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Economic and Cultural Drivers of Immigrant Support Worldwide

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Abstract:	Employing a comparative experimental design drawing on over 18,000 interviews across 11 countries on 4 continents, we revisit the discussion about economic and cultural drivers of attitudes towards immigrants in advanced democracies. We manipulate the occupational status, skin tone and national origin of immigrants in short vignettes. Results are most consistent with a sociotropic economic threat thesis: higher-skilled immigrants are preferred to lower-skilled in all countries, and at all levels of native SES. We find, in contrast, little support for the labor market competition hypothesis, since respondents are not more opposed to immigrants in their own SES stratum. While skin tone itself has little effect in any country, immigrants from Muslim majority countries do elicit significantly lower levels of support, and racial animus remains a powerful force.
Response to Reviewers:	Dear Professor Johns, This memo is a brief bit of guidance about where we did most of our revisions to address the remaining concerns you outlined. The most important changes, guided by

	your advice in an email on March 5th, involved setting up the logic of our argument that consistent findings in identical experiments across so many systems is important. We begin this on page 4 in the intro, and then in more detail on page 7. We really appreciate the feedback you gave here and think the argument reads much more smoothly. We no longer raise the reviewer's point only to reject it, but instead argue from the start that we have a test of whether these Tax Burden + Welfare Chauvanism processes are at work simultaneously. The second issue you asked us to address was a better and more seamless theoretical motivation for our narrow test of skin complexion. We now do this earlier, so that it is clearer why we did not test the broader claim that race writ large, perhaps carried by simultaneously manipulating skin tone and country of origin so we could compare reactions to, say, white eastern European immigrants with those from Africa or the Middle East. We do this on P. 3 in the introduction. We also streamline and modify our fuller discussion of the sprawling "cultural threat" literature on P. 8-10. In particular, we smooth out the writing in the area you point out regarding how our findings comport with previous work. We review the best work on skin tone, but not too much to avoid lengthening the manuscript, on page 10. We then cut back on the awkward discussion of why we got results that "contradict" our expectations (since they actually do not). I hope you like this discussion and I am willing to modify it further. We reduced ad modified the conclusions on p. 37 to bring the argument full circle. Finally, we did test the interaction you mentioned between skin tone and racial resentment. there is no instance in which the interaction between skin tone and animus is statistically significant, nor is the effect systematically signed either positive or negative across the countries for which we can perform this analysis. There just isn't much there. We now make a brief note of this on page 28 in the results section as further evidence that the null result on skin tone is substantive: Even among those most likely to punish racial outgroups, darker skin is not what causes opposition above and beyond the other indicators of difference present in the vignettes. We really hope these changes bring the paper into line with your advice. We are really grateful for all the work you put into this manuscript. Sincerely, Nicholas A. Valentino Professor of Political Science Research Professor, CPS, Institute for Social Research University of Michigan

Dear Professor Johns,

I know you didn't say you needed another long response memo, but I wanted to give you a bit of guidance nonetheless as to where we did most of our revisions to address the remaining concerns you outlined. The most important changes, guided by your advice in an email on March 5th, involved setting up the logic of our argument that consistent findings in identical experiments across so many systems is important. We begin this on page 4 in the intro, and then in more detail on page 7. We really appreciate the feedback you gave here and think the argument reads much more smoothly. We no longer raise the reviewer's point only to reject it, but instead argue from the start that we have a test of whether these Tax Burden + Welfare Chauvanism processes are at work simultaneously.

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Best,

Nick

Economic and Cultural Drivers of Immigrant Support Worldwide

Nicholas A. Valentino, Stuart Soroka, Shanto Iyengar, Toril Aalberg, Ray Duch, Marta Fraile, Kyu Hahn, Kasper Møller Hansen, Allison Harrell, Marc Helbling, Simon Jackman, Tetsuro Kobayashi

Abstract: Employing a comparative experimental design drawing on over 18,000 interviews across 11 countries on 4 continents, we revisit the discussion about economic and cultural drivers of attitudes towards immigrants in advanced democracies. We manipulate the occupational status, skin tone and national origin of immigrants in short vignettes. Results are most consistent with a *sociotropic economic threat* thesis: higher-skilled immigrants are preferred to lower-skilled in all countries, and at all levels of native SES. We find, in contrast, little support for the *labor market competition* hypothesis, since respondents are not more opposed to immigrants in their own SES stratum. While skin tone itself has little effect in any country, immigrants from Muslim majority countries do elicit significantly lower levels of support, and racial animus remains a powerful force.

The explosive rise in immigration worldwide over the last two decades has led to significant changes in the demographic composition of many developed countries. The political consequences of these shifts are profound, including the formation and electoral success of anti-immigrant parties in Western Europe, the passage of UK's referendum to leave the European Union, and now President Trump's drive to fundamental shift U.S. immigration policy after his election in 2016.

Debates about threats posed by immigrants have become a regular feature of election campaigns, and were especially prominent in the context of the 2016 US and 2017 Dutch elections. Then, as for many years before, political rhetoric about the issue was rife with cues highlighting both cultural differences between natives and newcomers, and the potentially negative economic consequences of increasing immigration.

The causal antecedents of mass opinion about immigration have received some careful attention, but comprehensive, comparative analyses are still rare, and most such attempts are survey-based correlational studies rather than experiments that can isolate specific causal mechanisms. One core debate focuses on the economic versus ethno-cultural drivers of opposition to new immigrants in advanced industrial nations. In this paper, we present results from the largest systematic, cross-national and controlled experimental study of these explanations to date.

We conducted a series of survey experiments, fielded in nearly identical ways across eleven countries on four continents. Several of the country studies on which we rely have been analyzed and presented elsewhere: there have been country-focused studies based on the U.S. and Canada and the Netherlands.[1] In addition, a seven-country study focused on a separate

[1] Harrell et al. 2012; Turper et al 2015.

hypothesis: the notion that "person positivity" could explain why respondents express more favorable views toward individual immigrants than about immigration policies in general.[2] The current paper, however, is the first complete analysis of all 11 countries in the omnibus study, adding four new surveys from European countries in which immigration politics has become highly salient and contentious.[3]

In addition, we consider more fine grained economic threat hypotheses than past work, which has acknowledged, but does not often contrast, distinct economic threat hypotheses. We also consider the impact of cultural forces. Observationally speaking, racial animus has been shown to play a consistently large role in opposition to immigration in most country specific studies.[4] Cultural differences between specific newcomers and the majority native population strongly predict opposition to immigration in many places and over time. Still, such differences are often highly correlated with the economic threats discussed above, and we know little about which dimensions difference matter most in the constellation of forces labeled "cultural threat." One of our goals, therefore, is to isolate and test factors that are often thought central to the cultural threat effects identified by others. One common "marker" of racial difference is skin tone, and so we carefully manipulated it in our experiments, while holding other dimensions of difference constant. We also compare reactions to immigrants from majority Muslim countries with those from non-Muslim states. We are thus able to see the extent to which, beyond simply knowing an immigrant is ethnically different, skin town and religious affiliation matter.

[2] Iyengar et al. 2013.

[3] Iyengar et al., 2013, included data from UK and Norway; we now add Denmark, Spain, France and Switzerland.

[4] Valentino et al. 2013; Kinder and Cam 2009; Side and Citrin 2007; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010.

Our results highlight an explanation for public opposition to immigration worldwide that has emerged in several individual country studies. *Sociotropic economic concerns*, stemming from burdens newcomers represent to the national as a whole, seem to drive opposition in advanced industrialized democracies around the world.[5] At every level of the socioeconomic status among our respondents, and across all the institutional systems under study, higher skilled immigrants are strongly preferred. This pervasive pattern across respondents and systems is broadly inconsistent with explanations based on narrow economic threats to particular native occupational groups, the so-called *labor market competition* hypothesis, concerns about the *tax burden* immigrants pose to those who pay a larger share of the social welfare costs for newcomers, or *welfare chauvinism* among native beneficiaries worried about competition for those scarce resources.

On the cultural dimension, we find that an immigrants' skin tone matters little on its own once it is known that he hails from an ethnically distinct nation. However, immigrants from Muslim majority countries are now opposed at higher rates than other countries around the world. And the correlation between self-reported racial animus and opposition to immigration is robust, as many prior studies have shown. We now turn to a review of the conventional wisdom about the specific causal mechanisms underlying these various antecedents of immigration opinion.

Economic versus Cultural Drivers of Immigration Opinion

Comprehensive reviews of the literature exploring the antecedents of immigration opinion have appeared relatively recently,[6] so we need only a brief overview here.

Economic Explanations

[5] For a review of previous discussions of this hypothesis, see Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014.

[6] See especially ibid.; Ceobanu and Escandel, 2010.

A substantial body of work has evaluated economic explanations for opposition to immigration in democratic publics. These are generally divided into two categories. The first focuses on the direct impact of competition between natives and newcomers for jobs and wages, while the second focuses on who will be affected most by the social welfare burdens newcomers create, if any. We review these explanations below.

1. *Labour Market Competition Hypothesis*. First, natives might oppose immigration most strongly when newcomers share their occupational skill level, because immigrants will compete directly for jobs and wages. Consistent with this expectation is the well-established regularity that working class citizens in the U.S. oppose immigration more than their wealthier countrymen, presumably because working class immigrants represent a large proportion of newcomers.[7] Higher economic status is also correlated with support for immigration openness in Germany.[8] Malhotra et al. find that those working in the tech industry are more opposed than other natives to immigrants holding H1-visas, presumably because they compete for high-tech jobs.[9] Finally, Mayda finds SES is most strongly correlated with support in countries where the difference between native and immigrant skill levels is largest.[10]

While the aforementioned evidence is consistent with the labor market competition hypothesis, alternative explanations for the findings have been offered. First, economists have found that the typical impact of newcomers on wages and employment is quite small,[11] and highly contingent on contextual factors like the overall size and diversity of the economy.

[7] Scheve and Slaughter, 2001.

[8] Pettigrew et al. 2007; Clark and Legge, 2009.

[9] Malhotra et al., 2013.

[10] Mayda, 2006.

[11] Friedberg and Hunt, 1995.

Second, most of the observational studies do not isolate variation in, and impact of, specific immigrant skill levels.[12] Rigorous work by Hainmueller and Hiscox has addressed these concerns, and they find very little evidence that employment competition with newcomers drives immigration policy opinion in the U.S or Europe.[13] In survey data from 22 countries around Europe (European Social Survey 2003) Hainmueller and Hiscox find that high skilled natives express greater support for immigration than their low-skilled countrymen regardless of the mix of low versus high-skilled newcomers.[14] In a survey experiment on U.S. citizens, they manipulate newcomers' skill levels and find again that natives with higher levels of education express more favorable immigration attitudes regardless of immigrant skills.[15]

2. *The Tax Burden Hypothesis*. Other work has focused on the possibility that the impact of economic self-interest operates through concerns about the *tax burden* which new immigrants place on high SES natives. For example, wealthy citizens sometimes oppose immigration most in places where an influx of low skilled newcomers is likely to boost social welfare costs.[16] Again, however, recent studies have returned little support examining the possibility that tax concerns among the rich dominate explanations of immigration opinion.[17] First, the actual fiscal implications of increasing immigration in a given nation are not obvious, since immigrants bring many economic benefits that offset their cost to domestic social welfare programs. Second, Hainmeuller and Hiscox find low skilled immigrants do not trigger greater opposition among

[12] But see Malhotra et al., 2013.

[13] Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010.

[14] Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007.

[15] Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010.

[16] Hanson et al., 2007. Facchini and Mayda, 2009.

[17] Tingley, 2013; Hainmeuller and Hiscox, 2010.

high SES natives, even in places with the most generous social welfare regimes.[18] Instead, all natives appear to prefer high over low skilled immigrants. Harell et al. also find higher skilled immigrants to be strongly preferred in Canada and the U.S.[19]

As it is most often discussed in the existing literature, the tax burden hypothesis is focused on the behavior of high-SES natives. A less-attended-to corollary exists for low-SES natives, namely, *welfare-chauvinism,* due to concerns about sharing a fixed (or narrowing) redistributive pie.[20] To the extent that this is the case, we should see anti-immigrant attitudes primarily amongst *low*-SES natives, *ceteris paribus.*

Of course, if this low-SES dynamic occurs alongside high-SES concerns about an increasing tax burden, we might observe anti-immigrant attitudes amongst natives regardless of SES. If taxes on the wealthy are the central concern, then we should primarily see high-SES natives motivated by what they might have to give. If a fixed or shrinking social welfare pie is of central concern, then we should primarily see low-SES natives motivated by what they might not get. Note, however, that such effects are unlikely to occur *simultaneously* in any given country. In countries with flexible social welfare systems that expand to accommodate newcomers, the Tax Burden hypothesis should dominate because the wealthy will indeed pay more. In countries with fixed systems, the Welfare Chauvinism effect should be largest because poor natives will be forced to share with newcomers. Since the flexibility of the welfare regime in a given country can only take on one value at a time, and most systems are slow to change, opposition should not arise simultaneously from low and high SES natives. Therefore, opposition to low skilled

[18] Hainmeuller and Hiscox, 2010.

[19] Harell et al., 2013.

[20] Dancygier, 2010.

immigrants amongst both high- and low-SES natives in a given country, and especially across all countries, is not strongly consistent with either of these explanations.

3. *The Sociotropic Economic Threat Hypothesis*. Our hunch is that if economic influences are operating, they might be doing so not at the individual level via job market competition, increasing tax burdens among the wealthy, or welfare chauvinism among the poor. Instead, immigrants might represent a more global, sociotropic economic threat to the places where the respondent lives, including states, regions, or the entire nation. Wong raises the important possibility that threats to a citizen's "imagined community," which might vary from neighborhood to more expansive geographic boundaries, will matter most.[21] The media may help to determine which communities are important as well, since some evidence shows that national level media narratives about immigration threat interact with changing local immigrant density, essentially priming conflict in some geographic areas but not others.[22] While our data do not allow us to examine smaller geographic units, such effects would help to explain sociotropic findings in various country-level studies.

That said, growing observational evidence, mostly from the U.S., suggests that sociotropic economic concerns underlie opposition to immigration. Mass perceptions about the state of the economy are linked to variation in support for immigration policy openness;[23] opposition to immigration also increases during times of national economic crises,[24] and even

[21] Wong, 2010.

[22] Hopkins, 2010.

[23] Higham, 1955 [1988]; Abowd and Freeman, 1991; Foner, 1964; Borjas and Freeman, 1992; Espenshade and Calhoun, 1993; Olzak, 1992; Citrin et al. 1997.

[24] Gimpel and Edwards, 1999; Lapinski et al. 1997; Simon and Alexander, 1993; Harwood, 1983.

seems to track with the business cycle;[25] California's anti-immigration Prop. 187, dubbed the "Save our State" initiative, may also have received unusually robust support due to the already strained educational, health, and transportation infrastructure of the state in the early 1990's.[26] That said, not all evidence points in this direction. Sides and Citrin find that the state of the economy and the total number of recent immigrants in 22 European countries is uncorrelated with average sentiments toward newcomers.[27]

Cultural Explanations

A literature developing in parallel with the debate over the economic motives underlying opposition to immigration explores ethno-cultural forces. The most general version is the claim that symbolic values linked to group identities, conflicts, and prejudice might lead citizens in many developed countries to oppose immigrants even if they do not represent an economic threat. Ethnocentrism, in particular, is put forth as a dominant alternative explanation to those reviewed above. A set of symbolic attitudes – including specific group animosities[28] or general ethnocentrism[29] – have been shown to drive anti-immigrant sentiments in the U.S., independent of the economic costs and benefits immigrants may bring to their new homeland.

Indeed, racial animosity often seems to overwhelm economic concerns as a predictor of hostility toward new immigrants.[30] Survey-based studies of the U.S. and European countries consistently show that attitudes about non-whites are powerful predictors of support for

[25] Durr, 1993; Stevenson, 2001.

[26] Calavita, 1996.

[27] Sides and Citrin, 2007.

[28] Valentino et al., 2013.

[29] Kinder and Kam, 2010.

[30] Sides and Citrin, 2007; Valentino et al., 2011; Kinder and Kam, 2010.

immigration.[31] Experimental work has also demonstrated the power of racial cues in the immigration debate. Brader, Valentino and Suhay manipulate images of immigrants in a news story that emphasizes either the (negative) costs or the (positive) benefits of immigration for America's economy and culture.[32] They find that Latinos make white Americans more anxious than European immigrants do, even when the social benefits/problems they are linked to are held constant. Finally, a few studies find evidence for the causal interactions of both economic and cultural forces: economic stressors can sometimes *activate* existing negative group sentiments, for instance,[33] or directly boost negative group attitudes which then drive up opposition to immigration.[34]

The general consensus, therefore, is that racial/ethnic "others" are considered undesirable immigrants in most single country studies. We still know little, however, about which particular dimensions of difference are most, since existing experimental studies compare immigrants who are different on many different dimensions that often confound economic and cultural threats (as in the Brader et al. study comparing white European immigrants with those from Mexico)[35].

We focus below on two dimensions of cultural difference. One obvious potential source of cultural difference is skin color, and that characteristic has been shown to influence candidate preference in the U.S.[36] However, few studies to date have explored whether strictly visual markers of race and ethnicity, above and beyond other potential sources of cultural threat, alter

[31] See, e.g., Lee and Ottati, 2002.

[32] Brader, Valentino and Suhay, 2008.

[33] Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior, 2004; Sniderman and Hagendoorn, 2007; Zarate et al. 2004.

[34] Quillian, 1995; Jackson and Inglehart, 1995.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Terkildsen, 1993; Weaver, 2012.

reactions to immigrants. Ostfeld manipulates a variety of phenotypic markers and finds that Americans marginally disfavor those with non-European features, though the largest effects come from the manipulation of cues about whether immigrants are assimilating to American culture.[37] Hopkins also manipulated immigrant skin tone and found it had very little effect on policy opinions in a U.S. sample.[38] Our effort, then, will be to replicate this test in the 11 countries in our sample. Another increasingly important dimension of cultural threat comes from religious distinctions, especially among immigrants from Muslim majority countries. Since 9/11, the threat of Islamic terrorism has played an increasingly important role in the political strategies and rhetoric of many immigrant receiving nations. The analysis that follows thus explores reactions to Muslim immigrants as well.

Hypotheses

We first test the *labor market competition* hypothesis, which suggests that opposition to immigration will be greatest among natives employed in job sectors similar to those of the newcomers. Second, we examine the *tax burden* hypothesis, which predicts that high SES natives will oppose low skilled immigrants most strongly, since the former pay disproportionately for any expansion of social welfare to serve such newcomers. Third we test the *welfare chauvinism* hypothesis, which predicts low SES natives will oppose low skilled immigrants most due to competition for nationally fixed social welfare benefits. Finally, a pattern of consistent preference for high over low skilled immigrants across all levels of native SES and across all countries would be evidence of the *sociotropic economic threat* hypothesis.

[37] Ostfeld, 2017.

[38] Hopkins, 2015.

If sociotropic economic concerns are operating, we would also expect it to be exacerbated when a low skilled immigrant is accompanied by children, but again this effect should be constant across native SES levels. High skilled immigrants with dependents would presumably not pose additional social welfare costs, so we would not expect this to influence opinion. Further, the presence of children in an immigrant's family should *not* exacerbate concerns about job market competition. Our experimental design allows us to test these additional expectations. Finally, we perform additional analysis to test the *sociotropic economic threat* hypothesis by examining whether the effect of immigrant skill level is constant across countries with more or less flexible welfare provision systems.

We examine the impact of three factors related to *cultural threat*: Skin complexion, religious difference, and racial animus. We first explore whether immigrants with darker skin and/or Muslim religious affiliation (conveyed through Middle Eastern origin) should be penalized compared to lighter skinned or non-Muslim immigrants in most or all advanced industrialized democracies we examine. Observationally, we would further expect those with conservative racial views – in this case those who score highly on the racial resentment scale – to oppose immigrants most strongly. Finally, we explore the possibility that economic and ethnocentric forces interact to alter opinions about immigration. For example, cultural threats may matter most in reaction to immigrants of low skill, as other research seems to indicate.[39]

Data and Methods

The independent contribution of economic versus cultural forces are difficult to isolate in observational research designs. We thus deploy experiments across countries that manipulate these factors independently. Moreover, we do so across a wide range of developed democracies.

[39] Brader, Valentino and Suhay, 2008.

Except for the few comparative studies from Europe cited above, evidence about the causal antecedents of immigration opinion is still drawn predominantly from the U.S. or other single country studies. The broadly cross-national quality of the current collection of studies is perhaps its strongest feature, allowing us to explore the degree to which these arguments might generalize across a wide variety of countries with different histories, governmental institutions, economies, cultures, and immigration patterns. Our research design adds to the literature in at least three ways: (1) we have cross-national, directly comparable evidence from 11 countries on 4 continents, (2) our experiments can precisely compare the relative causal impact of different economic threats and racial-group cues, and (3) we can examine heterogeneity in the impact of racial and economic cues across natives' socioeconomic status.

We drew online samples in eleven countries across four continents (Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Japan, Korea, Norway, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States). In all but four of these countries (France, Japan, Korea, Switzerland) we contracted with YouGov, an international survey firm that employs a consistent matching technique for drawing respondents from existing self-selected online panels. In the remaining four countries where YouGov did not maintain a presence, samples were collected via individual firms who were able to match the methodology of YouGov quite closely.[40] Most country studies were conducted during 2010, but a few were conducted between 2011 and 2013.

The online survey platform was necessary in order to present the visual racial cue – skin complexion– in conjunction with textual information about immigrants. Details about the methodology by which YouGov produces representative web samples are available in Vavreck

[40] Full details of the alternative firms are located in the online appendix.

and Iyengar.[41] YouGov samples have been found to match census-based population parameters quite closely, and it is for this reason that we are comfortable presenting country-level descriptives below (See Table 3). That said, our focus here is mostly on the causal effects of experimental manipulations of skill level, skin complexion, family status and religious affiliation. A main benefit for using YouGov in this study is that the samples span a broad and diverse cross section of the population in each country.

We delivered our manipulations through vignettes about immigrants containing text and images varying the skill level (high and low), family status (single or married with children), national origin (Middle Eastern versus Latin American/Asian) and racial phenotype (Afrocentric, non-Afrocentric) of an individual immigrant. To manipulate skill levels, we prepared a brief paragraph describing specific individuals hoping to come to the countries in our study. Participants read two short vignettes (ten sentences each, approximately 125 words), describing two different individuals hoping to emigrate in the near future.

The skill level and racial complexion manipulations were between subjects, so both vignettes read by each respondent described immigrants of the same occupational status and depicted them with the same skin tone. In other words, each subject read about immigrants at only one level of skill and one complexion in the 2*2 factorial, between-subjects design. Both immigrants were described as young men seeking to obtain temporary employment in the respondent's county with the hope of eventually acquiring citizenship. In the high status condition, one immigrant was described as a computer programmer while the other was an engineer. In the low status vignettes, immigrants were described as working in construction or

[41] Vavreck and Iyengar, 2011.

landscaping. We also randomly described one of the immigrants in each pair of vignettes as married with small children.

Subjects read the following introduction: "Now we want to ask you some questions about a couple of individuals who are interested in coming to <respondent's country> as immigrants. The first candidate is <immigrant's name> please take a minute and read about his background." Two vignettes are then presented to each respondent. Table 1 contains the details of our manipulations. The examples are from the U.S. study, but the language in every country study was as similar to these as possible after translation. Elements other than job skill were varied across treatments (name, country of origin, family status), and these are italicized in the table but not in the version the respondent read. The order of the vignettes varied randomly. Each vignette was accompanied by a photograph that varied the complexion of the immigrant.

Table 1. Experimental Manipulations

High Status Examples	Low Status Examples
Treatment: *Kuwaiti, programmer, no family.* *Rashid Siddiqui* is a native of *Kuwait*. He wants to come to the US and find a job as a *computer programmer*. Eventually, he would like to settle in the *US* and become an *American* citizen. He is 30 years old and lives in *Kuwait City*. His father is in poor health and is no longer able to work. *Rashid* helps pay for his parents' living expenses and for the education of his two younger brothers and one sister. *Rashid* completed his undergraduate degree in computer science at *Kuwait University*. After graduating, he has worked at *Polywell Computers* as a quality assurance technician. He recently enrolled in an online language institute to learn English.	*Treatment:* *Kuwaiti, construction worker, family.* Rashid Siddiqui is a native of Kuwait. He wants to come to the US and find a job as a construction worker. Eventually, he would like to settle in the US and become an American citizen. He is 30 years old and lives in Kuwait City. *Roberto and his wife have two sons and one daughter.* His father is in poor health and no longer able to work. Rashid helps pay for his parents' living expenses and also for the education of his two younger brothers and one sister. Rashid is a graduate of Khalifa School -- a vocational high school in Kuwait. After graduating, he has held various part-time jobs including construction worker, taxi driver, and house painter. He is learning English.
Treatment: *Mexican, engineer, family.* *Roberto Sanchez* comes from *Mexico*. He would like to come to the US to be an *engineer*. He would like to bring his young family to live with him and for them to become *US* citizens. He is 28 years old and currently lives in *Mexico City*. *Roberto and his wife have two sons and one daughter.* His parents are elderly and depend on him for financial support.	*Treatment:* *Mexican, landscaping, no family.* *Roberto Sanchez* is a native of *Mexico*. He wants to come to the US and find *work in landscaping*. Eventually, he would like to settle in the US and become an American citizen. He is 30 years old and lives in *Mexico City*. His father is in poor health and no longer able to work. *Roberto* helps pay for his parents' living expenses and also for the

Roberto received his undergraduate degree in structural engineering at *Universidad Tecnológica de México*. After graduating, he was hired by *Polywell Computers*. After graduating, he has worked at *Polywell Computers* as a quality assurance technician. He recently enrolled in an online language institute to learn English.	education of his two younger brothers and one sister. *Roberto* is a graduate of *Escuela Técnico* -- a vocational high school in *Mexico City*. After graduating, he has held various part-time jobs including construction worker, taxi driver, and house painter. He is learning English.

Words in italics vary across treatments. Respondents receive either (a) two high-status vignettes, or (b) two low-status vignettes. With the between subjects skill manipulation, there are two additional (orthogonal) manipulations: (1) immigrant name, source country and school name (ethnicity cues), and (2) the (non-) mention of the immigrant's wife and kids (family status cue).

To maximize the relevance and realism of the vignettes in each study we chose immigrants from a familiar country that would be recognizable to many citizens in the host nation. We paired an immigrant from that country with one involving an immigrant from the Middle East. In all countries except Spain, this immigrant was described as a citizen of Kuwait. In Spain, the Muslim immigrant hailed from Morocco. The decision to use a Middle Eastern immigrant enables us to compare reactions to immigrants from Muslim majority countries with those from non-Muslim countries; note that our use of Kuwait (intentionally) provides a conservative test of the impact of Middle-Eastern status, since this country is not typically viewed as a source of radicalism. These comparisons are within subjects, because each respondent read one vignette about a Middle Eastern immigrant and one from another country (e.g. Sri Lanka, Mexico, Serbia, Brazil, Poland and Ecuador). Table 2 displays the national origin for each immigrant in the vignettes for each country in the study.

Table 2. Country of Origin for Immigrants in Vignettes for each Nation Study

Country Study	Common Immigrant Source Country	Middle Eastern Source country	Study Field Dates
Australia	Sri Lanka	Kuwait	07/14/2010-07/24/2010
United States	Mexico	Kuwait	01/20/2010 - 02/02/2010
Canada	Sri Lanka	Kuwait	07/02/2010-07/18/2010
United Kingdom	Sri Lanka	Kuwait	Not in codebook
Norway	Sri Lanka	Kuwait	01/20/2010 - 02/02/2010
Switzerland	Serbia	Kuwait	09/02/2011- 09/12/2011
Korea	Sri Lanka	Kuwait	05/17/2011-05/21/2011
Japan	Brazil	Kuwait	Not in Codebook
France	Poland	Kuwait	Not in Codebook

Denmark	Sri Lanka	Kuwait	Not in Codebook
Spain	Ecuador	Morocco	06/28/2013-07/15/2013

We manipulated racial complexion precisely and subtly in order to make a conservative test of the hypothesis that skin complexion, above and beyond other dimensions of ethnic difference, influences tolerance toward immigrants. It is important to note that *all* the immigrants in our vignettes across all nations were ethnically distinct from the majority native population (white European, Australian or Asian). This makes for a particular precise test of the independent role of skin color. To achieve this, we first selected photographs of 6 young males to represent the 8 nationality groups featured in the vignettes in various countries. The pictures used to represent the Moroccan immigrant in the Spanish study and Kuwaiti in most other studies are identical; the picture used to create the Brazilian image in the Japanese study and the Mexican image in the U.S. study are also identical. Next, we selected a stereotypic Afrocentric and Eurocentric young male face from a database of photographs that had been rated for stereotypicality, attractiveness, and age by American college students. The two images we selected were rated similarly on all three attributes. We then used statistical morphing software (FaceGen) to combine the typical male image from an immigrant country with either the stereotypically African or European image. Figure 1 displays an example of our complexion manipulation for the Kuwaiti immigrant used in all 11 countries. On the far left appears the African face used in every country, and on the far right is the European face we selected. On the middle left, we have a typical Kuwaiti face morphed 60:40 with the African image. On the middle right, we combine the same Kuwaiti image with the European face, using the same ratio (60% Kuwaiti, 40% European). The resulting visual manipulation simply conveyed more or less

Afrocentric/Eurocentric facial features in a typical immigrant face without altering any other characteristic of the individual.[42]

Figure 1. Example of Facial Afrocentrism/Eurocentrism Manipulation: The Kuwaiti Applicant

Based on prior experience with face morphing (see Bailenson et al., 2008), this procedure provided a subtle but sufficiently visible manipulation of non-verbal racial cues. Our operational indicator of Afrocentrism is the "face-mean-value" score generated by the HSV color space. The value ranges from 0 to 1 where 0 represents the lightest and 1 the darkest images. In the South Asian-Eurocentric condition, the average FMV score was .55; in the Afrocentric condition it was .71. The corresponding entries for the Middle Eastern condition were .56 and .73 respectively. Figure 2 displays all 6 image pairings used in the 11 countries.

Figure 2. Complexion Manipulations for Immigrants used in All Country Studies

[42] We selected the prototypical faces from Dr. Jennifer Eberhardt's face database (Stanford University, Psychology Dept). This database includes 100 Afro-centric and Eurocentric faces that were rated by student judges for stereotypicality, attractiveness, and age. We selected two exemplars of each category with high stereotypicality ratings that were matched for attractiveness and age.



As an additional manipulation check, we provided photographs to a separate sample of judges from around the world drawn from Amazon Mechanical Turk workers, asking them to rate the pictures according to complexion and attractiveness. All 8 images were rated by at least 90 judges, and there were 128 total judges. No judge rated a single image twice. The sample was split evenly between American and international judges. MTurk workers rated all the faces on a scale ranging from "extremely dark" to "extremely light" and from "very attractive" to "very unattractive." The dark-light ratings differed significantly across the two levels of the Afrocentrism/Eurocentrism manipulation ($p<.01$), but there were no differences in the ratings of attractiveness between the Afrocentric versus Eurocentric faces.

After reading each vignette, participants answered three questions gauging attitudes about permitting the individual to enter the country for work and, eventually, to gain citizenship. The first question asked "Given what you know about <applicant's name> do you think his application for a work permit should be approved or rejected?" (Approved, Rejected, Can't Say).

The answers to this question were scored 2 for approving, 0 for rejecting, and 1 for undecided. The second question asked "If his application were approved, for how long should he be permitted to work?": 6 months, 1 year, 2 years, or 3 years. These answers were coded 6 months=0, 1 year=1, 2 years=2, 3 years=3. Finally, respondents were asked "Assume that <applicant's name> comes to the US on a work permit and then he decides to apply for American citizenship. Do you think his citizenship application should be approved or rejected?" (Approved, Rejected, Can't Say). The answers to this question were scored 2 for approve, 0 for reject, and 1 for undecided. Each question was rescaled from zero to one, and then the three questions were summed and again rescaled to produce a zero to one Immigrant Approval Scale for each candidate.[43] These items formed a highly reliable scale (Cronbach's Alpha=.84 and .85 for the first and second candidates respectively).

We also measured the socio-economic status (SES) of our respondents in each country, since our hypotheses posit the impact of immigrants' job status will vary across levels of native SES. We measure respondent socio-economic status using binary indicators of education, occupation and income. We coded education as less than college versus at least some college, and this is the only measure of SES available for all countries. Occupation was coded as blue collar or service equal to "low" and professional or skilled labor as "high." This measure was available for 8 countries: Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Japan, Korea, the UK, and the US. Income was coded as low for below the country's median income and high for above. Respondent income was available for all countries except Norway. While these binary measures

[43] In Denmark only, respondents who said that the candidate should not be given a work permit were not asked the "length of stay" question. For comparability across countries, we imputed values for the Danish sample on this variable. We assigned the mean value on the second question drawn from respondents (.6 on the 0-3 point scale) from other countries who said they would reject the work permit in the first question.

are blunt indicators of SES, they are appropriate for making comparisons across so many countries with different educational, occupational, and income distributions.[44]

As mentioned above, each respondent read two vignettes, so our analytic strategy combines reactions to both. We model effects using a pooled analysis in which each respondent-vignette combination is a separate case; that is, each vignette is treated as a case in a repeated, or within-subject, experimental design. In total we have over 30,000 respondent-vignette pairs (although the total differs slightly across models due to missing data in some independent variables such as income); within-country estimations rely on between 1,500 and 6,800 respondent-vignette pairs, depending on the country. This panel estimation strategy is ideally suited for capturing the impact of racial cues, alongside other factors, averaged across multiple vignettes. The estimation relies on a multilevel mixed-effects regression, fit using maximum likelihood (ML), with random effects for respondents alongside fixed effects for (a) treatments, and (b) a limited set of control and/or moderating variables. Within-country estimations are unweighted; combined results use weighting that ensures each country contributes equally to the results (despite varying sample sizes across countries).

[44] It is possible that non-white respondents respond differently to skin tone manipulations. Respondent race/ethnicity was captured, using nationally appropriate but not cross-nationally consistent categories, in seven countries: Canada, France, Japan, Switzerland, South Korea, the UK and US. Only the US data contain sizeable numbers of non-white respondents. We thus do not exclude non-white, nor do we include an interaction with respondents' race in the models we present. Doing so makes little difference in our results, however, most likely due to the very low number of non-whites in most of our samples.

Results

We first examine support for the immigrants described in our vignettes across all the countries under study. Table 3 displays mean responses for each country on three indicators: Approval of a work permit, allowing the immigrant to say 2 or 3 years (as opposed to 1 year or less) and approving citizenship. Remember that each respondent in each country read 2 vignettes, so these percentages capture the *average* response to both of the immigrants they read. The pattern of results across countries is identical if we restrict this table to display reactions to just the first or second immigrant.

The entries in Table 3 suggest that support for the immigrants in our vignettes was surprisingly high in many of the countries we studied. Support was lowest in the U.K., where citizens approved of a work permit only 37% of the time. Support for granting work permits was highest in Korea, at nearly 66%. That said, in 8 out of the 11 countries we surveyed, support for granting a work permit was over 50%, though usually not by much. Similarly large pluralities, and often majorities, of each of the countries we studied suggested the immigrants they read about should be allowed into the country for at least 2 years to work. The lowest support on this dimension came from Denmark, at 30% and the U.K., at 33%. Again Korea topped the scale at 63%. Finally, support for granting citizenship is displayed in the 3rd column of Table 3. Here we find somewhat less enthusiasm, with support ranging from a low of just under 20% in the UK to a high of 50% in Korea. Seven out of eleven countries fell between 30 and 40% support on this dimension.

Table 3. Immigrant Support Across Countries

Country	Q1 Approve Work Permit	Q2 Allow 2 or 3 year stay	Q3 Approve Citizenship	Overall Support (0-1)	
				Mean	SD
AU	50.3%	45.8%	32.1%	0.535	0.341
CA	56.6%	45.1%	44.6%	0.601	0.320

DK	51.7%	30.4%	38.9%	0.514	0.348
FR	47.9%	42.6%	37.9%	0.550	0.333
JP	53.2%	55.5%	31.5%	0.618	0.279
KR	65.9%	62.8%	50.6%	0.676	0.282
NO	48.9%	56.5%	33.2%	0.555	0.355
ES	61.1%	36.1%	46.6%	0.573	0.326
CH	55.5%	43.3%	30.8%	0.522	0.344
UK	37.0%	32.9%	19.5%	0.410	0.343
US	55.3%	46.4%	40.1%	0.585	0.337

Based on country-level results, unweighted.
Q1 show the percent of respondents who approve of the immigrant's work permit application.
Q2 shows the percent of respondents who believe the permit should be extended for 2 years or more (See preceding notes about recoded responses in DK. Also, note that percentages in Q2 can exceed those in Q1 since respondents saying 'can't say' in the first question may still approve of 2 or more years of work in the second question.)
Q3 shows the percent of respondents who approve of the immigrant's citizenship application.

Table 3 also displays the mean score on the scale we constructed from the combined answers to these questions. Recall that a score of "0" on the overall support scale would mean the respondent would reject the immigrant's application for a work permit, would choose the shortest time available in country if the application were approved (6 months), and would also reject the immigrant's application for citizenship. A "1" on the scale would mean the individual would approve the work permit, favor allowing him to remain 3 years in country, and also approve his application for citizenship. A middling score on the dependent variable could represent, for example, someone who supported the work permit but only for 1 or two years, and would not approve the application for citizenship. Table 3 indicates that nearly all of the countries in our study fall near the middle of this 0-1 scale. We should note that there exists a great deal of variation within countries in responses to each of these questions. The standard deviations for each country run from a low of .28 to a high of .36. This means that while support for the immigrants in our vignettes is sometimes quite substantial, there are a very significant number of participants who take the most restrictive position in these cases. In general, we are comfortable with the way the scale represents the individual responses to each item with most countries falling near the middle of the range on each dimension.

We next turn to the experimental results for each of the main effects of interest in each country: the impact of immigrant skill level, complexion, and country of origin. Average main effects across all 11 countries are captured in models presented in Table 4, including immigrant skill level, family status, skin complexion, Middle East origin, and vignette order. Drawing on results in Table 4, Figures 3, 4, and 5 display the estimated mean impact of the job status, complexion, and nationality treatments for each country.

Table 3 indicated a good deal of variation in levels of support for immigration across our eleven countries. Even so, results in Table 4 make clear that the effect of candidate job status is consistent across all eleven countries – in spite of cultural, linguistic, and ethnic differences among both destination countries and the immigrants crossing their borders. Candidate job status has a large effect– ceteris paribus, the shift from a low- to high-status job is associated with an average increase in support of roughly .12 (on a 0 to 1 scale). Country-specific models indicate statistically significant effects in every country. This is especially evident in Figure 3. The effect ranges from a low of .06 in France to a high of nearly .22 in Denmark.

Table 4. The Main Effects of Job Status, Family Status, Complexion and Middle Eastern Origin

	ALL	**AU**	**CA**	**DK**	**FR**	**JP**
Job Status	**.120*** **	**.113*** **	**.107*** **	**.219*** **	**.063*** **	**.067*** **
	(.004)	**(.020)**	**(.019)**	**(.012)**	**(.019)**	**(.008)**
Family Status	-.002	.002	.008	.021	-.017	.000
	(.002)	(.008)	(.007)	(.012)	(.019)	(.003)
Complexion	.002	.030	.022	-.012	-.016	-.004
	(.004)	(.020)	(.019)	(.012)	(.019)	(.008)
Middle East	**-.020*** **	**-.015**	**-.004**	**-.028*** **	**-.076*** **	**-.011*** **
	(.002)	**(.008)**	**(.007)**	**(.006)**	**(.008)**	**(.003)**
Cand	-.038***	-.038***	-.057***	.022***	-.031***	-.027***
	(.002)	(.008)	(.007)	(.007)	(.007)	(.003)
Constant	.524***	.487***	.564***	.403***	.590***	.605***
	(.004)	(.019)	(.017)	(.014)	(.020)	(.007)
lns1_1_1	-1.281***	.284***	.269***	.280***	.279***	.249***
	(.006)	(.008)	(.007)	(.005)	(.007)	(.003)
lnsig_e	-1.811***	.178***	.161***	.172***	.174***	.119***
	(.011)	(.004)	(.004)	(.003)	(.004)	(.001)
N	37579	1984	1982	4266	2145	8146
N_clust		998	998	3047	1073	4073

	KR	**NO**	**ES**	**CH**	**UK**	**US**
Job Status	**.078*** **	**.166*** **	**.097*** **	**.123*** **	**.179*** **	**.073*** **
	(.017)	**(.021)**	**(.017)**	**(.018)**	**(.012)**	**(.014)**
Family Status	-.005	-.013	-.003	-.008	-.006	-.004
	(.004)	(.007)	(.017)	(.018)	(.005)	(.005)
Complexion	-.000	-.017	.001	.026	.020	-.000
	(.017)	(.021)	(.017)	(.018)	(.012)	(.014)
Middle East	**.002**	**-.027*** **	**.000**	**.007**	**-.009***	**-.064*** **
	(.004)	**(.007)**	**(.001)**	**(.006)**	**(.005)**	**(.005)**

Cand	-.017***	-.050***	.000	-.061***	-.080***	-.047***
	(.004)	(.007)	(.001)	(.006)	(.005)	(.005)
Constant	.647***	.523***	.526***	.479***	.358***	.606***
	(.015)	(.019)	(.017)	(.019)	(.011)	(.013)
lns1_1_1	.261***	.310***	.322***	.305***	.280***	.293***
	(.006)	(.008)	(.006)	(.007)	(.005)	(.005)
lnsig_e	.099***	.147***	.020	.142***	.172***	.159***
	(.002)	(.003)	(.)	(.003)	(.002)	(.002)
N	2044	1992	2988	2467	5496	4069
N_clust	1022	999	1494	1234	2748	2048

* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. Cells contain coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses) from a mixed-effects multiple regression estimated using GLS.

Figure 3. Average Treatment Effect of Job Status by Country


All Countries
AU
CA
CH
DK
ES
FR
JP
KR
NO
UK
US
Level of Support
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
Low Status
High Status

Figure 4. Average Treatment Effect of Skin Complexion by Country



Figure 5. Average Treatment Effect of Middle Eastern Origin, by Country



The main effect of skin complexion, displayed in Figure 4, is also very consistent across all the countries in our study – and it is typically no different from zero. This does not change if we allow the impact of racial cues to be contingent on occupational skill, such that darker skinned, low skilled immigrants are the least preferred. This interaction has been demonstrated in other work (Brader et al. 2008), but we find little evidence for it here: the only two countries that return a significant interaction – Switzerland and the U.K. – present a pattern contrary to our expectations. (We do not include these results here, but see models including the race * occupation interaction in Appendix Table 2.) The effects also do not vary by levels of racial animus: Those who express the most negative attitudes toward non-whites in general are not more sensitive to the skin tone than those with more positive attitudes. This is an important result, because it gives us more confidence that skin tone, above and beyond other dimensions of cultural difference, do not dramatically influence immigration opinion.

Ethnic cues based on Middle Eastern origin, in contrast, prove significant in many of the countries including Denmark, France, Japan, Norway, UK, and the US, as shown in Figure 5 and Table 4. The coefficient is negative in 8 of the eleven countries, and is significant on average (-.02, $p<.05$). The modest average effect masks significant cross-country variation, however. France (-.08) and the US (-.06) impose substantial penalties for any immigrant from the Middle East. The effect is surprisingly small in Switzerland, given recent anti-immigrant policy developments in that country. These effects are all the more impressive given that the Muslim majority country we use in each study, Kuwait, is not known as a hotbed of anti-Western sentiment.

Next we turn to the argument about perceived sociotropic concerns- the impact of new immigrants on the domestic economy at large. Recall that our expectation would be that natives would be especially averse to unskilled immigrants with dependents. This would be indicated by a positive interaction between immigrant skill and family status. That interaction is included in additional results in Appendix Table 2. The results are consistent with our expectations: the presence of a wife and children reduces support when the immigrant is of low skill, but that penalty disappears when the immigrant is highly skilled. This is consistent with the notion that many publics, as a whole, are especially wary of lower skilled immigrants with large families who might represent a larger burden on the nation's economy. The individual country effects are displayed in Figure 6, and the interaction of interest is statistically significant for 6 of the 11 countries. Note also that the interaction is not stronger in countries with large social welfare states, as the tax burden hypothesis might presume. The interaction is consistently large in the U.S., Norway, and Denmark – states with much more generous welfare states. This suggests the effect is not narrowly egocentric, because publics that are especially vulnerable to high tax rates are not increasingly opposed.

The final row of coefficients in Table 4 shows the difference in levels of support for the second (versus the first) immigrant vignette presented to each respondent. Coefficients suggest that the second vignette elicits significantly less support than the first – roughly -.04 less on average; and since vignette order was randomly assigned, this effect is independent of immigrant job status, complexion, national origin or family status. This order effect is significant in all countries except Spain. One possible interpretation of this pattern is that the immigrant in the second vignette triggers even greater concern about the economic burdens associated with immigration in general, not just about an individual case.

The results so far reveal the overwhelming importance of job status in accounting for immigrant support cross-nationally. Recall, however, that the logic of the *labor market competition* hypothesis suggests natives should be most threatened by, and therefore react most strongly against, newcomers who compete directly for the employment opportunities in the natives' SES stratum. Testing this possibility requires an interaction between immigrant job status and native SES. If labor market competition drives immigration support, then support for high occupational status immigrants will be *lower* among high- versus low-SES natives, while the reverse should be true for low occupational status immigrants.

Models including the key interactions for testing the labor market competition hypothesis are included in Appendix Tables 3-5. The critical results are illustrated in Figure 7. Do natives oppose immigrants who pose a greater competitive risk to their own employment prospects or salaries? Our evidence suggests not. As before, highly skilled immigrants are preferred to unskilled immigrants in every country. But more importantly, in no country do we observe a negative interaction between job status and respondent SES. We present results for education Figure 7, but complete results using both occupation and income are included in Appendix Tables 4 and 5. Indeed, and contrary to the expectations of the labor market competition hypothesis, high SES natives are often significantly more enthusiastic than low SES natives about admitting immigrants of high job status. The combined estimation in the top left panel of Figure 7 shows a small but significant positive interaction between respondent education and the job status of the immigrant. This interaction is in the opposite direction of what would be predicted by the labor market competition hypothesis. This counts as mild support for the tax burden hypothesis, perhaps, since those who are most likely to bear the costs of a larger social welfare state would be expected to prefer higher skilled immigrants. That said, there is no

significant interaction between immigrant job status and our other measures of SES status, occupation and income; and even the results for education are only significant in the combined estimation, not the by-country results (See Appendix Table 3). In summary, the predominant impact of immigrant job status is unmoderated by respondent SES.

Figure 6. Average Treatment Effect of Family Status, Moderated by Job Status by Country



Figure 7. Average Treatment Effect of Job Status, Moderated by Respondent Education



The weight of the evidence points towards the sociotropic economic threat hypothesis, then. We nevertheless need to discount one further possibility, namely, that the *tax burden* hypothesis in which high-SES natives are concerned about increasing taxes and the *welfare chauvinism* hypothesis- where low-SES natives are concerned about decreasing benefits- operate simultaneously. We think this explanation is not consistent with our general pattern of results, because the actual flexibility of the social welfare pie in each country can only take on one of these values at a time. Therefore, one would expect one of these native groups to respond more powerfully to the low skilled immigrant than the other based on the actual flexibility of the social welfare state to increase the total amount of benefits available. Since countries vary in terms of the degree to which they alter the size of the welfare pie based on changes in demand due to immigration or other forces, we would not expect such a consistent pattern to emerge across all these countries.

We can, however, further explore how sensitive high SES natives are to particular aspects of the economic threat posed by immigrants. In the pretest questionnaire in every study, we asked respondents to think about the impact of immigrants to their country- on taxes and jobs - from the two countries that we would subsequently mention in the vignettes. Note that because these concerns were asked in the pretest, responses could not be affected by the manipulation. Therefore, we would expect most respondents would assume that most immigrants would be of lower skill, and so would be thinking about low skilled immigrants in response to these questions about the consequences of immigration in general.

Appendix Table 6 includes models of "openness to immigration" on measures of concern about (1) immigrants increasing taxes, and (2) immigrants taking jobs away from citizens. The models allow each to interact with measures of SES. If the tax burden hypotheses were correct,

we would expect that the interaction between taxes and R's income would be negative and significant, since the impact of tax concerns on tolerance should be most steeply negative among high SES natives. We do not find this to be the case. Both variables are negatively associated with openness to immigration, as we would expect; but tax concerns are not better predictors of opposition among high SES natives, nor are concerns about jobs a better predictor among low-SES natives.

The absence of any significant variation in country-level results is also of some significance. Countries in our sample range from quite modest and inflexible welfare states (e.g., US) to very comprehensive ones (e.g., Denmark); they notably include examples from each of Esping-Anderson's (1990) classic "three worlds of welfare capitalism": liberal, such as the US, Canada and Switzerland; Christian democratic, including France and Spain; and social democratic, including Denmark, Norway, and Switzerland. If welfare-chauvinistic accounts were operating, we would expect poorer respondents in less generous welfare regimes to be especially concerned about sharing a small pie, and thus to oppose low skilled immigrants far more than wealthy natives would. Alternatively, in high-tax, social democratic welfare states, wealthy respondents might be more motivated by tax-related issues and should thus oppose low skilled immigrants more than less wealthy natives. But no clear pattern emerges across these welfare regime types. Rather, all of our results point in the same direction: Low skilled immigrants are less preferred in all countries and about equally among both low and high SES native groups.

Discussion, and A Further Test of the Impact of Race

Our findings are clearest about the way in which economic concerns impact attitudes towards immigrants. On the cultural threat side, we find that skin tone had little effect but religious affiliation was quite significant. The result on skin tone is quite consistent with both Hopkins and Ostfeld,[45] who found relatively modest effects on most dependent variables of interest. Still, we would not conclude based on these results that racial concerns are irrelevant to most publics. One final piece of evidence on this point comes from five of our country studies – Canada, France, Spain, the United Kingdom and the U.S. – which contain indicators of the racial attitudes citizens harbor independent of their attitudes about immigrants. In these countries we can examine whether racial sentiments, not attitudes about immigrants per se, are linked to views about the immigrants described in our vignettes. In the U.S. we asked the standard 4-item agree-disagree racial resentment tapping attitudes about Blacks.[46] In Canada, France, Spain, the United Kingdom, we used a slightly modified version of the scale, utilizing a three-item battery focusing on "minorities" in order to make the items applicable to those other countries.[47] Each of these sets of items was additively combined and similarly rescaled to run from 0-1. Appendix Table 7 includes results from country by country models of immigrant support including treatment

[45] Hopkins, 2015; Ostfeld, 2017.

[46] From Sears and Henry, 2003; 1. "Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class." 2. "It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough. If blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites." 3. "Over the past few years, blacks have got less than they deserve." 4. "The Irish, Italians, Jews, Vietnamese and other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors."

[47] 1. Minorities need to work their way up on their own without favoured treatment. 2. Economic success is really a matter of individual effort; if minorities would only try harder they could be just as well off as white people. 3. Discrimination against minorities makes it difficult for them to succeed in COUNTRY.

effects alongside racial resentment, and demographic controls (gender, age, education, and income). Evidence there makes clear that racial attitudes remain a powerful determinant of opinion about immigrants. Moving from low to high levels of symbolic racism decreases support for the target immigrants by between .3 and nearly .6 on the one-unit dependent variable. These associations dwarf the experimental effects of job status. Indeed, in every country where we measured attitudes about Blacks or minorities, anti-minority resentment was the strongest predictor by far of opposition to admitting the immigrants described in the vignettes. Clearly, racial animus remains a force in immigration politics, despite the null results we find for skin complexion alone.

Skin complexion may simply have little effect when other dimensions of cultural difference are salient, as they typically are in the real world. All our vignettes feature immigrants from countries that would be seen by the majority of citizens as racially or ethnically distinct to begin with. In some sense, then, all the immigrants in these vignettes are racially distinct from the majority group in the receiving nations. Complexion is thus but one of a larger set of cues relevant to cultural distinction that drives immigration opinion, and it does not seem to be most important.

Our experiments nevertheless reveal powerful effects of job status – and, most importantly, effects that reinforce recent work on the causes of public opposition to immigrants that focuses on *sociotropic economic concerns*. Consistent with Hainmueller & Hiscox,[48] whose findings are limited to the U.S., we find a powerful, independent role for cues about skill level, invariant to natives' SES – this time, in eleven countries and across four continents. Low-skilled immigrants, regardless of their eagerness to work and willingness to learn the local language

[48] Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2010.

(which we held constant across all vignettes), trigger substantially more opposition and resistance to their efforts to enter the country temporarily for work, let alone to someday become a citizen.

The fact that the sociotropic economic hypothesis is most strongly supported, consistently across such a broad range of countries, is of real significance; and it is on this point that the preceding results make their most significant contribution to the existing literature. One might argue that we cannot rule out the possibility that respondents reacted to the skill manipulation with *only* economic concerns in mind. This has been our interpretation, certainly, but we acknowledge the possibility that 'low-skilled immigrant' may not be a purely economic cue – it may carry also a set of associated socio-cultural stereotypes as well. To what extent is this economic cue purely economic? We are able to explore this indirectly: if there were a socio-cultural component to our skill manipulation, we would expect the treatment to be moderated, at least in part, by respondents' racial attitudes. In other words, the low-skill immigrant would be opposed even more strongly by respondents high in racial animus. A slight adjustment of Appendix Table 7 models offers the necessary test. Appendix Table 8 displays the results of models that add an interaction between our measure of racial animus and the job status treatment. In no country does ethnocentrism moderate the effect on job status. This reassures us that the job status manipulation is indeed primarily interpreted as an economic (rather than socio-cultural) cue.[49] In doing so, it provides further evidence of the importance of economic cues in our findings.

[49] Since these models include three two-way interactions with job status (since there already are interactions with family status and complexion), results were confirmed by dropping all interactions except racial animus * job treatment. That interaction, even when it is alone in the model, is statistically insignificant across country studies.

Our strongest claim, therefore, is consistent with the growing consensus gleaned from country specific studies over the past several years: The *sociotropic economic threat* associated with low skilled immigrants is a powerful determinant of natives' willingness to accept these newcomers. What are the implications of this finding? Immigration attitudes have real-world consequences, of course; considering the policy consequences of our findings is thus an important objective. One consequence associated with this pattern is that programs that privilege high-skilled immigrants – focusing on admitting only newcomers with very high levels of wealth and/or skill – are likely to be more popular than programs that focus on other priorities, i.e., family reunification-based immigration policies. Some U.S. experts have already suggested a shift toward policies that favor high skilled immigrants would be beneficial economically,[50] for instance, and this policy trend is evident cross-nationally as well. Of course, just because a shift towards economically-focused immigration policy is popular does not mean it will come without a human cost.

Another objective must be to better understand the mechanisms underlying sociotropic economic effects. Our paper has provided powerful evidence of the significance of an economic threat that is not directly about one's personal economic situation. These findings are consistent with the literature on the importance of sociotropic versus egocentric economic concerns in presidential voting.[51] However, we still lack a strong theoretical account for how these concerns affect preferences. One possibility is that individuals connect sociotropic concerns with their individual future economic prospects – meaning that concerns about sociotropic economic threats are signals about one's own prospective economic situation. Another possibility is that

[50] West, 2011.

[51] Kinder and Kiewet, 1981; MacKuen et al., 1992.

sociotropic concerns reflect a more nationalistic, group-based commitment: Citizens may be genuinely worried about the economic success of the nation as a whole because they identify with that collective. It is important for future work to examine the causal mechanisms underlying this threat more fully.

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Economic and Cultural Drivers of Immigrant Support Worldwide

Online Appendix

Measuring Socio-Economic Status

The items used to measure occupational strata varied to a small degree across the countries in our sample, but in general consisted of self-selection into one of 9 or so broad categories. These included 1. Professional or higher technical work; 2. Work that requires at least degree-level qualifications such as a doctor, accountant, social worker, teacher; 3. Manager or senior administrator including finance manager, senior sales manager, senior local government officer; 4. Clerical or secretarial work; 5. Sales or services including shop assistant, nursery worker, paramedic; 6. Small business owners including shop owner, small builder, restaurant owner; 7. Foreman or supervisor of other workers including building site foreman, cleaning/janitorial staff supervisor; 8. Skilled manual work such as plumber, electrician, fitter, train driver, cook, hairdresser; and 9. Semi skilled or unskilled manual labor including machine operator, assembler, postman, waitress, cleaner. We grouped the first three of these categories into the "high skilled/professional" category. Categories 4 through 6 were considered moderate "services/sales" positions. Categories 7 through 9 were considered blue collar/labor. Students, unemployed and homemakers were excluded from these analyses. Occupational data were not available in Australia, Norway, and Switzerland. For these three countries, the SES variable was created using educational attainment. We considered any respondent with a high school education or less to be blue collar SES. Junior college or trade school degrees were considered moderate SES. Four year college and graduate degree recipients were considered high SES for these countries. While somewhat blunt, this tripartite measure of SES maps fairly well onto the distinction we

make in the vignette between low and high skilled immigrants. For example those with blue collar occupations or only high-school level educational attainment should experience greater competition for jobs and wages, on average, with the immigrant in our low skilled vignette.

Randomized Treatments

Our experimental treatments were randomized across respondents. We confirm this randomization in Appendix Table 1 (below), with some basic information on demographics (gender, age, and SES) across treatments (job status, complexion, and Middle-Eastern status).

Survey Firms Utilized in the Data Collection

YouGov Polimetrix was employed to collect data in 8 of the eleven countries studied here: Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom, and the United States.

In Japan we contracted with Cross Marketing, a leading Japanese market research company. As with YouGov, the firm matched respondents to nationally representative sample according to age, gender, education, and region of residence. The distributions of gender, age, and region were validated using 2010 The Basic Resident Registration Roll (an official governmental report) as a benchmark. The distribution of education was validated using 2005 Japan Election Study (JES) as a benchmark because census and Reg Roll do not have education data.

In Korea, we recruited respondents from the KBS Online Panel. KBS is the Korean equivalent of BBC, and they maintain an online survey panel. At the time of our study in 2011, their panel consisted of approximately 120,000 active members. Subsets of the panel are chronically replaced with fresh panelists. The sample was matched with the Korean population

using 2010 census data in terms of age, gender, education, household income, occupation, and region of residence.

In Switzerland, we contracted with the LINK Institute in Lucerne. Their online panel consists of 100,000 active participants. This firm provides the only Internet panel in Switzerland that has been fully recruited by means of computer-assisted telephone interviews. Neither self-selection nor multi-source sampling was possible. Infrequent Internet users are over-sampled due to the inherent bias toward Internet users. The questionnaire has been pretested by means of qualitative and quantitative interviews. The survey lasted about 10 min.

Additional Models

The text makes references to several models not included in tables in the text. These are included below, as follows:

Appendix Table 2. Adding Job Status*Family Status and Job Status*Complexion Interactions

Appendix Table 3. Adding SES interactions (Education)

Appendix Table 4. Adding SES interactions (Occupation)

Appendix Table 5. Adding SES interactions (Income)

Appendix Table 6. The Impact of Racial Attitudes, Controlling for Demographics

Appendix Table 1. Demographics by Experimental Treatment

		JP	KR	US	AU	CA	NO	SW	UK	DEN
Treatments		*Respondents' Gender (% Female per treatment)*								
Job Status	Low	0.48	0.45	0.50	0.51	0.52	0.48	0.50	0.51	0.50
	High	0.49	0.48	0.54	0.52	0.50	0.52	0.49	0.53	0.51
Complexion	Light	0.49	0.48	0.52	0.50	0.49	0.49	0.48	0.55	0.51
	Dark	0.49	0.44	0.51	0.53	0.53	0.51	0.51	0.49	0.50
ME	No	0.50	0.45	0.50	0.50	0.52	0.48	0.51	0.53	0.51
	Yes	0.48	0.47	0.53	0.54	0.51	0.52	0.48	0.50	0.50
		Respondents' Age (Mean yrs old per treatment)								
Job Status	Low	47.29	43.36	47.58	44.96	48.23	44.42	44.28	47.17	46.94
	High	47.14	43.54	47.16	45.02	47.21	43.69	44.47	47.21	46.96
Complexion	Light	47.18	43.31	47.99	44.32	47.44	43.54	43.85	47.44	46.85
	Dark	47.26	43.60	46.73	45.65	48.01	44.53	44.90	46.94	47.06
ME	No	47.56	43.45	47.73	44.75	47.58	44.29	44.58	47.13	47.04
	Yes	46.87	43.45	47.01	45.23	47.88	43.77	44.17	47.25	46.86
		Respondents' SES (Mean SES per treatment)								
Job Status	Low	2.19	2.32	2.17	1.94	2.07	2.33	1.81	2.29	2.27
	High	2.22	2.36	2.19	1.95	2.05	2.37	1.79	2.29	2.26
Complexion	Light	2.20	2.34	2.20	1.96	2.07	2.41	1.79	2.30	2.28
	Dark	2.21	2.34	2.16	1.93	2.05	2.30	1.81	2.29	2.25
ME	No	2.20	2.31	2.20	1.96	2.04	2.33	1.81	2.28	2.25
	Yes	2.22	2.37	2.16	1.93	2.07	2.38	1.79	2.31	2.27

Appendix Table 2. Adding Job Status*Family Status and Job Status*Complexion Interactions

	ALL	AU	CA	DK	FR	JP
Job Status	.100***	.062*	.088**	.228***	.054	.044***
	(.007)	(.029)	(.027)	(.021)	(.033)	(.012)
Family Status	-.022***	-.036**	-.011	.039*	-.023	-.009*
	(.003)	(.011)	(.010)	(.017)	(.026)	(.004)
*JS*FS*	.039***	.075***	.037**	-.037	.013	.019***
	(.004)	(.016)	(.014)	(.024)	(.037)	(.005)
Complexion	.002	.017	.023	-.021	-.018	-.018
	(.006)	(.028)	(.026)	(.017)	(.026)	(.012)
*JS*Comp*	.000	.026	-.000	.019	.004	.028
	(.009)	(.039)	(.037)	(.024)	(.037)	(.016)
Middle East	-.020***	-.014	-.004	-.028***	-.076***	-.011***
	(.002)	(.008)	(.007)	(.006)	(.008)	(.003)
Cand	-.039***	-.038***	-.058***	.022***	-.031***	-.027***
	(.002)	(.008)	(.007)	(.007)	(.007)	(.003)
Constant	.534***	.513***	.573***	.398***	.594***	.616***
	(.005)	(.022)	(.020)	(.017)	(.024)	(.009)
lns1_1_1	-1.280***	.285***	.269***	.280***	.279***	.249***
	(.006)	(.008)	(.007)	(.005)	(.007)	(.003)
lnsig_e	-1.814***	.176***	.160***	.172***	.174***	.119***
	(.011)	(.004)	(.004)	(.003)	(.004)	(.001)
N	37579	1984	1982	4266	2145	8146
N_clust		998	998	3047	1073	4073

	KR	NO	ES	CH	UK	US
Job Status	.055*	.184***	.076**	.158***	.164***	.061**
	(.024)	(.030)	(.029)	(.032)	(.017)	(.020)
Family Status	-.019**	-.023*	-.009	-.024	-.046***	-.024***
	(.006)	(.009)	(.024)	(.026)	(.006)	(.007)
*JS*FS*	.029***	.021	.011	.031	.078***	.040***
	(.009)	(.013)	(.033)	(.036)	(.009)	(.010)
Complexion	-.009	.013	-.014	.077**	.044**	.008
	(.024)	(.030)	(.024)	(.026)	(.017)	(.020)
*JS*Comp*	.018	-.057	.030	-.102**	-.048*	-.016
	(.034)	(.041)	(.033)	(.036)	(.023)	(.028)
Middle East	.002	-.026***	.000	.007	-.009	-.064***
	(.004)	(.007)	(.001)	(.006)	(.005)	(.005)
Cand	-.018***	-.050***	.000	-.061***	-.080***	-.047***
	(.004)	(.007)	(.001)	(.006)	(.005)	(.005)
Constant	.658***	.513***	.536***	.461***	.365***	.612***
	(.017)	(.022)	(.020)	(.023)	(.013)	(.015)
lns1_1_1	.261***	.310***	.322***	.304***	.280***	.293***
	(.006)	(.008)	(.006)	(.007)	(.005)	(.005)
lnsig_e	.098***	.147***	.024	.142***	.169***	.158***
	(.002)	(.003)	(.)	(.003)	(.002)	(.002)
N	2044	1992	2988	2467	5496	4069
N_clust	1022	999	1494	1234	2748	2048

* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. Cells contain coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses) from a mixed-effects multiple regression estimated using GLS.

Appendix Table 3. Adding SES interactions (Education)

	ALL	AU	CA	DK	FR	JP
Job Status	.083***	.080*	.084**	.088**	.057	.038**
	(.008)	(.032)	(.029)	(.028)	(.035)	(.013)
Family Status	-.020***	-.028*	-.013	.048	-.009	-.007
	(.004)	(.013)	(.011)	(.026)	(.028)	(.004)
SES (cat 2)	.041***	.107*	.030	.048	.160***	.013
	(.008)	(.044)	(.034)	(.025)	(.047)	(.015)
*JS*FS*	.036***	.057**	.039*	-.059	-.010	.015**
	(.005)	(.018)	(.016)	(.033)	(.040)	(.006)
*JS*SES*	.029**	-.056	.011	-.040	-.031	.026
	(.011)	(.062)	(.050)	(.030)	(.070)	(.022)
*FS*SES*	-.006	-.013	.010	-.067*	-.067	-.013
	(.007)	(.033)	(.025)	(.033)	(.067)	(.009)
*JS*FS*SES*	.011	.066	-.009	.091*	.115	.015
	(.009)	(.046)	(.036)	(.042)	(.100)	(.013)
Complexion	.004	.027	.020	-.004	-.028	-.018
	(.007)	(.029)	(.026)	(.017)	(.026)	(.012)
*JS*Comp*	-.003	.020	.005	-.018	.021	.029
	(.009)	(.040)	(.037)	(.021)	(.037)	(.016)
Middle East	-.020***	-.013	-.004	-.002	-.076***	-.011***
	(.002)	(.008)	(.007)	(.006)	(.008)	(.003)
Cand	-.038***	-.041***	-.058***	.009	-.031***	-.027***
	(.002)	(.008)	(.007)	(.006)	(.008)	(.003)
Constant	.546***	.482***	.568***	.791***	.569***	.614***
	(.006)	(.024)	(.021)	(.023)	(.025)	(.009)
lns1_1_1	-1.268***	.283***	.269***	.146***	.275***	.249***
	(.006)	(.008)	(.007)	(.004)	(.007)	(.003)
lnsig_e	-1.858***	.176***	.160***	.094***	.174***	.119***
	(.012)	(.004)	(.004)	(.003)	(.004)	(.001)
N	34530	1882	1982	1604	2133	8146
N_clust		947	998	1222	1067	4073

* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. Cells contain coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses) from a mixed-effects multiple regression estimated using GLS.

Appendix Table 3(Cont). Adding SES interactions (Education)

	KR	NO	ES	CH	UK	US
Job Status	.046	.197***	.064	.167***	.153***	.052*
	(.026)	(.039)	(.033)	(.033)	(.020)	(.023)
Family Status	-.016*	-.023	.014	-.012	-.047***	-.027**
	(.007)	(.014)	(.029)	(.027)	(.008)	(.009)
SES (cat 2)	-.012	.084**	.074*	.205***	-.011	.035
	(.027)	(.032)	(.035)	(.050)	(.019)	(.023)
*JS*FS*	.027**	.007	-.003	.019	.081***	.042***
	(.010)	(.020)	(.042)	(.039)	(.012)	(.012)
*JS*SES*	.033	-.032	.022	-.039	.020	.037
	(.038)	(.044)	(.049)	(.073)	(.026)	(.032)
*FS*SES*	-.011	.001	-.061	-.056	.002	.007
	(.013)	(.019)	(.049)	(.073)	(.014)	(.015)
*JS*FS*SES*	.005	.029	.034	.036	-.004	-.005
	(.019)	(.027)	(.070)	(.103)	(.019)	(.022)
Complexion	-.009	.013	-.017	.074**	.044**	.009
	(.024)	(.030)	(.024)	(.025)	(.017)	(.020)
*JS*Comp*	.017	-.062	.037	-.102**	-.051*	-.016
	(.034)	(.042)	(.033)	(.036)	(.024)	(.028)
Middle East	.002	-.028***	-.000	.007	-.009*	-.064***
	(.004)	(.007)	(.001)	(.006)	(.005)	(.005)
Cand	-.018***	-.050***	-.000	-.061***	-.081***	-.048***
	(.004)	(.007)	(.001)	(.006)	(.005)	(.005)
Constant	.662***	.476***	.512***	.432***	.372***	.601***
	(.018)	(.028)	(.023)	(.023)	(.014)	(.016)
lns1_1_1	.261***	.310***	.320***	.298***	.280***	.292***
	(.006)	(.008)	(.006)	(.007)	(.005)	(.005)
lnsig_e	.098***	.145***	.029	.142***	.169***	.158***
	(.002)	(.003)	(.)	(.003)	(.002)	(.002)
N	2044	1927	2964	2467	5344	4037
N_clust	1022	966	1482	1234	2672	2032

* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. Cells contain coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses) from a mixed-effects multiple regression estimated using GLS.

Appendix Table 4. Adding SES interactions (Occupation)

	ALL	AU	CA	DK	FR	JP
Job Status	.098***	.126***	.103**	.053*	.050	.022
	(.011)	(.036)	(.037)	(.025)	(.045)	(.016)
Family Status	-.015**	-.019	-.010	.030	.050	-.014*
	(.005)	(.015)	(.015)	(.024)	(.037)	(.006)
SES (cat 2)	.029**	.116***	.001	-.009	.110*	-.034*
	(.010)	(.033)	(.032)	(.026)	(.047)	(.014)
*JS*FS*	.034***	.043*	.047*	-.016	-.057	.025**
	(.008)	(.021)	(.021)	(.029)	(.054)	(.008)
*JS*SES*	.008	-.164***	.005	.043	-.008	.045*
	(.013)	(.047)	(.045)	(.031)	(.066)	(.019)
*FS*SES*	-.012	-.061*	.018	-.037	-.141*	.008
	(.008)	(.025)	(.023)	(.035)	(.067)	(.008)
*JS*FS*SES*	.017	.101**	-.048	.028	.147	-.010
	(.011)	(.035)	(.033)	(.043)	(.096)	(.012)
Complexion	.003	.031	.038	.007	-.042	-.017
	(.009)	(.030)	(.029)	(.018)	(.031)	(.013)
*JS*Comp*	-.005	-.005	-.026	-.033	.034	.023
	(.012)	(.042)	(.042)	(.022)	(.045)	(.018)
Middle East	-.021***	-.012	-.002	.000	-.075***	-.012***
	(.003)	(.008)	(.008)	(.006)	(.009)	(.003)
Cand	-.036***	-.037***	-.062***	.009	-.030**	-.028***
	(.003)	(.008)	(.008)	(.007)	(.009)	(.003)
Constant	.537***	.465***	.556***	.814***	.556***	.632***
	(.008)	(.026)	(.026)	(.021)	(.032)	(.012)
lns1_1_1	-1.350***	.283***	.271***	.147***	.280***	.248***
	(.010)	(.008)	(.008)	(.005)	(.009)	(.003)
lnsig_e	-1.674***	.174***	.160***	.094***	.179***	.121***
	(.015)	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)	(.005)	(.001)
N	20383	1759	1593	1485	1530	6802
N_clust		884	802	1138	765	3401

* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. Cells contain coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses) from a mixed-effects multiple regression estimated using GLS.

Appendix Table 4(Cont.). Adding SES interactions (Occupation)

	KR	NO	ES	CH	UK	US
Job Status	.084				.163***	.179***
	(.047)				(.022)	(.047)
Family Status	-.010				-.043***	-.003
	(.014)				(.009)	(.017)
SES (cat 2)	-.033				.073***	.047
	(.035)				(.018)	(.042)
*JS*FS*	.023				.063***	-.001
	(.020)				(.013)	(.024)
*JS*SES*	.010				.022	-.057
	(.050)				(.026)	(.057)
*FS*SES*	-.011				-.008	-.019
	(.017)				(.014)	(.026)
*JS*FS*SES*	.003				.032	.028
	(.025)				(.019)	(.035)
Complexion	-.012				.036*	.021
	(.033)				(.017)	(.039)
*JS*Comp*	-.004				-.041	-.079
	(.047)				(.024)	(.054)
Middle East	.001				-.011*	-.057***
	(.006)				(.005)	(.009)
Cand	-.017**				-.079***	-.028**
	(.006)				(.005)	(.009)
Constant	.675***				.326***	.551***
	(.032)				(.016)	(.034)
lns1_1_1	.260***				.275***	.300***
	(.009)				(.005)	(.010)
lnsig_e	.097***				.170***	.145***
	(.003)				(.002)	(.004)
N	1064				5036	1114
N_clust	532				2518	559

* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. Cells contain coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses) from a mixed-effects multiple regression estimated using GLS.

Appendix Table 5. Adding SES interactions (Income)

	ALL	AU	CA	DK	FR	JP
Job Status	.086***	.101**	.074*	.076**	.050	.046**
	(.009)	(.034)	(.036)	(.027)	(.043)	(.015)
Family Status	-.023***	-.018	-.011	.022	-.032	-.010
	(.005)	(.014)	(.015)	(.025)	(.036)	(.005)
SES (cat 2)	.021*	.049	-.015	-.007	.007	.007
	(.008)	(.031)	(.031)	(.026)	(.040)	(.013)
*JS*FS*	.035***	.034	.033	-.046	-.010	.017*
	(.006)	(.020)	(.021)	(.031)	(.051)	(.008)
*JS*SES*	.005	-.093*	.038	-.022	.000	.003
	(.011)	(.044)	(.044)	(.032)	(.057)	(.019)
*FS*SES*	.002	-.046*	.015	-.028	.026	.003
	(.007)	(.023)	(.023)	(.035)	(.055)	(.008)
*JS*FS*SES*	.018	.105**	-.012	.072	.067	.003
	(.010)	(.033)	(.033)	(.043)	(.080)	(.011)
Complexion	.006	.017	.032	-.006	-.023	-.012
	(.008)	(.028)	(.029)	(.018)	(.027)	(.013)
*JS*Comp*	-.002	.025	.008	-.015	.015	.020
	(.010)	(.040)	(.041)	(.022)	(.039)	(.018)
Middle East	-.019***	-.013	-.003	-.001	-.078***	-.011***
	(.002)	(.008)	(.008)	(.006)	(.008)	(.003)
Cand	-.034***	-.036***	-.053***	.009	-.026***	-.027***
	(.002)	(.008)	(.008)	(.007)	(.008)	(.003)
Constant	.554***	.491***	.575***	.822***	.588***	.615***
	(.007)	(.025)	(.026)	(.023)	(.031)	(.011)
lns1_1_1	-1.276***	.285***	.269***	.147***	.280***	.251***
	(.006)	(.008)	(.008)	(.005)	(.008)	(.003)
lnsig_e	-1.835***	.175***	.164***	.094***	.175***	.120***
	(.013)	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)	(.001)
N	28919	1960	1666	1422	1945	7080
N_clust		986	838	1082	973	3540

* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. Cells contain coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses) from a mixed-effects multiple regression estimated using GLS.

Appendix Table 5(Cont). Adding SES interactions (Income)

	KR	NO	ES	CH	UK	US
Job Status	.062*		.081*	.107**	.159***	.054*
	(.028)		(.035)	(.039)	(.022)	(.025)
Family Status	-.020**		-.006	-.049	-.055***	-.034***
	(.008)		(.031)	(.033)	(.009)	(.010)
SES (cat 2)	-.008		.084*	-.018	-.012	.005
	(.028)		(.034)	(.048)	(.020)	(.023)
*JS*FS*	.031**		.011	.046	.069***	.054***
	(.011)		(.043)	(.048)	(.013)	(.014)
*JS*SES*	.001		-.022	.075	.074**	.008
	(.040)		(.048)	(.064)	(.028)	(.032)
*FS*SES*	.014		-.004	.050	.025	.013
	(.014)		(.048)	(.066)	(.015)	(.015)
*JS*FS*SES*	-.023		.002	.020	.017	-.018
	(.019)		(.068)	(.091)	(.021)	(.022)
Complexion	-.008		-.021	.072*	.050**	.017
	(.025)		(.024)	(.029)	(.018)	(.021)
*JS*Comp*	.013		.038	-.072	-.065*	-.029
	(.035)		(.033)	(.041)	(.026)	(.030)
Middle East	-.002		.000	.010	-.008	-.062***
	(.004)		(.001)	(.006)	(.005)	(.005)
Cand	-.017***		.000	-.061***	-.083***	-.050***
	(.004)		(.001)	(.006)	(.005)	(.005)
Constant	.658***		.506***	.484***	.366***	.614***
	(.020)		(.025)	(.028)	(.016)	(.018)
lns1_1_1	.263***		.319***	.304***	.279***	.293***
	(.006)		(.006)	(.008)	(.005)	(.006)
lnsig_e	.097***		.029	.145***	.171***	.159***
	(.002)		(.)	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)
N	1890		2960	2007	4436	3553
N_clust	945		1480	1004	2218	1787

* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. Cells contain coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses) from a mixed-effects multiple regression estimated using GL

Appendix Table 6. The Impact of Economic Concerns on Openness to Immigration

	SES = Occupation	SES = Income
Increase Taxes	-.194***	-.206***
	(.011)	(.009)
Take Jobs	-.212***	-.197***
	(.011)	(.009)
SES	-.177***	-.000
	(.052)	(.044)
*Increase Taxes * SES*	.027	.013
	(.017)	(.015)
*Take Jobs*SES*	.053**	-.009
	(.017)	(.014)
Constant	4.129***	4.147***
	(.043)	(.036)
N	10830	14863

* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. Cells contain coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses) from a regression estimated using OLS. Models include country dummies, not shown here.

Openness to immigration, the dependent variable, is a composite measure built from four agree-disagree questions, as follows: (1) Our laws make it too difficult for foreign nationals to acquire NATIONALITY citizenship, (2) Right now, COUNTRY is taking in too many immigrants, (3) On the whole, the increasing cultural diversity in COUNTRY due to immigration has been good for the country, (4) Generally speaking, immigrants have a very favorable effect on the country. The second is reverse-coded, and the four are summed to produce a 1-5 variable.

Increase Taxes is based on responses to two items. Both are in a battery that beings as follows: "Now we'd like to know how you feel about different groups of immigrants who have come to COUNTRY at different times in our history. Recently, the population of COUNTRY has been changing to include many more people of [South Asian and Middle Eastern] background. Here is a list of things that people say may happen because of the growing number of immigrants in the COUNTRY." The battery is presented twice, once for each of the nationalities used in each survey. In both cases, the item that produces this measure is "Thinking about [ethnic group] immigrants, how likely is it that the growing number of [ethnic group] immigrants will Cause taxes to be increased because of increased demands for public services" The two items are averaged to create a 1-5 variable.

Take Jobs is based on responses to two items, in the batteries described above. The item that produces this measure is "Take jobs away from NATIONALITY workers" The two items are averaged to create a 1-5 variable.

Measures of SES are binary versions of the variables, as in previous estimations.

Appendix Table 7. The Impact of Racial Attitudes, Controlling for Demographics

	CA	FR	ES	UK	US
Job Status	.096***	.047	.065*	.199***	.066**
	(.029)	(.033)	(.028)	(.018)	(.021)
Family Status	-.004	-.031	-.013	-.045***	-.027***
	(.011)	(.026)	(.023)	(.008)	(.008)
*JS*FS*	.028	.020	.017	.079***	.044***
	(.016)	(.038)	(.033)	(.011)	(.011)
Complexion	.020	-.030	-.016	.038*	.016
	(.028)	(.026)	(.023)	(.017)	(.020)
*JS*Comp*	.009	.022	.032	-.056*	-.026
	(.039)	(.038)	(.033)	(.025)	(.028)
Middle East	-.002	-.077***	-.000	-.008	-.063***
	(.008)	(.008)	(.001)	(.005)	(.005)
Candidate	-.053***	-.026***	-.000	-.085***	-.049***
	(.008)	(.008)	(.001)	(.005)	(.005)
Racial Animus	-.413***	-.365***	-.317***	-.589***	-.367***
	(.051)	(.045)	(.042)	(.031)	(.027)
Female	.005	.027	-.008	.018	-.028
	(.020)	(.019)	(.016)	(.012)	(.015)
Age (in years)	.001	.001*	.001	-.001	-.001*
	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.000)	(.000)
Education (University)	.024	.103***	.059***	-.003	.021
	(.025)	(.027)	(.017)	(.013)	(.017)
Income (2nd tercile)	.009	.015	.034	.030	-.006
	(.024)	(.022)	(.019)	(.015)	(.017)
Income (3rd tercile)	-.006	.050	.060**	.031*	.025
	(.024)	(.026)	(.021)	(.015)	(.019)
Constant	.753***	.716***	.642***	.747***	.916***
	(.050)	(.047)	(.039)	(.034)	(.035)
lns1_1_1	.257***	.266***	.313***	.253***	.276***
	(.008)	(.007)	(.006)	(.005)	(.005)
lnsig_e	.163***	.175***	.031	.172***	.159***
	(.004)	(.004)	(.)	(.003)	(.003)
N	1642	1937	2936	4176	3497
N_clust	826	969	1468	2088	1759

* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. Cells contain coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses) from a mixed-effects multiple regression estimated using GLS.

Appendix Table 8. The Moderating Impact of Racial Attitudes, Controlling for Demographics

	CA	FR	ES	UK	US
Job Status	.051	-.045	.088	.207***	.085*
	(.066)	(.065)	(.053)	(.044)	(.040)
Family Status	-.004	-.034	-.012	-.045***	-.027***
	(.011)	(.026)	(.023)	(.008)	(.008)
*JS*FS*	.028	.024	.017	.079***	.044***
	(.016)	(.038)	(.033)	(.011)	(.011)
Complexion	.020	-.031	-.016	.038*	.016
	(.028)	(.026)	(.023)	(.017)	(.020)
*JS*Comp*	.011	.022	.032	-.056*	-.026
	(.039)	(.038)	(.033)	(.025)	(.028)
Middle East	-.002	-.077***	-.000	-.008	-.063***
	(.008)	(.008)	(.001)	(.005)	(.005)
Candidate	-.053***	-.026***	-.000	-.085***	-.049***
	(.008)	(.008)	(.001)	(.005)	(.005)
Racial Animus	-.450***	-.435***	-.298***	-.583***	-.353***
	(.070)	(.063)	(.057)	(.043)	(.037)
*JS*Animus*	.075	.145	-.041	-.013	-.028
	(.100)	(.089)	(.083)	(.061)	(.052)
Female	.004	.028	-.008	.018	-.028
	(.020)	(.019)	(.016)	(.012)	(.015)
Age (in years)	.001	.001*	.001	-.001	-.001*
	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.000)	(.000)
Education (University)	.024	.101***	.059***	-.003	.021
	(.025)	(.027)	(.017)	(.013)	(.017)
Income (2nd tercile)	.010	.015	.034	.030	-.006
	(.024)	(.022)	(.019)	(.015)	(.017)
Income (3rd tercile)	-.005	.050	.060**	.030*	.025
	(.024)	(.026)	(.021)	(.015)	(.019)
Constant	.776***	.762***	.631***	.743***	.906***
	(.058)	(.055)	(.045)	(.039)	(.039)
lns1_1_1	.257***	.265***	.313***	.253***	.276***
	(.008)	(.007)	(.006)	(.005)	(.005)
lnsig_e	.163***	.175***	.032	.172***	.159***
	(.004)	(.004)	(.)	(.003)	(.003)
N	1642	1937	2936	4176	3497
N_clust	826	969	1468	2088	1759

* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. Cells contain coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses) from a mixed-effects multiple regression estimated using GLS.