

Moving Beyond Their Mandates? How International Organisations are Responding to Climate Change

Nina Hall
St Antony's College

85, 575 words

Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of DPhil in
International Relations in the Department of Politics and International
Relations at the University of Oxford

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Abstract

Inter-governmental organisations (IGOs) are given mandates by states to perform particular tasks: from refugee protection to the management of migration to promoting development. As new global challenges arise, such as climate change, these organisations must decide whether to ignore them or change in response. But what drives inter-governmental organisations to move beyond their mandates, if it is not their member states? International Relations offers a limited account of if and how they will respond to new issue areas. Principal-agent theory treats IGOs as units with fixed preferences to expand and maximise their tasks and scope (Hawkins et al. 2006; Nielson and Tierney 2003; Pollack 2003). Meanwhile, sociological institutionalism argues that IOs are driven by a logic of appropriateness and staff will only support expansion if it fits coherently with their organisational identity and culture (Barnett and Coleman 2005). I build on these two theories and propose that IGO behaviour should be explained by organisational type. IGOs exist along a spectrum from normative to functional ideal-types. Normative IGOs have supervisory status over a body of international law, seek moral legitimacy and follow a logic of appropriateness. Functional IGOs are projectised organisations which seek pragmatic legitimacy and adopt a logic of consequences. I illustrate how IGO type interacts with the status of the new issue area to determine the timing, nature and extent of organisational change. I focus on the responses to climate change of three inter-governmental organisations: the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, a normative organisation; the International Organisation for Migration, a functional organisation; and the United Nations Development Programme, a hybrid organisation. IGO type has important implications for IR scholars and policy-makers as we look to these institutions to provide global solutions to global issues such as climate change, migration, refugees and development.

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Abbreviations

ADB	Asian Development Bank
CCEMA	Climate Change, Environment and Migration Alliance
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women
COP	Conference of the Parties
CRC	Convention on the Rights of the Child
DFID	Department for International Development
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
EPTA	Expanded Programme for Technical Assistance
EU	European Union
ExCom	Executive Committee of UNHCR
GEF	Global Environment Facility
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organization
IASC	Inter-agency Standing Committee
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IGO	Inter-Governmental Organisation
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross
IMO	International Meteorological Organization
ICEM	Inter-governmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organizations

IPCC	International Panel on Climate Change
IR	International Relations
NAPA	National Adaptation Programmes of Action
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PICCME	Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe
REDD	Reductions of Emissions due to Deforestation and forest Degradation
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNU-EHS	United Nations University, Institute for Environmental and Human Security
US	United States
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

WMO World Meteorological Organization

WWI World War One

WWII World War Two

Introduction

Organisational Change, Climate Change and International Relations

In December 2009 world leaders met at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to negotiate a global agreement. For the preceding two decades the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) had warned that anthropogenic climate change was one of the major challenges the world faced.¹ It predicted that global warming would lead to an increase in extreme weather events, from floods to droughts, and rising sea-levels (IPCC 1990; 2007). It noted that developing countries were most vulnerable to climate change: their lack of financial resources would limit their ability to adapt (IPCC 2007). These dire predictions fuelled a sense of urgency at Copenhagen. Negotiators faced a deadline - and immense pressure from civil society, NGOs and experts - to establish a new international framework to regulate greenhouse gas emissions and financing mechanisms to enable developing countries to adapt.

Earlier that same year a severe drought hit Eastern Africa. The drought dried out pastures in Northern Kenya, resulting in the deaths of cattle and devastating the primary

¹ See for example: IPCC. 1990. *Climate Change, The Impacts Assessment*, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.

livelihoods of Kenya's nomadic pastoralists. It also led to famine in Somalia, and thousands fled into Kenya to escape malnutrition, persecution and ongoing conflict. By August 2009 Somalis were arriving into Dadaab, the world's largest refugee camp, at an 'overwhelming average rate of 6,400 a month'.² The President of Kenya, Mwai Kibaki, declared the drought and the resulting famine 'a national disaster'.³ He explained that '10 million people are food insecure and require emergency support. These people will not be able to meet their minimum food requirements...without emergency measures'.⁴ President Kibaki called on the international community to assist Kenya and launched an appeal for US \$400 million in foreign aid. Drought and famine are not new to the Horn of Africa. However, the 2009 drought did exemplify the IPCC's prediction of a world with more severe and frequent extreme weather events.⁵

The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) were present in Kenya and at Copenhagen. States created these three inter-governmental organisations (IGOs) with mandates to address specific problems: protecting refugees, transporting migrants and fostering development respectively. They were tasked with assisting developing countries at an operational level and advocating

² This posed a major humanitarian challenge as the camp's 'facilities and resources were already overstretched and 'hosted three times the population it was designed for'. UNHCR, 2009, 'Conflict and Drought Force more Somalis to Leave Kenya', *Briefing Note*, 25 September 2009, available at <http://www.unhcr.org/4abc9f829.html> accessed 11 September 2012.

³ 'President Kibaki declares current Drought and Famine a National Disaster', *State House Kenya*, Nairobi, January 16 2009, available at <http://www.statehousekenya.go.ke/news/jan09/2009160101.htm> accessed 11 September 2012.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ United Nations Environment Programme claimed that the drought across East Africa was 'worsening because of global climate change'. Note that climate change increases the likelihood of extreme weather events, such as droughts, occurring but is not necessarily the sole cause. UNEP cited in: Mohammed Adow. 2009. Kenya drought 'has spared no one', *Aljazeera*, 14 October 2009 <http://www.aljazeera.com/focus/2009/10/20091011941816643.html> accessed 11 September 2012.

policies to benefit them at the global level. But how would these IGOs respond to a world in which hydro-meteorological natural disasters are likely to increase in magnitude and frequency? And how would they balance new priorities with their existing mandates?

IGO behaviour at Copenhagen suggested a variation in responses. UNHCR asserted that those displaced by climate change were not refugees and so did not fall under the protection of the refugee convention. Instead, the High Commissioner for Refugees urged states to develop new international legal frameworks to protect those displaced. IOM, meanwhile, emphasised that climate change would lead to mass-displacement and voluntary migration. IOM asked states to fund new research initiatives and projects to address climate change migration and showcased its expertise in climate change and migration. UNDP called on states to establish new climate financing mechanisms to assist developing states. UNDP's administrator positioned it as the lead UN agency to deliver climate adaptation programmes. What motivated and shaped these different IGO responses?

The response of UNHCR, IOM and UNDP to climate change also represents a puzzle for International Relations (IR) scholars. While these agencies have sought to respond to climate change, none was created with, or subsequently given, an explicit mandate from member states to do so.⁶ Yet IGOs need to make strategic decisions when new issues such as climate change arise, about whether they ignore or change in response. Would they move beyond their mandates and respond to this new issue area? This thesis

⁶ I define an IGO 'mandate' as activities explicitly delegated to an IGO in its constituent documents (such as General Assembly resolutions and/or multilateral treaties) and any subsequent amendments to these by member states.

addresses these questions by developing a conceptual framework to analyse, compare and explain how IGOs change in response to the emergence of a new issue area.

There are three fundamental questions that underpin this research. Firstly, how have non-environmental IGOs changed in response to the issue of climate change? Secondly, when and why has this change taken place? Thirdly, how can we explain the variation in change across these three organisations? The above questions are summarised in the following overarching research question of this thesis: Why and how have UNHCR, UNDP and IOM changed in response to the issue of climate change between 2000 and 2011? Essentially, this thesis focuses on a particular subset of IGO change, namely IGO responses to new issues that are outside their mandate and when there is no explicit state support for expansion.

The central argument is that IGO response is explained by issue status and IGO type. Firstly, I propose that all IGOs will engage with issues of high status, defined in terms of high global and linkage salience.⁷ Issues of high global salience are a top priority at international meetings of heads of government. Meanwhile, high linkage salience indicates that there is a strong substantive issue linkage between an issue and an IGO's core regime (development, migration, or refugees in this case).⁸ In other words, IGOs

⁷ I do not include international courts (such as the international criminal court) or international representative bodies (such as the African Union) in this theoretical framework as they cannot be easily placed on the normative-functional IGO spectrum, which is outlined in chapter one.

⁸ A substantive issue linkage is a real or perceived real causal relationship between two discrete issue areas (Betts 2010: 2). It differs from a tactical issue linkage, which occurs when issues are combined in inter-state negotiations through conditionality to facilitate bargaining (Betts 2010: 2). Substantive issue linkages will be discussed further in chapter two.

will not engage with issues that are neither relevant to their work nor salient at the international level.

Secondly, I argue that IGOs vary along a spectrum from normative to functional ideal-types. IGO types are distinguished by different sources of legitimacy and behavioural logics. Normative IGOs have supervisory status over a body of international law, seek moral legitimacy and follow a logic of appropriateness. Functional IGOs are projectised organisations, with no normative mandate, and follow a logic of consequences seeking pragmatic legitimacy. My central argument is that IGO type and issue status accounts for the variation in timing, extent and nature of IGO responses to new issue areas. I propose that normative IGOs, (for example, UNHCR), will engage with issues that are perceived as closely linked and relevant to their mandate. Meanwhile, functional IGOs (such as IOM) will engage with issues that are top priorities for states at the international level. Hybrid IGOs (UNDP), which exhibit both behavioural logics, may engage when an issue is either highly relevant to their mandate or a high international priority.

This research is important for IR theory, for states and for IGOs. We rarely see new IGOs being created yet there are an increasing number of global challenges which existing IGOs must respond to, from urbanisation to HIV-AIDs. States create IGOs to perform specific tasks and we need to understand why and how IGOs add to their own mandates. This is particularly important as many of today's IGOs were designed in the post-World War Two (WWII) era to deal with the impact of, or prevent, great power wars. As new challenges arise IGOs need to decide how to balance existing, mandated activities with

new priorities. Furthermore, IR has an extremely limited understanding of what IGOs want to do if it is not what states tell them to do. It is crucial for us to understand what drives and motivates IGO behaviour.

It is also empirically important to understand how and why IGOs have responded to climate change, given the global significance and projected implications of this environmental issue. Although I could have focused on another new issue area, such as human rights or gender equality, these issues have already been the subject of existing scholarship. Oestrich (2007), for example, has examined how a human rights framework has been integrated into UN agencies and there is a literature on gender mainstreaming in the UN (Hall and True 2009; Hafner-Burton and Pollack 2003). Interestingly, despite the proliferation of scholarship on climate change in the last two decades, there is no literature on how IGOs are responding to this new global challenge.⁹

The IR literature has focused predominantly on the ‘greening’ of the World Bank (Nielson and Tierney 2003; Park 2009; Weaver and Park 2012). In fact, there is only one study of the ‘greening’ of a UN agency other than the Bank: Luken’s (2009) analysis of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). Moreover, ‘greening’ constitutes the adoption of environmental mainstreaming and/or environmental impact assessments, such as efforts to reduce carbon footprints. This is distinct to integrating climate change adaptation. Adaptation involves examining how an increased frequency

⁹ Note that climate change is not a completely ‘new’ issue - it has been on the agenda of environmentalists and scientists since the 1960s. However, it has only risen to the top of the world’s political agenda in the last two decades. The evolution of climate change as an issue will be discussed further in chapter two. For an excellent account of the intellectual and scientific history of climate change see Hulme 2009.

and severity of extreme weather events, and rising sea levels will impact on an IGO's work: be it in the humanitarian, development or migration sphere.¹⁰ Thus there is a significant empirical gap in our understanding of how the UN's specialised agencies and IGOs, other than the Bank, have sought to address climate change.

There are strong incentives for IGOs to engage with climate change. Donors have established new multilateral and bilateral climate change assistance funds, separate from existing overseas development assistance, and are looking for projects to allocate funds to.¹¹ An analysis of the 'real-time' evolving responses of IGOs to climate change is thus useful for policy-makers as well as scholars. It is important for both of these communities to understand if IGOs are making only superficial changes in rhetoric without significant structural, policy or operational changes. In other words, how transformative and entrenched are IGO responses to climate change? And what are the benefits and risks associated with IGO change?

The following introduction is divided into two sections. Firstly, I elaborate the theoretical contribution of the thesis, arguing that principal-agent and sociological institutionalist theories are important but partial accounts of IGO change. I then elaborate the comparative case-study approach to studying IGO change used here.

¹⁰ This distinction is important yet many IGOs see integrating climate change as a continuation of previous environmental policies and programmes, which began in the 1990s. Telephone interview with Director of the IFRC Climate Change Center, International Federation of the Red Cross, Friday 16 April 2010.

¹¹ States, through the UNFCCC, have established a number of multilateral funds in the last decade including: the Adaptation Fund; the Special Climate Change Fund and the Least Developed Countries Fund. In addition a number of donors (such as UK, Norway, Japan) have established bilateral climate change assistance programmes.

Building on Principal-Agent Theory and Sociological Institutionalism

The core theoretical question of this thesis is: how do IGOs respond to new, emerging issues outside their mandate? I maintain that this question is not adequately addressed in existing IR literature, which falls into two dominant camps: principal-agent theories and sociological institutionalism. Principal-agent theories assume IGOs are ‘black-boxes’ with fixed interests to maximise their autonomy and tasks, which conflicts with their member-states preferences. IGOs will follow a logic of consequences, pursuing organisational expansion as long as benefits outweigh the costs. Sociological institutionalism examines how organisational culture and identity shape organisational responses. It argues that a logic of appropriateness is the fundamental driving force of organisational behaviour (March and Olsen 1989: 38). Organisational expansion will occur only when staff perceive a new issue area to fit coherently within their organisational culture. The theoretical framework presented here builds on these two theories and argues that both logics may operate. It proposes that variation in IGO behaviour should be explained by IGO type: functional IGOs follow a logic of consequences and normative IGOs a logic of appropriateness.

The dominant view in IR is that international organisations change in response to changing state preferences. Principal-agent theorists posit that states (principals) delegate IGOs (agents) the responsibility to perform particular tasks. States then monitor IGOs to ensure they deliver and do not stray beyond their mandate (Hawkins and Jacoby 2006). IGO behaviour is expected to ‘closely reflect the preferences of the most proximate and powerful member states’ (Weaver 2007: 497). Nielson and Tierney (2003), for instance,

argue that the World Bank integrated environment into its work because of pressure from the US. Following this view, we would expect non-environmental IGOs to engage with climate change only if they were explicitly delegated by member states to do so, or at least had tacit permission from them. Yet in each of these three cases — UNHCR, IOM and UNDP — there was no member state mandate to develop programmes on climate change: in fact there was explicit opposition to IGO expansion of mandate.

How would we expect IGOs to respond to new issue areas outside their mandate when member states have not expressed their preferences? Principal-agent theorists would assume that IGOs would seek to expand into a new issue area, even if member states do not support this. Principal-agent scholars maintain that IGOs have distinct preferences to states as they are staffed by independent, professional, international bureaucrats and not delegates of member states. The core assumption underlying principal-agent theory is that IGOs will follow a logic of consequences and seek ‘organisational autonomy and bureaucratic expansion of mandates and authority’ (Weaver 2007: 496; see also Cortell and Peterson 2006). IGO staff will seek ‘budget maximisation, task expansion, and “slack” maximisation’ (Gould 2006; Pollack 2003). Principal agent theory offers a number of explanations for variation in an agency’s autonomy, or ‘slack’. These include: degree of discretion delegated; proximity of member state preferences; heterogeneous principal preferences; voting structures; asymmetry of information; costs of monitoring and antinomic delegation (Hawkins et al. 2006; Lyne, Nielson and Tierney 2006; Pollack 2003). Principal-agent theory is an important framework to explain some IGOs

behaviour. However I propose that IGOs will not always seek to expand at the same time, to the same extent or in the same way as they do not have such fixed preferences.

Conversely, sociological institutionalists have argued that expansion in IGOs will vary according to organisational culture. IGO change for these scholars is an internally driven process and does not depend on member states. IGOs are likely to expand as staff become aware of the interdependency of the problems they seek to address with other issues and root causes (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). Variation in the extent of expansion occurs as some IGO cultures are more supportive than others of change (Barnett and Coleman 2005; Park and Weaver 2012). In contrast to principal-agent theory, staff will decide on a course of action, programme of policy based on their interpretation of norms and rules, rather than a rational cost-benefit calculation (Schein 1992). A logic of appropriateness drives, or constrains, organisational change (March and Olsen 1989: 38).

Variation in organisational expansion is thus explained by internal dynamics and in particular the strength and nature of organisational culture. Strong organisational culture may inhibit expansion if the new activity undermines the core organisational mission (Schein 1992). In contrast, a weak organisational culture may facilitate reform as staff are not wedded to a particular activity or organisational identity. Essentially, sociological institutionalism emphasises the importance of organisational culture and identities in the development of new organisational responses (Scott 2000). However, organisational culture cannot be easily operationalised across a range of IGOs and sociological

institutionalists have no account of what IGO preferences are (Barnett and Finnemore 2004:4).

My approach acknowledges that both a logic of consequences and logic of appropriateness may drive organisational behaviour. Principal-agent theory and sociological institutionalism provide important but partial accounts of IGO expansion. The challenge is to determine under what conditions these logics operate and when they fuel organisational change.

A Comparative Analysis of IGO Type and IGO Change

This thesis adopts a positivist, qualitative case study comparative approach to examine IGO responses to climate change between 2000 and 2011. My aim is to explain why specific cases of IGOs have particular outcomes of organisational change (Mahoney 2010). There are two parts to this analysis: 1) examining the IGO response to climate change, (the dependent variable); and 2) accounting for why these changes have occurred (independent variables). I argue that IGO change occurs along four dimensions: rhetoric, policy, structure and operational. I employ a coding scheme across my case studies to evaluate these four dimensions of change. I propose that IGOs will engage with new issues when these issues are of: high global salience and/or high linkage salience. High global salience is defined as an issue of top priority on the agenda of international meetings of heads of government on a regular and sustained basis. High linkage salience represents a strong and widely accepted substantive issue linkage between two distinct areas or regimes (see Betts 2010: 2). IGO responses will vary in timing and extent

according to IGO type: functional or normative. The first chapter details these dependent and independent variables and identifies four hypotheses that are the focus of the following chapters.

In chapter two I conduct a large-N analysis of IGO engagement with the climate change regime. IGO attendance at the UNFCCC is taken as a proxy measure for IGO response to climate change. I explore the relationship between the evolving global salience of climate change and IGO attendance at the UNFCCC. Chapter two also examines when climate change reached high linkage salience vis-à-vis the development and migration regimes. It identifies the time periods when we would expect normative and functional IGOs to respond. For example, climate change had high issue status (a confluence of linkage and global salience) during the 2008-2011 period which led all IGOs to engage with climate change.

The substantive focus of the dissertation is on three case studies of IGO change. I selected three intergovernmental organisations — UNHCR, UNDP and IOM — which share a number of similarities and one critical difference (IGO type) making them useful to compare. They are all inter-governmental organisations and not international non-governmental organisations (INGOs). IGOs are established by member states and delegated by these states to provide services in specific issue areas. INGOs are non-state actors. The critical theoretical difference is that IGOs are typically seen as having limited agency, due to their close relationship with member states, while international NGOs are independent, private entities that have the autonomy to pursue their own agendas

(Rittberger and Zangl 2006). In addition, I explicitly chose IGOs that are non-environmental. For example, I did not select the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) as climate change fits within its delegated mandate. All three of the selected IGOs have universal membership rather than regional.

In addition, all three organisations have historical similarities: they were created in response to WWII in an active period of multilateral bureaucracy building. UNHCR was established in 1951; IOM was established in 1952 and UNDP was established in 1965.¹² Thus a similar length of time (approximately 60 years) has lapsed between their original mandates and the present day. Furthermore, by selecting UNHCR, UNDP and IOM we are able to hold roughly constant geographic distribution, quantity and type of staff. The number of staff in each of the three agencies falls between 6,500 and 8,500 (Browne 2011: 81). All are staffed by professional international civil servants, have field offices in over 100 countries, where the majority of staff are located. This has significant implications for theorising how these IGOs act, because these IGOs are made up of regional, national and sub-national offices, which respond to headquarters' policy and other priorities.¹³ In summary the age, size and distribution of staff across the three case

¹² The age of these organisations distinguishes them from IGOs established prior to WWI (the International Labour Organization); IGOs established between WWI and WWII (the International Refugee Office); and IGOs established more recently in the 1980s – 2000s (the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs).

¹³ Their annual budgets in 2010 were of similar scale: US\$1.3 billion (IOM), US\$2 billion (UNHCR) and US\$3.67 billion (UNDP) per annum. This places them at the larger end of the IGO spectrum in contrast with smaller IGOs such as: the International Labour Union (3100 staff in 65 countries), the International Atomic Energy Agency (3 locations, 2,338 staff and a US \$435 million budget) and the International Marine Organization (8 countries, 347 staff). However, they are smaller than the World Bank, which has 13,892 staff in 155 locations and an annual budget of US \$72.9 billion (World Bank: 2010). See: UNHCR *Financial figures*, available at <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c1a.html> accessed 20 January 2010. UNDP, *UNDP Annual Report*, New York, 2010; Greening the Blue, <http://www.greeningtheblue.org/> accessed 29 January 2011.

study organisations are similar enough to be held constant while there is variation in the independent variables (IGO type and issue status).

These agencies do differ in their focus area: UNHCR is a humanitarian agency, IOM a migration agency and UNDP a development agency. What is important is that all three issue areas have potential substantive issue linkages with climate change. Functionalists, such as Mitrany (1977), would argue that the primary reason IGOs respond to climate change is because it relates to their core work and ‘spill-over occurs’. For instance, the effects of climate change have been highlighted as a potential cause of mass displacement and migration which has implications for UNHCR and IOM (Kolmannskog 2009; Gemène 2009; Gleditsch, Nordas and Salehyan 2007; Meyers 1993). In addition, climate change is also seen to challenge the existing development paradigm — development actors should be promoting sustainable, green growth rather than following the fossil fuel intensive industrialisation model of the west (Malone 2009). Development must also take into account the impacts of climate change and enable countries to adapt and prepare for the likely increase in slow-onset and fast-onset disasters (Barnett 2001). However, this thesis differs from the functionalist account as it argues that ‘spill-over’ is not automatic. A potential issue linkage is not sufficient to cause an agency to engage with a new issue area. The issue linkages between climate change and each organisation’s focus areas (migration; refugees and development) must be constructed as will be discussed in chapter one (Betts 2010). The variation across these three issue linkages is examined in chapter two through an examination of ‘linkage salience’.

The third, fourth and fifth chapters examine each IGO's response to climate change. I identify UNHCR as a normative organisation due to its supervisory responsibility for the 1951 Refugee Convention. This mandate gives it responsibility to monitor and promote compliance with international refugee law, and has shaped the culture and structure of the organisation. I argue that UNHCR, as a result of its normative type, was a 'slow starter' in the climate change debate. I outline its subsequent changes in rhetoric, policy, structure and its Kenyan operations. I demonstrate that a logic of appropriateness dominated its response to climate change.

IOM, I argue in the fourth chapter, is a functional organisation. It has no equivalent supervisory status to UNHCR and is a projectised organisation with greater flexibility to expand into new areas. I chart how the agency has engaged with debates over environmental migration in the 1990s and then climate change and migration between 2006 and 2011. I trace significant changes to rhetoric, policy, structure and operations and illustrate how a logic of consequences prevailed and drove IOM to pursue climate financing. IOM's functional type also meant that staff displayed minimal resistance to expansion into this new issue area.

UNDP is classified as a hybrid organisation in the fifth chapter. Like IOM it was not established with a supervisory responsibility over a regime of international law.

However, it has developed a strong normative element through its promulgation of the Human Development norms in the annual Human Development Report. As a result of this hybrid type its response to climate change began earlier and it changed to a greater

extent than IOM or UNHCR. This chapter traces when and how it made major rhetoric, policy, structural and operational changes.

Finally, in the conclusion I outline the importance of IGO type for IR theories of IO change. I propose that principal-agent theorists should examine how IGO type influences the delegation relationship between IOs and states. I suggest that sociological institutionalists should compare organisational cultures, pathologies and authority within IGO types. I encourage further research on when and how IGO type changes and what makes normative IGOs effective. In addition, I highlight how this account of IGO change will be useful for IGOs, states and other policy-makers.

Conclusion

IGOs are created by states to perform tasks. When faced with a new issue they must decide whether to ignore or engage with it. This thesis examines a subset of IGO change and asks: how do IGOs change in response to new issues beyond their mandates? I argue that IGO type and issue status determine IGO response. The theoretical framework elaborated here builds on principal-agent theory and sociological institutionalism. It proposes that IGOs can be classified along a spectrum of functional to normative IGO ideal-types which determine their behaviour. I combine a large-N analysis of IGO engagement in the UNFCCC with three case studies of IGOs. I focus on the responses of non-environmental IGOs (UNHCR, UNDP and IOM) to climate change. This process of IGO expansion and change is important for IR scholars, policy-makers and civil society

to understand as we look to IGOs to provide global solutions to global issues, such as climate change.

Chapter One

Theorising IGO Change

When IGOs respond to new issues they change to some degree.¹ Identifying why and how much they change is the focus of this chapter. I argue that International Relations scholars have overlooked the significant structural similarities amongst groups of IGOs. I propose that IGOs can be categorised along a spectrum from functional to normative ideal-types. These types determine IGO behaviours: functional IGOs, following a logic of consequences, are more likely to engage with issues of high global salience. Normative IGOs, following a logic of appropriateness, are more likely to respond to issues of high linkage salience.

The chapter proceeds in three parts. The first section presents the theoretical framework to explain IGO change. It defines the independent variables — issue status and IGO type — and outlines how they interact. Based on this it identifies four hypotheses to account for IGO response to new issue areas. The second section then outlines my conception of IGO change, the dependent variable. I argue that organisational change is comprised of four dimensions: rhetoric, policy, structure and operations. I then explain the methods

¹ If an IGO does not respond then we can say no change has taken place. A response (and thus IGO change) may be very minor – for instance the issuing of a press release, or it may be major – for instance establishing a new department. The second section of this chapter establishes indicators to evaluate IGO change. Note that I use the terms ‘IGO change’ and ‘IGO response’ interchangeably to refer to the process of an IGO changing in response to a new issue area.

and sources I have employed to account for IGO change along these four dimensions.

The third section outlines how IGO type builds on principal agent theory, resource dependency theory and sociological institutionalism to explain IGO change.

Explaining IGO Change

This section maintains that variation in IGO response to new issue areas is explained by two independent variables: issue status and IGO type. It is divided into two sub-sections which define and outline how these concepts will be operationalised.

Issue Status

New issues are constantly emerging on the international agenda and IGOs face a dilemma: which issues should they engage with and when? I propose the concept of issue status as an indicator of when an IGO will engage with a new issue. High issue status means the issue is an international priority and is relevant to the IGO core issue area.

There are two components of issue status: global salience and linkage salience.

Global Salience

Global salience is defined as an issue of top priority on the agenda of international meetings of heads of state, or government, on a regular and sustained basis. The core indicators of global salience are: a) that the issue is a *top priority*; b) that *heads of state or government* meet to discuss an issue; c) that they do so *regularly* and d) over a *sustained* period outside the core regime. High global salience indicates an issue of high concern to a majority of states, and not just to a core interest group or single state. These are issues

which have global ramifications, beyond national or regional borders and are seen to be so important that they should be a top priority for leaders over and above every day politics (see Buzan et al 1998: 27).² When heads of state or government discuss an issue this indicates that it is in the realm of 'high-politics' and not confined to the portfolio of the minister in charge. For instance, when a Minister for the Environment discusses environmental issues at an international environmental meeting this does not constitute high status as this is part of their routine brief. Issues reach high global salience when they become so important and pressing that a Prime Minister or President makes it a top priority. Moreover, heads of government must discuss an issue frequently, in international meetings, and over several years for the issue to be considered high status. In other words not every issue that heads of government discuss is by definition high status. This definition sifts out issues that appear briefly on the international agenda and then disappear again.

How do issues reach high global salience? There are a number of channels through which an issue may shift from low salience to high salience.³ One path is through an international advocacy effort by transnational advocacy networks or social movements (Keck and Sikkink 1998) as was the case with HIV-AIDs and the environment. Another path is through the lobbying of an epistemic community of experts which influences

² Global salience shares some similar attributes to securitisation (Buzan et al. 1998). It also consists of a 'speech act' in which an actor outlines an issue that is 'so important that it should not be exposed to normal haggling of politics but should be dealt with decisively by top leaders prior to other issues' (Buzan et al 1998: 27). However, unlike securitisation, this speech act does not have to be presented as an 'urgent and existential threat' (Buzan et al. 1998: 27), but rather as a top priority for states.

³ Issues may evolve from low to high salience, and may return to low salience. This is not a teleological concept; issues may also stay at low global salience. This is the same for linkage salience and also for the overall issue status.

senior decision-makers (Haas 1990).⁴ Advocacy groups may reframe the issue in economic and security terms as these are the dominant concerns of states. States, however, are the critical actors who determine if and when an issue takes on high global salience. They aggregate interests, choose between competing priorities, and decide which issues should be elevated above normal politics. Meanwhile interest groups, epistemic communities and other advocacy organisations represent specific causes and/or populations and do not have to aggregate concerns of state.

How can we measure global salience? I have proposed that high global salience is reached when a significant majority of heads of government meet on a regular and sustained basis to discuss the issue at international security and economic meetings. Meetings of heads of government are an excellent indicator of global salience as these agendas reflect competing interests between states and within states (between different ministries) on what issues should be on the agenda. In addition, a significant proportion of heads of government must agree that an issue is important for it to be a main item on the agenda. As a proxy for global salience, I investigate when climate change has been highlighted as a top priority at the G7/G8 leaders' summits. To be a top priority it must have been a major theme of discussion—in other words there must have either been: a session dedicated to discussing climate change; or a section in the final chair's summary dedicated to climate change.⁵ If it fulfills either of these two criteria this signals that

⁴ I use 'epistemic community' to refer to 'a network of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge' (Haas 1992: 3).

⁵ Chapter two examines the final declaration of the G7/G8 heads of government (1975 – 2011) for climate change. I noted when: i) climate change is mentioned and ii) climate change is an explicit theme (an explicit section titled 'climate change' and/or a significant proportion of the agreement devoted to it) in the chair's summary or communiqué.

heads of government of the world's most influential and important states agreed that it was an important and pressing issue.

Why focus on the G7/G8 summits? The G7/G8 has been the predominant international leaders' meeting to discuss economic and other major global issues. It began in 1975, is held on an annual basis, and thus offers a constant data source (G7/8 chair's summaries and final communiqués) to track the evolution of climate change.⁶ Although it is not representative of the entire international community, it indicates the preferences of the most influential states in the international system. I could have analysed the communiqués of other meetings such as the Arab League, African Union or Organisation of American States. However these are all regional meetings and I seek to measure *global* rather than *regional* engagement with the issue. Furthermore, although I focus on the G7/G8 I also include analysis of other significant international meetings — including the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting and the Security Council — to complement this analysis of the G7/G8 communiqués.

⁶ The G7/G8 is one of the longest standing annual international meetings of heads of government outside of the UN. It was created in 1975 as the G6, and then became the G7 in 1976 with the addition of Canada. In 1997 it became the G8 with the addition of Russia. Combined the G8 countries have 51 percent of global GDP. It includes most of the major world powers: Russia; US; Italy; France; UK; Canada; Germany and Japan. In 2008, following the world financial crisis, the G20 became the premier international economic forum. The G7/G8 was increasingly seen as irrelevant as it did not have membership of emerging powers such as: India, China, Brazil and South Africa. However the G20 heads of state' meetings are not analysed for global salience as they began when climate change was already a high-status issue. For more on the G8 see University of Toronto, *G8 Information Centre*, <http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/> accessed 20 July 2012.

Linkage Salience

Linkage salience represents the relevance of a new issue area to an existing and distinct issue area. High linkage salience is defined by a strong substantive issue linkage, or causal explanation, between two distinct issue areas or regimes.⁷ There are many examples of, and a growing literature on, emerging issue linkages that bridge distinct regimes such as: development and migration (Betts 2010); gender and security (Shepard 2008); or trade and environment (Esty 2001; Nordstrom and Vaughan 1999). One shortcoming of the existing literature is that it does not evaluate or measure the strength of these issue linkages (Betts 2010; Haas 1990; Jinnah 2011; Young 1996).⁸ I propose that the more widely accepted (or perceived) an issue linkage is the stronger it is, and correspondingly the stronger the linkage salience is between the two issues areas.

A strong issue linkage (which denotes high linkage salience) will be highly visible and widely supported by international actors in at least one of the two regimes being linked.⁹ Substantive issue linkages do not exist on their own accord—they must be established and actively promoted by actors who have an interest and/or see a reason in linking two discrete issue areas. They are inter-subjectively constituted and maintained by a range of international actors including: IGOs, INGOs and states. Inter-subjectivity means that no single actor can on their own (or subjectively) create a strong issue linkage. Rather, the creation of strong substantive issue linkages requires a consensus or agreement between a

⁷ This conception of linkage salience builds on Betts (2009), who defines substantive issue linkages as causal claims across issue areas.

⁸ An exception is Betts (2009) which compares substantive issue linkages across four international negotiations in the refugee regime. In contrast, this analysis measures the strength of substantive issue linkages across a number of regimes.

⁹ Linkage salience is not a binary variable. Substantive issue linkages vary in degrees of strength.

number of influential actors that there is a causal link between two discrete areas. The difference between a weak issue linkage and a strong issue linkage is often the presence of a successful epistemic community that endorses and promotes the issue linkage.

High linkage salience cannot be reduced to a single indicator or criterion. It is difficult to measure the degree of institutional support and/or consensus behind a substantive issue linkage. I propose the following measures for high linkage salience: significant number of NGOs and IGOs elaborating policy or advocacy material about an issue linkage; high citations and circulation of (policy and academic) literature substantiating the issue linkage; presence of inter-agency working groups dedicated to the issue linkage; and senior politicians endorsing the link. These indicators will be used in chapter two to identify when climate change had high relative salience vis-à-vis the development and migration regimes.

There is a potential problem of endogeneity with this conception of linkage salience. IGOs could create and promote an issue linkage between their regime and another and thus contribute directly to changing linkage salience. They could then use the strong issue linkage as a basis for expansion. A hypothetical example: UNEP could write an influential report that demonstrated how international trade impacted on the environment. This report could lead other actors (NGOs, states and other IGOs) to support a trade-environment linkage. Thus, UNEP would have effectively increased the linkage salience of trade to the environmental regime. UNEP may then cite this issue linkage (and the report) as a basis for involvement in World Trade Organisation negotiations.

Endogeneity would be an issue if a single organisation or report could change relative salience between two regimes. However, I seek to separate out the wider context of an emerging issue linkage from a single organisation's attempts to create their own institutional issue linkage. A single IGO report or speech is not sufficient to change the overall strength of an issue linkage: the linkage is intersubjective. Thus there must be a number of actors creating, advocating for and maintaining the issue linkage.

This conception of linkage salience as issue linkage builds on functionalist theories of 'spill-overs'. Functionalists have highlighted how international organisations should be created to pursue specific technical tasks – such as coordinating trade or communications (Mitrany 1975). Neo-functionalists, building on this theory and the empirical success of the EU common market, propose that interdependent economic interests create a demand for institutions to deliver cooperative outcomes in other areas (Nye 1994). Once regional economic institutions are created there is an inherent tendency for cooperation to 'spill-over' into other issue areas. For functionalists, cooperation between states on one issue triggers further cooperation and leads to IGO expansion. This occurs as the nature of a problem evolves or the original problem that an IGO was created for is solved. However, functionalists consider IGOs as passive in this process: they are independent variables and IGO change is determined by exogenous factors (Reinalda and Verbeek 1998). I argue, and elaborate on later in this chapter, that IGOs are autonomous and play an active role in instigating organisational change.

Linkage and Global Salience

High status issues are defined as those with high global and high linkage salience. Low status issues are those with low (or no) global and linkage salience. High linkage salience and high global salience may exist independent of each other. For instance, avian flu may be deemed a priority by heads of state (high global salience) but not relevant to the International Energy Agency as there is no linkage between the flu and the energy regime (low linkage salience). Linkage and global salience may also interact. High global salience may lead to high linkage salience as organisations seek to ‘bandwagon’, or link to a new issue (see Jinnah 2011; Wapner 2011). In addition, high linkage salience may result in high global salience as advocacy groups link their core issue (such as the environment; or HIV-AIDs) to security or economic concerns of states.

In the table below I outline how IGOs will change in response to issues of differing linkage and global salience. On the one hand, I predict that when an issue has no linkage salience, or no global salience, there will not be IGO change. In other words, if an issue is not seen as important on the international stage and there is no issue linkage between an IGO and the new issue, then we will not see IGOs expand or engage with it (Hypothesis 1). On the other hand, when an issue has high linkage and high global salience (high status) all IGOs will change in response (Hypothesis 2).

Table One: Issue Status and IGO Change

ISSUE STATUS	Low linkage salience	High linkage salience
Low global salience	No IGOs change	Normative IGOs change
High global salience	Functional IGOs change	All IGOs change

H1: no IGOs will change when a new issue has low status

H2: all IGOs will change when a new issue has high status

This table also includes two further hypotheses, stipulated below, which will be explained in the next sub-section.

H3: when an issue has high global salience, functional IGOs will change

H4: when an issue has high linkage salience, normative IGOs will change

IGO Type

I propose that IGOs exist along a spectrum from functional to normative ideal-types.¹⁰ Normative IGOs have a legal authority to ensure norm compliance. They can thus be identified by a core characteristic: they have supervisory authority over a body of international law.¹¹ Supervisory authority means that states have mandated an IGO to promote and ensure compliance with a discrete body of international rules and norms (Türk 2007: 3).¹² Examples of normative organisations include: the International Labour Organisation (ILO); the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC); and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR).¹³ The ICRC, for example, is the overseer of international humanitarian law and as such has the right to visit prisoners of war and civilian internees, and also has a special right of ‘humanitarian initiative’.¹⁴ The ILO oversees more than 150 international labour conventions under its legal

¹⁰ This typology includes neither representative bodies (such as the Organisation of American States; or the Arab League) nor international courts as neither fit along the normative-functional spectrum. The latter are established to adjudicate international law rather than have supervisory status over it. Alter also argues that international courts are distinct to other IOs as states cannot recontract to them and they are thus ‘agent-trustees’. Note that Brunsson (2002) also creates ideal-type organisations and distinguishes between political- and action-orientated. Meanwhile international law scholar Sarooshi (2007) distinguishes between three ideal types of IOs based on the degree of conferral of sovereign power from states to IOs. Neither typology offers insights into how IGOs will respond to new issues-areas or explains variation in response.

¹¹ Abbott et. al argue that IOs ‘give meaning to legal norms’ and are often ‘authorised to elaborate agreed norms, especially where it is infeasible to draft precise rules in advance and where special expertise is required’ (2000: 417). My typology of IOs distinguishes between IOs which have an authorisation to promote norms (through supervisory status over international law) and those that do not.

¹² Exercising supervisory authority typically consists of: i) monitoring and assessing state behaviour with regards to the international law of concern and ii) some type of enforcement mechanism. Note that legal personality of an IO is neither a prerequisite nor an assumption of this typology. For debates over the extent of legal personality of IOs see: *Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organisations or between International Organisations* 1986; Scott 2004; White 1996.

¹³ The OHCHR is almost a normative IGO but does not meet the supervisory status criteria. It is mandated by General Assembly Resolution 48/141 to ‘promote and protect the effective enjoyment by all of civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights’, and to lead the UN’s response to human rights as established in the Charter of the United Nations and in international human rights laws and treaties. However it has no formal legal authority over the international human rights conventions. See OHCHR, <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/AboutUs/Pages/Mandate.aspx> accessed 20 February 2012; General Assembly, 1993, *Resolution 48/141*, 20 December 1993. Thanks also to Prof. Goodwin Gill for this insight. Discussion with Prof. Guy Goodwin Gill, 16 February 2012, Oxford.

¹⁴ The Note that ICRC is not strictly speaking an IGO but an INGO however it has similarities to IGOs which make comparison useful. States have involvement through the ‘International Red Cross and Crescent Movement’ and conferences that guide ICRC’s work (see Ratner 2011). ICRC’s work is based on the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the additional protocols which confer on the ICRC a ‘specific mandate’ to act in the event of international armed conflict. ICRC, 2011, <http://www.icrc.org/eng/who-we-are/mandate/overview-icrc-mandate-mission.htm> accessed 15 November 2011.

framework. Normative IGOs have a legal mandate, through their supervisory status over a regime of international law, to promote international norms.¹⁵

Functional IGOs are not mandated to promote, or ensure compliance with, international norms. They have no supervisory responsibility over a regime of international law. Instead they exist to perform specific, discrete tasks and are often project-based organisations as a result. Examples of organisations in this category are: the World Bank, the International Meteorological Organisation (IMO) and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM).¹⁶ The World Bank, for example, has no supervisory authority over international conventions relating to development assistance. The Bank's articles of agreement state that its purposes are: to 'assist in the reconstruction and development of territories of members by facilitating the investment of capital for productive purposes' and 'to promote private foreign investment by means of guarantees or participations in loans' amongst other objectives.¹⁷ These organisations are functional as they do not have a legal authority to ensure compliance with international norms.

These two categories represent constructed ideal types. They are an abstraction and simplification of one important axis of variation within IGOs. As Weber explains, ideal-types are constructed through 'the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete...phenomena which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasised viewpoints into a unified analytical construct' (Weber 1949: 90). They will not exist in their pure form in reality. The IGOs listed above are examples and may not conform completely to these ideal-types but will be located close to one end of the normative-functional spectrum. The purpose of these ideal-types

¹⁵ I do not seek to distinguish between legal, moral or social norms. This has been examined by other scholars such as: Brunée and Toope (2010) and Finnemore (2000). Brunée and Toope, for instance, argue that legal norms are a subset of social norms. The former are differentiated from all other norms as they fulfill Fueller's eight criteria of 'legality' (2010: 351) and have 'communities of practice' which promote, apply and redefine their 'legality' on a daily basis. The emphasis here is not on the nature of the norms but the nature of the IGO relationship with norms.

¹⁶ The International Meteorological Organisation was created in 1878 to exchange weather information amongst states. It consisted of the directors of national meteorological services and not government representatives and so it could not adopt international Conventions. In 1950 it was replaced by the World Meteorological Organisation (Reinalda 2009: 98).

¹⁷ For the full list of functions see the World Bank. 1980. *Articles of Agreement*, Washington: World Bank.

is not to comprehensively and accurately explain *all* IGO behaviour but to set up heuristic ideal cases through which we can develop new hypotheses about IGOs' responses to new issue areas.

In between these two ideal types is a spectrum of hybrid IGOs. Hybrid IGOs have no supervisory authority but promote an international treaty and/or international norms. A hybrid IGO, for example, may provide organisational assistance to an international convention or play an active role in monitoring and advocating for adherence to it. However states will not have given these organisations a legal mandate to promote and enforce the international law of concern. Examples of hybrid IGOs include: UNEP and its various Multilateral Environmental Agreements¹⁸; the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), and the annual convention on the Elimination of the Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)¹⁹; and in recent years UNICEF, which has played an increasingly active role in promoting the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) (Oestrich 2007). A hybrid IGO may also be responsible for overseeing and promoting international standards, indices or goals, which embody international norms and can be categorised as 'soft-law'.²⁰ Examples here include UNDP with its Human Development Reports and the Millennium Development Goals. In sum, hybrid IGOs

¹⁸ UNEP hosts seven secretariats for nine global Conventions and protocols as well as eight secretariats for eight regional Conventions. However all of these treaties have their secretariats geographically outside of their 'mother' organisation. In other words they have separate and full secretariats with designated executive heads who run the secretariat on behalf of the Executive Director of UNEP. See UNEP (2010). *Typologies of Multi-lateral Environmental Agreements, Information Note by the Executive Director*. Nairobi, 7 June 2010.

¹⁹ UNIFEM was established in 1976 as a Voluntary Fund to promote gender equality and women's rights during the UN Decade for Women and the International Women's Year. It was an offshoot of UNDP and its work was not grounded in any of the human rights treaties. However, it subsequently developed a relationship with the *Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women* (CEDAW) and organised meetings of the Commission on the Status of Women which coincided with CEDAW committee meetings. However, UNIFEM did not have sole responsibility over implementation of CEDAW – there was a separate committee established under the Convention to monitor state compliance. UN-WOMEN replaced UNIFEM in 2010. See CEDAW, <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cedaw.htm> accessed 22 November 2011.

²⁰ There is an ongoing academic debate on the concept of soft law and whether it is a meaningful term. Some legal scholars dismiss the notion and claim it is 'non-sensical' while others say it matters but does not fit within formal sources of law. See Brunée and Toope 2010: 50 for a summary of this. For my purposes, soft law represents norms which are institutionalised in some way (through standards or indices) but not codified in legal terms.

have some relationship with international law and/or international norms, which distinguishes them from functional IGOs which do not.

We can identify where an IGO fits within this typology by examining an IGO's constitutional documents and subsequent amendments and protocols. Constitutional documents may include: UN General Assembly resolutions or constitutions establishing the organisation and setting-out its purpose, as well as multilateral treaties (in the case of normative IGOs) which outline a regime of international law and authorise an IGO to oversee it.

Table Two: IGO Types

IGO Type	Examples
Functional	World Bank, IMO, IOM.
Normative	ILO, ICRC, UNHCR.

How does IGO type influence IGOs behaviour and response to a new issue area? I argue that functional and normative IGOs have different 'logics of behaviour' which is a result of divergent legitimisation strategies. Functional IGOs have pragmatic legitimacy and are more likely to seek material gain and follow an 'instrumental-rational logic', more commonly called a 'logic of consequences' (Krasner 1999; March and Olsen 1998).²¹

²¹ Although I adopt the terms logic of appropriateness and logic of consequences from Krasner (1999) and March and Olsen (1998) I use them slightly differently. I delineate how IGOs define their identities *and* their preferences. For Krasner, and March and Olsen, a logic of consequences is 'rational-calculating behaviour to maximise a given set of *unexplained* preferences' in which actors are concerned with 'How do

Meanwhile, normative IGOs have moral legitimacy and will trade off material gain for moral authority in their niche area, which leads them to a ‘logic of appropriateness’ (March and Olsen 1998; Krasner 1999).²² I will now elaborate on these different sources of IGO legitimacy and IGO behavioural logics (depicted in the table below). I will focus on functional and normative types as hybrid IGOs are a composite of both forms of legitimacy and behavioural logics.

I get what I want’ (Krasner 1999: 5). In my conception, a logic of consequences indicates that IGOs will act in instrumental ways *and* that their preference will be for material gain. Meanwhile a logic of appropriateness for Krasner is ‘political action as a product of rules, roles and identities that stipulate appropriate behaviour’ (Krasner 1999: 5). Actors are concerned with what they *should* do in a situation, given existing social norms. In contrast, my conception of a logic of appropriateness has two elements: i) action they take will follow social norms *and* ii) an IGOs identity defines a specific role for them in promoting these norms.

²² These are not the only two possible logics merely the most useful in understanding IGO behaviour in response to new issues. Other IR scholars have challenged the dichotomy of logic of consequences and logic of appropriateness and outlined other logics. Risse for instance maintains that there is a ‘logic of arguing’ in which actors engage in truth seeking behaviour with the aim of reaching a ‘mutual understanding based on a reasoned consensus’ (2000: 1 – 2). A logic of arguing, however, does not work here as it explains interaction between actors (such as state leaders and/or NGOs), whereas I seek to explain how IGOs respond to an issue.

Table Three: IGO Typology

IGO Type	Type of Legitimacy	Behavioural Logic	Examples
Functional	Pragmatic legitimacy	Logic of Consequences	IMO World Bank IOM
Normative	Moral legitimacy	Logic of Appropriateness	ILO ICRC UNHCR
Hybrid	Moral and pragmatic legitimacy	Logic of Consequences and Logic of Appropriateness	UNICEF UNIFEM UNDP

IO legitimacy is essential for IO survival. IO legitimacy is understood as ‘depending on the environment for support’ (Brunsson 2002: 13).²³ I define the environment broadly to include states as well as competitor NGOs, IGOs and civil society. Legitimacy, or

²³ I focus on the act of ‘gaining legitimacy’ for expansion into a new issue area rather than maintaining or repairing legitimacy (Suchman 1995). This is because IGOs in the initial phase of expansion into a new issue area are looking to gain legitimacy.

support, in this sense takes two principal forms: material resources (in particular funding to continue operations); and ideational resources (acceptance of and tacit support for activities) (Brunsson 2002: 13). All IGOs need both forms of legitimacy to survive. However, normative IGOs explicitly seek a particular type of ideational resource that functional IGOs do not. Normative IGOs, I argue, seek to be widely accepted as the appropriate or right actor to perform a task, whereas functional IGOs do not. Normative IGOs also have moral legitimacy in this area: performing tasks for the universal, societal welfare. Functional IGOs are primarily concerned with proving that they have the expertise necessary to perform a task. This is explained by their divergent sources of legitimacy.

Functional IGOs have pragmatic legitimacy. Pragmatic legitimacy is derived from ‘the self-interested calculations of an organisation’s most immediate audience’ (Suchman 1995: 578). Their legitimacy is derived from demonstrating to their core constituents, principally donor states, that they can perform a delegated task in an efficient and expert manner (Suchman 1995: 548). In other words, they must demonstrate that they are competent, technical actors and can perform tasks which they are paid to do. Their primary concern is thus delivering ‘goods’ (projects or policies) in exchange for material resources (funding) to their constituents. They do not have moral authority but do have expert, rational-bureaucratic and delegated authority (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). To ensure their survival they seek to maintain and generate pragmatic legitimacy.

Normative IGOs, meanwhile, are founded on a particular type of moral legitimacy.

Broadly speaking moral legitimacy can be understood as promoting universal societal welfare rather than the interests of particular constituents (Suchman 1995: 578). In fact, they explicitly seek to prove they are not doing the ‘bidding of Great Powers but instead represent the “international community”’ (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 23). International law establishes what states ought to do and is the basis for normative IGOs’ source of moral authority within a particular area. Importantly, a normative IGO’s moral legitimacy is limited by the scope of the international convention they supervise. A normative IGO does not have moral authority over issues beyond its regime. For instance the ILO has moral authority to demand that states protect workers’ rights, but does not have moral authority to demand that states protect wildlife or that they reduce carbon emissions. Their arguments will not carry the same moral force in these areas. Thus the moral legitimacy of a normative IGO is defined as the promotion of societal welfare within a bounded issue area or regime. Normative IGOs derive this legitimacy from their supervisory role over an international treaty.²⁴ They seek ongoing acceptance that the issues and activities they pursue fall within the scope of their moral legitimacy. Essentially this legitimacy rests on an acceptance that they are the right actor to perform a particular task, and that they are performing that particular task in a ‘moral’ way.

These divergent sources of legitimacy lead to different behavioural logics which are internalised by staff and states, and are reflected in the structure of the organisation.

Functional IGOs follow a ‘logic of consequences’ (Krasner 1999; March and Olsen 1998). In this logic behaviour is the product of a rational cost-benefit calculation (Krasner

²⁴ Hybrid IGOs also have moral legitimacy through their role in promoting international law. However they do not have the same degree of moral legitimacy as normative IGOs because they do not have supervisory status over a regime of international law.

1999: 5). A functional IGO will value the material benefits of an action over any other competing concerns (Georgi 2011). In short, expansion is determined by financial incentives: is there funding available to take on this new issue area, or is there likely to be future funding? Functional IGOs are typically projectised organisations with staff who are not ideologically committed to a core mandate or organisational identity. Thus there is little or no staff resistance to expansion as long as there is instrumental value in it. In sum, a functional IGO is concerned with whether and how they will gain more funding; and not whether the new issue area contributes to a core mandate. The core criterion for expansion is high global issue salience, regardless of linkage issue salience.

Meanwhile, normative IGOs follow a ‘logic of appropriateness’. Action under this logic is based on whether or not it adheres to, and supports, the rules, laws and/or standards at the heart of its identity and source of legitimacy (Krasner 1999: 5). Staff in normative IGOs are strongly committed to the core treaty or convention(s) which give the organisation its identity. This creates an organisational culture (within the bureaucracy and with member states) which is resistant to any change which could weaken or undermine the identity of the organisation. Expansion thus depends on linkage salience. If there is a strong issue linkage between a new issue area and an IGO’s core regime, staff will endorse expansion. However, if expansion undermines or dilutes a normative IGO’s regime, it will not expand.

The ICRC offers a useful example of this. ICRC officials describe international humanitarian law as the ICRC’s ‘identity trademark’ (Ratner 2011: 491). Following a

logic of appropriateness, we would expect the ICRC to take actions which support and do not weaken its role as the supervisor of international humanitarian law. ICRC has sought to expand into international human rights law, but has faced resistance from delegates who have argued that it ‘detracts from the fundamental purpose of the ICRC’ and thereby ‘dilutes identity to stakeholders’ (Ratner 2011: 465). Thus the decision to expand in normative IGOs is evaluated in terms of the long-term implications for their identity, and not in terms of short-term material benefits.

In sum, normative IGOs have moral legitimacy derived from their core treaty and are concerned with maintaining this, so their actions are based on a logic of appropriateness. They will expand into new issue areas if they can demonstrate internally and externally that they are the appropriate actor to take on this new issue. The issue must have high linkage salience to their mandate, regardless of its global salience. Functional IGOs on the other hand have pragmatic legitimacy, and are concerned with gaining material resources to survive. They follow a logic of consequences and expand into new issue areas where there is material gain. They will engage with issues of high global salience regardless of their linkage salience. Hybrid IGOs have both sources of legitimacy — pragmatic and moral — and thus display both logics of behaviour — appropriateness and consequences and may respond to either high global or linkage salience. This leads us to the following two hypotheses, outlined previously, which are the central focus of this research:

H3: when an issue has high global salience, functional IGOs will change.

H4: when an issue has high linkage salience, normative IGOs will change.

As previously mentioned these IGO types are ideal-types. For this reason, part of the empirical analysis will need to consider where on the normative-functional spectrum each case study IGO (UNHCR, IOM and UNDP) sits, and how closely their behaviour fits these types. It is also worth noting that IGO type has a temporal dimension: IGOs may become more or less normative over time. While some are set up as functional IGOs they may acquire more normative attributes through the proliferation of these norms and laws, and their role in advocating and monitoring these. Meanwhile, normative IGOs may become more functional through expansion into service-orientated activities and dilution of their normative role. Thus the case study analyses of UNHCR, IOM and UNDP will also need to examine if and how each IGO has evolved in type since their creation. However I hold IGO type constant across the three IGOs during the period of analysis (2000 – 2011). IGO type cannot change within the space of two to three years — it is a slow, gradual process. Finally, there may be variation within IGOs: some units may be more normative or functional than others. For instance, we might expect variation in normativity between departments of an organisation. These issues will be discussed in subsequent chapters.

Measuring IGO Change

Change within intergovernmental organisations can occur in different ways, from mandate change to culture change, and to varying degrees, from ad-hoc changes to paradigm shifts. While there is a large scholarship on IGO change, IR has not developed a nuanced categorisation of this process and does not distinguish between the different

dimensions of change. Some IR scholars have focused their analysis of IGO change on one dimension such as: policy change (Freitas 2004); percentage of programme change (Luken 2005); organisational culture (Hopgood 2006); goal proliferation (Barnett and Finnemore 2001) or changes to the framing of policy problems (Haas 1990). In other scholarship there is a conflation of different types of change, such as policy change with operational change, which weakens the explanatory power of the corresponding theories (Nielson and Tierney 2003). I focus on one particular type of organisational change: organisational response to a new issue area.²⁵

An organisational response (or change) occurs when an organisation engages with a new issue area and integrates that new issue into its work to some degree. At one extreme, no response occurs when an organisation decides an issue is not a priority and does not engage with it at all. At the other extreme an organisation may: decide an issue is the top organisational priority, hire new staff with expertise in the area, create a new department, policies and programmes dedicated to that issue and re-negotiate its mandate with member states to officially make the issue a top priority. These changes will, most likely, differ in substance across different organisations and different issue areas. UNHCR, for instance, will not create the same programme as UNDP to work on climate change. One challenge I address is identifying and categorising organisational change across three IGOs given the differences in focus areas (migration, refugees and development).

²⁵ There is also a large literature within organisational theory that defines organisational change in much broader terms. See for example Gareth Morgan. 1998. *Images of Organisations, an Executive Edition*, San Francisco: Sage. The definition adopted here focuses entirely on organisational change *in response* to a new issue area and is not concerned with discussions about organisational efficiency or productivity changes.

I propose a novel classification of organisational change that distinguishes between four dimensions of change: rhetoric, policy, structure and operations.²⁶ This classification can be used across the three organisations as it focuses on the degree and dimension of change rather than the substance of changes. A change in rhetoric occurs if the senior leadership outlines a new agency position on a new issue area. This form of organisational behaviour can be observed through changes in the content of leaders' public speeches.²⁷ A change in policy represents the development of new policy position(s), documented in policy papers or reports.²⁸ It is distinct to rhetoric as it is a written document, which typically allows for a more substantiated and detailed account of an organisation's position than a speech. Policy change may be independent of rhetoric change: an organisation may develop a report on a new issue when there has been no specific mention of that issue in public speeches by senior management.

Structure refers to the composition and internal organisation of an IGO. Structural change occurs when an organisation hires new staff, creates new departments or significantly refocuses existing departments to engage with a new issue area. These structural changes

²⁶ Note that these represent four dimensions of the dependent variable and not four separate dependent variables. Although there may be some relationship between these dimensions this is not significant as they are all part of the same overall variable.

²⁷ Rhetoric is thus defined as public statements or speeches made by senior leadership (most commonly the administrator, director general or equivalent) of the organisation. We would expect to see some changes between leaders in organisational rhetoric as each leader has their own personal preferences (reflecting Cox's (1969) argument that leadership matters). However speeches are more than a reflection of the preferences, or whims, of the executive leader as the broader bureaucracy is likely to be involved in drafting the speech.

²⁸ I adopt a broad understanding of 'policy' as a 'principle or course of action adopted or proposed as desirable, advantageous, or expedient' by an IGO. Oxford English Dictionary, www.oed.com accessed 20 February 2012. Policy may come in 'diluted forms' - such as technical or research reports - in which the preferred course of action is implied in concluding recommendations but may not yet be institutionally accepted. Alternatively, policy may be explicitly titled as a 'policy paper' or 'policy document' and outline a new organisational position on an issue. My analysis in chapters three, four and five focuses on the latter, as this is where an IGO most clearly sets out its position, although it also includes the former.

indicate the prioritisation of an issue within an agency and its capability to deliver on policy and rhetorical change. For instance, if an entirely new HIV/AIDs department was created and new staff are hired this represents a significant investment of resources in a new issue. Change in operations occurs where agencies begin new field programmes or significantly reorientate old programmes to engage with a new issue.²⁹ Analysis here focuses on the field level of an IGO's behaviour. These four dimensions enable us to analyse a spectrum of organisational responses: from change on one dimension to change along all four dimensions.³⁰

Table Four: Defining IGO Change

1.	Rhetorical Change
2.	Policy Change
3.	Structural Change
4.	Operational Change

To compare change across the three organisations I have developed a numerical scoring system. This will be used to evaluate the degree of change along the four dimensions. In each case study I evaluate and score change in rhetoric, policy, structure and operations out of 10. A score of 0 represents no change and a score of 10 represents complete transformation. An overall organisational change score will then be calculated by averaging out the organisation's scores across the four variables. For instance if an IGO

²⁹ Operations are defined as programmes, projects and activities typically targeting at, and offering services to, a particular population.

³⁰ I considered measuring the changes in financing for climate change adaptation projects within each organisation. However there is not reliable data to do so for the ten-year period. None of the case studies have tracked funds that were either tied to, or spent on, climate change initiatives over the 2000 – 2011 period.

gains scores of: rhetoric 7, policy 7, structure 5, and operations 5, the overall organisational change will be $(7 + 7 + 5 + 5)/4 = 6$. In short, organisational change is the average of change in rhetoric, policy, structure and operations and is expressed as a score out of 10. These scores have no normative value: I do not propose that complete change (ten) is better than no change (zero).³¹

These scores are quantitative indicators of qualitative data on IGO change. I use a numerical index rather than a dichotomous variable (Yes/No) because it offers a more nuanced reading and enables comparison across cases. A dichotomous variable would make comparison difficult. There would be no meaningful average of organisational change if we had the following results: rhetoric (yes), policy (yes), structure (no) and operations (no). Would a 'yes' in two categories and a 'no' in two other mean an overall yes or no for organisational change? Instead, this numerical index enables us to easily interpret, recall and compare information provided in the qualitative case study analysis chapters.³² Below I outline what I would expect to see within three brackets of change: 1–3, 4–6 and 7–10 (inclusive).

³¹ The question of if and when organisational change is 'good' is discussed implicitly in the IR literature on IO change. Principal-agent theorists tend to view autonomous organisational change as problematic, particularly when IOs deviate from their core mandate and member states' interests (see Hawkins et al. 2006). Other IR scholars have seen IO change as a positive: it represents the success of transnational advocacy networks advocating for progressive norms (such as gender equality, human rights and environmental protection) and will lead to further norm diffusion (Keck and Sikkink 1999). Meanwhile Ernst Haas' makes a distinction between organisational learning and adaptation. He proposes that learning (understood as deep and transformative change), is good but adaptation (incremental, ad-hoc change) is not (Haas 1990).

³² Axelrod's attempt to code IGO change in response to climate change highlights problems with over-simplified dichotomous coding. He coded the annual reports of 17 regional fisheries organisations for 'climate action' on a dichotomous basis (yes/no). A 'climate action' was said to occur if there was support from all member states for the IO to 'undertake research or action related to climate change' (2011: 69). However, reports that constituted a 'climate action' varied significantly and Axelrod did not distinguish between state-led or IGO-led climate actions and thus his findings tell us little about IO autonomy.

Table Five: Evaluating IGO Change

	Minor Change (1–3)	Significant Change (4–6)	Major Change (7–10)
Rhetoric	Several leaders speeches mention the new issue. ³³	Several leaders speeches directly on the issue but not a sustained focus. ³⁴	Leaders make the issue a regular theme in speeches and outline the agency's response to it. ³⁵
Policy	Several reports mention the new issue but there is no specific policy paper on it. ³⁶	The organisation publishes a policy paper on the new issue. ³⁷ This is not accompanied by high-level strategic documents. ³⁸	The organisation publishes a policy paper on the issue and a high-level strategic documents which mention the issue.
Structure	No new positions are created. Some staff may have a part-time responsibility for following the new issue. ³⁹	One or two positions may be created and/or several staff may dedicate a significant proportion of their time to the issue. ⁴⁰	A new department is created and a number of new staff are hired with expertise on the issue. ⁴¹
Operations	Programmes may address new issue without explicitly relabeling it as such. ⁴² Alternatively, there may be a few projects targeting the new issue area. ⁴³	Field programmes in several sites are developed and labeled explicitly to address the new issue. ⁴⁴	A significant number of new field programmes are developed to address the issue. ⁴⁵

³³ A 'mention' of the issue suggests it is referred to six times or fewer within a speech. 'Several' speeches indicates that less than 6 speeches over the course of a year mention the new issue area.

³⁴ A speech which is 'directly' on the issue must make climate change a major theme if not the sole theme of the speech. A theme is one of the two to four top issues highlighted and substantiated in the speech. A 'sustained' focus on the issue over time indicates that there are more than three speeches with climate change as a theme in a year.

³⁵ A regular focus on the issue indicates that there are more than three speeches with climate change as a theme in a year.

³⁶ 'Several' indicates that fewer than six reports from headquarters over the course of a year mention the new issue. A 'mention' in a report indicates that the new issue may be cited six or fewer times. For instance climate change is often mentioned in introductions and conclusions as a future threat and then not referred to again in the body of a report.

³⁷ A policy paper is a paper which explicitly establishes an organisational position on an issue. It is not a research report or technical paper.

³⁸ High-level strategic documents are strategy documents decided by senior leadership which establish the overall organisational priorities.

³⁹ A new position is created when a job title and terms of reference are established to perform a task that is focused on the new issue area. Part-time indicates that staff may be responsible (or a 'focal-point') for an issue but this is in addition to their routine activities and may only be temporary. Part-time responsibility will take-up less than a third of their office hours.

⁴⁰ 'Several staff' represents at least two staff and they must work on the issue for more than a third of their office hours.

⁴¹ A new 'department' indicates that a new organisational unit (or team) is created. This means that at least three people have been assigned full-time responsibility for an issue and work together on this. A significant number of new staff indicates that at least three new staff are hired.

⁴² Programmes may evolve to address a new issue area without an explicit organisational intention or strategy to do so. In this case we will see project evolution without a renaming of the project to reflect a

There are several important limitations to this index. Firstly, the indicators are not intended to suggest that organisational change can be evaluated with a high-level of precision. These numbers are interpretations of qualitative data and the coding scheme is designed to capture IGO responses to new issue areas. I have sought external control of my application of this coding scheme to the case study material. I have given academic experts on the three case-study IGOs data for each dimension of change (rhetoric, policy, structure and operations) and asked them to code according to the above matrix. The majority of scores they assigned for each IGO along the four dimensions were within 1 point of my scores, which strengthens the reliability of these indicators.⁴⁶

A second limitation is that all of the dimensions of change — rhetoric, policy, structure, and operations — are given the same weighting in the overall average of IGO change. Yet rhetoric change may be easier to initiate than major structural or operational change. Operational change is likely to have the most meaningful outcome for beneficiaries, although policy and rhetoric change could result in changing IGO operations and thus state actions. In the long-term structural change may be the most significant. By hiring new staff to work on an issue you may ‘lock-in’ rhetoric, policy and operational changes.

I have decided to make all dimensions equal in the overall average because the relative

focus on the new issue area. A hypothetical example of this: gradually UNHCR could increase the number of women staff working in protection to ensure women refugees have better access to protection but UNHCR does not call this as a ‘gender equity’ policy. These changes are hard for my organisational survey to identify as many changes may have an impact on climate change or the environment but if they are not explicitly listed it is hard to identify them without extensive fieldwork.

⁴³ A few means fewer than six projects, some of which may be pilot projects, in fewer than six national jurisdictions.

⁴⁴ Field programmes must be explicitly labeled as targeting the new issue area and these must occur over more than six national jurisdictions and thus there must be more than six projects.

⁴⁵ A significant number indicates that more than a dozen projects in over a dozen national jurisdictions have been established and explicitly labeled as targeting the new issue.

⁴⁶ Eight out of the twelve categories were scored within 1 point or less of my score.

worth and impact of each change varies across organisations. For instance, in a highly centralised organisation rhetorical change may have a much larger impact than in a decentralised organisation. The subjective nature of assessing the relative worth of each dimension across IGOs would make the scores more arbitrary.

I also use these indicators to measure change between a starting point and an end point. I measure change between 2000 ($t = 0$) and 2011 ($t = 11$ years). In each case study chapter I establish the baseline ($t = 0$) by discussing previous work on the environment and climate change in the 1990s.⁴⁷ A limitation of how I apply these indicators is that they do not inform us when and what change occurred over the period. An organisation could change its policy score from 2 to 8 in the space of a year in 2007 ($t = 7$) but in the following years it may not increase its policy output at all. The overall indicator for policy change would still be 8. The indicator would not inform us that this change occurred in 2007 nor if and how change fluctuated, unless we were to take measurements for each month or year. For these reasons the numerical indicators complement but do not substitute the detailed case study analysis of each organisation covered in chapters three, four and five.

Sources and Methods

To analyse IGO change at the rhetoric, policy, structural and operational levels I have drawn on a wide range of primary and secondary sources.

⁴⁷ Although there was some work on climate change mitigation in all three cases there was no explicit work on climate change adaptation, the focus of this study. Thus the baseline from which I measure change is the same across all IGOs.

Firstly, I have built on secondary literature of each IGO's history and evolution, which is detailed in the case studies. I also analysed all of the publicly available speeches, reports, policy papers, and executive committee proceedings relating to the issue of climate change in each of the three organisations.⁴⁸ Analysing these documents involved 1) identifying documents which mentioned climate change;⁴⁹ 2) examining if and how the organisation framed and justified its climate change work; 3) examining member states' support for climate change actions (in the case of executive reports) and 4) evaluating whether the document represented a qualitative change from previous statements, policies and reports. The documents dramatically varied in type: from four page policy papers to 150 page reports. It would have been problematic to compare them for the frequency of times they mentioned climate change or the strength of their justification for climate change action. There was thus no universal coding scheme used as it would have blurred important differences between reports rather than enabled me to identify the core documents and speeches in which rhetoric and policy evolved.

Secondly, I conducted semi-structured interviews with over 150 IGO officials, member-states and NGOs. These were conducted at: the UNFCCC negotiations in Copenhagen (2009); the UNHCR and IOM Headquarters in Geneva (March 2010); the UNDP

⁴⁸ The majority of these documents can be found on-line. UNDP's climate change publications are available here: UNDP, Climate Change: http://www.undp.org/climatechange/about_us.shtml accessed 13 September 2010). UNHCR's are available at: UNHCR, *Climate Change* <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e4a5096.html> accessed 10 February 2010. IOM, *Climate Change and Migration*, <http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/copenhagen-and-beyond> accessed 11 February 2010. I have also been given a number of documents from IGO staff that are not publicly available such as meeting agendas, mission reports and programme proposals. These are cited throughout this thesis when used.

⁴⁹ I focused on documents, speeches and programs that explicitly mentioned 'climate change'. There were a number of organisational activities that could be interpreted as climate change adaptation or mitigation but were not labeled as such and thus not included in the core analysis. Through participant observation and extensive fieldwork I realised that the boundary between climate change adaptation and sustainable livelihoods projects was often extremely blurred and ambiguous. This is discussed in the case study chapters.

Headquarters (October 2010); field operations in Kenya (March – April 2011); and the *Nansen Conference on Climate Change and Displacement* in Oslo (June 2011). I also had regular telephone and in-person interviews with government and UN officials to keep abreast of policy developments and gain insights into operational change globally.⁵⁰ These ongoing interviews have been critical as the climate change-development, climate change-displacement and climate change-migration policy areas are evolving fairly rapidly.⁵¹ The fieldwork carried out in Kenya at the operational level was particularly important to understand what these three IGOs are actually doing. The dominant focus of UNHCR, UNDP and IOM is delivering humanitarian, development, and migration services, respectively, to people in developing countries. A focus on debates at headquarters and international conferences offers insights into rhetoric and policy changes but would not uncover if and how these global changes are manifest in the delivery of assistance.

Kenya was selected as the ideal site for fieldwork as all three IGOs have a large presence and have initiated climate change projects there.⁵² Kenya is one of the world's most

⁵⁰ I interviewed representatives of IGOs, or partner agencies, in a number of countries including: Mozambique, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines and Rwanda. I also attended a week-long summer academy on *Climate Change and Displacement: New Institutional and Legal Frameworks*, in Munich 2010. This was attended by the IOM and UNHCR climate change focal points, as well as other academics and policy-makers working in this area.

⁵¹ In fact it was often apparent that staff did not know what others were doing in their organisation on climate change. Although this can happen in many large bureaucracies, regardless of the issue area, it appears that this is particularly true in new issue areas as the institutional structures to consult and monitor other departments' work are often not in place.

⁵² I do not argue that Kenya is a 'representative' field site location as there is no generic or typical field site in which these three IOs work. On the one hand, for instance, I could have selected a low-lying Pacific Island country such as Tuvalu or Kiribati – some of the countries worst-affected by climate change. However the UN and IOM do not have a large presence in the Pacific, their operations are not typical and the populations affected are extremely small. On the other hand, I could have focused on Bangladesh, which is badly affected by climate change, has a much larger population and a larger UN presence. However not all of my case study IOs were conducting climate change projects in Bangladesh.

drought-prone countries and thus a good site to analyse and understand how IGOs are responding to slow-onset climate change (UNDP 2007: 16). Many IGOs are seeking to pilot new climate change initiatives and all three case study IGOs have established climate change adaptation projects in Kenya.⁵³ At the UNFCCC summit in Copenhagen they all showcased their Kenyan projects: UNDP elaborated on their *African Adaptation Programme*; UNHCR highlighted that climate change was increasing displacement into Kenya; and IOM presented their adaptation work with Kenyan pastoralists.⁵⁴ Kenya also represents a ‘hard-case’ for UN agencies to justify expansion into environmental and climate change activities. Kenya is the global headquarters of UNEP and it has a large operational presence there.⁵⁵ UNEP carries out environmental activities in partnership with, and on behalf, of other IGOs. Thus we might expect non-environmental IGOs to partner with UNEP rather than expanding and developing new expertise in this area themselves. In sum, focusing on Kenya to study IGO operations is instructive as it illuminates if and how IGOs are beginning to respond to climate change.

I identified interview participants in Kenya, Geneva, New York and elsewhere according to their role in the three case study IGOs. I sought to interview those who worked specifically on climate change initiatives as well as senior managers with an overview of the organisation. I also interviewed diplomats that were involved in executive committee deliberations, in monitoring and/or funding IGOs. I talked with a range of staff from

⁵³ IOs pilot in Kenya as it is seen as relatively stable and democratic, compared to its neighbours, and with good infrastructure enabling access for monitoring and evaluation.

⁵⁴ Author’s observation of IGO presentations, side-events and from interviews with IGOs staff at UNFCCC, 2009, COP 15, Copenhagen, 7 – 18 December 2009.

⁵⁵ UNEP is supposedly only a policy and research agency but does carry out a number of operational activities on the ground in Kenya.

partner organisations – IGOs and NGOs – who worked with the case study IGOs on climate change. Participants were found through a combination of the ‘snowball’ effect and directly contacting embassies and organisations for interviews.

There were some gaps and limitations in my data collection. I was not able to formally interview current or previous heads of UNHCR, UNDP or IOM, except for James Speth (Administrator of UNDP 1993 – 1999).⁵⁶ My analysis of these leaders’ motivations and perceptions is based on discussions with staff who have had close interaction with them. Another limitation is that my interviews are temporally biased towards the latter few years of the period as I conducted the interviews between 2009 and 2012. I addressed this bias by talking with former staff from each IO.⁵⁷ My analysis of member state – IGO relations for earlier periods draws on executive committee reports and the institutional memory of staff present at post. There were no archives available to consult as all of the material is from the recent past.

My interviews were semi-structured and lasted between 40 minutes and 100 minutes. I had a core series of questions that I asked IGO representatives at headquarters and another for states. I asked IGOs to identify the key changes in policy, rhetoric, structure and operations and explain what the events were that led up to these changes. I asked member states if they were supportive of these organisational changes. Interviews were

⁵⁶Although I have met and had brief conversations with Lord Malloch Brown (former UNDP Administrator), Helen Clark (current UNDP Administrator) and Antonio Guterres (current UNHCR High Commissioner).

⁵⁷For instance I interviewed: UNHCR’s former deputy head of operations, former focal points for climate change; UNDP’s former director of the Human Development Report Office; and UNDP’s first climate change officer.

then tailored to suit the participants' expertise and experience. Interviews also contextualised primary and secondary literature, providing the institutional story of why and how the documents, speeches or programs were produced and thus the basis for process-tracing.

To deepen my analysis of organisational change I conducted participant observation at the various field site locations (Gusterson 2008). Participant observation is a process of collecting data by participating in and observing everyday life 'from the inside' and is rarely used in IR (Schwartzman 1993:25; Vrasti 2008).⁵⁸ I used participant observation as a method of data generation and contextualisation rather than seeking to create full organisational ethnographies.⁵⁹ At the UNFCCC I observed where, how and to whom each organisation presented its climate change agenda. In Kenya I spent ten days based in Kakuma and two days in the Dadaab refugee camps.⁶⁰ I visited project sites in the camps and in the surrounding areas, talked and shared meals and leisure time with IOM and UNHCR staff and, to a lesser extent, with beneficiaries in the refugee and host community. These site visits were crucial to understand if and how IGO operations were changing on the ground. In both Copenhagen and Kenya I kept a daily diary of my observations and these notes assisted me in understanding IGOs' operations. I sought rich detailed accounts of IGO change that went beyond formal interviews with bureaucrats and policy documentation, which are often the dominant data sources for IR scholars of

⁵⁸ Stephen Hopgood's ethnography of Amnesty International is an exception. Stephen Hopgood. 2006. *Keepers of the Flame, Understanding Amnesty International*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

⁵⁹ I initially considered conducting ethnographies of the three organisations to generate rich, context-specific accounts of IO change (Fox 1998; Hopgood 2006; Weaver 2008). However, it would have been difficult to gain sufficient access to all three organisations.

⁶⁰ I also attempted to visit UNDP activities but none of their climate change initiatives were fully operational outside of Nairobi. Most of their activities were aimed at national-level policy-makers.

IOs. I now turn to these alternative accounts of IGO change and illustrate how the theoretical framework presented here addresses their limitations.

Building on Existing Explanations of IGO Change

IR scholars have traditionally looked to member states to explain IGO behaviour. Neo-realists and neo-liberal institutionalists saw IGOs as collections of states with no autonomy, and thus no agency to act independently from their member states.⁶¹

However, more recent IR scholarship has drawn on principal-agent theory, resource dependency theory and sociological institutionalism to challenge this conception of IGOs, arguing that they do have autonomy (Barnett and Coleman 2005; Hawkins et al. 2006; Weaver 2007).⁶² Autonomy represents the ability of ‘an IGO to follow a particular course of action not dictated to it by its members’ (see Oestrich 2012: 25). Some degree of agency is essential if IGOs are to pursue a new issue-area without member state instruction. This section outlines the core tenets of principal-agent theory, resource

⁶¹ Neo-realists maintain that institutions have no power as they have neither military nor economic resources, independent of what states allocate them. Thus they have no causal impact on international relations because they have ‘no independent effect on state behaviour’ (Mearsheimer 1994: 43). Their principal role is to enable great powers to pursue their own preferences (Pease 2010). Neo-liberal institutionalists have offered strong critiques of neo-realism and argued that IGOs can broker international cooperation between states by reducing transaction costs, correcting information asymmetries, and promoting transparency (Keohane 1982). However, neo-liberal institutionalism, like neo-realism, is state-centric and does not assign agency or autonomy to international organisations. IGOs matter only in as much as they enable states to cooperate. However, I contend that IGOs have some autonomy and can thus be the instigators of organisational change.

⁶² Recent IR scholarship has argued that these theories offer the most useful accounts of IGO behaviour (see Biermann and Sibenhuener 2009; Pollack 2006: 194; Weaver 2007). There are also agent-based accounts of IGO change focus on the individual actor level and argue that the primary instigators of change are: the executive leadership (Cox 1969; Haack and Kille 2012), policy entrepreneurs (Oestrich 2007) and/or epistemic communities (Haas and Haas 1995). While all of these explanations may have strong explanatory power within an individual case, they are not easily generalisable.

dependency theory and sociological institutionalism and builds on these to enrich our understanding of IGO type and organisational change.⁶³

Principal-Agent Theory

Principal-agent theorists focus on the relationship between ‘principals’ – the states, and their ‘agents’ – the international organisations (Hawkins et al 2006; Nielson and Tierney 2003).⁶⁴ They propose that states delegate tasks to IGOs to perform on their behalf.

These agents offer specialised expertise and services which would be costly for any one principal to provide (Hawkins et al. 2006: 13). IGOs may also enable cooperation by: facilitating collective decision-making, resolving disputes, and enhancing credibility of decisions by locking in particular policies (Pollack 2003: 25; Hawkins et al. 2006:13).

Although states delegate IGOs a limited autonomy to perform these tasks, IGOs can only go so far beyond, or against, state interests as they will lose financial and political support.⁶⁵ Agents are ultimately constrained by principals.

In fact, a major focus for principal-agent theory is identifying how to ensure that agents do not stray far from principals’ interests (Nielson and Tierney 2007; Gutner 2005; Hawkins et al 2006). States seek to minimise ‘agency-slack’ which manifests as ‘shirking or ‘slippage’. Shirking occurs when an agent minimises the effort it exerts on the

⁶³ Several IR scholars have sought to integrate resource dependency theory and/or principal agent theory with sociological institutionalism (see Barnett and Coleman 2005; Luken 2009; Weaver 2008).

⁶⁴ There is a distinction in the principal-agent literature between collective and multiple principals (Lyne, Nielson and Tierney: 2006). Multiple principals mean there are a number of different parties, with different interests, who are simultaneously delegating to an agent. Collective principals indicate that there are many principals who delegate collectively to their agent.

⁶⁵ Autonomy is defined in principal-agent theory as a ‘range of potential independent action available to an agent after principal has established mechanisms of control’ (Hawkins et al. 2006: 8)

principal's behalf (Hawkins et al 2006). Slippage happens when an IGO does not perform its delegated tasks, and strays from principal preferences to pursue its own preferences (Nielson and Tierney 2003).

Why does agency slack occur? Principal-agent theorists generally assume that agents have divergent preferences from their principals (Gould 2006). They seek to maximise their budget, tasks and autonomy, as they are 'competence-maximisers' (Pollack 2003: 39). Principal-agent theory assumes that these interests are fixed and exogenous. Thus an IGO's primary preference, when faced with a new-issue area, will be to expand and engage with it.

However, agents' success at maximising their preferences and gaining autonomy depends on a number of factors. Scholars have highlighted the following: degree of discretion delegated, proximity of member state preferences, heterogeneous principal preferences, voting structures, asymmetry of information, costs of monitoring, and antinomic delegation.⁶⁶ Variation across IGOs in these factors would explain why one IGO may be able to seize a new issue area while another cannot. Let us then examine each of these explanations in turn.

Delegation varies from rules-based to discretion (Hawkins et al. 2006: 27). Rules-based delegation occurs when a principal instructs an agent in detail how to perform its

⁶⁶ Scholars differ on the relative importance of these factors. Cortell and Peterson, for instance, argue there are three necessary condition for IGO slack: discretion, voting rules and international staff (2006: 262). All three must be present for slack to occur, if only one or two then slack is unlikely. Pollack meanwhile focuses on the degree of discretion and principal's use of control mechanisms (2006).

allocated task.⁶⁷ Discretion exists if ‘IGOs have the authority to fulfill their mandate without the specific, prior approval of the members’ (Cortell and Peterson 2006: 258). Principals will delegate discretion to an agent to give them greater agency in policy-making. Some degree of discretion is necessary for agency slack, otherwise there is little possibility that an IGO will deviate from principal preferences.

Principals will often delegate discretion when an agent’s activities are considered peripheral to the principals (Oestrich 2007: 17). Meanwhile, discretion is less likely in an area that is proximate to member state interests, such as security. States, for example, have given the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) less autonomy than the World Health Organization (WHO) (Cortell and Peterson 2006: 259). States are also likely to delegate more authority when they are dissatisfied with the status quo, or there is a crisis, or if IGO staff preferences are similar to theirs (Martin 2006: 163 - 164). Finally, discretion is also chosen in technical, scientific and other areas of high complexity and/or inherent uncertainty when agent flexibility and expertise is valued (Hawkins et al. 2007: 27; Pollack 2003: 32).

In fact, specialisation is also a source of autonomy for IGOs (Martin 2006: 145). States delegate to IGOs for specialised expertise but this creates an information asymmetry making it difficult for states to effectively monitor and ensure compliance. The principal is always at a disadvantage as agents will know more about their budget, effort, and performance (Pollack 2003: 27). Agents can also hide information about their activities

⁶⁷ However, this reduces the IGO’s flexibility and also limits the states’ gains from specialization (Hawkins et al. 2006: 27).

and decrease the ability of the principal to monitor them – particularly in areas that are highly technical (Weaver 2007: 496). States thus face a trade-off: there are incentives to delegate authority to an IGO to perform complex tasks but such delegation may give them greater flexibility due to information asymmetries (Martin 2006: 146).

Delegation may also be dysfunctional, and/or unclear, enabling agents to interpret or reinterpret their mandate. Principals, for instance may delegate conflicting or complex tasks that are difficult to institutionalise and implement (Gutner 2005: 11). So called ‘antinomic delegation’ enables agency slippage as agents can use ambiguity over their delegated tasks to their advantage. Agents can also create more autonomy for themselves by reinterpreting their mandate (Hawkins and Jacoby 2006: 205). They will do this in such a way as to split collective principals and ensure that sanctions are not imposed. IGOs all have ‘collective principals’ - member states who delegate collectively via a board. In sum, principals may make ‘poor decisions’ or decisions that are difficult to implement and agents can use this to their advantage.

Principal heterogeneity is another source of agent autonomy. The greater the number of principals the more autonomy the agency will have (Hawkins et al. 2006: 7). Agents can play differences in preferences to their advantage and seek support from one principal to use as leverage against another. As member state preferences diverge IGO autonomy should increase because there is greater space for IGO staff to manoeuvre (Martin 2006: 164). Some IGOs may even have ‘multiple principals’ as they receive financing from: private organisations, other IGOs, and/or multilateral funds, in addition to member states

(Gould 2003; Lyne, Nielson and Tierney 2006). Agents with multiple principals are likely to have more autonomy than agents with principals who work through a collective contract. The greater the number of principals, the greater scope agents will have to play principal differences off against each other (Lyne, Nielson and Tierney 2006).

Voting structure in collective principals is another important indicator of IGO autonomy. Most IGOs are governed by a board of the member states who provide financing, stipulate the agency's mandate and approve changes in organisational strategy and goals. The board will establish voting rules to coordinate and aggregate preferences across member states. These rules may empower a few states to control and limit slack (concentrated) or disperse power across the board in the case of consensus decision-making (Cortell and Peterson 2006). There is thus a range of voting rules: consensus (where all states must agree such as in the WTO); super-majority (WHO); minority or committee control (the UN Security Council) and one state executing decisions for all (Cortell and Peterson 2006). Consensus decision-making rules offer IGOs the most autonomy as they require unanimity to impose sanctions – if one state is against punishing an IGO then no action will be taken (Pollack 2003: 44). Meanwhile, slack is minimised when voting structures privilege one or a minority of decision-makers. In this case, agents will 'anticipate the preferences of principals and the high probability of sanctions...and adjust their behaviour accordingly' (Cortell and Peterson 2006: 262).

Principals can use a number of control mechanisms to ensure states do not engage in agency slack. As previously mentioned, they may simply delegate no (or very little)

discretion to the agent (Pollack 2003: 27). They may also monitor and enforce reporting requirements through ‘police patrols’ or ‘fire alarm’ oversights (Pollack 2003: 42; Nielson and Tierney 2003). ‘Police patrols’ involve active monitoring of IGO behaviour with the aim of detecting violations of legislative goals. Meanwhile ‘fire alarms’ rely on third parties (such as interest groups and citizens) to monitor agencies. States may establish institutional checks or sanction on IGOs by controlling the budget, staff appointments, and overriding agency behaviour through new legislation (Pollack 2003: 27 & 43). These control mechanisms enable principals to ensure compliance with their preferences, but may be costly to implement. States face a trade-off between the costs of monitoring and perceived agency losses. A principal may find monitoring an agent too costly and/or be ineffective at controlling an agent (Park and Weaver 2010). Thus an agent will gain greater slack if its principals decide not to – or cannot – effectively control it.

The underlying assumption that runs through all of these explanations is that agent and principal preferences diverge. Agents will maximise whatever opportunities they have to increase their tasks and scope (Gould 2006). They follow a logic of consequences, making decisions based on a rational cost-benefit analysis. If organisational change will lead to greater autonomy and financing then they will expand. Yet few principal-agent scholars have outlined if and how IGOs develop preferences independent of their member states. They focus on exogenous factors to explain agency slack, and thus ignore variation within IGOs which may account for variation in agent preferences and agency slack.

An exception is Cortell and Peterson (2006) who argue that IGOs will develop independent preferences only if they are staffed by international, professional bureaucrats. Staff who share a common professional identity, will be loyal to their IGO (rather than member states) as they depend on it for their job security and promotion. Independent professional bureaucrats will be dedicated to the ‘knowledge of problem-based aspects of the IGO’s mission’ and will thus create ‘epistemic communities’ and may even develop a ‘logic of appropriateness’ (Cortell and Peterson 2006: 260). In fact, IGO staff may decide not to pursue expansion if it risks undermining the organisation, even if all the exogenous conditions for agency-slack are present.

Staff are likely to be very aware of their dependency on states for resources and thus will avoid advocating policies or programmes that might jeopardise their relationship with states. They may ‘restrain themselves and advocate preferences in line with their principals if they think it will keep their organization alive’ (Cortell and Peterson 2006: 261). Equally, they may be wary of behaviour that might ‘tarnish their reputation’ or undermine the legitimacy of their organisation’s mission (Cortell and Peterson 2006: 261 & 279).⁶⁸ Although, Cortell and Peterson’s account of IGO preferences is distinct and a novel contribution to principal-agent theory, it fails to specify when IGOs will follow a logic of appropriateness.

⁶⁸ They cite a WHO official as an example: ‘If we allow ourselves to be lured astray into fields beyond our constitutional competence I am afraid we will find ourselves in the those very minefields that we have been trying to avoid in the interest first and foremost of the health of the deprived peoples living in the Third World’ (in Cortell and Peterson 2006: 267).

Furthermore, principal-agent theory does not tell generally investigate agent preferences but assumes they are given. Yet as we have seen, agents may not always take advantage of agency slack. Principal-agent theory needs to understand when and how they will use their autonomy and deviate from principal preferences (Gould 2006: 283 & 310). Thus this research contributes to an important gap in the principal-agent literature: how do we understand what IGO preferences are and when they will pursue them?

Resource Dependency Theory

Resource dependency theory argues that organisations are reliant on their external environment for survival. The key to IGO survival 'is the ability to acquire and maintain resources' (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978: 2). There are two important mechanisms which underlie this approach. Firstly, organisations must meet the needs of those individuals, groups and organisations that provide its resources, hence the name 'resource dependency theory' (Scott 2000). These may be donor states, as well as other multilateral institutions and competitor organisations. Secondly, senior managers and organisational leaders will attempt to manage and shape external dependencies to ensure organisational survival. When possible they will acquire more autonomy and freedom from external constraint (Pfeffer 1982: 193). Like principal-agent theorists these scholars view organisations' primary preferences as survival and increased autonomy.

Problems arise for organisations 'not merely because organisations are dependent on their environment, but because the environment is not dependable' (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978: 3). Environments change as new organisations exit and enter and resources become more

or less accessible. Organisations have to decide whether to adapt their activities to these changing circumstances or face the prospect of not surviving (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). To survive, an organisation has to maintain a coalition of external actors who will contribute resources and support to carry out activities, activities which must be deemed necessary by the supporters.

However, organisational environments are not objective realities. They are created by organisations through a process of interpretation as organisations gather, screen and retain information relevant to them (Pfeffer 1982: 193). How an organisation learns and responds to its environment influences its subsequent actions. Senior managers must decide, for instance, how to juggle competing demands from different interest groups as they seek to build sufficient support and acquire resources. Although the organisation is defined by the external actors who provide it resources, there is scope for IGO agency (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978).

Resource dependency theory was developed with the private sector in mind and IR scholars have argued that it may also explain IGO change (Barnett and Coleman 2005; Weaver 2008). IGOs, like firms, have to seek funding and other resources to pursue their activities. They look to a wide range of sources for funding from: member-states, multilateral institutions and the private sector (Gould 2003). Furthermore, IGOs operate in a competitive market place. Organisational security is thus an important factor in explaining organisational expansion (Barnett and Coleman 2005). IGOs with secure finances are unlikely to expand into a new issue-areas, whereas those in an insecure

position, or facing dramatic changes in their support base, are more likely to pursue new activities in which funding is available. IGOs may also seek to shape and influence their environment and create new coalitions of support and opportunities for funding. In short, resource dependency theory supports a conception of IGOs as resource maximisers that follow a logic of consequences. Expansion or a change in organisational activities is determined by the support and resources an IGO can muster in the market-place.

Sociological Institutionalism

Meanwhile, sociological institutionalism focuses on how social rules, expectations, norms and values pressure organisations to change and conform, rather than examining patterns of external dependencies (resource dependency theory) or rational decisions of principals (principal-agent theory). In particular it emphasises that organisations are socially constituted and their organisational behaviour is driven by inherited tradition, culture and custom (Aldrich 1999: 72). Organisations must ‘signal conformity with societal norms and rules to obtain legitimacy necessary to demonstrate social worthiness and mobilise resources’ (Weaver 2008: 26 - 27). This theoretical approach, which grew out of sociology and emerged in constructivist IR, explains why we might expect organisations to follow a logic of appropriateness.⁶⁹

Essentially, sociological institutionalists see a ‘logic of appropriateness as the fundamental logic of political action’ (March and Olsen 1989: 38). Organisational change is a function of rules and an organisation’s interpretation of these rules and their role,

⁶⁹ For more on sociological institutionalism see DiMaggio and Powell 1984; March and Olsen 1983; Pfeffer 1982.

rather than reflecting changes in the external environment (March and Olsen 1989: 169). Action is most often based on 'identifying the normatively appropriate behaviour rather than calculating the return expected from alternative choices' (March and Olsen 1989: 22). This is particularly true when organisations face novel and politically important scenarios (March and Olsen 1989: 38). Individuals in organisations will decide on a course of action based on their interpretation of existing norms and rules, rather than rationally calculating the cost-benefit return expected from their choices. Thus expansion will occur if IGOs perceive that they should play a role in the new issue-area.

Sociological institutionalists emphasise the role of internal dynamics, and in particular organisational culture, in determining organisational behaviour. Organisational culture is a fairly stable set of taken-for-granted assumptions, shared beliefs, norms and expectations that form a back-drop for action (Scott 2000: 318). It evolves from a need to create 'standard operating procedures and shared understandings' about how to work in a complex environment (Weaver 2007: 498). Schein, one of the founding scholars of organisational culture, argues that organisational culture exists on three levels: basic underlying assumptions (the implicit beliefs, perceptions and thoughts which guide behaviour and tell groups members how to perceive, think and behave); espoused values (the social principles, goals and philosophies which are acted upon); artifacts (the visible and tangible behaviours and process which are what one sees and hears when one encounters a new group) (Schein 1992). Organisational identity, defined as what is 'core, enduring, and distinctive about an organisation', is a sub-set of this broader organisational culture (Whetten and Godfrey 1998: 21). Organisational identity is

important as it represents the role an organisation perceives it should have: some may conceive of themselves as fulfilling normative tasks and others not (Schein 1992).

Organisational culture varies in strength, as well as content. Organisations with 'strong' cultures have firmly embedded the underlying belief-systems through socialisation, training and incentive systems (Weaver 2008: 37; Schein 1992). They also tend to have a homogenous, stable staff membership who have worked in the organisation for some time and thus internalised the underlying norms (Schein 1992). These embedded and relatively stable norms and rules enable staff to decide how to respond to new challenges and identify which policies are acceptable for their organisation to carry out and which are not (Scott 2003: 319; Weaver 2008: 37).

Organisational culture enables group decisions by creating a common language and defining criteria for staff selection and the distribution of power and status (Schein 1992). These underlying assumptions permeate the language and conceptual categories staff use to communicate with and understand each other (Schein's 'artifacts'). Certain words or concepts may have great resonance within the organisation and link directly to its core identity. In addition, organisational culture will define criteria for inclusion in the organisation as well as promotion. As 'one moves further in, one becomes privy to some of the more secret assumptions of the group' (Schein 1992). Individuals who are perceived to understand and internalise the organisational culture are more likely to be hired, retained and appointed to senior management roles. The attributes, skill-sets and

philosophies of staff, particularly those in leadership positions, are an important feature of organisational culture and it is they who will directly respond to a new issue.

Constructivist IR scholars have applied this argument to IGOs arguing that bureaucratic organisational culture shapes IGO behaviour (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: Oestrich 2007). In particular, Barnett and Finnemore have claimed that IGOs will tend to expand in both size and scope as they ‘try to square their rationalised abstractions of reality with facts on the ground’ (2004: 44). According to them, ‘conscientious bureaucrats very quickly recognise that to accomplish a great many ambitious social tasks they need to reach outside the narrow compartments in which we place them’ (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; see also Haas and Haas 1995: 257).⁷⁰ Importantly, they add that staff ‘will be more receptive to new goals and more active in implementing them when they believe that these goals flow logically from the organisation’s own expert knowledge’ than if they come from outside or are perceived to be tangential (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 64 - 65). They highlight a pivotal connection between organisational culture and the organisational response: organisational expansion depends on whether the new issue resonates with the existing culture and identity of an organisation.

Organisations may have multiple cultures, entrenched within various sub-units. The differentiation of tasks in organisations and the reliance and valuing of diverse knowledge may lead to ‘distinctively different beliefs’ (Aldrich 1999: 153). These sub-groups may become the primary sources of identification for staff and relations with the

⁷⁰ The phenomena whereby issues ‘no longer stay in tightly sealed compartments’, which leads to increasing IGO scope, is described as ‘issue non-decomposability’ (Hass and Haas 1995: 257).

larger organisation, or other sub-groups, may become problematic if there is a clash in underlying-belief systems and norms. In this scenario organisations may face dilemmas over how to respond to new issues: some sections of the organisation may be supportive while others are not. Organisational change is thus determined by inter-group conflict (Aldrich 1999: 154). Organisational sub-groups may seek to lobby the senior management and the broader organisation for their perspectives. As staff alliances change, organisational change occurs. We might expect this sort of dynamic to occur more powerfully in hybrid organisations which have a normatively driven sub-unit alongside a functionally-orientated sub-unit.

Sociological institutionalism offers an important explanation for why normative organisations may be more likely to follow a logic of appropriateness but functional will not. Firstly, this perspective suggests normative organisations will have a stronger organisational culture than functional. Normative IGOs are established with a clear underlying mission and identity – their supervisory role over a regime of law – whereas functional organisations are projectised organisations. Furthermore, normative organisations embed this culture through the selection and socialisation of staff in their normative mandate. Their staff are likely to be wedded and loyal to their underlying mission (be it labour rights or humanitarian principles of refugee protection) whereas functional organisations are more likely to select staff for particular skill-sets. Furthermore, functional organisations tend to hire staff on shorter and fixed-term contracts, have higher-staff turn-over and thus a weaker and less embedded organisational culture.

Secondly, sociological institutionalism posits that a strong, unitary organisational culture may inhibit reform or expansion, unless the change resonates with the organisational culture. Staff will not conceive of expansion into unrelated issues – as their core identity and underlying beliefs are so well internalised and embedded. Even if some staff do promote organisational expansion there is likely to be resistance from others who will have been selected to protect and promote the organisation's mission. This explains why normative organisations, which are more likely to have a strong organisational culture, will only support organisational expansion if and when they can see a clear issue-linkage to their mandate.

Functional organisations, on the other hand, will pursue expansion regardless of whether the issue relates to the organisation's mission. This is in part because their organisational culture is weaker – and staff have not internalised an overarching normative role they should play. Furthermore, their organisational identity is based on a logic of consequences, not a logic of appropriateness, and so staff will pursue organisational change if their primary resource providers ('principals') will support it. Finally, change in hybrid organisations, which may have two or more organisational cultures, will depend on the constellation and strength of contending sub-units. If a normatively inclined sub-unit has more organisational sway the organisation may follow a logic of appropriateness; if a functional unit has greater influence then the logic of consequences may dominate.

In summary, the typology of IGOs detailed in this chapter builds upon and adds to existing explanations of IO behaviour. Resource dependency theory, principal agent theory and sociological institutionalism offer IR useful starting points to explain how IGO will respond to new issue areas. Our understanding of IGOs as rational-resource maximisers operating within the constraints of the principal-agent framework underpins the conception of functional IGOs. Meanwhile sociological institutionalism enriches our understanding of normative IGOs: they are driven by a logic of appropriateness and change is restrained, or enabled, by organisational culture.

IGO type does not displace these theories but add to them by determining when each logic will operate. Normative IGOs may still be limited by member states, as a principal agent theorist would hypothesise. However, we would not expect a normative IGO to expand even if all the factors for agency-slack are fulfilled, unless the new issue resonates with the underlying organisational mission and identity. Similarly, organisational culture and identity may shape the response of a functional IGO. However, this culture will not prescribe a normative role for the agency and thus expansion will occur regardless of the issue-linkage strength. IGO type is a critical feature of organisations which both sociological institutionalism and principal agent should take into account.

Conclusion

This chapter has outlined a new conceptual framework for understanding IGO expansion based on issue status and IGO type. I argue that IGOs will expand when faced with high status issues (high global and linkage salience) which are outside their core mandate. I then suggested that IGOs will respond differently depending on if they are functional, hybrid or normative. Normative IGOs have a supervisory role over hard law, and from this derive moral legitimacy and follow a logic of appropriateness. Functional IGOs do not have a supervisory status over hard law and instead have pragmatic legitimacy which means they follow a logic of consequences. Hybrid IGOs are a blend of the two ideal-types and display both types of legitimacy and behavioural logics. As a result of these divergent behavioural logics, I proposed that functional IGOs will respond to new issue areas which have high global salience, regardless of their linkage salience. Normative IGOs, meanwhile, will respond to issues with high linkage salience regardless of their global salience. Hybrid IGOs will respond to issues with either high linkage or global salience (or both).

In the second section, I proposed that IGO change (the dependent variable) is a sum of rhetoric, policy, structure and operational change. I outlined a numerical index to assess change along these four dimensions. In the third section I outlined how principal agent theory, resource dependency theory and sociological institutionalism would account for IGO change by focusing on the degree of agency slack, the external environment and organisational culture respectively. I argued that each of these explanations provides an important but partial account of how IGOs will respond to new issue areas. Building on

the insights of these theories I developed a unique theoretical framework based on IGO type and issue status. The hypotheses presented here will be examined in the following chapters. The next chapter focuses on the evolving issue status of climate change and examines when IGOs participated in the climate change regime, highlighting evidence for hypotheses one and two. It is followed by three case study chapters on: UNHCR, IOM and UNDP, which examine hypotheses three and four.

Chapter Two

The Issue Status of Climate Change

Climate change was the cause célèbre of 2009. Trade unions and businesses, indigenous peoples and youth groups were engaged and active in the two-year lead-up to and at the UNFCCC summit at Copenhagen.¹ However climate change was not always such a prominent global issue. This chapter builds on the preceding chapter's argument that IGOs will engage with issues when they are high status. It traces the evolution of climate change's global salience and then its linkage salience to the development and migration regimes. This chapter argues that as climate change evolved from a low to a high status issue, there was an increased likelihood that IGOs would respond.

The chapter is structured into three main parts. The first section examines the global salience of climate change. It identifies the 2006 – 2011 period as one of high global salience as heads of government made climate change a top priority at international meetings. The second section demonstrates how the high global salience of climate change correlated with an increase in IGO participation at the UNFCCC. Through a

¹ The author was present at the 2009 UNFCCC in Copenhagen and had access to the Bella Center where negotiations were held.

large-N analysis of IGO attendance it highlights the increase in IGOs at the UNFCCC between 2007 and 2011. The third section focuses on the issue linkages forged between climate change and development, and between climate change and migration. It pinpoints moments of high linkage salience, as NGOs, civil society and other organisations promoted the causal connections between climate change and the development and migration regimes.

The Global Salience of Climate Change

This section provides an overview of climate change's global salience at the international level. It examines the emergence of climate change as a scientific issue in the early 19th century through to its political ascendancy in the late 20th and early 21st century. It identifies the 2006 – 2011 as a period of high global salience. Heads of government met on a regular and sustained basis at the international level and made climate change a top global priority, the criteria for high global salience. This section focuses on the G7/8 leaders summits as primary indicators of the changing salience of climate change. It complements this analysis with a broad examination of the global political and civil society attention to climate change.

Low Global Salience (1900 – 2006)

Scientific study and recognition of climatic changes began in the 19th century, while theories of human-induced climate change became strongly supported in the scientific community the mid to late 20th century. The first scientific study of climate change dates to a Swiss examination of glaciers in the 1820s (Paterson 1996: 17). It found that the

glaciers were receding and that there had been major climatic changes, such as ice ages, centuries ago (Hulme 2009). This study was followed by a series of scientific studies. In 1859 John Tyndall proved the 'Greenhouse effect' by demonstrating that gases have different absorption capacities. In 1908 Swedish scientist Svante Arrhenius proposed that humans, through industrialisation, could affect climate change (Paterson 1996: 20). In 1938 British scientist Guy Stewart Callendar also found that the increasing concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere was linked to the increase in world temperature (Hulme 2009). However other scientists did not take these results seriously, doubting that carbon dioxide levels had increased. It was only in the 1950s and 1960s that scientists began modeling carbon dioxide levels in Antarctica and Hawaii and found further evidence of anthropogenic climate change (Hulme 2009; Paterson 1996: 22).

The emergence of the modern environmental movement in the 1960s, marked by the publication of the *Silent Spring* by Rachel Carson, bolstered scientific claims of anthropogenic climate change. Environmental NGOs gained prominence and presented scientific evidence of climate change (Paterson 1996: 24). The Conservation Foundation, a UK based NGO, for example, hosted a conference of scientists in 1963, which issued the first dangerous warning of climate change (Cain 1983). In 1972 the first *United Nations Conference on the Human Environment* was held at Stockholm. Climate impacts were 'central concerns' of the conference (Cain 1983: 82). The conference led to a series of UN-sponsored conferences on climate change related issues such as: food (1974), water (1976) and desertification (1977) and the creation of UNEP (Paterson 1996: 25). However, it did not directly instigate further inter-governmental work on climate change.

It was not until the late 1980s that climate change became a major international political issue.² In 1988 the first intergovernmental conference on climate change was held in Toronto and attended by scientists and politicians.³ The *World Conference on the Changing Atmosphere* found that ‘humanity is conducting an unintended, uncontrolled, globally pervasive experiment whose ultimate consequences could be second only to nuclear war’ (Bulkeley and Newell 2010: 20). The conference recommended a twenty percent reduction in carbon dioxide emissions by 2005 and the establishment of an inter-governmental scientific body to monitor the issue: the *International Panel on Climate Change* (IPCC) (Bulkeley and Newell 2010: 20). The initial task set for the IPCC was to ‘prepare a comprehensive review and recommendations with respect to the state of knowledge of the science of climate change; social and economic impact of climate change, possible response strategies and elements for inclusion in a possible future international convention on climate’.⁴ The IPCC reports — the work of thousands of scientists who wrote and peer reviewed each other’s work — became the global authority on climate change.

1988 was a pivotal year: world leaders and legislators began to take notice of climate change. The US Senate held a hearing on climate change to which James Hansen (a scientist for the National Atmospheric and Space Administration) gave evidence on the

² The politicisation of climate change was supported by a strengthening scientific consensus that carbon dioxide levels were increasing and this was leading to an increase in global mean temperatures (Patterson 1996: 29). The Villach Conference in Austria (1985) for instance endorsed this.

³ There had been a previous international scientific conference on climate change, the World Climate Conference in 1979, however this was not attended by states.

⁴ See: IPCC, http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization_history.shtml viewed 25 October 2011.

dangers of global warming (Patterson 1996: 30). British Prime Minister Margret Thatcher made a speech to the Royal Society in London where she drew attention to climate change (Hulme 2009: 65). She maintained that ‘it is possible that we have unwittingly begun a massive experiment with the system of this planet itself’ (Hulme 2009: 65). Also in 1988 the Soviet Foreign Minister, Eduard Schevardnadze, called for action on climate change in a speech to the UN General Assembly and President Bush pledged during his election campaign to hold a global conference on climate change at the White House (Patterson 1996: 35). Climate change’s global salience increased as heads of government, ministers and legislators of the world’s largest economies commented on the problem.

Then in 1989 the Group of Seven (G7), the Non-Aligned Countries Meeting and the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting all stated that global warming was one of the major world problems (Patterson 1996: 37). Across these summits there was a common demand for an international framework convention to address climate change by limiting national emissions. The ‘green’ G7 summit in Paris called for a ‘framework or umbrella convention’ to urgently limit carbon emissions.⁵ Meanwhile the Commonwealth meeting urged for ‘the early conclusion of an international convention to protect and conserve the global climate’ (Commonwealth Heads of Governments 1989).⁶ Climate change met many of the core criteria for high global salience: heads of government were meeting frequently to discuss the issue.

⁵ ‘The first green summit’. *The Economist*, Issue 7611, London, England, Saturday, July 15, 1989: 14.

⁶ *Commonwealth Heads of Government*. 1989. *Commonwealth Heads of Government Langkawi Declaration on the Environment*, Issued by, Malaysia. Langkawi, 21 October 1989, available at www.thecommonwealth.org/document/34293/35468/171730/1989_langkawi_declaration_on_the_environment.htm accessed 12 January 2012

However climate change was not conceptualised as a top global priority by heads of government during this period, and thus did not reach high global salience. Rather, climate change was conceived by heads of government as a subset of environmental issues. At the time states were preparing for the Earth Summit at Rio de Janeiro in 1992, the largest global environmental meeting since the Stockholm Conference in 1972. They were concerned by a number of environmental problems from biodiversity, to the ozone hole; from pollution, to climate change, which is reflected in the communiqués of the G7/G8 during this period. In 1988, the G7 communiqué argued for ‘further action’ on ‘global climate change, air, sea and fresh water pollution, acid rain, hazardous substances, deforestation, and endangered species’.⁷ This communiqué was the first G7 communiqués to have a focused section on the environment, and thus signals the start of the environment’s high global salience. However, there was no section on climate change in the 1980s or for most of the 1990s.⁸ Climate change was not considered a stand-alone priority area.

Alongside the growing salience of the environment and climate change two new institutions began to monitor and address climate change. In 1990 the IPCC published its first report outlining the scientific evidence for anthropogenic climate change and

⁷ Climate change was first mentioned in a G7 communiqué in 1987. The Communiqué stated that ‘We underlie our own responsibility to encourage efforts to tackle effectively environmental problems of worldwide impact such as stratospheric ozone depletion, climate change, acid rains, endangered species, hazardous substances, air and water pollution, and destruction of tropical forests’. G7. 1987. *G7 Leaders Summit - Communiqué*, Venice Italy, 10 June 1987.

⁸ There was one exception to this: the 1997 G7 communiqué dedicated a section to climate change for the first time. However in the subsequent five leaders meetings there was no climate change section. Climate change was subsumed in the communiqué under issues such as: sustainable development (1998); protection of the environment (1999); the human genome (2000); and a legacy for the future (2001) and often only mentioned briefly.

predicting a future of unprecedented global warming.⁹ At the Rio Conference on the Environment and Development in 1992 states opened for signature the *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change* (UNFCCC) (Hulme 2009). The UNFCCC aimed to stabilise green house gas ‘concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous interference with the climate system’ (Bulkeley and Newell 2010: 20). The initial goal was to stabilise emissions at 1990 levels by 2000 and the UNFCCC became the forum where states negotiated how to reach this target. The first Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC was held in Berlin in 1995 and state parties agreed that industrialised states would need to make binding commitments to reduce emissions. The UNFCCC institutionalised debates about climate change and subsequent G7 meetings emphasised that members would ‘work with others to fulfill our existing obligations under the climate change convention’.¹⁰

The UNFCCC became the dominant forum through which states engaged with climate change and staked out positions vis-à-vis emissions reductions. There is a growing body of literature that examines: the evolution of states’ positions at the annual Conference of the Party negotiations (COPs); the formation of coalitions predominantly along North-South lines and negotiations over the agreement (Barnett 2008; Depledge 2008; Roberts 2011). By 1997 more than 150 countries agreed to sign the Kyoto Protocol which binds industrialised states (‘annex one’) to reduce green house gas emissions. The Protocol took a further four years to be operationalised and in 2000 UNFCCC negotiations collapsed over major disagreements between the US and EU. Then in 2001, the new US

⁹ See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 1990. *Climate Change: The IPCC Scientific Assessment* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

¹⁰ G7. 1995. *Leaders Summit - Communiqué*, Halifax, Canada, 17 June 1995.

President, George W. Bush, announced he would withdraw the US from the Kyoto Protocol, which President Clinton had previously signed (Busby 2010). The absence of the world's largest economy and emitter jeopardised an agreement, however other states continued to negotiate and in 2001 finalised the Kyoto Protocol.¹¹ The UNFCCC meetings focused almost exclusively on mitigation from its inception to the early 2000s.

A transnational advocacy movement emerged alongside the UNFCCC to lobby states to ratify and implement the Kyoto Protocol (Busby 2010; Newell 2000). Green political parties, NGOs and civil society groups around the globe mobilised and lobbied their governments to commit to binding emissions reductions and implement policies to decrease energy consumption (Busby 2010; Newell 2000). In 1989 *Climate Action Network*, the first and one of the most important international climate change advocacy networks, was established. The Climate Action Network includes over 287 NGOs which seek to influence the climate change negotiations and policies at the national and international levels.¹² This transnational advocacy movement grew over the course of the 1990s and 2000s as environmentalists focused on climate change as the most urgent and important global environmental issue (Busby 2010).

High Global Salience (2006 – 2011)

In the 2000s heads of government made climate change a top global priority outside the UNFCCC at economic and security forums. It was first mentioned at a G20 meeting in

¹¹ The Kyoto Protocol only came into law because the EU was able to successfully convince Russia to sign and ratify the treaty in 2005, in exchange for supporting Russia's World Trade Organization membership bid.

¹² See the Climate Action Network, <http://www.climatenetwork.org/> accessed 27 October 2011.

2000 where finance ministers and central bank governors ‘promised to collectively tackle broad environmental concerns, which included climate change’.¹³ In 2005 climate change was one of the top agenda items at the G8 summit agenda in Gleneagles. The UK, chairs of the summit, invited five ‘emerging’ states (Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa) to attend. They formed a new group G8+5 to build an agreement on climate change and issued a separate statement, the Gleneagles Plan of Action ‘setting out our common purpose in tackling climate change’.¹⁴ The communiqué stated that ‘all of us agreed that climate change is happening now...and resolved to take urgent action to meet the challenges we face’.¹⁵ Subsequent meetings of the G7/G8 continued this focus on climate change.¹⁶ Thus by 2006 G7 annual leaders summit had made climate change a top priority, an indicator of high global salience of the issue.

However, there was not a single clear, decisive moment that climate change took on high global salience: the transition began in 2005, gained momentum in 2006 and was consolidated by 2007. Alongside high-level heads of government meetings, there was also a wider public awareness of climate change. This was partly instigated by former US Vice-President’s documentary movie *An Inconvenient Truth* released in May 2006. The film presented the scientific evidence of human induced climate change, showed shocking footage of a future of floods and sea-level rise and urged people to take action

¹³ Caroline Bracht. 2010. *G20 Climate Governance: From Toronto to Seoul, Analysis*, G20 Information Center, University of Toronto, available at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/analysis/g20climategov-101110.html> accessed 27 October 2010.

¹⁴ G8 Chair. 2005. *Chair's Summary*, Gleneagles, 8 July, 2005.

<http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/2005gleneagles/summary.html> accessed 9 July 2012.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ The 2007 G8 meeting at Heiligendamm, Germany was also particularly important in emphasising that ‘urgent and concerted action is needed’ and states agreed to ‘accept our responsibility to show leadership in tackling climate change’. G8, *Chair's Summary*, Heiligendamm, <http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/2007heiligendamm/index.html> accessed 9 July 2012.

and join the transnational movement. It took the world by storm, winning many awards including an Oscar in 2007 for 'Best Documentary Feature' and catalysed a broader support base for action on climate change. Gore, a former US Vice-President, was also able to communicate this message to senior politicians and decision-makers.

The urgent message of *An Inconvenient Truth* was strengthened by the publication of the Stern Review in October 2006 and the 4th IPCC report in February 2007. Gordon Brown, UK Chancellor, commissioned Lord Nicholas Stern, a prominent economist, to write a report on the costs of climate change. The report made a strong case for immediate emissions reductions on the basis that the short-term costs of mitigation would be significantly less than the long-term costs of inaction.¹⁷ The report had a major international impact as it was the first report commissioned by a government to make an economic case for emissions reductions and Lord Stern, backed by the UK government, disseminated this message widely in late 2006 and 2007. The Stern Review effectively shifted climate change from being a purely environmental issue to an issue of economic concern.

In addition, the fourth IPCC report, released in February 2007, built a compelling and strong scientific case for anthropogenic climate change, stating that the 'Warming of the climate system is unequivocal'.¹⁸ The importance of this report and Gore's film was highlighted when the IPCC and Gore were jointly awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2007

¹⁷ Nicholas Stern. 2006. *The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press and Cabinet Office, HM Treasury.

¹⁸ See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007, *Climate Change 2007: The IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4)* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

for their ‘efforts to build up and disseminate greater knowledge about man-made climate change, and to lay the foundations for the measures that are needed to counteract such change’.¹⁹

Finally, the UK successfully campaigned for the UN Security Council to debate climate change in April 2007.²⁰ A record number of states spoke during this meeting —fifty-five states; forty non-members — and outlined the urgency of addressing climate change.²¹ Thus by 2007 both the world’s premier economic and security forum had made climate change an explicit top priority, singled out and above other environmental issues.²²

Climate change’s high global salience was also manifested by the level of interest of the public and heads of government in the issue. Media coverage and attention to the issue was intense, particularly in the lead-up to and during the UNFCCC Summit in 2009 at Copenhagen (Jinnah 2011). The Kyoto Protocol first commitment period ended in 2012 and negotiators had set a deadline of December 2009 to develop a new framework.

Copenhagen was billed as the stage where a new international framework, binding states to emissions targets, would be forged. The transnational advocacy movement grew

¹⁹ IPCC, ‘History’, http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization_history.shtml accessed 27 October 2011.

²⁰ This was somewhat controversial as the Security Council traditionally debates conflicts between states rather than potential causes of global security.

²¹ See the Chair’s final comments: United Nations. 2007. *UN Security Council 5663rd Meeting*, S/pv.5663, United Nations: New York, Tues 17 April 2007. There was no Security Council resolution from this meeting. A coalition of Pacific Island states lobbied unsuccessfully for the Security Council to discuss climate change again in 2008.

²² In addition, at the 2007 APEC summit in Sydney heads of government made a declaration on *Climate Change, Energy Security and Clean Development* and agreed to an ‘APEC-wide regional aspirational goal of a reduction in energy intensity of at least 25 per cent by 2030 (with 2005 as the base year)’. See the full text of the statement: The Sydney Morning Herald. 2007. *Sydney Declaration on Climate Change and Energy*, 9 September 2007, Sydney Australia, <http://www.smh.com.au/news/apec/bthe-declarationb/2007/09/09/1189276526002.html> viewed 27 October 2011.

dramatically in the lead-up to Copenhagen and an increasing number of prominent scientists and experts spoke out on the urgency of reducing emissions.

However, Copenhagen failed to produce a concrete agreement between states on emissions reductions despite the presence of heads of government of almost every country around the world.²³ The widespread perception that Copenhagen was a failure meant that climate change decreased somewhat in global salience in 2010 and 2011. Furthermore states began preparing for the Rio+ 20 Earth Summit, to be held in 2012, and climate change was subsumed once again in some forums as a subset of the ‘green economy’ and/or ‘sustainable development’. Yet, climate change can still be coded as ‘high global salience’ in 2010 and 2011 as it continued to be a major theme of discussion in the G8 and also the G20²⁴ with significant sections of the final chair’s summaries dedicated to it.²⁵

In summary, this section has demonstrated how climate change emerged as a scientific issue in the 19th century, became a political issue in the second half of the 20th, and then

²³ President Obama declared an agreement had been reached to US media before the UNFCCC had made any such agreement. Diplomats at the UNFCCC then spent all of the final evening into the early mornings of Saturday negotiating. They finally emerged with an agreement that was not ‘endorsed’ but which parties were invited to ‘take note of’.

²⁴ The G20 held its first heads of government meeting in 2008 during the global financial crisis and included G8 members plus a number of emerging economies such as: Brazil; China; India; South Korea; South Africa and Turkey. The 2011 G20 communiqué in Paris had a section entitled ‘improving energy markets and pursuing the fight against climate change’ and members stated that ‘We are committed to the success of the upcoming Durban Conference on Climate Change and support South Africa as the incoming President of the Conference’. G20. 2011. *G20 Leaders Summit - Final Communiqué*, Cannes, 3-4 November 2011, <http://www.g20-g8.com/g8-g20/g20/english/for-the-press/news-releases/g20-leaders-summit-final-communique.1554.html> accessed 2 July 2012.

²⁵ For example the 2011 G8 summit had a section on climate change and biodiversity which stated that ‘Tackling climate change is a global priority’. G8. 2011. *Declaration: Renewed Commitment for Freedom and Democracy*, Deauville, May 26 – 27, 2011, <http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/2011deauville/2011-declaration-en.html#climate> accessed on 3 July 2012.

reached high global salience between 2006 and 2011. During this time prime ministers and presidents, often responding to transnational advocacy networks, made climate change a cause célèbre.²⁶ This period constituted a window of opportunity for a host of new actors to engage with the issue.

IGO Attendance at the UNFCCC


In parallel to the evolution of climate change's global salience there was a correlated increase in the number of IGOs attending the UNFCCC. Attendance at the UNFCCC is a good proxy measure for IGO engagement with climate change.²⁷ Firstly, by sending a delegate to the UNFCCC an IGO is investing staff, time and resources. Secondly, most IGOs that attend the UNFCCC present at side-events and/or host an information booth to brief delegates of their IGO's climate change related work. An IGO leader may make a high-level speech on the issue and in preparation an IGO may have developed a policy paper. Attendance is thus likely to represent some policy development and rhetoric change.

²⁶ Although states had very different interpretations of where the negotiations should go. Some sought to move negotiations forward and identify emissions reduction targets while others such as Saudi Arabia to obstruct the negotiations (Depledge 2008).

²⁷ The data used in this section is compiled from the UNFCCC lists of participants. The UNFCCC distinguishes between attendees that are: i) 'parties and observer states'; ii) UN secretariat units and bodies, iii) UN specialised agencies and related organisations (such as the World Bank); iv) Inter-governmental Organisations (that are not UN related) and v) Non-governmental Organisations. In the graphs below I have summarised the total number of IGOs (categories ii; iii and iv). I am unaware of any other large-N analysis of IGO participation at the COPs. For analysis of NGOs at the UNFCCC see Cabré 2011. The list of attendees can be found on the UNFCCC website:


<http://unfccc.int/documentation/documents/items/3595.php#beg> accessed 26 March 2012. Note that these are lists of people and organisations that register to attend and not actual attendees; the UN does not have data on the latter.

Graph One: IGO attendance at the UNFCCC (1995 – 2011)



The graph indicates an increase in the overall attendance of IGOs at UNFCCC COPs particularly when climate change had high global salience (2006 – 2011). The two most significant increases in total numbers of IGOs are at COP13 (2007) and COP15 (2009). There is a slight decrease in attendance at COP16 (2010), reflecting disillusionment with the UNFCCC after Copenhagen, and then a small increase at COP17 (2011). This graph supports the overall argument that more IGOs engaged with climate change when the issue had high global salience (2006 – 2011). An alternative measure is the total number of IGO delegates (individuals rather than organisations) to the UNFCCC COPs which is documented in the graph below.

Graph Two: IGO delegates at the UNFCCC (1995 – 2011)



This graph follows a similar trend to the previous graph. Firstly, the total number of IGO delegates attending the UNFCCC COPs has increased over time. Secondly, the two largest increases in IGO delegates were in 2007 and 2009. In 2007 at COP 13 (Bali) there was also a more than two-fold increase (841). There was a slight decrease in 2008 and then a significant increase at COP 15 (Copenhagen), which had the largest number of IGOs (1434) attending. Thus this graph also supports the argument that an increase in global salience between 2007 and 2011 led to an overall increase in IGO engagement with the climate change regime. The fluctuations in IGO engagement are more pronounced in graph two than in graph one as the total number of delegates is much higher than the number of IGOs.

These two graphs offer a summary of the overall trends in IGO engagement with the UNFCCC. However, they do not separate IGOs with a mandate to work on climate change from those that do not. I have coded the UNFCCC attendance lists to distinguish between four different types of IGOs: climate change; development; representative bodies and other. The ‘climate change’ category includes all IGOs with some mandate to be present at the UNFCCC. This encompasses a number of IGOs: environmental (UNEP; South Pacific Environment Programme) energy (International Energy Agency; Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries), scientific bodies (the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization), and IGOs with a very broad, non-issue specific, mandate (the UN; United Nations University). The ‘representative bodies’ category covers organisations such as the Commonwealth secretariat; the Organization of American States and the League of Arab States.


The ‘development’ and ‘other’ categories are of most interest to this analysis. They represent IGOs from other regimes that have no explicit climate change mandate.

‘Development’ IGOs consist of: the UN economic commissions (Economic Commission for Latin America); development banks (Asian Development Bank; African Development Bank) as well as UN development agencies (UNIDO; UNDP) and the World Bank.

Finally the ‘other’ category is the broadest, and includes IGOs from a range of sectors including: humanitarian (World Food Programme and IFRC); health (World Health Organization); trade (World Trade Organization); labour (ILO); migration (IOM); refugee (UNHCR); human rights (OHCHR); communications (International

Telecommunications union); intellectual property (World Intellectual Property Organization) and tourism (World Tourism Organization).

**Graph three: IGO attendance at the UNFCCC by issue area
(1995 -2011)**



Graph three demonstrates how the number of ‘development’ and ‘other’ IGOs increased significantly as the global salience of climate change increased (2007 – 2009). During the period of low global salience (1995 – 2005) the total number of ‘other’ IGOs was less than four at any given UNFCCC summit; much less than any other category. Then between 2007 and 2009 the number of ‘other’ IGOs increased four-fold. It then plateaued in 2010 and 2011 and was the only category not to decrease after 2009. This graph

supports the argument that IGOs will seek to forge issue linkages (or ‘bandwagon’) with issues which have high global salience (Jinnah 2011; Wapner 2011).

The number of ‘development’ IGOs also increased markedly in the 2006 – 2009 period. There were already a number of ‘development’ IGOs attending the first ten UNFCCC summits (1995 – 2004). This suggests that there was a relatively strong issue linkage between climate change and development already in the 1990s, which will be examined in the following section. A steady increase in development IGOs began in 2006, earlier than the ‘other’ category. This will also be discussed in the subsequent section. Overall, the increasing number of ‘development’ and ‘other’ IGOs correlates with changes in global salience.

There are some limitations to these proxy measures of IGO engagement with climate change. These graphs do not inform us how much or what has changed within each organisation. Further analysis is needed to identify if periods of high IGO engagement with climate change regime correlate with periods of high organisational change in IGOs. For instance, does the 2006 – 2011 period correspond to an increase in IGO speeches and policy papers on climate change? Alternatively, did periods of low engagement with the UNFCCC correlate with low change in IGOs? Alternative indicators of IGO engagement with climate change include: frequency of policy papers or speeches on climate change; creation of new teams or units. However, identifying these changes for a large-N analysis of IGOs would be challenging as there is no readily available data and thus

requires significant primary and secondary research.²⁸ Instead I examine three IGOs responses to climate change in-depth in the subsequent three chapters.

The Linkage Salience of Climate Change

Alongside the increasing global salience of climate change the issue also became more connected to a broad range of regimes. High linkage salience occurs when there is a strong (widely supported and highly visible) substantive issue linkage between two distinct areas or regimes (such as climate change and conflict; or trade and environment). As outlined in chapter one, the more widely accepted an issue linkage is the stronger it is, and correspondingly the stronger the relative salience is between the two issues areas. This section investigates linkage salience between climate change and development, and climate change and migration, using four measures of linkage salience. These measures are: number of NGOs and IGOs elaborating policy or advocacy material about an issue linkage; citations and circulation of (policy and academic) literature substantiating the issue linkage; presence of inter-agency working groups dedicated to the issue; and senior politicians endorsing the link. I argue that a range of organisations sought to establish issue linkages between climate change and development; and climate change and migration to legitimate their presence at the UNFCCC and involvement in the climate regime.²⁹

²⁸ It would have been informative to also investigate patterns in IGO attendance at the UNFCCC by IGO type (functional; hybrid or normative). However, such a large-N analysis is difficult as IGO type is determined by IGOs constituent documents, subsequent changes. Categorising more than 100 IGOs would take a significant amount of primary fieldwork beyond the scope of this study.

²⁹ This behaviour has also been called 'band-wagoning' (Axelrod 2011; Jinnah 2011; Nicolson and Chong 2011 and Wapner 2011).

Climate Change and Development

The connection between development and climate change is embedded in the UNFCCC regime. Since the 1972 Stockholm conference global environmental issues and development have been intertwined. Developing countries have argued that environmental protection cannot come over and above their development (Sandeep 2011). The strength of the development-climate change linkage is reflected in the high number of ‘development’ IGOs at the UNFCCC between 1995 – 2005 in the graph above. However, it is important to distinguish between three distinct substantive linkages between climate change and development: a) development causes climate change; b) sustainable development can mitigate climate change; and c) adaptation is (sustainable) development. These substantive-issue linkages emerged at different times, endorsed by different actors, and have strongly influenced and framed discussions within the climate regime. For the purposes of this thesis it is the last substantive linkage that is most relevant and will be covered in most depth. I focus on if and how IGOs have developed climate change adaptation initiatives, not mitigation activities. I will examine the first two linkages briefly before concentrating on the evolution of ‘adaptation as development’.

Development Causes Climate Change

The core argument underlying the UNFCCC is that industrialisation causes climate change. The issue linkage is scientific: the shift from an agriculturally-based economy to one dependent on carbon-intensive manufacturing industries has led to a large increase in carbon emissions, which has led to an increase in global mean temperatures (Patterson

1996). Although this has been contested by a number of ‘climate change deniers’, we can state with a high degree of certainty (based on the IPCC reports) that the process of development and industrialisation in the global north has led to global warming.³⁰ This thesis does not contest that climate change is anthropogenic but is interested in the politicisation and framing of this issue linkage.

The notion that development has caused climate change framed the Kyoto Protocol and subsequent negotiations for a post-Kyoto framework. The Kyoto Protocol set out binding targets for developed states only (also known as Annex 1). Developing states did not have to make emissions reductions. The fundamental argument for this division in burden-sharing is that the industrialisation of the global north led to an increase in carbon emissions and resulted in anthropogenic global warming (Hulme 2009; Patterson 1996). Meanwhile most developing countries had not industrialised (or not until relatively recently, and to a much lesser extent), had extremely low carbon emissions and so did not have the same obligation to reduce their emissions.

The debate shifted in the mid-2000s as ‘emerging’ economies (such as China, India and Brazil) developed large industrial sectors and their carbon emissions increased (Hulme 2009). The Global North, led in particular by the US, argued that emerging economies should also commit to reducing their emissions in a future global agreement on

³⁰ I will not explore their arguments here as they have been given ample examination and dealt with elsewhere. Furthermore, the exact relationship between industrialisation, increasing carbon emissions and global warming is an ongoing matter of scientific debate and study. However what many mainstream commentators ignore is that science is never ‘settled’. The process of scientific inquiry involves testing and refining all ‘facts’, even Einstein’s theory of relativity is being tested and reworked. For the purposes of this thesis it is sufficient to say there is a strong substantive issue linkage between development and climate change. For more on the nature of scientific inquiry and the politicisation of science in the climate change debate see Hulme 2009.

mitigation. Meanwhile the coalition of G77 + China continued to argue that climate change was a result of industrialisation over centuries in the Global North and thus the North should shoulder the largest responsibility for binding emissions cuts.³¹ In short, the notion that development causes climate change is a fundamental and strong issue linkage that the UNFCCC negotiations are premised on and explains the high number of ‘development’ IGOs at the UNFCCC in the 1995 – 2005 period. There was high linkage salience between development and climate change and thus development IGOs engaged with climate change.

Sustainable Development Mitigates Climate Change

If development can cause climate change, then sustainable development should mitigate it. Sustainable development entails reducing - or at least minimising emissions - that we would otherwise see under ‘business as usual scenarios’ (Klein 2009). On this basis developed and developing states should utilise renewable energy, promote sustainable industries and public transport. This issue linkage, was based on a new norm of ‘sustainable development’, coined in 1987 by the Brundtland report (also known as the Report of the *World Commission on Environment and Development*).³² The report defined sustainable development as: ‘development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ (Brundtland 1987). Essentially, development was seen to have had social and

³¹ States’ positions in the UNFCCC are more diverse than I have space to describe here. For instance, some developing states, such as the Maldives, agreed to make emissions reductions.

³² The report was the work of the World Commission on Environment and Development which had been established by the UN General Assembly to address ‘growing concern about the accelerating deterioration of the human environment and natural resources and the consequences of that deterioration for economic and social development’. See UN General Assembly. 1987. 96th Plenary meeting, *Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development*, A/RES/42/187, 11 December 1987.

environmental costs, such as carbon emissions, pollution, resource depletion. In contrast, sustainable development could promote economic growth that was not at the expense of the environment.³³

The link between climate change mitigation and sustainable development was made at the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro. The conference declared that ‘In order to achieve sustainable development, environmental protection shall constitute an integral part of the development process and cannot be considered in isolation from it’.³⁴ In addition, at Rio states endorsed a new environmental fund, the Global Environmental Fund (GEF) to finance environmental projects in developing countries (Young 2002). The GEF focused on four key areas: biodiversity, climate change, international waters and ozone depletion (inorganic pollutants). The World Bank, UNDP and UNEP, had drafted the GEF constitution and were the only agencies with access to its funds. The GEF led to a dramatic increase and expansion of environmental activities in the Bank and UNDP (Young 2002). Thus by the mid-1990s there was a strong issue linkage between sustainable development and mitigation of climate change. Furthermore the Bank and UNDP, the two largest development agencies, had exclusive access to a multilateral fund to mitigate climate change. The account of how and why UNDP engaged with climate change mitigation activities is linked directly to the establishment of the GEF in the 1990s, and will be

³³ In the 1990s development actors, in particular IGOs, NGOs and donors, sought to position their work as sustainable development. A large body of academic and policy literature also developed to define, illustrate and elaborate the concept, see: Carley and Christie 1992; Elliot 1994 and Kirby, O’Keefe and Timerlake (eds) 1995.

³⁴ Article three of the *Rio Declaration on Environment and Development*, available online at <http://habitat.igc.org/agenda21/rio-dec.htm>. The conference also established a global action plan for sustainable development (*Agenda 21*). See Agenda 21, <http://habitat.igc.org/agenda21/a21-02.htm> accessed 24 March 2012.

discussed in chapter five.

Adaptation-Development Issue linkage

Low Linkage Salience (1990 – 2005)

In the 1990s and early 2000s the dominant focus of the UNFCCC, scientists and activists was on stopping climate change through mitigation — reductions in green house emissions (Persson et al 2008: 6). Hence the focus on the two issue linkages described above: development leads to climate change and sustainable development mitigates climate change. Adaptation — preparing for and dealing with the impacts of climate change — was not a focus for the IPCC or the UNFCCC (Klein 2000).³⁵ Many feared that a focus on adaptation would weaken states' willingness to reduce emissions and undermine mitigation efforts (Klein 2000: 116). Although adaptation was mentioned in the original UNFCCC text, it was not until 2000 that the IPCC held a workshop explicitly focused on adaptation and then published a chapter on the issue.³⁶ Meanwhile the Kyoto Protocol (adopted in 1997 and ratified in 2005) mentioned adaptation but did not define

³⁵ Although the first IPCC report (1990) mentioned adaptation it was a marginal issue that received little attention. In the first ten years the IPCC did not devote a single chapter of their reports to adaptation to climate change (Klein 2000: 115). Adaptation was defined by the IPCC in 1990 as 'measures to reduce the impact of global climate change' (IPCC 1990: 58) and primarily conceived as a technical activity such as engineering sea walls to protect against sea-level rise. In the fourth IPCC report adaptation was defined as an 'adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities' (2006). It was primarily a technical response to a specific climate change impact or vulnerability in a particular place (Moore 2010). See Klein 2000 for a more detailed account of why the IPCC did not focus on adaptation. He argues it was because preventionists and adaptationists prevailed within the scientific community. Adaptationists argue that both natural and human systems have a long history of adapting naturally to changing circumstances and that active adaptation would constitute interference with these systems, bringing with it high social costs. (Klein 2000: 116).

³⁶ The 1992 UNFCCC convention, urged developed countries to assist 'developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change in meeting costs of adaptation to those adverse effects' (Article 4.4). The UNFCCC agreement also called for cooperation in 'preparing for adaptation to the impacts of climate change; develop and elaborate appropriate and integrated plans for coastal zone management, water resources and agriculture, and for the protection and rehabilitation of areas, particularly in Africa, affected by drought and desertification, as well as floods (Article 4.1)'.

adaptation measures nor did it identify which countries were particularly vulnerable (Klein 2009: 38). The overwhelming focus of the UNFCCC and the IPCC was mitigation during the 1990s.

This began to change in 2000 at the 6th UNFCCC COP. As the negotiations over Kyoto became difficult, the EU agreed to establish an annual climate change fund of \$15 million to target adaptation as well as mitigation. Subsequently at the next COP in Marrakech in 2001 three multilateral funds were established: the *Special Climate Change Fund*, based on voluntary donations to facilitate technology transfer from developed to developing states; the *Least Developed Countries Fund* for least developed countries to develop National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPA); and the *Adaptation Fund* which was financed by a two percent levy on the *Clean Development Mechanism*. Although all three finance adaptation, the Adaptation Fund is the only multilateral fund that focuses solely on it.³⁷ The establishment of these three climate funds signaled that adaptation had become an important global response to climate change. Following this some donor states, such as the UK, Japan and Norway, established their own bilateral funds for adaptation and mitigation.³⁸

³⁷ The Adaptation Fund is relatively small on global terms. The Adaptation Fund secretariat estimates it will have a total of US \$ 262 – 344 million available between September 2011 and December 2012. Adaptation Fund. 2011. *Financial Status of the Adaptation Fund Trust Fund, as of 30 September 2011*, Report AFB/EFC.7/6, 18 November 2011. Prepared for the Adaptation Fund Board, Ethics and Finance Committee, Seventh Meeting, Durban, 12 December, 2011, available at <http://www.adaptation-fund.org/content/financial-status-adaptation-fund-trust-fund> accessed 30 November 2011.

³⁸ However the current literature on ‘climate aid’ suggests that ‘vast majority’ of climate financing goes to mitigation. Dr. Timmons Roberts has conducted the largest and most comprehensive study of climate aid and found that adaptation was 1/34th as much as mitigation (Roberts 2008: 5). See his database of climate financing at www.aiddata.org, accessed 20 November 2011.

However, the development-adaptation linkage was complicated by a disconnect between the politics of the UNFCCC and the operationalisation of development assistance. The climate funds were established on a ‘climate justice’ premise: the global north had an obligation to pay for adaptation as its industrialisation process had led to climate change (Arnold 2011; Hulme 2009). All climate assistance had to be additional to development assistance. The underlying implication of this political stance was that adaptation and development were distinct and could be easily separated out in operational terms. Yet in practice, adaptation and development are deeply interconnected, and this is increasingly recognised in the academic and policy literature in the following years.³⁹

High Linkage Salience (2006 – 2011)

The 2007 IPCC fourth report marked a significant shift: no longer was climate change a future problem but it was here now. Global warming was predicted to have adverse affects on everything from rural livelihoods (crops may no longer grow in some areas as rain frequency and temperatures changes) to the spread of disease (malaria mosquitoes will inhabit a much larger area) (IPCC 2006). Increased extreme weather events from floods to droughts could undermine development programmes and be an obstacle to achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (Fankhauser and Schmidt-Traub 2011). The IPCC report emphasised that developing states were the most ‘vulnerable’ to climate change due to their lack of financial or technological resources (IPCC 2006).⁴⁰

³⁹ A number of interview participants mentioned this, in particular UNDP staff.

⁴⁰ A comparison of the Netherlands and Bangladesh, two low-lying states which are largely dependent on agricultural production, illustrates this. The Netherlands has a much greater capacity than Bangladesh to adapt because of its economic resources and technical skills (Paterson 1996: 11).

Development agencies looked to include adaptation activities and ‘climate proof’ their development activities (Gupta 2009).

Adaptation was institutionalised as a top priority issue within the UNFCCC between 2006 and 2011. The ‘African’ COP in Nairobi 2006 began this shift. African states saw adaptation as a top priority and argued that they were amongst the most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change (Okereke et al. 2006). At Nairobi states finalised the *Nairobi Work Programme on Adaptation*, a five-year plan of work to support climate adaptation which sought to: enhance information exchange and capacity to identify vulnerability and implement effective adaptation responses (Nairobi Work Programme Overview 2007: 1; Kuloovesi et al. 2007: 1). Then at Bali in 2007 states established the *Bali Action Plan* which ‘attached equal importance’ to mitigation and adaptation (Persson et al 2008: 7). In particular, it called for ‘Enhanced action on adaptation, including consideration of: i) ... the urgent and immediate needs of developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change’ (Bali Action Plan 2007). The Bali Action Plan set out the framework and priorities for the two-year lead-up to the negotiations in Copenhagen. Adaptation featured strongly in the deliberations of the Ad-Hoc working group on Long-Term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA).⁴¹

From 2006 onwards development NGOs began to publish major reports on climate change adaptation. They were part of a global transnational movement demanding ‘climate justice’ or compensation for the emissions released over the centuries by developed states. From 2006 Oxfam, for instance, published more than six reports annually advocating for adaptation funding, in addition to current overseas development

⁴¹ See the UNFCCC adaptation website <http://unfccc.int/adaptation/items/4159.php>, accessed 22 June 2010.

assistance. CARE, Oxfam, UNEP, World Health Organization (WHO) and the IFRC established the Global Humanitarian Fund in 2007 to examine the impact of climate change on people.⁴² They published a major report – *The Anatomy of a Silent Crisis* – immediately before the UNFCCC summit in 2009. Donors also sought expertise on adaptation. The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation hired leading adaptation academics to write reports (Eriksen et al. 2007). In short, adaptation was widely recognised as an important issue within the UNFCCC and by the leading development agencies and donors by 2007.

In support of this policy literature, an academic literature emerged examining the connections between vulnerability, adaptation and development (Dessai 2009; Eriksen and Lind 2009; Vincent 2007). Individual vulnerability to climate change was predicated on factors such as class, ethnicity, age and gender. Development targeted the marginalised and addressed vulnerabilities of the most disadvantaged and was thus closely interlinked with adaptation.⁴³ As Moore explains: ‘Because adaptive capacity might be conceivably limited by any factor of development, almost any development project could be reframed as an adaptation project’ (2010: 76). Other academics argued that although development and adaptation activities overlapped there was a continuum from: ‘adaptation as development’ to ‘adaptation as technical solution to specific impact’. Thus adaptation activities include mainstream development work such as diversifying

⁴² The organisation closed in 2010 due to a lack of funding. See Global Humanitarian Fund, <http://www.ghf-ge.org/> accessed 27 April 2012.

⁴³ Richard Klein, one of the leading academic experts on adaptation, established a new journal in 2009 entitled *Climate Change and Development* to investigate the linkage between climate change adaptation and development. In his inaugural introduction he emphasised that climate research and development studies have ‘their own separate history and tradition. Yet the connections between climate and development can no longer be ignored’ (Klein 2009: 3).

livelihoods to ‘confronting climate change’ by reducing specific risks of flooding, drought or sea-level rise (Person 2006).

Adaptation continued to be a core part of the UNFCCC negotiations at Poznan (2008), Copenhagen (2009), Cancun (2010) and Durban (2011). While discussions of binding emissions targets stalled, delegates established another new funding mechanism for adaptation and mitigation. At Poznan states agreed on principles of a dedicated fund to assist developing states with the impacts of climate change. A crucial criterion was that this funding had to be additional to current development spending as developing states argued that development assistance should not be diverted.⁴⁴ At Copenhagen many developed countries collectively pledged US\$30 billion for a ‘fast track’ fund for the 2010 - 2012 period. They also outlined intentions to mobilise US\$100 billion by 2020 (Copenhagen Accord 2009: 3).⁴⁵ At Cancun and Durban the architecture of the new 2020 climate fund was developed. These funds provided a significant incentive for development, humanitarian and other actors to be engaged in the climate change regime – if they could prove their work constituted ‘adaptation’.

The broadening of the UNFCCC’s focus to include adaptation opened the door for a range of non-environmental IGOs to become involved in the climate change regime.

There was a strong incentive for engagement – given the opportunity for new funding –

⁴⁴ Although there is no consensus over what constituted ‘additional’ funding. See Jessica Brown, Neil Bird and Liane Schalatek. 2010. ‘Climate Finance Additionality: emerging definitions and their implications’ *Climate Finance Policy Brief, No.2*, June 2010, Overseas Development Institute: London.

⁴⁵ The \$100 billion in additional funding is supposed to come from a range of sources including: the private sector, carbon markets and states. See: UN, *Report of the Secretary-General’s High-Level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing*, 5 November 2010, United Nations: New York.

and there was no IGO with a mandated responsibility for adaptation. UN agencies competed to be the ‘lead’ adaptation agency at UN inter-agency meetings (namely the High Level Committee on Programmes and the Chief Executives Board).⁴⁶ However, the Secretary General explicitly decided not to nominate a lead agency and instead enable any UN agency to proclaim it could ‘do adaptation’.⁴⁷ Furthermore, adaptation was interpreted as a flexible, broad concept which encompassed everything from sustainable development to humanitarian relief to reproductive health rights (Moore 2010).⁴⁸ Some policy-makers argued it was a vague concept, and one Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) staff member claimed that ‘No one is a specialist in adaptation, no one knows what it is’.⁴⁹ The malleability of adaptation — a vague policy term rather than robust academic concept — facilitated the establishment of a wide range of new issue linkages.⁵⁰ The term could be adapted and adopted to suit any interest. Development agencies have been particularly active in advocating a discourse of ‘adaptation as development’ to legitimate why they are the most relevant and expert actors on adaptation (Moore 2010). The chapter on UNDP will examine how one agency has elaborated, presented and at times instrumentalised this issue linkage.

⁴⁶ Interview with senior policy advisor Chief Executives Board, UN Secretariat, 15 October 2010, New York.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Moore argues that the conception of adaptation was also stretched by various development and humanitarian organisations as well as academics who pointed out that vulnerability to climate change was part of a wider set of vulnerabilities to social, economic and/or political forces (see O’Brien et al. 2004; O’Brien 2007). Adaptation became decontextualised and universalised and ‘you could talk about adaptation’, rather than ‘adaptation to a specific impact, in a specific place’ (Moore 2010: 69 - 70).

⁴⁹ Interview with senior OCHA representative working on climate change, 19 March 2010, Geneva.

⁵⁰ For the same critique of the malleability of ‘sustainability’ (see Cohen et al. 1998: 353 and Cohen et al. 1998). There are a number of definitions of adaptation in the literature (see Eriksen et al 2011: 9).

In summary, the linkage between adaptation and development has existed since the establishment of the UNFCCC in the 1990s. However the first decade of UNFCCC negotiations focused almost exclusively on mitigation and adaptation was not prioritised. This changed in the 2000s as developing countries demanded adaptation funding to deal with the immediate and future impacts of climate change. From 2006 onwards this call for adaptation assistance was backed by the fourth IPCC report and a broad transnational ‘climate justice’ movement which included major development INGOs and IGOs. Policy and academic literature during this period emphasised the overlap between adaptation and development activities, even though these issues were separated for political reasons in the UNFCCC negotiations. There was a transition period of low to high linkage salience from 2005 to 2006, as there was for low to high global salience. For the purposes of this analysis we can state that there was a strong issue linkage (and thus high linkage salience) between climate change adaptation and development from 2006 onwards due to the level of advocacy, academic and policy attention to the issue. The evolution of the global salience of climate change and the linkage salience of climate change to development is summarised in the table below.

Table Six: Climate Change Adaptation and Development

	Low linkage salience	High linkage salience
Low global salience	2000 – 2005	-----
High global salience	-----	2006 – 2011

Climate Change and Migration

This section examines the linkages between climate change and migration and also encompasses the development of linkages between: climate change and displacement; and climate change and refugees. There is a significant distinction between refugees, displaced peoples and migrants. Refugees are essentially people who are forced to flee across international borders and meet states' legal criteria for refugeehood, which is based on a 'well-founded fear of persecution'.⁵¹ Displaced people are a broader category of persons. They are those forced to move due to any reason – persecution and/or natural disaster related - and may be internally displaced as well as internationally.⁵² Finally,

⁵¹ Note that states have established and use a number of definitions to determine refugee status. The most longstanding and well-established is the definition of International *Convention relating to the Status of Refugees*, Art. 1A(2), 1951 as modified by the 1967 Protocol. The 1969 Organisation of African Unity (OAU) adds that a refugee is also any person compelled to leave his or her country 'owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country or origin or nationality'. *1989 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa*, Article 1 (2), Addis Ababa, 10 September 1969. The 1984 Cartagena Declaration also includes persons who flee their country 'because their lives, security or freedom have been threatened by generalised violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violations of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order'. *Cartagena Declaration on Refugees*, 22 November 1984, Cartagena de Indias (3).

⁵² The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement defines IDPs as 'Persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a

migrant represents the broadest category. The UN statistical division defines an international migrant as ‘any person who changes his or her country of usual residence’.⁵³ This definition includes all individuals irrespective of the causes, voluntary or involuntary, and the means irregular or irregular, used to migrate.⁵⁴ These categories mark important differences which are entrenched in migration and refugee law and the institutional separation of IOM and UNHCR. Despite these differences it makes sense to examine the climate change-migration; climate change-displacement and climate change-refugees issue linkages collectively as they relate to overlapping academic debates, policy actors and rotate around the central question: does climate change cause people to move?

Low Linkage Salience (1970 – 2007)

An explicit substantive issue linkage between environmental change and refugees was first widely publicised in the 1970s. Lester Brown of the World Watch Institute argued severe environmental change may force people to move, and thus become ‘environmental refugees’ (Morrissey 2009). The term was picked up in other policy literature and entered into common usage in a 1985 UNEP Policy paper by Essam El-Hinnawi (Morrissey 2009). However, it was not until 1988 that a World Watch Institute Paper

result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalised violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognised State border. UN, *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement*, UN Doc E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2.

⁵³ UN Statistical Division 1997 recommendations quoted in IOM, *Identifying international migrants*, available at <http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/about-migration/developing-migration-policy/identify-intl-migrants> accessed 11 September 2012.

⁵⁴ Note that the UN and IOM tend to adopt a narrower definition of migrants, to focus on ‘long-term’ international migrants. This is ‘a person who moves to a country other than that of his or her usual residence for a period of at least a year’. IOM, *Identifying International Migrants*, available at <http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/about-migration/developing-migration-policy/identify-intl-migrants> accessed 11 September 2012.

claimed that climate change, rather than environmental change, could generate ‘environmental refugees’ and offered an estimate of the numbers.

The first International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report in 1990 endorsed a causal link between climate change and displacement. The report predicted that the greatest single consequence of climate change could be displacement of refugees, ‘with millions of people displaced by shoreline erosion, coastal flooding and severe drought’ (IPCC 1990a: 5 - 10).⁵⁵ It argued that ‘environmental refugees, people displaced by degradation of land, flooding or drought are becoming a much larger factor in many developing countries’ and that even a ‘modest rise in global sea-levels could produce tens of millions of such refugees’ (1990: 5-10). The first IPCC report took an alarmist view: climate change would cause millions to move and for this reason governments needed to act urgently.

This claim was supported by the work of Norman Meyers, an environmental scientist, who published two cornerstone articles in the 1990s, which influenced the framing of this issue for the next two decades. In an article in *BioScience* he claimed that a ‘large number of environmental refugees could be among the most significant of all upheavals’ caused by climate change (Meyers 1993: 752). He argued that there were already 10 million environmental refugees and there would be another 150 million in 2050 due to climate change (1993). He later increased this estimate to 250 million (1997). His claims and these figures became the foundation of the ‘maximalist’ perspective and have been

⁵⁵ The International Panel on Climate Change. 1990. *Climate Change the IPCC Impacts Assessment Report*. Australian Government Publishing Service: Canberra.

repeatedly cited in subsequent academic and policy literature on climate change and displacement.

On the other hand ‘minimalists’ scholars problematised the issue linkage arguing that there was not a linear, deterministic causal link between climate change and displacement (Black 2001; Morrissey 2009; Surhke 1994). They critiqued Meyers’ work for its problematic assumptions, flawed methodology, incorrect use of the term refugee and negative stereotypes of refugees (Betts 2010; Black 2001; McAdam 2009). They highlighted that numbers of so-called ‘environmental refugees’ were a rough estimate which he arrived at by examining the impact of predicted sea-level rise on populations living in coastal areas and then estimating the projected future population living in those areas (such as the population of coastal Bangladesh) assuming that all affected populations would have to move. All of these figures were based on very rough estimates – of sea-level rise, population growth – and did not take into account the multiple reasons why people might migrate and do so before environmental conditions become dire. Yet even in the most extreme cases not all people move. In fact, it is often the most vulnerable that are left behind – such was the case with Hurricane Katrina. Minimalists argued that migration is a multi-causal, complex phenomena and you cannot separate out climate change – or environmental change – as a distinct driver of migration except in very extreme cases (Brown 2008; Gemène 2009; Morrissey 2009; Zetter 2009).⁵⁶

⁵⁶ Migrants move because of a range of interconnected social, political and economic factors (Black 2001). In addition, some argued that it was problematic to analytically separate the environment from society as a causal factor of migration as ‘perceptions of nature are socially embedded’ (Betts 2010: 7). A key claim was that the relationship between the environment – let alone climate change – and human mobility was ‘inherently ambiguous’ (Betts 2010: 7)

Furthermore, Meyers presented refugees in an extremely negative light: they constituted a security threat and brought crime, civil disorder, social upheaval, and violence of many sorts as well as huge financial costs (Meyers 1993: 759). Other noted he was incorrect to use the term ‘refugee’ to refer to people displaced by natural disasters and/or climate change (McAdam 2010). A refugee is defined in international law by the International Convention on Refugees (1951) as someone with:

A well founded fear of persecution based for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside his country of nationality and is unable or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.⁵⁷

Displacement by natural disaster does not constitute refugee status (McAdam 2010). This misuse of the refugee category is problematic as refugees are offered special protection (*non-refoulement*) by the international community, which other displaced peoples and migrants are not. The interchanging use of climate ‘refugee’, ‘displaced person’ or ‘migrant’ was common in the academic and policy literature. I refer to all three terms following the terminology of the organisation or individual cited.

High Linkage Salience (2008 – 2011)

However, this alarmist argument, regardless of its methodological flaws and problematic assumptions, gained traction in the 2000s. Meyers’ work became immensely popular and widely cited by other academics and environmental NGOs and lobby groups who sought to persuade governments to take action on climate change (Friends of the Earth 2000;

⁵⁷ 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.

Friends of the Earth 2004).⁵⁸ In 2007 climate change-displacement began to be a more mainstream policy concern, fuelled by the publication of the fourth IPCC report, the Al Gore documentary and the broadening of the climate change regime to include adaptation. Al Gore's documentary showed images of the extraordinarily high neap-tides in Tuvalu, a low-lying Pacific Island state, and claimed mistakenly that New Zealand was accepting 'climate refugees' from Tuvalu. Also in 2007 Christian Aid and ActionAid, international development NGOs, published reports on climate change displacement.⁵⁹ Christian Aid's report, *The Human Tide: The Real Migration Crisis*, built on Meyer's work and predicted that a billion people would be displaced by 2050. These figures were widely cited by academics, policy-makers and media.

In 2008 high linkage salience was consolidated as a critical mass of NGOs published reports on 'climate refugees'. These were:

- Greenpeace (2008) *Blue Alert, Climate Migrants in South Asia*;
- Environmental Justice Foundation (2008); *No Place Like Home: Where Next for Environmental Refugees?*;
- Norwegian Refugee Council (2008) *Future Floods of Refugees: A Comment on Climate Change, conflict and Forced Migration*.
- Norwegian Refugee Council (2008) *Climate Changed: A People Displaced*;
- Environmental Justice Foundation. (2008) *No Place Like Home: Where Next*

⁵⁸ These reports only mention climate change migration in passing and do not focus on the issue linkage. Friends of the Earth, 2000, *Gathering Storm: The Human Cost of Climate Change*, Amsterdam: Friends of the Earth. Friends of the Earth, 2004, *Our environment, our rights: Standing up for people and the Planet*, Amsterdam: Friends of the Earth.

⁵⁹ ActionAid. 2007 *Unjust waters: Climate change, flooding and the protection of poor urban communities: experiences from six African cities*. Available at http://www.actionaid.org.uk/doc_lib/unjust_waters.pdf accessed on 28 April 2012.

for Climate Refugees.

And subsequently in 2009:

- OCHA, IDMC, NRC, (2009) Monitoring Disaster displacement in the context of Climate Change, Geneva.
- Oxfam (2009) *The future is here: Climate Change in the Pacific*

Claims that millions would be displaced were backed-up by Kofi Anan's *Global Humanitarian Forum*, that predicted that 78 million people would be displaced by 2030 in the *Anatomy of a Silent Crisis*.⁶⁰ The volume of major NGO reports on climate change-displacement indicates that there was high linkage salience from 2008 onwards.

The UN also played a role in promoting the linkage between climate change and displacement. The United Nations University, Institute of Environmental and Human Security (UNU-EHS), based in Bonn, conducted a prominent study of environmental migration between 2007 and 2009.⁶¹ The 'EACH-FOR' project was funded by the EU, covered 23 countries and found that climate change was leading to migration (EACH-FOR 2009). Their work gained widespread media attention and was the basis for later claims by the UN that climate change would create millions of 'eco-refugees'.⁶² The UNU-EHS, as a university and part of the UN, was able to effectively bridge the NGO, UN and academic sphere and initiate a targeted advocacy campaign for the recognition of

⁶⁰ Global Humanitarian Forum. 2009. *The Anatomy of A Silent Crisis*. Available online at <http://www.ghf-ge.org/human-impact-report.pdf> accessed 27 April 2012.

⁶¹ For details of the project see United Nations University, Institute for Environment and Human Security, EACH-FOR, <http://www.ehs.unu.edu/article/read/each-for> accessed 26 April 2012.

⁶² See for example: Stefan Lovgren. 2005. Climate Change Creating Millions of "Eco Refugees," UN Warns", *National Geographic News*, 18 November, 2005.

the impacts of climate change on migration in the UNFCCC.⁶³

In sum, between late 2007 and 2009 a broad transnational ‘climate justice’ movement formed of international development, environmental and human rights NGOs, local civil society groups and academics. They identified ‘climate refugees’ as the tangible victims of government inaction to mitigate carbon emissions. During the UNFCCC negotiations at Copenhagen an ‘International Campaign on Climate Refugees’ Rights was launched, and there was a march by a civil society group, ‘Climate No Borders’, which demanded open borders to enable climate refugees free movement.⁶⁴ American documentary maker Michael Nash also launched an emotive feature-length documentary at Copenhagen called *Climate Refugees*. The film interviewed what it called ‘climate refugees’ in Bangladesh and Tuvalu as well as experts and politicians including: US Speaker of the House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi; Senator John Kerry; and Kenyan Nobel Peace Prize Winner, Waagari Mathai. The film predicted that millions would be displaced from Asia and Africa to North America and Europe and thus climate change should be seen as a major security threat. The film launch was supported by CARE International — despite its negative stereotyping of refugees, and overly deterministic argument.

Governments adopted this alarmist view of climate change migration as it fitted with their conception of high-politics. Leaders securitised climate change as it communicated

⁶³ A UNU-EHS representative for instance participated in all the UN heads of agency meetings. The lead UNU academic, Dr. Koko Warner, was a policy entrepreneur in establishing an advocacy coalition of NGOs, UN officials and academics for the climate change-displacement issue linkage. The author has had various discussions with Koko Warner and other UNU-EHS researchers and staff: at Copenhagen in December 2009; at the UNU-EHS Summer Academy on Environmental Migration (May 2010); and at the Nansen Conference in Oslo (May 2011).

⁶⁴ The author was present at both of these events and interviewed the organisers of “Climate No Borders”, Copenhagen, December 2009.

a ‘certain gravitas...and warrants a policy response commensurate in effort if not in kind with war’ (Barnett 2003: 14).⁶⁵ For example, Margaret Beckett, the UK Foreign Secretary, for example, warned at the UN Security Council in April 2007 that climate change was a security threat which could cause ‘flooding, disease and famine, and from that migration on an unprecedented scale’.⁶⁶ The US Quadrennial Defense Review of 2010 identified climate change as a future cause of conflict and mass migration.⁶⁷ The Bangladeshi Finance Minister in December 2009 argued that climate change would lead to greater migration and asked ‘all their development partners for the naturalised right to move as ‘managed migration is always much better.’⁶⁸ Thus as climate change took on greater global salience it became securitised by governments and the climate change-migration linkage gained traction (Barnett 2003; Elliott 2010).

⁶⁵ The most vulnerable countries to climate change also used an alarmist discourse to alert and mobilise others to the urgent need for action. However, most low-lying states were clear they did not see want to leave and did not see themselves as refugees (McAdam 2010).

⁶⁶ Margaret Beckett. 2007. “The Case for Climate Security,” Speech at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), London, May 10, 2007, <http://www.ipb.org/Margaret%20Beckett%20-%20The%20Case%20for%20Climate%20Security.html> (accessed January 8, 2010). The Stern Review forecasted that ‘greater resource scarcity, desertification, risks of drought and floods, and rising sea levels could drive millions of people to migrate’. Nicholas Stern, 2006. *The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change*. Available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/independent_reviews/stern_review_economics_climate_change/sternr accessed 20 May 2010.

⁶⁷ US Department of Defense. 2010. *Quadrennial Defense Review*. Department of Defense: Washington. There was a side-event at Copenhagen entitled ‘Climate change and International Security’ at which the NATO Secretary General spoke alongside the African Union Commission Chairperson and the EU presidency, Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs. One of the main themes of this presentation was the potential security risk of climate change refugees. NATO also took an alarmist, securitised view of climate change migration, which could trigger the need for humanitarian intervention and lead to regional instability

⁶⁸ See: “Bangladesh Climate Aid: ‘We are Getting Peanuts’”, *The Guardian*, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/video/2009/dec/02/bangladesh-climate-aid> accessed 4 December, 2009.

The media also endorsed the alarmist view. They covered the reports published by UNU-EHS and other international NGOs.⁶⁹ They sought visible evidence of climate change and journalists traveled to Bangladesh and low-lying islands, reported to be ‘sinking’, to ‘find’ climate refugees. *The Times*, for example, sent a reporter and a cameraman to the Carteret Islands, in Papua New Guinea, in the lead-up to Copenhagen to interview locals who they claimed were the first ‘climate change refugees’.⁷⁰ Yet the stories of their migration were more complex than presented. It is not clear, for instance, that the Carterets were ‘sinking’ due to climate change or due to tectonic plate subversion.⁷¹

However, some humanitarian organisations took issue with the negative stereotyping of refugees that the alarmist rhetoric entailed. In 2008 the international humanitarian coordinating committee – the *Inter-Agency Standing Committee* (IASC) - established a working group on climate change. This group, instigated by Madeleine Helmer director of the *International Federation of the Red Cross’s* (IFRC) Climate Change Center and supported by IOM, wrote a number of submissions on the potential humanitarian impacts of climate change.⁷² They endorsed the message that climate change could result in mass displacement but sought to nuance it. In a series of submissions the IASC argued that climate change was not likely to lead to mass displacement from the Global South to the

⁶⁹ See Tom Zeller Jr, Making the Case for Climate as a Migration Driver, *The New York Times*, 14 June 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/15/business/energy-environment/15iht-green15.html?pagewanted=all> accessed 28 April 2012.

⁷⁰ ‘The Carteret Islands’, *The Telegraph* available at www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/carteret-islands/ 17 December 2011.

⁷¹ Dr Maryanne Loughry, Jesuit Refugee Service and Boston College, ‘Relocation, adaptation and internal displacement in Papua New Guinea’, *Climate Change and Migration in the Asia-Pacific: Legal and Policy Responses*, NSW Parliament House, Sydney, 11 November 2011.

⁷² Interview with OCHA staff member, 20 March 2009, Geneva. Interview with ISDR staff member and IASC member, 13 January 2012, Wellington, New Zealand.

Global North.⁷³ Instead it was likely to result in internal displacement which would be covered by the *Guidelines on Internally Displaced Peoples*. Humanitarian agencies were still concerned for the minority who were displaced across international borders by extreme weather events as there was no international legal framework to protect them. Lobbying for such a framework became the focus for several organisations including UNHCR, NRC and academics at the UNU-EHS, and will be examined in more depth in subsequent chapters.

In the mid-2000s an additional issue linkage emerged: migration could also be a voluntary form of adaptation to climate change. A number of migration academics, policy-makers and activists challenged the alarmist rhetoric of ‘climate change migration’ as a security threat described above (Elliot 2010). They argued that it was not necessarily problematic that people migrated. In fact, for centuries migration has been an important adaptation and survival strategy to all sorts of environmental pressures. In the lead-up to the Copenhagen UNFCCC meeting the IFRC, the Norwegian Refugee Council, IOM and researchers at the UNU-EHS formed an alliance to advocate for migration as an adaptation strategy.⁷⁴ They lobbied UNFCCC negotiators actively at Copenhagen (2009) and at Cancun (2010) to include migration as adaptation in the final agreement (Warner

⁷³ For example: Informal group on Migration/Displacement and Climate Change of the IASC, *Climate Change, Migration and Displacement: Who will be affected?* Working Paper, 31st October 2008. IASC Working Group on Climate Change, *Comments and Proposed Revisions to the negotiating text prepared by the Chair of the UNFCCC Ad Hoc Working Group on long-term cooperative action*, June 2009.

⁷⁴ A number of these actors were involved in the inter-agency standing committee (IASC) and through this co-authored submission to the UNFCCC. They also formed a separate alliance, the Climate Change and Environmental Migration Alliance (CCEMA). The submissions from the IASC will be discussed in more depth in the later chapters from the perspective of IOM and UNHCR.

2011: 10).⁷⁵ UNU-EHS representatives for instance sought meetings with state delegates, held press meetings and gained media coverage.

At Cancun they succeeded: states included migration as a form of adaptation in the final text. The previously mentioned lobby group had drafted the text of paragraph 14 (f) which invited all parties to undertake and enhance adaptation actions including ‘Measures to enhance understanding, coordination and cooperation related to national, regional and international climate change induced displacement, migration and planned relocation, where appropriate’ (Cancun Agreement 2011). Paragraph 14(f) was lauded as a major achievement within the migration and humanitarian community – although it was not a particularly controversial statement for states. The work of this coalition represented a reframing of migration within the climate change regime as a positive adaptation strategy.⁷⁶ There may have also been instrumental reasons for pursuing paragraph 14 (f): some advocates may have seen it as a route to access climate financing. However as of yet there is no evidence the inclusion of climate change migration in the text has given organisations access to additional funds.

In summary, the link between climate change and migration has its origins in the ‘environmental refugee’ policy and academic debate of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. The terms: ‘climate refugee’ and ‘climate migrant’ became commonly used terms in the

⁷⁵ See Koko Warner. 2011. Climate Change Induced Displacement: Adaptation Policy in the Context of the UNFCCC Climate Negotiations, *Legal and Protection Policy Research Series*, Division of International Protection, UNHCR: Geneva, May 2011.

⁷⁶ The UK government also published the Foresight Report (2011), *Migration and Global Environmental Change, Future Challenges and Opportunities*, Government Office for Science: London. In 2011 a new Climate Change and Migration Alliance, bought together a coalition of civil society environmentalist and refugee/migration groups in the UK. Discussions with Hannah Smith, Climate Change and Migration Alliance Coordinator, COIN, May 2010 and February 2011.

2000s due to the work of international environmental and development NGOs. By 2007 there was a strong issue linkage (and thus high linkage salience) between climate change and migration. The linkage was promoted and documented in the reports and advocacy work of international NGOs such as CARE, Oxfam, Christian Aid, Action Aid and Greenpeace. Local advocacy movements (such as the Bangladeshi climate refugees and the UK ‘climate no borders’ anarchist group) also endorsed the linkage as it resonated with calls for climate justice. There was high media coverage of the issue and senior politicians – from Nancy Pelosi to Margeret Beckett – endorsed the issue linkage. The evolution of the global salience of climate change and the linkage salience of climate change-migration is summarised in the table below.

Table Seven: Issue Status of Climate Change and Migration

	Low linkage salience	High linkage salience
Low global salience	2000 – 2005	-----
High global salience	2006 - 2007	2008 – 2011

Conclusion

This chapter examined the evolving ‘issue status’ of climate change along two dimensions: global and linkage issue salience. In the first section, it traced how climate change became an issue prioritised by states, in particular the UK, at G7/G8 summits from 2005 onwards. The chapter then demonstrated how this changing global salience of

climate change correlated with an increase in the number of ‘development’ and ‘other’ IGOs at the UNFCCC. I also found that the climate change adaptation-development linkage was strong between from 2006 onwards, because of strong academic, policy and civil society community endorsing this connection. Similarly, high linkage salience between climate change and migration occurred in the 2008 – 2011 period as migration and humanitarian NGOs forged an inter-agency working group.

This chapter also offers insights into the dynamic relationship between global salience and linkage salience. Although they can be traced as independent dimensions of issue status, as outlined in chapter one, they did impact on each other. For example, environmental NGOs sought to reframe climate change as a security issue that would threaten states. They argued that climate change could lead to displacement and mass refugee influxes to the West to lobby states to prioritise climate change and reduce their emissions. The formation of issue linkages can thus lead to greater global salience of an issue. Conversely, as climate change increased in global salience a greater number of IGOs, NGOs and other actors sought to create links to it and engage in the climate change negotiations. High global salience may thus lead to greater linkage salience as demonstrated by the graphs in section two, and supported by the literature on climate change ‘bandwagoning’ (Jinnah 2011; Wapner 2011). The following chapters will focus on how three IGOs — UNHCR, IOM and UNDP – responded to these broader changes in global and linkage salience.

Chapter Three

UNHCR and Climate Change

UNHCR occupies a unique place as an international provider of protection for refugees and stateless people (Barnett and Finnemore 2001; Loescher 2001; Loescher, Betts and Milner 2008; Freitas 2004). The office was created in 1951 with a narrow legal protection mandate and studies have emphasized how it has autonomously evolved to become one of the world's primary providers of humanitarian services (Crisp 2003; Crisp 2009; Gottwald 2009; McKittrick 2009). In recent years many NGOs and academics have argued that climate change will force people to move, from low-lying coastal lands, drought-prone areas and other at risk areas (Greenpeace 2008; Meyers 1993). Some have also argued for a new legal convention to protect those displaced (Bierman and Boas 2010). Yet, there is no academic literature exploring if and how UNHCR has expanded beyond the established refugee regime to respond to climate displacement. This chapter thus fills a significant empirical gap in the scholarship on UNHCR and on climate change and displacement.

This chapter argues that UNHCR, a normative IGO, was slow and reluctant to engage with climate change. It is structured into four parts. Firstly, it outlines why UNHCR is a normative IGO. Secondly it examines the office's engagement with environmental issues

in the 1990s. The third and most substantive section illustrates how this normative IGO has engaged with climate change between 2000 and 2011. It focuses initially on changes in rhetoric, policy and structure at headquarters, followed by changes at the operational level in Kenya and then UNHCR's role in natural disasters. The final section summarises and evaluates organisational change along the four dimensions: rhetoric, policy, structure and operations.

UNHCR: A Normative IGO

UNHCR is a normative IGO. It has responsibility for supervising the international Refugee and Statelessness Conventions (Türk 2007).¹ The agency was created in 1950 by a UN General Assembly resolution (UNHCR 2007; Loescher 2001). The UNHCR Statute (1950) gave the agency a mandate to protect thousands of people displaced by war and those who fled Eastern Europe (Holborn 1975; Loescher 2001; Loescher, Betts and Milner 2008). In 1951, a year after the establishment of UNHCR, states signed the *Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees*, which set out the definition and rights of refugees and gave UNHCR supervisory responsibility for the Convention. Article 35 of the Convention stipulated that: 'the contracting states undertake to cooperate with the Office of the UNHCR...in the exercise of its functions and shall in particular facilitate its duty of supervising the application of the provisions of this Convention'.² UNHCR was also given the authority and power to 'promote the conclusion and ratification of

¹ There are two statelessness Conventions 1954 and 1961. I focus on the 1951 Refugee Convention as this is UNHCR's primary mandate.

² 1951 *Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees*, Article 35.

international Conventions' to protect refugees.³ UNHCR was established with a legal mandate to supervise the application and development of international refugee law.⁴

Refugees were defined narrowly in the Convention, reflecting the post-war context. As discussed in the previous chapters, a refugee is someone with: 'A well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside his country of nationality and is unable or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country'.⁵ For UNHCR and as a matter of law, a refugee is distinguished from an economic migrant or someone displaced by a climate change related disaster (flooding, drought, sea-level rise) or any other natural disaster (earthquake, tsunami) as they face persecution. Refugee status is a specific, legal category of persons and not to be confused with the broader conception of a refugee as anyone fleeing his/her country and seeking refuge, used often by media, NGOs and some academics (Meyers 1995; see also Shacknove 1985).⁶ This legal categorization of refugees is at the heart of UNHCR's mandate and identity.

The 1951 Refugee Convention took on an 'almost constitutional character' within UNHCR (Türk 2007: 499). The office's supervisory status gave the High Commissioner 'considerable moral authority and legitimacy' even though he had little political legitimacy (Loescher 2002). In particular the agency was mandated with a unique and

³ 1950 *Statute of the Office of UNHCR*, Paragraph 8(a), Chapter II.

⁴ For a discussion of UNHCR's supervisory authority see: Glover and Russell 2001; Türk 2007.

⁵ 1951 *Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees*, Article 1A (2).

⁶ The Oxford English Dictionary defines a refugee as 'A person who has been forced to leave his or her home and seek refuge elsewhere, esp. in a foreign country, from war, religious persecution, political troubles, the effects of a natural disaster, etc.; a displaced person'. *Oxford English Dictionary*, www.oed.com, accessed 28 February 2012.

‘central role’ in supervising the implementation of international refugee law and offering protection to refugees (UNHCR, 1991).⁷ UNHCR has legal authority to judge state behaviour and challenge states whose policies undermine refugee law and threaten refugees’ rights (Türk 2007: 497 and Loescher 2002: 5). States on the other hand were expected to cooperate with the Office of the High Commissioner in its activities (Betts, Loescher and Milner 2012: 82). These legal functions gave the agency a ‘unique identity and considerable independence’, according to UNHCR’s Director of International Protection (Türk 2007: 481). Its ability to be openly critical of states behaviour, with regards to refugee law, distinguishes it from functional IGOs. UNHCR’s legal and moral authority is widely recognised in scholarship and is often closely correlated with its relative autonomy (Loescher 2002; Loescher, Betts and Milner 2008; McKittrick 2009). However, scholars of UNHCR have not explicitly associated these attributes with a broader typology of IGOs.

The Division of International Protection ‘protects’ the core identity of UNHCR. Its role is to interpret the Refugee Convention and protect refugee’s status. It is the oldest division in UNHCR and hosts the ‘traditionalists’ who tend to ‘view the UNHCR and itself as the refugee’s lawyer and as the protector of refugee rights under international law’ (Barnett and Finnemore 1999: 725). UNHCR inherited the legal protection division from its immediate predecessor the International Refugee Office, which had developed the notion of individualized refugee protection (Goodwin-Gill and McAdam 2007).⁸ In the first

⁷ It generally does this through diplomatic channels rather than through a formal adjudicatory or treaty monitoring body, thanks to Prof. McAdam for this insight.

⁸ UNHCR had also inherited significant moral legitimacy in this realm from its other predecessor: the League of Nations’ *Office of the High Commissioner of Refugees*, led by Fridtjof Nansen, a charismatic

decades of UNHCR the legal protection division (based at the headquarters in Geneva) was the dominant focus of the agency's work (Goodwin-Gill and McAdam 2007; Loescher, Betts and Milner 2012). The agency had no operational staff working in the field to offer assistance or protection in humanitarian crises. The legal protection division is responsible for determining legal criteria of refugee status and ensuring that states uphold their obligations. UNHCR's moral legitimacy can thus be derived from the work of the legal protection division, which makes it distinct to other humanitarian NGOs or IGOs.

UNHCR's organisational culture reflects the agency's legal standing as the protector of refugees. Staff in UNHCR are wedded to the mandate and strongly committed to refugee protection. UNHCR staff 'almost universally believe in principles of mandate' (Loescher, Betts and Milner 2012: 116). Loescher, Betts and Milner state that 'there exists no other UN agency where values and principled ideas are so central to the mandate and *raison d'être* of the institution, or where some committed staff members are willing to place their lives in danger to defend the proposition that persecuted individuals need protection' (Loescher, Betts and Milner 2008: 74). An independent review of UNHCR's organisational culture in 2005 found that staff had a 'very strong collective identity' and almost universally believed in the principles of the organisation's core mandate (Loescher, Betts and Milner 2008: 83). States also acknowledge that UNHCR has a 'normative setting' as UNHCR staff are 'the guardians of the Refugee Convention' and 'have the mandate to help these people, therefore you [states] can help us achieve this

Norwegian diplomat, explorer and humanitarian, who had high degree of moral authority (Loescher 2002). On the early refugee regime see: Loescher 2002; Goodwin-Gill and McAdam 2007.

goal’.⁹ UNHCR’s organisational culture is predominantly driven by a logic of appropriateness, rather than a logic of consequences.

UNHCR has used this moral legitimacy to expand significantly and autonomously from its original mandate (Crisp 2003; Loescher 2002 and McKittrick 2009). The agency started life ‘boxed-in’ with a limited mandate of protection for European refugees who were displaced pre-1951.¹⁰ It had restricted funding, little support from the US, a small staff of 34 and no operational activities (Betts, Loescher and Milner 2012: 111).¹¹ Under the 1950 Statute the office has a mandate to act ‘under the authority of the General Assembly’ which it had to renew every five years until 2003.¹² In addition, it has to report annually to the General Assembly through the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and follow policy directives issued by either of these two bodies (Loescher, Betts, and Milner 2008: 75). In the late 1950s and early 1960s the agency began to expand its mandate beyond Europe and into Asia (Hong Kong) and Africa (Algeria) through the use of ‘good-offices’ which were established to deal with specific refugee flows.¹³ Initially these UNHCR operations outside of Europe were adhoc expansions, which had to be endorsed by member states. However, in 1967 states agreed to an

⁹ Interview with UNHCR member state e, 10 May 2011, Geneva.

¹⁰ UNHCR’s 1950 Statute and the 1951 Refugee Convention limited UNHCR to work with refugees displaced before January 1951. See: *1950 Statute of the Office of UNHCR*, Paragraph 6 (a) (i) and *1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees*.

¹¹ The US were frustrated that their candidate did not win the election to be the first High Commissioner and thus refused to fund the agency in the first five years of its life (Loescher 2002). UNHCR staff body was so small that they were all able to gather around a single piano and sing carols at the office’s Christmas party in 1951 (Betts, Loescher and Milner 2012).

¹² *1950 Statute of the Office of UNHCR*, Paragraph 1 (a); Betts, Loescher and Milner 2012.

¹³ The Hong Kong Office was established in the 1950s after an influx of refugees from mainland China which had become the communist ruled, People’s Republic of China. Expansion came under the leadership of two Swiss High Commissioners: Auguste Lindt (1956 – 1960) and Felix Schnyder: 1960 – 1965 both of whom were eager for the agency to move beyond Europe and play an active role in post-colonial Africa (Betts, Loescher and Milner 2012).

additional protocol to the UNHCR Convention, which removed the temporal and geographical limitations of the original refugee definition.¹⁴ UNHCR was also given supervisory status over the 1961 *Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons* and thus increased the scope of its moral legitimacy.¹⁵

In the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s UNHCR continued to expand geographically and in scope (Crisp 2008). In the 1970s UNHCR operations moved into South East Asia, Latin America and later the Middle East and now operates globally. Correspondingly, there was a rapid expansion of UNHCR's budget and staff: it grew from a budget of several million and a few hundred staff in 1971, to thousands of staff and US\$500 million budget in 1980. In 2010 UNHCR had a budget of US\$3 billion and at the beginning of 2012 there were 7,735 staff (Loescher 2002).¹⁶ UNHCR increased the range of its activities to include: prevention, early warning and development assistance and in-country protection (Bradley 2012; Freitas 2004). It also expanded its 'persons of concern' and now offers protection and/or assistance to: returnees, asylum-seekers, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and other persons 'threatened with displacement' (Crisp 2010; Freitas 2004; Türk 2007: 489).¹⁷ However, the office's mandate for these groups of people evolved from

¹⁴ See: *1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees*.

¹⁵ UNHCR had a mandate to examine and assist individual stateless persons from the 1954 and 1961 Convention. It gained a global mandate 'to prevent and reduce statelessness' from the 1994 General Assembly Resolution 49/169. For a more detailed discussion of UNHCR's stateless mandate see: UNHCR, *Extracts relating to UNHCR's supervisory responsibility for the statelessness Conventions*, available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4f5cd0692.html> accessed 19 March 2012; UNHCR, *Stateless – UNHCR Actions*, <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c16a.html> accessed 19 March 2012; and UNHCR Division of International Protection, 2010. 'UNHCR Action to Address Statelessness: a Strategy Note', *International Journal of Refugee Law*, 22: 297 – 335.

¹⁶ The 2012 staff and budget figures for UNHCR can be found online at: UNHCR, *Staff Figures*, <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c17.html> accessed 14 March 2012. UNHCR, *Financial figures*, <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c1a.html> accessed 14 March 2012.

¹⁷ However these last two categories do not strictly fall within its mandate but rather within its 'scope of competence' (Türk 2007: 489). For instance, within the category of peoples facing displacement, UNHCR

‘residual powers’ vested in the UNHCR Statute which enable it to engage ‘in such additional activities as the General Assembly may determine’.¹⁸ Its mandate for IDPs, returnees and other persons ‘threatened with displacement’ is unlike its mandate for refugees and stateless persons as it is not based on an international convention but on the tacit or explicit consent from states for expansion. Furthermore, activities with these new groups are additional ‘add-ons’ or ‘extra-mandates’ that must not detract from or dilute the agency’s core mandate for refugees (Goodwin-Gill 2000). UNHCR’s protection role for refugees was of a higher importance and priority because it was stipulated in the Statute and by the Convention, and not a General Assembly resolution which could be changed from one year to the next.

Alongside this expansion in scope the agency became a more operational organisation driven by emergencies, as well as refugee flows. These changing priorities were reflected in structural changes. In the 1980s and 1990s the Division of Operations grew significantly and rivaled the Division of International Protection. The Director of the Division of International Protection was demoted to the same level as the Director of the Division of Operations (Loescher 2002; Betts, Loescher and Milner 2012: 113 – 114).

has typically focused on people who are 'war-affected' or 'besieged populations' rather than those facing natural disasters (Türk 2007). Furthermore, UNHCR’s engagement with these aforementioned categories occurred relatively recently (in the 1990s) during an expansionary phase under the leadership of Sadako Ogata. Ogata argued for UNHCR’s involvement in the Kosovo crisis where it assisted those that were not even displaced (Loescher, Betts and Milner 2012).

¹⁸ Paragraph 9 of the UNHCR Statute states that the ‘High Commissioner shall engage in additional activities as the General Assembly may determine within the limits of the resources provided at his disposal’. However, this is not a carte blanche for UNHCR to expand. The preceding paragraph (8) stipulates that UNHCR’s activities must be in a refugee specific context (Goodwin-Gill 2000). However, UNHCR has quoted paragraph 9 on a number of occasions to justify its expansion into new areas and to work with new groups such as internally displaced persons and those fleeing natural disasters. See for instance: UNHCR. 2007, *Informal Consultative Meeting, Note on The Protection of Internally Displaced Persons and the Role of UNHCR*, Geneva, 27 February 2007: 3; and UNHCR. 2011. *UNHCR’s role in support of an enhanced humanitarian response for the protection of persons affected by natural disasters*. Geneva: UNHCR: 3.

This placed a higher value on operational activities vis-à-vis legal protection and led to tensions within UNHCR between these two goals (Freitas 2004; Goodwin-Gill 1999).¹⁹ While the Division of Protection aims to defend the rights of refugees often against states, the Division of Operations is more liable to accede to state pressures as its goal is to deliver humanitarian assistance (Freitas 2004). A refugee advocate argued that ‘international law, which provides the essential framework of rule and principle for the protection of refugees, has been relegated to an inferior position vis-à-vis the political concerns of UN Member States’ (Anonymous 1997: 272). They also stated that the ‘authority and influence of the Division [of International Protection] have eroded to the point that its advice is now generally sought only after decisions have been made by policy and programme staff, and then only to find retrospective legal justification for UNHCR action, which has a number of detrimental consequences’ (Anonymous 1997: 272). This change in priorities and structure represented a shift towards the functional end of the IGO spectrum. UNHCR hired new staff for the Division of Operations who were not loyal to, or schooled in, UNHCR’s refugee law mandate.

Yet UNHCR can still be classified as a normative organisation: it retained its supervisory status for international refugee law and continued to fiercely guard its refugee mandate. Its normative type is illustrated by its response to debates over protection for IDPs in the 1990s. UNHCR followed a logic of appropriateness when faced with a new issue area

¹⁹ In the 1990s UNHCR attempted to become the UN lead for humanitarian activities. It argued it would keep its humanitarian coordination role separate from its refugee protection role (Goodwin-Gill 1999).

outside its mandate.²⁰ In the 1990s the US and the Netherlands, two of UNHCR's top donors, encouraged the office to expand their activities to internally displaced persons (Freitas 2004).²¹ A functional IGO, following a logic of consequences, would have expanded as there was sufficient member state and financial support for doing so and no grounds for staff resistance. However, UNHCR staff were concerned about expanding into IDP protection. The initial briefing note on IDP protection argued that UNHCR should not expand as it did not have the funding necessary or the training for a task which was more akin to the expertise of the ICRC.²² A debate ensued and many staff, academics and some NGOs asserted that expansion into IDP assistance could undermine UNHCR's ability to deliver on refugee protection (Goodwin-Gill 2000).²³ UNHCR's initial response to this new issue area typified a normative agency: it did not immediately see a strong issue linkage to its core mandate and so it was against expansion, even if member states were supportive.²⁴ I will return to the IDP issue later in this chapter.

UNHCR's activities are also closely monitored by states. Through annual reporting and frequent informal discussions member states are well informed and thus well placed to

²⁰ A number of UNHCR staff and scholars interviewed identified the IDP situation as a similar case where UNHCR was challenged to expand its conception of 'persons of concern'. Interview with UNHCR Senior Representative for the Pacific i, 11 November 2011, Sydney.

²¹ The US Permanent Ambassador to the UN, Richard Holbrooke, urged UNHCR to take on this mandate in a speech to the Security Council on 13 January 2000. See Goodwin-Gill 2000 for a transcript of this speech.

²² Discussion with Prof. Loescher, 21 February 2012, Oxford.

²³ See: Working Group on International Refugee Policy. 1999. 'Report of the International Conference on the Protection Mandate of UNHCR.' *Journal of Refugee Studies* 12(2): 202 - 220.

²⁴ UNHCR later claimed it gained a 'mandate' to offer assistance to IDPs on an ad-hoc operational basis in the 1990s through a series of UN General Assembly resolutions. However, its IDPs activities were very limited and proscribed. They should be at the 'request of the Secretary-General or the competent principal organs of the United Nations, with the consent of the Government concerned, should not undermine the institution of asylum and should take into account the complementarities of the mandates and expertise of other relevant organisations'. See: UNHCR, 2006, Standing Committee 36th Meeting, *UNHCR's expanded role in support of the inter-agency response to internal displacement situations*, Geneva, 8 June 2006.

ensure that it stays within its mandate and that neither ‘mandate creep’ nor budget creep occurs. Member states fundamental concern is that UNHCR does not expand beyond its mandate and thus require additional funds.²⁵ While the agency’s original mandate came from the General Assembly, states oversee the agency today primarily through the Executive Committee of the Programme of the UNHCR (ExCom) which meets on an regular basis.²⁶ UNHCR is particularly reliant on its donors to continue its operations and has no permanent funding, which means that long-term, multi-year planning is difficult (Loescher 2002: 349).²⁷ In fact, the agency receives approximately three quarters of its budget from its top ten donors who ‘exercise significant influence over the work of UNHCR’ (Betts, Loescher and Milner 2008: 93). Meanwhile, many states see ExCom conclusions as ‘normative’ text — a result of UNHCR’s ‘legalistically defined mandate’.²⁸ They treat ExCom cautiously and reject anything ‘that is too specific as they may be bound by it’ and do not want to set ‘prescriptive recommendations for the future’ which they cannot meet.²⁹ As another member state explained: ‘What they [UNHCR] say and do sets a precedent and leads the debate’.³⁰

²⁵ Interview with UNHCR member state representative a, 23 March, Geneva 2010.

²⁶ ExCom was created in 1958 with 25 members and has expanded progressively and, as of September 2012, had 87 members. It meets annually to approve UNHCR’s budget and program for the following year and provide guidance on UNHCR’s management, objectives and priorities (Loescher, Betts and Milner 2008: 77). See: UNHCR, *Executive Committee*, <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c83.html> accessed 12 September 2012.

²⁷ About 98 percent of the Office’s funding is from voluntary contributions (Loescher 2002: 349)

²⁸ Interview with UNHCR member state representatives b and e, 7 and 10 May 2012, Geneva. Note that the ExComm conclusions are ‘not formally binding but are relevant to the interpretation of the international protection regime’. According to UNHCR they: ‘constitute expressions of opinion which are broadly representative of the views of the international community. However, the fact that the Executive Committee’s conclusions are taken by consensus adds further weight to their value. Personal correspondence with UNHCR External Relations Officer, Secretariat and Inter-Agency Service, 11 May 2012.

²⁹ Interview with UNHCR member state representative e, 10 May 2012, Geneva.

³⁰ Telephone interview with UNHCR member state g, 19 June 2012.

This chapter will now examine how UNHCR's core identity as a protection agency for refugees, and its corresponding behavioural logic of appropriateness has shaped its engagement with the issue of climate change and displacement.

UNHCR and the Environment (1990 – 1999)

UNHCR was not created with a mandate to protect those displaced by environmental disaster or climate change. However, in the 1990s, following the end of the Cold War, the agency began to engage with environmental issues (Crisp 2003; Loescher 2002).³¹ It did this in two ways: 1) the issue of environmental displacement was discussed as a protection issue and 2) the agency developed an environmental division and environmental impact guidelines. These changes occurred in parallel to the expansion of its humanitarian operations under the leadership of a new High Commissioner, Sadako Ogata (1990 - 2000). Ogata perceived a need to restore the relevance and raise the profile of UNHCR and made appearances at the UN Security Council and NATO and gained widespread international press coverage for the agency (Loescher 2002).³² She also sent UNHCR into Yugoslavia to provide assistance to thousands, and not just those displaced. This section will focus on UNHCR's engagement with environmental issues during this period of operational expansion.

Between 1990 and 1991 UNHCR and the ExCom discussed the issue of international protection for environmentally displaced peoples. This discussion was through a Working

³¹ The environment became a high status issue in the 1990s, spurred by the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (The 'Rio Earth Summit') as mentioned in Chapter Two.

³² The previous High Commissioner, Jean-Pierre Hocké, had left in a scandal. He and his wife flew first class while donors were demanding greater budget restrictions for UNHCR (Loescher 2002).

Group, and its report, on *Solutions and Protection*. The Working Group was convened by the High Commissioner, at the request of the Executive Committee in 1989 and comprised of states, IGOs and UNHCR staff who were instructed to look at protection and preventive solutions to displacement. They discussed protection for groups beyond UNHCR's core refugee and stateless persons mandate. The Working Group identified five categories of displacement including: 'people forced to leave or prevented from returning because of man-made disasters; persons forced to leave or prevented from returning because of natural or ecological disasters or extreme poverty.'³³ It noted that natural or ecological disaster is a cause of migration and 'up-rootedness' and could contribute to a flow of persons across borders, although most cases of displacement are likely to be internal (UNHCR 1991: 11). It also stated that 'persons fleeing natural or ecological disaster normally have a need for relief assistance rather than protection' (UNHCR 1991: 11). However, it was agreed that 'the competence of UNHCR does not normally extend to those persons displaced inside their own countries as a result of natural or ecological disaster or extreme poverty'.³⁴ Other IGOs 'with appropriate mandates' should respond to the needs of those displaced externally or internally by environmental causes (UNHCR 1991: 11). In sum, UNHCR had no mandate to offer assistance or protection to those fleeing 'natural' or 'ecological' disasters and in the 1990s - despite the trends towards broader operational expansionism - it did not offer humanitarian relief to them.

³³ Man-made disasters were defined as 'international or internal armed conflict, massive violations of human rights and industrial accidents'. Broadly speaking, this category was seen to encompass political, social and economic factors. UNHCR. 1991. *Working Group in 1991 on Solutions and Protection to the 42nd Session of the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme*, EC/SCP/64, 12 August 1991.

³⁴ UNHCR co-hosted a symposium with IOM on environment and migration. However UNHCR's primary focus was on the impact of refugees on the environment. IOM and UNHCR. 1996. *Environmentally –Induced Population Displacements and Environmental Impacts Resulting from Mass Migrations*, Geneva.

Meanwhile, in the 1990s UNHCR began to include environmental impact projects within its humanitarian operations. These efforts were part of a growing acknowledgement that refugees had an impact on their host environment, and as Ogata stated, the ‘relationship between the environment and refugees had long been overlooked’.³⁵ In 1992 UNHCR attended a conference on the *Migration and Environment* in the lead-up to the UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro. A UNHCR staff member from the Programme and Technical Support Service explained that UNHCR did not traditionally consider environmental impacts in measuring the effectiveness of its programmes but that there was a ‘growing recognition of the need to take into account the use of environmental resources in planning assistance programs’.³⁶ Subsequently, UNHCR established the Engineering and Environmental Services Section within the Division of Operations, hired its first environmental coordinator in 1993, and in 1998 this section published UNHCR’s first environmental impact guidelines.³⁷ In addition, UNHCR developed environmental projects including: piloting solar cookers; refugee environmental education; reducing energy-use and deforestation in camps and sourcing environmentally friendlier materials.³⁸ By the late 1990s the environmental impact of refugees was considered an issue that UNHCR had to deal with routinely in its operational activities. These activities are not the focus of this research as they were

³⁵ Quoted from UNHCR, *Refugees*, 2002: 2.

³⁶ IOM. 1992. *Migration and the Environment*, Geneva: IOM: 48.

³⁷ The division received much support from the Japanese government who paid the salaries of a number of the environmental advisors. Interview with UNHCR official d, 17 March 2010, Geneva.

³⁸ UNHCR. 2009. *Environmental Publications*, available at <http://www.unhcr.org/3b94c8364.html>, accessed 14 February 2011.

framed not as a response to the issue of climate change but to the environment.³⁹

Moreover, they concentrate on the impact of UNHCR on the environment and not the impact of climate change on individuals of potential concern to UNHCR and its response to those individuals.

In sum during the 1990s UNHCR did not offer protection to those displaced by any environmental change or disasters. While there was one working group that discussed this issue it stated clearly that protection for this category of people was beyond the mandate of UNHCR. The environmental work that UNHCR engaged in focused on mitigating the environmental impacts of refugee camps, which is not the focus of this research.

UNHCR and Climate Change (2000 – 2011)

Low Global and Low Linkage Salience (2000 – 2005)

UNHCR was a ‘late-starter’ on climate change.⁴⁰ It did not engage with policy debates on the issue of climate change and displacement until 2007. Meanwhile the research and policy work on the issue was led by other agencies, such as the Norwegian Refugee Council, the IFRC and IOM.⁴¹ During the early and mid-2000s there was increasing

³⁹ Some of these environmental impact activities were later framed as mitigating climate change. UNHCR Kenya, for instance, hired an environmental advisor in the Kakuma refugee camp to develop a renewable energy project, funded by Energies of Portugal. Interview with UNHCR Kenya official k, April 5 2011, Nairobi. See also: the Energies of Portugal project website: <http://www.edp.pt/en/sustentabilidade/sociedadeecultura/IntervencaoSocial/Pages/Projectokakuma.aspx> accessed 4 April 2011.

⁴⁰ Telephone interview with UNHCR senior official c, 14 May 2010.

⁴¹ The International Federation of the Red Cross was the first organisation to engage with climate change. They established the Red Cross/Red Crescent Climate Change Center in 2002. Phone interview with Director of the Red Cross/Red Crescent Climate Change Center, 16 April 2010. Also interviews with other IASC members March – May 2010, Geneva, Switzerland.

media and NGO attention to the plight of so-called ‘climate refugees’.⁴² UNHCR did not engage with climate change during this period as it was not deemed an issue of high global or linkage salience. The High Commissioner, Rudd Lubbers (2001 – 2005) was ‘reacting to the most important issues of the time’ and climate change was not one of these during his leadership of UNHCR as it had not reached high-status.⁴³

In addition, senior staff did not see the issue as an important priority and were reluctant to engage with the issue, which was perceived as outside their mandate. A UNHCR staff member explained that ‘few people had any clue within the organisation about climate change or whether it was any interest to them’ and there was a degree of ‘skepticism’ about following global trends.⁴⁴ UNHCR’s main concern was to refute that ‘climate refugees’ were in fact refugees. They argued that according to the 1951 Convention refugees were only those fleeing a well-founded fear of persecution based on race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. This was not a controversial stance and the agency was supported by many refugee law experts (McAdam 2010).

⁴² Carol Farbotko, 2005. ‘Tuvalu and Climate Change: Constructions of Environmental Displacement in the Sydney Morning Herald.’ *Geografiska Annaler* 87(B): 279 - 293. The term ‘climate refugee’ was predominantly used by environmental NGOs and media who were not versed in refugee law.

⁴³ The lack of engagement with climate change was also because the High Commissioner Rudd Lubbers was ‘distracted by other issues’. Interview with UNHCR Senior Representative for the Pacific i, 11 November 2011, Sydney. Firstly, UNHCR was facing a budgetary crisis (Betts, Loescher and Milner 2012: 62). Secondly, the UN humanitarian system was undergoing major reform. Furthermore, Lubbers was widely seen as ineffective throughout this period and faced with these challenges. He lacked ‘a clear and coherent strategy’ and instead initiatives emerged ‘in an ad-hoc manner’ (Betts, Loescher and Milner 2012: 68). Lubbers damaged the reputation of the UNHCR through his own misdemeanors. He was forced to resign in 2005 due to allegations of sexual abuse. *BBC*, Lubbers quits over UN sex claims, *BBC News*, 20 February 2005, at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4282333.stm> accessed 29 February 2012.

⁴⁴ Telephone interview with UNHCR senior official c, 14 May 2010.

‘Climate refugees’ posed a threat to UNHCR as they blurred the boundaries between Convention refugees and popular conceptions of refugees. Engaging in debates over ‘climate refugees’ was not in UNHCR’s interest as it was a distraction from UNHCR’s core concern, protecting the unique legal status of Convention refugees. In fact, those in the Division of International Protection - predominantly refugee lawyers – were particularly reticent to engage with climate change and displacement debates as they saw it as a diversion from UNHCR’s mandate.⁴⁵ In 2005, a new High Commissioner, António Guterres, the former Primer Minister of Portugal, took office. He was driven by strong political ambitions and from the outset sought to affirm UNHCR’s core mandate and also expand the agency’s mandate.⁴⁶ However, in the first two years of his leadership Guterres did not speak on climate change as it was not a high status issue. In sum, UNHCR for much of the early 2000s and mid 2000s did not respond to the issue of climate change as it was not high status.

High Global Salience and Low Linkage Salience (2006 – 2007)

UNHCR first engaged with the issue of climate change and displacement in 2007. At the annual meeting of ExCom Guterres began his speech by highlighting that the drivers of displacement were changing. He claimed that:

⁴⁵ The staff member claimed there were two types of people within UNHCR: those that took a ‘practical approach’ and talked about climate change and lawyers who tended to reject the concept. He caveated this by stating that there were some lawyers who saw the conversation about climate change leading to statelessness as an interesting – albeit intellectual - conversation. Telephone interview with UNHCR senior official c, 14 May 2010.

⁴⁶ In a letter, written soon after Guterres was short-listed for the role of High Commissioner he acknowledged the core identity of UNHCR stating: ‘We are an organisation for refugees; let’s not leave any doubt about it’. He also claimed that if elected he would: ‘strongly concentrate in creating the conditions to mobilise the entire organisation around one single, but consistent and comprehensive, concept of protection and the capacity to operationalise it, making use of the ‘strong leadership to instill such a culture of protection’. António Guterres, 2005 *Talk Back, Special Issue: UNHCR Candidates Talk Back*, 7 -2a.

Almost every model of the long-term effects of climate change predicts a continued expansion of desertification, to the point of destroying livelihood prospects in many parts of the globe. For each centimeter that the sea level will rise, there will be one million more displaced. The international community seems no more adept at dealing with those new causes than it is at preventing conflict and persecution. It is therefore important to examine the reasons, the scale and the trends of present-day forced displacement.⁴⁷

In this speech for the first time he acknowledged a substantive issue linkage between climate change and displacement. He made this speech because he had a ‘strong belief that climate change was new phenomena that must be dealt with’.⁴⁸ On this occasion Guterres’ rhetoric followed a logic of consequences. He saw climate change as a top international priority with which the agency should engage.⁴⁹

The Official Summary Record of the 2007 Executive Meeting notes a mixture of responses from states to the High Commissioner’s statements. One state was actively supportive (Norway), some states were vaguely supportive and one was completely opposed (Austria) (UNHCR 2007). Yet most of the UNHCR staff interviewed claimed that states were completely opposed to UNHCR expansion in this area. As Jeff Crisp, the Head of UNHCR’s Policy Development and Evaluation Service, stated many key UNHCR donors have ‘expressed persistent wariness with regard to the organisation’s

⁴⁷ He also highlighted the impact of climate change on displacement at subsequent executive committee meetings in 2008 and 2009. See: Statement by the High Commissioner, *Executive Committee of the Programme of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees*, Fifty-eighth session, Geneva, 1 October 2007.

⁴⁸ Interview with UNHCR staff member d, Geneva, 17 March 2010.

⁴⁹ Interview with UNHCR staff member d, Geneva, 17 March 2010.

expansion, often expressing the opinion that the organisation should return to its “core mandate” which they consider to be that of providing refugees with protection in developing regions’ (Crisp 2009:76).⁵⁰ While a select few member states went on the official record endorsing UNHCR’s engagement with climate change the institutional memory and the record of subsequent meetings suggest that the majority of the executive committee did not actively encourage the agency to engage with climate change and displacement. Some states saw ExCom conclusions as a ‘normative text’ and did not want to set a precedent and be subsequently bound by new rules.⁵¹

High Global Salience and High Linkage Salience (2008 – 2011)

Nevertheless, over the course of 2008 and 2009 the High Commissioner continued to highlight in high-level speeches, interviews and articles that climate change would trigger mass displacement (Dickson 2010; Guterres 2008).⁵² In numerous speeches he emphasised that climate change was one of five new ‘mega-trends’ changing the nature of displacement.⁵³ He also made climate change a core theme of many speeches and

⁵⁰ Note that Crisp’s views are his own and do not represent the official position of UNHCR.

⁵¹ Interview with UNHCR member state representatives b and e, 7 and 10 May 2012. Telephone interview with UNHCR member state representative, 19 June 2012.

⁵² The Assistant High Commissioner, Craig Johnston, was the first senior UNHCR manager to attend a UNFCCC meeting. He attended Poznan summit in 2008 at his own initiative. Interview with former UNHCR senior official c, 27 January 2012, Oxford. He outlined that UNHCR did not have a mandate to protect people displaced by natural disaster but have been called -upon to do so time and time again. In his words, the UNHCR mandate ‘related to refugees and the protection, shelter and management of internally displaced people. We are not mandated to come to the assistance of the victims of natural disasters but time and time again we have been called upon to play this role, not because it is an implied mandate but because in the face of humanitarian suffering those who can help are those who receive the call.’ Remarks by Craig Johnston. 2008, UN Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees, *Planning for the Inevitable, the Humanitarian Consequences of Climate Change*, UNFCCC COP 14, Poznan.

⁵³ See: António Guterres, 2009, ‘Five ‘mega-trends’ – including population growth, urbanization, climate change – make contemporary displacement increasingly complex, third committee told’, Third Committee, *General Assembly* GA/SHC/3964, New York: United Nations, 3 November 2009, and Statement by Mr. António Guterres, 2011, ‘Maintenance of International Peace and Security: New Challenges to

interviews. For instance, in an interview with *The Guardian* he claimed that: ‘Climate change is today one of the main drivers of forced migration, both directly through its impact on the environment – not allowing people to live any more in the areas where they were traditionally living – and as a trigger of extreme poverty and conflict’ (Borger 2008). The agency began had begun to shift its position and acknowledge that climate change may lead to new forms of displacement.

Although there was significant rhetorical engagement from the High Commissioner on the issue, there was a lag in policy outputs by UNHCR. It was relatively easy for the High Commissioner to issue statements and make speeches on the changing nature of forced displacement without committing the agency to any particular role in addressing these new ‘flows’. However, there was still widespread resistance within UNHCR bureaucracy to the term ‘climate refugee’. Guterres avoided this term and was aware that adopting this language could weaken UNHCR’s core mandate. In fact, Guterres stated that ‘UNHCR has refused to embrace the new terminology of “climate refugees” or “environmental refugees,” fearing that this will complicate and confuse the organisation’s efforts to protect the victims of persecution and armed conflict.’⁵⁴ Guterres’ concern about expansion undermining the core mandate illustrates a logic of appropriateness.

Broader UNHCR involvement with climate change, beyond the High Commissioner, began in 2008. In May 2008 the UN Secretary General called for all UN agencies to

International Peace and Security and Conflict Prevention’, *United Nations Security Council Briefing*, New York: United Nations, 23 November 2011.

⁵⁴ António Guterres. 2011. ‘Statement by António Guterres’, *Nansen Conference on Climate Change and Displacement*, Oslo.

establish climate change focal points to prepare for the UNFCCC summit in Copenhagen and to give higher organisational priority to the issue.⁵⁵ The High Commissioner established a task force on climate change in 2008 backed by his ‘desire for the Office to engage fully and effectively in the international discussion on these issues’.⁵⁶ The brief of this task force included: ‘Liaising with the executive office to ensure that a consistent UNHCR position on climate change and related issues is articulated and adjusted as needed; tracking developments relating to climate change as they concern the mandate of UNHCR and providing inputs into the IASC task force on climate change.’⁵⁷ The terms of reference for this task force included a number of people across the agency – from the Department of Operations to International Protection. Essentially the task force assigned responsibility to staff to work on aspects of climate change within their other routine responsibilities.

The task force neither triggered nor constituted organisational change within UNHCR. In fact, there is evidence to suggest there was almost no change at all. Only a few new positions were created to work on climate change and all were temporary and/or part-time. Moreover, some UNHCR staff reported that even though they were supposedly responsible for working on climate change they had neither the time nor the space to

⁵⁵ Ban Ki-Moon, *Letter to UN agencies*, May 2008.

⁵⁶ UNHCR. 2008. *Task force on climate change and related issues, Final TORs [Terms of Reference]*, August 2008. UNHCR: Geneva.

⁵⁷ Other tasks included to: ‘Climate change and related issues is articulated and adjusted as needed; Ensure that relevant substantive and functional issues relating to climate change are addressed in a timely manner; Improve information sharing on these issues in Headquarters and with important field locations (Addis, Brussels, New York, Stockholm and Tokyo); Promote the visibility of activities linked to climate change and the environment; and provide inputs for a UNHCR webpage on climate change. UNHCR, *Task force on climate*.

work on it.⁵⁸ One staff member, for instance, claimed that he ‘was not encouraged to make substantive changes or to take the issue seriously’ as he never had the means or authority to turn it into a serious policy issue.⁵⁹ Senior managers did not prioritise climate change and were reluctant to delegate staff to work on it as they did not see the issue as a core concern or priority.⁶⁰ The agency established a focal point for climate change in the Policy Development and Evaluation Service, however they were given no formal briefing note on this work.⁶¹ There was no major structural change as UNHCR did not see climate change as relevant to its core mandate.

The new focal point’s primary role was to follow and engage with the IASC working group on climate change.⁶² In mid-2008 the IASC established an informal working group on climate change and within that a sub-group on migration, displacement and climate change.⁶³ The aim of both groups was to coordinate a common humanitarian advocacy strategy on climate change. They wrote collective submissions to the annual UNFCCC COPs.⁶⁴ The UNHCR climate change focal point represented UNHCR at these two working group meetings, yet UNHCR had not developed a policy position in house beyond a critique of the term ‘climate refugee’.

⁵⁸ Telephone interview with UNHCR official b, 30 March 2010. Interview with UNHCR official d, 17 March, Geneva.

⁵⁹ Telephone interview with UNHCR official b, 30 March 2010.

⁶⁰ One senior staff member reported that they were ‘jaded’ with the debate. Interview with UNHCR senior official a, 10 May 2012, Geneva.

⁶¹ Telephone interview with UNHCR official b, 30 March 2010. They subsequently (in 2009) shifted the climate change focal point into the Division of Operations as the Director of the Policy Development and Evaluation Service did not want his staff member to spend so much time working on it.

⁶² The IASC is a coordination mechanism for humanitarian organisations in Geneva. See IASC, website <http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/pageloader.aspx?page=content-about-default> accessed 21 March 2012.

⁶³ Telephone interview with IASC member, 14 April 2010.

⁶⁴ Interview with IASC members, March 2010, Geneva.

Initially, UNHCR was apprehensive of the working group. It had an ongoing debate with IOM over the title and terminology that should be used to refer to people who migrated or were displaced due to climate change.⁶⁵ UNHCR's position in the group was that climate change could not produce 'refugees' in the legal or official sense and the working group was reportedly mired in definitional debates.⁶⁶ According to one IASC participant, UNHCR 'argued there were existing mechanisms that could be used [to offer protection] and wanted to avoid using the term climate change refugees'.⁶⁷ UNHCR's position was manifest in the first sub-working submission to the UNFCCC on 'Climate change and migration: who will be affected?' in October 2008. This submission included a detailed description of who constituted an IDP, refugee or a stateless person under international law and was clearly authored by UNHCR.⁶⁸ UNHCR's initial engagement in the IASC demonstrated a logic of appropriateness: they sought to defend the unique status of refugees in the face of new groups of displaced peoples.

However, the IASC and the Guterres's frequent rhetorical statements on climate change were a catalyst for policy development in UNHCR. In September 2008 the *Policy Development and Evaluation Service* published the agency's first policy paper on climate change – a year after Guterres had first raised it to the Executive Committee. The paper was directed as much at an internal audience as an external one, and aimed to offer a preliminary policy stance and back-up, and catch-up with, the High Commissioner's

⁶⁵ Telephone interview with IASC member, 14 April 2010.

⁶⁶ Comments were made on this by a number of IASC members including: Telephone interview with IASC member, 14 April 2010 and OCHA official, 20 March 2010, Geneva.

⁶⁷ OCHA staff member, 20 March 2010, Geneva.

⁶⁸ Informal group on Migration/Displacement and Climate Change of the IASC, 2008. *Climate Change, Migration and Displacement: Who will be affected?*, Working Paper, 31 October 2008.

previous rhetorical statements. The policy paper argued strongly against the use of the term ‘environmental or climate change refugee’, which it posited was a misleading and ‘potentially dangerous’ term. It emphasised that ‘refugee’ should only be applied to those covered by the Refugee Convention (UNHCR 2008). Again, UNHCR’s core stance reflected the agency trying to defend its core mandate.

In addition the policy paper noted that climate change could lead to displacement but this would predominantly be *internal* displacement and UNHCR has responsibility for the protection of internally-displaced peoples under the cluster approach. As it stated: ‘Some movements prompted by climate change could indeed fall within the traditional refugee law framework bringing them within the ambit of international or regional refugee instruments... as well as within UNHCR’s framework’ (UNHCR 2008: 6). Finally, the paper identified gaps in the international protection framework as those displaced across national borders by climate change would not fall under its mandate. The paper stated that: ‘UNHCR does recognise that there are indeed certain groups of migrants, currently falling outside of the scope of international protection, who are in need of humanitarian and/or other forms of assistance’ (UNHCR 2008:9). The paper displayed a cautious shift as UNHCR acknowledged there were protection issues beyond the agency’s mandate. However, it offered little insights into if and how the agency would respond to those who fell outside its mandate: the agency was sticking strongly in policy to its mandate.

In 2009, in the lead-up to Copenhagen, UNHCR also ‘updated’ the policy paper, yet it barely changed at all. The most significant changes in the 2009 policy paper were two

new sentences that called for significant operational and structural shifts to integrate climate change into the agency's work. The 2009 policy paper stated that:

All UNHCR staff involved at the country level with refugee and IDP settlements, both rural and urban, will need to be equipped with strategies to combat and cope with the effects of climate change, impacting not just on persons of concern to UNHCR but also broader host communities (UNHCR 2009a: 11).

The policy paper also claimed that UNHCR would, going forward, have an 'overarching policy to tackle the effects of climate change' which would be reflected in 'operations management; protection strategies; and advocacy' (2009a: 11). While these constituted bold statements there is little evidence that they have been supported by any larger climate change policy development. There was, for example, no 'climate strategy', although one is mentioned in the 2009 paper.⁶⁹ Most importantly, the paper was noticeable for the fact that apart from the two sentences highlighted above almost nothing changed. In fact, a number of UNHCR staff expressed their confusion about why UNHCR attempted to update this paper and yet made no substantive changes.⁷⁰ There was thus little further policy development on climate change between 2008 and 2009 in UNHCR. This lack of policy development appears particularly odd given it was the year of Copenhagen – the biggest climate change negotiations ever (Schroeder 2009).

Over the course of 2009 the IASC working group was the main driving focus of UNHCR's climate change work. Engagement with other agencies on a regular basis, with

⁶⁹ Telephone interview with UNHCR staff member b, Thursday 29 April 2010.

⁷⁰ Interview with UNHCR staff members March – May 2010.

a goal (writing submissions), and with a clear deadline in sight (the UNFCCC summit in December 2009), encouraged UNHCR to develop a more detailed policy position on climate change and statelessness and climate change displacement.⁷¹ UNHCR worked on several other UNFCCC submissions with IOM and the Norwegian Refugee Council and became more interested in finding solutions for those displaced across borders by climate change.⁷² In February 2009 UNHCR co-authored a submission which argued for the inclusion of migration and displacement in the UNFCCC final agreement.⁷³ And in a June 2009 submission it reiterated the core message that the term ‘climate refugee’ should not be used and also recommended that a final UNFCCC agreement ‘acknowledge the need to identify modalities of inter-state cooperation to respond to the needs of affected populations who either cross an international frontier as a result of or find themselves abroad and are unable to return due to the effects of climate change’ (IASC 2009c: 3).⁷⁴ The IASC working group played an important role in catalysing UNHCR to engage with the UNFCCC and think more broadly about the climate change and displacement debate.

⁷¹ Note that the IASC sub-working group consisted of representatives from each organisation who were often lobbying as much internally as externally for their organisation to consider the impact of climate change on their work.

⁷² IOM, UNHCR and UNU. 2009. *Climate change, migration, and displacement: impacts, vulnerability, and adaptation options*, Submission to the 5th session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA 5). Bonn, March 29 – April 8 2009.

⁷³ I will detail this submission further in the IOM chapter.

⁷⁴ IASC Working Group on Climate Change, *Comments and Proposed Revisions to the negotiating text prepared by the Chair of the UNFCCC Ad Hoc Working Group on long-term cooperative action*, June 2009.

In addition, through the IASC working group UNHCR authored a paper on climate change and statelessness.⁷⁵ Unlike the other submissions it was the sole author of this paper, although it was supported by IOM and the Norwegian Refugee Council, as statelessness fitted squarely in UNHCR's mandate. The submission stated that statelessness would be a concern with rising sea levels threatening low-lying island states. The submission explained that while states were likely to be 'uninhabitable' long before 'their full submersion', populations and governments would be externally displaced and potentially become 'stateless'.⁷⁶ UNHCR argued that in this event any stateless people would come under their mandate. In addition it stated that 'in view of its mandate to engage in preventive actions related to statelessness, UNHCR would be pleased to support efforts by States to devise appropriate solutions for potentially affected populations, in partnership with other actors' (UNHCR 2009: 2). The office's position on climate change and statelessness was not controversial as there was a clear link to the Statelessness Convention and thus it could engage and follow a logic of appropriateness.

Although UNHCR's position was evolving, states' support for it was not. When the issue of climate change and displacement was raised by the High Commissioner at the September 2009 Executive Committee there was a public backlash from some states. The Bangladeshi representative stated that he had: 'reservations about any enlargement of the Office's responsibility to cover climate change-induced displacement scenarios. UNHCR should remain focused on its mandated areas where it had comparative advantages'

⁷⁵ UNHCR (supported by IOM and the Norwegian Refugee Council). 2009. *Climate Change and Statelessness*. Submission to the 6th session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA 6) under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 1 to 12 June 2009, Bonn, Germany.

⁷⁶ UNHCR. *Climate change and statelessness*.

(UNHCR 2009c). Bangladesh was concerned that an expansion of UNHCR activities into climate displacement would give it grounds to operate within Bangladesh, and thus undermine its sovereignty.⁷⁷ While Bangladesh now appears to support a revision of UNHCR's mandate⁷⁸ an interview with another member state delegate confirmed that many states were opposed to UNHCR expanding into new areas such as climate change induced displacement.⁷⁹

Despite this lack of state support, the High Commissioner continued to speak out on the issue. In December 2009 he made his first appearance at the UNFCCC negotiations in Copenhagen. He spoke at a number of high-level side events and press conferences on the humanitarian impacts of climate change. At an IASC convened side-event he claimed that: 'Climate change is expected to unseat conflict as the main driver of mass migration in coming years' and has blurred the boundaries between migration and displacement (Bennhold and Brothers 2009). At Copenhagen he implied for the first time that there was a need for a new framework to protect climate change displaces. He stated that 'the international community must develop new mechanisms for the protection of climate refugees'.⁸⁰ These were 'bold statements' and constituted a shift in UNHCR's position.

The High Commissioner, by suggesting that there was a need for new protection frameworks, was implicitly positioning his agency to provide this protection. These

⁷⁷ Bangladesh was concerned that an expansion of UNHCR activities into climate displacement would give it grounds to operate within Bangladesh, and thus undermine its national sovereignty.

⁷⁸ In December 2009 the Bangladeshi Finance Minister Abul Maal Abdul Muhith argued that 'UNHCR needed to be revised' in an interview with the *Guardian* newspaper (Grant et al 2009).

⁷⁹ Interview with UNHCR member state representative a, 23 March 2010, Geneva.

⁸⁰ This was the only occasion that the High Commissioner used the term 'climate refugees'. He made the statement in French, see : Grégoire Allix. 2009. 'António Guterres « La distinction entre réfugiés et déplacés est dépassée », *Le Monde*, 16 December 2009.

statements were potentially dangerous for UNHCR's core work in refugee protection. They could be interpreted as undermining the legal refugee definition: it was no longer relevant and should be significantly reworked. Some UNHCR staff conveyed that the High Commissioner made a strategic decision, as an astute politician, to take this proactive stance on climate change, natural disasters and displacement.⁸¹ He saw that the issue had increased status and UNHCR needed to engage with it in order to retain relevance and credibility.⁸² This suggests that the High Commissioner was more inclined to follow a logic of consequences than the rest of his agency.

In 2010 UNHCR changed the focal point on climate change. The role was given to the Division of International Protection but it was still not an institutionalised full-time role with official terms of reference.⁸³ The Protection Division had several other people – including interns - who worked on the legal implications of climate change for displacement and statelessness. This continual shifting of the focal point illustrates that the agency struggled to decide how to address the issue, where it should be located within the agency and who should be working on it. In short, there was still little consensus that climate change was an important issue that UNHCR should dedicate staff resources to.

In early 2011 UNHCR established a new position, 'Senior Technical Advisor on Climate Change' to develop disaster risk reduction work within the agency. However, the position was only for one-year and filled by the Norwegian Refugee Council, who paid the bulk of

⁸¹ Interview with UNHCR official d, 17 March 2010, Geneva. Telephone interview with UNHCR official 30 March 2010.

⁸² Interview with former senior UNHCR staff member c, 27 January 2012, Oxford.

⁸³ In fact, the original climate change focal point from 2008 took over the role. Telephone interview with UNHCR senior staff member c, 14 May 2010.

the Advisor's salary and benefits.⁸⁴ Moreover, UNHCR sidelined this operational work and focused on the legal (protection) of climate change and displacement.⁸⁵ The climate change advisor investigated funding for UNHCR projects from the various climate change funds but UNHCR was not able to identify or access these successfully.⁸⁶ This was in part because there was no 'buy-in' from the organisation. This example illustrates how UNHCR was not pursuing a logic of consequences in its engagement with climate change.

In 2011 UNHCR commemorated the 60th anniversary of the Refugee Convention and the 50th anniversary of the 1961 Stateless Persons Convention. The High Commissioner made climate change a core theme of the year's celebrations which culminated in two major ministerial meetings in December 2011. UNHCR also encouraged Norway to host a conference on Climate Change and Displacement in Oslo in commemoration of Nansen, the first High Commissioner for Refugees.⁸⁷ The office set the agenda by organising a three-day expert roundtable meeting on *Climate Change and Displacement: Identifying Gaps and Responses* at Bellagio, Italy in February 2011.⁸⁸ A small group of experts from academia, NGOs, IGOs met with senior UNHCR staff, and several governments to discuss the limitations of international protection frameworks for those

⁸⁴ Interview with UNHCR official j, 6 June 2011, Oslo.

⁸⁵ Interview with UNHCR official j, 9 May 2012, Geneva.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Norway was commemorating the 150th anniversary of Nansen's birth, which also coincided with the 100th anniversary of the first expedition to the South Pole led by Norwegian Roald Amundsen. To celebrate the Nansen-Amundsen Year in 2011 an individual at the Ministry of the Environment proposed dedicating a conference to Nansen's legacy as a: polar explorer, scientist (he was an oceanographer and early climate scientist) and a champion of humanitarianism. The Nansen conference was organised by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry for the Environment in partnership with the Norwegian Refugee Council and the Centre for Climate and Environmental Research. Interview with Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, 6 June 2011, Oslo.

⁸⁸ UNHCR. 2011. *Agenda for the Expert Roundtable: Change and Displacement: Identifying Gaps and Responses*, Bellagio, Italy, February 22 – 25 2011.

displaced by climate change. The most significant outcome of this meeting was the recommendation that ‘states in conjunction with UNHCR develop a guiding framework or instrument’ to address the protection needs of those displaced by sudden-onset disasters.⁸⁹ In sum, UNHCR began the year with an explicit goal: to develop a new protection mandate for climate change displacement.

In May 2011 UNHCR then urged states to explicitly pledge to address this protection gap at the December Ministerial Meeting. The agency wrote a guidance note for the pledging process in preparation for the Ministerial Summits. In the last section of this guidance note they encouraged states to:

identify situations that fell outside of the scope of the existing refugee protection instruments, develop the international protection regime in a way that provides appropriate and consistent responses to these situations; and/or developing a guiding framework for temporary or interim protection scenarios identifying the circumstances in which protection would be activated, the treatment that would be provided and how it would come to an end.⁹⁰

The pledging document did not explicitly mention ‘climate change induced displacement’, as UNHCR was concerned that states would be less likely to support or make pledges on this agenda item if they did so.⁹¹ However, UNHCR hoped that states would follow the recommendations from Bellagio and be favourable to an involvement of

⁸⁹ UNHCR did not necessarily mean a treaty but favoured a form of soft-law (collection of existing legal precedents and international law) similar to the IDP guiding principles and was UNHCR’s policy recommendation from the conference, not that of the academics. UNHCR. 2011. *Summary of Deliberations from the Expert Roundtable: Change and Displacement: Identifying Gaps and Responses*, Bellagio, 22 – 25 February 2011: 4.

⁹⁰ UNHCR. 2011. *Additional guidance note to support the state pledges process*, UNHCR, Geneva, 26 May 2011: 9.

⁹¹ Interview with UNHCR senior official 1, 7 June 2011, Oslo.

UNHCR in addressing protection gaps related to cross-border displacement as a result of natural disaster and climate change induced displacement.⁹²

UNHCR also used the Norwegian *Nansen Conference on Climate Change and Displacement* to lobby states for mandate expansion. The conference in Oslo included several member state representatives (Finland, Kenya, New Zealand and the US), academics, NGOs and policy makers. The High Commissioner in his opening speech outlined a role for UNHCR in offering protection to climate displaces: ‘Even if they are not refugees, such people are entitled to our support and to have their voices heard and taken into account’.⁹³ He called for a new legal framework for those displaced externally: ‘I strongly believe that a more viable approach would be to at least develop a global guiding framework for situations of cross-border displacement resulting from climate change and natural disasters.’⁹⁴ Finally he urged conference attendees to endorse the *Nansen Principles* as these would make a significant contribution to the 60th anniversary.⁹⁵

The *Nansen Principles* restated the Bellagio recommendation for: ‘a more coherent and consistent approach at the international level...to meet the protection needs of people displaced externally owing to sudden onset events’.⁹⁶ In addition, it called upon states, ‘working in conjunction with UNHCR’ to ‘develop a guiding framework or instrument in

⁹² Interview with UNHCR senior official I, 7 June 2011, Oslo.

⁹³ António Guterres, ‘Statement by António Guterres’, *Nansen Conference on Climate Change and Displacement*, Oslo Norway 2011.

⁹⁴ Note he used the term ‘guiding framework’ to avoid reference to a treaty or guiding principles. Guterres, *Nansen Conference*.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ *Nansen Principles*, in the *Chairperson’s summary of the Nansen Conference on Climate Change and Displacement in the 21st Century*, Oslo, 6-7 June 2011

this regard.⁹⁷ What was important was that UNHCR could now claim that they had a state's (Norway) support for this and thus move the debate forward. The Nansen principles were authored by a small group: the Norwegian Refugee Council, UNHCR and the Norwegian government representatives but the primary authorship was clearly UNHCR's.⁹⁸ UNHCR wanted states to endorse their position as the leader and facilitator of discussions on a new protection framework.

States were suspicious of this strategy and generally unsupportive of UNHCR expansion. The Kenyan Commissioner for Refugee Affairs, for instance, who was present at the Nansen conference, maintained that 'UNHCR have already expanded to include statelessness, IDPs and [now] including environment-related movers, a fourth category of people, how amorphous is this organisation going to be?'.⁹⁹ He was against mandate expansion 'If [financial] support for UNHCR stays the same then they should leave it to another agency so that resources aren't spread too thinly.'¹⁰⁰ Some states argued that it was 'too early' to talk about developing soft-law frameworks for climate change displacement.¹⁰¹ Other states expressed concern that UNHCR did not have capacity or

⁹⁷ Principle IX, Ibid. The Chairperson's summary also reiterated UNHCR's position that the terms 'climate refugees' and 'environmental refugee' should be avoided as they are legally inaccurate and misleading'. They suggested instead that the term 'environmentally displaced person' should be used to refer to those displaced by climate change and other natural hazards. Ibid: 4.

⁹⁸ Conference attendees were told they would have some involvement in drafting the principles which would be finalized over the course of the two-day conference. In fact, there was very little opportunity for the attendees to provide input. The author attended the conference and conducted interviews with academics, NGOs and UNHCR officials.

⁹⁹ Interview with Kenyan Commissioner for Refugee Affairs, 7 June 2011, Oslo.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Telephone interview with UNHCR member state representative g, 19 June 2012.

financial resources to expand, particularly given they had enough difficulty fulfilling their obligations to refugees.¹⁰²

The High Commissioner continued to campaign for a new protection framework. In November 2011 Guterres made a speech to the UN Security Council on climate change and displacement. He stated that: ‘More and more people are being forced to flee due to reasons that are not covered by the 1951 Refugee Convention’.¹⁰³ He argued that it was a ‘humanitarian imperative’ to assist those displaced by climate change or other natural disasters.¹⁰⁴ Finally, he recommended that the international community ‘formulate and adopt a set of principles, specifically designed to reinforce the protection of and find solutions for people who have been forced to leave their own country as a result of catastrophic environmental events, and who may not qualify for refugee status under international law’.¹⁰⁵ In this speech he promoted expansion over affirming UNHCR’s core identity. Although he attempted to link this call for a new protection framework to UNHCR’s existing responsibilities, these issue linkages were tenuous.¹⁰⁶ He reiterated this demand for a new international protection framework to states at the December Ministerial Meeting and stated that UNHCR was ‘ready to work with states who want to help develop such guiding frameworks’.¹⁰⁷ UNHCR’s emphasis on expanding a protection framework reflects its normative IGO type.

¹⁰² Interview with UNHCR member state representative d, 10 May 2012, Geneva.

¹⁰³ Guterres, 2011, *UN Security Council Statement*.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Guterres, 2011, *UN Security Council Statement*.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Statement by António Guterres. 2011. *Intergovernmental Meeting at Ministerial Level to mark the 60th anniversary of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 50th anniversary of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness*, Geneva, 7 December 2011.

The December Ministerial meeting was a disappointment for UNHCR as it did not gain a new mandate for climate change displacement. UNHCR prioritised ‘future protection challenges’ and burden-sharing as the two major issues for the Ministerial meeting. In the UNHCR background paper they highlighted the gap in the international normative framework, and recommended a new ‘global guiding framework’ or instrument for displaced peoples who did not fit inside the Convention.¹⁰⁸ This guiding framework was primarily aimed at climate change and natural disasters related displacement but UNHCR asked states if it could be broader. However, no states pledged to develop a new protection framework.¹⁰⁹ UNHCR did not gain a mandated expansion of its activities in 2011. However it had changed its rhetoric and policy position significantly but not its structure on the issue of climate change and displacement. The next section will examine the operational response to climate change in UNHCR Kenya.

Operational Change in Kenya

Kenya houses the largest refugee camp in the world - Dadaab – with over 500,000 refugees predominantly from Somalia. In 2011 the Horn of Africa faced a massive drought which led to a humanitarian crisis with thousands leaving Somalia for

¹⁰⁸ UNHCR. 2011. ‘Background Note for the Roundtables’, *Intergovernmental event at the ministerial level of Member States of the United Nations on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 50th anniversary of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness*, HCR/MINCOMMS/2011/08, 18 November 2011, Geneva.

¹⁰⁹ There was no mention of climate change or natural disaster displacement in the final Ministerial Communiqué. However, Mexico, Argentina, Norway, Germany and Switzerland were supportive of addressing the protection gap. See: Ministerial Communiqué, *Intergovernmental event at the ministerial level of Member States of the United Nations on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 50th anniversary of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness* (7-8 December 2011), HCR/MINCOMMS/2011/6, 8 December 2011 and Mexico Pledges, *Intergovernmental event at the ministerial level of Member States of the United Nations on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 50th anniversary of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness* (7-8 December 2011). Interviews with UNHCR member state representatives c and e, 8 and 10 May 2012, Geneva, Switzerland.

neighbouring countries.¹¹⁰ The OHCA framed this as a climate change driven crisis, although also acknowledging the impact of ongoing civil war in Somalia. For these reasons studying UNHCR response on the ground in Kenya to Somali asylum-seekers in 2011 provides an insight into if and how global debates on climate change and displacement resonated at the operational level.

In addition, UNHCR Geneva had highlighted at the UNFCCC summit in 2009 that climate change displacement was occurring into Kenyan refugee camps.¹¹¹ In December 2009, UNHCR Geneva published a press release stating that many Ethiopians and Somalis were being ‘forced to flee due to climate change and general insecurity’.¹¹² It cited the example of an Ethiopian (but ethnic Somali), Dulane Jama, and his family who were unable to sustain their pastoralist livelihoods due to a lack of rain and thus pasture. The article maintained that Jama saw the lack of rain and weather conditions as ‘the root of his problem’. Although most of the refugees in Dadaab had ‘fled conflict or persecution in their troubled homeland’ (thus making them traditional refugees), Dulane was ‘slightly different – he and his family have been forced to flee by climate change and general insecurity’.¹¹³ This was a highly controversial and potentially dangerous statement as it undermined Dulane’s claim to refugee status. The article did not stipulate

¹¹⁰ The crisis ran from June to September 2011 and covered much of the Horn of African including Northern Kenya and Somalia. The crisis was widely framed as a famine due to a severe drought in Southern Somalia and Dadaab received thousands of new arrivals. Press releases from UNHCR Dadaab and personal correspondence with Bettina Schulte, UNHCR Dadaab media advisor, July – November 2011. I visited Dadaab in April 2011.

¹¹¹ This is one of the rationales for an examination of UNHCR’s operations in Kenyan refugee camps. They have explicitly highlighted only two other examples of climate change displacement: in the Pacific Islands and in Bangladesh.

¹¹² Andy Needham. 2009. Nowhere to hide from climate change in Kenyan refugee camp, *UNHCR News Stories*, 18 December 2009, available at <http://www.unhcr.org/4b2b76a79.html> accessed 20 December 2009.

¹¹³ The article was explicit that, Jama did not use, and was not familiar with, the term climate change.

whether UNHCR had provided Dulane and his family assistance and/or if they had gained refugee status.

UNHCR Kenya does not view climate change induced displacement as an issue of concern in the Kakuma or Dadaab refugee camps.¹¹⁴ The prevailing view is that those hosted in Kenyan refugee camps have been forced to flee due to well-founded fears of persecution and fit within the Convention's definition of a refugee and the OAU definition.¹¹⁵ None of the refugee status determination officers in Kakuma and Dadaab reported that climate change (or even proxy issues such as environmental stress or drought) had specifically been given as a cause of displacement by an interviewee.¹¹⁶ UNHCR Kenya staff were not aware of the global debate on climate change induced displacement, had not seen UNHCR's policy briefs on the topic, and did not conceive of a 'gap' in the international protection framework.¹¹⁷ The head of the Kenyan Department

¹¹⁴ UNHCR does ask new arrivals at Kenyan camps their 'primary reason of flight' but this data is of very questionable validity. The office sorts responses into the following categories: 'access to food/assistance', 'livelihood problems (environmental)', as well as 'attack by fighting forces', 'political reasons/threats' and 'general insecurity'. According to these registration statistics in 2010 the vast majority of new arrivals to Dadaab reported they had fled due to general insecurity (85.56 percent). The second most influential reason was food insecurity (2.76 percent); followed by livelihood problems - environmental (2.33 percent) and livelihood problems – security (2 percent). These categories are highly problematic as they overlap - the distinction between food insecurity and livelihood problems (environmental) is not clear for instance. Interview with UNHCR official m, 21 April 2011, Dadaab; UNHCR Flight Reasons Statistics between 1 Jan 2010 and 31 Dec 2010.

¹¹⁵ Interviews with UNHCR staff in Nairobi, Dadaab and Kakuma March – April 2011. Note that the definition of a refugee in Africa is based on the OAU definition and thus broader than the Convention definition. As mentioned previously in chapter two, the 1969 OAU defines a refugee as any person compelled to leave his or her country 'owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country or origin or nationality'. *1989 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa*, Article 1 (2), 10 September 1969.

¹¹⁶ Interviews with UNHCR Refugee status determination officer, April 2011, Dadaab and Kakuma. Although refugees may not cite drought or general environmental insecurity as a reason for flight as they are often taught by others what to say to gain refugee status. One UNHCR official described Somalis as 'professional refugees' suggesting that they know what to say to gain refugee status. Interview with UNHCR Head of Dadaab Sub-Office, 20 April 2011, Dadaab.

¹¹⁷ Interviews with UNHCR officials in Kakuma (7 – 15 April) and Dadaab (20 – 21 April).

of Refugees Affairs also claimed that there has been ‘no discussion with UNHCR on climate change and displacement [in Kenya]. They are full to the brim with responsibilities and won’t accept any more’.¹¹⁸

However, staff in UNHCR Kenya did claim that during the drought and resulting famine in Somalia there was an increase in refugee arrivals.¹¹⁹ UNHCR staff in Dadaab, including the head of sub office, claimed there had been an increase in new arrivals when Somalia was in drought.¹²⁰ Moreover many staff highlighted the interconnections between conflict, drought and famine leading to displacement. A UNCHR officer explained that ‘there are higher malnutrition rates [in Somalia] where there is drought, and where it is Al Shabaab controlled’ suggesting that the presence of famine is linked to the Somali civil war.¹²¹

In fact, most UNHCR staff acknowledged that displacement into Kenya from Somali was often a product of drought and conflict.¹²² One staff member stated that ‘Somalis are coming into Kenya partly because of drought on the Somali side’ and added that Somalia ‘does not have the capacity to host those people suffering from drought’.¹²³ Another

¹¹⁸ Interview with Kenyan Commissioner for Refugee Affairs, 7 June 2011, Oslo.

¹¹⁹ This trend became particularly noticeable during the famine and humanitarian crisis in Somali between July – November 2011 which saw thousands of new arrivals to Dadaab. However it is important to note that drought cannot be directly attributed to climate change, nor can any other extreme weather events.

¹²⁰ Interview with UNHCR Head of Dadaab Sub-Office, 20 April 2011, Dadaab.

¹²¹ Interview with UNCHR officer n, 21 April 2011, Dadaab.

¹²² I talked with a number of refugees during my visit to Dadaab and Kakuma but did not have the opportunity nor the resources to conduct a rigorous, systematic survey of causes of movement. Anecdotally there was a mixed response from refugees across the camps and destination countries – some refugees highlighted conflict as a reason for their displacement, and some stated that that drought was an issue.

¹²³ Interview with UNHCR official g, 29 March 2011, Nairobi. A Norwegian Refugee Council staff member explained that ‘drought has diminished the livelihoods of people’ and ‘they have nothing else if their livelihoods are destroyed’. Interview with Norwegian Refugee Council official, 19 March 2011, Nairobi.

UNHCR staff member maintained that ‘the climate makes things worse. It is not the first reason why people flee but it aggravates the whole situation, even people who could find a reason to return are reluctant’.¹²⁴ However, no staff, used the term ‘climate change induced displacement’ to describe such movement. They recognised that displacement had to be primarily driven by conflict for UNHCR to have a mandate.

The position taken by UNHCR Kenya staff is partly because Somali asylum seekers, who constitute over ninety percent of Kenya’s refugee intake, have *prima facie* refugee status due to the prevalence of conflict. They are recognised collectively as refugees and do not need individual status determination.¹²⁵ Thus the key component of their flight from Somalia may be drought but UNHCR is still mandated to offer them protection. The head of UNHCR’s Dadaab sub-office summarised the situation as follows: ‘Somali’s have *prima facie* status so it [climate change induced displacement] is not an issue anyway that needs to be worked through’.¹²⁶ In short, Somalis’ *prima facie* refugee status and UNHCR’s operational focus on Convention refugees meant UNHCR Kenya did not perceive climate change as driving displacement.

There was one exception: a UNHCR staff member in Nairobi, in a relatively senior role, claimed that people displaced by natural disasters did fall within UNHCR’s refugee

¹²⁴ Interview with UNHCR official k, 5 April 2011, Nairobi.

¹²⁵ *Prima facie* status is in the Somali case based on either the Refugee Convention or the Organisation of African Union Convention and given due to the ongoing civil war and lack of central government (Hyndman and Nyuland 1998).

¹²⁶ Interview with UNHCR Head of Sub Office, 20 April 2011, Dadaab.

mandate.¹²⁷ He (mistakenly) proposed that: ‘A refugee is defined as: 1) if they cross a border; and 2) they have been forced to cross a border either because of fear of persecution *or because of a fear of a natural disaster*’.¹²⁸ This is a highly controversial and erroneous statement for a UNHCR staff member as the Refugee Convention does not cover natural disasters and never has.¹²⁹ This interview was an anomaly – no other UNHCR staff member interviewed in Kenya or elsewhere suggested natural disaster displacement was covered by the Refugee Convention or tried to distinguish between UNHCR’s mandate in slow and fast onset events. It illustrates that even though UNHCR has a strong organisational culture focused on refugee protection, not all staff are aware of the specific details of their agencies mandate, of who exactly they are able to protect and when they may be stepping outside UNHCR’s mandate. Essentially, this shows the limitations of UNHCR’s normative identity – it does not penetrate down to every individual staff member.

UNHCR, Natural Disasters and Internally Displaced Peoples (IDPs)

Parallel to these debates on climate change and displacement, there were ongoing discussions over UNHCR’s protection role for IDPs, including those displaced by natural

¹²⁷ The staff member was not a member of protection or responsible for refugee status determination in any way and thus it was not his principal duty to know the definition of a refugee according to the 1951 Refugee Convention.

¹²⁸ Author’s emphasis. Interview with UNHCR staff member g, 29 April 2011, Nairobi.

¹²⁹ In addition, the staff member claimed that UNHCR only had a mandate for fast onset events and not slow onset events as *forced* displacement did not occur in the latter. He explained that while ‘drought is indeed a natural disaster’ it ‘doesn’t necessarily force movement’ as ‘you chose to move’ and thus, ‘strictly speaking I don’t think displacement by drought would come under UNHCR’. However, he acknowledged that when people are displaced by drought, such as from Somalia, they do not ‘send them back’. His explanation was that: ‘if people are there and they are dying then we move in, we don’t necessarily distinguish between the displaced. We come into help them because they are displaced. But in terms of strict definitions drought does not stop you from going back to where you came from that is why we don’t necessarily help drought affected people’. Interview with UNHCR official g, 29 April 2011, Nairobi, Kenya.

disasters.¹³⁰ UNHCR's engagement with natural disaster IDPs was not fundamentally framed as a 'response to climate change' but came out of broader concerns about humanitarian reform and IDPs. The policy discussions on protection for natural disaster IDPs and climate change displacement were relatively separate.¹³¹ Yet there was important overlap as UNHCR in the 2000s increasingly sought to provide assistance to people displaced by floods, earthquakes and tsunamis and in doing so conflated the terms natural disaster and climate change. Natural disasters constitute a broad category of which some events could be linked to climate change (hydro-meteorological events) but many could not (tsunamis and earthquakes). Nevertheless both natural disasters and climate change displacement across borders face the same issue: there is no legal framework for international protection.¹³² We can thus test if the logic of appropriateness was also in action in UNHCR's engagement with natural disasters: we would expect the office to expand if protection of natural disaster displaces was perceived to link to their mandate. If a logic of consequences was in action we would expect UNHCR to be driven to expand by an increased global salience of natural disasters and potential for new financing.

In the 2000s UNHCR began to offer assistance on an ad-hoc basis to natural disasters IDPs. It offered assistance for the first time in Sri Lanka and Indonesia following the Asian Tsunami of 2004. It made this 'unprecedented move' upon the request of the

¹³⁰ UNHCR was granted an exclusive mandate for protection at the global and national level for conflict related IDPs but not natural disaster IDPs.

¹³¹ Agnes Hurwitz, UNHCR Research Officer, Division of International Protection, *The Nansen Principles on Climate Change and Displacement: Implications for Policy and Research*, Presentation at the Refugee Studies Center Seminar, Oxford University, 1 November 2011.

¹³² I have restricted my analysis to international displacement and do not focus on internal displacement as this is covered by the IDP guiding principles.

Secretary General and made clear it was doing this beyond its formal mandate (Deschamp, Azorbo and Lohse 2010). The office justified their involvement due to their ‘heavy operational presence on the ground and the massive scale of the disaster and need for immediate humanitarian action’ (Loescher 2002: 489). Following this, UNHCR took action in a six other natural disaster situations including: the Pakistan earthquake (2005); cyclone Nargis in Myanmar (2008); the Philippines floods (2009); the Pakistan floods (2010) and the Haitian earthquake (2010).¹³³ In all of these cases UNHCR already had an operational presence in the country and thus there was a humanitarian imperative to assist. It was difficult for the organisation not to offer its expertise and resources to assist the local population (Betts, Loescher and Milner 2012: 148).¹³⁴ UNHCR also offered assistance as a symbolic ‘gesture of international solidarity’.¹³⁵ Finally, there were instrumental advantages to this assistance. By assisting local IDPs it could build better relations with host governments which it hoped would benefit its refugee operations in country (Betts, Loescher and Milner 2012: 148).¹³⁶

In 2005 the inter-agency standing committee asked UN agencies to take the lead in particular areas (or clusters) of humanitarian operations (Betts, Loscher and Milner 2012: 73).¹³⁷ UNHCR was asked to take a role in the protection and assistance of IDPs and in

¹³³ UNHCR. 2011. *UNHCR’s role in support of an enhanced humanitarian response for the protection of persons affected by natural disasters*. Geneva: UNHCR.

¹³⁴ In addition, on some occasions refugees were also caught up in the floods. This was the case in the Pakistan floods and also in Kenya where the Dadaab refugee camp has been flooded several times in the past five years. Interview with UNHCR Senior Official i, 11 November 2011, Sydney.

¹³⁵ They sent a team to hurricane Katrina and also to assist with the earthquake in China on this basis, although the link to UNHCR’s mandate was tenuous. Ibid.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ The cluster system established a division of labour among UN agencies in humanitarian emergencies. Clusters were established to coordinate core sectors (water and sanitation, camp management, protection) and agencies nominated to lead these at the global and country level.

September they gained a mandate from the IASC to do so. UNHCR became the global ‘cluster lead’ for protection, camp management and emergency shelter of conflict generated IDPs. This mandate was from the IASC — not from states — and was a product of the wider humanitarian reform process. UNHCR’s mandate for IDPs under the cluster system was significant as it gave the agency a mandate for IDP protection.¹³⁸ However, UNHCR did not follow a logic of consequences and pursue cluster leads for financial gain.¹³⁹ Guterres argued in the lead-up to his appointment as High Commissioner that: ‘we must consider a well-defined UNHCR role in providing protection to internally displaced persons. They are not refugees according to the Convention, but they are it in fact. It would not make sense to forget about our unique capacity and expertise’.¹⁴⁰

UNHCR differentiated its protection mandate for those affected by conflict from those affected by natural disaster. UNHCR was the sole cluster lead at the country level for protection of conflict-induced IDPs (UNHCR 2006). However, its cluster protection role for natural disasters IDPs was shared at the country level with OHCHR and UNICEF.¹⁴¹

¹³⁸ There was a debate at UNHCR over whether it should be cluster lead for conflict IDPs. There was a concern that expansion would drain staff and budget and undermines its refugee protection mandate. To ensure that it did not divert funds from refugee programs for cluster work UNHCR created a separate budget for IDP operations and imposed a seven percent levy on its IDP work. However there still remain concerns about whether IDP protection detracts from its core mandate (Betts, Loescher and Milner 2012: 136 – 137).

¹³⁹ Interview with former UNHCR senior official c, 27 January 2012, Oxford

¹⁴⁰ He stressed that UNHCR faced with this new issue area had to balance their core mandate with expansion: ‘The key question, facing this [IDP question] or other problems is to be able to keep one’s identity and clearly engage, in good faith, in an open cooperation with all relevant entities’. He also stated that: ‘Our identity is clear and we can never renounce it. But the stronger the identity, the self-confidence, and the clear vision of our mandate, the better we work with others for the goals we have in common’. Guterres, *Talk Back, Special Issue*.

¹⁴¹ For more on UNHCR’s protection mandate see: Anonymous. 1997. "The UNHCR Note on International Protection You Won't See." *International Refugee Law* 9:267 - 273. Working group on International

The agency perceived it had a critical role in protection for conflict-induced IDPs but not for natural disaster IDPs (Betts, Loescher and Milner 2012). This delineation is important as it shows the agency sought to establish a clear link to its mandate: it would protect those IDPs that could potentially become refugees (those facing persecution and conflict) but not those facing environmental disasters. In other words, UNHCR distinguished between natural disasters and conflict IDPs as the latter fitted more closely with their mandate (although the Convention does not refer to conflict).

In addition, UNHCR ensured that refugees remained outside of the cluster system during the process of humanitarian reform. The agency saw refugees as a distinct group, separate from others victims of humanitarian crises, and did not want to integrate them into the humanitarian cluster system. It saw itself as the sole overseeing agency responsible for refugee matters which ran counter to the logic of the cluster system which allocated responsibility along thematic sectoral lines (such as water and sanitation). From an operational perspective this was highly problematic: how could one distinguish between refugees in complex emergencies where there were often many causes of movement? Furthermore creating a special exemption for refugees undermined the plan for a universal, streamlined and predictable humanitarian responses framework.¹⁴²

The head of the UN's humanitarian response sought to convince UNHCR to include refugees within the cluster system. In February 2009 the Emergency Relief Coordinator,

Refugee policy; Report on the International Conference on the Protection Mandate of UNHCR. 1999. *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 12, 2.

¹⁴² Note that some other sectors also remained out of the IASC cluster framework where was already clear leadership and line of accountability (food was coordinated by the World Food Programme for instance). However these were thematic areas rather than population groups.

John Holmes, met with Guterres to discuss UNHCR's role in the cluster system.¹⁴³

Holmes encouraged the High Commissioner to ask the General Assembly for a broader humanitarian mandate and not one with a dominant focus on refugees, which had the effect of leaving refugee emergencies outside the clusterised response. He assumed, however, that UNHCR's refugee mandate could be easily changed by general assembly resolution. The High Commissioner responded by explaining that the UNHCR mandate was more than a General Assembly resolution.¹⁴⁴ UNHCR's mandate could not be so easily changed as it also based on the Refugee Convention. Guterres had the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees on hand and was able to show it to Holmes and explain UNHCR's supervisory status over the Convention.¹⁴⁵ This is a compelling example of the logic of appropriateness in action.

Although the High Commissioner treasured UNHCR's refugee mandate he also sought to expand its humanitarian activities over the course of the 2000s. In particular, he wanted to formalise a role for UNHCR in natural disaster situations. In September 2009 in a speech to the Executive Committee he proposed that UNHCR take a 'more predictable role' as the protection lead at the country level in natural disasters (Betts, Loescher and Milner 2012: 76). States were not supportive of such an expansion, although they supported the High Commissioner and reelected him for a second term in office in April 2010. In speeches to UNHCR staff after his reelection he highlighted his expansionist tendencies stating that he saw UNHCR as the lead humanitarian actor for 'forced

¹⁴³ Interview with former UNHCR staff member c, 27 January, Oxford 2012.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ Interview with former UNHCR senior official c, 27 January 2012, Oxford

migration’.¹⁴⁶ In line with this vision, one of his top priorities was to develop the office’s ability to rapidly respond to humanitarian emergencies and take on a wider set of responsibilities within the cluster system (Betts, Loescher and Milner 2012: 78 – 79).¹⁴⁷

Over the course of 2010 and 2011 Guterres sought a more clearly defined mandate and ‘predictable role’ for UNHCR in natural disasters. He made a bid directly to the IASC heads of agencies to be the cluster lead for protection of IDPs in natural disasters in early 2010.¹⁴⁸ In addition, the agency published a review arguing for UNHCR to take on a ‘more predictable role’ in natural disasters (Deschamp, Azorbo and Lohse 2010: 2). UNHCR stated that until 2009 there had been ‘no institutional appetite for involvement in natural disasters, the international community’s focus on climate change and natural disasters has changed that, and, it would appear, so have institutional considerations about UNHCR’s future role as *the* protection agency’ (Deschamp, Azorbo and Lohse 2010: 3). It claimed that UNHCR’s involvement with natural disasters had been ‘unpredictable’, and ‘by exception and slow’. This was problematic for UNHCR as it could not access flash appeal funding in natural disasters and made it difficult for other NGOs and partners who were not sure of UNHCR’s role. It proposed that UNHCR should ‘provide leadership, especially in regard to any “protection gaps” rising from the debate over climate change and environmental refugees’ (Deschamp, Azorbo and Lohse 2010: 8). It saw UNHCR’s expansion into natural disaster protection as ‘consistent with

¹⁴⁶ Telephone interview with UNHCR staff e, 13 April 2010.

¹⁴⁷ The other top priority was to strengthen UNHCR’s protection role in the field (Betts, Loescher and Milner 2012: 78 – 79).

¹⁴⁸ He asked the Emergency Relief Coordinator to write a letter asking UNHCR to become the global protection lead for both conflict and natural disaster induced displacement (Betts, Loescher and Milner 2012).

UNHCR's protection work with IDPs to date...and a natural progression from its role as lead of the Global Protection Cluster' (Deschamp, Azorbo and Lohse 2010: 9).¹⁴⁹ This policy paper was a significant policy development and illustrates how the expansion into climate change and displacement overlapped with, and may have even triggered expansion into IDP natural disaster assistance.

In December 2010 the IASC endorsed a UNHCR 12-month 'pilot programme' as the protection coordinator at country level in natural disasters (Betts, Loescher and Milner 2012: 138; Deschamp, Azorbo and Lohse 2010). Following this, UNHCR went to its member states for a mandate for this pilot programme. States resolutely rejected it. At the Standing Committee in March 2011 several delegations cautioned that UNHCR's engagement with and protection of natural disaster victims 'should not be at the expense of its core mandate; that it should be subject to the consent of the Government concerned; and that it should not entail any diversion of funding from core mandate activities'.¹⁵⁰ States were not supportive of UNHCR's becoming the lead humanitarian agency for protection in natural disasters just as they were not for climate change and displacement.

Evaluating UNHCR's Organisational Change

This section summarises the changes in rhetoric, policy, structure and operations described in the previous section. It evaluates them out of ten according to the indicators

¹⁴⁹ They had the expertise and 'recognised competence and experience', particularly in 'profiling and registration', to assist displaced populations (UNHCR 2010: 8).

¹⁵⁰ Most states had major reservations about UNHCR taking on an expanded role. They were not 'convinced by the information provided to date' on the need for UNHCR's to take a lead in this area. The final decision was that UNHCR needed to conduct further consultations and outline in a paper to states why the IASC was proposing such a role for UNHCR. UNHCR, *Draft Report of the 50th meeting of the Standing Committee* (1 – 3 March 2011), Geneva, UNHCR: 5.

established in chapter one, ten is complete transformation in response to a new issue area and zero is no change.

Rhetorical Change (7)

Between 2000 and 2007 UNHCR senior leadership did not respond in rhetoric to the issue of climate change. The issue was of low status and not deemed to be relevant to UNHCR's core mandate. The High Commissioner first noted the links between climate change and displacement in 2007. This was at the same time that climate change took on high global salience.

From 2008 onwards the High Commissioner made climate change a regular theme of speeches. He would commonly refer in his speeches to climate change as a new 'mega-trend' which would trigger more displacement than conflict. In addition, he made climate change a significant theme of at least three speeches annually from 2009. In 2009 he outlined that climate change would lead to new forms of displacement and statelessness which fell outside the Refugee Convention and he called for new protection mechanisms. In 2010 and 2011 Guterres explicitly outlined a specific UNHCR position and role in dealing with climate change and displacement. He argued to the IASC and the UNHCR Standing Committee that UNHCR should be the cluster lead for protection of natural disaster IDPs. In 2011 Guterres proposed that UNHCR should facilitate a new framework for those displaced internationally by climate change at the Nansen Conference and in a speech to the UN Security Council.

In sum, there was significant rhetorical change in UNHCR which is reflected in a rhetorical change score of seven. This indicates that: the leadership made the issue a regular theme in speeches (more than three times a year); on a sustained basis and outlined the agency's response to this issue. UNHCR made significant change from a baseline in 2000 of no rhetorical engagement with climate change. These changes began when climate change took on high issue-status.

Policy Change (6)

UNHCR made no policy change between 2000 and 2006 when climate change had low issue status. Notably when climate change took on high linkage salience they began to publish policy papers on the issue (in 2008 and 2009) and a series of submissions to the UNFCCC on climate change and displacement, and statelessness (2008 – 2009).

However, these policies were not accompanied by other high-level strategic documents. Although the 2009 policy paper referred to a climate change strategy and stated that UNHCR would establish an 'overarching policy to tackle the effects of climate change', this never came to fruition.

Despite this lack of high-level policy direction, climate change was identified as an important priority in 2011 for the 60th Anniversary of the Refugee Convention and the 50th Anniversary of the Statelessness Convention. UNHCR sought to informally expand its mandate and offer protection in two ways. Firstly it sought a mandate from the IASC (2010) and then states (2011) to protect natural disaster IDPs. It had not succeeded in obtaining such a mandate by December 2011. In addition, UNHCR lobbied states during

the Nansen Conference and in the lead-up to the 2011 Ministerial Conference for a role in developing a new ‘framework’ for those displaced internationally by climate change and natural disasters. This was not supported by states either. Interestingly, these two policy developments (natural disasters IDPs and climate change induced displacement) occurred somewhat separately within the organisation. Although they were often linked at a rhetorical level by the High Commissioner, there was no clear policy link between them. UNHCR’s overall score for policy change is six as it made significant changes but had no high-level policy documents, which would shift it into the 7 – 10 bracket.

Structural Change (3)

UNHCR did not create and fund any full time positions dedicated to working on climate change and displacement. This means it does not reach the criteria for significant structural change (a score between 4 and 6). UNHCR did make minor structural changes. It had a number of staff who were allocated to working on the issue – such as the climate change focal point (2008 – 2011) – but no full-time permanent positions on the issues. Although several staff took on full-time responsibility for climate change they were in short-term roles and not permanent positions with climate change in their terms of reference.¹⁵¹ The only exception to this was the senior technical advisor on adaptation and climate change, who began in 2011. However the role was funded by the Norwegian Refugee Council and expired after a year as UNHCR chose not to renew it (even though the Norwegian Refugee Council offered to continue funding it). UNHCR’s overall score for structural change is three.

¹⁵¹ There were only two UNHCR staff to work on the issue full-time and both did so for a short period of time between missions and their positions were not institutionalised in the UNHCR organigram. Interview with former UNHCR senior official c, 27 January 2012, Oxford.

Operational Change (1)

UNHCR did not respond to ‘climate change displacement’ at an operational level.

UNHCR Kenya staff dealing with displacement due to drought and conflict in the Horn of Africa, were not familiar with the term ‘climate change displacement’ and unaware of the aforementioned policy and rhetorical shifts at UNHCR headquarters. While UNHCR staff acknowledged that drought and famine impacted on refugees’ decision to flee, the causes of famine were seen as deeply interconnected with wider political instability.

UNHCR has not identified any population – either in this region or globally - as ‘climate change displaced’ and sought to offer assistance on this basis. In the Kenyan context this is because those living in Kakuma and Dadaab are perceived as ‘Convention refugees’ with a legitimate claim to refugee status, whether it be granted through individual status recognition or prima facie processes.

UNHCR did expand and respond to natural disasters during this period but did not frame their work as responding to ‘climate change displacement’. Throughout the 2000s they offered ad-hoc assistance to victims of natural disasters and sought a mandate to be the global cluster lead for protection in natural disasters. However, victims of natural disasters does not overlap completely with those affected by climate change related events (such as floods; drought and sea-level rise). It includes people displaced by earthquakes and tsunamis that are not a product of climate change. In short, these operational activities do not indicate UNCHR ‘responding to climate change’ but responding to new humanitarian needs. However, UNHCR’s humanitarian activities

during the 2000s suggest that there is scope for addressing some climate change displacement within existing structures.

Finally, there is a mismatch between operational categories and the policy process at headquarters. While UNHCR staff have invested in developing responses to climate change displacement no UNHCR staff could identify a population displaced internationally by climate change related disasters. For example, UNHCR has claimed in policy and rhetorical statements that statelessness on low-lying islands may be an issue however it has not worked significantly on this issue in the Pacific or the Caribbean.¹⁵² In sum, discussions over extending protection and assistance to ‘climate change induced displacement’ do not appear to have much purchase beyond UNHCR headquarters, although natural disasters do. For this reason UNHCR scores a one for operational change in response to climate change.

Overall Change (4)

These four indicatory values (7, 6, 3, 1) can be averaged to give us an overall indication of UNHCR change. We can calculate this average in the following way: $(7 + 6 + 3 + 1)/4 = 4$. This information is summarized in the table below. An overall organisational change of four represents a change but not a very significant one, which is to be expected given that UNHCR is a normative organisation. In addition, we can note that this change was

¹⁵² The only slight exception is UNHCR Papua New Guinea’s support to the government in relocation of people from the Carteret Islands. However this is not an issue of statelessness, as the population will remain within Papua New Guinea and secondly it is contested as to whether climate change is causing the islands to ‘sink’ or if it is tectonic plate subversion. Telephone interview with Mary-Anne Loughry, Associate Director of the Jesuit Refugee Service Australia, 14 February 2011.

predominantly a top-down instigated change. Rhetorical change occurred first, then policy and structural change with no operational change following.

Table Eight: UNHCR and Climate Change

	Rhetorical Change	Policy Change	Structural Change	Operations Change	Overall Change
UNHCR	7	6	3	1	4

Conclusion

UNHCR’s core mandate and identity is refugee protection. It has supervisory status over international refugee law which mean it is a normative IGO. IGO type has shaped the response of UNHCR to climate change. It has overwhelmingly followed a logic of appropriateness – engaging with climate change displacement and related activities depending on whether they adhere and support its refugee protection mandate. For this reason the agency was reluctant to engage with, and then refuted, the issue of ‘climate refugees’. It feared this term undermined the special status of Convention refugees. It began to engage systematically with climate change and displacement in 2009, when the issue had reached high issue status (high global and linkage salience). Thus this chapter has supported the hypothesis that normative IGOs engage with new issues when they are high status.

The main policy and rhetorical position of the agency by 2011 reflected an agency seeking to expand its moral legitimacy into a new area. It did this by arguing for a role in facilitating a new legal protection framework for climate change displaces. This chapter suggests that normative agencies may be slow and reluctant to engage with new issues beyond their mandates, which may undermine their core focus. If they do so it will most likely be to seek to broaden the scope of their moral legitimacy rather than gain pragmatic legitimacy.

Chapter Four

IOM and Climate Change

IOM is responsible for promoting orderly and humane migration. It is not a UN agency, and has not received the same academic attention as IGOs affiliated with the UN, such as UNHCR, or the World Bank. In fact, there are only a handful of monographs which focus explicitly on IOM.¹ Moreover, there is no scholarship on IOM's engagement with the environment or climate change, despite the fact that it has worked on environmental issues since 1992. This chapter addresses an important empirical gap by investigating how IOM has changed in response to climate change.

The chapter argues that IOM is a functional IGO and responded quickly to climate change when it became an issue of high global salience. The first section examines IOM's origins and evolution. The second section then traces its mandate and prior engagement with the environment and migration. The third section focuses on how the agency has responded to climate change by tracing the four dimensions of organisational change: rhetoric, policy, structure and operations, between 2000 and 2011. The fourth section then evaluates and scores the degree of change across each dimension.

¹ I am aware of the following five articles (Elie 2010; Georgi 2010; Karatani 2005; Marks 1957; Perruchoud 1989) and a monograph on IOM (Ducasse-Rogier 2001).

IOM: A Functional IGO

IOM was not established to oversee a legal treaty or convention but to carry-out migration services on behalf of states. The organisation was created in 1951 as an initiative of the US, in response to high-unemployment rates in Europe which they feared would lead to instability and support for communism. The US convened an international conference in Brussels which established the *Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movements of Migrants from Europe* (PICMME). Its purpose was to organise the relocation of thousands of labour migrants from post-war Europe to the Americas, Australia and New Zealand (Ducasse-Rogier 2005: 15).² Its primary function was ‘to make arrangements for the transport of migrants, for whom existing facilities are inadequate, or who could not otherwise be moved, from European countries having surplus populations to countries overseas...’.³ To perform these tasks PICMME inherited: a fleet of ships, ‘trained officers and its experience in the mass movement of manpower across oceans’ from the International Refugee Organization (Loescher 2001: 58). With these assets the organisation was able to transport thousands of labour migrants and refugees from Europe across the Atlantic and Pacific oceans (Marks 1957: 513).⁴ In 1953 PICMME became a permanent organisation, losing its provisional status, and was renamed the *Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe* (ICEM). Notably, ICEM was created outside of the emerging UN structure and its mandate is derived from its constitution and was not given a role in the promotion, or

² ICEM, 1951, *Resolution to Establish a Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe*, 1951, Brussels.

³ ICEM, 1951, *Resolution*.

⁴ They also offered financial assistance to migrants; helped governments with essential migration services and promoted technical assistance and the exchange of information about sending and receiving countries.

enforcement, of international norms.⁵

As a functional organisation ICEM had no mandate to challenge states over their migration policies. It had to work within states' domestic jurisdiction. Chapter one of the 1953 constitution states that:

the committee shall recognise the fact that control of standards of admission and the number of immigrants to be admitted are matters within the domestic jurisdiction of States, and in carrying out its functions, shall conform to the laws, regulations, and policies of the emigration and immigration countries concerned (ICEM Constitution 1953:5).

IOM's original constitution made no provisions for responsibility over international migration law, and IOM was not granted such authority in any subsequent constituent documents. Its original primary purpose was to facilitate European emigration as directed by member states.

From the 1960s, the agency expanded its operations to include 'migration as development'. ICEM began programmes recruiting highly skilled migrants from Europe and placing them in Latin America (Ducasse-Rogier 2001). Then in 1980 the agency went global. It dropped 'European' from its name and became the *Intergovernmental Committee for Migration* (ICM). It replicated its Latin American 'migration for

⁵ IOM's separation from the UN was due to the US's refusal to fund an international organisation with communist members. In 1946 members of the ILO had proposed a 'central coordination body' to deal with 'overpopulation' in Europe within the UN (Ducasse-Rogier 2001; Karatani 2005). However, the US rejected this proposal and subsequently when the US Congress allocated US \$10 million to encourage migration from Europe they placed the condition that none of the funds could be allocated to an IGO which had in its membership 'any Communist-dominated or Communist controlled country' (Ducasse-Rogier 2001: 17). This ruled out the ILO, and the rest of the UN, which had universal membership. ICEM's inception was a reflection of US preferences (Marks 1957).

development' programmes elsewhere in Asia and Africa. Furthermore, a number of new non-European members joined including the Philippines, Thailand, Republic of Korea and Kenya (Ducasse-Rogier 2001: 74). The end of the Cold War in 1989 brought a major change for the organisation it took on a new constitution and a new name – the *International Organization for Migration*.

These name changes and new constitution reflected IOM's increasingly global ambit and broader scope but did not constitute a change in IOM's functional type. The most significant changes in the 1989 constitution were the: deletion of its European focus in the preamble; a new emphasis on a broader range of people requiring assistance; and the addition of new functions to its purpose. These functions included the provision of 'migration services' such as: recruitment, language training, medical examination and reception, integration activities and research on international migration.⁶ These activities increased IOM's scope but it did not gain authority over international migration law. As one member state explained: IOM is 'much more like a service provider. It has a constitution but not a convention [such as the Refugee Convention] but the constitution is just a founding document. It does not have an influence on international migration protection'.⁷ The agency requires a request from a member state or from the UN to carry-out activities.⁸ In short, IOM expanded its scope without gaining any additional normative authority.

⁶ See IOM, 1989, *Constitution of the International Organization for Migration*, Article 1 (c, d and e).

⁷ Interview with member state representative to IOM e, 10 May 2012, Geneva.

⁸ IOM, *Constitution*: 1(b).

Thus IOM had no moral legitimacy and ‘no normative authority’ (Betts 2008: 6). This means that it is ‘structurally responsible’ only to its member states’ governments and acts in their interests (Georgi 2011: 47). As stated in the Review of the IOM Strategy: ‘IOM does not have a mandate for the development and setting of norms...’ (2010: 2) nor does it have a legal protection mandate – as UNHCR does (IOM Strategy Document 2007: 4).⁹ IOM does not seek to change states’ behaviour and uphold migrants’ rights through open-criticism of states. As an IOM staff member explained: ‘Unlike many NGOs but also more ‘normative’ IGOs, like UNHCR or ILO, IOM never publicly criticises its member states or donors’ (Georgi 2011: 63). A consequence of this conduct is ‘the perception that many NGOs (and others) have of IOM as an agency that will do anything as long as there’s money with which to do it’.¹⁰ IOM expanded its scope without gaining any additional normative authority.

IOM’s functional type is exemplified by its projectised nature and organisational culture. The United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) noted that: ‘IOM has a market-oriented approach as a reactive project based organisation offering migration services in 12 broad areas of activities but is limited in its ability to direct resources strategically’.¹¹ The agency receives the majority of its funding through earmarked projects. In 2008 over 96 percent of its funding was earmarked, leaving less than 4 percent of its budget from regular contributions of member states (Georgi 2011:

⁹ Although IOM does claim that it performs a de facto protection role and does encourage governments to follow international law and protect the human rights of migrants (IOM Strategy Document 2007: 4)

¹⁰ ICVA 2004 quoted in Georgi 2011: 63.

¹¹ DFID, *Multilateral Review: International Organization for Migration, Working Paper*, March 2011: 15.

62).¹² As IOM does not receive a large regular budget of non-earmarked funds it has less autonomy to choose the areas to work in (Georgi 2011). Rather it carries out only those activities where it can gain funding from a donor.

IOM also hires staff on a project basis – thus they are accountable to the project rather than the organisation and are at risk of losing their jobs when the project ends and it is ‘difficult to create any new positions [in IOM] without a project’.¹³ Ninety-seven percent of IOM’s staff are in the field implementing projects which leaves a small staff of three percent at headquarters working in strategic, administrative and oversight roles (IOM Review of the IOM Strategy 2010: 2). IOM is dependent on the acquisition of new projects to maintain the jobs of its employees and its influence (Georgi 2011: 62).¹⁴ IOM’s functional type and projectisation instigates a ‘logic of consequences’ whereby the financial benefit of a project is valued over ‘its normative justification’ (Georgi 2011). This logic suggests that IOM will engage with a new issue if and when it sees an opportunity for additional income.

IOM’s functional type also influences its relationships with donors. Donors are more likely to target their influence through their funding decisions for projects rather than by lobbying for changes at headquarters in rhetoric or policy. The UK for instance argued that: IOM ‘is an independent projectised organisation which DFID and UKBA [UK

¹² In the last decade the gap between the administrative budget of regular contributions and the rapidly growing operative budget has increasingly widened. According to the annual financial reports, the administrative budget in 2000 still comprised 7.2 per cent of the whole budget. By 2008 this number had halved to about 3.4 per cent (Georgi 2011: 49).

¹³ Interview with IOM staff member i, 7 May 2012, Geneva. Also see IOM, 2010b.

¹⁴ Georgi (2011) compares it to a company that produces only those goods that have been ordered in advance.

Border Authority] only seek to influence on a project basis'.¹⁵ Most states spend less time monitoring IOM at headquarters than they do for UNHCR, and many states even monitor IOM from their capital.¹⁶ Furthermore, some states still perceive IOM as predominantly a 'travel agency' responsible for migration services and thus the lead Ministry working with IOM is the Ministry of Immigration or Justice, rather than Foreign Affairs.¹⁷ States are also less concerned with policy or mandate matters at IOM council meetings.¹⁸ In fact, several states claimed that 'member states don't talk about mandate' and that IOM is 'more interested in filling a gap if they can find funding for it'.¹⁹ Thus IOM has a high degree of policy and operational autonomy: states may chose not to fund IOM's expansion into a new area but they are also unlikely to strongly oppose it. A project in an un-mandated area poses little direct threat to states – unlike expansion in normative IOs which may seek to expand their normative power through an expansion of activities.

The agency sought a more normative mandate between 2007 and 2009. It argued in a series of strategic documents that it had a mandate for the protection of migrants' human rights in accordance with international law. The 2007 IOM strategy document, for instance, stated that: 'Although IOM has no legal protection mandate, the fact remains that its activities contribute to protecting human rights, having the effect, or consequence, of protecting persons involved in migration'.²⁰ The 12-point strategy, formulated by

¹⁵ DFID, *Multilateral Review*, 2011: 187.

¹⁶ Interview with IOM and UNHCR member state representatives e and f, 10 May 2012, Geneva.

¹⁷ Interview with IOM and UNHCR member state representative e, 10 May 2012, Geneva.

¹⁸ One state described IOM Council meetings as 'very easy-going' and said they mostly focus on financial issues. Interview with IOM and UNHCR member state representative d, 9 May 2012, Geneva.

¹⁹ Interview with IOM and UNHCR member state representative b, 7 May 2012, Geneva.

²⁰ A council resolution also stated that IOM's priority activities included: 'to enhance the humane and orderly management of migration and the effective respect for the human rights of migrants in accordance

states and IOM in 2007, also endorsed IOM's mandate 'to enhance the humane and orderly management of migration and the effective respect for the human rights of migrants in accordance with international law'.²¹

IOM argued in a note to council that it had a 'de facto' protection mandate.²² It stated that:

While certain intergovernmental organisations have a legal protection function based on mandate (such as UNHCR and ICRC), the concept and indeed application of protection is not restricted to legal mandate, but also extends to de facto protection, where an organisation's activities in effect extend protection to persons benefiting from the services of the organisation... While protection is not the prime objective of the organisation concerned, or even necessarily a formally recognised objective, it is a consequence or effect of the implementation of the main or exclusive purpose of the organisation.²³

Essentially, IOM claimed a protection mandate on the basis that: a) its constitutional documents mandated it to promote the human rights and dignity of migrants and b) its regular activities resulted in protection.²⁴ The agency acknowledged that it did not have a specific legal mandate, or supervisory status, over international migration law. However,

with international law'. IOM, *Council Resolution, Annex "IOM Strategy Document"*, No. 1150, June 7 2007.

²¹ The 12-point strategy listed other priority areas for the organisation to focus redirect IOM's provision of services for states. IOM, *12 Point Strategy*, 2007: 2.

²² IOM argued this mandate is recognised in IOM's constitutional documents: in the 1951 preamble to the Brussels Resolution, the 1954 Constitution and the 1989 Constitutional amendments. IOM. 2009. *Protection of Persons Involved in Migration: Note on IOM's Role*: 2 (6a-d).

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ In addition IOM sought to strengthen their involvement in international migration law by consolidating their international migration law division and legal affairs department in 2004. IOM, "The Human rights of migrants", *IOM Policy and Activities* 2009: 2.

IOM did not become more ‘normative’ despite its protection bid and remained a functional IGO.

IOM and the Environment (1990 – 1999)

This section focuses on IOM’s engagement with the environment, and asks whether IOM was mandated to work on environmental migration. I argue that IOM had no explicit mandate to work on climate change or environmental migration, and make this case with reference to IOM’s constitutional documents. I examine the expansion of the agency’s operations in the 1990s into: humanitarian assistance, in particular in natural disasters, and environmental migration. This expansion was contested by member states but provided a foundation for their later engagement with climate change.

IOM’s original 1953 constitution did not mandate it to assist those displaced by natural disasters or other environmental changes. The agency was authorised to perform two functions: 1) transport labour migrants from post-war Europe and 2) to assist with the migration of refugees.²⁵ This remained the mandate of IOM until 1989 when the new constitution mandated IOM to work with: refugees (in coordination with UNHCR); voluntary and/or economic migrants; IDPs and other ‘individuals in need of international assistance’.²⁶ This last category was described as the ‘grey zone’ migrants, and included those that did not easily fit into the traditional categories, such as stranded migrants, IDPs and those displaced by natural disasters or potentially even climate change – although the

²⁵ IOM’s refugee mandate was distinct from UNHCR as they focused on travel logistics and not protection (Ducasse-Rogier 2001: 20). See ICEM, 1953, *Constitution of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration*, Chapter 1, Article 1a and 1b.

²⁶ IOM, 1989, *Constitution*. As UNHCR takes the lead on the first category IOM has been more focused on the second two categories and is one of the only organisations who has an explicit mandate to protect this group (Ducasse-Rogier 2001: 132).

latter was not seen as a cause of displacement at the time (Ducasse-Rogier 2001: 132 – 133). This new broader mandate enabled IOM to move into humanitarian work, working with those displaced by conflicts and natural disasters, in the 1990s and 2000s. However the ambiguity of the term ‘individuals in need of international assistance’ engendered debate between IOM and member states over the boundaries of its mandate.

IOM expanded its operations into humanitarian work in the 1990s as part of a global paradigm shift in the post-Cold War era. As the Iron Curtain fell, the distinction between refugees and migrants was no longer seen as ‘clear-cut’ (Ducasse-Rogier 2001: 132). According to the IOM legal adviser Richard Perruchoud, there were more diverse and complex causes interacting to create population movements (Perruchoud 1989). There was also increased funding from the international community for humanitarian operations and in 1992 IOM established its first Emergency Relief Unit. Its goal was to ‘allow IOM to react more promptly and in a more systematic way to crises’ (Ducasse-Rogier 2001: 136). IOM saw an opportunity for further financing in humanitarian operations and, following a logic of consequences, expanded.

However, IOM’s emergency work was not supported by all member states – concerns were raised during meetings over the IOM strategic plan in 1995. Member states took issue with IOM’s desire to ‘provide migration assistance to persons affected by emergencies’ (Ducasse-Rogier 2001: 134). They did not want the agency to overlap with other humanitarian agencies and recommended that it should consider any activities in this area as additional and not core priorities. Nevertheless, IOM became increasingly

involved in relief efforts in conflict, political crises and natural disasters.²⁷ In 1998 they conducted their first operation in a natural disaster zone in Honduras after Hurricane Mitch struck.²⁸ The Emergency and Post-Conflict Relief Unit was restructured in the late 1990s and then re-established in the early 2000s, and its work will be discussed further in the following section.

In addition to these humanitarian activities, IOM developed specific expertise on the environment and migration in the 1990s. It organised two conferences and several research reports on the issue. In 1992 they convened their first conference on *Migration and the Environment*. This was spurred by the 1992 *UN Conference on Environment and Development* at Rio de Janeiro, which placed the environment on the global agenda. IOM's 1992 conference and subsequent work focused on environmental change as a cause of migration and on migrants impact on the environment. The Director General, James Purcell, outlined that the conference was convened to: 'address the causes of environmental migration, understand the needs of those forced from their homes by environmental degradation,... and develop...more effective strategies to minimise negative impacts on the environment...'.²⁹ There was no focus on climate change at this conference, despite the fact that the first report of the IPCC in 1990 stated that 'the gravest effects of climate change may be those on human migration' (IPCC 1990). The

²⁷ Most of the crises they dealt with in the 1990s were primarily political in nature – for instance they organised a massive airlift during the first Gulf War and addressed mass displacement in the Great Lakes region in 1994.

²⁸ They have highlighted this work in a number of documents as the beginning of their operational activities on migration, environment and climate change IOM, *IOM Migration, environment and climate change*, available at: <http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/pid/2068>, accessed 11 July 2011.

²⁹ Purcell quoted in IOM. 1992. *Migration and the Environment*. Geneva: International Organization for Migration.

1992 conference and subsequent report set IOM's priorities on 'environmental migration' for the years to come.

IOM next engaged with environmental issues in 1996 when they organised two conferences: 1) *Environmentally Induced Population Displacement and Environmental Impacts of Mass Migration and Examined Trends in Environmentally Induced Displacement*; and 2) a regional conference on environmental migration in the former Soviet Union Commonwealth of Independent States. These conferences shared a common purpose, form and framing with the 1992 conference. Firstly, IOM sought to end the 'vicious circle of mutually reinforcing environmental damage and mass migration' (IOM, UNHCR and Refugee Policy Group 1996:1). Secondly, they brought experts and policy-makers together to discuss if and how environmental changes lead to mass migration and how refugees impact on the environment. Thirdly, they did not focus explicitly on climate change as a driver of migration. Rather, IOM looked to forge links between environmental degradation, pollution and migration.³⁰ Their focus on the Chernobyl and the Ural zones of radioactive pollution – areas which had suffered from major man-made disasters not associated with climate change – demonstrates IOM's framing of environmental change as pollution or environmental degradation at the time.

In summary, by the late 1990s IOM had begun to establish itself as a humanitarian actor and expanded its mandate to encompass a wide range of migrants, IDPs, refugees and other forced displacees. It had a structure in place to respond to natural disasters (the

³⁰ IOM acknowledged that the link between environmental degradation and emigration was complex (IOM 1996).

emergency and post-conflict unit), and it had developed specific research expertise on environment and migration. Furthermore, by 1996 IOM had framed a new policy problem of ‘ecological migration’, defined as ‘migration caused by processes of environmental degradation including worsening quality and accessibility of natural resources’ (IOM 1996). They had showcased their research and policy work at various conferences, which were supported by some member states. However, IOM had not engaged with climate change, as distinct to the environment, as a driver of migration.

Does this mean that IOM had a mandate to work on climate change induced displacement and migration specifically? One senior IOM official claimed that climate change and migration ‘was not a mandate issue for IOM’ because they have the authorisation to work on it.³¹ Yet, this same senior IOM official also acknowledged that many developed countries in 2006 claimed climate migration was, ‘not part of the mandate’. She explained that ‘Switzerland argued that the time was not yet ripe’, and even if it was ripe, ‘they were not sure IOM should be working on it [climate change and migration]’.³² This view has been confirmed by other member states, one of whom expressed that ‘there is a view amongst member states that climate change is not an issue that...IOM should be working on’.³³ In sum, the ambiguity in IOM’s mandate over who constituted an individual ‘in need of international migration services’ resulted in a grey zone of delegation. It was not clear who fitted in this category, and thus under IOM’s mandate, and who did not. However, by the end of the 1990s IOM had neither an explicit mandate for humanitarian operations nor environmental migration, even though they had

³¹ Interview with IOM senior official b, 12 October 2010, New York.

³² Ibid.

³³ Interview with IOM member state a, 23 March 2010, Geneva.

developed initiatives in these areas. While some member states endorsed the conferences on environmental migration, most were still reluctant for an agency to expand significantly into new areas – be it climate change, environmental migration or humanitarian activities, and many were unaware that IOM even worked in this area.³⁴ The next section will examine the ways that IOM negotiated this ambiguous ‘grey zone’ of its mandate through its response to climate change.

IOM and Climate Change (2000 – 2010)

Low Global and Low Linkage Salience (2000 – 2005)

Between 2000 and 2006 the environment slipped under IOM’s ‘radar’ and there was no significant rhetoric, policy or operational activities that tackled this issue.³⁵ There was only one mention of the environment, for instance, in any of the Director General’s annual reports to the Executive Committee during these years.³⁶ This hiatus can be explained by the declining issue status of ‘environment’ (which had peaked in the early and mid-1990s around the Rio Earth summit) and the low issue status of climate change in the early 2000s. A senior IOM staff member suggested, for example, that the ‘hiatus’ was partly due to a lack of ‘media attention’.³⁷ Although climate change was recognised as an important global problem in the early 2000s, it was not until 2006 that climate change had high global salience.

³⁴ Interview with IOM member states, 7, 10 and 11 May 2012, Geneva.

³⁵ Interview with IOM senior official b, 12 October 2010, New York

³⁶ Note that I have searched every Council Report, Director General’s Report to the Council and Executive Committee Report for the years 2000 – 2010 for entries mentioning climate change, environment. The one reference to migration and the environment between 2000 and 2005 was in a research paper - *Migration, the Environment and Development, the impact of the tsunami on migration in Asia* – which examined the consequences of the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004. The report, unsurprisingly, did not focus on climate change at all as the tsunami was caused by an earthquake and not a hydro-meteorological event.

³⁷ Interview with IOM senior official b, 15 December 2009, Copenhagen.

However, in the mid 2000s IOM became more engaged in natural disaster operations. It expanded and renamed its Emergency and Post-Conflict Unit the Emergency and Post-Crisis Unit.³⁸ There was an increasing need for humanitarian assistance following natural disasters and IOM sent teams to: Gujarat post-earthquake (2001); Sri Lanka post-tsunami (2004); Haiti post-earthquake (2010) and Pakistan after the floods (2010) (IOM 2011: 101). In addition, the IASC appointed IOM to be the ‘cluster’ lead for camp coordination and camp management in conflicts and natural disasters under the new humanitarian coordination system.³⁹ In 2006 the director general explained this role to states at Council as they had not given it a mandate to take on this work. He stated that:

IOM was now a major disaster relief agency, and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) had recognised its role in the new cluster process and given it special standing with regard to natural disasters, i.e. emergencies that were not caused by war, oppression or human rights violations. Such disasters seemed to be increasing in number and duration, prompting IOM to focus more attention on them...(IOM 2006: 2)

There was no officially recorded response at this meeting to this new stream of work from member states. IOM’s expansion into humanitarian activities opened up new funding opportunities. Between 2004 and 2009 IOM’s involvement in natural disaster displacement accounted for a significant share of their humanitarian activities. Between 2005 and 2008 IOM received US \$300 million for natural disasters and projects relating

³⁸ Interview with IOM official d, 6 May 2012, Geneva.

³⁹ Interview with IOM official g, 11 May 2012, Geneva.

to fast and slow onset climate change equated to approximately 25 percent of the funding received by the department.⁴⁰

IOM gained a measure of autonomy from being the camp coordination cluster lead as it acquired ‘legitimacy vis-à-vis the UN system’.⁴¹ States supported this work tacitly even if they did not financially. One member state representative, for instance, explained that ‘IOM does a lot of important work that you don’t find in their mandate’.⁴² This representative had recently visited IOM’s Haiti operations and seen IOM engaged in reforestation activities and claimed these activities were not in IOM’s ‘core mandate’ and not a ‘core capacity of IOM’.⁴³ They acknowledged that ‘mission creep’ was occurring but did not see this as a ‘dangerous development’ as they argued ‘someone needs to do it [reforestation]’.⁴⁴ Yet this state would not fund IOM’s reforestation or other natural disaster activities as they only financed core mandated operations, in particular IOM’s assisted voluntary returns programme.⁴⁵ Another member state who had also been on the visit to Haiti was equally surprised by the broad nature of IOM’s humanitarian operations. They explained that ‘at Geneva we seem them as a migration agency’ but argued that IOM ‘don’t have to prove it [humanitarian operations] is part of their formal mandate’ as long as ‘they prove operationally sound’.⁴⁶ This example illustrates how a functional IGO is able to expand its operations easily even if member states do not

⁴⁰ IOM, 2009, *Compendium of IOM’s Activities in Migration, Climate Change and the Environment*, Geneva: 33.

⁴¹ Interview with IOM official g, 11 May 2012, Geneva.

⁴² Interview with IOM member state representative e, 10 May 2012, Geneva.

⁴³ Interview with IOM member state representative e, 10 May 2012, Geneva.

⁴⁴ This member state explained that you could make some link between deforestation and internal displacement as many IDPs lived at the bottom of mountains and they are more at risk of landslides ‘when it rains and hills are deforested’. Interview with IOM member state representative e, 10 May 2012, Geneva.

⁴⁵ Interview with IOM member state representative e, 10 May 2012, Geneva.

⁴⁶ Interview with IOM member state representative b, 7 May 2012, Geneva.

consider the additional activities are linked to their mandate (low linkage salience).

IOM's natural disaster activities were not explicitly framed as 'responding to climate change'. I will now focus on rhetoric, policies and operations that were.⁴⁷

High Global Salience and Low Linkage Salience (2006 – 2007)

IOM's response to climate change and migration was initially a reengagement with their previous work on environment and migration. In 2006 the organisation appealed to states to fund a small meeting of academics, policy-makers and experts on the issue. This correlated with the timing of climate change reaching high global salience, as outlined in chapter two. However, states were not supportive of IOM working on the issue and did not fund the conference. Instead, IOM turned to the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) for funding and co-organised a seminar in February 2007 in Bangkok on environment and migration.⁴⁸ The meeting was held in the same month as the release of the fourth IPCC report which provided strong scientific evidence for climate change to policy makers. The IPCC report explicitly mentioned that climate change was likely to cause migration, making the issue 'very hard to deny' in the words of one IOM staffer.⁴⁹ This staff member maintained that the IPCC report gave IOM the legitimacy and inspired its 'willingness' to work on the issue.⁵⁰ IOM's decision to hold the conference, and capitalise on media and policy attention to climate change, demonstrates a logic of consequences.

⁴⁷ Although there was no explicit link between natural disaster operations and climate change work there was an assumption that countries more prone to natural disasters will be more prone to climate change. Interview with IOM official g, 11 May 2012, Geneva.

⁴⁸ Interview with IOM senior official k and IOM official a, 17 March 2010, Geneva.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Interview with IOM official a, 17 March 2010, Geneva.

Yet despite the increased issue status of climate change, the Bangkok meeting was not framed in terms of *climate change* induced migration but in terms of *environment* and migration. Essentially, the conference discussion adopted the same focus, framing and form as IOM discussions in 1996.⁵¹ Conference attendees (25 policy-makers, practitioners and researchers) discussed the definition and typologies of environmental migration – from gradual environmental change to extreme events. IOM outlined a working definition of environmental migrants as: ‘persons or groups of persons who, for compelling reasons of sudden or progressive changes in the environment that adversely affect their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad’ (IOM 2007: 21).⁵² This working definition became IOM’s official definition in their later work. This meeting constituted a reengagement with an old policy area, rather than a significant phase of new policy development.

After the Bangkok conference, and in response to the growing awareness of climate change, IOM brought the issue of environmental migration to the attention of its membership at the annual Council meeting of 127 member states. Yet again, states were reluctant to support this, and when given the choice they did not prioritise it as a topic for discussion.⁵³ The main reason, according to one IOM staff member, was that states had

⁵¹ Swiss Department of International Affairs, IOM and Refugee Policy Group (1992), *Migration and the Environment Conference Report, An International Conference, Nyon, Switzerland, January 19-22*, Geneva.

⁵² They also discussed the impact of mass migration on the environment, which was seen as a corollary to discussions about environmental migration (IOM 2008: 20).

⁵³ Interview with IOM senior official b, 15 December 2009, Copenhagen.

neither awareness nor interest in the issue.⁵⁴ Another IOM staff member explained that states asked ‘what does IOM have to do with it [climate change]? Is this [climate change induced migration] a real issue?’⁵⁵ IOM needed to do more research and awareness-raising to make it a priority for states.⁵⁶ IOM staff were also aware of constraints: as an IOM staff member working on the issue explained: states would be ‘ready when they’re ready’.⁵⁷ What is interesting is that IOM went directly to council for a mandate to engage with climate change and migration.

In 2007 IOM convinced states to hold a three-hour discussion on migration, the environment and climate change at Council. The agency prepared a discussion note for this meeting and set out how environmental migration was a policy problem and solution. It was problem for those who were displaced and could have adverse affects on the recipient country or area. The paper outlined that ‘Gradual and sudden environmental changes are resulting in substantial human movement and displacement. The scale of the flows, both internal and cross-border, is expected to rise and have an unprecedented impact on lives and livelihoods’ (IOM 2007: 1). Migration was also presented as a coping strategy and thus (provisional) solution to severe environmental change. IOM maintained that: ‘Increased migration can contribute to further environmental degradation, but it can also be a coping mechanism and survival strategy for those who move’ (IOM 2007: 1). In the paper IOM recommended that countries of origin encourage ‘host states to admit environmental migrants, whether as part of labour migration schemes, resettlement

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Interview with IOM official a, 17 March 2010, Geneva.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

programmes or humanitarian assistance initiatives’ (IOM 2007: 7). This discussion note set out IOM’s policy position: environmental migration should be facilitated within the available legal migration channels. It also outlined a role for IOM’s role in enabling ‘more informed action and multi-stakeholder cooperation’ (IOM 2007: 7).

The subsequent discussion during the 2007 Council Meeting focused predominantly on the issue of environmental migration, rather than IOM’s role in addressing it. A panel of speakers, including representatives from China, Bangladesh, Greece, Cameroon and Colombia, spoke about if and how environmental migration was a problem in their country. Greece and China advocated for developed states to support developing countries response and disaster risk reduction. Greece even pledged it would create ‘special funds in cooperation with regional organisations to finance adaptation projects in Africa and small island developing states, and cooperate with IOM on various projects’ (2008: 27). Greece’s remarkable statement of support for IOM in this area was because their IOM representative was simultaneously chairing the international *Human Security Network* and the *Organisation for the Security and Co-operation in Europe* and focusing on the human security impacts of climate change in these roles.⁵⁸ However, Greece’s pledge of financial support was an anomaly - there was no other financial support offered for IOM to pursue this work.⁵⁹

At Council IOM did not set-out a new policy position or role for the agency in

⁵⁸ The Human Security Network is an informal group of 13 states that meet regularly at the Foreign Ministerial level to promote the concept of human security (IOM & Greece 2008: 27). Interview with IOM senior official b, 15 December 2009, Copenhagen.

⁵⁹ IOM, 2008, *Report on the Ninety-Fourth Session of the Council*, MC/2239, 14 February 2008, Geneva.

environmental migration. The agency did outline a series of principles states should follow to address environment and migration. These included: effective environmental migration management: proactive policy and early action; coherent policies; bilateral, regional and multi-stakeholder cooperation.⁶⁰ There is no official record of states disagreeing or agreeing with these principles. IOM did not explicitly establish its role in implementing or facilitating these principles.⁶¹ This evidence suggests there was a tacit acknowledgement of the issue but not explicit support for IOM's engagement with environmental migration. Notably IOM predominantly framed the issue as 'environmental migration' and not as 'climate migration'.⁶²

In 2007 and 2008 IOM made structural changes to reflect its reengagement with environmentally induced migration. IOM established a 'loose focal point' for environmental migration within the Migration Policy, Research and Communications Division to be assisted by two Migration Policy Officers. The focal point was appointed to ensure there was a 'party-line' in IOM on climate change and migration.⁶³ In addition there were about ten other staff spending time on climate change across IOM, particularly in research, and during the 2007 – 2008 period the climate change work was 'pretty intense'.⁶⁴ The focal point 'pushed' the issue internally, highlighting to others that 'this

⁶⁰ IOM, 2008, *Report of the Council*.

⁶¹ One member state questioned the focus on climate change and made no mention of pollution, particularly the illegal dumping of pollutants at sea. IOM, 2008, *Report of the Council*: 30.

⁶² In 2007 IOM commissioned an academic report on environmental migration that included a chapter examining how climate change could cause migration. The report 'Migration, Development and Environment' was written by an Australian Professor of Geography, Graeme Hugo. Hugo suggested that 'climate change which creates changes in environmental conditions in particular areas, is increasingly being recognised as a significant cause of environmental migration' (Hugo 2007: 19). IOM saw climate change was seen as part of a type of environmental migration.

⁶³ Interview with IOM official a and senior official k, 17 March 2010, Geneva.

⁶⁴ Interview with IOM official h, 11 May 2012, Geneva.

[issue] matters'.⁶⁵ They also participated in a number of events with governments and universities, outlining IOM's position and sharing their technical expertise on the issue.⁶⁶ They emphasised that governments should improve their coordination between ministries – immigration, labour and the environment. This structural change enabled subsequent policy and rhetoric change. Staff dedicated to the issue encouraged the IOM leadership to speak on it at the UNFCCC and other forums.

High Global and Linkage Salience (2008 – 2011)

In 2008 IOM received the first explicit financial support to work on climate change and migration from a member state. Greece financed and co-hosted a half-day long conference on *Climate Change, Environmental Degradation and Migration: Addressing Vulnerabilities and Harnessing Opportunities*. The idea for the conference emerged from a conversation between the Director General and the Greek representative Theodore Skylakkis on the sidelines of the 2007 Council discussion on environment migration (IOM 2008: 1). Skylakkis, was described by an IOM staff member, as interested in the subject, 'very committed' and the 'motor behind' the work.⁶⁷ This conference signaled a shift in focus from environment to climate migration.

The conference's primary objective was to raise 'political and public awareness of the human security challenge of climate change for the most vulnerable people' (IOM & Greece 2008: 97). The Director General of IOM, Brunson McKinley, spoke at the

⁶⁵ Interview with IOM senior official b, 12 October 2010, New York.

⁶⁶ Interview with IOM official a and senior official k, 17 March 2010, Geneva and also participant observation of IOM at *Climate Change and Migration in the Pacific Conference*, University of Victoria, Wellington, New Zealand, May 2008.

⁶⁷ Interview with IOM senior official b, 12 December 2009, Copenhagen.

conference alongside Skylakkis and highlighted IOM's expertise and experience on climate change, environmental degradation and migration. IOM focused the conference on the human security dimensions of climate change mobility to counter the growing securitisation of climate change and perception of migration as a threat.⁶⁸ The main achievement of the conference was to bring together over 180 people from 67 countries and 33 inter-governmental organisations (IOM & Greek Permanent Mission to Geneva 2008: 29). And it was highly significant for IOM that a state - for the first time - was explicitly supporting their research and policy work in the area. However this collaboration was limited to 2008 – the year that Greece was chairing the Human Security Council – and was largely due to the leadership of Skylakkis.⁶⁹

In 2008 IOM instigated a working group on climate change, displacement and migration under the IASC.⁷⁰ The group established a common humanitarian position on climate change and migration and wrote submissions to the UNFCCC. In October 2008 the working group submitted their first working paper, 'Climate Change, Migration and Displacement: Who will be affected?'. The paper outlined IASC's commitment to: 'Take account of, and manage, the humanitarian consequences of climate change, including protecting those who may move as a result' and to 'launch a dialogue among Member States on how to fill existing and foreseeable legal, operational and capacity gaps associated with climate change and human mobility'.⁷¹ In 2009 they submitted three

⁶⁸ IOM & Greek Permanent Mission to Geneva 2008: 36 – 37. Interview with IOM official h, 11 May 2012, Geneva.

⁶⁹ Interview with IOM senior official b, 12 October 2010, New York.

⁷⁰ This was subset of the IASC climate change working group, which had been initiated by the ICRC.

⁷¹ IASC, 2008, '[Climate Change, Migration and Displacement: Who will be affected?](#)', *Working Paper submitted to the UNFCCC by the informal group on Migration/ Displacement and Climate Change of the IASC*, Geneva, 31 October 2008.

more submissions to the UNFCCC and lobbied for the final agreement to include migration as a possible consequence of, and adaptation strategy to, climate change.⁷² The IASC working group shaped IOM's work significantly. Firstly, it gave them a structured space to interact with other agencies and to develop policy and advocacy frameworks. Secondly, the rhythm of the UNFCCC annual meetings focused their advocacy efforts. Agencies had to agree on submissions for each UNFCCC meeting and the IASC was a catalyst for developing IOM's policy on climate migration.

From 2008 onwards IOM also sought to establish itself as the expert on the issue of climate change induced migration. They published research reports, spoke on panel discussions, and organised awareness-raising seminars.⁷³ These seminars and discussions were opportunities for IOM to convince states and other agencies (NGOs, IGOs, civil society) that climate change and migration was: an issue and, within IOM's expertise. These were primarily rhetorical acts and did not constitute significant policy development. IOM's growing expertise was supported by the release of five new policy-orientated research reports on climate change and migration (written by IOM staff and outside academics).⁷⁴ Although most of the reports claimed that establishing a causal connection between climate change and migration was highly problematic, they still

⁷² Submissions included: IASC, *Climate change, migration, and displacement: impacts, vulnerability, and adaptation options*, Geneva, February 2009; IASC, *Joint Letter of the IASC Principals to the UNFCCC Executive Secretary*, 2009; IASC, *Comments and Proposed Revisions to the Negotiating Text prepared by the Chair of the UNFCCC Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action*, Geneva, 2009.

⁷³ IOM, 2009, *Report of the Director General on the Work of the Organization for the Year 2008*, Geneva,

⁷⁴ In 2008 IOM published the following: 1) *Migration and Climate Change*; 2) *Irregular Migration from West Africa to the Maghreb and the European Union: An Overview of Recent Trends*; 3) *Climate Change and Migration: Improving Methodologies to Estimate Flows*; 4) *Survey on Remittances 2008 and Environment*; and 5) *Migration, Environment and Development: New Directions for Research*. IOM staff wrote some of these reports and commissioned academics to write others, such as the report on *Climate Change and Migration: Improving Methodologies to Estimate Flows*.

advocated for further investigation of the link and developed methodologies and typologies to pursue this research goal. In fact, according to the Director General the nexus between migration, climate change and environmental degradation was their ‘second priority [research] area’ (DG report 2009: 38 – 39). By late 2008 there was a widespread view within IOM policy and research units that climate change induced migration was a phenomena that was: a) worthy of further research; b) an important issue which IOM should pursue.

IOM’s rhetoric developed alongside their policy as they engaged in inter-agency working groups, alliances and publicised their work on climate change, environment and migration. In March the Director General explicitly stated that ‘The International Organization for Migration has an obvious role in addressing the linkages between environmental degradation, climate change and migration’.⁷⁵ This statement was an indicator of support for the issue at the most senior level of IOM. McKinley also outlined the establishment of a new *Climate Change, Environment and Migration Alliance* (CCEMA) with UNEP, the United Nations University, Munich Re Foundation and civil society partners. This alliance’s primary purpose was to develop policy approaches and research to investigate the links between climate change, environmental degradation and migration. It also aimed to support the most vulnerable countries with capacity-building, incentivise support for sustainable livelihoods projects with migrants; and work with national governments on the degradation of natural resources. It was a broad and ambitious agenda ambit for a small alliance. IOM’s participation in this alliance signaled

⁷⁵ Brunson McKinley, 2008, ‘IOM statement’, *Institute for Public Policy Research Conference Climate Change and Forced Migration*, London, 29 March 2008.

its ongoing interest and commitment to the issue and provided a forum to engage away from member state monitoring.⁷⁶

In 2008 IOM representatives spoke for the first time at the UNFCCC in Bonn (October) and then Poznan (December). The climate focal point spoke on behalf of the Director General, who did not attend, and argued for two paradigm shifts: ‘1) from migration as a worst-case scenario to migration as an adaptation strategy, and 2) from reactive to proactive thinking: from an ex post response to ex ante prevention and preparedness’.⁷⁷ At Poznan IOM’s principal interest was to ensure migration was seen as an adaptation strategy within the UNFCCC text and not seen as a ‘failure of adaptation’.⁷⁸ This position was supported by other agencies in the IASC and CCEMA. IOM’s engagement with the UNFCCC marked a shift in their policy and advocacy focus.

Immediately after the Poznan climate summit in December 2008, a new Director General took office. William Lacey Swing, an American who was backed by the US, replaced the incumbent American Brunson McKinley.⁷⁹ Swing began exactly a year before the Copenhagen UNFCCC Summit when climate change was at high global salience. Despite this, Swing was initially reluctant to make climate change induced migration a priority. According to one senior IOM official he was ‘reluctant because of the evidence. [We

⁷⁶ In April 2008 they also held an expert meeting in Munich to which many CCEMA members attended including: UNU, UNEP, Munich Re Foundation and with financial support from the Rockefeller Foundation. See: Koko Warner, 2008, *Workshop Report for ‘Research Workshop on Migration and the Environment: Developing a Global Research Agenda’*, 18 – 18 April 2008, Munich, Germany.

⁷⁷ IOM, 2008, ‘Environment, Forced Migration and Social Vulnerability: Identifying Problems and Challenges’, *UNFCCC Preparatory Meeting*, 9 October 2008, Bonn.

⁷⁸ IOM, 2008, ‘Migration and Climate Change: from Emergency to Adaptation’, *Speech at the 14th Conference of the Parties of the UNFCCC*, 8 December 2008, Poznan.

⁷⁹ IOM, 2008, *Report on the Ninety-fifth (Special) Session of the Council*, 18 June 2008.

have] seen such widely different statistics, facts and a range between them is so huge that [he] needed to be convinced that it is climate change as opposed to some other factors causing the displacement'.⁸⁰ Thus IOM staff had to do a 'lot of ground work' to convince him to engage with the issue and then later to attend Copenhagen.⁸¹ They 'spent a lot time reviewing the key evidence' and argued that while climate change was not the 'decisive factor' there was no question that it was a 'contributing factor'.⁸² By 2010 he was reportedly '100 percent convinced and acknowledged [it] in most of his speeches'.⁸³ Yet even when Swing understood the nuances of the debate he was still concerned about the political dimensions – he did not want 'to get too far ahead of where governments are willing to go', particularly while some governments were still denying climate change was occurring.⁸⁴ This suggests that he did not perceive IOM had an explicit mandate to work in this area and that it would be curtailed by states if it sought to engage. He was concerned about the linkage between climate change and the mandate of his agency.

In November 2008 at the annual Council meeting the Director General mentioned to member states that climate change was an area of strategic priority. There is no officially recorded response from states on this. However, member states at this meeting expressed concern about IOM straying into UNHCR's mandate and stated that:

years of expansion in terms of both membership and scope of programming may have resulted in a form of 'mandate creep' and the Organization was urged to

⁸⁰ Interview with IOM senior official b, 12 October 2010, New York; and see William Lacy Swing, Interview on *Climate Change TV*, December 2011, available at <http://www.rtcc.org/climate-change-tv/unfccc-videos/william-lacy-swing-director-general-international-organisation-of-migration/> accessed 24 January 2012.

⁸¹ Interview with IOM senior official b, 12 October 2010, New York.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

consolidate its work in line with the 12 strategic activities....Particular disquiet was expressed about the possibility that IOM would stray from helping member states formulate migration policy and take on a normative role.⁸⁵

The Director General's responded that there 'should be no mandate creep' and pledged that IOM would always provide compelling evidence of linkages between its work and the 12 strategic activities established in 2007.⁸⁶ In addition, he stated that one of IOM's five 'broad strategic directions' was to 'engage cooperatively and thoughtfully in emerging fields such as elections and climate change'.⁸⁷ IOM could claim it had tacit consent, based on no vocal disagreement, for continuing research, conferences and submissions on climate migration.⁸⁸ It is likely that the agency would have faced strong opposition from states if it had sought a protection role for climate change displacement.

In 2009 Swing restructured IOM headquarters, induced in part by budgetary constraints and also to make his mark on the agency. During this period senior management questioned 'do we need to do something different about climate change?' and considered creating a unit to work on the issue.⁸⁹ However, IOM had 'no luxury to allocate new resources to create a new team' because of its limited resources.⁹⁰ Moreover, climate change was a cross-cutting issue that 'did not fit easily within one department or

⁸⁵ IOM, 2009, *Report on the Ninety-sixth Session of the Council 2008*, MC/2266/Rev.1: 6.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ There was also a discussion over whether IOM had a protection mandate for migrants or refugees. One delegation stated that 'IOM did indeed have a protection mandate stemming from the IOM strategy and constitution'. They added that it was 'becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish between refugees and migration in the field. A factor that could hinder the effective management of mixed migration flows because institutional mandates did not appear to be in sync with reality in the field'. IOM, 2009, *Report of the Council 2008*: 30.

⁸⁹ Interview with IOM senior official b, 12 October 2010, New York.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

another’.⁹¹ Senior management made a decision to leave the policy work on climate change under the management of a focal point.

In May 2009, with Copenhagen in sight, IOM published its first policy paper explicitly on climate change and migration. The nine-page brief, ‘Migration, Climate Change and the Environment’, outlined the ‘complex’ relationship between climate change and migration.⁹² It stated the ‘irrefutable evidence regarding climate change’ and expectation that global migration flows would ‘rise significantly over the next decades as a result of climate change.’⁹³ The paper emphasized that the agency had a ‘long established’ interest and expertise in the area through its publications and research and operational responses to natural disasters.⁹⁴ It outlined ambitious future goals to: mainstream climate change and environment into migration policies; and to minimize forced displacement by ‘developing temporary and circular labour migration schemes with ‘environmentally-vulnerable countries (IOM 2009: 7).’⁹⁵ The policy statement was a signal to the international community that climate change migration was a priority, and that IOM had the necessary expertise, experience and strategic direction to address it.

IOM also compiled a compendium of their climate change and environmental migration operations.⁹⁶ IOM Geneva invited 40 missions to send in descriptions of projects which

⁹¹ Interview with IOM senior official b, 12 October 2010, New York.

⁹² IOM, 2009, *Policy Brief* ‘Migration, Climate Change and the Environment’, May 2009, Geneva: 1 and 5.

⁹³ Ibid. 1 and 5.

⁹⁴ It highlighted for instance that funding to address natural disasters has increased from one-fifth in 2006 to one-quarter in 2008 of the total funding received by IOM under coordinated inter-agency joint appeals. IOM, 2009, *Policy Brief*: 7.

⁹⁵ IOM, 2009, *Policy Brief*: 7.

⁹⁶ IOM, 2009, *Compendium*.

related in some way to climate change and environment.⁹⁷ The *Compendium of IOM's activities in Migration, Climate Change and the Environment* covered a broad range of activities in thirty countries - from Angola to Azerbaijan, from Timor-Leste to Trinidad and Tobago. The Compendium was a major enterprise due to the decentralised nature of the organisation, and the process of producing it elevated the issue internally.⁹⁸ Country teams were asked to submit projects and in the process of compiling the report IOM staff became aware that a lot of work 'has already been done on climate change and environment'.⁹⁹ Staff working at an operational level also became aware of what others were working on. The 300-page compendium was also a useful external document as it illustrated that IOM was already an operational expert in the area of environment, climate change and migration. In fact, it was so popular with participants at the Copenhagen summit that IOM ran out of copies to distribute.¹⁰⁰

However, the Compendium also raised important questions on what constituted an environmental or climate change project. Entries included activities as varied as providing earthquake shelter assistance in Pakistan; soil conservation in Haiti and promoting youth employment in the environmental sector in Senegal. As these examples illustrate, some of the listed operations had no explicit link to climate change adaptation and/or only a tenuous link to IOM's migration mandate.¹⁰¹

⁹⁷ Interview with IOM official h, 11 May 2012, Geneva.

⁹⁸ Interview with IOM official a, 17 March 2010, Geneva.

⁹⁹ Interview with IOM official d, 25 March 2010, Geneva.

¹⁰⁰ Interview with IOM senior official c and official k, 17 March 2010, Geneva.

¹⁰¹ Note that adaptation is a broad category so some of these projects could fit within a broad definition of adaptation, however IOM gave neither a definition of adaptation nor made any explicit connections between these activities and climate change adaptation.

In fact the Compendium reflected the behavioural logic we would expect from a functional IGO. There was no clear, common expertise that IOM was delivering. Their activities were dependent on what donors were prepared to fund. Moreover, the Compendium inadvertently highlighted the disconnect between the global policy debate and operations on the ground. IOM's activities dealt with a range of migrants and non-migrants in situations where environmental change was sometimes severe (earthquake) and sometimes not even apparent. People did not fit within the clear typologies that were being developed and neither did it appear that assistance was being delivered by IOM on the basis of these typologies. Moreover, climate change was not identified as either a direct or contributing cause of many of the activities. The Compendium highlighted a conceptual ambiguity and tension between IOM's climate operations and policy statements. The examination of IOM's operations in Kenya, later in this chapter, will examine this further.

In the final months preceding Copenhagen, Swing began to speak on the issue of climate change. In September 2009 Swing made a speech on *Emerging Policy Perspectives on Human Mobility in a Changing Climate*.¹⁰² In this speech he highlighted IOM's contribution in carrying out 'relevant operations' in over 40 countries, developing a research base, setting out the policy issues and working in partnership with other agencies. He expressed his support for CCEMA and their goal of 'raising the awareness of human mobility' within the UNFCCC process. Then in December Swing published an Op-Ed in the French newspaper, *Le Monde*, where he called on the international

¹⁰² The occasion was a side-event organised by CCEMA during the Secretary General's climate change summit in New York.

community to accept the ‘principle of mobility of people who must migrate, temporary or permanently, in order to adapt or to survive climate change’.¹⁰³ This Op-Ed was notable as it was similar in style, timing and purpose to Guterres’ Op-Ed. The core message was that climate change induced migration was a problem that the UNFCCC, and the international community, needed to address.

In December 2009 Swing was the first IOM Director General to attend the UNFCCC. He spoke at a side-event on *Climate Adaptation Continuum, Migration and Displacement - Copenhagen and Beyond* alongside the High Commissioner for Refugees and other IASC working group members. At this event he emphasized IOM’s expertise in working with ‘environmentally displaced persons’. He reiterated the long institutional engagement of IOM with these migrants:

Certainly since Hurricane Mitch in Central America in 1998, IOM, together with its humanitarian partners, has been there every time a major disaster struck and forced populations to flee for sheer survival. We know how to put up the tents in displacement camps, we know of the protection and assistance needs of displaced persons, we know how important it is to build back better.¹⁰⁴

He argued that migration should not be a strategy of ‘last resort’ but that the international community needed to respond sooner and see migration as an adaption strategy. IOM also gained support from member states in late 2009 to continue working on climate change induced migration. At the 2009 Council meeting some states maintained that an

¹⁰³ Author’s translation from the French. See: W. Swing, 2009, ‘Aidons les pays en développement à faire face aux changements climatiques’, *Le Monde*, 12 December 2009.

¹⁰⁴ William Swing, *Side Event: Climate Adaptation Continuum, Migration and Displacement - Copenhagen and beyond*, at the UNFCCC Summit (COP15), Copenhagen, 16 December 2009.

area of ‘special importance’ to IOM’s was ‘climate change and the consequent displacement of migrants’.¹⁰⁵

2010 was much quieter for IOM on the policy, rhetoric and structure fronts. The failure of the Copenhagen negotiation to reach an agreement on climate change brought disillusionment and uncertainty. IASC members had lobbied for migration’s inclusion in the UNFCCC agreement yet there was no overall UNFCCC agreement and much ambiguity over the outcome of Copenhagen. In the following year the IASC working group on climate change met less frequently and there were no submissions written to the UNFCCC. Agencies focused internally on how to translate the global policy discussions into their own operations.¹⁰⁶ The Climate Change and Environmental Migration Alliance was left ‘dormant’, and their website was not updated at all after Copenhagen.¹⁰⁷

Throughout 2010 IOM continued to publish and speak on climate change at a range of events. IOM, for instance, spoke at an EU Seminar on the International Security Implications of Climate Change, at the ASEAN Regional Forum (November 2010) and at the African Development Forum (October 2010). They published various reports and held a conference in Bangladesh on climate change and migration. IOM was also applauded at the *Global Forum on Migration and Development* in Mexico as ‘Perhaps the most important international organisation in this area [of environmental and climate

¹⁰⁵ A member of the Executive Committee explicitly ‘recognised the Administration’s role in raising the profile of migration-related issues in the agreement expected to be produced’ at the Copenhagen UNFCCC Summit. IOM, 2009, *Report of the Council 2008*: 3.

¹⁰⁶ Interviews with IASC members, 18, 19 and 23 March 2010, Geneva.

¹⁰⁷ Interview with IOM official I, 7 May 2012, Geneva. See also: CCEMA website, <http://www.ccema-portal.org/>, accessed 2 May 2012.

migration]’.¹⁰⁸ Swing again attended the 2010 UNFCCC summit and emphasised that: ‘Today’s reality is that climate change and environmental degradation are already triggering migration and displacement. In the past decade alone, for example, IOM undertook some 500 projects for a total of \$280 million to assist victims of environmental degradation’.¹⁰⁹ He reiterated that migration was not a ‘worst case scenario’ but that it ‘should be part of our response to climate change’.¹¹⁰ In sum, IOM continued to project itself, and be recognised as, an expert on climate change and migration.

In 2010 member states at Council endorsed IOM’s work on climate change and migration. IOM elevated climate change to its 2010 strategic review arguing that as ‘emerging issues with implications for migration, such as climate change, continue to rise on the global agenda, it may also be in Member States’ strategic interest to ensure that IOM is tasked to specifically address such new challenges in the future’ (IOM *Review of the IOM Strategy* 2010: 21). At the council meeting in 2010 member states agreed that the *International Dialogue on Migration* in 2011 should focus on climate change and migration.¹¹¹ This was significant as the IDM is IOM’s top-policy level forum and engagement with states.¹¹² In March 2011 IOM convened the IDM on *Climate Change, Environmental Degradation and Migration*, set the agenda and 221 people attended, including 151 member states representatives. The deputy-director of IOM, Laura

¹⁰⁸ Koko Warner and Susan Martin, 2010, ‘Impact of climate change on migration and development’, *Background Paper* for Civil Society Days, Global Forum on Migration and Development, Mexico.

¹⁰⁹ William Swing, 2010, *IOM statement* at the UNFCCC COP 16 Plenary session, Cancun, Mexico, 10 December 2010.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ The *International Dialogue on Migration* (IDM) is a forum for states, NGOs and IGOs to discuss migration policy. See IDM website, <http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/international-dialogue-migration> accessed 16 July 2011 and IOM, 2010, *Draft Report on the Ninety-ninth Session of the Council*, MC/2310, Geneva.

¹¹² Interview with IOM official h, 11 May 2012, Geneva.

Thomson highlighted that in the past 10 years, IOM had received funding for more than 500 projects to respond to environmental migration (Thompson 2007: 1). IOM's aim was to bring the 'topic to the table' and then let states decide if and how they would pursue it.¹¹³ IOM did not advocate for a particular outcome from the conference and did not stipulate what its role was in implementing the conference recommendations.¹¹⁴ In short, they had no normative prescriptive goals.¹¹⁵

IOM sought out financing from new sources. IOM had successfully lobbied for the inclusion of migration as an adaptation strategy in the final UNFCCC agreement at Cancun.¹¹⁶ This was applauded as a significant victory on the basis that IOM would have access to the adaptation fund. Subsequently IOM did a 'mapping' of potential 'use of the adaptation fund, the Least Developed Countries Fund, EU funds' as well other bilateral, multilateral and private sources.¹¹⁷ IOM could not directly access the adaptation fund and so established a partnership with the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to access the fund.¹¹⁸ The Director General held bilateral meetings with the ADB to develop this partnership and also explored funding for adaptation projects with the Swedish International Development Agency. IOM was proactive in sourcing financing, as we

¹¹³ Interview with IOM official i, 7 May 2012, Geneva.

¹¹⁴ IOM, 2011, Chair's Summary of 'Intersessional Workshop on Climate Change, Environmental Degradation and Migration, *International Dialogue on Migration*, Geneva.

¹¹⁵ The Director General also attended the UNFCCC summit in Durban in 2011 but lacked a clear, advocacy message for negotiators. When asked who he would be meeting and what he would be telling them he stated that 'he hopes to meet as many people as possible in a 'Davos style' meeting in the corridors and offered no specific prescription on how migration should be integrated into the climate negotiations. In an interview with media at Durban he claimed he was at Durban because 'the IOM needs to be there' and 'needs to be represented at the most high-level possible'. William Swing, 2011, *Climate Change TV*.

¹¹⁶ Cancun Agreements, 2010, Paragraph 14 (f). See also Koko Warner, 2011, 'Climate Change Induced Displacement: Adaptation Policy in the Context of the UNFCCC Climate Negotiations', *Legal and Protection Policy Research Series*, Division of International Protection, UNHCR: Geneva, May 2011.

¹¹⁷ Interview with IOM official i, 7 May 2012, Geneva.

¹¹⁸ Interview with IOM staff member h, 11 May 2012, Geneva.

would expect from a functional organisation.

IOM Kenya and Climate Change (2000 – 2011)

IOM is a highly decentralised organisation and thus it is particularly important to explore if and how Geneva-level changes in policy, rhetoric and structure translated to the field. IOM listed a number of Kenyan based projects in the Compendium.¹¹⁹ I examine two of these operations: 1) adaptation initiatives with pastoralists the far-North and 2) humanitarian relief for pastoralists in the far-North. While these activities were similar in their substance only the first was labeled a climate change initiative. I investigate why and how this came about.

Climate Change Adaptation and Pastoralists

IOM Kenya first began to work on climate change in their operations in 2009. Prior to that their activities focused on refugee resettlement and migration management - not on emergency relief, disaster risk reduction or climate change projects, which were operational in other IOM offices worldwide.¹²⁰ As one IOM Kenya staff member explained: ‘IOM in general has been working on climate change at a global level, but [for] IOM in Kenya climate change projects commenced from 2009’.¹²¹ Kenya’s first climate change adaptation initiatives evolved out of a new emergency unit created in

¹¹⁹ I sought a country that had made operational changes (a positive case) rather than a country that had made no changes at all (and was thus not listed in the Compendium) in order to understand the process of operational change.

¹²⁰ Their first programming activity in Kenya in 1984 was the *Return of Qualified African Nationals Programme* through which IOM facilitated the return of highly skilled Kenyans. In 1993 they opened an office in Nairobi and subsequently established offices in Kenya’s refugee camps. See: IOM, 2011, *Kenya Country Profile*, http://nairobi.iom.int/kenya_profile.htm, accessed on 5 July 2011.

¹²¹ Interview with IOM official f, 25 March 2011, Nairobi.

response to the 2008 post-election violence. The election was closely fought between Mwai Kibaki's *Party of National Unity* and Raila Odinga's *Orange Democratic Movement* with reports of election rigging on both sides. The official results gave Kibaki a tiny majority (230,000 votes out of a total cast of some 10 million), which Odinga disputed.¹²² The contested election result turned into a major, violent political crisis and led to the displacement of an estimated 500,000 Kenyans, particularly from the Rift Valley.¹²³

In response, IOM Kenya established an Emergency and Post-Crisis unit to assist these IDPs. The unit received funding initially from the Central Emergency Response Fund to meet the emergency needs of IDPs in the Rift Valley. It then ran early recovery, community stabilisation and food security projects financed by the Japanese government.¹²⁴ In late 2008 the IDP situation shifted out of its emergency phase and the Emergency and Post-Crisis Unit sought new crises to address.¹²⁵

A structural change – the creation of the emergency and post-conflict unit – was a critical precondition for IOM's expansion into climate change adaptation. In early 2009 the Kenyan President declared the drought in the far north a national emergency.¹²⁶ Cattle

¹²² Kenya's Dubious Election', *BBC News*, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7175694.stm> accessed 12 February 2011. See also: Daniel Branch and Nic Cheeseman, (2008) Democratization, Sequencing, and State Failure in Africa: Lessons from Kenya, *African Affairs*, 108/430: 1-26 and Kagwanja, Peter and Roger Southall, 'Introduction: Kenya – A democracy in retreat?', *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 27, 3, 2009.

¹²³ IOM, 2011, *Project with Livelihoods Component 2009 – 2011, Unpublished project summaries*. Nairobi.

¹²⁴ Interviews with IOM officials e and f, 16 March and 25 March 2011, Nairobi. Interviews with IOM official c, 7-9 March 2011, Kakuma.

¹²⁵ The unit continued to work with IDPs throughout 2009 under the Shelter & Livelihoods for Peace & Reconciliation Programme which involved peacebuilding and alternative income generation activities.

¹²⁶ BBC, 2009, 'Kenya to declare food emergency', *BBC News*, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/7821260.stm> accessed 19 May 2011.

died leaving the pastoralists of the region with little to no food or income. IOM expanded its livelihood and peace-building initiatives from the Rift Valley into the far North of Kenya. They had existing offices in Kakuma and Dadaab (two refugee camps) and used these for staff and logistical support. They also had extra funding from the Rift Valley projects which they could reallocate as the Japanese funding was ‘very very flexible’.¹²⁷ IOM’s projects in the Far North sought to ‘mitigate the negative impacts of food insecurity’ on pastoralist communities and there was no mention of climate change in the 2009 project documentation.¹²⁸ They replicated their programmes from the fertile Rift Valley in the arid Turkana region, and many did not succeed.¹²⁹

In 2010 IOM began to explicitly frame their activities in the Far North as climate change adaptation. Their programme was entitled: *Livelihood Support to Pastoralist Communities and Refugees’ Host Communities in Response to Climate Change and Refugee Influx in Northern Kenya*.¹³⁰ The project manager, who had been based in Eldoret, Rift Valley, moved to Kakuma and brought with him the portfolio of programmes designed for the fertile Rift valley.¹³¹ These included: a poultry project for five women’s groups, installation of 25 sprinkler irrigation systems procured for vegetable farming, planting over 200 Aloe Vera seedlings, consultations with water

¹²⁷ The IOM staff member said it ‘very unusual’ to have such flexibility with funding. This was predominantly because it came from Japan’s supplementary budget and needed to be spent within the electoral year. Interview with IOM official c, 6 April 2011, Kakuma.

¹²⁸ IOM, 2011, *Project with Livelihoods Component 2009 – 2011, Unpublished project summaries*. Nairobi. Interview with IOM official c, 6 April 2011, Kakuma.

¹²⁹ Interview with NGO staff member working in Turkana, 7 April 2011, Kakuma.

¹³⁰ The underlying aim of the 2010 project was the: ‘recovery of livelihood systems of pastoralist communities in the Turkana region following prolonged climate change related drought, famine and floods, secondary armed conflicts and movement restrictions and conflict prevention and peace building interventions as well as protection of individuals susceptible to irregular migration and human trafficking...’. IOM, 2011, *Project with Livelihoods Component*.

¹³¹ Interview with NGO staff member working in Turkana, April 7 2011, Kakuma.

resource authority on sinking five boreholes, provision of 15 timber boats and two fiber glass boats to fishermen in Lake Turkana, and the establishment of a bone craft training center in Kakuma.¹³² On a given day the project coordinator dealt with issues as diverse as finding a spade for a greenhouse gardener, liaising with a mayor on where to build stalls for a market, to instructing farmers where to plant and irrigate crops.¹³³ The focus on climate change adaptation continued in 2011. The programme was renamed: *Mitigating Resource Based Conflicts among pastoralist local communities including refugee host communities in Northern Kenya through strengthening youth capacities to adapt to climate change*.¹³⁴

Interestingly, most of IOM's climate change adaptation activities in 2010 and 2011 were the same as their livelihood activities of 2009. The operational activities stayed the same while the labeling of them changed. IOM staff in the field did not distinguish between what was a climate change adaptation activity and what was not. In discussions with the project manager he identified a number of projects as adaptation such as: shallow water wells, planting of neem trees, drip irrigation, provision of boats to fishermen on Lake Turkana and integrated small-scale farming.¹³⁵ Yet no IOM field staff provided a clear rationale of what distinguished these from the other activities. In fact, the IOM project manager stated that a number of activities could be shifted between climate change

¹³² IOM, 2011, *Project with Livelihoods Component*.

¹³³ Author's experience when spending a day in the field with IOM project coordinator.

¹³⁴ Over the 2010 – 2011 period IOM established: a bakery, carpentry classes, small-scale greenhouse agriculture, small-scale integrated farms, a car wash business, basket making classes, a peace center, an internet café, a radio station, beehives, stalls for local business people, planted trees and provided soccer balls to youth. They also dug shallow-wells, provided drug centers for medicating animals and restocked pastoralists herds. The 2010 - 2011 Japanese funded projects are astonishing in the range and number of activities they encompass. IOM, 2011, *Project with Livelihoods Component*. Interview with IOM official c, 6 April 2011, Kakuma.

¹³⁵ Interview with IOM official c, 6 April 2011, Kakuma.

adaptation and other project categories.¹³⁶ This may be in part due to the ambiguity of the term adaptation – almost any development activity can be subsumed in the term under some definitions.¹³⁷

This shift in framing was not a result of requests or delegation from donor agencies. The Japanese supported the expansion of IOM's activities beyond peace-building into food security in 2009. However Japan made no explicit demands that the project deal with, or be labeled, climate change.¹³⁸ Instead, it appears that IOM staff decided to label the programme as a climate change initiative. IOM consulted the Japanese donors in advance – at both the Nairobi and Tokyo level – and they supported the change in labeling of the activities. In sum, IOM Kenya's 2009 food security initiatives in the Rift Valley offered a bridge into climate change adaptation work.

IOM's livelihood and adaptation activities were new, outside their expertise and not closely linked to their migration mandate. IOM developed, for the first time, working relationships with the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Livestock to implement these projects as they do not have the expertise needed in livestock and agriculture.¹³⁹ IOM made a number of claims to justify their expansion into this new area. They referred to the need to take a 'holistic approach',¹⁴⁰ and the fact that there was an institutional gap¹⁴¹ as no other agencies

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ See the section on 'climate change-development' issue linkages in Chapter Two.

¹³⁸ Interview with IOM official c, 6 April 2011, Kakuma.

¹³⁹ IOM, unlike UNHCR, tends to implement its own activities.

¹⁴⁰ For instance one staff member argued that it was necessary to take a holistic approach which saw peacebuilding, livelihood support and safe-migration as a three pronged approach or a triangle 'if you

worked with host communities or pastoralists. Most importantly they claimed that pastoralists were migrants, and thus any work with pastoralists fitted their mandate. As one IOM staff explained ‘we are not an agricultural organisation, so most of the time people would ask, why are you involved in this? Anything to do with migration is our field – pastoralism is our field.’¹⁴² Essentially, IOM staff in Kenya perceived their mandate as very broad and there were few projects that could not be linked to it.

One donor questioned this logic for expansion. He asked IOM in a bilateral meeting if working with pastoralists was ‘really part of your mandate and they said sure, migration is what we do. [But] It’s a more complex issue than that... I understand that migration is part of their mandate but still I’m not quite sure if this is what they have expertise on’.¹⁴³

Yet as this donor pointed out:

these are very marginalised areas both politically and economically and ...difficult areas to work in. You need a very good understanding of how the livelihood is, the coping mechanisms, the whole climate change, how have pastoralists adapted to climate change in the past twenty years. How much is a coping mechanism and how much is traditional? I think there are probably UN agencies and NGOs that have been tracking and following that conversation for a longer time than IOM.¹⁴⁴

remove one aspect of the three the other two will collapse’. Interview with IOM official f, 25 March 2011, Nairobi.

¹⁴¹ One Kakuma based staff member stated ‘most of the agencies here support the refugees so the host communities are overlooked here. But the host community are also pastoralists, so that is the reason why they wanted us to identify intervention to address their food security needs’. Interview with IOM official c, April 7 2011, Kakuma.

¹⁴² Interview with IOM official f, 25 March 2011, Nairobi.

¹⁴³ Interview with IOM member state representatives, April 6 2011, Nairobi.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

IOM's broad mandate enabled it to easily shift into a new area but it did so without the necessary expertise.

There are risks involved in expanding into a new issue area without the adequate expertise or institutional support. A number of government officials criticised IOM's initiatives as 'not appropriate' and 'not suitable'. They referred to mistakes with IOM's selection of crops to grow (such as bananas) in arid areas.¹⁴⁵ IOM's projects were also described as 'not well thought out' and 'destined to fail' because of the way of identifying beneficiaries.¹⁴⁶ Moreover, IOM projects were not informed by a long-term vision of sustainable, non-dependent, development in Northern Kenya.¹⁴⁷ Most of the initiatives seemed to be small-scale, once-off injections of capital and resources, which may not lead to sustainable income generation for the beneficiaries. One government official noted that: 'If you just buy items and give them to the community without thoroughly sensitising them and letting them know why you are giving them such items sometimes it comes out as just a mere donation and you will create a dependency situation' and suggested this was what IOM was doing'.¹⁴⁸ Another local councilor stated that 'they haven't trained a person how to sustain a project'.¹⁴⁹ They claimed they were marginalised from the projects and that there was no involvement of community leaders in project development.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁵ Interview with Ministry of Agriculture Crop Specialist, 13 April 2011, Kakuma.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid. Interview with Town Councilor, 15 April 2011, Kakuma.

¹⁴⁷ On previous attempts by Kenyan government and colonial government to shift pastoralists into agriculture see: David Anderson and Vigdis Broch-Due eds., 1999, *The Poor are Not Us: Poverty and Pastoralism in Eastern Africa*, Oxford: James Currey.

¹⁴⁸ Interview with Ministry of Agriculture Crop Specialist, 13 April, Kakuma.

¹⁴⁹ Interview with Town Councilor, 15 April, 2011, Kakuma.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

IOM's broad mandate and flexible funding from Japanese donors enabled it to shift into providing livelihood support for pastoralists in Kenya's far north. But IOM wasn't delegated to do so, it was an internal decision to frame their operations as climate change.¹⁵¹ This example demonstrates how functional IGOs can expand into a new issue area without explicit support from member states. It did so to develop expertise on a new issue of high global salience, and flexible donor funding facilitated this.

Humanitarian Aid for Pastoralists

IOM did not label all its assistance to Kenyan pastoralists in terms of climate change during this period. In 2010 IOM sought and gained funding from the 2010 UN Central Emergency Response Fund project to provide 'immediate livestock support to pastoralist host communities affected by impacts of recurrent droughts and floods in North West Kenya'.¹⁵² Their application and subsequent project documentation did not mention climate change although they were arguably dealing with the impacts of it. The CERF funded projects involved very similar activities to the Japanese funded adaptation programmes. IOM delivered assisted pastoralists living in the vicinity of the Kakuma and Dadaab refugee camps develop alternative livelihoods. They distributed and planted drought resistant seeds; established 'farmer field schools' to train locals in crop and fodder production; and restocked 100 households with five goats each.¹⁵³

IOM made a conscious decision not to frame these projects as climate change adaptation activities due to the donor demands. CERF provides short-term humanitarian financing

¹⁵¹ Interview with IOM staff member f, 25 March, 2011, Nairobi.

¹⁵² IOM, 2011, *Livelihood Project Summary*.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

when there is a gap in funding. It will not fund long-term, development work such as climate change adaptation projects. As one IOM staff member explained:

The Central Emergency Response Fund only funds short term emergency projects, which last between 3- 9 months. Thus Climate Change adaptation projects are not considered for funding under the CERF.¹⁵⁴

IOM would not have gained funding from CERF if they had chosen to describe their drought assistance as climate change adaptation and so it did not. This example illustrates how IOM framed their projects as ‘climate change’ when and if it suited their institutional interests.

Evaluating IOM’s Organisational Change

This section summarises and evaluates the changes described above in terms of rhetoric, policy, structure and operations.

Rhetorical Change (6)

Both IOM’s Director Generals in the 2000s were reluctant to engage with climate change. McKinley made no rhetorical statements, on climate change and migration during most of his leadership (2000 – 2008). This can be explained by the low global salience of climate change for most of this period.

In 2007, when climate change was high status, McKinley called on states at Council to address the issue of environmental migration and convinced the Greek government to

¹⁵⁴ Interview with IOM staff member f, 25 March, 2011, Nairobi.

fund an IOM conference on the issue. Subsequently, in 2008, he highlighted in several speeches that IOM had a role in addressing climate migration. However, McKinley chose not to attend the UNFCCC meeting at Poznan. Although he saw climate migration as an issue, he did not see the UNFCCC as an important venue to advance IOM's interests. In sum, rhetoric change under McKinley occurred as there were several speeches directly on the issue but climate change was not considered a top priority during this period.

The subsequent Director General, Swing, was also initially reluctant to engage with climate change. However, his position changed by late 2009 primarily due to the high issue status of climate change. Swing spoke in the lead-up to and at the Copenhagen UNFCCC summit. He called for the inclusion of migration as an adaptation strategy in the final agreement and reiterated this message at the UNFCCC meetings in Cancun (2010) and Durban (2011). At Council Meetings he also urged states to address climate change and migration.

Overall, IOM's rhetorical change was significant at 6. This reflects the several speeches Swing made focused directly on climate change and migration during the 2009 – 2011 period. However, IOM does not meet the standard for major rhetorical change. This is because neither Swing nor McKinley made more than three major speeches with a theme of climate migration in a year and over a sustained period of time.

However there are a few qualifications of this score. Firstly, it was more difficult for IOM to meet the 'significant rhetoric change' criteria as the Director General does not

make as many speeches as UN counterparts. One senior IOM official explained that ‘IOM doesn’t tend to make major speeches’.¹⁵⁵ Secondly, IOM’s rhetoric score is not as high as UNHCR’s because their baseline in 2000, from which we score change, was different. A previous IOM Director General, James Purcell, had highlighted the issue of environmental migration (although not climate change migration) at a 1992 IOM conference. Meanwhile no previous High Commissioner for Refugees had made a speech on environmental displacement. Finally, IOM’s rhetorical statements tended to follow and reinforce policy changes, rather than instigating them. This does not alter IOM’s rhetoric score but does inform us about how change occurred.

Policy Change (6)

IOM made significant changes to its policy between 2000 and 2011. It published a policy paper which stipulated IOM’s position on climate change and migration in 2009. In this paper the organisation shifted its focus from environmental migration (1990s) to climate migration (2008 onwards). IOM also developed its policy position through a series of IASC submissions to the UNFCCC (2008 – 2009). In these documents they called for new policy responses: the creation of international legal frameworks for those outside the refugee and IDP frameworks; the development of new migration policies to facilitate movement and the integration of migration as adaptation into the UNFCCC text. These policy changes were significant given IOM has a small headquarters with little policy-making capacity.

¹⁵⁵ Interview with IOM senior official b, 12 October 2010, New York.

In addition, the agency wrote and published a number of research reports on climate change and migration. However, these reports did not stipulate an organisational position on climate change, and are thus not included in the final score of policy change. Overall, IOM's policy developments constitute a significant change of 6 as it published specific papers outlining its position on climate change. However it does not meet the criteria for major change (7 – 10) as it did not include climate change and migration in high-level strategic documents, the core additional criteria for major policy change. IOM does not have many high-level policy documents and thus it is more difficult for it to meet these criteria. IOM staff had difficulty identifying a 'high-level' policy document when questioned.¹⁵⁶ This is primarily because IOM has little strategic policy-making capacity, council does not focus on strategic direction, and IOM operates 'reactively' to member state needs.¹⁵⁷

Structural Change (4)

IOM's created new positions to focus on environmental and climate induced migration. In 2007 IOM enlisted two people to develop organisational policy, attend meetings and conferences and lobby governments to take action on this issue. This 'focal point' structure remained throughout the period, even during the 2009 period of major organisational reform. In addition, IOM headquarters had several research staff who investigated the links between climate change and migration as well as policy and operational staff examining climate change, environment and natural disasters. There were thus more than two people dedicating more than a third of their office hours to the

¹⁵⁶ Interview with IOM staff members i and h, 7 and 11 May 2012, Geneva.

¹⁵⁷ DFID. 2011. *Multilateral Review*: 15.

issue and IOM scores a 4. IOM did not reach major change (7 – 10) as they did not create a new department and hire new staff with new expertise to work on climate change migration.

Operational Change (8)

IOM appeared to make the largest changes at the operational level. It had no climate change and migration portfolio in 2000, and by 2010 claimed to have over 500 projects, in over thirty countries worldwide.¹⁵⁸ IOM documented and promoted its operational expertise in environment, climate change and migration through the 2009 Compendium and at the International Dialogue on Migration in 2011. Thus IOM surpassed the criteria for major operational change (initiating over twelve projects in over twelve national jurisdictions) justifying a score of 8.

However IOM's new operations were often a relabeling of existing projects and did not necessarily respond to climate change. For this reason IOM's operational change does not reach a higher score of 9 or 10. In Kenya, for example, IOM expanded its operations into new communities (Northern Kenyan pastoralists), and engaged in new activities ('adaptation', livelihood and income generating activities) with new partners (FAO and the Kenyan Ministry of Agriculture). However, these activities were not driven by concerns over climate change. Rather they were the evolution of a previous project which focused on peacebuilding and sustainable livelihoods in the Rift Valley. IOM framed its assistance to pastoralists as 'climate change' adaptation because climate change was

¹⁵⁸ IOM. 2009. *Compendium*.

high- status, not due to on the ground demand. On another occasion, IOM did not name its livelihood assistance to pastoralist communities as climate change adaptation as UN humanitarian relief fund would not fund it. Further research should investigate how much operational change – beyond project relabeling - occurred in IOM’s other Compendium projects.

Overall Change (6)

IOM’s overall change is the average of the above four scores. This is calculated as: $(6, 6, 4, 8)/4 = 6$ and summarised in the table below.¹⁵⁹ An overall change of six represents a significant change, but not a major change. Changes at headquarters in Geneva were predominantly policy-led and supported by the structural changes which established the climate change focal points. Meanwhile operational changes were largely decoupled from headquarters, staff in the field responded to donor demands at the national level.

Table Nine: IOM and Climate Change

IGO	Rhetorical Change	Policy Change	Structural Change	Operations Change	Overall Change
IOM	6	6	4	8	6

¹⁵⁹ Note that these scores are not weighted to reflect organisational differences and may indicate very different proportional degrees of change across organisations. For example IOM’s rhetoric change may be greater proportionally than UNHCR’s as the Director General does not give many speeches. The fact that the Director General delivered two speeches in a year may be more meaningful than two speeches from the High Commissioner for Refugees or the Administrator of UNDP who give more speeches annually. Furthermore IOM’s structural change was minor, but their headquarters is much smaller than UNHCR or UNDP. A refinement of the coding matrix could include assessing structural change proportionally – if an organisation has 100 people at headquarters and hires one new person this should be weighted the same as an organisation with 500 people at headquarters that hires five new people.

Conclusion

IOM is as a functional organisation. It was established in 1951 to assist states in transporting labour migrants from Europe and was given no supervisory status over international migration law. The organisation is highly projectised, dependent on funding and follows a logic of consequences. This chapter traced how the organisation began engaging with ‘environmental migration’ in the 1990s — at a time when the environment had high global salience. The organisation did not engage with climate change when it had low global salience (2000 to 2006). Thus, issue status and IGO type explained when and why IOM engaged with climate change.

The chapter then traced how IOM changed its policy, rhetoric and structure when climate change had high issue status, despite a lack of member states’ support. IOM highlighted that climate change would lead to greater displacement and advocated for climate migration to be seen as a form of adaptation. At the operational level IOM made major changes initiating (or relabeling) over five hundred projects on climate change, environment and migration. The chapter illustrated how IOM’s decisions to frame its operational activities as climate change adaptation were often driven by donors funding criteria. In sum, a logic of consequences, a result of IOM’s functional type, drove the organisation’s response to climate change.

Chapter Five

UNDP and Climate Change

UNDP is the largest UN development agency within the UN system (Karns and Mingst 2004). It provides grants to recipient governments and works on capacity, good governance and reducing poverty. It is also the lead coordinator of UN agencies at the country level and has representation in more than 120 states. Its size, global spread, normative entrepreneurship, and development focus, make it an important agency to study (St Clair 2004). Yet there is relatively little academic scholarship dedicated to UNDP and none on its engagement with climate change or the environment.¹ It is much less studied than its larger counterpart, the World Bank, which has a literature dedicated to its ‘greening’ (Gutner 2005; Nielson and Tierney 2003; Park 2008).² This chapter makes an important empirical contribution by examining if and how UNDP has responded to climate change.

¹ In fact, there are only three monographs that document in detail the history of UNDP (Stokke 2007; Klingebiel 1999 and Murphy 2006).

² Although the World Bank is 13 times bigger than UNDP in financial terms (Boas and McNeill 2003). On the World Bank see Woods 2006; Weaver 2007.

This chapter begins by outlining UNDP's hybrid type. It argues that UNDP was created as a functional IGO in the 1950s but became more normative with the creation of the Human Development Report Office in 1994. The chapter then turns to UNDP's engagement with the environment in the 1990s and documents how UNDP developed a mandate for 'sustainable human development' but not climate change adaptation. The substantive part of the chapter traces the evolution of UNDP's climate change initiatives between 2000 and 2011. It demonstrates how the increasing issue status of climate change led UNDP to develop adaptation policies, rhetoric, policies and programmes. Finally the chapter summarises and scores UNDP's organisational changes along the four dimensions.

UNDP: A Hybrid IGO

UNDP was created in 1965 as a functional IGO. It was the product of a merger of two UN development agencies: the Expanded Programme for Technical Assistance (EPTA)³ and the UN Special Fund.⁴ These two organisations were both functional IGOs as they had no jurisdiction over an international treaty or convention. The General Assembly merged them and established UNDP 'to enhance coordination of the various types of technical assistance programs within the UN system' and avoid duplication of activities (Stokke 2009: 187). To manage UNDP states created a new intergovernmental body, the Governing Council. However it was not a complete merger: the two funds were kept

³ The Expanded Programme for Technical Assistance (EPTA) was created in 1949 by the UN's Economic and Social Council to provide assistance to developing countries (Mingst and Karns 2007: 141; Stokke 2009 and Reinalda 2009). See also Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), 1949, *Resolution 222 (IX)*, New York: United Nations.

⁴ The Special Fund was administered by ECOSOC and the General Assembly (Mingst and Karns 2007; Reinalda 2009: 458).

separate, the two heads worked together and contributions could be pledged to the two programs separately (Stokke 2009: 187). Thus at its origins UNDP was a functional IGO as it had no legal treaty or convention which it oversaw. Its mandate — to foster economic development in developing countries — came from the ECOSOC and the General Assembly.⁵

The procedures and principles governing the EPTA and the Special Fund continued to apply to UNDP's activities. UNDP inherited a strong network of field offices from EPTA through which it delivered development assistance (Reinalda 2009).⁶ UNDP's assistance, following EPTA, was made up of aid, not loans and was thus distinct to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, or World Bank as it would later be known (Mingst and Karns 2007). UNDP followed EPTA's approach asking central governments to review their needs and then developed programmes in the agricultural and industrial sector (Mingst and Karns 2007: 141; Reinalda 2009: 458). UNDP also continued EPTA's practice of distributing grants to other specialised UN agencies – such as ILO, WHO, UNICEF – alongside direct grants to states. The EPTA side of UNDP offered bilateral, needs based assistance to developing countries and other UN agencies.

⁵ UNDP is a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly and is administered under the authority of Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the General Assembly (Klingebiel 1999: 70). It is composed of an Executive Board of member states, formerly the governing council, an administrator who now leads the agency and staff who make up the bureaucracy. The General Assembly is mandated to set the overall policy of UNDP and the ECOSOC is 'responsible for the formulation of general rules and principles which govern the administration and operations of UNDP' (UNDP 1994: 1 and 70). However most of the strategy and policy decisions are now made at the Executive Board level or within UNDP at senior management level.

⁶ EPTA's country officers became the UNDP field representatives and today are often the UN development coordinators in country, known as the 'Resident Representatives'.

Meanwhile the Special Fund had been a much smaller grants programme. Paul Hoffman the manager of the Marshall Plan, had established the Special Fund in 1958, and the US was its biggest donor (Mingst and Karns 2007; Reinalda 2009: 458). It targeted grants to developing countries to use their natural resources and develop a skilled workforce through education and technical training (Manzer 1964: 780). UNDP also continued to finance grants through the Special Fund. Notably, UNDP and its two predecessors endorsed the exploitation of natural resources for economic development. There was no mandate in EPTA, the Special Fund or UNDP to address conservation, pollution, or other environmental issues of the era. Essentially, UNDP had a mandate as both a development fund and programme. As a fund it channeled assistance from donors to other UN specialised agencies. As a programme it worked with governments in over 130 countries to build capacity and develop agricultural and industrial sectors.

In 1969, at the end of the UN Development Decade, UNDP came under review. The *Jackson Report* found that the agency was ‘too focused on economics’ and should be orientated towards the well-being of least developed countries (Reinalda 2009: 459; United Nations 1969).⁷ In particular the review criticised UNDP for lacking a ‘think tank to work out ideas and launch them as directives for policies’ (Reinalda 2009: 459; St Clair 2004: 181). The Jackson Report recommended that UNDP play a more normative role in advocating for human well-being rather than focusing solely on economic growth. UNDP did not make this change in the 1970s or 1980s (St Clair 2004: 181-184).⁸

⁷ The review was named after Robert Jackson, a leading development cooperation figure in the 1960s and 1970s who authored the report (Jackson 1970; Reinalda 2009: 459).

⁸ Although UNDP created a think-tank in the 1970s, following the recommendations of the Jackson Report, it did not outline a divergent development paradigm from the Bretton-Woods conception of development as

By the 1990s UNDP was a development agency that did ‘everything’ but had no core specialisation or focus (Murphy 2006: 232). It had neither a clientele (UNIFEM had women; UNICEF had children) nor a sectoral focus (UNIDO and industrial development; WHO and health) like other UN agencies. In fact the UNDP administrator in the early 1990s, James Gustave Speth, stated that it ‘lacked a clear substantive profile, a focus in development policy terms and a profiled strategy’ (quoted in Klingebiel 1999: 104).⁹ UNDP had evolved from its days as a merger of two funds – it had ‘in-house expert capacity’ and it now ‘consumes a lot of the money it raises itself for projects it develops and executes.’¹⁰ UNDP was jeopardised by the World Bank which in the 1980s and 1990s broadened its activities and began to ‘invade’ UNDP’s development territory (Boas and McNeill 2004: 113). UNDP in the 1980s and early 1990s was an institution in search of a purpose.

In 1994 UNDP created the Human Development Report Office and launched the Human Development Reports. The office was a semi-autonomous think tank within UNDP to advocate for ‘human development’, and fulfilled the recommendations of the Jackson Report. The office, under the leadership of Mahbub Ul Haq, elaborated a new development paradigm focused on individual well-being rather than national economic

economic growth (St Clair 2004). It did shift its programming from headquarters to the country level, as a result of the review (Murphy 2006: 70; Stokke 2009: 200). See also: General Assembly, 1970, *Resolution 2688 (XXV)*, New York: United Nations.

⁹ A study of the agency by Kienbaum and Partners also noted that ‘one of the principal unwritten laws of UNDP seems to be: ‘Don’t have a strategy’ (quoted in Klingebiel 1999: 136).

¹⁰ Interview with former senior policy advisor at the UN System Chief Executives Board (CEB), UN Secretariat, 12 October 2010, New York. Formally UNDP is on equal standing with other UN funds and programmes. However, in addition to its own programming, it supports broader UN system activities at the country level, and the Administrator of UNDP chairs the UN Development Group at headquarters.

growth (Murphy 2006: 242). It published annual Human Development Reports with leading academics outlining the concept of human development and ranked states annually on a 'human development' index. The Human Development Report Office had a separate governance structure and governing board to ensure editorial independence.¹¹ Furthermore the office was guaranteed fixed regular contributions to finance its work and was not dependent on UNDP's core contributions.¹²

The establishment of the office and annual report gave UNDP a core focus and a normative goal: human development. The reports, according to one UNDP administrator, created 'an extraordinary advocacy tool' whose strength derives from the way it 'benchmarks progress' with the human development index.¹³ The report had a special status within UNDP: it could criticise states while UNDP could not. The Administrator of UNDP, for instance, would find it difficult to condemn India for not tackling poverty, while the Human Development Report could.¹⁴

Human development became the overarching goal for UNDP. The concept 'provided technical, political and even moral guidance' and 'acted as a source of institutional identity for UNDP staff' (McNeill 2007: 19). As Haq explained, the human development paradigm provided the 'missing moral core in our technological advance' and claimed that 'in rich nations and poor, the moral foundations of economic growth are often

¹¹ See: General Assembly, 2003, *Resolution 57/264*, New York: United Nations; General Assembly, 1995, *Resolution 49/123*, Article 1, New York: United Nations. The Administrator at the time stated that 'the essence of any such report must be its independence and its intellectual integrity' (McNeill 2007: 11).

¹² General Assembly, *Resolution 57/264*.

¹³ Mark Malloch-Brown, 'Welcome Address' to the first *Global Forum on Human Development*, New York 29 July 1999 in Murphy 2006: 242.

¹⁴ Interview with former director of the Human Development Report Office, February 3 2012, Oxford.

lacking.¹⁵ In sum, the human development reports increased the normativity of UNDP by giving it a normative purpose (St Clair 2004: 188).

In summary, UNDP was the product of two functional organisations: EPTA and the Special Fund. It was originally a functional organisation which channeled grants from donors to developing countries and other UN agencies. UNDP was not established as a normative, or hybrid, IGO. It had no supervisory relationship over international law or role in promulgating international law. The establishment of the Human Development Report Office and its subsequent reports shifted UNDP from a functional to hybrid IGO.¹⁶ During the 1990s it became more normative as it advocated for ‘human development’ and reported on states, particularly those that were not achieving highly on the index.¹⁷ However, the Human Development Report Office was somewhat siloed from the rest of UNDP and UNDP programming. Although this gave it editorial independence, it also limited the Office’s ability to influence UNDP policy.

Meanwhile UNDP policy has been closely monitored by member states. Since the mid-1990s UNDP reports three times annually to the executive board which formulates the general policy priorities and strategy, and reviews and approves programmes, activities

¹⁵ Haq quoted in McNeill 2007: 19.

¹⁶ Other functional IGOs have become more normative over time such as UNICEF which has embraced the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) in the past two decades. According to a former UNICEF staff member ‘the CRC has become defining part of the organisation and tends to be referenced in all activities and documents’. Interview with former UNICEF official, 21 May 2012, New York.

¹⁷ The Millennium Development Goals are another normative agenda endorsed by UNDP. However there is no Millennium Development Goals office, or equivalent, in UNDP from which we could observe a logic of appropriateness, which makes it hard to observe their impact as we can for the Human Development Report Office. Furthermore the Millennium Development Goals are not relevant to UNDP’s engagement with climate change.

and the budget.¹⁸ As UNDP gives technical assistance through grants, rather than lending capital like the World Bank, it is in constant need of funding from the board (Boas and McNeill 2003: 39).¹⁹ The board has the power to ‘veto a policy line’ but does not get involved with every policy detail (Boas and McNeill 2003: 39). As a member state to UNDP explained: ‘All major decisions about mandate have to be taken to the Executive Board: [we] expect that before they enter into a new issue area that they check this with their members. But [we] don’t have to legislate to the very last detail. There is space for design and exploration.’²⁰ It is this degree of space that this chapter examines.

UNDP and the Environment (1990 – 1999)

Up until the 1990s UNDP had no specific mandate to engage with environmental issues. In fact, in the 1980s, UNDP had programmes in natural resources extraction. It supported, for example, development of Ghana’s gold extraction industry.²¹ There were four important changes, elaborated in this section, which shifted UNDP’s focus from natural resource extraction to sustainable development. Firstly, the *Brundtland Report* (1987) outlined the notion of ‘sustainable development’ and shifted the UN’s development paradigm. Secondly, UNDP helped establish a new multilateral environmental fund, the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) and gained access to

¹⁸ The Board is comprised of 36 members: 8 from Africa; 7 from Asia; 5 from Latin America; 4 from Eastern Europe; 12 from Western Europe and North America. Although developing countries have a majority on the board decisions are made by consensus and donors have significant influence as they have to finance the agency (Klingebiel 1999).

¹⁹ Moreover it has become increasingly reliant on a small group of donors, including the Nordic countries, Japan, Netherlands and Canada, due to a general decrease in official development assistance (Boas and McNeill 2003: 39).

²⁰ Interview with UNDP member state representative a, 11 October 2010, New York,

²¹ Telephone interview with former UNDP Environment and Energy Group official, 4 June 2012. Note that UNDP also carried out programmes in renewable energies in the 1980s. For instance, it supported China in the development of clean coal technology and helped initiate national energy conservation efforts in Peru.

financing from the GEF to implement environmental programmes. Thirdly, UNDP created a new environmental unit to develop policy and channel GEF funding. Fourthly, a new UNDP administrator, Gus Speth, with an environmental background was appointed in 1994. He established a new mandate for UNDP: sustainable human development, connecting UNDP's human development focus with the sustainable development paradigm. UNDP did not, however, have a mandate for climate change adaptation during this period.

In 1987 the UN World Commission on Environment and Development published a report, commonly called the Brundtland Report, which outlined the need for 'sustainable' development. Sustainable development placed environmental protection and intergenerational equality at the center of the development paradigm. Development should not involve the exploitation or pollution of natural resources for the benefit of the living at the expense of future generations. The report defined sustainable development as: 'development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs'.²² Sustainable development was at the center of the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development at Rio, the most significant global conference on the environment since Stockholm, 1972.²³ UNDP was

²² World Commission on Environment and Development. 1987. *Our Common Future (The Brundtland Report)*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

²³ The conference established an action plan and guiding principles (the Rio Declaration and 'Agenda 21') to deliver sustainable development, these documents were signed by 172 governments. UNDP, as the UN's core development agency, was involved in the conference and in implementing the outcomes, particularly Agenda 21. UNDP had also been involved in the first, and only other, Environment and Development Conference in Stockholm in 1972. However in 1972 UNDP was not active in the environmental field as it: 'barely existed as a component of international development assistance' (UNDP Evaluation office 2008: 9). At Stockholm there was discussion of placing environmental responsibilities within UNDP to ensure that environmental considerations were included in development projects from their inception (Johnson: 1972).

involved in the conference and emerged as one of the UN agencies with a mandate for sustainable development. This gave it an entry point to take on more environmental activities (UNDP Evaluation Office 2010:12).

Alongside sustainable development, the Rio Conference identified two other global environmental priorities: climate change and biodiversity. In addition, a new global fund to address global environmental issues the GEF was officially launched (Mingst and Karns 2006: 216).²⁴ The GEF channeled grants from developed to developing states to address the following global environmental problems: biodiversity, climate change, ozone layer depletion and international waters (Young 2002).²⁵ The GEF was a collaborative partnership between UNDP, UNEP and the World Bank: the three agencies established the legal and constitutional framework for facility.²⁶ UNDP became one of only three agencies that had access to the GEF, worth US\$1.2 billion (Murphy 2006: 271). The creation of the GEF signaled the beginning of UNDP's work on climate change, in contrast to its main prior focus on energy demand, supply and conservation.

UNDP, through the GEF, had access to a stream of financing to develop environmental activities, separate from member state contributions. UNDP used the GEF to assist developing countries with 'enabling activities' and implement on the ground activities, to

However, many governments and NGOs doubted UNDP's ability to control separate funding 'for a purpose which may be at odds with the institution's traditional development interest'. (Johnson 1972: 274).

²⁴ The Rio summit also established two major multilateral environmental agreements: the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Convention on Biological Diversity.

²⁵ The GEF worked on ozone layer depletion only in countries not covered by the Montreal Protocol's Multilateral Fund. For more on the GEF see: GEF website, <http://www.globalenvironmentfund.com/>, accessed 18 August 2011.

²⁶ Telephone interview with former UNDP Environment and Energy Group official, 4 June 2012; Interview with UNDP Environment and Energy Group official b, 22 May 2012, New York.

fulfill requirements to the UNFCCC, the Convention on Biological Diversity, the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification and the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants from 1998 onwards.²⁷ Enabling activities to the UNFCCC involved monitoring, verification and writing national communication reports, which included inventories of greenhouse gas emissions and vulnerability assessments. This was the first phase of UNDP's climate change initiatives. However, the GEF's focus on mitigation and enabling activities limited UNDP to a 'very narrow understanding of what climate change meant'.²⁸ UNDP staff didn't, for instance, 'understand that it [climate change] included the forestry sector, that it included all the different sectors in adaptation'.²⁹ It was only in the 2000s with changes in climate financing that a broader conceptualisation of climate change was accepted. And when it did change 'it changed fairly fast as people can see the links but they never thought of it that way until then'.³⁰

Meanwhile, UNDP's Administrators in the 1990s sought an increasing role for UNDP in the environment. William Draper, a former Wall Street Banker, was aware that environmental degradation was occurring and would become more of an issue in the future.³¹ He also saw the environment as an area for future business for UNDP.³² Draper established UNDP's first environmental unit: the Energy and Natural Resources Unit.³³ In 1993 Draper was replaced by Speth, an environmentalist, who had played a central

²⁷ Interview with UNDP Environment and Energy Group official d, 6 October 2010, New York and see Global Environmental Facility (GEF), 'What is the GEF?', <http://www.thegef.org/gef/whatisgef> accessed 15 August 2012.

²⁸ Interview with UNDP Environment and Energy Group official f, 8 October 2010, New York.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Telephone interview with former UNDP Environment and Energy Group official p, 4 June 2012.

³² Ibid.

³³ Draper also appointed Haq and enabled him to establish the Human Development Report Office (McNeill 2007).

role in world environmental conferences, including Rio, and founded the *World Resources Institute*. Speth sought to integrate the concept of sustainable development into UNDP's human development focus. In Speth's first speech to all UNDP staff he outlined his answer: the concept of 'sustainable human development'.³⁴

Sustainable human development was Speth's way of integrating the sustainable development paradigm into UNDP's new found-focus on human development. However, he did not see anything 'inevitable' about the concept, or UNDP engaging with it.³⁵ Speth lobbied council to adopt a new mission statement for UNDP and claims there 'was no push-back' from states.³⁶ In 1996 UNDP's Executive Board endorsed a new mission, which placed 'sustainability' at its center. It stated that:

UNDP's mission is to help countries in their efforts to achieve *sustainable human development* by assisting them to build their capacity to design and carry out development programmes in poverty eradication, employment creation and sustainable livelihoods, the empowerment of women and protection and regeneration of the environment, giving first priority to poverty eradication.³⁷

This mandate change was important as it gave UNDP a more expansive role in environmental protection. However there was no explicit mention of climate change adaptation or mitigation in the new mandate nor is there any indication that this was intended at the time.

³⁴ Telephone Interview with former UNDP Administrator, James Gustave Speth, 14 June 2012.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Author's emphasis. In addition it was agreed that UNDP had a role to play in disaster risk reduction and disaster management. The board agreed that: 'UNDP strives to be an effective development partner for the United Nations relief agencies, working to sustain livelihoods while they seek to sustain lives. It acts to help countries to prepare for, avoid and manage complex emergencies and disasters.' Both citations are from Klingebiel 1999: 106 – 107.

Speth also renamed the environment unit and it became the *Sustainable Energy and Environment Division*.³⁸ The division had two functions: 1) to develop policy on sustainable development and 2) develop GEF projects.³⁹ UNDP employed a number of new staff to fulfill these goals. In 1993 UNDP Headquarters hired its first climate change expert, explicitly to develop GEF climate change projects and in 1998 it hired three more people to work on climate change as the national communications work increased.⁴⁰ However, GEF work dominated the environmental division, bringing in the majority of its funds.⁴¹ Between 1994 and 1997 UNDP received more than US \$150 million from GEF, three times the core funding of their programmes (Murphy 2006: 271). One UNDP staff member claimed that the ‘EEG [Energy Environment Group] was GEF’.⁴² GEF was reportedly such a ‘cash cow’ that the director of the GEF unit reported directly to the Administrator, instead of reporting through the director of the Sustainable Energy and Environment Division, the next in-line manager.⁴³

Furthermore, the Environment Division’s activities were siloed from other UNDP operations due to its independent funding stream. The environment division had little engagement or influence over the rest of UNDP’s programmes as they did not operate

³⁸ Note that this division went through a series of name changes in the 1990s and 2000s. It is now the Energy and Environment Group which is how I refer to it in the next section of this chapter.

³⁹ The GEF, Capacity 21 fund and the Montreal Protocol were first available to UNDP in Speth’s first year as administrator (Murphy 2006). Capacity 21 was a fund to implement the Rio summit’s Agenda 21 action plan.

⁴⁰ Telephone interview with former UNDP Environment and Energy Group staff member o, 14 October 2010.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² They also described GEF as the ‘tail wagging the dog’. Interview with UNDP Environment and Energy Group official q, 20 October 2011, New York. Another claimed that GEF work made up 80 percent of their divisions time while sustainable development policy work was only 20 percent. Telephone interview with former UNDP Environment and Energy Group staff member o, 14 October 2010.

⁴³ Telephone interview with former UNDP staff member o, 14 October 2010.

with core funding (Young 2002: 85). This separation was reinforced by a senior management decision to reduce funding to the environment division from around twenty percent to less than fifteen percent of UNDP's core contributions, due to budgetary pressure.⁴⁴ This made it more dependent on multilateral trust funds. Separate GEF funding 'was almost anti-mainstreaming because people had it [the environment] in a box, alone somewhere else and it wasn't important'.⁴⁵ In short, UNDP's engagement with climate change in the 1990s was limited almost entirely to the GEF. As a former Environment and Energy Group staff member explained: the 'GEF structured their climate change work' and 'as a result UNDP never deal with climate change on it's own'.⁴⁶ Thus UNDP by the late 1990s was developing and implementing a number of environmental projects, some of which focused on climate change mitigation, but these were not part of UNDP's development programming or strategic objectives. Rather, the Sustainable Development and Energy Division was based on a logic of consequences and sought to maximise funding opportunities from the multilateral trust funds.

⁴⁴ Telephone interview with former UNDP Environment and Energy Group official p, 4 June 2012

⁴⁵ Interview with UNDP staff member f, 8 October 2010, New York.

⁴⁶ Climate change, was given equal weight within UNDP's GEF portfolio alongside the other priorities. Telephone interview with former UNDP staff member o, 18 October 2010.

UNDP and Climate Change (2000 – 2011)

Low Global and Linkage Salience (2000 – 2005)

In 1999 Lord Malloch-Brown, a former World Bank Vice-President, became administrator of UNDP. UNDP's was in a financial crisis: the organisation's core funding was low. Malloch-Brown put it simply: 'UNDP was poor and the World Bank was rich' (Malloch-Brown 2011: 119). He diagnosed that UNDP had:

attempted to compete across too many areas of development, stretching its expertise too thin. It had agriculture and education experts, public health and forestry units, urban planning expertise and much else - even though the UN had other specialised agencies in each of these areas (Malloch-Brown 2011:121).

In doing so UNDP had built-up rival expertise with other UN agencies rather than acting as the UN's development coordinator. UNDP's projects were also often 'tokenistic' according to the new administrator and donors were demanding greater efficiency (Malloch-Brown 2011). He also argued that UNDP did not apply the World Bank's development rigor to its projects and sought to add the 'the professionalism' of the World Bank to UNDP (Malloch-Brown 2011: 119)

Malloch-Brown's answer was to refocus UNDP on 'upstream' macro policies with an emphasis on building good governance. He argued that UNDP needed to 'cut the redundancy and concentrate our resources where they made the most difference' (Malloch-Brown 2011: 121). He sought to create 'a highly focused'⁴⁷ organisation and downgraded the environment and natural resource management 'as having little to

⁴⁷ Mark Malloch-Brown in UNDP, 2001, 'Update on the UNDP Business Plans', *Report to First Regular Session of the Board*, DP/2001/CRP2, New York: United Nations: 2.

contribute to the core UNDP mandates of poverty and governance’ (UNDP Evaluation Office 2010: vii). During his period as Administrator Malloch-Brown almost never mentioned climate change in speeches.⁴⁸ Climate change was not a priority during his leadership and this was reflected in the lack of climate change rhetoric under Malloch-Brown.

Malloch-Brown made major structural changes to the environment division. He disbanded the forestry programme, reduced the number of staff working on the environment, and decentralised the Environment and Energy Group. He also discontinued positions in sustainable livelihoods, transport and sustainable development.⁴⁹ He sought to reduce the number of staff in the Bureau for Policy Development, of which the Environment and Energy Group was part, from 250 to ‘fewer than 120 staff members’ at headquarters, with ‘98 staff redeployed to the field’ by 2001.⁵⁰ Malloch-Brown’s decentralisation and restructuring caused a sharp decline in the number of environment staff positions at headquarters and a number of the senior environment and energy staff left upon his arrival.⁵¹

⁴⁸ There was only one speech in which Malloch-Brown mentioned climate change in all the speeches catalogued in: Mark Malloch Brown. 2005. *Statements, Speeches and Commentary 1999 – 2005*, New York: UNDP. He mentioned climate change as one of a list of global environmental issues in an address to the World Summit on Sustainable Development, 30 August 2002 (Malloch-Brown 2005: 357).

⁴⁹ UNDP Evaluation Office. 2008. *Evaluation of the Role and Contribution of UNDP in Environment and Energy*, New York: UNDP: 11.

⁵⁰ Malloch-Brown, 2001, *Report to the Board*: 2.

⁵¹ Telephone interview with former UNDP Environment and Energy Group staff member o, 18 October 2010.

In 2001 UNDP's environmental activities were almost exclusively GEF funded and there was no core funding for climate change activities.⁵² UNDP had lost much of its environmental policy work and UNDP environmental staff would be asked at non-GEF environmental meetings, 'why are you here?'.⁵³ Yet, while the rest of UNDP was facing major cuts, the GEF unit continued to have access to substantial 'new financial resources'.⁵⁴ UNDP was acquiring an increased proportion of funding from the GEF, particularly during the 2003 – 2006 period.⁵⁵ Staff were encouraged to develop the maximum possible number of projects likely to be approved by the GEF.⁵⁶ Thus, the environment and energy portfolio became even more dependent on the GEF and driven by a logic of consequences. Malloch-Brown would support climate change activities as long as they were financially self-sustaining (through the GEF or other multilateral funds) and did not drain core resources. Although UNDP did develop climate change mitigation projects they were not aligned with the Malloch-Brown's strategic focus on poverty reduction and good governance.⁵⁷

The UNDP Board was broadly supportive of Malloch-Brown's deprioritisation, decentralisation and downsizing of the Environment and Energy Group. In 2000 the Executive Board decided to discontinue environment as a core priority within UNDP's 'multi-year funding frameworks'.⁵⁸ Although the environment was reinstated as a priority

⁵² Telephone interview with former UNDP Environment and Energy Group official p, 4 June 2012.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ UNDP Evaluation Office, *Evaluation*.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid. Telephone interview with former UNDP Environment and Energy Group official p, 4 June 2012.

⁵⁷ Reliance on GEF funding for environment and energy initiatives meant that global environmental issues took precedence over national objectives and concerns such as pollution and water supply. The 2008 UNDP Evaluation was particularly critical of the GEF unit in UNDP for this reason.

⁵⁸ UNDP Evaluation Office, *Evaluation*.

in 2002 it, ‘never regained its status as a core priority supported by core funds’.⁵⁹

Furthermore there was little mention of climate change in the Board’s annual meetings between 2000 and 2005.⁶⁰ Climate change did not need to be a high organisational priority as it could rely on funding through the GEF during a period of declining core contributions. UNDP’s overarching goal was poverty reduction and other agencies, such as UNEP, had a greater mandate and expertise in the environmental sphere.⁶¹ Some suggest that Malloch-Brown became more supportive of UNDP’s environmental activities in the 2002 – 2005 period.⁶² This was reflected in a keynote speech he gave at the GEF Assembly in 2002 for which he received a ‘standing ovation’.⁶³ However there is no evidence that he prioritised climate change, which given its low issue status and UNDP’s financial difficulties, is not a surprise.

Nevertheless, in 2004 the environment division developed UNDP’s first adaptation policy: the Adaptation Policy Framework. The policy sought to link climate change adaptation to UNDP’s mandate. It stated that ‘climate change adaptation remains at the forefront of any sustainable development policy agenda’.⁶⁴ The framework was highly

⁵⁹ Ibid: 12

⁶⁰ The only mention of climate change in UNDP’s Annual Reports to the Executive board was in reference to its GEF activities. For example, in 2001 UNDP’s Annual Report stated explained that the ‘GEF is helping 100 countries to fight climate change by cutting greenhouse gas emissions without slowing their pace of growth’. UNDP, 2011, *Annual Report to the Executive Board*, New York: UNDP: 11. Meanwhile, climate change was mentioned in the multi-year funding frameworks (longer term strategy documents) but not as core priority for UNDP or even for the Environment and Energy Group. UNDP, 2004, *Multi Year Funding Framework*, New York: United Nations: 36 – 42.

⁶¹ Executive Board of the UNDP/UNFPA, 2004, *Report of the Executive Board on its work during 2004*, New York: UN Economic and Social Council; UNDP Evaluation Office, *Evaluation*: 12.

⁶² Telephone interview with former UNDP Environment and Energy Group official p, 4 June 2012.

⁶³ Telephone interview with former UNDP Environment and Energy Group official p, 4 June 2012.

⁶⁴ The Adaptation Policy Framework defined ‘adaptation as a process by which individuals, communities and countries seek to cope with the consequences of climate change and explained that while adaptation is not new, but what is ‘innovative is the idea of incorporating future climate risk into policy-making’. UNDP, 2004, *Adaptation Policy Framework*. New York: UNDP.

technical, directed at experts and focused on how to develop and fund adaptation programmes. It was funded by the GEF as there was no core funding made available for climate change adaptation. It was significant as it was the first adaptation activity that was not a national communication for the UNFCCC.

In 2005 Kemal Derviş took over as Administrator. He was a former Turkish Minister of Economic Affairs and had worked at the World Bank as the Chief Economist. He was a ‘very intellectual and solid economist and always demanded that policy decisions be rigorously backed by empirical evidence whenever possible’.⁶⁵ This may have influenced his outlook on climate change, particularly at a time when many governments were reluctant to admit it was anthropogenic and the development-adaptation issue linkage was weak. When Derviş arrived UNDP was still in the process of defining its positions on climate change as a development issue and weighing the importance it needed to accord to it alongside its priorities as a development IGO.⁶⁶ Derviş spent a ‘considerable amount time guiding the organisation’ and his senior managers through intellectual discussions to develop a UNDP position.⁶⁷ He demanded of his staff rigorous analysis on how mitigation and adaptation issues would impact development trajectories and how the burden of climate change, including financing, should be shared among states.⁶⁸ During his first year in office, while internal discussions took place, he delivered no speeches on

⁶⁵ Interview with UNDP official a, 7 October 2010, New York.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Interview with UNDP official a, 7 October 2010, New York. This staff member also stated that these discussions ‘laid the ground work, that made the senior managers who stayed on after his departure, had formulated the case already by the time the new administrator arrived who came with an understanding and appreciation of the issue’.

climate change.⁶⁹ In 2005 there was not yet a strong enough rationale – either financial or issue linkage - for engagement with climate change.

Structural change did not occur in the initial period of Derviş' leadership. In fact, an evaluation of the Environment and Energy Group stated that the environment was not a 'core priority for the new administrator' and was critical of the climate change activities taking place.⁷⁰ The evaluation argued that 'the fit between UNDP's poverty reduction and the GEF objective of mitigating global climate change has been less than convincing'.⁷¹ It argued that adaptation was a 'more natural area for UNDP to engage in than mitigation, where the benefits are largely global'. It noted that there was a high level of dependence on the GEF and emphasis on 'going after available money rather than allocating core resources to sets of activities that are consistent with the UNDP mandate'.⁷² The Environment and Energy Group, in other words, was dominated by logic of consequences.

High Global and High Linkage Salience (2006 – 2011)

In 2006 Derviş, and his associate administrator Ad Melkert, began to speak about climate change in their speeches. In 2006 they both highlighted a new UNDP initiative – the

⁶⁹ I conducted a survey of all the UNDP Administrators speeches available on the website from 2005 to 2011. See UNDP, *Administrator's Speeches*, available at <http://content.undp.org/go/newsroom/?categoryID=593043&lang=en> accessed 12 September 2010 and 20 March 2012. Derviş stated in a public lecture in 2008 that climate change was not 'very much on my mind until recently'. Kemal Derviş, 2008, 'The Climate Change Challenge', *WIDER Annual Lecture* 11, Helsinki.

⁷⁰ UNDP evaluation office, *Evaluation*: ix.

⁷¹ In particular it found that most of UNDP's activities have been aimed at mitigating greenhouse gas emissions - a global rather than local concern which 'was marginally relevant to mainstream development agendas. Ibid: x.

⁷² Ibid: x.

Millennium Development Goals Carbon Facility, which offered developing states financing for carbon emission reductions. Derviş explained that it was ‘formulated to assist developing countries in addressing the challenge of climate change while at the same time using carbon financing opportunities to generate alternative and additional financing for reaching the Millennium Development Goals’.⁷³ This was the first time a UNDP Administrator explicitly engaged with climate change in rhetoric.

In 2007 climate change became the cause célèbre with the release of the fourth IPCC report and the Bali UNFCCC summit. Derviş responded to this by stating that ‘global warming can’t be looked at as an environmental issue anymore: it is undoubtedly a threat to human development as a whole. All development strategies must therefore account for climate-related risk’.⁷⁴ He made climate change a central part of his speech to the Executive Board in 2007, where he outlined UNDP’s three ‘pronged approach’ to climate change. This involved: 1) mainstreaming climate change into UNDP’s core activities; 2) creating conditions that allow markets and the private sector to ‘provide effective solutions to sustainable development and climate change mitigation; and 3) increasing the capacity of developing countries to incorporate resilience into national plans.’⁷⁵ The speech was important as it signaled to the Executive Board the importance of climate change to UNDP for the first time.

⁷³ Kemal Derviş, 2006, *Statement to the Executive Board of UNDP/UNFPA*, 24 Jan 1996, available at <http://content.undp.org/go/newsroom/2006/january/statement-dervis-undp-unfpa-20060124.en?categoryID=349479&lang=en> accessed 25 September 2010.

⁷⁴ Kemal Derviş, 2007, *Kemal Derviş on climate change*, 09 April 2007, available at <http://content.undp.org/go/newsroom/2007/april/kemal-dervis-climate-change.en> accessed January 16 2011.

⁷⁵ Kemal Derviş, 2007, *Speech at the Second Session of the Executive Board*, New York: United Nations, 10 September 2007.

Derviş made other speeches in 2007, as climate change became high status.⁷⁶ These were directed at a wider public audience and had two functions. Firstly, they highlighted the importance of climate change as a development issue. For instance, in 2007 he stated that ‘should the pace of [climate] change accelerate further, development and adaptation could well become synonymous’.⁷⁷ Immediately before the Bali UNFCCC meeting Derviş published an Op-Ed on climate change and development where he stated that a ‘failure to act on climate change will have grave consequences for human development in some of the poorest places in the world and it will undermine efforts to tackle poverty’.⁷⁸ Secondly he used public speeches to position UNDP as an agency with expertise in climate change and development. In particular he showcased the UNDP’s expertise in climate assistance to member states at Council, stating that it was ‘one of the largest sources of technical assistance for climate change related actions in the world, with an on-going portfolio of about US \$2 billion [from GEF]’.⁷⁹ He continued to focus on climate change in subsequent speeches in 2008 and 2009.⁸⁰

A major policy shift occurred in 2007 when UNDP published the Human Development Report: *Fighting Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World*. This was

⁷⁶ He made a total of three major speeches dedicated to climate change in 2007 and made the issue a central theme during the two meetings with the Executive Board and in other speeches.

⁷⁷ Kemal Derviş, 2007, Speech at *UNEP Governing Council Meeting*, 6 February 2007, available at content.undp.org/go/newsroom/2007/february/dervis-unep-20070206.en?categoryID=1005974&lang=en accessed 12 January 2011.

⁷⁸ Kemal Derviş, 2007, *Op-Ed: Climate change and Development: The Central Challenge of Our Time*, UNDP, New York: United Nations, 28 November 2007.

⁷⁹ Derviş, 2007, *Second Session of the Executive Board*.

⁸⁰ Derviş, *WIDER Annual Lecture*.

UNDP's first major report linking climate change to human development.⁸¹ It argued that climate change was a development issue as 'development progress is increasingly going to be hindered by climate change. So we must see the fight against poverty and fight against the effects of climate change as interrelated efforts' (UNDP 2007: vi). The report forged a strong conceptual linkage between climate change and human development stating that climate change threatens human development by eroding 'human freedoms and limiting choice' (UNDP 2007: 7). It emphasised that developing countries would be the worst hit by climate change, and had the lowest carbon footprints, and thus the international community should assist them in adaptation. It stated that 'human development itself is the most secure foundation for adaptation to climate change' (UNDP 2007: 172). The Human Development Report's main contribution was to identify how climate change would impact on the poorest of the poor, and not just 'polar bears', the principal perceived victims of climate change at the time.⁸²

The report came as the global community was rallying around climate change – Al Gore's movie had been released and states were preparing for the Bali UNFCCC summit. Climate change was selected as a theme for the annual Human Development Report because of its high global salience at the time.⁸³ UNDP Administrator Derviş and the Human Development Report Office director both felt it 'was an important issue of the moment' and were aware of the need to establish a human development approach (or

⁸¹ The report was structured into four chapters: the first focused on the science of climate change; the second on the impacts of climate change; thirdly they examined policies and strategies for mitigation and fourthly, they explored adaptation policies at the national and international level. UNDP, *Human Development Report 2007/2008*, New York: United Nations.

⁸² Interview with former UNDP Human Development Report official r, 12 June 2012, Oxford.

⁸³ The formal process for selecting the topic members of human development network voting on several proposed themes. Interview with former director of the Human Development Report official, 3 February 2012, Oxford.

linkage) to climate change.⁸⁴ This illustrates how global salience may lead to the creation of new substantive issue linkages.

The report was an agenda-setting document because of its editorial independence and its global reach. The report was launched at a side-event of the Bali UNFCCC summit and Yvo de Boer (Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC), Ad Melkert (UNDP Associate Administrator), Kevin Watkins (Director of the Human Development Report Office), UN Secretary General Ban-Ki Moon, and environment ministers from Brazil and Nigeria spoke. This presence of the most senior representatives from the climate change and development regime illustrates the creation of a strong issue linkage.⁸⁵ The report was also widely publicised in each UNDP country office as UNDP country teams launched a dialogue with government officials on climate change.⁸⁶ The climate change Human Development Report created a ‘huge awareness’ of the linkage between human development and climate change at the global level and within UNDP.⁸⁷ The Human Development Report was a ‘very important catalytic moment’ according to one UNDP staff member, as until then climate change wasn’t well understood outside the Environment and Energy Group.⁸⁸

⁸⁴ Ibid. The previous Human Development Report had focused on water crises and water scarcity and had thus begun to outline the link between climate change and development. Interview with former UNDP Human Development Report official r, 12 June 2012, Oxford.

⁸⁵ UNDP, 2007, ‘Climate Change and Human Development: Charting a new course through international cooperation’, *A Panel Debate at the UNFCCC*, Bali, 11 December 2007, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2007-8/launch/title.4956.en.html> accessed 15 June 2012.

⁸⁶ Interview with UNDP Energy and Environment Group senior official b, 22 May 2012, New York.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Interview with UNDP Energy and Environment Group senior official b, 22 May 2012, New York.

However, the report was not designed to directly influence UNDP programming on climate change.⁸⁹ It did not set out prescriptive policies or recommendations for UNDP policy and it was not intended to do so.⁹⁰ Furthermore the Human Development Report office did not make financial gains, nor was it seeking them, by selecting climate change as a topic. Yet there were occasional tensions between the Human Development Report Office and UNDP's country offices over the content of the report. The report argued that all states, including developing countries, should make cuts to their carbon emissions. This was controversial and not in line with the negotiating positions of developing states, such as India, at the time.

In fact, at the launch of the Human Development Report in India the Minister for Planning was 'highly critical' of the report for arguing that 'developing countries needed to pay'.⁹¹ While the Human Development Report Office representative defended the report, the UNDP country officer was more sympathetic to the Indian government position.⁹² There was a variation in the logics of behaviour between UNDP country offices and the Human Development Report Office. The country officer followed a logic of consequences. They depended on a one-to-one relationship with government officials and regarded the Human Development Reports as a potential 'liability' as they could undermine this relationship and their ability to channel funding from donors to recipient

⁸⁹ Telephone interview with former Human Development Report official c, 13 September.

⁹⁰ The former director of the Human Development Report Office explained that most people see the report as a product of the UN rather than UNDP, and that UNEP was more influenced by the report than UNDP. Interview with former director of the Human Development Report Office, 3 February 2012, Oxford. A former member of the Human Development Report climate change team stated: It was not 'intended as a back-handed way for UNDP to squeeze itself into climate change'. Telephone interview with former Human Development Report official t, 28 February 2012.

⁹¹ Interview with former director of the Human Development Report official, 3 February 2012, Oxford.

⁹² Ibid.

states.⁹³ UNDP country offices wanted publicity from the reports but no controversy.⁹⁴

Meanwhile the Human Development Report Office was driven by a logic of appropriateness. It sought a global solution to climate change — regardless of how this would impact on UNDP’s ability to source or deliver assistance.⁹⁵

In addition to the Human Development Report, UNDP published a Climate Change Strategy in 2008. The strategy had an internal and external audience. It outlined how to integrate climate change across UNDP and justified why UNDP were the best-positioned agency to work on climate change within the UN system. The strategy built on the Human Development Report, stating that UNDP’s overarching goals were ‘to align human development and climate change management efforts by promoting mitigation and adaptation activities that do not slow down but rather accelerate socio-economic progress.’⁹⁶ This goal would be realised through mainstreaming climate change in UNDP’s development policies as well as through the UN, national, regional and international programmes and policies. Climate change mainstreaming within UNDP would be led by the Environment and Energy Group and a ‘cross-practice steering group’ of governance, poverty reduction, capacity development and gender experts who would develop programming tools in each area.⁹⁷ The Climate Change Strategy was a high-level document which established broad organisational goals for UNDP in climate change. The

⁹³ Interview with former director of the Human Development Report office, 3 February 2012, Oxford.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ In fact, the director of the Human Development Report Office at the time explained that the main message he received as director was ‘don’t offend India, don’t offend China...or Mexico or Brazil.’ Ibid.

⁹⁶ The strategy broke this down into four strategic goals: supporting the design of adaptation and mitigation policies, promoting early adaptation actions and long-term adaptation capacity; attracting direct private and public investment for low carbon technologies and integrating climate change into UN development assistance frameworks at all levels. UNDP, 2008, *Climate Change Strategy*, New York: UNDP: 7.

⁹⁷ UNDP, *Climate Change Strategy*: 20.

Climate Change Strategy and Human Development Report established a linkage between climate change and development and thus a rationale for UNDP's engagement with climate change.

Member states endorsed UNDP's new role in addressing climate change adaptation and mitigation. In 2008 UNDP renegotiated its multi-year strategy, to replace the previous multi-year funding framework 2004 – 2008. The resulting Strategy Document (2008) listed five key sectors that UNDP had a role and mandate to deliver policy advice and technical assistance in. These were: poverty reduction; democratic governance; crisis prevention and recovery; and environment and sustainable development. 'Promoting climate change adaptation' was listed as a subset of the UNDP's environment and energy areas.⁹⁸ The strategic plan also gave UNDP a clear and official focus on adaptation: up until 2007 UNDP had no adaptation service line.⁹⁹ Although climate change had moved into UNDP's highest-level strategy document it was not highly prioritised. At the same time 'funding exploded' for climate change adaptation outside of the GEF.¹⁰⁰ New funding opportunities for climate change emerged between 2008 – 2009 and demand from recipient countries multiplied.¹⁰¹ This provided a strong incentive for UNDP to expand its climate change portfolio and the 2008 – 2011 period saw major change in rhetoric, policy, structure and operations.

⁹⁸ UNDP, 2008, *UNDP Strategic Plan 2008 – 2011, Accelerating Global Progress on Human Development*, Executive Board of UNDP and UNFPA Annual Session, 22 May 2008, New York: 34-35.

⁹⁹ Telephone interview with UNDP Environment and Energy Group official u, 14 February 2011. Note that UNDP had been providing support to developing countries through GEF-financed adaptation projects for some years beforehand but had not separated this assistance out in strategic reports. Interview with UNDP official a, 7 October 2010, New York.

¹⁰⁰ Interview with UNDP Environment and Energy Group senior official b, 22 May 2012, New York.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

From 2008 there were major structural and operational changes with a marked increase in the number of staff working on climate change in the Environment and Energy Group, outside of the GEF. Bilateral donors funded UNDP to establish new programmes on adaptation, deforestation and carbon financing.¹⁰² To manage these programmes at headquarters UNDP created new teams. In 2008, for example, the Japanese government gave UNDP \$92.1 million to implement adaptation programmes in 20 African states. This was a major grant which UNDP, in partnership with UNIDO, UNICEF and the World Food Programme (WFP), used to establish the African Adaptation Programme, UNDP's largest adaptation programme. UNDP established a team to manage the programme in Senegal with oversight provided by UNDP Headquarters in New York.¹⁰³ One staff member explained that 'there's a lot more climate change capacity in the Environment and Energy Group and less and less in the other areas'.¹⁰⁴ The Environment and Energy Group shifted from being predominantly GEF reliant to a more even split between GEF and other projects and policy. Structural change was intertwined with operational change and enabled by new financing.

In addition divisions outside of the Environment and Energy Group and outside of headquarters began to establish their own climate change experts. The gender unit, for

¹⁰² UNDP, FAO and UNEP initiated the UN-REDD programme in 2008. REDD, or REDD+, is a financial incentive mechanism under the UNFCCC and stands for Reduction of Emissions due to Deforestation and forest Degradation in developing countries. The UN-REDD programme is funded by four major donors including the Norwegian government. The UNDP staff comprises: twelve technical and policy staff at the global level (based in New York, Oslo and Geneva); two regional technical advisers for the Asia-Pacific region; one regional adviser each in Latin America and the Caribbean and Africa. The programme is worth around \$119 million. Interview with UNDP Environment and Energy Group official i, 21 October 2010, New York.

¹⁰³ UNDP, Africa Adaptation Programme website, <http://www.undp-aap.org/> accessed 15 June 2012. Interview with UNDP Environment and Energy Group official d, 6 October 2010 and 21 May 2012, New York. Telephone interview with UNDP official m, 1 June 2012.

¹⁰⁴ Interview with UNDP official a, 7 October 2010, New York.

instance, established a team of three people to develop policy on the links between gender and climate change and advocate for gender equality in the UNFCCC negotiations and the climate funds.¹⁰⁵ UNDP also established a climate change focal point system at the regional headquarters and country office level. Each regional center was assigned several ‘really qualified people’ on climate change.¹⁰⁶ Staff expertise shifted from ‘environment and energy, to climate change, and now to climate change mitigation and adaptation separately’.¹⁰⁷ The Environment and Energy Group sought to train ‘almost every single staff member from UN resident coordinators to the environmental coordinators on the UNFCCC negotiations and carbon financing’.¹⁰⁸ The changes that had occurred in UNDP’s rhetoric and policy were now manifest in staff capacity.

In 2009 Derviş was replaced by Helen Clark, a former Prime Minister of New Zealand. Clark arrived the year of Copenhagen and stated from the outset that climate change should be one of UNDP’s top priorities, alongside the Millennium Development Goals.¹⁰⁹ In her first speech to the Executive Committee in April 2009 she argued that it is ‘critical’ to bring in the ‘climate change challenge into the centre of the way in which we think about development’.¹¹⁰ Clark’s rhetoric built on Derviş’s: she reiterated that climate change undermined development efforts and hit the poorest worst. In addition, she

¹⁰⁵ Interview with UNDP gender official h, 21 October 2010, New York. The gendered impacts of climate change was included in a number of speeches by the administrator and the deputy administrator. See: Ad Melkert, 2008, Climate-related conflict and the Millennium Development Goals, speech at the *ECOSOC Luncheon on Climate-related conflict and the Millennium Development Goals*, 30 June 2008, available at <http://content.undp.org/go/newsroom/2008/june/amelkert-statement-environment-conflict-mdg.en?categoryID=1486741&lang=en> accessed 15 August 2011.

¹⁰⁶ There are two or three regional centers per continent. Interview with UNDP official a, 12 October 2010, New York.

¹⁰⁷ Interview with UNDP official a, 12 October 2010, New York.

¹⁰⁸ Interview with UNDP Environment and Energy Group senior official b, 22 May 2012, New York.

¹⁰⁹ Many UNDP staff members mentioned this to me in interviews.

¹¹⁰ Helen Clark, 2009, *Statement On the Occasion of the Annual Session of the Executive Board of UNDP/UNFPA*, 26 May 2009.

outlined a role for UNDP as the ‘UN agency with a climate and development mandate’ as it had ‘significant expertise in the areas of climate change and sustainable development’.¹¹¹

Clark positioned UNDP as the UN climate change and development agency in the hope of securing additional funding. She viewed the Copenhagen summit as an opportunity to establish new climate funds¹¹² and lobbied governments to reduce emissions and commit new, additional resources to cover adaptation costs of developing countries.¹¹³ She argued for a ‘development deal’ at Copenhagen, which would benefit developing countries as well as UNDP. She stated:

What could be achieved at Copenhagen, including through finance mechanisms being worked on, has significant implications for development. These mechanisms could become a major new and additional source of development financing, complementing, and at some point possibly even surpassing the

¹¹¹ Helen Clark, 2009, ‘Remarks by Helen Clark’ *Between Now and 2015: Moving the Development Agenda Forward*, 31 August 2009, The Hague. Clark had a clear view of UNDP’s priorities within its mandate: ‘UNDP is mandated to work in four areas, two of these: promoting democratic governance, crisis prevention and recovery were ‘important stepping-stones’ to their other priorities: poverty reduction and the Millennium Development Goals; and environment and sustainable development.

¹¹² She highlighted this in conversation with the researcher at the UNFCCC summit at the UNFCCC, Copenhagen, 2009. She later stated that ‘Where I want more focus and action now is on...environment and sustainable development. This is particularly important...as the climate change negotiations enter an intensive period with considerable potential to benefit development’. Helen Clark, 2009, ‘Statement by Helen Clark’, *The UN Conference on the World Financial and Economic Crisis*, New York, 26 June 2009, <http://content.undp.org/go/newsroom/2009/june/helen-clark-un-conference-on-the-world-financial-and-economic-crisis.en?categoryID=1684491&lang=en> accessed 9 September 2010.

¹¹³ Helen Clark, 2009, ‘Remarks at the Pacific Leaders Event’, *UNFCCC Side-Event*, Copenhagen, 14 December 2009 available at: <http://content.undp.org/go/newsroom/2009/december/helen-clark-remarks-at-pacific-leaders-event-copenhagen.en?categoryID=1684491&lang=en> accessed 8 September 2010.

significance of ODA [overseas development assistance]. A new development paradigm could be in the making.¹¹⁴

Clark maintained that UNDP should have a role to play in dispersing this new climate financing, agreed upon by states at Copenhagen and Cancun UNFCCC summits.¹¹⁵

UNDP's rhetorical response under Clark reflected a logic of consequences.¹¹⁶

Policy changes continued between 2009 and 2011. However, there was no equivalent to the Climate Change Human Development Report or the Climate Change Strategy. UNDP published a number of technical reports and policy papers on issues ranging from adaptation, to gender and climate change, to wind energy.¹¹⁷ UNDP departments, outside of the Environment and Energy Group developed their own climate change policies.

There were, for instance, policy debates about how to promote climate change mainstreaming across UNDP's practice areas of: poverty reduction and good governance.

As one Environment and Energy Group staff member explained: 'We can't work in silos and have environment remain as an isolated issue'.¹¹⁸ UNDP's gender and climate change team carved out a distinct niche and released a *Resource Guide on Gender and*

¹¹⁴ Helen Clark, 2009, *Statement at the Annual Session of the Executive Board*, New York, 26 May 2009, available at <http://content.undp.org/go/newsroom/2009/may/helen-clark-statement-at-the-annual-session-of-the-executive-board.en?categoryID=1684491&lang=en> accessed 5 September 2010.

¹¹⁵ Clark argued that 'The UN development system also has a well-functioning system of multi-donor trust funds, which is already in use as a vehicle for climate finance, and could be more widely applied. Helen Clark, 2010, *Remarks at Joint Session of Executive Board*, 15 January 2010 available here at: <http://content.undp.org/go/newsroom/2010/january/helen-clark-remarks-at-joint-session-of-executive-board.en?categoryID=2219505&lang=en> accessed 5 September 2010.

¹¹⁶ In 2011 she focused her attention on the Rio + 20 conference and focused less on climate change. See Helen Clark, *Speeches*, 2011 – 2012 available at <http://content.undp.org/go/newsroom/2011/> accessed 15 June 2012.

¹¹⁷ In 2009 there were more than double the number of publications on climate change than any other year in UNDP, according to the website list of publications. See UNDP, *Climate Change Publications*, <http://www.undp.org/climatechange/publications.shtml> accessed 12 September 2010. Note that many of these reports were highly technical and not policy papers.

¹¹⁸ Interview with UNDP Environment and Energy Group official f, 8 October 2010, New York.

Climate Change and several other reports explaining why gender must be taken into account in the climate change regime.¹¹⁹

Significant structural change also occurred under Clark between 2009 and 2011. In 2009 UNDP outlined the need for a ‘surge’ in staff capacity to its Executive Board.¹²⁰ The Associate Administrator, Ad Melkert, argued that climate change was an area of ‘extraordinary demand’ due to preparations for Copenhagen and the hoped-for future agreement on mitigation and adaptation.¹²¹ He stated that there will be ‘with no doubt the need for substantial extra capacity to support in particular the least developed countries and small island states’.¹²² UNDP increased its climate change capacity at headquarters and in the field. At headquarters each regional bureau established a climate change focal point. For example, the Regional Bureau for Africa, had a climate change advisor reporting directly to the Bureau’s Director.¹²³ Clark also decided to hire new UNDP climate change policy advisors in 26 developed countries.¹²⁴ UNDP was, according to one Environment and Energy Group staff member:

making a huge infrastructure investment in regional and headquarters...That’s infrastructure that will not be reversed if there is policy change tomorrow...It’s really backed up by the level of activity, backed by financing at the country level, UNDP staff and experts in so many country offices and regional centre...It’s a

¹¹⁹ As one UNDP staff member explained UNDP realised it [the report] was something that could be used globally’ and they saw a ‘big-gap as 2 years ago [2008], few articles and no mention of gender in climate change’ Interview with UNDP gender official h, 21 October 2010, New York.

¹²⁰ Ad Melkert, 2009, *Speech to the UNDP/UNFPA Executive Board*, 26 May 2009, available at <http://content.undp.org/go/newsroom/2009/june/ad-melkert-to-the-undp-unfpa-executive-board-.en?categoryID=1684491&lang=en> accessed 15 September 2010.

¹²¹ Melkert. 2009. *Speech to the UNDP/UNFPA Executive Board*.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Interview with UNDP Climate Change Focal Point in Regional Bureau for Africa j, 21 October 2010.

¹²⁴ Interview with UNDP Environment and Energy Group official q, 20 October 2011, New York.

system wide reform and system wide change in terms of handling climate change at the organisation.¹²⁵

These structural changes institutionalised climate change as a top priority for UNDP.

UNDP gained member state support for focusing on climate change as a top organisational priority. At the 2009 Council Meeting, Clark stated that ‘Making the links between Millennium Development Goals achievement and sustainable development has also led me to prioritise UNDP’s support to programme countries on climate issues and the ongoing negotiations for a new agreement. Development and the impact of climate change and variability cannot be treated as distinct issues. They are inextricably linked’.¹²⁶ UNDP also reported on its climate change adaptation spend (a total of US \$11,791) for the first time (UNDP, Annual Report 2009: 15). In the 2010 Annual Report, Clark stated that combating climate change was one of UNDP’s top mandated priorities.¹²⁷ This was a remarkable assertion for the agency to make and a significant shift from UNDP in 2000. Donors in 2010 endorsed UNDP’s position and ‘called upon UNDP to continue playing a central role in linking climate change to development and helping developing countries to take mitigation and adaptation measures.’¹²⁸

In summary, by 2011 UNDP had established a strong linkage between climate change adaptation and human development through the Human Development Report and other

¹²⁵ Interview with UNDP Environment and Energy Group official q, 20 October 2011, New York.

¹²⁶ UNDP, 2009, *Administrators Report to the Executive Board in UNDP Reports on Sessions*, New York.

¹²⁷ She stated that UNDP’s mandate was to ‘work with countries to reduce poverty, promote democratic governance, prevent and recover from crises and protect the environment and combat climate change’.

UNDP, Annual Report 2010:1.

¹²⁸ UNDP Executive Board, 2010, *Report of the Executive Board on its work during 2010*, Economic and Social Council: New York: 3.

policy and rhetorical statements. As a result of the ‘explosion’ of funding opportunities UNDP increased its climate change capacity and operations and gained member state support to prioritise it. They then gained member state support for these rhetorical, policy, structural and operational changes.

Operational Change in Kenya

This section examines UNDP’s Kenya climate change operations.¹²⁹ It investigates if and how the trends observed at headquarters were reflected at country level. It finds that UNDP Kenya’s climate change portfolio has expanded in the 2006 – 2011 period due to increased financing and demand.¹³⁰

During the 1990s UNDP Kenya did not implement any climate change projects, even through the GEF. The Kenya GEF coordinator focused predominantly on biodiversity projects and was ‘very successful’ at gaining funding. This was because the regional advisor for GEF Kenya was a biodiversity expert. Meanwhile, GEF climate change projects were remotely supported from New York, which was not as effective. The only exception to this was in 1998, when UNDP assisted Kenya with its ‘national communications’, or reports, to the UNFCCC. UNDP Kenya mirrors the general trend at headquarters in the 1990s. There were no climate change adaptation operations, only a few GEF mitigation and enabling activities.

¹²⁹ There is an important distinction between projects that are formulated explicitly as ‘climate change projects’ and those which in retrospect are seen to have elements of climate change adaptation and mitigation. My analysis focuses on the former. A number of interviewers did not make this distinction and described projects as ‘climate change’ regardless of how they were labeled in project documentation.

¹³⁰ Note that I was only able to visit one UNDP Kenya projects in site - the African Adaptation Programme Office. I was unable to observe UNDP projects in action as none were operational during the two months I was in Kenya.

In 2001 UNDP began its first explicitly designed climate change mitigation project.¹³¹ UNDP partnered with the Kenyan Association of Manufacturers to assist Kenyan businesses to embrace energy efficiency and was funded by the GEF. GEF funding enabled UNDP to work on climate change mitigation before climate change was a high priority for donors or for recipient countries.¹³² Then in 2005 UNDP began its first climate change adaptation project in Kenya, ‘Coping with Drought and Climate Change’.¹³³ It was a regional project, also funded by the GEF, which aimed to gather, analyse, forecast and disseminate climate information in Kenya and other sub-Saharan African states.¹³⁴ However, the project was not managed by the UNDP Kenya office. The Kenyan Drylands Center led on technical aspects and the project was managed by UNDP New York, which had expanded its climate change adaptation capacity with the hiring of new staff.¹³⁵ In sum, UNDP Kenya implemented few climate change projects in the 2000 – 2005 period as it was not a high priority for the Kenyan government or UNDP.¹³⁶

Government and UNDP priorities changed in the 2006 – 2011 period. In 2009 the Kenyan government developed a national climate change strategy and adaptation plan.

¹³¹ Telephone interview with UNDP official v, 25 March 2011.

¹³² UNDP staff in hindsight reported that many of their environmental projects in the 1990s ‘qualified’ as climate change projects. A GEF project to expand protected forestry area systems and protect biodiversity could have been labeled as climate change project ‘because you’re talking about advancing carbon sequestration, which starts in the forest’. Interview with UNDP official w, 30 March 2011, Nairobi.

¹³³ Telephone interview with UNDP official v, 25 March 2011.

¹³⁴ UNDP, 2008, Kenya: Adapting to Climate Change in Arid and Semi-Arid Lands, *UNDP Project Document*, PIMS 3792, Nairobi: UNDP: 63.

¹³⁵ Telephone interview with UNDP official v, 25 March 2011.

¹³⁶ Furthermore, UNDP and many others donors did not partner with the Kenyan government because of perceived corruption in government at the time. The election of Kibaki in 2002 and the departure of President Moi put Kenya back in favour with donor governments and agencies. The GEF was unlikely to grant funds to what was widely seen as a corrupt government before then. Telephone interview with UNDP official v, 25 March 2011.

This strategy outlined national adaptation policies across the agricultural, forestry and other relevant sectors. Kenya also established a climate change Secretariat to coordinate climate change programmes.¹³⁷ UNDP Kenya, meanwhile, had produced a Climate Change Strategy which stated new office priorities such as: ‘...building Kenya’s capacity to address climate change... [and in particular] assess climate change impact and realistic response strategies and develop and implement relevant policies and regulations; and mainstreaming climate change into core government development areas...emphasising that climate change is not only an environmental issue’.¹³⁸ The explosion of funding in the 2008 – 2011 period offered potential for greater climate change operations.

In 2008 UNDP Kenya expanded its GEF climate mitigation activities. They hired a new staff member to implement a Clean Development Mechanism project in 2008, to enhance the Kenyan public and private sectors ability to access carbon finance.¹³⁹ UNDP Kenya also established a GEF project (US \$2.4 million) on standards and labeling to reduce electricity related carbon emissions.¹⁴⁰ They had the ‘Energy Market Transformation Programme’ to introduce improved cook stoves in small enterprises and schools (US \$6.6 million) and an ‘Access to Clean Energy Services in Kenya’ (US \$2.31 million). These

¹³⁷ The office has six staff members (two seconded from the Kenyan Meteorological Department, one from the department of remote sensing and remote survey, two from the environmental directorate and one from the National Environmental Authority). Interview with Kenyan climate change secretariat official, 31 March 2011, Nairobi.

¹³⁸ UNDP Kenya Country Office, *Climate Change Strategy*, Nairobi, Kenya.

¹³⁹ The project was part of the UNDP-UNEP Partnership on Climate Change launched at the UNFCCC meeting in Nairobi in 2006. It was small and only worth US \$250,000. UNDP. 2010. UNDP Kenya Portfolio of Energy and Environment Project/Programs 2010, Nairobi: 1. See also: UNDP, *Environmental and Energy in Kenya*, <http://mirror.undp.org/kenya/energyandenvironment.htm> accessed 3 August 2011.

¹⁴⁰ The project sought to establish standard energy efficiency labeling for electrical appliances. These labels would be placed on consumer goods (such as refrigerators and air conditioners) and signal cost-energy efficiency over the long-term, enabling people to purchase items that will lead to energy savings. UNDP, Energy and Environment Brief, Nairobi, Kenya, 2010. Interview with UNDP Kenya official w, 30 March 2011, Nairobi.

projects signified a shift in UNDP's GEF portfolio from a focus on biodiversity towards a focus also on energy efficiency, energy savings and a reduction in carbon emissions.

UNDP sought to expand its adaptation portfolio in Kenya by partnering with the World Bank.¹⁴¹ The World Bank had developed a large arid land resource management programme in 17 districts of Kenya.¹⁴² As a sub-set of this broader programme UNDP and the World Bank, established the 'Adaptation to Climate Change in Arid and Semi-Arid Lands'. They acquired US \$6.5 million from the Special Climate Change Fund to do environmental mapping, develop early warning systems and pilot community based adaptation pilot-projects.¹⁴³ The World Bank managed US \$5.5 million for several districts and UNDP was entrusted with the other US \$1 million to focus on one district (Mwingi). Essentially, UNDP sought to 'piggy-back operational and logistical support' from the World Bank's Arid Lands Resources management project.¹⁴⁴

Yet three years after acquiring this funding the project still had not been implemented. It was stalled by the World Bank's decision to stop funding the Arid Land resources project, following an audit of its projects. UNDP has been 'waiting' to put operational staff on the ground but is reliant on the Bank for technical inputs, consultants and vehicles.¹⁴⁵ A UNDP staff member explained that: 'The World Bank have all the structures in place and we could not move forward without [them], we are heavily

¹⁴¹ The World Bank and the Kenya government had developed a large arid land resource management programme in 17 districts of Kenya.

¹⁴² See the Kenya Arid Lands Resources Management website <http://www.aridland.go.ke/index.php> accessed 3 August 2011.

¹⁴³ See UNDP, *Kenya: Adapting to Climate Change*: 24 – 26.

¹⁴⁴ Interview with UNDP Kenya official w, 30 March 2011, Nairobi.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

dependent on their structures’.¹⁴⁶ Yet UNDP lists the project as active in their 2010 portfolio of Energy and Environment Projects despite the fact it is only a project proposal.¹⁴⁷ This example illustrates a logic of consequences: UNDP will partner with other agencies to access funding. It also highlights that a funded, ‘active’ operation is not necessarily implemented.

Kenya was also one of the 21 countries selected for the African Adaptation Programme. UNDP Kenya had US \$5.5 million to build capacity in government to develop climate change policy, access climate change financing, and model the impacts of climate change.¹⁴⁸ A UNDP employee summarised the purpose of the project as:

[the] Africa adaptation [programme] works to put in place structures, which will allow the government to first of all be organised because there is an anticipated inflow of climate change related funding from the west, from donors. So it is in the best interest of the government of Kenya to be prepared...to have the right structures in place so donors also look at the delivery structures. If you’ve figured out your delivery structures as a country you’re much better placed and you might get funding easily.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁶ He also stated that the project used ‘government structures to deliver, using the district, range management offices, district drought management offices. So most of the ‘on the ground work is done through government structures’. Interview with UNDP Kenya official w, 30 March 2011, Nairobi.

¹⁴⁷ See UNDP, 2010, *UNDP Kenya Portfolio of Energy and Environment Projects*.

¹⁴⁸ The adaptation programme included: training for climate change desk officers in government ministries and the purchase of equipment such as a dynamic modeling tool to predict climate change impacts. See UNDP, *Project Brief*, available at http://environment.hackkenya.org/climate_change/project_details.php?id=57 accessed 20 February 2011. Interview with Kenyan climate change secretariat official, 31 March 2011, Nairobi.

¹⁴⁹ Telephone interview with UNDP official v, 25 March 2011.

Yet this project had also been delayed by almost a year due to differences in budgeting procedures between the Kenyan government and UNDP.¹⁵⁰ Again, UNDP's adaptation operations in 2010 were more developed and advanced in their project documentation than on the ground.

In summary, what changes occurred in UNDP Kenya's environmental portfolio and why? Mitigation and adaptation projects increased in quantity over the 2000s. Until 2005 UNDP's involvement with climate change was limited to mitigation initiatives and funded solely by the GEF. By 2010 UNDP had various climate change projects funded outside of the GEF, by the Special Climate Change Fund and the Japanese government. The critical factors explaining an increase in climate change labeled activities in UNDP Kenya were the availability of funding, Kenyan government demand and UNDP's shift in expertise. However UNDP has a mixed record in actually implementing these projects.

Evaluating UNDP's Organisational Change

Rhetorical Change (8)

Between 2000 and 2005 UNDP had little to no rhetorical engagement with climate change. Climate change was a low status issue and neither Malloch-Brown nor Derviş made public speeches focused on climate change. In fact, Malloch-Brown deprioritised the environment as he did not see a comparative advantage for UNDP to expand beyond its GEF activities. Derviş did not speak on climate change during the first year as

¹⁵⁰ The project management office was only established in December 2010, instead of early 2010, and the project is supposed to finish in December 2011 giving them an extremely short period of time to realize their goals. Interview with Kenyan climate change secretariat official, 31 March 2011, Nairobi. Interview with the African Adaptation Project Manager, March 14 2011, Nairobi.

Administrator, because the issue had neither high global nor linkage salience.

Rhetorical activity changed dramatically during the 2006 – 2011 period as both administrators during this period made major speeches on a regular and sustained basis. From 2007 onwards Derviş made regular speeches dedicated solely to climate change, stating that ‘global warming can’t be looked at as an environmental issue anymore: it is undoubtedly a threat to human development as a whole’.¹⁵¹ He positioned UNDP as an expert in climate change and development and outlined the agency’s role in adaptation programming as well as mitigation.

Clark made climate change an even higher priority from the outset of her administration. She made climate change one of UNDP’s top two priorities, alongside the Millennium Development Goals. She claimed that UNDP was the ‘UN agency with a climate and development mandate’.¹⁵² She spoke regularly on climate change in the lead-up to the Copenhagen climate summit of 2009 and positioned UNDP as a conduit for the new climate assistance funds. She also won support from UNDP Executive Board to include climate change as one of UNDP’s top mandated priorities. As she outlined in the UNDP 2010 annual report: UNDP’s mandate was to work with countries to reduce poverty, promote democratic governance, prevent and recover from crises and protect the environment and combat climate change’.¹⁵³

¹⁵¹ Kemal Derviş, 2007, ‘Kemal Derviş on climate change’.

¹⁵² Clark, *Between Now and 2015*.

¹⁵³ UNDP, *Annual Report 2010*:1.

UNDP scores highly on rhetorical change with an eight. It meets the criteria for ‘major’ change: leaders made the issue a regular theme in speeches and outlined the agency’s response to the issue. Derviş and Clark prioritised climate change over a sustained period. UNDP does not score a ten for rhetorical change: this would require a complete and unitary focus on climate change, over and above any other priority, such as the Millennium Development Goals. Derviş and Clark continued to argue that the Millennium Development Goals were a core focus of the organisation.

Policy Change (8)

Policy changes in UNDP began before rhetoric as this chapter illustrated. In 2004 UNDP published the Adaptation Policy Framework, authored by a new and loosely forming adaptation team in the Environment and Energy Group and funded by the GEF. This group began to work on climate change adaptation despite Malloch-Brown’s deprioritisation of the environment. However, the Environment and Energy Group’s climate activities during the 2000 – 2005 were heavily dependent on GEF funding. Furthermore, the adaptation policy framework was a technical report, outlining how to develop adaptation policies in developing countries, and did not constitute a significant policy change within UNDP. Meanwhile Malloch-Brown selected good governance and poverty reduction as the two issues in which UNDP had comparative advantage, and both were prioritised in the Multi-Year Funding Frameworks (2000 – 2004 and 2004 – 2008). Malloch-Brown selected areas that were likely to secure funds and climate change was not one of these due to its low global salience.

In the 2006 - 2011 period there was a major change in policy outputs. Climate change transformed from a peripheral issue dealt with only in the Environment and Energy Group, and mostly in GEF, to a core UNDP policy concern. This shift was heralded by the 2007/2008 Climate Change Human Development Report which substantiated and promoted the link between UNDP's core mandate, human development, and climate change. The advocacy efforts surrounding the publication of this document gave UNDP internal and external support to develop further policy and programmes. The report was closely followed by the *Climate Change Strategy* (2008) which outlined how climate change would be mainstreamed across UNDP's work. These two documents are examples of policy papers which outline the organisation's position.

In addition, UNDP and member states developed a new Strategy document to replace the previous multi-year funding frameworks. The UNDP Strategy (2008) mandated UNDP to address climate change adaptation and mitigation, based on its environmental and energy mandate. The Strategy is a prime example of a high-level policy document as it reviewed and reprioritised all of UNDP's work for a multi-year period. It was also product of negotiation between UNDP senior managers and states and thus represented a mandate shift. However the 2008 Strategy did not mandate UNDP to place climate change as one of its top priorities.

Under Clark UNDP's climate change policy outputs evolved. Other UNDP divisions, outside of the Environment and Energy Group began to develop their climate change policies – such as the gender team. There were also a series of the Environment and

Energy Group policy publications including advocacy and technical reports. However, there was no major policy paper of equal stature to the Human Development Report and Climate Change Strategy.

UNDP scores highly on policy change. It published several significant policy papers specifically on the organisation's position on climate change and a high-level strategic document (the 2008 Strategy) prioritising the issue. It meets the criteria for major change and scores an 8. UNDP's score is not higher as the organisation did not reprioritise to solely focus on climate change.

Structural Change (8)

UNDP began the decade with a small number of staff working in the Environment and Energy Group, focused on developing national communications and mitigation projects funded by GEF. Between 2000 and 2005 there was major restructuring and deprioritising of UNDP's environment work. Malloch-Brown decentralised the work the Environment and Energy Group and a number of senior staff left. As documented in this chapter this restructuring reflected the low issue status of climate change during the period.

In the 2006 – 2011 period major structural change occurred. Under Derviş, the Energy and Environment Group expanded its climate change expertise dramatically and new adaptation and forestry teams were established. They were funded by new bilateral grants and thus were outside of the GEF unit. Other divisions outside of the Environment and Energy Group also established climate change positions, such as the gender and climate

change advisors. Structural change largely followed policy and rhetorical change.

Under Clark structural changes continued. UNDP established climate focal points in the regional bureau at headquarters and at regional and country levels. Twenty-six climate change focal points were sent to UNDP offices in Least Developed Countries. This was part of a concerted effort to put ‘more boots on the ground’, develop climate change programmes and mainstream climate change across UNDP’s work. The creation of these new positions represented a significant investment of resources and locked in previous rhetoric and policy changes.

UNDP meets the criteria for major structural change also. It had established a number of new teams and hired staff with new expertise on climate change to fill these new positions. This merits a score of 8. UNDP did not score higher as there was not a complete transformation – there is resistance to mainstreaming climate change and the numbers of climate change focal points in the regional bureau is proportionally small.

Operational Change (8)

UNDP operational change is harder to evaluate at the global level given the decentralised nature of its programming. By examining projects managed by UNDP headquarters and in Kenya we can arrive at an approximate indicator of change.¹⁵⁴

During the 2000 to 2005 period there were no climate change programmes outside of the

¹⁵⁴ There was an online database of UNDP’s climate change projects however this was hacked into and they are now creating a new one. Telephone interview with UNDP official n, 5 June 2012.

GEF. GEF projects were predominantly focused on mitigation (reducing carbon emissions) and on national communications for the UNFCCC. This was true for UNDP headquarters and UNDP Kenya, where all projects were GEF financed during this period.

There was a dramatic change between 2006 and 2011 as climate financing opportunities exploded. There was a range of new funding opportunities for climate change outside of the GEF. These opportunities included the three multilateral climate funds (the Special Climate Change Fund, the Least Developed Countries Fund and the Adaptation Fund); bilateral funds from traditional donors (Japan and Norway); and the potential for private sector financing. These new funds enabled UNDP to establish adaptation programmes in over twenty-one countries. UNDP country offices also sought out new funding opportunities – in Kenya UNDP partnered with the World Bank to establish a climate change adaptation programme.

UNDP thus scores equally highly for operational change. It developed over twelve new projects and programmes in over twelve national jurisdictions between 2000 – 2011, the criteria for ‘major’ change. Its score of 8 reflects the high number of programmes in the Pacific, Asia, Latin America and Africa. However it is also important to note that operational change is the most problematic to assess of the four dimensions of change. Although project documentation suggests that UNDP Kenya has expanded its adaptation activities, fieldwork suggested that some projects had not been implemented and existed in name only (such as the World Bank and UNDP Arid Land Resource Management Programme). As previously mentioned in the IOM chapter, the operational score does not

take into account the gap between creating (and labeling) projects and implementation.

Overall Change (8)

UNDP's overall change is summarised in the table below and calculated by taking the average of the four above scores $(8+8+8+8)/4 = 8$. An overall change of 8 indicates a major organisational change. This change was predominantly led by rhetorical change, then policy, structure and operations - although some policy change did occur in the early 2000s.

Table Ten: UNDP and Climate Change

	Rhetorical Change	Policy Change	Structural Change	Operations Change	Overall Change
UNDP	8	8	8	8	8

Conclusion

UNDP was not established with a mandate to work on climate change or environment and development but it has evolved over the past fifty years. UNDP gained a mandate to work on 'sustainable human development' in 1996, but environment was then deprioritised in the late 1990s and early 2000s under Malloch-Brown. There was little rhetoric, policy, structure or operational engagement with climate change between 2000 and 2007 beyond UNDP's GEF portfolio. Climate change became a major issue from 2007 onwards. There were numerous speeches by Derviş and Clark on the issue; the formulation of the Human Development Report, the Climate Change Strategy and the

2008 UNDP Strategy; and new climate change positions and teams were created. At the operational level UNDP acquired funding from the Japanese for the African Adaptation Programme, from the Norwegians for UN-REDD, and from various other bilateral and multilateral funds for in country programmes. This was a significant shift from the previous GEF centered climate portfolio. In 2010 member states endorsed a new mandate for UNDP, which included climate change. UNDP, of all three organisations, changed the most and the fastest. Collectively the three chapters on UNHCR, IOM and UNDP illustrated how issue status and IGO type influenced the timing, extent and nature of IGO change. Further research is needed to refine and increase the generalisability of IGO type as a theory of IGO change, this will be discussed in the next and concluding chapter.

Conclusion

Climate change was at the center of the world's attention in December 2009. Copenhagen was the largest UNFCCC summit thus far with the most IGOs, NGOs, states and media in attendance (Cabr  2012: 11). There was an intense scrutiny of who was contributing to climate change and who was going to address it. Development, humanitarian and migration IGOs positioned themselves as critical players in tackling the impacts of climate change in developing states - the most 'vulnerable' countries (IPCC 2007). But to what extent did these IGOs actually change? Were their statements mere rhetoric and posturing on the international scene? And how would they balance this new priority with their existing mandates? Where they, in other words, moving beyond their mandates? These empirical questions drove this research into IGO change and response to new issues areas.

IR scholars have not developed a parsimonious, generalisable account of why and how IGOs respond to new issue areas beyond their mandates. I have sought to do this and began this dissertation by posing three questions: how have IGOs responded to climate change? When and why has this change taken place? And how can we explain the variation in change across organisations? The first section of this conclusion outlines my answers to these three central questions. The second section illustrates how IGO type can inform IR theory and move us beyond principal-agent and sociological institutionalist

accounts. I then identify avenues for further research to deepen our understanding of IGO type in the fourth section. Finally in the fourth section, I outline how policy makers will benefit from this account of IGOs' responses to climate change.

The Importance of IGO Type

How have IGOs changed and responded to climate change? I answered this question in two ways. To set the context I conducted a large-N analysis of IGO attendance at the UNFCCC. I found that attendance increased over time, with the most significant increases in the 2006 – 2009 period, when climate change became an issue of high global salience, and was a top priority at international meetings on a regular and sustained basis. However, IGO attendance is a limited proxy for IGO change. It informs us of how many IGOs are acknowledging climate change in rhetoric – and perhaps also policy – but not to what extent they are prioritising it internally, nor if they are making major structural or operational changes.

My substantive analysis thus traced IGO change along four dimensions: rhetoric, policy, structure and operations. I developed numerical indicators to score and evaluate change along each dimension from major, to significant, to minor change. These scores offered a nuanced reading of IGO change and enabled comparison across IGOs, which diverged in the substance of their response. I traced how: UNDP changed the most (major change along all four dimensions); UNHCR changed the least (significant policy and rhetoric but only minor operational and structural change); and IOM placed in the middle (major operational change and significant policy, rhetoric and structural change). This four-

dimensional categorisation of IGO change and the corresponding indicators is a useful and important contribution to studies of IGO change. It will be useful for donors, partner NGOs and IGO staff seeking to identify and measure organisational change. IR theories could also benefit from more specific metrics to evaluate organisational change as a dependent variable. Further analysis could investigate the relationship between the different dimensions of change: does rhetorical change often precede, and lead to, other changes? And how do hierarchical and horizontal organisations differ in their change processes?

The other two central research questions shifted the focus from description to explanation. I sought to explain variation in IGOs' responses to new issue areas. I developed a theoretical framework, based on IGO type and issue status, and identified four hypotheses to explain the interaction between these two independent variables (chapter one). I provided evidence for these hypotheses through a large-N analysis (chapter two); in-depth case studies (chapters three, four and five). Essentially, I proposed that IGO change was driven by a combination of internal and external factors. IGOs react to changes in their external environment. When new issues arise and become top priorities on the international agenda ('high global salience') IGOs are likely to engage. All IGOs will engage when the issue is also perceived to be strongly linked to their mandate ('high linkage salience'). Thus the timing of IGO change is partly a result of the changing 'status' of an issue.

The other critical factor is IGO type. IGOs exist on a spectrum from functional to normative ideal types. Normative IGOs have supervisory status over a body of international law whereas functional do not. They are also distinguished by different sources of legitimacy and logics of behaviour. Normative IGOs have moral legitimacy, which they seek to protect and perpetuate by following a logic of appropriateness. Functional IGOs have pragmatic legitimacy and pursue a logic of consequences – favouring material gains over maintaining their core identity. IGO type and issue status interact to explain when and why IGOs will change in response to new issue areas. Normative IGOs (such as UNHCR) will change when an issue has high linkage salience; functional IGOs (such as IOM) will respond when an issue has high global salience.

I documented how these logics of behaviour play out in UNHCR, IOM and UNDP's responses to climate change and explain variation in the timing, nature and extent of IGO change. A logic of appropriateness was the dominant logic driving UNHCR's response to climate change. This explains why the agency was initially reluctant to engage, and then advocated for new legal frameworks through the Nansen Principles and at the Ministerial meeting in 2011. It accounts for why the agency also changed the least of the three case studies. This logic of appropriateness is captured in the High Commissioner's decision to turn down an offer to expand UNHCR's humanitarian mandate. Guterres did not want refugees to be subsumed within the humanitarian cluster system, even if expansion could generate further revenue. What makes the example particularly compelling is that Guterres is known for his expansionist tendencies yet even his decisions were shaped by UNHCR's normative IGO type.

IGO type also explains why we have not seen mandate expansion in UNHCR. UNHCR staff and states were skeptical about the linkage between climate change displacement and the agency's mandate. However, staff and a few states (Norway, Germany and Mexico) have become supportive of the issue in recent years. The office is now lobbying states for the development of a new protection framework for those displaced by climate change. We will have to wait to see how this proposal develops and what role UNCHR plays.

Conversely, IOM pushed the boundaries of its mandate by expanding its activities into climate change and migration as well as humanitarian assistance in natural disasters. It was able to shift into new areas, where it had little expertise, with no observable staff resistance because of its functional type. IOM was also quick to respond to climate change once it became an issue of high global salience. It held its first conference on the issue in February 2007, the same month that the influential IPCC report was released. Unlike UNHCR, IOM made its largest changes at the operational level, where it claimed to develop 500 new projects. The underlying logic of consequences, which drove its engagement, is reflected in its pursuit of climate financing. It mapped out potential sources of climate financing from private, bilateral and multilateral sources and pursued a partnership with the Asian Development Bank, to access the Adaptation Fund. Following a logic of consequences, IOM is likely to continue its humanitarian and climate change activities as long as there is financing available.

UNDP went the furthest in redefining its mandate. By 2010 it had convinced member states that climate change was one of the agency's top two priorities. Of all the three cases it changed the most and did so along all four dimensions. UNDP, like IOM, was also quick to respond to climate change when it became an issue of high global salience. As a hybrid IGO it followed both logics of behaviour. The interaction of these two logics came to the fore at the launch of the HDR in India. The HDR representative argued that India should reduce emissions, angering the Indian government, while the UNDP country officer was more sympathetic to the Indian government. There was thus a tension between the HDR's logic of appropriateness and the rest of UNDP's logic of consequences.

In sum, issue status and IGO type influenced the timing, extent and nature of change in these three IGOs. The normative IGO (UNHCR) was slower to engage than its hybrid (UNDP) or functional (IOM) counterparts. Secondly, hybrid and functional IGOs changed significantly and to a greater degree than the normative IGO. Thirdly, normative IGOs seek to perpetuate and maximise moral legitimacy. They tend towards legalistic responses to new issues. Meanwhile functional IGOs seek to maximise pragmatic legitimacy and tend to focus on operational activities that will be funded.

The theoretical framework presented here is applicable beyond these three case studies. It applies to all (non-environmental) IGOs' response to climate change, as long as they can

be categorised along the normative-functional spectrum.¹ Future research could strengthen the generalisability of the theory by studying qualitatively the response of nine IGOs (three normative; three functional and three hybrid) to three new issues (climate change; HIV-AIDs and gender equality). This would offer larger variation in issue areas and IGOs.

Take the issue of HIV-AIDs, for example, which has evolved from an issue of low to high global salience over the late 20th century. We would expect functional IGOs to engage with it in the early 1990s when it took on high global salience. Normative IGOs would be more reluctant, unless there was a clear issue linkage to their mandate. We could examine the responses of: the ILO (normative); UNICEF (hybrid) and the World Bank (functional). We would expect the ILO to have been the most resistant to engage with HIV-AIDs, while UNICEF and the World Bank would have changed much quicker and to a greater extent. Although it would be challenging to compare IGOs' responses across issue areas, as the nature of issue linkages varies considerably, such a study enable us to test and refine the theoretical framework developed here.

IR theory and IGO type

IGO type is an important contribution to theories of IGOs. It offers a nuanced, generalisable and parsimonious account of IGO behaviour given changing external circumstances. This theory challenges neo-realists (Mearsheimer 1994) and neo-liberalists (Keohane 1982) to treat IGOs as autonomous actors. I have illustrated that

¹ As mentioned in chapter one this study excludes IGOs which are: international courts, arbitration bodies purely representative bodies.

IGOs have their own distinct preferences, can instigate organisational change, and may even shape state preferences over time. IGOs are dependent variables: not just forums for states to transact information and broker cooperation (Keohane 1982 and 1984). I have argued that IGOs play a significant role in addressing global issues from climate change to refugees, migration and development.

In addition, this account of IGO type contributes to the two dominant IR theories of international organisations: principal-agent and sociological institutionalism. It builds on these theories to account for variation in IGO preferences, power, authority and behaviour. IGO type and the corresponding logics of behaviour offer a novel way to bridge these two schools of thought. I will now elaborate on how IGO type contributes to these two theories, as this is the major theoretical contribution of this thesis.

As outlined in chapter one, neither principal-agent theory nor sociological institutionalism sufficiently explain variation in IO preferences. IGO type encourages sociological institutionalism to develop an account of when a logic of appropriateness operates and when it does not. Sociological institutionalism assumes that a logic of appropriateness is the ‘fundamental logic of political action’ (Olsen and March 1989: 38) yet there are occasions where a logic of consequences may prevail. This is the case with functional IGOs, such as IOM. Meanwhile, I have cautioned against the principal-agent approach which assumes IGOs have universal preferences to maximise their budgets and tasks (Hawkins et al. 2006; Nielson and Tierney 2003). I have demonstrated that not all organisations will always seek to expand. Normative IGOs are resistant to take on new

activities unless they are strongly linked to their core mandate. Functional IGOs will not expand unless there is a clear material incentive to do so.

IGO type also has significant implications for principal-agent's conception of delegation, monitoring and slack (Lyne, Nielson and Tierney 2006). Although principal-agent theorists have considered the role of some agent characteristics (namely preferences, functions and strategies), they have not examined IGO type (see Hawkins et. al 2006). I have illustrated how member state-IGO relationships differ across IGO type. On the one hand, functional IGOs are given more slack as states are less concerned with them straying into new territory. We saw this in IOM: states did not closely monitor IOM's activities at headquarters level and were not concerned even if they did stray beyond their expertise and mandated activities. UNDP was also able to expand easily and make climate change a top priority by 2010, as member states were not concerned about changing focus.

On the other hand, normative IGOs are monitored closely, and given less slack, as states are concerned with setting a binding precedent. This is because delegating new tasks to normative IGOs implies setting new standards and norms about how states should behave. Delegating new tasks to functional IGOs does not carry this same weight: it is a transactional arrangement. States, for instance, were wary about the High Commissioner's mention of climate change displacement at ExCom in 2007 and they were troubled by UNHCR's bid for a 'more predictable role' as the cluster lead for protection in natural disasters (Deschamp, Azorbo and Lohse 2010). Essentially, the

degree of state monitoring differs across IGOs according to type. This is particularly relevant to principal-agent theorists interested in how IGOs use their limited autonomy to create more independence, such as Hawkins and Jacoby (2006). A larger, comparative analysis of IGO-state relationships across IGO types would enhance our understanding of this dynamic.

IGOs also view the nature of their mandates differently. Functional IGOs see few limits to their scope: almost anything can be justified as relevant to their mandate. IOM staff, for instance, had no issue with the organisation expanding into humanitarian relief, livelihood and development activities. We saw this in Kenya where staff claimed that almost anything fitted within their migration mandate – even assisting nomadic pastoralists to grow crops and establish small businesses. Activities that were, ironically, making these pastoralists more sedentary and not helping them migrate. Similarly UNDP staff had a broad, flexible conception of their mandate. Meanwhile UNHCR staff have been anxious about the implications of organisational expansion. This implies that functional organisations are more likely to adapt promptly to changing external circumstances, while normative are more focused on their niche area. IR theorists who analyse the relationship between organisations and their changing external environments should integrate IGO type (Barnett and Coleman 2005; Luken 2009).

In addition, sociological institutionalists could benefit from looking at the similarities in organisational culture within IGO ideal-type categories (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Oestrich 2007). In particular sociological institutionalism should view organisational

culture as a derivative of IGO type. For example, I have argued that functional IGOs tend to have an organisational culture in which financial benefits are valued above the overarching identity of the organisation. Meanwhile, staff in normative IGOs are schooled in, and loyal to their mandate. Sociological institutionalists could carry out a comparative analysis of six IGOs (two hybrid; two normative and two functional), their respective organisational cultures and organisational changes.

Sociological institutionalists could also examine if and how IGO types draw on divergent sources of authority and generate different organisational pathologies. Sociological institutionalists have overlooked variation in the moral authority of IGOs (Barnett and Finnemore 2001). Although all IGOs have delegated and expert authority, normative IGOs have greater moral authority than functional IGOs. This is because they are mandated by states to ensure norm compliance and monitor states behaviour. This moral authority gives normative IGOs a different source of power and legitimacy and a broader range of strategies to influence state behaviour. They can ‘name and shame’ states for not complying with norms while functional IGOs cannot. In fact, as the case of IOM illustrated, functional IGOs rarely criticise states in public. Variation in moral authority is a crucial factor in explaining IGO behaviour.

IGO type also offers an avenue to bridge principal-agent and sociological institutionalism (cf Weaver 2007; Woods 2006). Functional IGOs fit within a principal-agent model. They follow a logic of consequences and are driven by instrumental and material incentives – in particular donor state financing. This complements the view of principals

exerting power over their agents through their funding decisions. Meanwhile, normative IGOs follow a logic of appropriateness which resonates with sociological institutionalism. These IGOs are driven by what they, given their specific identity, should do. IGO type thus offers a way to integrate these two approaches.

Finally, this research has implications for IR theories of IGO design and evolution (Koremos, Snidal and Abbott 2001). It suggests that the decisions made at the constitution of IGOs have important implications for IGO evolution which may not be immediately apparent. Theorists of path dependency and organisational change should also consider why states decide to establish an IGO as normative, hybrid or functional (Pierson 2004; Thelen 2000). There may even be historical patterns of institutional design. Some international law experts have argued that there was a discrete window when states tasked IGOs with supervisory status over international law (see Türk 2007). Many normative IGOs were established in the early phase of IGO building: the ICRC was founded in 1863 and the ILO in 1919 (with UNHCR later in 1951). Meanwhile functional IGOs were created in the post-WWII era: the World Bank (1944); IOM (1951); and then functional UNDP (1968). Are states hesitant to establish normative IGOs now? And what types of IGOs are states looking to create and why? This research suggests states should consider the full range of powers and duties they seek from IGOs when creating and adding to their mandates.

Refining IGO Type

Do normative IGOs ever behave opportunistically and follow a logic of consequences? Conversely, do functional IGOs adopt a logic of appropriateness and seek to establish a mandate over a normative area? We might expect that decreases in funding might lead normative IGOs to behave opportunistically. This was the case for UNHCR in the 1990s which faced an increasingly competitive humanitarian marketplace and responded by transforming from a refugee agency to ‘more broadly-based humanitarian agency’ (Crisp 2001). Meanwhile functional IGOs might seek to differentiate themselves within a competitive marketplace by establishing a niche normative area.

In addition, what scope do leaders have to influence IGO logics of behaviour, regardless of IGO type? For instance the High Commissioner for Refugees, Guterres, followed a logic of consequences while his office followed a logic of appropriateness. Meanwhile, the Director General of IOM, Swing, was more reluctant to engage with climate change despite its high global salience in 2009. He wanted to see a clear issue linkage to IOM’s migration mandate. This suggests that some leaders may follow a different logic from the rest of their organisation depending on their personal views and the external funding environment. Further research should investigate the exogenous and endogenous variables which lead an IGO to follow the opposite logic to what we would expect.

The hybrid case of UNDP also raises some important questions about logics of behaviour. How can we determine if a logic of appropriateness is masking a logic of consequences or if both logics are operating simultaneously? For instance, both logics could have motivated Dervis and Clark’s rhetorical engagement with climate change as

they had a financial incentive and a moral imperative to engage with the issue.

Furthermore, I have argued that in UNDP the logic of consequences dominated as the HDR office had little direct influence over UNDP policy and programming. However, in other hybrid IGOs there may not be such a clear distinction of logics of behaviour between divisions. What happens if the same division is involved in promoting norms and seeking funding for operational programmes? Further analysis of a broader variety of hybrid IGOs could yield important insights into how logics of behaviour coexist in a single organisation.

And how much variation is there within the hybrid category of IGOs? I have proposed that some hybrid IGOs have a close relationship with international law – they support and promote an international convention (such as UNICEF and the CRC) — while others have developed their own normative goals but have no association with a body of international law (UNDP and human development).² UNDP is thus located at the more functional end of the hybrid spectrum than UNICEF. As a result it may be harder to see the logic of appropriateness in UNDP. In other words, there is variation in the degree of ‘legalisation’ of hybrid IGOs — the HDR has no legal status, unlike the CRC (Abott and Snidal 2000). It may be worthwhile distinguishing between two sub-types of hybrid IGOs: those that promote norms but not law (UNDP) and those that promote law as well as norms (UNICEF).

² UNICEF, as previously stated, developed a close relationship with the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) in the 1990s. It has also adopted a rights based approach to its programming and policy (Oestrich 2007).

Further research should also investigate when and why IGO type changes. I have proposed that IGOs are created as functional, hybrid or normative and can shift along this spectrum over time. Functional IGOs may, for instance, become more hybrid as they institutionalise normative goals and/or international conventions. Such was the case in the 1990s as UNDP and UNICEF took on more normative roles. Meanwhile normative IGOs may become more functional as they develop new tasks and operations which rely on constant revenue streams. But what leads these IGOs to shift IGO type? What role do individuals play? And how do changes in the international funding environment impact on IGO type? A longitudinal study of IGO evolution would shed light on these questions.

Importantly, this thesis suggests that we are seeing a convergence towards the hybrid IGO type. On the one hand, IOM has sought a more normative mandate in the 1990s by claiming a protection mandate and outlining a role in the promotion of human rights.³ On the other hand, UNHCR has discussed proposals with NGOs and academics to establish a separate and independent body to take-over supervisory responsibility of the Refugee Convention (Türk 2007).⁴ Many NGOs and academic experts expressed concern that UNHCR's supervisory role was in direct tension with its increased operational activities (Glover and Russell 2001). There was friction in UNHCR between the prevailing logic of appropriateness and a logic of consequences. While UNHCR's supervisory role remained unchanged this discussion illustrates how a normative IGO, by delegating its supervisory

³ However, a former IOM staff member noted that the organisation has been criticised by civil society, academics and activists for 'speaking the language of human rights without having a legal mandate to uphold them. UN agencies are seen to have primary responsibility to promote human rights'. Correspondence with former IOM staff 1, 11 September 2012.

⁴ A number of proposals were put forward including: the creation of a new and independent supervisory committee under ECOSOC, or ExCom, which would monitor UNHCR and the convention; another suggestion was to establish an independent group of experts which would conduct peer reviews of states (Türk 2007).

status to another body, could become a hybrid IGO. But what is driving this convergence towards hybridity? Are functional IGOs becoming more normative because of the growing prominence of human rights laws and norms in the last twenty years (see Oestrich 2007)? And what advantages do normative IGOs accrue from becoming more functional?

This research triggers another important question: what influences the effectiveness of normative IGOs? In particular, what determines whether normative IGOs gain state compliance with the regime of international law they oversee? While there is a large body of scholarship investigating state compliance with international law, there is little analysis of what factors influence the role and effectiveness of normative IGOs in ensuring states comply with the laws and norms they oversee. Yet IGOs have a range of political strategies at hand. Fieldwork in Kenya suggests that UNHCR actively lobbied the government, and the High Commissioner made compromises with Members of Parliament to open an extension in Dadaab to deal with the inflow of Somali refugees in 2011. It would be interesting to know if normative IGOs use different strategies to operate effectively in authoritarian versus democratic countries; and low versus middle-income countries. And, if so, what are these strategies?

Policy Implications of IGO Type

Beyond these theoretical implications, this research and the conception of IGO type sheds light on important policy questions for states and IGOs.

Firstly, we rarely see the creation of new IGOs and it is important to understand if and how existing institutions evolve. This becomes particularly important given that many of our existing IGOs were created over fifty years ago and the world has changed significantly in that time - climate change is one of many new global challenges. So are IGOs adapting to this new global context or are we only seeing superficial rhetorical change? This study has suggested that changes in IGOs go beyond rhetorical change to policy and in some cases structural and operational change. In addition, it has illustrated how three IGOs autonomously sought to redefine their direction, tasks and even mandate to stay relevant to a changing global context.

However this study has also been cautious about the degree and implications of these changes. IGOs may claim to be creating new operational programmes when in fact they are relabelling existing initiatives. It is difficult to assess deep, transformational change as it requires a long-term view to see if rhetoric, policy, structural and operational changes are embedded in the organisation. Future analysis could examine if UNHCR, IOM and UNDP's changes have been embedded and/or triggered further change, which would be of interest to IGO staff and states. This is particularly important given the increasing volume of climate change adaptation financing. While states face a high-level of scrutiny over how much they give, and whether it is additional to their official development assistance, there has been little analysis of how IGOs are using this money (see Brown, Bird and Schalatek 2010).

This study also suggests policy entrepreneurs and advocates of new issues should frame their message according to IGO type. They should make normative appeals, establishing a clear linkage between the issue and a IGOs mandate when lobbying normative IGOs, or normative departments of IGOs. Functional IGOs and divisions will be more receptive to proposals that highlight the benefits of expansion in funding terms.

Further research could also investigate what impact expansion has on an IGO's capacity to deliver on their mandate. States delegate IGOs to perform particular tasks and wish to see these tasks completed effectively. As we saw in the UNHCR case, both donor and host states were concerned that UNHCR's refugee mandate might be neglected if they were to expand their protection mandate to include climate change and or natural disaster related displacement. States, beneficiaries, IGO staff and other stakeholders in IGOs will be equally concerned about an IGO stretching itself across too many tasks and thus failing to deliver on its core priorities.

In addition, if an IGO does change and offer new programmes how effective are they in this new area? This study illustrated, for instance, that IOM's expansion into climate change adaptation and sustainable livelihood activities in Northern Kenya was generally ineffective. IOM operated outside its expertise and former IOM staff and donor states were skeptical about IOM's ability to encourage pastoralists into agriculture. UNHCR's expansion in the 1990s into development activities under Ogata was questioned on similar grounds: it was seen to be going beyond its 'comparative advantage' (Crisp 2001). This suggests that IGO expansion should be limited, to some degree, to ensure

IGO effectiveness. However, this should not be read as an excuse not to change at all. It is a question of how much, when and on what basis.

In fact, effectiveness of functional and normative IGOs should be the central focus for future policy-orientated research. Value for money has become a core concern of member states, given the global financial crisis. The UK, for example, recently conducted a review of all multilateral IGOs that it funds ‘to assess the value for money provided by each organisation’ with the aim of ‘extract[ing] the greatest possible value for money from our development budget’ given the ‘tough times’.⁵ Although this review noted that IOM does not ‘have a mandate based on international law’ it did not distinguish between IGO types and evaluate on this basis. Functional and normative IGO effectiveness should be evaluated on different metrics given the different purposes and logics of behaviour they follow. A normative IGO’s primary aim is to ensure state compliance with the area of international law they oversee. Meanwhile, functional IGOs should be evaluated on if they successfully deliver services they are tasked with.

In sum, IR theories, states and IGOs will gain from taking into account the broad differences in IGO types. Functional IGOs will not follow the same logics of behaviour; nor seek the same sorts of legitimacy as normative IGOs. IGO type offers IR scholars a theory that speaks to the complexities of organisations without losing parsimony. IGO staff can use IGO type to reflect on when organisational change and expansion may be effective. States should consider IGO type when evaluating effectiveness and guidance

⁵ Secretary of State for International Development Andrew Mitchell quoted in DFID. 2011. *UK Multilateral Review*, DFID: London: 1.

for monitoring. A more nuanced understanding of IGO behaviour and change is critical as IGOs are mandated with addressing pressing global issues such as climate change, international migration, refugee protection and development.

Appendix: Tables of IGOs and IGO Delegates at the UNFCCC

Table Eleven: Total Number of IGOs at UNFCCC COPs

UNFCCC	IGOs
COP 1 (1995)	42
COP 2 (1996)	30
COP 3 (1997)	42
COP 4 (1998)	32
COP 5 (1999)	36
COP 6 (2000)	48
COP 7 (2001)	40
COP 8 (2002)	45
COP 9 (2003)	45
COP 10 (2004)	46
COP 11 (2005)	58
COP 12 (2006)	52
COP 13 (2007)	78
COP 14 (2008)	79
COP 15 (2009)	106
COP 16 (2010)	93
COP 17 (2011)	96

Table Twelve: Total Number of IGO Delegates at UNFCCC COPs

UNFCCC	IGO delegates
COP 1 (1995)	77
COP 2 (1996)	28
COP 3 (1997)	202
COP 4 (1998)	271
COP 5 (1999)	233
COP 6 (2000)	283
COP 7 (2001)	242
COP 8 (2002)	231
COP 9 (2003)	239
COP 10 (2004)	260
COP 11 (2005)	415
COP 12 (2006)	400
COP 13 (2007)	821
COP 14 (2008)	597
COP 15 (2009)	1434
COP 16 (2010)	826
COP 17 (2011)	1039

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