to experience the power in him which has conquered existential estrangement in himself and in everyone who participates in him.' (Ibid., pp. 121, 125; italics mine) On the other hand, it is 'Spiritual Presence' -- 'the manifestation of the divine Spirit in the human spirit' (ST-3: 139, 107-109) -- which creates the New Being in man: 'The Spiritual Presence, elevating man through faith and love to the transcendent unity of unambiguous life, creates the New Being above the gap between essence and existence and consequently above the ambiguities of life.' (ST-3: 138-39).


ST-3: 280.

Ibid., p. 281.
longing.' To sum up, salvation through the New Being is an 'overcoming' (Überwindung) of the fragmentary, ambiguous and anticipatory character of psychotherapeutic healing through its 'ultimacy':

[The healing through the New Being in Jesus as the Christ] is the ultimate criterion of every healing and saving process ... in him the healing quality is complete and unlimited ... The New Being in the Christ transcends every relativity in its quality and power of healing. It is just this that makes him the Christ. Therefore, wherever there is saving power in mankind, it must be judged by the saving power in Jesus as the Christ.47

In the case of psychotherapeutic acceptance and acceptance in Justification, the overcoming can be seen in two aspects: first, the ultimate source of power which heals by accepting the unacceptable; and second, the ultimate source of courage to accept this acceptance.

1. The ultimate source of power which heals by accepting the unacceptable.

Concerning the 'ultimate source of power' in the salvation through the New Being which overcomes psychotherapeutic acceptance, Tillich says,

the point where the religious "acceptance as being accepted" transcends medical healing [is:] Religion asks for the ultimate source of power which heals by accepting the unacceptable, it asks for God. The acceptance by God, his forgiving or justifying act, is the only and ultimate source of a courage to be which is able to take the anxiety of guilt and condemnation into itself ... Everything less than this, one's own or anybody else's finite power of being cannot overcome the radical, infinite threat of non-being which is experienced in the despair of self-condemnation.48

Here the 'ultimacy' can be seen from two aspects. First, psychotherapy as a discipline only deals with pathological anxiety. But what is more basic behind the mental sickness is man's existential anxiety, which can only be treated by philosophers and theologians. As Tillich puts it:

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47 JST-2: 167-68. Cf. also UC, pp. 120-21.
48 CTB, p. 162. Italics mine.
No therapeutic theory can be developed without an implicit or explicit image of man ... No doctrine of man is possible without a general understanding of the processes of life, their trends, and their ambiguities ... no understanding of life process is possible without a doctrine of being.49

Psychotherapists deal pathologically with neurotic anxiety, neurotic guilt and neurotic emptiness. But these are only 'misplaced compulsory' phenomena. What is 'basic' are 'the universal structures of existence which make neurotic phenomena possible ... Here are very obvious reasons why psychoanalysis needs a philosophical matrix.'50 But even if one tries 'to overcome existential negativity, anxiety, estrangement, meaninglessness, or guilt,' the human predicament will remain and cannot be removed. For as long as he sees man 'only from the point of view of existence and not from the point of view of essence, only from the point of view of estrangement and not from the point of view of essential goodness, then this consequence is unavoidable.'51 At this point Tillich provides his theological judgement:

Three considerations of human nature are present in all genuine theological thinking: essential goodness, existential estrangement, and the possibility of something, a "third", beyond essence and existence, through which the cleavage is overcome and healed ... Every criticism of existentialism and psychoanalysis on the basis of this tripartite view of human nature is directed against the confusion of these three fundamental elements, which always must be distinguished although they always are together in all of us.52

Thus this 'third possibility' -- the New Being which conquers the gap between essence and existence -- is the ultimate answer to the human predicament. Whereas the psychotherapists deal with the pathological form of the

51 Tillich, 'Existentialism and Psychoanalysis' in TC, pp. 118-23. Italics mine.
52 Ibid., p. 119. Also 'Tillich and Rogers,' PastPsy 19: 56.
human situation, the New Being provides the *ultimate source of power* to overcome the universal problem in human nature.

The second aspect of 'overcoming' is concerned with a comparison between the *therapist* as a medium of grace and *God* as the One who unconditionally accepts the unacceptable. Tillich maintains that 'everything less than [the ultimate source of power from God], one's own or anybody else's finite power of being cannot overcome the radical, infinite threat of non-being which is experienced in the despair of self-condemnation.' Here we can see a contrast between the therapist as a *conditioned* human being who is *finite*, and the *unconditioned* God who is *infinite*. We can elucidate the contrast by considering two concrete implications -- the ultimate power to love and the phenomenon of transference.

We have seen that the psychotherapists (for example, Rogers) clearly recognize the essential role of 'love' in the therapeutic process as the healing power to overcome existential separation. 'Love' here is understood in the sense of 'complete acceptance' which the therapist holds towards his patient. But concerning the Rogerian's suggestion that a therapist should completely involve his subjective feeling in a therapeutic situation, Joel Kovel points out that 'its limits stem from its strong points.' For on the one hand, as a profession, the quality of love which a therapist has towards his patient is inevitably restricted. On the

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53 CTB, p. 162.
54 See supra, p. 101, n.19.
55 Rogers, *Client-Centered Therapy*, pp. 159-60.
56 Ibid., pp. 160-72.
58 Even Yalom, an existential psychotherapist, observes that 'there is an inescapable dissonance in the world of the therapist: no amount of polishing and lubricating make concepts like "friendship," "love," and "I-Thou" fit comfortably with other concepts like "fifty-minute sessions," "sixty-five dollars an hour," "case conference," and "third-party payments." This incongruity is built into the therapist's, and the patient's, "situation" and cannot be denied or ignored ... Will the patient ask, "Do you love me?" "If you really care for me, would you see me if I had no
other hand, 'a therapist focused on conveying his positive regard for the client cannot at the same time regard the situation with the eye of a circling hawk looking for a disturbance in the underbrush.' In other words, '[the therapist] pays for his subjectivity with objectivity; and the client pays too.'

According to Tillich, such a dilemma of attachment and detachment is rooted in human finitude. From an ontological point of view, love is the reunion of existential separation. But 'the greatest separation is the separation of self from self.' Since selfhood ontologically implies finitude, the quality of love between men cannot escape from its ambiguities with regard to the moral imperative, the moral norms and the moral motivation. Thus an unambiguous quality of love is 'impossible for the human spirit by itself.' It can only be 'a creation of the Spiritual Presence.' In Tillich's terms, this is 'the agape quality' of love:

Agape is an ecstatic manifestation of the Spiritual Presence. It is possible only in unity with faith and is the state of being drawn into the transcendent unity of unambiguous life. For this reason, it is independent of the other qualities of love [viz., philia, eros, epithymia] and is able to unite with them, to judge money?"

"Is therapy really a purchased relationship?" It is true that these questions veer perilously close to that ultimate secret of the psychotherapist which is that the encounter with the patient plays a relatively small role in the therapist's overall life ... Indeed, this denial of specialness is one of the cruel truths and poorly kept secrets of therapy: the patient has one therapist; the therapist, many patients. The therapist is far more important to the patient than the patient to the therapist.' (Yalom, Existential Psychotherapy, pp. 407, 415; italics mine)


59 Kovel, Guide to Therapy, p. 164.
60 ST-3: 134; LPJ, pp. 24-26.
61 LPJ, p. 25.
62 ST-1: 189-90.
64 ST-3: 135, 137; LPJ, p. 33.
them, and to transform them. Love as _agape_ is a creation of the Spiritual Presence which conquers the ambiguities of all other kinds of love.\(^6^5\)

Thus in the case of the therapist-patient encounter, love is experienced as the 'driving power toward reunion' which tries to overcome existential separation,\(^6^6\) whereas _agape_ as the God-man relationship has the 'power' and the 'basic structure' of the New Being. Such an _agape_ quality of love has the receptive, paradoxical and anticipatory character: the 'receptive' quality is 'its acceptance of the object of love without restriction;' the 'paradoxical' quality is 'disclosed in _agape_ 's holding fast to this acceptance in spite of the estranged, profanized, and demonized state of its objects;' and the 'anticipatory' quality is the 'expectation of the re-establishment of the holiness, greatness, and the dignity of the object of love through its accepting him.' Thus _'agape_ as Spiritual power' is 'prior to any personal or social actualization.' _'Agape_ is first of all the love of God has [sic.] toward the creature and through the creature toward himself. The three characteristics of _agape_ must first be ascribed to God's _agape_ toward his creatures and then to the _agape_ of creature toward creature.'\(^6^7\)

The second aspect of how God as the One who accepts 'overcomes' a therapist's acceptance of his patient is concerned with the problem of 'transference', an important feature in the psychotherapeutic

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\(^6^5\) ST-3: 137; also pp. 44-50. For a discussion of how, in holy community, the _agape_ quality of love cuts into the _libido_ (viz., _epithymia_), _eros_ and _phiilia_ qualities of love and elevates them beyond the ambiguities of their self-centeredness, see _LPJ_, pp. 24-34, 116-19.


relationship. Tillich himself discussed little about transference. But the problem was carefully scrutinized by Peter Homans in his article 'Transference and Transcendence: Freud and Tillich on the Nature of Personal Relatedness'. Commenting on the essay, Tillich writes, 'I have no quarrel with this comparison; on the contrary, I find it very illuminating for my understanding of Freud and for some unnoticed complications of my own thought.' From his survey of Sigmund Freud's writing on 'the transference neurosis', Homans traces the link between Freud's understanding of transference phenomena and religion: Religion is a phenomenon of 'cultural' transference, it reinstates man's earlier dependency on a misplaced belief in a 'transference-god'. In such a case, when Tillich speaks of a therapist who 'does not stand for himself as an individual but represents the objective power of acceptance and self-affirmation,' or a God who accepts in spite of man's unacceptability, he is seemingly introducing not an idea of genuine self-affirmation but, conversely, a 'transference' dependency relationship which causes a loss of independent

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68 Transference, a term first used by S. Freud in 1895, denotes 'the emergence of [the patient's] infantile feelings and attitudes in a new form, directed towards the person of the analyst.' (This is a definition essentially as described by Freud, quoted from J. Sandler, C. Dare and A. Holder, The Patient and the Analyst [London: George Allen & Unwin, 1973], p. 45. Researches and different interpretations of transference after Freud are beyond the scope of our study. For a survey, see ibid., pp. 37-60).


70 P. Tillich, 'Rejoinder,' JR 46 (1966): 195. Aside from a minor supplement which he suggests that Homans should refer to his ST-3, Tillich says that 'I am glad about the amount of my agreement with the analysis of my writings by Homans. It shows that ideas which have risen on different planes are able to be united in an overarching vision.' (Ibid., p. 196)


72 CTB, p. 161; see also Tillich, 'Existentialism and Psychoanalysis' in TC, p. 124.
selfhood. But Homans contends that the situation is not due to the dependency relationship itself. It is only because 'belief in the transference-god is the attempt (on the cultural level) to align oneself with "somebody" or with "a being" rather than with being itself.'

Employing Tillich's notion of the 'God above God', Homans argues that once the transference-god is transcended into being-itself which goes beyond the subject-object relation, one can acquire the 'courage to be' in the experience of 'absolute faith'. And in this 'courage to be' which transcends 'the solitary courage to exist,' one can find his genuine self-affirmation. Thus Homans concludes that 'the God above God emerges only when and insofar as the transference-god is destroyed, and the destruction of the transference occurs when and insofar as the subject-object relation is transcended.'

Here we can see how the New Being which transcends the subject-object polarity overcomes the dependent transference effect in the God-man encounter. The 'God above God (of theism)' accepts the unacceptable and at the same time provides man with the courage of genuine self-affirmation.

73 At this point, one can see a different understanding between Tillich and Rogers (in addition to Freud) with regard to the role of a therapist. For Tillich, the role of a therapist is more than a 'client-centered' listener who should give absolutely no evaluation, no interpretation, no probing, no personal reaction. When Tillich draws a parallel relationship between the analyst to the patient and God to man, he uses the words 'grace' and 'forgiveness' which already imply evaluative judgments (cf. Tillich, 'Existentialism and Psychoanalysis' in TC, p. 124). Rogers is negative towards an evaluative attitude and conceives it as the barrier to interpersonal communication (see Rogers, Becoming a Person, pp. 330-31). Rogers says, 'when the therapist is experienced as "knowing more about me than I know myself," then there appears to the client to be nothing to do but to hand over the reins of his life into these more competent hands ... once this has happened it is a slow process to get the patient to the point where he again feels confident in the control of his own life.' (Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy, p. 216)

74 Homans, 'Transference and Transcendence,' JR 46: 159.

75 Ibid., pp. 156-60; cf. CTB, 167-83. A further discussion of 'God above God' can be found in infra, pp. 119-26.

76 Homans, 'Transference and Transcendence,' JR 46: 159. See also ST-3: 76, '[the methods which can remove the phenomenon of transference in the healing process] can be successful only if the ambiguity of working for personal growth is overcome. And this is possible only if the subject-object scheme is conquered. Unambiguous life is impossible wherever the subject-object scheme is unbroken.'
2. *The ultimate source of courage to accept the acceptance.*

Now we consider the person who accepts the acceptance. So far in our discussions of psychotherapeutic theories, the whole emphasis has been placed upon the therapist's effort to accept the patient, with very little attention given to the source of courage that causes the patient to accept the acceptance in spite of his deep anxiety of unacceptability. To the therapists, a patient's receptivity is a spontaneous outgrowth from the psychiatric setting. But this is exactly where Tillich disagrees with the psychotherapists. Tillich would have no objection to the psychotherapeutic maxim that 'it is the relationship that heals.' But the relationship alone cannot provide the healing power. It is fallacious for contemporary sociological and psychological analyses to 'derive the evil of man's predicament [solely] from the structure of industrial society. Such a derivation implies the belief that changes in the structure of our society would, as such, change man's existential predicament. All utopianism has this character.' Since anxiety, as Tillich conceives it, is ontic in human life, no clinical or psychological healing can completely remove it. He writes, 'even if one is personally accepted, it [the healing] needs a self-transcending courage to accept, it needs the courage of confidence.' For even if the patient is brought to the stage where he can see himself as he is, the result would be a discovery of his finitude. And at this point a

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79 This is the central argument of CTB. For a good discussion, see S. J. Beck, 'Implications for Ego in Tillich's Ontology of Anxiety,' *PPR* 18 (1957/58): 451-70.
80 CTB, p. 161. Italics mine.
courage is needed to affirm oneself (one's being) in spite of the anxiety implied in the awareness of non-being. But self-affirmation in spite of the anxiety 'presupposes participation in something which transcends the self.' 'For the ultimate power of self-affirmation can only be the power of being-itself. Everything less than this, one's own or anybody else's finite power of being cannot overcome the radical, infinite threat of non-being which is experienced in the despair of self-condemnation.' Thus 'every act of courage is a manifestation of the ground of being.' It is 'the state of being grasped by the power of being which transcends everything that is and in which everything that is participates.' Here again we can see how the New Being as the power of being-itself which conquers existential estrangement overcomes psychotherapeutic healing by providing the ultimate source of courage to accept the acceptance in spite of one's deep anxiety of unacceptability. Tillich concludes, 'the question of God is the question of the possibility of this courage.'

II. THE QUEST FOR A 'PERSONAL-UNCONDITIONAL GOD' IN TILLICH'S DOCTRINE OF SALVATION

In our foregoing discussions we have seen how Tillich employs psychotherapeutic findings to reinterpret the Christian doctrine of Justification. He then shows how the healing through the New Being overcomes the psychotherapeutic situation by providing the ultimate source of

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82 See ST-1: 186-98; CTB, pp. 152-66.
83 CTB, pp. 161, 162; italics mine. Thus Tillich concludes his review of 'Erich Fromm's "The Sane Society'', PastPsy 6 (Sep 1955): 16, 'How can man's alienation be overcome except by a power which transcends the law and gives what law demands in vain? How can alienated man overcome alienation by himself? How can the "dead" man of the 20th century revive himself? Without an answer to these questions, Fromm's description of communitarian humanism sounds utopian.'
84 CTB, pp. 175, 168.
85 ST-1: 198. Italics mine.
power which heals by accepting the unacceptable on the one hand, and the ultimate source of courage to accept the acceptance on the other hand. Yet at this point, a more fundamental question has to be asked: If being-itself, in Tillich's system, is the ultimate power to accept and at the same time the ground from which the courage to accept the acceptance is derived, then how can he resolve the tension between the radical transcendence (that accepts the unacceptable) and the radical immanence (that provides the courage to accept this acceptance)?

God as the Unconditional -- A Non-spatial Answer to 'the Paradoxical Immanence of the Transcendent'

Many critics of Tillich like to employ the 'immanence-transcendence' categorization when they interpret his ontological understanding of the relationship between God and finite beings. But, while a critic concludes that 'the tension between the immanent and transcendent interpretations of the concept of being [in Tillich's ontology] ... is probably unresolvable,' Tillich himself explicitly expresses his doubt about the validity of employing such a categorization:

The question whether the relation between God and the world should be expressed in terms of immanence or transcendence is usually

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86 Or as Tillich puts it, 'Salvation is the healing of this split [viz., man's existential estrangement from his essential being] in the healing power of that which transcends man and gives him the courage to accept himself.' (P. Tillich, 'Review of "Psychoanalysis and Religion" by Erich Fromm,' PastPsy 2 [Jun 1951]: 66)

87 Similar questions have been raised by various critics of Tillich. For example, A. Thatcher, The Ontology of Paul Tillich (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 85-88; G. F. McLean, 'Paul Tillich's Existential Philosophy of Protestantism' in PTCT, pp. 81-83; J. P. Dourley, Paul Tillich and Bonaventure (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1975), pp. 61-64.

88 In addition to our list in n.87, one can add K. B. Osborne, New Being (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969), pp. 7-8, 142-43.

89 Thatcher, Ontology of Tillich, p. 88.
answer"d by an "as well as." Such an answer, although it is correct, does not solve any problem.\textsuperscript{90}

The reason is: 'Immanence and transcendence are spatial symbols ... [But] God is neither in another nor in the same space as the world. He is the creative ground of the spatial structure of the world, but he is not bound to the structure, positively or negatively.'\textsuperscript{91} But if the qualification of the God-world relation as 'immanent' or 'transcendent' is insufficient, what then are the non-spatial meanings beyond these spatial symbols? In Tillich's understanding, they are 'freedom' and 'participation'.

1. Transcendence as freedom.

When we say that God is transcendental to man as finite beings, it refers to 'the freedom-to-freedom relationship which is actual in every personal encounter.'\textsuperscript{92} The 'freedom' we are discussing here is concerned

\textsuperscript{90} ST-1: 263; italics mine. The statement that the relation between the Unconditional and the conditioned can be described as 'the paradoxical immanence of the transcendent', quoted by J. L. Adams in his 'Introduction' to WR, p. 15 (cf. also id., Paul Tillich's Philosophy of Culture, Science, and Religion [New York: Harper & Row, 1965], pp. 149, 250), belongs to Tillich's earlier usage (during the twenties) in his discussion of the philosophy of religion before his ST-1 (published in 1951). Even though the statement has been used, its occurrence among Tillich's earlier writings was rare. And in his later writings, although the 'immanence-transcendence' pair was used occasionally, it was applied to the stratification of the meaning of religious symbols, rather than directly used in his ontological delineation of the finite-infinite relationship. Cf. P. Tillich, 'The Nature of Religious Language' in TC, pp. 61-65; ST-3: 359-61. It is also interesting to notice that Tillich intentionally makes very little use of the word 'immanence' to describe his ontological and theological discussions of the finite-infinite relationship. Rather, he prefers to use the word 'participation'. A further discussion of 'participation' can be found in infra, pp. 126-31.

\textsuperscript{91} ST-1: 263.

\textsuperscript{92} Ibid. Also BR, pp. 74-75. Tillich's idea of the God-world relationship in freedom goes back to his study of F. Schelling. Cf. P. Tillich, Construction of the History of Religion, pp. 72-73. When Tillich states that 'the freedom of the creature to act against its essential unity with God makes God transcendent to the world' and 'the divine transcendence is the possible conflict and the possible reconciliation of infinite and finite freedom' (BR, pp. 74-75; ST-1: 263), the idea clearly echoes Schelling's 'Freiheitsphilosophie' in his Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit und die damit zusammenhängende...
with God's free relationship with the world and man. It should be distin-
guished from human finite freedom which is an ontological polarity to one's
destiny, or God's own divine actuality in which freedom is 'an absolute
and unconditional identity with his destiny.' When the Bible says that
'in freedom' God creates, deals, saves and fulfils the world and man, it
means that

his [viz., God's] freedom is freedom from anything prior to him or
alongside him. Chaos cannot prevent him from speaking the word
which makes light out of darkness; the evil deeds of man cannot
prevent him from carrying through his plans; the good deeds of men
cannot force him to reward them; the structure of being cannot
prevent him from revealing himself ... There is no ground prior
to him which could condition his freedom.

The key notion here is 'unconditional' (unbedingt): 'In terms of the exis-
tential correlation of man and God ... freedom means that that which is
man's ultimate concern is in no way dependent on man or on any finite being
or on any finite concern. Only that which is unconditional can be the
expression of unconditional concern, A conditioned God is no God.'
Thus the non-spatial meaning of God's 'transcendence' in terms of the notion of
freedom is that 'God is unconditional.' The idea of 'unconditional' here
means that which goes beyond any fixation or determining factor from finite
beings. On the one hand it echoes our earlier discussion of grace as the

Gegenstände (1809). Cf. also HCT, pp. 444-45; and R. Mokrosch,
Theologische Freiheitsphilosophie. Metaphysik, Freiheit und Ethik in der
philosophischen Entwicklung Schellings und in den Anfängen Tillichs
(Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976), pp. 350-60.

93 See ST-1: 182-86.
94 Ibid., pp. 185, 244.
95 Ibid., p. 248. Italics mine.
96 Ibid. Italics mine.
97 At this point, A. H. Armstrong's careful scrutiny between the
'spatial' and 'non-spatial' connotations of 'God's transcendence' is worth
quoting ('God's Transcendence and Infinity' in Christian Faith and Greek
& Todd, 1960], pp. 8-9): 'By God's transcendence one of two things can be
meant, both in their way attempts to express his overwhelming superiority
to all else. The first is that he is remote, only accessible through a
hierarchy of inferior divine beings or powers, or, in the most simple-
minded form of the doctrine, actually outside and above the world. This
'in-spite-of' character in God's acceptance of the unacceptable. On the other hand, the non-spatial interpretation of God's transcendence as unconditional provides an alternative approach to Tillich's controversial notion, 'God above God'.

In answer to his critics' confusion about the term 'God above God', Tillich stresses that 'it is not a dogmatic, but an apologetic, statement.' That is to say, it is a way to answer man's existential situation -- in this case, it is the 'extreme situation' of man's experience of radical doubt and meaningless. It is not the doctrine of God 'on which a whole structure of truth can be built,' but a way to apprehend the question of God in the face of an age of anxiety where traditional theism seems to give no satisfactory answer. Thus more than once Tillich suggests that the statement 'God above God' could be clarified by the alternative formula 'God above God of theism'. But why should the traditional theistic understanding of 'God' be overcome by such a formulation? According to Tillich, the 'God' of traditional theism can be understood in three senses: First, the traditional and psychological connotations of the word 'God' that produce irrelevant moods; second, the One in the personal encounter with man in the Jewish-Christian tradition; third, the existing 'God' from the so-called theological arguments. For Tillich, the first sense is

way of thinking about God's transcendence was common in late Greek philosophy, and has sometimes affected Christian theology ... though it is certainly not orthodox Christian doctrine. But the other meaning of transcendence is much more important for serious Christian thinking. This is that God is wholly other, different from and better than everything that we are or can know ... Not only is he not in space or time at all, he is free from all other boundaries and limitations.'

98 Cf. also ST-1: 285-86; ST-2: 178-79.
99 ST-2: 12.
100 Ibid.
101 Cf. CTB, pp. 180-81. In his answer to a student's difficulty in understanding the term 'God above God', Tillich said, 'If you add to it what my writing adds -- "God above the God of theism" -- the term may be clear to you, since "the God of theism" is God limited by man's finite conceptions.' (UC, p. 51)
102 CTB, pp. 176-78.
'irrelevant' because it is only a 'rhetorical-political abuse of the name God.'\textsuperscript{103} The second sense is 'one-sided' because it emphasizes only the existential dimension and takes God as a person. But even saying that 'God is a person' entails difficulties because 'personality (\textit{persona, prosopon}) includes individuality' which confines God's universal participation.\textsuperscript{104} And the final sense is said to be 'wrong'. It is 'bad theology' because in the arguments for the 'existence' of God, God is seen as a being and bound to the subject-object structure. Once we fall into such a level of division, either 'God' becomes an object which is a 'half blasphemous' conception,\textsuperscript{105} or God becomes a subject who is 'the invincible tyrant' that transforms 'everything into a mere object.'\textsuperscript{106} Thus the way to overcome such a distorted understanding is to go beyond the traditional theism which perceives God as a being, and to acknowledge that God is unconditional. At this point, we encounter Tillich's theory of symbolism. In the essay 'Das religiöse Symbol' written in 1928,\textsuperscript{107} Tillich argues that 'religious symbols are distinguished from others [viz., general characteristics of the symbol] by the fact that they are a representation of that which is unconditionally beyond (\textit{unbedingt übersteigt}) the conceptual sphere; they point to the ultimate reality implied in the religious act, to the unconditioned transcendent (\textit{das Unbedingt-Transzendent}).'\textsuperscript{108} And such an idea, that the basic characteristic of religious symbol is to 'point beyond' themselves to the ultimate reality, became the basic principle in Tillich's discussions of religious symbolism throughout his later

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\textsuperscript{103} Ibid., p. 177. \\
\textsuperscript{104} See ST-1: 244-45. \\
\textsuperscript{105} See P. Tillich, 'The Two Types of Philosophy of Religion' in TC, p. 25. \\
\textsuperscript{106} CTB, p. 179. \\
\textsuperscript{107} The essay was first published in Blätter für deutsche Philosophie 1 (n.4 1928); reprinted in RV, pp. 88-109. The English translation 'The Religious Symbol' can be found in Religious Experience and Truth, ed. S. Hook (London: Oliver & Boyd, 1962), pp. 301-321. \\
\textsuperscript{108} Tillich, 'Religious Symbol' in Experience and Truth, p. 303. E.T. is modified according to the original text.
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writings. From the perspective of this 'point beyond' character, the word 'God' as a religious symbol also points to 'the unconditioned-transcendent' which 'goes beyond (hinausgeht über) every possible conception of a being.' If God-language is to be understood as a 'pointer' from such a dynamically transcendent view of symbolism, every attempt to objectify the 'pointer' itself, instead of grasping that to which it points, will lead to 'a result which is destructive of the religious as well as the cultural life.' For 'wherever this aspect [of 'pointing beyond'] is lost sight of, there results an objectification of the Unconditioned (which is in essence opposed to objectification) ... [and] God is made into a "thing" that is not a real thing but a contradiction in terms and an absurdity.' Thus the statement 'God beyond "the God of theism"' is a safeguard against the abuse of symbolic language.

If the theory of symbolism provides Tillich with a philosophical basis to the statement 'God above God', then the apophasis in the Christian mystical tradition suggests the theological root which Tillich inherits. Adam Seigfried traces the idea back to Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite and the

109 See for example, 'Religious Language' in TC, p. 54; DF, p. 41. Certainly there is an equally important idea in Tillich's understanding that symbols do not only 'point to' but also 'participate in' the ultimate reality, viz., the 'ecstatically transcendent' character of religious symbolism (cf. ST-2: 8-10). But for our present context, we only discuss the 'pointing' power of religious symbols.

110 Tillich, 'Religious Symbol' in Experience and Truth, p. 314. E.T. is modified according to the original text.

111 Ibid.

112 In view of its German expression 'Gott über Gott', the statement would be more appropriately translated as 'God beyond God', in order to eliminate any spatial imagery such as the word 'above' would imply. In fact this alternative expression has been employed by Tillich and other interpreters. See, for example, CTB, pp. 182-83; UC, pp. 2, 51.

German mystics. But the idea of a negative way (via negationis) to the knowledge of God goes back to Philo, Clement of Alexandria, and the Cappadocian Fathers (especially Gregory of Nyssa). Nevertheless, the best elaboration still belongs to Pseudo-Dionysius. He distinguishes two possible approaches to the knowledge of God, viz., the cataphatic (affirmative) theology and apophatic theology. Affirmative theology aims to demonstrate what God is. But this stage of approach only 'leads us to some knowledge of God, but in an imperfect way. The perfect way; the only way which is fitting in regard to God, who is of His very nature unknowable, is the second [viz., apophatic theology] -- which leads us finally to total ignorance. All knowledge has as its object that which is. Now God is beyond all that exists. In order to approach Him it is necessary to deny all that is inferior to Him, that is to say, all that which is ... Proceeding by negations one ascends from the inferior degrees of being to the highest, by progressively setting aside all that can be known, in


115 Legum Allegoriae ii, 3; iii, 206. De vita contemplativa i, 2. Cf. also De posteritate Caini iv-v; De mutatione nominum 7-10; De specialibus legibus i, 20, 43-48. Thus A. Louth, The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), pp. 19-20 comments that 'Philo certainly has some claim to be called the Father of negative theology ... Philo's most frequent contention is that knowledge of God is beyond human capacity, because man's creaturely state prevents such knowledge.'

116 Stromata v, 10-12; Paedagogus i, 8.

117 While rejecting the Arians (Eunomius, Aetius) who claimed that the human mind can grasp a complete knowledge of God, the Cappadocians affirmed the radical transcendence of God's being and the impossibility of man's natural power to comprehend the divine essence. Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Vita Moysis i, 46; ii, 162-169, 234-239; De Beattitudinibus vi; also passage from In canticum canticorum xi and In Ecclesiastem vii (selected by J. Daniélou, From Glory to Glory [New York: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1979], pp. 126-29, 246-250) For a discussion of the various meanings of 'darkness' in Gregory of Nyssa's writings, see Daniélou, From Glory to Glory, pp. 23-33.

118 De mystica theologia iii; De divinis nominibus i, 1, 5.
order to draw near to the Unknown in the darkness of absolute ignorance." Since God in Himself transcends all predicates, He can be known only through contrary -- or dialectical -- expressions (viz., when it is described that 'God is X', one must immediately add 'yet God is non-X'). And Tillich's statement 'God above God' can be seen as a similar apophatic attempt to stress that God is not a being but being-itself. But neither the mystics' nor Tillich's apophatic theology is intended merely as an intellectual exercise to express the inexpressible. For the mystics, via negationis is a 'way' -- or, a 'pilgrimage' -- to enter into 'mystical union with God, whose nature remains incomprehensible to us.'


120 I am indebted to Prof. J. Macquarrie for this interpretation in his unpublished lecture on 'Divine Transcendence and Divine Immanence' at Oxford University in the Hilary term 1982-83. Pseudo-Dionysius' discussion of the predicate 'good' for God is a good example. When we say that 'God is good', we are drawing the idea of goodness from finite (created) beings. But God is not 'good' in the way we know about in this created world. In such a way we must add 'God is not good.' (See Epistolae i; cf. G. G. Bischoff, 'Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite: The Gnostic Myth' in The Spirituality of Western Christendom, ed. E. R. Elder [Kalamazoo: Cistercian Publications, 1976], pp. 31-33.) For a further linguistic discussion of Pseudo-Dionysius' God-talk, see W. T. Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy (London: Macmillan, 1961), pp. 288-94.

121 In his discussion of Pseudo-Dionysius' 'negative theology', Tillich writes, 'Perhaps this is the source -- unconsciously -- of what I said at the end of my book, "The Courage to Be", about the "God above God", namely, the God above God who is the real ground of everything that is, who is above any special name we can give to even the highest being.' (HCT, p. 92; on God as being-itself, see ST-1: 235-41). If we recognize the background of apophatic theology in Tillich's concept of God, the charge that Tillich is an atheist (cf. M. L. Diamond, Contemporary Philosophy and Religious Thought [New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974], p. 434, n.150; the list includes S. Hook, J. King-Farlow, L. Wheat and M. Diamond) should be reconsidered. For a discussion of Tillich's 'non-atheism', see R. N. Ross, 'The Non-existence of God: Tillich, Aquinas, and the Pseudo-Dionysius,' HTHR 68 (1975): 141-66. Further elaboration of the thesis can be found in id., The Non-existence of God: Linguistic Paradox in Tillich's Thought (New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1978).

122 Lossky, Mystical Theology, p. 28. Also W. R. Inge, Christian Mysticism (London: Methuen & Co., 1912), p. 111; and E. Underhill, Mysticism (London: Methuen & Co., 1930), pp. 129-36. Pseudo-Dionysius' analogy of 'carving a statue' in his De mystica theologia ii is a concrete example illustrating this 'positive' aim of mystics' 'negative' theology:
Tillich, while maintaining that classical mysticism still 'lacks the power to transform the existential distortion of reality,' \(^{123}\) pushes his 'positive' end of apophatic theology towards man's existential situation. This leads to our third consideration concerning Tillich's 'God above God'.

In defence of his employment of the statement 'God above God', Tillich explicitly claims that his aim is to give an existential answer to 'the radical doubt experienced by many people.' \(^{124}\) For

in the extreme state of radical doubt ... the God of both religious and theological language disappears. But something remains,

'Unto this Darkness which is beyond Light we pray we may come, and may attain unto vision through the loss of sight and knowledge, and that in ceasing thus to see or to know we may learn to know that which is beyond all perception and understanding (for this emptying of our faculties is true sight and knowledge), and that we may offer Him that transcends all things the praises of a transcendent hymnody, which we shall do by denying or removing all things that are — like a man who, carving a statue out of marble, remove all the impediments that hinder the clear perceptive of the latent image and by this mere removal display the hidden statue itself in its hidden beauty.' (Quoted from the translation by C. E. Rolt in Dionysius the Areopagite on the Divine Names and the Mystical Theology [New York: Macmillan, 1920], pp. 194-95) In his annotation Rolt comments, 'This simile shows that the \textit{Via Negativa} is, in the truest sense, positive ... If D. [viz., Pseudo-Dionysius] were open to the charge of pure negativity so often brought against him, he would have wanted to destroy his block of marble instead of carving it.' (Cf. also Louth, Christian Mystical Tradition, pp. 166-70; Lossky, 'Darkness and Light in the Knowledge of God' in In the Image and Likeness [New York: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1974], pp. 38-43) A remark should be made at this point: Since even the Christian mystics do not regard 'apophatic theology' as a mere 'epistemological approach,' Emmet's comment that 'though it may be tempting to look on this dialectic of Being and Non-Being as an apophatic approach, this is not what he [viz., Tillich] himself intends' (Emmet, 'Ground of Being', JThS 15: 29) seems inappropriate. Certainly Tillich does not intend to employ his statement 'God above God' for 'pointing to a bottomlessness!' But neither does the mystics' 'apophatic theology' intend to do so. Furthermore, Emmet's citation of Zen Buddhism as an example of 'extreme apophaticism' is also incorrect. For, even the \textit{koan} of the Zen masters does not intend to point to a 'bottomlessness' but the Buddha-nature in man. If Emmet needed an example, the \textit{Mādhyamika Kārikās} by \textit{Nāgārjuna} in India during the third century A.D. would have been more appropriate.

\(^{123}\) DF, p. 123. Cf. also ST-2: 12, Tillich tries to clarify that his statement 'God above God' is not 'a dogmatic statement of ... mystical character' by showing its particular implication in the existential situation.

\(^{124}\) ST-2: 12.
namely, the seriousness of that doubt in which meaning within meaninglessness is affirmed. The source of this affirmation of meaning within meaninglessness, of certitude within doubt, is not the God of traditional theism but the "God above God," the power of being, which works through those who have no name for it, not even the name God. This is the answer to those who ask for a message in the nothingness of their situation and at the end of their courage to be.125

Such a radical break-through between doubt and faith goes back to Tillich's personal experience during the First World War when he was an army chaplain on the western front (1914-1918). 'In the middle of a terrible battle,' Tillich experienced his 'personal kairos' through the struggle between deep despair (by radical doubt) and the courage of self-affirmation.126 And 'the paradox of "faith without God"' became his clue to re-assert the 'inner infiniteness of life.'127 From that point forward, existential implications became one of the basic concerns in Tillich's discussions of Gottesfrage.128 'The courage to be is rooted in the God who appears when

125 Ibid. Also it should be noticed that the notion of 'God above God' appears in the final section of CTB (p. 179) as 'the highest point' of Tillich's existential analysis of man's anxiety and courage to be. For the dialectical relation between doubt and faith, cf. DF, pp. 16-22; P. Tillich, 'Faith and Uncertainty' in NB, pp. 75-78. Cf. also K. Schedler, Natur und Gnade. Das sakramentale Denken in der frühen Theologie Paul Tillichs (1919-1935) (Stuttgart: Evangelisches Verlagswerk, 1970), pp. 93-103. For a further discussion of the 'theology for crucial situations' and 'faith' as an answer to the crisis of doubt, see C. Michalson, Faith for Personal Crises (London: Epworth, 1959), pp. 1-13, 66-92.

126 Cf. UC, p. 153; MAS, pp. 38-42.

127 Tillich's letter to Maria Klein on 5 December 1917, ENGW 5: 121.

128 For example, even in his discussion of the ontological and cosmological arguments of God (cf. ST-1: 204-210; id., 'The Two Types of Philosophy of Religion' in TC, pp. 10-29), Tillich does not take them as purely theoretical questions. The conclusion of his discussion is not concerned with the 'validity' or 'invalidity' of the arguments, but a section on the 'ontological certainty and the risk of faith' (Tillich, 'Two Types' in TC, pp. 27-29) -- an existential consideration of 'the immediate awareness of the Unconditioned' in man's experience of the risk of faith. In fact, besides his introduction of the notions 'ultimate concern' and 'the unconditional element' to the 'arguments of God' which revived the discussion of the problem among theologians, Tillich's contribution of bringing in the existential implication into the discussions should not be overlooked. At least no theologian has ever exerted such an endeavour in his formulation of the arguments. (Cf. Seigfried, Gott über Gott, pp. 13-46) For Tillich, the arguments of God are not merely intellectual demonstrations, they are the answer to man's anxiety of meaninglessness: 'The question of God must be asked because the threat of nonbeing, which man experiences as anxiety, drives him to the question of being conquering nonbeing and of courage conquering anxiety.' (ST-1: 208)
God has disappeared in the anxiety of doubt.\footnote{CTB, p. 183. Also ST-3: 227-28.}

2. **Immanence as participation.**

Now we turn to the problem of 'immanence'. Again, instead of saying that 'God is immanent \textit{in the world}' in spatial symbols, Tillich prefers to elucidate the 'qualitative relation': 'God is immanent in the world as its permanent creative ground ... everything finite \textit{participates} in being-itself and in its infinity. Otherwise it would not have the power of being.\footnote{ST-1: 263, 237. Italics mine.} Although Tillich seems to make no clear distinction between the metaphoric names 'the ground (or, abyss) of being', 'being-itself' and 'the power of being' in which every finite being participates,\footnote{See P. Tillich, 'The Meaning and Justification of Religious Symbols' in Experience and Truth, p. 7; ST-1: 79, 235-38; ST-2: 7; LPJ, p. 109. For a good survey of the concept of 'the power of being' in Tillich's systematic theology, see J. B. Lounibos, 'The Ideas of Power and Freedom in the Theology of Paul Tillich' (Ph.D. dissertation, Fordham University, 1976), pp. 131-43.} one can see two 'senses' involved in these expressions which characterize his understanding of participation.\footnote{Tillich, 'Rejoinder,' JR. 46: 184-85, '[Concerning the term "God"], in the first case it is the answer to the question "What does it mean that God \textit{is}?" which drives to the concept of being-itself. In the second case it is the element of mystery in the \textit{experience} of being ... that enables it to become a symbol.' (Italics mine)} In an \textit{ontological} sense, 'being-itself' or 'the ground of being' emphasizes God as 'the \textit{prius} of everything that is.'\footnote{Tillich, 'Meaning and Justification' in Experience and Truth, p. 7; ST-1: 236, 'As classical theology has emphasized, God is beyond essence and existence. Logically, being-itself is "before," "prior to," the split which characterizes finite being.'} In an \textit{experiential} sense, 'the power of being' emphasizes man's 'immediate awareness' of 'something unconditional which is the prius of the separation and interaction of subject and object, theoretically as well as practically.\footnote{Tillich, 'Two Types' in TC, pp. 22-26. See also ST-1: 236, 'the concept of being as being, or being-itself, points to the power inherent in everything, the power of resisting nonbeing. Therefore, instead of saying...}'}
First, the ontological sense of participation. In Tillich's ontology, all beings that exist must be grounded in their source, otherwise they would have no being. The main idea is twofold: first it refers to the 'creative origin' which 'points to the presence of everything that has being in the divine ground of being'; second, it refers to the idea of 'ontological dependence' which 'points to the inability of anything finite to be without the supporting power of the permanent divine creativity -- even in the state of estrangement and despair.' But this notion of God as the ground and man's 'essential belongingness' should not be interpreted as 'pantheism'. For Tillich, God is not 'identified with the unity and totality of finite potentialities.' Being the 'creative ground' of everything that has being, God is not subjected to the structure of finite beings but is the 'burning fire' of every being. Perhaps a more appropriate title to name this 'immanentist kind of theism' is that God is first of all being-itself, it is possible to say that he is the power of being in everything and above everything, the infinite power of being.' Cf. Emmet, "Ground of Being," JThS 15: 285-86.


For the notion of God as the 'ground' and 'being-itself' in philosophical history, see Emmet, "Ground of Being," JThS 15: 280-83; Thatcher, Ontology of Tillich, pp. 26-33, 58-62; G. F. McLean, 'Paul Tillich's Existential Philosophy of Protestantism' in PTCT, p. 54.


Tillich, 'Reply' in TPT, p. 341. ST-1: 236, 'It is as wrong to speak of God as the universal essence as it is to speak of him as existing. If God is understood as universal essence, as the form of all forms, he is identified with the unity and totality of finite potentialities; but he has ceased to be the power of the ground in all of them, and therefore he has ceased to transcend them. He has poured all his creative power into a system of forms, and he is bound to these forms. This is what pantheism means.' (Italics mine) Also ST-1: 245-49.

Emmet, "Ground of Being," JThS 15: 288.
'pan-en-theism'. In this case, both divine and human freedom are preserved. But the main emphasis of Tillich's notion of participation in its ontological sense is his 'essentialism' -- a concern for man's 'essential nature' in his 'temporal existence'. If every finite being participates in its creative ground, there should be an ontological unity beyond the boundary of particulars: 'The element of participation guarantees the unity of a disrupted world and makes a universal system of relations possible.' Such an understanding of 'participation', on the one hand,
illustrates Tillich's 'radical search' for 'unity' and 'identity where the infinite reveals itself in the finite, where the split of subject and object is overcome.' On the other hand, it characterizes again the idea that 'God is unconditional': 'The point of identity' which logically and ontologically precedes all special contents 'implies an unconditional element which transcends subjectivity and objectivity.'

Thus we can see that, for Tillich, the spatial symbols 'transcendence' and 'immanence' can be rendered into the non-spatial notions of 'freedom' and 'participation'. And these two notions, though with different concerns, convergingly lead to the same idea that 'God is unconditional'. In the 'transcendent' sense, 'God is unconditional' means that the freedom of God goes beyond human situations in His salvific act of justification (viz., the 'in-spite-of' character in God's acceptance of the unacceptable).

Also since 'God is unconditional,' a knowledge of Him goes beyond any finite symbol and is possible only in apophatic theology -- 'God beyond "the God of theism".' In the 'immanent' sense, 'God is unconditional' points to the ontological identity and unity beyond the boundary of particulars. From this perspective, God as radically transcendent and radically immanent does not lead to an idea of 'two Gods', as long as we leave behind the spatio-symbolic approach and apprehend the non-spatial quality of the 'unconditional'.

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148 Tillich, 'Two Types' in TC, pp. 24-25; ST-I: 207.
149 Supra, pp. 118-19.
150 Supra, pp. 118-26.
151 Cf. Thatcher's charge in his Ontology of Tillich, pp. 86-88.
152 For a discussion of 'unconditional' as a quality and not a being, see Tillich, 'Two Types' in TC, pp. 24-25; also UC, pp. 49-50.
transcendence and immanence through the notion of the 'unconditional', 'the two are in fact different ways of looking at the same thing.' As A. H. Armstrong puts it, 'Just because God is other than all things he is free from the sundering limitations of every definite thing and can be immediately present to all things everywhere. Not only is he not in space or time at all, he is free from all other boundaries and limitations.'

3. Being grasped by an ultimate concern.

Although the compatibility of transcendence and immanence has been solved philosophically, our investigation of Tillich's understanding of participation is not yet finished. Just like his 'God above God' which is concerned not only with epistemological symbolism but its existential transforming power experienced by man in the situation of radical doubt, the idea of participation does not suggest a mere intellectual panentheism. It is the experiential dimension which grasps Tillich's concern when he discusses man's participation in 'the power of being': Men as finite beings can have an immediate awareness of the presence of their ground in which they are participating. This happens when one is grasped by something unconditional expressed in his ultimate concern. The introduction of the idea of 'ultimate concern' adds a new dimension of meaning to the understanding of 'unconditional'. It is not only God Himself who is unconditional, but every unconditional quality within the realm of finite beings leads to God the Unconditional. In this context, the boundary between the

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153 Armstrong, 'God's Transcendence' in Christian Faith and Greek Philosophy, pp. 8-9. See also Macquarrie, Humanity, pp. 259-60. Thus ST-1: 245, 'God is equally "near" to each of them [viz., the polarity of "absolute individual" and "absolute participation"] while transcending them both.'


155 See Tillich, 'Two Types' in TC, pp. 22-27; also ST-1: 211-15.
sacred and the secular is completely dissolved: 156

In every cultural creation -- a picture, a system, a law, a political movement (however secular it may appear) -- an ultimate concern is expressed, and ... it is possible to recognize the unconscious theological character of it ... on the basis of the ontological awareness of the Unconditioned, i.e. on the basis of the insight that secular culture is essentially as impossible as atheism, because both presuppose the unconditional element and both express ultimate concerns. 157

Tillich's intention here is explicitly clear. According to his understanding of participation, 'religion, in the largest and most basic sense of the word, is ultimate concern. And ultimate concern is manifest in creative functions of human spirit.' 158 Thus whenever one is grasped by an ultimate concern (disregarding its realm, sacred or secular), he ecstatically participates in the power of being and is elevated to a state of transcendent unity. 159 Such an experience is 'religious' because the 'ultimate seriousness' is itself religion. 160 And in one's immediate awareness of 'something' unconditional he encounters God. 161

156 ST-1: 221, 'everything secular can enter the realm of the holy and ... the holy can be secularized. On the one hand, this means that secular things, events, and realms can become matters of ultimate concern, become divine powers; and, on the other hand, this means that divine powers can be reduced to secular objects, lose their religious character ... there is an essential unity of the holy and the secular, in spite of their existential separation. This means that the secular ultimates (the ontological concepts) and the sacred ultimates (the conceptions of God) are interdependent.' (Italics mine) See also P. Tillich, 'Religion as a Dimension in Man's Spiritual Life' in TC, pp. 3-9. Tillich's lifelong endeavour to bridge the sacred and the secular (for a discussion, see J. Macquarrie, God and Secularity [London: Lutterworth Press, 1968], pp. 31-33, 59-61) can be traced back to 1921 when he published his 'Über die Idee einer Theologie der Kultur' (see WR, esp. pp. 159-63), and later, more explicitly in his 'Religionsphilosophie' (1925) (see WR, esp. pp. 56-109). For a good critical survey, see Clayton, Concept of Correlation, pp. 87-116.

157 Tillich, 'Two Types' in TC, p. 27.

158 Tillich, 'Religion' in TC, pp. 7-8.

159 See ST-1: 45; ST-2: 9; ST-3: 129-38, 221-23, 256.


161 See Tillich, 'Two Types' in TC, pp. 22-27; also UC, p. 51, Tillich was asked, 'Would you conclude, then that everyone has encountered God in the sense of having encountered that which is not limited in time -- which is not temporary -- although not all have recognized it as such?' Tillich replied, 'You may say that, yes.' Also Satrom, 'Begriff der Religion,'
But at this point a clarification should be made. It seems that there are at least three kinds of 'ecstasy' which Tillich endeavours to bridge. And as far as the divine-human encounter is concerned, they are regarded by Tillich as equally 'religious'. The first kind (hereafter as 'Ecstasy_1') is the one we just mentioned. It is the ultimate concern in man's cultural creation. In such a case, the person is conscious of what he is concerned with unconditionally, although he might not recognize its 'religious' meaning. The second kind (hereafter as 'Ecstasy_2') is mainly elaborated in the final chapter of his The Courage to Be, where the notions of 'God above God' and 'absolute faith' are stressed. It is an ecstastical moment as the answer to a situation of radical doubt. In such a case, any concretization of that which grasps the person becomes a barrier to absolute faith -- 'the faith which creates the courage to take them into itself has no special content. It is simply faith, undirected, absolute. It is undefinable, since everything defined is dissolved by doubt and

p. 95, 'Der Begriff "ultimate concern", meint Tillich, unites a subjective meaning: somebody is concerned about something he considers of concern. Jemand hat etwas, was ihn unbedingt angeht. Das subjektive Element ist das, was ihn unbedingt angeht; das objektive, das, was ihn unbedingt angeht.'

Tillich defines his understanding of 'ecstasy' in ST-3: 111-12, 'the divine Spirit dwells and works in the human spirit. In this context, the word "in" implies all the problems of the relation of the divine to the human, of the unconditional to the conditioned, and of the creative ground to creaturely existence. If the divine Spirit breaks into the human spirit, this does not mean that it rests there, but it drives the human spirit out of itself [sic., it should be 'itself']. The "in" of the divine Spirit is an "out" for the human spirit. The spirit, a dimension of finite life, is driven into a successful self-transcendence; it is grasped by something ultimate and unconditional. It is still the human spirit; it remains what it is, but at the same time, it goes out of itself under the impact of the divine Spirit. "Ecstasy" is the classical term for this state of being grasped by the Spiritual Presence. It describes the human situation under the Spiritual Presence exactly.' For a summary of Tillich's idea of 'ecstasy', see S. Painadath, Dynamics of Prayer: Towards a Theology of Prayer in the Light of Paul Tillich's Theology of the Spirit (Bangalore: Asian Trading Corporation, 1980), pp. 165-76.

See UC, pp. 49-51.

'T Courage and Transcendence (The Courage to Accept Acceptance),' CTB, pp. 152-83.
meaninglessness ... It is the accepting of the acceptance without somebody or something that accepts.\footnote{165} A conspicuous expression of this understanding can be found in his sermon 'You are Accepted':

"You are accepted. You are accepted, accepted by that which is greater than you, and the name of which you do not know. Do not ask for the name now; perhaps you will find it later. Do not try to do anything now; perhaps later you will do much. Do not seek for anything; do not perform anything; do not intend anything. Simply accept the fact that you are accepted."\footnote{166}

Thus Ecstasy\textsubscript{2} is different from Ecstasy\textsubscript{1} in the case that the person grasped does not -- or even, should not -- have any concrete idea of who is concerned with him unconditionally. The third kind of ecstasy (hereafter as 'Ecstasy\textsubscript{3}') is, in a narrow sense of religion, the divine-human encounter in 'biblical religion'. Here 'God reveals himself as personal. The encounter with him and the concepts describing this encounter are thoroughly personal.'\footnote{167} In such a case, the God whom we encounter is conceived as both unconditional and personal.\footnote{168}

Tillich regards these three modes of ecstasy as basically the same, because ontologically they are the state of being grasped by the Spiritual Presence when the divine Spirit breaks into the human spirit. Existentially, this happens when one is grasped by unconditional concerns and participates in the power of being. As a result, existential separations are overcome and he is elevated to the transcendent unity of unambiguous life. But are the three modes of ecstasy really equivalent? If our task is to understand how divine intervention as the foundation of authentic

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\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{165} Ibid., pp. 171, 179.
\item \textsuperscript{166} SF, p. 162.
\item \textsuperscript{167} BR, p. 22.
\item \textsuperscript{168} Ibid., p. 27, 'biblical religion has discovered the full meaning of the personal. \textit{It is the unconditional character of the biblical God that makes the relation to him radically personal. For only that which concerns us in the center of our personal existence concerns us unconditionally. The God who is unconditional in power, demand, and promise is the God who makes us completely personal and who, consequently, is completely personal in our encounter with him.' (Italics mine)
humanity is possible, each of these ecstatic situations should be subjected to closer examination.

A 'Personal-Unconditional' Dilemma

Throughout the discussions in his book Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality, Tillich tries to elucidate that biblical personalism and ontological ultimacy are compatible with each other. And behind such a claim it is clear that he has presupposed the double criteria for an authentic divine-human encounter -- 'personal' and 'unconditional'. The criterion of 'unconditional' has been discussed in some detail. In this section we are going to focus our attention upon the criterion of 'personal' in Tillich's delineation of the divine-human encounter. Certainly this criterion is one of the major emphases in Tillich's system. For him, divine-human encounter as 'an existential relation is a person-to-person relation. Man cannot be ultimately concerned about anything that is less than personal.' But how valid is this 'personal-unconditional' criterion when we apply it to the ecstatical situations mentioned in our last section? We shall begin with Ecstasy_2, a state of absolute and contentless faith.

1. 'Ecstasy_2': doubt and mystical experience.

The basic characteristics of Ecstasy_2 have been discussed in some detail in our last section. To sum up, it is a state of being grasped by the 'God above God' which creates the courage of self-affirmation in spite of one's experience of radical doubt and meaninglessness. 'Since everything defined is dissolved by doubt and meaninglessness,' such an

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169 In addition to BR, see for example, P. Tillich, 'Science and Theology: A Discussion with Einstein' in TC, pp. 131-32; CTB, pp. 161-63.
170 ST-1: 244.
171 Supra, pp. 119-26.
existential act of faith is a pure form without any concrete content; only an attitude of 'unconditional seriousness' is left. Tillich's description of such an ecstatic moment when every concrete content is annihilated undoubtedly echoes the idea of 'divine darkness' in the Christian mystical tradition. In fact Tillich explicitly associates his notion 'God above God' with Pseudo-Dionysius' negative theology. But in spite of their similar idea of God's incomprehensibility through finite symbols, as far as ecstasy is concerned, there are essential differences between the two.

The first is concerned with the understanding of 'unknowing'. For Tillich, since radical doubt and meaninglessness dissolve any definable content, the 'unknowing' of one's undirected faith has to be understood in an absolute sense. Thus Tillich declares, 'it is the accepting of the acceptance without somebody or something that accepts.' But for the Christian mystics, 'unknowing' or 'ignorance' must be understood within the context of one's desire to enter into communion with God. Thus in an absolute sense, the mystic does 'know' who is concerned with him unconditionally. But since in ecstasy, God's super-essential nature always

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172 CTB, pp. 167-73, 'The faith which creates the courage to take them [viz., doubt and meaninglessness] into itself has no special content. It is simply faith, undirected, absolute. It is undefinable ... Absolute faith also transcends the divine-human encounter ... [when] this encounter is prevented by radical doubt and nothing is left but absolute faith.' (Italics mine)

173 HCT, p. 92.

174 See supra, pp. 121-24.

175 CTB, p. 179. Also Tillich, 'You are Accepted' in SF, p. 162, 'You are accepted ... accepted by that which is greater than you, and the name of which you do not know. Do not ask for the name now ...' (Italics mine)

176 See E. I. Watkin, The Philosophy of Mysticism (London: Grant Richards, 1920), pp. 182-206; Lossky, Mystical Theology, pp. 23-43. The two works cited represent respectively the Western and Eastern mystical traditions.

remains so inaccessible that the human intellect becomes no longer useful.\footnote{178} Although in ecstatic union the mind 'progressively eliminates all positive attributes of the object it wishes to attain, in order to culminate finally in a kind of apprehension by supreme ignorance of Him who cannot be an object of knowledge,'\footnote{179} cataphasis plays a vital role as a preparatory moment on the way to mystical union.\footnote{180} Tillich also sees these two senses of 'unknowing':

The mystical experience seems to be nearer to absolute faith but it is not. Absolute faith includes an element of scepticism which one cannot find in the mystical experience. Certainly mysticism also transcends all specific contents, but not because it doubts them or has found them meaningless; rather it deems them to be \textit{preliminary}. Mysticism uses the specific contents as \textit{grades}, stepping on them after having used them. The experience of meaninglessness, however, denies them (and everything that goes with them) \textit{without having used them}. The experience of meaninglessness is more radical than mysticism. Therefore it transcends the mystical experience.\footnote{181}

But he seems unaware of the significant implication of such a difference. It is concerned with the element of affection. For the Christian mystics, 'unknowing' not only excludes scepticism, but on the contrary it arises from the mystic's 'total dedication of the will' and 'deep-seated desire and tendency of the soul towards its Source.'\footnote{182} It is the mystic's deepest passion to be -- longing for perfect simplicity and unity of soul --

\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{178} Louth, Christian Mystical Tradition, p. 183, also pp. 164-78. See also Underhill, Mysticism, pp. 370-71.
\item \footnote{179} Lossky, Image and Likeness, p. 13.
\item \footnote{180} The case is evident for Pseudo-Dionysius, see V. Lossky, The Vision of God, trans. A. Moorhouse (Leighton Buzzard: The Faith Press, 1963), pp. 102-103, 'both theological paths [viz., cataphatic and apophatic theology] are necessary for the knowledge of God.' (Italics mine) The 'three stages' of the Light, the Cloud and the Darkness in Gregory of Nyssa also indicate the vitality of knowledge on the way to contemplation (cf. Daniélou, From Glory to Glory, pp. 23-26). Also from a wider perspective, both 'recollection' and 'mental prayer', for example, are indispensable as preparatory stages to the mystic's union with God (see Poulain, Interior Prayer, pp. 64-87; A. Saudreau, The Degrees of the Spiritual Life, trans. D. B. Camm [London: R. & T. Washbourne, Ltd., 1907] I: 99-127).
\item \footnote{181} CTB, p. 172. Italics mine.
\item \footnote{182} Underhill, Mysticism, p. 85.
\end{itemize}
that causes him to abandon his motive to know about.\textsuperscript{183} In order to attain union in perfect Love, one must pass through the 'dark night of the soul.'\textsuperscript{184} But when we turn to Tillich's notion of Ecstasy\textsubscript{2}, the idea of affective union is significantly missed.\textsuperscript{185} Such a lack is significant because it reflects a fundamental problem in his delineation of Ecstasy\textsubscript{2} as a divine-human encounter. Affective notions are inappropriate in such a context because one cannot 'love' someone about whom he knows nothing. If an authentic divine-human encounter should be a 'personal' one,\textsuperscript{186} Ecstasy\textsubscript{2} as 'the accepting of the acceptance without somebody or something that accepts' seems very unlikely to fulfil such a criterion. For 'the personal relation with the other is possible only between persons who know one another.'\textsuperscript{187} Would there be a powerful proclamation, or just empty words when one hears Tillich's preaching saying that 'you are accepted. You are accepted ... by the name of which you do not know'?\textsuperscript{188} For how, as an existential encounter, can this acceptance by an 'unknown' be personal? Thus instead of referring to an affective union, Tillich delineates the notion of 'courage' -- a sub-personal relation between a person and his


\textsuperscript{184} Here I employ the idea of the 'dark night of the soul' from the writings of St. John of the Cross (see The Ascent of Mount Carmel Bk. 1 and Dark Night of the Soul Bk. 1). But the contrast between 'the way of love' and 'the way of knowledge' should not be exaggerated, at least this is not the case in St. John of the Cross (see Louth, Christian Mystical Tradition, pp. 183-84) Cf. also R. Williams, The Wound of Knowledge (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1979), pp. 116-30.

\textsuperscript{185} Cf. CTB, pp. 167-83. In DF, p. 112 Tillich claims that 'love and action are implied in faith and cannot be separated from it.' (Also ST-3: 129, 135) Thus in the discussion of Ecstasy\textsubscript{2}, Tillich's mention of 'faith' without any reference to 'love' is a noticeable phenomenon.

\textsuperscript{186} See supra, pp. 133-34, ns. 168, 169.


\textsuperscript{188} Tillich, 'You are Accepted' in SF, p. 162. Italics of 'do not know' are mine. See also J. Oman, Grace and Personality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1931), pp. 72-90, 118-27.
situation. But even though Tillich claims that 'courage' can be regarded as 'the experience of the power of being,' he still cannot remove the difficulty altogether. For if this experience of acceptance does bring forth any power and courage to recover one from deep despair and estrangement, it must have been conceived in terms of certain concrete embodiments. Tillich's own illustrations described in The Courage to Be also indicate this requirement. In the case of the dying Socrates, his ultimate courage came from his faith in the 'two orders of reality' -- a particular belief of the ancient Greeks. And for Luther, 'the last word' in his utter despair was 'the first commandment' (viz., the statement that God is God) announced in the Old Testament -- an assertion within the Judaeo-Christian tradition. Here we encounter a basic problem in Tillich's understanding

189 'Affective union' is a person-to-person relationship, thus some mystics (e.g. Teresa of Avila) can symbolically describe it as 'spiritual marriage'. But 'spiritual marriage' is obviously inapplicable to Ecstasy. Instead, the symbol 'power' is used to describe the relation. But we should notice that the basic idea of 'courage' which is defined as 'the self-affirmation of being in spite of the fact of non-being' is a description of the man-to-situation and not person-to-person relations.

190 CTB, pp. 171-72. It should be noticed that the three characteristics of 'absolute faith' which Tillich describes are all expressed in terms of 'experience'. That is to say, in the ecstatic moment of absolute faith, the only thing a person can be conscious of is an experience -- the experience of the power of being.

191 As it is described in the sermon 'You are Accepted' in SF, pp. 162-63. Certainly the case of Paul (which Tillich cites as an example) cannot belong to the class of Ecstasy. For at the moment of Paul's experience of being accepted (cf. pp. 160-61), he definitely knew who was the One who accepted. For Paul had the Judaic religious tradition as the background of his knowledge of God. In a similar manner, when Tillich claims that 'in the light of this grace we perceive the power of grace in our relation to others and to ourselves' (p. 162, italics mine), the two notions of 'grace' should have a continuity. If it is the 'grace' in which we can acquire the power for personal reconciliation with our fellow men, it must have been first conceived in a 'person-to-person' manner.

192 CTB, pp. 164-66. So far as I can see, Tillich has not mentioned any concrete illustration of an authentic type of Ecstasy, viz., of how a person can experience the power of acceptance by an absolute 'Unknown' without employing any imagery. For when a person is in the state of radical doubt and meaninglessness, any concrete content is unacceptable to him. It seems even more difficult to discover a concrete example of Ecstasy with which a person can acquire the power to bring forth a healing in his relationship to himself and other fellow men. Perhaps R. May's description of his encounter with being-itself is more 'realistic' (see R. May, Paulus:
of divine intervention as a mode of Ecstasy. In order to argue the irreducibility between doubt and faith, Tillich endeavours to draw an absolute distinction between the 'form' (viz., the state of ultimate concern) and the concrete 'content' of faith. Thus Tillich claims that although doubt rejects concrete expressions, doubt as an 'attitude' of 'seriousness of concern' is in fact a 'confirmation of faith' in a formal manner.

But the point is, whereas such a distinction may work as far as an

Reminiscenes of a Friendship [London: Collins, 1974], pp. 94-96): After his experience of the 'abyss', May admits that the experience 'owes a good deal to my Protestant-Christian background. It would be surprising if I could cut off my cultural body, nor do I want to. And the Protestant-Christian influence is also present in the images which come to me in my state of receptivity.' (p. 95) In fact, any mystical experience has to be culturally and ideologically grounded (cf. S. T. Katz, 'Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism' in Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis, ed. S. T. Katz [London: Sheldon Press, 1978], pp. 22-74). But in such a case, it is no longer applicable to the situation of radical doubt and meaninglessness.

Tillich's intention to make 'faith' and 'doubt' compatible is explicitly expressed in the following statement: 'If doubt appears, it should not be considered as the negation of faith ...

Existential doubt and faith are poles of the same reality, the state of ultimate concern ... serious doubt is confirmation of faith.' (p. 22) Tillich's way to support such a conviction is to make a clear separation between 'form' and 'content'. Thus Tillich claims that 'faith' as 'an experience of the holy' in the state of ultimate concern (viz., the form of faith) is separable from its 'concrete content' which can become 'uncertain' and 'a failure': 'Faith [may become] a failure in its concrete expression, although it is not a failure in the experience of the unconditioned itself. A god disappears; divinity remains.' (p. 18) With such a distinction, Tillich tries to claim that although 'doubt' destroys the content, the 'attitude' (viz., form) as an ultimate concern remains. Thus 'the skeptic, so long as he is a serious skeptic, is not without faith, even though it has no concrete content.' (p. 20) Here we can see that a sharp distinction between form and content is the ground for Tillich's claim of the compatibility between faith and doubt. But it should be noticed that Tillich's notion of a distinction between form and content with regard to faith is not always consistent. For example, in ST-1: 178-79 Tillich argues that 'form should not be contrasted with content' but with 'dynamics' (although it is not directly concerned with faith in this context, 'faith' as a human act is certainly included). But in ST-3: 130-31 Tillich distinguishes the 'formal' and 'material' concepts of faith, a distinction which he also makes in DF. A comprehensive (historical) survey of Tillich's distinction between form and content can be found in Clayton, Concept of Correlation, pp. 191-236. Certainly the 'content' we are discussing should be 'Inhalt' and not 'Gehalt' in Tillich's terminology, although unfortunately Tillich's own distinction between 'Inhalt' and 'Gehalt' is also by no means consistent. Cf. Clayton, Concept of Correlation, pp. 191-236.

DF, pp. 19-22.
existential analysis of doubt is concerned, it faces serious difficulties regarding the phenomena of faith. The kind of faith which only exists in its pure form without any concrete content, as we have seen, is an impossibility.\textsuperscript{195} Although Tillich's presentation of Ecstasy\textsubscript{2} seems unsuccessful, his motive is clear: he tries to extend his doctrine of Justification (as acceptance) beyond the Christian circle to include those who know 'not even the name God.' Furthermore, man is not only justified by faith, but also by doubt.\textsuperscript{196}

We can also approach the problem from another perspective. Instead of showing the inadequacy of Tillich's idea of Ecstasy\textsubscript{2} because of its contentlessness, a study of how the Christian mystics -- especially the Eastern Fathers -- resolve the problem of a personal relation with the divine 'Unknown' will demonstrate a positive alternative to Tillich's notion of the divine-human encounter. Eastern mystical theology is chosen because we find a very similar concern between Tillich's Ecstasy\textsubscript{2} and the Orthodox understanding of 'the vision of God'. For more than ten centuries the theologians in the East have also been struggling to settle the problem of God's radical transcendence and immanence in man's experience of the divine-human encounter.\textsuperscript{197} Their solution to the problem is to draw a

\textsuperscript{195} For a more detailed criticism of this point, see W. L. Rowe, Religious Symbols and God (London & Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), pp. 150-53.


\textsuperscript{197} The problem arose because the Greek Fathers tried to resolve the tension between apophatic theology and the deification of man (for example, as early as Clement of Alexandria in the late second century). Discussions continued as a main problem in Orthodox spirituality until Gregory Palamas (1296-1359) who basically brought the problem to a settlement. For an historical survey, see J. Meyendorff, A Study of Gregory Palamas, trans. G.
distinction between God's 'essence' (οὐσία) and His 'energies' (ἐνέργεια):

The question of the possibility of any real union with God, and, indeed, of mystical experience in general, thus poses for Christian theology the antinomy of the accessibility of the inaccessible nature ... We are therefore compelled to recognize in God an ineffable distinction ... This distinction is that between the essence of God, or His nature, properly co-called [sic], which is inaccessible, unknowable and incommunicable; and the energies or divine operations, forces proper to and inseparable from God's essence, in which He goes forth from Himself, manifests, communicates, and gives Himself.138

We have discussed the inaccessibility of God's divine 'essence' in some detail. But are the accessible 'energies' of God conceived by the Christian East identical with Tillich's 'power of being' which every finite being can participate in? In spite of the similarity between ideas of accessibility and participation, there is a basic difference. Tillich tries to extend man's experience of the power of being as a universal phenomenon, whereas the Eastern Fathers firmly assert that any deification must begin with penitence: 'The soul which is not transformed by repentance does not know grace; and thus ceases to make progress in the way of ascent ... It [viz., penitence] is in fact not a stage but a condition which must continue permanently, the constant attitude of those who truly aspire to union with God.'199 For Tillich, God is related to all that is real, disregarding whether the person recognizes it as such or not.200 For the Eastern Fathers, the encounter of the divine 'energies' is an act of God as a willful presence; it demands not only a conscious response but a deep sense of repentence.201


198 Lossky, Mystical Theology, pp. 69-70.
199 Ibid., pp. 205, 204. 200 UC, pp. 50-51.
201 Ibid., p. 206. Quoting from the Macarian Homilies, Lossky writes, 'Unless man turns towards God of his own free will and with all his longing, unless he cries to Him in prayer with complete faith, he cannot be cured.' (Italics mine)
If in Christ man meets God "face to face," so that there is a real "participation" in divine existence, this participated divine existence can only be free gift from God, which safeguards the inaccessible character of the essence and the transcendence of God. This God-giving-himself is the divine "energy"; a living and personal God is indeed an acting God.\textsuperscript{202}

God's omnipresence is not the point at issue here.\textsuperscript{203} But the problem is, while ascribing Ecstasy\textsubscript{2} to those who know not even the name of God as a divine-human encounter, Tillich tends to regard the happening as an 'event' rather than an 'act'.\textsuperscript{204} On the part of man, it is only an experience of power from an unknown source. And on the divine side, the happening is only 'teleological' and not 'intentional'.\textsuperscript{205} The Eastern Fathers are well aware of the danger of passivity when they employ the term 'divine energies' to indicate the divine communicability.\textsuperscript{206} For them, the personal


\textsuperscript{203} 'God is in everything' is a theological statement which few theologians would query about. Even Barth, despite his emphasis on God's transcendence, affirms that God's 'absoluteness' can imply 'not only His freedom to transcend all that is other than Himself, but also His freedom to be immanent within it.' (CD II/1: 313) The key notion of Barth's doctrine of divine immanence is 'the triumph of God's freedom in immanence': 'while He is its [viz., the creature's] Creator and the Giver of its life, and while He does not take away this life, He does not withdraw His presence from this creaturely existence which is so different from His own divine ... God can in fact be nearer to it than it is to itself ... The fact that God can do this is His freedom in immanence.' (Ibid., pp. 313-14) Tillich's interpretation of omnipresence, on the other hand, emphasizes God's 'creative participation in the spatial existence of his creatures.' (ST-1: 277; italics mine) Another brief comparison should also be made at this point. Both Tillich and Barth endeavour to bridge their doctrines of Creation and Soteriology and regard the two doctrines as one single act of God. But whereas Barth tends to absorb Creation into his doctrine of Reconciliation (see supra, ch. 2, pp. 30-32), Tillich tends to absorb Soteriology into his doctrine of Creation (cf. Tillich's interpretation of 'salvation' as 'healing' in supra, pp. 105-107; and also his endeavour to breakdown the difference between the sacred and the secular, infra, pp. 144-49).

\textsuperscript{204} Here I employ the so-called 'prima facie distinction' in Macmurray's Personalism (see Macmurray, Self as Agent, pp. 146-64).

\textsuperscript{205} Cf. ibid., pp. 146-51. The recurrent pattern of Ecstasy\textsubscript{2} (viz., ultimate concern and the state of being grasped by the power of being) disregarding God's willful act at that particular moment, indicates, according to Macmurray's distinction, only a teleological mode in God's sustaining creativity.

\textsuperscript{206} See Lossky, Mystical Theology, pp. 79-82.
character of these 'uncreated energies' is rooted in the divine Trinity. The divine energies one encounters are not a quality of God but the triune God Himself in His economic manifestation. And behind such a claim there stands a fundamental emphasis in Eastern theology -- 'a living God who manifests himself in concrete Persons and by concrete acts.'

Ibid., pp. 80-85. Gregory Palamas's understanding is a good example. In his Study of Gregory Palamas, p. 225 Myendorff writes, 'Nothing shows Palamas's main preoccupation better than these hesitations [to regard 'energies' as 'accidents' of the divine essence]; that preoccupation was to free theology from Aristotle's philosophic categories which were clearly inadequate worthily to express the Mystery. Thinking along the same lines, he refuses to call the energies 'qualities' of God, for there may be no freedom about a quality, whereas the energies are the expression of the sovereign divine will; wisdom is the necessary quality which a master must possess to teach his pupil, but God only possesses wisdom as energy, for he only grants it according to his will.' See also Lossky, 'The Theology of Light in the Thought of St. Gregory Palamas' in Image and Likeness, pp. 54-56. On the other hand, we encounter some ambiguities in Tillich's understanding of 'the power of being'. First, it seems that Tillich does not make a clear distinction between 'being' and 'the power of being' (see for example, ST-1: 235-37; LPJ, p. 37). But as Thatcher rightly observes, sometimes when Tillich speaks of power of being he is speaking not of being but a quality of being. Yet 'to speak of a quality of being is perhaps not the same as to speak of being-itself, for there are other qualities of being, apart from power, which equally can be said to belong to it.' (Thatcher, Ontology of Tillich, p. 42; see also A. M. Macleod's criticism in his Paul Tillich: An Essay on the Role of Ontology in his Philosophical Theology [London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1973], pp. 116-18). A closer examination of the linguistic problem by J. Macquarrie is suggestive at this point (see J. Macquarrie, Twentieth-Century Religious Thought [London: SCM, 1971], p. 367, n.2): the two different senses of the word 'being' ('Being' or 'particular beings') and the two different possible ways to interpret the genitive case (viz., 'subjective' or 'objective' genitive) 'bear at least four different senses' for the statement 'the power of being'. Expect for one possibility that Tillich scarcely employs ('particular beings' with subjective genitive, viz., 'the power exerted by particular beings'), the other three senses (viz., 'the power exerted by Being', 'the power to be Being' and 'the power to be particular beings', see ST-1: 235-37, 64, 203 respectively) are used without any explicit awareness of the essential differences between them.

Meyendorff, Study of Gregory Palamas, p. 216. At this point we encounter two similar emphases which we met when we studied Barth's doctrine of God: first, 'God's Being is in His acts' (supra, ch. 2, pp. 44-47; cf. Meyendorff, op. cit., pp. 210-14); second, the 'perichoretic Trinitarianism' (supra, ch. 2, pp. 51-53; cf. Meyendorff, op. cit., pp. 215-16). Both of the two emphases, as in the case of Barth, point to a personalistic understanding of God (see supra, pp. 78-81; cf. also T. Ware, The Orthodox Church [Harmondsworth: a Pelican Book, 1980], p. 217).
from such a theological understanding that the divine-human encounter can be fully personal, not only in darkness but also in the Light. 209

2. 'Ecstasy_1': sacred and secular.

Ecstasy_1 is another of Tillich's attempts to break through the boundary between the sacred and the secular. Tillich acknowledges that Ecstasy_2 applies only to a critical moment, and 'such an extreme point is not a space within which one can live.' 210 If the validity of Ecstasy_2 as a divine-human encounter is doubtful because of its impersonal character, Ecstasy_1 does not have the same problem. The ultimate concern manifested in man's cultural creation certainly possesses its full concreteness. 211 But the claim of reducibility between Ecstasy_1 and Ecstasy_3 has to be subjected to a closer examination. The question can be seen from two sides: how valid is it that Ecstasy_1 can be regarded as a religious experience? and, how unique is biblical religion in the midst of man's various (sacred or secular) ultimate concerns? From a logical point of view, Tillich's claim that there is a 'religious' element in every Ecstasy_1 is self-evident. For if we adopt his idea that 'religion' is not a dimension alongside the others but 'the substance, the ground, and the depth of man's spiritual life,' 212 Ecstasy_1 as an ultimate concern is inevitably 'religious' -- no matter if it is 'a picture, a system, a law, a political

210 ST-2: 12.
211 Cf. supra, pp. 130-31.
212 Tillich, 'Religion' in TC, p. 8. See also id., 'Aspects of a Religious Analysis of Culture' in TC, p. 41, 'If religion is the state of being grasped by an ultimate concern, this state cannot be restricted to a special realm. The unconditional character of this concern implies that it refers to every moment of our life, to every space and every realm.'
movement.' But from a practical point of view, even Tillich himself is aware of the difficulty and possible danger. For a concern which grasps a person unconditionally may end up with demonization -- 'the elevation of something finite into ultimacy.' Nazi-Fascism is Tillich's oft-repeated illustration. But how is it possible to avoid such a lapse? The key is to hold firmly the 'transparency' (viz., the pointing-character) of every finite concern, without deifying or absolutizing it into the 'unconditional' itself:

A nation which looks upon itself as holy is correct in so far as everything can become a vehicle of man's ultimate concern, but the nation is incorrect in so far as it considers itself to be inherently holy. Innumerable things, all things in a way, have the power of becoming holy in a mediate sense. They can point to something beyond themselves. But if their holiness comes to be considered inherent, it becomes demonic. This happens continually in the actual life of most religions.

See Tillich, 'Two Types' in TC, p. 27; also id., 'Religion' in TC, pp. 7-8. However, as Clayton, Concept of Correlation, pp. 105-106 rightly remarks, Tillich's argument of the universality of religiosity is tautological, because 'one might with similar justification want to emphasize that politics is not merely one sphere of life alongside other spheres, that there is rather a political dimension within all human cultural activity, including man's religious activity. Or, again similar claim could be made with equal justification regarding the aesthetic dimension.' Also there is 'a slide and a jump in Tillich's argument about "ultimate concern" when he endeavours to conclude 'that everyone is religious.' (Ibid., pp. 109-112) Clayton concludes that 'there are in Tillich's conception of "ultimate concern" serious difficulties which raise questions about its usefulness.'

UC, p. 25; also pp. 19-34.

See ibid. Also CEWR, pp. 5-12.

For Tillich, the Unconditional is always a quality and not a being, a form and cannot be identified with the content. See for example, Tillich's careful distinction in 'Two Types' in TC, pp. 24-25. C. J. Armbruster, The Vision of Paul Tillich (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1967), pp. 50-51 observes that 'Tillich's use of the term "unconditional" becomes clearer if we recall his German origin. The German equivalent for unconditional is unbedingt, the connotation being that something is conditioned or limited by being made into a thing (Ding). Thus, the unconditional (das Unbedingte) is not "thingish" at all, but rather "a quality which we experience in encountering reality."' Cf. also UC, p. 49, where Tillich explains his understanding of 'unconditional imperative' in the Kantian sense of ethical Formalism.

ST-1: 216. Italics mine.
The Ecstasy becomes religious only if the concern is regarded as a 'pointer' and not as the 'Ultimate' itself. But then, how about biblical religion? If biblical religion as an ultimate concern should also be subjected to the same criterion, how can Tillich claim that the Christian message in particular is the 'final revelation' and the 'answer' to the human situation? A survey of Tillich's idea of comparative religion is not our task here. What we are concerned with is the implication of this problem to the doctrine of Salvation. Or, in Tillich's own words: 'What, then, is the peculiar character of the healing through the New Being in Jesus as the Christ?' His own answer is:

The answer cannot be that there is no saving power apart from him [viz., Jesus as the Christ] but that he is the ultimate criterion of every healing and saving process ... wherever there is saving power in mankind, it must be judged by the saving power in Jesus as the Christ.

Thus for Tillich, the particularity of Christian salvation is the twofold aspect of one event -- the ultimacy of saving power manifested in Jesus as the Christ. And the governing principle in Salvation is the presence of the 'New Being', the 'undistorted manifestation of essential being within and under the conditions of existence' yet 'conquering the gap between essence and existence.' The New Being is particularly related to Christology because 'Jesus Christ is the New Being' -- Incarnation is the manifestation of essential Godmanhood under the conditions of

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218 One can easily discover an echo in Tillich's theory of symbolism at this point. Cf. Thompson, Being and Meaning, pp. 98-105.


220 A more detailed discussion can be found towards the end of our next chapter. In fact the chapter as a whole is such a consideration in a wider context.

221 ST-2: 167.

222 Ibid., pp. 167-68. Italics mine.

223 Ibid., pp. 118-19; see also pp. 165-67.
existence. Thus the distinctiveness of Incarnation, as Tillich sees it, is that it is a *manifestation*, a *picture* of 'a complete concept of man's essential nature, as well as of his existence and of the radical contrast between them.' So instead of a 'substitutionary' theory, Tillich replaces it with an 'aesthetic theory' which emphasizes the 'ultimate manifestation' of a horizon of ontological possibility and 'through this picture the New Being has *power* to transform those who are transformed by it.' From such an understanding, Christianity is unique because it is a *picture* of ontological possibility with its transforming power and not *the* way to God. What is essential is 'the transforming power of the New Being' and man's *participation* in it. But according to Tillich's endeavour to bridge Ecstasy₁ and Ecstasy₃, the New Being who mediates the transforming power through the 'picture' of Jesus as the Christ should be the same New Being in whom a person ecstatically participates through his own ultimate concern. So if Atonement means participation in and transformed by the power of the New Being, salvation through Ecstasy₃ or Ecstasy₁ differs only in degree and not in quality. Such an emphasis of continuity pushes

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225 Tillich, 'Reinterpretation of Incarnation,' CQR 147: 140. Italics mine.

226 ST-2: 114; italics mine. Tillich is particularly negative towards the substitutionary theory of Atonement (see ibid., pp. 173, 176). Instead, after a critical and historical survey of the doctrines of Atonement in Christian theology, Tillich suggests the concept of *participation* as his own position: 'The replacement of the concept of substitution by the concept of participation seems to be a way to a more adequate doctrine of atonement.' (p. 173) And the threefold character of salvation (viz., regeneration, justification and sanctification) has to be understood 'in the light of the principle of participation.' (See ibid., pp. 176-80)

Tillich into the dilemma of claiming Christianity as the 'final revelation' on the one hand, and relativizing inter-religious dialogue on the other hand. As John Macquarrie observes:

[Tillich's Systematic Theology states that] "A theology which is not able to enter into a creative dialogue with the theological thought of other religions misses a world-historical occasion and remains provincial. Yet I doubt if even Tillich's own theology is able to do this, if he goes on talking in such terms as "preparatory revelation" and "final revelation."\(^{228}\)

Before we see how Tillich replies, we should examine the dilemma more closely. Although Tillich never explicitly abandoned his criterion of 'preparatory' and 'final' revelation,\(^ {229}\) his voyage to Japan in 1960 did exert a tremendous impact on his idea of inter-religious dialogue.\(^ {230}\)

Tillich was convinced by his conversations with Zen Buddhist Masters that

One cannot divide the religions of mankind into one true and many false religions. Rather, one must subject all religions, including Christianity, to the ultimate criteria of religion: the criterion of a faith which transcends every finite symbol of faith and the criterion of a love which unconditionally affirms, judges and receives the other person.\(^ {231}\)

Here only two criteria are maintained: 'the criterion of faith' which transcends every finite symbol, and 'the criterion of love' which unconditionally affirms, judges and receives the other person. No distinction between 'preparatory' and 'final' revelation is mentioned. Rather, 'in the depth of every living religion there is a point at which the religion itself loses its importance, and that to which it points breaks through its

\(^{228}\) J. Macquarrie, 'Christianity and Other Faiths,' USQR 20 (1964/65): 43.

\(^{229}\) It is interesting to notice that in his reply to Macquarrie's charge, Tillich still shows no intention to revise his idea. See P. Tillich, 'Discussion: Christianity and Other Faiths,' USQR 20 (1964/65): 177-78. Since the article was published in 1965, it should be regarded as Tillich's final position.

\(^{230}\) See M. Eliade, 'Paul Tillich and the History of Religions' in FR, pp. 31-36.

particularity, elevating it to spiritual freedom and with it to a vision of the spiritual presence in other expressions of the ultimate meaning of man's existence.\textsuperscript{232}

In fact, such an idea is fully consistent with his emphasis on 'the Protestant principle'. Positively, the principle means that God is present in every conditioned or finite reality. And negatively, the principle protests against every conditioned being that makes an unconditional claim for itself.\textsuperscript{233} But what then if 'the Protestant principle' is applied to the Protestant faith itself? Tillich claims that his reformulation of the Reformers' doctrine of Salvation as 'Justification by grace through faith' -- instead of 'Justification by faith' -- is 'the first and basic expression of the Protestant principle itself.'\textsuperscript{234} In view of our preceding survey, one can see more clearly that the real import of Tillich's new expression is certainly not a mere clarification of the formulation,\textsuperscript{235} but a universalization of the traditional doctrine. For, from the perspective of 'justification', no one is left unaccepted. Every person participates in the power of the New Being manifested in Jesus as the Christ, regardless of whether or not he acknowledges this fact. From the perspective of 'faith', no human being is without an ultimate concern and thus without faith. From such a view, it is natural for Tillich to conclude that one must say that revelatory experiences are universally human ... He [viz., Human being] is given a revelation, a particular kind of experience which always implies saving powers. One never can separate revelation and salvation. There are revealing and

\textsuperscript{232} Tillich, CEWR, p. 97. Also see Tillich's last open lecture, 'The Significance of the History of Religions for the Systematic Theologian' in \textit{FR}, pp. 80-94.

\textsuperscript{233} See P. Tillich, 'The Formative Power of Protestantism' in \textit{PE}, pp. 205-221, where he elaborates his idea of 'the Gestalt of grace'. A good survey of the notion has been given by Connolly, 'The Compatibility of Faith and Doubt,' pp. 13-29.

\textsuperscript{234} \textit{ST-3}: 223.

\textsuperscript{235} See \textit{ST-2}: 179.
saving powers in all religions. God has not left himself unwitnessed. 236

But how can he confirm universal salvation and revelation without lapsing into religious Relativism? Here Tillich's reply to Macquarrie's charge should be cited in full:

[The problem of religious absolutism and relativism] must be concretely analysed and described ... This analysis and description demands the elaboration of typological differences (for example, the differences between prophetic and mystical types); it demands value judgments about the ways in which elements of both types are combined in a concrete religion; it demands a judgment about the history of religion and the place of one's religion within it in past and future; and, above all, it demands that a relativist show the reasons why he affirms his own particular tradition in spite of his relativistic assertions. 237

In short, there are two demands for a theologian in order to avoid 'an unanalysed and dogmatically affirmed relativism.' 238 First, the inter-religious dialogue must be worked out concretely and not merely on an abstract and theoretical level. Second, the theologian who enters into dialogue with other religions has to show the reason why he affirms his own particular tradition. In his lecture 'The Significance of the History of Religions for the Systematic Theologian', the latter demand is elaborated more concretely. Tillich claims that there should be an 'inner telos', viz., 'the inner aim', of the history of religions. This inner telos, according to his understanding, 'is to become a Religion of the Concrete Spirit.' 239 Four formal criteria of this telos are suggested: The first two criteria (which he calls 'the sacramental basis' and 'the mystical

236 Tillich, 'Significance of History of Religions' in FR, p. 81. Italics mine.
237 Tillich, 'Discussion: Christianity and Other Faiths,' USQR 20: 178. Italics mine.
238 Ibid.
movement') are identical with his 'Protestant principle', viz., 'the Gestalt of grace' which is present in all religions yet at the same time protests against any demonization of the sacramental. The third criterion is the 'ethical or prophetic element', viz., the ecstasy of agape. And finally, there is the criterion of theonomy, the ultimate overcoming of the polarity of autonomy and heteronomy. According to these criteria, Tillich concludes,

I would dare to say, of course, dare as a Protestant theologian, that I believe that there is no longer expression for what I call the synthesis of these three elements [viz., the first three criteria] than in Paul's doctrine of the Spirit .... as Christian we see in the appearance of Jesus as the Christ the decisive victory in this struggle [of the 'sacramental' and 'demonic' elements in the history of religions]. There is an old symbol for the Christ, Christus Victor, and this can be used again in this view of the history of religions.

In fact, according to Tillich's proposed criteria, Christian religion which bears the witness of the New Being manifested in Jesus as the Christ and the Spiritual Presence which 'elevates the human spirit into the transcendent union of unambiguous life in faith and love' should naturally be regarded as the final and highest form of religion. Thus, although Tillich believes that 'all religions have something essential in common,' he rejects religious Relativism and maintains his conviction as a Protestant theologian. But this conviction, according to Tillich's own demand, cannot be justified unless one works out his inter-religious dialogue in concrete details. Tillich did not live long enough to fulfil this demand. Thus in

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240 Ibid., pp. 86-87.  
241 Ibid., pp. 87-88, 90.  
242 Ibid., p. 88. Italics mine.  
245 Except the chapter on 'a Christian-Buddhist Conversation' in CEWR, pp. 53-75.
Chapter Four of the present study, we shall attempt to examine Tillich's claim from an inter-disciplinary perspective. We are going to ask: As far as the problem of authentic humanity is concerned, how 'final' is the revelation in Jesus as the Christ if we enter into detailed dialogue with the non-Christian 'ways'?
In the last two chapters we began with Barth's doctrine of Reconciliation as the ground and foundation for the beginning of authentic humanity. His Christological Anthropology explores the threefold unreality of humanity (viz., ignorance, incompleteness and distortion). And Reconciliation, which is the incarnation of the real man Jesus Christ, provides the foundation for the threefold new beginning of real humanity, viz., the 'disclosure' of the 'completeness' and the 'reconstitution' of distorted manhood.¹ In such a way, Barth offers a powerful and comprehensive ontology for both the doctrines of Reconciliation and authentic humanity. But because of his attempt to absorb Soteriology into Christology, Barth tends 'to include human subjectivity within the divine objectivity.'² As a result, the divine-human encounter in Reconciliation becomes an impersonal one. If Barth tends to neglect the existential dimension of the doctrine of Reconciliation, Tillich's interpretation of Justification as God's acceptance of the unacceptable has supplied a penetrating description of the 'subjective' side. Applying the psychotherapeutic studies on 'acceptance', Tillich delineates the psychodynamics of how the objective declaration of righteousness from God can become the subjective power that brings forth a transformation of human existence. In such a way, the existential and subjective side of the doctrine of Reconciliation has received serious attention. Thus we can see that Barth's and Tillich's different emphases on the objective and subjective side of Reconciliation can

¹ See supra, ch. 2, pp. 13-16.

complement each other. Together they build up a more comprehensive understanding of God's salvific act in Christ and its transforming power in human experience.

Barth's and Tillich's understanding of Reconciliation as divine intervention not only complement each other, together they also have offered a challenge to man's attempt to attain authentic humanity by himself. Tillich rightly challenges that if one accepts that there is a distinction between 'human' and 'inhuman', we must have already presupposed and defined a general picture of real humanity. This is what Tillich calls the 'essentialist' view of human nature.³

Existentialism [the word here refers to those theories which understands human nature only from an existential and phenomenal perspective] is not a philosophy which can stand on its own legs. Actually it has no legs. It is always based on a vision of the essential structure of reality. In this sense it is based on essentialism, and cannot live without it. If you say that man is evil, you must have a concept of man in his essential goodness, otherwise the word "evil" would not make any sense. Without the distinction between good and evil the words themselves lose their meaning. And if you say that man's structure is distorted in time and space, or that it is "fallen," then you must have something from which he is fallen. You must have some structure which is distorted in time and space. So mere existentialism does not exist.⁴

According to Tillich, the lack of an essentialist understanding of human nature is the main problem and paradox that faces the existentialists and the psychologists when they attempt to construct a theory of authentic humanity.⁵ For without a comprehensive picture of the real humanity, one can in no way judge some activities of man as 'authentic' and others as 'inauthentic'. As Barth once put it, '[this is] a vicious circle in which

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³ See P. Tillich, 'The Theological Significance of Existentialism and Psychoanalysis' in TC, pp. 118-22.


we can never attain to real man.' He continues his challenge:

How does he reach the platform from which he thinks he can see himself? What kind of a platform is it, and what kind of a knowledge will he give himself from it? We cannot and will not dispute that he sees and grasps something which perhaps indicates the nature of true man ... [But the point is,] these phenomena as such are neutral, relative and ambiguous. They may point in various directions. They may or may not be symptoms of real man. They are so only for those who know him already and can therefore interpret them correctly ... They all speak in some way or other concerning man, but they are not really speaking about him ... They are speaking only about knives without edges, or, handles without pots, or predicates without subjects. 

Thus according to Tillich and Barth, the quest for an attainment of authentic humanity points to a comprehensive picture of what true humanity is. To such a quest, Tillich and Barth have both found their answer in the Person of Jesus Christ. For in the life of Jesus Christ the real man, we can see a complete blueprint of authentic humanity. In Tillich's words, Jesus as the Christ is the final revelation of the New Being, the 'undistorted manifestation of essential being within and under the conditions of existence' yet 'conquering the gap between essence and existence.' In such a case, Christianity has provided the foundation for the realization of authentic humanity by showing the telos of what a man should become. Of course Christianity does not only offer a telos, divine intervention also provides the power which enables a person to realize an authentic humanity. Such an idea will become the main theme of the second part of our study.

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6 CD III/2: 75-76. Italics mine.
PART II

The Realization of Authentic Humanity
In our preceding survey, we have seen how authentic humanity begins with divine intervention. On the objective side, the 'ontological change' of our being becomes possible through God's reconciling act in Jesus Christ. And on the subjective side, the experience of unconditional acceptance which overcomes one's deep anxiety of existential separation inaugurates a new phase of self-acceptance and self-affirmation. But all that has been investigated thus far are the beginning and foundation of human authenticity. The ontological determination of man has to be noetically realized, otherwise self-affirmation has the possibility of becoming self-centeredness instead of self-actualization. Authentic humanity is a journey because human life itself is a 'becoming' and not something already at hand. John Macquarrie remarks that

Perhaps one should speak not of a "human being" but of a "human becoming", awkward though this usage would be. We could say that we are all becoming human, in the sense that we are discovering and, it may be hoped, realizing what the potentials of a human existence are... "Becoming" suggests process, transition, incompleteness, movement from non-existence into existence (or the reverse). That which is becoming is compounded of act and potency, fact and possibility.\(^1\)

In terms of Christian ethics, the new life in Christ is not merely an 'indicative', it must be accompanied by 'imperatives' as its realization.\(^2\)

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2. See K. Kertelge, "Rechtfertigung" bei Paulus. Studien zur Struktur und zum Bedeutungsgehalt des paulinischen Rechtfertigungsbegriffs (Münster: Verlag Aschendorff, 1967), pp. 282-84. A good survey of the dialectical relationship between the 'indicatives' and the 'imperatives' in Pauline ethics has been given by W. Schrage, *Ethik des Neuen Testaments* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1982), pp. 156-61. A remark should be made on the view that to employ the notion of 'realization', or 'actualization', is too 'idealistic' (e.g., see V. P. Furnish, *Theology and Ethics in Paul* [Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1968], pp. 225-26; E. Käsemann, *Commentary on Romans*, trans. G. W. Bromiley [London: SCM, 1980], pp. 173-75) and that the indicative-imperative dialectic should be interpreted as the tension between the aeons, viz., 'this age' and 'the age to come' (see Furnish, op. cit., pp. 225-26; R. C. Tannehill, *Dying and Rising with Christ* [Berlin:
As Paul summons his readers in his letter to the Philippians 2:12, 'work out (κατεργάζεσθε;) your own salvation with fear and trembling.' Thus 'the Pauline indicatives and imperatives are both to be taken seriously.' The admonitions directed to the Christian are not a supplement, but a mode of faith itself, 'an appropriation of what God has already assigned.' As Günther Bornkamm rightly puts it, 'the two [viz., 'indicative' and 'imperative'] come together in equilibrium: to live on the basis of grace, but also to live on the basis of grace.' For 'the reality of faith embraces the entire man including his personal sphere -- and here faith is realized.'

Tillich clearly holds such a dynamic view of life when he employs the Aristotelian schema of dynamis and energeia and states that 'the actualization of the potential is a structural condition of all beings,' and

Verlag Alfred Töpelmann, 1967], pp. 75-83; H. Ridderbos, Paul: An Outline of His Theology, trans. J. R. de Witt [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1975], pp. 257-58). It seems that to make a sharp contrast between the two interpretations is unnecessary. Although 'realization' is not a Pauline word, the idea is 'nowhere explicitly refuted by him.' (Furnish, op. cit., p. 226) The two interpretations suggested should be conceived as seeing the same thing from different perspectives: one is an ontological perspective on the eschatological tension between the two aeons, whereas the other is a phenomenological description of an individual existence.


4 Furnish, Theology and Ethics, p. 227. See also H. Thielicke, Theological Ethics, vol. 1: Foundations, ed. W. H. Lazareth (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1979), pp. 74-93. But it is unnecessary to follow Thielicke's view that the 'imperative' should be confined only to obedience or openness to the Holy Spirit. At least such an idea is not Pauline, for 'he spends so much time on concrete exhortation.' (Käsemann, Romans, p. 173; also Tannehill, Dying and Rising with Christ, p. 81).


'this actualization is called "life".'

Thus authentic humanity (which Tillich calls the 'unambiguous life') is fulfilled in the ultimate telos of the process 'from essence through existence to essentialization':

[The term "essentialization" means] that the new which has been actualized in time and space adds something to essential being, uniting it with the positive which is created within existence, thus producing the ultimately new, the "New Being," not fragmentarily as in temporal life, but wholly as a contribution to the Kingdom of God in its fulfilment.

The discussion of the realization of authentic humanity is less explicit in Barth's theology. His antithesis with the idealist and existentialist traditions makes him hesitant to employ the notions of 'realization' or 'actualization'. Rather, Barth emphasizes the simia of

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7 ST-3: 12, also p. 30. Tillich's usage of 'self-actualization' and 'self-realization' seems interchangeable. Although he employs the term 'actualization' (or 'actuality') throughout his Systematic Theology, he occasionally uses the term 'self-realization' (or 'reality') in other writings which denotes the same idea (the synonymous usage of 'self-realization' even occurs within the ST-3 itself, e.g. p. 422). For example, see Tillich, 'Being and Love' in Four Existentialist Theologians, ed. W. Herberg (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1958), pp. 300-312, esp. p. 303, '... power means the chance of carrying through one's own self-realization. The power of Being is not a static possibility but it is the dynamic process in which a being actualizes itself by providing time and space to itself ....' (italics mine). The reason why Tillich prefers to use the term 'actualization' is perhaps due to its root words 'act', 'action', 'actual' which denote a dynamic sense in his discussion of life as an 'outgoing movement.' (ST-3: 30) In fact, the German word 'Verwirklichung' (which Tillich once used in his writing, viz., Religiöse Verwirklichung [1929]) is derived from the word 'wirklich' which can mean either 'real' or 'actual'.

8 ST-3: 422, 400-401. F. E. Elmo, 'The Concept of Self Actualization in the Theology of Paul Tillich and the Psychology of Abraham Maslow' (Ph.D. dissertation, Fordham University, 1974), pp. 98-99 has provided a good summary, '[For Tillich], self-actualization is the actualization of potential being in God. It is the movement of creation and man out of the state of potential being in God, into existence and finally to total reunion with God. It is the dynamic movement out of the ground of being and the upward, self-transcending movement to return to the ground of being. It is a triadic movement from potential, essential being in the ground, to existence with its mixture of essential and existential elements, to essentialization in Eternal life. Tillich calls this a triadic rhythm "from essence through existential estrangement to essentialization."'

Justification and Sanctification as one divine act of salvation, although he acknowledges that the two doctrines are not the same thing. The basis of such a claim is the double 'moments' of Jesus Christ's vicarious humanity in the one act of reconciliation, viz., His simultaneous humiliation and exaltation. Thus 'we can deduce at once that the same is true of justification and sanctification' and that they 'are only two moments and aspects of one and the same action, they do belong inseparately together.' From this perspective, Barth rejects the traditional ordo salutis. For such an order implies 'superiority and subordination,' and it is 'psychologised' to split up the relationship into a 'temporal sequence:'

In the simul of the one divine will and action justification is first as basis and second as presupposition, sanctification first as aim and second as consequence; and therefore both are superior and both subordinate.

Three remarks should be made at this point. First, it is unnecessary to think that ordo salutis implies superiority or subordination. One can see some ambiguities in Barth's juxtaposition of the two doctrines. To say that Justification is the 'presupposition' by no means implies the idea of 'subordination'. For the basic meaning of 'presupposition' only refers to those conditions that must be satisfied before. And in view of his own definition, Barth cannot regard Sanctification as the aim of God's divine act of Reconciliation but only one of the aims. If this is the case, there should be no 'superiority' granted to Sanctification because it is the 'aim'. Second, although Justification and Sanification can be

10 CD IV/2: 499, 501-505. Barth also warns that any failure to distinguish the two will either lead to 'an indolent quietism' or 'illusory activism'. The dialectic of Justification and Sanctification is clearly expressed in his four propositional statements: 'sanctification is not justification,' 'justification is not sanctification,' 'there is no justification without sanctification' and 'there is no sanctification without justification.' (Ibid., pp. 504, 506).
11 Ibid., pp. 503, 505. 12 Ibid., pp. 507, 508.
13 See A. Stroll, 'Presupposing' in EncPhil 6: 446-49.
14 See CD IV/1: 3, 22-78, esp. pp. 49-50.
regarded as a single redemptive act from the Christological perspective, one cannot deny a 'before-and-after' character in their 'natural' ordering, as Barth's words 'presupposition', 'basis' and 'consequence' clearly indicate. Furthermore, even Jesus Christ's vicarious humiliation (the Lord as servant) and exaltation (the servant as Lord) has an irreversible order. The humiliation always comes before the exaltation, and thus Justification before Sanctification. Third, when we turn our attention from the ontological ground (de iure) to the phenomena of God's sanctifying act de facto, the dynamic and realizing character becomes apparent. In fact, Barth unhesitatingly talks about 'growth' (Wachstum) as 'the expression, fulfilment and mark of life' through 'the immanent power of life,' although he discusses it within the context of the corporal dimension of Christian existence (viz., the Community) as a safeguard against giving too much stress to individual experience. And regarding the individual Christian existence, 'the principal of necessary repetition and renewal, and not a law of stability, is the law of the spiritual growth and continuity of our life.' Sanctification is a 'whole life-movement of man.' It is not 'a once-for-all act' but a movement of 'conversion with growing sincerity, depth and decision.'

To sum up, the idea of the noetic realization of the new life which is grounded in and begun with divine intervention can be justifiably

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15 Küng, Justification, p. 71.
17 CD IV/2: 651, also pp. 648-60.
18 CD II/2: 647. Also CD IV/3.1: 215, 'The ontic or objective element implies as its consequence the noetic or subjective established by it. Conversely, the noetic or subjective element implies as its presupposition the ontic or objective which establishes it.'
19 CD IV/2: 566-72, also pp. 529-31, 560-61. A similarly dynamic idea can also be found in his discussion of 'the liberation of the Christian' (CD IV/3.2: 662-64).
applied to the theologies of Tillich and Barth, although they express it in
different terms. In the following two chapters, we shall try to delineate
the picture of a realized authentic humanity as understood by Tillich and
Barth. Also the complementary feature of the apparently contrasting
approaches between the two theologians will be shown after a careful exami-
nation of their philosophical and theological constructions.
When Tillich's theological system comes to the delineation of human life -- its ambiguities and possible unambiguity, the 'method of correlation' is exercised in its full bloom.\(^1\) He states with conviction that

the church-hisistory situation in which the system [viz., his systematic theology] has been written is characterized by developments which surpass in religious significance everything solely theological. Most significant is the encounter of the historical religions with secularism and with the "quasi-religions" born out of it ... A theology which does not deal seriously with the criticism of religion by secular thought and some particular forms of secular faith, such as liberal humanism, nationalism, and socialism, would be "a-kairos" -- missing the demand of the historical movement ... Again I must say that a Christian theology which is not able to enter into a creative dialogue with the theological thought of other religions misses a world-historical occasion and remains provincial.\(^2\)

In this chapter we shall attempt to follow such a spirit and examine Tillich's idea of authentic humanity in the context of an interdisciplinary dialogue with other religions and human studies which also claim to possess the 'way' to authenticity. Of course it is impossible to include every related area, even from the list proposed by Tillich.\(^3\) Yet by considering

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\(^1\) A. J. McKelway, The Systematic Theology of Paul Tillich: A Review and Analysis (London: Lutterworth Press, 1964), pp. 189-90 comments that 'this part of Tillich's "Systematic Theology" [viz., Pt. 4 'Life and the Spirit'] is certainly the most complex and intricate of his whole work ... Tillich's perceptive and analytical mind ranges over such broad and diverse fields as art, technology, politics, medicine, and music, and into even such specialized areas as magic, nuclear physics, psychiatry, and semantics.' Also J. H. Randall, Jr., 'Discussion: Tillich's Systematic Theology, vol. III,' USQR 19 (1963/64): 351-59; W. Pannenberg, 'Review of "Systematic Theology" vol. III by Paul Tillich,' Dialog 4 (1965): 230.

\(^2\) ST-3: 6; see also p. 195.

\(^3\) For example, ibid., pp. 153-55.
some of the representative approaches one can see more clearly the strengths and weaknesses of Tillich's 'apologetic theology', as far as the question of authentic humanity is concerned.

I. ESSENTIALIZATION AND THE ONTOLOGY OF AUTHENTIC HUMANITY

To understand Tillich's ontology of authentic humanity, we have to start with his ontological analysis of 'life' and its ambiguities:

In all life process an essential and an existential element, created goodness and estrangement, are merged in such a way that neither one nor the other is exclusively effective. Life always includes essential and existential elements; this is the root of its ambiguity.4

Unlike Barth, who sees man's ontological determination from a Christological perspective, Tillich's idea belongs to the German Idealist and the Existentialist traditions.6 The metaphor "mixture" of essential and existential elements' which describes the ontological structure of life

5 Supra, ch. 3, pp. 11-40.
6 Cf. J. Macquarrie, 'Discussion: Tillich's Systematic Theology, vol. III,' USQR 19 (1963/64): 346. It seems strange that one can hold the positions of essentialism and existentialism together. But this is exactly what Tillich endeavours to maintain. See ST-1: 66-67, 'A third part [of "Systematic Theology", viz., the section "Life and the Spirit"] is based on the fact that the essential as well as the existential characteristics are abstractions and that in reality they appear in the complex and dynamic unity which is called "life." The power of essential being is ambiguously present in all existential distortions. Life, that is, being in its actuality, displays such a character in all its process.' See also id., 'Existentialism, Psychotherapy, and the Nature of Man,' PastPsy 11 (Jun 1960): 10-12; id., 'Dimensions, Levels, and the Unity of Life,' KAB 17 (n.4, 1959): 8. And in his 'Der philosophische Hintergrund meiner Theologie. Vortrag an der „St. Paul's University" in Tokio am 17. 5. 1960' in GW 13: 483, Tillich writes, 'Meine Theologie stellt ein Versuch dar, diese beiden Linien [viz., the 'essentialist line' and the 'existentialist line'] zu vereinigen.' Tillich exemplifies F. Schelling as his forerunner who has shown such a possibility through the development of his 'negative' and 'positive' philosophy. See HCT, pp. 438-39, 446-47. Also id., 'Schelling und die Anfänge des existentialistischen Protestes' (1955) in GW 4: 133-44. In fact, we will see that Tillich's triadic scheme 'essence-existence-essentialization' is immensely influenced by Schelling (infra, pp. 164-66).
should not be conceived as a static notion. On the contrary, life is a moving 'process' of becoming, an actualization of potential possibilities. The historical dimension is present in all realms of life,' and every life-process 'participates in the striving toward the inner aim of history: fulfilment or ultimate sublimation.' According to Tillich, there are two ways in the ontological movement of life: the way of existential estrangement as the transition from essence to existence; and the way of essentialization as the unambiguous fulfilment of life's essential possibilities. The overall characteristic which marks the former movement is polarization, whereas the latter is unification. The contrast between the two movements can be elucidated more concretely by considering their relationships with the three basic ontological polarities of life, viz., individualization and participation, dynamics and form, freedom and destiny. Whereas the movement of existential estrangement polarizes the three polarities and results in the disintegration, destruction and profanization of life respectively, the movement of essentialization unifies the polarities and the basic functions of life become self-integration, self-creativity and self-transcendence.

7 ST-3: 11-12, 30; ST-1: 241.
9 Cf. ST-1: 174-86.
10 See ST-3: 30-32.
Tillich attributes his notion of essentialization to Schelling. ¹¹

But there is a basic difference between the two: whereas Schelling tends to speculate about how immortality can be seen as the essentialized physical and how the good spirit will overcome the evil spirit after death, ¹² Tillich's idea of essentialization as the mode of Eternal Life is not describing the life hereafter. Rather, 'Eternal Life' is 'a matter of present experience without losing its futuristic dimension,' where 'past and future meet in the present, and both are included in the eternal "now".' ¹³ Thus essentialization is 'the permanent transition of the temporal to the eternal' here and now; it means that

the new which has been actualized in time and space adds something to essential being, uniting it with the positive which is created within existence, thus producing the ultimately new, the "New Being," not

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¹¹ Ibid., p. 400; also HCT., p. 444. Cf. F. W. J. Schelling, Clara, oder über den Zusammenhang der Natur mit der Geisterwelt. Ein Gespräch (Munich: Leibniz Verlag, 1948), esp. pp. 52-108, 130-33; also I. C. Henel, 'Paul Tillichs Begriff der Essentifikation und seine Bedeutung für die Ethik.' NZSTh 10 (1968): 9-10. Since Tillich's ontology of the transition from essence to existence is much discussed and is indirectly related to the present study, we will only discuss the ontology of essentialization in some detail in this section. However, the problem of existential polarization will be treated in the next section. For a study of Tillich's ontology of the transition from essence to existence, see A. Thatcher, The Ontology of Paul Tillich (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 117-38.


¹³ ST-3: 396, 395. Italics mine; also p. 418.
fragmentarily as in temporal life, but wholly as a contribution to the Kingdom of God in its fulfilment.\textsuperscript{14}

Essentialization is the ontological movement which brings an unambiguous fulfilment of essential possibilities;\textsuperscript{15} and in this sense, 'essentialization and unambiguous life are concomitant.'\textsuperscript{16} Regarding the ontological polarities of life, essentialization means a 'perfect balance' between the poles so that 'they are united in that which transcends their polar contrast.'\textsuperscript{17} But how is essentialization possible? Three fundamental elements should be mentioned: First, the \textit{Spiritual Presence} as the unifying power which 'elevates the human spirit into the transcendent union of unambiguous life;'\textsuperscript{18} second, \textit{faith and love} as the ecstatic states of being 'grasped by' and 'taken into' the transcendent unity of unambiguous life;\textsuperscript{19} and third, the \textit{Spiritual Community} and the \textit{Kingdom of God} as the corporal and historical dimensions of life, within which alone the conquest of the ambiguities of life is possible.\textsuperscript{20} And finally we come to the 'degree' of essentialization. Since the 'higher' and 'lower' forces which fight with each other are always present in every being, there is 'a higher or lower level of fulfilment' in the individual's essentialization.\textsuperscript{21} In terms of the manifestation of the New Being through the impact of the Spiritual Presence, there are 'latent' and 'manifest' stages of the Spiritual Community.\textsuperscript{22} They are the stages before and after the encounter with the

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., pp. 398-99, 400.
\textsuperscript{15} See ibid., pp. 107, 400-403, 405-407, 421.
\textsuperscript{17} \textit{ST-3}: 401-403.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., pp. 107-108, 128; also pp. 162-282.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., p. 129; also pp. 129-38.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., pp. 108-109; also pp. 138-61, 382-423.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., pp. 416-17.
\textsuperscript{22} The double stages also correspond to Tillich's idea of 'preparatory stage' and 'final stage' of revelation, see \textit{ST-1}: 143-44; \textit{ST-3}: 152-53.
'revelation', viz., the 'final' revelation of the New Being in Jesus as the Christ. That is to say, all the non-Christian endeavours towards human autenticity belong to the 'preparatory' stage of revelation and thus belong to the 'latent' Spiritual Community. Such a stage 'comprises a negative and a positive element': Positively, it is 'the stage of being partly actual, partly potential.' Since there are actualized elements and elements not actualized, the latent Spiritual Community also has 'the Spiritual Presence's impact in faith and love; but the ultimate criterion of both faith and love, the transcendent union of unambiguous life as it is manifest in the faith and the love of the Christ, is lacking.' Therefore negatively, the Spiritual Community in its latency 'is open to profanization and demonization' and to falling back into the polarization of exist­ tential estrangement 'without an ultimate principle of resistance.' And Tillich claims that the manifest Spiritual Community is 'the Community of the New Being' manifest in Jesus as the Christ. It is characterized by the ultimate criteria of faith and love, conquering the ambiguities of life through ecstatic participation 'in the holiness of the Divine Life.' In the manifest Spiritual Community, man's essential nature which is disrupted under the conditions of existence is recreated by the Spiritual Presence, and the transcendent union of the functions of life (viz., morality, culture and religion) is fragmentarily and anticipatorily -- yet unambiguously -- fulfilled.

Here we have Tillich's formal judgement of the non-Christian endeavour towards authentic humanity. But how valid is such a claim that

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24 ST-3: 153-54; also ST-1: 135-47.

25 Ibid., p. 155.

26 Ibid., pp. 155-61.
II. UNAMBIGUOUS LIFE: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY DIALOGUE

We have seen Tillich's ontology of authentic humanity. In this section we are going to examine some of its concrete implications. For this, Tillich has provided us with a triadic scheme, viz., the functions of life as self-integration, self-creativity and self-transcendence. The selection of the three is not arbitrary. According to Tillich, they correspond, metaphorically, to the 'circular movement' (outgoing and returning), 'horizontal movement' and 'vertical movement' in life's process respectively.27 In this case, the whole realm of life's dynamics are included. In the following sub-sections, each of the life functions will be discussed separately in more detail.

To Acquire Authentic Humanity through Self-integration

Tillich's idea that self-integration should be regarded as a mode of existence which fulfils authentic humanity is based upon his 'Gestalt' theory of man. 'Man is a living subject, a Gestalt, a totality of independent relations in which no part can be isolated as long as the

27 See ibid., pp. 30-31.
living process goes on.'28 Since life is a living Gestalt, it is at the same time 'centered' and 'altering'.29 This comprises life's ontological polarity of individualization and participation. Life is a movement 'going-out from a center' (viz., 'self-alteration'), yet at the same time remains a 'centered being' (viz., 'self-identity'). The dialectic between these two ontological 'movements' means that no perfect individualization or perfect participation is possible for human life. 'Individualization and participation are interdependent on all levels of being.'30 Accordingly, there are two possibilities in life's existence: If the unification of the polarities is achieved, the identity of the self can remain even in self-alteration so that the self can be a 'centered self' without being 'self-centered'.31 But if the ontological polarity becomes polarized, life approaches 'the death of mere self-identity' which 'does not have a life process whose content is changed and increased,' or it

28 P. Tillich, 'The Conception of Man in Existential Philosophy,' JR 19 (1939): 202. Tillich's idea of Gestalt as an approach to understanding man goes back to his Das System der Wissenschaften nach Gegenständen und Methoden (1923), where he provided a concise definition: 'We call a completely formed, self-contained existent a gestalt. The concept "gestalt" occupied the central position within the sciences of being [Seinswissenschaften].' (Quoted from E.T. by P. Wiebe as The System of the Sciences according to Objects and Methods [London: Associated University Presses, 1981], p. 45; see also pp. 99-101) And later in the same work Tillich introduces the name 'spirit-bearing individual gestalt' (die geisttragende Einzelgestalt), or simply 'spirit-bearing gestalt' (die geisttragende Gestalt). See GW 1: 192; and 210-13. The idea of 'Gestalt' as a central approach to the study of religion can also be found in his Religionsphilosophie (1925). See GW 1: 299-303, 313-17. J. L. Adams, Paul Tillich's Philosophy of Culture, Science, and Religion (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), p. 50, n.53 remarks that 'so much does the idea of Gestalt appear in Tillich's writings that one might call him a Gestalt philosopher or theologian.'

29 See ST-3: 30-33.

30 ST-1: 177. See also Tillich, System of Sciences, p. 138, 'On the one hand, the spirit-bearing gestalt is completely separated from the universal; it is something absolutely unique and individual. On the other hand, it contains the universal; it can absorb everything real. But everything it absorbs receives the peculiar formation corresponding exactly to its individuality.'

31 See ST-3: 268-71.
approaches 'the death of mere self-alteration' which 'faces the danger of losing its center altogether.' 32 Such an inauthentic existence has been well scrutinized by Martin Heidegger in his Sein und Zeit, which we are going to examine in some detail.

1. Anxiety, human wholeness and being-towards-death.

Answering the question of the 'Who' of Dasein as Being-in-the-world, Heidegger introduces the expression 'das Man'. 33 What he tries to emphasize is that the existential character of Dasein in its everydayness (Alltäglichkeit) is a state of having lost itself in the 'world'. 34 The subjective agent is replaced by the 'Other's' power that governs one's existence: 35

Dasein, as everyday Being-with-one-another, stands in subjection [Botmässigkeit] to Others. It itself is not [Nicht es selbst "ist"]; its Being has been taken away by the Others as they please. These Others, moreover, are not definite Others. On the contrary, any Other can represent them. What is decisive is just that inconspicuous domination by Others which has already been taken over unawares from Dasein as Being-with. One belongs to the Others oneself and enhances their power ... The "who" is not this one, not that one, not oneself [man selbst], not some people [einige], and not the sum of them all. The "who" is the neuter, the "they" [das Man] ... The Self of everyday Dasein is the they-self [das Man-selbst], which we distinguish from the authentic Self -- that is, from the Self which has been taken hold of in its own way [eigene ergriffenen]. 36

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32 Ibid., p. 33.
34 In addition to the obvious impersonal and anonymous character of the expression 'das Man', one can also notice that the word 'man' is an alternative form of expressing the passive construction. In view of Heidegger's discussions in sec.26 ('The Dasein-with of Others and Everyday Being-with') and sec.27 ('Everyday Being-one's-Self and the "They"'), the idea of self-loss in Dasein's everyday Being-with is clearly expressed.
35 See J. Macquarrie, Existentialism (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973), p. 120.
36 Heidegger, Being and Time, pp. 164, 167.
Such a loss of self-awareness in everyday existence is characterized by the 'averageness' (Durchschnittlichkeit) -- the 'everyday undifferentiated character of Dasein' which is a "leveling down" [Einebnung] of all possibilities of Being.' As a result, the mode of 'publicness' (die Offentlichkeit) controls every way of Dasein's everyday existence. Here we have a good elaboration of what Tillich calls 'the death of mere self-alteration' in the polarized mode of 'participation'.

Heidegger also delineates the mode of polarized 'individualization', though not as explicitly as he does for Dasein's 'publicness'. The idea is expressed in his discussion of the 'non-committal' (unverbindlich) character in Dasein's state of 'falling' (Verfallen). Three particular phenomena illustrate such inauthentic self-concealment. They are 'idle talk' (Gerede), 'curiosity' (Neugier) and 'ambiguity' (Zweideutigkeit). 'Idle talk' characterizes the inauthentic mode of human communication through discourse. It is a groundless talk which does not communicate but only talks 'by following the route of gossiping and passing the word along.'

37 Ibid., pp. 69, 164-65.
38 Ibid., p. 165.
39 M. E. Zimmerman, Eclipse of the Self: The Development of Heidegger's Concept of Authenticity (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1981), p. 33 sharply observes that 'In reading Section B [viz., the section which includes the discussion of Dasein's "falling"], I find that Heidegger is speaking not about average disclosedness but about inauthentic disclosedness. The self-destructive egoism which he describes, building up to a crescendo in his remarkable description of the "falling of Dasein," is clearly not an average, undifferentiated phenomena but an intensification and modification of everyday egoism.' Thus although it seems that Heidegger is carrying on his elucidation of 'the publicness of the "they"', the main attention has been shifted from the 'dispersal' and 'self-loss' character of publicness to the inauthentic mode of self-concealment. For the four characteristics which Heidegger attributes to 'falling' -- temptation, tranquillizing, alienation and self-entangling -- are describing the inauthenticity of existence resulting from self-concealed individualization of Being-in-the-world (see Heidegger, Being and Time, pp. 221-23; also Zimmerman, Eclipse of Self, p. 62). Nevertheless, one should acknowledge that Heidegger makes no attempt to distinguish the egoistic and the dispersal element in his delineation of Dasein's everydayness. But this does not forbid us from interpreting his existential analytic from the two perspectives.

41 Ibid., p. 212.
its very nature, 'idle talk is a closing-off.' When 'Dasein maintains itself in idle talk -- as Being-in-the-world -- cut off from its primary and primordially genuine relationships-of-Being towards the world, towards Dasein-with, and towards its very Being-in. Such a Dasein keeps floating unattached [in einer Schwebe]."42 In the mode of 'curiosity', 'Dasein lets itself be carried along [mitnehmen] solely by the looks of the world.' Therefore the inauthentic existence of Dasein in 'curiosity' is characterized by 'not tarrying', 'the constant possibility of distraction,' and 'never dwelling anywhere' (Aufenthaltslosigkeit). 'Curiosity is everywhere and nowhere.'43 Finally, 'ambiguity' also bears a resemblance to the first two modes. 'Everything looks as if it were genuinely understood, genuinely taken hold of, genuinely spoken, though at bottom it is not.'44 Thus 'ambiguity' brings together the inauthenticity of idle talk and curiosity by a kind of care which is only interested in 'a possibility of a non-committal just-surmising-with-someone-else.' Here self-concealment is expressed in the manner of 'disguise' and 'distortion' -- 'under the mask of "for-one-another", an "against-one-another" is in play.'45 Thus the phenomena of idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity, as we have seen, are the results of 'falling, our intrinsic tendency toward concealment.'46 In such a way, 'falling' characterizes the negativity of 'disclosedness', the authentic state of Being-in-the-world.47

From Dasein's 'average everydayness' and 'falling', Heidegger brings in his analysis of 'anxiety' (Angst), the distinctive mode of existence which discloses Dasein's structural whole as inauthentic and points to the possibility of human authenticity. Following Søren Kierkegaard's insight of distinguishing 'anxiety' from 'fear', Heidegger also claims that 'fear as a state-of-mind' has in view some detrimental entities 'within-the-world which come from some definite region' of which to be afraid. But 'that in the face of which one has anxiety is not an entity within-the-world.' In anxiety 'one does not encounter this thing or that thing which, as something threatening, must have an involvement.' Jean-Paul Sartre has a sharp observation at this point:

Kierkegaard describing anguish in the face of what one lacks characterizes it as anguish in the face of freedom. But Heidegger, whom we know to have been greatly influenced by Kierkegaard, considers anguish instead as the apprehension of nothingness.

By affirming that 'that in the face of which one has anxiety is characterized by the fact that what threatens is nowhere,' Heidegger moves from his existential analytic to the ontological structure of Dasein's Being. For if that which threatens is 'nothing and nowhere' and cannot be identified 'factically' with any 'concrete potentiality-for-Being', 'anxiety

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48 The importance of an analysis of anxiety in Heidegger's transition from the existential analytic of inauthentic existence to the fundamental ontology of human authenticity has been discussed by M. Gelven, A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1970), pp. 111-15. And for the appropriateness of translating 'Angst' as 'anxiety', see Macquarrie, Existentialism, pp. 164-65.

49 See S. Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety, trans. R. Thomte & A. B. Anderson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 42, 'The concept of anxiety is almost never treated in psychology. Therefore, I must point out that it is altogether different from fear and similar concepts that refer to something definite, whereas anxiety is freedom's actuality as the possibility of possibility.'


52 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 231.
makes manifest in Dasein its Being towards its ownmost \textit{[eigenst]} potentiality-for-Being.\textsuperscript{53} The characteristic feeling of anxiety, according to Heidegger, is 'uncanniness' (\textit{Unheimlichkeit}), viz., 'not-being-at-home' (\textit{das Nicht-zuhause-sein}).\textsuperscript{54} That is to say, we are anxious about 'our being able to be ourselves.' And this 'turning-away' mood of uncanniness reveals 'that from which we are turning away,'\textsuperscript{55} the 'Being of the totality of Dasein's structural whole.'\textsuperscript{56} In his inaugural lecture \textit{Was ist Metaphysik?}\textsuperscript{57} Heidegger elaborates more explicitly how an existential-ontological analysis of anxiety reveals 'what-is-in-totality' (\textit{das Seiende im Ganzen}):

[In the mood of anxiety], we are brought face to face with Nothing itself ... We are unable to say what gives "one" that uncanny feeling. "One" just feels it generally (\textit{im Ganzen}). All things, and we with them, sink into a sort of indifference. But not in the sense that everything simply disappears; rather, in the very act of drawing away from us everything turns towards us. This withdrawal of what-is-in-totality, which then crowds round us in dread, this is what oppresses us. There is nothing to hold on to. The only thing that remains and overwhelms us whilst what-is slips away, is this "nothing". Dread reveals Nothing [\textit{Die Angst offenbart das Nichts}].\textsuperscript{58}

At this point Tillich's ontology of anxiety, which is deeply influenced by Heidegger, provides us with a good commentary. Tillich's way of relating 'anxiety' and 'Nothing' is more straightforward: 'Anxiety is the state in which a being is aware of its possible non-being.' It is not an abstract knowledge but an 'existential awareness' that 'non-being is a part of one's own being.' The anxiety of non-being means 'the awareness of one's

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., p. 232. \textsuperscript{54} Ibid., p. 233.
\textsuperscript{55} Gelven, \textit{Commentary on Being and Time}, pp. 118, 113. Italics mine.
\textsuperscript{56} Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, p. 235.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., p. 366. Italics mine.
finitude as finitude.'\(^59\) But what Heidegger intends to work out here is not a nihilist interpretation of anxiety. On the contrary, he brings in the positive function of Nothing at this seemingly negative end. The argument of such a turn is this:

[In dread there is a mood of "retreat from"]: This "retreat from" has its source in Nothing. The latter does not attract: its nature is to repel. This "repelling from itself" is essentially an "expelling into": a conscious gradual relagation to the vanishing what-is-in-totality (das entgleitenlassende Verweisen auf das versinkende Seiende im Ganzen) ... it reveals the latter [viz., "what-is-in-totality"] in all its till now undiscovered strangeness as the pure "Other" -- contrasted with Nothing. Only in the clear night of dread's Nothingness is what-is as such revealed in all its original overtness (Offenheit): that it "is" and is not Nothing.\(^60\)

Thus 'only on the basis of the original manifestness of Nothing can our human Da-sein advance towards and enter into what-is.' Here Heidegger arrives at his positive conclusion: 'Nothing is that which makes the revelation of what-is as such possible for our human existence.'\(^61\)

It is appropriate at this point to introduce Heidegger's fundamental ontology of human authenticity as 'Being-towards-death' (das Sein zum Tode) -- Dasein's possibility of Being-a-whole (Ganzsein).\(^62\) But how can Being-towards-death lead to Dasein's authentic existence? Heidegger mentions at least three particular aspects of Being-towards-death which make an authentic existence possible. First, in anticipatory Being-towards-death, 'Dasein can first make certain of its ownmost Being in its totality

\(^59\) Tillich, CTB, p. 44. Also pp. 44-46.

\(^60\) Heidegger, 'What is Metaphysics' in Existence and Being, p. 369. Italics mine.


\(^62\) Macomber, Anatomy of Disillusion, p. 56, 'In the second half of Being and Time Heidegger portrays anxiety as a dimension of Dasein's care which is no longer care for things but goes beyond things to the limit of human experience in the anticipation of death.' See also Heidegger's introductory section to his second division of Being and Time, pp. 274-78 (sec.45).
[Gänseheit] -- a totality which is not to be outstripped. 63 If inauthentic existence means a state of self-loss in dispersal, Dasein's authentic Being-a-whole (eigentliches Ganzsein) is to be constituted by death as the 'end.' 64 For in Dasein's potentiality-for-Being, 'there is constantly something still to be settled,' viz., 'a lack of totality' in a 'not-yet' manner. Thus 'as long as Dasein is as an entity, it has never reached its "wholeness" [Gänse].' 65 But in Dasein's Being-towards-death, 'its own uttermost "not-yet" has already been included -- that "not-yet" which all others lie ahead of.' So such a Being-towards-the-end affords 'the existential possibility of an existential Being-a-whole for Dasein.' 66

John Macquarrie provides a good elucidation at this point:

To anticipate death and to recognize the boundary of one's existence is to achieve an overarching unity that gathers up the possibilities of existence ... just as a picture is organized and unified by the convergence of its perspectives toward the vanishing-point, so in human life death is the unifying point around which the possibilities of life are to be organized. 67

Second, anticipatory Being-towards-death reveals and releases Dasein's ownmost Being 'from the Illusions of the "they" [das Man].' 68 Since 'no

63 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 310.
64 Ibid., pp. 311, 284, 286-87, 290.
65 Ibid., pp. 279, 280.
66 Ibid., pp. 303, 296. Italics mine.
67 J. Macquarrie, Martin Heidegger (London: Lutterworth, 1968), p. 31. The 'disidentification' effect used in the psychotherapy of death awareness also concretely illustrates Heidegger's point: The 'disidentification' exercise is a device in which the psychotherapist asks the participants to list what they think to be the most important answer to the question 'Who am I?' Then the therapist will ask the participants to meditate on what it would be like to give up those 'attributes' written on their own answering cards. By going through it, the therapist helps each individual to reach his 'center of pure self-consciousness'. I. D. Yalom argues that such an effect also occurs in a person's anticipation of his death: 'It is the awareness of death that promotes a shift in perspective and makes it possible for an individual to distinguish between core and accessory: to reinvest one and to divest the other ... An awareness of death shifts one away from trivial preoccupations and provides life with depth and poignancy and an entirely different perspective.' (I. D. Yalom, Existential Psychotherapy [New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1980], pp. 163-65, 160)
68 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 311; also p. 307.
one can take the Other's dying away from him,' death 'lays claim to it as an individual Dasein. The non-relational character of death, as understood in anticipation, individualized Dasein down to itself.' And 'Dasein can be authentically itself only if it makes this possible for itself of its own accord.' Irvin D. Yalom, from his study of 'death awareness' in psychotherapy, concludes that

A confrontation with one's personal death ('my death') is the non-pareil boundary situation and has the power to provide a massive shift in the way one lives in the world. "Though the physicality of death destroys an individual, the idea of death can save him." Death acts as a catalyst that can move one from one state of being to a higher one: from a state of wondering about how things are to a state of wonderment that they are.

The third distinct character of Being-towards-death is concerned with the idea of possibility. For Heidegger, 'possibility' (Möglichkeit) 'means more than merely a future actuality.' Dasein lives in the realm of possibilities, 'and it is in the realm of possibilities that authentic existence is realized.' 'Dasein is constantly "more" than it factually [tatsächlich] is.' But 'Dasein is never more than it factically [faktisch] is.' The first statement indicates that Dasein's own potentiality-for-Being (Seinkönnen) always presses forward into possibilities. But since possibility means 'not yet', it means uncertain. The latter statement points out the tension between possibility and facticity. 'On the one side man is open and projects his possibilities; on the other side he is closed by the factual situation in which he already finds himself.' But death,

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69 Ibid., pp. 284, 308. Also pp. 296-97, 299, 307, 310.
70 Yalom, Existential Psychotherapy, pp. 159-60.
71 Gelven, Commentary on Being and Time, p. 157. See also Heidegger, Being and Time, pp. 183-87.
72 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 185. For a discussion of the difference between 'tatsächlich' and 'faktisch', see ibid., pp. 27, n.2; 82, n.1.
73 Ibid., pp. 184-86.
74 Macquarrie, Existentialism, p. 192.
as 'the possibility of no-longer-being-able-to-be-there [Nicht-mehr-dasein-könmens],' is 'the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein. Thus death reveals itself as that possibility which is one's ownmost, which is non-relational, and which is not to be outstripped [unerholbare].'75

Thus although death is a possibility for Dasein, it is a completely different kind of possibility. In fact, it is the only certain possibility.76 'But certainty is grounded in the truth, or belongs to it equiprimordially.' And this 'being-certain' with regard to death 'will in the end present us with a distinctive certainty of Dasein.'77 Anticipatory Being-towards-death thus 'turns out to be the possibility of understanding one's ownmost and uttermost potentiality-for-Being -- that is to say, the possibility of authentic existence.'78

2. 'Courage to be one-self' and 'courage to be a part'.

We have seen a deep concern for authentic existence as the attainment of human wholeness and releasement of one's ownmost being from 'das Man' through anticipation of death -- an untransferable possibility of the impossibility of existence. Now we can offer a critical assessment from the perspective of Tillich's notion of self-integration and self-

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75 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 294.
76 Ibid., pp. 309-310. 77 Ibid., pp. 299-303.
78 Ibid., p. 307. Again Yalom's psychotherapeutic study of some terminal cancer patients provides a good illustration of Heidegger's existential analytic. He discovers that some patients, in the face of their coming death, achieve 'personal growth' by realizing that 'existence cannot be postponed.' 'Many patients with cancer report that they live more fully in the present. They no longer postpone living until some time in the future. They realize that one can really live only in the present.' We may call this 'certainty of Dasein' as 'the eternalization of the presence' -- 'the present, not the future, is the eternal tense.' If one experiences life 'as the "possibility of possibility" (Kierkegaard) and to know death as the "impossibility of further possibility" (Heidegger), then one realizes that, as long as one lives, one has possibility -- one can alter one's life until -- but only until -- the last moment.' (Yalom, Existential Psychotherapy, pp. 161-62)
affirmation. 79 We shall begin with the analysis of anxiety. Both Tillich 
and Heidegger go beyond psychopathology and furnish an ontology of anxiety 
through the notion of 'nothingness'. 80 For Heidegger, anxiety which 
reveals 'Nothing' leads to the ontological meaning of death. 81 And from 
Dasein's anticipatory Being-towards-death, he elucidates the possibility of 
authentic existence. But Tillich, on the other hand, is not so preoccupied 
with the ontological meaning as Heidegger. Rather, his analysis of the 
problem of anxiety is existential and historico-cultural. As a result, 
Tillich furnishes a 'typology' of anxiety:

I suggest that we distinguish three types of anxiety according to 
three directions in which non-being threatens being. Non-being 
threatens man's ontic self-affirmation, relatively in terms of fate, 
absolutely in terms of death. It threatens man's spiritual self-
affirmation, relatively in terms of emptiness, absolutely in terms 
of meaninglessness. It threatens man's moral self-affirmation, rela-
tively in terms of guilt, absolutely in terms of condemnation. The 
awareness of this threefold threat is anxiety appearing in three

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79 We consider Tillich's notions of self-integration and self-
affirmation together because the two ideas are especially close to each 
other. In C TB Tillich elucidates 'self-affirmation' with the same ontolog-
ical polarity (viz., 'individualization' and 'participation') which also 
constitutes the life-function of 'self-integration' discussed in ST-3. As J. M. Barbee, 'The Doctrine of Man's Self-affirmation in Individual Person 
in the Philosophical Theology of Paul Tillich' (Ph.D. dissertation, 
Marquette University, 1976), p. 64 remarks, 'It is evident that self-
integration and self-affirmation are interdependent. They may be inter-
preted as the same process from different perspectives.'

80 See supra, pp. 174-75.

81 Although the continuity between Heidegger's 'preparatory analysis' 
of 'Dasein's Being as care', 'the basic state-of-mind of anxiety', and his 
'fundamental ontology' of death is clearly implied in Being and Time (for a 
discussion, see Gelven, Commentary on Being and Time, pp. 137-42), the way 
of how the anxiety of 'Nothing' is related to the anxiety of death is not 
explicitly discussed. Rather, in a lecture delivered at the Bayerischen 
Akademie der Schonen Kunste on June 6, 1950 entitled 'Das Ding', Heidegger 
gives a more explicit account of the connection between 'Nothing' and 
'death': 'The mortals are human beings. They are called mortals because 
they can die. To die means to be capable of death as death. Only man dies. 
The animal perishes. It has death neither ahead of itself nor behind it. 
Death is the shrine of nothing, that is, of that which in every respect is 
never something that merely exists, but which nevertheless preserves, even 
as the mystery of Being itself. As the shrine of Nothing, death harbors 
within itself the presencing of Being. As the shrine of Nothing, death is 
the shelter of Being.' (E.T. by A. Hofstadter as 'The Thing' in Poetry, 
forms, that of fate and death (briefly, the anxiety of death), that of emptiness and loss of meaning (briefly, the anxiety of meaninglessness), that of guilt and condemnation (briefly, the anxiety of condemnation). 82

Here we can see a wider perspective. Instead of focusing on analysis of death as the resolution, Tillich considers the transition from an inauthentic existence of anxiety to an authentic existence of self-affirmation from the directions of man's ontic, moral and spiritual life. According to Tillich, 'the three types of anxiety are interwoven in such a way that one of them gives the predominant colour but all of them participate in the colouring of the state of anxiety.' 83 Although Tillich acknowledges that the anxiety of death and fate 'is most basic, most universal, and inescapable,' he does not regard it as the only form of anxiety. The anxiety of the moral and spiritual dimensions threaten man's being from their own particular characters which cannot be resolved even by the possibility of death. 84 There is no way of escaping the despair of guilt and condemnation, 'even by ontic self-negation [viz., death]':

Suicide can liberate one from the anxiety of fate and death -- as the Stoics knew. But it cannot liberate from the anxiety of guilt and condemnation, as the Christians know. This is a highly paradoxical statement, as paradoxical as the relation of the moral sphere to ontic existence generally. But it is a true statement, verified by those who have experienced fully the despair of condemnation. 85

In the same way, the anxiety of emptiness and meaninglessness must also be distinguished from the ontic threat of non-being (viz., death), although they cannot be separated. 86 Meaninglessness threatens man from the spiritual dimension. 'The anxiety of meaninglessness is anxiety about the loss of an ultimate concern, for a meaning which gives meaning to all

82 Tillich, CTB, p. 49. Italics mine.
83 Ibid., p. 61.
84 Ibid., pp. 50, 57, 60-61.
85 Ibid., pp. 61-62.
86 Ibid., p. 57.
meanings.' Spiritual self-affirmation occurs only in the moment when man has 'creative participation in a sphere of culture.' But when he is cut off from creative participation, 'the creative eros is transformed into indifference or aversion.' Such a threat to spiritual life 'is not doubt as an element but the total doubt.' The extreme degree of the anxiety of meaninglessness is the act of suicide. As Tillich remarks,

\[\text{the threat to his [one's] spiritual being is a threat to his whole being. The most revealing expression of this fact is the desire to throw away one's ontic existence rather than stand the despair of emptiness and meaninglessness. The death instinct is not an ontic but a spiritual phenomenon.}\]

\[87\] Ibid., p. 54. Italics mine.

\[88\] Ibid., p. 55. V. Frankl, a logotherapist who pays particular attention to the psychiatric problems involving the meaning of life, distinguishes three principle ways in which man can find meaning in life: 'The first is what he gives to the world in terms of his creations; the second is what he takes from the world in terms of encounters and experiences; and the third is the stand he takes to his predicament in case he must face a fate which he cannot change.' (V. Frankl, The Will to Meaning: Foundations and Applications of Logotherapy [London: Souvenir Press, 1971], p. 70) The three ways correspond respectively to three chief groups of values, viz., creative, experiential and attitudinal values. One can observe that the first two ways are very close to Tillich's idea of 'creative participation'. And the third way, which is similar to A. Camus's suggestion in his The Myth of Sisyphus, trans. J. O'Brien (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1975), pp. 107-111, is also called 'life's unconditional meaningfulness' -- 'the possibility of investing meaning even in suffering and death.' (see V. Frankl, The Unheard Cry for Meaning: Psychotherapy and Humanism [London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1979], p. 40) In this respect, the idea is also close to what Tillich calls 'absolute faith' in one's radical doubt and meaninglessness.

\[89\] CTB, pp. 55, 56. Italics mine. Frankl mentions two stages of the meaninglessness syndrome: the 'existential vacuum' (see V. Frankl, 'Psychiatry and Man's Quest for Meaning' in Psychotherapy and Existentialism: Selected Papers on Logotherapy [London: Souvenir Press, 1970], pp. 71-86) and the 'existential (or noogenic) neurosis' (see J. C. Crumbaugh and L. T. Maholick, 'An Experimental Study in Existentialism: The Psychometric Approach to Frankl's Concept of Noogenic Neurosis' in ibid., pp. 183-97). The first is 'the experience of a total lack, or loss, of an ultimate meaning to one's existence that would make life worthwhile.' (Ibid., p. 71) The second syndrome is more serious. It is a 'psychological illness' (ibid., p. 43).


\[91\] Also Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus, pp. 11, 12, 'There is but one truly serious philosophical problem and that is suicide. Judging whether life is or is not worth living amounts to answering the fundamental question of philosophy ... I have never seen anyone die for the ontological
Here we can see the distinct character of meaninglessness as the threat of non-being from the spiritual direction. 'Man's search for meaning is a primary force in his life and not a "secondary rationalization" of instinctual drives.'

Whereas Being-towards-death can bring in the possibility of authentic existence, the despair of meaninglessness can also result in a death instinct. They are inseparable yet distinguishable. If an analysis of death alone is not enough to provide the whole picture of man's existential situation from anxiety to self-affirmation, we have to look for a more comprehensive resolution in order to include man's ontic, moral and spiritual life. For Tillich, the answer can be found in man's courage, 'the self-affirmation of being in spite of the fact of non-being.'

A more detailed comparison between Heidegger's idea of authentic humanity as Being-towards-death and Tillich's delineation of self-affirmation as courage is revealing. For it demonstrates more concretely how Tillich furnishes a more comprehensive idea of authentic humanity with regard to self-integration. The basic idea of Heidegger's notion of authentic Being-towards-death, as we have seen, is to individuate and release Dasein's ownmost Being from the illusion of das Man. The untransferring of death reveals the possibility which is 'uniquely my own' and 'frees me to be myself.'

In Tillich's terms, this is 'the courage to be as oneself' -- the courage of individualization. Commenting on Heidegger's notion of 'resoluteness' (Entschlossenheit), Tillich remarks,

argument ... On the other hand, I see many people die because they judge that life is not worth living ... I therefore conclude that the meaning of life is the most urgent of questions.'


93 CTB, p. 152.

94 Supra, pp. 176-77.

95 Zimmerman, Eclipse of Self, pp. 72, 73.
One of Heidegger's historical functions was to carry through the Existentialist analysis of the courage to be as oneself more fully than anyone else and, historically speaking, more destructively. Mark Blitz, in his *Heidegger's 'Being and Time' and the Possibility of Political Philosophy*, asks an acute question: 'It is true that the wholeness of man in his being belongs to *Dasein* as he is radically individualized in death. But is there a way in which such wholeness, especially when it is authentically revealed, is *communal*?' At first sight, since the idea of 'Being-with' is so emphasized by Heidegger, it seems natural to expect that his understanding of authentic existence should also be perceived from a communal perspective. But in fact this is not the case. Both *Being-towards-death* and the call of conscience (*Ruf des Gewissens*) tend to emphasize individualization rather than participation. At least the idea of how man can exist authentically in the social world seems undeveloped in Heidegger's writings. Blitz remarks, 'it is not altogether clear [in Heidegger's thinking] how authenticity could exist in this whole

96 CTB, p. 146.


98 We will not go into detailed exposition of Heidegger's idea of conscience as we did for 'Being-towards-death'. A comprehensive and critical study has been given by J. M. Hollenbach, *Sein und Gewissen. Über den Uspurung der Gewissensregung: Eine Begegnung zwischen Martin Heidegger und thomistischer Philosophie* (Baden-Baden: Bruno Grimm, 1954), esp. pp. 315-24. Also M. Gelvin, 'Authenticity and Guilt' in Heidegger's Existential Analytic, pp. 233-45. Although Heidegger's idea of authentic existence as 'resoluteness' by no means implies an isolated or detached existence (see Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 344), 'in the attempt to find a single grasp of authentic existence, Heidegger first had to isolate the self.' (Gelven, Commentary on *Being and Time*, p. 171) The case is evident not only for his delineation of 'Being-towards-death' (see supra, pp. 175-78) but also for 'the call of conscience'. For Heidegger, 'Dasein is *Zust* in the "they"', it must first find itself ... [And] conscience summons *Dasein's Self* from its lostness in the "they".' (Heidegger, *Being and Time*, pp. 313, 319; also pp. 312-13, 317, 321-22, 333, 341, 345-47.) Thus the call of conscience, in Heidegger's delineation, is basically in contrast with one's lostness in *das Man*. The main idea of 'resoluteness' is 'letting oneself be summoned out of one's lostness in the "they"' (ibid., p. 345; italics mine) and not participating in one's community life.
[viz., communal whole], or what could replace death as its "end," or guilt as its "before."' At this point, Tillich shows his more comprehensive concern for authentic existence as self-integration. For him, self-integration does not only mean individualization, it is also accompanied by participation:

Man's self-affirmation has two sides which are distinguishable but not separable: one is the affirmation of the self as a self; that is, of a separated, self-centred, individualized, incomparable, free, self-determining self ... [The other one is] the affirmation of oneself as "participant", and that this side of our self-affirmation is threatened by non-being as much as the other side, the affirmation of the self as an individual self. We are threatened not only with losing our individual selves but also with losing participation in our world. Therefore self-affirmation as a part requires courage as much as does self-affirmation as oneself ... The courage to be is essentially always the courage to be as a part and the courage to be as oneself, in interdependence. 100

Participation means 'being a part of something from which one is, at the same time, separated.' It connotes a threefold sense: 'sharing', 'having in common' and 'being a part (e.g. of a political movement). 101 Man as a centred being becomes a person through his participation in the world. 'Only in the continuous encounter with other persons does the person become and remain a person. The place of this encounter is the community.' 102 Being-towards-death particularly contributes to the authentic mode of existence as individualization, the spiritual and moral dimensions of self-

99 Blitz, Heidegger and the Possibility of Political Philosophy, p. 148. One might argue, as K. Harries in his 'Heidegger as a Political Thinker' in Heidegger and Modern Philosophy, ed. M. Murray (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), pp. 312-28 attempts to show, that during the Nazi period Heidegger's works (especially 'Einführung in die Metaphysik' [1935], 'Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes' [1935/36] and 'Hölderlin und das Wesen der Dichtung' [1936]) indicate the idea that authenticity can be realized only through the destiny of a people. But as Blitz, op. cit., pp. 205-222 contends, as far as Heidegger's writings during the Nazi period are concerned, 'Heidegger fails to develop the coherence or lack of coherence between the people's destiny and the individual's fate within that destiny ... [he] leaves unexplored both the whole of possibilities as it is in the public and the precise connection of the individual and political situations freed within the fated possibility.' (p. 207)

100 CTB, pp. 89, 92. 101 Ibid., pp. 90-91.

102 Ibid., p. 93.
affirmation are closely related with the problem of participation. First, self-affirmation in the spiritual dimension as acquiring the meaning of life. Tillich contends that due to the breakdown of absolutism and the development of liberalism, democracy and technical civilization since the Enlightenment, modern men are under the threat of spiritual non-being. We are living in a period where the anxiety of emptiness and meaninglessness is dominant. Certainly self-identity can be rescued by the act of individualization, as we have seen in Heidegger's delineation. But as Erich Fromm elucidates, individualization can drive man into new bondage. For 'as an isolated being he is utterly helpless in comparison with the world outside and therefore deeply afraid of it.' But 'both helplessness and doubt paralyse life, and in order to live, man tries to escape from freedom.' As a result, he chooses to lose his self again in the forms of 'authoritarianism', 'destructiveness' and 'automaton conformity'. Thus individualization has to be followed by an authentic mode of participation. Margarethe von Andics provides us a good description of how man acquires the meaning of life through participation:

the human being does not exist for his own sake and for the sake of his well-being, he wants to exist for somebody and for something. But the individual also wants his achievements to be accepted and acknowledged, and that somebody and something should be there for him in return. What is desired is an equilibrium of a reciprocal "intentionality"; I for somebody and something -- somebody and something for me.

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105 See ibid., pp. 117-78.


107 von Andics, Suicide and Meaning of Life, p. 173. Such a finding is clearly in accordance with Frankl's logotherapeutic theory, viz., the 'creative' and the 'experiential' values. See supra, p. 181, n.88.
Authentic participation can also be realized through a person's moral acts. As Tillich puts it,

Morality is the function of life by which the realm of the spirit comes into being ... A moral act, therefore, is not an act in which some divine or human law is obeyed but an act in which life integrates itself in the dimension of spirit, and this means as personality within a community. Morality is the function of life in which the centered self constitutes itself as a person; it is the totality of those acts in which a potentially personal life process becomes an actual person. 108

The moral act can be regarded as self-actualization because it unites a person's individualization and participation. On the one hand, man as a 'centred self' and 'bearer of the spirit' is free to choose and respond to moral demands. By such an act of choosing, man becomes what he (potentially) is. 109 But on the other hand, since moral acts occur in a community of persons, his becoming is limited by the other self. And 'the experience of this limit is the experience of the ought-to-be, the moral imperative.' 110 And since the ultimate demand and content of such an


109 See MB, p. 20; id., 'Moralisms and Morality: Theonomous Ethics' in TC, p. 134. Also ST-3: 40, 'man, facing his world, has the whole universe as the potential content of his centered self. Certainly, there are actual limits because of the finitude of every being, but the world is indefinitely open to man; everything can become a content of the self.' Tillich's statement here sounds almost Sartrean. Cf. J.-P. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, pp. 433-81. But there is an essential difference between Tillich and Sartre. For Sartre, to be is to act. Human reality exists as a choice of its being. The ground of such a claim is his conspicuous view that 'existence precedes essence.' (For a discussion, see P. C. Morris, Sartre's Concept of a Person: An Analytic Approach [Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1976], pp. 26-29) Whereas Tillich, holding his essentialism, rejects Sartre's 'pure existentialism'. For Tillich, Sartre has a 'happy inconsistency': 'He [Sartre] calls his existentialism humanism. But if he calls it humanism, that means he has an idea of what man essentially is, and he must consider the possibility that the essential being of man, his freedom, might be lost. And if this is a possibility, then he makes, against his own will, a distinction between man as he essentially is and man as he can be lost: man is to be free and to create himself.' (P. Tillich, 'The Theological Significance of Existentialism and Psychoanalysis' in TC, p. 121) Thus for Tillich, the act of moral choice does not create a person's being, but actualizes one's potentiality.

110 ST-3: 40.
'oughtness' is 'acknowledging the other one as a person,' the individual persons in a community participate in and at the same time actualize each other's personhood. Thus a moral act makes self-integration possible by individualizing a person through his moral response in freedom, and participating in a community through his obedience to the unconditional demand of the moral imperative. But an immediate question emerges at this point: 'How is [this] moral self-integration possible within the ambiguous mixture of essential and existential elements which characterizes life?' The problem not only arises in the case of the moral imperative but is also concerned with moral norms and moral motivation. What is the universal subjectivity which provides 'the unconditional validity of the moral imperative,' the subjective universality that gives 'the ultimate norm for all ethical content,' and the ultimate source of moral motivation which can bridge the gap between 'is' and 'ought'? Tillich's answer is: 'By love in the sense of *agape.*' 'Theonomous morality' is the name coined by Tillich to express the way of morality under the principle of *agape.* According to Tillich, the difficulties in actualizing one's personal self through moral acts are due to the dilemmas between the heteronomy (external command) and autonomy (viz., out of one's own nature) in the moral imperative, between ethical absolutism and ethical relativism with regard to moral norms, and that involving the power to motivate a person to fulfil what ought to be done. These difficulties point to a transcendent reality which bears the unconditional and absolute character, yet at the

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111 See MB, p. 20; ST-3: 45.
112 ST-3: 46. Italics mine.
113 ST-3: 44-50.
114 ST-3: 46.
115 Tillich, 'Moralisms and Morality' in TC, pp. 144-45; also ST-3: 268.
same time it is not strange to man's essential nature. At this point, Tillich brings in his 'religious dimension' -- a 'transmoral morality'.

Under the impact of the Spiritual Presence,

The Spirit elevates the person into the transcendent unity of the divine life and in so doing it reunites the estranged existence of the person with his essence. And this reunion is just what the moral law commands and what makes the moral imperative unconditionally valid. The historical relativity of all ethical contents does not contradict the unconditional validity of the moral imperative itself, because all contents must, in order to be valid, confirm the reunion of man's existential with his essential being.

The concrete expression of this theonomous kind of ethics is the principle of *agape*: 'Love unites the unconditional character of the formalized moral imperative with the conditional character of the ethical content. Love is

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117 See ST-3: 266; MR, pp. 25-30, 77-81. See also Henel, 'Tillich's Begriff der Essentifikation,' NZSTh 10: 4-6.

118 ST-3: 272. Also MR, pp. 24-25; LPJ, pp. 72-77. A more concrete elucidation of how the dilemma of the moral imperative can find its resolution in a religious dimension has been given by W. G. de Burgh in his *From Morality to Religion* (London: MacDonald & Evans, 1938). For de Burgh, the dilemma in man's moral experience is dualism of 'duty' and the 'good'. On the one hand, moral action can be judged according to 'the sense of duty', viz., 'the doing of duty for duty's sake' (ibid., pp. 37, 44). On the other hand, human actions should also be judged according to 'the desire for good', viz., action 'sub ratione boni' (ibid., pp. 81-92). Once we distinguish these two component factors in the principle of conduction, we can see 'a single act may indeed exhibit one motive to the exclusion of the other, nay, more, ... one or other may be predominant over a whole life (ibid., p. 92) But how can we find a satisfactory connexion between 'ought' and 'good', viz., the relation between 'duty' and 'goodness'? de Burgh has examined in detail the difficulties of 'either by grounding goodness upon duty, or conversely deriving duty from the good' (ibid., pp. 92-143, 188). At this point, moral dilemma opens out a way to religion. The synthesis of the two ethical ideas points beyond ethics to the religious realm. God is the ultimate ground of the unity of duty and goodness. 'God is revealed to religious faith as the ground alike of goodness and of the moral law;' and His eternal will for man 'is at once immanent in all judgements of duty and transcendent, eluding all efforts to give it content in terms of human experience' (ibid., pp. 188-205). Thus the religious faith that God is the ground of goodness and His will to man is the unity of the good and the right offers an answer to the dualism in moral experience. For on the one hand, 'objective rightness' exists only 'beyond time and change in the mind of God.' And on the other hand, 'faith in divine providence guarantees value to action motivated by the sense of obligation.' (Ibid., pp. 206-208)
unconditional in its essence, conditional in its existence.'\textsuperscript{119} If 'morality becomes a thread within a texture of premoral forces and motives,'\textsuperscript{120} the power of motivation also comes from love in the sense of \textit{agape}:

Love is unambiguous, not as law, but as grace. Theologically speaking, Spirit, love, and grace are one and the same reality in different aspects. Spirit is the creative power; love is its creation; grace is the effective presence of love in man ... Autonomous or heteronomous morality is without ultimate moral motivating power. Only love or the Spiritual Presence can motivate by giving what is demanded.\textsuperscript{121}

To sum up, the difficulties in moral imperatives, norms and motivation all point to the idea of theonomous ethics. The ontological ground of such a

\textsuperscript{119} ST-3: 273. Tillich's resolution to the problem of moral norms by his principle of \textit{agape} is not so satisfactory. When he claims that 'love, in the sense of \textit{agape}, is the unambiguous criterion of all ethical judgments ... Love is as near the abstract norms as it is near the particular demands of a situation (ibid.), he seems to over-simplify the complexity of moral reasoning. Even though he introduces the ideas of 'wisdom' and 'risk' (see ibid., pp. 273-74), he can hardly answer the challenges proposed by contemporary moralists, say, the non-descriptivists (e.g. R. M. Hare, \textit{Morality: Its Levels, Method and Point} [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981]. A discussion of the various views of non-descriptivism is beyond the scope of our study. For a good anthology of the discussion, see W. D. Hudson, ed., \textit{The Is-Ought Question} [London: Macmillan, 1969]). For example, Hare's principle of 'universalizability' (see R. M. Hare, \textit{Freedom and Reason} [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963], pp. 7-50, 86-111) has offered a more powerful and penetrating discussion of how to employ love (for Hare's case, the 'golden-rule') as a formal principle for moral decision making. Yet according to Hare, as B. Mitchell summarizes it in his 'Ideals, Roles, and Rules' in \textit{Norm and Context in Christian Ethics}, ed. G. H. Outka & P. Ramsey (London: SCM, 1969), p. 357, 'what seems clear in the light of it [viz., Hare's argument of universalizability] is that it is a necessary condition of a loving attitude that one should adopt the Golden Rule, but it is not a sufficient condition of enlightened moral choice. For a difference may still arise between two people who adopt the rule as to what really does help or harm themselves and others.'

\textsuperscript{120} MB, p. 56.

\textsuperscript{121} ST-3: 274. Also MB, pp. 56-64. Id., 'Moralisms and Morality' in \textit{TC}, pp. 143-145. For an elaboration of the ontological unity of love and power, see LPJ, pp. 48-53. See also Brenner, 'Prinzip der Moralität,' pp. 173-89; Henel, 'Tillichs Begriff der Essentifikation,' \textit{NZStH} 10: 6-8.
possibility is the Spiritual Presence, the concrete expression is the principle of *agape*, and the context is the Spiritual Community.\(^{122}\)

3. Ontological grounding and 'releasement' in Heidegger's later works.

It is appropriate at this point to turn our discussion from morality to Heidegger's notion of authenticity in his writings since *Sein und Zeit* (1927). For Heidegger's later works (especially those after the Second World War) also indicate a shifting emphasis on the idea of transcendence and ontological grounding regarding authentic existence.\(^{123}\) However, we have to start with *Sein und Zeit*. The idea of resoluteness presented in this work sounds voluntaristic: It is the individual who *chooses* with his *will power* to be authentic.\(^{124}\) For Heidegger is well aware of the fact that man's response to death does *not* necessarily bring in authentic existence. Thus he writes, 'Being-towards-death is essentially anxiety.'\(^{125}\)

\(^{122}\) For Tillich's elucidation of how 'in the holy community the *agape* quality of love cuts into the *libido*, *eros*, and *philia* qualities of love and elevates them beyond the ambiguities of their self-centredness,' see *LPJ*, pp. 116-19. See also ST-3: 156-57; also id., 'Being and Love' in *Four Existentialist Theologians*, ed. W. Herberg (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1958), pp. 306-308. Also Modras, *Tillich's Theology of Church*, pp. 75-76.

\(^{123}\) As we have pointed out (*supra*, ch. 2, p. 22, n.58), while there is certainly a shifting emphasis on a Being-centred approach in Heidegger's later works, the turning should not be over-dramatized as 'conversion', as J. Macquarrie carefully points out (see J. Macquarrie, 'Heidegger's Earlier and Later Work Compared' in *Thinking about God* [London: SCM, 1975], pp. 191-203; also M. Heidegger, 'Preface' to *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* by W. J. Richardson [The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963], pp. xvi-xxii). Rather, Heidegger's turn to the idea of ontological grounding regarding authenticity can be understood as his growing 'maturity' in his search for a genuine understanding of human existence. Such an idea constitutes the theme of Zimmerman's *Eclipse of Self*.


\(^{125}\) Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 310. E. Kübler-Ross's interdisciplinary study of more than two hundred patients of terminal illness is illuminating at this point. According to Kübler-Ross, there are different stages that people go through when they are faced with death: the first stage is 'denial and isolation', the second stage is 'anger', the third stage is 'bargaining', the fourth stage is 'depression' and the final stage, if any, would be 'acceptance'. (See E. Kübler-Ross, *On Death and Dying* [London: Tavistock Publications, 1973], pp. 34-121)
But then, what makes 'visible the ontological possibility of an existentiell Being-towards-death which is authentic?'\textsuperscript{126} Heidegger's answer is a voluntaristic one: It is accomplished by Dasein's 'choosing to choose' (Wählen der Wahl).\textsuperscript{127}

[Being lost in the "they", Dasein] make [sic] no choices, gets carried along by the nobody, and thus ensnares itself in inauthenticity. This process can be reversed only if Dasein specifically brings itself back to itself from its lostness in the "they"...

When Dasein thus brings itself back [Das Sichzurückholen] from the "they", the they-self is modified in an existentiell manner so that it becomes authentic Being-one's-Self. This must be accomplished by making up for not choosing [Nachholen einer Wahl]. But "making up" for not choosing signifies choosing to make this choice -- deciding for a potentiality-for-Being, and making this decision from one's own Self. In choosing to make this choice, Dasein makes possible, first and foremost, its authentic potentiality-for-Being.\textsuperscript{128}

But in the essay 'Vom Wesen des Grundes' published two years later (1929), Heidegger clarifies his idea of Dasein's will to choose. Freedom is by no means a mere spontaneity. Rather, it is a grounding process in its origin as transcendence:

We can characterize the essence of freedom more originally by explaining it in terms of transcendence than by defining it as spontaneity, i.e., as a type of causality. To say a free act is one that "is initiated by itself" or "begins with itself" is merely to offer a negative way of characterizing freedom...

Above all, it is to err on an ontological level in making no distinction between "initiating" and "happening"...

Spontaneity ("being initiated by itself") can serve as an essential feature of the "subject" only on two conditions: 1. Selfhood must be ontologically clarified in order to provide an appropriate manner of reading the phrase "by itself." 2. The same clarification of selfhood, if it is to be able to define the sort of "move" involved in "initiating," must be somehow explain

\textsuperscript{126} Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, p. 311.

\textsuperscript{127} Ibid., p. 314.

\textsuperscript{128} Ibid., pp. 312-13. We find a similar demand of Dasein's choosing in the case of 'the call of conscience': 'To the call of conscience there corresponds a possible hearing. Our understanding of the appeal unveils itself as our wanting to have a conscience [Gewissenhabenwollen]. But in this phenomenon lies that existentiell choosing which we seek -- the choosing to choose a kind of Being-one's-Self which, in accordance with its existential structure, we call "resoluteness".' (Ibid., p. 314) For further elaboration, see Zimmerman, \textit{Eclipse of Self}, pp. 78-80.
the "eventful" character of a self. But the selfhood of the self, which lies at the basis of all spontaneity, itself lies in transcendence.  

In the lecture 'Vom Wesen der Wahrheit' of 1930 (published in 1943), the non-voluntaristic understanding of freedom is expressed in more explicit terms: 'Man does not "possess" freedom as a property. At best, the converse holds: freedom, ek-sistent, disclosive Da-sein, possesses man.' Here we encounter a fundamental position of Heidegger regarding authentic existence. The realization of authentic existence, though involving Dasein's will to choose, cannot be grounded in Dasein's selfhood. For the essence of freedom is 'not merely what common sense ... [regards it as] the caprice, turning up occasionally in our choosing, of inclining in this or that direction. Freedom is not merely absence of constraint with respect to what we can or cannot do.' But 'prior to all this ("negative" and "positive" freedom), freedom is engagement in the disclosure of being as such.' Thus freedom should be understood as 'letting beings be' (das Sein-lassen des Seienden). It is 'the fulfillment and communication of the essence of truth in the sense of the disclosure of beings [Entbergung von Seiendem].' To sum up, Heidegger's writings after his Sein und Zeit indicate a growing emphasis on, what Herbert Spiegelberg calls, a 'Being-centred approach'. The attainment of authentic selfhood must be seen as

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130 E.T. by J. Sallis as 'On the Essence of Truth' in Basic Writings, p. 129.
132 Heidegger, 'Essence of Truth' in Basic Writings, p. 128; italics mine. See also Richardson, Heidegger, pp. 179-92.
133 Heidegger, 'Essence of Truth' in Basic Writings, p. 129. See also Macomber, Anatomy of Disillusion, pp. 98-103.
the disclosure, the opening up of beings. The grounding of such a possibility is not the autonomy of self-will but the 'letting-presence' (Anwesenlassen) of what 'it gives' (es gibt).\textsuperscript{135} The idea of 'letting' (lassen), rather than 'willing', which emphasizes the initiative of Being, signifies Heidegger's particular attention concerning authenticity since the Second World War. The idea can be understood from both his critical works against subjectivism and his positive statements regarding authenticity as 'releasement' (Gelassenheit).

In his answer to Jean Beaufret's questions referring to Sartre's L'Existentialisme est un humanisme, Heidegger furnished a general critique of subjectivistic humanism in his Brief über den Humanismus (1947). He complains that 'in defining the humanity of man humanism not only does not ask about the relation of Being to the essence of man; because of its metaphysical origin humanism even impedes the question by neither recognizing nor understanding it.'\textsuperscript{136} Against Sartre, Heidegger claims that 'the ek-sistence of man is his substance [die Ek-sistenz des Menschen ist seine Substanz].'\textsuperscript{137} He introduces the hyphenated word 'Da-sein' and the idea of 'the light of Being' (das Lichtung des Sein) in order to express the 'giving' and 'granting' character of Being itself in its relation to human existence:\textsuperscript{138}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[137] Ibid., p. 209. See also pp. 213-14, contrasting to Sartre's statement that 'précisément nous sommes sur un plan où il y a seulement des hommes,' Heidegger writes, 'précisément nous sommes sur un plan où il y a principalement l'Être.' (Italics mine)
\end{footnotes}
Man is rather "thrown" from Being itself into the truth of Being, so that ek-sisting in this fashion he might guard the truth of Being, in order that beings might appear in the light of Being as the beings they are. Man does not decide whether and how beings appear, whether and how God and the gods or history and nature come forward into the lighting of Being, come to presence and depart. The advent of beings lies in the destiny of Being ... For every departure from beings and every relation to them stands already in the light of Being. 139

Now we come to Heidegger's positive statements regarding authenticity in his later writings. In the essay 'Zur Erörterung der Gelassenheit' (dates from 1944/45, published in 1959) Heidegger opens the dialogue between a teacher, a scholar and a scientist with the statement, 'the question concerning man's nature is not a question about man.' 140 The question about man's nature, according to Heidegger, does not lie in the subjective human power (i.e. willing), but 'the awakening of releasement [Gelassenheit]' 141

On our own we do not awaken releasement in ourselves ... because releasement does not belong to the domain of will. 142

But then, 'What in the world am I to do?' The answer is: 'We are to do nothing but wait.' 143 Heidegger's idea of 'waiting' (das Warten) has been well elaborated by John M. Anderson. He draws our attention to the distinction between 'to wait for' and 'to wait upon' in Heidegger's work:

The difference between two kinds of waiting may be expressed by saying that when we wait in a merely human way we wait for, whereas in the deeper sense of waiting we wait upon. The different prepositions are intended to refer in the case of "for" to subjective human expectations of some sort, but in the case of "upon" to what is, if given, a gift ... This is to say that man's true nature may relate directly to what transcends him ... this possible transcendence, which is found in man's true nature, is developed as a transcendence to Being. 144

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141 Ibid., p. 60.

142 Ibid., p. 61.

143 Ibid., p. 62. Italics mine.

144 J. M. Anderson, 'Introduction' to Discourse on Thinking, p. 23.
'In waiting we leave open what we are waiting for,' because 'waiting releases itself into openness [Offene].'\textsuperscript{145} Here it is Being itself which takes the initiative. 'Waiting' is what man has to do; he has to be 'appropriated' (vereignet) to 'that-which-regions' (Gegnet), the dynamic ground in which man's nature emerges.\textsuperscript{146} Thus one can agree with Michael E. Zimmerman's remark that

Heidegger minimizes the need for will or effort in becoming released. In focusing on the individual making his way towards being ready for releasement, Heidegger speaks in a way very similar to how a religious person would describe the journey toward salvation.\textsuperscript{147}

In a poetic expression, Heidegger writes, 'the goldenness of the invisible shining of the light cannot be grasped because it is not itself something that can be grasped, but [it] is the pure happening [das reine Ereignen].'\textsuperscript{148} Here Heidegger's description of Ereignis has strong

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{145} Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, p. 68.
\textsuperscript{147} Zimmerman, Eclipse of Self, p. 249.
\textsuperscript{148} M. Heidegger, 'Aletheia (Heraklit, Fragment 16)' in Vorträge und Aufsätze (Pfullingen: Günther Neske, 1954), p. 281. The initiative of Being itself in Ereignis is clearly indicated in the following quotation: M. Heidegger, 'Der Weg zur Sprache' (1959), E.T. by P. D. Hertz as 'The Way to Language' in On the Way to Language (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 127, 'The moving force in Showing of Saying is Ownings. It is what brings all present and absent beings each into their own, from where they show themselves in what they are, and where they abide according to their kind. This owning which brings them there, and which moves Saying [Sagen] as Showing in its showing we call Appropriation [Ereignis] ... What Appropriation yields through Saying is never the effect of a cause, nor the consequence of an antecedent. The yielding owning, the Appropriation, confers more than any effectuation, making, or founding. What is yielding is Appropriation itself -- and nothing else. The Appropriation, seen as it is shown by Saying, cannot be represented either as an occurrence or a happening -- it can only be experienced as the abiding gift yielding by Saying ... The appropriating event is not the outcome (result) of something else, but the giving yield whose giving reach alone is what gives us things as a "there is," a "there is" of which even Being itself stands in need to come into its own as presence.' Certainly Heidegger's idea of Ereignis is never one-sided from Being to man (see, for example, M. Heidegger, 'Der Satz der Identität' [1957], E.T. by J. Stambaugh as 'The Principle of
similarity to what Tillich calls 'the Spiritual Presence':

The Spiritual Presence creates an ecstasy in both of them [viz., the "revelatory" and the "saving" experience] which drives the spirit of man beyond itself without destroying its essential, i.e., rational, structure ... it does something the human spirit could not do by itself. When it grasps man, it creates unambiguous life. Man in his self-transcendence can reach for it, but man cannot grasp it, unless he is first grasped by it.149

Now we can sum up our survey in this section on how man can acquire authentic humanity through self-integration. Heidegger's philosophical endeavour has offered a good demonstration of Tillich's point. Heidegger's in-depth reflection on 'resoluteness' and Tillich's wider perspective on both individualization and participation complement each other. And together they furnish a more comprehensive picture of human

Identity' in Identity and Difference [New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1974], esp. pp. 29-41, where he emphasizes the 'belonging together [Zusammengehören] of man and Being'). Thus 'the event of appropriation' (as suggested by J. Stambaugh) is a suitable translation of 'Ereignis'. However, in Heidegger's description of the happening of such an event, he always puts stress on the 'coming' and 'giving' characters of Being. See, for example in 'Der Kehre' (1949) Heidegger talks about the 'lights up', the 'coming to presence' and the 'saving-power' which is conveyed by 'the sudden flash of the truth of Being': 'Only when man, in the disclosing coming-to-pass [Ereignis] of the insight by which he himself is beheld, renounces human self-will and projects himself toward that insight, away from himself, does he correspond in his essence to the claim of that insight. In thus corresponding man is gathered into his own [ge-eignet], that he, within the safeguarded element of world, may, as the mortal, look out toward the divine.' (E.T. by W. Lovitt as 'The Turning' in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays [New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1977], p. 47)

149 ST-3: 112; see also pp. 268-71. A comprehensive survey of Heidegger's idea of Ereignis has been given by O. Pfügler, 'Sein als Ereignis' (1959), E.T. by R. H. Grimm as 'Being as Appropriation' in Heidegger and Modern Philosophy, pp. 84-115. Here we are not going into the intricate discussions between the later Heidegger and theology (especially since H. Ott's Denken und Sein. Der Weg Martin Heideggers und der Weg der Theologie [1959]). The Later Heidegger and Theology (ed. J. M. Robinson and J. B. Cobb, Jr.) provides a good anthology on the issue. Also a survey of the more recent development of the discussion has been given by A. Jäger, Gott. Nochmals Martin Heidegger (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1978), pp. 1-60, 84-133. So far the discussions have been mainly directed to Bultmannian and Barthian theology; Tillich's thought has received very little attention. Since Tillich never confines the Spiritual Presence to Christian religion but regards it as the impact from the 'dimension of depth' or 'dimension of the ultimate' (see ST-3: 113-14), Heidegger's description of Ereignis should be included as one of the manifestations.
self-integration. Concerning the ultimate fulfilment of authenticity, Heidegger's *Denkweg* in his post-*Sein und Zeit* works is also revealing. Although *Sein und Zeit* shows a sense of voluntarism regarding man's attainment of authentic existence, in his later writings Heidegger became more convinced that the realization of human authenticity cannot be an achievement of a merely subjective power of human self-will, but a *releasement* when Being reveals itself as a 'gift'. Such a 'turn' is significant for our discussion because it demonstrates that the acquiring of authentic humanity has to point beyond mere human endeavour and call for the presence of that which transcends. 'Human nature remains *appropriated* to that ... from whence we are called.'

To Acquire Authentic Humanity through Self-creativity

That the idea of self-creativity should be regarded as a mode of fulfilling authentic humanity is, according to Tillich, based upon the 'principle of growth.' For 'life creates itself through the dynamic of growth.' The dynamics of man's creativity have received particular attention both in the study of Humanistic Psychology and in Karl Marx's (especially earlier) writings, although they approach the problem from very different perspectives. Thus in order to appreciate Tillich's brief remark which regards self-creativity as one of the three main functions of life for man's self-actualization, we shall begin our study with a survey of how the humanistic psychologists and Marx see the relation between self-creativity and authentic humanity.

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150 Heidegger, *Discourse on Thinking*, p. 90.
151 ST-3: 50, 31.
1. Authentic humanity as self-creativity in humanistic psychology and Karl Marx's writings.

From a psychosynthetic point of view, the process of 'growth' is the actualization of a person's full potentialities. According to Carl R. Rogers, 'man's tendency to actualize himself, to become his potentialities' is 'the urge to expand, extend, develop, mature.' Such a tendency 'to express and activate all the capacities of the organism' is 'the mainspring of creativity.' Thus a 'self-actualizing person is characterized by an unusually strong motivation drive' towards creativity. Harold H. Anderson has provided a long list of the characteristics of a 'creative person' from an interdisciplinary study:

desire to grow, capacity to be puzzled, awareness, spontaneity, spontaneous flexibility, adaptive flexibility, originality, divergent thinking, learning, openness to new experience, no boundaries, permeability of boundaries, yielding, readiness to yield, abandoning, letting go, being born every day, discarding the irrelevant, ability to toy with elements, change of activity, persistence, hard work, composition, decomposition, recomposition, differentiation, integration, being at peace with the world, harmony, honesty, humility, enthusiasm, integrity, inner maturity, self-actualizing, skepticism, boldness, faith, courage, willingness to be alone, I see, I feel, I think, gust for temporary chaos, security in uncertainty, tolerance of ambiguity.

According to such a description, creativity can certainly be regarded as one of the basic modes of authentic humanity. A person cannot be 'fully


153 Rogers, 'Toward a Theory of Creativity' in Becoming a Person, pp. 350-51.


functioning' without being creative. Creativity as a mode of authentic humanity is not only affirmed by the humanistic psychologists, it is also argued by the Marxian humanists from a socio-economic perspective. Leszek Kolakowski rightly remarks that 'it has been a common misinterpretation by both Marxists and anti-Marxists to suppose' that 'individuality has no place in Marxist doctrine except as an obstacle in the way of society attaining to homogeneous unity.' Rather, in Karl Marx's works -- especially his earlier works -- man is conceived as a free subject. The idea is clearly presupposed

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157 'Marxian humanism' is a name referring to the interpretation of Marx's thinking (especially his earlier writings) which distinguishes from the so-called "scientific" strain of Marxism, the doctrine officially held by most communist countries (see R. Scruton, 'Marxism' in A Dictionary of Political Thought [London: Pan Books Ltd., 1983], pp. 290-91). For an historical survey and statements of their main concern, see R. Dunayevskaya, 'Marx's Humanism Today' in Socialist Humanism, ed. E. Fromm (London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1967), pp. 63-76.


159 See E. Kamenka's convincing argument in his The Ethical Foundations of Marxism (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962). We shall not go into detailed discussion of the continuity or discontinuity between the 'young Marx' and the 'late Marx'. It seems that since the publication of Marx's Grundrisse der Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie (published in Moscow in 1939, became accessible to the West in 1953), a sharp distinction between the two 'Marxs' became quite impossible to maintain, although a shift of emphasis is evident in the evolution of Marx's writings. The problem has been admirably treated by I. Petscher, 'The Young and the Old Marx' in Marx's Socialism, ed. S. Avineri (New York: Lieber-Atherton, 1972), pp. 36-58, where he concludes, 'Nobody would deny that the style and the ambiance did change in Marx's writings ... But there remains one fundamental topic which is the starting as well as the ending point: the quest to transcend capitalist society toward a more human, free and satisfactory society. There is no warrant for the conclusion that the old Marx buried the hopes of his youth and abandoned the fulfillment of his aims. His later writings
when Marx attacks 'alienated labour' in his 'Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts' (1844): Man's labour is alienated because the capitalist mode of appropriation dehumanizes man. It begins with 'the externalization of the worker in his product':

the object that produces, its product, confronts it as an alien being, as a power independent of the producer. The product of labour is labour that has solidified itself an object, made itself into a thing, the objectification of labour. The realization of labour is its objectification. In political economy this realization of labour appears as a loss of reality for the worker, objectification as a loss of the object or slavery to it, and appropriation as alienation, as externalization.

But why does this objectification of labour dehumanize man? Here Marx explicitly announces his understanding of human nature:

_vital activity and free conscious activity is the species-characteristic of man ... The animal is immediately one with its vital activity. It is not distinct from it. They are identical. Man makes his vital activity itself into an object of his will and consciousness. He has a conscious vital activity ... It is this and this alone that makes man a species-being ... This is the only reason for his activity being free activity. Alienated labour reverses the relationship so that, just because he is a conscious being, man makes his vital activity and essence a mere means to his existence._

Thus John McMurtry rightly comments that 'man's freedom is, for him [Marx], built in; prescribed by the agenda of his human nature.' However, there is still a deeper reason for Marx's rejection of alienated labour. For in

_can only be adequately understood in the light of his first writings ... [In the later writings] the "how" of this transformation and its empirical chances of realization were stressed more strongly than the necessity of the "that" (of which Marx remained too deeply convinced to need stressing) [in his early writings].' (p. 56)

161 Ibid., pp. 134-35.
162 Ibid., p. 139. Italics mine.
Marx's understanding, the externalization and objectification of a worker's labour not only confronts him as a self-conscious and free being, it is the very opposite of the humanization of man. Here we encounter Marx's concept of authentic humanity as man's self-creation and self-realization through labour. Labour, for Marx, is the distinctive activity of human beings as a species-being:

It is in the working over the objective world that man first really affirms himself as species-being. This production is his active species-life. Through it nature appears as his work and his reality. The object of work is therefore the objectification of the species-life of man; for he duplicates himself not only intellectually, in his mind, but also actively in reality and thus can look at his image in a world he has created.

The idea needs some elucidations. For Marx, the 'objectification of the species-life of man' means the 'self-realization of the subject' (Selbstverwirklichung des Subjekts). The process of self-realization must be understood through 'the relation of laboring individuals to nature and to other individuals.' First, the labour's relation to nature. Labour is a mutually transforming process between man and nature. In Das Kapital (I) Marx writes,

Labour is, first of all, a process between man and nature, a process by which man, through his own actions, mediates, regulates and controls the metabolism between himself and nature. He confronts the materials of nature as a force of nature. He sets in motion the natural forces which belong to his own body, his arms, legs, head and hands, in order to appropriate the materials of nature in a form adapted to his own needs. Through this movement he acts upon external nature and changes it, and in this way he simultaneously changes his

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own nature. He develops the potentialities slumbering within nature, and subjects the play of its forces to his own sovereign power. \(^{168}\)

Ontologically, labour realizes man's potentialities by objectifying the agent in the reality he has created and at the same time establishing new possibilities for his further fulfilment. \(^{169}\) And epistemologically, labour as praxis enables man to acquire a genuine knowledge of self-discovery. \(^{170}\)

For knowledge, as Marx conceives it, is not a merely 'subjective, non-active apprehension of external reality,' but 'an active inter-relationship between subject and object.' \(^{171}\) But for Marx, authentic humanity as self-realization through labour is not only confined to man's relation with nature, but also determined by man's relation with other individuals:

The production of life, both of one's own in labour and of fresh life in procreation, now appears as a twofold relation: on the one hand as a natural, on the other as a social relation -- social in the sense that it denotes the cooperation of several individuals, no matter what conditions, in what manner and to what end. \(^{172}\)

Here we touch the heart of Marx's social ontology. For him, 'the primary ontological subject is, properly speaking, a social individual:' \(^{173}\) 'Not only the material of my activity -- like language itself for the thinker -- is given to me as a social product, my own existence is social activity;

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\(^{170}\) See Marx, 'Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts' in KMET, pp. 153-55.


\(^{172}\) Marx, 'The German Ideology' in MEW 5: 43. Also id., 'Wage-Labour and Capital' in KMSW, p. 256.

\(^{173}\) Gould, Marx's Social Ontology, p. 35. Italics mine.
Therefore what I individually produce, I produce individually for society, conscious of myself as a social being.\textsuperscript{174} Thus if authentic humanity is man's self-creation through labour, it can be realized only within the context of 'the social relations of production'.\textsuperscript{175} But society as 'the sum of connections and relationships in which individuals find themselves'\textsuperscript{176} is not a static mode of existence, it evolves in history:

Thus the social relations within which individuals produce, the social relations of production, change, are transformed, with the change and development of the material means of production, the productive forces. The relations of production in their totality constitute what are called the social relations, society, and, specifically, a society at a definite stage of historical development, a society with a peculiar, distinctive character. Ancient society, feudal society, bourgeois society are such totalities of production relations, each of which at the same time denotes a special stage of development in the history of mankind.\textsuperscript{177}

From such social and historical bases, the idea of a future communist society emerges. If the inauthenticity of human existence is due to the alienated labour under the capitalist social relations, authentic humanity will be realized in this future stage of human history where 'from each according to his ability, to each according to his need!'\textsuperscript{178}

\textit{Communism is the positive abolition of private property, of human self-alienation, and thus, the real appropriation of human nature, through and for man. It is therefore the return of man himself as a social, that is, really human, being, a complete and conscious return which assimilates all the wealth of previous development.}

\textsuperscript{174} Marx, 'Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts' in \textit{KMET}, p. 150.


\textsuperscript{177} Marx, 'Wage-Labour and Capital' in \textit{KMSW}, p. 256. Cf. also id., 'German Ideology' in \textit{MECW 5: 77-89}. A good discussion of 'human nature as historically modified' has been given by McMurtry, \textit{Marx's World-View}, pp. 37-53.

Communism as a complete naturalism is humanism, and as a complete humanism is naturalism. It is the definitive resolution of the antagonism between man and Nature, and between man and man. It is the true solution of the conflict between existence and essence, between objectification and self-affirmation, between freedom and necessity, between individual and species. It is the solution of the riddle of history and knows itself to be this solution.¹⁷⁹

Thus we can see, from our preceding survey, that self-creativity as a mode of authentic humanity has been affirmed by both the humanistic psychologists and Marx. While the psychologists conceive creativity as a trait of a fully functioning personality, Marx understands it from social, economic and historical perspectives. The two views do not necessarily contradict each other. Rather, 'humanistic psychology is extremely interested in the social implications of its approach.'¹⁸⁰ And Marx definitely has a genuine concern for the 'universally developed individuals', although it can be only realized within the context of 'their own communal relations.'¹⁸¹ In terms of Tillich's ontological polarities, individualization and participation are mutually essential for each other.¹⁸² And the dynamics of man's creative vitality must be directed and formed:¹⁸³

Dynamics is held in a polar interdependence with form. Self-creation of life is always creation of form. Nothing that grows is without form. The form makes a thing what it is, and the form


¹⁸² ST-1: 174-78.

¹⁸³ Ibid., pp. 178-82.
makes a creation of man's culture into what it is: a poem or a building or a law, and so on. 184

In our last section we have considered authentic humanity through individualization in some detail. In this section we shall focus our attention on the communal level. The cultural and historical dimensions of man's self-realization are clearly Tillich's particular concern when he discusses life's function as self-creativity. For him, 'culture' is 'the self-creativity of life under the dimension of spirit.' 185 And the problems of social and cultural growth must be considered within the context of man's 'historical self-creativity.' 186 But what is meant by authentic humanity on the communal level? Here we encounter the concept of an ideal society -- or, as it is usually called, 'utopia.' Tillich writes,

A thoroughgoing analysis of utopia would involve showing first that it is rooted in the nature of man himself, for it is impossible to understand what it means for man "to have utopia" apart from this fundamental fact. Such an analysis would involve showing further

184 ST-3: 50. Certainly 'a moment of "chaos"' which represents the destruction of the old and the creation of the new forms is essential to the process of creativity. (ST-3: 50-51; cf. also B. Ghiselin, 'Introduction' to The Creative Process: A Symposium, ed. B. Ghiselin [New York: A Mentor Book, 1955], pp. 14-15) But the dynamics of pure destruction can only result in destructiveness and not positive creativity. Researches on human creativity indicate that the 'formal' (e.g. social and cultural) dimension is a basic component in any process of positive creativity: (i) The products of creativity must take certain cultural forms. As H. D. Lasswell puts it, 'within an articulated contour, innovations move in three directions: they particularize, universalize, or equalize.' And the three phases are inseparable with each other (H. D. Lasswell, 'The Social Setting of Creativity' in Creativity and its Cultivation, pp. 217-21; cf. also Ghiselin, op. cit., pp. 19-22). (ii) The social setting is an essential criterion for the creative works of an innovator (see Lasswell, op. cit., pp. 203-221; also C. W. Taylor and J. Holland, 'Predictors of Creative Performance' in Creativity: Progress and Potential, ed. C. W. Taylor [New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1964], p. 29; H. E. Brogden and T. B. Sprecher, 'Criteria of Creativity' in ibid., p. 176; and J. H. McPherson, 'Environment and Training for Creativity' in ibid., pp. 130-53.) Lasswell remarks that 'some innovations appear to owe more to the mutual impact of collective influences than to factors within the inner life of individuals ... it would be a mistake to disregard the social setting in which these events took place and with which they were in perpetual interaction.' (Lasswell, op. cit., p. 211)

185 ST-3: 57.
186 ST-3: 388-90; also pp. 78, 343-44, 388.
that it is impossible to understand history without utopia, for
neither historical consciousness nor action can be meaningful unless
utopia is envisaged both at the beginning and at the end of
history. 187

But before we present Tillich's own 'utopia', we have to examine the two
types of utopia suggested by the humanistic psychologists and Marx, with
Tillich's critical analysis of life's ambiguity within the social and his-
torical context. We shall choose Marx's idea of the communist society and
Abraham H. Maslow's 'Eupsychian society' as the subjects of our investiga-
tion. According to Frank E. Manuel, they exemplify the two main trends in
utopian thought since the French Revolution, viz., the 'open-ended utopia'
of the nineteenth century and the philosophical psychologists' 'Eupschias'
of the twentieth century. 188

2. The visions of a classless society and an eupsychian society.

'It has been frequently pointed out that Marx's sketches of future
society are few and fragmentary.' 189 'Nevertheless,' as David McLellan
rightly remarks, 'the broad outlines of Marx's picture [of the future
communist society] are clear enough.' 190 And 'the centrality of the good
society -- as a conception, as a historically plausible aim, and as a

187 P. Tillich, 'Die politische Bedeutung der Utopie im Leben der
Völker' (1951) in GW 6: 198. E.T. is quoted from P. Tillich, 'Critique and
Justification of Utopia' in Utopias and Utopian Thought, ed. F. E. Manuel
(London: Souvenir Press, 1973), p. 296. For further elaborations of the
idea, see Tillich, op. cit., in GW 6: 157-72; also W. Hartmann,
Heilsgeschichtliche Utopie. Über Paul Tillichs Begriff des Utopischen,'

188 See F. E. Manuel, 'Toward a Psychological History of Utopias' in
Utopias and Utopian Thought, p. 71. For a penetrating historical survey of
utopian thought, see R. A. Tsanoff, Civilization and Progress (Lexington:
The University Press of Kentucky, 1971), pp. 182-210; and for a comprehen-
sive one, see F. E. Manuel and F. P. Manuel, Utopian Thought in the Western

189 S. Avineri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx

p. 240.
program of human action -- is hardly to be doubted in the context of Marx's
time.'191 But what is Marx's 'picture' of this ideal society? In
'Manifesto of the Communist Party' (1848) Marx writes,

When, in the course of development, class distinctions have
disappeared, and all production has been concentrated in the hands
of associated individuals, the public power will lose its political
class... [If the proletariat] sweeps away by force the old
conditions of production, then it will, along with these conditions,
have swept away the conditions for the existence of class antago­
nisms and of classes generally, and will thereby have abolished its
own supremacy as a class. In place of the old bourgeois society,
with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an associ­
tion, in which the free development of each is the condition for the
free development of all.192

We can describe such a society on four levels. On the economic level,
there will be no class antagonisms, and the capitalistic mode of production
will be replaced by a communal mode of production.193 As a result of this
collective ownership, 'the individual producer receives back from society
-- after the deductions have been made -- exactly what he gives to it.
What he has given to it is his individual quantum of labour.'194 Accord­
ingly, as we have quoted, 'from each according to his ability, to each
according to his need!'195 On the level of politics, there will be a
'withering of the political functions of the state.' The 'government will

191 J. P. Burke, L. Crocker and L. H. Legters, 'Introduction' to
Marxism and the Good Society, ed. J. P. Burke et. al (Cambridge: Cambridge
pp. 1-25.
193 See Marx, Capital 1: 170-72; Capital 3: 958-59. Cf. also id.,
Grundrisse (E.T.), pp. 172-73; id., 'The Demands of the Communist Party in
Germany' (1848) in Portable Marx, pp. 242-44.
194 Marx, 'Critique of Gotha Programme' in Portable Marx, p. 539. See
also id., 'On James Mill' in KME!, p. 202; and D. McLellan, 'Marx's View of
195 Ibid., p. 541. For a comprehensive delineation of the economic
situation in future communism, see E. Mandel, Marxist Economic Theory,
cal surveys, see A. L. Harris, 'Utopian Elements in Marx's Thought,'
Ethics 60 (1950): 80-86; and P. Wiles, 'Man and the Ideal Economy,' Survey
become superfluous' and there will be 'no longer a privileged class which must defend its interests, if necessary by force, or by the constant threat of force.' 196 Rather, there will be 'an association [Association], in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.' 197 This leads to our third level -- the level of communal-personal relationship. Since 'man is,' according to Marx, 'by nature, a social being, he only develops his real nature in society.' 198 Thus in the classless society, a genuine communal life will be realized. For

religion, family, state, law, morality, science and art are only particular forms of production and fall under its general law. The positive abolition of private property and the appropriation of human life is therefore the positive abolition of all alienation, thus the return of man out of religion, family, state, etc. into his human, i.e. social being. 199

Finally, on the individual level, man in the future communist society will be characterized with a genuine freedom and full realization of his potentialities. For if

only within the community has each individual the means of cultivating his gifts in all directions; hence personal freedom becomes possible only within the community ... In the real community the individuals obtain their freedom in and through their association. 200

In such an 'association of free men' (Verein freier Menschen), 201 'man exists also in reality both as the contemplation and true enjoyment of

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197 Marx, 'Communist Manifesto' in KMSW, p. 238.


199 Marx, 'Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts' in KMET, p. 149 (italics mine); see also pp. 148-57.

200 Marx, 'German Ideology' in MECW 5: 78; also id., Capital 3: 959. A critical discussion has been given by Harris, 'Utopian Elements,' Ethics 60: 87-89.

201 Marx, Capital 1: 171.
social existence and as the totality of human manifestation of life.\footnote{Marx, 'Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts' in \textit{KMET}, p. 151.} Thus 'Communism represents the positive in the form of the negation of the negation and thus a phase in \textit{human emancipation} and \textit{rehabilitation}, both real and necessary at this juncture of human development.'\footnote{Ibid., p. 157; italics mine. See also Fetscher, 'Future Society,' \textit{Survey} 38: 106-110.} By then, there will be a full humanization of manhood. Erich Fromm has provided a good summary of such a vision:

> when man has built a rational, nonalienated form of society, he will have the chance to begin with what is the aim of life: the "development of human power, which is its own end, the true realm of freedom" ... Man, in Marx's view, has created in the course of history a culture which he will be free to make his own when he is freed from the chains, not only of economic poverty, but of the spiritual poverty created by alienation. Marx's vision is based on his faith in man, in the inherent and real potentialities of the essence of man which have developed in history.\footnote{Fromm, Marx's Concept of Man, pp. 60-61. See also R. C. Tucker, \textit{Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961), pp. 150-61; Berki, \textit{Insight and Vision}, pp. 165-66.}

But 'can we say the problem is solved?' As Maurice Merleau-Ponty asks, 'what Marx intended to do [is] to create a human community [where social injustice will be eliminated] ... [but] in any case, now that the expedient of Kronstadt\footnote{Viz., the 'Kronstadt Revolt' (1921) of the Bolshevik revolution of Russia.} has become a system and the revolutionary power has definitely been substituted for the proletariat as the ruling class, with the attributes of power of an unchecked élite, we can conclude that, one hundred years after Marx, the problem of a real humanism remains intact.'\footnote{M. Merleau-Ponty, 'A Note on Machiavelli' in \textit{Signs}, trans. R. C. McCleary (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), pp. 222-23.} Why did the vision of a full realization of human creativity...
become an uncreative politics of totalitarianism? At this point Tillich has offered a critical analysis. Although the Marxian influence on Tillich's socialist writings (especially during the twenties) is evident, he never reserved his criticism of Marx's thinking from social, political and theological perspectives.

For Tillich, one of the important contributions of Marxism is its 'prophetism'. In his Die sozialistische Entscheidung (1933) Tillich writes,

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207 The totalitarian character of Soviet Communism has been forcefully elucidated by C. J. Friedrich, 'The Unique Character of Totalitarian Society' in Totalitarianism, ed. C. J. Friedrich (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954), pp. 47-60. According to Friedrich, 'totalitarian' regimes which is distinguished from other autocracies can be characterized by six features: (i) 'An official ideology, consisting of an official body of doctrine covering all vital aspects of man's existence.' (ii) 'A single mass party consisting of a relatively small percentage of the total population (up to 10 percent) of men and women passionately and unquestioningly dedicated to the ideology and prepared to assist in every way in promoting its general acceptance.' (iii) 'A technologically conditioned near-complete monopoly of control of all means of effective armed combat.' (iv) A similar monopolistic control of social organizations and economy. (v) 'A system of terroristic police control.' (See ibid., pp. 52-53; also id., 'The Evolving Theory and Practice of Totalitarian Regimes' in Totalitarianism in Perspective: Three Views, ed. C. J. Friedrich et al. [London: Pall Mall Press, 1969], pp. 123-54.) For more detailed discussion, see Z. Barbee, Democracy and Dictatorship: Their Psychology and Patterns of Life (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1959), pp. 173-266. Although the question of 'how "totalitarian" is the Communist régime' is still debatable (see, for example, A. Zinoviev, 'Communism and Totalitarianism' in The Reality of Communism, trans. C. Janson [London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1984], p. 47), at least the national disaster during the 'Stalin period' in Russia and the 'Mao's period' in China have been recognized by their own governments. They cannot be so easily explained away by the reason of historical coincidence.

208 For a brief survey of Tillich's encounter with Marxism before he migrated to the United States in 1933, see T. M. O'Keefe, 'Paul Tillich's Marxism,' SocR 48 (1981): 473-77. Also Stumme, Socialism in Perspective, pp. 21-50. A comprehensive investigation of the problematic realization of the Communist ideal is impossible within the limited space of the present study. In the following pages we shall confine our discussion only to those aspects suggested by Tillich. However, as we will see, the problems which Tillich struggled with are in fact the most fundamental questions in Marx's vision of the new society.

209 See, for example, his 'Grundlinien des religiösen Sozialismus. Ein systematischer Entwurf' (1923) in GW 2: 91-119.
The socialist principle, so far as its substance is concerned, is prophetic. Socialism is a prophetic movement ... Socialism is propheticism on the soil of an autonomous, self-sufficient world ... No one really understands socialism who ignores its prophetic character.

Going back to 'the world-historical mission of Jewish prophetism,' Tillich characterizes prophetism with the idea of 'expectation' (Erwartung):

Time acquires a direction; it moves towards something that did not exist but will exist and, once it is attained, will not be lost again. The expectation of a "new heaven and a new earth" signifies the expectation of a reality that is not subject to the structure of being, that cannot be grasped ontologically.

To this, Tillich finds 'a striking structural analogy between the prophetic and the Marxian interpretation of history.' Thus 'the message of Communism must be interpreted as a secularized and politicized form of Christian prophetism.' For 'the basic eschatological feeling with its revolutionary impulse is common to both.' But what 'has darkened the significance of Marx's prophetic analysis' and brought about 'the perversion of his ideas, the catastrophes of Marxism and its anti-humanist transformation into present-day communism'? According to Tillich, such

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211 SD, p. 20. For further elaborations of 'the elevation of time above space', see Tillich, 'The Struggle between Time and Space' in TC, pp. 30-39.


a degeneration arises from the Marxist concept of ideology, which also leads to an inadequate understanding of human nature.

After six years of involvement in the 'the Kairos Circle' and discussions with other socialist intellectuals, Tillich set out his critique of the Marxist concept of ideology in the article 'Kairos und Logos. Eine Untersuchung zur Metaphysik des Erkennens' (1926). Tillich observes that Marx, according to his anti-Hegelianism, has 'attempted to unite ideal norms and historical reality' by 'making ideality subject to history in interpreting ideas as products of historical situations.' As a result, the 'productive society is the ultimate reality and ideas are only reflections of a special situation of society in the mirror of intellect.' Such an idea is usually called 'historical materialism'. But

[Marx's] emphasis upon the historicity of man is so strong that he derives the character of what is "nature" for man from his historical situation. He knows no nature in itself, only a history in itself, namely, the history of human production through which man has made himself into that which he is.

215 Published in Kairos. Zur Geisteslage und Geisteswendung, reprinted in GW 4: 43-76. E.T. as 'Kairos and Logos' in IH, pp. 123-75. Although Tillich once admitted that 'first and foremost I owe to Marx an insight into the ideological character not only of idealism but also of all systems of thought, religious and secular' (OB, p. 85; italics mine), he remained critical to the Marxist concept of ideology throughout his life-long encounter with Marxism. For Tillich, Marx's insight of 'the fundamental significance of economic structures and motives for the social and intellectual forms and changes in a historical period' is 'a method for unmasking hidden levels of reality.' (Ibid., pp. 87-88) Thus Marx's historical materialism should be regarded as a 'polemical concept' (Kampfbegriff) and not a kind of metaphysical materialism. (See SD, pp. 113-18; see also id., 'Der Sozialismus als Kirchenfrage' in GW 2: 16-17)

216 Tillich, 'Kairos and Logos' in IH, pp. 152-53. Cf. also id., 'The Attack of Dialectical Materialism on Christianity,' StW 31 (1938): 119, 'The basis of the notion of "ideology" is that all psychical and social structures produce an expression in thought which does not possess objective validity, but which has only the power of subjective conviction.'


The implications of such an understanding for the realization of the future ideal society are particularly significant. In our preceding survey, we have seen that Marx's ideal society can be described by the levels of economy, politics, communal-personal relationships and individual fulfillment. But one should notice that, for Marx, the order of these levels is also a fundamental criterion for the final humanization of man. From his early works like 'Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts' (1844), through his Grundrisse (1858), to later writings like Das Kapital (1860/65) and Critique of the Gotha Programme (1875), Marx persistently gave the priority of socio-economic transformation over against the individual-personal authentication in his visionary construction of the ideal society. This is, of course, consistent with his conviction that 'the economic structure of society' is 'the real foundation' and ultimately determining element of history. The social transformation caused by the development of 'material productive forces' and 'relations of production' will result in, not only a satisfaction of material needs, but a complete restructuring of

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219 An overall discussion of Marx's concept of ideology is impossible within the limited space of the present study. In fact, as H. Lefebvre remarks in his The Sociology of Marx, trans. N. Guterman (London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1968), p. 59, 'the concept of ideology is one of the most complex and most obscure [concepts Marx introduced], though the term is widely employed today.' One can see, for example, surprising diversities among the interpretations of G. Lukács, A. Gramsci and L. Althusser (see J. Larrain, Marxism and Ideology [London: Macmillan, 1983], pp. 46-121). In our present study, we shall only confine our investigation to the question of how Marx constructs his vision of the future ideal society according to his concept of ideology.


221 See Marx, 'Preface to A Critique of Political Economy' in KMSW, pp. 389-90. For a discussion, see McLellan, Thought of Marx, pp. 136-37.
the system of human needs. At this point we encounter a crucial question about Marx's concept of human nature in the future classless society - the most neglected part of Marxist and communist theory, as Tillich once put it. We can start with Marx's picture of the future society, viz., 'from each according to his ability, to each according to his need.' A closer examination of the two statements clearly indicates that they are not only a phenomenal description of a kind of social existence, but presuppose a strong moral demand. We can take the second statement - 'to each according to his need' (jedem nach seinen Bedürfnissen) -- for example. Although Marx's understanding of human needs is predominantly economic, he should acknowledge that the 'need' of man cannot only be confined to material but also includes non-material needs. But who is the one who can judge how much is needed for a particular person? If Marx regards the communist society as 'an association of free man,' one should expect that each individual person himself will know and demand what he genuinely needs. Here 'morality must be read into human nature for communism to make any sense at all.' Marx has to assume that human nature is essentially good and that once the socio-economic transformation is achieved, every individual will self-regulate his interest in order to coincide with the interest of the whole society. To this, Tillich has offered a critical remark:

[Marxist theory] never revised the liberal optimism regarding the nature of man, although they have an extremely pessimistic view of its present distortion, but since they did not explain this

222 For a good survey and discussion, see A. Heller, The Theory of Need in Marx (London: Allison & Busby, 1974), pp. 96-130.
223 Tillich, 'Church and Communism,' Rellife 6: 353.
224 Marx, 'Gotha Programme' in Portable Marx, p. 541.
226 Berki, Insight and Vision, p. 76.
227 Ibid., pp. 76-78.
distortion in anthropological, but only in sociological terms, the
transition from natural perfection to existential distortion and from
this to existential fulfilment, is described in a very utopian way.228

Such an 'utopian' view of the transformation of human nature in the
classless society has important practical consequences.229 For 'the actual-
ity of history disappoints such expectation and exposes it as utopian.
Psychologically and politically, that can have two opposite effects:

either a deep disappointment is evoked, and with it an often cynical
alienation from every historical expectation, or the determination is
born to hold fast to one's expectations with every means available.
When this latter happens, a period of reorganization is established,
and all the methods of totalitarian domination are employed to defend
this period, namely, the time after the victorious revolution, against
criticism and transition to something new. The strongest weapon of
this defense against presumed change is terror. That is a second line
that leads from Marxism to Stalinism.230

Thus Tillich concludes that 'sin, cupidity, the will to power, the uncon-
scious urge, or any other word used to describe the human situation is so
bound up with the existence of man and nature ... that establishing the
Kingdom of justice and peace within the realm of estranged reality is

228 Tillich, 'Church and Communism,' Rellife 6: 353. Heller, Theory of
Need and Marx, p. 130 also remarks that 'Marx believed this change in the
structure of needs to "natural" and "obvious". He took so little account
of the possibility of conflicts that one thing must be repeated: although
the change in Being is the decisive issue for him, there are quite a few
Enlightenment aspects to be found in his conception. One will search in
vain for the actual conflicts and problem of the transition which are so
relevant for us and which are now a century old.' W. Pannenberg, 'Can
Christianity Do without an Eschatology?' in The Christian Hope, theological
collection n.13 (London: SPCK, 1970), p. 29 also challenges that 'The
peculiar difficulty of this secular eschatology [of Marxism] is, however,
the expectation that man -- who, it is recognized, is alienated from his
true nature -- will at the same time be able to overcome his alienation by
himself. Is he really able to achieve true humanity when starting with his
alienated personality? Is not the promise of true humanity rather some-
thing which enters from the outside into the alienated human situation,
becoming effective there in spite of the continuing powers of alienated
rather than mysteriously resulting from alienated humanity itself?'

229 SD, p. 74, 'When socialist theory asserts that it is the transforma-
tion of the social situation that will transform human beings, it avoids
'How Much Truth Is There in Karl Marx?' CCen 65: 908.

230 Tillich, 'Christianity and Marxism' in PolExp, p. 94. Also id.,
impossible. The Kingdom of God can never be fulfilled in time and space. Every Utopianism is doomed to metaphysical disappointment. 231

If Marx's vision of a classless society where man's self-creativity will be realized through socio-economic transformation paradoxically introduced uncreative totalitarian régimes in the twentieth century because of his inadequate attention to the complexity of human nature and human needs, Abraham H. Maslow's vision of a 'Eupsychian society' is particularly concerned with what is lacking in Marx's 'utopia'. For Maslow, 'Eupsychia' is 'a psychologically healthy culture -- rather than just another

231 OB, pp. 76-77. Cf. Marx, 'Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts' in KMET, p. 148, '[Communism] is the genuine solution of the antagonism between man and nature and between man and man. It is the true solution of the struggle between existence and essence, between objectification and self-affirmation, between freedom and necessity, between individual and species.' A more detailed elucidation of how a utopian thought which is founded upon an inadequate understanding of human nature can turn out to be a totalitarian régime can be found in Tillich's 'Die politische Bedeutung der Utopie im Leben der Volker' (1951), E.T. by W. R. Grout et al., as 'The Political Meaning of Utopia' in PolExp, pp. 125-80. Tillich delineates three 'negative meaning of utopia': First, 'the untruth of utopia is that if [sic.] forgets the finitude and alienation of man, it forgets that man as finite unites being and nonbeing and that under the conditions of existence man is always estranged from his true being ... its fundamental failure is in presupposing a false image of man contrary to its own basic assumption. For we saw that almost all utopias speak of a total estrangement and sinfulness of the present or of a social group or a people or a religion, and that they want to lead out of this situation, but they do not say how it is possible if estrangement is radical.' This 'untruth' leads to the second negative feature of utopia, viz., 'unfruitfulness'. 'The unfruitfulness of utopia is that it describes impossibilities as real possibilities and fails to see them for what they are, impossibilities, or as oscillation between possibility and impossibility.' Finally, the 'untruth' and 'unfruitfulness' of utopian thought lead to the characteristic of 'impotence'. Because of utopia's 'untruth' and 'unfruitfulness', 'it leads inevitably to disillusionment.' But 'the utopian activists, those who still affirm the utopian good and, while affirming it, have power to preserve it in spite of its provisional and ambiguous character, must guard against disillusionment in order to hold out -- and to do so they must make use of terror. Terror is an expression of the disillusioning character of an actualized utopia; the political effects of disillusionment are staved off by means of terror.' (Ibid., pp. 170-73; italics mine.) A similar argument, but from a sociological and political points of view, has been given by L. Schapiro, Totalitarianism (London: The Pall Mall Press, 1972), pp. 85-90. For a survey of how the socialist utopian thinking became a totalitarian régime, taking the soviet development in Russia as an example, see A. Ulam, 'Socialism and Utopia' in Utopias and Utopian Thought, pp. 116-34.
materially-based utopia.' It is 'a society of psychologically healthy people.' Here the 'psychosocial factor' in the realization of the utopia has received full attention:

What research we have points to the conclusion that while a good environment fosters good personalities, this relationship is far from perfect, and furthermore, the definition of good environment has to change markedly to stress spiritual and psychological as well as material and economic forces.

The basic foundation of Eupsychia is the 'spontaneous' character of psychologically healthy people, viz., 'the capacity to function fully, to live with a certain naturalness, simplicity, lack of artificiality or guile.' Thus 'our conception of culture and of man's relation to it

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233 Manuel, 'Psychological History of Utopias' in Utopias and Utopian Thought, pp. 93-94.

234 A. H. Maslow, 'Normality, Healthy, and Values' in Motivation and Personality (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), p. 279. Also id., 'Preface' to Religions, Values, and Peak-experiences (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1976), p. xiv; id., 'Some Basic Propositions of a Growth and Self-Actualization Psychology' in Towards a Psychology of Being (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1968), pp. 211-12. For Maslow, a person's 'basic needs' consist of five hierarchical levels: (i) the physiological needs; (ii) the safety needs; (iii) the belongingness and love needs; (iv) the esteem needs; (v) the need for self-actualization. (See id., 'A Theory of Human Motivation' in Motivation and Personality, pp. 35-58) Although 'the lower needs are far more localized, more tangible, and more limited than are the higher needs,' 'satisfaction of higher needs is closer to self-actualization than is lower-need satisfaction.' Thus the 'higher needs as well as the lower needs must be included in the repertory of basic and given human nature (not as different from and opposed to it).' (See id., 'Higher and Lower Needs' in ibid., pp. 100-101)

235 Maslow, 'Eupsychia,' JHPsy 1: 3. Maslow has given concrete accounts of how a group of psychologically healthier people can provide surprisingly different results in the field of management and economic relationship in his Eupsychian Management: A Journal (Homewood: Richard D. Irwin, 1965), especially the articles 'The Attitude of Self-Actualizing People to Duty, Work, Mission, etc.' (pp. 1-4); 'Relationship between Psychological Health and the Characteristics of Superior Managers, Supervisors, Formen, etc. (Notes from Likert)' (pp. 68-73); 'Further Notes on the Relationship between Psychological Health and the Characteristics of Superior Managers (Notes from Likert)' (pp. 74-81); 'By-Products of Eupsychian Management' (pp. 85-87); 'The Good Eupsychian Salesman and Customer' (pp. 220-25); 'The Necessity for Enlightened Management Policies' (pp. 261-65).
must change in the direction of "synergy" -- the highest unity of 'mutual interdependence'. That is, 'when I pursue my selfish gratifications I automatically help others, and when I try to be altruistic I automatically reward and gratify myself.'²³⁶ Such a situation presumes the people involved are psychologically healthy.²³⁷ Only then, 'the dichotomy between selfishness and unselfishness' will be resolved, for self-actualizing people 'get pleasure from the pleasures of other people. That is, they get selfish pleasure from the pleasures of other people, which is a way of saying unselfish.'²³⁸

But how can such an ideal of synergic society be possible? It is clear that Maslow's approach is personological and psychological. His main concern is 'to work up a speculative description of a psychological Utopia

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²³⁸ Maslow, 'Notes on Synergy' in ibid., p. 88; also id., 'The Theory of Social Improvement; The Theory of the Slow Revolution' in ibid., pp. 247-60. One of the examples Maslow provided is the synergic action of a person to his child: 'What is good for my child is good for me, what is good for me is good for the child, what gives the child pleasure gives me pleasure, what gives me pleasure gives the child pleasure, and all the lines of difference fall and we can say now that these two persons are identified and in certain functional theoretical ways have become a single unit.' (p. 89) Such an attitude of self-actualizing love and self-sacrifice (see H. Winthrop, 'Self-Sacrifice as Autonomy, Ego-transcendence and Social Interest,' JHPsy 2 [n.2 1962]: 31-37; also Maslow, 'Love in Self-Actualizing People' in Motivation and Personality, pp. 181-202) is clearly presupposed in Marx's first statement of his ideal society, viz., 'from each according to his ability' (jeder nach seinen Fähigkeiten). As Kamenka, The Ethical Foundations of Marxism, pp. 110-14 acutely points out, although Marx tries to visualize the overcoming of alienation under Communism through 'an aesthetic conception' (viz., the labour of man will become so free and creative that it will be like 'a society of artists, engaged in creative production'), he still cannot avoid the presumption of ethical qualities. For the underlying quality of the activity is not simply aesthetic, rather, it is 'displaying the spirit of disinterested enquiry in general' (p. 111).
in which all men are psychologically healthy.' Since man's basic needs are instinctoid and since any gratification of them means a further step towards 'consequences that may be called variously desirable, good, healthy, self-actualizing,' the 'preconditions for basic need satisfactions' are, according to Maslow, simply the 'good environments' which provide the opportunities to permit an individual to gratify his needs. And these 'good conditions of permissiveness' should be the conditions of 'freedom to speak, freedom to do what one wishes so long as no harm is done to others, freedom to express oneself, freedom to investigate and seek for information, freedom to defend oneself, justice, fairness, honesty, orderliness in the group.' In short, there should be a condition of 'freedom' which permits an individual to gratify his basic needs. Here we encounter a dilemma between environmental conditions and innately prescribed human needs towards self-actualization. If the conditions are so important that 'without them the basic satisfactions are quite impossible,' the argument seems to put a heavy burden on culture for which the theory [viz., human needs are innately prescribed] in general makes no room. Thus the realization of Maslow's Eupsychian society can be challenged from two sides -- from the side of social environment and from the side of an individual's 'need gratification'. Maslow once remarked that when he was

239 Maslow, 'Normality, Health, and Values' in Motivation and Personality, p. 277.

240 See Maslow, 'The Role of Basic Need Gratification in Psychological Theory' in Motivation and Personality, pp. 61-62; and id., 'The Instinctoid Nature of Basic Needs' in ibid., pp. 88-95. Maslow's concept of 'basic needs' has been discussed in supra, n.234.


242 Id., 'A Theory of Human Motivation' in Motivation and Personality, p. 47.

243 Ibid.

244 Springborg, Human Needs and Critique of Civilisation, p. 188.
trying to work up a description of Eupsychia, 'I am very uncertain of some things -- economics in particular. But of other things I am very sure.'

But for the Marxists, this is exactly the matter at issue. From a Marxian point of view, it seems trivial to talk about 'freedom' to gratify a person's basic needs in a society of alienated labour. Marx writes,

In imagination, individuals seems freer under the dominance of the bourgeoisie than before, because their conditions of life seem accidental; in reality, of course, they are less free, because they are to a greater extent governed by material forces.

Without a serious consideration of the mode of production and political economy in the society, Maslow's thirty-six assumptions to Eupsychian Management Policy tends to be too hypothetical. Tillich is clearly

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245 Maslow, 'Normality, Health, and Values' in Motivation and Personality, p. 277.


247 See Maslow, 'Notes on Eupsychian Economics and Management' in Eupsychian Management, pp. 17-33. One can see a sharp contrast between Maslow's presumptions, and Marx's understanding of class-consciousness and his delineation of alienated labour. For example, '12. Assume that everyone can enjoy good teamwork, friendship, good group spirit, good group homonomy, good belongingness, and group love ... 19. Eupsychian management assumes everyone prefers to be a prime mover rather than a passive helper, a tool, a cork tossed about on the waves ... 25. Assume the preference for personhood, uniqueness as a person, identity (in contrast to being anonymous or interchangeable) ... 29. We must assume that everyone likes to be justly and fairly appreciated, preferably in public.' (Ibid., pp. 23, 27, 30, 31) Although this does not mean that Maslow is disregarding the role of a good society for individual self-actualization (see, for example, Maslow, 'Psychotherapy, Health, and Motivation' in Motivation and
aware of the intrinsic problem of self-actualization, even if the 'good conditions' have been given. But Maslow is highly optimistic about an individual's 'free choice'. He deeply believes in the ability of a person's 'self-determination':

If he [a child] is given a really free choice, he will choose what is good for his growth. This he does because it tastes good, feels good, gives pleasure or delight. This implies that he "knows" better than anyone else what is good for him. A permissive regime means not that adults gratify his needs directly but make it possible for him to gratify his needs, and make his own choice, i.e., let him be.

The belief behind such a claim is Maslow's 'humanistic' understanding of human nature. He writes,

We have, each of us, an essential inner nature ... This inner nature, as much as we know of it so far, seems not to be intrinsically evil, but rather either neutral or positively "good." What we call evil appears most often to be a secondary reaction to frustration of this intrinsic nature. Since this inner nature is good rather than bad, it is best to bring it out and to encourage it rather than to suppress it. If it is permitted to guide our life, we grow healthy, fruitful, and happy.

Tillich is persistently critical of such a humanistic view of autonomy. Although autonomy as the principle of dynamics and creativity is a vital component of human culture, the 'secularized autonomy' which implies the

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'humanistic ideal of personality' should be criticized and rejected.\textsuperscript{252} For 'the secularized autonomy of modern culture' is 'the attempt to create the forms of personal and social life without any reference to something ultimate and unconditional, following only the demands of theoretical and practical rationality.'\textsuperscript{253} The 'ambiguity of self-determination' can be seen in the problem of education. In contrast to Maslow's optimistic view of 'humanistic education' which heavily depends on an individual's 'psychological autonomy',\textsuperscript{254} Tillich asks,

"Educating" means leading out from something ... But neither these words nor present educational practice answer the question: \textit{Leading into what}? Unqualified humanism would reply: Into the actualization of all human potentialities. However, since the infinite distance between the individual and the species makes this impossible, the answer, in the humanistic view, would have to be: the actualization of those human potentialities which are possible in terms of the historical destiny of this particular individual. This qualification, however, is fatal for the humanist ideal in so far as it claims to give the final answer to the educational and general cultural question. Because of human finitude, no one can fulfill the humanist ideal, since decisive human potentialities will always remain unrealized.\textsuperscript{255}

In short, "self-determination" points to the ambiguity of identity and non-identity. The determining subject can determine only in the power of what it essentially is. But under the conditions of existential estrangement, it is separated from what it essentially is. Therefore, self-determination into fulfilled humanity is impossible.\textsuperscript{256}


\textsuperscript{253} Tillich, 'Religion and Secular Culture' in PE, pp. 62, 63.


\textsuperscript{255} ST-3: 85-86; p. 249. Italics mine.

3. Theonomous culture and the kairos of religious socialism.

We have examined the two types of ideal society suggested by Marx and Maslow through Tillich's understanding of self-creativity and its ambiguities under the conditions of existential estrangement. To sum up, the defect of Marx's 'prophetic' vision is particularly concerned with his Anthropology. Marx, due to his over-emphasis on the material principle of history, furnishes a 'one-sided' understanding of human nature. And accordingly, his vision turns out to be a utopia and has even degenerated into totalitarian régimes. At this point Maslow's Eupsychia has provided a complement to Marx's weakness. But his autonomous humanism of the individual overlooks the essential role of the socio-economic structure of human consciousness. Also his optimistic belief in man's innate ability of self-determination makes him unable to distinguish man's 'essential goodness' and 'existential estrangement.' As a result of this humanistic optimism

perverted character of the human situation and tries to achieve essential humanity on the basis of human self-determination. Over against [this,] Protestantism must insist upon the unveiled and realistic recognition of the perennial situation of man.'

It is interesting to notice that G. A. Cohen, one of the most powerful contemporary defenders of historical materialism in the West (see his Karl Marx's Theory of History: A defence [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978]), in his recent article 'Reconsidering Historical Materialism' criticizes that Marx's philosophical anthropology is 'false, because it is one-sided [viz., 'too materialistic'],' and thus it leads to an underestimation of 'the importance of phenomena, such as religion and nationalism, that satisfy the human need for self definition' in Marx's vision of the future Communist society. (G. A. Cohen, 'Reconsidering Historical Materialism' in Marxism, ed. J. R. Pennock & J. W. Chapman [New York: New York University Press, 1983], pp. 227-47.)

Cf. P. Tillich, 'The Theological Significance of Existentialism and Psychoanalysis' in TC, pp. 118-19. Springborg, Human Needs and Critique of Civilisation, pp. 189, 190 also criticizes that 'Maslow's work, far from succeeding in fusing facts and values, as he claims, has produced confusion in this area ... if in fact human needs are instinctoid, they cannot be said to be either good or bad as such ... [The problem of considering the] higher needs [viz., affection, belongingness, self-esteem, self-actualization] as "instinctoid", rules out the distinctions between innate and learned behaviour, voluntary and involuntary behaviour that allow us to differentiate characteristically human behaviour as goal-oriented.' Also, R. Fitzgerald, 'Abraham Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs -- An Exposition and Evaluation' in Human Needs and Politics, ed. R. Fitzgerald (Rushcutters Bay: Pergamon Press, 1977), pp. 36-51.
of human nature, Maslow's ideal of a future synergic society also tends to be utopian. For he overlooks 'the perennial situation of man' under existential estrangement, and that it is impossible to achieve an 'ideal of the all-round personality in which every human potentiality is actualized.'

Thus from our preceding comparative study between Marx and Maslow, we arrived at two points which are particularly relevant to the realization of authentic humanity on the communal level. On the one hand, Marx's 'organic-holistic model' which sees individuals as parts of society and Maslow's 'atomistic-individualistic model' which sees society as a collection of individuals can constructively complement each other. Yet on the other hand, both visions have suffered from an inadequate account of the doctrine of man. Due to their inadequate account of life's inevitable ambiguities under the conditions of existence, their visions became mere utopias. In Tillich's ontological interpretation, this is

the infinite gap [in the functions of the self-creation of life] between subject and object under the conditions of existential estrangement ... the gap lies between the existing human subject and the object for which he strives -- a state of essential humanity -- and the gap between the existing social order and the object toward which it strives -- a state of universal justice. This practical gap between subject and object has the same consequences as the theoretical gap; the subject-object scheme is not only the epistemological but also the ethical problem.

We shall proceed to discuss the two points in further details.

While criticising that 'the doctrine of man is the most neglected part of Marxist and communist theory,' Tillich also persistently defends

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260 See Boonin, 'Man and Society: Three Models' in Voluntary Associations, pp. 70-76.

261 ST-3: 67-68; see also pp. 72-84.

262 Tillich, 'Church and Communism,' RelLife 6: 353. See supra, pp. 214-16.
Marx's insight of emphasizing the material (economic) basis of human consciousness. In contrast to the idealist view, Tillich writes, 'human nature' is 'a historical reality that is indissolubly bound to a given social and economic context.' But this 'materialism' should not be understood metaphysically or ethically; rather, it is a 'polemical concept' (Kampfbegriff) and an approach, viz., 'a method for unmasking hidden levels of reality' in human existence. Here Tillich is clearly trying to hold a unity between being and consciousness, a dialectic between individuals and society. Human being differs from nature because he is at the same time 'dependent' on and 'independent' of his environment. Thus political thinking must proceed 'from human nature as a whole. It is rooted simultaneously in being and in consciousness, more precisely in the indissoluble unity of the two.' From such a perspective, the insights of Marx and Maslow can contribute each other. While acknowledging the economic process as the fundamental factor in historical development, psychologically healthy personality of an individual is the basic criterion

263 SD, p. 114.
264 Ibid., pp. 114-16; OB, pp. 87-89.
265 SD, pp. 2-3. Italics mine. Also id., 'Religiöser Sozialismus II' in GW 2: 164-66.
266 Cf. SD, pp. 132-37, where Tillich writes, 'Socialism must understand the human person in terms of his or her spiritual and vital center ... This insight into the inadequacies of the old socialist concept of human nature has led today in many places to an alliance of Marxism and psychoanalysis. The attempt is being made to overcome the mistakes of the older interpretation of human nature by a profounder and more complex psychology. These effects are important and welcome.' This comment certainly is referring to the Frankfurt School's attempt to introduce psychoanalysis into its neo-Marxist Critical Theory by T. W. Adorno, M. Horkheimer, H. Marcuse, and most prominently, E. Fromm. For a survey, see M. Jay, The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1973), pp. 86-112.
267 See ibid., pp. 113-18.
for the realization of an unalienated society.\textsuperscript{268} At least such a view is the first step towards a more 'realistic' construction of the ideal society.\textsuperscript{269}

But Tillich's critical analysis does not stop at this point. For the Anthropology of both Marx and Maslow is still engaged in a humanistic ideal which is 'the attempt of man to depend upon himself, to seek the fulfilment of meaning in his own being.'\textsuperscript{270} In so doing, they exclude the transcendent import and substitute it with self-sufficiency.\textsuperscript{271} They overlook the ambiguity of life under the conditions of existence and that it is impossible to fulfil history within history.\textsuperscript{272} At this point Tillich brings in his ideas of 'theonomous culture' and the 'kairos' of 'Religious Socialism'. The Kingdom of God as the fulfilment of history is both immanent and transcendent.\textsuperscript{273} That is to say, the Christian ideal of the

\textsuperscript{268} Maslow, 'Notes on Eupsychian Economic and Management' in Eupsychian Management, pp. 17, 19, 21, 25, 28, 32, has worked out some of the concrete criteria which are clearly dependent upon every individual's 'healthy personality'. For example, '1. Assume everyone is to be trusted ... 6. Eupsychian economics must assume good will among all the members of the organization rather than rivalry or jealousy ... 7. Assume that the individuals involved are healthy enough ... 17. That everyone prefers or perhaps even needs to love his boss (rather than to hate him), and that everyone prefers to respect his boss (rather than to disrespect him) ... 23. Assume the preference for working rather than being idle ... 31. Assume that everyone but especially the more developed persons prefer responsibility to dependency and passivity most of the time.'

\textsuperscript{269} A full elaboration of Tillich's own 'socialist principles' presented in SD, pp. 130-60 is beyond the scope of our study. But it is interesting to discover that similar ideas have been worked out in more concrete programmes by scholars in different fields of study. For example, the so-called 'third model' of the relationship between man and society, viz., the 'persons-in-relation theory' of voluntary associations, by Boonin, 'Man and Society: Three Models' in Voluntary Associations, pp. 76-83. Also, the principles of 'communitarian Socialism' suggested by E. Fromm in his The Sane Society, pp. 283-338.

\textsuperscript{270} P. Tillich, 'Klassenkampf und religiöser Sozialismus' in GW 2: 179, 'Humanismus ist der Versuch des Menschen, sich auf sich selb zu stellen, in seinem eigenen Sein die Erfüllung seines Sinnes zu finden.'

\textsuperscript{271} See ibid., p. 181.

\textsuperscript{272} See Tillich, 'Marxism and Christian Socialism' in PE, p. 281.

\textsuperscript{273} ST-3: 359-61.
'new eon' can fully affirm the 'inner-historical' and 'immanent' elements of historical development, yet 'God's Kingdom cannot be produced by the inner-historical development alone.' The ultimate fulfilment of history -- 'a new heaven and a new earth' -- becomes possible only 'through divine interference and a new creation.' Thus in answer to the Eupsychia, the inadequacy of humanistic autonomy can find itself fulfilment in theonomy. Here 'the idea of humanism is transcended without being denied.'

The dynamics of 'B-love' presupposed in the synergic society finds its fulfilment in the 'agape quality of love' as 'the state of being taken by the Spiritual Presence into the transcendent unity of unambiguous life.' This 'agape' is the 'unambiguous love and therefore impossible for the human spirit by itself.' Agape has the power to overcome existential separation because 'it has the basic structure of the New Being.' In short, 'agape as Spiritual power' is 'prior to any personal or social actualization,' it is 'a creation of the Spiritual Presence which conquers the ambiguities of all other kinds of love.' In answer to Marx's

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274 Ibid., p. 360. Italics mine.
275 Ibid.
276 Ibid., p. 249.
277 Ibid., p. 250. See also Tillich, 'Kairos' in PE, pp. 51-53; WR, pp. 20-22; id., 'Theonomie' in RGG 5: 1128-29.
278 That is, 'Being-love' which is the 'love for the Being of another person, unneeding love, unselfish love.' 'B-love' is contrasting with 'D-love,' viz., 'deficiency-love, love need, selfish love.' See Maslow, 'Deficiency Motivation and Growth Motivation' in Psychology of Being, pp. 41-43.
paradox of 'creating the condition for transcendence by rejecting trans­
dence,' \textsuperscript{280} Tillich proposes the \textit{kairos} of 'Religious Socialism'. Religious
Socialism 'is not bound to any sociological form,' rather, it is the
'religious principle' which realizes the socialist ideal. \textsuperscript{281} 'Religious
Socialism is the attempt to bring into awareness the element of faith at
work in socialism, to reveal socialism's inner conflict, and to lead it to
a solution that has symbolic power.' \textsuperscript{282} For

in the light of the brokenness of man's being, religious socialism
rejects every utopian ethics. That man is good and that only social
circumstances make him bad is as a generalization as false as it may
be relatively true for a concrete situation, for example, the
capitalist situation. The threat to man's being does not disappear
even in the most perfect institution. \textsuperscript{283}

Thus the quest for the realization of socialism points to the ultimate and
religious dimension in human life which breaks through the ambiguities of
existential estrangement. 'Therefore, for religious socialism the turning-
point of history is not the rise of the proletariat but the appearance of a
new meaning and power of life in the divine self-manifestation.' \textsuperscript{284} Thus
'theonomy is the goal of religious socialism.' \textsuperscript{285} The ultimate fulfilment

\textsuperscript{280} See Wee, 'Space and Time: The Relationship between Ontology and
Eschatology in the Philosophical Theology of Paul Tillich,' pp. 158-63.
\textsuperscript{281} Tillich, 'Religious Socialism' in PolExp, p. 56. Also id., 'Basic
Principles of Religious Socialism' in \textit{ibid.}, pp. 87-88.
\textsuperscript{282} SD, p. 71.
\textsuperscript{283} Tillich, 'Religious Socialism' in PolExp, p. 52.
\textsuperscript{284} Tillich, 'Marxism and Christian Socialism' in PE, p. 282. Italics
mine.
\textsuperscript{285} Tillich, 'Basic Principles of Religious Socialism' in PolExp, p. 66. Also
HCT, p. 534.
of the socialist ideal is the *kairos* when the impact of the Spiritual Presence breaks through our human conditional existence as the sacred import, and creates a transcendent unity which overcomes 'the split between the subject and object in a person-to-person encounter.' Thus Religious Socialism aims not to substitute but to *fulfil* Socialism. Tillich perceived such a vision as early as 1920. In his *Christentum und Sozialismus II*, he wrote,

Christianity and socialism must continue to develop and become one in a new world and social order whose foundation is an economic order which is structured by justice, whose ethos is an affirmation of every person because he is a person, and whose religious import is an experience of the divine in all humanity, of the eternal in all temporal nature.

In this section, we have examined the two ideal societies suggested by Marx and Maslow as the realization of authentic humanity on the communal level. By employing Tillich's understanding of man as a unity
of being and consciousness, we first showed that the two views should contribute to each other and form a more comprehensive picture of an ideal society. Then by criticizing their humanistic optimism on human nature with Tillich's analysis of life's ambiguities (especially the subject-object split) under existential estrangement, we argued that the Spiritual Presence which creates the theonomous culture provides the ultimate criteria for the possible realization of an ideal society. In such a way, we have demonstrated Tillich's conviction that 'the substance of culture is religion and the form of religion is culture.'

To Acquire Authentic Humanity through Self-transcendence

A critic once remarked that 'life as self-transcendence' is 'the central concept of Paul Tillich's philosophical theology.' For according to Tillich, life maintains itself against the threat of non-being by 'creating itself beyond its own present limits.' And 'this dynamic quality of life which drives it beyond itself is identified by Tillich as "self-transcendence".' From such a perspective, self-integration and self-creativity can also be regarded as forms of self-transcendence. For 'self-integration, going from identity through alteration back to identity, is a kind of intrinsic self-transcendence within a central being, and in every process of growth a later stage transcends a former one in the horizontal direction.' If this is the case, we have been, in fact, investigating Tillich's concept of self-transcendence from a wider context in our preceding discussions. But both the movement of participation which goes beyond an individual and the dynamics of growth which break through the form still

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289 P. Tillich, 'Church and Culture' in IH, p. 235.
291 Ibid., p. 37.
remain 'within the limits of finite life.' Therefore 'it seems appropriate to reserve the term "self-transcendence" for that function of life in which ... life drives beyond itself as finite life.' And the principle of 'sublimation', viz., 'going beyond limits,' is the basic characteristic of self-transcendence in its narrower sense.293

1. Self-transcendence and the fulfilment of life.

If self-transcendence means the movement of sublimation and going beyond one's finitude, this function of life is clearly essential to the realization of authentic humanity. Viktor E. Frankl, from a psychological perspective, claims that 'self-transcendence is the essence of existence.'294 For 'it is a constitutive characteristic of being human that it always points, and is directed, to something other than itself. It is, therefore, a severe and grave misinterpretation of man to deal with him as if he were a closed system.' Man's will to meaning points to 'the realm of the trans-subjective' and to 'otherness'.295 Man's search for transcendence has also been confirmed by Peter L. Berger from a socio-anthropological perspective. In his A Rumor of Angels: Modern Society and the Rediscovery of the Supernatural, Berger attempts to demonstrate what he calls 'signals of transcendence within the empirically given human situation.'296 He discovers at least five aspects in our everyday life which appear 'to point beyond' the domain of our 'natural' reality. They are the 'propensity for order', 'joy' and 'liberation' through the act of playing,

293 Ibid. Italics mine.
294 V. Frankl, 'Self-Transcendence as a Human Phenomenon' in Readings in Humanistic Psychology, p. 122.
'hope' as man's orientation towards the future, the 'intrinsic intention' of 'damnation' (not only condemnation) towards those inhuman evils, and the ability of 'humor' to 'bracket' the tragedy of the human condition.\(^{297}\)

These aspects of life all point beyond man's finite reality and rest upon a realm of trans-subjective reality. Thus from psychological and socio-anthropological points of view, the search for self-transcendence is deeply rooted in our human nature and there can be no ultimate human fulfilment without a sense of self-transcendence.\(^{298}\)

However, man's search for self-transcendence is certainly expressed more explicitly in the realm of religion. From his survey of five representative theories of man's transcendent experience by Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, R. C. Zaehner, Ninian Smart, W. T. Stace and Rudolf Otto, Philip C. Almond remarks that

> Experience of the transcendent is common to all religious traditions. It is from such experience that all the more general manifestations of man's religious behaviour are primarily derived ... There is therefore a universality about religious experience which transcends its various expressions -- doctrinal, ritual, ethical, and so on.\(^{299}\)

Thus Tillich claims that 'religion' can be 'defined as self-transcendence of life under the dimension of spirit.'\(^{300}\) But the word 'religion' here

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\(^{297}\) Ibid., pp. 66-90. For a more strictly Anthropological approach, H. Smith, 'The Reach and the Grasp: Transcendence Today' in Transcendence, ed. H. W. Richardson & D. R. Cutler (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), p. 9 summarizes B. Malinowski's findings, that 'Anthropologists generally agree that in situations of life crisis and emotional stress primitive man experienced rescue through myths that showed him a way of escape where empirically none had existed. The need for such transempirical ways has not disappeared.'

\(^{298}\) Smith, 'The Reach and the Grasp' in Transcendence, p. 3 has given a delineation of how a sense of transcendence counters human predicaments which is so unique that it cannot be replaced by other means.


\(^{300}\) ST-3: 96.
refers to the 'broader sense' which 'is defined as a state of "being grasped by an ultimate concern".' In such a case, self-transcendence is not restricted to the traditional concept (viz., the 'narrower sense') of religion but can be extended to all realms of cultural life. Since we have discussed this broader sense of self-transcendence as ultimate concern in Chapter Three, we shall confine our study in this section to the problem of self-transcendence in the 'narrower sense' of religion, viz., 'the concept of religion which supposes an organized group with its clergy, scriptures, and dogma, by which a set of symbols for the ultimate concern is accepted and cultivated in life and thought.'

Considering the pursuit of self-transcendence in world religions, the very first question is: Does every experience of 'something' beyond finitude necessarily lead to an achievement of self-transcendence? For Tillich, the answer is No. First, 'the definition of religion as self-transcendence of life in the dimension of the spirit has the decisive implication that religion must first of all be considered as a quality of the two other functions of the spirit [viz., morality and culture] and not as an independent function.' Any pursuit of self-transcendence which isolates itself from moral and cultural concerns can only end in 'profound ambiguities.' For 'life cannot genuinely transcend itself in one of its own functions.' Second, the divine transcendence in a person's

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301 UC, pp. 4-7. Also ST-3: 157; MSA, pp. 130-32.
303 See supra, ch. 3, pp. 130-34, 144-52.
304 UC, p. 4.
305 ST-3: 96. Italics mine.
306 Ibid.
religious experience may become the 'enemy' instead of a fulfilment of his self-transcendence.\textsuperscript{307} Tillich is certainly aware of such a danger when he speaks of the 'God above God' as the resolution of the dilemma between theism and Man's self-affirmation.\textsuperscript{308} The key problem, according to Tillich, is that if our understanding of divine transcendence 'is bound to the subject-object structure of reality,' this 'otherness' becomes 'an object for us as subjects' and 'at the same time we are objects for him as a subject.' In such a case, 'God appears as the invincible tyrant, the being in contrast with whom all other things are without freedom and subjectivity.'\textsuperscript{309} Thus the only way out is to go beyond the subject-object scheme and conceive the 'God above God' as the Unconditional who is both radically transcendent and radically immanent.\textsuperscript{310}

If the breakthrough of the subject-object structure of reality is the key to self-transcendence, it is appropriate for us to consider some of the contributions from Eastern religions at this point. For 'Eastern philosophy, especially Buddhism, has been concerned with this problem for two and a half millennia, indeed, since its origin.'\textsuperscript{311} And among the living religions in the East, Zen Buddhism should be regarded as the most radical attempt to overcome the subject-object scheme in order to achieve a genuine self-transcendence. As Bernard Phillips rightly remarks,

Zen is three things. First, externally and objectively considered, it is a particular sect of Buddhism ... Second, from a deeper point of view, it is the heart and essence of Buddhism, having no doctrine or scriptures of its own but pointing to the ultimate source of all Buddhist teaching, namely, the enlightenment experience of the

\textsuperscript{307} A good discussion has been given by Macquarrie, \textit{In Search of Humanity}, pp. 34-37.

\textsuperscript{308} CTB, pp. 176-83.

\textsuperscript{309} Ibid., pp. 178-79.

\textsuperscript{310} See supra, ch. 3, pp. 116-30.

Buddha ... Third, and still more profoundly considered, Zen transcends the particularities of Buddhism as such and is not one religion so much as it is religion itself in its most universal intention. In other words, it is the life of truth, of authentic being, wherein the self has overcome its alienation from itself and from all other things.\(^{312}\)

To justify such a claim, we have to examine more closely the idea of self-transcendence in Zen Buddhism.

2. Self-transcendence as 'satori' (enlightenment) in Zen Buddhism.

One of the central practices in Eastern religions to attain self-transcendence is meditation (\textit{\textit{dhyāna}}), a kind of quiet sitting which aims to develop a person's 'power of concentration, achieve unification and tranquillity of mind, and eventually, if his aspiration was pure and strong enough, come to Self-realization.'\(^{313}\) The key idea of such a practice is \textit{concentration}. Through a deep stage of concentration, the mind is unified and transcends the subject-object structure of the intellect and thus self-transcendence is realized. However, we can still distinguish two kinds of


approach to concentration in the process of meditation. In the first approach, by concentrating one's mind on 'an image or a sacred word that is visualized or a concept that is thought about or reflected on, or both,' usually with the help of a correct physical posture and the control of breathing, a person may evoke in himself a sense of tranquillity and release. But there is another kind of quiet sitting, which is particularly called *zazen* by the Zen Buddhists. The uniqueness of *zazen* is 'that the mind is freed from bondage to all thought-forms, visions, objects, and imaginings, however sacred or elevating, and brought to a state of absolute emptiness, from which alone it may one day perceive its own true nature, or the nature of universe.' Such a stage of concentration without concentrating one's mind on particular objects is, of course, more transcendent than the former one because it achieves a genuine dissolution of the split between subjectivity and objectivity. In his *Zen Geschichte und Gestalt* (1959), Heinrich Dumoulin reported a Zen monk's self-description of his experience of 'enlightenment' (*satori*) in *zazen*:

*Enlightenment is an overwhelming inner realization which comes suddenly. Man feels himself at once free and strong, exalted and great, in the universe. The breath of the universe vibrates through him. No longer is he merely a small, selfish ego, but rather he is open and transparent, united to all, in unity. Enlightenment is achieved in *zazen*, but it remains effective in all situations of life. Thus everything in life is meaningful, worthy of thanks, and good -- even suffering, sickness and death.*

Yet there is an even more radical way of attaining self-transcendence suggested especially by the *Rinzai* sect of Zen Buddhism.

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315 Ibid., p. 13.  
317 Although Zen Buddhism as a School of Buddhism traces its origin mythologically back to Gautama (466-386 B.C.), the real founder of the School was Hui-neng (638-713) in China. Five sects were established after Hui-neng and brought to Japan during the twelfth and the thirteenth centuries. In the present day, two of the sects, viz., the *Sōtō* sect and *Rinzai* sect, are still active in Japan. In China, however, all five sects
If transcendence means a complete liberation from subjectivity and objectivity, the Rinzai Zen argues that even by \textit{zazen} to attain the stage of 'without-thinking' is still inadequate with regard to the quest for transcendence. For if the attainment of self-transcendence is limited to the way of \textit{zazen}, there is still a cleavage between one's ordinary life and life in \textit{zazen}. Such a withdrawal and separation from everyday life cannot be regarded as the supreme stage of self-transcendence. A supreme stage of self-transcendence must be realized in an \textit{ordinary} life, yet at the same time can maintain a state of mind which overcomes the dichotomy between subjectivity and objectivity. As Shin'ichi Hisamatsu once tried to explain it to Tillich,

one should be able to find calm in the midst of busyness and not in escaping from it; that is, one's calm self should be able to work most actively in the busyness ... From the point of view of Zen, it would be to become awakened to your Calm Self in the midst of that activity ... After awakening to the Calm Self, even in a busy life ... the Self that transcends calmness and busyness is at work.\textsuperscript{318}

Hui-neng, the founder of Zen Buddhism, has given a more rigorous description in \textit{The Platform Scripture} (\textit{Liu-tsu t'\an-ching}):

Good and learned friends, in this method of mine, from the very beginning ... absence-of-thought [\textit{wu-nien}] has been instituted as the main doctrine, absence-of-character [\textit{wu-hsiang}] as the substance,

have lost their original identity and disappeared around the twelfth century. For historical accounts, see D. T. Suzuki, \textit{Zen and Japanese Buddhism} (Tokyo: Japan Travel Bureau, 1958); also H. Dumoulin, \textit{The Development of Chinese Zen after the Sixth Patriarch} in the Light of Mumonkan, trans. R. F. Sasaki (New York: The First Zen Institute of America, 1953). However, as many contemporary Zen scholars argue, the ideals of enlightenment in S\textit{\=o}t\text{\-}o Zen and Rinzai Zen are not incompatible, although they have different emphases on the ways to realize it. Whereas the S\textit{\=o}t\text{\-}o Zen emphasizes \textit{zazen}, the Rinzai Zen seeks the way in \textit{ko\-an}. Cf. T. P. Kasulis, \textit{Zen Action/Zen Person} (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1981), pp. 122-24; also Kapleau, \textit{Three Pillars of Zen}.

\textsuperscript{318} 'Dialogues, East and West: Conversation between Dr. Paul Tillich and Dr. Hisamatsu Shin'ichi' (part one) recorded by R. F. DeMartino, \textit{EB 4} (n.2 1971): 91-93. S. Hisamatsu was a Visiting Professor at the Harvard University Divinity School in the autumn of 1957. The conversation was held in Tillich's Cambridge apartment on 11 November 1957.
and non-attachment [wu-chu] as the foundation. What is meant by absence-of-character? Absence-of-character means to be free from characters while in the midst of them. Absence-of-thought means not to be carried away by thought in the process of thought. Non-attachment is man's original nature. Thought after thought goes on without remaining. Past, present, and future thought continue without termination ... [Yet] at no time should a single instant of thought be attached to any dharma [existence]. If one single instant of thought is attached to anything, then every thought will be attached. This is bondage. But if in regard to dharmas no thought is attached to anything, that is freedom. This is the meaning of having non-attachment as the foundation.

Thus a person who attains the supreme stage of 'no-mindedness' should live out an ordinary life yet looks at life and the world from a completely new viewpoint and a non-attached mind. Self-transcendence is thus realized in daily activities with a continual alertness in the overcoming of subjectivity and objectivity, universality and particularity.


320 The realization of self-transcendence as a state of non-attachment in an ordinary life is the essential feature (in fact, the most radical feature) which distinguishes Zen from other Schools (both Hinayana and Mahayana) of Buddhism. Thousands of cases (koan) are recorded in the main writings of Zen Buddhism (e.g. The Gateless Gate [Mumenkon] and Amalgamation of the Sources of the Five Lamps [Wu-têng Hui-yüan]) in order to demonstrate the mode of transcendence (viz., non-attachment) in a Zen monk's everyday activities. We shall choose just two incidents to illustrate such a paradoxical emphasis. The first one is from a Chinese monk P'ang Yün (?-811):

One day Master Shih-t'ou asked him [P'ang Yün], "What have you been doing with your days since you came here to see me?" P'ang Yün answered, "If you ask me my daily activity, there is nothing that I can speak of."

He presented him with a gatha [chant] which read:

Daily activity is nothing other than harmony within.
When each thing I do is without taking or rejecting,
There is no contradiction anywhere.
For whom is the majesty of red and purple robes?
The summit of the inner being has never been defiled by the dust of the world.

Supernatural power and wonderful functioning are found
In the carrying of water and the chopping of wood.'


The second koan is from the Japanese sources (late thirteenth century), recorded by Kasulis, Zen Action/Zen Person, p. 46: 'Coming to a ford in a
attain such a stage of continual alertness of non-attachment in a secular context, a period of 
\textit{sazen} or some theoretical instructions from the Master is inadequate. The Zen Master has to test his pupil \textit{unexpectedly} (in an unexpected moment and in an unexpected way) in order to awaken his awareness of self-transcendence. This kind of instruction is called \textit{koan}. It may be carried out by a strange question, a shouting, a particular act, or even a striking.\textsuperscript{321} Since the aim of \textit{koan} is to attain enlightenment (satori), the method itself also must not be stabilized, otherwise another form of objectification will emerge again.\textsuperscript{322} In such a way, this mind-

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\begin{verbatim}
river, two Zen monks met a beautiful maiden who asked assistance in getting across because of the depth and strength of the current. The first monk hesitated, starting to make apologies -- the rules of the religious order forbade physical contact with women. The second monk, on the other hand, without a moment's hesitation picked her up and carried her across. With a parting gesture of thanks, the young woman continued on her way, the two monks going off in the other direction. After some time, the first monk said to the second, "You shouldn't have picked her up like that -- the rules forbid it." The second monk replied in surprise, "You must be very tired indeed! As soon as we had crossed the river I put her down. But you! You have been carrying her all this time!"

\textsuperscript{321} A comprehensive discussion with concrete examples has been given by D. T. Suzuki, 'The Koan Exercise' in Essays in Zen Buddhism (second series) (London: Rider & Co., 1950), pp. 15-209.

\textsuperscript{322} The Zen classic Mumonkan recorded a case which demonstrates a radical attempt to non-objectify the method of \textit{koan}:

'Whatever he was asked (concerning Zen) Gutei [a Zen Master] simply stuck up one finger. At one time he had an acolyte, whom a visitor asked, "What is the essential point of your master's teaching?" The boy just stuck up one finger [as his master did] ... One day Gutei having hid a knife in his sleeve said to the boy, "I hear that you understand what Buddhism really is: is that so?" The boy replied, "It is so." Gutei said, "What is the Buddha?" The boy stuck up his finger. Gutei cut it off with the knife. As the boy ran howling out, Gutei called to him. He turned his head round, and Gutei said, "What is the Buddha?" The boy [habitually] lifting his hand (to stick out his finger) saw no finger there and became suddenly enlightened.' (R. H. Blyth, Zen and Zen Classics, vol. 4: Mumonkan [Tokyo: The Hokuseido Press, 1966], pp. 57-58)

The meaning of this \textit{koan} is: Any method which awakens satori (e.g. to stick up one finger) is only a 'pointer' and must maintain its transitory character. Once the method is stabilized or imitated, it is only a lifeless action. Gutei awakened many with his one finger, yet he awakened the boy with the losing of his finger. Zenkei Shibayama comments that 'while Gutei's finger was Zen itself, the universe itself [because it shows the disciples how to go beyond the dualistic limitations and grasp the Oneness behind the particularities], the attendant's finger was just an imitation without the fact of his own experience. It was a fake with no life, and
\end{verbatim}
awakening koan is always illogical in order to lead the pupil beyond intellectual understanding, and unconventional in order to break through one's habitual world-view.\textsuperscript{323} 'When this climax is reached,' Daisetz T. Suzuki writes, 'the koan unexpectedly opens up an hitherto unknown region of mind. Intellectually, this is the transcending of the limits of logical dualism, but at the same time it is a regeneration, the awakening of an inner sense which enables one to look into the actual working of things.'\textsuperscript{324} Now if the experience of satori cannot be transmitted through objective instructions, yet at the same time the experience cannot be a pure subjectivity (otherwise it will be completely incommunicable even by a koan), there should be a universal-subjective reality lying behind the communicability of the koan between the Zen Master and his pupil. For Zen Buddhism, this trans-subjective reality is the Buddha-nature (busshō). Buddha-nature is the reality lying beyond particularities yet at the same time immanent in all living beings. Dōgen Zenji (1200-1253) expressed it in a radical way: 'All is sentient being, all beings are (all being is) the Buddha nature; Tathāgata [the Perfect One] is permanent, non-being, being, and change.'\textsuperscript{325} Therefore, Buddha-nature is not only a potentiality in man's nature, but should be cut off. The Zen of One Finger is in the finger and yet transcends the finger. If one fails to grasp correctly the Truth of One Finger here, he is altogether out of Zen.' (S. Zenkei, Zen Comments on the Mumonkan, trans. K. Sumiko [New York: Harper & Row, 1974], pp. 46-47)

\textsuperscript{323} See Chang, Original Teachings of Ch' an Buddhism, pp. 129-47. For a good discussion, see also H. Rosemont, Jr., 'The Meaning is the Use: koan and mondo as Linguistic Tools of the Zen Masters,' PEW 20 (1970): 109-119.


\textsuperscript{325} 'Issai wa shujō nari; shitsuwa wa busshō nari; Nyorai wa jōtenishite mu nari, u nari, henyaku nari.' E.T. according to M. Abe, 'Dōgen on Buddha Nature,' EB 4 (n.1 1971): 30-31.
'all beings are Buddha nature.' It is non-substantial, radically universal and radically immanent in all beings. The Buddha-nature is always present in all beings, yet due to our subject-object splitting and attached mind we are unaware of and blind to such a reality. Thus the aim of koan is to break through our 'blindness' and awaken our mind to perceive this universal-subjective reality. Thus Dōgen writes,

To learn the Buddhist Way is to learn about oneself. To learn about oneself is to forget oneself. To forget oneself is to perceive oneself as all things. To realize this is to cast off the body and mind of self and others. When you have reached this stage you will be detached even from enlightenment but will practice it continually without thinking about it.

Therefore we can see that the ideal of self-transcendence has been pushed by the Zen Buddhists to the ultimate limit. Satori is to live out a life of non-attachment in everyday secular contexts. This is the way to realize authentic humanity because non-attachment authenticates the presence of Buddha-nature, the universal-subject reality which transcends yet at the same time is present in all beings.

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326 Pace Y. Yokoi, Zen Master Dōgen (New York: Weatherhill, 1976), p. 201, 'Buddha nature = the potential to realize enlightenment innate in all things.' Dōgen's view can be regarded as radical even within the Buddhist tradition. For the traditional Buddhist formulation about Buddha-nature reads, 'All sentient beings without exception have the Buddha nature: Tathāgata is permanent with no change at all.' Dōgen's replacement of the word 'have' by the word 'are' intends to push the universality of Buddha-nature to the ultimate limit. For a discussion, see Abe, 'Dōgen on Buddha Nature,' EB 4: 30-31. Also H. Dumoulin, Zen Enlightenment: Origins and Meaning, trans. J. C. Maraldo (New York: Weatherhill, 1979), pp. 104-119.

327 Abe, 'Dōgen on Buddha Nature,' EB 4: 37-64.


329 Dōgen, 'Genjokoan -- The actualization of enlightenment' in Shōbōgenzō 1: 1.


In our last section we have seen how Zen Buddhism attempts to push the ideal of self-transcendence to its ultimate limit. Tillich was certainly fascinated by this Eastern mode of thinking during his lecture trip to Japan. He wrote after he came back, 'I have felt an immense enrichment of substance ever since my trip ... I was grasped by them [viz., the "strange forms of religious life"] and drawn into their spiritual atmosphere.' 331

Although the encounter with Zen Buddhism exerted such an impact on his theological construction, Tillich never considered himself as 'being "converted" to Zen or any other form of Buddhism.' 332 Tillich's basic criticism is: 'We can agree with them in many respects in the vertical dimension, very little in the horizontal.' 333 For Tillich, this 'horizontal' dimension especially refers to the moral and socio-historical aspects of life, viz., 'love' and 'the Kingdom of God'.

Concluding from his experience of encountering Zen Buddhism, Tillich remarked that 'it was reference to agape that the differences between East and West became most evident to me.' 334 'Certainly there is a strong emphasis on compassion in Buddhism,' but agape as 'the principle of participation' is lacking. 335 Agape 'accepts the unacceptable and tries to transform it.' Compassion in Buddhism means a person's identification with another who suffers. 'He neither accepts the other in terms of "in spite of," nor does he try to transform him, but he suffers his suffering through

331 Tillich, 'On the Boundary Line,' CCen 77: 1435.
332 Ibid.
333 'Tillich Converses with Psychotherapists,' JRelH 11: 41. Italics mine.
335 Ibid. Italics mine.
identification.' What is lacking in Buddhism is 'the will to transform the other one, either directly, or indirectly by transforming the sociological and psychological structures by which he is conditioned.' Although there are 'great expressions of compassion in Buddhism,' it differs from agape because 'it lacks the double characteristic of agape -- the acceptance of the unacceptable, or the movement from the highest to the lowest, and, at the same time, the will to transform individual as well as social structures.' In the Buddhist's compassion, 'there is not an overagainstness' which belongs to agape in the Christian meaning of love. For love must include moral judgement. But for the Zen Buddhists, although self-transcendence as non-attachment does not mean a withdrawal from ordinary life, moral judgement which inevitably implies a subject-object scheme should not occupy a Zen monk's attention. Thus although 'compassion is not simply in contradiction to love,' 'it is not the full concept.'

Another 'horizontal' dimension in life which is lacking in Zen Buddhism is social and political concern. According to Tillich, the 'telos-formulas' of Christianity and Buddhism are different: 'in Christianity the telos of everyone and everything united in the Kingdom of God; in Buddhism the telos of everything and everyone fulfilled in the

336 CEWR, pp. 70-71. 337 Ibid., pp. 71-72. 338 'Tillich Converses with Psychotherapists,' JRelH 11: 45. Italics mine.
339 See LPJ, pp. 13-15, 82-86.
341 'Tillich Converses with Psychotherapists,' JRelH 11: 45.
Nirvana [liberated from existence]. Their different approaches to reality create 'the theoretical as well as practical contrast between the two religions':

The Kingdom of God is a social, political, and personalistic symbol ... In contrast to it Nirvana is an ontological symbol. Its material is taken from the experience of finitude, separation, blindness, suffering, and, in answer to all this, the image of the blessed oneness of everything, beyond finitude and error, in the ultimate Ground of Being.

The ontological principles that lie behind these conflicting symbols (viz., 'Kingdom of God' and 'Nirvana') are also different. Whereas Christianity is holding the 'principle of participation', Buddhism is governed by the 'principle of identity'. At this point, the problem of history and social transformation 'come into the foreground of the dialogue.' 'The Kingdom of God has a revolutionary character. Christianity, insofar as it works in line with this symbol, shows a revolutionary force directed towards a radical transformation of society.' But 'there is no analogy to this in Buddhism. No transformation of reality but salvation from reality is the basic attitude.' Under 'the principle of ultimate detachment,' 'no belief in the new in history, no impulse for transforming society, can be

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\textsuperscript{342} CEWR, p. 64. \hfill \textsuperscript{343} Ibid., pp. 64-65. \\
\textsuperscript{344} Ibid., p. 68; also id., 'On the Boundary Line,' CCen 77: 1436. This is also the main idea in Tillich's 'Informal Report on Lecture Trip to Japan -- Summer 1960' (Mimeographed by Harvard Divinity School, Cambridge, Mass.), as reported by Chuck, 'Zen Buddhism and Paul Tillich,' p. 213. For Zen Buddhism, the Buddha-nature is present in all beings and thus there is an identification between individual beings. But this principle of identity does not necessarily lead to a sense of a mutual participation in a personal community. We have seen a similar problem in Heidegger's idea of authentic existence (see supra, pp. 178-85). While emphasizing the ontology of 'Being-in-the-world', authentic existence as 'Being-towards-death' and 'the call of conscience' tend to individuate a person, rather than to lead him to more intimate communal participation. It is also interesting to notice that scholars from both the field of Heideggerian studies and Zen studies have discovered surprising similarities between Heidegger's description of 'releasement' and the Zen Buddhist 'satori'. See Zimmerman, Eclipse of Self, pp. 255-76; and Kasulis, Zen Action/Zen Person, pp. 48-51.
derived from the principle of Nirvana.\textsuperscript{345} Thus 'in its relation to history' Christianity includes more polar tensions than Buddhism, just because it has chosen the horizontal, historical line.\textsuperscript{346}

We have seen that 'in accordance with their essential nature [viz., the essential nature of morality, culture and religion],' self-transcendence must not be considered as an 'independent function' of life. 'Religion, or the self-transcendence of life under the dimension of spirit, is essentially related to morality and culture.'\textsuperscript{347} The 'vertical' dimension of life (viz., religion) and the 'horizontal' dimension of life (viz., morality and culture) must interpenetrate one another, for 'life cannot genuinely transcend itself in one of its own functions.'\textsuperscript{348} From such an understanding, Zen Buddhists' inadequate consideration of the 'horizontal' dimension of life constitutes its weakness. Although Zen Buddhism also emphasizes compassion and has its particular contribution to cultural forms (especially the art culture),\textsuperscript{349} it tends to separate self-transcendence from serious concerns for morality and socio-political transformation. According to Tillich, this separation of religion from morality and culture is due to life's ambiguity under existential estrangement.\textsuperscript{350} Only under the impact of the Spiritual Presence, can religion, morality and culture as the three functions of life be integrated and interpenetrate one another within the Spiritual Community.\textsuperscript{351} And the 'victory of Spirit over religion' in the Spiritual Community creates the transcendent unity of unambiguous life.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{345} CEWR, pp. 72-73. Italics mine. Cf. also R. H. Blyth, 'Zen and Society' in Zen and Zen Classics 5: 48-51.
\item \textsuperscript{346} Ibid., p. 74. Italics mine.
\item \textsuperscript{347} ST-3: 95, 96. See also supra, p. 233.
\item \textsuperscript{348} ST-3: 96, 139.
\item \textsuperscript{350} ST-3: 96, 100-101, 242.
\item \textsuperscript{351} Ibid., pp. 172-216.
\end{itemize}
and overcomes the existential ambiguity of separation. In this case, authentic humanity as self-integration, self-creativity and self-transcendence will finally be fulfilled.

III. THE SPIRITUAL PRESENCE AS THE ANSWER TO THE AMBIGUITIES OF LIFE

After our examination of Tillich's idea of the unambiguous life from an interdisciplinary perspective, we now have a clearer framework for examining his claim that the Spiritual Presence has offered the ultimate answer to the realization of authentic humanity. From our survey of the different ideas of authentic humanity developed by Heidegger, Humanistic Psychology, Marx, and Zen Buddhism, one has to acknowledge that Tillich has offered a profound and comprehensive interpretation of human authenticity in terms of self-integration, self-creativity and self-transcendence. Yet at the same time, Tillich also has offered a forceful critique of these non-Christian approaches to the realization of authentic humanity. Since life is inevitably ambiguous under the conditions of existential estrangement, an ultimate fulfilment of human selfhood by man himself is impossible. We have elucidated such an idea concretely through our investigation in the preceding section: In Heidegger's later works, we can see a growing emphasis on the idea of transcendence and ontological grounding regarding authentic existence. The achievement of a releasement cannot be attained merely by human self-will but through Ereignis. In the cases of Maslow and Marx, their humanistic optimism concerning man's potentialities turns their ideal societies into utopias. For both of them have neglected the 'eternal' element in life and have attempted 'to seek the fulfilment of meaning' in

352 Ibid., pp. 231-45. See also supra, pp. 166-68.
353 See supra, pp. 190-97.
man's own being.\textsuperscript{354} And for Zen Buddhism, there is a separation between the pursuit of self-transcendence in the 'vertical' dimension and moral and socio-historical concerns in the 'horizontal' dimension.\textsuperscript{355} All these problems manifested in the various approaches, according to Tillich, point to the quest for a theonomous transforming power which can only be created by the Spiritual Presence and realized in the Spiritual Community. Under the impact of the Spiritual Presence, essentialization as 'the permanent transition of the temporal to the eternal' and a 'perfect balance' between the polarities of individualization-participation, dynamics-form, freedom-destiny are finally achieved, and the quest for unambiguous life is fulfilled.

While Tillich's critical analysis of the problems in the non-Christian approaches to the realization of authentic humanity is penetrating and powerful, his own 'answer' may not satisfy his opponents. If the Spiritual Presence is the universal-subjective reality which fulfils the theonomous quest in the realization of authentic humanity, one finds it difficult to distinguish this 'Spiritual Presence' from those metaphysical principles already suggested by the non-Christian approaches. For, in Heidegger's ontology, we also have the idea of Ereignis for the attainment of releasement. Maslow also emphasizes the significance of peak-experiences for self-actualization.\textsuperscript{356} And the Zen Buddhists also recognize the Buddha-nature as the trans-subjective reality which makes the experience of satori possible. In fact, Tillich also tends to regard these experiences of the Ultimate as different manifestations of the divine Spirit's activity in


\textsuperscript{355} See supra, pp. 242-46.

human history when Tillich attempts to break through the boundary between
the sacred and the secular and claim the reducibility of Ecstasy₁ and
Ecstasy₂:⁴⁵⁷

[The Spiritual Presence as the] radical moments of purification with
their impact on the social group, are found everywhere in historical
mankind. The mark of the Spiritual Presence is not lacking at any
place or time. The divine Spirit or God, present to man's spirit,
breaks into all history in revelatory experiences which have both a
saving and transforming character. We have already pointed to this
fact in the discussion of universal revelation and the idea of holy.
Now we relate it to the doctrine of the divine Spirit and its mani-
festations, and we can assert: Mankind is never left alone. The
Spiritual Presence acts upon it in every moment and breaks into it
in some great moments, which are the historical kairot.⁴⁵⁸

If this is the case, what else can Tillich offer other than giving a
different name (viz., 'Spiritual Presence') for 'Ereignis', 'peak-
experience' or 'the Buddha-nature' which is already so familiar to each of
their own systems? How can Tillich still claim that Christianity has the
'answer' to the human situation and possesses the 'final revelation'? Here
we are still facing the same problem after an interdisciplinary investiga-
tion in concrete details.⁴⁵⁹

In fact, Tillich has, in some places, provided hints to demonstrate
the distinctiveness of the Christian experience of the Spiritual Presence
which is different from a merely ontological ground of universal-subjective
reality, so far as the realization of authentic humanity is concerned. For
Tillich, although 'the fulfilled transcendent union is an eschatological
concept,' there should be a distinction between the ambiguities of life and
the fragmentary manifestation of unambiguous life.⁴⁶⁰ 'The New Being is
fragmentarily and anticipatorily present, but in so far as it is present it

⁴⁵⁷ See supra, ch. 3, pp. 144-46.
⁴⁵⁸ ST-3: 139-40. Italics mine except 'kairot'.
⁴⁵⁹ Cf. supra, ch. 3, pp. 146, 150-52.
⁴⁶⁰ ST-3: 140.
But if the non-Christian pursuits can also experience some moments of the impact of the Spiritual Presence, and if, on the other hand, the Christian experience of the Spiritual Presence is also inevitably fragmentary, can there be a difference between the two? At this point, Tillich seems to suggest that there should be a difference between the experience of the Spiritual Presence in (especially Eastern) mysticism and the monotheism of the Judaeo-Christian religion. Whereas 'the East [is] affirming a "formless self" as the aim of all religious life,' Christian mysticism tries 'to preserve in the ecstatic experience the subjects of faith and love: personality and community.'

The Spiritual Presence in Christian experience is the presence of the God of humanity and justice ... [it is] a person-to-person encounter in prayer which certainly transcends ordinary experiences in intensity and effect but which neither extinguishes nor disintegrates the personal center of the prophet [here Tillich is referring the ecstasy of Elijah] and does not produce physical intoxication ... There is no pure Spiritual Presence where there is no humanity and justice.

Here, the difference between the presence of a personal Spirit and an ontological ground of universal-subjective reality is the key to defining the distinctiveness of the Christian experience. But such a distinction has not been worked out in further detail in Tillich's writings. While he is so preoccupied with the endeavour to reduce Ecstasy₁ and Ecstasy₂ to Ecstasy₃, Tillich tends to emphasize the universal, rather than the personal, character of the Spiritual Presence. In so doing, Tillich misses the ground on which he can 'show the reasons why he affirms his own particular tradition in spite of his relativistic assertions.'

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361 Ibid.
362 Ibid., p. 143. Italics mine.
363 Ibid., pp. 143, 144. Italics mine.
point, we should turn our attention from Tillich's endeavour to correlate the Christian understanding of authentic humanity with the non-Christian approaches, to Barth's delineation of the Christian life in the presence of a living God and under the guidance of a personal Spirit.
I. THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

'What does "a Christian life" mean?' Almost forty years after he gave his talk to the 'Christliche Studentenvereinigung' in Münster, Barth raised this question again. And the answer, though retained only in a deleted manuscript, provides a formal definition of an authentic Christian life in Barth's understanding:

A life in faith in him [viz., Jesus Christ], love for him, and hope in him is the Christian life. God the Reconciler demands it of man. Man has to live such a life in obedience to him. God does not demand it only of Christians. Whether recognized or not, God's command has always and everywhere this content ... By the Christian life ... [it] means the life of man from, under, and with Jesus Christ ... It embraces man in the totality of his relationship to God and therefore in his relationship, as to God, so also to his brother, himself, and the world.²

Barth's claim that the Christian life as the command of God should not be confined just to the Christian is fully consistent with his doctrine of real humanity, which we have seen in Chapter Two. For if Christian life 'has its absolutely unique origin' in the history of Jesus Christ (Geschichte Jesu Christi), 'it is the divine change [göttliche Wendung] which has been made for every man and which is valid for every man, but which is thankfully acknowledged, recognised and confessed by Christians.

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² Barth, Christian Life, pp. 279-80 (the appendix on 'First Version of the Conclusion of §74'). The passage quoted only exists in the typescript version and is not retained in the revision.
It is so as Jesus Christ is the One elected from eternity to be the Head and Saviour of all men, who in time responded to God's faithfulness with human faithfulness as the Representative of all men. Such an ontological perspective certainly goes back to our preceding survey of Barth's Christological Anthropology and finds its basis in his doctrine of Election. Since man is ontologically determined in God's divine election, the reconstitution of man's being has been fulfilled through the vicarious humanity of Jesus Christ. Thus the dynamics of Christian life as a 'divine change' in a person's life has ontologically taken place already in the history of Jesus Christ, whether one recognizes it or not. This is the ontological grounding of the Christian life.

'Follow Me' -- The Call to Discipleship

But what does it mean to live a Christian life in concreto? Once again Barth finds his answer in Christology:

[God's command as the right conduct of man] has its basis in the knowledge of Jesus Christ ... [God reveals] in Jesus Christ the human image with which Adam was created to correspond and could no longer do so when he sinned, when he became ethical man. This human image is at the same time God's own image. The man Jesus, who fulfils the commandment of God, does not give the answer, but by God's grace He is the answer to the ethical question put by God's grace. The sanctification of man, the fact that he is claimed by God, the fulfilment of his predestination in his self-determination to obedience, the judgment of God on man and His command to him in its actual concrete fulfilment -- they all take place here in Jesus Christ.

Barth sums up the whole idea in a single statement: 'Jesus Christ is the light of life.' Man who stands in the light of Jesus Christ can no longer

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3 CD IV/4: 13.
4 See supra, ch. 2, p. 38.
5 CD IV/4: 13; Barth, Christian Life, p. 37. Also cf. supra, pp. 54-56, 61, 85; cf. also CD IV/4: 3-14, 31-36.
6 CD II/2: 509, 517.
base himself on his 'self-understanding as such finally and decisively.'

'This light imparts itself to him, making itself known in its newness, commending itself in its strangeness, becoming inward in its outwardness.'

In such an event of 'illumination' (Erleuchtung), 'Jesus Christ in person meets him as a person and becomes a known and conscious element in his life-history.' And 'by this knowledge Christians are distinguished as the called from others who are not called.'

Here comes the fundamental difference between Tillich and Barth regarding the place of Jesus Christ in the realization of authentic humanity. For Tillich, it is the Spiritual Presence which creates the New Being in man and elevates him through faith and love to the transcendent unity of unambiguous life. The same thing happened to Jesus as the Christ, but only in an undistorted and unambiguous manner. 'The New Being is not dependent on the special symbol in which it is expressed. It has the power to be free from every form in which it appears.' Thus the significance of Jesus Christ is not 'the concrete biblical picture' but 'the transforming power of the New Being in Jesus as the Christ.'

And according to such an 'aesthetic theory', the mediating principle is the power expressed by the picture. The material content of the picture itself is not definitive. For Barth, however, the 'unreality' of humanity implies man's ignorance of his own ontological determination and also his inevitable incompleteness, for it is Jesus Christ the real man who

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7 CD IV/3.2: 496.  8 Ibid., p. 509.
9 Ibid., pp. 508-509. Italics mine.
11 Ibid., pp. 144-49. Also ST-2: 118-19.
reveals and discloses the authentic image of humanity: As the man Jesus is Himself the revealing Word of God, He is the *source of knowledge of the nature of man as created by God*. He is 'the royal man'. 'In what He thinks and wills and does, in His attitude, there is a correspondence, a parallel in the creaturely world, to the plan and purpose and work and attitude of God.' Thus from the existence of this man, what we have to see and consider, seeing and considering everything else in the light of it, is an earthly reality of the first and supreme order; the **concrete limit and measure and criterion of all other earthly reality**; the first and the last; the creature, the man (He is called the firstborn of every creature in Col. 15), from whom we have to learn what a creature, a man, really is; that which is unconditionally sure in a whole world of that which is less sure and unsure.

Although Barth has reservations about employing the traditional concept of *imitatio Christi* because of the possible danger of implying a moral self-achievement in the sense of copying, the idea of imitation is clearly essential to his understanding of the realization of the Christian life. For Barth, the sanctification of man 'takes place in a **definite form and direction**' -- 'What is required of us is that our action should be brought

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14 Supra, ch. 2, pp. 30-32.
15 CD III/2: 41. Italic mine.
16 CD IV/2: 166; italics mine. See also p. 297. Cf. E. Jüngel's substantial study of Barth's concept of Jesus Christ as 'the royal man' and its implication for the authentic image of real manhood in his 'Der königliche Mensch. Eine christologische Reflexion auf die Würde des Menschen in der Theologie Karl Barths' (1966), reprinted in Barth-Studien, pp. 233-45.
18 CD II/2: 576-77.
into conformity with His [viz., Jesus Christ's] action.\textsuperscript{19} Thus the divine command that man has to obey, and the conformity that demands man to redirect his life, are concretely crystallized into the one real man's life and works.\textsuperscript{20} In such a case, the material content of Jesus Christ's life and work is an essential necessity for the realization of authentic humanity. Thus Incarnation, for Barth, is never a mere \textit{analogia imaginis} which creates the transforming power to elevate man to the transcendent unity of unambiguous life. It is the \textit{supreme criterion and concrete direction} of human authenticity. In this one man's life, the 'handle' finds its 'pot' and the 'predicates' find their 'subject'.\textsuperscript{21} From such a claim, the revealed Word of Christianity is \textit{the} answer to man's search for authentic humanity, not \textit{a} symbol among the many.\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{19} CD IV/2: 533; CD II/2: 577; italics mine. Also CD IV/2: 522-23; Barth, \textit{Service of God}, p. 127, 'The true ordinance governing the Christian life is \textit{Jesus Christ} ... It is He who says what is good or evil, enjoined or forbidden. It is He and He alone who is also the judge, before whom we have to justify ourselves.' Also Barth, \textit{Heidelberg Catechism}, p. 67.

\textsuperscript{20} CD IV/2: 533-37, 546-53; CD II/2: 537-40.

\textsuperscript{21} Cf. CD III/2: 76, where Barth describes man's endeavour to attain a true account of man's being through human self-understanding as being like 'knives without edges, or handles without pots, or predicates without subjects.'

\textsuperscript{22} At least one work which aims at this end (but from a wider perspective) should be mentioned: J. M. Gustafson, \textit{Christ and the Moral Life} (New York: Harper & Row, 1968). Cf. also, Barth justifies Christianity as the one 'true religion' not because of her quality but 'through the name of Jesus Christ': 'The Christian religion is the predicate to the subject of the name of Jesus Christ. Without Him it is not merely something different ... Because it was and is and shall be through the name of Jesus Christ, it was and is and shall be the true religion: the knowledge of God, and the worship of God, and the service of God, in which man is not alone in defiance of God, but walks before God in peace with God.' (CD I/2: 347; also pp. 325-61). For good discussions, see P. P. Knitter, "Christomonism in Karl Barth's Evaluation of the Non-Christian Religions," \textit{NZSTH} 13 (1971): 99-121; also B.-E. Benktson, \textit{Christus und die Religion}. Der Religionsbegriff bei Barth, Bonhoeffer und Tillich (Stuttgart: Calwer Verlag, 1967), pp. 58-65; C. H. Ratschow, \textit{Die Religionen} (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1979), pp. 45-82.
Growth in the Presence of an Actual and Personal God

We come to the second fundamental principle which distinguishes Barth from Tillich concerning the realization of authentic humanity. How is growth in the Christian life different from self-cultivation in the non-Christian context? In a passage expounding the second petition of the 'Lord's Prayer', Barth delineates his understanding of the Christian life by emphasizing the 'newness' and the 'coming' of God, viz., the active intervention of an actual and personal God:

How could God himself not be new to us people each morning, new in all that he is and wills and does, new also over against all that we believe we have already heard of him and ought to know and think of him, new not only to unbelief and half-belief, but also to sincere belief in him, new not only to his enemies but also to his most loyal friends and servants? All kinds of traditional or self-won ideas about him may not be new, may be already old, or quickly enough becoming so. God himself, however, will always be new to us. God's kingdom is God himself and -- wonder of wonders, Marcion was right here -- it is God himself as he not merely is somewhere and somehow (not even in the highest height or as the God beyond God of Paul Tillich) but as he comes.23

For Barth, man is never left alone in his pursuits. God always is the Subject of speaking and acting.24 The 'newness' of God in the Christian life means that God does not only say 'Yes' but also says 'No' to man. God is not only for man but also against man.25 He is not a mere universal-subjective power which always positively fulfils man's endeavour for a higher life. God is a 'Holy Other', a Person who encounters man in an active and unexpected way:

In God's command we have to do with God himself, with the Creator, in distinction from all the material or spiritual reality of the created world, and especially and concretely in distinction from

23 Barth, Christian Life, p. 236.
24 CD I/2: 224-27; also Barth, Holy Ghost, pp. 20-27.
ourselves. We have to do with a will that meets our will with the demand that our will bow before it, be subject to it, be in conformity with it.\(^\text{26}\)

At this point, Barth explicitly contrasts his view with the 'idealistic theology' which can be well summarized by Fiedrich Schiller's poem Das Ideal und das Leben (1795): 'Take up deity into your own will and it will come down from its heavenly throne.' Such a 'deistic myth,' Barth remarks, 'is a myth, the great anthropological myth, the myth of apostasy and revolt, the great lie, because deity that is taken up into our will is no longer deity, no longer the Creator.' For 'a God who shares his dignity with me in this pleasant way, such a God is not God ... If deity comes down from its heavenly throne when we take it into our will, if the finite is capable of the infinite, is it more than a question of tact or taste whether we are prepared to say that God as such has given up the ghost?'\(^\text{27}\)

Such a rejection of Idealism is significant not only to theological categories but also for its practical implications. For a genuine growth must proceed within the context of personal encounter which inevitably involves a 'rhythm of withdrawal and return.' John Macmurray rightly observes how a child, even in his earliest stage, learns to grow in the presence of his mother's rhythm of approval and resistance. His description is so illuminating that it is worth quoting in full:

The child, at any of the critical stages of his early development, when forced into the negative phase by the mother's refusal to do for him any longer what he has come to expect, will, in fact, learn to do it for himself. He will, as a matter of fact, grow up and come to play the part required of him, stage by stage, until he reaches the independence of maturity ... This conflict of wills individualizes the child for himself; and the mother who opposes him, for him. He recognizes himself as an agent through the opposition of another agent, who seeks to determine his future against his own will ... The negative aspect of this contradiction in consciousness establishes the reflective distinction between good and bad, and between true and false. The mother's refusal

\(^{26}\) Barth, Ethics, p. 209.

\(^{27}\) Ibid., pp. 210-11.
institutes a dichotomy in the child's consciousness between what he expects and what actually occurs; between his demand and the response to it. He is forced into a recognition of the distinction between imagining and perceiving ... between what he intends that the Other should do and what the Other intends and does. 28

Here the child is confronting an active agent, an agent who can exert the pedagogical effect in an intentional and schematic manner. Such a situation occurs only in a person-to-person encounter, where the distinction between right and wrong is perceived through 'a clash of wills.' 29 If we borrow the terminology suggested by Robert P. Scharlemann to elucidate our point, we may describe such a situation as personal growth in the presence of an 'objectival subject', which is distinct from man's self-consciousness as 'subjectival objectivity'. 30 At this point we have to discuss in some detail Barth's critical evaluation of neo-Protestantism in general and of Schleiermacher in particular. Barth's reaction against the nineteenth century Protestant theology goes back to the early twenties when the movement of 'dialectical theology' was founded. 31 The 'new foundation' and message of the movement, in Barth's own description, is

the Godness of God, precisely God's Godness, God's own peculiar nature over against not only the natural, but also the spiritual

28 J. Macmurray, Persons in Relation (London: Faber & Faber, 1961), pp. 95-97; for a full discussion, see pp. 86-105.

Instead of "subject" and "object" I shall speak of the subjectival and the objectival poles or elements of thought. What is meant by "subjectival" is anything that is on the "I" side of the relation implied when I think of something. What is meant by "objectival" is anything on the other side of the relation. By using these terms and making the distinction in this way, we can allow for the fact that there are "objectival subjects" as well as "subjectival objects" and thus avoid the confusion that comes from using only "subject" and "object."

31 For Barth, as we have seen in chapter one (supra, ch. 1, pp. 6-8), the decisive 'turn' even goes back to the outbreak of the First World War.
cosmos, God's absolutely unique existence, power and initiative above all in His relationship to man.32

Here, the emphasis of God's 'over-againstness' (das Gegenüber)33 and 'initiative' (initiative) which polemically contrasts with the neo-Protestant understanding of God is what we have called, in an alternative expression, 'objectival (viz., the 'otherness' of God) subjectivity (a personal and living God)'. A survey of Barth's understanding of 'God as a Subject' has been done in our previous chapter on his doctrine of Election.34 A closer look at Barth's idea of 'God as the wholly Other' (Gott als der ganz Andere)35 is our task here. For such an idea is not only significant to 'dialectical theology',36 but also closely relevant to our discussion of the Christian life.

Thomas F. Torrance once remarked that 'the supreme charge that Barth brought against the theology of neo-Protestantism' was 'the reduction of all theology to some form of anthropology.' In his studies of German Idealism, Barth complains that 'Hegel's philosophy is the philosophy of self-confidence ... Hegel puts his confidence in the idea that his thinking and the thoughts which are thought by him are equivalent.' With such an identity of thinking and reality, Barth charges that 'with Hegel God and man can never confront one another [Gegenüber von Gott und Mensch] in a relationship which is actual and indissoluble, a word, a new word

33 See Busch, 'Dialectical Theology,' CJT 16: 166.
35 Römerbrief², p. 17.
36 See W. Härle, 'Dialektische Theologie' in TRE 8: 683-88.
revelatory in the strict sense, cannot pass between them.' Regarding
Fichte, Barth's criticism is even more explicit:

The god in whom Fichtean man believes is himself, his own mind ...
A God to whom man belongs as to another [als zu einem Anderen]; a
God who can act in relation to man and become his Saviour; a God
who has His own glory in which the essential concern of man is to
be seen; a God who reigns; a God in relation to whom man gains his
freedom and whom he must serve in his freedom; a God who confronts
and limits man and is thus his true determination [der des
Menschen Gegenüber und Grenze und so seine wirkliche Bestimmung
wäre], is for Fichte non-existence. Fichte's god is Fichte's man,
and Fichte's man is Fichte's god.

From this perspective, Barth can fully agree with Feuerbach's attack on
Christianity according to his 'illusionist theory' of religion, so far as
neo-Protestantism is concerned. For 'at least he [viz., Feuerbach] had an
understanding of the truth that the God of his theological contemporaries,
who was conjectured on the authority of the religious man, had better for
honesty's sake be entirely stripped of all the superhuman predicates with
which they wanted to furnish him.'

With such a background we come to Barth's criticism of
Schleiermacher. Once regarded by him as 'the most important' theological
writer 'since the closing of the New Testament cannon' and later as an
'apostate' of theology, Schleiermacher is a theologian whom Barth 'would
have both to appreciate fully' and yet 'depart from him radically if he

38 Barth, From Rousseau to Ritschl, pp. 275, 303.
40 K. Barth, 'The Word in Theology from Schleiermacher to Ritschl'
(1927) in Theology and Church, p. 213. Also Barth, From Rousseau to
(London & Glasgow: Collins, 1964), pp. 121-26. For Barth's similar criti-
cism of the 'idealistic theology', see Barth, Ethics, pp. 210-11, 305-318,
323-26; CD IV/2: 56-57.
41 See K. Barth, 'Concluding Unscientific Postscript on
Schleiermacher' in Schleiermacher, p. 262 and id., 'Schleiermacher' in
Theology and Church, p. 198.
were to change the tide of Protestant theology.

But the beginning of Barth's turn against Schleiermacher, in his own recollection, started with a doubt of the validity of the 'Schleiermacherian God': It was after the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 when Barth and Eduard Thurneysen discovered that 'what we need for preaching, instruction, and pastoral care was a "wholly other" theological foundation. It seemed impossible to proceed any further on the basis of Schleiermacher.

In 1922 Barth concluded that 'with all due respect to the genius in his work, I can not consider Schleiermacher a good teacher in the realm of theology because ... one can not speak of God simply by speaking of man in a loud voice ... what Schleiermacher never possessed ... [is] the truth that man is made to serve God and not God to serve man.' And towards the last few months of his life, Barth crystallized his criticism of Schleiermacher in four main questions which are specially relevant to our discussion.

Two of the questions concerning Schleiermacher's understanding reflect Barth's general critique of the 'idealistic theology', namely, God as an 'objectival subject'. Regarding the 'objectival', Barth asks,

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42 P. J. Rosato, The Spirit as Lord: The Pneumatology of Karl Barth (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1981), p. 3. It is not our task here to trace out all the theological connections between Barth and Schleiermacher, or whether Barth's criticism of Schleiermacher is fair enough (for example, J. H. S. Kent in his The End of the Line? The Development of Christian Theology in the Last Two Centuries [London: SCM, 1982], pp. 44-45, 122 regards Barth's treatment of Schleiermacher as 'opaque' and 'mistaken'). What we are concerned with is Barth's own theological understanding manifested through his criticism of Schleiermacher.


44 K. Barth, 'The Word of God and the Task of the Ministry' in WGWM, pp. 195-96. See also CD IV/3.2: 498; Barth, From Rousseau to Ritschl, pp. 340-41, 344.

45 During the summer of 1968 Barth contributed a 'Nachwort' to Schleiermacher -- Auswahl, ed. by H. Bolli (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus GTB419, 1968), pp. 290-312. An English translation by G. Hunsinger was published as 'Concluding Unscientific Postscript on Schleiermacher' in Schleiermacher, pp. 261-79.
In Schleiermacher's theology or philosophy, do persons feel, think, and speak (a) in relationship to an indispensable [unaufhebbare] Other, in accordance with an object which is superior to their own being, feeling, perceiving, willing, and acting, an object toward which adoration, gratitude, repentence, and supplication are concretely possible and even imperative? ... [or] (b) in and from a sovereign consciousness that their own beings are conjoined, and are indeed essentially united, with everything which might possibly come into question as something or even someone distinct from them? 46

And regarding God as a concrete and personal 'Subject', Barth asks,

According to Schleiermacher, do persons feel, think, and speak (a) primarily in relationship to a reality which is particular and concrete, and thus determinate and determinable, and about which, in view of its nature and meaning, they can abstract and generalize only secondarily? ... [or] (b) primarily in relationship to a general reality whose nature and meaning have already been derived and established in advance, so that on that basis only secondary attention is paid to its particular, concrete, determinable, and determinate form? 47

Finally, Barth asks a more direct question regarding man's religious experience, viz., the question of the Holy Spirit. For any genuine consideration of the noetic realization of God's acts upon man, Pneumatology is the key. 48 Regarding the theology of the Holy Spirit, 'of which Schleiermacher was scarcely conscious, but which might actually have been the legitimate concern dominating even his theological activity,' Barth asks,

46 Barth, 'Postscript on Schleiermacher' in Schleiermacher, p. 275. Although Barth poses the questions in a 'Yes' or 'No' manner in order to show his hope to reconcile with Schleiermacher's thinking, in view of his earlier writings from his Römerbrief (1919) up to the article itself, Barth was still conceiving himself as an opponent to Schleiermacher. For Barth's notion of God's 'objectival' against Schleiermacher's 'subjectival', see Barth, Schleiermacher, pp. 103-104, 217-18, 220, 250-51; id., Schleiermacher in Theology and Church, pp. 173, 180-81; id., From Rousseau to Ritschl, pp. 347-50, 354. Also cf. C. F. Starkloff, 'Schleiermacher and Barth on Religious Experience,' RUO 39 (1969): 121-23; T. F. Torrance, 'Introduction' to Theology and Church, pp. 24-25.

47 Barth, 'Postscript on Schleiermacher' in Schleiermacher, p. 276. For Barth's notion of a concrete and personal God against Schleiermacher's understanding, see Barth, Schleiermacher, pp. 171-72, 216-17, 220, 254; id., 'Schleiermacher' in Theology and Church, p. 165; id., 'Humanity of God' in God, Grace and Gospel, p. 42.

48 See Barth, 'Postscript on Schleiermacher' in Schleiermacher, pp. 278-79.
Is the spirit which moves feeling, speaking, and thinking persons, when things come about properly, (b) [sic. it should be (a)] an absolutely particular and specific Spirit, which not only distinguishes itself again and again from all other spirits, but which is seriously to be called "holy"? ... [or] rather (b) a universally effective spiritual power, one which, while individually differentiated, basically remains diffuse? 49

The German word 'Geist' bears particular ambiguity because of the Idealist tradition. 50 In contrast to such a background, Barth especially emphasizes the concrete and living character of the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit, for Barth, is the 'Finger of God' for the Christian life. 51 Differing from a mere 'ontological power', the Holy Spirit is always the initiative. He is 'free', 'exerting control' and not 'under control':

*The wind of the Spirit blows where it wills.* The presence and action of the Spirit are the grace of God who is always free, always superior, always giving himself undeservedly and without reservation ... [A person] should be happy if, while brooding over his work, he hears the hidden power rushing, and finds his statements determined, ruled, and controlled by it. But he does not know "whence it comes or whither it goes." He can wish only to follow its work, not to precede it. While he lets his thought and speech be controlled by it, he gladly renounces the temptation to exert control over it. Such is the sovereignty of this power in the event of the history of Immanuel; such its sovereignty over and in the prophets and apostles; such its sovereignty in the gathering, upbuilding, and sending forth of the community. 52

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49 Ibid., pp. 278, 276. See also Barth, *From Rousseau to Ritschl*, pp. 344, 353.


52 Barth, *Evangelical Theology*, pp. 57-58; italics mine. In contrast, '[a theology which] imagines that he [viz., the Spirit] is a power of nature that can be discovered, harnessed, and put to use like water, fire, electricity, or atomic energy' is a 'foolish theology'. A 'foolish theology presupposes the Spirit as the premise of its own declaration. The Spirit is thought to be one whom it knows and over whom it disposes. But a presupposed spirit is certainly not the Holy Spirit, and a theology that presumes to have it under control can only be unspiritual theology.' (Ibid.,
But above all, the Holy Spirit is 'the Spirit of Jesus Christ'. His operation is neither anonymous, amorphous, nor ... irrational. It is an operation from man to man. It is divine because the man from whom it proceeds is the eternal Son of God. Thus the Holy Spirit is not only concrete, living and initiating Himself, this personal Spirit also directs man in his Christian life to a concrete and living Subject, viz., Jesus Christ the real man. We can now sum up the two fundamental principles in Barth's understanding of the Christian life. First, the ontological grounding of the Christian life is the vicarious history of Jesus Christ. In concreto, Christian growth is carried out in the presence of a living God who is an 'objectival subject'. The Holy Spirit, not only in His free and unexpected way teaches a Christian how to grow, but also directs him to the concrete and authentic image of man, the real man Jesus Christ, after whom he is commanded to follow. From such an understanding, Barth

p. 58) Barth's mention of 'the gathering, upbuilding, and sending' of the community is certainly referring to his discussion of the work of the Holy Spirit in CD IV/1-3 (secs. 62, 67, 72; also secs. 63, 68, 73). It should be noticed that the three key words employed by Barth to qualify the activity of the Holy Spirit, viz., the Holy Spirit as the 'awakening power' (die erweckende Macht), the 'quickening power' (die belebende Macht) and the 'enlightening power' (die erleuchtende Macht), indicate Barth's intentional emphasis on the living and initiating character of the Holy Spirit. For a discussion of the Spirit as a person, which Barth so emphasizes, see A. B. Come, Human Spirit and Holy Spirit (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1959), pp. 121-24. See also H. Thielicke, The Evangelical Faith, vol. 3: Theology of the Spirit, trans. G. W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982), pp. 21-34.

53 Barth, Holy Ghost, p. 39.
54 CD IV/2: 361. Italics mine.
56 For a very important passage where Barth discusses 'the operation of the Holy Spirit' as 'definite instruction' and how He 'teaches', 'orientates' and 'advances consideration' in a 'precise' and 'concrete' manner which is 'distinguished from the self-instruction;' see CD IV/2: 372-77.
implicitly resolves the difficulties we met in Tillich's endeavour to correlate and at the same time try to 'overcome' the non-Christian ways of self-realization: Christianity does have her distinctiveness as well as universal significance because man's search for authentic humanity has to find its answer in the revealed Word, the real man Jesus Christ. And the guiding Spirit in the Christian life is not only an ontological ground of 'universal-subjective reality' or 'universal effective power', but an 'objectival subject' who can teach and direct man on his way to realizing the new life in Christ.

II. 'WHAT ARE WE TO DO?' -- THEOLOGICAL ETHICS AS GOD'S COMMAND IN CONCRETE SITUATIONS

'What are we to do?' The noetic realization of man's ontological determination cannot only rest on principles but has to be worked out in concrete situations. At this point we come to Barth's discussions of theological ethics. Two particular claims are especially relevant to our discussion of the realization of authentic humanity.

First, the applicability of theological ethics, in Barth's understanding, is not confined only to the Christian community, but is a universal claim of God for all men. The claim is clearly consistent with his Christological Anthropology which we have seen in Chapter Two and the beginning of this chapter: 'As the doctrine of God's command, ethics interprets ... the sanctification which comes to man through the electing God. Because Jesus Christ is the holy God and sanctified man in One, it has its

57 See supra, ch. 4, pp. 246-50.
59 For Barth, the problem of theological ethics means a practical consideration of the Christian life. See CD I/2: 367, 371.
60 See CD II/2: 642-44, 535.
basis in the knowledge of Jesus Christ.'\(^{61}\) Ontologically, since all men have been elected in Jesus Christ, 'human existence is no longer alone. It is no longer left to itself.' Thus theological ethics as the claim of God concerning our human existence is addressed 'objectively to all men' in Jesus Christ.\(^{62}\) Also from the perspective of the knowledge of 'the good', 'because Christian ethics knows the transcendent divine decision, it knows the secret of all men -- both believers and godless.'\(^{63}\) 'We cannot act as if the command of God, issued by God's grace to the elect man Jesus Christ, and again by God's grace already fulfilled by this man, were not already known to us as the \textit{sum total of the good}.\(^{64}\) According to such a claim, Barth's discussion of Christian ethics is in fact dealing with the general mode of authentic humanity.\(^{65}\)

\(^{61}\) Ibid., p. 509. See also Barth, \textit{Ethics}, pp. 16-17.

\(^{62}\) Ibid., pp. 557-60. Here we meet Barth's theological reinterpretation of the traditional antithesis between 'Law' and 'Gospel'. Since Jesus Christ Himself is both the Law and the Gospel, 'in order to answer the question: What does God want with us and from us in His law? We shall, if we do not want to fall into error, have to come back again rigorously to the content of the Gospel, to the fact that Jesus Christ has fulfilled the law and kept all the commandments.' (Barth, 'Gospel and Law' in \textit{God, Grace and Gospel}, p. 11) An evaluation of such a claim in view of biblical theology and historical theology (especially from the Lutheran tradition) is beyond the task of our study. For good discussions, see A. Peters, \textit{Gesetz und Evangelium}. HST vol. 2 (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1981), pp. 105-144; and E. Jüngel, 'Evangelium und Gesetz. Zugleich zum Verhältnis von Dogmatik und Ethik' in Barth-Studien, pp. 180-209. What is significant for our study here is that theological ethics as 'the manifest will of God' (viz., 'Law' according to Barth's definition) is grounded in Christology (see Barth, \textit{Dogmatics in Outline}, p. 66). For the Christological grounding in Barth's doctrine of God's command, see also O. Moosbrugger, 'Das Problem der speziellen Ethik bei Karl Barth' (Th.D. dissertation, University of Bonn, 1969), pp. 151-58. The idea of Christological grounding in Barth's understanding of ethics goes back to his \textit{Römerbrief}. For a survey, see H. Kirsch, 'Zum Problem der Ethik in der kritischen Theologie Karl Barth's' (Th.D. dissertation, University of Bonn, 1972), pp. 224-35.

\(^{63}\) CD II/2: 643. Also Barth, \textit{Christian Life}, p. 36.

\(^{64}\) CD II/2: 518. Italics mine.

The second claim of Barth regarding theological ethics is closely related to the first. If theological ethics is the command of God, it is the ethics for man. Subsequently, there can be no 'independent' ethics derived from the source of man's self-understanding or self-reflection. For 'what begins with the human self cannot end with the knowledge of God and of His command. Nor can it end with the knowledge of the real man in his real situation.' Thus theological ethics as the sum of good does not necessarily reject the ethics which are derived from non-theological bases. But being the ultimate and conclusive ground of the 'good', theological ethics can comprehensively absorb every other ethic which 'is obviously aware -- explicitly or implicitly -- of its origin and basis in God's command.' And for those who 'confront divine ethics with a human view of the world and of life which is supposed to have its own (if anything) superior value, and to undertake the replacement of the command of the grace of God by a sovereign humanism or even barbarism ... [theological ethics] can only meet it exclusively ... as wrong and false and perverted, and therefore not really as ethics at all.' According to such an understanding, non-theological ethics (viz., ethics derived not from the command of God) becomes practically unnecessary for Barth's Christian ethics. For if non-theological ethics possess any ethical

66 CD II/2: 542.  
67 Ibid., p. 541.  
68 Ibid., p. 527. Italics mine.  
70 CD II/2: 522, 'the command of God is not founded on any other command, and cannot therefore be derived from any other, or measured by any other, or have its validity tested by any other. He [viz., the man] knows that man cannot say this command to himself, but can only have it said to him ... [Theological ethics] has to accept the fact that it must believe in the work and revelation of the grace of God alone and therefore in the
truth at all, it must be either already enclosed in the command of God, or it is not ethical truth and should be excluded. Thus 'Dogmatics itself actual overlordship of God's command over the whole realm of ethical problems.' (Italics mine) Also ibid., p. 540, 'what ought we to do? ... In Him [viz., Christ] the obedience demanded of us men has already been rendered. In Him the realisation of the good corresponding to divine election has already taken place -- and so completely that we, for our part, have actually nothing to add, but have only to endorse this event by our action.' (Italics mine)

71 See K. Barth, Christliche Ethik. Ein Vortrag (Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1946), pp. 10-11; also Willis, Ethics, p. 109. A question should be raised at this point. The reference of the term 'other ethics' (sonstige Ethik, or andere Ethik) in Barth's various discussions is not explicitly clear. It may indicate an ethical 'system' as a whole, or, the 'basis' (Grund) of the ethical system, or the 'material' content (Stoff) in the ethical system (cf. CD II/2: 527). The ambiguity can be seen from the following two considerations: (1) Consider the statement 'it [viz., theological ethics] is in agreement with every other ethics adduced to the extent that the latter is obviously aware -- explicitly or implicitly -- of its origin and basis in God's command.' (Ibid. Italics mine) The words 'every other ethics' here cannot denote 'system'. For there are examples of ethical systems with which Barth cannot agree, which also bear the attitude of 'obviously aware [at least implicitly] of its origin and basis in God's command.' We may take Schleiermacher's system of ethics as an example. One cannot judge that it does not even have an 'implicit' awareness of the command of God as its origin and basis. So does 'every other ethics' mean certain 'material' contents? Difficulties still remain. For a same attitude (the awareness of its origin and basis in God's command) does not guarantee an identical decision on particular ethical issues: for example, the issue of 'capital punishment'. Different decisions on the issue can be suggested by theologians who bear undeniably 'obvious awareness' of their origins and bases in God's command. Barth certainly cannot agree with them all (cf. CD III/4: 437-50; for example, T. Haering and A. Schlatter). Thus to make agreement or disagreement with the material content of an ethical system by only considering its 'basis' and 'origin' is inadequate. And (2), conversely, according to Barth, when an ethical system 'tries to deny or obscure its derivation from God's command, to set up independent principles ... to confront divine ethics with a human view of the world and of life which is supposed to have its own (if anything) superior value, and to undertake the replacement of the command of the grace of God by a sovereign humanism or even barbarism ... [theological ethics] can only meet it exclusively ... as wrong and false and perverted, and therefore not really as ethics at all.' Here we meet another simplification. Certainly if there were an ethical system which denies God's command with both its basis and material content, theological ethics could simply reject it without any reservation. Yet in practice such a kind of ethical system can hardly exist. For even a system based on 'sovereign humanism' can arrive at some material contents which are coherent with theological ethics (e.g. seeking for peace from a Buddhist basis, against racial discrimination from a humanistic ground, or establishing a more just economic order from a Marxist foundation. Cf. J. Macquarrie, 'Theology and Ethics' in 3 Issues in Ethics [New York: Harper & Row, 1970], pp. 14-15). And in view of Barth's earlier statement that '[theological ethics'] starting-point is that all ethical truth is enclosed in the command of the grace
is ethics; and ethics is also dogmatics.' For 'a direct inclusion of
ethics in dogmatics has the advantage of greater consistency, unambiguity
and clarity.'\textsuperscript{72}

The same dogmatic principle of theological ethics is also applied
when we encounter 'special ethics', a sphere of 'concrete human volition,
decision, action and abstention.'\textsuperscript{73} Barth's rejection of 'casuistry' is
again noteworthy.\textsuperscript{74} Such an approach to normative ethics is the result of
two emphases: the \textit{concrete} and \textit{personal} character of man's ethical decision
in the presence of God's command. For Barth, 'God's general command for
all man in every situation is as such also the highly particular, concrete
and special command for this or that man in the "case of conscience" of his
particular situation, and therefore the measure by which the goodness or
evil of his action is to be assessed.'\textsuperscript{75} Any insertion of universal and
thus anticipatory moral laws will destroy the freedom of the living God's
demand and a living man's direct response to the commanding God.\textsuperscript{76} Thus


\textsuperscript{73} CD III/4: 6.

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., pp. 6-23. See also Moosbrugger, 'speziellen Ethik bei Barth,' pp. 109-120. Barth describes the way of casuistry as the follow­ing: 'If the moralist knows the command of God on the one side, i.e., the
definitions of universal moral law in the form of such a text, and the
sphere or various spheres of real human action on the other, then basically
in every case in which the conscience might be in doubt he is able to tell
himself and others what to be chosen as good or rejected as evil.' (CD
III/4: 7)

\textsuperscript{75} CD III/4: 9.

\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., pp. 13-15.
Barth is emphasizing the self-sufficiency of God's command for man's moral decision. The command of God is so specific and concrete that it 'requires no interpretation to come into force. To the last and smallest detail it is self-interpreted, and in this form it confronts man as a command already in force ... Special ethics can then become the investigation and representation of the character which this event will always take, of the standard by which the goodness or evil of human action will be decided, not by the moralist and his ethics, but by God the Commander.'

But then, what is the genuine mode of man's ethical decision in the presence of God's command? Barth's answer is:

God in his command, however, tells him very concretely what he is to do or not do here and now in these or those particular circumstances. God accompanies man's way with ever new and living and specific direction. He is always the free God who has chosen the good for man and made it known to him as a matter for his choice too. What free man has always to do is to receive God's command as his concrete claim, decision, and judgment, and thus to repeat God's choice, practicing what God has elected as the good.

What, then, are the material contents of God's command? Here we meet the direct presentation of God's directions for authentic humanity.

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77 Ibid., pp. 12, 18. Italics mine.
78 Barth, Christian Life, p. 33.
79 A clarification should be made here. One has to admit that there is a tension between 'contextual decisions' and the 'constancy' (cf. CD III/4: 17) of God's command in Barth's understanding. While emphasizing the contextual and non-anticipatory character of God's command, Barth spends seven hundred odd pages (according to the German text) to discuss 'God's command' on particular moral issues. The dilemma is: If the command of God is really non-anticipatory and cannot be objectified into universal statements, Barth's endeavour in those pages becomes trivial. But if God's command can be expressed in definite decisions on particular issues, disregarding the readers' concrete situations (for example, the prohibition of homosexuality, as G. Outka, AGAPE: An Ethical Analysis [New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1972], pp. 231-32 rightly observed), Barth's 'contextualism' becomes doubtful. Disregarding whether Barth calls these general statements on particular moral issues as 'approximation to the mandatum Dei concretissimum' (CD III/4: 48) or 'criteria' (Godsey, Table Talk, p. 82), one cannot see any absolute difference between them and the so-called 'moral principles' of the ethicists. Except for the rigorous Legalists, the ethicists' 'moral principles' also aim only to 'give directions' and leave final decisions (especially when conflicting
group them under two main categories, viz., 'man before God' and 'man before other men'.

To be Man is to be with God

Hans Urs von Balthasar once remarked that Barth was consumed with a 'zeal for God' (*Eifer für Gott*) throughout his life works in theology.

Thus if Barth has anything to say regarding authentic humanity, it must be first perceived from the God-man relationship. But how can his address be listened to in the midst of the so-called 'post-Christian era'? The principles are involved) to the readers according to their particular situations (for a good discussion, see J. M. Gustafson, 'Context versus Principles: A Misplaced Debate in Christian Ethics,' *HThR* 58 [1965]: 186-92). For a critical discussion of the tension between 'contextualism' and 'constancy' in Barth's theological ethics, see Outka, *AGAPE*, pp. 229-33. Also a convincing critique of Barth's rejection of casuistry has been given by J. H. Yoder, *Karl Barth and the Problem of War* (New York: Abingdon Press, 1970), pp. 57-63.

Due to the aim and limited space of this study, it is impossible for us to go into all the details of Barth's particular opinions on various moral issues. In fact, according to his emphasis, a presentation of general 'directions' for authentic humanity would be an appropriate approach. But the way to organize the 'directions' is an issue to be decided. The schematization presented in Barth's *Ethics* (cf. p. 61) should not be adopted because (1) there are significant changes in Barth's later writings on the issue (see P. Lehmann, 'Ethics' in Karl Barth in Re-view, pp. 7-17); and (2) the parts on 'the command of God the Reconciler' and 'the command of God the Redeemer' are incomplete in Barth's *Dogmatics*. And without a comparison with his more mature writings, the framework set in *Ethics* should not be regarded as final. A better alternative is to adopt the fourfold relationship presented in *CD III/4* which corresponds to Barth's treatment on Anthropology (viz., man's relationship with God, other men, himself and temporality). But this is only for 'the command of God the Creator'. We can see no such a schema for the part on Reconciliation (cf. *CD IV/4* and *Christian Life*). Since Barth himself does not provide a definite schematization, we shall draw the relevant materials together under the two categories of 'man-God' and 'man-man' relationships. The idea will be a synthesis of Barth's various discussions from both his doctrine of Creation, Reconciliation and Redemption, according to our particular attention to the problem of authentic humanity. Although such an arrangement might not be Barth's own preference, it should be legitimate for a critical study.

question has been basically answered in Part One of this study,\textsuperscript{82} where Barth argues that only Christology can be the vantage point to see the complete blueprint of human authenticity. Thus one can claim that a genuine Anthropology has to go back to Christology, the revealed Word of God. In this section we shall go a step further to see its practical implications in concrete human situations. It can be presented under three headings.

1. Freedom in obedience.

'Freedom' is certainly the key notion in Barth's exposition of God's command to man as a created being.\textsuperscript{83} What does 'freedom' mean in this context? We have seen that Barth's concept of human freedom in his doctrine of Reconciliation entails difficulties.\textsuperscript{84} In this section we will consider the positive side of his understanding of human freedom before God. For as a matter of fact, at least Barth never conceived of himself as a reactionist against man's freedom.\textsuperscript{85} On the contrary, as Herbert Hartwell observes, the concept of 'man's freedom for God' played 'a vital part in many aspects of Barth's later theology, especially in his theological ethics where Barth characterises the divine gift of human freedom as the foundation of Christian ethics and Christian ethics as the reflection upon what man is required to do in and with the gift of

\textsuperscript{82} See supra, ch. 2, pp. 11-38; 'General Remarks,' pp. 154-55; cf. also supra, pp. 251-65.

\textsuperscript{83} CD III/4: 46. We can see a change of the focal point in Barth's understanding of the command of God the Creator from his Münster/Bonn lectures (viz., Ethik I) to CD III/4. The notion of 'orders of creation' (Schöpfungsordnungen) has been abandoned due to the development of his idea of analogia fidei (especially in his FQI [1931]) and his debate with E. Brunner's Das Gebot und die Ordnungen (1932) (cf. R. W. A. McKinney, 'Review of "Ethik I,"' JThS 25 [1974]: 233). Cf. also D. Braun, 'Editor's Preface' in Ethics, p. vii.

\textsuperscript{84} See supra, ch. 2, pp. 89-92.

\textsuperscript{85} For example, see Barth's concluding words to an interview when he was in Chicago (1962) quoted by J. D. Godsey, Karl Barth, 1886-1968: How I Changed My Mind (Edinburgh: Saint Andrew Press, 1969), p. 79.
freedom.' But how can we reconcile Barth's negative judgements with his positive affirmation regarding human freedom? Two background points must be recognized before we can proceed to answer. First, whenever Barth discusses 'freedom', he is standing within a tradition which is still shadowed philosophically by German Idealism and theologically by Augustine and Luther. Thus the idea that freedom is marked with 'spontaneity', 'independence', or 'creativity' has never been the primary meaning when Barth speaks of 'freedom'. For him, 'freedom' cannot be described as 'man's capacity to do what he pleases,' but must rather be defined as his capacity 'to become what he ought.' Furthermore, Barth always employs different meanings for the word 'freedom' without indicating precisely which connotation he is intending. This inevitably adds extra difficulties to the interpretation.

We will first review Barth's negative statements on human freedom. Barth's starting point is: there is no 'neutral' human freedom as such. Even in man's original state as God's creature, 'he is not allotted a place midway between obedience and disobedience.' And as a fallen man, 'his sin excludes his freedom ... There is no middle position.' By

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89 Cf. Thielicke, Ethics 1: 281.
90 Cf. G. S. Hendry, 'The Freedom of God in the Theology of Karl Barth,' SJTh 31 (1978): 232-36, where Hendry distinguishes at least five different meanings: 'freedom as gratuity', 'freedom as option, or choice between alternatives', 'freedom as self-determination', 'freedom as initiative' and 'freedom as energy'.
92 See CD III/1: 263-66. 93 CD IV/2: 495.
interpreting the Calvinist notion of 'total depravity' with Luther's *servum arbitrium*, Barth draws a radical conclusion: 'Man has no freedom to do good.' We have suggested earlier that such a statement must be understood as 'a posteriori analytic', viz., an unconditionally true statement but referring to something happening within the phenomenal realm.

That is to say, this is a defined reality regardless of one's empirical findings. Or, in Barth's own words, this is a 'theological statement -- a statement of faith' which 'cannot be either proved or disproved by empirical findings or a priori reflections.' But then, how can we explain that in our empirical findings we in fact discover people who can willfully choose to do good? Barth is not unaware of such a question. But his

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94 See especially ibid., pp. 490-98, where Barth puts 'total depravity' and 'servum arbitrium' together in two consecutive points. The following quotations demonstrate the idea that 'man has no freedom to do good': Ibid., p. 491, 'the whole action of man is necessarily evil.' CD IV/1: 496, 'in the whole sphere of human activities there are no exceptions to the sin and corruption of man. There is no territory which has been spared and where he does not sin, where he is not perverted, where he still maintains the divine order and is therefore guiltless. At every point man is in the wrong and in arrears in relation to God. Because he himself as the subject of these activities is not a good tree, he cannot bring forth good fruit. Because his pride is radical and in principle, it is also total and universal and all-embracing, determining all his thoughts and words and works, his whole inner and hidden life, and his visible external movements and relationships. He is not just partly but altogether "flesh." He does not act in a fleshly way only in certain actions and passions and things done and things not done, but in all of them. There is, therefore, no "nature-reserve," for among his actions there are none which are neutral or indeterminate in character; there are no adiaphora in which he can act apart from the question of good and evil, of obedience and disobedience.' For more details, see CD IV/1: 488-501, 409-410. Cf. also W. Krötke, Sünde und Nichtiges bei Karl Barth (Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1971), pp. 69-70. At this point, Barth is more radical than Luther by totally rejecting the idea of 'relics' (cf. CD IV/1: 493-94); and also more radical than the Calvinist by pushing the idea of 'total depravity' to the extent that it is not only 'not possible not to sin' but also 'not possible to do good' (cf. G. C. Berkouwer, *Sin*, trans. P. C. Holtrop [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1971], pp. 530-31: '[the total character of sin] could only imply the impossibility of man's escaping to some "area" untouched by his own guilt ... that is to say, there is no such "area" which makes it possible for man to perform perfectly "good acts." Yet, the Church wished to avoid any hint of fatalism or compulsion."


96 CD IV/2: 494.
answer is a radical one: According to his defined true statement, the 'freedom' of one's willful choice can only be a 'pseudo-freedom', and the 'good' that he performs is no real 'good' at all from a theological perspective. Such a claim can only be understood as the logical result of Barth's 'a posteriori analytic' approach, viz., from the theo-logic of revelation, the 'freedom' and 'good' in human phenomena are 'pseudo' by definition. Any attempt to offer a psychological or sociological inquiry -- whether it is an explanation or objection -- would not be Barth's primary concern, for any such inquiry is still working within the realm of empirical findings. Neither does Barth 'bother at all' to calculate 'the extent of the deprivation' or 'residual goodness.' A critical assessment of such an 'a posteriori analytic' statement has been given in our previous

97 Such an understanding can be seen from the following quotation: CD IV/2: 494, '[servum arbitrium] does not consist at all in the fact that man cannot any longer will and decide, i.e., that he is deprived of arbitrium, that he has no will at all. [N.B. here Barth is talking on the level of 'empirical findings'] If this were the case, he would no longer be a man; he would only be part of a mechanism moved from without. This would involve the transformation of man into another and non-human being -- an idea which we have exerted ourselves to repudiate from the very outset in this whole context. But [N.B. hereafter Barth is applying his 'a posteriori analytic'] the freedom of man does not really consist -- except in the imagination of the invincibly ignorant -- in the fact that, like Hercules at the cross-roads, he can will and decide. Nor does the bondage of his will consist in the fact that he is not able to do this.' This is the way of argument, as Barth describes it, which 'cannot be either proved or disproved by empirical findings or a priori reflections.' (Ibid.) Cf. also ibid., pp. 494-97.

98 Consider the following quotation of Barth's notion of 'corruptio optimi': CD IV/1: 497, 'all the decisions of every man in all the spheres and periods of his activities are mistaken decisions, false answers to the questions continually addressed to him, wrong responses to the commandment which challenges him and calls him to freedom ... This is true even in relation to what seem to be [N.B. scheinbar] the activations of his nature as it was created good. It is true even here where he himself and others can ascribe to these activations a certain and perhaps a very high perfection ... But at every point -- and there is no reason why we should not constantly take note of it in detail -- we are dealing not merely with any corruptio, but with the corruptio optimi. And that is what it is -- the corruptio optimi, the selling and enslavement of the good man and his nature and all the activations of his nature to the service of evil and the work of his own pride.'

99 Küng, Justification, p. 50.
study and will not be repeated. But what is significant for our concern here is that, for Barth, to conceive 'freedom' as an independent choice between two equal possibilities is simply a pseudo-supposition. 'There are, in fact, no spheres [of life] which are neutral.'

When we turn to Barth's positive statements on human freedom, we see the same governing principle. If in his original as well as fallen states man cannot possess any 'neutral' freedom as such, neither can God allow libertas Christiana to be 'any vague choices between various possibilities' in 'a twilight of indifferent neutrality.' The definition of freedom has not been changed. As he was free from righteousness and free only to sin, a Christian is now free from sin and free only to obey God (Rom. 6:18, 20, 22). 'Now as then!' Barth comments,

As you had a lord then and have a Lord now, so you were then also free, i.e. from righteousness -- a terrible freedom, the inevitable shameful result and fruit of which is death. And in the same way you are free again, i.e. from sin, because you have become servants of God, with the result that by his decision and by the ensuing order, you are sanctified men who, as such, are on the way to eternal life ... This receiving and having is your life and as such is the order under which you live, the imperative which you have to obey, because apart from this order you do not even exist.

From this perspective, Barth prefers the dynamic term 'liberation' to the more static term 'freedom': 'In its full serious sense the word "liberation," like "freedom," does not signify merely a release from some authority or power which illegitimately binds man and dominates him to his own destruction, but also a redemption to responsibility to a very different court which demands his attention and obedience and which has a genuine, valid and saving claim upon him. Liberation is the one movement and

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100 Supra, ch. 2, pp. 66-67.
101 CD IV/1: 496. Cf. Willis, Ethics, p. 244.
103 Barth, Shorter Commentary on Romans, pp. 72-73; italics mine. Cf. CD IV/3.2: 601-603; id., Romans, pp. 216-17.
history in which there takes place inseparably the transition of man both from a false commitment and to a true.\textsuperscript{104} Thus the statement 'freedom in obedience' is not only uncontradictory, but a necessity according to the genuine definition of human freedom.\textsuperscript{105}

If 'freedom' basically means a transition from one lordship to another, the notion of grace is inevitably involved. The objective possibility of such a transfer is the fact that 'Jesus is Victor' -- the opponent has been defeated through God's reconciling act in Jesus Christ.\textsuperscript{106}

The subjective possibility of such a transfer is the twofold capacity in one -- on the one hand, a Christian man is capable of not sinning; on the other hand, he is capable of obeying God. Such a subjective possibility, as in the case of its objective ground, cannot be the result of man's own achievement but a gift from God:\textsuperscript{107}

\begin{quote}
[The true force of human freedom] as the freedom given to man (let us put it this way) by Jesus for Jesus, it is his freedom for intercourse with God, his freedom to be both from God and to God ... And this does not have only the negative meaning that they are independent, but the positive that they are able and powerful. In the determination and limitation given them in their intercourse with God they are men of unconditional and unlimited capacity. They can think rightly and desire rightly, wait rightly and hasten rightly, obey rightly and defy rightly, begin rightly and end
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{104} CD IV/3.2: 663. Italics mine.

\textsuperscript{105} Barth, 'Gift of Freedom' in Humanity of God, p. 76, 'It would be a strange freedom that would leave man neutral, able equally to choose, decide, and act rightly or wrongly! ... Trying to escape from being in accord with God's own freedom is not human freedom ... Sinful man is not free, he is a captive, a slave. When genuine human freedom is realised, inevitably the door to the "right" opens and the door to the "left" is shut. This inevitability is what makes God's gift of freedom so marvelous, and yet at the same time so terrifying. As a gift of God, human freedom cannot contradict divine freedom.' For a more detailed discussion, see S. K. Park, 'Man in Karl Barth's Doctrine of Election' (Ph.D. dissertation, Drew University, 1966), pp. 72-89.

\textsuperscript{106} K. Barth, Die Wirklichkeit des neuen Mensch (Zollikon-Zurich: Evangelischer Verlag, 1950), pp. 23-25. Cf. also supra, ch. 2, pp. 62-68, the discussion of the reconstitution of man's being through the vicarious humanity of Jesus Christ.

\textsuperscript{107} Barth, 'Gift of Freedom' in Humanity of God, pp. 75-78. Also CD 1/2: 257-65; id., Christian Life, pp. 71-72.
rightly, be with and for men rightly and by themselves rightly. They can do all these things and do them rightly ... because in faith they have the freedom of God's partners; not a freedom which they have chosen or sneaked or stolen or robbed, but the freedom for which God Himself has freed them. 108

Claiming such a foundation of 'God-given' freedom, Barth can freely speak without any hesitation of man's 'free obedience' as the response to God's command. 109 Since a Christian man is simul justus et peccator, the foundation of any possibility to do good can only be the gift of God. Thus for Barth, Christian ethics can only be and always is 'good-news' ethics (evangelische Ethik). 'The accuracy of his [viz., the Christian man's] actions is to follow the nature and character of his God-given freedom. Therefore it is no problem at all to name his "freedom" as the given "law" or "command". Man does the good when he acts according to the imperative inherent in the gift of freedom. He does the evil when he obeys a law that is contrary to his freedom.' 110

We have seen the continuity (viz., there is no 'neutral' freedom as such) and the contrast (viz., freedom as a 'capacity' given by God as a gift) between Barth's negative and positive approaches to human freedom. Yet we can also understand Barth's emphasis from an experiential level when he speaks of 'freedom in obedience'. Libertas Christiana is different from the freedom of a fallen man because it marks a completely different mode in experience. Although phenomenologically both of them are not unlimited freedom but 'freedom' under a lordship, the relationship between the


freedom and lordship of a fallen man consists only in hostility and imprisonment. But Christian freedom, on the other hand, is marked with joy, love and thanksgiving. This freedom is 'the joy whereby man appropriates for himself God's election.' And a Christian's love and thanksgiving display a genuine response out of his willful heart and soul to God's act of love and free gift. Here we find a perfect harmony between freedom and obedience:

In Christian love the loving subject gives to the other, the object of love, that which it has, which is its own, which belongs to it. It does so irrespective of the right or claim that it may have to it, or the further use that it might make of it. It does so in confirmation of the freedom in respect of itself which it has in its critical beginning... To do this the loving man has given up control of himself to place himself under the control of the other, the object of his love. He is free to that end. In this freedom he loves as what the Christian love should be.

Such a 'voluntariness of obedience' (die Freiwilligkeit des Gehorens) in love and praise of God is not only the essence of the Christian life, but also the most revealing and authentic mode of human freedom.

To sum up our preceding survey, one can see that there are three levels of emphasis when Barth suggests the apparently paradoxical statement 'freedom in obedience'. On the definitional level, the formulation is not self-contradictory because 'freedom', rightly understood, cannot be 'neutral' as such but is inevitably limited by the presence of lordship. This is the reality of human freedom. And on the level of recognizing the Christian man as simul iustus et peccator, 'freedom to obey God' emphasizes the contrast between man's original inability and the God-given freedom.

111 See CD IV/2: 485-98; CD IV/1: 435-45.
112 Barth, 'Gift of Freedom' in Humanity of God, pp. 78-83.
113 See ibid., p. 82; CD IV/2: 785-86. See also Hedinger, Freiheitsbegriff, pp. 238-40.
114 CD IV/2: 733. The translation is modified according to the original text. Italics mine.
115 See CD I/2: 371-454 on 'the love of God' and 'the praise of God' as the essence of the Christian life.
which enables man to do good according to the command of God. And finally, on the experiential level, 'freedom in obedience' means man's joyful willingness in his response to God with self-giving love and committing thanksgiving. In such a way, human freedom is authentically fulfilled in the mode of a perfect harmony between freedom and the bondage of love. 117

One has to acknowledge that Barth's interpretation of human freedom is a powerful challenge to any individualistic approach to the notion. Man is not completely independent, nor is he a self-sufficient being. 118 As John Macquarrie rightly observes, 'human freedom is always limited ... [and] conjoined with finitude.' 119 Man is subjected to spatial and temporal limitations from without, and moral bondage from within. 120 In the face of this human reality, Barth's suggestion that 'human freedom is only secondarily freedom from limitations and threats [but] primarily it is freedom for' is illuminating. 121 Furthermore, if the authentic mode of this 'freedom for' is 'freedom in obedience', 122 a perfect manifestation of


120 That man is subjected to spatial limitation (viz., bodily finitude and natural laws of the physical universe) is an obvious fact. For temporal limitations, Macquarrie's delineation should be quoted again: 'We never enjoy an absolute freedom (I have already criticized Sartre for exaggerating freedom) and we never confront entirely open possibilities. People do speak of "the open future", but the tragedy is that the future is never fully open ... Always to some extent the future is foreclosed by the past and the present ... no individual and no generation ever begins from scratch, so to speak, or is faced with an entirely open future.' (In Search of Humanity, p. 18). Barth's understanding of man's inability to do good has been discussed. For a general discussion, see Thiellec, Ethics 1: 281-90.

121 Barth, 'Gift of Freedom' in Humanity of God, p. 78.

such authentic freedom can only be found in the event that God, in His unlimited freedom, commits Himself as the covenant-God; and man, in his limited freedom, becomes the covenant-partner of God and doer of His command in joy, love and thanksgiving. 'To be man is to be with God.' This is not a tyrannical assertion, but a realistic description of authentic humanity.


If 'man does not belong to himself ... [and] does not exist in vacuum,' how is it different to be a 'man as God's correspondent' (der Gott entsprechende Mensch)? At this point, Barth makes an important distinction between the 'history' (Geschichte) and the 'state' (Zustand) of the being of man:

The concept of history in its true sense as distinct from that of a state is introduced and achieved when something happens to a being in a certain state, i.e., when something new and other than its own nature befalls it. History, therefore, does not occur when the being is involved in changes or different modes of behaviour intrinsic to itself, but when something takes place upon and to the being as it is. The history of a being begins, continues and is completed when something other than itself and transcending its own nature encounters it, approaches it and determines its being in the nature proper to it, so that it is compelled and enabled to transcend itself in response and in relation to this new factor.


124 CD II/2: 641.
126 CD III/2: 158. Italics mine.
As a result of the sense of thankfulness and responsibility before God, man arrives at a new awareness of his selfhood. This can be seen in three aspects, viz., self-identity, self-acceptance and self-integration.

"How is a being to collect itself as long as the mania of his detached I-hood chases it ceaselessly around an empty circle?" The transcendence of selfhood and full humanity emerges when 'in the first place, the fragmentariness of the individual must be overcome by his joining himself with others ... [and finally] he must transcend towards God and find his true centre there.' Barth elucidates this new self-identity of man with the idea that man has to see his life as a 'divine loan' (göttliche Leihgabe) from God: 'The freedom for life to which man is summoned by the command of God is the freedom to treat as a loan both the life of all men with his own and his own with that of all men.' Under such an awareness of life as a loan, man can have a genuine respect for life in the sense of 'astonishment, humility, awe, modesty, circumspection and carefulness.' Also man has to protect life because 'human life -- one's

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127 For an elucidation of man's 'thankfulness' and 'responsibility' before God, see ibid., pp. 166-98.


129 Macquarrie, In Search of Humanity, p. 46. For a detailed survey of how man can find his identity only through his encounter and communion with others, see C. Yu, 'The Contrast of two Ontological Models as a Clue to Indigenous Theology' (D.Phil. dissertation, University of Oxford, 1981), pp. 348-63. Yu starts with a survey of how the ancient Israelites found their identity through communion and involvement with God and the cosmos in the history of Covenant. With his ontological interpretation of the biblical concept of Covenant, Yu concludes that 'Biblical man's perception of "reality" is much more dynamic. "Reality" is perceived more as a drama of unfolding and fulfilment of being through interaction and communion taken as a mere collocation of things with distinct identity. Here, identity and relation cannot be separated. One's identity is revealed and fulfilled in and through involvement with that which is other than oneself.' (ibid., p. 336)

130 CD III/4: 335.

131 Ibid., p. 340. For full implications of such an attitude as 'the will to life' in various ethical issues regarding the responsible attitude towards plants and animals, concern for health, celebration of joy, and the authentic use of power, see ibid., pp. 344-97.
own and that of others -- belongs to God. It is His loan and blessing.\(^{132}\) Only from such a standpoint, can we see 'suicide' and 'homicide' from a wider and higher perspective.\(^{133}\) Finally, if human life is a loan, an authentic view of work can be neither activism nor passivism. For man does not work for his own sake, but 'in work he affirms his particular existence corresponding to the particular divine affirmation conferred by his creation as man.'\(^{134}\)

'Self-acceptance' means that man acknowledges his limitations given by God not as 'something derogatory, or even a kind of curse or affliction,'\(^{135}\) but joyfully responds to them in freedom and obedience.\(^{136}\) Regarding man's vocation, authentic obedience means a responsible choice according to 'the limits which God has set for him' (viz., 'his historical situation and personal endowment') and an openness to God's lordship of renewing.\(^{137}\) And finally, an authentic view of human honour also cannot be acquired through an 'inward convincing.' 'The once-for-all and unique thing in every man [viz., honour as 'distinction'], his value to himself and in the eyes of others, his reputation, is the honour which is his as the creature of God and from God.'\(^{138}\) Thus authentic honour is man's 'creaturely honour' which can really be his 'only as it comes to man from God and is accepted by him as God's free gift.'\(^{139}\)

The third aspect to elucidate the difference between man as God's correspondence and man as a being-for-himself is the problem of integration and disunity of selfhood. We have seen, in our survey of Barth's

\(^{132}\) Ibid., p. 397.
\(^{133}\) For details, see ibid., pp. 400-470.
\(^{134}\) Ibid., p. 518. For concrete criteria of work as 'the active affirmation of human existence;' see ibid., pp. 527-64.
\(^{135}\) Ibid., p. 567.
\(^{136}\) Ibid., pp. 565-94.
\(^{137}\) Ibid., pp. 630-47.
\(^{138}\) Ibid., p. 656.
\(^{139}\) Ibid., p. 662. For concrete criteria of 'what is honourable?' see ibid., pp. 656-85.
Christological Anthropology, that man has 'oneness' and 'wholeness' with regard to his soul and body.\textsuperscript{140} Authentic humanity, as manifest in the humanity of Jesus Christ, is 'a meaningfully ordered unity [sinnhaft geordnete Einheit] of soul and body.'\textsuperscript{141} The basis of such self-integration is the presence of the Spirit.\textsuperscript{142} Man does not possess spirit, he can only receive the Spirit as 'something that totally limits his constitution and thus totally determines' him.\textsuperscript{143} From such a perspective, Barth concludes again that '[man] is not without God':

\begin{quote}
[Man's] being is no fanciful picture, that man really is, is ontically and therefore noetically dependent on the fact that he is not without God ... Man cannot escape God, because he always derives from Him ... Man as soul and body is in no case so made that he is simply there, as though self-grounded, self-based, self-constituted and self-maintained.\textsuperscript{144}
\end{quote}

What, then, will happen if man rejects this ontological reality of his selfhood? Barth sees the case in man's religious striving for self-justification and self-sanctification. And he elucidates the consequence through his interpretation of Rom. 7.\textsuperscript{145} The result, as we can see from Rom. 7:14-25, is 'the disunity of an existence in which he does not what he does, or do what he wills.'\textsuperscript{146} And this 'fatal contradiction between

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{141} \textit{CD} III/2: 340-41.
\textsuperscript{142} Ibid., pp. 344-66.
\textsuperscript{143} Ibid., p. 354.
\textsuperscript{145} See Barth, \textit{Romans}, pp. 229-70.
\textsuperscript{146} \textit{CD} II/2: 727. Italics mine. Cf. also Barth, \textit{Romans}, p. 266, 'Our whole behaviour proves us to be in no way at one with ourselves; and for this reason, our relation to God is a disturbed relation. Happy the man who is able to deny this evident truth! May he long remain innocent of his own questionableness! The reality of religion, however, lies precisely in the utter questionableness of my EGO, confronted, as it is, by my inability to do what I would and by my ability to do what I would not. The subject of these contrasted predicates -- my EGO -- becomes an \( x \), capable neither of life nor of death ... Thus my noblest capacity becomes my deepest perplexity; my noblest opportunity, my uttermost distress; my noblest gift, my darkest menace.'
\end{quote}
willing and doing' is 'the separation between body and soul (which is death!)'. Thus to sum up our preceding survey, we still have the same statement: 'To be man is to be with God.' And furthermore, 'man is not [man] without God [der Mensch nicht ohne Gott ist].'

3. Faithfulness in invocation.

Although the notions of 'faithfulness' (Treu) and 'invocation of God' (Anrufung Gottes) become the main themes in Barth's interpretation of God's command within the context of Reconciliation, the idea of prayer as a human activity in relation to God has emerged in his earlier writings on Christian ethics and Christian life. It is interesting to notice that, for Barth, prayer as a particular act in Christian ethics is equally essential to each of the three doctrines of Creation, Reconciliation and Redemption. But why is it so important to Christian ethics (and thus authentic humanity)? The answer is: When we speak of the authentic mode of the God-man encounter as 'freedom in obedience', the basic activity in man's response to God's grace is prayer:

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147 CD II/2: 728.  
148 CD III/2: 345.  
149 See Dickinson, 'Dogmatics IV/4' in Barth in Re-view, p. 44.  
151 'Prayer' is regarded as a 'commanded activity' where man, in his freedom before God the Creator, 'present[s] himself before God wholly and utterly as a justified petition [Gesuch] directed to Him.' (KD III/4: 95). And in the sphere of covenantal grace, invocation as the divine command of God the Reconciler is 'the basic meaning of all human obedience ... in freedom, conversion, faith, gratitude, and faithfulness.' (Barth, Christian Life, p. 44) Also, as the command of promise from God the Redeemer, 'prayer is the actualization of our eschatological reality that is possible here and now.' (Barth, Ethics, pp. 472-73)  
The work of God's righteousness and the work of man's obedience come together in the freedom given the Christian to join with Jesus Christ in the invocation of the one true God, whom the Christian knows he has to thank for everything and from whom he may ask everything.\footnote{Barth, Heidelberg Catechism, p. 115. E.T. is modified according to the original text.}

Thus the act of prayer characterizes the authentic mode of the Christian life. For Barth, a prayer life is a life of confession (and thus praise and thanking), faithfulness, petition and hope.

Contrary to the mystical tradition which regards prayer as contemplation and the way to \textit{unio mystica},\footnote{See, for example, A. Poulain, The Graces of Interior Prayer: A Treatise on Mystical Theology, trans. L. Y. Smith (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., 1912).} Barth sees prayer together with \textit{confession}: 'Prayer and confession are related in respect of their common basis in the knowledge of God, like breathing out, systole and diastole.'\footnote{CD III/4: 87-88.}

To be a Christian and to pray mean the same thing, and not a thing which can be left to our own wayward impulses. It is, rather, a necessity, as breathing is necessary to life ... \textit{prayer is quite simply the primary act of recognition towards God}. The word "recognition" is more precise than "gratitude" because it means acting in accordance with what we recognize or know: everyone who knows God must express his recognition to him. He recognizes what God is and what he has done for man in Jesus Christ; he assumes the position which is ours in Christ, and in that position man must pray.\footnote{K. Barth, \textit{Prayer and Preaching}, trans. S. F. Terrien and B. E. Hooke (London: SCM, 1964), p. 19.}

Such an understanding clearly echoes Barth's idea of 'faith': 'As a human act it \textit{[Anerkennen], recognition [Erkennen] and confession [Bekennen]}. As this human act it has no creative but only a cognitive character. It does not alter anything.'\footnote{CD IV/1: 751. Italics mine.} Thus when we ask: 'What are we to do?' God's demand is 'rest' -- 'a deliberate non-continuation' in order 'to reflect on God
and His work and to participate consciously in the salvation provided by Him and to be awaited from Him.' 158 Thus the 'primal and basic form of the whole Christian ethos,' which man can exemplify in prayer, is an acknowledgement -- the confession, praise and thanksgiving of what God has done for him in Jesus Christ. 159

Certainly prayer does not only consist of confession. 160 From His own faithfulness, God also demands man's faithfulness in response: 161

God activates and reveals his own faithfulness in Jesus Christ. What he thus wills and requires of man is that he manifest and attest a similar faithfulness for his part. Faithfulness is a steady and lasting perseverance in thought, word, attitude, and act. It is endurance and persistence in a union, commitment, and obligation that is laid upon man with both kindness and strictness. 162

'Faithfulness' is chosen to be the 'guiding concept' of the command of God the Reconciler because this notion 'brings out most precisely' the situation of the covenant between God and man 'and therefore the Christian life as the will of God which man must obediently do.' 163 But faithfulness is

158 CD III/4: 50. This is the reason why Barth arranges the Sabbath command at the beginning of his volume on theological ethics (cf. ibid., pp. 49-72). The reason is: 'By demanding man's abstention and resting from his own works, it explains that the commanding God who has created man and enabled and commissioned him to do his own work, is the God who is gracious to man in Jesus Christ. Thus it points him away from everything that he himself can will and achieve and back to what God is for him and will do for him.' (p. 53)


160 Ibid., p. 88.

161 The idea goes back to Barth's particular paraphrase of Rom. 1:17 as 'Denn die Gerechtigkeit Gott enthüllt sich in ihr: aus Treue dem Glauben [ἐκ πίστεως εἰς πίστιν], wie geschrieben steht: Der Gerechte wird leben aus meiner Treue.' (Barth, Römerbrief 2, p. 10; italics mine). And Barth's interpretation is: 'The man who, perceiving the faithfulness of God in the very fact that He has set us within the realm of that which contradicts the course of this world, meets the faithfulness of God with a corresponding fidelity ... Where the faithfulness of God encounters the fidelity of men, there is manifested His righteousness. There shall the righteous man live.' (id., Romans, pp. 39, 42)

162 Barth, Christian Life, p. 39.

163 Barth, 'First Version of sec. 74' in ibid., p. 280.
not only an attitude in response to God; it is also a mark of authentic humanity.\textsuperscript{164} For 'what God in the word of his Holy Spirit demands and expects of the Christian as a member of his people is his wholly personal action, faithfulness in the form of a very definite inner and outer attitude, the display of a very definite character, namely, that which is appropriate to him as a man who is confronted with the faithfulness of the God who is gracious precisely to him.'\textsuperscript{165}

The third characteristic of a prayer life is a life of petition. A life of 'calling upon God' manifests a twofold spiritual reality: On the one hand, 'spiritual life is not just a matter of a single moment, or a number of exalted moments' for it 'is constantly threatened, each day afresh in evil ways, by interruption and even cessation, the end. Certainly they [viz., the Christians] have in themselves no security against this threat.' Thus to call upon God is to remind oneself of the eternal grace from the triune God, which is 'just as valid and effective today as yesterday and tomorrow, ensure the continuity of the Christian life, the perserverance of the saints.'\textsuperscript{166} On the other hand, calling upon God means that, as the children of God, Christians can play an active and vital part in God's activity in human history:

\[\text{The history of the God-man encounter is a living relation in which not only God acts but these specific people [viz., the children of God] may and should be truly active as well. The grace of God is the liberation of these specific people for free, spontaneous, and responsible cooperation in this history.}\textsuperscript{167}

\textsuperscript{164} For human 'fidelity' as a mark of authentic humanity, there are profound discussions in the works of Gabriel Marcel. A good survey can be found in J. McCown, Availability: Gabriel Marcel and the Phenomenology of Human Openness (Missoula: Scholars Press, 1978), pp. 67-74.

\textsuperscript{165} Barth, 'First Version of sec. 74' in Christian Life, p. 285. Italics mine. See also ibid., p. 132.

\textsuperscript{166} Barth, Christian Life, p. 94.

\textsuperscript{167} Ibid., p. 102. Also id., Heidelberg Catechism, p. 116, sec. 26.
Thus the petition of a Christian is an authentically 'free and responsible human action.'\textsuperscript{168} God 'does not merely hear' but 'hears and answers.'\textsuperscript{169} This is the grounding of regarding the Lord's prayer as the theme of special ethics. For there is an inseparable 'connection between creed and deed, theory and practice.'\textsuperscript{170} When we really pray the six petitions in the Lord's Prayer, we are also walking and living with God in agreement with His purpose.\textsuperscript{171} In such a way, we are really transforming ourselves and the world through prayer.\textsuperscript{172}

\textsuperscript{168} Barth, Christian Life, p. 102.
\textsuperscript{169} Ibid., p. 103. Cf. also CD II/1: 510-12. Such an idea of 'responsible cooperation', together with the notion of Baptism (cf. CD IV/4: 41-213), indicates a 'move' in Barth's later writings towards a vital regard for human subjectivity. (Cf. supra, ch. 2, p. 92, n.342. See also K. Bockmühl, 'Die Wende im Spätwerk Karl Barths,' ThBeitr 14 [1983]: 180-88.) Unfortunately Barth did not live long enough to provide us further elaborations. The significance of this idea for Christian ethics has been observed by Jüngel, 'Anrufung Gottes' in Anspruch der Wirklichkeit und christlicher Glaube, pp. 214-15, 'Das ist die fundamentale ethische Analogie ... So wie Gott kein deus otiosus ist, so ist auch der Mensch kein homo otiosus. Das ist Barths -- schon in der Tauflehre aufklingender -- „Synergismus". Der Gedanke einer cooperatio zwischen Gott und Mensch im Verkehr beider miteinander hat hier seine genuin protestantische, seine evangelische Fassung gefunden. Denn indem diese cooperatio gerade im Gebet ihren Sitz im Leben haben soll, also da, wo der Unterschied zwischen göttlichem und menschlichem Tun in seiner größten Reinheit und Strenge erfahren wird, gewinnt der paulinische Gedanke, daß wir συνεργοί θεού sind (1 Kor 3,9), eine neue Wendung, die sowohl recht verstandener katholischer Lehre als auch der reformatorischen Auffassung zu gemeinsamem Fortschritt zu verhelfen vermag.'

\textsuperscript{170} Barth, Heidelberg Catechism, p. 139.
\textsuperscript{171} Barth, Prayer and Preaching, p. 29. Thus in his exposition of the Heidelberg Catechism (question 122-127), Barth writes:

'Question 122: When I pray, "Hallowed be thy name," I begin to know God rightly, to hallow, glorify, and praise him. If I did not pray this way, I would not really be praying.

Question 123: When I pray, "Thy kingdom come," I am willing and ready to affirm the church of Jesus Christ as the dawn of his kingdom.

Question 124: When I pray, "Thy will be done," I subject myself to the will of God and renounce my will.

Question 125: When I pray, "Give us this day our daily bread," I acknowledge God as the only source of all that is good.

Question 126: When I pray, "Forgive us our debts," I humble myself before God and put myself in a position to forgive my neighbor.

Question 127: When I pray, "Lead us not into temptation," I am confident of God's help.'

(Barth, Heidelberg Catechism, pp. 139-40)

Finally we come to the *life of hope* in prayer: 'When we pray our human condition is laid bare to us and we are made aware of both our distress and our hope. It is God who places us in this situation, but at the same time he comes to our help. Prayer is therefore man's response when he understands his distress and knows that help is at hand.' 173 What constitutes the life of a Christian, viz., the *vita humana Christiana*, is his 'looking back and looking forward.' 174 And 'Christian hope is an uninterrupted and unequivocally positive expectation of the future.' 175 Such a 'looking forward' is 'positive' because 'the hoping person looks gladly, willingly, and joyfully beyond the present and away from himself.' 176 This can be done only when we derive our hope from God. 'The expectation of the future which derives and proceeds from man himself can never escape the vacillation of its gaze between the inward and the outward, the cosmos and the individual, an abstract beyond and an equally abstract present.' 177 By looking forward to the *parousia* of Jesus Christ and backward to what God has done in Him, the Christian hopes 'for the ultimate in the penultimate.' 178 As a result, the Christian hope, which is an *authentic* hope, is not bound to changing situations on the one hand, and is distinct from 'idle contemplation' on the other hand. Furthermore, since the coming of Jesus Christ is not a private matter, Christians can 'stand in the public ministry of witness to Jesus Christ' and hope 'not only for the ultimate dénouement but for all kinds of penultimate developments as intimations of the coming judgment and redemption.' 179

175 CD IV/3.2: 910.
177 CD IV/3.2: 910, 939-40.
'To be a Christian and to pray mean the same thing.' Through prayer the Christian life is characterized by confession (with praise and thanksgiving), faithfulness, petition and hope. This is an authentic life because it looks backward and forward on the basis of the eternal grace, love and promise of God the Creator, the Reconciler and the Redeemer.

To be Man is to be with Men

1. Authentic humanity as fellow-humanity.

We come to the second dimension of Barth's delineation of authentic humanity, viz., to be a man in the presence of other men. Barth's remark on this respect is simple, yet forceful: 'The "I" without "thou" is not man ... Humanity is fellow-humanity.' One can observe a growing enthusiasm among Barth's interpreters to regard this idea of 'fellow-humanity' as a significant contribution to the understanding of authentic humanity. Certainly Barth is not the one who originated such a notion. In fact,

180 Barth, Prayer and Preaching, p. 19.
181 See Barth, Christian Life, p. 94.
182 Barth, Humanismus, p. 8, 'Das Ich ohne Du ist kein Mensch ... Menschlichkeit ist Mitmenschlichkeit.'
184 According to M. Theunissen, 'Ich-Du-Verhältnis' in HWP 4: 20, the terminology goes back to W. von Humboldt's Über die Verschiedenheiten des menschlichen Sprachbaues (1827-29).
the notion of an 'I-thou encounter' has been applied to various disciplines of study since the beginning of the twentieth century, such as Psychology and Education. But Barth, while contrasting his understanding of humanity with nineteenth century German-Christian humanism and the 'new humanism' among the Western European intellectuals after the Second World War (which can be represented by the Recontres Internationales held in Geneva, September 1949), expounds the idea of 'fellow-humanity' so exhaustively that it becomes the basic criterion of authentic humanity in his theology.

One can feel Barth's full conviction when he declares,

Humanity is fellow-humanity. What is not fellow-humanity is inhumanity ... [This is the] reality in history that necessarily takes place between men. Here we stand before a question which, from the perspective of the Christian proclamation, stands over every individualistic and every collectivistic humanism, old or new. It excludes neither individualism nor collectivism. It bears on the individual and also on society, but always on the concrete individual as distinct from other individuals, and always on the society founded on free reciprocal responsibility. It defends discipline in the face of Nietzsche and freedom in the face of Marx. In contemporary terms, it defends the truth of socialism in the face of the West and the truth of personalism in the face of the East. It is an inexorable protest against any conception of man either as master or as mass. It recognizes and acknowledges human dignity, duty, and rights only in the context of the realization that true human existence means existence together with one's fellowmen.

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185 See ibid., cols. 19-21.
186 See Stock, Anthropologie der Verheißung, p. 130. Barth and the Catholic theologian A. J. Maydieu were the only Christians in the 'Recontres Internationales de Genève 1949'. The article 'Die Aktualität der christlichen Botschaft' was Barth's address in the conference (1 Sep., 1949). And the lecture 'Humanismus' (delivered in Zurich, 2 Feb., 1950) was Barth's reflections on the Geneva conference. The two essays were published together under the title Humanismus as no.28 in the series of Theologische Studien (Zollikon-Zurich: Evangelische Verlag, 1950).
187 Barth, 'Die Aktualität der christlichen Botschaft' in Humanismus, pp. 8-9. E.T. by P. M. van Buren in God Here and Now, pp. 6-7, with modifications according to the original text. We are not going to give a summary of Barth's doctrine of fellow-humanity (especially in his CD III/2, sec. 45, pt. 2). An elaborated survey has been provided by Anderson, On Being Human, pp. 44-54, 69-87, 104-129, 167-72. Also, a comprehensive survey from theological and philosophical perspectives can be found in Stock, Anthropologie der Verheißung, pp. 130-42. Cf. also Yu, 'Contrast of Two Ontological Models,' pp. 124-243; through his critical survey of the
Barth's 'relational ontology' is not limited to his understanding of humanity. In fact, it can be regarded as the theological approach in his Dogmatics, if we remember that, for Barth, analogia fidei means analogia relationis. According to Eberhard Jüngel, there are at least six pairs of relation analogically linked up with each other in Barth's theology: in addition to God's innertrinitarian perichoresis and man's fellow-humanity, there are relations between God and the man Jesus, between Jesus and the human being in general, between soul and body, and also other relational orders (such as male and female, heaven and earth, etc.). To sum up, in Barth's own word, 'I cannot say "I" without also saying "Thou" ... "I am" -- the true and filled "I am" -- may thus be paraphrase: "I am in encounter." ... Thus the formula: "I am as Thou art," tells us that the encounter between I and Thou is not arbitrary or accidental, that it is not incidentally but essentially proper to the concept of man. Thus for Barth, the 'mystery of humanity' (Geheimnis der Humanität) is an ontology of openness in mutual relationship which is dynamic, personal, joyful and free.

Western philosophic tradition on humanity (from the pre-Socratics to Descartes), concludes that to see man as 'being-in-itself' can only result in 'depersonalization' and 'desacralization'. Only if we acknowledge human being as 'being-in-communion' can we arrive at 'a culture in which man and the cosmos are infinitely affirmed through being grounded on the source of being. It is a culture where alienation and ambiguity are overcome. It is a culture in which an inner certainty of being is experienced.' (Ibid., pp. 337-65)

188 See supra, ch. 2, pp. 17-19.

189 See supra, ch. 2, pp. 51-53.

190 E. Jüngel, 'Die Möglichkeit theologischer Anthropologie auf dem Grunde der Analogie. Eine Untersuchung zum Analogieverständnis Karl Barth's,' EvTh 22 (1962): 541-42. For a detailed elaboration and schematization, see Becker, 'Menschsein im Dialog,' pp. 30-41. See also K. Barth, 'A Theological Dialogue,' ThTo 19 (1962/63): 173. One can also see a strong motive of relational ontology in Barth's understanding of the covenantal relationship between God and man, the 'humanity' of God and the concept of freedom.

191 CD III/2: 244-49.

2. The Christian community and the realization of authentic humanity.

'To be man is to be with men.' But what does this statement imply when we consider the concrete situation in human life? At this point we encounter Barth's conception of Christian community. For Barth, any noetic realization of man's ontic determination must be mediated and conditioned (vermittelt und bedingt ist) by the community.193 Barth's emphasis on the precedence of the solidarity of human existence is clearly manifest in his interjection of the election of the community between the election of Jesus Christ and the election of the individual.194 The order (viz., from community to the individual) cannot be reversed because the community is the 'necessary medium' as the 'witness' where the 'individuals' are reached and encountered by the Word of God, summoned to faith and confession, baptised and gathered into the church.195 When we come to the 'subjective realization' (subjektive Realisierung) of God's reconciliation with man, the precedence of the Christian community is again explicitly clear -- if man is justified, sanctified and called in Jesus Christ, the individual Christian virtues (viz., faith, love and hope) cannot be realized individually, but within the context of the gathering, upbuilding and sending of the Christian community by the work of the Holy Spirit.

If it is true that Christian love is that which (with Christian faith and Christian hope) makes an individual man a Christian, we have to remember that the individual man does not become a Christian, and live as such, in a vacuum, but in a definite historical context ... He does so on the basis and in the meaning and purpose of the

193 CD II/2: 196.
existence of the community ... [The Christian love and life] must be surrounded and supported and nourished and critically limited by this representation in its totality, i.e., by the life and love of the community, if it is to make its own contribution to this representation in its totality. Even the greatest saint is only this one man -- a saint with others in the communion of saints. And he is not perpetuo manu. He is a saint only in the *ecclesia perpetuo manu*. He would not be a saint if he tried to be so in and for himself ... Extra *ecclesiam nulla salus*. We shall have good reason to remember this assertion. 196

Barth is not asserting a Roman Catholic idea here, although he finds 'a surprising measure of formal agreement with it in the doctrine of the Church.' 197 For Barth, the priority of *communio sanctorum* in the realization of individual Christian virtues does not come from the Church's possession of any *intrinsic* authority, but only by the free grace of God does the Church become 'the living community of the living Lord Jesus Christ.' 198 Barth's Ecclesiology is characterized by his belief that the essence of the Christian community is an *event*. 199 Thus the

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196 CD IV/2: 614-622. Also K. Barth, *The Faith of the Church: A Commentary on the Apostle's Creed*, trans. G. Vahanian (London: Collins Fontana Books, 1960), p. 115, 'the Church precedes the individual and particular gifts. The modernist conception of the Church is exactly the reverse: first of all they speak of what the individual receives, then of the free incorporation into a "church" of these lucky individuals who have individually received their salvation.' Also CD IV/1: 705-707.


198 See CD I/2: 213-220. Also K. Barth, 'The Church: The Living Congregation of the Living Lord Jesus Christ' (1948) in *God Here and Now*, pp. 61-85; CD IV/1: 650-68. Cf. also Barth, 'Der Begriff der Kirche,' *ZZ* 5: 372-76.

199 See Barth, 'Church' in *God Here and Now*, pp. 62-67. Cf. also H. Fries, 'Kirche als Ereignis. Zu Karl Barths Lehre von der Kirche,' *Cath(M)* 11 (1958): 81-107; H. Honecker, *Kirche als Gestalt und Ereignis* (Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1963), pp. 168-69, 174-201. The 'happening character' of the Christian community means: (i) Concerning the being of the community, 'we must abandon the usual distinctions between being and act, status and dynamics, essence and existence. Its act is its being, its status its dynamic, its essence its existence.' (CD IV/1: 650) (ii) From an 'eschatological' point of view, 'the concept "Church" is a concept of dynamic reality. It speaks of the Lord Jesus Christ risen from the dead
Christian community is primarily not an institution but the 'concrete happening' between God and man in time. This concrete and living encounter means, on the one hand, that only in the community is there 'the perceiving and attesting of His [viz., Jesus Christ's] real presence, the recognisable and recognised union of a concrete human fellowship with Him.'\footnote{CD IV/1: 665.} On the other hand, 'in the freedom of their subordination to Him who is Lord of them all, [the community] find themselves united also in freedom toward each other.'\footnote{Barth, 'Church' in God Here and Now, p. 63.} To sum up, as a God-man encounter, the Christian community (in its precedence over the individual Christian) is the eschatological realization of God's election and reconciliation. As the \textit{communio sanctorum}, the community realizes Christian maturity as 'the integrity in and through interrelatedness which makes it possible for each individual

\[\text{[viz., the first parousia] and of His congregation which is hurrying from there toward His future self-revelation [viz., the second parousia]. This concept speaks of the peculiar \textit{history} between God and man in the time which is determined and characterized by these two dates, one being its beginning, the other its goal.} \text{(Barth, 'Church' in God Here and Now, p. 62)} \text{See also CD IV/1: 725-39. Cf. also Bäumler, \textit{Kirche}, pp. 10-12. (iii) 'The community is the earthly-historical form of existence of Jesus Christ Himself ... He [viz., Jesus Christ] does not live only above human history on earth, addressing Himself to it only from above and from afar and from without. He Himself lives in a special element of this history created and controlled by Him ... This particular element of human history, this earthly-historical form of existence of Jesus Christ, is the Christian community. He is the Head of this body, the community. And it is the body which has its Head in Him. It belongs to Him, and He belongs to it.' (CD IV/1: 661) (iv) The Christian community is 'in concrete form, therefore, and visible to everyone.' It is 'a specific and yet also an integrated, a distinctive and yet not a unique element in the whole of human culture, its achievements and its destinies.' Thus as an eschatological existence, 'in the unity of faith' the Christian community 'is gathered in every age, from many peoples and tribes, to be a \textit{provisional representation} of all humanity as justified in Jesus Christ.' (Ibid., pp. 652-53, 727; italics mine)\]
member of an organic whole to be himself in togetherness, and in togetherness each to be himself.'

3. Fellow-humani ty in the context of man and his world.

The realization of authentic humanity as fellow-humanity, according to Barth, should not be confined only to the Christian community. If it is ontological reality of humanity as a whole, the implication must be extended to the world beyond the body of Christ. As we have seen, Barth never permits the created cosmos to have any independent order outside God's covenant of grace. Since Jesus Christ is the elected man, 'He enclosed us on all sides, and we all, unasked and whether we know and like it or not, derive from Him and return to Him.' The creaturely history is always 'a "predicate" of salvation history.' Thus considering the realization of authentic humanity in 'world-history' (Weltgeschichte), we have the same criterion:

[God] wills that man's being should fulfil itself as being in the encounter, in the relationship, in the togetherness of I and Thou. He commands him, invites him and challenges him not merely to allow his humanity as fellow-humanity to be his nature, but to affirm and exercise it in his own decision, in action and omission.

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202 Lehmann, Ethics, p. 55. Here I borrow Lehmann's idea of 'koinonia ethics'. See also Anderson, On Being Human, pp. 179-93. We will not go into the details of Barth's ecclesiastical structure in practice. For a schema, see Bäumler, Kirche, p. 38. A good survey and discussion has been given by Willis, Ethics, pp. 273-94. Cf. also Wendebourg, Christusgemeinde, pp. 131-39.

203 See supra, ch. 2, pp. 30-31. See also Willis, Ethics, pp. 294-96.

204 CD IV/2: 335. See also supra, ch. 2, pp. 54-56.

205 Willis, Ethics, p. 295.

206 Cf. KD III/4: 128, 'Er [viz., Gott] will, daß sein Sein sich erfülle als Sein in der Begegnung, im Verhältnis, im Zusammensein von Ich und Du.'

207 CD III/4: 116. E.T. is modified according to the original text. Cf. the discussion of Moosbrugger, 'speziellen Ethik bei Barth,' pp. 338-42.
This divine command of fellow-humanity is exemplified by the human relationships in marriage, between parents and children, and in the socio-political realm (viz., the sphere of near and distant neighbours).  

To Barth, man as male and female is the most original form of human existence. 'It is the true humanum and therefore the true creaturely image of God.' Ontologically, it is an existence of 'differentiation and relationship,' the great paradigm of everything that is to take place between him and God, and also of everything that is to take place between him and his fellows. In practice, marriage manifests the true encounter of freedom in mutual love, self-giving, faithfulness and responsibility. Thus male-female co-existence in marriage is the first and at the same time exemplary purview of fellow-humanity. Turning to the relation of parents and children, Barth sees the realization of fellow-humanity from the divine relationship between God the Father and His Son Jesus Christ. As God's representatives, the parents are summoned to be responsible in their parental authority. And the children, viewed from the only fulfilled sonship of Jesus Christ, are required to respect their

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208 We will not discuss each relationship in detail. For a survey, see Willis, Ethics, pp. 335-63. Our task here is only concerned with how fellow-humanity can be regarded as the realization of authentic humanity within man's total cultural framework.

209 CD III/1: 186. Also ibid., p. 313, '[Gen. 2] tells us that only male and female together are man [der Mensch]. The male alone is not yet man, for it is not good for him to be alone; nor can the female alone be man, for she is taken out of the man: "They twain shall be one flesh."' See also CD III/2: 285-316.

210 CD III/1: 186. Italics mine. Also CD III/4: 150, 'Male and female being is the prototype of all I and Thou, of all the individuality in which man and man differ from and yet belong to each other.' (Italics mine) See also H. G. Pöhlmann, Analogia entis oder Analogia fidei? Die Frage der Analogie bei Karl Barth (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1965), pp. 96-98.


212 KD III/4: 128, 'Der erste und zugleich exemplarische Bereich ...'

The grounding of such a relationship -- to use the terms suggested by Eberhard Busch -- is the 'reciprocal solidarity' (die gegenseitige Solidarität) between the generations perceived from man's creatureliness in the presence of God his Creator. Extending the criterion of fellow-humanity to the socio-political sphere, Barth sets out his sharp criticism of the concepts of 'competition' (Konkurrenz) and 'appropriation' (Aneignung) in Western societies. For the concept of 'competition' means 'restriction for the life of the others,' and 'appropriation' implies an attitude that 'I live as I grasp after this or that which I need to satisfy my needs or to give me pleasure or simply to test and prove my strength, or which I want to lay by, perhaps, as a reserve for future use.' Here Barth is concerned not only with social ethics in general, but particularly concerned with the criticism of the Western politico-economic situations. Then, 'was Karl Barth a Socialist?' The question became so controversial when Friedrich-Wilhelm Marquardt published his Theologie und Sozialismus. Das Beispiel Karl Barths in 1972 that it is impossible to reproduce a full account here. But in view of his early activities as a Social Democratic Party


216 See Barth, Ethics, pp. 161-73.


member, his early 'socialist' sermons and writings, and his inclination to the socialist viewpoint regarding social and politico-economic issues. Barth did show his preference to Socialism as a politico-economic structure. Perhaps it would be going too far to agree with Marquardt that Barth's recovery of the two-nature doctrine in his Christology is an objective theological expression for the experience of socialist-Christian solidarity. It forms the organic connection between the Bible and the newspaper, and it generates the two-edged sentence that in Barth's socialist writings occurs again and again: "A true Christian must be a socialist; a true socialist should be a Christian."

But there is little doubt that Barth did show his favour to democracy rather than aristocratic or monarchic dictatorship, and to Socialism rather than Capitalism. And in view of his claim that 'togetherness in

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220 See Marquardt, Theologie und Sozialismus, pp. 39-66, 70-83; also H. Gollwitzer, Reich Gottes und Sozialismus bei Karl Barth. TEH 169 (Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1972), pp. 7-13.

221 See Marquardt, Theologie und Sozialismus, pp. 83-168. Also Dannemann, Theologie und Politik, pp. 25-54.

222 For example, his concept of labour (see R. E. Hood, 'Karl Barth's Christological Basis for the State and Political Praxis,' SJTh 33 [1980]: 236-37; also Marquardt, Theologie und Sozialismus, pp. 331-32), his preference to Internationalism than Nationalism (see CD III/4: 298-323) and his actualism of political praxis (see G. Hunsinger, 'Conclusion: Toward a Radical Barth' in Barth and Radical Politics, pp. 181-236).


224 F.-W. Marquardt, 'Sozialismus bei Karl Barth,' Junge Kirche 33 (1972), quoted from E.T. as 'Socialism in the Theology of Karl Barth' in Barth and Radical Politics, pp. 64-65.

fellow-humanity' is the criterion of authentic humanity, it seems natural for Barth to take the position of social democracy and not that of free competition between individuals.

III. THE WAY OF ANTHROPOLOGY -- 'ANALOGIA FIDEI' OR 'ANALOGIA ENTIS'? 

Our preceding survey has shown that Barth, in spite of his Christological concentration and zeal for the 'Godness' of God, has in fact a lot to say about man. To him, authentic humanity must be seen from a relational perspective: man exists in the presence of God and in the presence of other men. As far as these two relationships are concerned, his 'picture' of authentic humanity is comprehensive and persuasive.

But there is a fundamental problem in Barth's approach to Anthropology. We can start with his treatise on special ethics. One finds ambiguities in his attitude towards the so-called 'other ethics'. While claiming the self-sufficiency and autonomy of theological ethics, Barth hesitates to allow a genuine place for contributions from the human-sciences. Also according to the concreteness and definiteness of God's command for any particular circumstance, what man has to do is an 'instant obedience'. In such a way, theological ethics is 'self-interpreted' and thus needs little help from non-theological findings. But such an exclusive view of theological ethics is not easy to maintain. The main difficulty arises from his understanding of moral deliberation. He has to

und die persönliche Verantwortlichkeit zum Maßstab der Ordnung macht, liegt die Demokratie mehr in seiner Linie als eine aristokratische oder monarchische Diktatur, der Sozialismus mehr als die ungebundene Wirtschaft und das auf sie begründete Gesellschafts- und Erwerbssystem, eine föderation freier ...' Cf. also Dannemann, Theologie und Politik, pp. 207-216, 225-29, 243-51.

226 See supra, n. 71.
227 See supra, pp. 267-69.
228 See supra, pp. 269-71.
allow a place in his ethics for moral deliberation. But moral deliberation in a particular situation requires an intricate decision-process which inevitably involves an interpretation of the situation. At this point, an understanding of human-sciences is not only a necessary but also a decisive and integral factor in making a decision. In fact, one can see that different decisions on a moral issue are, in many cases, the result of different interpretations of the situation and not simply of the modes of

229 See R. E. Willis, 'Some Difficulties in Barth's Development of Special Ethics,' RelSt 6 (1970): 153-54. Also id., Ethics, pp. 328-35.

230 The names of Barth, Bonhoeffer, Brunner and Lehmann are always grouped together by the moral critics as 'contextualists' (see Outka, AGAPE, p. 229). A general problem of such a position is: There is a 'jump' between the 'command of God' revealed through the Word (even if some moral 'criteria' can be drawn from it, as Barth has demonstrated in his CD III/4), and the concrete decision one has to make under a particular situation. Especially 'when it comes down to highly particular and complex situations,' Macquarrie asks, 'who has the "hot line" so that he knows God's angle in the affair? The notion of what God is allegedly doing in the world can even be a dangerous one.' (Macquarrie, 3 Issues, p. 40) In fact, between 'moral principle' (or moral 'criteria', as Barth prefers to call; cf. supra n.79) and 'moral decisions', not only will (or 'virtue') is involved, but also experience and reason. The complexity of moral reasoning and the 'logical gap between facts and norms' has been critically discussed by K. Nielsen, 'Ethics, Problem of' in EncPhil 3: 130-32. See also H. D. Aiken, Reason and Conduct: New Bearings in Moral Philosophy (New York: Alfred. A. Knopf, 1962), pp. 98-105. A more balanced view on moral decision has been given by F. S. Carney, 'Deciding in the Situation: What is Required?' in Norm and Context in Christian Ethics, ed. G. H. Outka and P. Ramsey (London: SCM, 1969), pp. 3-16. For a discussion especially referring to Barth, see Willis, Ethics, pp. 420-27.

231 For the importance of the interpretation of the situation in moral discernment, see T. D. Perry, Moral Reasoning and Truth: An Essay in Philosophy and Jurisprudence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), pp. 38-43. The problem of Barth's ethics is, while rejecting casuistry (in this case he sides with the Contextualists), he also hesitates to employ non-theological findings to acquire an accurate and perceptive situational analysis (see Gustafson, 'Context versus Principles,' HTHR 58: 177-80). By doing this, he clearly distinguishes himself from the other Contextualists. For the Contextualists (e.g. Gustafson), though emphasizing the contextual consideration, also fully acknowledge the importance of situational analysis and social analysis (see ibid., pp. 192-201). And Barth, who rejects both casuistry and situational analysis, permits only 'an ethics of obedience in particular time and place.' (Ibid., p. 179) For a critique of Barth's 'Situationsethik', see A. Günthör, Entscheidung gegen das Gesetz. Die Stellung der Kirche, Karl Barths und Helmut Thielickes zur Situationsethik (Freiburg: Seelsorge Verlag, 1969), pp. 41-55.
'obedience' or 'disobedience'. Nevertheless, one should be reminded here that to employ non-theological findings in special ethics is

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recognized by and acceptable to Barth in his theological ethics, provided
that a radical split is made between the material content and the basis.\textsuperscript{233}

But the fact is, one can never so freely detach the material findings from
their bases in a system.\textsuperscript{234} And this is the reason why Barth, even though
he allows a legitimate place for non-theological findings, hesitates to
employ them throughout his ethical discussions. As Robert E. Willis
rightly criticizes:

The general criticism that must be brought against Barth, I feel, is
that he makes virtually no attempt to use the suggestions and
insights that might be provided by the various "secular" disciplines
whose task it is to deal with "phenomena of the human". To be sure,
Barth mentions these disciplines (some of them, at least). There is
a difference, however, between mention and use. One looks in vain
for the sort of positive use the theologian might make of the
insights provided by the social sciences -- anthropology, sociology,
psychology and political science, in particular -- and by some of
the more recent experiments and developments taking place in the
biological sciences.\textsuperscript{235}

\textsuperscript{233} See \textit{supra}, n.71.

\textsuperscript{234} A similar problem can be found in Barth's understanding of the
relation between theology and philosophy. McLelland, 'Philosophy and
Theology' in Footnotes to a Theology, p. 37 rightly observes that '[Barth]
is defining philosophy as analytic rather than synthetic, capable of
descriptive metaphysics but not of any sort of normative or fundamental
ontology ... We think of Pierre Thévenaz or Paul Ricoeur, both of whom
would accept such a role for philosophy, I believe. But how is one to meet
those philosophers who continue their synthetic work "as if God does not
exist"?'

\textsuperscript{235} Willis, Ethics, p. 385. We can illustrate Willis's criticism with
Barth's attitude towards Communism in the post-war period. The reports and
lectures from his journey to Hungary in 1948 (collected and published as
Die christliche Gemeinde im Wandel der Staatsordnungen. Dokumente einer
Ungarnreise 1948 [Zollikon-Zurich: Evangelischer Verlag, 1948]), his
silence towards the Hungarian revolt in 1956, and his Brief an einen
Pfarrer in der Duetschen Demokratischen Republik (1958) aroused severe
criticisms from theologians like Brunner ('Wie soll man das verstehen?
Offener Brief an Karl Barth,' EvTh 8 \textsuperscript{[1948/49]}: 36-41) and R. Niebuhr ('Why
is Barth silent on Hungary?' CCen 74 \textsuperscript{[1957]}: 108-110, 454-55; id., 'Barth's
East German Letter,' CCen 76 \textsuperscript{[1959]}: 167-68). We will not go into the
details of the controversy. A survey and criticism has been given by
Willis, Ethics, pp. 412-20. In view of our preceding analysis of Communist
politics and its social reality (see \textit{supra}, ch. 4, pp. 211-16), Barth
seems to have an inadequate socio-political knowledge of Communism when he
tries to justify his shifting attitude towards Nazism and Communism by
claiming that: 1. We have to distinguish the Communist's 'totalitarian
atrocities' from 'the positive intention behind them.' And 'what has been
tackled in Soviet Russia ... is, after all, a constructive idea, the
Moreover, a similar critique can be extended to a wider perspective beyond Barth's theological ethics. For Barth, we have to do theology 'from above' (analogia fidei) and not 'from below' (analogia entis). And human self-understanding, though not necessarily evil, can never arrive at a 'true' account of man's being. Barth explicitly contrasts the two ways when he discusses the issue of freedom:

solution of a problem which is a serious and burning problem for us as well, and which we with our clean hands have not yet tackled anything like energetically enough: the social problem.' (K. Barth, 'Die Kirche zwischen Ost und West' [1949], E.T. is quoted from Against the Stream, p. 139).

2. 'In its relationship to Christianity, Communism, as distinguished from Nazism, has not done, and by its very nature cannot do, one thing: it has never made the slightest attempt to reinterpret or to falsify Christianity, or to shroud itself in a Christian garment ... It [Communism] is not anti-Christian. It is coldly non-Christian. It does not seem to have encoun­tered the gospel as yet. It is brutally, but at least honestly, godless.' (Ibid., p. 140). 3. And after all, "Totalitarian" also, in a way, is the grace of the gospel which we all are to proclaim, free grace, truly divine and truly human, claiming every man wholly for itself. To a degree the Communist state might be interpreted and understood as an image of grace -- to be sure, a grossly distorted and darkened image. Indeed, grace is all-embracing, totalitarian.' (K. Barth, 'Brief an einen Pfarrer in DDR'. E.T. is quoted from How to Serve God in a Marxist Land, p. 58). Against these claims, one should notice that: 1. Barth's attempt to make a sharp distinc­tion between the 'theory' and 'praxis' of Russian Communism is the very opposite of the Marxian emphasis on the unity of theory and praxis (see supra., ch. 4, p. 202). 2. Barth seems unaware of the necessarily 'religious dimension' in any Communist ruled ideology (see, for example, Tillich's discussion of the 'quasi-religious' character of Communism in CEWR, pp. 1-25). 3. It seems that Barth cannot see the difference between the Gestalt of totalitarianism in a Communist country and the 'totalitarian' character of grace. To employ Tillich's distinction, one is 'heteronomy' and the other is 'theonomy' (cf. P. Tillich, 'The Church and Communism,' RelLife 6 [1937]: 350-55). One would agree with R. M. Brown's criticism in his 'Introductory Essay' to How to Serve God in a Marxist Land, p. 38, that '[While Barth is admitting that "he is not acquainted with the East Germany situation at first hand"], one wonders a bit at the confidence with which he [Barth] can then go on, from the isolation of neutral Switzerland (and the Bernese Emmenthal at that), to give such confident replies to men in situations which he has not experienced, where life and death and moral integrity might well hang in the balance if Barth's replies were taken seriously. One must hope that in the cases where Barth did not know the details of the situation, his answers did not become wrong answers in the light of a true knowledge of those situations.' For a sharp criticism, see also H. Zilleßen, Dialektische Theologie und Politik. Eine Studie zur politischen Ethik Karl Barth's (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1970), pp. 119-28.

236 See supra, ch. 2, pp. 13-14.
I have heard the news that we can speak about God only by speaking about man... But this claim, correctly understood, calls for a counterclaim. We can speak about man only by speaking about God. This general statement is hardly disputed among Christian theologians. There is, however, sharp disagreement as to the priority of the two claims... Why deny priority to God in the realm of knowing when it is uncontested in the realm of being? If God is the first reality, how can man be the first truth?237

But at this point, it seems that Barth is confusing the levels of ontological priority and epistemological priority. Ontologically speaking, it is right to claim that 'God is the first reality.' For all the predicates in God-talk are grounded in God's being and not in man's. We only 'participate in the truth of His revelation.'238 But as a 'knowing-procedure', it is inevitable that we must first have some minimal ideas of the concepts before we employ them in our theological statements. As Macquarrie remarks, if the idea 'is to mean anything to us, there must be some continuity between its subject-matter and what we already understand. If it were entirely "out of another world" and did not link up at any point with our own experience, we could make nothing of it.'239 Here we encounter the problem of what is called the 'hermeneutical circle'.240 Richard E. Palmer writes,

Understanding is a basically referential operation; we understand something by comparing it to something we already know. What we understand forms itself into systematic unities, or circles made up of parts. The circle as a whole defines the individual part, and the parts together form the circle... By dialectical interaction between the whole and the part, each gives the other meaning; understanding is circular, then. Because within this "circle" the meaning comes to stand, we call this the "hermeneutical circle."241

237 Barth, 'Gift of Freedom' in Humanity of God, pp. 69-70.
The point is, if understanding is 'circular', Barth's attempt to make a sharp distinction between *analogia fidei* and *analogia entis* seems too schematic. It has been pointed out by Battista Mondin that Barth's attack on *analogia entis* is based on his 'misconception' of the Catholic teaching. Even Jüngel complains that 'the debate about analogy has usually been carried on within recent Evangelical theology with an astonishing lack of understanding and horrifying carelessness.' And 'the confusing thing about this struggle is that, on the side of Protestant theology, the criticism of the genuinely Catholic doctrine of so-called "analogy of being" (*analogia entis*) is directed against the very thing against which this doctrine itself is directed.'

Then what should be the genuine way to work out a theological Anthropology? In our preceding survey, we have seen that even Barth, *de facto*, inherits particular philosophical ideas in his theological construction, so to talk about doing theology only either 'from above' or 'from

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242 B. Mondin, *The Principle of Analogy in Protestant and Catholic Theology* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963), pp. 169-70. From his careful exposition of Aquinas' doctrine of analogy, Mondin concludes that 'it seems to us that Barth's criticisms cannot affect in any Aquinas' doctrine of analogy, and this for three reasons: (1) Aquinas' analogy does not rest on a preconceived epistemology, but remains valid both in a natural and in a revealed epistemology. (2) Aquinas' analogy does not destroy the infinite qualitative difference between God and man, because it simply asserts the priority of God over man with respect to the perfections of both God and man. (3) Aquinas' analogy does not put God and man on the same level by bringing God and man under the same category, the category of being ... By rejecting a doctrine of *analogia entis* that considers being as a genus, Barth is not opposing Aquinas, rather he is just doing what Aquinas does when he condemns *analogia duorum ad tertium* in the predication of divine names.' Cf. also G. Söhnngen, 'Analoga entis in analogia fidei' in *Antwort*, pp. 266-71.


244 For example, we have seen Barth's Platonic understanding of Christ's vicarious humanity in *Reconciliation* *(supra*, ch. 2, pp. 57-58). There is also a growing attention to the idealist background of Barth's theology since H. U. von Balthasar's *Karl Barth: Darstellung und Deutung seiner Theologie* (1962). Cf. M. Welker, 'Barth und Hegel. Zur Erkenntnis eines methodischen Verfahrens bei Barth,' *EvTh* 43 (1983): 307-328; see also W. Pannenberg, 'Die Subjektivität Gottes und die Trinitätslehre. Ein
below' is unrealistic. Rather, it should be done by a dialectical process between findings from human self-understanding and corrections (or even destruction) from the revealed Words of God. Certainly Anthropology from human-sciences can only provide a partial understanding. Yet 'a partial understanding is used to understand still further, like using pieces of a puzzle to figure out what is missing.'\textsuperscript{245} Through critical dialogues -- learning, identifying or criticizing -- with human-sciences, we can acquire a more comprehensive, or even new perspective on the revealed truth about humanity.\textsuperscript{246} But at this point, it seems that our discussion is leading us back again to Tillich's idea of 'apologetic theology'? For, as J. Heywood Thomas remarks, 'he [Tillich] more than anyone else ... has sought to relate theology to the fields of science, art and sociology.'\textsuperscript{247} Although we have seen that Tillich's way of ontologization entails difficulties of bringing out the distinctiveness of Christian faith,\textsuperscript{248} his conviction of interdisciplinary dialogue is essential to any theological Anthropology.

\textsuperscript{245} Palmer, Hermeneutics, p. 25.


\textsuperscript{248} See supra, ch. 4, pp. 246-50.
But how can we bring together Barth's and Tillich's particular insights to build up a comprehensive view of Anthropology? This leads to the final chapter of our study.
Conclusion
CHAPTER SIX

THE TASK OF A THEOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY

'Modern men and women are greatly interested in their inner world, in their deepest self, in their personal identity. We want to know ourselves, and so we ask: "Who am I? Where do I come from? Where are my roots? What is at the core of my being?" We want to realize ourselves, and so we ask: "How can I become my true self? How can I be truly human? How can I be authentic?"

-- William Johnston

We have come a long way to demonstrate that the Anthropologies of Tillich and Barth, though deeply rooted in the Christian tradition, have their particular contributions to make to man's search for authentic humanity. Moreover, although the two theologians approach the problems of humanity from different perspectives, they do in fact complement each other. We began with Tillich's endeavour to dialogue with non-Christian approaches to authentic humanity. On the one hand, through interdisciplinary dialogues Tillich's idea of authentic humanity as self-integration, self-creativity and self-transcendence was concretely elaborated. It also demonstrates Tillich's perennial contribution to this vital question of mankind.² He penetratingly elucidates that the 'ambiguities' manifested in


2 Pace N. F. S. Ferré, 'The Fabric of Paul Tillich's Theology,' SJTh 21 (1968): 157, where he reported that '[theologians have] found general agreement that Tillich's writings, except possibly for his occasional writings, especially his sermons, "would not last".'
man's endeavour to attain human authenticity point beyond human finitude and lead to the quest for a divine breakthrough. Yet on the other hand, Tillich's own presentation of the Spiritual Presence as the answer to life's ambiguities is less satisfactory because he is so preoccupied with the universal character that he tends to overlook its distinctiveness in Christian experience. In so doing, Tillich fails to 'show the reasons why he affirms his own particular tradition in spite of his relativistic assertions.' At this point we turned to Barth. The distinctiveness of the divine breakthrough in Christian experience is fully elaborated in Barth's delineation of the Christian life. The divine-human encounter in Christian growth is characterized by the presence of a living God who is an 'objectival subject', and guided by a personal Spirit who can direct and teach a Christian how to grow after the image of Jesus Christ the real man. And Barth furnishes a blueprint of authentic human life (which can only be a Christian life) according to his relational ontology, viz., authentic humanity as fellow-humanity with God and with other men. Yet, due to his rejection of analogia entis and his conviction of the validity of analogia fidei, Barth intentionally works out his picture of authentic humanity exclusively according to the biblical materials and without referring to any of the achievements in other disciplines of human study. Such a way of theological methodology, as we have shown, is impossible in theory and practically weakens the profundity of his picture of authentic human life. At this point, our critical survey led us back to the place where we started, viz., an interdisciplinary concern within the construction of a theological Anthropology. Thus a comprehensive view of authentic humanity is possible only if we bring together Tillich's and Barth's particular insights in their Anthropologies. Of course, to work out such a

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3 See supra, ch. 4, pp. 248-50.
4 See supra, ch. 5, pp. 252-65.
'comprehensive view' of authentic humanity in detail is beyond the scope of the present thesis. But as a conclusion to our study, we can put our preceding findings together and attempt to present an overall picture of authentic humanity according to the contributions from Tillich and Barth. The basic stand behind such a picture of man is, as it may be called, Christian Personalism. It can be formulated more concretely by the following six statements.

Man is a personal agent.

Man is a personal subject, an agent in action and for action.\(^5\)

Human nature is not something abstract, static and substantial. According to Tillich, 'man is a living subject, a Gestalt.'\(^6\) Human life is always in the process of 'becoming'. And authentic humanity is a process of 'realizing what the potentials of a human existence are.'\(^7\) 'Self-as-agent' not only implies a dynamic view of human nature, it also affirms that man is free to create\(^8\) and free to relate.\(^9\) Although man's freedom is not unlimited freedom,\(^10\) human subjectivity as the ultimate ground of all actions cannot be made into an object.\(^11\)


\(^7\) J. Macquarrie, In Search of Humanity (London: SCM, 1982), p. 2. See supra, pp. 156-61 (on the realization of authentic humanity); also ch. 4, pp. 163-68 (on Tillich's ontology of essentialization).

\(^8\) See Tillich, 'Conception of Man,' JR 19: 204-209. Also supra, ch. 4, pp. 197-205 (on self-creativity) and pp. 230-34 (on self-transcendence).

\(^9\) See supra, ch. 5, pp. 272-81, where Barth regards freedom as the foundation of Christian ethics.

\(^10\) See ibid., Barth's idea of 'freedom in obedience'. Also ST-1: 182-86, Tillich on the ontological polarity of freedom and destiny.

\(^11\) Cf. supra, ch. 2, pp. 81-92 (on the impersonal character of Barth's understanding of the divine-human encounter in Reconciliation). For the necessity of a 'pure Ego' (das reine Ich) as the ultimate centre of all human actions, see E. Husserl, Ideen II in Husserliana, ed. M. Biemel (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950) 4: 105, 'Das Ich ist das identische
God is a personal Subject.

This idea is particularly elucidated by Barth's divine Actualism. For Barth, God is a living Person. God is the Subject that remains indissolubly Subject, a non-objectified 'Thou'. God always takes the active and initial part, and never becomes a mere casual power in the world-process. God's Being is in His acts. One cannot go beyond God's actions to His abstractly observed being. Furthermore, God can encounter man in an unpredictable and ever new way. In such a way, God radically distinguishes Himself from a merely ontological principle or human self-consciousness. In short, He is an 'objectival subject' who encounters man as a living Person and guides him concretely on his way to realize the new life in Christ.

There is a personal encounter between God and man.

A personal encounter must consist of living persons on both sides. This we have seen in our preceding two statements, viz., both God and man are personal agents. But such a criterion is only necessary and not sufficient. An encounter between two personal beings is not necessarily personal. An authentic I-thou relationship cannot be one-sided. It must be characterized by reciprocity, mutuality and involvement. According to these criteria, both Barth's and Tillich's ideas of the divine-human

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12 See supra, ch. 2, pp. 78-81 (on the concept of a personal God in the doctrine of Election) and ch. 5, pp. 256-65 (on Christian growth in the presence of an actual and personal God).

13 See supra, ch. 2, pp. 82-83, n.309.
encounter in Reconciliation are inadequate in a personal sense. While Barth does not acknowledge a genuine place for human response in his doctrine of Atonement, Tillich's idea of Ecstasy tends to be too ontological and cannot be regarded as a genuine experience of personal encounter.14

There is a personal encounter between man and man.

This idea can be well summarized by Barth's forceful statement: 'The "I" without "thou" is not man ... Humanity is fellow-humanity.'15 For Barth, the 'mystery of humanity' is an ontology of openness in mutual relationship which is dynamic, personal, joyful and free.16 Authentic humanity can only be realized through one's personal encounter with his fellow men.17 In concreto, this relational ontology of humanity can be applied to the relationship between male and female (viz., marriage), between parents and children (viz., family) and within the Christian community, and can constitute the socialist ideal in the realm of politics.18

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15 K. Barth, Humanismus, p. 8.

16 See supra, ch. 3, pp. 17-19 (on man's relationship with other men) and ch. 5, pp. 291-93.

17 See supra, ch. 5, pp. 297-301 (on fellow-humanity in the context of man and his world); also supra, ch. 4, pp. 178-90 (on authentic participation and morality).

18 See supra, ch. 5, pp. 297-301 (on marriage, family and the socialist view of social and political issues) and ch. 4, pp. 165-68, 206-230 (on the Spirit Community, and the realization of authentic humanity on the communal level, viz., theonomous culture and Religious Socialism). Both Barth and Tillich are explicitly holding a socialist position concerning the socio-political ideal. Such a similarity should not be regarded as accidental. Rather, their socialist principle is deeply rooted in their relational ontology of humanity. For the sake of completion, one should, for example, include a statement that 'there is a personal encounter between man and the universe.' Since Barth and Tillich have not directly dealt with such a thesis in detail, we will not include this aspect in our discussion.
A personal divine-human encounter is the foundation of man's self-realization and his authentic encounter with other men.

Barth claims that 'to be man is to be with God.' 19 Only in the presence of God, can man achieve genuine self-identity, self-acceptance and self-integration. 20 Tillich also has powerfully demonstrated -- through an interdisciplinary dialogue -- the necessity of a divine intervention for the final fulfilment of authentic humanity. He concretely illustrates his case in the three functions of life -- authentic humanity as self-integration, self-creativity and self-transcendence. 21 Only by the impact of the Spiritual Presence, can man attain the ultimate transcendent unity of unambiguous life in the Spiritual Community of faith and love.

An authentic divine-human encounter must be realized within the personal encounter between man and man.

According to Tillich, the 'vertical' and 'horizontal' elements are inseparable in an authentic religious experience. 22 Only within the Spiritual Community can there be a genuine unity of religion, morality and culture. 23 Barth also strongly claims that 'even the greatest saint is only this one -- a saint with others in the communion of saints. And he is

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19 See supra, ch. 2, pp. 15-16 (on man's relationship with God) and ch. 5, pp. 271-91 (on 'to be man is to be with God').

20 See supra, ch. 5, pp. 281-85 (on self-identity, self-acceptance and self-integration); ch. 2, pp. 25, 28-38 (on Reconciliation as the foundation of the 'divine turn' from the unreality of humanity to authentic humanity). Also Tillich has given a penetrating analysis of self-acceptance and acceptance by God in supra, ch. 3, pp. 98-102.

21 See supra, ch. 4, pp. 168-246.

22 See P. Tillich, 'Vertical and Horizontal Thinking,' AmSchol 15 (1945/46): 102-105. Here 'vertical' refers 'to the eternal in its presence as the ground of our being and the ultimate meaning of our lives,' and 'horizontal' refers 'to the transforming power of the eternal whenever it manifests itself,' for example, 'the prophetic fight for social justice and personal righteousness' (p. 103).

not perpetuo mansurus. He is a saint only in the eclesia perpetuo
mansura. He would not be a saint if he tried to be so in and for
himself."24

The above six statements of Christian Personalism certainly need
further elaboration, especially from an interdisciplinary perspective. And
Christian Personalism does not claim to solve all the questions in human
life. But at least, as we have witnessed throughout our study, in the
midst of the world of anxiety and violence, the voice of Jesus Christ has
not been silenced. We can still hear Him proclaiming:25

'Εγώ εἰμι ἡ ὁδός καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια καὶ ἡ ζωή ...
ὁ ἀκολουθῶν μοι οὐ μὴν περιπατήσῃ ἐν τῇ σκοτίᾳ,
ἀλλ' ἔξει τὸ φῶς τῆς ζωῆς.

24 CD IV/2: 622. See also supra, ch. 5, pp. 294-97 (on the Christian
community and the realization of authentic humanity).
25 Jn. 14:6; 8:12.
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