The construction of the South: developing countries, coalition formation and the UN climate change negotiations, 1988-2012

Nicholas Chan
St. Antony's College

96,568 words

Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of D.Phil in International Relations in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford

Trinity Term 2013

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Abstract

The North-South divide is one of the central political characteristics of the UN climate change negotiations. But while the Group of 77 coalition has been the main negotiating group for the South, developing countries have often faced challenges to their unity, magnified by the recent establishment of smaller negotiating groups. How has 'the South' hung together? This thesis investigates how developing countries have formed negotiating groups over the two decades of the UN climate negotiating process. It explains the origins of the different negotiating groups that have formed over this time, as well as the timing of their emergence and the scope of their membership. In particular, while scholarly attention has focused on the G77, Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) and most recently the Brazil-South Africa-India-China (BASIC) coalition, this thesis corrects the relative neglect in understanding the many other negotiating groups that have formed.

While conventional explanations highlights the shared material interests that underpin group formation, this thesis advances a constructivist argument that emphasises instead the importance of collective identities in shaping norms of 'appropriate association' – the social bases of whose one's friends and allies are. It highlights the regional basis for many of these negotiating groups that cut across shared material circumstances, and draws upon historical institutionalist insights on critical junctures and path dependence to place this larger pattern of Southern coalition formation in the appropriate historical and institutional context of the UN system. It demonstrates the continuing persistence of countries identifying as the 'South', where despite changing material circumstances and disagreements among developing countries, the salience of the G77 as the constitutive institution of this identity remains. Above all, in investigating the processes of coalition formation among developing countries in the climate context, this thesis deepens scholarly understanding about the contemporary meaning of the 'South'.

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Abbreviations

AGBM	Ad-Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate
AILAC	Alianza Independiente de Latinamericano y el Caribe (Association of Independent Latin American Countries)
AIJ	Activities Implemented Jointly
ALBA	Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América (Bolivarian Alliance of the Peoples of Our America)
AMCEN	African Ministerial Conference on the Environment
AOSIS	Alliance of Small Island States
A/R	Afforestation and reforestation (activities under the CDM)
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU	African Union
AWG-KP	Ad-hoc Working Group on the Kyoto Protocol
AWG-LCA	Ad-hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action
BAP	Bali Action Plan
BASIC	Brazil, South Africa, India and China
CAHOSSC	Conference of African Heads of States and Government on Climate Change
CAMRE	Council of Arab Ministers Responsible for the Environment
CARICOM	Carribean Community
CCAD	Central American Commission on Environment and Development
CDM	Clean Development Mechanism
CfRN	Coalition for Rainforest Nations
CMP	Conference of Parties serving as Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol
COMIFAC	Commission des Forêts d'Afrique Centrale
COP	Conference of Parties of the UNFCCC
EAC	East African Community
EIG	Environmental Integrity Group

EU	European Union
G8	Group of Eight
G77	Group of 77 and China
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GRILA	Grupo de Iniciativas Latinoamericano
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organisation
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IMO	International Maritime Organisation
INC	Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee
JI	Joint Implementation
JUSCANZ	Japan, United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand
LDC	Least Developed Countries
LMDC	Like-Minded Developing Countries
LULUCF	Land-use, land-use change, and forestry
O5	Outreach Five
OAPEC	Organisation of Arab Oil-Exporting Countries
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OPEC	Organisation of the Petroleum-Exporting Countries
QELRO	Quantified emission limitation reduction objective
REDD	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation
SADC	South African Development Community
SB	Subsidiary Bodies (refers to both SBI and SBSTA)
SBI	Subsidiary Body for Implementation (of the UNFCCC)
SBSTA	Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (of the UNFCCC)
SICA	Central American Integration System
SIDS	Small island developing states
SPF	South Pacific Forum

SWCC	Second World Climate Conference
UNCED	United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (also known as the Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit)
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
WMO	World Meteorological Organisation

Chapter One
Introduction

> "Apart from the financial issues, however, developing countries had difficulty acting as a bloc. Three groups emerged as particularly important: semi-industrialized developing countries, oil-producing states, and AOSIS"[1].
>
> - Daniel Bodansky, 1993

> "The Copenhagen Conference is also notable, from a process standpoint, for several shifts In the negotiating dynamic...The fractures within the developing country negotiating bloc (the so-called Group of 77) were more evident than ever; indeed, during the final session, one small island state negotiator publicly blamed the big developing countries for the failure to make more progress"[2]
>
> - Daniel Bodansky, 2010

From the very beginning of the international climate change negotiations two decades ago, differences between developed and developing countries have marked much of the history of these negotiations. As with many other negotiating processes, the future success of any international agreement will depend on its ability to address this North-South divide, among other political differences and divides. The centrality of the North-South relationship to the climate negotiations is a subject that has been well-recognized in scholarship on the international politics of climate change, as have North-North relationships[3]. South-South relationships, however, have received much less attention and it is this subject that this thesis is concerned with.

The Puzzle

This thesis examines the coalition behaviour of developing countries across the first 20 years

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1 Bodansky 1993: 480
2 Bodansky 2010: 230
3 For a recent examination of North-South relations, see Roberts and Parks 2007; for an examination of North-North relations, see Cass 2006

of the international climate change negotiations: why have negotiating coalitions and groups of developing countries formed in the way that they have? In particular, why have they formed with the memberships that they have? Over the entire history of these negotiations thus far, the coalition behaviour of developing countries has been marked by a North-South pattern, where developing countries have only ever formed negotiating groups with other developing countries. Given the complexity of interests and ideas in the UNFCCC process among states, this presents a puzzle: why have all the coalitions and alliances that have been formed by developing countries refused to transcend or cross the North-South divide? The prospect of, and need for, cross-North-South alliances have been mooted at regular intervals as observers point out where there is a 'natural' congruence of interests, but these have failed to materialize[4] even as the need for cross-North-South coalitions to be shaped and formed is repeatedly advanced[5]. Explaining this unity that has been maintained among the 'South' is fundamental to understanding the wider international politics of climate change; while a great deal of scholarly attention has been preoccupied with the central problem of cooperation, institutional architecture, and regime-building across the North-South divide, arguments absent an understanding of the coalition dynamics of developing countries will be deficient. Attempts to address global climate change need to address the North-South divide, and doing so needs to consider the nature of how Southern unity has been constructed and sustained. In providing insight into how developing countries have sought to define and advance their interests in these international negotiations, this thesis ultimately sheds light on the progress of and possibilities for international cooperation on climate change, as well as more generally in international politics.

This puzzle will be explored through explaining two key features of the coalition behaviour of

---

4 Paterson and Grubb 1992; Sebenius 1991

5 Hale 2011; Christoff 2006; Chasek and Rajamani 2003; Hampson 1990

developing countries. The first is the continued presence of a single coalition for all developing countries over this time, in the form of the Group of 77 and China (G77) grouping, despite longstanding expectations to the contrary since negotiations began in the 1990s. As Bodansky's comments cited above illustrate, the G77's unity has perpetually appeared to be in peril over the two decades of negotiations. Negotiating unity among developing countries was an outcome considered unlikely to last as the first negotiations on climate change got underway in the early 1990s. How could a coalition including the emerging economies alongside the world's least developed countries, and the oil-exporting countries alongside the small-island states, be a durable one? The extensive literature on North-South conflict and cooperation on climate change frequently emphasizes the heterogeneous membership of the G77 and China coalition, cautioning against a monolithic treatment – but these differences are often simply noted, and rarely explored at greater length, especially with reference to the cohesiveness and unity of the coalition itself[6]. To the extent that North-South differences are addressed in any climate agreement, understanding the bases of Southern unity within the G77 is essential to reaching a global agreement. As Jon Barnett puts it:

> "Surprisingly little has been written about the internal dynamics of the G77 given that it is very heterogeneous, and that the politics of the negotiations is almost always understood as being fundamentally driven by the North-South divide. What happens *within* the G-77 is critical for the progress or otherwise of the climate regime, yet there is as yet no totally convincing explanation of why the G-77 has been so unified for so long despite widely and increasingly divergent interests among its members"[7].

---

[6] Roberts and Parks 2007; many analyses of Southern interests and strategies, such as the extensively-cited work of Adil Najam (2005; 2003; 1994) often also treat the G77 and China as a black box out of which a common Southern position emerges; exceptions are Kasa, Gullberg and Heggelund 2008; Williams 2005; Williams 1993

[7] Barnett 2008: 4 (emphasis original)

The second feature, running in parallel to the first, however, has been the evolution of coalition behaviour in the gradual formation of smaller coalitions of developing countries that function as subgroups of the G77. These have grown more numerous in recent years, and their overlapping nature – where many countries are part of multiple coalitions, resulting in overlapping, non-exclusive coalition memberships, and where all remain members of the G77 – has been part of the increased complexity of negotiations, especially since 2005 when a new phase of negotiations on a post-2012 regime began in earnest. The formation of these coalitions certainly raise questions about the future of the G77, with many arguing that they represent a fragmentation of negotiating unity among the South, consistent with their larger fragmentation and differentiation in world politics[8]. These coalitions, however, are also in need of a more systematic investigation in their own right in order to justify such claims. Even as the variety of these newer groupings is noted[9], the academic understanding of the origins of and differences among these groups is still a fairly thin one.

Contributions and Contexts

In addressing these two historical features of the negotiating behaviour of developing countries, the main contributions of this thesis are twofold: The first lies in the empirical material assembled, which presents a record of the various developing country coalitions over the entire two decade period of negotiations thus far. Barnett's remarks above on the lack of attention given to the internal dynamics among developing countries in the G77 applies just as strongly, if not more, when it comes to the other negotiating groups that developing countries have organised themselves in: only a handful of accounts exist even of the history of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), founded in 1990, let alone any of the more recent

[8] Roberts 2011; see Wagner, Hajjar and Appleton 2012 for a comparative discussion of Southern negotiating groups across different environmental negotiating processes.

[9] Roberts 2011; Betzold, Castro and Weiler 2012; Vihma, Mulugetta and Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen 2011.

groupings[10]. Academic scholarship, whether in IR or the international law and IPE disciplines, has tended to focus on the evolution of the climate regime and negotiating process as a whole[11], rather than on the negotiating groups as the key units of analysis and objects of explanation. The second main contribution is to provide a theoretically informed analysis of the origins of coalition formation among developing countries. How do developing countries define their interests and preferences in multilateral negotiating processes? And how do the coalitions that have formed relate to these? Academic analysis has long sought answers to the basic question of "what do developing countries want?" and how these differ from developed countries[12], and an examination of the process from interest definition to coalition formation serves to provide one answer to this theme.

Beyond these main contributions, this larger context of this thesis is located in various broader debates within the IR discipline. Firstly, this thesis also aims to contribute to the larger question in international relations about the contemporary meaning of the 'South' in international politics, of which the behaviour of developing countries in international climate change politics, the subject of this thesis, represents just one manifestation. The post-Cold War period was supposed to mark the end of the 'Third World' as a meaningful analytical category of international relations – partly lifting the lens of Cold War bipolarity, partly in light of the increasing economic stratification among developing countries, and partly in view of increasing global policy and normative convergence among both developed and developing countries[13]. "The outdated categorizations of First and Third Worlds, donor and supplicant, leader

[10] The only exception is the Brazil-South Africa-India-China (BASIC) grouping that has triggered analyses about the place of the emerging powers in world politics, see Hochstetler 2012; Papa and Gleason 2012; Hallding et al. 2011.

[11] Especially Yamin and Depledge 2004; Victor 2011 is an excellent political economy account of the history of the regime

[12] Both in terms of climate change, and wider international politics, see especially Roberts and Parks 2007 for the former and Krasner 1985 for the latter; and Nel 2010 generally.

[13] Berger 2004; Thérien 1999; Broad and Landi 1996; Berger 1994; Biersteker 1994; Ravenhill 1990; Rothstein 1988

and led, no longer fit"[14], and the 'Third World', with a few exceptions[15], was declared defunct. Indeed, the difficulties of developing countries in forging effective or lasting negotiating coalitions in other areas of world politics provided one indicator of this end to usefulness of a 'North-South' analysis[16]. What meaning could the idea of the 'South' still possibly have?[17]

Despite these claims, the 'South' continues to be a unit of analysis in a wide range of issue areas[18], with the past two decades continuing to be punctuated by unified positions among developing countries that speak in the name of the South[19]. For IR scholars, the recent surge of interest in 'non-Western' IR hints at efforts to probe more deeply into the meaning, lessons and ideas of this 'South' for building IR theory[20]. Indeed, that 'North-South' is still, in a recent analysis, criticised as "theatre", is perhaps one indicator that the concept still holds some degree of salience in world politics[21]. That developing countries continue to collectively organise into a single common negotiating coalition that has persisted over the same post-Cold War period provides one challenge to the claim that thinking in terms of North-South is an irrelevance. Examining developing country negotiating unity over the past two decades, in the context of the climate change negotiations, provides an opportunity to consider once again the future of the 'South'.

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14 Zoellick 2010: 1

15 But see the analyses of Thomas 1999 and Williams 1993, which both argued for the continuing analytical relevance of the 'South' in the post-Cold War world, with Williams in particular focusing on the ability of developing countries to organize around environmental issues.

16 Narlikar 2003 details how developing countries coalition patterns in the GATT and WTO have shifted and become more fluid and ad hoc over time; Roddick 1997.

17 In this thesis, the 'South' and 'developing countries' will be used interchangeably, as follows conventional usage; 'Third World', on the other hand, is a term that has become used far less frequently in the academic literature as well as by climate policymakers, and will be avoided. Nonetheless, see Solarz 2012b on the implications of using 'South' and 'Third World' differently.

18 Alden, Morphet and Vieira 2010; Betts 2008; Ayoob 2007; Williams 2005.

19 Tussie and Narlikar 2004

20 Hutchings 2011

21 Weiss 2009: 273 "Dramatic and largely symbolic and theatrical confrontations, rather than a search for meaningful partners, is the usual way to proceed". See especially Hurrell 2013 for a discussion of the meanings of North-South and the narratives of contemporary analysis.

Secondly, this discussion of the South takes on greater resonance in light of the shifting backdrop of international politics in the early twenty-first century with the rise of the 'emerging powers' reinvigorating questions over the meaning of the 'developing world'. While much attention to the trajectory of these countries – China, India and Brazil in particular – has been concerned with how these emerging powers will fit or challenge the norms of the extant global system[22], it seems equally pertinent to strive for a better understanding of the relationships that they maintain with other 'non-Western' countries, be they middle-income or the so-called 'bottom billion'. That is, how can we understand 'South-South' relations in the contemporary era, long after the idea of 'South-South' cooperation was first mooted as a core element of the NIEO challenge?[23] For while the economic 'graduation' of these emerging powers from the ranks of the developing world may be frequently noted[24], the power and purpose of these emerging countries in shaping the global system depend, at least in part, on the evolving nature of their relationship with that mass of countries which are still called the developing world: what response do claims to leadership evoke? Are these emerging powers of malign or benign significance to the rest? Is there anything distinctively 'Southern' about their emergence?[25] Examining the negotiating behaviour of developing countries in the context of the climate negotiations provides one way to address this larger set of concerns.

The rest of this chapter thus proceeds as follows. The next section introduces the coalitions and groups that are the subject of this thesis. The section that follows presents the main arguments of this thesis; the section after that discusses the research design and strategy employed, as well as the main methodological issues that arise from this design, locating this

[22] Wade 2011; Hurrell 2006; this question is raised especially frequently with regards to China, see Beeson 2013; Pearson 2006; Johnston and Ross 1999.

[23] Pieterse 2011; Alden and Vieira 2005.

[24] But even this picture is complicated, as research on the distribution of global poverty (Kanbur and Sumner 2012; Sumner 2011) shows.

[25] Nel and Taylor 2013; Golub 2013; Schirm 2010; with regards to China, on how its traditional disengagement with the developing world and aversion to enmeshment therein has evolved, see van Ness 1998.

study in the context of the existing literature. The final section outlines the structure of the thesis and the chapters that follow.

Coalitions of the South

This section now turns to outlining a number of definitional issues about the coalitions addressed in this thesis. Firstly, the terms 'alliances' and 'coalitions' will be used interchangeably. Alliances may normally refer to a *security* relationship between countries. Stephen Walt defines an alliance as "a formal or informal arrangement for security cooperation between two or more sovereign states"[26] and for Glenn Snyder, alliances are "formal associations of states for the use (or nonuse) of military force, in specified circumstances, against states outside their own membership"[27]. Coalitions, on the other hand, arguably refer normally to groups established for negotiations in non-security realms. In one definition, a coalition is "a set of governments that defend a common position in a negotiation by explicit coordination"[28].

There are other ways of making a distinction between alliances and coalitions[29], but how this distinction is cut in academic scholarship varies. Amrita Narlikar subsumes 'alliance' as one type of coalition, distinguishing them instead from 'bloc' diplomacy[30], and Marc Williams chooses a similarly expanded definition, where a coalition is "a grouping of two or more actors (states) who have decided to pool certain resources for the pursuance of a common goal...if all groups are coalitions, then particular characteristics will define and distinguish different types of coalitions. Thus alliances and pressure groups can be seen as specific types

[26] Walt 1987: 12
[27] Snyder 1997: 4; for Snyder, as for other security scholars (such as Morrow 2000), the distinction is more importantly made between 'alignment' and 'alliance' as a measure of the degree of formal agreement on cooperation.
[28] Odell 2006: 13
[29] Weitsman 2003
[30] Narlikar 2003

of coalitions"[31]. In the other direction, 'coalitions' are also applied to military and security settings in common usage, as in the 2003 Iraq invasion's 'coalition of the willing'. Perhaps the most important point for our purposes in this thesis is that with regards to the climate change negotiations, no meaningful distinction is made in the existing literature: the G77 and China is described interchangeably as coalition and alliance, as are other negotiating groups[32], and the wider literature on the G77's historical behaviour similarly uses the terms interchangeably[33]. This thesis thus hews to this common usage.

Secondly, the coalitions that this thesis considers are self-defining ones. That is, the coalitions examined in this thesis are groups of countries that publicly identify themselves acting as a unified negotiating group, and which speak as a group during the opening and closing plenary sessions of the UNFCCC negotiating sessions. These plenaries provide an opportunity for general statements, at which groups of countries are given precedence over countries speaking individually. The coalitions that are considered in this thesis are those that speak as a group during these plenary sessions. With this criterion, Illustration 1 and Table 1 below provides a listing of the different coalitions to be considered here, with a date of the first session at which they speak as a group[34]. This formal criterion admittedly does not capture the informal fluidity of the negotiating process, where often just a handful of countries may be heavily active on a particular issue. Nor will it capture the informal processes within the coalition. Nonetheless, the formal nature of this criterion will provide a first cut understanding of these different groups; the centrality of coalitions to the conduct of multilateral negotiations means too that the fact that they self-identify as a group is in itself significant[35].

---

[31] Williams 1991: 8

[32] Kasa, Gullberg and Heggelund 2008; Williams 2005; indeed, the grouping of small island developing countries is the *Alliance* of Small Island States (AOSIS).

[33] Mortimer 1984; Rothstein 1977

[34] The LMDCs and AILAC are included in Table 1 but do not appear in Illustration 1 because their 'start' year is 2012, when this thesis' periodisation ends.

[35] For instance, small-group 'friends of the chair' negotiations are often organised based on these groups.



Illustration 1: Developing country coalition duration

Coalition	**First negotiating session (year)**
Group of 77 and China (G77)	INC1 (1991)
Alliance Of Small Island States (AOSIS)	INC1 (1991)
African Group	COP3 (1997)
Grupo de Iniciativas Latinoamericano (GRILA)	COP5 (1999)
Least Developed Countries (LDCs)	SB13 (2000)
Coalition for Rainforest Nations (CfRN)	COP11 (2005)
Congo Basin	COP13 (2007)
Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples for Our America / Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América (ALBA)	COP15 (2009)
Arab Group	COP15 (2009)
Central American Integration System (SICA)	COP15 (2009)
Brazil, South Africa, India and China (BASIC)	COP15 (2009)
Mountainous Landlocked Developing Countries (MLDCs)	AWG-LCA10 (2010)
Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDCs)	AWG (2012)
Association of Independent Latin American and Caribbean States / Alianza Independiente de Latinoamerica y el Caribe (AILAC)	COP18 (2012)

Table 1: Developing country coalition formation

While the criteria outlined above for defining coalitions (self-identifying) and their formation (date of plenary statement) provides a straightforward basis for identifying the groups listed above in Table 1, three sets of exceptions have been made that require explanation. The first lies in possible dispute over the dates attributed to one of the groups. The negotiating session attributed to BASIC's formation may be challenged, because it does not speak as a group during the plenary sessions until 2011, whereas its 'start date' is given here as COP15 in 2009. By the main criterion set out above the former date should be provided for BASIC's first active negotiating session; the date of 2009 has been chosen instead, however, because BASIC was substantively participating as a group from that session, which marks the beginning of convening ministerial-level meetings and joint statements.

This attention to, and justification for possible dispute over, dates of the first negotiating session for each of the negotiating groups listed above in Table 1 is needed because of the focus of this thesis on the sequential formation of developing countries – that is, the order and *timing* of their formation. Illustration 1 above represents Table 1 in a different form, which puts the two historical questions that this thesis seeks to address in clearer form: the longevity of the G77 and China, and the recent proliferation in coalitions among developing countries. The value of Illustration 1 is its focus on temporality, and the evolution of this coalition behaviour across the two decades of negotiations by the different start dates. This is a different emphasis to that of other representations and summaries of the recent formation of various developing country coalitions, which focus primarily on the overlapping character of these groups as snapshots at a particular point in time, as Illustration 2 below illustrates. That is, this illustration below isolates one particular element, what may be thought of as a 'fragmentation' or 'splintering' view, which focuses on the overlapping and apparently convoluted memberships of the different coalitions. But a temporal view, the subject of this

thesis, allows a more nuanced understanding of the different coalitions by investigating why they formed at the time that they did. The temporality of their emergence is what is being addressed here, although this investigation will also shed light on why these coalitions also have this non-exclusive character.

The second exception is that what is identified as GRILA, the 'Grupo de Iniciativas Latinoamericano', between 1999-2001 may also be considered as an anomaly because they did not speak during these opening and closing plenaries as a self-identified group. However, their activity as a negotiating group that coordinated its positions, and with this specific name, allows its treatment here among the other groups that do formally speak in the plenary sessions. While more about its specific agenda and goals will be said in Chapter Five, which covers the period in which GRILA is active, its presence as a substantive negotiating group during its short lifespan was clear to both observers and participants themselves[36].

Finally, this analysis excludes a number of groups. The first is the Organisation of Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OPEC). This exclusion may be surprising to some in view of the considerable influence that OPEC members have wielded in the course of the negotiations[37]. 'OPEC', however needs to be distinguished between its institutional form as an intergovernmental organisation and as a shorthand reference for the behaviour of oil-exporting countries in these negotiations, which it often tends to be. OPEC does not speak during the plenary sessions that mark the formal, self-identifying criterion of this thesis. Thus while the oil-exporting countries constitute a considerable subgroup within the G77, active in the climate negotiating process and feature at many points in this discussions in this thesis,

[36] Gupta's 2000 'guide for negotiators' identifies GRILA as among the main negotiating groups, and Jauregui describes some of its own objectives. Apart from a handful of academic references (Boyd, Corbera and Estrada 2008; Porrua and Garcia-Guerrero 2008) GRILA has largely faded from the political (as well as academic) memory.

[37] See Depledge 2006

they will be discussed in general, non-institutionally-specific terms as an informal group of countries with a particular set of interests, rather than specifically as 'OPEC', because this denotes a political entity with a specific institutional presence[38].

Two other groups that are not included are those that fall in the gap between 'non-Annex I' classification of the Convention and G77 membership: CACAM and the Environmental Integrity Group (EIG). CACAM consisted of Central Asia and the Caucasus, Albania and Moldova[39], a group that was largely active between 2001 and 2003, but while they are non-Annex I countries, they do not identify or describe themselves as being 'developing countries' or 'Southern' given their ex-Soviet origins and thus considering themselves instead as 'economies in transition'. The reason for their formation was that the agreements reached in the 2001 Marrakesh Accords on financial, technological and capacity-building assistance to developing countries described such assistance in terms of "developing countries" rather than "non-Annex I parties". As a result, these countries feared being excluded from such assistance as a result of not considering themselves developing countries[40]. Similarly, the Environmental Integrity Group is not included too, because it reflects a group of three European but non-EU countries (Switzerland, Lichtenstein and Monaco) and two non-Annex I but non-G77 countries (South Korea and Mexico). The latter two countries are OECD members, which is the normal distinction between being considered 'developed' and 'developing'[41], and their continuing non-Annex I status is simply a historical anomaly to this.

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38 As Yamin and Depledge 2004 note the same that OPEC countries do not present themselves as a group.

39 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan

40 UNFCCC 2001 (FCCC/CP/2001/12); the issue of their status was discussed at negotiating sessions until COP9, when it was agreed that the COP would "return to the issue at a future session", which it has not since, see UNFCCC 2004: 23 and Rajamani 2006: 169-170.

41 In practice, G77 and OECD membership is exclusive of each other.

The Illustration 2 image originally presented here cannot be made freely available via ORA because of copyright. The image was sourced at Betzold 2012: 593 and adapted from Castro et al. 2011.

Illustration 2: Developing country coalitions (Betzold 2012, adapted from Castro et al. 2011, which does not include the MLDCs, Arab Group, LMDCs or AILAC)

The Argument: The social origins of coalition formation

The central theoretical issue addressed in this thesis is an longstanding one in IR: how do countries form alliances and coalitions? How do they *choose* their allies and coalition partners? This thesis advances a constructivist response to this question that connects social identities to coalition formation via a norm of 'appropriate association'. Social identity provides a state with its sense of self, depending on the context at hand. The content of identity is in part constituted by a norm of appropriate association, that specifies who friend and foe is given that identity – that is, others who share that identity and others who are antagonistic towards it. In other words, a country's identity implies certain answers as to who one's allies are – who to appropriately associate with – circumscribing the range of choice practically available. While this argument is reflected in much constructivist analysis, the argument made in this thesis complements and deepens this larger logic by drawing on insights from historical institutionalism into how initial coalition choices become path-dependent ones, sustained and reproduced over time, and the role of existing cooperation and institutions in structuring the possible future coalitions that do emerge.

Alternative arguments broadly start from the analysis of coalitions by focusing on the shared interests that causes countries to associate with each other. Such shared interests are normally conceived of in material terms. In realist analysis, for instance, "primarily as a response to an external threat. Threats, in turn, are a function of power, proximity, specific offensive capabilities, and aggressive intentions, and the expected response to an emerging threat is to attempt to balance against it"[42]. In the case at hand, a focus on the overall North-South divide in world politics highlights the common interests shared among opposing camps, as Stephen Krasner does in his neorealist account of international relations based on a structural inequality of material power. A world-systems account, by Bradley Parks and Timmons

[42] Walt 2009: 89

Roberts, makes a similarly structural argument about shared interests based on a historical ecological inequality between developed and developing countries. Structural arguments of this sort essentially contend that differences among developing countries are minor compared to the larger, systemic picture, and it is this systemic North-South divide which is what brings developing countries together and makes their coalitions unsurprising. Other analyses of climate change negotiating groups also focus on the material interests of countries: while taking developing country heterogeneity seriously, an response advanced by Sjur Kasa and colleagues is to highlight the coercive influence wielded by more powerful members of the G77 and China (namely China, India and Brazil) within that coalition[43].

These prevailing arguments are largely based on a materialist ontology about the causes of state behaviour, looking to the material circumstances of developing countries (such as their environmental vulnerabilities, or position in the world economy) to understand and account for their behaviour. These are limited, this thesis argues, by their relative neglect of the social factors in how coalitions and negotiating groups have been formed – the importance of social identities and norms in the construction of state interests. In taking the latter seriously, coalition formation is still to be explained as being an expression of shared interests – but rather than being assumed, interests are understood as products of state identities, which can and do vary depending on the historical context at hand[44]. The specific way in which states identify themselves constrains their possible coalition choices because a key part of that identity is constituted by a norm of who their friends are (and who are not), and by implication, who they should be forming alliances with (and with who they should not be). 'Who' a state is therefore constituted and defined, in part, by choices about who they form coalitions with[45].

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[43] Kasa, Gullberg and Heggelund 2008
[44] Hopf 1998: 175-176
[45] Barnett 1996

Understanding the 'distribution' of identities in the international system, rather than just the distribution of material capabilities, is therefore a significant element in understanding why countries associate themselves with certain others (as well as other kinds of norm-driven behaviour). This line of analysis features in a wide range of contexts, from debates about the democratic peace (do democracies not go to war with each other because they recognise others' democratic identity) to European Union expansion (are prospective entrants recognised as being 'European'). In the context of the climate negotiations, the same logic applies: the way in which states identify themselves provides an important basis for the negotiating groups that they subsequently form, because of the respective 'norm of appropriate association' for that identity. Thus states that identify themselves as being 'developing' or 'Southern' see the G77 as the appropriate grouping of friends to join; those that identify themselves as 'Arab', the Arab Group'; those as 'Least Developed', the Least Developed Countries group; and so on.

Almost all the coalitions that have formed among developing countries in this negotiating context reflect this basic dynamic in their composition and membership – that is, their membership choices, and therefore the scope of the coalition, are driven by this reliance on the social norms of their relevant identities, and less so by their issue-specific interests on climate change. These identities are not always climate-specific, and are not always imported wholesale into the climate negotiating arena without refinement and adaptation, but it provides a common way to understand the empirical dynamics that have been observed and described in the first half of this chapter.

Meanwhile, historical institutional insights into the path-dependent nature of political life complements this by providing an explanation for the overall persistence of the North-South

political divide in structuring the 'problem' of climate change as a North-South one. Path-dependent arguments focus on how critical junctures create self-reinforcing political dynamics that constrain later prospects for change[46]. In this case, the origins of the climate negotiating process in the developments in the late 1980s introduced an 'United Nations General Assembly' institutional framework that defined the larger political template of climate change as a North-South one. This institutional choice for organising the negotiations determined a particular configuration of possible coalition behaviour for developing countries in institutionalising a norm of *Southern* appropriate association in the form of the G77 grouping that was constitutive of Southern identity. All other coalition activity by developing countries has thus taken place within this configuration, where these initial institutional choices have had longer consequences upon the progress and prospects of the international climate negotiations. Additionally, historical institutionalism helps to understand the process of how identities are acted upon to form coalitions, by highlighting the very direct role that institutions which embody these identities play in the mobilisation of these coalitions. This is particularly true for regional organisations, through which much of the new coalitions receive their social identity.

As a result, the theoretical ambition of this thesis lies in exploring and capturing the insights of a largely underappreciated line of inquiry – one rooted in constructivist insights on how particular conceptions of collective identity constitute and define state interests, as well as the larger institutional context that constrains and enables particular courses of behaviour. Hints of this argument have been briefly made by others, but without much elaboration[47] and in this regard, further developing a constructivist argument, and demonstrating how it helps to more

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[46] Pierson 2004

[47] Williams 2005: 50: "Central to the construction and maintenance of the coalition has been a normative dimension, and the relevance of institutional factors. In materialist-rationalist accounts the role of norms is absent and preferences are derived solely from self-interest".

satisfactorily explain important elements of these developing country coalitions (as well as its limits therein), constitutes the theoretical goal of this thesis.

Research Design and Methodology

The type of research question being addressed in this thesis is a 'causes-of-effects' one, rather than 'effects-of-causes': its purpose is to reach a satisfactory and convincing explanation of the outcomes at hand (the formation of these coalitions) through a within-case analysis, and not to estimate what the general impacts of particular causal variables might be, which is better done via a comparative-case analysis[48]. As such, it stands very much in line of what has been called the "new methodology" of how to generate causal inferences in qualitative research[49]. The nature of this puzzle means that causation is best explored and argued through a process-tracing research design, which seeks to assess the causal mechanisms and sequence of events connecting supposed and putative causes to observed effects. Process-tracing is a method well-established in IR research; in broad terms, it focuses on a comparison of alternative explanations to the proposed explanation, in considering what the available empirical material indicates about the causal path from cause to effect[50].

This approach constitutes a search for the mechanisms that explain coalition formation, but it is crucially a theoretically-guided enterprise[51]. Process-tracing "provides a strong basis for causal inference *only* if it can establish an uninterrupted causal path linking the putative causes to the observed effects, at the appropriate level(s) of analysis as specified by the theory being tested"[52]. In the first place, therefore, we have to be clear about the differences between

[48] Mahoney et al. 2009: 116-117; Bennett and Elman 2006a
[49] Mahoney 2010; While distinct from the specific methodological tools that Mahoney discusses, Bennett and Elman 2006a: 456-458 also note that the causes-of-effects model also reflects particular ontological and epistemological commitments and views of the nature of the social world.
[50] Bennett and Elman 2007: 183
[51] Checkel 2005
[52] George and Bennett 2005: 222

the various arguments that provide an account of developing country negotiating behaviour, and in particular the different "evidence that should be found if the account is true"[53]. This is the subject of Chapter Two, which outlines what various theories might expect to happen with regard to the processes by which negotiating unity has been sustained. As George and Bennett note, underspecified theory can make it impossible to eliminate plausible alternative processes, and doing as much as possible to limit this possible deficiency is critical to enhancing the strength of the causal inferences drawn[54].

A process-tracing method is particularly useful for assessing the theoretical arguments outlined above and examined across the body of this thesis. It is sensitive to the particular sequence and timing of events, and how the historical pathway of negotiations has evolved with regard to the coalition behaviour of developing countries. Process-tracing acknowledges the possibility of path-dependent explanations and other insights drawn from historical institutionalist scholarship: events in the past decade are not observations that are truly 'independent' from events in the 1990s, and earlier events either close off or open up subsequent sets of possible outcomes[55]; recent scholarship on the South has tended to focus on the preceding few years, taking the initial foundation of the coalition for granted[56]. Feedback effects, in analysing how particular paths generate positive or negative reactions, and a whole chain of subsequent reactions, may be especially important in constructing such over-time analyses, rather than 'snapshot' analysis[57]. Because of this longitudinal focus, process-tracing is particularly sensitive to the changing normative and material context in which these negotiations have taken place.As a study of a single set of negotiations, this context cannot be 'controlled' for per se (as it might be in a comparative case selection), but a continuous tracing

[53] Bennett and Elman 2006a: 460
[54] George and Bennett 2005: 223
[55] Fioretos 2011; George and Bennett 2005: 206-207
[56] Vihma, Mulugetta and Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen 2011
[57] Bennett and Elman 2006b; Pierson 2004

of the historical trajectory of the negotiations will better take account of broader changes in the international environment over this two-decade period. In this regard, counterfactual scenarios will also be employed in reconstructing the historical behaviour of the various coalitions. As Lebow points out, when undertaken with appropriate controls, counterfactual reasoning complements process-tracing in clarifying assumptions about the nature of the causal process concerned, overcoming hindsight biases, and assessing just how contingent or redundant particular developments may have been[58].

One key methodological goal of the process-tracing approach employed in this thesis lies in assessing the causal homogeneity of the cases explored – that is, the different coalitions that constitute the universe of developing country coalition activity. Evaluating and assessing causal homogeneity involves asking: do the causal processes and mechanisms identified apply in the same way across the different cases? How alike are the cases, in order that their causes and origins are similar?[59] As noted above, one of the questions that remains unasked from the existing emphasis on the proliferation of coalitions is whether these coalitions are really 'alike' units, and rather than being assumed away, is one of the underlying questions of this thesis. Thus there is an attempt to explain "every case in their attempt to uncover patterned diversity. Cases often deviate from common patterns, but these deviations are identified and addressed"[60].

This question of causal homogeneity is also related to two other methodological issues. The first is a concern about equifinality, namely the possibility that different causal explanations exist for the same outcome[61]. A sensitivity to this possibility means that we do not need to

[58] Lebow 2010: 47-58 outlines nine criteria for productively constructing such counterfactuals; but see George and Bennett 2005: 230-232 for questioning the value of counterfactuals to process-tracing.
[59] Munck 2004: 23-28
[60] Ragin
[61] Bennett and George 2005: 161-162 "Equifinality challenges and undermines the common assumption that similar outcomes in several cases must have a common cause that remains to be discovered".

anticipate that a single causal explanation holds equally powerfully for all the coalitions that have emerged and formed over time, but rather, can consider that different causal explanations may hold for different groups of countries, but which lead to the same type of outcome of coalition formation. George and Bennett emphasize this point, arguing that "When a phenomenon is governed by equifinality, the investigator's task is to produce a *differentiated* empirically based theory that identifies different causal patterns that produce similar outcomes. If this research task is taken seriously, investigators cannot content themselves with a claim that they have at least discovered a common causal factor for all or many cases that have similar outcomes on the independent variable"[62]. The second is that causal homogeneity provides another way of thinking about the 'scope conditions' that apply to the conclusions of this thesis: if different coalitions have their origins in different causal processes, the generalisable limits to the findings and conclusions about these processes also need to be acknowledged[63].

This thesis' methodological approach may be usefully illuminated by comparison with Joyeeta Gupta's work, *Developing Countries and the UNFCCC negotiations*, a frequently cited study on the behaviour of developing countries in the climate negotiations[64]. That study focused on the development of climate change foreign policy within four developing countries, and then extrapolated this to wider conclusions about developing country behaviour more generally. Like Robert Putnam's seminal two-level game framework for linking domestic variables with international bargaining, the objective of Gupta's study lies in making claims about developing country foreign policy behaviour in the origins of domestic variables[65]. In this thesis, however, the focus is both narrower and broader than the methodological orientation of

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62 George and Bennett 2005: 161
63 Munck 2004: 26-27
64 Gupta 1997
65 Putnam 1988

foreign policy studies. It is narrower in being concerned with coalition dynamics, rather than the development of particular national positions (which have implications beyond coalition behaviour and preferences). But it is also broader in attempting to build a more general argument for developing country coalition behaviour, which in drawing upon a wider base of developing country perspectives (i.e., more than four), will not account for the particularities of each and every developing country concerned. In part, this stems from the limitations of the foreign policy approach to understanding the dynamics of such a large coalition, where it would be impossible to account for the preferences of each and every member and how they might be aggregated into the larger structure of the coalition. Scholarship on the climate change foreign policies of most developing countries is relatively sparse; where research has been undertaken, this has focused on the 'usual suspects' of general interest – China, India and Brazil[66]. A number of other developing countries have also attracted interest, but the literature is especially thin in this regard[67], paling in comparison to scholarship on the foreign policy and coalition dynamics of developed countries[68]. The effect of this limited existing literature on developing country behaviour in the climate negotiations is to focus attention in this thesis upon the interstate interactions that underpin coalition activity, acknowledging that doing so comes at the expense of extensively considering intrastate factors, which may be a task for future studies.

In larger terms, the limits to the generalizable theoretical implications of this thesis should also be made clear. This inquiry is more about theory development than it is about theory testing, and therefore the causal inferences are drawn with specific regard to the climate change negotiations, and only indirectly to the wider landscape of contemporary North-South

[66] See Harris and Yu 2009, Kobayashi 2003, Economy 2001, Johnston 1998, and Economy 1997 for studies on China; see Vihma 2011 and Rajan 1997 for India; see Johnson 2001 on Brazil.

[67] Gupta 1997 discusses Indonesia and Kenya, in addition to a focus on India; see Chasek 2005 and Betzold 2010 for scholarship to do with the small island states; Depledge 2008 on Saudi Arabia

[68] See especially Cass 2006, for analyses of developed country diplomacy; Depledge 2005a, Lisowski 2002 on the USA; Afionis and Chatzopoulous 2010 on Russia.

relations. A focus on any one set of negotiations informs and contributes to this landscape, but is no general proxy. Remarks by Hurrell and Narlikar about the limits to generalizable conclusions from single-negotiation case studies, made with regards to the WTO negotiations, are equally applicable here: "we should be cautious before seeing North–South confrontations in trade negotiations only, or even principally, in terms of a broad foreign policy challenge to the developed world or as expressing deep-rooted rejection of the hegemonic liberal order that developed in the 1990s"[69].

A greater measure of confidence in conclusions about the nature of North-South and South-South relationships would be better reached via a comparative examination across issue-areas, which this thesis eschews in favour of greater scrutiny of this one particular set of negotiations. Similarly, with regards to general analyses of the coalition behaviour demonstrated by developing countries, only indicative suggestions are appropriate in this thesis about the conditions under which coalitions may be understood to generally thrive or disintegrate[70]. Nonetheless, this thesis aims to provide a stepping stone to such research, in filling an empirical gap about the history of the climate change negotiations that complements studies about developing country behaviour in other issue areas by suggesting correlations for future investigation[71]. Indeed, as a constructivist-focused study of the sources of coalition formation, it will constitute a reference point for other research that address the unity and disunity of developing countries and the continued meaning of the South[72].

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69 Hurrell and Narlikar 2006: 433

70 Narlikar 2003 is precisely such a study, with comparison of different trade coalitions arriving at conclusions about how coalitions are formed and maintained.

71 See Narlikar 2003 and Odell 2006 for discussions of developing countries in the WTO; see Falkner and Gupta 2009 for a discussion on regulation on genetic modification; see Shadlen 2004 for a discussion on North-South conflict over intellectual property rights; Krasner 1985 is a highly influential account that does seek to link developing country behaviour across different issue areas; and Williams 1991 makes generalizable conclusions about G77 mechanisms of cooperation drawn from UNCTAD processes.

72 Narlikar and Tussie 2004

Data and Sources

In constructing an account of how coalitions of developing countries have formed throughout the negotiations, this thesis draws from both primary and secondary source material. The purpose of this thesis is not to comprehensively review the behaviour and activity of developing countries in the UN climate change process – as one seasoned observer comments in light of the increased complexity of recent negotiations: "Today there is no single individual who can follow, or even fully grasp, all agenda items negotiated under the UNFCCC"[73]. The evidence of interest, instead, for process-tracing exercise such and this, is that which sheds light and provides data on the causal process linking supposed causes to observed outcomes[74].

The extensive secondary literature on the UNFCCC process that exists, from within the IR and international law disciplines, provided the main starting point for collecting evidence for this thesis. While much scholarship has also traced the evolution of the negotiations, these analyses have different research objectives and phenomena of interest, and so focus on different elements of the negotiations. Scholarship from the latter (in particular the *Environmental Policy & Law* and *Review of European Community and International Environmental Law* journals) has often published frequent but detailed analysis of progress and developments in the negotiations for an expert audience, providing valuable context.

The primary source documentary evidence has been drawn from a wide variety of material. One of the main sources has been the formal records of the UNFCCC process as issued by the UNFCCC secretariat: negotiated agreements, draft text, national submissions and group statements. Analysing these provided an opportunity to assess the nature and scope of a

[73] Streck 2012: 53
[74] George and Bennett 2005: 223

group's activity, the issues it was active on, and the justifications used in their argumentation. These formal records have been contextualised by close reference to other reports of conference proceedings, especially the *Earth Negotiations Bulletins*, an independent day-by-day reporting service of the UNFCCC process, and which is commonly used in other scholarship in tracing the developments and progress of the negotiations[75]. Similarly, although in a more biased manner, the ECO newsletter issued daily at the negotiating conferences by a coalition of NGOs, has helped to understand the main points of the debate and the political differences as they appeared to observers at the time[76]. To a lesser degree, news reporting of the time from media organisations has also been used, particularly in attempting to capture day-by-day shifts at the negotiating conferences themselves. This material, however, in being produced for mass media audiences, focuses on the overall developments at the conferences and thus has been less useful in capturing the nuances of activity among developing countries.

To complement the documentary material, an extensive range of 56 semi-structured interviews have also been conducted with negotiators and expert non-governmental and academic observers of the UNFCCC process[77] - mainly on the sidelines of the two UNFCCC subsidiary body meetings in Bonn, Germany in June 2011 and May 2012, but also in various other locations where a number of retired or former negotiators were based (New York City, Washington DC, London, New Delhi and Kuala Lumpur). Most individuals interviewed were from developing countries, and all were generally selected and approached based on the longevity of their experience of the climate negotiations – that is, with a focus and effort to approach interviewees who had many years of experience and involvement in the UNFCCC

[75] The ENBs are produced by a team of expert reporters from the International Institute for Sustainable Development. These are issued daily during UNFCCC sessions and are widely read by delegates and observers. See Chasek 2001; Chasek and Wagner 2012 for scholarly reflections by two of the ENB authors.

[76] While ECO claims to have been in publication at major environmental summits since the 1972 Stockholm summit, their digitised archives are only available since 1999. Efforts to identify and access a collection of pre-1999 material, apart from one published volume collating 1991-1992 issues from the INC sessions, were unfruitful.

[77] For a full listing of interviewees see Appendix II at the end of this thesis.

process. In addition to these formal interviews, observing the two subsidiary body meetings in 2011 and 2012, as well as participant-observation as the two COPs in 2011 and 2012, also allowed many more informal conversations with delegates and observers.

The interview process was a semistructured one – interviewees were provided, ahead of time of the interview if possible, a brief description and summary of this thesis' research questions, and during the interview, invited to respond to these general questions in addition to being asked specific questions about the coalitions that they had personal experience of. The content and subject matter of the interviews varied considerably and as such would not be appropriate for coding and quantitative analysis. Interviews are by their nature limited tools as subjective reflections and insights, dependent on the recollection of the interviewees. In often discussing events that are at some distance in time, they are also necessarily partial and incomplete. These limitations notwithstanding, the data and information that has arisen through this interview work, however, provided important insights into the dynamics within these coalitions. This is especially true for some senior negotiators interviewed who held key decision-making roles within their delegations, and whose recollection of events provides data not otherwise available in the published scholarly literature. In most other cases, however, the anecdotes and explanations that interviewees offered have not been taken as definitive reflections or necessarily representative of of a particular country's position or view, but as hypotheses for further exploration and confirmed by triangulating documentary sources. Such qualitative interviews will help to enhance understanding of the context in which negotiators see themselves operating in, the constraints that they identify, and the types of justifications deployed in defending positions taken[78]. The 'talk in the corridors' and day-to-day developments of the negotiating process itself (rather than just the outcomes) do not always make it into written records, and this interview work is intended to guard against the

[78] Tansey 2007

rhetorical flourishes of public statements that obscure more nuanced perspectives and positions. All interviews have been anonymised, although they will normally be identified with a region or 'type' of country that they represent. Guaranteeing interviewees confidentiality and anonymity has, admittedly, drawbacks for the transparency of this data, but this is a trade-off intended to encourage frank reflections and honest responses from interviewees, and ultimately, strengthen the evidence from which conclusions are drawn.

Finally, valuable insight was also gained by participant-observation fieldwork at the 2011 and 2012 COP meetings in Durban and Doha respectively, as a pro bono advisor to the delegation of Vanuatu. This position, with accreditation as a member of Vanuatu's delegation, enabled access to observe the main negotiating meetings that are normally closed to non-governmental observers where parties engage in drafting negotiating text, as well as the coordination meetings of the G77, AOSIS and LDC groups, which are only open to delegates from members of these coalitions. This firsthand experience, while only a two-conference snapshot, has been crucial to achieving a nuanced understanding of the dynamics of the actual *negotiating* process, which is otherwise effectively a black box for scholars of the UNFCCC negotiations[79], and been key to improving confidence in the causal inferences made about the factors and origins of coalition behaviour.

Conclusion and outline

Why have developing countries formed coalitions in the climate change negotiations in the manner and at the time that they have? This chapter has laid out the broad contours of the research questions guiding this thesis, deficiencies in the existing literature on coalitions in

[79] Apart from legal scholar-practitioners who frequently publish analyses of the UNFCCC process drawn from their own personal insights and actions, most scholarship (certainly in the IR discipline) is conducted without being able to directly observe the drafting process of the negotiations. Observers accredited through NGOs or academic institutions are typically not allowed to attend drafting meetings where draft agreements are reached. The only notable exception to this has been Radoslav Dimitrov, whose experience as a member of the European Union delegation has led to published scholarship . See Dimitrov 2010 and 2012.

the international politics of climate change, and the methodological basis of the qualitative within-case analysis approach that structures this thesis. The next chapter proceeds to review alternative arguments in the existing literature to fully develop the argument of this thesis sketched out in this chapter. It sets out the various ways in which Southern coalition formation may be explained theoretically and against these, presents the constructivist-focused arguments on the effects of social identity that this thesis argues better explain the origins of developing country coalition formation in these negotiations. Existing explanations largely focus on how material forces underpin state behaviour. For instance, states may be variously expected to form coalitions on the basis of balancing the structural distribution of power in the international system; on the basis of structural economic inequalities; or on the basis of calculating their cost-benefits positions from climate change. What is neglected in the existing literature, and what this thesis develops, is an argument drawing on how developing country coalitions have instead been structured by their social identities. Their formation has been guided by social norms of appropriate association, based on their social identities, that set out who their socially 'natural' allies and coalition partners are – and provides a deeper understanding of the North-South dynamics of the climate change negotiations.

The subsequent four chapters presents the empirical material that illustrate these arguments, proceeding in a chronological nature that mirror the changing political phases of the negotiations. Each chapter addresses three issues. The first is to provide an account of each of the negotiating groups that were formed during that period. These empirical accounts are one of the major contributions of this thesis to the existing literature. The second is also to consider some of the differences that do emerge among developing countries, in order to contrast these divergences with the relative stability of the coalitions forms that exist. The third is to illustrate the theoretical argument outlined briefly here and more extensively in the

next chapter, by juxtaposing the explanatory power of the appropriate association argument with one based on a narrowly material understanding of state interests. How much of the observed behaviour can we explain with reference to state identity and the appropriate association norm therein, and not the main alternative explanation of climate-specific material interests?

Chapter Three begins this chronicle with an account of the prenegotiating period, principally addressing the emergence of climate change as a political issue from 1988-1990 and how, over this period, the institutional choice of the UN General Assembly to organise formal negotiations was reached instead of the UN Environment Programme, which was widely considered to be the most likely candidate at the time. This choice is essential to understand, this thesis argues, because the General Assembly mandate ensured that the formal negotiations were placed in a universal North-South context within which a particular norm of *Southern* appropriate association was thus institutionally present at the very outset of negotiations. This institutional choice, and the consequent social norm effectively determined the establishment of a G77 structure to organise developing country participation. In a related but distinct way, additionally, the social origins of AOSIS are also considered here, highlighting its origins in the *regional* groupings of the Pacific and Caribbean regions that qualifies the conventional interpretation of AOSIS a purely interest-based negotiating group.

Chapter Four moves to discuss the beginnings of these formal negotiations in the INC negotiating period from 1991-1992 that culminated in agreement on the Framework Convention on Climate Change, and the subsequent phase of negotiations leading from the Earth Summit to agreement on the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. The focus here is on two incidents, one in 1991 and one in 1995, when the G77 was unable to agree a joint position on

the strength of mitigation commitments, resulting in separate submissions from subgroups. The key element to explore here, however, is that these breakdowns in G77 coordination did not lead to lasting fragmentation – this thesis argues, because the norm of appropriate association. This norm expected continuing G77 coordination as the default coalition arrangement, a social factor resulting from the institutional context of negotiations outlined in the preceding chapter. This chapter provides a history of the South when the universe of negotiating groups remains constant at two – the G77 and AOSIS. It acknowledges and highlights the considerable differences in negotiating positions among developing countries that already exist over this first decade, but argues that these do not change the strength of the South's collective identification and its coalition expression as the G77.

Chapter Five then covers the seven years after Kyoto from 1998 to 2004. During this phase the main questions confronting the development of the climate regime were to do with bringing Kyoto into force, issues where developing countries were less central actors. But the pattern of coalitions that had been largely static up until Kyoto began to change, with the emergence of three new subgroups of developing states: GRILA, the African Group, and the LDCs. Their origins have also been the subject of scholarly neglect, but they can all also be understood, to varying degrees, through the emphasis on social identities that this thesis provides. These are the beginnings of coalitions formed drawing on regional identities where norms of regional appropriate association structure group membership and composition – geographic regions in the case of GRILA and the African Group, and non-geographic regions in the case of the LDCs.

Chapter Six then addresses the most recent phase of negotiations from 2005 to 2012, where the public attention upon the 2009 Copenhagen summit led to the formation of further groups

of countries along regional lines: SICA, ALBA, the Arab Group, the African Group (again) and the Congo Basin countries. The establishment of a group of mountainous countries (the MLDCs) was also the result of emerging into an established categorisation of climate vulnerability. And even the most noted 'new' coalition of the past decade, BASIC, still reflects an institutional logic where prior cooperation shapes cooperation and coalition membership. Only in one case, with the Coalition for Rainforest Nations, is there a coalition formed for a specific policy purpose to advance a particular negotiating position. An initial analysis of two coalitions established at the very end of this period in 2012, AILAC and the LMDCs, will also be provided in view of the overarching argument presented over the preceding chapters.

Finally, a concluding chapter (Chapter Seven) will summarize conclusions drawn from this study: a more cogent and systematic history of developing country coalition formation in the climate negotiations; and the insights generated from a constructivist approach with which to understand and conceptualize coalition formation among developing countries. Taken together, these aim to advance understanding about the larger meanings of the South in world politics, in both its past and future, as the political challenge of how states respond to climate change grows ever more pressing.

Chapter Two
Explaining Southern Coalition Formation

How have developing countries sought to form negotiating groups and coalitions in the climate change negotiations? The record of Southern negotiating behaviour, as outlined in the introductory chapter to this thesis, provides two key patterns of behaviour to explain. The first is the 'Southern-ness' of all these coalitions, where they have been formed exclusively among developing countries and have yet to cross the North-South divide. The second is the emergence and formation of newer groups over the course of the negotiations – but where the older groups, with only one exception (GRILA), fail to lapse or die. In this chapter, existing arguments are reviewed, and a new one advanced, to explain the origins of these patterns of negotiating behaviour.

The first part of this chapter offers reasons as to why the broad pattern of Southern unity and the continued salience of the G77 might be considered unproblematic – that is, that the puzzle of this thesis really does not constitute much of a puzzle at all. Neorealist and world-systems arguments – both structural theories of international politics – focus on the differences between North and South as ones that transcend the differences between developing countries themselves. If this first section defines the interests of developing countries in a particular way that emphasizes structural imperatives, however, then the second section then moves to consider more seriously how developing countries might define their interests in a less aggregated manner. These focus on the differences in the unit-level characteristics of developing countries, and the grounds upon which the frequently-

made observation of developing country 'heterogeneity' is made[80]. Attention to this heterogeneity, and increasing heterogeneity over time, of developing country interests thus raises a collective action problem with regards to membership in a common coalition, and ways of overcoming these discussed in the third section of this chapter.

The propositions developed in these three sections, however, all focus primarily on the material factors that drive state behaviour – and they have their limitations in fully accounting for the historical record of the climate negotiations. Accordingly, the fourth part of this chapter outlines a constructivist and historical institutionalist argument that seeks to capture the social and institutional elements of Southern negotiating behaviour and coalition formation. This draws upon the academic literature on both social identity and path dependency, thus far underappreciated in the study of international climate change diplomacy[81], and sets out a richer and subtler argument for the behaviour of developing countries within the context of the climate negotiations.

Structurally defined interests

Two theoretical approaches focus on structural arguments to explain coalition formation. Each offers an argument as to why the existence of a common Southern coalition in the G77, and its persistence may be considered relatively unproblematic. In ontological terms, both are materialist in the sense that it is the material distribution of capabilities and resources that matters most in how states define their interests, rather than ideational or social phenomenon. Neorealism has tended to conceive of power as material power, typically in the form of military might or economic weight, and the insights of world-

[80] Kasa, Gullberg and Heggelund 2008

[81] Some constructivist work applied to international climate politics includes Pettenger 2007 and Cass 2006, although these largely focus on domestic politics.

systems theory are premised on economic relationships. There are differences between them in terms of how structures are thought to constitute properties of actors, but the brief point here is to emphasize the shared material assumptions of both these theoretical approaches[82].

Neorealist structuralism

In an anarchic international order, the behaviour of states is constrained by the distribution of capabilities across the entire international system. This distribution of capabilities among states is what defines the structure of the international system, which has consequences for the interaction of states and their attributes[83]. That is, in neorealist analyses, states are expected to behave differently depending on whether the system is unipolar, bipolar or multipolar; system structure leads to particular and enduring patterns of behaviour, and changes in system structure therefore leads to different patterns of behaviour.

Explaining alliance behaviour, consequently, is undertaken via reference to system structure. States choose and form their alliances as a response to the capabilities of other states, and with the goal of preserving their survival in the international system, seek to *balance* preponderant power[84]. The alliances of great powers are arguably accounted for in terms of balancing efforts. European patterns of alliances in the post-Westphalia era, for instance, are seen as structurally determined whereby alliances were formed to counter accumulations of power by other states: "...would-be hegemons invariably fail to achieve lasting dominance. Structural realism leads to the expectation that hegemony should generate the rise of countervailing power in the form of new great powers"[85].

[82] Wendt 1999: 29-33.
[83] Waltz 1979: 97-100
[84] The issue of balancing is a central especially to realist debates – over the varying propensity to balance, bandwagon, or other forms of behaviour.
[85] See Layne 1993: 12

The balancing logic that is a central neorealist proposition has been modified by Stephen Walt, arguing that states balance not against capabilities, but threat[86]. That is, alliances are best thought of as responses to the threat posed by other states; there may be various sources of threat, but regardless of the relative importance of these in any given situation, an increase in the level of threat makes balancing behaviour more likely. Walt suggests that weak states, however, are more likely to bandwagon rather than balance, because the marginal utility of their alliance choice upon the overall balance of power means that the safer option lies in siding with the more powerful coalition. Nonetheless, bandwagoning may be mitigated by the availability of allies and the interpretation of intentions[87].

Distinguishing the alliance behaviour of strong and weak countries, as Walt does, however, raises a more general theoretical question, particularly if we seek to define state interests in structural terms: how well does this structural neorealist framework, traditionally drawn from and applied to great power relationships, work for developing countries? Building theory from a narrowly European experience has been criticised for neglecting the particular situations that developing countries occupy in the international system[88]. Alliance decisions depend on more than the external balance of power, and instead are arguably linked more closely to the internal dynamics of regime survival and statebuilding that set developing states apart from industrialised countries. That is, rather than states balancing the power of other states because of the systemic imperative of survival in anarchy, alliances may be made and broken, at least in part, because of threats posed by the domestic

[86] Walt 1987

[87] Walt 1987: 28-32

[88] On the struggle of developing countries to approximate the Westphalian ideal of sovereignty (on which much IR theory is premised), which makes their membership of and participation within international society qualitatively different from the Western states, see Ayoob 1991 and 2002, and also Jackson 1990's "quasi-states" distinction. For the general debate on the development of 'Western/non-Western' IR theory, see Acharya 2011 and Bilgin 2008

political environment[89]. For some, these limitations of structural theorizing in its focus on the external configuration of power militate against the analytical value of neorealism[90].

Nonetheless, attempts have been made at taking seriously the difference that developing countries present to structural theorizing when contrasted with conventional assumptions about a stable, cohesive nation-state. This is at the heart of Stephen Krasner's account of North-South conflict in the 1970s over the New International Economic Order (NIEO). The hallmarks of the NIEO challenge, in the collective mobilization of developing countries and attempts at forging a united South, Krasner argues, derive from the weak and precarious *structural* position that developing countries occupy in the international system[91]. The weaknesses of being in this position, in short, compel attempts to change the rules of the game as a way of improving outcomes for developing countries[92].

Asymmetries of international capabilities have been compounded by the domestic weaknesses of Third World regimes, vulnerable to political and social instability. As a result, developing countries have sought to alter the liberal, market-oriented bases on which international regimes are organized, an expression of "meta-power behaviour designed to change international regimes in ways that would not only ensure greater transfers of wealth but also mitigate shocks emanating from the international system by increasing state

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89 David 1991: 244-245: "Balance of power theory is flawed in its application to the Third World because it ignores internal threats; that is, it overlooks the most likely source of challenge to the leadership of Third World states...For those cases in which the principal threats to the leadership are from other states, balance of power theory indeed applies. But it is only prudent to consider the impact of domestic challenges before assuming that external threats alone have determined an alignment, because in what appears to be the vast majority of Third World states, internal threats play a major role."

90 Rothstein 1988; Acharya 1998

91 Krasner 1985; the key contrast between Krasner and Steven David is that while both are making general arguments about the behaviour of Third World states, David's is one that has little reference to the overall international distribution of capabilities.

92 This builds on earlier analyses of the power (and not just economic) goals of Third World states, such as Tucker 1977 for a reading of Third World demands for equality in terms of power and status goals, rather than purely welfare and development ones.

control"[93]. The challenge of survival in an anarchical order, given the internal weaknesses of Third World states, leads to concern with how regimes are organised and therefore the attempts to reorder these in modes of 'authoritative', rather than 'liberal', market-led allocation, as expressed in the key NIEO demands such as the right of expropriating foreign direct investment, greater control over multinational corporations, and the reduction of Northern trade barriers[94]. This structural imperative therefore leads Krasner to the conclusion of 'enduring' conflict between North and South. While Krasner himself preferred to describe his analysis as a 'modified' realist position, in view of his attention to the role of institutions as avenues for power-based behaviour (rather than an outright dismissal of institutions[95]), this argument is still very much a structural one[96]. This emphasis on explaining state behaviour through structural considerations of power thus relegates differences between developing countries as secondary to those between developed and developing countries, in view of the broader shared position of developing countries in the international system. Specifying their interests in the first place depends on looking at their structural position, and when it comes to choices for coalition formation, the dominant expectation of structural neorealism is that developing countries will seek to challenge the position of the dominant states. As Krasner put it, "...Third World unity is the result of structural similarity among developing states, not a logrolling strategy designed to incorporate a wide range of economic demands"[97].

The 'failure' of the NIEO demands, especially in the undermining of Southern unity into the

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93 Krasner 1985: 32

94 Lake 1987 identified the most important element of these demands as being their multilateral nature, but that the demands themselves were historically similar to the mercantilist strategies of previous economic challengers such as the United States, Great Britain and Germany, in seeking to increase capital inflows while maintaining domestic protectionism.

95 Mearsheimer 1994

96 Rothstein 1988: 732-740 discusses Krasner's neorealism vis-a-vis other aspects of neorealist theory.

97 Krasner 1985: 308

1980s and beyond, however, casts a more problematic light on the structural imperatives of power and insecurity that Krasner identifies as underpinning an enduring North-South conflict. Instead, divergent economic positions and prospects of developing countries made it difficult to prevent defections from a common Southern coalition[98]. The intensification of these divergences among developing countries into the 1990s and 2000s and the uneven pattern of cooperation among developing countries, particularly with the rise of the 'emerging' developing countries, have further questioned the validity of this neorealist emphasis on a structural explanation. That is, the notion of developing countries sharing a structurally similar position struggles firstly to explain differences across issue areas in developing country behaviour in recent decades, and secondly, the more specific pattern of coalition formation among developing countries that is the subject of thesis. At the same time, however, there is a distinction to be made between the theoretical argument regarding the supposed effects of system structure and the character of the NIEO demands. The brief conclusion reached here suggests that Krasner's neorealist argument is of limited value in attempting to understand the patterns of coalition formation explored here. This, however, is different from arguments that identify echoes and continuities of the NIEO in the behaviour of the emerging powers, but eschew a structural component in explaining their motivations[99]. A different kind of structural argument, however, has been used to explain the specific patterns of behaviour of developing countries on climate change, which is outlined next.

World-systems structuralism

In a capitalist world economy, states occupy different positions, which are related to

[98] Rothstein 1988; Rothstein 1990

[99] Nel 2010 identifies the goals of the IBSA states as continuations of the NIEO demands, although they also have a 'prestige' and 'recognition' component. See also Nel, Nabers and Hanif 2012; Golub 2013.

particular roles that they fulfil in this world economy. As argued most notably by Immanuel Wallerstein, the development of individual states cannot be understood apart from whether they are located in the core, semi-periphery, or periphery of the world economy. This location is determined by the wage differentials and profit margins of production; core states produce high-wage and high-profit products, and peripheral states produce low-wage and low-profits ones, with semi-peripheral states in between[100]. Hence states are said to face only "limited possibilities of transformation within the capitalist world economy", because the *capitalist* structure of the world economy necessitates that there are unequal regions of core and periphery, and this unequal structure meaning that it is not possible for all states to develop simultaneously[101].

The key concern underlying world-systems arguments is to account for the limited development prospects of developing countries and identifying the class distributions across the world economy, rather than with explicitly constructing a theory of international politics. Nonetheless, insofar as identifying a country's position in the world economy helps to clarify its interests, an account of alliance dynamics can still be derived. This is principally that because peripheral countries especially, but semiperipheral ones too, are on the receiving end of relationships of unequal exchange, their interests are revisionist ones, to challenge the core states and upend these relationships of unequal exchange. This depiction imports a balancing logic from neorealist arguments, but the insight generated by world-systems arguments lies in the different conception of state interests that it offers compared to neorealist ones. In this picture, therefore, a common alliance of developing countries, constituting the periphery and semiperiphery, might be expected[102].

[100] Wallerstein 1979: 71-72
[101] Wallerstein 1979: 66-94
[102] Nonetheless, we should acknowledge that Wallerstein was pessimistic about the possibility of developing country-unity, particularly between socialist and non-socialist countries, because of the temptation inherent in the system to pursue self-advancement at the expense of other semi-peripheral or peripheral

This is the argument explicitly made in reference to contemporary climate change politics by Roberts and Parks, who suggest that the positions of developing countries in the climate negotiations are constituted, in good part, by a continuing pattern of North-South structural inequality, the core characteristics of which have not changed over time. These positions, they argue, cannot be understood apart from a recognition of relationships of *ecologically* unequal exchange between rich and poor. Developed countries profit from the extraction of natural resources of developing countries:

> "Improvements in emissions intensity of other measures of carbon responsibility by wealthy nations are not solely the result of improvements in energy efficiency. Rather, much of the apparent improvement comes from their effectively offshoring the most environmentally damaging production stages of the goods they consume...the [sources of] impacts on carbon dioxide emissions have shifted from wealthy importers of goods to poorer exporters, while relatively few social and economic benefits have accrued to the poorer partner"[103].

The structural nature of this unequal ecological relationship, Roberts and Parks suggest, explains why the overarching problem of the climate negotiations has been along the North-South divide and why developing countries have been relatively united for most of the two decades of negotiations. It is the overarching constraints of a disadvantageous economic system that ultimately defines what developing countries have in common, even against the rise of the emerging economies since the end of the Cold War. These are the larger crises of development since the 1980s: the Washington Consensus, and the rewriting of global trade

countries (Wallerstein 1979: 116-118).

[103] Roberts and Parks 2007: 183

and monetary rules to the advantage of developed countries[104]. The structural inequality that has resulted is echoed by various scholars who draw attention to the continuing patterns of economic inequality in world politics, a pattern that has not decreased over the past century[105]. It is especially echoed, however, in the claims advanced by developing countries of the "ecological debt" of the North to the South, namely that a debt of ecological extraction has been generated historically over centuries of colonialism and which continues in the present era[106]. To the extent that developing country governments express 'structuralist' worldviews that lay the causes of climate change at the door of rich, developed, 'haves', these are well-founded in the empirical reality of material relationships in the world economy and not just a rhetorical device, Roberts and Parks argue[107]. In addressing the question of Southern coalition behaviour, and in particular the salience of the G77, the world-systems argument outlined in this section sees the formation of a common Southern coalition and the maintenance of negotiating unity as relatively unproblematic: the interests of developing countries are constructed in the structural terms of global economic relationships where North-South cleavages are still relevant, justifying pan-Southern coalitions in the pursuit of such interests[108].

As with the neorealist argument, however, the world-systems one leaves unaddressed the issue of the divergent patterns of behaviour among developing countries in the post-Cold War era noted in the first chapter. If the positions of developing countries on climate change are indeed influenced by the wider context of their economic fortunes since the 1980s and impossible to resolve without resolving the wider development agenda, as Roberts and

[104] Roberts and Parks 2007: 48-56
[105] Milankovic 2009; Arrighi, Brewer and Silver 2003
[106] Roberts and Parks 2007: 164-165; Parks and Roberts 2010: 141-144.
[107] Parks and Roberts 2010: 145-147.
[108] Many of the arguments advanced by the South Centre reflect this type of argument; see Khor 2010.

Parks contend[109], it seems anomalous that the same economic context does not consistently influence coalition behaviour in settings other than the climate change negotiations, and result in stronger levels of cooperation among developing countries in both those issue areas as well as within climate negotiating sphere specifically. The explanation provided by Roberts and Parks addresses only part of the phenomena traced in this thesis, the general North-South divide that still persists – but not the changes among developing countries and the reasons why new groups have developed among them, both gradually in the 1990s and more rapidly in the 2000s.

In both the neorealist and world-systems arguments, interests are defined, and therefore acted upon, in ways that are guided by the structural position of developing countries which set the context for coalition behaviour. Coalition partners are identified by an assessment of shared interests – these shared interests being structural ones. Both arguments are applied to explain wide-ranging behaviour – for Krasner, meta-power goals across various regimes, and for Roberts and Parks, drawing from the broader context of economic development. But when the record of the past two decades suggests considerable variation in developing country unity in different issue areas, it would seem that an emphasis on the structure of international system is not a sufficient explanation. Instead, there is a need to more closely consider the issue-specific configurations of interest and power, which is undertaken in the next section.

Unit-level interests: abatement costs and environmental vulnerability

Interests, rather than being guided purely or chiefly by structural considerations, are far more heterogeneous if we understand their origins in the internal characteristics of

[109] Roberts and Parks 2007: 48-59.

developing countries. This section highlights the increasing divergence of the countries of the South from each other – in light of which Southern unity is a phenomenon in need of real explanation, a more surprising outcome than what structural arguments would suggest.

How do unit-level characteristics inform our understanding of state interests on international climate change policy, and coalition preferences therein? One starting point is a narrow construction of interests that focuses on the ecological vulnerability of a country to pollution and the cost of measures to abate the pollution[110]. A country's interests on environmental issues, Sprinz and Vaahtoranta argue, can be derived from the unit-specific configuration of each of these two variables. Some countries are more vulnerable to the impacts of pollution than others, and these would be expected to be more supportive of international regulation and pollution control than those which are not. Similarly, countries for which the cost of pollution abatement measures is high, would be less supportive of international regulation than those for which such costs are low. Combined, these two variables reflect a country-specific cost-benefit analysis that can be expected to be predictive of the strength of that particular country's support for international environmental regulation during international negotiations: whether they are 'pushers', 'intermediates', 'bystanders' or 'draggers' in international negotiations (see Table 1). Like the above section on structural imperatives, this account similarly explains state behaviour in material terms, but instead locates the relevant factors at a different level of analysis.

State preferences for environmental regulation, thus defined, lead towards a spectrum where support for international agreement is strongest from 'pushers', less so for 'intermediates', even less so for 'bystanders', and finally 'draggers' are the most recalcitrant.

[110] Sprinz and Vaahtoranta 1994. The discussion uses the ozone depletion and acid rain experiences as case studies, but their framework is explicitly more generalizable.

The middle ground between intermediates and bystanders may be somewhat of a grey area: intermediates face high ecological vulnerability, but may not be willing (or able) to pay the costs of abatement, whereas bystanders have little interest in an agreement, but because of the low costs incurred may be willing to go along[111]. If and when these domestic factors change over time, we should also expect negotiating preferences to change correspondingly[112].

	Ecological vulnerability		
Abatement costs		**Low**	**High**
	Low	Bystanders	Pushers
	High	Draggers	Intermediates

Table 2: Classification of a country's support for international environmental regulation. Reproduced from Sprinz and Vaahtoranta 1994

This two-variable definition of state interests can be extended to coalition preferences. While the Sprinz and Vaahtoranta model aims simply to explain the distribution of support for international environmental regulation, this distribution also points towards possible patterns of coalition formation: countries with similar preferences at international negotiations, whether for strong or weak environmental regulation, will seek to form alliances with countries that share similar preferences. Common interests, defined in domestic, rather than external-structural terms, form the basis on which alliances are formed, which we should expect to continue for as long as these preferences remain shared[113]. This is consistent with an orthodox understanding of alliances and coalitions as vehicles to aggregate capabilities – in this case bargaining strength – towards the achievement of common goals.

[111] Sprinz and Vaahtoranta 1994
[112] Sprinz and Vaahtoranta 1994: 78-81.
[113] DeSombre 2000: 40

The expectations about coalition behaviour that emerge, subsequently, are that pushers and draggers would be in adversarial coalitions: the former eager for strong regulation, and the latter preferring a weak agreement. Intermediates are more likely to form a coalition with pushers, and bystanders with draggers – but it may also be possible that intermediates and draggers may find themselves aligned together on either side, depending on the particular incentives at stake. The key point here, at the very least, however, is that we would not expect pushers and draggers to be in the same coalition. In this way, the two-variable model helps us to identify likely and unlikely coalitions.

Operationalizing this argument depends on the availability of data sources that allow the assessment of both ecological vulnerability and economic cost to a country from environmental regulation[114]. But when it comes to climate change, the diffuse characteristics of the problem – rising greenhouse gas emissions leading to qualitatively different physical impacts in different parts of the world, and the variety of sources of emissions in different parts of the world – makes this an especially difficult challenge. Doing so has tended to involve composite indices that allow for an aggregate perspective of vulnerability and abatement costs[115]. One attempt, for example, uses potential agricultural impacts, sea-level rise and the future propensity of extreme weather events to capture the vulnerability of a country to climate change; meanwhile, carbon intensity, fossil fuel dependence, renewable energy potential and carbon sequestration potential cumulatively capture the cost of abatement[116]. Using the analytical scheme outlined by Sprinz and

[114] As Sprinz and Vaahtoranta 1994 demonstrate in their case studies, the difficulty of this is related to the problem at hand. Ozone depletion, with a relatively straightforward causal path from CFC emissions to ozone depletion and therefore skin cancer risk, allowed for skin cancer incidence to be taken as the vulnerability indicator, and CFC consumption relative to GNP per capita as the cost indicator.

[115] Rowlands 1995; Parks and Roberts 2007 (a vulnerability index only); Buys et al. 2009

[116] Buys et al 2009. The authors use 'source vulnerability' to denote the effects of "emission reduction mandates", which amounts to the same thing as the costs of abatement.

Vaahtoranta, the indices developed by Buys and colleagues allow for a similar analysis to be applied to the climate negotiations[117]. And while the methodological issues involved in developing these indices are not insignificant[118], but nonetheless allow an overview of the negotiating positions that we should expect states to hold, based on an interest-based explanation for state behaviour in the climate change negotiations (Table 3).

	Ecological vulnerability (impact vulnerability)			
Abatement costs (source vulnerability)		Low	Medium	High
	Low	**BYSTANDERS** DR Congo Croatia Iceland Kyrgyzstan Latvia New Zealand Tajikistan	Argentina Brazil Cameroon Chile Costa Rica Cyprus Cote d'Ivoire Denmark El Salvador Gabon Georgia Ghana Guatemala Ireland Laos Mongolia Panama Papua New Guinea Sierra Leone Suriname Togo Turkey Uruguay	**PUSHERS** Albania Belize Benin Bolivia Botswana Cambodia Djibouti Dominican Republic Ethiopia Guinea Guinea-Bissau Guyana Honduras Madagascar Mexico Mozambique Myanmar Namibia Nicaragua Paraguay Peru Philippines Senegal Sri Lanka Tunisia Zambia
	Medium	Armenia Austria Belarus Egypt Germany Lebanon Libya Luxembourg Moldova Norway Slovenia Sweden Switzerland Uganda United Kingdom	Belgium Burkina Faso Canada Central African Republic Chad Colombia Congo Finland France Italy Japan Kenya North Korea Lithuania Malaysia	Algeria Angola Australia Cuba Ecuador Eritrea Gambia Haiti Indonesia Jamaica Malawi Mauritania Niger Syria Thailand Venezuela

[117] Sprinz and Vaahtoranta 1994 use a 2x2 scheme in their model, which is simpler than the 3x3 scheme here, but the latter follows the way that the data has been presented in Buys et al. 2009 in three categories (low/medium/high).

[118] See Klein 2009

			Mali Nepal Netherlands Oman Portugal Spain Tanzania	Vietnam Yemen
	High	**DRAGGERS** Andorra Azerbaijan Bahrain Bhutan Bosnia and Herzegovina Brunei Darussalam Bulgaria Burundi Czech Republic Estonia Greenland Hungary Israel Kazakhstan Kuwait Liechtenstein Macedonia Monaco Poland Qatar Romania Russian Federation San Marino Serbia & Montenegro Singapore Slovakia Taiwan Turkmenistan Ukraine United Arab Emirates Uzbekistan West Bank & Gaza	Afghanistan Equatorial Guinea Greece South Korea Lesotho Nigeria Rwanda Saudi Arabia South Africa Swaziland USA	**INTERMEDIATES** Bangladesh China India Iran Iraq Jordan Liberia Morocco Pakistan Somalia Sudan Zimbabwe

Table 3: Classification of a country's support for international climate change regulation. Adapted based on source data from Buys et al. 20091. G77 and China members are highlighted.

With this overview of the distribution of support for the strength of an international agreement based on two (indexed) domestic variables, we can apply this distribution towards expectations of what bargaining coalitions might form and last at climate change negotiations. That is, identifying the preferences of countries in this way allows an understanding of which countries face similar ecological and economic situations with regards to addressing climate change, and which countries face dissimilar ones. To follow

the argument outlined earlier in this section: we would not expect countries in dissimilar situations to form coalitions, given the divergences in their interests. And if any coalition were to grow particularly large, it would because its members largely face a particular combination of economic costs and environmental vulnerability that conditions a particular level of support for international climate negotiations.

We can compare this expected positioning of countries to actual coalition membership: the G77 and China's membership is broadly distributed across all categories of countries. In the four main categories, pushers (advocates for a strong agreement) make up 18.5% of the G77 and China's membership. But at the other extreme, 7% of the membership is made up of dragger countries (preferring only a weak agreement). In Table 3 the distribution of the G77 and China membership is illustrated, leaving attempts to explain coalition dynamics in terms of domestically defined interests only inconclusive ones[119]. Indeed, if anything, what this distribution illustrates is the diversity of the G77 – the "heterogeneity" widely acknowledged elsewhere[120].

	Ecological vulnerability (impact vulnerability)			
Abatement costs (source vulnerability)		Low	Medium	High
	Low	BYSTANDERS 1 (0.8%)	18 (13.8%)	PUSHERS 24 (18.5%)
	Medium	4 (3.1%)	12 (9.2%)	17 (13.1%)
	High	DRAGGERS 10 (7.7%)	8 (6.2%)	INTERMEDIATES 12 (9.2%)

Table 4: Distribution of G77 and China members support for international climate regulation (summarized from Table 3); 106 of 130 G77 and China members included

[119] This is admittedly an incomplete exercise, because not all G77 and China countries were included in the Buys dataset. Of the 24 G77 and China members not included, 22 are also AOSIS members.

[120] Kasa, Gullberg and Heggelund 2008: 117

Other challenges remain in how strongly conclusions about the negotiating behaviour of developing countries can be drawn from such a definition of state interests. Firstly, a more robust assessment would require a longitudinal comparison given the purpose of this thesis to examine coalition dynamics over a 25-year period; the Buys dataset, assembled in 2007, is a more recent snapshot of country interests. A more complete analysis would ideally access a snapshot of country interests at the beginning of the intergovernmental climate negotiations in 1991, to see how 'interests' defined in terms of these same domestic variables present a different picture to the one suggested by the Buys dataset, particularly at the moment of coalition formation (and where the potential for path dependency might be more readily observable). However, the limited availability of such data, especially for developing countries, is a further challenge to how robustly an account of coalition dynamics derived from domestic interests can be advanced. Indeed, the relatively few number of attempts to operationalize the Sprinz and Vaahtoranta model with regards to climate change indicates the methodological difficulties in developing such indices[121].

Secondly, the limited availability of reliable historical data of this type for developing countries highlights a problem for the rationalist assumption that underpins this model of state interests. That is, states are assumed to 'know' what their interests are, which are readily accessible. But as the issues with data collection highlighted here suggest, this may be a problematic assumption to make. For if the academic analysis of country interests in the climate change negotiations has proved to be a challenging endeavour, it would be equally challenging (if not more so) for many developing countries that lack research capabilities or the political attention to prioritise such research. IR theory notes that states

[121] Rowlands 1995a

often operate under conditions of bounded rationality and incomplete information; if this is the case, then to explain their negotiating position as being driven by concern for ecological vulnerability or economic cost may be incorrect in falsely attributing how states define their interests. The challenge for developing countries of actually possessing information with which to define their interests is not new, nor is it limited to climate change[122]. Likewise, it also highlights the limits of external, 'objective' definitions of what Southern unity is for when instead it is properly understood through the definitions that developing countries construct for themselves[123]. Thirdly, aggregating these domestic variables into a single index value does not address the relative priority of issues to different countries, which may be more useful in understanding how their interests are guided by specific priorities and a relative hierarchy of issues.

These data concerns notwithstanding, the model outlined in this section, relying on a domestic definition of interests, highlights the heterogeneity of the interests among G77 and China members. Juxtaposed against the structural arguments outlined earlier that emphasise the common interests among developing countries, a more varied picture is presented, although one which still interprets state behaviour in material terms. The next section now turns to how, amid such divergent interests, negotiating unity can still be achieved.

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[122] Gupta 1997 makes this specific point with developing countries in the UNFCCC setting, but see also Jones, Deere-Birkbeck and Woods 2010 for a discussion of interest-definition with regards to trade negotiations, and as Rothstein 1988: 734 notes with regards to North-South conflict over the NIEO in the 1970s and 1980s: "...many of the Third World countries did not know what their interests were on complex issues (debt, commodities, finance and so on) and simply followed the Group of 77 position (on faith and promises of compensation), which was itself established largely by one or another UN bureaucracy or, more rarely, by a trusted group of outside experts".

[123] Willetts 1978: 44 makes a related point with regards to non-alignment.

Sustaining negotiating unity: mixed interests and asymmetric power

In this section, two different arguments are presented that offer explanations both for how coalitions are formed, and subsequently maintained. Each suggests a different mechanism and process by which negotiating unity has been sustained, but all attempt to confront two key challenges to unity: heterogeneous interests with regards to climate policy, and an asymmetric distribution of power among the G77 membership.

Coalitions as functional institutions

Debate over the relative significance of institutions revolves around the difference they make to international cooperation. One such form of cooperation is expressed within alliance relationships, where states reach common agreement among themselves as a means to some external ends. In this section we discuss coalitions as institutions for cooperation among states – which should not, however, be mistaken for the larger 'game' of cooperation or conflict that a coalition or alliance is geared towards. That is, following Glenn Snyder, alliances involve a primary 'adversary' game and a secondary 'alliance' game[124]. The focus in this section is on how a coalition serves as a functional institution among developing countries – that is, on how cooperation is achieved within the secondary alliance game. It is a different discussion from that which seeks to understand how institutions at the primary adversary game level may facilitate cooperation between coalitions or adversaries, or the issues associated with 'regime creation'[125].

As with other forms of cooperation more generally, this institutionalist view of coalitions pays attention to how institutions help functionally to overcome informational uncertainties

[124] Snyder 1984

[125] One difference in terms of institutions between the two is that in the primary adversary game, cooperation between adversaries focuses on the creation of new regulatory regimes and institutions; in the secondary alliance game, cooperation does not normally create a regulatory regime that 'does stuff'...?

and reducing transaction costs that prevent the realization of common interests, given mixed motives[126]. The fear of defection, or being double-crossed by erstwhile allies, is common given the anarchical structure of international politics, and this fear inhibits cooperation despite the possibility of common interests. But in providing information about the actions of other states, in creating a 'shadow of the future' through iterative interaction, and in raising the costs of defection through sanctions or reputational costs, institutions help to enable and sustain cooperation over the long-term[127]. The sunk costs of institution-building to fulfil such functions, however, also contain an explanation of persistence, accounting for the fact that particular coalitional forms can remain long after the initial conditions that precipitated its formation have changed. That is, while an existing coalition may be acknowledged as suboptimal, the cost and uncertainty over states' ability to build a new coalition generates a bias in favour of existing coalition structures[128].

Improving ally credibility (and communicating one's own credibility) through changing the informational environment is one contribution that institutions make to intra-coalition cooperative behaviour. A second lies in providing a mechanism to create issue-linkages that allow for joint agreement on a collective negotiating position. States will value different issues differently, and thus asymmetric preferences mean that through a coalition, issues that might otherwise be kept distinct can be linked into a single agreement that delivers joint gains for the parties involved. As Haas notes, issue-linkage can be of a purely tactical, log-rolling type where the linked issues are substantively unconnected; it can be of a fragmented nature where there is an expectation of joint gains, even though the distribution of these is unclear; and it can be of a substantive type where the redefinition of national

[126] Keohane 1984
[127] Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger 1997: 33-36; Narlikar 2003: 24-27
[128] Keohane 1984

interests comes to broaden the goals being sought[129]. The type of issue-linkage has implications for the stability of the bargain being struck, but in any case institutions serve an efficient function in providing a mechanism that aids the process of making linkages, by reducing the transaction costs of identifying possible linkages that might otherwise go unrealized[130].

A particular challenge faced by developing countries in building and sustaining coalitions lies in the issue of large-number cooperation that is often pessimistically viewed when it comes to collective action, even if larger numbers have often been viewed by developing countries as critical to achieving greater bargaining weight. Large-number cooperation is regarded as a challenge in itself, with group size and the possibility for collective action seen in pessimistic terms[131]. Furthermore, the difficulty of such cooperation is amplified by the weaknesses of developing countries that are less able to resist pressure from developed countries, and face greater temptations to defect from the coalition[132]. In light of this difficulty, the two functions of coalitions just discussed help to maintain negotiating unity – that by facilitating the process of information-sharing among allies, improves the credibility of allies (and thereby reduces the fear of abandonment); and that issue-linkage tactics in the intra-coalition bargaining process allows for side payments to be made such that the promise of gains over issues of greatest interest to a particular country counterbalances the temptation to defect.

The attention to how cooperation is facilitated by institutions contains a number of insights for explaining coalition dynamics. The institutional setting of the G77 and China coalition

[129] Haas 1980: 372
[130] Martin 1992
[131] Olson 1971
[132] Narlikar and Tussie 2004: 954-957

has enabled interests shared across the heterogeneity of developing countries to be met, enabling negotiating unity. The opportunity to exchange information among members has allowed agreement to coalesce around core issues of joint interest – such as the stringency of developed country commitments, or the demand for North-South financial transfers and 'additional' assistance[133]. Publicly agreeing to a collective negotiating position constitutes a form of costly commitment[134], intended to allow G77 members to reassure each other about their commitment to the coalition.

Secondly, negotiating unity is also facilitated through issue-linkage that allows different priorities to be met within the collective negotiating position. One example is the linkage expressed in Article 4.8 of the Framework Convention that unites issues of core interest to different developing countries into a single principle. In this principle, one of the highest priorities for small island states, receiving special treatment as those most vulnerable to the physical impacts of climate change, is placed on the same legal basis as the priorities of countries dependent on oil exports, which demanded that they should be compensated for the economic costs of lost export revenue, should worldwide consumption of fossil fuels decrease dramatically (as would be the case in a low-carbon world)[135]. In this case, two substantially different policy demands are linked as part of the common G77 negotiating platform and embedded into the Convention text, with the goal that doing so will enhance the coalition's ability to achieve both rather than the case if they were negotiated separately.

Attention to the functional purposes of coalitions, drawn from neoliberal institutionalist theorizing, serves as a reminder that coalitions serve as much to aggregate power against an

[133] These are the issues at the core of the collective Southern position, as described by Marc Williams (1993; 2005)
[134] How costly is actually is is an empirical question.
[135] Barnett and Dessai 2002

external threat as they do to manage relations among allies[136]. However, the G77 and China is also a minimalist institution, only thinly formalised and without a standing institutional capacity, operating as part of the New York chapter of the G77. Compared to the much thicker institutional structure of how the G77 functions in UNCTAD, or for a highly institutionalised alliance in NATO, the G77 and China is a pale imitation of these and the cost of commitment nowhere nearly as large. So while institutional cooperation may have aided negotiating unity to be achieved, this should not be overstated[137].The presence of common interests is not a sufficient condition for the formation or maintenance of coalitions, and the intra-coalition bargaining process that leads to a collective negotiating position is crucial to understanding the cohesion and unity of a coalition. This section has highlighted how the institutional functions of a coalition help such cooperation; the next section turns to more conflictual elements of cooperation.

Coercive intra-coalition unity

Earlier, interpreting environmental domestic-level variables as guiding the international policy preferences of developing countries, and hence coalition preferences, drew attention to the heterogeneity of the true 'interests' of developing countries. The fulfilment of these interests, however, in realist thinking, is more likely to be mediated by the exercise of asymmetrical power. That is, if we accept that interests are to be narrowly defined in terms of environmental variables, a realist response would be that unity is instead coerced.

The core concern of classical realism lies with the exercise of power, leading to the expectation that the balance of positions adopted by the coalition will reflect the interests of its more powerful members. The structural neorealist argument outlined earlier highlighted

[136] Weitsman 1997
[137] Williams 2005; see Williams 1994 for an account of the G77 in UNCTAD

the common ground that the position of developing countries in the international system has generated in terms of attempts to balance the power of the West as a reaction to external constraints of power. But the argument here, rather than this structural emphasis on the system-wide constraints of power, accepts that divergences do exist between developing countries but that asymmetries of power explain cooperation. The cooperation problem of collective action captures one important set of issues in understanding coalition dynamics, but unequal power differentials among members constitute another set of issues: Togo, Micronesia and Lesotho simply do not muster the same influence that Brazil, India and China do towards the G77 position.

The basic expectation is that the will and interests of the more powerful coalition partners prevail in the coalition's policies. Like other forms of international cooperation, such as that within international regimes and institutions, the coalition can be seen as 'epiphenomenal', having no independent effect on the behaviour of its members and the preferences of great powers[138]. As temporary marriages of convenience, alliances will endure for as long as they fulfil the self-interest of states in a self-help world and no longer. One consequence would be to expect states to defect from a coalition should it no longer fulfil its interests – much of the immediate post-Cold War debate around NATO's future focusing on this point, for instance[139]. But the asymmetric power of coalition partners matters, for defection by leading members possesses different implications to defection by minor members. If leading members were to defect, the coalition would be expected to collapse. But if minor members intended to defect when leading members would rather they remain in the coalition, then we should expect leading members to exert pressure to ensure that minor members remain in the coalition. Leading members, in this regard, are willing to absorb the costs of

[138] Mearsheimer 1994
[139] Hellmann and Wolf 1993

punishing disloyalty and enforcing compliance[140].

The coalition is a reflection of the preferences of its most powerful members, and the G77 and China's continued existence, therefore is explained in this light by viewing the coalition as coercively maintained. The leading powers pressure weaker members into supporting the demands of the former, and professions of shared interests are merely a demonstration of rhetorical opportunism. For the G77 and China in the context of the climate change negotiations, the balance of power is clearly held by a select few states, which pressure smaller developing countries into acquiescence and alignment with their position. The 'solidarity' of the South is little more than a fig-leaf of legitimacy for the interests of India, China, Brazil and South Africa – and perhaps the recent emergence of newer coalitions is a reflection that these interests have become simply too divergent. Given the differentiation among developing countries outlined in above, asymmetric power and coercion is the key variable to explaining the continuing presence of the G77. This is the argument made by Kasa, Gullberg and Heggelund, who suggest that these four countries possess an "ability to negotiate directly with industrialized countries without resorting to the G77" by virtue of their own economic size and contribution to global greenhouse gas emissions[141]. The opportunism of power is what underlines continuing G77 unity – but chiefly for these four countries, indirectly wielded through the oil-exporters and OPEC, whose rigid opposition to ambitious agreement provides convenient cover for the positions of these big four. In cost-benefit terms, then, perhaps the G77 is best understood in the language of power, where the big countries are able to pursue options outside the UNFCCC process, but within it, "the G77 is still useful for countries like China, India and Brazil as an instrument for avoiding

[140] Walt 1997: 164-165
[141] Kasa, Gullberg and Heggelund 2008: 119

future commitments in the post-Kyoto negotiations"[142]

A coercion-based argument also explains the longitudinal question of the historical unity of the G77 and China. That is, during the 1988-1992 period of prenegotiations and the initial formal intergovernmental negotiations, asymmetries between G77 and China members were already apparent. As many expected at the time, competing interests arising from these asymmetries would make the coalition untenable[143]. But in the two decades since, if anything, these asymmetries have widened rather than narrowed, as China and India's economic prosperity has far outpaced much of the developing world. The consolidation of the dominant position of certain developing countries vis-a-vis helps to explain coalition unity, where the powerful have even more resources and clout with which to pressure and coerce weaker developing countries into supporting the former's positions.

However, this claim would be qualified if the dominant states in a coalition bear certain costs and restrictions from their participation in and leadership of the coalition. That is, the coalition does not consist of power running all the way through, but instead there are instances and issues where the preferences of leading members are not reflected in the coalition's positions, and the prospect of entrapment by the positions of allies is a real concern[144]. But rather than leading members defecting from the coalition, however, they remain committed to it, even while as it appears that minor countries are loosening their commitments to it by establishing alternative coalition groupings. Thus, moments when the coercive power of the major developing countries seem to run up against its limits, but yet negotiating unity is not threatened are in need of further explanation. Instead, in echoes of

[142] Kasa, Gullberg and Heggelund 2008: 125
[143] Paterson and Grubb 1992
[144] See Snyder 1984 on the alliance dilemma of entrapment versus abandonment.

earlier theorizing on hegemonic stability, large states may be willing to take on burdens and bear costs in order to facilitate wider cooperation among developing countries[145].

The two arguments presented in this section offer different theoretical perspectives to approach the processes of how negotiating unity is maintained in the face of mixed interests and asymmetrical power. An institutionalist perspective draws our attention to how cooperation can be facilitated by the provision of information and the opportunities to draw issue-linkages; and a coercive argument reduces unity to a function of the intra-coalition power relationship. These arguments, however, are all essentially materialist ones, like the structural ones in the first part of this chapter. In the next and final section of this chapter, we turn to constructivist arguments about how unity is sustained by particular ideas and norms about appropriate behaviour by developing countries

Social identity: the South and appropriate association

The various theoretical hypotheses developed in this chapter have sought to explain developing country negotiating behaviour and reasons for coalition formation in essentially material terms. While some have emphasized structural factors, and others unit-level ones, state interests have been conceptualized in ways that identify the material interests of states as driving negotiating unity and Southern coalition formation. In contrast to these, this section sets out the main theoretical argument of this thesis, drawing from constructivist arguments on how interests can also be defined in social terms, ones that establish the context for choices regarding coalition formation. Negotiating behaviour, in other words, is explained not by the material content of state interests, but by their social content that is ultimately traced back to how state identity is constructed.

[145] Flemes 2009

The key contrast lies in the different logics of state action implied in these arguments[146]. In the accounts presented above that emphasize the exogenously defined material interests of states, a logic of consequences is at work, whereby developing countries form their coalitions because of the consequences of doing so; coalitions are formed a means to getting what they want and fulfilling their preferences (or at least improving their chances of doing so). In the argument outlined in this section, however, attention is paid to a logic of appropriateness, whereby particular coalitions are formed because they are seen as the 'right' and 'appropriate' thing to do; the construction of a coalition is based on a normative assessment of friend and foe. The argument here is not that *only* a logic of appropriateness explains coalition formation, but rather to consider how it is absent from the other accounts of coalition formation and negotiating behaviour that rely purely on logics of consequences. As the review of existing arguments in this chapter demonstrates, these are inadequate to fully account for the observed coalition behaviour[147], and a constructivist approach to understanding these coalitions is a largely unexplored line of inquiry.

Collective identity and coalition formation

State identity refers to the image that a state possesses of itself, and where this image stands relative to others. Put differently, the identity of a state is an answer to the question of 'who am I?', and whatever the answer is, thereby associates and disassociates a state with particular other states[148]. States possess multiple identities in the sense that in different social contexts there are different answers to the 'who am I' question, but each identity claim contains a certain understanding of roles and obligations, rights and responsibilities.

[146] March and Olsen 1998

[147] Tannenwald 2007: 50-51 discusses how norms work through both logics, where compliance with a norm is also instrumental (and therefore consequentialist) because it is judged as an efficient means of achieving state goals, but where compliance is also principled because the norm is judged as appropriate.

[148] Wendt 1992: 397-398

This understanding is key to defining the interests of a state: "Actors often cannot decide what their interests are until they know what they are representing – "who they are" – which in turns depends on their social relationships"[149]. So whatever a state identity is in a given context, particular interests arise from that identity, rather than being *materially* given. In Ruggie's formulation, this is the question of what happens "*before* the neo-utilitarian model kicks in"[150]. Rather than interests existing exogenously, prior to norms or beliefs, interests are informed and shaped by norms and beliefs themselves.

The behavioural choices that states make, consequently, are means to fulfilling the expectations of the identity that it possesses in a particular context. As Percy puts it, "states that identify in a particular manner will find it difficult, if not, impossible, to behave in a way that threatens that identification"[151], demonstrated by the findings in various studies that change in the material conditions faced by states need not result in substantial behavioural changes, because of the stability of their identity construction[152]. While the interest in much of the literature lies in the stability of state identities, and some do seek to identify how identities can and do change[153], the broad point emphasized is on how the logic of appropriateness functions in accounting for particular courses of action. Because states identify positively with certain others, their interests change: "Having such [collective] interests does not mean that actors are irrational or no longer calculate costs and benefits but, rather, that they do so on a higher level of social aggregation"[154]. Thus, depending on the collective that states identify themselves as being part of – for instance, whether as 'Arab', 'liberal democracy' or a 'civilised nation' – some types of behaviour are

[149] Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein 1996: 60
[150] Ruggie 1998: 867
[151] Percy 2007: 25
[152] Spruyt 2000
[153] Legro 2009; Abdelal, Herrera et al. 2006
[154] Wendt 1994: 386

encouraged, and others ruled out, as the appropriate methods of achieving state interests.

When it comes to choices over the formation of alliances, therefore, states are informed not solely (or even mainly) by the material distributions of capability at hand and the efficiency of the potential alliance, but by the social norms of friend and foe implied by their identity. Michael Barnett points out that "actors with a shared identity are likely to have a shared construction of the threat"[155] which may often result in different assessments of threat than those based purely on material considerations. In Barnett's argument, with a close connection between identity and threat, therefore, there is also a close connection with the choice of alliance partners. If there is a shared conception of self, there is often a shared conception of who the (dangerous) 'other' is, implying that states will prefer as allies other states whom they recognise as being 'one of us' sharing that particular collective identity. Even before efforts at coordination begin, there is a social bias towards particular allies[156]. Indeed, states will *expect* others sharing that collective identity to ally and form a coalition with them *because* of that collective identity that defines the 'we' and 'us'. This is the constitutive norm of 'appropriate association' that gives content to state identity by defining who socially appropriate allies and coalition partners are[157]. Each identity has its respective constitutive norm of appropriate association; on its own, the norm has no specific content, but asks the question: who *should* my friends be? There are as many different appropriate association norms as there are identities, because its specific content in light of the identity in that context then prefixes the 'appropriate association' label: *Southern* appropriate association; *African* appropriate association; *democratic* appropriate association; *great*

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[155] Barnett 1996: 408-410, arguing especially against Stephen Walt's materialist interpretation of threat in his balance of threat interpretation of alliance behaviour; on this, see Buzan, Waever and de Wilde 1998's introduction of 'securitisation' as a way of describing the social construction of security threats.

[156] Narlikar 2003: 27-29

[157] Barnett 1996 does not appear to use this particular "appropriate association" label, but it is Blyth's 2003: 700 description of Barnett's argument and type of argument.

power appropriate association; and so on.

Constitutive norms are "the practices that define that identity and lead other actors to recognize it...they do not determine the preferences of the group; rather, they define the boundaries and distinctive practices of a group"[158]. In these terms, explaining how states decide who to ally with and 'associate' with helps to distinguish the question of coalition membership from the interests and preferences of a coalition. Both are connected to the effects of identity, but are not the same thing: states can disagree about what the purposes of an alliance are, even while accepting that they share a collective identity; they can disagree about the substance of their normative policy positions, but their notion of being friends and allies does not change. In other words, they associate with each other not necessarily because of a common position, but because of a collective identity, where the norm of appropriate association is prior to substantive positions and interests[159].

This connection between identity and coalition formation is a well-established argument in IR, as a range of examples illustrate. The norm of appropriate association is often at work in these cases, although it has tended to be implied rather than as directly stated as it is here. Barnett's discussion of Middle East alliance politics, for instance, draws out the significance of Arab identity in understanding how alliance patterns were shaped by the norm of appropriate association. The 1955 Baghdad Pact between Iraq and Turkey was regarded as a threat by other Arab states not because of its strategic ramifications for regional security, but principally because of Iraq's choice to ally with a *non-Arab* country – one that had previously been the imperial force in the region and a partial catalyst for the emergence of

[158] Abdelal, Herrera et al. 2006: 696

[159] At the same time, as Johnston 2008 explains, the depth of this socialisation into a collective identity can vary – from being a completely unconscious 'habit', to compliance as a matter of social influence to avoid ostracisation and oppobrium.

Arab nationalism itself. The Baghdad Pact was regarded by Iraq's neighbours as a violation of the social norm of pan-Arab cooperation (that Arab states should coordinate their foreign policies with each other) that followed from Arab identity and its constitutive norm of *Arab* appropriate association. The opprobrium that followed from other Arab states towards Iraq until its military coup in 1958 that repudiated the Baghdad Pact, was a result of Iraq's perceived "affront to Arabism"[160]. Similarly, Hemmer and Katzenstein contrast the differences in collective identification by the US towards Europe and Southeast Asia, which explain differences in the institutional forms of their collective security arrangements in NATO and SEATO respectively. US policymakers identified themselves as being similar to Europeans, thus justifying the construction of a 'North Atlantic' community on a multilateral basis of equal membership; they identified with Southeast Asians less, regarding them as being inferior and less trustworthy, and therefore a weaker security arrangement that reduced the risk of entrapment was agreed. Shared identity and the strength of respective appropriate association norm was far stronger in the former than the latter, explaining the difference between the two treaties[161].

At a deeper level, the study of security communities also illustrates the possibility of how 'thick' the level of collective identity may be, such that the possibility of war between allies becomes impossible to consider as a policy choice, replaced by 'dependable expectations of peaceful change' as a means of dispute settlement[162]. In alliances with a great degree of 'we-feeling' between the allies, called "tightly coupled" security communities, a corporate identity develops to the point where state identity comes to be coterminous with that of the security community[163]. Not all, or even most alliances, will develop into such communities,

[160] Barnett 1996: 413-422; see also Hinnebusch 2013 on identity and the Arab world
[161] Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002
[162] Adler and Barnett 1998: 34
[163] Adler and Barnett 1998: 47-48

but an important argument of the security community literature is to highlight how, out of functional interstate interactions that are extended and deepened over time, a deeper level of collective identity can emerge that can transform security dynamics.

This identity-based understanding of the context in which coalitions are formed sheds light on an important aspect of coalition formation explored in this thesis: membership. The composition of a coalition's members depends on the extent of their collective identification with each other, rather than on the basis of material interests on the specific issue area in question. And this is where potential 'inefficiencies' may emerge: countries join coalitions and ally with each other because they are share a collective identity that is generalised and not issue-specific, resulting in a mismatch between the identity of that coalition and the specific (material) interests of its members. Countries may be included in a negotiating group because it is seen to be socially appropriate given their larger identity, even if on climate change material interests diverge; conversely, countries that share negotiating positions with a given group can sometimes not be able to join it because it does not share that group's larger collective identity. The identity that a coalition has implies a certain membership[164]. This raises the possibility of the strategic use of identity, as a rallying cry to avoid defection from a particular coalition. As some realists would have it, appeals to social appropriateness are simply cheap talk and epiphenomenal. In response, Abdelal et al. point out, however, "if language is used strategically it will only be effective if at least some important portion of the population has internalized the identity cues and responds to their use. That is, the instrumentality and authenticity of identity are two sides of the same coin"[165]. The fact that countries still respond to the normative demand for appropriate

[164] Narlikar and Odell 2006: 138 note in a WTO context how these identities matter in the design of one negotiating group, for instance a 'Like Minded Group' based on a shared set of principles instead of one based on shared commercial interests, which affected the negotiating conduct of the group.

[165] Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston and McDermott 2006: 700

association in particular coalitions does not exclude the possibility that it also reflects the strategic exercise of power on the part of some members[166], but at the same time also affirms its intersubjective character – that it exists because it is collectively seen to exist.

This connection between organisational membership and identity is not unusual: debates around the expansion of European integration institutions are in part debates about the limits and bounds of 'European' identity, especially around the issue of prospective Turkish membership; the meaning of the 'West' is expressed in part through NATO membership[167]. As a result, the extensive consideration given in the literature on optimal coalition size, analysing trade-offs between credibility and fragmentation[168] is heavily qualified in understanding the precise shape and composition of a coalition in light of this argument about the social norms of appropriate association. This general connection between identity and coalition formation outlined here now provides a basis for specifying the two main identity conceptions that explain the formation of developing country coalitions examined in this thesis via their respective norms of appropriate association.

Southern identity

The first is a 'Southern' identity. The literature on the defining the South often focuses on their shared and divergent material circumstances, especially in light of the differentiating effects of globalisation[169]. Equally important, however, is the identification of these countries as a social group and the social facts that underpin this identity: the 'we' as the ex-colonial countries of Latin America, Africa and Asia, and the 'other' (the North) as the

[166] Barnett and Duvall 2005
[167] Stuenkel 2011: 188
[168] Odell 2006: 12-14
[169] Miller 1995; Solarz 2012a; the South can also be defined in ways other than inter-state terms, of course – such as in terms of social movements, subregions. See Alden, Vieira and Morphet 2010: chapter 6; Thomas 1999.

former metropolitan countries of North America and Western Europe. What is socially shared is a historical narrative of their former subordination in the international system, that their former colonial masters are still attempting to exploit them, and thus that their sovereignty is to be jealously guarded[170]. The resulting sense of marginalisation and alienation may be unevenly felt, but it is nonetheless a social fact: That Southern institutions "only weakly or intermittently reflect this sense of common purpose does not mean that such a sense does not exist"[171]. Negotiating together as the South is thus seen the best – and perhaps only – way to press for the global redistribution of wealth and the recognition of their status as equals in international society[172]. Amrita Narlikar sums up these elements of Southern identity: Identifying themselves as the 'South': "offered developing countries a shared reading of history in terms of their exploitation. It posited them as a collective against the North, that is their exploiters, boosted their morale by promising them greater equality in the international system, offered them a way to achieve this aim, that is through group solidarity, and provided them some simple rules of thumb that they could apply to new situations for which they were individually ill prepared"[173]. Alternatively, "the notion of the South informs both a critique of the [inequities] of the global order and a rallying point for solidarity and activism"[174]. For instance, the identity of the emerging powers in the IBSA grouping is framed in terms of being emerging powers of *the South*, being the vanguard of this older set of still-unresolved issues[175].

Concretely, this identity contains a shared institutional history of the attempts of developing countries to organize themselves, beginning with the Bandung Conference in 1955 and then

[170] As postcolonial writers argue, this colonial difference is still embodied in current political, economic and legal practices, see Anghie 2007 and Slater 2004.
[171] Fawcett 1999: 242
[172] Nel 2010
[173] Narlikar 2003: 28
[174] Alden, Morphet and Vieira 2010: 4
[175] Even if this is not uncontested by other developing countries, as Vieira and Alden 2011 note.

pressing forward demands on decolonisation and the NIEO via the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77 bloc that began in UNCTAD[176]. However else one might want to define or conceptualise the South, it is the practice of participation in these that constitutes the South, and it is the latter form, the G77, that is the relevant institution in the context of issues addressed this thesis. The 'G77' is thus more than another label for developing countries, but a historically specific negotiating vehicle within which the more general sense of 'Southernness' is sustained and reproduced. Simply put, the institutional implication of Southern identity is G77 membership. The norm of appropriate association for this collective Southern, 'developing country' identity, in the institutional context of the UN climate change negotiations, is membership in the G77.

G77 membership is thus constitutive of Southern identity in the institutional context of climate change. In other institutional contexts this may be different, but the implications for the issue addressed in this thesis is that one cannot still claim to be a member of the South and *not* be a member of the G77. It is this focus on identity which provides an important part of the explanation as to why the South still 'hangs together' in spite of the material economic and political diversities discussed earlier in this chapter. This identity has remained constant over this time even where countries of the South have undergone considerable change in their material economic and political circumstances.

Finally, it is also important to also distinguish, additionally, between this appropriate association norm of G77 membership and other norms (i.e. of sustainable development, or differentiated responsibilities) that address the substance of the specific negotiating issues at hand. Actors that share an identity can have different understandings of the substantive

[176] Berger 2004; Mortimer 1984

norms associated with that identity[177]; what this means is that, as will be demonstrated empirically, the divergent negotiating positions among developing countries do not themselves put into dispute the shared identity of the group. Disagreement among G77 members is not as problematic as it might seem for the larger notion of the South, because membership is not itself challenged by these disagreements.

Regional identities

The second identity type drawn to analyse the coalitions in this thesis is that of identifying in 'regional' terms. While a range of different definitions and conceptualisations of what a 'region' is exist, often revolving around geography, the 'imagined' or socially constructed character of a region is one established way of explaining important political phenomena at a level of analysis between the nation-state and the universal[178]. Regions are what we make of them, produced and reproduced by actors, with their reality being intersubjective. Identity in a regional sense refers therefore to the sense of 'we-ness' among a group of countries who see themselves as forming a shared community, as the security communities argument highlights[179]. Again, Narlikar recognises that social identities are an important element of regions: "Shared histories, geographies, and institutions facilitate cooperation among regional allies"[180]. The important thing to note about regional identities in the context of this thesis, however, is that they complement rather than supplement the larger Southern identity, as is sometimes argued elsewhere in the regionalism literature.

Given that regional identity is just one type of collective identity, therefore, the same causal

[177] Barnett 1996: 409

[178] See especially Fawcett 2004 and Hurrell 2007 for a summary; and of course regions can also be conceptualised at other levels of analysis in relation to the state, be they subnational, transnational, and so forth.

[179] The phrase 'logic of community' is sometimes used to distinguish this basis of regionalism from material power/economic drivers of regionalism; see Adler and Barnett 1998

[180] Narlikar 2003: 156

argument about how identity shapes coalition formation, the relevant norm of appropriate association and the character of its membership traced above applies here, just at a more specific level. While the specific boundaries and markers of each regional identity will be traced in their respective sections of this thesis, and while there are slight differences in the causal significance of identity in each of them, we can broadly distinguish their geographic and non-geographic character here. The geographic regions are the more obvious coalitions to understand a connection between regional identity and coalition formation, which applies to a number of groups: the African Group reflecting an 'African' regional identity; 'Latin American' identity in both GRILA and AILAC; subsets of this larger continental identity in the subregional identity of 'Central America' with SICA, and 'Bolivarian' America with ALBA; and finally 'Arab' identity in the Arab group. Regional identities are also visible, although not at first glance, to the grouping frequently described as having the most shared interests, AOSIS. The same causal argument applies too to the 'non-geographic regions', the Least Developed Countries, and nascently in BASIC and the MLDCs, where a sense of regional we-ness is also arguably at stake. Indeed, the 'South' as a whole can be thought of as a region for the same reasons described over the course of this section[181]; the only reason for distinguishing them slightly lies in their different membership ranges, where the 'South' is a far more all-encompassing identity than the specific, more limited regional identities.

The constructivist study of identity also considers ways in which identity can change, given that they are the results of processes of constant production and reproduction[182]. While acknowledging this point, however, in this particular context studied in this thesis they have remained relatively stable. To understand why, however, this argument will be deepened by turning to the concept of path dependency as set out in the historical institutionalist

[181] Fawcett 2004: 432-434
[182] Legro 2009; Abdelal, Herrera et al. 2006; Klotz and Lynch 2005; Barnett 1996: 410

literature which highlights key institutional features of the negotiating context of the UN climate negotiations that both constrain and enable particular identities.

Insights from historical institutionalism: the path-dependent nature of the South

While individual coalition formation is explained by the constructivist emphasis on identity, this argument is complemented and grounded by historical institutionalist analysis of path dependency to help explain the larger evolution of coalition formation across the two decades of negotiation. The larger historical institutionalist approach[183] focuses on a number of concepts of interest in explaining political phenomena: it is historical in recognising the importance of 'time', that is, identifying the temporal dimensions of political behaviour as being causally significant such that behaviour at one time is not independent from behaviour at another; it is 'institutionalist' in its focus on the role that institutions play in structuring political behaviour within specific contexts and settings[184]. Path dependency is frequently referred to within constructivist literature too[185].

The salient insight from HI is the concept of path dependency in exploring change and continuity over time, usually conceptualised as a two-stage process. With contingent initial conditions, a causal process is then set in place with "relatively deterministic causal patterns or what can be thought of as 'inertia'"[186]. That is, firstly, there is a "critical juncture", moments when the structural constraints normally present are relaxed to a greater degree and some degree of contingency and agency is present[187]. Secondly, there is a causal

[183] Much effort has gone into attempting to distinguish a historical institutionalist approach from the other 'institutionalisms', see Peters 2005; Thelen 1999; Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth 1992; Lawson 2006 sees historical institutionalism as a subset of historical sociology; Fioretos' survey of HI in IR acknowledges that a number works which may be termed 'historical institutionalist' do not explicitly self-identify as being in the HI tradition, and Steinmo 2008: 118 (footnote 2) makes a similar observation more generally.
[184] Fioretos 2011: 371; Steinmo 2008
[185] Adler and Barnett 1998: 49; Dannreuther 2010.
[186] Mahoney 2000: 510-511
[187] Benett and Elman 2006a: 464; Mahoney 2000

pattern of inertia, often described as working through 'increasing returns', such that a given institutional choice provides incentives that reinforce that initial choice. The IR literature often describes this where a particular institutional configuration creates a new coalition of political actors, who, in benefiting from this change, therefore lobby, press and demand for this configuration to remain, thereby further entrenching it[188]. The institution shapes political interest formation, with feedback effects for the institutional configuration itself; "designs once adopted strengthen the potential for continuity by creating more intense support among new and existing constituencies for incremental over fundamental reform"[189]. Learning effects may also be present. While this is a largely materialist interpretation of increasing returns and positive feedback, a social interpretation is also possible, such that initial *social* understandings at a particular point in time are reproduced because of the institutional choices made[190].

In the argument of this thesis, this basic concept informs the above constructivist analysis in two ways. Firstly, particular importance is accorded to critical junctures as 'founding moments' in institutional development, and the sequencing patterns that follow. *When* something happens influences *how* it proceeds, develops and evolves from thereon and affects choices and possibilities later in time. This is distinct from the rational choice institutionalist approach, or those discussed earlier drawn from neorealist and neoliberal theory, that emphasize the functional imperatives that underpin coalition and alliance formation as being 'efficient' processes[191]; and is also distinct from a 'snapshot', instead seeing the historical process that is going on[192]. This directs attention to considering the circumstances in which the climate negotiations began as a way of understanding the later

[188] Sell 2010
[189] Fioretos 2011: 377; Weir 1992
[190] Pierson 2004: 39-40
[191] March and Olsen 1984
[192] Pierson 1996: 126-127

possibilities of coalition formation, and hence why the prenegotiating period is as extensively treated as it is in the next chapter. During this period, it is the institutional choice of the UN General Assembly to organise formal negotiations that was absolutely essential for the establishment of the G77 when the formal INC process began in 1991. This was because it is within the institutional context of the General Assembly that firstly, a Southern identity was the dominant political identity producing a distinction between North and South; and secondly, that the strength of this Southern identity therefore implied a G77 structure to organise developing country participation in the formal climate negotiations as a result of the norm of *Southern* appropriate association. The prenegotiations were a critical juncture in ideational terms that was resolved by a particular institutional choice, one which bounded the possibilities for later coalition formation.

Secondly, it also draws analytical attention to the limited possibilities for coalition formation in later periods by reference to the crowding out of 'political space': "...groups able to consolidate early advantages may achieve enduring superiority. Actors arriving later may find that resources in the environment...are already committed to other patterns of mobilisation"[193]. Explaining coalition formation is more than the alignment of interests at a given point in time; it is a reflection of the circumstances in which the coalition was created, namely in the extent of existing commitments. In the longer evolution of developing country coalitions, the presence of the G77 and thus the social demand for appropriate association with it limited the possibility for newer coalitions to form because the G77 and this norm of Southern appropriate association crowded out other forms. The G77 became the 'default' coalition for developing countries, and the prospect of new coalitions would have to justify themselves relative to the G77. Only much later, after

[193] Pierson 2004: 71-74

nearly a decade of negotiations, were the agency of other potential coalitions able to overcome this constraint to actually begin to form other groups.

At the same time though, that these other groups have been one that also draw on existing social identities is significant to note. This part of the argument highlights an important element of the construction of the regional groups: that the collective identity that shapes the formation of these new groups is one that exists prior to the formation of the groups in this negotiating context. In many cases this is institutionalised in regional organisations or other cooperative institutions, which further sharpens the sense of collective identity and the boundaries of membership in the group. As Katzenstein and Hemmer recognised, "Once a region is formed or once a particular institution is put in place, that construction then has effects on the future of regional and global politics. There is a great deal of path dependency at work[194]". The general point here lies in the regional identity, and only secondarily in the place of its institutionalisation in an organisation, but there is a distinct causal process also present here in how new regional identities make their entrance in ways that are 'layered' on top of the existing, initial Southern identity

Finally, it is also worth noting that a number of analyses of international climate politics have frequently alluded to path dependency, but without much clarity about the precise manner and operation of such dynamics. Vihma and colleagues make reference to how "institutional factors or path dependency play a role in the cohesiveness of the G77 in climate change negotiations"[195], following on from Williams' more general comments about the institutionalisation of the Annex I divide[196]; and allusions to the notion are not

[194] Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002: 601
[195] Vihma 2011: 332
[196] Williams 2005

uncommon in other accounts of international climate politics[197]. Perhaps the closest argument that draws on HI ones is the suggestion of Castro and Michaelowa, that identifies the annex structure of the UNFCCC as limiting the alliance possibilities over the course of subsequent negotiations, and again referencing path dependency dynamics[198]. The argument presented in this section draws on this common analytical perception of path dependence but provides greater clarify about what exactly this path is, by returning to its origins to highlight the critical juncture from which particular social identities became especially important in driving the formation and creation of developing country coalitions.

Conclusion

What shapes the coalition choices of developing countries? This chapter, in surveying the various claims and propositions made by different paradigms of International Relations, has outlined a number of plausible causal mechanisms to explain developing country coalition formation in the context of the climate change negotiations. In the first place, arguments that see emphasize the common structural position of developing countries in the international political and economic system we re discussed, but the breadth of these arguments have been challenged by the variation in coalition behaviour and difficulties of Southern cooperation exhibited by developing countries across diverse areas of world politics. Secondly, the heterogeneity of developing country 'interests' was illustrated, raising the question of whether coalition preferences, expressed in G77 and China membership, can be satisfactorily accounted for by a narrow reading of environmental and economic costs and benefits. Thirdly, the issue of mixed interests and asymmetric power among coalition members was addressed: a neoliberal institutionalist account of how coalition

[197] Hurrell and Sengupta 2012: 468

[198] Castro and Michaelowa 2011; relevant in this regard is Depledge 2009, which examines the difficulty that some countries that have attempted to move between the UNFCCC annexes have encountered

serve as functional institutions for cooperation among members is weakened in instances of 'thin' institutions, as the G77 is. Similarly, a coercive, power-based interpretation of the coalition neglects the instances where leading countries have been constrained by the coalition's common position.

While each of these approaches contribute important insights to an understanding of developing country coalition dynamics in the international climate change negotiations, as noted above, they also have their limitations. Accordingly, the final sections of this chapter set out an argument informed by constructivist and historical institutionalist claims regarding the explanatory power of state identity constructions, their norms of appropriate association, and the institutions through which these manifest themselves over time. This forms the essence of the contribution of this thesis: that the negotiating behaviour of coalition formation demonstrated by developing countries over two decades of climate negotiations has to be understood in terms of the continuing collective identification of being part of the 'South' at a general level, and the importance of regional identities as a basis for association in the formation of new negotiating groups.

Theoretically, this argument speaks to the larger constructivist claim that " A focus on material factors and assumptions of self-help and rationality cannot predict who allies with whom and why"[199]. The view that one country is another's 'natural' ally, or that one coalition is a country's natural' coalition, can only be understood as a social process rather than as a historically 'efficient' process that reflects issue-specific calculations of material power and interest. The history of coalition formation among developing countries presented in this thesis is not an exclusive focus on these factors, because it recognises where material power

[199] Blyth 2003: 700

and interest do matter in explaining complex choices of coalition formation; what it seeks to achieve, however, is a fuller understanding of this history where social factors have been previously underappreciated.

In the next chapter, the origins of the G77 in the context of the climate negotiations will be outlined, drawing upon the record of the prenegotiations from 1988-1990, to show how this context favouring a Southern identity was established, and with it, the norm of Southern appropriate association and subsequently the formation of the G77 by the time formal negotiations began in 1991. This starting point is immensely important – a critical juncture – in the possibility for the emergence of other groups over the subsequent years of negotiation, as subsequent chapters will chart, that sheds light on the existence and dominance of the G77 as the marker of Southern identity.

Chapter Three
The climate change prenegotiations, 1988-1990: critical junctures and the context for coalition construction

When formal intergovernmental negotiations on climate change began in February 1991, developing countries were already organised through two negotiating groups: the Group of 77 and China (G77) coalition, and the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS). But how were these two groups formed and constructed ahead of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) process that was to negotiate a framework convention on climate change? How and why did developing countries choose to associate with each other in these ways? This chapter explores the origins of these two coalitions, and turns its attention to the three years *preceding* the beginning of the INC process, when climate change began to make its way up the political agenda of the international community. Developments during this prenegotiating period, this chapter argues, constituted a critical juncture for the possible future configuration of coalitions among developing countries. In doing so, this chapter highlights the normative context driving the formation of these two groups. Key assumptions about the nature of the climate change 'problem' were formed during this time and in doing so implied particular coalition dynamics among developing countries over the following years and decades of negotiations.

The prenegotiations constituted a period of informal conferences and meetings, convened and hosted by individual governments and international organisations in response to rising awareness and alarm at the prospective impacts of climate change[200]. The most notable of

[200] For summaries of the various meetings over this period see Gupta 2010: 638-639; Paterson 1996: chapter 2; see especially Hulme 2009: chapter 2 on the scientific background and 'discovery' of climate change

these initial developments were the establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in 1988, the Second World Climate Conference in 1990, and the adoption of Resolution 45/212 by the UN General Assembly in December 1990, mandating the establishment of the INC and marking the transition to a formal intergovernmental negotiating process. But how and why was the *General Assembly* chosen as the institution within which to organize and define the INC's mandate? This chapter argues that the way in which climate change was defined as an international policy problem during the prenegotiations shaped the political divisions that would crystallize and solidify as formal negotiations commenced. It is in the context of the developments examined in this chapter that the form and membership of the G77 and AOSIS are best understood, and their role within the overarching North-South character of the the negotiations.

This argument proceeds in the following parts: firstly, the notion that developing countries should participate in a G77 structure is questioned, arguing that its initial formation should not be taken for granted. Instead, a deeper understanding of its origins can be reached through treating the prenegotiations as a critical juncture for coalition formation, which this section also outlines. Secondly, the significance of Resolution 45/212, the key event of the prenegotiations, is discussed, arguing that the formation of the G77 has to be seen in light of formal negotiations being mandated through the General Assembly. The third section to this chapter then provides an account of why and how the mandate for the INC was indeed agreed through the General Assembly rather than an alternative institutional setting such as the UN Environment Programme (UNEP): the proximate experiences of the Montreal Protocol as a precedent for a regime with universal participation, the perception of exclusion from the climate prenegotiations in the IPCC, and the activism of certain

over the preceding century.

developing countries catalysed by their experience of the ozone negotiations. The fourth section reviews this account by considering the alternative possible arguments to account for Resolution 45/212, posing counterfactual questions to explore the degree of contingency or inertia in constituting the critical juncture in this historical process. Finally, the fifth section then discusses the entrepreneurship catalysing the formation of AOSIS, but also the way too that it is shaped by the norm of appropriate association in its construction ahead of the INC process.

In emphasizing the beginnings and origins of the climate regime as a whole for understanding later developments, this chapter provides an illustration of both the socially constructed origins of coalitions and alliances, and the importance of sequencing in critical junctures. It treats the North-South character of the climate negotiations as a social construction and not as a given, providing the basis for a more nuanced understanding of the formation of both the G77 and AOSIS. Taken together, these highlight aspects of the negotiating process and coalition behaviour that a narrowly material interpretation may obscure.

Critical junctures and coalition formation

This first part of the chapter problematises the establishment of the G77 and the need to reach a more fine-grained understanding of its formation in the climate negotiations. Scholarship that has sought to analyse the G77's behaviour and prospects in the UNFCCC typically offers a cursory history of the G77, noting its founding in 1964 at the first UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and in the North-South economic debates of the 1960s and 1970s[201] , its centrality as the main way of representing the South

[201] On these, see Williams 1991; Sauvant 1981; Murphy 1984

during these negotiations[202]. The question of the G77's very establishment in the climate negotiations has been largely taken as a natural given, as a result of the identification of climate change as a North-South problem, and thus being the heir of both the wider economic challenge embodied in the NIEO and the specific environment-development tension between North and South since the 1972 Stockholm United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE). Adil Najam sums up this view: "...even when developing countries have different priorities on specific issues in global negotiations – something that should not be surprising – they almost always have chosen to pursue these interests within the framework of the Southern collective...Analysts trace this to a common view of the nature of environmental issues and their placement within a North-South framework"[203].

The 1992 Rio Earth Summit that was set as a deadline for negotiating the climate convention, after all, had been organised as the successor to the 1972 Stockholm summit and stood squarely in its legacy of a North-South political divide on global environmental questions[204]. While the emergence of the 'sustainable development' formulation by the Brundtland Commission towards the end of the 1980s marked an attempted compromise in resolving this environment-development tension[205], the pervasive nature of continued North-South differences on the environmental issues being addressed in preparation for the Rio Earth Summit led to Marc Williams' characterisation of the "re-articulation of the Third World coalition" in the period surrounding the Earth Summit[206]. In this way, the existing literature essentially implies a smooth trajectory and continuity from Stockholm 1972 to

[202] Vihma et al. 2011; Kasa, Gullberg and Heggelund 2008
[203] Najam 2004: 227
[204] See Conca 2004; Rajamani 2003
[205] See especially Bernstein 2000's description of 'liberal environmentalism' as the result of the compromise reached in debating the meaning of 'sustainable development'.
[206] Williams 1993; see also G77 1989: para.34

Rio 1992 in the concerns shared among developing countries: Southern demands in the pre-Rio negotiations represented an effort at constructing a New International *Environmental* Order, directly echoing the New International *Economic* Order attempts of the 1970s[207]. In all these accounts the question of why the G77 was established is unaddressed because it it appeared to be a logical, unsurprising consequence of the problem structure of climate change and North-South environmental discourse.

This explanation is incomplete for three reasons. The first is that this broad sweep neglects the temporally proximate reasons for why states even sought to negotiate a climate convention at the end of the 1980s. These reasons, most importantly the experience of the ozone depletion negotiations, affected important elements of how these negotiations were organised, and these in turn affecting what coalitions would be likely to form. A more complete understanding of the longer evolution of the climate negotiating process depends on a better appreciation of the context in which the negotiations originated. Thus, for instance, Williams' discussion of how the Third World was "constructed" in the climate change negotiations takes as its key moment the institutionalisation of the North-South divide in the terms of the UNFCCC in 1992, particularly its annex structure: "it is likely that the fragile unity achieved by the G77 on climate change would have seriously fractured soon after the successful negotiation of the UNFCCC. This has not happened and one of the main reasons lies in the institutionalization of a North-South divide in climate politics. Institutionalized at the outset in the UNFCCC there has been no major amendments to this framework"[208]. The understanding of the G77 developed in this chapter, however, probes further back in time to highlight important institutional features settled by the time formal negotiations on a climate convention even began – that is, *prior* to the 1991-1992 process

[207] Najam 1994: 442-446
[208] Williams 2005: 63

that agreed the UNFCCC – that provide important insights into the ways in which the G77 has been constructed in this process, such that the basic form of the North-South divide predates agreement on the FCCC's annexes.

Secondly, while some analysts of the G77 make reference to 'path dependency', what this entails and how this begins is scarcely elaborated on[209]. As discussed in the previous chapter, path dependent analysis focuses on how increasing returns lead to self-reinforcing political processes[210], and in doing so prompts the further question of the beginnings of these processes. If path dependency is to feature in understanding coalition behaviour, therefore, there has to be an understanding of how the coalitions form to begin with and how these initial choices were made[211]. Thirdly, even during this prenegotiating phase, developing countries were already at loggerheads – principally the small islands (not yet organised as AOSIS) and the oil-exporting countries. Why would they willingly join a negotiating group with others with whom their divergence of material interests and positions was already obvious?

This chapter provides an account that examines the context of this 'choice', understanding its establishment as a socially constructed phenomenon, rather than as a 'natural' negotiating coalition. In revisiting the developments over 1988-1990 that led to the beginning of the INC negotiations, this chapter will provide a more fine-grained and historically proximate understanding of the context in which the climate negotiations began, qualifying the

[209] Vihma et al. 2011: 332 suggest that "institutional factors or path dependency play a role in the cohesiveness of the G77 in climate change negotiations" without much elaboration on what exactly is path dependent.

[210] See especially Pierson 2000

[211] Capoccia and Kelemen 2007: 342 note that "Despite the theoretical and practical importance of critical junctures as the genetic moments for institutional equilibria, analyses of path dependence often devote little attention to them, focusing instead on the "reproductive" phase launched after a path-dependent process is initiated."

broader sweep of analysis of the South that typically progresses directly from Stockholm to Rio. In the theoretical scope of this thesis, too, this chapter illustrates an important aspect of the larger evolution of developing country coalitions by focusing on the role that social identities play in coalition construction within a historically specific institutional context *at the very outset* of the negotiating process on climate change.

This attention to the inception of international negotiations on climate change highlights the significance of the normative understandings developed during the prenegotiations from 1988-1990 that resulted in a particular institutional choice to organise the formal negotiations. This was a period where the structural constraints on institutional development were momentary loosened – a critical juncture[212]. The outcomes from choices made during a critical juncture trigger a process of positive feedback that constrains future choices, and agents have greater freedom than they normally do in shaping the outcome. Positive feedback refers to the introduction of self-reinforcing dynamics that increase the cost of some previously plausible course of action[213]; contingent moments are no less contingent because no change results at the critical juncture[214]. At the same time, this model of political life does not imply that the oft-used phrase of 'lock-in' is permanent: "Identifying self-reinforcing processes does help us to understand why organizational and institutional practices are often extremely persistent...Change continues, but it is bounded change"[215].

Examining the prenegotiations as a critical juncture for coalition formation, therefore, asks

[212] Capoccia and Kelemen 2007: 348: "we define critical junctures as *relatively* short periods of time during which there is a *substantially* heightened probability that agents' choices will affect the outcome of interest."
[213] Pierson 2004: 33
[214] Capoccia and Kelemen 2007: 352
[215] Pierson 2004: 52; for a review of differences in how path dependency and critical junctures can be conceptualised, however, see Mahoney and Schensul 2006 and Bennett and Elman 2006b: 251-264

two specific empirical questions about this period: what was the process leading to the construction of the North-South divide; how did this process result in a coalition with a specific institutional form in the G77? Thus, the specific argument presented in this chapter is as follows: during the prenegotiating phase, the social construction of climate change as a universal and North-South issue led to the formation of the G77 and China as the primary coalition arrangement for developing countries in the climate change negotiations. For decisionmakers from developing countries, interpreting the negotiations in these universal, North-South terms favoured firstly, the choice of the General Assembly as the setting for negotiations, and then secondly, as a matter of the norm of appropriate association resulting from the Southern identity within the General Assembly context, the use of the traditional G77 structure to organize developing country participation in the negotiations. As described in the previous chapter, G77 membership is constitutive to Southern identity within the specific institutional environment of the UN General Assembly. The 'appropriate' coalition for countries identifying as part of the South was the G77. Thus the origins of the G77 in the climate negotiations should be viewed as the result of a specific historical process that constructed the basic political characteristics of the climate change 'problem' as being a universal, North-South one. These characteristics led to the UN General Assembly, and not UNEP or some other institution, providing the mandate for organising the formal INC process expressed in the General Assembly's Resolution 45/212 of December 1990. But these characteristics were, this thesis argues, a result of a particular historical sequence in being drawn from the model and precedent that the ozone depletion negotiations had for the climate negotiating process. They were not as 'obvious' or as 'natural' as has often presumed to be the case, but instead reflected developments taking place on this other issue which shaped the social context for the climate prenegotiations that eventually culminated in Resolution 45/212. It is this institutional outcome that is the source of the positive feedback

mechanisms evident over the climate negotiations ever since, in formalising 'Southern' identity within the G77 coalition form at the very beginning of the negotiations and thus which has proven difficult to displace or dislodge.

These downstream effects are visible in the coalitions that form later in time, but they are also observable in how AOSIS is organised and its relationship with the G77 – that is, how this new coalition responded to the context of this norm of appropriate Southern association. While this particular argument will be set out in the next chapter, this chapter discusses too how AOSIS' origins are also understood within the framework of this thesis. AOSIS is often described as reflecting a strong bond of common interests based on their shared issue-specific material vulnerability to climate change. While this is certainly true, what this chapter also discusses are AOSIS' foundations in regional identities that provide a stepping stone to coalition formation – foreshadowing the emergence of later coalitions which are also built on regional identities.

What this chapter directs our attention to is the importance of the social context of the negotiations that in characterising the climate 'problem' in a particular way, led to a particular institutional choice for the organisation of negotiations, and this choice subsequently constrained possible coalition forms by introducing a specific norm of Southern appropriate association. Coalitions are therefore less chosen for instrumental reasons than the result of the identities and norms associated with a particular institutional setting.

From UNEP to the General Assembly: Resolution 45/212 and organising the intergovernmental negotiations

The adoption of Resolution 45/212 by the General Assembly, mandating the establishment of the INC, marked the climax of the prenegotiations. This section argues that while often noted in passing, Resolution 45/212 is in fact a key moment for understanding the context of developing country coalition formation in the climate negotiations. Its importance lies in locating the mandate for the INC with the *General Assembly* – and not with the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO). The INC would be a process "under the auspices" of the General Assembly with its own ad hoc secretariat, rather than a UNEP/WMO run process[216]. This difference in the institutional mandate of formal negotiations closed a critical juncture in the possibilities for coalition formation, for this difference imposed the political norms of the General Assembly upon the climate negotiations, where the institutionalised North-South approach to international politics of the General Assembly was overlaid upon the fledging, but not yet formalized North-South divide of the climate prenegotiations.

The significance of this General Assembly mandate for developing country coalition formation would be to determine that when the INC began to meet, developing countries would be organised as the G77 *from the outset*. This was a consequence – although one that appears to have been unintended – of the political norms of the General Assembly, where the institutionally relevant norm of appropriate association, following identification as a developing country, implied participation within a G77 framework and structure. The 'choice' of the G77 as a way of organising developing countries in the INC was thereby an entirely taken-for-granted and standard practice of General Assembly negotiating

[216] UN General Assembly 1990

behaviour[217]. This normative requirement, by contrast, was not present within UNEP, which while providing a negotiating forum with the possibility of universal membership, was not routinely organised with a G77 grouping.

The broader causal connection argued here – that institutional choices determine the appropriate association norm – provides an explanation for why developing countries did caucus and coordinate together as the G77 from the very beginning of the INCs, an explanation that refers primarily to the normative context of negotiation, rather than the material costs and benefits of alignment. But it is also a historically significant choice, one that has been tremendously important for the overall trajectory of coalition formation among developing countries, because in introducing the G77 at the outset of the climate negotiations, it has set the normative and institutional terrain for all other developing country negotiating groups that have followed. All other negotiating groups have had to demonstrate their conformity to this normative requirement of G77 participation that is the starting point for coalition construction. Thus the possibilities of other coalition configurations, in other words, was to be constrained by the G77's existence – the legacy of the institutional choice of the General Assembly, the key choice that marks the prenegotiations out as a critical juncture.

This influence and significance of the Resolution 45/212 mandate was to impose a particular normative and institutional structure of coalition organisation upon a political situation that was arguably more liquid. During the various prenegotiating conferences and meetings hosted by different governments, no effort had been made at forming a common

[217] The expectation that New York-organised UN negotiations on a broad range of subjects would involve the G77 as the main coordinating coalition for developing countries had already emerged by the beginning of the 1980s, as part of the general movement of North-South global negotiations to the General Assembly away from UNCTAD or other specialised organisations that Sauvant 1981: 84 describes.

G77-style caucus of all developing countries[218]. At the SWCC, the US, Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia were perceived as being closely aligned in their opposition to an ambitious ministerial declaration, in contrast to the European countries and small island states[219]. And while there were certainly broad distinctions in the political emphases placed by developed and developing countries during the prenegotiations, the grey areas and flexibilities within these would have to conform to the far more rigid structure of coalition organisation that the General Assembly mandate introduced to the negotiating process. In other words, it was this institutional context that introduced particular norms of appropriate association to the climate negotiations, resulting in the *default* creation of the G77 in the INCs. The next chapter will introduce more closely the consequences of the General Assembly mandate for the working of the G77 during the INCs themselves, but the core point in this chapter lies in demonstrating the construction of the G77 for the purposes of the INCs as a result of the shift in institutional context of negotiations. The G77 was a coalition that was imported into the climate negotiations as a result of Resolution 45/212.

Understanding the G77 as an institutional construct in this way, additionally, also recasts the prenegotiating period as a critical juncture in the evolution of developing country coalition forms in this set of negotiations. The institutional choice reflected in Resolution 45/212 marks the end of the critical juncture where the possibility of a different institutional mandate, with different implications for coalition behaviour, were real and possible. This is better appreciated by recognising the discontinuity that this institutional choice of the General Assembly presented compared to UNEP, where the institutional activism on climate change during the prenegotiations had been focused on, and which Resolution

[218] One meeting of developing countries on the sidelines of the IPCC's third meeting, in February 1990, explicitly eschewed the establishment of a G77-type structure to coordinate developing country positions for the IPCC, instead preferring a looser, ad hoc arrangement; see WMO 1990: Appendix F.

[219] ECO 1990a

45/212 relegated to the sidelines. UNEP had been the prominent international organisation on global environmental issues during the 1980s, especially as a result of having successfully organised and facilitated the landmark ozone depletion negotiations, widely regarded as a positive precedent for the climate negotiations. In particular, UNEP's energetic Executive Director, Mostafa Tolba, had received much of the credit for this success, and at the end of the 1980s was enjoying the limelight and was keen to replicate this success for the case of global climate change[220]. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the landmark institution created during the prenegotiations with a responsibility for summarising the state of scientific knowledge on climate change, had been established by a joint UNEP and WMO mandate in 1988 after much entrepreneurial activity by Tolba himself[221]. The work of the IPCC's Working Group III (WGIII) on legal and policy responses to climate change, was widely seen as the precursor to formal negotiations, for which UNEP and the WMO were considered the most likely organisers of[222]. Its assessment report prepared during this time, for instance, included an annex listing "elements" for inclusion in an framework convention on climate change[223], and Tolba himself remarked that "A framework convention supported, and its elements developed, by the [IPCC] is in my view the most feasible undertaking"[224]. One of the major prenegotiating conferences, hosted by the Netherlands at ministerial level in Noordwijk in 1989, called for the preparation of a framework convention on climate change and identified UNEP and the WMO as the hub of this preparatory work[225]. Finally, UNEP's role at the centre of prenegotiating activity on climate change was epitomised by hosting, with

[220] Agrawala 1998a: 609
[221] See Agrawala 1998a for a history of the context leading up to the IPCC's creation, including Tolba's entrepreneurial activity as early as 1986 in engaging US interest in the creation of the IPCC.
[222] Ramakrishna 1990: 424-429
[223] IPCC 1992: 143-148; the term "elements" often refers to early submissions in a negotiating process that contain ideas for later inclusion, but for which the next step often is their translation into legal text.
[224] Tolba 1990: 307
[225] Noordwijk Declaration 1989

the WMO, an ad hoc intergovernmental preparatory meeting in September 1990 that provided further momentum for formal negotiations on a framework convention, after the IPCC had delivered its First Assessment Report at the Second World Climate Conference.

Thus, with UNEP doing much of the running on climate change, the decision to locate the INC's mandate through a General Assembly process was a deviation from the institutional trajectory of the prenegotiations[226]. As one report after Resolution 45/212 noted, "Normally, UNEP would have taken the lead for such a [negotiating] conference, but was stripped of this responsibility as a result of the December 1990 UN General Assembly resolution"[227]. Indeed, Resolution 45/212 established an ad hoc secretariat rather than directly draw upon UNEP's existing capacity to organize the INC meetings[228]. UNEP, in short, was called upon to 'support' the INC[229] – a reversal of the General Assembly's own 1989 resolution on climate change that urged support for the UNEP Governing Council's decision earlier that year to begin preparations for a future climate treaty[230]. UNEP, another report observed, "until this decision had been flying high on the success of its recent global ozone accords"[231], was brought down to earth, and Tolba himself, in later reflections, expressed his dissatisfaction and regret at this turn of events, arguing that the negotiating process would have been better organised and more successful if it had come directly within UNEP's remit[232].

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[226] Brenton 1994: 185; Johnson 2012: 83-94 vividly illustrates the expectation by observers and participants that UNEP and WMO would assume the responsibility of organising the climate negotiations.

[227] Jahnke 1991: 53

[228] The man who became the head of the INC secretariat, and later the UNFCCC's first Executive Secretary, Michael Zammit Cutajar, explained this in Cutajar 2004: 62: "This institutional shift meant, *inter alia*, that the secretariat responsible for managing the negotiating process was not beholden to either of these bodies and remained subordinate to the directives emanating from the intergovernmental process. This was in contrast to negotiations managed by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), whose executive head was an assertive presence in intergovernmental decision-making."

[229] United Nations General Assembly 1990: clauses 1 and 5

[230] United Nations General Assembly 1989 44/207.

[231] Anderson and Aldhous 1991: 727

[232] Tolba 1998: 95; writing in the third person, Tolba's defensiveness is striking, even if Resolution 45/212 is never explicitly referenced: "At this point in preparations for the Earth Summit meeting, for reasons that

This change in how the formal climate negotiations were to be organised, especially in the abruptness of the shift to the General Assembly, provides more reason to carefully explore the socially constructed nature of the G77 coalition in this negotiating process rather than treating it as a Cold War hangover for which analyses from the 1970s and 1980s apply identically to the climate negotiating process[233]. For as noted above, in being the institutional representation of the norm of appropriate association for developing countries, its establishment at the beginning of the INCs provided the social context for the possibilities of subsequent coalition formation among developing countries. The transition from the prenegotiations to formal negotiations, and the end of the critical juncture, marked a 'refounding' moment for the G77 in the specific institutional context of the INCs. In attempting to understand what follows over the ensuring years of negotiation, the prenegotiations shed important light on the social underpinnings of developing country coalition construction that this thesis identifies. The rest of this chapter thus revisits the history of how the international community reached the point of Resolution 45/212: why did the General Assembly become the favoured source of the mandate for the INC, and not the UNEP Governing Council? How was this critical juncture resolved in the way that it was?

Constructing climate change as a North-South problem

The shift from favouring UNEP to the General Assembly was located in the evolution of

were never clearly stated, the convening governments removed the proceedings for the preparation of a Framework Convention on Climate Change from management by UNEP. It has been speculated that the developed countries were not yet ready for the positive action and concrete measures so strongly advocated by the UNEP executive director; nevertheless he continued to press for firm commitments for reduction of greenhouse gases and for transfer of technology and financial resources and urged that the Convention on Climate Change not substitute words for action. In the matter of a basic choice between the objective of keeping temperatures within a level that allows life on earth to continue or setting a maximum acceptable increase, the negotiating governments ultimately favoured the second alternative."

[233] Williams 1991; Mortimer 1984; Willetts 1978

the larger social context that defined climate change as a North-South problem requiring universal participation, and hence a General Assembly mandate. This shared understanding developed over these three years as a fundamentally *political* definition of who should do what, when and how, and implied certain answers to what the appropriate ways and means to conduct formal negotiations were. This section outlines three factors in this direction that led to the construction of the consensus reflected in Resolution 45/212. The first lies in the evolution of the participation requirements for a global climate treaty, from limited participation to universal participation; the second lies in developing country dissatisfaction with the initial institutional configuration of the IPCC; and the third lies in a learning process among developing countries as a result of the Montreal Protocol negotiations on ozone depletion.

As a result of these factors, the adoption of Resolution 45/212 reflected a consensus on the appropriate institutional setting within which to organise formal negotiations. The adoption of the resolution was not a near-miss or chance event, but that had developed over the three years of prenegotiations, and marked the end of the critical juncture of the prenegotiations. Much of Resolution 45/212 was foreshadowed in (with some language taken verbatim from) the conclusions of the September 1990 UNEP/WMO-convened ad hoc working group[234], representing a consensual understanding that had emerged by then, among both developed and developing countries that the General Assembly would provide the rightful institutional mandate for the proposed INC[235].

[234] UN General Assembly 1990b: annex I

[235] By the time of the adoption of the General Assembly's December 1989 resolution on climate change, debate was intensifying over how the climate negotiations should be organized, with some developing countries arguing that it should take place through the Preparatory Committee for the 1992 Rio Summit, itself established by the General Assembly (which would have also had the effect of establishing a G77 structure); see Environmental Policy & Law 1990b:3; although as late as the UNEP Governing Council meeting in August 1990, "many participants argued that the negotiations on a climate change convention, *under the joint auspices of UNEP and WMO*, should follow the guidelines provided by the UNEP Governing Council..." (Environmental Policy & Law 1990a: 126, emphasis added)

Universal participation and the legacies of the ozone negotiations

The ozone depletion negotiations that had begun in 1983, particularly the 1987 Montreal Protocol and the 1990 London Amendment[236], are widely acknowledged as important influences upon the climate prenegotiations, where the overlap of their timing was magnified by the landmark success that the ozone negotiations were judged to be[237]. As well as being problems to do with atmospheric pollution, both were also seen as part of a new class of transboundary problems with *global,* and not just regional effects[238]. There was a keen interest in searching for useful lessons drawn from the ozone negotiations for the purposes of the climate ones, most obviously made in the supposed efficacy of the 'framework convention → protocol' model in which to structure formal negotiations[239].

The formal structure of the agreement, however, was not the only lesson that policymakers drew. As Matthew Hoffmann has shown, over the course of the ozone negotiations, normative participation requirements for an 'appropriate' treaty changed dramatically in a few short years, moving from a participation requirement of only industrialised countries (the case for the 1985 Vienna Convention), to a requirement for universal participation, involving both industrialised and developing countries (the case for the 1990 London Amendment). Despite only needing a relatively small group of countries to be physically effective (in terms of the reduction of ozone-depleting substances), the normatively appropriate response to the problem of ozone depletion came to be defined more expansively, including smaller developing countries despite their marginal significance for

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[236] See Parson 2003 for a comprehensive history of the scientific and political development of the ozone regime.

[237] Victor 2011; Victor and Coben 2005; Benedick 1998; Brenton 1994: 180-181

[238] Wapner 1994; Sooros 1991

[239] Ramakrishna 1992; Morrissette 1991; Lang 1990; although Sebenius 1991 was a notable dissenter to this view

the ozone regime[240]. The mass participation of developing countries came to be seen as desirable among ozone negotiators, because *global* problems were thought to need *global* solutions. Crucially, the shift in participation requirements from an industrialised country-only to a universal one thereby also introduced a North-South dimension to the ozone debates, with developing country demands on finance, technology and differential treatment being accommodated by industrialised countries[241].

In drawing lessons from the ozone regime to apply to the forthcoming climate negotiations, the desirability of universal participation, Hoffmann argues, formed the starting point for climate negotiators. The observation that an ozone depletion regime could have functioned effectively without mass developing country participation applies similarly to climate change – that a relatively small number of countries are responsible for the burden of global greenhouse gas emissions, and that universal participation is in fact unnecessary, in physical terms, for an effective international agreement[242]. Be that as it may, however, Hoffmann shows how this possibility eluded most decisionmakers during the climate prenegotiations: universal participation was a social understanding that was taken for granted, pursued because the political understanding of how global environmental issues should be addressed dictated so ('global problems need global solutions'), and not for any ecologically or economically rational reason[243]. When contemplating what needed to be done, a de facto rule that any agreement seek universal participation was widely seen as one necessary element of this:

> "Universal participation was a normative position internalized before the climate

[240] Hoffmann 2005: chapter 5
[241] Benedick 1998
[242] See Victor 2001; indeed, arguments advanced by the George W. Bush administration during the mid-2000s were precisely to return to this point, in seeking a narrower range of participants that would nonetheless account for the bulk of global greenhouse gas emissions.
[243] Hoffmann 2005: chapter 6

> change negotiations began. Positive reinforcement of the universal participation rule after the London Amendment negotiations led to its use in the next global environmental problem to arise [i.e. climate change]...all states understood that the appropriate rule to follow was the universal participation norm"[244].

The first significant consequence of the universal participation norm was thus that the very beginning of the climate negotiations had a universal participation requirement, a choice biasing favouring the General Assembly over UNEP as the one organisation with assured universal participation. The second significant consequence of the norm was that just as universal participation introduced North-South dynamics into the ozone regime where they had previously been largely absent, the desirability of universal participation in the climate prenegotiations similarly introduced a North-South dimension to these discussions, with the normative desire for universal participation providing leverage for development concerns to be raised by developing countries[245]. The universal participation norm, in persuading developing countries to participate in the nascent discussions on climate change, also legitimised the discussion of issues of greater concern to them – i.e. development ones – in the context of climate change. If development issues were to be discussed, therefore, it seemed only appropriate for the developing countries that this should take place under the aegis of the General Assembly, rather than UNEP's narrower environmental mandate[246]. Hoffmann notes this link between the universal participation norm and the shift to the General Assembly:

> "Nothing made the acceptance of universal participation more unmistakable, however, than the decision of the UN to move the climate change negotiations from

[244] Hoffmann 2005: 132
[245] Hoffmann 2005: 137; Chen 2012: 5 notes this same point.
[246] Hochstetler 2012a: 971

> the auspices of UNEP (already a universal participation advocate) to the General Assembly itself...Southern states now viewed themselves as full participants in the climate change negotiations – where they did not view themselves this way in the ozone depletion negotiations only five years before"[247].

Developing country participation in the IPCC

If the universal participation norm provided a reason to shift negotiations to the General Assembly, this demand was heightened by the perception among developing countries during the IPCC discussions that the norm was being inadequately met, and could only be fully realised by shifting formal negotiations to the General Assembly. It is important to remember, as noted above, that the main thrust of discussions about the possible shape and content of a climate treaty was taking place within the IPCC's meetings, the only regular meetings at the time on climate change (the other prenegotiating conferences hosted by individual governments being one-off events). Post-UNCED, the IPCC's significance to the international political process diminished considerably[248], but prior to the INC being established, the IPCC had been the main institution engaged in climate discussions: "the IPCC fulfilled the dual role of assessing knowledge to advise policy, and at the same time directly helping shape policy itself"[249]. With the IPCC's assessment report to be signed off by governments (as opposed to being a standalone report produced by an independent body), its conclusions – not just on scientific knowledge about climate change, but also on possible policy responses – were recognised as carrying some measure of political significance about the direction for formal negotiations[250]. The IPCC itself was considered a

[247] Hoffmann 2005: 138

[248] Bolin 2007: 68-71; Lanchbery and Victor 1995 also note the FCCC's establishment of its own Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice, further increasing the separation between the INC and IPCC.

[249] Agrawala 1998b: 634

[250] This applies to the 20-page 'policymaker summaries' of each Working Group, which are subject to line-by-line government approval by the IPCC plenary; as Brenton 1994: 181 describes, the result at the fourth

possible setting within which to negotiate a climate convention, particularly given the discussions in Working Group III on possible response measures to climate change[251]. But over the three years of prenegotiations, the IPCC was effectively delegitimised in the eyes of developing countries as such a plausible setting.

The main complaint of Southern states underpinning the IPCC's delegitimisation lay in their limited ability to participate, generating a suspicious perception of exclusion. Initially, IPCC membership had been restricted to 'core members', a group of thirty-two countries spread across the three working groups and largely drawn from industrialised states. By the IPCC's second session in June 1989, however, discontent raised by developing countries led to this method of working being abandoned[252]. In between the first and second sessions, the IPCC Bureau had initiated an ad hoc four-member 'Sub-Group on Ways to Increase the Participation of IPCC Activities', chaired by a Saudi Arabian delegate, to identify ways to facilitate the participation of developing countries in IPCC proceedings. Its report to the second session led to the establishment of a Special Committee on the Participation of Developing Countries to recommend measures to improve developing country participation which reported to the fourth IPCC meeting in August 1990[253]. While short-term measures to increase participation by non-OECD experts (namely through travel funding) resulted in a

IPCC meeting in April 1990 that finalised the First Assessment Report, was that "having started in a very civilized fashion with songs about the future from children's choirs and an address from the prime minister of Sweden, the meeting finally came very close to breakdown. It finished at four o'clock in the morning, one day late, with most of the delegates having abandoned their chairs in the conference hall to gather on the front podium and shout at each other. This unconventional procedure produced agreement to abandon a lot of carefully-worked out, but still hotly contested, text prepared in the course of the week..." See also Agrawala 1998b: 623-628 and Leggett 1999

[251] WMO 1990: 22-23. Indeed, WMO and UNEP had set up a small "Task Force on a Convention on Climate Change", of WMO and UNEP representatives, the coordinator of the forthcoming SWCC, and three members of the WGIII sub-group on legal measures. The purpose of this group, according to Agrawala 1998b: 634 was to "arrive at specific 'action oriented measures' which national governments could agree to as part of a possible climate convention...[and] *to keep the deliberations for the climate convention low key and to prevent them from becoming enmeshed in the much more political UN General Assembly*" (emphasis added).

[252] WMO 1989: 22; Ramakrishna 1990: 425

[253] WMO 1989: 18-20, Annex III; in the final IPCC First Assessment Report, a summary of the work of this Special Committee was included alongside the other Working Group summaries.

marked increase in their participation by 1990[254], the perception of exclusion nonetheless continued and was to remain a common theme throughout the IPCC's subsequent deliberations[255]. As a senior Pakistani INC negotiator remarked:

> "With due respect to the work of the IPCC, it must be observed that the developing world is not completely at ease with the contributions of the organization. This is only natural, given the fact that the IPCC reflects the prevailing dominance of the Western countries in the field of scientific observation and study...Hence, we hope that the future work of the IPCC will reflect a more balanced composition"[256].

This concern over IPCC participation was linked to the substantive conclusions of its deliberations, further reducing its legitimacy: would there would be sufficient opportunity to advance development concerns, and hence avoid a 'Northern-dominated' report that would concentrate on the narrowly 'environmental' aspects without linkages to development issues?[257]. Concern about the IPCC being an unconducive setting in which to raise development issues is understood in light of its prospective policymaking significance at the turn of the decade prior to the INC being established – an anxiety about the possibility of the IPCC conclusions becoming the basis of a negotiated agreement that developing countries would have little choice but to consent to[258]. On the sidelines of the IPCC's third

[254] Agrawala 1998b: 630 notes that 48 non-OECD experts attended the fourth IPCC plenary meeting in August 1990 when the First Assessment Report was agreed, up from 14 at the IPCC's first plenary meeting in 1988. Agrawala also discusses the other recommendations and issues related to this subject.

[255] In the words of one developed country delegate (Brenton 1994: 185), "Many of them [developing countries] had only limited representation in Nairobi and so limited involvement in UNEP's day-to-day business. They were much more strongly represented in New York. Moreover, they tended to see UNEP, particularly after the ozone negotiation, as too much of a technical environmental body to run a negotiation which they saw as being heavily political and in which they wanted the wider developmental and equity aspects of the issue to be taken fully into account." However, Ramakrishna 1990: 428 notes that complaints about exclusion also obscured their lack of technical expertise: "While the delegates from the less-developed nations complained at being excluded from discussions, they were not sufficiently well-versed in the topic to advance arguments as to specific threats to their interests or to advance proposals for solutions."

[256] Hyder 1992: 326

[257] Bodansky 1993: 451; Rajan 1997: 109

[258] The extent to which the WMO and UNEP would be 'preparing' for the intergovernmental negotiations was a contested subject, reflected in debates at the third IPCC plenary meeting. See WMO 1990: 14-16

plenary meeting in February 1990, an ad hoc meeting of developing countries was convened "to exchange views and harmonize positions they would take in the said Special Committee" [on the Participation of Developing Countries][259], the first time that developing countries started to meet as a group within the IPCC process. One view expressed at this ad hoc meeting on the frustrated participation of developing countries was that "it was felt to date that developing countries were being brought along to the IPCC to create the impression only of being part of the action"[260].

These developments within the IPCC are crucial to understanding why the General Assembly came to be favoured over UNEP in providing the INC's institutional mandate. The lack of legitimacy that the IPCC process had in the eyes of Southern states for the purposes of conducting and organising negotiations, inadequately addressed by 1990[261], was compounded by the rapidly-consolidating norm of universal participation and the pressures therein to move to a different institutional setting. The social context that frames universal participation in a future treaty as desirable was reinforced by these events between 1988 and 1990: developing countries came to expect the promise of fair and equal participation in the prenegotiations, and when this promise appeared to be inadequately met in the UNEP/WMO-led process, turned their eyes to the one forum where this promise could be assured by having an inbuilt voting majority – the General Assembly.

Lessons for the South: agency and coalition construction

In Hoffmann's account, the impetus for universal participation in the ozone negotiations emerged in particular through Mostafa Tolba's entrepreneurship, but was generally accepted

[259] WMO 1990: Appendix F
[260] WMO 1990: Appendix F
[261] This problem arguably has not changed, as Lahsen 2007 and Hulme and Mahony 2010: 708-709 note continued Southern dissatisfaction with IPCC participation.

by the industrialised countries, including the United States. In this section, however, the agency of developing countries is more thoroughly considered with regards to generating pressure to locate the INC mandate in a General Assembly resolution. The emergence of the universal participation norm took place against a background of Southern scepticism of participation in multilateral environmental agreements[262]. But while Southern states had to be persuaded to participate in the ozone negotiations, their acceptance and internalization of the norm as the climate negotiations begin was also in part instrumental. The fear of 'losing out' from participation that underpinned a traditional reluctance to participate had evolved into a new recognition of the gains from participation, catalysing efforts at Southern coalition-building.

Two 'lessons' were drawn from the ozone negotiations that explain this evolution. Firstly, in the 1987-1990 ozone negotiations that led to agreement on the London Amendment and the subsequent accession of China and India to the Montreal Protocol, longstanding Southern demands on the broader environment-development divide were realized[263]. The most significant of these was the creation of the Multilateral Fund to the Montreal Protocol, agreed upon despite initial opposition from developed countries, especially the United States. This was a new institution, governed jointly by both developed and developing countries, to fund the full incremental costs of the technology transition away from CFCs in developing countries[264]. The significance of this new institution was not lost on participants – at the US' insistence, a clause was included noting that this new financial mechanism was established "without prejudice to any future arrangements that may be developed with

[262] Brenton 1994; Najam 2005

[263] Sell 1996

[264] The United States in particular would have preferred using existing institutions, for governance voting to be weighted by donor contributions, and was wary of the principle of additionality and mandatory financial commitments. See Benedick 1998: chapters 12 and 13 for a review of these negotiations, who described the Multilateral Fund (188) as "an exceptional innovation in the realm of multilateral cooperation."

respect to to other environmental issues"[265]. For developing countries, nonetheless, a precedent did appear to have been set, and the Multilateral Fund was interpreted as a successful example of what developing countries could indeed achieve in North-South bargaining: a lesson about the concrete benefits of Southern negotiating unity that had only been haltingly realized over the 1980s[266].

Secondly, the ozone negotiations had also served as a wake-up call to the leading developing countries of the consequences of coming late to the conference table, and having to attempt to negotiate changes to an established regime, rather than contributing to its initial agreement and formation[267]. Southern participation in the ozone negotiations had only begun in earnest at the adoption of the Montreal Protocol itself in 1987, too late to make changes to the Protocol itself, but developing countries – especially India and China – were able to engage in a rearguard advocacy of their interests by delaying signing the Montreal Protocol as a signal of their dissatisfaction[268]. While they were able to successfully press for their demands to be met as a condition for their accession over the subsequent round of negotiations, in doing so they also drew the lesson that this may have been a near-miss[269]. Thus while many developing countries had been reluctant to participate in the ozone negotiations from the beginning, suspicious of being entrapped into commitments, a different lesson emerged: that non-participation and late participation may be more dangerous and detrimental to Southern objectives than participation at the outset.

As a result of these two lessons from the ozone negotiations[270], the developing countries

[265] Benedick 1998: 184
[266] At the end of the 1980s, as the first two chapters have noted, the death-knell of the NIEO and Southern unity was being proclaimed; see Rothstein 1988
[267] Rajan 1997: 264
[268] Hoffmann 2005: 104
[269] Rowlands 1995: 170-171
[270] This does not exclude other lessons and motivations, however: Kobayashi 2003 notes that one part of

that had been involved in the ozone negotiations were also actively engaged in the initial discussions surrounding climate change. The contentiousness of participation in the IPCC discussed above was indicative of their demand to be included, but developing countries also sought to build concretely on these lessons for the upcoming climate negotiating process by engaging in wider efforts to build and coordinate common positions. The most noteworthy of these was the New Delhi Conference of Select Developing Countries on Global Environmental Issues, hosted by India in April 1990 with the participation of 19 developing countries. This was a conference that convened developing countries in preparation for the upcoming London Amendment ozone negotiations in June 1990, but which also discussed climate change and the other environmental issues that were rising up the political agenda ahead of the 1992 Rio Earth Summit. Coming just as the London Amendment negotiations were reaching their conclusion, and as the climate prenegotiating meetings were intensifying, the New Delhi conference's effort at coalition-building among developing countries, as well as a later similar conference hosted by China in Beijing in 1991[271], indicated the learning among larger developing countries of the lessons indicated above from the ozone negotiations. Having experienced negotiating success in North-South bargaining, but recognising that these may very well have been elusive had they come later to the negotiating table, they now sought to build a larger coalition of developing countries engaged in climate change and other forthcoming global environmental issues[272].

China's willingness to engage in the climate negotiating process as also an effort to end its post-Tiananmen diplomatic isolation.

[271] Johnston 1998

[272] Rajan 1997: 107, while containing a number of caveats, nonetheless makes the link firmly. At the August 1990 special session of the UNEP Governing Council, "Of special significance to Indian policy makers was a private meeting with their Chinese counterparts. Here, both sides expressed satisfaction with the outcome of the ozone negotiations. These Chinese also expressed their appreciation for Indian efforts to promote Southern solidarity at the Conference of Select Developing Countries, and disclosed their intention to hold a similar conference in 1991. The two sides agreed to consult with each other, and coordinate their policies on global environmental issues...Clearly, too, they were keen to repeat, if possible, their ozone success [in the climate setting]. Because of the confidentiality maintained by both sides in their bilateral communications, it is difficult to highlight obvious evidence of policy coordination during the climate negotiations. Nevertheless, we will see that neither side's proposals adversely affected the other. Moreoever, we will see that at a crucial stage in the climate negotiations, Indian policy makers at

The establishment of the G77 and the shift to Resolution 45/212 at the beginning of the INCs thus, this section has argued, is properly understood as a constructed political phenomenon. The emerging norm of universal participation had begun to set the participation requirements for climate change as being universal; the experience of the IPCC had been disappointing for developing countries; and clear lessons about the importance of participation had been drawn from the ozone negotiations driving Southern agency. Together, all these explain the evolution of the institutional home for the formal intergovernmental negotiations on climate change from UNEP to the General Assembly, in presumably being able to satisfy the concerns emerging out of these issues.

Counterfactual coalitions: universal participation and organisation mandates

The argument laid out in this chapter has a particular importance for the overall arguments of this thesis because it identifies the prenegotiations as constituting a critical juncture for coalition formation among developing countries. The implication of critical juncture arguments, however, is to also imply that had the juncture been resolved differently, a different causal trajectory would unfold[273]. If the context had been constructed in a different manner than what was outlined here, would the coalitions have formed differently? What would alternatively constructed contexts suggest about the political dynamics leading to Southern identity and coalition formation?

This section thus explores this implication more closely in a counterfactual exercise that attempts to consider the possibility of climate negotiations conducted outside of the General

the highest level linked India's stance to the Chinese position"

[273] Capoccia and Kelemen 2007: 355-357

Assembly[274]. The key antecedent here is universal participation, and the consequent is a General Assembly mandate – Resolution 45/212. Universal participation is the antecedent, because it gives rise to the two other factors identified above – if wide participation had not been normatively anticipated, the issues with regards to participation in the IPCC would not have risen; and if the mass participation of developing countries had not been an issue, then the chances of 'development' issues being included would have been less, with less chance of success and successful lessons being drawn.

The single event that marks the end of the critical juncture, as identified above, is Resolution 45/212 that provides the INC's mandate. If Resolution 45/212 had not been agreed upon – and therefore, no General Assembly mandate for the INCs – would the G77 have formed? The likely alternative institutional setting would have been instead UNEP and the WMO, which, as earlier parts of this chapter showed, was very much the anticipated outcome. Indeed, given the prominence of UNEP/WMO in convening the IPCC and engaging states on climate change, a historical institutionalist interpretation may lead to an expectation that this *earlier* activity would have made the organisation of the negotiations a path-dependent outcome by providing them with both the practical experience and social legitimacy as the appropriate institutional forum for the new climate negotiations. Climate negotiations conducted by UNEP and the WMO would have been far less likely to result in a 'G77' – that is, as this specific coalition with its norms of appropriate association following Southern identity. This was already the result within the ozone negotiations, where increased participation by developing countries *did not* result in a G77 caucus forming. Thus, with no shift to the General Assembly (and no Resolution 45/212), the G77-style politics of the General Assembly would not have been imported into the formal

[274] On counterfactual methodology generally, and in particular how it complements process-tracing in mitigating hindsight biases and overdetermined arguments, see Lebow 2010

climate negotiations.

Instead, more likely would have been an ad hoc coalition among the developing countries to advance their interests – but being an ad hoc, rather than drawing directly on a norm of Southern appropriate association in the G77, it would have been more fragile and prone to fragmentation, perhaps guided primarily by consequentialist considerations rather than ones of appropriateness. It may also be smaller, given that many developing countries would have simply not participated, being suspicious of North-initiated negotiations, or given their positioning as bystanders or intermediates on climate change, following the scheme presented in the last chapter. This scenario calls into question whether AOSIS would have formed at all, in the absence of a universal participation norm, because it is this norm which, as discussed above, empowers their participation – but if they had been able to organize, without a norm of Southern appropriate association present , they would have been far more likely to operate independently of the large developing countries, and perhaps closer to the European states on a largely interest-based coalition, sharing positions for greater ambition in a climate convention. In other words, the absence of universal participation suggests that more fluid coalition configurations would have characterised the climate negotiations, because of the absence of General Assembly politics. Many developing countries – mostly bystanders and intermediates, in the interest-based scheme presented in Chapter 2 – would simply have not participated, and therefore the social possibility of a G77 coalition structure would have been largely non-existent and not applied.

Was this a possibility? How likely was a norm of non-universal participation? The personal agency and norm entrepreneurialism associated with the development of the universal

participation norm in UNEP Executive Secretary Mostafa Tolba means that if Tolba is rewritten out of history – that is, if another Executive Secretary was in place, we can begin to imagine a different history without a normative requirement of universal participation[275]. The result is that the ozone negotiations reach the end of the 1990s with participation being far more restricted than was actually the case, only including the states necessary to build a multilateral regime that could effectively address ozone depletion. As the climate prenegotiations commence and overlap with the ozone negotiations, accordingly, there is no demand that universal participation is desirable, and only a small number of developing countries participate in these discussions – the large, developing ones with high net emissions (even while still having low per capita emissions). In such a scenario, North-South differences would still have been likely, because countries with high net and per capita emissions (the industrialised ones) would be challenged to take relatively ambitious action in the short and medium term. The absence of the universal participation norm, however, suggests that UNEP and the WMO would not have been challenged as the appropriate institution to organize the climate negotiations, and would have instead remained the natural home for such discussions. Without the General Assembly, as a result, the prospects for Southern identity and a norm of Southern appropriate association look more uncertain.

There are other elements of the arguments of this chapter that can be explored counterfactually, a key related one being the relative timing of the ozone and climate negotiations, which would deepen an exploration of sequence and the importance of precedent[276]. For now, however, the limited nature of this counterfactual in focusing on just

[275] This is admittedly loses the 'minimal rewrite' methodological criterion, because there are no ready reasons why there would have been a different UNEP Executive Secretary in 1988 – Tolba had been in office since 1975, which is a lot of second-order history to rewrite.

[276] Hoffmann 2005: 192-193 also engages in a counterfactual exercise: “What would have happened if climate change had come first? Would the global governance of these issues have proceeded differently? If

one element of the social construction of the South and G77 serves to highlight the how the basic political characteristics of the climate change negotiations should not be taken as given, but reflect a discrete political process connecting the ozone negotiations to the climate change ones. The institutions within which the negotiations take place matter[277]. The use of counterfactuals helps to clarify the critical juncture, and informs the later, larger argument about the path dependent character of the G77.

Universal participation and the mobilization of small island states

While the norm of universal participation was crucial in the shift to the General Assembly and the introduction of the G77 structure to negotiations, this norm also enabled the mobilization of a new coalition of some of the world's smallest and marginal states. In September 1990, at the Second World Climate Conference (SWCC) in Geneva, an ad hoc meeting of 24 countries was later organised as the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), including island and low-lying states across the Pacific, Caribbean and Indian Oceans. The formation of AOSIS is often characterised, contrary to the G77, as constituting a narrow interest-based coalition of countries facing similar threats from sea-level rise and extreme weather weather events[278]. "The unity of purpose of AOSIS stems simply from the common threat to the survival of island countries that is imposed by global climate change", wrote one delegate, such that its members have been able to overcome other cultural, economic and political differences among them[279]. Similarly, AOSIS was "an ad hoc alliance which

climate change arose to prominence in the mid-1970s it is doubtful that more than one hundred nations would have attended the first negotiating session. In the 1970s and early 1980s there was no context for thinking universally. The characteristics of the problem would have been viewed through lenses that constrained perceptions to national or regional levels of participation – just as happened with ozone depletion. It is the lenses through which problems are viewed that are the key determinant in how a problem is defined and addressed. Climate change was defined as a universal problem precisely because the lenses developed in ozone depletion only allowed actors to see climate change as universal. If the climate change problem had come first, would the lenses developed have been different? It is hard to say. Climate change might have proceeded as ozone depletion, North-only..."

277 See Parson 1993 for a related point on the ozone negotiations.

278 Betzold 2010

279 Davis 1996

grew out of our common concern on this issue [of climate change]", according to its first chairperson, Robert van Lierop[280]. AOSIS's formation and establishment, however, illustrate the two key normative underpinnings of coalition construction outlined in this chapter: universal participation and appropriate association.

The first lies in the possibility of these countries simply being involved in the issue, where it is the universal participation norm that, in expanding participation requirements for the climate negotiations, also enabled the participation of small island states. When planning for the SWCC began in 1988, it was conceived as a conference of limited participation of some 20-30 states – those countries with scientific expertise in the area, and those countries responsible for the bulk of emissions. With the emergence of the universal participation norm as described above over the late 1980s, however, where the mass participation of developing countries came to be seen as desirable and socially appropriate, some 137 states participated in the SWCC[281]. Thus countries making little physical contribution to reducing greenhouse gases – the small island states, as well as many other developing countries – were invited to fully participate in the SWCC, a development entirely dependent on the emergence of the universal participation norm[282]. As a result, the INC mandate in Resolution 45/212 specified that participation would be open to all members of the UN itself as well as members of UN specialised agencies[283].

The larger consequences of the universal participation norm traced in this chapter – General

[280] Williams 1991

[281] Hoffmann 2005: 128, 137

[282] While these countries certainly highlighted their concerns over their vulnerability to the impacts of climate change, issues of adaptation were very much secondary to the overwhelming attention on mitigation issues in the years of initial negotiations.

[283] A number of Pacific island states were not UN members at the beginning of the 1990s. One of India's lead INC delegates, Dasgupta 1994: 132 also notes this, that "this paved the way for inclusion of a number of small island states which would have otherwise been unable to take part in the negotiating process. The decision had a major impact on the negotiations".

Assembly involvement in mandating the INC, thereby setting the stage for the activation of the G77 as the appropriate negotiating form for developing countries – also had consequences for the behaviour and shape of AOSIS and the AOSIS-G77 relationship, as the next chapter will discuss. For the moment, however, the significance of the universal participation norm lies in enabling the very participation and possibility of small island states, a prelude to their mobilisation as AOSIS.

The process by which AOSIS itself came into being, however, while providing the common perception as a coalition of the like-minded, deserves further treatment, because the form of its membership provides insight into how developing countries form their coalition and the salience of appropriate association norms[284]. The formation of AOSIS undoubtedly reflected considerable individual agency and entrepreneurship in the process of coalition creation. While scientific concern about the impacts of climate change had been rising among small island states from the mid-1980s[285], the formation of a grouping of island states was an entirely new endeavour when these countries met on the sidelines of the SWCC. Frustrated at the perceived intransigence of industrialised and oil-exporting countries in negotiations on the ministerial declaration at the SWCC, delegates from Trinidad and Tobago (led by its Environment Minister, Lincoln Myers) and Barbados first convened a meeting of CARICOM countries present at the SWCC, which then agreed to meet with delegates of other small island states[286]. Following agreement among those at this ad hoc meeting that a

[284] Analytical attention has instead focused on how AOSIS seeks to meet its goals; see Betzold, Castro and Weiler 2012; Deitelhoff and Walbott 2012

[285] Barnett and Campbell 2010: 70-73 highlight the joint research initiative of the Association of South Pacific Environmental Institutions (ASPEI) to begin researching the regional impacts of climate change from 1987; a number of other prenegotiating meetings had focused on small island states: the Maldives hosted the "Small States Conference on Sea Level Rise" in November 1989 with 14 countries represented from the Pacific, Caribbean and Indian Oceans; the Marshall Islands, together with the SPC, UNEP and ASPEI hosted the "Intergovernmental Meeting on Climatic Change and Sea Level Rise in the South Pacific" in July 1989 for South Pacific island states.

[286] Myers, personal communication, which also emphasised that AOSIS was a spontaneous response to developments at the SWCC rather than a pre-meditated move. Myers 2004 discusses some of the larger context to his activity on the issue.

firmer political stand needed to be made, the final days of the conference and debate over the ministerial declaration marked the creation of AOSIS, with ministers arguing publicly that the interests of small island states were being ignored[287].

While the activism and agency of those at the SWCC should not be underestimated, however, what has been unrecognised in the existing literature is that AOSIS' membership reflected the political norms of appropriate association of two regions: the Pacific and the Caribbean. Specifically, AOSIS membership was constructed out of the memberships of the two main existing regional organisations – the South Pacific Forum (then the SPF, now the Pacific Islands Forum(PIF)) and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). Both these organisations are larger forums for multi-issue regional cooperation, created in 1971 and 1973 respectively and with records of varying success in fostering closer political and economic regional cooperation[288]. And while both sit within a larger complex of possible regional and subregional institutions and identities[289], the existing memberships of these two organisations were taken wholesale as the appropriate basis for constructing this new coalition[290].

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[287] ECO 1990b: 7 quotes ministers from Trinidad & Tobago, the Maldives, Kiribati and Saint Lucia as members of the new 'Small Islands Group' in their criticisms of the SWCC process: "We were appalled...to find that the Draft Ministerial Declaration contained no mention of the position of small island states, even though we are in the front line of climatic change. We are frequently added to the end of such declarations as mere codicils. But we are part of the planet too." Tuvalu's Prime Minister was also present but his formal speech made no reference to AOSIS, see Paeniu 1991. Heileman 1993 notes some changes that AOSIS was able to introduce to the final SWCC Ministerial Declaration and Leggett 1999: 23-29 vividly recounts some of the final deliberations in adopting the ministerial declaration and the clashes between small island states and Saudi Arabia and the US.

[288] See Shibuya 2004; Fry 1994; Macqueen 1993 for a discussion of the wider regional activity of the SPF/PIF, especially on functional economic issues such as fishing and aviation, and on political issues such as decolonisation and collective relations with Australia and New Zealand, the two regional powers. The South Pacific Forum was renamed the Pacific Islands Forum as a result of a new treaty agreement in 2000. See Payne 1994 on CARICOM's background and record of integration and activity.

[289] Fry 1994: 142-144 notes the distinction between possible Polynesian and Melanesian identities among Pacific states, Macqueen 1989 discusses Melanesian subregionalism in particular and the establishment of one such subregional coalition, the Melanesian Spearhead Group.

[290] Interview with senior AOSIS INC delegate.

These, of course, were not the sum of the AOSIS membership, as Table 5 notes, which included a number of other countries from the Atlantic (Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Sao Tome and Principe), Indian Ocean (the Comoros, Maldives, Seychelles and Mauritius) South China Sea (Singapore), and initially also included the Mediterranean islands of Malta and Cyprus[291]. The key point here, however, is that assembling this new coalition – and in particular, the process of turning the ad hoc coalition speaking at the SWCC into a more lasting group for the formal INC process beginning a few months later – the bulk of its membership was premised on existing models of appropriate association, highlighting how coalition construction was dependent on existing institutionalised identities that identified the main members of the coalition[292]. One description of AOSIS reflects this, that AOSIS was effectively "an inter-regional organisation that established a network of regional organisations of small island countries. Although AOSIS affiliations took place on a national basis, the AOSIS has used regional organisations as coordinating bodies"[293], reflecting the role of both the SPF and CARICOM in supporting the negotiating capacity and organisation of delegates from their respective regions[294]. This regional understanding of AOSIS' creation also helps to explain the inclusion of some countries that may be thought to be anomalies to the 'small island state' definition – Papua New Guinea, being a rather large island, but also an existing SPF member; and Belize and Guyana as continental

[291] Malta and Cyprus remained members until their EU accession. Malta had also been one of the key countries in drawing international political attention to climate change, having sponsored the first UN General Assembly resolution on the subject (Resolution 43/53) in 1988. According to Robert van Lierop, other apparent candidates considered for AOSIS membership included Brunei, Bahrain and Qatar

[292] Buzan and Waever 2003: 465 make a passing reference to AOSIS as a possible non-territorial 'security constellation', but this highlights the limited way that the regional origins of AOSIS have been understood: "...global warming is interesting for producing distinct subgroups with shared interests and mutual dependence but along non-regional lines (yet shaped by geography): e.g., AOSIS...is a group of states with shared interests – they would more or less disappear with rising sea levels, but they are spread across the globe".

[293] Ogashiwa 2002: 211

[294] This still continues today, where pre-sessional preparatory meetings also take place within these regional groupings (personal observation, 2012). In the Pacific much of this role is taken by the regional environmental institution, the South Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP).

Caribbean countries, but were also established members of CARICOM[295]. The salience of the existing regional organisations as the bases for coalition membership, additionally, may also have made sense in light of the relative inexperience of each other, with not much prior inter-regional cooperation and indeed considerable economic and cultural diversity among the AOSIS countries[296]. Indeed, the relative novelty of these diverse regions joining into a common political group is reflected in the effort at the Earth Summit and beyond, catalysed in good part by AOSIS' establishment, to recognise the special circumstances of 'small island developing states' as a new category within the UN system[297].

The conventional alternative explanation of coalition construction may present AOSIS as an unproblematic example of the mobilisation of a like-minded group of countries with shared interests and facing a common threat. What the account of its creation presented here highlights, however, is the way in which this creation was structured and guided by existing normative understandings. In the first place, the universal participation norm leading towards the General Assembly resolution establishing the INC created the political space for small island state participation in the prenegotiations on climate change. Secondly, existing norms of appropriate association provided a basis for determining AOSIS' membership, in drawing upon the memberships of the dominant regional institutions in the Pacific and Caribbean, consistent with the larger argument of this thesis arguing that existing institutions guide coalition formation.

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[295] Heileman 1993: 55; Payne 1994: 75 does describe Belize and Guyana as being "islanded by jungle". An exception to the CARICOM template is the exclusion of Montserrat – a full CARICOM member, but as a British overseas territory, its foreign relations are managed by the UK

[296] Myers, personal communication; see Chasek 2005 for a discussion of the differences between the Pacific and Caribbean regions, focusing especially on the Pacific, and Bishop and Payne 2012 especially on the Caribbean.

[297] One of the Earth Summit outcomes was recognising SIDS as a special category and thus mandating the beginning of a process to address the sustainable development needs of SIDS, with the Barbados Programme of Action agreed in 1994 being the first results of this process. See Fry 2005; Chasek 2005 and Taplin 1994 on the wider developments of this SIDS and sustainable development agenda and AOSIS' role in these, and see Bruckner 2013 in particular exploring the shared vulnerability and heterogeneity of SIDS, but also the different definitions and ways of classifying SIDS.

Pacific	Caribbean	Atlantic, Indian Ocean, South China Sea, Mediterranean
Cook Islands Federated States of Micronesia Fiji Kiribati Marshall Islands Nauru Niue Papua New Guinea Samoa Solomon Islands Tonga Tuvalu Vanuatu	Antigua and Barbuda Bahamas Barbados Belize Cuba (non-CARICOM) Dominica Grenada Guyana Jamaica St Kitts and Nevis Saint Lucia Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Trinidad and Tobago	Cape Verde Guinea-Bissau Sao Tome and Principe Comoros Maldives Mauritius Seychelles Singapore Cyprus Malta

Table 5: AOSIS membership, 1992 (Source: Taplin 1994)

Conclusion

This chapter has traced the process of developing country coalition formation in the climate negotiations that began in 1991, focusing on the prenegotiations that began in 1988 and culminated in Resolution 45/212 being adopted by the UN General Assembly. This resolution, and the shift to the General Assembly as the institutional mandate for the formal climate negotiations, this chapter argues, explains the G77's emergence when the formal negotiations commenced. The immediate conclusion lies in recognizing the significance of the institutional context for the possibilities of coalition formation – that once the General Assembly became the favoured venue within which to mandate formal negotiations, there was little other possibility other than the G77 coalition structure. The G77 was not so much 'chosen' as the most optimal, efficient way to organize developing country participation in the negotiations as it was the default option associated with this particular institution. This shift to the General Assembly, furthermore, was itself the product of how states defined climate change as a policy problem – one that necessitated universal participation as a

normative requirement, and which therefore enabled its social construction as a North-South issue. Finally, this sequential argument and its contingency was also examined via a counterfactual exercise that considered other ways and possibilities for coalition formation among developing countries.

The more distant conclusion of the argument presented in this chapter, however, lies in the significance of these origins for coalition dynamics over the subsequent two decades of negotiations, which the remaining chapters of this thesis outline. The coalitions that emerged as formal negotiations began, understood as products of the social context of the prenegotiations, have proved resilient in facing the challenges of maintaining the unity of a large-number coalition in a context where the diversity of its membership has widened, rather than narrowed, over time. Early coalition outcomes have been ones that matter over time and been difficult, thus far, to reverse and reconfigure. It is this legacy and record of negotiating unity that confronts the renewed questions about the future of the South: for however attempts are made to justify new categories to differentiate developing countries, particularly in light of the emerging powers, the experience of the climate negotiations charted in this thesis indicates the continuing salience and value of analysing the world in terms of a single, global South.

Chapter Four
The G77 and AOSIS: Negotiating the Framework Convention and Kyoto Protocol, 1991-1997

The previous chapter had shown how the institutional context in which these formal negotiations began marked the end of a critical juncture whereby, in resolving the question of the institutional mandate for these formal negotiations, determined much of the coalition dynamics that would emerge as the negotiating phase began proper. Launching the INC process under the auspices of the UN General Assembly, rather than alternative institutional fora such as the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) or the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), decisively shaped the subsequent possibilities for coalition formation among developing countries. This institutional choice, the previous chapter showed, determined that the negotiations were interpreted through a North-South lens even if the underlying alignment of material interests was less clear. This North-South lens thus made the relevant collective identity classification that of 'the South' – and thus the norm of appropriate association, following this identity, was the G77 coalition.

The emergence of this normative requirement of Southern appropriate association, at this initial stage of the negotiations, was of tremendous importance for the subsequent formation of other coalitions by developing countries. In short, this requirement occupied the political space for coalition formation; other coalitions would have to demonstrate continuing conformity to this normative requirement even as they attempted to build a new grouping. What develops over this chapter, thus, is an illustration of the positive feedback processes that justifies a 'path-dependency' analysis – but processes that are profoundly social, and not just material. This chapter examines the way developing countries

negotiated during the first phase of the climate negotiations from 1991 to 1997, showing how the norm of appropriate association provides a deeper understanding of the two developing country coalitions of this era – the G77 and AOSIS.

The institutionalisation of these two coalitions during this time – developing a structure and organisation for INC participation – guided the way in which developing country interests were constructed and articulated during the INCs and beyond. It ensured that they were bound by the norm of appropriate association that had the effect of sustaining Southern negotiating unity within the G77 despite areas of considerable divergences. In other words, this chapter argues that the distinct elements of the form and shape of both these coalitions, and hence the scope of their activity over this phase of negotiations, are best explained by the institutional context within which they were formed, although with local differences for the two coalitions.

The first section provides a brief review of the overall developments in the negotiating process for the regime as a whole over this period. It also introduces some of the general patterns of developing country behaviour during this period to hint at the very real differences that did exist among them. For many experts and participants of the time, the likelihood and prospect of Southern negotiating unity lasting for very long was an uncertain one, highlighting once again one of the central puzzles of this thesis, in needing to explain the underpinnings of the G77's presence. The second section then moves to explore the pathway by which this positive feedback process helps to explain the enduring character of the two-coalition structure of developing country coalitions during this period. This mechanism unfolds in distinct ways for the G77 and AOSIS, but the underlying logic remains the same.

The next two sections illustrate these dynamics at work in the substantive issues being negotiated over this period. The third section considers the disagreement on mitigation commitments among developing countries that resulted in momentary breakups of the G77. At two meetings – firstly, at the INC negotiations in 1991, and secondly, at the first COP in 1995 – the G77 failed to coordinate a common position on the strength of mitigation commitments to be undertaken, but neither of these led to lasting splits in this group. This section also traces further challenges in negotiating a common position during the AGBM process over the commitments of a new protocol, which was only averted by linking the issue to that of a proposed compensation mechanism for fossil fuel-exporting countries. The final section then turns to a different issue in the use of market-based 'flexible mechanisms' , and further divisions among developing countries – where opposition to joint implementation (JI) in the post-Rio INCs evolved into agreement for the Clean Development Mechanism[298].

What emerges from this chapter, ultimately, is a more fine-grained understanding of how the two coalitions' origins in the institutional setting of negotiations shaped important elements of the way in which developing countries' positions would be reflected in their coalitions. The social identities present in this particular institutional context, once manifested in a particular coalition resulting from the norm of appropriate association, was subject to social reproduction and entrenchment in the political dynamics of the negotiations.

[298] There were, of course, many other areas during these negotiations that are not addressed in this chapter where developing countries disagreed among themselves considerably – the rules of procedure and composition of the COP Bureau, the structure and depth of reporting 'national communications'; the character and structure of the FCCC's subsidiary bodies; but these do not change the argument presented here.

Negotiating the FCCC, Berlin Mandate and Kyoto Protocol: the perennial problem of Southern unity

The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change was agreed in May 1992 and opened for signature at the Earth Summit in June of that year. After it entered into force in 1994, it held its first Conference of Parties in Berlin, in April 1995, and its third COP in Kyoto, in December 1997. COP1 produced a mandate to negotiate a further agreement to complement the FCCC, the Berlin Mandate, and COP3 finalised this agreement, in the form of the Kyoto Protocol. These landmark events were linked by a number of different negotiating processes. The first was the series of six meetings of the INC process launched by Resolution 45/212 between 1991 and 1992. Secondly, this INC process continued after the Earth Summit in a further five meetings to prepare for the Convention's implementation upon its entry into force[299]. With this entry into force, 1995 marked the beginning of the COP process with the Convention coming into force – the FCCC's decisionmaking authority, which has met annually since to direct and guide the implementation of the FCCC. Finally, COP1 initiated a further process, the Ad-Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate (AGBM), to develop a new legal instrument to further define commitments and obligations by COP3, which met eight times between 1995 and 1997, ending with the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol at COP3.

This first phase of the climate negotiations may be regarded as one where developing countries were bystanders. In this view, the prospect of Southern negotiating unity may be viewed as a relatively low-cost, easy-to-achieve outcome, given that it was the obligations of developed countries that were being most fiercely disputed. On many issues, developing countries did hold shared positions, around the demand for technology and financial transfers from developed countries. This unity was especially true in the INCs on the

[299] UN 1994 (A/AC/237/24)

question of how the Framework Convention's financial mechanism would be structured[300]. Developing countries were wholly against this mechanism being located in the Global Environment Facility (GEF), as favoured by Northern donors[301]. Their main concerns here were over the governance of financial assistance and whether it would be accountable to its donors, and not to its developing country recipients in how it distributed funds, especially against a background of declining North-South financial flows[302]. Here, another influence of the Montreal Protocol was especially discernible as the G77 sought to establish a similar structure – an independent fund with a double-majority voting procedure that would be accountable to the FCCC's Conference of Parties, and not to some other agency or body[303]. The GEF, however, was an institution administered by the World Bank, UNEP and UNDP, and championed in part by developed countries as a way of avoiding a proliferation of environmental finance institutions[304].

Certainly, amid later disputes among developing countries as charted in the next two chapters, differences during this first phase of formal negotiations may appear slight and thus sufficient to explain Southern negotiating unity. The rest of this section, however, in drawing attention to the general perception of Southern *disunity* during this period, still highlights a problem for understanding developing country coalition formation: how, despite these clearly diverging interests, did the basic two-coalition structure (of the G77 and AOSIS) present at the beginning of these negotiations remain intact until the very end What this section highlights, therefore, is the continuing expectation that a united South would not last, an expectation present from the very beginning of the negotiating process.

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[300] These arguments over the GEF's role were also mirrored in the UNCED negotiations; on other financial discussions, such as the AOSIS proposal on insurance for climate impacts, however, other developing countries extended little support; see Ashe, van Lierop and Cherian 1999; Hampson 1995: 328

[301] Hampson 1995: 321

[302] Hyder 1992: 332; Djoghlaf 1994: 105; Gupta 1997: chapter 5

[303] Drennen 1993: 20-24

[304] See Sjoberg 1996 for a history of the GEF and disputes between developed and developing countries over its governance

Developing countries were generally perceived as being disorganised, and this point is important to contrast in highlighting the inconsistent fit between the coalitions within which developing countries are organised, and the substantive political differences that were at the heart of negotiating the FCCC and Kyoto Protocol. Many, but not all, of these were between the small island states and oil-exporting countries, and against a more fluid picture of interests, bringing these disparate groups together in a single G77 coalition appears especially rigid and in need of further explanation. The following section then restates the argument of this thesis in light of this pattern, and the rest of the chapter then proceeds to examine these divergent issues more closely.

It was clear to both observers and participants that the 'South' was far from a monolithic entity and instead was divided in a number of ways. Some of these characterisations are summed up here: "[T]he point must be made," one group of scholars argued, while nonetheless acknowledging areas of developing country unanimity, "that the FC [Framework Convention] negotiations have radically changed the pattern of alliances in the South, creating something of a diplomatic revolution"[305]. One of the key chroniclers of the climate negotiating process, Daniel Bodansky, observed at the time that "To the surprise of few, however, the developing world has had difficulty acting as a bloc in the INC... [v]irtually the only point on which the G-77 agree[d] is the need of developing countries for financial assistance and technology transfer"[306]. Algerian diplomat Ahmed Djoghlaf, one of the INC's Vice-Chairs, in reflections upon the INC process, said that "It is significant to note in this regard that , over the course of the negotiations, the G-77 presented only one unified position paper. This paper broke no new ground; it simply restated the general considerations which have historically guided the actions of the G-77"[307]. Even as Marc

[305] Nilsson and Pitt 1994: 55-56
[306] Bodansky 1992: 7
[307] Djoghlaf 1994: 105

Williams was writing about the 're-articulation of the Third World coalition' following the various Earth Summit negotiating processes, he also suggested that "It will be difficult for the Third World coalition to negotiate as a group on this issue beyond the general agreement on additional funding"[308].

Thus, to begin with, preferences about the kind of agreement desired were divergent[309]. This appearance of a tenuous unity among developing countries, divided instead into "novel" interest groupings[310], was based on the emergence of new groups during the INCs, seemingly challenging the relevance of the G77 as the main grouping for developing countries[311]. The first of these, and the most widely appreciated one, was AOSIS, acting upon their shared vulnerability to the impacts of climate change. The second, diametrically opposed to the AOSIS demand for robust and ambitious action on climate change, were the oil-exporting countries whose renewed activism was noted especially by Djoghlaf[312]. The third, emerging during INC4 during the G77's failure to agree a collective position on commitments (of which more will be said later), was a 43-member grouping labelled by Djoghlaf as the 'Kuala Lumpur Group', consisting of like-minded states, including the large and traditionally influential countries of Brazil, India and China, bridging these two poles and concerned too by any prospective restrictions on the use of forest resources[313].

[308] Williams 1993
[309] Sell 1996: 106-108
[310] Sands 1993: 271
[311] For other descriptions of developing country coalition disunity, see Hampson and Hart 1995: 335-337: "… the Group of 77 worked less and less effectively as a group as negotiations progressed."; see also Paterson and Grubb 1992: 299-230 for ways of distinguishing the different alignments of developing countries.
[312] Djoghlaf 1994: 106 observed OPEC's renewal of its "tradition of holding periodic consultations in conjunction with major international events...[that] had been suspended since the early 1980s. In addition to convening regular consultative meetings in conjunction with the sessions of the INC, the OPEC member countries held three separate seminars in Vienna to harmonize their positions in regard to the major provisions of the draft Framework Convention on Climate Change. The reactivation of this tradition of consultation by OPEC member countries parallel to UN meetings was motivated by the concerns of the principal oil-exporting developing countries about the potential impact that the Framework Convention on Climate Change might have on the future of the international oil market."; as noted in the introductory chapter, however, OPEC's apparently deliberate decision not to caucus and present itself as a formal negotiating group in the UNFCCC process is one that is not well understood. This passage cited here is one of the few available primary sources on OPEC's activities in the UNFCCC process.
[313] Djoghlaf 1994: 106 (although the reason for the origins of this name is unclear)

The challenge that these groupings posed to G77 unity was underlined by the working relationships formed across the North-South divide during the INCs. These cut across the formal coalition structure and resembled the political positions of the prenegotiations. AOSIS, for example, was frequently aligned with European Community countries in sharing a demand for an ambitious agreement, as well as the strength of the subsidiary institutions that the Framework Convention would establish[314]. The EC, in particular, had begun to see itself as a 'leader' on climate change, expressing sympathies with the island states and pressing for more specific actions[315]. Ranged against them, on the other hand, oil-exporting countries were far closer to the positions adopted by the USA in its reluctance for international agreement, casting doubt on the science and seeking delays in making commitments to reduce emissions. A Greenpeace observer at the INCs described the relationship between Saudi Arabia and the US delegation (as well as its domestic fossil fuel industry) as akin to “shuttle diplomacy”, such was the level of cooperation between the two countries[316]. At times, additionally, China was seen as close to the US position in being averse to including targets and timetables in the INC discussions – arguing that if developed countries were not to have stringent obligations, then the degree of commitments asked of developing countries should be diluted and weakened further[317].

With good reason, therefore, the INC negotiations thus suggested that the G77's future unity, or at least its ability to make substantive contributions to the future negotiating process, would be a limited one. Groups focused on narrower bases of common interest seemed to take greater precedence, and often found themselves at loggerheads in their

[314] Bodansky 1992: 7; Sands 1993: 272; Hampson 1995: 328
[315] Gupta and van der Grijp 1999; see Vogler and Stephan 2007 on EU 'leadership' in global environmental governance.
[316] Leggett 1999
[317] Oberthur 1991: 195

negotiating demands and objectives. After the Earth Summit, the picture that frequently emerges of a fractious South was not much different. Two prominent Indian environmentalists reflected that "G77 countries, meanwhile, began the [COP1] meeting as disunited as they had been during the INC meetings after Rio"[318]. Similarly, Michael Grubb commented that "Another feature [of the Kyoto negotiations] was the internal difficulties experienced by the developing countries in formulating and agreeing positive contributions"[319].

Nor were Northern, developed countries terribly united either, adding to the general perception of heterogeneous interests and political fluidity. The US had been firmly against the 'targets and timetables' approach favoured by most other parties[320]. The very prospect of coordination among the OECD countries during the INCs did not begin until the end of 1991 and was a deeply "frustrating" process, in the words of one senior diplomat[321]. Later, during the final INC meetings and into the COP and AGBM process, a new 'JUSCANZ' grouping (Japan, US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, i.e. the developed countries apart from the EU) had formed based on a common position pushing for a more extensive use of market-based 'flexible mechanisms' because of the difficulties they faced in reducing domestic emissions, as well as being cautious about further emission reduction commitments beyond the FCCC. This stood in contrast to the EU approach, which had supported more aggressive mitigation commitments and were cautious about the use of flexible mechanisms[322].

Against this broad trend, the question addressed in this chapter thus arises: given these

[318] Agarwal and Narain 1999: 45
[319] Grubb 1999: 113
[320] Hoffmann 2005: chapter 6; Nitze 1994
[321] Kjellen 1994: 157-160
[322] Aarts and Rudig 1995: 483; Cass 2006: 116

varied differences, why did the G77 remain the main negotiating group for developing countries; and why did other groups or subgroups of developing countries not form?

Positive *social* returns: Southern appropriate association

The previous chapter explained how and why the climate negotiations came to be organised through the General Assembly rather than through UNEP, with corresponding implications for the establishment of a G77 structure to the coalition politics of the negotiations as a largely unquestioned feature of the negotiations. What this section now shows is the continuing significance of this institutional choice upon the conduct of the INC negotiating process. This section addresses the G77 and AOSIS in turn, but the same causal process is at work here: because the institutional mandate for the INC rested with the General Assembly, the resulting norm of Southern appropriate association in the G77 was the starting, default coalition structure for developing countries as the taken-for-granted consequence of Southern identity.

After a critical juncture, what establishes path dependency are positive returns – processes that are self-reinforcing, that make change more costly and difficult over time, as discussed in chapter 2. While these are often thought of as rationalist or materialist causal processes, they can also be social ones. This point returns to the constructivist notion that identity is in constant *reproduction* by actors themselves. In how actors act and behave, it is these practices that themselves come to constitute their identity. Each act, so long as it is consistent with that norm, reinforces and deepens the strength of that norm as being socially appropriate. As Wendt put it, "identities and interests are not only learned in interaction, by *sustained* by them"[323].

[323] Wendt 1999: 331 (emphasis added)

What this means is that the act of meeting as the G77 at the beginning of the negotiations was an act reconstituting the G77 as the outcome of the appropriate association norm for Southern identity. Each time the G77 met, in effect, was an affirmation of this norm, and over time deepening the social identification of the G77 as being the appropriate model to organise developing country participation in the negotiations. When the first INC session met in February 1991, only 66 developing countries were represented – barely half the G77's membership – and yet were still organized within a G77 framework where the coalition's chairperson was the same country that held the G77 chair at the General Assembly[324]. Developing countries that only began to participate at later INC sessions (i.e. after INC1) would thus enter a negotiating environment where the existence of the G77 meant that the normative requirement for these new countries as a result of their larger Southern identity was to join in this structure – one in which they had no real political choice or space over. As a result of this default participation in the G77, however, their continued participation served to have a self-reinforcing effect – that once they began to participate in the G77, it would be socially difficult to *not* continue to join the G77 coordinating process.

The reiteration of this practice was also reinforced by a shift in the institutional composition of delegates towards diplomats based at the permanent missions to the UN in New York that served the work of the General Assembly, as opposed to lesser representation from capital-based environment ministries or meteorological offices (as had predominated during many of the prenegotiating meetings). After all, as what was now a formal General Assembly-led process, it was entirely natural that the diplomats that normally represented their countries in other similar processes (such as the parallel Earth Summit Preparatory

[324] United Nations General Assembly 1991 A/AC.237/INF.1; different chapters of the G77 at the different UN centres (New York, Geneva, Nairobi, Paris) all have different chairpersons. In New York in 1991, this was Ghana, and in 1992, Pakistan. See www.g77.org/doc/presiding.html.

Committee, but also in other non-environmental processes) did so for the new INC process. "Responsibilities shifted from specialised agencies to political organisations, from scientists to professional diplomats," as two Canadian delegates described it[325]. In doing so, thus, the G77 structure of organising, as their 'normal' method of working in New York would have also seemed an entirely natural method of proceeding in the new INC process[326]. Because coordinating a common G77 position among developing countries was regarded as being the appropriate thing to do, the positions that developed also reflected the political emphases that were commonplace in the General Assembly: a North-South distinction between developed and developing countries, and where an overarching emphasis was on development issues. One report from the NGO newsletter, ECO, at INC1 observed essentially this point:

> "Developing countries present at the meeting were mainly represented by diplomats from New York – where they act as the 'Group of 77'... – and both environment and industry observers were agreed that the 'UN agenda' brought to the negotiations by these diplomats had linked the climate discussions to wider north-south issues of economic equity and interest"[327].

This process thus provides a way of understanding how the positions of those developing countries, especially those that were only passively participating in the INC process, were constructed by organisational biases specific to the institutional context in favour of the G77. The point here, however, is that with General Assembly diplomats leading negotiations, any other alternative to the G77 would have been incomprehensible. What is essential here, then, is that the appropriateness of the North-South structure to the coalition

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[325] Dowdeswell and Kinley 1994

[326] A further consequence would also have been a bias in the domestic bureaucratic structure within developing countries – although this does not apply universally, a number of interviewees highlighted that the Foreign Affairs ministry took charge in the domestic policy-making process on climate change.

[327] ECO 1991: 1

politics encountered in the INC process is, at its heart, a social understanding that emerges through the political construction of the INC process itself as a North-South problem even if the substantive differences were more nuanced and fluid.

Appropriate association and AOSIS

The second way in which the link between the UNGA mandate and the INC is observed in the negotiating behaviour of developing countries is through how AOSIS functions and the shape it takes as a 'new' coalition without a prior social identity to draw upon. Most accounts of AOSIS' establishment and its activity in the initial negotiations have highlighted the entrepreneurship and activism underpinning its establishment in countries meeting in defence of common goals, as the previous chapter highlighted[328]. But various organisational features of how AOSIS functioned as a coalition during the INCs have not previously been discussed elsewhere in the literature. The larger social logic traced earlier in this section – of G77 participation socially self-reinforcing Southern identity – applies equally to AOSIS, but the UNGA mandate also had some coalition-specific consequences for AOSIS.

The attention here to the particular organisational basis of AOSIS is important, because it demonstrates a striking consistency with the points made above about how the G77 proceeds. AOSIS was organised as a coalition where representation was explicitly at the Permanent Representative (PR) level – that is, the heads of countries' UN permanent missions in New York, which was a deliberate choice[329]. Having its chief deliberations at the PR level allowed a closer and more frequent level of coordination and dialogue than might have been otherwise possible had its chief representatives been capital-based, and

[328] Davis 1996; Shibuya 1996
[329] Interview with AOSIS INC negotiator

contributed to AOSIS' ability to act as a coherent negotiating group from the very beginning of the negotiating process. Politically, it also encouraged greater influence, as it brought together a sizeable number of the UN membership – which, in General Assembly terms, was significant for election and voting purposes and meant that this new grouping could not be ignored simply as a collection of small states. For both these reasons, this organisational choice may be viewed as an efficient one that provided greater benefits than alternative methods of institutionalising the coalition[330]. This organisational feature, however, cannot be separated from the specific institutional context that AOSIS was established for – a General Assembly-led process. Configuring AOSIS as a PR-led coalition was a logical consequence of the INC's structure as a UNGA-mandated process where many PRs from New York missions led their INC delegations, as would be the norm for any General Assembly-mandated process.

The implications of this organisational set-up are also significant for the social limits it places on AOSIS' behaviour over the course of the subsequent negotiations. Firstly, for reasons similar to those articulated above with regards to the INC delegates being heavily drawn from foreign ministries, if not their New York missions specifically, having the heads of AOSIS delegations also be at the PR level meant that they were also simultaneously committed to the larger pattern of the G77 as their 'normal' method of working within General Assembly processes. Within this institutional setting, the norm of Southern appropriate association would be the default method of organising developing countries. The influence of this norm is also instructive in the choice of Vanuatu as the AOSIS chairperson: Vanuatu held at the time a geopolitical position as a country fully active and committed to G77 association[331], and thus its chairmanship of AOSIS was judged to be

[330] Williams 1991 quotes van Lierop on the functional benefits of AOSIS' coordination, such as joint scientific and legal support for the delegations.

[331] Robertson 1988; Vanuatu was the only member of the Non-Aligned Movement in the South Pacific region

helpful in to assuaging suspicions by other G77 countries about AOSIS' intentions vis-a-vis other Southern objectives and goals[332]. This portrayal of the role of the AOSIS chairman is consistent with the larger institutional theme traced here that places limits to AOSIS' activism and entrepreneurship: because not all of the AOSIS membership at that time were UN members yet[333], and thereby they were not participants in the G77, their role within AOSIS was viewed cautiously by other developing countries[334]. The choice of van Lierop's chairmanship was therefore an affirmation of how AOSIS would work – an autonomous coalition, but also working within and committed to the G77, and influencing non-G77 island states not to stridently criticise other developing countries[335].

This section has presented a analysis that traces how the INC's institutional link to the General Assembly shaped key features of how developing countries participated in the INC process, for both the G77 as a whole, and for AOSIS as well. The leadership of developing country delegations by PRs meant that a North-South interpretation of negotiations was the most likely one – and it doing so, providing a buttress for sustaining G77 coordination despite differences. This is as true for the G77 as it is for AOSIS – that the institutional backgrounds of delegates predisposed them to a G77 method of working, such that despite the heterogeneity of interests present, the G77 was the socially appropriate coalition within which to organise their participation.

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and through the 1980s was viewed warily by regional powers Australia and New Zealand for its openness to Communist countries such as Libya and Vietnam, as well as its vehement anti-colonial rhetoric. See van Lierop 1992 for an example of his general foreign policy outlook and Shibuya 1996 for a discussion of the domestic background in Vanuatu for van Lierop's entrepreneurship.

[332] Interview with AOSIS INC negotiator; but van Lierop had also been involved in helping to organise a pre-INC briefing for AOSIS members to prepare for the INC process, and so was also a prominent figure already, see Taplin 1994: 275-276.

[333] As noted in the previous chapter, countries that were not full UN members but that were members of UN specialised agencies could participate in the INC process. At the beginning of the INC process in February 1991, the following countries were not full UN members: the Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands, Kiribati, Nauru, Tonga, Tuvalu.

[334] Interview with AOSIS INC negotiator

[335] Interview with AOSIS INC negotiator

As will be more extensively demonstrated in the next chapter, however, this social context that enabled the formation of a new coalition also constrained later possible courses of action. But attempting to realize their negotiating goals within this same General Assembly context, however, was limited by the social pressures of simultaneously conforming to the G77, which most AOSIS members were also part of. Thus the link between the INC and the General Assembly, which made the G77 possible, and which also offered small island states a platform in the negotiations, also constrained their independence because of the negotiating unity norm associated with G77 membership. The Alliance's negotiating goals were therefore expressed in terms of lobbying and negotiating within the G77 itself, facing mediation and compromise not just with industrialised countries, but with other developing countries[336]. The social context in which AOSIS was formed, therefore, constrained how loudly it would be able to challenge some positions contrary to their own interests; challenging G77 unity in the INC would jeopardize cooperation elsewhere in General Assembly contexts and risk diplomatic isolation[337].

Seamless institutional transitions

Finally, the self-reproducing effect of this norm of appropriate association can be illustrated through examining the institutional trajectory of how the negotiations were organised during his period. Two institutional features that underpin this continuing norm salience are important to note here, which illustrate the path dependent consequences of initial institutional choices for subsequent coalition possibilities.

The first lies in the transition between the pre- and post-Earth Summit INC processes. At the close of pre-Earth Summit INC negotiations, discussions turned to the process by which

[336] Ashe, van Lierop and Cherian 1999; Taplin 1994
[337] Interviews with AOSIS delegates to the INCs

negotiations would continue during the period of ratifications – i.e. the period between the Convention being signed and reaching the necessary number of ratifications for it to come into force. Countries had been generally agreed on the need for a 'fast start' to implementation and thus of the need to continue discussions in the years before the first COP. This debate on 'interim arrangements', however, became what Hampson and Hart describe as a "surprisingly controversial" debate[338]. Developed countries wanted to hold this interim process going outside the UN General Assembly, and for convention signatories to have a privileged place in these proceedings. Developing countries resisted both these points, and gained a compromise to instead extend the INC structure beyond 1992 until the first COP, open to all INC partipants and not just those had signed the Convention[339]. Cass observed that

> "Traditionally, intergovernmental negotiating committees have been dissolved after the treaty is signed. The new treaty typically establishes subsidiary bodies, which become active after the initial conference of parties (COP). The climate negotiations represented the first time that the INC continued to meet after the treaty was signed"[340].

For the purposes of this argument, this renewed mandate for the INC after the Earth Summit is important to note because of the institutional continuity that is achieved – and thus guaranteeing a continuity in the coalition politics after the Earth Summit. A senior G77 negotiator argued how this continuity in the INC was important in order to enable continuing universal participation, which as the previous chapter highlighted, was crucial factor in underpinning the G77 coalition structure[341]. Thus, after Rio, the institutional

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[338] Hampson and Hart 1995: 332
[339] UN 1994 (A/AC.237/18(PartII)/Add.1): 28 (Resolution INC/1992/1)
[340] Cass 2006: 115
[341] Hyder 1994: 203

context that sustained the norm of Southern appropriate action was still intact, and thus with it, the social appropriateness of the G77.

The second institutional transition was from the INC to the COP process. With the hosting of the first COP in 1995 after the FCCC's entry into force, the climate negotiating process was no longer organised through UN General Assembly but became a stand-alone process (belying the 'United Nations' in the UNFCCC name, which was not an automatic feature[342]) with the COP as the supreme decision-making body governing the Convention's implementation. Politically, however, there was an indistinguishable transition in negotiating dynamics from one to the other even as the legal basis moved from a UN General Assembly-mandated INC to an autonomous COP-led process. Between the final INC and the COP1, the G77 continued to meet to coordinate positions seamlessly – there was no question about the G77 continuing to be the appropriate coalition form within which to organise developing country participation in the negotiating process, even though the negotiating process was no longer responding to a UN General Assembly mandate.

At first glance, both these institutional transitions may seem unremarkable and simply legal minutiae. Politically, there was no change in the dynamics of the negotiating process. In the context of the argument presented in the previous chapter, however, they take on greater importance – and that no change resulted in negotiating dynamics is itself noteworthy. The

[342] As former UNFCCC Executive Secretary Michael Zammit Cutajar (who was also head of the INC Secretariat) recalled (Weiss 2000: 50), explaining the 'UN' origins of the 'UNFCCC' title: "The [INC] negotiation was conducted under the auspices of the General Assembly. The result is a treaty which is ratified and is governed by the Conference of the Parties. The Conference of the Parties is a sovereign body; it is not subsidiary to the General Assembly. Consequently, the legal opinion from the legal office is that this is not a UN body, it's a treaty body; it's independent. Most treaty bodies, in fact, are constructed in that way. Some are, like the human rights treaties or the ECE (Economic Commission for Europe) treaties, run by departments of the UN. I got the UN into the title because I felt it was very important that this key subject, which was launched onto the international stage by the UN, should remain associated with the UN, and it still is. That's a success in terms of the label."A noteworthy contrast is that the Convention on Biological Diversity, also agreed and opened for signature at the 1992 Earth Summit, is not prefixed by 'UN' – it is simply the CBD. See Desai 2010 on the legal basis of the treaty, secretariat, and the linkage between the UNFCCC and the UN itself.

argument set out in the previous chapter highlighted the importance of the shift to the General Assembly for the construction of developing country coalitions. Now, however, the ending of this authority had no discernible effect on the behaviour of these coalitions. The identities and norms introduced as a result of the previous institutional choice were simply continued and reproduced even as that original mandate no longer applied. The critical juncture closed by Resolution 45/212 set in place a particular configuration of political dynamics which now continued down this path effortlessly.

Ambition and commitments: Southern disunity

This emergence of new coalitions in both South-South and North-South terms was unsurprising to observers and participants, because they appeared as symptoms of the real and much deeper disagreements among developing countries about the key issue of the negotiations in the commitments and obligations of parties that would be set out in the Framework Convention and the Kyoto Protocol: who would bear what burdens with regards to the central task of reducing greenhouse gas emissions? This conflict was evident throughout, coming to a head at both INC4 in December 1991, and COP1 in 1995, which this chapter will discuss in turn.

The INC

The INC had established Working Group I at its first meeting to address the nature of commitments that countries would have under the proposed Framework Convention, and after dealing with procedural issues at INC1, began to substantively debate these from INC2 onwards. The emerging notion of 'common but differentiated responsibilities' (CBDR) provided the main source of contested interpretations, for while developing countries were united on the insistence that industrialised countries take on stringent

emission-reduction commitments, disunity emerged over what differentiation meant in terms of commitments for developing countries. For India and China, the position adopted was that developing countries should not have to undertake *any* commitments. India's position, in particular, emphasized the historical nature of responsibilities as an indicator of the burden to be borne by developed countries, as well as advocating a per capita approach to allocating "atmospheric space"[343]. By contrast, AOSIS, and some Latin American countries, were more willing to consider the prospect of voluntary commitments[344]. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait sought only loose commitments for *all* countries, and the absence of targets and timetables for emissions reductions, including industrialised ones. Indeed, there was opposition from AOSIS and others open to the possibility of voluntary commitments, to the very attempt of developing a common G77 position on commitments at INC2 because it was thought that this would only be a weak one[345].

It is important to note, for the purposes of interpreting the longer history of the climate negotiations, that this has remained the central issue of division among developing countries throughout the entire history of the negotiations. For all parties to the Convention accept and repeatedly emphasize the "common but differentiated responsibility" principle that underpins the Convention, but the basis on which such differentiation takes place was, from the very beginning of the INC debates, fiercely contested. For India and China in particular, an emphasis on the historical responsibility of industrialised countries is what leads to this differentiation and justifies their attitude and positions on the subject of commitments, such that on occasion they found themselves "in the minority" among G77 counterparts willing to be more flexible on emphasising the 'historical' element of

[343] Hampson and Hart 1995: 326; Dasgupta 1994: 133
[344] Agrawal et al 1999: 36-37
[345] Agrawal et al 1999: 33

responsibilities[346] . From developed countries and especially the United States, on the other hand, there has been no acceptance of the 'historical' element of this formulation, interpreting differentiation instead in terms of different capabilities to respond to climate change. In between remain some developed countries and developing countries, such as AOSIS and the European Community members, for whom the ambiguity of the CBDR principle is precisely a compromise between these two extremes. Nonetheless, agreement on this principle in the Convention did removed the basic contention over interpretations of differentiation, as later chapters will continue to demonstrate. What needs to be noted here is simply that there has *always* been this disagreement among developing countries, let alone on North-South lines, about the terms in which the CBDR principle is interpreted[347].

These early differences on commitments came to a dramatic head at INC4 in December 1991, when the G77 did attempt to reach a collective position on commitments – and failed, resulting in separate draft proposals on commitments from AOSIS, and from the 43-member group of countries referred to earlier (the 'Kuala Lumpur group'), which included India and China (see Table 6)[348]. The key difference between the two drafts reflects this basic disagreement about commitments: whether developing countries should 'take' (in the AOSIS draft), or 'consider taking' (in the 43-member group draft) measures to address climate change; whether all countries should 'implement' and 'submit' national action plans to reduce the impact of human activities on the climate; and whether all countries should also 'preserve, protect and enhance' sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases[349]. The AOSIS draft also set out a target for developed country emission reductions (to be stabilised by 1995 at 1990 levels), whereas the 43-member group simply set out a placeholder text

[346] Hampson and Hart 1995: 337
[347] Matsui 2002; Rajamani 2006
[348] United Nations General Assembly 1991b; United Nations General Assembly 1991c
[349] Bodansky 1992: 9

reading “We are waiting an agreed pronouncement from the developed countries on how they plan to address greenhouse gases in climate change before we can formulate a response”[350].

An important feature of this 43-member group was that it did not include Saudi Arabia or Kuwait, the chief protagonists of the oil-exporting countries that had sought as weak an agreement was possible. Their preference for an even more minimal set of proposals meant that this 43-member submission, which had been essentially the G77 draft when attempts at coordination broke down, resulted in their diplomatic isolation. INC4 concluded without resolving the G77's inability to agree on commitments, and the separate proposals, together with submissions made by industrialised countries, were assigned to the INC chairpersons to merge into a single common negotiating text, which was presented at INC5 in February 1992. The outcome of OPEC resistance, however, meant that, as Brazilian minister Jose Goldemberg put it, there was an increase in the “rhetorical noise” of the G77, returning to general principles rather than specific revisions of the negotiating text[351], given the disagreement among G77 members on commitments in the Convention[352].

AOSIS	**43-member 'Kuala Lumpur Group'**	
Belize	Algeria	Madagascar
Cook Islands	Bangladesh	Malawi
Fiji	Benin	Malaysia
Grenada	Bhutan	Mali
Jamaica	Brazil	Mexico
Kiribati	Cameroon	Morocco
Maldives	Central African Republic	Mozambique
Marshall Islands	Chad	Namibia
Micronesia	Chile	Niger
Nauru	China	Nigeria
Papua New Guinea	Colombia	Pakistan
Saint Lucia	Congo	Peru
Samoa	Cuba	Philippines

[350] United Nations General Assembly 1991b; United Nations General Assembly 1991c; see also Dasgupta 1994: 138
[351] Goldemberg 1994
[352] Hampson and Hart 1995: 326

Sao Tome and Principe	Dominican Republic	Sierra Leone
Solomon Islands	Gambia	Sudan
Singapore	Ghana	United Republic of Tanzania
Tonga	Guinea	Thailand
Trinidad and Tobago	Guinea Bissau	Tunisia
Tuvalu	India	Uganda
Vanuatu	Indonesia	Vietnam
	Kenya	Zimbabwe
	Lesotho	

Table 6: Developing country submissions on commitments, INC4

In what terms should this episode – a failure of G77 coordination, and breakdown into separate submissions – be regarded? An account of INC4 by the Pakistani head of delegation, Tariq Osman Hyder, minimizes the failure to reach a common G77 position, insisting that:

> "Many other countries would have signed this proposal if there had been more time to discuss it. Others could have gone along with a G-77 consensus, but needed instructions from their capitals before signing a document which had not yet gained the final drafting approval of all the countries...To a large extent, the process was more important than the product it produced. The developing countries had arrived at a common approach, even if time was lacking for a common formulation. This achievement puts them in a better position during the next round of negotiations"[353].

The evolving context of the negotiations, with developed countries struggling to agree over the scope of their own commitments, meant that the negotiating agenda was different when INC5 resumed two months later to engage in final negotiating text. North-North diplomacy outside of the INC process had begun to address these intra-Northern differences, with developing countries largely excluded from these informal processes[354]. But if the G77 appeared to have sustained no lasting damage as a result of its failure to coordinate on this central issue at INC4, this has to be understood as a result of the social pressures of being

[353] Hyder 1992: 332
[354] Kjellen 1994: 159

institutionally linked to the larger G77 entity in the General Assembly. The process of ensuring that this moment of negotiating fragmentation did not repeat itself at INC5 follows the mechanism charted in the first section of this chapter: in a context where delegation leadership was largely the preserve of General Assembly-based diplomats, the social expectation in this context would have been that they would continue to meet as a G77. For these diplomats, the continuing linkage to the General Assembly meant that attempting to compartmentalise their work in the GA (or indeed the other Earth Summit negotiating processes that were proceeding in parallel) from their involvement in the INC would not have been possible. This explanation for why the failure to coordinate a common position did not continue beyond INC4 certainly leaves room for self-interested considerations: for the oil-exporting countries, a continuing isolation from the G77 would have been politically disastrous for their ability to meet their goals. Similarly, for AOSIS, they may have judged that pressing more vociferously independently would have lacked the bargaining weight of the G77. Over and above this, however, the expectation that developing countries would continue to meet as the G77 is one that is profoundly social, and a consequence of the particular 'Southern' identity resonant in the General Assembly context. In other words, social norms favouring Southern unity that were institutionally sustained; it is because of the specific institutional configuration of the INC process, triggering particular normative expectations, that this moment of Southern fragmentation did not last.

COP1: the adequacy of commitments

One of the key subjects addressed during the resumed INC sessions from 1992 to 1995, and only resolved at COP1, was on whether further commitments beyond those elaborated in the Framework Convention needed to be agreed upon. The Framework Convention had only set out qualitative, rather than quantitative targets, but had provided for a review of the

'adequacy of commitments' at the first COP. When discussions on this subject began at INC9, the options facing countries were to recognise the commitments specified in the FCCC as being 'adequate' or 'inadequate': a conclusion that the commitments were adequate would have been that no further commitments needed to be specified, and vice versa, a conclusion that the commitments were inadequate would accordingly justify the need to negotiate new commitments[355].

As before, the political divisions on this issue are striking in how they cross North-South lines similar to the pre-Earth Summit period discussed above. The US, Russia, JUSCANZ and oil-exporting countries all opposed negotiations on further commitments, arguing that the FCCC obligations were sufficient[356]. In this, they were also vigorously joined by China[357]. Meanwhile, many European countries had been happy to develop new quantified commitments, although they were slow in coming up with specific figures and faced considerable difficulty in coordinating a common EU view[358]. The AOSIS countries had been strongly articulating the need for new commitments (as well as continuing to urge action on adaptation): ahead of INC11, attempting to raise the political momentum towards agreeing new targets, AOSIS had submitted a draft protocol for adoption at COP1, setting out quantified targets for Annex I countries to reduce emissions by 20% below 1990 levels by 2005 – a move which then was hurriedly followed by a German 'elements of a protocol' paper[359]. Meanwhile, many other developing countries were ambivalent about commencing a discussion on new commitments – while keen to point out that industrialised countries were not meeting their commitments, in both mitigation and financial terms, there was a general reluctance to begin a discussion on new commitments due to a fear that such a

[355] UN 1993 (A/AC.237/47); INC7 had prioritised other elements for discussion at INC8, and so discussion of this issue did not commence before then.
[356] Oberthur and Ott 1995: 145
[357] Chayes and Kim 1998
[358] Cass 2006: 111-115
[359] UN 1994a (A/AC.237/L.23); UN 1994b (A/AC.237/L.23/Add.1)

discussion would lead to mitigation commitments being extended to developing countries, especially with the German elements paper suggesting the need to work towards commitments "to limit the rise in emissions in the case of certain more advanced developing countries"[360].

As a result, arguing over the adequacy of commitments continued without resolution through the final INC meetings until COP1 itself, and indeed, it was unclear at the outset that the conference would be able to resolve the issue at all. The main G77 view had been to emphasize the need to implement existing commitments[361]. Crucially, however, the AOSIS proposal had provided a possible basis for negotiation, and within the G77, countries deliberated throughout the first week of the COP on whether and how to support it, with oil-exporting countries continuing to insist that no new commitments would be necessary. This continuing deadlock on reaching a group consensus, however, led to what remains the best-known instance of the G77 fracturing. Midway through COP1, the G77 suspended its efforts at coordinating a position on this issue, and an Indian revision of the main ideas of the AOSIS protocol, which came to be known as the 'green paper' was distributed to other 'like-minded' developing countries[362] – and quickly gained support among the non-oil-exporting G77 membership. The Indian proposal revised the AOSIS protocol in two key ways: in accepting that current FCCC commitments were not 'adequate', it agreed that a process should be established to agree new commitments (rather than adopting new commitments, as per the AOSIS protocol, but a shift away from a previous anti-protocol position); it clearly emphasized that this process was a review of the commitments of developed, not developing countries, and that this new process "will not

[360] UN 1994b (A/AC.237/L.23/Add.1: 3)
[361] Jaura 1995 (March 30)
[362] ENB 1995: 4

introduce any obligations whatsoever for developing country parties"[363].

Developing countries sponsoring the 'green group' submission at COP1		
Antigua and Barbuda	Dominica	Peru
Argentina	Egypt	Philippines
Bahamas	Fiji	Samoa
Barbados	India	Solomon Islands
Bhutan	Kiribati	South Africa
Bolivia	Korea (Republic of)	Sri Lanka
Botswana	Malawi	Tanzania
Brazil	Malaysia	Thailand
Chile	Mali	Trinidad & Tobago
China	Marshall Islands	Tunisia
Colombia	Mauritius	Tuvalu
Cook Islands	Micronesia	Uganda
Costa Rica	Nauru	Zambia
Cuba	Papua New Guinea	Zimbabwe

Table 7: Developing countries sponsoring the 'green group' submission at COP1

This 'green group' of 42 developing countries that tabled this submission to the main discussions, while spearheaded by India, also included China and Brazil, as well as the Philippines, the G77 chairperson that year, and also included the AOSIS countries who saw this proposal as the best available option other than their own protocol[364]. The split of the oil-exporting countries with the rest of the G77 was apparent to all, and further small-group negotiations on this issue with developed countries based on the green paper proceeded with separate representatives from the oil-exporting and this new like-minded green group of developing countries, rather than speaking through a G77 spokesperson as would normally be the case[365]. These final small-group negotiations proceeded until the very last hours of the conference, and agreement between the green group and developed countries provided the basis for the Berlin Mandate decision agreeing a process to negotiate a further agreement as a consequence of the judgement that current commitments were indeed 'inadequate'. Thus, the Berlin Mandate specified the main parameters for the negotiating

[363] Mwandosya 1999: 19-20; Arts and Rundig 1995: 485; the Indian head of delegation put it in Sreenivasan 2008: 110: "the bottom line [was]...no commitments for developing countries", a point that Cutajar 2004 recognised as being absolute.

[364] UNFCCC 1995 (FCCC/CP/1995/CRP.1)

[365] Abdullah 1995a (April 3); ENB 1995: 4

process that was to follow in the AGBM process: setting 'quantified limitation and reduction objectives' (QELROs) for developed country parties, and, in this process, to "Not introduce any new commitments for Parties not included in Annex I...", all of which were to be guided by the Convention principles, especially Article 3 and its emphasis on the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities[366]. Nonetheless, even after the final adoption by the plenary of this decision, various oil-exporting countries, while not blocking the adoption of the Mandate, also registered their reservations, arguing that consideration had not been given to their needs, demonstrating that their views had not substantially changed[367].

Understanding the split of the G77 at COP1 into a like-minded 'green group' and the oil-exporting countries draws attention to the entrepreneurial role played by India, in shifting from the position that it had articulated up until then towards one that was critical to achieving the outcome of the Berlin Mandate. Building the 'green group' had left developed countries "bamboozled; no one expected developing states, including heavyweights such as China, India and Brazil, to make such a U-turn"[368]. Two aspects of this process of coalition construction are worth reflecting on here. The first is that countries had to *actively* agree to be included in the formal green group submission, which listed the name of each country supporting the submission. Juxtaposed against the normal method of coalition working, where the agreement of countries to the group position is a passive one, the green group submission required countries to actively articulate a position either in support or not. Secondly, the swiftness with which the green group coalesced – the initial 42 developing countries were rapidly joined by other developing countries – points to the degree to which

366 Decision 1/CP.1
367 FCCC/CP/1995/7: para.60 (these were Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela)
368 Simonian 1995; Johnston 1998: 576 suggests that China's willingness to change its position, however, was to avoid isolation and in being relatively low-key for the rest of COP1 despite having been a vocal opponent of the AOSIS protocol prior.

many developing countries outside of the oil-exporting or AOSIS camps were persuadable when faced with a shift in position from one the larger developing countries. Some began to speak thereafter of the aims of the AOSIS protocol in sympathetic terms[369],but the insight here lies in the influence of change among a small group of countries for the positions developed in the larger coalition.

A brief counterfactual is worth considering here to: in the absence of direct coalition-building entrepreneurship, it seems plausible to suggest that the smaller and middle-sized G77 members would have continued with the same position previously adopted, unwilling to directly split from the oil-exporting members of the G77. If the positions of the G77 are frequently characterised as being 'lowest common denominator' ones[370], the green group developments at COP1 represent a moment in moving beyond such a position – which would have been to maintain a no-protocol consensus – but which required considerable first-mover effort, in this case by India, to build a new consensus and with it, the green group. Without such effort being made, however, the default institutional inertia persists by reverting to the 'safe' option of previously-agreed group positions, which constitute the default approach of the G77. Why did this not persist? The next section demonstrates the continuing hold of the appropriate association norm in the 1995-1997 negotiations.

Negotiating Kyoto: QELROs and the compensation mechanism

Even while the oil-exporting states had been forced into conceding the negotiation of a new agreement in the Berlin Mandate, much of the same political differences continued over the next two years in the AGBM meetings and the final conference and agreement at Kyoto. Again, it is worth noting that while the hardest bargaining was taking place among

[369] Abdullah 1995b (April 9, New Straits Times)
[370] Interviews

developed countries (such as on the timescale for commitments, the gases to be included in commitments, possible differentiation of commitments among Annex I countries, and the question of counting of sinks), the G77 countries also faced considerable difficulties in reaching their own group positions to put forward.

The initial AGBM sessions proceeded slowly over 1995 and 1996, with differences emerging over the nature of the agreement to be reached, as well as its components, while negotiations largely progressed in terms of sharing information and views. Only towards the end of 1996, after AGBM5, was a compilation text of proposals being prepared by AGBM chair Raúl Estrada-Oyuela, which was considered in section-by-section detail at AGBM6. Thereafter, a single 'consolidated negotiating text' was produced and revised at AGBM7, 8 and Kyoto itself. The trigger for moving into a detailed phase of negotiations was the larger political development during this period in a shift in the US position at COP2, with its chief negotiator, Timothy Wirth, making a statement that the US was indeed committed to taking on a legally binding emissions mitigation target. While this was accompanied by conditions on the need for 'flexibility' through emissions trading and the 'meaningful participation' of developing countries, it broke a deadlock on the character of commitments that would be included in the protocol[371]. The effect of this shift by the US, however, was to leave the oil-exporting developing countries as the remaining holdouts against taking further effective action. This was made clear in the progress of negotiations at COP2: while oil-exporting countries had successfully blocked agreement on conclusions at the subsidiary bodies meeting earlier in 1996 on whether the findings in the new IPCC Second Assessment Report resulted in a need for action[372], the US was an active participant in the drafting of the ministerial Geneva Declaration at COP2 that endorsed the IPCC report

[371] Newell and Paterson 1996: 730
[372] See Oberthur 1996a: 158

over the protestations of oil-exporting countries and made it clear that parties were willing to act in the absence of consensus, despite not having fully agreed rules of procedure[373]. Thus after COP2, Oberthur noted "the increasing isolation of OPEC members..."[374]...and that the "implicit coalition existing before between OPEC and JUSCANZ broke apart with the US and the other laggards from the industrialised countries joining the majority of the OECD in wholeheartedly supporting the IPCC SAR."[375]

After COP2, as firm numbers on quantified emission limitation and reduction targets (QELROs) began to be developed, developing countries in turn were faced with the challenge of coming to their own position of what these should be because of the G77's organisational objective to agree a common position on all areas of negotiation[376]. AOSIS in their draft protocol had stipulated a 20% reduction goal below 1990 levels by 2005, while oil-exporting countries continued to insist that no further action was needed, especially in view of the uncertainty over the implications of emission reduction measures by developed countries for the economies of developing countries. Reconciling these differences into a common G77 was a politically charged process, and the recollections of Tanzania (the G77 chair in 1997) are worth quoting at length:

> "Tanzania applied intense pressure and persuasion to get the AOSIS and petroleum-exporting countries take a middle ground for the sake of the unity of the group. At one stage in the process, some oil-exporting developing countries were accused of blocking the negotiations process and the unity of the Group of 77 and China. They were informed that there was no way Tanzania would accept a split in the Group, and if that happened, an accusing finger would be pointed at them. They were informed

[373] Bodansky 2001: 35
[374] Oberthur 1996a: 160
[375] Oberthur 1996b: 197
[376] Mwandosya 1999: 43

> further that the Chair of the Group of 77 was not going to be held hostage to their demand. This exchange occurred around noon as AGBM6 was winding its business on 7 March 1997. Between 1pm and 3pm the Ambassador of Tanzania to Germany His Excellency Darja was bombarded with telephone calls from nearly all petroleum-exporting countries' diplomatic missions in Bonn, accusing Tanzania's delegation of being biased against them and of having been "bought" by the green peace [sic]!"[377]

Nonetheless, a G77 position began to be formed at AGBM6 in an effective trade-off between these two divergent camps within the G77: the oil-exporting countries would lift their resistance to the G77 taking a position on QELROs, although one without specific numbers, while the small island states agreed on a principle of compensation for those impacted by response measures, while broadening it to include compensation for environmental damage itself[378]. Facing isolation after COP2, the oil-exporting countries undertook a shift in strategy – rather than questioning the need for action, or emphasizing the uncertainties in both science and policy, the oil-exporting countries had begun to accept that further commitments by Annex I countries would be possible. This, however, was conditional on taking into account the circumstances of economies dependent on fossil fuel exports by developing a 'compensation mechanism' to offset the negative consequences of the measures taken by developed countries to respond to climate change (a topic summed up as 'response measures')[379]. At the beginning of 1997, therefore, a group of oil-exporting countries submitted a proposal for the development of a mechanism to compensate "economic and social losses arising from the implementation" of the protocol[380].

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377 Mwandosya 1999: 43
378 Mwandosya 1999: 44
379 Ehrmann and Oberthur 1996: 194
380 UNFCCC 1997 (FCCC/AGBM.1997/Misc.1/Add.1) 30-35; UNFCCC 1997 (FCCC/AGBM/1997/3/Add.1) para. 152

The G77 position on QELROs thus began to develop in tandem with one supporting the principle of a compensation mechanism: all the G77 was able to agree upon was that a compensation mechanism should be established, and included a placeholder text option for the specifics of this mechanism, simply reading: "(to be developed later)"[381]. This ostensibly provided the space for the specifics of a compensation mechanism to be submitted in the future – but without committing the group, at the time, to any of these possible specifics. Mark Mwandosya, the G77 chairperson from Tanzania, explained this as reflecting the "difficulty of reaching agreement details on any possible compensation mechanism...a proposal from the Chair urging for unity in the group in order to go forward and so that the Group could formally table a proposal to be included in the negotiating text"[382].

At AGBM7, however, the G77 was still unable to move on to a discussion of firm numbers, and "a few countries...threatened to break the ranks and go it alone" in advancing their own QELRO numbers[383]. The tensions that this difficulty was causing was apparent to observers, with the suggestion of another COP1-style green group developing for a G77 proposal on QELROs[384], which was indeed real, as Mwandosya himself recollected:

> "The matter [of a G77 position on QELROs] was raised again by the Philippines at AGBM7. The Philippines and a group of like-minded states were requested to give Tanzania more time to shape a consensus on the issue. It was therefore not surprising when at the pre-session consultations the possibility of a breakup of the Group of 77 and China was mooted. Again the Group was informed that Tanzania would work hard to get a group position on QELROs. The chairman of the Group of 77 told

[381] UNFCCC 1997 (FCCC/AGBM/1997/Misc.1/Add.2): 72-73
[382] Mwandosya 1999: 84
[383] Mwandosya 1999: 46
[384] Lanchbery 1997: 11

> colleagues attending the consultations that it was 'treasonable' to contemplate the split of the Group of 77 and China, while meeting in the Tanzania Embassy in Bonn, with Tanzania as the chairman of the Group of 77 and spokesperson for the Group of 77 and China!"[385]

In the G77 position that was indeed presented at AGBM8, the same delicate balance reached earlier was preserved: while introducing firm numbers for QELRO reductions (7.5% by 2005, 15% by 2010 and a 35% reduction by 2020), also associated these targets and timetables with the need to minimise adverse impacts on developing countries, and calling for a compensation fund to deal with impacts that did arise[386]. This enabled, as Michael Grubb put it, "OPEC to return fully to the G77 fold, and paved the way for a united G77 position to emerge in 1997 for the first time since its collapse in Berlin. The G77 grouped around support for deep emission cuts by the industrialised world, with action to compensate *all* those adversely affected – whether by climate change itself, or by actions to mitigate it. The negotiations witnessed the curious spectacle of OPEC and the small island states working for the same cause"[387].

Nonetheless, while the G77 strove to form a common position during the AGBM meetings, at Kyoto itself, finalizing the character and nature of the QELRO targets and timetables was a largely Annex I affair, with only incremental changes at the very end being up for wider discussion[388]. The vehement opposition of developed countries to the notion of a compensation mechanism meant that this proposal was removed from the table during Kyoto and replaced with a declaration reiterating the Convention principles that developed

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385 Mwandosya 2000: 98;
386 UNFCCC 1997 (FCCC/AGBM/1997/Misc.1/Add.6): 16-17
387 Grubb et al. 1999: 57
388 See Hattori 1999 for an account, from inside the Japanese government, on the process of how the specific QELRO figures were reached.

countries had to fulfil their mitigation commitments in a way to limit the adverse impacts on developing countries (Articles 3.5 and 4.8 of the Convention)[389]. Despite resistance by oil-exporting countries to the fund being removed from the negotiating text, Mwandosya characterised this as the "recognition that "it was prudent not to pursue the matter further", and that "in the spirit of maintaining the unity of the Group of 77 and China, petroleum-exporting countries within the Group of 77 and China accepted the situation"[390].

The G77 position that evolved over the final AGBM meetings and Kyoto was a logrolled position – the two wings of the G77 each getting their main aim incorporated into the group position, and having to compromise by accepting the others'. But the difficulty in coordinating this position that this section has highlighted raises the the analytical question as to why the COP1 like-minded 'green group' did not continue *beyond* COP1: why, despite signs of heading in that direction, did the same did not materialise and the compromise stuck of balancing numbers for Annex I QELROs and the compensation mechanism? In part, the larger consequences of the shift in the US position meant that the oil-exporting countries then had to show flexibility from COP2 onwards to avoid exclusion of the type they had experienced at COP1 lasting; the agreement by the rest of the G77 to the Berlin Mandate had signalled to the oil-exporters that persuading other developing countries to reverse their positions on whether a new agreement was needed was going to be unlikely.

The absence of the COP1 'green group' continuing, and a reversion to G77 unity in the AGBMs, highlights the continuing normative salience of appropriately associating within the G77. At COP2, India had a lower-key presence, "probably because of changes in the composition of the delegation and for internal political reasons in the context of the recent

[389] Decision 3/CP.3
[390] Mwandosya 1999: 87

change of government"[391]. But whatever the reason, what this illustrates is that the absence of entrepreneurship, the default pattern of alignment is not 'no coalition', but the G77. If India was not prepared or able to play a similarly entrepreneurial role in embarking on sustaining the like-minded group, it is telling that no country of comparable influence among developing countries was willing to step up to replace it in bearing the diplomatic costs of attempting to find the bases of shared interest for forming some coalition other than the G77. Instead, the reversion to the G77 ultimately indicates that even after a dramatic breakdown at COP1, the appropriate association norm of the G77 to the climate negotiating process persisted. A senior developed country negotiator suggested that this was due to "strong intervention by the G77 leadership in New York" to reunite the group after COP1, which would illustrate the continuing way in which the G77 structure of UN General Assembly politics shapes the political alignments of the climate negotiations[392]. But similarly, what Mwandosya's account of his year as the G77 chairman during the 1997 negotiations also illustrates is his overarching goal, as a chair neutral on the matters of substance under negotiation, of simply maintaining a united group despite the diversity of positions held by its members. For the chair at least, group unity is an end in itself and a split in the manner of COP1 would be "regrettable" – which serves as another form of institutionalised social pressure for countries to conform to this norm of unity by compromising their positions. The institutional inertia and path dependent character of the coalition structures within the UNFCCC process, for developing countries at least, is self-reproducing in this way: once inside a G77 as a method of coalition organisation, considerable social influence and pressure persists, embedded in this institutional context, to maintain the shape and membership of this coalition.

[391] Oberthur 1996: 198
[392] Metz 2012: 180

No 'evolution' or 'graduation' after Berlin

The final element of the mitigation debates during this period lay in continued attempts by developed countries, and the United States in particular, to expand the breadth of those taking on mitigation commitments from being just developed countries, to including developing countries too. The main objective of many developing countries apart from AOSIS in the final INCs and Berlin had been to avoid the introduction of new commitments for themselves[393], a goal that had been successfully met in the Berlin Mandate and its specification that the AGBM process would not introduce any new commitments for developing countries. But the US, in stating at COP2 that one of its conditions for taking on a mitigation target was for 'meaningful participation' by developing countries, raised this prospect anew onto the negotiating agenda.

The challenge to this element of the Berlin Mandate meant that the G77 position throughout the Kyoto negotiations was simply to prevent the expansion of commitments to developing countries (a concession that had been secured in Berlin), right up to the final hours of Kyoto. Thus,

> "...the most acrimonious negotiations took place over the one thing the Berlin Mandate was absolutely clear about: no new commitments for developing countries. On more than one occasion Chairman Estrada decisively ruled that proposals put forward by the US on 'graduation' and 'evolution' fell outside the terms of the Berlin Mandate. Although excluded from the formal AGBM agenda, the underlying political pressure for consideration of these matters, driven primarily by the US playing to its domestic fossil fuel lobby, created tension throughout the negotiations, in particular in relation to what was meant by the 'advancement of existing commitments' pursuant to the Berlin Mandate. This tension eventually surfaced in a battle of titanic proportions

[393] Sengupta 2012: 107

between the G-77 and China and the whole of the OECD when the latter attempted to force these issues on to the formal Kyoto agenda."[394]

What is important to note here is that there were various developing countries that were open to the possibility of taking on voluntary mitigation commitments. The AOSIS protocol had left the door open for developing countries to take on commitments without being included in Annex I, and this view continued unchanged during the AGBM process[395] as well as right up to the final Kyoto plenary. A Kenyan proposal had also provided for voluntary commitments by developing countries, and as the final negotiating texts developed an article on voluntary participation, Argentina also began to express its support for such a provision until the end[396]. Nonetheless, for the majority of developing countries, firm opposition to such a prospect remained, for various reasons – maintaining the terms of the Berlin Mandate, but also a fear that the very possibility of voluntary participation would be, in practice, made obligatory through conditionalities imposed for financial and technological assistance[397]. Thus, while the final negotiating text that was presented at the beginning of Kyoto included a draft article on voluntary commitment, the repeated objections from other developing countries to including such an article, right up until the final plenary, meant that the proposed Article 10 was declared to have no consensus for its inclusion and removed from the final text[398].

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394 Yamin 1998: 115

395 ENB 1997: 3; AOSIS' Chairperson at the time, Tuiloma Neroni Slade, later expressed as much directly (Slade 2003: 541): "...because developing countries are growing rapidly we believe there is need for the regime to evolve to include the more systematic and formal contributions of developing countries, at least the major and fast industrialising countries. In view of this principle....we think developing countries should be free to individually and voluntarily enter into new commitments in a way that respects their differing needs and capacities to do so."

396 Estrada-Oyuela 1998: 25 explained this position as being necessary for developing country participation in the Kyoto flexible mechanisms (JI and emissions trading)

397 Mwandosya 1999: 66

398 UNFCCC 2000: 102-105

Divisions: Flexibility mechanisms from joint implementation to the CDM

The final main area of contention over this period was the place of 'flexible mechanisms' in implementing the FCCC, which concerned ways in which Annex I countries could meet their emission-reduction commitments through international market-based mechanisms. By reducing emissions in other countries where the marginal costs of emission reductions were lower, the notion of "flexibility" was raised as a more cost-efficient way of reducing emissions than meeting their obligations wholly through domestic policies. While developing countries approached this subject warily, their hostility eased over this period in debate on two mechanisms: firstly, joint implementation (JI) up until COP1, and secondly, with what became the Clean Development Mechanism in the final Kyoto agreement[399].

Joint implementation (JI) and activities implemented jointly (AIJ)

The pre-COP1 discussions within the INC process had begun to consider "criteria for joint implementation" from INC8 onwards, as part of Working Group I discussions and as one of the subjects that the FCCC required a decision to be taken at COP1[400]. JI had been included as part of Annex I commitments specified in the FCCC, but were "mentioned but not defined" as they had not bee the subject of extensive debate prior to the Earth Summit[401]. The post-Earth Summit INC discussions thus sought to define and operationalise the basic elements of the concept, namely around what "joint" meant: who would participate and the role of crediting in such a scheme[402].

The North-South issue of contestation was about whether this mechanism could include

[399] The third flexible mechanism, emissions trading, was a process between Annex I countries to trade emission permits between countries that had failed to achieve their targets and those that had overachieved theirs. See Yamin 2005 for a general discussion on the FCCC and Kyoto's flexible mechanisms.

[400] FCCC Article 4.2(d)

[401] Gupta 1997: 116-117; Article 4.2(a) of the FCCC simply noted that Annex I countries could implement their policies "jointly with other Parties", and a major ambiguity was whether this constituted project-based activities, or a broader emissions trading system.

[402] Gupta 1997: 117; UN 1993 (A/AC.237/35)

developing countries: whether an Annex I country could make an emissions-reducing investment in a non-Annex I country, on the grounds that such global investments would be a cheaper way of reducing emissions than if JI was limited to Annex I countries and economies in transition. While developed countries, in particular the USA, had been pressing hard for the inclusion of developing countries[403], developing countries were wary, although the strength of opposition varied. Reasons for opposition included principled concerns on sovereignty over land ownership and usage; whether such projects would effectively be claiming the 'low-hanging fruit' of cheaper projects in developing countries and thereby forgoing the ability of developing countries to claim these for their own in the future; whether such a mechanism was a trapdoor towards inducing developing country participation in mitigation commitments (particularly as the US, who had been pushing hard for developing country mitigation, was also one of the strongest proponents of flexible mechanisms[404]); as well as more practical ones over whether such flexible mechanisms would enable industrialised countries to 'buy' their way towards meeting their obligations and avoiding domestic reductions; whether investment from JI projects would be an excuse to reduce ODA flows and financial contributions to the GEF; and technical concerns over carbon 'leakage'; the extent of donor control and priorities over such projects and constraints on development choices; and whether any net reduction would actually occur, especially in the context of forests and land use[405]. One AOSIS advisor commented that "Developing countries were mistrustful that trading would be used by these richer countries to buy their way out of taking domestic action while shifting the actual burden of pollution control to the South"[406].

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[403] But the EU was also an opponent of wide JI use, given its normative position that emissions reductions should come from domestic action, as Cass 2005 notes

[404] Not an unfounded suspicion, as Hoffmann 2005: 173 describes: "JI...was used by the United States and other states as a bridging device between Northern and Southern commitment positions...[they] have used JI as an incentive for bringing Southern states into broader commitments than held in the FCCC."

[405] Yamin 1994; Stuart and Moura-Costa 1998: 23-24; Mwandosya 1999: 35-37; Loske and Oberthur 1994

[406] Yamin 2005: 5

Reflecting these objections, at INC8 the G77 expressed a general hostility to JI's possible application to developing countries, insisting that JI should remain a mechanism applicable only between Annex I countries as a means of implementing their obligations to reduce emissions and not transfer responsibilities for reducing emissions to developing countries, a position also expressed by AOSIS[407]. As discussions continued at INC10, however, drawing on a proposal to agree on a 'pilot phase' of joint implementation rather than full-fledged criteria[408], a number of developing countries began to regard the prospect in more positive terms. Costa Rica in particular, as well as some other Latin American states, and some Southeast Asian countries, were increasingly open to this possibility, but Brazil as well as other influential G77 countries like China and India, remained critical of the concept, preventing discussion from commencing on the substance of a pilot phase[409]. At INC11 the G77 maintained a consensus position that a JI pilot phase should only be applicable to Annex I countries, resulting in continuing stalemate with industrialised countries[410], but "[a]t COP1 the ranks of the G77 and China were open again" over the question of developing country participation, with Brazil and "most" African countries in particular remaining opposed to developing country participation, but India sympathetic as long as there was no formal crediting[411].

The final compromise agreed to at COP1 involved a five-year pilot phase of 'activities implemented jointly' (AIJ), where developing countries agreed to their voluntary participation in JI projects, but where no crediting against Convention obligations by developed countries would be possible[412]. In view of this evolution of the G77 position

[407] A/AC.237/Misc.33: 16-17 and A/AC.237/Misc.33/Add.3
[408] A/AC.237/66
[409] Oberthur 1994: 301; Agarwal and Narain 1999: 44; Chayes and Kim 1998: 520-522.
[410] A/AC.237/91/Add.1: 20-21; ENB 1995a: 9
[411] Oberthur and Ott 1995: 147
[412] Decision 5/CP.1; the new 'AIJ' formulation was meant to distinguish acceptance of the pilot phase from

since the beginning of the post-Rio INCs, Gupta asked: "How is it then that a month later [after having a common position against JI at INC11] at Berlin, a decision was taken to allow JI...?"[413] Rowlands portrays this as part of the larger COP1 bargain with developing countries conceding on JI in exchange for the Berlin Mandate's commitment against new commitments for developing countries[414]. There was, as illustrated above however, a clear and growing constituency within the G77 comfortable with the idea of JI, especially if voluntary participation precluded an emissions crediting system, weakening the possibility of the group maintaining its common pre-COP1 position against JI[415]. JI had been a new policy idea with considerable different options for its operationalisation and design[416] and the earlier common group position arguably reflected a caution with moving too hastily, particularly given the interest of developed countries in rapidly advancing the concept. But what explains the willingness of some countries to be open to JI?

The relevant distinction appears to be between countries acting for material self-interested reasons upon recognising JI's possible benefits, and those who were "shaped by historical experiences" in the absence of concrete, country-specific information[417]. Costa Rica, a chief protagonist in the G77's shifting position, had already established a national JI office in 1994 and declared its intent to cooperate in JI projects with developed countries – a move considered unsurprising given the country's past experience with innovative environmental financing schemes[418]. For others, however, the prospective investment from JI perhaps represented "the only source of new environmental policy resources" in the absence of

acceptance of general JI criteria, as the main part of the discussions had been about;Yamin 2000

413 Gupta 1997: 125

414 Rowlands 1995b: 150; many developing countries considered agreement on flexible mechanisms to be a concession to developed countries, and thus one that they only made reluctantly.

415 ENB 1995: 10

416 Although ideas drew on similar mechanisms in other international regimes that participants looked back for design lessons and implications; see Yamin 2000; Torvanger et al. 1994

417 Gupta 1997: 126

418 Dutschke and Michaelowa 2000; Costa Rica's consistent support for JI was also later evident during the Kyoto negotiations, see UNFCCC 1997 (FCCC/AGBM/1997/Misc.1/Add.2)

significant direct financial transfers[419]. The point to note about this debate, however, is the extent to which differences were along lines rather different to those of mitigation negotiations; here, various Latin American countries had been the chief advocates of the use of JI, whereas AOSIS found itself alongside India and China in expressing caution at this new process.

The 'Kyoto surprise' and the Clean Development Mechanism

Despite this agreement on AIJ at COP1, Gupta argued that "there should be no illusion that the [COP1] consensus necessarily shows that there is a change of heart" among developing countries to the concept of joint implementation or the general place of flexible mechanisms[420]. Over the course of the AGBM process, and including the preparation of a consolidated negotiating text from AGBM6 onwards, the G77 continued to oppose having a clause on JI or on emissions trading, as proposed by the United States[421]. And yet the US statement at COP2, in addition to the points discussed above, had set out as a key goal to "seek market-based solutions that are flexible and cost-effective", a proposal that was clarified after COP2 to mean emissions trading and which ensured that the G77's efforts to remove the clauses were unfulfilled.

In June 1997, however, ahead of AGBM7, Brazil submitted a proposal for a 'Clean Development Fund' (CDF) as an enforcement tool to penalize Annex I countries that failed to meet their binding mitigation objectives that were being concurrently negotiated *and* encourage precautionary mitigation projects in developing countries[422]. Specifically, Brazil argued that:

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[419] Dutschke and Michaelowa 2000: 67; Chayes and Kim 1998 also suggest a financially-driven change of heart by China.
[420] Gupta 1997: 129
[421] Mwandosya 1999: 37-40; UNFCCC 1997 (FCCC/AGBM/1997/Misc.1/Add.8)
[422] FCCC/AGBM/1997/Misc.1/Add.3

> "the effective implementation of the protocol requires a feedback mechanism by which the departure of a Party from its commitment to maintain its emissions below a ceiling results in an obligation to compensate such departure by other means...the difference...of the departure from the objective of that Party, be used...for establishing, in the case of emissions above the ceiling, a compulsory contribution to a non-Annex I clean development fund...for the promotion of mitigation measures in non-Annex I parties"[423].

The CDF proposal accompanied an extensive proposal on calculating and distributing mitigation burdens for Annex I countries based on historic responsibilities[424], and these two elements were intended to work in tandem to provide both a quantitative basis for Annex I mitigation targets as well as a means of enforcing compliance with these targets[425]. When presented at G77 meetings at AGBM7, concern was raised that the CDF proposal would introduce issues of developing country mitigation or credited joint implementation that had been so contentious in the pre-COP1 negotiations. Some of these concerns may, however, have been assuaged by the prospect of further financial transfers from Annex I countries being generated through the fund[426], and the G77 adopted it as part of the G77 submission on QELROs agreed during AGBM8, enabling Brazil to proceed with negotiating this proposal on behalf of the G77[427]. When COP3 itself commenced, however, the separation of the compliance-related 'institutional' aspects of the protocol from financial aspects into

[423] FCCC/AGBM/1997/Misc.1/Add.3: 24

[424] See Friman and Linner 2008 on the fate of this element of the proposal.

[425] Cole 2012: 43-44 notes that the goal of Brazilian policymakers in preparing the proposal was to avoid the mitigation discussions losing sight of the historical emissions and liabilities of Annex I countries, and thus ensure that Kyoto Protocol's mitigation commitments remained an Annex I-only obligation and to strengthen the Protocol's compliance and enforcement measures for meeting these commitments.

[426] Cole 2012: 52-53 argues that the fund element of the Brazilian proposal to support developing country mitigation efforts was included specifically to strengthen developing country solidarity and build a G77 consensus around the proposal (although this was a secondary goal to that of avoiding mitigation commitments being introduced for non-Annex I countries).

[427] FCCC/AGBM/1997/Misc.1/Add.6: 16-17; Mwandosya 1999: 129-130; Brazilian and US negotiators had also met prior to COP3 to discuss the issue more intensively, paving the way for discussions at Kyoto itself.

different negotiating subgroups meant that the link between compliance issues and the fund faded away. The question of compliance thus turned into one of incentives, particularly with developed countries being unwilling to countenance strong compliance procedures, and in the negotiating group dealing with financial issues, discussing the fund ended up focusing on the role it could play in incentivizing what was effectively project-based JI, rapidly developing the principles and institutional structure of what became the CDM "within 48 hours"[428].

When presented back to the G77 on the final day of the Kyoto negotiations, this ran into mixed reactions[429]. That the CDM in its agreed form represented a dramatic transformation of the original Brazilian fund proposal, and in effect constituted project-based Joint Implementation that the G77 had opposed at COP1 and again as a separate element of the Kyoto Protocol was lost on no one[430]. The main cleavages here are more difficult to discern: AOSIS was supportive of the CDM, largely as a necessary means of attempting to raise Annex I mitigation targets and increase the prospects of US acceptance of the Kyoto Protocol as a whole[431]. At the same time, however, the difference between financial transfers for non-compliance and financial transfers for projects was no longer as great as it had once seemed; perhaps acceptance of the CDM was also the concession the G77 made in the final compromises to reach an agreement at Kyoto, given its opposition to emission trading and the exclusion of voluntary participation, and the area where it could show some flexibility[432].

[428] Werksman and Cameron 2000: 259; Cole 2012: 44

[429] Mwandosya 1999: 130-131

[430] Grubb 1999: 101-103; Estrada-Oyuela 1998: 25 on the key differences between the proposed CDF and agreed CDM; Werksman and Cameron 2000: 256-257 on pre-COP3 discussions on JI, namely on continued G77 opposition to project-based JI, heightened by the unfolding discussion between COP1 and COP3 on reporting procedures for AIJ, and EU opposition for it possibly leading to lower commitments and action by other Annex I countries.

[431] Werksman and Cameron 2000: 260; while small countries such as AOSIS members acknowledged that the CDM would provide few direct economic benefits to themselves by hosting CDM projects, a by-product of the CDM system was a levy imposed on CDM projects earmarked for adaptation purposes.

[432] Mwandosya 1999: 131; Grubb 1999: 96

Conclusion

Since the Berlin COP1 meeting, observers and participants have looked back towards the Indian-led 'green group' effort wistfully, calling for similar efforts to be made in order to move in a more engaged fashion towards international action[433]. Rather optimistically, Oberthur and Ott wrote after COP1 that:

> "In reaching this goal [the Berlin Mandate] the formation of new coalitions that emerged at COP1 might prove helpful. This is first of all the 'Green Group' of developing countries under the leadership of India that was vital for the negotiations in Berlin: Their 'Green Paper' broke the ice and served as the basis for negotiations at COP1. This group joined forces with the EU, especially Germany, France and the UK...If these coalitions are preserved and strengthened during the next two years, they could exert considerable pressure on the US and the other laggards, in particular Australia, Russia and China. They might even be able to pull in Japan, which has so far been very quiet in the international climate negotiations"[434].

Instead, the negotiations culminating in the Kyoto Protocol failed to realise the lasting presence of a 'like-minded' group of developing countries, and instead reverted to a G77 structure. The COP1 split in the G77 on what became the Berlin Mandate has remained notable in the years since precisely *because* of its rarity and uniqueness. The two-group coalition structure of the G77 and AOSIS established at the beginning of the INCs remained intact seven years later at the conclusion of the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, despite facing moments of rupture at INC4 and COP1 as well as considerable other differences after the

[433] Metz 2012; One newspaper report (Simonian 1995) commented after COP1 that "the splits within industrialised states and developing world suggest differences on climate change have transcended the established north-south division on most international issues. Instead the cleavage appears to be largely between producers of energy (notably coal) and consumers."

[434] Oberthur and Ott 1995: 154

Earth Summit on the question of joint implementation. This pattern of persistence is all the more remarkable because throughout this negotiating process, developing countries were commonly perceived to be struggling to form a cohesive negotiating group as the G77. AOSIS was one sign of this, but so too was the temporary 'Kuala Lumpur' group at INC4 and the 'green group' at COP1[435]. With divergent negotiating priorities and objectives, why did developing countries continue to 'hang together' in the G77?

Following the argument set out in the past two chapters, this is understood by considering what it is that brings developing countries together in the first place – the institutional implications of the universal participation norm, in organising the climate negotiations through the UN General Assembly that made G77 membership a constitutive part of the 'Southern' identity that was socially appropriate within that social context. This social context is the path dependent element that remained constant throughout this period (even if the formal legal context changed with the COP process beginning in 1995). The continued collective identification of these countries as being Southern meant that they continued to associate themselves with other developing countries within the G77 structure, despite the substantive differences among them. In the immediate aftermath of Berlin, the positions espoused by different groups within the G77 that had led to the split had not been reconciled – nor would they be for a full year after Berlin, well into the AGBM negotiating process. Despite positions remaining divergent, the G77 reconvened after Berlin, struggling on before reaching the modus vivendi expressed in its AGBM7 submission linking developed country QELROs to the compensation mechanism, a compromise essentially only possible because of the changing external opportunity structure of the US position that

[435] Of concern here to students of the overall regime-building process here may be the implication of fragmented developing country behaviour for the prospects of overall success. Hampson and Hart 1995: 442 suggested, for instance, that "the fact that the Third World did not operate as a block also facilitated the possibilities of agreement between North and South on certain issues like institutional mechanisms and implementation procedures in the Convention".

completely isolated oil-exporting countries[436].

In other words, it is a continuing normative understanding of appropriate association which constrains developing countries and binds them to coordinate within the same coalition. The Southern identity activated as a result of the institutional context into which the climate negotiations were launched became the default negotiating coalition for developing countries. The social significance of this identity has meant that even after breakdown at particular moments, the alliance norm consistent with that identity has required a continued effort and association within the form and structure of the G77.

At the same time, this explanation and emphasis does not neglect the material differences among states. Instances of countries acting in their own material self-interest were common throughout, and the differences on JI in particular provide a harbinger of future differences to emerge on the CDM, addressed in the next chapter, where the self-interest arising from CDM participation drove a more assertive expression of their position. AOSIS, for their part, found themselves repeatedly at odds with other G77 members over key aspects of negotiations on mitigation, but because of their larger enmeshment in the same institutional context of the UN General Assembly, were also unwilling to completely break with the rest of the G77. The key element of this 1991-1997 phase, thus, was that this self-interested behaviour did not translate into lasting changes in the formal coalitions through which developing countries were organised. The norm of Southern appropriate association meant that developing countries continued to retain membership in the G77 in order to conform to this normative requirement, one arising out of the institutional context of the negotiations.

[436] Another lesson may have been, as Kjellen 2008: 77 suggested, the lesson "from Berlin: after that there has never been an open rift within G77 in the climate negotiations".

These conclusions provide the context for the next two chapters of this thesis that turn to two phases where new coalitions do form. How the G77 was formed and operated, and the position of AOSIS within this, provided an instructive example for the development of new coalitions. All this has rested, this thesis argues, on the continuing social pull institutionalised within this negotiating setting, of Southern appropriate association – the social expectation among developing countries remains that they do negotiate within the G77, despite the very messy way in which it attempts to balance the competing interests and demands of its membership. Its resilience in doing so is understood as a path dependent character of the international climate negotiations: the institutional choices made at the outset continue to structure the political alignments that are possible later in time. As a coalition established primarily as a result of existing institutional habits in the United Nations, the G77's presence is not an aggregation of climate-specific interests and preferences, but a reflection of the larger institutional context in which the climate negotiations have been conducted.

Chapter Five
The first new groups from Kyoto to Montreal, 1998-2004

Just months after the euphoria of the late-night drama that produced the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, one expert and negotiator looked to the future warily: "Like parents of a new born infant, the majority of Parties gathered at Kyoto are proud of delivering one of the most complex and comprehensive pieces of international environmental legislation of modern times...but at present, it is frail and faces an uncertain future"[437]. How right she was. Negotiators struggled for seven years to resolve the outstanding issues that would allow the Protocol to enter into force as a legally binding obligation upon its signatories, overshooting initial hopes that it would be operational by the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development, and only finally holding its first Meeting of Parties (CMP) in 2005. This chapter reviews this period of negotiations over the struggle to operationalise the Protocol, overcoming the buffeting tumult of a conference suspended after deadlock (COP6); the withdrawal of the world's then-largest greenhouse gas emitter (The United States); and then years of waiting with baited breath for the then-second largest greenhouse gas emitter to ratify the Protocol (Russia).

Amidst these larger developments in the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, the negotiating positions of developing countries were also evolving. As charted in the preceding three chapters, formal negotiations since 1991 had seen developing countries, despite tensions and moments of fissure, united in the G77 group, with small island states also organising AOSIS. This chapter traces the establishment of three new Southern

[437] Yamin 1998: 126

coalitions between 1997 and 2004: the African Group, the Least Developed Countries group, and the Group of Initiative Latin America (GRILA). The latter had only a brief existence between 1999 and 2001, while the other two have continued to caucus and organise as negotiating groups in the UNFCCC process since. At the time, the establishment of these groups was not seen as constituting a major change to the North-South negotiating dynamic[438] and they have received barely any scholarly attention in their own right. But understanding the larger evolution of developing country negotiating groups and the dynamics of coalition formation should prompt an examination, which is what this chapter does, of what exactly it is that explains their establishment.

Indeed, they provide important signs of the larger dynamics of developing country negotiating behaviour discussed in this thesis: the extent to which material, climate-specific interests do structure patterns of political alignment; the way in which agency is exercised by the smaller and less powerful; and above all, how social identities underpin coalition formation through norms of appropriate association. What the three groups here share, albeit to different degrees, is that their construction has been founded on prior social identities that, as discussed through this thesis, have constraining effects on their membership and composition. The LDC group is the activation of a pre-existing UN categorisation. The African Group, in drawing upon all countries of the African continent, relies on an existing regional identity. And even the case of GRILA, of which much of its rationale is materially driven, relies on a 'Latin American' identity framework for membership as its starting point. Thus, even while there is an immediate context that prompts the establishment of each of these groups, their formation remains guided by the institutional logic that this thesis advances.

[438] Depledge 2006: 4: "Although groups within the G-77—the LDCs, AOSIS, the African Group—often negotiate individually on issues of specific concern to them, they very rarely form alliances outside the G-77, or go against a common G-77 position."

The relevant question for the longer record of developing country coalitions lie in the extent to which these new coalitions provide a challenge to the G77 and the meaning of the South. Located in the context of the preceding chapters, these coalitions are essentially the first new sustained negotiating groups since the very beginning of the negotiations and the establishment of the G77 and AOSIS then. To most observers, the emergence of these three new groups was subsumed within the larger North-South divide still dominant at this time, and if anything, was viewed as becoming even more reified and entrenched[439]. But their low profile is at least also understood precisely because they were not perceived as constituting a direct challenge to the G77's primacy and to the norm of Southern appropriate association. At least with both the LDCs and African Group, these new groups were built on the larger political identities of the same type, being layered on top of, rather than displacing the G77. Both these identities were already well-established ones, institutionalised in other international organisations, and thus more likely to be viewed as being familiar and socially acceptable by others, rather than being new and potentially threatening forms. They could retain an identity of being both an 'LDC' and Southern, and both 'African' and Southern, conforming to *both* norms of appropriate association.

This chapter proceeds in three main parts. The first provides a brief review and summary of the key points in the development of the overall regime and the larger context of the negotiations. The second then introduces the main issue of contention among developing countries during this period: who would be eligible for to host Clean Development Mechanism projects? The following three sections then trace the origins of the three groups that form during this period: GRILA, the African Group, and then the Least Developed Countries, taking care to distinguish their different origins and the ways in which they

[439] Depledge 2006; Roberts and Parks 2007

demonstrate the larger arguments of this chapter and thesis. The final section briefly turns to another issue where it appeared that developing countries were divided – on the question of developing country mitigation – but on which they turned out to be more unified than before.

Operationalising the Kyoto Protocol

After the Kyoto Protocol had been agreed in December 1997, countries' attention then shifted to bringing the Protocol into force, a process that took eight years, culminating in the first Meeting of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol at Montreal in 2005. The Protocol's negotiations had been preoccupied with establishing the quantified emissions limitation reduction obligations (QELROs) for industrialised countries, but had deferred agreement upon the mechanisms and accounting rules for how countries would meet these targets. Negotiating, and finalising, this 'rulebook' was the main subject of attention in the 1998-2001 period, initiated at COP4 with the launch of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action (BAPA), and finishing with this rulebook's approval in the Marrakesh Accords at COP7 in 2001. The further delay in entry into force after this between 2002-2005, however, lay in waiting for Russia's ratification of the Protocol – a country that effectively held veto power over the Protocol after the Bush administration withdrew the US from the Protocol in 2001. The Protocol's legal entry into force depended on it being ratified by industrialised countries accounting for 55% of world greenhouse gas emissions – a figure that, given the US withdrawal, would have been impossible to reach without Russian ratification, which was only completed in 2004[440]. Thus, with the Protocol having entered into force in 2005, a new phase of negotiations could be launched at COP11 about the shape and content of the climate regime after 2012, when the Protocol's first commitment period ended – the detail

[440] See Henry and Sundstrom 2007; Afionis and Chatzopolous 2010 which provide accounts of the Russian ratification decision, generally pointing to issue-linkage between Russia's ratification and its World Trade Organisation accession

and dynamics of which are taken up in the next chapter.

The overarching focus of the 1998-2004 negotiations, as recounted in this brief summary, concerned the necessary steps to implement and bring into force the Kyoto Protocol. As such, the main bargaining over these details revolved around the industrialised countries over how they would meet their Kyoto QELROs, with developing countries involved but on the margins of this discussion[441]. This is the often-told story of this period, and is true as far as it goes for the purposes of understanding the construction of the climate change regime as a whole and the years when the future of the Kyoto Protocol – agreed, but not in force as a legal obligation upon its signatories – hung in the balance[442]. But what is often subsumed beneath this focus are the slowly shifting dynamics among developing countries, which this chapter addresses. These contain the roots and origins of later challenges and while conforming to the norm of Southern appropriate association, also foreshadowed larger stresses to come that, as detailed in the next chapter.

The negotiations to bring the Kyoto Protocol into force over 1998-2004, beyond those essentially resolved between industrialised countries, also raised a host of new issues to the negotiating agenda – the scope of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), a new emissions trading policy instrument established by the Kyoto Protocol; the shape of new funds to provide direct financial transfers from industrialised to developing countries to support capacity-building; and the slow but steady shift towards putting adaptation activities on a less unequal footing with those concerned with mitigation[443]. In these debates

[441] At times, negotiating simply proceeded without developing countries – as at COP6, when as the conference overran its scheduled close, industrialised countries continued to meet and negotiate for a final day in the hopes of producing a compromise among themselves as most developing country delegations packed up and headed home.

[442] Grubb and Yamin 2001; Kjellen 2008: 94-103; see Barrett 2005 on the compliance issues involved.

[443] See Schipper 2006 and Mace 2006 on this rebalancing of mitigation and adaptation issues within the negotiating process.

developing countries were central participants, where the costs and benefits of action on climate change were more apparent. The rest of this chapter, in examining the formation of the three new groups, illustrates the implications of this changing context for Southern coalition behaviour.

The Clean Development Mechanism: Material interests emerge?

While debates over finalising the Kyoto Protocol rulebook were largely between industrialised countries over how to implement their mitigation commitments[444], one way of such implementation, the Clean Development Mechanism, required the active participation of developing countries and prompted a closer, 'national' interpretation of their material interests.

The CDM was one of the three 'flexibility mechanisms' to emerge out of Kyoto, intended as an global emissions trading instrument to allow industrialised countries to reduce emissions at lower cost by investing in project activities in developing countries – thereby aiding the twin goals of emissions reduction financed by industrialised countries, and supporting sustainable development goals in developing countries. In doing so, it presented the first direct financial transfers from industrialised countries to developing ones, rather than through funds managed and administered by the Global Environmental Facility – and therefore for developing countries, a zero-sum financial pie to be distributed among them based on those who had the highest potential to reduce emissions. In the 1998-2004 negotiations, accordingly, the G77 faced considerable difficulty in reaching a common group position on the specifics of the CDM, especially over what projects would be eligible. Including some types of projects but not others would reorder the expected distribution of CDM investment, and the intra-G77 disputes over the CDM mark the first

[444] Cass 2005 shows the change in the EU's position on emissions trading in this debate, for instance

time where the heterogeneous economic and environmental characteristics of developing countries would be reflected in the uneven spread of who would receive financial and technological aid and assistance[445].

As Lavanya Rajamani wrote: "Some believe that the CDM will only favour countries that are on a high emissions trajectory such as India and China. Indeed, the CDM has been playfully nicknamed the "China Development Mechanism." It is no surprise that those countries within the G-77/China group that do not perceive themselves as benefiting directly from the CDM, as currently understood, are seeking to redefine the nature and scope of it to suit their needs"[446]. Table 8 provides a summary of the differences among developing countries on CDM project eligibility – a case where, when faced with a distributive problem, national economic interests predominate.

At SB10 in 1999, the internal G77 debate on the CDM took a full week of the conference to reach a common (and very general) negotiating position before being presented to the main meeting for discussion with industrialised countries, largely due to disputes over project eligibility among the G77[447]. All the different types of possible CDM projects faced concerns over their contribution to the Protocol's integrity – whether they would be projects and activities that would be genuinely 'additional' to existing activities or whether they would contribute to 'hot air' by crediting activities that would have been likely to take place anyway; how this would be measured; and their contribution to the 'sustainable

[445] Baumert, Kete and Figueres 2000: 1: "The CDM's design will largely shape the type of projects that take place, the geographical distribution of projects, the overall size of the CDM, the power dynamics within individual project negotiations, and the overall attractiveness of the mechanism relative to other abatement options available to other countries."But project eligibility was not the only CDM design issue to be contentious; other design questions included whether Kyoto Protocol ratification was a prerequisite, or the establishment of a national authority to handle CDM transactions.

[446] Rajamani 1999

[447] FCCC/SB/1999/Misc.3/Add.5

development' requirement defined by the Kyoto Protocol[448]. Much of the argumentation around the CDM has been couched in the language of upholding the environmental integrity and effectiveness of the CDM, and avoiding the creation of loopholes. But the pattern of support and opposition for particular types of CDM projects over others, as Table 8 depicts, clearly reflects divergent national economic interests among developing countries. Divergent positions among developing countries during this time represented an effort, in setting the rules for this market mechanism, to limit project eligibility to activities that could be supported and undertaken in their own countries and to avoid being crowded out by other project types. For instance, those already with nuclear power industries sought to include nuclear power in the CDM, in order for future projects to be eligible for CDM support[449]. Forestry projects, or land-use and land-use change (LULUCF) projects were particularly contentious, as the next section will illustrate[450], while the African countries, accounting for a very small proportion of global greenhouse gas emissions, sought to create a new category of projects called 'avoided emissions', of which they would be the main beneficiaries[451]. Unilateral CDM was also fought over, especially by Latin American countries, to reward countries to finance their own projects to sell CDM credits to Annex I countries, rather than relying wholly on Annex I investment as bilateral projects would, which would be likely to be dominated by the large developing countries[452]. Conversely, the fierceness of these disputes among developing countries was also arguably highlighted by the learning experience of the climate regime's initial experimentation with market

[448] On the sustainable development requirement in particular, see Kenber 2005: 268-269; see also Cole 2012 for a discussion about the difference between the sustainable development requirement as intended by the Brazilian architects of the CDM and as judged by the academic and policy community.

[449] Objection by Latin American countries: UNFCCC 2000: 44 (FCCC/SB/2000/MISC.4/ADD.2/REV.1)

[450] See also Forner et al. 2006 for a discussion of LULUCF

[451] For an African perspective particularly concerned about the regional distribution of the CDM, see Sokona, Humphreys and Thomas 1998, who suggested regional-based quotas for the CDM

[452] See a submission by Latin American countries in UNFCCC 2000 (FCCC/SB/2000/MISC.4/ADD.3); Baumert, Kete and Figueres 2000: 7: “Some countries with CDM aspirations, such as Colombia, may be unable to attract any bilateral and portfolio investment because of unacceptably high political risk. A unilateral model could enable some countries that are high risk, but which also have a political commitment to address climate change and promote sustainable development to benefit from CDM projects”.

mechanisms in the Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ) scheme, a first effort for industrialised countries to invest in carbon offset projects in developing countries discussed in the previous chapter. While the the AIJ scheme was limited from its inception to a pilot phase from which offset emissions would not be tradeable, the uneven skew of AIJ projects to a few developing countries[453], reflecting their higher potential for emissions reduction and existing institutional capacity to host CDM projects generated an awareness among developing countries that the benefits from future AIJ-style schemes would also be likely to flow unevenly to developing countries, increasing the stakes for the negotiation of CDM project eligibility[454].

Proposed types of projects eligible for CDM inclusion	**Supportive**	**Opposed**
Sinks, forestry and other LULUCF activities	Colombia, Costa Rica and other Latin American countries (except Brazil, Peru and Venezuela)	China, India, Brazil, AOSIS, African countries
Nuclear power	China and India	AOSIS and oil-exporting countries
'Avoided emission' projects	African countries	Most others
'Unilateral' projects	Latin American countries	China and India

Table 8: CDM Eligibility Preferences among G77 members, 1998-2000[455]

For the arguments advanced in this thesis, the most important element of the debates among developing countries on CDM project eligibility is that they represent a growing clarity about differentiated economic interests among developing countries that had hitherto often

[453] UNFCCC 1999 (FCCC/SB/1999/Inf. 1); By 1999, some 27 AIJ projects were underway in developing countries, but with Latin American ones hosting 19, and just one in Africa; of these, seven were forestry projects. As this phase of CDM negotiations was coming to a close in 2001, this ratio had scarecly changed, with 39 projects hosted by Latin American countries, 18 by Asian-Pacific countries, and 10 by African countries, see UNFCCC 2002 (FCCC/SBSTA/2002/8)

[454] Nonetheless, this should not be overstated, as understanding at this time was quite uneven. Silayan 2005: 34 “After the Kyoto protocol, it took...several years and much investment in studies and capacity-building before the CDM would be clearly understood by key players in their countries.”

[455] Rajamani 2001: 218-221

been obscured or misunderstood. In recognizing how economic and environmental differences among themselves would be likely to result in uneven financial flows across the G77 coalition membership, negotiating unity became much more difficult to sustain. What the CDM project eligibility debates crystallise, therefore are the roots of a shift in processes of interest definition and preference formation among developing countries in the climate change negotiations, a shift from positions being informed primarily by international and coalition-level political dynamics, to being informed by more local and national economic and environmental characteristics. This point should not be understated: while all countries operate under conditions of imperfect information and bounded rationality, informational challenges are undoubtedly more acute for developing countries than they are for industrialised ones. The passivity of many developing countries, and their willingness to follow the lead of more activist countries and traditional principles, as charted in the preceding chapters, provides evidence of this. In the specific context of the climate negotiations, this pattern of behaviour is also extensively detailed by Joyeeta Gupta with regards to the Framework Convention and implementation negotiations: negotiators proceeding on the basis of 'hollow mandates' from capitals, resorting instead to habit, analogy or ideology rather than considering the new situation and the applicability of traditional and established practices[456].

These CDM debates are identified here as a specific issue over which developing countries' interests began to diverge in ways that were nationally-specific, when prompted over whether they could benefit from a particular CDM project type being implemented in their country. Over this period a number of other developments are also driving this shift, although in more subtle and slow-moving ways. One was simply in the new scientific and technical information emerging during this time that is able to provide a more nationally-

[456] Gupta 1997

focused understanding of the causes and impacts of climate change and the relative costs and benefits of climate-friendly economic policy. The IPCC's Third Assessment Report (TAR) was being prepared and finalised for its launch in 2001 (the previous assessment report had been published in 1995), and was a subject of discussion at negotiating sessions in 2002 and 2003, prompting debate over what steps would be necessary to meet the Convention's goals given the updated state of scientific information on climate change. In the TAR, an assessment of the anthropogenic causes of climate change was being made with greater levels of certainty, and the projection of future climate impacts was being undertaken with increased levels of granularity at regional and subregional levels, thereby becoming of greater use to the national policymaker and bureaucrat in understanding the projected impacts of climate change[457].

Of at least equal, if not greater importance, however, may have been the process of preparing and developing national communications among developing countries at the end of the 1990s and in the initial years of the 2000s. These were reports submitted by countries providing an inventory of national greenhouse gas emissions, extenuating national circumstances, an assessment of vulnerability as well as financial and technological needs, and a summary of mitigation and adaptation strategies being undertaken, and constitute the key Convention obligation of developing countries. International reporting requirements have often been viewed by developing countries as burdensome and technically challenging, and many smaller countries had to receive technical assistance from the GEF for the process of preparing these national communications. While by June 2000, only 27 developing countries had submitted their first national communications, a year later, the

[457] One Indian diplomat put it in an interview: “There was also...a huge amount of capacity building during this period [from Marrakesh onwards]...All these helped countries to assess for themselves the kinds of costs and benefits that climate change was bringing to them...What happened was also, until that point in time, the understanding was much more global. IPCC assessments until that time, had only been at a global level.”

figure had nearly doubled to 52 submissions, and a further 31 countries made their submissions by June 2002[458]. While this is at best circumstantial evidence, it seems likely that this reporting process also contributed to a more general improvement in national capacities to understand and interpret the technicalities of the science and economics, informing positions taken at the negotiations towards one more closely reflecting national circumstances.

Finally, in political terms, alongside the improvements in information able to inform national climate policy and negotiating positions, the explosion of Chinese and Indian economic growth was increasing attention paid to them by other developing countries. This is the same type of awareness that the AIJ and CDM project eligibility debates represent, where other developing countries represent a relative threat to accessing finite financial resources; in this regard it was a growing awareness of the significance of China, and India and Brazil to a lesser extent, in a future regime[459]. This may have been triggered in part by the Bush Administration's withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol in 2001, and the letter sent by President Bush to four US senators singling out the Protocol's exclusion of China and India from binding mitigation commitments as the basis for the Protocol being unfair for the US[460]. One Indian diplomat, in an interview, identified that letter as challenging their own assumptions about India's relative contribution to global greenhouse gas emissions. With

> "the US getting out of Kyoto...That suddenly changed how countries looked at climate change. Until that time, climate change was a global problem that required a global solution, everyone had to work together. With the US getting out, suddenly it became a national issue. You looked at national costs and benefits. The US said...we

[458] FCCC/SBI/2002/16; FCCC/SBI/2001/14
[459] See Nurse and Moore 2005 for an expression of this awareness by two AOSIS delegates.
[460] Bush Administration 2001

> are particularly at a disadvantage if countries like India and China don't take part. In India and China, we used to wonder, why are they concerned about us? But between 2000 and 2007, you also note that the emissions from India and China, particularly from China, also increased greatly...So this also changed. Therefore, countries started looking at national interests. Maybe the transition that occurred, was looking at everything from a global perspective to a national perspective"[461]

All these developments, and the differences emerging during the CDM debates discussed earlier in this section illustrate the more nuanced interpretations of interests developing over this 1997-2004 period. Material interests do matter, especially as the divergences become more pronounced among countries in the same negotiating group. But only in one area of the CDM debates did these catalyse the formation of a new coalition focused on forest and sink projects within the CDM – and as the next section will argue, was also strongly influenced by existing regional social identities. If anything, in light of the wide differences described above among developing countries, the CDM debates may have been expected to result in *more* coalitions than was actually the case, seeking to champion favoured project types. The next section now turns to better understanding the character of the one coalition that did emerge on these issue-specific lines.

LULUCF and sinks in the CDM: GRILA

Despite the differing views on CDM project eligibility cutting across the G77, only in one instance did this catalyse the establishment of a new negotiating coalition: over the inclusion of forest and sink projects in the CDM and the formation of GRILA. In the general context of the post-Kyoto negotiations over implementing the Protocol, the issue of 'land-use, land-use-change and forests' (LULUCF) or 'sinks' was one of the major

[461] Interview with Indian delegate

contentious subjects addressed: how would the carbon from forests and other land-use activities be counted? For Annex I countries, these technical and methodological questions were crucial, because of the potential impact of LULUCF activities on their ability to meet their overall Kyoto QELROs – loose rules would make it easier to meet these targets, while narrower rules would require more to be done in reducing emissions rather than relying on sinks. These discussions were supposed to be resolved three years after Kyoto at COP6[462] – but LULUCF disagreements were at the heart of the collapse of the COP6 negotiations and only finally agreed at a resumed session half a year later (COP6-bis), in a dramatically-changed political context of the US withdrawal from the Protocol[463]. For non-Annex I countries, however, while participating in these wider LULUCF debates in a generally unified way within the G77, LULUCF activities were also to be similarly divisive in one respect over the extent to which such activities could be included in the CDM[464].

Sinks had not been explicitly referenced in the Kyoto Protocol article setting out the CDM, disappearing in final drafting stages[465], leading to considerable dispute during the 1998-2001 period of discussions on setting up the CDM over whether sinks could indeed be included. Mwandosya noted that "the fact that carbon sequestration projects are not included in Article 12 [the CDM] illustrates the difficulties that AGBM had in getting a consensus on how to deal with sinks in the Kyoto Protocol. The Group of 77 and China was unable, throughout the negotiations on sinks, to come up with a consensus"[466]. Concerns

[462] Boyd, Corbera and Estrada 2008: 102; While the issues of including sinks in the CDM was not one of the major issues derailing the COP6 conference, agreement on this issue depended on wider agreement between Annex I parties on the technical and methodological rules and guidelines surrounding sinks, of which failure to agree was one of the major causes of the COP6 collapse.

[463] The Kyoto Protocol had specified QELROs without detailing the extent to which sinks could be used to meet them, a "strategic ambiguity" that required three years of negotiation to interpret and elaborate. See Hohne et al. 2007 for a good summary of this process of LULUCF rule-interpretation; Schulze et al. 2002; For some of the extensive studies of sinks and QELROs and the failed COP6 negotiations, see Fry 2002; Lövbrand 2009

[464] Jung 2004: 7

[465] UNFCCC 2000: 76 (FCCC/TP/2); Fry 2002: 161 remarks that "whether the deletion of the specific sinks footnote was part of a general clean-up process or a deliberate omission is a matter of conjecture".

[466] Mwandosya 1999: 135

raised earlier in regard to other CDM projects are relevant here, especially additionality – but the complexities when addressing forest activities and projects were even more challenging, to do with baseline identification (the monitoring and data collection process to determine GHG removals by sinks from the project), permanence (the long-term reversibility of such projects), and leakage (the displacement of GHG-emitting activity to other areas outside the project). What is especially important about this issue, however, is that unlike the other clashes among developing countries over CDM project eligibility discussed above, these differences were accentuated by the establishment of a subgroup of Latin American countries favouring the wide inclusion of sinks within the CDM against many other G77 members being opposed to including sinks.

This group, the 'Latin American Initiatives Group' (GRILA), was active largely during these sinks debates between 1999-2001 but has barely received any analytical attention. Consisting of all the Latin American countries except for Brazil, Peru and Venezuela, this group was described in Gupta's handbook on the negotiating process as one of the key developing country groupings at the time even if it did not speak as a group during the main plenary sessions of the UNFCCC meetings. It did, however, regularly make submissions advocating the inclusion of LULUCF in the CDM. Thus, for instance, these countries argued that the technical uncertainties could indeed be adequately addressed without compromising the environmental integrity of the process, and that not including a wide variety of LULUCF activities would be to exclude a considerable source of emissions from global action. As the issue was intensifying in 2000 heading towards an intended conclusion at COP6, one GRILA submission colourfully argued that

> "According to the letter of the Protocol, the spirit of the negotiations, and the purpose of the Clean Development Mechanism, LULUCF projects are eligible to receive

certified emissions reductions...The time has ended for spurious legal interpretations and invalid scientific claims regarding LULUCF projects"[467].

GRILA members		
Argentina	Dominican Republic	Mexico
Bolivia	Ecuador	Nicaragua
Chile	El Salvador	Panama
Colombia*	Guatemala	Paraguay
Costa Rica	Honduras	Uruguay

**Colombia only associated with some of these submissions.*

Opponents, on the other hand, expressed concern about the environmental integrity of including a wide range of LULUCF measures in the CDM given the technical uncertainties prevent a robust design and the implications for flooding the CDM market with relatively cheap credits[468]. Brazil argued strongly against, and China was also opposed to sinks, although this was because it feared that the inclusion of sink projects would threaten its prospective proceeds from other CDM project types such as energy efficiency and renewable energy projects that were more favourable to itself. AOSIS countries were similarly opposed, highlighting concerns that "the scientific uncertainty about the benefits of sequestration are unresolved, and methodologies have not been developed that can guarantee that such projects provide real, measurable and long-term benefits related to the mitigation of climate change"[469]. AOSIS' view instead that including sinks in CDM activity to be credited towards Annex I QELROs would also delay their own domestic measures to

[467] FCCC/SB/2000/Misc.1/Add.2; for other GRILA submissions see FCCC/SB/1999/Misc.10/Add.3 justifying a wide variety of LULUCF projects in the CDM; FCCC/SB/2000/Misc.4/Add.2/Rev.1: 41 removing anti-LULUCF language in draft negotiating text ; and FCCC/SB/2000/Misc.4/Add.3 on other CDM design issues

[468] Boyd et al. 2008: 101-103 also observes that annex I countries also held a diversity of positions on the inclusion of sinks in the CDM, with the EU and Switzerland sharing much of the scepticism of AOSIS, Brazil and India over sinks, but the US, Japan and Norway were in favour. According to Jauregui 2007, the withdrawal of the US from the Kyoto Protocol (and therefore its flexible mechanisms) "sealed the fate" of excluding many types of sinks in the Marrakesh Accords.

[469] FCCC/SB/1999/Misc.10: 56; and see FCC/SB/2000/Misc.1: 119-121; these concerns over sinks were also evident in the Kyoto negotiations and in the wider discussion about the extent to which sinks could be included in Annex I QELRO calculations.

reduce emissions at source, diluting the effectiveness of meeting the QELROs[470] and opposition to sinks can also be identified in the individual submissions of other G77 countries[471].

And yet behind most of these technical arguments about the scientific integrity and technical methodology of LULUCF inclusion in the CDM, as with the LULUCF disputes more generally, are clear national self-interests with battles over science serving proxies for political differences[472]. GRILA's positions and coalescing as a negotiating group are best and unambiguously explained by the material benefits that they would receive from the wide inclusion of LULUCF activities in the CDM as potential potential host countries[473]. Thus from this first phase of flexible mechanisms involving developing countries in the form of the AIJ pilot phase, the countries benefiting the most from it were the ones that constituted GRILA in the next phase of flexible mechanism discussions. At the same time, Brazil's outlier position compared to the rest of its Latin American neighbours follows the same explanation as previously articulated with its foreign policy being averse to making any element of its Amazon subject to international scrutiny, especially if included as part of tradeable international crediting[474]. "[P]reserving control over the Amazon" was described as the "issue which strikes more than any at the heart of Brazilian interests"[475].

When COP6-bis was convened in 2001 in Bonn, the question of LULUCF in the CDM was resolved as part of the larger package of agreements that was adopted as part of the

[470] FCCC/SB/1999/Misc.3: 48
[471] FCCC/SB/1999/Misc.3/Add.1: 75 (Sierra Leone)
[472] As Lövbrand 2009: 410 observers, states "have used scientific knowledge claims as a resource to establish their [political] preferences as scientifically sound and thus mould the multilateral dialogue in their favour"; see also Fearnside 2001, and these spilled over into the IPCC preparation of its 2000 Special Report on LULUCF and its discussion of project-based sink activities as Fry 2002: 167 and Fogel 2005: 200 describe.
[473] Lövbrand 2009: 409
[474] Fearnside 2001, criticizing the Brazilian position, described this as being akin to a 'conspiracy theory'.
[475] Johnson 2001: 199; see Kolk 1996 and Goldemberg and Durham 1990 for the origins of this concern over the 'internationalisation' of the Amazon from the 1980s onwards.

Marrakesh Accords adopted later that at COP7[476]: LULUCF activities eligible for the CDM would be restricted to afforestation and reforestation (A/R) for the first commitment period of the Protocol[477], and a cap set on how much these could count towards Annex I targets- an outcome marking the end of GRILA, which did not meet beyond COP6-bis[478]. This decision settled the broad contours of disagreement on the place of LULUCF in the CDM, even while the next two years up until COP9 reprised familiar political divisions on agreeing further guidelines and rules in order to operationalise the Marrakesh A/R decision[479].

Chief among the LULUCF activities that GRILA and others had sought to include but failed to achieve in the Bonn-Marrakesh decisions was avoided deforestation: rather than the tree-planting activities covered under A/R , this concept sought to incentivize and reward countries taking action to slow their rate of deforestation of existing forests[480]. In the years after COP7, however, more scientific attention began to be drawn to the issue given that the Kyoto Protocol structure, following Marrakesh, only sought to control LULUCF activities in Annex I countries, and CDM A/R would only address a small proportion of LULUCF activities in non-Annex I countries. The best-known proposal was termed 'compensated reduction', whereby after a baseline for deforestation is set, countries that reduce deforestation below this baseline may issue and trade carbon credits equivalent to the amount of carbon saved compared to the baseline[481].

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476 Decision 17/CP.7; see also Boyd et al. 2008: 102-103

477 Both are essentially tree-planting activities: afforestation is the conversion of non-forested land to forest where there has been no forest for at least 50 years; reforestation on land where there was no forest of 31 December 1989, defined in the IPCC.

478 Although Porrura and Garcia-Guerrero 2008: 211 comment that smaller groups of Latin American countries continued to work informally on CDM-sink issues beyond 2001.

479 Lövbrand 2009: 409; see Boyd et al. 2004 for an extensive discussion of the COP9 decision on A/R in the CDM (Decision 19/CP.9), which focused principally on the reference year to calculate the project baseline; the accounting system to take into account leakage effects; the addressing permanence through a time-limited crediting system that drew on an earlier Colombian proposal (FCCC/SB/2000/Misc.4/Add.2/Rev.1: 20-23)

480 Fry 2007: 342

481 An initial version of Santilli, Moutinho et al. 2005 was presented at a COP9 side event; see other

This account of GRILA's brief existence highlights the material incentives that appear to explain its formation and behaviour. The group's attention was largely focused on forest issues, especially in the CDM, advancing self-interested positions distinct from those of other G77 members. Unlike the ad hoc groups that had formed at INC4 and COP1 in the midst of disagreement over the scope of mitigation commitments but which had dissolved beyond those particular sessions, GRILA had a sustained presence over the three years that the issue was proceeding towards a conclusion. In this way, GRILA does stand as an example of an 'interest-based' group underpinned by shared material interests. But what is noteworthy about GRILA is that while the Latin American countries were willing to form a stand-alone coalition distinct from the G77 on this issue, it was a coalition with a distinctly *regional* identity – that is, compromised of Latin American countries and defining itself as a subgroup of Latin American countries. This characteristic is worthy of reflection given that the positions it was advocating could conceivably have gained wider support from non-Latin American developing countries that would have similarly benefited from a more expansive approach to forest-based mitigation activities. Indeed the case of the Coalition for Rainforest Nations (CfRN), which formed in 2005 and is one of the subjects of the next chapter, provides a useful comparison of a negotiating group that was formed around the same issue of deepening the inclusion of forest projects in the UNFCCC architecture, and indeed championed the compensated reduction proposal mentioned above as a way forward for LULUCF activities in the post-2012 regime. While the CfRN stands, like GRILA, as an example of a coalition drawn together for clear and narrowly-defined interests, unlike GRILA, however, it had a pan-Southern membership composition in drawing support from across all regions of the developing world towards essentially the same cause.

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commentary at Hohne et al. 2007: 347. “Considering that a large proportion of CO2 emissions in developing countries comes from deforestation and unsustainable logging, a future regime should aim to provide incentives to avoid these emissions.”

Explaining this regional dimension to GRILA requires a return to the larger arguments that this thesis makes – as outlined in the first two chapters, and illustrated with the G77 and AOSIS over the course of chapters three and four – about the way in which, in understanding the coalition behaviour of developing countries, material factors are structured by the social identities embedded in specific institutional settings. An existing social identity based on regional geography provided a fixed membership in guiding the establishment of a *Latin American* group. A rehearsal of the history of Latin American regionalism is beyond the scope of this thesis, but the salient point to note here is that in the UN-defined regional groupings that exist primarily for the purpose of elections and representation, 'Latin America and the Caribbean' is one such group. Thus these countries were already meeting periodically as this regional group for the purposes of nominating candidates for UNFCCC bodies – and this existing basis of cooperation provides one basis for understanding GRILA's constitution along regional lines. Another, as Bolivia's chief negotiator suggested, was simply linguistic – that is, a shared command of Spanish facilitated mutual understanding of positions leading towards agreement on acting together as a negotiating group[482]. While a shared language may seem trivial compared to the underlying material costs and benefits of particular positions, this should not be underestimated because it echoes the larger theme of how negotiating capacity, or rather lack thereof, influence the capabilities of developing countries to advance positions and objectives in the negotiating process. Finally, various Latin American countries had already been among the more engaged developing countries in the UNFCCC process – the past involvement with AIJ providing a learning experience about the benefits of emissions trading, and several submissions on this, and sink subjects[483], had already been made by

[482] Jauregui 2001
[483] Boyd et al. 2008: 103

Latin American countries, thus putting them in a position of being more able to act towards identifying coalition allies than other developing countries that had hitherto been more passive. All these taken together suggest that explaining GRILA's behaviour in the UNFCCC requires greater nuance than a straightforward interpretation of material interests, even while these are central to GRILA. While it could clearly not accommodate Brazil and others wary of wide LULUCF inclusion, the relevant question that highlights its basis in social identity is why it did not widen to other non-Latin American countries sharing similar views. Instead, the reflection of material interests on forest issues driving coalition formation foreshadows the CfRN discussed in the next chapter, where perhaps even the social glue described here for GRILA applies less, making the CfRN the best – but rare – example of an exclusively interest-based negotiating group for developing countries.

The African Group: regional identity catalyst

It is during this period that the African countries also begin to meet as a group. Its first statements as a group had been made during the second half of the AGBM process, and at Kyoto, but consistent with the way in which the discussion on flexible mechanisms catalysed greater activity among developing countries, its first submission as a group is made in 1998 on this subject, stating that "The Clean Development Mechanism should be designed in such a way that it is advantageous to Africa..."[484]. The same issue was highlighted by the continental ministerial group, the African Ministerial Conference on the Environment (AMCEN) at a special meeting in 1998 prior to COP4, noting the limited participation of African countries in the AIJ phase[485]. Thus the 'African position' in the debate surrounding the CDM's design included options such as a 'seed fund' to assist African capacity-building, or suggesting regional quotas for CDM projects to direct

[484] UNFCCC 1998 (FCCC/CP/1998/Misc.7/Add.2) on the flexible mechanisms
[485] UNEP 1998; this meeting was not one of AMCEN's regular sessions.

investment towards African countries[486].

While the impetus for this activity resembles GRILA in some respect, a focus on the membership and the way in which the group is constituted draws attention to its identity as the *African* group. That it, it stands as an example of the social origins of coalition formation in regional identities – that is, drawing on a pan-continental regional identity that defines the 'we' as the members of the African continent. This understanding may be highlighted by the rather limited behaviour that follows this initial activity. The African Group encountered considerable frustration in its efforts to coordinate a common position during this phase of negotiations (and indeed too in its efforts at coordinating a common position prior to this phase, in the AGBM meetings leading to Kyoto[487]), meeting and delivering statements, but with little to distinguish itself from the general positions taken by the G77. In the thin literature on the agency of the African countries in the UNFCCC process, one observer pilloried the engagement of African countries as ineffective and unreflective[488]. One interviewee highlighted the frequent challenge of overcoming language difficulties among the Francophone, Anglophone and Lusophone delegations during these initial years[489], and these linguistic differences are just one set of a much greater diversity among African countries, which include some small island states and oil-exporting ones.

This should prompt the question of why the African countries do meet at all, and a more satisfying explanation (rather than a search for shared material circumstances) is found in the larger regional identity that provides a social basis for coalition coordination: meeting

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[486] Sokona, Humphreys and Thomas 1998

[487] It may be a notable omission that Mwandosya 1999, a fairly detailed account of the Kyoto negotiations from the G77 chairperson's perspective, makes no mention of the African countries coordinating positions together (or at least alongside that of the G77 itself).

[488] Mumma 2000

[489] Interview with African negotiator

as the *African Group* is a common phenomenon in UN system and processes[490]. Pan-Africanism, epitomised in the post-independence period by leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere, expanded the boundaries of collective identity to the continental level, although there was considerable disagreement and dispute over the policies pursued in pursuit of this identity. Indeed, the importance of this pan-continental regional identity often appears much weaker compared to subregional identities (West, East, Southern Africa and so on)[491]. But whatever the actual depth of institutionalisation and effectiveness of pan-African identity, it is this identification that found expression in efforts at UNFCCC coordination. Meeting as an *African* group is a common political negotiating move; one survey charts more than 30 African 'common positions' – some agreed for specific international conferences, and others expressing goals and objectives on an issue over the longer-term[492].

This argument is strengthened, however, by considering what happens to the African Group in the post-2005 phase of the negotiations, which will be more extensively considered in the context of the next chapter. Briefly put, this highlights that the African Group began to attempt to coordinate positions more substantively as a result of pan-continental regional institutions becoming more engaged with climate change, which provided a greater political impetus to representing 'Africa', rather than any other possible sub- or trans-regional identification. In the post-2005 negotiations, the African Group is effectively 're-founded' in organisational terms, which is when other studies date the substantive 'beginning' of the African Group in the UNFCCC process[493]. Thus the African Group – attempting to coordinate with only a limited area of shared material interests – is more completely

[490] Zondi 2013
[491] Fawcett and Gandois 2010
[492] Zondi 2013
[493] Compagnon, Floremont and Lamaud 2011

explained as the attempt to form a negotiating group based on a regional identity. *African* identity, thus, compels African appropriate association within the coalition structure of the African group. This early activity suggests that there is little interest-based about the establishment and formation of the African Group; it is, instead a negotiating group where collective identity as being 'African', and hence the normative requirement of African appropriate association, precedes substantive coordination.

The Least Developed Countries: Institutionalised coalition creation

The third coalition established during this period was the formation of the Least Developed Countries (LDC) grouping. At the SB13 session in September 2000, the Least Developed Countries announced that they were now organising and speaking as a group, bringing together the 52 countries classed as LDCs by the UN General Assembly[494]. Like the other coalitions discussed thus far, the LDC group stands as an example of the extent to which developing country coalition formation has been structured by existing institutional classifications which have constructed a particular social identity. As before, perhaps the most important consequence guiding these groups is a fixed-membership character. The question of who is a Least Developed Country is a fundamentally political question, and recognition of the LDC classification is a wider feature of the UN system.

This section outlines three key points. The first is a discussion of the immediate context underpinning the emergence of the LDC group in 2000. On first glance, the formation of this group may appear to serve as an important example of Southern fragmentation with the members of this new group claiming to need a voice independent from that of the G77. The second section, in outlining the larger category of the Least Developed Countries, however, highlights the existing institutional structure of out which the LDC group formed. The third

[494] See the figure in the introductory chapter for their current composition

then goes on to illustrate that the consequence of the narrowness of its establishment meant that its participation during this initial period was weak, constrained – on the face of it, the LDC group has been able to say that it speaks on behalf of the LDCs,but the actual degree of participation should be open to question.

The context for LDC group's formation in 2000 was a set of discussions on the implementation of Articles 4.8 and 4.9 of the Framework Convention, and Articles 2.3 and 3.14 of the Kyoto Protocol, collectively dealing with how developing countries would cope with both the 'adverse effects' of climate change and the 'impact of response measures'[495]. 'Adverse effects' refers to the negative effects of climate change, but the 'impact of response measures' refers to the effects of policies undertaken to address climate change – two rather distinct concepts but which were associated together in Article 4.8 and which negotiators have struggled to disentangle since[496]. One consequence of the 'compensation mechanism' debates at Kyoto, as discussed in the previous chapter, was that one concession of the proposal being dropped in the final Kyoto negotiations was agreement on a COP decision that mandated a new agenda item being taken up over the following on the implementation of Articles 4.8 and 4.9[497]. At COP4, as part of the general package agreement on the Buenos Aires Plan of Action setting out items to be completed by COP6, a two-year work

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[495] **Article 4.8:** "In the implementation of the commitments in this Article, the Parties shall give full consideration to what actions are necessary under the Convention, including actions related to funding, insurance and the transfer of technology, to meet the specific needs and concerns of developing country Parties arising from the adverse effects of climate change and/or the impact of the implementation of response measures, especially on: (a) small island countries; (b) Countries with low-lying coastal areas; (c) Countries with arid and semi-arid areas, forested areas and areas liable to forest decay; (d) Countries with areas prone to natural disasters; (e) Countries with areas liable to drought and desertification; (f) Countries with areas of high urban atmospheric pollution; (g) Countries with areas with fragile ecosystems, including mountainous ecosystems; (h) Countries whose economies are highly dependent on income generated from the production, processing and export, and/or on consumption of fossil fuels and associated energy-intensive products; and (i) Landlocked and transit countries";
Article 4.9: "The Parties shall take full account of the specific needs and special situations of the least developed countries in their actions with regard to funding and transfer of technology."

[496] Rajamani 2000: 229-230; one G77 delegate involved in these discussions said that the joint discussion of the two issues "made no sense" but was the result of a political compromise (MRS)

[497] Decision 3/CP.3; as UNFCCC 2000 : 56-57 (FCCC/TP/2) recounts, final negotiations on 3/CP.3 involved a battle by several LDCs to re-insert a specific reference to Article 4.9 in the draft decision.

programme was agreed upon to "identify additional actions" needed to implement these two FCCC articles, as well as the two Kyoto Protocol articles (2.3 and 3.14) dealing with the minimization of adverse impacts and response measures[498]. Thus for the first time, a specific stream of discussions concerning LDCs, in 'implementing' Article 4.9, proceeded over 1999 and 2000 in determining and agreeing what their 'special treatment' consisted of, and was a key part of the package of 'developing country issues' that were supposed to be resolved at COP6[499].

But amid the slow progress on other issues at COP6, little progress was also made on this set of issues; the follow-up meetings in 2001, COP6-bis and COP7, produced the political compromise on LDC-specific activities: an LDC work programme; a specific focus on LDCs and small island developing states (SIDS) in a general decision on a capacity-building framework; the creation of National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs) for LDCs to communicate their particular needs and vulnerabilities; an LDC Fund under the Convention, to financially support NAPA implementation; the LDC Expert Group (LEG), compromised of technical experts to assist LDCs to prepare NAPAs; and recognition of the special needs of LDCs and SIDS in the Adaptation Fund's terms and priority areas[500]. In the agreement on these issues, amid the general tensions on Article 4.8 and the continuing demands of the oil-exporting countries for action on response measures, the LDC Group outlined many of these elements jointly[501], shaping their own participation in the governance of the LDC Fund and the LEG composition[502]

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498 Decision 5/CP.4

499 In addition to negotiating sessions, two workshops were held in September 1999 and March 2000 on the implementation of Articles 4.8 and 4.9; see FCCC/SB/2000/2

500 Marrakesh Accords: Decision 2/CP.7; Decision 5/CP.7; Decision 7/CP.7; Decision 27/CP.7; Decision 28/CP.7; Decision 29/CP.7

501 FCCC/SB/2000/CRP.18: 21-25

502 Boyd and Schipper 2002: 188

The success of the LDC group in achieving these demands – essentially institutionalising LDC-specific treatment within the FCCC's general implementation – reflected a rising awareness among LDC delegates that their interests and 'special circumstances' needed to be independently articulated from the G77, and "to ensure that the LDCs' interests were not subsumed within the larger G77/China interests"[503]. This formation as an negotiating group – and thus demanding a distinct seat at the table, was not without political pressure, with considerable pressure from other G77 members to not speak independently[504]. For instance, the G77 chair in 2000 worried that the LDCs were splitting the G77, and affirmations of the LDCs' continued commitment to the G77 was necessary to avert further diplomatic pressure[505]. Similarly, the choice of Vanuatu to serve as the first chair of the LDC group was intended to reassure AOSIS that the new group would not serve as competition for funding and support[506]. In both these contexts – a specific agenda item to address, and facing down political challenges to their rise – the establishment of the LDC group constitutes a statement of the political agency of some the world's poorest countries, in attempting to better advance specific goals and positions which also had a clear element of self-interest involved. In the years after Marrakesh, much of the guidance to these programmes agreed at COP7 needed to be detailed, and this was the primary purpose of the LDC group – often negotiating directly with Annex I countries without other G77 representation[507]. The Subsidiary Body for Implementation's (SBI) agenda since has included a specific 'Matters related to Least Developed Countries' item under which many of these issues are gathered,

[503] Rajamani 2001: 211-212

[504] Yamin and Depledge 2004: 40 "Some of the few African countries not classified as LDCs we worried that such a move would divide the African Group and argued that the poor in their countries were just as poor as the poor in LDCs. Those AOSIS countries not classified as LDCs were similarly concerned that the formation of the LDC group would affect attention – and potential funding – away from them, and limit the capacity of AOSIS to participate fully in the negotiations – by diverting the energies of its members. Other developing countries were also nervous that the unity of the G77 would be compromised. Formal statements of support for the new LDC chair from the G77 chair and influential G77 members at the final plenary of SB13 represented an important victory for LDC delegations that had fought to gain acceptance for their group".

[505] Interview with LDC negotiator

[506] Interview with LDC negotiator

[507] Dessai et al. 2005: 111-112

which has been the focus of the LDC group's energies: rather than competing with the G77, this agenda item was effectively subcontracted to the LDC group to focus on the related issues of direct interest, working within the G77 but organising itself independently. In this way the LDCs continued to meet the norm of Southern appropriate association – their G77 membership very much remains, but a subset of issues saw them meet and organise, in addition to the G77, as 'the LDCs'.

At the same time, however, the overall argument of this section highlights the institutional origins of the special treatment that the LDCs were pressing for: the category of being a Least Developed Country within the UN system, and the routine special treatment accorded to LDCs in UN-associated multilateral agreements. Least Developed Countries are formally and specifically defined as "low-income countries suffering from severe structural impediments to sustainable development"[508]. This status is a historical one, emerging out of the development debates of the 1960s, formally recognised by the General Assembly in 1971[509], and has since been the subject of considerable institutional and donor attention[510]. LDC classification – in terms of both entry and exit – depends on whether they fall below a certain threshold on three core indicators: per capita income level, a composite 'Human Assets' index, and a composite 'Economic Vulnerability' index – as well as political decisions by the state to being classed as an LDC, and approval by the UN General Assembly[511].

[508] UN 2012: 14

[509] See Fialho 2012 for a recent history of these debates over the origins of the LDC classification; see also Hawthorne 2013 on the evolution of the norm of special treatment for LDCs in the UN system and WTO.

[510] A special UN office, the Office of the High Representative for Least Developed States, Landlocked Developing States, and Small Island Developing States (OHRLLS), and a joint donor-LDC conference every ten years, most recently the Fourth UN Conference on the Least Developed Countries, held in Turkey in May 2011, producing the Istanbul Programme of Action.

[511] Entry and exit processes are not, however, identical – a state has to agree to be listed as an LDC, whereas the recommendation of exiting LDC status is one that it has no say over.

The most important consequence of this categorisation is that it constitutes the LDC group as a fixed-membership grouping; its composition is institutionally defined by political processes not specific to climate change, but instead are determined by their broader economic development trajectories and pathways[512]. LDCs can choose not to participate in the work of the LDC group – but non-LDCs, no matter how similar their interests and positions may be with the LDC group, cannot be members. This membership element is directly linked to the larger and ongoing process of LDC categorisation – while only a handful of LDCs have 'graduated' from LDC status over the past two decades, as these graduations take place they similarly cease to remain members of the LDC group in the climate negotiations. The establishment of the LDC group, thus, is best understood as an instance of a group of countries mobilising politically into a negotiating coalition with interests that are *institutionally* shared and surrounding which they already had a shared identity. Indeed, like the groups discussed in the next chapter, the LDC category can also be thought of as a political *region*, even if not geographically-oriented, that shared a collective self-identification of being LDCs, the same identification that this new coalition took on.

That the Framework Convention *already* provided for special treatment for LDCs (Article 4.9) without needing an LDC group to agitate for its inclusion during the initial 1991-1992 INC negotiations illustrates the extent to which the overall institutional structure and political space for the LDC group to form was already present as a product of the 'UN' institutional context in which the climate negotiations take place. A relevant question here, instead, may be one of timing – why did the LDC group did not form earlier? For instance, the Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC secretariat, Michael Zammit Cutajar, had suggested earlier to some LDC members of the need to organise themselves a group,

[512] Only recently have some studies sought to consider whether the socioeconomic indicators and criteria for LDC status need revision in light of impacts and consequences of climate change, see Bruckner 2012.

because the LDCs were also organised as a group at the UN General Assembly, and when the group announced itself at SB13, he welcomed their formation[513]. That the group did form is still a reflection of their agency, as noted above, especially given the social pressures coming from other developing countries – but this is a grouping where its rationale and membership are all reflections of characteristics specific to a larger institutional process that provides it with a ready-made membership.

One final note, however, is on one consequence of coalition formation that occurs on the basis of existing institutional categories – that, like the G77 as recounted in earlier chapters, these categories provide a fixed membership without necessitating complete engagement by members of the coalition. Because countries become members through their larger membership in an existing institutional category and collective identity, their participation and representation in the group is more has more of an opt-out rather than opt-in character; in the same way that the G77 spoke on behalf of its larger membership despite only 66 members being present at INC1, the LDC group has always spoken on behalf of *all* LDCs despite the uneven participation of its membership. One chairperson, for instance, remarked on his frustrations at the lack of engagement by LDCs in the work of the group[514], comparing the group unfavourably to the better-organised AOSIS[515]. This point, in asking about coalition *effectiveness* is one, however, that is beyond the particular focus of this thesis and is made here as a question for future investigation rather than a key claim.

[513] Interviews with LDC negotiators
[514] Ahmed 2005
[515] Personal participant observation of the LDC group later in time, at COP17 and 18, also provides further anecdotal evidence of this point: LDC plenary meetings were only unevenly attended, with the chairperson frequently urging group members to attend meetings and participate more assertively in discussions.

The continuing salience of Southern appropriate association and developing country commitments

While it may seem, in light of this discussion of these new groups, that the norm of Southern appropriate association was being weakened, the norm was in fact appearing stronger. The new groups all demonstrated their continuing conformity to the G77, and indeed, on other issues, Southern appropriate association was even more visible.

One moment when G77 negotiating unity did appear under direct challenge came at COP4 when the conference hosts, Argentina, proposed a discussion of such 'voluntary commitments' of how developing countries (without QELROs in the Kyoto Protocol), could make their own declarations of QELRO-type targets[516]. The issue had, after all, been a contentious element of the Kyoto negotiations because of the US demand for 'meaningful participation' by developing countries, and only dropped from the draft protocol amidst the final-night negotiations. At COP4, Argentina's proposal ran into immediate and severe criticism from other developing countries, delaying adoption of the conference agenda, which was eventually adopted without the proposed item being included[517]. Argentina's position was a clear break from the established G77 position – and for some, this was a harbinger of future G77 fragmentation[518]. But while opposition from the rest of the G77 was not surprising given fears of a slippery slope towards binding mitigation commitments for developing countries, this opposition needs also to be understood in terms of the widespread perception that Argentina was acting at the US' behest, a reflection of their

[516] At the same time, Argentina announced its intention to declare its own target during the following year. One argument advanced by Argentina was that taking on such targets would enable access to the Kyoto Protocol emissions trading mechanisms (a point made by Estrada-Oyuela 1998: 25). Bouille and Girardin 2002: 146, however, suggest that this was speculative argument rather than the product of a considered domestic analysis and the result of a decision made at the highest political levels without much consultation within government or other stakeholders. Sari 2005: 37 recounts a meeting between Argentine parliamentarians and developing country delegates, where the former indicated their opposition to their government's proposal;

[517] UNFCCC 1998

[518] Tangen 1999: 178

close bilateral relationship[519]. Opposition from other developing countries, in this light, was as much about the substance of the proposal as it was about the perception of norm violation – about Argentina's *inappropriate* association with the United States.

The character of G77 opposition, in a way, reflects this point about norm violation. Countries that in the past had expressed sympathy for this substantive point – that is, for developing countries to be able to take on some kind of commitment, such as some AOSIS and Latin American countries, were silent in response to Argentina's proposal. The perception that the Argentine proposal was "an attempt to destroy the consensus" inside the G77[520] led a reaction that associated being a member in good standing within the coalition with a particular policy position of being unconditionally against any new commitments for developments[521]. This was true immediately at COP4 in a general wariness of "any hint of new obligations of what they considered to be associated conditionalities" [522]. Later over this phase of negotiations, including heated negotiations to conclude both COP8 and COP10, initiatives at discussing how developing country mitigation might happen were heavily circumscribed by the norm restricting AOSIS countries away from this line. At COP8, the effort to produce a 'Delhi Declaration' saw a pronounced clash between the G77 and the EU on the extent to which the declaration should reference the future shape of the regime after 2012, including the question of developing country mitigation[523]. Oil-exporting countries were seen as being in the ascendancy in influencing the G77 position in placing

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519 Argentina's willingness to propose the idea reflected the "full diplomatic press" of the US, as Rajamani 1999 noted and a reflection of the close bilateral relationship between the two countries (for instance, Mwandosya 1999: 100-101 noted the curious role of Argentine diplomats, especially Estrada-Oyuela, in suggesting that the developing countries did not need a united group position. By contrast, the US had also sought to influence the Bolivians in this direction, but were unsuccessful in doing so, as Jauregui 2001 recounts.

520 Bouille and Girardin 2002: 153

521 This may be thought of as an instance of negative feedback.

522 Jahnke 1999: 3. See also Rajamani 1999's discussion of developing countries' wariness that the willingness of Annex I countries to fund assessments of non-Annex I national communications was a desire to generate data on emissions that would later be used against them.

523 Ott 2003; ENB 2002: 14

an emphasis on response measures as a matter of adaptation and the implementation of existing commitments, with AOSIS being disregarded[524]. Two years later at COP10, one of the final difficulties also concerned the structure for future discussions on the post-2012 climate regime with concerns over developing country commitments coming to the fore again. Proposals for an informal 'Seminar of Government Experts' were only agreed on after specifying its mandate to explicitly state that the seminar was not the beginning of a new negotiating process or would lead to new commitments for developing countries[525].

This limited willingness of the G77 group to discuss the prospect of developing country mitigation[526] was certainly a source of frustration for some AOSIS delegates, recognising that "there is no way of circumventing the fact that some Member States of the G77 are major emitters of greenhouse gases" and the dilemma for AOSIS arose "by virtue of many of its members also being members of the G77"[527]. One way of looking at this is as a clash between the material interests of the AOSIS group, favouring a course different from many other G77 countries, and the social commitments of those AOSIS members who were also G77 members. The normative requirement of G77 association as appropriate for those identifying as Southern is most visible here in suggesting why AOSIS countries were not more vocal in articulating their differences with other developing countries on this subject.

Conclusion

The period between the agreement of the Kyoto Protocol, and the formal commencement of negotiations in 2005 on its second commitment period represent a period of transition for the coalition dynamics among developing countries. This chapter has also argued that clear

[524] Ott 2002
[525] ENB 2004
[526] Depledge 2006: 5 described this as a "taboo topic"
[527] Nurse and Moore 2005: 104

signs of an evolution of interests is also emerging in this period, even if only nascent, provide early signs of material differentiation leading to new coalitions among developing countries. Alternative explanations for these coalitions, particularly GRILA, that point to this differentiation, account for some elements of the emergence of these three groups. The discussion of the three coalitions that did form, however, qualifies this trend in its analysis of how social, identity-based factors continue to guide the formation of these new groups, even while they all remain consistent with the norm of Southern appropriate association in the G77. Especially so in the context of the Least Developed Countries and African Group, and to a somewhat lesser extent for GRILA, other collective identities – what this thesis identifies as being 'regional' – shape the kind of coalitions that form, i.e. ones that are based on a fixed-identity membership. No matter the extent to which the substantive positions of all of these three coalitions are shared by other Southern countries, their identity – as hailing from 'Africa' or 'Latin America', or as a 'Least Developed Country', preclude the inclusion of countries that do not share this identity. Indeed, the formation of the LDCs is a direct reflection of the 'UN' context for the negotiations where LDC coalition mobilisation is not an unusual feature of wider UN processes and restricted to members sharing that specific classification[528]. Informal alliances may certainly be possible, but as a group, the formal inclusion of such other countries would, in violating the relevant norm of appropriate association, threaten the very identity of that group itself.

For the members of these three new groups, their new commitments are instead 'layered' on top of, rather than challenging, that of the G77. In other words, the norm of Southern appropriate association does not go away, because these countries and groups still identify themselves as being Southern. At the same time, nonetheless, there is also arguably an

[528] Even while, acknowledging the point made in the last chapter that the UNFCCC is formally not a UN institution or treaty process since coming into force in 1995.

increased flexibility and permissiveness in the appropriate association norm, such that G77 members can also join other negotiating groups and not have their Southern identity questioned, as long as they continue to affirm their participation and commitment to the G77. This was always present to some degree, with the AOSIS-G77 overlap since the beginning of the negotiating process, but the wider diffusion of this practice to a wider range of developing countries can be thought of as reconstituting Southern identity in a slightly different way than was the case previously. That is, if the positive feedback process identified at the beginning of chapter 4 highlights how identity is continually in a process of being reproduced as actors enact those identities, subtle changes over time can also alter the acceptable practices for that identity. This will be more extensively illustrated in the next chapter, where the possible overlap between G77 and 'other' coalition membership is taken up by more and more countries in the formation of new groups – but it does not challenge the continuing normative requirement for Southern association in the G77.

Nonetheless, with the three new coalitions that are formed during this period, this chapter demonstrates the larger arguments of this thesis in its attention to the identity-based origins of developing country coalition formation. This explanation, via their respective norms of appropriate association, provides a more complete account of how these coalitions formed, especially with regards to their composition and membership, in contrast to the main alternative explanation of material divergences catalysing new coalition formation. Norms of appropriate association explain the basic composition of the membership of these three coalitions, as they have in the preceding chapters and as they will continue to do so in the next and final chapter of this thesis. This has not happened uniformly, of course, but it provides an important corrective to a purely material account of the bases and sources of how developing countries have formed their negotiating groups.

Chapter Six
Fragmentation? Copenhagen and new coalitions, 2005-2012

This final empirical chapter traces the most recent stage of developments in the climate change negotiations, where the subject of negotiations turns, with the 2005 Montreal COP11 conference, to the future shape of the international climate regime in a post-2012 phase, when the Kyoto Protocol's first commitment period was due to end. The period addressed in this chapter is perhaps best known for the dramatic finale to the 2009 Copenhagen COP15 conference, when a new agreement for the post-2012 era was anticipated to be finalised. But the failure to reach such an agreement at Copenhagen meant that this phase of negotiations continued, reaching some form of closure at the 2011 and 2012 COP17 and COP18 summits with the launch of a new negotiating process and deadline, the Durban Platform, at the former, and the conclusion of the two pre-Copenhagen working groups at the latter conference in Doha.

These post-2005 negotiations marked the reopening of a debate on the basic principles and structure of the international climate regime. The preceding phase of negotiations, as discussed in the previous chapter, had largely dealt with questions over the circumstances by which the Kyoto Protocol would finally come into force. Differences of opinion over the overall shape of the regime were certainly not far from the surface, but with the initiation of new negotiations at COP11 over a successor to the Kyoto Protocol, these questions were brought front and centre. In doing so, developing countries faced new pressures in identifying and adopting positions on what a future agreement would entail. These pressures have been commonly explained as precipitating a greater fragmentation among

developing countries, giving rise to new coalitions and groupings. This chapter, however, in tracing the origins of these new groupings, identifies a different logic – one illustrating the continuing arguments of this thesis – in how these newer coalitions are still largely structured by existing identity commitments and institutionalised cooperation, rather than reflecting an alignment of climate-specific interests. Indeed, it also illustrates the continuing long-term pattern where the North-South divide continues to structure the overall shape of coalition activity, where none of these newer coalitions 'cross' the North-South divide.

This chapter proceeds as follows. The first section offers a brief overview of the main developments in the evolution of the regime over this time period that provides the backdrop for the more specific discussions of each coalition later in the chapter. The second then addresses the common critique of Southern 'fragmentation' that has been advanced by many. Against this narrative, this section also sets out the argument of this chapter that nuances and qualifies this perspective, highlighting the extent to which the new coalitions surrounding Copenhagen and after instead reflect the continuing salience of social identities underpinning their formation, rather than climate-specific material interests.

The remaining sections then introduce these groups in turn: the third section groups five of these together, as they demonstrate similar origins in their respective regional organisations that provides a basis for their establishment as negotiating coalitions in the UNFCCC process; the fourth section considers the Mountainous Landlocked Developing Countries as a coalition with a focused interest, but whose identity is based on an existing institutional categorisation; the fifth examines BASIC's origins, identifying a prior pattern of cooperation in the G8+5 process where its institutionalisation gave raise to a new political identity; the sixth section turns to the one unambiguous interest-based negotiating group,

the Coalition for Rainforest Nations; and the final section then briefly discusses the two most recent groups formed at the very end of the period studied in this thesis, the Like-Minded Developing Countries group, and the Association of Independent Latin American Countries.

After Kyoto's first commitment period: Attempts to negotiate a new compromise

This section provides a brief overview of the main features of the climate regime's evolution between 2005 and 2012 – a phase that was intended to reach a climax in 2009 at the Copenhagen summit but instead faltered at that meeting, and continued with only a temporary resolution over the following three years. With the first Meeting of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP1) held in 2005 alongside COP11 following the Protocol's entry into force, political attention and interest began to turn towards a successor agreement. The Protocol's first commitment period – the period to which the quantitative targets for Annex I countries agreed in Kyoto applied – was due to end in 2012, and the subject of discussions began to turn to what post-2012 arrangements would look like. At COP11/CMP1 a new process was initiated to negotiate further targets for Annex I countries in a second commitment period to begin in 2012 – what was known as the Ad-Hoc Working Group on the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP). The commitments negotiated within this group would, however, only address Annex I parties to the Kyoto Protocol – thus not including developing countries, or the United States, which had withdrawn from the Protocol in 2001. At the 2007 COP13 conference in Bali, Indonesia, thus, a second process was also initiated – the Ad-Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA), to provide a negotiating process for other parties to take action and make commitments distinct from the specific architecture of the Protocol itself. The mandate for the AWG-LCA, known as the Bali Action Plan (BAP), set out a wide-ranging agenda for an envisaged agreement:

'Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions' (NAMAs), meaning mitigation commitments by Annex I countries "comparable" among developed countries, and by non-Annex I countries "in the context of sustainable development"; action on adaptation; action on technology transfer to support mitigation and adaptation actions; and on financial resources to support all of the above[529].

Taken together, the KP and LCA working groups constituted the 'twin-track process' that was intended to come to a resolution at the 2009 Copenhagen conference in order for a new agreement to be in force by 2012 when the Kyoto Protocol's first commitment period ended. Billed as a heads-of-state conference, the Copenhagen summit dramatically failed to come to a conclusion, running over time and producing only a three-page political declaration from negotiations among a limited group of world leaders termed the 'Copenhagen Accord' – but which itself failed to be formally adopted by the conference and was simply 'noted' instead. The three years after Copenhagen became instead an effort to 'save the multilateral process'[530]. Various packages of individual decisions were agreed at the three successive COPs: the Cancun Agreements in 2010, the Durban Platform in 2011, and the Doha Climate Gateway in 2012. Each entailed small steps being taken on the various agenda items, representing an attempt to proceed in a more incremental manner and less of a 'big bang', whole-treaty fashion: the Cancun Agreements established a series of new institutional processes to advance continued attention to specific issues[531]; the Durban Platform set out the mandate for a new legal agreement to be concluded by 2015 and enter into force by 2020, when the Kyoto Protocol's second commitment period ends[532]; and the Doha Climate Gateway formally closed the KP and LCA working groups by agreeing the

[529] Decision 1/CP.13
[530] See Grubb 2013's review of the sum of these developments over 2010-2012.
[531] The Adaptation Committee, Technology Executive Committee, Standing Committee, Green Climate Fund.
[532] Decision 1/CP.17

terms for the Protocol's second commitment period, and agreeing further action and processes to complete the LCA group's agenda and mandate[533].

Coalition proliferation: the fragmentation of the South?

In the midst of this description of the broad trajectory of the evolution of the climate regime, coalition dynamics among developing countries became considerably more complex; as Figure 1 and Illustration 1 in the introductory chapter sets out, this period constituted a period of considerable growth in the number of coalitions of developing countries. Table 10 below provides a listing focusing solely on these groups; other attempts to understand the dynamics arising from these new coalitions are reflected in the type of analysis produced by Castro and colleagues in Illustration 2 in the introductory chapter, mapping the overlapping character of membership among these different coalitions.

Coalition	**First plenary statement**	**Other initial activity**
Central American Integration System (SICA)	2009 COP15	
Arab Group	2009 COP15	
Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA)	2009 COP 15	
Mountainous Landlocked Developing Countries (MLDCs)	2010 AWG-LCA10	
Coalition of Rainforest Nations (CfRN)	2010 COP16	Activity initiated in 2005
BASIC	2011 COP17	Summits held from 2009
Congo Basin countries	2007 COP13	
Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC)	2012 AWG	
Association of Independent Latin American Countries (AILAC)	2012 COP18	

Table 10: New coalitions in the 2005-2012 phase of negotiations

[533] Decision 1/CP.18

This pattern has been commonly explained in the years since Copenhagen by the argument that developing countries are undergoing a period of fragmentation: they are forming smaller negotiating groups among themselves and ultimately reducing the relevance of the G77 and China grouping in favour of more specific and smaller groups for countries to articulate their interests. These groups are now myriad, as the litany of statements delivered on behalf of these groups at opening and closing plenary sessions demonstrates[534]. For Roberts, the proliferation of negotiating groups among developing countries is one sign of a larger pattern of the renewed multipolarity of international politics, "as even small nations can now closely tailor their statements in the negotiations to their national interests along all four dimensions described above. A single omnibus bargaining unit like the G-77 and China has proven unable to reflect these kinds of specific and multi-dimensional concerns"[535]. Other analysts echo this perspective, frequently claiming that "the world today is fundamentally different from that of 1992"[536] and that "the coalitions that states use to achieve their goals in environmental negotiations have reflected these changes"[537]. Similarly, Christoff observes that "the neat formal binary of developed versus developing states at COP/MOPs has visibly dissolved into more complex alliances and smaller clusters of actors drawn together by their specific interests."[538].

In this view, the coalition developments since 2005 mark the formal reflection of the reality of increasing economic and material differentiation among developing countries – a differentiation that leads to divergent interests and henceforth coalition arrangements[539].

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534 At the opening of COP18 these lasted for over an hour
535 Roberts 2011: 779
536 Fuhr and Schalatek 2012: 3
537 Wagner, Hajjar and Appleton 2012: 85; see also Hurrell and Sengupta 2012: 474
538 Christoff 2010: 652
539 This argument echoes the general narrative about the differentiation and fragmentation that the South is undergoing, the best example of which is Zoellick 2010

But as noted in the introductory chapter, Table 10 here and Illustration 1 (from Chapter One) provide two different kinds of analysis that deserve further distinction. The table here charts when each of these groups made their first plenary statement as a self-declared negotiating group and presents a temporal view of these new groupings. It highlights the recent nature of most of these groups, both in terms of this particular period and the longer record of developing country coalition. The Castro diagram reproduced in Illustration 2, by contrast, presents a static snapshot in 2011 intended to serve a different purpose of their overlapping memberships even while all being confined to other non-Annex I countries, rather than crossing North-South lines. What does attention to their temporal evolution, as opposed to their overlapping memberships, tell us?

This burst of coalition behaviour is best explained through the changing political context, namely the increasing political status and public attention that climate change was receiving over this period. Various developments underpin this changing political salience – the engagement of the G8 leaders with climate change, especially at the 2005 UK-hosted Gleneagles summit; the launch of the Stern Review in 2006 highlighting the economic costs of inaction on climate change; and the completion of the IPCC's Third Assessment Report in 2007, expressing renewed confidence in scientific bases of climate change. In the negotiating context, with the beginning of a new phase and launch of new working groups from 2005 onwards as mentioned above, the prospect of a new agreement or protocol meant that a fresh opportunity was arising in the negotiating process to include new items on the negotiating agenda to be included in the new agreement. The rise of climate change up the political agenda with the adoption of the Bali Action Plan that had set a deadline for a new agreement to be reached at the 2009 COP15 session, had also put the issue beyond the attention and remit of environment ministers, to that of heads-of-state, with the Danish

hosts of COP15 seeking participation at this highest political level[540]. The key consequence for this thesis, of this rising place of climate change on the political agenda of heads-of-state, was that climate change increasingly came to be discussed within existing multi-issue institutions and political settings in the run-up to 2009. Climate change began to be debated in political fora and settings where it had hitherto remained off the agenda, at a global level from the G8 to the UN Security Council[541] and Commonwealth, and at a regional level in regional institutions such as the African Union, SICA and the Arab League.

The argument traced in this chapter identifies the origins of the negotiating groups formed over this period in their shared reliance on institutionalised identities that have been mobilised by the political importance of climate change. It is in this rising political status of climate change, and the response of existing institutions that these new coalitions find their shared logic of formation. The institutional expressions of collective identity are what have provided the identities upon which these new groups have been based, and similarly define the membership and composition of these new groups. While this general pattern plays out differently in each of the coalitions that have formed, it explains much of why these groups have formed in the shape and time that they have. This is, to be clear, a rather different emphasis of their origins that one based on a narrow climate-focused interpretation of interests, that might have been expected to lead to alternative patterns of coalition formation. The most important marker in this regard lies in what the groups define and identify *themselves* as – what they call themselves reflects in good part what they see the purpose and rationale of the group is, and it is this process of identification that the discussion of each coalition will turn its attention to. This basis of coalition formation,

[540] Making climate change a heads-of-state issue was a deliberate move and part of the Danish COP15 presidency's strategy to ensure a successful outcome at Copenhagen, as Meilstrup 2010 charts in detail.

[541] The UN Security Council had held a debate on climate change in 2007 for the first time (see a summary in Jaggard 2008)

finally, continues to illustrate the significance of temporal context in the evolution of developing country negotiating behaviour in also explaining why these coalitions emerged at the time that they did – i.e. why they 'clustered' around Copenhagen – as a matter of political pressures and imperatives that were not largely related to their climate-specific material interests.

A few sub-patterns exist within this larger argument. For some of these groups there is a clear regional logic underpinning their formation – not just a geographic association, as chapter 2 discussed, but a direct causal relationship between existing regional institutions to their establishment as negotiating groups, whereby these groups are premised on the identity and membership of their respective regional organisations. The sections below trace that for these groups – SICA, ALBA, the Arab Group, the African Group and the Congo Basin group – existing regional integration institutions provided the template, if not impetus and direction for the formation of UNFCCC negotiating groups where the groups identify themselves as part of these larger, wider political processes and institutions. In a different way, the establishment of the MLDC group is similar to that of the LDCs in the previous chapter (although with some differences): the category of a 'mountainous' country is also one singled out for special attention in the Framework Convention, and some attention is also devoted to them within the UN system, although not as extensively as it is of the Least Developed Countries category. Their membership and identity is also defined well prior to coalition construction efforts. The creation of BASIC also demonstrates, despite the conventional explanation of being a sudden, ad hoc coalition formed at short notice, had instead deeper roots in prior cooperation and a nascent collective identity emerging within the G8+5 framework, which had constructed a 'G5' of the four BASIC countries and Mexico. It is this initial political structure which was then adjusted for the

UNFCCC context as a matter of conforming to the Southern appropriate association norm. Only the Coalition for Rainforest Nations demonstrates what might be unequivocally understood as a like-minded, interest-based coalition, formed for specific purposes with a specific agenda to advance. Finally, the two most recent groups formed in 2012 – the Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC) and Alliance of Independent Latin American Countries (AILAC) – illustrate many of these dynamics, although these two groups are perhaps too recently formed to make conclusive claims about.

Different *social* identities thus underpin the the formation of these new coalitions of developing countries, an understanding that goes beyond a conventional assumption that they are premised on material fragmentation. Instead, what emerges in this chapter is a more differentiated understanding of these new coalitions. That is, not all coalitions are alike, or have been created for the same purpose, in contrast to the orthodox interpretation that these new groups are primarily driven with their climate-specific interests in mind. The next sections of this chapter explore these differences by beginning to explore the different identity commitments, and their institutionalised form, out of which the new negotiating groups have emerged.

At the same time, it must also be noted that the creation of these newer groups has not meant the demise of the old, even while it raises questions about the G77. If anything, AOSIS and the LDC group act with renewed vigour and activism in the post-2005 discussions. Indeed, to the extent that substantive differences have emerged among developing countries, these have come from AOSIS and the LDCs, rather than the newer groupings (with the exception of the CfRN). That is, while the landscape of simply how many coalitions there are now looks different compared to different points in the past, it is

not clear that it is in these new coalitions that larger political shifts among developing countries are taking place. Thus, for instance, on the key issue of the nature of future commitments and the specific matter of differentiation, AOSIS and the LDCs began to strike out a markedly different position from the G77 well before Copenhagen[542]. AOSIS, for instance, has clearly articulated the need that "all major emitting countries must, therefore, be engaged in global efforts to mitigate emissions, according to their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities", including both Annex I countries, and "major emitting developing countries"[543]. Senior AOSIS negotiator, M.J. Mace acknowledged the politics of this shift, that

> "In what might be seen as a radical departure from positioning by the Group of 77 and China (G77) over the years, AOSIS not only called for action by all major emitting countries (whether developed or developing), but also expressly called for *differentiation within the group of developing countries as part of the post 2012 package*"[544].

Similarly, in a review of the 2007 Bali negotiations, for instance, two Bangladesh negotiators involved in the LDC group discussions said that:

> "In the Bali climate debate, the developed *and* advanced developing nations have kept avenues open for increased carbon emission even though it is clear that further delays in reducing emissions would result in more climatic disasters, social imbalances and economic collapse of the LDCs. In the negotiation process the LDCs

[542] Although, for the same reasons discussed earlier in chapters 3 and 4, they retain their membership of the G77 because of their existing institutionalised identity commitments.

[543] UNFCCC 2007 (Dialogue paper 14)

[544] Mace 2008: 188 (emphasis original); see also Nurse and Moore 2007: 108: "In this regard, the time may have long passed for SIDS to continue travelling the '*path of least resistance*', which almost invariably requires a significant dilution of otherwise cogent proposals, merely to satisfy the special interests of traditional alignments...In their own interest, the SIDS must be willing to support the call for binding emissions reduction by all large emitters of greenhouse gases, even if it means temporarily breaking rank with traditional allies."

> were within the group of G77 and China but their 'areas of interest' on climate change were different. Even though the LDCs are a majority in the G77 and China, they could not put forward their concerns on several issues..."[545].

The important point being made here with these two examples is that the marked changes in the positions of some of the developing country negotiating groups did not come from the newer groups. These new groups make some different emphases, but the largest divergences in positions among developing countries were being expressed by these two older groups – AOSIS being established at the outset of negotiations in 1991, and the LDCs since 2000 – and not by any of the new groups that began to meet after 2005, whom we might have conventionally expected to have been formed with clear rationales that had compelled their creation to distinguish them from the G77 that they had all been part of. Indeed, it was AOSIS and the LDCs that were perceived to be the ones that were challenging the G77's centrality in an 'alliance' with the EU at COP17 in pushing for the need for a new negotiating mandate that became the Durban Platform[546]. And even in doing so, such alliances are only momentary as both these groups continued to associate themselves with their default, larger grouping – the G77.

The rest of this chapter now proceeds to trace the origins of each of these new post-2005 coalitions. The uneven 'fit', thus, between the shape and form of the new coalitions and the different negotiating positions actually observed among developing countries should prompt a more careful understanding of these new groups and where exactly changes among developing countries are taking place.

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[545] Shamsuddoha and Chowdbury 2008: 398 (emphasis added).

[546] Van Schaik 2012; the EU, LDCs and AOSIS had released a joint press statement towards the end of the conference, see European Commission 2011 and ENB 2011b: 30.

The 'new' regional groups

One of the more striking characteristics of the recent groups of developing countries that have formed within these negotiations is that while they are said to reflect the diversity of interests among developing countries, as mentioned above, a number of them are organised along existing regional identities, rather than being more narrowly issue-specific coalitions. This section highlights the regional character of a number of the groups that have recently emerged in the climate negotiations, and argues that this regional basis often has little to do with their like-mindedness on climate change issues, although it is not completely absent. What these groups share in common instead, are social origins in a collective identity that has been expressed in a larger background of regional cooperation and integration processes which typically have a multi-issue agendas that have expanded over the years as part of wider trends towards regionalism[547]. Of these wider regional processes, climate change is often only one part (if at all), and then only usually a very minor part. Their participation in the climate negotiations is just one fragment of a larger complex of institutions and processes organised along regional lines, and it is in the social identities triggered through these regional processes, and norms of regional appropriate association that we best understand their formation in the UNFCCC context[548].

This analysis applies to five of the groups highlighted above: SICA, ALBA, the Arab Group, the African Group, and the Congo Basin countries. In all five cases, these groups exist as prior regional identities, well-institutionalised within their respective regions and subregions. None of them are specific or exclusive to the climate change negotiations, but

[547] The 'new regionalism' among developing countries is also an important aspect of the discussions surrounding the meaning of the South; see Alden, Morphet and Vieira 2010: chapter 5; Boas, Marchand and Shaw 1999. On the new regionalism and larger regional trends in world politics generally, see Fawn 2009; Acharya 2007; Fawcett 2004; Hettne and Soderbaum 2000.

[548] And, as will be noted in the concluding chapter of this thesis, that the rationale of this group is not climate-specific, accordingly, hints at the difficulties they have encountered in making significant contributions to the negotiating process.

they have all begun to recently participate as groups in the climate change negotiations, holding coordination meetings, and regularly presenting statements, making submissions, and speaking as groups in plenary sessions. All of them, additionally, are consistent with the continuing Southern appropriate association, such that these regional identities coexist alongside the larger Southern one. The rest of this section reviews the formation of each of these groups in turn to highlight the regional identity logic that underlies a considerable part of coalition formation in the UNFCCC process[549].

SICA

The Central American Integration System (SICA) consists of seven Central American countries: Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama. Established in 1991 as a means of reforming the existing Organisation of Central American States, SICA was meant to serve as umbrella institution encompassing other regional mechanisms such as the Central American Parliament and the Central American Court of Justice, and including permanent councils of presidents and ministers[550]. Its creation, Dabène remarks, constituted the "institutionalization of a disorganized work in progress" of stop-start regional political and economic cooperation and integration[551]. Efforts over the past two decades, through SICA, at reforming the institutional basis of Central American regional cooperation have have had varying levels of success, reflecting the "centripetal dynamics of [Central American] integration"[552] and with only "moderate levels of foreign policy coordination" in maintaining a common bloc for trade negotiations through the 1990s[553].

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[549] For recent wider discussions of their respective regional structures and organisational processes, on Latin American regionalism, see Malamud and Gardini 2012; Riggirozzi and Tussie 2012; and Fawcett and Serrano 2005; for African regionalism, see REFERENCE

[550] The 1991 Tegucigalpa Protocol to ODECA; see O'Keefe 2000 for a general description of SICA

[551] Dabène 2009: 113

[552] Dabène 2009: 122

[553] Dominguez 2007: 117; Bull 1999; O'Keefe 2000: 261 noted that SICA countries did not "even coordinate their negotiating positions at these fora [WTO or FTAA meetings] (as did the Andean Community, for

SICA's remit is a broad one: treaties signed among its members in the 1990s covered a wide range of issues from democratic sustainability and regional security to social issues, as well as one of 'sustainable development', broadly defined. Among the many issue-specific secretariats that comprise the SICA 'system' is the Central American Commission on Environment and Development (CCAD), headed by a council of environment ministers, and which had been established in 1989 in preparation for the 1992 Rio Earth Summit[554], although a 2005 report remarked that it had yet to "establish itself in a sustainable fashion"[555]. Through CCAD, SICA's first engagement with climate change began in 2008, when a regional Presidential Summit on Climate Change and the Environment, held in Honduras, mandated that CCAD develop a SICA regional strategy on climate change (RSCC)[556].

Among its other elements, this strategy provided the impetus towards the coordination of a regional SICA position. The RSCC was finalised and approved in November 2010 in order to have the strategy in effect for the 2010 COP16 Cancun summit "to create *a sound regional position* based on positive public policy actions"[557]. Of this plan, one strategic area identified was to "Improve effective participation of SICA countries in international negotiations on climate change"[558]. Thus, as a result of the political direction coming from the head-of-state level, a 'SICA Common Position' was reached and approved by ministers for the first time ahead of COP16[559], a process which was repeated in the run-up to COP17

example)"

554 Dabène 2009: 114-115

555 Rivera and Midré 2005: 2

556 SICA 2008

557 CCAD 2010: 44

558 CCAD 2010: 74-75; Actions in support of this goal involved holding regional workshops on negotiating issues, sending more specialised personnel to UN meetings, and regional and national capacity-building activities to input into the UNFCCC process.

559 SICA 2010 (Common Position)

in 2011[560]. SICA countries had already begun to speak together, making their first statement at COP15 itself, and in the sessions since, have consistently presented statements at the opening plenaries of all the negotiating tracks and processes.

	Ecological vulnerability (impact vulnerability)			
Abatement costs (source vulnerability)		**Low**	**Medium**	**High**
	Low	BYSTANDERS	Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Panama	PUSHERS Belize Honduras Nicaragua
	Medium			
	High	DRAGGERS		INTERMEDIATES

Table 11: Classification of SICA member support for international climate change regulation. Adapted based on source data from Buys et al. 2009[561].

What explains SICA's establishment? In an interest-based interpretation of SICA members' expected positions in terms of ecological vulnerability and abatement costs, they do cluster around having a shared medium-high vulnerability to climate change, while all facing low prospective abatement costs, as the figure above illustrates[562]. The clear political engagement in the process of agreeing a common position described above – at both heads-of-state and ministerial levels – can be explained as a reaction to this shared positioning in terms of being all in favour of an ambitious new climate agreement. The attention to timing and the organisational form that this coalition takes, however, together with anecdotal data from interview work, suggest a different explanation. The discussion of climate change at the SICA heads-of-state level in 2008 (and the political mandate to develop a common position) needs to be understood as part of a larger pattern of greater political attention to climate change developing after 2005, and particularly towards the anticipated high-level summit at Copenhagen in 2009. That is, that climate change emerges onto SICA leaders'

[560] SICA 2011 (Common Position)
[561] For the purposes of comparison with the source data, Buys et al. 2007 use a different scale.
[562] Buys et al. 2007: 20-21 also noted this particular regional cluster of the Central American states

agenda at the time that it does is at least in part due to the greater political engagement with climate change during this period, which in this case manifests itself in the political mobilisation of the subregional organisation and its institutional machinery, *rather* than being a narrowly interest-driven process of responding to the costs and benefits of climate change or any dissatisfaction with their existing commitments, namely in the G77.

This argument is strengthened by the available evidence on its initial activity. Its two ministerially approved common positions for COP16 and 17 provide little distinctiveness from the general themes of the G77 approach – calling for an agreement on the Kyoto Protocol's second commitment period, the compliance of developed countries with their existing commitments, and the need for further action on adaptation support, finance, technology and forests. The only regionally-specific demands contained in these common positions call for the creation of a regional financial mechanism to meet the needs of SICA countries, and for a technology excellence centre to be located in a SICA – both self-interested demands that are value-claiming, but which differ little from other regions[563]. Anecdotal evidence on the manner of how SICA functions, additionally, suggests that this coalition is less interest-based than the positioning described above in Table 11 would suggest. One delegate observed that minutes of daily coordination meetings and plenary statements had to be signed off and approved by delegates from each of its members, noting that it was a rather unusual process in comparison with how the other groups function where the chairperson has some flexibility in the delivery of these statements and where meeting minutes are not negotiated over[564].

Instead, SICA's formation is better explained by being directly traced to the political

[563] SICA 2010; SICA 2011
[564] Interview with G77 negotiator

demand for a common negotiating position emanating from the subregional institution. The same delegate noted that the main purpose of SICA's meetings and statements was to be able to "satisfy our ministers back home", given the mandate from heads-of-state and ministers to agree a common position[565]. Competing coalition loyalties may be the cause of these difficulties, where Nicaragua may be more committed to the positions articulated by ALBA, and similarly Belize to AOSIS – in which case, the question that arises is why these countries saw a need to join a further negotiating group in addition to their existing coalition commitments? The point here is to ultimately trace the SICA's formation as a negotiating group that identifies itself as *SICA*, precisely to its larger institutional presence as a specific organisation formed for subregional economic and political integration. Its formation may be thought of as 'top-down', driven by the subregional political process, where the emergence of climate change onto the leaders' agenda of this subregional process triggered a demand for a common position, one which has been able to make general statements and demands for some special treatment, but which does not appear to play a substantive role during the main part of the negotiating process. In this way, its formation illustrates a key argument of this thesis – that in understanding the pattern of coalition formation among developing countries, institutionalised patterns of cooperation (in this case regional) provide a ready-made mechanism of coordination, and a defined membership of the coalition – but which cannot be assumed to always reflect a clear definition of shared interests.

ALBA

The Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America is perhaps best known in the UNFCCC context for the energetic rhetoric of its members – espousing what has been

[565] Interview with G77 negotiator. This observation also points to the methodological limits of relying on the ENB records – that activity, while still requiring effort, is not always a sound indicator of significance and contributing towards outcomes.

described as “radical climate justice” in its criticism of capitalism and specifically market-based responses to climate change[566]. What is less appreciated in the context of the UN climate negotiations, however, and the key aspect highlighted here is that ALBA, after all, is a larger project of regional economic and social integration among its members. The formation of the ALBA negotiating coalition in the UNFCCC process, this section shows, draws upon the identity and institutions of this broader regional construction that define group membership.

ALBA was launched formally in December 2004 by Venezuela and Cuba as the Bolivarian Alliances for the Peoples of Our America-People's Trade Treaty (ALBA-TCP), and finds its roots in opposition to the efforts to negotiate a Free Trade Area of the Americas through the 1990s. In the years since its inception its regional initiatives have been established in the health, education and energy sectors[567]. In the latter, for instance, the 2005-initiated Petrocaribe mechanism provides Venezuelan oil to its members with a low-interest payment method, as well the possibility of paying-in-kind, an arrangement described as “a direct assault on the money-based trading networks that have dominated the world since the emergence of capitalism”[568]. In the meantime, ALBA's membership has slowly expanded, including Bolivia in 2006, Nicaragua in 2007, Dominica in 2008, Ecuador, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Antigua and Barbuda in 2009[569]. A common ALBA response was coordinated in response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake, followed by a longer-term plan to contribute to reconstruction efforts, which, according to Thomas Muhr, “refutes the neo-conservative humanitarian militarism, whether legitimized by the UN Security Council...or unauthorized, as unilaterally enacted by the USA in Haiti in 2010, within the rationale of

[566] Roberts 2011;
[567] Muhr 2012a: 148 (Table 1 provides a more extensive listing of ALBA activities); Tahsin 2009
[568] Kellogg 2007: 206; Muhr 2010: 43; Altmann 2009
[569] Honduras joined in 2008, but withdrew in 2010 following the coup against then-President Manuel Zelaya.

'disaster capitalism'"[570]. ALBA's starting point in its self-identification as a 'region' is, in this way, not one borne of geography (for its members share no common borders, instead claiming to be of all of 'Bolivarian' America), but of a shared normative perspective on international and regional politics[571]. "The whole ALBA process," writes Paul Kellogg, "does not just implicitly challenge neoliberalism and the FTAA. That challenge is explicit and embedded in the very founding documents of the ALBA process[572]". Thus while ALBA is just one expression of Latin American regionalism[573], it is one that gives institutional form to a shared normative commitment of its members to question US-led capitalism and hegemonic practices in the region[574].

In the climate change negotiations, ALBA first spoke as a negotiating group at the 2009 Copenhagen summit, and was galvanised later during the conference by the activism of its two key members, Bolivia and Venezuela in opposing the adoption of the Copenhagen Accord[575]. This was preceded, like the other regional groupings discussed here, with heads-of-state political affirmations of the group's position at Copenhagen. A leaders' summit in 2009 that preceded Copenhagen issued a Special Declaration on Climate Change, ALBA's first engagement on the issue at its heads-of-state level[576]. Another heads-of-state summit, which coincided with the final week of the Copenhagen conference, issued a communiqué

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570 Muhr 2012a: 154 (Boliv. Glob.)

571 Riggirozzi 2012: 434; Muhr 2012c also describes this as being of a more transformational *transnational* rather than simply intergovernmental regionalism; Burges 2007

572 Kellogg 2007:202

573 For instance, its establishment was paralleled by another regional initiative, the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), responding to the failure of the FTAA negotiations

574 Riggirozzi 2012: 437 also characterizes ALBA as "a more radical departure from previous experiences of integration in Latin America embracing a *regional community* where social cohesion through welfarism rather than institution building are drivers of ALBA's construction of region" (emphasis original). Al-Attar and Miller 2010 discuss ALBA in reference to international law practices

575 While opposition by Bolivia and Venezuela was also on the substantive inadequacies of the draft Copenhagen Accord, a key part of their opposition, according to one seasoned observer, was procedural in nature, in being upset that they had not been included in the small-group discussions among heads of state that had drafted the Accord.

576 ALBA-TCP 2009a

decrying the state of the negotiations[577]. The substance of these leaders' statements, and ALBA's statements during the UNFCCC sessions have been consistent with the larger anti-capitalist normative core of ALBA identified above. Frequent reference, for instance, is made to the "climate debt" and "ecological debt" of developed countries to developing countries; the "imposition of a predatory development model upon the rest of the world" by the West as underpinning the climate crisis; the "commercialization of nature" and a rejection of market-based instruments and carbon offsets[578]. Indeed, in April 2010, after the Bolivia-hosted Cochabamba 'World People's Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth', an alternative conference on climate change described as being driven by social movements and participatory democracy, Venezuela made a UNFCCC submission based on the conference declaration, including, among other elements, a call for a 1ºC stabilisation target and an "acknowledgement of the Rights of Mother Earth" in the LCA negotiating text[579].

This brief introduction to ALBA's formation and activity acknowledges the shared ideological basis that draws its membership together in its appeal to a regional Bolivarian identity. At the same time, however, it also highlights the direct relationship between ALBA's voice as a negotiating coalition in the UNFCCC context and its larger construction as a regional cooperation and institutional-building effort that extends well beyond climate change, let alone the environment. Its existence in the climate negotiations followed a political directive from its heads-of-state, and like the other coalitions discussed in this section, this existence as a group in the climate negotiations is simply one element of this broader institutional presence. This regional presence plays a crucial role in constituting the

[577] ALBA-TCP 2009b

[578] ALBA-TCP 2009a; ALBA-TCP 2009b; Stevenson 2011 provides a discourse analysis of the main elements of ALBA's approach.

[579] UNFCCC 2010 (FCCC/AWGLCA/2010/MISC.2) (paper no.18); see also paper no.3 for a more extensive submission from Bolivia; the 1ºC stabilisation target is especially notable in its radicalism because it goes beyond even what AOSIS had been demanding, which had been a 1.5ºC goal instead.

identity of this new negotiating group as *ALBA,* and not simply as a coalition open to all brought together by shared normative positions such as demands for ecological debt reparations and seeking alternatives to neoliberal economic development. Its identity claim is, by contrast, geographically and historically specific: it associates itself with the wider Latin American and Caribbean region and with Simon Bolivar in particular. While its positions are consistent with this Bolivarian regional identity, what this identity is not consistent with – normatively, in terms of appropriate association – is the prospect of including countries that do not share this identity (i.e. from other continents), no matter the extent to which they may share positions with ALBA. The norm of *Bolivarian* appropriate association, defines and limits group membership to countries that had justifiably claim this Bolivarian identity.

An important caveat here, however, is that in the case of ALBA, the continuity between this larger regional existence and the UNFCCC is interrupted by the non-participation of some ALBA members in its UNFCCC negotiating activity[580]. While Venezuela's 2010 submission noted above was billed as an ALBA submission, the states associated with this submission were only Venezuela, Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Ecuador – and not the remaining ALBA members, Antigua and Barbuda, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Dominica. When ALBA made its first UNFCCC plenary statement after Copenhagen, at the August 2010 talks during the AWG-LCA session, the same approach generally applied (as it has at sessions thereafter), where the statement was made on behalf of the former five states

[580] A parallel point is that analytical care has to be taken not to conflate ALBA with the individual behaviour of its individual members, especially Bolivia and Venezuela. Differences have existed between them – which included being played out in the final adoption of the Cancun Agreements at the 2010 COP16 Cancun summit, where just Bolivia remained alone in refusing to accept the Agreements, while other ALBA members (Venezuela, Cuba and Ecuador) decried the limited nature and inadequacies of the draft Agreements but accepted their adoption on the basis that they nonetheless represented some measure of progress. See Stevenson 2011: 20-21; 24. National politics may also be a factor here, as a US Embassy cable in 2010 (US State Department 2010) suggests in highlighting the political benefits accruing to Bolivia in continuing its steadfast opposition to the Copenhagen Accord.

only[581]. The reasons for this non-association of the latter three ALBA members with its UNFCCC statements and submissions are unclear at present, but a plausible explanation lies in observing that these countries are also AOSIS members, and thus may have had viewed membership of the two groups in exclusive terms, and/or viewing their commitment to this existing group as taking precedence. Instrumentally, another reason may have been AOSIS' less confrontational approach to the negotiating process even while also striving for ambitious climate action, a difference which may have been judged as having more chance of success[582]. In any case, the effect is that ALBA in the climate negotiations is a partial composition of its normal membership, an 'ALBA-lite' in membership terms. The norm of *Bolivarian* appropriate association sets limits on who can be members, but in this case, it does not appear to have been strong enough to compel participation by all its members[583]. Importantly, however, it continues to identify itself as ALBA even with this partial membership, which illustrates how this regional identity and institutionalisation as a "counter-hegemonic globalization project"[584] has provided the basis for its reproduction as a negotiating group in the climate negotiating process. While this reproduction has not corresponded exactly to this larger regional existence, the crucial theoretical feature to understand here about ALBA's origins and formation lies in how the basic elements of coalition construction have been structured by an institutionalised regional identity the implied norm of *Bolivarian* appropriate association that constitutes both the identity and membership of the new negotiating group and the wider regional identity.

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[581] Stevenson 2011: 10

[582] A speculative explanation may be that the strident opposition of Venezuela and Bolivia to the Copenhagen Accord and a view that they were being overly obstructive is what may have discouraged the continued association of these three members with ALBA after Copenhagen.

[583] In the context of the wider ALBA project, this opting-out on climate change may also look like less of an anomaly in view of the instrumental, behaviour on other issues by other ALBA countries and Latin American neighbours that Burges 2007: 1353 describes, where they accept Venezuelan causes and the ALBA agenda pragmatically, only when it is the (material) interests of that country.

[584] Muhr 2012b (Reconstructing)

Arab Group

The Arab Group consists of the 22 members of the Arab League: Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen, and its activity dates from the first post-Copenhagen meeting in 2010. Here, as in the other subsections of this chapter, the Arab Group will be introduced and discussed with an emphasis on its broader institutional underpinnings in the regional organisation and identity.

As an intergovernmental organisation, the Arab League is an expression of Arab regionalism – one organisation in a patchwork of overlapping institutions at the regional and subregional levels[585]. Established in 1945 as a vehicle for collective security, the Arab League also serves as an expression of a larger 'Arab' identity marker for the countries of the Middle East stretching from Mauritania in the west to Oman in the east, in contrast to subregional identity claims such as the the Maghreb, Mashreq and Gulf[586]. The Arab League's origins and evolution in the decades since its inception have been the subject of considerable scholarship and analysis, with considerable scepticism over its effectiveness at both its genesis and recent record in light of perpetual contestation and tensions over Arab/national nationalism, economic integration, and how to address the Israel/Palestine question[587]. Even so, the Arab League's associated institutions have proliferated through a panoply of specialized organisations, committees, funds and agencies to address a wide variety of issues, ranging from its original security remit to economic, social and cultural affairs. The most relevant of these here is the Council of Arab Ministers Responsible for the Environment (CAMRE), established in 1987 and which marked “a turning point for the

[585] Fawcett 2013; Aarts 1999; Tripp 1995
[586] Hinnebusch 2013
[587] Barnett and Solingen 2007; Solingen 2008

Arab region as it provided the first political forum to address environmental matters regionally"[588]. Arab ministerial engagement in climate change only began, however, at the 2007 CAMRE session, producing the Arab Ministerial Declaration on Climate Change, ahead of the COP13 Bali summit at the end of 2007, as well as calling for the development of regional and national climate policies, its first such statement on the subject[589]. A number of regional initiatives, most notably an 'Arab Framework of Action on Climate Change', have been developed that are beginning to coordinate a shared response to climate change among Arab countries[590].

CAMRE's own institutional machinery has provided an organisational basis for coordination among the Arab states on climate change. Its technical body, the Joint Committee on Environment and Development in the Arab Region (JCEDAR), has two standing committees devoted to the issue: one comprised mainly of scientists and meteorologists concerned with scientific aspects of climate change and focused on the IPCC process, and one comprised mainly of Organisation of Arab Oil-Exporting Countries (OAPEC) experts focused on the UNFCCC process itself[591]. This role of OAPEC in the engagement of Arab states in the climate process hints at the dominance of the Gulf oil-exporting countries in the emergence and behaviour of the wider Arab Group in the UNFCCC negotiations, but at the same time continues to illustrate the way in which existing regional identities structure the coalition forms that have emerged.

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588 Gelil 2012: 150-151

589 CAMRE 2007

590 Regional UN agencies have also become involved, defining the Arab region as an appropriate level on which to organise action on climate change: the Regional Bureau for Arab States of UNDP has organised Arab region meetings on climate change, including meetings for Arab delegations to the UNFCCC process and has initiated a capacity-building 'Arab Climate Resilience Initiative'; UNEP, while organised differently into a 'West Asian' region that officially only covers the non-African Arab countries, provides support to CAMRE on climate issues; UN agencies in the region are generally linked through an interagency regional coordination mechanism that addresses the whole of the Arab region and in 2008 established a 'thematic working group on climate change'. See UNDP 2010; UNDP 2011

591 Gelil 2012: 159-161; Personal communication, Gelil

OAPEC is an intergovernmental organisation distinct from OPEC, restricted to Arab states heavily dependent on oil revenues[592], and like OPEC itself, appears to be heavily influenced by Saudi Arabia. This influence happens for a variety of reasons, of which the clearest are interest-based, given the perceived economic vulnerability of OAPEC members to a global reduction in demand for oil and gas that would result from an ambitious global agreement. This material vulnerability, following theoretical expectations, leads to an obstructionist negotiating position and the objective to defend the status quo in global energy demand[593]. At the same time, however, a similarly interest-based interpretation of the negotiating objectives of non-OAPEC Arab states would suggest different regional priorities, as studies frequently note the wide divergences in human development, energy use and environmental vulnerability to climate change among Arab countries and in contrast to the wealth of the Gulf monarchies, six Arab countries are also LDCs[594].

	Ecological vulnerability (impact vulnerability)			
Abatement costs (source vulnerability)		**Low**	**Medium**	**High**
	Low	BYSTANDERS		PUSHERS Djibouti Tunisia
	Medium	Egypt Lebanon Libya	Oman	Algeria Mauritania Syria Yemen
	High	DRAGGERS Bahrain Kuwait Qatar United Arab Emirates West Bank & Gaza (Palestine)	Saudi Arabia	INTERMEDIATES Iraq Jordan Morocco Somalia Sudan

Table 12: Classification of Arab Group members' anticipated support for international climate change regulation. Adapted based on source data from Buys et al. 2009[595].

[592] See Mingst 1977 for an account of OAPEC's establishment in the context of the Arab oil embargoes of the 1970s. OAPEC's current membership is Algeria, Egypt, Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, and the UAE; of these, Algeria, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Libya, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are OPEC members.

[593] Luomi 2011; Aarts and Janssen 2003

[594] Gelil 2005; Tolba and Saab 2009. Habib-Mintz 2009; Waterbury 2013

[595] For the purposes of comparison with the source data, Buys et al. 2009 use a different scale. The Comoros is not included in the Buys et al. dataset

How are these two interest-based explanations to be reconciled in a larger Arab negotiating position? Observers suggest that they have not and instead "the oil monarchies [have] advanced their interests at the cost of the needs of resource-weak Arab countries"[596]. The behaviour of the Arab Group illustrates this more directly: while the general statements of the Arab Group affirm the main themes already expressed through the G77, the one area of its activity and submissions is response measures, where Saudi Arabia in particular has an established record of demanding special treatment for the economic vulnerabilities of fossil fuel-exporting countries[597]. Indeed, the Group's statements at UNCCC plenaries have been exclusively delivered by either Egypt or Saudi Arabia, providing one indication (although far from conclusive) of the balance of influence within the group.

This unequal influence is also explained by Luomi in drawing out a variety of other causal factors, ranging from possible side-payments by OAPEC states towards their non-OAPEC Arab neighbours, to the relatively low intensity of interest that these neighbours towards climate change, allowing OAPEC to apply their greater negotiating capacity and resources to monopolise the development of the Arab Group's position[598]. But however explained, whether through economic interests or the asymmetries of power among Arab countries, the key feature of interest to understand here is that the coalition that forms is one that identifies itself as being the *Arab League* and therefore encompassing all 22 members of this institution. The coalition that forms is not a reproduction of OAPEC, even if its positions are essentially those of OAPEC, but one that claims a specifically regional identity that also precludes a common platform with non-Arab countries that might hold similar positions. It is a norm of *Arab* appropriate association that defines the membership

[596] Althaus 2012
[597] Depledge 2008; Barnett and Dessai 2002; The divisiveness of this debate was illustrated in chapter 5
[598] Luomi 2011

of the group

This distinction may be interpreted as being an example of instrumental behaviour where OAPEC countries are manipulating their neighbours into supporting them, as well as a further illustration of the weaknesses of the Arab League's environmental institutions, CAMRE and the JCEDAR, in being co-opted by a subset of its membership (as well as illustrating the weakness of Arab League institutions generally). Strategically, it may be a 'cheap' way of claiming wider legitimacy for the positions of this narrower subset of countries. Nonetheless, the choice of this regional identity is still significant for the larger patterns of coalition formation that this thesis presents. Coalition formation in this instance still conforms to regional lines, premised on an existing regional institution, even if that institution only has a thin and fairly recent engagement with climate change. The boundaries of the coalition's membership are identity-based, as that identity specifies what the norm of appropriate association is. The underlying interests may be different in character from some of the other groups discussed, especially those of this chapter, but the common point lies in that the logic of formation is still strikingly of the regional identity type.

African Group

While the beginnings of the African Group's presence in the UNFCCC process after Kyoto were briefly noted in the previous chapter, it undergoes a 're-founding' process of organisational change in the post-2005 period. The key change described in this section is the creation and formalisation of a link between the African Group of Negotiators and the wider African regional institutions, much in the same way as the other groups discussed in this section of this chapter, where the identity of the group mirrors the the larger political

and economic integration process of the region or subregion.

In the post-Kyoto period, the Africa Group's efforts at coordination had been largely restricted to meeting at the UNFCCC negotiating sessions themselves, obstructed by difficulties in organising themselves coherently. This changed in 2006, when, as part of preparations for the COP12 summit hosted by Kenya, UNEP and the African Ministerial Conference for the Environment (AMCEN) supported a pre-COP coordination meeting for African negotiators in September 2006 in Naivasha, Kenya. For the first time, a draft position paper articulating an 'African' position was prepared, and then adopted at an AMCEN extraordinary meeting on the sidelines of COP12, in order to be delivered during the high-level segment of the conference[599]. While previous AMCEN summits had discussed and urged closer coordination among climate negotiators, there had been little further action or oversight on AMCEN's part[600], and this 2006 pre-COP meeting and in-COP AMCEN session thus marked the beginning of AMCEN's direct involvement in the work of the African Group of Negotiators[601]. AMCEN's engagement *at this time* in the development of an African common position is directly related to the increased political attention resulting from Kenya's hosting of COP12 – billed as an 'African COP', the first time a UNFCCC COP had been hosted by a sub-Saharan African country, and with UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in attendance[602]. In other words, COP12 provided a prompt to AMCEN engagement with the UNFCCC African Group of negotiators, with African ministers meeting for the first time in a coordinated way as AMCEN, and not just a collection of African environmental ministers. Indeed, it is somewhat remarkable that the

[599] AMCEN 2006: Annex 5 (UNEP/AMCEN/Preparatory .Mtg-CC/1)

[600] AMCEN 2000 (UNEP/AMCEN/8/5)

[601] AMCEN summaries of their involvement in the UNFCCC process routinely acknowledge these 2006 meetings as the beginning of AMCEN's engagement: “The recent global preoccupation with climate change issues... required AMCEN to shift focus and concentrate more on preparing its constituency, the African region, to craft credible common positions and key messages on climate change” AMCEN/14/5: 5 para.27; AMCEN 2009: paragraphs 3 and 8 (AMCEN/SS/III/3)

[602] COP7 in 2001 had been hosted by Morocco; for COP12 being billed as an 'African COP', see ENB 2006.

2006 expert group meeting marked the first time that African negotiators had met outside of UNFCCC meetings itself, despite having made joint statements for nearly a decade since Kyoto, and similarly that the regional political institution for environment coordination, in AMCEN, had not had any major engagement with the UNFCCC process before then.

Hosting COP12 in sub-Saharan Africa provided an immediate catalyst for African ministerial engagement, but this coincides with the larger trend in the rising political issue status of climate change during this time: the broad scope of UNFCCC discussions were shifting after COP11 to the shape of the post-2012 regime; and the impacts of climate change on Africa had received particular attention in the IPCC's 2007 Third Assessment Report, providing information at a more precise (and therefore usable) scale about the consequences of climate change for African subregions and countries. With the agreement of the Bali Action Plan at COP13 in 2007, a clear timetable had been set towards a 2009 agreement at the Copenhagen COP.

The 2008 AMCEN summit, under South Africa's chairmanship, initiated ministerial policy discussions on 'Africa's Climate Roadmap: From Johannesburg through Africa to Copenhagen' towards establishing a common African position for the ongoing UNFCCC process, in recognition of the limited articulation of an African position until then. The experts meeting preceding the 2008 summit had acknowledged the difficulties faced by the African Group in making its voice heard[603], and in remarks opening the conference, South African environment minister, Martinius van Schalkwyk, "stressed the need for Africa to put in place agreed common positions on climate change, in order to combat such divisive

[603] AMCEN 2008 (UNEP/AMCEN/EGM/12/3): "Several experts said that the African voice struggled to make itself heard during international conventions, and the preparation of a manual for negotiators was suggested as a means of improving the negotiation skills of African representatives. Coordination between African countries was hampered by poor communication between organizations and focal points and failure to identify focal points clearly."

tactics [by developed countries], and pledged the determination of South Africa to strive to attain the objectives of AMCEN"[604]. The 2008 summit launched the 'African process for combating climate change', which would take the form of a high-level expert panel that would draft a common African position to be presented at a special session of AMCEN the following year, and forwarded to the African Union (AU) Assembly that year, as 'Africa's highest political authority', for approval before Copenhagen[605]. Thus a meeting of African Group negotiators in Algiers, in November 2008, produced the Algiers Declaration on Climate Change that served as the basis for the African Common Position, and this was modified, updated and approved at the 2009 AMCEN Fourth Special Session on Climate Change[606].

From 2006 onwards, therefore, African environment ministers, through AMCEN, became more involved in the work of the African Group of Negotiators; the rising political status of climate change heading towards the Copenhagen conference, however, also raised the political status of climate change even higher – to that of the heads-of-state level, in the African Union. The AU had been established in 2002 as the main pan-continental political institution, the result of reform to the Organization for African Unity (OAU) and its political and security bodies and organs. The AU Assembly is its main heads-of-state gathering, meeting twice a year, and at its July 2009 session, approved the position that had been agreed upon at the 2009 AMCEN Fourth Special Session on Climate Change. This AU Assembly summit, however, also established a new mechanism for representing this position at Copenhagen, and created a new organisational structure, the Committee of African Heads of State and Government on Climate Change (CAHOSCC)[607]. CAHOSCC

[604] AMCEN 2008:3 (UNEP/AMCEN/12//9)
[605] AMCEN 2008: 19 (Decision 2/I) (UNEP/AMCEN/12/9)
[606] AMCEN 2009 (UNEP/AMCEN/SS/III/6)
[607] AU Assembly 2009 (Decision Assembly/AU/Dec.257(XIII)); AU Executive Committee 2009 (EX.CL/Dec.500 (XV))

comprised eight AU members, the AU chairperson, the AU Commission chairperson, and expert African Group negotiators, and in the concept note drafted for its inaugural meeting, justified its creation by arguing that "One key gap has been dismal coordination of the African negotiation process. More importantly, there has not been visible continent wide political leadership on climate change negotiations in the UNFCCC process"[608]. CAHOSCC was to lead and represent Africa at the Copenhagen negotiations, with the aim of improving the political oversight of the African position in the climate negotiations and its effectiveness at achieving its aims and objectives.

An important element of this new and evolving institutional context for the African Group of Negotiators, however, has been that AMCEN is a regional organisation related to, but distinct from the AU. AMCEN was established in 1985 with its own secretariat hosted through UNEP, while CAHOSSC, as an AU committee, draws its organisational support through the African Union Commission. Heading into Copenhagen, the effective result was a parallel organisational structure to articulate the African position – one at the head-of-state level, through CAHOSSC, and one at the ministerial and expert level, through AMCEN – and thus leading to barely improved efforts to articulate this position at the Copenhagen conference[609]. "One representative [at the 2010 AMCEN summit] noted that, at the Copenhagen negotiations, the African Union Commission and AMCEN had been working on somewhat divergent agendas and that there was a clear need then, as now, for better coordination between them, to translate scientific knowledge into political positions"[610], an analysis that has been echoed elsewhere by negotiators[611].

[608] AU 2009 (concept note)

[609] AMCEN: 5 (UNEP/AMCEN/13/10): "One representative rued what he perceived as the discord within the African camp in Copenhagen, which, in his view, had undermined its position" See also acknowledgement in high-level expert group discussions in AMCEN/AHLPCC/3/2 paras.9 and 33

[610] AMCEN 2010: 9 (UNEP/AMCEN/13/10); see AMCEN 2010 paras.63-66 (AMCEN/EX.MTG/II/2) for discussion at COP15 among AMCEN ministers highlighting the challenges in coordinating the ministerial and head-of-state levels.

[611] ECBI 2010

The result of these continuing difficulties in sustaining a common position in the cut-and-thrust of negotiations and beyond presenting statements, was the 2010 request of the African Union Assembly for CAHOSSC "to establish a streamlined single negotiating structure at the Ministerial and Expert levels to replace the current coordinating mechanism"[612], a clear acknowledgment of the confusion and uncertainty encountered up until that point. The question of the institutional arrangements underpinning a common African position has continued since: AMCEN's 2010 summit considered AMCEN's status as one of the AU's technical committees[613], and a paper prepared for its 2012 summit urged caution at subsuming AMCEN within the AU Commission's institutional architecture[614] - perhaps a reflection of institutional and bureaucratic rivalries.

This brief account of the institutional evolution of the African Group's presence in the climate negotiations, focused on the engagement of African regional institutions to the African Group's activity, provides an illustration of how coalition activity and behaviour has been structured by and embedded into these larger regional institutions, and that their timing depends on the shifting context of negotiations. Indeed, it should also prompt the problematisation of why a pan-continental African negotiating group should exist at all, for African countries demonstrate the same diverse vulnerabilities to climate change as developing countries more generally, as the Table 13 below illustrates[615]. That Africa is the only one of the UN's five continental groupings to function as a UNFCCC negotiating group is often lauded[616], but following one of the key themes of this chapter, geographical

[612] AU Assembly 2010 (Decision Assembly/AU/Dec.281 (XIV))
[613] AMCEN 2010: 9-10 (UNEP/AMCEN/13/10)
[614] AMCEN 2012 (AMCEN/14/5)
[615] See also Alfaro-Pelico 2010
[616] Duff 2012; Masters 2010: 2-3; AMCEN 2009: para.11 (AMCEN/EX.MTG/II/2): "The Chair, speaking as AMCEN President, observed that Africa had a particular strength in that it was the only continent with a united position on the issue".

affinities often do not translate smoothly into common positions. Masters notes the pulls of Africa's OPEC members upon its efforts to reach a common position[617], but the same can also be expected of the African AOSIS and LDC members, who we would also expect to be attempting to align the continental position more closely with that of these other groups. The regional basis of coordinating a common position also introduces the wider tensions of regional rivalries into the internal politics of such efforts at coordination. Thus, for instance, while China's relationship with Sudan has often been noted in the context of the context of Sudan's chairmanship of the G77 in 2009[618], regional tensions between Sudan and Ethiopia, the latter as CAHOSCC chair, may go some way to accounting for the accusations leveled by Sudan at Ethiopia about breaking G77 solidarity after Ethiopia's then-President, Meles Zenawi returned from mid-COP summitry with French President Nicolas Sarkozy[619]. This latter example also points to the leverage that bilateral relationships have over efforts to sustain an African common position. Hoste and Anderson similarly speculate about the Japan's influence over Kenya at COP16[620].

	Ecological vulnerability (impact vulnerability)			
Abatement costs (source vulnerability)		**Low**	**Medium**	**High**
	Low	BYSTANDERS DR Congo	Cameroon Cote d'Ivoire Gabon Ghana Sierra Leone Togo	PUSHERS Benin Botswana Djibouti Ethiopia Guinea Guinea-Bissau Madagascar Mozambique Namibia Senegal Tunisia Zambia
	Medium	Egypt Libya Uganda	Burkina Faso Central African Republic Chad Congo	Algeria Angola Eritrea Gambia

[617] Masters 2011: 263-264
[618] Lynas 2009; Kornegay 2010
[619] Hoste and Anderson 2011; Chandani 2010: 215
[620] Hoste and Anderson 2011

			Kenya Mali Tanzania	Malawi Mauritania Niger
	High	DRAGGERS Burundi	Equatorial Guinea Lesotho Nigeria Rwanda South Africa Swaziland	INTERMEDIATES Liberia Morocco Somalia Sudan Zimbabwe

Table 13: Classification of African countries' support for international climate change regulation. Adapted based on source data from Buys et al. 2009[621].

What this record ultimately suggests, however, is that both in the initial caucusing of African negotiators described in the previous chapter, and the sustained engagement of regional bodies (AMCEN, and the AU through CAHOSSC) recounted here, is a continued effort to coordinate a joint position despite repeated obstacles and frustrations to successfully doing so. There has been a continued effort to coordinate as an African group – an effort that appears to originate not solely (or perhaps even primarily) from an issue-specific identification of shared interests and vulnerabilities, but in terms of a larger collective identity that justifies these efforts as being consistent and appropriate with this identity construction. These efforts in forging a common position are less surprising in light of the wider efforts that African countries have made in producing common positions across a variety of issue areas and domains: "Common positions have also become a norm as part of Africa's search for its actor status in a changing international society...Common positions have become the main means by which Africa has given meaning to its actorness and activism in multilateral negotiations..."[622]. This collective identity of being *African* is far from a monolithic social construction – the organisational tensions between AMCEN and CAHOSSC reflect in some way differences in how to proceed in expressing this collective identity – but the key point emerging from this discussion lies in emphasising the *African* identification of this negotiating group, one expression of a larger regional identity and not

[621] For the purposes of comparison with the source data, Buys et al. 2007 use a different scale.
[622] Zondi 2013

one that is climate-specific.

Congo Basin countries

The final coalition whose origins can be identified in regional terms is the Congo Basin group, which also regularly presents statements and submissions[623]. This coalition, which focuses exclusively on forest issues (and in effect is a regional subset of the Coalition for Rainforest Nations, discussed later in the chapter) compromises ten countries: Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, and are all Francophone Central African countries sharing in the Congo Basin rivershed, the second-largest tropical forest after the Amazon region[624]. The key point for the purposes of this thesis, however, is the recognition that this coalition is underpinned by a subregional institution – the Commission des Forêts d'Afrique Centrale (COMIFAC), established in 2005 by the Treaty on the Conservation and Sustainable Management of Forest Ecosystems in Central Africa and to Establish the Central African Forests Commission. While COMIFAC is one institution in a larger system of regional initiatives and domestic legislation that seeks to govern regional forest management[625], the activism and establishment of the Congo Basin group as a negotiating coalition has a clear institutional mandate from COMIFAC.

The key concern that underpins the Congo Basin group's activity is its emphasis on forest

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623 FCCC/SBSTA/2006/MISC.5; FCCC/SBSTA/2007/MISC.2; FCCC/SBSTA/2007/MISC.14; FCCC/SBSTA/2008/MISC.4; FCCC/SBSTA/2009/MISC.2; and FCCC/AWGLCA/2012/MISC.3/ADD.2

624 Angola is also an observer state; see Hoare 2007 for an introduction to the Congo Basin's significance for forests and carbon

625 Assembe-Mvondo 2009; other regional initiatives distinct from COMIFAC include the 'Type 2' Congo Basin Forest Partnership, and the Conference on Dense and Humid Forest Ecosystem in Central Africa, but Compagnon et al. 2011: 97 argue that COMIFAC "can be seen as the main site of coordination and guidance, since other projects and organizations use the COMIFAC "Plan de Convergence" and its ten policy principles as a common roadmap". The significance of the Congo Basin region for REDD+ efforts means that it is also the subject of growing scholarly and policy attention about the progress and prospects for REDD activities; see Brown, Smit et al. 2011;

degradation in the UNFCCC debates on REDD+ as separate from deforestation, largely because of their own special circumstances[626]. Forest degradation refers to a "diminution of carbon stock per hectare which does not result in a reduction/destruction of forest cover"[627], a concept distinct from deforestation, which is defined as involving a loss of forest cover, and the situation that the Congo Basin countries find themselves in, having low deforestation but high degradation rates. Their negotiating activity since their first submission in 2006, while sharing much with the Coalition for Rainforest Nations in supporting the development of a REDD+ mechanism, has sought to ensure that forest degradation are included in this mechanism: "Central African countries think that those efforts [to address degradation] benefit the climate and that they should be encouraged. To this end, they are asking for their integration in the future regime"[628]. Thus the evolution of the UNFCCC REDD+ discussions from 'RED' (reducing emissions from deforestation) in 2005, to 'REDD' (reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation) by 2007 (and then later to 'REDD+' by Copenhagen) reflected their negotiating objectives, as did acceptance of the framework of 'sustainable forest management' (SFM), a notion that forests could be 'sustainably' exploited rather than simply declared off-limits and conserved[629]. Another key emphasis of the Congo Basin countries was that the development of reference deforestation levels for a REDD+ market-based mechanism (against which reducing deforestation would be measured and rewarded) should not be based solely on historical levels, as this would disadvantage countries (like themselves) with low historical deforestation rates. Instead, such reference levels should also have a "development adjustment factor" applied to take into account future emissions growth resulting from

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626 Potvin and Bovarnik 2008: 267; FCCC/SBSTA/2007MISC.14, pp.25-35.
627 Congo Basin submission, FCCC/SBSTA/2007/MISC.2, pp.35-51.
628 FCCC/SBSTA/2006/Misc.5: 72
629 Pistorius 2012; Logan-Hines, Evidente et al. 2012; these authors also note that the expansion of the REDD+ concept, including the inclusion of forest degradation, has introduced considerable methodological complexity to the discussions over how to measure and account for changes, compounding existing capacity challenges in many forested developing countries.

development, while still rewarding countries against this adjusted baseline[630]. Finally, as discussions on designing a REDD+ mechanism were intensifying during and after 2007, their key policy idea, distinct from their support for the CfRN's proposals, was to establish a separate 'Stabilization Fund' to support countries with low rates of deforestation to support them in maintaining their existing forest cover[631].

In these ways, the Congo Basin countries are indeed a fairly narrowly-focused negotiating group, and where they share a distinct set of common interests is the context of the REDD+ negotiations, separately from the CfRN that they are all also members of[632]. Their establishment follows the emergence of REDD+ onto the UNFCCC agenda in 2005 at COP11, and may thus be interpreted as responding to the shifting context and agenda of the negotiations. At the same time, however, their formation as a coalition draws on an existing institutional framework and identity in COMIFAC, as the main regional actor on forest issues. Institutionally, COMIFAC's structure comprises of a heads of state summit, a ministerial summit, and a secretariat[633], and regional cooperation on forest management in the Congo River Basin is supposed to be guided by the 2004 COMIFAC 'Convergence Plan', which over ten 'strategic areas' sets out a range of shared goals and intergovernmental activities for research, monitoring systems, policy harmonisation, the joint management of protected areas, and regulates the exploitation of forest resources[634]. Part of COMIFAC's

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630 FCCC/SBSTA/2007/MISC.2: 40; FCCC/SBSTA/2008/MISC.4; see a sceptical analysis and response from Karsenty and Ongolo 2012: 42-43: “Congo Basin countries also chose to negotiate rules to maximize their chances of being paid without having to face difficult choices in the fight against deforestation”.

631 FCCC/SBSTA/2007/MISC.2: 41; FCCC/SBSTA/2008/MISC.4; see an analysis of this and other REDD fund proposals in Potvin, Guay and Pedroni 2008.

632 The group also notionally has common positions on the main (non-forest) areas of the UNFCCC negotiating agenda, as set out and agreed to in their ministerial 2009 Kinshasa Declaration, but their submissions and statements are essentially restricted to REDD+ themes.

633 While established in 2005, COMIFAC replaced an existing ministerial forum attempting to address the same issue, the 'Council of Ministers in charge of Central African Forests' (and that had the same COMIFAC acronym), which had itself been initiated in 2000, following the 1999 Yaounde Declaration made at the Summit of Central African Heads of State on the Conservation and Sustainable Management of Tropical Forests; see COMIFAC 2005: 19; International Legal Materials 1999: 381

634 COMIFAC 2004; Compagnon, Floremont and Lamaud 2011

early activity since its treaty establishment in 2005 was specifically about helping to organise and prepare a regional submission following COP11's initiation of the REDD+ agenda, work that it continued since in preparing other submissions and for regional REDD+ discussions[635], and the group's submissions are all prefaced by reference to their shared institutional background as COMIFAC members. A special working group among COMIFAC members with assistance from their secretariat has been the main forum where their submissions have been prepared[636], and ahead of the 2009 Copenhagen conference, an Extraordinary Conference of COMIFAC and Economic Community of Central African States ministers was convened to discuss and approve a common negotiating position for Copenhagen for the Congo Basin group, especially on REDD+[637].

For an interest-based explanation of the origins of developing country coalitions, the positions and origins of the Congo Basin coalition can be understood in fairly straightforward terms, attempting to influence the development of the UNFCCC's REDD+ regime in self-interested directions. But a regional dimension – both socially and institutionally – is an important part of the explanation too. Its political mandate and organisational basis arrive directly through a subregional institution, and its identity in the negotiations draws on this regional exclusivity in identifying itself. While its concerns are focused on forest degradation, it is the *Congo Basin* group, and not some alternative Forest Degradation Coalition that would be purely interest-based. The wider and prior institutional setting is a crucial part of how the coalition comes into being.

635 Gauer 2006: 131; Gauer also describes some of the other work that COMIFAC has sought to undertake.
636 Tadoum 2009
637 COMIFAC 2009a (Final Communique); COMIFAC 2009b (Explanatory Note to Common Position); COMIFAC 2009c (Kinshasa Declaration); the other main subject of this ministerial conference was about COMIFAC's broader activities and funding.

SICA, ALBA, the Arab Group, the African Group, and the Congo Basin group: regional identity and coalition formation

The formation of the five negotiating groups discussed here that formed after 2005 all conform to a common logic, one based on their respective regional identifications and institutions, as Table 14 below summarizes. None of these are climate-specific groupings, and all are rooted in existing and wider political and economic processes of integration, no matter how halting or incomplete these may be judged to be. In the cases of SICA and the Arab Group, both of these emerge out of regional projects for the Central American and the Arab regions respectively that were initiated decades ago. ALBA's inception is more recent, but it has still been sustained for over a decade. The African Group, while dating from earlier negotiations with efforts to coordinate since 1997, also sees a much greater engagement from its regional institutional mechanisms during this period and reflects larger patterns of pan-African regionalism. This regional pattern becomes more important to explain given the observations made above about the limited like-mindedness on climate change among members of each of these essentially regional groupings.

As in the other examples of developing country coalitions discussed here (and especially those of a regional nature), the shape that coalition formation takes has to be understood through existing patterns of institutionalised cooperation that provides a preexisting social identity – and therefore membership – to the new grouping. Some degree of shared interests, both material and normative, are not absent from the explanation, but what these examples demonstrate, as one of the core points of this thesis, is how existing institutions based on regional identities shape the form and composition of the coalition concerned.

Coalition	Institutional origins in regional treaty or organisation and ministerial responsibility
SICA	SICA and CCAD
ALBA	ALBA
Arab Group	Arab League and CAMRE
African Group	African Union and AMCEN
Congo Basin	COMIFAC

Table 14: Regional institutions and regional coalitions

This dynamic has to be understood as a consequence of the increasing issue prominence of climate change over the past decade, in particular with the elevation of climate change to head-of-state level that the Danish hosts of COP15 championed. With the adoption of the Bali Action Plan in 2007 at COP13, and the initiation of a two-year deadline to conclude negotiations, concerted efforts were being made to make the Copenhagen summit one of the largest heads-of-state gatherings outside of the UN General Assembly. The rapidly increasing political significance of climate change had a ripple effect through existing organisations, as climate change became a fixture on the agenda of these organisations, as the various political declarations at these summits discussed throughout the above sections illustrate: in 2007 by Arab ministers, in 2008 by SICA ministers, and in 2009 by ALBA ministers. The expansion of climate discussions onto the agendas and summit declarations of these other organisations, this chapter argues, catalysed the development of common positions within the framework of these organisations. In other words, because climate change *had* to be discussed within existing regional institutions as part of the political tenor of the time, common positions began to be articulated through these *same* existing institutions. This, in short, provides a crucial reason as to why the formation of these coalitions in the UNFCCC process, as these five cases demonstrate, conforms to the structure of existing regional organisations and follow the identities institutionalised within these regional organisations.

In forging common positions through organisations initiated for other purposes, the tensions between the national preferences of members becomes evident, as discussed above. It remains far from clear that these groups mark an 'improvement' from a universal, G77 structure of organising developing country interests or greater functional 'efficiency' in representing shared interests. This is because their rationale does not derive directly from any shared concern exclusively about climate change, in bringing together countries that may be closely associated in other settings, but where climate change presents a different set of costs, benefits, and interests. Instead, what this represents is the harnessing of an existing institutional process for the purposes of responding to the increased international political pressure surrounding climate change in the run-up to the Copenhagen summit, as well as wider trends in doing things on a regional basis. Accordingly, this type of group formation may be thought of as a top-down process, where it is the political impetus from a head-of-state level that drives the establishment of a group, rather than being a negotiator-driven process that results as an attempt to consolidate similar positions and approaches. The result is a coalition that exists formally, with a clearly defined membership, but is of questionable significance during the back-and-forth of the negotiation process itself.

Categories of vulnerability: the Mountainous Landlocked Developing Countries

A different type of coalition where membership is also formally defined, however, is one which groups together countries that share a common institutional classification that creates its identity. The Least Developed Countries group discussed in the previous chapter are one key example, in the mobilisation of a group of countries whose special circumstances were already recognised in the Framework Convention and negotiating processes. A similar group also emerges during this post-2005 period, where their shared characteristics are

those that are already institutionally recognised: the Group of Mountainous Landlocked Developing Countries (MLDCs), which at present has just three members: Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikstan.

It announced its formation at the closing plenary of the AWG-LCA session in Bonn in June 2010, although Kyrgyzstan had, in earlier negotiating sessions, announced its intention to form such a group in the future[638]. Its specific rationale can be said to arise from the shared vulnerability to climate impact that arise from being mountainous and landlocked countries. This was described by Kyrgyzstan in 2010 as:

> "the adverse impact of global climate change on mountain ecosystems, including intensive melting of glaciers, reduction of water resources, rapidly increasing incidences of landslides, mid-slides, floods, [which] are already causing casualties, biodiversity, land degradation, and considerable damage to the economy".

As a result, the group had been formed:

> "to raise awareness to the parties to the UNFCCC, of the challenges that mountainous landlocked developing countries face due to climate change, and to ensure that the needs to [sic] these countries are met in the framework of the UNFCCC negotiation process."[639]

Accordingly, this group appears to have emerged out of a frustration that the needs specific to the vulnerabilities of mountain ecosystems were not being reflected in existing discussions. At least since COP6, various countries had sought to draw special attention to the circumstances of mountain countries[640], so in this regard, this claim was not something

[638] Kyrgyzstan 2009, Statement delivered at AWG-LCA opening plenary, December 2009
[639] Kyrgyzstan 2010, Statement delivered at AWG-LCA closing plenary, June 2010
[640] ENB 2000: 16

new. The creation of this particular group, however, also reflects the institutional recognition of the particular vulnerabilities of its members: Article 8 of the Framework Convention identifies nine categories of climate impacts, of which two are encompassed in the MLDC group: "countries with areas with fragile ecosystems, including mountainous ecosystems", and "land-locked and transit countries"[641]. In doing so, the establishment of the MLDC brings into being a coalition based on a particular Convention-recognised classification, like that of small island states and least developing countries[642]. The pre-existing recognition of this group in the Convention provides it with the added advantage of being able to justify its special treatment by reference to the Convention's provisions for which types of countries should deserve special treatment. SIDS and LDCs are routinely acknowledged as being deserving of special treatment, but arguably all other types of countries that Article 8 specifies can make similar claims on the same legal justification[643].

At the same time, however, participation and membership in the MLDC group reflects a considerable degree of political contestation and where collective identity as 'mountainous landlocked' countries is only nascent: with just three members, the MLDC group does not come close to reflecting the larger pattern of landlocked countries as recognised by the United Nations, which includes 31 countries spread across the three main continents (although not all of these may be called mountainous). The only available explanation for this discrepancy lies in a rivalry between the three countries that make up the current MLDC group, and others, especially Nepal, that had reportedly attempted to initiate and

[641] FCCC Article 8

[642] These three categories of countries, incidentally, also share institutional support in the UN system through OHRLLS – the Office of the High Representative for Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Countries, and Small Island Developing Countries, each of which have a regular UN-initiated conference and specific programmes of action.

[643] Vulnerability, of course, is also a social construct rather than an objective given, as Barrett and Campell 2010: 159-167 and Klein 2009 point out. See also Leichenko and O'Brien 2006: 99-100: "It can also be advantageous for a nation to identify itself as a loser from climate change, to enhance its ability to negotiate for advantageous policies, technical assistance or compensation. For example, the availability of funds for adaptation under the so-called Marrakesh Funds and the GEF may encourage developing countries to overidentify as losers from climate change."

found another coalition of mountainous countries in the UNFCCC negotiations. The Nepali Prime Minister, at Copenhagen, had urged a coalition of mountainous countries in his high-level address[644], but before such a group could be established, the MLDC group was announced in 2010 by the three countries that now mark the extent of its membership[645]. In response, Nepal initiated a 'Mountains Initiative', which has not coordinated as a group in the UNFCCC process, but which has held biennial conferences. Meanwhile, although discussions have been held regarding the possible expansion of the MLDC group to a larger one for more mountainous concerns generally, no change in its composition has been reported[646].

The MLDC group has not been a very active coalition, delivering only occasional statements at plenary sessions since 2010. Nonetheless, its formation and the political rivalries among mountainous countries illustrate two key elements of the arguments being made here: the first is a further illustration of the way in which political attention to climate change catalysed attempts to form a coalition, with Nepal's interest in leading such a coalition being advanced at its head-of-government level, and the three other countries attempting to bring this grouping separately into being at Copenhagen itself[647]. The second, however, illustrates how this coalition is one that is built around an existing identity, one based in the UNFCCC's institutional classification of mountainous countries being classed as vulnerable and therefore presumably eligible for special treatment. The identity of the MLDC group in defining itself along these categories of being 'mountainous' and 'landlocked' is one that has a ready pool of prospective members – but perhaps unlike the

644 ICIMOD 2009
645 Khadka 2010
646 Mountain Partnership 2011: "The MLDC group announced that it is open to the idea of establishing a broader negotiation group for mountains but will continue to advocate the specific interests of landlocked mountain developing countries which are more vulnerable to transportation costs and food insecurity." See Khadkha 2011 for a report on the tensions between various international organisations and Nepal on the appropriate way to establish a mountain-countries initiative.
647 Kyrgzstan 2009

other regional groups discussed in the earlier part of this chapter, it is a pool of prospective members that exists on paper rather than already being expressed in a regional organisation of some sort. While political rivalries among prospective leaders meant that it has not drawn fully upon this prospective membership, this difficulty perhaps also shows the weakness of the 'mountainous landlocked' identity.

Cooperation outside the UNFCCC process: BASIC and the G8 Outreach Five

The final coalition that illustrates the larger themes and arguments of this thesis is the BASIC group of Brazil, South Africa, India and China, which first met at a ministerial level ahead of the 2009 Copenhagen summit. It drew significant attention at Copenhagen, however, from its role in the final small-group heads-of-state meetings that drafted the Copenhagen Accord, where these countries now not only seemed to be advancing their interests separately from that of the G77, but where they were also now treated as equals by the United States as the central actors in any global climate agreement, to the relative exclusion of the EU[648]. More than any of the other groups discussed in this chapter, BASIC's formation has been the subject of academic attention in the short span of time since its inception, often in the context of the emerging powers and changing trends in international order and influence[649].

Existing accounts of BASIC's establishment have focused on its establishment at a ministerial meeting just before Copenhagen – a hastily-convened group forged by shared anxiety and opposition to European proposals that had been floated to end the Kyoto Protocol after 2012 and replace it with a new treaty to be agreed at Copenhagen[650]. At this

[648] For various accounts of these meetings and the Copenhagen Accord itself, see Dimitrov 2010; Rajamani 2010.

[649] Terhalle 2011; Hallding et al. 2011; Papa and Gleason 2012; Hurrell and Sengupta 2012

[650] Or as Terhalle 2011: 342 puts it, they were "[u]nited by their struggles for economic rise and based on their shared assumption regarding national sovereignty..."

ministerial meeting, just ten days before the Copenhagen conference was due to open, these four countries announced their intention to coordinate their actions at Copenhagen[651]. The extent of their coordination at Copenhagen was later described by India's environment minister as being "virtually on an hourly basis right through the...conference"[652]. Since Copenhagen, the BASIC countries have continued to hold quarterly ministerial meetings, and they made their first plenary statement as a group at the 2011 Durban COP17 conference, an intervention which did not go unnoticed by observers[653]. The same question guiding the discussion of the other coalitions is raised here: what has led these countries to associate with each other within the same negotiating group?

While there may have been an initial context-specific demand for BASIC to form in late 2009, observers have noted the considerably divergent circumstances on climate change that they face, some of which is indicated in Table 15: South Africa's net emissions are considerably less than the others, although it is the highest in Africa; China's per capita emissions are close to approximating EU levels and is the world's largest net emitter, whereas India's per capita emissions are still very low but with these adding up to a high net emissions burden[654]; Brazil's emissions are heavily influenced by land-use changes and deforestation in the Amazon, whereas the other members' emissions are largely from fossil fuel sources[655].

Since Copenhagen, others have also highlighted different negotiating positions emerging

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651 Dasgupta 2009

652 Ramesh 2009

653 ENB 2011b: 30

654 Indeed, some suggest that India's development challenge should make it 'natural' allies of the LDCs. See Dubash 2012: 16-17: "In terms of development parameters India has more in common with the least developing and vulnerable countries than with countries like China, Brazil, and South Africa" and ecbi 2012: 5

655 See Hallding et al. 2011 for a more extensive discussion of the domestic similarities and differences on climate change of the four BASIC countries.

within the group, such as on the question of developing country mitigation at COP16[656] or on the legal form of the Durban Platform at COP17, where divergences among BASIC "seem to be widening"[657]. Similarly, while the need for historical responsibilities to play a role in how future mitigation obligations are determined is regarded as a core BASIC goal[658], the countries have struggled to present a common perspective on how exactly such "equitable access to sustainable development" should inform the negotiations: a report by experts from the BASIC countries in 2011 produced analyses with different emphases on how to calculate what such 'equitable access' should look like[659]. The larger arguments of this thesis on coalition formation, however, highlight two important elements of BASIC's establishment – the role of collective identity in BASIC's formation; and tensions between 'BASIC' and 'Southern' identity in shaping the composition of its membership and some of its behaviour since its formation.

Country (global rank by total emissions)	**Total greenhouse gas emissions including LUCF ($MtCO_2e$)**	**Per capita GHG emissions including LUCF (tCO_2e per capita)**
China (1)	10,081.53	7.54
India (5)	2,304.39	1.88
Brazil (6)	2,136.21	10.96
Indonesia (8)	1,170.02	4.88
Iran (11)	727.00	9.83
Mexico (13)	706.46	6.23
South Korea (14)	679.36	13.75
South Africa (16)	559.65	11.20
Saudi Arabia (17)	542.10	19.75

Table 15: Top non-Annex I GHG emitters, 2010 (Source: WRI CAIT 2.0)

656 Hoste and Anderson 2011: 5

657 Hochstetler and Viola 2012: 766-769

658 As Friman and Linnér 2008 chart, the original Brazilian proposal on historical responsibility in 1997 had faded off the UNFCCC agenda in the following years as the discussion became an increasingly technical one on how to model past contributions, rather than about equity in their distribution.

659 BASIC Experts 2011; see also Winkler, Letete and Marquand 2013 for a further elaboration on technical issues in calculating these. That the different parts of the report relied on different emphases and assumptions was observed by an AOSIS delegate interviewed, and a point also recognised by a BASIC delegate quoted in Hochstetler and Viola 2012: 768. India had sought to include 'equitable access to sustainable development' as a new agenda item at COP17 (UNFCCC 2011) but disagreement on the agenda meant that discussion was deferred to an AWG-LCA workshop in 2012.

BASIC and the G8 Outreach Five

The first highlights a specific precursor to BASIC – in the 'Outreach Five' process initiated at the 2005 G8 summit hosted by the UK. In hosting that Gleneagles summit, British Prime Minister Tony Blair had invited Brazil, South Africa, India, China and Mexico to join the G8 leaders for discussions on climate change and energy. The timing of this invitation was no accident, with that year marking the entry of the Kyoto Protocol into force and the beginning of negotiations at COP11 in Montreal, as noted at the beginning of this chapter, on the shape of the climate regime after 2012. The Gleneagles G8 summit established a ministerial-level 'Gleneagles Dialogue on Climate Change, Clean Energy and Sustainable Development' among the G8+5 that was to meet over the next four years. More crucially, however, the Gleneagles summit established a more formal recognition of the continued participation of these five countries in the G8 process, becoming known as the 'Outreach Five' (O5) routinely invited to G8 meetings rather than at the behest of that year's host[660].

The involvement of the Outreach Five in what was called the Heiligendamm Process has been the subject of much study[661], but the key point to emphasise here is that the institutionalisation of this process created a forum for these five countries to interact with each other on a closer basis, largely on the specific subject of climate change. In preparing for the G8 meetings, civil servants, sherpas and ministers from these five countries began to meet among themselves in advance and on the sidelines of the G8 summits themselves, taking on a quasi-institutional character[662]. In what may resemble the basic security community dynamic, however, this interaction also led to a greater degree of 'we-feeling' and collective identity as the 'Outreach Five' and not just a grouping of five countries. As

[660] Payne 2008: 530-532
[661] Ankiewitcz and Cooper 2008
[662] Interviews with Indian negotiators; a specific logo was even developed for these Outreach Five meetings.

Adler and Barnett set out, intensified interactions can lead to increased trust and the development of collective identity among political actors, especially within institutionalised settings[663]. Thus Lesage, van der Graaf and Westphal argued, "the designation by the G8 of the O5 countries has given way to the formation of a new *group identity* among those five"[664].

The argument set out here suggests a much closer causal connection between the Outreach Five and BASIC that has hitherto been advanced. While discussions of BASIC frequently refer to the deepening connections among emerging powers in various issue arenas, the G8+5 process is usually just one among these – on energy and climate these includes the Major Economies Forum, and in wider international affairs, the IBSA Dialogue Forum, the G20 in trade negotiations and the BRICs format[665]. Instead, there is reason to focus more closely on the Outreach Five process. Coordination for the purposes of G8 summitry over 2005-2009 catalysed similar coordination for the purposes of UNFCCC negotiations as the climate discussions in both G8 and UNFCCC began to parallel each other (at least on the subject of the role of the emerging powers) in the run-up to Copenhagen, and both processes largely involved the same civil servants and technical experts[666]. BASIC's formation in 2009 thus built directly on the experience and legacy of Outreach Five coordination – both in terms of functional cooperation and the development of collective identity, even if only nascent. As Copenhagen drew closer and China and India in particular feared the erosion of the Kyoto Protocol framework, the basis for BASIC was drawn from this existing pattern of close coordination on climate change in the O5 with South Africa and Brazil. Rather than being an ad hoc, knee-jerk reaction to anticipated developments at

663 Adler and Barnett 1998
664 Lesage, van de Graaf and Wesphal 2009: 269
665 Hallding et al. 2011
666 Interviews with Indian negotiators

the Copenhagen conference, BASIC's creation was closely structured by the Outreach Five process.

BASIC and Southern appropriate association

This understanding may be strengthened by considering the second element of identity in BASIC's behaviour, in how its membership relates to the Southern appropriate association norm. Three aspects of how BASIC's membership is composed are relevant here. The first aspect is one implied by this attention to the Outreach Five – this, after all, included Mexico, which BASIC did not. If the O5 provided both a material and social model for BASIC, why was Mexico not included? It is possible to read this exclusion in terms of Mexico being too materially dissimilar to the BASIC countries – with greater wealth and mitigation capacity, for instance[667], or more general differences in its foreign policy outlook in being less committed to a North-South interpretation of international affairs[668]. Equally important, however, was Mexico's *social* dissimilarity to the other BASIC countries in its identity and relevant norm of appropriate association. Mexico, after all, was not a G77 member despite being categorised as a non-Annex I country, instead being a member of the OECD and in the UNFCCC, a member of a coalition, the Environmental Integrity Group, that did stand apart from the G77[669]. Thus for the four BASIC countries, forming a new negotiating group with a non-G77 country would clash with the norm of Southern appropriate association in the G77. This would have been a violation of the social rule of G77 association, in forming a new coalition with a country that while still institutionally classified as a non-Annex I country, was not included within the boundaries of the 'we' community of the South defined and constituted by G77 membership[670]. The collective

[667] Rong 2010
[668] Wood 2008
[669] The EIG also included South Korea (also a non-Annex I country and non-G77 member), Switzerland, Lichtenstein and Monaco (all non-EU member European countries).
[670] One Indian interviewee explicitly referred to G77 membership as a reason for not including Mexico in BASIC.

identity emerging during the O5 process was not enough to displace this more deeply entrenched social identity of the South and the appropriate association norm implied by that identity of the G77.

The second aspect lies in considering an emerging power *not* included in BASIC – Indonesia. As Table 15 above indicates, Indonesia's net emissions, inclusive of land-use emissions, ranked it the world's eighth largest emitter in 2010, which was more than twice South Africa's; Indonesia had been a member of the Major Economies Forum as well as being considered among likely 'next' candidates to be invited to the G8[671]. If BASIC was an expression of emerging power assertiveness on climate change, Indonesia would be expected to be an eligible member. What is not widely known, however – certainly not recognised in the existing academic literature on BASIC – is that BASIC did make an approach to invite Indonesia to join, but *after* Copenhagen. Indonesian media reported an invitation by BASIC for Indonesia to attend its April 2010 ministerial, but also included caution by a former minister that "Indonesia must be careful because it could benefit China and India in its fighting for their interests against the rich nations"[672]. Indonesia ultimately declined the invitation[673], but it is the timing of this invitation that may also offer clues about the argument in this section of the origins of BASIC in the O5: Indonesia may not have been invited to join BASIC at the outset (i.e. prior to Copenhagen) because its positions on the climate negotiations may have been regarded as being too different from those of the four BASIC members – a reason consistent with declining the invitation when it did arrive in March 2010. However, another plausible reason – one consistent with the argument of this section, although for which there is no direct evidence – is that no invitation was extended at the outset because with Indonesia not being an O5 member, the

[671] Bowles 2008
[672] Simamora and Nurhayati 2010
[673] Simamora 2010

BASIC countries had fewer interactions and less familiarity with Indonesia. At the moment at which BASIC held its first ministerial meeting in November 2009, its chief protagonists, China and India, turned to the two other G77 countries that it was intensively familiar with, South Africa and Brazil, and not to Indonesia, whom it did not have this prior record of interaction with to provide a springboard for coalition construction.

The third identity aspect of BASIC's behaviour for its membership lies in the implications of group formation for the Southern appropriate association norm. As noted in the second section of this chapter, BASIC's formation at Copenhagen has been taken as the exemplar of a fragmenting South. Certainly, BASIC's perceived separation from the G77 was raised when the G77 convened in New York after Copenhagen and threatened to cause divisions on unrelated issues on the General Assembly agenda[674]. In the eyes of its G77 confrères, BASIC's formation raised questions about the continuing claims of its four members to continue to be 'developing countries' and members of the 'South': was BASIC a violation of the Southern appropriate association norm? The intersubjective nature of collective identity, after all, means that identity is as much recognised by others as it is self-declared. BASIC's efforts to make explicit its continuing commitment to the G77 in its post-Copenhagen behaviour are efforts to demonstrate compliance with the Southern appropriate association norm. This has taken two forms. Firstly, joint statements produced at the end of quarterly ministerial meetings have been careful to stress their continuing commitment to the G77[675], whether that BASIC "remain[s] anchored in the G77 & China"; or that "BASIC countries as part of G-77 & China are extremely vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change and therefore share the deep concern of SIDS, LDCs and Africa"[676]. Secondly, the BASIC

[674] Interview with New York-based G77 delegate
[675] Hochstetler 2012: 59-60
[676] BASIC 2010; BASIC 2012; the precise formulation varies from statement to statement but the essence and reference is the same.

countries have adapted their organisational structure to show that there is no conflict with the normative requirement for G77 association. By their third ministerial meeting, they had evolved the "BASIC-Plus" approach, extending invitations to other Southern negotiating groups to their ministerial meetings – namely the G77 chair and representatives from AOSIS, the LDCs, and the African Group, with the incoming COP president also included[677].

This continued affirmation by BASIC of their G77 affiliation may certainly be read in instrumental terms, as a move to avoid diplomatic isolation that would limit their ability to meet their goals, and such considerations are likely to be part of their reasoning. But this question over BASIC's identity as one of the various Southern coalitions is also mirrored in an ongoing tension about their larger identities and statuses in world politics as being 'developing' or 'emerging' [678]. That they continue to associate themselves, individually and collectively, as members of the G77 is to continue to identify themselves as being Southern. In the specific institutional setting of the UNFCCC process, as set out over the earlier chapters of this thesis, Southern identity is constituted by socially appropriate G77 membership. Indeed, for South Africa in particular, there is a further challenge in demonstrating continued association with its regional coalition[679], the African Group, particularly given its claims to continental leadership, both on climate change as well as in wider world politics[680]. Thus, its 'African' identity is constituted by a norm of appropriate association with the African Group, and the perception of breaking from this association, such as at Copenhagen, in turn threatens others' acceptance of that identity, or at least its

[677] BASIC 2010
[678] Hurrell 2006; Stuenkel 2011
[679] This issue does not really apply to the other BASIC countries, as their continental groupings (Latin America/Asia) are not negotiating coalitions. For instance, Hochstetler 2012: 971 describes Brazil as being 'deregionalised'; India and China have never been involved in regional coalitions on climate change.
[680] Alden and Schoeman 2013; Kornegay 2010; Flemes 2009

leadership within that identity[681].

The formation of the BASIC group in 2009 was, like the other groups, a response to the political context of the period leading up to Copenhagen. But it also reflects the identity-focused causal processes underpinning coalition formation highlighted in this chapter, although in more subtle ways: the first is that it was a coalition built on the foundations of existing cooperation that had begun to catalyse a process of social identification over the four years that the G8+5 process was alive for. It may be too strong to claim that 'O5' identity was the main catalyst for BASIC, but there does appear to have been a social process causing these countries to more closely associate with other than might have otherwise been the case. Secondly, it also highlights the possibility of considering BASIC as a regional coalition if a greater degree of 'we-feeling' and community comes to emerge among its members. This may not be so surprising, given that other emerging power constellations, such as IBSA, have also been thought of in regional terms[682]. But at the same time the existence of such collective identification may help to explain why BASIC itself remains together despite divergences among its four members on their negotiating positions.

Finally, however, this analytical emphasis on social identity of the negotiating groups also highlights the importance of distinguishing the different various emerging power groupings, because the specific membership of the group reflects an institutionally-specific social construction that makes the groups more than the sum of its members. It makes no sense analytically to speak of the 'BRICS' in the context of the climate negotiations[683], nor of

[681] Masters 2010: 4; Hoste and Anderson 2011

[682] Alden, Morphet and Vieira 2010: 183-185: “IBSA, on the other hand, could be seen as a sort of 'regionalism' without a clearly defined region"”.

[683] As Papa and Gleason 2012 or Davenport 2012 do, even while acknowledging the profound dissimilarities that Russia presents when attempting to discuss them together

BASIC in the context of the WTO or the wider UN system[684]. The specific states may be the same, but the identity of how the emerging powers organise themselves in these different settings reflect different histories and social purposes that are better understood by distinguishing, rather than conflating them[685].

An issue-specific group on avoided deforestation: the Coalition for Rainforest Nations

In 2005 a UNFCCC-organized 'seminar of government experts'[686] held as discussions began to address the question of post-2012 action included a presentation by Papua New Guinea on the need to address deforestation, particularly in tropical developing countries, and concluded with a call for a "Coalition for Rainforest Nations"[687]. This was followed by a proposal for a new agenda item to be added to the COP11 agenda later that year, "Reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries: approaches to stimulate action", submitted jointly by Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica, accompanied by letters of support from eight countries, marking the beginning of this negotiating group[688].

This move was successful in persuading COP11 to initiate a new process to negotiate 'RED' (reducing emissions from deforestation), which saw resulted in the firm placement of the issue on the UNFCCC agenda, as well as the expansion of the concept over the following sessions with RED later becoming 'REDD' to include forest degradation, and finally 'REDD+' to include sustainable forest management[689]. What began with a presentation by

[684] Terhalle 2011

[685] For instance, to highlight that "BASIC absorbed almost all those sources of [CDM] climate finance", as Hochstetler 2012: 63 does, conflates the sum of these countries with a single negotiating group; Kornegay 2010:4 writes in terms of the Copenhagen Accord that "Had China not joined India in association, BASIC would have ceased to be IBSA+China".

[686] ENB 2005 12(261); This 'seminar' was effectively a roundtable, but COP10 had been unable to agree on a formal negotiating meeting, resulting in this alternative title for an informal meeting with a general agenda and no mandated outcomes.

[687] UNFCCC 2005 (PNG SOGE presentation/proceedings); the PNG presentation was also made with the support of Congo

[688] FCCC/CP/2005/Misc.1; these countries were Bolivia, the Central African Republic, Chile, Congo, DR Congo, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Nicaragua

[689] ENB 2005 12(291): 6; see Den Basten, Arts and Verkooijen 2013 for a broad history of the evolution of

one country thus led to the establishment of a sector-specific negotiating group, with its membership growing from 2005 onwards to a current figure of 40 countries. The key goal of the CfRN was to return to an issue that had been momentarily addressed some years earlier in the 1998-2001 negotiating phase leading to the Marrakesh Accords but effectively suspended thereafter – the issue of avoided deforestation.

Avoided deforestation is based on the idea that governments of heavily forested countries would be provided with financial incentives to governments to prevent deforestation that would have otherwise occurred, such that conserving forests is more economically efficient than deforesting them for timber or other forms of land use[690]. This idea was not new, having been discussed in various other negotiating processes on global forests; the 1992 Earth Summit negotiations had, after all, intended to establish a forest convention along the climate, biodiversity and desertification conventions. As the previous chapter discussed, efforts by GRILA between 1999 and 2001 to include a wide scope for forest projects in the CDM project eligibility criterion failed, with the Marrakesh Accords limiting CDM forest projects instead only to afforestation and reforestation (A/R) activities. But in the years since Marrakesh, interest in avoided deforestation had grown and its emergence onto the UNFCCC agenda was the convergence of two factors: slow and virtually non-existent progress in other negotiating settings since the failure to agree a forest convention in 1992[691]; and the growing awareness of the mitigation potential in forest conservation, which had been only been sparingly addressed in the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms, hence raising the question of how to include deforestation emissions in a post-2012 framework[692]. Thus, avoided deforestation was a longstanding demand raised anew: "Some developing countries

REDD+

690 Humphreys 2008: 436

691 Dimitrov 2005

692 Streck and Scholz 2006; Forner, Blaser et al. 2010; Hunt 2009; Jaurgeui 2007: 190 described avoided deforestation as "a phantom travelling through the corridors of the COPs/MOP" until its introduction from 2005.

believe that there are more opportunities for realising financial gains from the FCCC compared to the UNFF [UN Forum on Forests]", a move clearly linked to "protracted North-South disagreement on global economy inequalities"[693] and in this way perhaps illustrates what others have called "climate bandwagoning", in this case coupling forest initiatives onto climate ones[694].

The CfRN's establishment responded to a clear interest-based demand among its members: "the push for the creation of this [RED] mechanism has been driven by developing countries and civil organizations which were unsatisfied with the final [2001] CDM framework, in particular the decision of excluding forest conservation as an eligible emission reduction activity"[695]. But, as one skeptic of avoided deforestation put it, in reopening "an old COP-7 battleground"[696], it also catalysed opposition along similar lines to that experienced earlier by GRILA. Chief among oppositions of the RED agenda was Brazil with a different perspective on how to address avoided deforestation through the UNFCCC process[697]. For the CfRN, the potential of avoided deforestation would be maximised by linking it to the global carbon market: credits for avoiding deforestation would be generated by host countries, which could then be purchased by companies, governments or other entities in the same way as the existing carbon credits, as in the CDM. For Brazil, however – and its earlier positions on forest issues in the CDM discussed in previous chapters is instructive here – its position has been to avoid linking its forests to global carbon markets, for principled concerns over sovereignty[698], as well as self-

693 Humphreys 2008: 437
694 McDermott, Levin and Cashore 2011
695 Boyd et al. 2008: 109
696 Fry 2007: 348-349
697 Humphreys 2008: 434
698 Fry 2008: 177; Okereke and Dooley 2010: 89 "There is indeed a strong sense among commentators that Brazil would rather have the Amazon as a desert under Brazilian government control than have it as a rich rainforest under the control of foreign governments."

interest[699], and instead proposing non-market-based bilateral and multilateral approaches for which a fund would be established to reward efforts at avoided deforestation[700]. Other opposition came from some AOSIS countries; for Tuvalu's lead negotiator, non-market approaches that did not generate credits to be used in meeting Annex I reduction commitments would be more environmentally sound than market approaches: "The significant difference is that if the [non-market] approaches fail, they are not directly related to an emission offset, therefore the climate change implications are less"[701]

Alongside these, a number of other perspectives on how to address deforestation have been advanced by individual countries, but here the distinguishing difference is over what should be included in a REDD+ mechanism, rather than the mechanism's linkage to carbon markets[702]. A looser group of five Latin American countries was also present in this debate, advocating the 'Nested Approach', a mix of project-based and national-based mechanisms[703]. India's approach has been to articulate "compensated conservation" such that "countries like India that have implemented strong conservation measures and regulations be suitably compensated", effectively providing finance to countries with low current deforestation rates in order for their own forest stocks to be maintained and expanded[704].

All these positions reflect clear self-interested positions, where the promotion of particular concepts in defining a REDD+ mechanism has been clearly associated with the expected

699 Humphreys 2008: 434
700 FCCC/SBSTA/2007/MISC.2, pp.21-24
701 Fry 2008: 179
702 See especially Parker, Mitchell et al. 2009; and also Potvin and Bovnarick 2008; Pirard and Karsenty 2009; Jauregui 2007 and Okereke and Dooley 2010 for further comparative reviews of these different proposals.
703 FCCC/SBSTA/2007/MISC.14
704 FCCC/SBSTA/2007/MISC.2, pp.59-61.

material benefits that would accrue from anticipated REDD+ finance[705]. Thus, for instance, variance among forested countries in the extent of remaining forest cover and rate of deforestation among countries broadly accounts for the differences in the positions articulated; countries with low forest cover and deforestation (such as India and China) have argued for an approach countries that incentivizes the conservation of existing forest cover; others with high cover and deforestation (such as CfRN members) have argued for an approach that incentivizes a reduction in the rate of deforestation[706]. These differences are intense enough that they have precluded any of the other established groups taking meaningful positions on the issue. In AOSIS, for example, Tuvalu's vehement opposition to linking forests to market mechanism has led to regular clashes in both private and public among AOSIS members, with the result that AOSIS does not coordinate a common position on REDD+[707].

In this regard, the CfRN is thus perhaps the best example of a like-minded negotiating group established to articulate a narrowly-focused set of interests on a single item of the negotiating agenda: it does not venture positions on subjects other than REDD+, apart from emphasising that a REDD+ agreement must be part of a final package outcome of the negotiating process. In drawing its membership from across the South, it transcends the regional patterns described earlier in this chapter and any reliance on existing institutional processes. Indeed, it has established its own secretariat as an independent organisation based in New York City, in order to better coordinate common positions among its members, and where its staff are accredited during the UNFCCC sessions as members of

[705] Fry 2008: 180-181; Okereke and Dooley 2010: 89; Karsenty and Ongolo 2012
[706] Den Besten, Aarts and Verkooijen 2013
[707] ENB 2011 12(504): 3 and ECO Fossil of the Day, 8 June 2011 to PNG for saying that "Tuvalu did not have enough trees to be entitled to have an opinion on REDD or advocate for the rights of indigenous peoples" ; Fry 2011: 125 "Within the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), efforts have been made to sabotage other positions of AOSIS if the group did not support Papua New Guinea's positions on LULUCF and reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+)"

the Papua New Guinean delegation[708]. At the same time, however, the model of coalition formation that it has presented stands out because of its rarity among all the other groups discussed over the course of this thesis. In this larger universe, it is very much the outlier in the sources of its origins and formation.

The new groups of 2012: LMDCs and AILAC

As the twin-track negotiating process initiated at COP11 in 2005 headed towards a closure some seven years later at the Doha COP18 session in 2012, further shifts in the negotiating behaviour of developing countries took place with the establishment of two new negotiating groups: the Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC) group, and the Association of Independent Latin American Countries (AILAC). Do these new groups portend further change in the coalition politics of developing countries? Both these groups emerge in a shifting negotiating context: in 2012, the future shape of the climate regime became much clearer after the 2011 Durban COP17 launching the Durban Platform (ADP), and both these groups have been formed with these new set of negotiations in mind to press for particular positions and outcomes in the ADP process. But while these are identifiable, their emergence can also be understood with reference to the arguments made throughout this thesis about how Southern coalition formation has been structured by existing institutionalised identity commitments. Nonetheless, the comments in this section are made with the caveat that the newness of these groups has meant that only a handful of public statements have been made, limiting the available record on which to base arguments.

[708] This role of its secretariat, and through it, the balance of influence among its members, has been highlighted by Okereke and Dooley 2010: 88-89: "The CfRN, which purport to represent the views of vulnerable forest nations, is largely directed by a small secretariat based in New York. Recent tension between some of the member governments indicates that rather than being a coalition of the consensus views of many nations, the dominant voice in the debate has evolved out of a handful of member states which may have vested interests in promoting a particular outcome. This was demonstrated at recent UN climate talks when PNG took the floor on behalf of the Coalition and affirmed that it spoke on behalf of the countries listed on its submission (including Bolivia) even though Bolivia had tendered views which differed significantly. The situation demonstrates the dominant role held by PNG, and the extent to which many members of similar coalitions may be unable to project their candid views on important subject matters."

The Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC) Group

The Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC) Group announced itself at the August-September 2012 informal negotiating session held in Bangkok, delivering opening (and closing) statements across all three of the negotiating tracks[709]. Unlike any of the other negotiating groups whose origins this thesis has traced to an existing identity construction, this grouping suggests a different dynamic based on shared concerns over the broad contours of the negotiating agenda.

Table 16 below lists 24 members of the LMDC group, distinguished by region to illustrate their geographic diversity. In the context of this thesis, the most significant feature of this new group appears to be the absence of any larger institutional underpinning, as has so often be the case. Instead, the choice to form a new negotiating group with a particular name constitutes an attempt at forging a new group identity in being 'like-minded' on the importance of a certain set of principles. As a result, the group's membership can appear somewhat fluid, with some countries being associated with some statements but not others[710].

[709] Although a larger group of countries delivered a joint statement at the closing plenary of the preceding AWG-LCA session in Bonn in May 2012. See Chiew 2012

[710] In each plenary statement delivered a list of countries associated with it has also been read out, with some variation; the 24 countries here constitute the 'maximum' membership of the LMDCs as observed over the AWG meetings of August 2012 and COP18, but not all of these countries have been associated with every statement. The reasons for these variations are not entirely clear as yet; they may be based on objections to particular elements of the draft group statement, but they may also be based, as one LMDC delegate has suggested, on logistical difficulties, with a country simply not assenting in time to being included among the countries associated with the statement.

Latin America and the Caribbean	Africa	Asia
Argentina Bolivia Cuba Dominica Ecuador El Salvador Nicaragua Venezuela	Algeria DR Congo Egypt Sudan Mali	China India Iran Iraq Kuwait Malaysia Pakistan Philippines Saudi Arabia Sri Lanka Thailand

Table 16: 24-member Like-Minded Developing Countries group, 2012

The relatively brief timeframe since the formation of this group limits the strength of any claims about its origins or purpose, but it has been characterised as a group constituting countries attempting to defend a traditional interpretation of the Convention's principles, in particular its 'common but differentiated responsibilities' (CBDR) element: the need for a firm distinction between Annex I countries and the others, with the former still needing to implement their existing commitments before introducing new commitments for the latter.

Its membership brings together various G77 countries that do have other coalition commitments, such as the the Arab Group, African Group, ALBA, and BASIC and undoubtedly further adds to the overlapping character of this coalition landscape. Perhaps, however, in this way it illustrates the limited nature of these other groupings in coalescing common interests – that is, that many of the groups that have gone before it have struggled to effectively articulate the negotiating positions of these countries, thus necessitating a new vehicle to advance these positions. Unlike the Coalition for Rainforest Nations, the LMDC group speaks on the broad areas under negotiation, rather than an exclusive focus on one specific negotiating issue. Thus, for instance, its early statements have emphasised, that the Durban Platform negotiations need to be conducted firmly within the structure of the Framework Convention, including its established two-annex structure; and raising the need

for agreements to be elaborated, in the LCA negotiating track, on intellectual property rights and the avoidance of unilateral measures, two issues anathema to many developed countries, and thus minimized by many other G77 members to avoid scuppering the prospects for an overall agreement[711].

The LMDC may be read as being a response and counterweight to the other developing country groups that have more forcefully expressed opinions on the need for all countries to take on emission reduction commitments, namely AOSIS and the LDCs, as noted in the second section of this chapter. The positions of these latter groups within the G77 framework has been said to weaken a more robust defence of a traditional interpretation of the CBDR principle that these countries favoured, and their mobilisation into the LMDC group suggests a recognition that working solely through the G77 would be insufficient to adequately defend their interpretation.

The Association of Independent Latin American Countries

In the final days of the 2012 Doha conference[712], a new group of Latin American countries announced itself as a new negotiating group, made up of seven countries: Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Panama and Peru and calling itself the 'Association of Independent Latin American Countries' (AILAC).

This group had been presaged by a tendency to make statements as a collection of countries in preceding sessions, but without self-identifying as a negotiating group. Their formation has been justified on the basis of providing a different approach, one less focused on the defending the significance of the Framework Convention's annex structure as a basis for

[711] ENB 2012; Raman 2012
[712] An AWG-LCA contact group at which the author was present.

making future commitments on emissions mitigation action. Early commentary and analysis has portrayed AILAC as a "new progressive force", pointing to the association of various members in the Cartagena Dialogue that had brought together negotiators from both developed and developing countries in an informal setting separate from the UNFCCC sessions. AILAC's membership is composed of middle-income countries who, according to Roberts and Edwards, "have decided to stop waiting for emissions reductions or financial support from wealthy countries like the U.S., and launch an ambitious case for low-carbon development at home and abroad."[713]. This position – a willingness to to move towards low-carbon commitments – stands in contrast with the traditional emphasis of the G77 on the need and obligation of developing countries to receive technological and financial support from developed, Annex I countries in order for non-Annex I countries to take mitigation action.

At the same time, however, the fact that it is also constituted and organised as a negotiating group of an essentially regional identity – that is, of Latin American countries – illustrates once again the larger arguments of this thesis in highlighting how coalition formation has been guided by existing identities, where a regional identity precludes a wider association with other countries that may share the same positions and preferences. Indeed, given a reference to the Cartagena Dialogue as having contributed to the development of common positions among its members[714], the regional identity of this coalition appears odd when there are certainly other developing countries in other regions – or even developed countries – that may be thought to share similar positions in terms of the future shape of the climate negotiations.

[713] Roberts and Edwards 2012
[714] Roberts and Edwards 2012

Both the LMDCs and AILAC's formation can be understood in light of the shifting terrain of discussions towards a 2015 agreement as mandated by the Durban Platform, in dealing centrally with the question of how global action should take place, including that by different countries. Crucially, however, they function as subgroups still associated with the G77, rather than repudiating their membership in this larger coalition. While AILAC's regional flavour remains consistent with the larger themes of this thesis, a question that also arises is in better understanding the point in which a group of countries that meet informally decide to present themselves formally. A lead AILAC negotiator was reported to have said that the group was a "natural progression" given the shared positions of these countries[715], but better understanding the drivers of formal establishment as a group remains elusive for the moment.

Conclusion

This final empirical chapter, in reviewing the patterns of coalition diplomacy among developing countries, has sought to distinguish how we understand the different coalitions that have formed in the negotiations over this period – both in the politically heightened run-up to Copenhagen, and in the unsettled, uncertain period since, culminating in the 2012 COP18 session in Doha. The background condition over this period has been the steadily rising political prominence of climate change: as the world attempted to forge a new treaty leading up to Copenhagen, climate change began to occupy a more prominent place on the agenda of politicians, right up to the heads-of-state level. This backdrop has provided the impetus for much of the changes and continuities in coalition diplomacy seen over the seven years of negotiation since the AWG-KP was launched in 2005.

In the first place, the rising political status of climate change saw the issue being taken up at

[715] Roberts and Edwards 2012

regular heads-of-state meetings away from the climate negotiating arena. The bandwagoning of existing institutions, especially regional organisations, to discussions on climate change, has driven increased political activity in those institutions and organisations that hitherto had seen little high-level engagement with the subject. But as a result of this spillover of climate change into existing institutions, new coalitions began to be formed along the lines and identity of these institutions – this has been the case especially with SICA, ALBA, Congo Basin countries, and the Arab Group. This effect may also be witnessed in the African Group, which with high-level political engagement, became more active than it had previously been, but in a way which also suggests that its regional identity has preceded material interests in what mobilised the coalition and continues to bring it together. Each of the discussions in this chapter (apart from the brief comment on the two most recent groups, LMDCs and AILAC) has sought to problematise a materialist understanding of shared interests as an explanation for coalition formation, juxtaposing this with the social logic of appropriateness advanced in this thesis, and found the former wanting.

Secondly, the rising political status of climate change has driven more self-interested coalition formation in fairly limited ways, as certain types of countries, anticipating a new agreement that would set the terms for climate action in the post-2012 period, sought recognition of their circumstances in a new agreement – this has been the case to some degree with the Mountainous Landlocked Developing Countries, but most convincingly with the forest-specific grouping, the Coalition for Rainforest Nations. The substantive divisions among the South have not, for the most part, taken place on the basis of these new groups, as a material understanding of coalition behaviour would have expected. Instead, it is two of the older groups, AOSIS and the LDCs, that have been the site of increased

contestation among developing countries on the substance of the climate regime's future. There is – as there always has been – an increasing material differentiation and fragmentation of developing countries. But this is not what is reflected in the pattern of coalitions that has evolved over recent phase of negotiations. Instead, this pattern points to the social origins of coalition formation – how the norms of appropriate association linked to specific identities affect the shape of the new groups, particularly mirroring the composition of *existing* patterns of institutionalised cooperation.

The more salient normative change, however, may be that simply in widening the landscape of negotiating groups, even if the substantive coherence of many of these groups remains uncertain, the norm of appropriate association may be becoming more permissive. Delegates from across the diversity of developing countries acknowledge the "right" of other countries to form their own groupings, even while, at the same time many of them bemoan the consequences of further group proliferation[716]. Thus while the norm of Southern appropriate association in the G77 remains intact, a necessary condition for new groups to adhere to in order for them to continue to claim a 'Southern' identity, this is less subject to social pressure from other developing countries than before, simply now because almost all of the G77 has some 'other' coalition commitment in addition to their G77 one.

This review of the patterns of coalition diplomacy that have unfolded in negotiations since 2005 over a post-2012 agreement highlights, above all, the continuing significance of how institutionalised identity structures explain much of the patterns and politics that have resulted. One of the more striking observations made here is the rarity of ad hoc, issue-specific coalitions: only in the instance of deforestation negotiations has one narrowly-focused group of developing countries emerged; all the rest attempt to present positions on

[716] Interviews with G77 delegate

the full spectrum of negotiating issues. In the final, concluding chapter that comes next, the fuller history of how coalition politics have evolved in the two decades of negotiation will be reviewed, putting the complex empirical record presented here into theoretical perspective.

Chapter Seven
Conclusion

Two decades after international negotiations first began on climate change, the North-South divide remains at the centre of the political debate over the future shape of the international climate regime. Indeed, its continuing salience has propelled climate change to be treated as a key issue area in analyses about change and continuity in the wider North-South divide, especially in light of the implications of the emerging powers for international order and global governance[717]. Over a decade ago, Fawcett remarked that "[s]uggesting that the Third World has become more complex and diverse since the late 1980s does not mean that it has disappeared"[718]. Despite a long-pronounced irrelevance, the notion of the 'South' continues to feature "as a marker of difference and an organising principle in international politics" across a multitude of issue areas and institutional settings[719]. For understanding this wider significance and its place within the UNFCCC negotiating process to come, how the South hangs together remains a vital object of inquiry.

This thesis has investigated two related questions: firstly, how have developing countries have formed their negotiating coalitions over the first twenty years of the UN climate change negotiations; and secondly, what explains this pattern of formation? The issue of how countries choose their friends and allies is a central theme in the study of IR. This thesis sought to address a scholarly gap on coalition formation in the specific context of the climate negotiations by tracing and presenting a history of how developing countries have gone about this process, arguing that these can only be fully explained by understanding the

[717] See, for instance, Hurrell 2013
[718] Fawcett 1999: 235
[719] Alden, Morphet and Vieira 2010: 321; see also Weiss 2009

collective identities that identify socially appropriate friends and allies. Chapter Two began this enterprise by reviewing the main theoretical approaches to explaining coalition formation. In contrast to conventional expectations that coalitions are formed based on shared material interests among its membership, this chapter set out the theoretical argument of this thesis that identified the importance of collective social identities in constituting negotiating groups. Such social identities – specifically the South, but also regional ones – are constituted by norms of appropriate association that set out who one's friends and allies are in rather different ways than what a material interpretation of state interests might imply.

Chapter Three began to illustrate this by examining the social context in which the climate negotiations began and the critical juncture of the the *pre*-negotiating phase. It highlighted the normative understandings, especially universal participation, emerging during this time about the way to organise the formal negotiations, culminating in the General Assembly mandate for the INC process, and the importance of this institutional choice in effectively truncating the range of possible coalition forms for developing countries to one: the G77. Chapter Four then turned to the beginning of formal negotiations, addressing both the INC process that adopted the Framework Convention, and the COP/AGBM process that agreed the Kyoto Protocol. This was a period where the G77 was already struggling to contain differences between small island states and oil-exporting countries over the ambition of mitigation requirements. Its persistence, however, is much less puzzling in light of the influence of the Southern appropriate association norm that constituted Southern identity through G77 membership; the socially 'natural' coalition for developing countries no matter what their negotiating differences, being then, as it still is now, the G77.

Chapter Five then discussed the phase of operationalising the Kyoto Protocol from 1998 to 2004, which saw three new Southern coalitions form. While two of these – GRILA and the African Group – were closely related to the emerging dispute over the terms of the Clean Development Mechanism, they also reflected the social identities of continental groupings, although with some modification in the case of GRILA. The other coalition, the Least Developed Countries, reflects a different 'regional' construction: a categorisation already present in world politics, and a role and social identity already intersubjectively recognised. Finally, Chapter Six focused on the shift in the negotiating context during 2005 to 2012 to a post-Kyoto agreement, when international attention on climate change intensified in the run-up towards the 2009 Copenhagen conference. While the flurry of new groupings emerging during this time has prompted a widespread perception of Southern fragmentation, the closer examination of their origins in this chapter qualifies this depiction. Instead of being primarily driven by shared material interests (with the exception of the CfRN), a different set of dynamics is identified – ones that again root the formation of these groups in prior and wider social identities, especially regional ones.

Following this empirical examination of the two decades of climate negotiations, this concluding chapter proceeds in three sections to highlight the key claims and implications of this thesis' arguments. The first draws out the insights that this understanding and discussion has provided for theoretical debates in IR on coalition formation. The second then focuses on the empirical contributions that this thesis has made towards the scholarly understanding of the UN climate change negotiations. The third and final section then turns to questions for future research that this thesis has prompted.

Identity, Appropriate Association and Coalition Formation

Drawing on the record of two decades of intergovernmental climate change negotiations, this thesis has sought to explain the processes by which developing countries have formed their negotiating groups. It is commonly thought – and expected – that countries 'associate' with each other and form their coalitions based on certain shared interests, most usually a common threat. This is the case in much realist and functionalist analyses, taking as their starting point the material costs and benefits of certain coalitions over others. What this thesis has sought to argue is, by contrast, the importance of considering a different basis for association, one understood as a result of *social* appropriateness given identity claims, and one that provides considerably greater explanatory value in understanding the phenomena at hand.

This is what has been called the norm of appropriate association. Its provides a guide to states as to who they should associate with – that is, who their friends are, who is part of their collective 'we-group' – given their particular identity. Its specific content is dependent on its identity, varying from context to context, but it provides a more precise way of connecting social identity to coalition choices. Thus, for instance, a norm of *Southern* appropriate association indicates that for states identifying as 'developing countries', the socially appropriate coalition is the G77 group. Similarly, for states identifying as African, the resulting norm of *African* appropriate association means that the socially appropriate coalition to join is the African Group. Understanding the content of the norm by understanding the relevant identity to the context at hand helps to address the puzzle of the non-appearance of coalitions that material configuration of interests would expect to indeed appear. In this way, the norm of appropriate association helps to understand not just the coalitions that have formed, but those that have not, what Hopf calls 'missing interests':

"Just as identities and interests are produced through social practices, missing interests are understood by constructivists as *produced absences*, omissions that are the understandable product of social practices and structure"[720].

This thesis deepens this relationship between social identity and coalition formation by also drawing attention to the significance of *institutionalised* identities in the process of how identity translates into coalitions, as two insights drawn from the historical institutionalist aspect of this analysis bear out. The first is to consider the pattern of existing commitments that states have at any given point in time in order to determine the prospects for new or other groups emerging, rather than what a distribution of material interests might suggest. Existing coalition commitments at particular historical moments both enable and constrain particular types of subsequent behaviour, and highlights, as has been the case here with the G77, the importance of initial choices. The second is to root the norm of appropriate association and the relevance of particular identities over others in specific institutions. As this thesis has shown, the origins of specific identities in preexisting organisations helps to provide for a smoother processes of coalition formation based on their identities and related norms of appropriate association. Whether this be for instance, in the African Group's institutional basis in pan-African regional institutions, AOSIS in the regional institutions of its two main constituent regions, or the G77 itself in the General Assembly context, the identities that have been realised and expressed in coalition-building are not novel identities in world politics.

The theoretical contours of this argument serve as a further contribution to the constructivist analysis of international climate politics. As noted in Chapter Two, constructivist approaches have been somewhat neglected in the analysis of climate

[720] Hopf 1998: 176 (emphasis added)

negotiating behaviour. In contrast to, for instance, the domestic process of climate-related norm emergence and evolution, especially among and within industrialised countries[721], this thesis considers instead normative and identity influences within the *international* social structure relevant to developing countries. Indeed, a number of elements of this analysis has implications for wider study of coalitions in world politics, particularly in how we understand the form and effectiveness of such identity-based coalitions.

The first is to reconsider the extent of the 'choice' and agency that states have in forming their negotiating groups, in contrast to the shared purpose of 'common threat' that they are normally presumed to have. Instead, in this constructivist account, coalitions can often have a taken-for-granted character, a reflection of their social identities rather than the material 'facts' and issue-specific interests at hand. In a similar way to other constructivist scholarship that has sought to show how the supposed material facts of 'anarchy' or the 'market' are instead 'what states make of it'[722], the parallel here is to contend that the material facts that states face on climate change, especially the economic costs and environmental vulnerabilities, do not, and cannot, fully explain why developing countries have chosen to form negotiating groups in the ways that they have. Thus, even while this constructivist analysis unpacks the origins of the coalitions and considers a wider range of choices than a material analysis might imply, it also highlights the limits and constrains to this agency[723].

The second is a recognition of the inflexibility of formal membership that arises from such socially constructed coalitions. Within this type of coalition, for countries outside the social 'we-group' defined by the identity, membership is socially impossible no matter the areas of

[721] Eckersley 2013; Sengupta 2012; Pettenger 2007
[722] Abdelal, Blyth and Parsons 2010: 4
[723] Hopf 1998: 177

material interest in common. For instance, a country that does not have 'Least Developed Country' status cannot join the LDC group, no matter the extent of their negotiating position shared in common with the LDC group. The LDC group cannot expand to include non-LDC countries without compromising its identity. The reverse is true too: shared membership in a coalition may be based on shared identity, not material interests, and thus the degree and strength of any common negotiating position cannot be assumed. For instance, in both the African Group and the G77 as a whole, the presence of both oil-exporting countries and small-island states has often made establishing a substantive common position difficult, given the rather divergent material interests between these two subgroups of countries. An appropriate parallel here may be the European Union itself within the same negotiating context, where the norm of climate leadership is central to its identity as a unifed actor – but which often runs into difficulties in producing a coordinated substantive position among its own energy-heterogeneous membership[724]. The broad implication here is that groups, constructed based on norms of appropriate association, should give caution about the extent to which changes in the number of coalitions reflect changing material interests, as is commonly argued.

The third implication is a question about the multilayered character of social identity. With this renewed attention on the 'distribution' of identity in the international system as a way of understanding the patterns of coalitions present (rather than just the distribution of power), there also arises the issue of how these identities interact with each other. The climate case highlights how geographically regional identities can coexist with other economic identity classifications, as well as the broader Southern identity, such that a country can hold multiple identities simultaneously and thus be part of multiple groups at the same time: Cape Verde, for instance, is at the same time an African Group member, an AOSIS member,

[724] Vogler 2009

and a G77 member, and it is not alone in its multiple identities and coalition memberships. In immediate terms there is a practical and logistical question about the extent to which it can effectively participate in all of these, given delegation constraints, but there is a strategic question too, about how differences in the positions that emerge within different coalitions are reconciled, if at all. This same question is obviously relevant in wider contexts, not least the emerging power debates: "what happens if that 'developing country identity' comes into conflict with the 'aspiring great power identity'?"[725].

The fourth implication is a question about the durability of such identities and coalitions. The foregoing analysis and the three points raised above all imply some gap between what a material interpretation of interests would predict in terms of coalition formation and the actual record of coalition behaviour, which has instead been sustained by social identities and their respective norms of appropriate association. But if such coalitions are, as a result, functionally inefficient, for how long can they be so? This point is a somewhat consequentialist one, but it suggests that identities, while often thought of as stable phenomena, can also be subject to change and adaptation in the face of undesirable and unanticipated outcomes. Sustained inefficacy can destabilise an identity, even those institutionalised and entrenched over time, resulting in change and evolution in collective identities[726].

The past and future international politics of climate change

In addition to these theoretical conclusions, the empirical material examined in this thesis provides important insights into the political dynamics that underpin the UN climate change negotiations. The common view of the current landscape of developing country coalitions,

[725] Hurrell 2006: 19
[726] Legro 2009

especially in the wake of the 2009 Copenhagen conference, portrays a virtual mayhem of shifting alliances where divergent national interests have triggered the formation of these newer groupings. These observations are made with a certain excitement about the fluidity now supposedly apparent among developing countries in constructing a larger narrative about change in the developing world[727]. "When one considers the structure of the G-77 and the different layers of interests, it becomes easy to see why, with so many competing economic and development interests, new coalitions have emerged as the negotiations have evolved"[728]. But the kind of change assumed to be underway is that which leads a changing material context to underpin the new coalitions. This is true, but only up to a point. In investigating the origins of these groups and coalitions, this thesis allows a more subtle understanding and interpretation of the current state of the 'South', by showing how these divergent material interests have been mediated by social understandings and institutional structures that have given these coalitions the precise form that they have.

The result is a more nuanced understanding that the actual coalition landscape is far less fluid and shifting than has been presumed, a conclusion reached in this thesis by tracing the process by which each of these coalitions have come into being rather than assuming that all these coalitions are like units (and causally homogeneous). With only one sustained example of a like-minded coalition that bears no relation to existing patterns of institutionalised cooperation and social identification, in the Coalition for Rainforest Nations (the LMDC's establishment in 2012 may be a further example in this direction, but its formation is perhaps too recent to be able to apply a similar judgement to), the conventional assumption about Southern fragmentation needs to be qualified by

[727] Hurrell 2013 describes some of these narratives; while made in the context of the BRICS, see Fourcade 2013 on the power of new classifications and groupings in constructing narratives about change in world politics.

[728] Wagner, Hajjar and Appleton 2012: 99

acknowledging the extent to which many of these groupings have relied on the normative guidance resulting from their collective identities – from regional settings and issue areas unrelated to climate change.

In turn, the 'South' is an ever-diverse entity – as it always was – but the continuing identification of countries within this collective identity is then, something more than a post-Cold War hangover, but something that has been socially constructed and constantly reproduced as states continue to see themselves in these terms. Still, two experienced practitioners and scholars, Depledge and Yamin, argue that "the [climate] regime's greatest weakness is the persistence of North-South politics...this two-way split is *utterly at odds with the reality of country circumstances*, *relative to climate change*, instead reflecting longstanding ideological differences and *historical political allegiances*"[729]. This conventional understanding of what underpins state behaviour – or a normative view about what *should* underpin state behaviour – is an assumption that states' choices, including their choice of coalitions, should be guided by an issue-specific, cost-benefit material 'reality'. In short, the anachronistic allegiances of old should thus be abandoned. By contrast, the understanding advanced in this thesis is to recognise that the bases of these allegiances, in political identities, however, are always in a process of construction as part of the social fabric of international life; its continuing resonance in the climate change context is perhaps one indication of the deeper roots it has. Indeed, can what goes on in the climate context be the driver, and not the derivative of, the larger strength and salience of the South, echoing Marc Williams' older claim about environmental issues 're-articulating' the South[730]? That would be a remarkable statement of the place of climate change on the global political agenda[731].

[729] Depledge and Yamin 2009: 444 (emphasis added)
[730] Williams 1993
[731] A parallel may be found in the presence of the European Union, for which a unified climate change has

Thus, it seems, many would regard the development of new coalitions as a normatively *good* thing[732]. But whether this coalition proliferation eases – or possibly complicates – the negotiating process remains open to question, particularly given the arguments advanced in this thesis about the origins of these negotiating groups about the extent to which they do aggregate shared interests. As Christoff remarks, "The phenomenon of empowerment through fragmentation may, ultimately, be illusory and deliver only stalemate"[733]. The trade negotiations may provide a cautionary example about the overlapping nature of these groups: "The co-existence of divided loyalties further detracts from commitment to any single negotiating platform and hence also its credibility"[734].

Substantively, this thesis also highlights the relatively *few* negotiating areas where divergent preferences among developing countries are reflected in the coalition structure of the negotiating process. This has occurred primarily at the intersection of CDM eligibility and forest issues. The CDM debates after Kyoto gave rise to wide differences of opinion among developing countries on project eligibility, each favouring project types that they were expected to benefit from. But only on the subject of forestry in the CDM, and the prospect of including avoided deforestation, did a new coalition emerge, in the form of GRILA. This coalition, although regional in character, was focused on a wide inclusion of foresty projects in the CDM, and after it failed to achieve these demands, stopped meeting regularly. The failure of this demand, however, gave rise a few years later to a renewed

been a central part of its larger political identity, see Schreurs and Tiberghien 2007; Pavese and Torney 2012

[732] More generally in relation to the UN system, Weiss 2009: 271, 278, 282 comments that "the North–South divide is counterproductive to the generation of norms and policies geared towards ensuring human security in a globalising world..The disappearance of the North–South dichotomy and the generation of new partnerships that transcend the confines of these simplistic categories is essential...But it is the default option because no other template is readily available."

[733] Christoff 2010: 652. In practical terms, more coalitions add further practical challenges: groups meeting each other as bilaterals take up more and more time; it is not always clear who is speaking for which group, especially given their overlap; and just finding the time to meet. (Ronny Jumeau)

[734] Narlikar 2003: 52

effort to more comprehensively include forestry in a prospective post-2012 agreement, and the formation of a new coalition, genuinely transcending regional associations (although not the Annex I divide), in the form of the Coalition for Rainforest Nations, which sought to move beyond CDM-related finance for avoided deforestation and to establish forestry as a distinct area of finance. Other CDM disputes over the past decade – such as over CCS or nuclear power – failed to catalyse similar issue-specific coalitions. These discussions have not sought to comprehensively chart shared and divergent views among developing countries – but its focus on the areas where new coalitions have emerged begins to explore some of the relationship between shared negotiating preferences and coalition form, including the continued association of these newer groups with, rather than displacing the South.

Additionally, by returning to the question of how the initial groupings – the G77 and AOSIS – came into being at the inception of the negotiations, key features of the overall structure of the negotiating process have been highlighted that provide insight into contemporary dynamics. Despite the overlapping complexity of these current coalitions, they all remain organised within the same North-South framework that has characterised these negotiations since their inception. Asking what the South means in the current age[735] also prompts the question of what the South ever meant, and how it came into being in the first place. This aspect of the argument has probed into that original meaning - showing how the choice of institutional setting – in the UN General Assembly – determined a 'G77' approach to organising developing country participation at the outset, consequently imposing a coalition structure whereby all developing countries are default members of the same, large-number negotiating coalition[736]. The 'founding moment' of the negotiations, in

[735] Hochstetler 2012: 59 still poses this point: "The continued alliance of the G-77 countries is something of a puzzle."

[736] While not making this specific argument directly, Sebenius 1991 warned about the importance of how the

other words, has structured the coalition politics through imposing a particular norm of Southern appropriate association, and later efforts at coalition-building have had to confront this institutionalised normative reality.

Recent arguments, especially post-Copenhagen, have sought to move the main political discussion of climate change away from a UN-organised approach precisely because a non-universal approach in terms of numbers of the table might imply a different political "geometry"; frustration at universal participation and consensus decision-making are often the main targets, but the North-South divide is usually not far behind in being implicated as the reasons for the failure at Copenhagen and struggles beyond[737]. But both this point and the argument made here, in turn, highlight how the normative structures embedded in the design of international negotiations shapes the politics that are possible, and once this design is settled, becomes considerably more difficult to change at increasing distance in time. Indeed, it is really only in a scenario of truly catastrophic climate change impacts and consequent transnational security and humanitarian crises that Weiss and Burke imagine the possibility of overcoming the political gridlock of recent times. This, however, is to be achieved by transcending the anarchical condition of world politics towards a wider definition of collective identity and ultimately, "a more cosmopolitan and compelling approach to global problem solving to protect the planet's ecosystems"[738].

Directions for future research

These contributions present a basis for further research to better understand contemporary dynamics of the international politics of climate change, especially in three directions. The

negotiations would be organised for the prospects of agreement, including the risk of triggering North-South differences as a political cleavage.

[737] Victor 2011

[738] Weiss and Burke 2011: 1070

first is that these arguments should prompt a further question about the effectiveness of these groupings, like those raised earlier in this chapter with regards to coalitions more generally. Some assessment of this has taken place in this thesis, in an effort to explain the particular form that the various coalitions have taken. But the key question in this regard is whether coalition form shapes coalition effectiveness: do their different origins indicate anything about which coalitions "work", and for whom do they work?[739]. This question raises issues of the internal coherence of these groups, some of which have been raised here in attempting to discern the balance of influence among coalition members, but of which a much-improved empirical understanding remains elusive[740].

This question is particularly relevant given the understanding advanced in this thesis about the pre-defined membership which most of these coalitions have been established with, in relying on existing social identities that define who one's friends and foes are. As a result, the extent of substantive participation within a coalition may be usefully problematized: are some simply 'paper' members, that do not substantively participate in negotiating group, yet find themselves politically committed to that position? Such an outcome may not be surprising given the well-documented challenges of negotiating capacity that many smaller, poorer developing countries face, where they simply do not participate in some groupings that they are nonetheless formally members of. Indeed, this may be another consequence of the proliferation and overlapping of negotiating groups, where already-stretched delegates of small countries struggle to attend and participate in all of them. Probing into the internal dynamics of the various coalitions should also prompt a closer examination especially of how power is exercised informally, especially in the larger groupings. As Barnett and Duvall remind us, power is also exercised within social, and not just material, analyses of

[739] As for instance, this is a key question animating Narlikar 2003's history of the trade negotiations
[740] Barnett 2008; Aarts and Janssen 2003: 340; Paterson 1996

world politics[741]. This thesis took as its focus the formal negotiating groups as whole units, but attempting to better understand patterns and processes of influence within this is an important task to move beyond questions of formation to those of coherence and effectiveness. This may be a particular task for further constructivist research, in focusing on the dynamics of socialisation that underpin larger social structures – how exactly are agents socialised into these norms and identities?[742].

Secondly, the material presented here, in its focus on the climate negotiating process, provides a basis for a wider comparative examination of how developing countries form their coalitions across other issue areas, in both environmental terms and more widely[743]. While institutional contexts and timescales vary, such cross-issue analyses would provide greater confidence and nuance in theoretical arguments about the way in which Southern coalitions are formed, as noted in Chapter One. For instance, the fluid character of coalition-building among developing countries in the context of the GATT/WTO process is in part attributed to dominance of 'informal' coalitions that mirror the informal negotiating process of the trade regime itself, with the result that there is said to be relatively *little* collective identification among developing countries[744]. This brief comparison points to the importance of importance of institutional setting on the range of possible coalitions, but in a rather different way to the process outlined in this thesis in the importance of the UN General Assembly to the G77's formation, where the institution within which negotiations were first conducted *narrowed* the range of socially possible groups. A different comparison may be made to the other treaty processes set out ahead of the 1992 Earth Summit, namely the biodiversity and desertification conventions. In both these contexts,

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741 Barnett and Duvall 2005

742 Constructivist scholarship on European integration provides a good example of such socialisation inquiry, see Zürn and Checkel 2005.

743 Wagner, Hajjar and Appleton 2012

744 Narlikar 2003; Drahos 2003

while the G77 played a central role in the negotiation of the conventions, its importance since has been relatively minor, with regional groups often being the basis for coordinating positions among developing countries instead, providing a different example to the continuity of the G77 pre- and post-agreement on the climate convention. Finally, further comparative work can also be directed towards understanding the ways in which this international Southern identity is located within the domestic political context of states, and a more differentiated specification of its champions in the different parts of the South[745].

Finally, the analysis presented here also provokes further questions about the way in which regional and international political dynamics intersect. The increased political construction of climate change at the regional level[746] and wider trends in the resurgence of regionalism in world politics hints at the possibility of further coalition construction along regional lines, given the examples of a number of the coalitions that have indeed formed. In this way, possible 'non-cases' of coalition formation among developing countries along regional lines raises the further question of why other regions have not similarly made the transition to meeting as a negotiating coalition at the intergovernmental level, or the possibility of regional economic communities becoming parties to the Framework Convention[747]. While the study of 'non-cases' present their own methodological challenges, investigation in this direction may be theoretically interesting in providing a better specification of the conditions under which regional activity on climate change may transition into political coordination at the international level; one hypothesis in this regard may be the extent to which these regional institutions have been developing their own regional adaptation plans and climate strategies, and how a negotiating presence may follow from this[748].

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[745] Burges 2007; Vihma 2011

[746] See especially Conca 2012 on the attractions of regionalism in environmental governance; see Elliott and Breslin 2011 on the diversity of such regional environmental governance.

[747] Masters 2011: 260

[748] See Masters 2011: 260-263 on African subregions

In any case, however, these too would have to interact with the continuing and existing social context outlined in this thesis that establishes the normative parameters for coalition behaviour. The attractiveness of the 'regional', at least so far, does not appear to be an abandonment of the global[749]. In at least three regions, there are some signs of attempts to articulate a regional voice in the UNFCCC process through their main regional organisations. Should further such negotiating groups emerge, however, the even more intense overlaps in membership that would result may also prompt questions about the coherence and effectiveness of existing groups[750].

One is the five-member East African Community (EAC) established in 1999[751], where a regional position paper on climate change was developed among its members ahead of the 2009 Copenhagen summit in a process involving national roundtables facilitated by the EAC Secretariat. The EAC's institutional architecture has begun to expand to explicitly consider climate impacts on the region and what a collective response through these regional institutions might be[752], and a more extensive climate change policy and action plan has followed since following a directive from EAC heads of state[753]. Another of the African subregional organisations, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) has also demonstrated some sign of regional political activity on climate change, where the institutional response of this regional organ has become the focused of increased attention[754]. And the SADC secretariat has also become more involved at the UNFCCC in

[749] This worry is often expressed within the context of the trade negotiations
[750] This already takes place to some degree: one interviewee feared the divisive nature of such new groups forming; see AMCEN/EAC questions about African-G77 relationship.
[751] EAC members are Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi
[752] Jarso 2012; East African Community 2009
[753] East African Community 2011: 123-124 on the possibility of group formation
[754] Alfaro-Pelico 2010: 7 suggests that “Several member countries are currently negotiating for SADC to form another negotiating group within Africa at the UNFCCC”.

recent years in supporting SADC negotiators[755]. Finally, similar patterns are also observed in a different part of the world, with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), where its leaders' summit, since 2007, has routinely included declarations on climate change, and where its institutional response to climate change, among matters of regional implementation of joint strategies, includes an 'ASEAN Working Group on Climate Change' to explore shared positions[756]. These possible, but as-yet-unrealised regional groupings represent an opportunity to further clarify the causal pathways that lead towards coalition formation and non-formation.

A considerable degree of frustration and disappointment has emerged in recent years with regards to the effectiveness of the UNFCCC process as the supposed mainstay of the collective response to the challenges of global climate change, symbolised in particular by the collapse of the 2009 Copenhagen conference. But while observers and scholars, in response, highlight the need to focus attention on the wider regime complex of global climate change as a way of driving action towards having some chance of avoiding 'dangerous' climate change[757], for developing countries the ongoings of the UNFCCC process remain central. As this negotiating process continues forward into considering the shape of the regime and a new agreement after 2020[758] as well as wider institutional questions on adaptation, finance and technology[759], developing countries will move to centre stage. Understanding the ways in which they organise themselves – the sources and origins of how they choose their friends and allies – within this multilateral setting remains a crucial scholarly task towards understanding the possible politics of the future.

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[755] Lesolle 2012; but also see van der Lugt 2001 highlighting the possibility of climate action through SADC for South African foreign policy.
[756] Letchuman 2010; ASEAN 2009; on environmental governance in ASEAN generally, see Elliott 2012
[757] van Asselt and Zelli 2012; Falkner, Stephan and Vogler 2010; Keohane and Victor 2008; on city governance, see Andonova, Betsill and Bulkeley 2009
[758] Bodansky 2012
[759] Carlan 2012; Ciplet, Roberts and Khan 2013

Appendix I: Key events in the UN climate negotiations

Session	Dates	Location	Notable Outcome
Second World Climate Conference	29 October – 7 November 1990	Geneva	SWCC Ministerial Declaration
United Nations General Assembly (71st plenary, 45th session)	21 December 1990	New York, USA	General Assembly Resolution 45/212
INC1	4 – 14 February 1991	Chantilly, USA	
INC4	9 – 20 December 1991	Geneva, Switzerland	
INC5 Part I	18 – 28 February 1992	New York, USA	
INC5 Part II	30 April – 8 May 1992	New York, USA	FCCC adopted
COP1	28 March – 7 April 1995	Berlin, Germany	Berlin Mandate
COP2 / AGBM4	8 – 19 July 1996	Geneva, Switzerland	Geneva Declaration
COP3	1 – 11 December 1997	Kyoto, Japan	Kyoto Protocol
COP4	2 – 13 November 2000	Buenos Aires, Argentina	Buenos Aires Plan of Action
COP6	13 – 24 November 2000	The Hague, Netherlands	
COP6-bis	16 – 27 June 2001	Bonn, Germany	Bonn Agreements
COP7	29 October – 9 November 2001	Marrakesh, Algeria	Marrakesh Accords
COP8	23 October – 1 November 2002	New Delhi, India	Delhi Declaration on Sustainable Development
COP11 / CMP1	28 November – 9 December 2005	Montreal, Canada	Launch of AWG-KP
COP13 / CMP3	3 – 15 December 2007	Bali, Indonesia	Bali Action Plan
COP15 / CMP5	7 – 19 December 2009	Copenhagen, Denmark	Copenhagen Accord
COP16 / CMP6	29 November – 11 December 2010	Cancun, Mexico	Cancun Agreements
COP17 / CMP7	28 November – 9 December 2011	Durban, South Africa	Durban Platform for Enhanced Action
COP18 / CMP8	26 November – 7 December 2012	Doha, Qatar	Doha Climate Gateway

Appendix II : List of interviewees

(all interviews were conducted in person unless otherwise indicated)

Name	Position at time of interview and other relevant affiliation
Abdullah Alsaidi	Senior Fellow, International Peace Institute, and former Permanent Representative of Yemen to the United Nations and G77 Chair, 2010
Ko Barrett	Deputy Director, National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration
Collin Beck	Permanent Representative of the Solomon Islands to the United Nations
Quamrul Chowdhury	Chairman, Foundation of Environment Journalists of Bangladesh and delegation of Bangladesh
Caleb Christopher	Legal Advisor, Permanent Mission of the Marshall Islands to the United Nations
Michael Zammit Cutajar (via telephone)	Former Executive Secretary, UN Framework Convention on Climate Change Secretariat
Chandrashekar Dasgupta	Distinguished Fellow, the Energy and Resources Institute (TERI), and former Ambassador, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, India
W. Jackson Davis (via email)	President, Environmental Studies Institute, and former Scientific Advisor to Nauru and AOSIS
Nitin Desai	Distinguished Fellow, The Energy and Resources Institute (TERI), and former Under-Secretary-General for Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations
Alison Drayton	Director of UN Affairs, UNDP and former Permanent Mission of Guyana to the United Nations
Navroz Dubash	Senior Fellow, Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi
Angus Friday	Senior International Climate Policy Specialist, World Bank, and former Chairperson of AOSIS and Permanent Representative of Grenada to the United Nations
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