

1 **Division of labour in microorganisms: an evolutionary perspective**

2
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6
7 The division of labour, where individuals within a group specialise in certain tasks,
8 has long been appreciated to be central to the evolution of complex biological
9 societies. In recent years, a number of examples of division of labour in
10 microorganisms have arisen, suggesting that this strategy may also be important
11 within microbial species. In this Perspective, we proposed a set of conditions that
12 define division of labour, and discuss recent examples according to these conditions.
13 Furthermore, we discuss how clarifying what constitutes division of labour highlights
14 key evolutionary question, including what form division of labour takes and why it is
15 favoured by natural selection.

16 17 **Introduction**

18 Microbial cells within a population often show extreme variation in phenotype, which
19 can arise via multiple mechanisms (**Box 1**). For example, when *Escherichia coli* cells
20 are growing in a batch culture, a fraction of cells are in a transient non-growing state,
21 termed persister cells, while the rest of the cells are growing normally¹. A standard
22 explanation for this phenotypic variation is that it represents a bet-hedging strategy,
23 by which different phenotypes do better in different environments, and so the fitness
24 of cells is increased by the production of variable phenotypes^{2,3}. In the case of *E. coli*,
25 the persister phenotype is beneficial because it enables survival under conditions of
26 environmental stress, such as in the presence of antibiotics⁴.

27 However, many examples of phenotypic variation cannot be explained as bet-
28 hedging. Instead, these other examples appear to involve some cells specialising to
29 perform cooperative tasks that provide a benefit to other cells (FIG. 1A). For
30 example, in *Bacillus subtilis* populations at stationary phase in liquid medium, some
31 cells produce and excrete proteases to degrade proteins in the environment into
32 smaller peptides, that can be used as nutrient sources⁵. As both these proteases and
33 their degradation products diffuse freely, the production of proteases provides a
34 benefit to the local population of cells, and not just those that produced them. We
35 suggest that cooperation between different phenotypes is a defining feature of division
36 of labour, and so these examples of phenotypic variation represent division of
37 labour^{3,6,7}.

38 Determining whether examples of phenotypic variation represent division of
39 labour raises a range of new questions. Why would natural selection favour division
40 of labour? Why would it be beneficial to have just a fraction of cells performing a
41 trait, such as protease production, at a relatively high rate, rather than having all the
42 cells performing that trait at a lower rate? If the division of labour is cooperative, why
43 can't lineages that produce a lower proportion of the cooperative phenotype (cheats)⁸,
44 invade the population, leading eventually to the loss of division of labour? Why is
45 division favoured by natural selection in certain environments, for certain tasks, but
46 not others? Or why should different mechanisms, such as phenotypic noise or
47 environmental cues² (**Box 1**), be used to produce phenotypic variation in different
48 situations?

49 An understanding of division of can also elucidate the evolution of other
50 biological processes, including virulence and multicellularity. The division of labour

51 appears to be central to the success and virulence of pathogenic species, such as
52 *Cryptococcus gattii*, the cause of fungal meningitis. During infection with *C. gattii*,
53 the host immune response triggers a fraction of cells to develop tubular mitochondria,
54 which somehow protect the cells with normal mitochondria from the host immune
55 system⁹. Furthermore, the discovery of division of labour in microorganisms suggests
56 that broad comparisons could be made for why division of labour is favoured, across
57 all levels of biological organisation, including human societies¹⁰. Finally, the division
58 of labour between cells has played a crucial role in the evolution of multicellularity,
59 so in order to understand how complex life on earth evolved, we need to understand
60 why division of labour is favoured in microorganisms¹⁰⁻¹².

61 In this Perspective, we clarify what constitutes division of labour within a
62 microbial species. We propose a set of conditions that define division of labour and
63 discuss whether a number of previously described examples of phenotypic plasticity
64 represent adaptive division of labour. A precise definition matters, because imprecise
65 definitions and ambiguity can obscure the fundamental problems and impede
66 conceptual unification^{13,14}. We outline key questions in the study of division of labour
67 in microorganisms, focusing on what division of labour is, why it is favoured by
68 natural selection, and what forms it can take.

70 **What is division of labour?**

71 We define the division of labour as when cooperating individuals specialise to
72 perform specific tasks. This requires three conditions: (1) individuals perform
73 different tasks (phenotypic variation); (2) some individuals perform cooperative tasks
74 that benefit other individuals (cooperation); (3) this dividing of tasks
75 provides an inclusive fitness benefit to all the individuals involved (adaptation).

76 A behaviour or trait represents cooperation if it benefits another individual,
77 and has been selected for, at least partially, because of this benefit¹⁴. Cooperation is
78 an adaptation. Our definition emphasises cooperation because we are interested in
79 cases where individuals have been selected to work together, and so the actual
80 dividing of tasks between individuals is an adaptation (see Supplementary
81 Information S1 & S2). It is the ‘working together’ that makes division of labour
82 especially interesting from an evolutionary perspective, because it implies a
83 cooperative adaptation across multiple individuals, to the benefit of those individuals.
84 Van Gestel et al.⁷ have also emphasised the importance of division of labour being
85 cooperative.

86 Our second and third conditions distinguish division of labour from cases
87 where phenotypic variation has arisen as a by-product of otherwise self-interested
88 traits, such as diversification to exploit different niches, or when one phenotype
89 evolves to exploit another. We focus on inclusive fitness because it is our most
90 general description of Darwinian fitness - natural selection favours traits that lead to
91 an increase in inclusive fitness¹⁵⁻¹⁷ (**Box 2**). Consequently if we are interested in
92 whether a social trait, such as division of labour, can be favoured, we examine the
93 inclusive fitness consequences. Our definition makes no claim as to whether a
94 population must be clonal, although we will discuss below how this can influence
95 whether and what form of division is favoured.

96
97 **Examples.** When the bacterium *Salmonella enterica* subsp. *enterica* serovar imurium
98 infects its vertebrate hosts, there is a division of labour between cells that stay in the
99 gut lumen to reproduce, and cells that invade the gut tissue and express the type three
100 secretion system, *tss-1*, triggering an inflammatory response which eliminates

101 competing bacteria from different species^{18,19} (FIG. 1A). The cells that enter the gut
102 tissue are killed by the host immune system, and so this represents an altruistic
103 cooperative behaviour, which is costly to the invading cells but benefits the cells that
104 remained in the gut lumen (FIG. 1B; see Supplementary Information S3). Another
105 example of altruistic division of labour is provided by the fruiting bodies of slime
106 moulds such as *Dictyostelium discoideum*²⁰, where non-viable stalk cells hold up and
107 help disperse the viable spore cells. Spore cells also occur in the fruiting bodies of
108 *Myxococcus xanthus*²¹. These examples are analogous to that between germ and soma
109 cells in multicellular species¹⁰.

110
111 **Not division of labour.** Our definition excludes a number of examples of phenotypic
112 variation which are not cooperative, and hence not division of labour. When the
113 bacterium *Pseudomonas fluorescens* is kept in liquid cultures, mutation leads to a
114 range of different phenotypes, termed ‘smooth’, ‘wrinkly spreader’ and ‘fuzzy
115 spreader’²². This diversification does not represent an adaptive division of labour, it
116 represents different lineages specialising to exploit different niches. Smooth inhabits
117 the liquid phase, wrinkly spreader forms a mat at the air-broth interface, and fuzzy
118 inhabits the less aerobic bottom of the broth. A variety of phenotypes also evolve in
119 *P. fluorescens* colonies growing on agar²³.

120 Another class of examples is provided by cases where cells can be divided
121 between different lineages, where some perform cooperative behaviour and others do
122 not perform, or perform less, of the cooperative behaviour. For example,
123 *Pseudomonas aeruginosa* cells produce and excrete siderophores which scavenge for
124 iron. The benefits of iron scavenging are shared between the local cells, and so this is
125 a cooperative behaviour²⁴. However, lineages evolve, both in laboratory broth cultures
126 and in the lungs of humans with cystic fibrosis, that produce less or no
127 siderophores^{25,26}. These lineages appear to act as cheats, which exploit the
128 siderophores produced by other cells⁸. In this example, the adaptation is the ability of
129 cheaters (which produce less siderophores) to exploit co-operators (which produce
130 more siderophores); this provides cheats with a selfish fitness benefit but decreases
131 the fitness of the co-operators, and therefore does not constitute a division of labour.
132 An analogous example of cheating is lineages that do not produce or respond to
133 quorum sensing molecules^{27,28}.

134 These examples illustrate that division of labour requires more than the
135 production of a novel ‘joint’ phenotype or an ability to do something that wouldn’t be
136 possible without phenotypic diversity. For example, the different morphological
137 variants of *P. fluorescens* can exploit the liquid media of a beaker in a way that would
138 not be possible with a single phenotype²². It is not that these other types of phenotypic
139 diversity are less interesting, just that they involve different problems than division of
140 labour and result from different selection pressures. For example, cheats arise from
141 conflict not cooperation, and do not require the efficiency benefits that we discuss
142 below.

143
144 **How to demonstrate division of labour?** In order to demonstrate division of labour,
145 two things need to be done. First, it must be shown that there is phenotypic variation,
146 with different individuals specialising to perform different tasks. Second, it must be
147 shown that this division is cooperative, providing a fitness benefit to the cells
148 involved.

149 Considering the *S. Typhimurium* example discussed above, there is clearly
150 phenotypic variation (some individuals express the *ttss-1*, whereas other do not)¹⁸, but

151 is it cooperative? One way to test whether microbial traits are cooperative is to grow
152 strains that do and do not perform the trait in both monocultures and mixed cultures²⁹.
153 Genetic manipulations allow the production of such strains. If the trait is cooperative
154 and provides a benefit to others, then we would expect cells that perform the trait to
155 grow best as monocultures (cooperators outperform cheats), whereas cells that do not
156 perform the trait are predicted to grow best in mixed cultures (cheats can exploit co-
157 operators; FIG. 1C)^{7,29}.

158 Data from *S. Typhimurium* suggest that expression of *ttss-1* is an altruistically
159 cooperative trait, and hence represents division of labour^{19,30}. When grown in a
160 monoculture, a mutant lineage that does not express *ttss-1* is avirulent and unable to
161 spread within hosts (FIG. 1D). By contrast, when grown in a mixed culture with a
162 wild type strain (that does express *ttss-1*), this mutant lineage is at an advantage and
163 increases in frequency (FIG. 1D). Similar data exists for other cases, including the
164 fruiting bodies of *D. discoideum* and *M. xanthus*, and the tubular mitochondrial morph
165 in *C. gattii*^{9,20,21}.

166 It is necessary to carry out tests of whether a trait is cooperative in the
167 environmental conditions under which that trait has evolved, or as near to it as
168 possible⁸. The costs and benefits of traits vary with environmental conditions, and so
169 wrong conclusions can be made if tests are carried out in inappropriate
170 environments³¹. With more complex traits and/or when labour is divided into more
171 types, testing for cooperation can be harder. For example, in *B. subtilis*, two cell types
172 are required to facilitate migration: cells that produce surfactin, a surfactant that
173 reduces water surface tension, and cells that produce an extracellular polysaccharide
174 matrix that glues cells together³².

175

176 **Why divide labour?**

177 Why would natural selection favour a division of labour, with different individuals
178 performing different tasks, rather than just have everyone perform all the tasks?
179 Consider a simple case with two tasks, A and B, where investment into these two
180 activities must be traded off against each other, because time and energy spent on task
181 A cannot be spent on task B. For example, task A might be reproduction and task B
182 might be secreting a factor that causes an inflammatory response in the host, as in *S.*
183 *Typhimurium*^{18,33}. In these cases, a division of labour can be favoured when two
184 conditions are met: (1) there is an efficiency benefit from different individuals
185 performing different tasks (specialisation); (2) the reproductive interests of the
186 different individuals are aligned, such that cooperation is favoured.

187

188 ***Efficiency benefits to division.*** Division of labour requires that there is some
189 efficiency benefit to different individuals specialising in different tasks^{7,10,34-38}. This
190 means that when a cell puts a larger effort into a task, it obtains a larger return per unit
191 invested. Assuming linear costs per unit invested into a task, this requires that the
192 relationship between the proportion of resources that a cell allocates to a task and the
193 fitness return is accelerating^{7,10,34,39} (FIG. 2A). An accelerating slope could arise if a
194 task becomes more efficient as more effort is put into it, or if performing one of the
195 tasks affects the ability to perform the other task (i.e., tasks A and B don't mix well,
196 or are better done in different locations). By contrast, if the fitness returns on tasks are
197 decelerating, with cells becoming less efficient the more they do of something, then
198 natural selection favours all cells performing both tasks (FIG. 2A; see Supplementary
199 Information S4).

200 There is a lack of experimental work that explicitly tests for the kind of
201 accelerating relationships illustrated in FIG. 2A, and this represents one of the largest
202 gaps in our study of division of labour⁴⁰. To date, arguments have tended to rely upon
203 indirect extrapolations, rather than direct experimental tests. For example, consider
204 the division between cells that photosynthesise and cells that fix nitrogen into
205 ammonia (heterocysts) in some cyanobacteria species⁴¹. It has been argued that this
206 division is favoured because nitrogenase, the enzyme that converts nitrogen gas to
207 ammonia, is rapidly destroyed in the presence of oxygen, which is produced by
208 photosynthesis⁴². A direct experimental test of this hypothesis would require
209 experimental manipulation of the extent to which nitrogen fixing and photosynthesis
210 are divided between cells.

211 There are a number of other factors that could influence selection for division.
212 For example, the relative returns from different tasks could vary with cell condition⁴³.
213 In some volvocine green algae, such as *Volvox carteri*, multicellular groups are
214 composed of large germ cells that reproduce and smaller somatic cells that beat their
215 flagella to keep the colony afloat^{44,45}. This division appears to be favoured because
216 large cells are more efficient at reproducing, which involves growth to a large cell
217 size and then division, and small cells are better at both keeping the colony afloat and
218 promoting diffusion of nutrients across the colony wall^{35,46,47}. Another possibility is
219 that cells in worse condition, such as smaller size or starved, could preferentially
220 become the altruistic helper cells, rather than reproduce, if they have less to lose by
221 not reproducing.

222 A major research aim is to explain why some species divide labour whereas
223 other similar species do not? For example, it seems reasonable that the interaction
224 between nitrogen fixing and photosynthesis could lead to the accelerating relationship
225 in FIG. 2A, and hence lead to division of labour in cyanobacteria species such as
226 *Anabaena cylindrica*. But that raises the problem of how do we explain other
227 cyanobacteria, where this division of labour has not been favoured, such as
228 *Trichodesmium erythraeum*^{41,42}?

229
230 **Alignment of interests.** Division of labour requires that the fitness interests of
231 different individuals are aligned. If not, the interaction between these individuals
232 could be destabilised by selfish cheats, which can exploit the cooperative nature of
233 division of labour. Examples of such cheats would be a *S. Typhimurium* strain that
234 produced more cells that stayed in the gut lumen and never went into the gut tissue to
235 express *ttss-1*, or a *D. discoideum* lineage that invested more into spore cells and less
236 into stalk cells^{20,33,48}.

237 One way for the interests of different individuals to be aligned is if they are
238 genetically related¹⁵. This process, often termed kin selection, captures the idea that
239 by helping a relative to reproduce, an individual is still indirectly passing on copies of
240 its genes to the next generation (Box 2). Consequently, related cells can be favoured
241 to work together via division of labour, in order to increase their genetic contribution
242 to the next generation. Hamilton's rule¹⁵ (Box 2) predicts that altruistic traits (such as
243 invading the gut tissue and expressing *ttss-1* in *S. Typhimurium*) will be favoured
244 when both the relatedness between cells (r) and the efficiency benefits (B/C) are
245 sufficiently high (FIG 2B). This illustrates that while division of labour is more likely
246 with a higher relatedness, it does not require clonality ($r=1$).

247 Four lines of evidence support the hypothesis that relatedness is important in
248 favouring division of labour within species. First, anecdotally, many examples of
249 division of labour occur in groups which are clonal ($r=1$) or close to clonal. For

250 example, cyanobacteria differentiate within clonal filaments⁴¹, and the average
251 relatedness in fruiting bodies of the slime mould *D. discoideum* is 0.98⁴⁹. Second,
252 some species with division of labour exhibit kin discrimination during group
253 formation. For example, individuals of the slime mould *Dictyostelium purpureum*
254 preferentially form fruiting bodies with clone mates⁵⁰. Third, the maintenance of
255 cultures under low relatedness conditions led to the loss of the ability to form fruiting
256 bodies in both *D. discoideum* and *M. xanthus*⁵¹, and a lower investment into somatic
257 functions in the fungus *Neurospora crassa*⁵². Fourth, comparing across species,
258 species with clonal group formation have greater division of labour, with both a
259 higher likelihood of sterile cells and more cell types than species where group
260 formation is non-clonal⁵³ (FIG. 2C).

261

262 **What kind of division?**

263 In conditions where division of labour is favoured, we can then ask a range of more
264 subtle questions. For example, what fraction of individuals should perform the
265 different tasks? How many different cell types will labour be divided between? And
266 which mechanisms are expected to give rise to division of labour?

267

268 **How much division?** Within the context of our theoretical example, where
269 individuals perform either task A or task B, we can ask what is the evolutionarily
270 stable strategy⁵⁴ (ESS) fraction of individuals that should perform tasks A and
271 B^{18,34,42}. The ESS is an often used concept in evolutionary biology, to denote the
272 strategy or behaviour that would win out over evolutionary time⁵⁵. Put formally, it is
273 the strategy which, if adopted by everyone in the population, cannot be invaded by
274 any alternate strategy⁵⁴.

275 The ESS will depend upon the shape of the fitness return curves (FIG. 2A) and
276 the relatedness (r) between interacting cells. One prediction is that, in clonal
277 populations, the fitness of individuals will peak at the ESS fraction of A and B
278 individuals, and then decrease as either A or B become more common¹⁸. For example,
279 in the *S. Typhimurium* example, enough cells should express the type III secretion
280 system to produce an inflammatory response, but any more than that is a waste¹⁸.
281 Consistent with this prediction, mutants with either a lower or a higher fraction of
282 cells expressing the type III secretion system showed a reduced fitness³³.

283 Theory could be developed for specific cases to help explain both what the
284 ESS is for certain situations and in what way should the ESS vary across populations
285 or species. For example, in the volvocine green algae, the ratio of soma to germ cells
286 increases with colony size⁴⁴. It has been argued that this represents the shape of the
287 fitness curve (FIG. 2A) changing with group size. Specifically, that as colony size
288 increases, it becomes harder to keep the colony afloat and to transport nutrients, and
289 so the ESS fraction of soma cells increases^{35,46}.

290 We can ask questions about the variation in the fraction of cell types at a range
291 of levels. For example, within species, why does the proportion of stalk cells in *D.*
292 *discoideum* vary so widely across samples taken from the same location^{48,49}? Across
293 closely related species, why does the proportion of stalk cells vary across
294 *Dictyostelium* species⁵⁶? Across more distantly related species, why does the
295 proportion of the altruistic reproductive phenotype vary from the approximately 20%
296 of *D. discoideum* cells that become stalk, to the over 99% of *Volvox* cells that become
297 soma^{20,57}. ESS theory provides a tool for tackling these questions.

298 The ESS ratio of different types is also likely to vary with the relatedness
299 between interacting individuals. However, there is a lack of both theory and empirical

300 work examining how variation in relatedness would influence the ESS ratio of
301 phenotypes^{18,53}. Nonetheless, as relatedness gets lower, it will lead to a reduction in
302 the kin selected benefit from helping others¹⁵, and so we suspect that a relatively
303 general prediction is that a lower relatedness will lead to a lower proportion of
304 individuals expressing altruistic phenotypes (FIG. 2B). Comparing across species, the
305 percentage of sterile cells is twice as high in species with clonal groups, but this
306 pattern is not statistically significant⁵³. Although, there were only data for a small
307 number of phylogenetically independent comparisons, and so this test had low
308 statistical power.

309
310 **How many types?** Labour is sometimes divided into more than two types. For
311 example, in cyanobacteria the number of cell types varies across species, up to at least
312 four types⁴¹ (FIG. 1A). These cell types include photosynthetic cells, nitrogen fixing
313 heterocysts, resting cells that are able to withstand environmental stress (akinetes) and
314 motile dispersing filaments of cells (hormogonia).

315 We lack a formal theoretical framework for explaining variation in the number
316 of cell types. A range of factors, are likely to be important, including ecological
317 conditions, molecular mechanisms, relatedness within groups, and group size.
318 Consistent with these possibilities, species which form clonal groups ($r=1$) have more
319 cell types than species where groups are not clonal ($r<1$) (FIG. 2D), and species
320 which form larger groups have more cell types^{53,58}. A caveat here is that not all cell
321 types represent division of labour, as phenotypic variation can arise for other reasons,
322 such as bet hedging^{2,3}.

323
324 **Which way to divide?** Given that there are many ways to produce variable phenotypes
325 within a species (**Box 1**), what should we expect to occur in nature? Should we expect
326 one mechanism to dominate or different mechanisms to mediate phenotypic variation
327 in different species? And if mechanisms vary across species, does this represent
328 adaptive variation, with different mechanisms being better suited to different
329 situations, or is phenotypic variation just the result of noise created by historical
330 artefacts? There has been no theoretical or empirical work addressing such questions,
331 and so we make a number of tentative suggestions.

332 We suspect that it would require relatively restrictive conditions to maintain
333 division of labour within species mediated by genetic differences. For example, most
334 division of labour interactions occur within clonal lineages, where there will not be
335 sufficient genetic differences. Furthermore, when multiple genetic lineages interact,
336 this can reduce selection for cooperation⁵⁹, and so whilst phenotypic variation can be
337 maintained, it could be hard for such interactions to constitute a cooperative division
338 of labour. For example, coexistence of producing and non-producing lineages, with
339 traits such as invertase production in the yeast *Saccharomyces cerevisiae*, or
340 siderophore production in the bacteria *P. aeruginosa*, appear to represent coexistence
341 of cooperators and cheats, and not cooperative division of labour^{60,61}. In cases where
342 different genotypes could cooperate, there is the problem of how to keep them
343 together over evolutionary time. Similar arguments would apply when considering
344 epigenetic mechanisms⁶².

345 By contrast, phenotypic noise seems a robust way to produce division of
346 labour. Noise can produce one or more phenotypes from a single genotype. The ratio
347 of these genotypes could be selected upon, by selection on the underlying gene
348 network, producing ratios that varied according to the ESS in the local environment².
349 A limitation with phenotypic noise is that it would work less well in small social

350 groups. If the social group was a small number of cells, then stochasticity would lead
351 to a chance that there were none, or almost none, of a certain phenotype in a social
352 group, which could lead to a large fitness cost associated with maintaining phenotypic
353 variation (FIG. 3). Consequently, we predict that phenotypic noise will be more likely
354 to be the mechanism used when the social group is very large, as with expression of
355 the *tss-1* system in *Salmonella* cells^{18,33}.

356 Coordination between cells, with mechanisms such as signalling, provides a
357 possible solution to the problem of stochasticity in small social groups. If cells
358 interact and coordinate phenotypes at a local level, then this can ensure a precise and
359 appropriate ratio of different phenotypes, even in small social groups, as occurs in
360 cyanobacteria filaments⁴¹ (FIG. 3). Given this advantage of signalling, why is it not
361 used more frequently to control division of labour? Possibilities include that it could
362 be relatively costly, or that it would be inaccurate in certain environments, such as
363 when diffusion rates are high. In such cases, and when the problem of stochasticity is
364 less important, such as with large social groups, phenotypic noise could provide a
365 more efficient mechanism to divide labour.

366

367 **Outlook**

368 We have provided a definition of division of labour and discussed the implications
369 associated with this definition. Is our definition useful? We have taken an
370 evolutionary approach, focused on how individuals are adapted to their environments,
371 and emphasised that division involves individuals working together. An alternative
372 approach, focused on outcome rather than evolutionary adaptation, would be to define
373 division of labour more loosely, as when phenotypic diversity allows more complex
374 tasks to be carried out²³. This alternative would include the examples we have
375 excluded such as diversification, and one phenotype exploiting another.

376 The advantage of our stricter definition is that it brings together cases where
377 the same problems arise, and where there is the potential for unifying understanding.
378 For example, our stricter definition has illuminated the importance of shared interests
379 and non-linear fitness returns in the evolution of division of labour (FIG. 2). By
380 contrast, a looser definition would lump together traits that have evolved for very
381 different reasons, and hence obscure underlying similarities. For example, the
382 evolution of exploitation, or cheats that do not produce siderophores, does not require
383 non-linear fitness returns, and is less likely to be favoured when individuals have
384 shared interests. This illustrates the advantage of drawing a clear a distinction as
385 possible between processes that arise for different reasons⁶³.

386 Our definition resolves debates. Phenotypic heterogeneity between cells could
387 arise in two broad ways. Either persistent specialisation, with some cells only carrying
388 out task A, and other cells only carrying out task B, or via transient specialisation,
389 with the same cell switching to do A and B at different times. In the social insect
390 literature, it has been suggested that persistent specialisation is required for division of
391 labour⁶⁴. In contrast, by emphasising that what matters is cooperation, our definition
392 clarifies that both persistent and transient specialisation could lead to division of
393 labour.

394 To give another example of a debate, it has been suggested that the mutation
395 of co-operators into non-cooperative cheats played a pivotal role in the evolution of
396 the division between reproductive (germ) and helper (soma) cells, and hence the
397 evolution of complex multicellularity^{65,66}. If, however, we consider this hypothesis
398 from an evolutionary perspective, both theory and empirical data contradict it. Theory
399 suggests that selection would act in the opposite direction, favouring cheats that are

400 better able to exploit cooperators, and cooperators who are less exploitable^{8,11}. The
401 empirical data has shown that division of labour into germ and soma occurs more
402 often in species with clonal group formation, where there is no selection for
403 cheating⁵³ (FIG. 2C).

404 Based on the multiple examples that have been described in recent years, these
405 are exciting times for the study of division of labour in microorganisms. Much
406 remains to be done, both theoretically and empirically. In many cases, it remains to
407 even be demonstrated if examples of phenotypic variation really represent division of
408 labour. In cases where a division of labour is demonstrated, this raises a whole slew of
409 further questions. Why is division favoured? How many different phenotypes, and
410 what fraction should each be? What mechanism is used to generate phenotypic
411 diversity and why? Can we explain variation across species, as well as specific cases?
412 Can we apply the same concepts to explain division of labour between species (see
413 Supplementary Information S6)? By answering these questions we can unify our
414 understanding of division of labour, not only with mechanistically very different
415 microbial examples, but also with examples from other taxa, including animal
416 societies.

417

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423

424 **Text boxes**

425

426 **Box 1. Mechanisms of phenotypic variation.**

427 There are at least six possible mechanisms for generating phenotypic variation within
428 a species^{2,67}. There can be overlap between these mechanisms.

429 **Genetics.** There could be genetic differences, with different genotypes leading to
430 different phenotypes, via standing genetic variation or mutation²³.

431 **Epigenetics.** Different phenotypes could be maintained by epigenetic inheritance,
432 such as DNA methylation, leading to a correlation in phenotype across generation⁶⁸.

433 **Noise.** If noise in the biochemistry of the cell is coupled with a gene network that
434 amplifies small differences, then this can lead to phenotypic variation^{2,67}. Phenotypic
435 noise is the basis for examples such as that between cells which do and don't express
436 *ttss-1* in *S. Typhimurium*, or exoproteases in *Bacillus subtilis*^{5,18}.

437 **Signalling.** In cyanobacteria, such as *Anabaena* species, signaling peptides are
438 exported from cells to their neighbours, to control which cells develop into nitrogen
439 fixing heterocysts⁴¹. This produces a regular pattern of heterocysts every relatively
440 fixed number of vegetative cells along the filamentous colony. This number can vary
441 from \approx 4-15 cells, depending upon the species.

442 **Environment.** Variation can be generated by environmental cues. For example, in
443 cyanobacteria, in addition to the role of signaling, nitrogen stress can lead to a higher
444 proportion of cells developing into heterocysts⁴¹.

445 **Condition dependence.** Variation can be generated by differences in cell condition.
446 In *V. carteri*, a series of asymmetric cell divisions, during early embryonic
447 development, lead to small and large cells, which develop into soma and germ
448 respectively^{69,70}. This process involves a gene that ancestral ancestors used to reduce
449 reproduction in stressful conditions, being co-opted to produce a non-reproductive

450 phenotype^{69,71,72}. Variation in condition can also be environment dependent, for
451 example lower condition starving cells might be more likely to become a non-
452 reproductive altruist.

453 **Complementary or competing approaches?** It is useful to distinguish between
454 mechanistic and evolutionary approaches to studying traits such as phenotypic
455 heterogeneity⁷³. The mechanistic (proximate) approach is to ask questions about how
456 traits are controlled, such as what are the molecular or genetic mechanisms that
457 control a particular trait (how questions). The evolutionary (ultimate) approach is to
458 ask questions about the fitness consequences of that trait, and why it has been
459 favoured by natural selection (why questions).

460 The majority of previous work on phenotypic heterogeneity has been
461 mechanistic – our aim in this paper is to ask evolutionary questions^{2,3,6,7,41,67}. These
462 two approaches are complementary and not competing. Mechanistic answers cannot
463 be given for evolutionary questions and vice versa, but an understanding from one
464 perspective can aid the other perspective²⁹. For example, an evolutionary approach
465 can suggest when we might find different mechanisms in different species, whereas a
466 mechanistic understating of what factors stimulate phenotypic heterogeneity can help
467 us understand why that heterogeneity is favoured.

468

469 **Box 2. Natural selection and adaptation**

470 Natural selection favours genes that are better at transmitting to the next generation⁷⁴.
471 However, researchers often talk about natural selection acting on individual
472 behaviour, leading to individuals that maximise their fitness. The formal justification
473 for this thinking at the individual level is that genes which increase fitness will
474 accumulate, and so natural selection, via gene dynamics, will lead to organisms that
475 behave *as if* they are trying to maximise their fitness^{74,75}. Thus, the gene and
476 individual approaches are not competing, they are flip sides of the same coin - gene
477 dynamics leads to individual fitness maximisation.

478 Genes can influence their transmission to the next generation, not only by
479 influencing the reproductive success of the individual that they are in, but also by
480 influencing the reproductive success of other individuals carrying that gene.
481 Hamilton¹⁵ showed that natural selection will lead to individuals that behave as if they
482 are maximising not their personal reproductive success, but what he called inclusive
483 fitness. Inclusive fitness is the sum of fitness obtained directly, through reproduction,
484 and indirectly through influencing the reproduction of relatives. Indirect fitness must
485 be weighted according to relatedness, which is a statistical measure of the genetic
486 similarity between individuals.

487 Hamilton's theory is often discussed in terms of kin selection, and Hamilton's
488 rule¹⁵. Hamilton's rule shows that an altruistic trait, such as becoming a sterile stalk
489 cell in a fruiting body, will be favoured when $rB-C > 0$; where C is the fitness cost of
490 performing the trait, B is the fitness benefit to other individuals, and r is the genetic
491 relatedness to the individuals receiving the benefit. The most common ways for
492 interacting cells to be related are by either limited dispersal keeping relatives together,
493 or kin discrimination mechanisms which allow individuals to preferentially interact
494 with relatives¹⁵.

495 Division of labour is often discussed as benefitting the population or
496 community, with cells behaving analogous to a multicellular organism. It is useful to
497 ask whether this is justified. More formally, we can ask when would gene dynamics
498 lead to individuals that are trying to maximise their group or population fitness? This
499 requires extremely restrictive conditions, where there is effectively no conflict within

500 groups, such as in clonal populations of cells^{63,76,77}. The cells that make up complex
501 multicellular organisms, such as humans, fit this criterion, but populations or
502 communities of microorganisms might not. Consequently, thinking about adaptations
503 such as division of labour at the group or population level is not formally justified and
504 can lead to errors with microorganisms.

505

506 **FIGURE LEGENDS**

507

508 **Fig. 1. Division of labour.**

509 (a) Potential examples of division of labour. The photos show phenotypic variation in:
510 (i) *Volvox carteri* (large germ cells, and small soma cells; from⁷⁸); (ii) *Bacillus*
511 *subtilis* (cells which are (green) and are not (grey) producing proteases; from⁵); (iii) *S.*
512 *Typhimurium* (cells which are (green) and are not (grey) expressing the type three
513 secretion system; from³⁰); and (iv) *Cryptococcus gatti* (the cell on its own has
514 tubularised its mitochondria (the yellow), whereas the others have not; Simon
515 Johnston & Robin May). (b) Division of labour can involve either cooperation in one
516 direction where individuals of one phenotype help another phenotype (usually
517 altruistically), or cooperation in both directions, where individuals of each phenotype
518 cooperate with each other (possibly to their mutual benefit; see Supplementary
519 Information S3). (c) One way to demonstrate division of labour is to grow strains that
520 do and do not perform the putatively cooperative trait, in both monocultures and
521 mixed cultures. We consider: a cooperative strain, with division of labour, where cells
522 develop into both the altruistic helping phenotype (blue cells) and the reproducing
523 phenotype (green cells); and a cheat strain, where all cells develop into the
524 reproducing phenotype (black cells). In monocultures, the cooperative strain, with
525 division of labour, grows at a greater rate. In contrast, in mixed cultures, the cheats
526 grow at a faster rate. This prediction arises because relatively non-cooperative
527 ‘cheats’ can exploit the benefits provided by the altruistic helping phenotype, when
528 they are grown with the cooperative strain. (d) An example of this predicted pattern is
529 provided by data from two strains of *S. Typhimurium* - the wild type with a relatively
530 normal division of labour, and an *ahilD* mutant, that produces less of the phenotype
531 that triggers the type III secretion system. The wild type has a relatively higher fitness
532 when grown in monoculture, as measured by cells per gram of faeces, but a relatively
533 lower fitness when grown in a mixed culture. Data from Diard et al.¹⁹.

534

535 **Fig 2. Why Divide Labour?**

536 (a) The relationship between the proportion of resources that a cell invests into a task
537 A and the fitness return from that task. We assume that a cell invests proportion of
538 resources X into task A, and the remaining proportion $1-X$ into task B. Division of
539 labour can be favoured when the returns from investment are accelerating. (b) The
540 hypothetical relationship between the proportion or likelihood of individuals
541 specializing in task A, and the relatedness (r) between interacting individuals in a
542 social group. Division of labour is only favoured above a threshold value of
543 relatedness (r_c). (c,d) Across the tree of life, a higher relatedness within multicellular
544 groups is correlated with both: (c) a higher likelihood of sterile cells; and (d) more
545 cell types. The relatedness comparison is between groups which form clonally ($r=1$)
546 and groups which form non-clonally ($r<1$). Data from Fisher et al.⁵³.

547

548 **Fig. 3. How to divide?**

549 Consider a population that is composed of altruistic cells (blue) and reproductive cells
550 (green). Determination of phenotype occurs via phenotypic noise or via a coordinated
551 mechanism such as between cell signalling. The number of cells that interact in the
552 social group can be either large or small. In large groups, both phenotypic noise and
553 coordinated division lead to groups with the appropriate number of altruists.
554 Consequently, both mechanisms could be favoured to divide labour. If coordinated
555 division is more costly, for example because it requires the metabolic cost of
556 producing a signal, then phenotypic noise will be the favoured mechanism. In small
557 social groups, the stochastic nature of phenotypic noise will mean that there is an
558 appreciable chance that the group contains no altruists, and so have low fitness (these
559 groups are circled in red). In contrast, coordinated division provides a mechanism to
560 ensure that all groups contain altruists. Consequently, phenotypic noise is less likely
561 to be favoured as a mechanism to divide labour in species where the number of
562 interacting cells is small.
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