What's not to like?

Benefit design, funding structure and support for universal basic income

Journal of European Social Policy

Accepted version December 2021

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Abstract

After decades of debates on the economic and philosophical merits and shortcomings of a universal basic income (UBI), more recent literature has started to investigate the politics of a UBI. While this has shed new light on the individual characteristics associated with higher or lower support for a UBI, we still do not know what features of a UBI itself are attractive or repealing to people, nor whether other slightly different policy alternatives like means-tested and minimum incomes would be more popular. This article addresses this gap by employing a conjoint experiment fielded in Finland, where a UBI has received significant media and political attention. Our findings show that the most contentious dimension of a UBI is — surprisingly — not its universality, but instead its unconditional nature. Individuals are more likely to support policies that condition receipts upon searching for employment or being genuinely unable to work, and less likely to support policies that are unconditional. On the funding side, support tends to be lower for a UBI that is linked to reducing existing benefits, but higher when the UBI would be funded by increasing taxes, especially on the rich. These findings contribute to a wider literature on the politics of UBI and to our understanding of the potential popularity of competing policy reform alternatives.

Keywords

universal basic income, social policy preferences, conjoint, Finland, welfare state reform.
**Introduction**

Recent welfare state reform debates have brought renewed attention to universal basic income (UBI), which has existed as a policy proposal for over 100 years. A UBI would give every individual a universal, unconditional and regular cash payment, with no strings attached or means-testing. Despite its current popularity, further heightened by the economic fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic, we still know relatively little about the politics of UBI. Indeed, there is a large and valuable literature on UBI, but there remains important gaps concerning the determinants of public support for UBI. Specifically, most existing research on UBI has debated the normative justifications and desirability of a UBI (some examples include Van Parijs, 2004; McKay, 2007; Matsaganis and Flevotomou, 2008; Standing, 2008; for a detailed review check Winderquist et al., 2013) as well as the economic feasibility and desirability of introducing a UBI.

By contrast, more recent studies have started to explore public preferences for a UBI (Dermont and Stadelmann-Steffen, 2019; Roosma and van Oorschot, 2020; Parolin and Siöland, 2020; Vlandas, 2020b). Yet, most of this latter work to date concentrates on how certain individual characteristics are positively or negatively correlated with support for a UBI. These studies find that more economically vulnerable individuals, that is, those on a low income, who are young or unemployed, and those who are politically left-leaning are more likely to support UBI (Vlandas, 2019; Roosma and van Oorschot, 2020). There is also some emerging literature about the drivers of cross-national variation, which for instance suggests that support appears higher in countries where unemployment benefits are less generous as
well as where the ‘activation’ of benefits, in the form of sanctions and greater conditionality on the receipt of benefits, is extensive (Vlandas, 2020a). 1

While this new strand of literature advances our knowledge about the scale of support for UBI in different national contexts and identifies the potential individual characteristics associated with UBI support, it still leaves certain important questions about the nature of public support for UBI unanswered. Indeed, recent survey analysis shows that the same individual attributes predicting support for other – often more targeted – welfare state policies can explain support for a UBI despite its universality (Vlandas, 2019, 2020b; Roosma and van Oorschot, 2020; Chrisp et al., 2020). However, existing studies cannot tell us about which characteristics of a UBI itself are more or less popular, or how support for UBI relates to support for other (marginally different) policy proposals: for example, are targeted schemes and means-tested benefits more popular than a UBI? And if so, what particular differences between these schemes and a UBI account for this differential support?

This article examines empirically which precise characteristics of a UBI are most important for shaping support for this policy proposal. We adopt an inductive research design because there are no clear theoretical expectations about which dimensions of UBI should be expected to make it more or less attractive. 2 On the benefit design side, it is not clear whether it is universality or unconditionality that drives support. On the funding side, we do not know which funding model is likely to make a UBI more or less appealing. We also have limited evidence about whether variation funding or benefit design dimensions have the largest effect on support.

1 See Figure 2 in Vlandas (2020a) for more details about this relationship at the cross-national level. Note that activation is distinct from spending on active labour market policies (on the latter, please see Vlandas, 2013).
2 Note that one could certainly theorize that individuals with particular ideological or material dispositions are more or less likely to support a UBI, but this is distinct from a focus on the dimensions within a policy itself (rather than the individual).
Methodologically, we build on recent experimental research identifying the causal impact of competing policy designs, justifications and framings. One early study on funding design by Jensen (2012) shows that individuals would not be favourable to a policy that replaces other social benefits. In terms of benefit design, the more recent research by Dermont and Stadelmann-Steffen (2020) finds that entitlement criteria, generosity and funding have the strongest effect on policy support. Other studies explore how other types of concerns might play role, and for instance suggest that support for universal cash transfers is undermined by concerns about immigration (Bay and Pedersen, 2006; Muñoz and Pardos-Prado, 2017).

Our contribution lies at the intersection of studies on politics of UBI that analyse how individual characteristics drive support for a UBI on the one hand and the more experimental work on how policy design in general affects support for a policy on the other hand. We move beyond the state of the art by examining individual policy support in a cross-policy and multidimensional perspective. We study how benefit and funding design affects support for a UBI, and under which conditions support for UBI’s core characteristics – namely, universality and unconditionality – are appealing or not to people. Our inductive research design relies on a conjoint experiment carried out in Finland, which is a good case given recent welfare reform debates surrounding the basic income experiment in 2017–18. The presence of enduring labour market problems further increases issue salience (Halmetoja et al., 2019).

Our findings reveal that universality, in terms of the recipient population sub-groups and the legal entitlements of residence or citizenship, is not a key dimension of contention. Instead, it is UBI’s unconditionality, and how it is funded, that is key in determining support. The latter seems to generate resistance, as individuals are more supportive of policies where recipients are required to search for employment, or prove that they cannot work, rather than no-strings attached cash transfers. Funding also plays an important role to secure policy support: we
detect a demand for redistributive funding mechanisms by taxing the rich, and crucially, as in previous research, we find that retrenching current welfare policies is highly unpopular (for example, Dermont and Stadelmann-Steffen, 2020).

Given that universality and unconditionality are the most distinguishing traits of a UBI, we also explore the conditions under which these two features elicit more or less support among individuals. We find little evidence that most other policy characteristics affect the popularity of universal and unconditional benefits. One exception is the effect of universality on support for a UBI, which appears to be enhanced by specifying funding that would come from flat-rate taxation. In addition, we find evidence for what we term a ‘Robin Hood’ effect whereby popularity is higher if a cash benefit is jointly targeted on the poor and funded by the rich.

Taken together, our results suggest that the difficulties associated with crafting a political coalition in support of a UBI are not necessarily rooted in a general lack of demand for redistribution or government intervention. Instead, individuals might prefer other forms of intervention, for instance because of deservingness considerations and/or alternative more preferred policy designs. Support for UBI may therefore be best configured through framing strategies that tap into the population demands for redistribution, reciprocity and helping those in need.

In the next section, we describe the key characteristics of a UBI and review existing welfare state literature to identify which policy dimensions might be important for individual support. Next, we motivate our inductive research design and describe our conjoint experiment. After presenting and discussing our findings, we conclude with wider implications and avenues for future research.
State of the Art: UBI and the salient dimensions of cash benefits

UBI differs from traditional tax-funded cash benefit schemes in its two most distinguishable features: universality and unconditionality. The degree of universality refers to the share of the population that is covered. It is often contrasted with selectivity, because universality implies that everyone should be eligible for receiving welfare support. In terms of cash transfers, flat-rate pensions or child benefits are usually considered universal (Anttonen and Sipilä, 2014), although their selectivity based on eligibility criteria such as age, contrasts with the absolute universality of UBI where everyone receives a cash transfer (De Wispelaere and Stirton, 2004). Thus, a key distinguishing characteristic of UBI in relation to other cash transfers is the extent to which different parts of the population are eligible, and in particular the fact that with UBI all population sub-groups are covered.

However, even the most universal cash transfer may come with some sort of selectivity, if only in terms of who should be eligible in a territory, which is, for example, the case with legal requirements restricting benefits to citizens or residents (De Wispelaere and Stirton, 2004). These legal requirements may in turn impinge directly upon the preference formation of individuals when they come to form opinions about cash transfer policies. For example, we know from previous work that immigration concerns may negatively alter the support for a universal policy (Bay and Pedersen, 2006; Muñoz and Pardos-Prado, 2017).

A second key characteristic of UBI is its unconditionality. A policy is characterized as unconditional when it is not subject to any form of prerequisite conditions, most notably a means-test in terms of income, which would restrict a persons’ eligibility under certain conditions, or any behavioural requirements (De Wispelaere and Stirton, 2004). For instance, a UBI would not require individuals to comply with any ex-ante or ex-post behaviour or requirement to receive a UBI. This contrasts with the wide range of conditions embedded in most existing social policies. For instance, the unemployed are often required to search for a
job to be eligible for unemployment benefits (Immervoll and Knotz, 2018). Conversely, in-work benefits are conditioned on being already employed. These examples highlight both the ‘in-need’ and reciprocity dimensions of deservingness (Van Oorschot, 2000). Within many welfare state debates, the focus is on whether new income-support policies should be introduced, and whether these should be conditional on active and meaningful participation in society even if it is not through employment. One paradigmatic example is one of UBI’s cousin proposals known as the participation income (Atkinson, 1996).

Universality and unconditionality are therefore analytically distinct dimensions, although in practice they can be – and often are – linked. Indeed, a policy may be universal, but conditional, which is for example the case of Atkinson’s participation income (a cash transfer for everyone but in exchange for meaningful participation in society). Conversely, the opposite is also possible since a cash benefit can be unconditional but not universal. Examples include minimum incomes or any cash transfer which is not for all the population but requires no form of conditionality to receive it. The opposite of universality is therefore not conditionality but selectivity, while the opposite of unconditionality is imposing conditions.³

Two other important dimensions that characterize a UBI include individuality and generosity. A UBI is granted on an individual basis, rather than at the household level. Individuality may not be a particular contentious feature given the fact that many other existing benefits are sometimes already granted at the individual level, for example, pensions and unemployment benefits. Nevertheless, several income support schemes are granted at the household level, so the extent to which this feature is contentious remains an empirical matter. With respect to benefit generosity, the level is not a priori set within the standard definitions of a UBI (De

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³ For more discussion of the differences between these two concepts, see De Wispelaere and Stirton (2004).
The importance of the level of generosity is equally ambiguous since a wide range of existing benefits are set at varying levels of generosity.

Finally, the introduction or reform of social transfers comes at a financial cost, which may be covered through revenue-raising strategies like the introduction or reform of taxes, or through cost-saving mechanisms like the retrenchment of other existing welfare state policies. Previous research documents the (unsurprisingly) high unpopularity of welfare-state retrenchment (Pierson, 1996; 2000). However, not all types of retrenchment entail similar electoral penalties (for recent contributions, see Giger and Nelson, 2010; Schumacher, 2012). Welfare retrenchment of policies aimed at preventing life cycle risks (e.g. Jensen, 2012) such as health, old age and education have been shown to be particularly unpopular. More recent studies on the multidimensionality of cost and revenue raising reforms suggest that voters care about the personal income losses incurred through tax reforms, but that they are also very wary of imposing costs on the poor (Ballard-Rosa et al., 2017; Bechtel and Liesch, 2020). While we know that welfare-retrenchment based funding mechanisms are generally unpopular; the extent to which this is more or less the case for targeted or universal policies is ultimately an empirical matter.

To sum up, we have identified six relevant dimensions of a universal basic income: universality, understood in terms of (1) population sub-groups and (2) legal requirements; (3) unconditionality; (4) ‘individuality’; (5) generosity; and (6) funding mechanisms. We have explained why these dimensions are likely to be important and argued that an inductive approach is necessary given the lack of clear theoretical expectations about the likely effects of different dimensions of a policy proposal on support for different versions of UBI.
Empirical approach

Case selection and data

We focus on the case of Finland to examine whether support for a UBI depends on policy design. This is a good case study given the recent intense political and public debates on welfare state reforms driven by the need to improve labour market activation, and culminating in a pilot project to test basic income for unemployed people. The two-year basic income experiment in Finland between 2017 and 2018 was the first nationwide statutory randomized controlled trial testing the effects of an unconditional basic income for unemployed people (Halmetoja et al., 2019). Due to this widely publicized experiment, basic security benefits in general and basic income in particular became well-known policy ideas for the public in Finland.

Traditionally, among political parties, the Left Alliance and the Greens have advocated for a UBI, but surprisingly the experiment was implemented by a centre-right government. This is particularly relevant because it means that in Finland basic income is not strongly associated with any particular party or ideological strand. Therefore, a survey that asks respondents about different benefit designs and funding mechanisms for various social policy alternatives such as a UBI is particularly appropriate. Due to the ongoing debate, Finnish respondents had many opportunities to think about the different problems and dimensions of policies, which probably makes them better informed than citizens in other countries.

At the same time, Finland is characterized by specific institutional and contextual features that may affect our findings. We now outline the Finnish context in terms of welfare institutions, and later in the discussion, we then explain how this context may be influencing our findings. Finland belongs to a set of countries within the Social Democratic welfare regime characterized by a strong de-commodification potential through extended
universalistic programmes (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Kangas and Kvist, 2019). This means that individuals are not as dependent on labour-market participation for income and material subsistence as in other welfare states, something which is known as the de-commodification potential of this regime. Decommodification is facilitated through encompassing basic and earning-related social security benefits, rather than focusing exclusively on minimal needs-based assistance. One of the main characteristics of the Nordic or Social Democratic welfare regimes, in which Finland is usually classified, is its highly universalistic character (Esping-Andersen, 1990), which tends to result in low levels of poverty and high equality in terms of outcomes.

The welfare state in Finland, however, is multidimensional and is not only characterized by this universalistic character typical of the Nordic typology. This is for example reflected in its level of social expenditures, where the Finnish welfare state spends much less than its Nordic counterparts, albeit with high income redistribution and low inequality (Korpi and Palme, 1998). The Finnish welfare state has also been accompanied by a parallel evolution of an earnings-related benefit system, which contributes to high dualization. In Finland, due to the economic recession in the early 1990s, and after the global economic collapse of 2008, economic imperatives have been prioritized at the detriment of social policy, especially relative to other Nordic countries (Pekkarinen, 2005). During the recession, the Finnish welfare state was able to cushion most of the economic shocks and guarantee security when most needed. However, the prolonged recession has exposed growing ‘pockets’ of poverty and social exclusion underlining the question of the adequacy and tightness of basic income transfer schemes (Kangas, 2019).
**Method**

Conjoint experiments are increasingly used in the study of individual preferences, especially policy proposals and multidimensional issues. This method breaks down every decision object (namely, a policy proposal, candidate, profile and so on) into a set of dimensions (key characteristics) and attributes (different levels within each dimension). By making respondents choose between these – randomly allocated - sets of varying dimensions/attributes, conjoint analyses can detect the trade-offs implicit in each decision in choosing one profile over the other.

In previous work, conjoint designs have been mostly used to measure voter preferences for different candidates (Franchino and Zucchini, 2015; Hainmueller et al., 2014; Kirkland and Coppock, 2018; Schwarz et al., 2018; Tomz and Houweling, 2016), but they are also increasingly used to understand public opinion towards different policies related to welfare such as unemployment benefits (Gallego and Marx, 2016), pension reform (Häusermann et al., 2019), or housing policy (Hankinson, 2018). The suitability of this method for our particular question lies in its capacity to establish causal relations between the presence of particular policy attributes and support for a policy.

Traditional survey questions bundle up a series of different policy characteristics, so one cannot identify the specific effect of each policy feature separately on its support level. By eliciting different characteristics randomly to survey respondents, conjoint experiments are well suited to establish a causal association between specific policy features and policy support. Crucially, they do not only detect the causal impact of one policy feature on support – as this could also be done with other experiments like vignettes – but they are also capable of detecting the trade-offs and other interactive dynamics between policy attributes, which are central to the contribution of this article.
Our experiment was fielded by a commercial polling agency (Netquest) to a representative sample of 1,000 respondents in Finland during the month of March 2019, as part of a broader survey which was specifically designed to measure preferences for different versions of a UBI. The respondents are selected from a ‘non-random’ convenience sample from a pool of respondents chosen by Netquest, but there are strict quotas based on gender, age and geographical region (see section A1 in the appendix). The sample is non-random in the sense that these individuals had to register to Netquest to participate in the survey, and hence were not randomly drawn from the population. Nevertheless, this is standard practice in most survey research, and does not imply that the sample is biased in any way. The survey was administered online using the Qualtrics software and the duration of the whole survey was approximately 15 minutes.

To understand which type of reform is preferred, we employ a fully randomized conjoint experiment which varies in the attributes presented along six dimensions shared by income cash transfers, as described in Table 1: two dimensions of universality – population subgroups and legal requirements; conditionality; unit of recipients (individuals versus household); generosity; and funding mechanisms. Table A2 in the appendix displays how we collapse the attributes for the analysis and explains why and how we decide to adopt this collapsing. For the benefit generosity dimension, we use the quantity in euros (for more details, see Table A3 in appendix).

In each round, respondents are shown two policy proposals, which all exhibit the same core dimensions but then vary the attributes within some of the core dimensions. Each respondent is asked to complete four conjoint tasks, where one task involves reading two proposals, selecting one of them and rating both, after responding to a series of sociodemographic

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4 All figures and tables from the appendix are numbered preceded by the letter A.
questions. For each task, respondents are required to choose between the two proposals that appear in front of them and to rate each one of them. A screenshot of the task is shown in Figure A4 in the appendix.

Table 1. Conjoint design: dimensions and attributes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conjoint dimension</th>
<th>Attributes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Benefit design</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universality I</td>
<td>Targeting need (dependency/under poverty threshold)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Target population sub-groups)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Targeting minors</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not targeting (giving to everyone)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universality II</td>
<td>Citizenship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Legal requirements)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Residence (combine 6 months, 1 year and 5 years residence)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditionality</td>
<td>Unconditional (no conditions, or being unemployed and not having to look for employment)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Participatory conditions (that is, training, education; community work)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Need (looking for employment, or being unable to work)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Employment (having some form of employment, like self-employed, part-time or full-time)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recipients</td>
<td>Households</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generosity</td>
<td>Covers living costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Beyond living costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eurodividend (200€)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Funding mechanisms</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding mechanisms</td>
<td>Capital/technology taxation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reducing targeted welfare spending</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reducing universal welfare spending</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Environmental taxation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increase inheritance tax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cut spending on defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increase personal income tax to everyone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increase personal income tax to highest incomes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 below provides details of the wording for each question we included. It also describes how we operationalize our two dependent variables. We have two main dependent variables: a forced choice (between the two policies shown to respondents in each round), and a support

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5 The concept of eurodividend was developed by Van Parjis (2013) and proposed as a pan-European income scheme to every individual with the specified level of generosity of €200, as a starting symbolic quantity. Because the concept of eurodividend is part of the UBI debate, and having a very minimal, symbolic quantity is also considered by some as a potential stepping stone to the introduction of a full basic income scheme, we include this minimal, symbolic quantity to test preferences for different UBI schemes and welfare reform. We label this quantity as eurodividend, because it is the concept from where we take this quantity.
rate (given to each of the two policies per round). Our analysis mainly relies on the support rate as dependent variable, for reasons that are discussed in the next paragraphs, but the analysis of the forced choice dependent variable can be found in the appendix.

Table 2. Wording of the two dependent variable questions and operationalization of the dependent variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>Question wording</th>
<th>Operationalisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Forced choice</td>
<td>Please read the two income proposals carefully, and choose from the following options your preferred proposal</td>
<td>0, 1, where 1 is the selected policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support rate</td>
<td>Please rate each policy according to how likely you are of voting in favour of it. Note that 0 is not at all, and 10 means definitely voting in favour of it.</td>
<td>Ordinal scale 0–10, where 0 is no support and 10 is full support.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To maximize data quality we exclude all responses that have taken less than 10 minutes to go through the whole survey, and we keep only those respondents who have completed the whole four conjoint tasks, and whose responses across the two dependent variables are consistent\(^6\) (n= 653). To guarantee that the results are robust given the cognitive demand of completing four conjoint tasks and satisficing concerns that may arise due to the number of tasks (Bansak et al., 2018; Bansak et al., 2017), we also carry out robustness checks with only two conjoint tasks.

To analyse results of the conjoint experiment we calculate two quantities of interest. The main analysis presented in this article relies on the marginal means as developed by recent research, which represent the level of favourability of a profile with a particular attribute, marginalized across all other design elements (Leeper et al., 2020). While we rely on the marginal means for our main analysis, the average marginal component effect (AMCE) is shown in the appendix. The AMCE is defined as the marginal effect of one attribute averaged

\(^6\) That is, we delete all inconsistent responses which are those where a respondent has selected one policy proposal but rated the other policy proposal higher.
over the joint distribution of other attributes (Hainmueller et al., 2014; Bansak et al., 2020). It is interpreted as the probability of choosing one policy proposal when that attribute appears, in reference to an abstract counterfactual level, which is set as the baseline (Teele et al., 2018).

Indeed, the reference category in the AMCE means that all the effects (captured by coefficient sizes) of the attributes are always interpreted in relation to the baseline category. As an example, in the universality dimension, taking as the baseline (reference) category, ‘giving to everyone’, would mean that the effect of targeting those in need or minors would always need to be interpreted in relation to giving to everyone. Hence, in this latter case, one could not compare the significant differences between attributes if one particular pair was not within the same dimension and even if the attributes were in the same dimension, one could not compare them if one of these is not set as the baseline category. This means that one could not compare the effect of targeting need to that of targeting minors, as this would always have to be compared to giving to everyone. It is also the case that one could not compare the effect of targeting need to – for example – restricting eligibility criteria to citizens only. In sum, we focus on the marginal mean analysis because this is a more relevant quantity for our research question, since we are most interested in the overall effect of an attribute on policy support.

To perform the relevant analysis, we reshape the data so that each observation is a policy proposal k of a task j, presented to a respondent i. This means that for our total of 653 respondents, we have a total of 4,948 observations, where each observation is a policy package or profile, shown to one respondent, in one specific round, which was either selected or not. Each respondent chooses one out of two profiles at any given time. The respondent then completes four of each of these rounds, meaning that he/she observes a total of eight policy profiles. Each respondent is required to select one policy proposal from each pair and
rate the two of them, which leaves us with two dependent variables – forced choice and support rate.

We code our first dependent variable $Y_1$, the forced choice, as 1 if the policy proposal is selected, and 0 if it is the unselected policy proposal. Our second dependent variable $Y_2$, the support rate, is a number ranging from 0 to 10, depending on the support given to the policy proposal – both to the unselected and selected one. Each observation includes a vector of the attributes presented in that observation. Our dependent variables $Y_1$ and $Y_2$ are modelled as a function of $X$ which is a vector containing the attributes that the respondents were exposed to. This can be analysed with a simple ordinary least squares linear regression (Hainmueller et al., 2014).

**Results**

We begin by exploring the main effects of different policy dimensions – and within them distinct attributes – on support for different policy proposals. We explain which dimensions are more important in shaping support for different policy proposals, which are the popular and unpopular features of a UBI, and how support for a basic income relates to other policy proposals, depending on its specific features. In the second part of the results section, we examine under which conditions individuals support two key characteristics of UBI – universality and unconditionality.

*Which dimensions are important in shaping support for policy proposals?*

Our results suggest that the policy dimensions considered in this study vary in the extent to which they play a role in configuring policy support of UBI (Figure 1). Behavioural
conditionality and funding dimensions appear especially relevant, whereas neither target
groups nor legal requirements – crucial for the universal character of basic income – seem to
have an effect on policy support.

More specifically, we find that the unconditional character of UBI decreases support for this
policy (this attribute gathers a marginal mean of 4.49). Conversely, conditions targeting
individuals in need and establishing reciprocal attitudes of recipients – that is, where
recipients are looking for employment, or prove that they cannot work – have a positive
effect on policy support, gathering a marginal mean of 4.66, which is significantly higher
than any other characteristic in the benefit design dimensions.

These results echo the importance of reciprocity found in studies of social policy attitudes
(for example, Van Oorschot, 2000). In this respect, our findings further suggest that not all
forms of reciprocity are equally important: conditions involving training or community work
are especially unpopular (with a marginal mean of 4.17), which implies that a UBI or
traditional unemployment policies are likely to be more popular than a participation income
proposed, for example, by Atkinson (1996).

The second crucial dimension shaping support for a UBI concerns how the policy is funded.
Reducing costs from existing universal welfare schemes such as health, education and
pensions to fund a UBI appear particularly unpopular, in line with arguments from older
welfare state literature (Pierson, 1996; 2001) as well as findings from previous conjoint
experiments (Dermont and Stadelmann-Steffen, 2019). Support, however, is not hindered as
much when reducing costs from selective welfare benefits such as low-income support or
housing benefits, which runs counter to theories of deservingness and life cycle risks
prevention (Jensen, 2012). A potential explanation for this surprising finding is that this
particular attribute may be susceptible to heterogeneous effects, if support is driven by
material concerns about who benefits directly from specific, targeted policies. On the tax side of funding proposals, we find that there is a strong demand for increasing taxes to the rich, which is the most popular of all attributes within the design (with a marginal mean of 4.96).

**Figure 1. Marginal means of the support rate for dependent variable**

Note: The vertical line indicates the average support level for all respondents, across all the policy packages evaluated. The dots indicate the marginal mean, and the confidence intervals are set at 95%. The arrows next to the funding proposals indicate whether these are revenue-increasing or cost-reducing. The analysis of the forced choice dependent variable can be found in appendix Figure A7, the AMCE analysis is found in A8 and the discussion of the coherence of these findings is provided in appendix A9. The robustness checks appear in Figures A10 to A12 in the appendix, A13 being a discussion of the robustness of the results.

Several dimensions do not seem to have an effect on support. First, the population subgroups or target groups dimension does not seem to be a relevant dimension shaping support. This would explain why there is support for a UBI as much as for targeted policies: the target groups dimension does not seem to have an effect on support. Second, legal requirements do not have a statistically significant effect on policy support. Third, increasing generosity does not seem to reduce support: this is a crucial finding for the politics of UBI since it shows that generosity is not the main political obstacle to introducing the policy. Conversely, this further
suggests that making UBI proposals more generous will not increase its political feasibility. We do find, however, that very low and symbolic quantities have a negative impact on policy support. Thus, a proposal such as a euro dividend may not be the most attractive option for public support (Van Parijs, 2013). Finally, the unit of recipients also does not seem to matter greatly on policy support. While there might be genuine economic and normative debates about whether the individual or the household should receive a UBI, this does not affect political support in Finland.

**What makes universality appealing?**

We now turn our attention to exploring under which conditions support for UBI’s most characteristic features – universality and unconditionality – may be promoted or hindered, by specifically looking at how other design elements shape support for these attributes. We begin by exploring universality. Our findings suggest that manipulating some dimensions in some cases matter, while in others it does not (Figures 2 and 3). On the one hand, tightening behavioural conditions, or restricting the citizenship-residence conditionality does not boost support for universality in contrast to findings from previous work (Muñoz and Pradós-Prado, 2019). On the other hand, benefit generosity dimension alters the support levels for universality, albeit in unexpected ways (Figures A16 and A17 in appendix). Indeed, while generosity has no direct effect on policy support, lowering generosity indirectly reduces the support for universality.  

Next, we analyse the effect of funding mechanisms on support for universality (Figure 4) while robustness checks are shown in Figure A13 in the appendix. Interestingly, we find that increasing taxes to the rich is a very popular funding mechanism, but when it comes to giving

---

7 Although we did not have clear theoretical expectations, it would have been reasonable to expect the opposite: lowering quantities may increase support for giving to everyone.
to all (universality), individuals also prefer taxing everyone (that is, increasing personal income tax to all). In fact, this latter attribute gathers one of the highest marginal means and is statistically different from taxing the rich. This suggests the following ‘give-all’, ‘take-all’ dynamic: if the government distributes cash to all, then everyone should also pay for it to make the policy proposal most appealing. Two additional funding mechanisms seem to gather higher marginal means than the average in the interaction between universality and funding mechanisms: environmental taxation and corporate/capital taxation.

*Figure 2. Can tighter conditions increase support for universality? Interaction between conditionality and universality (population sub-groups) dimension*

![Graph showing interaction between conditionality and universality](image)

*Note: The vertical line indicates the average level of support for respondents. The dots are the marginal means with 95% confidence intervals. Appendix Figure A16 shows the robustness checks.*

All of the three aforementioned mechanisms have been considered as important funding sources for a potential UBI. First, income tax may be required to fund the cost of a UBI, even at relatively low level of generosity (Arcarons et al., 2019). Second, the popularity of environmental taxation makes a green new deal, combining carbon taxes with a UBI,
potentially politically viable (Howard et al., 2019). Third, increasing and/or introducing new taxes on capital and corporations also appears to boost support for universality (see Figure 2). This is consistent with debates about the increased concentration of corporate wealth, driven by technological development and the COVID-19 crisis.

Figure 3. Can tighter legal requirements increase support for universality? Interaction between target groups dimension and legal requirements

Note: The vertical line indicates the average level of support for respondents. The dots are the marginal means with 95% confidence intervals.

Overall, our results about universality imply that having a universal benefit for everyone may be more justifiable if everyone is also responsible for funding it, than only incurring costs to the better-off. A striking finding is that the funding mechanisms which boost support for universality are not the same as the funding mechanisms that are more popular (for example, increasing taxes to the rich). Indeed, the generally popular funding mechanism is not popular in and of itself, but also boosts support for in-need target groups – which was not generally a popular feature (4.39 in the main effects, but 5.27 when interacted with taxing the rich). These results seem indicative of a ‘Robin Hood’ effect: while individuals do not support giving to those in need in general, their support for this option becomes high when funding
comes from the rich. This might be picking up an underlying demand for redistribution from
the rich to the poor, because individuals do not want to pay for the poor but they will support
such a policy if funded by the rich. Overall, this combination of policy recipients and sources
of funding seems to be the preferred form of welfare reform.

**Figure 4. Interaction between target groups and funding mechanisms dimensions**

What makes unconditionality appealing?

The second key characteristic of a UBI is its unconditionality. For reasons of space, all results
for interaction effects and robustness checks are shown in appendices A20 to A27. Similar to
universality, our results show that few other design dimensions alter the support given to
unconditionality. Support for unconditionality is not increased when restricting population
sub-groups to those in need or minors, but neither is support hindered for this attribute if
combining it with full universality. Instead, we find that combining two restrictive designs boosts support, as shown in the interaction figure between universality (population subgroups) and conditionality in Figure 3. When both these dimensions focus on population in need, support increases significantly. The marginal mean is the largest (5.02) across all the interactions and is higher than the main effects of the marginal mean of these attributes when considered separately (Figure 1). If imposing behavioural criteria increases the support towards particular in-need population sub-groups, then clearly these groups are not perceived as deserving enough.

Moreover, different funding mechanisms may alter the support for unconditionality, although in different ways than in the case of universality. The funding mechanisms that seem to increase support for unconditionality the most is increasing personal income tax to the highest incomes, but this is not statistically different from spreading the tax burden on the whole of the population, or on capital and corporations, and it is not different from the reduction of current costs – in welfare or other areas such as defence. Given that the interaction of funding mechanisms and support for unconditionality or universality works differently, the key political challenge is boosting support for both these attributes.

In Finland, any UBI proposal aiming to attract public support should complement existing benefits schemes and derive funding from progressive tax schemes. Our findings show that increasing taxes to all, and/or corporate/capital taxation, may be suitable pathways that are also politically feasible as they boost support for universality and do not particularly hinder support for unconditionality.
Discussion and conclusion

This article addresses an empirical gap in the literature on UBI. Existing scholarship on UBI support and welfare reform have not to date analysed what elements of a UBI generate support and opposition, and how support for a UBI compares to other policy proposals. To answer this question, we adopt a novel conjoint design fielded in Finland which allows us to pay closer attention to the multidimensionality of support for a UBI. Our contribution is to shed new light on what dimensions of a UBI are most important in order to maximize support.

Specifically, we find that universality is not a key contentious dimension, in terms of legal requirements or population sub-groups. This helps make sense of the high levels of support for a UBI across Europe (Roosma and van Oorschot, 2020; Vlandas, 2020): whereas much literature shows that giving benefits to all groups reduces support because it entails covering groups that might be seen as underserving, the results from our conjoint experiment in Finland shows that universality does not in itself elicit opposition.

Moreover, our findings show that it is the unconditional character of a UBI that elicits opposition among some individuals. Individuals are more likely to support policies that are conditional on recipients looking for employment, or genuinely being unable to work, echoing what we know about deservingness in terms of need and reciprocity (Van Oorschot, 2000). Next, the funding of a UBI also appears crucial. We find that taxing the rich increases support, whereas reducing universal welfare benefits decreases support, suggesting that there is a demand for welfare enhancing policies that are progressively financed. In sum, our results suggest that a progressively-funded UBI, with forms of conditionality attached, is the ideal policy proposal to maximize public support for UBI in Finland.
In addition, we examine under which conditions support for the two key characteristic attributes of a UBI (universality and unconditionality) increases. We find little evidence that other design characteristics matter in this respect, nor that more stringent and limiting policy characteristics actually boost support for these policy features. Our results suggest a ‘give-all’, ‘take-all’ dynamic, whereby giving to everyone increases support only if it is funded by everyone. Yet, the preferred form of welfare reform is in line with what we term a ‘Robin Hood’ effect: take from the rich to give to the poor.

These findings have important implications for the politics of welfare reform and UBI. First, in terms of the politics of welfare reform, we conclude that a UBI may be more politically feasible than other alternatives such as participation income (Atkinson, 1996) or a euro-dividend (Van Parijs, 2013). Second, we observe a strong rejection of a roll-back of the welfare state so that a UBI is unlikely to be politically viable if it is combined with retrenchment of existing benefits. Third, we show that there is strong support for redistribution in its traditional form of taxing the rich to provide benefits to the poor. Finally, given that we find limited evidence that altering other policy features may boost support for universality and unconditionality, a UBI will need to rely on its redistributive potential to appeal to wide segments of the electorate.

There are also a number of wider implications for the literature on welfare reform and deservingness theory. In contrast to much existing work, we show that legal requirements do not change support for a cash benefit, which is at odds with the expectations from studies on immigration and the welfare state, as well as for deservingness theory (Van Oorschot, 2000; Bay and Pedersen, 2006; van der Waal et al., 2013; Muñoz and Pardos-Prado, 2019). In addition, we identify distinct attitudes with respect to two crucial dimensions of a policy: the benefit design (the ‘giving’ dimension) on the one hand, and the funding design (the ‘taking’ dimension) on the other hand (Cavaillé and Trump, 2015).
Moreover, we further demonstrate that these two sides interact to produce different patterns of support: the impact of some ‘taking’ features of the funding sign on support is not the same depending on which ‘giving’ side of the benefit design are specified, and vice versa. Most notably, while giving to the poor is boosted when taking from the rich, this is not the case for giving to everyone, where instead flat-rate funding mechanisms seem more popular. In contrast to an older ‘something for nothing’ literature (Citrin, 1979 and subsequent work), we find that individuals support more taxes on a smaller portion of the population (the rich) to support the funding of schemes that are targeted on particular population subgroups such as those who are poor, dependents or minors. However, support for a more universal funding design that taxes everyone can elicit support if the policies reach everyone rather than just the poor and needy. In other words, support of benefit universality is higher when funded by taxes on everyone.

Overall, this article has laid the empirical grounds for a new multidimensional and cross-policy support approach to welfare state reform, unveiling the configuration of support for new proposals like a UBI. Nevertheless, as with most experiments, results are susceptible to the specificities of the design and of the context.

Finally, two avenues for further research are worth emphasising. First, we need more work on possible heterogeneity of the effects, in particular with respect to how individual characteristics may affect the multidimensional dynamics of support towards UBI and welfare state reforms. For example, future research should explore empirically how the effects of well-established characteristics such as risks and income depend crucially on the policy dimension under consideration, and vice versa. Second, more research should examine whether these findings travel to other institutional and economic contexts, since this study focused on just one country. In particular, we find that universality is not a core-dividing dimension, but this may be attributable to the fact that our survey was fielded in a relatively
universalistic Finnish context. As more careful attention to how both the design of policy proposals and individual characteristics shape support for a UBI across different countries and contexts, we will develop a fuller understanding of the politics of a UBI.
References


APPENDIX

What's not to like?

Benefit design, funding structure and support for universal basic income

*Accepted version December 2021*

*Journal of European Social Policy*

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### A1. Respondent quotas.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Target number</th>
<th>Target percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male (1)</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>489</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female (2)</td>
<td>511</td>
<td>511</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18–29 (2)</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30–39 (3)</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40–49 (4)</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50–59 (5)</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60–69 (6)</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70–84 (7) (70+)</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Region</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Itä – Östra län</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Etelä – Södra län</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Länsi – Västra län</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oulun – Lapin – Uleåborgs län</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### A2. Justification for dimensions, attributes and collapsing of different attributes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Attributes</th>
<th>Collapsed Categories</th>
<th>Justification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Target population sub-groups</td>
<td>To those under the poverty threshold</td>
<td>Targeting need</td>
<td>We collapse the categories of dependency and poverty because, although different in terms of potential deservingness considerations, they are still two categories subject to need of recipients.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To those with dependent family members</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To those with minors</td>
<td>Minors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Everyone</td>
<td>Universalization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal requirements</td>
<td>Residency permit 6 months ago</td>
<td>Residency</td>
<td>We introduced different residency requirements to add variation, but we collapse them for the main analysis for the purpose of clarity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Residency permit 1 year ago</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Residency permit 5 years ago</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Citizenship</td>
<td>Citizenship</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditionality</td>
<td>Full-time employed</td>
<td>Conditional on</td>
<td>We designed the conjoint experiment with different specific conditions, but we collapse them into their main thematic categories for the purposes of clarity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>employment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Part-time employed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Involved in volunteering or community work</td>
<td>Conditional on</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Training or education</td>
<td>participating in</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unable to work</td>
<td>society in different</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unemployed but looking for employment</td>
<td>ways</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unemployed and not looking for employment</td>
<td>Universalization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unconditional</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generosity</td>
<td>Eurodividend</td>
<td>Does not cover living costs</td>
<td>We decide to collapse different extents of living costs/poverty threshold because, although we built them according to theoretical constructs, we did not have a clear theoretical expectation of, for instance, why individuals should differ in preferences of -25% poverty threshold or the poverty threshold level itself.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Covers living costs without housing</td>
<td>Covers part or all of living costs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minus 25% of poverty threshold</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poverty threshold</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Plus 25% of poverty threshold</td>
<td>Above minimum need</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recipients</td>
<td>Households</td>
<td></td>
<td>No collapsing needed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Individuals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dimension</td>
<td>Attributes</td>
<td>Collapsed Categories</td>
<td>Justification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding mechanisms</td>
<td>Increase taxes to corporations</td>
<td>Capital/technology taxation;</td>
<td>We chose to design this dimension so that it included budget-neutral forms of funding (that is, reducing current spending), because we believe that budget-neutral forms are of interest per se, but they also include an important part of the welfare remodelling debate: rolling back current welfare models, but adding an income guarantee (as stipulated by the above dimensions). We include a series of detailed options per category (i.e., environmental taxation, reducing targeted welfare), because we believe that including a generic funding mechanism is not enough for respondents to have a clear idea of the implications. Moreover, including detailed options is also relevant as these may be very subject to national debates. We considered a variety of collapsing mechanisms, such as: budget-neutral/increasing or introducing new taxes. The inconvenience of this is that there is, per se, no theoretical expectation behind these preferences: it is not only about whether one increases, introduces new taxes or uses the current budget, but about which types of mechanisms are used. Another alternative we considered was to collapse into forms of progressive vs. regressive funding mechanisms, but these distributive effects are also conditional on other characteristics of the policy design, and we could not automatically infer what mechanisms respondents consider to be regressive/progressive. Our hypothesis for this paper, being focused on general effects, is concerned with the reduction of two broad types of welfare expenditure. While we collapse these into two relevant categories (universal/targeted), we were adamant of collapsing the rest of the options into one, precisely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increase capital income tax</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Introduce a tax on technology</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Introduce a tax on inter-bank financial transactions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cutting unemployment benefits</td>
<td>Reducing targeted welfare spending</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cutting social assistance for low income families</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cutting housing benefits</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cutting pension spending</td>
<td>Reducing universal welfare spending</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cutting spending on health</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cutting spending on education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Introduce a new environmental tax</td>
<td>Environmental taxation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increase Environmental taxes (Finland: excise liquid fuels; Spain: hydrocarbons)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increase inheritance tax</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cut spending on defense</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increase personal income tax to everyone</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increase personal income tax to highest incomes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dimension</td>
<td>Attributes</td>
<td>Collapsed Categories</td>
<td>Justification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>because they are theoretically very different. Therefore, with the remaining collapse followed by a thematic categorization: environment, capital, and the remaining categories we left as individual. We think that a possibility could be collapsing the increase of PIT (2 options) and inheritance into one, as thematically they make sense. However, these are options that are very contentious in both contexts, and that are clearly distinguishable in terms of progresiveness (especially the options of personal income tax).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A3. Construction of the quantity dimension.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Quantity (in euros)</th>
<th>Calculation and data source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eurodividend proposal</td>
<td>€200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Covers living costs without housing</td>
<td>€500</td>
<td>Level of social assistance for a single person in 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-25% poverty threshold</td>
<td>€900</td>
<td>Calculated from poverty threshold for a single person in 2016 (National income statistics)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty threshold</td>
<td>€1200</td>
<td>Calculated from poverty threshold for a single person in 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+25% poverty threshold</td>
<td>€1500</td>
<td>Calculated from poverty threshold</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A4. Screenshot of the conjoint experiment. Respondents saw the table in finish language.

**First round**

In the following table you will see two policy proposals. The first column indicates the main characteristics and the following two specify the features of the two proposals. Please read carefully both alternatives and select the proposal you prefer.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy characteristics</th>
<th>Proposal 1</th>
<th>Proposal 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To whom the benefit is directed</td>
<td>Everyone</td>
<td>Individuals with minors under their charge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditions to receive the benefit</td>
<td>Having full-time employment</td>
<td>Being involved in studying or training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefit recipients</td>
<td>Families/households</td>
<td>Families/households</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quantity</td>
<td>550€</td>
<td>550€</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal requirements</td>
<td>Having a residence permit (since at least 6 months ago)</td>
<td>Having a residence permit (since at least 6 months ago)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How it will be funded</td>
<td>Reducing housing expenditure</td>
<td>Reducing education expenditure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A5. Marginal mean of the forced-choice dependent variable.
A6. Average marginal component effect (AMCE) of the forced-choice dependent variable.

Note: The dots indicate the AMCE, and confidence intervals are set at 95%. Those attributes where the dot is set at 0, are the baseline or reference categories.
A7. Discussion of the implications for the forced choice analysis for main effects

Marginal mean analysis of the forced choice dependent variable shows the same patterns than support rate, especially with regards to the recipients, generosity, legal requirement dimension and funding mechanisms. Some slight differences appear in the conditionality dimension, where, although we find the same tendency (need as a condition is preferred), this is not statistically different. We also find that similar to the forced choice there is no statistical difference between a universal policy and targeting those in need (within the target group dimensions), although unlike in the support rate, minors do have a statistically significant negative impact. This is also something reflected in the AMCE analysis. So overall, results are very similar in the two analysis of the forced choice dependent variable, with two minor exceptions, which rather than a substantive change of results are reflective of changes in significance. To a certain extent it is reasonable that some differences appear because of the operationalisation of the two dependent variables, and substantively of how respondents make decisions. In a forced choice, the respondent is selecting one policy over the other, however, this says little about how much/less the respondent is supportive of the policy. In our methods section we explain why we use support rate as a main dependent variable giving strong theoretical reasons of its value-added, but we follow previous work in analysing the forced choice dependent variable as a robustness check.
A8. Robustness check: Average marginal component effect (AMCE) of the forced-choice dependent variable, of the two first rounds.

Note: The dots indicate the AMCE, and confidence intervals are set at 95%. Those attributes where the dot is set at 0, are the baseline or reference categories.
A9. Robustness check: Marginal Means of the forced choice dependent variables only for the two first respondent rounds.

Note: The vertical line in the second graph indicates the average level of support. The dots represent marginal means and the lines 95% of confidence interval.

A10. Robustness checks: Marginal Means of support rate dependent variables only for the two first respondent rounds.

Note: The vertical line in the second graph indicates the average level of support. The dots represent marginal means and the lines 95% of confidence interval.
A11. Discussion of the implications of the robustness checks of the marginal mean analysis of the support rate dependent variable.

The support rate dependent variable robustness checks confirm our main findings. A series of dimensions do not seem to matter on their own, once more these are: target groups, generosity, recipients and legal requirements. The only minor difference that we do find here is that the lowest level of benefit generosity (200€), does seem to significantly reduce support in comparison to the rest of the quantities. We also find supportive evidence that need is the most popular form of conditionality (although in this case it is not statistically different from unconditionality), and funding though taxing the rich boosts support while cutting universal welfare reduces support for a policy package. We argue that while there may be some differences of significance, this may be rather reflective of a lower number of cases because the patterns reflected are the same.

A12. Marginal means of the target and funding interaction (forced choice dependent variable).
A13. Robustness check of interaction: marginal means of the target and funding interaction (support rate dependent variable), only including the two first respondent rounds.

A14. Robustness check of interaction: marginal means of the target and conditionality dimensions (support rate dependent variable), only including the two first respondent rounds.
Discussion of the robustness checks of the marginal mean support rate analysis of the interactions between dimensions. Our robustness checks of the funding dimension and target groups interaction still convey the same patterns as our results: increasing taxes to the rich is the most popular funding method for targeting those in need, while environmental taxation (but also taxing capital, and income taxes to everyone are). Like we have discussed in previous sections however, some slight differences may appear in that substantively speaking respondents may not make the same type of choice or use the same heuristics when having to make a choice or giving an extent of support.

Our robustness checks confirm our main findings (Figure 2 in paper). The most popular mechanism for targeting those in need is increasing taxes to the rich, as is the case with targeting minors. However, this pattern is reversed when it concerns universal policies: support for this form of funding decreases, while increasing taxes to everyone, environmental taxation and taxing capital become statistically significant.

As we report in the paper, targeting policies to those in need, and making them conditional on need, increases support for a policy proposal. Making policies unconditional to those in need is also quite popular too. Unlike we expected, restricting universal policies through imposing some form of condition does not increase support. We only find that imposing participatory conditions is more popular than remaining unconditional, but this form of conditionality is not statistically different from the other forms of conditions.
A15. Robustness of target and legal requirement dimension

A16. Interaction of target and generosity dimension
A17. Robustness: Interaction of target and generosity dimension

A18. Interaction of target and unit of recipient dimension
A19. Robustness: Interaction of target and unit of recipient dimension

![Diagram showing robustness interaction]

A20. Marginal mean analysis of the interaction between conditions and legal requirements (support rate dependent variable).

![Diagram showing marginal mean analysis]
A21. Robustness: Marginal mean analysis of the interaction between conditions and legal requirements (support rate dependent variable).

A22. Marginal mean analysis of the interaction between conditions and unit (support rate dependent variable).
A23. Robustness: Marginal mean analysis of the interaction between conditions and unit (support rate dependent variable).

A24. Marginal mean analysis of the interaction between conditions and generosity (support rate dependent variable).
A25. Robustness: Marginal mean analysis of the interaction between conditions and generosity (support rate dependent variable).

A26. Marginal mean analysis of the interaction between conditions and funding (support rate dependent variable).
A27. Robustness: Marginal mean analysis of the interaction between conditions and funding (support rate dependent variable).

A28: Validity and reliability

In this section we discuss the validity and reliability of our findings. We tackle concerns for task complexity, relevance of survey questions to respondents, and respondent satisficing. To ensure that task complexity was not an issue, we pre-tested the survey several times with a broad range of respondents, observing how these performed the tasks. Individuals engaged with the task in a straightforward manner and the attributes resonated well with respondents’ notions and understandings of welfare state (it did not sound remote to them).

Another related concern could be whether these combinations are unlikely to appear in the real world, and to what extent this could compromise the validity of our findings. For instance, a respondent could observe a cash transfer proposal given to everyone, unconditional, of very generous quantity (above the poverty threshold level), financed by a reform of personal income tax by everyone; a combination which might not be feasible and
therefore affect support levels. In all the pre-testing sessions this concern did not arise among respondents, because their focus is to assess their desirability for the elements of the policy. We also argue that because we do not speak of the specific quantities of taxation and whether the funding mechanisms that appear would be the only funding mechanisms, we allow room for practical feasibility. It is also key to loosen the combinations we allow, to be able to test how these combinations work. If we imposed too many conditions, we could not test how different policy configurations play out in determining support.

A third concern is respondent satisficing. Our pre-testing indicated that four rounds are an optimal number for respondent engagement. The number of tasks and dimensions is also very similar to the number found in previous work. However, to eliminate concerns of respondent satisficing we also perform all the analysis with robustness checks of the first and second round to make sure that findings are consistent throughout rounds. As outlined in the results section, findings are generally robust with few exceptions that do not compromise our findings as results are consistent in tendency across analyses, although there are differences which appear significant.

A final concern may be how our case selection influences the generalizability our results. One of the obvious factors which may influence attitudes towards welfare state reform is the domestic welfare state institutions. In this sense, we find, contrary to much other work, that targeting need is not crucial, legal requirements neither, nor that generosity is not dependent on who is targeted either. It may be the case that having a universalistic welfare state influences preference for welfare state by rendering the consideration behind this dimension less important, as predicted by much literature (Korpi and Palme, 1998). However, this is something that future work could analyse.