Julian of Norwich:
A Phenomenology of Health and Home

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Abstract

The thesis offers a new reading of the Julian of Norwich texts using a theoretical framework based on post-Heideggerian philosophy, specifically the phenomenological hermeneutics of health and medicine. By redirecting attention to the complex network of phenomena which constitute the visionary text, it argues for a consideration of the relationship between contemplation and wellbeing, proposing spiritual seeking as a means to being 'wele'. Engaging recently developed phenomenological models based on Heidegger's concept of 'homelikeness' (*Heimlichkeit*), the thesis redefines health as a holistic condition not solely confined to full physiological function, but of phenomenological 'being-at-home', or 'homlyhede', in Julian's terms. In doing so, it considers the impact of Julian's illness on her being-in-the-world, arguing for the ensuing disruption of Julian's subjectivity as a precedent for the divine showings which follow. It subsequently proposes an interpretation of Julian's near-fatal illness and revelation as contingent phenomena constituting a single lived experience, which brings forth the anchorite's highly original theology of love. Following this event, Julian devises a participatory model of salvation which offers the possibility of 'homlyhede' on earth, as well as in heaven. Through a close reading of this vernacular theology, the thesis offers the Julian texts as an instructive and tranfigurative tool for developing personal and communal wellbeing. Focusing particularly on Julian's language of homeliness, it demonstrates the efficacy of this concept as a metaphor for understanding the salvation narrative and issues of postlapsarian living, including pain and tribulation. Finally, it calls attention to the insufficiencies of modern thinking and vocabulary related to these issues, insisting upon the continued relevance of the genre of medieval contemplative literature to present day concerns. It concludes with an invitation to participate in the communal project of Julian's *Revelation of Love*, through a compassionate programme of reading and contemplative seeking.

Contents

List of Abbreviations

DMLBS	Dictionary of Medieval Latin from British Sources
EETS	Early English Text Society
o.s.	Original Series
n.s.	New Series
eLALME	Linguistic Atlas for Medieval England Online
OED	Oxford English Dictionary
MED	Middle English Dictionary
MMTE	The Medieval Mystical Tradition in England (Series)
MS	Manuscript

Preface

The final stages of this thesis were completed during the Coronavirus or COVID-19 pandemic, which at the time of writing has caused a global lockdown. I did not anticipate finishing a thesis on anchoritic texts, written by a fourteenth-century woman who herself lived through the Black Death, while quarantined against a twenty-first century pandemic. Julian of Norwich's work has seeped into my present in a way I could never have imagined when I began my research. And while historians rightly warn against the dangers of anachronising and drawing parallels between past and present, some meditation on the uncanny symmetry is unavoidable when the literature resonates so starkly with the current state of living. Then and now are no longer distinct. The pandemic has fragmented time, divided it into a remembered before and an imagined, longed-for after. Eric Weiskott has written powerfully of this 'Coronavirus Time Warp', relating the feeling of simultaneous standstill and acceleration to the boundlessness of Augustine's present moment: 'But how is the future diminished or consumed, when it does not yet exist? Or how does the past increase, when it no longer exists?'.[1] This quote brings to my mind T. S. Eliot's 'East Coker',

> In my beginning is my end
> […]
> Time past and time future
> What might have been and what has been
> Point to one end, which is always present.[2]

Of Eliot's *Four Quartets*, 'Little Gidding' speaks most explicitly to Julian's work, echoing as it does the anchorite's well-known maxim, 'all shall be well'.[3] But in my own timeless present, it is 'East Coker' that speaks with the loudest voice, of the 'sharp compassion of the healer's art / […] And that, to be restored, our sickness must grow worse'.[4] Julian, too, knew that *being well* was so often preceded by pain; health by sickness; light by darkness. She also knew of the power of the present moment, the eternity offered in each second's renewal of the now. She knew, in other words, of the healing, and revelatory, potential contained within a focused attentivity to that 'always present'.

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[1] Quoted in Eric Weiskott, 'The Coronavirus Time Warp: Reading Medieval Literature in the Midst of a Pandemic', *Public Seminar*, 10 April 2020, available at: <https://publicseminar.org/2020/04/the-coronavirus-time-warp/> [accessed 13 April 2020].
[2] T. S. Eliot, 'East Coker', *Four Quartets*, in *The Poems of T. S. Eliot, Volume 1: Collected and Uncollected Poems*, ed. by Christopher Ricks and Jim McCue (London: Faber & Faber, 2015), pp. 185–92 (p. 185), I, ll. 1, 44–46.
[3] Eliot, 'Little Gidding', in *ibid*, pp. 201–210 (p. 206), III, ll. 18–19.
[4] Eliot, 'East Coker', p. 190, IV, ll. 4, 10.

We have much to learn from the anchorite's meditations on her own sickness. This thesis hopes to begin that conversation. By drawing together the temporally distant voices of Julian and phenomenological philosophers after Heidegger, I throw myself—and my reader—into a critical conflation of past and present. In doing so, not only do I call attention to the parallels between then and now, I draw *out* these parallels, identifying—indeed, insisting upon—the enduring applicability of medieval responses to illness and death to the present day. So many of us remain troublingly illiterate when speaking about disease and dying, as recent headlines have shown. Julian's work offers us a vocabulary with which to articulate these experiences, providing not only an account of her survival, but a series of unparalleled meditations on the *meaning* of survival. For Julian, this is the revelation of God's 'homely love'. We find this love in the everyday, when we are compelled to slow down, to be truly and fixedly present, as when suffering from illness. As I have written elsewhere,

> I wonder if the threat of pandemic functions in a similar way: calling us out of the everyday and into isolation, we are asked to 'stay at home' in every sense. Though we can't make plans for the days and weeks to come, we can seek out homely love even among the chaos and anxiety of present times. By focusing our attention in this way, we can find a home within the self, a place of safety and security, which promises good things to come; a place of light in the darkness, where 'al shal be wele'.[5]

The COVID-19 pandemic has inflicted terrible pain and suffering, and will continue to do so. But it has also highlighted the mid-trauma gathering of individuals and communities in support of one another.[6] My work asks how we can learn to cultivate this compassion, as we move forward from the timeless now into the after. Looking to what might have been and what has been, the thesis is intended to recover a literacy of living and dying well—a lexis of well-being which has never been more necessary, both in time present, and for time future.

[5] Hannah Lucas, 'Good Things Coming: On Julian of Norwich and Living Through Pandemic', *Artsolation*, 27 March 2020, available at: <https://t.co/UWchFAsN6b?amp=1> [accessed 13 April 2020].
[6] George Monbiot, 'The horror films got it wrong. This virus has turned us into caring neighbours', *The Guardian*, 31 March 2020, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/mar/31/virus-neighbours-covid-19> [accessed 13 April 2020].

Introduction

‘Now up the hed, for al ys wel;
Seynt Julyan, loo, bon hostel!’
– *The House of Fame*[1]

Jesus and Sayn Gilyan, þat gentyle ar boþe,
Þat cortaysly hade hym kydde and his cry herkened.
‘Now bone hostel’, coþe þe burne, ‘I beseche yow ȝette!’
– *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight*[2]

‘Ha i-findeth i-wis Sein Julienes in, the wei-fearinde men yeornliche bisecheth.’
– *Ancrene Wisse*[3]

In the above quote from Chaucer’s *House of Fame*, the Eagle repeats a standard invocation to St Julian the Hospitaller, patron saint of hospitality and travellers, to grant good lodging. The Eagle’s petition attests to the continued popularity of the legend or romance of St Julian in the fourteenth century, a tale which describes a nobleman who, after receiving a prophecy that he would kill his parents, fled his home. Like Oedipus, Julian mistakenly fulfils the prophecy when his wife welcomes his parents into their castle, unbeknownst to him. After killing his parents, Julian enters a life of penitential solitude and service to the poor and the sick, establishing a hospice, and is later forgiven when he accommodates a dying leper, a disguised divine messenger, in his own bed.[4] Julian’s story is told in Jacobus de Voragine’s *Legenda aurea* and Giovanni Boccaccio’s *Decameron*, while prayers to St Julian are reported in the *South English Legendary*, to be performed by medieval travellers hoping for a hospitable journey—specifically ‘Iulianes *Pater Noster*’, a Paternoster for Julian’s parents which the saint enjoins on travellers who ask for his help.[5] The second quote, from *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight*, is an entreaty of this kind, spoken by Gawain as he approaches Bertilak’s castle. Here, the eponymous knight ‘beseche[s]’ the saint ‘yette’, implying he has already beseeched St Julian for ‘bon hostel’

[1] Geoffrey Chaucer, ‘The House of Fame’, in *The Riverside Chaucer*, ed. by Larry Dean Benson and F. N. Robinson, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 347–74 (p. 360), ll. 1021–22.
[2] ‘Sir Gawain and the Green Knight’, in *The Poems of the Pearl Manuscript: Pearl, Cleanness, Patience, Sir Gawain and the Green Knight*, ed. by Malcolm Andrew and Ronald Waldron, 5th ed. (Exeter: University of Exeter Press), pp. 207–300 (p. 237), ll. 774–76.
[3] *Ancrene Wisse*, ed. by Robert Hasenfratz, TEAMS Middle English Texts (Kalamazoo, MI: Medieval Institute Publications, 2000), available at: <https://d.lib.rochester.edu> [accessed 16 March 2020], Part Six, ll. 33–34.
[4] *The Life of St. Julian the Hospitaller: Introduction*, in *Saints’ Lives in Middle English Collections*, ed. by E. Gordon Whatley, Anne B. Thompson, and Robert K. Upchurch, TEAMS Middle English Texts (Kalamazoo, MI: Medieval Institute Publications, 2004), available at: <https://d.lib.rochester.edu> [accessed 17 March 2020].
[5] *The South English Legendary*, ed. by C. d’Evelyn and A. J. Mill, 3 vols., EETS o.s. 235, 236, 244 (London: Oxford University Press, 1956–1959), vol. 1, p. 35, l. 101.

(presumably during the prayers he performed en route[6]), and will continue to do so until it is firmly granted. The 'yette' serves to extend the suspense of Gawain's reception at the castle, the irony being, of course, that Bertilak's residence will not prove 'bone hostel' for Gawain, despite the knight's best intentions to observe the customs of hospitality performed through the daily gift-exchange.

As the example from *Gawain* demonstrates, there is an inevitable penultimacy implicit in any invocation to St Julian, with a prayer for 'bone hostel' depending on the 'yette' of its receipt. That is to say, the person praying to St Julian is always in a state of itinerancy. Similarly, the garrulous Eagle in *The House of Fame* states his invocation as he and Geoffrey are approaching the House of Fame, which he spies 'up the hed'. The same is also true of the final quote, taken from the thirteenth-century rule for anchorites, *Ancrene Wisse*: just as Gawain 'beseche[s]' St Julian, the spiritual pilgrims or wayfarers in this passage 'yeornliche bisecheth' (earnestly beseech, or seek) 'Sein Julienes in' (St Julian's house or inn). The quote is excerpted from Part Six of the rule, 'On Penance', a passage based on a sermon by Bernard of Clairvaux, which delineates three models the anchorite can follow: the pilgrim, the dead, and the sufferer on the cross. The invocation to St Julian is added to the first category of men, who, 'thah ha beon i the world, ha beoth th'rin as pilegrimes ant gath with god lif-lade toward te riche of heovene' (though they live in the world, live in it as pilgrims, and travel with a good way of life toward the kingdom of heaven).[7] Passing through the world as 'wei-fearinde men' (way-faring men), they seek a final lodging-place at St Julian's house. The 'bisecheth' of this passage can, then, be translated as both a petitionary prayer to the saint (like Gawain's), as well as to the *act of seeking* the place of rest which has occupied the span of their worldly peregrinations; their true home in heaven.

The legendary St Julian thus acts as an intercessor between two conditions of being: the peripatetic state of seeking, and the hospitable state of homely abiding. As the above examples highlight, achieving the latter is a challenging undertaking, with a secure sense of hospitality frequently eluding the earthly traveller: *Ancrene Wisse*'s pilgrim must wait until heaven to reach the comfort of Julian's house, while Gawain's hospitality in Bertilak's castle is part of Morgan's cunning deception, and his conclusive welcome home to Arthur's table is tainted by the knight's 'schame'.[8] Even the Eagle's optimistic assertion that 'al ys wel' as they arrive at the House of Fame is ironically undermined by the house's mistress, the goddess Fame, who oversees the

[6] 'Sir Gawain and the Green Knight', p. 236, ll. 756–58.
[7] Hasenfratz, ed., *Ancrene Wisse*, Part Six, ll. 23–25.
[8] 'Sir Gawain and the Green Knight', p. 299, l. 2504.

status and infamy of those residing on earth; whether Geoffrey will be received hospitably remains uncertain. And yet, the intercessory powers of St Julian provide the speaker with faith that finding refuge is possible, even if it seems to be always 'up ahead' or out of reach. The rhetorical pairing in *Gawain* of 'Sayn Gilyan' with 'Jesus' is particularly pertinent here, given the power of Christ's incarnation to redeem those on earth, a connection which associates the tale of St Julian with the wider Christian narrative: just as Christ leads postlapsarian humanity out of the wilderness of sin and towards salvation, St Julian guides the pilgrim or wayfarer towards the salvation of hospitable accommodation. In turn, this connection highlights another analogy: the identification of salvation or spiritual wellbeing with homeliness—a theme which undergirds the narrative of a different Julian, and is the focus of the present study.

The connection between the legendary St Julian and the anchorite, Julian of Norwich (1342/1343–a. 1416), is indirect. The birth name of the anchorite remains unknown, and it is generally assumed that she took the name of the saint to whom her church was dedicated. While it is not certain whether this church was dedicated to Julian the Hospitaller or Julian of Toledo,[9] the myth of the former provides a poetic antecedent for Julian the anchorite's life and work. For Julian of Norwich's *Revelation of Love* is grounded in the same concern with homeliness and wellbeing as the above invocations to St Julian the Hospitaller. Indeed, the Eagle's chirpy 'al ys wel' is uncannily echoed in perhaps the most well known line from Julian of Norwich's work: 'al shal be wele'.[10] Julian's version, however, while capturing the penultimacy discussed above, simultaneously invites an optimism regarding its fulfilment; she does not write 'all *is* well' or even 'all *will* be well', but 'all *shall* be well'. 'Shall' derives from the Old English *sculen* or *sceal*, with a base meaning 'to owe'.[11] A modal auxiliary expressing futurity, the term indicates a potentiality, even a necessity, for all to be well. Indeed, the full quote, 'al shal be wele, and al shall be wele, and all manner thing shal be wele', is expanded later in Julian's work, in the voice of Christ, who says: 'I may make alle thing wele, and I can make alle thing welle, and I wille make alle thing wele, and I shalle make alle thing welle'.[12] The shifting triptych of modals serves

[9] Julian of Norwich, *The Writings of Julian of Norwich: A Vision Showed to a Devout Woman and A Revelation of Love*, ed. by Nicholas Watson and Jacqueline Jenkins (Turnhout: Brepols, 2006), p. 6, n. 12.
[10] Julian of Norwich, *A Revelation of Love*, ed. by Marion Glasscoe, rev. ed. (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1993), pp. 39, 47, 48, 111.
[11] MED, s.v. 'schulen', *v.* (1).
[12] Watson and Jenkins, eds., *Writings*, p. 217.

to highlight the power of the Trinity, with the final 'shalle' denoting the unity of the former three.[13]

Julian's 'al shal be wele' statement subsequently refers the divine *intention* of things being well, the realisation of which, she explains elsewhere in the *Revelation*, depends upon human participation. She describes this in terms also resonant with the above quotations: just as Gawain's 'beseche[s]' St Julian, for Julian of Norwich things being well—*well-being*—is contingent upon the human action of 'beseking'. The present study is concerned with this exact process: the fulfilment of wellbeing, the kind of homely abiding associated with salvation, via the itinerant searching and prayer which constitutes the Christian way of life. Julian's work is acutely aware of the difficulties of this project; of finding hospitality, a safe place to abide, in the face of the trials and tribulations of earthly living. Her texts are driven by the interrogative existentialism of an individual who herself survived pandemic and a near-fatal illness, in addition to the everyday difficulties of living in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Nonetheless, *A Revelation of Love* is overarchingly optimistic. While Julian acknowledges that true wellbeing may at times seem out of reach, her revelation of God's 'homely loveing' offers a new way of looking at the penultimacy of worldly living, reminding the reader of the eternal and mutual indwelling of divinity within the soul. In this way, Julian of Norwich is perhaps more closely related to her potential namesake than is immediately obvious: just as St Julian promises 'bone hostel' for the wayfaring traveller, the anchorite's meditations also guide the reader towards wellbeing and homeliness. For the anchorite, however, the hospitable home she offers is not physical, or even exclusively heavenly; instead, it resides within the self, an inner state of spiritual at-homeness. In what follows, I examine this condition at-homeness as a way of redefining health or wellbeing. By engaging Julian's texts in dialogue with Heideggerian phenomenology, I hope to demonstrate the universal applicability of Julian's work, especially pertaining to the existential questions about living and dying *well*, which continue to preoccupy philosophers in the present day. This is, then, a thesis about the therapeutic nature of Julian's visionary text, which I posit as a vital tool in the cultivation of personal and communal wellbeing, for all her wayfaring readers.

[13] For more on Julian's grammar, see Eleanor Johnson, *Staging Contemplation: Participatory Theology in Middle English Prose, Verse, and Drama* (Chicago, IL and London: University of Chicago Press, 2018), esp. pp. 62–63, 69.

i. Julian of Norwich's Life and Writing

a) Who Was Julian?

The only known evidence pertaining to the life of Julian of Norwich is that which survives in the two versions of her text, *A Revelation of Love*, several bequests made to an anchorite by her name in local wills, and the record of a visit made to her by her contemporary and fellow visionary, Margery Kempe (c. 1373–c. 1440). The fragmentary nature of this biography has proven frustrating to many modern scholars. Elisabeth Dutton remarks that 'all studies of the *Revelation* […] are hampered to a greater or lesser degree by our almost complete ignorance about Julian's life', calling her a 'shadowy figure',[14] while Annie Sutherland has described Julian as 'arguably the most opaque' of participants in the medieval mystical tradition.[15] Julian herself might, however, have been glad of this obscurity, given her own claim to *humilitas* in the shorter version of her text: 'I praye yowe alle for Goddys sake […] that ye leve the behaldynge of the wrechid worldes synfulle creature that it was schewyd unto'.[16] Nevertheless, some introduction to Julian's circumstances (as far we we know them) will help to situate her writing in context, and to illuminate the remarkable achievements of the anchoritic theologian ahead of my own reading of her texts.

According to her texts, Julian was born in 1342 or 1343, likely in or near Norwich. In May 1373, Julian fell ill and received a series of sixteen 'showings'. At some point after this event, she entered into a life of enclosed religious solitude, as an anchorite attached to St Julian's church in Norwich. In 1388, Julian received an additional showing, that love was God's meaning, and in 1393, she received a final revelation which helped her understand her earlier visions: of the parable of the lord and the servant. This series of showings constitute the 'revelation of love' that is the subject of Julian's written text, which survives in two versions. The shorter version provides a more succinct account of the visionary event, focused on describing rather than interpreting the showings. This text is presumed to have been written fairly soon after Julian's receipt of the initial revelation, and is currently dated to the mid or late 1380s. The longer version

[14] Elisabeth Dutton, *Julian of Norwich: The Influence of Late-Medieval Devotional Compilations* (Cambridge: Brewer, 2008), p. 2.
[15] Annie Sutherland, '"Oure Feyth is Groundyd in Goddes Worde"—Julian of Norwich and the Bible', in *MMTE VII, Papers Read at Charney Manor, July 2004*, ed. by E. A. Jones (Cambridge: Brewer, 2004), pp. 1–20 (p. 1).
[16] Julian of Norwich, *Revelations of Divine Love: The Short Text and the Long Text*, ed. by Barry Windeatt (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 6.

is an extended commentary on the showings, which subjects the revelation to intense contemplative scrutiny, replete with insights and meditations on universal questions about the nature of existence, salvation, and sin. This text is now taken to have been written years after the initial version, which was seemingly abandoned, as Vincent Gillespie writes, 'in favour of a wholesale […] more radical rewrite' between the mid-1390s and Julian's death in or after 1416.[17]

While the details of Julian's life until 1373 are unknown, her recent editors Nicholas Watson and Jacqueline Jenkins suggest that she was born into 'affluent circumstances'.[18] They hazard that Julian was initially writing as a Benedictine nun in the convent at Carrow, a mile from the site of her later enclosure.[19] Other, more conjectural suggestions include those that Julian was a wife, mother, and even possibly a widow prior to entering into anchoritism. Benedicta Ward, for example, makes a case for Julian writing her short text when she was 'a young widow living in her own house with her servants and her mother', claiming that her learning would have derived from her 'need to read and write for the management of a household'.[20] The most recent contribution to this discussion has been made by Gillespie, who proposes Julian's short text to be of the *probatio* type, a requirement of aspirant anchorites as a means to verify their orthodoxy and vocational motivation.[21] This position is supported by Watson's critically accepted redating of Julian's texts, which places the *terminus a quo* of the short text from 1373 to 1382 at the earliest, but was most likely 'finished by, or at least shortly after, 1388', the year of the secondary revelation.[22] Watson persuasively argues that the short text's meditation on the nature of sin which concludes 'Amen par charite'—included in section twenty-four of Watson and Jenkins's edition of the short text[23]—was originally intended as the peroration of this version.[24] According to Watson, the passage which follows 'reveals Julian's dissatisfaction' with this emphasis on sin, and her subsequent desire to refocus the text towards the revelation that 'love was his meaning'.

[17] Vincent Gillespie, '"[S]he do the police in different voices": Pastiche, Ventriloquism and Parody in Julian of Norwich', in *A Companion to Julian of Norwich*, ed. by Liz Herbert McAvoy (Cambridge: Brewer, 2008), pp. 192–207. For more on this dating, see Nicholas Watson, 'The Composition of Julian of Norwich's *Revelation of Love*', *Speculum* 68.3 (1993), 637–83.
[18] Watson and Jenkins, eds., *Writings*, p. 3.
[19] *Ibid*, p. 4.
[20] Benedicta Ward, 'Julian the Solitary', in *Julian Reconsidered*, ed. by Kenneth Leech and Benedicta Ward (Oxford: SLG Press, 1988), pp. 11–35 (p. 26–27).
[21] Gillespie, '"[S]he do the police"', p. 196.
[22] Watson, 'The Composition of Julian of Norwich's *Revelation of Love*', p. 667.
[23] Watson and Jenkins, eds., *Writings*, p. 115.
[24] Watson, 'The Composition of Julian of Norwich's *Revelation of Love*', p. 669–70.

This chronology sits comfortably with the transition we find from the more autobiographical short text to the communal project of Julian's long text—or, as Philip Sheldrake puts it, the 'shift from a more experience-based narrative by Julian as participant to a teaching-centered presentation by Julian as interpreter'.[25] Julian herself confirms that her longer text is intended to edify her 'even cristen', her fellow Christians, providing them with access to the same revelation that she received. The little surviving evidence of her life, corroborated by recent work on the anchoritic vocation, confirms that Julian was an active and respected member of this community. Margery Kempe's visit paid to Julian's anchorhold sometime around 1413, for example, provides a glimpse of Julian's respected status: 'Dame Jelyan' is recommended to Margery as an expert in visionary matters, whose *Book* reports several days of communion and discussion between the two women.[26] Her reputation is also implied by a number of bequests to an anchorite named Julian in some Norwich wills at the end of the fourteenth and beginning of the fifteenth centuries, which are helpfully attached as Appendix B to Watson and Jenkins' edition of the text.[27] These confirm, as Liz Herbert McAvoy writes, that Julian spent more than twenty years as a recluse, and was 'evidently held in high esteem locally by a wide and influential network of people'.[28] McAvoy subsequently rejects readings of Julian as 'solitary', favouring a depiction of Julian as a woman who, 'whilst spanning the ideological solitude of the desert upon which the anchoritic vocation was firmly built, nevertheless also occupied a position at the heart of the Christian community within late-medieval East Anglia'.[29] Watson and Jenkins point out, moreover, that anchoritic solitude was a metaphorical, rather than physical, way of life: 'far from living in isolation', they write, 'anchorites were public figures, performing every Christian's need for detachment from the world and inner solitude before God'.[30]

The solitude of Julian's anchoritic life must therefore also be understood as a communal enterprise: as Felicity Riddy writes, 'To see Julian as a solitary is to ignore a central feature of her self-representation, which is relational'.[31] This results, however, in an inevitable tension when

[25] Philip Sheldrake, *Julian of Norwich: In God's Sight, Her Theology in Context* (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2019), p. 28.
[26] *The Book of Margery Kempe*, ed. by Barry Windeatt (Cambridge: Brewer, 2004), p. 123.
[27] Watson and Jenkins, eds., *Writings*, pp. 431–35. Cf. Norman P. Tanner, *Popular Religion in Norwich with Special Reference to the Evidence of Wills, 1370–1532*, Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation (Oxford: University of Oxford, 1974), pp. 334–40.
[28] Liz Herbert McAvoy, 'Introduction', in *A Companion to Julian of Norwich*, pp. 1–18 (p. 6).
[29] *Ibid*, p. 7.
[30] Watson and Jenkins, eds., *Writings*, p. 5.
[31] Felicity Riddy, '"Women Talking About the Things of God"': A Late Medieval Sub-Culture', in *Women and Literature in Britain, 1150–1500*, ed. by Carol M. Meale, Cambridge Studies in Medieval Literature 17, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 104–27 (p. 115).

writing about Julian, between addressing the 'visionary I' who experiences the events described within the text, and the self-obfuscating 'authorial I'. While I distinguish these subjectivities later in the thesis as Julian-the-subject and Julian-the-author, these two personae remain contingent upon one another. As Watson and Jenkins rightly point out, this is 'a relationship of mutual care between the interpreter and the creature, in which neither forgets her final identity with the other'.[32] To repeat McAvoy's question in her introduction to the recent *Companion to Julian of Norwich*, then, 'which and how many "Julians", conceived of and produced over the countless "timeless moments" since she came to writing', does this study aim to uncover? I do not intend to contribute to debates surrounding Julian's biography; my primary focus is Julian's exceptional literary, philosophical, and theological contributions, and their continued relevance to existential questions of healthful living. My approach is therefore tightly focused on the text itself, with any discussion of Julian's subjective experiences limited to the account given in her own words. That is to say, the 'Julians' about which I am writing are—aside from the contribution of the evidence above—to be found internal to the texts. As such, while my reading of the texts is supported by references to medieval literature and culture, any connections of this kind should be taken as suggestive, rather than definitive. As recent criticism in medieval studies has shown, it is not always necessary to establish direct contact between texts of cultural significance; they can be construed in a 'horizontal', rather than 'vertical', relationship.[33] Furthermore, my approach highlights connections between Julian's work and postmodern thought. With this, I hope to uncover a *universal* Julian, whose work resonates across centuries of philosophical and theological thought, securing her a place in a community of 'even cristen' not only during her lifetime, but long after her death.

b) Manuscripts and Editions

No definitive version of Julian's writing survives in the present day. A copy of her short text can be found in British Library, Additional MS 37790 (formerly the Amherst MS), a mid-fifteenth-century anthology of devotional writings which Watson and Jenkins argue is 'a copy of a copy' of Julian's autograph.[34] The longer text, meanwhile, survives in three versions: Paris, Bibliothèque

[32] Watson and Jenkins, eds., *Writings*, p. 9.
[33] Gillian Adler deploys these terms in 'Visionary Metaphors: Sight, Sickness, and Space in Boethius's *Consolation of Philosophy* and Julian of Norwich's *Showings*', *The Journal of Medieval Religious Cultures* 46.1 (2020), 53–70. They originate from George Edmondson, *The Neighboring Text: Chaucer, Boccaccio, Henryson* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2011).
[34] Watson and Jenkins, *Writings*, p. 33. For more on this MS, see Marleen Cré, *Vernacular Mysticism in the Charterhouse: A Study of London, British Library, MS Additional 37790* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2006).

Nationale MS Fonds Anglais 40; London, British Library MS Sloane 2499 and MS Sloane 3705 (the second a later copy of the first); and London, Westminster Cathedral Treasury MS 4. In addition, there exist a number of fragments in MS St Joseph's College, Upholland, a seventeenth-century compilation. These multiple versions do not always agree with one another, making for an inherently unstable text. And none—aside from Additional MS 37790—is medieval: the earliest is the Westminster MS, a compilation of religious works which likely dates from c. 1500, but which only contains passages from the first, second, ninth, tenth, and fourteenth revelations.[35] The Paris MS is thought to date to around 1650, written in an 'unconvincing imitation […] of a hand of c. 1500', according to Edmund Colledge and James Walsh in their edition.[36] This is the chosen version used by Colledge and Walsh, as well as that of Denise Baker.[37] It is also used as the main source text in Watson and Jenkins' hybrid edition. The Sloane MS (2499), thought to belong to the early seventeenth century, is the favoured source in the editions of Marion Glasscoe and Barry Windeatt, who argue that this version is more faithful to Julian's original diction: Glasscoe asserts that 'its language is much closer to fourteenth-century English than that of P [Paris]',[38] while Windeatt writes that Sloane's use of northern East Anglian language is 'more likely to preserve closeness to her [Julian's] ways and patterns of thought'.[39]

On account of this textual *mouvance*, Watson and Jenkins offer a synthetic edition of Julian's texts, which they advance as 'a more intellectually sophisticated representation of this text than [would result from] the choice of either complete manuscript'.[40] While this edition is invaluable for its accessibility and stabilisation of codicological variance, the modernised or hybrid language does not suit my purposes, which are focused on Julian's careful and complex use of Middle English. Though I treat each manuscript (and indeed, each edition) as contributing to the larger project of an ever-shifting, fluid text, I have chosen to use Glasscoe's edition as my base text. Notwithstanding ease of reading and continuity, this decision is primarily motivated by Sloane's theological language, which I read as more reflective of Julian's theology: as Gillespie and Ross point out, Paris 'consistently avoids the theological *lectio difficilior*, preferring the orthodox to

[35] Watson and Jenkins, eds., *Writings*, pp. 417–18.
[36] Julian of Norwich, *A Book of Showings to the Anchoress Julian of Norwich*, ed. by Edmund Colledge and James Walsh, 2 vols. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1978), vol. 1, p. 7.
[37] Julian of Norwich, *The Showings of Julian of Norwich*, ed. by Denise Baker (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 2005).
[38] Glasscoe, ed., *A Revelation of Love*, p. ix.
[39] Windeatt, ed., *Revelations of Divine Love*, p. lxvii.
[40] Watson and Jenkins, eds., *Writings*, p. 29.

the audacious'.[41] Evidence of this will become apparent in chapter three, where I observe variance between Paris and Sloane's wording of the contemplative journey inward, and again in chapter four, where I point out the effacement of the *-hede* suffix in Paris, where it is retained in Sloane—a feature I read as central to Julian's theology. Both of these variations, I argue, disrupt the 'mystical poetic' of Julian's writing, and therefore the impact of the text as a contemplative tool. I do identify codicological disparities throughout the thesis, though these are not explicitly addressed unless they change the force of my interpretation. Similarly, while the long text supplies the primary material for my discussion, I invoke the short text whenever it may provide further elucidation. When referring to the texts in general, I call them the Julian texts, or *A Revelation of Love*, after Glasscoe.

ii. Julian Criticism

The development of Julian studies must be contextualised within the so-called mystical field, which was, in its inception in the early twentieth century, dominated by the Catholic discipline of mystical theology. Integrated with spirituality studies, which sought to combine psychological and sociological concerns with the theological, this early work reassigned medieval contemplative writers as *mystics*, a category which subsequently took on a pluralist and even universalist sense of transcendent spiritual experience. The psychological strand of scholarship also, however, gave rise to studies which sought to undertake rationalist readings of mystical texts. Freudian influence, for example, can be felt in the trend of diagnosing mystics—especially female mystics—a modern iteration of the *discretio spirituum* discourse which sought to ascertain whether the experiences reported were genuinely divine or disordered. Julian has not been not immune to such readings: in 1924, Robert Thouless wrote that Julian's visions were hallucinations demonstrating a precarious mental imbalance,[42] while Conrad Pepler suggested in 1958 that Julian was 'apparently delirious', diagnosing 'an acute neurosis, induced perhaps by an over-enthusiastic life of penance and solitude'.[43] The first book-length study to deal with Julian exclusively offers a similarly positivist reading of Julian's illness and mental state: while Paul Molinari ultimately finds Julian both *compos mentis* and orthodox in her spirituality, his analysis

[41] Vincent Gillespie and Maggie Ross, '"With Mekeness Aske Perserverantly": On Reading Julian of Norwich', *Mystics Quarterly* 30.3–4 (2004), 126–41 (p. 140, n. 1).
[42] Robert H. Thouless, *The Lady Julian: A Psychological Study* (London and New York: Macmillan, 1924), p. 25.
[43] Conrad Pepler, *English Religious Heritage* (London: Blackfriars, 1958), p. 312.

is nevertheless weighed down by lingering designations of female mysticism as an expression of psychological deprivation or pathology.[44]

Concurrently, theologians such as James Walsh and Anna Maria Reynolds focused on the textual elements of Julian's work, sketching out some preliminary findings concerning Julian's scriptural and theological borrowings.[45] As with Richard Rolle and Margery Kempe, Julian's texts initially resisted the dogmatic readings of mystical theologians, an approach which constrained the canon of the Middle English mystics against their continental counterparts. The publication of Colledge and Walsh's two-volume edition of Julian's works in 1978 did much to bring Julian's work into the critical fold, though it relied on a representation of Julian as deeply familiar with the Latin Bible, the patristics, and both mystical and vernacular theology. Colledge and Walsh's systematisation of Julian's work is felt in the edition's extensive notes, which include—as Watson and Jenkins point out in their own edition—more than a thousand possible allusions to a wide array of writers, and a list of biblical citations seven hundred items long. These are deployed as evidence to infer Julian's status as *literata*, Latin literate, despite Julian's claim that she is 'unletterde'. This version of the text sits adjacent to Marion Glasscoe's 1972 *A Revelation of Love*, the first modern edition of Julian's works in Middle English. Glasscoe's editorial principle was, in contrast to Colledge and Walsh's exegetical approach, to preserve the 'complex nature of Julian's thought' and use of language, the rhythms and inflections of which she reads as 'often those of the speaking voice'.[46] Glasscoe's reading of Julian as experimental in her linguistic representation of the showings gave rise to further discussions of Julian's 'literariness'. The first Exeter Symposium in 1980, organised by Glasscoe, and the accompanying collection of essays, *The Medieval Mystical Tradition in England*, offered—and continues to offer in its later forms—a forum for such conversations. Contributions to this series by Barry Windeatt, Oliver Davies, Tarjei Park, Nicholas Watson, and Vincent Gillespie, to name but a few, have been particularly formative to the field in their readings of Julian.[47]

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[44] Paul Molinari, *Julian of Norwich: The Teaching of a 14th Century English Mystic* (London, New York, and Toronto: Longmans, Green and Co., 1958).

[45] James Walsh, 'God's Homely Loving: St. John and Julian of Norwich on the Divine Indwelling', *The Month* 205 n.s. 19 (1958), 164–72; Anna Maria Reynolds, 'Some Literary Influences in the *Revelations* of Julian of Norwich (c. 1342–post-1416)', *Leeds Studies in English and Kindred Languages* 7–8 (1952), 18–28.

[46] Glasscoe, ed., *A Revelation of Love*, p. xviii.

[47] Barry Windeatt, 'The Art of Mystical Loving: Julian of Norwich', in *MMTE I, Papers Read at the Exeter Symposium, July 1980*, ed. by Marion Glasscoe (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1980), pp. 55–71; Oliver Davies, 'Transformational Processes in the Work of Julian of Norwich and Mechtild of Magdeburg', in *MMTE V, Papers Read at The Devon Centre, Dartington Hall, July 1992* (Cambridge: Brewer, 1992), pp. 39–52; Tarjei Park, 'Reflecting Christ: The Role of Flesh in Walter Hilton and Julian of Norwich', in

Colledge and Walsh's edition has since been criticised as an attempt to retroactively legitimate Julian's text by locating her within a 'masculinist clerical culture'.[48] This reflects another methodological 'turn' in Julian studies, and in the mystical field more broadly: the feminist, or bodily turn. Scholarship of the 1980s rejected the emphasis on asceticism and denial of the body which had characterised earlier studies of mystical texts. Postmodern critics, following Julia Kristeva and Luce Irigaray, instead celebrated the feminine *jouissance* of the mystical body, which—in all its abjection—provided women with new modes of communication, 'figuratively written in blood or milk instead of ink', as Barbara Newman puts it.[49] This approach informs the work of Newman, as well as Frances Beer, Alexandra Barratt, Elizabeth Robertson, and Grace Jantzen, who are all in some way concerned with representations of the feminine body, and the transference of embodied femininity onto the flesh of Christ, specifically the sexual and gynaecological elements.[50] These discussions have been continued more recently by the work of Liz Herbert McAvoy, Diane Watt, Laura Saetveit Miles, and others, who have been particularly concerned with the interaction between space, gender, and authority in Julian's writing.[51] These studies have coincided with an increased interest in Julian's life and context, as outlined above. The most recent 2006 edition of Julian's work by Watson and Jenkins assimilates this neohistoricist movement, with its biographical suggestions building on Watson's previous work redating the presumed composition of the short and long texts. The 2008 *Companion to Julian of*

MMTE V, pp. 17–37; Nicholas Watson, 'The Trinitarian Hermeneutic in Julian of Norwich's *Revelation of Love*', in *MMTE V*, pp. 79–100; Vincent Gillespie, 'The Colours of Contemplation: Less Light on Julian of Norwich', in *MMTE VIII, Papers Read at Charney Manor July 2011*, ed. by E. A. Jones (Cambridge: Brewer, 2013), pp. 7–28.

[48] Riddy, '"Women Talking About the Things of God"', p. 112.

[49] Barbara Newman, 'New Seeds, New Harvests: Thirty Years of Tilling the Mystic Field', *Traditio* 72 (2017), 9–20 (p. 13).

[50] Barbara Newman, *From Virile Woman to WomanChrist* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995); Frances Beer, *Women and Mystical Experience in the Middle Ages* (Woodbridge: Boydell, 1992); Alexandra Barratt, '"In the Lowest Part of our Need": Julian and Medieval Gynaecological Writing', in *Julian of Norwich: A Book of Essays*, ed. by Sandra McEntire (New York and London: Garland, 1998), pp. 239–56; Elizabeth Robertson, 'Medieval Medical Views of Women and Female Spirituality in the *Ancrene Wisse* and Julian of Norwich's *Showings*', in *Feminist Approaches to the Body in Medieval Literature*, ed. by Linda Lomperis and Sarah Stanbury (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993), pp. 142–67; Grace Jantzen, *Power, Gender, and Christian Mysticism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Grace Jantzen, *Julian of Norwich: Mystic and Theologian* (London: SPCK, 2000).

[51] Liz Herbert McAvoy and Mari Hughes-Edwards, eds., *Anchorites, Wombs and Tombs* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2010); Liz Herbert McAvoy, ed., *Rhetoric of the Anchorhold: Space, Place and Body within the Discourses of the Enclosure* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2008); Liz Herbert McAvoy, *Authority and the Female Body in the Writings of Julian of Norwich and Margery Kempe* (Cambridge: Brewer, 2004); Diane Watt, *Medieval Women's Writing: Works by and for Women in England, 1100–1500* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007); Laura Saetveit Miles, 'Space and Enclosure in Julian of Norwich's *A Revelation of Love*', in *A Companion to Julian of Norwich*, pp. 321–44.

Norwich, edited by McAvoy, must also be acknowledged for its brilliant synthesis of these various strands of Julian scholarship, offering a comprehensive overview of the prevailing attitudes and approaches to Julian the author and her writings in context.

Given the increased rigor applied to historicising Julian's texts in recent decades, it follows that readings of Julian's account of her illness have moved away from the problematic territory of retroactive diagnosis, towards a more integrated consideration of the event within its cultural context. Richard Lawes' essay on Julian, Thomas Hoccleve, and Margery Kempe, for example, insists on the power of an author's culture to mediate autobiographical accounts of illness, 'in all ages and societies, whether the accounts are oral or written'.[52] This is a theme also taken up by Juliette Vuille, who argues for female mystics' 'madness' as potentially construed as 'holy insanity' by their contemporaries, in accordance with exemplary accounts of holy women.[53] Gillespie's recent article linking Julian's account of her 'disese' with contemporary tribulation literature, too, demonstrates the richness of *A Revelation*'s intertextual resonances, arguing for Julian's tactical synthesis of tropes from the *ars moriendi* and passion meditation traditions.[54] This work has been followed by a number of studies stressing the contingency between Julian's writing, her sickness, and contemporary understandings of disease.[55] Such intertextual, historicist readings directly counteract the diagnostic positivism of earlier studies, two ends of the methodological spectrum which can be broadly classified using terms coined by linguist Kenneth Pike: *-emic* and *-etic*.[56] These terms denote the application of interpretative categories which arise out of the culture in question, or the use of categories brought from outside the culture, respectively. Historian of medicine Monica Green notes, for instance, that modern biomedical

[52] Richard Lawes, 'Psychological Disorder and the Autobiographical Impulse in Julian of Norwich, Margery Kempe and Thomas Hoccleve', in *Writing Religious Women: Female Spiritual and Textual Practices in Late Medieval England*, ed. by Christiania Whitehead and Denis Renevey (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), pp. 217–44 (p. 223).
[53] Juliette Vuille, '"Maybe I'm Crazy?" Diagnosis and Contextualisation of Medieval Female Mystics', in *Medicine, Religion and Gender in Medieval Culture*, ed. by Naoë Kukita Yoshikawa (Cambridge: Brewer, 2015), pp. 103–20.
[54] Vincent Gillespie, 'Seek, Suffer, and Trust: "Ese" and "Disese" in Julian of Norwich', *Studies in the Age of Chaucer* 39 (2017), 129–58.
[55] See Adler, 'Visionary Metaphors'; Sarah Star, '"The Precious Plenty": Julian of Norwich's Visions in Blood', *The Journal of Medieval Religious Cultures* 46.1 (2020), 71–90; Hannah Lucas, 'Passion and Melancholy: Julian of Norwich's Medical Hermeneutic', *The Review of English Studies* (2020), available at: <https://doi.org/10.1093/res/hgaa022> [accessed 7 April 2020].
[56] Kenneth L. Pike, ed., *Language in Relation to a Unified Theory of Structure of Human Behavior*, 2nd ed. (The Hague: Mouton, 1967). Cf. Thomas N. Headland, Kenneth L. Pike, and Marvin Harris, eds., *Frontiers of Anthropology*, vol. 7: *Emics and Etics: The Insider/Outsider Debate* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1990).

science will always be an *-etic* interpretation, while diagnoses using cultural evidence move into *-emic* territory.[57]

Discussions that follow an *-emic* methodology such as those cited above, which resituate Julian's textual voice within contemporary conversations about spirituality and disease, offer to greatly enrich our understanding of the anchorite's multifaceted texts. There is, however, more work to be done interrogating the relationship in Julian's writing between her sickness, the visionary event, and her textual representation/interpretation of said event. This requires, in my view, a critical approach which follows Julian's own methodology, asking the same existential questions as Julian with the same rejection of rationalism and egocentrism. A reading of the Julian texts from an existentialist, philosophical perspective will seek towards some answers to these questions. Some phenomenological aspects of Julian of Norwich's writing have already been sketched out by Michael Raby, who writes of Julian's work as 'rich in phenomenological description'.[58] A detailed study of the phenomenological aspects of the Julian texts, however, has not yet been undertaken. The thesis seeks to fill this critical gap. By engaging a modern critical framework which refuses epistemological closure on the texts, I aim to disrupt the *-emic* and *-etic* dichotomy. Instead, I ask how medieval discussions of contemplation and health can inform current understandings of this topic and vice versa, with a close linguistic analysis of Julian's text triangulating this enquiry. In so doing, the thesis opens up a vital new area of research in Julian studies, focused on the connections between the anchorite's illness and revelation, the mechanics of her language and theology, and the potential of her text to effect a corresponding change in her readers to that which she herself underwent.

It remains for me to clarify my critical vocabulary in the context of this scholarly field. The terminological pressures of the categories of *mystic*, *mystical*, and *mysticism* have been foregrounded in recent years by scholarship on this body of literature. In his introduction to *The Cambridge Companion to Mysticism*, Watson writes that while 'The term *mysticism* is […] an essential reference-point for the field […] the vexed history of the term, its strong conceptual and emotional pull away from the world of history towards the eternal, and its unhelpful lack of purchase so far as medieval England is concerned, has made it come to seem increasingly

[57] Monica H. Green, 'Taking "Pandemic" Seriously: Making the Black Death Global', *Pandemic Disease in the Medieval World: Rethinking the Black Death*, *The Medieval Globe* 1.1–2 (2014), 27–61.
[58] Michael Raby, 'The Phenomenology of Attention in Julian of Norwich's *A Revelation of Love*', *Exemplaria* 26.4 (2014), 347–67 (p. 350).

problematic'.[59] He subsequently concludes that 'the study of what we must still refer to as *medieval English mysticism* needs, rather, to take place within a differently and more broadly defined set of keywords, principal among which, throughout this book, is the term *contemplation*'.[60] I will, in accordance with this terminological shift, broadly refer to Julian as a *contemplative* (and the more event-focused *visionary*), and to the intellectual and affective pursuit and receipt of transcendental or visionary experience as *contemplation*. When I do refer to mysticism, it is either in reference to the field of mystical theology, alongside which I discuss Heidegger's phenomenology, or with the intention of focusing on the disclosive capacity of language to reveal the hiddenness of the transcendental experience, as in my discussion of 'mystical poetics'. That is, in accordance with the Middle English definition of *mystik* as 'figurative'.[61]

iii. Methodological Comments

a) Phenomenology and Mystical Theology

The grounding principle of my methodology is allowing the text to speak for itself, while situating that speech *in dialogue* or *conversation* with modern philosophy. This follows the phenomenological account of speech as an inherently relational act, a joint project of meaning-making between speaker and listener, author and reader. I subsequently consider the dialogical relationship between Julian's texts and phenomenology as mutually-enriching, to both our understanding of existential philosophy and Julian's theology. Laura Moncion has advocated for just this approach in her recent Butlerian reading of Julian; for a reading of the past and postmodern in conversation, foregrounding 'equal participation between terms'.[62] The reciprocal aspect of this method can be described in phenomenological terms as the hermeneutic circle, a concept which typically refers to the notion that an understanding of the text as a whole requires an understanding of its component parts, and vice versa. Critics have already noted that Julian's reader is encouraged to engage in a circle of ongoing interpretation; Julian's language spirals in

[59] Nicholas Watson, 'Introduction', in *The Cambridge Companion to Medieval English Mysticism*, ed. by Samuel Fanous and Vincent Gillespie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 1–28 (p. 10).
[60] *Ibid*, p. 11, emphasis in original.
[61] MED, s.v. 'mistik(e', *adj.*
[62] Laura Moncion, 'Bodies That Talk: Julian of Norwich and Judith Butler in Conversation', *Postmedieval* (2018), 1–15 (p. 2).

on itself, returning to and reassessing key words and concepts.[63] The effect of this—as a method for knowing, writing, and reading—is that a single 'correct' interpretation is never finalised. This confirms Julian's text as a participant in what Maggie Ross calls the 'silence tradition' of Christianity:[64] as philosopher of religion Jean-Luc Marion writes, 'Silence, precisely because it does not explain itself, exposes itself to an infinite equivocation of meaning'.[65] New studies of Julian's texts therefore draw on a store of previous interpretations, providing enriched readings which in turn lead forward to further criticism, and enabling, as Philip Sheldrake writes, the 'spiritual classic to come alive in the present'.[66] In line with the circular method, my thesis will return to certain concepts, quotes, and themes recurrently, with varying angles or depths of interpretation. To this end, if any ideas appear initially unexcavated, it is likely I examine them at greater length later in the thesis. Finally, the thesis—like Julian's text—is by no means a last word on the topic. As Ross puts it, we must not '[demand] closure on a text that is leading the reader into infinite openness'.[67] Instead, I posit the thesis as a participant in a longer conversation about the topics addressed herein, to speak some words on the text's 'infinite equivocation' of meaning.

In addition to my interpretation of the Julian texts, the joint conversational project of theory and text allows a secondary direction of illumination: on the relationship between medieval theology and the atheistic philosophy of the continental school. Heidegger's connection to medieval theology is one of direct philosophical heritage: the medieval schoolmen were the last philosophers prior to Heidegger to ask ontological questions about modes of being.[68] Born out of

[63] E.g. Sheldrake, *Julian of Norwich: In God's Sight*, p. 6; Kerrie Hide, *Gifted Origins to Graced Fulfillment: The Soteriology of Julian of Norwich* (Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 2001), p. 19.
[64] Maggie Ross, *Silence: A User's Guide*, *Vol. 1: Process* (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2018), passim.
[65] Jean-Luc Marion, *God Without Being*, trans. by Thomas A. Carlson (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1991), p. 54.
[66] Philip Sheldrake, *Explorations in Spirituality: History, Theology, and Social Practice* (New York and Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 2010), p. 45.
[67] Maggie Ross, 'Behold Not the Cloud of Experience', in *MMTE VIII*, pp. 29–50 (p. 50); Ross, *Silence: A User's Guide, Vol. 1*, p. 125.
[68] For more on this heritage, see Costantino Esposito and Pasquale Porro, eds., *Quaestio. Annuario di Storia Della Metafisica*, vol. 1: *Heidegger e i Medievali. Atti del Colloquio Internazionale Cassino 10/13 Maggio 2000* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2001)—a volume which contains an exhaustive bibliography of the literature on Heidegger's relationship to medieval philosophy. Cf. Ethan Knapp, 'Medieval Studies, Historicity, and Heidegger's Early Phenomenology', in *The Legitimacy of the Middle Ages: On the Unwritten History of Theory*, ed. by Andrew Cole and D. Vance Smith (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), pp. 159–93; Helmuth Vetter, ed., *Heidegger und das Mittelalter* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1999); Robert Bernasconi, 'On Heidegger's Other Sins of Omission: His Exclusion of Asian Thought from the Origins of Occidental Metaphysics and His Denial of the Possibility of Christian Philosophy', *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 69 (1995), 333–49; John D. Caputo, 'Heidegger and Theology', in *The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger*, ed. by Charles B. Guignon (Cambridge:

the early period of his life in which his Catholic faith was intact, Heidegger even identified his initial philosophy as scholastic phenomenology. This inheritance leaves a distinct imprint on Heidegger's phenomenological method. In his view, Dasein's primordial state is grounded in 'nothing', the revelation of which is pitted as an analogy to mysticism, an act of apophasis in which the constructedness of being is profiled against the 'nothing and nowhere'. In other words, being is brought into unconcealment by the 'nothing', just as God is unconcealed by silence in the apophatic tradition. This relationship is itself unconcealed by the language Heidegger adopts and repurposes to his own ends: terms like 'letting be' (*Gelassenheit*), 'detachment' (*Abgeschiedenheit*), and 'devotion' (*Hingabe*). As Sean McGrath points out, 'Heidegger never fully clarifies the nature of these analogies between the mystical and phenomenological meanings of these words', though he does not deny 'they might mean something different'.[69]

As his work progressed, Heidegger sought to separate his philosophy from its theological roots, culminating in 1927 with *Sein und Zeit*, or *Being and Time,* which phenomenologically bracketed its theological foundation. It is this period of Heidegger's existential phenomenology with which I am primarily concerned. Influenced by early Luther's criticism of *scientia* and the scholastic potentiality of affirming God through reason, Heidegger sought in *Sein und Zeit* to separate philosophy from metaphysical theology. He had grown dissatisfied with the 'onto-theology' of scholasticism, which aspired to affirmative certainty regarding God's existence, instead reaching for a post-metaphysical phenomenology of being that was open to multiple—indeed, endless—interpretations of experience. McGrath comments that *Sein und Zeit* is 'mired in the theological heritage it seeks to overcome', a critique which, he acknowledges, is not new: in 1953, Heidegger's student Karl Löwith argued that Heidegger's thinking of being in terms of time is based primarily on a 'religious and […] eschatological consciousness'.[70] Jacques Derrida, too, identified the Judaeo-Christian-Islamic ideal of faithful existence as the operative behind *Sein und Zeit*: 'Neither the language nor the process of this analysis of death is possible without the Christian experience, indeed, the Judaeo-Christian-Islamic experience of death to which the

Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 270–88; John D. Caputo, *Heidegger and Aquinas: An Essay on Overcoming Metaphysics* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1982).

[69] Sean J. McGrath, *The Early Heidegger and Medieval Philosophy: Phenomenology for the Godforsaken* (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2006), p. 134.

[70] McGrath, *The Early Heidegger*, p. 173.

analysis testifies'.[71] Judith Wolfe has since called this Heidegger's 'eschatology without an eschaton'.[72]

Recent studies concerning Heidegger's relationship with his theological heritage have responded to newly available German texts of his earliest letters and lectures (from 1909 onwards), which have further contextualised the philosopher within the political and theological debates of his early university career.[73] McGrath notes that 'We now possess a significantly fuller picture of Heidegger's work prior to *Sein und Zeit*, the pivotal years between the Scholastic *Habilitationsschrift* and the "hermeneutics of facticity", when Heidegger was explicitly cornered with theological issues'. [74] This has coincided with the recent 'theological turn' of phenomenology, which has found divine revelation a productive field of inquiry for phenomenological study. Revelation is, Jean-Luc Marion has argued, the 'saturated phenomenon par excellence', or is comprised, in other words, of phenomena that 'exceed every attempt to conceptualise and categorise, those that explode into visibility in a surplus of intuition', and which stretch 'to breaking point' the receptive capacities of the subject.[75] As Michael Raby notes, 'the mystical theologian models a method and practice that anticipates the phenomenologist's call to return "to the things themselves"'.[76] It seems, then, a particularly charged moment in both Heideggerian and medieval studies for an enriching and interrogative dialogue between the two.

While medieval theology resonates throughout Heidegger's philosophy, close Heideggerian readings of medieval visionary texts have been limited: Sonya Sikka has conducted a Heideggerian analysis of *The Cloud of Unknowing*, where she argues that Heidegger's way of thinking about being can be viewed as 'a negative theology, but without the Christian God'.[77] Sikka proceeded to a comparative study of Heidegger with medieval theologians, Meister Eckhart of Hochheim (c. 1260–c. 1328), Johannes Tauler (c. 1300–1361), and John of Ruusbroec (1293/1294–1381), who, as proto-Augustinians, preceded Heidegger's reactionary position

[71] Jacques Derrida, *Aporias: Dying—Awaiting One Another as The 'Limits of Truth'*, trans. by Thomas Dutoit (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), p. 80.
[72] Judith Wolfe, *Heidegger's Eschatology: Theological Horizons in Martin Heidegger's Early Work* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 2.
[73] Particularly Heidegger's *Frühe Freiburger Vorlesungen*, the lectures he gave at the University of Freiburg as Husserl's assistant (1919–1923).
[74] McGrath, *The Early Heidegger*, p. xiv.
[75] Jean-Luc Marion, quoted and paraphrased in Raby, 'The Phenomenology of Attention', p. 349.
[76] *Ibid*.
[77] Sonya Sikka, 'Transcendence in Death: A Heideggerian Approach to *Via Negativa* in *The Cloud of Unknowing*', in *MMTE V*, pp. 179–92 (p. 180).

against scholasticism.[78] John Caputo has also found 'extensive parallels' between Eckhart and later Heidegger, declaring there to be 'no stronger analogy to the relation between *Dasein* and the coming to pass of the Truth of Being in Heidegger's later thought than that between the soul and God in Eckhart'.[79] Reiner Schürmann has, however, argued that the presence of Eckhartian mysticism in Heidegger's work has been a confused area of study, due to the interpretation of Eckhart's thought as a 'metaphysics' concerned with substances considered statically, when Eckhart is, in fact, concerned not with substance but *event*; with the 'path' of the soul *en route* to God, known as 'perigrinal ontology'.[80] This is evinced in the imagery of Eckhart's sermons:

> St. Augustine says there are many who sought light and truth, but only outside where it was not to be found. Finally they go out so far that they never get back home or find their way in again. Thus they have not found the truth, for truth is within, in the ground, and not without.[81]

Eckhart stresses what will later be conceptualised by Heidegger as 'being-at-home-in-the-world': 'Here in the world the body is bold and strong, for it is *at home*, the world helps it, the earth is its fatherland, it is helped by all its kin'.[82] As I will demonstrate, there are echoes of these words too in Julian's theology, which locates a home in this world through entrance into the self and Christ. While Eckhartian influence on Julian is not possible to confirm,[83] it is worth drawing attention to these textual reflections and refractions, which serve to reiterate the network of imagery that pervades this kind of phenomenological theology. For these visionary theologians, as in phenomenology, revelations are characterised as *events*, with understanding a fluid hermeneutical

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[78] Sonya Sikka, *Forms of Transcendence: Heidegger and Medieval Mystical Theology* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1997).

[79] John D. Caputo, 'Meister Eckhart and the Later Heidegger: The Mystical Element in Heidegger's Thought: Part One', *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 12.4 (1974), 479–94 (p. 482).

[80] Reiner Schürmann, *Maître Eckhart ou La Joie Errante: Sermons Allemands Traduits et Commentés* (Paris: Éditions Planète, 1972), esp. p. 66, n. 46, p. 170.

[81] Meister Eckhart, 'Sermon Two (Pf2, Q102, QT 58)', in *The Complete Mystical Works of Meister Eckhart*, trans. and ed. by Maurice O'C. Walshe, rev. with a foreword by Bernard McGinn (New York: Crossroad Publishing Company, 2009), pp. 39–45 (p. 41).

[82] Meister Eckhart, 'Sermon Four (Pf4, Q103, AT 59)', in *ibid*, pp. 55–61 (p. 60, emphasis added).

[83] Though scholars have not refrained from speculation. Anna Maria Reynolds states that 'Johannes Eckhart would appear to have influenced her strongly. Julian's tendency to speculate, her concrete imagery and a certain forthrightness of expression would certainly seem to give her kinship with this great German thinker. And while this resemblance may be accidental, it is a tempting surmise […]'. 'Some Literary Influences in the *Revelations* of Julian of Norwich', p. 27. More recently, James Charlton has dedicated a full-length study to the '*congruency of sympathy*' between Julian, Eckhart, and Traherne, with the cursory speculation that 'Julian is thought by medievalists to have been familiar with Eckhart's work. Some would hold that she was influenced by it. Much remains unclear'. *Non-Dualism in Eckhart, Julian of Norwich and Traherne: A Theopoetic Reflection* (New York and London: Bloomsbury, 2013), pp. 3, 70, emphasis in original.

process, and both constituted of dynamic interaction between the self-conscious mind and deep mind; self and world; soul and divine.

The reading of mystical theology with phenomenology, and of Julian with Heidegger, will subsequently demonstrate the colliding contemplative and phenomenological emancipation of ontological enquiry from the boundaries of rationality and objectivity. This is not to suggest, however, that Julian rejects the scholastic method entirely, as did Heidegger and the theologians above: to group Julian with proto-Augustinian, anti-scholastic theologians like Eckhart or Tauler would contravene the intention of the thesis, which is to reveal new aspects of the text which have been previously unexamined, without enforcing a programmatic reading. In this way, I use Julian's approach as a hermeneutic model: just as Julian herself draws on numerous discursive matrices without using them to find closure on the revelation, I draw on phenomenology as a means by which 'to identify and investigate the text's exceptionalities, but never […] to override them'.[84] The possibility of hope and redemption enshrined within Julian's theology is *profiled* against, rather than overridden by, the negative darkness of 'nothing' towards which Heidegger's philosophy projects us. In turn, I show how Julian's proto-phenomenological movement away from causality and objectivity *forestalls* the Heideggerian requirement of a distinct separation of theology and philosophy. In other words, while Heideggerian phenomenology accepts the dark night of the 'nothing' as Godforsaken,[85] Julian reaches into the philosophical darkness with 'the groping hand of trusting love',[86] waiting for divine illumination.

b) The Etymological Method

I deploy etymologies throughout the thesis to expand upon my own interpretation of Julian's language. I consider this attention to the etymological origins of Middle English words to be part of my phenomenological toolkit, following Heidegger's own philosophical method, which repurposes prefixes and roots of words, and their meanings, to new ends: *Da-sein*, *Ge-stell*, etc. Heidegger also returns repeatedly to the etymologies of the words he deploys—like *Bauen*, which I discuss in chapter one. Matthew King, in his article on 'Heidegger's Etymological Method', argues for this use of etymologies as a means Heidegger uses to '*open up* the word, to overcome

[84] Paul Strohm, *Theory and the Premodern Text* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), p. xv.
[85] McGrath distinguishes Godforsakenness from Godlessness: 'it is the anguished cry of a believer who feels abandoned by God'. McGrath, *The Early Heidegger*, p. 11.
[86] René Tixier, '"Good Gamesumli Pley": Games of Love in *The Cloud of Unknowing*', *Downside Review* 108 (1990), 235–53 (p. 244).

the tendency for the meaning of words […] to become restricted over time'.[87] With this thesis, King rejects two possible readings of Heidegger's etymological method: first, that etymologies are a 'kind of pretentious, inconsequential hand-waving'; second, that they are linked to Heidegger's supposed goal of 'retrieving the "purer" concepts of earlier times'.[88] Instead, King argues that Heidegger's etymologies act as a method of disclosure. This resonates with my definition of mystical poetics outlined in chapter three: a linguistic expression of visionary experience which draws attention to itself—namely, its failure to inarticulate God, and in doing so, foregrounds the limitations of language as a disclosive tool. In Heideggerian terms, language becomes obtrusive, or *unready-to-hand*. Similarly, etymological work draws attention to the words at hand, refusing to *assume* what they are saying. Instead, etymologies show how words speak differently in different historical periods, demonstrating that 'a word can resonate more richly when its roots are still heard in it than when its roots have been forgotten'.[89] In this way, the use of etymology as a phenomenological method 'transposes history's concerns', as Frank Schalow writes.[90]

The etymological method functions, then, as a kind of phenomenological reduction. It operates in contradistinction to traditional philosophical *analysis*, which aims to precisely define or narrow the sense of a term. Schalow describes analysis as the 'compulsive exactness [of] representational [i.e., metaphysical] thought [which] turns language into an instrument of convention, omitting differences and forsaking distinctions'.[91] King posits Heideggerian etymology as an antidote to analysis, in that it '[restores] language to its natural flexibility and ambiguity'.[92] It guards against what Heidegger called 'uninhibited word-mysticism'.[93] As many have pointed out, 'word-mysticism' is precisely what many would accuse Heidegger of falling prey to.[94] If, however, we understand Heidegger's etymological method as *challenging* the idea that words have determinate contents, then this method can be seen to enrich, instead of excoriating, our interpretation of

[87] Matthew King, 'Heidegger's Etymological Method: Discovering Being By Recovering the Richness of the Word', *Philosophy Today* 51.3 (2007), 278–89 (p. 278, emphasis in original).
[88] *Ibid*.
[89] *Ibid*, p. 279.
[90] Frank Schalow, 'Language and the Etymological Turn of Thought', *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal* 18 (1995), 187–203 (p. 196).
[91] *Ibid*, p. 197.
[92] King, 'Heidegger's Etymological Method', p. 279.
[93] Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time* [1927], trans. by Joan Stambaugh, rev. and with a foreword by Dennis J. Schmidt (Albany, NY: University of New York Press, 2010), §44. All further quotations are taken from this edition, following convention by citing marginal numbers rather than page numbers. Original German is cross-referenced from Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* [1927], 17th ed. (Niemeyer: Tübingen, 1993).
[94] For example, Theodor W. Adorno, *The Jargon of Authenticity* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973).

words. King admits the irony in pointing out that 'etymology' is derived from the Greek ἐτυμολογία (*etymología*), meaning 'true' in the sense of 'genuine' or 'natural'. But rather than seeking the most 'genuine' or 'true' meaning, Heidegger's etymological method seeks to open up *multiple* historical routes of meaning. Again, King performs this himself, defining 'method' etymologically as 'a way of going toward something, a way of approaching'.[95] He notes that 'the restricted sense of technical "rigour" which clashes with the later Heideggerian attitude, comes to dominate the meaning of the word only as a result of its association with modern science'.[96] This aligns with my purposes, which in turn reflect Julian's own attitude of epistemological non-closure. As Mikael Males points out, etymologies in medieval texts are often false, and medieval authors 'had no qualms about lending equal support to several mutually contradicting etymologies'.[97] Instead, etymons and roots were often repurposed in medieval texts in the form of wordplay and puns, expanding and enriching texts with semantic plurality—as in Julian's mystical poetic. Similarly, my thesis is intended to open up new avenues of enquiry, expanding our understanding of the rich store of meaning contained within the text, without laying claim to positivist resolutions or answers.

c) Challenging Heidegger's Ideology

In spite of my above challenge to conceptions of Heidegger's etymological method as seeking a return to 'genuine' meaning or truth, there are very real dangers inherent within adopting Heidegger's lexicon of authenticity without addressing its more disturbing elements. Any philosophy of health which strives towards that which is 'genuine' or 'natural' risks slippage into a purist ideology. This applies to Heideggerian philosophy in particular, given the philosopher's long-debated associations with fascism and Nazism.[98] I do not wish to simply repeat the ethical question of whether we should divorce Heidegger's philosophy from his politics.[99] Instead, I want to show how positioning Heidegger's philosophy in conversation with the Julian of Norwich texts can throw light on the ethical and political concerns attached to both Heideggerian studies and

[95] King, 'Heidegger's Etymological Method', p. 280.
[96] *Ibid.*
[97] Mikael Males, 'Introduction', in *Etymology and Wordplay in Medieval Literature*, ed. by Mikael Males, Disputatio 30 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2018), pp. 1–18 (p. 1).
[98] See Richard Wolin, ed., *The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader* (London and Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993).
[99] Cf. Patricia Cohen, 'An Ethical Question: Does a Nazi Deserve a Place Among Philosophers?', *The New York Times Online*, 8 November 2009, available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/09/books/09philosophy.html?smid=tw-share> [accessed 25 February 2020].

medieval studies alike. For the field of medieval studies has recently proven itself to be susceptible to weaponisation by far-right groups, who have appropriated the literature and culture of the Middle Ages to promote ideologies of supremacism and nationalism.[100] Similarly rooted in notions of 'purity' or 'authenticity', these groups falsify history through their idealist conceptions of race, nationhood, gender, and language. This should be concerning to all medieval scholars, particularly those dealing with philosophical questions of personal and communal wellbeing.

While Julian has thus far escaped exposure to this kind of violent misreading, her universal appeal and continued presence in popular spirituality invites a kind of passive idealism which could result in misappropriation. Kenneth Leech's essay on Julian's 'Hazelnut Theology' points to these concerns, warning against some corresponding dangers to the otherwise 'positive, creative, and abiding contributions' Julian makes to our theological understanding.[101] First is the simplicity of her theology, which Leech argues can be misread as a 'spiritual pseudo-innocence which cannot, and therefore does not, face those areas of reality which threaten and disturb it'.[102] Second, her optimism, which can again easily become 'pseudo-optimism': 'an optimism which refuses to face the depths of evil in persons and in structures'—also known as *spiritual bypassing*.[103] Finally her 'earthiness', which can be rendered as 'A green spirituality that bypasses the need for redemption'; in other words, a theology which risks romanticising nature, '[finding] God in the natural order'.[104] Reflected in this last concern is, once again, the same purism which motivates right-wing groups and their antecedents: 'the folk traditions of race and nature [and] the rich culture of the *Volk*', which '[end] up as a spiritual reinforcement for the dominant order'.[105] These are, Leech notes, 'essentially forms of retreat', part of the anti-urban tradition which also finds expression in Heidegger's critique of the current technological epoch and its *Gestell* subject, and his subsequent emphasis on de-mechanisation.

While Julian writes of sin and suffering as 'behovabil', she is by no means fatalistic: free will is an important component of her theological framework, and any discussion of suffering is indeed countered by her emphasis on the potentiality of wellbeing in the face of it. However, to read

[100] Cf. Jennifer Schuessler, 'Medieval Scholars Joust With White Nationalists. And One Another.', *The New York Times Online*, 5 May 2019, available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/05/arts/the-battle-for-medieval-studies-white-supremacy.html> [accessed 25 February 2020].
[101] Kenneth Leech, 'Hazelnut Theology: Its Potential and Perils', in *Julian Reconsidered*, pp. 1–10 (p. 1).
[102] *Ibid*, p. 6.
[103] *Ibid*, p. 7. Cf. Gabriela Piccioto, Jesse Fox, and Félix Neto, 'A Phenomenology of Spiritual Bypass: Causes, Consequences, and Implications', *Journal of Spirituality in Mental Health* 20.4 (2018), 333–54.
[104] *Ibid*, pp. 7–8.
[105] *Ibid*, p. 9.

Julian's 'all shall be well' maxim as a universalist sublimation of sin, punishment, pain, and suffering is to disregard the very trauma which laid bare her soul to God. It is, moreover, to dismiss her insistence on the necessity for continued spiritual perseverence in the face of sin and its accompanying tribulation, which are certain in life. Julian places equal stress on the hard and cruel sides of worldly living as on joy, on 'wele and wo'; acknowledging nature red in tooth and claw. She does not, therefore, negate the potentially detrimental impact of tribulation. This is a crucial qualification given my discussion in chapter one of Havi Carel's 'adversity hypothesis', influenced by social psychologist Jonathan Haidt. While trauma and suffering *can* effect personal transfiguration, this does not invalidate the accompanying pain, nor does it neutralise the moral imperative to critique the root causes of suffering, and to actively deconstruct the structures—social, institutional, political—which may have made such suffering possible.

When I write, then, of the thesis as challenging the pathophobia which grounds modern discourses of health and medicine, I do not mean to glorify suffering. This would be contrary to Julian's own writing, which never goes further in its discussion of asceticism than is implied by its Ancient Greek etymology, *ἄσκησις* or *áskēsis* (exercise, training): for Julian, 'beseking' does require an *exercise* or training of the wills, but she does not recommend pain—or what I will describe as the 'purgative way'—as a means to divine union, which can in fact be a force of distraction. In Julian's framework, pain is akin to sin, the fall into the slade in the parable of the lord and the servant; a difficult obstacle to navigate, but also an inevitable part of being-in-the-world. With her reframing of pain in this way, Julian provides her readers with a new way of looking at tribulation. Hers is, in other words, a theology of *transfiguration*. This is a term borrowed from Maggie Ross, who writes of transfiguration (as opposed to transformation or transcendence) as 'a *narrative about changed perspective*'.[106] The person is not changed, as such, since they have always possessed the capacity for receiving God; rather, Julian offers a way to *change the way we figure things out*. This approach is not, then, simply a case of 'rediscovering' our innate or 'natural' divinity, in idealist terms, but a commitment to disrupting ways of thinking which exclude or ignore the fullness of human experience. My reading of Julian's texts should, therefore, actively disrupt any purism or supremacism associated with the philosophy of 'authenticity', instead demonstrating the ways in which love, compassion, and presence can effect a shared understanding and communal shift in perspective.

iv. A Summary of the Chapters

[106] Ross, *Silence: A User's Guide, Vol. 1*, p. 31.

It remains for me to provide an outline of the chapters to follow. Chapter one, 'Developing a Phenomenology of Health and Home', details my methodological framework: a phenomenology of illness and wellbeing, following the work of phenomenologists Martin Heidegger, Havi Carel, Fredrik Svenaeus, and others. This model is predicated upon the redefinition of health as homelike being-in-the-world, a state of wellbeing distinct from optimal biological or physiological function. Here, I examine the fundamentals of the phenomenological method, asking how phenomenology can inform the goal of medicine, and offering up a model that prioritises 'care' when biomedical cure is unavailable. I then outline a phenomenology of the *home*, asking how these phenomena might function as metaphorical indicators of health. I conclude the chapter by discussing the possibility of a phenomenological *ars moriendi*, a reappraisal of the medieval model which can inform modern approaches to dying, based on the Heideggerian concept of resoluteness in the face of death, or being-towards-death. After establishing my methodological framework, the thesis broadly follows a sequence of event > interpretation > communication, tracking a shift from Julian-the-subject's experience of her sickness and revelation, the way in which the revelation is epistemologically processed, and how Julian-the-author communicates this in writing.

Chapter two, 'Reading Julian's "Bodely Sekeness"', addresses the first aspect of this triad, focusing on the near-fatal experience which preceded Julian's divine revelation. Engaging the phenomenological framework outlined in chapter one, I propose that the illness wounds Julian's subjectivity such that her homelikeness is disrupted, projecting her into a state of abject liminality into which the revelation or beholding irrupts. I look here at Julian's experience of embodiment, and the disclosure of her body as objective; the uncanny effect of the illness on her experience of time; her relation to her companions who surround her; and the distinction between physical and spiritual pain. Finally, I demonstrate Julian's resoluteness in the face of death, facilitated by the breakdown of her subjectivity in favour of a porous, compassionate self, which abandons the individual 'I' in favour of being-with-others. Chapter three, 'Writing the Visionary Text', then examines the epistemologies at play in Julian's receipt of revelation, and their representational challenges. Drawing on theologian Maggie Ross's two epistemologies of contemplation (Appendix 1), I ask what it means to *experience* revelation, in spiritual, psychological, and phenomenological terms. This initiates my reading of Julian's contemplative mode as a hermeneutic circle of understanding: a non-closing exercise of circulation between 'beseking' and 'beholding'. I argue for this circle as ontological: a mode of *knowing* which fulfils *being*, in terms

of disclosing the wholeness of the soul as it is reunified in God. I call this a kind of re-attunement to the soul's natural capacity, described by Julian as 'kynde'. In section two, I show how the text might effect the same re-attunement in the reader, through an inducement to compassion through a shared textual performance. Drawing on enactivist ideas of mutual sense-making, I argue for Julian's contemplative text as a 'mene' for effecting transfiguration in the reader, just as her revelation transfigured her. Finally, I ask *how* this text is constructed, through what I call Julian's mystical poetic: a linguistic expression of mystical knowing—and unknowing—through affirmation and negation, cataphasis and apophasis. I here posit Middle English as a suitable linguistic medium for Julian's communal project, arguing for vernacularity as a shared or 'homely' mode of communication which accords with the Word-made-flesh conceit at the heart of incarnational theology.

Chapter four, 'Performing "Homlyhede"', concludes the event > interpretation > communication triad, focusing on Julian's figurative language as signifying the active and participatory nature of the human relationship to God. Focusing on the 'homely' root, I trace the rhetorical amplification of this term as movement of supereffability, from cataphasis to apophasis, and to Julian's 'homeliest' vision of heaven. I then read the term 'homlyhede' as denoting homeliness through enaction or performativity, a way of living I describe phenomenologically as being-towards-God, or the 'wey' of Christ. I ask how Julian suggests 'homlyhede' might be performed; as an act of willed surrender to God through prayer. With this, I explore the phenomenology of prayer and the transfigurative impact of this practice upon the subject. Here, I further distinguish between the 'contemplative' and 'purgative' ways of seeking God, showing how the act of contemplation can effect a similar—though less violent—transfiguration as does illness or pain. Finally, I show how Julian expresses this anthropological schema through figurative language of ecology and domesticity, which I then integrate with the phenomenological framework of homelikeness to examine Julian's participatory model of redemption. The centrality of Christ's incarnation to Julian's theological project is also the subject of my conclusion, where I frame the relationship between Christ and humanity in terms of the physician-patient encounter, intended to initiate healing through mutual understanding. With this, the event > interpretation > communication triad is revealed to be a cyclical nexus, rather than a linear progression, as the process of transfiguration circles back to the reader: the 'we' of Julian's 'even cristen' audience.

Following Julian's continued emphasis on communality, I deploy the *pluralis majestatis* or 'royal we' at points throughout the thesis. I am aware this will be disagreeable to some. I must qualify

that I do not refer only to myself, nor do I presume to speak for my imagined reader, or to evade personal responsibility for my argument. Rather, I aim to decentre the Cartesian ego or *das Ich*—what Heidegger called the 'dominance of the subject'[107]—in favour of a relational model following Martin Buber's 'I-Thou' engagement. In using the first-person plural, I therefore invite my reader to read the thesis as its own 'compassionate text' or 'joint project' as I describe it in chapter three, with the same qualities as Julian's for encouraging porosity and transfiguration. The thesis thus becomes a metatextual conversation between myself and my reader, concerning the conversations contained within—between Julian, phenomenology, and my own interpretative voice—which are, in turn, concerned with Julian's conversations with Christ. These concentric layerings of dialogue reflect the structure of mutual indwelling which defines Julian's theological schema, whereby the respective participants in these dialogical relationships are invited to dwell within each conversation. In this way, the thesis itself functions as a tool of disclosure—like a supplement to Julian's own disclosive text, provided as a 'mene' to assist in the reading of her *Revelation*—and thus also becomes a tool in the communal cultivation of 'homlyhede'.

[107] Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche II* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1961), pp. 141–42.

Chapter One:
Developing A Phenomenology of Health and Home

i. Phenomenology: To The Things Themselves

The phenomenological approach derives from Edmund Husserl's philosophical injunction: 'to the "things themselves"'.[1] It attempts to return to phenomena as they are immediately encountered; to the conscious processes of experiencing (the 'noetic') and the objects of experience (the 'noematic'). In so doing, the phenomenologist sets aside presuppositions about the nature of the world. They must distance themselves from what they know, suspending scientific or objective ratiocination in favour of pre-reflective, subjective human experience. This process—the phenomenological reduction, or *bracketing*—is thought of as a 'letting be' of the world, its living beings and objects. In Husserl's work, the phenomenological project can be broadly described as epistemological, in that he was concerned with the reduction of consciousness to its core truth. Husserl's early thinking is in this respect Kantian: just as Kant saw knowledge as the activity of consciousness, as transcendental, Husserl argues that phenomena are constituted by consciousness. He posited phenomenology as a transcendental science, which would explain the way consciousness *transcends* itself, stands outside itself in the world. This emphasis on the theory of science and knowledge—*scientia*—was eventually rejected by Husserl's student and protégé, Martin Heidegger, who turned instead to the everyday world of being and understanding. Heidegger defined his approach as 'fundamental ontology': while Husserl's concern was what it means *to know*, Heidegger's was what it means *to be* (*die Seinsfrage*). He based his phenomenology on the idea that understanding is an existential, a priori aspect of human being; in other words, that to experience, exist, or live in the world means to interpret or understand it. In light of this conviction, Heidegger developed a new phenomenological method: hermeneutics. Traditionally a methodology for reading sacred or legal texts, Heidegger's hermeneutics is instead a way of understanding the world. As Cristina Lafont summarises, 'It is precisely because human beings are nothing but interpretation all the way down that the activity of *interpreting a meaningful text* offers the most appropriate model for understanding any human experience whatsoever'.[2] In spite of Husserl's insistence that phenomenology is primarily descriptive, Heidegger suggested that hermeneutics' necessary suspension of preconceptions about the world

[1] Edmund Husserl, *Logical Investigations* [1900/1901], trans. by J. N. Findlay and ed. by Dermot Moran, 2nd ed., 2 vols. (London: Routledge, 2001), vol. 1, p. 168.
[2] Cristina Lafont, 'Hermeneutics', in *A Companion to Heidegger*, ed. by Hubert L. Dreyfus and Mark A. Wrathall (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), pp. 265–84 (p. 265, emphasis in original).

is also a *destructive*, or deconstructive act. The hermeneutic method requires us to strip away any notion of interpretation as conceived by the subject-object model, and to dis-identify from any scientific role of observer. This is an active and effortful process of dismantling, which John Caputo has described as a kind of natural violence, since 'Hermeneutics is able to "retrieve" the primordial only insofar as it dismantles the overlaid accretions and derivative understandings of the world'.[3]

Heidegger's hermeneutics therefore breaks with the traditional philosophical metaphysics of sight, which viewed human experience as based on our perception of objects. He offers a new paradigm: that humans are principally self-interpreting beings, existing in a web of interpretation and significance with the world we inhabit. In Heidegger's words, the world is a 'referential context of significance' (*Verwisungszusammenhang der Bedeutsamkeit*) in which humans participate in 'being-there' (*Da-sein*). This term for the human being, Dasein, defines us by our 'ability-to-be', and Heidegger interprets this ability as our rational capacity for questioning our own existence, which separates us from the rest of the animal world. Dasein understands itself through 'being-in-the-world' (*in-der-Welt-sein*); through our ability to engage with the world, rather than our ability to observe it. Heidegger writes that 'subject and object are not the same as Dasein and world'.[4] Rather, Dasein finds itself already *in* the world, in the sense of involvement and inclusion: it is 'in comportment' or 'in relation' (*Verhalten*) with the world, while animals, for example, are 'held captive' by theirs. Heidegger calls this Dasein's 'worldliness' (*Weltlichkeit*), which echoes Husserl's concept of the 'lifeworld'. Dasein is 'thrown' (*geworfen*) into a social and cultural situation not of its own choosing, given over to meaning-structures (*Bewandnisganzheiten*) which are intersubjective, historical, and cultural—they change over time and place—but which also in a number of ways remain necessarily constant for Dasein's self-understanding, as a permanent 'facticity' (*Faktizität*) of Dasein. This 'thrownness', which informs Dasein's understanding, then affects Dasein's worldly existence, which Heidegger defines through several aspects. He calls these existential qualities of Dasein 'existentials' (*Existenzialien*), which denote Dasein's relation to its own being, and open up the world as a possibility for itself, binding Dasein with the world. These existentials constitute Heidegger's 'existential analytic' and are comprised of: 'understanding' (*Verstehen*), 'attunement' (*Befindlichkeit*), and 'discourse' or 'articulacy' (*Rede*). Heidegger thematises these existentials under the concept of 'care' (*Sorge*), which denotes the transcending-returning structure of Dasein,

[3] John D. Caputo, *Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction, and the Hermeneutic Project* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1987), p. 63.
[4] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, §60.

and which Heidegger writes is a constant 'coming back to itself'. This structure accounts for Dasein's situatedness within time, with Dasein projecting itself towards the future in a perpetual return to the possibilities presented by the past; an 'out-standing' (*ek-statikon*) in both past and future, which Heidegger calls *Ekstasen.* Working together, these existentials mean that Dasein is able to project itself towards certain opportunities and goals, which make up its everyday actions and routines.

With this notion of projection, Heidegger draws on Husserl's theory of intentionality, which determines consciousness as a directedness toward the world in a series of 'acts'. Derived from Aristotelian scholasticism, intentional being (*esse intentionale*) presupposes the immateriality of the intellect and its freedom to take on the forms of other things, 'wherein subject and object are united in a single suprasubjective mode of existing'.[5] Husserl calls this the 'natural attitude', a non-conscious way of being-in-the-world to which we do not usually pay attention, but which is revealed by the phenomenological reduction.[6] The theory of intentionality relies on a non-conscious sense of temporality. In phenomenological terms, human consciousness exists in a ceaseless flow of time, wherein the 'now' is the central point of reference for the appearance of past and future: 'Each actually present now', Husserl writes, 'creates a new time-point because it creates […] a new object-point'.[7] An object or event is individuated because it appears in the now, which is attended by past and future. That is to say, it is dependent on other points in time for its own definition: on an awareness of the future, which Husserl calls 'protention', and on an awareness of the past, called 'retention'. We retain information of the 'just having been', while simultaneously directing ourselves forward in anticipation of what is to come, all of which helps to form an impression of something in the now. Where Husserl deviates from traditional notions of tripartite past-present-future time structures is in the conceptual unity of these processes into one single mental act. The example commonly cited to explain this concept is of hearing a melody, when we have direct access to a certain note, but perceive a coherent unity of different notes. In this instance, the direct access to a certain note is the primal impression, while our protention of the notes to come and retention of notes no longer heard interweave to fulfil the impression of a sequential tune.

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[5] John N. Deely, *The Tradition via Heidegger: An Essay on the Meaning of Being on the Philosophy of Martin Heidegger* (Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), p. 67. Cf. McGrath, *The Early Heidegger*, pp. 61–62.
[6] For an overview of Husserl's phenomenology, see Rudolf Bernet, Iso Kern, and Eduard Marbach, *Introduction to Husserlian Phenomenology*, with a foreword by Lester Embree (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1993).
[7] Edmund Husserl, *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893–1917)*, trans. by J. Brough (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991), p. 68.

Husserl attaches intentionality to the 'soul' (*Seele*), writing of goal-directedness as a purely mental process. However, given that the phenomenological reduction rejects the subject-object model, phenomenology after Husserl abandons the scholastic idea of intentionality as a solely intellectual concept. Phenomenology understands human beings as a *unity* of body and soul, and although Husserl appreciates the body's participation in the intentional process, it remains a thorn in the side of his understanding of perception. He makes the distinction between the 'immanent' sphere of conscious experience and the 'transcendent' domain of external objects. The body, however, is both an organ of perception and an object to be perceived—a duality which places it in a liminal space between these epistemological categories, since it is neither *internal* to one's consciousness, nor *external* in one's environment. As Husserl writes, 'I do not have the possibility of distancing myself from my body, nor it from me', since 'The same body that serves me as a means of all perception stands in my way in the perception of itself and is a remarkably incompletely constituted thing'. [8] Husserl subsequently prioritises consciousness as a transcendental ego in our goal-directedness: the body remains a conceptual 'abyss', a 'quasi-object' that an essentially disembodied transcendental ego 'owns' as the locus of subjective sensations.[9] As Taylor Carman argues, 'Husserl's distinction between the lived body and material bodies is not enough, then, to overcome the conceptual dualism underwriting his project'.[10]

After Husserl, phenomenologists are clearer to distinguish between the body as a material object, viewed from a third-person perspective (*Körper*), and the body as an organ of perception, viewed from a first-person perspective (*Leib*). The former is, as Jean-Paul Sartre writes, the body of others, or the body *as it appears to* others.[11] The latter is the body as 'lived': as I experience it. Heidegger expresses a similar notion to the lived body with the neologism '*Das Leiben des Leibes*'. He writes of existence as a 'bodying-forth' into the meaning-structures of the world, which are consequently not confined to only mental or intellectual structures. But Heidegger's seminal *Being and Time* (*Sein und Zeit*) famously excluded any detailed explication of *how* the body functions in Dasein's activity and understanding, focusing only on the possibility of Dasein's lived spatiality. Philosopher Fredrik Svenaeus notes that Heidegger's later *Zollikon*

[8] Edmund Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy—Second Book: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution*, trans. by R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989), p. 159.
[9] Taylor Carman, 'The Body in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty', *Philosophical Topics* 27 (1999), 205–26 (p. 224).
[10] *Ibid*, p. 210.
[11] Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness: A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology* [1943], trans. by Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Washington Square Press, 1956), pp. 401–70.

Seminars 'provides evidence that Heidegger was aware of this shortcoming already when he wrote *Sein und Zeit,* and that the body as lived—*Leib*—forms a more important part of Dasein's being-in-the-world than is evident from the book'. [12] This is an omission which greatly informed phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological project. Likewise, Svenaeus surmises that Heidegger's analysis of the body in the *Zollikon Seminars* 'was inspired by a reading of Merleau-Ponty, although he is never mentioned there'. [13] In *Phenomenology of Perception*, Merleau-Ponty confronts the issue of the embodied subject head on, rejecting the Husserlian notion that we *own* the body in favour of the notion of the 'body-subject': an experiential unity of body and mind. Merleau-Ponty once and for all casts aside the historically dualist understanding of the flesh as over against the rational spirit or intellect inherent in, for example, Plato's articulation of the body as the 'dungeon' of the soul, and crystallised in the work of René Descartes. In Merleau-Pontian terms, we *are* and *have* our bodies at the same time: 'I am conscious of my body *via* the world', he writes, just as 'for the same reason […] my body is the pivot of the world'.[14] This body-subject is the seat of our subjectivity, the *gestalt* means by which we engage with the world. Being-in-the-world, for Merleau-Ponty, is not a matter of an 'I think', but an 'I can'.

The lived body functions, then, as an integral part of existential phenomenology, even if it is not fully elucidated in Heideggerian ontology. Svenaeus closes this gap in his analysis of Heidegger's existential analytic, proposing the inclusion of the lived body (*Leib*) as a 'fourth existential'. Svenaeus argues that there is no reason to not include the body in Heidegger's analytic, which understands Dasein's being-in-the-world as played out by meaning-patterns formed between different tools (*Zeuge*), since the body itself is a vital part of our transcendence into the world. In fact, Heidegger traces the word 'organ' to the Greek *organon*, meaning instrument or tool: 'The [bodily] organ is a *Werkzeug*', he writes, 'a working instrument'.[15] Heidegger's understanding of tools is based on their inconspicuous functionality, whereby relations between different tools are explicated as an 'in order to' (*um zu*). It is only when a tool malfunctions that we become aware of its existence *qua* tool. If a tool ceases to work, it becomes 'conspicuous', if it is missing, it

[12] Fredrik Svenaeus, 'The Phenomenology of Health and Illness', in *Handbook of Phenomenology and Medicine*, ed. by S. Kay Toombs (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001), pp. 87–108 (p. 98, n. 19); Fredrik Svenaeus, *The Hermeneutics of Medicine and the Phenomenology of Health: Steps Towards a Philosophy of Medical Practice* (Dordrecht and London: Kluwer, 2000), p. 108, n. 167.
[13] *Ibid.*
[14] Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception* [1945], trans. by Colin Smith (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), p. 94.
[15] Martin Heidegger, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude* [1929/30], trans. by W. McNeill and N. Walker (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1995), p. 213.

becomes 'obtrusive', and finally, if it is there but not suited to the required task, it is 'obstinate'.[16] Conspicuousness relies on Heidegger's distinction between entities which are 'present-at-hand' (*vorhanden*) and 'ready-to-hand' (*zuhanden*).[17] When a ready-to-hand entity becomes *present*-at-hand, it is viewed as an object independent of its function. Heidegger then distinguishes between 'present-at-handness' and '*unready*-to-handedness', where the latter defines objects that are no longer phenomenologically transparent, but are not wholly independent either: broken objects, for example, remain perceived as broken *versions* of the object, rather than totally objective objects in and of themselves.[18] Perhaps the most famous example of 'unready-to-handedness' is Heidegger's hammer, which is revealed as a hammer only when it breaks: the brokenness of the hammer reveals that our experience of the hammer is defined by our everyday engagement with it, *um zu*. Similarly, as S. Kay Toombs has pointed out, 'I am not usually conscious of my body being separate from me'. She qualifies: 'my body is '"mine" most of all, yet [it is also] '"other" most of all'.[19] On account of this duality, Svenaeus admits that 'it would be wrong to call the body parts tools since they are also part of *Dasein* as a self': they are 'as lived (*leibliche*), they belong to the projective power of the self'.[20] He therefore qualifies the *totality* of the lived body against, for example, body-tools such as the hand: 'If the hand instead of the hammer breaks, the activity will likewise come to an end. The hand consequently is also a sort of tool for activity and understanding constituting a nodal point in the meaning-pattern of the world', but 'The confusion and annoyance of the broken hammer can hardly be compared to the pain we experience having broken a wrist'.[21] The broken wrist affects our transcendence into the world: our ability to 'body-forth'.

Havi Carel's *Phenomenology of Illness* explains how this duality of the body-as-object and the body-as-lived is vital for a phenomenological understanding of embodiment, since 'if we think of the body as experienced and lived, its failure will be experienced differently to the failure of a pen', or indeed, a hammer.[22] Carel, too, points out that 'Our bodies cannot be replaced or repaired as easily as tools': 'In other words', she writes, 'the body is not a tool in its crucial sense: it is the *origin* of our sense of being in the world and this feeling of *inhabiting* a *world*, although tacit, is

[16] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, §§72–89.
[17] *Ibid*, §16. Stambaugh translates these as 'at hand' and 'handy', but I have chosen to stick to the more conventional translations.
[18] *Ibid*, §68.
[19] S. Kay Toombs, *The Meaning of Illness: A Phenomenological Account of the Different Perspectives of Physician and Patient* (Boston, MA: Kluwer, 1992), pp. 51–62.
[20] Svenaeus, *The Hermeneutics of Medicine*, p. 109.
[21] *Ibid.*
[22] Havi Carel, *Phenomenology of Illness* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 61–62.

anchored in the body and depends upon it'.[23] Carel's choice of language here underscores the duality of *being* and *belonging* encapsulated by the embodied subject. Her emphasis on origin, anchoring, and habitation is linked with Svenaeus's idea that body and language are 'inter-nested'.[24] Heidegger uses 'language' to denote a system of shared meaning—a 'deep culture'—which enables entities to emerge in intelligible ways. It is the background in which our being-in-the-world is contextualised and injected with meaning: the world is 'intersubjectively shared because it is *linguistically articulated*'.[25] 'Language', Heidegger writes in his 1946 essay, 'Letter on Humanism', 'is the house of being. In its home man dwells'.[26] This dwelling then gives meaning to the gestures and behaviours of the body. On this topic, Svenaeus cites Heidegger's *Zollikon Seminars*, in which he refers to Dasein's bodying-forth as 'gestures' (*Gebärde*), a term connected to the language of the body:

> In philosophy we must not confine the meaning of the term gesture to 'expression' (*Ausdruck*) […]. Every movement of my body (*Leib*) as a gesture and behaviour enabled me not only to take place in physical space. Rather the behaviour is always already situated in a region (*Gegend*) that has been opened up by the thing that I am occupied with.[27]

That is to say, Dasein is 'in-the-world' on account of its existentials, which allow it to 'body-forth' into this dwelling, while simultaneously, Dasein's bodying-forth builds the 'world' into which it transcends. Dasein's being-in-the-world is itself world-building.

In phenomenological terms, then, the body is not simply a static vessel or husk of a dwelling, just as the entities in the world are not simply objects perceived as external to us. These are the fundamental tenets of phenomenological hermeneutics. I have here provided an overview of this movement, tracing the development of the phenomenological method as inherited and developed by its major philosophical thinkers. To summarise, Husserl's transcendental phenomenology was succeeded by Heidegger's existential ontology, which developed the hermeneutic method. Heidegger's analysis of human being rejects the subject-object model for an intersubjective existential analytic, whereby Dasein understands itself by transcending into a world of shared meaning-patterns. This self-understanding is temporal, operating within a ceaseless flow of time.

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[23] *Ibid*, p. 62, emphasis added.
[24] Svenaeus, *Hermeneutics of Medicine*, p. 111.
[25] Lafont, 'Hermeneutics', p. 273.
[26] Martin Heidegger, 'Letter on Humanism' [1946], in *Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings: From* Being and Time *(1927) to The* Task of Thinking *(1964)*, rev. ed. by David Farrell Krell (San Francisco, CA: Harper Collins, 1993), pp. 215–266, (p. 217).
[27] Heidegger, *Zollikon Seminars* [1959–69], quoted in Svenaeus, *Hermeneutics of Medicine*, p. 118.

Dasein's interaction with the world is mediated by the body, which is both an object or organ which facilitates perception (*Körper*), and part of the lived, subjective 'I' (*Leib*). This was developed further by Merleau-Ponty, who declared the human being a 'body-subject' of embodied subjectivity. This being 'bodies-forth' into the world, a shared dwelling which in turn gains meaning by virtue of this participation. In what remains of this chapter, I will follow Heidegger's ontological phenomenology and Merleau-Ponty's theory of embodied subjectivity, in order to develop a phenomenological model of health informed by Svenaeus's and Carel's theories on this subject, and grounded in the condition of homelikeness, or at-homeness.

ii. Towards a Phenomenology of (Ill) Health

With the continued authority of biomedicine and empiricism in the twentieth- and twenty-first century West, post-Cartesian dualist conceptions of the mind-body subject have become even more entrenched. Phenomenology offers an alternative. In recent decades, there has been movement towards a fuller understanding of the lived experience of health and illness through the phenomenological perspective. The major phenomenological thinkers surveyed so far did not develop theories of the lived experience of health and illness, although a number have touched on how the embodied subject might experience different ways of being-in-the-world according to their bodily situation. Psychiatrists and psychoanalysts have since employed phenomenology to develop theories of mental health and psychological development, but attempts to work out a general theory of health have been a relatively recent development in the field of medical philosophy and ethics.[28] In the 1980s and 90s, Richard Zaner and Drew Leder developed phenomenological theories of embodiment, drawing on medical case studies and professional experiences in healthcare scenarios to corroborate or elucidate concepts of subjectivity and perception.[29] S. Kay Toombs was the first to shift the centre of gravity of medical phenomenology from a focus on illnesses as 'evidence' or 'clues' to inform theory, to an emphasis on the lived experience of the sick person. Drawing predominantly on the phenomenology of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and Alfred Schutz, Toombs' approach seeks to integrate phenomenological theory with its application, addressing the gap between physician and patient. Bringing her personal experience of multiple sclerosis to her research, Toombs insists upon the voice of the patient: 'To bypass the patient's voice', she writes, 'is to bypass the illness

[28] For theories of mental health and illness informed by phenomenology, see the work of Ludwig Binswanger, Medard Boss, and Jacques Lacan.
[29] Richard M. Zaner, *The Context of Self* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1981); Drew Leder, *The Absent Body* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1990).

itself'.[30] After Toombs, philosopher Fredrik Svenaeus turned to Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer in his attempt to undo what he terms the 'radical *philosophectomy* in medicine', which saw philosophy 'cut off as a useless and even dangerous speculative approach to questions of health and illness'.[31] The focus of his work is the transformation of the patient's lifeworld. Svenaeus thus uses ideas about embodiment to inform his theory of the being-in-the-world of ill persons, and how this might be applied to the clinical encounter; how the clinician might approach *healing* rather than simply *curing*, as advocated by the naturalistic biomedical approach.

Most recently, Havi Carel has tried to construct a 'comprehensive, systematic—and distinctly philosophical—account of illness' so that we can walk through its 'complex topography' with a conceptual map in hand, 'to bring this philosophically uncharted territory into clearer view'.[32] Carel shifts the critical focus from using illness as a data-set for informing theory, instead engaging lived experiences of illness in a mutually-enriching relationship with philosophy, exploring 'what illness can do for philosophy' as well as how we can construct a 'coherent phenomenology of illness'.[33] As with Toombs, Carel draws on her own experience of respiratory illness, using her own testimony to 'tell the story' of disease in a way which heeds the phenomenological call to give voice to the patient and their experience. But what is most progressive in Carel's phenomenology is her effort to address the pathophobic and necrophobic attitudes that prevail in western culture. By understanding the distinctions between objective disease and the lived experience of illness, Carel argues, we can develop a self-reflective awareness of the vast spectrum of modes of being. This opens up space to 'acknowledge *inability to be* as a way of being', which has vast implications for disability studies, palliative care, and chronic illness alike.[34] Kevin Aho and James Aho come to similar conclusions in their work, which develops the phenomenological strategy as a way to 'move beyond Cartesian dualism',[35] the separation of mind and body which Heidegger, after Kant, termed the biggest 'scandal' in the history of philosophy.[36] They argue from a Heideggerian standpoint that the world is a 'joint project', which has constructed, 'broadcast and inherited' an interpretation that the body is a 'congeries of genetically conferred anatomical structures and physiological processes that can be

[30] Toombs, *Meaning of Illness*, p. 28.
[31] Svenaeus, *Hermeneutics of Medicine*, p. 4, emphasis in original.
[32] Carel, *Phenomenology of Illness*, p. 3. This study is Carel's successor to *Illness* (Durham: Acumen Publishing, 2008).
[33] Carel, *Phenomenology of Illness*, pp. 11, 38.
[34] *Ibid*, p. 82, emphasis added.
[35] Kevin Aho and James Aho, eds., *Body Matters: A Phenomenology of Sickness, Disease, and Illness* (Lanham, MD and Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2008), p. 4.
[36] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, §205.

monitored, and that, like a car or washing machine, is capable of being "repaired" by various pills and surgeries'.[37] This makes it difficult to grasp 'the paradoxical role played by sicknesses in maintaining the overall "health" of society', and 'the lived-suffering undergone by the ill'.[38] The goal of their research, they declare, is 'to clear a path through a clutter of stale assumptions and self-defeating ways of thinking our bodies, and to see ourselves and our afflictions in a more thoughtful way'.[39] This choice selection of the leading studies on the phenomenology of health and illness exists in dialogue with the early phenomenological thinkers and with each other. An inherited project, phenomenology works to strip away the dualist and positivist assumptions about what it means to be (un)well, prising apart the presumed mutual exclusivity of, for example, being well *and* being diseased. Like the separation of *Körper* from *Leib*, phenomenology allows the distinction of *disease*, as the objective physiological disorder understood through biomedical approaches, from *illness*, the first-person lived experience of disease. As Carel writes: 'Disease is to illness what our physical body is to our body as it is lived and experienced by us'.[40]

The upshot of this method is a major cognitive shift regarding how we define *health*. An OED search for 'health' reveals the dualist assumptions contained within the term in modern usage: sense 1(a) defines health as 'Soundness of body; that condition in which its functions are duly and efficiently discharged'.[41] Historically, however, health derives from the Old English *hǽlþ,* meaning 'wholeness', 'being whole', from the Proto-Germanic **hailitho*, and related to *halig*, 'holy'. Aho and Aho observe that this connection is particularly clear in modern German, wherein the participle 'healing' (*heilen*) is almost identical to the adjective 'holy' or 'godlike' (*heilig*).[42] Underlying the socio-cultural accretions which overlay the term in modern English usage, then, is an historical understanding of health as a condition of *wholeness*, not only in physical terms, but on a spiritual level. Health can therefore be understood as a self-effacing concept, greatly affected by cultural, social, and historical contexts, as Susan Sontag has argued.[43] Gadamer also picks up this notion of health as a more holistic kind of wholeness, writing of health as an equilibrium or a rhythm, which in its implicit and primordial rootedness in life, is largely latent and self-concealing:

[37] Aho and Aho, *Body Matters*, pp. 11, 13.
[38] *Ibid*, p. 13.
[39] *Ibid*, p. 6.
[40] Carel, *Phenomenology of Illness*, p. 17.
[41] OED, s.v. 'health', *n*.
[42] Aho and Aho, *Body Matters*, p. 5.
[43] Susan Sontag, *Illness as Metaphor* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1978), passim.

> Without doubt it is part of our nature as living beings that the conscious awareness of health conceals itself. Despite its hidden character, health nonetheless manifests itself in a kind of feeling of well-being. It shows itself above all where such a feeling of well-being means that we are open to new things, ready to embark on new enterprises and, forgetful of ourselves, scarcely notice the demands and strains which are put upon us. This is what health is.[44]

Gadamer's theory describes the phenomenon of health as rhythmic, concerning harmony or 'right measure', which Niall Keane points out follows from Plato, 'for whom the production of health is the establishment of the component parts of the body "in a natural relation of control and being controlled"'.[45] Recognisable in medieval humoral theory as the necessary balancing of humours,[46] and in modern nosology in the biological process of homeostasis, this interpretation of health-as-rhythm articulates a process common to the 'order' of natural life.[47] Gadamer cites 'breathing, digesting, and sleeping, as part of this rhythm of life, a permanent process in which equilibrium re-establishes itself'.[48] It must not, however, be mistaken for a process of causality or object-oriented intentionality: Gadamer's feeling of wellbeing, Svenaeus warns, 'should not […] be confused with other *positive* moods', which 'colour our understanding […] in a much more obvious and manifest way than health'.[49]

If health is understood as an inconspicuous and continuous balancing and re-balancing of the subject's engagement with the meaning-patterns of their world, *ill* health implies a breakdown in these meaning-patterns. In health, an individual intends towards the possibilities available to it, moving ceaselessly in the flow of its self-understanding. Merleau-Ponty calls this the 'intentional arc', which 'projects round about us our past, our future, our human setting, our physical, ideological and moral situation, or rather which results in our being situated in all these respects'.[50] In Heidegger's terms, Dasein is defined by its 'potentiality for being' or 'ability-to-be' (*Seinkönnen*, literally 'can-be'), and its undifferentiated character is constituted by activities of 'average everydayness', which, akin to Husserl's 'natural attitude', is the mode of being

[44] Hans-Georg Gadamer*, Über die Verborgenheit der Gesundheit. Aufsätze und Vorträge* [1993], quoted and translated in Svenaeus, *Hermeneutics of Medicine*, p. 80.
[45] Plato, *Republic*, IV.444d, quoted in Niall Keane, 'On the Origins of Illness and the Hiddenness of Health: A Hermeneutic Approach to the History of a Problem', in *Medicine and Society: New Perspectives in Continential Philosophy*, ed. by Darian Meacham (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014), pp. 57–72 (p. 63).
[46] Cf. Noga Arikha, *Passions and Tempers: A History of the Humours* (New York: Harper Collins, 2007).
[47] Keane, 'On the Origins of Illness', p. 58.
[48] Hans-Georg Gadamer, quoted in Svenaeus, *Hermeneutics of Medicine*, p. 80.
[49] *Ibid*, p. 94, emphasis in original.
[50] Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, p. 157.

towards which Dasein comports itself.[51] Illness, however, means a loss of this easeful intentionality: the intentional arc 'goes limp'.[52] When afflicted with disease, the biological body becomes unpredictable and is no longer able to perform the tasks through which Heidegger argued we understand ourselves; the body's ability-to-be is disrupted. To use Carel's example of respiratory illness, the body's breathlessness limits everyday movements and capabilities. She movingly relates the lived experience of this *in*ability-to-be, a description that underscores the innately spatial and temporal aspects of easeful intentionality or everyday being-in-the-world:

> In illness things grow heavier and further away. A distance I would once call 'near' or 'a day's walk in the countryside' is now 'far' or 'impossible'. Small tasks like carrying groceries home or lifting a child require preparation, pauses, rest, and cause fatigue. Everything is hard. Everything is far. Everything is strenuous. My world, and the world of those who are close to me, has shrunk. For me the trap is permanent. There is no release from it. Every movement requires oxygen. This fundamental fact about human biology, known to us all in the abstract, is experienced in everything I do.[53]

The phenomenon of 'shrinkage' described by Carel is also common to experiences of acute and chronic pain, which is known to shatter one's perception of time and space. When one is in pain, lived time ceases to relate coherently to objective time. As Calvin Schrag writes:

> The moments of pain […] do not follow the regular and ordered sequence of seconds and minutes that are marked off by the swing of a pendulum or the ticking of a clock. Clock time is isotropic. The values of its units are uniform. The time of one's being in pain is anisotropic. Its values vary with the intensity of the pain, the accompanying emotional weight, and the press of concerns at hand.[54]

Just like pain, illness has its own lived time. The ability to intend towards things by protracting and retenting is obstructed, as the linear timeline is lost to what Toombs has termed 'a continuum of discomfort', in which 'past and future pains coalesce into a stagnating present'.[55] Toombs calls this the 'ever-present' of illness, which afflicts the ill person with an enduring preoccupation with 'the here and now'.[56]

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[51] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, §§42–89. Stambaugh chooses the translation 'potentiality-for-being', but since I am examining Carel's critique of Heidegger, I follow her in using 'ability-to-be'.
[52] Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, p. 157.
[53] Carel, *Phenomenology of Illness*, p. 71.
[54] Calvin Schrag, 'Being in Pain', in *The Humanity of the Ill: Phenomenological Perspectives*, ed. by V. Kestenbaum (Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press, 1982, pp. 101–24 (p. 122).
[55] Toombs, *Meaning of Illness*, p. 15.
[56] *Ibid*.

This disruption of bodily intentionality reveals the body in its objectivity—as separate from us—when usually it converges within our lived experience as the embodied subject. Its operations that we would normally take for granted are made conspicuous, in a manner similar to Heidegger's broken tool. C. E. Silberman articulates this perceptual transition from the lived to the objective body: 'We take it for granted that our arms, legs, fingers, feet and other organs will respond to our commands', he writes, describing the experience of bodily transparency.[57] 'When they do not', however, Silberman says that 'we discover how much of our sense of self is bound up with our body and how disoriented we become when that body turns into an enemy rather than ally'.[58] With this vocabulary of conflict, Silberman reveals the essential violence of disease, which, with its disruption of the natural or everyday flow of existence, draws attention to the 'otherness' of the objective body. Svenaeus describes this phenomenon as an 'uncanny' experience, 'since the otherness of the body then presents itself in an obtrusive, merciless way'.[59] The body is disengaged from the self, because it is revealed to be beyond the self's control. Of course, the body is *always* beyond our control, in that it involves biological processes that continue without conscious interference. These are still lived processes, part of the rhythm of health and everyday being-in-the-world of the individual. But when this lack of control disrupts the individual's transcendence in the world—if the body collapses with the exertion of climbing the stairs, or no longer digests food unaided, for example—the individual might feel that they are 'at odds' with their body. The ill body becomes an oppositional force that resists the flow of the individual's intentionality. It is easy to see how language of 'doing battle with' or 'fighting' illness emerges in modern narratives of illness, which respond to the chaotic and unsettling disorder of sickness. By engaging the ill body in 'battle', this narrative fixates on the regaining of control of unruly flesh. In other words, to suggest that the patient is 'fighting' their sick body is to imply that they are resisting the weakness to which their body has succumbed—weakness which, as the phenomenological approach will make apparent, represents and reminds us of our constant and inevitable progression towards death.

Svenaeus explains this othering of the body in illness using Heidegger's existential analytic. Reminding us that 'no transcendence and no illness is entirely somatic or entirely mental', Svenaeus's approach therefore dispels the dualist narrative of resistance against the flesh.[60] He

[57] C. E. Silberman, 'From the Patient's Bed', *Health Management* Quarterly 13.2 (1991), 12–15 (p. 13).
[58] *Ibid*.
[59] Svenaeus, *Hermeneutics of Medicine*, p. 111.
[60] *Ibid*, p. 101.

engages Heidegger's existential of 'attunement' to explain how this othering operates in the lived experience of illness, basing his analysis on the concept of 'homelikeness'. According to Heidegger, we 'find ourselves' (*sich befunden*) in the world of intersubjective meaning, by finding ourselves in a mood or 'attunement'. As Heidegger writes in the *Zollikon Seminars*, 'We all in the different cases of experiencing a broken arm, buzzing in the ears, stomach pains, or anxiety find ourselves in a different way. In every case our attunement (*Be-findlichkeit*) is different […]'.[61] An attunement of illness means we no longer are able to participate in the familiar actions, projects, and communications of our everydayness: 'The body, our thinking, the world, everything is now "out of tune", coloured by feelings of pain, weakness and helplessness'.[62] Our lifeworld as we know it—including our body and its participation in it—is brought to our attention in its objectivity, revealed as other or as uncanny: 'es ist dem Kranken unheimlich'.[63] Sveaneus's emphasis on this concept of the uncanny draws on the notion of the *unheimlich*, which Heidegger describes as 'not-being-at-home' (*Un-zuhause*).[64] Uncanniness, Heidegger writes, comes from 'the nothing and the nowhere'.[65] The feeling of uncanniness arises out of the fear of the unknown, the void, or 'the Nothing' (*das Nichts*), a condition which Heidegger calls anxiety (*Angst*):

> In anxiety one has an *'uncanny' ['unheimlich']* feeling. Here, with anxiety, the peculiar indefiniteness of that which Dasein finds itself involved in anxiety initially finds expression: the nothing and nowhere. But uncanniness means at the same time not-being-at-home […]. Anxiety […] fetches Dasein back out of its entangled absorption in the 'world'. Everyday familiarity collapses. Dasein is individualized, but *as* being-in-the-world. Being-in enters the existential 'mode' of *not-being-at-home*. The talk about 'uncanniness' ['Unheimlichkeit'] means nothing other than this.[66]

In this state of existential anxiety, every thing in the world is revealed as empty of meaning: 'The world is revealed in anxiety, not as a collection of things with different characteristics, but as a meaning-structure of human understanding which has no meaning *in itself*'.[67] That is to say, meaning-patterns are only created through humanity's being-in-the-world, and anxiety reveals

[61] Quoted in Svenaeus, *Hermeneutics of Medicine*, p. 92.
[62] Svenaeus, *Hermeneutics of Medicine*, p. 81.
[63] Fredrik Svenaeus, 'Das Unheimliche—Towards a Phenomenology of Illness', *Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy* 3 (2000), 3–16 (p. 3).
[64] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, §189.
[65] *Ibid.*
[66] *Ibid*, emphases in original.
[67] Svenaeus, 'Das Unheimliche', p. 8, emphasis in original.

this self-constructedness. Heidegger describes this as a state of 'authenticity', which will be explored in more detail later in the chapter.

Svenaeus examines the uncanniness, or 'unhomelikeness' of this condition as a marker of illness.[68] Using Heidegger's vocabulary, he defines 'unhomelikeness' (*Unheimlichkeit*) as an extreme form of anxiety, wherein the meaning-patterns of someone's lifeworld break down. As we have seen, Dasein is defined by its worldliness—its being-*in-the-world*: 'being-in [is] defined as *dwelling* with […], being familiar with'.[69] Heidegger also wrote that it is only by 'dwelling' in a particular language that things gather meaning and become what they are to us. So the everyday rhythms of Dasein create a sense of dwelling, familiarity, belonging, or 'being-at-home' (*Zuhause-sein*), a balancing mode which conceals the self-constructed meaning of its world. In other words, our everyday activities cover up the fact that the world is fundamentally strange to us: it is always another's world, and so it is always 'other'. This fact that we share the world with others should not necessarily be a deficit: in Heidegger's theory, 'Falling prey' (or being 'thrown') 'to the "world" means being absorbed in being-with-one-another'.[70] Indeed, Svenaeus writes that the homelike attunement of the healthy person 'indicates that he is experiencing wholeness in his being-in-the-world. He inhabits a world that is his world *and* the world of other people—it is a meaningful world'.[71] In illness, however, the fact that the world is *not* our own reveals our existential homelessness: the world is made unfamiliar, the 'mineness' of the world is lost, and we no longer feel that we belong. Our shared world becomes *unhomelike*. In Heidegger's terms, Dasein's 'fragmentariness' is revealed to itself.[72] This, Heidegger writes, is our base ontological state: '*"Not-being-at-home" must be conceived existentially and ontologically as the more primordial phenomenon*'.[73]

iii. Care and Cure

What, then, is the goal of medicine? Eric Cassell has described it as the removal or relief of human suffering, but this term covers a broader range of human experience than is limited to the

[68] Svenaeus, *Hermeneutics of Medicine*, p. 107.
[69] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, §188, emphasis added.
[70] *Ibid*, §175.
[71] Svenaeus, *Hermeneutics of Medicine*, p. 100.
[72] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, §§242, 251–67.
[73] *Ibid*, §189, emphasis in original.

medical sphere.[74] From the biomedical perspective, it is to restore the sound operation of the biological processes of the body: to restore health, in its physiological definition. Yet in the phenomenological view, health is a *wholeness* of being, a latent and self-balancing rhythm which constitutes our everyday transcendence into the world. Svenaeus's definition of healthy being-in-the-world as *homelikeness* thus rejects the naturalistic approach to the restoration of health in favour of the phenomenological focus on lived experience. '[H]omelikeness', he writes, is 'the goal of clinical practice': 'to bring the patient back to homelikeness—that is, to health—or, if that is not possible, as far in the direction of homelike being-in-the-world as possible'.[75] He qualifies that 'back' does not mean 'backwards', but is often a move *forward* 'to a new and different form of being-in-the-world than the one present before the onset of illness'.[76] Mitigating and curing physiological disorders might form significant aspects of this process, but the phenomenological objective prioritises how these disorders affect the individual in their everyday life. This definition of health as homelike being-in-the-world suggests that medicine can restore a degree of health even if it cannot relieve the physiological disorder: 'Doctors […] are of course still able to do a great deal for chronically ill patients to make their lives better—their being-in-the-world more homelike—although they cannot cure them'.[77]

For Svenaeus, this model of care relies on a level of understanding within the patient-clinician encounter. By establishing an understanding of the patient's lived experience, the clinician can take actions that are lifeworld—rather than biomedically—oriented.[78] Svenaeus cites the psychoanalytic hermeneutic model described by Paul Ricoeur, the goal of which is to change the *patient*'s self-understanding in order to bring about health, on the presupposition that 'regained health for the patient may require a new self-understanding'.[79] This process relies on the Freudian hermeneutics of *suspicion*, which 'reveals the play of unconscious desire and resistance underneath the patient's statements and symptoms', and Ricoeur's addition of *revelation*, whereby 'the patient's language is not only the effect of unconscious forces, but actually gives birth to new meaning'.[80] Svenaeus then makes the distinction between this model and his hermeneutics of medicine, where the patient's self-understanding 'does not guarantee restored health': 'In psychoanalysis the only possibility of healing goes through the *patient*'s, and not the

[74] Eric J. Cassell, *The Nature of Suffering and the Goals of Medicine*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), passim.
[75] Svenaeus, *Hermeneutics of Medicine*, pp. 103, 113.
[76] *Ibid*, p. 113.
[77] *Ibid*, p. 129.
[78] *Ibid*, p. 130.
[79] *Ibid*, p. 145.
[80] *Ibid*.

analyst's, understanding'.[81] This process occurs vice versa in Svenaeus's interpretation of the medical meeting. Despite the asymmetry of the patient-clinician encounter, the doctor must 'understand the patient as an understanding person, through projecting himself into the patient's understanding and vice versa'.[82] Svenaeus determines three vital components for the success of this meeting: discourse, mutual trust, and respect. 'To understand in a medical meeting […] is essentially to be understand*ing*', he writes.[83] He calls this 'clinical hermeneutics', going back to Gadamer's model of textual interpretation, whereby the reader must understand the text as authoritative, posing to it a question which can only be answered by meeting the text. In the clinical scenario, the doctor is the 'reader' or 'interpreter' of the patient-text, although since the meeting is dialogic this is a mutual process of questions and answers. With its emphasis on the body language of the body-subject, clinical or medical hermeneutics pays attention to the language of the body, which may be hidden or incomprehensible to the subject. The two 'lifeworld horizons' of the patient and doctor are honed by this dialogue, brought to touch one another. In contrast to psychoanalytic hermeneutics, this model is 'action-oriented': the doctor does not adopt the basic assumption of psychoanalytic suspicion; that the patient's account is intentionally or unintentionally hidden or distorted, to be mistrusted. Rather, they understand the patient's account as simply incomplete, 'in the sense that the patient himself is often unaware of the ways in which a particular disease can make life unhomelike'.[84]

This phenomenological perspective reminds us that disease is not always possible to cure. Even the Greeks, writes Svenaeus, 'viewed the attempt to cure the *incurable* illnesses as *hubris*'.[85] In the case of chronic illness, for example, full physiological ability or functioning might never be restored. Homelike being-in-the-world, however, may still be possible. Svenaeus's concept of health as homelikeness therefore challenges the Heideggerian conception of Dasein as 'ability-to-be'. The Heideggerian model of a human being as active and goal-pursuing—Merleau-Ponty's 'I can'—suggests that in order to be whole, Dasein must be able to transcend into the world with ease and autonomy. Carel has highlighted this as a shortcoming of Heidegger's phenomenology:

> In illness, as well as in other situations of dependency, insufficiency, and incapacitation, understanding the human being as 'ability to be' does not seem as useful or descriptive. In fact, one's first and final years are usually periods in

[81] *Ibid*, emphasis in original.
[82] *Ibid*, pp. 145–46.
[83] *Ibid*, p. 147, emphasis in original.
[84] *Ibid*, p. 150.
[85] *Ibid*, p. 17, emphases in original.

> which one's 'ability to be' (in the Heideggerian sense) is restricted and dependent on the facilitation of others […] We begin and end in insufficiency and dependence.[86]

Carel takes issue with three main points in Heidegger's model, noting first that 'it only captures the middle part of the trajectory of a human life, excluding infancy and aspects of childhood and old age'. Second, 'it only captures the paradigmatic cases of healthy, autonomous adulthood', and third, 'it overlooks the important ways in which our existence depends on other people and is saturated by a background sense of trust'. She argues that by definition, 'inability is implied by ability', since ability is a *process of becoming*.[87] Consequently, Carel suggests that the notion of '"being able to be" should be broadened to include radically differing abilities', which would be more successful should we think of 'being unable to be' as a form of existence that is 'worthwhile, challenging, and most importantly, unavoidable'.[88] Carel therefore proposes a replacement of Heidegger's dichotomy of 'being able to be' and 'being unable to be' with a 'spectrum of abilities to be'; a continuum which, she argues, will allow a change in perspective 'from seeing ability as positive and desirable to seeing it as part of a broader, more varied flux of life'.[89]

A spectrum of 'abilities to be' integrates diseased and disabled states within the span of human life. In doing so, it separates health, as in homelike being-in-the-world or wellbeing, from health as in physiological function. This makes room for the notion of *homelikeness within illness*. The idea of 'health within illness' was developed in nursing literature of the 1990s to express the diversity of sickness experiences. It draws on the phenomenological emphasis on first-person experience to investigate the large variety of meaning and impact of illness.[90] Carel has surveyed these studies, noting that 'When studies ask about illness, the interviewees' responses focus on illness. But if they ask about health within illness, new and more positive dimensions of chronic illness emerge'.[91] For example, a study by A. K. Stuifbergen, H. A. Becker, K. Ingalsbe, and D. Sands found that 76% of interviewees, all of whom were living with a disability, rated their health

[86] Carel, *Phenomenology of Illness*, p. 80.
[87] *Ibid*.
[88] *Ibid*, p. 81.
[89] *Ibid*, p. 83.
[90] See E. Lindsey, 'Health Within Illness: Experiences of Chronically Ill/Disabled People', *Journal of Advanced Nursing* 24 (1996), 465–72; Susan Diemert Moch, 'Health Within Illness: Conceptual Evolution and Practice Possibilities', *Advances in Nursing Science* 11.4 (1989), 23–31.
[91] Havi Carel, 'Can I Be Ill and Happy?', *Philosophia* 35.2 (2007), 95–110 (p. 104).

as good or excellent.[92] Phenomenological reflections on this concept include the idea that chronically ill people experience health subjectively and individually, since health can be socially-created, or 'co-created through the human environment interaction'.[93] Increasingly, disability is thought of as the result of an individual's environment; that is to say, their potentially impaired participation within said environment.[94] I have already demonstrated how the balancing rhythm of health relies on the easeful flow of an individual's intentionality, but if we cease to consider ability-to-be as the defining characteristic of the subject's health, then we can begin to assimilate Svenaeus's concept of health as homelikeness. For example, a subject's motor intentionality can be severely disrupted—they can lose limbs and no longer be able to direct themselves to move within their environment—but they can still maintain a sense of homelikeness in their situation. This does not, Svenaeus reminds us, mean that they are necessarily joyful, happy, or content with their lived situation, but rather that they are experiencing *meaningful wholeness* in their being-in-the-world.[95] Carel makes a similar argument, only using different vocabulary: 'I am not claiming', she writes, 'that a life with illness or impairment is necessarily happy, only that it need not be substantially less happy than a life of a healthy person. In other words, health is neither necessary nor sufficient for happiness'.[96] Carel is here defining health in Heideggerian terms: as the ability-to-be that is lost in the breakdown of meaning-patterns in illness. The concept of 'health within illness' however, infers a more general condition of *wellbeing*, which relates more to the historical definition of health as wholeness, and to Svenaeus's homelike being-in-the-world. Indeed, elsewhere Carel uses the term 'wellbeing' as a possibility within illness.[97]

For Carel, this wellbeing is twofold: firstly, it constitutes the growth and edification that can occur as a result of ill health. Secondly, it relies on the adaptive recession of illness experienced as suffering for the individual: illness 'can […]—and often does—recede into the background in a way unimaginable to the healthy outsider'.[98] With regard to the former, Carel cites Jonathan Haidt's 'happiness hypothesis', which goes so far as to argue that 'people *need* adversity,

[92] A. K. Stuifbergen, H. A. Becker, K. Ingalsbe, and D. Sands, 'Perceptions of Health among Adults with Disabilities', *Health Values* 14.2 (1990), 18–26.
[93] R. R. Parse, 'Health: A Personal Commitment', *Nursing Science Quarterly* 3 (1990), 136–40 (p. 137).
[94] This is the view taken by R. Amundson in 'Disability, Handicap and the Environment', *Journal of Social Philosophy*, 23.1 (1992), 105–19.
[95] Svenaeus, *Hermeneutics of Medicine*, p. 100.
[96] Carel, *Phenomenology of Illness*, p. 133.
[97] *Ibid*, pp. 130–49. Cf. Havi Carel, '"I Am Well, Apart from the Fact that I Have Cancer": Explaining Wellbeing Within Illness', in *Philosophy and Happiness*, ed. by L. Bortolotti (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2009), pp. 82–99.
[98] Carel, *Phenomenology of Illness*, p. 132.

setbacks, and perhaps even trauma to reach the highest levels of strength, fulfillment, and personal development'.[99] Carel calls this his 'adversity hypothesis', which once again reiterates the immateriality of actual happiness to the personal growth described by Haidt. Haidt attributes this 'post-traumatic growth' to three improved areas of life: the revelation of hidden abilities, such as coping and resilience; the improvement of relationships; and the shifting of priorities in such a way that provides focus and peace of mind.[100] Carel suggests that this focus is a shift in the perception of one's lived time: describing her own experience of illness, she writes that 'Time did change for me. I began to take it much more seriously […] I wanted to feel like I am living life to the full in the present. That I *am* now'.[101] That living 'in the present' contributes to wellbeing is certainly not a new concept. Meditative practice to connect with the present is commended by almost every religious tradition, with philosophical thinkers from Epicurus to Eckhart Tolle endorsing the 'power of now' as a means to relieve suffering.[102] The release of unhealthy connections to the past (defined by Carel as feelings of regret, longing, bitterness, loss), and to the future (anxiety, obsession, worry, desire), brings with it a privileging of and anchoring in the present. With this reconnection comes not only a renewed appreciation for the moment at hand, but of *re-attunement* to one's immediate lived experience which injects this experience with a reinvigorated web of meaning. In regards to wellbeing as a result of the recession of illness as suffering, Carel appeals to the theory of 'hedonic adaptation': 'we adapt to—and therefore cease to feel the impact of—changes to things that affect our hedonic state (e.g. the car we drive, the size of our house, and even marital status)'.[103] This adaptation also occurs with negative change, including the change to one's being-in-the-world which constitutes illness. This adaptive capacity is also present in Svenaeus's shift from unhomelikeness to homelikeness, which he describes as a restoration of homelike attunement. Once again, the individual is *re-attuned* to their lifeworld, in an attunement of wholeness, as their fragmented meaning-patterns are re-established in a different way.

It seems, then, that even the recession of illness as suffering relies on the initiation of a *new* way of being-in-the-world. Wellbeing is not simply revealed by the deficit of suffering: indeed,

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[99] Jonathan Haidt, *The Happiness Hypothesis: Putting Ancient Wisdom to the Test of Modern Science* (London: Random House, 2006), p. 136, emphasis added. Quoted in Carel, *Phenomenology of Illness*, p. 140. Cf. I. J. Kidd, 'Can Illness Be Edifying?', *Inquiry* 55.5 (2012), 496–520.
[100] Carel, *Phenomenology of Illness*, p. 140.
[101] Carel, *Illness*, p. 144, emphasis in original.
[102] Epicurus, *The Epicurus Reader*, ed. by B. Inwood and L. P. Gerson (Cambridge, MA: Hackett, 1994); Eckhart Tolle, *The Power of Now: A Guide to Spiritual Enlightenment* (Vancouver, B.C.: Namaste, 1999).
[103] S. Lyubomirsky, *The How of Happiness* (London: Piatkus Books, 2007), p. 47. Cited in Carel, *Phenomenology of Illness*, p. 135.

phenomenology tells us that our primordial state is one of homelessness and meaninglessness. Wellbeing emerges, it has genesis, and therefore can also be cultivated, with the help of others (doctors, etc.) or on one's own. It is a form of flourishing, or *eudaimonia*, in Aristotelian terms. With this redefinition of health, the medical project is hence transformed. Carel's research highlights the pitfalls of the naturalistic model of medicine, which sees health and disease as 'an objective matter to be read off biological facts'.[104] In place of this, she proposes a model which gives 'more weight to subjective first-person reports'.[105] Carel calls this 'the change "from cure to care", moving away from a model of disease and cure to a model of care which promotes health and healing for people with chronic disease and disability'.[106] Paired with Svenaeus's phenomenology of health as homelikeness, this 'care over cure' model has significant implications for chronic illness and palliative care alike, wherein chronically ill and dying people can be restored to homelikeness, if not health. It subsequently provides us with a new vocabulary for understanding the medical project, one which is not solely focused on 'correcting' a patient's faulty physiology. The concept of homelikeness, or at-homeness, which is central to this model, instead provides a marker for wellbeing which is at once more holistic and more discrete than a biomedical focus on 'health' allows. In what follows, I interrogate the linguistic and phenomenological characteristics of this concept, in order to understand how the specific qualities associated with the *home* map onto the above understandings of *health*. By pivoting my discussion away from the phenomenology of health and towards a phenomenology of the home, I aim to elucidate the ways in which this key concept provides access to an understanding of the full spectrum of healthful living and dying. That is, how at-homeness functions as a lexical key for speaking not only about being *well*, but also for discussing arguably the most challenging aspect of any medical model, the threat of which is disclosed in many experiences of illness: death.

iv. Towards a Phenomenology of (Un)Homelikeness

According to philosopher Gaston Bachelard, 'poetic creation' and 'poetic power' are necessary in order to grasp the specific human values of the material world.[107] 'Poetics', from the Greek

[104] C. Boorse, 'A Rebuttal on Health', in *What is Disease?*, ed. by J. Humber and R. Almeder (Totowa, NJ: Humana, 1997), pp. 3–134 (p. 4).
[105] Carel, 'Can I Be Ill and Happy?', p. 103.
[106] *Ibid*.
[107] Gaston Bachelard, *The Poetics of Space* [1958], with a foreword by Mark Z. Danielewski and introduction by Richard Kearney (New York: Penguin, 2014), p. 7.

poietikos, 'pertaining to poetry', literally means 'creative, productive', from *poietos*, 'made'.[108] Bachelard therefore invokes the phenomenological understanding of meaning as constructed through participation in the world; meaning as a creative and joint project between individual and world. One way of constructing this web of intersubjective meaning is through the sharing of values in language. As Heidegger writes, language is our 'dwelling', and we share the world because it is linguistically articulated; language is inter-nested with our worldly attunement. Figurative language in particular facilitates such inter-nesting through the associative act of thinking of experiences and objects in terms and concepts of other things. In his *Poetics,* Aristotle defined the construction of metaphor as 'the application of a word that belongs to another thing: either from genus to species, species to genus, species to species, or by analogy'.[109] Aristotle held that metaphor is an ornamental add-on to linguistic articulation; an aesthetic category of rhetoric. This aesthetic standpoint persists into the medieval period, finding its way into the didactic manuals of poetry, or *artes poetriae*, such as Geoffrey of Vinsauf's *Poetria Nova* (c. 1208–1213). In his section 'On Stylistic Ornament', Geoffrey instructs on how to 'transume' words (Latin: *transumptio* and verb form *transumere*), a term which Rita Copeland and Ineke Sluiter point out derives from Quintilian, who gives it as a Latin equivalent to the Greek *metalepsis*.[110] The term literally means 'to take from one to another', and has since been translated as 'metaphor', though Copeland and Sluiter observe that *metalepsis*/*transumptio* 'has a much broader application than simply metaphor'.[111] Geoffrey's text deploys the very features of poetry he describes: using metaphor to describe figurative language, and so on. In one particularly apposite example, he compares poetic composition to the construction of a house: 'If anyone is to lay the foundation of a house', he writes, 'his impetuous hand does not leap into action: the inner design of the heart measures out the work beforehand'.[112] Intended to encourage the writing of a plan before engaging in writing poetry itself, this analogy at once gestures towards the constructedness of language as a receptacle for poetic meaning, and to the applicability of the metaphor of the home for statements pertaining to dwelling, containment, and building.

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[108] OED, s.v. 'poetic', *adj.* and *n*.
[109] Aristotle, *Poetics*, in *Poetics. Longinus: On the Sublime. Demetrius: On Style*, trans. by Stephen Halliwell, W. Hamilton Fyfe, Doreen C. Innes, and W. Rhys Roberts, rev. by Donald A. Russell, Loeb Classical Library 199 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 105, 1457b.
[110] 'Geoffrey of Vinsauf, Poetria nova, CA. 1208–1213', in *Medieval Grammar and Rhetoric: Language Arts and Literary Theory, AD 300–1475*, ed. and trans. by Rita Copeland and Ineke Sluiter (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 594–606 (p. 602, n. 35).
[111] *Ibid*.
[112] *Ibid*.

Since the twentieth century, linguists and philosophers have broadly agreed that metaphor is a fundamental component of language, perception, and cognition. Friedrich Nietzsche, for example, observed that almost every word we utter derives from an image, betraying its metaphoricity,[113] a position from which hermeneutics derives much of its methodology, while Hans-Georg Gadamer maintained that 'Being that can be understood is language', and language contains a 'fundamental metaphoricity'. [114] Indeed, metaphoric expressions are often particularly suggestive of phenomenological insights. The Ricouerian mode of hermeneutics, for example, regards all experience and actions as 'texts' which require interpretative analysis. Clearly drawing on the Heideggerian model, Paul Ricoeur makes a case for the narrative and linguistic nature of all human life, for metaphor implies a carrying over of meaning that is beyond literal, indicating that a necessary cognitive component to the initial linguistic act.[115] I. A. Richards similarly claimed that metaphor is an omnipresent principle of language, conceptualising this process with his model for each half of the double unit of metaphor: 'tenor' and 'vehicle'.[116] 'Vehicle' is the word that carries the meaning or attributes, 'tenor' the subject to which those attributes are ascribed: in the statement 'language is our home', the tenor 'language' is ascribed the qualities or attributes of the vehicle 'home'. Yet while the primary or literal signification of 'home' is clear—a place where one takes residence—the metaphorical usage opens the vehicle up to a multiplicity of secondary, non-literal significations, such as 'familiarity', 'refuge', 'shelter', 'place of origin', 'source', 'comfort', or 'rest'. Rhetoricians have since substituted the terms 'tenor' and 'vehicle' for 'ground' and 'figure', or in cognitive linguistics, 'target' and 'source', respectively. These terms provide a useful schema for thinking about the figurative power of language, and the layers of interpretation required in the experiential process.

When it comes to illness, the phenomenological stance is that this phenomenon must be understood through first-person, lived experience. Susan Sontag has claimed that illness is not simply a metaphor, narrative, or story, but an experience that gains meaning from social or cultural context.[117] I wonder if it can't be both, since according to the hermeneutic model, the

[113] Friedrich Nietzsche, 'On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense' [1873], in *The Continental Aesthetics Reader*, ed. by Clive Cazeaux (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 53–62. Cf. Clive Cazeaux, 'Conflicting Perspectives: Epistemology and Ontology in Nietzsche's Will to Power', in *Metaphor and Continental Philosophy: From Kant to Derrida* (New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 103–32.
[114] Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, trans. and rev. by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, 2nd ed. (London and New York: Continuum, 2004), p. 431.
[115] Paul Ricoeur, *The Rule of Metaphor: The Creation of Meaning in Language* [1975], trans. by Robert Czerny with Kathleen McLaughlin and John Costello (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), passim.
[116] I. A. Richards, *The Philosophy of Rhetoric* [1936] (New York: Galaxy, 1965), pp. 92–93.
[117] Sontag, *Illness as Metaphor*, passim.

metaphoricity of language, and language itself, are fundamental to life. Indeed, metaphors form an excellent tool with which to express the complexity of a condition that we are unable to name, and given that naming one's experience is a vital aspect of the phenomenological reduction, the application of metaphor would seem to be a core component of the phenomenological theories of ontology outlined above. We have already witnessed Carel's description of the experience of illness as a shift in spatio-temporal existence, engaging geographical and spatial metaphors to evoke the qualities and conditions of this transformation: she describes illness as a 'topography', a 'terrain'.[118] Richard Gunderman, too, describes pain as invading and dominating the 'psychic landscape'.[119] The neologisms for which Heidegger is famous are also replete with appropriations of meaning: homelikeness, worldliness, and so on, as well as his phrases like 'language is the house of being' and 'the neighbourhood of thinking and poetry'. But how might we understand Heidegger's use of figurative language within the phenomenological model of health as homelikeness?

David Nowell Smith observes that Heidegger's relationship to metaphoricity has been a long-contested topic: he comments that 'The terms *metaphor* and *metaphoricity*, be they explicitly of a nonmetaphysical or a cognitively creative kind, sit uneasily with the aporetic reflexivity of Heidegger's own "text"'.[120] In other words, Heidegger's metaphors function both to *de*construct as well as *construct* meaning, disabling as well as enabling the valuation of certain concepts. Smith refers to Jacques Derrida's description of Heidegger's text as 'more "metaphoric" or *quasi*-metaphoric than ever': with this qualification Derrida recognises, regarding Heidegger's 'house of being' concept, that 'We are […] no longer dealing with metaphor in the usual sense'.[121] He then quotes Heidegger's self-description in the years after *Being and Time*, when he was brought to 'abandon [his] own path of thinking to namelessness [*im Namenlosen zu lassen*]', where such 'namelessness' becomes the very condition for naming.[122] This is a rhetorical paradox: examining Heidegger's 'namelessness' (i.e. the way in which he replaces or destabilises concrete concepts with figurative language) results in a necessary construction of rhetorical categories for naming. As Smith writes, if 'naming is to trace, and thereby "bring to language", something that otherwise remains unnameable, then the attempt to identify a rhetorical category for this bringing-to-

[118] Carel, *Phenomenology of Illness*, p. 3.
[119] Richard B. Gunderman, 'Is Suffering the Enemy?', *Hastings Center Report* 32.2 (2002), 40–44 (p. 40).
[120] David Nowell Smith, *Sounding/Silence: Martin Heidegger at the Limits of Poetics* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013), p. 108, emphasis in original.
[121] Jacques Derrida, 'The *Retrait* of Metaphor', in *The Derrida Reader: Writing Performances*, ed. by Julian Wolfreys (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998), pp. 102–30 (p. 119).
[122] Martin Heidegger, *Unterwegs zur Sprache* [1950–1959], 3rd ed. (Pfullingen: Neske, 1965), p. 121. Quoted in Smith, *Sounding/Silence*, p. 109.

language would end up imposing a homogeneity upon a writing that thinks precisely through its verbal and stylistic diversity'.[123] Indeed, scholars have since felt it necessary to categorise Heidegger's metaphors into distinct types: Giuseppe Stellardi, for example, makes a distinction between the 'intervention of extraordinary contexts […] in order to make certain otherwise incongruous occurrences interpretable', and 'open' metaphors, which '[open] up a possibility of meaning and [leave] it in suspense'.[124]

Whether attempting to name the unnameable, or opening up possible meanings to non-closure, it is hard to deny that Heidegger's phenomenology deploys figurative and metaphorical language in unexpected and complex ways. But Heideggerian phenomenologists have not always interrogated the metaphorical vehicles with which they engage: Fredrik Svenaeus, for example, 'makes use of parts of [Heidegger's] vocabulary' as a tool to develop his own theory, without pausing for long on the meaning of its core term, homelikeness.[125] He briefly outlines the notion of the uncanny—the *unheimlich*—as not-being-at-home or unhomelikeness, quoting Heidegger on the contradistinction between this state and the 'insideness' of dwelling.[126] He refers to the 'familiarity of our lifeworld' which is usually homelike, and the 'rhythmic, balancing mood' of homelike attunement, which he identifies with health. He admits, however, that Heidegger does not relate homelike being-in-the-world with health, and therefore does not link the two linguistic concepts, leaving aside any phenomenological definition of the concept of the home itself; in a note on the text, Svenaeus simply refers the reader to Emmanuel Levinas' work on this topic.[127] Yet given the spatio-temporal aspect of the phenomenological subject's lived experience of illness, the dual concepts of homelike and unhomelike being-in-the-world provide us with an incredibly powerful figurative construction for understanding some primordial and universal conditions of existence—they name 'otherwise incongruous occurrences', making them interpretable. Further analysis of these concepts will, therefore, provide an access point not only to a discussion of experiences of illness and health, but to the *naming* and *interpreting* of said experiences through language.

Only a small number of phenomenologists have examined the phenomenon of the home and its derivatives—the homely, homeliness, or at-homeness—and an even smaller number have related

[123] *Ibid*.
[124] Giuseppe Stellardi, *Heidegger and Derrida on Philosophy and Metaphor: Imperfect Thought* (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2000), pp. 139–40.
[125] Svenaeus, *Hermeneutics of Medicine*, p. 92.
[126] *Ibid*, p. 93.
[127] *Ibid*, p. 92, n. 146.

it to medicine. Otto Bollnow, for example, has written about the home in regards to lived space.[128] Anne Winning draws on Bollnow in her personal account of homesickness, exploring the questions to which one is exposed when an individual leaves their home for a new environment.[129] Mary Douglas, meanwhile, has argued that the home is not only located in space, but is temporally structured, citing Suzanne Langer's theory of 'presentational thought' and 'virtual' time and space: home, Douglas writes, is 'always a localizable idea', which 'creates its own time rhythms'.[130] David Seamon has pointed to how the home functions within an individual's lifeworld,[131] while Wim Dekkers has since explored the notion of home in relation to palliative care, examining what it means to think in terms of dying as a patient's 'coming home'.[132] Stefan Baldursson has tried to get at the nature or essence of this 'homeness', or the '"whatness" of a home', looking for the 'common structure of the experience of at-homeness',[133] a phenomenological project which also occupies the work of Frank Buckley.[134] Buckley has suggested that the difficulty of examining the meaning of at-homeness derives from the originary—and thus, perhaps, taken for granted—quality of the condition. He equates the search for at-homeness with the search to understand our embodiment, comparing the 'concurrent *nearness* and *remoteness*' of the experience: '"never so far as when so near" can as truly be spoken of the central human search for the experience of being at home as may be spoken of the deeper awareness of the meaning of my flesh and bones which are so close to me'.[135] It is almost, he writes, 'as though that which is first for us, as certainly as body and home, are the last to be described and thought through'.[136]

Buckley's expression of the concurrent nearness and remoteness of the home is contained within the original term from which Svenaeus derives his concept of unhomelikeness: the *uncanny*. The

[128] Otto F. Bollnow, 'Lived-space', *Philosophy Today* 5.1 (1961), 31–39.
[129] Anne Winning, 'Homesickness', *Phenomenology + Pedagogy* 8 (1990), 245–58.
[130] Mary Douglas, 'The Idea of Home: A Kind of Space', *Social Research* 58.1 (1991), 287–307 (pp. 290, 293).
[131] David Seamon, *A Geography of the Lifeworld: Movement, Rest, and Encounter* (New York: St Martins, 1979), esp. pp. 78–90.
[132] Wim Dekkers, 'On the Notion of Home and the Goals of Palliative Care', *Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics* 30.5 (2009), 335–49. Cf. Wim Dekkers, 'Dwelling, House and Home: Towards a Home-Led Perspective on Dementia Care', *Medicine, Health Care, and Philosophy* 14.3 (2011), 291–300.
[133] Stefan Baldursson, 'The Nature of At-Homeness', *Phenomenology Online* (2011), available at: <http://www.phenomenologyonline.com/sources/textorium/baldursson-stefan-the-nature-of-at-homeness/> [accessed 10 October 2018].
[134] Frank Buckley, 'An Approach to a Phenomenology of At-Homeness', *Duquesne Studies in Phenomenological Psychology*, vol. 1, ed. by Amedeo Giorgi, William Frank Fischer, and Rolf Von Eckartsberg (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1971), pp. 198–211.
[135] *Ibid*, p. 198.
[136] *Ibid*.

uncanny—*Das unheimliche*—was first developed as a psychoanalytic concept, which came to define its cognate term, *Das heimliche*.[137] Deriving from the German word for home (*Heim*), there is a phonetic similarity between 'uncanny' (*unheimlich*), and 'unhomelike' (*unheimisch*), a distinction which has been somewhat blurred in translation. The various meanings of *heimlich* are not well translated by the English word 'homely': *heimlich* includes the notion of keeping within the walls of one's home (*geheim,* 'keeping hidden'). But 'canny' and 'uncanny' still confer a sense of familiarity or hiddenness. 'Canny' is derived from 'can' (to know how, to be able to), the Indo-Germanic root of which—*ken*—is retained in 'kin' and 'kindred'. *Un*canny, then, still implies a sense of *un*knowing, secrecy, or unfamiliarity. According to Freud, the uncanny is generated by an involuntary return to the repressed: the 'involuntary return to the same situation' (*unbeabsichtige Widerkehr*).[138] This metapsychological theory is outlined in Freud's essay, 'The Uncanny', which asserts that the discomfort of uncanniness arises from the obtrusive *compulsiveness* of the repetition; the loss of control, or feeling of being controlled by an other. Freud's interpretation of the uncanniness of E. T. A. Hoffman's 'The Sandman', for example, is that a fear of being 'robbed of one's eyes' provokes this phenomenon, which he argues rests symbolically on an Oedipal fear of castration (*Kastrationsangst*).[139] This uncanniness seems greatly tied up with the relation between seeing and knowing. Indeed, Svenaeus contends that 'to know is to see with the eye of the mind', and thus Oedipus blinds himself because he 'did not even know *himself*'.[140]

Heidegger's use of the terms *heimlich* and *unheimlich* are, then, particularly appropriate for his phenomenological project, conferring as they do the qualities of (un)familiarity, (un)knowing and (in)ability. The *Heim* is an originary dwelling which denotes a sense of belonging, and its opposite thus invokes an originary unknown: our primordial homelessness which Heidegger writes is revealed in moments of *Angst*. As Marc Falkenberg has noted, Freud's use of *Das unheimliche*:

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[137] First by Ernst Jentsch in 'On the Psychology of the Uncanny' (orig. pub. 'Zur Psychologie des Unheimlichen', *Psychiatrisch-Neurologische Wochenschrift* 8.22 [1906], 195–98 and 8.23 [1906], 203–5), and then by Sigmund Freud, 'The Uncanny', in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, trans. and gen. ed. by James Strachey and Anna Freud, asst. by Alix Strachey and Alan Tyson, 24 vols. (London: Hogarth Press and The Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1953–1974), vol. 17: *An Infantile Neurosis and Other Works, 1917–1919* (1971), pp. 218–53.

[138] Freud, 'The Uncanny', p. 237.

[139] Cf. Paul Ricoeur, *Freud and Philosophy: An Essay in Interpretation* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1970), pp. 515–16.

[140] Fredrik Svenaeus, 'Freud's Philosophy of the Uncanny', *Scandinavian Psychoanalytic Review* 22.2 (1999), 239–54 (p. 242, emphasis in original).

> overlooks that the prefix '-un' in German, apart from the negating function that it shares with its English counterpart, has an older, pejorative function that still survives into New High German. 'Unheimlich' thus has connotations, in German, of primal or prehistoric awe, of a fear of all that is unknown to man, that points to fears existing long before the Enlightenment.[141]

Being-at-home, being homelike, is therefore a primal state—our nearest and first experience, like Buckley's 'nearness and remoteness' of our 'flesh and bones'. This comparison is drawn purposely, since embodiment is every-*body*'s first experience, and therefore that with which we are most familiar. The body is the medium by which we can consciously transcend into our environment. The body facilitates one's being-in-the-world, rather than restricting it, as in Plato's notion of the body as a 'dungeon of the soul'. It is fitting, therefore, to think of the body as our *home*, our original source of at-homeness. As Martha Nussbaum comments, our bodies 'are our homes, so to speak, opening certain options and denying others, giving us certain needs and possibilities for excellence'.[142] But what makes the lived body homelike? Phenomenology presumes the existence of the body-subject within time and space, a transcending-returning structure wherein environment supports identity. Merleau-Ponty writes that the body displays its own kinaesthetic wisdom or *praktognosia*, the ability to seamlessly and pre-reflectively manoeuvre itself through, and orient itself within lived space.[143] The body stretches "ex-statically" into space, and the world and the body-subject "intersect and engage each other like gears".[144] This simile illuminates the way in which body and world work together to alter the rate or momentum with which the subject can move through space. If body and world exist in well-oiled coaction, then the implication is that the individual's movement is more easeful. This is the state Svenaeus describes as homelike attunement: the balancing, rhythmic mood that supports the individual's self-understanding. When we are in this mood, Svenaeus writes, 'everything "flows"'.[145]

Fluid and easeful inhabitance of space can thus be determined the first feature of at-homeness, or being-at-home. David Seamon, for example, writes that a person who is at home 'can move fluidly through the dwelling because body-subject knows that space intimately'.[146] This ease

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[141] Marc Falkenberg, *Rethinking the Uncanny in Hoffman and Tieck* (Bern: Peter Lang, 2005), p. 56.
[142] Martha Nussbaum, 'Human Capabilities, Female Human Beings', in *Women, Culture, and Development: A Study of Human Capabilities*, ed. by Martha C. Nussbaum and Jonathan Glover (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 61–104 (p. 76).
[143] Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, p. 162.
[144] *Ibid*, p. xxii.
[145] Svenaeus, *Hermeneutics of Medicine*, p. 94.
[146] Seamon, *A Geography of the Lifeworld*, p. 79.

allows for the individual's 'time-space routine', physical actions which establish what Heidegger calls 'average everydayness', or what Seamon calls 'rootedness'. Rootedness, Seamon writes, requires time to develop: 'The person who lives in the same place his entire life establishes rootedness in the first few months and years of his childhood; the person who changes place must re-establish rootedness each time he moves'.[147] The product of this reiterative routine over time is *familiarity*. In a state of at-homeness, the lived body is familiar with its space. Seamon gives the example of a subject's mother who 'knows the exact location of everything' in the house and so can '[go] to it automatically'.[148] As a result of this familiarity, the objective space of a house is transformed into the subjective place of the home. Easeful movement or familiarity with an environment thus transforms 'geometric' space to 'lived' space, described by Neil Smith and Cindi Katz's dichotomy of 'position' against 'location': 'In geographical terms, "location" fixes a point in space, usually by reference to some abstract co-ordinate systems such as latitude and longitude', while '"position", by contrast, implies location vis-à-vis other locations and incorporates a *sense of perspective* on other places'.[149] Familiar perspective or positioning—being-at-home—thus requires an *orientation* to environment, a phenomenon of perception which Henri Lefebvre has described as a '"sense": an organ that perceives, a direction that may be conceived, and a directly lived movement progressive towards the horizon'.[150] Through such perception, bodies can be positioned in responsiveness to the space they occupy. Sara Ahmed has argued that this orientation constructs identity, since 'bodies do not dwell in spaces that are exterior but rather are shaped by their dwellings and take shape by dwelling'.[151] She points to the self-contained negative in 'orientation', '*disorientation*', since in a way, we 'learn what home means, or how we occupy space at home and as home, when we *leave* home'.[152] Ahmed refers, by way of example, to the lived experiences of migration, which 'could be described as a process of disorientation and reorientation': 'bodies "move away" as well as "arrive", as they reinhabit spaces'.[153] She also observes the supportive interaction of body and environment as the body extends into space, reaching for an identity: 'If orientation is about making the strange familiar

[147] *Ibid*.
[148] *Ibid*.
[149] Neil Smith and Cindi Katz, 'Grounding Metaphor: Towards a Spatialized Politics', in *Place and the Politics of Identity*, ed. by Michael Keith and Steve Pile (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), pp. 66–81 (p. 68, emphasis added).
[150] Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, trans. by Donald Nicholson-Smith (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), p. 423.
[151] Sara Ahmed, *Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects, Others* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), p. 9.
[152] *Ibid*, emphases added.
[153] *Ibid*.

through the extension of bodies into space, then disorientation occurs when that extension fails'.[154]

When extension fails, lived-space and lived-time undergo a transformation: 'lived time, time *as it is for me*, shrinks'.[155] This 'shrinkage' is a contraction that also affects the body-subject in space. The body itself can 'freeze' or 'tighten', as Thomas Fuchs describes of the depressed patient, who undergoes a 'rigidity of the lived-body' that can localise in a specific organ: 'a feeling of an armor [around] the chest, of a lump in the throat, pressure in the head'.[156] Fuchs even describes a patient who 'maintained that her body, her stomach and bowels had been contracted so long that there was no hollow space left'.[157] The lived-body 'contracts to its own skin',[158] and then to the 'second skin' of its environment, which 'unfolds in the folds of the body'.[159] Aho and Aho point out the linguistic implication of narrowing or restricting in the term *Angst*, Heidegger's term for anxiety: Latin *anguistiae*, from *ango,* 'to bind' or 'press together', 'to choke', 'throttle', 'strangle', 'to cause pain'.[160] Heidegger writes that when Dasein experiences *Angst*, the meaning-patterns of its world collapses and it encounters a state of *not-being-at-home*. If one's body feels physically constricted, then the body is revealed as 'other' to us. The lived body becomes objective as it ceases to be comfortable—ceases to be homelike—becoming more like Plato's dungeon. It might feel constricted to the point of solid matter, but in terms of at-homeness, the vessel of the body has become hollow. It ceases to be a home, like a shell without an inhabitant; as in Ahmed's description of moving house, when she arrives at the new house and 'It looks like a shell'.[161] Bachelard also deploys this metaphor, reminding us how homes are conceptualised in terms of movement, new beginnings, building and rebuilding, orientation and reorientation. He quotes Paul Valery's essay, *Les coquillages*, in which Valery praises the geometrical formation (not form) of the shell, which 'remains mysterious' even though the object itself is 'highly

[154] *Ibid*, p. 11.
[155] Aho and Aho, *Body Matters*, p. 120, emphasis in original. Cf. Toombs, *Meaning of Illness*, pp. 68–70.
[156] Thomas Fuchs, 'Corporealized and Disembodied Minds: A Phenomenological View of the Body in Melancholia and Schizophrenia', *Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology* 12 (2005), 95–107 (p. 99); Thomas Fuchs, 'The Phenomenology of Shame, Guilt and the Body in Body Dysmorphic Disorder and Depression', *Journal of Phenomenological Psychiatry* 33 (2003), 223–43 (p. 237).
[157] Thomas Fuchs, quoted in Aho and Aho, *Body Matters*, p. 120.
[158] *Ibid*, p. 118.
[159] Ahmed, *Queer Phenomenology*, p. 8.
[160] Aho and Aho, *Body Matters*, p. 118.
[161] Ahmed, *Queer Phenomenology*, p. 10.

intelligible'.[162] Bachelard observes that 'life begins less by reaching upward, than by turning in on upon itself', in a 'coiling vital principle'.[163]

There is a difference, however, between a 'living' shell and a shell devoid of life: 'an empty shell', Bachelard writes, 'like an empty nest, invites daydreams of refuge'.[164] An enclosed space, otherwise simply an objectively material vessel, becomes as a home by the act of occupation, or orientation. This therefore constitutes the second essential characteristic of at-homeness, which intersects with the notion of familiarity: *the act of belonging*, *occupation*, or *dwelling*. The subject is required to *root* themselves to a vessel, in order for it to become home. Home must belong to us just we enjoy a sense of belonging when we feel at home: we *occupy* the home and in doing so take possession of it, hence why the body can be described as unhomelike when it becomes conspicuous in illness. The disengagement of body from self means that the body is no longer experienced as 'belonging to me': what was 'mine' becomes 'other'.[165] Seamon calls this belonging 'appropriation', which involves, first, 'a sense of possession and control: the person who is at home holds a space over which he is in charge'.[166] The resident controls passage in and out of the home, rendering it cut off from the public sphere: 'A place to be alone', according to Seamon, 'is part of at-homeness, and the person whose home does not provide such a place feels a certain degree of upset'.[167] Consider Virginia Woolf's 'A Room of One's Own'—how important it is for an individual to claim a space for themselves and their creative projects. This occupation is self-constructed, whereby the subject carves out a world for themselves in both space and time. Bollnow, too, describes the construction of a home as the foundation of 'a cosmos in a chaos', citing the Dutch philosopher Gerard van der Leeuw, for whom 'House and temple are essentially one', since *templum* means something 'cut out', an apt expression of a settlement for dwelling: 'house building signifies a world creating, world sustaining activity which calls for sacred rites'.[168] This resonates with Heidegger's 1951 lecture, 'Building, Dwelling, Thinking', in which he shows that 'to build is in itself already to dwell': *bauen* comes from 'the Old English and High German word for building, *buan* [which] means to dwell'.[169]

[162] Bachelard, *Poetics of Space*, p. 125.
[163] *Ibid*, p. 126.
[164] *Ibid*, p. 127.
[165] Toombs, *Meaning of Illness*, p. 88.
[166] Seamon, *A Geography of the Lifeworld*, p. 80.
[167] *Ibid*, p. 81.
[168] Bollnow, 'Lived-space', p. 34.
[169] Martin Heidegger, 'Building Dwelling Thinking', in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. and with an introduction by Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), pp. 145–61 (p. 147).

Home-building, or establishing at-homeness, is therefore predicated upon dwelling: 'The way in which you are and I am, the manner in which we humans are on the earth, is *Buan*, dwelling'.[170]

The physical dwelling—the place in which one dwells—thus becomes a point of reference around which one establishes a sense of orientation, meaning, or knownness. I distinguish this as the third quality of at-homeness: *the positioning of the home as an anchor*, *or reference point*, from which all lived movement is 'a going away or a coming back'.[171] Bollnow uses the example of sitting in a café, arising to fetch a newspaper and then returning to his place: 'But this place in the café', he writes, 'is only a passing point of rest. After I have read my newspaper, I arise and go "home"'.[172] 'Home', he writes, (as opposed to the house) is the 'broader area' of the 'Heimat', which 'thins out slowly from the relatively known through the comparatively unknown, into the completely unknown'.[173] This borderland of the 'unknown' is characterised by i) breadth, which denotes the 'absence of restriction, room to move' ii) strangeness, which 'stands in contrast with what is his own', and iii) distance, which is 'enticing and alluring', and 'makes the road to far places the way back to a forgotten origin'.[174] For Bollnow, then, the house is the crux of familiarity and known possibilities, an anchor which supplies the subject with a perceived 'zero point reference' in time and space, so that they will not 'be dragged along helplessly by the stream of time'.[175] This supplies the individual with a sense of at-homeness, of possession over their life, an illusion of a sustained place of residence, and of belonging: Bollnow argues that human beings need 'an area protected and hidden, an area in which he can be relieved of continual anxious alertness, into which he can withdraw in order to return to himself'.[176] Home-building, on these terms, is a process of anchoring, rooting, making the self stable in an otherwise chaotic world.

Being-at-home is not, however, always about retreat. Home refers to a place in the past, of first experience, such as being at home in our bodies, but also to the future: to final destinations. Bollnow himself acknowledges that 'the road to far places' can offer a way back to our origins. We have seen that the phenomenological subject exists in a transcending-returning structure, whereby it stretches itself into its environment and returns to itself. This might be likened to a

[170] *Ibid.*
[171] Bollnow, 'Lived-space', p. 32.
[172] *Ibid*.
[173] *Ibid*, p. 35.
[174] *Ibid*.
[175] *Ibid*.
[176] *Ibid*, p. 33.

continual process of reorientation: of rooting and finding one's way back to one's roots. But finding one's way 'back' to one's roots is not necessarily a return trip. Remembering one's 'forgotten origin' also involves a quality of distance from one's home; it involves taking the 'road to far places', venturing *forward*, into the unknown. Just like Ahmed writes in the quotation above, we often arrive at a sense of at-homeness by *leaving behind* the places we call home. Indeed, Bollnow calls man a 'fugitive on earth', who 'gains a stay in so far as with his building, with the solid walls of his house, he roots himself tightly to the ground'.[177] 'Fugitive' denotes a quality of transience or ephemerality, which Heidegger refers to as our existential homelessness, and the Merleau-Pontian model describes as the lived body's constant orientation and reorientation. Rooting ourselves to the ground therefore constitutes the illusion of homelikeness which is revealed as such in illness. We are, as Gabriel Marcel wrote, '*homo viator*'.[178] Wim Dekkers builds on this idea: 'The life of human beings', he writes, 'is like an odyssey that comes to an end when one finds one's way home'.[179]

In light of this brief survey, homelike being-in-the-world can be interpreted as a kind of orientation to our environment, predicated upon familiarity, reiterative action and routine, a resulting ease of movement within the space, and a sense of belonging or possession. When this homelikeness is disrupted, for whatever reason, we are called to reorient ourselves, adapting and growing into new situations. This might, as we have seen, constitute a reorientation either backwards or forwards: when we are homesick, for example, Winning writes that we must '"antibody" the old space of our lived experience of home and acquaint our bodies with the new place'.[180] This ability to adapt and re-home ourselves is quite remarkable, and accounts for the necessary separation between health and homelikeness described above. Taking up Svenaeus's concept of health *as* homelikeness, health must therefore be reconstrued as not so much an 'ability-to-be' as 'ability-to-be-*at-home*'; the capacity to repeatedly and dynamically re-habituate oneself in one's environment, regardless of the dysfunction that might present itself through the body-world engagement. This is, as Gadamer's theory of health states, a dynamic process of continual balancing and rebalancing. We outgrow our shells, and haul ourselves into new ones, adjusting, adapting, and flourishing as we make them home through the act of living.

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[177] *Ibid*.
[178] Gabriel Marcel, *Homo Viator: Introduction to the Metaphysic of Hope*, trans. by Emma Crauford (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), passim.
[179] Dekkers, 'On the Notion of Home', p. 345.
[180] Winning, 'Homesickness', p. 251.

v. *Ars Moriendi*: The Art of Being-Towards-Death

The phenomenological understanding of homelike being-in-the-world is, therefore, temporally—as well as spatially—structured, with the reiterative construction of at-homeness both a return to the past and a protention of the self into the future. In illness, however, we are made aware of the finitude of our existence, and therefore struggle to maintain this easeful temporal flow. As Aho and Aho point out, 'pain reminds us of our own mortality. It is, in a sense, a prefiguration of our own death'.[181] This recalls the conception of philosophy found in Socrates, the Stoics, and later Montaigne, that to philosophise is to learn how to die: as Carel writes, 'Learning how to die means learning to be ill, confronting pain and disability, accepting diminishing abilities, and dealing with mourning, envy, and sadness'.[182] In phenomenological terms, it also means confronting our 'limit-situation': the end point to which the roads of sickness, disease, and pain all have the potential to lead. In the Heideggerian model, the realisation of this reality constitutes a form of existential crisis, or *Angst*, where the world is revealed as unhomelike; our innate homelessness is made known to us, disrupting the homelike being-in-the-world of everyday existence. Heidegger delineates different ways of living depending on one's orientation to this limit. He argues that Dasein's demise is a structuring component of its existence, and that we should aim to live with an awareness of it; in a conscious, constant 'being-towards-death'. This way of thinking has major ramifications for the possibility of health—homelikeness—within illness, particularly terminal illness. As Carel points out, if we understand illness and death not as two opposite poles but points on a spectrum of embodied experience, then the prospect of death should not necessarily lead to a recession of homelikeness. In contrast to the necrophobic death-avoidance of the biomedical approach, a perspective of death as the *completion of life* would instead offer the individual a renewed sense of wholeness (and at-homeness) in the face of their demise. In this context, it should not be surprising that Dekkers' description of death as a 'coming home' is a common metaphor used in writing about death and terminal illness. In the final section of this chapter, I subsequently argue for the possibility of a phenomenological *ars moriendi*: that by adopting a phenomenological approach to health in terms of homelike being-in-the-world, we can effect a cognitive shift in the perception of illness and death, which focuses on the possibility of homelikeness no matter the physiological condition of one's life.

[181] Aho and Aho, *Body Matters*, p. 6.
[182] Havi Carel, 'The Philosophical Role of Illness', *Metaphilosophy* 45.1 (2014), 20–40 (p. 27).

This challenge to our cultural avoidance of death requires a more detailed analysis of Heidegger's condition of *Angst*, or anxiety, which must be distinguished from fear. While 'fear' (*Furcht*) requires a definite object of which to be afraid, and 'fright' (*Schreck*) denotes a state of fear without preparation (i.e. with a factor of surprise), 'anxiety' (*Angst*) concerns nothing at all: it 'is the unsettling realization that my heretofore neatly arranged existence is penetrated to its very core by an abyss'.[183] Anxiety, says Heidegger, 'reveals the nothing' (*das Nichts*): '[It] leaves us hanging because it induces the slipping away of *beings as a whole*'.[184] This is a return to our most primordial state of being, in which Dasein means 'being-held-out-into-the-nothing' (*Dasein ist Hineingenhaltenheit in das Nichts*).[185] That is to say, it reveals the constructedness of the meaning-patterns which define us and our lifeworlds. For Heidegger, this realisation of the meaninglessness of our own existence results in uncanny attunement:

> When anxiety has subsided, in our everyday way of talking we are accustomed to say 'it was really nothing'. This way of talking, indeed, gets at *what* it was ontically. Everyday discourse aims at taking care of things at hand and talking about them. That about which anxiety is anxious is not [nichts] innerworldly things at hand. But this not [Nichts] any thing at hand, which is all that everyday, circumspect discourse understands, is not completely nothing [Nichts]. The nothing of handiness is grounded in the primordial 'something' ['Etwas'], in the *world*. The world, however, ontologically belongs essentially to the being of Dasein as being-in-the-world. So if what anxiety is about exposes nothing, that is, the world as such, this means that *that about which anxiety is anxious is being-in-the-world itself*.[186]

Anxiety is, then, a state of dissociation, of separation from the meaning-structures inhabited by what Heidegger calls 'the They' (*das Man*); what is valued by the collective consciousness of humanity. The effect is that one's sense of purposeful activity is lost, leaving the person unable to act. Carel reminds us that all activity is grounded in meaning, giving the example, 'I tap keys on my computer keyboard in order to write this book'.[187] With this, the entities with which we create this purposeful activity—the keys on the keyboard—become conspicuous. Carel notes that this experience has been documented by people with mental illness, and questions whether the same can be said of somatic illness, where an individual might remain completely absorbed in their activities, but unable to pursue them: 'she might still want those things but find them no longer

[183] Aho and Aho, *Body Matters*, p. 123.
[184] Martin Heidegger, 'What is Metaphysics?' [1929], in *Basic Writings*, pp. 89–110 (p. 103, emphasis added).
[185] Martin Heidegger, *Pathmarks* [1919–1958], ed. by William McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 91.
[186] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, §187, emphases in original.
[187] Carel, *Phenomenology of Illness*, p. 97.

within reach'.[188] Carel calls this 'bodily doubt', writing of how in normal conditions, bodily failure might frustrate one's actions, but when our body's precariousness and unpredictability is revealed to us in somatic illness, this 'casts us out of immersion and into suspension' as 'the familiar world is replaced by an uncanny one'.[189] Carel distinguishes this from other kinds of anxiety by the *embodied* nature of the disruption: 'bodily doubt is experienced as *anxiety on a physical level*, hesitation with respect to movement and action, and a deep disturbance of existential feeling'.[190] She gives the example of the respiratory patient, who fears they will be unable to breathe,[191] an instance which does indeed concretise the same effect Heidegger describes in anxiety: 'what is threatening cannot come closer from a definite direction within nearness, it is already "there"—and yet nowhere. It is so near *that it is oppressive and takes away one's breath*—and yet it is nowhere'.[192] Yet Carel notes that this loss of meaning which accompanies bodily doubt is 'neither irrational nor meaningless'; being unable to breathe for a respiratory patient is a rational fear grounded in knowledge of their body's dysfunctional state. The individual thus may still be able to retain their goal-directedness: 'there is not the actual "sinking away" from "everyday familiarity" of coping absorption'.[193] Nonetheless, in spite of the rationality of the threat, 'such a radical break experienced within full absorption in a project necessarily withdraws the ill person from everyday familiarity and forces her to extract herself and view her position as no longer compatible with that of *das Man*'.[194] If we subsequently define Heidegger's account of *Angst* by its effect on the individual's being-in-the-world—their projection into the 'nothing' and the accompanying unhomelike attunement—rather than the rationality of the threat, we may then incorporate experiences of illness into this hermeneutic. Since Carel's account of bodily doubt does force the ill person to renegotiate their participation in the world, she concludes that 'Heidegger's account of *Angst* does apply in somatic illness, as well as in mental disorder'.[195]

Whether due to a mental or embodied dysfunction, the concept of *Angst*, or anxiety, can therefore be used to denote the disruption of one's being-in-the-world that induces unhomelike attunement. Anxiety forces the self to focus on the meaning-patterns of the world as related to its *own* transcendence into the world, so that the lived world becomes objective and material. In other

[188] *Ibid*, p. 98.
[189] *Ibid*, p. 94.
[190] *Ibid*, p. 96, emphasis added.
[191] *Ibid*.
[192] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, §186, emphasis added.
[193] Carel, *Phenomenology of Illness*, pp. 94, 98.
[194] *Ibid*, p. 98
[195] *Ibid*.

words, the focus changes from the entities and actions we participate with *in* the world, to the world itself as a structure: 'The world has the character of complete insignificance [Unbedeutsamkeit]'. [196] Heidegger calls this disclosure 'authentic anxiety' or 'authentic understanding': authentic, because the breakdown reveals the world *as it really is*. Taylor Carman notes that 'authentic' has the archaic meaning of 'belonging to', 'own', or 'proper', and comments that one could accordingly translate *Eigentlichkeit* [Authenticity] as 'ownedness'.[197] Authenticity is thus a state where Dasein's *own* being is at issue for it; where Dasein stands in a directly first-person relation to itself, with an understanding of the ontological structure of its 'mineness' (*Jemeinigkeit*).[198] This condition contrasts with its opposite, *in*authenticity, where Dasein is absorbed in average everydayness, 'lost in the publicness of the they'.[199] Heidegger defines this further as 'falling prey' to the world, a state which is not a 'fall' from a 'purer and higher "primordial condition"', but rather an existential 'entanglement' in the everyday flow of the world and of others.[200] Indeed, Heidegger famously objected to a moral or value judgement between living authentically or inauthentically: 'The ontological-existential structure of falling prey would […] be misunderstood if we wanted to attribute to it the meaning of a bad and deporable ontic quality which could perhaps be removed in the advanced stages of human culture'.[201] As we shall see, however, authenticity plays a vital role in some transformative phenomenological processes, and may, depending on one's worldview, be associated with certain positive qualities.

Some scholarship argues that living with lasting authenticity is impossible, since Heidegger's conception of authentic understanding (as in anxiety) exclusively denotes a momentary leap out of inauthenticity.[202] In line with this view, Svenaeus makes the distinction between the attunement of *authenticity* and *unhomelike* attunement. Although he acknowledges that both 'offer new perspectives on the worldiness of human being', Svenaeus differentiates the 'lasting'

[196] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, §186.
[197] *Ibid.* Authenticity has been interpreted and analysed extensively, particularly in existentialist philosophy and in Theodore Adorno's *The Jargon of Authenticity*. Carel retains the translation of 'authenticity' 'while bearing in mind the inflated resonance of the English term'. *Phenomenology of Illness*, p. 152, n. 4.
[198] Taylor Carman, 'Authenticity', in *A Companion to Heidegger*, pp. 285–96 (p. 285).
[199] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, §175.
[200] *Ibid*.
[201] *Ibid*, §176.
[202] E.g. Rudi Visker, who views authenticity as momentary, and that in order to have basic continuous existence, we must therefore be inauthentic. Rudi Visker, 'Dropping: The "Subject" of Authenticity: *Being and Time* on Disappearing Existentials and True Friendship with Being', in *Deconstructive Subjectivities*, ed. by S. Critchley and P. Dews (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1996), pp. 59–83 (p. 80). Cf. Michael Lewis, *Heidegger and the Place of Ethics* (London: Continuum, 2005), p. 35.

quality of unhomelikeness from the brief 'moment' (*Augenblick*) of authenticity.[203] Carel, however, considers authenticity as not necessarily a fleeting state: *anxiety* lasts only for a moment, she writes, but the *authentic understanding* that follows is 'a return to the everyday, to the full thrust of thrown projection and worldly life'.[204] She points to Heidegger's distinction between 'genuine' (*echt*) and 'non-genuine' (*unecht*) authenticity: 'authentic as well as inauthentic understanding *can* be either genuine or not genuine'.[205] According to Carel, 'genuine' indicates an ability to act and participate in the world at hand, while 'non-genuine' indicates a complete severance from this active participation. 'Non-genuine authenticity', then, is usually the state afflicted by anxiety, where Dasein is equipped with authentic understanding but unable to act. 'Genuine authenticity', on the other hand, means that Dasein has obtained authentic understanding and is then able to re-enter the world and act within it, as in Carel's description of post-traumatic growth; the tremendous personal development that some illness provides. In light of this distinction, it is possible to qualify Svenaeus's model of (un)homelikeness. I have shown that homelike being-in-the-world, as an easeful interaction with one's world, is present in *inauthentic* living, where the world has not been disclosed at all, and Dasein is swept along with the flow of *das Man*. But homelikeness is also present in *genuine authenticity*, where one is able to act after world-disclosure, albeit with a new perspective. Unhomelike being-in-the-world is present in the moment of disclosure—authentic anxiety—but is therefore limited to a state of *non-genuine authenticity*.

Genuine authenticity can, therefore, be classified as a more specific condition of homelikeness, with the transition from non-genuine to genuine authenticity almost equivalent to the restoration of homelike being-in-the-world from a position of unhomelikeness. The difference lies in the retention of one's authentic understanding. In other words, the individual remains aware of their own being-in-the-world. In order to achieve this, Heidegger writes that Dasein must have 'resoluteness' (*Entschlossenheit*).[206] The word *Entschlossenheit* literally means 'decisiveness' or 'resolve', but also has the meaning of 'unclosing', or 'disclosing'. For Heidegger, to be resolute is to face up to the 'situation' (*Situation*) in which one finds oneself, as opposed to assimilating it as a 'general state of affairs' (*allgemeine Lage*).[207] Carman notes the similarity with the Aristotelian concept of inspiration, namely an ability to simply see the right ethical rules to make, without

[203] Svenaeus, *Hermeneutics of Medicine*, p. 107.
[204] Carel, *Phenomenology of Illness*, p. 173.
[205] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, §146, emphasis in original.
[206] *Ibid*, §297.
[207] Cf. Carman, 'Authenticity', p. 291.

subsuming them under general rules (*phronêsis*).[208] Similarly, Dasein's resoluteness consists of a kind of focused engagement that allows it to act with a 'sight which is primarily and as a whole related to existence *transparency*', or 'perspicuity' (*Durchsichtigkeit*). [209] The authentic understanding that occurs in illness, which can result in a feeling of uncanniness or unhomelike attunement, serves to remind us of the situation of our existence. Since this situation is constrained by temporality—limited by our mortal finitude—what is disclosed to us, made transparent, is the full constitution of our life, including certain death.

As stated above, Heidegger understood this mortal finitude as Dasein's ultimate limit-situation, a view which must be contextualised in his model of Dasein as ability-to-be: ultimately, there will come a point where Dasein can no longer *be*. Heidegger calls this Dasein's 'demise' (*Ableben*), a term which refers to the objective ceasing of consciousness, from a third-person perspective, i.e. the death of another, or the transformation of a lived body (*Leib*) into a corpse *(Körper*). This is not to be confused with his notion of '*perishing*' (*Verenden*), literally 'the ending of what is only alive'.[210] 'Perishing' is a biological concept indicating the cessation of an objective organism's life-maintaining functions, without their awareness of this occurrence, while 'demise' is the narrative completion of another's life; their death *as a person*. However, since we cannot experience our own 'demise', Heidegger comes up with another term entirely to describe the first-person experience of death: 'dying' (*Sterben*). This precedes biographical 'demise', rather indicating 'the *mode of being* in which Dasein is *toward* its death'.[211] Carman summarises it thus: 'What Heidegger's existential phenomenology of death discloses, then, is the first-person dimension of death insofar as the death is my own, the death into which I constantly project myself, without ever being able to step out of it, live through it, and stand over against it as I do the deaths of others'.[212] As Carel has also shown, death structures, limits, and shapes the goals, choices, and actions that make up life.[213] It is this sense of death as part of life that illuminates Heidegger's notion of death as a *way of being*: death is a capacity that structures everyday life. In other words, *Sterben* is Dasein's 'being-towards-death' (*Sein-zum-Tode*).

[208] *Ibid.*
[209] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, §146, emphasis in original.
[210] *Ibid*, §247, emphasis in original.
[211] *Ibid*, emphasis in original.
[212] Carman, 'Authenticity', p. 290.
[213] Carel, *Phenomenology of Illness*, p. 150.

'Death' (*der Tod*) is therefore a defining aspect of being: 'Only in dying can I to some extent say absolutely "I am"'.[214] William Blattner has described this condition as the same as that which occurs when Dasein is beset with anxiety. He characterises Dasein as constituted by a 'thick' and a 'thin' sense of being: Dasein's thin sense is how 'its being is at issue for it', and its thick sense is how 'it understands who it is by throwing itself into possible ways to be'.[215] Put another way, Dasein's thin sense is its first-person self-understanding, and its thick sense is its ability to enact that way of being. This echoes the vocabulary of authenticity, with *thin* denoting the state of authentic understanding which occurs in anxiety, and *thick* denoting the genuine version of this authenticity, in which Dasein is still able to participate in the world. For Blattner, death means Dasein exists in the thin sense, but is *unable to be* in the thick sense: in other words, Blattner's concept of death is equal to Heidegger's anxiety. Carel has reintegrated Blattner's view with Heidegger's concept of resoluteness. She argues that the idea of dying as an anxiety attack is helpful in that it shows us how Heidegger's 'death' is a way of being, but that it lacks the notion of temporal finitude so crucial to his ideas. Dasein's temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*) is the meaning of its totality, or 'care' (*Sorge*): Dasein exists as the 'between' of birth and death.[216] 'Care' is a unity of existence characterising the future, made up of Dasein's 'facticity' (characterising its past) and its 'falling' (characterising the inauthentic present).[217] An inauthentic Dasein brackets death as irrelevant to life: it 'tranquillizes' itself in a 'constant *flight from death*'.[218] In order to face death authentically, Dasein must free itself from this tranquillisation by actively projecting itself with a constant awareness of its own finitude. Dasein must bring itself back from 'falling' to the world, which is what happens when it gets absorbed into the world of *das Man* inauthentically. It must be authentically 'there', 'in the moment' (the *Augenblick* referred to above). This is what Heidegger's means by *resoluteness*: the awareness that one's death is a fundamental structure of being, an 'expecting' of this phenomenon that then allows Dasein a '*freedom toward death which is free of the illusions of the they, factical, and certain of itself*'.[219] And just as no one can live my life, '*No one can take* [*my own dying*] *away from* [*me*]'.[220] With resolute anticipation, Dasein recognises its death as its own. Death 'belongs' to Dasein: it is Dasein's 'ownmost' (*eigenst*).

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[214] Martin, Heidegger, *The History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena* [1925], trans. by Theodore Kisiel (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1985), p. 318.
[215] William Blattner, 'The Concept of Death in Heidegger's *Being and Time*', *Man and World* 27 (1994), 49–70 (p. 63).
[216] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, §373.
[217] Carel, *Phenomenology of Illness*, p. 170.
[218] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, §254, emphasis in original.
[219] *Ibid*, §266, emphasis in original.
[220] *Ibid*, §240, emphasis in original.

The 'belonging' of death to Dasein individuates it, experienced as a cutting off from its lifeworld described above as anxiety. But, as Carel reminds us, this is only one stage in being-towards-death: 'that of non-genuine authenticity'.[221] *Genuine* authenticity, meanwhile, requires a re-integration into the meaning-patterns of one's lifeworld, which is inherently linked to other people, to what Heidegger called 'being-with' (*Mitsein*).[222] Carel similarly emphasises the necessity for communal and relational involvement in resolute authenticity: 'In order to face illness authentically, Dasein does not need to sever its links to the world. An authentic attitude may include resolutely facing illness, refusing to repress its impact, and accepting its presence'.[223] Consequently, Carel argues for the deconstruction of 'authentic' and 'inauthentic' as poles of existential possibility. Instead, she proposes that the two states are 'internally related': namely, that the move to authenticity does not involve abandoning everydayness and being-with-others. Authenticity becomes the 'full disclosure of the horizon of the everyday, fully retaining Dasein's relationship to other Dasein and to the world'.[224] In this model, resolute authenticity incorporates an awareness of mortality within the social structures of life. It takes up the perspective that the last stages of life should not be seen as a defeat, but rather as life's fulfilment.[225] With resolute authenticity, the individual is no longer paralysed by the awareness of their own mortality. Unhomelike attunement is transformed to homelikeness, as the person accepts death as the completion of their life.

With this, the phenomenological method invites new perspectives on the process of dying. We have seen that the condition of at-homeness depends on a sense of belonging, familiarity, and easeful movement within a spatio-temporal situation. If death is received within the timeline of an individual's self-understanding—a condition of resolute being-towards-death—then this individual can feel at home in such an existence. By adapting to their new situation and continuing what remains of their life with resolute authenticity, the ill person is practising the art of dying well—*ars moriendi*—which as Carlo Leget has pointed out, 'is nothing but a particular version of the art of living well (*ars bene vivendi*)'.[226] Leget reformulates the medieval *ars moriendi* model in modern terms, including the revised themes of: emphasis on interrelatedness and interdependency; an alleviation of pain without forgetting the value of suffering; the

[221] Carel, *Phenomenology of Illness*, p. 177.
[222] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, §298.
[223] Carel, *Phenomenology of Illness*, p. 177.
[224] *Ibid*, p. 174.
[225] This is a position also argued in the pioneering work of Cicely Saunders. See, for example, 'The Last Stages of Life', *American Journal of Nursing* 65 (1965), 70–75.
[226] Carlo Leget, 'Retrieving the *ars moriendi* Tradition', *Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy* 10 (2007), 313–19 (p. 319).

appreciation and detachment of worldly goods and relationships; the processes of forgiveness and forgetting; and the acceptance of the limits of our knowledge in regards to the meaning of life. Leget uses the concept of 'inner space' as a heuristic for working through these areas, which he defines as a capacity of emotional awareness and an open-minded attitude.[227] This enables care-givers to listen and deal with contrary emotions, creating an atmosphere of confidence and trust.[228] By 'moving the emotional capacity of the dying person to center stage in terminal care', the *ars moriendi* model allows room for the good and loving, as well as the 'bad, mean and ugly corners of the human soul'.[229] Note the spatial metaphor: *inner space* denotes an open area in which there is room for the patient to manoeuvre their unwieldy and often overwhelming emotions regarding their illness. It denotes time given to understanding these emotions; a spatio-temporal zone carved out by care. And finally, it is space *given* to the patient. Talking therapy commonly refers to 'holding space' for a patient's experience, which means not only to the 'safe space' of the therapy room, but the compassionate silence of listening that gives the individual permission to 'open up'. This space subsequently *belongs* to the patient, for them to fill with their testimony. Holding 'inner space', in Leget's model, thus constitutes the building of homelikeness for the ill person. As Dekkers points out, 'It is telling that the Dutch hospices are sometimes called "Almost-at-Home-Homes" ("Bijna Thuis Huizen")', a metaphor which 'refers to the idea of a good life and a good death which has always been considered the object of ethics'.[230]

This view of dying as 'coming home' conceptualises the process as a reorientation as much as a journey either forward or backward. We are, as human beings, fugitive: innately homeless. But with this homelessness comes the possibility of carving out a home in whatever situation we find ourselves. Such an adaptive quality extends even to our at-homeness within our own bodies: what might be made unhomelike by the dysfunction of illness can, through reorientation, be made familiar and secure once again. This is not dependent on ability in the sense of physiological comportment to one's surroundings, but rather on the ability to (re-)establish the meaning-patterns of engagement with the world, such that one can understand oneself as *whole* through this enactive participation. Reconfiguring health as homelikeness thus avoids the pitfalls of the

[227] *Ibid*, p. 315.
[228] *Ibid*.
[229] *Ibid*, pp. 315–16.
[230] Dekkers, 'On the Notion of Home', p. 347. Cf. Wim Dekkers, Lars Sandman, and Pat Webb, 'Good Death or Good Life as a Goal of Palliative Care', in *The Ethics of Palliative Care: European Perspectives*, ed. by Henk ten Have and David Clark (Buckingham and Philadelphia, PA: Open University Press, 2002), pp. 106–25; Lars Sandman, *A Good Death: On the Value of Death and Dying* (New York: Open University Press, 2005); David Clark, 'Between Hope and Acceptance: The Medicalisation of Dying', *British Medical Journal* 324 (2002), 905–90.

naturalistic approach to medicine, which with its dualist origins seeks solely to restore optimal physiological function. A clinical approach that acknowledges the holism of body and mind recognises the limitations of this model. Moreover, it opens up the possibility of health within illness: the concept that wellbeing is available even with a breakdown of bodily operation. *Care* is placed on equal footing to *cure*, and even brought to the fore in situations of chronic or terminal illness. This prioritising of care enables the 'we' (*Wir*)[231] to flourish: by cultivating a space of sympathetic understanding, a phenomenological framework of *health-as-homelikeness* allows for what Max Scheler has called the primal, unlearned, preconscious act of recollection of our shared flesh.[232] As Richard Gunderman writes,

> Far from denying suffering by treating only the pain, we should acknowledge it, and even, in a certain sense, embrace it. To inflict suffering would be cruelty, but to ignore or deny or trivialize it is no less inhumane, for it blinds us to love, and stifles the human calling to become wiser than we are. [233]

Gunderman bases this statement on the notion that 'To know ourselves fully requires that we recognize our incompleteness. Alone, we are not whole'.[234] This 'incompleteness' refers to our homelessness. We must, as Carel writes, authentically re-engage in being-with-others in order to counter this condition. And while with incompleteness comes vulnerability, there also comes the possibility for completion or wholeness.

So, while we are blinded to love by ignoring suffering, the 'care over cure' model discloses love by acknowledging our incompleteness. Indeed, knowing ourselves fully *is* love, or care, as Heidegger understood it: '*Sorge*', Heidegger said in the *Zollikon Seminars*, 'can never be differentiated from "love" insofar as it names "comprehension of Being" as the fundamental determination of the ek-static temporal constitution of Dasein'.[235] This articulation surely mitigates the criticism levelled at hermeneutics by Susan Sontag, who famously wrote: 'In place of a hermeneutics we need an erotics of art'.[236] Sontag asks us 'recover our senses'—'We must learn to *see* more, to *hear* more, to *feel* more'—a statement seems to be predicated upon a

[231] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, §228.
[232] Max Scheler, *The Nature of Sympathy*, trans. by Peter Heath (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958), passim.
[233] Gunderman, 'Is Suffering the Enemy?', p. 43.
[234] *Ibid*.
[235] Martin Heidegger, *Zollikoner Seminare* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1987), p. 237. For the English translation, see *Zollikon Seminars*, ed. by Medard Boss (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2001).
[236] Susan Sontag, *Against Interpretation and Other Essays* (New York: Noonday Press, 1966), p. 14.

definition of hermeneutics as an interpretative effort to establish a single correct interpretation, as in legal or biblical hermeneutics.[237] For Heidegger, however, the ontological constitution of Dasein *is* erotic, inasmuch that love, eros (ἔρως), constitutes the experiential dimension of being.[238] Eros, in Platonic terms, is a demi-God, in between Gods and humans, abundance and poverty, having and wanting. Similarly, the transcending-returning structure of Dasein marks the 'in-betweenness' of being; the completion *and* incompletion, familiarity *and* uncanniness. To know resolutely our own finitude is also, then, to know how to live in it, and live in it with love. Novelist William Goyen articulates this connection between at-homeness and love, when he writes of the wonder that

> people could come into the world in a place they could not at first even name and had never known before; and out of a nameless and unknown place they could grow and move around in it until its name they knew and called with love, and call it HOME, and put root there and love others there; so that whenever they left this place they would sing homesick songs about it and write poems of yearning for it, like a lover.[239]

It is, then, by venturing into the unknown, by seeking authenticity, that we open ourselves to the possibility—indeed, the certainty—of our frailty and eventual demise. But travelling this uncertain terrain, hopefully with the understanding sympathy of others, also offers the disclosure of our potential for being well, for homelikeness, and ultimately, for love.

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[237] *Ibid*, emphasis in original.

[238] *Being and Time* does not address 'love' explicitly, a fact which motivated Ludwig Binswanger's criticism in *Grundformen und Erkenntnis menschlichen Daseins* [1942], leading to Heidegger's response at Zollikon. For more on Heidegger and Eros, see Marcia Sá Cavalcante Schuback, 'Heideggerian Love', in *A Phenomenology of Eros*, ed. by Jonna Bornemark and Marcia Sá Cavalcante Schuback, Söertörn Philosophical Studies 10 (Stockholm: Södertörn University, 2012), pp. 129–52.

[239] William Goyen, *The House of Breath* [1949] (Evanston, IL: Triquarterly Books, 1999), pp. 40–41.

Chapter Two:
Reading Julian's 'Bodely Sekeness'

i. Sickness, Sin, and Seeking God

In the previous chapter, I developed a phenomenology of illness predicated upon the redefinition of health as homelike being-in-the-world, a state of wellbeing distinct from optimal biological or physiological function. By examining the phenomenology of homelikeness, I observed that the term is predicated on the conditions of familiarity, easeful movement, dwelling, inhabitation, occupation or belonging. This phenomenological reduction revealed homelike being-in-the-world as a form of transcendence into the world wherein an individual feels whole. I then outlined a medical hermeneutic which understands wellbeing—homelikeness—as separate from biological disease, thereby challenging post-Cartesian, dualist attitudes to health, sickness, and death. Indeed, I ended the chapter by discussing the possibility of a phenomenological *ars moriendi*, a reappraisal of the medieval model which reiterates the potential of historical approaches to illness and mortality to inform modern approaches to dying. In what follows of the thesis, I develop this approach through a reading of the Julian of Norwich texts, bringing the contemplative into conversation with the phenomenological thinkers cited above. In this chapter, I focus specifically on Julian's 'bodely sekeness', recounted in her text as a near-fatal experience which preceded her divine revelations. In doing so, I engage the phenomenological model based on homelikeness outlined in chapter one, in addition to historicising this event among medieval medical understandings of sickness, sin, and salvation. This integrated approach will illuminate Julian's own revelations about the nature of living and dying well, mutually enriching both our understanding of the Julian texts, and these universal, existential questions.

The Middle Ages inherited a Neoplatonic, dualistic epistemology of the body, which was generally held to be anti-flesh and pro-spirit, or intellect. Yet this epistemology recognised the holistic and interactive nature of body and soul. Medieval medicine subsequently took a psychosomatic approach that accounted for these dual entities' coaction as the subject's seat of experience. In this matrix, 'sowle-hele' (soul-health) and bodily health were seen as mutually governing.[1] In fourteenth-century England, exposure to turbulent social and environmental factors such as war and sickness—including the Black Death, which killed approximately one third of

[1] Cf. Daniel McCann, *Soul-Health: Therapeutic Reading in Later Medieval England* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2019).

the population in England[2]—served to position mortality and the possibility of death at the forefront of many people's lives. Amy Appleford has written extensively on the flourishing 'death culture' of the period, and the rituals associated with it—constitutive of the *ars moriendi* and *visitacio infirmorum* traditions—arguing that 'the schooled awareness of mortality was a vital aspect of civic culture, critical not only to the individual's experience of interiority and the management of families and households but also to the practices of cultural memory, institution building, and the government of the city itself'.[3] She cites 'an increasingly laicized religiosity' that coexisted with 'an ambitious program of urban renewal and cultural enrichment', and which, when injected with 'violent political change', understood death as a 'generative force: one capable of providing vital personal, institutional, social and literary as well as religious opportunities'.[4] Appleford's thesis subsequently challenges the Huizingan notion that medieval culture was rooted in a morbid fascination and 'deep psychological strata of fear' of death, as well as the idea that 'Renaissance or Reformation modernity was born from a repudiation of [this] death "fixation"'.[5] Rather than a death 'fixation', it might be more appropriate to describe a pre-modern resoluteness or death acceptance: Carel calls this 'pathophilia', an approach to illness as potentially edifying, purifying, or instructive. Carel remarks that 'Such [pathophilic] attitudes can be found in the premodern world, where illness was unavoidable and thus best tackled with acceptance and preparation'.[6] Pathophilia is therefore antagonistic to the 'pathophobia' which pervades modern culture: the fear of illness which results in the desire to avoid it at all costs,[7] an attitude has resulted in the modern biomedical drive for prevention and cure discussed in the previous chapter, which is so often prioritised over care or quality of life.

The last chapter examined the ways in which the concept of health is culturally, socially, and historically constructed, an analysis which can be extended to the concepts of death and dying. As Appleford argues, 'Death is at once a natural fact and acculturated through the human production

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[2] Bruce Campbell, *The Great Transition: Climate, Disease and Society in the Late-Medieval World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), p. 307.
[3] Amy Appleford, *Learning to Die in London, 1380–1540* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014), p. 1.
[4] *Ibid*.
[5] *Ibid*, p. 3.
[6] Carel, *Phenomenology of Illness*, p. 12.
[7] Of course, a preparedness for illness and dying does not preclude fear, anxiety, grief, pain, and all of the other negative experiences commonly associated with mortality. As Leget points out, the *ars moriendi* model makes provision for these, conceptualised as 'loss of faith', 'loss of one's confidence in salvation', and 'the inability to deal with pain and suffering'. See Leget, 'Retrieving the *ars moriendi* Tradition', p. 313.

of meaning'.[8] Appleford has suggested that Julian of Norwich's texts 'may reflect the enhanced awareness of death on the part of those, like her, who had lived through the plague'.[9] Julian's writing is indeed rooted in the *ars moriendi* tradition: her receipt of the last rites by a curate and the procession of the crucifix, for example, are both common to the visitations of the sick. During these visitations, the priest would sing the seven penitential psalms whilst processing to the sick person's house: he 'carries the reserved host in a pyx […] walking behind two altar boys, one of whom holds the cross while the other rings a bell to tell passers-by that they must either join the procession or, as John Mirk instructs, "knele-a-downe" "wyth grete devoyone", as "Goddes body" is borne by'.[10] Those who arrive at the house with the priest, Appleford recounts, 'join those already there to form the community of "even-cristen" presupposed in what follows'.[11] Julian accordingly describes how, when her sickness falls upon her, her 'curate was sent for to be at my endeing, and by than he cam I had sett my eyen and might not speke. He sett the cross before my face and seid: "I have browte thee the image of thy maker and saviour. Louke thereupon and comfort thee therewith"'.[12] In the short text, Julian confirms the adherence to these visitation rites: 'He [the curate] come, and a childe with hym, and brought a crosse'.[13] Appleford has also commented on the role played by the Julian's 'even cristen', whose visitation performs the mercy required by them for their own salvation. She argues that in Julian's case, these 'deathbed attendants' function 'as a sign of the equality of all Christian souls in the face of death and of the private judgment that follows'.[14] But 'enhanced awareness of death' is surely not the whole story in Julian's texts. Indeed, Vincent Gillespie argues that her treatment of her sickness and near-death experience extends beyond social or cultural exemplarity: 'Julian goes much further than Appleford allows, and transforms the deathbed repertoire through her revelatory accounts with Christ'.[15] Gillespie writes that 'Julian's trajectory through the experience of learning how to die is *revelatory* as well as exemplary'.[16]

In light of these studies, it is the personal and religious growth experienced by Julian that will be the focus of this chapter: in other words, the revelation effected by the generative force of death. I propose a phenomenological understanding of Julian's experience of illness as *revelatory* in the

[8] Appleford, *Learning to Die*, p. 4.
[9] *Ibid*, p. 9.
[10] *Ibid*, p. 31.
[11] *Ibid*.
[12] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 4.
[13] Windeatt, ed., *Revelations of Divine Love*, p. 4.
[14] Appleford, *Learning to Die*, p. 25.
[15] Gillespie, 'Seek, Suffer, and Trust', p. 132.
[16] *Ibid*, p. 133, emphasis added.

Heideggerian sense of the term, as well as the spiritual. Heidegger understood 'craft' as a form of *techne*, which in the original Greek (*technē*) captures the idea of 'revealing' things or 'bringing [things] forth', as a sculptor or farmer might, who help to 'release' the potential held within the land.[17] On account of this instrumentality, Heidegger called the world's materials 'standing reserves' (*Bestanden*); objects awaiting manipulation by Dasein. For Heidegger, this manipulation should be a 'letting be' of the natural order: he cites the example of a pre-modern craftsman who builds a wooden bridge, which *lets* the river run its course.[18] This contrasts with the modern notion of technology, which *compels* materials to do our bidding, 'setting upon', 'challenging' or 'enframing' (*Gestell*) natural resources. Kevin Aho and James Aho remind us that ancient Greek physicians understood healing as *technē,* 'the artful practice of aiding the body in restoring itself back to its natural condition of harmony'.[19] Healing was thought of as a craft—*ars medicina*—in the same way as death, a linkage which remembers the potentially creative force of both processes. The phenomenological approach which views death as a 'coming home' is another iteration of this perspective. Heidegger's state of resoluteness in the face of death offers to 'reveal', through authentic understanding, the other side of life's coin. The effect this revelation can have on the individual is, remarkably, akin to a type of healing. Aho and Aho refer, for example, to the Buddhist thanologist Stephen Levine, whose goal was to reconcile his patients with their terminal diagnoses: 'Levine teaches that true health (wholeness) of necessity entails that we embrace what completes us as living beings. And what completes us, of course, is our own biological end—our death'.[20] After 'letting go' of their life attachments and 'opening up' to their deaths, Levine's patients reportedly 'claim to have been cured of their diseases'.[21] This is the nature of Heidegger's resolute authenticity—a sustained awareness of our own mortality, which (although Heidegger might not have seen it as such) translates into a healing practice, revivifying our experience of life. Julian's illness—her dying—is therefore an *ars moriendi* in both its adherence to the traditional contemporary rituals surrounding death, and in its 'craft', *in what it reveals or brings forth*: namely, her revelation of love.

While the death culture of the Middle Ages saw death as a generative force, this perspective was contiguous with the belief in the causal relationship between sin and sickness; sin was often considered the root of disease, and physical healing was thought to directly result from spiritual

[17] Heidegger, quoted in Aho and Aho, *Body Matters*, p. 145.
[18] *Ibid*.
[19] *Ibid*, p. 148.
[20] *Ibid*, p. 5.
[21] *Ibid*.

therapy, such as confession, penance, and so on. Aho and Aho have observed how this is played out in the etymological relationship between 'penance' and 'punishment', both deriving from the Latin *poena* (pain).[22] They comment that understanding of pain differs in these two cases, the former indicating what they call a 'purifactory atonement', or 'the re-establishment of the believer's "at-one-ment" with God, a psychic state designated by the term "grace"'.[23] If to be sick is to be unwell, then to be sick is to be 'not good', and to be 'not good' is tantamount to being evil.[24] To re-pent is thus to return to pain or hurt; to revisit old wounds, in order to come to terms with and heal them. Medieval penitential handbooks offered therapeutic programmes of prayer and confession with which this could be achieved. Governance of the self was a particular concern, and some of these tribulation texts offered more rigorous strategies than others, developing ascetic practices derived from monastic or eremitic literature. Penitential asceticism was particularly common to women's devotion in the high Middle Ages: Caroline Walker Bynum's work draws attention to this trend, noting, for example, that for only 17.5 percent of the saints, women are almost 53 percent of those whose reputations for sanctity were primarily based on patient bearing of illness.[25] The inclination behind these practices was the apophatic negation of the self, whereby the subject submits their entire selfhood to the divine, body and soul. This is modelled on Christ's self-emptying *kenosis*—the paradigm for humanity of meekness, humility, obedience, and yielding to God. Julian speaks of this when she writes in chapter fifty-five of the long text, 'And thus Criste is our wey',[26] and when she refers, in the short text, to the exemplary St Cecilia, and the three mortal wounds which martyred her.[27] Meditation on the suffering of Christ is part of this wider process of self-emptying; an affective engagement with the divine through cataphasis—through affirmative expressions of God, such as images and descriptions of Christ's passion—which leads into an apophatic negation of the self.

The self is therefore transfigured by the affective and emotive acts of *imitatio* and *compassio*, a process which resonates with the phenomenological disruption of the subject-object model. Through contemplation, the boundaries between self and divine—self and Word—are dissolved, effecting a 'co-wounding' of the self with Christ. From here, the individual is more easily re-

[22] Aho and Aho, *Body Matters*, p. 68.
[23] *Ibid*.
[24] *Ibid*, p. 69.
[25] Caroline Walker Bynum, *Fragmentation and Redemption: Essays on Gender and the Human Body in Medieval Religion* (New York: Zone Books, 1991), p. 60.
[26] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 87.
[27] 'I harde a man telle of halye kyrke of the storye of Saynte Cecille, in the whilke shewinge I undyrstode that sche hadde thre woundys with a swerde in the nekke, with the whilke she pynede to the dede'. Windeatt, ed., *Revelations of Divine Love*, p. 1.

integrated into the 'oneness' of the world within God's love. Martin Buber writes of this phenomenon in terms of the 'I-Thou' engagement, understanding the ego, the 'I', as dependent on its relation to an un-objectifiable 'other'.[28] For Buber, relationality is dialogue, discourse, and one cannot say 'I' without relating to a world outside the self. These words thus mark two basic ways of being in the world: 'I-It' relationships, which are characterised by experiencing and using objects (a one-way relationship), and 'I-Thou' relationships, two-way relationships based on dialogue, where one being encounters the other with mutual awareness or what Buber calls 'presentness'. The former is akin to Heidegger's *Gestell* subject, which sees that which is other to itself as objective and expendable, and is supported by Hannah Arendt's concept of *homo faber*; the notion that humanity has become that which 'makes' rather than discovers truth, relying on 'doing' rather than thinking, indistinguishable to that which we ourselves have fabricated.[29] Charles Taylor has since called these subjects 'buffered' and 'porous' selves, the former of which he argues is the post-Enlightenment imprisonment of the medieval porous self.[30] Taylor contends that the 'buffered' self emerged as a result of the post-Reformation mindset, which 'flattened' orders of holiness, expelled the sacred, and allowed a move to self-imposed discipline. Taylor's buffered subject thus finds ultimate expression in Descartes' *cogito* subject.

Porosity denotes a sense of *permeability*: of convergence, coalescence, and commingling. This is a condition of compassion, which entails the sharing of suffering, 'suffering together with another' or sympathetic commiseration.[31] The *cogito*, buffered self is detached from the world and from others, objective and self-preoccupied, all traits which Iain McGilchrist has identified as dominated by the left hemisphere of the brain.[32] The porous self, on the other hand, might be thought of as a right-brain phenomenon, which softens the subject's boundaries such that they become empathetic to others and to the world around them. Maggie Ross draws on these mind-states in her contemplative epistemologies (Appendix 1), which describe the submission of the 'I' in the self-emptying 'I-Thou' engagement. She refers to the porous threshold of contemplation, where the self-conscious mind becomes attentively receptive, opening to the deep mind, as the condition of 'beholding', a word which retains the paradox of holding, grasping, and *un*grasping:

[28] Martin Buber, *I and Thou*, trans. by Ronald Gregor Smith (London and New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), passim.
[29] Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* [1958], with an introduction by Margaret Canovan and a foreword by Danielle S. Allen, 2nd ed. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2018), p. 85.
[30] Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), esp. pp. 80–86.
[31] OED, s.v. 'compassion', *n*. Cf, MED, s.v. 'compassiŏun', *n*.
[32] Iain McGilchrist, *The Master and His Emissary: The Divided Brain and the Making of the Western World* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009), passim.

'in beholding, the analytic, conceptualising faculty is relinquished'.[33] Ross calls this the 'living and ongoing recapitulation of the self-empting en-Christing process of Philippians 2:5–11':

> For let this mind be in you, which was also in Christ Jesus
> Who being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God:
> But emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men, and in habit found as a man.
> He humbled himself, becoming obedient unto death, even to the death of the cross.[34]

By allowing the *cogito* self to dissipate—by fracturing or wounding the buffered self—one therefore opens the self up to oneness with the world, others, and most importantly, with the divine. This is the route to 'at-one-ment', the way of grace, designated by Aho and Aho as the purpose of purificatory penance.[35]

The paradox of beholding is thus that wounding leads to at-one-ment; to wholeness, to healing, or to health. As described in the previous chapter, willingness to accept the breakdown of one's being-in-the-world (one's mortality), in fact leads to a level of genuinely authentic living, which is characterised by a homelike attunement and an awareness of one's being. The power of compassion operates the same way, breaking down the boundaries of the individual to a state of 'withness'. To suffer *with* another means to cultivate the 'inner space' described by Leget, which enables a shared understanding of another and an attunement to their pain. *Compassio*, then, bridges the gap between self and other, offering a paradoxical restoration of wholeness for the self through deconstructive wounding. Wounds turn to honours, or in Julian's words, 'peynys shal be turnyd into everlestyng passyng ioyes by the vertue of Crists passion'.[36] Julian is aware of this when she asks for 'iii gifts of God', the first being 'mende of his passion', the second a 'bodily sekenesse', and the third, 'iii wounds' of contrition, compassion, and 'willfull longing to God'.[37] A number of scholars have commented on Julian's acute awareness of the power of a participatory devotional practice, as a *way of living*. Oliver Davies remarks that these requests all 'point to an increase in holiness of life through personal participation in the redemptive suffering

[33] *Ibid*, p. 30. Cf. Marvin Shaw, *The Paradox of Intention: Reaching the Goal by Giving up the Attempt to Reach It* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
[34] All Bible quotations are taken from the 1899 Douay-Rheims edition, with the Latin cross-referenced from the Vulgate where necessary.
[35] Aho and Aho, *Body Matters*, p. 68.
[36] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 30.
[37] *Ibid*, p. 3.

by Christ'.[38] Claire Foster-Gilbert has related Julian's vision of Christ's woundedness to the porous self, invoking Taylor, Heidegger, and Arendt in her argument that Julian's revelations transform the subjectivity of Julian and have the potential to transform the reader's subjectivity in turn.[39] Ross has also described Julian's process of 'beseking' and 'beholding' as the circular contemplation between the self-conscious mind and the deep mind: 'for Julian to "seke to beholding" is life itself, a way of being in the world'.[40] Ross states, moreover, that for Julian, 'beholding is a matter of life and death; to choose it echoes the biblical commandment for every person to "choose life" (Deuteronomy 30:19)'.[41]

In what follows of this chapter, I argue that Julian's writing does indeed describe a transfiguration in her subjectivity, or being-in-the-world, as I have discussed it phenomenologically. First, I will engage a close reading of Julian's 'bodely sekeness', using the phenomenological framework developed above to explore how the symptoms of her disease affect Julian as a body-subject, including how her paralysis reveals the body as object, like a broken tool that ceases to be transparent. Together with the loss of speech and vision, I argue that this bodily failure results in the breakdown of Julian's intentionality and intersubjectivity: unable to communicate with her companions, Julian is subjected to a loss of her ability to engage with the world. Moreover, with the acute affliction of pain, Julian's intentionality shrinks, such that her lifeworld is narrowed or restricted. Consequently, the world, her body, and those surrounding her become uncanny, or unhomelike. This rests on Julian's theological understanding that humanity is afflicted with an innate frailty or chronic illness—the inherited 'blindhede' of original sin—akin to the condition of originary homelessness of Heidegger and Svenaeus's phenomenological model. To be healed, or whole, Julian must re-attune to the beholding of God's homely love. With this understanding, Julian's text supersedes Heidegger's projection of Dasein as being-towards-death with a *being-towards-God*. This is what Julian calls the state of 'beseking': a condition of continuous balancing and re-evaluation of the self's attunement. By exploring Julian's personal experience of illness, I therefore expand the phenomenological linkage of wholeness, homelikeness, and health with that of *holiness*, proposing that homelike being-in-the-world constitutes a state of spiritual wellbeing equivalent to the wellbeing or 'health within illness' discussed in chapter one. Julian provides a theological framework with which to conceptualise this, simultaneously offering the

[38] Davies, 'Transformational Processes', p. 43.
[39] Claire Foster-Gilbert, *Restoring Porosity and the Ecological Crisis: A Post-Ricoeurian Reading of the Julian of Norwich Texts*, Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation (London: King's College London, 2018), passim.
[40] Ross, 'Behold Not the Cloud of Experience', p. 47.
[41] *Ibid*, p. 48.

means by which her readers can undergo the same transfiguration. Wounds turn to honours, and to use Gunderman's metaphor, suffering is 'pregnant' with insight and with love.[42]

ii. A Phenomenology of Julian's 'Bodely Sekeness'

a) The Onset

When Julian was 'thirty yers old and halfe', her prayer for a bodily sickness was fulfilled, as she fell ill with a sickness which lasted 'iii dayes and iii nights'.[43] She describes her experience briefly in her longer text which, while more developed in its theological programme than the shorter version, recounts less biographical detail of the deathbed scene and the symptoms of her sickness. The following phenomenological reading of Julian's sickness addresses her account broadly chronologically, as both texts describe it, considering how the various aspects of her being-in-the-world are altered as a result of her 'disese'. It will become apparent that all aspects of Julian's 'existential analytic' are affected: her attunement (*Befindlichkeit*); transcendence (*Verstehen*); discourse (*Rede*); and her lived body (*Leib*) are each disrupted as Julian's illness progresses. As she attunes to the pain and dysfunction of her bodily situation, Julian's ability to transcend (her intentionality, or *intentio*) into the world fails her, her lived body becomes objective, and she is unable to participate in discourse, either to engage with her companions, or indeed at various points to recount her experience. Such a disruption of these existentials attunes Julian to unhomelike being-in-the-world, projecting her into an acute awareness of her mortality. This, I argue, is the crux of Julian's revelatory beholding.

At the onset of Julian's sickness, she is afflicted with such pains that she believes they will be fatal: 'I understood by my *reason* and be my *feleing* of my peynes that I should dye'.[44] This statement implies, however, that at this stage in Julian's illness, she retains a level of lucidity which allows her to rationally engage both thought and feeling, mind and body. Moreover, it expresses her understanding of body and soul as a unified seat of experience (in a theologically radical way which will be explored in later chapters), and suggests that Julian here retains a sense of wholeness in her being-in-the-world. After Merleau-Ponty, the phenomenological approach understands the body not solely as Husserl's 'quasi-object' possessed by a transcendental ego which 'owns' the locus of sensation, but as a conscious medium with which we transcend into the

[42] Gunderman, 'Is Suffering the Enemy?', p. 43.
[43] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 4.
[44] *Ibid*, emphases added.

world. Heidegger writes that this transcendence is governed by the 'existential analytic' outlined above, of which I suggest that Julian's 'reason' and 'feleing' broadly correspond to 'understanding' and 'attunement'. The former differs from cognition, in that it relates to action: as Svenaeus writes, 'Understanding can include the active and incarnated sides of life'.[45] The latter denotes the attunement with which we find ourselves in the world of intersubjective meaning: the mood we find ourselves in as we experience certain actions and events. With these existentials intact, the way in which Julian finds herself at this stage of her illness remains meaningful, and she continues to participate in the collective consciousness inhabited by 'the They' (*das Man*). Although Julian says that by the time the curate comes, she physically 'might not speke', she is still able to participate in the *ars moriendi* discourse, as she hears and understands the words of the curate: 'I have browte thee the image of thy maker and saviour. Louke thereupon and comfort thee therewith'.[46] Julian engages her bodily intentionality as she fixes her gaze on the crucifix before her.

Julian's belief that she will die—'I wened oftentimes to have passyd'[47]—therefore remains at this stage an act of participation within the wider meaning-patterns of her lifeworld. The belief remains as conditional as her earlier prayer for pains 'as much as she would have *if* she should die', her use of 'should' and 'if' expressing this contingency. While Julian declares that she 'assented fully with all, with all the will of my herte', she remains 'at God will'. This is more explicit in the short text, when she writes:

> Botte in this I was ryght sarye and lothe thought for to dye, botte for nothynge that was in erthe that me lykede to lyeve fore, nor for nothynge that I was aferde fore, for I tristyd in God. Botte it was fore I walde halfe lyevede to have lovede God better and lange tyme, that I myght, be the grace of that lyevinge, have the more knowynge and lovynge of God in the blysse of hevene.[48]

Directly following this passage Julian asks, '"Goode Lorde, maye my lyevynge be no langere to thy worschippe?" And I was aunswerde in my resone, and be the felynges of my paynes, that I schulde die'.[49] In this version of the text, Julian's reason and feeling provide the answer to her request about whether she will live or die; her illness has not disrupted these existentials to the extent that her homelikeness recedes. Their integrity means that she can ask the question of her

[45] Svenaeus, *Hermeneutics of Medicine*, p. 86.
[46] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 4.
[47] *Ibid*.
[48] Windeatt, ed., *Revelations of Divine Love*, p. 4.
[49] *Ibid*.

mortality without fear, a condition of homelikeness which is revealed explicitly with her statement: 'Methought I was wele, for my eyen were sett uprightward into hevyn'.[50] 'Wele' denotes a condition of wellbeing, which corresponds to Julian's lack of fear in the face of potential death: 'ne for no peyne that I was aferd of'.[51] Julian experiences a sense of acceptance, comfort, and ease with her current situation. This cannot be described as an *authentic* acceptance of death, since the question of whether she will die predicated upon her desire to *live*, which forestalls the resoluteness that is present in a state of authenticity. Instead, the contingency of Julian's attunement to death places her at a remove from it: Julian proceeds, as Heidegger would say, inauthentically. Conceived of or understood by an inauthentic Dasein, Blattner writes that this approach to death might be described by Heidegger's term 'demise' (*Ableben*). Demise is, Blattner explains, not 'inauthentic death', but rather the state when Dasein 'inauthentically understands (i.e., disowns its death)'. As a result, 'Inauthentic Dasein misunderstands death as being demise', and 'hence does not come face to face with death, and thereby evades anxiety about death'.[52] Julian's stoicism in the face of potential death could be described as patient and virtuous forbearance. But she has not yet been subjected to the unhomelike attunement that accompanies a complete breakdown in her being-in-the-world: to the extreme anxiety of *death*, rather than demise. When this does occur, it soon becomes apparent that this constitutes a greater risk to Julian's directedness towards God.

This breakdown begins with the steady failure of Julian's bodily function, the first instance of which occurs in the chapter referred to above: chapter three. After assenting to God's will that she should die, Julian writes: 'Thus I durid till day, and be than my body was dede fro the middes downewards as to my feleing', a state of apparent lower-body paralysis which disables her from self-motivated movement.[53] She is then lifted to a seated position by her companions who, we learn in the short text, place clothes underneath her head: 'Then was I stered to be sett upright, [ST: lenande with clothes to my heede] underlenand with helpe, for to have more fredam of my herte to be at Gods will'.[54] This passage indicates the transformation from Julian's experience of her lived body (*Leib*) to her experience of her body as objective (*Körper*), as she shifts from the use of first-person pronoun to possessive object, 'my body'. Until this point, Julian's description of her illness and her meditations on death have all been reported using the subjective 'I'. With

[50] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 4.
[51] MED, s.v. 'wēle', *n*. (1); Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 4.
[52] Blattner, 'The Concept of Death', p. 57.
[53] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 4.
[54] *Ibid*, p. 4; Windeatt, ed., *Revelations of Divine Love*, p. 4.

the onset of Julian's paralysis, however, her body is the object which becomes 'dede'. Julian's lived perception of her 'dead' torso can be understood by engaging Merleau-Ponty's theory of perception, which explains the body-subject's capacity to occupy the position of both perceiving subject and object of perception. Merleau-Ponty gives the example of his right hand touching his left:

> if I can, with my left hand, feel my right hand as it touches an object, the right hand as an object is not the right hand as it touches: the first is a system of bones, muscles and flesh brought down at a point in space, the second shoots through space like a rocket to reveal the external object in its place.[55]

In the case of bodily dysfunction like Julian's, the constant and self-balancing rhythm of oscillation between subject and object which constitutes the lived body breaks down. The 'dead limb', Herbert Plügge writes, 'takes on many characteristics of objective thinglikeness, such as an importunate heaviness, burden, weight, with the quality of a substance that feels essentially strange, wooden, like plaster of paris, in any event as largely space-filling and hence not altogether as a part of ourselves'.[56] Toombs observes that this sense of alienation is 'particularly pronounced in pathological disturbances such as paresis', arguing that 'the loss of tactual and kinesthetic sensation is experienced as a radical disengagement of body from self'.[57] She cites Husserl's notion of kinaesthetic sensations giving the body an 'interior', clearly defining it as 'mine': 'To lose this sense is to become dissociated from the body. It is "the" arm, rather than "my" arm which moves'.[58] This can, in extreme cases, lead to the bodily disownership or denial called *somotoparaphrenia*: Yochai Ataria writes that this condition 'can be defined in terms of neglect on both the visual and the sensorimotor levels'.[59] He describes how 'The neglected limb or, in more severe cases, half of the body is experienced as heavy, dead, or lifeless'.[60] Ataria then distinguishes between a sense of bodily ownership (SBO) and sense of agency (SA), concepts which can exist independently of one another.[61] He gives the example of the patient 'GA', who

[55] Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, p. 105.
[56] Herbert Plügge, 'Man and His Body', in *The Philosophy of the Body: Rejections of Cartesian Dualism*, ed. by S. F. Spicker (Chicago, IL: Quadrangle Books, 1970), pp. 293–311 (p. 296).
[57] Toombs, *Meaning of Illness*, p. 135, n. 84.
[58] *Ibid.* For a discussion of Husserl's analysis of the role of kinaesthetic sensation in the constitution of lived body, see H. T. Engelhardt Jr., 'Husserl and the Mind-Body Relation', in *Interdisciplinary Phenomenology*, ed. by Don Ihde and Richard Zaner (Hague: Martinus Nijhodd, 1977), pp. 51–70.
[59] Yochai Ataria, *Body Disownership in Complex Posttraumatic Stress Disorder* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), p. 59.
[60] *Ibid*.
[61] *Ibid*, pp. 29, 53.

suffers from somatoparaphrenic symptoms, and describes his hand and arm as 'dead'.[62] The limb is described as 'not mine', indicating a lack of SBO, but more precisely, Ataria notes, 'the *dead hand* is no longer both subject and object. It is no longer a tool like the blind man's cane, allowing GA to perceive the world, but rather a thing, an object that cannot touch or be touched'.[63] In cases of 'dead limbs', then, loss of SA is often associated with loss of SBO.[64]

While Julian's shift from 'I' to 'my body' does not indicate a full loss of SBO (her body remains 'my [*her*] body'), it does highlight the change from the lived to objective body. What's more, Julian's description of her companions moving her so that she might have 'freedom of my herte' indicates a loss of SA. James McIlwain and Richard Lawes have both suggested biomedical aetiologies for the relief that accompanies Julian's move upright,[65] but a phenomenological approach understands differently the upright posture as a gestural indicator of healthful or homelike embodiment. Freedom only arises out of a state of oppression or constraint, such as that which accompanies paresis, which, from the Greek πάρεσις (*paresis*, a letting go), from παρίημι (*pariémi*, to pass by or over), denotes a loss of voluntary movement; literally, a letting go of control of the body. In paralysis, the subject has lost control of their body, and has thus lost their freedom. Maintaining an upright posture is thus a maintainance of bodily control. This requires bodily agency, in terms of motor, sensory and cognitive communication: as Erwin Straus has shown, the upright posture 'remains a task' for the lived body, which must 'oppose the forces of gravity' in a counteraction which literally 'with-stands' its environment.[66] 'The natural stance of man', he writes, 'is, therefore, "resistance"'.[67] I refer back to our phenomenological definition of homelikeness as easeful movement within space, and a sense of possession or control. Freedom from paresis thus constitutes a reinstitution of SA: a healthy, or homelike, body *facilitates* one's being-in-the-world, rather than restricting it, since one is in control of one's bodily movements within space. Once again the paradox of homelikeness comes to the fore: homelike embodiment means *exertion* but also *freedom*, *resistance* but also *non-constraint.* Moreover, Julian wishes to

[62] *Ibid*, p. 60. Example taken from R. Cogliano, C. Crisci, M. Conson, D. Grossi, and L. Trojano, 'Chronic Somatoparaphrenia: A Follow-up Study on Two Clinical Cases', *Cortex* 48.6 (2012), 758–67 (p. 765).
[63] Ataria, *Body Disownership*, p. 60, emphasis in original.
[64] Ataria makes further distinctions between the mismatch between SBO and SA at the body-schema level and then between body-schema and body-image, but this is beyond the scope of this thesis. See *ibid*, pp. 71–75.
[65] McIlwain writes that Julian 'struggles to breathe if the diaphragm and thoracic muscles are severely affected'. James T. McIlwain, '"The bodelye syeknes" of Julian of Norwich', *Journal of Medical History* 10 (1984), 167–80 (p. 176). Lawes also remarks that Julian's 'urge to sit upright suggests breathlessness'. Richard Lawes, 'Psychological Disorder and the Autobiographical Impulse', p. 235.
[66] Erwin W. Straus, 'The Upright Posture', *The Psychiatric Quarterly* 26.4 (1952), 529–61 (pp. 534–35).
[67] *Ibid*, p. 535.

relieve the involuntary constriction of her body so that she can '[thinke] on God while [her] life would lest', suggesting that her paralysis also affects her mental state, reiterating the body-mind connection.[68] For Julian, this freedom (SA) is facilitated 'with helpe' from her companions, who are acting as caregivers while she is incapacitated. By 'stereing' Julian to set her upright, they paradoxically take and restore control of her bodily movement, relieving the oppressive weight of her abject body. The interference of her companions thus maintains Julian's homelike attunement, helping her to adapt to her bodily dysfunction. This serves to reiterate the importance of intersubjectivity—Heidegger's early concept of 'being-with' (*Mitsein*)—in an individual's wellbeing: a porous self is a relational self, and also a whole or homelike self. This notion of communality will become crucial for Julian's theological writing, as well as her lived experience of at-homeness.

After Julian focuses her attention on the crucifix, her condition begins to worsen. She describes how her sight fails her: 'it was all derke about me in the chamber as it had be night, save in the image of the cross wherein I beheld a comon light'.[69] Her peripheral vision becomes 'uggely to [her] as if it had be mekil occupyed with the fends', and after this 'the other party of [her] body began to dyen so ferforth that onethys [she] had ony feleing, with shortness of onde'.[70] The short text has more detail: 'Myne handdys felle downe on aythere side, and also for unpowere my heede satylde downe on side. The maste payne that I felyd was schortnes of wynde and faylynge of lyfe'.[71] Julian's description of breathlessness as the 'most pain' that she feels is corroborated by Carel, who cites recent research on dyspnoea, which has shown that the same brain pathways are activated in breathlessness as in pain, hunger, and thirst.[72] This may lead us to explore, Carel writes, the possibility that 'breathlessness bears a family resemblance to pain': even though breathlessness is not painful, as such, it is 'acutely distressing in other ways'.[73] While Julian's paralysis has thus spread upwards on her body, and sensation receded with it, she remains in a state of suffering, if not 'pain' as we know it. This, I argue, is the juncture at which Julian slips into the liminal psychic landscape of unhomelike being-in-the-world. It is also, crucially, the first

[68] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 4.
[69] *Ibid*, pp. 4–5.
[70] *Ibid*, p. 5.
[71] Windeatt, ed., *Revelations of Divine Love*, p. 4.
[72] M. Herigstad, A. Hayen, K. Wiech, and K. T. S. Pattinson, 'Dyspnoea and the Brain', *Respiratory Medicine* 105.6 (2011), 809–17. Cited in Carel, *Phenomenology of Illness*, p. 107.
[73] Carel, *Phenomenology of Illness*, p. 107.

point at which Julian reports finding herself in a state of 'beholding': 'I beheld a comon light, and I wiste not how'.[74]

b) Authentic Understanding

At this stage in her account, Julian's body remains objective, and her attunement to the feelings in her body shifts to an attunement to their dying: 'my body began to dyen'.[75] While her companions have helped Julian to maintain her seated position until this point, they cannot assist with her breathlessness, which reiterates her desire 'to have passid'—to die. Accompanied by the failure of her sight, Julian becomes completely cut off from her lifeworld. All that surrounds her becomes alien, 'as if it had be mekil occupyed with the fends'.[76] It becomes, in other words, *unhomelike*. As shown in chapter one, unhomelikeness discloses one's world as 'other' to the self: the unhomelike, or the uncanny, denotes something unfamiliar, an involuntary disclosure of a primordial unknown. The metaphor with which Julian chooses to describe the blindness which pervades her vision expresses this in spiritual terms: the world becomes dark, as though the agents of the devil who first tempted us into our first sin, our originary 'un-knowing', have been revealed. This projection into a state of unhomelikeness is akin to the authentic understanding induced by Heidegger's *Angst*, where Dasein is 'called forth', 'summoned to itself' and to uncanniness. Heidegger wrote that in our everyday mode of being-in-the-world, a basic aspect of our existence is covered up, hidden by our dominating attunement of at-homeness: the fact that we are *not* at home in the world. Authenticity brings this state of not-being-at-home out of concealment. Julian's description of this dark condition can be compared to the Augustinian *regio dissimilitudinis*, the region of unlikeness, into which humanity was exiled in consequence of our separation from God.[77] Theologically speaking, this *regio* constitutes our entire lives, which we spend in a state of inherited sin. Just as Julian's sickness loses her the 'fredam' of her heart to

[74] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 5. The short text has 'helde'. The longer version's 'beheld' pairs more closely with Julian's unknowing—'I wiste not'—suggesting the light is located as phenomena of the deep mind.
[75] *Ibid.*
[76] *Ibid*.
[77] Augustine of Hippo, *Confessions, Volume I: Books 1–8*, ed. and trans. by Carolyn J. B. Hammond, Loeb Classical Library 26 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), p. 329, Book VII, 10. Cf. Augustine of Hippo, *The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century, The Confessions*, vol. 1, part 1, trans. and notes by Maria Boulding, ed. by John E. Rotelle (New York: New City Press 1997), p. 173, vii.10, n. 72: 'The formula is from Plotinus, *Enn*. 1.8.13, who derived it from Plato's "bottomess sea of unlikeness", *Politicus* 273 D6-E1. But Lk 15:13 is perhaps equally in Augustine's mind. In his *Expositions of the Psalms* 99, 5 Augustine says, "In your unlikeness to God you have gone far from him; as you become like him you draw near"'.

breathe, then, her illness also discloses her innate lack of freedom as a result of her postlapsarian human condition. The world is both revealed as unfamiliar and hidden in darkness.

Julian describes this moment as if she is suspended outside her body, not in the Heideggerian sense of a healthy body transcending into the world, but in the dissociative sense: she is no longer experiencing her body *qua* her body. This change also recalls Heidegger's description of authentic anxiety, when 'the world has the character of complete insignificance'. The world is revealed as it really is, and the individual stands in a first-person relation to itself, where its own being is at issue for it. Julian's world and bodily transcendence has broken down, and her being is indeed at issue: without feeling in her body, without sight, and without breath, Julian desires once more to die. However, while Julian's projection into authenticity is momentary, like Heidegger's *Angst*, this fleeting disclosure of the world does not cast her into the 'nothing and nowhere'. Instead, in this moment (*Augenblick*), Julian is transfigured. Her pains are taken from her, she experiences a sense of renewed wholeness, and she enters the deep mind state of beholding:

> And, in this, *sodenly* all my peyne was taken fro me and I was as hele, and namely in the other party of my body, as ever I was aforn. I mervalid at this *soden* change for methought it was a privy workeing of God and not of kinde.[78]

Julian adds, however, that this state does not fully relieve her of dis-ease—'the feleing of this ease was no full ease to me'—since she still wishes to 'be deliveryd of this world', indicating a distinction between bodily pain and 'ease' or wellbeing to which I shall return.[79] Then, she is struck with the renewed desire for the second wound of compassion: 'Than came *suddenly* to my minde that I should desyre the second wounde, of our lords gracious gift, that my body might be fullfilled with minde and felyng of his blissid passion'.[80] Gillespie and Ross have observed that the adverb 'sodenly' is one of Julian's most common descriptors, repeated three times in seven lines in this passage.[81] They write that Julian's use of the word signals 'the suspension of "ordinary" time'.[82] Julian subsequently enters what Ross has called the 'boundless present' of beholding, where the self-conscious mind is conflated with the deep mind: in the Bible, Ross writes, beholding is used to 'interrupt the narrative', bringing the reader back to the here and the

[78] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 5, emphases added.
[79] *Ibid*.
[80] *Ibid*, emphasis added.
[81] Vincent Gillespie and Maggie Ross, 'The Apophatic Image: The Poetics of Effacement in Julian of Norwich', *MMTE V*, pp. 53–77 (p. 60).
[82] *Ibid*.

now, freeing them 'from the bondage of time-bound self-consciousness to receive a glimpse of eternity, however fleeting'.[83]

The interruption of linear time in disease functions similarly: let us compare Ross's 'boundless present' of beholding to Toombs's 'stagnating present' of illness. In both states, the individual is retrieved from the experience of time as 'beads on a string', to borrow John Brough's description.[84] Instead, time is experienced as a 'landscape'.[85] At the onset of her illness, Julian enters a state of individuation where she is cut off from both space and time. Her sickbed can therefore be described as a 'heterotopia' in the same way as Laura Saetveit Miles describes her anchorhold: 'a site for heaven on earth as well as a site of visionary (re-)experience that achieved an intimacy with God otherwise unreachable in this world'.[86] This is enacted at when we 'arrive at a sort of absolute break with […] traditional time', as in the anchorhold, when the anchorite is brought 'out of marketplace time into her own "heterochrony" of God-time—a mélange of liturgical schedule, personal time of life and death, and universal eschatological time'.[87] Liz Herbert McAvoy's description of the sickroom relates the two spaces:

> The sickroom becomes [Julian's] figurative anchorhold; the inert body which houses her soul echoes its tomb-like walls and the only visible animation is that which emanates from the suspended crucifix before her. Thus, a homogeneity between Julian's worldly suffering in the sickroom and the otherworldly existence she will later embrace within the anchorhold is established even in the early stages of the Short Text.[88]

McAvoy here gives voice to the objective ('inert') body, which in its uncanniness becomes 'other' and, with dualist sentiment, encases the soul like Plato's dungeon. For McAvoy, the sickroom precedes the anchorhold as a liminal space of self-negation. The landscape of Julian's illness acts as a precedent to the boundless topography of her beholding.

This transition from illness to beholding follows a paradoxical movement from stagnation to freedom, constriction to release, a slippage across marginal boundaries of experience. When

[83] Ross, 'Behold Not the Cloud of Experience', p. 33.
[84] John B. Brough, 'Temporality and Illness: A Phenomenological Perspective', in *Handbook of Phenomenology and Medicine*, ed. by S. Kay Toombs (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001), pp. 29–46 (p. 41).
[85] *Ibid.* Cf. T. J. Murray, 'Personal Time: The Patient's Experience', *Annals of Internal Medicine* 132.1 (2000), 58–62 (p. 62): 'When patients become ill, they may begin to see time running backward as well as forward, with life spread out as on a landscape'.
[86] Miles, 'Space and Enclosure in Julian of Norwich's *A Revelation of Love*', p. 324.
[87] *Ibid*.
[88] McAvoy, *Authority and the Female Body*, pp. 64–65.

Julian is projected into authentic understanding and unhomelikeness by her illness, her ability to understand herself in the thick sense, 'by throwing herself into possible ways to be', is disrupted.[89] Julian's sense of self is made highly unstable and, stripped of all worldly connection, she enters a state which Gillespie has called 'abject liminality': 'The abject man or woman, reduced to their bare humanity, can achieve a focused attentiveness to matters of life and death, and potentially to matters of spiritual significance'.[90] The breakdown in Julian's subjectivity effected by her illness thus makes her *more receptive* to God. Like prayer, which leads the mind into this state of receptivity through the 'long practice of choosing silence',[91] illness catapults the mind into liminality by shrinking—silencing—all that surrounds it: it makes the soul 'supple and buxum to God',[92] stretching that which is *capax Dei* (capable of receiving God).[93] This process of self-emptying is followed by Julian's expression of the desire for the second wound of compassion, which suddenly fills the capacity of her mind that has been opened up by her detachment from world and body. She longs for her pains to be replaced with the pains of Christ: that her body might be *fulfilled* with 'minde and felyng' of his passion.[94] Julian qualifies that she is not asking for a corporeal vision of the passion; she does not need to *see* the crucifixion, only to know and to feel it. There is a distinction here between the 'minde' of the passion that she wants to fill her body, and the 'minde' which is filled with this requesting desire. The latter indicates Julian's intellectual capacity; a self-conscious, ratiocinative process of the left brain. The former, however, is a lived experience of body *and* mind; a pre-reflective kind of knowledge, or *beholding*. While Julian has formerly had 'mind and feeling' of her *own* pains, she now opens herself to a complete experience of Christ's suffering. As she beholds the light emanating from the crucifix, her entrance into this liminal state thus constitutes a step towards the compassionate 'at-one-ment' referred to above. In the short text, Julian's head is even described as lolling to one side, a reflection of iconography of the passion: 'for unpowere my heede satylde downe on syde'.[95] Although she is not *fully* 'eased', Julian's suffering is 'taken fro [her]' and she is 'as hele', as if she was well, or whole.[96]

[89] Blattner, 'The Concept of Death', p. 63.
[90] Gillespie, 'Seek, Suffer, and Trust', p. 138.
[91] *Ibid*.
[92] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 61.
[93] 'This semantic of *capax* (*Dei*), although thematized by Augustine, nonetheless belongs to the common stock of theology'. Jean-Luc Marion, *Cartesian Questions: Method and Metaphysics*, with a foreword by Daniel Garber (Chicago, IL and London: University of Chicago Press, 1999), p. 87, n. 28.
[94] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 5.
[95] Windeatt, ed., *Revelations of Divine Love*, p. 4.
[96] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 5.

c) Genuine Authenticity

The 'hele' Julian refers to in chapter three persists throughout the entirety of her first revelation, a state we might understand phenomenologically as homelike being-in-the-world. This is evident in chapter eight, when Julian recapitulates and reflects on this first showing:

> […] and al these our lord shewid me in the first sight with time and space to beholden it. And the bodily sight stinted and the gostly sight dwellid in myne understondyng. And I abode with reverent drede ioyand in that I saw. And I desired as I durst to se more, if it were his will, or ell lenger time the same. In al this I was mekil sterid in charite to mine even cristen, that thei might seen and knowyn the same that I saw; for I would it were comfort to they, for al this sight was shewid general.[97]

Julian's emphasis on the 'time and space to beholden' the showing reiterates Ross's 'boundless present' of the revelatory state. Julian is released from the former constraints of illness into the wide plains of beholding. As described above, in the unhomelike attunement to her paralysis, blindness, and shortness of breath, Julian's perception is narrowed, and she is cut off from the world around her. Meaning-patterns are broken down such that Julian cannot transcend into her lifeworld, in a state of non-genuine authenticity. Following the entrance into beholding, however, Julian is able to re-connect with her lifeworld. She describes her return from the deep mind state to post-reflective understanding: 'And the bodily sight stinted and the gostly sight *dwellid in myne understondyng*'. The idea of the showings 'dwelling' in her mind prefigures Julian's Johannine theology of mutual indwelling. The term also implies a sense of restful orientation to a space or environs, here suggesting that the spiritual revelation has found a 'home' in her mind even after the bodily experience has ceased. It indicates, moreover, the condition of at-homeness that accompanies the showings, and the authentic understanding which is preserved after the event. Re-entering the world while retaining the revelation in mind, Julian thus enters a state of genuine authenticity, complete with homelike attunement.

Such an attunement of at-homeness is demonstrated throughout Julian's first revelation, in which she finds 'hele' not only in terms of pain relief, but also in regards to her other existentials. Julian recounts in chapter eight, 'as longe as I saw this sight […] I might never stinte of these words: "Benedicte domine!"'.[98] This statement is significant in that it marks a continuous participation in a devotional dialogue with God: Jennifer Bryan observes that Julian's 'Benedicte domine'

[97] *Ibid*, pp. 12–13.
[98] *Ibid*, p. 12.

resonates with Mary's 'Lo, me here, God's handmaiden', with 'one [determining] the other'.[99] Furthermore, it demonstrates the retention of Julian's linguistic capacity, or *discourse*, as she moves between deep and self-conscious states of mind. As the showing recedes, and Julian returns to the space of her sickroom, her mind then returns to its capacity for interpretative and linguistic articulation, which she uses to summarise the 'vi' understandings she has gleaned from the revelation, describing how she '*abode* with reverent drede ioyand in that [she] saw'.[100] Once again, language of *dwelling*—abiding—is used to express the comfort and joy Julian receives from her revelation: 'abode' plays on the noun and verb forms of 'dwelling', from 'abiden', meaning 'to live', 'stay', 'sojourn', 'await', as well as '*the act* of waiting' or 'staying in a place' (from 'abod').[101] While the usage of 'abode' in noun form to denote 'a house or home' is only recorded after Julian's time,[102] the OED notes that 'abiding' can also refer to 'a place where a person remains habitually or resides; a dwelling place, abode, habitation'. The OED quotes the *Cursor Mundi*'s use of 'abode' as 'with reference to a person's life on earth': 'Þis abraham was of longe abode'.[103] The idea that Julian 'abode with reverent drede' in the showings thus describes Julian's own dwelling in the space of the revelation: just as the sight dwells in her understanding, she abides within the showing, in a visionary mutual indwelling. Her abiding is also characterised by the state of reverent dread, which Gillespie describes as 'a state of awe and respect for the power and grace of God that yields the initiative to him'.[104] Julian will later gloss this as the dread which most fully pleases God, since it is 'full soft' and goes hand in hand with love: 'Love and drede are brethren; and thei arn rotid in us be the goodnes of our maker'.[105] Love and dread are intertwined within Julian, a pairing which facilitate the restoration of homelikeness through the self-emptying of beholding: paradoxically, it is by *yielding* to God—by allowing God's showing to 'fulfil' her body and mind—that Julian can 'abide' in the showing, in the 'visionary space of the revelation' referred to by Miles, which is 'able to bear [an] astonishing blend of immensities'.[106] This homelike space is constrained by neither space nor time: God provides the 'time and space to beholden it'. It bears all the paradoxical qualities of *Das heimliche*: it is enclosing, an abode in which Julian can dwell, and permeable, a liminal space which connects past, present, and future, heaven and earth.

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[99] Jennifer Bryan, *Looking Inward: Devotional Reading and the Private Self in Late Medieval England* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), p. 156.
[100] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 12, emphasis added.
[101] MED, s.v. 'abīden', *v.* and 'abōd', *n*.
[102] The earliest instance cited by the OED is 1549.
[103] OED, s.v. 'abode', *n*.1. II.2.a.
[104] Gillespie, 'Seek, Suffer, and Trust', p. 149.
[105] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 119.
[106] Miles, 'Space and Enclosure in Julian of Norwich', p. 329.

Just as her participation in discourse exemplifies Julian's homelike attunement during beholding, so too does her intersubjectivity. After being cut off from the sickroom in unhomelikeness, perceiving it as occupied by fiends, the restoration of Julian's homelikeness by the revelation opens her up again to relational engagement with her companions. It opens her up to 'being-with' or *Mitsein*, a 'withness' which is present in the porous self, and is a prerequisite for compassion.[107] There is, Carel writes, a common misconception that authenticity requires isolation, or that it clashes with *Mitsein*.[108] This, however, is predicated upon *non*-genuine authenticity, where Dasein is able to be in the thin sense but not the thick sense of *participation with the world*. Julian's sustained porosity within her state of authentic understanding—her participation with her 'even cristen'—dispels this idea, demonstrating instead that 'genuine authenticity is inherently linked to *Mitsein*'.[109] As with her discourse, Julian's intersubjectivity is sustained throughout the first revelation: '*In al this*', Julian writes, 'I was mekil sterid in charite to mine even cristen'.[110] The passage implies that this stirring lasted the duration of the revelation, and when Julian's perception then exits the visionary space to re-enter the sickroom, this concern finds expression in her statement, 'It is today domysday with me'.[111] This utterance is intended, Julian writes, to inform her 'even cristen' of the showing's message: 'for to make hem to have mende that this life is shorte as thei might se in example', so that the might 'lovid God the better'.[112] In other words, Julian hopes to share her comfort with those around her, soliciting them to also seek the beholding of God, which will extend the 'curtes love and endless godenes' she has glimpsed in her own beholding of him. She uses the phrase 'mine even cristen' twice in this chapter, a possessive signifier of her own participation within this collective. Julian will deploy the term seven more times in the long text, and three more in the variant '*our* even cristen', indicating her abandonment of individuation in favour of full being-with-others. Julian makes this explicit when she describes the communality of genuine authenticity and homelike attunement:

> I sey not this to hem that be wise, for thei wote it wele; but I sey it to yow that be simple for ese and comfort, for *we arn al one in comfort*; for sothly it was not shewid me that God lovid me better than the lest soule that is in grace, for I am sekir that there be many that never had shewing ner sight, but of the comon techyng of holy church, that loven God better than I; for if I loke singularly to

[107] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, §298.
[108] Carel, *Phenomenology of Illness*, p. 176.
[109] *Ibid*, p. 177.
[110] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 12, emphasis added.
[111] *Ibid*, p. 13.
[112] *Ibid*.

> myselfe I am right nowte; but in general I am in hope, in onehede of charitie with al myn evyn cristen; for in this onehede stond the life of all mankinde that shall be savid […].[113]

This passage demonstrates Julian's transition from self-consciousness to self-negation. Julian recognises that in wholeness, or holiness, '*we arn al one*', and that she herself is 'right nowte'. This is reiterated with her statement that 'all mankind that shall be savid' stand in this 'oneness': 'at-*one*-ment' literally becomes *atonement*, the means of salvation, as in *salus*, healing. To be 'at one', she explains, is to be 'hele'.

d) Homelessness

The 'sekirnes' of Julian's homelike attunement is sustained throughout her second to sixth showings, as long as she is held in the attentive receptivity of beholding. She is fulfilled, she writes, 'of the everlesting sekirnes migtily susteinid withoute any peynful drede', a feeling which is 'so gladd and so gostly that [she] was in al peace and in reste that there was nothing in erth that should a grevid [her]'.[114] However, the seventh showing reveals to Julian the implicit changeability of our health, and how 'it is spedeful to some soulis to fele on this wise, somtime to be in comfort, and somtyme to faile and to be left to hemselfe'.[115] With this, she experiences a violent fluctuation between 'wele' and 'wo':

> I was turnyd and left to myselfe in hevynes and werines of my life and irkenes of myselfe that onethis I coude have patience to leve. There was no comfort nor none ease to me but feith, hope and charite, and these I had in truthe, but litil in feling. And anone, after this, our blissid lord gave me ageyne the comfort and the rest in soule, in likyng and sekirnes so blisful and so mycti that no drede, no sorow, ne peyne bodily that might be suffrid should have desesid me. And than the peyne shewid ageyn to my feling, and than the ioy and the lekyng, and now that one, and now that other, dyvers times—I suppose aboute xx tymes.[116]

This restoration to her former state of suffering returns Julian to the thrownness of her worldly situation. Left to herself, Julian is 'turned' back to face the heaviness, weariness, and irksomeness of her being-in-the-world, returned to the unhomelike attunement of illness. The following oscillations between pain and comfort serve to highlight the effect of bodily pain on Julian's perception. The heaviness incurred by her pain precludes any comfort or 'ease' except faith,

[113] *Ibid*, emphasis added.
[114] *Ibid*, p. 23.
[115] *Ibid*, emphasis in original.
[116] *Ibid*.

hope, and charity, which she *knows* on an intellectual, rational level, but which she does not *feel* as part of her embodied experience. In this state, Julian does not believe she has the patience to live. It is only when her pain is relieved once more that Julian finds 'comfort' and 'rest in soule', and she cannot imagine how any dread, sorrow, or bodily pain could disease her: in the short text, she adds, 'there was nothynge in erthe that schulde hafe grevyd me'.[117] She describes these oscillating states using words from Paul and Peter: in comfort and 'ioy', she writes, 'I migte have seid with Seynt Paul: "Nothing shal depart me fro the charite of Criste". And in the peyne I migte have seid with Peter: "Lord, save me, I perish"'.[118]

Pain projects Julian into the state of authentic understanding whereby she is certain of her own mortality, a state required by the phenomenological model for genuinely authentic living. However, the accompanying distortion of perception renders this a dangerous condition: as shown above, Julian's perception shrinks such that she cannot feel comfort, a destabilisation of subjectivity which threatens to lead her into the 'stagnating present' of illness, which threatens to *constrain* rather than liberate the self. Nevertheless, Julian writes that 'it is spedeful to some soulis to fele on this wise'.[119] Julian recognises the potential for such wounds to turn to honours, for personal growth to be born from suffering; for to have one's homelike attunement disrupted discloses one's life in its totality. As long as this has not occurred as a result of sin, Julian qualifies, a steady faith in God's love will ultimately provide comfort for these worldly pains. Julian's own fluctuations are 'so soden' they cannot result from sin, she writes. Since 'soden' marks out the disruption of ordinary time, she realises here that these feelings are revelatory, part of her beholding. She subsequently conveys the lesson of this showing, as she understands it: that God 'kepyth us even alike sekir in wo and in wele'.[120] Pain, woe, and suffering must be endured patiently, with a fixity on the love of God: 'for it is Godds wil we hold us in comfort with al our migte, for blisse is lestinge withoute ende, and peyne is passand and shal be browte to nougte to hem that shall be savyd'.[121] God's love, which sustains us in grace, thus offers the comfort of homelikeness even when we are in pain, should we choose to attune to it. 'And therefore', Julian concludes, 'it is not Godds wil that we folow the felyng of peyne in sorow and morning […], but sodenly passing over and holden us in endless likyng'.[122]

[117] Windeatt, ed., *Revelations of Divine Love*, p. 9.
[118] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 23.
[119] *Ibid*.
[120] *Ibid*.
[121] *Ibid*, pp. 23–24.
[122] *Ibid*, p. 24.

Julian therefore begins to develop a theology of health akin to the medical hermeneutic outlined in chapter one, one which recognises health or wellbeing as distinct from embodied or physiological function. Embodied pain, Julian understands, can disrupt one's ability-to-be in many ways. Yet by distinguishing spiritual 'hele' as a condition of wellbeing possible even in painful situations, Julian conceptualises an optimistic theology of 'health within illness'. We can be 'sekir in wo and in wele', she writes, if we maintain the way of Christ: if we focus our attention towards the love of God, which is made manifest in Christ's suffering. In so doing, we submit the 'I' to the 'I-Thou' relationship, becoming porous and thus becoming holy. Julian experiences this for herself when, in chapter seventeen, she recounts her vision of the passion in which Christ's suffering transcends mere disease. The intensity of Julian's attunement to Christ's pains—which 'passid bodily dethe'—disrupts her discourse (language), as she fails to articulate this ineffable suffering: 'for which paynys I saw that all is to litil that I can sey, for *it may not be told*'.[123] But the porosity of Julian's state of beholding enables her request to be fulfilled, as she is literally emptied of her own pains, and filled with compassionate pains of Christ's passion:

> The which shewing of Cristes peynys *fillid* me ful of payne, for I wiste wele he suffryd but onys, but, as he wold shewn it me and *fillen* me with mynde as I had aforn desyryd. And in al this tyme of Cristes paynys I felte no payn but for Cristes paynys.[124]

These pains are so severe they lead Julian to question her own urge to perform *compassio*: 'I knew but litil what payne it was that I askyd'.[125] Yet Julian's reason and ability to project herself towards Christ are preserved: when she thinks, 'Is any payne like this?' she is 'answered *in* [*her*] *reason*' that 'Helle is another payne, for there is despeyr. But of al paynes that leden to salvation, this is the most payne: to se thy love suffir'.[126] Such attentive directedness, even in the face of the intensely distracting torment of her *compassio*, sustains the interaction between Julian's *intentio* and her state of beholding. Through self-negation, putting Christ 'above [her]selfe', Julian's compassion then allows her to re-attune to a feeling of love: 'Here felt I sothfastly that I lovyd Criste so mech above myselfe that there was no payne that might be suffrid leke to that sorow that I had to se him in payne'.[127]

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[123] *Ibid*, p. 26, emphasis added.
[124] *Ibid*, emphasis added.
[125] *Ibid*, p. 14. Evoking Christ's words: 'You know not what you ask. Can you drink the chalice that I shall drink?' (Matthew 20:22).
[126] *Ibid*, p. 26, emphasis added.
[127] *Ibid*, p. 27.

Julian subsequently makes the distinction between physical pain, which disrupts her existentials but can be borne with sustained focus on God's love, and the more severely damaging spiritual pains of 'despeyr'. Omitted from the long text is her qualification that this 'despeyr' in hell is '*mare*' than physical pain, 'for that es gastelye paine'.[128] This hierarchy of suffering is based on the idea that 'gastelye' or spiritual pain is accompanied by a total and sustained breakdown of one's being-in-the-world. Like Heidegger's *Angst,* spiritual suffering means a loss of faith in God or, a projection into the 'nothing and nowhere'. In the 'wey' of Christ, God's love guarantees security and the hope of future communion—'onyng'—with God, even if one does not feel whole; if we maintain being-towards-God, we can re-attune to love and to homelikeness even when we are in pain. In 'despeyr', on the other hand, we have lost our way, and have fallen to what Julian will later refer to as a 'beholding of ourselfe and of our synnes'.[129] This turn away from God in solipsistic self-beholding reduces receptivity to the divine, closing off porosity and leaving the individual alone and buffered, over and against the unhomelike world. The world is revealed as somewhere we do not belong. Julian interprets this condition as the product of our postlapsarian 'blindhede', which renders us continually receding back towards sin and self-beholding:

> […] and anon we fallen into ourself, and than fynde we no felyng of ryth—nowte but contrarioust that is in ourselfe, and that of the elder rote of our first synne with all that followyn of our contrivans, and in this we arn traveylid and tempestid with felyng of synnys and of peynes in many dyvers manner, gostly and bodyly, as it [is] knowen to us in this lif.[130]

Just as phenomenology considers health a process of dynamic balancing and re-balancing, the inheritance of original sin has left humankind 'chongeable in this lif': 'he is onmytye and onwise of hymself, and also his wil is overleyd; and in this tyme he is in tempest and in sorow and wo'.[131] Spiritual wholeness or 'hele' is therefore dependent on a ceaseless and effortful circularity self-consciousness and self-negation; a constant and paradoxical reassertion and yielding of control. This rhythmic and self-effacing quality of health means that 'if peyn be taken fro us it may commen agen', and that Julian, and humanity more generally, will always sin: 'God browte to my mynd that I shuld sin'.[132] Just as homelikeness serves to disguise the existential 'otherness' of the world, Julian understands that health or lack of pain is merely a temporary relief from a

[128] Windeatt, ed, *Revelations of Divine Love*, p. 11, emphasis added.
[129] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, pp. 118.
[130] *Ibid*, p. 67.
[131] *Ibid*, p. 66.
[132] *Ibid*, pp. 105, 51.

more chronic condition of fallenness. Our original home lost, humanity's postlapsarian existence is marred by an existential destitution that is otherwise obscured by our everyday engagement with it. When this everydayness breaks down, as in states of disease, the reality of this homelessness is disclosed.

e) Doubtful Dread

Julian encounters such disruption when, after fifteen showings, her pains return and she loses the beholding of God. In the previous chapter, Julian has recapitulated God's will that we 'pass […] lytely over and sett we [our pain] at nowte', instead focusing our attention on his love, so that we 'shall have peas and ben in grete rest': in homelikeness.[133] Yet she intimates that this may not be an easy task, since when we are *in* pain, we can 'thynke ryte nowte but that we arn in'.[134] Julian here acknowledges the distracting effect of pain on one's *intentio—distentio*—a concept Michael Raby traces to Aquinas, who recognises that the soul cannot receive new information in pain, since it is entirely occupied: 'physical pain, more than anything, absorbs the soul's energies [*intentionem animae*]'.[135] Augustine, too, Raby observes, points out how bodily pain 'blocks off the internal routes through which the soul's attention [*intentio*] was striving to reach out and sense things through the flesh'.[136] Toombs's notion of world 'shrinkage' during pain echoes these thinkers, as does Carel's description of the experience of heaviness and distance in ill being-in-the-world. When Julian's pains return in chapter sixty-six, these qualities of unhomelikeness return once more:

> […] and anon my sekenes cam agen: first in my hede, with a sound and a dynne; and sodenly all my body was fu[l]fillid [Paris: fulfyllyd] with sekenes like as it was aforn, and I was as baren and as drye as I never had comfort but litil. And as a wretch I moned and hevyed for felyng of my bodily pey[n]es [Paris: peyes] and for fayling of comfort, gostly and bodily.[137]

The idea that Julian's suffering is laid bare by a *failure* of comfort, spiritual and bodily, reiterates the transparency of health. When Julian ceases to behold her visions—'al was close and I saw no more'[138]—the homelikeness and spiritual fulfilment they have provided recede. Julian's capacity

[133] *Ibid*, p. 107.
[134] *Ibid*.
[135] Michael Raby, 'The Phenomenology of Attention', p. 360.
[136] *Ibid*.
[137] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 108.
[138] *Ibid*.

for receiving God is emptied, or shrunken, as she returns to herself, and her subjectivity rushes in to claim its territory: she has, as she wrote in chapter forty-seven, '*fallen into* [herself]'.[139] Or, as Heidegger would say, she returns to the human tendency to 'fall to' the world in which we find ourselves; to inauthenticity or, as Julian puts it, self-beholding. In theological terms, such a fall into the self is tantamount to a denial of God. Julian's rejection in this chapter of her showings as the 'ravings' of a diseased mind manifests this denial. Her comfort has receded, and Julian is fully occupied by the distracting force of her disease.

When the 'religious person' asks how she fares, Julian deems her visions as another symptom of this condition: 'I seyd I had ravid today, and he leuhe loud and inderly. And I seyd: "The cross that stod afore my face, methowte it blode fast"'.[140] With the *discretio* of this person (perhaps a friar or canon[141]), Julian is encouraged to look again, and is 'sor ashamid and astonyd for [her] recleshede'.[142] The term 'recleshede' denotes imprudence; a lack of prudence or *prudentia*, which, equivalent to 'wisdom', constitutes one of the four cardinal virtues, an ability to project oneself ahead to pre-empt the outcome of one's actions.[143] As Boethius writes, 'prudence must measure up how things will work out in the future'.[144] Just so, Julian's beholding is interrupted by the tunnel-vision of the self-conscious mind, and the preoccupation of her pains has prevented her from anticipating the outcome of her actions. Julian's subsequent desire to be 'shrevyn' following this incident indicates her purpose to redirect her *intentio* and open herself up once more to beholding. To be shriven, or to give confession, was considered an act of soul-cleansing in late medieval devotion: the priest would usually recommend a programme of penance, which drew on the purifactory power of pain (bodily or spiritual) to purge the deviant of their sins. The following absolution was thought to render the soul unmarked, emptied, and receptive to the Word; as described in the 'Tretis of Discrescyon of Spirites' (c. 1390s), which metaphorises the soul's receptivity as a piece of parchment, which after confession is a 'clene paper leef' ready to be

[139] *Ibid*, p. 67, emphasis added.
[140] *Ibid*, p. 108.
[141] Watson and Jenkins, eds., *Writings*, p. 108, n. to l. 6.
[142] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 108.
[143] MED, s.v. 'rḝchelĕs', *adj*. 1(a). Cf. 'The Parson's Tale', in *The Riverside Chaucer*, p. 312, l. 709, where 'reccheleesnesse' is equivalent to 'necligence', and William Langland, *Piers Plowman: An Edition of the C-Text*, ed. by Derek Pearsall (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1978), p. 203, n. to l. 196: 'One of the major innovations in C is the extension of the role of Rechelesnesse […] [who] is an aspect of the dreamer's consciousness'.
[144] Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius, *Theological Tractates: The Consolation of Philosophy*, trans. by H. F. Stewart, E. J. Rand, and S. J. Tester, Loeb Classical Library 74 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973), p. 179, II.1.

inscribed upon.[145] Confession, in other words, was thought to cleanse, purify, or *empty* the soul's capacity, making it porous to the effects of external influences (good or evil).

This resultant porosity necessitates individual accountability; for the subject to read the text of their own soul, seeking to erase or inscribe the Word upon it. As Karma Lochrie writes, 'The mystical text [as with the mystical soul] is engaged in a continual process of self-verification'.[146] New emphasis was placed upon the sacraments of confession at the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215, a move which reiterated the need for such self-verification; for the individual to be responsible for their own sins. Julian struggles with this requirement, as she recoils in horror at the idea that she has fallen into the sin of self-beholding. It is, she cries, 'a gret synne, grete onkindness, that I for foly, of feling of a litill bodily peyne, so onwisely lost for the time the comfort of all this blissid shewing of our lord God'.[147] The unnaturalness—or 'onkindness'—of sin will constitute the basis of Julian's later hamartiology, and can be compared to the phenomenological condition of unhomelikeness, if we consider sin the theological cause of our homeless condition. Julian's realisation that she has sinned subsequently throws her back to a state of unhomelikeness, or non-genuine authenticity, where she understands her error, but is paralysed and unable to act upon it: she 'cowde tell it no preist'.[148] Julian erupts into weeping and wishes to be shriven: 'whan I saw that he toke it sadly and with so gret reverens, I wepid [Paris: waxsyd], *ful gretly ashamid*, and wold have ben shrevyn'.[149] The paralysing attunement of *shame*, however, prevents her from doing so.

Shame constitutes a physical feeling akin to that of pain: as Patricia DeYoung writes, 'Shame hurts. If our shame is exposed, the pain can be unbearable'.[150] DeYoung cites findings in the field of affect theory, which have highlighted the same shift in neural firing in shame as in pain. She goes on to outline the psychological mal-attunements that produce shame, and their

[145] 'A Tretis of Discrescyon of Spirites', in *Deonise Hid Diuinite and other treatises on Contemplative Prayer related to* The Cloud of Unknowing, ed. by Phyllis Hodgson, EETS o.s. 231 (London: Oxford University Press, 1955), pp. 93–94; see also pp. 90–91.
[146] Karma Lochrie, *Margery Kempe and Translations of the Flesh* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991), p. 72.
[147] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 108.
[148] *Ibid*.
[149] *Ibid*, emphasis added. The Paris variation repeats from two lines above: 'And with this word the person that I spake to *waxid* al sad and mervelid'. *Ibid*, p. 142, n. 210, emphasis added. 'Wepid' is the more affective descriptor.
[150] Patricia A. DeYoung, *Understanding and Treating Chronic Shame: A Relational/Neurobiological Approach* (New York: Routledge, 2015), p. xii.

transformation into self-objectifying thoughts and faulty self-images.[151] Considering such self-objectification is a core component of the phenomenological account of disease, might it be possible, then, to define shame as a form of illness? While a passing feeling of shame might not affect being-in-the-world in any meaningful way, if shame is prolonged, such that it disrupts ability to transcend into the world—in other words, if meaning-patterns are broken down—it can certainly afflict the ashamed with the unhomelike attunement of illness. Indeed, shame theory speaks of the disconnective effects of shame on intersubjectivity, and the therapeutic necessity for re-integration of the individual with themselves and their world: DeYoung argues that 'shame in all its forms is relational. Shame is the experience of self-in-relation when "in-relation" is ruptured and disconnected. A chronic sense of self-in-disconnection becomes a profound sense of isolation'.[152] This definition of shame is contingent upon on a breakdown of the individual's sense of personhood: the belief in an innate worthlessness or lack within or associated with the self. *Guilt*, by contrast, is defined by social psychologists as a feeling arising from a certain behaviour or action perceived to be faulty, and which remains attached to this action, rather than affecting perception of self. The distinction follows thus: where shame is predicated upon the statement, 'I am a *bad* person', guilt requires a recognised distinction between character—'I am a *good* person'—and behaviour—'I did a *bad* thing'.[153] Brené Brown subsequently argues that guilt—the holding up of our actions against our values and feeling psychological discomfort—is adaptive and therefore helpful, even necessary, to participation in social structures.[154] Shame, however, is an 'intensely painful feeling or experience of believing that we are flawed and therefore unworthy of love and belonging'.[155] This set of beliefs is, according to Brown, much more likely to be the source of 'destructive, hurtful behavior than the solution or cure'.[156]

Julian's *Revelation* makes clear that God considers all his servants worthy of love, forgiveness, and absolution. It follows that confession is a disclosure of *guilt*, rather than *shame*; an acknowledgment of error in thought or action—a moral failure—but not of personal worthlessness. As in Isaiah 59:2, to sin is to *turn the face away from God*, a rejection of him which separates and isolates the self from its creator. To be absolved, then, is to be welcomed back into communion with him, with a restoration of the self-in-relation, or the self-in-relation-

[151] *Ibid*, p. xii–xiii.
[152] *Ibid*, p. 18.
[153] *Ibid*, p. 31.
[154] Brené Brown, 'shame v. guilt', *Brené Brown*, 14 January 2013, available at: <https://brenebrown.com/blog/2013/01/14/shame-v-guilt/> [accessed 21 November 2019]. Cf. June Price Tangney and Ronda L. Dearing, *Shame and Guilt* (New York and London: Guilford Press, 2002), passim.
[155] Brené Brown, 'shame v. guilt'.
[156] *Ibid*.

with-God. When an individual is afflicted with shame, however, their own faulty self-perception may prevent them from turning back to God: they may 'thynkyth hymself he is not worthy but as to synken in helle', in Julian's words.[157] This is the Catch-22 of the shame cycle: a person needs to think themselves worthy enough of forgiveness to seek re-communion, but they will not feel their worth until they are re-communed. In psychotherapeutic terms, a felt lack in the self might prevent an individual from believing themselves worthy of therapy, the very provision which will enable them to rebuild this sense of worth. Julian's description of the 'grete sorow and grete *shame* that he hath defoulyd the fair ymage of God' expresses the self-objectifying power of this feeling; that one has polluted their innermost purity or holiness.[158] In other words, that they have fragmented the soul which is 'onyd' to God, rupturing its wholeness, or 'hele'. In order negotiate this breach between self-perception and action, the individual must rely on *faith*; faith in God's mercy, that he considers us deserving no matter our low opinion of ourselves. Faith, Julian writes, depends on the touchings of the Holy Ghost, which 'ledyth hym to confession wilfully to shewyn his synnes, nakidly and truely', and 'turnyth the bitternes in hopes of Gods mercy'.[159] Then, the person 'begynnyth his woundis to *helyn* and the soule to quickkyn tur[n]yd [Paris: turned] into the life of holy chirch' and can 'underfo[n]gyth […] penance for every synne'.[160] This passage manifests what Nicholas Watson has called Julian's 'Trinitarian hermeneutic', in which the Holy Ghost constitutes the dynamic of love and grace that allows the soul to pursue reunification with God: 'the Holy Gost, which is endles lif wonnyng in our soule, ful sekirly kepyth us, and werkyth therin a peas and bryngith it to ese be grace and accordith it to God and makyth it buxum'.[161]

The Holy Ghost, through its facilitation of loving faith, maintains the soul's receptivity to God, allowing the individual to intend towards contrition and penance, and to find 'ese' from the painful 'disese' of shameful sin. This is an attunement of *hope*, 'that we shal cum agen up aboven to our substance, into the vertue of Criste, incresid and *fulfillid*'.[162] In Julian's case, if she were to attune to love—to the 'touchings' of the Holy Ghost—she would realise God's mercy for those who have sinned. She would, as a result, feel a sense of *guilt:* the discomfiting dissonance between her actions and values. With a sustained faith in God's love, she would then be able to engage in the healing process of confession, and to re-attune to a relational and homelike 'onyng' with God. As it stands, however, Julian mentions twice how 'ashamid' she is of herself, rejecting

[157] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 53.
[158] *Ibid*, emphasis added.
[159] *Ibid*.
[160] *Ibid*, emphasis added.
[161] Watson, 'The Trinitarian Hermeneutic', passim; Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 67.
[162] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 88, emphasis added.

the potentially productive pain of guilt for the destructive pain of shame; the belief that she is unworthy. Indeed, her question 'How should a preist levyn me? I leve not our lord God' plays on the metonymy of 'leve' (believe) and 'love'.[163] By denying her faith ('I leve not'), Julian in turn denies her capacity to love God and be loved by God unconditionally. Instead, she is paralysed in a state of unhomelikeness: she describes herself as 'astonyd', a term meaning 'stupified' or 'stunned', as well as the more physiological 'insensate', 'unconscious', and in reference to the senses or mental faculties specifically, 'dulled', 'benumbed', or 'deadened'.[164] Julian thus experiences a 'deadening' of her senses which repeats the earlier deadening of her torso as a result of her illness. Just as her paralysis 'fro the middis downewards' reveals her body as an object, disclosing its 'otherness', Julian's paralysing shame exposes herself in its self-conscious subjectivity: 'Here may you sene what I am of myselfe', Julian writes.[165]

This distinction between the pains of guilt and shame finds expression in Julian's differentiation between physical and spiritual pain referred to above. In guilt, the individual retains faith in God's love and mercy, meaning they can re-attune to holiness or a homelike state of being. This is like Julian's evaluation of passing physical pain, for which she deems suffrance possible if one remembers and directs oneself towards God's homely love. Shame, in contrast, is akin to Julian's description of spiritual pain, which she glosses further in chapter seventy-three of the long text. Here, Julian describes 'ii manner of sekenes that we have': 'that on is onpatience or slaith, for we bere our trevell and our pey[n]es [Paris: payne] hevily; that other is dispeir or doubtfull drede'.[166] The latter, she writes, is a 'drede' which 'dwellith' in us and submits us to 'the beholding of ourselfe and of our synnes aforn don'.[167] This beholding 'makyth us so sorry and so hevy that onethis we can finde ony comfort'.[168] 'Onpatience', meanwhile—'impacyence' in the short text[169]—implies a breakdown of control, an inability to 'bere' pain, from *patientia*, 'suffering' or 'patience'. Julian associates the heaviness of this 'trevell' with 'slaith', the sin of sloth. Sloth, known in monastic and eremitic contexts as *acedia* (also *accidie* or *accedie*, literally 'lack of care'), was an affliction thought to derive from the devil leading the individual into despondency and inertia. This 'noonday devil' is described by John Cassian in terms of a physical disease: 'like some fever which seizes him at stated times, bringing the burning heat of its attacks on the sick

[163] *Ibid*, p. 108. Paris adds: 'when I by seaying I raved I shewed my selfe nott to belyue oure lorde god · Nott withstanding I beleft hym truly for the tyme'. *Ibid*, p. 142, n. 211.
[164] MED, s.v. 'astŏned, astŏuned', *ppl.*
[165] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 108.
[166] *Ibid*, p. 117.
[167] *Ibid*, p. 118.
[168] *Ibid*.
[169] Windeatt, ed., *Revelations of Divine Love*, p. 22.

man at usual and regular hours'.[170] Like impatience, the sin of sloth seizes the individual's ability to project themselves meaningfully into the world, leaving them immobilised. They are, furthermore, turned away from God's love. Both these 'ii manner of sekenes' can thus be classified as types of spiritual 'disese' based on distorted perception, just as when Julian denies the divinity of her showings and loses the beholding of God.

f) Deep Anxiety

When Julian's shame descends upon her in chapter sixty-six, she experiences the same unhomelikeness in her surroundings as when her sight initially fails her in chapter three, when all around her seems as though it is occupied with fiends. This state of unhomelike attunement, as shown above, is effected by the projection into authentic understanding: that is, Julian's realisation of her objective human condition. Previously, this state of authenticity occurred as Julian's illness made the transparency of her health opaque, disclosing her body as object and cutting her off from her lifeworld. Julian then entered the liminal state of receptivity to beholding. In this later scene, authentic understanding is effected by a similar realisation of human frailty. This time, however, the understanding is of a predominantly *spiritual*, rather than physical, weakness; though the connection between the two means that one affects the other. Julian falls asleep and is plagued by a visitation of the 'fend', a non-conscious experience which then manifests on a full body, physical level, assaulting her senses.[171] The 'oggley shewing' of the devil translates to a physical feeling of heat and a smell, a 'foule stinke' which she believes to be from smoke coming in the door. Julian's spiritual failure thus makes the physical space of the sickroom feel as though hell has ascended into it; the enclosure of her homelike space invaded by the original cause of our 'onknowyng', the devil who tempted us into original sin. Seeping through the door of her lifeworld, the nightmare threatens to transfigure dwelling into dungeon; rendering it unhomelike. Julian has, however, been shown the therapeutic potential of God's homelike love—his 'homely loveing'[172]— the remedy for such states of total spiritual 'despeyr' or 'doubtfull drede'. Julian therefore engages this possibility for *re-attunement* to this love, and to homelike being-in-the-world, with her response to this nightmarish apparition: 'And in all this time I trostid to be savid and kepid be the mercy of God. And our curtes lord gave me grace to

[170] John Cassian, *The Foundations of the Cenobitic Life,* in *The Nature of Melancholy: From Aristotle to Kristeva*, ed. by Jennifer Radden (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 71–74 (p. 72).
[171] Glasscoe, ed., *A Revelation of Love*, p. 109.
[172] *Ibid*, p. 7.

waken, and onethis had I my lif'.[173] Trust in the mercy of God allows the grace—the love—of God, the Holy Ghost of the Trinity, to fill Julian and enable her to reconnect with wholeness, albeit by a thread: 'onethis had I my lif'.

Upon waking, Julian's re-attunement to love and to homelikeness is expedited by her engagement with her companions. Julian's caregivers comfort her, assuring her that the room is not alight, and thus maintain her connection to their world: 'The persons that wer with me *beheld* me and wet my temples, and my herte began to comforten'.[174] Their beholding of Julian—a selfless, interrelational act of love—comforts her heart against the 'tempesting' of the fiend. This reassurance then enables Julian to focus her attention on the former showings 'that our lord had shewid [her] on the same day': she 'beheld' these, and 'fled therto as to [her] comforte'. 'And anone', she writes, 'al vanishid away, and I was browte to gret rest and peas *withouten sekenes of body or drede of conscience*'.[175] In other words, the unhomelike unrest of the vision recedes, and Julian is both physically and spiritually restored to wholeness, homelikeness, or 'hele'. This healing quality of her companions' care allows Julian to re-enter the state of beholding, as the lord opens her 'gostly eye' and shows her the 'blisfull kyngdom' of her soul: the home in which God dwells in us, the site of his 'homliest home and endles wonyng'.[176] This sense of at-homeness is sustained as Julian realises that the Trinity could not have made 'manys soule ony better, ony fairer, ony noblyer tha[n] [Paris: than] it was made'.[177] Julian is then assured by the lord, 'thou shalt not be overcome', words which reiterate the theological programme of wounds turning to honours that has permeated her showings so far.[178] This practice of re-attunement continues into the second visitation of the devil: the 'second long temptation of the devill to despeir', when his 'hete' and 'stinke' return and make her 'full besy'.[179]

'Besy' indicates that the devil 'occupies' Julian, as in occupies her attention or *intentio*.[180] Julian has used this term in former chapters to denote a state in which the self-conscious mind is preoccupied, seeking answers to God's 'privities'—seeking knowledge through interpretation—rather than accepting our limitations and relying on the more fundamental kind of experiential knowledge (which I will later describe as 'kynde knowyng'): 'the more we *besyn* us to knowen

[173] *Ibid*, p. 109.
[174] *Ibid*, emphasis added.
[175] *Ibid*, emphasis added.
[176] *Ibid*, p. 110.
[177] *Ibid*.
[178] *Ibid*, p. 111.
[179] *Ibid*, pp. 111–12.
[180] MED, s.v. 'bisī', *adj*.

his privities in this or any other thyng, the ferther shal we be from the knowing therof'.[181] This emphasis on reason and the interpretative faculties characterised the scholastic approach to knowledge, which also deployed language of questioning and debate. Julian has already experimented with this dialectic in chapter eleven, when, deploying the scholastic *quaestio*, she asks, 'What is synne?'.[182] Julian is then informed that God does 'althyng', but her reason remains 'gretly traveylid' by her 'blyndhede', and she is left 'in onknowyng'.[183] This process has the effect of reminding Julian—and the reader—that her postlapsarian state limits her capacity for ratiocination toward objective truth, and she must defer to the authority of God. For a mind or soul to be '*besy*', then, is for it to lead itself further into self-consciousness, putting layers of human misinterpretation between us and our original knowledge of God. Julian even describes the sin of the devil as 'the which of mallice and shrewidnes *bysyen* hem to contriven and to done agens Gods wille'.[184] In other words, 'besynes' equates to the distorted, distracted, sinful mind. Indeed, 'bisi dred' is a term used by Chaucer and Lydgate to denote a state of deep anxiety or worry: 'That love is thyng ay ful of bisy drede'.[185] This definition of business as a kind of anxious, dreadful occupation accords with the Heideggerian condition of *Angst*, in that the individual is held out against the 'nothing and nowhere'; a total breakdown in meaning which renders the world unrecognisable, plaguing the individual with distraction or 'disese'. Accordingly, Julian describes how the bodies of these apparations jangle as though they are holding 'a parlement with a gret bysynes', which she recognises is intended to 'stirre [her] to dispeir'.[186] That is to say, to stir her to turn away from God.

Julian subsequently qualifies that although this temptation has appeared in physical effect, it remains a *spiritual* affliction: 'Methowte that bysynes myte not be likenyd to no bodily bysynes'.[187] Thus, while the fiend occupies Julian 'al that nyte, and on the morne till it was about prime day', Julian knows that she must not let the force of the devil's 'business' take occupation of her soul. Instead, she must redirect and re-attune her *intentio* to God's love, filling the capacity of her soul with faith and her mind with thoughts of God, keeping herself *busy* with the paradoxical attentive receptivity of 'beseking' and 'beholding'. Gillespie refers to this as Julian's

[181] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 46, emphasis added.
[182] *Ibid*, p. 17.
[183] *Ibid*, p. 71.
[184] *Ibid*, p. 21, emphasis added.
[185] MED, s.v. 'bisī', *adj.* (5).f.
[186] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 112.
[187] *Ibid*.

'acutely attentive stillness', which she calls 'wilful abiding'.[188] As Julian thinks to herself: 'Thou hast now grete *bysynes* to kepe the in the feith, for thou shuldst not be taken of the enemy; woldst thou now for this time ever more be so bysy to kepe the fro synne, this were a good and soverain occupation'.[189] Re-attuning to the 'trost' given to her by the grace of God, Julian knows she will be kept 'saf fro synne' and thus 'full saf fro all the fends of helle and enemys of [her] soule'.[190] This gives her the strength to scorn the devil, delivering her 'be the vertue of Christ passion'—the earthly manifestation of God's love and mercy. In phenomenological terms, this constitutes a transition from the non-genuine authenticity of anxiety, which discloses the world but inhibits relationality and action, to a *genuine* and *homelike authenticity*, wherein Julian is 'saf' and whole, able to resist the temptations of sin. As she writes in the next chapter, this temptation functions as a reminder that we must '*kepe*' this trust and faith, even in the face of pain and sin: 'Kepe the therein and comfort the therewith and trost thou therto'.[191] Julian understands this to mean that we must maintain our directedness to God, in whom we find our secure dwelling: 'festyn it feyfully in our herte; for he will that it dwell with us in feith to our lifes end'.[192]

Following Julian's forsaking of her showings as 'ravings' after her bodily pain, these temptations from the devil therefore function as a form of spiritual tribulation or 'sekenes', which threaten to lead Julian further from the beholding of God. After this mistake, however, Julian understands her error and frailty: Julian is able to keep herself 'besy' with '[wilful] abidyng'[193] in God, increasing her capability for homelike attunement even when her perception is almost overwhelmed by 'disese'. This series of showings, and the homelikeness Julian finds as a result, perfectly exemplify the transition Julian describes as wounds turning to honours. As the author of the *Ancrene Wisse* writes in Part Four, 'On Temptation', sickness offers the opportunity for a refocused and purified sense of self: 'Secnesse maketh mon to understonden hwet he is, to cnawen him-seolven—ant, as god meister, beat for-te leorni wel hu mihti is Godd, hu frakel is the worldes blisse' (sickness makes man understand what he is, to know himself—and, like a good teacher, [sickness] beats in order to teach well how mighty God is, [and] how vile the world's joy is).[194] Sickness is then described as the 'gold-smith' which gilds one's crown in heaven. The more serious the sickness, the author writes, the *busier* the goldsmith, and the brighter and longer-

[188] Gillespie, '"[S]he do the police"', p. 193.
[189] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 112, emphasis added.
[190] *Ibid*.
[191] *Ibid*, p. 113.
[192] *Ibid*.
[193] *Ibid*, p. 31.
[194] Hasenfratz, ed., *Ancrene Wisse*, Part Four, ll. 60–62.

lasting the crown: 'Secnesse is thi gold-smith […] Se the secnesse is mare, se the golt-smith is bisgre' (Sickness is your goldsmith […] The greater the sickness, the busier is the goldsmith).[195] Thus 'is secnesse sawlene heale, salve of hire wunden' (sickness is the healing of souls, salve for her wounds).[196] Accordingly, Julian's sickness—her woundedness—turns to honours; she finds healing as she fastens faithfully the lessons of her showings to her heart, cultivating a homelike dwelling for God's loving grace. This, she learns, is a process of focusing, rather than magnifying, her *intentio*; of stripping away solipsistic thoughts and redirecting the soul towards 'onyng'. Just as Julian's sickness discloses her homeless condition, then, it also reveals her capacity for love. Dissolving the busyness of her buffered subjectivity, Julian is strengthened, able to face future tribulation with a 'wilful abiding'—with compassion and patience.

iii. Resoluteness

The wilfulness of Julian's attentive receptivity can be described as a kind of focused engagement with the situation at hand, which Heidegger called *resoluteness*: 'The word *Entschlossenheit* ["resoluteness"] means decisiveness or resolve, but it also literally means unclosing, or disclosing, which is to say, remaining open'.[197] This is a useful term with which to read Julian's account, in that it describes a lasting condition which changes the present and future existence of the individual. What Julian's sickness discloses is her own 'frelte' and the certainty of her own mortality. To face up to this situation is, therefore, to face up to death, and to face up to it *resolutely* is to carry this knowledge forward into everyday living. This process is twofold. Julian's perception of death shifts from one of 'demise' (i.e. a third-person view that 'one dies') to resolute being-towards-death; the conditional 'if' of death in Julian's request for compassion becomes certitude. This is the first step of resoluteness: that of *non-genuine authenticity*, where Julian is individuated, cut off from her lifeworld. The second is a re-integration into the meaning-patterns of her lifeworld, in a relational and communal capacity. In order to examine Julian's completion of this process, the achievement of *genuine authenticity*, we must therefore begin to incorporate the details available concerning the authorial persona of the text: that is, how Julian went on to live her life *after* the event of her sickness and revelation. There is a useful distinction to be made here between Julian-the-subject and Julian-the-author, in the style of Lynn Staley, who in her analysis of *The Book of Margery Kempe* distinguishes between Margery-the-subject

[195] *Ibid*, ll. 62–64.
[196] *Ibid*, l. 59.
[197] Taylor Carman, 'Authenticity', p. 291.

and Kempe-the-author.[198] While Margery's affective devotion seeks to authenticate her subjectivity via reiterative performance, however, Julian's is self-negating. Julian's illness and accompanying revelations break down her buffered self, in favour of a porous, compassionate self, which abandons the 'I' in favour of a 'withness', or being-with-others. This self-emptying devotion then translates to Julian's writing, where Julian-the-*author* intentionally absents herself from the text. Indeed, it is entirely representative that Julian does not name herself in her own texts, and all references we have to her use the possible pseudonym, Julian of Norwich. She is assigned this name, as well as the designation of spiritual authority, in *The Book of Margery Kempe*, where 'Dame Jelyan' is accorded status as a respected 'ankres' of Norwich.[199] This demonstrates the *lasting* quality of Julian's transfiguration, which is evinced both by the production of her texts itself, and her subsequent anchoritic lifestyle—phenomena which will occupy the remainder of this chapter.

The evolution of Julian-the-subject to Julian-the-author, then, is effectively a transition from self-conscious, buffered, non-authentic subjectivity, to a resolute, porous, and genuinely authentic being-in-the-world. The most commonly cited example of Julian-the-author's self-negation is the short text's authorial *apologia* (revised to an abbreviated version in the longer text), where Julian foregrounds her 'even cristen' for whom she believes the showings are meant:

> Alle that I saye of myselfe, I meene in the persone of alle myne evyn-Cristene, for I am lernede in the gastelye schewinge of oure Lorde that he meenys so. And therfore I praye yowe alle for Goddys sake, and cownsayles yowe for yowre awne profyt, that ye leve the behaldynge of the wrechid worldes sinfulle creature that it was schewyd unto, and that ye myghtlye, wyselye, lovandlye, and mekelye behalde God, that of his curtays love and of his endles goodnes walde schewe generalye this visyon in comforthe of us alle.[200]

The passage marks the transfigurational process of Julian's revelations at large, moving from first person to second person address, and finally incorporating the 'I' with 'alle mine evencristene'/'yow', in the inclusive 'us alle'. Julian goes on to write (and I quote from the long text): 'for if I loke singularly to myselfe I am right nowte; but in general I am in hope, in onehede of charitie with al myn evyn cristen; for in this onehede stond the life of all mankinde that shall

[198] Lynn Staley, *Margery Kempe's Dissenting Fictions* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), passim, esp. p. 3.
[199] Windeatt, ed., *The Book of Margery Kempe*, p. 123.
[200] Windeatt, ed., *Revelations of Divine Love*, pp. 6–7.

be savid'.[201] Scholars have argued that Julian's initial tentativeness in this passage displays an 'anxiety about her sex and gender, the purpose and meaning of her showings and, in particular, what she was supposed to do with them'.[202] This quality is (seemingly paradoxically) accompanied in the short text by greater autobiographical detail, including aspects of her sickbed experience which are left out of the longer version. Gillespie has made the recent suggestion that the short text may have been a *probatio* text of the type required of applicants to the anchoritic profession, which might explain what he calls its 'theologically cautious, perhaps even defensive' quality.[203] This would account for the marriage of apologetic self-deprecation and autobiographical narrative. By the time we reach the long text, Julian has undergone the personal and theological maturation that follows her prolonged contemplation on the second 1388 showing that 'love was his mening', and the third 1393 showing of the lord and the servant. The long text thus evolves, leaving behind much of Julian's 'origin story' to arrive at her highly complex and original theological conclusions. This shift in the text's purpose effects a shift in Julian-the-author's focus: from self to universal, or from self-deprecation to self-dissolution, as she diffuses into oneness with her 'even cristen'.

The possibility that Julian was an anchorite at the time of writing the later version supports this self-negating and relational emphasis, since to enter into the anchoritic life was to nought the self and be reborn as part of the communal body of Christ. As Liz Herbert McAvoy and Mari Hughes-Edwards have written, the anchorhold was like a 'communal "womb" from which could emerge an idealized sense of a community's own reborn potential'.[204] They describe the 'heteroglossic interactivity between anchorhold and society',[205] a description of convergence echoed by Gillespie's observation that Julian's writing 'has many of the dialogic characteristics of Bakhtinian "heteroglossia"'.[206] The heteroglossic mode of speaking in the language of another is inherently relational: as Heidegger's description of language as a dwelling iterates, the sharing of language allows the world, too, to be intersubjectively shared. Gillespie argues that Julian's long text exemplifies this heteroglossia as it 'adopts and adapts multiple discourses and textual voices', and, I would add, with its theological and textual emphasis on 'oneness' with community. If we include in this definition of 'heteroglossia' the *language of the body*, this aligns with my analysis of Julian's experience of bodily suffering as breaking down barriers between self and world, de-

[201] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 13.
[202] McAvoy, 'Introduction', in *A Companion to Julian of Norwich*, p. 2.
[203] Gillespie, '"[S]he do the police"', p. 196.
[204] McAvoy and Hughes-Edwards, *Anchorites, Wombs and Tombs*, p. 18.
[205] *Ibid*, p. 19.
[206] Gillespie, '"[S]he do the police"', p. 197.

buffering the subject. Julian's heteroglossic mode *begins* with, or at the very least (since phenomenology avoids the subject-object severance that comes with causality), *manifests on* the body: Julian's fulfilled request for a 'bodely sekeness' projects her into the state of authentic understanding, a liminal psychological condition which facilitates the attentive receptivity of beholding. While Julian's sickness begins by individuating her, it also enables the longer-term transition from non-genuine to genuine authenticity, and from buffered self to communality. By the time of writing, Julian displays a great deal of personal growth and creative productivity: illness has been a 'source', as Carel writes—or, to use a more phenomenologically sensitive word, a 'catalyst' or 'accompaniment'—of 'growth and edification'.[207] This transfiguration, as we have seen, follows the complete breakdown of Julian's homelikeness, which goes hand in hand with her forsaking of God. Fracture then becomes reconstruction and resilience, as Julian displays a 'post-traumatic growth', which reveals her ability to focus on God's love and restore homelikeness in the face of adversity. In other words, her ability to be-towards-God is sustained, even while her physical, or corporeal, ability-to-be (i.e. intentionality) is impaired. The breakdown of Julian's subjectivity within this process manifests heteroglossia through compassion, as her body speaks in the language of others' suffering: of Christ, and of the corporate body of humankind, of both its inherited infirmity and capacity for salvation.

Julian's heteroglossic body thus remembers the language of our shared flesh: the 'co-' aspect, or 'withness', of compassion opens up the possibility of homelikeness within illness, by cultivating a space—geographical, bodily, or temporally—of relational understanding. Julian's development of resolute authenticity is vital to this compassionate project. Resoluteness draws on the convergence of self, world, and others—*Mitsein*—a joint project which Julian's companions encourage through their own compassion, as they 'hold space' for Julian throughout her illness. For example, Julian recounts in the short text how her 'modere' (whether biological or religious is unclear, although the former is more likely if we take this text to be of the *probatio* type) 'behelde' her and reached to close her eyes, believing her dead: 'sche wenyd I had bene dede or els I hadde dyede. And this encresyd mekille my sorowe, for noughtwithstandynge alle my paynes, I wolde nought hafe been lettyd for loove that I hadde in hym'.[208] As Watson and Jenkins observe, this moment 'reinforces the parallel between her and Christ made in Section 2 […] Julian's mother stands in for Mary, whose grief is described in lines 38–43 and whose presence at

[207] Carel, *Phenomenology of Illness*, p. 12.
[208] Windeatt, ed., *Revelations of Divine Love*, p. 10.

the Crucifixion is often said to increase Christ's pains'.[209] McAvoy has commented on Benedicta Ward's 'unduly harsh' interpretation of this 'maternal reaction', which Ward argues '[shows] no warmth at all in [Julian's] solitary mention of [her mother]; in fact, her own mother totally misunderstood her': McAvoy writes that Ward 'misses the multivalence of the description altogether. […] Far from lacking in warmth […] the response of Julian's mother is qualified by this touching display of a heightened concern for her dying daughter, mixed as it is with a poignant misunderstanding'.[210] Julian's mother's action is, in my view, one of grief: to close Julian's eyes is to accept her departure from the world, a final and conclusive—indeed, a closure—of the *ars moriendi* ritual. The dissonance between Julian's desire to remain in the room, fixed on Christ, and her mother's belief in her passing, is a consequence of Julian's entrance into the 'abject liminality' of her sickness and beholding. Her mother remains *in-the-world*, while Julian is poised on its threshold, immediately cut off from it. But her mother's care is also part of the healing process that reconnects Julian to others, and can be read alongside the care given to Julian by her companions in the rest of the text, a connection reiterated by the description that her mother '*beheld*' her. As we have seen, beholding requires the individual to *remain open*, 'in an ungrasping and self-emptying way'.[211] The care of Julian's mother thus carves out the 'inner space' of Leget's *ars moriendi* model. This creation of 'inner space' constitutes the rebuilding of homelikeness for the ill person, which they can fill with their experience and testimony, inclusive of fear, denial, or grief, as well as joy and comfort.

The care displayed by Julian's companions maintains her connection to her surroundings, helping her remain anchored to a sense of community even when her being-in-the-world breaks down. Since this kind of being-with-others is a fundamental facet of being-at-home, this helps Julian to re-establish homelike attunement. Indeed, we have already seen that at-homeness requires a rooting of oneself to the world; a fastening or securing of self to environment and to others, such that we feel a sense of control over our fugitive or transient mortality. We orient and re-orient ourselves, bodying forth into new situations, re-homing and re-anchoring into time and space. Etymologically, 'anchor' not only refers to a mechanism of fastening or mooring to a place, but is descriptive of the object itself, from **ang-/*ank-*, 'to bend', also as in 'angle'. To anchor oneself, then, is to *angle* oneself necessarily both towards and away from something. The anchorite, enclosed in a dwelling fastened—anchored—to the church, thus also angles, or orients, themselves away from their former lives (self-beholding) and *towards* God, in an authentic and

[209] Watson and Jenkins, eds., *Writings*, p. 83, n. to ll. 26–28.
[210] Ward, 'Julian the Solitary', p. 24; McAvoy, *Authority and the Female Body*, p. 76.
[211] Ross, 'Behold Not the Cloud of Experience', p. 29.

resolute being-towards-God. The requirement of resolutely anticipating one's own death is fulfilled by the anchorite's way of living: the anchorhold becomes, as McAvoy, Barratt, and others have noted, both womb and tomb: her rebirth when she abandons her former life is paralleled by a constant awareness of the anchorite's own mortality.[212] *Ancrene Wisse* even details instruction for the anchorite to dig her own (symbolic and actual) grave: 'Ha schulden schrapien euche dei the eorthe up of hare put thet ha schu*le*n rotien in' (They should scrape each day the earth up from their grave that they will rot in).[213] In so doing, the anchorite grasps her mortality with her bare hands, rooting herself to the earth to which her body will return.

This preparation for death is a kind of *ars moriendi,* since it enables the anchorite to die a 'good death', or, in phenomenological terms, to approach death resolutely. Leget has shown how the various components of this ritual can be replicated in modern formats as processes which serve to retain and restore homelikeness for the patient.[214] For Julian, this resoluteness requires a fastening to the power of God's love, which transfigures non-genuine to genuine authenticity by vouchsafing the projection into the 'nothing and nowhere' instead as a future *re*-homing in heaven. As Julian's showings reveal, being-towards-death is therefore also a *being-towards-God*, which she conceptualises as a 'coming home': Julian is 'lifted up into hevyn where [she sees] our lord as a lord in his own house', where God 'had clepid al his derworthy servants and freinds to a solemne fest'.[215] She sees him 'rialy regne in his hous, and fulfillid it with ioy and mirth, hymselfe endlesly to gladen and to solacyn his derworthy frends ful homeley and ful curtesly'.[216] In this home, God tells Julian,

> 'Sodenly thou shal be taken fro al thy peyne, fro al thi sekeness, fro al this disese and fro al the wo. […] And thou shal never have no maner of peyne [Paris: no manner of sycknes no etc.], no manner of mislekyn no wanting of will, but ever ioye and bliss withouten ende'.[217]

This re-homing is ultimately beyond-the-world; an actualisation of earth-bound home*like*ness, our limited capacity for homeliness that we can experience in-the-world. Indeed, Julian must stand outside herself and outside temporality (she will 'never' have pain, and 'ever' joy and bliss) in order to get a glimpse of it. In the economy of salvation, wherein 'it is our dett […] to don our

[212] Alexandra Barratt, 'Context: Some Reflections on Wombs and Tombs and Inclusive Language', in *Anchorites, Wombs, and Tombs*, pp. 27–40.
[213] Hasenfratz, ed., *Ancrene Wisse*, Part Two, ll. 815–16.
[214] Leget, 'Retrieving the *ars moriendi* Tradition', passim.
[215] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, pp. 21–22.
[216] *Ibid*, p. 22.
[217] *Ibid*, p. 104.

diligens', God supplies a home as recompense for our 'travel'.[218] Julian learns that we must bear the pains of this condition in this life with patient suffrance, and is given a glimpse of the reward that awaits us: 'iii degrees of blis that every soule shal have in hevyn that wilfully hath servid God in any degre in erthe'.[219] God says to Julian directly, 'I thanke thee of thy travel and namely of thy youthe', iterating the existential necessity for tribulation as a form of therapy.[220]

While for Heidegger, then, 'we stand before the nothing and recognise that we are not at home in the world', Julian stands before the world and seeks a home in God.[221] This is a hermeneutic exercise, of deconstructing—stripping away—the worldly accretions of selfhood and subjectivity, and turning *back* to God with a focused and receptive attention. Julian's 'bodely sekeness' expedites her transfiguration from patient to anchorite, subject to author, buffered self to porous. By projecting her into the liminal state of authentic understanding, she is able to distinguish between physical and spiritual wellbeing, the former of which is inevitably changeable, the latter of which sustains us through the constricting darkness of all tribulation. Re-attuning to God's love allows her find homelikeness even within this *regio dissimilitudinis*, and health within illness. The remainder of Julian's work outlines the ways in which this psychological transfiguration can be achieved by her 'even cristen'. Despite the chronicity of our homelessness, Julian writes, God's loving grace will 'hele us ful faire' if we let it; if we choose the 'wey' of Christ.[222] This is not only a momentary request, like Julian's original prayer which passed from her mind, but a lasting way of being-in-the-world, which—like the phenomenological understanding of health—requires continuous balancing and re-orientation. It is a resolute and reiterative decision, of choosing love, and choosing life.

[218] *Ibid*, p. 60.
[219] *Ibid*, p. 22.
[220] *Ibid*, p. 21.
[221] McGrath, *The Early Heidegger*, p. 134.
[222] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 103.

Chapter Three:
Writing the Visionary Text

i. Contemplative Epistemologies

In chapter two, I asked how Julian of Norwich's 'bodely sekeness' effected a transfiguration of the anchorite's subjectivity, predisposing her to the irruption of beholding. Engaging a phenomenological framework, I showed how Julian's disease projects her into a state of unhomelike being-in-the-world or authentic understanding, which renders her lifeworld alien or uncanny. I argued for a reading of this experience as revelatory, in both the mystical and Heideggerian senses of the term: that Julian's sickness calls her out of her everyday existence and into a liminal psychological state, opening her up to a compassionate co-wounding with Christ. This gives rise to Julian's holistic understanding of spiritual wellbeing, which I read in terms of the medical hermeneutic of health within illness. The experience reveals to Julian the possibility of 'hele', or homelike being-in-the-world, through an attunement to God's eternal love, a revelation which reiterates the potentially generative force of pain and suffering. The chapter therefore outlined Julian's experience of this revelation at the level of the immediate phenomena as she encountered them; it was, in other words, broadly concerned with the transfiguration of Julian-the-subject. I concluded with a word on how this transfiguration manifests in Julian-the-*author*'s work: how through a strategy of self-negation, Julian's long text offers to her audience of 'even cristen' a universal message of how to seek towards holiness, 'at-one-ment', or homelikeness. The present chapter looks further at this transition from the event of the showings to the visionary text. It is, in other words, concerned with Julian's encounter with God, and how this might be defined in terms of her cognitive faculties. This focus will, in turn, illuminate some representational challenges of communicating the revelation, an encounter with the Word, using the written word of the vernacular.

a) Experience, Reason, and Authority

Experience requires precise definition when applied to discussions of visionary and revelatory events. Maggie Ross writes of the word as a 'poisoned chalice', which 'twists interpretations to serve prejudices and reinforce reflexive feedback loops'.[1] The distorting conception of experience as self-reflexive and automatically self-authenticating is another product of the post-Cartesian

[1] Ross, 'Behold Not the Cloud of Experience', p. 40.

mode of subjectivity, which centers ego against object, with empirical realities grounded in an ontological certainty of perception.[2] We must suspend this subject-object epistemology to make room for the intellectual project of late medieval contemplative writing: the balancing of authority and reason, divine revelation with human intellectual power. Experience, in this context, was an axis around which various schools of theology positioned themselves, depending on their emphasis on either of these two authorities. The medieval Latin terms *experientia* and *experimentum* point to this conflict: although there was no consistent terminological distinction between the terms across the Middle Ages, *experientia* broadly came to be defined as the *direct* experiencing of phenomena as they are encountered, while *experimentum* usually denoted the rational organisation of such experience, knowledge acquired by the *interpretation* of phenomena external to the self. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, increased weight was given to *experientia* as a kind of spontaneous, metaphysical, non-empirical, spiritual event, distinct from *experimentum*, which was inflected with increasingly methodical, and later scientific, meaning. Sabetai Unguru observes that by the Renaissance, the latter was connected with a 'searched-for, sought-after kind of experience', defining the following relationship: '*Experientia quaesita = experimentum*'.[3] *Experimentum* even acquired undertones of the occult, or diabolic, based on Augustine's interpretation of the devil tempting Jesus to jump from the pinnacle of the temple as an 'experiment'. As Heiko Oberman points out, the experimental nature of this event is as much about the temptation as it is about the curiosity, 'to see what happens'.[4] The term came to refer to a sense of something hidden, perhaps something forbidden—to be sought out and understood. It referred, in other words, to a desire for knowledge.

The medieval notion of *experience*, then, is rooted in a sense of the incompleteness of experiential knowledge: in the human *lack* of knowledge, and whether (and by what means) we are able to fulfil this lack. Indeed, it was only in the late fourteenth century that *experience* came to be used as an authentication of authority, as in the *expertus novit* tradition,[5] which was

[2] René Descartes, *Principles of Philosophy*, trans. by V. R. Miller and R. P. Miller (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1983), p. xxiv.
[3] Sabetai Unguru, 'Experiment in Medieval Optics', in *Physics, Cosmology and Astronomy, 1300–1700: Tension and Accommodation*, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 126 (Dordrecht: Springer, 1991), pp. 163–81 (p. 163).
[4] Heiko A. Oberman, quoted in Brian Stock, 'Experience, Praxis, Work and Planning in Bernard of Clairvaux: Observations on the *Sermones in Cantica*', in *The Cultural Context of Medieval Learning: Proceedings of the First International Colloquium on Philosophy, Science, and Theology in the Middle Ages—September 1973*, ed. by John Emery Murdoch and Edith Dudley Sylla (Dordrecht and Boston, MA: D. Reidel, 1973), pp. 219–61 (p. 267).
[5] John Duns Scotus: 'expertus infallibiter novit' (he who has had an experience, has flawless knowledge). Ioannis Duns Scoti, *Opera Omnia*, vol. 18: *Lectura* II, dist. 1–6, ed. by L. Modrić, S. Bušelić, B. Hechich,

employed by theologians to distinguish themselves as possessing superior knowledge of the divine texts: as Bernard of Clairvaux writes, 'Loquor vobis experimentum meum quod expertus sum' (I tell you my experience because I am experienced).[6] This compares to modern (from Renaissance onwards) conceptions of experience as self-authenticating, born out of the subject-object relationship on which modern ideas of selfhood and world are modelled. We can see the origins of this distinction in Aristotle's sentiment that science and art come to men *through experience*, based on the principle that experience was acquired through the senses, a position which positioned sense perception as the basis of knowledge.[7] Aristotle distinguished, however, between knowledge acquired by sense perception (empirical or observational knowledge) and causal explanations, which contribute to the *wisdom* he attributes to artists, who 'know the wherefore and the cause': '[the senses] do not tell us the reason for anything, as for example why the fire is hot, only that it *is* hot'.[8] 'Wisdom', then, according to Aristotle, is 'the knowledge of certain principles and causes'.[9] This paradigm was the basis of the medieval scholastic method, which emphasised the authority of ratiocination in the receipt of wisdom.

In the context of medieval theology, however, this Aristotelian conviction in the power of human reason (*ratio*) to deduce genuine knowledge (*epistēmē*) was also balanced against the ineffable essence of God. This tension grounds Augustine's theory that holy wisdom (*sapientia*, as opposed to *scientia*) was a product of both faith *and* reason, an epistemological programme Anselm would later term '*fides quaerens intellectum*', faith seeking understanding. This is borne out in the customary medieval model of the rational soul's cognitive faculties, or modes of apprehension, formed of the *intellectus* and *affectus*, intellect and affect or will, through which the contemplative was thought to ascend towards apprehension of God. Medieval theologians such as Thomas Gallus (c. 1200–1246), Hugh of Balma (c. 1200s), and the author of the *Cloud of Unknowing* (c. 1375) variously interpreted the *intellectus* or the *affectus* as the final point of

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I. Jurić, I. Percan, R. Rosini, S. Ruiz de Loizaga, and C. Saco Alarcón (Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1982), dist. 3a, Q. IV.9.

[6] Bernard of Clairvaux, *Sancti Bernardi Opera*, vols. 1–2: *Sermones super Cantica Canticorum*, ed. by Jean Leclercq, C. H. Talbot, and H. M. Rochais (Rome: Editiones Cistercienses, 1957–1958), Sermon 51.2.3. This *expertus*/*inexpertus* distinction was later utilised in nominalist circles to justify their insistence on *cognitio intuitiva*. See, for example, Gyula Klima and Alexander W. Hall, eds., *The Demonic Temptations of Medieval Nominalism*, Proceedings of the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics, vol. 9 (Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 2011); C. K. Brampton, 'Scotus, Ockham, and the Theory of Intuitive Cognition', *Antonianum* 40 (1965), 449–66; Sebastian Day, *Intuitive Cognition: A Key to the Significance of the Later Scholastics* (St Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute, 1947).

[7] Aristotle, *Metaphysics, Books I–X*, trans. by Hugh Tredennick, Loeb Classical Library 271 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1933), pp. 4–5, I.I.981a.4–6.

[8] *Ibid*, pp. 6–7, I.I.981b.10–12, emphasis in original.

[9] *Ibid*, pp. 8–9, I.I.982a.17.

union with the divine. For Hugh, loving awareness of God transcends the intellect, while for Thomas, 'The unitive experience is […] achieved through the power of love, in the *apex affectus*', a transintellectual union which Rosemary Ann Lees calls 'knowledge-in-love'.[10] The *Cloud*-author, meanwhile, stresses that the intellect—and the imagination—must be abandoned in order for the contemplative to proceed toward God.[11] We can here bear witness to the varying emphases on apophasis, the negation of human experience, in texts of contemplative theology in this period. In the journey of ascent to the divine, the contemplative is drawn toward the eternal truth of God and away from the linear temporality of human existence. Whether they reach wisdom through the intellect or through affect, however, this ascent thus requires an active and focused practice of *seeking*. As Hugh of Balma writes, wisdom is achieved 'through *practice* in the purgative and illuminative ways and under the inward instruction and direction of God alone'.[12]

It is on account of this emphasis on *practice* that monasticism has been called a *lived theology*, for if theology is the contemplation of God, then monastic theology is devoted to the disciplines which nurture that contemplation—disciplines like *lectio divina*, or holy reading. Derived from the earlier cenobitic tradition, *lectio divina* denotes an ascent towards illumination, or wisdom, through a programme of attentive reading (*lectio*), reflection (*meditatio*), vocal or mental prayer (*oratio*), and attentive stillness (*contemplatio*). In the first two states, the reader occupies a mode of awareness, *cogitatio*, broadly equivalent to Aristotle's mode of sense perception, in which they are preoccupied with curiosity, restless mental activity, and passions. At this level, the mind processes images which become, as Ienje van't Spijker states, 'free-floating thoughts'.[13] When the mind wants to ascend, it concentrates on these thoughts, an act which Richard of St Victor defines as 'the eager exertion of the mind which affectionately tries to investigate something'.[14] Finally, *contemplatio* engages the mind in a free gazing onto divine manifestations, with a kind of

[10] Rosemary Ann Lees, *The Negative Language of the Dionysian School of Mystical Theology: An Approach to the Cloud of Unknowing*, Analecta Cartusiana 107, 2 vols. (Salzburg: Institut für Anglistik und Amerikanistik, Universität Salzburg, 1983), vol. 1, pp. 279, 286.
[11] *The Cloud of Unknowing*, ed. by Patrick J. Gallacher, TEAMS Middle English Texts (Kalamazoo, MI: Medieval Institute Publications, 1997), available at: <d.lib.rochester.edu> [accessed 2 April 2020].
[12] Hugh of Balma, quoted in Peter Tyler, *The Return to the Mystical: Ludgwig Wittgenstein, Teresa of Avila, and the Christian Mystical Tradition* (London and New York: Continuum, 2011), p. 96, emphasis added.
[13] Ienje van't Spijker, *Fictions of the Inner Life. Religious Literature and Formation of the Self in the Eleventh and Twelfth Century* (Brepols: Turnhout, 2004), p. 145.
[14] 'Meditatio vero est studiosa mentis intentio circa aliquid investigandum diligenter insistens […]'. Richardi a Sancto Victore, *De gratia contemplationis libri quinque occasione accepta ab arca Moysis et o beam rem hactenus dictum Benjamin Maior*, in *Opera Omnia*, ed. by Jacques-Paul Migne, Patrologia Latina 196 (Paris: Migne, 1855), cols. 63–202B (col. 67).

astonishment or admiration—*admiratio,* in Richard's terms—which, as Karl Baier writes, 'expands the established horizon of understanding (it is *supra aestimationem* as Richard says)'.[15]

Admiratio again derives from Aristotle, who in his *Metaphysics* argues that the state of *wonder* is the root cause of all epistemological enquiry: 'it is through *wonder* that men now begin and originally began to philosophize'.[16] The state of wonder is contingent upon the wonderer's acknowledgment of their lack of knowledge: 'he who wonders and is perplexed feels that he is ignorant (thus the myth-lover is in a sense a philosopher, since myths are composed of wonders)', writes Aristotle.[17] But while for Aristotle wonder is the maternal agent of thought, a mystification which, through its natural coupling with critical enquiry, labours and gives birth to the *epistēmē,* the experience of wonder in the apophatic tradition is transfigurative in its capacity to reach beyond such positivist realms. Mary-Jane Rubenstein has written of this difference: 'Aristotelian thaumazein [wonder], one might say, seeks the very resolution that Socratic thaumazein struggles to resist; for, all the way up the ontological chain, causal knowledge gradually replaces the very wonder that sets it in motion. In the words of the early seventeenth-century mechanician Simon Stevinus, "*Wonder en is gheen wonder*"—(the) wonder is no longer (a) wonder'.[18] This is not to say, Rubenstein clarifies, that wonder precludes investigative thinking, rather that there is an 'irreducible difference between a rigorous, investigative thinking that sustains wonder's strangeness and a rigorous, investigative thinking that endeavours to assimilate that strangeness'.[19] She continues: 'To the extent that thinking remains with wonder, it is not inimical to all propositions, but rather keeps propositions *provisional, open-ended, and incomplete*': 'Wonder', Rubenstein argues, 'wonders at wonder'.[20] This is a kind of 'groundless awe', or apophatic indeterminacy which, for Rubenstein, 'can either be inquisitively endured or it can be covered over with unquestionable premises and conclusions that obstruct further inquiry'.[21]

In chapter two, I touched on the effect of this *admiratio* or wonder on the self, outlining the concomitant wounding of the subject in the state of beholding. This self-empyting 'I-Thou'

[15] Karl Baier, 'Meditation and Contemplation in High to Late Medieval Europe', in *Yogic Perception, Meditation and Altered States of Consciousness*, ed. by Eli Franco (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften), pp. 325–49 (p. 328).
[16] Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, pp. 12–13, 1.2.982b9–10, emphasis added.
[17] *Ibid*.
[18] Mary-Jane Rubenstein, *Strange Wonder: The Closure of Metaphysics and the Opening of Awe* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), p. 13, emphasis in original.
[19] *Ibid*, p. 8.
[20] *Ibid*, emphasis added.
[21] *Ibid*, p. 23.

engagement does not obstruct or close off the individual to further wonder, but instead perpetuates the condition of *admiratio* by opening up the self-conscious mind to the mysteries of the deep mind, rendering it porous to the world and to others. It is, in phenomenological terms, a leap out of inauthenticity and into the perspective of *Angst*, or authentic understanding. As I demonstrated, however, the individual can either attempt to assimilate their unhomelike situation, returning to homelikeness without any sustained transfiguration of the self, or they can attempt to *sustain* their projection into authenticity: to 'sustain wonder's strangeness', in Rubenstein's terms. This is not to say that the *unhomelikeness* of the encounter must be sustained, rather the *authentic understanding* which has accompanied it. That is, the individual must re-enter the world with a perspective which interrogates their ontological condition such that it prevents them from slipping back into average everydayness. I defined this as the re-entrance into being in the thick sense, or genuine authenticity, a phenomenological process which does not provide a means to epistemological truth or certitude, but offers an engaged and understanding *way to be.* The self is encouraged to unfurl and become porous, opening itself up to the multiplicity (and limitations) of human existence. Glossing this process phenomenologically serves to underscore the open-endedness of the contemplative epistemology, which understands holy wisdom as inevitably incomplete until the beatific vision itself; an idea contingent on the penultimacy of human perception within the eschatological timeline. That is, the idea that human logic or rational interpretation is constrained by its earthly bounds, and thus fundamentally inadequate to reach divine truth, which Julian calls our 'blindhede'. Visionary experience is therefore fundamentally experimental, if we define *experimentum* as *experientia quaesita,* a seeking out of further knowledge; or *fides quaerens intellectum*. In this revised epistemological model, *experientia* and *experimentum* exist in a circular and mutually-generative relationship; one does not provide closure on the other. Instead, the tantalising ineffability of the divine revelation leads the visionary into further enquiry, worship, or 'beseking', to use Julian's term—a lifelong project which is never complete, 'begunne' but 'not yet performid'.[22]

b) 'Beseking' and 'Beholding': The Hermeneutic Circle

Maggie Ross has outlined the relationship between what I have broadly defined as *experientia* and *experimentum*—direct, pre-cognitive revelatory experience and their secondary interpretation—in her two epistemologies concerning contemplation (Appendix 1). Ross traces the concept of visionary experience through ancient and medieval texts, defining it as the moment

[22] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 132.

of conflation of two different epistemologies, from two points of view of the mind: the self-conscious mind (the left side of the diagram) and the deep mind (the right side of the diagram). I have also been referring to this intermittently in modern cognitive terms, as left brain and right brain activity. The left side is, according to Ross, what keeps people 'trapped in the virtual and noisy world of self-consciousness', the part of the mind in which experiences are interpreted (as experimental). The right side or deep mind is where—for lack of self-consciousness—revelation 'irrupts' as continual *excessus mentis*.[23] This side, Ross writes, 'is not directly accessible': 'it can be influenced primarily by intention, paradox, and resonance'.[24] The epistemological 'chasm' which exists between the two is bridged only by *faith*. Just as we may not know our own worthiness, we cannot know God: we must instead reach with the spiritual senses, to 'fele' him with what René Tixier calls the 'groping hand of a trusting love'.[25] Citing Jean Gerson's definition of contemplation, Ross describes this process as a movement from i) engagement with divine love, which is apophatic, to ii) experimental knowledge, which is interpretation of the traces this apophatic engagement has left, and iii) to the understanding that contemplation requires the '*relinquishing all claims to experience*'.[26] This process precipitates an opening up of the self-conscious mind to the deep mind, facilitating circulation between the two: an act of beholding, a term which (as I wrote in chapter two), refers to the paradox of grasping and ungrasping; the 'en-Christing' process, or the dissipation of the self into co-wounding with Christ. Beholding signals, Ross states, 'the threshold of contemplation, where the self-conscious mind stops analysing and becomes attentively receptive, open in an ungrasping and self-emptying way to irruption from the deep mind'.[27] Through the act of beholding, the mental processes of the interpretative mind are prevented from becoming 'too abstract, linear, and schematised', drawing them out of causality into what Ross calls 'the boundless present'.[28]

Beholding is therefore *experiential* only in apophatic terms: an engagement with divinity which is beyond the principles of earthbound knowledge or ratiocination. It is, Ross shows, located at the fissure, or the 'between' of ordinary and extraordinary perception; at the 'point of coincidence' between willing and unwilling, desire and the giving up of desire. It resides in the negative space between moments of consciousness; the point of stillness at which one thought ends and another begins. In this sense, beholding *displaces* experience—it stands in opposition to *experience*—

[23] Ross, 'Behold Not The Cloud of Experience', pp. 34–35.
[24] *Ibid*, pp. 33, n. 13.
[25] Tixier, 'Games of Love in *The Cloud of Unknowing*', p. 244.
[26] Ross, 'Behold Not The Cloud of Experience', p. 39, emphasis in original.
[27] *Ibid*, pp. 29–30.
[28] *Ibid*.

because such engagement with the activity of the divine spirit resides in the deep mind, which is otherwise inaccessible. It is only *experienced* in self-conscious terms when it is over: when the revelatory activities are processed as effects in the left mind, where they undergo interpretation.[29] This left side of the mind assimilates these irruptions as *experimental* knowledge: the retrospective interpretation of the traces left by the apophatic engagement.[30] As Ross reminds us, this left side of the mind is how we interpret the world, a self-conscious exercise which is 'good and necessary' but which is also 'always distorted': 'experience is *always* interpretation, and as such it must *always* be provisional'.[31] Experience, Ross writes, is the 'enigmatic mirror' through which one perceives phenomena, while in beholding one 'sees face to face'.[32] By assimilating these traces, the self-conscious mind is subsequently recentred in the deep mind, to which it strives to return, 'so that ordinary daily life draws on its wellspring of silence and trans-figuration'.[33] We might understand this 'wellspring' theologically as the endless supply of God's prevenient grace, the grace which comes before the individual even decides to engage in seeking, and which facilitates conversion.

Julian's *Revelation* evinces the gradual relinquishing of her self-conscious, intellectual mind for a simpler, more intuitive way of knowing based on her beholding of God. This movement is charted through the failure of her brief attempts at questioning God about worldly matters: I have already referred to the moment when, in chapter eleven, Julian deploys the *quaestio* and *disputatio* of the scholastic *epistēmē*, asking 'What is synne?'.[34] She follows this enquiry with qualifications of what she knows to be true: 'I saw truly that God doth althing be it never so litil. And I saw truly that nothing is done be happe ne be aventure, but althing be the foreseing wisedome of God'.[35] She navigates conditionals—'If it be happe or adventure'—and deduces a firm conclusion: 'Wherefore me behovith […]'.[36] Just as with the scholastics, when *disputatio* would take place as philosophical dialogue between master and student, this dialectic examines a statement based on reason and authority.[37] In Julian's case, however, her question concerning the nature of sin has no rational solution: upon asking God after the blameworthiness of sinners, and

[29] *Ibid*, p. 38.
[30] *Ibid*, p. 39.
[31] *Ibid*, emphasis in original.
[32] *Ibid*, p. 41.
[33] *Ibid*, p. 34.
[34] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 17.
[35] *Ibid*.
[36] *Ibid*, pp. 17–18.
[37] Cf. Bernardo Bazán, John Wippel, Gérard Fransen, and Danielle Jacquart, eds., *Les Questions Disputées et Les Questions Quodlibétiques dans les Facultés de Théologie, de Droit et de Médecine* (Turnhout: Brepols, 1985), p. 40.

receiving an answer that God assigns 'no more blame than if we were as clene as holy as angelys be in hevyn', she remains 'in onknowyng', just as the servant—as Adam—is 'blinded in his reason and stonyed in his mend' after the fall.[38] In chapter thirty-five, too, Julian desires to know whether 'a certeyn creature that I lovid if it shuld continu in good lyvyng', and she is told to 'Take it generally, and behold the curtesy of the lord God as he shewith to the; for it is mor worship to God to behold hym in al than in any special thyng'.[39] Julian is instructed to *behold* the showings of God—to enter into the self-forgetting contemplative mode fuelled by the deep mind—rather than to dwell in the preoccupations of her self-conscious, worldly perspective.

Julian navigates this epistemological process using the hermeneutic markers of 'beseking' and 'beholding', which can be mapped onto Ross's diagram in a cyclical relationship: the self-conscious mind—through 'beseking'—makes the subject receptive to deep mind *excessus mentis*—'beholding'—the traces of which are at once assimilated back into the self-conscious mind. Denys Turner describes this in terms of the distinction between contemplation and prayer, which, he writes, 'differ from and relate to one another in ways that parallel the relationship between the timelessness of vision and the temporality of our historical condition': these are, in Turner's words, positioned in the 'eschatological "not yet"' and the 'eschatological "now"'.[40] Moving from one to the other—seeking towards beholding—is a process of distillation, whereby the soul is continually refined through direction and redirection of attention and action. The soul is concentrated on God, who is at the center of this circle: in the 'poynte', in Julian's terms.[41] Anna Maria Reynolds has argued that Julian's metaphor of God 'in a poynte' comes from the pseudo-Dionysian comparison of God as the centre of a circle where all the radii meet.[42] Wolfgang Riehle, meanwhile, points out that this concept for expressing God's infiniteness dates back to antiquity: he quotes Eckhart, who says that the soul which has left all things behind it throws itself 'in das punt des zirkels'.[43]

Julian's contemplative epistemology might, therefore, be described as a hermeneutic circle; that principle which traditionally refers to the interpretative interdependence, within any meaningful

[38] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, pp. 71, 73.
[39] *Ibid*, pp. 47–48.
[40] Denys Turner, *Julian of Norwich, Theologian* (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 2011), p. 141.
[41] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 17.
[42] Anna Maria Reynolds, 'Some Literary Influences in the *Revelations* of Julian of Norwich', p. 24.
[43] Wolfgang Riehle, *The Middle English Mystics*, trans. by Bernard Standring (London, Boston, MA and Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981), p. 83.

structure, between parts of that structure and its whole.[44] For Heidegger, however, this circular structure figures as a central aspect of the existential constitution of Dasein, which he understood to be both presuppositional and projective: 'This circle of understanding is […] the expression of the existential *fore-structure* of Dasein itself'.[45] This ontological specification clears up one of the major criticisms levelled at this concept: of epistemological closure or holism. Judith Shklar, for example, has argued that the interpretative 'movement back and forth' between parts and whole need not have a center: 'The hermeneutic circle makes sense only if there is a known closed whole'.[46] She cites the Bible as the only text 'which can be understood in terms of its own parts and which has as its core God, who is its anchor and creator […] It is the only possibly wholly self-sufficient text'.[47] In Julian's case, as shown above, her circular epistemology positions God as the 'zero point reference' of the circle, but does not insist on the *known*ness of this whole. For Julian, the 'point' of the circle of contemplation is not so much to reach the center—to reach the point—as the dynamic revolutions effected by the process itself, which (in its very nature as cyclical) is never completed. Beholding will always lead back to seeking, and seeking may never lead to beholding. '[S]ekyng', Julian writes, 'is *as good as* beholdyng': 'It is God wille that we seke him to the beholdyng of him, for be that he shall shew us himselfe of his special grace whan he wil'.[48]

Julian's circle of contemplation is therefore as ontological as much as epistemological, where to engage in seeking is an *existential* aspect of the soul's being. This idea dates back to Aristotle, who viewed the soul *as* its capacity: to be capable of something, in Aristotle's theory, is to actively strive towards it, *finding being in this striving*.[49] Husserl's theory of intentionality appropriates this idea, suggesting that to be conscious is to be directed towards the world in

[44] Philologist Friedrich Ast wrote of this as 'The foundational law of all understanding and knowledge', in *Grundlinien der Grammatik, Hermeneutik und Kritik* (Landshut: Jos. Thomann, Buchdrucker und Buchhändler, 1808), p. 178.
[45] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, §31, emphasis in original.
[46] Judith N. Shklar, 'Squaring the Hermeneutic Circle' [1986], *Social Research* 71.3 (2004), 655–78 (p. 657). Heidegger determines what is 'pre-known' in terms of 'fore-having' (*Vorhabe*), 'fore-sight' (*Vorsicht*), and 'fore-conception' (*Vorgriff*), but these a priori categories do not have the fixed or formal character of theoretical *knowledge*: they are, instead, precognitive presuppositions. For more on Heidegger's epistemology, see Merold Westphal, 'Hermeneutics as Epistemology', in *Overcoming Onto-Theology: Towards a Postmodern Christian Faith* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2001), pp. 47–74.
[47] *Ibid*, pp. 657–58.
[48] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 16, emphasis added.
[49] Aristotle, *On the Soul. Parva Naturalia. On Breath*, Loeb Classical Library 288, trans. by Walter Stanley Hett, rev. ed. (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1957), pp. 68–73, 412a20-413a11.

'acts'.[50] He calls this our 'natural attitude', to which we do not pay attention in our everyday being-in-the-world: it is *non-conscious*. When we engage in a phenomenological reduction, however, we reveal what is otherwise transparent; we pay attention to it, making it conscious. For Julian, the revelation would be the soul's natural (as in primordial) directedness toward, and ontological union with, God. Julian's hermeneutic circle facilitates this disclosure: when we engage in seeking, we are drawn out of linear time—out of the natural attitude of protention and retention—into the boundlessness of the present, and possibly into beholding. Essentially, in seeking towards beholding we become aware of the mode of our own existence: of our existence *qua* existence. Seeking towards beholding, then, can be understood within the phenomenological model as the aspiration towards authentic understanding, as defined in the previous chapter, a manner of being-towards-God which Julian describes as the 'wey' of Christ. It is, then, a kind of phenomenological reduction, which doesn't so much *reduce* the soul as expand it, thereby fulfilling its ontological capacity.

In Augustine's version of the *capax Dei* paradigm, the soul's capacity to receive God is compared to a leather purse, which is, as Raby summarises, 'stretched by desire when God withholds what he wants to see. Augustine urges his audience to stretch their own purses so that they might increase their capacity to receive God'.[51] To this end, Augustine cites Paul: 'I have forgotten what is behind, I have stretched out [*extentus*] to what is ahead, in accord with the plan [*secendum intentionem*] I pursue the victory of my lofty calling'.[52] This recalls Julian's statement that 'man goyth vppe ryght and the soule of his body is sparyde [closed] as a purse fulle feyer'.[53] This passage is common to both the Paris and Westminster manuscripts, but does not appear in the other witnesses to the long text. Scholars have emphasised the various theological possibilities contained within this particular section.[54] Cristina Cervone has called this excerpt the '"soule" crux', on account of the contention among scholars about the interpretation of Julian's use of the term 'soule'.[55] Colledge and Walsh, Cervone points out, established a tradition of translating

[50] Husserl, quoted in Svenaeus, *The Hermeneutics of Medicine*, pp. 75–78.
[51] Raby, 'The Phenomenology of Attention', p. 353.
[52] Augustine of Hippo, *The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century, Homilies on the First Epistle of John* (Tractatus in Epistolam Joannis ad Parthos), trans. and ser. ed. by Boniface Ramsey, ed. by Daniel E. Doyle and Thomas Martin (New York: New City Press, 2008), p. 70, XXIX.6. Cf. Phil. 3:12–14. As the editors note, Augustine's Latin for this passage pairs the verb *extend* and the noun *intentio*, which are related.
[53] Quoted from Barratt, '"In the Lowest Part of our Need"', p. 253, emphasis added. Cf. Watson and Jenkins, *Writings*, pp. 143, 420.
[54] E.g. Liz Herbert McAvoy, '"… a purse fulle feyer": Feminising the Body in Julian of Norwich's *A Revelation of Love*', *Leeds Studies in English* n.s. 33 (2002), 99–113.
[55] Cristina Maria Cervone, 'The "Soule" Crux in Julian of Norwich's *A Revelation of Love*', *The Review of*

'soule' as 'cooked, digested food', and thus as a description of excretion.[56] Watson and Jenkins agree, writing that '"soule" is probably a spelling of "saule"/"sawlee" (French *saulee*), food or meal, a common word in late Middle English. The "purse" is then the bowel, and "nescessery" excretion'.[57] Julian's image is a dynamic one of openings and closings, iterating the continual adjustment of this 'soule' entity as it is tightened and made slack: 'it is openyde and sparyde ayen fulle honestly'.[58] This motion does indeed evoke the physiology of the body, as Katie Walter points out.[59] But Julian would surely have been alive to a double image here: of the purse as *the soul*'s capacity expanding and contracting, as much as the body's. I subsequently propose that this passage is a subtle pun, referring both to bodily *and* soul functions, in accordance with Julian's integrated and holistic understanding of the body-soul relationship.

Cervone comes closest to this interpretation, reading 'soule' in the more traditional sense of 'spirit'.[60] She maintains, however, that the 'purse' describes the fleshly body, which is opened and closed again to let out the soul at the moment of death, referring by way of example to Julian's image in chapter sixty-four, in which she describes our being taken from pain and into the joy of heaven:

> And in this tyme I saw a body lyand on the erth, which body shewid hevy and ogyley, withoute shappe and forme as it were a bolned quave of styngand myre. And sodenly out of this body sprang a ful fair creature, a little childe full shapen and formid, swifie [Paris: swyft] and lively, whiter than lilly, which sharpely glode up onto hevyn. And the bolnehede of the body betokenith gret wretchidnes of our dedly flesh, and the littlehede of the child betokenith the clenes of purity in the soule.[61]

In this passage, we see the end of the soul's enclosure within the body: releasing it from earth into heaven, God's compassion takes the soul out of the pain and suffering intrinsic to earthly living (rather than taking pain away from humanity). Cervone argues that this is the same image Julian is invoking in chapter six. Yet if we read the purse *as* the soul—that is, the unified experience of the body *and* soul (the lived experience of the individual, in phenomenological terms)—the meaning of this passage is rather different. Just as the stomach spends its lifetime in motion—

English Studies 55.219 (2004), 151–56.
[56] *Ibid*, p. 151.
[57] Watson and Jenkins, eds., *Writings*, p. 142, n. to ll. 29–31.
[58] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 138, n. 15.
[59] Katie L. Walter, *Middle English Mouths: Late Medieval Medical, Religious and Literary Traditions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), pp. 55–56.
[60] Cervone, 'The "Soule" Crux', p. 155.
[61] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 105.

receiving, expanding, digesting, absorbing, and contracting—the implication is that the soul also moves constantly. If it moves in the direction of God, it engages in a being-towards-God which, as we have seen, facilitates homelike being-in-the-world, and beholding. This process is one of *orientation* and *reorientation*, a transcending-returning structure (turning and re-turning) as much as a journey forward or backward: a coming home.

c) Knowing as Being: Julian's Ontology

By conceptualising the contemplative process as a hermeneutic circle, we begin to understand the ways in which Julian configures 'seeking towards beholding' as an existential mode. That is, how the process of seeking God is part of our innate existence as human beings: a *being*-towards-God. Julian's focus is on the possibilities available for knowing God on earth, *in this life*, an epistemology which rejects a Neoplatonic spirituality of ascent in favour of an incarnational spirituality, wherein 'redemption is a redemption of this life, not a redemption from it', in the words of Simon Tugwell.[62] Julian's contemplative mode is both affective and cognitive; a holistic epistemology which incorporates our human, earthly experiences—the self-conscious *experiments* of the intellect—with apophatic contemplation. The entirety of human nature is focused in 'beseking'. As Gillespie points out, beholding 'does *not* demand the "sacrifice" of reason in the sense of its denial', even while demanding us 'to give up the illusion of our activity and initiative'.[63] This aligns with my analysis of beholding as a homelike and authentic state of being; a condition which requires rational engagement of the existentials thought *and* feeling for the subject to successfully find themselves in the world. Yet in order to fully comprehend how this epistemology functions, we must also understand Julian's anthropological model, which outlines *how* our souls have the capacity to engage in successful 'beseking' and 'beholding' of God. This leads Julian to some rather radical conclusions about sin, predestination, and the universal possibility for the salvation of the elect—and, consequently, to how we might pursue this redemption by reunifying our fragmented soul to wholeness, attaining a genuinely authentic state of existence.

Julian's anthropology is rooted in the doctrine of mutual indwelling, a principle which allows that knowledge of God will be achieved by means of self-knowledge, and vice versa. Knowing God,

[62] Simon Tugwell, *Ways of Imperfection: An Exploration of Christian Spirituality* (London: Templegate, 1985), p. 201.
[63] Gillespie,'"[S]he do the police"', p. 194, emphasis in original.

Julian writes, is in fact easier than knowing ourselves, since God is closer to us than our own created souls:

> And thuss I saw full sekirly that it is ridier to us to cum to the knowyng of God than to knowen our owne soule; for our soule is so deepe groundid in God, and so endlesly tresorid, that we may not cum to the knowing therof till we have first knowing of God, which is the maker to whom it is onyd.[64]

In regards to knowing ourselves, Julian believes that 'we may never full know ourselfe into the laste poynte; in which poynte this passend life and manner of peyne and wo shall have an end'.[65] Julian's invocation of the 'poynte' image once again points to the contemplative movement inward, which will never reach its conclusion. But if our soul—indeed, our very being—is grounded in God, then the means to achieve divine wisdom and union is to reconnect with this source; with our fundamental and primordial divine aspect. This involves reconfiguring our self-conscious mind away from solipsistic 'self-beholding', 'of ourselfe and of our synnes'. 'Ourselfe', as in our self as we experience it in the everyday; the thinking, *cogito* self which stands objectively over and against the world. The individual must accept the limitations of the thinking self which is usually preoccupied with its average everydayness, as Heidegger calls it. In theological terms, this preoccupation is what leads the self into sin, which has warped our reason and led us into 'blindhede'. Julian exhorts her reader to instead look to a more experiential kind of knowledge; experiential in the sense of *existential*, as in *ontological*. She asks us to enquire into the nature of our being.

This concept of 'knowing as being' is dependent on Julian's incarnational anthropology, which is grounded in the atemporal eschatological timeline. Julian sees the soul in two parts at the point of creation: 'our kynde substance', which is overseen by God, who keeps it 'in hym, hoole and save without end'; and the 'changeabil sensualyte', which is judged by 'man', and which is 'shewyth outward'.[66] This distinction does not, importantly, conflate to a spirit/body dichotomy. Rather, our 'substance' is the 'heyer parte' of the soul, which is always in God, while our 'sensualite' refers to our specifically human, time-bound experience of the world, which limits our perception of God's loving nature and eschatological plan.[67] Julian writes that we are 'made sensual' when

[64] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 89.
[65] *Ibid*, p. 64.
[66] *Ibid*, p. 63.
[67] *Ibid*, p. 94.

our soul is 'inspirid into our body', a 'knitting' of these two parts together.[68] She understands that this fragmentariness puts us in constant danger of receding into the self ('beholding of ourselfe'), towards sin and away from God: 'And thus in our substance we arn full, and in our sensualite we faylyn'.[69] The 'sensualite' is, however, redeemed and reunited with the 'substance' by the grace and goodness of God, which fulfils his nature through the incarnation of Christ on earth: 'The heyer part was on in peace with God in full ioy and bliss; the lower partie, which is sensualite, suffrid for the salvation of mankynd'.[70] The incarnation grounds and roots (to use Julian's terms) our earthly experience with the divine, and the soul is 'restorid be grace': 'for he [God] is ground in whom our soule stondith and he is mene that kepith the substance and the sensualite to God [Paris: to geder] so that thai shall never departyn'.[71] Julian's final showing concludes this ontological schema, as she witnesses with her 'gostly eye' Jesus sitting within her soul, which is 'so large as it were an endles world and as it were a blisfull kyngdom'.[72] This kingdom, she perceives, is the site of our 'endles wonyng' with the Trinity—'wonyng' as in *oneing* but also 'wonen', *to dwell*. The showing thus reiterates her conception of the Trinity as 'our moder in whom we arn al beclosid', an enclosure which is paralleled by God's enclosure within us.[73]

Critics have pointed to the implicit allusions of Julian's indwelling doctrine to the teachings of St John the Evangelist, who similarly understood our relationship with God as one of reciprocal dwelling: 'Whoever confesses Jesus to be the Son of God, God dwells in him'.[74] Grace Jantzen cites the paradox from John's Gospel, 'Abide in me and I in you', which she observes also occupies an important place in Pauline writings, with their emphasis on 'Christ in you' and 'you in Christ'.[75] This chiastic structure is rendered by Julian in a similarly reflective syntactical triad of 'beclosings': 'We arn beclosid in the Fadir, and we arn beclosid in the Son, and we arn beclosid in the Holy Gost; and the Fader is beclosid in us, and the Son is beclosid in us, and the Holy Gost is beclosid in us'.[76] The doctrine of indwelling does not, therefore, describe the momentary irruption or *excessus mentis* of visionary beholding. Rather, in*dwelling* denotes a constant presence: a 'lasting oneness-of-being', as Riehle describes it.[77] 'From this', writes

[68] *Ibid*, pp. 88, 85.
[69] *Ibid*, p. 91.
[70] *Ibid*, p. 89.
[71] *Ibid*, p. 90.
[72] *Ibid*, p. 109.
[73] *Ibid*, p. 87.
[74] Quoted in Walsh, 'God's Homely Loving', p. 167.
[75] Grace Jantzen, *Julian of Norwich*, p. 139.
[76] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 87.
[77] Wolfgang Riehle, *The Secret Within: Hermits, Recluses, and Spiritual Outsiders in Medieval England*,

Riehle, 'stems Julian's view that epistemological knowledge is strongly rooted in the corporeal, and indeed starts from the body, if not entirely, then to a considerable degree'.[78] That is to say, this ontological structure provides the *basis* for the contemplative epistemology outlined above: for our ability to direct ourselves towards God on earth. Framing our soul and body as a unified seat of divine indwelling, Julian's ontological framework uplifts our lived, human experience as the foundation of our connection to the Trinity.

Julian's theodical enquiry about the nature of sin and suffering is inseparable from this anthropological schema, for it is on account of her ontological structure of the soul that she determines the possibility for *choosing* a life of love—for choosing God—over sin. Julian outlines the nature of this free choice in her account of the thirteenth revelation, in which she explains the nature of the will in the souls of the elect. This will is made up of two parts: the 'godly will' and the 'beastly will', which respectively denote our innate inability to choose anything *but* goodness and love, and our tendency to bury this connection to God beneath our failings of love, our sins:

> For in every soule that shal be savid is a godly wil that never assentid to synne ne never shal; ryth as there is a bestly will in the lower party that may [w]illen [Paris: wylle] no good, ryth so ther is a godly will in the heyer party, which will is so good that it may never willen yll but ever good […].[79]

Denise Baker has noted various theological precedents for this concept of the 'godly will', writing of it as 'the nexus between Julian's theodicy and her anthropology', the mechanism with which she develops her optimistic theology of predestination.[80] Baker makes a particularly productive comparison between Julian's schema and the Bernardian framework of free will, which was taken up by Bernard's friend and mentee, William of St Thierry.[81] Bernard, Baker writes, moved the *imago Dei* from the mind (as in Augustinian theology) to the will 'in order to indicate, as Bernard McGinn explains, that "freedom, understood in its most general form as the absence of external coercion, is the inalienable characteristic of the human person as human"'.[82] Baker compares Julian's beastly and godly wills with Bernard's '*liberum arbitrium* (free choice)',

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trans. by Charity Scott-Stokes (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 2014), p. 222.
[78] *Ibid*.
[79] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 51.
[80] Denise N. Baker, 'The Structure of the Soul and the "Godly Wylle" in Julian of Norwich's *Showings*', in *MMTE VII*, pp. 37–49; Denise N. Baker, *Julian of Norwich's Showings: From Vision to Book* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 75.
[81] Baker, *Julian of Norwich's Showings*, pp. 76–79.
[82] Bernard McGinn, quoted in Baker, *Julian of Norwich's Showings*, p. 117.

which is 'freedom from necessity, the essential condition of humankind both before and after the Fall' and *'liberum consilium* (free counsel), lost by Adam but restored by Christ', which 'enables the elect to refrain from sin'.[83] For Bernard, the grace of God 'acts as the intermediary between these two parts of the will for the elect': 'True, we cannot be completely without sin or sorrow here on earth', he writes, 'but we can, with the help of grace, avoid being overcome either by sin or sorrow'.[84] This is the nature of prevenient grace, that illumination of the Holy Spirit which is endlessly available, and which precedes the free determination of the will.

Both Bernard's and Julian's models enable the soul to refrain from sin and thus pursue beholding *in this life*. However, Baker rightly distinguishes between Bernard's 'affective, operational union of willing and loving', and Julian's 'essential or ontological union between God and the soul'.[85] For Julian, we are only separate from God in terms of the difference between creator and created: an ontological, rather than moral, distinction. Julian describes this separation in terms of 'likeness' and 'unlikeness': since her theology of mutual indwelling understands the 'substance' as remaining always within God (and God within it), to redirect the soul towards the 'substance' is to redirect it towards the divine. Julian writes, for example, of how prayer 'onyth the soule to God', since 'thow the soule be *ever lyke to God in kynde and substance*, restorid be grace, it is often *onlyke* in condition be synne on manys partye'.[86] Julian here presents prayer as part of the mode of seeking, the intentional being-towards-God which will enact this reunion of 'sensualite' and 'kindly substance', redeeming unlikeness to likeness.[87] By consistently configuring God and 'substance' as *alike* 'in kynde'—as 'kindly'—Julian suggests that this part of ourselves is innately, naturally divine. Indeed, we might read Julian's use of 'kindly' as referring to the ontology of our soul, its essential nature which is never separate from God: Julian sees no difference between God and man ('I saw no difference atwix God and our substance, but as it were al God'), and equates the soul's created 'substance' with the divine, who is its 'kindly ground'.[88] This is not, however, an ontology of indistinction. Julian remains committed to the Augustinian tradition, and is careful to distinguish between creator and created: 'and yet myn vnderstandyng toke that oure substance is in God: that is to sey, that God is God, and oure substance is a creture in God'.[89] The soul is *made* of substance but from *nothing made*, united to

[83] *Ibid*, p. 117, emphasis in original.
[84] Bernard of Clairvaux, quoted in *ibid*, p. 117.
[85] *Ibid*, p. 118.
[86] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 60, emphases added.
[87] *Ibid*, p. 64.
[88] *Ibid*, pp. 87, 91.
[89] *Ibid*, p. 87.

God who is *unmade* ('substantial kynd onmade') in its creation.[90] The body, meanwhile, is not 'like' God in its creation because it is *made* from the already created earth: 'And thus I vnderstond that mannys soule is made of nought, that is to sey, it is made, but of nought that is made, as thus; whan God shuld make mans body he tooke the slyppe of erth, which is a matter medlid and gaderid of all bodily things, and therof he made mannys bodye; but to the makyng of manys soule he wold take ryte nought, but made it'.[91] Our experience of the body—our soul's 'sensualite'—is only united to God through Christ's incarnation, and is, therefore, more likely to lead us away from God and into sin.

Julian's ontology therefore positions all aspects of the soul as integral to the process of 'beseking' and 'beholding'. Since Christ has redeemed the 'sensualite', nothing need be suppressed within the soul for us to reunite with God, only *reoriented* away from sin and towards the 'substance'. In Ross's diagram, she describes this as a 'turning away from the distractions of experience and their noise […] continually choosing to "seke [him] to the beholding"'.[92] This holistic enterprise engages both sides of the mind outlined in the circular epistemology, which are fused together in a transactional and mutually-affecting process. Indeed, Julian refers to 'reason *and* grace' as the motivational forces which exhort us to prayer.[93] By attaching the one to the other, Julian reiterates the requirement of the intellect in the cyclical epistemology of seeking and beholding: for Julian, 'our reason is *in God*'.[94] The exercise of seeking thus strips the soul's capacity of its worldly excesses, paring back its epistemological capabilities to a more intuitive, primordial kind of knowing. This is enacted using what Julian calls 'kindly reason' or 'manys reason natural' a ratiocinative capability which stands in contrast to our everyday postlapsarian reason, which has been rendered 'so blynd, so low and so symple'.[95] Julian does not, then, define our fallen state as hopeless. Instead, blindness or unknowing are simply points of departure for loving faith, with which we commit to the redirection of attention and action towards God.

This language of reorientation is more explicit in Sloane than in the Paris witness and the short version of Julian's text. In the latter two versions, Julian describes the soul as frail or

[90] *Ibid*, p. 85.
[91] *Ibid*.
[92] Ross, 'Behold Not The Cloud of Experience', p. 36.
[93] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 71, emphasis added.
[94] *Ibid*, p. 132, emphasis added.
[95] *Ibid*, p. 44.

'*unkunnynge*',[96] a term which can be related to 'understanding' as I have discussed it phenomenologically. By the time the Old English *cennan* (to know, to understand) and *cunnan* (to be able or to have power to) overlap into the Middle English *conne-*, the word refers to both possession of knowledge and of skill in an action, as in *can*.[97] 'Unkunnyng' thus reminds us of our defective state of fallen transcendence; that state of 'effortful striving' which makes it that much harder to re-attune ourselves and restore homelikeness. It also recalls our inherited, originary homelessness; the primordial *loss* of 'kunnyng' caused by the devil, who made use of his own cunning to induce mankind to sin.[98] The term thus rings through Freud's 'uncanny', the 'involuntary return to the same situation' (*unbeabsichtige Widerkehr*)—in this case, the situation being sin.[99] While 'unkunnyng' reminds us of the fall, however, Sloane directs attention to the possibility of change, with '*overcummyng*' in its place.[100] This variance agrees Sloane's abundant use of the *over-* prefix elsewhere (twenty-nine times overall). Meaning 'to pass over', 'to overturn', or to 'upset' something, 'overcummyng' could also denote the damage to our natural condition.[101] But instead of a simple *negation*, 'overcummyng' reads as an overlaying or *distortion* of our essential goodness: just as Christ's dying face is '*over*rede with drie blode', our will is 'overleyd' with worldly accretions.[102] Sloane's variance thus resonates with the turning and re-turning structure of Julian's epistemology, and with it Christ's redemptive words, 'Thou shalt not be overcome'. To 'seke him to the beholdyng' is, in this model, a seeking of our innately divine capacity; a coming *back* to ourselves with a genuinely authentic understanding of our nature and its relation to God. We have been brought low by the fall, but we remain in *imago Dei*: as Judith Lang writes, 'all that pertains to the soul of man is thus "kyndely", or natural, to man, as created by God, except sin, which is "unkynde"'.[103]

d) 'Kynde Knowyng'

Julian's contemplative mode thus focuses on the potential we have in this life for *knowing* and *reuniting* with God on earth, which can be glossed phenomenologically as authentic

[96] Windeatt, ed., *Revelations of Divine Love*, p. 22, emphasis added; Watson and Jenkins, eds., *Writings*, pp. 115, 265. This could indicate the Paris scribe's allegiance to the short text.
[97] MED, s.v. 'cŏnning', *ppl.* See also entries for 'kennen' and 'connan'.
[98] Genesis 3:1 describes the serpent in Eden as the most cunning—'more subtle [Latin: 'calliador', also 'cunning']'—of all the animals on earth.
[99] Freud, 'The Uncanny', p. 237.
[100] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 66, emphasis added.
[101] MED, s.v. 'overcŏmen', *v*.
[102] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, pp. 14, 66, emphasis added.
[103] Judith Lang, '"The Godly Wylle" in Julian of Norwich', *The Downside Review* 102.348 (1984), 163–73 (p. 167).

understanding—of the divine, and our divine nature—and homelike being-in-the-world. These conditions come together to constitute a life of *genuine authenticity*, whereby the individual has obtained authentic understanding and is then able to re-enter the world and act within it. 'Authenticity', as defined by the OED, refers to a condition 'of truthful correspondence between inner feelings and their outward expression': a fact or quality of 'being true', or 'real'.[104] This definition elucidates the phenomenological approach, which characterises the attainment of authentic understanding as the becoming aware of one's being, the ontological reality of their existence. In this section of the chapter, I will explore the concept of 'kynde' as the medieval counterpart to this phenomenological definition of authenticity. We find the term used in medieval epistemological discourses to refer to a specific form of experiential knowledge, which draws on the various associations of 'kynde' with nature and creation. More specifically, the collocation 'kynde knowyng' is used in contemporary literature to denote the entire cognitive and pre-cognitive process of knowing something by experience, not just in terms of affective knowledge—through loving—but knowledge gleaned through the act of *living*. This knowledge encompasses the full spectrum of existential experience, of love *and* its negation, sin; of 'wele and wo'. Julian encounters such 'knowyng' through experience for herself at the event of her sickness and revelation, which we have understood as the projection into unhomelikeness and authenticity. And while Julian does not explicitly use the term 'kynde *knowyng*', she does use the term 'kynde' or variations thereof almost eighty times in the long text. Indeed, the term features significantly in her anthropological schema, governing her understanding of the relationship between created and creator: since God is 'unmade kynd', and we are 'grounded in kynde', the act of seeking God is to seek 'kynde' and also to seek to know our divine nature. Seeking that which is 'kynde' is therefore equivalent to Julian's 'beseking', and to seeking authentic understanding, if beholding (and homelikeness, or wholeness) emerges out of authenticity. 'Kindenes' is therefore a useful hermeneutic for examining Julian's contemplative epistemology, particularly the ways in which Julian grounds our knowledge of God in lived experience; as both a *return* to our originary nature, and a move *forward* into redemption.

'Kynde', or 'kind', in medieval usage broadly refers to 'nature' or that which is 'natural'.[105] The term was widely used in the Middle Ages to denote both the natural order of the universe, as well as the natural disposition of human*kind*, with the etymological associations of 'kind' with 'kin' and 'kindred' invoking a sense of our species as a collective. The one definition informs the

[104] OED, s.v. 'authenticity', *n*.
[105] MED, s.v. 'kinde', *n.*

other, with 'kynde' in terms of the literal earth (nature) also invoking the animating *logos* of Genesis, which spoke *human nature* into existence. Alfred Kentigern Siewers points out that 'to the ancients, [earth] meant a realm including land and sea, ultimately planet *and* soil, native country *and* the dust of Genesis, from which humans were energized by God's breath, *pneuma*', which 'entwined the *logoi* of the speaking-into-being of Creation, in which *logos* could mean at once harmony, word, discourse, story, reason, and purpose'.[106] Rebecca Douglass also writes of the medieval concept of 'kind' as 'character', 'type', and also as 'everything'—'the amorphous mass of all matter'[107]—which Neil Evernden states was 'not simply a physical entity but a record of the will of God'.[108] These double meanings, of nature as object and as generative force—created and force of creation—are rooted in the Greek notion of *phusis* (Latin: *natura*), literally meaning 'beginning, coming to be', and which came to mean 'everything', as in the 'conceptual container for the universe'.[109] Classically, *phusis* denoted the principle of change, set against the immovable gods or mathematics, paving the way for the creator/created distinction that saw, in the Christian tradition, God as distinct from nature as an artist from his work, or parent from its child—a relationship borne out in Julian's distinction between 'unmade' God and our souls, which are in their 'kynde substance' 'made' of that which is 'unmade'.

We might, then, define Julian's use of 'kynde' as referring to the prelapsarian condition of humanity: its original state as it was created, prior to the intervention of humankind. As Douglass writes, the 'natural' generally refers to 'something untouched by the human'.[110] Julian's use of the term certainly invokes this kind of originary 'nature', her ontology of the soul referring to its condition at the point of creation: 'the blissed Trinite made mankinde to his image and to his likenes', 'knitt to God in the makyng'.[111] However, since Julian's understanding of the fall is that we have distorted, not destroyed, the image of God in our soul, she represents our 'nature' as fundamentally unchanged by our lapse into sin. This is not to say that Julian's theodicy is Pelagian: our 'substance' remains in God, but Julian acknowledges that we are dependent on Christ to redeem our 'sensualite', he who is, as the author of the fourteenth-century religious

[106] Alfred Kentigern Siewers, 'Earth: A Wandering', *Postmedieval* 4.1: *Ecomaterialism* (2013), 6–17 (p. 9, emphases in original).
[107] Rebecca Douglass, 'Ecocriticism and Middle English Literature', *Studies in Medievalism* 10 (1998), 136–63 (p. 145).
[108] Neil Evernden, *The Social Creation of Nature* (Baltimore, MD and London: John Hopkins University Press, 1992), p. 39.
[109] *Ibid*, p. 20.
[110] Douglass, 'Ecocriticism and Middle English Literature', p. 145.
[111] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, pp. 16, 91.

manual *Pore Caitif* writes, both God and man, 'perfitli double *kynde*'.[112] Indeed, Julian is explicit that 'the redemption and the ageyn byeng of mankynd is nedefull and spedefull in everything'.[113] As a result, Julian's contemplative schema offers re-attunement of the soul to its natural or authentic state, not in terms of a return to prelapsarianism—she acknowledges we will always sin—but in terms of a commitment to the transcending-returning cycle of contemplative seeking; of expanding the soul in its divine capacity. In other words, a commitment to the 'wey' of Christ I discussed in chapter two, since Christ is the archetype of 'kindness'—'*our kinde lord*'[114]—in whom is contained all the potential we possess for redemption. Julian's pursuit of 'kynde' does not, therefore, indicate a mystical ascent *out* of the world, but a reimmersion of ourselves *within* our own divine creatureliness.

This corresponds in many ways to William Langland's use of the term 'kynde knowyng' in *Piers Plowman* (c. 1370–1390), which has been glossed by some critics as natural knowing, the Thomistic type of knowledge deriving from sensation and intellection (the other type being revelatory knowledge).[115] Others read the term as a variant of divine wisdom, experiential knowledge, *sapientia*, or the Pauline concept of *gnosis*: Mary Davlin, for example, has observed that wisdom or *sapientia* had 'no fixed name' in the late fourteenth century, citing biblical translations of the term as 'knowyng' and similar variants.[116] 'Kynde knowyng' can feasibly be understood as a kind of affective knowledge, experienced through the will rather than the intellect: in Langland's allegory, Will (as in human will) seeks a more direct knowledge of God (Truthe) by passing through the intellective faculties of his soul and seeking God in nature (Kynde). The Tree of Charity is figured as the culmination of this journey, where Will pulls down the sapiential knowledge of its fruit, 'to assaien what sauour it hadde'.[117] Edward Vasta has gone one step further, reading this journey as a mystical ascent, assigning linear categories of contemplation to Will's quest for 'knowyng'.[118] Vasta defines Langland's 'kynde knowyng' as

[112] *The Pore Caitif, Edited from MS. Harley 2336, With Introduction and Notes*, ed. by Mary Teresa Brady, Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation (New York: Fordham University, 1954), p. 28, emphasis added.
[113] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 85.
[114] *Ibid*, p. 31, emphasis added.
[115] Michelle Karnes, 'Will's Imagination in *Piers Plowman*', *Journal of English and Germanic Philology* 108 (2009), 27–58; Nicolette Zeeman, Piers Plowman *and the Medieval Discourse of Desire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 3, 7, 20.
[116] Mary Clemente Davlin, '*Kynde Knowyng* as a Middle English Equivalent for "Wisdom" in *Piers Plowman* B', *Medium Ævum* 50 (1981), 5–17 (p. 8).
[117] William Langland, *Piers Plowman: The B Version*, ed. by George Kane and E. Talbot Donaldson, 2nd ed. (London: Athlone Press, 1988), p. 575, XVI.73–74. Cf. James Simpson, *Piers Plowman: An Introduction to the B-Text* (London: Longman, 1990), p. 190.
[118] Edward Vasta, *The Spiritual Basis of Piers Plowman*, Studies in English 18 (New York: Humanities Press, 1965), p. 92.

the point in contemplation at which the soul is deified by the Holy Spirit, identifying the term as a kind of revelation predicated upon love, rather than knowledge.[119] In a more persuasive reading, Davlin argues that the term incorporates *both* cognitive and experiential types of knowledge, pointing to Will's enquiry to Kynde as to which craft he should learn to achieve salvation. Kynde replies, 'Lerne to loue'.[120] James Simpson has subsequently conceived of Will's journey as a movement 'from reason to affective knowledge'.[121]

Hugh White also argues that 'kynde knowyng' is not *sapientia*, which is solely a theological form of knowledge, nor *scientia*, factual knowledge, but is 'a manner of knowing *various* things'.[122] This is a kind of 'experiential knowledge', White writes, but which is not confined to the experience of the *object* of knowledge.[123] It encapsulates rather the experience of the thing *and* the experience of its opposite:

> The experience of life itself, with all the weight of the destructive indignities to which it subjects man, turns out not only to be necessary for a full appreciation of the bliss of heaven (for God as well as man, it seems), but to be a most effective instrument, perhaps indeed *the* most effective, for urging man towards his salvation.[124]

This fits into the circular epistemology outlined above: it is the *nature* of life that we experience both love and suffering, joy and woe—as Julian encounters for herself. And with each of these progressive experiences, we are drawn further *back* to our nature. Similarly, as Robert Adams has argued, for Langland the progress of society *circles* from promise to decay.[125] 'Kynde knowyng', then, as both a natural knowledge and a knowledge of nature, acknowledges that life contains both suffering and bliss; that nature, 'kynde', is red in tooth and claw. When applied to Julian's theology, this concept neatly captures the holistic and paradoxical conglomerate of love and suffering within us, and in the paradigm of Christ. White gives the example of Will's experience of suffering which brings his journey to its conclusion: 'Perhaps it is because Will is now, as he

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[119] *Ibid*.
[120] Davlin, '*Kynde Knowing* as a Middle English Equivalent for "Wisdom"', p. 6. Cf. Mary Clemente Davlin, '*Kynde Knowyng* as a Major Theme in *Piers Plowman* B', *The Review of English Studies* 22.85 (1971), 1–19 (p. 17).
[121] James Simpson, 'From Reason to Affective Knowledge: Modes of Thought and Poetic Form in *Piers Plowman*', *Medium Ævum* 55.1 (1986), 1–23.
[122] Hugh White, *Nature and Salvation in Piers Plowman* (Cambridge: Brewer, 1988), p. 59.
[123] *Ibid*.
[124] *Ibid*, emphasis in original.
[125] Robert Adams, 'Langland's Theology', in *A Companion to Piers Plowman*, ed. by J. Alford (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988), pp. 87–114 (p. 88).

has not always been, actually suffering, evidently deeply immersed in the flow of natural experience, rather than merely looking on, that the lesson which presents itself carries conviction—it has been learnt on the pulses'.[126] He describes this as a 'sense of authenticity' that is the 'quintessence of wisdom', resulting from Will's confrontation of death: 'the emergence of the teaching *ex extremis*'.[127] Here we have a description of a similar kind of emergent knowledge as Julian's following her own experience *in extremis,* which I have also defined as authentic understanding. For Will, this authentic wisdom, 'kynde knowyng', is an earthly goal, based on effortful *seeking* over many years: 'I haue ben his folwere al þis [fourty] wynter'.[128] As Davlin writes, it depends 'upon grace and upon loving effort (for Piers, to "sowe and sette")', and is only achieved after a lifetime of experience.[129] Similarly for Julian, her knowledge depends on her suffering and seeking. We will see this epistemology borne out in the parable of the lord and the servant, which shows how seeking requires the digging and delving of both Christ and humankind, cultivating the soil of the soul and 'sekyn the depnes', just as Piers sows and sets the earth.[130]

Julian's ontological schema of 'likeness' and 'unlikeness' finds expression in the definition of 'kynde' as type or character. If 'kynde' is nature, as in the essence of all created things, then to focus on our divine likeness, on our 'kynde substance', is to concentrate on the '*thisness*' of our existence. The scholastic approach might call this our *haecceitas* (the 'thisness' specific to our being), or quiddity (the 'whatness' of this being): in other words, the pre-theoretical essence of factical life. Yet this term risks slippage into the objectivity of scientific thought. For Julian, knowledge of the 'thisness' of our being emerges not from objective interrogation or enquiry, but from our active engagement with the world: our being-towards-God. Just as Heidegger wrote, 'I must see away from the what-content [*Wasgehalt*] and attend only to the fact that the object is a given, attitudinally grasped one', Julian suggests that our essence is only grasped in relation to our perspective on the eschatological timeline, which has its basis in our lived experience.[131] Her

[126] *Ibid*, p. 58.
[127] *Ibid*.
[128] Langland, *Piers Plowman: The B Version*, p. 340, V.542–52. Cf. Denise N. Baker, 'From Plowing to Penitence: Piers Plowman and Fourteenth-Century Theology', *Speculum* 55.4 (1980), 715–25 (p. 721).
[129] Davlin, '*Kynde Knowing* as a Middle English Equivalent for "Wisdom"', p. 14.
[130] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 77. While it is not my objective to ascertain direct influence between Julian and Langland, it is worth pointing out, as Barbara Newman does, that 'by the time of her final revisions, she [Julian] could have had an opportunity to read Langland in either the B or C text'. Barbara Newman, 'Redeeming the Time: Langland, Julian, and the Art of Lifelong Revision', *The Yearbook of Langland Studies* 23 (2009), 1–32 (p. 23).
[131] Martin Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life* [1995], trans. by Matthias Fritsch and Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2010), p. 40.

foundation for this position lies in her differentiation between the 'workings' or energies of God, which can be known, and the being or essence of God, which cannot be known. To get to know our divine aspect, we must know it through *God's being in us*. Julian is shown that God's essential nature is fulfilled by Christ's incarnation, which redeems our 'sensualite', a fulfilment which is beyond the mechanics of causality, part of God's simultaneously occurring narrative. We cannot yet know this redemption from our position on the eschatological timeline: from where we are, we are always in the process of being fulfilled. Grasping our 'kindly substance', our divine *thisness*, is thus part of the balancing and re-balancing of the hermeneutic circle outlined above. For this cycle does not only apply to the seeking of a singular visionary event, but rather offers a *way of living*, in which we can challenge the chronic, inherited condition which sees us 'chongeable in this lif'.[132] This can be compared to the self-effacing condition of health, which in its rhythmic dynamism, serves to disguise our existential homelessness. By 'beseking', or '[seking] him to the beholdyng', we engage a *lived practice* which reorients us to face God, subsequently reorienting us to ourselves; to the thisness of our being, which is in God. Julian's circular epistemology can thus be understood as a return to 'kynde', a lived process of returning to our nature.

ii. Performing the Text

a) From *Visio* to *Vita*

The thesis has thus far understood Julian's epistemology of 'beseking' and 'beholding' as an existential mode, which is driven by the grace and love of the Trinity, the 'touchings' which work within us. Yet as I have shown, the cyclicality of this process renders it inevitably non-closing: as Heidegger also writes of our existential condition, '*A constant unfinished quality [Unabgeschlossenheit]* thus lies in the basic constitution of Dasein'.[133] The same is true of Julian's contemplative epistemology. Since we can never fully reach divine wisdom on earth, the interpretative products of the left mind are necessarily experimental, a category within which we can group the visionary text: René Tixier writes, for example, of the *Cloud of Unknowing* as an 'experiment in love'.[134] This brings me to the question of the mechanics of the text: not only in

[132] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 66.
[133] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, §236, emphasis in original.
[134] René Tixier, '"Þis louely blinde werk": Contemplation in *The Cloud of Unknowing* and Related Treatises', in *Mysticism and Spirituality in Medieval England*, ed. by William F. Pollard and Robert Boenig (Woodbridge: Brewer, 1997), pp. 107–37 (p. 120).

terms of *what* the genre of contemplative writing intends to do for the reader, but *how* the text proposes to effect this purpose. Peter Moore defines the writing of the text as the final stage in the visionary experience: 'retrospective interpretation',[135] a distinction Barbara Newman refers to as the separation of '*visio*' from '*vita*'.[136] Yet Moore also acknowledges 'the way in which experience and interpretation overlap'.[137] So while Denise Baker has observed that Julian's account of the 'bodily sight', 'words formed in mine understanding', and 'ghostly sight' of the showings can be described in Moore's terms as reflected interpretation (in regards to the visions and locutions) and assimilated interpretation (for her more abstract, spiritual insights), the very open-endedness of Julian's writing refutes the neat chronology of sight > interpretation > textual production.[138] As Newman writes, Julian '[refuses] a schematic elegance that would have unduly privileged *visio* over *vita*'.[139] By insisting on the provisionality of any interpretation supplied by her visionary text, Julian defers to the ineffability of the divine revelation. As a result, the categories in Julian's own interpretative triad are constantly slipping their definitions. Julian embraces fluidity between the experience and interpretation, interweaving her own musings about the meaning of the revelation into her account of the revelation itself.

This narratological strategy serves to construct Julian's porous or 'wounded' text, wherein the showings and Julian's interpretation leak into one another.[140] Julian's voice drops into the text intermittently, like the drops of blood that fall from the garland of thorns, 'spredeing' and dissolving into the showings themselves, such that the reader is not always aware of any distinction between them.[141] With this, the author makes herself transparent, self-noughting so that the revelation can flow through her and to the reader, for the communal body of her 'even cristen'. She thus positions herself not as interpreter—'God forbede that […] I am a techere', Julian writes in the short text[142]—but as intermediary; translator or transcriber of the Word as she receives it. Her task is to *perform* the text: to produce; to carry out; to fulfil the call of the

[135] Peter Moore, 'Christian Mysticism and Interpretation: Some Philosophical Issues Illustrated in the Study of the Medieval English Mystics', in *MMTE IV, Papers Read at Dartington Hall, July 1987*, ed. by Marion Glasscoe (Cambridge: Brewer, 1987), pp. 154–76 (p. 163).
[136] Newman, 'Redeeming the Time', p. 2.
[137] Moore, 'Christian Mysticism and Interpretation', p. 165.
[138] Baker, *Julian of Norwich's Showings*, p. 12.
[139] Newman, 'Redeeming the Time', p. 3.
[140] Cf. Vincent Gillespie, 'Postcards from the Edge: Interpreting the Ineffable in the Middle English Mystics', in *Looking Into Holy Books: Essays on Late Medieval Religious Writing in England* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2011), pp. 307–38 (p. 335, n. 57): 'The notion of wounded language derives from the work of Michel de Certeau'. See A. Lion, 'Le Discours blessé: sur le langage mystique selon Michel de Certeau', *Révue des sciences philosophies et théologiques* 71 (1987), 405–20.
[141] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 10.
[142] Windeatt, ed., *Revelations of Divine Love*, p. 7.

revelation to share it with her fellow Christians.[143] Her role is as an instrument of this communication: like Heidegger's inconspicuous tool, which is defined by its place within the totality of relevance, by its role *um zu* (in order to), Julian-the-author is defined simply by her function as intermediary between human and divine. She is the 'mene' by which God's 'mening' can be related. If she enters the text as an individuated subject, she becomes conspicuous—like the broken tool—and no longer fulfils her purpose. By remaining inconspicuous, Julian refuses to be drawn back into reflexive self-beholding. Instead, she sustains the porous subjectivity of the visionary experience, the state of interconnectedness with one's environment and community which has been facilitated by the sickness and visionary event—an emergence of genuine authenticity.

This condition of genuine authenticity, or being in the thick sense, is effected by the re-integration into the meaning-patterns of one's lifeworld after the disclosure of authentic understanding. It is, therefore, inherently linked to other people: it is only by re-engaging with others that Julian can fully enter this state. She must face her existence with Heidegger's 'resoluteness'—a focused engagement with her life in all its possibilities, including its limit-situation, death—and throw herself into participation with her lifeworld. This is borne out in Julian's desire to share her condition of comfort with those around her, an aspiration which anticipates her lifelong dedication to the communal body of the church, and her writing. We may subsequently think of the act of writing the visionary text—Julian's 'experiment in love'—as part of her genuinely authentic engagement with her world; part of being in the thick sense. But given the difficulties of visionary interpretation outlined above, how successful can Julian's creative project be in sharing the divine revelation with her readers, as she intends? Indeed, is it even possible for a visionary text to effect the same transfiguration as experienced by the visionary herself? In the phenomenological framework, an authentic and resolute understanding of one's death occurs in a moment of anxiety, trauma, or sickness. The individual then reaches genuine authenticity through re-attunement to a homelike way of being-in-the-world, and reintegration *in* that world. In Julian's case, this process is precipitated by her sickness and revelation. According to Heidegger, this is an entirely first-person transformation, wherein an understanding of '*my own* death' is the only way in which I can understand mortality and thus engage a genuinely authentic way of living. Carel argues against this Heideggerian emphasis on auto-*Angst* as the only disclosive experience of authenticity: 'I suggest', Carel writes, 'that grief and mourning *for others*

[143] MED, s.v. 'perfōrmen', *v*.

can also intimate mortality and thus have an edifying role'.[144] Carel proposes that being cut off from one's lifeworld is not a compulsory element for death, illness, or authenticity. Rather, that death or pain *of another* can also stimulate an affective state which leads to authenticity; a second-hand, sympathetic response which is predicated upon interrelational participation. She argues, in other words, for the disclosive power of compassion.

b) The Compassionate Text

Including compassion in this discussion requires further definition of the phenomenon and its connotations. The OED defines *compassion* as 'suffering together with another (from the Latin *com* + *patior*, suffering with), participation in suffering; fellow-feeling, sympathy', which may be motivated by the distress of another, and may lead to a desire to relieve it.[145] Ayoush Lazikani calls this 'co-feeling', after Milan Kundera, a phenomenon which, she writes, offers a gateway between self and other.[146] This is distinct from *empathy*, which derives from the Greek *empatheia*: *in* + *pathos*, '*in*-feeling'. To be *in*-feeling means to be drawn into one's own pain in a self-reflexive way, such that the pain may be overwhelming; research has shown that individuals can suffer from empathetic overload or burnout, by taking on too much of another's negative emotions. To be compassionate, on the other hand, sustains the co-createdness of the experience, the *shared* nature of the encounter, which also sustains the porosity of the 'I-Thou' relation, preventing individuation. In other words, *empathy* identifies with the *pain*, while *compassion* identifies with the *person-in-pain*, with different brain pathways activated in these respective experiences of self-feeling and socially connected feeling.[147] Historians of emotion have shown how this phenomenon is created by and functions within different cultures: Sarah McNamer, for example, offers a variety of cross-cultural manifestations of compassion.[148] She cites the work of Catherine Lutz, who translates the Ifaluk word *fago* as 'compassion/love/sadness', a condition predicated upon a perceived need or lack in another person—reiterating the above definition of compassion as socially connected. Lutz accounts for the widespread use of the term as resulting from the 'precariousness of life' in Ifaluk society, in which 'illness and early death' are 'common

[144] Carel, *Phenomenology of Illness*, p. 178, emphasis added.
[145] OED, s.v. 'compassion', *n.*
[146] Ayoush S. Lazikani, *Cultivating the Heart: Feeling and Emotion in Twelfth- and Thirteenth-Century Religious Texts* (Cardiff: Cardiff University Press, 2015), p. 74.
[147] Olga M. Klimecki, Susanne Leiberg, Matthieu Ricard, and Tania Singer, 'Differential pattern of functional brain plasticity after compassion and empathy training', *Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience* 9.6 (2014), 873–79.
[148] Sarah McNamer, *Affective Meditation and the Invention of Medieval Compassion* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), p. 10.

and visible'.[149] This example also speaks to the medieval imaginary, in which personal experiences of sickness and death were widely prevalent points of reference for igniting feelings of compassion. Literature from this period is particularly disclosive of the power of *participatory* emotion, with the medieval belief in the generative power of death offering a transformation of the self through reiterative and affective performances or rituals.

Affective meditations on the life and death of Christ, for example, provided a schematic rubric for compassionate prayer in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. McNamer calls these 'intimate scripts', 'quite literally scripts or the performance of feeling—scripts that often explicitly aspire to performative efficacy'.[150] In order to enhance affective efficacy, these scripts were often highly self-reflexive, using first-person, present-tense utterances to direct the reader's response towards the passion. They are not, as McNamer has pointed out, always 'altruistic', in that they certainly do not always seek to relieve the suffering of the individual in question; they are, in fact, often 'self-interested'.[151] That is to say, they realise the positive potential of suffering-with Christ—not that they seek to individuate the reader. For the reader of Christ's passion is *always* part of a co-created project of suffering and salvation: part of it is Christ's work, and part of it is humanity's, whereby having compassion for Christ's part serves to enhances the soul's self-understanding. This is an epistemology of love, in which Christ's death on the cross symbolises God's eternal love of humankind, and meditating on this event would elicit compassionate love in turn: *passio* leads to *compassio*. Concepts such as the 'wound of love' or 'love languor' articulate this pathetic framework in physical terms, particularly in anchoritic texts, where, as Lazikani observes, 'Love and compassion are coupled together as joint efforts'.[152] There is, then, a medieval model of compassion based on an integration of will and intellect, thought and feeling, available with which we can read Julian's texts. But how does this tradition of compassionate reading function in phenomenological terms? And how might we understand the effect of Julian's writing on her reader within this framework? Further examination of the hermeneutic design of the visionary text will provide us with some preliminary answers to these questions, in turn drawing together the medieval and phenomenological models of shared feeling and shared understanding.

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[149] Catherine A. Lutz, 'The Emotion of *Fago* (Compassion/Love/Sadness)', in *Unnatural Emotions: Everyday Sentiments on a Micronesian Atoll & Their Challenge to Western Theory* (Chicago, IL and London: University of Chicago Press, 1998), pp. 119–54. Quoted in Sarah McNamer, *Affective Meditation*, p. 8.
[150] McNamer, *Affective Meditation*, p. 12.
[151] *Ibid*, p. 11.
[152] Lazikani, *Cultivating the Heart*, p. 74.

Just as affective meditation invites the reader's participation, Julian's texts defer hermeneutic closure to the reader: 'the better it is more to you than to me', Julian writes.[153] Oliver Davies acknowledges this *shared* interpretative enterprise: '[Julian gives] expression to this encounter through the medium of a text which itself becomes the means whereby other persons, the readers of the texts, are themselves drawn into their original experience'. [154] I have described this as the Heideggerian hermeneutic circle, in which understanding of the whole (the text) is developed on the basis of fore-structures of understanding (experience), which allow phenomena to be interpreted in a preliminary way. Interpretation thus constitutes a new experience in itself. We can apply this to the creative process of the visionary text, where each reader of the revelation (including the initial visionary) interprets the text of the showings: in the case of the visionary, this means translating the revelation into the language of the visionary text; in the case of the reader, this means adding their perspective to this hermeneutic circle. The text is shaped by each reader, just as each reader is shaped by the text, but interpretation of the showings is continually deferred: from showing to visionary to text to reader, the hermeneutic chain is never complete. The interchange between these vehicles contributes to the construction of a shared and fluid text, and subsequently, a shared transfiguration of subjectivity. This notion of the joint project is rooted in the enactivist model, which, derived in part from phenomenology, describes meaning as performatively constructed. The act of conversation, for example, is interpreted by the enactivist approach as a process of mutual sense-making, in which each conversation partner is engaged in creating something new.[155] This is based on the notion of the human self as an inherently social being, intersubjective or porous to those around it.[156] Claire Foster-Gilbert draws on these enactivist principles to describe the Julian texts, which, she argues, have a 'visceral, material effect that can call their reader into a performative response'. [157] This is an inherently phenomenological project, drawing upon the idea that there is a 'vast mysterious store' of meaning 'behind what we show each other and are aware of ourselves', which is revealed 'by participative performance and not by cognitive reasoning'.[158]

[153] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 13.
[154] Davies, 'Transformational Processes', p. 50.
[155] Joanna Raczaszek-Leonardi, Agnieszka Debska, and Adam Sochanowicz, 'Pooling the Ground: Understanding and Coordination in Collective Sense-making', in *Towards an Embodied Science of Intersubjectivity: Widening the Scope of Social Understanding Research*, ed. by E. Di Paolo and H. De Jaegher (Lausanne: Frontiers Media, 2015), pp. 352–65 (p. 353).
[156] Cf. Leonard Schilbach, Bert Timmermans, Vasudevi Reddy, and Alan Costall, 'Towards a Second-Person Neuroscience', *Behavioural and Brain Sciences* 36 (2013), 393–462.
[157] Foster-Gilbert, *Restoring Porosity and the Ecological Crisis*, p. 74.
[158] *Ibid*, p. 76.

Recent work on compassion has, however, also highlighted the cognitive components of this project. Citing Stanton Garner Jr's definition of this phenomenon as 'a mimetic inhabiting of the suffering body', Jill Stevenson notes the role of mirror neurons in the process of identification, writing that the same neurons fire when we observe, execute, and even imagine the same action: 'simply imagining someone's experience of pain triggers embodied simulation of that same pain'.[159] The reader's compassion is therefore contingent on their internalising of the pain before them using the interpretative left mind: on the individual *relating* to this suffering consciously, through the invocation of memory or imagination; the 'vertu imaginatif' (*vis imaginativa*) in medieval faculty psychology, which 'covers both memory and our "imagination" (in both the creative and speculative/anticipatory senses)'.[160] Phenomenological accounts of shared meaning-making thus combine both intellect and affect, as in the medieval model; a pairing which can be mapped onto the contemplative epistemology. As Ross writes, 'Most people are trapped in the virtual and noisy world of self-consciousness […] For the mind to function optimally, it must be recentred in the deep mind […] restoring the circulation between the two epistemologies so that ordinary daily life draws on its wellspring'.[161] This seems to apply not only to the individual who receives the showings—to the state of beholding itself—but to the mind which is nourished by participatory performance of compassion. Both visionary and reader are shaped by the hermeneutic circle of the shared text, which functions as a channel for the 'wellspring' of beholding.

In light of the participatory nature of the visionary text, we might expand Carel's statement that 'grief and mourning for others can also intimate mortality and thus have an edifying role', in favour of: 'grief and mourning for others can also intimate mortality *and the potential for homelikeness*, and thus have an edifying role'. This more accurately describes the soteriological focus of Julian's *Revelation*, which frames her suffering within the Christian narrative of hope and redemption. As demonstrated, Julian's epistemology is grounded in a directedness towards God (specifically the second person of the Trinity, Christ), who is the 'mene' towards understanding and engaging with his divine love. I have described this as being-towards-God or 'beseking', a way of living which Julian offers to her 'even cristen' through the secondary 'mene'

[159] Stanton B. Garner Jr, *Bodied Spaces: Phenomenology and Performance in Contemporary Drama* (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 1994), p. 183. Cited in Jill Stevenson, *Performance, Cognitive Theory, and Devotional Culture: Sensual Piety in Late Medieval York* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 145.
[160] William Langland, *Piers Plowman: A New Translation of the B-Text*, ed. and trans. by A. V. C. Schmidt (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 302, n. 126.
[161] Ross, 'Behold Not The Cloud of Experience', p. 34.

of her text. This is exemplified by the wording of the Sloane version of the long text, in which Julian exhorts the reader to 'seke him *to* the beholdyng of him'.[162] The Paris manuscript here reads 'seke *into* the beholdyng'.[163] Seeking him *to* the beholding is the less theologically schematic of the two, and the closer to Julian's epistemology.[164] Seeking *into* beholding seems to refer to the contemplative journey inward, but is also a contradiction in terms in Julian's schema, in which beholding is a state which precludes the self-conscious process of seeking. Seeking him *to* the beholding is therefore more faithful to Julian's text, if we consider *to* as akin to the Latin *ut*—or, indeed, the Heideggerian *um zu*: to seek him *in order to*, or *for the purpose of* beholding. For Julian, a compassionate awareness of pain, suffering, and death is the 'mene' by which the effect of beholding—of homelikeness—might be transferred from visionary to reader. This being-towards-God is thus directed by the promise of wholeness—'onyng'—and infinite being-with-God in heaven.

This directedness of being-towards-God includes a teleological destination absent in the phenomenological mode of being-towards-death, wherein *to be* means to be 'held-out-into-the-nothing'.[165] In this secular schema, authentic living means recognition of the 'nothing' of one's limit-situation: anxiety brings Dasein 'face to face with the possibility to be itself'.[166] This is an 'expecting' of this phenomenon which then allows Dasein a '*freedom toward death, which is free of the illusions of the they, factical, and certain of itself*'.[167] Because death is annihilation, however, it cannot be a totality: death, Carel writes, is 'an end, but not a teleological end'.[168] Judith Wolfe has called this Heidegger's 'eschatology without an eschaton', wherein the 'consummation' of Dasein is at the same time its negation.[169] In Christian theology, meanwhile, death is but one event in the eschatological timeline. Human living is subsequently directed towards a different end—a different *telos*—determined by the salvation narrative: we exist in 'orientation towards an envisioned end as determinative of the present'.[170] Julian's epistemology is oriented in this direction: Julian 'expects' death, in that 'Expecting is not only an occasional looking away from the possible to its possible actualization, but essentially a *waiting for that*

[162] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 16, emphasis added.
[163] Watson and Jenkins, eds., *Writings*, p. 161, l. 64, emphasis added.
[164] With thanks to Vincent Gillespie for pointing this out distinction.
[165] Heidegger, quoted in McGrath, *The Early Heidegger*, p. 133.
[166] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, §266, emphasis in original.
[167] *Ibid*, emphasis in original.
[168] Carel, *Phenomenology of Illness*, p. 159.
[169] Wolfe, *Heidegger's Eschatology*, p. 2.
[170] *Ibid*, p. 6.

actualization'.[171] This perspective might be described as a resolute 'letting be' of this potentiality, which anticipates death as an eventuality, but which also accepts that this is out of our control. Just so, Julian's mystical longing for *compassio* with Christ is contingent on the conditional 'if' of being-towards-death: she desires to have 'all manier peynes bodily and ghostly that I [Julian] should have *if I should dye*'.[172] But this conditional is eternally vouchsafed by the power of Christ's soteriological act. Julian does not, then, consider death her limit-situation: her being-towards-death has a *theological* end, which will arrive at 'domysday'. This is the *eschaton* which has been bracketed by the Heideggerian phenomenological framework, and which structures Julian's genuinely authentic way of living: the 'wey' of Christ, a submission of one's life to its negation, with the faith that this negation is not our end.

Meditation on Christ's death thus offers an access point to the hermeneutic circle of contemplation, where 'seking him' offers a means to co-wounding and 'onyng' with him: of re-attuning to our divine aspect, our 'kynde substance', or to homelikeness—even in the face of death. Julian offers her *Revelation* as an affective tool to assist the reader in this process, inviting them to participate in the joint project of the visionary text. Yet to seek to interpret the ineffable in language is a necessarily experimental project: as Julian reminds us, in the wilderness of our postlapsarian world, our 'blindhede' constrains the limits of our knowledge. In this model of non-closure, the task of the visionary is to lead the reader to the edge of the chasm of experience, holding a light so that they might peer into its apophatic depths. As Gillespie writes,

> Mystical language seeks to deliver us to the threshold of ineffability. Mystical imagery seeks to deliver us to the brink of the apophatic. Together they constitute a repertoire of liminal signifiers which gesture beyond themselves into the realm of unmediated wisdom and the paradise of the Transcendental Signified from which we have been excluded by the fall.[173]

Julian must therefore find a language with which to speak about God, which does not seek to close off the 'play of signification'—of absence and presence—which Gillespie and Ross argue characterises 'the human experience of engagement with the ineffable'.[174] She does so through a variety of complex poetic and linguistic strategies, which come together to form a 'mystical poetic' that is both incarnational and apophatic, literal and figurative, familiar and strange—one

[171] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, §262, emphasis in original.
[172] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 3, emphasis added.
[173] Gillespie, 'Postcards from the Edge', p. 311.
[174] Gillespie and Ross, 'The Apophatic Image', p. 53.

which leads the reader into a realm of language, where in the depths of hiddenness hints at what might be originally, primordially known.

iii. Mystical Poetics

In chapter one, I identified the phenomenological idea of existence as a web of intersubjective meaning, which contains and stages all aspects of our lived experience—including that which is apophatic. This web is constructed using a shared system of signs which we know as language, the 'dwelling' in which we abide together, according to Heidegger: 'Language is the house of being. In its home man dwells'.[175] All lived experience is therefore a text which requires interpretative analysis; as the means through which we understand our own being. In Gadamer's words, '*Being that can be understood is language*'.[176] I have since framed the contemplative epistemology as an existential mode, given the inherently linguistic nature of visionary experience: the showings 'dwell' in Julian's 'understondyng', a self-conscious act of interpretation that instantly integrates them into a shared system of language, and which she then seeks to translate to the visionary text. But if beholding is not *experience*, as such, but rather a pre-discursive *relinquishing* of claims to experience, what kind of language is most suitable for this apophatic project? I have already touched upon the various strategies with which late medieval theology feeds the channel between the pre-discursive mind and the realm of discourse. Scholasticism, for example, offered a route to wisdom through reason: language of questioning and debate, which would produce knowledge through ratiocination. The contemplative theologian, by contrast, was required to find language which preserved the negative quality of the apophatic experience. It is Julian's navigation of this contemplative project which will occupy the remainder of this chapter.

Cristina Cervone has pointed to the way in which medieval theologians perceived figurative language as fundamental to theological expression and understanding: an act of *poiesis* in the literal sense of *making* meaning.[177] The pre-Cartesian understanding of the holistic mind-body unity accounts for this model of language as an active component in revelation. As Ross writes, 'Beholding is *embodied*; it opens on the deep mind where incarnation, transfiguration, and

[175] Heidegger, 'Letter on Humanism', p. 193.
[176] Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, p. 431, emphasis added.
[177] Cristina Maria Cervone, *Poetics of the Incarnation: Middle English Writing and the Leap of Love* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), passim.

resurrection are rapt into one'.[178] This is borne out in the circular epistemology of contemplation, which locates language as contingent in the experimental seeking out of knowledge. Cervone summarises this process, writing that 'Medieval writers found in their diverse Incarnational thought experiments a way of seeking a way of knowing'.[179] These thought experiments are in conversation with (to use enactivist phrasing) the inner, spiritual organs of perception which are, at the visionary event, touched by divine grace. That is to say, they are both active processes in the meaning-making project. Riehle accounts for this connection between experience and language using Origen's doctrine of the spiritual senses, which held that we possess spiritual as well as physical sense perception.[180] He asserts that

> If the mystics now frequently use the language of earthly sense perceptions in a spiritual meaning when relating their personal experiences, then it would be wrong […] to understand and assess this language simply as the use of metaphor in the normal sense of the term, for this is no mere makeshift language but rather one in which the mystical experience itself takes place.[181]

This relies on the premise that the spiritual senses reveal a supernatural object 'as if it were present in some concrete manner'. Riehle continues: 'therefore the language which expresses such experiences is something rather different than mere metaphor'.[182] Riehle is here arguing for an inter-nesting of supernatural experience and language, where cognition and language both organise and inform the preconceptual phenomena of visionary experience. Cervone summarises his argument thus: that 'individuals can experience mystical union with God *as metaphorical language*'.[183]

Heidegger, however, distinguishes the existential manner of this meaning-making against the linguistic expression of said meaning. This distinction is particularly useful in highlighting the transition from Julian's integration of the showings into her own *epistēmē*, to her act of textual performance—her textual speech act—with which she invites the reader to engage. In particular, it enables us to point to the power of language which is beyond words: apophasis, or the power of silence. Heidegger's conception of Dasein's existential discursivity superficially provides a basis for Riehle's above statement. For Heidegger, we exist as discursive beings, which is to say that

[178] Ross, 'Behold Not The Cloud of Experience', p. 36, emphasis in original.
[179] Cervone, *Poetics of the Incarnation*, p. 5.
[180] Riehle, *The Middle English Mystics*, p. 104.
[181] *Ibid*.
[182] *Ibid*.
[183] Cervone, *Poetics of the Incarnation*, p. 33, emphasis in original.

the meaning of our being is disclosed to us through our discursiveness. As such, discourse constitutes one of Heidegger's 'existentials', glossed in chapter two: as Heidegger writes, '*The existential-ontological foundation of language [Sprache] is discourse [Rede]*'.[184] Discourse is the primordial 'articulation of intelligibility' which 'lies at the basis of interpretation and statement' and, moreover, at the basis of meaning. What is articulated in discourse is, in Heidegger's words, 'the totality of significations': our 'attuned intelligibility of being-in-the-world *expresses itself as discourse*'.[185] He identifies this expression of discourse as an objective presence in nature and culture, which he calls '*existential language*'.[186] This is a seemingly contradictory term that blurs the distinction between discourse as an 'existential' and language itself, which Heidegger defines separately. Language is, emphatically, *not* an existential, even though it is constitutive of the fluency with which we understand our being-in-the-world. Rather, it is a *tool* with which we effect this disclosure. In explaining this, Heidegger cites the Greek definition of human being as *zoon logon echon*, which has been interpreted as the *animal rationale*, the rational being, an unfortunate translation which, Heidegger argues, 'covers over the phenomenal basis from which this definition of Dasein is taken': 'The human being shows itself as a being who speaks'.[187]

Heidegger subsequently distinguishes between discourse itself, and the 'fundamental structures of the forms and constituents of discourse' which have been developed 'following the guideline of *this logos*': linguistics.[188] Grammar, Heidegger writes, 'searched for its foundation in the "logic" of this *logos*', but this logic is 'based on the ontology of what is present'.[189] He advocates the *freeing* of grammar from logic—that is, the return to discourse as an existential mode. Language, on the other hand, he writes of as 'expression' or 'what is expressed' (*Ausgesprochenheit*), literally, 'spoken-out-ness': 'discourse expresses itself and has always already expressed itself. It is language'.[190] In other words, language discloses (*erschliessen*), unconceals (*unverborgen*), or discovers (*entdecken*) the discursive meaning—truth—which constitutes being. This is, as King points out, what Heidegger means when he says that 'language is the house of being': 'language is being's home, the place where being is allowed to be'.[191] As a disclosive tool, then—as with Heidegger's hammer—we encounter language as something ready-to-hand when we are using

[184] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, §161, emphasis in original.
[185] *Ibid*, emphasis in original.
[186] *Ibid*, emphasis added.
[187] *Ibid*, §166.
[188] *Ibid*, emphasis in original.
[189] *Ibid*.
[190] *Ibid*, §168.
[191] King, 'Heidegger's Etymological Method', p. 282.

it.[192] This inobtrusiveness of language facilitates the performance of 'idle talk' (*Gerede*), the mode of discourse common to the inauthentic Dasein, who is entangled in, or 'fallen to' the world.[193] When language becomes an object of analysis—to the literary historian, for example—it is then made obtrusive, as word-things. By including language as part of the visionary experience, I must therefore qualify that I mean what Heidegger calls *discourse* or *existential language*, rather than the expression or unconcealment of discourse in language.

With this in mind, we can revisit Riehle's notion that mystical experience *is* metaphorical language. In phenomenological terms, the visionary event is disclosed by Julian's discourse, in that her discursive manner of being-in-the-world (located in her rational, left brain) reveals, interprets, or makes intelligible the experience. To adjust Riehle's argument to this Heideggerian model, then, mystical experience *is discourse*, rather than language (as spoken discourse). This is a necessary distinction to make, since '*Listening* and *silence* are possibilities belonging to discoursing speech', Heidegger writes—possibilities which are not components of language, which is solely speech.[194] Silence can be defined only in relation to its opposite, just as visionary experience can only be expressed in apophatic language: 'Authentic silence is possible only in genuine discourse'.[195] 'One who never says anything is […] unable to keep silent', Heidegger concludes: 'In order to be silent, Dasein must have something to say'.[196] Heidegger's assertion that being calls for *saying* can also be found in Ross's work on contemplation and silence, although she does not make the same distinction as Heidegger between discourse and language: 'Language feeds silence and silence is a wellspring for language', Ross writes.[197] This is borne out in the interchange between her contemplative epistemologies of the deep mind and self-consciousness. The act of beholding is ultimately an act which restores what Ross calls the 'flow' between the two, '*finding the balance between silence and speech*'.[198] This is being in its truest spiritual form: an energetic balancing act.

We may think of genuine mystical discourse, then, as the iridescent web of meaning in which we all share, defined by the gaps between each thread as much as the threads themselves. Language,

[192] For more on Heidegger and language, see Duane Williams, *Language and Being: Heidegger's Linguistics* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2017); and Jeffrey Powell, *Heidegger and Language* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2013).
[193] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, §35.
[194] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, §161, emphasis in original.
[195] *Ibid*, §165.
[196] *Ibid.* To this he adds the footnote, '*and what calls for saying [*das Zu-sagende*]? (being) [*Seyn*]'.
[197] Ross, *Silence: A User's Guide, Vol. 1*, p. 66.
[198] *Ibid*, emphasis added.

meanwhile, is akin to the material used for each thread, which can be understood either through its production, its use, or in terms of its metaphysical qualities. It is only in relation to discourse that language can be understood: meaning emerges at the point of intersection of these graticular cross-hairs. Since this web of discourse encompasses both thread and space—speech and silence—mystical *poetics*, the linguistic tool or 'mene' with which the visionary articulates this discourse, must navigate this inter-spatial and multi-dimensional zone of positive and negative material. Ross writes that 'poetry is often the conduit' to this exchange, 'because it draws on both ways of knowing simultaneously'.[199] Poetry gestures to meanings beyond the text, with resonances which extend beyond the literal meaning-making of hermeneutics. It finds meaning in silence as much as it does in speech. A mystical poetic therefore performs the mystical text of the showings by drawing on the wellspring of silence. It draws attention to its own limitations, speaking about God by acknowledging its incapacity *to* speak about God, an apophatic tradition inherited from pseudo-Dionysius: 'we must not', pseudo-Dionysius wrote, 'dare to apply words or conceptions to this hidden transcendent God', and yet in our act of worship we still 'praise it by every name', names which are 'fittingly derived from the sum total of creation'.[200] Or, in the words of Augustine,

> Have I spoken of God, or uttered His praise, in any worthy way? Nay […] God is not even to be called 'unspeakable', because to say even this is to speak of Him. Thus there arises a curious contradiction of words, because if the unspeakable is what cannot be spoken of, it is not unspeakable if it can be called unspeakable. *And this opposition of words is rather to be avoided by silence than be explained away by speech*.[201]

We see this topos of inexpressibility borne out in Julian's account of her bodily sickness given in chapter two, when her discourse is disrupted by the pains of the dying Christ: 'it may not be told'.[202] Just as Julian's bodily intentionality ceases to function transparently in sickness, so too does language become a stumbling block in her encounter with pain: language as ready-to-hand becomes unready-to-hand, objectively experienced in its incapacity to serve its purpose. Again

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[199] *Ibid*.
[200] Pseudo-Dionysius, *Divine Names*, in *Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works*, trans. by Colm Luibheid (New York and Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1987), pp. 50, 56, 588C.2, 597A.7.
[201] Augustine of Hippo, *On Christian Doctrine*, ed. by Philip Schaff, *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Series I Volume 2*, Christian Classics Ethereal Library, available at: <https://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf102> [accessed 17/9/2019], I.6, emphasis added. We find echoes of this 'avoidance by silence' in Wittgenstein: 'Whereof one cannot speak of, thereof one must be silent'. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, trans. by C. K. Ogden (New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 27. For this connection see James K. A. Smith, 'Between Predication and Silence: Augustine On How (Not) To Speak of God', *Heythrop Journal* 4 (2000), 66–86.
[202] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 17.

evoking the same process of disclosure as Heidegger's broken tool, language becomes 'word-things objectively present'. While I have examined this disruption in terms of the effect on Julian's *own* being-in-the-world—on her capacity for beholding—it must also be considered within the performance of her mystical poetic. By drawing attention to the incapacity of language, Julian intimates the negative quality of silence within the mystical discourse. As a result, the very unready-to-handedness of language which we might otherwise consider a *disruption* of our existential mode functions as part of the *disclosive* capacity of the mystical poetic. This reiterates the creative project of the visionary text as one of performance rather than exegesis: a sounding out of the remnants of the mystical text of revelation in the realm of earthly signs, in which one can only perceive such phenomena 'through a glass darkly'. In this pseudo-Dionysian model, cataphatic and apophatic language interact in a mutual relationship rather than in mutual exclusivity, with affirmative statements or descriptions of God collapsing into negation.

This cataphatic-apophatic dialectic can be described in linguistic terms as the disruption of linear or literal sign-signification relations, with truth emerging from the deferral of signification, rather than from a closed dyadic sequence. Metaphorical or figurative language facilitates this deferral, with signifying vehicles gesturing beyond their literal meaning to any number of abstract signifieds. Gillespie and Ross have called this a 'poetics of effacement', which through the interweaving of likeness with otherness, '[offers] mystical writers a means of counteracting the pull of referentiality'.[203] With this effacement, the mystical poetic thus engages what Cervone has called 'a sort of supereffability', which she defines as 'an understanding of sacred fullness enacted through form'.[204] Supereffability points, Cervone writes, 'to something beyond itself', '[encoding] the expectation that the sought thing cannot be comprehended fully at once in its own nature but must be understood by means of something-it-isn't, expressed in language-it-isn't'.[205] This series of 'something-it-isn't's then comes together to produce an 'eddying back of sense', which Cervone characterises as an '*Incarnational poetic*', that is, 'a vernacular poetics of metaphor triggered by the issue of Incarnation'.[206] In focusing on the moment of connection of human and divine—the hypostatic union—this kind of poetic emphasises the middle term of the incarnational narrative: the verbal enactment of 'the Word *made* flesh'.[207] It emphasises *activity*, which recalls our phenomenological definition of Dasein as a condition of *dynamis*; an enactive,

[203] Gillespie and Ross, 'The Apophatic Image', p. 58.
[204] Cervone, *Poetics of the Incarnation*, p. 5.
[205] *Ibid*, p. 26.
[206] *Ibid*, pp. 26, 8, emphasis added.
[207] *Ibid*, p. 6, emphasis added.

participatory process of our being-in-the-world. Cervone's incarnational poetic seeks to express this *dynamis* in language, invoking images and allegories which are verbal and kinetic. 'It is no coincidence', Cervone points out, 'that these writers incline toward thought experiments that portray emanative activity or organic growth rather than stasis or passivity', since the incarnational poetic complements the 'willed, kenotic leaping of love' of the incarnation.[208] She gives the examples of Christ represented as a book or as language; as cloth, clothing, or enwrapment; and as a plant, growth, or life force. All of these images 'momentarily reverse "the Word made flesh" to render Christ's body in figure as something *other than* a human body', a fleeting reversal which in turn 'calls attention to the cognitive shift involved in understanding the metaphor'.[209] Cervone describes this as a strategy of 'making the abstract concrete in order to highlight the abstract'.[210]

The use of metaphor thus serves not only to intimate the presence of divinity on earth, but also to elevate and redeem our experiences of earthly things, while still continually deferring interpretation into further abstractions. This poetic strategy serves to construct the distinct circling or eddying feel of Julian's prose, which Denys Turner relates to the pseudo-Dionysian 'spiral', which 'moves forward, as one does along a straight line' but 'constantly returns to the same point, as one does around a circle'.[211] The repetition, Turner writes, 'is therefore never identical, for it has always moved on—it has a progressive trajectory up or down, into higher reaches or greater depth'.[212] Julian's showing of the lord and the servant is the most prominent example of this hermeneutic. A tangle of image and typology, with creation, fall, and incarnation overlayed in a trans-temporal tableau, Julian's circling poetic reifies the Trinity as earthly things: the earth, the plants, the gardener, and so on. The various objects and roles ascribed to each person depicted prevent the reader's interpretation from settling, instead shifting between perspectives and between signifieds. These formal choices draw attention not so much to the objects themselves as their enactive functions: all are located within action-based contexts, with transformational, dynamic purposes of planting, emanative growth, cultivation, and flourishing. Yet this movement is never complete. Instead, the earthiness of Julian's language gestures ever onwards, toward the next layer of meaning. With this mystical poetic, then, Julian expresses in language the hermeneutic non-closure of the showings' discourse. Language, the thread of spoken discourse,

[208] *Ibid*.
[209] *Ibid*, p. 5, emphasis added.
[210] *Ibid*, p. 57
[211] Turner, *Julian of Norwich, Theologian*, p. 4.
[212] *Ibid*.

continually expands the web of meaning without ever reaching completion, drawing the reader into the endless existential cycle of seeking and seeing, 'beseking' and 'beholding'. As Julian writes of her own showings: 'and thus I saw him and sowte him, and I had him and I wantid hym'.[213] Divine knowledge continues to elude all readers of the mystical text, while desire drives it ever onward.

iv. 'Kynde Langage': The Common Tongue

After examining the construction of a mystical poetic and the effect of particular linguistic devices, the final issue to address in regards to Julian's creative project is that of communicating her revelation in the vernacular. In this concluding section of the chapter, I therefore examine how the language of Julian's texts—the system of signifiers chosen for the creative project, Middle English—plays a significant part in its performance, and to what extent we might judge the relative success of this performance in relation to its purpose. Julian-the-author states her intent as rooted in her desire to share the revelation with the collective of her 'even cristen'. Denys Turner has subsequently ascribed Julian the role of vernacular, or demotic, theologian.[214] Demotic, a term Turner borrows from Alastair Minnis, derives from the Greek *dēmotikos,* 'popular', from *dēmotēs,* 'one of the people', a term appropriately descriptive of Julian's communal and intersubjective text. Philip Sheldrake, too, describes Julian as a 'vernacular theologian', 'not simply because she used Middle English prose rather than Latin but also because her vision and projected audience is democratic rather than limited to a spiritual or theological elite'.[215] Any notion of the vernacular should not, therefore, be limited to the notion of a single linguistic code, but rather of a social concept inferring a sense of commonality and accessibility. Bearing in mind our phenomenological definition of language as a shared dwelling, Julian's vernacular thus performs communality both in purpose and in praxis. Her style is, Turner continues, one of 'freedom, aware of but inhibited by formulaic methodology, a style essentially exploratory, reflective, meditative, and above all, vernacular', 'poised in a space uncircumscribed by the boundaries of the open, ruminative styles of monastic biblicism and the closed, inferential styles of scholastic dialectics'.[216] Turner here connects the vernacularity of Julian's text with its theological content, a relationship also claimed by Denis Renevey, who writes that 'Vernacular languages' liminality makes them ideal repositories for the contestation of Latinate ecclesiastical

[213] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 15.
[214] *Ibid*, pp. 13–18.
[215] Sheldrake, *Julian of Norwich: In God's Sight*, p. 56.
[216] *Ibid*, p. 15.

and humanistic cultures'.[217] Whether or not Julian's writing in Middle English can be described as a 'choice' in terms of the extent of her multilingualism, Julian's vernacular is nevertheless a complex interweaving of multiple modes of linguistic expression. Gillespie calls Julian 'the master of multiple discourses, capable of alluding to and pastiching various contemporary styles of religious and philosophical writing, without ever allowing them to become dominant or specifying'.[218] Her text, he writes, is 'a vast echo chamber of allusion and imitation', constructed by 'her virtuoso command to the full range of contemporary didactic and devotional vernacular writing'.[219] It is perhaps this discursive skill which allowed Julian to maintain her authority and spiritual orthodoxy while navigating the landscape of vernacular theology, a term which has become somewhat of a shorthand for the often politicised universalism—or, demoticism—of theological texts written in Middle English in the late fourteenth century.

While we have no basis for claiming a political Julian in the same sense as, for example, Bridget of Sweden (c. 1303–1373), Margery Kempe (c. 1373–c. 1436), or Elisabeth Barton (c. 1506–1534), the Julian texts span a period in which vernacular English was emerging as a widespread form of theological expression, but which was still engaged in an increasingly heated political debate about the legitimacy of this medium. Writing in the vernacular is one of three difficulties outlined by John Capgrave (1393–1464) in his poetic task of writing about the incarnation, a triad of issues summarised by Cervone as follows:

> [T]he conceptual challenge of working through a theology of the Incarnation (a timeless problem), the linguistic problem of expressing abstract thought in material terms (also timeless), and the potential social or political ramifications of disputing complex theological issues in the vernacular (an issue contemporary to him).[220]

If we follow the argument made by Nicholas Watson for Middle English as an emblem of universality used to emphasise the communality of the incarnation, Capgrave's final problem seems to stem out of his reaction to the former two.[221] That is, his choice to write in the vernacular can be read as a contemporary response to the issue of divine ineffability. Watson

[217] Denis Renevey, 'Mysticism and the Vernacular', in *The Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Christian Mysticism*, ed. by Julia A. Lamm (Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 2013), pp. 562–76 (p. 571).
[218] Vincent Gillespie, 'Vernacular Theology', in *Middle English: Oxford Twenty-First Century Approaches to Literature*, ed. by Paul Strohm (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 401–20 (p. 403).
[219] *Ibid*.
[220] Cervone, *Poetics of the Incarnation*, p. 9.
[221] Nicholas Watson, 'Conceptions of the Word: The Mother Tongue and the Incarnation of God', *New Medieval Literatures* 1 (1997), 85–124 (p. 109).

famously proposed that by the late fourteenth century, theological writing in the vernacular constituted a political statement about salvation. He suggests that notions of universal salvation—for the 'lewed' as well as the 'lettred'—were born 'out of the way the vernacular itself (or "common tongue", as it was known) was conceived as a powerful, affective, natural bond linking all the English people and, by extension, the world into one community'.[222]

This thesis of communality can also be understood phenomenologically. While Germanic in phonology, morphology, and syntax, Middle English has a hybrid vocabulary, rich in borrowings and loanwords. If, as I have been arguing after Heidegger, language functions as a tool for disclosure, then this hybridity of the Middle English lexicon may be understood to facilitate disclosure by accruing instruments for speaking from various linguistic traditions—as exemplified by Julian's linguistic 'echo chamber of allusion and imitation'. This idea is supported by my earlier phenomenological examination of at-homeness. The vernacular—*vernaculus*, a domestic or native language—is the language of our home, both on a local and global, specific and universal, scale. One nation's vernacular may not be the same as another's, but the bond of being-at-home presides over all such shared languages. As shown in chapter one, the phenomenological state of being-at-home implies interconnection with others, the familiarity of the *heimlich*, of canniness, and all its connotations of *kin* and *kindred*. This is not an exclusionary phenomenon; the security of being-at-home is an opening up to community and oneness. It gathers us together in our common humanity. To speak the native language of English, then, is to draw on a sign-system of the everyday, tapping into a primordial sense of shared belonging.

Watson also makes a claim for the notion of universal salvation as a counterpart to the communality of the vernacular, a doctrine which he argues was reconceived by authors including Langland and Julian, 'as a horizontal, not a top-down, affair'.[223] His suggestion is that the body of Christ—'ever more associated with the laity […] in which the creator and his creation are eternally united'—is figured textually in 'the language in which they write', which is 'common to all and in which theological truths […] are incarnated just as Christ is incarnate in the flesh'.[224] Watson situates his argument in the context of the late fourteenth-century Wycliffite heresy, the Oxford translation debate, and Arundel's 1409 Constitutions, to which he attributes responsibility

[222] Nicholas Watson, 'Visions of Inclusion: Universal Salvation and Vernacular Theology in Pre-Reformation England', *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies* 27 (1997), 145–87 (p. 170). Cf. Nicholas Watson, 'Censorship and Cultural Change in Late-Medieval England: Vernacular Theology, the Oxford Translation Debate, and Arundel's Constitutions of 1409', *Speculum* 70.4 (1995), 822–64 (p. 839).
[223] Nicholas Watson, 'Visions of Inclusion', p. 171.
[224] *Ibid*, p. 170.

for censoring vernacular theology—including mystical theology—and for creating a canon of vernacular works produced in the 'brilliant years before the ban'.[225] A number of studies have problematised Watson's thesis since the time of writing,[226] arguing against his comparison of a 'cautious and subdued fifteenth century against the halcyon days of the late 1300s'.[227] As Christiania Whitehead notes, 'Recent discussions acknowledge the authoritative status of this argument but tend to view the fifteenth century in far more positive terms'.[228] Nevertheless, Watson's emphasis on the communality of Middle English speaks powerfully to Julian's *Revelation*, both in terms of her intent as communicator of the showings, and in regards to her epistemology outlined above. In particular, his association of Christ's incarnation with the vernacular, our 'kynde' tongue, is exemplified by Julian's conception of Christ as our 'kindly' paradigm—the 'mene' with which we might seek towards divine wisdom and our 'kynde substance'. The connection between the Word-made-flesh and the words of the visionary text implicitly challenges the notion of the vernacular as a lower order of signs, instead continuing the work of Cervone's incarnational poetic, elevating the incarnate by emphasising the divine nature of our common humanity.

The 'kynde langage' motif can be found in a number of Middle English translator's prologues of the period, which disclose attitudes to use of the vernacular through a variety of self-conscious declarations and justifications pertaining to their textual project. Elizabeth Dearnley has examined this genre in detail: 'To study Middle English translation, through the lens of prologues', she argues, is 'to ponder the growth of the English language in the Middle Ages as a literary and learned medium', whereby 'translators acted as *ambassadors* for their own language, returning with knowledge gained, so to speak, from their overseas postings'.[229] This metaphor speaks to the above notion of rendering texts in English as an act of literary elevation or growth, whereby the translator 'brings home' the linguistic bacon, gathering together material from different languages into the 'house' or dwelling of the English vernacular. One such example is the anonymous, fourteenth-century translation of Lorens d'Orleans' *Somme le Roi* (1279)—*Speculum vitae* (a.

[225] Nicholas Watson, 'The Middle English Mystics', in *The Cambridge History of Medieval English Literature*, ed. by David Wallace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 539–65 (p. 562).
[226] See Bruce Holsinger, ed., *Literary History and the Religious Turn*, special issue of *English Language Notes* 44.1 (2006); Vincent Gillespie and Kantik Ghosh, *After Arundel: Religious Writing in Fifteenth-Century England*, Medieval Church Studies 21 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2011).
[227] Chistiania Whitehead, 'The Late Fourteenth-Century English Mystics', in *The Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Christian Mysticism*, pp. 357–72 (p. 370).
[228] *Ibid*.
[229] Elizabeth Dearnley, *Translators and Their Prologues in Medieval England* (Cambridge: Brewer, 2016), pp. 4–5, emphasis added. Cf. Jocelyn Wogan-Browne, *The Idea of the Vernacular: An Anthology of Middle English Literary Theory, 1280–1520* (Exeter: Exeter University Press, 1999).

1384)—which was widely circulated in the Middle Ages. As Dearnley comments, this prologue offers 'one of the best-known divisions of the three languages based on their social roles, with Latin reserved for the schools, French for the court and English *for everyone*'.[230] The prologue reads as follows:

> In Inglische tunge I sal yhow telle,
> If yhe so lange with me wil dwelle.
> Na Latyne wil I speke ne wast
> Bot Inglische þat men vses mast,
> For þat es yhour *kynde langage*
> Þat yhe haf maste here of vsage.
> Þat can ilk man vnderstande
> Þat es borne in Ingelande,
> For þat langage es mast shewed
> Als wele amonge lered as lewed.[231]

In this passage, the translator's exhortation to the reader invokes once more the web of meaning woven by the textual act, in which they are invited to 'dwelle' a while. The fact of the translator's explicit speech act—'I sal yhow *telle*'—positions their 'langage' as the tool with which they are expressing their discourse, to return to this Heideggerian distinction. This is reinforced by the inherited metonymy of 'language' and 'tongue': the attribution of linguistic expression to the *bodily instrument used* for that expression is derived from the etymology of 'language', Latin *lingua*, 'tongue'. The act of translation reverses the process of signification from abstract-concrete to concrete-abstract: doing away with the literal signifier 'language', the metaphor 'tonge' prioritises only the figurative signifier, which is in fact more concrete. As Cervone has discussed, a 'literal-first' model of linguistics would argue that this substitution of body-part-as-abstract-faculty requires a secondary act of recognition of the figurative meaning, after cognition of the literal meaning. If we think phenomenologically, however, we explode this literal/figurative dichotomy. In this view of conceptual metaphor as fundamental to cognition, the signifier 'tonge' contains within it both concrete and conceptual meaning, which are cognitively processed simultaneously.

'Tonge' thus becomes shorthand for the act of speech, most commonly used in medieval texts in relation to the success, or lack thereof, of this speech: for example, 'tunge mai tellen', or its

[230] Dearnley, *Translators and Their Prologues in Medieval England*, p. 56, emphasis added.
[231] *Speculum Vitae: A Reading Edition*, ed. by Ralph Hanna, EETS o.s. 331, 2 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), vol. 1, pp. 6–7, f. I^{rb}.61–70, emphasis added. By the c. 1400s, the text had been rendered in prose as the *Myrour to Lewde Men and Wymmen*: see *A Myrour to Lewde Men and Wymmen: A prose version of the Speculum vitae*, ed. by Venetia Somerset (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1981).

antithesis, 'mei na tunge tellen'.[232] The everydayness of the vernacular 'tongue'—the rude language of 'lewde men & women & hem þat bene of symple vndirstondyng'[233]—was a particular source of contention for its ability to 'tellen', especially of that which transcends the 'symple' everyday. Yet the meaning-making power of the vernacular often lies in the *in*ability to represent, as much as ability. This is played out in the 'series of something-it-isn't's' of Cervone's incarnational poetic, and the apophatic tradition more widely, but it is similarly pervasive in secular literature, via rhetorical expressions of paralipsis. As Chaucer's Squire proclaims, his 'Englysshe eek is insufficient' to express the beauty of the king's daughter, Canacee.[234] In this case, Donald Baker observes, the Squire 'was probably more *at home* in French than in English'.[235] Whether or not this is the case, the Squire's self-conscious discomfort, or unhomelikeness, in this register is itself meaning-making. The Squire 'dar nat undertake' the task of linguistic expression in English, because the telling of Canacee's beauty 'lyth nat in my tonge, nyn my konnyng'.[236] With this *occupatio* or affected modesty topos*,* the Squire is drawing upon his inability to speak to convey his sense: to 'discryven' Canacee, he states, would take a 'rethor' well skilled in the *color rhetorici,* or figurative language of *ars poetica*. This is (apparently) beyond the Squire's 'konnyng', a term which implies both ability, and the 'knowyng' or learnedness of social refinements. In proclaiming his 'tonge' and 'konnyng' insufficient, the Squire ostensibly aligns himself with the shared community of the 'lewde' rather than the 'learned', while simultaneously demonstrating the very skill in rhetoric of which he denies possession.

The Squire's 'tonge' is thus a receptacle—a dwelling—for meaning, as well as a tool with which he enters into the dwelling of language. This mutual indwelling of language within body, and the body within the web of discursive meaning, speaks both to my phenomenological framework and to Julian's anthropological schema. In chapter one, I rejected Heidegger's conception of ability-to-be as constitutive of Dasein, in favour of a model of wellbeing which transcends full physiological function. In regards to speech, Heidegger's distinction between discourse and

[232] See MED, s.v. 'tŏng(e', *n*. (2). Esp. (1).a, e.g. *?c1250 I-blessed beo þu (Eg 613)12*: 'Lauedi freo, þu […] send me in-to þat blisse þat tunge ne mai tellen'; *c1225(?c1200) SWard (Bod 34)32/295*: 'Þe swetnesse of hare song ne mei na tunge tellen'.
[233] Nicholas Love, *The Mirror of the Blessed Life of Jesus Christ: A Full Critical Edition*, ed. by Michael G. Sargent (Exeter: Exeter University Press, 2005), p. 10.
[234] Geoffrey Chaucer, *The Works of Geoffrey Chaucer*, vol. 11: *The Canterbury Tales,* Part 12: *The Squire's Tale*, ed. by Donald C. Baker (Norman, OK and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1990), p. 137, l. 37.
[235] *Ibid*, n. to l. 37, emphasis added.
[236] *Ibid*, p. 136, ll. 35–36.

language protects his argument from any further challenge, since he conceptualises language as a tool, rather than as an 'existential' fundamental to Dasein's ability-to-be. This existential comportment of Dasein remains entrusted to its participation in *discourse*. As such, the *inability* to speak should not prohibit being-at-home in the web of discourse. Indeed, inability to speak is a vital component of Heidegger's discursive model, with speech and silence running against one another as constitutive of the meaning-patterns we dwell in. Just as apophatic language makes meaning out of its inability to express the ineffable, the vernacular also serves as a particularly useful instrument with which to navigate this negative semiotic space. The Squire's meaning emerges out of what does *not* dwell 'in [his] tonge', a rhetorical statement of unhomelikeness which in the moment of expression betrays his very at-homeness in the English language. 'I moot speke as I kan', the Squire apologises, a statement through which resonates the Merleau-Pontian 'I can', as well as the inferred *cannot* of the Squire's language.

Julian's *Revelation* does not contain any overt comment on the text's vernacularity, as in the passage by Capgrave quoted above. Hers is certainly not one of Watson's 'highly self-conscious theologies' which explicitly address their linguistic choices.[237] Indeed, any claims to self-consciousness are negated by Julian's epistemological framework. We do, however, find in Julian's poetics of effacement moments when her language draws attention to itself and its instrumentality. We find the 'tongue' invocation four times in the Sloane manuscript, thrice of which function as figuratives expressing something superlative or inexpressible: once to describe the kingdom of heaven where our tribulations and woe are 'made more swete and delectable than herte may thynken or tongue may tellen'; once to describe God as 'more nere to us than tongue can tellen or herte can thynken'; and again, later in the same chapter, referring to the utmost pain we might feel on earth—'all the peyne that herte can thy[n]ke [Paris: thygnk] and tongue may tell'—which 'shuld us not agrevin' if we keep God's 'faire, blisfull chere' in mind.[238] The final and outlying reference is deployed during Julian's defence against the fiend, which she enacts by seeking comfort in the visual sight of the cross, the emotional fastening of trust unto God, and by 'tonge with speech of Crists passion'.[239] This final description of the speech act constructs a multi-layering of meaning, referring to i) the subjective performance of the flesh in Julian's speech-act of the tongue, ii) the equivalent, historical, and universal performance of the fleshly Word on the Cross, and then, by the very act of this wordplay, iii) the performance of Julian's visionary text.

[237] Watson, 'Censorship and Cultural Change', p. 839.
[238] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, pp. 70, 116.
[239] *Ibid*, p. 112.

We have returned, then, to Cervone's incarnational poetic, which draws together the meaning-making speech act with the flesh-making of the incarnation, and to the experiential route to divine 'knowyng'. Watson asserts that certain texts of universality written in the vernacular emphasise literacy of Christ's flesh as the route to divine wisdom, rather than learnedness in Latin. The *Pore Caitif*, for example, 'sees itself as democratizing the spiritual life by reminding everyone, lay or cleric, that only a certain set of religious truths (oriented towards feeling and praxis, not speculation) matter and that these truths are common to all: the "clergy" that really needs to be learned (whether by vernacular readers or clerics) is not Latin, but holiness'.[240] The body of Christ—and the associated vernacular—thus becomes 'an image for communality', and moreover, for communal *knowledge*. As Watson writes,

> In this model, developed most fully in vernacular texts, Christ is not veiled by the flesh, nor is his manifestation in the flesh the mere preliminary to his textualization in Scripture it sometimes is in Lollard thinking. Rather, the act of kenosis itself, Christ's extravagant gift of his divinity in humility and love, is seen as a *revelation of God's essential nature*, which is *more fully* understood through Christ's Incarnation than by other means.[241]

This association between the '*kynde knowyng*' effected by the incarnation discussed above, and our '*kynde langage*', serves to reposition the vernacular, not as a 'lesser' form of speech but one which, through its rude simplicity and acknowledgment of its own limitations, comes closer to the *essence* of the Word. This is reinforced by the association of this fleshly 'tonge' with our 'sensualite', which is, in Julian's schema, redeemed by the incarnation. In this model, the 'unkindness' of our sin occurred so that both human *and* divine could understand 'kyndeliche' the reality of suffering and joy—an *experiment*, 'so that God, by becoming something less than himself, might understand his own fullness'.[242]

This incarnational narrative of mutual knowing is described in the terms of our medical hermeneutic as shared understanding, a bringing together of the 'lifeworld horizons' of clinician and patient, which relies on reciprocal participation in a shared discursive web of language.

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[240] Watson, 'Conceptions of the Word', p. 108.
[241] *Ibid*, p. 101, first emphasis added.
[242] *Ibid*, p. 117. Davlin comments that God's permission for humankind to sin in order that he might 'know' 'seems a highly original view', and she cites only two Scriptural precedents, although she acknowledges Gerald O'Grady's statement that this is a standard medieval topos. She cites Hebrews 5:8: Christ 'learned […] obedience by the things which he suffered', and a prayer of St. Gregory Nazianzen. '*Kynde Knowyng* as a Major Theme', p. 13, n. 1.

Svenaeus calls language the '*medium of the meeting*': 'the doctor must understand the patient as an understanding person, through projecting himself into the patient's understanding and vice versa'.[243] This facilitates the phenomenological model of 'care over cure', '*in the sense that both parties understand what the other is saying*'. [244] Svenaeus further observes that since phenomenology understands language as *embodied*, gestural languages—body language—and intonation 'are often even more important than the cognitive content in establishing this shared understanding': 'To understand in a medical meeting […] is essentially to be understand*ing*', as in, to be *compassionate*.[245] This is the essence of Christ's incarnation: 'for whan he was in payne, we were in payne'.[246] As Davlin writes, 'Since God took our "kynde" we are all his blood brothers. Christ has two natures now, and we share the human one with him'.[247] Our 'kynde langage' is thus a shared language in two senses: linguistically, in terms of its communal web of intersubjective meaning, common to those both 'lewed' and 'lettred', and theologically, in its relation to our essential, incarnated but redeemed nature—that which we share with Christ. Moreover, its position as a less learned form of expression articulates the limitations of our human 'kynde', our human nature, which is by necessity 'unkynde' (in the act of sinning) as it is 'kynde'; a doubleness communicated by what the English tongue tells and 'mai not telle'.

This mystical poetic surely evinces Heidegger's argument that language both conceals and reveals.[248] For Heidegger, language should be an unobtrusive medium for communicating discourse, and our dominion over it 'merely conceals the uncanniness of language', 'holding him [humankind] out of his essence': 'How far', Heidegger writes, 'man is from *being at home in his own essence* is revealed by his opinion of himself as he who invented and could have invented language and understanding, building and poetry'.[249] In this violence of 'taming and ordering', Heidegger's human is 'always thrown back on the paths that he himself has laid out […] He turns round and round in his own circle'.[250] This violence 'shatters against *one* thing. That is death', the 'strange and alien <un-heimlich> thing', which 'banishes us once and for all from everything in which we are at home'.[251] Mystical language, however, does not presume to have invented the

[243] Svenaeus, *Hermeneutics of Medicine*, p. 147, emphasis added.
[244] *Ibid*, emphasis added.
[245] *Ibid*, emphasis in original.
[246] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 27.
[247] Davlin, '*Kynde Knowyng* as a Major Theme', p. 14.
[248] Martin Heidegger, *An Introduction to Metaphysics* [1953], trans. by Ralph Mannheim (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 1959), pp. 93–206.
[249] *Ibid*, p. 156, emphasis added.
[250] *Ibid*, p. 157.
[251] *Ibid*, pp. 158, emphasis in original.

meaning which emerges, nor does it claim dominion over such language: we speak of meaning-making in visionary texts as simply the *communication*, as in translation, or channelling, of meaning from the divine source. The visionary does so by finding the most appropriate 'mene' to gesture towards this 'Transcendental Signified'. The hermeneutic circling of the visionary text is not, moreover, broken by the annihilating force of death. The circling, eddying, mystical poetic abandons violence and power, instead submitting itself before the ineffable divine. Its circular path does not bar us from our essence, but asks us to journey inwards towards it, reorienting our 'kynde substance' with our redeemed 'sensualite'. While Baker states that Julian's use of the vernacular 'obscures her theological erudition',[252] it may be more accurate, then, to attribute Julian's 'theological erudition' to a literacy of Christ, as Watson has described it. Whether or not this is a 'learned' literacy of Latin is immaterial, for it is a literacy of holiness: of a 'lewde', communal, and 'kynde langage' which does not strive towards ready-to-hand transparency, but which acknowledges the speech/silence paradox of discourse by the means of its very obtrusiveness, the thread of which slips our grasp as we are drawn further into its web.

[252] Baker, 'The Structure of the Soul and the "Godly Wylle" in Julian of Norwich's *Showings*', p. 49.

Chapter Four:
Performing 'Homlyhede'

i. A Theology of Homely Indwelling

The last chapter examined the contemplative text as the 'mene' with which Julian of Norwich communicates the Word of God, extending the phenomenological framework of health developed in chapters one and two to encompass the revelatory event. The chapter was, therefore, especially concerned with the relationship between experience and interpretation; discourse and language; vision and text. I outlined a model of mutual and transactional generation between these dualities, ascribing them to the circular epistemology developed by Maggie Ross. I then explored Julian's representation of this model, examining the linguistic strategies with which she strives to express the ineffability of divine engagement. With this, I showed how the shared language of the vernacular, with its associations with the body and the Word-made-flesh, speaks particularly well to Julian's incarnational spirituality. The chapter to follow will continue this exploration of Julian's linguistic strategies, witnessing how her figurative language manifests her theology of mutual indwelling. Specifically, I will examine Julian's concept of 'homlyhede', asking how this metaphor functions in relation to her anthropological theology. This will draw together Julian's writing with the Heideggerian framework established in chapter one, highlighting her emphasis on the transfigurative power of seeking God. The focus of the chapter is, therefore, on what Philip Sheldrake has called the 'practical-pastoral' element of Julian's writing: the therapeutic framework Julian offers her 'even cristen', born out of her personal experiences of sickness and divine revelation.[1] This will conclude the triad of event > interpretation > communication which I have broadly followed in my analysis of Julian's work. This final stage underlines the incarnational emphasis of Julian's theology: just as the incarnation communicates God's message via the Word-made-flesh, the creative project of Julian's text (as a shared project between author and reader) fulfils her purpose, putting into words her revelation of love.

a) Homely / Homelier / Homeliest

The aforementioned attribution of the vernacular as a 'kynde langage'—a communal mode of communication particularly suited to incarnational theology—already associates Julian's figurative language with the concept of the home, with the notion of a 'native' or 'primary'

[1] Sheldrake, *Julian of Norwich: In God's Sight*, p. 157.

language invoking qualities of *everydayness*, *familiarity*, and *shared belonging*. Yet the sense that a language (or indeed anything) is 'natural' is only constructed by virtue of it being well known or conventional to the speaker, characteristics which result from a process of repetition, or reiterative performance, as the enactivist tradition would put it. The root of both 'native' and 'natural', Latin *nātus* (born, made), gestures towards this generative meaning: recalling the dynamism of Cervone's incarnational poetic, Julian's vernacular poetic is thus already grounded in the features of homelikeness defined in chapter one. It has a quality of *fluidity*, in the sense of one's primary language requiring no additional degree of cognitive processing with which to access the meaning. We inhabit the shared dwelling of this language *easefully*, allowing for our the establishment of a 'time-space routine' within it: just as we extend ourselves into the geography of the home, we negotiate the web of discourse, establishing a lived realm or dwelling out of this objective residence. And by this occupation or habitation, we are made intimately *familiar* with the topography of the language, an orientation which establishes both an affinity and sense of identity with the dwelling. This itself is a kind of mutual indwelling: we *belong* to the language, just as the language *belongs* to us. This conglomerate of homelike qualities is reflected in Julian's choice of words; in the individual signifiers used, as well as the sign-system itself. I have already discussed how the multiplicity of signification inherent in figurative language can serve to represent the discourse of visionary experience. Yet I also observed that the use of the vernacular for theological exposition was a contentious choice in the late fourteenth century, loaded with social and political ramifications. Julian's use of figurative language in the vernacular must therefore 'translate' the theological concepts she gleans from the revelation, glossing them with words which will convey their meaning as successfully as possible, while navigating a language not commonly used to discuss such complex theological issues. Julian does so by drawing from a network of domestic and nature-related motifs, a language of *ecology* which is explicitly and implicitly associated with home and home-loss.

This section of the chapter begins by examining the roots of Julian's homely lexis. Julian uses the term 'homely' and its variations thirty-one times in the Sloane version of the long text, compared to six instances in the short text. The Middle English headword *hōm** derives from the Old English *hām* (village, hamlet, manor, estate, home, dwelling, house, region, country), from Proto-Germanic **haimaz* (home, village). The adjectival form 'hōmlī' is first glossed by the MED as:

> 1. (a) used at home; characteristic of a home; ~medicine, household remedy […] (b) pertaining or belonging to a household, domestic; ~chirche, a church in one's house; ~fo, an enemy in one's own house; ~heue (hine, man), a household

> servant; ~meinee, members of one's family or household; fig. God's servants; ~womman, a female servant; fig. an anchorite; (c) as a noun: members of one's family or household; fig. the disciples of Christ; (d) native, indigenous; (e) of sections of anatomical parts or bodily organs: inner, interior.[2]

There are a number of significant correlations even in this first sense between the Middle English definition invoked by Julian and the phenomenological framework. Perhaps most obviously, the term denotes a person or thing *pertaining to a house* or household, implying that homeliness emerges out of the *relationship* between the house(hold) and the person/thing in question. Secondly, the structure of these relationships is itself given definition by the description of the person/thing: a servant is homely with God, with the master of the house, or, as a disciple, with Christ. Finally, (and the last sense here alludes to this most clearly) the term is implicitly connected to that which is *bodily*, or *of the flesh*: that which is *closest* or *most interior* to us. The entry's second definition reiterates this emphasis on inter-personal relationships defined by their participation in a particular community: '(a) Belonging to one household; ~with, of the same family or household as (sb.); ~of the feith, ~to the bileve, belonging to the community of Christians', and so on. The definition continues to elaborate on the specific characteristics of these relationships, which again reflect those already discussed in relation to being-at-home: 'familiar', 'close', 'intimate', 'deep', 'friendly with', 'closely associated'. The final two senses highlight some further, more historically specific, qualities: '3. (a) Meek, gentle, kind, gracious', and '4. (a) Simple, common; unassuming; (b) ugly, not comely, unattractive; unrefined, crude; (c) presumptuous, impudent, shameless'. The adverbial form, too, serves to emphasise those qualities already stated: '1. (a) In a familiar manner, intimately, closely; (b) privately, secretly; (c) meekly, gently, softly, kindly; tamely', and so on.

The attached quotations in the MED demonstrate the fairly standard contemporary usage of the term, with notable instances from or after the turn of the fifteenth century appearing in religious texts such as the *Ancrene Riwle* (a. 1400)—'Þe fende scheteþ mo querels to homelich wymmen [i.e. *anchorites*] þan to an hundreþ leuedies in þe werlde'[3]—*Pearl* (c. 1400)—'He [Christ] gef vus to be his homly hyne',[4] or *The Chastising of God's Children* (c. 1390s)—'to moche

[2] MED, s.v. 'hōmlī', *adj*.
[3] *The English Text of the Ancrene Riwle: Magdalene College Cambridge MS Pepys 2498*, ed. by A. Zettersten, EETS o.s. 274 (London: Oxford University Press, 1976). Quoted in *ibid*, 1.a.
[4] *Pearl*, ed. by Sarah Stanbury, TEAMS Middle English Texts (Kalamazoo, MI: Medieval Institute Publications, 2001), available at: <https://d.lib.rochester.edu> [accessed 19 September 2019], l. 1211. Quoted in *ibid*, 1.a.

famuliarite, as for to be homly'.[5] In a secular context pertaining to health, Thomas Hoccleve's *Series* (c. 1420) uses language of at-homeness as an indicator of his itinerant wits: 'my wit / wer hoom come ageyn'.[6] Prior to 1400, however, there are fewer instances listed. Rolle's *Psalter* features a handful, though Wycliffite texts offer a higher number, particularly with their use of 'homelynesse'.[7] The later version of the Middle English Bible (c. 1395) in Oxford, New College MS 66 (a. 1450), for example, has 'Hooly homelynesse in byleeue profitith to him silf aloone', where 'homelynesse' replaces 'cherlhed' (Latin: *rusticitas*) in the earlier version.[8] Julian may have had access to a translation of the Bible, though Georgia Ronan Crampton, editor for the TEAMS edition of the *Shewings*, is doubtful: 'Though she might have used a Wycliffite translation, her wording is not close to the only ones known to have been in circulation in her time. Other possibilities are a Wycliffite Bible unknown to us or an Anglo-French translation'.[9] Crampton cites Colledge and Walsh's conclusion that 'her own translating is most probable', writing that Julian's work is 'consistent with Biblical familiarity through hearing and quotation from memory'.[10] Annie Sutherland also points out that though 'Julian's words do not *exactly reproduce* those of the Vulgate' there is no evidence of her accessing a biblical translation.[11] Whether or not Julian had access to scriptural translations, it is what Julian does with this vernacular lexis which is my concern, that linguistic dexterity which marks her text out as a uniquely innovative text of contemplative theology.

As in modern usage, the instances cited by the MED of 'homli' and its related terms confirm the presence of comparative and superlative grammatical forms of the word. In other words, homeliness can be assigned in varying degrees of potency, with something *homely* being bettered by something *homelier* or *more homely*, or indeed bested by that which is *homeliest*. These aspects or degrees of homeliness feature throughout Julian's text: she is shown a 'ghostly sight of

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[5] *The Chastising of God's Children, And the Treatise of Perfection of the Sons of God*, ed. by Joyce Bazire and Eric Colledge (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1957), p. 198. Quoted in *ibid*, 1.a.
[6] Thomas Hoccleve, 'Complaint: Edited Text', in *Thomas Hoccleve's Complaint and Dialogue*, ed. by J. A. Burrow, EETS o.s. 313 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 7, l. 64.
[7] See *The English Works of Wyclif Hitherto Unprinted*, ed. by F. D. Matthew, EETS o.s. 74 (London: Trübner & Co., 1973), pp. 219, 435, 462, 468, 477.
[8] *The Holy Bible Containing the Old and New Testaments with the Apocryphal Books in the Earliest English Versions Made from the Latin Vulgate by John Wycliffe and His Followers*, ed. by J. Forshall and F. Madden, 4 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1850), vol. 1, p. 64.
[9] Julian of Norwich, *The Shewings of Julian of Norwich*, ed. by Georgia Ronan Crampton, TEAMS Middle English Texts (Kalamazoo, MI: Medieval Institute Publications, 1994), available at: <https://d.lib.rochester.edu> [accessed 3 May 2019], part 1, n. to ll. 574–76.
[10] Edmund Colledge and James Walsh, 'Editing Julian of Norwich's *Revelations*: A Progress Report', *Medieval Studies* 39 (1976), 404–27.
[11] Sutherland, '"Oure Feyth is Groundyd in Goddes Worde"', p. 6, emphasis in original.

his *homely* loveing'; we are 'cladde in the goodness of God and inclosyd; ya, and *more homley*'; and she describes our soul as 'his *homliest* home'.[12] This rhetorical *amplificatio* has been related by John Alford to contemporary sermon techniques.[13] Describing perhaps the most famous contemporary grammatical triad of this sort—Langland's 'Dowel', 'Dobet', and 'Dobest'—Alford pronounces amplification as a commonplace schema for dividing the generic term 'Dowel'. He cites Will's desire to obtain 'more kynde knowynge' of Dowel, which takes him 'from Thought to other, more specialized personifications of the intellectual life': 'The sequence represents that of the learning process', whereby 'Wit (native intelligence)' is joined with 'Study (*studium*, application)', which leads to 'Clergy (learning)', which 'resides with 'Scripture (books writing)', and all of these contribute to 'Imaginatif (prudential judgment)'.[14] As Alford points out, however, Will becomes more confused the further he proceeds: 'Neither learning nor Dowel appears to be crucial to salvation'.[15] After the abrupt end of the A-version, Alford observes that the 'dream-within-a-dream' of the B-continuation suspends the main action to allow for the resolution of this conundrum: 'Up to this point', Alford writes, 'he [Will] has conducted the search for Dowel as if it could be known without being lived'.[16] Will's journey 'has been marked repeatedly by conflict between the intellect and the will, by the dreamer's refusal to accept what his reason was telling him'.[17] This was borne out in the last chapter, in my discussion of 'kynde', which landed upon Hugh White's description of 'kynde knowyng' as knowledge of an experience and its opposite, or, the full spectrum of *authentic* lived experience. The same distinction might be made here: as the inner dream shows with its emphasis on fear and shame, the affective part of the soul is 'an essential partner in the intellect's search for Dowel'.[18] Indeed, the affect may supersede the intellect: as Ralph Hanna argues, 'The insistent association of Piers with "kynde knowyng" presupposes the non-institutional power of the individual to access, understand, and actuate God's law', situating learned knowledge as 'potentially unnecessary to Christian action or salvation, open to all'.[19] Will has to *live* Dowel, not simply *know* it.

Julian's path to superlative homeliness follows a similar route. Her first use of the 'homely' descriptor relays her astonishment that God would be 'so homely with a synfull creture liveing in

[12] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, pp. 7, 9, 110, emphases added.
[13] John A. Alford, 'Design of the Poem', in *A Companion to Piers Plowman*, pp. 29–66 (p. 46).
[14] *Ibid*.
[15] *Ibid*.
[16] *Ibid*, p. 47.
[17] *Ibid*.
[18] *Ibid*.
[19] Ralph Hanna, *London Literature, 1300–1380* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 275.

wretched flesh'.[20] This features at the point of her description of the 'bodily' part of the first showing: the crown of thorns. 'In this same time', however, Julian is shown 'a ghostly sight of his homely loveing': the showing of the 'littil thing, the quantitye of an hesil nutt'.[21] This shift from bodily to ghostly showing is made more explicit in the long text than in the short. Where in the shorter version, the pseudo-hazelnut showing is accompanied by the Annunciation sequence, a pairing which lends weight to the 'erthelye besynes'[22] and immanence of God's love, the longer version shifts the image of the Annunciation to the previous chapter. In place of this, Julian puts an emphasis on the spiritual relationship between the soul and God: she removes the opening reference to the former 'bodily sight' of the garland of thorns, while inserting more phrases of comprehension—she looks 'with eye of [her] understondyng', and she is 'answered in [her] understondyng'[23]—thereby drawing the focus towards her spiritual exegesis of the anthropological schema of indwelling. Indeed, following her description of the 'iii properties' of the soul ('that God made it', 'that God loveth it', and 'that God kepith it'), she expounds upon the proximity of the soul to God: 'till I am substantially onyd to him, I may never have full rest ne very blisse', she writes, 'that is to sey, that I be so festined to him that there is right nowte that is made betwix my God and me'.[24] She then details how this might be achieved, by seeking knowing of God, 'for he is the very rest': only when the soul noughts 'all things that is made' can it receive this 'ghostly rest'.[25] Directly following this, Julian adds that 'it is full gret plesance to him that a sily soule come to him nakidly and pleynly and *homely*',[26] a statement which reiterates the stripping down of the soul of its worldly excesses, to its most primary condition (which we might call its natural, or 'kindly', state).

The long text's version of these two chapters thus performs a movement of 'supereffability', as Cervone has described it. It first establishes a sense of God's presence in the physical realm—his *lively* presence, to use Julian's word—through the images of Christ's garland of thorns and the immaculate conception. Indeed, it is Christ's bleeding head which will provide the most visceral (as in 'viscera', relating to the internal or homely body) descriptions in the *Revelation*. By moving, then, from a description of the homely qualities of the flesh to the more abstract, spiritual manifestations of his love, Julian performs a cataphatic-apophatic manoeuvre: the

[20] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 6.
[21] *Ibid*, p. 7.
[22] Windeatt, ed., *Revelations of Divine Love*, p. 6.
[23] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 7.
[24] *Ibid*.
[25] *Ibid*.
[26] *Ibid*, emphasis added.

circular crown of thorns becomes the 'littil thing', which, 'round as a balle', encompasses all of creation. But Julian goes one step further: just as she holds this 'in the palme of [her] hand', God holds creation in his 'homely loveing', like 'clotheing' which 'wrappith', '[halseth]', and 'beclosyth us for tender love'.[27] In this sequence of inter-nested enclosures, Julian circles from the physical to the abstract, and finally back to the physical, with God's love reified as wrapping cloth. I have already shown how the circle functions within Julian's hermeneutic strategy, meaningful in the perpetuity of its circumference rather than solely in its signification of 'das punt', as Eckhart says. Later, in the eighth showing, the garland will be coated with blood, 'as it were garland upon garland',[28] constructing another imagined stratification or layering of circles, this time of Christ's lifeblood. The circles are collected one upon the other, in an active sequence of layering, emphasising—as in Cervone's incarnational poetic—the eternal dynamism of the mutual indwelling of God and humanity, via the homely paradox of simultaneous stripping and enwrapment.

In the following chapter, Julian skilfully fuses these bodily and ghostly showings of God's love in the image of his goodness coming 'downe to the lowest party of our nede'.[29] Here, she writes of the animating power of God's goodness, which 'quickyth our soule and bringith it on life and makyth it for to waxen in grace and vertue'.[30] It is 'nerest in kind and ridiest in grace',

> for as the body is cladde in the cloth, and the flesh in the skyne, and the bonys in the flesh, and the herte in the bouke, so arn we, soule and body, cladde in the goodnes of God and inclosyd; ya, *and more homely*, for all these may wasten and weren away; the godenes of God is ever hole, and more nere to us withoute any likenes […].[31]

This passage underscores the figurative progression which has played out in the last two chapters: from that which we know to be homely in the physical world (the body in relation to clothes; the flesh to skin; the bones to flesh, etc.), to the comparative homeliness of our soul to God, which is *more* homely than these fleshly parallels. The comparison thus serves not only as rhetorical amplification, but as a reminder of the transfiguration and 'quickening' the soul must undergo to know God and to fully find rest. Given that rest is a vital quality of being-at-home—if the fugitive, homeless soul is eternally rest*less*, the soul-at-home has attained the condition of

[27] *Ibid*.
[28] *Ibid*, p. 26.
[29] *Ibid*, p. 9.
[30] *Ibid*.
[31] *Ibid*, emphasis added.

rest*ful*ness—Julian here shows how God's goodness supplies the soul with a sense of at-homeness, if it directs itself away from worldly things and comes to him plainly in 'beseking'. Just as with Will and Dowel, then, the soul must *seek* homeliness, not just know it.

Finally, it is with Julian's description of the sixteenth showing in chapter sixty-seven of the long text, of the soul as the 'blisfull kyngdom' of God, that we find the superlative manifestation of her linguistic progression of homeliness. Julian's 'gostly eye' is opened, and she witnesses 'the soule so large as it were an endles world', a 'worshipful syte' where, '[i]n the midds of that syte', Jesus sits.[32] The play on sight/site here reiterates the locative aspect of the passage, at once invoking the homelikeness of the showing (the sight) itself—the time and space of her beholding—as well as the visual of a kingdom within the heart (the site). As stated in chapter three, the sight of Julian's 'beholding' encloses her within a dwelling immense enough to permeate the boundary of heaven and earth. This creates another level of layered indwelling: the *site* of the soul-kingdom dwells within Julian's ghostly *sight*, while Jesus dwells within the *city*. Here 'is his very wonyng; and the heyest lyte and the brightest shynyng of the cite is the glorious love of our lord, as to my syte', Julian writes.[33] Superlatives litter this chapter, with Christ appearing as 'heyest bishopp, solemnest kinge, worshipfulliest lord', who dwells 'in the worthyest place'.[34] Accordingly, Julian concludes the chapter with her statement regarding the perfection of the soul: 'For I saw in the same shewing that if the blisfull Trinite myte have made manys soule ony better, ony fairer, ony noblyer tha[n] [Paris: than] it was made, he shuld not have be full plesid with the makyng of manys soule'.[35] The soul is so perfect in its creation, that is it the site of Christ's '*homliest home* and his endles wonyng'.[36]

This chapter therefore reaches a textual climax, both in its conclusion of the sixteen showings and in its showing of the perfection of the soul; its 'onyng' (or 'wonyng') with Christ. Watson and Jenkins gloss this vision a representative of 'the New Jerusalem of Rev. 21:1–27, as represented in art and poems such as *Pearl* or *The Pricke*, where the vision of God "es mast joy" of the city of heaven, a city "so large and wide" it has space for all the saved, all of whom can nonetheless clearly see "the face of God allemighty"'.[37] They also note that this image of heart-dwelling can be found in *Piers Plowman*, in which Piers tells the pilgrims that if they search

[32] *Ibid*, p. 109.
[33] *Ibid*, p. 110.
[34] *Ibid*, pp. 109–10.
[35] *Ibid*, p. 110.
[36] *Ibid*, emphasis added.
[37] Watson and Jenkins, eds., *Writings*, p. 335, n. to ll. 1–4.

diligently for Truth, they will find him in their own hearts: 'Thou shalt se in thiselves Truth sitte in thin herte / In a cheyne of charite, as thou a child were, / To suffren him and segge nought ayein thy sires wille'.[38] Images of interior enclosure or indwelling mark the fulfilment of the soul/pilgrim/dreamer's seeking: the end of the sowing and setting, digging and delving which constitutes the effortful process of making the soul a perfect dwelling-place for the divine, and finding its perfect dwelling in God. This sense of culmination and fulfilment is characterised by another iteration of the term 'homely' earlier in Julian's long text: '*full homely*'.[39] In chapter twelve, describing the scourging of Jesus and the spilling of his blood, Julian asks that we 'take full homely [Paris: full holsomly] [h]is [Paris: his] blissid blode to washe us of synne'.[40] Two chapters later, she then describes her lord as hosting his 'derworthy frends *ful homeley* and ful curtesly'.[41] Fullness in these instances suggests a *capacity* of/for homeliness, in both our taking of Christ, and Christ's dealing with us. When the soul reaches its fullness or fulfilment—its 'fulhede'—it will finally be 'reysid above the depeness of the erth and al vayne sorows, and enioyen in him', the 'worthyest', 'heyest', 'brightest', '*homliest*' home in which for God to dwell.

The Paris manuscript does not differ enormously from Sloane's use of homely language, apart from the passage quoted above concerning the plenteousness of Christ's blood. To quote the passage in full, Sloane has:

> And than cam to my minde that God hath made waters plentivous in erthe to our service and to our bodily ease, for tender love that he hath to us, but yet lekyth him better that we take *full homely* [h]is blissid blode to washe us of synne; for there is no licor that is made that he lekyth so wele to give us; for it is most plentivous as it is most pretious […].[42]

Paris, meanwhile, has '*full holsomly*', which is retained in Watson and Jenkins' edition,[43] and expanded from 'we take fullye' in the short text.[44] Watson and Jenkins point out that this passage bears similarities to Richard Rolle's meditations on Christ's body as a meadow 'ful of swete flouris and *holsum* herbis'.[45] It is true that the 'licor' referred to here invokes the liquor of

[38] *Ibid*, n. to l. 5.
[39] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 19, emphasis added.
[40] *Ibid*.
[41] *Ibid*, p. 22, emphasis added.
[42] *Ibid*, p. 19, emphasis added.
[43] Watson and Jenkins, eds., *Writings*, pp. 167, 77, emphasis added.
[44] Windeatt, ed., *Revelations of Divine Love*, p. 8.
[45] Watson and Jenkins, eds., *Writings*, p. 166, n. to ll. 9–13, emphasis added.

medicine, as well as that of the sacramental wine, both of which—like Rolle's 'holsum herbis'—are conducive to good health. Yet considering our association of 'homeliness' with 'wholeness' and indeed 'health', the 'full homely' of the Sloane manuscript is equally, if not more, appropriate. Indeed, 'full homely', in Julian's usage, has the double meaning of both taking his blood close to, or indeed *into*, the body, and the notion that this act of taking will provide full wholeness, full holiness, or full health.

b) 'Homlyhede'

The final textual variant of 'homely' Julian deploys refers to the state of 'homlyhede' (also: 'homlihede'). For Julian, this is the condition the soul aspires to with its 'beseking', or '[seking] him to the beholdyng of him'. In the last chapter, I described this as a kind of being-towards-God, effected by the soul re-attuning to its divine aspect, its 'kynde substance', and to homelikeness. Contemporary texts of contemplative theology offer similar descriptions of this process. Wolfgang Riehle cites, for example, expressions of the *familiaritas cum Deo* motif, which described the intimacy of the human-divine relationship, and often manifested in vernacular literature with 'the more concrete Germanic words *homli* or *homlihed* and *homlines*'.[46] The term 'hoomly' appears in Walter Hilton's *Eight Chapters on Perfection*, for instance, as a synonym for mystical union: 'whanne his soule is oonyd wiþ Crist, and riȝt hoomly with him'.[47] Such 'onyng' or *unio* is the highest point of contemplation following the spiritual ascent of the *Scala paradisi*, at which point the soul meets the divine in a moment of ecstasy, or *excessus mentis*. Hilton's depiction of this as a journey to Jerusalem in the second book of the *Scale* attests to this ascent as a pilgrimage to the 'place of peace' (Jerusalem: from the Western Semitic **uru*, 'house', 'town', and **salim*, either 'peace' or 'Shalim'), in which the pilgrim seeks a place of homeliness. The itinerancy of this state of seeking recalls Marcel's *homo viator*, the Odyssean conception of life as a pilgrimage, which ends when one comes home. In Hilton's story, however, which is highly Augustinian, the perceived difference between God, the 'unmade' creator, and our soul, which is still 'made' (although made from that which is 'unmade') precludes any kind of complete union occurring *in this life*. This rests on the problem of the soul's fragmentation following the fall, which is continually leading us away from our 'kindly' nature (our 'substance') and towards sin. We have, as John Trevisa's (a. 1387) translation of Ranulf Higden's *Polychronicon* attests, lost our primordial 'homlynesse': 'Man in

[46] Riehle, *The Middle English Mystics*, p. 97.
[47] Quoted in *ibid.*

his bygynnynge […] fel […] out of homlynesse [*Higd.(2)*: familiarite; Latin: familiaritate] into offence and wreþþe'.[48] Even Eckhart, whose writing on this point has exposed him to accusations of pantheism, maintained that the soul and God *do not* completely fuse in *unio mystica*: 'God is in the soul, but only in so far as he mirrors himself in it'.[49] Consequently, the journey *home*—the pilgrimage to New Jerusalem, as Hilton, among others, would put it—is never truly fulfilled as long as we live; we can be *familiar* with him in this life, but never entirely 'oned' with God.

For Julian, while we remain distinct from God, the ontological union of our 'substance' with the divine suggests that a degree of homeliness *can* be achieved in this life. Or rather, she suggests that we *are already* at home, or 'oned' to God, on account of his grace. This is a state we can then *fulfil* through the act of 'beseking'. To return to the pilgrimage analogy, at-homeness can be found on the pilgrim's road, rather than solely at their destination. There is a distinction to be made, then, in our theoretical lexis: between homeliness, or the phenomenological concept of home*like*ness I have been using, derived from Heidegger, and Julian's understanding of this concept of being-at-home as she describes it using the term 'homlyhede'. This rests on the figurative mechanics of each term, with Heidegger's simile gesturing towards likeness, and Julian's metaphor suggesting a more essential kind of condition or capacity. Yet 'homlyhede' has not yet been unpacked for its specific theological connotations; indeed, it has been transcribed or translated out of existence in some witnesses of Julian's text. Watson and Jenkins observe linguistic variance between the Paris and Sloane versions' use of the *-hede* suffix generally: where *-hede* is retained throughout Sloane, they write, Paris retains some forms but changes all but two[50] forms of 'homlyhede' to *-nes(se*.[51] This Paris variance is, unfortunately, an editorial decision which persisted into print: the first edition of Julian's text produced by Serenus Cressy in 1670, for example, also transcribes 'homlyhede' as 'homeliness'.[52] Late medieval variance can be determined by consulting the eLALME, where for the suffix *-hood* (assigned 'dot number' 315), we find listed four variants: '*he(e)d*, and all other *–e–* forms'; '*ho(o)d*, and all other *–o–* forms'; '*had(e)*'; '*-id* and *-yd*'. A brief survey using the eLALME dot map feature throws up a significant distribution of this suffix to the north of England, most heavily grouped

[48] MED, s.v. 'hōmlīnes(se', *n*.
[49] Quoted in Riehle, *The Middle English Mystics*, p. 154.
[50] Apart from Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, pp. 125, 132.
[51] Watson and Jenkins, eds., *Writings*, p. 36.
[52] Julian of Norwich, *XVI revelations of divine love shewed to a devout servant of our Lord called Mother Juliana, an anchorete of Norwich, who lived in the dayes of King Edward the Third*, ed. by Serenus Cressy (orig. pub. London: s.n., 1670), EEBO (Ann Arbor, MI and Oxford: Text Creation Partnership, 2014), available at: <http://name.umdl.umich.edu/B20816.0001.001> [accessed 5 June 2019], p. 10.

in the northeast, disclosing the inclusion of the term as a feature specific to northern—and most importantly, Norfolk—dialect. Moreover, with the short text, the version in the Amherst manuscript, and the excerpt version in the Westminster manuscript all retaining the suffix *-hede* in the majority of the text, the Sloane scribe's retention of this form can be comfortably read as a reflection of Julian's original lexis. It should, therefore, be retained as such.

The codicological disparity between Paris and Sloane is, however, more than simply a linguistic issue, with the Paris variation incurring major implications for Julian's theology. To again quote Gillespie and Ross, Paris 'consistently avoids the theological *lectio difficilior*, preferring the orthodox to the audacious'.[53] Yet even Watson and Jenkins' synthetic edition, which they justify as a reflection of the 'diversity of written forms' and culture of 'textual *mouvance*',[54] does not offer any theological interpretation for Julian's diverse and recurrent use of the *-hede* suffix. A closer look at the semantic variance between the two versions of the text reveals a particular distinction which makes it hard to deny the construction is Julian's own. The suffix *-nesse* is usually attached to an adjective in Middle English, sometimes to form a noun, and generally signifies, as it does in modern usage, a quality or condition of a thing[55]—as in Trevisa's usage, which frames 'homlynesse' as a condition of *familiaritas*. This is, of course, retained in modern English: the OED glosses *-ness* as a formation of 'abstract nouns from adjectives, participles', etc.[56] Julian's preferred suffix *-hede*, however, is a term which most commonly features in composition with a noun as a simplex, denoting a role, rank, or position.[57] The OED offers a similar definition for the modern derivative, *-hood*, glossing the original form as a 'distinction' meaning 'person, personality, sex, condition, quality, rank'.[58] While the former indicates, therefore, a quality or approximation of a thing, the latter suggests a participatory condition: indeed, a *collective* condition, shared by a 'collection or group of people'.

Julian's invocation of 'homlyhede' is thus more specific than the generalised sense of potency which the suffix *-ness* affords. While *-ness* denotes a condition of a state of *being*—a characterisation of a specific element in a person/thing's ontic state (its *haecceitas* or 'thingliness')—the *-hede* variant offers a simplex for a person/thing's *capacity*. This sense of a capacity/role reiterates Julian's emphasis on our anthropological performativity, which is

[53] Gillespie and Ross, '"With Mekeness Aske Perserverantly"', p. 140, n. 1.
[54] Watson and Jenkins, eds., *Writings*, p. 30.
[55] MED, s.v. '-nes(se', *suf.*
[56] OED, s.v. '-ness', *suf.*
[57] MED, s.v. -hēd(e', *suf.*
[58] OED, s.v. '-hood', *suf.*

particularly suitable to phenomenological analysis. That is, according to Julian's model, our essence or 'thisness' *emerges* out of our active engagement with the world; we discover the 'divine likeness' of our 'kynde substance' (the '*thisness*' of our existence) through the process of seeking or being-towards-God. Similarly, since God's *essential nature* or being cannot be known, we must know him through his workings or energies: through the 'Godhede', a perichoretic reference to the work or operations of the Trinity. According to Gregory of Nyssa, Godhead refers solely to the divine operation of seeing or beholding, as 'His nature cannot be named and is ineffable. We say that every name, whether invented by human custom or handed down by the Scriptures, is indicative of our conceptions of the divine nature, but does not signify *what that nature is in itself*'.[59] The Godhead is known to us only via the hypostatic union of the incarnation.[60] Grasping our own divine aspect is therefore equally bound up in performativity, which the last chapter framed within the non-closing dynamism of the contemplative epistemology.

'Homlyhede' denotes, then, the way of living I formerly described as being-towards-God, or genuinely authentic being-in-the-world: a knowing through experience of the spectrum of suffering and joy inherent in postlapsarian life, combined with an active directedness towards health, wholeness, or holiness. Consider Julian's use of the suffix elsewhere: 'fulhede', 'hardhede', 'roundhede', 'plentioushede', 'lordhede', 'heyhede', 'kinghede', 'lordhede', 'faderhede', and, of course, 'moderhede'. These choice instances give an impression of the *enactive* quality of each term: those used to describe Christ's blood, for instance, function as a kind of wordplay on 'the plentious bledeing of the *hede*'.[61] The dripping of the blood fulfils its 'plentioushede', the spreading its 'roundhede', both of which are reiteratively accreted as she circles around the 'forehede'. Each *-hede* word is, importantly, likened by Julian to a domestic image: the 'roundhede' of the pellots to 'the scale of heryng', the 'plentioushede' of the spreading on the 'forehede' to the 'dropys of water that fallen of the evys after a greate showre of reyne'.[62] Finally landing on 'plentioushede inumberable', the spiralling amplification

[59] Gregory of Nyssa, 'An Answer to Ablabius: That We Should Not Think of Saying That There Are Three Gods', trans. by Cyril C. Richardson, in *Christology of the Later Fathers*, ed. by Edward R. Hardy, Library of Christian Classics 4 (Philadelphia, PA: Westminster Press, 1954), pp. 256–67 (p. 259, emphasis added). For original Latin see 'Ad Ablabium: Quod non sint tres dei', in *Gregorii Nysseni opera dogmatica minora*, ed. by F. Mueller, *Gregorii Nysseni opera*, vol. 3, part 1, ed. by W. Jaeger (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1958), pp. 42–43.
[60] Cf. R. Kendall Soulen, *Divine Names and the Holy Trinity: Distinguishing the Voices* (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2011).
[61] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 10, emphasis added.
[62] *Ibid*.

collapses, and Julian falls back on paradox: 'This shewing was quick and lively, and hidouse and dredfull, swete and lovely'; and God 'that is so reverent and dredefull' is also 'so homley and curtes'.[63] The dynamic bleeding of the 'hede' in this passage—the *lived* experience of Christ's suffering—both acts as an analog to the performance of 'homlyhede', and offers the 'mene' by which the reader might access it. I have shown how pain—and compassion for another's pain—breaks down the subjectivity of the individual, wounding them and disclosing the objectivity and otherness of their own existence. Passages such as the one above effect this disclosure by leading the reader with language into the same epistemology as the visionary herself. Christ's performance of 'homlyhede' thus not only concerns his own bodily wounding, but opens the reader up to their own enactive participation in this homely project.

Redefining homelikeness as 'homlyhede' more accurately draws together Julian's Christological theology with her anthropological schema. In Julian's *imago Dei* model, we remain essentially united to God, and therefore can reorient our un(home)likeness to (home)likeness by the exercise of redirecting our attention and action to God. By pursuing this way of living—this being-towards-God—we are able to redeem, indeed remould, our distorted soul back to its *imago Dei*, which has been warped out of shape by generations of inherited sin. Redirecting ourselves to our divine substance is, for Julian, a collective vocation: we must realise the *kin*ship of human*kind*, so as to heal the communal body of all 'even cristen'. In this sense, we must define our collective identity through compassionate 'withness', a joint project which will facilitate the *fulfilment*, the 'fulhede', of our potentiality. This is not the kind of exclusionary *-hood* identity which builds barriers, such as one's nationhood might. Such exclusivity stems from a sense of *un*homelikeness, and the 'buffered', closed-off self which accompanies this sense of instability. 'Homlyhede', on the other hand, is a group identity enacted through reiterative togetherness, stability, and interconnection. This communal act offers a new way of identifying within the world; an opportunity for a collective, performative identity based, fundamentally, on love.

ii. The Porosity of Prayer

a) The Path of Non-Resistance

In chapter three, I defined *seeking* as an existential mode or condition of human nature, characterised by a conscious redirection of intention and worldly living towards the 'substance'

[63] *Ibid*, p. 11.

of the soul and towards God. 'Homlyhede' emerges out of this same enactive process: just as Will must seek Dowel, the soul must *seek* 'homlyhede' through their way of living. Until now, I have included the terms 'seking' and 'beseking' as part and parcel of this same dialectical mode. At this point, however, it is necessary to distinguish between seeking (as part of Julian's circular epistemology) and '*be*seking', a more specific grammatical subset of this term. Many modern editions of the *Revelation* translate 'beseking' as the modern cognate 'beseeching' (to seek after, search for, try to get, to seek to know[64]), an editorial decision which silences not only Julian's dialectal voice, but some of the more subtle theological currents of her writing. 'Beseeching' is, of course, a prefixed form from c. 1200 of the Old English *sēċan* (to seek or inquire about), often used to denote an act of petition or prayer. The OED notes that the 'seek' in 'beseking' displaced the southern 'seech' in the simple verb, while in contrast, the modern 'beseeching' retains the southern form. A search in the eLALME affirms this north/south variance in the 'k' and 'ch' forms of the verb: a dot-map fit for the 'k' forms of 'beseking' and 'seeking' (marker 236: 'SEEK, *pres*') shows a cluster of matching linguistic profiles in the east and northeast of England, concentrated around the East Anglian and East Midlands border. The translation or glossing of 'beseke-' as 'beseech' therefore imposes a false dissociation between Julian's two terms, 'seke' and 'beseking', both of which are common to her dialect. Yet once again, there is more lost in translation than simply dialectal expression. Given the precision of Julian's lexis, I contend that 'beseking' is, like 'homlyhede', a specific contemplative term which must be retained in critical analysis in order to understand Julian's complex theology.

I propose that Julian uses 'beseking' to denote the *enaction* of seeking: the performance, or *realisation* of the soul's capacity to seek God. The prefix *be-*, the MED states, is used to form transitive verbs from simple transitives, 'usually with intensive, completive, or figurative meaning(s)', with 'bisȩchen' cited as a form inherited from Old English.[65] Similarly, the OED cites the original meaning of *be-* as 'about' in its various senses, such as 'be-come' (come about), or 'be-stir', in which 'the notion of "all about, all round, over", or "throughout", naturally intensifies the sense of the verb'.[66] Thus, while the transitive 'seek' (i.e. 'seke him') denotes the directedness of the soul *towards* God, the intensive '*be*seking' focuses the act of seeking *around* or *about* God, or specifically *concerning* God. In addition to the usage of 'beseking' as a verb, however, what is equally (if not more) significant is Julian's use of the term as a gerund. The MED defines the gerund 'bisȩchinge' as '(a) Entreaty, supplication, prayer, intercession, or an

[64] OED, s.v. 'beseech', *v.* (1).a–b.
[65] MED, s.v 'bi-', *pref.* (2).
[66] OED, s.v. 'be-', *pref.*

instance of it; (b) *law* a petition or plea'.[67] Prefixed in this way, 'beseking' functions as a noun, denoting the objective *act* of seeking God. In other words, we do not only 'beseke' at/towards the grammatical object—'we shuld besekyn mercy and grace'; 'thou besekyst it'—instead, 'beseking' becomes a verbal noun, and, importantly, a collective project: 'our besekyng'. The translation of 'beseking' as 'beseeching', however, limits the term to the category of petitionary prayer. It is true that the term *is* used by Julian specifically in relation to prayer, appearing solely in Julian's chapters discussing the fourteenth revelation—chapters forty-one to forty-three of the long text—in which she outlines the power of prayer and its effect on the soul. Prayer, Julian writes, *expands* the capacity of the soul like the leather purse, making it 'supple and buxum to God', which leads to the oneing of the soul with the divine.[68] Yet with the above grammatical points in mind, Julian's definition of prayer does not refer so much to a sense of supplication or petition, but rather as a 'mene' to increased porosity and unification; that is, the catalysing force of the dynamic balancing and rebalancing of our relationship to God. Indeed, Paul Molinari calls this '*unitive* prayer' rather than petitionary prayer,[69] while Sheldrake refers to Julian's treatment of prayer as 'fundamentally relational rather than instrumental'.[70] I contend that it is both: relational, in that it does indeed describe 'our life-long relationship with God and God's relationship with us',[71] and instrumental in that it *discloses* this relationship to us. It is due to this linguistic movement that Julian is able to report that 'our besekyng is not cause of Godis goodness', but that God is the 'ground of thi besekyng':[72] God is the ontological foundation of the soul, including its capacity for seeking, and thus is also the foundation of our 'beseking'.

Prayer, or 'beseking', in other words, refers to the dynamic fulfilment of our relationship with God. The term is, therefore, especially useful for Julian's discussion of the performance of 'homlyhede'. Prayer disrupts the inauthentic or buffered self in a manner akin to the contemplative text, effecting a kind of willed porosity, like the *willed unwilling* of beholding, and facilitated by desire: the 'godly' or 'kindly will'. Molinari outlines this framework, whereby the 'longing' of the soul corresponds to the 'good will of God'. This, he writes, leads to two movements: 'the one of the soul aspiring and tending towards God, and the other of god desiring to have us, [which] are shown by Julian as intrinsically joined, as two aspects of one reality,

[67] MED, s.v. 'bisēchinge', *ger*, emphasis in original.
[68] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 61.
[69] Molinari, *Julian of Norwich*, p. 75, emphasis added.
[70] Sheldrake, *Julian of Norwich: In God's Sight*, p. 138.
[71] *Ibid*, p. 142.
[72] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, pp. 56–57.

when she says: "our kindly Will is to have God, and the Good Will of God is to have us"'.[73] Molinari writes of this union as achieved in degrees, whereby 'a certain degree of union […] is already established' merely by the soul longing for God, an aspiration which must then be developed into full union for it to 'become more concrete and exercise its influence on man's life. Therefore from the union of aspiration or desire, Julian proceeds to the union of wills by means of prayer'.[74] As the *Revelation* reports: 'first it is my [our lord's] wille that thou have it, and sythen I make the to willen it, and sithen I make the to besekyn it and thou besekyst it'.[75] The act of 'beseking' then enables 'a new, gracious, lestyng will of the soule ony[d] [Paris: onyd] and festenyd into the will of our lord be the swete, privy werke of the Holy Gost'.[76] This schematic of an initial degree against the full degree of union parallels the above classification of 'seeking-as-capacity' and 'beseking-as-action': if the aspiration or will is towards God (our capacity), then this establishes an initial potentiality for union, which must be fulfilled or satisfied by prayer or 'beseking'. Julian describes this movement as a 'turning' of the will towards God: 'our wil be turnyd into the will of our lord, enioyand: and so menith he whan he seith "I mak the to willen it"'.[77] This language of turning resonates through Heidegger's description of conversion, as a 'turning-*toward* God and a turning-*away* from idol-images'.[78] With God as 'ground' and the 'substance' already 'oned' to him, we are able to re-attune to our *likeness* of him and away from the *unlikeness* which is effected by slippage into sin: in Julian's words, 'Prayor onyth the soule to God; for thow the soule be ever lyke to God in kynde and substance, restorid be grace, it is often onlyke in condition be synne on manys partye'.[79]

In Julian's model, it is the 'kindly will' that allows us to choose to perform this 'turn towards', an emphasis on willingness which Julian uses to distinguish between the intentionality of 'beseking', against the disclosive—but generally *involuntary*—experiences of purgation, like her bodily sickness. The former constitutes an internal movement—'Pray *inderly*'[80]—while the latter denotes an external (usually a bodily) catalyst. Recall the hierarchy of suffering outlined in chapter two, in which I discussed the 'closing off' effected by extreme physical pain; the limitations placed upon the subject's ability to perform *compassio*. In chapters thirty-nine and forty, Julian describes these external experiences as preparatory stages of 'beseking'. These

[73] Molinari, *Julian of Norwich*, p. 94.
[74] *Ibid*, p. 96.
[75] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 56.
[76] *Ibid*, p. 57.
[77] *Ibid*, p. 58.
[78] Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, p. 66, emphasis in original.
[79] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 60.
[80] *Ibid*, p. 57, emphasis added.

include experiences such as 'bodely sekenes of Gods sendyng, and also sorow and shame from withoute, and reprove and dispyte of this world' as those which make us 'clene' and 'redy' for the higher stages of prayer.[81] She does not dwell on these for long, however. Molinari ascribes this to Julian's understanding that too much purgation might make a soul 'spiritually self-centred', which would hinder their progress.[82] Certainly, if we consider Julian's anxious avoidance of the 'self-beholding' discussed in chapter two, it is clear that she favours the willed disclosure effected by compassionate reading, learning, and prayer over the involuntary disclosure of pain and purgation. This might be ascribed to a Bernardian prioritising of the internal over the external—'For, just as the soul is more important than the body, so spiritual practices are more fruitful than material ones'[83]—yet I would argue (especially considering Julian's holistic attitude to the body-soul unity) that she is aware of the difference between these lower degrees of purgative disclosure, against the higher degree of willed contemplation and 'beseking'; a difference which lies in the matter of the will.

Both of these routes—the purgative way and the contemplative way—are practices that disrupt the average everydayness of the individual, thereby opening them up to porosity and facilitating 'homlyhede'. In the purgative way, however, there is an added level of effort or will required, an extra turn in the circular epistemology: in illness, the subject must turn *away* from the potentially distracting force of pain before they can turn *towards* the homelikeness of God. In other words, the will is only engaged *once* they are in the condition of pain—which Julian learns 'on the pulses' when her pain draws her into self-beholding and momentary despair. Buddhist teacher Shinzen Young provides a useful formula or 'pain equation' for understanding this process: 'S = P x R', or, 'Suffering equals Pain times Resistance'.[84] Young did not invent this formula, of course; the practice of non-resistance is pervasive in various forms throughout most meditative traditions. It has been inverted for happiness, too, under the general tenet of 'Happiness = Non-Resistance'.[85] In this framework, suffering emerges out of perceptive response to an attunement: it is the story we tell ourselves about our pain; the mind's judgement of the signals or sensations

[81] *Ibid*, p. 53.
[82] Molinari, *Julian of Norwich*, p. 76.
[83] Bernard of Clairvaux, 'Apologia to Abbot William', quoted in Jantzen, *Julian of Norwich*, p. 42.
[84] Shinzen Young, *Break Through Pain: A Step-by-Step Mindfulness Meditation Programme for Transforming Chronic and Acute Pain* (Boulder, CO: Sounds True, 2004), passim.
[85] Verified, for example, by the 2014 study by University College London, which found higher levels of reported happiness in those with lower expectations (i.e. lower resistance to the potential actuality of the situation). Robb B. Rutledge, Nikolina Skandali, Peter Dayan, and Raymond J. Dolan, 'A Computational and Neural Model of Momentary Subjective Well-Being', *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 11.33 (2014), 12252–57.

of the body; the ego's interpretation of experience. As psychologist and Holocaust survivor Viktor Frankl puts it, 'Between stimulus and response, there is a space. In that space lies our freedom and our power to choose our response. In our response lies our growth and our happiness'.[86] By using the will to hijack the rational thinking mind or ego, the subject can *choose* to respond differently to pain. Instead of telling themselves a story about the unbearable nature of pain—i.e. 'I will never feel well again', or, as with Julian, 'Is any payne like this?'—the non-resistant individual might seek to replace these beliefs with new thoughts, such as 'I have survived pain before, I can survive this too', or, like Julian, 'peyne is passand'.[87]

Such conceptions of resistance also appear in texts of medieval theology. Aquinas, for example, distinguishes between categories of experience wherein a person retains their ability to choose—to reason, *ratio*—and others where their reason is disrupted. He calls the latter *perfect passions*, and the former *imperfect passions*, or *propassions*.[88] Derived from Greek philosophy, 'propassion' translates literally as *pro-* (in place of, for, instead of) + *passio* (suffering).[89] For Aquinas, *propassions* are a quality of the virtuous; the ability to choose one's response to external stimuli means they can incline their reason towards good judgement. The reason Aquinas makes this distinction is to clarify the paradox of Christ's suffering: how Christ functions as the paradigm of non-resistance, but also as the paradigm of suffering. Aquinas explains that Christ could suffer far more powerful propassions that any human, on account of his higher powers—reason—being hypostatically connected to God (indeed, *as* God).[90] As Nicholas Kahm puts it, 'untouched by original sin and full of grace, and experiencing the beatific vision, the strength of Christ's higher powers could and did suffer very vehement passions that did not disturb or affect his reason, for example, he could sweat blood for fear of death without it affecting his choice'.[91] With this in mind, we might therefore think of a person's will—or their reason, in Aquinas' terms—as possessing a certain degree of tolerance for the sensual experiences provoked by external stimuli; including pain. Since Christ's tolerance is higher than any human, he is able to take on the suffering and sin of *all* humanity while remaining non-

[86] Viktor Frankl, quoted in Alex Pattakos, *Prisoners of Our Thoughts: Viktor Frankl's Principles for Discovering Meaning in Life and Work* (San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Joehler, 2004), p. viii.
[87] *Ibid*, pp. 26, 23.
[88] Thomas Aquinas, *Opera Omnia*, vol. 22.3: *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate*, ed. by A. Dondaine (Rome: Leonine Commission/Editori di San Tommaso, 1975–1976), q. 26, a. 8. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Sancti Thomae de Aquino Summa Theologiae* (Rome: Editiones Paulinae, 1962), 3, q. 15, a. 4.
[89] Cf. Paul Gondreau, *The Passions of Christ's Soul in the Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Scranton, PA: University of Scranton Press, 2009), esp. pp. 67–70, 366–72.
[90] Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, 3, q. 46, aa. 7–8.
[91] Nicholas Kahm, *Aquinas: On Emotion's Participation in Reason* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2019), p. 252.

resistant—until the very last moment, when, at the apex of his kenosis, he cries out, 'My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?' (Matthew 27:46; Mark 15:34). Perhaps this is the moment Christ's propassions lapse into perfect passions; dying in his humanity, Christ's non-resistance finally fails and his pains are transformed into suffering, the same 'despeir' described by Julian. This concludes the 'experiment' of God's embodiment in human form: the act of suffering par excellence—the passion. Christ suffers and dies *as* a human *for* humanity, encompassing both the *passionate* 'I suffer', the *compassionate* 'I suffer with', and the *propassionate* 'I suffer *for*'. It is on account of this paradigm that we can say that when a person chooses non-resistance, they are choosing the 'wey' of Christ, or choosing to live a life *in* Christ, to be 'en-Christed'.

As Aquinas's model acknowledges, however, a person's propassionate capacity, their level of tolerance of the will or reason, may not be 'strong' enough to choose this path. I use scare quotes here to highlight the fact that in this framework, overcoming pain is not a matter of strength in terms of conscious effort, wherein if one succumbs to suffering they are deemed to have not 'tried hard enough'—this is the faulty thinking which gives rise to language of 'fighting' illness. While some individuals may attain this degree of enlightenment required to choose non-resistance in the face of pain, in most instances this is out of their control. This might be the case even if the individual has *willed* pain, as in Julian's earlier request for a bodily sickness. Indeed, it surely requires a lifetime of practice to endure sudden loss, trauma, or physical pain as neutral phenomena—if this is possible at all, which in some cases it may never be. This accounts, in my view, for Julian's skimming of the preparatory, external stages of 'beseking' in favour of the higher practice of prayer: in other words, her foregrounding of the *contemplative way* over the *purgative way*. It also accounts for the disrupted death sequence in Julian's showing of the passion: in the final chapter of the eighth showing, Julian anticipates Christ's death, but 'saw hym not so'.[92] Instead of dying, Christ changes his 'chere', an advent of joy which draws focus *away* from the intensity of his pain.[93] I have written elsewhere of this 'dying-but-not-death' as a reminder of the duality of God's internal and external countenance.[94] In other words, a reminder that there are less accessible, inner expressions behind Christ's *outward* suffering; expressions of love and joy, which are not always visible to the human eye. With the moment of changing cheer, Julian thus avoids bearing witness to the slippage of Christ-in-pain into Christ-in-suffering; Christ remains *propassionate* until the end, a plot twist which bypasses any equivalent association of ability to endure pain as a virtuous trait, as in Aquinas's model. Instead of

[92] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 30.
[93] *Ibid*, p. 31.
[94] Lucas, 'Passion and Melancholy', pp. 15–18.

emphasising the need for *patientia* in terms of *suffering*, Julian subsequently emphasises the need for the reader to be patient in their *seeking*. For while the purgative way requires the individual to train their will against pain, the contemplative way trains the individual in practising porosity and attentive non-resistance to *all* circumstances. The former is driven by the pain event, the latter is a daily, reiterative, lived practice. Indeed, the latter prepares the individual for the former: when the contemplative inevitably does experience pain, they may then be able to engage the will more quickly, and re-attune to homelikeness more easily. By *beginning* with the contemplative way of 'beseking', the individual learns how deal with unwilled and discomfiting circumstances—to suffer pain without suffer*ing*.

b) Prayer Posture

In the contemplative way, wilful intention is integrated with *attention* to the present moment, a practice which trains the subject in inhabiting the space of the deep mind. This is the nature of prayer: the individual strips themselves of all worldly accretions and self-conscious thoughts, thereby making room for the irruption of the divine, or the gift of the Spirit. Christ spoke to this in the Garden of Gethsemane, when he said:

> Take ye heed, watch and pray. For ye know not when the time is.
> Even as a man who going into a far country, left his house; and gave authority to his servants over every work, and commanded the porter to watch.
> Watch ye therefore, (for you know not when the lord of the house cometh […]
> (Mark 13:33–35)

Benjamin Crowe quotes this verse with two further passages about the night in the garden, in which Jesus finds the disciples sleeping, saying to them: 'Watch ye, and pray that you enter not into temptation' (Mark 14:38).[95] Crowe writes that '*watchful prayer* is an essential response to the message of the imminent kingdom of God. Praying in a spirit of "watchfulness" means praying with one's eyes peeled and ears opened for the fulfilment of the new creation'.[96] It means, in other words, praying in a spirit of preparation. This is the Christian way of life: such a life, Crowe writes, 'is often called a life "in the Spirit", which means 'recognizing prayer itself as a *gift*, as a part of the radically altered existential situation of those who have received the gift

[95] Benjamin Crowe, 'Heidegger and the Prospect of a Phenomenology of Prayer', in *The Phenomenology of Prayer*, ed. by Bruce Ellis Benson and Norman Wirzba (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005), pp. 119–33 (p. 128).
[96] *Ibid*, emphasis in original.

of the Spirit'.[97] In chapter three, I examined Julian's writing on receptivity to the spirit with a quote in which she describes a man like 'a purse', which I interpreted as a description of the expanding-contracting capacity of the soul-body unity. It is worth at this point quoting it in full:

> A man goyth vppe ryght and the soule of his body is sparyde as a purse fulle feyer · And whan it is tyme of his nescessery it is openyde and sparyde ayen fulle honestly · And that it is he · that Doyth this it is schewed ther wher he seyth · he comyth downe to us to the lowest parte of oure nede ·[98]

In the above discussion, I suggested a reading of 'soule' as the unified soul-body experience, wherein soul and body mutually dwell within each other; a holistic organism which offers the potential for spiritual growth in this life, rather than simply the abandonment of the 'wretched flesh' of the body after death. This interpretation reiterates the contemplative mode of stripping the self back to 'kindly' being (and knowing) and 'onyng' the soul. Such 'onyng' must be striven for *in spite of* the tribulations that make us 'wretched', like 'wo', the 'heavyness and irkehede of our fleshly liveing'.[99]

This image of uprightness also supplies a figurative analog to the embodied practice of prayer. Since Julian's understanding of 'beseking' is of a *lived* practice, which must be intended towards in both spiritual and material terms ('sensualite' towards the 'substance'), so is prayer an *embodied*, reiterative act of making oneself receptive to the divine. Merold Westphal writes, for example, of 'prayer as the posture of the decentered self […] a posture of the soul, of an inner attitude of the self that can appropriately express itself in a variety of outer stances'.[100] Such a self 'is not its own origin', Westphal writes: 'It does not make itself but rather *receives itself* in receiving what is given to it *by putting itself at the disposal of the gift*'.[101] Thinking of prayer in this way—as a *posture*—is a useful schematic for understanding the ways in which prayer opens up the self to porosity, or decenters it. In the passage quoted above, the man is 'vppe ryght' when the soul is 'sparyde' (closed up; locked up; prevented from speaking[102]) like a purse. So, too, is the lived body 'upright' in its everyday doings. This position of the body is, phenomenologically speaking, a kind of *body language* which serves to indicate healthful or homelike attunement:[103]

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[97] *Ibid*, pp. 129–30, emphasis in original.
[98] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 138, n. 15.
[99] *Ibid*, p. 1.
[100] Merold Westphal, 'Prayer as the Posture of the Decentered Self', in *The Phenomenology of Prayer*, pp. 13–31 (p. 30).
[101] *Ibid*, p. 31, emphases added.
[102] MED, s.v. 'sparren', *v*. (1).
[103] Hence Svenaeus's inclusion of the lived body (*Lieb*) as a fourth existential.

'In philosophy', Heidegger writes, 'we must not confine the meaning of the term gesture to 'expression' (*Ausdruck*) […]. Every moment of my body (*Leib*) as a gesture and behaviour enables me not only to take place in physical space. Rather the behaviour is always already situated in a region (*Gegend*) that has been opened up by the thing that I am occupied with, as for instance when I take something in my hand'.[104] This is an idea taken up further by Merleau-Ponty, who examines how this bodily intentionality facilitates our habitation of the world: for Merleau-Ponty, gestural signs are the physical basis for words, fleshly 'speech acts' which are part of our psychical self-expression.

Returning to Julian's notion that 'man goyth vppe ryght', we might subsequently read uprightness as the gestural body's natural attitude, in which state it transcends into the world with homelikeness. Indeed, as Erwin Straus explains, uprightness distinguishes a sense of equilibrium, stability, or steadfastness: it is an intentional stance of stability which allows the subject to '[gain] his standing in the world'.[105] It also opposes the forces of gravity, requiring the maintenance of a 'character of counteraction': 'It calls for our activity and attention'.[106] Straus subsequently argues that 'The natural stance of man is […] resistance': our status 'demands endeavor. It is essentially restless. We are committed to an ever-renewed exertion'.[107] This aligns with the phenomenological definition of homelikeness, as a condition which must be perpetually established and re-established via the re-balancing of existentials, on account of the individual's existential homelessness. The practice of establishing and re-establishing homelike attunement (for Julian, performing 'homlyhede') is never complete, just as uprightnesss 'is not finished with getting up and standing': we have to '*with-stand*'.[108] Paradoxically, the task of finding *rest*—being-towards-God—requires a significant amount of physical toil and labour, as in the *willed unwilling* of Julian's 'beseking'.

This phenomenological account of uprightness therefore parallels Julian's epistemological project, with both always inevitably incomplete. Indeed, Julian's key epistemological term—'understanding'—is etymologically linked to the concept of *standing*, through the shared **sta-* root: 'to stand, make, or be firm'. 'Substance', too, comes from the Latin *substare*, or *substant-* (standing firm), which becomes *substantia* (being, essence). See, for example, the first MED

[104] Heidegger, 'Das Leiben des Leibes' (1994), quoted in Svenaeus, *Hermeneutics of Medicine*, p. 110.
[105] Straus, 'The Upright Posture', p. 535.
[106] *Ibid.*
[107] *Ibid*, p. 536.
[108] *Ibid*, p. 537, emphasis added.

sense of 'stōnden'—'To assume or maintain a standing position, *stand upright*; stand in a place'[109]—and the associated phrase 'stonden on rōte' (stand upright).[110] Similarly, consider -*stan* as in place names: from Persian 'country', '*home of*', literally 'place where one *stays*'. Straus notes, however, that this family of words is kept together by one and the same principal meaning: 'They refer to something that is instituted, erected, constructed, and, in its dangerous equilibrium, threatened by fall and collapse'.[111] This recalls the instability of homelike attunement, which is continually threatened by worldly experiences of pain and trauma: as Julian puts it, 'if peyn be taken fro us it may commen agen'.[112] Our existential *instability* is thus the foundation of 'beseking', with Julian's 'vppe ryght' man functioning as a figurative and/or physical synecdoche for the body-soul unity, which must be perpetually and effortfully redirected towards God. '[W]han it is tyme of his nescessery' (i.e. when the subject is *willing* to perform their devotion), Julian writes, the soul is 'openyde and sparyde ayen fulle honestly', and God 'comyth downe to us to the lowest parte of oure nede'.

The practice of prayer must, then, engage both our divine 'substance' as well as this 'lowest parte', which Julian describes elsewhere as the place in which the 'bestly will' resides: the 'lower partie, which is sensualite'.[113] The 'sensualite' is, as shown above, the part of our soul which experiences the world, or our *embodied* being-in-the-world. Coming down to this 'lower partie' is not only God's task, but the task of the individual 'beseking' him. In true phenomenological fashion, 'beseking' needs to disrupt and redirect the body as much as the psyche. Prayer facilitates this disruption through a physical renouncement of *the upright body*, a phrase used here to denote not only literal uprightness, but the natural attitude of the everyday, inauthentic, lived body. Such disruption is effected by the traditional Christian prayer postures of kneeling or prostrating oneself, which J. A. Burrow calls '[gestures] of submission'.[114] These suspend both the visual and gestural field in a *downward* movement, correlating with the sense of 'being below what is higher' in the religious attitude, while emphasising the verticality of religious experience; that is, the vertical relationship with the divine correlated with the vertical motion of our body. Baker discusses this language of verticality in relation to the mystical paradox of the soul: 'Because [the] highest point of the soul is also its deepest recess, the

[109] MED, s.v. 'stōnden', *v.* (1), emphasis added.
[110] MED, s.v. 'rō̤te', *n*. (4).
[111] Straus, 'The Upright Posture', p. 538.
[112] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 105.
[113] *Ibid*, p. 89.
[114] J. A. Burrow, *Gestures and Looks in Medieval Narrative* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 17.

metaphors of ascent and depth are interchangeable; the summit or point of the soul is also its foundation or ground'.[115] She quotes Turner: 'The two metaphors of inwardness and ascent themselves intersect at the point where God and the self intersect, so that which is most interior to me is also that which is above and beyond me, so that the God who is within me is also the God I am in'.[116] By choosing to direct one's kinaesthesia *downwards*, then, the body necessarily also directs itself upwards and inwards: 'When we lower our heads or kneel in prayer, when we bow or bend our knees in greeting, *the deviation from the vertical reveals the relation to it*'.[117] That is to say, the deviation from uprightness reveals the relation to God: it *reorients* us to the divine.

By the later Middle Ages, a range of physical attitudes of prayer were deployed depending on the intention or situation. The oustretched *orans* gesture, for instance, came to signify ecstatic prayer, while lying prostrate symbolised subjection and awareness of humility.[118] Burrow notes, for example, Langland's Pride, who prostrates herself to express contrition: 'Pernele proud-herte platte hire to þe erþe / And lay longe er she loked, and "lord, mercy!" cryde'.[119] John Mirk's *Instructions for Parish Priests* (c. 1400), meanwhile, suggests that kneeling and outward-facing hands were encouraged in the laity: 'Teche hem eft to knele downe sone, / And whenne they here the belle rynge / To that holy sakerynge, / Teche hem knele downe, both yonge and olde, / And both here hondes up to holde […]'.[120] By the mid-sixteenth century, Ignatius of Loyola's *Spiritual Exercises* suggests a movement towards personal discretion in the adoption of prayer postures, reiterating the *intention* of the practice: 'To enter on the contemplation now on my knees, now prostrate on the earth, now lying face upwards, now seated, now standing, always intent on seeking what I want'.[121] Ignatius here implies a sense of physical modification; of changing the bodily attitude depending on the will. We should not, then, limit our understanding of prayer posture to a static spatial placement of the body. Although representations of prayer in visual culture from the Middle Ages imply stasis—take the illustrations to Peter the Chanter's

[115] Denise N. Baker, 'The Structure of the Soul', p. 42.
[116] Denys Turner, *The Darkness of God: Negativity in Christian Mysticism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 99. Quoted in *ibid.*
[117] Straus, 'The Upright Posture', p. 540, emphasis added.
[118] See *The Christian at Prayer: An Illustrated Prayer Manual Attributed to Peter the Chanter (d. 1197)*, ed. by Richard C. Trexler (Binghamton, NY: Medieval & Renaissance Texts & Studies, State University of New York, 1987), esp. p. 194.
[119] Quoted in Burrow, *Gestures and Looks*, p. 18.
[120] John Mirk, *John Mirk's Instructions for Parish Priests*, ed. by Gillis Kristensson, Lund Studies in English 49 (Lund: Gleerup, 1974), pp. 82–83, ll. 283–86.
[121] Ignatius of Loyola, *The Spiritual Exercises of St Ignatius of Loyola*, trans. by John Morris (London: Burns and Oates, 1880), p. 29.

prayer manual, for example—these are a kind of 'immobile posture of the type captured by artists'.[122] Kinetic postures offer similar opportunities for opening up to porosity: like the whirling dervishes in the eastern tradition, or the ecstasies of the Low Country beguines, movement can function as a kind of gestural mantra, a physical display akin to the verbal repetition of spoken prayer, which occupies the self-conscious mind and thus opens it up to the spirit.[123] Movement is even perhaps an *easier* route to porosity than stillness, for finding stillness is as difficult a task as seeking silence. Yet both remain examples of *willed unwilling*; whether performing stillness or rest, both are essentially *performed* actions. Indeed, according to Husserl, all bodily intentionality is determined by 'kinesthetic processes', which have the character 'I do', 'I move' or even 'I hold still', all of which are dynamic events.[124] Dorion Cairns also remarks that 'Rest is the null value of motion, until there is perceived motion there is no rest'.[125] There is, in other words, constant kinaesthetic sensation across this spectrum of movement and stillness. We find God in the intersection between these kind of paradoxes; in the moment in which speech collapses into silence, thought into nothingness, seeking into beholding, and the upright, kinaesthetic body into downward rest.

What all prayer postures have in common, then, is the intentional surrender of the lived body. This is where the collapse of the body in prayer diverges from the involuntary collapse instigated by illness, trauma, or disease: remember the distinction in chapter one between ability-to-be, in which the body-mind can intend toward something with ease, and inability-to-be, when the intentional arc 'goes limp'. Toombs writes that 'loss of verticality (upright posture) [engenders] feelings of helplessness and dependency in the one who is ill' and 'causes others to assign the dependent role to the patient'.[126] Yet the examples given above fall into the former category: the subject is *choosing* to relinquish the gestural display of the everyday body, taking up postures which acknowledge their inferiority (i.e. dependency) and helplessness against the higher power of God. Clasping the hands, for example, reiterates the voluntary incapacitation of the posture,

[122] Trexler, *The Christian at Prayer*, p. 38–39.
[123] Hannah Lucas, 'Whirling Heretics: Reading Ecstatic Postures in the *vitae* of the Low Country Beguines', presented at *Mobilities, Literature, Culture: An Interdisciplinary International Conference*, 21–22 April 2017 (Lancaster: Lancaster University, in association with Palgrave Macmillan).
[124] Edmund Husserl, *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie*, ed. by W. Biemel, Husserliana VI (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1962), trans. by David Carr as *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970), p. 47.
[125] Dorion Cairns, *The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl*, ed. by Lester Embree (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013) p. 157, n. 14.
[126] Toombs, *Meaning of Illness*, p. 65.

closing off worldly kinaesthetic activity (as with the collapse of the upright posture), while open palms more likely emphasises the openness and porosity of the body to the transcendental other; an exposure of one's vulnerable flesh to a higher power, which lays bare one's heart and torso in a natural position of surrender or submission, while expanding the literal capacity of the heart-centre to receive the gift. This practice thrusts the subject into a state of porosity in a similar way to the disclosive experience of sickness. Yet compassionate surrender—whether performed by reading the contemplative text or by prayer—effects a different kind of disclosure to that of trauma or disease. Provoked by *desire* or *longing* to behold God, this disclosure leads with the will, and is therefore more assiduous and prolonged than the sudden, momentous disclosure of trauma. Yet while the 'beseking' individual *may* experience a similar irruption of authentic understanding as in illness, *if* they enter into beholding, Julian recognises that most people remain in the state of seeking their entire lives. They might not, therefore, encounter the same kind of revelation as Julian herself. Rather, they may glean snatches of understanding here and there, which emerge in moments of true connectedness and porosity. In either case, such understanding will always, Julian writes, lead to further seeking; a lifelong practice of deconstructing, focusing, and refocusing one's *intentio* toward the divine. It is in this sense that we can understand prayer as a component of 'beseking'; as an effortful practice which requires continued commitment and work, and facilitates compassion—a labour of love.

iii. Spiritual Growth

a) Clearing the Ground

The labour of 'beseking' is communicated by Julian as part of the overarching performance of 'homlyhede', the fulfilment of our divine capacity. This is revealed to Julian allegorically, with the soteriological narrative expressed in the showing of the lord and the servant. Here, the various agents of salvation are metaphorised not only as the persons of the lord and the servant themselves, but as the topography of the parable. Drawing from a common stock of theological terms denoting evolution and interconnection, such as 'ground' and 'root', *A Revelation* thus performs what Cervone describes as the incarnational poetic; that is, a verbal and kinetic representation of the salvation narrative as growth or life force, momentarily reversing the Word-made-flesh to render Christ as something other than flesh. Yet once again, Julian goes further than this singular reversal: in line with her theology of mutual indwelling, Julian not only interprets *Christ* as growth/plant-life/the earth, but incorporates her anthropological schema into

this allegory. All of humanity—the human soul—is included within her figurative ecosystem. Given the root of *ecology*—Greek: *oîkos*, 'house'—this metaphorical framework triangulates Julian's notion of 'homlyhede' with her epistemological emphasis on 'kynde'. By figuratively representing us as 'kynde', as part of the natural landscape and its movements, Julian's poetic thus also reconnects us with a sense of *belonging*, revealing interconnection between self and other. For if fear of loss results in the solidifying of inner-outer boundaries—of the self as separate from the space or world it inhabits—conceiving of the self as already within an ecosystem of mutual subsistence serves to weaken this dichotomy. The porous soul is 'ecological', in terms of its interconnectedness with its environment and others: as Barry Commoner wrote, the 'first law of ecology' is that 'everything is connected to everything else'.[127] Julian's earthy allegory thus serves to remind us of our *role* (our *-hede* identity) as actors within a dynamic ecosystem which is constantly shifting and changing, growing and receding, living and dying. This, in turn, offers the possibility for reunification on and with the earth; for cultivating a home within this global organism, through a constant labour of seeking, transfiguration, and becoming.

Julian's representation of the soul as 'grounded' and 'rooted' in God echoes the Augustinian concepts of *fundus* (bottom, base, foundation) and *profundum* (depth), used to express the doctrine of participation, in which ontology is defined not by discrete ontic categories but by its participation in the 'True Being' of the divine.[128] Creation, for Julian, is a condition of shared ontological existence, dependent upon its connection to God; as in her suggestion that the 'substance' or 'heyer part' of the soul, which is 'knitt to god in the makyng'.[129] Julian's anthropological structure is thus spatially constructed, as demonstrated in the above examination of her 'vppe ryght' passage, wherein God 'comyth downe to us to the lowest parte of oure nede'. When speaking of the immanent divinity of God, however, deixis is an inherently unstable linguistic construction. Above/below, up/down, here/there, left/right: such terms cease to function in straightforward patterns of signification. Cervone notes that such spatio-temporal positioning 'has no meaning with regard to an all-encompassing, ever-being God […] In linguistic terms, God's deictic center, the locational and temporal *origo* for the speaking subject,

[127] Barry Commoner, *The Closing Circle: Nature, Man & Technology* (New York: Bantam, 1974), p. 29.
[128] Baker, 'Structure of the Soul', p. 41. Cf. David N. Bell, *The Image and Likeness: The Augustinian Spirituality of William of St. Thierry*, Cistercian Studies 78 (Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publications 1984), p. 23.
[129] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 91.

must be everywhere, always'.[130] As shown above, a downward direction of the body might project us both upward (towards God) and inward (towards self), while reaching upward might enable us to see the bottommost groundedness of the self in God. As Turner puts it, 'The *intinerarium intus* is also an *ascensio superius.* The two metaphors of inwardness and ascent themselves intersect at the point where God and the self intersect, so that which is most interior to me is also that which is above and beyond me; so that the God who is within me is also the God I am in'.[131]

Such paradoxes of mutual indwelling are established by Augustine through his development of the Neoplatonic theology of ascent. Yet it is in the Rhineland mystics that we find the most explicit representations of the soul's ontological union with God as 'ground': Eckhart deploys the formula of the 'ground of the soul' (*grunt der sele*), though Tauler uses it more frequently.[132] Riehle has emphatically denied any likely (or traceable) influence between the theology of Eckhart or Tauler and Julian's *Revelation*: any parallels—such as those pointed out by Dalgairns, Underhill, and Reynolds—he ascribes to common scriptural and scholastic sources, such as the Thomist notion that man is nearer to God than to his own soul; of God as a 'fundamentum et basis omnium aliorum entium'.[133] Julian does share her anthropological lexis with Neoplatonist theology: see, for example, the derivation of 'substance' and 'sensualite' from *De Trinitate*, when Augustine distinguishes between higher and lower reason in the soul. As Cervone rightly notes, however, these terms were 'picked up by other theologians and commentators throughout the Middle Ages, including, among others, Hilton, her [Julian's] contemporary'.[134] Transmission and tradition over direct influence on Julian's *Revelation* does seem more likely, although Julian may well have picked up Rhinelandish turns of phrase from the incoming ideas or texts which made their way into the vibrant port of Norwich from the continent.[135] It is perhaps not so crucial, however, to determine the extent to which Julian is aware of, or subscribes to, these strands of Neoplatonist anthropology. What is more pertinent to

[130] Cervone, *Poetics of The Incarnation*, p. 44.
[131] Turner, *The Darkness of God*, p. 99.
[132] Cf. Evelyn Underhill, *Mysticism: A Study in the Nature and Development of Man's Spiritual Consciousness* (London: University Paperbacks Edition, 1960), p. 54.
[133] Riehle, *Middle English Mystics*, p. 156. Cf. J. B. Dalgairns, ed., *The Scale (or Ladder) of Perfection: Written by Walter Hilton: With an Essay on the Spiritual Life of Medieval England* (London: Philps, 1870), p. xix; Evelyn Underhill, *The Essentials of Mysticism* [1920] (New York: Cosimo, 2007), p. 192; Reynolds, 'Some Literary Influences in the *Revelations* of Julian of Norwich', p. 26.
[134] Cervone, *Poetics of the Incarnation*, p. 47. Cf. Baker, 'The Image of God', pp. 35–60.
[135] Jantzen writes of this potential connection: 'whether there was actual historical influence from Bernard and Eckhart [on Julian] cannot be established, although it is certainly possible, given the spread of Cistercian monasteries in England, on the one hand, and the flourishing trade between East Anglia and the Rhineland on the other'. Jantzen, *Julian of Norwich*, p. 159.

our discussion is Julian's linguistic treatment of these terms within *her own* theological framework: specifically, how Julian instrumentalises this lexis by reinvigorating its literal or additional meanings.

The previous chapter's discussion of the model of metaphorical signification showed how the literal tenor of a signifying vehicle is disrupted by the figurative deferral to another (or many other) abstract signifieds, or *added to* in the phenomenological understanding of simultaneous processing. In the case of the above anthropological terms, the vehicle 'ground' carries the literal sense of 'The bottom; the lowest part or downward limit of anything', usually 'Of the sea, a well, ditch, etc., and of hell; rarely of heaven'.[136] Used within a theological context (such as in Augustine or Eckhart's writing), the spatial connotations of the term are reconfigured as *abstractly spiritual*. That is, the reader's attention is drawn into an imagined, metaphorical space of the soul, a perspective from which they are referred to the ground, the apex, and so on. The interchangeability of deictic terms—upwards also referring to downwards, and vice versa—refuses this metaphor any kind of figurative solidification. In other words, the spatial construction within the imagination collapses as soon as it is built; the reader cannot get a grasp on the figurative ground beneath their feet. On the surface, Julian's text seems to adhere to this particular spatial poetic, expressing her theology of mutual indwelling using the same principles referred to above. Yet Julian's ability to blend abstract thought with her homely language drawn from everyday experience offers a new kind of poetic to her 'even cristen' reader. Adding another link in the chain of signification, Julian's implicit invocation of these abstract scholastic terms re-makes them, spatially and pictorially, through their figurative rendering.

In a passage added to the long text, for example, Julian describes how 'One tyme' her understanding was 'led downe into the see-ground', where she sees 'hill and dalis grene, semand as it were mosse begrowne, with wrekke and gravel'.[137] When 'a man or a woman' is 'under the broade watyr' of God's enveloping goodness, they should have 'mor solace and comfort than al this world can telle', Julian writes. Critics have not agreed on the meaning and significance of this image of the 'see-ground', perhaps on account of its sudden imposition amongst the description of Christ's seeping blood; the singular temporal location ('one tyme') displaces the image apart from the rest of the showing. Juliana Dresvina has attempted to locate a scriptural referent here, that the 'user of an illustrated Psalter would immediately think of the image of

[136] OED, s.v. 'ground', *n.* I.1.a–b.
[137] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 15.

David in water, beginning Psalm 68 (69)',[138] while Watson and Jenkins have suggesting an association with the story of Jonah (as in *Patience*), noting the connection to Julian's earlier reference to herring scales.[139] I wonder, however, if assigning a biblical source here does not draw the focus away from a highly Julian-ish turn: a topographical, ecological rendering of the concept of divine indwelling. The landscape is interpolated into the midst of the second revelation of Christ's discolouring (where Julian notably also introduces the 'seek, suffer, trust' triad[140]), just as the more detailed landscape of the lord and the servant allegory will be interpolated later in the text, between showings fourteen and fifteen (that God is the ground of our 'beseking', and of our deliverance from this life). Indeed, both passages are additions in the longer version of the text, suggesting that the sea-ground image is another visual heuristic of Julian's for understanding the meaning of the revelation.

This theory is supported by the topographical resonances between the two passages, which when read together offer a visual rendering of the soul-as-ground topos. Inadvertently speaking to this parallelism, Appleford remarks on the 'crisp detail' of the underwater landscape, 'a visual echo of the regular land above the sea'.[141] The verdancy of the sea-ground—the green hills and dales, overgrown with moss and seaweed—anticipates the flourishing brought to bear on the earth by the servant, who 'turne the earth upsodowne', making 'swete flods to rennen, and noble and plenteous fruits to springen'.[142] The ground is underwater, overturned, upended, all by the 'mene' of this topography topos, which literalises the otherwise abstract anthropological term as land which can be traversed and travailed: just as Julian's understanding descends onto the sea-ground, so the servant falls into the ditch and must work the land, and so did Adam descend into hell and then 'com up into hevyn'.[143] In *grounding* her anthropological schema of divine indwelling in visual topography, Julian thereby *upends* the metaphor by reverting to the literal tenor of the vehicle 'ground', as in the ground of the earth. Or, in line with the phenomenological view on simultaneous processing, Julian layers another semantic stratum onto the textual terrain. In yet another circular manoeuvre, ground-of-the-earth becomes abstract

[138] Juliana Dresvina, 'What Julian Saw: The Embodied Showings and the Items for Private Devotion', *Religions* 10.245 (2019), 1–20 (p. 13).
[139] Cf. Jantzen, who writes that Julian 'takes delight in the creation of God, the beauty of the sea valley and the hazelnut and the intricacy of herring scales'. Jantzen, *Julian of Norwich*, p. 216; and Amy Appleford's work, which argues for the passage as a reiteration of the Office of the Dead, underlining 'the limits of natural human physicality in this life'. Amy Appleford, 'The Sea Ground and the London Street: The Ascetic Self in Julian of Norwich and Thomas Hoccleve', *The Chaucer Review* 51.1 (2016), 49–67 (p. 58).
[140] Cf. Gillespie, 'Seek, Suffer, and Trust', pp. 129–58.
[141] Appleford, 'The Sea Ground and the London Street', p. 57.
[142] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 77.
[143] *Ibid*, p. 76.

ground-of-the-soul, which through her figurative imagery is rendered ground-of-the-earth once more.

This linguistic doubling upon doubling allows Julian to navigate a topographical picture of our relationship to God, at once positioning us in time and space, only to collapse the rules of this constructed universe with a paradoxical inversion of ascent and descent. As Turner writes, 'Julian can confidently play with formulas little short of Eckhart's in audacity while remaining firmly within the common Neoplatonic tradition […]'.[144] One final example brings us full circle, back to Julian's concept of 'uprightness', which can be compared to the Platonic notion of the rational soul as housed in the toppermost aspect of our body, thus elevating us to the position 'not [of] an earthly but [of] a heavenly plant—up from the earth towards our kindred in the heaven'.[145] Heidegger also favoured this analogy to plant-life, quoting Johann Peter Hebel, who wrote, 'We are plants which—whether we like to admit it to ourselves or not—must with our roots rise out of the earth in order to bloom in the ether and bear fruit'.[146] Heidegger adds: 'For a truly joyous and salutary human work to flourish, man must be able to mount *from the depth of his home ground* up into the ether'.[147] Plato's heavenly plant, however, has its roots not in the ground of the earth, but in the sky, in the eidetic sphere, the realm of ideas, which is responsible for the nourishment and sustenance of the psyche. As Michael Marder writes, only 'when this tie remains intact is the body itself "upright", literally and figuratively, spatially and morally, in the sense that the rational soul stays firmly in charge of the animal and vegetal desires in us'.[148] Julian's framework of groundedness is less exclusively rooted to the heavens, instead focusing on the necessity of earthly grounding *within self and world*. This is most insistently borne out in the lord and the servant parable, which reiterates not only the ontological status of the human soul, but her emphasis on spiritual reunion and growth; the means by which 'homlyhede' is performed. In Julian's description of the showing, her multilayering of horticultural and ecological metaphors expands the architecture of domestic images established in the first half of the text (as in the 'see-ground' passage above), performing a movement from the immediacy and viscerality of Christ's homeliness as he appears to her in the bedchamber, to a more global—an

[144] Turner, *The Darkness of God*, p. 162.
[145] Plato, 'Timaeus', in *Timaeus. Critias. Cleitophon. Menexenus. Epistles*, trans. by R. G. Bury, Loeb Classical Library 234 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1929), pp. 1–254 (p. 245).
[146] Johann Peter Hebel, quoted in Martin Heidegger, 'Memorial Address', in *Discourse on Thinking: A Translation of* Gelassenheit, trans. by John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund with an introduction by John M. Anderson (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), pp. 43–57 (p. 46).
[147] *Ibid*, emphasis added.
[148] Michael Marder, *Plant-Thinking: A Philosophy of Vegetal Life* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013) p. 57.

ecological—sphere of at-homeness, expressing the universality of the eschatological timeline. These first fourteen showings, with their focus on Christ's passion, have opened the reader up to porosity, connection, and relation to God. The lord and the servant parable then asks the reader to enact the self-investigative spiritual cultivation and growth—the performance of 'homlyhede'—made possible by the *passio* of the salvation narrative.

b) Cultivating the Earth

The ecological poetic of the parable expresses Julian's theology of mutual indwelling by figuring both human soul and the divine as the ground to be tended, as well as the gardener who tends it. Without the cultivating labour of the servant, the lord is 'nothing but wildernes', identified *as* the wilderness, just as the human soul is identified with the 'barren and desert' abode where the lord sits, which the servant—as Adam or Christ—is required to tend.[149] The salvation narrative is contingent on this uncultivated land: the wilderness typology functions as a zone of unhomelikeness, or in theological terms, the *regio dissimilitudinis* of postlapsarian homelessness. It is a wild land, not yet brought under human control, possibly also not under God's control. This is reiterated by contemporary renderings of this topos, such as the *Gawain*-poet's description of the 'wyldrenesse of Wyrale', a region in which there lived 'bot lyte / Þat auþer God oþer gome wyth goud hert louied'.[150] Douglass refers to the point of this passage as 'not so much that the land is uninhabited as that the inhabitants, human and otherwise, are not part of the court world […]; they are not Christian'.[151] This returns us to the duality of 'kynde' and 'unkynde', the familiar and the unfamiliar, homelike or unhomelike, self and other. Yet since Julian's anthropology understands our nature as fundamentally unchanged by our original lapse into sin, her deployment of the wilderness motif does not fit so neatly into this dichotomy. Julian's incarnational theology does not envisage the uncultivated soul—that which is 'unkynde'—as evil or irretrievably broken: as the parable illustrates, the servant is not held culpable for their fall. Rather, they are figured as simply in need of being helped to their feet and righted—in need of care and cultivation.

[149] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, pp. 78, 75.
[150] 'Sir Gawain and the Green Knight', p. 234, ll. 701–2. OED quotes this line in definition 1.b of 'wilderness', supporting this historical (c. 1400) definition of wilderness as 'a wild or uncultivated region or tract of land, uninhabited, or inhabited only by wild animals; a tract of solitude and savageness'. OED, s.v. 'wilderness', 1.b. Cf. Gillian Rudd, '"The Wilderness of Wirral" in "Sir Gawain and the Green Knight"', *Arthuriana* 23.1 (2013), 52–65.
[151] Douglass, 'Ecocriticism and Middle English Literature', pp. 148–49.

Julian therefore imagines the wilderness of the soul in its *capacity for growth* and transfiguration into the dwelling of the 'blissful kyngdom' and 'cite' we saw earlier. The servant's fall into the slade—his fall into unhomelikeness—does not disconnect him from his relationship to the lord, nor does it destroy the soul's capability for receiving God. Instead, the afflictions of the fallen servant simply restrict this capacity, shrinking his *intentio* to a self-beholding akin to that which Julian has experienced as a result of pain. He too suffers 'grete peynes', consisting of: the bodily—'sore brosyng'—which Julian considers a 'felable peyne', 'hevynes of his body', and 'febilnes folowyng of these twe'; the blinding of his 'reason'—he is 'stonyed in his mend' to such an extent that he had almost 'forgotten his owne luf'; the pain that 'he myte not rysen'; and finally, the pain that he 'lay alone'.[152] Understood phenomenologically, these pains broadly correspond to the disruption of the subject's existentials: the servant has lost homelike attunement ('faylyng of comforte'[153]), understanding transcendence (he can 'ne helpyn himself'), articulating discourse ('stonyed in his mend'), and use of his lived body ('hevynes of his body'). Such a critical unsettling of these existentials renders the servant entirely consumed by the unhomelike attunement of his incapacitation, the intensity of which constitutes the original homelessness of mankind (the projection into the *regio dissimilitudinis*), and the misperception inflicted by the inevitable sins which follow. The servant's endeavours are coloured, however, with the promise of restored homelikeness through the double-layered imagery of the servant's cultivation: the servant 'delvyn and dykyn, swinkin and swetyn, and turne the earth upsodowne, and sekyn the depnes, and wattir the plants in tyme'.[154] This 'travel' makes 'swete flods to rennen, and noble and plenteous fruits to springen' to bring before God, who provides the love that 'grounds' this agrarian enterprise.

Invoking the metonym of earth for human, Julian frames the agricultural labour of the servant as an internal, as well as external, task of cultivation. She describes the human body as made from a 'slyppe of erth', a creation story which encloses *soul* in *soil*, invoking the possible derivation of 'Adam' from *adamah*, 'earth'.[155] Indeed, Baker notes that the servant's agricultural labour alludes to two events in Genesis: 'God's bestowal on the newly created Adam of dominion over the earth

[152] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, pp. 72–73.
[153] 'Comforte' denoting support, steadfastness, the ability to *withstand*. MED, s.v. 'cŏmfort', *n.* (5–6).
[154] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 77.
[155] A semiotic parallelism taken up, for example, by the medieval lyric 'Erthe toc of erthe' from London, BL MS Harley 2253, in Neil R. Ker, ed., *Facsimile of British Museum MS. Harley 2253*, EETS o.s. 255 (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), f. 59v. Quoted in Gillian Rudd, *Greenery: Ecocritical Readings of Late Medieval English Literature* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2007), p. 21.

(Gen. 2:19–20) and his curse on the ground to punish the disobedient Adam (Gen. 3:17–19)'.[156] Yet while both of these tasks require hard physical labour—the 'gretest labor and herdest travel that is'[157]—Julian transforms the punitive implications with her description of 'the earth's bounty and the lord's pleasure', making it a story 'about creation rather than transgression', as Baker puts it.[158] Instead of this earth being transformed by the fall into a tool for punishment, Julian's exegesis glosses the soil as the means of redemptive *re-creation*. This is fulfilled by the next layer of the showing's double allegory, in which the servant can be read as Christ or second Adam. Great labour is also required in this stage of the narrative, where the plants (humanity) are watered by the flood of Christ's blood shed at the passion, which provides nourishment (food and drink, as in the Eucharist). In this emphasis on growth and maturation, Margaret Palliser reads echoes of Paul (Eph. 4:4–16) and the early Christian tradition exemplified in the writings of Irenaeus of Lyons, for whom Adam was not endowed with supernatural perfection in his creation, but rather with a childlike aptitude for growth toward perfection which had to be developed.[159] Palliser subsequently describes Julian's understanding of sin as 'not unlike a debilitating illness or an immaturity that evokes pity, not wrath, from God'.[160] The sin (fall) of the servant-as-Adam does indeed invoke the disruption present in an individual unaware—closed off—from the world: the servant is merely unable to see the love of their lord before them. In this theodicy, then, the lord's focus is on the *intention* of the servant, rather than the failure of his action.

With its emphasis on the servant's connection to the earth, the allegory also draws on the scriptural tradition of soul-as-garden, a topos common to many devotional and instructive texts contemporary to Julian. Riehle notes the use of this image in the writing of the other fourteenth-century English contemplatives: Rolle's *Incendium Amoris*, for instance, describes the soul as blooming with virtues such that it can be called the garden of Christ; the *Cloud*-author draws on the traditional allegory of the tree, which is placed in the garden of the reader's soul, the highest fruit of which is love; while Hilton renders the soul in similarly horticultural terms, describing the 'ground' of the soul—as in the *bottom* of the soul—as the place where the image of vain self-love is found.[161] For Hilton, growth depends on the individual blocking the bottom of the well which is in the garden of the soul and from which the stinking water of sin flows, otherwise 'it wole

[156] Baker, *Julian of Norwich's Showings*, p. 93.
[157] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 77.
[158] Baker, *Julian of Norwich's Showings*, p. 93.
[159] Margaret Ann Palliser, *Christ, Our Mother of Mercy: Divine Mercy and Compassion in the Theology of the* Shewings *of Julian of Norwich* (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1992), p. 65.
[160] *Ibid*.
[161] Riehle, *The Middle English Mystics*, p. 161.

corrumpe alle the floures of the gardyn of thi soule'.[162] He, too, must dig deep to search for this kind of spiritual treasure: 'Thee bihoveth for to delve deepe in thyn herte'.[163] This allegory can be traced to the *Somme le Roi* tradition, in which the soul reaches for the spade of penance to dig its ground and remove that which prevents it from witnessing God, who appears as a gardener, paralleling Julian's own rendering of the servant as Christ, who 'shuld ben a gardiner'.[164] In Julian's soul-as-garden configuration, as in her representation of the soul as the 'cite' from the sixteenth showing, the spatial construction is defined by its suitability—its *capacity*—for habitation or dwelling. In chapter one, I discussed the possibility of location becoming position, or, objective space becoming *lived* space through reiterative orientation. It follows that the spatial construction of the soul must also have such a capacity for homelikeness. The soul-as-garden metaphor offers a foundation for this transformation, with the 'tresor' in the earth indicating the potential for at-homeness in need of being dug. In order to effect this transformation, Julian's servant must do the work of 'beseking'; they must be willing to 'stirtith and rynnith in grete haste for love to don his lords will', even if they 'fallith in a slade and takith ful grete sore'.[165]

This image finds a Rhinelandish parallel in Eckhart's commentary on Luke 14:21–32, the parable of the Great Supper, in which the lord tells his servant to 'go out into the highways [*vias*] and hedgerows [*sepes*], and compel [the people] to come in, that my house may be filled'. Eckhart here reads the land as the soul, with the hedgerows signifying its hedged-in powers: 'the more the soul has gathered itself, the narrower it is, and the narrower it is, the broader it is'.[166] For Eckhart, the servant is the 'spark of the soul' (*vunkelin der sele*), like the *scintilla*, the 'spark of conscience', which ignites the soul into union with God, as with Julian's 'godly will'. The image of the 'highways and hedges' thus indicates the soul as *capax Dei*, which is expanded by the *labour* of the *will* in service of the lord. A further parallel can be found in Passus XVIII of the *Piers Plowman* C-text, when Will is shown the way to the Tree by Liberum Arbitrium (Free Will), who replaces Piers in tending to the Tree within the human heart.[167] Will's journey across this 'contre' is the culmination of his spiritual pilgrimage. He has already traversed the 'lond of

[162] Walter Hilton, *Scale of Perfection*, ed. by Thomas H. Bestul, TEAMS Middle English Texts (Kalamazoo, MI: Medieval Institute Publications, 2000), available at: <https://d.lib.rochester.edu> [accessed 19 September 2019], Book I, ll. 1577–78.
[163] *Ibid*, ll. 1379–80.
[164] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 77.
[165] *Ibid*, p. 72.
[166] 'Ie mê sich diu sêle hât gesament, ie enger si ist, und ie enger si ist, ie wîter si ist'. Eckhart, 'Sermon 20b', quoted in David Blamires, 'Eckhart and Tauler: A Comparison of Their Sermons on "Homo quidam fecit cenam magnam" (Luke XIV.16)', *The Modern Language Review* 66.3 (1971), 608–27 (p. 624).
[167] Pearsall, ed., *Piers Plowman: An Edition of the C-Text*, Passus XVIII.

longyng',[168] the *regio dissimilitudinis* or land of unlikeness; the moral and psychological realm where Will sees himself in the 'myrrour' (as does Julian in her own Godforsaken moment: 'Here may you sene what I am of myselfe'[169]). Then, in Will's first interaction with this character in Passus XVI, he asks, 'Whareof serue ȝe […] sire *Liberum Arbitrium*?'[170]—a query which functions to establish the role of Free Will. But the line also echoes the oft-quoted speech by Reason in Passus V, when Reason questions Will, 'Can thow seruen', detailing the tasks he should be able to perform: 'Heggen or harwen, or swyn or gees dryue / Or eny other kynes craft þat þe comune nedeth'.[171] Will answers affirmatively, 'Sertes!', but perhaps not with the 'kynes craft' prescribed by Reason: he claims to contribute by creating verse and praying for others.[172] He is subsequently impelled to repent by Conscience, who convinces him that he must be *productive* in his labour, like the apostles. Will's later interaction with Liberum Arbitrium at the Tree reiterates this theme, stressing the need for both *works* of charity as well as clerical teaching. Will's service, he learns, must be performed as a *willed labour*, of 'Heggen and harwen', cultivating the hedgerows and harrowing the soil of the soul.

For Langland, then, the search for salvation is a *doing*, or a series of doings—'Dowel', 'Dobet', 'Dobest'—which ascends the epistemological ladder, only to land on the 'synthetic self-knowing' which Eleanor Johnson calls 'participatory contemplation', a practice which breaks down the boundary between the active and the contemplative life.[173] Similarly, Julian's 'beseking' is an active rather than passive pursuit; a labour which *brings things forth*—a 'craft' as Langland's Reason (and Heidegger) understands it. 'Beseking' thus also defies any separation between the inward-facing practice of prayer, as an act of attentive receptivity, and the outward-facing cultivation of oneself in relation to others, as a responsibility give back to one's community. It is about both giving *and* receiving, present participles that reflect its continuous performance, which promises to fulfil the statement that 'al shal be wele', where being well is also a *doing* well. By committing to this work, the labourer or servant practises non-resistance to the falls, hurts, and sins which delay their task, moving through the land of longing, the region of unlikeness, without judgement or blame. And, in doing so, they recognise their ability to cultivate this wilderness into a place of 'homlyhede'. This does not mean disengaging from its barrenness and waste, but rather choosing to persist, choosing to see the goodness and love within that place, and choosing to

[168] *Ibid*, Passus XI, l. 170.
[169] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 108.
[170] Pearsall, ed., *Piers Plowman: An Edition of the C-Text*, Passus XVI, l. 173.
[171] *Ibid*, Passus V, ll. 12–21.
[172] *Ibid*, Passus V, ll. 5, 48, 84–85.
[173] Johnson, *Staging Contemplation*, p. 81.

abide in it. As Norman Wirzba writes, 'Care-ful work introduces us to the sanctity of the world or, as Henry Bugbee would put it, the wilderness that everywhere surrounds us: "The more we experience things in depth, the more we participate in a mystery intelligible to us only as such; and the more we understand our world to be an unknown world. *Our true home is wilderness, even the world of everyday*"'.[174]

iv. Home is at Hand

Julian's theology of spiritual growth and cultivation has been examined thus far as a narrative in which our ontological connection to God facilitates our choosing to redirect our attention to him, and thus the reunification of the soul. This is a superficially temporal timeline, with our 'digging and delving' following the fall, as in the lord and the servant parable, and in Langland's 'Dowel', 'Dobet', 'Dobest' triad. Julian's revelation is, however, predicated upon God's eschatological perspective, wherein past, present, and future are held together in eternal atemporality: God 'makyth', 'restorith and fulfillith', and 'kepith' us within him continuously.[175] As such, we are *always in the process* of being fulfilled. The spatio-temporal zone of beholding reflects this eschatological 'now' and 'then', which Julian embraces with what Judith Lang calls her 'ease of language' and 'rhetorical artistry'.[176] Temporal indicators such as 'then' (/'than') and 'sodenly' give her sentences a run-on feeling, signalling, as Gillespie and Ross note, 'the suspension of "ordinary' time'.[177] In this realm of beholding, a timeline beyond time, the question of free will and agency becomes particularly pertinent: 'beseking' rests upon the 'good will' of the individual, their ability to perform 'homlyhede' through a continuous, directed way of life. The soul must *choose* to reunify this will with the lower aspect of the soul which veers off the path of righteousness: prayer must be willingly performed; penance willingly suffered; confession willingly given. Yet Julian's system of the wills is not Pelagian, relying as it does on the incarnation as a remedy or resolution to our fragmentariness. With creation, fall, incarnation, and redemption occurring in one eternal instant, what, then, are the implications of *predestination* for Julian's notion of intentional living, attentive 'beseking', and the participatory performance of 'homlyhede'?

[174] Norman Wirzba, 'Attention and Responsibility', in *The Phenomenology of Prayer*, pp. 88–102 (p. 99), emphasis added.
[175] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 92.
[176] Lang, '"The Godly Wylle" in Julian of Norwich', p. 165.
[177] Gillespie and Ross, 'The Apophatic Image', p. 60.

Julian's metaphysical schema succeeds in configuring a participatory model of Christian living in relation to an omniscient and omnipotent God. On first glance, however, with her lexis of that which is 'made', 'created', and in 'substance', a reader might be forgiven for interpreting Julian's writing on the soul as understanding it as formal rather than performative. We are *made*—our body moulded from the mucky earth—in the likeness of God; a product, crafted and realised in relation to the prefactical form of the creator. Heidegger challenged the medieval scholastic metaphysics of creation on the grounds of this very distinction, arguing that it eclipsed the active constitution of Dasein. He traced this creator/created dichotomy to the Greek terms *eidos* (literally 'form' for Plato) and *ousia* ('substance' for Aristotle), writing that the former equated to *essentia* (the 'whatness' of a thing), the model or image by which the thing is crafted or made, its quiddity, the latter to *existentia* (the 'thatness' of the thing), its ontic properties or haecceity.[178] The moment of creation or production realises the *eidos* of a thing, releasing it into an existence independent of its creator or its perfect model. It thereby becomes *ousia*, a thing with ontic properties. Indeed, McGrath notes that 'The prephilosophical meaning of *ousia* is *property*, that which is present-at-hand in a household, that which, at any given moment is available for use and over which I have right of disposal'.[179] *Ousia*, in Heidegger's understanding, is akin to that which is present-at-hand, 'the objective presence corresponding to *eidos*'.[180]

McGrath has outlined a number of difficulties with Heidegger's critique of medieval scholasticism, not only because he does not back up many of his statements with evidence.[181] This discussion will serve as a useful springboard for examining Julian's own representation of causality and human action. In Heidegger's view, the scholastic reduction of being to a causal nexus eclipses the spontaneous emergence of being present in *phusis,* the energetic presencing of a thing into being. As stated in the last chapter, *phusis* came to be set against the immovability of God, while the scholastic approach translated its catalysing *energeia* into the Latin *actualitas*, which has a causal point of reference. In the Greek model, being emerges spontaneously from nothing; in the creator/created model, the presencing of being is temporal, awaiting completion. According to Heidegger, this scholastic objectification of being obscures the productive capacity of the product. As McGrath puts it, 'When Christianity appropriates Greek ontology in a theology of creation, all being becomes product in relation to the Creator. The producer, God, is a

[178] See McGrath, *Early Heidegger*, pp. 210–28.
[179] *Ibid*, p. 213.
[180] *Ibid*.
[181] *Ibid*, pp. 208–42.

nonfactical being, a being outside of time. The nonproduct character of Dasein is forgotten'.[182] This precludes, therefore, the dynamic being of Dasein: 'the being that we ourselves are, the Dasein, cannot at all be *interrogated* as such by the question *What* is this? We gain access to this being only if we ask: *Who* is it? The Dasein is not constituted by whatness but—if we may coin the expression—by *whoness*. The answer does not give a thing but an I, you, we'.[183] Heidegger's critique, in other words, is that if our being is just another product, we can no longer be considered *participants in the production of our world*. He thereby rejects the conceptual paradigm of humanity and world as product in relation to producer.

This is a tension between the pre-factical and the factical, the infinite and the temporal. Heidegger's argument is a refusal of the infinite potentiality of a higher power, implicating not only medieval scholasticism but, as McGrath points out, all ontologies which invoke a creator: 'Heidegger's life project is to think the finitude of being without referencing the infinite'.[184] We arrive once again at the crucial distinction between the secular philosophy of Heidegger and the eschatological metaphysics of Julian's *Revelation*, which engages the infinite horizon of divinity as the limit-situation of the subject. Rather than Heidegger's 'nothing' of death, Julian frames God as both creative producer and the teleological end of 'beseking' or being-towards-God, an end towards which we are continually self-projecting. Yet McGrath also points out that 'Heidegger shows no signs of ever having truly understood the radical break with Greek ontology in Aquinas's notion of being', which underwent a transformation, conceiving of being as *esse*, the act signified by the verb 'to be'.[185] *Essentia*, McGrath writes, 'is a limitation of *esse*, a contraction of the act of being to determinate structure. *Substantia* is a further contraction of *esse* to a particular *this* […] In its concretization and finitization in the thing, *esse* is released from God and channeled into determinate thinghood'.[186] In other words, *esse* frees Aquinas's notion of being from the constrictions of formal, temporal categories. Heidegger's rejection of the doctrine of creation on account of its causal nexus seems not to account for this *active* understanding of being, as a *verbal* concept.

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[182] *Ibid*, p. 214.
[183] Martin Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 24: *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* [1927], ed. by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1997), and trans. by Albert Hofstadter as *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, rev. ed. (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1982), p. 120, emphases in original.
[184] McGrath, *The Early Heidegger*, p. 217.
[185] *Ibid*, p. 225. Cf. Étienne Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1955), p. 368.
[186] McGrath, *The Early Heidegger*, p. 227, emphases in original.

Perhaps it is between Heidegger and the scholastic onto-theology he criticises that I must triangulate my analysis of Julian's work. For in Julian's theology of mutual indwelling, our soul is 'a creature in god', made of substance but from nothing made, while our body is made from the created earth. This model recognises the presence of the creator within us, meaning that our souls transcend a state of simply creature, as in created product. We are already 'oned' to God in substance, a fact which is obscured by the fragmentariness of our soul. The redemptive power of Christ's incarnation redeems the divinity of our creatureliness, providing a path through the dark night of the postlapsarian soul to our true home, fully whole and 'oned' with God. This wholeness (as it stands from our penultimate perspective in the eschatological timeline) is achieved through action: since we are not whole as when we were created, our fragmentariness is subsequently only available to us through the process of '*beseking*', an existential enterprise enacted through experience or living. We are, therefore, *participants* in the re-productive, re-creative reunification of our wholeness or essential nature; our ontology. This lapsarian principle allows us to speak of the soul not only as product, but as a necessary *actor* within the salvation narrative. The sense is that our lifelong performance of 'beseking' restores our porosity and self-in-relation to God, thereby filling the void of our existential homelessness. This requires agency on the part of the supplicant, who must work and strive towards self-understanding—the self-unfolding or flourishing of spiritual growth—in order to cultivate their soul as an appropriate dwelling for God. Just as the phenomenological model understands human existence as a transcending-returning projection within a referential web of meaning-structures—a *whoness,* not a whatness—Julian's understanding is, similarly, of our nature as in a constant process of reunification and fulfilment. Yet while for Heidegger, the creator/created distinction eclipses the dynamic constitution of Dasein, Julian works out a complex solution to the question of our capacity for action and production independent of our producer. She does so through her theology of mutual indwelling, wherein we are both 'oned' with God as our creator *and* as the likeness of our ontological wholeness, to which we are 'beseking'.

Aquinas makes a similar argument in his own writing on predestination in the *Summa*, where he quotes Paul's description of this as a 'call' to glorification: 'And whom he predestinated, them he also called. And whom he called, them he also justified. And whom he justified, them he also glorified' (Romans 8:30). He writes that predestination 'remains in their doer', like the imminent activities of 'understanding' and 'willing', comparing these to the transitive actions like 'heating

or cutting […] those that produce a reaction in outside material'.[187] Predestination, he argues, 'does not *put anything into the predestined*', but its execution 'reaches out into external things and produces an effect there'.[188] This is contingent on grace, 'which is temporal', and must therefore be in 'the person predestined', since God is eternal. As such, predestination is defined as '*A preparation for grace in the present, and for glory in the future*'.[189] Aquinas concludes this article by stating that grace is 'not included in the definition of predestination as though it were an essential element, but because predestination implies a relationship to grace, namely a relationship of cause to effect, and *of act to objective*. Hence it does not follow that predestination is temporal'.[190] The phrase '*of act to objective*' is key here, and Thomas Gilby expounds its meaning in a footnote to his edition, writing that it implies a relationship of glory to grace 'beyond the "mechanics" of causality': 'The specific significance of grace is that it is a sharing in God's life by friendship, the exemplar of which is in heaven. The distinction between them is not just that between different historical periods, one now, the other hereafter. In one sense the Kingdom is at hand, in another it is already present'.[191]

This excerpt speaks to my reading of the *Revelation* as promoting a theology wherein a degree of at-homeness or wholeness is available in this life as well as in heaven—both at hand and already present. Aquinas is arguing that God's predestined plan produces an *effect* in the predestined soul (rather than putting something into it directly), which correlates directly to its preparedness to receive the grace of God. Similarly, Julian's anthropology leaves room for human action as *essential* to the fulfilment of our fundamental identity. Turner summarises this well, writing that Julian's theology 'is wholly resistant to that picture of the divine providence and governance of human affairs according to God which causes the overall drama of human history, as it were micromanaging the general lines of the salvific plot, leaving human agents to exercise their freedom of action within the plot, but free only insofar as they are free *from* the providential causality'.[192] Indeed, the idea of the kingdom as both at hand and already present is communicated via Julian's theology of indwelling, where Christ finds his 'homliest home' in the 'blisfull kyngdom' of the heart. This is a dwelling which, as argued above, dissolves the boundary between heaven and earth, available to us not only after death but *within ourselves*. In

[187] Aquinas, *Summae Theologiae*, 1a, q. 23, a. 2. Translations are taken from *Summa Theologiae*, vol. 5: *God's Will and Providence: 1a. 19–26*, ed. and trans. by Thomas Gilby (London: Blackfriars in conjunction with Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1964).
[188] *Ibid*, emphasis added.
[189] *Ibid*, emphasis in original.
[190] *Ibid*, emphasis added.
[191] *Ibid*.
[192] Turner, *Julian of Norwich*, pp. 53–54, emphasis in original.

an argument of reciprocity akin to that which grounds this doctrine of indwelling, Aquinas refers to this necessary 'preparedness' as twofold: preparedness 'of the thing acted on' (i.e. the making ready of our own souls) and preparedness of the agent, God, who 'has already conceived the idea of how a work is to be done'.[193] God is already prepared in the eschatological plan; we are required to uphold our side of the bargain. God's predestining of us is therefore an immanent action, effecting our receptivity to his grace, but our cultivation of this receptivity is transitive in form: he has created our capacity for grace, but we transfigure ourselves, or 'produce the reaction' through 'beseking'. God is the object of this transitive action, but the action itself also becomes objective: '*our beseking*'. With this grammatical doubling, Julian thus expresses the lively activity of the soul—its dynamism—as a realisation of its essential capacity.

Julian's theology is therefore *ontological* as much as it is teleological. This is by no means an attempt, however, to hem Julian in as a scholastic theologian. As I have demonstrated, my approach considers Julian's theology as an ecology of thought, its roots brushing up against an inheritance of scholastic, monastic, and vernacular theology. Unlike Aquinas and other scholastic theologians of her time, Julian's focus is not so much on the abstract conceptual understanding of ontology, but on the *lived practice* which is both a constituent and a consequence of this ontology, a practice which will see her (and her 'even cristen') through the 'hidouse and dredfull, swete and lovely' spectrum of worldly experience. In this sense, Julian is drawing on Boethian and pseudo-Dionysian traditions as much as those of the schools. This is most evident in her writing on sin, the final aspect of her theology remaining for me to examine. Figuratively speaking, Julian's attitude is of sin as a great wound which, gifted to us, will be turned to honours upon God's judgement. She subsequently determines that the pains and tribulation of life stem from our ontological separation from God, rather than moral defect. In Watson's words, 'not only is divine lack merely an aspect of the divine fullness, a manifestation of God's need to pour himself out; human lack, properly understood, is essentially no different'.[194] For Julian, then, the ontological fact of our separation from God is the foundation for our lapse into sin (the soul's dynamism directed wrongfully; action in the wrong direction), but it is also the foundation for our fulfilment: both facts are mutually coexistent in the creation/fall/redemption timeline. Sin and suffering are thus configured as part of the very essence of existence and, moreover, part of the process of reunification which defines the

[193] Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, 1a, q. 23, a. 3.
[194] Watson, 'Conceptions of the Word', p. 121.

existence of 'all mankinde that shall be savid'.[195] It is on account of this that Julian can say 'Synne is behovabil': it is befitting, appropriate, an ontological fact of our existence.[196]

The performative action required in Julian's onto-theology is thus one of both preparedness *and* fulfilment. Our future home in heaven is bought to hand by the incarnation of Christ, the redemption of earthly existence. This was prophesied by John the Baptist, who, preaching in the wilderness of Judea, declared 'the kingdom of heaven is at hand' (Matthew 3:2). He advised the people to repent, calling for the 'way' to be prepared for the lord, for paths to be 'made straight': '*Uox* clamantis *i*n [*deserto*] *p*arate *u*iam domini *r*ectas *f*acite semitas *e*jus', glossed as 'Makeð þe lou*er*des weies. *and* rihteð his peðes' in the thirteenth-century homily.[197] 'At hand' in this verse is a translation of *appropinquavit* in the Vulgate, indicating a drawing near, from adverbial *prope* (near, nigh, close), related to *propinquity* (nearness, kindred), *proper,* and *appropriate*—as in Julian's 'behovabil', which indicates a sense of *appropriateness* or expediency in the existence of sin. Turner offers a similar translation of 'behovabil' as the Latin *conveniens*, 'in the sense that Anselm, Hugh of St Victor, Thomas Aquinas, and Bonaventure would have understood it, which is […] that it "fits", it is "just so".[198] Again, Julian goes further than this reading allows: sin is not only 'behovabil' as in convenient or fitting, it is *beneficial*, indeed it is necessary. Sin is the gift which is better for the servant than his own health—'a geft that be better to hym and more worshipfull than his own hole shuld have ben'[199]—because the mundanity of health would never have exposed him to his ontological condition of separation, and thus to its fulfilment. Our awareness or knowledge of this lack rests on the disclosure of authentic understanding discussed earlier. For Julian, her sickness and subsequent beholding of Christ exposes her to this condition. For her 'even cristen', they must seek into themselves and to the divine. This is what it means to exist in dwelling in God.

The etymological nexus of 'appropriateness', 'nearness', or 'at-handness' also includes *property*, as in the Greek *ousia*; that which is objectively present-at-hand in a household, available at any given moment for use, as McGrath puts it. As I have shown, present-at-handness in phenomenological terms denotes a sense of availability (literally 'being-before-the-hand'), a

[195] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 13.
[196] *Ibid*, p. 38.
[197] *Old English Homilies of the Twelfth Century: From the Unique MS. B.14.52. in the Library of Trinity College, Cambridge: Second Series, with Three Thirteenth Century Hymns from MS. 54 D.4.14 in Corpus Christi College*, ed. and trans. by Richard Morris, EETS o.s. 53 (London: Trübner & Co., 1873), p. 129.
[198] Turner, *Julian of Norwich, Theologian*, p. 37.
[199] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 73.

theoretical determination of a thing's essence, defined as such by the thing's showing itself apart from its web of relation. McGrath reminds us that this emerges out of ready-to-handness, a condition of homelike attunement or inauthenticity, whereby the thing functions within a referential whole. When we cease to *use* the thing or when we move to define it, it becomes present-at-hand; it becomes objective, removed from its situational context and thus disclosed in its thingliness. Similarly, the kingdom is brought to hand by Christ's incarnation: the coming of the prophet-son who embodies God's Word, the disclosive act par excellence. Of course, the kingdom has not been disclosed as useless or meaningless. Rather, via the 'mene' of the incarnation, we are given *disposal over* that which is at-hand: the kingdom of heaven, his 'homliest home', is brought to hand—disclosed to us—by the incarnation, in a similar way to our realisation by the creative hand of God. Our ontological fulfilment or 'homlyhede' is thus also made present-at-hand, made consciously available to us, by both the creation and incarnation, events which are equally and simultaneously contingent for this reunification.

In summary, Julian's ontological framework of divine indwelling understands us as *always* connected to God in substance, on account of the atemporal creation/fall/redemption timeline, able to realise our wholeness through the very act of seeking it. Heaven, or 'homlyhede', is thus *made available to us* at any given moment. We just have to become aware of it. This is made difficult by our 'blindhede', our temporal position in the eschatological timeline. The 'almost-thereness' implied by John the Baptist's use of *appropinquavit* captures the penultimacy of this state; suspended in the eternal now, we are positioned in the 'being-between' like Heidegger's Dasein, projecting ourselves into the unknown with the faith that the discomfort of this wilderness will be transformed by our effortful seeking. Heaven is therefore at hand in Julian's theology due to our mutual indwelling with God, whereby we are already, in a sense, at home in him, and him in us. This at-homeness is realised, fulfilled, or simply disclosed by the incarnation of Christ, which reveals to us the goodness and love of God. Subsequently, 'coming home' or performing 'homlyhede' is also a coming home to ourselves, an inner journey that parallels the topography expressed in Matthew 3:2 and Luke 14:23; a making straight of the paths, an expanding of the hedgerows, a cultivating of the wilderness, the land of unlikeness, so that it can flourish to receive him. This can be done via the reiterative and fundamentally disruptive act of 'beseking', the performative act or way of living that realises our divine wholeness. Christ leads us on this pathway home, he *is* the pathway home, and all the while we are already at home in God, because God is at home in us, sitting in the wilderness of our soul. Just as Christ comes into the Judean desert as the 'path' through this postlapsarian wilderness, labouring on the cross

to lead us onward, we must, then, labour within the wilderness of our own soul. This preparation is performed through participatory contemplation or ‘beseking’, which re-forms the soul such that its capacity—its highways and hedgerows—is expanded enough to allow the journey.

Conclusion

i. Christ the Physician

The thesis has thus far examined the transfigurative events of illness and revelation in Julian of Norwich's writing: how her 'bodely sekeness' suspends her in a state of abject liminality, from which she must then begin to re-attune to the homelikeness of her revelation or beholding. This phenomenological reading has reiterated the idea that homelikeness can be restored separately from physiological function, such that an ill person—in this case, Julian—is able to return to everyday life with a renewed sense of wholeness. Phenomenology determines this process as contingent upon the patient's *self*-understanding, which, as Fredrik Svenaeus writes, is developed by the doctor's own *understanding* of the patient and their experiences. Svenaeus calls this 'shared understanding', where the lifeworld horizons of clinician and patient are brought closer together and converge. In this concluding word on the text, I would like to consider Julian's therapeutic theology of love within this medical hermeneutic of physician and patient, focusing specifically on the catalysing element of *mutual trust*, as it is borne out in the divine-human relationship. With this, I uncover a final phenomenological component to Julian's texts: her subtle configuration of the *Christus medicus* topos, wherein Christ is both patient *and* physician, just as he is both servant *and* lord, son *and* mother. Julian's Christ subsequently fuses the world-heaven horizon, disclosing 'homlyhede' as a relational condition which is born out of the interaction, the 'between', of self and other. I conclude by contemplating the communality of this spiritual and therapeutic project: Julian's healing was not the end of her story, and neither should it be for her 'even cristen'. Instead, the therapeutic responsibility is passed osmotically, in an eternal cycle between doctor and patient, author and reader, 'I' and 'Thou', via the performative porosity of our shared flesh. The thesis therefore culminates in a redefinition of the linear event > interpretation > communication sequence as cyclical, with an invitation to the reader to pursue their own transfiguration, and with it, to engage others in the same process. The new event which is yielded from this process may not be an irruption of beholding, but rather a life lived in dwelling in Christ; yet it remains an event (from *e*[*x*], 'out of' and *venire*, 'to come') which *comes out of*, is *born from*, the reiterative and compassionate practice of love.

Just as Julian's account of her own suffering and revelation becomes an access point for readerly participation, the anchorite's route to understanding maps onto a collective experience available to her 'even cristen'. This epistemological process requires that Julian enter *into* the showings,

which means simultaneously to enter into Christ, and into herself; a hermeneutic excavation of their co-woundedness. In the tenth showing, for example, Christ guides Julian's understanding into the fissure in his side, 'as if he had seid: "My derling, behold and se thy lord, thy God […]"'.[1] After years of inward contemplation—of seeking into Christ's woundedness—Julian finally arrives at the meaning of the revelation: 'love'.[2] This joint project can be understood in terms of Svenaeus's medical hermeneutic outlined in chapter one, which in turn draws on the work of Thomas Szasz and Marc Hollender, who frame such encounters as adhering to a medical model of 'mutual participation':

> This relationship, characterised by a high degree of empathy, has elements often associated with the notions of friendship and partnership and the imparting of expert advice. The physician may be said to help the patient to help himself. The physician's gratification cannot stem from power or from the control over someone else's. His satisfactions are derived from more abstract kinds of mastery, which are as yet poorly understood.[3]

This relationship is asymmetrical, in that the physician is regarded as the therapeutic authority in the partnership, a higher power or the 'causal component' in the relationship. Yet this model also provides room for the productive capacity of the subject or patient, who must *work with* the physician to generate this therapeutic power, by increasing their own self-understanding; the physician *helps them to help themselves*. On account of this, I would redefine Szasz and Hollender's 'high degree of empathy' as a high degree of *compassion*, since the model foregrounds the *person*-in-pain, and the development of their self-understanding: it is a model of *co*-feeling, not *in*-feeling.

Julian's representation of Christ is characterised by the same degree of compassion which grounds the mutual participation model, a healing relationship which can be read as a tacit configuration of Christ as a physician. To be 'homely', as is God with humanity, is to engage a relationship based on simplicity, directness, familiarity and, most of all, the expectation of *trust*—a feature Svenaeus deems a core component of the clinical encounter. 'Deep trust, despite estrangement and asymmetry, is […] a necessary feature of the medical meeting', he writes.[4] Indeed, deep trust is surely required *on account* of estrangement and asymmetry, since in any

[1] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 35.
[2] *Ibid*, p. 135.
[3] Thomas S. Szasz and Marc H. Hollender, 'Contribution to the Philosophy of Medicine: The Basic Models of the Doctor-Patient Relationship', *American Medical Association—Archives of Internal Medicine* 97 (1956), 585–92 (p. 588).
[4] *Ibid*, pp. 147–48.

asymmetrical relationship one individual is essentially required to surrender a degree of agency to a higher power. Julian describes this as 'sekir truste', the second property which constitutes the 'ground of our beseekeing', the first being prayer.[5] For if prayer is the direction of the intention towards God, trust is the acknowledgment that our intention may not be enough to reach him in beholding—a principle of epistemological concession that undergirds all apophatic contemplation. This emphasis on the power of trust to lead the contemplative onward is elegantly articulated in the Bible by Proverb 3:5–6, which in the King James Version reads 'Trust in the Lord with all thine heart; and lean not unto thine own understanding. | In all thy ways acknowledge him, and he shall direct thy paths'.[6] The translation of 'gressus' as 'paths' recalls the making straight of paths of Matthew 3:2, which I previously described as a topographical parallel to Julian's act of 'beseking'. The Douay-Rheims version, meanwhile, reads 'Have confidence in the Lord with all thy heart, and lean not upon thy own prudence. In all thy ways think on him, and he will direct thy steps'. Both are valid translations of the Vulgate's 'Habe fiduciam', 'fiduciam' from *fīdere*, to trust or have confidence in.[7] Douay-Rheims' 'prudence' is, however, closer to the Vulgate's 'prudentiae'. As I noted in chapter two, prudence or *prudentia* is the cardinal virtue which governs the ability to project oneself forward, to direct one's *intentio* as is required in prayer. But trust requires us to *abandon* this perceived wisdom, this intellectual capacity of directed intentionality—instead submitting ourselves to the wisdom of God. It requires us, to paraphrase Maggie Ross, to *relinquish* all claims to experience, and its epistemological trappings.[8]

Julian's pairing of prayer and trust as the ground of 'beseking' thus maps onto the contemplative epistemology I outlined in chapter three, wherein both are *actions* of the will undertaken by the self-conscious mind, which lead the contemplative towards beholding; of *willed unwilling*. In chapter four, I showed how prayer discloses our relationship to God, that ontological connection which is always present but not always witnessed. Trust functions similarly: as an intersubjective condition between two agents or participants, trust is a bond predicated upon *action* or *process*.[9] It is built over time and through interaction; a person can prove themselves be trust*worthy* by fulfilling our expectations of them, or can break our trust by failing to prove themselves reliable.

[5] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 2.
[6] Latin Vulgate: 'Habe fiduciam in Domino ex toto corde tuo, et ne innitaris prudentiae tuae. | In omnibus viis tuis cogita illum, et ipse diriget gressus tuos'.
[7] DMLBS, s.v. 'fidere',
[8] Ross, 'Behold Not The Cloud of Experience', p. 39.
[9] For more on trust as process, see Guido Möllering, 'Process Views of Trusting and Crises', in *Handbook of Advances in Trust Research*, ed. by R. Bachmann and A. Zaheer (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2013), pp. 285–305.

It relies, in other words, upon reiterative and reciprocal acts of vulnerability. In the words of Charles Feltman, 'Trust is choosing to risk making something you value vulnerable to another person's actions'.[10] *Choosing to make oneself vulnerable to the actions of another*. Brené Brown picks up this definition in 'The Anatomy of Trust', where she speaks about trust as 'braving connection'.[11] This must be a total and complete commitment to be effective—*deep* or 'sekir' trust—or else it is automatically negated, becoming *dis*trust. As philosopher Knud Eljer Løgstrup writes, 'the least interruption, the least calculation, the least dilution of it in the service of something else destroys it entirely, indeed turns it into the opposite of what it is'.[12] Julian describes such an experience when she writes of the ninth revelation, that 'oftentymes our troste is not full, for we arn not sekir that God herith us'.[13] The result is that the supplicant is left 'as barren and dry' after their prayers as they were before. In this instance, they did not trust, not only because they were afraid that God would not hear, but that he would not be listening—that if they truly committed to braving that connection, they would find themselves abandoned and alone. By choosing to trust *fully*, a person acknowledges and 'overpasses' (to use Julian's word) this potential for betrayal, and the potential for Godforsakenness.

This example echoes the Catch-22 of the shame cycle described in chapter three, where an individual feels unworthy, leading them to act in ways which prevent them from rebuilding a sense of worth. Similarly, a person's lack of trust prevents them from seeking connection, which in turn corroborates their feelings of abandonment and distrust. As with shame, breaking out of the distrust cycle requires the individual to remember their worth, wholeness, or integrity—their innate union with God—which will secure their sense of homelikeness *even if they feel alone*. This requires, again as with shame, a reliance on *faith*, which we can define as a belief-system, worldview, or spiritual conviction. In Julian's theological framework, faith is a condition of the ontological mutual indwelling of the soul in God: it is situated in the soul, fulfilling its capacity for receiving God—'we faith*full*y pray'—and is also a spatial zone in which our soul dwells—'stedfastly hold me *in the faith*', Julian writes.[14] Trust, meanwhile, discloses this indwelling to us through the choice to turn towards God, to brave the connection. It is a *willed act of relational disclosure*. Trust might subsequently be understood as *faith-in-action*; the leap in a 'leap of faith',

[10] Charles Feltman, *The Thin Book of Trust: An Essential Primer for Building Trust at Work* (Bend, OR: Thin Book Publishing Co, 2009), p. 7.
[11] Brené Brown, 'Supersoul Sessions: The Anatomy of Trust', *Brené Brown*, available at: <https://brenebrown.com/videos/anatomy-trust-video/> [accessed 16 April 2020].
[12] Knud Eljer Løgstrup, *Beyond the Ethical Demand* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), p. 85. Løgstrup refers here to the destruction of mercy, but he says the same of trust.
[13] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 56.
[14] *Ibid*, pp. 8, 45, emphases added.

or perhaps more accurately, the continuous and dynamic series of leaps which constitute 'beseking'.[15] As in the Augustinian model of *fides quaerens intellectum*, first comes faith, then comes the act of seeking understanding. What this definition highlights is the vulnerability necessary in the act of 'beseking': a person *chooses* to make something they value vulnerable to the actions of God, the 'something' of which is usually their ego, their ability to protect themselves, to remain buffered or closed off, over and against the world. In medical terms, this requires a sacrifice of individual or personal sovereignty over their wellbeing (or salvation), in favour of trusting in their faithful relationship with the physician (God).

This relationship of trust is not, moreover, predicated upon belief without proof, or without disclosure on the part of God, as is faith. It is, as the mutual participation model defines it, a *reciprocal* act; a choice to be vulnerable with God in response to God's own dealings with us. As I have written above, the incarnation discloses these dealings, functioning as God's own 'willed, kenotic leaping of love', as Cervone writes; the *leap* which provided humanity with the opportunity to seek salvation, or wholeness.[16] He then sacrificed his son for this same purpose, in the ultimate and eternal act of trust. As Julian writes, 'Be Criste we are stedfastly kept, and be his grace touchyng we are reysid into sekir troste of salvation'.[17] The Ancient Greek word *therápōn*, meaning 'earthly attendant' or 'servant', captures the essence of Christ's role as physician within this narrative, closely related as it is to the modern borrowing, 'therapy'.[18] The term is used once in the Greek Testament of the King James Version, when Jesus is described as worthy of greater honour than even Moses, who was 'faithful as a servant [Greek: therapon] in all God's house'; Christ is to Moses as 'he that built the house' is to the house itself. Christ, however, is double in nature: he is divine *and* human, creator *and* created. He subsequently embodies both the builder of the house (God) and the house God built (humanity). In chapter four, I outlined how this principle of doubling also manifests in Julian's anthropology: given her understanding of our ontological union with God in the substance of our soul, Julian recognises the presence of the creator within us, rendering us not only *creatures* as in created products, but as active participants, or *producers*, in the continual and eternal timeline of creation and recreation, redemption or reunification. Julian's participatory theology thus aligns with the mutual

[15] For more on this 'leap', see Guido Möllering, 'The Nature of Trust: From Georg Simmel to a Theory of Expectation, Interpretation and Suspension', *Sociology* 35.2 (2001), 403–20.
[16] Cervone, *Poetics of the Incarnation*, p. 6.
[17] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 82.
[18] James Strong, *A Concise Dictionary of the Words in The Greek Testament* (New York: Abingdon Press, 1890), available at: <https://archive.org/details/StrongsGreekAndHebrewDictionaries1890> [accessed 31 March 2020], s.v. 'θεράπων' (therápōn) [#G2324].

participation model outlined above, wherein the physician 'may be said to help the patient to help himself'. Christ is the lord God's *therápōn* and the lord himself, serving and engaging us in service of the same project; the *therapy* of humanity. He does so by *changing the way we figure things out*, to return to Ross's definition of transfiguration: as his earthly attendant, Christ reveals God's home-building project, disclosing to us the present-at-handness of heaven on earth. But we still have to perform the 'figuring out'—to keep up the building and rebuilding of the house within our soul, which is God's 'homliest home'. We still have to engage reiteratively and 'trostily' in 'beseking'.[19]

The motivation of the physician in Julian's therapeutic theology is therefore perhaps not as 'poorly understood' as Szasz and Hollender would have it. Phenomenology shows us that human existence is at its heart an intersubjective project; we find genuine authenticity through being-with-others, *Mitsein*. At the root of this intersubjectivity lies the impulse toward connection and compassion, which Julian conceptualises as our essential integrity or 'godly will', the part of the soul which tends always towards goodness. As Julian writes when she reminds her reader that God does not love her better because he appeared to her, nor that she loves God more, '*we arn al one in comfort*'. In Sloane, this is repeated twice more: 'we arn al on in Goddis menyng'; 'we arn al one in his loveing'.[20] For Julian, the ground of this unified, communal existence is God's love. Love binds us. Love unites us. Love is our natural, 'kindly', genuinely authentic state of being-in-the-world. 'Wete it wele: love was his mening. Who shewid it the? Love. What shewid he the? Love. Wherfore shewid it he? For love'.[21] Love is therefore also behind the motivations, or 'satisfactions' as Szasz and Hollender put it, of Christ the physician in Julian's texts. The term 'satisfactions' is crucial here, for in Julian's theology, it is not only the satisfaction of the physician which drives his healing. Inverting the traditional satisfaction theory of Anselm—the notion that Christ's death satisfies the debt that humanity has failed to pay—Julian's Christ instead asks *Julian* if she is satisfied: 'Art thou wele payd that I suffrid for thee?'.[22] He then reiterates the compassionate fusion of their horizons with the words, 'If thou art payde, I am payde'.[23]

[19] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 44.
[20] *Ibid*, pp. 41, 123.
[21] *Ibid*, p. 135.
[22] *Ibid*, p. 31.
[23] *Ibid*.

By placing Julian's satisfaction *ahead* of Christ's, just as she puts the readers' ahead of hers, Julian's Christ goes much further than contemporary renderings of the *Christus medicus* topos allow.[24] Rejecting any clearcut or linear physician-patient relationship, *A Revelation* instead configures a mutual and participatory model of healing, which understands the *patient*'s satisfaction—their understanding—as equally vital to the therapeutic project. As in Szasz and Hollender's model, the patient at once *trusts* in the physician's intention and expertise to heal them, and *contributes* to this practice. For Julian, the individual has 'truste' in God's guidance for their seeking; in his direction of their directedness, *his ability to help them help themselves*. Transfiguration subsequently emerges from the *patient*'s or *servant*'s labour, their own digging and delving into the recesses of their soul, upending the soil of their sins and exposing the systematic distortion of their perception. I have modelled this as the phenomenological disclosure of authentic understanding, effected either by the sudden and momentous breakdown of subjectivity experienced in illness, or by the gradual and effortful process of 'beseking'. Christ functions as the clinical touchstone of this joint project, the disclosive facilitator of love and security throughout both routes to understanding. As the foundation of trust and care, Christ provides his servants each with the 'inner space' required for working towards this wholeness. This space is to be found in his side-wound and thus within the self, the large and spacious kingdom in which they can manoeuvre and navigate their self-beliefs and attitudes, their testimony about their life experiences. It is with this provision of space that 'homlyhede' can be reiteratively performed by the dis-eased individual; that they are able to find a home within themselves, which was always present, and is now at hand.

ii. Walking Each Other Home

I conclude this study with a quote by a spiritual teacher from the present day, Ram Dass: '*we're all just walking each other home*'.[25] In his collaborative work with Mirabai Bush of this name, Ram Dass writes of the shift in consciousness from identification with the ego to oneness with the universe.[26] His lifelong meditations on this philosophy supply a twenty-first century example of an individual *figuring this out*, for himself and for others. Indeed, in a parallel to Julian's experience of sickness, Ram Dass also suffered a life-changing illness—a stroke—which he

[24] For more of my writing on this, see Lucas, 'Passion and Melancholy', esp. pp. 3–8.
[25] Ram Dass, quoted at <www.ramdass.org> [accessed 13 April 2020], emphasis added.
[26] Ram Dass and Mirabai Bush, *Walking Each Other Home: Conversations on Loving and Dying* (Louiseville, CO: Sounds True, 2018), p. 26.

would later term 'fierce grace'.[27] The stroke left him partially paralysed and aphasic, which, he writes, 'gave [him] the gift of silence'.[28] It also drastically altered his approach to death and dying, which he came to see 'through a lens ground by suffering'.[29] His own death shortly after writing *Walking Each Other Home* sits as a powerful epilogue to his meditations on dying as the last *sādhanā*, a term from the yogic tradition which translates as a spiritual practice or discipline, much like Julian's 'beseking'.[30] At the heart of *sādhanā* is *compassion*, or being of service: as Ram Dass said of his illness, 'The stroke has given me another way to serve people. It lets me feel more deeply the pain of others; to help them know by example that ultimately, whatever happens, no harm can come. "Death is perfectly safe", I like to say'.[31]

In choosing to end the thesis with a contemporary voice not belonging exclusively to the Christian tradition, I hope to leave my reader with an awareness of the ways in which the metaphor of the home continues to find its way into meditations on wellbeing in modern times—and, moreover, the ways it transcends denominations, reminding us of the universality of being-at-home as an existential experience. That is, of the *boundless availability* of at-homeness, the wellspring from which we can choose to seek nourishment. It also reminds us of the availability of this lexis for speaking about the journey of life to death; a vocabulary which is always nearest and readiest to us, always at hand. With this, we can find a way to speak into being the collective project of living in wholeness, whether we call it 'walking each other home' or performing 'homlyhede'. For this performance of 'homlyhede' is, like *sādhanā*, at its heart a performance of compassion; a form of co-feeling which allows a person to not only *feel* another's feelings, but to identify with the person who is feeling, and to help them work towards healing themselves. In pursuing this practice, transfiguration is made possible *between* individuals. One person's compassion encourages reciprocal compassion; one person's trust births trust in another. And through this transfiguration, the individual realises their oneness with said 'other'. Both individuals are made porous, as the 'I-Thou' engagement transfigures both 'I' *and* 'Thou'.

This comparison is not, however, intended to suggest that Julian's theology is universalist: never going 'beyond the brink of universalism', she is resolute in her adherence to the church's

[27] Sara Davidson, 'The Ultimate Trip' [2006], *Tufts Magazine*, Archived 4 March 2016, available at: <https://web.archive.org/web/20160304021804/http://www.tufts.edu/alumni/magazine/fall2006/features/ultimate-trip.html> [accessed 13 April 2020].
[28] Ram Dass and Mirabai Bush, *Walking Each Other Home*, p. 2.
[29] *Ibid*, p. 10.
[30] *Ibid*, p. 13.
[31] Ram Dass, quoted at <www.ramdass.org> [accessed 13 April 2020]. Cf. Ram Dass and Mirabai Bush, *Compassion in Action: Setting out on the Path of Service* (New York: Bell Tower, 1995).

teachings on salvation.[32] In line with the Christological emphasis of *A Revelation*, it is Christ who functions as the facilitator of the therapeutic project: the wounded physician who suffered so that he might know humanity's suffering; the divine voice of disclosure that *whatever happens*, *no harm can come*, even in death. Christ thus provides a holy paradigm for all of humanity to follow: 'Criste is *our* wey', Julian writes.[33] *Our* way; a path for all who choose it. Julian's texts grant her readers access to this path, offering 'homlyhede' to the seeking reader just as St Julian the Hospitaller grants 'bone hostel' to the peripatetic traveller. She does so by inviting the reader to share in her understanding, to enter in and dwell a while in Christ's woundedness, and thus also to enter into their own personal wounds. Fuelled by her own encounter with God's 'fierce grace', Julian's writing shows us what is possible if we tap into this wellspring ourselves, as a collective. This is the crux of her theology which renders it so universally and powerfully applicable even in the present day: that we—Julian's readers—are offered a means of finding a home wherever our way-faring takes us, even if this is to the darkest, or most unhomelike, of places. Her texts therefore function not only as a therapeutic tool with which to approach tribulation, but as an access point to a therapeutic way of life, one which promises that 'al shal be wele', should we find the faith—indeed, the trust—with which to seek it.

[32] Richard Harries, 'On the Brink of Universalism', in *Julian: Woman of Our Day*, ed. by R. Llewelyn (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1985), pp. 41–60 (pp. 54, 57).
[33] Glasscoe, ed., *Revelation of Love*, p. 87, emphasis added.

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Appendix:

Maggie Ross's Contemplative Epistemologies

Maggie Ross, 'Behold Not the Cloud of Experience', in *MMTE VIII, Papers Read at Charney Manor, July 2011*, ed. by E. A. Jones (Woodbridge: Brewer, 2013), pp. 29–50 (pp. 34–35).

Diagram 1

Some Ancient and Medieval Texts Concerning Contemplation:

Two Epistemologies [En-Christing Process]

Left Side: Self-Conscious Mind

Finite, limited capacity, linear mind / creates two dimensional virtual world / simple speech / 'experience' / interpretation / discrimination / dualistic / horizontal / time-bound / law / noise / feedback loop / one kind of attention / exclusive / grandiose / hierarchical / self-reflexive / deceitful / illusion of objectivity. Able to influence deep mind only indirectly through paradox, intention, resonance. God as absence.



Most people are trapped in the virtual and noisy world of self-consciousness (left side of diagram). For the mind to function optimally, it must be recentred in the deep mind (right side), restoring the circulation between the two epistemologies so that ordinary daily life draws on its wellspring of silence and trans-figuration. Then experience is understood as provisional and is continually submitted to silence where it is trans-figured. After long practice of choosing silence, the centre of the person abides in it.

Self-knowledge is even more about understanding this dynamic than it is a moral inventory, so that all of life may be yielded to and transfigured by the Spirit.

Right Side: Deep Mind

Infinite large capacity / holographic rational faculty / ethical / inclusive / lateral connections / core silence / beholding / no self-consciousness / processes complex language but does not speak / no 'experience' or interpretation / polyvalent and polysemous / not time-bound / work of Spirit / deep silence / 'apophatic consciousness' / 'secret silence' (Ps-Denys) / 'darkness' = not directly accessible / several forms of global attention / open and outflowing / God as presence–absence.

unfolding truth of self/shared nature with God

spiritual faculties implicitly paradoxical, e.g. cling to dispossession, know by unknowing, see through blindness, touch nothing, etc. Processes layered meanings, metaphors, etc.



trans-figuration – incarnation – resurrection

creativity, changed perspective

face to Face

kynde knowing

continual beholding

continual *excessus mentis* (because no self-consciousness) which irrupts; these irruptions decrease in significance and are ultimately irrelevant after person is re-centred and there is a continual flow and exchange between deep mind and self-conscious mind.

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