

Making Friends:

Amity in American Foreign Policy

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Abstract: *This thesis examines an important but understudied phenomenon in international politics: the role of amity in foreign policy. The core research question is “how have American friendships for specified others been made possible?” Drawing on the logic of securitization, this thesis employs Aristotle’s notion of character friends as Other Selves and Judith Butler’s concept of performativity to elaborate an international process of friendship or amitization. In doing so, the thesis employs critical discourse analysis of presidential rhetoric and popular culture to elucidate the process through which discourses of similarity become naturalized frames of reference within the conduct of foreign policy. It argues that friendship emerges when a state comes to see itself in an other and that this similarity (re)produces a certain form of state identity that enables and forecloses certain policy options vis-à-vis friends. Friendship manifests in a habitual, or naturalized, disposition to treat friends better than others. As such, it can account for how certain policies and postures, such as uncritical and often unconditional support for subjects positioned as “friends,” have come to be pursued as common sense. Amitization is illustrated by assessing three case studies: the Anglo-American “special relationship;” the US-Israel “unbreakable bond;” and America’s membership of “the Atlantic Community.” Specifically, the thesis similarly demonstrates the ways in which amity accounts for how supererogatory commitments such as vast financial assistance, diplomatic support, information sharing, security guarantees and concern for the welfare of these specified others have come to be seen as unquestionably legitimate policies in the broader trajectory of American foreign policy. Amity matters and the practices of amitization are inseparable from intelligible foreign policy.*

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Contents

Introduction.....	1
Theoretical Framework and Epistemology.....	3
Overview of Argument.....	6
<i>International Society and (Imagined) International Communities</i>	8
<i>American Communities</i>	18
<i>Amity in American Foreign Policy</i>	22
Chapter 1: Performing Foreign Policy	27
<i>Foreign Policy as Social Construction</i>	29
<i>The National Interest</i>	39
<i>Identity as Performative Accomplishment</i>	43
<i>Casting the World</i>	52
Chapter 2: Between Other and Self: A Place for Friendship?	63
<i>Friends and Allies</i>	65
<i>A Forgotten Concept: A Brief History of Friendship</i>	71
<i>Friendship in International Politics</i>	83
Chapter 3: Amitization.....	91
<i>Securitization and Amitization</i>	91
<i>Maintaining Friendship</i>	105
<i>Finding Friendships – A Methodology</i>	112
Rhetorical Presence and the Rhetorical Presidency	112
Unpacking Common Sense	115
Case Selection.....	120
Chapter 4: Language and Likeness: “An English Speaking Brotherhood”	123
<i>From Habitual Hatred to Neutral Conduct</i>	130
Overcoming Anti-British Interests	132
The Peaceful Resolution of Disputes.....	135
“War Plan Red” – A Prelude to Friendship?	137
<i>Forging Friendship</i>	139
Imperialism v. Empire	141
Monarchy.....	148
Aristocracy.....	152

<i>Brothers in Arms</i>	155
Securitizing British Freedom.....	156
Our Democratic Neighbor	158
Brave Brethren.....	160
<i>Addendum to the Special Relationship</i>	163
Chapter 5: “The Unbreakable Bond”: Constructing the US-Israel Special Relationship	167
<i>The Anomalous Relationship</i>	169
“Strategic Asset”: Real or Imagined?	174
The Israel Lobby.....	177
Public Preferences	181
<i>Imagining Israel</i>	183
Mainstreaming Jewish Identity.....	185
Uniting the Diaspora.....	190
American Orientalism in Palestine	194
<i>Introducing Israel</i>	198
<i>Cementing the Bond</i>	206
Chapter 6: Security as Similarity: “The Atlantic Community”	210
<i>Prioritizing Europe</i>	216
<i>Constructing “the Atlantic Community”</i>	223
Common Heritage and Civilization.....	224
Virtuous Europe.....	229
The Deserving Poor	233
<i>Representing non-European Allies</i>	238
Protector/Protected: The Decline of Pan-Americanism	241
Tutors and Students: The Absence of a Pacific Community.....	245
<i>The Borders of the Atlantic Community</i>	248
Conclusion	254
<i>Enduring Love</i>	255
<i>Prospects for Deamitization</i>	259
<i>Whither Amity?</i>	265
Bibliography	269

Introduction

On 20 May 2011, President Barack Obama of the United States met with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel in the Oval Office. After a ninety minute meeting, they spoke to the press. President Obama began his comments by reiterating the “extraordinary bonds” of “friendship” between the United States and Israel:

Well, let me first of all welcome again Prime Minister Netanyahu, who I think has now been here seven times during the course of my Presidency. And I want to indicate that the frequency of these meetings is an indication of the *extraordinary bonds* between our two countries, as is the opportunity for the Prime Minister to address Congress during his visit here. I know that’s an honor that’s reserved for those who have always shown themselves to be a great friend of the United States and is indicative of *the friendship between our countries*.¹

Before the Washington press corps, the Prime Minister of a state, which has received sustained military, political, and economic support from America for decades, began to speak. Looking Obama squarely in the eye, Netanyahu declared that “[Israel] cannot go back to the 1967 lines;” opposing the vision that Obama had set out the day before and 44 years of America’s professed commitment to United Nations Security Council Resolution 242.² As if such boldness was not enough of a break with protocol, Netanyahu went further, giving Obama a history lesson: “Remember that before 1967 Israel was all of 9 miles wide. It was half the width of the Washington Beltway. And these were not the boundaries of peace; they were the boundaries of repeated wars.”³ How could it be possible for a prime minister of a much less powerful and strategically dependent state to humiliate the president in the White House? And why weren’t there greater consequences?

¹ Barack Obama, *Public Papers of the President (PPP)*, “Remarks Following a Meeting with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel,” 20 May 2011. For the purposes of this thesis, assume all emphases are added, unless indicated otherwise. British English is used, unless American authors or orators are cited.

² Obama, *PPP*, “Remarks at the Department of State,” 19 May 2011. Obama announced: “We believe the borders of Israel and Palestine should be based on the 1967 lines with mutually agreed swaps, so that secure and recognized borders are established for both states.”

³ Obama, *PPP*, “Remarks,” 20 May 2011.

This thesis starts from the premise that other-regarding behaviour, warranted by categorizations of others as “friend,” “enemy,” “ally,” “rival,” constitutes the “reality” of the world for foreign policy makers and the general public. If these categorizations do not matter, states should not *a priori* expect either good or bad treatment from any other. However, amity and enmity create reasonable, though not necessary, expectations of favourable treatment and are sources of order in international relations. Where American foreign policy makers give special treatment and sustained support to Britain and Israel, take on special obligations to protect Europe, treat Russia and China with suspicion, or are overtly hostile towards North Korea and Iran, they are operating within the boundaries of possibility created by taken-for-granted assumptions both about “America” and those subjects with which America interacts. To humiliate a president of a state whose support is crucial for the welfare of your nation, may seem a risky strategy. Netanyahu, however, could publicly challenge Obama without the risk that Obama would change policy because he understood that Obama, and all American policy makers, are constrained. Obama is constrained by America’s friendship for Israel.

This thesis is about international friendship – amity. Amity is important in the formation and maintenance of some international alignments and is a source of continuity in American foreign policy. Foreign policy decisions are limited by everyday understandings that America has enemies, rivals, allies, partners, and friends. Of these categories, “friend” is the most neglected in International Relations: “Relative to ‘enemy’, the concept of ‘friend’ is undertheorized in social theory, and especially in IR, where a substantial literature exists on enemy images but little on friend images, on enduring rivalries but little on enduring friendships, on the causes of war but little on the causes of peace.”⁴ Alexander Wendt’s assessment continues to ring true: there have been few attempts to incorporate amity into foreign policy analysis. Indeed, a fixation with enmity and having enemies dominates IR

⁴ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 298.

scholarship. This is a problem as relations of enmity constitute only a small part of the variety of international relations. Indeed, arguably, generally agreeable relations between friendly states and institutions constitute the bulk of international politics. Amity, like its antonym enmity, requires attention since the particular constitution of friendship (and attendant identity) enables some forms of foreign policy while precluding others.

The main question this thesis seeks to address is *how have American friendships for specified others been made possible?* In addressing this it explores several related questions including: *What is international friendship? How does international friendship emerge? What implications do international friendships have for foreign policy?* This thesis has three goals: it builds on existing post-positivist analyses of discourses and foreign policy to contribute to the field of foreign policy analysis;⁵ it assesses whether friendship is a meaningful term that can be transposed onto the international, as well as how having “friends” affects foreign policy; and, using America as a case study, it explains the process through which friendships emerge and are maintained by exploring the discursive construction of amity.

Theoretical Framework and Epistemology

Drawing on the logic of securitization, this thesis employs Aristotle’s notion of friendship as *Other Selves* and Judith Butler’s concept of performativity to elaborate an international process of friendship or *amitization*. Understanding “friends” as *Other Selves* opens up possibilities for the analysis of other-regarding behaviour in foreign policy practices.

⁵ In particular this thesis is indebted to critical constructivist and poststructuralist research on foreign policy practices. Among numerous works, it draws on: Lene Hansen, *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War* (London: Routledge, 2006); Janice Bially Mattern, *Ordering International Politics: Identity, Crisis, and Representational Force* (London: Routledge, 2005); Jutta Weldes et al., *Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production of Danger* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999); Jutta Weldes, *Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999); David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Manchester: University of Minnesota Press, 1998); Jutta Weldes and Diane Saco, “Making State Action Possible: The United States and the Discursive Construction of the ‘Cuban Problem’, 1960-1994,” *Millennium* 25 (2) (1996); and Roxanne Lynn Doty, “Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of US Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines,” *International Studies Quarterly* 37 (3) (1993).

Aristotle's conception of character friendship centres on virtue and concern for the welfare of the other for their own sake and not for some external good or mutual project. It is based on character (similarity of virtue), not capabilities. Judith Butler's theory of performativity informs how certain actions and policies (performances) have become possible and naturalized for a discursively constituted "America."⁶ Everyday understandings that "America" is a "friend of Britain," a "friend of Israel," and a "member of the Atlantic Community" have become part of an American identity, a performatively accomplishment that is discursively (re)constituted *through a stylized repetition of acts and behaviours*. Performing these constituent parts of American identity has become taken-for-granted and part of the compulsory reiteration of norms through which "America" is (re)produced.⁷

This thesis adopts a post-positivist (non-causal) epistemology: it sides with a social constructivist analysis that posits "what is understood as reality is socially constructed."⁸ Following David Campbell, it accepts the logic of interpretation that "acknowledges the improbability of cataloguing, calculating and specifying "real causes," and concerns itself instead with considering the manifest political consequences of adopting one mode of representation over another."⁹ This thesis accepts that discourses constitute state identity and make certain actions appear to be common sense. For the purpose of this study, discourse is understood as a system of representation that finds its expression in language, though it is not synonymous with language: "it is about language and practice."¹⁰ This thesis adopts Jim George's definition: "[discourse] refers to a broader matrix of social practices that give meaning to the way people understand themselves and their behaviour...More precisely a

⁶ Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity*. (London: Routledge, 2006), provides the main theoretical framework for this thesis.

⁷ Mark Laffey, "Locating Identity: Performativity, Foreign Policy and State Action," *Review of International Studies* 26 (2000): 430-431, and Hansen, *Security as Practice*, 19.

⁸ Weldes et al., *Cultures of Insecurity*, 13.

⁹ Campbell, *Writing Security*, 4.

¹⁰ Stuart Hall, et al., *Representation* (Los Angeles: Sage, 2013), 29. Stuart Hall explicates the shift from language to discourse in Michel Foucault's work.

discourse makes “real” that which *it* prescribes as meaningful.”¹¹ Discourses involve both linguistic concepts and the rules and practices that produce meaningful statements. As such, discourses are productive and constitute *subjects*, including “friends.”

Actions do not speak for themselves. Everyday understanding that others are “friends” becomes a frame of reference through which actions are interpreted and options selected. The same actions that could be interpreted as hostile by a non-friend will likely not be interpreted as hostile if enacted by an other that has been categorized as a friend. For example, in the 1950s, the American public and policy makers did not view “the British Empire” as a threat to global security in the way that “communist imperialism” was because Britain had been categorized as friend and the Soviet Union had been categorized as enemy. Frames are “politically saturated...operations of power,”¹² which limit spheres of intelligible meaning. By limiting these spheres, they marginalize (and do violence to) those who act/speak against dominant discourses. The frame of reference bounds political contestation by constituting the set of possible actions. The rigidity of the boundaries of the set of possible actions precludes certain options from consideration, unless the discourses of amity/enmity that constitute the subject position are resignified.

By categorizing others as “friends,” “allies,” “rivals,” or “enemies,” America’s own identity is secured in both the difference between self and other, and also through differentiating its “allies” from its “enemies,” and its “closest allies” from its “strategic partners.” These categorizations do not *cause* states to behave in a certain way: as such, it is inaccurate to speak of amity as a “variable.” As Alexander Wendt has argued, “the effects of constitutive structures might be said to ‘vary’ with their constituting conditions, but the dependency reflected in this variation is conceptual rather than causal. When constituting conditions vary,

¹¹ Jim George, *Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994), 29.

¹² Judith Butler, *Frames of War: When is Life Grievable?* (London: Verso, 2009), 1.

then so do their constitutive effects, *by definition*.”¹³ However, these frames of reference “posit well defined relations” that are “warranting conditions, which make a particular action or belief more ‘reasonable,’ ‘justified,’ or ‘appropriate’”: as such, Jutta Weldes speaks of them as quasi-causal.¹⁴ Understanding that specified others are friends is a constituting structure/warranting condition that enables certain behaviours (constituting effects) to appear to be common sense for public and policy makers in the categorizing state.

Overview of Argument

Amity matters because its manifestation has political consequences. Friendship emerges through a process of amitization.¹⁵ Drawing on extant resources, elites categorize X as a friend by articulating *discourses of similarity* through the use of predicates that endow subjects with certain qualities (character traits) that are presupposed to be qualities (character traits) of the categorizing state.¹⁶ If this *amitizing* move is accepted by the general public, X is successfully *amitized*, inhabiting a subject position “friend.” Amitization depends on stereotypes and generalized simplifications and the success of amitizing moves will largely depend on the openness of the general public to these linking predicates. The openness to accept is largely constituted by presuppositions about X that populate both previous official texts and popular culture.

¹³ Alexander Wendt, “On Constitution and Causation in International Relations,” *Review of International Studies* 24 (5) (1998): 106.

¹⁴ Jutta Weldes, “Constructing National Interests,” *European Journal of International Relations* 2 (3) (1996), 282. See also Weldes and Saco, “Making State Action Possible,” 373, n 47.

¹⁵ As elucidated in chapter 3 – the practices of amitization draw extensively on the work of “the Copenhagen School,” especially Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework For Analysis* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998).

¹⁶ On predication, subject positioning, and presupposition see Doty, “Foreign Policy as Social Construction.” Drawing on Jennifer Milliken, Doty clarifies that: “Predication involves the linking of certain qualities to particular subjects through the use of predicates and the adverbs and adjectives that modify them” (Milliken, 1990). A predicate affirms a quality, attribute, or property of a person or thing. For example, to state that the United States “has stood for fair play, for aid to the weak, for liberty, and freedom” establishes the United States as a particular kind of subject with these qualities. Attributes attached to subjects are important for constructing identities for those subjects and for telling us what subjects can do.” 306. Presuppositions are examined as *naturalized* “background knowledge that is taken to be true” that create the “reality” of the world. Subject positioning links particular subjects and objects to one another. Doty states that “some of the important kinds of relationships that position subjects are those of *opposition*, *identity*, *similarity*, and, *complementarity*.” This thesis elucidates the establishment of many of these relationships, but focuses on similarity.

Amitization requires an assessment of both the official discourse of those who speak for the state and the presuppositions embedded in popular culture and representations of difference. Thus, an intertextual assessment of official rhetoric and the texts of cultural discourse best account for the emergence and maintenance of stable friendly relations between America and specified others. This thesis employs Lene Hanson's methodology in *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War* (2006) to elaborate the practices of amitization. Official texts are largely gauged from *Public Papers of the President*. The stereotypes and generalized images of others are revealed in widely spread and heralded books, films, and songs.¹⁷ In this thesis, the emergence of America's commitments to Great Britain, Israel, and the Atlantic Community are explored.

Friendship manifests in a *habitual, or naturalized, disposition to treat X better than not-X*. As such, it can explain how certain policies and postures such as uncritical and often unconditional support for subjects constituted as "friends" have come to be pursued as obvious. Friendship is not a matter of means or evaluations, supportive actions are pursued unreflectively with friendship as a default position. This thesis argues that friendship exists *where a state comes to see itself in an other*. Amity accounts for how supererogatory commitments such as vast financial assistance, diplomatic support, information sharing, security guarantees and concern for the welfare of specified others have come to be seen as unquestionably legitimate policies in the broader trajectory of American foreign policy.

Within this thesis, friendship is conceptualized as unidirectional and does not, therefore, exist outside of the common sense in the categorizing state that X is a friend and is a discursively constituted *frame of reference* that guides action. The amitization of X does not entail that X is "actually" a friend or that X will behave in a friendly way towards the categorizer. Similarly, though interpellation may occur, this thesis does not explore whether the

¹⁷ A full methodology is provided in the discussion of amitization in chapter 3.

“befriended” others come to identify with those subject positions and perform reciprocated friendly acts. Rather, the amicitization of X enables the categorizing state to offer supererogatory support and treat X with special privileges that are not offered universally, while simultaneously making certain unsupportive policies unimaginable. Everyday categorizations of others as “friends” frame and limit American foreign policy and become part of social reality. Since a friend cannot be treated as an enemy, or a “state like any other,” certain courses of action are precluded from consideration at the highest levels, since their pursuit would violate the everyday assumptions about “the world” and “American-ness.” As such, amity has manifest political consequences and forms part of international order.

The central contributions of this thesis are to highlight the importance of amity in international politics in general and in American foreign policy in particular, and to suggest that scholars add states’ practices of amicitization (and deamitization) to their already well-developed interest in states’ practices of securitization and desecuritization. It contributes primarily to foreign policy analysis as it focuses on how naturalized discourses of friendship have emerged in America and enabled certain policies while precluding others. Further, it speaks to alliance theory by addressing Stephen Walt’s *Origins of Alliances* (1983) and rational choice arguments on alliance formation. It does so by situating identity and discourses of similarity at the centre of enquiry in the forms of association practiced by states.

International Society and (Imagined) International Communities

On 22 January 1963, French President Charles de Gaulle and Chancellor of West Germany Konrad Adenauer signed the Élysée Treaty in Paris. This much celebrated agreement has formed the basis for fifty years of Franco-German economic and military co-operation. The treaty committed each nation to consult the other with regard to foreign affairs, strengthened co-operation in economic policy, and collaboration in areas of scientific research. However,

the treaty goes *beyond alliance*. The Preamble states that a major purpose of the treaty is to “deepen and shape the reconciliation and friendship of the German people and the French people.”¹⁸ This sentiment was repeated by the elder statesman on his return to Germany the following day: “the Treaty is, in its way, I believe, unique in history, in the sense that it provides for the cultivation of *amicable relations* between the two peoples without any limit in time. This friendship is to be cultivated at all levels of society and in all walks of life.”¹⁹ Adenauer continued by highlighting not the military or economic aspects of the agreement, but rather the section on the importance of cross-cultural understanding between German and French youth:

I would, however, draw your attention to one point. A substantial proportion of this Treaty is directed at young people. One concern of the Treaty is that the youth of both countries, whatever their situation, not just schoolchildren and students but also young people pursuing a trade, should *get to know* each other, that they should learn each other’s languages and discover the riches of each other’s cultures and natural environments, so that the other country becomes for them a second great home. That is, I believe, an aim which all of us, and here I include my fellow politicians, can only approve. Since this Treaty is meant to endure for many, many years, the youth of Germany and of France will now and in the future be called upon to make a reality of this Treaty.²⁰

The treaty was, thus, designed to give a sense of permanence to the ties that were being fostered between France and Germany after a century of conflict and insecurity. Its aim was not merely to reflect the contemporary state of affairs (in 1963) but rather to bind and secure special understandings in the future, based in part of two peoples not only *getting the know each other*, but *getting to know specific things about each other*. Developing frames of reference through which they can interpret the actions of the other.

¹⁸ The official title of the Treaty is *Traité entre la République fédérale d’Allemagne et la République française sur la coopération germano-française/Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Französischen Republik über die deutschfranzösische Zusammenarbeit*, accessed 8 April 2015, http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=864.

¹⁹ Konrad Adenauer, “Address given by Konrad Adenauer,” 23 January 1963, accessed 8 April 2015, http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2001/10/25/98792bf0-9b72-4b60-b723-bcaa1e74606c/publishable_en.pdf.

²⁰ Ibid.

The institutionalization of a relationship that was already being called *L'amitié franco-allemande* or *Deutsch-Französische Freundschaft* was not a spontaneous occurrence but rather the result of a process that had long been underway. A series of cultural and linguistic sites made such a treaty a likely, if not inevitable, consequence of the meeting between the two leaders.²¹ Four months earlier, De Gaulle had lent his voice, and authority, to the idea of such an inter-state friendship. In a speech in Bonn in September 1962, he had pronounced: “*es lebe Bonn, es lebe Deutschland, es lebe die Deutsch-Französische Freundschaft.*”²² Elite rhetoric combined with a series of positive representations (which define and thereby constitute reality) of the other state to form the foundation of, and to cement an alignment that goes beyond alliance and places emphasis on, what is shared rather than what is distinct.²³ Consider the popular song “Göttingen,” released the year after by Jewish-French singer Barbara. It featured the lines:

Of course, we have la Seine
And our Vincennes’ wood,
But God, the roses are beautiful
In Göttingen, in Göttingen.

But children are the same,
In Paris or in Göttingen.
May the time of blood and hatred
Never come back
Because there are people I love
In Göttingen, in Göttingen.²⁴

²¹ Hansen, *Security as Practice*, 17, comments that language is constitutive of what is being brought about: “Language is social and political, an inherently unstable system of signs that generate meaning through a simultaneous construction of identity and difference.” See also Jenny Edkins, *Poststructuralism and International Relations: Bringing the Political Back In* (London: Lynne Rienner, 1999), and Rob Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

²² Speech by Charles de Gaulle [translated “Long live Bonn, long live Germany, long live the Franco-German friendship”], accessed 8 April 2015, <http://blog.sprachcaffe.de/2012/sprachreisen/50-jahre-deutsch-franzosische-freundschaft-angebot-der-woche-sprachreise-paris-11094142>.

²³ On representational practices, see Roxanne Lynn Doty, *Imperial Encounters* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 1-19. Campbell, *Writing Security*, 1-32 and Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (London, Penguin, 2003), 1. II, “Imaginative Geography and Its Representations: *Orientalizing and Orient*,” 49-73.

²⁴ Steven Evens, “Goettingen: The song that made history,” 22 January 2013, accessed 8 April 2015, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-21126353>.

A confluence of popular culture and elite articulations facilitated and cemented understandings of similarity upon which future interactions were based. It is not solely ties between leaders that bind, but imagined ties between peoples – *children are the same*. Once constructed these discourses of similarity provide naturalized frames of reference that constrain and constitute the courses of action available to foreign-policy makers. Most obviously war or the threat of war as a means to resolve disputes between the countries becomes an absurd course of action. Amity can also justify extraordinary levels of co-operation, openness, and trust as well as supererogatory levels of assistance. Conceptualizing such an inter-state relationship is difficult as it undermines realist assumptions about sovereignty and rational state behaviour. However, discursively constructed bonds between nations of this kind exist and warrant attention.

Order is a contested concept in International Relations. The lack of a global government with effective enforcement powers has enabled realists to conceptualize anarchy – the lack of formal authority – as the sole ordering principle.²⁵ Structural realists see fear and the drive for survival as universal principles that stem directly from the anarchic order that governs international politics. International Society theorists draw on these structuralist assumptions but note that even if anarchy distinguishes the *international* from the *domestic* level of analysis, anarchy does not necessitate disorder and chaos.²⁶ For Martin Wight, the balance of power and international law provided a form of order under anarchy.²⁷ The English School went further: Hedley Bull argued that order comes about through a society of states:

A society of states exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive of

²⁵ Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (London: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 88-93.

²⁶ See Kenneth Oye, ed., *Cooperation Under Anarchy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), and Helen Milner, "The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique," *Review of International Studies* 17 (1991).

²⁷ Martin Wight, *Power Politics*, eds. Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1979), "if anarchy means complete disorder, it is not a true description of international relations," 105.

themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.²⁸

States are not atomized under anarchy but rather have *relations*. Relations, by definition, require interactions between at least two nominally independent agents. Out of these relations comes order, which Bull defined as “a pattern of activity that sustains the elementary or primary goals of the society of states or international society.” The goals he had in mind were preservation of the system, defending sovereignty, maintenance of peace, and promotion of common good.²⁹ According to Bull, these goals are universal and are furthered by the rules that constitute international society. Common interest in furthering these goals drives the society, while rules regulate orderly behaviour and prevent chaos.

This definition of order is, however, remarkably restrictive due to its emphasis on the universality of the laws, rules, and norms that guide international interactions. When assessing international politics, scholars cannot just focus on general rules, norms, and laws but must also assess specific cases of inter-state order. Amity is a source of order: the frame of reference has political consequences, creating reasonable expectations about future behaviour – even though it is not focused on the general rules, laws, and norms that (Bull supposes) govern international conduct. The Franco-German alignment in the Élysée treaty constitutes a source of order and certain expectations about future interaction. A better definition – one that incorporates the particular as well as the universal nature of order – is provided by Janice Bially Mattern, who views order as “*a relationship among specific states that produces and reinforces shared understandings of expectations and behaviors with respect to one another.*”³⁰ Relationships between dyads or groups of states, whether friendly

²⁸ Hedley Bull, *The Anarchic Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995), 13.

²⁹ Ibid., 8.

³⁰ Janice Bially Mattern, *Ordering International Politics: Identity, Crisis, and Representational Force* (London: Routledge, 2005), 30. Emphasis in original.

or hostile, co-operative or combative, provide order in international politics since they are constituted by frames of reference that warrant reasonable expectations about future action.

Deutsch-Französische Freundschaft provides security for the agents involved as it mitigates anxiety – in this case the anxiety that France and Germany will easily slip back into patterns of enmity. The relationship also creates expectations of non-aggression, pacific resolution of disagreements, and openness. After Élysée, war and open hostility between France and Germany becomes highly unlikely, if not impossible. This is not because war and hostility violate the rules of a presupposed international society – laws against the use of force are rarely enforced – or because war has become obsolete, but rather because specific meanings have been constituted such that acting outside of the friend frame of reference is absurd for either state. These understandings provide the foundation for the absence of war or the threat of war between France and Germany. Other possible explanations that emphasize Cold War alliance and the emergence of the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Economic Community do not account for the importance of identity, narrative generation, and cross-cultural understanding in enabling a stable peace between these historical antagonists. The institutionalization of agreements was, of course, part of the story but was itself only made possible through certain modes of representation becoming common sense.

While ideas of community in international politics are not widely discussed, beneath a universal (and imagined) society of states there are commitments and ties between groups and pairs of states such that have been described as communities.³¹ Karl Deutsch first introduced the concept of community to the field in his discussion of “pluralistic security

³¹ Emanuel Adler, *Communitarian International Relations: The Epistemic Foundations of International Relations* (London: Routledge, 2005), and Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds., *Security Communities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

communities:” regions of the world where war has become so unlikely as to be unthinkable.³² Drawing on communitarian political theory, Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett have developed this idea further, arguing that a community is defined by three characteristics, each of which makes it a non-universalizable model. The first is that “members of a community have shared identities, values and meanings.” The second is that “those in a community have many-sided and direct relations.” And finally “communities exhibit a reciprocity that expresses some degree of long-term interest and perhaps even altruism.”³³ There are neither the material resources nor conceptual resources for this to describe a universal community. Not all states have the same level of interaction. Though absolute gains are possible, universal altruism (or Kant’s universal hospitality described in *Perpetual Peace* (1795)) is not a maxim of international politics, and the continued importance attached to state sovereignty and a pluralist global order, which allows for competing conceptions of the good, demonstrates the existence of numerous identities, values, and meanings.

Communities can be said to have been discursively constituted in a small number of specific regions or dyads. Deutsch’s focus on security is, however, misleading since international communities do not necessarily have security, conceived as a material and quantifiable resource, as the sole or even foremost concern.³⁴ An example of this is the formation of the Nordic Council (since 1971 the Nordic Council of Ministers) and the special ties between

³² Karl Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (New York: Greenwood, 1969) distinguishes between “amalgamated” and “pluralistic” security communities, 5-7. He argues that the United States constitutes an amalgamated security community whereas Norway-Sweden and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) constitute pluralistic security communities as each member retains “the legal independence of separate governments.”

³³ Adler and Barnett, *Security Communities*, 31.

³⁴ On Security Communities, see Charles Kupchan, *How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace* (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2010), Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order* (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2009), Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO,” in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), and Michael C. Williams and Iver B. Neumann, “From Alliance to Security Community: NATO, Russia and the Power of Security,” *Millennium* 29 (2) (2000).

Scandinavian countries that were institutionalized in the Helsinki Agreement in 1962.³⁵ This occurred in spite of different approaches to maximizing security during the Cold War and differing alignments with the wider society of states.³⁶ Relations between Scandinavian countries can be described as a type of international community given an often referenced shared identity that frames their interactions. Friendly relations do not depend on mimetic security interests; indeed, French-German friendship also goes beyond security covering closeness in economic and domestic policies.

Deutsch's understanding of a community, however, has a further major complicating aspect. The notion of "shared identities, values and meanings" is problematic because identities are tenuously constituted and meanings are unstable and are constantly (re)produced. Benedict Anderson was the first to define the nation as "an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign."³⁷ Community depends on shared meanings and understandings about the constituents of membership and the appropriateness of its associated behaviours. As such, it is not dependent on territory but rather a sense of *belonging*. He argued that "[the nation] is *imagined* because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the mind of each lives the image of their communion."³⁸ This feature of communities is even more intense when discussing international relations, where the level of direct contact between the French and Germans, or between Swedes and Norwegians is likely to be less than that between co-nationals. In order to understand the existence of international

³⁵ The Helsinki Agreement Preamble states: "The Governments of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, desiring to promote and strengthen the close ties existing between the Nordic peoples in matters of culture, and of legal and social philosophy, and to extend the scale of co-operation between the Nordic countries." Accessed 8 April 2015, <http://www.norden.org/en/about-nordic-co-operation/agreements/treaties-and-agreements/basic-agreement/the-helsinki-treaty>.

³⁶ Proposals for a Scandinavian Defence Union broke down in 1948; Norway, Denmark and, Iceland were founding members of NATO. Sweden insisted on Neutrality. Finland was under Soviet influence and was not able to join the Nordic Council until 1955.

³⁷ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso, 1991), 6.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

communities, the emergence of this sense of belonging needs to be explored as a precondition for their development. For amity, seeing the self in the other, belonging comes through discourses of similarity.

Adler develops this point further, arguing that “while community-regions possess a territorial dimension, they are not merely a physical place. Instead, we may view them as *cognitive regions* or cognitive structures that help constitute the interests and practices of their members, whose meanings, understandings, and identities help keep the region ‘in place’.”³⁹ These communities do not exist simply in virtue of shared values, but rather are constituted by a series of imaginative geographies and representations of otherness. Geography is too often viewed as fixed and insurmountable, depending on territorial necessity. A more nuanced account can explain why Australia feels “closer” to the US than it does to Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia and why there is greater distance between Israel and Iran than between Israel and Great Britain. Any relationship – familial, inter-personal, group, national, international – depends on certain ideas, images, and representations of both self and other. International communities are *imagined* communities because all states, and the relationships between them, depend on how the other is categorized and represented by the self. This thesis accepts that the naturalization of dominant discourses of similarity enables communities to develop. Thus, amity in Franco-German relations depended on at least one of states (possibly both) coming to see itself in the other.

Community often, and in trans-national relationships usually, does not require any direct physical proximity. Relationships depend on interpretation and at the international level they

³⁹ Emanuel Adler, “Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive Regions in International Relations,” *Millennium* 26 (2) (1997): 254.

depend on *imaginative geographies*.⁴⁰ These relations are no less important for understanding foreign policy because they depend on interpretations, narratives, and stereotypes. Imaginative geographies clearly impact foreign policy through creating possibilities for action – it is easier to wage war against people with whom one feels no fellow-feeling and even easier if its antithesis is present. Imagined enmity enables the possibility of war and hostility, while imagined similarities also frame and limit possible (friendly) action. Discourses of similarity and amity are no less important than discourses of intractable difference and irrevocable hostility. Both create order in international relations and both rely on certain dominant discourses to (re)produce identity and common sense.

When assessing international communities and the everyday meanings that support them, it is important to explore how states have come to categorize others and how this categorization (re)constitutes the categorizer. For communities to develop, discourses of similarity are prerequisite. Friendly policies are made possible by the everyday assumptions in the categorizing state supporting the idea that specified others are similar. Most frequently the referent other of friendship is a state, but this is not necessarily the case – security communities can develop only once discourses of similarity have been attached to regions and become part of the background knowledge that frames foreign policy. This is especially the case for America's relations with "Britain" and "Europe," where the discourses of similarity is often understood in metaphors of geographical closeness with the Atlantic Ocean represented as a "pond" which America's friends are "just across."

⁴⁰ For a discussion on imaginative geographies, see Edward Said, *Orientalism*, and *Culture and Imperialism* (London: Vintage, 1994), and Derek Gregory, *The Colonial Present: Afghanistan, Palestine, Iraq* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004).

American Communities

The United States of America is often described as exceptional. The content of United States Exceptionalism is elusive but there is general agreement that it is the notion that the United States was created differently, developed differently and has to be understood differently.⁴¹ The first two claims are widely accepted. The United States's origins in a revolutionary movement are inseparable from contemporary United States society: the revolution and the early documents of the Republic remain central in contemporary political discourses. In terms of "development" there are many anomalous features of United States society, none more so than the failure of "American socialism." Whilst socialism has existed, in some form or another, in all other democracies, the United States has remained remarkably impervious to socialist parties and suspicious of socialist ideas (or policies that are routinely described as such).⁴² While sociologists and political scientists have attempted to provide accounts for and descriptions of this strange absence, it is enough for the purposes of this thesis to comment that unwillingness to vote for socialist parties or knowingly embrace socialist policies stems primarily from historic and romanticized dominant discourses of citizenship, that have naturalized meanings about what it is to be an American citizen. It is these meanings that matter most when looking at United States foreign policy since common understandings of what the United States is makes state action possible.⁴³

⁴¹ Byron Shafer, ed., *Is America Different? A New Look at American Exceptionalism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), v.

⁴² The highpoint of the American socialist party was in 1912 when Eugene Debs won 6% of the national vote. He also won 6% whilst in prison in 1920. The collapse of the SPA was due to many factors such as Debs anti-war stance and factional wars within the party over links with the Comintern in the 1920s. See James Weinstein, *The Decline of Socialism in America, 1912-1925* (New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1984).

⁴³ The phrase "makes state action possible" is taken from Jutta Weldes and Diane Saco, "Making State Action Possible."

If all nations are imagined, none are more so than the United States. The United States is, in Seymour Martin Lipset's words, "the first new nation."⁴⁴ It was the first of Britain's colonies to gain independence and its revolution was a major contributor to the democratic revolutions that spread throughout Europe in the next fifty years. It was the first to codify Montesquieu's principles of "separate, but equal powers" into a constitution. And it was the first to voice an (admittedly largely futile and half-hearted) attempt to break out of the cycle of *realpolitik* that shaped European relations.

Starting from this revolutionary event and founded on principles of "equality of condition" and a renunciation of systems of natural aristocracy seen in Britain, the Thirteen Colonies strove to find a sense of common identity out of which a nation could emerge. Lipset argues that "all states that have recently gained their independence are faced with two interrelated problems, legitimating the use of political power and establishing national identity."⁴⁵ Nationalism is a powerful driving force in politics, depending on a common sense of history, present, and future; something that is *ours* reflected in Anderson's sense of *belonging*.⁴⁶ The revolution meant that there was no long-run process through which the nation came to be and the peoples came to consider themselves as citizens of a United States of America.

How a sense of common identity was forged in the United States is widely debated. Lipset argues that several key factors worked together to create the shared understandings out of which a nation could emerge: the revolution, the role of intellectuals and the neutral stance the early United States took in international affairs. However, a widespread understanding of what it meant to be a citizen of the federal United States as opposed to a Pennsylvanian, a Virginian, or a New Yorker required something else – a mechanism through which discourses

⁴⁴ Seymour Martin Lipset, *The First New Nation: The United States in Historical and Comparative Perspective* (London: Transaction, 2003).

⁴⁵ Lipset, *First New Nation*, 90.

⁴⁶ See Homi K. Bhabha, ed., *Nation and Narration* (London: Routledge, 1990), especially "Introduction," and Timothy Brennan, "The National Longing for Form."

could be transferred from elites to the public. Today, television, radio and the Internet are major mediums for (re)producing state identity. Anderson suggests that the growth of print-media in the early United States was the driving force behind the dissemination of these ideas and the formation of an imagined community.⁴⁷ Communications are crucial elements in the formation of communities at all levels: familial, national, and inter-state. Without a shared language and web of meaning, everyday understandings are impossible.⁴⁸

Citizens of the United States are also citizens of another place: “America.” There is no state called America, and yet the collective will of America and American ideals are often the referent object of study – indeed, this thesis is a study of *American* foreign policy. “America,” as David Campbell has argued, is “the imagined community par excellence,”⁴⁹ and imagining America predates the formal declaration of the United States. Originally imagined in the *salons* of Europe, America is now the dominant idea consisting in a broad set of meanings that are separate from concrete territorial space.⁵⁰ America has come to be associated with the United States but there was nothing inevitable about this process. America has meant different things to different peoples at different times; for much of its history “America” has been equally associated with the states of Latin America. *Being American* is to forge a national identity out of practices that are not associated with geography or history but rather with representational force.⁵¹ Among its many representations, America is a land of immigrants, a land of opportunity, the land of the free,

⁴⁷ Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, chapter 4.

⁴⁸ See John Earl Joseph, *Language and Identity: National, Ethnic, Religious* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), especially chapter 5, “Language in National Identities” also Thomas Risse, ““Let’s Argue!” Communicative Action in World Politics,” *International Organization* 54 (1) (2000).

⁴⁹ Campbell, *Writing Security*, 91.

⁵⁰ For discussion on America as an anti-territorial, imagined community see John Ruggie, *Constructing The World Polity* (London: Routledge, 1998), 218-222, and Ed White, “Early American Nations as Imagined Communities,” *American Quarterly* 56 (1) (2004). On the origins of the American nation see Desmond King, *The Liberty of Strangers: Making the American Nation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

⁵¹ Campbell, *Writing Security*, chapter 4. The divorce of identity from geography is particularly important in the development of America since the history of the Thirteen Colonies and later the incipient US belief in “Manifest Destiny,” is one of the mass repression and slaughter of Native Americans.

the home of the brave, and the shining city on the hill – all these representations inform and serve to (re)produce “America.”⁵² These dominant discourses are subject to mass repetition. The (re)production of what it means to *be American* is vital in understanding the nature and trajectory of American foreign policy.

In his Farewell Address to the Nation, George Washington famously warned his successors against cultivating “inveterate antipathies” and “passionate attachments” for other nations.

The nation which indulges towards another *an habitual hatred* or *an habitual fondness* is in some degree a slave. It is a slave to its animosity or to its affection, either of which is sufficient to lead it astray from its duty and its interest.⁵³

In *Democracy in America* (1835), Alexis de Tocqueville referred to these words as “admirable” and “just,” but he also expressed his fears that such wisdom would not endure. America’s need “to obey the impulse of passion rather than the suggestions of prudence” would, he argued, result in the disregarding of Washington’s vision.⁵⁴ The United States has had a complex history in its foreign relations. The initial attempt to avoid confrontation with European powers and maintain neutrality was short lived. Foreign policy is not a matter of wishful-thinking and the economic interests of the new nation meant that avoiding such entanglements with the old world was not feasible. There was a quasi-war with France in the late 1790s and the War of 1812 against the British. However, neither of these conflicts led to the creation of habitual hatreds or fondnesses and American foreign policy stuck reasonably closely to Washington’s advice. In the 19th century, the United States had groups of Anglophiles and Anglophobes, Francophiles and Francophobes and so on, but avoided signing treaties that would confer lasting obligations to any of the European powers.

⁵² These representations tie into a second core element of US Exceptionalism: namely that America provides a providential image of the future. These representations, however, are an important part of the performance of American identity that is discussed at length in chapter 1 “Performing Foreign Policy.”

⁵³ George Washington, “Farewell Address,” 19 September 1796, available at *The American Presidency Project*, accessed 8 April 2015, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/>.

⁵⁴ Alexis de Tocqueville, “How American Democracy Conducts the External Affairs of the State,” in J. P. Mayer, ed., *Democracy in America* (London: Fontana, 1994), 226-30.

The 20th century, however, was one in which the United States emerged as the dominant world power and as a powerful actor. Interacting with multiple others implies a temptation to categorize and to make sense of a complex world by drawing widely accepted distinctions. It began with a period of intense reflection in the aftermath of the war against Spain and drew to a close during a period of unipolarity after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the 21st century the United States has not drawn back, fighting a War on Terror against an invisible and abstract enemy. The “first new nation,” born of a struggle to carve out a sense of domestic community, has not been able to escape the temptations that come from community living and has made friends.

This thesis argues that both habitual hatreds and habitual fondnesses are inextricably linked with the formation of foreign policy. The practices of American foreign policy are made possible partly by the way(s) America has categorized others. These categorizations function, as Washington foretold, to make America “in some degree a slave,” since the unreflective impulse to view actions and policies pursued by others through the lens of amity or enmity constrains the sort of decisions that American policy makers can take. The creation of Washington’s “habitual fondnesses” for specified others is the subject of this thesis. A history of American foreign policy that focuses on conflicts of interest and enduring animosity is an incomplete history: the creation of habitual fondnesses has also occurred through a process of constructing similarity in others and making friendships.

Amity in American Foreign Policy

Amity has emerged and become institutionalized in the form of special relationships, which defy realist assumptions about self-interest and state behaviour. This thesis explores the idea that states forge close relationships with specified others that depend on discourses of similarity. By assessing philosophical traditions of friendship, following Aristotle, it argues

that amity constitutes seeing in the other a part of the self. The existence of friendship is evidenced by dominant discourses and prominent representations of the other as “good,” “courageous,” “virtuous,” and most importantly “similar.” Amity emerges through a process of amitization – whereby the United States has been able to befriend others, by categorizing them into the subject position “friend.” Once it emerges, amity guides state action by making certain policies appear to be self-evidently correct and others self-evidently absurd. It, thus, is a warranting condition for action.

The theoretical section, comprising chapters 1 to 3, sets out foreign policy as social construction: it conceives amity as an important frame of reference in international politics, and explores the process through which states make friends. The first chapter advocates a discursive analysis to assess foreign policy, arguing that “national interests” are constructed rather than discovered. Drawing on Judith Butler and David Campbell, it addresses state identity in terms of *performativity*, arguing that certain acts and behaviours, including supporting friends, become part of the stylized repetition that constitutes a state and its foreign policy. Categorizing others as “friends” creates frames of reference that bound intelligible action. By assessing some of the ways in which enemies have been represented in American discourses; it suggests that a similar assessment should be granted to representations of friends.

The second chapter assesses whether amity can be successfully incorporated into alliance theory. It traces common understandings of friendship in philosophy and literature and explains how the concept can aid our understanding of politics in general and international politics specifically. In elucidating the difficulties friendship poses to common assumptions about self-interest, it posits Aristotle as an important thinker for the study of International Relations. It highlights the properties of amity and how it manifests as a habitual disposition

to support the other categorized a “friend.” Understanding amity, using the Aristotelian notion of friends as *Other Selves*, opens up possibilities for fuller analysis of other-regarding behaviour in foreign policy practices.

The third chapter argues that in much the same way that issues become securitized and nations become “rogue states” or threats, friends are created by a complex mix of elite speech-acts and the extant resources that make up everyday presuppositions. Since similarity is constructed, these are then maintained through constitutive structures such as “special relationship,” “passionate attachment,” and “unbreakable bond.” It assesses how stable amity is and explores it as a warranting condition that has independent quasi-causal force only insofar as its reproduction is compelled by common sense. Friend is a default “subject position” that complicates decision makers interpreting friends’ actions in ways that do not conform to the naturalized understanding that they are “friends.” Finally, drawing on Lene Hansen’s discursive methodology, it provides a methodology for the analysis that follows by exploring the role of the president as not only commander-in-chief but also *interpreter-in-chief*, and the tools available for critical discursive analysis of the cultural and linguistic sites that make foreign policy intelligible.

The empirical section looks at three examples of amity in American foreign policy. These cases have been selected on the bases of reference – they are the three relationships which are most frequently invoked by presidents, congressmen and media as constituting “friendship” and have attained the greatest taken-for-granted nature in the United States. In each case it addresses the conditions of possibility for state action.

The Anglo-American “special relationship,” made explicit in Winston Churchill’s Fulton, Missouri, speech in 1946, had been implicit in discourses long before. Chapter 4 explores the importance of language and brotherhood in forging the original “special relationship.” It

provides an explanation to the question: *How has the Anglo-American “special relationship” been constituted such that American sustained support for Britain has been made possible and even intelligible?* It argues that support rests on certain extant resources (presuppositions about the British political system and the character of the British people), which were harnessed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in the late 1930s and cemented during the Second World War.

The second case is the “unbreakable bond” between the US and Israel. Chapter 5 argues that it rests largely on ideas of “kindred people” and certain dominant modes of representation about Israel’s intentions and character that have gradually facilitated the emergence of a relationship now routinely described as an “unbreakable bond.” It provides an explanation to the question: *How has the US-Israel “unbreakable bond” been constituted such that a sustained American policy of support has been made possible and even intelligible?* The support Israel enjoys can only be explained through Americans coming to privilege Israel as a similar nation, as the US-Israel relationship is the case that most clearly cannot be reconciled with a realist position.

The third case is America’s membership of an “Atlantic Community” constituted by representational practices, not geography. Chapter 6 demonstrates that material security is not the sole factor that shapes the development and longevity of regional security arrangements. Securing an identity is equally important. The case is made that the Cold War obligations towards European allies taken on by the United States were different from those of other regional arrangements that the United States had with Latin America and Southeast Asia. It addresses the question: *How has “the Atlantic Community” been constituted such that strong American commitments to European allies – relative to other non-European allies – have been made possible and even intelligible?* It argues that this difference is best accounted for

by the discursive construction of America as a member of “the Atlantic Community,” as opposed to a “Pacific Community” or a “Pan-American Community” after the Second World War. All Cold War allies were united against communism, but there are significant differences in how the United States treated its allies. These behaviours can be understood through discourses of similarity, which set America’s commitments to “Western Europe” apart from other regions.

A concluding chapter offers reflections on amity in contemporary American foreign policy and the durability of the relationships assessed. It suggests implications of this thesis for further scholarship on friendship, including the practices of deamitization: *How is it possible for friendships to end?* In suggesting future areas where amity can be assessed, it further analyses prospects for the deamitization of current American friends and amitization of others. The importance this thesis attaches to the categorization of others in taken-for-granted subject positions highlights the value of a critical approach to exploring common sense in the study of enmity, rivalry, alliance, and amity.

Chapter 1: Performing Foreign Policy

In order to conduct foreign policy analysis it is necessary to follow an approach that can account for how it was possible for courses of action and inaction to be pursued. Once these conditions of possibility have been elucidated, it is then possible to discuss how certain foreign policy practices, such as the habitual disposition to treat friends better than others, have are facilitated by those naturalized conditions of possibility. Valarie Hudson comments that foreign policy analysis should focus on explaining and/or understanding “the decisions taken by human decision makers with reference to or having known consequences for entities external to the nation-state.”¹ As such, Hudson sets out and explores a variety of levels of analysis for foreign policy analysis. There is, however, an overwhelming bias in Hudson’s analysis towards positivist approaches and where culture and identity are assessed they are treated (almost solely) as variables in the decision-making process.

Positivist accounts of foreign policy are at best incomplete and at worst misleading since they fail to address the conditions that made certain decisions possible. Roxanne Lynn Doty points out that “they presuppose a particular subjectivity (i.e., a mode of being), a background of social/discursive practices and meanings which make possible the practices as well as the social actors themselves.”² Foreign policy analysts attempt to answer a host of questions that can be of the “Why” type, seen as falling under the remit of explanation (*Erklären*), or “How Possible” type, under the remit of understanding (*Verstehen*). This thesis follows Audie Koltz and Cecilia Lynch in positing that “those who say they explain behaviour also interpret meaning, and those who focus on understanding language also explain action to some

¹ Valarie M. Hudson, *Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 4.

² Roxanne Lynn Doty, “Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of US Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines,” *International Studies Quarterly* 37 (3) (1993): 298.

degree.”³ Explaining and understanding are not mutually exclusive: as Alexander Wendt has argued “theories which answer ‘what?’ or ‘how possible?’ questions ‘explain’ the world.”⁴ This is because “objects and events do not present themselves unproblematically to the observer” and what is taken to be reality is socially constructed.⁵

This chapter accepts that dominant discourses constitute intelligible foreign policy practices. Naturalized meanings limit the sphere of contestation in which the competition between domestic factors takes place as they constitute the frames of reference that bound action. This chapter builds on a large body of critical constructivist work that has: established that foreign policy is best conceived as social construction; argued for a critical analysis of the discursive practices that constitute the state and foreign policy, in order to examine how certain courses of action are possible while others are unthinkable; and posited that a socially constructed “national interest” is the basis for state action and is inextricably bound up with state identity. This assessment lays the groundwork for the use of Judith Butler’s notion of performativity to account for how state identity is expressed and stabilized through a process of compulsory reiteration and stylized repetition of acts and behaviours. Understanding that state identity is a performative accomplishment, (re)produced through policy discourses, sheds light on how those who speak for the state come to cast others as: enemy, rival, ally, and friend. Endowing others with qualities (character traits) that make them “friends” is one of the representational practices out of which meanings about the world become naturalized.

Operating as “codes of intelligibility” discourses make certain courses of action not only possible but probable since their naturalization constitutes a “reality” through which certain

³ Audie Koltz and Cecilia Lynch, *Strategies for Constructivist Research in International Relations* (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2007), 15.

⁴ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 86.

⁵ Jutta Weldes, “Constructing National Interests,” *European Journal of International Relations* 2 (3) (1996): 279.

policies and practices are unreflectively followed.⁶ In this thesis, the “reality” that certain specified others are “friends” makes the performance of friendly policies and strategies unavoidable as friendship is a quasi-causal condition for action. However, while accepting that discourses constitute continuity, this chapter also seeks to demonstrate that agency is retained through the ability (primarily of elites) to resignify and shift the dominant discourses of foreign policy, and their attendant state identity. It is always possible for subversive acts and behaviours to be performed and, in time, these can serve to reconstitute identity by challenging dominant discourses. However, the marginalization of these behaviours as deviant fosters a compulsion to repeat, which enables and legitimates acts and behaviours that confirm the understanding that certain subjects are friend.

Foreign Policy as Social Construction

Foreign policy analysts tend to fall into two camps: those who advocate a comparative approach, and those who advocate case-study analysis.⁷ The former believe that foreign policies are essentially comparable and state behaviour is generalizable (i.e. all states will behave in similar ways in similar circumstances and options selected are primarily dependent on capabilities), while the latter focus on the uniqueness of each state and the importance of detailed historical knowledge in order to analyse foreign policy choices. Here realism and cognitive decision-making approaches are briefly discussed and dismissed for taking conditions of possibility for granted.⁸

⁶ “Probable” does not refer to specific actions, but rather trend. It is probable that “friends” will be supported as a “friend” is a subject that is supported, almost by definition. It is not, however, probable that any given specific policy of support will be chosen over another. Rather actions that are widely accepted to be “supportive” will unavoidably (i.e. probably) be chosen as unsupportive policies are unimaginable. Friendship precludes options (often a great number) from consideration and, thus, it is probable that supportive actions will be pursued.

⁷ Steve Smith, “Foreign Policy Analysis: British and American Orientations and Methodologies,” *Political Studies* 31 (4) (1983).

⁸ This has already been established in much of the work that this thesis draws upon and cites. Existing post-positivist work is briefly assessed here to contextualize the study of amicitization that follows and to set up the argument and to address audiences that may be unfamiliar with such an approach.

Realism and other theories that grant states a fixed ontology can account neither for behaviour that does not follow from a set conceptualization of national interests defined in terms of material power, nor from socialization and mimicking behaviour in international society. On the other hand are scholars who emphasize domestic factors including: the beliefs and perceptions of individuals; political parties; public opinion; ethnic and commercial lobbies; and competitions between branches of government. These are all significant features of the foreign policy decision-making process that imply a need to look within the state and conduct detailed historical analysis to explain why certain options were taken.⁹ Decisions are made, however, within the boundaries of the possible. Policy makers literally cannot select a course that is unthinkable and perceptions, analogies, and beliefs function primarily to select between options that have already been delimited by the dominant discourses that constitute both the state and the world.

For realists, the logic of anarchy and self-interest cause rational policy makers to make decisions on the basis of the logic of consequences and states to behave as security/power maximizers. A significant weakness of these accounts is that even in the areas of war and the development of material capabilities; they tell us relatively little about how states actually behave. The propensity of a state to develop nuclear weapons, for example, is far more complicated and nuanced than simply a drive for power and security, and predictive theories tend to misjudge which nations will seek them and why.¹⁰ Various factors, some based on capability, some based on ideas and perceptions, constitute how likely it is that a state will violate, or remain a non-signatory to, the 1968 Non-Proliferation Agreement. There are both

⁹ On the domestic sources of foreign policy, see Eugene R. Wittkopf and James M. McCormick, eds., *The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence* (Lanham, Md.; Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008), and Ole R. Holsti, *Making American Foreign Policy* (London: Routledge, 2006).

¹⁰ John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," *International Security* 15 (1) (1990), predicted Germany would acquire nuclear weapons. One of the great difficulties "theories" of International Relations have is that they portend to be predictive. Though their predictions rarely turn out to be accurate, they are unfalsifiable.

costs and benefits for a state if nuclear armament is chosen. Choosing to develop such weapons risks international condemnation as it violates long-standing norms of international society and international law.¹¹ However, costs and benefits are not determined by a pre-discursive community and are constituted by everyday understandings of the relations of identity and difference.

Consider the case of Iran: Iran is thought to be developing nuclear weapons, or at least the ability to develop them in a relatively short period of time if recent diplomatic endeavours fail. Iran has numerous reasons to feel threatened. Israel has nuclear weapons and hawks in the Israeli government have openly discussed a potential pre-emptive strike on Iran's nuclear facilities with conventional weapons. The Americans and Europeans have been highly critical of the regime and have placed crippling sanctions on exports as well as making it clear that any spread of nuclear weapons in the Persian Gulf would be "a red line."¹² It is clear that Iran's security concerns have not developed in a vacuum. They are dependent not only on external shocks but on everyday assumptions about hostile others.

In much the same way, Americans have specific reasons – again related to their understanding of Iran and the enmity between them – for opposing Iran's nuclear ambitions so comprehensively. Whereas India and Pakistan received limited criticism from the State Department and were only briefly faced with the legally required American sanctions when they developed nuclear capabilities in the 1990s, Iran's acquisition of such weapons is

¹¹ Nina Tannenwald, "Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo," *International Security* 29 (4) (2005) provides a genealogical account of the norm's development.

¹² President Obama referred to Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons as "an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States," *Public Papers of the President (PPP)*, "Notice – Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to Iran," 11 March 2009. This exact phrase has been repeated annually in his messages to Congress. Presidential candidate Mitt Romney described preventing a nuclear Iran as a "moral commitment" during his visit to Israel in 2012.

deemed completely “unacceptable” and a vital threat to national security.¹³ It may appear strange that the United States, which successfully contained the Soviet Union, is so desperately concerned with the possibility that Iran might develop one or two crude missiles. In fact, such concern is not peculiar when one considers the discursive construction of Iranian nuclear capabilities as a security threat that warrants extraordinary measures.¹⁴ This concern depends on certain representations of Iran that serve to make such a course of action particularly unacceptable. Structural realists cannot effectively explain why an Iranian bomb is worse than an Indian or British one, yet aside from a brief period of sanctions and cooled relations, America has accepted a nuclear India. Structure struggles with specifics because it fails to look inside the state, especially at the social meanings that constitute the world.

A cognitive decision-making approach recognizes the importance of individuals’ beliefs, long-held assumptions, and perceptions in decision-making processes. The Human is now widely acknowledged to be “an active agent who shapes his own behaviour by constructing meaning from the environment, rather than an S-R [self-reproducing] automaton buffeted about by environmental stimuli.”¹⁵ Alexander George was the first to emphasize the importance of tracing individuals’ “operational codes” and Robert Axelrod argued that understanding decisions could be furthered through the use of a “cognitive map.”¹⁶ Even

¹³ By law, United States sanctions are imposed immediately on any state that develops nuclear weapons. In the televised presidential debate on 22 October 2012, candidate Romney asserted that “the greatest threat the world faces, the greatest security threat is a nuclear Iran.”

¹⁴ Discursive construction is a process, through which meanings are attached to events and objects. These meanings delimit foreign policy options through making certain courses of action appear desirable/unavoidable. For an account of this see Jutta Weldes and Diane Saco, “Making State Action Possible: The United States and the Discursive Construction of the ‘Cuban Problem’, 1960-1994,” *Millennium* 25 (2) (1996). Lene Hansen, *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War* (London: Routledge, 2006), sets out a discursive ontology that views foreign policy and discourses as inextricably linked and a discursive epistemology that sees material factors as “always discursively mediated,” 25. A discursive analysis of US-Iranian enmity is not analysed in detail in this thesis.

¹⁵ Deborah Larson, *Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 24.

¹⁶ Alexander George, *The “Operational Code”: A Neglected Approach to The Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making* (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1967), and Robert Axelrod, *Structure of Decision: The Cognitive Maps of Political Elites* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).

Stephen Walt, nominally committed to structural realism, has accepted the importance of perceptions of threat in framing international alignments.¹⁷

Developments in social psychology provide lenses through which the decisions of policy makers have been analysed. Deborah Larson has described the implications of a “cognitive revolution” for foreign policy analysis: drawing on this “paradigm shift” in psychological research she is able to demonstrate that “social psychological theories are useful for explaining how American leaders interpreted, analysed and utilized information about Soviet actions” between 1945 and 1947.¹⁸ The centrality of agency opens up new questions and an approach for analysing the decisions that govern world affairs that focuses on the cognitive stimuli for decision-making. Options analysis is a vital tool in foreign policy analysis.¹⁹ Strategic memos and options outlines form an important part of the foreign policy process. Indeed, schools of government in the United States devote substantial hours in training students how to write appropriate memos that set out clear options for the recipient. The clearest example of options analysis is put forward in Graham Allison’s seminal work *Essence of Decision* (1999). Allison and Zelikow sets out six options regarding how Kennedy could have responded to the Soviet missile deployment on Cuba:

1. Do Nothing
2. Diplomatic Pressures
3. Secret approach to Castro
4. Invasion
5. Air Strike
6. Blockade

¹⁷ Stephen Walt, *Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987). See chapter 2 “Between Other and Self: a Place for Friendship,” for a full critique of Walt’s balance of threat theory.

¹⁸ Larson, *Origins of Containment*, 58.

¹⁹ On the significance of options analysis in foreign policy see Charles Powell, et al., “Opening the “Black Box”: Cognitive Processing and Optimal Choice in Foreign Policy Decision Making,” in Charles Hermann, et al., eds., *New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy* (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987), and Yuen Foong Khong, *Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).

Allison's work continues to loom large in the cannon of texts of foreign policy analysis.²⁰ However, his assessment of the decision is incomplete. A critical approach offers up further insights by assessing conditions of possibility. Understanding why certain options are chosen over others is a vital part of foreign policy analysis: so too, however, is understanding why the vast majority of options are excluded from the option-set. Jutta Weldes argues that an equally significant question is to explore the "security imaginary" which meant that only Bundy briefly considered such an option.²¹ In understanding why an option was selected, we must first assess how it was possible for that option to be selected and why other options were never even considered.

What Weldes demonstrates with respect to Cuba is true for American foreign policy generally. Indeed, it is true for all foreign policies. Consider relations between the United Kingdom and Argentina in the build-up to the Falklands War in 1982. On 3 April 1982, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher gave a speech to the House of Commons in which she laid out and defined the contours of the conflict that was to begin the following day. Excerpts of this speech are given below:

The House meets this Saturday to respond to a situation of great gravity. We are here because, for the first time for many years, *British sovereign territory* has been invaded by a foreign power. After several days of rising tension in our relations with Argentina, that country's armed forces attacked the Falkland Islands yesterday and established military control of the islands.

²⁰ Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: Longman, 1999).

²¹ Jutta Weldes, *Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 10-16. On "security imaginary" see Joelien Pretorius, "The Security Imaginary: Explaining Military Isomorphism," *Security Dialogue* 39 (1) (2008). He argues that "security imaginary is founded on the belief that security and insecurity (or threat) are not objective realities that can be observed and responded to, but are constructed through the fixing of meanings to things, an identity to 'the self' and others, and the relationships that are thus instituted," 100. Himadeep Muppidi, "Postcoloniality and the Production of Insecurity," in *Cultures of Insecurity*, ed. Weldes et al., defines it as "a field of meanings and social power," 123.

Yesterday was a day of *rumour and counter-rumour*.... By late afternoon yesterday it became clear that an Argentine invasion had taken place and that the lawful British Government of the islands had been usurped.

I am sure that the whole House will join me in condemning totally this unprovoked aggression by the Government of Argentina against British territory. [Hon. Members: “Hear, hear.”] It has not a shred of justification and not a scrap of legality.

...

Argentina has, of course, long disputed British sovereignty over the islands. We have absolutely no doubt about our sovereignty, which has been continuous since 1833. Nor have we any doubt about the unequivocal wishes of the Falkland Islanders, who are British in stock and tradition, and they wish to remain British in allegiance. We cannot allow the *democratic rights* of the islanders to be denied by the *territorial ambitions* of Argentina.²²

In this speech are numerous appeals to background knowledge, which indicate that a British counter-assault to retake the islands is a highly probable scenario. The “Falkland Islands” description as “British sovereign territory” and the emphasis of the “democratic rights” of the islanders implies a course of action, given readily understandable meanings that were attached to notions of democracy, sovereignty, and self-determination. “Argentina” is placed in the subject position of the invader: an “aggressor” with “territorial ambitions.” Similarly, the highlighting of “rumour and counter-rumour” predicates Argentina as deceitful and sneaky. By assigning these predicates to “the Falklands” and “Argentina,” and articulating these representations the notion that the British government has a responsibility to *do something* in response to the “unprovoked aggression” becomes unavoidable. This speech provides the discursive foundations for a military response and is a vital part of the answer to the question: *How was the Falklands War made possible?*

Realism accounts for the Falklands War as a drive for power and security in a “self-help” world. Britain could not afford to appear weak in the face of Argentinian aggression on British sovereign territory. A structuralist account sees this speech as incidental, merely

²² Margaret Thatcher Public Statement before the House of Commons, *Hansard HC* [21/633-38], 3 April 1982.

providing evidence that a conflict would occur. For cognitive decision-making approaches, it serves a justificatory role for a course that had already been selected on the basis of the perceptions, beliefs and schemas of policy makers. A discursive practices approach, by contrast, sees this speech as part of a broader context in which meanings are attached to “Argentina” and an “intervention” in “the Falkland Islands.” This speech reflects a socially constructed national interest to retain the islands and a mechanism with which to persuade an audience (both foreign and domestic) of its legitimacy. Simultaneously it provides warranting conditions for action.

Realists may argue that the predicates used by Margaret Thatcher in her speech to the House of Commons are objective truths. The Argentinians were “aggressors” with “territorial ambitions” and the islanders did “wish to remain British in allegiance.” However, though these predicates may have been common sense at the time to the British public and policy makers, the meanings attached to the Falkland Islands and Argentina had to be tied to background knowledge. A cursory critical glance at alternative representations shows that what is taken-for-granted as objective truth is in fact socially constructed dependent on marginalizing other narratives. In Argentina the representational practices that enabled action were completely different. The assumption that the operation violated British sovereignty is absent since it was common sense in Argentina that British presence in the Falklands was (and still is) illegitimate. Viewed as an anti-imperialist venture, every border into Argentina still has a billboard with a message – *Las Malvinas son de Argentina* (The Malvinas are Argentinian). Nor was the American response to the conflict as black-and-white a portrayal as that given by the British Prime Minister. On 5 April 1982, Ronald Reagan had the following exchange with a reporter at a Question and Answer Session:

Q. Mr. President, would you support – would this government support Britain’s efforts to free its hostages in the Falklands in exchange for Mrs. Thatcher’s support for freeing American hostages in Iran?

The President. You’ve asked a question, in a way, about a particular facet of it. Let me just answer it in a little broader context.

It’s a very difficult situation for the United States, because we’re friends with both of the countries engaged in this dispute, and we stand ready to do anything we can to help them. And what we hope for and would like to help in doing is have a peaceful resolution of this with no forceful action or no bloodshed. And to that extent, we support the resolution that’s already in the United Nations, that there be a withdrawal of forces and we resolve this at the U.N.²³

In spite of a long friendship with the United Kingdom, the president offers no immediate condemnation of Argentina. Reagan is also keen to distance any equivalence being drawn between the Iranian hostage crisis – one that required a set of United States actions – and the situation in the Falkland Islands, which did not. A great deal of interpretation went into making sense of the Argentinian action and legitimizing the British response.²⁴

That policy makers respond to events in different ways cannot be simply explained away by differences in states’ material capabilities. Where you stand depends on where you sit. When foreign policy decisions are made, the beliefs, opinions, and interpretations of key decision makers are not irrelevant. Nor, however, should we, as cognitive decision-making approaches are prone to do, view decision makers and veto players as holding a great degree of agency

²³ Ronald Reagan, *Public Papers of the President (PPP)*, “Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters on Domestic and Foreign Policy Issues,” 5 April 1982. It is interesting here that President Reagan refers to both Britain and Argentina as “friends.” For reasons that are explicated in detail (particularly in chapters 2 and 3) Argentina is not a friend of the United States. Indeed, the label “friend” is insufficient for a country to be subject positioned as a friend of the United States.

²⁴ This is a very rough example and a full discussion on the discursive construction of the Falklands Crisis would require a much more detailed analysis of multiple sources and inter-textual analysis. The point is rather to demonstrate that even with limited analysis, many of the everyday presuppositions upon which the invasion was based were not uncontested. The British response may have appeared self-evident, but it actually involved the marginalization of several representations and narratives, not least among them the one being put forward by the Argentinian government.

over foreign policy.²⁵ Agency is constrained by the productive power of dominant discourses, which frame and constrain the decision-making process. To understand foreign policy, it is necessary to explore the practices that make the actions of decision makers intelligible.

All decisions are constrained by conditions of possibility: an American official cannot make decisions (foreign or domestic) and effectively pursue policies that are widely deemed to be “un-American.” The 2010 battle to provide universal healthcare provides a good example of how identity and common sense creates a context that limits policy makers’ options. The Obama Administration was subjected to charges of trying to introduce “socialized medicine,” just as President Clinton had been during the 1994 battle over Hillarycare. The mandate system that was eventually adopted under the Affordable Care Act was not merely a compromise with insurance companies and lobbyists: it was the most that could be achieved given the strength of naturalized discourses on American freedom. A system that provided free universal coverage was not up for discussion. An American National Health Service, which followed the British model of a publicly funded healthcare system with single-payer coverage, could not emerge because an NHS is incompatible with taken-for-granted and reproduced ideas of what American freedom means. “Freedom” means freedom from government control, rather than freedom to pursue one’s goals with the security of government healthcare provision. Although freedom is a contested concept, it is portrayed and followed as though it has pre-determined and settled upon content. The question is not why America had 44 million Americans without adequate healthcare; rather it is how such a fact was made to seem unproblematic and consistent with representations of America as a rich, generous, free nation.

²⁵ George Tsebelis, *Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 19, defines veto players as “individual or collective actors whose agreement is necessary for a change of the status quo.”

Foreign policy (like all social relations) proves to be a social construction since it is always conducted within the limits of possibility. In order to address questions of possibility, a critical discourse analysis is useful. Post-positivist analysis of the textual mechanisms (presuppositions, predicates, and subject positions) that make foreign policy intelligible is a vital tool for discovering and critiquing the “reality” of foreign policy. This is because it opens up domains of productive power for assessment, which positivist theories take as given. The naturalization of meanings creates a “cultural matrix of intelligibility,” which, Judith Butler argues, makes certain identities (and their constituting associated actions and behaviours) appear deviant or logically impossible.²⁶ The appearance of impossibility becomes embedded in taken-for-granted knowledge and precludes and marginalizes certain interpretations that would make possible another set of actions.

The National Interest

Among the most important contributions made by the constructivist school to the study of foreign policy has been its recognition that identities are the basis of interests. National interests are not *discovered* on rational assessment of the logic of anarchy, rather they are *constructed*. Every few years the United States State Department publishes a National Security Strategy in which America’s national interests are invariably tied to an image of America that is (re)produced in the paper. In 2010, for example, American interests were defined broadly but always in terms readily understandable to the American people: in terms of freedom, justice, and democracy.

America’s commitment to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law are essential sources of our strength and influence in the world. They too must be cultivated by our rejection of actions like torture that are not in line with our values, by our commitment to pursue justice consistent with our Constitution, and by our steady determination to extend the promise of America to all of our citizens. America has

²⁶ Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (London: Routledge, 2006), 24.

always been a beacon to the peoples of the world when we ensure that the light of America's example burns bright.²⁷

Within such texts is a presupposition that there is some essential American identity. An approach that can account for identity is important in assessing state behaviour, not because identity is rigid and essential, but rather because identity constitutes state behaviour as state behaviour constitutes identity. Lene Hansen uses the democratic peace to highlight how “poststructuralists conceptualize identity and policy as ontologically inseparable.”²⁸ This differs from rationalist and conventional constructivist accounts that grant identity causal logic. The “democracy” that underpins the democratic peace is a foreign policy discourse that enables certain policies to be seen as natural as “democracy” naturalizes. The aforementioned “American commitment to democracy” does not cause America to behave a certain way, rather strongly held understandings that America is a democracy may make some policies unimaginable.

Since national interests are constructed it is necessary to understand the process by which they come to be widely seen as worth pursuing. In discussing the American response to the Soviet deployment of missiles in Cuba, Jutta Weldes argues that “the national interest is important to explanations of international politics, and so requires adequate theorization, quite simply because it is the *language of state action*.”²⁹ The ability to define objectives in terms of the national interest is a vital resource for policy makers and is a power that is much overlooked in foreign policy analysis, but assessed at length by securitization theorists. Policy makers cannot react to events without interpreting them: instead, every action, event, and non-event must be interpreted prior to response. Some courses of action may appear self-

²⁷ “The National Security Strategy of the United States,” 1 May 2010, accessed 8 April 2015, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf.

²⁸ Hansen, *Security as Practice*, 27

²⁹ Weldes, “Constructing National Interests,” 276.

evidently proper and not require a great deal (or any) conscious reflection prior to response, but it remains important to understand how this is the case.

If “the national interest” is conceived of as a social construction rather than the consequence of international anarchy then the concept has much to offer foreign policy analysts. Weldes argues that the particular representation of the Cuban Missile Crisis as *crisis* rather than minor annoyance or non-event depended on significant interpretative labour and the marginalization of other potential narratives.³⁰ The threat posed by Cuba depended on certain meanings being ascribed to objects such as “Cuba,” “America,” and the “Soviet Union” as well as the emphasis on certain representations of the events leading up to the blockade and background knowledge. These representations constituted a national interest out of which state action is made possible: “for ‘the state’ to act, ‘it’ must have some understanding of its surroundings and some specification of its goals.”³¹ In the case of Cuba, the American goal – of removing the missiles – quickly gained the appearance of being obvious, though in fact owed much to the dismissal of alternative interpretations.³² The choice of a naval blockade can be critiqued as effective or ineffective, but only given the pre-articulated interest of the United States in removing the weapons.

Interests are not, as is often assumed, objectively determined. Rather they are subjective: dependent on the constitutive elements of state identity. Weldes convincingly demonstrates that a socially constructed “national interest” is the basis for state action and as “a rhetorical

³⁰ Weldes, *Ibid.*, uses the term “interpretative labor” in discussing how the Soviet deployment of nuclear missiles in Cuba became widely viewed as a threat to United States national interests. This involved the marginalization of alternative narratives (representations of events).

³¹ *Ibid.*, 281.

³² In *Essence of Decision*, Allison and Zelikow show that within the discussions to determine which option to select in response to the Soviet decision to place missiles on Cuba, Kennedy remarked: “Last month I said we weren’t going to [allow it]. Last month I should have said we don’t care.” The option of *doing nothing* was precluded by a rhetorical trap that reflected a security imaginary of containment and a reality in which Cuba had already been cast as an enemy.

device through which the legitimacy of and political support for state action are generated.”³³

Realists subscribe to a view that rationality is solely concerned about the *ends* of state action. An alternative conception of rationality is concerned not with ends but with *means*. The ends of state action – set out as the national interest – are socially constructed and dependent on cultural production.

Realist scholarship may be uncomfortable with this understanding of rationality, but it has long-established roots. In *A Treatise Concerning Human Understanding* (1738), David Hume wrote:

Where a passion is neither founded on false suppositions, nor chooses means insufficient for the end, the understanding can neither justify nor condemn it. It is not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger.³⁴

Hume’s conception of rationality sees affections as unreasonable only if they are founded on false beliefs and agents as irrational where they “choose means insufficient for the designed end.”³⁵ Pursuing a foreign policy based on a vision of international society as co-operative not conflictive is only irrational if the means taken to achieve that end are counter-productive and bad strategy. When America offers sustained and supererogatory support to its friends, it is not acting against the national interests. Instead “supporting friends” has been linguistically constructed as a national interest. In the case of states, “passions” are expressed through the national interest and texts that provide a hierarchy of those interests.

Using this conception of rational behaviour we can determine how a given national interest and its associated actions came about by tracing how their selection was made possible with reference to a set of presuppositions about the reality of the world and a state identity. Yet

³³ Weldes, “Constructing National Interests,” 276.

³⁴ David Hume, *A Treatise on Human Nature*, Part 3 Section 3 in *The Complete Works and Correspondence of David Hume* (electronic edition) (Charlottesville, Virginia: InteLex Corporation, 1995).

³⁵ Ibid.

foreign policy analysts can still make judgements on state behaviour by offering critiques of the strategies with which states pursue their national interests. Specifically, this thesis offers accounts of how American friendship for specified others was made possible, not whether those relationships are good or bad in terms of some objective criteria. However, in attempting to “deconstruct privileged constructions of the world,” it shares the critical constructivist concern with opening space for reimagining the world and raising awareness of the possibilities for remaking the world.³⁶

Identity as Performative Accomplishment

The ability of policy makers to define national interests and respond to events in ways that the public understand as reasonable is the most important resource in the production of an intelligible foreign policy. Tying these interests to a presupposed state identity, which they (re)produce, is vital in making state action possible. However, identity is not a self-evident concept: since identity has no pre-discursive meaning understanding how state identity is expressed and constitutes, and is constituted by, foreign policy practices is required for a post-positivist foreign policy analysis.

In “The Erosion of America’s National Interest,” *Foreign Affairs* (September/October 1997), Samuel Huntington claimed that culture has a basic continuity and that the undermining of American identity by commercial and ethnic interests constituted a major challenge to American interests around the world. Though he acknowledged a fundamental link between national interests and state identity, his account dismissed the notion of a fluid American identity. Rather than assessing how changing conceptions of what it means to be an American impact the construction of state interests, he saw immigration and interest groups as somehow

³⁶ Weldes et al., *Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production of Danger* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 21.

alien to a halcyon and essentialized vision of American identity, which he conceived as a variable in determining what American foreign policy should be in a realist world.

Huntington is challenged forcefully and convincingly by non-essentializing cultural scholars such as David Campbell who views culture as “a relational site for the politics of identity rather than a substantive phenomenon in its own right.”³⁷ This is of particular importance when discussing taken-for-granted relations, such as friendship. The relationships assessed in this thesis are routinely explained by appeals to “obvious” cultural similarities. This thesis argues that these cultural similarities exist only because of a certain mode of representation that has naturalized, marginalizing others. Attempts to measure identity and to draw on “it” in order to understand foreign policy must go beyond simplistic accounts that take it as an objective set of ideas. Identity is not real and static; rather it is imagined and transitory.³⁸

Identity is best conceived as performatively constituted by the very practices and actions that are said to be its results, rather than as something independent of those practices. In developing a theory of performativity, Judith Butler cites Jacques Derrida’s reading of Kafka’s “Before the Law”:

There the one who waits for the law, sits before the door of the law, attributes a certain force to the law for which one awaits. The anticipation of an authoritative discourse of meaning is the means by which authority is installed: *the anticipation conjures its object.*³⁹

The expectation that the Law has some force mirrors the ways in which positivists tend to attribute identity independent causal force. Identity is “conjured,” with Butler, by behaviours

³⁷ David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Manchester: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 221

³⁸ By real is meant that identity does not exist outside of representation. In another and important sense identity is real. Ian Hacking, *Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 146-7, writes “we shall count as real what we can use to intervene in the world to affect something else, or what the world can use to affect us.” Identity has a profound role in affecting foreign policies, change, and continuity since non-essential meanings all intervene in the world by constituting a “reality.”

³⁹ Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble*, xiv.

that are exhibited through our anticipation of its existence and settled understandings that it has a set of certain specific attributes. This *anticipatory force* provides stability as performativity “is not a singular act, but a *repetition and ritual*, which achieves its effects through its naturalization in the context of a body, understood, in part, as a culturally sustained temporal duration.”⁴⁰ Identity is made and secured by the repeated behaviours and acts (performances), which are presumed to be its results.

Judith Butler elaborates the notion that identity is performatively constituted in *Gender Trouble*. Here, Butler argues that “gender proves to be performative – that is, constituting the identity it is purported to be. In this sense gender is always doing, though not a doing by a subject who might be said to pre-exist the deed.”⁴¹ For Butler, gender is constituted through cultural production and the repetition and imitation of the acts that are deemed to be its effect.

Gender ought not to be constructed as a stable identity or locus of agency from which various acts follow; rather gender is an identity tenuously constituted in time, instituted in an interior space through a *stylized repetition of acts*....Significantly if gender is instituted through acts which are internally discontinuous, then the *appearance of substance* is precisely that, a constructed identity, a *performative accomplishment* which the mundane social audience, including the actors themselves, come to believe and to perform in the mode of belief.⁴²

Deviation is possible, but the subversive agent who violates gendered behaviour is subjected to violence. These behaviours are often so naturalized that speaking of them brings ridicule. Speaking from personal experience of how members of her family were treated after “coming out,” (revealing their own subversive behaviour) Butler writes: “it was difficult to bring this violence into view precisely because gender was *so taken for granted* at the same time it was violently policed.”⁴³ Queer and Trans individuals subvert the norms associated with gender; the risk of violence, against those who deviate and subvert those norms, police and

⁴⁰ Ibid., xv.

⁴¹ Ibid., 34.

⁴² Ibid., 191-192.

⁴³ Ibid., xx.

promulgate those norms and their associated performance. The rigidity of gender norms, heterosexual socialization, and ideas of a masculine/feminine binary are dependent on force being granted to their enactment.⁴⁴

Some scholars have sought to use Butler's insights about identity construction to assess foreign policy. Foremost among them is David Campbell who, following Butler, argued that "the performative constitution of gender and the body is analogous to the performative constitution of the state."⁴⁵ Campbell cites Butler practically verbatim:

We can understand the state as having "no ontological status apart from the various acts that constitute its reality"; that its status as the sovereign presence in world politics is produced by a "discourse of primary and stable identity"; and that the identity of any particular state should be understood as "tenuously constituted in time....through a *stylized repetition of acts*" and achieved, "*not [through] a founding act, but rather a regulated process of repetition.*"⁴⁶

Campbell uses performativity to make a case that America is in permanent need of reproduction to secure the meanings that constitute its identity at any given time. State (identity) is secured by the articulated and repeated (domestic and foreign) policies as well as other discursive practices, which are presumed to be its results. Foreign policy is "understood as one of the practices which contingently constructs through stylized and regulated performances the identity of the state in whose name it operates."⁴⁷ He views the articulation of danger and construction of threats as necessary for the identity and existence of any given state. The repetition is *regulated* (not determined) by dominant discourses that "govern the intelligible invocation of identity."⁴⁸ State identity – as a set of performatively expressed and violently regulated acts and behaviours – is in fact in greater need of explicit articulation than

⁴⁴ Masculinity, for example, is learnt. See Martin P. Levine, *Gay Macho: The Life and Death of the Homosexual Clone* (New York: New York University Press, 1998). Of particular relevance is "'It's Raining Men': The Sociology of Gay Masculinity," in which Levine describes the process of the socialization of boys into "traditional definitions of American masculinity," 11.

⁴⁵ Campbell, *Writing Security*, 10.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 73.

⁴⁸ Butler, *Gender Trouble*, 198.

gender identity as the repeated behaviours and acts of being “Australian,” “European,” or “American,” for instance, appear less self-evident than those associated with gender.

Policy that reflects certain values and ideals appears to stem from a stable state identity. In fact, the articulation of these values and ideals constitute and bring about the identity that is presumed to be their cause. American identity is conjured and takes on concrete meaning precisely through the process by which it is imagined, anticipated, and attributed force. Values – such as liberty, democracy, justice – are portrayed as “American” and their regulated performance – supporting democracy around the world, standing against authoritarianism, bringing terrorists to justice – as those that accord with a common sense subject position “America” in international society in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. That subjectivity is in fact constituted and portrayed as natural given the repeated articulation of those values and actions. Violence manifests in the marginalization of dissenting voices, from low-level marginalization in the form of ridicule, for instance, to high-level marginalization, with charges of treason levelled at subversive voices.

Performativity is much misunderstood. Most frequently it is confused with the notion of performance. In *Bodies That Matter* (1993), Butler clarifies that performativity is citational: “not a singular ‘act,’ for it is always a reiteration of a norm or set of norms, and to the extent that it acquires an act-like status in the present, it conceals or dissimulates the conventions of which it is a repetition.”⁴⁹ Cynthia Weber points out that performativity is not performance. “Instead of referring to a singular deliberative ‘act’ as performance does,” she writes, “performativity should be understood as the reiterative and citational practice by which discourse produces the effects that it names.”⁵⁰ The idea of performance implies some set script from which pre-discursive actors read when on the global stage. It implies a necessity

⁴⁹ Judith Butler, *Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex”* (London: Routledge, 1993), 12.

⁵⁰ Cynthia Weber, “Performative States,” *Millennium* 27 (1) (1998), 77. See also Cynthia Weber, *Simulating Sovereignty: Intervention, the State, and Symbolic Exchange* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

to act in a certain way. There is, however, no pre-discursive interpretative community and so an analysis of discourse that highlights the discursive construction of reality to the study of foreign policy is preferable.⁵¹

The lack of a script and pre-discursive America does not, however, mean we should dismiss the notion of performing altogether. In her preface to the second edition of *Gender Trouble*, Butler addresses this point:

My theory sometimes waffles between understanding performativity as linguistic and casting it as theatrical. I have come to think that the two are invariably related, chemically so, and that a reconsideration of the speech act as an instance of power invariably draws attention to both its theatrical and linguistic dimensions.....The speech act is at once performed (and thus theatrical, presented to an audience, subject to interpretation), and as linguistic, inducing a set of effects through its implied relation to linguistic conventions.”⁵²

Performance – enacting certain naturalized understandings of gender/national identity – is an important part of *performativity*. The discursive enactment of foreign policy can be said to be a performance. The notion of an audience and a negotiation between speech-act and recipient is also vital in understanding the (re)production of identity and difference. The process of amitization discussed in this thesis is dependent on performative utterances, presuppositions, and representational force and fits a critical discourse analysis that assesses the construction of reality. The linguistic dimension implies agency, change and an ever-present potential for resignification. If language, definitional labour, and (re)interpretation could not alter state identity then a theory of performativity would be redundant. However, it is clear that resignification can occur, and re-constitute identities and well defined relationship between subjects.

⁵¹ Doty, “Foreign Policy as Social Construction” contrasts a discursive practices approach to a social performance approach. She critiques the social performance approach for deferring the question of how templates get constructed.

⁵² Butler, *Gender Trouble*, xxvi-xxvii.

America's recent debate about torture demonstrates the ability to resignify state identity and to challenge the regulatory norms of international society. International norms against torture are widely accepted and nations that torture are staunchly criticized by the vast majority that do not. Of course, the norm (like all norms) is non-enforceable, especially against the United States, which has greater ability to withstand international condemnation. But charges of hypocrisy have dented America's global reputation.⁵³ A state's ability to torture prisoners is further limited by domestic laws that make evidence acquired through torture inadmissible in domestic courts.

In the 20th century, the United States had an unambiguous relationship with torture. It was a signatory to the Geneva conventions and the UN Convention against Torture. The Bill of Rights forbids the infliction of "cruel and unusual punishments," and being a nation that does not torture was part of the social fabric of being American: not torturing, that is, was one of the repeated acts that constituted American identity. However, the mere existence of the recent public debate over "enhanced interrogation techniques" reveal that torture was reinstated as a contested concept not automatically precluded from consideration as inconsistent with American identity. Throughout the 2008 presidential election candidates were asked for their opinions about waterboarding and other techniques widely understood to constitute torture since the Fourth Geneva Convention.

The presence of open debate and public discussion of torture transformed not torturing to a contestable and political topic. America's ability to subvert and challenge the practices and behaviours associated with being a "free" nation demonstrate how, even in the face of settled meanings, agency is retained and a process of resignification can alter the content of a given identity. Indeed, the use of the language "enhanced interrogation techniques" is itself telling,

⁵³ Every year, China publishes a Report on the Human Rights Record of the United States. Though this does not constitute "physical violence," charges of hypocrisy do constitute a form of violence as Butler conceives of it in that they call into question a state's behaviour and act to police future action.

as it reveals the difficulty of making torture compatible with “America.” Rather than resignify America as a nation that can torture, it was easier to attempt to disassociate specific “techniques” from “torture.” There is a compulsion to “not torture,” but the manner in which Americans repeat “not torturing” creates space for agency.

Butler argues that whereas positivism presumes the existence of a pre-discursive subject, discursive accounts occasionally act as though “to be constituted by discourse is to be determined by discourse, where determinism forecloses the possibility of agency.”⁵⁴ Identity is a social construct, but since it is performatively constituted through the stylized repetition of acts and constantly (re)produced by their enactment, agency is retained and accounted for in a clear and readily understandable manner.

Butler emphasizes the “compulsion to repeat” certain acts and behaviours that enact the identity that has been performatively accomplished. This compelling is significant. Rather than friendly actions being chosen following the logic of consequences or the logic of appropriateness, actions are habitually followed unreflectively.⁵⁵ Butler’s “compulsion to repeat” certain acts and behaviours (including the practices of friendship) lends order to America’s relations with those that have been categorized as “friends.”⁵⁶ In foreign policy, acting as though subject positions (like amity and enmity) are reflective of some objective truth is compelled and becomes naturalized.

However, Butler writes that “if the cultural construction of sexuality compels a repetition of [the phallus as a privileged] signifier, there is nevertheless in the very fore of repetition, understood as resignification or recirculation, the possibility of deprivileging the signifier.”⁵⁷

⁵⁴ Butler, *Gender Trouble*, 195.

⁵⁵ Ted Hopf, “The Logic of Habit in International Relations,” *European Journal of International Relations* 16 (4) (2010).

⁵⁶ Butler, *Gender Trouble*, 198.

⁵⁷ Butler, *Bodies That Matter*, 89.

Agency exists in *the potential to repeat in another manner*. “The force of repetition in language,” Butler writes, “may be the paradoxical condition by which a certain agency is derived from the *impossibility* of choice.”⁵⁸ Agency is retained through the possibility of deviation from patterns of behaviour and the attendant identity constituting resignification. “The question of agency,” Butler argues, “is reformulated as a question of how signification and resignification work.”⁵⁹ Mark Laffey has defined resignification as “the reworking of the discourse through which the subject effects are produced.”⁶⁰ The meanings associated with being American alter when the discourse that constitutes American identity is reworked. This is useful as practices of (re)signification enable “becoming friends.”

In investigating the logic of habit in international relations, Ted Hopf points out that Butler “finds the potential for change in social structures in *the wiggle room* we all have in performing the identities that are ‘given’ by those structures...the potential for change is in the variations of our performances.”⁶¹ However, certain performances are naturalized and so deviation (though possible) is unlikely as acting differently is unthinkable. In much the same way, well defined relations between states (including amity and enmity) are stable since the frame of reference is acted on unreflectively. Discourses not only make it possible to support your friends, the constituting structures make it almost unavoidable that friends will be supported and performances will be repeated until signifiers shift.

Conceiving identity as *performativity* constituted through a process of a stylized repetition of acts and behaviours, on the one hand, and viewing policy makers as *performing* these acts unreflectively, which is played out in and through the selection and pursuit of certain national interests, on the other, provides an understanding of foreign policy that allows for agency

⁵⁸ Ibid., 85. Emphasis in original.

⁵⁹ Butler, *Gender Trouble*, 197.

⁶⁰ Mark Laffey, “Locating Identity: Performativity, Foreign Policy and State Action,” *Review of International Studies* 26 (3) (2000): 432.

⁶¹ Hopf, “The Logic of Habit,” 548.

(resignification and deviation) and structure (dominant discourses that regulate and compel). Foreign policy is not, therefore, merely constructed, but it is performed and through this process of performing it cites and thus (re)constructs the identity to which it refers.

State identity is performative: made concrete through the process of its regulated repetition. However, this tenuously constituted identity is ontologically inseparable with foreign policy practices and expressed in a world of others. As such, foreign policy is dependent not just on the performative constitution of identity, but on the construction of *categories* of difference.

Casting the World

All the world's a stage,
And all its men and women merely players:
They have their exits and their entrances;
And one man in his time plays many parts.
(William Shakespeare, *As You like It*)

The notion that there is a global stage on which various international actors fight, compete, and pursue their goals may appear to oversimplify the complex process of state interaction. However, the metaphor holds in many important ways. When a state interacts with others, it does so with a certain identity (or character) that is stabilized through the regulated performance of acts and behaviours (enactments) that (re)produce it. This identity is crucial in making foreign policy intelligible. But so too are understandings of others. As James Der Derian has commented:

More than a rational calculation of interests takes us to war. People go to war because of how they see, perceive, imagine and speak of others: that is, how they construct the differences of others as well as the sameness of themselves through representation.⁶²

“Difference” and “sameness” are imagined and transitory, rather than concrete and static, depending on a certain mode of representation becoming common sense. However, the

⁶² James Der Derian, quoted in Derek Gregory, *The Colonial Present: Afghanistan, Palestine, Iraq* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 20.

illusoriness of similarity and difference does not prevent them from framing the possible foreign policies available to any state.

War between France and Germany is not conceptually impossible, in that circumstances could arise in which understandings between the two could be so challenged as to make violence a possibility. It is, however, so unlikely (given the naturalization of current understandings) that it barely warrants concern. In much the same way, amity between India and Pakistan is highly unlikely to develop in the near future. Franco-German amity and India-Pakistan enmity are important sources of order in international relations, in that both constitute reasonable expectations about future behaviour of other. These kinds of expectations about how others will behave frame the foreign policy-making process for all states and create possibilities for action. Everyday assumptions are frequently expressed in the form of default subject positions assigned through a long term and largely subconscious process of *casting* others into certain positions and endowing them with qualities that highlight the differences or sameness with the casting state. When Pakistan's army moved into Kargil in the winter of 1998-99, the Indian Government's response was constrained and constituted by the pre-established categorization of Pakistan as "enemy."⁶³ Certain behaviours and expectations were attached to Pakistan through the naturalization of dominant discourses in Indian society about the character of Pakistan.

Foreign policy necessarily involves interacting with others. In responding to any event, meanings must be attached to those participants identified as "relevant." The various subject positions facilitate and foreclose state action. While these subject positions can be, and frequently are, set out in a time of crisis or in tandem with the construction of specific and/or

⁶³ Janice Bially Mattern, *Ordering International Politics Identity, Crisis, and Representational Force* (London: Routledge, 2005), points out that "order" is created through specific understandings between states as well as the general laws, norms and rules which members of the English School emphasize. Amity and enmity constitute such understandings.

immediate threats, they need not be: not all subject positions come about because of a specific crisis or event that requires immediate response.

Those who speak for the United States do not have to articulate entirely new representations every time it interacts with an other, because certain prior representations have already become naturalized. Performing foreign policy does not only involve defining specific threats and responding to events as they unfold, it also involves casting others in certain default positions. This process of categorizing others takes place over a long period of time and is based on certain meanings being attached to others because of common understanding about the *character* of the other. Repeated representations about the character of the other (*inter alia* good, bad, reliable, erratic, moral, virtuous, vicious) serve to make these positions relatively stable and order international relations.⁶⁴

When the British Parliament voted against possible military intervention in Syria in August 2013, the American response was complicated by naturalized understandings that Britain was a friend endowed with certain characteristics that made friendship unquestionable. When North Korea conducted nuclear tests in 2013, this action did not appear *de novo* to international society or American policy makers. Responses depended upon everyday assumptions about North Korea, which made intelligible the viewing of such an action in a self-evidently hostile manner. Though realists may claim that such an action was clearly a threat to America's national interest, it struggles to account for why this action was any

⁶⁴ This chapter suggests a discursive practices approach for assessing foreign policy that allows for both the ordering ability of settled meanings (subject positions) which are attached to both self and other whilst accepting the significance of agency and resignification in the foreign policy process. It has not provided a detailed assessment of any of the settled meanings that states attach to themselves or others. In order to do this critical genealogies can be constructed which are both path dependent and historically contingent, looking at how certain understandings of self and other become common sense and others marginalized. As is argued in chapter 3, a critical discursive analysis of the texts of foreign policy – including both official texts and the texts of cultural discourse – is an appropriate approach for this.


graver than French testing of nuclear weapons in the Pacific in the 1960s. This is because they do not take the character of others seriously.

America's relationship with North Korea is limited by pre-existing representations of the state as an "enemy of America" and America as "enemy of North Korea." The categorization "enemy" implies the posture American officials should take and removes certain actions from consideration. In much the same way when France developed an independent nuclear capability in the 1960s, considerations were framed in part by France's character as an "ally." Similarly, when Israel refuses to cease settlement activity in the West Bank, America's response is constrained by the discourse of Israel as "friend." The category in which a state is placed, and the character attached to it, frame and limit state action by cutting down the number of options imaginable.

Figure 1.1 (below) illustrates the function of subject positions "friends" and the frame of reference "friendship" in options sets. Within the sets may be a variety of options that a policy maker can choose in response to an action or inaction by the other. However, the frame of reference bounds political contestation by constituting the set of possible actions. The rigidity of the boundaries of the set precludes certain options from consideration unless the discourse of amity/enmity is resignified. President Obama cannot, for example, invite Kim Jong-Un to a conference in Washington D.C., nor publicly sue for normalized relations. In much the same way, Obama cannot publicly threaten Israel with economic sanctions in order to secure a withdrawal from the West Bank. There may be a variety of specific responses available to policy makers, but there are limits of what is feasible given the strength of common sense frames of reference. War, sanctions, estrangement and hostility are possible responses to an enemy because an enemy is an actor *ipso facto* that is *opposed* and the subject position "enemy" enables *opposing* actions. Peace, economic support, and

attention are possible responses to a friend because a friend is an actor *ipso facto* that is *supported* and the subject position “friend” enables *supportive* actions.

Figure 1.1: Options Sets



Enemies do not just appear: they are constructed. There are, however, certain state and non-state actors that policy makers and publics would understand as enemies as common sense. This is due to a constant process of casting: coherence is lent to foreign policy by assigning qualities to others and placing them in subject positions. These subject positions have no meaning outside of representation, but the categorization of nations into groups of enemies, rivals, allies, and friends enables and frames foreign policy. Casting is a nuanced and important form of construction as it involves assigning subject positions through predicates to others such as “villain,” “hero,” “coward,” or “infant,” for instance. These play into a certain vision of the “reality” of the world. Enemies are not only *constructed*, but are also cast and (re)cast into subject positions, which distinguish them from both the actor doing the casting and from the other categorizations. An “enemy” is not an “ally” and both terms gain meaning for policy makers from some understanding of their relative position.

These subject positions are relatively stable but, just as agency is retained through the potential for resignification, they can shift. Between 1945 and 1947, the Soviet Union went from “ally of the United States” to “enemy of the United States.” The creation of enmity between the United States and the Soviet Union required a reinterpretation of the relationship between the two states. Presenting the Soviet Union as a security threat required a great deal of interpretive labour. Much of the change focused on the image of Stalin. By 1947, any references to “Uncle Joe” were long gone and instead a whole host of new representations of Stalin as untrustworthy and dangerous began to permeate American discourses:

Our ‘ally’ in the recent war ‘Uncle Joe Stalin,’ as the accidental President Harry S. Truman had called him, was growing horns and fangs that dripped blood. On earth we were the only great unruined power with atomic weapons; yet we were somehow at terrible risk. Why? How?⁶⁵

Actions do not speak for themselves. The failure of free and fair elections in Eastern Europe was represented neither as an understandable response of a nation that had been invaded three times in as many decades from the East, nor part of the Soviet desire for a Sphere of Influence. Instead it became a mark of the ruthless and untrustworthiness of the Soviets – a form of “communist imperialism.” Any alternative narrative that viewed the imposition of communist clients in terms of security was marginalized in American discourse. Americans reverted to the Red Scare mentality of the 1920s and the notion that communists had permeated the American government, media, and film industry was propagated with horrific results by Senator Joe McCarthy. The Soviet Union was portrayed as a threat and anathema to an imagined yet intervening “American way of life.” This is not to suggest that America and the Soviet Union did not have differing understandings of their respective interests that would have made the maintenance of a post-War alliance difficult. Rather it is to say that the alliance between the United States and the Soviet Union had itself required certain expedient

⁶⁵ Gore Vidal, “The Last Empire,” in *The Last Empire: Essays 1992-2001* (London: Abacus, 2002), 168.

representations of the Soviet Union and that these were swiftly replaced by others, allowing for enmity to become taken-for-granted. It is the nature of these representations that best account for how the Soviet Union could be swiftly portrayed as an enemy as opposed to a rival or partner.⁶⁶ This resignification was a necessary, if not sufficient, contributor to the macro-securitization of the Cold War.⁶⁷

Whether it is the construction of enmity between the United States and the Soviet Union or the drive to find in Russia, China, or Orientalized Islam, a new enemy: representational practices (stereotypes, images, imaginative geographies) construct hostility. This type of categorization is an on-going process. But just as a state's own identity is performatively constituted through taken-for-granted and repeated behaviours and acts, so too do these categorizations conjure their objects. "Enemy of the United States" exists precisely through the representations that are believed to have objective force.⁶⁸ The frame is articulated and maintained through a process of (re)casting.

Enemy is perhaps the most important and assessed subject position because International Relations and foreign policy analyses tend to focus on ways of avoiding war. Enemies are not, however, the only category available when assigning positions in international politics. Foreign policy is not necessarily conducted in a Hobbesian "state of nature." Rivals and allies are categorizations that are readily understood and used frequently. By categorizing states as "allies," "rivals," or "enemies," America's own identity is secured in both the difference between self and other, and also through differentiating its "allies" from its "enemies," and its

⁶⁶ See Guy Oakes, *The Imaginary War: Civil Defense and American Cold War Culture* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) and Alan Nadel, *Containment Culture: American Narratives, Postmodernism, and the Atomic Age* (London: Duke University Press, 1995).

⁶⁷ Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, "Macrosecuritization and Security Constellations: Reconsidering Scale in Securitization Theory," *Review of International Studies* 35 (2009).

⁶⁸ The construction of specific imaginative geographies is a nuanced form of construction. L. Bialasiewicz et al., "Performing Security: The Imaginative Geographies of Current US Strategy," *Political Geography* 26 (2007), write that "in the discursive production of imaginative geographies it is *performativity* rather than *construction* which is the better theoretical assessment." This thesis agrees since performativity can best account for the process of (re)construction and shifting geographies.

“closest allies” from its “strategic partners.” Foreign policy is not merely performed through the radical otherness of enmity and the creation of subject positions that oppose American identity completely: it is performed in the construction of varieties of difference.⁶⁹

There remains, however, a wide-spread assumption that “identity is based on a division between ‘us’ and ‘them’.”⁷⁰ This vision of the world derives particularly from conceptions of identity as culturally constructed through a series of binary exclusions. The use of binary distinctions is fundamental: understandings of sanity derive meaning from the notion of madness with which it is opposed. The bad, barbaric criminal gains meaning with reference to the civilized, law-abiding citizen.⁷¹ Edward Said also emphasized the importance in “othering” in the Orientalist practices of European imperialism.⁷² “Othering” refers to the process by which differences are harnessed to construct and maintain an in-group and out-group. The constructions of enmity that David Campbell elucidates in *Writing Security* fit this model of radical otherness.

While Richard Ned Lebow acknowledges that “the ‘us’ and ‘other’ binary distinction has a long and distinguished lineage,” in developing a cultural theory of international politics, he argues that identity can emerge and become relatively stable in the absence of othering.⁷³ “Homer and modern history suggest that identity construction and maintenance often take place through positive, although not necessarily equal, interactions with the ‘other’.”⁷⁴ When it comes to friendships, positive representations of others are vital in the maintenance of the identity out of which they emerged. “Positive relationships with other human beings,” argues Lebow, “stretch our identities, together with our conceptions of ourselves and our self-

⁶⁹ William Connolly, *Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), speaks of radical Otherness as a “temptation rather than a necessity,” 8.

⁷⁰ Klotz and Lynch, *Strategies for Research*, 74.

⁷¹ Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality: Part 1* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990).

⁷² Edward Said, *Orientalism* (London, Penguin, 2003).

⁷³ Richard Ned Lebow, “Identity and International Relations,” *International Relations* 22 (2008): 475.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 473.

interest.”⁷⁵ Indeed, the representations of friends in fact can be seen as a process of differentiation through relations of similarity. American identity has been reconstituted (stretched) to incorporate friendships for specified others, imagined to be similar. It is this imagined similarity provides the quality of the relationship. Their performance builds confidence and certainty as well as security. In *Orientalism* (1979), Said sought primarily to explore the architectures of enmity, providing a critique for how discourses are wielded by the powerful to marginalize and dominate others. When looking at the foreign policy practices of the United States it is necessary to look, also, for the *architectures of amity*.

Friendship based on relations of similarity and complementarity is a core component of identity expression. Graham Allen argues that “to the extent that friendship involves generating ties of solidarity based on compatibility and liking independent of instrumental considerations, then friendship permits a greater leeway in expressing one’s identity than most other roles do.”⁷⁶ Since states cast others as enemies, friends, and allies, but also themselves as being a “friend of X” or “enemy of Y,” the behaviour exhibited towards others (re)produces their own identity. Individuals make their friends, and in the process of making, take on certain obligations and commitments towards them that are supererogatory (i.e. agents do things for their friends they will not do for everyone). In practicing these behaviours an actor repeats acts that (re)constitutes their identity.

A second assumption, that identity construction is based primarily on distinguishing self from other, does not hold. Rod Edmond, for example, has shown that the British explorers’ categorization of islands in the Pacific in the 1760s does not accord with othering, in that it focuses more on differences between island groups as on differences between the peoples of

⁷⁵ Richard Ned Lebow, *A Cultural Theory of International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 137.

⁷⁶ Graham Allan, *Friendship: Developing a Sociological Perspective* (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989), 59.

Europe and the Pacific. He notes that, “in Oceania, at least, the concern with similarity and difference was more complex than Saïdean-derived notions of othering can accommodate.”⁷⁷

The British categorization labelled and identified groups in contrast with each other rather than through a simple contrast with Britain or Europe. States do not solely gain their identity through contrasting themselves with others; they also categorize and contrast states with one another. In short: although identities often depend on exclusions, negative imagery and “outsiders,” identity is also formed and performed both through positive representations and through contrasting others both with self and with other others.

States can be closer or further from each other given their categorization. Ideas of self and other are important; but so too are notions of *distance* and *difference*. This is something that David Campbell understood, even while his work focused on radical othering. His notes that his analysis “emphasizes the exclusionary practices, the discourses of danger, the representations of fear, and the enumeration of threats; and downplays the role of affirmative discourses such as claims to shared ethnicity, nationality, political ideas, religious beliefs and other commonalities.”⁷⁸ His understanding, however, that “difference is constituted in relation to identity”⁷⁹ comes directly from the work of William Connolly. Self/Other is not the core binary for securing identity; rather Identity/Difference is how identity is constituted.

For Connolly the type of othering that Campbell assesses is “the second problem of evil...the diverse political tactics through which doubts about self-identity are posed and resolved by the constitution of an other against which that identity may define itself.”⁸⁰ Identity is relational and collectively constituted by both forms of association and disassociation. In representing danger America secures its own identity, but identity is not solely secured

⁷⁷ Rod Edmond, “Encounter and Disease in the South Pacific,” in Felicity A. Nussbaum, ed., *The Global Eighteenth Century* (London: John Hopkins University Press, 2003), 260.

⁷⁸ Campbell, *Writing Security*, 77.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 8.

⁸⁰ Connolly, *Identity/Difference*, ix-x.

through representations of danger and others “out there.” When America faces the world it is not merely securing its boundaries by writing security through representing danger and the practices of enmity. American foreign policy is also constituted through representations of safety and a cast of allies, rivals, partners and friends. It is these common sense frames of reference that make foreign policy intelligible.

Chapter 2: Between Other and Self: A Place for Friendship?

Foreign policy options are enabled and precluded by common sense categorizations of others as enemy, rival, ally, partner, and friend. These categories are socially constructed and emerge through a process of *casting*, by which states differentiate others *by degrees*, depending on everyday representations of the character of the other. Of the various categories available, “friend” is perhaps the most neglected:

Relative to ‘enemy’, the concept of ‘friend’ is undertheorized in social theory, and especially in IR, where a substantial literature exists on enemy images but little on friend images, on enduring rivalries but little on enduring friendships, on the causes of war but little on the causes of peace.¹

Theorists who have noted that amity plays a role in state behaviour have viewed it either as a poor reason for conducting policy, which is usually short-lived, or else have attempted to limit its scope to “mutual trust.”² No theory that accurately reflects the dynamics of international friendship has been articulated. Indeed, Wendt’s discussion on the Third Degree of Internalization in the Kantian Culture – where he argues that “collective identity is constituted by defining the welfare of the Self to *include* that of the Other” – comes close but does not offer a rigorous assessment of the process by which such a definition occurs.³ The same is true of the work of the Copenhagen School, which treats amity and enmity as variables in regional security complexes, but does not explore how the particular constitution of friendship (and attendant identity) facilitates and forecloses possibilities for action.⁴

¹ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 298.

² Andrea Oelsner, “Friendship, Mutual Trust and the Evolution of Regional Peace in the International System,” in Preston T. King and Graham Smith, eds., *Friendship in Politics* (London: Routledge, 2007). Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1965), chapter 2 views amity as “letting one’s guard down,” and a “disastrous way of conducting diplomatic relations.”

³ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 297-307.

⁴ Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 45-65.

A truly *social theory* of international relations is incomplete without an assessment of all forms of international association. This includes friendship. Amity frequently complicates taken-for-granted security imaginaries for two reasons. Firstly, supererogatory commitments enabled by friendship go beyond security and can make the categorizing state less secure within the broader lens of that security imaginary, since friendship involves concern for the welfare of a specified other and doing something for friends is not seen as an exchange. Secondly, its primary characteristic – *amity exists where a state comes to see itself in an other* – would require a fairly radical rereading of taken-for-granted security imaginaries.⁵

This chapter argues that amity enables an important form of association in international politics that needs to be distinguished from alliance. It discusses how inter-personal friendship has been conceptualized: highlighting that much of the reason for its absence from International Relations literature stems from its general neglect in moral philosophy and political theory. Having elucidated two competing conceptions of inter-personal friendship, this chapter turns to whether it makes sense to speak of states as friends and how amity can be considered by International Relations scholars. It argues that amity is a unidirectional relationship emerging when a casting state comes to place X in a subject position “friend”; friendship manifests as a habitual disposition to treat X better than not-X (most frequently in the form of sustained policies of support). Amity has several properties: it is rare, partial, equalizing, intimate, and intense. The “friend” is a naturalized subject position that comes about through signifying practices that construct similarity and is best captured by Aristotelian notions of character friends as *Other Selves*.

⁵ Though theoretically possible to incorporate discourses of similarity into a security imaginary heuristic, given that the policies facilitated by friendship frequently appear to counter broader interests in security imaginaries, such as “the Cold War” and “the War on Terror,” it is better to assess friendship as a frame of reference that complicates the overarching security imaginary.

Friends and Allies

More often than not, International Relations scholars do not differentiate between friends and allies, perhaps assuming that friendship makes no substantive difference in foreign policy decision-making. Journalists frequently reference America's "friends and allies," and policy makers also usually fail to distinguish them: "We must stand by the friends and allies who are making tough decisions and taking risks to defeat the terrorists" is a vague statement if the categories boil down to one and the same, or if friends are merely strategically important or historic allies.⁶ Not only are the categories genuinely distinct, the differences between how being friends and being allies create possibilities for action are important and striking.

In order to distinguish the terms, it is necessary to put forward a working definition of alliance that sets out its properties. Glenn Snyder defines alliances as follows:

Alliances are formal associations of states for the use (or non-use) of military force, intended for either the security or aggrandizement of their members, against specific other states, whether or not those others are explicitly identified.⁷

The Entente Cordiale against the Central Powers or the Allies against the Axis are seen as clear examples of associations of states, bound through formal agreements against a potential and then actual threat. Alliances are an important and seemingly universal feature of international politics. Cost/benefit analysis provides the basis for most accounts of why states align, be it to balance against power, to balance against threat, or even to urge policy-restraint and "reassure."⁸ Policy makers are thought to weigh up the costs of forming an alliance, including expense and limiting freedom of action, against the benefits, which may include enhanced security, power, and reputation. For Rational Choice Theory, alliances can differ in

⁶ George W. Bush, *Public Papers of the President (PPP)*, "Speech at West Point," 10 December 2008.

⁷ Glenn H. Snyder, "Alliance Theory: a Neorealist First Cut," *Journal of International Affairs* 44 (1991): 104.

⁸ Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (London: McGraw-Hill, 1979); Stephen M. Walt, *Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); Jeremy Pressman, *Warring Friends: Alliance Restraint in International Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007); Al Roth, "Reassurance: A Strategic basis of US Support for Israel," *International Studies Perspectives* 10 (4) (2009).

strategic importance, but they can always be justified on the basis of cost/benefit analysis. If states only ever behave rationally, where the content of friendship is as cost/benefit analysis would have it, then friendship is impossible: “Alliances are not,” according to Martin Wight, “the friendships of international politics – unless as Aristotle observed, we apply the word to relationships based on utility.”⁹ However, this understanding of rationality is correct only if a realist assessment – that the material world is knowable and presents itself to observers unproblematically – is accepted. Such a position is not accepted by this thesis, which seeks to explore the conditions of possibility that makes supporting friends intelligible.

The most enduring contribution to alliance theory was made by Stephen Walt. In *Origins of Alliances* (1983) he argued that “states balance against the states that pose the greatest threat, and the latter need not be the most powerful state in the system.”¹⁰ France has a significant and independent nuclear capability, yet one Iranian or North Korean nuclear weapon is a far greater concern to policy makers in the United States. Walt maintains that threats are determined on the basis of power, geographical proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived intentions. His account is insightful; however, by bringing in notions of *perceived intentions*, he undermines the core claims of the structural realist school, of which he claims membership. Understanding state intentions necessarily involves some assessment of domestic politics and an explication of how it is that some states are imagined to be more threatening than others. This depends on a mode of representation and a prior categorization of that state as “enemy” or “concern,” which it is appropriate or vital to check.

Where Kenneth Waltz claims that “alliances are made by states that have some but not all of their interests in common,”¹¹ Walt has to admit an element of subjectivity in the selection of

⁹ Martin Wight, *Power Politics*, eds. Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1979), 122.

¹⁰ Walt, *Origins of Alliances*, 263.

¹¹ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 106.

those common interests. Indeed, Walt's theory contains elements that are far closer to the constructivist approach than to structural realism. In his discussion of how states shifted their alignments in the Middle East, for example, he notes that "in the Arab world, the most important source of power has been the ability to manipulate one's own image and the image of one's rivals in the minds of other Arab elites."¹² This understanding of the importance of images and perceptions leads Walt to undermine the notions of objective threats and rational choice on which his theory purports to be based.

Walt's argument, that states enter alliances in order to balance against threats, remains the most cited theory of alliance formation. Smaller states, aware of their relative weakness, generally look for larger states, or international organizations, for protection, either through balancing or bandwagoning. Balancing threats depends, however, on representational practices. Interpretations of how trustworthy states are and how likely they are to act in an opportunistic fashion will enable the form of the alliance chosen, but these in turn depend on extant resources and everyday understandings. These understandings order the alliance and their strength or weakness often reveal their likelihood to endure.

The Cold War is often presented as a competition for allies, but intra-alliance relations differed enormously. Whereas the United States could maintain its alliances without incurring significant governance costs, the Soviet Union was only able to maintain its influence over Eastern Europe with the constant threat of military incursion.¹³ David Lake argues that, when assessing alliance formation, it is necessary to consider the role of hierarchy as opposed to anarchy in the international system. It is assumed that states cannot deny their relative standing in terms of power and prestige in international society when determining the type of alliance they enter into, if states are very unequal then the one with fewer capabilities takes

¹² Walt, *Origins of Alliances*, 149.

¹³ David Lake, "Anarchy, Hierarchy, and the Variety of International Relations," *International Organization* 50 (1) (1996).

on the junior (dependent) role and is expected to “fall into line.” Mao’s policy to “lean to one side” and sign the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance in 1950 could be seen as evidence of this.

On an official trip Mao’s deputy, Liu Shaoqi, stated before the Politburo:

If on some matter differences should arise between the CCP and the Soviet Communist party, the CCP, having outlined its point of view, will submit and will resolutely carry out the decisions of the Soviet Communist Party.¹⁴

There is here an explicit acceptance of China’s position as “junior partner.” Given Mao’s fear of the United States and need to shore-up the Chinese Communist Party’s improbable victory with Soviet arms and advisors such an alliance becomes intelligible. However, hierarchy, like anarchy, depends on modes of representation. The manifest political consequence, in this case a hierarchical relationship, was made possible by the adoption of one mode of representation over another. It depended on both Mao and Stalin’s understandings of one another, the history between them, and what it meant to be a communist. Friendship, on the other hand, whilst not erasing differences in capabilities and prestige lessens their import by emphasizing the character of the agents involved over the strategic utility of the association, as such it is an equalizing discourse.¹⁵ Friendship levels the social place of hierarchy and is a possible form of association for very unequal actors. Stalin appears to have been unwilling to embark on a friendship for China that would have warranted a more equal treatment of China in the relationship, preferring to maintain a hegemonic relation.¹⁶

¹⁴ Liu Shaoqi, quoted in Odd Arne Westad, *Decisive Encounters: The Chinese Civil War, 1946-1950* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2003), 268.

¹⁵ How equality and hierarchy function in friendship is a matter of considerable debate. It is the contention of the thesis however, and part of its theoretical contribution, drawing on an Aristotelian notion of friendship, based on character, not capabilities, that constructions of friendship may serve to level hierarchy. Friendship for X entails recognizing X as equal in some way. Since the subject position “friend” is discursively constructed by the categorizing state, debate about the role of equality of status or capabilities in friendship can be set aside. Rather, friendship discourses construct similarities, which *inter alia* serve to equalize the relationship.

¹⁶ Again a full discursive analysis of the non-amitization of China by the Soviet Union would be a project in itself. However, taking on a junior or dependent role in a hierarchical relationship does not solely depend on

It is possible to argue that friendships and special relationships exist when an alignment is of particular strategic importance. Given the *presuppositions* of the “Cold War” security imaginary, the American alignments with Japan and West Germany post-1945 seem to be of far greater strategic importance than the American alignments with Great Britain and, certainly that with, Israel. Indeed, the modes of representation that enabled support for Britain and Israel complicated America’s relations with decolonizing states and the Arab world. However, friendship is not based on importance: importance alone is a function of cost/benefit analysis and falls under the remit of Aristotelian utility friendship. Friendships can be presumed to be extremely important for those who engage the discourses of friendship, but there is an extra quality in amity, which makes the category “friend” distinct from “vital ally.” That quality is similarity and the idea that the friend is an *Other Self*.

Within existing alliance theory, friendship appears to be closest to notions of *natural allies*: allies with which a state feels a particular affinity or closeness, which makes co-operation likely and desirable. The existence of natural allies has, however, fallen out of fashion as *realpolitik* and concepts such as the balance of power have come to dominate the field. In the 19th century a future British Prime Minister, Lord Palmerston, famously asserted:

We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.¹⁷

The idea that states have natural allies was discussed by Martin Wight. He traced the history of European alignments commenting that in all cases of supposed natural alliances “divergent

capabilities. America’s Cold War alliance structure (as argued in chapter 6) is a good example of how discourses of similarity make it possible to treat certain allies better than others, even where the relationships display great differences in capabilities.

¹⁷ Lord Palmerston, Speech to the House of Commons, 1 March 1848, when he was not yet Prime Minister *Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates. 3rd series*, vol. 97, col. 122. He was partially correct; interests are not eternal though the state’s impetus to follow its “national interest” is.

interests come to eclipse the common interest.”¹⁸ This very impermanence appears to demonstrate that claims that any two states are natural allies are nothing more than linguistic flourishes designed to please a particular audience – often foreign officials. However, to understand the *naturalness* of alliances in terms of longevity is wrong. The alliance between England (now the United Kingdom) and Portugal is the oldest in the world: “the most persistent factor in international relationships of modern times.”¹⁹ Surely if longevity and durability is the major component of natural alliance, the oldest is the best place to look. The Anglo-Portuguese treaty, however, has always been heavily dependent on common interests:

The treaty of 1386 was directed especially against the danger of Spanish aggression. In later years, defense of the Portuguese colonies became the central and permanent objective: and today [1942] Portugal regards the ancient alliance as primarily useful in case aggression should threaten her relatively large and vulnerable empire.²⁰

Robert Caldwell argued that the same balance against threats is present in even the most “persistent” alliance the world has ever seen. The interests of England and Portugal have shifted, but being able to represent the continuation of the alliance as serving some purpose other than a concern for the welfare of the ally best explains its longevity. If there are natural allies, durability and longevity are not their distinguishing features.

This thesis contends, however, that rather than natural/eternal allies it is better to speak of states as friends. Fiends are not natural allies, but *naturalized* subject positions. Whereas an alliance is constructed to counter a specific and defined threat – which is constructed through the attachment of meanings to objects and the security imaginary – a friendship does not require the prior existence of a specific enemy or threat. Even where a threat and a friend

¹⁸ Wight, *Power Politics*, 130.

¹⁹ Robert G. Caldwell, “The Anglo-Portuguese Alliance Today,” *Foreign Affairs* 21 (1) (1942/1943): 149.

²⁰ Ibid.

are constructed in tandem amity is likely to endure long after the threat has dissipated, since having friends (re)produces a certain form a national identity for the categorizing state. Friendships are rarely formal associations, but are more often informal alignments, stabilized on the basis of everyday assumptions about the character of the friend, which forecloses hostility and facilitates supportive action. Friends often stand together against a common enemy, but friendships are often prior to those threats. Instead, friendship emerges through a process by which a state comes to view the other as being similar and worthy of supererogatory support.²¹

A Forgotten Concept: A Brief History of Friendship

Few have examined the relationship between friendship and politics in a thoughtful and precise manner. In *Politics as Friendship* (1978), Horst Hutter pointed out that friendship used to be thought intrinsic to politics. An understanding that the self could be oriented towards the other was commonplace in ancient Greece where it was assumed that friendship and politics were inseparable:

At the present moment in the Western tradition of thought the idea of friendship has receded into the background and has been supplanted by the idea of market exchange as the major principal for the intellectual ordering of the political world.²²

A hegemonic discourse of individuals as self-interested underpins realism. *Homo Economicus* cannot have friends. If the term “friend” is used, it is a masquerade for the purposes of furthering self-interest. Indeed, any form of charitable giving or altruistic behaviour is inconsistent with the major assumptions of the field, unless we accept that altruism is merely a mechanism for improving an individual’s standing and image.

²¹ This is not to say that other permissive conditions do not have to be present. Friends usually, for example, also have no clear and obviously (i.e. generally seen as common sense) adverse interests. However, given that interests are constructed rather than discovered, discourses of similarity are unlikely to be articulated whilst at the same time emphasizing irreconcilable interests.

²² Horst Hutter, *Politics as Friendship: The Origins of Classical Notions of Politics and Practice of Friendship* (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1978), 2.

For market based systems, the dominant value is not friendship but is rather co-operation for the purpose of profit maximization. However, there is increasing awareness that models of market exchange and the assumptions on which much of modern economic theory are built neither accurately reflect how individuals tend to behave nor what constitutes rational behaviour. Consider the following problem:

1000 people are told that they will win a prize if they successfully guess a number between 0 and 100 [inclusive] that is two thirds of the average of all the other guesses.

A Rational Actor Model predicts that all the agents – being rational – will pick 0, since they will correctly anticipate the rational behaviour of the other participants and race to the bottom. In fact when this experiment is tried the average guess stands at around 18.91 and so the winning guess is 13.²³ Modelling behaviour in a way that presumes perfect rationality in selecting options denies many of the important elements of how humans actually behave. This type of theory-building depends on an assessment of individuals as rational and self-interested devoid of many of the characteristics that make them human. It may be useful in making economic predications, but this is not because humans have some necessary and unchanging ontology. Indeed in this instance the rational actor – who we assume wants to win – should account for the irrationality of the other guessers. International Relations has been too keen to adopt the conceptual tools of economics, such as game theory, profit-maximizing assumptions, and a set of presuppositions about rational behaviour, without considering whether it is apt to assign these to states.²⁴

²³ This is a test that has been used to demonstrate the limitations of the assumptions behind *homo economicus*. See Richard H. Thaler, “From Homo Economicus to Homo Sapiens,” *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 14 (1) (2000), and Rosemarie Nagel, “Unravelling the Guessing Games: An Experimental Study,” *American Economic Review* 85 (5) (1995).

²⁴ The RAND Corporation used game theory, under the supervision of Robert McNamara to develop the concept of Mutually Assured Destruction. Indeed, game theory was largely developed by the RAND Corporation because of the Cold War security imaginary, which made such modelling appear to be important.

Moral philosophy's neglect of friendship informs the phenomenon's more general neglect by International Relations scholars. Writing in the 19th century, Freidrich Nietzsche commented that the Greeks "are the first, and thus far the last, to consider the friend as *a problem worthy of solution*."²⁵ This absence can be primarily explained by two things: the rise and dominance of deontology and consequentialism within modern moral philosophy and the relegation of legitimate friendship from the "public" to the "private" sphere.²⁶

This idea that all humans should be treated as equal is present in the deontic impartiality implied by both major branches of normative ethics: deontology and consequentialism. Kant's categorical imperative demands that agents are treated as "ends in themselves" and does not allow for a consideration of one's own personal commitments. As a rule based system agents are supposed to impartially judge what they *ought* to do based on universalizable rules derived from the categorical imperative. Lying is always wrong, even if done to protect friends. Consequentialism does not permit agents to consider their feelings and affections when weighing up their actions. Given the choice between saving a friend from a fire and saving two people to whom an agent has lesser commitments, consequentialist theories demand an agent rescue the two.

In the introduction to an anthology of philosophical writings on friendship, Michael Pakaluk notes that "friendship seems to be difficult to justify morally; for this would seem to involve the odd if not impossible project of justifying partiality with impartial reasons."²⁷ Since

²⁵ Freidrich Nietzsche, *Human All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 143.

²⁶ Given that the etymology of philosophy is "love of wisdom" or "friend of wisdom," philosophy's failure to engage with the concept is hard to comprehend. Giorgio Agamben points out that "friendship is so tightly linked to the definition of philosophy that it can be said that without it, philosophy would not really be possible." *What Is An Apparatus? And Other Essays*, trans. David Kishik and Stefan Pedatella, (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2009), 25.

²⁷ Michael Pakaluk, ed., *Other Selves: Philosophers on Friendship* (Cambridge: Hackett, 1991), ix. Of course saying that impartiality is difficult to justify morally is not to suggest that moral philosophers working within the deontological or consequentialist school cannot make many excellent arguments to account for this. Indeed, the maxim "Honour thy Father and Mother" seems to counter the difficulty of universalizing partiality. Rather

friendship manifests in practices that favour the friend over non-friends, friendship complicates the principles of equality on which much of modern morality is based.

The perception of friendship as a malign influence on public life further encourages scholarly indifference on the subject. Elected officials suffer charges of corruption and cronyism if they favour their friends or use their office to further their friends' careers or interests. Judges recuse themselves from cases where they know the claimant or defendant because the law must be impartial. John Rawls's *Theory of Justice* (1971) follows Kant by developing the "veil of ignorance" thought experiment to determine his two principles where knowledge of relationships including friendships is omitted. Whereas in ancient Greece friendship was at the heart of public life, it has been relegated to the private sphere in modern society. However, the increasing awareness that the separation of "private" and "public" does not mirror how humans actually behave gives further impetus to those who seek to explore the philosophy of friendship. Politics and friendship cannot be divorced since friendship is intrinsic to identity. Friendship is political, even if this is an uncomfortable truth.

Those who draw on the ancient Greeks have the most success in accommodating friendship into a moral and political framework. Virtue ethicists rely on a non-normative conception of morality. What matters are the questions: How should one live? What sort of person should one be? Here there is room for friendship as a constituent part of the good life and as a foundation of civic participatory democracy. There are multiple discussions on friendship in ancient Greek philosophy. However, the most complete account of friendship is found in Books VIII and IX of Aristotle's *Nichomachean Ethics*. In his exploration of how men should live and of *eudaimonia*, Aristotle argues that "no one would choose to live without friends

the claim here is that the difficulty of accounting for partiality has contributed to friendship's neglect by moral philosophers who seek to exclude the character of agents in moral calculations.

even if he had all other goods.”²⁸ So friendship must be partially constitutive of the good life. He elucidates three types of friendship: utility, pleasure, and complete (or character) friendship. Utility friendship is found in doing things together and for the purpose of gaining certain goods for the Self, some friendships are based on what is useful and are not durable in the sense that when the impetus for utility is absent the friendship disintegrates. The same is true for those who choose friendship for love of pleasure. Both of these forms find the object of friendship in something external to the beloved person themselves. Complete friendship, however, finds the object of friendship to be reciprocated goodwill between virtuous people:

Complete friendship is the friendship of good people similar in virtue; for they wish goods in the same way to each other insofar as they are good, and they are good in their own right. [Hence they wish goods to each other for each other’s own sake].²⁹

Aristotle sees loving one’s friend as an extension of self-love: a friend is both *other* and *self* – a single soul dwelling in two bodies. Friendship exists between virtuous individuals where one regards the good of the other as an end in itself because of the character of the friend. Loraine Smith Pangle notes that: “In loving a friend as another self, one loves him both as other and as same.”³⁰ For Aristotle, complete friendship relies on equality (1158b13-28), which is brought about through shared virtue (1157b33-35) and reciprocity (1155b34) and is an important constituent of the good life. It is not possible for the young, the old and cantankerous, or between people of different social standing (including men and women). Friendship is found in loving the friend as an other self because of character, not because of capabilities and what the friend can do for/with the self.

Most accounts of friendship have drawn on Aristotle. Cicero took on Aristotle’s conception of a friend as another self in *De Amicitia*, where he suggests that even when the friend dies,

²⁸ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. Terence Irwin (Cambridge: Hackett, 1999), 1155a5.

²⁹ Ibid., 1156b6-10.

³⁰ Loraine Smith Pangle, *Aristotle and the Philosophy of Friendship* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 153.

the friend lives on in your heart. There is a profound melding of interests between self and other in which the concerns and interests of the one are in parity with the other. As friendship develops the two become ontologically intertwined. Within Christian theology Thomas Aquinas attempts, and largely fails, to reconcile an Aristotelian conception of friendship – friends as Other Selves – with Christian charity and universal love of God. Thomas Aquinas’s view in *Summa Theologiae* (that God is a friend of all rational agents) attempts to reconcile the love of God with the intensity of partial commitments within Aristotelian character friendships.

A major difficulty that Aquinas faces is that an alternative tradition of Christian theology sees these aims as fundamentally incompatible. Friendship troubles Christian ethics. “Love thy neighbour” is universal not specific, and the idea that individuals ought to pursue friendship is absent in Biblical teaching.

Let a poet search the New Testament for a word about friendship which could please him, and he will search vainly unto despair.³¹

God’s love is universal and selfless and love between friends is particular and selfish. There is an inherent inequality in friendship in that the Self demonstrates a preference for the company and welfare of a specified other. Though John 15:13 states: “Greater love hath no man than this, that he lay down his life for his friends,” the friends spoken of reflect the early Christian practice of referring to other Christians as “friend” in order to identify and acknowledge shared faith. The requirement to *lay down one’s life* reflects loving one’s friends precisely through a universal and self-sacrificial love (agápe not philía) for the Church and the communion.³² Søren Kierkegaard argued that the ethic of love thy neighbour

³¹ Søren Kierkegaard, “You Shall Love Your Neighbour,” in Pakaluk, *Other Selves*, 236.

³² In ancient Greek there are three words for friendship. *Eros* is physical and passionate love which exists between those who seek friendship for pleasure. *Agápe* is a spiritual love a form of selfless devotion found in the texts of the New Testament, which implies love without reason and without any thought for the self. It is

precludes friendship and exclusive love: “One’s neighbour is one’s equal. One’s neighbour is not the beloved, for whom you have a passionate preference, nor your friend, for whom you have a passionate preference.”³³ To love another above others goes against the spirit of Christianity, which provides another account of why moral philosophers have shied away from a detailed explication of its content.

Given philosophy’s silence, the moral problems of friendship and its everyday meaning are best and most frequently illustrated in literature, particularly epics. Homer’s *Iliad* emphatically represents a feature of friendship – its *intensity*. The love Achilles has for Patroclus is powerful, emotional, and violent. In response to Patroclus’ death, Achilles laments:

But now to me, thy wounds so wound me, and thy overthrow.
For which my ready food I fly, and on thy longings feed.
Nothing could more afflict me: fame relating to the foul deed
Of my dear father’s slaughter, blood drawn from my sole son’s heart,
No more could wound me.³⁴

Achilles mourning is extreme and all-consuming representing an extraordinary passion for his friend. This type of love between male friends is a constant feature of the discourses surrounding friendship in literature. Though ignored by moral philosophers, *philia* continued to have a prominent place in European literary conceptions of friendship. In Euripides’ *Iphigenia in Tauris*, the friendship of Orestes for Pylades is such that Orestes demands that he be sacrificed on the altar of Diana and Pylades sent back to Argos. Orestes’ aria from Gluck’s 1776 opera, *Iphigénie en Tauride*, demonstrates the centrality of friendship in virtuous and heroic action and the enduring impact of Greek images of friendship on European art and culture:

most often used to denote the love Christ had for humanity and the communion. *Philia* is the subject of Aristotle’s analysis. It is a form of love with reason – pleasure, utility and character.

³³ Kierkegaard, “You Shall Love Your Neighbour.”

³⁴ George Chapman, trans., *The Iliad of Homer* (Ware, UK: Wordsworth Editions Ltd., 2003), Book XIX 316-320.

I have given death to you.
 It wasn't enough that my murderous hand
 Had plunged the dagger into the heart of a mother,
 The Gods have reserved a new crime (infamy) for me:
 I only had one friend, I become his executioner.
 Gods! Go pursue me: Gods! Author of my crimes.
 From Hell, beneath my steps, open part-way the abysses
 Their torments will be too (sweet) kind for me!
 I have betrayed friendship, I have betrayed nature.³⁵

Orestes' lament that he has *betrayed* friendship and, therefore, betrayed nature reveals something about common understandings of friendship; it is somehow worse to betray your friends than those to whom one has weaker commitments. Orestes' grief at his friend's imminent sacrifice to Artemis closely resembles the intensity of Achilles' mourning. There is violence in the extraordinary partiality demonstrated by Achilles for Patroclus and by Orestes for Pylades. In the *Iliad*, it justifies and spurs on the desecration of Hector's body and in *Iphigenia*, Orestes' desertion of his mission from Apollo.

This understanding is seen also in Shakespeare's tragedies. The friendships between Hamlet and Horatio, Banquo and Macbeth, all share this intensity and open both this possibility of violence and betrayal. In his play *Timon of Athens*, the wealthy Timon showers gifts on his friends, who all turn their backs on him the moment his generosity leads to his destitution. His confidence that: "you shall perceive how you mistake my fortunes: I am wealthy in my friends," proves folly – demonstrating the dangers inherent in mistaking flattery for friendship.³⁶ Though Timon is much aggrieved, this problem play is as much a critique of his mistaken beliefs as it is about his friends' failure to reciprocate.

³⁵ Orestes' aria from Christoph Gluck's *Iphigénie en Tauride* text of song *Dieux qui me Poursuivez*:
 Je t'ai donné la mort. Ce n'était pas assez que ma main meurtrière Eût plongé le poignard dans le cur d'une mère, Les Dieux me réservaient pour un forfait nouveau: Je n'avais qu'un seul ami, je deviens son bourreau. Dieux! qui me poursuivez; Dieux! auteurs de mes crimes. De l'enfer, sous mes pas, entrouvrez les abîmes! Ses supplices pour moi seront encore trop doux! J'ai trahi l'amitié, j'ai trahi la nature.

³⁶ Karl Klein, *William Shakespeare's Timon of Athens* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), Act II Scene II.

Friendship is not something you can have with many different people. “Friendship discourses,” note Laurie Shannon, “themselves depend upon such likenesses being rare, even anomalous and bizarre, celebrating it as a wonder or a marvel.”³⁷ Michel de Montaigne described the friendship he had with Étienne de la Boétie as one that was only likely to come about every three centuries.³⁸ In Gore Vidal’s *The City and The Pillar* (1947), Jim believes his love for Bob is somehow special and unique: “he was the only one who had done what he had done and felt the way he did.”³⁹ He views Bob as his “twin,” and the love he experiences (though also sexual) represents the elements of *philia* and a Greek conception of seeing the self in the other. Literary conceptions of friendship hold it to be rare, non-universal, violent in its intensity, and opening up the possibility of betrayal.⁴⁰

Aristotle seems to have been aware that friendship, as an ideal type, is either impossible or so rare as to make it unobtainable. The demands of friendship Aristotle sets out are reciprocity, equality and similarity of virtue, yet he admits that “friendship seems to consist more in loving than in being loved.”⁴¹ Even in the intense friendships between Orestes and Pylades and Achilles and Patroclus, one actor’s love for the other appears greater. Though Aristotle makes many interesting points about the importance of friendship for the successful operation of the *polis* and its distinction from its pleasure and utility variants, Aristotle’s conception does not fully capture reciprocity and tends towards narcissism – in loving the friend as an other self, friendship becomes self-love. The content of the relationship *between* the agents is underexplored. The reciprocity condition is absent (or idealized) and it is possible and better to love than to be loved. All Aristotle can say is that friendship (as a relation *between* other

³⁷ Laurie Shannon, *Sovereign Amity: Figures of Friendship in Shakespearean Contexts* (London: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 21.

³⁸ Michel de Montaigne, *Of Friendship*, in Pakulak, *Other Selves*, 187-199.

³⁹ Gore Vidal, *The City and the Pillar* (London: Abacus, 1997), 64.

⁴⁰ These are all qualities of friendship, rather than differing definitions. Friendship is “where Y come to see itself in X” and it manifests in “Y habitually treating X better than not-X.”

⁴¹ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1159a27-1159b3. Aristotle comments that a mother who gives up her child can be satisfied through loving the child from afar.

and self) is an intense feeling of closeness and similarity towards felt by X towards Y, because X imagines Y as similar in virtue. Having friends may make life worthwhile and be an important constituent part of the good life, but it remains unclear how the relationship transforms both parties and how true reciprocity is achieved.

The Greeks, however, had a competing conception of friendship. The Aristotelian conception of *philia* must be contrasted with a different conception friendship, *philoxenia* – hospitality. Whereas *philia* is seen as bonding citizens in the *polis*, Epicurus believed the social structures of the *polis* damaged friendship. True friendship lies instead in friendship towards strangers and foreigners. It exists outside of the political structures of the city in the philosophical commune of “the garden.” It is not a concept limited to male, adult, citizens, as Aristotle believed; rather, it is open to all regardless of gender, age or social standing (slaves are included). Since the garden is outside of the politics of the city, political structures and social norms are irrelevant to true friendship. Rather than a similar/difference binary, the distinction is based on treatment: hospitality/hostility. Friendship is revealed in the manner one treats those to whom one has no external obligation (i.e. citizenship), not unlike the famous line:

If I had to choose between betraying my country and betraying my friend I hope I should have the guts to betray my country. (E. M. Foster “What I believe”).

For Aristotle such a choice is false as friends necessarily share common projects – in particular love of country (or community). Leela Gandhi describes a choice between “two historically parallel (rather than successive) regimes of western political thought, deriving from the opposed poles of sameness (communitarianism, the polis, regimes of security) and difference (hospitality, exile, risk).”⁴² Whereas Aristotle saw hospitality as an example of utility friendship, Jacques Derrida uses the notion of hospitality and radical openness to find a

⁴² Leela Gandhi, *Affective Communities: Anticolonial Thought, Fin-de-Siècle Radicalism, and The Politics of Friendship* (London: Duke University Press, 2006), 30.

means of describing the relationship *between* other and self. He criticizes the Aristotelian notion of friendship on two counts: First, it limits friendship to male citizens:

The model of [Aristotelian] friendship is a friendship between two young men, mortals, who have a contract according to which one will survive the other, one will be the heir of the other, and they will agree politically...Which excludes first of all friendship between a man and a woman, or between women, so women are totally excluded from this model of friendship: woman as the friend of a man or women as friends between themselves. Then the figure of the brother, of fraternity, is also at the centre of this canonical model...Brotherhood, fraternity, is the figure of this canonical friendship.⁴³

For Derrida friendship cannot be limited to only a small number of individuals within that state as that makes it a conditional relation. Aristotle's preclusion of friendship from women and children is particularly problematic. Aristotle believed that "the cause of friendship between young people seems to be pleasure" (1156a32) since the young are mainly driven by feelings. Friendship between women and men was also never possible since proper character friendship cannot survive great differences in social standing.⁴⁴

Second, Aristotelian friendship lives only as an ideal-type in the realms of future possibility. The *telos philia* is an unachievable end, precisely because, as Aristotle admits, it is possible, indeed it may only be possible, to love asymmetrically. "[Aristotelian] friendship," Derrida argues "is never a given in the present; it belongs to the experience of waiting, of promise or of engagement. Its discourse is that of a prayer, and at stake there is what responsibility opens to the future."⁴⁵ In assessing friendship and hospitality, Derrida is trying to pin-point the relation *between* other and self, *between* active and passive – *amiance*.⁴⁶ He believes it is only by determining the nature of the relationship between agents that friendship can be properly

⁴³ "Politics and Friendship: a conversation with Jacques Derrida," hosted at the Centre for Modern French Studies University of Sussex, 1 December 1997.

⁴⁴ Aristotle discussed friendship in the family – including between husband and wife in Book VIII Chapter 12. He argues that friendship in marriage is one of utility and pleasure.

⁴⁵ Jacques Derrida, "Politics of Friendship," *American Imago* 50 (3) (1993).

⁴⁶ Jacques Derrida, *The Politics of Friendship* (London: Verso, 2005), note 5, 24-25.

assessed. Since reciprocity is the unachievable ideal of the Aristotelian conception, the most Aristotle can claim is that the friend is the *selfsame* – a passive agent (the loved) in whom the active participant (the lover) sees themselves – a narcissist construct, embodying self-love.

Where *philia* allows for the prioritization of the interests of the friend, even if to the detriment of all others, the principle of hospitality “demands, it even creates a desire for, a welcome without reserve and without calculation, an exposure without limit to whoever arrives.” It makes welcome non-conditional.⁴⁷ Derrida notes, however, that this form of relation between self and other is not necessarily a positive one and seeks to explore whether friendship mitigates the demands of hospitality. The complete and unconditional welcome that is necessitated by pure and absolute hospitality “requires that I open up my home and that I give not only to the foreigner, but to the absolute, unknown, anonymous other, and that I *give place* to them, that I let them come, that I let them arrive, and take place in the place I offer them, without asking of them either reciprocity (entering into a pact) or even their names.”⁴⁸ You love your friends, in some sense, before you meet them, as Montaigne claims he did with Etienne. The relation between self and other is “an interruption of the self.”⁴⁹ The self is required to become hostage to the other, in that the self – for friendship – must welcome the stranger without condition. Derrida comments that:

This logic calls friendship back to non-reciprocity, to dissymmetry or to disproportion, to the impossibility of a return to offered or received hospitality: in short, it calls friendship back to the irreducible precedence of the other.⁵⁰

Derrida refers to this situation as “mad.” However, in seeing friendship in complete hospitality to others, the giving over of the self to the other – true friendship (*a relation between self and other*) – emerges. Friendship thus finds itself caught between two traditions:

⁴⁷ Jacques Derrida, “The Principle of Hospitality,” *parallax* 11 (1) (2005): 6-9.

⁴⁸ Jacques Derrida, *Of Hospitality* (California: Stanford University Press, 2000), 25.

⁴⁹ See Mark Westmoreland, “Interruptions: Derrida and Hospitality,” *Kritike* 2 (1) (2009).

⁵⁰ Derrida, *Politics of Friendship*, 63.

either an ideal-type, existing only in the future as the *telos philia* (the friend a narcissistic construct) and the friendship as equal and unconditional hospitality to strangers embodied in Epicurean *philoxenia* and radical openness – putting the unknown other before the self. Such a choice of traditions – the narcissism of the selfsame on the one hand and the slavery of radical openness on the other – may be unappealing, but both have important lessons for the study of amity.

Friendship in International Politics

Finding a substantive basis for amity has proved a daunting task for those scholars who have attempted it. Not only is it undervalued as an enterprise, but friendship, as we have seen, is a difficult concept to explicate. Carl Schmitt's concept of the political centred on the friend-enemy distinction. "The specific political distinction on which political actions and motives can be reduced," he argued, "is that between friend and enemy."⁵¹ His work is, however, incomplete: while he spends numerous pages devoted to the necessity of enmity and enemies; he fails to give equal weight to amity and friends.

Who then are Schmittian friends? For Schmitt the possibility of death and killing is always present in the international sphere and "the distinction of friend and enemy denotes that utmost degree of intensity of a union or separation, of an association or disassociation."⁵² Schmitt's friends, therefore, are in an intense association in a world where death is a constant possibility. A friend is an international actor willing to risk its dissolution and eradication for the purpose of aiding another in its endeavours. There must, then, be some form of a mutual project for which one should risk death and kill. In assessing Schmitt's conception of friendship, Gabriella Slomp convincingly argues that Schmitt would have chosen a "true" or

⁵¹ Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, trans. George Schwab (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 26.

⁵² Ibid.

“existential” version of friendship – “it is an existential bond between agents struggling to establish their political identity.”⁵³ In international politics, a friend becomes both crucial to the identity of the active state and part of a process of change in which state identity is transformed and stabilizes. When America befriends X, American identity stretches to incorporate the subject position “friend of X,” and the associated behaviours (acting partially towards X) become part of the habitual performance of state identity.

There are two reasons why Schmitt’s conception of friendship should be rejected. First, for Schmitt, amity necessarily entails the existence of enemies, but “there is nothing to suggest that identification with some necessarily entails hostility to others, or vice versa.”⁵⁴ The need for friends does not necessarily stem from the politics of enmity. Secondly, the notion that friendship that involves *dying and killing* for the friend is the only means of the friend having a profound influence over an agent’s identity is to overstate the case. Friendship can exist even in the absence of a willingness to die and kill. Slomp contrasts Schmitt’s view with that of Michael Oakeshott who argues:

[A friend]...is someone who engages the imagination, who excites contemplation, who provokes interest, sympathy, delight and loyalty simply on account of the relationship entered into. One friend cannot replace another...*the relationship of friend to friend is dramatic nor utilitarian; the tie is one of familiarity, not usefulness; the disposition engaged is conservative, not ‘progressive’.*⁵⁵

Oakeshott’s conception of friendship also allows for its transformative effects through shifting the identity of at least one of the agents – the one who is *engaged, excited, interested, and delights*. The irreplaceability of the friend is fundamental. Friendship is not utilitarian and it is not engaged in by agents seeking something external to the welfare of the other and

⁵³ Gabriella Slomp, “Carl Schmitt on Friendship: Polemics and Diagnostics,” in King and Smith, eds., *Friendship in Politics*, 91.

⁵⁴ Graham M. Smith, “Friendship and the World of States,” *International Politics* 48 (2011).

⁵⁵ Cited in Slomp, “Carl Schmitt on Friendship,” 95. Emphasis in original.

the health of the relationship between them. The friend is irreplaceable because of their (imagined) character.

A more promising way in which International Relations theorists have attempted to incorporate friendship into the field is by considering Heidegger's conception of anxiety. On Heidegger's account, friendship is necessarily an *intimate* relationship that involves the partiality of the agents, where anxiety is overcome through the creation of stable relations.⁵⁶

Felix Berenskoetter views friendship as an "anxiety-controlling mechanism" that is fundamental in the state's process of *becoming*. This conception is, in fact, very close to the performative conception of state identity put forth in the preceding chapter. This thesis agrees the state is in a constant state of becoming, and finds a settled identity through activities like engaging friends and in repeating associated behaviours and actions.

Berenskoetter provides a compelling account of how states are transformed through their friendships and the importance of intimacy in creating a sense of belonging. However, this account does not resolve the problem of the relationship *between* other and self. The state is transformed through its friendships, but the "unique logic of reciprocity" that is highlighted – doing something for the friend cannot be seen as an exchange – does not reduce the problem of asymmetry. Berenskoetter's account ties friendship to the development of mutual projects, examples given are "the Anglo-American attempt to design the 'Western world' and the German-French attempt to do the same with 'Europe'."⁵⁷ However, again this makes friendship dependent on a set of objectives external to the relationship and fits more neatly with Aristotle's conception of utility or pleasure friendship. "Projects" make it difficult to draw a distinction between the 1960s US-Iranian "special relationship," the ongoing US-Saudi Arabian "special relationship" and the US-Israel "special relationship." However, this

⁵⁶ Felix Berenskoetter, "Friends, There are no Friends? An Intimate Reframing of the International," *Millennium* 35 (3) (2007).

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 672.

thesis argues that the US-Israel “special relationship” was constituted differently and has different political consequences: enabling unconditional and uncritical support that goes beyond securing goods or projects external to the welfare of the friend.⁵⁸

It would seem likely that amity would resemble *philoxenia* – love for guests and foreigners – rather than *philia* since it involves ties beyond the sovereign state. In *Perpetual Peace* (1795), Kant’s third definitive article is “the rights of men, as citizens of the world, shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality.”⁵⁹ Conceiving friendship as hospitality means that it would indeed undermine state sovereignty and amity could be portrayed as a malign influence on the national interest. Indeed, those who critique amity as a basis of foreign policy do just that since they determine the state’s true interests and see friends as at best distractions and at worst severe detriments to foreign policy.⁶⁰ Derrida’s conception of *amiance* does not, however, mirror either the inter-personal or the inter-state friendships that are explored here. Universal welcome ties into a conception of international politics that is fundamentally friendless: one in which solidarism and universal maxims apply to every state and one in which sovereignty and the pursuit of “national interest” ceases to be.

An Aristotelian conception of character friendship mirrors how international friendships are imagined and how this imagining constitutes reality. In international politics, friends are few in number and treated with extraordinary benefits which include: support in international

⁵⁸ Transposing the difference between Aristotle’s conception of pleasure and utility friendship to the international level between states is not clear cut. Since both understandings have their object in something external to the relationship. For Aristotle in pleasure friendship “they like a witty person not because of his character, but because he is pleasant to them” and utility “they are fond of a friend because of what is good or pleasant for themselves.” (Book VIII, chapter 3). It is not, therefore, self-evident that the US-Saudi Arabian relationship, for example, falls neatly into one of these conceptions or the other. America has specific (constructed) interests that are served by the existence of such an alignment, which are not eternal (a utility perspective), yet also gains prestige and power in having such an alignment (a pleasure conception). What is clear is that this type of relationship does not fall under an understanding of character friendship where the friendship has no object external to it.

⁵⁹ Immanuel Kant, *Perpetual Peace* (UK: Filiquarian Publishing, 2007).

⁶⁰ This is the argument put forth in Samuel P. Huntington, “The Erosion of American National Interests,” and Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration*, chapter 2.

forums; provision of aid and other resources; and general deference. Unlike Kantian conceptions of perpetual peace, amity in international politics is partial not universal. Though this special treatment may be partially justified on the basis of cost/benefit analysis and projects, the *unconditional* level of support offered is far more frequently justified on the basis of friendship, since benefits are not demanded. Support is facilitated by the character of that other, not because of some greater good secured as an exchange. In addition, friendships are intense as dissenting voices are marginalized since to fail to support a friend is to undermine one's own identity: hence, support is often given *uncritically*.

Friendship also does not necessarily weaken the state and its sovereignty, as support for the friend becomes ontologically inseparable from state identity. Indeed, having friends may in fact strengthen the state since friends form the bonds of community which secures an identity. In *How Enemies Become Friends* (2013), Charles Kupchan offers a Figure showing "The Logics of International Politics, International Society, and National Politics."⁶¹ In this he includes four thinkers (Hobbes, Locke, Deutsch, Weber) and eight organizing principles (Anarchy, Balance of Power, Hegemony, Contingent Co-operation, Rapprochement, Security Community, Federal Union and the Unitary State). This thesis contends that he is missing: a logic (international community); a thinker (Aristotle); and amity as a source of order. Amity in international politics resembles an Aristotelian conception and falls between security community and federal union. Friendship does not involve betraying one's own country, as the interests of that country have already expanded to include supporting friends. As such, it does not facilitate union, but rather a partial concern with the welfare of a separate other.

Amity resembles Aristotle's notion of *Other Selves* in two significant ways: similarity of virtue and similarity of characteristics. These serve to level hierarchy and confer equality on

⁶¹ Charles Kupchan, *How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace* (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 18.

friendship. Unlike other relatively agreeable international relations, friendship serves to equalize material differences, reducing, in some limited circumstances, the social place of hierarchy. Categorizing others as “friends” naturalizes as the discourses of similarity become embedded in common sense. This begs the question: similarity of what? Others, categorized as friends, are represented as possessing virtues that are presupposed to be virtues of the categorizing state. These include, *inter alia*, courage, wisdom, charity, truthfulness and rationality. These tie to another set of vital representations: international friends are both gendered as male and cast as mature, or rather predication endows friends with attributes that are presupposed to be masculinized and mature qualities.

Aristotle believed that friendship was achievable only between virtuous, adult, free, male citizens. The function of representations of difference in international affairs mirrors this understanding. In representing enemies, those who speak for the state tend to feminize adversaries. The Cold War representations of communism in American discourses were invariably tied to a feminization of the enemy. A latent homosexuality that stood in opposition to a particular kind of masculinity that was performed through the practices of American foreign policy meant that: “Communists and other ‘undesirables’ were linked through feminization, and indicated by the abusive term *pinkos*.”⁶² Radical othering frequently emerges from portraying enemies as “sick,” “dirty,” “sneaky,” and also feminine.⁶³ Where enemies are imbued with qualities presupposed to be femininity, friends are masculinized by those who speak for the categorizing state, described as “stalwart,” “brave,” “rational,” and other gendered descriptors.

⁶² Charlotte Hooper, *Manly States: Masculinities, International Relations and Gender Politics* (New York; Chichester: Columbia University Press, 2001), 86. For literature on the role of gender in international relations see, in particular, J. Ann Tickner, *Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), and Jill Steans, *Gender in International Relations: Theory, Practice, Policy* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013).

⁶³ Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (London, Penguin, 2003), 311-316.

Gendered categorizations play a significant role in distinguishing friends and allies. In *Gendered States*, V. Spike Peterson assesses the inherent appeals to gender embodied in the “protector role” that the United States is (re)constituted by in relation to certain allies:

The protector-protected role [is] powerfully gendered. Protector-protected roles are embedded in constructions of masculine autonomy (freedom, control, heroics) and feminine dependency (passivity, vulnerability, women as adored but also despised). Cast in this fashion dependency is demeaning, a status indicative of subordination and one shunned by the free man – by the political man in Aristotle’s terms.⁶⁴

Latent feminizing and infantilizing discourses constitute certain dependent and protected allies. Masculinizing and maturing discourses constitute equal friends: imagined virtue, fraternity and brotherhood are part of amity. As shall be seen the modes of representation through which the friend category stabilizes are overwhelmingly masculinized. Friends are “brothers in arms,” mirroring American conceptions of itself as “tough,” “brave,” “resolute” and other predicates, which are associated as manly virtues.

Friends are virtuous. It is through these bonds of virtue that a relationship resembling Aristotelian equality comes about. Equality of capabilities, power, and prestige cannot be the basis for international friendship, since that makes friendship a conditional relation. Though power differentials exist, friends stand in affective equality in their relations because of this linking by similarity of virtue and character. This is of particular significance when assessing America’s friendships. From an empirical perspective, utilizing conventional international relations understandings of power, all of the relationships highlighted in this thesis, as relations between virtually any state and the US, are very unequal. America has a far greater material power than its friends “Britain,” “Israel,” and “Western Europe,” but representations of these others as similar (placing them in the subject position “friend”) serves to level the hierarchy of the relationship as it complicates treating them like less powerful allies.

⁶⁴ V Spike Peterson, ed., *Gendered States: Feminist (re)Visions of International Relations Theory* (London: Lynne Rienner, 1992), 54.

Friendship is about character not capabilities. The character of “friends” makes certain actions, which can be contemplated when dealing with “allies,” unthinkable. Hence, discourses of friendship foreclose hegemony and relations of hierarchy based on capabilities.

Amity exists where a *state comes to see itself in another*. Following Aristotle’s conception of the friend as *Other Self*: it is partial – a state prioritizes friends, giving sustained support and taking on extra commitments to its friends; it is rare – a state cannot have many friends; it is intense – opening up greater possibilities for betrayal and acts of violence; it is intimate – there is a particular closeness put forth in discussions of the other state; and it is based on virtuous character – and virtue serves to equalize differences in capabilities.

In exploring friendship it has been argued (1) that friends and allies are qualitatively different categorizations that facilitate and foreclose different forms of behaviour from the casting state, (2) amity is best explored through an Aristotelian (and communitarian) conception of *Other Selves* rather than through Epicurean ideas of unconditional welcome, and (3) in international politics, state identity can be effectively stretched to incorporate understandings that others are friends without constituting or necessitating a full union between the two. We are left, however, with two elements of friendship that are yet to be assessed in detail: the process through which one state befriends another and the relative stability of the friendship frame of reference. The next and final theoretical chapter explores each of these in turn before setting out a methodology for the empirical assessment of American amity.

Chapter 3: Amitization

Friends, like enemies, are not discovered; they are made. Casting the subject position “friend” is a long run process: one instance of articulation does not suffice. Rather, the “friend” is settled as part of an extended process by which an identity is stretched to incorporate close ties towards specified others and by which naturalized meanings are generated that characterize the other as *similar*.

This chapter explores how friendship emerges in international politics. Drawing on the logic of securitization, it argues that a process of amitization occurs through which policy makers and the public negotiate the construction of friendships. It then turns to the relative stability of amity’s constituting structures: the “special relationships,” “unbreakable bonds,” “eternal commitments.” These constructs are frames of reference that warrant action. International friendship comes about through the everyday understandings attached to these frames of reference, which remain nonetheless dependent on a constant, yet largely unreflective, process of casting. Finally, it provides a methodology for the empirical chapters that follow, arguing for critical discourse analysis of presidential rhetoric and popular culture, which enable the emergence and maintenance of international friendships.

Securitization and Amitization

The ability to define interests, enemies, and friends is a crucial capability in politics. A category of interests set out is a special commitment to support states in which America sees itself. Making friends is a complex process. Representations are articulated, repeated, and naturalized. General understandings that certain others are “friends” become part of a linguistically constructed reality. These modes of representation constitute frames of reference for future action and marginalize alternative modes of representation.

The “friend” is constituted through discourses of similarity. Some authors see similarity as a self-evident feature of international relations, particularly those who refer to the Democratic Peace. P. E. Digeser, for instance, argues that “international friendships are based either on military/economic advantage or on the character of the regime.”¹ Digeser’s account is one that construes the importance of some objective criteria of similarity: identity becomes a variable that explains states’ propensities to align and descriptions of similarity reflect a true meaning.² This thesis challenges this approach, positing instead that these apparently self-evident character similarities are, in fact, discursively constructed and dependent on representational practices. Indeed, the apparently self-evident nature of similarities of character shows that the performative is working. Judith Butler writes that “a performative “works” to the extent that *it draws on and covers over* the constituting conventions by which it is mobilized.”³ That many authors see character, and culture as obvious and not in need of further analysis and explication demonstrates, instead, the performative power of discourses.⁴

Supporting evidence for the tenuous and temporal nature of similarity of character comes, perhaps surprisingly, from Kenneth Waltz, who wrote that “a liberal democracy at war with another country is unlikely to call it a liberal democracy.”⁵ This was certainly the case in the period leading up to the First World War; policy makers in the United States ceased referring to Germany as a democracy around 1910. While Waltz was using such a remark to discredit those who maintain that similarity is an important source of order in peaceful relations, this thesis would claim that the use of language to represent another state as a democracy for a given audience is highly significant. Common understandings that another state has similar

¹ P. E. Digeser, “Friendship between States,” *British Journal of Political Science* 39 (2008): 324-325.

² On competing theories of language and representation, see Stuart Hall et al., *Representation* (Los Angeles: Sage, 2013)

³ Judith Butler, *Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex”* (Routledge: London, 1993), 227.

⁴ Authors such as: Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilization Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), and Niall Ferguson, *Civilization: the West and the Rest* (London: Allen Lane, 2011).

⁵ Kenneth Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” *International Security* 25 (1) (2000): 10.

institutions are crucial for amity, but it is those understandings, not the institutions themselves, which have political consequences. The “democracy” that underpins the democratic peace is a foreign policy discourse that enables certain policies to be seen as common sense and others as unthinkable.

Charles Kupchan’s, *How Enemies Become Friends* (2013) is an important attempt to incorporate understandings of friendship into the field. Kupchan’s understanding of friendship is different from that set out in this thesis in that he ties the concept concretely to the absence of war or the threat of war between two agents; in effect, it is an analysis of the development of security communities. However, in assessing the process by which “peace breaks out” between autonomous actors, he highlights the marginalization of friendship and peace as phenomena for enquiry. For Kupchan peace breaks out through a four stage process:

1. Unilateral Accommodation
2. Reciprocal Restraint
3. Societal Integration
4. Narrative Generation

Narrative generation is essential in how discourses of similarity become dominant. While the previous three stages are useful in assessing the diminution of enmity, narrative generation provides the basis for friendship and its associated behaviours. Kupchan writes that “using the discourse of community as a vehicle, the polities in question embrace a compatible, shared, or common identity and expectations of peaceful relations come to have a taken-for-granted quality, producing a sense of social *solidarity*.”⁶ While Kupchan points out the importance in the generation of narratives, this thesis seeks to go further and elucidate the dynamics of this process in detail. In addition, it does not look at both sides of the

⁶ Charles Kupchan, *How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 36.

relationship since the construction of the friend is unidirectional, coming about through a state identifying an other as similar.

Making friends is a long-term process: the friend subject position often takes decades to become common sense. The emergence of a friendship, furthermore, occurs in a similar way to how the Copenhagen School have conceived the construction of threats. Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde have argued that threats are determined in international politics through a process of securitization.⁷ This occurs when a political elite chooses to make an issue a security problem and articulates a “security speech-act.” If the “audience” (the general public) accepts this move, the issue becomes effectively securitized. Once an issue is effectively securitized, it becomes above politics, subjected to extraordinary measures: “‘Security’ is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics.”⁸ A security issue, since it poses an existential threat to a referent object, enables certain possibilities for action (and forecloses others) that political issues do not.

Securitization often occurs in response to specific events and situations. However, it also occurs in response to broader trends that are deemed concerning. Climate change, for example, is understood by many to be an obvious security problem. As evidence of significant shifts in weather patterns has been presented and (some) political decision-makers have chosen to articulate “security speech acts” in relation to the phenomenon, climate change has gained the status of a security threat for many individuals. As consensus is created that ecological disaster is imminent, the issue is depoliticized, framing all future decisions.⁹

⁷ See Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), and Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (London: Lynne Rienner, 1998).

⁸ Buzan et al., *Security*, 23.

⁹ Bruno Latour, “How to Think Like a State,” lecture given at the occasion of the anniversary of the Scientific Council for Government Policy, in 2007, accessed 8 April 2015, <http://www.bruno-latour.fr/node/357>.

This consensus legitimates extraordinary measures and limits the ability to pursue a policy (select options) that does not treat it as an existential threat.

In America, issues once thought unproblematic have been securitized fairly easily. When presidential candidates Barack Obama and John McCain spoke about “energy independence” as a security concern in 2008, they voiced their concerns against presuppositions about American identity and greatness, and common understandings about the dangers posed by dependence on Middle Eastern oil reserves. The fact that almost half of America’s oil and petroleum imports come from Canada was incidental to the debate, further demonstrating the importance of representations in constructing the “reality” of the world. Their solutions differed from “Drill Baby Drill” to a \$150 billion investment in clean and renewable sources.¹⁰ There was, however, wide agreement that something had to be done *urgently* because it had become a national security concern. These “speech acts” were articulated by elites, but to gain force they also had to be accepted by the audience by reflecting presupposed knowledge.¹¹

There are two main problems with Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde’s argument. First, they accept J. L. Austin’s notion of “performative utterances” without criticism.¹² Austin’s claim that certain utterances, such as “I name this ship” or “I bet you a sixpence,” “is not to *describe* my doing of what I should be said in so uttering to be doing or to state that I am doing it: it is to do it.”¹³ For Austin these are *performatives*, and securitization theory takes this to mean that when President Kennedy stated: “this urgent transformation of Cuba into an important strategic base – by the presence of these large, long-range, and clearly offensive weapons of sudden mass destruction – constitutes an explicit threat to the peace and security

¹⁰ Positions set out in the Addresses Accepting their Party’s Nomination.

¹¹ For a sociological account of the 2008 election, see Jeffrey C. Alexander, *The Performance of Politics: Obama’s Victory and the Democratic Struggle for Power* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

¹² J. L. Austin, *How To Do Things With Words* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976).

¹³ *Ibid.*, Lecture I.

of all the Americas.”¹⁴ The threat is constituted by the utterance. In fact, the threat is constituted through a combination of the utterance and common understandings about the “Cold War” and meanings that had already been attached to “Cuba,” “nuclear weapons,” and “the Soviet Union.”¹⁵ A set of presuppositions about “the Cold War” security imaginary provide the context for securitizing Soviet missiles on Cuba.

Although valuable, Austin’s assessment of the performative nature of illocutionary utterances is not the end of the story. The utterance is necessary, yet insufficient, to accomplish the act of securitizing. When elite rhetoric portrays another state as a danger to the United States, the utterance “cites and so reproduces an entire genre of performance.”¹⁶ Austin’s famous example of the “illocutionary ‘I Do’” of the marriage ceremony does not alone constitute the force of marriage. Following Judith Butler, W. B. Worthon points out that:

It is the construction of the text within the specific apparatus of the ceremony that creates performative force. The performance is not a citation of the text. The ceremony deploys the text – and much else – as part of an elaborate reiteration of a specific vision of social order.¹⁷

Just as the marriage utterance conforms to a set of practices associated with the regimes of heteronormativity, securitizing speech acts operate within a system of manifestly citational behaviour and cannot be separated from the bundle of practices that constitute “international relations,” “enemy,” and “the United States.”

Secondly, they further underestimate the importance of addressing how it is possible for the general public to willingly accept the performative utterances of policy makers. Since “successful securitization is not decided by the securitizer but by the audience of the security

¹⁴ John F. Kennedy, *Public Papers of the President (PPP)*, “Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Soviet Arms Build-Up in Cuba,” 22 October 1962.

¹⁵ See especially Jutta Weldes and Diane Saco, “Making State Action Possible: The United States and the Discursive Construction of ‘the Cuban Problem’ 1960-1994,” *Millennium* 25 (2) (1996).

¹⁶ W. B. Worthon, “Drama, Performativity and Performance,” *PMLA* 113 (5) (1998): 1097.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

speech act...Thus, security (as with all politics) ultimately rests neither with the objects nor with the subjects but *among* the subjects;” it is important to understand how the general public can incorporate these securitizing moves into their everyday understandings about the reality of the world.¹⁸ A securitized issue enables and precludes actions because it becomes taken-for-granted that discussing the issue without the signifier “security” is absurd. In short, the practices of securitization are constituted by elite articulations and everyday assumptions.

Consider the two following examples as failures of securitization: the “War on Drugs” and the threat posed to the United States by Venezuela under President Hugo Chávez. The use of illegal drugs is a major problem in the United States – over half of incarcerated Americans are serving time for drug offences. The term “War on Drugs” was first used publicly by President Richard Nixon in 1971.¹⁹ However, the notion that the drug problem constituted an existential threat to America that would justify the descriptor “War” came to the fore during the end of President Ronald Reagan’s second term and throughout the presidency of George H. W. Bush who had served as Reagan’s “point-man” on the issue.²⁰ The focus was especially on the supply of drugs from Latin America: vast resources were invested in curbing that supply.

Shortly before leaving office, President Reagan gave a radio address in which he stated:

I want all Americans to take heart. This war [on drugs] is not yet won, not by a long shot. But we’re doing better, and our nation is united against this scourge as never before.

Right now there’s a drug bill on Capitol Hill. It has passed the House but hasn’t even come up for consideration in the Senate, and time is fast running out. The House bill

¹⁸ Barry Buzan et al., *Security*, 31.

¹⁹ Richard Nixon, *PPP*, “Statement about Drug Abuse Law Enforcement,” 22 September 1972.

²⁰ See Webster Griffin Tarpley and Anton Chaitkin, *George Bush: The Unauthorized Biography* (Joshua Tree, CA: Progressive Press, 2004), chapter 20, “The Phoney War on Drugs.”

has many good and tough provisions that express our national commitment to five simple but powerful words. Those words are “zero tolerance” and “just say no.”²¹

In describing drugs as a “scourge,” Reagan directly appealed to the public to place pressure on the Democratic Senate in swiftly ratifying a Bill that would have reinforced the mandatory minimums and tough sentences for drug-use as well as supply that had been set out in the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act. References to the “War on Drugs” peaked in 1989.²² George H. W. Bush tried to reformulate the “War on Drugs” especially as an attempt to limit demand through education. That year he publicly uttered the phrase “War on Drugs” on 59 separate occasions. Contrast this to George W. Bush who mentioned it only four times in his two terms, indicating the rejection of this “war” as a serious security threat. In 2011, the descriptor was abandoned by the Obama Administration and a “Report on the Global Commission on Drug Policy,” whose membership included former Secretary of State George Shultz, declared that the global war on drugs a failure and the label counter-productive.²³

The failure of the “War on Drugs” is attributed to the failure to curb demand in the United States. It is clear that the supply-side policies and tough sentencing of the 1980s did not work.²⁴ However, the failure of policy makers to convince the general public that drug trafficking was, indeed, a significant security threat – a failed negotiation between the speech-act articulator and the audience – is also important. The “War on Drugs” failed because the elite speech acts were too much at odds with general notions of what constitutes “war” and of the dangers of drugs themselves. Everyday representations of drugs in the late

²¹ Ronald Reagan, *PPP*, “Radio Address to the Nation on Economic Growth and the War on Drugs,” 8 October 1988.

²² All references to “war on drugs” found at the American Presidency project <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/>

²³ Report on the Global Commission on Drug Policy, “The Negative Impact of the War on Drugs on Public Health: The Hidden Hepatitis C Epidemic,” May 2013, accessed 8 April 2015, <http://www.globalcommissionondrugs.org/reports/>.

²⁴ See Bruce M. Bagley and Juan G. Tokatlian “Dope and Dogma: Explaining the Failure of U.S.-Latin American Drug Policies” in *Neighborly Adversaries* Michael La Rosa and Frank O. Mora, eds., (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007).

1980s and early 1990s were not overwhelmingly negative.²⁵ The supporting assumptions necessary for elite speech acts to construct hostility were not taken-for-granted and so the articulations did not legitimate policies. Hence, the “War on Drugs” was destined to fail. Common sense did not support the securitization, remove drug policy from legitimate debate, or justify the extraordinary and expensive measures taken by the Reagan Administration.

Ole Wæver makes it clear that securitization should be undertaken sparingly, precisely because it is dangerous for too many topics to be taboo in a democracy.²⁶ America had an uneasy relationship with Hugo Chávez. Portrayals of Chávez as a radical socialist, an anti-American, and a supporter of terrorists (in his staunch alliance with Cuba) who sought to harm the United States, were common place. Both political cartoons and popular culture supported this image of an unpredictable and dangerous man. In an episode of *The Good Wife*, aired April 2011, Chávez was presented as an erratic figure happy to change laws in an instant with a comedic and unserious interest in Courtney Love.²⁷ Everyday understandings supported a cautious and even hostile confrontation against Chávez and his administration in Venezuela.

However, American policy makers were careful not to speak of Chávez as a security threat, although such a portrayal may well have been readily accepted by the majority of Americans, given everyday assumptions. On 11 July 2012, President Obama was asked by journalist Oscar Hara about the threat posed by Venezuela.

Oscar Hara – Are you worried about the alliance between Iran and Venezuela and Hugo Chávez?

²⁵ Peter Christenson et al., “Booze, Drugs, and Pop Music: Trends in Substance Portrayals in the Billboard Top 100 – 1968-2008,” *Substance Use and Misuse* 47 (2012) use content analysis to argue that “both alcohol and drugs were much more likely to be portrayed positively than negatively.”

²⁶ Ole Wæver, “Securitization and Desecuritization,” in *On Security*, Ronnie E. Lipschutz, ed., (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).

²⁷ *The Good Wife*, (2011) [TV Show] CBS, Season 2, ep. 20, “Foreign Affairs,” 10 October 2010.

The President – You know the truth is we are always concerned about Iran aiding any destabilizing activity around the globe. But overall my sense is that what Mr Chávez has done over the last several years *hasn't had a serious national security impact on us*....we have to be vigilant. My main concern when it comes to Venezuela is having the Venezuelan people have a voice in their affairs and you end up ultimately having free and fair elections which we don't always see.²⁸

Some commentators in the media – and also Obama's then presumptive opponent in the November election – warned that this rhetoric seemed to under-estimate a significant threat.

I was stunned by [Obama's] comments and shocked by them. This is Hugo Chávez who has invited Iran in, who has invited Hezbollah... The idea that this nation, this president, doesn't pose a national security threat is simply naive and an extraordinary admission on the part of this president to be completely *out of touch* with what is happening in Latin America.²⁹

However, when presidential statements regarding Venezuela are viewed over the period of the Chávez's presidency, Obama's position, that "Venezuela hasn't had a serious national security impact on us," is in fact consistent with that of George W. Bush and Bill Clinton. They have been careful in their choice of language regarding Venezuela; in part because they are aware how easy it would be to construe Venezuela as a threat and an enemy of the United States, which would warrant extraordinary measures and significant concern. Venezuela was notably omitted from the "axis of evil." Presidents are slightly "out of touch" precisely because extant resources enabled the construction of enmity. In the case of Chávez, ridicule breeds contempt and contempt enmity should the securitizing moves be made. The absence of securitizing moves by elite rhetoricians made the translation of Chávez into a significant security problem unlikely.

²⁸ Obama remarks, accessed 8 April 2015, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2012/07/11/obama_hugo_chavez_has_not_posed_serious_national_security_threat.html

²⁹ Mitt Romney's remarks, accessed 8 April 2015, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2012/07/11/romney_on_obamas_chavez_remarks_stunning_and_shocking.html

How then are friends made? This thesis argues that in much the same way as threats are constructed through a process of securitization; friends emerge through a process of amitization. Amitization occurs when elites articulate amitizing speech-acts that represent an other as a friend. These are made concrete by predication, portrayals of that other as having qualities that are presupposed to be qualities of the categorizing state: “good,” “virtuous,” “admirable,” and, most significantly, “similar” characteristics.

The label “friend” alone does not amitize: indeed few nations have not at one time or another been described as a “friend” or “friendly” by senior officials in the United States. Simply calling a state a “friend” does not construct a frame of reference. Rather, discourses of similarity amitize. Successful amitization occurs when the domestic audience accepts this mode of representation and believes their associated performances and behaviours, such as partial and favourable treatment, are justified. These speech-acts are neither true nor false but rather, they create the meanings out of which the world and American foreign policy become intelligible. Friendship depends on the willingness of decision makers to tie their state to another and on common conceptions of that state as one worth amitizing. These common conceptions are the result of images, characterization, and stereotypes that create a climate out of which policy comes to be seen as natural and desirable. It is not sufficient to look at elite rhetoric: it is as, if not more, important to elucidate how elite interpretations of others as “friends” are enabled by extant resources and readily accepted by the general public.

Policy change is enabled by shifting representational practices. The debate over gay rights has radically transformed in many countries over the past two decades. Sociologists have noted an enormous reduction of homophobia in schools across America. Between 1982 and 1991, the number of American teenagers who thought sex between same-sex people was always or mostly wrong was consistently around 80%. This has declined rapidly and is now

lower than 50%.³⁰ The decision to end Don't Ask Don't Tell and Obama's "coming out" in support of equal marriage was made possible by a swift shift in representations and resignification of "gay marriage" as "equal marriage." This attitudinal shift had come from a plethora of cultural sites – such as music, film, theatre, literature – that, in turn, have shifted the bundle of practices and discourses associated with homosexuality.


The everyday assumptions of a general public are frequently found by assessing popular culture. In analysing the relationship between US foreign policy discourses and *Star Trek*, Jutta Weldes has suggested that "state policy has a pervasive cultural bias and state action is made commonsensical through popular culture."³¹ In order to understand how state practices of securitization/desecuritization work, it is necessary to go beyond the elite texts and to look at the assumptions about that "threat" or "friend" that populate popular culture. Everyday stereotypes and characterizations of others profoundly influence the formation of American foreign policy. Tracing and understanding these presuppositions is just as important in understanding the categorization of other states as the official texts of foreign policy. Just as shifting popular representations of gay and lesbian characters have influenced generations of Americans into adopting a more tolerant attitude, so shifting images of other states, regions, and peoples create the climate for casting and (re)casting.

Securitization theory has a further important lesson for understanding the nature of casting international relations. Just as threats are constructed, so are friends and enemies. Just as security issues warrant extraordinary measures, so too do friends receive extraordinary privileges and enemies warrant extraordinary criticism. Figure 3.1 (below) demonstrates the effect of moving an issue from normal (contested) politics to security politics.

³⁰ "It's getting better," *The Economist*, 3 March 2012.

³¹ Jutta Weldes, "Going Cultural: Star Trek, State Action, and Popular Culture," *Millennium* 28 (1999): 119.

Figure 3.1: Areas of Contestation (Issue v. Securitized Issue)



Once an issue is accepted as a security issue all options considered are framed by the prior categorization as one that warrants extraordinary attention. Jenny Edkins has argued that this move is a further step in the direction of “depoliticization” since “when issues are ‘securitized’ they are even more firmly constrained within the already accepted criteria of a specific social form.”³² A securitized issue naturalizes, through discursive practices, what is widely accepted to be taken-for-granted behaviour. Similarly, amitization is best viewed as a step in the direction of depoliticization since the general acceptance of the friend subject position has the power to marginalize and silence critical voices.


The successful securitization of energy independence, for example, means that future energy policy needs to take place with background knowledge that certain policies, such as remaining a net importer of fossil fuels, are no longer acceptable. Contestation between policies takes place, but all the veto players in the foreign policy process have already accepted the “truth” that energy independence is in fact a “security issue.” As opposed to a political issue, a security issue poses an existential threat to a referent object, most often a

³² Jenny Edkins, *Poststructuralism and International Politics: Bringing the Political Back In*, (London: Lynn Rienner, 1999).

state. In securitizing an issue policy makers engage in a process that removes it from the realm of ordinary politics to the realm of extraordinary politics.

Amity, like securitization, removes the issue/other from legitimate debate. Amity and enmity function as a means of limiting and altering the options available to policy makers. Returning to the notion of options sets, the friend categorization limits the options available to policy makers by making certain options appear absurd and illogical. The zone of political contestation surrounding friends is diminished:

Figure 3.2: Areas of Contestation (Ally v. Friend)



As the friend subject position naturalizes, there is an alignment of the domestic sources of foreign policy behind that understanding. Public opinion, lobbies, congressional leaders, media outlets, and the executive branch can differ on how best to support a friend: but the subject position acts to marginalize those who would advocate unsupportive policies. Whereas the ally categorization allows for a broader discussion about whether and how support should be continued and what form that support should take, by casting a state into the subject position of friend the consensus is that a friend *ipso facto* is an other that ought to be supported.

Just as post-9/11 few Americans would argue that a terrorist attack on the United States homeland was not a security issue, few Americans would argue that certain others do not warrant special privileges. Both have been removed from the realm of “legitimate” debate. It is the silence and general acceptance of the subject positions assigned that provides order and continuity in American foreign policy. The practices of amitization then construct the “friend” and enable the effects, such as supererogatory support, by making unsupportive action unimaginable.

Maintaining Friendship

In order for friendship to be important in foreign policy practices, it is necessary to assess its relative stability and the potential for a resignification of “friend” as “not friend.” Judith Butler makes clear that such resignification is always possible, yet there is a compulsion to repeat actions which “echo prior action, and *accumulates the force of authority through the repetition or citation of a prior authoritative set of practices.*”³³ The foreign policy practices of friendship tend to be naturalized. The experience of the Soviet Union and the United States after the Second World War reveals how relations between states can shift. How can friendship be *maintained* in international politics?

At a news conference in 1978, President Carter was answering questions about foreign arms sales. One interlocutor asked, “will there be a class of countries that get special treatment?” to which Carter replied:

We have a certain small group of nations who, because of *long-standing historical commitments* of Presidents, Congress, and the American people, do have a special relationship with our Government.³⁴

³³ Butler, *Bodies That Matter*, 227, emphasis in original.

³⁴ Jimmy Carter, *PPP*, “The President’s News Conference,” 17 May 1977.

What then is a special relationship? Most analysis of this type of relationship has considered the Anglo-American alignment. The emphasis has often been on the inter-personal relationships between British Prime Ministers and American Presidents: Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt; Harold Macmillan and John Kennedy; Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan; and Tony Blair and George W. Bush. This has led to claims that a special relationship is epiphenomenal and is merely a *bonding* exercise through which prime ministers have sought to further their own interests, while restraining United States adventurism.³⁵ However, to view special relationships as the existence of close ties between leaders is to underestimate their importance in framing foreign policy decisions. The personal relationship between Gordon Brown and George W. Bush was not nearly as close, but there was no notable change in the relationship once Brown's predecessor stepped aside in 2007.

In much the same way, to view a special relationship as one that policy makers attribute importance is not sufficient for it to be conceptualized as a friendship. As argued in chapter 2, the practices of amicitization were not necessary to make the United States interested in a close alignment with West Germany and Japan during the Cold War. Similarly, the desire to keep foreign powers out of the western hemisphere did not depend on a form of friendship emerging between United States and Latin America. All alignments depend on constructed interests. "Long standing historical commitments" have to be presented and accepted as common sense, but not all alignments depend on discourses of similarity.

A "special relationship" or "unbreakable bond" is a discursive construct that rests on understandings that have become naturalized over time. A "special relationship" is a quasi-causal constituting structure that establishes warranting conditions that make certain actions (constituting effects) and beliefs unavoidable. These warranting conditions create order as

³⁵ Stephen Walt, *Taming American Power: The Global Response to American Primacy* (New York: Norton, 2005), 191-194.

they become referents for future interstate action. They posit well-defined relations, and their invocation enables America to prioritize friends over others.³⁶ Policy makers unreflectively support their friends – choosing them over others – because these structures are naturalized in everyday assumptions about how the world really is. A major feature of amity is a lack of critical debate about the continuation of such relationships. Voices calling for a reconsideration of the relationship are few and silenced, since the reality of the world is protected by the dominant discourses that enable its (re)production.

Understanding others as friends facilitates expectations of behaviour. Americans know their friends will behave in predictable and manageable ways when operating in international society. Americans know, for example, that Britain is unlikely to cease integrated intelligence sharing practices. Harold Wilson's decision not to join the United States in Vietnam was damaging precisely because Americans knew that Britain would support them. In the same way Americans knew that Israel would not use white phosphorous in Gaza in 2009. Indeed, crises in the relationship occur precisely because expectations about how friends behave are relatively settled. Behaviour that contradicts this knowledge requires a flurry of activity – or conspicuous inactivity – to reiterate the meanings that underpin such a relationship.

Constructivists argue about whether meanings created through the process of representation can ever be stable enough to constitute social facts.³⁷ Do special relationships exert coercive force on the actors external to their interpretation of them? On the surface, special relationships have the appearance of social facts: their durability indicates that the meanings attached to the arrangement are, indeed, relatively stable. In addition, it is hard to imagine

³⁶ Jutta Weldes, "Constructing National Interests," *European Journal of International Relations* 2 (3) (1996): 282.

³⁷ Emile Durkheim, *The Rules of Sociological Method*, ed. George E. G. Catlin, trans. Sarah A. Solovay and John H. Mueller (Glencoe: Free Press, 1962), 3. Durkheim expressed his belief that social facts "[consist] of ways of acting, thinking, and feeling, external to the individual and endowed with a power of coercion, by reason of which they control him." Wendt follows this conception, claiming that states themselves are best described as "self-organizing facts." See *Social Theory*, 73.

that the United States could easily disentangle itself from its extensive commitments to states that have come to be naturalized as friends, in part because friendships are usually bolstered by practices and institutions such as intelligence sharing and security guarantees.³⁸ On the other hand, core elements of the meaning of these commitments are constantly rearticulated because to do so is commonsensical. No relationship in international politics is permanent and reproducing subject positions is a process. An international friendship has to be *maintained* and this comes through a swift reproduction of the acts and articulations that (re)produce the relationship.

In assessing the Anglo-American special relationship, Janice Bially Mattern comments that in times of crisis, specifically during the British intervention in Suez in 1956, such a relationship can break: “The longstanding international order enjoyed between the US and Britain broke down into disorder during the Suez crisis, *but was quickly repaired*.”³⁹ In failing to inform President Eisenhower of the forthcoming collusion with the French and Israelis against Nasser, the British violated common American understandings about the nature of Anglo-American relations. Since identity is a relationship that is always in process, a certain degree of choice is involved in repairing a close partnership. As Mattern argues, “identity can (if the authors so choose) be re-produced in the midst of a crisis; from its dissolved state, it can be produced all over again as if starting from scratch.”⁴⁰ Though profitably highlighting the constant construction of order through representations of agents, Mattern’s argument could be clearer with regards to how swift this reproduction might be and how much agency those who speak for the state have. Reproduction was required; but with Anglo-American relations the transition from disorder to order is virtually guaranteed. Choice exists but choice is

³⁸ The creation of these institutions play a significant role in maintaining the bonds, but can be unmade should the discourses supporting these shift dramatically.

³⁹ Janice Bially Mattern, *Ordering International Politics: Identity, Crisis, and Representational Force* (London: Routledge, 2005), 16.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 17.

constrained by extant resources and a “compulsion to repeat” that is a constitutive effect of the friendship.

Reproduction takes multiple forms. The rearticulation of discourses of similarity that naturalized the subject position is important, but often the absence of public criticism is just as significant. President Eisenhower’s address to the nation on the Suez crisis was remarkably careful to avoid harsh criticism of Britain, France, and Israel who “have been subjected to grave and repeated provocations” by Nasser and have “grave anxieties.”⁴¹ Presidents Kennedy and Johnson never publicly voiced their private distain for President Charles de Gaulle even after he both withdrew from NATO’s integrated military command and publicly voiced his opposition to America’s policy in Vietnam: significantly, Johnson accepted de Gaulle’s opposition “more in sorrow than in anger.”⁴² Muted criticism is just as important for maintaining these relationships as the initial amitiizing rhetoric was in their emergence. Recategorizing Britain would require an interruption of discourse: a “challenge,” that is, to “what have, through discursive practices, been constituted as normal, natural, and accepted way of carrying on.”⁴³ Such practices are not easily reversed.

Noam Chomsky points out that a “reaction of silence or misrepresentation” has become the most insidious element of the US-Israel relationship, which involves a “unique immunity from criticism in mainstream journalism and scholarship, consistent with its unique roles as a beneficiary of other forms of American support.”⁴⁴ Israel’s bombing of the Osirak reactor in 1981 and the use of American-made artillery during the Lebanon War in 1982 (in violation of

⁴¹ Dwight D. Eisenhower, *PPP*, 282 “Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Developments in Eastern Europe and the Middle East,” 31 October 1956.

⁴² Lyndon B. Johnson, *PPP*, 273 “Remarks to the Delegates to a Conference of State Legislative Leaders,” 16 June 1966.

⁴³ Edkins, *Poststructuralism and International Politics*, 12.

⁴⁴ Noam Chomsky, *The Fateful Triangle: the United States, Israel and the Palestinians* (London: Pluto Press, 1999), 81.

the terms of their provision) caused private frustration in Washington.⁴⁵ However, there was no qualitative change in the nature of the relationship: indeed, two years later Reagan stated publicly that America would maintain “Israel’s qualitative military advantage” for the first time.⁴⁶ Perhaps even more surprising had been the silence that followed Israel’s attack on the *U.S.S. Liberty* in 1967, which President Johnson later described as a “heart-breaking incident” that “grieved the Israelis, as it did us.”⁴⁷ The attack caused bewilderment in internal deliberations and prompted a CIA-led investigation.⁴⁸ It was, however, ordered to be “smoothed over” in public.⁴⁹ Incidences of silence like that following Suez and the attack on *Liberty* are made possible by the naturalization of “friends.”

Figure 3.3: Comparable Rigidity of the Subject Position




Figure 3.3 demonstrates that whereas the subject position “ally” can readily change with time and circumstance, the “friend” is far more durable. The subject position is not permanent,

⁴⁵ Reagan’s diaries indicate his frustration with Israel. *The Reagan Diaries* (New York: Harper Collins, 2007), 24-5, Reagan writes that Menachem Begin “took wrong option” by preventively bombing the reactor, and in response to the massacres he simply writes: “The Israelis did nothing to prevent it.”

⁴⁶ Reagan, *PPP*, “Remarks Following Discussions with Prime Minister Shimon Peres of Israel,” 17 October 1985.

⁴⁷ Stephen Green, *Taking Sides: America’s Secret Relations with a Militant Israel 1948-67* (London: Faber, 1984), Lyndon Johnson, *The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-69* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1972), 297.

⁴⁸ *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) 1964-68*, Vol XIX, 212, 284, 319.

⁴⁹ H. W. Brands, *Into the Labyrinth: The United States and the Middle East, 1945-93* (London: McGraw-Hill, 1994) 119.

certainly: it is much easier, however, for a policy maker to respond to a hostile act by an ally by reconstructing the relationship than it is to resignify the friend when a friend behaves in a way that challenges everyday assumptions. This is because the zone of contestation has already been diminished. Lobbyists, public advocates, and policy makers who would support the breaking of ties have been marginalized, while those who remain prominent will most likely have bought into the “reality” that the amitized other is a friend. As a result, none of the veto players in the foreign policy process have the will or ability to challenge effectively the continuation of the relationship.

Reasonable expectations and meanings are created by amity’s structures. The taken-for-granted nature of the United States’ commitment to its friends does have power on United States decision makers, since it makes certain courses of action appear unavoidable. Such swift reproduction occurs because to act otherwise would be seen as deviating from the narrative, violating the frames of reference that make state action possible. Just as there is room for agency in the potential for resignification of an agent’s own identity, the “friend” can transform to “ally” or “enemy” through reinterpretations of the relationship. Such reinterpretations are, however, generally not forthcoming since to (re)cast the friend would subvert both a state’s own identity, as “friend of X,” and the settled practices that constitute such a relation. Performing friendship differently is the area where policy makers retain some agency, but performances are always bound by conditions of friendship.

The stability of amity’s structures concords with Judith Butler’s theory of performativity. Resignification is possible, yet unlikely given how gender is policed and promulgated. Given that in friendship an identity has been stretched to incorporate a close and partial tie to another international actor, the failure to reiterate the friendship discourse is a failure to confirm with a constituent part of one’s own identity. Though dependent on process, frames

of reference have force on policy makers and make action unavoidable since their rearticulation and repetition is virtually guaranteed and their existence is taken-for-granted by both policy makers and public. Amity acts as a relatively stable default position. Thus, the constitutive structure “friend” can account for the constitutive effects: sustained support.

Finding Friendships – A Methodology

Rhetorical Presence and the Rhetorical Presidency

The role of the president in the American system is poorly defined, with relatively few *de jure* powers. Though keen to get legislation passed, the president’s constitutional legislative powers are limited “to recommending laws he [sic] thinks wise and vetoing laws he [sic] thinks bad.”⁵⁰ Though commander-in-chief, the president cannot declare war: this depends on an act of Congress.⁵¹ Formal powers are buffered by what Jeffery Tulis has described as the “second constitution,” consisting of extra-constitutional institutions such as electoral primaries and the media.⁵² In *The Rhetorical Presidency* (1987), Tulis argued that since President Woodrow Wilson, a “new way” developed in the American system in which leadership is increasingly associated with interpretation.⁵³ Recognizing the constitutional limitations of the office and convinced that the Separation of Powers was “the central defect of American politics,” Wilson developed a presidential style of “leader-interpreter,” a role of

⁵⁰ Justice Hugo Black’s decision in *Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer*, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).

⁵¹ In practice presidents have used congressional deference to conduct an executive-led foreign policy and have concluded “executive agreements” with countries so as to by-pass the treaty-making power of Congress. Nonetheless, Congress has the potential power to nullify these through refusing to pass legislation. See James Lindsay, *Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), Stephen Weissman, *A Culture of Deference* (New York: Basic Books, 1995), and Harold Hongju Koh, *The National Security State: Sharing Power after the Iran-Contra Affair* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990).

⁵² Jeffery Tulis, “The Two Constitutional Presidencies,” in *The Presidency and the Political System*, ed., Michael Nelson (Washington, D.C: CQ Press, 1990), 85-115.

⁵³ Jeffery Tulis, *The Rhetorical Presidency* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), chapter 5.

which has grown over the last century.⁵⁴ The president has great *de facto* power to control the foreign policy agenda and to interpret and simplify the world for the American audience.

In foreign policy, presidents – buffeted by two constitutions – are empowered to side-step Congress and to appeal directly to the public using the Rose Garden Strategy to appear above partisan politics or to appeal directly through presidential addresses.⁵⁵ The vast majority of citizens do not gain knowledge through first-hand experience: “The ‘reality’ of politics,” argues Colleen Kelley, “is rarely constructed by the American electorate ‘first-hand’ but through mass communication, group interaction, and mediation by charismatic and/or credible individuals.”⁵⁶ Public statements can be used with great effect for both *justification* and policy *advocacy*, but language also constructs reality and the president is in a unique position to speak for the state.

Foreign policy gives presidents the resources to situate America in opposition to or in alignment with certain nations, objectives, or threats. This provides a sense of consistency and makes the interests pursued seem obvious. “Rhetorical power,” argued Tulis, “is a very special case of executive power because simultaneously it is the means by which an executive can defend the use of force and other executive powers and it is a power in itself.”⁵⁷ Articulating speech acts is not merely a means of *communicating* to the public, but also provides the major mechanism for reproducing meaning. Through interpreting the world, politicians are able to connect together and give meaning to disparate linguistic terms and are also able to posit America’s “subject-position” and (re)produce American identity.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 119.

⁵⁵ Keith Erickson and Wallace Schmidt, “Presidential Political Silence: Rhetoric and the Rose Garden Strategy,” *Southern Communication Journal* 47 (4) (1982).

⁵⁶ Colleen Kelley, *Post 9-11 Presidential Rhetoric: A Study of Protofascist Discourse* (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2007), 38.

⁵⁷ Tulis, *The Rhetorical Presidency*, 203.

The growth of the rhetorical presidency has increased expectations about the executive's ability to direct the course of American foreign policy. In their use of rhetoric, presidents have a great power to define issues to the public at large. Mary Stuckey argues that: "the dual process of inclusion and exclusion are enacted through presidential rhetoric; these processes are enabled through the institutional *definitional power*."⁵⁸ The growth of the media has furthered the importance of defining the world for the American public. However, presidents are naturally conservative: they are constrained, at least in part, by the codes of intelligibility and everyday understandings they inherit. A new American president would be unable, for example, to launch into a series of amityizing speech-acts about North Korea, because, like amity, enmity is embedded in common sense. A president is also tied to the contours of previous presidential statements – any statement refers back to other official texts, with which it can be compared, contrasted, and critiqued.

When assessing rhetoric, it is sensible to focus on the president: "more than any other participant in the national conversation, the task of articulating the collective culture, like the responsibility for managing the collective action, belongs to the president."⁵⁹ This is especially true in the foreign policy process. Although congressmen and high-profile figures can use the media to attempt to influence policy, the president is ultimately not just commander-in-chief, but also *interpreter-in-chief*. The apparent investing of all executive power in the person of the president creates a focal point for public attention. For this reason a major focus of this research is presidential speech-acts. The president is not alone in the national conversation, but the president does dominate it.

⁵⁸ Mary Stuckey, *Defining Americans: The Presidency and National Identity* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004), 4.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

Unpacking Common Sense

What is taken to be common sense varies between societies and time, as does what is regarded as obviously absurd or unthinkable. Representing the world with appeals to common sense is often self-fulfilling. Stuart Hall and Alan O'Shea note that when elites invoke common sense: "by asserting the popular opinion *already agrees*, they hope to produce agreement *as an effect*."⁶⁰ Such an account is essential for understanding casting: the process whereby certain modes of representations of others become so embedded within a society that they appear unquestionably true. Amitization tends to occur with both explicit and implicit appeals to the common sense, in which the "friend" naturalizes.

Unpacking common sense requires critical discourse analysis of the taken-for-granted ideas and everyday assumptions that cover over the conventions by which they were mobilized. By examining the residue of discursive practices through, for example, detailed textual analysis, critical genealogies can be traced of how certain representations become common sense.⁶¹ Norman Fairclough argues that "the analyst must draw upon her own Members' Resources (interpretive procedures) in order to explain how participants draw on theirs."⁶² There is some subjectivity in discursive studies and minimizing this is a significant challenge. "Complete objectivity," notes Walter McDougall, "about America is a characteristic only of God and Alexis de Tocqueville."⁶³ America remains an imagined community. As has always been the case, Europeans as well as Americans do this imagining and scholars writing on America from the perspective of "outsiders" must also wrestle with their own subjectivity.

⁶⁰ Stuart Hall and Alan O'Shea, "Common-Sense Neoliberalism," *Soundings: A Journal of Politics and Culture* 55 (2013), 8, emphasis in original.


⁶¹ Richard Price, "A Genealogy of the Chemical Weapons Taboo," *International Organization* 49 (1) (1995), offers an excellent summary of the means and importance of genealogies in the study of international norm development and specific constructions.

⁶² Norman Fairclough, *Language and Power* (Harlow: Longman, 2001), 138-139.

⁶³ Walter McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World since 1776* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997), 6.

Everyday representations intervene in the world by creating the codes of meaning through which decisions become intelligible. Some clearly intervene more than others because they are subject to mass repetition. An excellent example of discourse analysis in foreign policy analysis can be found in Lene Hansen's *Security as Practice* (2006). In building a systematic method for conducting discourse analysis, Hansen proposes the following research design:

Figure 3.4: Research Design



Hansen argues that critical discursive analysis must pin-point the referent object of study – which Self/Selves are being discussed. Hansen points out that it is also vital to highlight the time-frame being assessed and the number of events chosen.⁶⁴

Pursuing a discursive epistemology requires an intertextual approach that recognizes that texts do not exist independently of others. Presidential statements and style, for example, are often embedded in the past. Lee Spinks notes that “Bill Clinton’s repetition of the rhythm, as well as the rhetoric, of JFK’s speeches reduces ideological differences between himself and his audience by producing nostalgic feeling-tones and emotions in them which allow him to portray himself as a reincarnation of the spirit of ‘Camelot’.”⁶⁵ All texts gain power through referencing other texts. At the same time texts that are articulated in an official capacity can

⁶⁴ Lene Hansen, *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War* (London: Routledge, 2006), chapter 5, “Research Designs.”

⁶⁵ Lee Spinks, “Thinking the Post-Human: Literature, Affect and the Politics of Style,” *Textual Practice* 15 (1) (2001): 23.

be set against genealogies of cultural representations to explicate why certain texts are 1) articulated and 2) become naturalized – part of common sense.

Identifying the texts that should be analysed is another major challenge. Hansen sets out three models of intertextuality: the first model focuses on political leadership; the second considers the wider foreign policy debate; and the third focuses on cultural representations, including both popular and high culture as well as marginal or dissenting voices.⁶⁶ For the purposes of exploring amicitization, the first and third models are the most useful. Since amicitization is a negotiation between elites and public, public statements of the president (as interpreter-in-chief) should be explored whilst simultaneously assessing popular culture.⁶⁷ These include film, literature, poetry, biography, art, and travel-guides as well as documentary series like *National Geographic*.⁶⁸ Though often written, the texts of cultural discourse include political communications that are embedded in televisual images, music, and art.⁶⁹ These must not be neglected in unpacking common sense.

Public opinion polls are useful in determining some taken-for-granted presuppositions and stereotypes about others, and where they are available they supplement the study of discourses. However, for the purpose of this thesis polling data is insufficient for determining the existence of amity. Firstly, providing a genealogy of the cultural and linguistic sites out of

⁶⁶ Hansen, *Security as Practice*, 56-64.

⁶⁷ This is not to suggest that private deliberations are not important in framing foreign policies. Indeed, important work has been done on how commonplace understandings at the elite level frame and affect the policy-making process. Matthew F. Jacobs, *Imagining the Middle East: The Building of an American Foreign Policy, 1918-1967* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011), is an important assessment that traces how an informal network of academics, area specialists and business interests interpreted the Middle East in a way that lent coherence to America's foreign policy. However, private deliberations also occur against presuppositions that are best explored through the interplay of public and expressed elite attitudes. Elite articulations can be assumed to mirror this imagining, but only within the bounds and limits of discourses. Diaries and memos of private deliberations may reveal more precisely why certain discursive constructs are chosen. For example, expressions like "the arsenal of democracy" and "the unbreakable bond" were carefully chosen prior to their articulation. However, in order to flesh out the common sense it is sufficient to highlight those constructs rather than provide a detailed assessment of their origination in internal deliberations.


⁶⁸ Douglas Little, *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2003), uses *National Geographic* magazine to explore American attitudes towards the Middle East.

⁶⁹ Michael Williams, "Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics," *International Studies Quarterly* 47 (2003).

which discourses naturalize provides a more well-rounded assessment that does not presuppose a relationship between beliefs and behaviours. Secondly, for much of the period being assessed, polls are unavailable or sparse. *Gallup*, for example, was only founded in 1935 and so tracing American views of others before the Second World War requires a more imaginative approach that unpacks both popular culture and linguistic shifts. Even during the Cold War, polls were not particularly ubiquitous and so they are effectively supplemented by accounting for the modes of representations of other states that are cast as friends.

For the purposes of exploring amitization and the maintenance of the friend subject position, the following method is appropriate:

Figure 3.5: Research Design for Practices of Amitization



The four elements of this research design map neatly onto amitization in international politics. Though identity is stretched, stabilized and distinguished performatively, America constitutes a self as policy makers assess and categorize others. Since amity mirrors the Aristotelian conception, there is an irreversible order: “One must start with the friend-who-loves, not with the friend-who-is-loved, if one is to think about friendship.”⁷⁰ It is not necessarily reciprocated, and the state that does the *friending* should be the referent object of study. Since states represent friends as *Other Selves* – tracing how other states have come to be represented as similar is vital in understanding the development of friendships. Exploring

⁷⁰ Jacques Derrida, *The Politics of Friendship* (London: Verso, 2005), 9.

amity in American foreign policy does not necessitate an exploration of how “America” is amitized by its friends: since friendship is unidirectional so the number of selves is one.

The temporal perspective is continuous; starting at the point of awareness of the other that is amitized. However, since this thesis is primarily a study of how American friendships have been made possible, the discursive analysis focuses on the period prior to the friend subject position becoming common sense. The number of events of each friendship model is multiple as they include every interaction between America and the state that comes to be cast as friend, linked by amity’s structures. Amitization, as already argued, requires an assessment of both the official discourse and of the presuppositions embedded in popular culture and representations of otherness. Thus an intertextual assessment of official rhetoric and the texts of cultural discourse best account for the creation and maintenance of stable friendly relations between America and others.

Official texts are largely gauged from *Public Papers of the President*. This poses two problems. First, an assumption must be made that what a president says in public is transmitted readily and easily to the general public. Though today this is an unproblematic assumption, in a pre-radio era, this is not reasonable. This project, therefore, focuses on Presidential State of the Unions (annual messages to Congress) pre-1923 as well as looking at campaign literature for presidential elections as the most likely presidential statements to reach a wide audience. It includes radio addresses, such as Franklin Roosevelt’s “Fireside Chats,” for the period between 1923 and 1947. After 1947, it assumes that all presidential statements are readily available for transmission by mass media, though the focus remains on major public statements: Inaugurations, State of the Unions, and messages to Congress.

Second, it is important to recognize the influence that an intended or implied audience, such as an audience of foreign dignitaries, might have on presidential rhetoric. Though statements

of friendship are not unimportant if made in the presence of foreign dignitaries, they are certainly of greater importance if made in a Press Conference before the White House press corps, for instance, or in a published *Memoir* the primary audience of which is American and purpose is less likely to be one of flattery. Both sorts of statement are assessed, but where a statement of friendship is made before a national audience, it is prioritized and highlighted as of special significance in the naturalization process, especially pre-1947. Where statements are made to an audience of foreign dignitaries, how widely such statements were disseminated are traced by looking at the contemporaneous reporting in *The New York Times*, as the major Newspaper of Record throughout the 20th century.

The stereotypes and generalized images of others are revealed in widely spread and heralded books, films, and songs.⁷¹ Though by no means comprehensive, this thesis focuses on: acclaimed and award winning films; books (both non-fiction and fiction) that featured on various Best-Sellers lists; and songs that rated highly on the Billboard Charts.⁷² Where other cultural representations are selected, a justification for that selection is provided. In combination with opinion polls and elite statements, these sites provide the resources out of which amicitization can be assessed.

Case Selection


Selection bias is a significant problem in case study analysis. In order to demonstrate that amity is an important feature of international politics, it is necessary to explicate those relationships that seem most likely to be properly called friendships. Figure 3.6 (below) shows those states to which a “special relationship” has been attached most frequently by

⁷¹ The importance of these resources was appreciated throughout the Cold War. The CIA’s decision to fund the activities of the Congress of Cultural Freedom strongly implies the importance of popular culture in cementing the meanings that securitized the Cold War.

⁷² Bestsellers are available from *Publishers Weekly* from 1919 and *The New York Times* from 1935. A useful resource is Keith L. Justice, *Bestseller Index: All Books, Publishers Weekly and The New York Times Through 1990* (London: McFarland, 1998).

presidents of the United States. The graph shows that it is the relationships with Britain (with 31 references) and Israel (with 22) that stand out quantitatively. It is demonstrated that the distinguishing factor in both the Anglo-American and the US-Israel relationship is amity. Whereas United States-Mexican relations are complicated by immigration discourses and their neighbour status, and while United States-Latin American relations are clouded by the hierarchy implicit in the Monroe Doctrine, these relationships are justified as major referents of study by their reference as special.

Figure 3.6: Presidential References to “Special Relationship”⁷³



This thesis also assesses the discursive construction of America’s membership of the Atlantic Community, institutionalized in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This is

⁷³ Data collected from *The American Presidency Project*, accessed 8 April 2015, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/>.

perhaps more surprising as this thesis has hitherto highlighted the difference between alliance and friendship and suggested that friendships are distinct from, and prior to, Deutschian security communities. However, by doing comparison of the presidential articulations and extant resources surrounding America's major Cold War regional alignments, it can be demonstrated that the different origin, organizational culture, and operational system were guided by popular ideas of Euro-American similarity. Just as positive characteristics can be attached to other states, so too can they be attached to imagined regions. Not every country within NATO was amitized and sustained support was not offered to every member, but rather discourses of "Atlantic Community" were constructed that enabled a prioritization of European allies over other Cold War allies. Competing representations that America was part of a "Pacific community" or "Pan-American community" were marginalized. This depended on representations of Western Europe as an homogenous and similar other becoming common sense in America.

The naturalization of a mode of representation that emphasizes the similarity of "America" and *Other Selves* provides default frames of reference that make American foreign policy possible and intelligible. The amitization of "Britain," "Israel," and "Europe" has profound political consequences. The Anglo-American "special relationship," the US-Israel "unbreakable bond" and America's membership of an "Atlantic Community" (re)produce a certain form of US national identity. The particular constitution of these relationships (and attendant identities) is significant as they enable some forms of US policy action, while foreclosing others. As such, amity is of considerable interest to foreign policy analysts.

Chapter 4: Language and Likeness: “An English Speaking Brotherhood”

The most important fact of the modern world is that Britain and America speak the same language. (Otto Von Bismarck, 1891)

Shared language is neither sufficient nor necessary for amity to emerge in international politics, and does not guarantee cordial or even civil relations. George Bernard Shaw famously described Britain and America as “two nations divided by a common language” and the ardent American nationalist Noah Webster hoped and predicted that over the years British English and American English would become separate and distinct languages.¹ Indeed, in the 1829 Preface to *An American Dictionary of the English Language*, Webster keenly highlighted the differences between his work and Dr Benjamin Johnson’s dictionary, celebrating “the progress which the English language has made” over the preceding seventy years.²

However, language – as a system of signs and techniques for communicating and setting out discourses – was not incidental to the formation of America’s most cited friendship: embodied in its “special relationship” with Great Britain. The ability of British authors, newspaper columnists, and filmmakers to permeate the American imagination without the need for translation was important in the production of common sense and developing sentiments of solidarity with the British in the inter-war period. This form of cultural transfer, on-going throughout the 19th century with the popularity of Charles Dickens and Anthony Trollope, for instance, was of even greater significance with technological advances and improved literacy rates at the turn of the 20th century.³

¹ John Edwards, *Language and Identity: An Introduction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 220-223.

² Noah Webster, *An American Dictionary of the English Language* (New York: Harper Brothers, 1846), v.

³ Edward Gordon and Elaine Gordon, *Literacy in America: Historic Journey and Contemporary Solutions* (London: Praeger, 2003), 265 from Table 10.2. In 1870, 20% of children over 10 are illiterate; in 1920, it is 6%.

At a moment of tension, official discourse presented the understanding that Britain and America were somehow bound in closeness due to their common language. Addressing Congress on the Venezuela boundary controversy (1895) – the final instance of a president publicly raising the prospect of war between Great Britain and the United States – Grover Cleveland remarked:

I am nevertheless firm in my conviction that while it is a grievous thing to contemplate the two great English-speaking peoples of the world as being otherwise than friendly competitors in the onward march of civilization, and strenuous and worthy rivals in all the arts of peace, there is no calamity which a great nation can invite which equals that which follows a supine submission to wrong and injustice and the consequent loss of national self-respect and honour beneath which are shielded and defended a people's safety and greatness.⁴

Notions of an “English-speaking brotherhood” based on the Anglo-Saxon values and shared language became fashionable at the turn of the 20th century in Britain.⁵ In 1904, the British Committee on Imperial Defence decided that “America need not be taken into consideration” with regards to defence planning.⁶ There is little evidence, however, that a similar sentiment was felt in policy circles in the United States where fear and mistrust of the old enemy was the rule rather than the exception. In 1884, Grover Cleveland broke the sixteen-year Republican monopoly on the presidency by running a campaign that was highly critical of the Republicans’ pro-British stance. The Democrats’ Party Platform of that year stated:

Literary historians are increasingly taking on quantitative analysis of this type of cultural transfer. Franco Moretti, *Graphs, Maps and Trees: Abstract Models for Literary History* (London: Verso, 2005).

⁴ Grover Cleveland, *Public Papers of the President (PPP)*, “Special Message to Congress,” 17 December 1895. This is an example of a “near-miss” used by Christopher Layne in his critique of the Democratic Peace Theory, “Kant or Can’t: The Myth of Democratic Peace,” *International Security* 19 (2) (1994), 19. The reality is that the prospect of war was more imagined than real. Cleveland’s message to Congress was widely condemned amongst the mercantile classes on the Eastern Seaboard and, on 20 December 1895, there was a panic in Wall Street with an estimated US\$400 million depreciation of American securities.

⁵ See, for example, Charles Watson, “The English-Speaking Brotherhood: A Lecture Delivered at the Imperial Institute, London,” 7 July 1898, in *The English Speaking Brotherhood and the League of Nations* (Cambridge, 1919).

⁶ Alan Dobson, *Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century: On Friendship, Conflict and the Rise and Decline of Superpowers* (London: Routledge, 1995), 28.

Under a long period of Democratic rule and policy, our merchant marine was fast overtaking and on the point of outstripping that of Great Britain. Under twenty years of Republican rule and policy, our commerce has been left to British bottoms, and almost has the American flag been swept off the high seas.

Instead of the *Republican Party's British policy*, we demand for the people of the United States an American policy.

Under Democratic rule and policy our merchants and sailors, flying the stars and stripes in every port, successfully searched out a market for the varied products of American industry.

Under a quarter of a century of Republican rule and policy, despite our manifest advantage of all other nations in high-paid labor, favorable climate and teeming soils; despite freedom of trade among all these United States; despite their population by the foremost races of men and an annual immigration of the young, thrifty and adventurous of all nations; despite our freedom here from the inherited burdens of life and industry in the old-world monarchies, their costly war navies, their vast tax-consuming, non-producing standing armies; despite twenty years of peace, that Republican rule and policy have managed to surrender to Great Britain, along with our commerce, the control of the markets of the world.

Instead of the *Republican Party's British policy*, we demand on behalf of the American Democracy, an American policy.⁷

The refrain reflects the old fear of British imperialism as well as superior economic and naval power. No party had a monopoly on Anglophobia and the Democrats were certainly not immune from attack. Concerns about the malign influence of British business featured in the campaign material of both major parties and used to critique both candidates. A widely published Republican campaign leaflet (1888), for instance, contained an interview with an Irish-American pilot James O'Sullivan who condemned Cleveland for acting in the interests of England during his tenure as New York Governor:

The fact is this country is being run by English corporations in the interests of England, and is as much an English colony to-day as it was before the war of independence, the only difference being that we do not fly the English flag.⁸

⁷ Democratic Party Platform of 1884. *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/>.

It is one of the great ironies in the history of American politics that, four years after running on a Party Platform that was the most anglophobic of the post-Civil War era, Cleveland narrowly lost his bid for re-election in no small part due to the publication of the Murchison Letter, in which the British ambassador, Sir Lionel Sackville-West, appeared to suggest that Cleveland was Britain's preferred candidate due to his support for lower tariffs. This sensation enabled Benjamin Harrison to win over the Irish-American cleavage in New York, thereby securing their 36 votes in the Electoral College from Cleveland's home state and with them the presidency.⁹

Common language is frequently emphasized in the academic literature on the special relationship, as are common values, shared history, common fate and other rather nebulous and imprecise terms. American friendship for Great Britain was in no sense pre-determined by some idea of common history or culture. America's relationship with Britain was consistently strained throughout the 19th century when Anglophobia and fear of Britain's naval power and imperial ambitions were frequently articulated. Even when pro-British presidents, like Martin Van Buren, were in office, the relationship between America and Britain was relatively cool: a form of mass bipolarity between suspicion and admiration of the British dominated the collective imagination. The War of 1812 was historicized and taught as a Second War for Independence and Britain's neutrality during the Civil War was a cause of significant mistrust right up to the early 20th century.¹⁰ David Watt has argued "at

⁸ Taken from an interview from *The Irish World*, 30 August 1884, reprinted in "Campaign of 1884. Labor Record of Grover Cleveland. A Startling Instance of his Love and Care of Laboring Men!" accessed 8 April 2015, <http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/elections/election1884.html>.

⁹ The effect of the Murchison letter is widely debated. Richard E. Welch, *The Presidencies of Grover Cleveland* (Lawrence: University Press Kansas, 1988), sees it as having a relatively small effect, noting that "Cleveland actually did better in some Irish-American districts than four years earlier," 96. In *Minority Rights: Gilded Age Politics and the Front Porch campaign of 1888* (Lawrence: University Press Kansas, 2008), on the other hand, Charles W. Calhoun construes it as of greater significance, 160-161. Either way Cleveland's reaction, demanding Sackville-West leave the US, reveals the importance he attached to the Irish cleavage and the perceived political power of Anglophobia.

¹⁰ Lawrence A. Peskin, "Conspiratorial Anglophobia and the War of 1812," *Journal of American History* 98 (3) (2011).

the popular level, a shared language and a joint adherence to the common law did not make our nineteenth century forebears feel any very close affinity.”¹¹ In the late 19th century, politicians were able to use anti-British sentiment as a stick with which to beat their rivals. Memories of the War of 1812 may have faded, but few Americans had forgotten the *Trent Affair* (1861): the sneaking suspicion that Britain was acting to undermine America’s prosperity and freedom was never completely absent. Anglophobia remained an important force until at least the 1890s and “twisting the lion’s tail,” a metaphor for riling the British, remained a political ploy well into the 20th century.

The emergence of Anglo-American amity is interesting precisely because the period between 1884 and 1940 was characterized by a transition not solely from neutrality to amity, but from enmity to amity: a shift, that is, from habitual hatred to habitual fondness. Authors on the emergence of the “special relationship” frequently write as though these shared elements – language, race, religion, culture – made such an alignment inevitable. Walter Russell Mead referred to the relationship as resembling “the relationship between cousins who work in a family firm. We can be annoyed with each other if we like, and even temporarily estranged, but the family tie is still there.”¹² This claim is based on the premise that similarity and interests are somehow natural and only need be discovered. This is problematic for two reasons. First, all of these links were stronger in 1775 and 1812 than they were at any other time in American history and second, similarity was not *discovered* as such, but was constructed, and the shift from enmity to amity reveals the importance of both elites and popular culture in the construction of this form of international order.

¹¹ David Watt, “Introduction: The Anglo-American Relationship,” in Wm. Roger Louis and Hedley Bull, eds., *The ‘Special Relationship’: Anglo-American Relations since 1945* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 1.

¹² Walter Russell Mead, *God and Gold: Britain, America and the Making of the Modern World* (London: Atlantic, 2007), xii.

Britain had to be presented to, and understood by, the American audience in favourable terms. Even a common language needed to be presented and understood as a source of solidarity as opposed to one of jealousy or rivalry. The special relationship is both a rhetorical device and a discursive construct. In order to construct a critical genealogy of this shift from enmity to amity, it is necessary to understand both the how American commentators attached meanings to Britain and how these meanings shifted during the early 20th century.

The majority of work on the special relationship tends to focus on the post-1945 period and on specific relationships between Prime Ministers and Presidents. There is an enduring fascination, particularly within British scholarship, with what the special relationship means, whether it is mutual or specifically British wishful thinking, and whether it depends on interests or emotion.¹³ In numerous historical accounts of the special relationship, it is analysed in terms of “warm” or “cool” relations with authors selecting moments of “coolness” to dismiss its import and moments of “warmth” to reassert its durability.¹⁴

Even the most sceptical accounts, however, presuppose that there is something of note and interest in Anglo-American relations. In *Special No More: Anglo-American Relations Rhetoric and Reality* (1994), John Dickie concludes that “however much the memories fade, Britain will never be *just another foreign country* to the Americans.”¹⁵ This is a key point for consideration in this chapter: how was it that Britain was transformed into a country that warranted special consideration?¹⁶ It addresses the question: *How has the Anglo-American*

¹³ For theoretical accounts of the “special relationship” see Louis and Bull, *The ‘Special Relationship’*, Alex Danchev, *On Specialness: Essays in Anglo-American Relations* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), John Charmley, *Churchill’s Grand Alliance: The Anglo-American Special Relationship* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1995).

¹⁴ For historical accounts of Anglo-American relations see C. J. Bartlett, “*The Special Relationship*” *A Political History of Anglo-American Relations since 1945* (London: Longman, 1992), John Dickie, *‘Special’ No More; Anglo-American Relations: Rhetoric and Reality* (London: Weiden & Nicolson, 1994), Niklas H. Rossbach, *Heath, Nixon, and the Rebirth of the Special Relationship* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

¹⁵ Dickie, *‘Special’ No More*, 276.

¹⁶ The expression “just another nation” is used in terms of partiality and supererogatory support as set out in the theoretical chapters. Given the extent of the British Empire and Britain’s dominance over global finance and

“special relationship” been constituted such that American sustained support for Britain has been made possible and even intelligible? In order to understand the relationship, it is necessary to assess everyday understandings about Britain in the period prior to the articulation of the discourse of “the special relationship.” It is through first understanding how it was possible for a friendship to come about that how the “special relationship” creates conditions of possibility in foreign policy decision-making processes can be understood.

This chapter contends that between 1895 and 1940 there was a dramatic shift in the ways in which Britain and the British were imagined and discussed in America. Though it did not disappear entirely, the decline in Anglophobia between 1895 and the 1930s was a necessary, if insufficient, condition for the emergence of amity. At the same time an increasing fear that the Government of the United States was being undermined by foreign interests (particularly Irish, German, and Jewish) and an isolationist streak in the 1920s Republican Party led to a willingness to see Britain in neutral rather than hostile terms. The xenophobia and isolationism of the 1920s inadvertently lay the groundwork for the development of the British connection. Finally, in the 1930s a host of extant resources were harnessed by President Franklin Roosevelt to portray the British in positive and similar terms to the American audience. This was only possible as the three great 19th century lines of differentiation – imperialism, monarchy, and aristocracy – had already been redefined to encourage rather than undermine the closeness that Bismarck had prophesized. By the time Winston Churchill famously called for an association of the English-speaking peoples at Fulton Missouri in

trade routes, the United States had to engage with Britain and had a series of interests that could not be entirely divorced from Britain. Indeed, if defined in terms of economic and military interests, Britain was never “just another nation” but one which American policy makers had to consider when determining their strategies and options for action. That American policy makers could not avoid considering Britain is clear, but this should not be conflated with American policy operating under the conditions of possibility enabled by amity or enmity. Unlike the other two cases, America’s relationship with Britain takes place over a long timeframe. Whereas with US-Israel relations an appropriate start date is slightly before 1948 and with the Atlantic Community an appropriate start date is 1945. It is less clear-cut when the start date for such discursive analysis should take place when considering Britain. The justification for 1884 is that it is (as explained above) the last time a presidential election was fought, and a Party Platform was offered by either major party that can be legitimately described as, appealing to an anglophobic cleavage.

1946, he was preaching to the choir. The amitization of Britain was complete and America's friendship for Britain was already common sense.

From Habitual Hatred to Neutral Conduct

In 1900, the Democrats in the House of Representatives voiced their concern that Britain's support during the Spanish-American War, and President McKinley's downplaying of pro-Boer sentiment, were tantamount to the creation of a secret alliance. On 19 February that year, the Democrats passed a resolution requesting that their fears be assuaged.¹⁷ The response was swift and on 22 February, *The New York Times* ran a piece, which cited Secretary of State Hay's response in full:

There is no truth in the charge that a secret alliance exists between the Republic of the United States and the Empire of Great Britain; that no form of secret alliance is possible under the Constitution of the United States, inasmuch as treaties require the advice and consent of the Senate; and finally that no secret alliance, convention, arrangement, or understanding exists between the United States and any other nation.¹⁸

Many scholars see the period between the resolution of the Venezuela boundary dispute and the First World War as crucial in the emergence of Anglo-American amity. In *The Great Rapprochement* (1968), Bradford Perkins claimed that "Between [1898] and 1914 the almost instinctive American dislike of England lost much of its force, a generally favourable inclination developing to replace it."¹⁹ Similar accounts are given in Duncan Campbell's *Unlikely Allies: Britain, America and the Victorian Origins of the Special Relationship* (2008) and Charles Campbell's *Anglo-American Understanding: 1898-1903* (1957). It is certainly the case that many of the most contentious issues between the two nations were

¹⁷ William McKinley, *PPP*, "Message to the House of Representatives," 21 February 1900.

¹⁸ John Hay "Department of State, Feb 20, 1900," cited in *The New York Times*, "Secretary Hay's Answer," 22 February 1900.

¹⁹ Bradley Perkins, *The Great Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1895-1914* (London: Gollancz, 1969).

resolved, or at least mitigated, in this period. These included the Venezuelan boundary dispute, the Alaskan boundary and fisheries disputes between Britain, America and Canada, and arguments over the construction of the Panama Canal.²⁰

Others have taken a different approach against this triumphalism of a late Victorian Rapprochement. In *Twisting the Lion's Tail* (1999), John E. Moser makes a forceful case that "Anglophobia would remain a potent force in the 1920s, as it would until the early years of the Cold War."²¹ The inter-war period certainly was not smooth sailing for relations between Britain and the United States. The alliance forged in the First World War was quickly forgotten and disputes over economic policy and navy size continued until the 1930s. In addition, important sections of American society remained staunchly anti-British. The Anglo-Irish War and British policy in the Palestine mandate were significant rallying events for Irish and Jewish-Americans. Most of the common understandings of Britain in the United States certainly did not favour friendship in the 1920s. The three Republican administrations of the 1920s also had to deal with managing the expectations of both the pro-business anglophiles and anglophobic cleavages.

To see this period as cementing amity is to overstate the case. Presidents remained fairly conservative in describing Britain in their official statements. In private letters William McKinley, Teddy Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson all express a willingness to forge a closer relationship with Britain, but this did not translate into practice or professed policy. The 1895-1932 period is best viewed as a period in which enmity towards Britain diminished and rivalry emerged, yet the discourses of similarity necessary for Americans to see themselves in their British counterparts were absent from official texts and only subtly permeated taken-for-granted knowledge.

²⁰ See A. E Campbell, *Great Britain and the United States, 1895-1903* (London: Longmans, 1960).

²¹ John E. Moser, *Twisting the Lion's Tail: Anglophobia in the United States, 1921-1948* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), 16.

Overcoming Anti-British Interests

Demographics at the turn of the 20th century did not favour a close alignment with Britain. Indeed, immigration figures for the 19th century show a huge rise in the number of Americans from two areas that created some of the most vocal anglophobic blocks in American society.²² Irish-Americans had settled in large numbers in New York and large enclaves of German-Americans had come to the Midwest. Neither of these groups supported America's entry into the First World War or the Treaty of Versailles. In the inter-war period, the question of Home Rule for Ireland and the British deployment of the "Black and Tans" came to a head during the Anglo-Irish War of 1919-1921. *The Friends of Irish Freedom* published a pamphlet entitled *English Atrocities in Ireland* (1919).²³ In addition, a large community of American Jews remained sceptical, if not yet hostile, to Britain's attempts to restrict Jewish immigration in the Palestine mandate. German-Americans attempted, with some success, to portray President Wilson as a blunderer who crumbled before British propaganda, led America into an ill-conceived and unnecessary war, and had failed to deliver the "just peace" that was promised.²⁴

For ethnic lobbies to have a significant influence on policy, they require a receptive context: the 1920s did not provide that. Two developments in the inter-war period undermined the ability of ethnic interests to influence foreign policy: first was America's introspection and withdrawal from international affairs in the 1920s, while second was the development of negative attitudes towards "hyphenated Americans" and the related success of the anti-

²² Between 1820 and 1920, the number of Irish immigrants to the United States was 4,358,350, German immigrants was 5,495,691 and by 1920 Jewish-American population was around 3,300,000 compared with only 3,898,509 English immigrants in the same period. Figures taken from "Appendix B," Paul Spikard, *Almost All Aliens: Immigration, Race, and Colonialism in American History and Identity* (London: Routledge, 2007).

²³ For a full account see Michael Doorley, *Irish-American Diaspora Nationalism: The Friends of Irish Freedom, 1916-1935* (Dublin: Four Courts, 2005).

²⁴ See Don Heinrich Tolzmann, *The German-American Experience* (Amhurst: Humanity Books, 2000), and Frederick C. Leubke, *Bonds of Loyalty: German-Americans and World War One* (Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1974).

immigration movement in enacting strict legislation that included quotas and restrictions on “undesirables.”

Though America was never truly isolationist in the inter-war period and sought to intervene selectively in European affairs when economic and naval interests were at stake, a determination to remain outside of the messy affairs of Old World politics was fairly constant. There was no public expectation that American diplomats would intervene in European affairs to pressure France and Britain to allow for significant revisions of Versailles, to aid the Irish Free State, or to make Britain honour or renege upon its promise in the Balfour Declaration of 1917.²⁵ The 1930s Neutrality Acts, which George Kennan and the other architects of early American Cold War foreign policy so heavily criticized, may have allowed for German and Japanese revisionism to go unchecked, but they had the dual effect of limiting and muting voices critical of Britain. Indeed, the reliance on the “diplomacy of the dollar” in the 1920s increased the power of the financial services industry over foreign policy, as a rule this was the industry that had the most to gain from direct and healthy relationships with the British.

In the 1920s Irish and German-Americans also lost political clout. The expectations placed on first and second generation immigrants altered as the “immigrant as villain” discourse re-emerged in American politics. While German-Americans were overwhelmingly opposed to America’s entry into the First World War, Teddy Roosevelt had launched scathing attacks on the split loyalties of “hyphenated Americans”:

There is no such thing as a hyphenated American who is a good American...For an American citizen to vote as a German-American, an Irish-American, or an English-American is to be a traitor to American institutions; and those hyphenated

²⁵ American influence in European affairs was not negligible and it would be mistaken to label the United States fully isolationist in this period. American financial pressure was instrumental in persuading the French to leave the Ruhr (1924) and the United States took part in the largely ignored King-Crane commission (1919) on the mandates in the Middle East. Rather, a form of “selective interventionism” existed in the inter-war period.

Americans who terrorise American politicians by threats of the foreign vote are engaged in treason to the American republic.²⁶

A belief that “hyphenated Americans” were undermining America’s national interest and had left America vulnerable and under-prepared for preserving her national defence was a severe attack launched against Wilson’s neutrality policy throughout the 1916 election. This was especially the case after the sinking of the *Lusitania* (1915) stirred up anti-German sentiment. Wilson himself – who would veto an early version of the 1917 Immigration Act as it “embodie[d] a radical departure from the traditional and long-established policy of this country”²⁷ – also bought into the warnings about “hyphenated Americans,” and lent his voice to popular clamours that all should be “100% American.” The campaign to demonize foreigners was represented in numerous satirical cartoons. Though this was largely an anti-German campaign, Irish-Americans were also the subject of such fears about split loyalties, and the anti-immigrant discourse outlasted the war. In his Second Annual Message to Congress, Harding claimed “there is the recrudescence of hyphenated Americanism which we thought to have been stamped out when we committed the Nation, life and soul, to the World War.”²⁸ An understanding that malign influences and interests were undermining “American-ness” and driving America from her true interests occurred in tandem with the “Red Scare” and the most restrictive and racist immigration legislation in America’s history.

Significant pressure to restrict immigration on the basis of race had begun around 1890. The first major success of the anti-immigration movement was in the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1902. From 1917 a series of immigration laws were passed designed to keep out “undesirables.” The Immigration Act of 1917 included a literacy test, and was followed by the 1921 Johnson Act that established quotas for the numbers of immigrants from specific

²⁶ Theodore Roosevelt, “Americanism” *The Works of Theodore Roosevelt XVIII Fear God and Take Your Own Part*, comp. Hermann Hagedorn (New York: C. Scribner’s Sons, 1926), 388-405.

²⁷ Arthur S. Link, comp. *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson* 32, “To The House of Representatives” letter of 28 January 1915, 143.

²⁸ Warren G. Harding, *PPP*, “Second Annual Message,” 8 December 1922.

regions. A further Act in 1924 significantly favoured immigrants from northern and western Europe.²⁹ The text of the 1924 Act reads:

The annual quota of any nationality shall be 2 per centum of the number of foreign-born individuals of such nationality resident in continental United States as determined by the US consensus of 1890³⁰

Using the data from the 1890 census meant that Britain's annual quota (effective July 1924) stood at 85,135 compared with Germany's 20,028 and Ireland's 8,330. In order to encourage support for this bill, advocates misused data on health, crime, and language acquisition with great effect.³¹ This immigration legislation significantly decreased the number of immigrants able to enter the United States, but its success also demonstrated the mainstreaming of xenophobia, designed to preserve an imagined "American-ness" that did not allow for split loyalties. The emphasis placed on the treachery of hyphenated Americans, and the need for Uncle Sam to be concerned with Uncle Sam's interests, fostered neutrality towards Britain, since the most vocal groups highlighting British atrocities and deception were increasingly marginalized and represented as subversive and un-American in the 1920s and 1930s.

The Peaceful Resolution of Disputes

With the promotion of anglophile John Hay to the position of Secretary of State, many in Congress feared that the United States was turning towards partnership with Great Britain. However, in his public statements President McKinley represented Britain not as a friend or ally but rather as a nation like any other deserving no specific praise or blame. In his State of the Union in 1899, he stated:

²⁹ For accounts of immigration in America see Kitty Calavita, *US Immigration Law and the Control of Labour: 1820-1924* (London: Academic Press, 1984), William S. Bernard, ed., *American Immigration Policy: A Reappraisal* (Port Washington: Kennikat Press, 1969), Silva Pedraza and Rubén G. Rumbaut, eds., *Origins and Destinies: Immigration, Race, and Ethnicity in America* (London: Wadsworth, 1996).

³⁰ SEC. 11. (a) Text of the American Immigration Act of 1924 in "Appendix A" of John Trevor, *An Analysis of the American Immigration Act of 1924* (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of Intercourse and Education, 1924).

³¹ Susan F. Martin, *A Nation of Immigrants* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 132-151.

This Government has maintained an attitude of neutrality in the unfortunate contest between Great Britain and the Boer States of Africa. *We have remained faithful to the precept of avoiding entangling alliances as to affairs not of our direct concern.*³²

In presenting the Boer War as “not of our direct concern,” McKinley transgressed the general tenor of American sympathy, which lay with the Boers. However, by tying the position of neutrality to America’s tradition of avoiding entanglements as a constituent part of American identity, the statement serves as a means for diminishing hostility, if not a means of fostering friendship.

Presidents of the United States from McKinley to Hoover portrayed Britain not as a friend but rather as simply another nation with whom the United States could develop cordial and “friendly” relations whilst maintaining its traditional posture of avoiding significant overseas commitments. Britain is portrayed as a nation like any other, deserving neither special reproach nor special privilege. On accepting his nomination for the presidency in 1920, for instance, Warren Harding stated: “We have no envy, no suspicion, no aversion for any people in the world....there is the concord of amity and sympathy and fraternity in every resolution.”³³ Certainly, there were outstanding issues between the eagle and the lion, including war debts and naval power, which made the transition from wartime allies to neutral competitors difficult. However, throughout the 1920s the most significant outstanding issues between the two nations were resolved peaceably.³⁴

The London Naval Conference of 1930 followed the unsuccessful Geneva Naval Conference of 1927. Whereas in 1927 President Hoover and Prime Minister Baldwin had been unable to reconcile the positions of their governments, in 1930 an agreement was reached where Britain

³² McKinley, *PPP*, “Third Annual Message to Congress,” 5 December 1899.

³³ Leonard C. Schlup and John Henry Hepp, eds., *Selections from the Papers and Speeches of Warren G. Harding 1918-1923* (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 2008), “Harding’s Acceptance of the Republican Nomination in 1920.”

³⁴ An important work on the 1920s relationship is B. J. C. McKercher, ed., *Anglo-American Relations in the 1920s: The Struggle for Supremacy* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991).

conceded that the 5-5-3-3 agreement struck at the Washington Naval Conference should apply to lighter carriers as well. Historians tend to point to the shared interest of both parties in disarmament and limiting expenditure after the Wall Street Crash. Equally important, though less recognised, however, was the visit of Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald to the United States the previous year. During his visit, MacDonald delivered a series of radio addresses that were widely heard and well received by the American public. In the *Forward* to the collection of speeches, published the year after and widely distributed in the United States, the former Vice President Charles G. Dawes wrote “it was universally agreed by all classes of our public that the Prime Minister had voiced the high aspirations for peace of the two English-speaking peoples in a way that they themselves desired.”³⁵ In these speeches, MacDonald emphasized above all “informality” and the importance of the speedy and frank resolution of disputes. President Hoover mirrored this rhetoric: in his own public statements at the time, Hoover keenly emphasized the friendly atmosphere in which the two nations could come to resolve their outstanding differences. In these statements there is perhaps the glimmer of an understanding that amity is possible. What is certainly the case is that by 1929, Britain is being treated as any other nation with Washington’s “neutral conduct,” and not with the suspicion that attended the enmity of the 19th century.

“War Plan Red” – A Prelude to Friendship?

There is no better evidence that two nations are not friends than the possibility of war. The declassification of top-secret “War Plan Red” in 1974 was met with incredulity by those who had always imagined that war between America and Great Britain post-1918 was “unthinkable.” The American Navy devised the secret plan between 1927 and 1930: it set out a detailed list of the various contingencies for war with Britain, up to and including, invasion

³⁵ Charles G. Dawes, Foreword to *American Speeches* by Ramsey McDonald (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1930), 10.

of Canada and the possibility of a hypothetical British-Japanese alliance (War Plan Red-Orange).³⁶ The existence of Plan Red and the subsequent Army Plan (1932) containing detailed mobilization plans for an invasion of Canada seem to be evidence that amity was far from the minds of many US policy makers.³⁷

The mere existence of War Plan Red, however, is not in itself evidence that enmity and suspicion was rife in the American policy-making establishment. First, the plan was drawn up by the Navy without presidential or congressional oversight. Given that sea power disparity was one of the major causes of dispute between Britain and American in the 1920s, it is hardly surprising that the Navy remained sensitive to British power in the Atlantic. Christopher Bell points out that “as US politicians allowed the armed services to decide for themselves which states they considered to be potential enemies, war with the British Empire was likely to be given serious attention.”³⁸ Indeed, the existence of this War Plan provides evidence not of a consensus of suspicion, but rather of a tactic to extract money from a sceptical Congress by the institution that had the most to fear from British power.

Second Plan Red was one of many plans drawn up by the Army War Plans Division, starting in 1919, and there is little evidence it was given the same level of planning or immediacy. Other ‘Plans’ include: as Plan White, countering revolutionary activity; Plan Brown, which dealt with insurrection in the Philippines; Plan Yellow, covering US interests in China; Plan Purple, dealing with intervention in Latin America; Plan Tan, dealing with Cuba; and Plan Green, which recommended aiding regime change in Mexico. Each of these Plans preceded Plan Red and was “continuous of traditional missions.”³⁹ Of these new naval plans, Plan

³⁶ For a detailed account of American War Plans see Steven T. Ross, *American War Plans 1890-1939* (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 121-160.

³⁷ As discussed in the Introduction and chapter 1. War is the course of action most obviously precluded by casting a state as “friend.”

³⁸ Christopher Bell, “Thinking the Unthinkable: British and American Naval Strategies for an Anglo-American War 1918-1931,” *The International History Review* 19 (4) (1997): 795.

³⁹ Ross, *American War Plans*, 137.

Orange was certainly the most serious and was accordingly subjected to greater Congressional scrutiny and attention.

Given British power and the outstanding differences between the interests of the two nations, it would have been enormously surprising had some contingency not been outlined, however unlikely such a war in fact was by 1929 (though interestingly the British had no counter-part). The absence of serious discussion of Plan Red in policy circles and Congressional committees and its relatively late development (Plan Orange preceded Plan Red by at least four years) ironically provide evidence that attitudes towards Britain had softened by the 1930s. The existence of a plan does not necessarily mean that either foreign policy makers or the American public would in fact have accepted a war with Britain. The decade following the First World War was one in which America grappled with selective interventionism in Europe and in which Anglo-American relations were moderated by the resolution of disputes and the fear of foreign interests acting on the policy process. While friendship clearly did not emerge, much of the grounding for amity was set in place. As military planners were detailing Plan Red, a number of cultural shifts had already taken place that made a future close alignment with Britain possible.

Forging Friendship

In his second term President Franklin Roosevelt (FDR) sought to deliberately and publicly encourage the development of a close tie with Britain. His reasons for doing so were numerous. Early in 1939, FDR had unsuccessfully attempted to get Congress to renew the cash-and-carry provision of the Neutrality legislation, a rebuff that had made him seem politically weak at home and incompetent abroad. His own worries about Hitler, whom he privately described as a “menace,” were alone insufficient to warrant the use of his veto. Isolationist sentiment reached its nadir in the late 1930s. Instead, FDR would embark on a

rhetorical campaign to present Britain in a favourable light precisely in order to marginalize isolationist voices and to present American ties with Britain as an appropriate facet of a stretched American identity.

With the prospect of a second war in Europe, the predicates and descriptions of Britain in public statements became increasingly positive. A year before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, for instance, the president made the following comments in the most important of his “Fireside Chats.” The subject was the national defence of the United States:

One hundred and seventeen years ago the Monroe Doctrine was conceived by our Government as a measure of defense in the face of a threat against this hemisphere by an alliance in Continental Europe. Thereafter, we stood *on guard* in the Atlantic, with the British as *neighbors*. There was no treaty. There was no “unwritten agreement.”

And yet, there was the feeling, proven correct by history, that we as neighbors could settle any disputes in peaceful fashion. The fact is that during the whole of this time the Western Hemisphere has remained free from aggression from Europe or from Asia.

Does anyone seriously believe that we need to fear attack anywhere in the Americas while a free Britain remains our most powerful naval neighbor in the Atlantic? Does anyone seriously believe, on the other hand, that we could rest easy if the Axis powers were our neighbors there?

If Great Britain goes down, the Axis powers will control the continents of Europe, Asia, Africa, Australasia, and the high seas—and they will be in a position to bring enormous military and naval resources against this hemisphere. It is no exaggeration to say that all of us, in all the Americas, would be living at the point of a gun—a gun loaded with explosive bullets, economic as well as military

.....

In a military sense Great Britain and the British Empire are today the spearhead of resistance to *world conquest*. They are putting up *a fight which will live forever in the story of human gallantry*.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ Franklin D. Roosevelt, *PPP*, #153 “Fireside Chat,” 29 December 1940. This is after he had secured an unprecedented third term as President.

This speech contains numerous positive predicates and presuppositions that reveal naturalized meanings. Britain is a “neighbor” and has been since the early 19th century, the Atlantic Britain’s to “guard,” a nation with which disputes can be settled in a “peaceful fashion” and with which Americans can “rest easy.” The “feeling proven correct by history” presents such an alignment as obvious and “does anyone seriously believe” implicitly ridicules those who harbour suspicions of Britain’s intentions. The British fight against “world conquest” is one that “will live forever in the story of human gallantry.” All of these examples underscore what would become the dominant discourse of the Second World War: the United States as “the arsenal of democracy” and the war itself as a battle against totalitarianism.

Though FDR had domestic and international concerns that made him pursue an amitizing strategy, such hyperbolic rhetoric would have been unthinkable fifty years earlier. However, in order to cement a close relationship with Great Britain, FDR could appeal to numerous prior discursive shifts that made such a statement of support seem natural and common sense. Everyday American understandings of Great Britain, once the great enemy of American democracy, had already transformed dramatically by the late 1930s. In order for America to become “the arsenal of democracy,” understandings that Britain was a democracy had to be naturalized. This is illustrated by understandings of three elements of British government and society, which until the inter-war period provided fundamental lines of differentiation between the two nations. These are imperialism, monarchy, and aristocracy. The changing understandings attached to these concepts enabled the Americans to see in Britain a kindred and democratic nation and provide the context for FDR’s amitizing rhetoric.

Imperialism v. Empire

On 8 August 1900, the Democratic candidate for the Presidency, William Jennings Bryan delivered his acceptance speech at the Democratic Convention in Indianapolis. Over eight

million copies of the text of his speech were disseminated as part of his unsuccessful bid to take the White House. This speech has gone down as one of the great American speeches: its subject was imperialism and the dangers he saw in the McKinley Administration's "colonial policy" towards Cuba and the Philippines:

The Republican platform says that "the largest measure of self-government consistent with their welfare and our duties shall be secured to them (the Filipinos) by law." This is a strange doctrine for a government which owes its very existence to the men who offered their lives as a protest against government without consent and taxation without representation. *In what respect does the position of the Republican Party differ from the position taken by the English Government in 1776?* Did not the English Government promise a good government to the colonists? What king ever promised a bad government to his people? Did not the English Government promise that the colonists should have the largest measure of self-government consistent with their welfare and English duties? Did not the Spanish Government promise to give to the Cubans the largest measure of self-government consistent with their welfare and Spanish duties? The whole difference between a monarchy and a republic may be summed up in one sentence. *In a monarchy the king gives to the people what he believes to be a good government; in a republic the people secure for themselves what they believe to be a good government.*

The Republican Party has accepted the European idea and planted itself upon the ground taken by George III, and by every ruler who distrusts the capacity of the people for self-government or denies them a voice in their own affairs.

Bryan's subsequent defeat should not be seen as an embrace of imperialism by Americans. In spite of the centrality given to the issue, the election was largely won on economic issues, particularly the controversy over free silver.⁴¹ However, it is interesting that imperialism is portrayed as both anathema to America's values, and as something primarily associated with the English. By the mid-1930s, Americans would come to agree with the first portrayal, but not the second.

Imperialism was a relatively new and contested concept in the late 19th century. As American policy makers turned towards the Pacific with the forced deposal of the Queen of Hawaii in

⁴¹ Thomas A. Bailey, "Was the Presidential Election of 1900 a Mandate on Imperialism," *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 24 (1) (1937).

1893 and the takeover of the Philippines between 1898 and 1902, debate over the term was far from settled.⁴² However, as a growing consensus about America's interest in occupying certain foreign lands emerged, the content and meanings attached to the term changed. Those who accepted the need for expansion did not couch their policies in terms of imperialism. McKinley's speech on accepting the Republican nomination for 1900 proudly asserted, for example, that it was the Republican Party that had "liberated 10,000,000 of the human family from the yoke of imperialism."⁴³ The Democrats in their Public Platform critiqued this same action as imperialist ambition.

Wilson's Third Annual Address stated that Pan-Americanism had "none of the spirit of empire in it. It is the embodiment, the effectual embodiment, of the spirit of law and independence and liberty and mutual service."⁴⁴ In his 1925 Inaugural Address, Calvin Coolidge affirmed that, "America seeks no earthly empire built on blood and force. No ambition, no temptation, lures her to thought of foreign dominions."⁴⁵ Presidential rhetoric consistently presents imperialism as incompatible with American values and role in the world, while simultaneously pursuing policies that could easily be dubbed imperialism. President Hoover's Inauguration contained:

Those who have a true understanding of America know that we have no desire for territorial expansion, for economic or other *domination of other peoples*. Such purposes are *repugnant to our ideals of human freedom*. Our form of government is ill adapted to the responsibilities which inevitably follow permanent limitation of the independence of other peoples. Superficial observers seem to find no destiny for our abounding increase in population, in wealth and power except that of imperialism. They fail to see that the American people are engrossed in the building for themselves of a new economic system, a new social system, a new political system – all of which

⁴² John R. Eperjesi, *The Imperialist Imaginary: Visions of Asia and the Pacific in American Culture* (Hanover: Dartmouth College Press, 2005).

⁴³ McKinley, PPP, "Address Accepting the Republican Presidential Nomination," 12 July 1900.

⁴⁴ Woodrow Wilson, PPP, "Third Annual Address to Congress," 7 December 1915.

⁴⁵ Calvin Coolidge, PPP, "Inaugural Address," 4 March 1925.

are characterized by aspirations of freedom of opportunity and thereby are the *negation of imperialism*.⁴⁶

American identity and democracy is presented and (re)constituted as “the negation of imperialism,” which is about the “domination of other peoples,” and “repugnant to our ideals of human freedom.” Speaking in 1930, President Hoover stated:

We know there is neither financial, territorial, nor military imperialism in the American heart. We know that such ideas are *anathema to the American mind*, and *no man could be elected a county commissioner* on such a platform. We know, in fact, that we have opened the door of a new social and economic system by which within our own borders we shall create our own conquest of poverty without seeking to exploit other nations.⁴⁷

The fact that “no man could be elected a county commissioner on such a platform” demonstrates the widely held assumption that American imperialism was a contradiction in terms. Imperialism was rarely referenced in public presidential discourse in the 1930s, and where it was used it served one purpose: to differentiate the policy of the United States from other nations, and particularly to excuse American policy towards the Philippines and Latin America more generally. In 1936 Roosevelt spoke about US foreign relations:

Of all the Nations of the world today we are in many ways most singularly blessed. Our closest neighbors are good neighbors. If there are remoter Nations that wish us not good but ill, they know that we are strong; they know that we can and will defend ourselves and defend our neighborhood.

We seek to dominate no other Nation. We ask no territorial expansion. We oppose imperialism. We desire reduction in world armaments.⁴⁸

Just as the term entered the English lexicon as a critique of Bonapartism, the label “imperialist” was used in the course of the Second World War to critique Fascism – Italian,

⁴⁶ Herbert Hoover, *PPP*, “Inaugural Address,” 4 March 1929.

⁴⁷ Hoover, *PPP*, “Address to the Gridiron Club,” 26 April 1930.

⁴⁸ Roosevelt, *PPP*, “Address at Chautauqua, N.Y.,” 14 August 1936.

German and Japanese.⁴⁹ In the 1930s and 1940s, Roosevelt used the “imperialism” of Fascist nations as a stick with which to beat them, and to present them as profoundly different.⁵⁰

While imperialism remains “anathema to the American mind,” this does not apply to all Empires. Between 1900 and 1940, American discourses on the British Empire served to disassociate it from imperialism – presenting “the British Empire” as a necessary and even moral practice. Firstly, it is noteworthy that between 1901 and 1920 the phrase “British Empire” is absent from presidential rhetoric altogether, while frequent reference is made to “Imperial Germany,” “the Ottoman Empire,” and “the Chinese Empire.” The term “British Empire” did not re-enter presidential rhetoric until 1925. In a speech President Coolidge delivered just three months after his Inauguration, he notes that “[the war of independence] was just as necessary for the maintenance of the British Empire as for the proper development of the American community.”⁵¹ From 1936 President Roosevelt continued America’s traditional hostility towards imperialism whilst praising the British Empire as a good for mankind. Addressing the Canadian Prime Minister in Quebec, Roosevelt sought to emphasize the similarities between America and the “democratic” British Empire:

The United States and Canada, and, indeed, *all parts of the British Empire share a democratic form of government* which comes to us from common sources. We have adapted our institutions on both sides of the border to our own needs and our own special conditions, but *fundamentally they are the same.*⁵²

The “democratic” nature of the British Empire is further emphasized in other important speeches, particularly in the run up to the American entry into the Second World War. In part, this is done by separating Great Britain from the British Empire, which is presented –

⁴⁹ Roosevelt, *PPP*, “State of the Union,” 6 January 1941, “Address to the Nation,” 24 December 1944, “State of the Union,” 6 January 1945.

⁵⁰ The use of the label “imperialism” to predicate an enemy continued in the Cold War. Both Presidents Truman and Eisenhower made frequent references to “communist imperialism” in their public statements.

⁵¹ Coolidge, *PPP*, “Address at the celebration of the 150th Anniversary of George Washington taking command of the continental army, Cambridge, Mass.,” 3 July 1925.

⁵² Roosevelt, *PPP*, “Address in Quebec, Canada,” 31 July 1936.

like American interests in the western hemisphere – as a more voluntary and worthy enterprise than the evil and sickness of imperial domination. There is not a single presidential public statement in the inter-war years that uses the “Empire” as a tactic to drum up anti-British sentiment. How then was it that a president of the United States could demonstrate such a dissonance without being charged with hypocrisy? It was largely possible because FDR was tapping into common understandings that had been present in previous texts and that had come to be embodied in popular culture. Various cultural sites supported this meaning of imperialism as bad, brutish, and anathema to American values, yet the British Empire was somehow divorced from this violent and antithetical form of imperialism.⁵³

America’s own experience with expansion in the Pacific necessitated a more nuanced view of holding foreign territories. In the final weeks of his presidency, Teddy Roosevelt addressed a Methodist Episcopal Church in Washington D.C. The speech, which was subsequently reprinted as part of his extensive collection of writings, addressed the importance of the English presence in India as a stabilizing influence: “If English control were now withdrawn from India, the whole peninsula would become a chaos of bloodshed and violence.”⁵⁴ He continued:

I have seen many American missionaries who have come from India and I cannot overstate the terms of admiration in which they speak of English rule in India, and of the incalculable benefits it has conferred upon the natives.⁵⁵

This belief that English control has a civilizing influence is then tied directly into the American experience in the Philippines, where “we are endeavouring to educate and train the native races under our sovereignty.”⁵⁶ Within this speech is an understanding that Americans should – as Rudyard Kipling urged in his (in)famous poem – take up their share of the

⁵³ This is not to say that FDR was pro-British imperialism, quite the opposite. Roosevelt, for expediency’s sake, chose not to articulate his concerns.

⁵⁴ Theodore Roosevelt, “The Expansion of the White Races,” in *American Problems Vol XVI*, 262.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 263.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

“White Man’s Burden,” the full title of which includes the subtitle “The United States and the Philippine Islands.” It is this same understanding of the readiness of certain peoples for self-government that both enabled Wilson to see few problems with the inclusion of Article 22 in the League of Nations Charter whilst simultaneously advocating a universal right to self-determination and allowed for Hoover and FDR to set out the Good Neighbor Policy towards Latin America.

In addition to common assumptions about racial hierarchies and the readiness of people for self-rule, understandings of American masculinity also made Empire seem an interesting and plausible option for the anti-imperialist United States. Amy Kaplan has argued that popular historical novels in the 1890s laid the groundwork for Empire acquisition by romanticizing Empire and tying American masculinity to the conquering and retention of foreign lands.⁵⁷ Though many of these novels do, in fact, serve to differentiate the American experience with Old World colonialism including British colonialism, popular culture between 1900 and 1940 increasingly allows for the British Empire to be included in this masculine and virtuous conception of Empire against the negative aspects that have already been set out. This can be seen in the representations of Lawrence of Arabia and films such as *The Green Goddess* (1930). In divorcing the British Empire from imperialism, American elites and cultural discourse ground the framing of Britain as a democratic nation with a common fate, which would become so important in the war against Japanese, Italian, and German imperialism. Between the late-19th and early 20th century, American policy makers fabricated an American brand of imperialism that both appealed to the general population and was compatible with the British Empire.

⁵⁷ Amy Kaplan, “Romancing the Empire: The Embodiment of American Masculinity in the Popular Historical Novel of the 1890s,” *American Literary History* 2 (4) (1990).

Monarchy

American perceptions of the British monarchy had begun to shift long before the inter-war period. Queen Victoria was widely revered in the United States: both her Golden and her Diamond Jubilees were a cause for significant celebration amongst the populace. This may appear surprising since America's Declaration of Independence was a series of grievances against the tyrannical rule of an unelected Head of State. Indeed, the *Federalist Papers* and the Constitution of the United States were set up in order to avoid the type of tyranny or demagoguery that King George III had placed upon the Thirteen Colonies. In the 19th century, politicians would criticize one another with refrains that the other had acted in a monarchical manner and cartoons would satirize encroaching executive power by presenting the president with a crown and sceptre.⁵⁸

The American fascination with monarchy was evident in the reception and the gushing reviews of Queen Victoria. The front page of *The New York Times* on the day of her Diamond Jubilee, for instance, carried the following story:

A number of Americans armed with their kodaks had stationed themselves opposite the Palace gate, and somebody in the crowd shouted: "Now Yanks, three cheers for your mother" raising a roar of good humoured laughter.⁵⁹

In *The Eagle and the Crown* (2008), F. J. Prochaska notes that "few, if any, Americans wanted a hereditary monarchy at home, but Queen Victoria did more than any other British sovereign to encourage royalist sympathies in the United States. Empresses are easier to love than Emperors."⁶⁰ Perhaps it was the longevity of her reign, perhaps her sex, but Queen

⁵⁸ These cartoons of a monarchical president made a comeback in the lead up to the Watergate Scandal, see Jerry Robinson, ed., *The 1970s: Best Political Cartoons of the Decade* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981). Interestingly the depictions of Nixon do not make the overt parallels with the British monarchy that had been common place in the 19th century.

⁵⁹ "Queen's Journey to London" *The New York Times*, 22 June 1897.

⁶⁰ F. J. Prochaska, *The Eagle and the Crown: Americans and the British Monarchy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 106.

Victoria certainly was popular in the United States.⁶¹ Both the president and public mourned her death and flags were lowered to half-mast on both sides of the Atlantic. The headline in *The New York Times* read “Enmity for Great Britain hushed and only sympathy expressed” and for the following week there were multiple stories and opinion pieces rubbishing the Mayor of New York Mr. Van Wick for his refusal to lower the flag to half-mast. A particularly humorous poem was composed, which pokes fun at the mayor for trying to curry favour with the Irish cleavage. After all:

Home rule’s not a question
Right now for digestion.⁶²

The reign of Queen Victoria was certainly important in softening American attitudes towards Great Britain. Of particular importance was Victoria’s emphasis on presenting the monarchy as a family, which served to make the life of monarchic privilege less alien to regular Americans. As Walter Arnstein notes, “the formal process of rapprochement involving the governments of Britain and the United States between the years 1895 and 1914 that Bradford Perkins has charted was notably, if coincidentally, assisted by the Diamond Jubilee in 1897 and by Victoria’s death in 1901.”⁶³ An interest in monarchy certainly continued in the inter-war years. As Prince of Wales, Edward VIII’s tour of the United States in 1920 was widely reported on and the abdication crisis caught the American imagination, not least since the object of his affection was the American divorcee Wallis Simpson.

Though the public seemed increasingly enamoured with the British Royal Family, presidents and precedent at official functions had not yet put the British royalty above others. Coolidge received the Prince of Wales in 1924 at an informal reception with no invited guests and,

⁶¹ Here is a good example that reveals the importance of a discursive approach to measuring attitudes. There are no public opinion polls on Americans pro- or anti-monarchical sentiment and so a study of poems and newspaper articles provides part of the genealogy.

⁶² Paul John, “An Irishman to his Honor the Mayor,” *The New York Times*, 26 January 1901.

⁶³ Walter Arnstein, “Queen Victoria and the United States,” in Frank M. Leventhal and Roland Quinault, eds., *Anglo-American Attitudes: From Revolution to Partnership* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000).

though the reason was that the president was in mourning for his son, no indication is given in his autobiography that any special treatment would be accorded to the British royalty over the Swedish or Danish royals.⁶⁴ During King George VI's tour of North America in May and June 1939, President Roosevelt exploited the royals' popularity to attempt to soften the isolationist mood in Washington and present Britain as a friend with which issues could be resolved peacefully. In this he mirrored the speeches of Herbert Hoover who during Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald's visit had emphasized that future disputes over naval size would be settled peaceably. FDR's toast to the King is below:

Your Majesties:

In the life of a nation, as in that of an individual, there are occasions that stand out in high relief. Such an occasion is the present one, when the entire United States is welcoming on its soil the King and Queen of Great Britain, of our neighbor Canada, and of all the far-flung British Commonwealth of Nations. *It is an occasion for festivities, but it is also fitting that we give thanks for the bonds of friendship that link our two peoples.*

I am persuaded that the greatest single contribution our two countries have been enabled to make to civilization, and to the welfare of peoples throughout the world, is the example we have jointly set by our manner of conducting relations between our two nations.

It is because *each nation is lacking in fear of the other that we have unfortified borders between us.* It is because neither of us fears aggression on the part of the other that we have entered no race of armaments, the one against the other.

The King and I are aware of a recent episode. Two small uninhabited Islands in the center of the Pacific became of sudden interest to the British Empire and to the United States as stepping stones for commercial airplanes between America and Australasia. Both nations claimed sovereignty. Both nations had good cases. To have entered into a long drawn out argument could have meant ill-will between us and delay in the use of the Islands by either nation. It was suggested that the problem be solved by the joint use of both Islands by both nations, and, by a gentleman's agreement, to defer the question of ultimate sovereignty until the year 1989. The passage of fifty years will solve many problems.

⁶⁴ Calvin Coolidge, *The Autobiography of Calvin Coolidge* (New York Cosmopolitan Book Corporation, 1929), 208.

If this illustration of the use of methods of peace, divorced from aggression, could only be universally followed, relations between all countries would rest upon a sure foundation, and men and women everywhere could once more look upon a happy, prosperous and a peaceful world.

May this kind of understanding between our countries grow ever closer, and may our friendship prosper. Ladies and gentlemen, we drink to the health of His Majesty, King George VI.⁶⁵

The New York Times ran headlines of “Roosevelt Tells Amity” and “George hopes we will ever walk in Friendship.” It would appear that the newspapers were in fact ahead of FDR, since peaceful resolution alone does not a friendship make though the emphasis on the unfortified border is of significance as is the reference to “bonds of friendship,” only the second time a president had publicly referenced such bonds with Britain.⁶⁶ Two weeks later the Royal entourage came, with much celebration, to the 1939 New York World Fair. Among the exhibits was Magna Carta, “strategically positioned next to a genealogy of George Washington revealing his decent from King John and 25 of the barons.”⁶⁷ This certainly did no harm to the prospects of a close relationship developing.⁶⁸

Ultimately, monarchy may not have been the most important factor in the formation of amity, but the American public’s continued and continuing fascination with the British Royal Family certainly softened attitudes towards Britain. Lytton Strachely’s *Queen Victoria* was the eighth best-selling non-fiction book of 1922, and in 1936 “The Queen’s Last Ride” was included in a compilation of the Nation’s 50 favourite poems. By the 1930s monarchy was a cause of fascination but not differentiation for the American public, who saw in British royalty a family, not an alien tyrannical institution.

⁶⁵ Roosevelt, *PPP*, #85 “Toast to his Majesty, King George VI, at the White House,” 8 June 1939.

⁶⁶ The first time was William Taft, *PPP*, “Third Annual Message,” 5 December 1911. This was incidentally also with reference to royalty – the coronation of George V.

⁶⁷ Frank M. Leventhal, “Public Face and Public Space: The Projection of Britain in America before the Second World War,” in Leventhal and Quinault, *Anglo-American Attitudes*, 217. The author goes on to note that “Nothing could have demonstrated more effectively how inextricably linked were the political cultures of the two nations.”

⁶⁸ It is noteworthy that a 13th century copy of Magna Carta is displayed to this day in the atrium of *The National Archives* in Washington D.C. next to the original Declaration of Independence and Constitution.

Aristocracy

One of the most important elements of British society against which Americans defined themselves in the 19th century was the British class system and, in particular, the aristocracy. Milly Williamson describes America of the 1890s as “a country forged against the values of the British aristocracy.”⁶⁹ In 1885 Rev. Josiah Strong published his treatise *Our Country: Its Possible Future and Its Present Crises* in which, though acknowledging the “peril” of wealth and of the emergence of a ruling class, he points out that “our aristocracy, unlike that of Europe, is open to all comers. Wealth, position, influence, are prizes offered for energy, and every farmer’s boy, every apprentice and clerk, every friendless and penniless immigrant, is free to enter the lists.”⁷⁰ In England “there is an eager ambition to rise in rank, an ambition as rarely gratified as it is commonly experienced. With us, aspiration meets with no such iron check as birth.”⁷¹ Of all understandings the impermeable nature of the English aristocracy was the most significant dividing line, contrasting with the equality of opportunity myth on which American identity was forged.

The silent comedy *American Aristocracy* was a Hollywood hit in 1916. The opening titles read:

Has America an aristocracy? We say yes! And to prove it we take you to Narrowport-by-the-sea where we find some of our finest families whose patents of nobility are founded on such deeds of daring as the canning of soup, the floating of soup, and the borating of talcum.

It relates the story of Cassius Lee, a young entomologist from Virginia, who falls for Geraldine Hicks, daughter of the famous “aristocrat” who invented “Hicks Hatpin with the Hump.” On meeting the two men have the following exchange:

⁶⁹ Milly Williamson, “When ‘Popular’ was ‘Radical’: The Mass Circulation US Press in the 1890s, Emerging Celebrity Journalism and Popular Taste,” *Media History* 18 (2) (2012): 120.

⁷⁰ Josiah Strong, *Our Country: Its Possible Future and Its Present Crises* (New York: The Baker and Taylor Co., 1885), 174.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 116.

Cassius Lee: My business? Why our family never went into trade.

Hicks: Young man, this hotel is for aristocrats. We ain't got any time for upstarts.

The running joke being that to enter the American aristocracy, the route is not land or family connections, but rather entrepreneurship and money. Fortunately for Cassius, he inadvertently invents the Hatpin with the Double Hump, so gets the full-page advertisement in the paper – a prerequisite for social climbing – and is allowed to join the ranks of the American aristocracy.⁷² Few Americans would not have got the joke and seen the fundamental difference being drawn between American and English aristocracies.

Though aristocracy is infrequently referenced in presidential statements, there is an implicit understanding that the British class system should not be viewed as a fundamental differentiating category between America and Britain. Although Americans remained tied to a vision of America as a nation lacking aristocracy, by the late 1930s the curious habits and privileges of the English aristocrats became less mysterious and impermeable. First among a core constituency of wealthy Americans, the idea of an aristocracy was romanticized. Charles Jennings has pointed out that in the early 20th century “while much of republican America, not least in the Midwest, found [British aristocracy] distasteful and even immoral, there were pockets of enthusiasm for British elitism, especially on the East Coast.”⁷³ The popularity of John Nash’s *The Mansions of England in the Olden Times* (1839-41) indicates a fascination with British class and privilege. *The Autobiography of Margot Asquith* (1921) was the fifth bestselling non-fiction on *Publishers Weekly* bestseller list that year and novels depicting British aristocracy remained popular throughout the inter-war years. *Gentlemen Prefer Blondes* by Anita Loos (1926), *Goodbye Mr. Chips* by James Hilton (1935), and *Rebecca* by

⁷² *American Aristocracy*, directed by Lloyd Ingraham (1916, USA: Grapevine Video, 2011), DVD. The screenplay was written by Anita Loos.

⁷³ Charles Jennings, “*Them and Us*” *The American Invasion of British High Society* (Stroud: Sutton, 2007), 14.

Daphne Du Maurier (1938-9) all rode high in the *Publishers Weekly* and *New York Times* best-seller list, presenting a softer and relatable image of the English aristocracy.⁷⁴

It is here that common language had its most important role in forging amity. The ability of English authors, such as H. G. Wells and Daphne Du Maurier, to present their work to an American audience swiftly and without the need for translation was of great importance in constructing imagined similarity between the two nations. As both fiction and non-fiction represented Britain to the American audience, another type of cultural exchange continued in earnest in the early 20th century. Inter-marriages between wealthy American heiresses and British aristocrats had become a common phenomenon since Jennie Jerome became Lady Randolph Churchill in 1874. These inter-marriages were greeted with great speculation in the gossip columns of the time. Walter Winchell, America's first syndicated gossip columnist who became an active and vocal supporter on American intervention on the side of the British against Hitler in the 1940s, was the first to break news of high-profile weddings.⁷⁵

Representations of the aristocracy in film, literature, and the gossip columns presented a world far less exclusive, far less alien, and far more relatable. If success and money could buy American heiresses in, then perhaps aristocracy was not as antithetical to American values after all. Changing perceptions of the British Empire, the Royal Family, and the English aristocracy in the early 20th century and inter-war period did much to ground the sympathy Americans would feel towards their British counterparts during the early years of the Second World War. Each of these great lines of differentiation was broken down in these

⁷⁴ At the same time American values and identity were also being redefined. The opposition between British social rigidity and America as classless land of opportunity also broke down during the Great Depression. FDR's introduction of Social Security welfare provisions required a rhetorical reconfiguration of the relationship between the American individual and the American state. His 1937 Inauguration stated: "We have always known that heedless self-interest was bad morals; we know now that it is bad economics. Out of the collapse of prosperity whose builders boasted their practicality has come the conviction that in the long run economic morality pays. We are beginning to wipe out the line that divides the practical from the ideal; and in so doing we are fashioning an instrument of unimagined power for the establishment of a morally better world."

⁷⁵ See Walter Winchell, *Winchell Exclusive* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1975) and Neal Gabler, *Walter Winchell: Gossip, Power and the Culture of Celebrity* (London: Picador, 1995).

years and actually became some of the strongest indicators that American amity for Britain would naturalize and endure. It would be the shifts in common sense and everyday meanings attached to British “democratic” institutions and “virtuous” habits that would enable FDR to present closeness with Great Britain as both strategically necessary and morally correct in the early years of the Second World War.

Brothers in Arms

Unlike the propaganda surrounding the First World War, which emphasized “Hun” atrocities and the legitimate grievances against United States commercial and business shipping, Second World War discourses emphasized the similarities and positive images of Great Britain and the British people. This was partly down to a concerted effort on the part of British politicians and propagandists.⁷⁶ However, to see the construction of similarity as solely enabled by foreign influences is to overstate the case. The British Council was acutely aware that many in America still blamed British propaganda for their entry into the First World War. It is also to under-appreciate the important role that FDR had in constructing the national interest and fostering positive images of the British in the years preceding America’s eventual entry into the Second World War. Americanization requires a receptive audience. As the aforementioned discussion has made clear, numerous meanings attached to Britain in the inter-war period encouraged a different sort of rationale for American involvement in the war against fascism, but these were skilfully harnessed by elites to make a close tie with Britain appropriate between 1939 and 1945.⁷⁷

⁷⁶ Leventhal, “Public Face and Public Space.”

⁷⁷ Of particular significance was the relationship between FDR and Harry Hopkins who acted as his close advisor and assessor of Britain’s ability and will to confront Hitler in 1940. David L. Roll, *The Hopkins Touch: Harry Hopkins and the Forging of the Alliance to Defeat Hitler* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), claims that “Hopkins played a key part in nudging [FDR] toward leading rather than following public opinion,” 105.

Securitizing British Freedom

As the Second World War broke out in Europe, isolationist sentiment remained dominant in the United States. FDR was at the forefront of convincing Congress to provide the authority to fund and support British efforts with lend-lease. This legislation, the official title of which was “An Act to Further Promote the Defense of the United States” (ironically Bill 1776), passed the House on 10 January 1941 and gave the president sweeping powers to provide munitions and financial support to any nation that he deemed appropriate:

The President may, from time to time, when he deems it in the interest of national defense, authorize the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, or the head of any other department or agency of the Government (1) To manufacture in arsenals, factories, and shipyards under their jurisdiction, or otherwise procure, to the extent to which funds are made available therefor[e], or contracts are authorized from time to time by the Congress, or both, any defense article for the government of any country whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the United States.⁷⁸

Though Britain is not mentioned specifically, no one was under any illusions as to which nation qualified for such support. In his public statements FDR had already made it clear that the defence of America depended on Britain remaining free. The Act was a crucial shift in America’s position of neutrality to one in which Britain was tacitly supported.

In his 1941 Labor Day Address, FDR further explained this rationale to the American people, when he tied British naval strength to the defence of the United States:

These enemies all know that we possess a strong Navy—a Navy gaining in strength. They know that the Navy—as long as the navies of the British Empire and the Netherlands and Norway and Russia exist can together guarantee the freedom of the seas. These enemies know also that if these other navies are destroyed, the American Navy cannot now, or in the future, maintain the freedom of the seas against all the rest of the world.⁷⁹

⁷⁸ H. R. 1776, “An Act to Further Promote the Defense of the United States,” Section 3 (a), 10 January 1941.

⁷⁹ Roosevelt, *PPP*, #97 “Labor Day Radio Address,” 1 September 1941.

This was followed by a “Fireside Chat” ten days later, in which he argued that in order to gain “world mastery” Hitler must first “silence the British navy”:

I think it must be explained over and over again to people who like to think of the United States Navy as an invincible protection, that this can be true only if the British Navy survives. And that, my friends, is simple arithmetic.⁸⁰

The repeated articulation that Britain’s freedom was an essential national interest of the United States had an important effect in shaping attitudes towards the conflict. After the sinking of the *Robin Moor*, “a lawless act of violence,” in June 1941, FDR further emphasized the importance of maintaining Britain’s survival.⁸¹ In the debate that surrounded the repeal of the neutrality legislation in November of that year, German control of the sea was the most important element emphasized. The securitization of British freedom was largely successful. In January 1941, 68% of Americans agreed that “our country’s future safety depends on Britain winning the war,” a dramatic shift from 1939 when 77% of Americans had opposed joining a European War even if Germany conquered Britain and France.⁸² This is not to suggest that there was an overt intention to participate in a European War at this stage, rather it reflected a diminution of the realm of political contestation surrounding American assistance to Great Britain. Those who remained isolationist were presented as “appeasers” who in suing for a “negotiated peace” were spouting “nonsense”:

Is it a negotiated peace if a gang of outlaws surrounds your community and on threat of extermination makes you pay tribute to save your own skins?⁸³

The use of “gang of outlaws” plays into a constructed narrative that Britain and the United States share a common civilization that is readily contrasted with Nazi Barbarism. In emphasizing America’s vulnerability to attack, Roosevelt was able to silence many of his

⁸⁰ Roosevelt, *PPP*, #100 “Fireside Chat,” 11 September 1941.

⁸¹ Roosevelt, *PPP*, #66 “Message to Congress on the sinking of the *Robin Moor*,” 20 June 1941.

⁸² Gallup poll, accessed 8 April 2015, <http://ibiblio.org/pha/Gallup/Gallup%201941.htm>. See also William C. Adams, “Opinion and Foreign Policy,” *Foreign Service Journal* (May 1984).

⁸³ Roosevelt, *PPP*, #154 “Fireside Chat,” 29 December 1940.

critics and gradually persuade the American public that Britain and America shared a common fate in this war. It was part of a shared “community” which was threatened. Through his public statements he securitized the defence of Great Britain and the survival of her navy. National interests against a common enemy cemented the rationale for an alliance with Great Britain, but it was two further representations that constructed amity: British democracy and British bravery.

Our Democratic Neighbor

The most frequent and important understandings attached to Britain was the democratic nature of the struggle and the similarities between the British and the American political system. FDR harnessed everyday understandings about Britain’s form of government to emphasize Britain and America’s similar forms of government and common values. A few months before lend-lease was signed, FDR gave a speech at Arlington Cemetery on Armistice Day. He declared:

The Americas, all of the Americas in that century, and the British Isles, England and Scotland and Ireland and Wales, *led the world in spreading the gospel of democracy* among peoples, great and small.⁸⁴

The war became “the great struggle to save our democratic civilization”⁸⁵ with Americans acting initially as “the arsenal of democracy” and subsequently as its great defender.⁸⁶ The statement on the Atlantic Charter announced between Winston Churchill and FDR in August 1941 emphasized the “common principles” and a commitment to allow all nations and peoples self-determination. As with the 1930s, the British Empire was not presented as in any way inconsistent with this goal. The first principle is that neither country “seeks

⁸⁴ Roosevelt, *PPP*, #137 “Address on Armistice Day, Arlington National Cemetery,” 11 November 1940.

⁸⁵ Roosevelt, *PPP*, #107 “Fireside Chat,” 12 October 1942.

⁸⁶ Term first used in “Fireside Chat,” 29 December 1941, also referenced on six further occasions including the 1943 State of the Union address, where Roosevelt declared “I think the arsenal of democracy is making good.”

aggrandizement, territorial or other.”⁸⁷ Conveniently ignoring the British Empire, Britain stands as the defender of democracy in the battle.

In addition to using the democratic nature of Britain to make support and closeness seem natural, the Atlantic Ocean is portrayed as small and no great barrier to America’s security both in the securitization of British freedom and in the amitization of Great Britain. This did not just construct a threat to America but in presenting the wide Ocean as no distance at all, FDR is conjuring imagined physical closeness as well as cultural similarities. In a Press Conference of December 1940, FDR uses the following extended metaphor to illustrate his feelings about providing the British with munitions:

Suppose my neighbor’s home catches fire, and I have a length of garden hose four or five hundred feet away. If he can take my garden hose and connect it up with his hydrant, I may help him to put out his fire. Now, what do I do? I don’t say to him before that operation, “Neighbor, my garden hose cost me \$15; you have to pay me \$15 for it.” What is the transaction that goes on? I don’t want \$15—I want my garden hose back after the fire is over. All right. If it goes through the fire all right, intact, without any damage to it, he gives it back to me and thanks me very much for the use of it. But suppose it gets smashed up—holes in it—during the fire; we don’t have to have too much formality about it, but I say to him, “I was glad to lend you that hose; I see I can’t use it any more, it’s all smashed up.” He says, “How many feet of it were there?” I tell him, “There were 150 feet of it.” He says, “All right, I will replace it.” Now, if I get a nice garden hose back, I am in pretty good shape.

The “neighbourliness” of Britain is a dramatic shift from the discourse – popular during the isolationist period – that America stood protected by two great oceans and so could largely stay out of European affairs. It demonstrates that imaginative geographies affect not only understandings and feelings of closeness but can also be used to transcend physical distance. Since Britain and America needed no “official treaty” and no “unwritten agreement” to be neighbourly, in this understanding we see the narrative generation of the Atlantic Community that has endured to the present day.

⁸⁷ Roosevelt, *PPP*, #86 “Statement on The Atlantic Charter Meeting with Prime Minister Churchill,” 14 August 1941.

Brave Brethren

As America entered the war, the bravery of the British people was frequently referenced. The British were represented as heroes, “the unbeatable defenders of Britain,” who had bravely fought against the odds and stood fast against the superior numbers of the Axis.⁸⁸ Shortly after entering the war, FDR commented:

Many thousands of civilians all over the world have been and are being killed or maimed by enemy action. Indeed, it was the *fortitude of the common people of Britain* under fire which enabled that island to stand and prevented Hitler from winning the war in 1940. The ruins of London and Coventry and other cities are today the proudest monuments to *British heroism*.⁸⁹

It is not surprising that such rhetoric, focused on the character of the British people, became important as America entered the war. If the British were “heroes” for fighting, the charge would be that people of the “arsenal of democracy” had been somehow less heroic in the preceding two years, before America entered. Yet since “today Americans and their British brothers in arms are again fighting on French soil,” exaggerated rhetoric representing the fortitude of the British becomes a common feature of the predicates.⁹⁰ The presentation of British heroism tied into preconceived ideas about the links between heroism, friendship and masculinity.

Tied into the vision of the British people as brave brethren, FDR never hesitated to remind the American public that the British stood alone for the first two years of the war. Britain was presented as a plucky survivor whose continued existence was all but miraculous, but would have been impossible without American support:

This equipment arrived in Britain after the retreat from Dunkirk, where the British had lost great quantities of guns and other military supplies. No one can appraise

⁸⁸ Roosevelt, *PPP*, #27 “Address at the Annual Dinner of White House Correspondents’ Association,” 15 March 1941.

⁸⁹ Roosevelt, *PPP*, #49 “Fireside Chat,” 28 April 1942.

⁹⁰ Roosevelt, *PPP*, #124 “Armistice Day Address,” 11 November 1942.

what effect the delivery of these supplies had upon the successful British resistance in the summer and fall of 1940 when they were fighting against such terrific odds.⁹¹

In further defending the lend-lease program, FDR continued the refrain that until he had been granted the sweeping powers, “Britain stood alone, faced by the same machine of terror which had overwhelmed her allies.”⁹² It was not just the state and politicians, but the British people who were singled out for praise due to their gallant fight against Fascist forces:

For we are fighting on the same side with the British people, who fought alone for *long terrible months*, and withstood the enemy with fortitude and tenacity and skill.⁹³

The use of those “long terrible months” at a State of the Union address was clearly an indication to those who had long argued against lend-lease and favoured neutrality that Pearl Harbor had proved them wrong. A sense of unity with the British people was tied to the community spirit of the British themselves:

When Britain was being subjected to mass bombing in 1940 and 1941 – when the British people, including their King and Prime Minister, were proving that Britain “could take it” – the strategists of the Royal Air Force and of our own Army Air Forces were not idle.⁹⁴

Though emphasizing Britain’s role in preventing the victory of Hitler’s forces, FDR remains careful to state that “our own forces were not idle” since it remains important not to see the British as better but rather as equal to Americans in fortitude and bravery. It is the character not the relative capability of Britain that is emphasized.

Understandings that Brits were not so different from their co-nationals had entered the American imagination in the inter-war period. The aristocracy had been portrayed as more permeable than many could have imagined in the 19th century. In film and literature, the

⁹¹ Roosevelt, *PPP*, #62 “Report to Congress on the Operations of the Lend-Lease Act,” 10 June 1941.

⁹² Roosevelt, *PPP*, #55 “Radio Address Announcing an Unlimited National Emergency,” 27 May 1941.

⁹³ Roosevelt, *PPP*, #5 “State of the Union,” 6 January 1942.

⁹⁴ Roosevelt, *PPP*, #106 “Message to Congress on the progress of the war,” 17 September 1943.

1920s and 1930s had demonstrated the bravery and pluckiness of the Brits. The 1936 film *The Charge of the Light Brigade* had brought Alfred Tennyson's poem to a wide audience and showed Brits at their best. Representations of the Brits tied into the major contours of American masculinity. "Masculinities are lived out in the flesh, but fashioned in the imagination,"⁹⁵ and if the British were, in fact, fighting gallantly, that would have facilitated little had common sense not supported that type of understanding and had the major newspapers not have reported it as such. Actions do not speak for themselves and wartime bravery was ubiquitous in how American correspondents reported on the course of the war. The fraternal links had to be interpreted and represented. British virtuous character was most clearly demonstrated in the personhood of Britain's Prime Minister:

The dauntless fighting spirit of the British people in this war has been expressed in the historic words and deeds of Winston Churchill – and the world knows how the American people feel about him.⁹⁶

In presenting the closeness felt for a foreign Prime Minister (who was himself half-American, a point made frequently by both Churchill and his American counterparts) and the fighting spirit of the British people as taken-for-granted, FDR is going beyond what would be expected in an alliance. Certainly representations of Joseph Stalin never reach such heights. Compared to Winston Churchill's effect on the America imagination, Charles de Gaulle is barely worthy of note. In a 1944 "Toast at a State Luncheon for General de Gaulle," there is a dearth of amitizing rhetoric, and praise for the French resistance is entirely absent. This is hardly surprising given the administration's suspicion and contempt for De Gaulle and the widely held belief that the French had surrendered too easily in 1940.⁹⁷

⁹⁵ Graham Dawson, *Soldier Heroes: British Adventurer, Empire and Imagining of Masculinities* (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 1994), 1.

⁹⁶ Roosevelt, *PPP*, #86 "Fireside Chat," 28 July 1943.

⁹⁷ Roosevelt, *PPP*, #51 "Toast at a State Luncheon for General de Gaulle," 7 July 1944.

Literature and film bolstered understandings of the fortitude and the bravery of ordinary Brits. In 1940, *How Green was my Valley* was the best-selling work of fiction and *Mrs Miniver*, after its success as a column in *The Times*, was third in *The New York Times* bestsellers list and detailed the “ordinary British family’s” struggles in the early years of war. As Valarie Grove notes in her introduction, “Roosevelt told Jan Struther than *Mrs. Miniver* had considerably hastened America’s entry into the war; and Winston Churchill said that *Mrs. Miniver* had done more for the allies than a flotilla of battleships.”⁹⁸ In 1941, *The White Cliffs* was the second best-selling work of non-fiction. Its preface serves to further tie Britain and America mentioning the “profound admiration for the dogged defiance put up by Great Britain against long odds and a growing realization that we are fighting America’s battle.” Most importantly it urges the reader to “see ourselves as a friendly American sees us.”⁹⁹ Alice Duer Miller ends her series of poems with the following plea:

I am American bred,
I have seen much to hate here – much to forgive,
But in a world where England is finished and dead,
I do not wish to live.¹⁰⁰

Each of these books had a profound effect on generating American sympathies. If prior to America’s entry into the war, the threat from Germany had been successfully securitized, four years of fighting as brothers in arms completed the americanization of America’s democratic twin across the Atlantic – the Empire of Great Britain.

Addendum to the Special Relationship

As the Second World War came to a close, and with it the need for an especially close relationship with the British, lend-lease was cancelled. British and American policy makers had differing interests and approaches to the post-war reconstruction of Europe and the threat

⁹⁸ Valarie Grove, “Introduction,” in Jan Struther, *Mrs Miniver* (London: Virago, 1989), xi.

⁹⁹ Alice Duer Miller, *The White Cliffs* (London: Methuen, 1941), preface by Sir Walter Layton.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 59.

posed by the Soviet Union.¹⁰¹ They also had deep disagreements over policy in Palestine, Iran, and the British imperial preference in trade and economic policy. Few American politicians were receptive to Churchill's desire for an English-speaking brotherhood, especially as suspicion of the Attlee Government was rife, but a return to immediately treating Britain as *just another nation* was no longer possible. The lived experience of the Second World War strengthened the bonds that had been discursively constructed.

A decade of amitizing rhetoric and cultural discourse that presented Britain as a kindred democracy in the good fight and images of Brits as gallant and steadfast could not easily be swept away. Nor could the two million American soldiers who had been stationed in Britain forget how they had come to know and recognize that the Brits were “not so different after all.”¹⁰² In 1944, a popular pamphlet was produced to show the co-operation and amity between Americans and their British allies:

There are no signs hanging in parliament or congress saying, “The Americans and British have come to know each other, and they seem to be getting along fine.” Let them stand in the local pub and listen...These are the things our leaders must discover. For although democracies may have their undemocratic moments, in the end it's the people who count. *And, in this war, as never before, enough of the two people have come to know each other well enough to want to be friends.*¹⁰³

Common sense is not easily undone, and, once amitized, policy makers find it difficult to shift the meanings that their electorate have attached to any nation. This has been especially true of the Anglo-American relationship. The subsequent history of Anglo-American

¹⁰¹ See Richard Wevill, *Britain and America after World War II: Bilateral Relations and the Beginnings of the Cold War* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2012) discusses the role of the British embassy in persuading American policy makers to enact the Marshall Plan and assuaging American fears about a “socialist” Labour government. David Reynolds, *From World War to Cold War: Churchill, Roosevelt, and the International History of the 1940s* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006), gives a useful and nuanced discussion of some of the areas of agreement after the Second World War seeing a “special relationship” as a function of ‘importance’ and ‘quality’. He comments that “from the late 1940s to the early 1960s the Anglo-American relationship was not without its frictions, but it was nonetheless uniquely close and uniquely important to both governments and to the reshaping of the post-war world,” 312.

¹⁰² Quote taken from an audio interview with Lt. Col Barney Oldfield, on display at the World War II Museum New Orleans, Louisiana.

¹⁰³ Betty Knox, *Over Here from Other There: A Pictorial Record of 25 years of Anglo-American Comradeship in Arms and Peace in 118 Authentic Photos* (London: Alliance Press, 1944).

relations bears out the fact that, when acting, policy makers are limited by the understanding that Britain deserves special treatment. Moments of supreme political crisis such as Suez and Skybolt, or divergent interests, or even sceptical politicians at the top have not diminished Britain's special place in the American imagination.¹⁰⁴ Indeed, these crises come about precisely when the expectations between the two nations are violated and when American policy makers fail to remember that their options are limited by Britain's subject position "friend" that was the consequence of the inter-war amitization of Britain. Such was the case when the Reagan administration failed to inform the British about their invasion of Grenada in 1983. Yet, crises are weathered easily.

President Harry Truman faced a plethora of challenges in the aftermath of victory. The decision to pursue a strategy of containment and to establish an anti-communist framework for global order is assessed further in chapter 6. However, Anglo-American ties were a foundation on which the decision to form a long term defence pact with Western Europe could be built. The intelligence sharing of the Second World War was cemented in the 1948 UK-US Agreements and continues to this day. The label "friend of America" continues to apply to Britain and the associated behaviours are usually forthcoming. Britain's categorization as "friend" has diminished the zone of political contestation since the frame of reference of decision-making continues to marginalize Anglophobia and provides an unreceptive climate for those who would wish to deconstruct the "English-speaking brotherhood." America's support for Britain's independent nuclear deterrent through the 1958 US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement continues to this day and remains an uncontested policy in American discourse.

The "English-speaking brotherhood" has if anything expanded to include partial ties to three of Britain's former dominions. The ANZUS Treaty was signed in 1951 and in 1957 NORAD

¹⁰⁴ Richard E Neustadt, *Alliance Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970).

was set up. Although a detailed explication of America's relationship with each of these countries is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is interesting that in the moment of greatest tension between America and a former dominion of Britain, the friendship discourse was present. When New Zealand's Labour government refused to allow United States ships to use their ports because of America's policy of not revealing which of their ships carried nuclear materials, Secretary of State George Schultz stated: "The time has come to part. We part as friends – but we part."¹⁰⁵ New Zealand, in fact, offers the fascinating prospect of a friend which, for a time at least, was not considered an ally. Not all bilateral relations are equal and the relationships that America has cultivated with Canada, Australia and New Zealand can be viewed in some ways as the realization of Churchill's English-Speaking Brotherhood.

Great Britain is an ally in that there remain numerous shared interests and projects – though these are not mimetic. American interests were served neither through Britain's defence of its Empire in the 1940s and 1950s nor its desire to retain control over the Falkland Islands, and nor indeed are they currently being served by Britain's posturing over its membership of the European Union. Indeed, each of these can be critiqued as frustrating American interests elsewhere. But as the relationship has altered, and had its moments of closeness and distance, the friendship discourses are never completely absent, and expectations continue to be placed on politicians in their relations with Britain. Teddy Roosevelt once wrote that "The United States has – and deserves to have – only one friend in the world. This is the United States."¹⁰⁶ Yet, in both his praise of British Empire and in being one of the staunchest critics of Anglophobia, hyphenated American split loyalties and isolationism, he had been, perhaps an unwilling, advocate of the construction of a dominant discourse that sustains a habitual fondness for Great Britain.

¹⁰⁵ George P. Schultz, Manila, July 1986 cited in *Friend or Ally? A Question for New Zealand* by Ewan Jamieson, *McNair Papers* 12.

¹⁰⁶ Theodore Roosevelt, "Uncle Sam's Only Friend is Uncle Sam," *Fear God and Take Your Own Part*, 334-335.

Chapter 5: “The Unbreakable Bond”: Constructing the US-Israel Special Relationship

Israel holds a privileged position in the American imagination. The relationship between the United States and Israel is in many ways unique in that it involves immense, and apparently uncritical and unreciprocated, support from the American side. Or as Moshe Dayan put it: “Our American friends give us arms, money, and advice. We take the money, we take the arms, and we decline the advice.”¹ “The Unbreakable Bond” shared between Israel and America entered Presidential rhetoric in 2009 and has been subject to mass repetition ever since. Its uncontested articulation reflects how embedded a partial concern for Israel’s welfare has become in America. This chapter addresses the question: *How has the US-Israel “unbreakable bond” been constituted such that a sustained American policy of support has been made possible and even intelligible?* It argues that a sustained American policy of uncritical and incomparable support is only intelligible given the amitization of Israel and the naturalization of the friend subject position that Israel continues to enjoy.

It is commonly assumed that the US-Israel partnership came into being shortly after, and as a consequence of, Israel’s victory in the Six-Day War. Though co-operation certainly increased in the late 1960s and 1970s, this chapter argues that many of the constituting discourses for this level of co-operation were laid long before. Israel was a quasi-ally or regional client for much of the Cold War, but a force in American cultural practices throughout. Amity is central in explaining this level of co-operation and best accounts for America’s supererogatory support for the welfare of Israel. The amitization of Israel occurred between 1962 – the year President Kennedy privately assured Israeli Foreign Minister Golda Meir of a US-Israel special relationship – and 1980, the year President Carter presented the “special

¹ Moshe Dayan, cited in Avi Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World* (London: W. W. Norton, 2000), 316.

relationship” to the nation as a *fait accompli*. Three modes of representing Israel dominated presidential rhetoric from the mid-1960s: Israel was portrayed as an economic success story with a pioneering people embodying an entrepreneurial spirit; a “tiny little nation” facing the imminent danger of being overwhelmed by a supposed monolithic Arab nationalist movement; and a peace-loving democracy.

These representations provided the discursive context from which American presidents were able to present Israel as a kindred nation, creating and reinforcing understandings of Israel as an *Other Self*, embodying the character and attributes underpinning the American experience. The emphasis on the similarities between the United States and Israel are the most important utterances in tracing amity. President Johnson was the first president to articulate a public preference for Israel.² Then as President Nixon took office America lost certainty in its external relations and ventures, which, after the Tet Offensive debacle (1968), created a Vietnam Syndrome.³ Both the American public and their political representatives became less willing to engage in unilateral foreign interventions. This political-cultural introspection and desire to mitigate anxiety resulted in ever-closer ties with the state of Israel, in whose successes Americans regained confidence and self-esteem.

By 1978, an understanding that Israel was a friend of the United States was presented as common sense. In response to a question on whether Israel should accept a Palestinian homeland, President Carter stated:

² Lyndon B. Johnson, *Public Papers of the President (PPP)*, #175 “Remarks in New York City at the Dinner of the Weizmann Institute of Science,” 6 February 1964.

³ The Vietnam Syndrome has been much discussed in scholarship on US foreign policy generally and the Middle East specifically. In *American Orientalism* (London: I. B. Taurus, 2003), Douglas Little describes the Gulf War 1991 as an attempt at “kicking the Vietnam Syndrome,” chapter 7. Other authors who analyse the Middle East as a location where America could kick the Vietnam Syndrome include: Derek Gregory, *The Colonial Present: Afghanistan, Palestine, Iraq* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004); Melani McAlister, *Epic Encounters: Culture Media and US Interests in the Middle East, 1945-2000* (London: University of California Press, 2001); and James William Gibson, *Warrior Dreams: Paramilitary Culture in Post-Vietnam America* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1994).

We have a special relationship with Israel. It's absolutely crucial that no-one in our country or around the world ever doubt that our *number one commitment* in the Middle East is to protect the right of Israel to exist, to exist permanently, and to exist in peace. It's a special relationship.⁴

The most important aspect of Carter's rhetoric was his portrayal of this "special relationship" as natural and taken-for-granted: "The US, *as all of you know*, has a warm and unique relationship of friendship with Israel that is morally right. It is compatible with our deepest religious convictions, and it is right in terms of America's own strategic interest."⁵ This appeal to common sense is more than an invocation of opinion, it is an utterance imbued with power to produce common sense. Through portraying the US-Israel relationship as permanent, natural, and good for America, Jimmy Carter made the performative utterances that naturalized the "special relationship" and made it the referent for all future state interaction: in short, he amitized Israel.

The Anomalous Relationship

Israel receives incomparable support from America – political, economic, and military.⁶ The US has consistently taken a severe posture towards UN General Assembly resolutions that sought to equate Zionism with racism.⁷ It has vetoed 44 Security Council resolutions critical of Israel since 1978 and currently follows the "Negroponte Doctrine," which states that resolutions critical of Israel will be indiscriminately vetoed unless they also condemn US-

⁴ Jimmy Carter, *PPP*, "Presidents News Conference," 12 May 1977.

⁵ Carter, *PPP*, "First Anniversary of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty Remarks of the President, Ambassador Ashraf A. Ghorbal of Egypt, and Ambassador Ephraim Evron of Israel at a White House Reception," 23 March 1980.

⁶ This is a brief summary of the quantifiable content of the special relationship. Other accounts provide greater details, see Stephen M. Walt and John J. Mearsheimer, *The Israel Lobby and U. S. Foreign Policy* (London: Penguin, 2008), 23-48.

⁷ **A/RES/3379(XXX)** "determines that Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination." This enabled some in America to question membership of the UN. President Reagan made it clear that any attempts to expel Israel would result in the US's withdrawal from the organization. On 14 March 1984, he stated: "the so-called anti-Zionism just another mask for vicious anti-Semitism, and that's something the United States will not tolerate" *PPP*. The resolution was overturned only after substantial US pressure in 1991.

labelled terrorist groups, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, in equally strong terms.⁸ After the IDF's botched flotilla-raid in June 2010, for example, the President of the Security Council issued a statement that expressed "regret" for the loss of life. However, no blame was assigned.⁹ Given the global outrage over what was perceived to have been Israel's disproportionate use of force, the failure of the UNSC to issue a more damning assessment reflects American unwillingness to criticize Israel publicly.¹⁰

Israel has been heavily dependent on foreign aid for economic development. Reparations from the Federal Republic of Germany for the State of Israel and for individual victims of the Holocaust were vital throughout the 1950s, as was the philanthropy of the Jewish Diaspora. However, since the late-1960s economic grants and loan from the US Federal Government has been a major contributor to Israel's economic development. Congress first earmarked a specific amount of economic aid for Israel in 1971. Since then, aid to Israel has amounted to an average of \$2 billion annually; after 1985, the figure stands at \$3 billion.¹¹ By far the greatest part of this economic assistance has been in the form of grants rather than loans. Without this economic assistance Israel would not have been able to maintain its military expenditure, survive its balance of payments crisis in the mid-1970s, or settle such high numbers of Soviet Jews after the break-up of the Soviet Union. Alberto Alesina and David Dollar have shown that, since 1976, "the US has targeted about one third of its total

⁸ "Statement by Ambassador John D. Negroponte," 5 August 2002. The number of vetoes would undoubtedly be larger, but the other Permanent Security Council members increasingly do not propose resolutions critical of Israel due to their inevitable failure. The Obama Administration continued this policy on 18 February 2011 when they vetoed a Resolution that condemned Israel's settlement expansion. **S/2011/24.**

⁹ **S/PRST/2010/9.**

¹⁰ Ban-Ki Moon statement: "While recognizing Israel's security concerns regarding the continued firing of rockets from Gaza, he firmly reiterates Israel's obligation to uphold international humanitarian and human rights law and *condemns excessive use of force leading to the killing and injuring of civilians.*" 28 December 2008. **SG/SM/12025.**

¹¹ Clyde R. Mark, "Israel: U.S. Foreign Assistance," *Foreign Affairs and National Research Division*, updated 26 July 1994, Jeremy M. Sharp, "US Foreign Aid to Israel," *CRS Report for Congress*, updated 4 December 2009.

assistance to Egypt and Israel.”¹² In their statistical analysis they are forced to control America’s “special interest” in order to draw more detailed conclusions about the broader nature and direction of aid. This is indicative of the supererogatory support offered to Israel.

The most crucial form of material support is military assistance. This comes both in the form of extensive military grants-in-aid and the sale of advanced weaponry, denied to other allies. There was a shift in American policy in the 1960s; from a determination to avoid an arms race in the Middle East and, in particular, to avoid nuclear proliferation in the region, to a commitment to maintain Israel’s “qualitative military advantage” over her neighbours. In 1966, President Johnson sold Sky-Hawks to Israel after Kennedy had agreed to provide a small number of Hawk missiles in 1963.¹³ The key turning point, however, came in 1968 when the Johnson administration finally agreed to the sale of advanced offensive military equipment, including F-4 Phantom fighters. America effectively replaced France’s role as Israel’s arms-supplier-in-chief, once President Charles De Gaulle broke his own “special relationship” with Israel. Correctly described as “one of the most significant acts in the Israeli-American relationship,” all subsequent administrations have followed the precedent set by this deal.¹⁴

¹² Alberto Alesina and David Dollar, “Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?” *Journal of Economic Growth* 5 (1) (2000).

¹³ Zach Levey, “The United States’ Skyhawk Sale to Israel, 1966: Strategic Exigencies of an Arms Deal,” *Diplomatic History* 28 (2) (2004). In *American Orientalism*, Douglas Little argues that the origins of the special relationship lie in Kennedy’s worries concerning Israel’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. He claims that the strategic military relationship was fostered because it was believed that furthering Israel’s security with conventional weapons would persuade David Ben-Gurion and Levi Eshkol that a nuclear deterrent was unnecessary. Michael Oren, *Power, Faith and Fantasy: America in the Middle East since 1776* (London: W. W. Norton, 2007), also claims that Kennedy’s decision to provide Hawk missiles to Israel was an “attempt to assuage Ben-Gurion’s fears,” 8. They are undoubtedly correct that fear of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East was a major determinant in enabling this early military support for Israel. However, they cannot explain the most important facet of the relationship: the relative dearth of official criticism and lack of debate about the utility of the special relationship.

¹⁴ T. G. Fraser, *The US and the Middle East since World War 2* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989), 85. See also William Quandt, *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2005).

However, this *quantifiable* support is only a part of the relationship. More important is America's general attitude of sympathy and concern towards Israel. This manifests especially in the lack of debate over the nature of US assistance to Israel and the paucity of criticism of the Jewish state to be found in US media, branches of federal and local government, and academic institutions. It would not be an exaggeration to describe a public pledge to further Israel's well-being as a litmus-test for any presidential aspirant: since 1968 every Republican and Democratic Party Platform for the Presidency has repeated a commitment to continue to support Israel.¹⁵ Criticism of Israel remains a major electoral liability for congressmen. The dearth of critical responses to Israel's foreign policy choices largely reflects the taken-for-granted nature of the relationship and a context that does violence against those who voice such opinions publicly.¹⁶

Unofficial censorship has limited a public debate about the relationship. In 1989, Professor Charles Black wrote an article entitled: "Let Us Rethink Our 'Special Relationship' with Israel," in which he argued that America and Israel were *participes crimines*, that the US bore responsibility for Israel's misuse of power in the Occupied Territories, and that continued support was neither moral nor legal.¹⁷ The special relationship was a "howling paradox" that weakened America's ability to retain the moral high-ground when addressing China's human rights abuses, making her liable to charges of hypocrisy. His argument – that "we have no *right* to keep on sustaining and constantly renewing the power of Israel" – stood alone as a critical commentary on the nature of US-Israel relations. However, no magazine or journal in the United States would publish it. This was the only time in his career that he failed to be

¹⁵ Data collected from *The American Presidency Project*, accessed 8 April 2015, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/>

¹⁶ The marginalization of opinions and the development of consensus is an important part of the naturalization of certain subject positions. The violence against those authors who criticize Israel's foreign policy in the United States tends to focus on labels such as "anti-Semite" and "self-hating Jew." This violence conforms to Butler's assessment of the performative role of gender norms.

¹⁷ Charles L. Black Jr., "Let Us Rethink Our Special Relationship with Israel," (1989). The article was published and distributed by a Jewish organization, accessed 8 April 2015 at: www.mafhoum.com/press/51P13.htm.

published. Charles Black was not a radical on the margins of academia. *The New York Times* obituary described him as “a leading authority on constitutional law....a prominent voice in the national debates on presidential impeachments, desegregation, the death penalty and other issues.”¹⁸ The non-publication of his article is indicative of the marginalization of those critical of Israel’s policies and the dominance of the friend frame of reference, which limits legitimate contestation over the continuation of the relationship.

The lack of academic and political criticism is the main reason that the US is out-of-step with most other nations on many of the complex issues surrounding the Israel-Palestinian conflict. America and Israel stand alone in refusing to push for a final status agreement with the Palestinians. Without America’s tacit support for the principle of “peace for peace,” it is unlikely that successive Israel governments would have been able to ignore the “land for peace” formula enshrined in UNSC Resolution 242 and hold onto the land occupied in June 1967, or annex the Golan Heights in 1981. With uncritical and unconditional American support, Israel can push boundaries further than most IR theories, that see states as self-interested entities, can tolerate.¹⁹

There is a substantial literature on US-Israel relations out of which emerge three major arguments as to why the US provides such a high level of support for its friend in the Middle East. These are: (1) Israel is, or at least was, a strategic asset for the United States; (2) the existence of a powerful lobby of pro-Israel activists has effectively pressured the executive and legislative branches to advocate policies that further Israel’s interests; (3) the US public has a relatively stable and widespread preference for policies favourable to Israel. Each of these is briefly assessed. It is argued that none of these arguments alone can account for the

¹⁸ Robert D. McFadden, “Charles L. Black Jr., 85, Constitutional Law Expert Who Wrote on Impeachment, Dies,” *New York Times*, 8 May 2001.

¹⁹ Support for Israel is not totally *unconditional*. Ronald Reagan suspended a strategic co-operation agreement with Israel after the annexation of the Golan Heights and George W. Bush imposed sanctions on Israel over Israel’s decision to sell weapons to China in 2005. It is, however, more unconditional than other relations.

emergence and maintenance of the relationship. In fact, scrutiny of each lends support for the main contention of this chapter: that a close tie with Israel was discursively constructed as Americans came to see themselves in Israel, and it is maintained through a dominant discourse that makes unsupportive actions unimaginable.

“Strategic Asset”: Real or Imagined?

If Israel is a strategic asset, the costs of fostering close ties must be clearly outweighed by the strategic benefits America derives.²⁰ There is a widely-held assumption that Israel, *at some point, was clearly an asset to the United States* and this best explains the origins of the relationship. The Cold War context is hailed as causing a close alignment between America and a “democratic” and “West-leaning” Israel in opposition to unreliable and communist-leaning Arab states. This division is taken-for-granted in realist accounts of the Cold War and neo-orientalist cultural accounts, such as Huntington’s *Clash of Civilizations*. These assumptions are based on simplified Manichean world views and form part of the narrative that frames how Israel is imagined in America.

In 1962 there was much discussion in the US State Department about how to respond to Israel’s request for defensive Hawk anti-aircraft missiles. In the course of the debate a memorandum was issued which summed up thoughts on a “Special National Security Arrangement with Israel.” The arguments for and against are listed below:

a. For

- i. From the foreign policy standpoint, *there are no advantages*.
- ii. From a domestic point of view, the American supporters of Israel would be pleased and would be less critical of our policy.

²⁰ In fact the term “strategic asset” implies a degree of objectivity in measurement that this thesis, with its focus on constructed interests and the importance of discourses, denies. However, given that discourses intervene in the world it is worth considering whether the presuppositions that Israel is an asset are or ever were widespread.

b. Against

- i. Would constitute a direct challenge to the Arabs by the US, destroy growing Arab confidence in our *impartiality*, and remove the protective covering of the UN behind which we deal with most Palestine issues.
- ii. Could not be counterbalanced by creation of a corresponding relationship with the Arabs.
- iii. Would render the US responsible in Arab eyes for every Israeli military venture.
- iv. Would encourage the more fanatical Arabs to seek a similar relationship with the Soviet Union and would hand the Soviets a very useful propaganda weapon.
- v. Would be the only US security arrangement with another country not directed against the Sino-Soviet bloc, and would cause us further problems with Pakistan in refusing to take Pakistan's side in the Kashmir dispute.
- vi. Would lead to increasing Israeli demands for sophisticated weapons.
- vii. Would put greater pressure on Arab leaders well-disposed toward the US.
- viii. Would be unnecessary to maintenance of Israel's security.
- ix. Would pose security problems for [the Department of Defense].

Ultimately, it was concluded that an "effective military alliance with Israel would destroy the delicate balance we seek to maintain in our Near Eastern relations," and the impartiality that America had attempted to foster in the region.²¹ However, an even stronger security arrangement than that envisaged in 1962 was in place by the time Ronald Reagan took the oath of office in 1981 and arguably had been so since the signing of the 1968 Foreign Assistance Act. The shift from the balanced position found in the 1950 Tripartite Agreement to an "Israel first" policy cannot be given an explanation in strategic terms: Israel was hapless

²¹ *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)*, 1961-1963, Volume XVII, Near East, 1961-1962, 290: "Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) to Secretary of State Dean Rusk." Note the similarity between this and General Petraeus, Testimony to the Senate Foreign Services Committee, 16 March 2010 where he stated that "Arab anger over the Palestinian question limits the strength and depth of U.S. partnerships with governments and peoples [in the region]." Although he subsequently distanced himself from these remarks, it would be foolish for policy makers not to consider the linkage between US policy and current difficulties in the region. The emphasis on the importance of "Arab Confidence in our impartiality" is also significant as it demonstrates the concern in private documents that America's actions are viewed by others as fair and unbiased.

and self-interested during the 1958 Revolutionary Year. Prime Minister Ben-Gurion demanded concessions from the United States in return for use of its air space – hardly the behaviour of an asset. Those who argue that US overstretch in Vietnam and the articulation of the “Nixon Doctrine” mean that Israel was self-evidently a trustworthy asset cannot account for the obvious disquiet in the White House during Black September where National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger and President Richard Nixon expressed significant concern about acting with the support of the Government of Israel – which was seen as untrustworthy and having “their own reasons for wishing to send ground troops into Jordan.”²²

Looking at whether Israel has proved an asset or liability for the United States through simple cost/benefit analysis is unsatisfactory. First, it is extremely hard to measure: attempts to weigh up the gain in having a regional proxy that could provide information and support against terrorism, help further United States interests in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, and test out advanced US weaponry, relative to the loss of opportunity cost in furthering cordial relations with Iran, Syria, and a more nuanced approach to Arab nationalist movements are incalculable. Secondly, it assumes a conception of state rationality that this thesis has already rejected.

It cannot be stated that Israel is a strategic asset, nor can it even be stated that policy makers widely *perceive* Israel as a strategic asset. The available evidence – given the lack of the notes on internal foreign policy deliberations after 1973 – demonstrates that since the 1980s, Israel has been increasingly *defined* as a strategic asset.²³ In a sense, therefore, “strategic asset” becomes just another labelling technique that presidents and elites have at their

²² *FRUS*, 1969-1976, Volume XXIV, 289: “Transcript of a Telephone Conversation between Nixon and Kissinger,” in which Kissinger notes, “it’s damn hard to get [the Israelis] out once they’re in.” This is not to suggest that Israel was of no use to the United States during Black September, Israel’s air-support for Jordan against the Syrian-backed Palestinian land incursion was vital as was Israeli radio relaying of Hussein’s commands to Jordanian army units. Rather, the discussion reveals that trust – the sort that has been used by some authors to indicate friendship – was absent in 1970.

²³ Joe Stork, “Israel as a Strategic Asset,” *MERIP Report*, May 1982.

disposal to construct America's national interest and (re)produce an identity, in this case the vital interest in supporting its friend in the Middle East. Indeed, if Israel was actually a strategic asset "this would," as Kamil Mansur notes, "carry the seeds within it for its own negation."²⁴ The label survives precisely because it is not obvious that Israel is an asset. The term is used to explain why the Americans do not claim greater leverage over Israel's actions in return for continued support and why there is no substantial distancing when Israel pursues policies that adversely affect US interests.²⁵

The Israel Lobby

Dissatisfaction with the argument that Israel is a strategic asset has led to claims that American support is the result of a lobby, consisting in a "pro-Israel community," which is actively engaged in the policy process and attempting to change the direction of American foreign policy.²⁶ The openness of US government, guaranteed in the first amendment of the Constitution, provides the multiple venues through which foreign governments and domestic lobbying groups can permeate government and the policy process in order to influence decision-making. The importance of money in US elections, given the two-year cycle, *Citizens United* (2010), and the failure to enact effective campaign finance reform, has led to arguments that politicians are hyper-sensitive to the will of powerful interest groups: an "iron triangle" linking the executive, legislative and interests.

Since its establishment in 1963, AIPAC has grown into a formidable political force. Add to this the rise of pro-Israel factions both in academic institutions and the Christian Right, and

²⁴ Kamil Mansur, *Beyond Alliance: Israel in US Foreign Policy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 32.

²⁵ Examples include Israel's attempt to sell military hardware to China in the 1990s, the conviction of Jonathan Pollard who spied on the CIA for Israel in the 1980s.

²⁶ Walt and Mearsheimer, *The Israel Lobby*, 112-4.

interest group driven accounts gain plausibility.²⁷ There is certainly a large pro-Israel community in America. Recently declassified documents reveal that President Kennedy was concerned about getting his Department of Justice to register the American Zionist Organization as a foreign rather than a domestic agent.²⁸ The power of the lobby was also noted by successive presidents. Richard Nixon's *Memoirs* express his frustration with the lobby after Congress overrode his decision to postpone the delivery of F-4 Phantoms in 1970:

One of the main problems I faced...was the unyielding and short-sighted pro-Israel attitude prevalent in large and influential segments of the American Jewish community, Congress, the media and in intellectual and cultural circles. In the quarter century since the end of World War Two this attitude had been so deeply ingrained that many saw this corollary of not being pro-Israel as being anti-Israel, or even anti-Semitic.²⁹

Ronald Reagan too appears to have believed that the Israel lobby was immensely powerful. During the Lebanon Civil War he noted: "We are trying to get the Israel lobby which is incredibly powerful in Cong.[ress] to go to work on how much Israel has to lose if Congress forces a withdrawal of our troops."³⁰ His successor, George H. W. Bush also commented on the power of the Lobby in his futile attempts to get Yitzhak Shamir to cease settlement expansion: "I am up against some pretty powerful political forces, but I owe it to the American people to tell them how strongly I feel about deferral."³¹ It is important to note that these statements imply that the "powerful forces" are as much attitudinal as they are institutional, yet those who emphasize the role of the lobby frequently talk as though the lobby is a purely institutional factor, an interest group backed by economic power.

²⁷ On accounts about the influence of the Christian Right see Victoria Clarke, *Allies for Armageddon: The Rise of Christian Zionism* (London: Yale University Press, 2007) and Lawrence Davidson, "Christian Zionism as a Representation of Manifest Destiny," *Critical Middle Eastern Studies* 14 (2) (2005).

²⁸ Accessed 8 April 2015, available at http://irmep.org/ila/FARA/01_AZC_FARA_Order.htm

²⁹ Richard M. Nixon, *Memoirs* (London: Arrow Books, 1979), 481.

³⁰ Ronald Reagan, *Reagan Diaries*, Friday 27 January 1984.

³¹ George H. W. Bush, *PPP*, "President's News Conference," 12 September 1991.

Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer's *The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy* (2007) is the most widely cited critique of the role of the Israel lobby in the formation of US foreign policy. They argue that "the United States provides Israel with extraordinary material aid and diplomatic support, the lobby is the principal reason for that support, and this uncritical and unconditional relationship is not in the American national interest."³² By controlling the discourse surrounding Israel and influencing campaign financing, they contend that the lobby wields an unnatural influence over the direction of America's Middle East policy. Their willingness to challenge the Israel as asset narrative should not, however, elide the limitations of their argument. They only provide convincing evidence for their first claim: the US does provide "extraordinary material aid and diplomatic support." They do not demonstrate that this is primarily caused by the lobby; for their account does not look at the emergence of the lobby in America, or at how the special relationship and everyday meanings attached to Israel create opportunities for AIPAC and other supporters of Israel that are not available to other interest groups. Finally, they can only justify their third premise – that the relationship is not in America's interest – if national interests are strictly defined in terms of power. In short, Walt and Mearsheimer are guilty of a lack of imagination: if material interests cannot explain US-Israel policy it must be the consequence of "domestic political penetration."³³ They fail to address the point that discourses make state action possible and intelligible.

More nuanced accounts of the role of the Israel lobby are offered in Cheryl Rubenberg's *Israel and the American National Interest* (1986) and George Ball and Douglas Ball's *The Passionate Attachment* (1992). Rubenberg argues that the relationship depends on both false perceptions – "a total misunderstanding of the Arab world," which has created an elite

³² Walt and Mearsheimer, *The Israel Lobby*, 18.

³³ Stephen M. Walt, *Taming American Power: The Global Response to US Primacy* (New York: Norton, 2005), 194-210.

consensus that Israel is a strategic asset – as well as the power of the lobby.³⁴ She maintains that “the existence of an intensely emotionally committed and active group of pro-Israeli individuals in the United States has given Israel a tremendous advantage in the effort to win hearts and minds of Americans.”³⁵ In this Rubenberg is undoubtedly correct. Unlike Walt and Mearsheimer, Rubenberg examines other major factors within American society, such as Holocaust guilt and the traditional hostility towards Islam. Ball and Ball’s account is also a valuable assessment of the numerous ways in which the lobby can and has affected policy: they highlight cases such as the 1981 battle over the sale of Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACs) to Saudi Arabia and factors such as the “pro-Israel caucus.”³⁶ However, in over-emphasizing the role of the lobby, Ball and Ball excuse presidential responsibility for their role in Israel’s actions – effectively scapegoating the lobby. Both accounts do not trace and rigorously assess the role of representations and common sense in facilitating the lobby’s rise and continued importance in American politics.

The power of the lobbies cannot be explained without looking at the institutions and cultural resources that facilitate their rise as legitimate political actors. As Kamil Mansur noted, “an ideological-cultural environment favourable to the lobby is a necessary if not a sufficient condition for its development.”³⁷ The Israel lobby clearly has a substantial role in electoral financing, but so do other lobbying groups. The Israel lobby argument is self-referential: if one explains support for Israel with reference to the Israel lobby one cannot account for why opposing lobbies that promote Arab interests, and in particular business interests, have not neutralized the effect of the Israel lobby. How has it been made possible that opposing lobbies have not become as important in determining America’s Middle East policy?

³⁴ Cheryl Rubenberg, *Israel and the National Interest: A Critical Examination* (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1986), 9.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 335.

³⁶ George Ball and Douglas Ball, *The Passionate Attachment: America’s Involvement with Israel 1947-Present* (London: Norton, 1992), chapter 9.

³⁷ Mansur, *Beyond Alliance*, 274.

Ultimately, it matters not only how powerful the messenger is: the recipient's willingness to react to the message is what will determine the response. It is this willingness that the Israel lobby argument does not fully account for.

Public Preferences

In response to *The Israel Lobby*, Walter Russell Mead has argued that “a pro-Israel foreign policy does not represent the triumph of a small lobby over the public will. It represents the power of public opinion to shape foreign policy in the face of concerns by foreign policy professionals.”³⁸ Using polling data he demonstrates that “the American public has few foreign policy preferences that are this marked, this deep, this enduring – and this much at odds with public opinion in other countries.”³⁹ He is correct to note the American public's consistently high support for Israel since June 1967, and he makes insightful comments about “the Right Turn” in support, as ideas of premillennial dispensationalism have become more wide-spread. Figure 5.1 (below) shows the trends in US public opinion towards the Arab-Israel conflict since 1967.⁴⁰

Polls, taken since 1967, reveal that on average 47.2% of respondents sympathize with the Israelis, in contrast with 11.1% who sympathize with the Arabs. The graph demonstrates a consistent pro-Israel preference among those questioned. The lowest level of support for Israel was in September 1982, shortly after the Sabra and Shatila massacres, and highs are found during the 1991 Gulf War when Israel was bombarded with Iraqi SCUD missiles. The graph also demonstrates a slight growth in the number of respondents who sympathize with the Arabs since 1967 along with a net-decline in the number with no marked preference for


³⁸ Walter Russell Mead, “The New Israel and the Old: Why Gentile Americans Back The Jewish State,” *Foreign Affairs* July/August 2008.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Compiled from Gallup, accessed 8 April 2015, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/126155/support-israel-near-record-high.aspx>.

either side. This is indicative of increased interest in the conflict as America has become actively involved in the peace process.

Figure 5.1: American sympathies (%) in the Arab-Israel conflict



Many of Mead’s claims that Americans see Israel as “chosen cousins” with a common history and value-set that is strengthened by the apparent similarities of “settler states” are plausible and presupposed in much of the literature on the special relationship. It mirrors his arguments about the familial relationship between Britain and the United States. However, these claims are difficult to demonstrate, and certainly require greater analysis than that of polling data. Ideas are important, but without discourse analysis and an understanding of how these ideas became part of American common sense, it is impossible to demonstrate that they are anything more than window-dressing. Jutta Weldes and Diane Saco point out that “individual beliefs are neither meaningful nor strictly speaking possible without the socially constituted

and shared language in which they find expression.”⁴¹ Ideas gain meaning given an interpreted set of social practices. The argument from ideas is therefore at best incomplete and at worst misleading, since it lacks a discursive framework, without which a relationship between beliefs and behaviours is assumed. Mead also does not explore the interplay of public opinion and elite manipulation, which is crucial to any study that looks at the discursive construction of reality that enables an intelligible foreign policy.

Imagining Israel

In *Israel in the Mind of America* (1983), Paul Grose concluded with the observation:

Liking it or not, Americans who are willing to look see something of themselves in Israel. Even as they go their own way, in pursuit of their own interests, Americans and Israelis are bonded together like no two other sovereign peoples. As the Judaic heritage flowed through the minds of America’s early settlers and helped to shape the new American republic, so Israel restored adopted the vision and the values of the American dream. Each, the United States and Israel, *grafted the heritage of the other onto itself*.⁴²

Similarity is constructed, not discovered. If by the 1980s Americans could see something of themselves in Israel, this was due to the success of various discourses in naturalizing to make such a statement appear unquestionably true. How then did discourses favouring a close alignment with Israel become dominant in the United States? After the Second World War a series of representations of Jews, Jewish-Americans, and Israel became common sense; this pre-disposed Americans towards a close relationship with Israel.⁴³ Each of these discursive sites served to render Israel familiar to the American audience. However, it was only after these extant resources were harnessed by presidents in the 1960s and 1970s that the

⁴¹ Jutta Weldes and Diane Saco, “Making State Action Possible: The United States and the Discursive Construction of ‘the Cuban Problem’ 1960-1994,” *Millennium* 25 (2) (1996): 371.

⁴² Peter Grose, *Israel in the Mind of America* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1983), 316.

⁴³ These are explored here briefly, but for a fuller account see Michelle Mart, *Eyes on Israel: How America Came to View Israel as an Ally* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006).

categorization of Israel as “friend” became common sense and the quantifiable content of America’s commitment to Israel came to be viewed as incontestable.

A general fascination with the idea of Israel had been a cultural staple in the 17th and 18th centuries. The creation of a “New Jerusalem” became the aim of countless Protestants, fleeing persecution to an America that loomed large in the European imagination. Americans were the “chosen people,” America “the Israel of our time.”⁴⁴ After the War of Independence a serious proposal was put forward in Congress to change the language of the new country to Ancient Hebrew. The theologian Ezra Stiles described “God’s American Israel” and in Thomas Jefferson’s inaugural address, God’s leading of “Israel of old” became the allegorical model for God’s interest in America.⁴⁵ This “New Israel,” however, did not refer to Judaism or a wider Middle East with which most Americans were unfamiliar. Aside from John Adams’ desire “I really wish the Jews again in Judea as an Independent nation,” and a small proto-Christian Zionist movement led by William Eugene Blackstone, few Americans were concerned with recreating a Jewish homeland in the Middle East. Early American fascination with Israel was not based on resurrecting the Israel of the Old Testament but rather on a politics and theology that advocated a realized eschatology in God’s American Israel. The rebirth of Israel in the Holy Land did not stem from this early association of “America” with “Israel” nor did it occur arbitrarily: discourses that would shape US-Israel relations pre-existed the state and these provided some of the frames of reference with which Americans would imagine Israel reborn.

⁴⁴ Herman Melville, *Clarel: A Poem and Pilgrimage in the Holy Land*, ed., Walter E Bezanson (New York: Hendricks House, 1960).

⁴⁵ Eritz Styles, “The United States elevated to Glory and Honor” [Sermon] (1783).

Mainstreaming Jewish Identity

Anti-Semitism has long roots in America. Categorized as the “Hebrew Race” in 1924 immigration legislation, Jews were effectively subjected to immigration quotas. They were berated and ridiculed as “propagandists,” and found themselves the subject of conspiracy theories both at home (Ford’s *The International Jew* described them as the “World’s foremost problem”) and abroad (*The Protocols of Zion*). It is thus hardly surprising that Jews born in 1920s America were sensitive to their status within civil society. The 1920s and 1930s were a heyday for American anti-Semitism in which Jews were cast as “outsiders” and “hyphenated Americans.”⁴⁶ This was in part the consequence of the overall “improvement in circumstances” of Jews, who increasingly found representation in higher education and skilled employment.⁴⁷ Anti-Semitism was augmented further by the Great Depression and remained a significant part of the Jewish-American experience long after polls showed its marked rejection after the Second World War.⁴⁸

The fundamental representation of Israel is that it is a Jewish State. Since Israel is inexorably tied to Jewishness, popular understandings of Jewry in America played a significant role in framing early US-Israel relations. America has a long and complex history with race: colour remains the principal cleavage in American politics; deep-seated racial prejudices permeate civil discourse; and a legacy of white privilege affects multiple aspects of policy-making. Racial identities are, for the most part, socially constructed through a process of inclusion and exclusion. This process is indeterminate, and Thomas Borstelmann claims that this very

⁴⁶ See chapter 4, “Overcoming anti-British Interests.”

⁴⁷ Seymour Martin Lipset, *American Exceptionalism: A Double Edged Sword* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1996), 163.

⁴⁸ This is not to suggest that anti-Semitism ceases to be a feature of American society and politics after the Second World War. The White House tape recordings made during 1969-1971 reveal a tendency of President Nixon to make anti-Semitic statements. Since 1964 the Anti-Defamation League has conducted polling on the presence of anti-Jewish attitudes among Americans. In 1964, 29% were anti-Semitic; in 2013, 12%.

indeterminacy “in the immediate aftermath of World War 2 helped shape shifting American attitudes towards the state of Israel.”⁴⁹

Between the 1930s and the 1960s, Jewish-Americans *became white*: their collective social identity morphed from “outsider” to “insider” and Jews took on roles within the US tri-racial discourse that had previously been associated with “whiteness.” Jews were not the only group that transcended these boundaries in this period: the same is largely true of Southern Europeans and Irish Catholics. This ethno-racial assignment of Jews as differentiated by biology and character gradually dissipated after the Second World War. In *How the Jews Became White Folks* (2006), Karen Brodtkin offers a personal history of the differing Jewish identities within her own family. “Assignment,” she writes, “refers to the ways in which the dominant culture and political understandings construct different categories of social and political beings in the US.”⁵⁰ She comments that her parents’ hyper-sensitivity to the Rosenberg executions in 1953 was alien to her simply because, growing up in the 1950s, she “grew up white.”⁵¹

The re-assignment of Jewish racial identity in the 1950s went hand-in-hand with federal programs designed to elevate Jews whilst simultaneously failing to address the grievances of other racial groups. The reduction of anti-Semitism, therefore, should not be viewed as part of an overall decline in the pervasive influence of racism and racial hierarchies in policy-making, but rather as an extension of whiteness to Jews that allowed for the continued denigration of other ethnic groups. This shifting ethno-racial assignment links to amity: the “white” American stands with the “white” Jew. This colour stretching facilitated and complemented the stretching of identity which occurred as American elites amitized Israel.

⁴⁹ Thomas Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena* (London: Harvard University Press, 2001), 63.

⁵⁰ Karen Brodtkin, *How the Jews Became White Folks: And What That Says About Race in America* (London: Rutgers University Press, 2006), 22.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 2.

Literature and film underscored these shifting images of Jews. In early 20th century literature Jews were minor characters. Jewish-Americans were predominately portrayed as physically and morally different from Americans, outsiders with their own social and moral code. For example, F. Scott Fitzgerald's *The Great Gatsby* (1925) introduces the character Meyer Wolfsheim, "a small, flat-nosed Jew," a gambler, "the man who fixed the World Series back in 1919."⁵² Wolfsheim, based on the New York businessman Arnold Rothstein, who was nicknamed "King of the Jews," is portrayed as fundamentally different from the other characters. His failure to attend Gatsby's funeral is indicative of the notion that Jews stand in relationships to their business partners that differ from those of other Americans.

Jewish-American literature, despite going through a period of "creative awakening" had yet to produce texts that would permeate mainstream American culture.⁵³ Early silent films predominantly portrayed Jews as villains, playing up the "Shylock-stereotype" and in the 1930s "Jews virtually disappeared from America's movie screens."⁵⁴ Lester Friedman argues that until the 1940s Jewish characters were one-dimensional and often sought to conceal their identity: there was a growth of a "that too" attitude, which was reflected in the films. Protagonists sought to de-emphasize their Jewish heritage and to assimilate, acting according to pre-conceived notions of "American-ness."

The belief that Jews are "just like us" became widespread in the 1940s. In 1947, two films, *Crossfire* and *Gentlemen's Agreement*, confronted anti-Semitism. The success of *Gentlemen's Agreement*, a best-selling book and winner of Best Picture at the Academy Awards, is indicative of a changing mood in America. The film challenges characterizations of Jews whilst highlighting the irrationality of anti-Semitism. The protagonist, played by

⁵² F. Scott Fitzgerald, *The Great Gatsby* (New York: Collier-Macmillan, 1992), chapter 4.

⁵³ Louis Harap, *Creative Awakening: the Jewish Presence in Twentieth Century American Literature, 1900-1940s* (London: Greenwood, 1987).

⁵⁴ Lester D. Friedman, *The Jewish Image in American Film* (Secaucus N.J.: Citadel, 1987), 33.

Gregory Peck, is a Gentile who goes undercover as a Jew to write a piece on anti-Semitism. In one scene he stands in front of a mirror commenting on his identical appearance to his friend Dave, a Jewish-American soldier.

Dark hair, dark eyes.
Sure, so has Dave.
So have a lot of guys who aren't Jewish.
No accent, no mannerisms.
Neither has Dave.

The simple act of changing his name from "Green" to "Greenberg" makes him Jewish.⁵⁵ In particular, both films highlight a general misunderstanding that Jews were weak by having prominent characters that are Jewish-American soldiers. They also highlight the systemic discrimination and irrational assumptions that constitute anti-Semitism. The tagline of *Crossfire*, a film in which an anti-Semitic murder takes place in part because of the murderer's misperception that the Jewish victim had lazed around making money during the war, simply states: "Hate is like a loaded gun!"⁵⁶

In literature, Philip Roth's *Goodbye Columbus* (1959) came at the end of "The Jewish Decade," which saw an "unprecedented unleashing of creative energies by Jewish writers."⁵⁷ Images of Jewish soldier came to prominence in the American imagination and stood in contrast to the negative-stereotype of the "Communist Jew," furthered by a sub-culture of Jewish artists like poet Allen Ginsberg; whose classic *America* (1956) depicts American fears of the Jews' "effeminate," "communist" influence. "Tough Jew" images were prominent in

⁵⁵ *Gentlemen's Agreement*, directed by Elia Kazan (1947, USA: 20th Century Fox, 2005), DVD, and *Crossfire* directed by Edward Dmytryk (1947, USA: Universal Pictures, 2007), DVD.

⁵⁶ The strong Jewish presence in Hollywood is, of course, not incidental. Both of these films (and the book of which *Gentlemen's Agreement* was based) had Jewish writers and producers. However, it is too simple to see the construction of anti-anti-Semitic narratives as the consequence of a deliberate attempt by powerful executives to further their own political and social agenda. The audience has to be ready to receive such a message. Equivalence can be drawn with the mainstreaming of LGBTQ rights issues in early 21st century discourse. The production of films like *Milk* (2008) and popular dramas like *Modern Family*, *Glee*, and *The Normal Heart* may reflect a liberal Hollywood bias and the presence of writers and producers who support gay rights, but their popularity reveals an audience that is open or at least not irrevocably hostile to such representations.

⁵⁷ Louis Harap, *In the Mainstream: the Jewish presence in twentieth century American literature, 1950-1980s* (London: Greenwood, 1987), 21.

film with Charlton Heston's portrayal of *Ben-Hur* (1959) and Paul Newman's role in *Exodus* (1961), which "welded together what had been rather scattered images into an epic tale of the founding of a new nation."⁵⁸ These images also served to marginalize negative or "un-American" stereotypes of Jews.

By the late 1960s, Jewish characters had moved away from the villainy of the 1920s, through the silence of the 1930s and the victimhood of the 1940s to become a staple of American cultural discourse. Barbra Streisand's Oscar-winning portrayal of Fanny Brice, with her "American beauty nose and ten American beauty toes" in *Funny Girl* (1968) is important precisely because her Jewishness – although evident – is not the significant trope: her problems are those of gender-dynamics in an all-American relationship.⁵⁹ The ability of Jewish actors to play varied roles, in which they were not stereotyped, and of Jewish characters to explore a multitude of issues outside of their own racial identity, indicate the inclusion of Jewish-Americans within American identity. These meanings attached to Jewishness formed part of the cultural context in which American presidents would encourage closer ties with Israel.

The first public reference to a "special relationship" between Israel and America was articulated by President Ford in 1976:

Two hundred years ago, there were relatively few Jews in America. Though small in number, they were great in spirit. They served in all capacities. George Washington turned to one patriot of Jewish faith, Haym Salomon, when the budget of the Continental Army was totally depleted. Salomon sacrificed his personal fortune and encouraged others to join in financing the American Revolution. In pursuing justice and liberty, *he personified the finest qualities of American patriotism.*

⁵⁸ Melani McAlister, *Epic Encounters: Culture Media and US Interests in the Middle East, 1945-2000* (London: University of California Press, 2001), 163. In chapter 4 she describes how "the Exodus Phenomenon" "captured the American imagination" and laid the ground-work for greater involvement.

⁵⁹ "I am the Greatest Star" *Funny Girl*, directed by William Wyler (1968, USA: Warner Brothers Studios, 2002), DVD.

In those early, early days, we benefited not only from our own patriots but from outside assistance to establish and to maintain our independence. Today, the American people, regardless of religion, see justice in this Nation's traditional and *special relationship* to a kindred nation in the Middle East – the State of Israel.⁶⁰

His claim – that America and Israel shared a special relationship – would find itself subject to mass repetition throughout the following quarter-century. This statement is especially important as Ford ties the relationship to both a close and natural tie with Jewish people and the role of Jewish-Americans in the formation of the American nation. Haym Salomon “personified the finest qualities of American patriotism.” The headline in *The New York Times* the next day was “Ford Pledges US Will Remain Guarantor of Israel's Freedom.” A privileging of the Jewish experience has also been seen in the annual presidential Hanukkah address, the first of which was in 1984, and the opening of the Holocaust Museum in Washington D.C. by President Clinton in 1993. Presidential rhetoric both reflects increased interest in Judaism in US civil society and furthers ideas that Jews and Christians are not dissimilar. This type of rhetoric was only made possible, however, by the mainstreaming of Jewish identity as a legitimate expression of American identity.

Uniting the Diaspora

The commitment of Jewish-Americans to Israel has been an important development in the genealogy of American support for Israel. However, this group-tie was not inevitable. Zionism was a marginal movement within the Jewish-American community throughout the first half of the 20th century. In 1914, “no more than 20,000 of America's 2.5 million Jews belonged to any Zionist organization.”⁶¹ Before the Second World War the vast majority of Jewish-Americans had little interest in realizing a Jewish nation in the Middle East. American

⁶⁰ Gerald Ford, *PPP*, #43 “Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the American Jewish Committee,” 13 May 1976. Of course, here a president is speaking before an Israel-friendly audience, but his remarks were picked up by numerous newspapers and we can assume the given it is a public statement; the choice of such language was not incidental in framing future descriptions of Israel.

⁶¹ Grose, *Israel in the Mind of America*, 45.

Jews continued to have a complicated relationship with Israel in the 1950s. Few Jewish-Americans saw themselves as bound to the Jewish state and even fewer considered making *Aliyah* (the practice of Jews immigrating to Israel (returning to the Holy Land)). Although a 1957 study found that during the 1948 War, around half of Jewish-Americans felt a close affiliation with Israel, the use of language by the respondents is telling. Respondents habitually said things such as: “*They’ve* been persecuted” or “*They’re fighting*,” which, as Marshall Sklare notes, “indicates that considerable distance was still felt between the Jew safe in America and the Jew persecuted in Europe or fighting in Palestine.”⁶² It remained a Diaspora divided.

It is commonly assumed that the enormity of the Nazi genocide immediately affected global and American consciousness and provided early links between Jewish-Americans and Israel. In fact, the use of the word “Holocaust” is notably absent from American discourse in the 1950s. When the word was used, it referred to its literal meaning “to be completely consumed by a fire.” The book *Holocaust* (1957) was about an inferno in a Brooklyn building and President Eisenhower used the word solely in the context of Mutually Assured Destruction and a potential nuclear holocaust. The absence of the word and the lack of significant analysis of the genocide after the war are surprising given the scale of the atrocities. “No fifties picture attempted to confront the horror of the Holocaust and the transformative effect of the lives of those who experienced it.”⁶³ Indeed, it was only after the Eichmann trial (1961) and Hannah Arendt’s coining of the phrase the “banality of evil” in *The New Yorker* that the word Holocaust permeated American culture and became associated with the Nazi atrocities. Even

⁶² Marshall Sklare and Benjamin Ringer, “A Study of Jewish Attitudes toward the State of Israel,” in Marshall Sklare, ed., *The Jews*, 449.

⁶³ Friedman, *The Jewish Image in American Film*, 60.

so, it was not until 1972 that a presidential statement referenced “Holocaust” in connection with the experience of the Jews during the Second World War.⁶⁴

Leon Jick suggests that this absence reflects the victimhood felt by American Jews. “On a deeper psychological level,” he argues, “it is likely that American Jewry desired to separate itself from the experience of abuse and suffering and from the sense of shame which victims of crimes often feel.”⁶⁵ Within Jewish-American literature reflections on the Holocaust are notable for their absence until the mid-1960s. Indeed, much Jewish-American scholarship is critical of both Jewish-American and American culture in this period for failing to address the genocide. The change that occurred in the 1960s is best accounted for by a growth in awareness about the true horrors of the Nazi genocide. In 1961 Raul Hilberg published his magnum opus *The Destruction of the European Jews*, the first of numerous academic works on the genocide that served to make the Holocaust central to the study of the Second World War. By 1967, “Holocaust” was a term widely understood and its portrayal in early films such as *The Diary of Ann Frank* (1961) had impacted Jewish-Americans. Holocaust-guilt, like all affects and ideas, only intervenes in policy once awareness of the genocide became commonplace. In this context the Six-Day War, in which “the Holocaust appeared not only as a past experience but as an ever present danger,” helped mould a renewed affiliation between Israeli and American Jews.⁶⁶

Israel’s victory in June 1967 came to act as a palliative for Jewish-Americans. A new connection was found with Israel, which had overcome a threatened annihilation, for Jewish-American who were attempting to escape from a sense of victimhood that came with an increasing understanding of the horrors perpetrated in Europe: in identifying with Israel, Jewish-American had a means of transforming their identities from “victim” to “victor.”

⁶⁴ Nixon, *PPP*, #56 “Third Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy,” 9 February 1972.

⁶⁵ Leon Jick, “The Holocaust: Its Use and Abuse within the American Public,” *Yad Vashem Studies* 14 (1981).

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 313.

“Arthur Hertzberg and Leonard Fein only slightly overstated matters,” notes Andrew Furman, “when they suggest that Israel *became* the religion of American Jews after the Six-Day War of 1967.”⁶⁷ They were not “them” out there; they transformed in language to “we”: it was this “We-ness” which best explains why pro-Israel lobbying groups grew exponentially throughout the 1970s. Jewish-Americans increasingly saw their interests as tied to the fate of Israel: Israel was not “they” but *theirs*.

In *We Are One* (1978), Melvin Urofsky argues that “Israel had quite simply added a dimension of dignity and pride to Jews the world over, especially those in America, who had never felt the insecurity and degradation of the European ghetto or the Arab *Mellah*.”⁶⁸ As the 1970s drew on, more assessments of the Holocaust are to be found in both mainstream and Jewish-American culture. Israel’s successes in overcoming tragedy became reflective of Jewish success and heroism in America – it confirmed the “tough Jew” image of the Silver Screen. Melvin Konner’s work on *The Jewish Body* (2009) is a testament to the continued affiliation felt by older Jewish-Americans to a tough Israel: “Jews yearn for physical strength to reverse millennial weakness and the searing contempt of the strong.”⁶⁹ It is reasonable to presume that reflections upon the Holocaust and Israel’s strength, embodied in the brave *kibbutznik*, strengthened the bonds between Jewish-Americans and Israel.

The tie between Jewish-Americans and Israel was significant in pressuring the American government to maintain a close tie with Israel but only because the context allowed for such a lobby group to be seen as legitimate actor in the political process. Until the decline of anti-Semitism in the 1950s, Jewish-Americans fell into the category of hyphenated Americans and “outsiders.” Their political power arose only as meanings attached to them were transformed

⁶⁷ Andrew Furman, *Israel through the Jewish-American Imagination: A Survey of Jewish-American Literature on Israel, 1928-1995* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 1.

⁶⁸ Melvin Urofsky, *We Are One: American Jewry and Israel* (New York: Anchor Press, 1978), 241.

⁶⁹ Melvin Konner, *The Jewish Body* (New York: Schoken Books, 2009), 205-6.

through a much longer shift away from anti-Semitic stereotypes. That context included a general greater understanding of Jewish history and the Holocaust.

American Orientalism in Palestine

Although American-Israel connections did not emerge solely because of the negative portrayals of Arabs (and later Palestinians) in American popular culture, such portrayals continue to exist and have bolstered the US-Israel connection. Americans early experience with the Middle East was one of unfamiliarity, limited to tales of Christian missionaries and the occasional novel. Mark Twain, for instance, returned from his travels with tales of the strange practices of the peoples of the Middle East, and *The Innocents Abroad* (1869) presented ideas that permeated American culture. During this period, Americans preserved domestic racial hierarchies. Xenophobia, fuelled by waves of immigration, extended these racial hierarchies to their understandings of the foreign: “By 1900,” notes Douglas Little, “anti-Semitic and anti-Islamic sentiments were as American as apple pie.”⁷⁰ In his support for the Middle East mandates in the 1920s, President Wilson showed himself even more indifferent to claims of self-determination put forward by Arabs than he had been to the Balfour Declaration. Prince Faisal, the leader of the Arab revolt against the Ottoman Empire, left Versailles disappointed that Wilson’s 14 points were limited to Europeans. This *limited universalism* is indicative of social norms about racial hierarchies and Wilson’s own unconscious bigotry.⁷¹

The end of “Britain’s moment in the Middle East” appeared to necessitate ever greater American involvement, as Soviet interests in Iran and Turkey threatened the Western monopoly over the region. In *Epic Encounters*, Melani McAlister argues that “the Middle

⁷⁰ Little, *American Orientalism*, 3-4.

⁷¹ Kathleen Christison, *Perceptions of Palestine: Their Influence on U.S. Middle East Policy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 26-44.

East has been both strategically important and metaphorically central in the construction of US global power.”⁷² As America became more involved in the Middle East, stereotypes of Arabs became more prevalent and more negative. Edward Said has argued that the Middle East was a place on which Americans could project their fears and upon which they could construct “moral boundaries”: Initial stereotypes of camel-riding nomads gave way to new images of Arabs that permeated the American imagination: swarthy polygamous oil traders who stood in stark contrast to wholesome American families.⁷³ Racial prejudices are not epiphenomenal in the construction of an intelligible foreign policy. As Michael Hunt has argued:

The continuing influence of a culture-bound, color-conscious world view that still positions nations and peoples in a hierarchy defined at the extremes by civilization and barbarism, modernity and tradition. It renders [Americans] sympathetic to forward-looking Israelis, seen largely as European, at loggerheads with swarthy, bearded, polygamous, fanatical Arabs.⁷⁴

Edward Said comments that “since World War II, and more noticeably after each of the Arab-Israeli wars, the Arab Muslim has become a figure in American popular culture.”⁷⁵ Successive Arab losses to Israel created a caricature embodying “incompetence and easy defeat.” The most curious aspect of these widespread characterizations was the precise manner in which they were negative. As anti-Semitism against Jews decreased in the US, anti-Semitism against Semitic Arabs increased: the prejudice was the same but the animus had been transferred to an Arab target – a non-western and non-white target. One need only look at Disney’s *Aladdin* (1992) to see the clearest expression of American Orientalism. It is a film in which the mysterious, dangerous, “Arabia” stands in bleak contrast to the “West.” Its two protagonists notably lighter-skinned and westernized and singing about “a whole new

⁷² McAlister, *Epic Encounters*, 4.

⁷³ Edward Said, *Orientalism* (London: Penguin, 2003), 284-288. See also Catherine Hall, ed., *Cultures of Empire: Colonizers in Britain and the Empire in Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: a Reader* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000).

⁷⁴ Michael Hunt, *Ideology and United States Foreign Policy* (London: Yale University Press, 1987), 178.

⁷⁵ Said, *Orientalism*, 284.

world,” are set above background characters that will “cut off your ear if they don’t like your face.”⁷⁶ Indeed, the fact that this line was cut from the video release after a successful campaign by the American-Arab anti-Discrimination League confirms that there is an inherent and largely subconscious Orientalist attitude in America. More recently, the growth of Islamic Fundamentalism and its increasing importance for the American amity/enmity discourse, given the popularization of civilization-centred assessments of global politics, has yet again shifted representations of Arabs, emphasizing that they are dangerous and organized as well as cowardly in using terrorist methods against America and its friend Israel.

American Orientalism did not constitute enmity with all Middle Eastern states and American policy makers had strategically important and fluctuating relationships with *inter alia* Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iran.⁷⁷ There is not space here for either a detailed assessment on American foreign policy in the Middle East. The period 1945-1990, was dominated, however, by the Cold War security imaginary and American policy makers tended to view the Middle East through the lens of this conflict – a strategic prize to be won. For the purposes of this thesis, it is important to understand that America’s Middle Eastern allies were not cast as friends. Michael Oren highlights the “countervailing images...one romantic and the other brutally real,” which existed in the American mind.⁷⁸ Support for America’s Middle Eastern allies was, and continues to be, highly conditional: American “friendships” with Iran and Saudi Arabia were based on capabilities not character.

⁷⁶ Marvin Wingfield and Bushra Karaman, “Arab Stereotypes and American Educators,” *Social Studies*, March/April 1995.

⁷⁷ For accounts of America’s Cold War foreign policy in the Middle East, see H.W. Brands, *Into the Labyrinth: The United States and the Middle East, 1945-1993* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1994), T. G. Fraser, *The US and the Middle East since World War 2* (Basingstoke: Macmillan 1989), Gray Sick, *All Fall Down: America’s tragic Encounter with Iran* (London: Tauris, 1985), and Salim Yaqub, *Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East* (London: University of North Carolina Press, 2004).

⁷⁸ Oren, *Power, Faith and Fantasy*, and *Little American Orientalism*, trace and assesses the popular images that became references for American policy makers in conducting policy.

Most significantly, however, when Israel was created in 1948, the US had to reformulate limited understandings of “Palestine.” Whilst various dominant discourses bolstered these conceptualizations, of particular importance was, “the perception that the Palestinians have no rational basis for their hostility to Israel and no legitimate national claim to the land of Palestine” which, as Kathleen Christison notes, was “fundamental to the misperceptions surrounding the conflict.”⁷⁹ The developing closeness between Israel and the United States necessarily led to greater distance between the Americans and the Palestinians, who did not even figure as separated from the Arabs in presidential discourse until 1971.⁸⁰ Americans increasingly saw the Palestinian Arabs as lacking a sense of nationalism, unattached to Palestine, and eventually as terrorists after *fedayeen* attacks were widely reported in the 1960s, the airplane hijackings of the 1970s, and the tragedy of the Munich Olympics.

As Jews became assimilated into culturally defined frames of “whiteness” Israelis stood in contrast to their – often physically identical – Palestinian neighbours. A multitude of discursive sites served to enforce the dominant meanings that Americans attached to Israel between 1948 and 1982. Lawrence Davidson claims that as early as the 1960s, “America maintained an image of Israel as a progressive Western nation.”⁸¹ *National Geographic* provided imagery of Israeli achievements which contrasted with the misunderstandings and limited perceptions of Palestine held in American culture pre-1948. The whiteness of Jews was also tied into the understanding of Israel as part of “the West.” An understanding that

⁷⁹ Christison, *Perceptions of Palestine*, 7.

⁸⁰ Nixon, PPP, “Second Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy,” 25 February, 1971. In 1968 President Johnson has hosted President Bourguiba on Tunisia, who, in his response to Johnson’s toast, made multiple references to the Palestinian people and “the new fact that we are witnessing in this part of the world, is the appearance on this stage of the Palestinians themselves since last June. This fact is something that I have been wishing for, for several years.” Johnson, PPP, #205 “Toast of the President and President Bourguiba,” 15 May 1968.

⁸¹ Lawrence Davidson, *America’s Palestine: Popular and Official Perceptions from Balfour to Israeli Statehood* (Gainesville: University Press Florida, 2001).

was increasingly confirmed by academic institutions where Jewish studies became a discipline separated from Middle Eastern, or Oriental, studies.

American amity for Israel depended upon the diachronic demarcation of Israel as separate from the wider Middle East, both geographically and culturally. This demarcation excludes the possibility of anything being both “Oriental” and “Israeli,” hence the popular understandings of Israelis as Western. The existence of Arab-Israelis challenges this American categorization of the Middle East, and they have been hidden in American popular culture, leaving Israelis to be portrayed as blonde Paul Newman types. Ignoring the fact that almost half of the earliest Jewish immigrants came from Arab countries dismisses a vast component of Israel’s heritage, but this dismissal is one necessitated by America’s conceptual scheme. Presidents would draw on these scattered images to present a partial tie to Israel as not only strategically important but also morally appropriate, as they became embodied in a more formalized discursive construct – initially that of the US-Israel “special relationship,” and today the US-Israel “unbreakable bond.”

Introducing Israel

Analysis of presidential rhetoric demonstrates that much of the grounding that enabled the “special relationship” discourse to become part of the performance of American foreign policy in the late-1970s was articulated after Lyndon Johnson’s succession to the presidency. Israel does not figure highly in presidential statements before 1964. Truman made brief reference to his “deep personal concern” for the fate of the victims of Hitlerism in his *Memoirs* (1955) and attempted to persuade the Attlee Government to grant 100,000 emergency visas for European Jews in Palestine.⁸² Eisenhower expressed anger over Israel’s collusion during the Suez War and, although he dodged a question concerning the possibility

⁸² Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs* (New York: Da Capo Press, 1955), 140. Nicklaus Thomas-Symonds, *Attlee: A Life In Politics* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 187-198.

of economic sanctions, he was quick to state that “we are committed to the support of the United Nations.”⁸³ This implies that options were not limited by a friendship and that if the IDF failed to withdraw from Sinai sanctions would certainly be an option.

President Kennedy made only four public references to Israel during his administration. These can be best described as neutral statements, mixing hope for Israel’s economic success with caution about the spread of arms in the region: “*as you know*, the US has never been a supplier of military equipment directly to the Israelis.”⁸⁴ Johnson changed this. At a News Conference in March 1965, Johnson refused to answer an “iffy question” about whether the US would be willing to provide Israel arms to maintain the “balance of power” in the Middle East.⁸⁵ The non-response is of significance since Kennedy had always maintained that arms provision would not be forthcoming. America’s move from arms limitation to a desire to preserve Israel’s qualitative military edge and a widespread belief that America had a moral commitment to ensure Israel’s survival did not happen over-night. It was the product of various representations and meanings that had already been attached to Israel and would be developed further in presidential statements in the 1960s and the 1970s.

A decade before “the special relationship” was articulated, the architectures of amity were developing in presidential rhetoric. Toasts to “our friends the people of Israel” were commonplace in the 1960s, as Lyndon Johnson sought to express his own personal commitment to Israel. A multitude of informal and apparently inconsequential statements contain within them the seeds for state action. The informality of texts is actually evidence of the importance of common sense. Consider President Nixon, jokingly commenting in 1973 about the over-crowding at a State Dinner honouring Golda Meir:

⁸³ Dwight D. Eisenhower, *PPP*, #28 “President’s News Conference,” 6 February 1957.

⁸⁴ John F. Kennedy, *PPP*, #120 “Presidents News Conference,” 3 April 1963, “As you know” has the function of presenting such a policy as common sense given the broader security context and interests of America.

⁸⁵ Johnson, *PPP*, #117 “The President’s News Conference,” 20 March 1965.

I don't know of a dinner we have had, Madam Prime Minister, in this house since we have had the honor of being here, in which more people wanted to come and in which we could make fewer friends and more enemies than we did by inviting the group that we have here. But this company is one that is very distinguished. It represents our Government, our Congress; it represents also this whole Nation.⁸⁶

Throw-away comments like this can be just as important as declarations of security-guarantees in demonstrating the quality of an inter-state relationship especially when a photo of Nixon escorting Meir to the state dinner is prominently displayed in *The New York Times*. They are indicative of unstated assumptions that ground the scattered language out of which the discourses, which underpinned Israel's friend subject position, emerged.

Positive articulated representations of Israel were important in grounding and legitimizing the relationship that was to emerge. In the 1960s, Israel was portrayed as an economic success story with a pioneering people embodying an entrepreneurial spirit. At the same time, Israel was also portrayed as a "tiny little nation" facing the imminent danger of being overwhelmed by an imagined monolithic Arab Nationalist movement. President Johnson's first major speech that referenced Israel was to the Weizmann Institute of Science:

Israel knows well the importance of science. At its birth in 1948, *this tiny little nation* faced monumental problems of economic survival. Only a fifth of its meagre territory was fit for cultivation. Yet it was called upon to sustain a population that more than doubled in 10 years.⁸⁷

In his speech the shared pride in Israel's achievements in desalination and scientific expertise is referenced, but so too is the notion that Israel is a "tiny little nation." During the visit of Prime Minister Eshkol the following June, Johnson commented that "today, Israel is a vital,

⁸⁶ Nixon, *PPP*, #62 "Toast of the President and Prime Minister Golda Meir of Israel," 1 March 1973.

⁸⁷ Johnson, *PPP*, #175 "Remarks in New York City at the Dinner of the Weizmann Institute of Science," 6 February 1964. Admittedly a pro-Israel audience, but given the growth of media coverage of presidential statements, it is not unreasonable to include such a statement from 1964. Indeed the front page of *The New York Times* ran with the headline "Johnson pledges Israel Water Aid with Atom Power."

prosperous land, *a symbol of the courage and strength of her people.*”⁸⁸ It is during that visit that the “close friendship between our two countries” first makes its way into presidential rhetoric.⁸⁹ The statement that was released the following day stated that “[Johnson] congratulated Prime Minister Eshkol on the progress made by Israel since 1948 in the economic, technical, social and cultural fields. He noted the example provided by Israel in economic growth and human development in conditions of freedom.”⁹⁰ *The New York Times* ran a front page story that emphasized the “symbol of courage” comment, while also noting the significance of this first visit to America by a Prime Minister of Israel.⁹¹

Presenting Israel as a “tiny little nation” conjured images of a young underdog David facing the Goliath of Nasserite Arab Nationalism. Israel’s spectacular victory in 1967 should have exposed this analogy as flawed. Yet Nixon wrote in 1970: “As do so many of my fellow Americans, I deeply admire the accomplishments your country has realized in the course of its young life. Adversity has been your challenge, as you have pressed onwards in the face of overwhelming odds towards progress and well-being for your citizens.”⁹² Nixon made frequent public references to the Israelis as a “courageous people” who have suffered incommensurably and have “a remarkable story.”⁹³ The underdog analogy was based, in part, on an increasing recognition in presidential rhetoric of the historic suffering of the Jews: “the policies of the US government have been influenced by these indelible memories of the past,”⁹⁴ and widespread empathy with the challenges faced in setting up a new nation. The notion that Israel was an enterprising underdog implicitly played into America’s conception

⁸⁸ Johnson, *PPP*, #377 “Remarks of Welcome at the White House to Prime Minister Eshkol of Israel,” 1 June 1964.

⁸⁹ Johnson, *PPP*, #378 “Toasts of the President and the Prime Minister Eshkol,” 1 June 1964.

⁹⁰ Johnson, *PPP*, #380 “Joint Statement Following Discussions with the Prime Minister of Israel,” 2 June 1964.

⁹¹ Hendrick Smith, “Johnson Hails Eshkol and Calls for Mideast Peace,” *The New York Times*, 2 June 1964.

⁹² Nixon, *PPP*, #164 “Letter of Congratulation to President Zalmar Shazar on 21st Anniversary of Israel,” 22 April 1969.

⁹³ Nixon, *PPP*, #373 “Remarks of welcome to PM Golda Meir at White House,” 25 September 1969.

⁹⁴ Carter, *PPP*, “Remarks of the President and PM Begin at a White House Reception,” 1 May 1978.

of itself as an underdog that had struggled to forge a nation against the might of superior British power in the 18th and 19th centuries.

For amicitization, emphasis on the similarities between the US and Israel are the most important of the statements made by presidents. The idea that Israel is similar to the United States and that Americans commonsensically would see a part of themselves in Israel's courage, entrepreneurial talent, and values has been an implicit consistent theme in presidential rhetoric since 1964. In 1966, President Johnson first explicitly articulated such sentiments in public: "Our country, like yours, was nurtured by the philosophy of the ancient Hebrew leaders who taught mankind the principles of morality, of social justice, and of universal peace."⁹⁵ Rhetoric displaying the links between Israel and the United States was most frequently invoked at the official visits of Israeli leaders. "I can think," proclaimed Carter, "of no two nations of Earth that more narrowly focus deep commitments on a common way for the principles of government based on mutual background."⁹⁶ Of course, hyperbolic rhetoric is a standard feature of any meeting of an American President and visiting Head of State, but the pattern of flattery extended to Israel – and the presence of parallels emphasizing shared heritage – in this period is incomparable with that offered to other states.

When describing Israel, President Carter articulated similarity based on history, "Americans have always found an echo of our own frontier past in Israel's energy and strong individualism;"⁹⁷ democracy and values "the US has a moral commitment to Israel because we share so many things in common;"⁹⁸ and security "Israel's security is so closely linked to the security of the US."⁹⁹ Equally important are the understandings of Israelis as kindred

⁹⁵ Johnson, *PPP*, #36 "Toast of the President Zalmar Shazar of Israel," 2 August 1966.

⁹⁶ Carter, *PPP*, "Remarks of the President and the Prime Minister at Welcoming Ceremony," 7 March 1977.

⁹⁷ Carter, *PPP*, "Remarks on the Departure of Prime Minister Begin," 22 March 1978.

⁹⁸ Carter, *PPP*, "Remarks to Members of the Young Men's Hebrew Association and Area Residents," 30 October 1980.

⁹⁹ Carter, *PPP*, "United Jewish Appeal Remarks at the Organization's National Young Leadership Conference," 25 February 1980.

people who are viewed as tough pioneers, able to overcome the odds and in whom Americans could see themselves. Johnson first described Zalman Shazar as a “pioneer,” drawing clear links between America’s historical narrative and Israel’s present.¹⁰⁰ Israel had supposed done in fifteen years what Arabs had had over two millennia to achieve. This bolstered the myth that the Palestinians had no rightful claim to the land, just as Lockean arguments had enabled American settlers to strip the native populations of their land in the 18th and 19th centuries.

After the Six-Day War, Israel was represented as a “peace-loving democracy,” marginalizing alternative portrayals such as “occupying force” or “new imperialists.” In a Toast at a Dinner for Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, President Johnson said that “[Americans and Israelis] have been born and raised to seek and find peace. In the common spirit of our hopes, I respect our hope that a just and lasting peace will prevails between Israel and her neighbors.”¹⁰¹ The notion that Israel was deeply committed to peace is one that was frequently articulated in the 1970s. Whilst Israeli politicians were rejecting the Roger’s Plan, Nixon was asserting that “the people of Israel deserve peace. They have earned peace.”¹⁰² In a 1977 Press Conference, Jimmy Carter emphasized Israel’s “strong desire to have a permanent and lasting peace” and referred to his belief that Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin was as committed as Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to the peace process.¹⁰³ Given the expansionist ideologically-motivated aims of the Likud government, much of the talk of Israel’s desire for peace must be simply described as wishful-thinking. However, all these descriptors served to re-enforce the image of Israel as a like-nation, which embodied the attributes underpinning the American experience. Amity focuses on the character and imagined intentions of a state not the capabilities and true intentions.

¹⁰⁰ Johnson, *PPP*, #365 “Toast of the President and President Zalman Shazar of Israel,” 2 August 1966.

¹⁰¹ Johnson, *PPP*, #8 “Toasts of the President and Prime Minister Eshkol at a Dinner at the LBJ Ranch,” 7 January, 1968.

¹⁰² Nixon, *PPP*, #373 “Toast to the PM Golda Meir of Israel at White House,” 25 September 1969.

¹⁰³ Carter, *PPP*, “Dobbins Air Force Base, Georgia Q-a-A Session with reporters on Arrival,” 8 April 1977.

Similarity in character was bolstered by military prowess: Israel's victory in 1967 "impressed an America whose forces were not only being defeated but humiliated in Vietnam."¹⁰⁴ The victory was portrayed as enormously surprising and this furthered the idea that Israel was an underdog in the region. Michelle Mart has argued that the images of Israel's victory in 1948 over the Arabs had already had a profound effect on American-Israel relations. In the late-1950s Israel came to embody the three elements of American masculinity – Israel was the "new born baby" needing nurture; the "tough fighter" capable of defeating the forces of Arab nationalism; and a "gutsy underdog," like the adolescent David. "From sex symbols to tough fighters to youthful underdogs," she writes, "Israelis filled the contours of stereotypical American masculinity."¹⁰⁵ In embodying American-masculinity, Israelis became positively gendered against a "queer" and "subversive" Communism and the feminine Arab who followed their Soviet masters.

Just as Israel came to be a palliative for Jewish-Americans seeking to throw off their victimhood, America's relationship with Israel came to be a palliative for all Americans who saw in Israel's military successes an escape at a time of American self-doubt. Israel became an aspiration for an America suffering from its "Vietnam syndrome." America's failure to defeat the Viet Cong meant that increasingly "Israel came to be constituted as an icon in the post-Vietnam debate about the nature of US power."¹⁰⁶ Cartoons depicting a muscle-clad Golda Meir trampling on the Arab neighbours during the Yom Kippur War served to re-ignite a faith in American power, paralleled by her kindred nation in the Holy Land. So too did the IDF's well publicized success in rescuing 256 hostages from Uganda in 1976, during which *The Philadelphia Enquirer* presented Israel as superman.¹⁰⁷ In *Warrior Dreams* (1994),

¹⁰⁴ Derek Gregory, *The Colonial Present: Afghanistan, Palestine, Iraq* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 77.

¹⁰⁵ Michelle Mart, "Tough Guys and American Cold War Policy: Images of Israel," *Diplomatic History* 20 (3) (2007), 376.

¹⁰⁶ McAlister, *Epic Encounters*, 157.

¹⁰⁷ Jerry Robinson, *The 1970s, Best Political Cartoons of the Decade* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981), 137.

James Gibson has argued that “the 1980s saw the emergence of a highly energized culture of war and the warrior.”¹⁰⁸ Rambo-like paramilitary figures, who were not constrained by changing social and international norms, came to dominate aspirations of masculinity for a generation. Their embodiment in the figure of Ronald Reagan also translated into further bolstering the US-Israel partnership: Israel was America, but the America of the dreams of wannabe warriors.

A comparative study of the political systems of Israel and America would reveal fundamental differences. Israel of the 1950s and 1960s was far more concerned with provision of social welfare than with keeping out communist influences. However, it was the image of Israel as a democratic bulwark against Communism that was important in shaping attitudes. These were increasingly tied to Israelis being steadfast against terrorism. In setting the stage for the provision of F-4 Phantoms, Johnson spoke of “terrorism and reprisal raids on Israeli borders,” in his 1967 Message to Congress.¹⁰⁹ Just as Americans were fighting the “good fight” against communism; so too were Israelis fighting “the good fight” against Arab nationalism and, later, Palestinian “terrorism,” which was represented as a threat not only to Israel but to America in the film *Black Sunday* (1977).

By 1976, President Ford – the president who first used the “special relationship” label in public from that office – spoke of “the enduring friendship” between America and Israel:

The US and Israel share a deep devotion to democratic ideas, a special affinity as two *kindred peoples*, and common moral and political values that flow from the Great Judeo-Christian heritage.¹¹⁰

The idea that Israel was just another nation had left presidential rhetoric entirely. Where Nixon, and to some extent Johnson, were careful to tone down the rhetoric and to see their

¹⁰⁸ Gibson, *Warrior Dreams*, 9.

¹⁰⁹ Johnson, *PPP*, #488 “Message to Congress Transmitting Report on US Participation in the UN,” 15 November 1967.

¹¹⁰ Ford, *PPP*, #32 “Remarks of Welcome to Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin,” 27 January 1976.

commitment to Israel as in no way exclusive, Ford presents America's commitment to Israel as supererogatory and eternal: "America must and America will pursue friendship with all nations, but this will never be done at the expense of America's commitment to Israel."¹¹¹ The resolution of the UN General Assembly equating Zionism with racism was "very wrong."¹¹² The mission in Uganda was "a tremendous act of courage."¹¹³ President Carter followed by emphasizing the "unbreakable ties" as well as "a moral commitment to Israel." A series of implicit and explicit appeals to the similarity of America and Israel are found in presidential discourse in the 1960s and 1970s. By the late 1970s, America's commitment to Israel had become unquestionable. This was not because Israel was self-evidently a strategic asset or because of the concerted effort by a lobby. It was because a combination of cultural and linguistic sites that favoured a close relationship with Israel served to cast Israel as a "friend of the United States."

Cementing the Bond

The 1980s saw Ronald Reagan enter the White House. In his *Memoirs* (1990) he wrote: "I've believed many things in my life, but no conviction I've ever held has been stronger than my belief that the US must ensure the survival of Israel."¹¹⁴ Reagan's Manichean world-view often appeared in descriptions of Israel. Americans and Israelis were "historic partners in the *global quest* for human dignity and freedom."¹¹⁵ If world politics was a global epic in the 1980s, Israel and America stood firmly together on the side of the *heroes* bound in the bonds of fraternity and virtue. President Clinton also highlighted "America's *unshakeable pledge* to

¹¹¹ Ford, *PPP*, #473 "Remarks at the annual Meeting of the American Jewish Committee," 12 May 1976.

¹¹² Ford, *PPP*, #678 "President's News Conference," 14 November 1975. A cartoon from *the Washington Star* depicted "the cannibals" at the UN devouring Israel, whose bones are picked clean, Robinson *The Best Political Cartoons*, 113.

¹¹³ Ford, *PPP*, #885 "Remarks at Yeshiva at Flatbush High School in Brooklyn, New York," 12 October 1976;

¹¹⁴ Ronald Reagan, *An American Life* (London: Hutchinson, 1990), 410.

¹¹⁵ Reagan, *PPP*, "Remarks at Welcoming Ceremony for President Chaim Herzog of Israel," 10 November 1987.

maintain and enhance Israel's qualitative security edge.”¹¹⁶ In furthering Israel's security, the US has kept its “pledge” and made good on the promise enshrined in the discourses of the special relationship. In both *My Life* (2004) and his public statements President Clinton would frequently invoke the story of his “mentor and pastor” W. O. Vaught whose last words to him were: “Bill, I think you’re going to be President someday. I think you’ll do a good job, but there’s one thing above all you must remember: God will never forgive you if you don’t stand by Israel.”¹¹⁷ Whether or not either of these reflections had much effect over their policy choices is uncertain. What is clear, however, is that their articulation in memoirs and speeches confirms the common sense nature that US support for Israel had attained.

There are, of course, differences between presidential approaches to Israel. Avi Shlaim argues that US presidents can be divided into two camps: an “Israel first” camp, which includes Reagan, Clinton and George W. Bush, and an “even-handed camp.”¹¹⁸ To a certain extent, this seems accurate: Nixon, Carter and George H. W. Bush, refrain from such gushing anecdotes in their memoirs and pushed Israeli Prime Ministers for concessions. However, when looking at discourses, it appears that even those widely considered to have been even-handed did as much to construct and maintain the relationship as any Israel first President. Presidents Ford and Carter ambivalentized Israel whilst simultaneously supporting a Palestinian state and a negotiated solution to Israeli-Egyptian hostilities. It was in response to his decision to sell AWACs to Saudi Arabia that Reagan first referred to Israel as “friend,” noting that “friends sometimes have arguments and this is one of them.”¹¹⁹ George H. W. Bush had a fraught relationship with Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and offered the most

¹¹⁶ William J. Clinton, *PPP*, “Exchange with Reporters Prior to Discussions with Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of Israel,” 12 November 1993.

¹¹⁷ Cited in Bill Clinton, *My Life* (London: Arrow, 2005), 353.

¹¹⁸ Avi Shlaim, “The United States and the Israel-Palestinian Conflict,” in Kenneth Booth and Tim Dunne, eds., *Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future World Order* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).

¹¹⁹ Reagan, *PPP*, “Interview with the President,” 23 December 1981.

strident criticism of Israel since Eisenhower. However, he also made frequent references to the friendship:

I think the whole world knows that the United States has a very special relationship with Israel – a strong relationship.¹²⁰

Indeed, the special relationship discourse has been articulated especially in times of crises in US-Israel relations. There is a clear trend that reversion to the special relationship discourse is a way of limiting criticism over presidents' Middle East policies: rather than evidencing a diminution in its importance, this reflects the special relationship's wide assimilation into the ways in which policy makers and public address the Middle East and the peace-process. Its re-articulation becomes both active assertion and defence mechanism, used whenever presidents are challenged on their commitment to the Jewish state. The pattern of rhetoric reveals that amitizing speech-acts both constitute and are compelled by the citational process that reiterates the special relationship discourse. This may account for President Obama's use of the "unbreakable bond" metaphor over the past six years: the discourse is required given the genealogy of the commitment, which necessitates constant reiteration. Not to reference the friendship that Americans feel towards Israel would be to violate the expectations America has developed in stretching its identity to include "friend of Israel."

Casting Israel as a friend has radically diminished the zone of contestation in American politics, perhaps more than any other relationship. Public preferences, bipartisan congressional opinion, the influence of lobbies, journalist attitudes, and the pro-Israel posture of the executive branch combine to make the subject position particularly rigid. The lobby argument is appealing precisely because there are no powerful actors challenging the continuation of America's unconditional commitments towards Israel. However, their absence is a reflection not of the financial and institutional power of the lobby but rather of

¹²⁰ George H. W. Bush, *PPP*, "Presidents News Conference," 4 November 1990.

the marginalization of those narratives and those voices who would favour a more even-handed policy. The difficulties Chuck Hagel faced in gaining Senate confirmation of his appointment as Secretary of Defence, in 2013, is indicative of how risky it remains to challenge, or be seen to have challenged, America's commitment to Israel.

This chapter has revealed several discourses that served to provide the extant resources for the amitization of Israel. In the 1960s and 1970s, Israel shifted from the margins to the mainstream. As Presidents were articulating amitizing speech-acts, and with that re-defining the relationship between America and Israel as common sense and producing a new facet of American identity, underlying cultural and linguistic resources had already made the American public increasingly receptive to a close relationship with Israel. The practices of amitization make the unconditional nature of American support intelligible. As the Cold War ended, these same images and characterizations endured and continue to maintain the relationship. And despite great systemic change, the durability of the alignment is best accounted for by discourses of similarity that underpin American friendship for Israel.

Chapter 6: Security as Similarity: “The Atlantic Community”

A considerable amount of commotion was stirred up during the past year over the prospect of a multilateral force, known to the headline writers as MLF... the basic idea was that a bunch of us nations – the good guys – would get together on a joint nuclear deterrent force including our current friends, like France, and our traditional friends, like Germany. (Tom Lehrer, 1965)¹

Audience laughter follows “good guys,” “France,” and “Germany.”

The Senate’s ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty, on 25 July 1949, institutionalized George Washington’s nightmare and cemented a new phase in America’s global leadership.² Gore Vidal described the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as the main turning point in American foreign policy: “we replaced the old republic with the National Security State and set up shop as the major *European* power west of the Elbe.”³ Vidal’s words reflect a widespread understanding that in acceding to the commitments of the North Atlantic Treaty, and the expansion of those commitments that came after the Korean War and into the 1950s, something of a revolution had taken place in America’s foreign policy.⁴ An instinctive Atlanticism developed. This Atlanticism continues to dominate the American imagination and a disposition to prioritize Europe has become common sense in American foreign policy.

An understanding that America was a “European power” did not – and has not taken – hold. Much has been written on the differences between Europe and America, both in and out of the discipline of International Relations, and competing interests and visions of order

¹ Tom Lehrer, *That Was the Year That Was*, Reprise Records, Audio CD, 1965, Preamble to “MLF Lullaby.”

² There are many accounts detailing the importance of NATO is transforming America’s global role including: G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001); Christopher Layne, *The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006); Ronald E. Powaski, *Towards an Entangling Alliance: American Isolationism, Internationalism, and Europe, 1901-1950* (Greenwood Press, New York, 1991).

³ Gore Vidal, “The Last Empire,” in *The Last Empire: Essays 1992-2001* (London: Abacus, 2002).

⁴ In 1964, historian Armin Rappaport wrote “The American Revolution of 1949,” discussed in Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO and the United States: The Enduring Alliance* (Twayne: Boston, 1988).

persisted throughout the Cold War.⁵ Discussions of “crises” in the NATO alliance frequently occur. However, despite disagreements between America and its European allies—over, for instance, European integration in the 1950s and 1960s;⁶ the disputes between Lyndon Johnson and Charles De Gaulle in 1966;⁷ the Vietnam War;⁸ the failure of the MLF;⁹ a series of crises in the bilateral relations between Turkey and Greece that resulted in the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974;¹⁰ the crises over Intermediate Nuclear Forces in the 1970s;¹¹ and the end of the Cold War¹² – NATO continues to exist: voices calling for an end to America’s role as defender of Europe are marginalized.¹³

American policy makers’ failure to articulate a more critical assessment on the strategic utility of the NATO alignment has been the subject of much academic debate. Writing in 1970, David Calleo described *The Atlantic Fantasy* and highlighted several reasons why Americans should take a more critical look at its relationship with Europe. He contended that

⁵ Robert Kagen, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* (New York: Vintage Books, 2004), provides an account of “America” and “Europe” that views each as separated and following competing visions of international order. Peter Baldwin, *The Narcissism of Minor Difference: How America and Europe are Alike* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), provides an overview of similarities between American and European societies using statistics, “an essay in numbers,” to demonstrate the often overlooked similarities of Western Europe and America. The “narcissism of minor difference” is itself of interest, since imagined differences and the myths Baldwin seeks to debunk are themselves crucial in understanding foreign policy. Of particular interest, however, is that the myths of difference he seeks to debunk are mostly framed and based around domestic policy differences. Even those of the Right who seek to contrast America with socialist Europe do not often differentiate Western Europe when it comes to security issues.

⁶ Pascaline Winand, *Eisenhower, Kennedy and the United States of Europe* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993) and Geir Lundestad, *Empire by Integration: The United States and European Integration* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

⁷ J. Ellison, “Defeating the General: Anglo-American Relations, Europe, and the NATO Crisis of 1966,” *Cold War History* 6 (1) (2006).

⁸ Eugenie Blang, *Allies at Odds: America, Europe, and Vietnam, 1961-68* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2011).

⁹ W. L. Kohl, “Nuclear Sharing in NATO and the Multilateral Force,” *Political Science Quarterly* 80 (1) (1965).

¹⁰ Theodore A. Coulombis, *The United States, Greece, and Turkey: the Troubled Triangle* (New York: Praeger, 1983).

¹¹ Earl C. Ravenal, “Europe without America: The Erosion of NATO,” *Foreign Affairs* 63 (5) (1985).

¹² John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War,” *International Security* 15 (1) (1990), Kenneth Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” *International Security* 18 (2) (1993), and Stephen M. Walt, “The Ties that Fray: Why Europe and America are Drifting Apart,” *The National Interest* (Winter 1998/99).

¹³ This is not to suggest that there is a constant and unquestionable commitment to support each of the NATO allies. Support for Turkey, in particular, has always been contestable and Congress battled President Ford in 1974 over the Eagleton Amendment, which cut off economic support to Turkey. Rather, this chapter assesses the growth of Atlanticism as taken-for-granted in America.

Atlanticism held a “tenacious hold on the American imagination,”¹⁴ a hold that needed to be countered by a realistic reassessment of the consequences of the alignment. He noted the persistence of Atlanticism in American discourses: “for many well-meaning Americans,” he argued, “being against NATO is like being against birth control.”¹⁵ This chapter explores the development of this tenacious grip. Just as relations of similarity with Britain and Israel make strong American commitments to them unavoidable, so too does the widespread acceptance that it is vital for America to be particularly concerned with the fate of Europe as part of a common (Atlantic) region.

Every president has emphasized the import of the Euro-American connection and public and congressional opinion has remained staunchly behind the existence and continuation of the Atlantic community’s most evident institution – NATO, since 1950.¹⁶ Foreign policy options were, and continue to be, contested within the confines of America’s membership of “the Atlantic Community.” The connection has become common sense and, like the friend subject position that has been attached to specified states, the friend subject position attached to (some of) Europe precludes and enables options. This chapter does not deny the existence of controversies and crises in NATO; rather, viewing NATO as developed out of an Atlantic community, constructed through discourses of similarity, furthers understanding of how the transatlantic partnership has been able to weather disagreements and how less powerful states have been able to constrain America’s hegemonic power.

The notion that Europe and the United States were obviously bound by shared characteristics and shared culture was articulated throughout discussions on the Atlantic Community. NATO would not and could not have developed the way it has, had Americans not first presupposed

¹⁴ David P. Calleo, *The Atlantic Fantasy: The U.S., NATO and Europe* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1970), 100. He described the NATO alignment as an “institutionalized attempt at hegemony,” 141.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 101.

¹⁶ All public opinion polls taken from Thomas W. Graham, *American Public Opinion on NATO, Extended Deterrence, and Use of Nuclear Weapons: Future Fissions?* (London: University Press of America, 1989).

that Europe was similar. Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy drew on extant resources to amitize “Europe” and to stretch American identity to include the subject position “member of the Atlantic Community.” Similarity *became* security, and it is that process of constructing similarity that is explicated, in part, by drawing comparisons between America’s commitments to, and representations of, Europe *vis-à-vis* other regions. Though all Cold War alliances were the consequence of a Cold War security imaginary and enmity with the Soviet Union, the scale and nature of US commitments to Europe are best accounted for by assessing the discursive construction of “the Atlantic Community.”

This does not mean that policy makers amitized each of the original eleven members, nor does it mean that every new member becomes a “friend of the United States:” the idea that France and West Germany were “friends of the United States” was, quite literally, laughable in 1965; and the bilateral American relationships with Turkey and, to a lesser extent, Greece have been extremely fraught. Individually, no state (save Britain) could expect the supererogatory support that friendship enables. Rather, the idea that the United States was part of “the Atlantic Community” became a frame of reference for American foreign policy makers. An instinctive Atlanticism developed that enables and makes intelligible high levels of support and favourable treatment for Europe and European leaders who disproportionately have access to presidents and Congress: 45 of 116 of the Addresses by Foreign Heads of State before Congress are from NATO. In important ways, this instinctive Atlanticism accounts for how transatlantic disputes have been managed and how America’s commitment to European security and NATO endures.

This chapter argues that American support for European allies is greater and less conditional than the support offered to other allies. It addresses the question: *How has “the Atlantic Community” been constituted such that strong American commitments to European allies –*

relative to other non-European allies – have been made possible and even intelligible? It argues that shortly after the Second World War, American presidents were able to draw on extant resources to present America as a member of “the Atlantic Community.” Such a construction was enabled by dominant discourses that situated Europe and America as part of a shared civilization. Simultaneously, it depended on predicating Europeans with certain qualities (character traits) and virtues that were presupposed to be qualities of Americans. These included: rationality, maturity, intelligence, bravery, and industriousness.

Much work has been done on the representational practices that constituted the Cold War can be elucidated through analysis of the major texts of American foreign policy.¹⁷ Far less attention has been paid to how America’s Cold War allies were represented and understood, still less to the differing discourses that naturalized to differentiate allies.¹⁸ The Cold War and the bipolar structure that is presumed to have come about were highly complex and multifaceted. In many ways, a concern with assessing the discourses of the Cold War as the construction of settled binary meanings about Us v. Them, West v. East, Capitalist v. Communist has elided an equally significant process of differentiating allies from friends.¹⁹

¹⁷ David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Manchester: University of Minnesota Press, 1992), Robert D. Dean, *Imperial Brotherhood: Gender and the Making of Cold War Foreign Policy* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2001) explores the “Lavender Scare” commenting that “Cold War contests over political inclusion placed a strong emphasis on sexuality and the ‘perversion’ of sexual norms,” 67: “Communism, depicted as an implacable, expansionist, militarily threatening enemy in its external imperial incarnation, was portrayed domestically as an “infection”; a conspiratorial, protean invasion of the boundaries of state and society, undermining national strength from within.” Also see Ira Chernus, *Apocalypse Management: Eisenhower and the Discourse of National Insecurity* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2008), Michael Hunt, *Ideology and United States Foreign Policy* (London: Yale University Press, 1987), Michael Hogan, *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State 1945-1954* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

¹⁸ One account which is informative is provided by Richard K. Herrmann, *Perceptions and Behavior in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 1985), 32, he offers a Table “Perceptions of Other Nations Indicated By common Descriptive metaphors found in foreign policy statements” in which he contrasts “Ally” with “Dependent Ally” and “Child.” Also see Roxanne Lynn Doty, *Imperial Encounters* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996).

¹⁹ Critiquing Campbell’s *Writing Security*, Jennifer Milliken, “Intervention and Identity: Reconstructing the West in Korea,” 99, in *Cultures of Insecurity*, Weldes et al., attempts to do this. Lene Hansen, *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War* (London: Routledge, 2006), also offers a critique of Campbell and provides a useful discussion of “linking” and “differentiation,” 18-19.

The amitization of “Europe” depended on a mode of representation that positioned Europe as a “friend” that warranted support because of certain similarities. Europe was understood to be much more similar to America than Southeast Asia and Latin America. Though this may appear obvious, dominant discourses of similarity with Europe had to emerge and this marginalized discourses of similarity with other regions. Three related representations were of particular significance in categorizing allies.

European	Non-European
Civilized	Primitive
Rational	Irrational
Self-Sufficient	Dependent

Firstly, the idea that Western Europe and the United States (along with Canada) all shared certain rights and political institutions that made them part of the same *civilized* world featured, and continues to feature, especially in elite discourse.²⁰ Latin America and Southeast Asia were not included in this civilization and were rather part of a primitive or lesser (though not barbaric) civilization. Talk of Pan-American solidarity did not extend the boundaries of this civilization to the nations of Latin America in the 1940s and 1950s, and Asian nations were grouped together as “newly independent,” which served to justify a level of American military and political interference that would have been unthinkable in Europe.

Secondly, in the 1950s, peoples and leaders of the newly constructed Atlantic Community were predicated as with certain virtuous characteristics such as bravery, intelligence and rationality (male, adult, predictable). The peoples and leaders of Latin America and Southeast Asia were predicated as irrational (female, childish, erratic). Imagined rationality meant that it was presupposed that Europeans could not be readily *subverted* by communism and that a communist take-over of Europe could only come from invasion and military aggression, not

²⁰ It also continues in popular academic work such as: Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilization Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), and Niall Ferguson, *Civilization: the West and the Rest* (London: Allen Lane, 2011).

from domestic politics. Again, this made American political interference in Europe unthinkable in Europe and enabled a stronger and less conditional commitment to defend NATO allies from the *external* imposition of communism.

Finally, Europeans were represented as *self-sufficient* American financial support for Europe was understood as *assistance* for European peoples who were blameless in their need and actively using American generosity to build themselves up *again*. On the other hand, the non-European recipients of American aid were represented as dependents in desperate need of development, passively taking American aid. The development discourse served to further differentiate European and non-European allies.

Amity manifested and continues to manifest as a habitual disposition to treat European allies better than non-European allies and to view their engagement with the world through Europe first. This involves high levels of (largely) uncritical and unconditional support. Amity also mitigates differences in capabilities, since it legitimates alignments because of the character (and not the capabilities) of the other that is amitized. Thus, vast inequalities between the United States and European states are less important than they might have been because the representations of “Europe” as part of a shared community serve to level hierarchy. Support was made possible and is intelligible because Atlanticism continues to have a “tenacious hold on the American imagination,” and realist critiques of the utility of the relationship have had little effect, precisely because American support for Europe is common sense.

Prioritizing Europe

John Lewis Gaddis has argued that we must understand the Cold War in terms of Empires: one arising from imposition and one from invitation. This may be a useful way of

understanding bipolarity but it elides an important element in American strategic thinking.²¹ Within the American camp were a series of alliances, but in the American security imaginary: all allies were equal, but some were more equal than others. Indeed, the differences between alliance and friendship are well demonstrated by contrasting the differing obligations and associated behaviours that the America took on regarding each of their regional alignments. The world was not merely divided into allies and enemies, but rather a more complex picture emerges in which European allies, which deserved high levels of largely unconditional support in exchange for minimal returns, can be contrasted with extra-community allies the support of which was conditional, smaller, and justified largely in terms of strategic benefits and expediency.

A widespread fear of “communist imperialism” meant that American policy makers were increasingly open to building durable security guarantees in the form of mutual security treaties and regional alignments. Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter allowed for the development of such entities:

Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.²²

Policy makers in the United States made full use of the leeway granted by the UN, participating in three regional security arrangements.²³ In 1947, George Kennan had introduced the term that was to dominate American strategic thinking throughout the Cold

²¹ John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).

²² “The Charter of the United Nations,” accessed 8 April 2015 <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/>.

²³ America also created highly important Cold War bilateral relationships, particularly with Japan, South Korea, and West Germany (pre-1955). These are not discussed here at length, but for an account of US-Japanese relations that highlights the importance of representational practices in forming alliances see Naoko Shibushawa, *America's Geisha Ally: Reimagining the Japanese Enemy* (London: Harvard University Press, 2006), who makes the case that US-Japanese Cold War relations are inexplicable without the shift in popular images of the Japanese from ruthless barbarian warriors to harmless individuals – women and children.

War: “containment.” The policies enabled by containment differed depending on the representational practices that constituted the region in the American imagination. Containing communism in Southeast Asia and Latin America enabled: interventionism; covert operations; tacit support for dictatorships; the suppression of nationalist movements; and hierarchical relationships. Containment in Europe built on extant resources that had developed over the Second World War to make a particularly close alignment possible that precluded certain options from consideration.

The first regional arrangement was the OAS, founded in 1948. NATO followed in 1949 and the South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1955. These three regional arrangements have two major features in common: the United States, as the nation with the greatest economic and military capability, is the greatest provider of resources, and the alliance’s primary purpose was to hold the line against communist encroachment. There are, however, significant differences.

The wording of the Rio Treaty, the North Atlantic Treaty, and the South East Asian Treaty reveal some important differences in the defensive commitments and how they worked to constrain American foreign policy. Of greatest significance is the different wording of Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty, Article IV of SEATO Treaty, and Article III of the Rio Treaty – the articles setting out the obligations for collective defence.²⁴ Article IV of SEATO’s Charter is readily contrastable with Article V of NATO’s since the text mirrors it closely. The wording of SEATO makes the obligation conferred on the United States should an armed attack occur conditional. In NATO “an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all,” in SEATO an armed attack constitutes a “common danger,” but it is not considered to be a direct attack on the United

²⁴ The texts of each treaty all accessed 8 April 2015 can be found in full at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm, <http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/b-29.html>, and http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/usmu003.asp.

States. This distinction was deliberate. A 1970 Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations entitled: “Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad,” assessed “major problem areas.” The Philippines, Laos, and Thailand were considered separately (rather than under the remit of the region), whereas Section H, on NATO, began with the declaration:

There is *nothing ambiguous* about the United States commitment to its partners in the North Atlantic Treaty. This commitment was undertaken, as it should have been, in the full glare of publicity and Senate debate. It remains as valid today as when the North Atlantic Treaty was ratified in 1949.²⁵

This Senate report confirms what the wording of the treaties implies: the commitments undertaken in the South East Asian Treaty were never designed to be as unconditional as those of the North Atlantic Treaty. The Rio Treaty also creates different obligations. Though here “an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the American States,” it devotes much discussion to how the Parties should respond to an intra-OAS conflict, a consideration not within the North Atlantic Treaty where the idea that the Parties would enter into disputes of such magnitude was presented as unimaginable.

Differing commitments and greater ambiguity meant that the American policy makers were less constrained by the SEATO and Rio Treaties. The Rio Treaty states that “each one of the Contracting Parties may determine the immediate measures which it may individually take in fulfilment of the obligation [of collective self-defence] and in accordance with the principle of continental solidarity” prior to the meeting of the Organ of Consultation. The SEATO treaty goes further in defining the word “threatened” to include: any “fact or situation which might endanger the peace of the area.”²⁶ In the SEATO region an attack shall be met “in

²⁵ Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations US Senate by the Subcommittee on Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, “Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad,” 21 December 1970.

²⁶ It is not merely speculative to suggest that policy makers were aware of these differences. A declassified “Top Secret” document from the Pentagon (2011) has an Appendix in which the author(s) demonstrate clause by clause the differences between the obligations taken on by the North Atlantic Treaty as opposed to those owed

accordance with its constitutional processes,” after consultation. In the North Atlantic Treaty the obligation to act has to be met “forthwith.”

The non-immediacy of the response to an attack and the expanded remit of threat in OAS and SEATO is significant for three reasons: 1) it does not grant the executive war powers without consultation with Congress; 2) it confers the United States the freedom to intervene unilaterally or not to intervene at all in Latin America and Asia, and to use delaying tactics prior to consultation; 3) it allows the United States to “determine the immediate measures” in the Western hemisphere and to define what constitutes a “threat” in South East Asia. For Europe, support was guaranteed; for other allies, support was provisional. For Europe, intervention is justified only to repel an act of armed aggression; for other allies, intervention can occur where American policy makers view a threat.

There are various *institutional differences*, the most important of which are: first, the unanimity requirement in NATO is not mirrored for the OAS where “the Organ of Consultation shall take its decisions by a vote of two-thirds” and due to the inclusion of three (arguably six) extra-regional powers the unanimity requirement of SEATO was toothless. Both Thailand and the Philippines were unlikely to vote against the United States, and where unanimity was not found, it was because Britain and France vetoed American action, as they did over the use of force in Laos in 1962; and second, only NATO developed a permanent and well-funded integrated military structure.²⁷ Such integration in Southeast Asia was never

to SEATO allies. It provides a far more comprehensive account than that given here. Pentagon Papers [Part IV. A. 1.] Evolution of the War. U.S. Map for Diem: The Eisenhower Commitments, 1954-1960. NATO and SEATO: A Comparison,” compiled between 06/1967 and 01/1969. Indeed, much of the discussion in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings revolved around whether the treaty granted the executive authority to act in defence of NATO allies without the consent of congress. Again, Senator Donnell poses the most difficult questions here with a hypothetical case involving the Soviets sending 500,000 troops into Norway and whether the treaty bound the US to intervene regardless of protestations from Congress. John Dulles attempts to deflect this question, but the basic answer is yes.

²⁷ Francis A. Beer, ed., *Alliances: Latent War Communities in the Contemporary World* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), especially Part III, “Alliance Cooperation:” Elliot Vandevanter, “NATO and the OAS;” and George Modelski, “SEATO,” for fuller comparisons between the structures of these alliances.

seriously contemplated by the State Department. In addition, the United States worked multilaterally with its NATO allies, and bilaterally with those in the OAS and SEATO.²⁸ Both Southeast Asian Members of SEATO had separate defence treaties with the United States: the Philippines-US Mutual Defence Treaty (1951) pre-dated SEATO; and the 1962 Rusk-Thanat communique, as the 1970 Senate Report made clear, “turned SEATO into a bilateral US-Thai defence agreement.”²⁹ When forced to take sides between NATO allies and countries in the OAS and SEATO, America’s obligation to the former trumped the latter: this was seen most clearly during the Falklands conflict.

European allies were prioritized from the outset, receiving more military and economic assistance, a greater level and respect, and more leeway than others.³⁰ A significant element of the support offered to European allies is that France and Britain (and later West Germany) could contravene the wishes of the United States without the dissolution of NATO ever being seriously contemplated by American policy makers. In spite of a series of early crises in the relationships with these NATO countries – such as France’s vetoing of the European Defence Community (1954); Suez (1956); and De Gaulle’s posturing throughout the 1960s – voices calling for a tough stance against the NATO allies or NATO’s dissolution were marginalized in the United States. This marginalization meant that leaders in Western Europe could act opportunistically and against the wishes of their American counterparts without either the threat that their security guarantee would be withdrawn or that the US would intervene

²⁸ G. John Ikenberry, “Is American Multilateralism in Decline?” *Perspectives on Politics* 1 (3) (2003), 534, defines multilateralism as “the coordination of relations between three or more states according to a set of rules and principles.” Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Why is there no NATO in Asia: Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism,” *International Organization* 56 (3) (2002), note that “Multilateralism is a particularly demanding form of international co-operation. It requires a strong sense of collective identity in addition to shared interests.” In “The Decline of the OAS,” *International Journal* 24 (3) (1969), 499, Jerome Slater wrote that “the United States made it clear that it considered the exigencies of the cold war, as defined exclusively by itself, to override its multilateral commitments [in Latin America] no matter how explicit and solemnly formalized.”

²⁹ “Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad,” December 1970.

³⁰ David Lake, “Anarchy, Hierarchy, and the Variety of International Relations,” *International Organization* 50 (1) (1996).

militarily to secure its wishes. States in Southeast Asia, and especially in Latin America, did not enjoy such privileges. During the Cold War, American policy makers launched covert operations in Guatemala, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Chile and made economic support conditional on Latin American leaders siding with America. Whereas governments critical of American foreign policy in the Atlantic Community were tolerated, those in Southeast Asia and Latin America were viewed as national security threats.

Why, then, were the forms of commitment and support taken on by the United States in its various regional alignments different? This is the main question motivating the present chapter: the reason proffered in response is that common understandings about the similarities of America and Europe – presented in the discursive construct of “the Atlantic Community” – operated in opposition to understandings about the differences between America and the non-communist allies of Southeast Asia and Latin America. This made special treatment for, and muted criticism of, Europe appear an inevitable course of action. As America’s membership of an Atlantic Community became naturalized, discourses surrounding pan-Americanism were marginalized and discourses of a Pacific Community were absent. Instead, discourses constituted well-defined relations of dependence and hierarchy in US-Latin American and US-Southeast Asian interactions.

There was nothing inevitable about the amicitization of Europe, America could have aligned itself more closely with Latin America as part of a “New World” discourse or with the decolonization movement as part of an anti-imperialism discourse. However, in the early years of the Cold War, Americans came to see a tie to Europe as a natural and legitimate constituent part of American identity and the alliances with Latin America and Asia as expedient burdens necessitated by enmity with the Soviet Union. It was the character, not just the importance, of Europe that determined such an arrangement and amity functioned to

distinguish the utilitarian concerns of Cold War alignments from the virtuous considerations that strengthened the transatlantic connection.

Constructing “the Atlantic Community”

When President Truman addressed the nation on signing the North Atlantic Treaty, he publicly asserted: “I am happy to welcome the foreign ministers of the countries, which together with the United States, make up the *North Atlantic Community of nations*.” This was the first articulation of the phrase “the Atlantic Community” by a President of the United States. It would be repeated 23 times over the remainder of his presidency, including in three of his remaining four State of the Union addresses. Since then every president has paid lip-service to the idea that America is part of such a community.

If American attitudes towards the British were complicated, the way in which they imagined “Europe” bordered on the neurotic in the 19th and early 20th centuries. In *The American Image of the Old World* (1963), Cushing Strout offers an account of the images of Europe against which Americans defined their “New World.” Ruud Janssens comments that “there is a wide range of American images of Europe, and they are used depending on the situation, political or otherwise, whether in the United States or in America-European relations.”³¹ This chapter does not dispute the complexity and variety of discourses. Rather, it seeks to determine which were highlighted and which marginalized in the late 1940s in order to make the construction of an Atlantic Community, with America at its core, a naturalized frame of reference.

Between 1947 and 1950, sanitizing discourses that took “Europe” to be its referent constituted American Atlanticism. The idea that the North Atlantic formed a *region* was relatively new

³¹ Ruud Janssens, “‘I would rather go to Europe than go to Heaven’: Images of Europe in the United States,” Michael J. Wintle, ed., *Imagining Europe: Europe and European Civilization as seen from its Margins and by the Rest of the World, in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (Brussels: P.I.E.-Peter Lang, 2008), 145.

and not without dissent from isolationist quarters in the Senate, especially since Italy, Portugal, Iceland, and Norway were to be included as well as the members of the Brussels Pact. In questioning Ambassador Austen, Senators Donnell and Lodge expressed scepticism about the notion that NATO fell under the regional principle of the United Nations.³² Whereas it was presupposed that the Western hemisphere constituted a region, the North Atlantic had to be represented as a region that fell under the United Nations qualifications, especially since the Vandenberg Resolution had made conformity to the provisions of the UN Charter a major condition on American involvement.³³ In assenting to a regional arrangement outside of the Western hemisphere, the United States of America entered a new phase in its foreign relations and constructed a region based on imagined rather than physical geography. Several extant resources made this possible. The amitization of Britain had already presented the Atlantic as no great barrier and America's isolationist posture had been presented as antithetical to American identity and associated global responsibilities.³⁴ However, discourses of civilization, virtuous character, and industry naturalized to separate Europe and make a particularly close form of American support possible.

Common Heritage and Civilization

The Preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty stated a commitment to "safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law." The notion that membership of NATO institutionalized an ideological commitment may appear to be epiphenomenal, but it was in fact a carefully constructed enactment of state identity that all the major advocates of America's entry into the treaty were keen to perform. In August 1973, the confidential

³² U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations, *North Atlantic Treaty: Report on Executive L, Eighty First Congress, First Session* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1949), 28 April 1949.

³³ Kaplan, *NATO and the United States*, 13-30.

³⁴ As discussed in chapter 4, "Our Democratic Neighbor."

discussions of the Executive Session of the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee were declassified. Though much of the conversation focused on NATO's compatibility with America's prior commitments as set out in the UN Charter, the Senator for Massachusetts, and future ambassador to the UN, Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., pointed out a glaring contradiction between NATO's stated aim and the reality of membership. What follows is a revealing conversation and worth citing at length as it demonstrates the tactical choice of language:

Senator Lodge: What do we say on page 1, section 1, when we talk about "the common heritage of freedom" and somebody asks us about Portugal? What is the answer to that? Somebody is going to ask that. What is the answer to it? What freedom do they have?

Chairman Connally: They have some.

Lodge: Very little. Portugal is commonly known to have a dictatorship, and when you talk about common heritage of freedom –

Mr Theodore Achilles (State Department): Another and a good argument can be made on that, that while the Portuguese Government is not in the same form of democracy as we have, it is authoritarian, but it is not totalitarian, and it is really based on the interests of the peoples as between the people and the state, and it is not designed to make the state supreme. The Portuguese Government is really based on the importance of the individual, rather than the importance of the state.

Chairman: Is that in their constitution?

Achilles: Of that I am not sure, sir, but, during the war the Portuguese Government was very definitely of real help to us in our struggles against the totalitarians.

Lodge: *So were the Russians.* Why can't we just say "to keep the peace"?

Dr Wilcox: I think you can go further, because I think last year there was in Portugal a presidential election at which time two opposing candidates representing political parties ran in opposition, and you had a fairly free election there.

Lodge: *So the answer is to prove that Portugal is not a dictatorship?*

Achilles: It is a dictatorship.

Senator Vandenberg: It is a constitutional dictatorship.

Lodge: I just wanted to bring it out.

Chairman: It is a dictatorship by the will of the people. They voted for it.

Lodge: In a free election?

Chairman: That is what Dr Wilcox says.

Dr Wilcox: Is there not another argument that it is comparable to some of the dictatorships in Latin America. Even though they do have dictatorships that have pretty much the same attitude towards international relationships as we. For example, their willingness to subscribe to the treaty obligation not to use force in the settlement of disputes, and their objection to war, and that sort of thing.

Chairman: Right there, now, even though it may be a form of dictatorship, it still is not robbed of the inherent right of self-defence and dealing collectively.

Vandenberg: He is just talking about the last phase “common heritage of freedom.”

Chairman: Portugal, whatever you can say about it is an independent country. It is that way because the people have decided.

Vandenberg: I think you might soften the blow if you said “their common heritage of peace and freedom” They are a peaceful country.

Lodge: *It has been said that this is not the old-fashioned simple alliance of the old days, and that we have certain ideological things in common and so forth. Certainly Portugal makes it difficult to sustain that. I like the Portuguese, but I think it is better not to oversell yourself and not to claim more than is there.*

Chairman: Don’t we owe her a little for Vasco da Gama?

Senator Green: Didn’t she found Massachusetts?

Lodge: I am for Portugal. I am glad to see Portugal in. I just wanted to know what the answer was. You refer on page 5 to strengthening their free institutions. What are the free institutions of Portugal? I don’t know. I know what the free institutions are in this country.

Green: You only support their free institutions. If they haven’t any, you don’t support any.

Lodge: If that satisfies you, it is OK with me.³⁵

The attempt to reconcile America’s strategic interest in keeping the Azores within the collective defence pact, whilst making a regional arrangement based on both strategic interest and “ideological things in common” is revealing; especially when compared to the public hearings where Senator Lodge’s private concerns over the overselling of the treaty in the wording of the Preamble and Article II are not voiced at any point.

The conversation highlights several points. Firstly, the alliance is not merely an extension of the World War Two alignment and Portugal’s membership cannot be justified as such since that is incompatible with the exclusion of “the Russians.” Secondly, the phrase “common heritage of freedom” distinguishes NATO from the OAS since it is not merely about “the

³⁵U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. *The Vandenberg Resolution and the North Atlantic Treaty* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1973), 297-299, “Executive Session of the United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations,” Monday June 6 1949. Mr. Theodore C. Achilles was the Director for Western European Affairs and one of the two major architects in the State Department and a keen supporter of NATO, which may explain his defence of Portugal. Kaplan quotes him as saying: “I don’t care whether entangling alliance have been considered worse than original sin since George Washington’s time. We’ve got to negotiate a military alliance within Western Europe in peacetime and we’ve got to do it quickly,” *NATO and the United States*, 19.

same attitude to international relations.” Finally there is awareness that, with Portugal’s membership, the North Atlantic Treaty is in some way “overselling” itself, since Portugal lacks the “free institutions” it presents as common sense.

In presenting the North Atlantic Treaty to the America people Truman made frequent reference to the ideological commitment shared between the Parties. There are no caveats about Portugal’s membership. The media were complicit, since no questions on this inconsistency are put to Truman in any of the twenty Presidential News Conferences between April and September of 1949. The fact that Portugal violated the notion of shared political institutions was noted in William Fox and Annette Fox’s in *NATO and the Range of American Choice* (1967). They refer to the “undemocratic character of Portugal’s government” as being “conveniently ignored.”³⁶ The discussions in the Senate reveal that it was, in fact, deliberately ignored in order to present amity as obvious. Presidential rhetoric cemented this omission. Appeals to common sense had the effect of generating an unquestioning set of assumptions that it was in fact common sense that the NATO allies all came from the same civilization.

From the alliance’s inception an understanding that Europe and America were bound by something greater than the common threat of Soviet aggression was presented as common sense. The “common heritage and civilization of their peoples” became a major purpose and was subject to mass repetition, as the Truman Administration successfully convinced the Senate to ratify the treaty. On 4 April 1949, President Truman introduced the North Atlantic Treaty to the American public. As he signed the agreement and sent it to the Senate, he made the following comments:

³⁶ William T. Fox and Annette Baker Fox, *NATO and the Range of American Choice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 29.

The nations represented here are bound together *by ties of long standing*. We are joined by a common heritage of democracy, individual liberty, and rule of law. These are the ties of a peaceful way of life. In this pact we are *merely giving them formal recognition*.³⁷

The idea that the treaty reflected “ties of long standing” and that Americans ought therefore to support it, is explicit: “we are merely giving them formal recognition.” As the Senate prepared to call its witnesses, Truman continued a rhetorical campaign both to construct and to cement the region as an obvious project that conformed to the principles to which America had already subscribed and by which it had been constituted:

The nations signing this Treaty share a common heritage of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law. The American members of the North Atlantic community stem directly from the European members in tradition and in love of freedom.³⁸

The “love of freedom” as represented by institutions and common values united the “New World” (the United States and Canada) with the “Old” (Western Europe). This was a radical departure from how Americans had imagined the miasma and rivalries of Europe in the inter-war period. Truman was also keen to stem any criticism that NATO was in any way incompatible with the United Nations Charter:

Much remains to be done, however, to carry out the principles of the United Nations. Within the terms of the United Nations Charter, we and certain other countries have undertaken to provide greater assurance against the danger of armed conflict. That is the purpose of the North Atlantic Treaty. The idea behind this treaty – the association of democratic nations for mutual defense – *is well understood in this country*.³⁹

The presentation of the NATO allies as committed to democratic and free institutions that forged a common civilization was central in cementing an understanding among the

³⁷ Harry S. Truman, *Public Papers of the President (PPP)*, #68 “Address on the Occasion of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty,” 4 April 1949.

³⁸ Truman, *PPP*, #75 “Special Message to the Senate Transmitting the North Atlantic Treaty,” 12 April 1949.

³⁹ Truman, *PPP*, #120 “Address in Little Rock at the Dedication of the World War Memorial Park,” 11 June 1949.

American public that a security commitment was a natural and important one. Understandings that America and Europe had similar political institutions were bolstered by developing understandings of America's global responsibilities as "leader of the free world," which built on its extant role as "the arsenal of democracy."

Virtuous Europe

As NATO intervened in Korea in the 1950s, European peoples and their leaders were predicated with several imagined American virtues – courage, intelligence, rationality. The *courage* of the people of the NATO countries was frequently referenced:

The two hundred million people of the NATO nations of Europe are in the deepest sense *bound together by a unity more profound than any pact*. They are skilled in work, courageous in spirit, and tenacious in their love of freedom.⁴⁰

During the Korean War, Western European allies showed "their courage and their love of freedom."⁴¹ Jennifer Milliken argues convincingly that the Korean War was "a particularly significant moment in the broader process of (re)constituting the Western security collectively."⁴² Indeed, NATO's development into an interventionist alignment with an integrated military command structure was enabled by the discourses of intervention in Korea, as was its earliest expansion to include Greece and Turkey.⁴³

Popular culture reminded Americans of the character of their European allies. Throughout the 1950s, World War Two films were numerous: *Decisions before Dawn* (1951), *The Caine Mutiny* (1954), and *Bridge over the River Kwai* (1957) were all nominated for Best Picture at the Academy Awards, and tales of the heroism of the French Resistance, starting with *This*

⁴⁰ Dwight D. Eisenhower, *PPP*, #42 "Statement by the President on the Fourth Anniversary of the Signing of the North Atlantic Treaty," 4 April 1953.

⁴¹ Truman, *PPP*, #303 "Radio and Television Report to the American People on the National Emergency," 15 December 1950.

⁴² Jennifer Milliken, "Intervention and Identity," 99.

⁴³ Cameron S. Brown, "The One Coalition they Craved to Join: Turkey in the Korean War," *Review of International Studies* 34 (2008).

Land is Mine (1943), were popularised in *Résistance: Memoirs of Occupied France* (1948). General Eisenhower's memoir, *Crusade in Europe* (1948), compounded an understanding that the French Resistance had been active and important in aiding the Allies in liberating France. The bounds of bravery extended beyond Britain and included heroic French fighters.⁴⁴

Americans had long projected an image of cultural and *intellectual* superiority onto Europe. Ruud Janssens notes that "culture played an important role in the perception of Europe by Americans" and there remained "a fixed idea that Europe was culturally superior."⁴⁵ He argues that "after World War 2, American authors would continue to visit Europe, testifying that even though the United States had become a military and political superpower beyond doubt, Europe remained a cultural h(e)aven." Popular films like *An American in Paris* (1951) and *Roman Holiday* (1953) provided escapism and a glimpse of culture and history. Such culture produced rational, educated, and wise leaders. In 1952, Truman referenced the common heritage and "Western Civilization" in his praise of Leonardo da Vinci:

Since the American people have a common interest in the heritage of Western civilization which owes so much to da Vinci, it is fitting that we also take note of the anniversary [of his birth] with appropriate observances in our museums and other institutions of art, science, and learning.⁴⁶

In President Eisenhower's 1953 Inauguration, he cast Western European leaders as "enlightened and inspired." Winston Churchill, then returned to office, embodied the tough individualism of those courageous statesmen. His Nobel Prize for Literature (1953) confirmed his reputation both as a statesman and as a historian. Both *The Second World War* (1948) and *History of the English-Speaking Peoples* (1956) were bestsellers in America.

⁴⁴ Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe* (London: W. Heinemann, 1948), 325. In 1948 this book topped both the *New York Times Bestsellers List* and *Publishers Weekly* for 11 weeks.

⁴⁵ Ruud Janssens, "'I would rather go to Europe,'" 125.

⁴⁶ Truman, *PPP*, #89 "Statement by the President on the 500th Anniversary of the Birth of Leonardo da Vinci," 11 April 1952.

The threat of subversion provoked considerable disquiet in American Cold War foreign policy.⁴⁷ Talk of subversion had, however, been absent in the public Senate Hearings on the ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty, save for the briefest of private discussions when Senator Lodge asked the following of then Secretary of State, Dean Acheson:

Senator Lodge: In the preamble “they” – that is the parties –

Are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of the peoples founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law

The other except is Article 2:

The Parties will contribute to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization if their peoples founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law

My question is, in the light of those two phrases: Is it not true that a communist government would not come within the purview of those two phrases that I have quoted?

Dean Acheson (Secretary of State): I think you are quite right

Lodge: Are those not two very pertinent provisions?

Acheson: They are very pertinent, and they bear upon the question that you have in mind.

Lodge: And they would justify us, would they not, in saying to a nation that was taken over by “Communists” “You no longer come within the purview of the Pact.”

Acheson: In my judgement they would.

Lodge: Thank you.⁴⁸

In all the pages of testimony, there is no public talk of the fear of subversion in Europe. *Mature* democracies and *rational* peoples were agents cast as unreceptive to subversion and antithetical to communist ideas. Indeed, it is only in justifying NATO’s existence *ex post* that public articulation is given to pre-existing fears that Western Europe could have been subverted.⁴⁹ This is an odd omission given both the strength of Communist Parties in Italy and France in the late 1940s and that British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, who was

⁴⁷ NSC-68 described the fundamental design of the Kremlin as calling for “complete subversion or forcible destruction of the machinery of government and structure of society in the countries of the non-Soviet world...to that end Soviet efforts are now directed to the domination of the Eurasian land mass,” accessed 8 April 2015, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/10-1.pdf

⁴⁸ U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1949), Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s testimony and questioning, 27 April 1949.

⁴⁹ Eisenhower, *PPP*, #32 “Special Message to the Congress on the Mutual Security Program,” 19 February 1958. Eisenhower stated: “It is easy to forget our fears of only a decade ago that France, Italy, and other nations of Europe devastated by war would be engulfed by the Red tide. Due in major measure to this great program, these and other nations of Asia and the Middle East are free today and stand with us against Communist domination.” Ironically one of the reasons it was easy to forget is that the threat of Italy and France being overrun was downplayed by the Truman Administration ten years earlier.

arguably the most important individual in NATO's creation, "believed that a more immediate threat came from internal communist subversion of the economically and politically weak countries of Western Europe."⁵⁰ The absence of a subversion clause in the NATO treaty reflected certain understandings about the strength of character of Western European peoples and institutions.

Article II of SEATO, on the other hand, included the clause: "to prevent and counter subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political activity." Common understandings that SEATO was designed to prevent subversion reflect an image of physical and moral weakness that can also be seen in Article III, which emphasizes the "social wellbeing" of the parties. Though it included the "directed from without" clause, both Thailand and the Philippines were understood to face communist threats from domestic actors that were represented as pawns of the Kremlin, rather than legitimate political actors. In combination with the understandings that these nations were newly independent, the "directed from without" clause ties in to the fear that these countries lacked the maturity – invariably tied to democracy – to resist communist encroachment.

In the hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (1954), Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, the architect of the treaty, made it clear that SEATO was not envisaged to be a NATO for Southeast Asia. He made this point by emphasizing the subversion clause:

A second *novel feature* of the treaty is the fact that more than any other of our security treaties it emphasizes the danger of subversion.⁵¹

⁵⁰ John C. Milloy, *The North Atlantic Treaty Organization 1948-1957: Community or Alliance* (McGill-Queen's University Press: London, 2006), 9. Indeed, given that the 1948 elections in Italy could well have brought a Communist government into office, these fears were not unfounded. The French Communist Party won the biggest share of the popular vote in each of the three National Assembly elections of the Fourth Republic.

⁵¹ United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations., *Hearing Before the Senate Foreign Relations United States Senate 83rd Congress, Second Session on The Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty and the Protocol thereto, both Signed at Manila on September 8, 1954 Part I* (Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1954-55), Secretary of State John Foster Dulles' testimony, 11 November 1954.

Upon sending the SEATO treaty to the Senate, Eisenhower publicly described it as “a treaty for defense against both open armed attack and internal subversion.”⁵² Whereas allies could be readily subverted, America’s *Other Self*, “Europe,” was rational and could be trusted not to be led astray by the forces of communist imperialism. This mode of representation further accounts for the immediacy of the defence of Europe as it was common sense that *only* armed aggression could subvert Europe.

The Deserving Poor

In contrasting representations of Asia, Latin America, and Europe in statements on financial support, further important trends emerge. American financial support was not evenly distributed between regions and allies. In 1950, 78% of US Overseas Loans and Grants went to Europe compared with 0.5% to Latin America and 11.4% to Asia. However, European nations were never represented as dependent. Rather, presidential statements presented the recipients of the Marshall Aid Package and the European recipients of the Mutual Security Act assistance as industrious, self-sufficient, and deserving, whereas the non-European recipients of the \$24.1 billion that constituted the Mutual Security Act (1953-1961) and the \$123.1 billion of the Foreign Assistance Act (1962-1984) were presented as dependents, in desperate need of development.⁵³ The development discourse served to differentiate European from non-European allies. Underdeveloped nations received aid out of necessity (because they were weak and readily subverted), European allies received assistance out of virtue (because they were blameless in their misfortune and it was the right thing to do): there is an implicit distinction between the deserving and undeserving poor.

⁵² Eisenhower, *PPP*, #329 “Special Message to the Senate Transmitting the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and Protocol Thereto,” 10 November 1954.

⁵³ Aid figures taken from Earl Conteh-Morgan, *American Foreign Aid and Global Power Projection: The Geopolitics of Resource Allocation* (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1990), 47.

European nations were never presented as weak or dependent in presidential discourse. Rather the effort to “rebuild” Europe was presented as vital because of the war damage:

We have joined together in the progressive development of free institutions, and we have *shared* our moral and material strength in the *present task of rebuilding from the devastation of war*.⁵⁴

President Truman’s choice of language is telling. Americans “share” their material strength with the nations of Western Europe who are “rebuilding from the devastation of war.” Europe’s economic troubles had not been self-inflicted, rather their need stemmed from a war that Americans already understood as common sense to have been one of morality and necessity. The European Recovery Program (ERP) was presented as of “vital importance to the United States,” but it went beyond this and Truman made sure to link the Marshall Plan to the commonsensical affinity and shared culture of Europe.

Our deepest concern with European recovery, however, is that it is essential to the maintenance of the civilization in which the American way of life is rooted.⁵⁵

In his 1949 Inauguration, the vital interest in the defence of Europe was the central theme. Truman stated:

We must keep our full weight behind the European recovery program. We are confident of the success of this major venture in world recovery. We believe that our partners in this effort will achieve *the status of self-supporting nations once again*.⁵⁶

The phrase “self-supporting nations once again” implicitly recognizes the blamelessness of Europe in requiring American aid – Europe is presented as the deserving poor and by implication American assistance is a moral venture. In 1951, Truman delivered a statement on the third Anniversary of the ERP, which began as follows:

⁵⁴ Truman, *PPP*, #75 “Special Message to the Senate Transmitting the North Atlantic Treaty,” 12 April 1949.

⁵⁵ Truman, *PPP*, #238 “Special Message to the Congress on the Marshall Plan,” 19 December 1947.

⁵⁶ Truman, *PPP*, #19 “Inaugural Address,” 20 January 1949.

Today, *thanks primarily to their own efforts*, the people of Western Europe, together with our help, have rebuilt the economies of their countries and have developed a new spirit of confidence in themselves and in their free institutions. To my mind, this spirit, this rising confidence in the hearts of the people, is one of the greatest sources of strength in the free world.⁵⁷

The most significant element of how Truman described the ERP was that the European nations were playing an active role in rebuilding from war. The recipient nations were not passively received and wasting American generosity, rather they were productively and effectively using the aid to become self-sufficient. In statements on the ERP emphasis is always placed on the self-sufficiency of Europe and the free institutions that they, like Americans, cherish, as well as their undeserved misfortune.

This discourse of assistance did not apply to all foreign aid. The 1950s saw a discursive division of the world into classes of developed and underdeveloped nations. On signing the Mutual Security Act, Truman highlighted Asia's need for support:

The peoples of the underdeveloped areas of the world want desperately to take fuller advantage of their human and natural resources. We are now supplying material and technical assistance to help them realize these aspirations, and I believe that we should continue to do so. I am thinking particularly of the necessity of supporting the free nations of Asia in their efforts to strengthen the economic foundations of their independence.⁵⁸

As the Cold War progressed there was a shifting regional emphasis – self-sufficient Europe no longer needed financial assistance – but there was also a shift in focus from military aspects to development. Michael Hunt describes development as “the younger sibling of containment.... But while containment underlined the obligation of a great nation to defend liberty, development theory drew its inspiration from the old American vision of appropriate or inappropriate processes of social change and an abiding sense of superiority over dark-

⁵⁷ Truman, *PPP*, #66 “Statement by the President on the Third Anniversary of the European Recovery Program,” 2 April 1951.

⁵⁸ Truman, *PPP*, #250 “Statement by the President Upon Signing the Mutual Security Act,” 10 October 1951.

skinned peoples of the Third World.”⁵⁹ Between 1952 and 1961, the president released an annual “Special Message to Congress on the Mutual Security Program.” Asian nations were lumped with those in Africa and the Middle East as “underdeveloped.” The discourse of development was invariably tied to the aforementioned fear of subversion.

While the amounts requested for technical, economic and developmental purposes are small as compared with the military support, these programs are nonetheless of the most vital importance. They will be applied chiefly in South and Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa. Through these programs, the United States is proving its interest in helping the peoples of these areas to work toward better and more hopeful conditions of life, to strengthen the foundations of opportunity and freedom. To guard against the external military threat is not enough: we must also move against those conditions exploited by *subversive forces from within*.⁶⁰

The notion that underdevelopment would lead to exploitation by Communism was not new and had played a part in justifying the ERP *ex post* as well as the new focus on development in the Mutual Security Act. However, though the fear of a communist takeover of Europe was never completely absent, Truman’s State of the Union addresses in 1950 and 1951 made it clear that the threat of Communism encroachment in Europe was external not internal. In 1950 Truman referred to “the possibility which faced us 3 years ago that most of Europe and the Mediterranean area might *collapse under totalitarian pressure*” as “the greatest danger.” In 1951 Truman stated:

In Europe the Marshall plan has had an electrifying result. As European recovery progressed, the *strikes led by the Kremlin’s agents in Italy and France failed*. All over Western Europe the Communist Party took worse and worse beatings at the polls.

The countries which have received Marshall Plan aid have been able, *through hard work, to expand their productive strength-in many cases, to levels higher than ever before in their history*. Without this strength they would be completely incapable of

⁵⁹ Hunt, *Ideology and USFP*, 159-160.

⁶⁰ Eisenhower, *PPP*, #66 “Special Message to the Congress on the Mutual Security Program,” 5 May 1953.

defending themselves today. They are now ready to use this strength in helping to build a strong combined defense against aggression.⁶¹

In both of these scenarios, the threat that European nations would turn communist was nothing to do with subversive elements within these countries. Rather, it was the product of external “totalitarian pressure” and “strikes led by the Kremlin.” Indeed the “Communist Party” is portrayed as a monolithic entity. This productive strength fed into the narrative that Western European countries embodied the same entrepreneurial spirit of the United States. Their industriousness had paid off and, “through hard work,” they were stronger than ever.

In his 1955 Message to Congress on the Mutual Security Act, President Eisenhower shifted the primary recipient of American financial assistance to “the free nations of South and East Asia.” This is one of the most telling Presidential Messages since it contrasts Europe’s needs with Asia’s clearly. “The program reflects the greatly improved conditions in Europe and provides for the critical needs of Asia.” It contrasts the “continuing threat of aggression and subversion in Asia” with the nations of Western Europe which “are capable of meeting current defense goals without such support.” Most interestingly, however, the two NATO allies who continue to receive support – Turkey and Greece – are described as “stalwart” and “making significant progress.” Though both received more aid than any nation in Southeast Asia, the discourse of dependence was absent and, as with Western Europe 1947-1952, was replaced by a discourse of assistance.⁶²

The discourse of development was tied to the conceptions of passivity and weakness that contrasted with the active strength of Europe and the discourse of assistance. It cast America in the subject position of protector and “underdeveloped” nations in the subject position of protected. A significant division between the representations of European allies and of those that make up SEATO and the OAS is that the former, in its need for economic aid, was not

⁶¹ Truman, *PPP*, #4 “Annual Message to Congress on the State of the Union,” 8 January 1951.

⁶² Eisenhower, *PPP*, #76 “Message to Congress on the Mutual Security Program,” 20 April 1955.

cast as dependent, whereas non-friend allies were subjected to this demeaning casting. The discourses of development and underdevelopment separated Europe from the broader alliance strategy America pursued throughout the Cold War. In emphasizing the industrious character of Europe and hard-working Europeans, the alignment became ever more taken-for-granted in the 1950s.

Representing non-European Allies

In order to demonstrate that the discursive construction of friendship for Europe was different from the discursive construction of alliances in other regions, this section briefly explores the construction of relations of difference between the United States and Latin America and the United States and Southeast Asia. Neither of these cases has been explored in detail. They have been chosen to highlight the general absence of discourses of similarity. Their purpose is to demonstrate differences in representational practices in America's alliances in the early Cold War. Each warrants further attention.

President Kennedy's Inaugural address in 1961 was the most eagerly anticipated, and indeed remains the most viewed, in American history.⁶³ Best known for its "ask not what your country can do for you" appeal, the speech's major foreign policy theme was that America would "support any friend":

Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, *support any friend*, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty.

By 1961, it was well understood that these alliances were not all equal. The support offered was not identical; an implicit hierarchy existed. The first five minutes of his speech provided a summation of the discursive construction of the difference between friends and allies that

⁶³ John F. Kennedy, *PPP*, #1 "Inauguration Address," 20 January 1961.

conformed to and (re)produced common sense. First, to the “old allies whose cultural and spiritual origins we share,” America pledged “the loyalty of faithful friends.” So as to emphasize the point, Kennedy sent an open message to the Permanent Council of NATO three weeks later, in which he further clarified that this commitment was aimed at this specific organization:

We of the Atlantic Community are the single most effective obstacle between tyranny and its desire to dominate the world. Our historic bonds of friendship have been strengthened by common values and a common goal – the creation of a world where free men can live at peace and in dignity, liberated from the bonds of hunger, poverty and ignorance.⁶⁴

Kennedy then turns to the “new states whom we welcome to the ranks of the free,” to whom he pledges that “one form of colonial control shall not have passed away merely to be replaced by a *far more iron tyranny*.” This conjured a hierarchy of forms of domination in Southeast Asia. Colonial control (as practiced by Europeans) was bad, but not nearly as bad as communist imperialism. It also casts America in the subject position of leader and guide, the host who welcomes the stranger into its midst.

Finally, Kennedy turns to Latin America and announces his Alliance for Progress. He rearticulates the discourse of dependency:

To our *sister republics* south of our border, we offer a special pledge – to convert our good words into good deeds – in a new alliance for progress – to assist free men and free governments in *casting off the chains of poverty*. But this peaceful revolution of hope cannot become the prey of hostile powers. Let all our neighbors know that we shall join with them to oppose aggression or *subversion* anywhere in the Americas. And let every other power know that *this Hemisphere intends to remain the master of its own house*.

This sums up many the discourses surrounding Latin America that prevailed in the 1940s and 1950s. The unifying discourses of free nations joined against the prey of hostile powers meets

⁶⁴ Kennedy, *PPP*, #34 “Message to the Permanent Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” 15 February 1961.

the feminization and infantilization of Latin America, which requires the protection of an America: cast into the role of “master of its own house” against the subversion of weak, dependent, and impoverished Latin America.

Before briefly exploring the representations of Latin America and Southeast Asia, it is important to note some of the parallels in representations of all Cold War allies. It is unsurprising that such discourses dominated given that the relations of difference that constitute ally and friend are substantially more complementary than those between friend and enemy. The two major representations of all Cold War allies were that they were *free* and *united*. “The division is not,” Truman stated in his first speech that referenced “the Cold War,” “between the United States and the Soviet Union, but between the Soviet Union and the free nations of the world.”⁶⁵ Both of these understandings are made in opposition to communism and the supposed bipolarity of the era. Unity, as a discursive construct, was articulated with reference to the communist threat. Unity depended on a purpose: the purpose of the Cold War was to avoid further communist encroachment through “containment.”

The distinctions between the slavery of communism and the freedom of “like-minded states” were clearly articulated in Truman’s 1949 Inauguration, which had been largely devoted to setting up “Communism” against “Democracy.”⁶⁶ In the 1950s, the set of “free” nations expanded. “Free” nations were not necessarily democratic, nor did they conform to the vast majority of the American conception of the good, they were simply not communist. Asian nations that were party to the SEATO treaty were referred to as “the free Asian nations” from 1955 onwards. The label “free” was attached frequently and always in opposition to the “enslaved” peoples living under Communism. Eisenhower’s first State of the Union was instrumental in divorcing freedom from democracy:

⁶⁵ Truman, *PPP*, #129 “Commencement Address at the University of California,” 12 June 1948.

⁶⁶ Truman, *PPP*, #10 “Inaugural Address,” 20 January 1949.

The freedom we cherish and defend in Europe and in the Americas is no different from the freedom that is imperilled in Asia.⁶⁷

The understanding of freedom as a negative rather than a positive concept had roots in the understandings of freedom that was presupposed to have already been won (by the United States) for the Western Hemisphere. Latin Americans were “free from the jealousies and antagonisms which have proved such obstacles to progress and prosperity in other sections of the world.”⁶⁸ Latin Americans were, according to President Hoover, *free from* extra-hemispheric rivalries, but only *free to* act in conformity with the preferences of the United States packaged in the Monroe Doctrine, Article 22 of the League of Nations, and FDR’s “Good Neighbor Policy.” Equally, Southeast Asian nations were *free from* Communist enslavement, but not *free to* be fully self-determining members of international society without the proper levels of advice and tutelage from mature nations.

Protector/Protected: The Decline of Pan-Americanism

The nations of Latin America were not part of the civilization that justified Atlanticism. Pan-Americanism is not referenced in any major presidential speech after 1915 and the 14th of April (from 1931 onwards “Pan-American Day,”) warranted little attention by the president or major newspapers.⁶⁹ In his second term, Truman released Annual Proclamations celebrating the day, which referenced: “the close bonds of friendship existing between the peoples of the United States and of the other American republics.” Notably absent, however, is a discussion of common heritage and/or civilization and “unity” and “solidarity” are the purview of defence against external threats. The Rio Treaty committed the Parties to

⁶⁷ Eisenhower, *PPP*, #6 “Annual Message to Congress on the State of the Union,” 2 February 1953.

⁶⁸ Herbert Hoover, *PPP*, #135 “Address to the Pan American Union,” 14 April 1931.

⁶⁹ Inattention was a significant theme set forth in a restricted “Unsigned Draft memorandum Prepared in the Department of State,” January 4 1950. *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)*, 1950, Volume II, “The United Nations; The Western Hemisphere.” “The American Publics: Multilateral Relations” comments that the measures taken to reassure Latin Americans that they are not being ignored as the US has become preoccupied in other parts of the world have “attracted relatively little attention domestically.”

“relations of friendship” and “good neighbourliness,” but this is not found with greater appeals to a civilizational discourse, a fact implicitly recognized in Senate discussions.

In the 19th and early 20th century several representations stressed Pan-American solidarity, others stressing hemispheric differences. The Cold War security imaginary led to the marginalization of solidarity and the highlighting of difference. As Americans increasingly could not define themselves against the “Old World” of Europe, they sought to define themselves against “primitive” and “underdeveloped” civilizations. In the late 1940s, the United States and Latin America were commonly understood to be fundamentally different. The discovery of underdevelopment in Latin America ushered in the vast spending of the Alliance for Progress, which served to further differentiate the productive and self-sufficient European allies from the unproductive and dependent ones of the south.

Hollywood played a significant role in differentiating Latin America in the mid-20th century. Ruth Vasey argues that “Mexican locations offered filmmakers Spanish names, dusty streets, donkeys, haciendas, sombreros, and erotic Spanish women. Most of all it offered them the Mexican Bad Man – a large, raucous, moustachioed bandit who spoke semi-comic pigeon English, exhibited varying degrees of barbarous behavior, and was understandably anathema to the Mexican government.” Films such as *Woman Trap* (1935) and *Only Angels Have Wings* (1939) distinguished the primitiveness and lawlessness of Latin America from the civilization of the United States and Europe. Such understandings continued in earnest throughout the 1940s and Latin America was largely ignored and not considered a foreign policy priority. James Park notes that “in addition to general indifference to Latin American affairs both at the official and the unofficial levels, reporting of the region reflected a remote quality occasionally bordering on the lewd in the post-war years.”⁷⁰ The primitivism of dirt-

⁷⁰ James William Park, “Latin America and the Discovery of Underdevelopment, 1945-1960,” 179, in Michael L. Krenin, ed., *The Impact of Race on US Foreign Policy: A Reader* (London: Garland Pub., 1999).

roads and the lawlessness of Mexican bandits, seen in *The Treasure of Sierra Madre* (1941) and *Bandido* (1956), contrasted with the virtuous and trustworthy character of Western European allies.⁷¹

Intra-Hemispheric relations were acutely gendered. J. Ann Ticker comments that in characterizing Latin America: “all the images are profoundly gendered: the United States as a civilizing warrior, a suitor, or a father, and Latin America as a lesser male, a female or a child.”⁷² The representation of Latin American nations as female had long roots. The phrase, “Fraternal Greetings to our Sister Republics,” had been used in the 1930s both by President Hoover and President Roosevelt.⁷³ The United States was masculinized in opposition to the weaker nations that need a fraternal protector. Eldon Kennworthy notes that “Latin American nations are ‘sister republics’ but rarely is the United States their sister. Official discourse prefers to cast Washington as ‘neighbor’ or ‘brother’.”⁷⁴ Throughout the Cold War, these understandings of a feminized region were subject to constant repetition. The elite articulation of “sister republics” was bolstered by everyday understandings of Latin Americans that emphasized sensuality and weakness. Political cartoons tended to depict Latin America as a woman or a child in the early 20th century.⁷⁵ Simultaneously, Carmen Miranda’s performances in *That Night in Rio* (1941) and *Copacabana* (1947) cemented an image of a fun, if unserious, people, devoid of the morals and responsibilities of those in the Atlantic Community, bound by military heroism, fraternity, and maturity.

⁷¹ For more details see Grace Livingstone, *America’s Backyard: the United States and Latin America from the Monroe Doctrine to the War on Terror* (London: Zed Books, 2009), “Coca-Cola, Cartoons and Caricature.”

⁷² J. Ann Ticker, *Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 58. See also V Spike Peterson, ed., *Gendered States: Feminist (re)Visions of International Relations Theory* (London: Lynne Rienner, 1992).

⁷³ Hoover, *PPP*, #135 “Address to the Pan American Union,” 14 April 1931,” and Franklin Roosevelt, *PPP*, #38 “Address on the Occasion of the Celebration of Pan-American Day,” 12 April 1933.

⁷⁴ Eldon Kenworthy, *America/Américas; Myth in the Making of U.S. Policy towards Latin America* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 32.

⁷⁵ See John J. Johnson, *Latin America in Caricature* (Austin: University of Texas, 1980).

Latin America received very little aid during the 1940s. The “communist threat” was not to become evident in Latin America until 1952, when Jacobo Guzmán’s land reforms threatened American business interests in Guatemala. Having largely ignored Latin America in the late 1940s and during the Korean War, American policy makers discovered “subversion” in their backyard in the 1950s. Guatemala became “a chosen target for Communist aggression in our Hemisphere.”⁷⁶ On 28 March 1954, the Caracas Declaration of Solidarity was issued, noting that “international co-operation is required to eradicate the danger which the subversive activities of international communism pose for the American State.”⁷⁷ American stereotypes of Latin Americans further contrasted them from Europeans. In 1940, 41% of Americans surveyed had described Latin Americans as “lazy” and this assessment was reinforced by popular culture. In 1947, Peggy Lee’s song “*Mañana* (Is soon enough for me)” topped the Billboard Charts. Sung in a stereotypical Hispanic accent the song features the lines:

The window she is broken and the rain is comin’ in
If someone doesn’t fix it I’ll be soaking to my skin
But if we wait a day or two the rain may go away
And we don’t need a window on such a sunny day

Ending with the common refrain “*mañana, mañana, mañana* is soon enough for me” its popularity reflected an attitude that Latin Americans were unproductive and unlikely to use American aid in a wise and reflective manner.⁷⁸

In assessing the dominant images of Latin America, Martha Coltan argues that “during the Cold War, the US commonly viewed Latin American leaders and peoples as dependents.”⁷⁹ Frederick Pike has argued that the inattention paid to support of Latin America reflected

⁷⁶ Eisenhower, *PPP*, #210 “Radio and Television Address Opening the President's Campaign for Re-Election,” 19 September 1956.

⁷⁷ “Declaration of Solidarity for the Preservation of the Political Integrity of the American States against International Communist Intervention,” 28 March 1954, accessed 8 April 2015, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/intam10.asp.

⁷⁸ Peggy Lee and Dave Barbour, “*Mañana*, is Soon Enough for Me,” Peggy Lee, Capitol Records, 15022.

⁷⁹ Martha L. Coltan, *Images and Intervention: U.S. Policies in Latin America* (London: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1994), 25.

public opinion: “Rather than lavish vast amounts on people who allegedly possessed endless capacity to squander the capital that civilized men produced, Americans preferred to help people who, *like themselves*, had demonstrated the ability to rise above the limitations of natural men and to create capitalist civilization.”⁸⁰ After all, only 5% of Americans believed Latin Americans to be “efficient” and a mere 15% said “intelligent.” Latin America was underdeveloped and primitive, but this underdevelopment was not the fault of decades of exploitation under the Monroe Doctrine, it was the consequence of a certain presupposed character traits: a “backwards” (44%), “quick tempered” (49%) and “ignorant” (34%) people.⁸¹ Public opinion may presuppose certain stereotypes, but American policy makers’ neglect of Latin America did little to shift these attitudes. While Americans came to see a connection with a geographically distant Europe as natural, the distance between the United States and its southern neighbours grew throughout the Cold War.

Tutors and Students: The Absence of a Pacific Community

If Europe and Latin America were familiar to Americans in the 1940s, Southeast Asia was a comparatively blank canvas onto which new representations could be projected. The countries that were party to the Manila Pact included three extra-regional powers (the United States, Britain, and France), two former British dominions (Australia and New Zealand), and three Southeast Asian nations (Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines). Whereas a plethora of extant resources could be harnessed in order create a sense of familiarity and to categorize and cast Latin American and European nations in certain positions, Southeast Asia remained profoundly unfamiliar to the majority of Americans.

⁸⁰ Frederick B. Pike, *The United States and Latin America: Myths and Stereotypes of Civilization and Nature* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1992), 301.

⁸¹ Table of Stereotypes in Grace Livingstone, *America’s Backyard*, 218. Admittedly, this is only one poll, but it does provide some empirically valid evidence for such presuppositions being common place.

Like the Rio Treaty, the Preamble of the SEATO Treaty is devoid of reference to common civilization. SEATO committed the parties “to promote self-government and to secure the independence of all countries whose peoples desire it *and are able to undertake its responsibilities*.” The significance of this final caveat is vast: it implied a tutoring period to prepare those newly independent nations for self-determination. This is unsurprising as in the 1940s, “in the imagination of Washington policy makers, an umbilical cord tethered the colonies of Southeast Asia to their mother countries in Europe.”⁸² The presence of infantilizing discourse fostered images of immaturity: countries unprepared for the demands of self-governance and incapable of defending themselves without significant assistance from external powers.⁸³

Southeast Asian “immaturity” conformed to a second major understanding that distinguished NATO allies from others: that the character of certain peoples made them more readily subverted than others. This played into an adult/child dichotomy with the United States and Europe taking on the roles of mature tutors. A series of cultural sites bolstered these images. In *Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination* (2003), Christina Klein describes the pertinence and persistence of various infantilizing discourses in America’s Southeast Asian relations. Klein places special emphasis on the popular Rogers and Hammerstein musical *The King and I* which had opened in Broadway in 1951, was nominated for Best Picture in the 1957 Academy Awards, and for which Yul Brenner won Best Actor. It remains the most prominent film about an Asian member of SEATO, Thailand (the Kingdom of Siam), and it shaped the attitudes of a generation of Americans. Klein argues “in texts such as *The King and I*’s “getting to Know You,” cultural producers imaginatively mapped a network of sentimental pathways between the United States and Asia

⁸² Frances Gouda, *American Visions of the Netherlands East Indies/ Indonesia: US Foreign Policy and Indonesian nationalism, 1920-1949* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2002), 153.

⁸³ Doty, *Imperial Encounters*, chapter 4 looks at the presuppositions of childishness and adolescence that enabled America’s policy in the Philippines.

that paralleled and reinforced the more material pathways along which America's economic, political, and military power flowed."⁸⁴ America stands as a tutor and teacher, welcomed and needed by the uneducated King, who desires to modernize and know all things "scientific."

As the King, torn apart by his failure to reconcile his desire to modernize with his commitment to "barbaric" practices, lies dying in the final scene; one of his female children makes the following plea to the Western tutor:

YING YAO: Dear friend and teacher. My goodness gracious do not go away. We are in great need of you. We are like one blind. Do not let us fall down in darkness. Continue good and sincere concern for us and lead us in right road. Your loving pupil, Princess Ying Yaowlak.⁸⁵

The apparent desire for Western tutoring in the process of modernization put forth in this text is profound and *The King and I* represented the difficulties faced by "backwards" nations, as well as the responsibility of modern, scientific ones to aid in that process. The line "do not let us fall down in darkness" does not feature in the original script and was an addition for the movie. Released less than two years after SEATO's creation, the film is a pertinent example of how popular culture worked to familiarize a hitherto unfamiliar region and internalized America's commitment to the region.

One of the interesting things about the 1956 film is the absence of any Siamese villains. The Siamese characters can be divided into those who are wise and understand the need for Western tutoring and those who are committed to tradition and superstition. The same is not true of 1999 animated remake where the King's Prime Minister is portrayed in a villainous and orientalized manner.⁸⁶ The absence of the villain/hero dichotomy ties in neatly to the understandings of the differences between "ally" and "friend." A friend is a hero, but an ally

⁸⁴ Christina Klein, *Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination: 1945-1961* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 16-17, see especially chapter 5, "Musicals and Modernization: The King and I."

⁸⁵ *The King and I*, directed by Walter Lang. (1956: USA: 20th Century Fox, 2006), DVD.

⁸⁶ *The King and I*, directed by Richard Rich. (1999: USA: Warner Brothers, 1999), DVD.

is not a villain. Rather an ally plays the role of worthy sidekick, female or lesser (in this case uneducated) male. The intentions of the ally are good and in line with the hero's, but only heroes have the character to be steadfast and a true friend.⁸⁷

The Borders of the Atlantic Community

While SEATO was formally dissolved in 1977, it effectively ceased to function as a collective defence organization from the Rusk-Thanat communique. The OAS limps on, but as a mask for United States unilateral interventions and bilateral negotiations. NATO has survived as a functional multilateral alliance, an accomplishment that is all the more surprising given the end of the Cold War. Its continued existence is made possible by the persistence of Atlanticism in American discourses and the amity that frames America's membership of the Atlantic Community.

In 1966, a Harris poll asked Americans the following question:

President Johnson has said that whether or not France and de Gaulle stay in NATO, he wants to see NATO continued as before – even without France. Do you tend to agree or disagree with President Johnson on this?

Agree	75
Disagree	6
Don't Know	19

Since 1950, American public support for NATO has never fallen below 70% and this is largely because of the discursive construction of “the Atlantic Community,” with which it is frequently equated, in the late 1940s and 1950s. It is constituted by unquestioned assumptions that America's relationship with Europe is natural and appropriate. In 1973, 65% of a war-weary American public, aware that none of their European allies had assisted them in the miasma of Vietnam, still believed that their countries' ties to Western Europe “mattered a

⁸⁷ See especially Jane Naomi Iwamura, *Virtual Orientalism: Asian Religion and American Popular Culture* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

great deal;” even at their lowest moment, almost two thirds of Americans understood that America and Western Europe were bound to one another. This climbed to 86% in 1987.⁸⁸

The idea that America is part of an “Atlantic Community” persisted throughout the Cold War and continues to be embedded in American foreign policy discourses and (re)produces a form of America identity that enables and precludes certain policies *vis-a-vis* Europe. In 1982, President Reagan declared that “Europe’s borders are our borders.”⁸⁹ This begs the question: where are Europe’s borders?

Recent work has sought to explain the development of security communities beyond the North Atlantic, but NATO remains a referent for these studies.⁹⁰ The presence of Turkey and Greece in NATO has complicated understandings of NATO as a “security community.” Disputes between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus in the 1960s and 1970s suggest that NATO was, at least then, not a security community.⁹¹ Indeed, not all NATO allies received the same levels of support. In 1964, President Johnson wrote a letter to Turkish Prime Minister İnönü, in which he expressed his “grave concern” about a potential Turkish engagement in Cyprus. “I hope you will understand,” he wrote, “that your NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union.”⁹² For Turkey, defence would not be met “forthwith.” In spite of protests from the Ford Administration, Congress passed the

⁸⁸ Thomas W. Graham, *American Public Opinion*.

⁸⁹ Reagan, PPP, “Address Before the Bundestag in Bonn, Federal Republic of Germany,” 9 June 1982.

⁹⁰ See in particular Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order* (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2009), Sharyl Cross et al., *Shaping South East Europe’s Security Community for the Twenty-First Century: Trust, Partnership, Integration* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), Muhammad Shoaib Pervez, *Security Community in South Asia: India-Pakistan* (Routledge: Oxon, 2013).

⁹¹ Barry Buzan and Thomas Diez, “The European Union and Turkey,” *Survival* (41) (1) (1999). Fotios Moustakis and Michael Sheehan, “Democratic Peace and the European Security Community: The Paradox of Greece and Turkey,” *Mediterranean Quarterly* 13 (1) (2002).

⁹² “Letter from President Jonson to Turkish Prime Minister İnönü, June 5, 1964” reprinted from Monteagle Stearns, *Entangled Allies: U.S. Policy toward Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992).

Eagleton Amendment in 1974, which cut off military assistance to Turkey for six years. This indicates that membership of NATO alone did not guarantee high levels of support.

This does not mean, however, that membership of the Atlantic Community did not continue to confer special privileges. It indicates that not all members of NATO were cast into the Atlantic Community. In assigned subject positions to Greece, and especially Turkey, the amitizing rhetoric that constituted the Atlantic Community was absent from presidential rhetoric. The expansion of NATO in 1952 did not stretch the Atlantic Community. In Truman's final State of the Union he noted that:

The principle of collective measures to forestall aggression has found expression in the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro, the North Atlantic Treaty, now extended to include Greece and Turkey, and the several treaties we have concluded to reinforce security in the Pacific area.⁹³

Turkey and Greece's membership was consistently justified on the basis of collective defence; the amitizing emphasis on character was absent. In the same speech, economic aid for Turkey and Greece's is separated from aid to "our partners in the Atlantic Community." The admittance of West Germany in 1955, on the other hand, entailed a stretching of the Atlantic Community. "The Federal Republic," Eisenhower announced "will be fully associated with the Atlantic community through membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization."⁹⁴ In 1961, Kennedy and Adenauer released a joint statement. On finishing reading, Kennedy added the following:

I don't think that *there is any doubt* that history will deal most generously with [Adenauer] in writing the history of the Atlantic Community in the years from 1945 to the present. His accomplishments have been extraordinary in binding the nations of

⁹³ Truman, *PPP*, #366 "Annual Message to Congress on the State of the Union," 7 January 1953.

⁹⁴ Eisenhower, *PPP*, #322 "Special Message to the Senate Transmitting Protocols to Treaties Relating to the Federal Republic of Germany," 15 November, 1954.

Western Europe together, in strengthening the ties which link the United States and the Federal Republic.⁹⁵

Whereas Germany's entry into NATO corresponded with a subject positioning that constituted Germany as part of the Atlantic Community, Turkey and Greece's entry did not.

This discursive construction makes intelligible President Ford's 1974 Address to Congress. He expressed disappointment that "US military assistance to an old and faithful ally, Turkey, has been cut off by action of the Congress," shortly after commenting that: "our relations with Europe have never been stronger. There are no peoples with whom America's destiny has been more closely linked. There are no peoples whose friendship and co-operation are more needed for the future. For none of the members of the Atlantic community can be secure, none can prosper, none can advance unless we all do so together."⁹⁶ Even in his desire to overturn the Eagleton Amendment, Ford stops short of casting Turkey in the Atlantic Community as such a subject positioning was not widely presupposed. NATO's borders may have stretched over the Bosphorus, but the Atlantic Community did not extend that far.

Much has been made of NATO's continued existence and expansion after the end of the Cold War, an international development that realism, and especially structural realism, struggle to account for.⁹⁷ The expansion of NATO to include the former Warsaw Pact nations contested the borders of the Atlantic community yet again. In both George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton's speeches on expansion, a new term emerged: "the Euro-Atlantic community."⁹⁸ This label at once constituted America's relations with Eastern Europe as similar and

⁹⁵ Kennedy, *PPP*, #120 "Joint Statement and Remarks Following Discussions with Chancellor Adenauer of Germany," 13 April 1961.

⁹⁶ Gerald Ford, *PPP*, #179 "Address Before a Joint Session of Congress Reporting on United State Foreign Policy," 10 April, 1974.

⁹⁷ For accounts on NATO's expansion see K. M. Fierke and Antje Wiener, "Constructing Institutional Interests: EU and NATO Enlargement," *Journal of European Public Policy* 6 (5) (1999).

⁹⁸ Interestingly the term "transatlantic community" also emerges in these speeches. This had only been used once before, during President Ford's 1975 visit to Spain where he stated that "Spain has a logical place in the transatlantic community."

different to its relations with Western Europe. First used by Bush in 1991,⁹⁹ Clinton used the language of a “Euro-Atlantic area” in selling the partnership for peace programme, which was “based on the simple commitments of all nations in Europe to democracy, to free markets, and to respect for existing borders.”¹⁰⁰

The construction of a “Euro-Atlantic area” laid the foundations for a “Euro-Atlantic community” of likeminded, democratic nations. A “strong consensus” emerged in America in the 1990s that NATO’s expansion should occur.¹⁰¹ A month after President Clinton formally asked the Senate to consider Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic’s membership, he delivered this speech in Warsaw:

Now Poland is joining NATO. Poland is taking its place in *the community of democracies*. Never again will your fate be decided by others. Never again will the birthright of freedom be denied you. *Poland is coming home.*¹⁰²

NATO’s enlargement was presented as an expansion of a common civilization, *the community of democracies*, reflecting a birth right of freedom, and a homecoming from the shackles of communist enslavement. Speaking in Bonn in 1998, Clinton remarked:

In 1994 I came to Europe to support your unity and to set forth a vision of partnership between America and a new Europe, rooted in security cooperation, free markets, and vibrant democracies. I asked all our countries to adapt our institutions for the new time, to help the new market economies of Europe’s eastern half to thrive, to support the growth of freedom and the spread of peace, to bring the peoples of the Euro-Atlantic community more closely together.¹⁰³

American membership of “the Atlantic Community” and, in the 1990s, the “Euro-Atlantic community” function in much the same way as the friend subject position in that it takes support for Europe out of the realm of normal contested politics and into the realm of

⁹⁹ George H. W. Bush, *PPP*, “Joint Declaration of the United States and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic,” 22 October 1991.

¹⁰⁰ Bill Clinton, *PPP*, “Address before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union,” 25 January 1994.

¹⁰¹ Michael E. Brown, “The Flawed Logic of NATO Expansion,” *Survival* 37 (1) (1995).

¹⁰² Clinton, *PPP*, “Remarks to the Citizens of Warsaw, Poland,” 10 July 1997.

¹⁰³ Clinton, *PPP*, “Remarks to the People of Germany in Berlin,” 13 May 1998.

affective politics. NATO's expansion since 1990 to include the former Warsaw Pact states and the Baltic States, and its development of new roles through its intervention in Afghanistan and its "New Strategic Concept" (2010) is intelligible, given the strength of American amity towards an expanding Western Europe.

Conclusion

A history of American foreign policy that focuses on conflicts of interest and enduring animosity is an incomplete history: the construction of friendships has also occurred through a process of casting others as similar, amicitization. In the 20th century, American identity was stretched to incorporate close ties with, or a passionate attachment to, Britain and Israel as well as membership of an Atlantic Community. Each of these relationships have experienced crises and moments of uncertainty, yet the labels “friend of Britain,” “friend of Israel,” and “member of the Atlantic Community” continue to (re)produce a certain form of United States identity and policy makers still habitually act in a manner facilitated by this attendant American identity. This is because there remains an alignment of common sense and political agents behind these labels, which precludes and marginalizes contested visions about appropriate behaviour and stops policy makers from having either the will or ability to contest a sustained policy of support. Amity both opens possibilities for action, in the form of supererogatory support, and forecloses others from consideration. As such it requires the attention and reflection of International Relations scholars and foreign policy analysts.

This thesis has accepted that understanding the conditions of possibility, which frame and limit the options available to decision makers, is crucial in analysing foreign policy. These are constituted by a state’s own identity which arises performatively and makes possible behaviours, which become common sense, and actions, which are repeated. It is also constituted and constrained by the categorizations of others. Casting others into a variety of subject positions – including enemy, rival, ally, and friend – constitutes order in international politics as it creates reasonable expectations about future action and behaviour of both self and other. A truly *social theory* of international politics ought to focus on all forms of international association, not solely on the construction of enmity based on radical otherness.

Friendships emerge through a process of amicitization and once constructed they are fairly rigid frame of reference for future action. These categorizations are not permanent and the possibility of resignification is ever present, though deviating by repeating the enactments of friendship in a different manner. However, given the strength of the categorizations' naturalization in common sense, such a resignification is unlikely as it does violence to, and undermines, constituent parts of state identity. As such, "the variety of evils" George Washington feared such as "sympathy for the favourite nation," in the form of concern for the welfare of the other; "the illusion of imagined common interest," which manifests in a variety of ways including security, economic, and cultural interests; "the infusing into one the enmities of the other," as happened with Nasserite Arab Nationalism, the Palestinian Liberation Organization, and Russia; and "concessions to the favoured nation" including extraordinary levels of financial, political, and military support continue to be a major part of the performance of American foreign policy.¹

Enduring Love

Mark Twain famously asserted that "it is easy to make friends, but hard to get rid of them." Once amity is constructed and international actors are befriended it is not easy to "get rid of them" and return to treating them as "just another nation" since the subject position limits the realm of political contestation. As friendships are fostered and naturalized, behaviours that are un-friendly are viewed as absurd and their enactment ruptures a state's identity. Franklin

¹ George Washington, "Farewell Address," stated: "A passionate attachment of one nation for another produces a variety of evils. Sympathy for the favorite nation, facilitating the illusion of an imaginary common interest in cases where no real common interest exists, and infusing into one the enmities of the other, betrays the former into a participation in the quarrels and wars of the latter without adequate inducement or justification. It leads also to concessions to the favorite nation of privileges denied to others, which is apt doubly to injure the nation making the concessions by unnecessarily parting with what ought to have been retained, and by exciting jealousy, ill will, and a disposition to retaliate in the parties from whom equal privileges are withheld; and it gives to ambitions, corrupted, or deluded citizens (who devote themselves to the favorite nation) facility to betray or sacrifice the interests of their own country without odium, sometimes even with popularity, gilding with the appearances of a virtuous sense of obligation, a commendable deference for public opinion, or a laudable zeal for public good the base or foolish compliances of ambition, corruption, or infatuation."

D. Roosevelt had great doubts about the morality of the British Empire; all Presidents of the United States have remained committed by UNSC Resolution 242; and President Charles De Gaulle's posturing within NATO and his public critiques of American adventurism in Vietnam in the 1960s caused private anguish for President Johnson. Nonetheless categories have power in international politics and friendships, especially, are not readily unmade as violating the friendship would also subvert a state's own identity.

There have been recent attempts to re-conceptualize the relationship America has with Britain, Israel, and Western Europe but all of these occur within the common sense bounds of friendship that remains the frame of reference for future interactions. President Barack Obama has started to describe the relationship with Britain as "the essential relationship." A joint op-ed with Prime Minister David Cameron in 2012 concluded with the following:

Our troops and citizens have long shown what can be achieved when British and Americans work together, heart and hand, and why this remains an essential relationship – to our nations and the world. So like generations before us, we're going to keep it up. Because with confidence in our cause and faith in each other, we still believe that there is hardly anything we cannot do.²

The attempt to re-conceptualize the relationship in utilitarian terms as one "the world can count on," which manifests itself through multiple shared endeavours, remains underscored, however, by "a partnership of the heart," which manifests as a naturalized American disposition to treat Britain well. Britain and the United States have never had identical interests, but Britain's categorization as friend continues to be a default position when American policy makers are assessing policy options.

In much the same way America's relations with Israel and the wider Middle East continue to be framed and limited by the friend subject position that Israel enjoys. The "new beginning"

² Barack Obama, *Public Papers of the President (PPP)*, "Joint Op-Ed by President Obama and Prime Minister Cameron: An Alliance the World Can Count On," 13 March 2012.

President Obama sought in his Cairo speech in 2009 also contained his first public articulation of the existence of an “unbreakable bond” between America and Israel:

America’s strong bonds with Israel are well known. This bond is unbreakable. It is based upon cultural and historical ties and the recognition that the aspiration for a Jewish homeland is rooted in a tragic history that cannot be denied.³

President Obama has ceased voicing civilization-centred rhetoric when addressing Middle Eastern nations.⁴ However, although Obama has dismissed Huntingtonian Clash Rhetoric, there has been no substantive change in the portrayals of, or the broad thrust of policy towards, Israel. Indeed, his moderated language to the wider Middle East has come in parallel with hyper-use of the discourse of “the unbreakable bond,” which is after all his expression, as well as with yearly increases in financial support.

Friendship remains the default for action. President Obama’s attempts to persuade Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to re-open peace negotiations with the Palestinians, on his 2013 state visit to Israel, occurred against a dominant discourse that Israel is a friend of America. His speech at the Jewish International Convention Center in Jerusalem was in some ways a radical appeal for peace, setting out a vision of a two-state solution. Much of the speech, however, conformed to the everyday understandings surrounding US-Israel relations. First he reiterated the obligatory common understandings:

The source of our friendship extends beyond mere interests, just as it has transcended political parties and individual leaders. America is a nation of immigrants. America is strengthened by diversity. America is enriched by faith. We are governed not simply by men and women, but by laws. We’re fueled by entrepreneurship and innovation, and we are defined by a democratic discourse that allows each generation to reimagine and renew our Union once more. So in Israel,

³ Obama, *PPP*, “Remarks in Cairo,” 4 June 2009.

⁴ This was noted in Dr Saeb Erekat’s speech of 2009: “No less important than what President Obama said [in Cairo], is what he didn’t say. Absent is the tired rhetoric of Manichean opposites: Good-versus-evil; moderates-versus-extremists; with-us-or-against-us,” Saeb Erekat, “Keynote Speech at the 2009 US-Islamic World Forum,” *The Palestine Papers*.

we see values that we share, even as we recognize what makes us different. That is an essential part of our bond.

He then presented the case for the re-opening of peace talks. His remarks occur, much like the ongoing relationship with Britain, against a backdrop of international friendship:

Not everyone in this hall will agree with what I have to say about peace. I recognize that there are those who are not simply skeptical about peace, but question its underlying premise, have a different vision for Israel's future. And that's part of a democracy. That's part of the discourse between our two countries. I recognize that. But *I also believe it's important to be open and honest, especially with your friends.* I also believe that.⁵

So ingrained is the understanding that America is a friend of Israel that Obama's posture and beliefs must be justified in relation to amity. A friend is an agent who is "open and honest," not one who blindly supports. The significance is that Obama was not seeking (or able) to deconstruct the friend subject position and release America from its commitments to Israel; rather, he attempted to alter the meaning of that position and the appropriate behaviours it continues make possible.

America's "pivot to Asia" and the "Russian reset" also occurred against a backdrop of America's enduring membership of the Atlantic Community. An improved relationship with Russia was central to Obama's first term foreign policy, but "Russia needs to understand our unflagging commitment to the independence of countries like a Poland or a Czech Republic."⁶ Indeed, talk of a Russian reset is always paired with a linguistic (re)construction of the enduring ties between Europe and America:

⁵ Obama, *PPP*, #170 "Remarks at the Jerusalem International Convention Center in Jerusalem, Israel," 21 March 2013. Interestingly Obama continues by saying: "Politically, given the strong bipartisan support for Israel in America, *the easiest thing for me to do would be to put this issue aside, just express unconditional support for whatever Israel decides to do.* That would be the easiest political path. But I want you to know that I speak to you as a friend who is deeply concerned and committed to your future." America's commitment to Israel is so ingrained that a president can even publicly reference his political limitations.

⁶ Obama, *PPP*, "Remarks Following a Meeting With Prime Minister Gordon Brown of the United Kingdom and an Exchange With Reporters," 3 March 2009.

I am proud to have visited Europe a half-dozen times as president. This reflects *an enduring truth of American foreign policy* — our relationship with our European allies and partners is the cornerstone of our engagement with the world, and a catalyst for global cooperation.⁷

The “enduring truth” that the Euro-American connection “is the cornerstone” of American engagement in the world limits America’s ability to sacrifice Europe’s interests in order to pursue a policy that accommodates Russia. The “pivot to Asia” that was set out in the paper “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” stated that, “we will of necessity rebalance towards the Asia-Pacific region.” However it also noted that “Europe is our principal partner in seeking global and economic security, and will remain so for the foreseeable future.”⁸ The pivot to Asia has occurred but, as with the Russian reset, policy makers are keen to highlight the durability of America’s ties to Europe, which frame and limit the prospect of a significant policy change. President Obama’s foreign policy may be a departure from the neoconservatism of his predecessor, but the cast remains.

Prospects for Deamitization

Though it is a fairly durable subject position, just as inter-personal friendships can wither or break irreparably so too can international ones. There are no permanent relationships in international politics, no necessary constituent parts of state identity and no reason to believe that what is constructed is eternal. Amitization is a process combining elite rhetoric and popular culture, which creates and stabilizes friendships. A process of deamitization can occur in which friends become allies or even enemies. Indeed, given that friendship creates great opportunities for betrayal and friends take up a prominent part of the collective imagination a shift from amity to enmity is not inconceivable.

⁷ Obama, *PPP*, “Op-Ed by President Barack Obama: “Europe and America, Aligned for the Future,”” 19 November 2010. He continues by commenting: “With no other region does the United States have such a close alignment of values, interests, capabilities and goals.”

⁸ United States, Department of Defense, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2012).

Within security studies there has been increased interest in the concept of “desecuritization” – the returning of issues from “emergency politics” to “normal politics.”⁹ Ole Wæver has argued that desecuritization can occur through silence, “efforts to keep issues off the security agenda,” and “speech-act failure” when “the performance of the security speech-act and reinstallation of truth suddenly fail to work.”¹⁰ If we consider the macro-securitization of “the Cold War” discourse, for example, events in 1988-1989 failed to support images of irreconcilable enmity so the Cold War security imaginary loses the power to marginalize.¹¹ The friend subject position dissipates in a similar manner. Silence and inattention could lead to estrangement. However, given that lobbies, public opinion, and foreign policy elites have arisen to bolster and agitate for close relationships between America and its friends this is unlikely. Deamitization, then, is possible only if the presuppositions that underpin the friend subject position become widely questioned to the extent that there is speech act failure and the reiteration of the discourse of friendship becomes untenable. If appeals to friendship shift from the realm of the obvious to the realm of contestation, there could be the returning of friends from “affective politics” to “normal politics.”

Disentangling such a relationship, too, is a process; and recent statements suggest that any sort of deamitization of the cases discussed in this thesis is not an imminent possibility. A normalization of relations between the United States and its friends would require two things. First, rhetorical change: elites would need to cease constantly re-articulating the discourses of similarity. However, America and Great Britain’s “partnership of the heart,” the US-Israel “unbreakable bond” and references to NATO as “the strongest alliance the world has ever

⁹ Paul Roe, “Securitization and Minority Rights: Conditions of Desecuritization,” *Security Dialogue* 35 (2004), 279.

¹⁰ Ole Wæver, “Securitization and Desecuritization,” 61, in Ronnie E. Lipschutz, ed., *On Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).

¹¹ It was not until 21 November 1990, that George H. W. Bush declared “The Cold War is over.” This omission further evidences that Presidents are naturally conservative in their choice of words.

known” remain.¹² Their continued use indicates that such a shift in presidential discourse is not currently on the agenda. Secondly, and more importantly, challenges could be mounted against the underlying everyday assumptions that make these relationships common sense. Unless this occurs, foreign policy elites, particularly presidents, will persist in indulging in rhetoric that exaggerates the strength of the ties and the strategic value of the relationships. Presidents are naturally conservative and cannot shift the discourse without at least a partial shift in everyday assumptions. Definitional power is great but it depends on willingness to (re)define, which is limited by presupposed knowledge about the world. Challenges to the discursive sites that bolster these taken-for-granted assumptions could gradually erode the foundation of amity, though given the remarkable continuity in descriptors attached to America’s friends by presidents it appears that this has not happened.

The Anglo-American special relationship continues to play an important part in America’s foreign policy. The NSA and WikiLeaks scandals serve as a reminder that intelligence sharing between the NSA and GCHQ remains an important on-going practice. Not all recent representations of Britain have been positive. The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill of April 2010 was portrayed in much of the American press as the fault not of BP but of “British Petroleum.” BP’s CEO, Tony Hayward, was a ready-made villain with his apparent lack of empathy with the workers who had been killed. This half-hearted apology – “I’m sorry for the massive disruption it’s caused their lives. There’s no one who wants this over more than I do. I’d like my life back.” – was a PR disaster for the firm. President Obama even weighed in on the subject of Tony Hayward saying that “he wouldn’t be working for me after any of those statements.”¹³ The brief wave of anti-British (petroleum) sentiment has not shaken the relationship too much but this was in part because among the elites demonizing Britain was

¹² Obama, *PPP*, “State of the Union address,” 28 February 2014.

¹³ Obama, *PPP*, “Interview with Matt Lauer on NBC’s “Today”,” 7 June 2010.

not really a political option. Indeed, Obama was careful in his choice of language and never resorted to the use of “British Petroleum” as a descriptor.¹⁴

The British connection, however, is in far better stead than many pundits on both sides of the Atlantic claim. Supposed slights by the Obama Administration may have been repeated in opinion pieces, but the fundamentals of the relationship – its widespread acceptance as common sense in America – remains strong. The power of positive representations of Britain in the United States continues: Britain’s support for America in the Iraq War in 2003 has not gone unnoticed and a “Leflein associates poll in January 2010 revealed that 57% of Americans ranked the US relationship with Britain as the world’s most important bilateral relationship.”¹⁵ A Gallup poll from 2012 saw 90% of Americans holding a favourable view of the United Kingdom, only beaten by Canada and Australia – themselves offshoots of an English-speaking brotherhood. There is no debate in the United States about whether America ought to provide the technology for the upgrade of Britain’s Trident missiles in 2020, rather a general consensus remains that this is unquestionably in the (constructed) strategic interest of America.

America’s commitment to Israel remains common sense. A permissive discourse has allowed for the pro-Israel community to become ever-more powerful. The weakness of the Israel lobby argument in accounting for the development of the relationship does not change the fact that powerful interests are able to draw on these cultural resources and America’s identification of Israel as a friend in order to further the interests (as they see them) of Israel. Jewish-Americans are showing some signs of distancing themselves from ideas of identical interests, but Christian Zionism has become an ever-stronger force that may well influence

¹⁴ Interestingly many commentators critical of Obama on both sides of the Atlantic wrote a series of articles erroneously claiming that Obama and his aids frequently used the phrase. The transcripts of the interviews at the time reveal that Obama and his senior aides never referred to BP and “British Petroleum.”

¹⁵ Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh, eds., *Anglo-American Relations: Contemporary Perspectives* (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2013), 2.

policy makers to re-examine their consistent 45 year opposition to Israeli settlements.¹⁶ Cultural references challenging the special relationship are few and far between but they exist. In a 2001 episode of NBC's *The West Wing*, for example, President Bartlett is advised against putting up a map of the Middle East from the 18th century because:

Toby: Some people are going to find it offensive.

President Bartlett: Why?

Toby: It doesn't recognize Israel.

President Bartlett: It was drawn in 1709.

Toby: Yeah.

President Bartlett: There was no Israel.

Toby: Right.

President Bartlett: Israel wouldn't happen for another two hundred and fifty years.

Toby: Yeah.

President Bartlett: So what's the problem with the map?

Toby: Some people are going to find it offensive.

President Bartlett: Why?

Toby: It doesn't recognise Israel.

President Bartlett: Take lunch, would you?¹⁷

In *The Good Wife*, Peter Florrick's chances of winning the Cook County state's attorney election are hampered after a photo of him carrying Jimmy Carter's book *Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid* appears in the local news. The episode contains significant debate about the IDF's botched flotilla raid, which shows both sides with a level of honesty that is usually absent from mainstream American television.¹⁸ The power of drama and television to challenge the direction of foreign policy should not be underestimated. Popular culture was instrumental in providing the presuppositions out of which amity emerged and will also be instrumental in any deamitization that occurs in the future.

¹⁶ Peter Beinart has found that young Jews are less willing to stick to the party-line of uncritical support precisely because they have not experienced the immediate urgency felt after 1967: "they did not realize they were supposed to shed these [liberal] values when it came to Israel." "The Failure of the American Jewish establishment," *New York Review of Books*, 10 June 2010.

¹⁷ *The West Wing* (2002), [TV Show] NBC, Season 3, ep.10, "H. Con-172," 9 January 2002.

¹⁸ *The Good Wife* (2010), [TV Show] CBS, Season 2, ep.3, "Breaking Fast," 10 October 2010.

The US-European connection remains strong, but there are signs that this too could be questioned. The strategic utility of heavy military commitments to the European Union is being more frequently challenged. As Russian troops mobilized in the Crimean region of the Ukraine in March 2014, policy makers made it clear that the “costs” the Obama administration promised would only be realized if Europeans were willing to bear their share of the sacrifices. An idea that Europeans have not borne their fair share of the costs of security is not new and has been the subject of academic and strategic critiques for decades. However, foreign policy elites have hitherto been reluctant to criticize European allies too harshly in public.

Another area that may persuade Americans to distance themselves from the Atlantic Community stems from “the narcissism of minor difference.”¹⁹ Since the global economic downturn, the social democratic model that European nations are presumed to pursue has been frequently represented as fundamentally distinct from the American model. Whereas an understanding that European allies were “democratic” was a vital discourse in constructing the Atlantic Community in the 1950s, the “socialism” of Europe is now voiced with increasing frequency. Fears that America could become “another Greece” were voiced throughout the 2008 recession. In February 2009, Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell warned of “the Europeanization of America.” In fact several GOP Senators and media sites have taken up this discourse and warned against Europeanization in the last five years. None of these representations imply a necessary shift, they do, however, open up space for those politicians who may wish to challenge the post-1950 consensus that America’s foreign policy depends on strong links with Europe.

¹⁹ Peter Baldwin, *The Narcissism of Minor Difference: How America and Europe are Alike* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

One feature of contemporary American (and international) society that opens up prospects for speeding the (re)casting process – undermining established enmities (inveterate antipathies) and amities (passionate attachments) and potentially fostering new ones – is the emergence of a plethora of new sites out of which representations can be articulated and voices once marginalized can speak. The subject positions in which America has cast other states depend on representations and so how these are disseminated is of vital importance. One of the most significant technological developments of a globalized world has been the horizontalization of knowledge transfer. As print-media has lost its monopoly on informing the public, 24 hour news channels and Internet sources have become relatively commonplace in America. New sites, each with competing interpretations of events and characterizations of others, compete and provide potential new sites of representations. Each challenges the rigidity of the categorizations that frame American foreign policy.

Whither Amity?

In seeking to address the question – *How have American friendships for specified others been made possible?* – it has been necessary to go beyond the international system and look to the domestic sphere for answers. The field of International Relations requires greater imagination than parsimony permits: every state of being is necessarily inter-twined with interpretation; every decision is bound by conditions of possibility; every decision maker is the product of their environment; and every public relies on simplified narratives and everyday assumptions when addressing the world. In order to understand foreign policy, the state identities with which it is ontologically intertwined must also be assessed. The Anglo-American “special relationship,” the US-Israel “unbreakable bond,” and “the Atlantic Community” are some of the clearest demonstrations in international society that IR scholarship must increasingly look

beyond structure and interests defined in terms of material power; focusing instead on dominant discourses and conditions of possibility.

Amity's stability is such that amitization should be undertaken sparingly and there are no obvious candidates for future amitization. Yet modes of representation have unintended political consequences. FDR could not have predicted how his amitizing rhetoric would limit a future president's options when dealing with the Falklands War; Carter could scarcely have predicted that America's uncritical and unconditional support for Israel would last into the 21st century; and Truman could hardly have imagined that NATO would not only outlast the Soviet Union, but expand to include former parts of the Soviet Union. It is difficult to predict future developments in international alignments. Interestingly, India is frequently referenced as "the world's largest democracy" in public statements. As US-Pakistan relations continue to fray perhaps India will be the next beneficiary of the inadvertent amitizing rhetoric of a president of the United States of America – but such speculation falls beyond the remit of this thesis. Rather the current categorizations can and should be assessed as they lend order to foreign policy.

This thesis has attempted to make a contribution to foreign policy analysis. Taking amity seriously opens up multiple venues for future research, including in peace studies. Foreign policy decisions can be assessed in greater detail with amity taken as a background condition to account for how certain courses of action are excluded *ex ante*. Amity adds another level to our understanding of American policy makers' reactions to specific events that involve their friends. Each of the cases explored here warrant further analysis and more detailed attention that draws on private documents and a greater array of public discourses. In particular, the maintenance of the subject position (through marginalization of alternative narratives) after amitization requires further discussion.

The decision to focus on America was not arbitrary and certain features of the American system such as the rhetorical presidency are peculiar (or at least heightened) in the United States. There is no reason, however, why analysis of amity should not be extended to assessing the foreign policies and decision-making processes of other states, organizations, and individuals. America may be the imagined community par excellence, but all states are imagined and all have relations that depend on imaginative geographies and relational identities. The centrality of the performative construction of identity opens up avenues for post-positivist research agendas in making the foreign policy of all states intelligible.

A study of the conditions of possibility that bound sets of options can also be applied to the process of casting others in subject positions not explored in detail here, rival, client, and enemy. The vilification of enemies is of particular importance in assessing potential future developments in the creation of stable peace and accommodation. Given the recent shift in rhetoric and the potential nuclear deal reached in March 2015, it is a fruitful time, for example, for an investigation into the construction and potential deconstruction of US-Iranian enmity, and whether cases such Sino-American rapprochement can shed light on how enemies become rivals, as well as how rivals become friends. Understanding how these categorizations emerged helps unravel them.

The main contribution of this thesis, however, has been to aid understanding of America's supererogatory commitments and advocate the study of practices of amitization and deamitization. A major problem with alliance theory has been its inability to differentiate between allies, incorporate amity, and assess the extent to which *Other Selves* constitute meanings and expectations out of which policies emerges. Amity can exist precisely because of the constructed nature of state interests and the performative accomplishment of state identity. Though impermanent, amity is a naturalized frame of reference that should be

addressed when looking at inter-state relationships and foreign policies. Amitization stretches and reconstitutes state identity, enables states to construct their national interests as being furthered by supporting others unconditionally, and it is an important form of international association that International Relations scholars can no longer afford to disregard.

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