DIVINE PERFECTION AND HUMAN POTENTIALITY: TRINITARIAN ANTHROPOLOGY IN HILARY OF POITIERS' *DE TRINITATE*

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By

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Bibliography
No figure of fourth-century Christianity seems to be at once so well known and so clouded in mystery as Hilary of Poitiers. His work as an historian provides invaluable knowledge of the mid-fourth century, and he was praised as a theologian throughout late antiquity. Today, however, discussions of his theology are founded upon less solid ground. This is largely due to methodological issues. Modern scholarship has often read Hilary through anachronistic historical and theological categories which have rendered his thought incomprehensible. Recent scholars have sought to overcome this and to reexamine Hilary within his own historical, polemical, and theological context. Much remains to be said, however, in regard to Hilary's actual theological contribution within these contextual parameters.

This thesis contends that in all of Hilary's polemical and constructive argumentation in *De Trinitate*, which is essentially trinitarian, he is inherently and necessarily developing an anthropology. In all he says about the divine, he is saying as much about what it means to be human. This thesis therefore seeks to reenvision Hilary's overall theological project in terms of the continual, and for him necessary, anthropological corollary of trinitarian theology—to reframe it in terms of a 'trinitarian anthropology'. My contention is that the coherence of Hilary's thought depends upon his understanding of divine-human relations. I will demonstrate this through following Hilary's main lines of trinitarian argument, out of which flows his anthropological vision. These main lines of argument, namely, divine generation, divine infinity, divine unity, the divine
image, and divine humanity, each unfold into a progressive picture of humanity from potentiality to perfection.

This not only provides a new paradigm for understanding Hilary's own thought, but invites us to reexamine our approach to fourth-century theology entirely, as it disavows any reading of the trinitarian controversies in conceptual abstraction. Further, theological and religious anthropology are widely discussed in contemporary scholarship, and Hilary's profound exploration of divine-human relations, and what it means to be a human being as a result, has much to offer both historical and contemporary concerns.
LONGER ABSTRACT

No figure of fourth-century Christianity seems to be at once so well known and so clouded in mystery as Hilary of Poitiers. His work as an historian provides a breadth of knowledge of the mid-fourth century which would perhaps otherwise be lost, and his work as a theologian was praised by the likes of Augustine, Jerome, and numerous others throughout late-antiquity. Today, however, discussions of his theology are founded upon less solid ground. This is partly due to methodological issues. Throughout nineteenth- and twentieth-century scholarship, Hilary's thought was largely read within the framework of an 'history of dogma' approach. In this approach, he was read in light of developing 'orthodox' doctrine, and thus necessarily in comparison with later thinkers, and indeed, the standards of modern readers. This necessitates a reading which is divorced from Hilary's genuine historical context, as if his thought could be understood within an atemporal ideological vacuum, and this further led to strict demarcations of his thought into categories of modern theology: 'Trinity', 'Christology', 'Soteriology', etc., which render his thought incomprehensible.

In the second half of the twentieth-century a few groundbreaking works on Hilary opened up new pathways for approaching his theology, examining his work not from an overarching, transcendent doctrinal panorama, but from within his immediate historical and intellectual context. Jean Doignon's 1971 work demonstrated Hilary's Latin intellectual heritage, and Hans Brennecke (1984) brought new perspective to his political and historical situation. Following on from the methodological groundwork of Doignon and Brennecke, multiple studies
have sought to further uncover Hilary's polemical situation and influences (Burns (1985), D. H. Williams (1992, 2001, 2006), Weedman (2007), Beckwith (2007, 2008), among others). This has made it possible to reassess Hilary's own thought from within these new parameters, moving beyond previous generations of scholarship. The work of Weedman (2007) and Burns (2012) in particular have begun to reshape Hilary's theology through inductive examination of his texts and context, rather than through the imposition of external categories. These scholarly achievements have made the type of study presented in this thesis possible. As Hilary's Latin heritage, historical circumstances, and polemical opponents have been examined, it remains to expose what it is that Hilary accomplished within these parameters.

This thesis contends that in all of Hilary's polemical and constructive argumentation in *De Trinitate*, which is essentially 'trinitarian', he is inherently and necessarily developing an anthropology. In all he is saying about the divine, he is saying as much about what it means to be human. In this thesis, I therefore seek to reenvision Hilary's overall theological project in terms of the continual, and for him necessary, anthropological corollary of trinitarian theology—to reframe it in terms of a 'trinitarian anthropology'. My contention is that the coherence of Hilary's thought depends upon his understanding of divine-human relations. This paradigm reframes his thought in such a way as to expose both his overall perspective and particular aspects of it which remain in abeyance outside his trinitarian-anthropological framework. I will demonstrate this through following Hilary's main lines of trinitarian argument, out of which flows his anthropological vision. These main lines of argument, namely, divine generation, divine infinity, divine unity, the divine image, and divine humanity, each unfold
into a progressive picture of humanity from potentiality to perfection.

In Chapter 1, I begin this reinterpreting of Hilary's overall theological vision by exploring how, for Hilary, *divine* generation is the initiation of this journey of the perfection of *human* potentiality. This chapter frames early Christian discussion of divine generation within the interpretation of John 1.1-4, which illuminates its importance in fourth-century debates and emphasizes Hilary's unique contribution. For Hilary, the nature of God as generative directly implicates humanity in his productivity. He argues that all things are potentially created in the eternal generation of the Son. Creation finds its ultimate origin (in potentiality) in the Son's generation from the Father, as 'life' has gone forth from the Father and the life is 'that which was made in him' (Jn 1.3-4).

Chapter 2 discusses Hilary's ingenious development of the doctrine of divine infinity, which is at the centre of his theology. The full significance of divine infinity in Hilary cannot be realized without an exploration of its exegetical foundation of John 1.1-4, the subject of Chapter 1. This is shown through, first, observing his development of divine infinity, which transforms his argumentation of Father-Son relations. This assists Hilary in constructing a working definition of divine infinity for his polemical context. His understanding of divine infinity, and its exegetical foundation, afford him a new interpretation of the critical and controversial text of Proverbs 8.22, which has immense implications for his trinitarian anthropology. These implications are then elucidated through Hilary's understanding of a *progressus in infinitum* of the mind towards the infinite God. Hilary's doctrine of divine infinity reorientates how humanity is seen to know and relate to the divine.

Chapter 3 moves Hilary's trinitarian anthropology forward by examining his
arguments for divine unity, which are essentially an exegetical expansion of John 10.30, read intertextually with John 14.9-11 (as it was in third century polemic, and by Hilary’s opponents). Ultimately, Hilary’s argumentation for divine unity stems from the conversation I have followed to this point, eternal generation and divine infinity. The epistemological and anthropological insights from the previous two chapters are brought to bear on his opponents in his discussion of divine unity. This chapter provides the most direct exploration of 'trinitarian' theology *per se*, and because of this it directly confronts the anachronistic category errors in Hilary scholarship noted above. Reading Hilary within his own set boundaries for discourse on the divine rather than presumed categories imposed upon his texts reveals theological and anthropological implications which otherwise remain unearthed. In all Hilary's arguments for divine unity, the emphasis is on the *humane* condescension of God in Christ’s humanity. The Father and Son are revealed as a unity from within humanity itself. The infinite distinction of Creator and creatures, and the finite epistemological restrictions of humanity as a result, require this sort of condescension. But, for Hilary, this condescension educates and nourishes humanity, moving it beyond its limitations to the vision of God. The humane condescension of God in Scripture and incarnation serves an anagogical function to lead humanity to its fullness in divine perfection.

In Chapter 4 I discuss 'divine image' language. This language, a common thread throughout the thesis, is here set within the broader context of early Christian notions of the divine image in order to exemplify Hilary’s contribution. Hilary transforms the ambiguous and pliable theological notion of 'image' in his polemical context so as to appropriate for it an explicitly pro-Nicene meaning. The
anthropological implications for 'image' terminology permeate early Christian thought, primarily through discussions of the nature of the *imago Dei* of Genesis 1. Hilary greatly expands upon this. Here it becomes clear how Hilary's trinitarian anthropology takes on a particular christological form. For Hilary, Christ is the place where the trinitarian life is lived out in the human condition, he is the locative expression of normative divine-human relations. This is articulated by Hilary in the context of Christ's suffering and human experience, a highly contested aspect of Hilary's thought. The misreadings of Hilary's discussion of Christ's humanity paint a vivid picture of how particular aspects of his thought are incomprehensible outside of his overall framework of trinitarian anthropology. Within this discussion of the image, Hilary addresses the relationship of the body and soul, and this chapter will address how this relates to his overall theological project. These aspects of Hilary's thought—concepts of the divine-human image, the body and soul, and the suffering of Christ—carry the prime polemical weight of Hilary's trinitarian anthropology, and perhaps also reveal his most creative theological constructs. As Hilary's trinitarian anthropology is expressly lived out in a *humane* manner, the 'image of the invisible God' not only reveals divinity to humanity, but humanity to itself.

Chapter 5 discusses how Hilary sees this anthropological reality, the perfection of human potentiality, coming to fruition. Hilary's reading of John 17:1-6, 1 Corinthians 15:21-28, and Philippians 3:21, intertextually and within his christological framework founded upon Philippians 2:6-11, brings his overall perspective of divine-human relations to a climactic and holistic cogency. These biblical passages were at the centre of controversy, and Hilary's polemical reading of them imaginatively constructs an eschatological vision for humanity which is
the culmination of his trinitarian anthropology. Here, the human destiny, the perfection of potentiality through Christ's humanity, is brought to completion. Hilary's use of *adsumere*, a word typically reserved for the ascension, for Christ's assumption of humanity in the incarnation directly links incarnation with resurrection-ascension-glorification as a single fluid movement. There is thus a movement from *adsumptio* to *adsumptio* in Christ's assumption of humanity and the Father's assumption of Christ (and humanity in him). This is possible because Hilary speaks of the assumption of all humanity in Christ's assumption of a particular human. In Christ, the Son assumes *corpus universi humani generis* (*Trin. 2.24*), so that the human condition is implicated in the destiny of Christ himself. The perfection of human potentiality is a concorporeal conforming to Christ. He is thus, for Hilary, both the origin and destiny of humanity's hopeful mutability.

This thesis is not an explication of Hilary's 'trinitarian theology' or 'anthropology' in themselves, but is rather a reinterpretation of his overall theological vision under the overarching paradigm of 'trinitarian anthropology'. This not only provides a new approach to Hilary's own thought, but invites us to examine our approach to fourth-century theology entirely. Hilary's view of humanity being implicated in all trinitarian discourse disavows any reading of the trinitarian controversies in conceptual abstraction. This project also will be of interest to contemporary theology and religious studies. Theological and religious anthropology are widely discussed in contemporary scholarship, and Hilary's profound exploration of divine-human relations, and what it means to be a human being as a result, has much to offer to both historical and contemporary concerns.
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perpetual source of encouragement, and has always intentionally reminded me that what I do matters, and for that I am truly grateful.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ANRW  Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt
Aug   Augustinianum
CSEL  Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum
CCSG  Corpus Christianorum Series Graeca
CCSL  Corpus Christianorum Series Latina
CH    Church History
DBS   Dictionnaire de la Bible: Supplément
FC    Fathers of the Church Series
GCS   Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller
Greg  Gregorianum
IJSCC  International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church
JECS  Journal of Early Christian Studies
JEH   Journal of Ecclesiastical History
JThS  Journal of Theological Studies
NPNF  Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers
PG    Patrologia Graeca
PL    Patrologia Latina
REPT  Realenzyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche
RSR   Revue des sciences religieuses
SC    Sources Chrétiennes
SP    Studia Patristica
SVF   Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta
ThSt  Theological Studies
TSK   Theologische Studien und Kritiken
TU    Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur
URK   H.-G. Opitz, ed. Urkunden zur Geschichte des Arianischen Streites
VC    Vigiliae Christianae

All abbreviations for primary sources are indicated in the bibliography and generally follow Dictionnaire latin-français des auteurs chrétiens, ed. Albert Blaise. Strasbourg, 1954 (Latin), and A Patristic Greek Lexicon, ed. G. W. H Lampe. Oxford, 1961 (Greek).
INTRODUCTION

When we turn to fourth-century Christianity, no figure seems to be at once so well known and so clouded in mystery as Hilary of Poitiers. His work as an historian provides a breadth of knowledge of the mid-fourth century which would perhaps otherwise be lost, and no one can deny the force of his polemical prowess against Homoian theology. He was the one hailed by Sulpicius as the sole conqueror of 'heresy' in Gaul.¹ Those who lived soon after Hilary found his work theologically invaluable. For Augustine he is the keenest defender of the faith,² for Jerome a trustworthy teacher,³ Cassian says his piety of faith did not waver,⁴ and his name is hailed as one of the greatest of saints at Chalcedon.⁵ In modern scholarship, however, the landscape in which Hilary's theology is explored is in muddy waters. This is primarily due to methodological issues. Throughout the nineteenth- and twentieth-centuries, Hilary scholarship assessed his theology

¹ Chron. 2.45.
² Augustine, c. Iul. 1.3.9, PL 44:645; cf. Rufinus, Hist. eccl. 1.31.
⁴ Cassian, De inc. c. Nes. 7.24. Here Cassian calls Hilary 'Confessor'.
⁵ See discussion in B. de Gaiffier, 'Comment Hilaire fut proclamé Docteur de l'Église' in Hilaire de Poitiers: évêque et docteur (368-1968), ed. Edmond-René Labande (Paris: Études augustiniennes, 1968), 27-37, for praise of Hilary from these late-ancient references through to modernity.
from an 'history of dogma' approach. Understanding Hilary's thought within the flow of development of certain doctrines necessitates the imposition of preconceived categories onto Hilary's text from the outside. The reader is not only adjudicating Hilary's thought from the standpoint of later thinkers, but also from her own. So modern understandings of 'Trinity, 'Christology', 'Soteriology', 'Anthropology', etc., both dictate the study of Hilary and judge the conclusions (as have outdated narratives of fourth-century Christianity). The use of such categories also strictly demarcates Hilary's thought in a way which makes it unintelligible. In Hilary these concepts are so intertwined that they interpret one another, and to demarcate them is to make each incomprehensible.

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6 J. A. Dorner, Entwicklungs geschichte der Lehre von der Person Christi, vol. 1 (Berlin:1851); J. H. Reinkens, Hilarius von Poitiers (Schaffhausen, 1864); J. P. Baltzer, Die Theologie des h. Hilarius von Poitiers (Rottweil, 1879); P. Coustant, Vita Sancti Hilarii (PL 9.125-184) (Paris, 1844); E. W. Watson, 'Introduction', in NPNF 2.9; Anton Beck, Die Trinitätslehre des Heiligen Hilarius von Poitiers (Mainz: F. Kirchheim, 1903). Throughout these studies, Hilary's trinitarian theology was seen largely in the context of imposed theological categories, such as 'generic' and 'numeric' models of trinitarian relations, as a way of interpreting Hilary's role in doctrinal controversy and in developing Nicene 'orthodoxy'. Particularly regarding an Homoiousian influence of it (Adolf von Harnack, History of Dogma 4, trans. E. B. Speirs and James Millar (London:Williams & Norgate, 1898), 72-80; F. Loofs, 'Hilarius von Poitiers' REPT III (Leipzig, 1900): 57-67; J. Gummerus, Die Homöusianische Partei bis zum Tode des Konstantius (Leipzig, 1900), 112); L. Coulanges (J. Turmel), 'Métamorphose du consubstantiel—Athanase et Hilaire', Revue d'Histoire et Littérature Religieuses 8 (1922), 191f; see C. F. A. Borchardt, Hilary of Poitiers' Role in the Arian Struggle (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), 162-5). Pierre Smulders, La doctrine trinitaire de S. Hilaire de Poitiers: Esquisse du mouvement dogmatique depuis le Concile de Nicée jusqu'au règne de Julien (325-362) (Rome: Gregoriana, 1944), 252-55, sought to refute these arguments, claiming a 'numeric' unity in Hilary (G. Rasneur, 'L'Homoiusianisme dans ses rapports avec l'Orthodoxie', Revue d'Histoire Ecclesiastique 4 (1903):411-24, argued similarly), and concludes that Hilary was not influenced by Homoiousian thought during his exile. His remarkably detailed look at Hilary's trinitarian doctrine suffers from the same category distinctions that plagued those he was writing against. While he sought to overturn their arguments, he accepted their framework of argumentation, remaining within their constructed paradigm while seeking to overcome the intellectual conclusions of it. For summaries of scholarship, see Joseph Moingt, 'La théologie trinitaire de S. Hilaire' in Hilaire et son temps: Actes du colloque de Poitiers, 29 septembre-3 octobre 1968, à l'occasion du XVIe centenaire de la mort de saint Hilaire (Paris: Études augustiniennes, 1969), 159-73; Mark Weedman, The Trinitarian Theology of Hilary of Poitiers (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 13-19.
Recent studies have recognized this. In particular, the very recent works by Mark Weedman, Ellen Scully, and Paul Burns make a point of overcoming such demarcations. This is in large part, as Weedman notes, thanks to a few groundbreaking studies of the last century. Whereas earlier scholars were committed to a diachronic assessment, treating Christian doctrines as ahistorical, transcendent categories, which stand as judge over historically conditioned circumstances, Brennecke sought to place Hilary within his own historically conditioned context, particularly his political one, and Doignon within his Latin intellectual tradition. Both of these works, in different ways, allowed Hilary to be read within his own context and began to bring out his immediate concerns and perspectives. He could no longer be read within an overarching narrative construction of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity or of christology, but was being addressed as an individual thinker within the framework of a particular, temporal, specific reality. Paul Burns’s study on Hilary’s *Mat.* built upon Doignon's work to show that, despite the affirmation of the previous generation, Hilary's theology was not set from the beginning, but developed and changed due to his exile and interaction with eastern theology and his Homoian opponents.

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7 Weedman, *Trinitarian.*


Weedman's work was thus freed to explore Hilary's trinitarian theology in his polemical context and, especially, in his interaction with Homoiousian theology, and in the process, to reconstruct Hilary's trinitarian theology in a way which refuses modern demarcated categories and challenge previous understandings of Hilary's doctrine. Weedman's study thus remains within the confines of trinitarian doctrine strictly understood, but he, as much as possible, allows Hilary's own trinitarian categories to surface from within, rather than imposing preconceived notions of what trinitarian theology must be on the text. Scully seeks to assess Hilary's overall thought from outside the confines of trinitarian doctrine per se, and to overcome anachronistic categorization of Hilary's thought by reading that thought through a single idea, that of Christ's universal assumption of all humanity in the incarnation. Burns's latest work argues that Hilary's Psal. is written as a model for the progress of Christian life towards God. He shows Hilary's theology in Psal. as a holistic vision, which both refuses demarcated categories, and is a process of human movement towards the divine.

As a result of the achievements of later twentieth- and twenty-first century Hilary scholarship, doors have been opened for studies to explore the overall shape of Hilary's thought. As his Latin heritage, historical circumstances, and polemical opponents have been examined, it remains to assess what it is that Hilary accomplished within these parameters. Weedman's work, as stated above, remains within the domain of trinitarian theology proper, and he utilizes this study to convincingly demonstrate the development of Hilary's thought throughout his career and the influence of Basil of Ancyra and the Homoiousians upon that development, but he notes that this provides the groundwork for further study into the implications for Hilary's thought and fourth-century
Christianity generally, and that 'the study of Hilary could make a positive contribution to the continuing reevaluation of the Trinitarian Controversy itself'.\textsuperscript{14} Burns's study of Hilary's \textit{Psal.} shows the roots of his holistic theological vision of human progress towards God are in \textit{Trin.},\textsuperscript{15} and this thesis will show that in \textit{Trin.} this reality is directly dependent upon, indeed, flows out of, Hilary's trinitarian argumentation. This thesis contends that in Hilary's constructive and polemical arguments for trinitarian doctrine he is necessarily and inherently developing an anthropology. In his theological discourse, which is fundamentally about the divine, he is saying as much about what it is to be human. For Hilary, 'revelation of God to humanity, reveals humanity to itself'.\textsuperscript{16}

In this thesis, I therefore seek to reenvision Hilary's overall theological project in terms of the continual, and for him essential, anthropological corollary of trinitarian theology—to reframe it in terms of a 'trinitarian anthropology'. If anachronistic category errors are not taken as viable reference points for discussing fourth-century theology, Hilary's thought begins to take on a very different shape. His theology is not primarily about how God is seen to be both one and three, or how the two natures of Christ relate to one another, or an exploration of trinitarian terminology (\textit{homoousios, homoiousios, persona, substantia, essentia, natura}, etc.). There is a more fundamental element for Hilary of divine-human relations, which, indeed, makes knowledge and discourse of God possible. All of Hilary's argumentation is an exploration of what it is to be a human being existing in relation to the type of God he argues for. I will

\textsuperscript{14} \textit{Trinitarian}, 202.

\textsuperscript{15} e.g., \textit{Model}, 2, 224, see Chapter 5 of this thesis for discussion.

\textsuperscript{16} Patrick Descourtieux, 'Introduction', in \textit{Psal. 1-14}, SC 515:63. All translations of ancient and modern non-English texts are my own unless otherwise noted.
demonstrate this through examining Hilary's main lines of argument, which are necessarily trinitarian, theological, and discovering the anthropological conclusions which, for Hilary, necessarily flow from these arguments. These main lines of argument, namely, divine generation, divine infinity, divine unity, the divine image, and divine humanity, each unfold into a progressive picture of humanity from origin to destiny, from potentiality to perfection.

In Chapter 1, I begin this objective of reinterpreting of Hilary's theological vision by exploring how, for Hilary, divine generation is the initiation of this journey of the perfection of human potentiality. Recent reconstructions of fourth-century theology have shown that divine generativity is at its centre, and Hilary exemplifies this. This chapter frames the discussion within the bounds of early Christian interpretation of John 1.1-4, Hilary's favoured text relating to divine generation. This discussion will illuminate the importance of divine generation in fourth-century Christianity, and also Hilary's unique contributions and significant anthropological implications therein. In his reading of the passage (in polemical engagements with Homoian theology) the nature of God as eternally generative is seen to directly implicate humanity in that productivity. Hilary argues that in the eternal generation of the Son all things are potentially created, so that the nature of humanity is directly dependent upon the eternal generation of the Son, as this is where it finds its origin.

Chapter 2 discusses Hilary's ingenious doctrine of divine infinity. While the centrality of divine infinity in Hilary has been recognized in recent scholarship, its full significance for his overall thought has not been realized. It is my contention that it cannot be realized without an exploration of the exegetical foundation of the doctrine in Trin., namely, John 1.1-4. This is shown first through framing
divine infinity in the context of Hilary's argumentation, and how the concept of infinity transforms his argument of Father-Son relations. Second, this transformation aids Hilary towards a working definition of infinity, an understanding of what it means for God to be infinite. Third, we will see how Hilary provides a new interpretation of the critical text of Proverbs 8.22 due to his John 1.1-4 interpretive foundation. His reading of Proverbs 8 has immense implications for his trinitarian anthropology. Fourth, these implications are elucidated through his understanding of a progressus in infinitum of the mind towards the infinite God. Hilary's discussion of divine infinity has significant epistemological conclusions which reorientate how humanity is seen to know and relate to God.

Chapter 3 considers divine unity. In this chapter Hilary's polemical opponents, which are discussed throughout the thesis, are brought into sharper focus, and Hilary is seen to bring his epistemological and anthropological insights from the previous two chapters to bear on his opponents. This chapter is also the most direct 'trinitarian' discussion, strictly understood, in the thesis. Because of this, it also comes into direct confrontation with the anachronistic category errors in Hilary scholarship discussed above. Hilary's reference points for trinitarian doctrine are not those of modern assumptions, and reading Hilary within his own set boundaries for discourse on the divine, rather than presumed categories imposed upon his text, will reveal theological and anthropological consequences which remain hidden in readings which adjudicate Hilary's argument by anachronistic intrusions. Hilary's understanding of divine unity is primarily seen in his intertextual reading of John 10.30 and 14.9 in polemical engagement with mid-fourth century Homoian and monarchian theologies and expanding upon his
previous Latin tradition, and it both depends upon and elaborates upon his epistemological foundation stemming from divine infinity. In all of Hilary's arguments for divine unity, the emphasis is on the *humane* condescension of God in the humanity of Christ, so that the Father and the Son are revealed as one from within humanity itself. Humanity's finite epistemological restrictions require this sort of material, bodily revelation, and by it, human weakness is nourished and educated to move beyond its limitations to the vision of the triune God. For Hilary, the humane condescension of God in the words of Scripture and the humanity of Jesus serves an anagogical function to lead humanity to its fullness in divine perfection.

In Chapter 4 I discuss Hilary's use of 'divine image' language. This is a common thread throughout the thesis and here it is set in the broader context of early Christian notions of the divine image in order to bring about its significance for Hilary. Through polemical maneuvering, Hilary transforms the ambiguous theological language of image so that it takes on an explicitly pro-Nicene articulation. Further, the anthropological significance of 'image' language, inherently present through the *imago Dei* language in Genesis 1, is greatly expanded by Hilary. Here we see how Hilary's trinitarian anthropology takes on a particular christological form. For Hilary, Christ is the locative expression of normative divine-human relations, he is the place where the trinitarian life becomes a lived reality in the human condition, and this is uniquely articulated by

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17 Throughout this thesis, I am using *humane* in its most literal sense as 'of or pertaining to humanity', not in its common sense which pertains to having or showing compassion. This language best communicates how Hilary's framework of trinitarian anthropology relates particularly to issues of epistemology and revelation. For Hilary, humanity can only know God in a humane way, meaning, in a manner which corresponds to its finite limitations (humans know *humanly*). Correspondingly, Hilary emphasizes that God must reveal himself in a manner in which humans can grasp, in a manner which is of their human condition, so that *divine* condescension must be *humane* condescension (i.e., condescension which reveals God *humanely*, in a way pertaining to humanity).
Hilary within the context of Christ’s suffering and human experience, the most contested aspect of his thought. Within this discussion, Hilary also addresses the relationship of the body and soul in humanity, and how this relates to his overall theological project. In these interrelated concepts of the divine-human image, the body and soul, and the suffering of God in Christ Hilary’s trinitarian anthropology carries its prime polemical weight against his Homoian opponents, and is perhaps where it yields its most creative theological constructions. Here Hilary’s trinitarian anthropology is both expressed and lived out in a *humane* manner, so that the ‘image of the invisible God’ not only reveals divinity to humanity, but humanity to itself. The discussion of Hilary’s thought in Chapter 4 affords further critique of and renewed perspective on both Hilary scholarship and the study of fourth-century Christianity generally.

Chapter 5 explores how Hilary sees the outworking of the perfection of human potentiality. Hilary’s overall anthropological vision cannot be properly understood without an in depth reading of his intertextual interpretation of John 17.1-6, 1 Corinthians 15.21-28, and Philippians 3.21, all read within the boundaries of his overall christological framework governed by Philippians 2.6-11. Hilary reads these passages, which were central to the controversy, to address his polemical context, but also to imaginatively construct an echatological vision for humanity which is the culmination of his trinitarian anthropology. Here, the human destiny in Christ parsed in the previous chapter comes to fruition. This has to do initially with the novelty of Hilary’s discussion of the incarnation. He uses *adsumere*, language traditionally reserved for Christ’s ascension, in reference to the incarnation, tying incarnation and resurrection-ascension-glorification together as one movement. There is thus a double assumption of humanity by Christ and of
Christ by the Father. Hilary's theology of *adsumere/adsumptio* profoundly explicates the anthropological implications of such a double assumption. Hilary speaks of Christ’s assumption of humanity as an assumption of all humanity in the assumption of one particular human. In Christ, the Son assumes *corpus universi humani generis*.\(^{18}\) Humanity is thus united to and in Christ 'by the society of our nature in the communion of the immortal God',\(^{19}\) and is thus discovered to be associated with, indeed, to be implicated in, the destiny of Christ himself. The perfection of human potentiality is a concorporeal conforming to Christ. Humanity’s progression in the assumed human life of Christ makes Christ himself the geographical boundary of human salvation: the fulfillment of human potentiality. He is both the origin and destiny of humanity’s hopeful mutability.

It is important to note what this study is not. It is not a study of Hilary’s 'trinitarian theology' as such, indeed, as indicated above, this type of classification has led to misappropriations of Hilary’s thought, and divisions in Hilary’s thought which render it incomprehensible. I will also not include a general historical overview of Hilary’s life or polemical situation in any one section of the thesis. Space does not allow this, and further, this has been done thoroughly elsewhere\(^{20}\) and to do so here would be monotonous and distracting. Hilary’s argument is dealt with in his polemical and historical context throughout this thesis, rather than an introduction to this background being given in any one place. It is also not a study of Hilary’s 'anthropology' *per se*, and in the same way as superimposed trinitarian categories cannot adjudicate Hilary’s argument, neither can presumed

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\(^{18}\) *Trin.* 2.24, SC 443:314.

\(^{19}\) Ibid., 9.13, SC 462:40.

anthropological ones. Traditional anthropological topics (such as the relationship of the body and soul) are addressed throughout Hilary's argument, but as they arise therein, not as an imposition upon that argument. The goal of this thesis is not, therefore, to simply reconstruct Hilary's trinitarian theology or anthropology, but to reinterpret his overall theological vision within the overarching paradigm of 'trinitarian anthropology'. My contention is that the coherence of his thought hangs on his understanding of divine-human relations. For Hilary, the type of God he argues for necessitates a certain type of human being, and the certain way in which finite humanity exists determines how it can know and speak of the infinite God. This paradigm reframes Hilary's thought in such a way as to expose both its overall perspective and particular aspects which remain hidden outside this trinitarian-anthropological impetus and foundation. Further, it forces us to reexamine our approach to fourth-century theology as a whole. The way humanity is implicated in all trinitarian discourse in Hilary disavows any such discourse in conceptual abstraction, and reframes it as a humane, embodied, lived reality.
CHAPTER ONE

Divine Generation and Human Potentiality

Introduction

Eternal generation, the Son’s divine natiuitas, has often been noted as the core of Hilary’s thought, at least as pertains to his De Trinitate. It is the hinge upon which his entire theological project turns. This chapter will provide a brief backdrop of the theological milieu which makes this project possible and then move to refocus the scope of Hilary’s favoured lens of divine generation in such a way as to transform our understanding what it constitutes within his overall theological vision. This chapter thus begins a central objective of this thesis, a reframing of Hilary’s theological vision, which can be summarized under the overarching narrative of a ‘trinitarian anthropology’, and brings to light how, for Hilary, divine generation is the initiation of the perfection of human potentiality.

In the various recent reconstructions of fourth-century doctrinal controversy, scholars have continually shown divine generation to be the foundation. Lewis

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2 I use the word ‘narrative’ because Hilary’s trinitarian anthropology unfolds as a narrative journey of the human being towards God, and essentially, we shall see, a narrative of Christ’s humanity itself.
Ayres notes that the focus of the debate 'lies in competing accounts of the Son's
generation',³ and Michel Barnes concludes, 'the argument is over divine
productivity'.⁴ Vaggione agrees that the language of generation was at the centre
of the controversy.⁵ Behr rightly notes that the fourth and fifth centuries cannot
be divided up in terms of fourth-century 'trinitarian' and fifth-century
' christological' debates, and contends that the controversy is over different
' approaches to conceptualizing the identity of Christ'.⁶ One must have a certain
sympathy with this approach, how Christ is divine (for all confessed his divinity in
some way) is certainly a significant concern, but, it must be said, this discussion
continually refers back to the Son's origination in and from the Father, and how
one conceives of this taking place,⁸ and I believe Ayres is right to note that rather
than speaking of the fourth- and fifth-century controversies as not simply
'trinitarian' or 'christological', we would do better to avoid such categories
entirely.⁹

³ Ayres, Nicaea, 35; see Michel R. Barnes, 'The Fourth Century as Trinitarian Canon', in
Christian Origins: Theology, Rhetoric and Community, eds. Lewis Ayres and Gareth Jones

⁴ Michel R. Barnes, The Power of God: Dunamis in Gregory of Nyssa's Trinitarian Theology

⁵ Richard Vaggione, Eunomius of Cyzicus and the Nicene Revolution (Oxford: Oxford

Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2004), 33. A similar, though not identical, line is followed by R. P. C.
Hanson, The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God: The Arian Controversy, 318-381
(London:T&T Clark, 2005 [orig. pub. 1988]), xx, who states that the crisis was over reconciling
monotheism with the worship of Jesus Christ as divine.

⁷ See Khaled Anatolios, Retrieving Nicaea: The Development and Meaning of Trinitarian
Doctrine (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2011), 36-38, for an excellent discussion on the
commonalities of all sides in the controversies: all were essentially 'trinitarian' at least on their
own terms, proclaimed faith in Father, Son and Holy Spirit, and all held to the divinity of Christ,
whatever that divinity's relation was to the Father's.

⁸ As Vaggione, Eunomius, 237-38, makes clear, this is another commonality on all sides of the
debate: everyone spoke of divine generation. The difficulty being the 'oddness' of the language—it
had to be explained, and different interpretive frameworks were involved in explaining it.

⁹ Ayres, Nicaea, 3.
Throughout these approaches, when these reconstructions begin to take shape divine generation is continually seen as the foundational point of controversy, whether or not it is specifically stated as primary. The question of the 'character of divine productivity' is 'necessarily prior' to 'an argument over whether Son implies "same nature" or not'. Whether or not God the Father is naturally generative, is itself the most generative dilemma of the fourth century.

Divine generation also necessarily entails cosmological implications for early Christians, so that 'pro-Nicene theologies use their accounts of the Son's eternal generation to shape accounts of creation and redemption'. In the same way that the debates were governed by concerns about whether God is or is not naturally generative, so this concern has immediate implications for whether or not God is naturally productive generally. The character of divine productivity, and particularly this link between God's generating and creating, will evidence in Hilary some of his most original and significant arguments.

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10 Barnes, *Dunamis*, 14.

11 Ayres, *Nicaea*, 302. Throughout this thesis I use 'pro-Nicene' or 'Nicene' to refer to those who affirmed the confession of Nicaea as a standard of faith, and not in the technical sense in which Ayres (ibid., 236) and others (Barnes, *Dunamis*, 143; Behr, *Nicene Faith*, 27-35; Hanson, *Search*) do. While I am not opposed to a technical sense of the language of 'pro-Nicene' (as is Christopher Beeley, *Gregory of Nazianzus on the Trinity and the Knowledge of God: In Your Light We Shall See Light* (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) 10n27), it does have the tendency towards fracturing historical connections which can be acknowledged if the language is not a technical theologically defining category (such as Hilary and Basil of Ancyra, an anti-Nicene of a very different sort than Homoians. See Mark Weedman, 'Hilary and the Homoiousians: Using New Categories to Map the Trinitarian Controversy', *CH* 76.3 (Sept., 2007), 510). 'Pro-Nicene' as a programmatic category based upon shared ideas and principles when examining the fourth-century controversies as a whole (as it is used by those mentioned above) is a useful device. However, when dealing with the mid-fourth century alone, before this 'pro-Nicene' thought has reached a stable pinnacle, it can be problematic. Particularly when dealing with someone like Hilary, who argues that Basil of Ancyra and the Homoiousians are perfectly orthodox, though they are self-proclaimed anti-Nicenes who refuse the term 'homoousios', using the language in a formulaic sense is counterproductive. I have therefore chosen 'Nicene' or 'pro-Nicene' and 'anti-Nicene' as descriptive language for those who support and do not support Nicaea, but not in a programmatic sense.

Language of 'Homoian' is itself difficult. There is technically no 'Homoian' theology until the councils of Rimini/Ariminum and Seleucia in 359, but throughout this thesis I use the term in reference to the theology promoted from Sirmium 357 forward, as this was the foundation of Homoianism which would reach definition in 359 (See Weedman, *Trinitarian*, 7n22).

One important conclusion in particular which has arisen out of recent reconstructions of fourth-century theology (centred on divine generativity) will aid my presentation of Hilary’s thought as we proceed, namely, that pro-Nicene trinitarian theology is inseparable from human progress towards God. Ayres argues for an epistemological and anthropological movement of the human towards God in fourth-century trinitarian theology as a defining criterion of a wider pro-Nicene theological *habitus* or culture,\(^\text{13}\) and Anatolios contends that trinitarian theology was ultimately a *performed* reality, expressing 'coherent construals of the entirety of Christian existence', as opposed to simply a debate about particular terminology or theological propositions.\(^\text{14}\) The notion of human progress towards and relation to the divine in trinitarian discourse is ever present in Hilary’s *De Trinitate*, and exactly how his theology is in continual reference to this divine-human relation gives shape to the entirety of his thought.

To begin this reinterpretation of Hilary’s thought along these lines of divine-human relations, I will contextualize the discussion of divine generation within the confines of early Christian readings of John 1.1-4. The fourth-century debates were primarily exegetical in character,\(^\text{15}\) and the prologue to John’s gospel was one of the most theologically stimulating texts in early Christian theology, and it was interpreted in the third and fourth centuries with explicit reference to divine productivity. Pollard contends that John’s Gospel, along with his first epistle, brings the problems which created doctrinal controversy into sharpest focus.\(^\text{16}\)

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\(^\text{13}\) Ayres, *Nicaea*, 325-35. Ayres refers to this particularly to writers of the late-fourth century, but Hilary is clearly their predecessor in this, as Burns, *Model*, 37n65, 224, has noted.


and Origen wrote, 'We might dare to say, then, that the Gospels are the firstfruits of all Scriptures, but that the firstfruits of the Gospels is that according to John'.

Hilary himself encourages his readers to 'like John, recline on the Lord Jesus, that we might be able to understand and profess the majesty of God'.

Through an exploration of the exegetical interplay of John 1.1-4 and third- and fourth-century polemical engagements, Hilary’s approach to this text will be sharpened with greater clarity, and in his interpretation of it, his trinitarian anthropology begins to unfold. For Hilary, the nature of God as triune, as eternally generative and productive, implicates humanity in that productivity, carrying it through to the fullness of its potentiality and necessitating its perfection.

*John 1:1-4 and divine generation*

In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God and the Word was God. He was in the beginning with God. All things were made through him, and without him nothing was made. That which was made in him is life, and the life was the light of humanity.

The primary issue in early Christian interpretation of these verses is how the Word relates to God. The words ‘beginning’, ‘with’ and ‘was’ in the passage often govern this discussion. The following survey will work through the thinkers who’s ideas were most influential on Hilary. Origen is given considerable space, as, while Tertullian and Novatian had more direct influence on Hilary, Origen provided the theological framework which made fourth-century discussions of

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18 *Trin.* 2.21, SC 143:310.

19 John 1.1-4, from Hilary’s Latin at *Trin.* 1.10, SC 443:220. My intention throughout this discussion of early Christian readings of John 1.1-4 and their impact on developments of theologies of divine generation is to elucidate Hilary’s argument, and particularly the ways in which his argument is unique and how it informs his overall trinitarian anthropology. There is therefore no attempt to provide a full survey of early Christian readings of the passage, which would be tedious and distract from the argument. My discussion is intentionally selective in accordance with the objectives of this chapter.
As will become clear, Hilary follows many of Origen's themes throughout *Trin.*, but it cannot be said with any certainty if Hilary was influenced by Origen at the time of writing, as these themes are also present, and argued in a similar way, in Basil of Anacyra, who had considerable influence on Hilary during his exile. Direct influence of Origen on Hilary's later *Ps.* is more evident, and scholars have demonstrated this influence to, at least in some sense, verify Jerome's claim that Hilary 'imitated' Origen's writings on the Psalms (*De viris illustribus* 100) (for the most valuable studies on Origen's influence on Hilary's *Ps.*, see Doignon (CCSL 61, 61A) and Milhau (SC 344, 347) who both provide a critical apparatus in their editions; Burns, *Model*, 65-77. For a concise discussion of Origen's themes in Hilary's commentary see Manlio Simonetti, 'Hilary of Poitiers and the Arian Crisis in the West: Polemicists and Heretics', in *Patrology IV*, ed. Angelo Di Berardino (Notre Dame, IN: Ave Maria Press, 1986), 50-51).

There are two problems with Jerome's claim, however. First, in 393 (*De viris illustribus* 100), he claims that Hilary imitated Origen in his Psalms commentary, but in 404, in order to defend his own translation of Origen, he claims that Hilary 'translated' Origen's text (*Epistula ad Augustinum* 112.20). So it becomes unclear, based upon Jerome's claim, what the relationship is between the texts of these writers. Second, one has to ask which text of Origen on the Psalms is referred to, or which would Hilary have had access to. There are at least three fragmentary texts of Origen on the Psalms, written in three different periods of his life, in three different locations (Alexandria, Caesarea, and Palestine respectively). Origen's texts were further corrupted and fragmented due to later writers and translators dropping or augmenting controversial passages. Émile Goffinet's major work on Hilary's use of Origen in *Ps.* (*L'utilisation d'Origène dans le Commentaire des Psaumes de saint Hilaire de Poitiers*, Studia Hellenistica 14 (Louvain: Publication Universitaire de Louvain, 1965) has been criticized for not taking these important factors sufficiently into consideration (see discussion at Burns, *Model*, 65-6). When looking at extant portions of Origen's works, however, we can see numerous parallels in Hilary—particularly in his *Instructio*, commentaries on Psalm 1 and 2, and on 118—and it seems that Jerome's assertions are correct. The issue is that where there is material unique to Hilary throughout *Ps.*, one cannot say for certain whether it is new creative material of Hilary, or whether it was once present in Origen but lost or corrupted, or whether it is potentially something intentionally changed by Hilary (see Burns, ibid., 68-9). Therefore, whereas the influence of Origen, and indeed, probably the loose translation of Origen, is present in Hilary's *Ps.*, these textual issues must be given proper sensitivity when assessing the extent of Hilary's use of Origen. Further, Hilary's major themes in *Ps.* show 'significant perspectives, which have little or no antecedents' in Origen (Burns, ibid., 68), and some themes which do also appear in Origen (such as that of the metaphor of the 'city') are used in different ways in Hilary, and more suitable sources can perhaps be found in Hilary's Latin rhetorical tradition (see Chapter 5). Burns, ibid., 77, sums this up clearly: 'When he encounters themes in his Greek source, Hilary tends to adapt and to apply them in ways consistent with the perspectives of his Latin exegetical and theological background of the mid-fourth century'. This can be seen as a pattern for Hilary's use of sources throughout his writings.

In short, Doignon shows that the direct influence of Origen on Hilary's early exegesis in *Mat.* is not possible. There is no evidence that Origen's Greek work on Matthew had appeared in Gaul by the 350s, and it had not yet been translated into Latin (Jerome, *De viris illustribus* 100, claimed that Hilary also worked from Origen's book on Matthew, but this is not the case). However, during his exile Hilary certainly came into contact with Origen's works (see Simonetti, 'Hilary', '50-51), though whether Origen's arguments held direct sway over Hilary or came primarily through the influence of Basil is not certain. Hilary's *Ps.* shows certain direct influence of Origen, to the extent that Origen's fragmented texts allow us to observe. It seems at points that Hilary worked as a translator of passages of Origen, though he certainly added his own perspective and fit Origen's exegesis and images into his traditional Latin framework and his contemporary polemical context. Hilary continuously shows a willingness to use his sources creatively, and Origen is not different in this regard.
ways in which they are particularly influential on Hilary.21

The Word in the beginning: John 1.1-4 in Origen

Origen dedicates almost the entirety of Book 1 of his Commentary on John to the meaning of the word ἀρχή in the context of John 1:1. He rehearses six possible interpretations before stating the most plausible to be that of an author who brings about an effect.22 The Son is the one by which God brings about his work. He is the creator to whom God says ‘Let there be light’. Proverbs 8:22 gives Origen the basis to say that Christ is this creator (Δημιουργός) as the beginning (ἀρχή) in as much as he is Wisdom (καθ’ ὃσοφία).23 The Son is then conceived as being eternal by Origen, in so far as he is Wisdom, and Wisdom precedes the Word which announces her.24 The Son, as Wisdom, contains within him and

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21 Tertullian and Novatian naturally provided the source material for Hilary’s early trinitarian theology. As Weedman notes (Trinitarian, 6), at the time Hilary was writing Mat. the deeply rooted patterns and traditions of Latin trinitarian thought were essentially the works of Tertullian and Novatian. Prior to Hilary’s exile, the influence of these two predecessors is not only evident but overwhelmingly pervasive (Doignon, Hilaire; Burns, Christology, and D. H. Williams, ‘Defining Orthodoxy in Hilary of Poitiers’ Commentary In Matthaeum’, JECS 9 (2001):151-71, have firmly settled the issue of Hilary’s dependence upon these Latin theological sources in Mat. See also Weedman, Trinitarian, Chapter 1). While Hilary becomes greatly influenced by Greek theology and debates in his exile, this Latin background remains a foundation for him to build upon, but his horizon is also broadened beyond them. So when Hanson, Search, 472, claims that Hilary theologically follows Tertullian in almost every detail, he is grossly overstating his case. Hilary continues to utilize his Latin heritage, but deviates from and elaborates upon these sources in many ways (further, Manlio Simonetti, ‘Ilario e Novaziano’, Revista di cultura classica e medioevale 7 (1965): 1034-47 (see particularly 1045-46), has shows that Hilary follows Novatian much more closely than Tertullian in several points of argument and emphasis). Hilary ‘exercised considerable liberty in his use of sources’ and often ‘radically reworked’ them (Simonetti, ‘Hilary’, 42). Tertullian and Novatian provide a framework of language, images, and points of reference (particularly in anti-monarchian polemic, biblical exegesis, and discussions of Christ’s two natures and passion) for Hilary to build upon to address his contemporary context. Throughout this thesis it will become clear that Hilary is both indebted to these sources and that he uses them creatively, adapting their arguments and categories for his own purposes (this is particularly seen in Chapters 3-5).

22 Jo. 1.90-124.

23 Ibid., 1.111, SC 120:118. Methodius, creat. 8, amongst his criticisms of Origen, follows this interpretation of Proverbs 8.22.

24 Ibid., 1.289.
reveals 'the hidden things of the Father'. Proverbs 8.22 will be 'explosively controversial in the Christological debates of the fourth century', and it is significant that Origen uses the concept of Wisdom in Proverbs 8.22 in a way which elevates the status of the Son, for, as divine Wisdom, he contains all God's thoughts and the causes of the entire creation within himself. The Son is thus the image and revealer of the Father, as 'light from light' or brightness from the Son. This imaging of the Father as the divine Wisdom is possible for Origen due to the Son's generation from the Father. The Son's divinity is demonstrated further in that he accomplishes the divine capacity of the Father: 'Wisdom is the energeia of the divine uirtus of dunamis', the actualization of a divine capacity. This demonstration of the divinity of the Son through working the works of the Father becomes a primary argument, in a modified form, in the fourth century.

The line of reasoning in Origen's relation of Wisdom to Word has immense implications for what it means for the Son to relate to the Father, to be begotten, and to be eternal. For Origen, though the Son is eternal as Wisdom, as the Word
he becomes something which he had not always been. Indeed, 'He is not even the beginning insofar as he is the Word, since "the Word" was "in the beginning"'.

He speaks of the Son comprising in himself principles of the first order, second order, and third order:

John, therefore, added, declaring of the Word, 'What came to be in him was life' (John 1.3-4). Life, therefore, came to be in the Word. And neither is the Word other than the Christ, God the Word, the one with the Father, through whom all things came to be, nor is the life other than the Son of God who says, 'I am the way the truth and the life'. Just as life, then, came to be in the Word (ἐν τῷ λόγῳ), so the Word in the beginning (ἐν ἀρχῇ).

He progresses this argument by interpreting Christ as 'the beginning and the end' according to this order of things in him, and not in reference to temporal concerns. Again quoting Proverbs 8:22, he is the beginning as wisdom: 'so that someone might say boldly that wisdom is older than all the concepts in the names of the firstborn of all creation'.

This is so for Origen because whereas the Son mirrors the Father's simplicity as his wisdom and image, he does not share or participate entirely in that simplicity: whereas the Father is absolutely one, 'the Son, one in his hypostasis, is multiple in his titles'. These concepts, titles, or ἐπινοίαι, are ordered in the Son and thus create a sort of mediation of the Son not only between God and the world but within God's own divinity.

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33 Jo. 1.118, SC 120:122; Heine, 58.
34 Ibid., 1.112, SC 120:120; Heine, 57.
36 Henry Crouzel, Origen, trans. A. S. Worrall (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1989), 188. See Beeley, Unity, 28-9: The Son differs through many epinōiai, 'which stand in contrast with the pure simplicity of the Father'.
37 Ibid. Crouzel (ibid.) adds that 'if on this point the relationship of Origen with Plotinus, probably through their common master, Ammonius Saccas, is clear, Origen's equivalences based on the unity of their nature must not be forgotten'. On the complexities of Origen as a student of 'Ammonius', see Mark J. Edwards, Origen Against Plato (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002), 53-5, and 'Ammonius, Teacher of Origen', JEH 44 (1993): 1-13.
temporal, nature of this ordering is is crucial.\textsuperscript{38} It is important, however, how this type of argumentation becomes prominent in later theologians to support a view of the Son being begotten in a temporal sense, particularly with the use of Proverbs 8:22. Origen’s removal of the argument from issues of time and eternity safeguards against an interpretation which places an interval of time between the eternality of the Father and the existence of the Son and in which the Son is changeable, which Origen clearly denies.\textsuperscript{39} As the discussion moves forward, and as issues of time and eternity begin to become critical to the understanding of divine generation, Origen’s safety net of transcendent logic in the life of the Son dissolves. And indeed by the mid-fourth century, time, eternity, and limitation become the context for understanding John 1:1.

As Origen’s reading of John’s prologue continues, the statement that the Word was \textit{with} God becomes increasingly significant. He understands the passage to mean that the Word was in the beginning at the same time when he was with God, he is neither separated from the beginning nor does he depart from the Father. And again, he does not \textit{come to be} "in the beginning" from not being "in the beginning," nor does he pass from not being "with God" to coming to be "with God".\textsuperscript{40} The idea that the Word is \textit{with} God is the underlying principle which explains that he \textit{was} God. The Word’s \textit{with-ness} governs his divinity.\textsuperscript{41}

\textsuperscript{38} See Jo. 2.35, where Origen explicitly states that the issue in John 1.1 is not one of time at all, ‘in \textit{arche} was the Logos’ is a question concerning ‘in what’ the Logos was, not ‘when’ the Logos was. See discussion in P. Tzamalikos, \textit{Origen: Cosmology and Ontology of Time} (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 32.

\textsuperscript{39} Princ. 1.2.10, SC 252: 136-8: \textit{Sapientia uero dei, qui est unigenitus filius eius, quoniam in omnibus inconuertibilis est et incommutabilis, et substantiale in eo omne bonum est, quod utique mutari aut convuerti numquam potest, idcirco pura eius ac sincera gloria praedicatur.}

\textsuperscript{40} Jo. 2.9, SC 120:212; Heine, 97.

\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., 2.12, SC 120:214. Again, this is not in the sense of time. He is simply following the passage chronologically which first says the Word was, and then the Word was with God, and then the Word was God. For Origen this is sufficient to give primacy to 'with-ness' in the Son’s divinity.
He proceeds in Jo. 2.2 to say that the article (ὁ) is used with θεὸς in reference to the Father, whereas with the Word there is no article, he is simply called θεὸς (in John 1.1-2). So the Father is ἄνετοθεὸς, God of himself, whereas the Son is God in a different way, not of his own simple nature, but by participation in the Father’s. The Son is higher than other beings who participate in divinity because he is the first to be with God, and who has 'drawn divinity into himself'.

Origen is often accused of 'subordinationism' because of discussions such as this. But the language of 'subordinationism' can only be used of Origin in a highly equivocal sense. In Crouzel's words, 'it is wrong to confuse the subordinationism of the Ante-Nicenes with that of the Arians'. In fact, Origen is moving the discussion away from what would later be termed 'subordinationism'. While the Son is subordinate in certain senses, 'Origen's insistence on the relationship of Father and Son offers a new argument in Christian tradition, an argument that depicts this relationship as intrinsic to the life of God'. Edwards argues that, 'both the manhood of Christ and his divinity were more strongly affirmed by

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42 As Crouzel, Origen, 182, makes clear, for Origen this simply refers to the Father as the source or origin of deity. θεὸς in the Son’s case is thus adjectival and denotes the divinity that the Son receives from the Father. This divinity is, however, the same divinity. Beeley, Unity, 21, further argues that Origen is seeking to avoid monarchianism and those who deny the Son is divine, and following the structure of John 1.1 itself which refers to ὁ θεὸς and θεὸς.

43 At Apoc. 20 (TU 38:29) and Ps. 134.19-20, Origen says that the union of the Son with the Father is in substance and not only by participation. The authenticity of the Apoc. fragment is uncertain, but the Ps. passage and my argument below shows that this seems to be Origen’s line of thought regardless of this fragment’s authenticity. He states that they have equal power (Princ. 1.2.16), and argues for their shared nature (see argument regarding generation by will below). See Williams, Arius, 142; Beeley, Unity, 26.

44 Jo. 2.17, SC 120:218; Heine, 99.

45 Crouzel, Origen, 188.

46 Principally, in that he is Son and not also Father and comes from the Father, in their economic roles in the world, and in the notion of ἐπινοοῖα as opposed to the Father’s strict simplicity. See Crouzel, Origen, 188. For several expressions of Origen which seem to imply subordinationism, see Beeley, Unity, 26.

47 Ayres, Nicaea, 27.
Origen than by any theologian before him'.

Origen sees the correlativity of the Father and Son as constitutive of the divine being, so that it is 'simply part of the definition of the word God'. Ultimately, for Origen, though the Father and Son are equally divine, they have a different manner of being divine. Origen's view of Father-Son relations is entirely dependent upon his seeing God as generative, and particularly generative by 'will'.

Origen heavily emphasized the will of the Father in generation, primarily as a tactic to guard against emanation or corporeal images of it, by 'Gnostics' and monarchians, respectively. His fear of the language of progenation being taken literally to represent corporeal ideas emphasizes generation by the Father's will. In the next century, generation by will outlines a classic anti-Nicene argument: if the Son is born of the Father's will, he is necessarily not from the Father's nature. For Origen, however, God's nature and will coincide, so that generation

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48 Mark Edwards, *Catholicity and Heresy in the Early Church* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), 79. See also his, *Origen*, 70.

49 Williams, *Arius*, 139.

50 Beeley, *Unity*, 28. This again involves the Father's ultimate and transcendent simplicity and the Son's ἐπινοεῖ.

51 See Princ. 1.2.6, SC 252:122: [Filius] qui utique natus ex eo est uelut quaedam voluntas eius ex mente procedens.


53 See Ayres, *Nicaea*, 27.
by the Father's will does not divorce him from the Father's nature.\footnote{Lyman, *Christology*, 71. This idea is seen in much of the pro-Nicene theology of the fourth century. Hilary and, for example, Gregory Nazianzen (Or. 29.6, 8; 20.9) are able to speak of God's will being involved in the generation of the Son in such a way that does not threaten the eternality or full divinity of the Son.} For Origen, the Son existing by the eternal will of the Father is an eternal expression of the Father, so that to say that the Son is from the Father's will actually emphasizes the eternal status of the Son as the image and 'Wisdom' of the Father.\footnote{Ayres, *Nicaea*, 27, following Williams, *Arius*, 140-41.} The eternality of the Son and, what Williams calls, the 'quasi-necessity' of the Son to the Father are 'fundamentally at odds' with Arius,\footnote{Williams, *Arius*, 143-44.} and we could add, anti-Nicenes generally. Indeed, 'in Origen's scheme . . . generation by will in no way undermines the Son's true derivation from the Father, their commonality of nature, or their equality; rather, in consideration of the Gnostic and modalist alternatives, it preserves it'.\footnote{Beeley, *Unity*, 26.} In Origen's view, due to the eternal generation, everything that belongs to the Father also belongs to the Son.\footnote{Ibid., 27.}
Cosmology and soteriology in Origen

It is in this consonance of will and nature in Origen that the connections of divine generation and divine productivity generally (including creation) come to the fore. Lyman observes that 'the perfect congruence between eternal divine nature and will . . . results in God’s continuous salvific and creative action'. Thus 'soteriology' also enters the trinitarian equation of the Father’s productivity. For Origen, this leads to a teaching of eternal creation. Throughout this highly contentious teaching, the deeper issue is this perfect congruence of will and nature in the divine.

It is mentioned above how for Origen the Son 'contains creation within himself' in his generation from the Father. This, divine generativity, is the foundation of Origen’s idea of eternal creation. There was an initial creation, of which the Son is the 'beginning' and medium through which it comes about, which is spiritual: an 'immediate and unimpeded expression of God’s will'. Origen is clear that material creation is a creation out of nothing and is not eternal. The idea most basically states that the intelligible or spiritual world was created by the Father in the eternal generation of the Son and is present in the Son as Wisdom. Origen’s argument is parallel to arguments for eternal

59 Lyman, Christology, 55.

60 This is one of the most controversial of Origen’s teachings, and the nuance of his thought was not always appreciated in those utilising him as a polemical scapegoat. Methodius had great difficulty with Origen’s doctrine of eternal creation, perhaps suspicious of Origin’s thought due to a fear of the dualism present in various positions of his own opponents (see Ayres, Nicaea, 29, who references Lloyd Patterson, 'Methodius, Origen and the Arian Dispute', SP 17.2 (1982): 916-19.

61 Lyman, Christology, 55.

62 Ayres, Nicaea, 27. See Princ. 4.4.1.

63 See Princ. 1.3.3, SC 252:146, writing against those who argue ‘materia deo coaeterna’. See also 2.1.5; 4.4.6-8; Jo. 1.103, and discussion by Crouzel, Origen, 185.

64 Crouzel, Origen, 189.
generation: as God cannot begin to be Father but must be so from eternity, so must he always be Creator as he cannot change and become what he is not.\(^{65}\) The creation is not co-eternal with God in the same sense that God is eternal—it is accidental due to its beginning.\(^{66}\)

Origen has a fundamentally dualist cosmology which does not implicate actual material creation with the spiritual 'world' in Wisdom, which is in a sense akin to divine foreknowledge\(^ {67}\)—Wisdom 'fashions beforehand and contains within herself the species and causes of the entire creation'.\(^ {68}\) The idea of eternal creation thus betrays his dualist cosmology. A key element in Origen's reading is:

Like Justin and Irenaeus, Origen accepted and used Middle Platonic formulas of transcendence as definitions of divine nature. God as νοῦς or ἄγένητος was source of all things, and was wholly comprehensible only to himself, transcending all attributes, perhaps even being itself. God was simple (ἀπλοῦς), one (ἐν, μονάς), incorporeal (ἀσωματος), unchangeable (ἀτρεπτος), and invisible (ἄόρατος).\(^ {69}\)

The definitive marker of the divine nature is therefore absolute transcendence. This is so much so that the Father is said to transcend the Son and the Spirit even more than they transcend the created world,\(^ {70}\) which Ayres observes, is 'probably linked with his insistence in Contra Celsum that the Father is "beyond νοῦς (mind) and ousia"'.\(^ {71}\) Beeley further notes that later in life, and further removed

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\(^{65}\) Ibid., 190.

\(^{66}\) Ibid. See Princ. 2.9.2.

\(^{67}\) Lyman, Christology, 55.

\(^{68}\) Princ. 1.2.2-3, referenced in Beeley, Unity, 19.

\(^{69}\) Lyman, Christology, 47.

\(^{70}\) Jo. 13.151.

\(^{71}\) Ayres, Nicaea, 26. See Williams, Arius, 140; Edwards, Origen, 51-3.
from the Marcionite troubles in Rome and Gnostic challenges in Alexandria he counters this statement.\textsuperscript{72}

The issue of how such a transcendent God can be known in the world is ultimately solved by the Son, and more specifically the relationship of the Father and the Son through generation. For Origen, cosmology frames the spiritual life,\textsuperscript{73} and this 'hierarchy' of divinity functions not as some cosmological bridge, 'but the paradigm for knowing and loving the Father': 'The Son is clearly seen as more than an instrument for connecting God with the world'.\textsuperscript{74} This is ultimately because, as noted above, the Son is inherent in the word 'God', he is eternal, and his existence does not depend upon the desire to create.\textsuperscript{75} He is primary to cosmology. However, for Origen, the Son works as revealer in the world, and human beings come to know God through his revelation from within this cosmological framework. Thus, Edwards notes, while it is often believed that in Origen's thought the Logos functions as purely a ''cosmological intermediary'', who protects the frail creation from the otherwise intolerable majesty of the uncreated God',\textsuperscript{76} this is to miss the fundamental link between divine generativity and divine-human relations in Origen's paradigm.

The inherent connection between divinity and creation through God being naturally productive (in which 'all created beings only find their being and make

\textsuperscript{72} Beeley, \textit{Unity}, 26n48. At \textit{comm. in Mt.} 15.10, Origen argues that the Son transcends creation more than the Father transcends the Son.

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid., 16.

\textsuperscript{74} Williams, \textit{Arius}, 139.

\textsuperscript{75} See ibid.

sense in relation to the Creator\textsuperscript{77} continues in the fourth century, however, within a different cosmological framework. Various writers will utilize Origen’s tools in different ways. While Hilary’s overall account of the Father and the Son is markedly different than Origen’s, the themes of the Son as firstborn and image, the centrality of eternal generation, the arguments of the names of Father and Son being in some sense ‘natural’ and eternal, divine transcendence, and even a highly nuanced variation of Origen’s idea of creation existing eternally in the Son, are all used by Hilary. What will be significant is how he is able to transform the language and concepts he inherits for his contemporary polemical context. The contours of much of Origen’s argumentation, along with that of Tertullian and Novatian, become powerful polemical and creative constructive devices in Hilary’s hands.

Origen’s paradigm of divine generation, stimulated primarily through the \( \lambda \dot{\omicron} \gamma \omicron \varsigma \), \( \alpha \rho \chi \tilde{n} \), \( \check{\eta} \), and \( \pi \rho \dot{\omicron} \varsigma \) of John 1.1-3, is in many ways the universal groundwork for fourth-century theological argumentation.

One significant aspect which will be discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis, but should be introduced here is that, whereas Origen’s dualistic cosmology leads to a dualistic anthropology: a fundamental dualism in body and

\textsuperscript{77} Lyman, Christology, 48.
soul, Hilary adheres to a *fundamentally* united body and soul. For Hilary, far from the body being a problem in ascent towards God, the body, materiality, has a positive and even *necessary* role in progression towards God and knowledge of him. This is essential to his trinitarian anthropology.

*The reasonable Word: John 1.1-4 in Tertullian*

When Tertullian approaches John 1.1-4, he is burdened with understanding and communicating the Greek idea of Logos into Latin language and culture. He translates the Greek λόγος as *sermo* rather than *uerbum*, which would become standard in the fourth century. René Braun has demonstrated a progression from *uerbum* to *sermo* in Tertullian, indicating not only a regional preference for *sermo* (a comparison of Cyprian and Novatian shows that, at least after Tertullian, there seemed to be a regional preference in the third century for *sermo* in Africa and *uerbum* in Rome), but a theological and exegetical one. Tertullian finds *sermo* more appropriate to designate 'la Parole créatrice et révélatrice,

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78 Hilary ascribes to a 'dual creation', in which the soul is created first in the image of God and then the body is created subsequently. However, origin and destiny both equally define what it is to be human for Hilary, and in the end in resurrection and glorification the body and soul are united in one image of God and in perfect unity; this is the ultimate human destiny and demonstrates a *fundamental* unity of body and soul beyond the initial dualism. This is discussed in Chapter 4.

See Beeley, *Unity*, 13-17 for a helpful discussion of Origen’s dualistic cosmology and anthropology, which is not a radical ‘gnostic’ dualism.

Joseph Moingt, *Le théologie trinitaire de Tertullien*, vol. 2: 'Substantialité et individualité' (Paris: Aubier, 1966), 418-20, points to a trinitarian analogy in Tertullian, drawn between the works *De anima* and *De resurrectione mortuorum* and Prax., in which the unity of the divine substance as distributed in persons in God’s economy is like the unity of the soul and flesh, which exist in an interdependent 'communion de nature', the soul being the centre of operations, the *hegemonikon*, and the body administering the judgements and power of the soul. Further, both body and soul are necessary to being a human being and are indissoluble. This theme, drawn from Stoic psychological perspectives, will be extremely important for Hilary’s anthropology.

79 René Braun, *Deus Christianorum: recherches sur le vocabulaire doctrinal de Tertullien* (Paris: Études augustiniennes, 1977), 264-72. Tertullian used both early in life, even using *uerbum* in a *regula fidei* (praes. 13), but in Prax. *sermo* occurs 82 times in reference to the Son and *uerbum* not once.
formulation de la pensée du Père, qui s'est incarnée dans le Christ’.\textsuperscript{80} For Tertullian, \textit{sermo} denotes a working power which acts, whereas \textit{uerbum} is simply 'le résultat de l'activité énonciatrice'.\textsuperscript{81} Tertullian's \textit{sermo} works not only to unite Father and Son, but to unite the Son in himself as reason (\textit{ratio}) and word of God. Indeed, he claims that \textit{sermo} is itself an insufficient translation of \textit{λόγος} without \textit{ratio}, as \textit{ratio} precedes \textit{sermo}.\textsuperscript{82}

Tertullian argues that God was alone in the beginning, yet was not without this \textit{ratio}. God is not discursive in the beginning, as there is not a Word outside himself, but the Word is within him as God is rational in the beginning. This reason includes a sort of 'discourse' within God’s rational self, which produced another beside himself by activity within. He uses an analogy of reason within producing a word without to reflect the life of God and his Word.\textsuperscript{83}

Tertullian’s mental analogy of thought within the human mind seeks explanation for the relation of the Son to the Father. \textit{Ante omnia enim deus erat solus}, he argues.\textsuperscript{84} This does not mean that the \textit{Father} was alone without the Son, but that God was alone without any created thing, for even then, says Tertullian, he had his \textit{ratio}. This Reason in God is not some faculty, but a second

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{80} Ibid., 271-2.
  \item \textsuperscript{81} Ibid., 270.
  \item \textsuperscript{82} \textit{Prax.} 5. See Ernest Evans, \textit{Tertullian’s Treatise Against Praxeas: The Text Edited, with an Introduction, Translation, and Commentary} (London: SPCK, 1948), 213, for why Tertullian demands \textit{ratio} in translation of \textit{λόγος}.
  \item \textsuperscript{83} \textit{Prax} 5.
  \item \textsuperscript{84} Ibid., 5.2, CCSL 2:1162. All of Tertullian’s analogies are efforts to explain the \textit{probole veritatis} (Ibid., 8.5, CCSL 2:1167. Tertullian often transliterates the Greek \textit{προβολήν}, which preserves divine unity. This means that, while Tertullian is often accused of subordinationism, it cannot be argued from his understanding of the Son’s \textit{prolatio} from the Father, and therefore cannot be deduced from his analogical investigations of trinitarian relations (which all purpose to explain the \textit{prolatio}). His understanding of \textit{prolatio} actually functions to dignify the name of 'Son', so that the Son is seen to be distinct, having an identity which not only depends upon the Father but for which the identity of the Father, the very name ‘Father’, depends.
\end{itemize}
subsistent reality, one in which God has dialogue or discourse with within himself. This relates to our thoughts, which are always accompanied by language, so that there is continual discourse within us, as if there were a 'second [person]' in us.

So the Word was always within God, and this Word is always articulate, always in dialogue, always distinct. God always had his ratio within him as a secundum a se. The Word, or sermo, is the outward manifestation of ratio.

At first sight, Tertullian’s model of divine filiation appears to be following the traditional two-stage Logos theology of the 'Apologists'. Justin clearly presents the Word eternally in the Father, but brought forth subsequently for the purpose of creation. Theophilus writes, 'originally God was alone and the Logos was in him', and his doctrine of λόγος ἐνδιάθεσις and λόγος προφορικός, used to emphasize the utter transcendence of the Father, taught that though the Word always existed in the heart of God, he was not brought forth, or begotten, until the Father wished to create. This two-stage theory, however, does not correspond to Tertullian’s thought. Braun observes,

Loin qu'il conçoive deux Verbes divine, ou même deux états du Verbe divin,— dont l'un serait Raison (λόγος ἐνδιάθεσις) et l'autre Parole (λόγος προφορικός) —, tout l'effort de Tertullien au contraire consiste à montrer, en partant d'une distinction normale entre ratio et sermo, que le Logos de la théologie chrétienne définit une réalité complexe dont ratio et sermo sont pour ainsi dire les deux faces, dont l'un est le fond, l'autre la forme.

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85 Ibid., 5.6, CCSL 2:1164: *Ita secundus quodammodo in te est sermo per quem loqueris cogitando et per quem cogitas loquendo, ipse sermo alius est.*

86 Ibid. 5.7, CCSL 2:1164.

87 The reason being the ultimate transcendence of the Father: Justin *dial*. 127.


89 Ibid. It is also significant that a level of spacial and perhaps temporal existence of the only-begotten is implied here. Though he is certainly eternal within the Father, when he is sent forth from the Father he is ‘found in a place’ according to Theophilus.

Ratio is thus the substance of sermo,\textsuperscript{91} and the ordering of the two is purely logical without temporal implications.\textsuperscript{92} Evans notes that Tertullian is actually struggling to avoid the two-stage contrast between ἐνδιάθετος and προφορικός, for 'Ratio did not become sermo by being emitted as speech at any point of time, but Logos is always sermo because it is always articulate ratio'.\textsuperscript{93} Tertullian even apparently coined the term sermonalis in imitation of rationalis to connect sermo with the inherent eternal ratio of God. His goal is thus unity, not diversity or separation. The sermo is not then only applied to an external 'word', as opposed to the internal existence of the ratio, but applies always to the eternal existence of the Word in God and is used to articulate the expression or manifestation of ratio's operations.\textsuperscript{94}

Though Tertullian does not support the two-stage theory of the Logos, he does side with those who do in saying that the Son was begotten for the purpose of creating (citing Prov 8:22).\textsuperscript{95} For Tertullian, the generation of the Son from the Father does denote that the Son is of the nature or substance of the Father, but the Son is not the entire substance, he is a derivation of the Father's substance.\textsuperscript{96} Tertullian thus shifts from the two-stage theory to that of a dynamic economism, in which there is no purely static threeness within God, as he does not understand the Trinity in this metaphysical sense. The second and third persons of the Trinity

\textsuperscript{91} Ibid. Pollard, \textit{Johannine Christology}, 61.
\textsuperscript{92} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{93} Evans, \textit{Tertullian’s Treatise}, 213-14.
\textsuperscript{94} Braun, \textit{Deus Christianorum}, 262.
\textsuperscript{95} Prax. 6, CCSL 2:1165: ipsum primum protulit sermonem . . . ut per ipsum fient uniuersa per quem.
\textsuperscript{96} Ibid. 6-9, CCSL 2:1164-69, esp. 9.2, 1168: Pater enim tota substantia est, Filius  erno deriuatio totius et protio sicut ipse profitetur: Quia Pater maior me est.
come forth from the *unitas substantiae* 'because they have a task to fulfil. Only the Father remains completely transcendent'. This development is perhaps able to establish a defense against Tertullian’s monarchian opponents, but it provides what would come to be a problem for theologians in the next century, as the Son’s generation is contingent upon the Father willing to create. Here the cosmological connection with divine-human relations is clearly in place, though Origen’s notion of the Son’s ‘quasi-necessity’ is missing in Tertullian’s paradigm. Nevertheless God creator is in some sense coterminous with God generator, and creation exists only in relation to this God.

**Novatian: God, creation, and the two ‘logoi’**

Novatian builds upon Tertullian’s emphasis on divine generation of the Son. He contends that a lack of divinity in the Son is dangerous not only because the Saviour would then be *homo tantus*, but also because it would degrade the Father, as if he could not beget (*si Deus Pater Filium Deum generare non potuit*). Chapter 31 of Novatian’s *De Trinitate* gives his most significant statement of the Son’s generation. He emphasizes that the Father has no beginning and is infinite, and the Son was born when the Father willed it (*quando uoluit*). As the Word, the Son is not ‘received in the sound of the stricken air’, or in the tone of voice forced from the lungs, but is acknowledged in the substance of the power put forth by God. . . ‘. As for Tertullian, generation is by the will of the Father and the Son

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99 Borrowing Tertullian’s image of the *aer offensus intelligibilis auditu* (*Prax.* 7, CCSL 2:1166).

100 Ibid., 31.1-2, CCSL 4:75.
was generated 'en vue de la création et du salut'.\textsuperscript{101} However, for Novatian, there is a very real sense in which the Father precedes the Son: \textit{Pater illum etiam praecedit}.\textsuperscript{102} It is necessary, in some degree, that the Father should be before he is Father (\textit{quod necesse est prior sit qua Pater sit}). He writes,

> Because one who knows no origin must precede him who has an origin, [the Son] is at the same time less [than his origin] . . . and, in a certain measure (\textit{quodammodo}), in as much as he has an origin by birth, he resembles the nature (\textit{uicinus}) [of his origin], since he is born of that Father who alone has no origin.\textsuperscript{103}

Novatian makes a distinction between the Father who is \textit{ab aeterno} and the Son's generation \textit{ante tempus}, so that the Son is always in the Father, but he is also after the Father.\textsuperscript{104} This corresponds to the Logos of John 1 in and with the Father. For Novatian, the equivalent of Tertullian's \textit{ratio} and \textit{sermo} are separated, rather than Tertullian's goal of unity being upheld. He clearly exemplifies the two-stage theory of the Logos, in which there are 'two logos' (the \textit{ἐνδιάθετος} and \textit{προφορικός}).\textsuperscript{105}

A major difficulty for Novatian is that he sees the status as Begotten or Unbegotten as pertaining to nature. So that, though the Son is God from God, if he is seen to be God in every way the Father is God then there would be two


\textsuperscript{102} \textit{Trin.} 31.3, CCSL 4:75.

\textsuperscript{103} Ibid. The 'quodammodo', in a certain measure, in reference to the Son's likeness to the Father in his birth demonstrates the necessary interval between the existence of the infinite God and the begetting of the Son.

\textsuperscript{104} Pelland, 'Une passage', 29. See Novatian, \textit{Trin.} 31.3-5, CCSL 4:75-6.

\textsuperscript{105} Ibid., 31. Pelland, ibid, wrongly equates this with Tertullian's exposition of John 1.1 in conjunction with Proverbs 8 at \textit{Prax.} 6, stating that Novatian's two-stage theory of the Logos is the same as Tertullian's 'distinction de Sophia et de sa nativitas perfecta en tant que sermo'. While \textit{Prax} 7 does indicate a sense of progression in the \textit{ratio-sermo} paradigm (\textit{tunc, cum, dum, primum}, all in the first sentence) this is done in a way, as seen above, which intentionally avoids the two-stage model. The 'progression' is that of manifestation, which intensifies the sense of union of \textit{ratio} and \textit{sermo}, rather than denoting two 'stages' of the Word's existence.
unborns, and therefore two gods. The birth of the Son is necessary for Novatian, but cannot denote complete equality of nature or greatness without there existing two gods. Therefore, an interval between the Father and Son in his birth, an existence of God, at least in a logical sense, before God as Father and God as Son is seen as necessary to avoid ditheism. It is also significant that the birth of the Son is seen in some sense as analogous to that of human generation—a father must by necessity exist alone before he can generate a son.

There is a certain sense in which the Son has always been for Novatian, in which there is an eternal generation, but it cannot be said that he sees the generation as truly eternal. The Son is born of the eternal God, and therefore receives his eternal nature which makes him eternal. While Tertullian claimed that the Son was generated for the purposes of creation but avoided the two-stage theory of the Logos, Novatian sees this two-stage theory as necessary for both the existence of Father and Son in one God, and for the understanding of the Son generated for a purpose by the will of God to stand. For Novatian the Son’s ‘born’ divinity confirms the Father as the one true unborn God.

For Tertullian, then, there are not ‘two logoi’, but the generation of the Son is still dependent upon God’s desire to create. There is therefore seen an inherent cosmological connection in divine generation, though in a different way than Origen, which, aside from the direct theological implication (i.e., that the Son’s

106 Trin. 31.6, CCSL 4:76.

107 Hilary too argued for the Son’s eternity in this way in his early Mat. (see 31.3). His theology develops greatly due to his interactions with trinitarian controversy after his exile in 356. This early following of Novatian is perhaps largely due not only to his lack of exposure to other theological options, but to a similar anti-adoptionist polemic to that of Novatian’s (see Williams, ‘Defining Orthodoxy’). Williams argues that Hilary’s anti-adoptionist language and polemic mirror the acts of a small (probable) Gallic council of 345 or 346 in which Eufrata was condemned for a form of adoptionism (ibid., 164-5). See also Carl Beckwith, ‘Photinian Opponents in Hilary of Poitiers’ Commentarium in Matthaueum’, JEH 58.4 (October, 2007): 615-16. Beckwith, ibid., 621-22, argues that Hilary perhaps did already at this point contain the theological tools to promote the doctrine of eternal generation and was attempting to do so with his equation of aeternitas and infinitas for the first time in Mat. 33.
identity in some sense depends upon creation), directly affects anthropology. In
Novatian's case, generation also depends upon creation. In this sense Pelland is
correct, he is saying something very similar to Tertullian, though with a different
starting place for his argument, that of a two-stage Logos theory.108

In all these accounts divine generativity is necessarily connected to divine
productivity generally. The relationship of the Son to the Father directly impacts
the relation of the created world to God.

Origen’s paradigm of divine generativity, which has cosmological and
soteriological efficacy (and therefore directly affects anthropology) but is not
dependent upon cosmology, is more like Hilary’s in Trin., though the heritage of
Hilary's Latin predecessors is ever present in his patterns of argumentation. Like
Origen (and unlike Tertullian and Novatian), for Hilary divine generation is
inherent to who God is. Unlike Origen, however, Hilary believes the Son shares
entirely in the Father's perfect simplicity due to his generation. This has immense
implications for the necessary anthropological connections divine productivity
has in early Christianity. Humanity, created in and through this Son who exists in
the perfection and simplicity of the Father, is not only defined by, but exists both
from and towards this divine perfection.

Athanasius against the 'Arians': reconceiving divine perfection

In the fourth century, the third-century inherent connection of cosmology and
intra-trinitarian life is affirmed by all sides. As Anatolios recognizes, 'from the
outbreak of the debates between Arius and Alexander onward, the question of the
relation between Father and Son was bound up with that of the relation between

108 See n105 above regarding Pelland’s equation of Tertullian and Novatian’s thought regarding
the two stages of the Logos.
both of them and creation'. 109 Those on all sides of the debate held that Christ preexisted the world (which is why assessments of the fourth century as a controversy over 'high' and 'low' christologies are erroneous). No one denied John 1.3 or Colossians 1.16 (’... all things were created through him and in him’), or contested the grand implications of Jesus as 'Word' and 'Wisdom'—the Son is the creative agent of God. So for anti-Nicenes, Arius saw Christ as the preexistent created Creator, and Asterius emphasized this by stressing the Father’s utter transcendence necessitating the creative work of the Son. 110 Indeed, 'with Asterius’s development of Arius's doctrine, we see the construction of a certain nexus between an account of the relation between Father and Son and the doctrines of creation, divine transcendence, and christological mediation'. 111

Athanasius rejects Asterius’s interpretation of this doctrinal nexus, but works within this same structure of connectivity between intra-divine relations and the relation of the created world to God. This is simply a natural progression from third-century anti-monarchian and anti-'Gnostic' polemic applied in anti-Nicene and anti-'Arian' polemic. It is a foundational and structural framework which all sides of debate have inherited and agree on, how Athanasius works within it to refute the Arius-Asterius position is far more insightful than he is often given credit for. 112

109 Anatolios, Retrieving Nicaea, 115.
110 Ibid.
111 Ibid., 115-16.
112 The brief discussion of Athanasius in this chapter is greatly indebted to Anatolios’s analysis in Retrieving Nicaea, 114-121, which is perhaps the only contemporary scholarly approach to Athanasius which has given full recognition to his powerful constructive use of this ‘nexus’. 
His most significant contribution in this regard is his 'christological reconception of divine perfection', in which divine productivity (in generation and creation) is integral to God's perfect simplicity, and he does this in such a way so that the Son is included in that divine perfection. The divine 'naming' of the Son denotes his nature as he is eternal and without beginning. Whereas the language of the Son being ‘Shepherd’, or ‘Light’, or ‘Life’ is for Origen a description of what Christ is in relation to humanity or attributes which are in some way accidental and not eternal in the Son (for he is eternal only as Wisdom), for Athanasius, Christ’s statement of ‘I am’ involves his entire self, as he was born complete as God from God.

Within the Father-Son, God-creation nexus, he argues that the anti-Nicene interpretation, as it does not hold to the Son's simplicity in this way, denies that God is Creator. He thus directly and intentionally places the title 'Creator' inherently in the divine essence. The position that God in his very being is eternally Creator is of course a dangerous proposition, as we have seen in the troubled reception history of Origen's perspective. Athanasius's position differs from Origen, however, in that he makes a distinction between the active potency of God (which is eternal) and the term of that potency’s action. It is not necessary then for God to actively be creating from eternity, but it is for the power to create to be active in God from eternity. And as the biblical text ascribes such divine power (which is necessarily essential and eternal for Athanasius) to the Father

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113 Anatolios, Retrieving Nicaea, 115.
114 Ar. 1.12; 16; 29.
115 Ibid., 1.12.
116 Ibid., 2.2. See Anatolios, Retrieving Nicaea, 116.
and the Son, the Son must be professed to be eternal and essential to divinity.¹¹⁷

The creation of the world is 'grounded in the generation of the Son', so that 'God's relation to the world is enfolded by the Father's relation to the Son', and that includes both initial creation and final renewed creation.¹¹⁸

Athanasius's christological modification, the correlativity of the Father and the Son as integral to the divine perfection as a result of the natural generativity of the Father, is the beginning of a transformation of divine simplicity which, I will argue in the next chapter, is further developed by Hilary in his doctrine of divine infinity. It is a 'dynamic simplicity' in which the source generates a 'product' which is equal to it.¹¹⁹ Hilary will elaborate further on what it means for humanity to be a finite 'product' of an infinite God who has this sort of dynamic perfection. In it, the way in which the inherent connection of the creation and destiny of humanity is 'enfolded' by the Father's generation of the Son works in ways which move beyond Athanasius's initial transformation of divine perfection.¹²⁰

**Hilary: John 1.1-2 and the birth without beginning**

Hilary writes in *Trin.* 2.16 that as the Son is *in principio*, 'he is not contained within time (*non tenetur in tempore*). Since he is God, he is not alleged to be a voice. Since he is *with* God, he neither suffers injury nor is cast aside—for he is not abolished in another. The one only-begotten God is proclaimed to be with the

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¹¹⁸ Ibid., 118.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., 115.

¹²⁰ At ibid., 118, Anatolios notes: 'that the creation of the world is grounded in the generation of the Son is an aspect of Athanasius's's trinitarian theology that has received remarkably little attention'. The implications of this in Hilary's thought has indeed received no attention, other than my brief 'The Life in the Word and the Light of Humanity: The Exegetical Foundation of Hilary of Poitiers' Doctrine of Divine Infinity', SP 66.14 (2012): 273-82, which is a result of research for this thesis.
unborn God, and born from the same.'121 Not only does this demonstrate the extent to which the interpretation of ‘in the beginning’ of John 1:1 has begun to be read in the context of time, eternity and limitation, but also shows how Hilary sees the with of John 1:2 to support his interpretation of the eternality of the Son.

Whereas for Origen the Son’s being God is dependent upon his being with God, for Hilary, the Son’s being with God is evidence of what he always was. The word was 'is no accidental title (accidens nomen) but a susbsistent truth (subsistens veritas), both a permanent condition (manens causa) and a property of the nature of his birth (naturalis generis proprietas)'.122 That the Word was, for Hilary, is a "subsistent" (subsistens) truth that fully demonstrates the Son’s nature'.123 For Hilary, the Son was not deified by any means, but was born God.124

Hilary further claims that the name Word in John 1 is meant to teach us of the mystery of the eternal birth:

The substance exists in the Word (Res existit in uerbo), and that substance is announced in the name (uerbi res enuntiatur in nomine). For the naming of the Word in the Son of God is on account of the mystery of his birth. . . . For we do not preach, as is frequently said of us, division in the Son, but of the mystery of the birth. . . . Birth does not contain loss of the begetter. . . . The nature of the Son is not that of an utterance of a voice (prolatio vocis), but God from God and subsisting truly from his birth (ex Deo Deus cum natuiritatis ueritate subsistens). The name 'Word' was used that he might be taught to be the Father’s own (a Patre proprius) and by indifference of nature to be inseparable from him.125

121 *Trin.* 2.16, SC 443:304.

122 Ibid. 7.11, SC 448:298. For Hilary’s theory of names see Weedman, *Trinitarian*, 136-56; Tarmo Toom, 'Hilary of Poitiers on the Name(s) of God', *VC* 64 (2010): 456-79; and the brief discussion in Chapter 2 of this thesis.


124 *Trin.* 11.19.

125 Ibid. 7.11, SC 448:296. At *Psal.* 122.7, CCSL 61B:38, Hilary writes, quoting John 1.1: diuinitatis unitatem in innascibili Deo et in unigenito Deo secundum proprietatem atque naturam cum fide et ueritate profitemur.
The life of the Word and the relationship of the Father and Son are clearly set in the context of eternal generation. Indeed, for Hilary, the 'the mystery of the true birth' is the core of Christian belief.\footnote{126 Ayres, Nicaea, 184. See Trin., 7.31.}

Hilary identifies two main polemical opponents in Trīn. 1.16, and their arguments are directly related to the interpretation of the johannine prologue and divine generation. First, Marcellus of Ancyra's theology, or at least his theology as commonly received through critical filters. In his 'caricature of Marcellus' theological sympathies' Hilary claims to write against those who deny the true identity of the Son through his generation in an attempt to preserve Christian monotheism.\footnote{127 Beckwith, Hilary, 82; Trin. 1.16.} He argues that these further argue, under the banner of a pious confession of the unius Dei, that there was no true incarnation as the Son has no separate identity, but God the Father was 'extended' into humanity.\footnote{128 Trin. 1.16, SC 443:234. Hilary's caricature here is more akin to Eusebius of Caesarea's depiction of Marcellus than what his fragments themselves suggest. See Lienhard, Contra Macellum, 50-6.} He turns then to the Homoian position as represented by Sirmium 357. He argues that these opponents deny the true birth of the Son by saying that he was created. This confession of the Son's creation is to 'separate him from the one true God' and prove that the Son is not 'true' God as the Father is.\footnote{129 Ibid., 236.} At Trīn. 2.4, he clearly adds to the 'Marcellan' opponents the theology of Photinus of Sirmium. Photinus was already a polemical opponent in Mat.,\footnote{130 See Beckwith, 'Photinian Opponents'.} and Hilary elaborates upon this polemic throughout Trīn. 'Hebion', so he defames Photinus,\footnote{131 At Trīn. 7.3, SC 448:280, Hilary refers to Hebion, 'quod est Fotinus'.} argues that the beginning of the Son is in Mary and that he was first human and then God, and the 'Word' to
him is simply the 'sound of a voice'.\textsuperscript{132}\ He continues here again against those who believe the Son to be separate from the Father and created 'ex nihilo adque a tempore'.\textsuperscript{133}

When he comes to refute these positions, at Trīn. 2.12-21, he immediately turns to John 1.1-3. His reading of this passage is therefore in continual reference to Marcellan and Photinian thought and Homoianism, and the eternal generation of the Son is his defense against them. The Word through the birth is 'liberated from time' (\textit{verbum tempore liberavit}), indeed, \textit{est ergo erans apud Deum}, 'He is and always was with God'.\textsuperscript{134} With these types of statements Hilary is able to regularly argue against both the Photinian and Homoian positions congruently, as

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{132} Trīn. 2.4, SC 443:280. See also 2.15, 300: \textit{Dices enim: «Verbum sonus vocis est . . . »}. On the significance of Photinus's theology throughout the fourth-century controversy see D. H. Williams, 'Monarchianism and Photinus of Sirmium as the Persistent Heretical Face of the Fourth Century', \textit{HTR} 99 (2006): 187-206. According to Ambrosiaster, \textit{Questiones Verteris et Novi Testamenti} XCI.10 (PL 35:2285), Photinus deliberately altered the punctuation in the first two verses of John to read: \textit{in principio erat Verbum, et Verbum erat apud Deum, et Deus erat. Verbum hoc in principio erat apud Deum}. Referenced in Beckwith, \textit{Hilary}, 121n62 and his 'Photinian', 624-5. For Marcellus, the title 'Word' is not metaphorical: 'Before the whole creation there was a silence, as it seems, since the Word was in God' (\textit{frag}. 103, GCS 4, 207) (quoted in Lienhard, \textit{Contra Marcellum}, 51).

\textsuperscript{133} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{134} Ibid., 2.14, SC 443:300. See P. Smulders, 'A Bold Move of Hilary of Poitiers: "Est ergo erans"', \textit{VC} 42.2 (1988): 121-31, for Hilary's use of the seemingly non-sensical 'erans' to emphasize the eternality of the Son in polemical argumentation.
\end{footnotesize}
they both deny that the Son was eternally with the Father. Indeed, Hilary uses this as a polemical tool against the Homoians. Associating them with the already condemned Photinus (Sirmium 351) helped his anti-Homoian agenda. Williams notes how this continued throughout the fourth century: Photinus's thought was a link which allowed "Arianism" and monarchianism' to be 'thrown together as essentially sharing the same heretical goals'. Throughout this polemic, Hilary situates his pro-Nicene position between the extremes of modalism and subordinationism. As Weedman has shown, this was a common Latin strategy. Both Phoebadius and Marius Victorinus struggled to accomplish this same goal.

The Latin theological categories of these two would sometimes prove inadequate for this task, but nevertheless, 'all of the Latin theologians had a common sense of

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135 The 358 Ancyran council used John 1.1-4, in conjunction with Proverbs 8 and Colossians 1.15-16 (haer. 73.8.2-3), as Hilary, against not only Sirmium 357 and the Homoians but primarily against Heterousian doctrine under the influence of Aetius, and also surely Eunomius. Although he did not publish his first Apology until the end of 359 or in 360, his ideas, along with Aetius's, who published his Syntagmation in 359, were certainly known prior to the 358 council, which was called as a result of Gregory of Laodicea's letter warning of the spread of Heterousian doctrine (Thomas A. Kopecek, A History of Neo-Arianism (Cambridge, MA: Philadelphia Patristics Foundation, 1979), 153). Hilary was highly influenced by Hominousian argument which was engaging this Heterousian thought (See Weedman, 'Hilary'). It is quite likely that when Hilary writes of positions which seem like an early Eunomian or Heterousian position that he is not always just exaggerating Homoian claims, but has Heterousian doctrine in mind.

The johannine prologue is also a preferred text of Basil and the Hominousians against Marcellus and Photinus (see Beckwith, Hilary, 61-2; Euphranius haer. 73.8.5; The Panarion of Epiphanius of Salamis: Books II and III, trans. Frank Williams (Leiden: Brill, 1994), 442). This does not however necessitate a direct influence on Hilary's argument in this instance, as Hilary had already used the prologue against Photinus prior to his exile at Trin. (=De fide) 2.15. See Beckwith, 'Photinian Opponents', 264-5.

For a detailed discussion of the construction of Trin. and Books Two and Three of Trin. being written prior to his exile as De fide see Beckwith, Hilary, esp. 71-94. The most detailed study prior to Beckwith's work on the topic was M. Simonetti, 'Note sulla struttura e la cronologia del "De Trinitate" di Ilario di Poiitiers', Studi Urbinati 39 (1965): 274-300. For a summary of the issue see Michael Figura and Jean Doignon, 'Introduction', in La Trinité, SC 443:46-52.

136 Williams, 'Monarchianism', 187.

137 Beckwith, Hilary, 82-3.

what the solution to the Homoian crisis should look like. In no case do we find a Latin theologian rejecting Homoianism in favor of a thinly veiled modalism’.  

Hilary thus stops at no effort to demonstrate that the Son possesses all the Father possesses through his birth and *from eternity*, which defeats both of the two extremes. Therefore, ‘from the perfect and eternal unbegotten Father, the only-begotten Son is both perfect and eternal’, 140 and ‘What is in the Father is also in the Son. . . . Thus they are mutually in each other, because just as all things are perfect in the unborn Father, so are all things perfect in the only-begotten Son’. 141 For Hilary, the Father is the Son’s source through the divine birth. This idea of ‘source’ actually upholds the Son’s perfect divinity, rather than dilutes it, as the Father cannot beget anything which is contrary to his own nature. Hilary is then able to speak of the birth in a way which acknowledges all the power, eternity, incomprehensibility and immutability of the Father as inherent also in the Son. Indeed, the fact that the Father is the eternal Source of the Godhead means that the birth must necessarily be eternal:  

For just as birth comes from an origin (*actio*), so a birth from an eternal origin is eternal. . . . If that which is truly born from the eternal is not born eternal, then the Father will not be an eternal origin (*iam non erit et Pater auctor aeternus*). . . . Neither reason nor understanding admit an interval between the birth of God the Son and the generation by God the Father, because the birth is in the generation and the generation in the birth. . . . Therefore that which does not exists unless from both remains in everything only as both. . . . [One] cannot exist without the other (*non possit esse sine altero*). 142

139 Ibid. Part of the important argument of Weedman’s monograph demonstrates Hilary’s ability to overcome the restrictions of these Latin categories through his interactions with those of the Homoiousians.

140 Trin. 3-3, SC 443:338. See also Psal. 122.7, CCSL 61B:3, where John 1.1 is used ‘ut intellegeremus per id quod unus inascibilis Deus est non adimi unigenito Deo posses, quod Deus est’.

141 Ibid., 3.4, SC 443:340-42.

142 Ibid., 12.21, SC 462:414.
One can see the constructive developments Hilary’s doctrine makes in light of the review of some major earlier thinkers above. For example, whereas Novatian saw it necessary to have an interval between the unbegotten God’s existence and the generation of the Son, so that there might not be two gods, for Hilary, their being no interval between the Father as source and the Son as begotten is necessary for establishing that the Son is God without there being two gods. The birth safeguards the belief that there can be ‘no God besides Him’.¹⁴³ For Hilary, the Son must always exist as God from God, as in his birth the whole of divinity is bestowed upon him (including eternality), so that his generation is ‘free from time, unfettered by the world, by which all things were made’,¹⁴⁴ and as the Father the Son is incorporalis adque indemutabilis.¹⁴⁵ There is no growth or development in the Son. The fact that he is born demonstrates the necessity of his eternal, simplistic existence, and inversely, that of the Father’s.¹⁴⁶

There are a few further constructive elements to Hilary’s doctrine of eternal generation that merit mentioning for the purposes of this chapter. One of his most brilliant aspects of argumentation is his ability to remove begotten and unbegotten language from the category of essence. This will also be a crucial aspect of Gregory of Nyssa’s argument in response to Eunomius,¹⁴⁷ but Hilary contemplates this insightful, and what would become at least by Gregory’s time, necessary pro-Nicene argument prior to Gregory. Hilary writes in Trin. 5.37:

¹⁴³ Ibid. 5.37, SC 448:164.
¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 2.22, SC 443:312: liberum a tempore, solutum a saeculis, per quem omnia facta sunt.
¹⁴⁵ Ibid., 5.37, SC 448:164.
¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 8.41, CCSL 62A:354: unus significatur in utroque et non est eterque sine uno. See also 12.21 above.
The birth of God necessarily possesses that nature from which it proceeds. For he does not subsist as something other than God, because he does not subsist from another source than God. His nature is the same in this way, not that the one born is himself the begetter . . . but the one born subsists in all those things which the begetter himself is (sed in his ipsis subsistat ille qui genitus est, quae totus est ipse qui genuit), because he is from no other.\textsuperscript{148}

The significance of this move by Hilary lies primarily in the context of his doctrine of divine infinity, discussed in the next chapter. For now it suffices to note that the Father and Son are seen to be entirely one in nature, yet Hilary feels free to use the language of ‘unbegotten’ and ‘begotten’ in the same sentence, not reflecting any notion of differentiation of essence.

Another aspect of eternal generation in Hilary, which will also become increasingly evident in his doctrine of divine infinity, is that in it the distinction between creature and Creator becomes far more vivid than for previous theologians, and his category of \textit{nativitas} is the foundation for this, rather than working against it (as Hilary believes it does for the Homoians, who, he argues, use the birth of the Son to associate him with creation, rather than to demonstrate his divinity). Hilary emphasizes that as the Son went forth from the Eternal, it is proper to see his going forth as a birth, but not as a beginning: \textit{Non enim idem est substantiam coepisse et Deum exisse Deo.}\textsuperscript{149} The birth of the Son is then entirely different than that of the creation of humanity or indeed that of procreation among humanity, so that analogies break down. Indeed, Hilary criticizes his opponents directly for not recognizing this.\textsuperscript{150} The divine \textit{nativitas} seen within the framework of divine infinity, explored in the next chapter, will further bring to

\textsuperscript{148} Trin. 5.37, SC 448:164.

\textsuperscript{149} Ibid., 6.35, SC 448:242. See also 8.41.

\textsuperscript{150} Trin. 6.9; 7.28; 12.8, 16; Syn. 33. It is significant that Athanasius does not follow this line of argument, but strongly argues for a positive analogous relationship between human and divine birth (see Ar. 1.26-27; Weedman, \textit{Trinitarian}, 147-48).
light this intentional move by Hilary of emphasizing Creator-creature distinction through the *nativitas*. While it is necessary for humans to see birth as a beginning it is necessary for birth of God from God to have no beginning. *Trin.* 7.14 elaborates: 'He who was born as God neither began to be what God is nor advanced to it (*nec coepit quod Deus est nec profecit*). The Son is distinguished as Creator from all creation in that something created out of nothing grows into something which it is not, but as the Son was not born out of nothing but eternally from God, he did not grow to be or become God; he was simply born as all that it is to be God.\(^{152}\)

Hilary writes this primarily against Photinus, who confessed that Christ's beginning was from Mary, denying any preexistent Christ, and, according to routine accusations by his opponents, that Jesus was elevated to divinity and came to be God through adoption.\(^{153}\) But these words also critique Homoian opponents as Hilary asserts that as they deny eternity to the Son, they necessarily place him within time, outside of the Father's divinity, and therefore prone to

\(^{151}\) *Trin.*, 7.14, SC 448:306.

\(^{152}\) Ibid., 304-6.

\(^{153}\) Whereas it can only be certainly confirmed that Photinus taught that Christ did not exist before Mary, the accusation that he was also an adoptionist has a very early history. Hilary hints at an adoptionist position of Photinus stating that he believed Christ was *ex homine Deum proferat* (*Trin.* 2.4, SC 443:280). *Syn.* 61, and the final anathema of the Creed of Sirmium, 351, at *Syn.* 38, report that Photinus believed that Christ gained his divinity after his birth from Mary. Athanasius, *Syn.* 26.5-6, discloses similar accusations from the 344 Macrostich. Weedman, *Trinitarian*, 25-612; Beckwith, 'Photinus Opponents', 616; Williams, 'Defining Orthodoxy', 151-71, show clearly that Hilary's polemic against Photinus involved anti-adoptionist arguments. Whether Hanson's claim (*Search*, 235) that 'everyone in the ancient world accuses Photinus of reducing Christ to a mere man adopted by God' can be sustained is difficult to say, but it is clear that Photinus was regularly the recipient of adoptionist accusations. Indeed, as Ayres, *Nicaea*, 128, notes, the fact that Photinus's thought implied adoptionism to many Latin theologians 'helped to secure some western suspicion of Marcellus', due to Photinus's association with him.

Hilary's Photinian polemic is an important aspect of *Trin.* which clearly shows Homoiousian influence, as his view of Photinus is taken mostly from Basil of Ancyra's reported debate with Photinus at Sirmium 351 (see Epiphanius *haer.* 71). Basil's use of John 1 in the debate should be particularly noted. Homoiousian influence on Hilary is dealt with in more detail in Chapter 2.
development as creation.\footnote{At \textit{Trin.} 4.5, \textit{SC} 448:18, Hilary draws a firm line for his opponents. He argues that since they reject the Son’s eternity, it is necessary that they believe that he was born in time, as this makes time anterior to him (\textit{erit ante eum tempus}). However much his opponents might object, Hilary is convinced that they teach \textit{erit tempus quo non fuit}.}{154} It must also be noted that Hilary’s association of Homoianism with Photinianism might be more than just a polemical ploy. He records at \textit{Syn.} 11 that the 'Sirmium blasphemia'\footnote{\textit{Syn.} 10, PL 10:486.}{155} states that the Son 'took flesh and body, that is, man (\textit{hominem}) from the womb of the Virgin Mary. . . . He took man from the Virgin Mary, through whom He suffered'.\footnote{Ibid., 11, PL 10:489. I am grateful to Tarmo Toom for bringing this to my attention. One must be careful in situations like this not to over hastily categorize the positions Hilary is writing against. In the same way any 'adoptionist' position is often automatically assumed to be Photinus/Photinian in Hilary, when he comes to discuss those who oppose a human soul in Christ, scholars have readily assumed Apollinarius to be his focus, which, as I will show in Chapter 4, is simply not the case.}{156} This taking up a human being of Mary could be interpreted to be assuming an already existing human, which would imply a type of adoptionism within Homoian theology. Regardless, Hilary brings to bear on all his opponents that his description of the eternal generation of the Son is necessary for the proper distinction of creature and Creator, and the proper distinction of creature and Creator upholds and buttresses the proper understanding of divine generation.

This will become more clear in the next chapter of this thesis, but is mentioned here to show the intentional use of \textit{nativitas} by Hilary to intensify Creator-creature distinction. Birth from this particular Origin necessitates the particular infinite existence of the Son as God and Creator, as 'through him all things were made'.
For Hilary, *through him* all things were made demonstrates that the Son lacks nothing of the power and nature of God. He quotes Genesis 1:6-7, 2 Maccabees 7:28 and Psalm 148:5 in reference to John 1:1-3 in order to explain these words, 'all things were made through him'. The Father spoke, and they were made, he did not speak and something happened. The act of making refers to the Son. In their act of creation:

The effectual power to produce by word is of that nature which has the power to fulfill what is said in creating (*naturae eius est quae efficiens id possit praestare quod dicens*). How then is he who creates not true [God] when he who speaks is, since if the words spoken are truth it follows that the deeds done are true? It is God who spoke, it is God who created. If he is true [God] in speaking, I ask, why he is not in creating?

This verse has a claim on the Son’s omnipotence for Hilary. The fact that God can execute as agent whatever his words as speaker can express defines absolute power. There is unlimited power of expression combined with unlimited power of execution, proving the Son to be true God by birth.

The word *without* is significant to Hilary for properly understanding the creative work of the one divine nature in the Father and the Son. This ‘without him’ gives Hilary defense against not only the ‘all things’ created including the Holy Spirit, but it demonstrates that the Son was not alone in creation: 'He through whom [creation was made] is one; he without whom [creation was not made] is another'. An objection could then be that if there was one there

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157 Trin. 5.4, SC, 448:104: *Si omnia per eum, et omnia ex nihilo, et nihil non per eum, quaero in quo ei veritas Dei desit, cui non desit Dei nec natura nec virtus.*

158 Ibid., 4.16.

159 Ibid., 5.5, SC 448:104-6.

160 Ibid.

161 Ibid., 2.18, SC 443:306.
creating with the Word, and this one created any one thing, then it would not be true that ‘through him all things were made’. The Word is in danger of being only ‘companion’ (socium). But Hilary says this logic is the wrong way round. John’s previous statement ‘through him all things were made’ gives the context for the ‘without him’. These ideas, that all things were made through him (in him and through him in Col 1:16), and that creation proves the unity of nature of the Father and the Son, both through the Son having the ability to execute the Father’s expression and by the fact that creation was not a lone work but that of the Father and the Son, are utilized significantly in Hilary’s reading of John 1:4. Life is at the center of this divine Father-Son reality.

As acknowledged above, for Hilary, due to the Son’s full divine simplicity, he is life and was born as life, not made life following his birth. The Son being life by virtue of his birth is essential to Hilary’s overall theological project. He says of John 1:4:

That which was made in him was life’ (Quod factum est in eo, uita est). . . . For all things were created through him and in him. Created in him, because he was born God the Creator (quia nascebatur creator Deus). . . . There is no interval of time in him of birth and progress (Non habet inter se tempus et natuitas et profectus). Nothing of these things made in him was made without him, because he, in whom they were made, is life, and because God, who was born from God, does not exist after being born but as God born. For being born Living from Living (Nascens enim a uiuente uiuus), True from True, Perfect from Perfect, he was born with the power of his birth.

Hilary interprets ‘life’ in John 1:4 to be eternally in the Son as he is eternally begotten of the Father.

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162 Ibid.

163 Ibid., 2.19.

164 Hilary does not comment extensively on the word ‘nothing’, as does Origen: ‘nothing’ is non-being, or evil (Jo. 2.92-99), and as Augustine would: human beings become nothing when they sin (Tract. Jo. 1.13.1). He simply takes it in the natural sense of the word, that there is not anything that was not made through the Word.

165 Trin. 2.20, SC 443:306-308.
The reading of the passage itself is important for its interpretation. Our common reading of, ‘In him was life, and that life was the light of humanity’, assumes punctuation between verses 3-4 which was often not assumed in patristic readings. With punctuation in verse 3 after ‘without him nothing was made’ rather than at the end of the verse the passage reads not, ‘In him was life’, but, ‘That which was made in him was life’. Many prominent theologians in the second and third centuries knew this reading, including Irenaeus and Tertullian. The reading of ‘which was made, in him is life’ is also present, particularly in later writers. Jerome, Chrysostom and others ascribe to this reading. Augustine demands this reading because, as all things are made in him, the former reading would mean that everything is life. Origen insists on the former reading however, as it is not that life was in him in a simple or necessary sense, as he was in the beginning in as much as he was wisdom only, it

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166 This is in agreement many of the oldest Greek and Latin manuscripts. The Latin reading: *omnia per ipsum facta sunt et sine ipso factum est nihil quod factum est in ipso uita erat et uita erat lux hominum*, with no punctuation or intentional spacing (e.g. hanging lines), as the Vulgate, could support either reading. The Greek text is: πάντα δι᾽ αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο, καὶ χωρὶς αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο οὐδὲ ἔν. ὃ γέγονεν ἐν αὐτῷ ἦν ζωὴν (see VL2: Codex Palatinus (e) fol. 44r; VL4: Codex Veronensis (b), fol. 122r; VL6: Codex Colbertinus (c), fol. 68r; VL34: Pericope Cryptoferatensis (Cryptoferatensis was excluded from the critical edition as it is believed to be more appropriately classified as a Vulgate text rather than Vetus Latina); see also the placement of medial and high point punctuation markings in VL29: Codex Sangermanensis Secundus (g2), fol. 120r and VL10: Codex Brixianus (f), fol. 152r. The critical edition, *Vetus Latina 19: Evangelium Secundum Iohannem*, fascile 1, Jo 1.1-4.48, eds. P. G. Burton, H. A. G. Houghton, R.F. Maclachlan, D. C. Parker (Freiburg: Verlag Herder, 2011), 47, 54, unfortunately cannot portray the clear visual division at *Quod factum* that these manuscripts present due to its linear format.

167 Irenaeus *haer*. 3.11.1; Tertullian *Prax*. 7.

168 Chrysostom *hom. in. Jo*. 5.1-2; Jerome *hom*. 87, Jo. 1.11.14. Metzger notes that the tense of the imperfect verb ἦν was even changed in some mss to the present ἐστιν, reflecting the desire to force tense disagreement with ὃ γέγονεν to oblige the reading of ‘that which was made. In him is life’, see Bruce M. Metzger, *A Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament*, 3rd ed. (London; New York: United Bible Societies, 1971), 196.

169 *Tract. Jo*. 1.16 (CSL 96, 9-10): *Vtquid dictum est: Quod factum est in illo, uita est? Si enim omnia in ipso facta sunt, non te abducant: pronuntia sic: Quod factum est; hic subdistingue, et deinde infer: in illo uita est. Quid est hoc? Facta est terra, sed ipsa terra quae facta est, non est uita: est autem in ipsa sapientia spiritualiter ratio quaedam qua terra facta est; haec uita est.*
is therefore ‘that which was made in him which is life’.\(^{170}\) It is significant for Origen that life is something added to the Word.\(^{171}\) As the life is the light of humanity, the light has not always been in the Word as the light of humanity could not exist before humanity itself existed. Life is inseparable from the Logos, but once it comes to him and not eternally.\(^{172}\) He contends, 'as, therefore, "all things were made through him", not, all things were through him, and, "without him nothing was made", not, without him nothing was, so "what was made in him", not what was in him, "was life"'.\(^{173}\)

Hilary’s understanding that the Son is born \textit{a uiuente uiuus} brings an original perspective to reading John 1.3-4, and brings out the anthropological implications of the category of \textit{nativitas} lying at the foundation of Creator-creature distinction.

\textit{The potential creation 'In Him'}

In \textit{Trin. 2.20}, quoted partially above, Hilary gives an intertextual reading of John 1:3-4 in order to demonstrate a key dynamic in his theology between eternal generation and the creation of the world in, by, and through the Word. He writes, '[All things] were created in him, for he was born as God the Creator'.\(^{174}\) Hilary does not mean here that all things are eternal, that there is a literal creation in the birth of the Son as Creator. He means that in the eternal generation there is a


\(^{171}\) Ibid., 2.112-31, SC 120:282-95.

\(^{172}\) Ibid., 2.129, SC 120:292: Αὕτη δὴ ἡ ζωὴ τῷ λόγῳ ἐπιγίνεται, ἀχώριστος αὐτοῦ μετὰ τὸ ἐπιγενέσθαι τυγχάνουσα.

\(^{173}\) Ibid., 2.131, SC 120:294: οὖτως ὃ γέγονεν ἐν αὐτῷ, οὐχὶ δὲ ἦν ἐν αὐτῷ, ζωῇ ἦν; Heine, 129.

\(^{174}\) Trin. 2.20, SC 443:308.
potential creation of all things. Hilary's emphasis here is that in the eternal generation of the Son, all things are created in him; the 'life' of creation is in the Son from his generation. That the Son was born as life, and did not become life 'after his birth', and that there is no interval between his birth and his perfection are crucial to this reading. A string of verses is used to interpret John 1:3-4 (and 1:1-4 generally) in this passage, governed principally by Colossians 1:16, all things made through him is extended by Paul to 'through him and in him'. John 10:30, 'I and the Father are one', along with John 14:9, 16:15, 5:26, Matthew 11:27, and Colossians 2:9: *in eo plenitudo divinitatis corporaliter*, are used to expand his exegesis of John 1:3-4 to explain that all things are created 'in' him because he is Life, and thus all existence is conditioned upon him. Further, the 'in him' signifies that when the Creator Son was born, the world was both potentially created and redeemed in him. There is no confusion between Creator and creature here, and no sense that the potentiality of the world and its redemption are in any way necessary to the Godhead (as perhaps Tertullian’s economic Trinity could be in danger of admitting). It is to say, rather, that in the eternal birth of the Son life has been given and received, and that the Son did not at some point become life,

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175 Meijering, *Hilary*, 102, notes a notion of potential creation in Hilary’s Latin tradition in order to avoid the famous Epicurean objection to the gods arbitrarily deciding to create the world (see Lucrecius, *De rer. nat.* 5; Cicero, *De nat. deor.* 1.9.21). However, when I use this term 'potential creation' I am speaking of something unique to Hilary due to its anthropological significance (which is necessarily and inherently dependent upon divine generation). Hilary's account differs in that it does not only seek to defend divinity but to define humanity. The language of 'potential creation' is also important to distinguish Hilary's thought from a doctrine of eternal creation. Hilary is clear that, though creation exists eternally in the life of the Son, this is not an eternal existence of material reality, as will become evidently clear in the discussion of his reading of Proverbs 8 in the next chapter. Hilary does not use the phrase 'potential creation' himself, but it provides a way for us to categorize his discussion of all creation being 'in' the Son from eternity in his generation: that the Son contains eternally within himself the 'origin of the universe' (*uniuersitatis exordium*) (*Trin.* 8.50), that Christ has existed eternally as Creator, and is the Creator of 'infinite things' (*Trin.* 12.39), which are not material, but real and in some way existent nonetheless.

176 see *Trin.* 8.50, and discussion on this passage below.

177 In which, 'Creation and history threaten to become factors in the inner procession of God' (Grillmeier, *Christ*, 112-13). Tertullian’s notion of 'economy' is discussed in Chapter 3.
or inherit life, or become Creator as if he had not always existed as the Creator and the Life and the giver of life. All things are created not only through him, but in him, because in the Son's generation the world was potentially created in him: *In ipso autem creata, quia nascebatur creator Deus.*

Hilary's understanding of potential creation will become more explicit and clear within the framework of his doctrine of divine infinity, and particularly in his exegesis of Proverbs 8, as seen in the Chapter 2 of this thesis. There, Hilary speaks of a 'perpetual and eternal' preparation of creation, in which the things that are 'yet to be' are in God 'already made'. He claims creation was 'established with God in an equal eternity of infinity'. These references will be discussed in detail in the context of Hilary's doctrine of divine infinity below, in which the explicit purpose and impact of his idea of potential creation, and his exegesis of John 1.1-4 generally, come fully into view. But it is his polemical reading of John 1.1-4 discussed here which forms the exegetical foundation for his doctrine of divine infinity and reading of Proverbs 8.

Hilary has more in mind than the doctrine of creation, or an explanation of the cosmos in his idea of potential creation. He is speaking about a salvific and, indeed, anthropological reality. The text of John itself continues to evidence this in the next phrase: 'This life is the light of humanity', which Hilary addresses in the very next paragraph of 2.21, which of course, not seeing the idea of potential creation in the Living Image, is why Origen must reject the idea that the Word

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178 *Trin.* 2.20, SC 443:308.  
181 Ibid., 12.40, SC 462:442.
always had life in him.\textsuperscript{182} But Hilary’s argument goes beyond simply referencing the rest of the verse.

He further supports his argument with his understanding of Christ as the image of God and the firstborn of all creation. In Trin. 8.50, he explains that Christ can be called the firstborn of every creature 'because all things are created in him' (\textit{quia in ipso creata omnia sunt}),\textsuperscript{183} and our previous discussion is brought straight into the discussion of Christ as the firstborn and image of God with the quotation of Colossians 1:15-20.\textsuperscript{184} This quotation directly connects firstborn language with both the Son’s eternal generation and Christ’s assumed human nature in the incarnation, and further with the resurrection from the dead, placing the argument firmly in a soteriological context. The Son, as the image of the invisible God, is the firstborn in the resurrection of every creature while at the same time the firstborn for eternity (\textit{dum qui primogenitus creaturae est, idem primogenitus ad aeternitatem est}):

So that to him spiritual things, created in the firstborn (\textit{primogenito creata}), owe it that they may abide, and humans owe it to him that in the firstborn from the dead they are born again into eternity (\textit{primogenito ex mortuis renascantur aeterna}). For he is himself the beginning (\textit{Ipse est enim initium}) who as the Son is the image, and as he is the image of God, he is also the firstborn of every creature, containing in himself the origin of the universe (\textit{uniuersitatis exordium}). . . . And because all things consist in him, the fullness [of divinity] is pleased to dwell in himself: at the same time, in him all things are reconciled, in him and through him alone, in whom all things were

\textsuperscript{182} See Jo. 2.131, where Origen states that the life cannot always be in the Word as it is a life in relation to humanity.

\textsuperscript{183} Trin. 8.50, SC 448:458.

\textsuperscript{184} It is significant that Homoiosian argumentation, in anti-Homoian/Heteroousian and anti-Photinian polemic also connects John 1.3-4, Colossians 1.15-16, and the concept of 'life'. They do not build constructively upon this as Hilary does regarding potential creation and the doctrine of divine infinity which upholds it, but Hilary's polemical pattern follows the Homoioussians. They also connect John 1.3-4 with Proverbs 8, as does Hilary, and also with John 5.19 and John 5.26, which are central to Hilary's argument. See Epiphanius \textit{haer.} 8.2; Williams, 441-42.
created, through himself and in himself (in quo per ipsum in ipso omnia sunt creata).\textsuperscript{185}

This connection of the potential creation of all things in eternal generation with the incarnation in the temporal birth emphasizes that all creation has its existence and redemption, its origin and destiny, ‘in him’ who is the Life and the Image, the Firstborn of all creation.

*Trin.* 8.51 continues with more direct image language, much in the way that 8.50 does with that of firstborn. He poses the question: 'Do you now perceive what it is to be the image of God?' and answers that 'all things are created in him and through him'.\textsuperscript{186} The origin and destiny connection is again made as Hilary notes that as all things are created and reconciled in him they are also done so through him, so that he is working in the unity of the Father’s nature, not simply the Father working something in him as a passive agent. In this the Father is ‘reconciling all things to himself’ (2 Cor 5:18-19). By the Son’s existence as the living Image of the Living he has all that the Father does, and is all that the Father is in nature through his birth, and therefore has life in himself.\textsuperscript{187} When the divine nature works, the Son works. So Hilary’s answer to the question of what it is to be the image of God—that all things are created in him and through him—takes shape in the idea that the Son being the image of God means complete and entire unity with the Father’s nature through the eternal birth, so that by his very existence as the living Image, as Life from Life, all things are created and

\textsuperscript{185} *Trin.* 8.50, SC 448:458-60. The language of universitas is extremely important for Hilary, particularly in reference to Christ’s assumption of humanity, which is discussed in Chapter 5. Here, I have translated it as 'universe' as the context is in Christ’s creation of all things, but the special reference to humanity in Christ is certainly applicable in this passage. See *Frg* B.2.11.3(30), CSEL 65:152 also for Hilary’s use of ‘firstborn’ language from Colossians 1 to speak of potential creation in Christ.

\textsuperscript{186} Ibid., 8.51, SC 448:460.

\textsuperscript{187} Ibid., 2.8, 11. See also 3.4; 7.27.
reconciled in and through him, both potentially in his eternal being as the uniuersitatis exordium, and as the Life and the Light of humanity as primigenitus ex mortuis.

The themes of Hilary’s reading of John 1.1-4 will surface continually throughout his entire theological project. The eternal generation of the Son is the primary material for understanding the intra-divine relationship and the divine-human one. We shall see in the next chapter, essentially in the framework of 'potential creation' and in Hilary’s polemical context against Homoianism, the development of what would come to undergird this, that of divine infinity. The anthropological implications of the very existence of God as Father and Son, as Life from Life, are realized only with divine infinity as their premise. The infinite God as naturally productive necessitates for Hilary a hopeful reality for humanity. Its potentiality and fulfillment, origin and destiny, are both founded and perfected in the infinite self-giving productivity of God.
CHAPTER TWO

Divine Infinity and Human Progress

Introduction

Recent scholarship has acknowledged the central place the doctrine of divine infinity holds in Hilary’s thought. John McDermott has traced the development of the idea in Hilary’s writings, and explored some significant implications it has for his trinitarian theology.¹ More recently, Mark Weedman has shown that while the doctrine of divine infinity and its significance for Christian theology is virtually unanimously ascribed to the pure ingenuity of Gregory of Nyssa, both Hilary and Basil of Caesarea had previously developed the idea in their polemical contexts against Homoian and Eunomian theologies.² While these two works accomplish their set tasks of tracing Hilary’s development of the idea of divine infinity and properly setting it in its polemical orientation, neither fully addresses the question of the doctrine’s full significance in Hilary’s own thought, nor do any works which deal tangentially with it. It is my contention that without a full outworking of the theological significance of divine infinity for Hilary, the distinctiveness of his theology cannot be fully realized. This chapter also seeks to demonstrate that,

² Weedman, ‘Polemical Context’.
while the soteriological implications of divine infinity for Hilary have been briefly noted, without an exploration of the exegetical foundation of the doctrine in *Trin.*, namely John 1.1-4, the theological and anthropological significance of infinity for Hilary will remain concealed.

This chapter will locate this significance first through an examination of the developments of Hilary's argumentation, which move from the traditional pro-Nicene Father-Son analogy to describe the unity of the Father and the Son to the infinite nature of God itself. Second, this shift in argumentation will assist us in developing a working definition of infinity for Hilary, and how this definition ventures beyond previous understandings of the idea. Third, I will further examine Hilary’s exegetical foundation of divine infinity. His original and creative reading of Proverbs 8.22, based on an interpretive foundation of John 1.3-4 seen in the previous chapter and elaborated upon here, allows him to read the passage positively toward an understanding of eternal generation, and leads to remarkable implications for both the doctrine of God and for divine-human relations in Hilary’s thought. Fourth, these implications will be explored, principally through an investigation of his understanding of the *progressus in infinitum* of the mind toward the infinite God, which reveals the primary significance of Hilary’s doctrine of divine infinity, particularly in regard to anthropology.

*‘Traditional’ arguments of Father-Son relations for eternal generation*

The fatherhood and sonship of God do not deceive us, Hilary argues.\(^3\) The names assigned to Father and Son are information about the divine nature.\(^4\) This

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\(^3\) *Trin* 6.26, SC 448:222. *Non fallit itaque in uocabulis Deus, nec se aut Pater mentitur aut Filius.*

\(^4\) Ibid., 2.5; see 7.9.
idea of name corresponding to nature is a staple pro-Nicene category for interpreting the relationship of the Father and the Son, and produces an understanding of correlative of the Father and the Son which supports eternal generation. Indeed, the mention of Father involves sonship in the Name. This concept was largely borrowed from Origen. Both Origen and Athanasius use this idea of the names of Father and Son representing nature ‘as theological "raw material" from which they can build an authoritative account of the relationship between the two’, and ‘the correlation between these names and human conception and birth also allows them to suggest a way for the Son to receive the Father’s nature without any loss on the Father’s part’. This type of Father-Son analogy, that just as human fatherhood requires a son, so the Father must always have his Son to be Father, becomes a central point of contention between pro-Nicenes and their opponents, which will eventually, principally in Hilary, cause a shift in pro-Nicene argumentation.

The true significance of the Father-Son analogy for pro-Nicenes in the mid-fourth century was that for them it necessitated a unity or connection on the level of ousia. The Father-Son relationship creates a condition of causality which produces a like nature (i.e. not a Creator-creature relationship). The analogy had a long history in anti-monarchian polemic. Not only Origen, but Tertullian claimed that for a father or son, having these relations (fatherhood and sonship) are what make them what they are. They must, then, eternally have these relations, at least

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5 Ibid., 2.3, SC 448:278: Numquid natura Fili non continetur in nomine?

6 See Widdicombe, Fatherhood, 59. For Origen, names and language are not a mere human convention (a rejection of Aristotelian theory, see Cels. 1.24 and 5.54)—there is a direct and intrinsic relationship between a name and the object named.

7 Weedman, Trinitarian, 150.
in some sense, as a father is not a father without a son.\textsuperscript{8} This is against any monarchian tendency that God is Father while being Father and Son while being Son. This polemic, naturally, continues in the use of this Father-Son analogy in the fourth century, but when the Homoians, also anti-monarchians, begin to use this Father-Son analogy against pro-Nicenes, whom they accuse of monarchian tendencies, there comes a pressing need for new ways of expressing the Father-Son relationship, and indeed, perhaps new ways of speaking about God entirely.

For Athanasius the Father is always the Father, and the Son is always the Son.\textsuperscript{9} The Father-Son relation is not an accidental one, it is not a property contained by or attributed to the Godhead, but ‘the very life of the Godhead’,\textsuperscript{10} as ‘Father’ and ‘Son’ are proper names for the divine nature. Athanasius’s main terminology used for this concept is that the Son is \textit{proper} (\textit{ἱδιος}) to the Father’s \textit{ousia}. The problem with his \textit{ἱδιος} terminology is that it

serves to reinforce his tendency to present the Father/Son relationship as most like that of a person and their faculties. Thus while this language is an important tool in Athanasius’s armoury it probably served only to reinforce his opponents’ sense that the use of \textit{ousia} language could only serve to confuse the clear distinction between Father and Son, God and Word.\textsuperscript{11}

The Father-Son analogy, originally wielded as an anti-monarchian polemic, has, at least potentially, come to be seen as a monarchian idiom.

\textsuperscript{8} Prax. 10:3, CCSL 2:1169: \textit{Habeat necesse est pater filium ut pater sit, et filius patrem ut filius sit.}

\textsuperscript{9} Ar. 1.19.

\textsuperscript{10} Pollard, \textit{Johannine Christology}, 200.

\textsuperscript{11} Ayres, \textit{Nicaea}, 115. Weedman, \textit{Trinitarian}, 193-4, notes how this is different than Hilary’s argumentation. While both ground their understanding in the divine nature, Athanasius’s category of \textit{ἱδιος} differs from Hilary’s infinity. This ‘permits Hilary to forbid the Homoians from tainting the discussion of the Son’s eternal birth with material, created considerations’, and this difference is ultimately what allows Hilary to argue positively for eternal generation from Proverbs 8, while Athanasius cannot.
From the very beginning of fourth-century theological controversies the Father-Son analogy had been used against those arguing for the full divinity of the Son. Not only is the language seen as Sabellian, but as early as Arius’s letters to Eusebius of Nicomedia and Alexander, he writes that those who use the argument of relations (that for there to be a father there must also be a son) are positing two ultimate beings, two unbegottens or ingenerates. Further, speaking of the Son as being of the nature of the Father is to speak of him as a portion or emission of the Father (so they are somehow at once accused of Sabellianism, ditheism, and gnosticism!). More precise arguments develop among those who appose the ‘Athanasian’ reading of Nicaea. Eusebius of Caesarea can also capitalize on the names Father and Son, but sees them as demonstrating the opposite reality as Athanasius, ‘they are co-ordinate with the contrasting pairs first and second, and ingenerate and generate’. In the mid-fourth century, Homoians pick up on this thread, and, while accusations of Sabellianism and God being divisible remain, the Father-Son analogy begins to be turned on its head, or more precisely, carried to its logical conclusion. They argue, a father must exist before he exists as father. This is drawn from the argument of relations being seen on human terms, understanding the generation of the Son from the Father in the way that the birth of a son takes place in human experience. While pro-Nicenes have brought this analogy to the forefront of the debate through their understanding of the relationships of names and natures, the analogy is now being used against them. The mid-fourth century begins to see, principally in


\[14\] See discussion of this argument in Novation (Trin. 31.3, CCSL 4:75) on p34. There are no surviving Homoian texts which directly reveal their use of these arguments. Hilary refutes the arguments at Trin. 12.22-33, particularly that a Father must first exist himself before begetting a Son at 12.33. Basil of Ancyra refutes similar arguments at Epiphanius *haer.* 73.3.
Hilary's writings, new formations not only of this argument of relations, but, as mentioned above, of how to speak of God *tout court*.

**Name and nature in Hilary**

Hilary, in a very qualified theological sense, holds to a natural view of names. The name 'God' ascribed to the Word is not a mere title (*accidens nomen*), a name which is not true or derived from nature (*non naturale nomen in genere*). Due to the divine birth, the names of the Son, and all references to his divinity, are *natural*, and not accidental. There is an 'inseparable profession of name and nature', so that, 'if he is not of the nature, then he cannot claim the name, for if the name of the nature is in him, the power of the nature cannot be absent from him'.

There is a caveat, however, regarding Hilary's theory of names corresponding to nature. Much of the discussion of Hilary's theory of names is largely contained within, what Tarmo Toom calls, a 'self-perpetuating consensus that there were two diametrically different understandings of naming in antiquity'. The first being naturalism: names contain within them the nature of the thing named (Cratylus, Stoic, Origen, Eunomius). The second being conventionalism: names have no intrinsic relationship to nature at all, they 'are arbitrary designations of things that they nominate' (Hermogenes, Aristotle, Porphyry, the Cappadocians,

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15 *Trin.* 7.11, SC 448:298. See also *falsum nomen* (5.23); *honoris nomen* (7.12); and *nomen inane* (12.54). For a thorough study of Hilary's theory of names, see Toom, 'Name(s)'.

16 Ibid., 7.10, SC 448:296.

17 Ibid., 5.38, SC 448:166.

18 Ibid., 5.14, SC 448:120. Smulders, *Doctrine*, 127, notes that for Hilary, 'Le nom propre . . . indique ce «qu'elle est». «Ce qu'elle est» ne se surajoute pas à la chose, c'est son essence, sa cause intime et immanente, sa nature propre'.

19 Toom, 'Name(s)', 460.
Augustine). Due to Hilary’s assertions of the natural quality of names, one might be persuaded that he is a naturalist, and indeed, this has been argued. But Toom has rightly argued that this can only be said of Hilary in a very qualified sense. First, Hilary uses names in both a naturalist and conventionalist sense, and directly distinguishes between two types of names: the *naturae nomen* and the *falsum nomen* or *accidens nomen* (or title), a name (*naturae nomen*) is natural, whereas a title is conventional. Toom concludes, 'At best, Hilary would be a naturalist only in his theological use of names, that is, he holds that only certain divine names correspond to what they name, whereas other names may well be conventional'. The second complication which Toom identifies in labeling Hilary a naturalist is that his 'emphatically apophatic approach to speaking about God relativized his conviction that certain divine names designated the nature of what they named', and 'the names of God may well be natural, but the full meaning of these few natural names is nevertheless beyond human comprehension'. This apophatic hesitation is an essential foundation for all theological language for Hilary, and whatever he says which lends itself toward a naturalist understanding of naming must be cloaked with this apophatic indisposition of Hilary to say anything of God beyond what God has spoken of regarding himself. Hilary utilizes the names of God only in so far as he sees them

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20 Ibid. Cratylus and Hermogenes are characters in Plato’s dialogue.
22 *Trin.* 5.23.
23 Ibid., 7.11.
24 Ibid., 7.9. See Toom, 'Name(s)', 469.
25 Toom, 'Name(s)', 474.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid., 475.
in agreement with the text of Scripture (Matt 28.19-20, Jn 10.30, etc.) and only in so far as it assists his polemic against those who, being naturalists in their own right, have understood biblical names (such as Father and Son, or 'true God' in Isa. 45.5) to deny a true and natural equality of divinity in the Father and the Son, either by demoting the Son to the level of creation or denying the Son any real existence at all in identifying him with the Father.

Divine birth and Father-Son analogy

In Trin. 2 and 7, Hilary utilizes the natural and conventional views of names discussed above in the direct context of the names Father and Son. The names of 'Father' and 'Son' are not mere titles, but at once secure the distinction of the two 'personally' and their natural unity. Hilary borrows Homoiousian polemical strategies to combat any subordinationist or monarchian tendencies in his opponents.

During Hilary's exile, he came into contact with a theological and ecclesial world which was previously unknown to him, both through exposure to Greek literature and personal engagement with Greek Christians.28 In his exile, Hilary acquired a much more thorough appreciation for and understanding of the controversy in which he had become so enthralled. Indeed, one could say that his entire narrative understanding of the controversy was rewritten, and the lens through which he approached it, theologically and historically, completely refocussed. This is principally due to his relationship to Basil of Ancyra and the Homoiousians.

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28 For Hilary's interaction with Greek literature in his exile, previously unknown to him in Gaul, see Doignon, Hilaire, 176.
Hilary had an unusually lenient experience in exile. He was, it seems, allowed to roam freely throughout the empire. He spent time with Basil of Ancyra and Eleusius of Cyzicus, and on some level appeared to have continued to engage in the public life of the Church, attending the council of Seleucia in 359, and later that year requesting a hearing with Constantius in Constantinople. This freedom of movement contributed greatly to Hilary's theological development, and between the beginning and end of his exile, the internal evidence of his own writings further shows how his entire perspective on the nature of the controversy had shifted.

In his earlier Against Valens and Ursacius, Hilary was concerned primarily with defending Athanasius, directly confronting the efforts of Valens and Ursacius throughout the West to condemn Athanasius (whatever the true circumstance of Hilary's exile, he was convinced himself that it was for theological reasons). However, Athanasius is completely out of the picture in Syn., which, as Meslin notes, is particularly startling given his important role in the Serdican Creed of 343, which is a creed Hilary gives prominence to in Syn. Hilary 'has come to see the conflict through a different lens, one influenced by Basil and Sirmium 357, and Athanasius plays no part in this new vision'.

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29 Syn. 63, 90.
30 Sulpicius Severus, Chron. 2.42. Weedman, 'Hilary', 304n42, suggests that Hilary might have gone to Seleucia to support his new ally Basil.
31 Beckwith, Hilary, 9.
32 See, for example, Syn. 2. See Carl L. Beckwith, 'The Condemnation and Exile of Hilary of Poitiers at the Synod of Béziers (356 C.E.)', JECS 13.1 (Spring, 2005): 21-38, for a detailed discussion.
33 Weedman, 'Hilary', 505.
35 Weedman, 'Hilary', 505.
provides clear evidence of Homoiousian influence on Hilary, influence which, until very recently, has generally troubled scholars.

Weedman points out two challenges to this Homoiousian influence. First, the widespread scholarly opinion (which the most recent scholars have now denied) that Hilary's thought did not develop, even as a result of his exile. Second, the deeply ingrained assumption that the various groups or alliances in the 350s can be divided into 'Nicenes' and 'anti-Nicenes'. The second obstacle has simply become historically unsustainable, and is no longer a point of scholarly contention. And the first challenge can be dismissed based upon the historical conditions of Hilary's exile and the internal textual evidence of his transformed perspective on the controversy mentioned above, as well as the development of his theological arguments within *Trin*. Given the historical details of Hilary's exile—his freedom of movement, association with the Homoiousians, and his continued involvement in the controversy (indeed, perhaps far more central involvement, or at least observation, than he could have ever experienced in Poitiers)—it is evident that Hilary and Basil shared the same polemical context, and 'the fact that Hilary is western and Basil is eastern is less important than their common enemies (both theologically and politically) Valens and Ursacius, and...

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36 e.g. Weedman, *Trinitarian*, Chapter 4, *passim*, and his, 'Hilary', 491-510; Beckwith, *Hilary*, 66-8, 210, *passim*. It was perhaps, however, as mentioned in the Introduction to this thesis, Doignon and Brennecke's works which opened the door for this transition.

37 See, for example, Smulders, *Doctrine*, 235-49; Hanson, *Search*, 471-75, who, partly due to false historical assumptions, such as his belief that Hilary wrote the whole of *Trin*. before Syn. (p471), also refuses to acknowledge genuine development in Hilary's thought. See Weedman, *Trinitarian*, 18-19, for an important assessment of Hanson's discussion.

38 Weedman, 'Hilary', 493. My discussion here of Hilary's relationship to Basil of Ancyra and the Homoiousians directly evidences the point made at 14n11 regarding why I have not used 'Nicene', 'pro-Nicene' or 'anti-Nicene' in a programatic sense in this thesis.

that the western Hilary only really comes into his own as a polemicist in the East'.

Hilary's perspective on the controversy in Syn. is adopted from Basil of Ancyra—he has come to see these common opponents through Basil's lens. This is seen, first, in the councils Hilary chooses to discuss and the order in which he presents them. He reports on Sirmium 357, then follows by listing Basil's anathemas from his Synodical Letter of 358 as an effective defense against the 357 Creed, and proceeds by reproducing the texts of the 'Dedication Creed' of Antioch 341, the eastern Creed of Serdica 343, and the (anti-Photinian) Sirmium 351, all of which are named in Basil's letter. As Weedman notes, 'This is at once a political and a theological move. By framing his own work around Basil's authorities, Hilary has cast his lot with Basil's party, both politically and theologically'.

This is not to say that Hilary went to Constantinople in 360 as a Homoiousian, and Hilary does not simply reproduce Basil's thought to align himself with the Homoiousians, but he adopts Basil's polemical perspective and many of his theological categories and works creatively with them in order to shape his own mature thought.

Hilary has learned from the Homoiousians of the need for a more deliberate defense against monarchianism within his defense against the Homoians, and that Nicaea's homoousios is not the only valid theological weapon to defeat Homoian claims. This second point is again a direct rebuttal against a bipartisan divide of the mid-fourth century into 'Nicenes' or 'pro-Nicenes' and 'anti-Nicenes',

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40 Weedman, 'Hilary', 504.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid., 507, 510. One example in this immediate context is his use of essentia to alter Basil's definition of ousia at Syn. 12 (Weedman, 'Hilary', 507), and his use of the Father-Son analogy to support his own primary theological category of nativitas, discussed below.
as Hilary himself refuses to understand the controversy this way.\textsuperscript{44} The anti-‘Sabellian’ emphasis is not, of course, new for Hilary, and before he made contact with the Homoiousians he had argued strongly against monarchian and Photinian agendas using his inherited Latin anti-monarchian defenses.\textsuperscript{45} Claims made by scholars that Hilary’s anti-monarchian polemic was purely gained though Basil and the Homoiousians and lacked Latin precedent are overstatements,\textsuperscript{46} however, Hilary learns to better wield his anti-monarchian polemic in the context of controversy with his Homoian and Photinian opponents through the use of Homoiousian categories, principally those of ‘name’ and ‘birth’.

Hilary's use of name and birth as theological categories owes nothing to his Latin tradition and is purely of Greek heritage, and is assimilated by Hilary through Basil of Ancyra.\textsuperscript{47} Basil begins his letter by adhering to the natural meaning of names, and uses the baptismal formula of Matthew 28.19 to support his natural name theory and demonstrate the likeness of the Father and Son.\textsuperscript{48} He utilises the Father-Son analogy, stating very clearly the necessity of removing any materialist connotations of generation, to argue that as a father cannot produce a nature which is dissimilar to his own, the Father and Son must be like according to \textit{ousia}.\textsuperscript{49} When Hilary asserts in \textit{Trin.} 7 that the concepts of name and birth contain within them all that is necessary to understand the Son as God\textsuperscript{50} he shows

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{44} For Hilary's acknowledgement of the weaknesses of \textit{homoousios}, see \textit{Syn.} 68-71.
\item \textsuperscript{45} See Beckwith, 'Photinian Opponents', and Williams, 'Defining Orthodoxy'.
\item \textsuperscript{46} e.g. Simonetti, 'Hilary', 40; Weedman, 'Hilary', 505. Weedman does admit that there was a Latin theological heritage of apposing monarchianism (506n51), but remains steadfast in stating that Hilary’s anti-monarchianism is learned from Basil.
\item \textsuperscript{47} Weedman, \textit{Trinitarian}, 136. This originates with Origen (see \textit{Prin.} 1.2.10), and is Basil’s main line of argument. See discussion of Origen and Athanasius above.
\item \textsuperscript{48} Epiphanius \textit{haer.} 73.3.2-3.
\item \textsuperscript{49} Ibid., 73.4.2.
\item \textsuperscript{50} See \textit{Trin.} 7.9-25.
\end{itemize}
that he has adopted the fundamental categories of Homoiousian theology and that he has come to use them to address his central polemical concerns against the Homoians.\textsuperscript{51} Hilary's use of these categories are not a mere restatement, however. He uses Homoiousian categories to get at his primary concept of \textit{nativitas}.\textsuperscript{52} Hilary's heavy qualification of the 'naturalist' theory of names, discussed above, is significant for his adaptation of Basil's understanding for his own purposes. Hilary's looser commitment to a natural theory of names as fundamental to trinitarian theology, and therefore also a less stringent commitment to the classical use of the Father-Son analogy, will enable him to modify his argument in response to the Homoian critique of the analogy, which opens the door for significant constructive developments for Hilary, particularly regarding the doctrine of divine infinity.\textsuperscript{53}

The significance of Basil of Ancyra and the Homoiousians in the background of Hilary's polemical arguments against the Homoians (and monarchians) is not minute. The use of the names 'Father' and 'Son' were key polemical principles for the Homoiousians in order to demonstrate both distinction of persons and similarity of essence in the Father and Son.\textsuperscript{54} It is obvious why this view was so effective against Homoians as it restricts their ability to conflate ideas of 'birth'

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Weedman, \textit{Trinitarian}, 156.
\item Ibid.
\item Hilary's advancement beyond the Father-Son analogy in response to Homoian critique is discussed below.
\item Epiphanius \textit{haer.} 73.4.2; 73.12.6ff. See Weedman, 'Hilary', 500-2.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
and 'creation' under their conventional use of the names Father and Son.\textsuperscript{55} In \textit{Syn.} 20, discussing Basil of Ancyra's twelfth anathema (which he numbers as the seventh), Hilary accuses his opponents of regarding the names Father and Son as mere 'titles' and not as expressing \textit{naturalis et genuinae essentiae}.\textsuperscript{56} They only hold a conventional rather than natural meaning for these 'titles', and the terms therefore do not tell us anything about who God is in himself.

Hilary borrows Basil's Father-Son analogy, and the language of 'offspring' (\textit{progenies}) therein, in order to secure differentiation of the Father and the Son against monarchian tendencies and also to demonstrate that they are \textit{unum} and \textit{unus ab uno},\textsuperscript{57} that there is a \textit{naturalis nativitas} which results in a \textit{naturae aequalitatem}.\textsuperscript{58} This equality of nature modifies Basil's argument. While Hilary utilizes Basil's polemical strategy, he retains his opinion that a pro-Nicene understanding of \textit{homoousios} is the best weapon against the Homoians.\textsuperscript{59} While \textit{homoousios} is not a first-order theological principle in the way that \textit{nativitas} is for Hilary (evidenced by his confidence in the orthodoxy of Basil of Ancyra and

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\textsuperscript{55} The Letter of George of Laodicea provides an interesting commentary on theories of names in mid-fourth century polemic. He states in his letter, Epiph. \textit{haer.} 73.19.1-5, that Homoians/Heteroousians seek to overcome Homooiusian arguments by using the terms 'generate' and 'ingenerate' rather than 'Father' and 'Son'. He argues against ingenerate-generate language in favour of father-son language as ingenerate-generate language provides no information about the relationship between the two or give indication of their nature, rather it puts the Son on the same level as creation. It makes no affirmation that the Son is related to the Father in a different way than any other 'generated' or, indeed, 'created' thing. This is significant here because it shows a naturalist view of names in Homooiusian/Heteroousian polemic as well, which demonstrates not only a selective use of naturalist naming in Hilary, but also in Homoian arguments. One cannot simply categorise Hilary's position as 'Stoic' or naturalist, or the Homoians as 'Aristotelian' or conventionalist. George is writing in 359 (see reference at 14.7 to the easterners coming to Sirmium 'last year' (i.e. 358)), which means his polemic is engaging the same type of theology as Hilary. This makes for speculation as well regarding how much writers like Hilary might have been engaging the early theology of Eunomius, as the Homooiusians surely were.

\textsuperscript{56} \textit{Syn.} 20, PL 10:496. See Beckwith, \textit{Hilary}, 116.

\textsuperscript{57} \textit{Trin.} 2.11, SC 443:296.

\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., 7.15, SC 448:306.

\textsuperscript{59} For a helpful discussion of Hilary's use of Basil's Father-Son analogy in Book 2 of \textit{Trin.}, which this brief discussion follows, see Beckwith, \textit{Hilary}, 101-18.
the Homoiousians regardless of their acceptance or rejection of the term *homoousios*\(^{60}\)), it remains in his mind the most effective language for combating Homoian theology. Hilary's use of this analogy is further predicated more strongly than Basil's by his acknowledgement of the insufficiency of all human language concerning God—the apophatic approach spoken of above which qualifies Hilary's theory of names.\(^{61}\)

In Hilary's use of the Father-Son analogy, he focusses on the mutual dependence of the Father and Son, which allows him to deconstruct the Homoian argument at its most central and cherished point, the transcendent and marvelous divinity of the Father. He argues, that due to Father-Son relations, and their dependence upon one another, 'these preachers of a new Christ . . . in the same way preach another God the Father'.\(^{62}\) For Hilary, the Son must be everything that the Father is in order for, not only the Son, but also the Father to be honoured for who he really is:

They praise God the Father, worthily, as is fitting—he is by nature unattainable, invisible, inviolable, indescribable, infinite, prescient, powerful, beneficent, mobile, passing through all things remaining inside and outside of them, and perceived as 'all in all' (*omnia in omnibus*) (1 Cor 15.28). But when they add to this preeminence of praise: 'alone good, alone omnipotent, alone immortal' (1 Tim 6.15-16), who does not perceive that this pious praise aims to exclude the Lord Jesus Christ from this blessedness, from honour ascribed to God only, by the limitation 'alone'?\(^{63}\)

And in doing so, due to the mutuality of fatherhood and sonship, they not only restrict the genuine sonship of the Son but also the fatherhood of God. Indeed, For Hilary, *Patrem consummat Filius*.\(^{64}\) Hilary has, under the general doctrine of

\(^{60}\) *Syn.* 72-77, 91.

\(^{61}\) *Trin.* 2.2.

\(^{62}\) Ibid., 11.4, SC 462:300.

\(^{63}\) Ibid., 300-302.

\(^{64}\) Ibid., 7.31, SC 448:348.
the Father and the Son, enforced the seemingly inexplicable and impossible doctrine of mutual inhabitation in John 14.10: 'I am in the Father and the Father is in me'.\textsuperscript{65} Further, because of the divine birth, the Father must not only be Father, but must be Father of a Son who is fully divine in every way that he is. The divine generation is \textit{viventis naturae ex vivente nativitas},\textsuperscript{66} and therefore the Son is the 'living Image of the Living', who has life in himself as the Father has life in himself—for the Father communicates to the Son all that he is.\textsuperscript{67} If the Son, born of the Father, does not possess all the qualities of the divine (including the apophatic markers of divinity quoted in \textit{Trin.} 11.4 above) this evidences that the Father does not possess them. Not only must the Father have a Son, but 'il est essentiel à Dieu le Père d’être le Père d’un tel Fils'.\textsuperscript{68} This principle is foundational to all of Hilary's theology and polemical argumentation. It is absolutely necessary and essential to the divine life as Trinity that the Father, infinitely and eternally, give all that he is to the Son, and that the Son, infinitely and eternally, has received all that the Father is from him. The Father must be Father of this exact irreducibly divine Son unless he is to be understood as less than the irreducibly divine Father.

We begin to see here Hilary's transformation of the Father-Son analogy in light of divine infinity, his 'ultimate philosophical weapon'\textsuperscript{69} against the Homoians. The Father simply is,\textsuperscript{70} and this simple and infinite nature is what makes the Son's generation differ from human generation, and it is what demands

\textsuperscript{65} Smulders, \textit{Doctrine}, 145. See \textit{Trin.} 3.1.

\textsuperscript{66} \textit{Trin.}, 6.35, SC 448:242.

\textsuperscript{67} Ibid., 6.13.

\textsuperscript{68} Smulders, \textit{Doctrine}, 155. See \textit{Trin.} 9.61.

\textsuperscript{69} McDermott, 'Hilary', 173.

\textsuperscript{70} \textit{Trin.} 12.17.
perfect union of the Father and the Son through that generation. As Hilary sees it, the fundamental error in the Homoian argument, which otherwise seems perfectly coherent, is that they do not recognize that this is a divine generation, not a human one. As the Son is born 'not prior to temporal but to infinite things',\textsuperscript{71} it is a categorical error to speak of the divine generation in the same way as human generation, beyond the single point of analogical reference that a son's origin is in his father, and therefore his nature is given from his father, and even that analogical site, while it aids our understanding, must be understood as infinitely insufficient to comprehend divine generation.\textsuperscript{72} Hilary's doctrine of divine infinity allows the Father to be cause and origin, and the Son to exist by birth from the Father, yet at the same time for there to be a birth without a beginning.\textsuperscript{73} The Son is born and yet always exists. To be born means nothing other than to receive one's nature,\textsuperscript{74} and in the case of the begotten-God, Hilary argues, that nature is an infinite, immutable and perfectly divine one.

**Reforming the analogy: the epistemological reorientation of the doctrine of God**

As Hilary progressed in his writing of *Trin.*, his argumentation for defending the eternal generation developed. Weedman notes that, ‘Sometime between the writing of *De Trinitate* 7 and *De Trinitate* 12, Hilary had come to grips with a potential problem with the central claim of his doctrine of God, that the “name

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\textsuperscript{71} Ibid. 12.39, SC 462:438.

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid. 12.32, SC 462:428: *si quid de Filio mens retroacta scrutabitur, nihil aliud scrutinatis sensui quam natum esse semper occurred.* Whereas for Athanasius, the analogy of human father-son relations is useful in some way to assist one to understand divine generation (*Ar.* 1.26-27), for Hilary, ultimately it shows us what we cannot know. It demonstrates the infinity of God beyond all our finite perceptions.

\textsuperscript{73} See *Trin.* 7.14; 9.57. Smulders, *Doctrine*, 177n126, notes Athanasius's ‘très rapide allusion’ to this argument (*Ar.* 2.57). For the Homoian arguments that birth implies beginning, see *Trin.* 12.18, 22; 4.5; 6.14.

\textsuperscript{74} See *Trin.* 12.17.
reveals the nature”. Hilary has picked up on the flaw the Homoians found in the traditional Father-Son argument. His primary argument for defending eternal generation thus moves from the Father himself, to the *eternity* of the Father. The Father-Son analogy leads one to think directly of the human experience of fatherhood, and this is precisely where the analogy breaks down, and exactly the point at which the Homoians located their criticism. Hilary notes the limitations of such an analogy. When he then hesitates to put full weight into the traditional form of the Father-Son analogy, his primary means of defending eternal generation, he must find a new defense, and ‘it is at this point that Hilary puts forward one of the first constructive accounts in Christian literature of divine infinity’. His argument now hinges on the way divine causation works within the Godhead, not the traditional view that the Father must always have a Son to be Father.

The Father-Son analogy could account perhaps for a relation between the Father and the Son, but it did not seem to provide any sufficient explanation for how the Father is the *origin* of this relationship, for how this relationship is distinctly a ‘Father-Son’ one. Hilary’s argument in *Trin*. 12.16-17 demonstrates to what extent he has become dependent on the notion of divine infinity for his understanding of eternal generation. The nature of one’s birth must be

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75 Weedman, *Trinitarian*, 194.
76 Ibid., 187.
77 Trin. 12.8. Weedman, *Trinitarian*, 186, notes that Hilary addresses the question of analogies in two other earlier places in the *Trin*. (1.19 and 6.9). But, if one follows Beckwith’s thesis (Hilary, 179) that Hilary added these passages in editing after original composition, perhaps as late as 361 after return from exile, then this would add additional evidence to this material reflecting his developments later in the work in response to Homoian criticism of the Father-Son analogy.
78 Weedman, ‘Polemical Context’, 94.
79 Ibid.
understood in terms of time and cause. Humans are born from a parent, a cause or origin, which itself once did not exist. The fact that the parent came into being in time, and is an origin which was itself caused within time, necessarily means that the offspring also did. The Son, however, has an origin who is eternal, and who has no cause or origin. The Homoian argument that the nature of a father requires him to exist alone first and then produce a son cannot survive against Hilary’s conception of the categorical opposition of the fatherhood and sonship, generation and birth, in humanity and in God. It is not only that the Father must always have a Son to be called Father (the Father-Son analogy), but that this Father is infinite and eternal, entirely uncaused and unoriginated, and therefore the Son is born of this infinite nature. An eternal source can only generate an eternal offspring. Hilary writes:

It is one thing to be always eternal, without any origen, and another to be co-eternal with the Father, who is the origin. . . . If that which is born from the eternal is not born as eternal, then the Father will not be an eternal origin (iam non erit et Pater auctor aeternus). . . . What is infinite in the begetter, is also infinite in the one born (quia quod gignenti est infinitum, infinitum est etiam nascenti).

So the argument of correlativity stands, but it is not based merely on the essential relationship of the Father and the Son, but on the nature of God himself as infinite. Not a father requires a son to be father, but an eternal, infinite source requires an eternal, infinite offspring.

Weedman notes that by moving past the old analogy, more had to be done than simply rethink eternal generation, but the epistemological presuppositions that

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80 Trin. 12.16, SC 462:406: *Et haec quidem communia in rerum humanarum origine sunt, ut omnia initium sui, cum antea non fuerint, accipiant: primum quidem, ut docuimus, per tempus, deinde per causam.*

81 Ibid. 12.25, SC 462:418: *Ex aeterno autem nihil aliud quam aeternum.*

82 Ibid. 12.21, SC 462:414.
made that analogy possible also had to be revised.\textsuperscript{83} Pro-Nicenes, then, had to not only abandon a particular analogy, but:

They began to reconsider how to think about God at all. Divine infinity worked, in this context, because it allowed for a causal relationship between the Father and the Son (which preserves their distinction) outside of time (which preserves their unity). In other words, by properly conceiving of God as infinite, Pro-Nicenes came to believe that they could resolve the Trinitarian debate in ways that answered the Homoian and Eunomian critiques.\textsuperscript{84}

The move to understanding eternal generation in the context of divine infinity was an epistemological reorientation of the Christian doctrine of God.\textsuperscript{85}

\textit{Divine infinity in early Christianity}

Certain features of divine infinity are continuously affirmed throughout early Christianity, particularly that the infinite God is beyond comprehension. When Irenaeus speaks of the infinite nature of God, his main emphasis is that God contains or encompasses all things and that nothing contains God. He writes: God ‘contains all things, and is contained by no one’.\textsuperscript{86} And ‘solus Deus . . . continens omnia’.\textsuperscript{87} For Tertullian, God is unexplainable and so immeasurably great that only he truly knows himself: \textit{quod vero immensum est, solo sibi notum est}.\textsuperscript{88} Novatian emphasises that God is without time, that nothing precedes him and he

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{83} Weedman, ‘Polemical Context’, 99.
\item \textsuperscript{84} Ibid., 104.
\item \textsuperscript{85} This is not to say that Hilary alone was able to carry this reorientation through entirely. Developments in pro-Nicene thought will, of course, continue. As Weedman, \textit{Trinitarian}, 195, notes, ‘Hilary’s genius is not that he provided the solution, but that he anticipated the way that Pro-Nicene theology would have to go’. He continues, ibid., 196, ‘To read Hilary is to gain insight into exactly what Pro-Nicenes wanted to accomplish. If his thought does not attain the sophistication of later Pro-Nicenes, such as the Cappadocians, Hilary does understand what the problems are, and he has an idea of how to solve them’.
\item \textsuperscript{86} \textit{Haer.} 4.20.2, SC 100:628: \textit{omnium capax et qui a nemine capiatur}.
\item \textsuperscript{87} Ibid., 2.1.1, SC 294:26. See also 2.1.2: \textit{omnia circumteneri nec et circumtenere nemine}.
\item \textsuperscript{88} \textit{Apol.} 17.2, CCSL 1:117. This passage is clearly influential on Hilary. In particular, that the infinite nature of God is unable to be known truly demonstrates something of the reality of God’s infinite nature, and therefore actually assists us to know him.
\end{itemize}
is without beginning, and therefore the mind cannot conceive of him. God contains all things, and if he were contained by anything (including the mind) he would necessarily be less than what contains him. This tradition is supported by one central presupposition which categorically defines the Christian view of infinity of God in this period: the idea that he is radically transcendent. This is clearly emphasised by Tertullian and Novatian who stress that the Word becomes present to creation in a way in which the utterly transcendent Father cannot. Origen provides the most elaborate Christian discussion of infinity, and the relationship of God to time in general, prior to the fourth century.

The previous chapter described how Origen’s ‘transcendent logic’ enabled him to speak of the Word as not God-in-himself (αὐτόθεος), but God by participation (μετοχῇ) while at the same time not relegating the production of or existence of the Son to time. There is a logical distinction between the existence of the Father as God and the Son as God, but not a temporal one. The Logos is present in both timelessness and in time. It is through him that a perpetual communication between the world and God is sustained. Thus the fundamental tenet that God is radically transcendent to the world is maintained; still it is through the Logos that a working relation between the world and God is established. This conception of the Logos allows God to be both transcendentally above creation in every way, and also be the actual and direct creator of that creation: though he is radically transcendent to the world, ‘he communicates with it and indeed acts within it’.

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89 *Trin.*, 4.9. See also ibid., 2.5, CCSL 4:14: *Maior est enim mente ipsa nec cogitari possit quantus sit, ne si potuerit cogitari, mente humana minor sit qua concipi possit*. This is greatly influential on Hilary’s understanding of divine infinity.

90 *Jo.* 2.17, SC 120:216. See Chapter 1, pp20–21.

91 Tzamalikos, *Origen*, 168.

92 Ibid., 172.
The way Origen’s Logos doctrine supports and upholds the radical transcendence of God depends upon a classical Greek understanding of infinity: God is not omnitemporal but timeless, in a way that ‘God’s being is an atemporal reality which transcends all time’.\(^93\) This assists Origen in his attempts to develop a doctrine of eternal generation which will uphold the eternal divinity of the Word. There can be no temporal distinction between the Logos and Wisdom since the Logos and Wisdom both exist in the atemporal life of God.\(^94\)

Hilary, while not denying a transcendent view of infinity removed from time, recognizes that the finite human perspective must see divine infinity as God encompassing and embracing all of time—as existing eternally previous to all time and beyond it in eternity future. He argues that if one considers the concept of infinity, it is apparent to the human mind as an eternal linear progression in

\(^93\) Ibid., 23. Infinity is often reported in scholarship as undesirable or even 'bad' according to the classical Greek view. Aristotle’s so-called *horror infinitas* is taken as a blanket statement for all of Greek philosophy. But, while this is a legitimate Greek position, it was not so widespread as is typically assumed. Adam Drozdek, *In the Beginning was apeiron: Infinity in Greek Philosophy* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2008), 8, argues that an inherently negative view of infinity is indeed only truly present in Aristotle. While there are points at which Pythagoreans, Atomists, and Plato all regard the concept as inferior to finitude, as it is necessarily unbounded and incomprehensible, it was seen as the most appropriate term in reference to the supreme reality of the divine. As Vagione, *Eunomius*, 255-56, notes the term, ‘enjoyed a place as an acceptable term in apophatic theology’, and eventually became a self-evident proposition of the ultimate divine reality and was particularly amenable to the biblical view of God for Christians. It indeed becomes commonplace by the fourth-century controversies (ibid., 168-70). Edwards, *Origen*, 64, notes that by Origen’s death in 254 the most eminent school of Platonists taught that the highest principle was infinite (ἄπειρον). Infinity in classical Greek thought always denoted boundlessness and utter transcendence. The infinite is superior to all and cannot participate in finitude (ibid.).

This is easily taken over into Christian theology. Clement of Alexandria speaks of God being infinite as he is without limit (*Str.* 5.12), and this ‘classical’ view of infinity is discussed in other early Christians above. There is a shift in the midst of the fourth century, however, so that by the time of Gregory Nazianzen, for example, ἄπειρον τὸ θεῖον can be used in pro-Nicene thought not only as a practical category to distinguish God from his creation, a standard theological trope by this time, but as a polemical category against Eunomian epistemological arrogance. God is ‘so vast that the mind becomes dizzy from gazing into the abyss’ (*Or.* 38.7-8, translation by Beeley, *Gregory*, 96). It is the transformation of divine infinity in Hilary which will make much of this argumentation possible.


\(^94\) Tzamalikos, *Origen*, 59.
either direction from any given point. This conception of infinity in the mind leads one to consider the incomprehensibility of God not to mean that he is unknowable, but rather, as is shown below, that he is infinitely known in a finite way. That is, the human mind knows God infinitely, without end, but always from within the confines of its finitude—from a finite perspective.

Though Origen rejects a view of infinity which extends throughout time or encompasses all of time (what might be called 'horizontal' infinity), which Hilary will develop in polemical engagements with Homoians, in favor of an infinity entirely transcendent above time (vertical infinity), his developments on the Christian view of time greatly impacts later generations. Time is created, with a beginning and therefore an end (and 'end' not merely in terms of extinction, but as telos, goal, or purpose). What is not infinite is comprehensible, and the fact that it is comprehensible, that it has a beginning and an end, is what makes it finite (coming, it seems, awfully close to admitting a 'horizontal' infinity!). He writes: ‘the contemplation of all made things (γεγονότων) is a finite one, in this including also contemplation of time; it is only the knowledge of the Holy Trinity that is infinite’. These principles provide an important fourth-century foundation.

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95 His refusal to speak of infinity as extending eternally backwards and forwards, may stem from a desire to avoid the Stoic doctrine that time itself extends eternally backwards and forwards in their understanding of infinity (i.e. horizontal view, yes, but infinite time, not infinite divinity). See Tzamalikos, Origen, 254.

It is significant that Novatian does in some sense speak of infinity in a horizontal way (see Trin. 4.9, CCSL 4:18: Infinitum est autem quicquid nec originem habet omnino nec finem), though does not carry this through to its philosophical implications as Hilary does.

I borrow the language of 'horizontal' and 'vertical' infinity from McDermott, 'Hilary', 183. McDermott notes that both compliment each other and are not mutually exclusive, though we cannot imagine both simultaneously.

96 Tzamalikos, Origen, 250.

97 sel. in Ps., 144, in Tzamalikos, Origen, 252.
Introduction to Hilary’s conception of divine infinity

Hilary's initial movement in reorientating the Christian understanding of divine infinity is his equation of infinitas with aeternitas, which is seen very early on in his writings. McDermott traces this connection from Hilary’s Mat., noting that where this link is made ‘eternity is defined as an infinity, a measurelessness in time which embraces all of the measuredness of time’. Here we see the beginnings of his horizontal infinity. There is also an equation of aeternitas and infinitas in description of the nature of God itself, so that it is the same thing to say the Son is de aeternitate and de infinitate paterna substantiae. McDermott notes that this is the foundation for Hilary's insights on divine infinity in his future works. While here, in Hilary’s early writing, he may not be fully aware of the philosophical implications of this eternal infinity, ‘which would by definition exclude the total fulfillment of any finite creature’, and he does not seem to have a genuine working conception of a progressus in infinitum, seen in his later writings, it is sufficient to recognise here that the link between aeternitas and infinitas has surely been made.

In Trin., the concept of infinity is at the centre of the divine being. God simply is: ‘nothing is perceived as more proper to God than to be’. There is no beginning or end for God. Further, God dwells in all places and envelopes all—

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98 McDermott, ‘Hilary’, 177. See Mat. 31.2.
99 Mat. 31.3, SC 258:228.
100 McDermott, ‘Hilary’, 178.
101 Ibid. McDermott, ibid., 188-9, notes that Hilary’s realisation of the philosophical ramifications of divine infinity is perhaps one impetus for his seeing the contradiction in his former two-stage theory of the Logos in the Matthew commentary, which implies that in some sense the divine Son came to a later perfection.
confined by no part of the universe, but pervades everything.\textsuperscript{103} God ‘is infinite because he himself is not in anything, but all things are in him. He is always outside of space, because nothing contains him; always before time (\textit{aeuuum}), because time is from him’.\textsuperscript{104} Earlier teachings on infinity are readily present. Irenaeus’s understanding of God ‘encompassing all’ and ‘containing all things’ in himself, Tertullian’s reflections of God’s immeasurability and limitlessness, Novatian’s concept of God being entirely anterior to all time and having no beginning, and, perhaps most importantly, being therefore incomprehensible by time-bound human beings, and Origen’s ideas of time being created and that what has a beginning has an \textit{end}, are all central to Hilary’s idea of divine infinity. What perhaps most strikingly sets Hilary apart from these earlier thinkers is that the end goal of his doctrine of divine infinity (and therefore his doctrine of God generally, as God is the one who simply ‘is’) is not transcendence, but \textit{presence}. This is not to say that Hilary denies God’s transcendence above creation, but rather that God’s infinity does not mean God is removed transcendentally above that creation. God’s transcendence means that his infinite omnipotence is infinitely superior to all his creation, but it does not separate him from it. This would indeed be a limitation upon the infinite, illimitable God if he was restricted from any part of the universe due to his infinite nature. The Logos is thus not present with God for the purposes of interaction with a world the infinite Father is too transcendent to interact with. He is indeed every bit as infinite as the Father. His mediation is rather a union of two contradictory realities: the infinite and the finite, the limited and the illimitable.\textsuperscript{105} Hilary’s doctrine of divine infinity is an

\textsuperscript{103} Ibid., 1.6, 7. See also \textit{Psal}. 129.3.

\textsuperscript{104} Ibid., 2.6, SC 443:284.

\textsuperscript{105} \textit{Trin}. 10.22.
open door for significant developments in the ‘search for’, or one might say ‘reorientation of’ the doctrine of God. The end result of divine infinity for previous Christian thinkers, that God is incomprehensible, is ever and always present in Hilary’s thought, but what that means for understanding who God is, is quite different. Further, this reorientation of human knowing of God reorientates humanity itself in relation to him.

Hilary’s equation of infinity and eternity, and God with aeternitas, is at the centre of this process.106 The connection of infinity and eternity is based upon the human experience of the mind, particularly, ‘the human mind's inability to arrive at any end in its unending attempt to comprehend the beginning of time’.107 Yet the mind’s ‘progressus in infinitum’ towards God (the aeternitas) is seen as ‘a true reflection of God’s infinity’.108 Maintaining the Son’s true eternal identity required meditation on the nature of God (aeternitas), ‘and so he reached the insight that God is not transcendent in a timeless instant but that his infinity, while remaining transcendent, nevertheless, embraces time’,109 so that the infinite progression of the mind is a true reflection of the divine life. That our minds cannot come to the end of progression demonstrates that God is infinitely beyond human comprehension, and his incomprehensibility therefore truly reflects his infinite nature. The way in which humans know God is therefore iself a true revelation of who God is, and who humanity is as a result.

This infinite existence, this way in which God is, makes significant leaps in the developing understanding of a strict demarcation of Creature and creator, and

107 Ibid., 187.
108 Ibid., 189.
109 Ibid.
also towards an understanding of the ever-elusive and even ambiguous terminology of God’s *simplicity*, and its anthropological implications. Hilary in fact uses infinity to interpret simplicity, and vice versa. So God as infinite is the God who simply is, and as God is simple (*Deus simplex est*), 'he is not to be conceptualized (*sensu uero non persequendus est*), but adored, for a nature limited and weak does not possess the mystery of an infinite and omnipotent nature by the opinions of his understanding'.\(^{111}\) Not only, then, do simplicity and infinity interpret one another, but they are both used to demonstrate that God is infinite beyond all human comprehension, so that they are seen as coterminous. The infinite God is the *Deus, qui semper est*.\(^{112}\) Divine infinity, then, is an all-encompassing theological reality for Hilary. It is not some strict category, but who God is in his entirety.

This has significant epistemological and anthropological implications, which are explored below. First, I turn to what is missing in the scholarship on the issue.

*The state of the scholarship: what is not being said*

The history of scholarship on the development of divine infinity in early Christian thought is overwhelmingly of the opinion that a genuine doctrine of divine infinity is a result of the genius of Gregory of Nyssa. Most notable are the works of Werner Elert and Ekkehard Mühlenberg.\(^{113}\) Elert’s thesis is that the

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\(^{110}\) Ayres, *Nicaea*, 287, recognizes that pro-Nicenes ‘are loose and inconsistent in their definitions of simplicity’. However, ‘this inconsistency does not necessarily prevent them using the doctrine in very similar ways’.

\(^{111}\) *Trin*. 9.72, SC 462:162.

\(^{112}\) Ibid., 11.47, SC 462:376.

person of Jesus Christ (God and human) in Christianity confronted classical Greek metaphysics, and, ultimately, the Christian understanding of infinity caused its dissolution. Classical Greek metaphysics is disassembled and reshaped when Christianity appropriates its categories. He writes,

> Man braucht nur an die Rolle zu denken, welche die Begriffe Usia, Physis, Hypostasis dabei spielen, um zu bemerken, daß es hier nicht mehr um die Fragen der urchristlichen Christologie geht (i.e. dramatischen Kategorien), ob Jesus der Messias ist, welche Attribute ihm, weil er es ist, gebühren, was von ihm zu erwarten ist. Die absolute Auszeichnung seiner Person wird jetzt vielmehr in den Kategorien der griechischen Metaphysik ausgedrückt (i.e. Seinskategorien). Göttliche Usia und menschliche Usia, göttliches Sein und menschliches Sein in einer Person—das ist nicht mehr die Sprache Kanaans, sondern Platos.\(^\text{114}\)

This reality, regarding the ultimate point of dissolution, the concept of infinity, saw its genuine formulation in the work of Gregory of Nyssa.

Seven years after Elert’s work, Mühlenberg published his study on Gregory’s understanding of infinity as a critique of classical Greek metaphysics. Mühlenberg states that in the Platonic understanding of infinity God is unknown if called infinite. The radical transcendence of the infinite, vertically suspended above and outside of all that can be known or comprehended, means that an infinite God is entirely unknowable. Gregory, then, explicitly rejects the Platonic understanding of infinity and reformulates divine infinity to accommodate belief in a God who interacts with and is known (on some level) in the universe. Weedman notes that Mühlenberg’s thesis is faulty because he ignores the use of infinity in trinitarian debates up to Gregory, or rather assumes there is no use of infinity in these debates, and thus misses what Weedman asserts to be Gregory’s most important background, the polemical context situated within the broader scope of fourth-century debates, and particularly the use of infinity in arguments for eternal

\[^{114}\text{Elert, Ausgang, 34.}\]
This neglect of the development of the concept of infinity in early Christianity prior to Gregory is an attribute of both of these works, and indeed, the scholarship on the subject generally, which states that ‘Gregory took an accepted philosophical doctrine, that God’s essence is circumscribed, radically reshaped it, and used this new idea to reshape an entire religious and philosophical sensibility’. In the central, and perhaps exclusive, focus on the philosophical shift which takes place in metaphysics, from ‘classical’ to ‘Christian’, early Christian developments of divine infinity in their polemical and theological contexts are lost, and the major achievements prior to Gregory, particularly those of Hilary, are simply overshadowed by the modern assumptions of scholars concerning the necessary and useful categories for discussing the subject. Categories which were perhaps not the most essential ones to early Christian thinkers at all.

**Apophatic analogy and divine linguistics**

A study of Hilary’s conception of infinity requires at first a recognition of its epistemological implications, which govern everything he says in reference to God. The epistemological insight resulting from infinity creates an apophathic hesitation in theological discourse: God eludes definition at every turn, he is entirely ineffable, and all our knowledge of him is mediated through the finite and inadequate cognitive functions of our created condition, and is therefore in every way analogous. For, ‘the imperfect cannot comprehend the perfect. A being existing from another cannot obtain full understanding of its origin or of itself. . . .

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116 Ibid., 81-2.
Its perception does not extend beyond that which has been fixed by its nature’. A created being cannot even have perfect knowledge of itself, much less of its Creator. Though human speech and analogy cannot give full insight into the things of God, and God is utterly beyond the limits of definition, the ‘weakness of our intellect’ forces upon us the necessity of speaking of God in analogous human terms and in ordinary human speech. Further, the ineffability and incomprehensibility of God is not unknowability, but knowledge of God is mediated, imperfect, and finite. This imperfect knowledge of the ineffable God is a necessary conclusion of Hilary’s understanding of divine infinity. God precedes even the very perception of eternity in his infinite life.

This apophatic understanding of theology that stems from the differing realities of the infinite and finite, of Creator and creation, necessitates revelation in order to know God. Only God has knowledge of himself, and he can only be known to the extent that he has chosen to reveal himself. Hilary writes:

For we are in a certain measure numb by the indolent dullness of our nature, and as to your qualities, which ought to be known, we are restrained within the necessity of our ignorance by the weakness of our mind. But the study of your teaching instructs us to perceive divine knowledge and advances beyond natural opinion by the obedience of faith.

He refuses to reject reason, reason is necessary for knowledge, but true knowledge of God is not possible through reason only, unassisted by the submission of faith to God’s revelation of himself. Knowledge of God is therefore

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118 Ibid., 4:2, SC 448:14.
119 Ibid., 12.54.
120 Ibid., 1.18.
121 Ibid., 1.37, SC 443:270.
122 Not as Mühlenberg, Unendlichkeit Gottes, 71, asserts. Mühlenberg’s argument is discussed below.
dependent upon God in a very direct sense. Indeed, he dreads to go beyond the words of Scripture in discourse on God, stating that the trinitarian declaration of the baptismal formula of Matthew 28:19 is a complete statement on the nature of God, including the order of trinitarian relations ( negotiorum ordinem ), and his opponents forced his, unwillingly he protests, to go beyond it: ‘Their infidelity draw us out ( protrahit nos ) into the perilous and dangerous situation, where it is necessary to profess beyond the divine precept ( ultra praescribtum caeleste ), upon such great and hidden things’.

The divine nature is most fully revealed in the incarnate life of the Son. In reference to Matthew 11.27, ‘no one knows the Father except the Son and he to whom the Son wishes to reveal him, nor the Son except the Father’, he contends: 'They have a mutual knowledge of each other, a perfect reciprocal knowledge in both ( Illis scientia mutua est, illis uicissim cognitio perfecta ). And because no one knows the Father except the Son, let our thoughts of the Father be one with the Son, the only faithful witness ( solus testis fidelis ), who reveals him'. It it not unique amongst early Christians to argue for the divinity of Christ based on his revelation of the Father. But Hilary is not merely arguing for Christ’s divinity, but actually defining divinity itself by the life of Christ. The argument is not 'the Son reveals the Father, therefore the Son is divine', but, 'the Son, in revealing the Father, reveals the divine nature; he tells us what it is to be divine'.

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123 Ibid., 2.1, SC 443:274.

124 Ibid., 2.5, SC 443:282.

125 Ibid., 2.6, SC 443:286.
words, the Son’s works on earth in the incarnate Christ do not only reveal the divinity of the Son, but, in a sense, define that very divinity.\footnote{126} It is significant to note that this revelation is mediated through the human life Jesus, it is a revelation through \textit{humane} condescension.\footnote{127} This parallels precisely the revelation of God in Scripture, through the condescension of human language. It is clear how Hilary’s doctrine of divine infinity is at work here. The condescension to human nature and language in revelation are due to the ineffability of God and create an understanding of God through the medium of the finite human condition, leading humanity to an analogous understanding of divine, infinite reality. Though human speech and analogy cannot give us full insight into divine things, and the ineffable God cannot be confined to the boundaries of definition, we are bound by our finite nature to speak of God in our ordinary language and manner.\footnote{128} God’s revelation, and all human knowledge of him, is necessarily given and known in the context of human finitude. While, as previously mentioned, the analogous understanding of the divine nature is a hallmark of the epistemological assumptions of pro-Nicene thought, Hilary’s deliberate reflections on the nature of this phenomenon, his actual seeking to formulate an epistemology from this, is much more rare, perhaps ingenious.\footnote{129}

What Ayres recognizes in later pro-Nicenes, that,

\footnote{126} This has immense ramifications not only for the unity of the trinitarian life of God, but for the developing pro-Nicene idea of ‘inseparable operations’. The works of the Father and the Son are one to the extent that the Son’s works on earth are the fullest revelation of the Father possible to the finite human mind.

\footnote{127} Here God’s \textit{humane} condescension is seen most clearly. This condescension is \textit{divine} condescension, divinity is what is being revealed in Jesus, but it is condescension which takes place in a \textit{humane} way (i.e., a manner which pertains to the human condition (see 8n17)). Indeed, here, literally from within humanity itself. The full significance of the humanity of Christ as the focal point of divine revelation in Hilary is discussed in detail below, particularly in Chapters 3-4.

\footnote{128} See \textit{Trin.} 4.2.

\footnote{129} The following chapter of this thesis will elaborate upon the epistemological ramifications of Hilary’s trinitarian anthropology.
for deeply held *theological* reasons, pro-Nicenes consider it impossible to
derive precision about human growth towards God. Through these accounts,
however, one common principle is clear. Pro-Nicenes argue that we can have
no knowledge of God in which we can rest as if we finally understood: all
knowledge of God is useful within what we might term an anagogic context.\(^{130}\)
is profoundly true for Hilary. Knowledge of God in this anagogic context is a
dynamic not simply of revelation, ‘but of the divine economy that condescends to
our categories but does so only to draw us slowly towards a contemplation of the
divine realities of which they speak’.\(^{131}\) Hilary’s investigations into this process are
essentially a formation of a sort of philosophy of divine language. Through
observations on finite, created humanity seeking to know the infinite creator God,
a philosophy of language develops not only of how to speak of God but of how God
speaks, at least according to human terms. Divine infinity therefore gives us a
grammar both of how to speak of God,\(^{132}\) and an understanding, a finite, entirely
insufficient, and anagogic understanding, of *divine linguistics*. For Hilary, in light
of God’s infinite nature and our finite existence, this is how God reveals, this is
how God speaks and this is how we hear and understand.

*Proverbs 8.22: the crux interpretum*

Simonetti, in his extensive study of Proverbs 8.22 (‘The Lord created me
(Wisdom) for the beginning of his ways’) in early Christian literature, notes, ‘È
noto come l’interpretazione di Prov. 8,22 sia stata al centro della polemica fra
Ariani e ortodossi’.\(^{133}\) In many ways, fourth-century debates seem to swirl around
this all-important passage. Hilary makes an original contribution to this

\(^{130}\) Ayres, *Nicaea*, 284.

\(^{131}\) Ibid., 300.

\(^{132}\) I borrow the language of ‘grammar’ from Ayres, *Nicaea*, 14, which he defines as, ‘a set of
rules or principles intrinsic to theological discourse, whether or not they are formally articulated’.

discussion as a result of his doctrine of divine infinity and its exegetical foundation, John 1:3-4.

Even prior to the outbreak of fourth-century controversy, this verse had a primary place in polemical engagements.\(^\text{134}\) Origen's logical prioritizing of the Son's *epinoiai* allows him to approach the Proverbs passage in a way which defends the eternality of the Son but allows also that the Son may become, in relation to creation, what he was not always in relation to divinity.

The ‘created’ language of the passage is then for Origen when Wisdom *established a relation to creation*, and *became* the ‘beginning’ (ἀρχή) of God’s ways, though she existed eternally as a timeless (ἀϊδίος) being prior to all creation (and is thus herself uncreated).\(^\text{135}\) The distinguishing also between ‘Wisdom’ and ‘wisdom’ affords Origin his reading of Proverbs 8. There is eternal Wisdom in relation to God the Father and created wisdom, in relation to creation—‘made for the beginning of his ways’. This created wisdom refers the the ‘objects of contemplation’ which were made ‘in wisdom'. Wisdom refers not only to the person of the Son, but also to the ‘contemplation and apprehension of divine things'. It is to this latter concept that the language of ‘created’ wisdom in Proverbs 8.22 refers.\(^\text{136}\)

\(^\text{134}\) See ibid., 9-32.

\(^\text{135}\) exp. in Pr. 8, PG, 17:185, referenced in Tzamalikos, *Cosmology*, 39. Another interesting aspect of Origen's interpretation here is that it can be seen as perhaps a predecessor to later fourth-century interpretations in reference to the incarnation. Origen seems to be referencing a foreknowledge of the incarnation in this interpretation of Proverbs 8.22. There is a harmonizing in this fragment of Gen 1.6, Jn 1.1 and Prov 8.22 which seems take the incarnate Logos into account (See Jacques Haers, *Creation Theology in Origen* (Oxford, DPhil. Thesis, 1993), 132) (see Tzamalikos, *Cosmology*, 47). Matthieu Cassin, *L’Écriture de la controverse chez Grégoire de Nysse: polémique littéraire et exégèse dans le Contre Eunome* (Paris: Études augustiniennes, 2008), 146-8, also argues for an interpretation in reference to the incarnation in Origen.

\(^\text{136}\) Tzamalikos, *Origen*, 53. See Jo. 19.6; *Cels.* 5.37.
Tertullian depends upon his *ratio-sermo* reading of John's prologue in interpreting Proverbs 8.22. All substances have *form* for Tertullian, and he reads the passage as proclaiming the point in which the Word proceeded forth from God *formed*. This coming forth from the Father is a giving of form (*effigies*) to the Son as a second ‘bodily’ substance, as all beings, even incorporeal ones, have some type of form or body.\(^{137}\) What is most significant in Tertullian’s interpretation for our purposes is his insistence on the uncreated status of the Son. Proverbs 8.22 cannot be interpreted to say that the Son is created, as he is formed *for the purposes of being the Creator*. John 1:1-4 is again referenced in support of this—all things are made through him, he is the Creator of all things, and therefore, though second to the Father and formed for the purposes of creation and as a separate subsistent reality *logically* second to the Father, the Son is entirely prior to all creation and anterior to time. The Son is also explicitly a separate ‘person’ for Tertullian (which is Tertullian’s intention for the *corpus, formam* and *effigie* language). This places Tertullian within an established anti-monarchian reading of Proverbs 8.22 in the third century.

*Proverbs 8.22 in the fourth century*

Second- and third- century Christians did not settle the ambiguity of the preexistent Word and the language of begotten/created. The Word is certainly distinguished from the creation of the universe, but there is no clarity over *how* his being ‘created’ or 'begotten' makes him so.\(^{138}\) Dionysius of Rome argued, on the basis of Proverbs 8.22, that the Son can be called created (κτίζω) but not

\(^{137}\) *Prax*. 7.8, CCSL 2:1166-7.

made (ποιέω) in response to his namesake in Alexandria who claimed the Son was a ‘thing made’ (ποιέμα) and ‘created’ (γενετός), that he was not ‘proper’ (ὑός) to the nature of God, but ‘alien in substance’ (ξένον κατ’ οὐσίαν): ‘for being a poiema he did not exist before he was generated’. Dionysius of Rome draws a distinction between the Son having been generated (γεγεννήσθαι) and having been produced or made (γεγενέναι) by the Father.139 Dionysius of Rome draws a distinction between the Son having been generated (γεγεννήσθαι) and having been produced or made (γεγενέναι) by the Father.139

Arius, himself in Alexandria, will ignore this distinction. He seems to have no objection to saying that the Son is begotten, or even that he is beyond change, but begotten must be understood as coterminous with created and established.140 For Eusebius of Nicomedia, the Son is called created, established, and produced (κτιστόν, θεμελιωτόν, γέννετον), and Proverbs 8.22 is used as his standard prooftext.142 For him, that Scripture says the Son is created or established makes it impossible to say that he is ‘of God’. Everything comes into existence by the Father’s will, nothing can be said to be from his substance.143 It must be noted, however, that these terms can be synonymous for anti-Nicenes because they hold a unique status. Anti-Nicenes are continuously clear that they do not see Wisdom as poiema or ktisma in the way anything else is poiema or ktisma. Though Nicenes continually accused them of saying the Son was a creature like other creatures, they unanimously denied this.144 For pro-Nicenes, language which fosters belief in ‘from the substance of the Father’, is taken as primary and

139 Athanasius, Dion. 4, Urk ii.1, 48, Ins 20-3, in Widdicombe, Fatherhood, 122.
140 Athanasius, decr. 26, Urk ii.1, 23, Ins 4-7, in Widdicombe, Fatherhood, 122.
141 Hanson, Search, 8. See Morales, Athanase, 97; Urk. 6, 6.2-5.
142 Urk. 8, 8.4, Ins 9-12.
143 Ibid., 5-6; 7-8. See Hanson, Search, 30-31.
144 Vaggione, Eunomius, 124-25.
Proverbs 8 type language is interpreted in light of this primacy. The Son cannot be said to be created, as for them, though not for anti-Nicenes, to be created is to be not-God. The language of creation in Proverbs 8.22 must be seen to mean something other than literal creation.

This is typically done by reading the passage proleptically in reference to the incarnation. Eustathius interprets the passage this way,\textsuperscript{145} while also upholding the distinction between ‘created’ (κτιστός) and ‘begotten’ (γέννετος).\textsuperscript{146} Marcellus of Ancyra seems to be the originator of this proleptic practice.\textsuperscript{147} Indeed, for Marcellus, if the Son (Word) is to be associated at all with Wisdom in the Proverbs passage, the ‘created’ language must refer to the incarnation, as the Logos is only Son after the incarnation. The first-born of all creation for Marcellus is ‘Logos-with-human-body’.\textsuperscript{148} He can speak of no pre-existent Logos, at least not ‘outside’ the Father as a separate identity—the Logos, prior to the incarnation is in the mind of God, as a human ‘logos’ is.\textsuperscript{149} Marcellus, ‘left a legacy of interpreting Old Testament references to the incarnate Word at places where before everyone had seen references to the pre-existent Logos’.\textsuperscript{150} Athanasius’s reading follows Marcellus, but not slavishly. Virtually all pro-Nicenes interpreted the verse this way.

\textsuperscript{145} frag. 65, CCSG 51:135-37. Here Eustathius makes a connection of Galatians 4.4 with Proverbs 8.22, which will be critical to Hilary’s argument.

\textsuperscript{146} frag. 57. See Hanson, Search, 214.

\textsuperscript{147} frag. 9, GCS Eusebius 4:187; Eusebius, Marcell. 2.3.43-5.

\textsuperscript{148} Hanson, Search, 225; Lienhard, Contra Marcellum, 51-52.

\textsuperscript{149} See frag. 103, GCS Eusebius 4:207: ‘Before the whole creation there was a silence, as it seems, since the Word was in God’. Referenced in Lienhard, Contra Marcellum, 51.

\textsuperscript{150} Hanson, Search, 235.
way: Athanasius, Hilary, Ambrose, Basil of Ceasarea, Gregory Nyssen, etc., none of whom are mimicking Marcellus’s exegesis. Athanasius interprets the passage in reference to the incarnation, though he alters the interpretation to avoid any 'Sabellian' tendencies seen in Marcellus’s reading. The verse does not, for Athanasius, deny eternal generation by implying that there is no true pre-existent Son prior to the incarnation, as it does for Marcellus, and Athanasius’s reading categorically denies any interpretation which sees the generation of the Son for the purposes of creation. His 'christological reconception of divine perfection' is at work here, and is an important and lasting step in the Christian imagination.

Phoebadius of Agen could, it seems, avoid christological controversy altogether in his equating of Wisdom with the Holy Spirit rather than the Word. Yet, he does, at least at one point, also read Proverbs 8:22 in reference to the pre-incarnate Son. Gregory of Elvira shares the interpretation in reference to the Holy Spirit, and relegates the language of ‘creation’ not to the nature of the Spirit but to the effects of its operation. Marius Victorinus sees difficult passages like

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151 Ar. 2.73-4.

152 See discussion below. While Hilary does interpret Proverbs 8.22 in light of the incarnation at points, he is also able to read the passage in reference to eternal generation.

153 Fid. 3.7.1-7; 9.1-22.

154 Eun. 2.20.27-31. See Mark DelCogliano, 'Basil of Caesarea on Proverbs 8:22 and the Sources of Pro-Nicene Theology', JThS, NS, 59.1 (April, 2008):183-190, for Basil’s variety of interpretations, essentially following Eusebius, yet in the end declaring that there is no certain exegesis of the passage.

155 Eun. 3.1.21-65. See Cassin, L'Écriture, 234-49, for a thorough reading of Nyssa’s interpretation.

156 Or. 29.18.

157 Anatolios, Retrieving Nicaea, 115. See Chapter 1, p98.

158 C. Ar. 20, PL 20:28.

159 Ibid., 15, PL 20:24.

160 De Fide 27-29, CCSL 69:227.
Proverbs 8.22 (also Acts 2.36, Jn 1.3-4 and Gal 4.4) as pure condescension—naming God in ways we are familiar with and can grasp, realizing that we cannot really name him as it is impossible to find any name worthy of God. And he shares Elvira's interpretation, though in relation to the Son and not the Holy Spirit, stating that that verses refer to the Son being 'made' or 'created' mean: 'the Son was made, but: he was made to be our Lord'. These texts do not refer to his existence, but to his works and power.

Eusebius of Caesarea's interpretation of Proverbs 8 against Marcellus provides for alternative interpretations which will become influential on future pro-Nicene readings, particularly those of Basil and Gregory of Nyssa, and, as DelCogliano notes, helps us 'to gain a better understanding of the diverse sources of pro-Nicene theology'. Eusebius refuses to read the passage in reference to the incarnation, but also as a 'creation' of Wisdom. He argues that this is Wisdom being established as ruler of the universe. He further argues that the proverbs are not meant to be taken literally, and that, in at least three cases, translators from the Hebrew did not follow the LXX's ἐκτισένυμε (‘he created me’) but rather chose ἐκτησατόμε (‘he acquired me’). Both Basil and Gregory will use these arguments, and Athanasius himself argued with Eusebius that Proverbs should

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161 Ad. Can. 28, CSEL 83.1:43.
162 Ibid., 29, CSEL 83.1:44.
163 Ibid: non in eius existentiam, sed in actus et in ministrationem eius potentiae atque virtutis.
164 For Basil see DelCogliano, 'Basil'; for Nyssen see Cassin, L’Écriture, 238.
165 DelCogliano, 'Basil', 184.
166 E.th. 3.1.1-3.2.8.
167 Ibid., 3.2.15.
168 Nyssa Eun. 1.298-303; Basil Eun. 2.20.
not be taken literally. While there is a variety amongst pro-Nicene interpretations, none will ascribe the language of Proverbs 8.22 in any way to the Son's generation.

Hilary’s interpretation will see many appropriations from the interpretations noted above, but he is able to utilise Proverbs 8.22 in a way which is not seen elsewhere—to be a positive defense of eternal generation. And the manner in which he does so will see immense ramifications for his theology as a whole. The placing of arguments for eternal generation in the context of divine infinity, the move from a purely traditional view of Father-Son correlativity to argumentation placed in the infinite life of God itself is seen most clearly in Hilary’s reading of this crucially important passage.

**Hilary’s interpretation: ‘Potential creation’ and Proverbs 8**

It has been said that the johannine prologue and Proverbs 8 have such a strong similarity that we can speak of a literary dependence. This is certainly evident in Hilary’s reading of Proverbs 8, which is essentially governed by his understanding of the eternal generation in John 1.3-4. Hilary's interpretation of Proverbs 8.22, which he calls the ‘wave of a winding whirlwind’ of his opponents, and ‘the greatest surge of their storm’, eternal generation is firmly secured within his understanding of divine infinity. This enables Hilary to develop an interpretation of this ‘greatest surge’ of Proverbs 8:22 which actually makes a defense for eternal generation.

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169 Ar. 2.44. Origen Princ. 4.1.103 also argued this of Proverbs.

170 Discussed below.

171 Grillmeier, Christ, 29.

172 Trin. 12.1, SC 462:386.
Hilary begins Book 12 of *Trin.* by arguing that the Son’s birth cannot in any way be equated with being ‘created’, using a string of verses in 12.3-5 (Rom 1:25; Gen 14:19; Hos 13:4; 1 Pet 4:29 and Rom 8:19-20) to demonstrate that the Son cannot be created as he is himself the Creator. He proceeds to argue that if the Son is creature then the Father does not differ from creatures:

For Christ, remaining in the form of God (*in forma Dei*), took the form of a servant (*formam serui*), and if he who is in the form of God is a creature, then God is not different from a creature (*Deus non aberit a creatura*), because a creature is in the form of God. To be in the form of God does not have another meaning than to be remain in God's nature. By this, therefore, God is also a creature, because a creature is in his nature.\(^{173}\)

He further uses the concept of birth to evidence the Son’s uncreated status. Psalm 109.3: ‘From the womb before the morning star I begot you’, is an analogy to the human condition in order to aid our understanding. God does not have a literal ‘womb’, in the same way that the ‘hands’ ‘heart’ or ‘eyes’ of God are used as anthropomorphisms to show that God acts, wills or sees in the way one does who performs these actions from within a body, though he himself does them without the use of a body. These anthropomorphisms, Hilary argues, demonstrate spiritual realities. What would be the point of using the anthropomorphism of the womb if not to point to the spiritual birth behind it? The use of ‘womb’ is to show that there is a true and genuine spiritual birth, and therefore not a creation.\(^{174}\)

Hilary’s argument of origins, discussed above, sets boundaries for his interpretation of Proverbs 8:22. *Unigenitus Deus* is one *cui non praeest tempus anterius*, and the possibility that he at some time did not exist is excluded, as then that *aliquando* would be prior to him. It also cannot be said that he was not before he was born (*non fuerit antequam nascetur*), for ‘the very period when

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\(^{173}\) *Trin.* 12.6, SC 462:392.

\(^{174}\) Ibid., 12.8-10. This analogy used within the context of Proverbs 8.22 polemic clearly shows how Hilary is able to in some sense refer the verse to eternal generation.
he was not will precede him’. Further, his origin is from ‘he who is’ (ex eo qui est natus est), and not from anything which came into being, and therefore, again, his birth is fundamentally different from human birth. For Hilary, the evidence is clear, the passage cannot mean that the Son is in any way created.

If the language of ‘creation’ in the passage cannot mean that the Son is created, how is this language to be taken? Hilary, at a point in his argument, follows suit with the developing strand of interpretation we have seen in others above: ‘created’ refers to the human nature of Jesus in the incarnation. He recognizes the problem of the language used in the verse, and, if it weren’t for this passage’s teaching on eternal generation (discussed below) it would be a great hindrance: ‘the name of creation would reasonably disturb us if the birth was not said to be before time and the creation for the beginning of the ways of God and for his works’.  

Hilary uses Proverbs 8.21 as evidence, and 8.4,5 and 15.16 and 20.21 aid the interpretation of 8.21: ‘If I shall reveal to you the things that are done daily, I shall remember to recount those that are in time’. Wisdom declares, then, what is done 'cotidie' and what is done in time. Hilary writes,

Therefore, mindful to speak of those things which are professed to be in time Wisdom said: ‘The Lord created me in the beginning of his ways for his works’. That expression is thus referring to things which have been carried out in time; it is not a teaching of the generation proclaimed to be before time, but of the dispensation having begun in time.

This then, he contends, speaks of the incarnation, wherein Christ was created in bodily form, and declares that he was the way of the works of God (quoting John 14:6). So the word ‘created’ is here used in reference to the incarnation.

175 Ibid., 12.17, SC 462:406-408.


177 Ibid., 12.44, SC 462:448.
A key phrase used in the preceding interpretation is, ‘things which have been carried out in time’. In so far as creavit is taken in reference to those things done in time, it is referring to the incarnation. But Hilary is also able to understand the language of creation in the passage in a way which positively upholds and defends eternal generation. In Trin. 12.50, He relates the use of ‘made from woman’ (factum de muliere) in Galatians 4.4 to this use of ‘created’ in Proverbs 8.22. The Apostle writes that Jesus was made from the Virgin Mary is clearly to mean that he was born of her, but ‘made’, argues Hilary, is intended to remove the birth from human passions. This parallels the eternal generation in that its purpose is to emphasize that Jesus’s birth from Mary is a birth from the woman only, from one parent (unius ex uno), as the eternal generation of God from God. The language of creavit can be understood then to emphasise the uniqueness of the eternal birth, as similar language is used to demonstrate the birth of one from one in reference to the incarnation in Galatians 4.4. Creavit in Proverbs 8 is therefore not a denial of eternal generation or a statement that the Son is created or born in time, nor can it be seen, however, to not refer to the eternal birth at all and only to the incarnation. This original interpretation of Proverbs 8.22 as a positive argument for eternal generation illustrates clearly the effect of Hilary’s

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179 Weedman, Trinitarian, 194, briefly notes this move by Hilary. This is not, to my knowledge, recognized in any other Hilary scholarship, which continually reads Hilary’s discussion of Proverbs 8.22 only in reference to the incarnation (e.g., Smulders, Doctrine, 193; Beckwith, Hilary, 202-4; Hanson, Search, 494, writes: ‘In accordance with the tradition established by Marcellus of Ancyra and Athanasius, Hilary is ready on occasion to refer awkward or embarrassing texts to the incarnate rather than the pre-existent Son’). Weedman, ibid, observes that this is how the Homoiousians argue regarding this passage (see Epiphanius haer. 73.21.6), and due to this Hilary’s ‘less than wholehearted’ endorsement of this interpretation is surprising (Hilary uses this logic with great hesitation at Trin. 12.50). In the context of his interpretation of Proverbs 8 through to verse 30, and given his exegetical foundation of John 1.3-4, which provides him with the concept of potential creation, this argument has great consequences, which have not been explored. Hilary’s ability to read Proverbs 8.22 in reference to eternal generation, however reluctantly, has vast implications for divine-human relations in his thought.
understanding of the eternal generation firmly in the context of the simple, infinite nature of God itself.

As he continues his reading in Proverbs 8, he is able to read the passage up to verse 30 as governed by his principle of potential creation seen in his interpretation of John 1:3-4 (introduced in the previous chapter) to further manifest the trinitarian (and, therefore, for Hilary, necessarily anthropological) implications of eternal generation understood in the context of divine infinity. Hilary argues that ‘creation’ cannot be understood to submit the eternal generation to the conditions of time, as Wisdom declared that it was ‘established before the ages’ (v23),\(^\text{180}\) so that one must recognize that it is one thing to be created for the beginning of the ways and for the works, and another thing to be established before the ages.\(^\text{181}\) But, ‘that “creation” (creatio) and “establishing” (fundatio) should not offend the faith of the divine birth’, these words follow in Proverbs 8.24-25: ‘Before he made the earth, before he made the mountains firm, before all the hills he begat me’. So Wisdom is said to be begotten before the earth, and not only the earth but the mountains and hills. Hilary says that these words must mean more than they say, not only since they are the words of Wisdom herself, but, because of the mention of the mountain and the hills when the birth is already declared to be before the earth (which must exist before mountains and hills). These verses then indicate that the ‘creation’ of verse 22, or the begetting or ‘establishing’ here, cannot refer simply to a time prior to the

\(^{180}\) Ibid., 12.36, SC 462:434: *fundatam se ante saecula sit professa*.

\(^{181}\) Ibid: *Vt dum aliud est in viarum initium et in opera creari et aliud est ante saecula fundari, anterior intellegatur esse creatione fundatio*. 
earth, the verses are not speaking simply of a temporal distinction between the
generation and the creation of the world.\footnote{Ibid., 12.37, SC 462:434.}

We are not left in the dark, Hilary argues, further explanation comes in verses 26-30. Wisdom was present with God for the preparation of the heavens, and when he made firm the foundations of the earth. He remarks that it cannot be understood that the Son was begotten merely prior to temporal things, for then he would be subject to the same conditions of time as them, merely antecedent to them in time.\footnote{Ibid., 12.38.} The creation and establishing of the world here is then not to be understood as the material creation. Hilary’s idea of ‘potential creation’, based on his reading of John 1.3-4, becomes a necessary presupposition for his understanding of Proverbs 8.

Aided by his idea of potential creation, Hilary is able to further utilise verses 26-30 to uphold eternal generation in Proverbs 8. He contends that Wisdom is ‘prior not to temporal things, but infinite things’.\footnote{Ibid., 12.39, SC 462:438.} For she was present with God when the heavens were prepared: and ‘is the preparation of the heavens pertaining to time for God, that a sudden movement of thought unexpectedly crept into his mind, as if it was previously inactive and dull, and he might weigh the cost and search for instruments to build heaven?’\footnote{Ibid.} His answer is a firm ‘no’: the preparation of creation is ‘perpetual and eternal’.\footnote{Ibid., 12.40, SC 462:440: Perpetua enim et aeterna rerum creandarum est praeparatio.} He uses Isaiah 45.11 (LXX) as further support: ‘O God, who has formed all things that are yet to be’. ‘The things that are yet to be’, writes Hilary, ‘while they are still to be made as they
are not yet created, to God, to whom nothing in created things is new and unexpected, they are made already',\textsuperscript{187} for ‘there is nothing whatsoever in things that are made which is not always with God’.\textsuperscript{188} For Hilary, Wisdom proves her eternity by her presence with the Father as he prepares. She is not only previous to temporal things, but is co-eternal with eternal things, ‘namely, in the preparation of heaven, and in the setting apart of God’s dwelling place’.

Through this preparation of creation, the potential creation of the world, creation ‘was established with God in an equal eternity of infinity’,\textsuperscript{189} and it is brought about in the life of the Word who is with him for the preparation in an infinite eternity.

Hilary’s concept of potential creation, therefore, further argues for a defense of eternal generation in the Proverbs passage. Because the preparation for creation is ‘perpetual and eternal’, and because the Son is present and working in this preparation, he shows himself to be present in the infinite divine life. The Son is infinite in his presence with the Father in the preparation, in the midst of these ‘infinite things’, and he is shown to be fully God in his fashioning of all things in inseparable operations with the Father.\textsuperscript{191} He is the one ‘in whom is life’ and ‘through whom all things are made’ (John 1.3-4). Hilary’s exegetical foundation of divine infinity, John 1.3-4, and the theological ramifications this foundation has,

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{187} Ibid., 12.39, SC 462:438.
\textsuperscript{188} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{189} Ibid., 440.
\textsuperscript{190} Ibid., 12.40, SC 462:442: quia eorum praeparatio aequabilis paenex Deum infinitis aeternitate constiterat.
\textsuperscript{191} Ibid., 12.39.
\end{footnotesize}
supply him with an ingenious and constructive reading of Proverbs 8 which is a major impetus shaping both his view of God and his trinitarian anthropology.\textsuperscript{192}

*Divine infinity and human progress*

Hilary is here ultimately constructing a doctrine of God, but he is also certainly saying something about how humanity relates to this God; about how and why this finite humanity is created out of nothing by this infinite God at all. Essentially, for Hilary, to form a doctrine of God is to also form an anthropology.\textsuperscript{193}

The significant move made by Hilary to understand infinity in a ‘horizontal’ as opposed to only a ‘vertical’ sense is briefly discussed above. This is an infinity in which the life of God extends eternally before and after time,\textsuperscript{194} ‘an eternity embracing all of time rather than an atemporal moment removed vertically from the temporal flow’.\textsuperscript{195} Hilary writes that the infinity of God ‘consumes what is temporal’.\textsuperscript{196} All that is within time is contained by him, including all reason and thought. Therefore what precedes the existence of human reason and all thought cannot be comprehended (as seen above regarding eternal generation). Our thoughts, existing within time, cannot grasp the infinite God, as one cannot grasp what it is grasped by, that is, the finite cannot comprehend the infinite. This

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item The continual struggle of Latin Christiains beyond Hilary’s time to deal with the language of Proverbs 8.22 is perhaps reflected in the Vulgate’s avoidance of the language of creauit entirely, giving preference to possedit instead: Dominus possedit me initium uiarum suarum. Though there is precedent for this reading in the manuscript traditions, as seen above in Eusebius’s reading (see p96 above).
\item So Burns, *Model*, 144, states of God’s infinity in Psal., ‘the most prominent appeal to the divine attribute of eternity is to provide the goal for the human quest’, and states that this is reminiscent of the quest in Trin.
\item Weedman, ‘Polemical Context’, 95.
\item McDermott, ‘Hilary’, 183.
\item Trin. 12.31, SC 462:428: Ergo et infinitas temporum aeternorum quod est temporis, id est non fuisse, consumit. See Psal. 129.3.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
ineffability and incomprehensibility of the birth of the Son is what initially leads Hilary to its eternality,\footnote{Weedman, ‘Polemical Context’, 95.} and the incomprehensibility of God actually becomes a remarkably constructive theological tool for Hilary.

Mühlenberg, in his insistence that no one prior to Gregory of Nyssa held an idea of a \textit{progressus in infinitum}, claims that Hilary’s understanding of God’s infinity and incomprehensibility means the dissolution of the mind, that there is no movement, no \textit{progressus in infinitum} of the mind. He writes of \textit{Trin.} 2.6 (‘God is everywhere, and is everywhere entirely’) that thought itself must be content with the realization that God cannot be known (\textit{daß Gott nicht erkannt werden kann}). He contends that in Hilary no \textit{progressus in infinitum} is required, that reason comes to rest and nothing remains of it as faith steps into its place.\footnote{Mühlenberg, \textit{Unendlichkeit Gottes}, 71.} There is a forgetting of the mind (not as Hilary actually says: \textit{mens infinita}), a dissolution of the mind and a leaping by faith into what one cannot know.\footnote{Ibid.} Hilary directly contradicts this, however. It is not the forgetting of reason in faith, but rather a \textit{reasonable faith}. He says that ‘faith receives understanding to itself’, and this reasonable faith leads one to know that ‘inasmuch as [God] cannot be comprehended, he can be believed’.\footnote{\textit{Trin.} 1.8, SC 443:218.} In other words, it is perfectly reasonable for a finite being to realize that it cannot grasp the infinite, and indeed the only reasonable conclusion. It is \textit{un}reasonable to assume that a finite being can have full knowledge of an infinite God. But not having complete knowledge of the infinite is what leads the finite creature to contemplation of God’s infinite life, and indeed makes that contemplation infinitely possible, leading the creature to
infinite progression in the divine life. It is not *daß Gott nicht erkannt werden kann* for Hilary, but rather, God’s incomprehensibility is what mysteriously allows him to be known by finite creatures as the infinite Creator.

Incomprehensibility, therefore, is a *positive* aspect of Hilary’s theology. He is not saying that God is entirely unknowable, that our minds cannot consider God, but: ‘That which is infinite in God is continually drawing itself away in retreat from our infinite perceptions’.\(^{201}\) Here we begin to see the *progressus in infinitum* of the mind not only demonstrating the infinite nature of God, but becoming a salvific or mystical picture of human life. That God is incomprehensible is not a hindrance to the knowledge of God, but, on the contrary, allows human knowing of God to continue without every reaching an end. Our minds continually progress, never arriving and always increasing in the infinite life of God. Ineffability, then, does not make God unknowable, quite the contrary, it makes him *infinitely knowable*. For Hilary, it is a remarkably *good* thing that God cannot be fully or perfectly known in this sense, for it means that humanity will never cease to know—the knowing has no end. McDermott rightly understands Hilary when he writes: ‘One senses that the mind is progressing through time to touch the positive infinity of God’.\(^{202}\)

The idea of *progressus in infinitum* and its significance for Hilary’s thought are clearly seen in the interpretation of John 1.3-4, and Proverbs 8.22 in light of it. Both the idea of the potential creation in the life of the Word and that of eternal generation being understood within the category of divine infinity greatly aid our understanding of Hilary’s trinitarian anthropology.

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\(^{201}\) Ibid., 12.24, SC 462:418: *quia id quod infinitum in Deo est semper se infiniti sensus nostri recursui subtrahat.*

\(^{202}\) McDermott, ‘Hilary’, 176.
As mentioned in the discussion of potential creation in the previous chapter, Hilary understands the potential creation of all things in the eternal generation in John 1.3-4 to be a salvific reality. That the preparation for creation if ‘perpetual and eternal’ and that this potential creation is seen in the one who is Life, means that this creation is purposed for life and not death.\footnote{See Psal. 118.22, SC 347:298: *Nam nasci ad mortem, non uitae est causa, sed mortis.*} Hilary argues that it would in fact be unworthy of God to bring humanity into this life for another purpose than life itself. For God did not create humanity that ‘what did not exist might be established, in order to then not exist. For it is understood that the sole reason of our nature is this: that what did not exist had begun to exist, not that what had begun to exist would cease to exist’.\footnote{Trin. 1.9, SC 443:220. Similar argumentation is found in Athanasius *Inc. 6*, yet based upon humanity in sin, and not necessarily humanity in its originally created state: a good God would not create humanity if only to leave his creation in sin and not redeem.} Hilary here sets divine infinity as the foundation for his overall view of the natural condition of creation. He argues that 'the world, in these things that are born, has the power for increase, it does not have the ability to decrease'.\footnote{Trin. 9.4, SC 462:20.} While humans may undergo a form of decline in their old age, they cannot cease to be human or decrease to a lower nature, nor can they become children again in regress: 'therefore, the necessity of our nature, advancing in perpetual increase by the law of the world (\textit{in augmentum semper mundi lege proiecta}), does not presumptuously await progression to a better nature; because increase is according to nature, and decrease is against nature (\textit{cui et incrementum secundum naturam est et imminutio contra naturam est})'.\footnote{Ibid.} As Durst concludes, for Hilary, ‘Die Ewigkeit der Geschöpfe ist das Ziel
der Schöpfung’. The potential creation of all things in the one who is Life purposes that creation toward infinite progress and not regress. It is therefore an anthropological necessity for the Son to eternally have life in himself, and this life is demonstrated, through the potential creation in the eternal generation, eternally in the infinite God.

**Conclusion**

Only through a full recognition of the exegetical foundation for Hilary’s doctrine of divine infinity can its implications truly be appreciated. The concept of potential creation in the eternal generation of the Son, originating in his exegesis of John 1.3-4 and driving his reading of Proverbs 8, destines that creation toward perpetual increase in the divine life, purposes it towards a *progressus in infinitum* in the knowledge and perfection of God. His doctrine of divine infinity is not one of pure metaphysical abstraction, but one directed at an understanding of God which has inherent anthropological implications—which communicates not only something of the divine but something central, necessary, natural about the finite human condition in relation to that infinite divine reality.

In the eternal birth of the Son from the Father, humanity is, in the infinite life of God, ‘potentially’ and, indeed, initially redeemed and set on a trajectory of infinite progression in that infinite life. Because God exists as Father and Son, as Begetter and Begotten, he exists as infinitely life-giving. This giving and receiving of life has a certain relation towards creation, whose preparation is ‘perpetual and eternal’, and this relation exists in the one who is life and gives life, and defines what it is to be human. For Hilary, divine infinity sets the context for

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anthropology, so that the creation of all things in the infinite life of God himself means something good, indeed, infinitely good, for that creation.
CHAPTER THREE

Divine Unity and the ‘Ladder of Our Nature’

Introduction

Near the beginning of De Trinite, Hilary gives something of a purpose statements for the work: ‘Let us hasten most particularly, by the proclamations of the prophets and evangelists, to confound the insanity and ignorance of those who, under the unity of God, itself a truly useful and pious confession, deny either that in Christ God is born, or assert that he is not true God’.¹ He makes clear the positions he is writing against, and the consequences of those positions. His trinitarian theology is formed in polemic against both Homoianism and the various shades and emphases of different groups of monarchians.² Those who deny the birth of true God from true God and therefore demote the Son to the status of creation³ (Homoians), or claim there was an extension of God into

¹ Trin. 1.17, SC 443:236-8.

² I use the term ‘monarchian’ throughout this thesis, as opposed to ‘modalism’ or some other variation intentionally, as these groups cannot be subsumed under the term modalism, at least in its modern form. Photinus, Sabellius and Marcellus do not agree on how the godhead is to be understood as mia hypostasis. And one must, at the very least, mention both ‘modalistic’ and ‘dynamic’ attributions of these variations in our modern terminology, rather than referring to all forms of mia hypostasis theology swirling around in the fourth century as ‘modalism’. For a review of this subject, see D. H. Williams, ‘Monarchianism’.

³ Trin., 1.16.
humanity⁴ (Sabellius), that the Son is identical to the Father⁵ (Marcellus), or that his sonship is merely an adoption⁶ (Photinus). All of these positions, Hilary claims, have as their root a desire to isolate a solitary God: Homoianism as it degrades the true birth of the Son 'that he may be separated from the divine unity’⁷ and protect unity of God against polytheism, and monarchians, conflating the Father and the Son into a singular identity as a way of maintaining divine unity.⁸

Divine unity is, indeed, the point where the arguments of those from all sides of the debate converge. This issue lies at the heart of Hilary’s opponents’ thought, both Homoian and monarchian, and it is also the main point of polemical contention between these opponents. Divine unity must, therefore, also be at the centre of Hilary’s own polemic. Hilary’s theology, and that of his opponents, stands or falls on this issue.

Hilary gives a clear description of Homoian logic at Trin. 8.3:

For against the pious profession of our faith they have elaborated their counter-argument of impious falsehood, so that first they ask, if in our faith God is one, next, whether Christ is also God, lastly, whether the Father is greater than the Son (Jn 14.28), in order that when they have heard by our profession that God is one, they may use it to show that Christ is not God. For they do not ask about Christ, whether he is God, but they only want to say, in their arguing about Christ, that he is not Son, that by entrapping the person of simple faith, they may, through faith in the unity of God, remove him from the confession of Christ as God, since now God is not one, if Christ is also to be acknowledged as God.⁹

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⁴ Ibid.
⁵ Ibid., 1.17.
⁶ Ibid., 2.8. See 471n153 for Photinus and adoptionism.
⁷ Ibid., 1.16, SC, 443:236. He further claims 'sed creatio falsitatem doceret: quae dum ementiretur in genere Dei unius fidem'.
⁸ Ibid., 1.16.
Their logic in this 'carefully devised' polemic is that if there is another who is God then God can no longer be one, 'since nature does not permit that where another is, there might be one'.  

Next, they contend that Christ is God in name only and not in nature, and this is how the Father is greater than the Son: 'The Father is greater by the property of his nature, and this one is being called Son but is a creature who exists by God's will, because he is both less than the Father and is not God. . . . And he who is less is necessarily alien in nature from he who is greater'.  

The Homoian logic of natures is significant. The entire Homoian polemic, as much as the monarchian argument, is an argument for divine unity. The way of describing unity and diversity in the Godhead is necessarily an argument to protect the unity of the Godhead, which is, principally, for both these opposing parties, the oneness of God the Father.

There are epistemological assumptions which Hilary sees at the foundation of all 'heretical' arguments. They claim to ascertain infinite knowledge, that they can encompass the incomprehensible. Rather than 'rising up to infinity to imagine infinite things', they seek to reduce them to ordinary human reason. Forgetting their place, they 'disregard divine realities', and they amend the teachings of God. In a word, they cannot properly understand God because they assume that he can be understood. This 'fraud' against divine unity, the root of all heretical ideas, is due to a lack of recognition of divine infinity and its epistemological implications discussed in the previous chapter—of divine perfection and

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10 Ibid., 380.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid., 1.15 SC 443:234: neque ut ipsi usque ad infinitatem opinandi de infinitis rebus emergerent.

13 Ibid: sui inmemores, diuinorum neglegentes, praeceptorum emendatores.

14 Ibid., 1.16, SC 443:236.
simplicity and human potentiality and mutability, of the strict demarcation of the infinite Creator and finite creature which perpetuates humanity toward infinite Life. Hilary claims his opponents lack a proper sense of the 'Other', and in doing so, seek to bring that other down to their level, rather than 'ascending' to his.\(^\text{15}\)

As discussed in the previous chapter, for Hilary, the only way of ascension is God's condescension. He will, therefore, throughout his treatise, seek to interpret Homoian proof-texts through this lens, which he argues they have ignored,\(^\text{16}\) and in light of the epistemological framework provided by his doctrine of divine infinity and Creator-creature distinction.

The subject of divine unity in Hilary, ultimately, his trinitarian theology, has been discussed in various studies. There is, however, as mentioned in the Introduction of this thesis, a tendency in the vast majority of these studies to read Hilary's trinitarian theology not through this lens which he seeks to provide his readers and his Homoian opponents, but rather through the anachronistic lenses of modern theological categories, in particular, 'models' of trinitarianism (i.e., eastern vs. western, generic vs. numeric, etc.)\(^\text{17}\) and strict demarcations between doctrinal categories such as 'Christology', 'Trinity', 'Soteriology' and 'Anthropology'.\(^\text{18}\) Further, the dominance of an 'history of dogma' approach has often skewed the distinctiveness of his thought. For instance, Smulders argues that because later theologians better express the ideas Hilary puts forward, his

\(^{15}\) This ascension is of course to proper doctrine, a right understanding of God and of this divine-human/Creator-creature relation, but this understanding elevates the human life itself, it is a realisation of the fullness of human potential, and an ontological, not only epistemological, realisation. This is seen clearly in the next two chapter of this thesis.

\(^{16}\) *Trin.* 1.15.

\(^{17}\) See 2n6.

\(^{18}\) Moingt, *théologie trinaire*, 160, amidst a summary of scholarship on Hilary's trinitarianism writes: 'Il existe beaucoup de monographies sur la christologie d'Hilaire, il en existe très peu sur sa doctrine trinaire'. I argue that a proper reading of Hilary would render this division an impossibility. See also pp 2-4.
work 'ne conservera qu'un intérêt historique',\textsuperscript{19} and concludes that his thought has a place 'parmi les sources' of genuine Christian theology, as expressed by Augustine and others Hilary influenced.\textsuperscript{20} Hilary's thought, or that of anyone other, can only be properly assessed and appreciated in his own time and context. He cannot be relegated to the sources of true Christian theology, be it that of the fifth or the twenty-first century, but seen as a Christian theologian himself in his own time.

This chapter provides a reconstruction of Hilary's argumentation for divine unity, founded not upon prescribed categories but through an inductive analysis of the argument, which is primarily an intertextual exegetical expansion of John 10.30 ('I and the Father are one'),\textsuperscript{21} principally in conjunction with John 14.9 ('He who has seen me has seen the Father'), in polemical engagement with mid-fourth century Homoian and monarchian theologies. His arguments build upon his previous Latin tradition, which both presupposes and further justifies his apophatic epistemological foundation for any knowledge of or discussion about

\textsuperscript{19} Smulders, Doctrine, 295.

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{21} Indeed, Marc Milhau, 'Le "De Trinitate" d'Hilaire de Poitiers: unité et mouvement', in Dieu Trinité d'hier à demain avec Hilaire de Poitiers: Actes du congrès-colloque du Futuroscope de Poitiers, 15-17 novembre 2002, ed. Dominique Bertrand (Paris: Cerf, 2010), 93, writes: 'Point de départ et point d'arrivée de la démonstration, encadre-t-elle une œuvre puissante, structurée, dont l'unité est assurée par l'idée forte qui sous-tend tout au long l'argumentation et qui n'est peut-être rien d'autre qu'une paraphrase de Jean 10,30: Ego et Pater unum sumus'.

God. This will further illumine significant implications, particularly anthropological ones, which remain hidden in readings which are intent on interpreting Hilary's text by adjudicating how his ideas correspond to a framework and measure up to standards anachronistically imposed. We begin by observing Hilary's heritage of John 10.30 in third-century Christianity.

The centrality of John 10.30 in third-century anti-monarchian polemic

In the third century, John 10.30 was as central in polemical debates as in the fourth. This was a key text for both monarchians and anti-monarchians, and in many ways was where the battle was one or lost: whoever was to 'win' the exegetical debate, which circled around John 10.30, was to win the day. There are no surviving texts from third century monarchian writers themselves, and their theology and arguments are best reconstructed through polemical texts against them, and as these are very hostile sources this reconstruction must be a

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22 One of the issues involved in assessing Hilary's contribution is the claim that he follows his Latin heritage slavishly, not allowing for the full implications of either his Greek influences or his own creativity. Interpreting Hilary against the entire backdrop of fourth-century development, rather than his own specific context further eclipses his contribution (see, for example, Hanson, Search, 471-506, who provides an overall excellent historical and theological assessment, but his general approach to Hilary skews his interpretation of the admirably assessed evidence). This can lead to focussing on how Hilary deals with controversial language of the period (persona, substantia, homoousios, etc.), and how his use of such language fits a 'numeric' or 'generic' model of trinitarian theology, or into the mold of later pro-Nicene thinkers at the end of the century (see discussion at Weedman, Trinitarian, 14-19; Hanson, ibid.; Smulders, Doctrine, 252).

This approach to Hilary's thought through predisposed categories greatly affects our understanding of both Hilary's own arguments and his use of sources. The influence of Tertullian and Novation is too readily summarized in terms of his use of shared trinitarian language and formulas. Simonetti, 'Hilary', 54, argues that Hilary takes on the traditional formulation of natura (substantia)/persona from Tertullian and Novation. While Hilary does use the language of his predecessors—it is, indeed, the only language which is available in Latin—he does not use any ready-made formulas (such as Tertullian's 'una substantia, tres personae'). Hilary does use his Latin sources, but his means of doing so should not be assumed to be utilising certain 'trinitarian' categories which have been perceived as necessary to the study of this period.

careful one.24 What can be discerned clearly is the exegetical basis for their arguments,25 and their key themes and points of emphasis. Whether or not one can always trust the representations of opponents given in these polemical texts, the subject matter of those opposing views certainly becomes evident in the arguments forged against them.26 What is most relevant here is not monarchian positions *per se*, but the polemical argumentation against monarchianism based upon the interpretation of John 10.30 in the tradition which Hilary will follow. This aim can best be reached by close readings of Tertullian’s *Prax.* and Novatian’s *Trin.* Both monarchian and anti-monarchian readings at their most critical points are shaped by an intertextual reading of John 10:30 and John 14.9-11.27 Hilary will continue in this tradition against the challenges of monarchianism and Homoianism, and while he shares Tertullian and Novatian’s aims and epistemological presuppositions, he will greatly expand and elaborate upon their work and incorporate it into a paradigm which can withstand mid-fourth century Homoian arguments.

24 Our primary sources are Hippolytus, *Noet.* and *haer.*, and Tertullian’s *Prax.* This is not a claim that Hippolytus was unquestionably the author of both of these texts, but simply to point the reader to the most relevant sources for third-century monarchian polemic. Regardless of the authorship, these texts give us a picture of third-century monarchianism in Rome. For the authorship of these works see Manlio Simonetti, ‘Tra Noeto, Ippolito e Melitone’, *Revista di storia e letteratura religiosa* 38 (1995): 393-414; Ronald E. Heine, ‘Hippolytus, Ps.-Hippolytus and the Early Canons’, in *The Cambridge History of Early Christian Literature*, ed. Francis Young, et. al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 142-51.


26 For example, perhaps Epiphanius’s description of gnostic liturgical baby-eating needs to be swallowed with more than a pinch of salt (*haer.* 26)! But Irenaeus arguing vehemently for continuity between the God of the Old Testament and the New, or for a genuinely human Christ indicates that the relationship between matter and the immaterial and the goodness of God based upon his involvement in that relationship were in some way important to his opponents, whether or not one wishes to take Irenaeus’s description of what they believe about these issues at face value.

27 ‘Jesus said to him, “Have I been with you all this time, Philip, and you still do not know me? Whoever has seen me has seen the Father. How can you say, “Show us the Father”? Do you not believe that I am in the Father and the Father is in me? The words that I say to you I do not speak on my own; but the Father who dwells in me does his works. Believe me that I am in the Father and the Father is in me; but if you do not, then believe me because of the works themselves”’. 
In *Prax.* 20, Tertullian writes of the exegetical foundations of the monarchian position, claiming that their entire argument is based upon reading one verse from the Old Testament (Isaiah 45.5), and three from the Gospels (John 10.30 and John 14.9-10). The first is to demonstrate the impossibility of plurality in God: 'I am God, and beside me there is no God', in which 'God' is understood as the Father in isolation. The Johannine passages, 'I and the Father are one', 'he that has seen me has seen the Father', and 'I am in the Father and the Father is in me', then undergird their entire position on the relation of the Father and the Son. Before moving to his own interpretation of these verses, against monarchian readings, Tertullian provides a rather exhaustive list of Gospel passages (particularly johannine ones) which describe the Father and Son as two separate identities, yet he claims they are 'inseparably two' (*inseparatos duos*). All of this is in the context of Philip's question in John 14, and leads into an extended discussion of John 10.30, which is where the monarchians 'want to fix their stand'. For Tertullian, the grammar of the verse itself proves the monarchian's error, for Christ says 'Ego et Pater unum sumus', clearly stating that there are two. Further, the verb *sumus* is plural, and it leads to a singular neuter nominative predicate: *unum*, so that Christ says *sumus* 'one thing', *unum*, not 'one person' or 'individual', * unus*. In verses 34-38 of John 10, Tertullian claims that Christ evidences further the requirement of this reading of verse 30: 'If I do

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28 *Prax.* 20.

29 Ibid., 21-22. He quotes John 1.1-3, 4, 9, 14, 18, 29, 49, 50; 2.16; 3.16-18, 35-6; 4.25, 34; 20.31; 5.17, 19-27, 36-7, 43; 6.29, 30, 32, 37-46, 66-8; 7.28-30; 8.16-19, 26-7, 28-9, 38, 40, 42, 49, 54-6; 9.4, 35-8; 10.15, 17-18, 24-29; along with Matt 16.16-17.

30 Ibid., 22.2, CCSL 2:1189.

31 Ibid., 21.

32 Ibid., 22.11, CCSL 2:1191. Hilary follows this argument, as does Novatian (see below). As Simonetti, 'Ilario e Novaziano', 1047, notes, it is impossible to tell from which source Hilary derives his argument.
not do the works of my Father, then do not believe me, but if I do, even if you will not believe me, believe my works, and know that I am in the Father and the Father is in me' (vv. 37-8). It is therefore in the works of the Son that we recognize that the Father and Son are 'in' one another, and how we understand them as unum.33

Novatian's Trin. is engaged equally against those who argue for the identity of the Son with the Father and for a strict division between the Son and the Father—those who argue for sameness in a monarchian sense, and those who argue for otherness in a way which claims Christ was a 'mere human' (hominem tantum Christum).34 Novatian's polemical context is therefore in many ways a direct, if nascent, precursor to what Hilary will face a century later. He uses John 10:30 extensively in this polemical context. His primary defense against monarchianism is given in Trin. 26-28. He writes that the monarchians 'frequently place before us' John 10:30 as proof of their position in chapter 27, and chapter 28 is an extended discussion of Christ's discussion with Philip in John 14. Contrary to those Novatian had just previously been arguing against, who claim that Christ was merely human, these claim: 'If it is asserted that God is one, and Christ is God . . . [and] the Father and Christ be one God, Christ will be called the Father . . . for they are not willing that he should be the second person after the Father, but the Father himself'.35 Novatian uses Old Testament passages (Gen 1.26; 19.24; Ps 2.7-8; 40.1; Isa 45.1),36 which will also be key passages in Hilary's argument, and then a string of New Testament references, similar to Tertullian's

33 Ibid., 22.13, CCSL 2:1191.
34 Trin. 30.3, CCSL 4:72-3; cf. 15.18.
36 Ibid.
list, again leading to a more extended discussion of John 10.30. Novatian enforces the same grammatical argument as Tertullian, and in Trin. 28 gives a detailed intertextual reading of John 14.9 both to deconstruct the monarchian reading and to provide a reading of the passage which supports both unity and difference in the Father and Son, in line with his reading of John 10.30.

John 10.30 is inextricably linked to John 14.9-11 in third-century Latin anti-monarchian polemic, and these passages remain so linked in the fourth-century. These established texts continue to be used by Homoians against Marcellus and the monarchian potential of the Nicene symbol. Hilary thus had to develop intertextual readings of John 10.30 and 14.9-11 which were both anti-monarchian and anti-Homoian, and his developments, when understood properly in this traditional and polemical context, will not only yield a polemical achievement but have profound and constructive implications for developing pro-Nicene Christianity.

**John 10.30 in fourth-century controversy: Hilary's interpretive background**

In the fourth century, John 10.30 remained at the forefront of polemical debates, both in anti-monarchian (by both pro- and anti-Nicenes) and anti-Homoian polemic. Mark DelCogliano has demonstrated persuasively how third century anti-monarchians succeeded in establishing a standard reading of John 10.30 over their monarchian opponents. The rigour in which Hippolytus and Tertullian had carefully and precisely interpreted the verse, through examination

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37 Ibid., 27.


39 DelCogliano, 'John 10:30'.

of its particular grammar and general context within the rest of Scripture, had brought about a superior interpretation than that of the monarchians. Both sides attempted to use 'grammatical' methods for a 'natural' reading of the text, but the anti-monarchians had done so more effectively, so much so that later in the third century, writers such as Cyprian, Origen, and Dionysius of Rome could simply quote John 10.30 as evidence against monarchian claims, without needing to argue their case. The battle for this verse in the monarchian vs anti-monarchian interpretations had already been won.\(^\text{40}\)

The verse continues to be at the forefront of the controversy in the fourth century, however, in at least two ways. First, whereas it might be read as explicitly anti-monarchian by this time, it must be argued for in the context of Homoian and anti-Homoian polemic. Second, anti-Homoian Nicenes will be associated with monarchianism by the Homoians, and the spoils of victory for third-century anti-monarchians, will be used against pro-Nicenes in the fourth century, by the anti-monarchian Homoians.

The discomfort the verse brings to subordinationist theologies like those of Arius and the Homoians is obvious. Any potential reference to an eternal union or equality of the Father and Son carried for them more than a hint of Sabellianism, and the use of the verse by some associated with Nicaea, which has the potential to be 'Sabellian' in itself, would only seem to confirm their worst fears and lead them to their own anti-monarchian polemical constructions surrounding the verse. From Alexander's writing against Arius we can already see the connection of monarchianism and John 10.30 coming back into play. When he quotes the verse, he immediately begins to speak of the distinction of the Father and the Son

\(^{\text{40}}\) See ibid., 132.
to avoid charges of monarchianism, then goes on to argue for unity based upon the Son being the image of the Father, and a 'distinct expression of the prototype'.\(^{41}\) He even claims that in saying he is one with the Father, the Son is not declaring himself to be the Father, directly reminiscent of the type of theology third-century anti-monarchians were writing against.\(^{42}\) Alexander is clearly seeking to distance himself from this type of reading of the verse. Whereas in the end of the third century a distinctly anti-monarchian reading had been clearly established, in the first quarter of the fourth, the concern about monarchian interpretations of the verse had already resurfaced.

The significance of Marcellus in these developments should not be overlooked. Marcellus was seen as the embodiment of the fears of Eusebius of Caesarea and later the Homoians regarding Nicaea and the language of *homoousios*, and Eusebius's direct relation of Marcellus's thought to Sabellius\(^{43}\) didn't exactly work to *porter Marcel aux nues*. Indeed, Michel Meslin observes that Marcellus's doctrine (which, as recorded by Eusebius, claimed that the distinction of hypostases was polytheism and that the unity of God was originally a monad which underwent a process of expansion and was transformed into a triad, to then return to a monad\(^{44}\)) led Eusebius to search the Scriptures for support of his own doctrine, and encouraged anti-Nicenes to develop their scriptural arsenal.\(^{45}\)


\(^{42}\) Ibid.

\(^{43}\) See *e.th.* 1.14-16.

\(^{44}\) See references in note above. The question of the accuracy of this assessment of Marcellus's thought is insignificant here. What is significant is the influence of this perspective of Marcellus in the development of fourth-century controversies.

\(^{45}\) Michel Meslin, *Les Ariens d’Occident* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1967), 256-7. Meslin notes particularly *Marcell.* 1-2 and *e.th.* 1, 20, where Eusebius argues that Marcellus is a poor interpreter of Scripture and that he does not wish to understand the sense of the citations concerning the Son (257n10).
The concern of Marcellus's contemporaries about his theology cannot be overstated. All sides of debate sought to avoid Marcellus's 'Sabellianism' in their polemics with one another. Indeed, Michel Barnes observes that 'Fourth-century trinitarian orthodoxy was the net product of rejecting modalism's claim as the necessary cost for defeating subordinationism'.

Hilary's polemics is a remarkable representation of this rejection of modalism's claim as the necessary rejoinder to subordinationist theologies, and without his opponents reading of John 10.30, we would perhaps not have the significant polemical and constructive developments of Hilary discussed below. The 'heretics and blasphemers' have forced his hand and caused careful deliberation of things beyond human language. His answer to them brings about not only an engaging and more precise account of trinitarian relations, but also of deliberate consideration of the inadequacies all human language and thought about God, leading to epistemological reflections with considerable theological and anthropological implications.

_Hilary’s polemical arguments for divine unity_

As noted above in the introduction to this chapter, Hilary's polemic is equally against the various shades and influences of monarchianism (namely, Photinus

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46 Ibid., 257.
47 Barnes, 'Fourth Century', 62.
48 Trin. 2.2, SC 443:276.
and Marcellus), often summarized under the slanderous rhetoric of 'Sabellius' (or 'Hebion' for Photinus), and Homoianism, most often scandalized by the name Arius or as his followers. Throughout all his polemical arguments, his goal is to show that the unity of God is consistent with the birth of the Son. The birth of the Son remains continually a first-order theological principle. As much as Deuteronomy 6.4 is at the foundation of Christian monotheism, for Hilary, so is Peter's confession 'you are the Son of the living God' (Matt. 16.16). All Hilary’s arguments for divine unity are aimed at a proper intertextual reading of John 10.30, which is, as seen in previous controversy, read with continual reference to John 14.9-11. Hilary's reading of these verses gives way to the doctrine of inseparable operations of the Father and the Son, which functions to demonstrate how the two are united in one nature, and his argumentation works towards further opening up his trinitarian anthropological vision.

Origin and nature

The generation of the Son is a communication of divine life which makes God alius ab alio, quia Pater et Filius, and this is the foundation for Hilary's polemic against both Homoian and monarchian opponents. The Father gives to the Son and the Son receives. Hilary summarizes this giving and receiving of life in Trin. 11.12: 'To speak of the Father's giving, is a profession of [the Son] receiving from his birth', he writes, 'that they are one is a natural property from birth'. The Son reveals the Father, and speaks and acts with the Father because 'he does not

49 See Trin. 2.23, SC 443:314. Indeed he writes that this statement: tanta in se argumenta sustinens ueritatis, quantae perversatum quaestiones et infidelitatis calumniae mouebuntur.

50 Trin. 2.11, SC 443:296.

51 Ibid., 11.12, SC 462:316. The concept of 'origin' is absolutely central to Hilary’s theology.
subsist in anything other than in God’,\textsuperscript{52} and he subsists as God due to his receiving of all that God is in his birth because the Father is his origin. He argues that the reason why the Homoians do not know who Christ is because they do not know from whom he is.\textsuperscript{53}

Because of the centrality of the concept of birth for Hilary, he is able to speak of both equality of the Father and the Son and the authority of the Father without contradiction.\textsuperscript{54} For Hilary, the naturae aequalitas is a direct and necessary result of the naturalis natiuitas.\textsuperscript{55} It is the divine generation which allows for his use of the language of 'equality' together with that of 'origin' and 'image'. The latter terms would seem to denote superiority of the origin over its offspring, of the one imaged over the image, but due to Hilary's placing of the argument within the overarching framework of divine infinity—moving beyond the traditional Father-Son analogy to the divine nature itself and the way causation works within the Godhead—the Father being the cause and origin of the Son is actually the reason for their equality.\textsuperscript{56}

The general pro-Nicene polemic was that when the Son speaks of submission to the Father or honouring the Father in Scripture he is speaking in his

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., 318. It is significant that John 14.9 and 10.30 are referenced in this passage (along with Jn 5.19 and 14.28).

\textsuperscript{53} Trin. 6.29.

\textsuperscript{54} See Trin. 9.51.

\textsuperscript{55} Trin. 7.15, SC 448:306.

\textsuperscript{56} The same sort of argument is seen in Hilary's theology of the image, discussed in the next chapter, and indicates the significant influence of Basil of Ancyra. The 'image' is a substantial one, and it cannot properly image the origin unless it is like the origin according to substance. Hilary argues, as a result of his adaptation of Homoiousian argumentation, that similis/similitudo=aequalitas when properly understood (see Trin. 1.29; 3.23; 7.18; Syn. 72-6). This understanding of equality gives Hilary the means of supporting divine unity and equality of divinity in the Father and the Son without adhering to a monarchian understanding of the Father and Son being 'identical' and without distinction. The important role of Homoiousian thought in this regard is addressed more fully in the following chapter. At C. Const. 18, Hilary's argument that John 10.30, 37-38 'uicissitudinem aequalitatis expressit' rules out any subordination in the Son's reception of divinity from the Father, as there is a reciprocity of equality.
humanity. But Hilary is able to speak of the Son ‘honouring’ or submitting to the Father even in his divine nature as Son of the Father without forfeiting the Son’s equality with the Father or indicating any difference of nature. As quoted above in *Trin.* 11.12, Hilary acknowledges freely that the Son recognises the Father as ‘greater’ than him by the fact that he is conscious that he has received all that he is from the Father. After a direct statement that there is no distinction in nature in the Father and the Son in *Trin.* 9.52, based upon the united operations of the Father and the Son in John 14.9-11, he continues in 9.53-4 (based on John 14.28, and further elaborated upon by Philippians 2.8-11) to say that though the Giver is greater, the Receiver is not less. For just as the Father is said to be greater due to his authority as the Giver, so the Son is confessed by every tongue to be in the glory of God the Father. He therefore cannot be less as it is given to him to be one with the Giver. Therefore, the Father is assuredly greater than the Son, ‘who gives to him to be all that he is in himself’, but while ‘in the authority of the giver’, the Father is greater, ‘in the confession of what is given’ they are one, so that, *maior itaque Pater est, dum Pater est. Sed Filius, dum Filius est, minor non est.* The Father is therefore ‘greater’ as the Giver and origin of the Son, but the Son, because of and not in spite of that giving, is the Father’s equal as he has received all that the Father is as God. The unity of the Father and Son is thus actually

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57 See Smulders, *Doctrine*, 182. Smulders references the symbol composed by Ossius at Sardica in *Athanasius Ar.* 1.58f; Basil of Caesarea *Eun.* 4; Gregory Nasianzen, *Or.* 30.7. For further examples of Hilary’s argument see *Trin.* 3.12 and 7.6.

58 ‘He humbled himself and became obedient to the point of death—even death on a cross. Therefore God also highly exalted him and gave him the name that is above every name, so that at the name of Jesus every knee should bend, in heaven and on earth and under the earth, and every tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord in the glory of God the Father’.


60 Ibid.

demonstrated in the Son’s submission or obedience to the Father. In Syn. 79, Hilary notes that the subjection of creation is different from this type of subjection of the Son. Creatures are submissive to God in virtue of their weakness which is derivative of their created status, but the Son submits to the Father in virtue of the 'piety of his nature' (naturae pietas),\(^\text{62}\) that is, the piety he owes his Father as a Son who is born of the Father’s very nature. The Son is therefore not obedient to the Father by external forces, but because the very will of the Father is none other than what is proper to him.\(^\text{63}\) It is actually quite important to Hilary that this obedience of the Son or the fact that the Father is 'greater' not be interpreted merely in terms of Christ's human nature, for if it is, this implies that the obedience or submission is incompatible with the Son’s divinity, and therefore further implies that the Son lost his divine nature in the incarnation.\(^\text{64}\) Smulders aptly notes, 'Ainsi ce seul mot du Christ . . . contient le double mystère de la filiation et de l'incarnation, puisque en tous deux apparaît et l’autorité de Père sur le Fils et l'unité de leur nature'.\(^\text{65}\) In refusing to separate the two sides of the mystery (contrary to normal pro-Nicene practice) Hilary not only denies an ontologically kenotic understanding of the incarnation, but also emphasizes the revelatory function of the humanity of Jesus by refusing to separate it from the person of the Son, the 'Receiver'. Not only in the filiation, but in the incarnation the unity of their nature is revealed. The humanity of Jesus is therefore enabled to be a revelatory window into the divine life. This link of the 'double mystery' is retained throughout Hilary's theology. Even when he uses the argument of

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\(^{63}\) Smulders, Doctrine, 188. See Syn. 79.

\(^{64}\) See Trin. 9.51-4.

\(^{65}\) Smulders, Doctrine, 186. See Trin. 9.56 quoted above.
passages of Scripture only referring to the humanity of Jesus (for example, passages referring to Christ's suffering in the passion, discussed in the next chapter) he refuses to interpret them only as such (see his reading of Proverbs 8 in with reference to John 1.1-4 in the previous chapter). He always reads the passages also in reference to divinity. Christ as human, for Hilary, reveals the divine life and therefore these cannot be ultimately separated.

Hilary's accusation against his opponents that they refuse to recognize the limitations of any analogous sense of divine and human birth is again significant in his discussion of 'origin'. Where the analogy stands is that nature derives from origin. Parents bring into existence a nature one with their own, and therefore in *gignente se manet ille qui nascitur*. Yet this still remains entirely inadequate as a parallel to the perfect birth of God the only-begotten, 'for the weakness of human nature is furnished from different elements and is bound to life by inanimate things'. The radical otherness of a 'perfect' birth to that of imperfect human birth renders them fundamentally different and incomparable. As Smulders notes, in human birth not only is the father an insufficient origin in himself, and is therefore in need of another to engender a son, but also:

> le père n'est pas totalement vivant mais composé d'éléments et vivants et inertes, il ne peut communiquer à son fils tout ce qui en lui-même constitue la nature humaine. Et le fils qui ne peut tirer du père tout ce qui concourt à constituer l'intégrité et la plénitude de la nature humaine, doit nécessairement faire appel à des éléments étrangers, puisés ailleurs, pour atteindre le plein développement de sa virilité.

This demonstrates not only the completeness and perfection of the Son's birth—by his birth he is eternally *non aliud quam quod Deus est*[^69], and he 'possesses all

[^66]: *Trin.* 7.28, SC 448:342.
[^67]: Ibid.
that God is by nature— but also something of the incompleteness and imperfection of human birth. Whereas the son has 'life in himself' through his birth, the human is in need of 'éléments étrangers' for full human life and flourishing. Hilary continues by saying that humanity not only 'does not reach that life at once', but, while it proceeds from life, it 'does not entirely live' (neque totum vivit), though in God, 'all is living, for God is Life and nothing can come from Life but the living'.

Here we can begin to see immense anthropological implications of Hilary's arguments for divine unity, and how they are distinctly trinitarian ones. Due to Hilary's axiom that origin is determinative of nature, the Son is necessarily infinitely complete, perfect, immutable and simple as the Father, and humanity is necessarily and infinitely incomplete, possessing potentiality rather than perfection and in need of a 'Life' outside of itself for its potential to be realized. As noted in the previous chapter, this 'incompleteness' of humanity is a remarkably positive anthropological insight for Hilary, principally due to his doctrine of divine infinity, as it implies a continual and perpetual increase toward an infinite divine perfection in which there is no end.

**Natural unity and agreement of will**

In Book 8 of *Trin.*, Hilary most directly answers the main Homoian argument regarding the interpretation of John 10.30 (and therefore their understanding of divine unity). Homoians argued that the Father and the Son were united in unanimity of will, and Hilary contends for both the exegetical impossibility and dysfunctional logic of this argument. In 8.4 he lists the key texts of John 10 (v.30)

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70 Ibid., 11.12, SC 462:318.

71 Ibid., 7.28, SC 448:342: Deus enim uita est et ex uita non potest quicquam esse nisi uiuam.
and 14 (here vv.7-11) which we have seen recurring continuously. These verses alone destroy every error, including the belief in two gods or one solitary God, *cum qui unum sunt, non sit unus*.\(^{72}\) Hilary is here, as at *Trin.* 7.5, following Tertullian and Novatian's argument using John 10.30 to refute monarchianism: The Father and Son are *unum*, not *unus* due to the Son's generation, because 'sumus' *non patitur singularem* (i.e., a single person) and 'unum' *naturam non discernit in genere*, so that *neque unum diversitatis est* (against the Homoians) *neque sumus unius est* (against the monarchians).\(^{73}\) Hilary thus utilizes the anti-monarchian polemic of Tertullian and Novatian to confront both his monarchian and Homoian opponents. So that, 'Pater et Filius non persona sed natura unus et verus Deus'.\(^{74}\) Later in *Trin.*, Hilary ridicules Homoian exegesis of these passages:

As if the divine teaching were too poor in words to enable to Lord to say: 'I and the Father are one in will'; or 'I and the Father are one' means that same thing. Or even, because of unfamiliarity with speaking he did not say: 'He who sees my will, sees my Father's will', but meant those words when he said, 'He that has seen me has seen the Father also'. Or as if certain terms of the divine vocabulary were not in use so he could not say, 'The will of my Father is in me, and my will is in my Father', but 'I in the Father and the Father in me'. . . . All this is detestable and absurd and irreverent, and human sense vanishes in this way of thinking—foolish fancy, as if the Lord could not say what he wanted, or that he said other than what he actually said!\(^{75}\)

Hilary picks up on Tertullian's reading of John 10.30 which provided, even in anti-monarchian polemic, for a *substantial* unity of the Father and the Son,

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\(^{72}\) *Trin.* 8.4, SC 448:384. The *Sources chétiennes* translation brings out the *unum—unus* distinction beautifully: 'Car s'ils sont un quelque chose, c'est qu'il n'y a pas qu'un quelqu'un'(385).

\(^{73}\) Simonetti, 'Hilary', 58. See *Trin.* 7.5, SC 448:286; 7.31; 8.4.

\(^{74}\) *Trin.* 5.10, SC 448:114; 7.32; *Syn.* 69. Referenced in Simonetti, 'Hilary', 58. As Simonetti, ibid., notes, another of Hilary's favoured expressions which distinguishes his concept of divine unity from the monarchians is the *unitas/unio* contrast, so that 'Pater Deus et Filius Deus unum sunt, non unione personae sed substantiae unitate' (*Trin.* 4.42, SC 448:94). It is the divine generation which differentiates the *unitas* from *unio* (*Trin.* 7.5, 21).

\(^{75}\) Ibid. 9.70, SC 462:158. In 8.11, SC 448:392, he writes: *Aut forte qui uerbum est significationem uerbi ignorauit?*
against mere *volitional* unity, which Hilary's Homoian opponents proposed.\(^{76}\)

Hilary responds in three primary ways to the Homoian argument of unity by will in *Trin.* 8.9-17. First, he assesses the manner of human unity which the Homoians claim is merely volitional, and which they refer univocally to the unity of God. Second, he observes the object or aim of the Father sending the Son through Christ’s prayer in John 17, which is a key Homoian proof text. And finally he seeks to show that divine unity of will presupposes unity of nature.\(^{77}\)

Throughout his arguments against the unity of Father and Son by will only, Hilary claims that his opponents have inverted the order of the *exemplo unitatis*,\(^{78}\) looking at human unity as a ruler for the divine, rather than divine for the human. For Hilary, rather than human union with one another, the paradigm of human unity is that of humanity with Christ, the ultimate standard of true humanity. Indeed, human unity comes through a literally bodily union with Christ through the mirroring reality of incarnation and sacrament.\(^{79}\) Further, while human union, again as understood as humanity's union with the incarnate Word, remains analogous to Christ it is an analogy which leads to the pattern or paradigm, and indeed demonstrates that pattern in its analogous

\(^{76}\) Tertullian argued for volitional unity, unity of love and affection, and moral unity (*Prax* 22), an interpretation largely followed by Novatian (see *Trin.* 27, where his unity by *societatis concordiam* is analogous to Tertullian's unity of *dilectio*). But Tertullian is clear that this is not the only way the Father and Son are seen as *unum*. At *Prax.* 25 he argues for a unity of *substantia*. See discussion in DelCoglano, 'John 10:30', 127-32.


\(^{78}\) Ibid., 8.11, SC 448:392.

\(^{79}\) Ibid., 8.13-17. Human unity in Christ’s body is discussed in Chapter 5.
The union of the Father and the Son is the basis for divine-human unity in Christ, but that divine-human unity in Christ is the basis for all human discussion of the union of the Father and the Son, and this discussion, therefore, in an analogical sense, becomes increasingly and necessarily more and more physical and material; more intentionally focussed on the humanity of Jesus, on the visible and material revelatory function of the incarnation which propels the human mind beyond that material vision to the (intellectual, not physical or material) vision of the triune God.

The Holy Spirit: Spirit of God and Spirit of Christ

Against the the Homoian argument of a mere unity of will between the Father and the Son, Hilary further uses an argument of the Holy Spirit. He interprets texts which refer to the Holy Spirit as both the Spirit of Christ and the Spirit of God (e.g. Rom. 8.9-11) to argue a natural union of the Father and the Son: they possess the same Holy Spirit, not two different spirits.\(^{81}\) Further, the Spirit takes from both the Father and the Son, and what he receives from one he also receives from the other, for all that the Father has belongs equally to the Son.\(^{82}\) The Holy Spirit is 'au Père «res naturae paternae», puisqu’il procède de lui; mais il

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\(^{80}\) This move by Hilary is another significant point of creative use of his sources. This argument relates strongly to Hilary’s use of the language of *substantiae communio* for the relationship of the Father and the Son. Hilary learns this language from Novatian, and in his *Mat.*, particularly, it is his 'basic vocabulary for designating the divinity of the Son and his relation to the Father' (Burns, *Christology*, 68) (Tertullian also uses this language at *Prax.* 19 and 24). Hilary, however, only uses the language in reference to Father-Son unity, and while he at times extends the use of *aeternitas* to all humanity through Christ, he never uses 'community of substance' for the human relationship or humanity’s relationship to God as Novatian was able to do (presumably because he sees the unity of John 10.30 as a moral unity, whereas Hilary sees it as substantial). Hilary uses the language of *societas*, not *communio*, for humanity (see Burns, ibid., 80). This restricted use of *substantiae communio* contributes to Hilary’s anti-Homoian polemic—he cannot base the nature of divine unity on a human model, as he argues the Homoians have done.

\(^{81}\) See *Trin.* 8.21-2; 9.52.

\(^{82}\) Ibid., 9.73; 8.20.
The nature of the Father, from which the Spirit receives, is thus the nature of the Son. They are united naturally, not merely volitionally. The Spirit, being referred to as the Spirit of God and the Spirit of Christ, proves that Christ is fully God, and united in nature to the Father. The Father and Son possess all the same properties and the same Spirit, and the Spirit is said to receive from both of them: 'All things that are the Father's are mine, therefore, I said, he receives from me (John 16.15): that is, he takes from him, but it is not supposed that he does not take from the Father also . . . he is seen to receive these things, because they are all God's'.

Further evidence of the unity of the Father and the Son is in the revelation which the Spirit gives to humanity. Jesus said that he would send an advocate, and that this advocate would guide unto all truth, for he would not speak from himself, but whatever things he will hear from God. And he further adds that the Spirit will, 'take of mine' (John 14.13-14). The Spirit is said then to speak the words of God, which he receives from the Son, therefore, the Son is God. The revelation of the Father and Son given by the Spirit also assures the unity of the three is a natural unity. The Spirit is the 'Gift' (Donum) of the Father and the Son, sent by both to illuminate humanity unto the knowledge of God, so that human minds are illuminated by the sancti Spiritus donum. As the eye without light

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84 Ibid., 255. See Trin. 8.20.
85 Trin. 9.73, SC 462:166.
86 Ibid., 2.33, SC 443:330.
87 Ibid.
cannot fulfill its purpose, nor the ear without sound, nor the nostrils without scent, 'So too the human soul, unless by faith it draws in the gift of the Spirit, will certainly have a nature which ought to receive God, but lacks the light of knowledge'.\textsuperscript{88} This Spirit is 'the light of our minds (\textit{mentium lumen}), the splendor of our souls (\textit{splendor animorum})'.\textsuperscript{89} As the Spirit receives from the one nature of the Father and the Son, he reveals them both as the one God. Further, this also demonstrates the Spirit's natural unity with the Father and Son. The vision of the divine through the human Jesus is the work of the Spirit.\textsuperscript{90}

\textit{Divine unity and mutual indwelling}

So far this chapter has assessed Hilary's argumentation for divine unity against Homoian and monarchian theologies. This section will seek to explain how Hilary understands this unity to be so. Hilary claims in \textit{Trin.} 5.39 that in order for the faith of the Church to be recognized, the unity of the Father and the Son must be proclaimed, and that this recognition is a confession of the Father \textit{in

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{88} Ibid., 2.35, SC 443:332.
\item \textsuperscript{89} Ibid., 334.
\item \textsuperscript{90} The divinity and personal distinction of the Spirit in Hilary is often questioned. He has been accused outrightly of binitarianism by some (Turmel, 'Métemorphose', 191; Friedrich Loofs, 'Hilarius', in REPT VIII, 60). I would argue that this accusation is only possible if anachronistic categories are in place—only if one approaches Hilary's text with a modern vision of 'trinitarian' theology. Even Hilary's Homoian opponents were, in their own way, 'trinitarian' (see 13n7). No one skipped Matt 28.19-20 in the lectionary. How exactly Hilary believed the Spirit to be divine with the Father and the Son is not always entirely clear. Partly because the language of \textit{Spiritus} often refers to the Father or the Son, as well as at other times to the Holy Spirit. He himself notes the difficulty, saying that the fact that the name 'spirit' is at times used of the Father or Son can be a barrier to belief in the Spirit (which he clearly affirms in this statement) (\textit{Trin.} 2.30; 'spiritus' used to refer to the divine nature itself is standard in the Latin tradition (see, for example, Tertullian, \textit{Prax.} 27; Burns, \textit{Chritology}, 69-70)). He continues, however, to say that the words 'God is Spirit' do not change the fact that the Holy Spirit has a name of his own, and that he is the 'Gift' to us (ibid., 2.31). The error of those who read Hilary as binitarian is that they synthesize Hilary's use of \textit{Spiritus}, rather than recognizing his intentional variation in usage (see Smulders's critique of Beck on this point, \textit{Doctrine}, 272). While Hilary does not elaborate on how the Spirit relates to the Father and the Son, and in no way seeks to construct a full pneumatology, he sees the Spirit as both distinct and divine (see \textit{Trin.} 2.1; 2.5; 12.55-6; 8.19, and discussion above on the Spirit as 'of God' and 'of Christ'; further, see Smulders, \textit{Doctrine}, 263-79). The most extensive study on the Holy Spirit in Hilary is Luis Ladaria, \textit{El Espíritu Santo en San Hilario de Poitiers} (Gregoriana, 1977); see also his 'La pneumatologie de «La Trinité»', in \textit{Dieu Trinité}, 153-77. Scully, 'Assumption', 192-97, gives an excellent survey of the Spirit's role in Hilary's soteriology.
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the Son. Those who insist that God is one in order to enforce a doctrine of an isolated God are strangers to the knowledge of God, because they 'do not confess God to be in God'.\footnote{Ibid., 5.39, SC 448:168.} Indeed, he argues, 'The true and absolute and perfect mystery of our faith is the confession of God from God and God in God'.\footnote{Ibid., 5.37, SC 448:162.}  

Hilary is clear that John 14.11 (cf. John 10.38), 'I am in the Father and the Father is in me', cannot be understood as corporeal as the infinite God 'exceeds space, time, appearance and everything which will be able to be comprehended by human perception'. God being in God cannot be understood as in any sense analogous to finite creatures who are contained by these very things that the infinite God exceeds.\footnote{Ibid., 3.2, SC 443:338.} Analogy cannot assist us in understanding the mutual indwelling of the Father and the Son. There is nothing from our experience or world which can aid our minds to grasp it. Therefore, Hilary puts forward an ultimatum for reading the verse: either one must rely on human reason and reject John's Gospel, or accept John's word on faith even though it is beyond all human understanding.\footnote{Ibid., 3.1.} Thus while Hilary cannot offer any sort of explanation of what this mutual indwelling looks like, or how it takes place (what modern readers...
often attempt to answer for Hilary\textsuperscript{95}, what he suggests is why it is necessary to accept it.

In \textit{Trin.} 3.4, Hilary's interpretation of Christ's words in John 14.10-11 responds to his opponents whom he accuses of accepting their own reason above the faith. The Father and the Son are in one another because their nature is \textit{unum}: 'The Father is in the Son because the Son is from him, the Son is in the Father because the Son has no other origin . . . Thus they are mutually in each other (\textit{in se invicem}), for as all things in the unbegotten Father are perfect, so are all things in the only-begotten Son perfect'.\textsuperscript{96} Later he concludes they are in one another, 'for the Son has received all things from the Father. . . . The Father in the Son and the Son in the Father means that the fulness of divinity is perfect in both'.\textsuperscript{97} The one substance of the Father and the Son is often explained by Hilary

\textsuperscript{95} For example, the continual focus on 'perichoresis' (see, among others, Beckwith, \textit{Hilary}, 114-15; 127; Smulders, \textit{Doctrine}, 256). The problem I see with using anachronistic language like \textit{perichoresis} is that language is not simply a code to decipher meaning, it is pregnant with social and cultural implications which cannot be simply read into another historical or cultural situation without inadvertently applying many of those implications to it. While Hilary's text certainly communicates the basic idea of \textit{perichoresis}, if it is understood as mutual indwelling, not only does he not use the language (the Latin equivalent \textit{circumincessio}) but no one does in a trinitarian context for another three centuries (John Damascene), and it simply cannot be used as if it is a term existing in an ideological vacuum, and doesn't carry with it connotations of the thought-world, context (including polemical context) and concerns of that time. Hilary certainly does not communicate the mutual indwelling of the trinitarian 'persons' as John does, or later thinkers using the term do. He speaks of a mutual indwelling, even that one envelopes the other while at the same time being enveloped (\textit{Trin.} 3.1), but he never implies anything resembling an 'inter-penetration', which is necessarily carried in the language of \textit{perichoresis}. Hilary's mutual indwelling is due to the Father being the Origin of the Son, and therefore, through the birth, the Son is perfect as the Father is perfect, containing all that the Father is. The Father is in the Son because all that is the Father's belongs also to the Son through their union of nature through generation. He never implies anything like the 'cleaving together' of John (f.o. 1.14), and he explicitly denies an indwelling by 'mutual transfusion and flowing', reminding that it is by a birth (\textit{Trin.} 7.31). Further, the modern reader has ideas of \textit{perichoresis} well beyond that of John Damascene. Hilary's mutual indwelling is surely not to be compared with the \textit{perichoresis} of Miroslav Volf or Jürgen Moltmann (nor should theirs be seen as coterminous with Damascene's). Yet the modern reader cannot divorce these conceptions of \textit{perichoresis} from her mind. This is in no way an attempt to critique modern conceptions of the idea, or John Damascene's or Hilary's (in its presence or absence) for that matter, or to claim one as somehow above the others (this is a problem with historical assessments of theology already mentioned above), polemics is not my goal here. It is, however, a goal in all of these theologians mentioned, and this must be respected, along with all aspects of their historical setting, which is why language cannot simply be lifted from one of those settings and applied to Hilary's.

\textsuperscript{96} \textit{Trin.} 3.4, SC 443:340-42.

\textsuperscript{97} Ibid., 3.23, SC 443:378. See also Athanasius \textit{Ar.} 3.23.1, for a similar reading of John 14.10-11.
by the mutual indwelling of the two inseparably in one another, but that mutual indwelling means simply that all that the Father is is in the Son, that the power and nature of the Father and the Son are one and the same. Hilary's 'God from God' (birth) language thus supports and, indeed, necessarily concludes his 'God in God' language. This is further evidenced in that *unus ex uno* is so often joined to the expressions *totus ex toto*, and *perfectus ex perfecto*. The mutual indwelling of the two is not, in Hilary, other than 'l'identité en chacun d'eux d'une même substance et d'une même vie', and this is the meaning of Hilary's *l'étonnante et vigoureuse formule* of the unity of the Father and the Son: *esse inuicem*. It is in the inseparable operations of the Father and the Son, principally revealed in the *incarnate life of the Son*, in which this *esse inuicem* is revealed. While this concept of mutual indwelling is incomprehensible to the human mind, the one power and work of the Father and the Son demonstrates its reality. This indwelling is the divine unity, and it is a unity caused by the birth, and manifested in the shared operations of the two. The indwelling of the Father and the Son, displayed in divine action, explains, in a mysterious, incomprehensible way what human language cannot.

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99 Smulders, *Doctrine*, 230. See *Trin.* 2.11; 5.37; 6.10; 8.52; 8.56; *Syn.* 33.

100 Ibid., 230-1. See *Trin.* 7.32. Smulders, ibid., 257-8, further elaborates: 'Toute cette circuminsession ne s'explique que ex *virtute naturae* divinae (*Trin.* 6.19; 7.31; 9.30) par laquelle le Père transmet à son Fils, lors de sa naissance, tous ses biens'. See n95 above for why I choose not to use the language of *circuminsession*, as Smulders does here.

101 e.g., *Trin.* 7.36.
Divine unity and inseparable operations

Hilary's opponents argue that the Son's obedience and submission to the Father's will and that he did nothing on his own but only what he saw the Father doing (Jn 5.19) demonstrate that he was not true God and therefore the Father and the Son cannot be united in one nature. In response, Hilary develops a robust account of the inseparable operations of the Father and the Son based upon John 5.17f. Hilary opens his argument by stating that the statement by Christ in John 5.19 must be a statement of unity and not division, for the people wanted to kill Jesus following the statement as he was making himself equal with God. Their motive for the wishing to kill Jesus was an absence of essential difference in the Father and the Son. The words of Jesus which follow are therefore meant to illustrate divine equality, not deny it. Jesus is in contention with the belief of the Jews that he is not equal with the Father, not in agreement with it. Indeed, Christ's words here are a declaration of 'the whole mystery of our faith' (omne sacramentum fidei nostrae), Hilary claims. Christ, 'wanting to confirm his birth and to confess openly the power of his nature says: "The Son can do nothing of himself, except what he sees the Father do"'. This 'seeing' what the Father does and doing it, is not a learning from or imitation of the Father, as if he acquired particular powers for particular deeds through apprehension, it rather signifies consciousness of the Father's nature abiding in him (id . . . conscientiam significat in uisu), so that his works come ex conscientia naturae

102 See Trin. 9.43, 49; Palladius frag. 82, SC 267:264-6.
103 Trin. 9.43.
104 Ibid., 7.16. See also Trin 9.43.
105 Ibid., 7.17 SC 448:310.
106 Ibid.
The Son sees and knows the Father and does his actions because he possesses the entirety of the Father's nature. As Smulders writes, 'C'est le Fils lui-même qui agit, mais il existe et il agit comme né'.

Hilary goes on to quote John 14.9, stating that 'the contemplation of the Son is the vision of the Father' (cum contemplatio Fili usum compenset et Patrem), and that the one abides in the other shows that they are inseparable (non discernat), and in order that no one might assume a corporeal vision of God, Christ continues in John 14.11 to say: 'Believe me, as I am in the Father and the Father in me; but if not, believe according to the works alone'. The works of the Son manifest that incomprehensible, incorporeal, inexplicable union of 'God in God', and demonstrate that there is no distinction of nature.

Inseparable operations is thus the key for interpreting divine unity for Hilary. Ego et Pater unum sumus is unambiguous: Whatever the Son did and said the Father did and said. Whatever can be said of God the Father can be said of God the Son, for their nature, their life, is the same. The Son in his operations 'testifies that his whole life is from the living. For what is born living from the living has a progression by birth without newness of nature'.

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108 Ibid., 110.
109 Smulders, Doctrine, 189.
110 Trin. 9.52, SC 462:124.
111 Borchardt, Hilary, 105.
112 Trin. 7.27, SC 448:340.
I argued at the beginning of this chapter that anachronistic categories have often governed interpretations of Hilary’s trinitarian theology. But discussions of divine unity, or ‘diversity’ or ‘plurality’ in the Trinity were primarily formed in polemical exegesis of John 10.30 and John 14.9. My argument so far has sought to reframe the discussion in light of this exegetical root. I now turn to this intertextual exegesis directly. This reveals that all of Hilary’s arguments for divine unity point to the humane condescension of God, the Infinite revealed in the confines of human, finite limitation, and this opens up into new anthropological connections in Hilary which otherwise remain neglected.

This is seen primarily by observing how Hilary argues, in addition to what he actually argues for. As Hilary saw the source of heresy in a lack of apophatic hesitation in speaking about God, I will trace the continuous, though expanding, apophatic tradition in Latin trinitarian thought leading up to Hilary, principally in Hilary’s two key theological influences, Tertullian and Novatian, and how Hilary expands upon it and adapts it to his own context. This is done through an examination of the use of analogy in trinitarian discussion. Hilary claims that as our humanity is temporally conditioned and material, we must know and speak in temporally conditioned and material ways. Analogies and the analogical nature of human language and knowledge are therefore necessary tools for the how of these trinitarian arguments. Further, John 10.30 and 14.9-11 remain at the centre, and function as the generative exegetical and contemplative sites for demonstrating these epistemological foundations and bringing about their anthropological implications. As we have seen in Chapter 1, trinitarian analogies serve apophatic functions which govern both knowledge of God and how knowledge of God is
obtained by the knower—about the nature of theological language itself and how language refers to God—they do not define who or what God is (i.e., they are not fundamentally about saying, 'God is like this'). This analogical sense of theological knowledge, as we have seen already, yields bold conclusions in Hilary, and his discussion of divine unity through reading John 10.30 and 14.9 follows this pattern.

Tertullian: approaching the unapproachable God

Tertullian's use of trinitarian analogies correlates to his understanding of the divine economy: the internal organization of the divine monarchy in which the power and substance of the Father is distributed to the Son and the Spirit. Through Tertullian's economy, God is seen as one in 'quality, substance and power (status, substantia, potestas), but distinct in sequence, aspect and manifestation (gradus, forma, species). This understanding of the economy is utilised by Tertullian to both protect the monarchy of God and refute his monarchian opponents who through their view of the monarchy, he argues, rid the Godhead of both Father and Son. He uses the analogies of a stream from a fountain, a tree from its root or a ray of light from the sun, to demonstrate that the prolatio (προβολή) of the Son cannot be understood in the Valentinian sense,
which denotes a separation from the begetter and an ignorance of the begetter in the one born.\textsuperscript{115} Further, the eternal existence of distinct persons of the Trinity, and their relation to one another is shown by his analogy of thought within the human mind.\textsuperscript{116} His analogies must also seek to show how this distribution of the power of the monarchy takes place in a way which rejects the Valentinian understanding of προβολή. Tertullian’s prolatio understood according to the pattern of these examples (secundum horum exemplorum formam), he argues, is ‘the guardian of unity’ (custos unitatis) in the monarchy.\textsuperscript{117} It allows for alius language which forbids monarchianism, while also avoiding a Valentinian understanding, as there is no division but disposition, ‘car ce qui procède peut rester uni à son principe’.\textsuperscript{118}

The analogies work to uphold the unity of monarchy while dignifying the persons as equal in divinity, as they are alius only in sequence of distribution, not by division or separation. This is so because the Father is the one source or origin of the divine power distributed to the other two persons. Which is exposed most clearly in his analogy of the monarch and his kingdom. A monarch distributes his power to his sons, yet the kingdom remains under one rule as they rule jointly. Plurality within this one power does not threaten the monarchy, as the source of the power remains the monarch himself. Only an outside power invading threatens the unity of the monarch’s reign.\textsuperscript{119}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{115} Prax. 8.
\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., 5. Briefly discussed at p30.
\textsuperscript{117} Prax., 8,5-6, CCSL 2:1167-8.
\textsuperscript{118} Moingt, Tertullien, vol. 1, 230. See also the body-soul analogy of Tertullian, noted at 29n78.
\textsuperscript{119} Prax. 3.
\end{flushright}
While Tertullian’s analogies seek to show how God can retain his unity and unicity (God’s unique simplicity or oneness) as that unicity is relatively disposed in three ‘persons’, in short, how the one God can be a Trinity, there is a more basic polemical concern which is driving his argument, and therefore something more basic which his trinitarian analogies are expressing about the nature of God. The primary error he identifies in his monarchian opponents in patripassionism, that the Father is compassible with the Son.\textsuperscript{120} Here is where we find the most fundamental function and significance of his analogical argumentation. The divine nature must be shown to be immutable and constant, entirely simple and absolutely other than creation. Tertullian finds the answer to his opponents in the utter transcendence of the Father. There is a basic assumption which lies at the root of this argument, and which is a recurring motif in Tertullian’s discussion of the economy: the invisibility of the Father,\textsuperscript{121} which is coupled with some sense of inherent visibility in the Son.

In \textit{Prax. 14}, Tertullian begins to shape this argument. He argues for the utter transcendence of the Father based upon Exodus 33.20: ‘no one can see God’s face and live’. In response to monarchians, who claim that the Father and the Son are one and the same, Tertullian observes that Scripture demonstrates a difference by distinguishing the visible from the invisible. While the Son is invisible in substance, he was visible even before the incarnation \textit{in speculo} and \textit{in aenigmate}.\textsuperscript{122} The visible-invisible dichotomy thus allows for a distinction of persons, but it also demonstrates unity of substance as the Son has knowledge of


\textsuperscript{122} \textit{Prax. 14}, 8, CCSL 2:1177.
and reveals the Father. Just as we cannot look upon the sun in its full substance, our eyes can bear its beam because of its moderation. The Son is visible ‘in keeping with the limitation of his derivation’ (uisibílem uero Filium agnoscamus pro modulo deriuationis), as his divinity is moderated for our comprehension.\textsuperscript{123} That the Son was seen \textit{in aenigmate} is significant, as this allows Tertullian to uphold the distinction of Father and Son, with the traditional interpretation of the Old Testament theophanies in reference to the Son,\textsuperscript{124} while at the same time upholding the unity and unicity of God in that the Son’s divine substance remains invisible. There is a difference in personal condition which does not deprive the Son of certain attributes of the Father but gives him an unequal possession of them. The Father’s personal condition contains the attributes in a certain \textit{radicalité} which the Son’s condition lacks.\textsuperscript{125} There is, then, an inequality in the Father and Son, but it is not because of a different substance, but a ‘disparity of personal condition’. The Son can thus be invisible in substance, and visible personally.\textsuperscript{126}

He continues his anti-monarchian polemic in \textit{Prax.} 15. The monarchians have no explanation for the theophanies, as they argue that the one person of God was invisible prior to the incarnation and made visible in the incarnation. On the contrary, he argues, the Son has always had an inherent visibility, though as an ‘enigma’ prior to the incarnation and made more fully visible when incarnate. The

\textsuperscript{123} Ibid., 14.3, CCSL 2:1176.

\textsuperscript{124} See, for example, Justin, \textit{Apol.} 1.63 and \textit{Dial.} 56.

\textsuperscript{125} Moingt, \textit{Tertullien}, vol. 2, 401-2: ‘Cette différence de condition personnelle consiste, non dans le fait que le Fils serait dépourvu de certains attributes du Père, mais dans une possession inégale. La prérogative du Père se définit par la négativité absolue. Le Fils est bien tout ce qu’est le Père, mais il l’est moindrement; et sa condition paraît différente, du seul fait qu’elle est exemptée—ou privée—de la radicalité qui caractérise celle du Père’.

\textsuperscript{126} Ibid., 402-3.
Father is the one whom ‘No one has ever seen’ (1 Tim. 6:16), and the Son the ‘Word made flesh’ (Jn 1:14) and the one which John says, ‘we have heard, we have seen with our eyes, and our hands have handled, the Word of life’ (1 Jn 1:1). He distinguishes between the glory of the invisible Father and the glory of the visible Son, referencing John 1:14, which states the glory of the only-begotten has been seen, and claims that the text itself distinguishes between the invisible Father and the visible Son when it adds in v. 18: ‘no one has seen God at any time’.\textsuperscript{127} The use of 1 Timothy 6:16, which states that God alone is immortal and dwells in unapproachable light, and 1 Timothy 1:17: ‘Now unto the King eternal, immortal, invisible, to the only God’, is significant, as Tertullian says they indicate the contrary to the Son—mortality, approachability and visibility. He is seen as the accessible light (\textit{per accessibilem utique lucem}) in contrast to the Father who is unapproachable. The one who was always seen became visible, and the one who was never seen remains invisible.\textsuperscript{128}

Tertullian thus uses the argument of the visible Father and the invisible Son to serve his anti-monarchian polemic, including the rejection of patripassionism, as it provides for distinction of the Father and the Son and at the same time retains the unity of their substance. Further, and just as importantly, it continues his polemical purposes by upholding the traditional Christian teaching that the Son is the revelation of the Father.

The Son for Tertullian, as Moingt observes, ‘is the subsistent Discourse in and by which the Father expresses himself to humanity . . . he is able to be made visible, because the Father actualises in him his will of being made known by

\textsuperscript{127} \textit{Prox}. 15. He gives 1 Cor 9:1, Rom 9:5, Gal 3:1, 1 Tim 6:16-17, Acts 9:8, and Matt 17:6 as further evidence.

\textsuperscript{128} Ibid., 15,8, CCSL 2:1180.
him’. For Tertullian, then, the Son reveals what the Father is like. ‘He who has seen me has seen the Father’ (Jn 14:9), Christ said. The deeds and words of the invisible Father are known in the deeds and words of the visible Son. The invisible Father therefore in a sense becomes visible in the Son who reveals him by acts of power, not actual manifestation of his person (in Filio fieri ex uirtutibus, non ex personae respraesentatione).

Novatian: the visible image of the invisible God

Novatian’s choice analogy for the unity of the Father and the Son is a peculiar one: that of two human persons who ‘have one judgment, one truth, one faith, one and the same religion, one fear of God also, they are one even though they are two persons: they are the same, in that they have the same mind’, with Paul and Apollos seen as an example of this. While this analogy, indicating an agreement of will, will be radically insufficient for pro-Nicenes in the next century, it provides Novatian with a certain subordinate understanding of the Son which functions to support trinitarianism against monarchianism. The differentiation of persons is sharp, even so that the Son is imagined in docile obedience to the

129 Moingt, Tertullien, 404.
131 Prax. 24.5, CCSL 2:1194. In Prax. 14, Tertullian, interpreting Ex. 33.1 where Moses is said to have spoken with God ‘face to face’, and the words of Jacob in Gen.32:30 (‘I have seen the face of God’), says that we see the Father in the face of the Son (Ergo facies erit filii pater, ln.74; faciem autem suam dicit invisibilem patrem, ln. 69; an facies Filii Pater accipi possit, ln. 79)
132 Trin. 27.8, CCSL 4:64-5.
Father, and yet, through this obedience demonstrating unity by acting, thinking, and speaking in union with the Father. This is clearly not the only way in which Novatian understands the Trinity, and no analogy should be seen as determinative of any early Christian's understanding of God (again, this is not their ultimate function). This analogy can function, however, as a key to interpret numerous New Testament texts in a way which evidences both difference in the persons of the Godhead (contra monarchians) and which denies any confession of Christ as a 'mere human', as he carries out the will and work of the Father. Further, it enables Novatian to continue in the tradition of Tertullian and others previous to him in saying that the Father is utterly transcendent, unknowable, and invisible and that the Son reveals the Father as the visible 'image of the invisible God' (Col 1.15).

The transcendence and, indeed, infinity of God are at the core of Novatian's theology. God is simple, ineffable, and incomprehensible and therefore cannot be grasped by the human mind. All eloquence is mute and the mind poor, he writes, for 'he is greater than mind itself; nor can it be conceived how great he is, seeing that, if he could be conceived, he would be smaller than the human mind wherein he could be conceived. He is greater, moreover, than all discourse, nor can he be declared', for 'if he could be declared, he would be less than human discourse'. He compares human contemplation of God as eyes growing dull from looking at the sun, as its brightness is too great to look at directly. The same is true of our mental perceptions considering God, and however much we seek to directly do so, our mind is blinded by the brightness of its own thought.

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133 Ibid., 30.15-20; cf. 15.18.

134 Ibid., 2.4, CCSL 2:14: *ne si potuerit edici, humano sermone minor sit*.

135 Ibid., 2.10, CCSL 2:14-15.
The anthropomorphisms of the Old Testament provide Novatian with tangible tools to explain this reality. In them, God speaks by accommodation, in ways that are appropriate to and can be made sense of by the hearer, not in direct accordance with what or who he is:

For we know the plan (rationem) of divine Scripture from the arrangement of the dispensation (de temperamento dispositionis). For at that time the prophets were still speaking about God in parables according to the time of faith (secundum fidei tempus), not as God was, but as the people were able to comprehend (capere). Therefore as these things [i.e. the anthropomorphisms] are thus spoken about God, they are more usefully attributed to the people, not to God.¹³⁶

For, ‘God is not limited (mediocris), but the understanding of the people is limited (sed populi mediocris est sensus).¹³⁷ There is here, as Hallman notes:

A basic duality in regard to all language, biblical and theological, relating to God. The incomprehensible God has graciously made himself known, but in doing so condescends to us in our weakness and frailty by speaking to us in human words. Thus biblical language is a form of speech extremely apt for human understanding, but at the same time a form of speech which manifests God’s nature to us. By this medium there is communicated to us that to which we ourselves would be unable to attain.¹³⁸

God speaks truthfully of himself and humanity can therefore know him, but all human understanding and speech of God is restricted to finite human weakness and administered by God by way of accommodation to those restricted cognitive categories.

Novatian has explicitly recognized what any use of analogical language in trinitarian discussion implicitly requires. Language, and indeed, human thought, fall infinitely short of expressing the life and nature of God. This will not be worked out theoretically, nor will its implications be explored until Hilary, but


¹³⁷ Ibid. It is significant that Novatian even brings in the discussion of names relating to nature in this context, claiming that names of God cannot correspond to his essence, which is incomprehensible, but they simply aid our feeble understanding (see Trin. 4 and 7).

Novatian has made this concept explicit to theological discourse. This will shed further light upon the significance and polemical promise of the categories of the visible Son and the invisible Father, which were already central to Tertullian’s thought.

Novatian continually affirms the necessity of the invisible Father and the visible Son, even claiming that if there were two invisibles, there would be two infinities, and therefore two gods.\textsuperscript{139} Theophanies in the Old Testament are interpreted as visions of the Son. 'No one can see God and live' (Ex. 33.20), yet Scripture does not lie when it says that 'God was seen of Abraham' (Gen. 12.7). Therefore, God was seen, but the Father remains in transcendent glory while the Son is made visible, who was \textit{accustomed (assuesceret)} to descend and be seen as the 'image of the invisible God'.\textsuperscript{140} This idea demonstrates that the Son, in revealing the Father, leads the frailty of the human mind to contemplate the Father, to 'see' the invisible God. He recalls the imagery of the brightness of the sun for explanation: the sun rises from the darkness gradually, so as not to strike our unaccustomed eyes blind.\textsuperscript{141} In the same way, Christ is looked upon by humanity and its weakness is \textit{nourished (alitur)} and \textit{educated (producitur, educatur)} that it might one day look upon the Father.\textsuperscript{142} The imperfection of human destiny (\textit{sortis humanae}) is led by gradual progression, being strengthened by the image to be able to behold the one imaged.\textsuperscript{143}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{139} \textit{Trin.} 31.
\item \textsuperscript{140} Ibid., 18.3, CCSL 4:44.
\item \textsuperscript{141} Ibid., 18.4, CCSL 4:44.
\item \textsuperscript{142} Ibid., 18.5, CCSL 4:44.
\item \textsuperscript{143} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
For Novatian as for Tertullian, as for both Tertullian and Novatian’s opponents, the conversation of the invisibility and visibility of the Father and Son is most basically an exegetical expansion of John 14:9: ‘he who has seen me has seen the Father’. Novatian’s recognition of the analogical nature of all language about God, and his understanding of the revelation of the visible Son as propelling human destiny into progressive knowledge of the Father serves to create a future orientation of these words. He argues that Jesus’s claim is not that he himself was the Father seen, but that whoever followed him would obtain the reward of being able to see the Father, again emphasizing the movement of the vision from the Son to the Father.\textsuperscript{144} He refers to Matthew 5:8 in this discussion: ‘Blessed are the clean of heart, for they will see God’.\textsuperscript{145} In faith in Christ one sees the image of the Father through the Son, in order to ‘be exercised in the contemplation of the likeness (\textit{imaginis}), so that having been accustomed to seeing the divinity in likeness (\textit{imagine}), he may be able to advance (\textit{proficere}) and grow (\textit{crescere}) even to the perfect contemplation of God the Father Almighty’.\textsuperscript{146}

Novatian expands upon the analogical tradition of Latin trinitarian discourse, not by his use of specific trinitarian analogies, but by recognizing the analogical

\textsuperscript{144} Ibid., 28.14, CCSL 4:67: \textit{Dicebat enim uisum iri ab eo Patrem, quisquis Filium secutus fuisset, non quasi Filius ipse esset Pater uisus, sed quod praemium consecuturus esset quisquis illum sequi et discipulus eius esse voluisset, ut uidere Patrem posset.}

\textsuperscript{145} Ibid. 28.27, CCSL 4:68. See Michel René Barnes, ‘The Visible Christ and the Invisible Trinity: Mt. 5:8 in Augustine’s Trinitarian Theology of 400’, \textit{Modern Theology} 19.3 (July 2003): 329-55, for an extended discussion of the use of Matthew 5:8 in arguments of the visibility and invisibility of God. Barnes calls this way of distinguishing the Father from the Son (the Son as the visible Image of the invisible Father) ‘the bedrock of Latin Trinitarian theology’ (341).

\textsuperscript{146} Ibid., 28.25, CCSL 4:68. In this passage, the argument remains firmly in the context of antimonarchian polemic. Novatian claims that this promise of going forward—of a future vision of something beyond the current vision of the incarnate Son—is proof that the Son is not the Father. What would he be promising if he was the Father himself? Matthew 5.8 is also used here in this way: what is Jesus promising the pure in heart if the full vision of God is already seen in the Son?
nature of all language from and about God. Further, Christ himself, as the image of the invisible God, serves a sort of analogical, indeed, anagogical revelatory purpose himself, as his likeness leads the eyes of the mind toward contemplation of its hidden source, that in which it images.

**Hilary: the living Image and the triune God**

In Hilary's *Trin.*, this tradition of analogical language, expanded by Novatian, is developed far more. In Novatian, whereas the use of specific and traditional analogies decreases, we begin to see how all biblical and theological language is analogical and that analogies assist the human intellect to progress towards God, rather than directly correspond to God's infinite and incomprehensible being. This is elaborated upon in Hilary as he consciously reflects on this analogical process of theology and use of human language in a much more coherent and systematic way. He specifically addresses the use of particular, traditional trinitarian analogies, such as the river from the fountain or the tree from its root or light from the sun, which were analogies used by the Apologetists and Tertullian, and deems them insufficient, even theologically problematic. He claims that in these analogies there is expansion without separation, the things emitted do not have any existence in themselves, their own identity, and they do not abide in their source nor their source in them because they are simply the same. He prefers only ‘light from light’, which can be said, at least for Hilary, to have

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147 This is not to say that all language of God, or the word ‘God’ itself, is an analogy. Novatian's argument, and Hilary's as seen below, is that, as God is incomprehensible, human words cannot encompass him. God, the ultimate referent of our human description, is always infinitely beyond what we say of him. This is not to say that humans cannot speak directly or truly of God, or that when they do, they are speaking of something else, which is analogously related to God. It is to say rather that when they do speak of God, he is not fully defined or encapsulated in their finite understanding, but always exceeds it. Theological language therefore always points beyond itself to what it cannot completely express.

become virtually canonical after its use at Nicaea, and he only uses it after any opportunity for materiality or a pre-existent substance which both Father and Son share in is entirely stripped away.\footnote{Ibid., 6.12. Hilary's rejection of material analogies for the Trinity, which were so dear to Tertullian, shows a clear influence of Novatian (see Novatian Trin. 2).} Further, Arius's vehement rejection of προβολή/\textit{prolatio} as an inherently Valentinian notion leads Hilary to reject its use entirely, and this influences his rejection of these traditional analogies, which purpose to explain the προβολή.\footnote{A very interesting analogy is drawn in regards to the rejection of a 'Valentinian' understanding of generation which allows for diminution in the begetter in \textit{Trin.} 3.19, SC 443:370, in which the Virgin Mary having generated a perfect son without 'detrimentum sui . . . perpessa sit' is compared to the Father's nature not suffering any loss in the eternal birth of the Son.} Yet, in his thorough commitment to an apophatic understanding of theology, he recognizes the absolute human necessity of analogical reference to God.\footnote{Trin. 7.30.} As the previous chapter on divine infinity observed, as God is infinite and incomprehensible he is infinitely beyond the human mind and cannot be grasped. The imperfect cannot comprehend (\textit{concipiunt}) the perfect.\footnote{Ibid., 3.24, SC 443:380.} Finite beings cannot grasp the infinite, and therefore their knowledge of the infinite must be assisted by finite representations: humans must know God in a \textit{humane} way. So analogical understanding of God is both infinitely insufficient and an absolute human necessity.\footnote{Ibid., 7.30.} Trinitarian analogies specifically, and human language generally, therefore, do serve to give real, though incomplete, enlightening of human understanding of God by comparing him with physical types.\footnote{Ibid., 7.28.} No human speech, nor analog of human nature or material reality can give full insight into the things of God, yet Hilary recognises still that, because of this, because of God's infinite perfection and our finite
limitation, we must speak of God in our terms,\textsuperscript{155} though our finite language about God is useful to our faith and understanding and not appropriate to the dignity of God.\textsuperscript{156} Further, just as human contemplation of infinity gives a true picture of God's infinity (as he infinitely exceeds our thoughts), so does analogy give real understanding, because it demonstrates God's incomprehensibility in humanity’s inability to comprehend him. In nearly every book of \textit{Trin.} there are explicit references to the inadequacy of human thought and language and all human analogy in reference to God, and every page of the work fundamentally assumes it.\textsuperscript{157}

From the first book of \textit{Trin.} Hilary explicitly sets forth the problem of discourse about God. God alone has true knowledge of himself and we can know him only to the extent that he has chosen to reveal himself. Therefore, Hilary makes clear:

If in so far as we speak the truth of the nature and birth of God we are driven to drawing examples of comparison, let no one consider them complete in themselves to contain a perfection of understanding. For there is no comparison of earthly things and God. But the weakness of our knowledge forces [us] to look for certain likenesses in inferior things as if they are indications of higher things, in order that by an urging through the custom of familiar things, we may be brought up (educeremur) out of our conscious perceptions to perceptions unaccustomed to imagination. Therefore every comparison should be considered more useful to humanity than fitting to God, because it points to the meaning more than it fulfills [it].\textsuperscript{158}

The idea of humanity being educated, or brought up into a higher knowledge beyond analogical reference to God demonstrates the anagogical progress of

\textsuperscript{155} Ibid., 4.2.

\textsuperscript{156} Ibid., 1.19; 4.2, SC 448:14: \textit{non utique dignitati Dei congrua sed ingenii nostri inbecillitati necessaria.}

\textsuperscript{157} For explicit references, see 1.7, 8, 13, 15, 18-19, 37; 2.2, 5-7, 10, 11; 3.20, 24; 4.2, 14; 5.1; 6.12; 7.1, 28-30; 8.43; 9.37; 11.45-46; 12.31-32, 53-4, and this is not an exhaustive list. Beckwith, \textit{Hilary}, 90, in his argument regarding the construction of \textit{Trin.}, observes, 'We can see that a chief reason why Hilary recast his efforts with \textit{De Trinitate} has to do with the use of human analogy and the proper theological method to use in articulating the mystery of God'.

\textsuperscript{158} \textit{Trin.} 1.19, SC 443:240-42. Emphasis mine.
humanity through analogical theological discourse (and this extends to divine discourse to humanity, as seen in the previous chapter). In *Trin.* 10.53, Hilary takes the image employed previously by both Tertullian and Novatian of the sun and its beams. However, whereas this was a trinitarian analogy for them, for Hilary, it is an analogy of the capacities of human knowledge of God. When humans do not recognize their finitude, and therefore inability to comprehend God's infinite nature, they are blinded, as if looking directly at the sun, and their feeble knowledge becomes even more feeble. There is that in God which humanity can understand, what God has chosen to reveal of himself—*in quantum se permittit intellegi.* We cannot attempt to go beyond the limits of his indulgence or we will lose what knowledge of God was possible.\(^{159}\) Yet, even this possible knowledge of God is restricted by human weakness 'for whatever is applied to a weak conscience, will be within a condition of weakness in itself.'\(^{160}\) That knowledge of God which is possible in humanity, even that which is revealed by God himself, is necessarily limited, as God in his communication to humanity must speak in an accommodated way, a manner which the weakness of human nature can grasp.\(^{161}\) All human knowledge of God is in this way analogical. It leads beyond itself to the infinite referent which is forever beyond it.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, in spite of the tempered language of Scripture, the accommodated speech of God, Hilary argues that the only logical thing to do is accept by faith what God demonstrates to us about himself as he is the only one who can have full knowledge of himself. Accepting by faith God’s revelation of himself is therefore what reason demands, the only reasonable

\(^{159}\) Ibid., 10.53, SC 462:260.

\(^{160}\) Ibid., 258.

\(^{161}\) Ibid., 8.43.
option. Indeed, submission to faith is a path which moves beyond (prouehit) unassisted reason due to God’s revelation of himself. There is a more profound knowledge gained as the intellect is ‘brought up’ by God’s condescension. Hilary calls this reason the ratio caelestis, and these eyes of faith are not a rejection of reason but an expansion of it, an education and growing up of the human intellect.

This revelation, this condescension of God, is of course seen most clearly in the incarnate Son, the solus testis fidelis. The discussion of the invisibility of God remains at the foundation of the Son’s revelation of the Father, as well as the proper understanding of analogy in theological discourse. This demonstrates continuity in analogical argumentation about the nature of God with his previous Latin tradition, but the content of his arguments shows significant alteration of the trinitarian and, as a result, anthropological function of that argumentation.

As for Tertullian and Novatian, Hilary interprets John 10.30 and John 14.9 as complements of one another. He must, however, utilize these traditional connections for an interpretation which in some ways breaks with tradition. In fact, his Homoian opponents have utilised these traditional readings found in Tertullian and Novatian for their own theological agenda, with an added fundamental presupposition: divinity is necessarily invisible. The Son, as the visible image of the invisible God, is therefore not God as the invisible God is. Barnes notes,

162 Ibid., 12.20. For ratio caelestis in Hilary, see Beckwith, Hilary, 183-5.

163 Ibid., 2.6, SC 443:286.

164 Palladius frag. 106, SC 267:290, uses virtually the same dossier of texts that Tertullian (see Prax. 15) does in his exposition on the visibility of the Son (1 Tim 6.16-17; Ex 33.20; Jn 1.18, 14; Gen 18.1; Jn 9.36-7). See discussion in Barnes, ’Mt. 5.8’, 336-7, where he notes: ‘The First Timothy passage is an important [text] for every generation of what we will call ‘anti-Nicenes’—beginning with Arius’ own theology’.
According to Latin Homoians in the second half of the fourth century, the appearance of the Son in the theophanies and the Incarnation serves as proof that the Son is not true God; only the invisible—and non-appearing—Father is the true or real God. These appearances by the Son, his visibility, constitute sufficient evidence that the Son is not God.\textsuperscript{165}

The classic interpretation of Hilary's tradition must be radically altered in order to successfully engage in his polemical context. It is also significant that Hilary takes notice in \textit{Syn.} 10 that the 'Blasphemy of Sirmium' of 357 calls the Father 'invisible, immortal, and impassible', and Hilary interprets this to imply that the Son lacked these attributes. Marcellus also viewed an 'image' as something that must be visible and distinct from God, and therefore the 'image' is not seen as the eternal Word of God but the visible Christ.\textsuperscript{166} Therefore, both the traditional interpretation of the John 10.30 and 14.9 connection and the traditional understanding of the purely functional view of the 'image of the invisible God' in Colossians 1.15 must be re-cast by Hilary in order to avoid both Homoianism and monarchianism. The discussion of the invisible Father and visible Son lies at the foundation of Latin trinitarian theology (pro- and anti-Nicene), Hilary approaches this central problem by meeting it at its critical exegetical foci: John 10.30 and 14.9, which will maintain its traditional polemical place, but in doing so reshape its theological vision that it might continue its considerable influence in the context of developing pro-Nicene theology.

The 'image' language, that the Son \textit{uiuentis uiuens imago est}, gives Hilary the tools needed for this new theological shape of traditional arguments. Hilary reads Colossians 1.15 to show the absolute equality of the Father and Son. The Son, as

\textsuperscript{165} Barnes, 'Mt. 5:8', 336.

\textsuperscript{166} Mattei, 'Novatien à Hilaire', 115n5, notes that the functional affirmation of the image of God seen in Novatian (the Son as image by the incarnation, or as a foretaste of that incarnation prior to it) was favoured by Marcellus of Acyra, and thus Hilary's anti-Marcellan polemic necessarily avoided it.
the image of the Father, is God in every way the Father is God. The life of the Father is in the Son, he is not merely a representation of the Father. For Tertullian and Novatian, the 'image' language for the Son is used for a specific function, namely, one which places the person of the Father in utter transcendence and allows the visible image to be seen in order that the transcendent divinity might be revealed. The image represents the Father, so that the 'image of the invisible God' of Colossians 1.15 is read in reference to the incarnation, or as an anticipation of that incarnation in the theophanies (so Novatian's language of the Son being 'accustomed' to descend and be seen before being incarnate).

Hilary's image language denotes absolute equality rather than revelatory representation alone, so that, for example, the theophanies designate function (i.e., the Son as sent) but not nature (that the Son is by nature visible). The Son appears as an angel or a human being to Abraham and Jacob, and as fire to Moses through the burning bush, but these show merely 'an outward guise', and do not embody the true nature of these things. This is clear, Hilary argues, in the case of the guise of fire in the bush, for he did not take on the destructive property inherent in the nature of the fire, as the bush did not burn, he simply spoke from the appearance of fire. Though he was made visible to some in the Old Testament, these do not demonstrate him to be visible by nature, they do not refer \textit{ad substantiam naturae}. Hilary does not, therefore, read Colossians 1.15 in the

\begin{itemize}
  \item[167] The influence of Basil of Ancyra on this argument in Hilary is discussed in the next chapter.
  \item[168] Perhaps Weedman, \textit{Trinitarian}, 126, softens Hilary's position too much when he says he 'falls within the framework established by his Latin predecessors, particularly Novatian' in discussion of the Son as visible image of the invisible God. He claims that while de-emphasising it, Hilary does not entirely lose the visible-invisible distinction (ibid., 127).
  \item[169] Mattei, 'Novatien à Hilaire', 114-15.
  \item[170] \textit{Trin.} 12.46, SC 462:452.
\end{itemize}
context of exegeting the theophanies, as Tertullian and Novatian. Instead, he interprets the verse in parallel exegesis of John 14.9: *qui me uidit, uidit et Patrem.* In doing so, rather than continuing in the tradition of the 'image' in Tertullian and Novatian, he rather takes up the conception which was adhered to by Origen: the Son is the image of the Father in his very being, so that he is shown to be the same nature as him.¹⁷¹

When we perceive of this *viventis vivens imago,* Hilary writes, 'it is necessary that we include with him the one of whom he is the image. But we are pursuing invisible things, and we are handling incomprehensible things, [we] to whom knowledge is confined to visible and material things'.¹⁷² The Son, as the living Image of the Living, is therefore ineffable, infinite, incomprehensible, and invisible exactly as the Father is, for contemplation of the image includes within it contemplation of the one imaged. For Hilary, then, there is no inherent visibility in the person of the Son, and the invisible God must then be made visible in Christ's humanity not in the divine person of the Son, for our understanding is restricted to the ‘visible and material’, where Christ is seen working the works of God. This understanding of Christ as the image of the invisible God is understood, then, in the context of the joint and inseparable operations of the Father and Son, as seen particularly in the work of the incarnate Christ. He writes,

They are one, for the things which are not snatched from his hand are not snatched from the Father’s hand (Jn 10:28-9); while he was known, the Father has been known; while he was seen, the Father has been seen; while he speaks

¹⁷¹ Mattei, ‘Novatien à Hilaire’, 115. I am not making an argument here for direct influence of Origen upon Hilary's conception of the 'image', but simply pointing out the commonality.

See also Smulders, Doctrine, 130: ‘Dans cet exposé des théophanies par Hilaire on ne rencontre nulle trace de ce subordinationism d’après lequel les APOLOGÈTES et NOVATIEN lui-même démonistraient que le Fils et non le Père était apparu aux patriarches, vu que nul homme sans exception ne peut approcher le Père. D’autre part cependant, Hilaire n’est pas entièrement d’accord avec l’exégèse d’IRÉNÉE. Pour ce dernier, les théophanies ne sont des apparitions du Fils seul qu’en tant que préludes de l’incarnation’.

¹⁷² Ibid., 3.18, SC 443:368: *quibus intellegentia ad conspicabiles res et corporeas coartatur.*
anything, the Father speaks who is abiding in him; while he himself is at work, the Father works; while he himself is in the Father and the Father in him (Jn 14:7-12). This does not manifest a creature, but a birth; not brought about by will, but power; harmony of mind is not mentioned, but nature.\(^{173}\)

In the inseparable operations of the Father and the Son, as seen worked in the *incarnate* existence of the Son, we 'recognise the Father in the Son'.\(^{174}\)

It is important in Hilary's argument that this is an observation of Christ's incarnate, human existence. The works which allow us to contemplate the Father, mentioned by Christ in John 14.9-11, are deeds performed 'in the humanity he assumed' (*in homine adsumpto*).\(^{175}\) He did all of this *carnalem*.\(^{176}\) Galtier observes rightly that 'C'est par son humanité qu'il nous a révélé sa divinité'.\(^{177}\) And Le Guillou writes, 'Le Christ est l’image dans son incarnation parce que c’est vraiment dans son incarnation que le visage du Père manifeste'.\(^{178}\) For Hilary, 'Telle est le vie chrétienne, une assimilation au Dieu vivant à travers une contemplation du Christ incarné'.\(^{179}\) This idea that Christ is revealed as the image of God, by which Hilary means the very nature or substance of the Father, and revealed by his inseparable operations with the Father in his incarnate existence further elaborates the analogical nature of revelation. God is revealed in the Son in a manner appropriate to human understanding, indeed, *as human*. Here we are able to see his theoretical understanding of human language and divine revelation

\(^{173}\) Ibid., 8.18, SC 448:404.

\(^{174}\) Ibid., 7.41, SC 448:368: *ut cum Patrem nosceremus in Filio*.

\(^{175}\) Ibid, 7.36, SC 448:358.

\(^{176}\) Ibid.


\(^{179}\) Ibid., 49. Le Guillou's comment is an exposition of Hilary's reading of 2 Cor 3.16-4.6 and Col 1, our 'image' passage in this discussion.
in ‘real time’, as it were. The incarnation itself is this type of revelation, God revealing himself in human terms, on a *humane* level.

Hilary illustrates this point when interpreting Colossians 2.9: 'in him the fullness of the Godhead dwells bodily'. He writes,

> For the invisible, incorporeal, and incomprehensible, being that he has been begotten from God, received in himself as much of matter and lowliness as he was in us of power, *for the purpose of coming to know him, of perceiving and looking upon him*. A condescending useful to our feebleness (*inbecillitati nostrae potius obtemperans*) rather than an abandoning of what he himself was.¹⁸⁰

He further elaborates his own position in light of his Homoian opponents. Whereas they see the humanity, weakness, suffering, and death of Christ as a denial of the true divinity of the Son, for Hilary this is where true divinity is revealed.¹⁸¹ He embellishes his argument with the narrative of Jacob wrestling with God (Gen 32). He wrestles with a man, but is 'face to face' with God, so that what he sees with his bodily eye is different than what he sees with the vision of faith: while looking upon what seemed to be a week human, his 'soul was saved by the vision of God'.¹⁸² Here the physical and material has lead Jacob's *uisu fidei* beyond them. God has condescended to him in a way in which he can grasp the greater reality of God beyond that condescension. He quotes Romans 1.20 ('For the invisible things of him are observed in the condition of the world, perceived through the things that are made, even his eternal power and divinity') in *Trin.* 8.56 to solidify his argument, explaining: 'Thus this is an embodied divinity in Christ (*Huius itaque diuinitas corporalis in Christo est*) . . . dwelling corporeally, in order that they be one', so that 'God is not different from God'. Because 'God is

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¹⁸¹ Ibid., 5.18.
¹⁸² Ibid., 5.19, SC 448:130.
born from God, the fullness of divinity dwells bodily'. Divine unity is ultimately revealed in the humanity of Christ, the embodiment of boundless divinity.

The Son has not then lost the functional or revelatory role for Hilary, but in that function he is fully and wholly all that God the Father is, so that John 14.9 is seen as an elaboration, perhaps even a paraphrase, or John 10.30: Ego et Pater unum sumus. Coming to Hilary’s direct interpretation of John 14.9, then, we can now see it in the context of the absolute equality of the divinity of the Father and the Son, evidenced by their inseparable operations in the divine work of the human Jesus and understood within the rubric of the necessarily apophatic nature of theological language spoken to or by humans with finite limitations.

Hilary elaborates on Novatian’s future-orientated reading of John 14.9. In Trin. 7.35, he notes that Jesus says they have seen the Father in seeing him, and that in knowing the Son through 'sight and bodily touch', they will come to know the Father, denoting a sense of knowledge beyond the revelation, which the revelation guides human knowledge toward. In 7.37, he expands this point, saying that Jesus was not claiming to be a bodily manifestation of the Father, perceived by the eye, but he was lifting the eyes of their understanding. The Father is not seen in the physical body of Jesus, but in the divine works which are accomplished in that physical existence. In manifesting the Father through the divine power in him: 'he is the image so as to not be a different kind [than the Father], and yet that he might indicate an origin [in the Father]'. It is the divine

183 Ibid., 8.56, SC 448:468.
184 See Mattei, ‘Novatien à Hilaire’, 114, and quotation of Trin. 8.18 above.
185 Trin. 7.35, SC 448:354.
186 Ibid., 7.37, SC 448:360.
power worked in the *humanity* of Christ which is the revelatory gateway beyond itself to the full divine mystery.

Here Hilary continues in the way of Novatian by declaring that visible representation works as an anagogical guide toward knowledge of the invisible God. For Hilary, however, the goal of the analogical process of knowing God is knowledge of the unity of Father and Son: knowledge of the invisible Father, yes, but also the *invisible* Son, so that humanity is carried forward by the revelation of God past the restrictions of its finitude, to the infinite triune life. He speaks of this process directly regarding the use of trinitarian analogies in *Trin.* 6.9: ‘analogies lent from human comparison do not satisfy the mysteries of divine power, but only are an appearance conveyed to the earthly race to spiritually initiate (*ad inbuendum spiritualiter*) a perception (*sensum*) of heavenly things, *that we may be promoted* (prouehamur) *by this ladder of our nature* to a degree of understanding (*ad intellegentiam*) of the divine splendour’.\(^{187}\) So specific uses of analogies for God, as well as the notion of divine revelation and all theological language generally, as it is necessarily analogical, work to form a ‘ladder of our nature’ (*naturae nostrae gradum*) to carry humanity beyond the confines of its finitude to the majesty and mystery of the divine. A mystery which humanity’s finite existence will never exhaust, and to whatever extent it is understood, there will always be an infinite surplus.

Hilary’s developments in the intertextual interpretation of John 10.30 and 14.9 are clearly seen within an evolving, though steady and continuous, apophatic tradition within early Christian Latin trinitarianism, which recognises and utilises polemically the analogical and anagogical nature of all theological language. This

\(^{187}\) Ibid., 6.9, SC 448:184.
developing tradition is seen from Tertullian and Novatian's arguments of the visible Son leading the mind to knowledge of the invisible Father, to Hilary's recognition that the Son is not the inherently visible image, but the 'living Image of the Living'. For Hilary, the visible presence of the Son in his assumed humanity functions as a revelatory ladder to higher things, a springboard for the human mind and imagination not to the invisible Father alone, but the ineffable and united Trinity: to the invisible Origin and its invisible living Image.

**Conclusion: divine unity and human ascension**

Hilary's arguments for divine unity, firmly rooted in his traditional and polemical contexts, result not only in thoughtful and creative argumentation for the unity of the Father and the Son, but have immense anthropological implications. As has been seen earlier in this thesis in the cases of eternal generation and divine infinity, here, in the case of divine unity, we see that all Hilary's argumentation about God has as much to say about humanity. For Hilary, the question of God cannot be separated from the question: 'What does it mean to be human'.

There is an apophatic root from which stems all of Hilary's theology and polemic: arising from that divergence between divine perfection and simplicity and human potentiality and mutability, from the strict demarcation of the infinite Creator and finite creature. For Hilary, the error of his opponents is an attempt to contain the divine, to bring the divine down to the level of human knowledge and categorisation, all the while claiming to magnify God's transcendence by placing him in solitude without his Son.\(^{188}\) Hilary contends that knowledge of God is

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\(^{188}\) Ibid., 1.16-17.
obtained not through debasing that knowledge to human understanding, but through *ascending (emergerent)* to it.\textsuperscript{189} The ascension of the finite to the infinite is impossible, however, and therefore humanity must rely on God's willful condescension—and only that condescension—for knowledge of him.\textsuperscript{190} In revelation, then, God indulges humanity with knowledge of himself in an accommodating way, by condescending to ways of knowing appropriate to the human condition. But this condescension, this accommodation, is not an end in itself, so that God's revelation serves an analogical and anagogical function which leads humanity beyond the revelation itself to its infinite referent: it provides a *ratio caelestis,*\textsuperscript{191} it educates (*educeremur*),\textsuperscript{192} elevates (*prouehit*),\textsuperscript{193} it gives a more perfect and profound knowledge (*ad perfectum fidei sacramentum intelligendum*),\textsuperscript{194} and advances the mind from the visible to the invisible\textsuperscript{195} as it contains a deeper meaning than the words which are heard.\textsuperscript{196} Though full knowledge of God can never be obtained, Hilary encourages his reader: 'Begin, advance, persist. Although I know you will not attain the goal, nevertheless *I rejoice at your progress.* For he who piously pursues infinity, though he does not take hold of it, will profit by advancing'.\textsuperscript{197}

\textsuperscript{189} Ibid., 1.15, SC 443:234.
\textsuperscript{190} Ibid., 1.18.
\textsuperscript{191} Ibid., 12.20, SC 462:412.
\textsuperscript{192} Ibid., 1.19, SC 443:240.
\textsuperscript{193} Ibid., 1.37, SC 443:270.
\textsuperscript{194} Ibid., 7.1, SC 448:274; 3.1.
\textsuperscript{195} Ibid., 4.2.
\textsuperscript{196} Ibid., 1.6.
\textsuperscript{197} Ibid. 2.10, SC 443:294. Emphasis mine.
These epistemological and anthropological conclusions are a direct result of Hilary's trinitarian arguments, and more specifically, his arguments for divine unity, founded upon John 10.30 and John 14.9. The unity of the Father and Son becomes the direct cause of this human progression, this natural human condition of progressus in infinitum, as the vision of the incarnate Son carries humanity beyond itself to the triune God which the Son manifests through his humanity. The physical, material, sensational world thus has immense epistemological consequences for Hilary: humanity needs knowledge in the confines of human temporality, finitude, and physicality in order for that knowledge to properly correspond to how humanity knows. And these epistemological consequences further elaborate upon the anthropological implications of his trinitarian theology. The begotten God, who is Life and received his birth from Life, reveals his union with the Father and manifests his divinity from within the human condition. As a result, humanity who, in itself, never fully lives (neque totum vivit), is elevated, as by a ladder of its nature, beyond that human condition to the vision of the triune God.

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198 For a discussion of this progressus in infinitum in Hilary see the previous chapter of this thesis.

199 Trin. 7.27.

200 Ibid., 7.28, SC 448:342.
CHAPTER FOUR

The Divine Image and Human Destiny

Introduction

The theme of the image of God in Hilary has been a thread throughout this thesis. In this chapter Hilary's use of image language will be set in the broader context of the early Christian notions of the divine image. Hilary transforms the ambiguous and pliable language of the divine image so that it takes on an explicitly, and perhaps exclusively, pro-Nicene articulation. Through the traditional connections of the Word as the divine image with mediation and revelation, early Christians naturally connected image language with anthropology, principally through the incarnation of Christ and through the explication of the *imago Dei* of Genesis 1. Hilary's distinctly trinitarian understanding of the *imago Dei* further develops his trinitarian anthropology, and the christological connection of the 'image' gives shape to it. As the trinitarian concepts of eternal generation in Chapter 1, divine infinity in Chapter 2, and divine unity in Chapter 3 have begun to expose Hilary's anthropological vision, in his discussion of the divine image this vision begins to become a tangible reality. For Hilary, Christ is the locative expression of normative divine-human relations,
where this trinitarian anthropology becomes a lived reality, where divine perfection and human potentiality meet, and indeed, coexist.

Further, I will revisit contentious points of Hilary’s christology, particularly that of Christ’s suffering and human experience, through the lens of Hilary’s trinitarian anthropology and not through the lens of modern historical assumptions and theological categories which have led to readings of Hilary which are directly opposed to his argument. Approaching these controversial aspects of Hilary’s thought from the perspective of Hilary’s overarching paradigm of divine-human relations (his trinitarian theology which seeks to involve the whole of human life in the divine and not to speculate in divine abstractions) provides perhaps not only a more faithful reading of these particular issues, but of Hilary’s thought tout court, and his place in fourth-century Christianity as a whole.

’Image’ language in philosophical and Christian tradition

In the classical Platonic sense, the notion of ‘image’ necessarily involved the idea of inferiority in the image in relation to the original.1 It is only the representation of the real, and therefore ‘se trouve marquée par un caractère d’irréalité’.2 While there are other philosophical options available which do not go to the extreme of Plato,3 discussions on ‘image’ are confined to inanimate objects,

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1 Marie-Odile Boulois, *Le paradoxe trinitaire chez Cyrille d’Alexandrie: herméneutic, analyses philosophiques et argumentation théologique* (Paris: Études augustiniennes, 1994), 549. See Plato *Cratylus* 432d: ‘Do you not perceive how far images are from possessing the same qualities as the originals which they imitate?’. Quoted in Boulois, ibid., 549n73. See also Plato *Rep.* 509E-510A; *Tim.* 52 B-C.

2 Ibid.

3 See Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 12.24-26; Maximus of Tyre, *Or.* 2.2-3; 2.10; Porphyry, *Fr.* 351.24; *Ep.* 2.1.1-5, discussed in Mark Edwards, *Image, Word and God in the Early Christian Centuries* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013), 69-73, 125-6. Dio Chrysostom goes as far to refer to a statue of Zeus as ‘the god in whose presence we are’ (Edwards, ibid., 69).
representations in sculpture and painting, for instance. However, due to the use of the term image as a title of the Son in biblical passages such as Colossians 1.15 ('He is the image of the invisible God'), Hebrews 1.3 ('He reflects the glory of God, and bears the very stamp/image of his nature') and Wisdom 7.26 ('For [Wisdom] is a reflection of the eternal light, a spotless mirror of the working of God, and an image of his goodness'), the term progressively was transformed in the Christian imagination that it might be used appropriately in accordance with contemporary trinitarian thought (be it of the second, third or fourth century and of the various theological variations of the periods). The discussion now surrounds a living image, and this necessarily impinges upon how the relationship of the image and the archetype is understood. In the fourth century, the term was being solidified by Nicene theologians as a precise technical term which indicated a total identification of nature between the original and the image, the Father and the Son, in a way which entirely abandoned the classical notion of inferiority. The Son was then able to be seen as a 'consubstantial image' of the Father, or in Hilary's terminology, the 'living Image of the Living'. There are two basic understandings of image language in reference to the Son in the fourth century, taking on different modes of argument or shades of variation or emphases, and often using the same descriptive language of the image to communicate vastly different ideas.

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5 Eusebius of Caesarea could also refer to the Son as the living Image of the Living, but with a different interpretation of what this meant. This is just one example of how image language is fluid and variable, and, as will be demonstrated below, in itself cannot carry the weight of any argument for either subordination of the Son or consubstantiality of the Son with the Father in early Christianity. The argumentation itself, how one uses the language of image as technical theological vocabulary, polemical weapon, and cypher to explicate a further theological system, is what illuminates early Christian understandings of the term image and the significance of those understandings in Christian theology.
In the last few centuries before Christ, authors tried to explain the personified 'Wisdom' in the biblical texts by describing her as the 'image' (εἰκὼν) of the divine goodness (particularly as seen in Wisdom 7.26). When it then became necessary to find language to articulate the relationship of Jesus to the Father, the analogy which this language provided was an obvious one, thus the Pauline language of Colossians 1.15 and the μορφή/forma language of Philippians 2.6-8. While this language is formidable and effective, it remains on its own entirely ambiguous. The central ambiguity in the language is the referent of the image: what is the Son (or Wisdom) the image of? The very essence of the Father? The Wisdom passage refers to the goodness, not the being of God. Further, much of philosophical tradition, as noted above, takes image to imply something separate and other than the original, which is inherently limited and inferior to that which it images. It is thus possible to even refer to wise people as 'images' of God. Vaggione also notes the difficulty of materialist implications of an ontological referent for the Son as 'image' of the Father:

The Epistle to the Hebrews is a case in point. The author of that work says the Son is the 'very stamp of the divine substance' (1.3); but the word he chose to use is one usually associated with the minting of coins. Physical analogies are perhaps a concomitant of substance language as such, but in this case at least one of the words used to make things clearer only confused things more—that word was αὐταρακτικός, 'exactly' or 'without any difference'.

The use of this modifier led to vigorous debate, particularly amongst anti-Nicenes. This is discussed below, and it demonstrates the pliability of image language in this period, as the interpretations of this 'exact image' can vary across the

6 Vaggione, Eunomius, 64.
7 Ibid., 64-65.
8 Ibid. Vagionne references Sextus Sent. 190; Diog. Laert. 6.51; Lucian Pro imaginibus 28; cf. also Philost. ἡ.ε. 3.6a.
9 Ibid.
boundaries of debate. Presently, however, an overview of the development of the
Christian use of image language to explain Father-Son relations will help to locate
the uniqueness and significance of Hilary’s understanding. This will further aid us
to see the connections of this language to the *imago Dei* in humanity and in
reference to the human life of Jesus in order to explore the central
anthropological question of divine-human relations, and see how the ‘image’
discussion elaborates Hilary’s development of a distinctive trinitarian
anthropology.

Anti-Nicene interpretations of the Son as image require less translation of the
classical notion of an image and its prototype. Without oversimplification which
might lead to an outdated understanding of non-Nicenes as mere ‘platonists’, the
classic model affords us an helpful avenue for understanding. For Arius, and later
anti-Nicenes, the Son as image necessarily implies an inferior existence to the
Father, and further, limited scope in the Son’s ability to reveal the Father.\(^\text{10}\)
Barnes notes that for both Arius and Asterius titles for the Son like Power,
Wisdom, and Word referred, in the first sense to specific properties of God.
Second, these were titles of the Son due primarily to his status as a perfect
creature, and they can refer equally to other creatures insofar as they carry out
God’s will. The titles are thus ‘attributed to the Son in a derived or equivocal
sense’.\(^\text{11}\) The Son is not in any way equal to these qualities or properties of God,
they are attributed to him as he has received them and imitates them in his
of God’, and other titles given to the Son, only describe the gifts received by the

\(^\text{10}\) See Boulnois, *Paradoxe*, 549-50; Christoph von Schönborn, *God’s Human Face: The Christ-

\(^\text{11}\) Barnes, *Dunamis*, 129.
Son when he was created by the Father. Image language therefore proves that the Son is inferior to God. The image is in some sense an imitation, a representation, even a mirror to the divine goodness, but cannot in any way mirror the divine nature. The anti-Nicene view of the image is thus used as an instrument to protect the utter transcendence of God.

Eusebius of Caesarea writes extensively on the Son as the Image of the Father. He uses the example of an emperor and his statues to illustrate the disparity between the Father and the Son, and this is used directly to interpret Colossians 1.15 at *d.e.* 5.4.11. But this analogy is not meant to demonstrate inferiority in the Son (his view is more akin to Dio Chrysostom than Plato). For Eusebius, the Son is the 'living image' of the living God and is therefore unlike earthly images. The Son is in his substance the image and complete likeness of the Father, and he is an ineffable and immaterial image. Further, the Son is the image of the Father's ousia.

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12 Boulois, *Paradoxe*, 549-50. See Arius's *Thalia* as conserved by Athanasius, *Syn.* 15. The Son can only be the image with this qualification of limitation. For Arius, he cannot even know God the Father in his intrinsic nature, and therefore can be neither a perfect image nor perfect revelation of the Father. See Schönborn, *Human*, 6-7. Ayres, *Nicaea*, 57, discusses Arius's view of the Son not knowing the Father, which seemed to put him at odds with other 'Lucianists' and Eusebians. All anti-Nicenes sought to defend the utter transcendence of the Father through the idea of subordination of the Son, yet Arius seems to go a step farther.


14 There is evidence that Arius was following in step with earlier theologians in seeing the Son as a necessary mediator for the purpose of creation, the Father's transcendence being unable to make contact with the material world. This manner of argument returns to the anti-Nicene cause with Eunomius (*Apol.* 15.12-15).

15 *d.e.* 5.4.10

16 See n3 above.

17 Schönborn, *Human*, 63. See *d.e.* 5.1.20-21.

18 *d.e.* 4.3.8-12. See Ayres, *Nicaea*, 59; Hanson, *Search*, 51-56. This shows again the pliability of the language in this discussion. Eusebius promotes the Son as the image of the Father's essence, and as is shown below, even Asterius could do so, but both mean something different than the other, and mean something entirely different than Athanasius, Hilary, or Gregory of Nyssa.
him in every attribute'. There are clear differences in the arguments of Eusebius and Arius and Asterius, and both similarities and differences in their concepts of the image which allow for variation in argumentation while still not adhering to a 'Nicene' understanding of consubstantiality of the image (a Nicene understanding which of course comes later than the writings discussed thus far in this chapter and is not inherent in the Nicene Symbol of 325).

The use of 'image' language illustrates how the structures of thought for receiving and interpreting doctrine, the way of thinking toward God, is more essential for the unfolding of controversy than theological terminology or even doctrines themselves. As Lienhard has shown:

The crisis of 318 was part of a larger movement: a movement from the rule of faith to theology, from the language of confession to the language of reflection, from belief to speculation on what was believed. . . . For centuries Christians had believed in God, the Father, and in His Son Jesus Christ, and in the Holy Spirit. They had prayed to God the Father through His Son Jesus Christ, their Lord. And they had baptized in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit.

At the outbreak of crisis, 'the rule of faith and the lex orandi were clear and accepted by all'. Essentially, in the early fourth century, Christians knew and agreed upon creedal statements, but could not readily explain them. Williams

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19 Edwards, Image, 142; d.e. 4.2.2. Eusebius's use of deuteros for the Son, that he is 'second' to God (h.e. 1.2.4-5), should be understood in the same way. Edwards, ibid., 143, notes that unless this is qualified by another phrase, such as 'after the Father' (d.e. 5.33.3;5, proem 23), then it suggests 'an unqualified iteration of the Father's attributes'. See also Beeley, Unity, 68-71. While there is an underlying sense of 'subordinationism' in Eusebius's theology, he is not arguing for any sort of subordination in using image language. At Marcell. 1.4 he draws the analogy of Seth born as the image of Adam, intentionally noting that imaging and begetting can be seen as the same thing. Hilary uses the same analogy at Syn. 73, and Origen used it previously (Princ. 1.2.6).

20 Vaggione’s discussion (Eunomius, 103, passim) of theological ‘imagination’, Ayres’s categorization of ‘theological trajectories’ (Nicaea, chapters 2-3), and Behr, Nicene Faith, 12-15, on the universal presuppositions of all those involved on how Scripture is to be read, are all helpful here.


22 Ibid.

23 Ibid.
agrees that the 'newness' of fourth-century theology is about the Church becoming 'self-aware' and moving from a 'theology of repetition' to something more 'exploratory and constructive'.

The developments of image theology in the fourth century clarify this portrait. Due to the fluidity of the notion of image, the same language, and even referents for that language (i.e. ontological or purely functional), are used at times by both 'sides'. Eusebius of Caesarea is one clear example.

Eusebius's associations and ideas would often seem to put him on the 'anti-Nicene' side of the argument, yet he was, under whatever circumstances, also amongst the signers of the Nicene Symbol. His use of image language helps to elucidate his sentiments. Barnes notes Eusebius's emphasis on the Son's ministerial function, particularly linked to the Son's status as creator. This ministerial focus, Barnes observes, is not however principally opposing the theologies of Alexander and Athanasius and the latter's interpretation of Nicaea: 'Although Eusebius gave some intellectual support to Arius before Nicaea, after Nicaea he and Asterius wrote not against Alexander or Athanasius but against Marcellus of Ancyra'.

Barnes notes the clear anti-Marcellan polemic in the Dedication Creed of 341. The debate was largely between the equivocation of titles for the Father and the

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25 The theology of the image also works against narrations of the fourth century which see the controversies as between those who were true to existing Christian understandings (non-Nicenes) and those who championed a new vision for the Christian faith in response (Nicenes), nor between those who were slaves to Platonism and those who had shed the fetters of philosophical baggage through a purity of trinitarian piety. So Schönborn's description (*Human*, 62) of the 'Arian' image theology of Eusebius as 'the neoplatonic concept of the image' which 'has not yet been purified in the fire of trinitarian theology', is both against Eusebius's use of image theology as show above, and simply unsustainable. This also raises 'serious doubts' to Hanson's claim that 'orthodoxy' was first discovered or constructed by fourth-century pro-Nicenes (see Behr, *Nicene Faith*, 15 for this argument based on factors other than the use of language relating to 'image').

26 Barnes, *Dunamis*, 135.
Son by the anti-Marcellans, which necessitated two hypostases, and Marcellus's insistence on the singular referent of the Father for divine titles (Power, Wisdom, etc.).\textsuperscript{27} The Son is identified with these which are inseparable from the Father, and therefore identified with the Father so that the separate existence of the Son is spoken of only in language of temporality and economic activity.\textsuperscript{28} The 'image of the invisible God' for Marcellus is therefore the flesh of Christ, the only-begotten Son (which is Logos plus assumed flesh for Marcellus) is not the image of God.\textsuperscript{29}

Acacius provides an important report and critique of Marcellus's 'one power' theology in the context of the discussion on the divine image. He says that Marcellus does not allow that the Son is actually the things he images, 'the essence, will, power, and glory' of God. He cannot be the image of the Lord and God, Marcellus argues, if he is really Lord and really God, so that 'if he is an image of an essence, he cannot be self-existence. If he is the image of a will, he cannot be absolute will. If he is the image of power, he cannot be power; if of glory, he cannot be glory. For an image is not an image of itself but an image of something else'.\textsuperscript{30} This reported view of Marcellus is clearly in the background of polemical arguments involving the image throughout this period, including those of Hilary. Acacius argues that Marcellus has limited the image of God to 'lifelessness', as he will not have the image to 'be a living image of a living God, will not have the image of an essence be an essence, or have the exact image of will, power and

\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., 135-38. The so-called Third Creed of Antioch blatantly opposes Marcellus with the significant use of \textit{hypostasis} language for the Son, and condemns him by name, along with Sabellius and Paul of Samosata, as Marcellus openly denies \textit{hypostasis} language for the Son. See J. N. D. Kelly, \textit{Early Christian Creeds}, third ed. (Harlow: Longman, 1981), 267.

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{29} Hanson, \textit{Search}, 227. This is Marcellus's view at least as reported by Eusebius, \textit{e.th.} 2.23.134.

\textsuperscript{30} Epiphanius \textit{haer.} 72.6.5; Williams, 427.
glory be will, power and glory’.  

Acacius also ties the idea of a perfect living image to the Son's begottenness, for 'Lord begets Lord' and 'God begets God'.  

This argument will be used in Basil of Ancyra's anti-Marcellan polemic to argue that image corresponds with essence, for a substantial image, and this comes to the centre of Hilary's mature thought through Basil.  

The use of the homoousion interpretation of image discourse promoted by Marcellus aids the progression of both anti-Nicene and Nicene interpretations of it. The language of image used in anti-Marcellan creeds of the mid-fourth century help to elucidate the complexities of this pliable language and its polemical and constructive potential in this period. The Dedication Creed creed states that the Son is the 'exact image (ἀπαράλλακτον εἰκόνα) of the Godhead (θεότητος), substance (οὐσίας), will (βουλῆς), power (δυνάμεως) and glory (δόχης) of the Father, the first-begotten of all creation (πρωτότοκον πᾶσις κτίσεως).  

The majority of anti-Nicenes seemed keen to avoid such language as 'exact image', particularly in relation to ousia, which could too easily be taken in a 'homoousion' sense, particularly as it could carry materialist notions. Yet, its previous use by Asterius (οὐσίας τε και βουλῆς και δόχης και δυνάμεως ἀπαράλλακτων εἰκόνα), virtually verbatim to the 'exact image' of the Second Creed of Antioch,  

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31 Ibid., 7.3; Williams, 427-28.  
32 Ibid., 7.8-9. It is striking how Acacius, Basil of Ancyra, and Hilary can, in this sense, use the same arguments for the same end (anti-monarchian polemic).  
33 See Weedman, Trinitarian, 100. Basil's influence on Hilary's 'image' argument is discussed below.  
34 Kelly, Creeds, 368-69.  
35 Asterius, apud Eusebius Marcell. 1.4, GSC 4:25; fr. 96. Ayres, Nicaea, 119, notes that it seems that Asterius had an important role in forming this creed.
coupled with the tradition of the creed being a Lucianist document (Sozomen *h.e.* 3.5.9; 6.12.4 presents the possibility of Lucian authorship), a strong case for an acceptable non-Nicene use of ἀπαράλλακτον εἰκόνα becomes apparent. The Nicene usage of the phrase is well attested, and almost all Eusebians were reluctant to admit that the Son was the image of the divine essence and reserved image terminology for divine attributes: will, for instance. Nevertheless, the use of the phrase by Asterius illustrates more than a desire to follow his master Lucian, if he did indeed teach this. What might seem to lend itself to a distinctively Nicene interpretation, 'exact image' was readily transferable to anti-Nicene usage, or more precisely, anti-Marcellan polemic. Asterius's ability to use the phrase is not difficult to fathom being that his understanding of the Son as image carries with it clear and definitive marks of inferiority and limitation, as

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37 I am not advocating Lucian authorship or Lucianist construction of this creed. It was, however, understood by pro-Nicenes to be such, and, as the Sozomen reference shows, was perceived as such in pro-Nicene memory. The point is that it is typically recognized by pro-Nicenes as an anti-Nicene creed while at the same time utilising the language of 'exact image' (excluding Hilary, who interprets it rather favourably at *Syn.* 31-33, largely because of its use of image language. As will be clear below, this is due to Hilary's polemical transformation of image language to a distinctively Nicene appropriation).

38 A definitive argument that the Second Antiochene Creed is 'anti-Nicene' cannot be made, but it certainly sought to be a more faithful confession of faith against Marcellus and 'Sabellian' thought, where the framers might have seen Nicaea's statement as failing (See Ayres, *Nicaea*, 119-20). Indeed, whereas Athanasius could classify the creed as 'Arian' ( *Syn.* 23), Hilary could provide a pro-Nicene interpretation of it, treating its subordinate language as understandable due to the anti-monarchian nature of the document ( *Syn.* 32). Asterius's near verbatim use can certainly be classified as both anti-Nicene and anti-Marcellan (which he may have been able to easily group together as the same thing).


41 It is interesting to note that, as is shown below, Hilary will use image theology in anti-Marcellan polemic as well, though he holds an opposing view of the Son as image to that of Asterius.
discussed above. The referent of the image, what the Son is image of, are divine qualities, which the Son participates in in a derivative sense, not the divine essence. The Athanasian acceptance of the statue analogy of Eusebius (something even Aetius could have readily accepted) makes an anti-Nicene use of 'exact image' yet easier still, and further elaborates the point that it is more the use and polemical argumentation which elucidates the meaning of notions like 'image' in early Christian writings than terms in themselves.

Hilary, perhaps observing its problematic tendency toward anti-Nicene understandings of the Son, will reject the statue analogy and directly argue that the Son is image in no way like a statue or any other inanimate thing is image. Athanasius, however, the first fourth-century Nicene theologian to express the idea of a 'consubstantial' image, uses the statue analogy to intentionally express the idea. Whereas for Eusebius what one does to the statue has no bearing on the

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42 See also Ayres, Nicaea, 54.

43 Ar. 3.6.

44 Vaggione, Eunomius, 661n86.

45 Boulnois, Paradoxe, 552, observes of ἀπαράλλακτος: 'Cette expression a même été discutée à Nicée où elle aurait pu devenir le mot technique du symbole, si elle n’avait risqué d’être comprise par les ariens de manière équivoque, de sorte que les Pères lui on préféré le terme plus clair de «consubstantiel» (homoousios) (referencing Augusto Segovia 'Estudios sobre la terminología trinitaria en la época postnicena', Greg 19 (1938): 14-36).

46 Trin. 7.38. Edwards, Image, 48, notes that Xenophanes may have been the first to teach that statues cannot reveal the true likeness of the gods. While his assertion pertains specifically to the issue of external form or embodiedness as a problem in imaging the divine and Hilary’s critique refers primarily to the statue’s lifelessness, it demonstrates available perspectives, long before Hilary, which deny the possibility of statues reflecting divine realities.

Melitius’s sermon (Epiphanius haer. 73.31.5) also argues that the Son cannot be seen as image of the Father as an inanimate object is an image. Further, his use of the ‘exact impress of the Father’ in anti-Photinian polemic (73.30.6), his connection of image with ‘offspring’, and his argument that John 1.3, ‘all things are made by him’, is sufficient teaching of the Son’s indescribable generation (73.33.2) are all very close to Hilary’s arguments. Melitius’s argument for the ineffability of God, and that he must be revealed in earthly things in order for our minds to advance to heavenly things is similar to Hilary’s (73.31.4; see Hilary Trin. 4.2, and discussions in Chapters 1 and 3). Both writers argue that we cannot even understand our own birth, and thus certainly cannot understand the only-Begotten’s (Hilary Trin. 2.9; Melitius 73.32.5), and, as Hilary (Trin. 10.23), Melitius claims that we cannot seek to pass the limits of our understanding or we will lose what understanding of God we do have (73.31.4). Melitius's sermon was preached just after his being made bishop of Antioch in 360. While it may not be possible to demonstrate a certain influence of Miltiatus on Hilary, or vice versa, the parallels in their arguments are striking.
one imaged, for Athanasius what one does to the statue one does to the emperor himself whose image the statue bears, and in the same way, in worshiping Christ God himself is truly worshiped.\textsuperscript{47} Athanasius's view of the consubstantial image is soteriologically focussed and driven: if the Word of God is not the consubstantial image, divine in his very self and not only through participation in the divine, then he cannot properly bestow divinity upon others.\textsuperscript{48} This soteriological, and for Hilary, anthropological, focus of the consubstantial image remains continually at the centre of the pro-Nicene expression of the Son's imaging of the Father.

Contrary to assumptions that the pro-Nicene concerns were essentially 'new' concerns of the fourth century, the tradition provided interpretive resources for the concept of a consubstantial image, an image which is equal in nature to its referent. New things are surely being said, but from within a given traditional framework. The consubstantial image tradition allows for anti-monarchian polemic using a substantial vision of the image that denies subordination of the image and combats Homoian theology.

In \textit{Princ.} 1.2.6, Origen discusses the possible meanings of Colossians 1.15 (which he here reads as the \textit{inuisibilis dei imago inuisibilis est}). For Origen, the use of image in terms of a statue or painting is relevant to the image of God in humanity but not to the Son, who is the image 'in the same manner as according to history we say that the image of Adam is his son Seth', and he quotes Genesis 5.3: \textit{Et genuit Adam Seth secundum imaginem suam et secundum speciem suam.} This image contains 'the unity of nature and substance of father and son'.\textsuperscript{49} While

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item\textsuperscript{47} Cyril of Alexandria, \textit{thes.} 12, PG75:184D-185A, will argue in a similar way using a painting of an emperor analogously to the Son imaging the Father, and he uses John 14.9 and 10.30 in this discussion ('I am in the emperor and the emperor is in me'). See discussion in Boulnois, \textit{Paradoxe}, 558-59.
\item\textsuperscript{48} \textit{Syn.} 51.
\item\textsuperscript{49} \textit{Princ.} 1.2.6, SC 252:120-22. Hilary uses the analogy of Seth at \textit{Syn.} 73.
\end{enumerate}
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fourth-century pro-Nicene interpretation will alter and elaborate upon Origen’s argument, the logic of the interpretation is already provided in Origen’s understanding of the 'invisible image' which is how 'God is rightly called the Father of his Son'.\(^{50}\) I am not making a case for a pure or necessary lineage from Origen through Nicaea to pro-Nicene argumentation. I am simply suggesting how Origen provided an interpretive framework in which pro-Nicene argumentation flourished.\(^{51}\) This framework for the consubstantial image was received in the theological culture of the fourth-century, it was part of the its inheritance and indwelled the existing milieu: it was *traditional*.

Ayres indicates how widespread this *traditional* interpretation was from the beginning of the controversy. In Alexander's *Letter to Alexander*, the Son is seen as the true image as he shares the qualities of the one he reflects.\(^{52}\) At the synodical letter from the council of Antioch, early in 325, a council which Alexander did not attend, a very similar theological tradition is present.\(^{53}\) In particular the Son is said to be immutable as the Father is (in the anathemas which are perhaps more keenly anti-Arius even than the anathemas of Nicaea). Ayres notes the soteriological concern of this text as well: 'The Son's status as revealer of the Father, as light of the world and as saviour is seen as resting on his being the true image eternally generated from the Father'.\(^{54}\)

\(^{50}\) Ibid., 120. See discussion in Barnes, *Dunamis*, 117-18, and the development upon Origen’s foundation of the reading of this passage by Gregory of Nyssa. See previous chapter for the idea of the invisible image in Hilary.

\(^{51}\) Ayres, *Nicaea*, 42, notes that Origen's usage of image language to show correlativity of the Father and the Son results in the hierarchical use of the language being less frequent than one might expect (Son as first 'creature' of Father, etc.).

\(^{52}\) *Urk*. 14.47. See Ayres, *Nicaea*, 45; Hanson, *Search*, 142.

\(^{53}\) Ayres, *Nicaea*, 50.

\(^{54}\) Ibid., 51.
Both pro- and anti-Nicenes inherited frameworks to receive the notion of 'image', and these frameworks enabled them to use the same language and terminology in opposing ways, and this in many ways contributed to the shaping of both of their self-identities. The inheritance of image discourse carries with it other heirlooms, however. And, from the biblical text forward, the question of the image of God does not remain only a question of Father-Son relations or of the divinity of the Son. The New Testament depicts this Son assuming the formam (μορφήν) servi. The discussion cannot, then, remain divorced from human existence, and the incarnation becomes a focal point for entering into image discourse, and indeed, discourse about God at all as we have already seen in previous chapters. Due to the incarnation, the discussion of the divine image is intrinsically and necessarily connected to discussions about humanity. The concept of the imago Dei, which was virtually left unexplored in Hebrew Scripture or midrashic literature, thus becomes a primary doctrine of the Christian faith.55 The divine image, therefore, brings anthropological discussion into the realm of the theological. The Son 'est l'image du Père qui s'est rendue visible dans l'incarnation et à l'image de laquelle les hommes sont appelés à devenir eux aussi fils de cet unique Père'.56

In Hilary's image theology this anthropological imperative will come clearly to the fore. His image language in regard to the Son's relation to the Father sets the foundation upon which these anthropological implications are built upon in a trinitarian context. As Athanasius, Hilary argues for a consubstantial image, but

55 Edwards, Image, 11.

56 Boulnois, Paradoxe, 556. Boulnois is speaking directly of Cyril of Alexandria's thought here, but this statement can clearly be representative of pro-Nicenes, and all Christian thought generally. Though the interpretations of what this might mean have varied greatly, all Christians have had to consider what the humanity of Jesus means for the imago Dei in all of humanity and how both of these relate to ideas of redemption.
the manner and focus of his argumentation leads to both polemical advantage and constructive ingenuity, and this argumentation owes its foundation to Basil of Ancyra.

Hilary's image theology further shows his alignment with Basil, both in polemical concern and theological insight. As in the case of the categories of 'name' and 'birth' explored in Chapter 2, he does not simply repeat Basil's polemical and theological arguments for the divine image, but he certainly acquires his polemical strategy and theological emphases from Basil's use of image theology against Marcellan and Homoian opponents. In Syn. Hilary establishes a clear connection to Basil's image argument, and in Trin. his mature arguments, explicated below, are built upon this foundation received from Basil. Basil treats the christological titles of Wisdom, Word, and Image as synonyms, and as part of a 'wider exegetical strategy' which identifies Wisdom as something outside God but with a similar essence as God, he also associates Wisdom's synonyms of Word and Image with God's essence. He writes, 'Wisdom is the Son of the Wise, an essence which is the Son of an essence, so the image is like the essence'. The argument ultimately is meant to support Basil's primary point that the Son is like in substance to the Father but not identical to the Father. He directly links Colossians 1.15 with Proverbs 8, wedding Wisdom and Image language, and he contends that as Wisdom is produced without passions in Proverbs 8 so is the 'image' in Colossians 1 in order to show that the language of image does not undermine the essential likeness of the Father and the Son. This

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57 Weedman, *Trinitarian*, 100. See also Beckwith, *Hilary*, 60-61, for Basil's use of image theology in anti-Marcellan polemic.

58 Epiphanius *haer.* 73.7.3; Williams, 441. Quoted in Beckwith, *Hilary*, 60-61. George of Laodicea (Epiphanius *haer.* 73.17.1; Williams, 451) uses the Colossians 1 phrase 'the image of the invisible God' to demonstrate the Son's likeness to the Father in all respects.
opposes both Marcellus, who insisted that an 'image' must be visible and distinct from the essence of its origin, and the Homoians, who decry any use of 'substance' language *tout court* in trinitarian discourse. For Basil, the Image must be a substantial one, but must also be distinct from its origin.

Basil's first anathema condemned those who say the image is the same as the origin. In Hilary's gloss of this anathema at *Syn.* 13 he follows Basil's anti-Marcellan argument, but through his modified understanding of *similis* language used to describe the Father and the Son which reads *similis* and *aequalitas* as coterminous, Hilary turns Basil's anti-monarchian polemic into a defense of the consubstantial image. He moves Basil's argument for distinction of the Father and the Son forward to say that the image contains within it the 'image, species, and nature' (*imago, species, natura*) of its origin. He continues this argument when discussing Basil's third anathema, stating that the Son contains all the 'properties' of the Father, including 'glory, worth, power, invisibility, and essence' (*gloria, uirtus, potestas, inuisibilis, essentia*). This is the case because as the image the Son must be the 'perfect likeness of the nature imaged in himself'. As stated above, Hilary acquires this understanding that image corresponds to nature from Basil and it establishes an anti-monarchian polemic which simultaneously refuses to separate the Father and the Son at the level of

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59 See 124n56.
60 See Weedman, *Trinitarian*, 67-8, for a discussion of this section of *Syn.*
61 *Syn.* 13.
62 *Syn.* 15.
essence.\textsuperscript{64} In \textit{Syn}. Hilary’s received Homoiousian polemical and theological categories await development in his more mature trinitarian arguments in \textit{Trin.} Recognizing Hilary's polemical situation and his categories for engaging it, we can turn to his argument for the divine image in \textit{Trin.} and understand what it achieves for his overall theological vision.

\textit{The living Image of the Living: Hilary’s transformation of image language}

After a reminder of the apophatic hesitation necessary in the use of analogy in reference to God, Hilary utilizes the same traditional reading of the relationship of birth and image seen in Origen and further developed by Alexander, other anti-'Arians' at Antioch, and Athanasius. In birth 'both he who generates by a handing over of an identical nature (\textit{naturae eiusdem}) is the origin of a lineage (\textit{originem nascentem}), and the one begotten remains in the begetter whose power, though it be derivative, is not withdrawn, by receiving through birth'.\textsuperscript{65} Yet, as we have seen, this is inadequate to the perfect birth of God from God. For whereas humanity is born in weakness, the divine birth is in perfect power and in it God does not suffer change. Because the Son does not have a beginning from the elements of the world—which are either without life or have been issued into life from nothing—he is life itself, as the Father, for 'Christ, God from God, is himself entirely what God is'.\textsuperscript{66} Hilary’s connection of 'image' with 'life' leads to his rejection of the 'statue' analogy, which Athanasius held on to. The living Image

\textsuperscript{64} See Weedman, \textit{Trinitarian}, 100. Jeffrey Steenson, 'Basil of Ancyra and the Course of Nicene Orthodoxy' (D.Phil. Thesis, University of Oxford, 1983), 260 (referenced in Weedman, ibid. n32), points out that this use of 'image' was unheard of in the Latin tradition. Though it is possibly also developed by Victorinus, depending upon whether Victorinus had read Hilary and learned from him or independently picked it up from Basil.

\textsuperscript{65} \textit{Trin.} 7.28, SC 448:342.

\textsuperscript{66} Ibid., 8.53, SC 448:464.
of the Living is not an image as painted or carved images, which reproduce the appearance of the objects they represent but cannot be put on the same level as their living originals. The Son, on the contrary, is the Image of the Father in such a way as to be 'not different in kind (genere) [to the Father], but to indicate [the Father as] his origin (auctorem}'.

Hilary thus distinguishes between two types of images, living and material, the latter being categorically other than the manner in which the Son is the Image of the Father. Due to this distinction, and the categorical denial of the Son imaging as material images image, he is able to say:

Unless [the Son] possesses the perfect glory of the Father's blessedness and reproduces the absolute vision of the whole nature (et absolutam naturae totius refert speciem), he is not in truth [his] image. But if the only-begotten God is the image of the unbegotten God, the truth of that perfect and absolute nature is in him and makes him the image of the Truth' (perfectae adque absolutae in eo naturae ueritas inest, per quam efficitur esse eum imaginem ueritatis).

Any interpretation of image language which allows for inferiority or subordination of the Son only acknowledges in the Son a fictitious divinity, and therefore denies the very language of 'image' itself. For 'that which is false is not the image of the true'.

Basil does not elaborate upon the notion of 'life' as Hilary does (towards the living and consubstantial image) but he links 'image', 'life', and 'essence' in order to again show distinction of the Father and the Son against monarchians but a likeness of essence against Homoians. Whatever is given by the 'origin' (whether 'life' or 'image') necessarily demonstrates a similarity of substance to the original in the origin's offspring. Hilary utilises this argument against the Homoians who had, presumably, argued for a hierarchical relationship of the Father and Son

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67 Ibid., 7.37, SC 448:360.
68 Ibid., 11.5 SC 462:302.
69 Ibid., 304. See also 5.37.
based upon the origin and offspring, or giver and receiver relationship.\textsuperscript{70} In both cases, whether 'image' or 'life', as for Basil so for Hilary, whatever is granted to the offspring by the origin is like in substance to the origin.\textsuperscript{71}

Within Hilary's transformation of the concept of the Son as the 'living Image' based upon the Son's eternal generation, the title of 'Image' for the Son necessarily means he is good as the Father is good, incorporeal as the Father is incorporeal, ineffable, invisible, and unchangeable as the Father is (for one who can be described is not the image of the Ineffable, for example).\textsuperscript{72} In Hilary's description of the Image, he clearly draws on elements of the 'consubstantial image' tradition described above. As Origen, he is the invisible Image, as Alexander, he contains all the elements of the divine, as the Antiochene statement of 325, he is immutable or unchangeable, and he also stresses the revelatory nature of the image, as the 325 statement does. Yet Hilary's polemical argumentation has secured image language for this tradition in a profound and, we might be tempted to say, exclusive way. What began in its classical understanding as a term which inherently and necessarily denotes inferiority and otherness, has become a term which inherently and necessarily denotes unity and consubstantiality, as this living Image contains the one he images within himself and is the perfect revelation of his origin—for the 'false cannot image the true'. If Christ is to be the 'image of the invisible God', he is essentially and necessarily true God. While this is what this 'consubstantial image' tradition has wanted to say and has communicated in its basic sense, Hilary provides a polemical

\textsuperscript{70} Syn. 16. See Weedman, \textit{Trinitarian}, 101.

\textsuperscript{71} Weedman, \textit{Trinitarian}, 101.

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid.
framework which is able to gain this tradition interpretive stability. The fluid semantic range of the 'Image' has been strategically narrowed.

Asterius had used language of the exact image, but with a preunderstanding that image language inherently denotes inferiority. Eusebius used the language of living image of the living but cyphered that language through the analogy of the statue and its emperor, which Hilary sees as insufficient. Hilary's coupling of a robust doctrine of the connatural or consubstantial image as a direct result of the generation of the Son from the Father with the rejection of the statue analogy or any analogous representation of how the Son images the Father presented in the created world, provides a polemic of the Image which cannot admit the sort of pliable interpretations that preceded him. In confrontation with Hilary, one can no longer speak of an image both living and subordinate. Hilary has transformed the polemical use and as a result the contextual meaning of 'image' into an exclusively pro-Nicene one.73

*Image and equality*

Hilary's language of equality is bold, and it is through his theology of the image that it finds its coherence. As Father and Son are equal, he argues, we cannot understand the Son to be less because he is Son, nor the Father to be greater because he is Father, for 'the Son and image of the invisible God embraces in himself the fullness of the Father's divinity, he is its form both in kind and in

73 It is interesting to note that Eunomius, after a strained attempt at an interpretation of image language drops the image discussion entirely, and it is an exclusively 'Cappadocian' pro-Nicene tool. In reference to Augustine's argument that while an image can imply imperfection and lack of equality (cf. *Lib.* 83 QQ, Q74; *Ep.* Io. 4.9; *Serm.* 9 (*de decem chordis*), 8.9; *Trin.* 7.6.12), some images indeed do contain equality (*de vera relig.* 43.81), John Sullivan, *The Image of God: The Doctrine of St Augustine and its Influence* (Dubuque, IO: Priory Press, 1963), 14, notes: 'Christian teaching has given decisive direction to the augustinian concept of image here, for it teaches that the perfect Image of the Father is the Word, who is equal in every respect to him', referencing Ambrose, *Hexam.* 6.6.41 as an example. Here we see prior to Ambrose in Hilary the development of this 'decisive direction' of Christian teaching.
amount: and this is to be truly Son, that he has reflected the truth of the Father's form by the perfect likeness of the nature represented in himself.\textsuperscript{74} The equality of the Father and Son through their 'identical essence' harnesses his image theology further in both anti-'Arian' and anti-Marcellan polemic.

Hilary argues, 'Only birth can prove an equality of nature. True equality is nowhere to be believed where there is one (\textit{unio}); neither still will it be discovered where there is difference. Thus equality of the likeness (or image, \textit{similitudinis}) has neither solitude nor diversity, because all equal things exist neither in diversity or alone.'\textsuperscript{75} This equality, \textit{as of the image}, refutes both Homoian and Marcellan theologies, and it demonstrates how Hilary can use such strong language as \textit{aequalitas} regarding the Father and the Son. This is how they are equal, as the image of the origin. The securing of image language for pro-Nicene argumentation expands Hilary's polemic based upon eternal generation.

Hilary interprets Jesus's words in John 5.19-22 as support for this equal and consubstantial image.\textsuperscript{76} Far from evidencing a subordinate Son, these verses prove the Son's perfect birth and imaging of the Father, Hilary argues. God the only-begotten, 'containing in Himself the form and image of the invisible God, in all things which are proper to God the Father are by the fulness of true divinity in himself made equal.'\textsuperscript{77} Hilary's arguments concerning the one divine nature through the birth of the Son from the Father and the inseparable operations of the Father and the Son revealing the reality of that birth are discussed in depth in chapters 1 and 3 of this thesis. Here, however, it is important to observe how

\textsuperscript{74} Syn. 15, PL 10:492.

\textsuperscript{75} Ibid. 7.15 SC 448: 306-308.

\textsuperscript{76} See the previous chapter for a discussion of this passage.

\textsuperscript{77} Ibid., 12.24 SC 462:416.
Hilary's image theology and these ideas mutually support, and even define one another.

*Image and revelation*

From the pro-Nicene perspective, the idea of revelation brings a challenge to the anti-Nicene understanding of image language as used to protect the utter transcendence of the Father. Athanasius says that the 'Arians' destroy the dignity of creation by seeking to distance the Creator from it to such an extent.\(^{78}\) As a consequence, the Word, or Image, cannot truly reveal the Father as his essence is fundamentally dissimilar.\(^{79}\) This is why Hilary's argument, explored in the previous chapter, of reading John 14.9 in light of the *humanity* of Christ is so polemically significant. How the Son is seen as the Image directly affects one's view of humanity, and creation generally, and how it is that humanity knows and can know God. Knowledge of God for humans must be *humane* knowledge: knowledge which corresponds to our created existence and submits to the bounds of our epistemic framework. In pro-Nicene polemic, a view of divine transcendence which places God entirely out of contact with his creation makes revelation of the 'true' God impossible. The anti-Nicene understanding of the image, for Hilary, seeks to protect the transcendence of the Father in a non-incarnational, inhumane way.

Hilary's image theology is prefigured in Tertullian and Clement of Alexandria speaking of the Son as the 'face of God',\(^{80}\) and Origen of the Son as the 'mirror' of


the Father. Marius Victorinus firmly brings out the connection of the humility of Christ's humanity and divine revelation, as the Logos is the image, form, character, reflection of the Father, 'through which God appears and is made known . . . Jesus Christ whom we confess. This tradition of the revelatory image yields remarkable anthropological implications for Hilary, as is clear below. The divine 'image of the invisible God' is directly connected with the humanity of Christ, and, as a result, the human condition as such. For Hilary, in Christ all the fullness of God is present corporaliter, so that, as Descourtieux has observed, 'Pour Hilaire, la révélation de Dieu à l'homme révèle l'homme à lui-même'.

**Image and mediation**

In *Trin.* 9.3, Hilary states: 'he does not entirely know his own life . . . who is ignorant of Jesus Christ as true God and true human'. The revelation of what it is to be human is founded upon Christ being true God and true human; upon the mediation of divinity and humanity in Christ. He elaborates: 'It is equally dangerous to deny Jesus Christ is either Spirit of God or the flesh of our body (*carnem nostri corporis*)' and then quotes from Matthew 10.32-33, in which Christ states that he will confess before the Father those who confess him but deny those who deny him. This mediatorship in the very *carnem nostri corporis* is essential in Hilary's trinitarian anthropology. Christ, in some sense, contains all

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81 Princ. 1.2.12, SC 252:138. See also Gregory of Nyssa *Eun.* 1.10, Jaegar 1:25f.

82 Adv. Ar. 1.47, CSEL 83.1:141.

83 Trin. 8.53 SC 448:466; 8.54 SC 448:466.

84 Descourtieux, 'Introduction', 63.

85 Trin. 9.3 SC 462:18: *Nescit plane uitam suam, nescit, qui Christum Iesum ut uerum Deum ita et uerum hominem ignorat.*

86 Ibid.
of humanity in his own body and presents it to the Father.  

He exists himself as that necessary humane revelation and mediation of the divine in order that humanity might be brought beyond its finite restrictions to God.

This type of embodied mediation by the divine Image necessarily provides insight into the central discussion of the *imago Dei* of humanity in early Christianity. This discussion directly connects the image theology of the trinitarian controversy to that of anthropology, and Hilary's earthy, material, 'bodily' focus provides for a significant and unique achievement in Christian anthropology.

*The imago Dei in early Christianity*

The early Christian discussion of the *imago Dei* is a mysterious realm. It is an aspect of theology 'where one must seek first not what we may say of God, but what God says of himself in fashioning us as the creatures we are', and 'it is precisely here . . . in contemplating where the image of God is impressed upon his creatures, and how—that Trinitarian reflection can achieve its fullest and supplest expression'.

In the following, I will briefly trace the key aspects of this discussion in order to demonstrate this trinitarian-anthropological connection. There is no attempt here at an exhaustive study of the theme, but simply a demonstration of this main point.

The *imago Dei* in early Christianity is centred, naturally, on the interpretation of Genesis 1.26-27: 'Then God said, “Let us make humankind in our image, according to our likeness”. . . . So God created humankind in his image, in the

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87 On the bodily mediation of Christ, see Chapter 5.

image of God he created them; male and female he created them’. Even when not writing an extended exegesis of the passage, these verses are a continual reference point for early Christian understandings of the *imago Dei*.

For Clement, humanity (or at least the Christian 'Gnostic') constitutes a third divine image, as the Son is the 'Second Cause (δύτερον αἰτίον), the True Life (ὤντως ζωήν)’ through which we live and have life. The Son is the true and express image of God the Father, and we image according to being made like the Second. Tertullian elaborates upon the relationship of Christ to the *imago Dei* in humanity. The one in whose image humanity is made is Christ, who one day would become human himself. This is why God creates in the 'image of God', and the Scripture does not simply say he creates humanity in 'his own image'. Humanity is created by God in the image of Christ.

Origen’s theology of the *imago Dei* is clearly set within the context of redemption. Humanity is created in resemblance to God’s Image, the Son, who is the firstborn of all creation. The essence of sin is a rejection of or leaving of this imaging, toward the *imago maligni* or *imago diaboli*. The 'fall' is thus a turning away of humans from what they truly are, and therefore what is needed is a restoration to being in the image of the true Image. Christ takes on the *imago hominis* to save humans from being like the devil. Humanity’s imaging of the Image is therefore more than an ontological status—a statement about what

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89 Str. 7, 3.16.6, SC 428:78.
90 Prax. 12.
91 Hom. Gen. 1.1.
92 Haers, Creation, 113.
93 On humanity as the 'image of the Image', and not the image itself, see Cels. 6.63; Jo. 2.2-3; 1.19.
94 Haers, Creation, 118.
Humans are and how they were created—it is a relational reality. Humans are created in a certain relationship of resemblance to the Word, and the restoring of humans in the image is a restoring of this relation. The ultimate structure of the *imago Dei* in humanity is 'being related to God'. Origen's emphasis on the restoration of the image, the restoring of humanity's relation to God, is essential to understanding early Christian views of the *imago Dei*. Christ is the root of the created reality of the human person, but not only this, 'he is also an active element in the shaping of its future'.

Athanasius continues both this redemptive and christological focus. The Word is the Image, and humanity is created to image the Word. In the incarnation humanity is re-created or renewed in this image so that it might be capable of perceiving the Image, the Son, and therefore come to know the Father. This restoration involves a returning to an original sharing in or participation in the *Logos*, a sharing in the Word's imaging of God, and this could only be achieved through the incarnation. The *Logos* became human, 'so that, since he was the image of the Father, he might be able to create afresh the man made after his Image'.

There is further specificity given to the imaging discussion. Particularly, it is often the soul which is said to be in or toward the Image of God. For Marius Victorinus, the soul is the 'image of the Image', the 'image of life' who is the

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96 Ibid. Origen quotes Colossians 1.15 and John 1.1-3 in this context at *Hom. Gen.* 1.13.
98 Here he follows Origen, see *Jo.* 2.3.
Son.\(^{100}\) As to the restoration of the image in humanity, Victorinus distinguishes between image and likeness in humanity.\(^{101}\) While humanity images the Image from its creation, the soul's fall into sensible thought necessitates the Logos's entering the sensible world. The spiritual life can be recovered when the revelation of God in Christ is received. The soul will thus be the 'resemblance' and not only the image when it turns its thought to the Logos, and through the Logos to the Father.\(^{102}\) This movement from Christ to the Father is significant. It recalls Hilary's reading of John 14.9 in the previous chapter, and the epistemic necessity of moving from Christ to the divine life, as Christ reveals divinity to humanity in a way which is able to be comprehended by human limitations. Victorinus writes that as only like knows like, 'we, therefore, if we are in Christ, will see God through Christ—that is, through the true life, the true image'.\(^{103}\) For Victorinus, however, this requires a dying to external, material life. There is a separation of soul and body involved in his argument which necessitates the elevation of the soul at the expense of the body: the soul is created after the image of God, and therefore finds its restoration in that image, but the sensible and material is not naturally progressive or turned toward God.\(^{104}\) The view that the *imago Dei* is located exclusively in the soul has a tendency toward this type of reasoning, and it

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\(^{101}\) For the separation of image and likeness of Genesis 1.27 see Irenaeus (e.g. *haer.* 5.6.1), Origen, *Princ.* 3.6.1; Jerome sees some distinction *In illud Ezech*. 2.38 (PL 25:269), Athanasius *Inc.* 13, Ambrose *Fid.* 1.7; 2.prol., Augustine (e.g. *Trin.* 7.6.12) and Cyril of Alexandria *On Sol.* 3 (among others) argue that the image and likeness are inseparably joined (though not co-extensive). See Sullivan, *Image*, 12.


\(^{103}\) *Adv. Ar.* 3.2, CSEL 83.1:193.

\(^{104}\) See discussion of this in Origen in Chapter 1.
brings to the forefront the question of the body’s relationship to the soul, and indeed, to the divine Image.

Hilary’s view of the *imago Dei* in humanity, stemming from his transformation of the consubstantial image tradition, entrusts great significance to the material (see interpretation of John 14.9 in the previous chapter, for example). The anti-Nicene emphasis on the ultra transcendent God the Father perhaps aids Hilary in his high view of materiality and embodiedness in his image theology.

*The imago Dei in Hilary: humanity in trinitarian perspective*

Hilary’s reading of Genesis 1.26-27 and its ensuing *imago Dei* discussion are primarily centred upon a trinitarian preoccupation. As Tertullian, Hilary states that the image language of Genesis 1 is 'announcing the mystery of the Gospel'. For Hilary, however, the image in which humanity is created is not the Son, as it is for Tertullian and so many others above. Hilary sees three referents in the passage. The passage refers to the maker, to the one being made, and to the image. Humanity is made, God made humanity, and he made humanity in the image of God. The passage does not speak of an isolated God creating, and therefore the 'our image' refers to the image of both God who creates and God through whom God creates. Humanity is created after a common image of the

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105 Trin. 4.18, SC 448:50. For Tertullian, see Prax. 12. For Tertullian, the image language in humanity is a foretaste of the incarnation. God the Father creates humanity in the image of God the Son, and particularly in his future incarnate state as Christ.
Father and Son.106 This is central in Hilary’s trinitarian polemic. If there is one image of both this demonstrates one nature of both.107 Hilary’s doctrine of the *imago Dei* defends his understanding of the equal consubstantial Image explored above. As Dupont-Fauville observes: ‘Le fait qu'une seule image puisse refléter les deux personnes divines plaide en effet en faveur de la consubstantialité du Fils. Ainsi, l'homme n'est plus créé image de l'image [as previous tradition affirmed], mais réplique de «l'image commune» aux deux personnes divines’.108 Hilary claims that 'the Son made humanity in the image of the Father and the Son'.109 The 'common image' supports Hilary's doctrine of inseparable operations,110 and it gives the key with which to understand the Son as 'true God': ‘ce n'est en effet que dans cette communion, manifestée par l'image selon laquelle l'homme a été créé, que peut se concevoir la divinité véritable du Fils’.111 The 'communion of the image' works on two levels, however. It is identified with the mystery of the Trinity, or at least, 'the perception of the communion appears as the necessary condition for a coherent discourse on the mystery of the unity that lives between

106 There is some sense in which Victorinus was also able to speak of a common image: the image in which humanity is created is 'one sole image' of the Father and the Son. Yet, his commitment to the name God being reserved for the Father, and to the Father being the divine substance (the Son being the image of that substance) leads to a very different understanding of this united image than is explored here in Hilary. As expressed above, for Victorinus, humanity is primarily created in the image of the Logos, and this is a trinitarian image only secondarily because of the unity of the Logos with the divine substance of the Father (See Hadot, 'L’Image', 412-13).

Ambrose will speak of a common image of the Father and the Son based upon Genesis 1 in *Haex.* 6.7.10; *Fid.* 1.7.53; 1.7.51; 1.3.23; *Spir.* 2.prol.2; 2.9.100. See Sullivan, *Image*, 187.

107 *Trin.* 4.18. See 4.19-20; 5.7-9. Philip Wild, *The Divinization of Man According to St. Hilary of Poitiers* (Mundelein, IL: St Mary of the Lake Seminary, 1950), 144, notes that the 'common image' language does not occur in *Psal.*, though it reappears in *Myst.*, probably his last work, for the same reason of demonstrating the unity of the Father and the Son.


109 Ibid., 190. See *Trin.* 5.24.

110 See *Trin.* 5.9.

the divine persons'. Second, as the image of the Father and the Son constitutes the image in which humanity is created by God, 'the communion by which that image is defined is revealed equally indispensable for understanding the gift that God gives to humanity' (i.e. that gift of sharing or participating in that common image in which it has been made). The 'communion of the image' or the 'common image' of the Father and the Son after which humanity is created is thus necessary in Hilary's argument for true trinitarian discourse, but this trinitarian discourse, by consequence of the relationship of humanity to this image, is also necessary for true knowledge of one's own human nature. Hilary's reading of the Genesis passage not only supports his reading of Colossians 1.15 and the understanding of the equal and consubstantial image, but it creates a reciprocal relationship of 'image theology' in which the imago Dei of humanity depends upon image discourse in trinitarian theology. The imago Dei, as it was in a sense for Origen and will be also for Augustine, is more of a relational term than a purely ontological one, describing the relationship of the human to the divine more than indicating something specific which humanity possesses which is divine-like.

For Hilary, the theology of the image, and its double entendre revealing the true divine and the true human life, reveals not only a direct relation between these two realities but a direct dependence. Anthropology is defined by, and indeed, in a sense, flows out of one's theology. Hilary's understanding of humanity is developed as the necessary result of his understanding of God. His anthropology is genuinely and inescapably trinitarian.

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112 Ibid., 191.
113 Ibid. See also 185-86.
Trinity and human mediation: Christ's humanity as the lived imago Dei

Book 11 of Trin. brings out the distinctive, and highly significant, role of Christ's humanity in this discussion, and following on from this the role of humanity generally. The communion of humanity with the divine, the participation in or sharing in this 'communion of the image' of the Father and the Son is a communion which exists in the first instance between human beings: 'c’est bien la nature humain qui nous regroupe avec le Christ en un ensemble commun'.\(^{115}\) As in the previous chapter we saw that for Hilary the humanity of Christ is the central point of divine revelation to humanity—overcoming humanity's finite epistemological restrictions and analogically carrying human nature beyond itself into the knowledge of the divine—so in Hilary's theology of the image the humanity of Christ is the central point of contact for the divine-human relation, and, far from the material or human aspect being a barrier\(^{116}\) to the imago Dei and image theology generally, Christ's humanity is the avenue to it. The human nature of Christ becomes for Hilary the effectual outworking of this 'common image'—where humanity participates in the trinitarian communal life and becomes the 'image' of that life—and as such, is the definitive marker of what it is to be (and become) fully human. Hilary's trinitarian anthropology is necessarily christological, as Christ is the definition and goal of all human life.

\(^{115}\) Dupont-Fauville, Hilaire, 203. See Trin. 11.8f.

\(^{116}\) See Chapter 1 for this idea in Origen, and Victorinus above. See also Eusebius, e.th. 3.21.1, and discussion by Schönborn, Human, 76-78.
Approaching Hilary's christology

Hilary's christology in *De trinitate* is based primarily upon Philippians 2.6-7, which says that he who is in the form of God (*forma Dei*) emptied himself (*se exinaniuit*) taking the form of a servant (*formam servi*). The passage becomes a hermeneutical guide for reading other christological texts, creating an overarching framework to understand the two natures of Christ. In this framework, he distinguishes between the words and works of the human and divine natures, and further, according to the three periods of Christ's existence (before incarnation, incarnation, post-resurrection). He even argues that the problem with anti-Nicene exegesis is that they ascribe things to the divinity of Christ which are in accordance with his humanity. These distinctions of times and natures become exegetical tools for refuting Homoian opponents. A foundational commitment for non-Nicenes was that they could not ever admit two voices or two subjects in Christ, for, as Philostorgius notes, what they really feared was that the Nicenes' doctrine denied the incarnation. Athanasius records the accusation that Nicenes worshipped a creature. If there is a human person of Christ, then it is not God made flesh, but only a human being worshipped. The anti-Nicene concern is thus that whatever Jesus experienced it was God the creator who was experiencing.

In Hilary's time, this argument took on a particular interest in the suffering and weakness of Christ. Athanasius, Hilary and others were not teaching that

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118 *Trin.* 9.15.
119 Vaggione, *Eunomius*, 113; *h.e.* 8.13.
121 Ibid., n219.
there were two 'persons' in Christ, even if this is how they were understood by some anti-Nicenes, but the pre-Nicene and pro-Nicene arguments could often place a strict demarcation between the human and divine natures of Christ. Part of anti-Nicene polemic from the mid-fourth century forward was to stress both the unity of Christ's person and concurrently to use this argument to emphasise the Son's subordination to the Father through the (inferior) divine person of the Son being present in and even suffering in the created world.

Hilary, however, much more so than some pro-Nicene contemporaries, places great emphasis on the unity of Christ: Christ for Hilary is explicitly a single subject. He does distinguish between the works and words of the human nature and those of the divine, but this is in no way used to exclude the divine from participating in the lowly and humble actions of the human. Smulders framed Hilary's understanding well:

Hilaire répète souvent qu'en lui Jésus et le Christ, Dieu et l'homme ne peuvent en aucune façon être séparés. Celui qui est Dieu est tout entier devenu homme; et tout l'homme né de Marie conserve la nature divine. L'homme parle donc et accomplit tout ce qui est de Dieu, et Dieu accomplit et dit tout ce qui est de la nature humaine.\textsuperscript{122}

His unwavering commitment to the single subject of Christ requires much more nuanced argumentation and biblical interpretation. He cannot simply say that only the humanity of Christ suffers or experiences weakness or dies, nor that the humanity could not truly experience pain or weakness because of its union with the divine Word. Both his distinctive two natures christology and his psychological framework (explored below) do not allow for such simplistic answers. A lack of proper regard for the coherent, systematic nature of Hilary's holistic theological vision has often led to misinterpretations of his thought, and

\textsuperscript{122} Smulders, \textit{Doctrine}, 196. See Trin. 10.22: \textit{quia totus hominis filius totus Dei filius sit}, cf. 11.6; 9.5; 11.6; \textit{Psal.} 53.8.
nowhere more than in regard to the suffering and human experience of Christ. This discussion has immense implications for Hilary's trinitarian anthropology, and particularly in this chapter to the divine and human connection of his image theology discussed above. Before approaching this argument, however, Hilary’s overarching christological framework must be understood, as it provides the lens through which to properly view his often misunderstood argument regarding Christ’s suffering.

It is his reading of Philippians 2 which allows him to formulate a two natures christology with an unwavering commitment to the unity of Christ's 'person', that Christ is a single subject. He writes:

Therefore since Jesus Christ was born, suffered (passus), died and was buried, he also rose again to life. In these contradictions of mysteries he cannot be divided from himself in such a way that he would not be Christ, since there is no other Christ than he who was in the form of God [and] received the form of a servant (cum non alius Christus, quam qui in forma Dei erat, formam serui acceperit).¹²³

He explicitly affirms that the experience of abandonment on the cross, the commending of his spirit to the Father unto death, and even death itself are to be attributed to the person of God the Son,¹²⁴ indeed, claiming the 'death of the immortal God' (inmortalis Dei mortem).¹²⁵ His Philippians 2 framework enables this vivid language of the unity of Christ.¹²⁶ Hilary’s confession of a human soul of Christ is strongly linked to this discussion of Christ's two natures in one subject. For Hilary, Christ's soul is ineffably “mingled” (admiscuit)¹²⁷ with the Word, so

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¹²³ Trin. 10.22, SC 462:206. See also 9.11, SC 462:36: Et cum sint utraque suis gesta naturis, unum tamen Christum Iesum eum memento esse qui utrumque est.

¹²⁴ Trin. 10.62.

¹²⁵ Trin. 10.63, SC 462:274.

¹²⁶ Trin. 10.65, SC 462:280: . . . habens in se uno eodemque, per dispensationem adque naturam, in Dei forma et in forma serui, sine aliqua sui et partitione quod homo est, et diuisione quod Deus est.

¹²⁷ see Trin. 10.44, SC 462:242.
that the person of the Son acts in both natures in a way which does not overcome the humanity or take the place of the truly, though particular, human soul. Many, because of this view of mingling, have misread Hilary as promoting a divinizing of Christ’s humanity, in which the Word overtakes the human soul, contributing to the accusation of docetism which has long followed Hilary’s christology.\(^\text{128}\) I propose that a proper reading of his Philippians 2 christological framework clarifies his position. The misinterpretations of Hilary’s thought are largely due to either a lack of recognition of this framework or of its extent in \textit{Trin}.

\textit{Forma Dei-forma servi: divine-human coexistence}

Hilary’s use of the language of \textit{forma Dei} is often difficult to interpret, and seems at points to imply direct contradictions in his view of the \textit{exinaniuit} or \textit{euacuatio} of the incarnation. He claims that the emptying must take place because the form of God and the form of the servant are in some way incongruous. The Son 'emptied himself of the form of God (\textit{exinuit . . . se ex Dei forma}), that is, of that which was equal with God' (\textit{ex eo quod aequalis Deo erat}).\(^\text{129}\) This seems to imply a giving up of the divine nature, something which cannot coexist with humanity. Yet, Hilary is unquestionably clear that there is no loss of divinity in the incarnation:

The emptying of the form (\textit{euacuatio formae}) is not the abolition of the nature (\textit{abolitio naturae}): because he who empties himself, is not deprived of himself (\textit{non caret sese}); and he who receives, remains. . . . The change of appearance (\textit{demutatio habitus}), and the assumption of a nature (\textit{adsumptio naturae}), did not destroy the divine nature remaining; because

\(^{128}\) This position is discussed throughout my argument below.

\(^{129}\) \textit{Trin.} 8.45, SC 448:452.
he is one and the same Christ (quia unus adque idem Christus), who both changes appearance and assumes.\textsuperscript{130}

Along with his affirmation of the full divinity of Christ, he is clear that the Son became all that we are in his assumption of human nature, that he was fully human.\textsuperscript{131} So, there is full humanity and full divinity, and a sense in which these coexist and a sense in which they cannot coexist.\textsuperscript{132}

There are texts in \textit{Trin.} which expressly prevent the equation of \textit{forma Dei} and the divine nature, and other texts which deliberately equate them.\textsuperscript{133} This has caused some to read Hilary as stating previous to Book Ten that the Son really did give up the divine nature in his incarnation, reading, for instance, \textit{ex eo quod aequalis Deo erat} of \textit{Trin.} 8.45 as a reference to the divinity. Hallman claims that this reversal in Book Ten, from saying that the divine and human natures could not coexist to directly stating that they indeed do coexist (for instance, \textit{Trin.} 10.22), leads Hilary to 'docetic comments' as he has 'divinized' the humanity of Jesus. He argues: 'If there is, in fact, no real \textit{evacuatio} in the incarnation, divine

\textsuperscript{130} \textit{Trin.} 9.14, SC 462:42. See also \textit{Mat.} 9.7, SC 254:210, where he states that the assumption of a body did not constrain 'the nature of his power' (naturam uirtutis). See also \textit{Psal.} 2.11; 2.25; \textit{Trin.} 9.10; 10.16.

This 'one and the same' (unus adque idem) language of Hilary is significant for Christ as a single subject. Beeley, Gregory, 132-33, makes much of Gregory Nazienzen's use of the same phrase 'one and the same' as a central christological trope, and it increasingly gains importance in his later writings (e.g., \textit{Ep.} 101.13). This language is also utilised by Gregory in discussion of the suffering and human weakness of Christ. Here, in one of the most criticised aspects of Hilary's thought we see yet more of the often recognised connections between Hilary and the 'Cappadocians'.

\textsuperscript{131} \textit{Trin.} 11.16, SC 462:322: Ipse autem uniuersitatis nostrae in se continens ex carnis adsumptione naturam, erat quod nos sumus neque amiserat esse quod manserat.

\textsuperscript{132} In \textit{C. Const.} Hilary even uses the full humanity of Jesus to prove his divinity, based upon his Philippians 2 \textit{forma Dei-forma servi} paradigm, arguing that Christ can only be said to not be equal with God being in the form of God if he is said to be not truly human in the form of the slave (SC 334:205-207).

\textsuperscript{133} Smulders, \textit{Doctrine}, 198, notes the difficulty: 'Plus d’une fois Hilaire prévient expressément que l’abandon de la forme divine n’est pas l’abolition de la nature . . . Hilaire n’envisage donc pas la forme divine comme simplement identique avec la nature divine. Les passages ne manquent pas cependant où il donne expressément pour équivalents: être dans la forme de Dieu et être dans la nature de Dieu'. See \textit{Trin.} 12.6-7; 11.5; \textit{Frg.} B 2.1.4; \textit{Psal.} 138.15; 131.7.
power overcomes the weakness of human nature.\textsuperscript{134} The assumption that Hilary intended an *euacuatio* of the divine nature at any point in *Trin.* seems untenable, as this is his principal reproach of the Homoians. To admit change in the Word in any way would be, for him, to submit to heresy and concede to those he is writing against.\textsuperscript{135} Smulders, however, recognizes that the confusion over Hilary’s usage of *forma Dei* does not result in contradiction. What cannot coexist with the humanity of Christ, is not the divine nature *per se*, but ‘d’apparence divine’. The incarnate Christ still contained in himself the full divine nature, but that nature is manifested in the humility and weakness of the slave. The abandonment is, for Hilary, not of Christ’s divinity but a *habitus demutatio*.\textsuperscript{136}

Hilary declares from the beginning of *Trin.* that in *Christo plenitudo est diiunitatis*\textsuperscript{137} (Col 2.9) and he draws a distinction between the Son being in *naturae paternae gloriam* and being God by nature.\textsuperscript{138} Paul Galtier’s extensive assessment of *forma* language in Hilary shows that there is a general usage of

\textsuperscript{134} Joseph M. Hallman, *The Descent of God: Divine Suffering in History and Theology* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1991), 104-5. There is a tradition of using Hilary to promote these modern positions. Thomasius, the father of modern kenoticism, even claimed Hilary as an authority (*Christi Person und Werke* (Erlangen, 1855), sec. 40; see Le Bachelet, ‘Hilaire (saint)’, *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique* 6.2 (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1920), 2430-1, for a discussion of nineteenth-century kenoticists referencing Hilary in support).

\textsuperscript{135} Arguing for a passibilist theology based upon early Christians is another example of reading modern concerns on to the perspective of late-ancient Christians. This requires some degree of historical impositions on early texts, as there simply seems to be no true passibilist affirmation among early Christians. Its twentieth century development makes complete historical sense, whatever one might think of it ideologically. The immense and visible suffering of innocent people on such a grand scale naturally led to these discussions. For example, Kenneth Surin, ‘The Impassibility of God and the Problem of Evil’, *SJT* 35.2 (April 1982): 105, writes of the thought of Jürgen Moltmann and Dorothee Sölle: ‘The only credible theodicy for Auschwitz is one that makes God an inmate of the place, one that acknowledges the possibility that he too hung on the gallows’. The historian (or theologian) must recognize and respect the historical settings of theological developments if anything of historical value is actually to be said. While passibilist developments might make perfect historical sense in the modern world, they must be recognized as indeed modern developments, and early Christian texts should not be selectively read to suit modern concerns.

\textsuperscript{136} Smulders, *Doctrine*, 199-200. See *Trin.* 9.14, 38, 51; 11.48; *Psal.* 68.25; 68.4; 143.7.

\textsuperscript{137} *Trin.* 1.13, SC 443:232.

*forma Dei* which does mean that for the Son to be in the form of God is to be God by nature.\(^{139}\) But there is another, more precise, usage which refers to the outward manifestation of power and glory, and this particular sense is the sense in which the *forma Dei* is opposed to the *forma servi*, in which they cannot coexist.\(^{140}\) Hilary himself makes this clarification concerning the *euacuatio* in *Trin.* 9.55. The Son, in his full divinity and of his own volition, assumed the form of the servant and was alienated from the form of the Father’s majesty (*formam paternae maiestatis alienans*).\(^{141}\) Again, the emptying is not in power but in *habitus*. If this clarifies the way in which Hilary says the *forma Dei* and *forma servi* cannot coexist, it means that the way in which they *do* coexist is in the full divine nature and the full human nature. Therefore, not only is there no loss of divinity in the incarnation, but there is essentially and necessarily no loss to the assumed humanity either. As there is no reduction of divinity, so the feebleness of the assumed flesh is not erased due to its powerful nature.\(^{142}\) Given Hilary’s christological paradigm, the idea that without an *euacuatio* of the divine nature in the incarnation the divine overcomes Christ’s humanity is therefore unfounded: there is no need for one or the other nature to decrease that the other might increase. For Hilary, divinity and humanity are perfectly coexistent in Christ, there is no give and take relationship between them.

That divinity and humanity perfectly coexist in Christ opens up Hilary to a discussion of the counterpart to the *euacuatio* in the incarnation—human

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\(^{139}\) see *Trin.* 11.6, SC 462:304: . . . *forma Dei plenitudinem in se Dei contineret*.

\(^{140}\) Galtier, *‘forma Dei’*, 106.

\(^{141}\) *Trin.* 9.55, SC 462:130.

\(^{142}\) Galtier, *‘forma Dei’*, 109: ‘Pour ne pas écraser la faiblesse de la chair assumée sous le poids de sa puissante nature’.
The coexistence of full divinity with full humanity in Christ necessarily achieves the glorification of humanity for Hilary. See Trin. 9.4-5; Psal. 2.25.


Ibid., 66.
(sunamphoteron),\textsuperscript{146} as seen also in Origen and Victorinus.\textsuperscript{147} These Christian writers differ from the philosophers, however, as the soul's 'author and interpreter' is Christ.\textsuperscript{148} It seems that the anthropological principle which Hilary will capitalize on is touched on here, as it was in Irenaeus, that \textit{not only the origin but also the destiny of humanity determines the nature of what it is to be human}. Whether embodiedness is included in an ethereal 'pure' origin of humanity or not, its being included in the consummation of the \textit{imago Dei} gives corporality as much a claim as the soul on what necessarily constitutes human nature.\textsuperscript{149}

Directly linked to this idea is the origination of the soul. There were two basic Christian options (as the preexistence of souls came to be rejected): traducianism—that the soul is transmitted from parent to child—a view carrying material connotations, and creationism, or the belief that the soul was the direct creation of God. The Stoics followed the traducianist understanding based upon empirical evidence—children often not only inherited physical but also personality and character traits from their parents.\textsuperscript{150} Tertullian, and the early Hilary, would follow this line. Tertullian even spoke of 'fault of origin' (\textit{vitium originis}), which

\textsuperscript{146} Mark Edwards, \textit{Origen}, 95. Interestingly, there is no full escape of the soul from the body in these platonists, however, as Edwards (ibid., 95-96) observes. Plotinus hold that the soul subsists alone for an interval, but is bound to return and occupy another body, and even this brief separation is denied by Porphyry, who holds that the soul maintains a vestigial body (\textit{On the Styx}; \textit{To Gaurus}). And Iamblichus argues that at least the 'lower' soul is never separated. Further, 'Proclus, writing 150 years later, refines the teaching of Iamblichus, still arguing that the lower soul cannot discard its attenuated body, and all the while protesting that the \textit{sunamphoteron} is not the man' (Edwards, \textit{Origen}, 96).

\textsuperscript{147} Origen does, however, speak of some necessity for the body for eternity, as without it individuality would be lost (\textit{Princ.} 1.6.4); Edwards, \textit{Origen}, 109. Edwards also argues for how this passage should not be seen as a Latin interpolation of Rufinus (ibid., 121n119).

\textsuperscript{148} Edwards, \textit{Origen}, 112.

\textsuperscript{149} The early thought of Augustine continues this anthropological dilemma. The body is the instrument of the soul: 'the true self is the soul, to which the body is a distraction and at best secondary'. Controversy with the Manichees led Augustine to a more positive appreciation of the value and beauty of the body, which did not view the body as accidental and secondary to being truly human. Chadwick, 'Philosophical Tradition', 77-8.

\textsuperscript{150} Chadwick, 'Philosophical Tradition', 79.
would later influence Augustine’s doctrine of original sin.\textsuperscript{151} The creationist view is most widely held in pre-Augustinian Christianity.

This discussion, particularly in regard to the creationist position, coincides with that of the manner of God’s creation of humanity, in particular of the timing of the creation of body and soul. It was not uncommon for early Christians to speak of a ‘double creation’ of humanity, the soul being created first and subsequently the body created for it. This is perhaps for some, including Origen, simply a literal reading of the two creation accounts in Genesis 1 and 2.\textsuperscript{152} Image theology is indeed one of the reasons Origen sees a double creation of humanity as necessary. If Genesis 1.26-27 and Genesis 2.7 are read as the creation of the same human being (i.e., the physical Adam), then the \textit{imago Dei}, as originally created, would refer to the body, and this, for Origen, would imply a bodily form for God.\textsuperscript{153} This double creation of humanity involves an initial creation of the soul and a subsequent fashioning of the body.\textsuperscript{154} This creating and fashioning, however, does not necessitate a view that the body is evil or that materiality is a result of the fall. Indeed, Origen himself (often accused of this belief) actually wrote against a strict gnostic dualism.\textsuperscript{155}

Hilary’s ascribes to a double creation, and his understanding of the origin of the soul is intertwined with his interpretation of this view of human origins.

\textsuperscript{151} Ibid. See An. 41.

\textsuperscript{152} Edwards, Origen, 89.

\textsuperscript{153} Haers, Creation, 167. See Origen Hom. Gen. 1.13; Comm. Rom. 1.19 (in rejection of Anthropomorphites). See also Tzamalikos, Origen, 40. See Edwards, Origen, 96, for how the reading promoted by many, including Haers, ibid., 112, and Tzamalikos, ibid., 41-52, of not only the double creation of humanity but that of all of creation, is erroneous. For a reading of Origen’s theory of double creation in its proper context of the soul and body see Edwards, Origen, 104f.

\textsuperscript{154} Hom. Gen. 1.13.

\textsuperscript{155} See Edwards, Origen, 104; Beeley, Unity, 13-17.
The body and soul in Hilary

In his early *Mat.* Hilary held a traducianist view of the soul, following his great teacher Tertullian. In *Mat.* 10.23, Hilary uses the word *traductus* as a technical term, as did Tertullian, in order to interpret Matthew 10.34-35 ('Do not think that I came to bring peace to Earth. I came not to bring peace, but a sword. For I came to sever son from father and daughter from mother and daughter-in-law from her mother-in-law, and enemies of a man will belong to his family') in a way which reflects Pauline theology of the battle between the flesh and the spirit, and the old and new human (he quotes Col 3.9-10, 5-8; Rom 8.13 at *Mat.* 10.24). Creation of humanity in the Genesis narrative did not involve a *traductus* from any other source than God, whereas for following generations, the sin and unbelief of the first parents is passed on to their offspring. He writes, 'in following generations sins began to be the father of our body, and faithlessness the mother of our soul. For through these we received our birth, through the transgression of our first parents. For their will is joined to each of us'. This understanding gives Hilary a way to make sense of Christ's difficult declaration, 'I have not come to bring peace, but a sword', and that he would turn son against father and daughter against mother:

So there are five in one house: the father of our body, sin; the mother of our soul, faithlessness; and free will, which belongs to everyone by a sort of conjugal law, is cut through and divided between them. The mother-in-law is unbelief, accepting us as her children, as we wander from the faith and the fear

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156 *An.* 36.


158 It is important to note the difference between Hilary's view as an explanation of sinful human nature and that of later theology, particularly Augustine. Augustine's later inherited *reatus*, or guilt, should not be read back on to Hilary's text here.

159 *Mat.* 10.23, SC 254:244.
of God. She detains us, possessed between unbelief and pleasure, and in the ignorance of God by delight in every vice.\textsuperscript{160}

The 'sword' then, cuts humanity away from its sin and unbelief. One's initial birth into an existence with sin as the father of the body and unbelief the mother of the soul, but in the re-birth of baptism, 'we are separated from the sins and authors of our origin'.\textsuperscript{161} The Word excises us from the dispositions of our 'father' and 'mother', the 'old man' is cast off, we are renewed in soul and body by the Spirit, and reject our inborn habits and former ways.\textsuperscript{162} The result of this new life of regeneration is where Hilary provides particular anthropological insight, which will have a sustained influence in his later works (though he will abandon his early traducianist position). Because the body has been 'mortified through faith', it 'ascends to the nature of the soul'. There is a union brought about between the body and soul by the Word, and 'for this reason, [the body] begins to wish to be made one and the same with the soul, that is, to be spiritual as it is'.\textsuperscript{163} Therefore the one separated by regeneration from the members of this 'household', 'because he is divided from them through the Word of God, will rejoice to remain, both in the interior and the exterior, that is, in both body and soul, in the newness of the Spirit'.\textsuperscript{164} The separation from one's 'family' then, is a separation from the heritage of sin and unbelief toward a renewal, a being made new, of the human person which involves the union of the body and soul. Hilary will reject his traducianist

\textsuperscript{160} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{161} Ibid. 10.24, SC 254:244.

\textsuperscript{162} Ibid. See Tertullian, \textit{An.} 41.4; \textit{Carn. Chr.} 4.4; Cyprian, \textit{Hab. virg.} 23. References in \textit{Mat.}, FC, 125.

\textsuperscript{163} Ibid., 246.

\textsuperscript{164} Ibid.
view of the soul in his later writings, but the soul-body union, and the of futurity in that union, remains at the heart of his anthropology.

At the very beginning of *Trin.* in the legendary 'autobiographical' introduction to the work, Hilary elaborates on the relationship of the body and soul in this new humanity. Concerning his perspective after his conversion (i.e., the receiving of the new humanity), he writes,

Indeed now it is not believed that the life of this body is itself merely troublesome or grievous, but as letters of the alphabet are to children, medicine is to the sick, swimming to the shipwrecked, education to the young, warfare to the future commander, namely, the supporting of present things, progressing toward the profit of blessed immortality.165

The body has come to be seen by Hilary as an educative and necessary condition of the soul's salvation. It educates and trains the soul for salvation, and indeed, is in a sense the instrument or way of that salvation. First, as it provides the means for the soul's movement or progression to new life (like swimming to the shipwrecked, or medicine to the sick), indeed, endurance in bodily existence in this present life is necessary in order to gain a blissful eternity. Second, the body effectually carries out the soul's progress in salvation. This physicality allows for the salvation of the soul to invade human living, to enter into the lived reality of human beings. So not only is there a future union of body and soul in salvation, but there is a necessary bodily movement progressing toward that reality. The body is not merely tagging along the soul's journey toward God, but is the necessary vessel for the journey. It effectuates the journey and makes it possible. There is an educative nature of embodied, temporal human existence.

Hilary's movement from a traducianist view of the soul to a creationist view, that each soul is created directly by God, and further his view of the double

creation of humanity, while at first sight might seem to contradict the significance of embodiedness actually sustain and advance that significance when they are properly understood within Hilary's anthropological framework of the natural and inherent human progression toward the Infinite. In Trinit. Hilary states that each soul is the direct creation of God (opposing his earlier traducianist view).\textsuperscript{166} And further, particularly in Psal., his view of double creation is made evidently clear.\textsuperscript{167} The initial creation of the human soul is said by Hilary to be the creation of humanity in the image of God. The futurity of the union of body and soul thus comes into play here as a progression of the body to be united to the soul in God's image. The body shares the characteristics of the earth through a second creation from the earth, whereas the 'inner man' of the soul is made directly by God and according to God's image.\textsuperscript{168} However, Hilary also makes clear in Psal. 129 that although the body and soul are created separately, through the inbreathing of God they were joined together. The soul is not genuine humanity, created according to God's image, and the body a supplement or afterthought for Hilary.\textsuperscript{169} While there is a certain futurity to the perfect union of body and soul, they are inseparably joined together by God from the beginning of their creation. The futurity actually necessitates the progressive nature of earthly human existence.

\textsuperscript{166} Trinit. 10.20.

\textsuperscript{167} See, for example, Psal. 129.5. See Scully, 'Assumption', 125-30, for an argument that Hilary is in keeping with his Latin tradition in his development of his view of double creation, and does not seem to be following Origen. Further, there is a Stoic philosophical background for his thought, rather than a Platonic one, as argued by Durst, Eschatologie, 21 and Alfredo Fierro, Sobre la gloria en San Hilarion: una sintesis doctrinal sobre la nocion biblica de 'doxa', Analecta Gregoriana 144 (Rome: Gregoriana, 1964), 334. Hilary's view of double creation in no way supports a platonic dualism, as noted here, the creation of body and soul is meant for their unity, not opposition. See Marie Josèphe Rondeau, 'Remarques sur l'anthropologie de saint Hilaire', SP 6 (1962): 198.

\textsuperscript{168} Scully, 'Assumption', 128-29.

\textsuperscript{169} Wild, Divinization, 145, 148, while recognising the futurity of Hilary's discussion, argues that only the soul of humanity is in the image of God, though the body will be united to the soul in the 'likeness' in the eschaton. Hilary's christological centre of humanity in the imago Dei, however, does not admit a 'soul only' reading.
The human mind is 'drawn to the knowledge and hope of eternity by a certain natural impulse because the thought of the divine origin of our souls is, as it were, implanted and engraved in us all'.\textsuperscript{170} The union of body and soul thus works to effectuate this natural inclination. This takes place in the incarnation of Christ. As Scully notes,

The joining of heavenly and earthly natures in Christ's assumption of all humanity serves not only to unify man with God, but also to unify the heavenly and earthly natures within the human person himself. The human person is a microcosm and contains within himself divine and earthly natures (soul and body, respectively). The assumption of the flesh of humanity is the means by which Christ brings both body and soul to eternal life.\textsuperscript{171} As Christ unifies humanity with the Father in his body, so he reharmonizes in his body the divine soul and earthly body put out of order within us by sin. \textit{In each human person, we find a mirroring of Christ's cosmic mediation}.\textsuperscript{172}

The human person, in two natures due to a double creation, finds its fulfillment in Christ as the microcosm of him: that unity of body and soul which is the destiny of humanity, is fulfilled in he whom humanity 'images'. While the body and soul have differing origins, they share a common destiny.\textsuperscript{173} The two are distinct, but are created for unity not separation, and it is due to their common destiny of unity that one cannot simply say that for Hilary only the human soul is created according to the image of God. As my argument has demonstrated throughout this thesis, and will do so more clearly in this chapter and the next, the \textit{destiny} of humanity defines human ontology as much as origin does, therefore the united body and soul, that destiny fulfilled by Christ, is Hilary's full anthropological vision. His vision of what it is to be human, and therefore what it is to be according to the image of God, necessarily includes the body. If for no other

\textsuperscript{170} Wild, \textit{Divinization}, 137. See \textit{Tract. sup. Psal.} 62.3; cf. 61.4; 119.19; 119.12.

\textsuperscript{171} \textit{Psal.} 61.2.

\textsuperscript{172} Scully, 'Assumption', 124. Emphasis mine.

\textsuperscript{173} Ibid., 129. See Rondeau, 'Remarques', 205.
reason, for the fact that the soul's intended destiny is effectually made the reality of the human person only through the work of the vessel of the body. God's direct creation of the soul, and that soul's union with, its being 'joined' to, the body directly draws the whole of human life, body and soul, toward the divine life in perpetual progress. The soul's direct origin is God, and therefore its nature is reflected back on the divine. The body's direct origin is the earth, but that Hilary's body-soul double creation is understood as a joining, a union, rather than a dualistic opposition, the body is brought into the divine through union with the soul. The true 'image of the invisible God' assuming humanity to himself, brings this natural anthropological destiny to fruition. Hilary's full anthropological vision, of body and soul according to God’s image, is most essentially a christological one.

The body and soul of Christ: contours of the discussion

The relationship of Christ's body and soul is traditionally located at the core of early Christian anthropology. The question of the soul of Christ was contextualised in polemical agendas from early on in the Christian tradition. Due to the consciously polemical or anti-'heretical' nature of the discussion, the emphasis parallels polemical bias. Thus, for second- and early third-century theologians, such as Irenaeus and Tertullian, the christological discussion of Christ's humanity tends to emphasize 'flesh' language in refutation of gnostic groups and 'Marcianites'. As these groups were specifically focussed on the material flesh of Christ, so was the response. Tertullian does, however, use flesh

174 Maurice Wiles, Working Papers in Doctrine (London: SCM, 1976), 52. See for example, Carn. Chr. 16, where Tertullian argues that Christ’s true flesh is necessary to purify human flesh unto salvation. The polemical discussion did not lend itself naturally toward something like, 'Christ took a human soul in order to purify the soul', as this was not the stress that his polemical discourse demanded.
language to refer to the mental human experiences of Christ. For example, in *Prax.* 27, referencing Matthew 26.28, saying the 'flesh' was 'sorrowful even unto death', where the gospel text uses 'soul'. For Tertullian, the word flesh refers to the whole of Christ's human nature.¹⁷⁵ Wiles notes the similar argument of Origen, who does at points make explicit reference to Christ's human soul in this context.¹⁷⁶

Origen shares Tertullian's soteriological emphasis regarding Christ's assumption of a whole human nature. Indeed, he argues, 'The whole human would not have been saved unless he had take upon him the whole human'.¹⁷⁷ The soul plays a significant mediating role in this soteriological argument for Origen. Direct union of God with flesh would be impossible, and the soul within the flesh allows for an intelligible and effective incarnation.¹⁷⁸ The controversy surrounding Paul of Samosata and anti-Origen sympathies in the following decades, however, made the belief in a human soul of Christ a theological liability. The opposition to Paul's strict separation of the Logos and the human Jesus was naturally supported by the view that the Logos inhabits the human body as the soul does in other human beings, implying that the Logos takes the place of the soul.¹⁷⁹ Following on from this, Pamphilus in the early fourth century records the objection to Origen's

¹⁷⁵ Ibid. 59.
¹⁷⁶ Ibid. See Origen, Jo. 1.28.
¹⁷⁹ Ibid., 56, see note 25. Ayres, *Nicaea*, 77, observes: 'There were many at the beginning of the fourth century who thought that confessing Christ to have a soul indicated a semi-modalist theology. It is also possible that emphasis on Christ not possessing a human soul was a reaction against Origen's very strong emphasis on *eternal* souls as the mediating principles between the Logos and the material world. As this theology became the subject of a sustained critique, the Logos itself was treated as the eternal mediating principle and hence understood to replace Christ's human soul'. 
argument that Christ had a human soul,\textsuperscript{180} and while testimonies regarding the issue in the early fourth century are not always conclusive, 'certainly there is sufficient evidence to conclude that the notion of Christ's human soul was found to be an embarrassment within the context of the attempt to conceive the unity of Christ's person'. But as Scripture did speak in such terms about Christ, the concept was more often neglected, dropping out of use, than vehemently or directly denied.\textsuperscript{181}

Eusebius comes closer to an outright denial than others, even though he typically comes to Origen's defense.\textsuperscript{182} The use of the terminology in Scripture is easily overcome, as Origen himself reports that Scripture refers to the soul of God, which must be allegorically understood,\textsuperscript{183} Christ's soul could be understood as such also. Epiphanius actually reports this argument as used by the 'Arians', though it is not widely utilised.\textsuperscript{184} Denying Christ's soul, however, was an important Homoian argument. If the Logos takes the place of the human soul, who can be said to suffer but the Logos himself? Or who can be said to proclaim 'The Father is greater than I', and other statements of subordination but the Son himself?\textsuperscript{185} Early in the controversy, Eustathius is able to point out the view that Christ had no human soul as a distinctively 'Arian' trait.\textsuperscript{186} This is, of course, not true, even if it lent itself toward non-Nicene interpretations. Eustathius recognized a human soul or mind in Christ in order to avoid implicating God in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{180} Pamphilus, \textit{Apologia pro Origene}, 5 (PG 17, 590AB), referenced in Wiles, \textit{Papers}, 201n26.
\item \textsuperscript{181} Wiles, \textit{Papers}, 57.
\item \textsuperscript{182} See \textit{d.e.} 7.1.23,24; 10.88.74; \textit{e.th.} 1.20.87.
\item \textsuperscript{183} \textit{Prin.} 2.8.5.
\item \textsuperscript{184} Wiles, \textit{Papers}, 57-58. See Epiph. \textit{anc.} 35.
\item \textsuperscript{185} Hanson, \textit{Search}, 110.
\item \textsuperscript{186} See Hanson, \textit{Search}, 111.
\end{itemize}
suffering—the full humanity of Christ, body and soul, suffers, and God remains impassible.\textsuperscript{187} Whether or not Christ possesses a soul and how the body and soul are related in his person, and thus to his divinity, will be a prime locale for the formation of christology, and resulting anthropology, throughout the fourth century.

While the unity of Christ's person and opposition to monarchianism seemed to require a replacement of the human soul by the Logos in Christ for many in the fourth century, anti-Nicenes were able to capitalize on this argument in discussions surrounding divine suffering (also in anti-monarchian polemic) which often led Nicenes to divisions between Christ's humanity and divinity which were so strict that they seemed to deny the unity of Christ's person that the Logos christology was meant to uphold. It is in these interrelated concepts of the divine-human image, the body and soul, and the suffering of God that Hilary's trinitarian anthropology will carry its prime polemical weight against his Homoian opponents.

\textit{The body and soul of Christ in Hilary}

Hilary develops an explicit teaching on the soul of Christ, and so, as Grillmeier put it, 'achieves a doctrine of the incarnation which is relatively complete by fourth century standards'.\textsuperscript{188} In Hilary, 'Latin christology has found its first comprehensive description. An advance has been made on both Athanasius and Tertullian'.\textsuperscript{189} Hilary's view that Christ had a full human soul and will\textsuperscript{190} is in itself

\textsuperscript{187} See \textit{frag.} 33.
\textsuperscript{188} Grillmeier, \textit{Christ}, 307.
\textsuperscript{189} Ibid., 313.
\textsuperscript{190} See \textit{Trin.} 9.49-50; 10.19; 10.57.
an advancement upon previous and contemporary christology, but it also further allows for christological investigation beyond the pure metaphysical in discussions of Christ's two natures. Hilary delves deeper into the psychology of Christ than others of his time. Due to this, many have questioned his conclusions regarding Christ's human experience, and suffering in particular, and this will be addressed specifically below, but, whatever his conclusions, the fact the Hilary not only affirmed the human soul and will of Christ, but sought to carry this out to its logical conclusion in light of Christ's full humanity and divinity, marks a major christological achievement and opens doors for future developments. Hilary recognizes the significance of the Homoian denial of the human soul of Christ and engages in a bold polemic against it.¹⁹¹

Scholars have often mis-identified Hilary's opponents in Trīn. 10, and this has skewed the interpretation of Hilary's own view on Christ's soul, and his emphatic insistence upon the unity of Christ's person as the answer to what he sees as erroneous christological views (and their anthropological impact). In Trīn. 10.20-21 and 50-51, Hilary directly confronts his opponents on this issue. The discussion hinges upon origin. In 10.20 He writes against those who believe that Christ's body and soul came from Adam, that Christ's true origin is a man, and not the Holy Spirit. Here Hilary is directly refuting his earlier traducianist position. Whereas flesh is born of flesh 'every soul is the work of God',¹⁹² and, in the case of Christ, his soul is therefore his own work: 'He received a soul for himself from himself'.¹⁹³ Second, these who confuse Christ's divine origin from eternity, say that the Son is related to the Father as a word to its speaker, as an utterance of the

¹⁹¹ See Trīn. 10.50-51.
¹⁹² Ibid. 10.20, SC 462:200.
¹⁹³ Ibid. 10.22, SC 462:202: ex se sibi animam adsumpsit.
voice of God. Wanting 'the Only-begotten God . . . not to be the substantive God (non substantiuum Deum esse) but a word, an emission from a voice (uocis emissae); so that what a word is to those who speak, so the Son would be to God the Father'. To them Christ was not 'God the Word remaining and abiding in the form of God, who was born Christ the man . . . that he would not be God the Word making himself man by birth from the Virgin, but that the Word of God would be in Jesus as the spirit of prophecy was in the prophets (ut in profetis Spiritus profetiae').¹⁹⁴

The goal of these interlocutors is to deny the full divinity of Christ and Hilary says in doing so they have divorced the Son of God and the Son of Man; there is an existing human being who is then inspired by a foreign (extrinsecus) power. Their reason for doing so is because Christ's 'soul was sorrowful even to death'.¹⁹⁵ Once again, suffering is seen at the root of the discussion. Hilary's response is to deny that Christ's possession of a soul implies two separate subjects:

God the Word is born a human while remaining in the mystery of his nature. For he is born not to be another and another (alius adque alius), but that as [being] God before human, taking up humanity, he might be known to be God and human. . . . For having received the form of the servant, he who was in the form of God brought two contraries together (de contrariis comparatur): so that it is just as true that he remained in the form of God, as it is true that he received the form of the servant.¹⁹⁶

Christ, in his humanity and divinity, must then be confessed as 'identical' (eundemque) 'not through a desertion of God but through an assumption of humanity'.¹⁹⁷ The single subject of Christ is absolutely critical for

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¹⁹⁴ Ibid. 10.21, SC 462:200-202.
¹⁹⁶ Ibid., 204.
¹⁹⁷ Ibid: non Dei defectione sed hominis adsumptione.
Hilary in properly assessing the issue of Christ's suffering in relation to his divinity:

Because of this, Jesus Christ in his birth, suffering, death, burial and resurrection is not able to be divided from himself in these divers mysteries, so as to not be Christ. There is no other Christ, than he who was in the form of God, who received the form of the servant; neither is there another than he who was born, who died; neither another than he who died, who resurrected; neither another than he who resurrected, who is in heaven; for in heaven there is no other than he who beforehand descended from heaven.¹⁹⁸

This leads Hilary immediately into a discussion of the suffering and human experience of Christ, which is discussed below. Here, it is important to be precise about who Hilary's opponents actually are in order to gauge the purpose and scope of his argument.

The positions which are addressed here by Hilary have been rather mechanically assigned in Hilary scholarship as, predominantly, Apollinarian.¹⁹⁹ Hilary, indeed, opens 10.51 by saying that these are drawn into the error of believing that God the Word became soul to the body.²⁰⁰ Beckwith rightly notes that this position is most likely known to Hilary from 'Arian' circles, but he says it becomes explicit in the writings of Apollinarius (as if the position of the 'Arian' circles on the soul of Christ was a precursor to that of Apollinarius). Vaggione, commenting on Trin. 10.20-22, calls Hilary's opponents 'Apollinarian'. The NPNF translators reference Apollinarius as Hilary's polemical target at 10.20 and 10.50-52. Had Hilary ended his discussion at stating that the divine Word took the place of the human soul this would indeed sound a great deal like Apollinarius (though Apollinarius's christological arguments are published a decade later!). He

¹⁹⁸ Ibid. This strong sense of unity in Christ's person, before incarnation, during, and after incarnation is central to Hilary's christology.

¹⁹⁹ I am indebted to Tarmo Toom for the observations of the particular interlocutors of Hilary and the broader discussion of Hilary's opponents here regarding the Word overtaking the human soul, who first brought the various emphases of these varieties to my attention.

²⁰⁰ Ibid. 10.51.
does not end the description there, however. He goes on to discuss the way in which the Word exists as the soul of the body — 'through a change of nature and weakening of himself [so that] he would cease to be God the Word'.

This is virtually opposite from the (Nicene) Apollinarius. For him, the Word elevates the mindless humanity, for Hilary's Homoian opponents, the Word is the soul of Christ through a lowering of divinity. Further, the view that Christ was an existing human being overtaken by the Word is supplemented by Hilary, saying he was strengthened by 'the external power of a word extending itself' into him. This second opponent identified in 50-51, correctly pointed out by Beckwith, is Photinus. Hilary sums up the error of his opponents: 'In every way the deadly danger of the deception of faith appears, whether . . . [there is] a weakness of nature in God the Word, or the Word was absolutely not God, for the birth of Jesus Christ from Mary alone was his beginning'.

If Hilary's rebuke here is to be attributed to particular interlocutors, they cannot be Apollinarian. Hilary's central opponents are Homoian, and as he has deliberately framed his discussion of those who argue that the Word took over the role of the human soul in the body in the context of a lowering or lessening of divinity to a human level, rather than Apollinarius's raising of human status to the divine. A proper identification of Hilary's opponents here must be derived from a search amongst Homoians and/or their predecessors. Immediately jumping to the

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201 Ibid., SC 462:254: *per demutationem naturae se infirmantis extiterit et uerbum Deus esse defecerit.*

202 see *Trin.* 10.7. For the view of the Homoians that the incarnation involved a lowering or lessening of divinity (beyond Hilary's sustained polemic against it), see also Phoebadius c. Ar. 4.15.16; Gregory of Elvira *Fid. orth.* 69. See discussion of Hanson, *Search,* 566-67.

203 Ibid. 10.51, SC 462:254.

204 see Ibid. 10.21; 2.4; 7.3.

205 Ibid. 10.51, SC 462:254.
conclusion that when one sees the idea of the Word taking over the human soul of Christ one must regard it as Apollinarianism is committing the same polemical pigeonholing that Athanasius did by conflating all the arguments of his opponents as 'Arian'. The legacy of this thought is gifted to Homoian theology by Eusebius of Caesarea, who, as is clear above, directly denies a human soul to Christ in conjunction with a subordinate view of the Son to the Father. The development of Homoian thought in this regard is seen in Eudoxius of Constantinople, whose *regula* asserted clearly that Christ took flesh 'but not humanity, for he did not take a human soul'.

Hilary has more keenly observed the nuances and variations of the heretical groups he is writing against than has Athanasius or many modern scholars who have pre-adjudicated his opposition. This allows Hilary to leverage his pro-Nicene theology in new ways which bring his 'comprehensive' christology to bear upon both anti-Nicene, Homoian commitments to the impossibility of reconciling the *totus homo* with the full divine life, and anti-Homoian views which commit to the same from an opposing vantage point. Hilary is constructing a view of divine-human relations, specifically in Christ and generally of all humanity, which demands that the divine and the human inhabit the same 'space' through Christ’s mediation. He is constructing a vision of divine-human relation in which the two contraries, the infinite and the finite, come together in a way which does not cause one or the other to decrease or be overcome. In refuting these two opposing theologies in this way, he demonstrates their common bottom line concern which is generative for both of their christological conclusions, no matter how different

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those conclusions might be. Both seek to protect divine transcendence and immutability by not implicating 'true' divinity in the sufferings of Christ, and both do so from a basic underlying theological reasoning that these two contraries cannot coexist.

Hilary's refutation confronts both of these theologies by affirming Christ's full humanity and divinity as united in one subject in such a way as to make the denial that the full human soul is incompatible with full divinity in Christ in both anti-Nicene and anti-Homoian theologies contra fide. For Hilary, the totus homo (body and soul) united with full divinity in one 'person' in Christ, so that they are 'one and the same' (eundemque), constitutes the basic structure of the Christian faith. In the same way Hilary has focussed in the broad panoramic of 'image' language, he has hemmed in the spectrum of early Christian perspectives on the soul of Christ within that discussion of the image. How Hilary understands the soul of Christ functioning in the lived life of Jesus is cause for further inquiry, but he has, for the first time in the history of Christianity, synthesized a theologically coherent explanation of Christ's possession of a fully human soul and will while at the same time affirming equal divinity of Christ and the Father, through that human soul and will being predicated on the single subject of the eternal Son of God.

**Approaching Hilary's discussion of Christ's suffering**

I noted above that in the interrelated discussions of divine and human 'image' discourse, the relationship of the body and soul, and the suffering of God, Hilary's trinitarian anthropology carries its prime polemical weight. The connections of these concepts are vivid and deliberate in Hilary's discussion of Christ's suffering.
He keenly recognises the nuances of his opponents, as seen above, and also that the centre of their arguments is the issue of how to read the biblical narratives of Christ's suffering and human weakness. Particularly his Homoian adversaries found the biblical narratives Christ's sufferings as obviously supportive of their cause (it can be argued that the anti-Nicenes were in fact more evidently true to the biblical texts in their position\textsuperscript{207}). Indeed, as is evident above, the suffering of Christ was always at the very foundation of anti-Nicene arguments.\textsuperscript{208} Hilary is very clear about the position of the Homoians he is writing against: 'Many of them', he writes, 'do not wish [Christ] to have existed in the nature of the impassible God on account of his fear of the passion and his weakness in suffering', and, due to this weakness and fear, they argue that he had an 'inferior nature to God the Father' (\textit{inferiores a Deo Patre naturae}).\textsuperscript{209} Further, Homoians appeal to the entire life of Christ to support their argument: 'Considering the labour of the birth, the weakness of infancy, the growth of childhood, the period of youth, of bodily sufferings and the Cross of the sufferings, and the death of the Cross, because of these things they do not perceive [him to be] the true God'.\textsuperscript{210}

\textsuperscript{207} See, for example, Hanson, \textit{Search}, 26, who specifically mentions Hilary and Athanasius taking 'refuge in most unconvincing arguments' regarding their interpretation of Christ's suffering and weakness in the gospels; Kevin Madigan, 'Christus Nesciens? Was Christ Ignorant of the Day of Judgment? Arian and Orthodox Interpretation of Mark 13:32 in the Ancient Latin West', \textit{HTR} 96.3 (July 2003), 278: 'pro-Nicenes had to strain the biblical text'.

\textsuperscript{208} Additional evidence is found in the Greek version of the council of Sardica in 343 C.E., which indicates that Valens and Ursacius used Christ's sufferings to make this argument. The second council of Sirmium in 357 C.E. also alludes to Christ's sufferings (See Burns, \textit{Christology}, 85-86). The subordinationism in the so-called 5th Confession of the Macrostich of 344 C.E. relies upon the Son's passibility (See Paul L. Gavrilyuk, \textit{The Suffering of the Impassible God: The Dialectics of Patristic Thought} (Oxford: OUP, 2004), 104). Hilary already recognized the crucial placement of Christ's sufferings in arguments used to deny or lessen his divinity in \textit{Mat.} 6.1. Phoebadius also recognizes the logic of Homoian argument, and references Potamius's letter at \textit{c. Ar.} 5.1 which connects the suffering of God with the lessening of the Son's deity. He further argues that these make the incarnate Christ to be a \textit{tertium quid} (see also Teri. \textit{Prax.} 27).

\textsuperscript{209} \textit{Trin.} 10.9, SC 462:186.

\textsuperscript{210} Ibid. 5.18, SC 448:48-50.
Against this anti-Nicene argument, pro-Nicene theologians had to devise a way of holding to the biblical narrative while maintaining the impassibility of the Son’s divinity (as did pre-Nicenes against patripassionism). This led, primarily, to an argument that the human nature of Christ suffered, while the divine nature was free from that suffering. This is seen in the writings of Athanasius, Marcellus, Victorinus, Phoebadius, and others, as well as pre-Nicene writers like Tertullian and Novatian. Hilary does utilize this exegetical tool to some extent, but, for Hilary, the divine Word is mixed or mingled (admixtum) with the human soul of Christ, so that all of the experiences of Christ necessarily refer to the Word, and vice versa. This being said, he must be careful to shield his argument from Homoian logic which results in either observing varying degrees of divinity (the Son’s passibility denoting his lower divinity than the Father's transcendent impassibility) or denies impassibility to the Godhead (which would result in patripassionism). This argument stems from his carefully constructed pro-Nicene re-appropriation of Christ’s possession of a soul together

211 Ar. 3.34.13-15, Athanasius Werke 1.3 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2000): καὶ γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ἀπόστολος δικὶ τοῦτο οὐκ εἴρηκε· >Χριστοῦ οὐν παθόντος θεότητι, ἀλλ.’ «ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν σαρκός, ἵνα μὴ αὐτοῦ τοῦ λόγου ἴδια κατὰ φύσιν, ἀλλ.’ αὐτῆς τῆς σαρκὸς ἴδια φύσει τὰ πάθη ἐπιγνωσθῇ.

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213 Adv. Ar. 1.44; 1.47.

214 C. Ar. 22.1-4; 24.

215 Prax 27, 29-30.

216 Trin. 25.10, CCSL 4:61: . . . Non nisi hominem in Christo interfectum, appareat ad mortalitatem sermonem in loco non esse deductum. In Hilary’s earlier Mat., the humanity and divinity of Christ are more strictly separated (see 33.6; 3.2), and he follows his Latin tradition closely, using this argument to avoid notions of divine suffering. His argument regarding the human soul of Christ, and his concern with polemic against Photinus who separated Christ into three parts: Word, body, and soul (see Trin. 10.52), caused him to nuance this position greatly. See Burns, Christology, 92, and discussion at 92-4 for Mat. Photinian polemic is not absent from Mat., but Hilary’s argument regarding the unity of Christ against Photinus is substantially more emphatic in Trin. In Trin., the emphasis of Hilary’s argument is focussed on the unity of Christ rather than the distinction of his natures.

217 Discussed below.
with Christ being seen as a single divine subject, and his anti-Nicene polemic against a graded divinity designed to protect the divine transcendence from lowly human experience.

In *Trin.* 10, Hilary most directly confronts this issue which lies at the heart of the Homoian argument. He says in places that Christ could not feel pain, yet also that Christ did indeed weep, fear, was sad, and did suffer. He seems at first sight to contradict himself in an argument which is at best incoherent, and at worst forfeits any real humanity to the incarnate Christ at all. His ultimate argument is that Christ suffered but did not experience the pain of that suffering, and that Christ wept, was hungry and thirsty, not out of the necessity of his nature but out of condescension to us, according to 'human custom'.

He says that Christ’s body could undergo *impetus passionis* without feeling the *dolor passionis,* and makes a distinction between *pati* and *dolere,* *pati* being the blow of suffering and *dolere* being the effect of pain in that suffering. This has caused many, particularly modern scholars, to ascribe docetism to Hilary, and where it is not fully ascribed, it is seen as not far off from Hilary’s position, and Hilary’s argument is judged to be lessening the human experience of Christ. I argue, however, that Hilary is doing quite the opposite. His argument actually serves to *increase* the value of Christ’s human experience, not weaken it. One might want to question what the nature of that experience actually *is* for Hilary, but the common assumption that Hilary is denying or weakening true human experience in Christ

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220 Ibid. 10.23, SC 462:206.
is not only a mis-interpretation of his work, but actually works against the true function of his argument.221

There is a spectrum of interpretation of Hilary's view of Christ's humanity. Watson comments that while Hilary has been accused of 'sailing somewhat close to the cliffs of docetism', it is agreed that 'he has escaped shipwreck'.222 Kelly claims there was a 'strain' in Hilary's thought veering close to docetism.223 And while Burns asserts that Hilary did not maintain a 'purely docetic' christology,224 and Borchardt argues that he was not docetic 'in the strict sense of the word',225 Hanson boldly claims that Hilary was 'nakedly docetic', and calls into question the possibility of Christ's mediation and redemption of humanity.226 Some scholars take medial, and quite fruitless, positions which seek to exonerate Hilary of docetism, but their focus is clearly to excuse Hilary's doctrine, rather than to expose his thought in an historically productive way.227 Though Weedman and Beckwith have recently argued that a proper contextual reading of Hilary's argument cannot result in a docetic interpretation,228 the overall spectrum of the

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221 For a full discussion of the suffering and human experience of Christ in Hilary see my 'Suffering for Our Sake: Christ and Human Destiny in Hilary of Poitiers's De Trinitate', JECS 22.4 (Winter, 2014): 541-68. This section will largely adapt the discussion of 'Suffering for Our Sake' for the purposes of this chapter and the thesis as a whole.


224 Burns, Christology, 88-89.

225 Borchardt, Hilary, 130.

226 Hanson, Search, 501.

227 Galtier, Hilaire, 135; Smulders, Doctrine, 204-5.

scholarly discussion at least associates Hilary closely with docetism, and at points fully accuses him of it.

Hilary’s psychological framework and his *forma Dei-forma servi* christological paradigm provide the foundation for not only avoiding erroneous readings of his text, but for properly engaging Hilary’s argument on Christ’s suffering and human experience in a way which further reaps significant fruits for his trinitarian anthropology.

*The influence of Stoicism on Hilary’s argument*

The significance of Hilary’s view of Christ’s soul comes into sharper focus when considering his psychological perspective as a whole, which is essentially Stoic. The influence of Stoicism on Hilary’s argument has long been recognized.229 Favre argues that ‘without a doubt’ he depended directly upon Seneca,230 though the majority of scholarship is more reserved about stating direct Stoic

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229 It was first noted in 1906 by A. Beck, 'Die Lehre des hl. Hilarius von Poitiers über die Leidensfähigkeit des Leibes Christi’, *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie* 30 (1906): 109-22, followed by Le Bachelet, ’Hilaire (saint)’, 2438-49, and most prominently put forward in Favre’s article, ’La communiation des idiomes dans les oeuvres de Saint Hilaire de Poitiers’, *Greg* 17 (1936): 481-514, and it is extremely rare for Favre not to be mentioned in literature discussing Hilary’s view of Christ’s suffering. Hanson, *Search*, makes no mention of Favre or Stoicism in Hilary, and it might not be coincidence that he also makes the firmest affirmation of docetism in contemporary Hilary scholarship.

230 Ib. 491n31. Seneca distinguishes between *feritur* and *laeditur* in his discussion of the Stoic sage: *inuulnerabile est non quod non feritur, sed quod non laeditur* (Const. 3.3, *L. Annaei Senecae Diologorum libri duodecim: Recognovit brevique adnotatione critica instruxit*, ed. L. D. Reynolds (Oxford: 1977), 20), and Hilary uses *pati* and *dolere* in a similar way in reference to Christ. Seneca’s sage is not beyond the experience of suffering, but overcomes it (Ibid. 3.4; Reynolds:20: ‘Is it at all doubtful that a strength which is not overcome is truer than one which is not provoked?’). The sage’s body is struck with suffering, but these sufferings cannot overwhelm him, he is unaffected by them. He thus achieves a certain level of impassibility. In the same way, Favre argues, Hilary’s distinction of *pati* and *dolere* provides a way of speaking of Christ’s impassibility, even while he suffers.
Whatever the progeny of Hilary’s Stoic framework, it is clearly evident. Some, as Beckwith, can simply state Stoic influence without even arguing for it, showing the extent to which is has become standard in Hilary scholarship.

The parallels between Hilary’s discussion of the body and soul of Christ and the Stoic discussion of the sage are striking, so that Seneca’s argument for the sage can be seen as the ‘unspoken model’ for Hilary’s discussion of Christ’s body and soul. The model of the Stoic sage for Christ in Hilary allows us to understand how he can speak of suffering without pain as legitimate human

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231 Doignon, *Avant l’exil*, 375, and Weedman, *Martyrdom*, 30, contend that Hilary’s Stoic background was mediated through previous Christian tradition, principally Tertullian. Burns, *Christology*, 88-9, shows the wide popularity of Seneca in Latin Christianity. Indeed Latin Christians had a particular admiration of Seneca. Lactantius thought that he would have become a Christian with some instruction, and quoted him some thirty times (See *Inst. 5.5.19*), Tertullian spoke of Seneca as *saepe noster* (*An. 20*). Further, the legend of Paul and Seneca’s alleged correspondence is circulating in the fourth century (*Jerome writes of this first in 392; De uiris illustribus 12*). Saffrey, ‘Saint Hilaire et la philosophie’, in *Hilaire et son temps: Actes du colloque de Poitiers 29 septembre—3 octobre 1968* (Paris: Études augustinienne, 1968), 249-51, demonstrates how Stoicism would have been transmitted through Hilary’s rhetorical education. Doignon, *Hilaire*, 520, further observes that there was an omnipresence of rhetoric in pagan and Christian culture especially in Gaul in late antiquity. Saffrey, ibid., 250-51, also shows how Hilary’s philosophical training generally would have been received inadvertently through rhetorical texts.

232 Beckwith, ‘Suffering’, 84.

233 Even Hilary’s polemic at points mimics Stoic argument. In *Psal.*, Hilary’s polemic against the Epicureans tends to follow Stoic polemical patterns through the intermediaries of Christian and rhetorical traditions. For example, in 1.7, his argumentation against Epicureans follows Minucius Felix, Lactantius, and Cicero in arguing against the position that the world was formed randomly by a conflation of atoms, using the language of *fortuitis constitisse* (Minucius Felix uses *fortuitis concursionibus* (*Oct. 5.7-8*) and Lactantius the same (*Opif. 2.10*), and Cicero that of *concursio fortuita* (*Fin. 1.17*). See Descourtieux’s note in SC 515:181n4. See also *Psal. 61.2; 63.4, 9; 65.7; 144.4; 148.3* for Hilary’s arguments against Epicureans, and discussion by Saffrey, ‘Hilaire’, 255-60). Weedman further notes that the use of *admixtio* by Hilary to describe the joining of the soul and body with each other also follows Stoic thought (*Martyrdom*, 31n34). Although this concept has Aristotelian origins, it was preferred by the Stoics and developed by them. See, for example, Cicero, *De senectute*, ln. 1: *animos . . . sed cum omni admixtione corporis liberatus purus* (referenced in Weedman, 31n34). Hilary also uses *admixtio* in a similar way to discuss the unity of Christ’s divine nature to his human soul (discussed below).

234 Indeed, Seneca provides analogies at *Const. 5.3* (*Reynolds:22*) to demonstrate that the Stoic sage receives the blows of suffering, but is not injured by them (*Nam si iniuria alicuius mali patientia est, sapiens autem nullius mali est patiens, nulla ad sapientem iniuria pertinet* (*ibid., 22*)), which Hilary directly parallels at *Trin. 23*. Hilary draws the same sorts of analogies for the same purpose in reference to the human experience and suffering of Christ. Hilary’s use of different analogies for the same argument supports the thesis that he inherited Stoic ideas second-hand. The same can be said, as Weedman suggests, *Martyrdom*, 30n28, of his *pati-dolere* terminology, used to communicate the same concept as Seneca’s *feritur-laeditur*.

experience, and offers us a way to move past the docetic question to the true significance and purpose of Hilary's view of Christ's suffering.

*Introduction to Stoic moral psychology*

A brief sketch of Stoic psychology provides avenues for properly engaging with Hilary's thought and avoiding erroneous readings of his christology. Brennan notes how in ancient moral psychologies ethical theorizing begins along with psychology. There is no ethical theorizing taking place prior to practical living, creating an ideal to then live by, so that for the Stoics, 'violations of ethical standards always reflect lapses in psychological hygiene, and our obligations are set for us by the actual practice of psychologically perfect agents'. Sorabji notes that in Stoic ethics 'the connection between practice and theory is seamless'.

Stoic psychology begins with impressions. Impressions are alterations of or impacts on the soul, commonly brought about by sensible objects in one's environment, which present themselves as providing information about how

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236 A unified position of 'Stoic psychology' or 'Stoic ethics' is not implied by my use of these terms. There were differing opinions among Stoics, particularly concerning the nature of passions and assent to impressions. This is a synthetic account given here of what might be called a classic Stoic position (principally a Chrysippian one), and is focussed on points which will illuminate our reading of Hilary's argument.


238 Ibid., 259.


240 Diog. Laert. 7.49:318: ἄρεσκει τοῖς Στοιχείοις τὸν περὶ φαντασίας καὶ αἰσθήσεως προσέκτειν λόγον . . . προφητεύεται γάρ ἡ φαντασία (φαντασία is most commonly translated in English as 'impression' and I am following this language here: Sorabji prefers 'appearance' ('Chrysippus', 157); Brad Inwood uses 'presentation' (Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism (Oxford: Clarendon, 1985), 22).

things are. How one responds to an impression is a direct reflection on her soul. Therefore, pain (or grief, \( \lambda \upsilon \eta \)) or pleasure (\( \eta \delta o\nu \eta \)) have nothing to do with bodily feelings: 'Mere bodily pleasure and pain are classed as "things indifferent" to the moral status of the agent'. Everyone experiences these 'indifferent' impressions, this is simply a part of being human, indeed, not to feel them would be inhumanitas. The soul judges the experiences of these impressions: 'The body feels and the soul decides'. It is then the evaluation of these experiences which separates the non-sage from the sage, that determines one's moral standing. Ascribing virtue or vice to indifferent things is false judgment and constitutes false beliefs called \( \pi \alpha \theta \eta \) (passions). The sage cannot assent to \( \pi \alpha \theta \eta \), for in them outside circumstances overcome reason, but the Stoic sage is not psychologically subject to anything beyond reason itself.

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243 Inwood, Ethics, 145.

244 Seneca, Ep. 99.5. See discussion in J. M. Rist, 'Seneca and Stoic Orthodoxy', in ANRW II. 36.3 (1972): 2000. The use of the word 'indifferent' does not imply a lack of care about things which are labeled as such. The word does not express a feeling of indifference toward emotion or experience in the sage, but rather to the neutral, or indifferent, moral status of certain experiences. See Paul Veyne, 'Préface', in Sénèque: Entretiens lettres à Lucilius (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1993), lxxxv-lxxxvi.

245 Veyne, 'Préface', civ.

246 Brennan, 'Stoic Moral Psychology', 264: The non-sage continually ascribes value to indifferents: health, wealth, comfort, etc., are seen as 'good', whereas disease, sorrow and death are judged as 'bad'. For the sage and passions see Steven K. Strange, 'The Stoics on the Voluntariness of the Passions', in Stoicism: Traditions and Transformations, ed. Steven K. Strange and Jack Zapko (Cambridge: CUP, 2004), 37. For Stoic definitions of the four species of passions see Andronic. Rhod. 1 (SVF 3.391:95); Cic. Tusc. IV 7.14 (SVF 3.393:95); Stobaeus 2.90.7 (SVF 3.394:95-96); Diog. Laert. 6.110-114/343-45.

247 See Stobaeus, Ecl. 2.7.2 (44W), 2.7.10 (88W), who reports the Stoic description of passions as 'disobedient to reason'. Seneca, De ira 2.4.1, refers to the passions as being carried away (efferantur), uncontrolled (impotens) and as overthrowing reason (evicit). Chrysippus uses the corresponding language in Greek: Galen, PHP 4.4.24 (SVF 3.476); 4.2.12 (LS 65 J, SVF 3.462); 4.17 (SVF 3.476); 4.20-21, 23 (SVF 3.476), references in Sorabji, 'Chrysippus', 166. See also Cic. Tusc. 4.42. In De ira 2.4.2, Seneca writes of the passions: Ista non potest ratio vincere. The language of being overcome, etc., does not contradict the Stoic teaching of voluntary assent or action: see Margaret R. Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 61-83.
The ἀπάθεια of the Stoic sage has often been misinterpreted to mean that he does not feel, but, as Rist writes, 'The stoic wise man is a man of feeling, but his feelings do not control, or even influence, his decisions and his actions. In their terminology he is passionless (apathēs), but not without rational feelings'.

One's response to suffering, not undergoing suffering itself, is the psychological and moral gauge of the soul.

Within this Stoic psychological framework, in which one's response to sensations is in direct relation to the condition of one's soul, Christ's sinless and perfect existence must be, for Hilary, predicated directly on the condition of his soul and nature. Christ's actions and experiences give direct and particular insight into the 'judge' of those actions, the soul, so that looking to Christ's actions and reactions is in a sense a peering into his soul.

**Hilary's psychological framework**

Hilary's *forma Dei-forma servi* christology is discussed in detail above, and in order to understand Hilary's argument within its full context it is necessary to also consider his psychological perspective, principally, the relationship of the body and soul in humanity generally, and then particularly regarding the body and soul of Christ. In *Trin.* 10.14, Hilary clearly expresses the body-soul relationship and its implications for ordinary human life. A body, without the animation of the soul, is a dull and lifeless mass. It is by the infiltration of the soul which permeates

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249 J. M. Rist, 'The Stoic Concept of Detachment', in *The Stoics*, ed. John M. Rist (Berkely: University of California Press, 1978), 260. For example, the sage does not have fear, which is the opinion that some future thing is evil and should be avoided, he has caution instead; see Brennan, 'Stoic Moral Psychology', 270. There are direct parallels in Hilary. Christ is reported to show fear or anxiety in the garden prior to his death, and fear, as a judgment that a future thing is evil and must be avoided, determines a selection of avoidance. Yet, Christ does not avoid the cross, so he is not overcome by a passion which would have him avoid ensuing 'evil' (see *Trin.* 10.33).
throughout the body that pleasure or pain are experienced according to the circumstances the body finds itself in. So when a body is pierced or torn and experiences pain, the 'sensation of the soul admits the sensation of pain [in the body] by pouring out into it'. If there is a defect or decay in the body, sensation is lost, or when a member is cut off or burned it will cease to feel anything, as it is no longer permeated by the soul. And when surgery is needed to remove a member of the body, 'the activity of the soul is lulled to sleep' (consopitūr uīgor animae) through medication. So, as we have seen in the Stoic framework above, the soul is responsible for the body's sensations, but the sensations of this soul are effected by outside circumstances—whether toward pain or pleasure, or becoming dormant by an anesthetic. Hilary says this is through an animae infirmis admixtionem, and it is through this 'mingling' with a 'weak soul' that our bodies experience pain enforced by outward circumstances. The nature of suffering

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250 Trin. 10.14, SC 462:192. This view of body-soul relations is also standard in Stoic thought. See the helpful discussion in Long, Stoic Studies, 224-49.

251 Ibid.

252 Ibid., 10.14, SC 462:192. While I have found no use of the anesthesia analogy in preceding philosophical tradition, Hilary does not appear to be saying anything unusual here. He is not equating the 'weak soul' with an anesthetised person, which could indicate that the weak soul is incapable of voluntary assent to impressions. The illustration simply demonstrates the body's dependence upon the soul for sensation (the view of both Hilary and the Stoics). In classical Stoicism, human assent is volitional. But this volition does not mean self-determination or 'free will'; it means humans assent using reason and not automatically (see Michael Frede, A Free Will: Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought (Berkely: University of California Press, 2011), 42-43; Inwood, Ethics, 67). For a corrective to the problematic interpretation of Stoicism which conflates 'freedom' with responsibility or 'that which depends on us', see Susanne Bobzien, Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon, 1998), 330-57.

Chrysippus spoke of auxiliary causes—causes from external circumstances—and principal causes—the internal causes 'consisting of the relevant disposition of the agent's soul' (Inwood, Ethics, 67) (see Charlotte Stough, 'Stoic Determinism and Moral Responsibility', in Rist, The Stoics, 218; Cic. Fat. (SVF 2.974)). If all the important causes are principle, the action can reasonably be considered voluntary (Graver, Stoicism, 63), as it is caused from within the self. Chrysippus's well known cylinder example illustrates this (SVF 2.974; 2.1000). The cause of a cylinder rolling is its being pushed, but this is not the primary cause. The principal cause for the cylinder rolling is its own rollable nature (see Graver, Stoicism, 64). If the push took place on a square object the object would not role. In the same way, the person with a 'weak soul' does not cease to be the volitional and primary cause of her own actions, for the nature of one's soul is determinative of the assent one makes.
corresponds to the nature of the soul and body.\textsuperscript{253} Therefore, the discussion of Christ's experience of suffering must be a discussion of the condition of his soul, and how it relates to his body.

The question of Christ's human experience and suffering then is a question about the nature of his body and soul, about \textit{what type} of body and soul he had, not whether or not he had a fully human body and soul, as Hilary explicitly rejects the docetic option of a phantom (\textit{fantasma}) body.\textsuperscript{254} The question of Christ's experience of pain and suffering in Hilary is a question of his \textit{response} to the suffering—an essentially moral or ethical question—which directly reflects or mirrors his nature, as psychology and ethics are not ideals in this understanding but the actual experience of perfect psychological and moral agents.\textsuperscript{255} The ability to suffer without feeling pain thus manifests the particular relation of the body and soul in Christ.\textsuperscript{256}

As Hilary directly links nature with origin,\textsuperscript{257} and as the nature of suffering must be in accordance with the nature of the soul and body, Christ's differing origin than other human beings must, of necessity, demonstrate something different about the nature of his sufferings. Christ is truly human through his birth from Mary, but he was conceived by the Holy Spirit, he is of divine \textit{origin}.\textsuperscript{258}

\begin{table}
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\textsuperscript{253} \textit{Trin.} 10.15, SC 462:194: \textit{secundum animae corporisque naturam necesse est et passionum fuisse naturam}. \\
\textsuperscript{254} Ibid. 10.41, SC 462:236. \\
\textsuperscript{255} The idea of a \textquoteleft real\textquoteright{} and not idealised standard of humanity is significant to my overall argument. \\
\textsuperscript{256} See \textit{Trin.} 23, SC 462:206: \textit{adferrent quidem haec (the sufferings of his passion) inpetum passionis, non tamen dolorem passionis inferrent}. \\
\textsuperscript{257} See Weedman, 'Martyrdom', 28n20, for the use of the terms \textit{initium} and \textit{origo} in \textit{Trin}. \\
\textsuperscript{258} \textit{Trin.} 10.15. \\
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\end{table}
He was human, but he was a 'man from heaven' (*homo de caelo*). This origin makes Christ not only fully and truly human, but the perfect human, namely, because he is the perfect union of God and humanity—where God and humanity coexist.\(^{260}\)

The origin of Christ's humanity is the direct cause of Hilary's discussion of his human experience. As God the Son, Christ is the origin of his own human body and soul, and thus the ruler of that soul.\(^{261}\) External circumstances and sensations play no part in determining his experience. Christ then *does have* sensations and sufferings, he *does experience*, but he experiences because he wills to, not because of a weak soul which demands by nature certain reactions to those experiences. For Christ's body is not animated by an *animae infirmis admixtionem*, but it is rather *admiscuit* with the power of God through his divine origin from himself.\(^{262}\) Christ's nature is utterly free.\(^{263}\)

**Christ's unique body**

The nature of this soul of Christ must necessarily affect the nature of his body. His body must be *appropriate* to the nature of his soul, as the soul is 'poured into' and permeates the body. Christ's unique, but fully human, soul must then also have, in some sense, a unique body. There is 'una peculiaridad en el cuerpo de

\(^{259}\) Ibid., 10.17, SC 462:198 (1 Cor. 15.47). He even uses the language of a 'heavenly body' (*corpus caeleste*) (10.18, CCSL 62A:473) of Christ, which is not referring to a 'divinized' humanity, but to his heavenly origin, as is clear in the context.

\(^{260}\) Ibid., 10.19, SC 462:200: *... habens in se et totum uerumque quod homo est et totum uerumque quod Deus est*.

\(^{261}\) Ibid., 10.15, SC 462:194: *Quodsi adsumpta sibi per se ex uirgine carne, ipse sibi ex se animam concepti per se corporis coaptuit*. See also 10.25 (CCSL 62A:479); 9.7 (CCSL 62A:377); 2.24 (CCSL 62:60).

\(^{262}\) Ibid., 10.44, SC 462:242.

\(^{263}\) See *Trin*. 9.7
Jesús respecto des nuestro’.

This is clearly expressed in Trin. 23, the passage mentioned above as paralleling Seneca’s Const. 5.3:

In him, although either a blow would strike him, or a wound would descend, or knots would bind him, or a suspension would raise him, these things which brought about the vehemence of suffering, nevertheless did not cause the pain of suffering (adferrent quidem haec inpetum passionis, non tamen dolorem passionis inferrent), as any weapon pierces through water, punctures fire, or wounds the air indeed inflicts all these sufferings by its nature, so that it pierces, it punctures, it wounds, but the pain being caused in these things does not restrain their nature, since it is not natural for water to be pierced, fire to be punctured, or air to be wounded, although it is of the nature of a weapon to wound, to puncture, and to pierce.

All things act according to their nature—the weapon inflicts suffering as to its nature, but it is not in the nature of water, or fire, or air to be penetrated, pierced, or wounded. This is analogous to Christ’s perfect humanity for Hilary. Christ does truly suffer—the things or situations which inflict suffering do actually act upon Christ in accordance with their natures—but that suffering does not manifest in his nature the ordinary response to suffering. The ‘power of [his] body’ (virtus corporis) receives the force of the pain, but does not feel that pain. He continues, stating what might be seen as a summary statement for understanding Christ’s suffering and human experience: ‘That flesh, that bread, is from heaven, and that man is from God; who certainly has a body able to suffer, and he did suffer, but does not have a nature which can feel pain’. Christ, then, because of his unique divine origin, and his ineffable and intimate union with the divine Word, possessed the full range of human weakness in his humanity, the capability

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264 Luis F. Ladaria, La cristología de Hilario de Poitiers, Analecta Gregoriana 255 (Roma: Gregoriana, 1989), 166.

265 See 227n234.

266 Trin. 10.23, SC 462:206.

267 Ibid.

268 Ibid.: habens ad patiendum quidem corpus, et passus est, sed naturam non habens ad dolendum. Emphasis mine.
of suffering, dying, etc., but he was free from the necessity of human defects by nature.\textsuperscript{269}

Hilary is able to speak this way about Christ's full range of human experiences, not just suffering and pain. So Christ hungers, thirsts and weeps, and exposes himself to the conditions of sufferings, but he experiences these things not out of the necessity of his own nature. For 'when he received drink and food, he conceded (\textit{tribuit}) not to the necessity of his body, but to [its] custom (\textit{consuetudini}).\textsuperscript{270}

Because the word shares a fundamental oneness with human nature in Christ, Hilary's discussion of Christ's human experience is important for preserving divine impassibility. What occurs in the soul can be predicated on the Word in a very direct sense. \textit{Divine} impassibility, then, becomes another crucial determining factor for the nature of Christ's \textit{human} soul, and as the soul determines the nature of the body, divine impassibility determines something of what the human body of Christ must be like also. Christ's flesh must be appropriate to his soul, and also, in a sense, to the Word, and while it shares the nature of human flesh entirely, it must remain always the \textit{verbi caro}, the Word's flesh.\textsuperscript{271}

The martyr tradition provides Hilary with an exemplum to demonstrate that speaking of a body which suffers without feeling pain is an authentically Christian

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{269} Ibid., 10.25.
\item \textsuperscript{270} Ibid., 10.24, SC 462:210.
\item \textsuperscript{271} Ibid., 10.26, SC 462:214; Weedman, 'Martyrdom', 26. While 10.26 is referring directly to the \textit{body} of Christ, this is a larger discussion of his body and soul. In 10.19-26 Hilary is speaking of the unity of the body and soul. Speech about the body of Christ is speech about the 'whole human', even stating \textit{adsumpta caro, id est homo totus}—body and soul. 10.25-26, then, discuss that assumed flesh (the entire human), speaking of Christ’s heavenly origin and demonstrating the uniqueness of his body and soul which are appropriate (natural) to that origin.
\end{itemize}
Weedman notes Hilary’s particular use of the ‘fiery Furnace’ narrative. While the narrative is common in the martyr literature, very little attention was given to the fact that the three in the furnace did not experience pain. Indeed, Tertullian was even somewhat embarrassed by this lack of pain in the story. The three in the furnace actually defy what is proper to their nature. Their bodies should have burned in the fire, but due to their faith they felt no pain. Even for those of natural human origin in the weakness of sin (whose bodies have an *animae infirmis admixtionem*) it is possible to experience suffering without pain. For God incarnate, whose origin is without the weakness of normal human generation, not only is this possible, but natural. For those in the furnace, natural weakness is removed from their bodies through the 'consciousness of faith' (*sensus fidei*). Their bodies do not feel the pain of suffering, *due to the arousing soul*. In other words, at least momentarily, their soul was made strong and was not mixed with weakness. Again, we see that the nature of one’s soul determines the body’s experience. A perfect, strong soul cannot be overcome by pain in the body.

The question arises whether or not Hilary’s argument here, which guards the impassibility of the divine Word, also ascribes impassibility to the humanity of Christ. Favre claims that in *Trin.* Hilary asserts that the human nature of Christ is impassible, but that by *De synodis* he 'no longer explicitly and clearly declares

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272 Athanasius also draws on the martyr tradition to explain Christ’s passion (Weedman, ‘Martyrdom’, 34. See Ar. 3.57). Hilary does something quite different, however. His use of the martyr tradition is a clear demonstration of his Stoic psychological categories in christological discussion. See below that the strength of the martyrs’ souls is what allows them to overcome pain.


274 *Trin.* 10.45.

275 Ibid.

276 Ibid. 10.46, SC 462:244. Emphasis mine.
that the humanity of Christ was, in itself, exempt from all physical suffering', while he continues to affirm the complete impassibility of the divine nature.\(^\text{277}\)

This seems implausible, however, considering that Hilary wrote \textit{Syn.} very close to the time of finishing \textit{Trin.} meaning that he would have held two conflicting opinions, in writing, at the same time.\(^\text{278}\)

Favre further argues that in \textit{Trin.} Christ's body and soul remain strangers to impressions like sadness or pain, and Galtier writes that 'the body only has feeling due to the action exercised on it by the soul: so it is enough that this action be paralysed by some anesthetic so that one can slash and cut it without it feeling any pain', quoting \textit{Trin.} 10.14 for support.\(^\text{279}\) And based upon \textit{Trin.} 10.23, where Hilary uses the example of the impassibility of water, fire and air he contends: 'From this point of view, far from sharing the infirmity of our nature, he was superior to it. While giving an opening to the passion, he was escaping the pain'.\(^\text{280}\)

The context of \textit{Trin.} 10.14, however, as shown above, is the relationship of the human body and soul generally, that the soul invigorates the body, and specifically of the \textit{weak} human soul, in which outside circumstances, be they pleasure or pain, or an anesthetic to prevent pleasure or pain, overcome someone's beliefs and actions. This \textit{paralysée par quelque anesthésique} cannot then refer to the experience of Christ. And while Galtier is correct to note that there is some sense that the description at \textit{Trin.} 10.23 demonstrates Christ's

\(^{277}\) Favre, 'Communication', 500.


human existence beyond our own, it cannot be said that he held a superior nature, if this is taken to be beyond human. As for Christ being a stranger to sadness and pain in Hilary, I hope to show that this is simply not the case. He actually, for Hilary, took upon himself all the infirmities of human nature, the question is, once again, not whether impressions such as sadness or pain existed for Christ, but how he responded to them, and what their purpose was in him. Further, the concept of impassibility in Hilary and the broader early Christian tradition must be explored in order to properly engage with Hilary's conception of Christ's impassibility in the incarnation. Before approaching impassibility, however, we must consider the object of Christ's suffering, which will bring to light its soteriological focus.

Other-focussed suffering

The orientation or directional focus of Hilary's discussion of Christ's human experience illuminates his purpose and clarifies much of his argumentation. 'For our sake' (Nostri . . . causa), he writes, Christ was 'born human in our body (corporis nostri), spoke according to the custom of our nature, yet without ceasing to be what God is in his own nature'. And because the only-begotten God became human of his own free will:

Humanity will abide for eternity in God. . . . Thus God is born for our assumption, suffers truly for [our] innocence, [and] finally dies for [our] vengeance; while our humanity abides in God, and the sufferings of our infirmity are joined with God, and the spiritual powers of wickedness and malice are subdued in the triumph of the flesh, when God dies through the flesh (Deo per carnem moriente). 281

At every point for Hilary, the discussion of Christ's suffering and experience must lead to this salvific end. Christ must be God and human 'for our sake' in his birth,

life, suffering, death and all 'the circumstances of our nature' (naturae nostrae res peregerit). This 'for our sake' is for Hilary not a concept of substitution, he means that Christ's fear, sadness, and pain are actually toward or for us, and at times literally ours, and not concerning himself or his own circumstance. In this we see perhaps the most fruitful developments of Hilary's psychological foundations in a christological context.

In Trin. 10.10, Hilary prefaces a series of interpretations of key biblical texts dealing with Christ's suffering, fear, or sorrow by stating that in all of these occurrences 'neither had there occurred any weakness in him concerning himself (de se) of being fearful nor of feeling pain'. This de se begins to suggest this other-focussed suffering. Hilary's description of Christ's prayer in the garden that the cup might pass from him provides a vivid picture of this. He argues that the prayer for the disciples not to fall into temptation, and that the 'if possible' of Christ's prayer reflects his desire for the cup to pass so that they do not have to face it or share in it.

Prior to this request Christ came to his disciples and found them sleeping. He said to Peter, 'Could you not watch one hour with me? Watch and pray, that you may not enter into temptation. The spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh is weak' (Matt 26.40-41). He then prays for them, and warns them to pray in order that the cup of the passion may not overwhelm them: 'He prays for it to pass away from him so that it may not remain with them'. He knows that this cup cannot pass away, however, unless he drinks it—when the passion is completed in him,
then the fear of the cup will pass away and 'the end of its terror (finem terroris eius) will not be completed unless he submits to the terror of the passion in himself (in se), for after his death, the scandal of the Apostles' weakness will be driven away by power and glory'. Christ's 'sadness unto death' is also on account of the disciples, for what they must face, and it is not sadness on account of death (propter mortem), but unto death (ad mortem). Christ’s death is the termination of fear and sadness and is in no way then the cause of them. Hilary argues that Christ’s prayer in the garden in John 17 demonstrates clearly the cause of his sorrow and the request for the removal of the cup. For Christ does not pray that suffering be taken away from him, but he pleads with the Father to protect the disciples, since he is about to suffer.

Returning to Trin. 9.7, it is evident how Hilary’s psychological and christological categories support the claim 'for our sake . . . he passed through the circumstances of our nature'. In this passage, Hilary repeatedly states that Christ's entire human existence and all his experiences are of his own power and volition: he passed through all the circumstances of our nature, but, virtute naturae suae. He was himself the 'origin (origo) of his birth'; 'he willed to suffer what he could not suffer'; he 'suffered through himself and died of himself'; he became human of...


287 Trin. 10.36, SC 462:228.

288 Trin. 10.43. In Mat., Hilary goes as far as to claim Christ is praying that the disciples may suffer just as he does: sine sensu doloris (31.7). See discussion in Burns, Christology, 91.

Christ's 'ignorance' in the gospels of the day of his return is also a key example of Hilary's argument. His opponents used Christ's claim to not know the day as evidence that he was subordinate to the Father who is said to know. Hilary argues that Christ claims not to know not because he is by nature ignorant, but because he has condescended to our way of knowing—he must communicate to us from within our epistemological restraints. Christ is using 'the language of humanity', and his ignorance is so that the knowledge may be hidden from humanity: he doesn't know so that it might not be revealed (10.66). If there is no 'ignorance' or 'mystery' than this divine knowledge would become human knowledge, which it is not meant to be, and indeed cannot be, as for knowledge to reach our understanding it must be 'applicable to our own nature', and this knowledge is not (10.73). Christ himself told the disciples 'it is not yours to know times or moments which the Father has set within his own authority' (Acts 1.7) (10.75).
his own free will.\textsuperscript{289} That all of Christ's actions, including the passion, are deliberate and volitional actions means that Christ's experiences are not determined by external factors, he cannot be overcome by passions such as pain or fear. He is in full control of his response to these 'impressions'. He overcomes \textit{them}. Humans typically come to the end of life by external forces and causes: fever, being wounded, an accident, disease, or old age. But God incarnate gave up his own life, laid it down of his own volition and power. He bowed his head and gave up his spirit.\textsuperscript{290}

This strong soul of Christ, which does not contain the weaknesses of our sin, is, for Hilary, the only way for Christ to be truly 'for our sake'. His statements regarding Christ's condescension to the custom of humanity, rather than hungering, thirsting, etc., by nature, for which he is often accused of docetic tendencies, or that the object of his fear, sadness and suffering was the disciples and not his own circumstance, give Hilary grounds for this other-focussed human life of Christ. Due to Christ's strong soul, he voluntarily, in his own power, of his own free will undergoes human experience and suffering 'for our sake'. For Hilary, without this strong soul, Christ would have undergone these experiences for his own sake, his own need, fulfilling the inward necessity of his own nature—as if he just could not help it, so to speak.

All of Christ's experiences must be for our sake, for salvific purpose, and therefore in no way determined by the cause of his nature but willfully entered into and undergone in his full power. For Hilary, Christ's strong soul, which is not subject to the feeling of pain in the same way as ordinary human beings, does not

\textsuperscript{289} Ibid. 9.7, SC 462:26.

\textsuperscript{290} Ibid. 10.11.
weaken the soteriological force of his human experiences, but enforces it, as none
of them were necessary, and all of them willfully undergone for our sake.\textsuperscript{291}

\textit{Divine impassibility}

Crucial to a proper reading of Hilary's view of Christ's sufferings is an
historically responsible understanding of divine impassibility, both in Hilary and
in the context of the traditional understanding and function of \textit{impassibilis} or
\textit{ἀπαθεια} in early Christianity.\textsuperscript{292} Contemporary historians and theologians often
understand impassibility in the sense of being inactive, lacking affections,
emotional detachment, and the like. Further, modern theologians often look to
early Christian texts to validate their presumed need for a passible God, or, if
validation is not found, to condemned those texts to hopeless irrelevance.\textsuperscript{293} This
is, however, due to a lack of historical sensitivity to the early Christian debates
and discussions and indeed of the meaning of impassibility itself in early
Christian texts. Divine impassibility from the apostolic Fathers and apologists

\textsuperscript{291} Hilary uses Christ's sinlessness analogously to this other-focussed experience. In a similar
way as he bears sins, he bears human pain and suffering 'for our sake' without himself being
subject to the pain of that suffering, as 'quidquid patitur, non sibi patitur' (\textit{Trin.} 10.47).

\textsuperscript{292} For this traditional understanding see Paul L. Gavrilyuk, 'God's Impassible Suffering in the
Flesh: The Promise of Paradoxical Christology', in \textit{Divine Impassibility and the Mystery of
Human Suffering}, ed. James Keating and Thomas Joseph White (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,

\textsuperscript{293} For example, Hallman's article, 'The Mutability of God: Tertullian to Lactantius', \textit{ThSt} 42.3
(Setp. 1981) 373-93, seeks to show how some pre-Augustinian theologians shared the concern of
modern scholars about the immutability and mutability discussion (374), and argues the
Tertullian views God as mutable and passible as he is 'someone who does indeed have personal
feelings', and he 'expresses a sentiment which is in strong agreement with some modern thinking'.
Again he argues for a passibilist theology in Tertullian because he expresses God's 'personal
responsiveness to the world' (377). But, as I will argue here, this is not what divine impassibility
argues against. Early Christians arguing for the impassibility of God are in no way denying God's
activity in the world, or affirming a detached emotional apathy in God. Hallman's article is
concerned that contemporary discussions have not been historically faithful or even been overly
concerned with history, and he is attempting to discuss the passibility/impassibility debate by
tracing its historical roots. The problem is that Hallman never begins to discuss the actual
historical meanings of the terms, but simply anachronistically reads modern notions of passibility
and impassibility on to early Christian texts. This is a continual issue in modern and contemporary
theological uses of early Christianity.
forward meant that God was transcendent and enjoyed perfect freedom; not that God was inactive, but rather that God acts freely by his own volition. Early Christians are not attempting to provide a positive definition about God’s nature or attributes when speaking of him as impassible, but seeking to acknowledge his transcendence and negatively predicate what cannot be attributed to him. As Gavrilyuk notes: 'Divine impassibility is primarily a metaphysical term, marking God's unlikeness to everything in the created order, not a psychological term denoting . . . God's emotional apathy'. Impassibility, as an apophatic category used to distinguish God from creation, does not prevent God from positive engagement with creation but actually intensifies his love and mercy, as they are not dependent upon external circumstances but are unchanging and unwavering. For early Christians, it functions as an apophatic marker to secure the freedom of God.

This historical view of divine impassibility provides further support that Hilary's argument works to increase the significance of Christ's human experience. Christ's suffering and experience are not weakened for Hilary due to their uniqueness, but are actually seen as the most profound of all suffering and human experience. Hilary's argument directly corresponds to the larger early Christian vision of divine impassibility. His view of Christ's suffering upholds Christ's freedom as he suffers by his own power and volition and not due to the conditions of a weak nature. Christ is active in his suffering. Hilary's description of Christ's suffering thus might actually, in the same way impassibility did in

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295 Gavrilyuk, 'Impassible Suffering', 139.

296 Thomas G. Weinandy, Does God Suffer? (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2000), 78, traces this, aside from biblical tradition, to Philo. See Philo, Quod Deus Immutabilis Sit, 73 and 76.
regard to divine transcendence for early Christians, provide a view of Christ's experience which does not divorce him from suffering but frees him to suffer the greatest of all possible sufferings.

_Human potentiality as hopeful mutability_

This unique humanity of Christ reveals something about the nature of humanity itself for Hilary. While this is not how humanity _normally_ exists, it is _normative_ humanity. Following a quotation of Philippians 2.7, he asserts that Paul adds that he was made in the likeness of humanity and found in the habit of humanity 'in order that it might not be believed that a nature [weakened] through the defects of infirmity is a property of a true birth' (i.e. true human nature, as nature corresponds to birth or origin). Hilary is going far beyond the question modern scholarship has often assumed he is asking: 'How human was Jesus?', to the question of 'What does it mean to be human?'. The assumption which is made by many historians, and particularly in theological assessments of Hilary's work (and in modern theological discussions generally), is that if Christ's human experience is not exactly like ours in every way then he was not truly human. The assumption is that you and I define what it means to be human. Hilary's assumption is the opposite—anthropology is defined by christology, not by my own human experience. For Hilary, Christ is the human par excellence, and no

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297 Aquinas interprets Book Ten of Hilary’s _Trin._ to say exactly this. He utilizes _Trin._ 10.11, where Hilary testifies that the Son endured all human suffering, to argue that Christ's pain is greater than all others, as in his perfect humanity of divine origin he voluntarily accepts suffering (_Summa Theologica_ 3, q46, a5, obj1; q46, a6, resp. See Trent Pomplun, ‘Impassibility in St. Hilary of Poitiers’s _De Trinitate_’, in Keating and White, _Divine Impassibility_, 208–9, and his wider discussion of medieval interpreters, 203–13). Bonaventure interprets Hilary’s statement that Christ can suffer but _naturam non habens ad dolendum_ to mean that Christ’s flesh is passible, though _contra voluntatem_, but _ex voluntate_. If this were not the case, then Hilary could not have said that Christ _habens corpus ad patiendum, passus est_ (_III Sent._, d16, dub1, resp., p354, quoted in Pomplun, ‘Impassibility’, 207)

298 _Trin._ 10.25, SC 462:212.
one else is. Therefore his humanity cannot be judged in relation to ours, but ours
must be judged in relation to his. This means that if there is any docetism to be
found, it is found not in Christ, but in us.\(^{299}\) We are the humanity which is less
human, \textit{inhumane}. Hilary is making the observation that humanity, as we know it
of ourselves, is not the fullest and truest expression of human potentiality.\(^{300}\) He
is saying that suffering, pain, disease, fear, and sorrow are not meant for
humanity and are therefore not necessary to what it is to be human. Christ, by not
submitting to these in the same way as we do, is, far from being less human, seen
as the truest expression of being human. Further, as Christ is the normative
human existence, he is the fullness of human potentiality and the destiny of
humanity is fulfilled in his humanity.

That Christ is the goal and fulfillment of humanity for Hilary has been recently
noted.\(^{301}\) However, the significance of the full range of \textit{Christ's human experience}
for Hilary has not been recognized. The assumption that Christ's humanity was
deified through union with the Word has influenced the way in which the
soteriological and anthropological implications for Christ's humanity are
understood: 'the union with the Word infuses the humanity with such power that
it is perfectly sanctified or divinized'.\(^{302}\) While it is correct to note that divinization

\(^{299}\) At least docetism as it has come to be understood. The term \textit{dokesis} (appearance) in itself
would refer to whether or not Christ assumed a real or false humanity, and would not merge into
judgment regarding the \textit{degree} of Christ's experience as a real, physical human. But the
christological category of docetism quickly came to be used as a short-hand polemical umbrella
term for numerous views of Christ's humanity which were deemed erroneous. Indeed, Alain Le
Boulluec argues: 'conviendrait-il de ne pas s'engager dans un faux problème, en partant à la
recherche d'un docétisme authentique. La doctrine ainsi nommée est en effet une création
hérésiologique et il paraît assez vain de vouloir identifier un docétisme au sens strict.' ('Patristique
et histoire des dogmes', \textit{Annuaire: École Pratique des Hautes Études V\textsuperscript{e} Section—Sciences
Religieuses} 91 (1982-83), 380).

\(^{300}\) At \textit{Psal.} 118.10.2, SC 347:26, he notes that humanity in sin is 'unworthy to be called human
and one who is made according to the image and likeness of God'. Humanity in its current state of
sin is in some sense unfit to be called human—sin (and its produce) are contrary to human nature.

\(^{301}\) Weedman, 'Martyrdom', and Beckwith, 'Suffering'.

\(^{302}\) Beckwith, 'Suffering', 87.
through union with the Word is the goal of all humanity in Hilary, this goal, this
destiny, is not an immediate divinization of the human Jesus in the incarnation,
as is typically argued.\textsuperscript{303} The nature of Christ's human existence is not something
which is deified in the sense of being beyond human (though it might be beyond
our current human condition). This is a real human experience, though that of a
unique human being. Christ's humanity cannot be seen in Hilary as something
which surpasses what is natural. In other words, for Hilary, the deification of
Christ's humanity is not something external to what it is for Jesus to be human,
something invading, overtaking, or 'infusing' his humanity. This deification is not
a divine overtaking of Christ's human experience, it just is true human
experience.\textsuperscript{304} This means that for Hilary the salvific life of Christ functions
holistically, not only as an initial union of divinity and humanity or an
eschatological reality, but an actual lived life. There is a process in the
 glorification of Christ's humanity. While there is a sense that this union takes
place initially when Christ assumes humanity, it must be carried through to glory,
when the \textit{forma servi} is taken up into the glory of the \textit{forma Dei}.\textsuperscript{305} The language
of incarnation thus involves the entirety of Christ's life. Hilary speaks of this

\textsuperscript{303} See, for example, Ibid.; Scully, 'Assumption', 81-2; Hallman, \textit{Descent}, 104.

\textsuperscript{304} The view of Christ's humanity being overtaken by the divine in Hilary is typical, to the point
of some accusing him (anachronistically) of Apollinarianism (see Smulders, \textit{Doctrine}, 203-6.
Hanson, \textit{Search}, 500, and Beckwith, 'Suffering,' 92n9, claim that Smulders himself deems Hilary
susceptible to Apollinarianism. However, Smulders, ibid., 206, could not have been more clear to
the contrary when, after refuting charges of docetism against Hilary, he writes: 'C'est à moins juste
titre encore qu'on peut l'incriminer du grief d'apollinarisme, car il ne professe en aucune façon que
le Verbe ait tenu lieu d'âme').

This normative view of human nature is also essential to the Stoic position. What is 'natural' is
not necessarily what usually happens, and is even what rarely, if ever, happens in the ordinary
person. There is no abstract definition of humanity, but rather the life of the sage. This
understanding is central to a proper interpretation of Hilary (though Christ, not the sage, is
'normative'). For Hilary, Christ's human experience, though it is not what happens normally in our
lives, is normative human existence, it is the definitive humanity.

\textsuperscript{305} \textit{Trin}. 9.39, SC 462:94.
directly as an advancement to a more complete glory and of an 'increase' of glory.\textsuperscript{306}

The salvific and anthropological implications of this progression of the deification of Christ’s humanity are directly enforced by Hilary. Due to Christ’s assumption of all human life in one human individual, discussed in the next chapter, humanity is bodily united to Christ. In \textit{Trin.} 2.24 Hilary assures the reader of the significance of this physical union: ‘When he was made human of the Virgin he received the nature of flesh in himself, and through the fellowship of this \textit{admixtionem}, the body of the entire human race might emerge sanctified in him’.\textsuperscript{307} Christ's humanity is in a very real sense our humanity, and the progression of Christ’s humanity is our human progression.\textsuperscript{308} He writes:

Moreover, we shall progress (\textit{proficiemus}) [to] a similar (\textit{conformem}) glory in our humanity (\textit{in hominis nostris}). Having been renewed (\textit{renouati}) in the knowledge of God, we will be moulded anew (\textit{reformabimur}) to the image of the Creator, according to the saying of the Apostle: 'Having put off the old human with its deeds, and having put on the new, one which is being renewed (\textit{innouatur}) in the knowledge of God, after (\textit{secundum}) the image of him that created it' (Col 3.9-10). And thus humanity is made perfect (\textit{consummatur}), the image of God.\textsuperscript{309}

The restoration of humanity in the \textit{imago Dei} is through the creation of Christ's humanity, in which he is the 'new human, which is created according to God' (\textit{qui secundum Deum nouus homo creatur}) whom we are to 'put on' (Eph 4.21-24).\textsuperscript{310}

\textsuperscript{306} \textit{Trin.} 11.42, SC 462:366.
\textsuperscript{307} Ibid. 2.24, SC 443:314.
\textsuperscript{308} Ibid. 11.49.

\textsuperscript{309} \textit{Trin.} 11.49, SC 462:380-2. The use of the phrase \textit{hominis nostris}, 'our human', demonstrates Hilary’s view of Christ’s universal assumption of all humanity (see the following chapter). This phrase used in conjunction with \textit{proficio}, to make headway, advance, or progress, demonstrates the progressive nature of the deification of 'our human'. \textit{Ad creatoris imaginem reformabimur}, continues to illuminate Hilary’s position as, used here in the context of \textit{in hominis nostris} . . . \textit{proficiemus}, could actually be translated as toward the image of the Creator. There is clearly an emphasis on movement and progress for Christ’s humanity, and therefore all humanity.

\textsuperscript{310} Ibid. 12.28, SC 462:424.
This restoration of the image is granted to humanity in the bodily revelation of the Son—in the human flesh of Christ, so that 'à travers l'incarnation du Christ nous somme renvoyées au Père, comme le miroir renvoie au visage dont il réfléchit l'image'.

Christ is the image in his incarnation 'parce que c'est vraiment dans son incarnation que le visage du Père se manifest', and through humanity's 'putting on' of Christ, its admixtionem with the verbi caro, it is recreated in the image of God. Christ's revelation, therefore, as the 'living image' not only reveals the mystery of God but also true humanity to itself. Because Christ has taken hominem nostrī, his life reveals not only the divine, but is the lived expression of the fullness of humanity. Christ is where we contemplate at once both God and ourselves. And through the bodily union of our humanity with God in Christ, the subjection of the forma servi to the forma Dei is a promotion of our nature, and a recreation in the image of God.

In Chapter 2 we saw that for Hilary 'advancing in perpetual increase' is the natural condition of humanity, and that 'increase is according to nature, and decrease is against nature (cui et incrementum secundum naturam est et imminutio contra naturam est)'. This is due to the origin of humanity. From Mat. forward this is a continual thread throughout Hilary's writings. He writes at Mat. 26.3, "Those things which are created, that is, brought about from nothing (de nihilo), have within themselves the necessity of non-being (ut non sint), for they are derived from eternity, containing within themselves the power to

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311 Le Guillou, 'Hilaire', 49. This reality is directly connected to the discussion of the anagogical nature of Christ's humanity, leading the human knower beyond itself to the triune God seen in chapter four of this thesis. Le Guillou, ibid., 49, notes, 'Telle est le vie chrétienne, une assimilation au Dieu vivant à travers une contemplation du Christ incarné'.

312 See ibid., 51.

313 Trin. 9.4, SC 462:20.
endure’. Existing with a natural 'ut non sint', as a conditional being in relation to an origin who is perfect and incapable of progress, makes humanity necessarily mutable, but not only that, it makes humanity mutable in a particular direction. To be a human is for Hilary to be hopefully mutable. The fragility, mutability and finitude of humanity is not a barrier, something to be overcome or to be rid of: it is a hopeful mutability, a potentiality which is directly dependent upon infinite perfection. This perfect origin is the cause of hope. In the same way we have seen that God's infinity, and humanity's infinite distinction from that infinite God, functions positively for Hilary—that humanity might infinitely progress in the knowledge and life of God—so too does God's immutability, perfection, simplicity, and impassibility function not to distance God from humanity or divorce him from human life and concerns, but to be the source of human hope. Our existence is our gain and profit, not God's, he argues, and it is gain because of the particular direction of our mutability. For Hilary, the infinite, simple, impassible divinity as the origin of human life perpetuates a sustained movement of that life toward its fulfillment.

We have seen in previous chapters that for Hilary it is absolutely essential that humanity is created for life and not death, for increase and not decrease. Here we observe that this life and progression, this human potentiality, is fulfilled in the life of Jesus. That this sense of progression is natural to the human condition, not only means Christ assumed it, but it means that progress, change, and growth, are not a result of sin, of a humanity animae infirmis admixtionem. Humanity, in God's original created intention, is meant for this perpetual increase. If Christ is the true human, that humanity as originally intended, then his actual lived life, his

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314 Mat. 26:3, SC 258:196.

315 See Psal. 2.14-15; Trin. 11.49; 2.24-25.
process of human experience, including each and every one of his human experiences, and not just a metaphysical union to a 'human nature' abstractly understood, is critical, even essential, for the carrying out of his salvific functions.

This acknowledges Hilary's submission of anthropology to christology. It prevents us from communicating Hilary's understanding of Christ's humanity as a truer version of humanity or a truer example of some abstract vision or ideal of human nature. He does not provide a generalised definition of what it is to be human, something that is conventional and can be repeated elsewhere; there is the irreducible singularity of the actual lived life of Christ which illuminates our own humanity, and lack thereof, based not on any ideal of a truer human example but simply, the true human. And this makes human salvation not an escape from genuine human existence, but a coming into that true humanity which it is destined for.

In Hilary's discussion of the actual lived life of Christ, of his suffering and human experience, far from a weakened understanding of Christ's humanity, offering an illusory or at best vague anthropological musing, we are given a clear anthropological vision through Christ's lived reality. Hilary's description of this lived reality is the point where his anthropological vision, his continual exploration into divine-human relations from within his trinitarian argumentation, 'becomes flesh'. The divine-human relation discussed throughout the previous chapters born out of polemical and constructive arguments concerning eternal generation, divine infinity, and divine unity are expressly lived out in the world through the incarnate life of Christ. Here Hilary's trinitarian anthropology is both expressed and lived out in a humane manner, appropriate to

316 As Beckwith, 'Suffering', 87, assumes.

317 See discussion of 'normative' humanity at n304.
the finite restrictions of human knowing and existing which his trinitarian theology has already deemed necessary. As the 'image of the invisible God', the Son not only reveals divinity to humanity, but humanity to itself. This humanely given divine condescension exposes humanity not only to its current condition of hopeful mutability, but also to its fulfilled potentiality.

Conclusion

We saw above that while Hilary seems at first to acknowledge the classic view that only the soul images God, his argument moves beyond this to include the body. It is in his argument of Christ as the fulfillment of human potentiality that this is seen as effectuated as an anthropological reality. This is because Christ is not only the origin but the destiny of humanity in the image of God, and the destiny of humanity is as definitive of the imago Dei as its original creation is. For Hilary, humanity is necessarily body and soul inseparably united, not soul alone. While there is a double creation of the body and soul, their inseparable union results in a common destiny. This common destiny, without Christ, would be destruction, but in Christ this is reversed, so that the soul (the spiritual creation created directly by God) is not brought down through union with the body (the corporeal creation coming from dust) but the body takes on the destiny of the human soul now united to the Word. Rondeau speaks of a ‘vision évolutif’ of

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318 See, for example, Psal. 129.5-6; Myst. 2.13; Psal. 118.10.6-7; Wild, Divinization 145-47; For other patristic examples see discussion of Ayres, Nicaea, 326, who references Augustine, Conf. 13.32.7; Gregory of Nyssa, Hom. Opif. 5; Gregory Nazianzen, Or. 38.11; Ephrem, HdF 11; and Athanasius, Inc. 3 and 11, but for Athanasius the human being is in the image of God only insofar as he or she shares in the Logos, the true image, the human soul itself does not image God. See also discussion in this chapter above.

319 See Gilles Pelland, 'Le «Subjectio» du Christ chez saint Hilaire', Greg. 64 (1983), 431: 'Le destin commun de l’âme et du corps, en effet, qui, sans le Christ, eut été une chute, est maintenant inversé. L’œuvre du sauveur consiste à opérer en nous ultimement une spiritualisation de l’homme extérieur lui-même'.
humanity in Hilary, which is composed of two dissonant elements from the start, but the unique destiny of both are united.320 There is a change in the mode of being without a change of being in the body: the human 'body of misery destined to corruption' is given a new constitution, not ceasing to be flesh, but made new through union with the verbi caro. It is a 'trans-formation qui sera en même temps une con-formation'.321 The whole human being, body and soul, shares in the divine life through a glorification of the body: through concorporeality with Christ.

We see, therefore, how Hilary’s view of the body as necessary to redemption rather than a hindrance to it operates. It is actually in and with the body, communicating its 'light' to the body, that the soul 'will shine'.322 By the soul being brought down with the body in the fall, in the descent of humanity 'destined to corruption', it is made 'terrestrial' and fallen as the body, but this is only the first step in a double movement toward ascent. Christ, as we have seen, unlike us, did not have a soul destined to corruption through a sharing in fallen flesh; as the origin of both his soul and body (and not just soul as other humans) were directly from God (thus himself), the common destiny of his body and soul (and that of others through union with him) is not corruption but celestial perfection. Through union with him homo nostrum shares in his glorified state, rather than fulfilling our potential destiny of corruption.

It is here that we see the discussion of the language of the image, including both body and soul, and that of Christ's humanity and our destiny in it come

321 Pelland, 'Subjectio', 432. Pelland also shows here that this idea again shows a borrowing from Stoicism.
322 Rondeau, 'Remarques', 205: 'Mais Hilaire est au contraire très ferme sur l'idée que c'est dans le corps, avec le corps, en communiquant au corps sa lumière que l'âme finalement brillera'.
together as a coherent whole. Assumed into his body, our body and soul have their common destiny in the infinite perfection of God, and not in separation from him. In Christ's literal body, we cease to have a body of sin which is contrary to the destiny of our celestial soul, so that embodiedness, and particularly, Christ's embodiedness, is the only route to salvation, to consummation in the divine image.

This anthropological vision of Hilary is made most clear in the closing of Book 11 of *Trin.* (11.49) where God is said to be 'all in all'. Here Hilary says humanity is *consummatur itaque homo imago Dei.* It is 'to be made in conformity to the glory of the body of God' (*conformes efficiendi gloriae corporis Dei*). In this consummation, humans, being made full in Christ, are to be made full 'in themselves' (*in ipsis*), so that, they are no longer made *after* or *according to* the image of God, but are made to *be* God's very image.

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324 Ibid. 9.8, SC 462:28.

CHAPTER FIVE

Divine Humanity: The glorification of Christ and the perfection of human potentiality

Introduction

Hilary’s overall anthropological vision, the movement of human potentiality towards its final destiny in divine perfection—from imaging *in eo* to *in ipsis*, cannot be fully understood without an exploration of his view of Christ’s glorification which is founded upon his intertextual reading of John 17.1-6, 1 Corinthians 15.21-28, and Philippians 3.21, understood within his overarching Philippians 2 christological framework. John 17.1-6, in which Christ requests glory from the Father, and 1 Corinthians 15.21-28, in which Christ is said to be subjected to the Father, are primary sources for the central questions driving fourth-century controversies. John 17 is particularly pertinent to Homoian thought, and Marcellus of Ancyra’s use of 1 Corinthians 15 heightened its already critical place in trinitarian discourse. Hilary reads both passages, of course, to address his polemical context, but his interpretations do not only work to thwart his opponents, they construct an eschatological vision for humanity which is the culmination of his development of a trinitarian anthropology seen throughout this
thesis. Here the human destiny presented in the previous chapter comes to fruition.

The double adsumptio: transforming the language of incarnation

In the previous chapter Hilary’s, quite literal, understanding of Christ’s humanity, indeed, ‘body’, as the location of this human destiny was introduced: a renewed humanity is one ‘concoporeal’ with Christ.\(^1\) Hilary’s understanding of humanity’s bodily union with Christ is much discussed in Hilary scholarship, particularly regarding its connection with Hilary’s teaching of a universal assumption of all humanity in the incarnation.\(^2\) Doignon’s insightful assessment of Hilary’s use of the terms *adsumo* and *adsumptio* is a particularly expedient way to enter this discussion.

Doignon notes that the use of *incarnari/incarnatio* is a rather late development, and has its inception at least with Hilary,\(^3\) if not with Marius Victorinus.\(^4\) A paraphrase such as *inuere corpus, carnem,* or *hominem,* found in several of Paul’s texts (in particular 1 Cor. 15.53) was widely used to refer to the incarnation.\(^5\) *Adsumere* and *adsumptio* make a slight appearance in Novatian,\(^6\)

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\(^1\) *C. Const.* 11, SC 334:190: ‘concorporatos Christo’; see also *Psal.* 91.9.


\(^3\) See *Trin.* 2.33 and 3.22.

\(^4\) *Adv. Ar.* 1.46, 47, 53, 68.

\(^5\) See Tertullian, *Carn. Chr.* 4, 6, 7, 16; Cyprian, *De idolorum vanitate* 11, 14; Arnobius *Adv. gent.* 1); and Lactantius *Inst.* 4.24.

and Tertullian knew *sumere carnem*,\(^7\) or *corpus*,\(^8\) and used *adsumere* at *De carne Christi* 3.\(^9\) Hilary follows on from this (formerly rare) usage, and Doignon counts 163 cases where *adsumere*, and 57 where *adsumptio* enter into the paraphrases expressing the incarnation.\(^10\)

In the development of Hilary’s usage from his *Mat.* to *Trin.* to *Psal.* and *Myst.*, *adsumo corpus* and *carnem est* are in relative decline and *adsumo hominem*/ *adsumptus homo* steadily increases. *Adsumere hominem* was used elsewhere in the Christian tradition, namely by Victorinus\(^11\) and the Greek equivalent (*analambanein ton anthropon*) in Eustathius of Antioch\(^12\) and Eusebius of Caesarea.\(^13\) And further, *homo* in the New Testament and patristic tradition is typically a synonym of *caro*.\(^14\) But in Hilary’s vocabulary, *adsumere hominem*/ *adsumptio hominis* ‘fait mieux ressortir qu’aucune autre locution l’insondable disproportion des deux natures que le Verbe unit dans son Incarnation’.\(^15\) This is principally because Hilary has taken vocabulary that is reserved in previous tradition for Christ’s ascension and applied it to his incarnation.\(^16\)

\[\text{dans l’Incarnation, l’homme est «assumé» par le Christ; dans la Résurrection — Ascension, le Christ est «assumé» par le Père: in formam Dei ADSVMPTIO formae seruillis ADSVMITVR (De Trinit. IX, 41); et du même coup l’homme «assumé» par le Christ est «assumé» par le Père, qui «assume» le Christ: nos}\]

\(^7\) *Carn. Chr.* 6, 14, 18.

\(^8\) Ibid. 6.

\(^9\) Ibid. 3. See Jean Doignon, “*Adsumo*” et “*Adsumptio*”: comme expressions du mystère de l’Incarnation chez Hilaire de Poitiers’, *Archivum Latinitatis Medii Aevi* 23 (1953), 127.


\(^11\) *Adv. Ar.* 3.3.

\(^12\) *Frag.* PG 18:679.

\(^13\) *Marcell.* 2.3.

\(^14\) Doignon, ‘Adsumo’, 133.

\(^15\) Ibid.

\(^16\) Ibid.
There is thus a double assumption involved in the incarnate life of Christ. The resurrection is for Hilary a second birth, so that as Christ is born in humanity in the incarnation he is born in that humanity in the glory of the Father in resurrection. Further, particularly in relation to 1 Timothy 3.16 (‘Great indeed, we confess, is the mystery of piety: He was manifested in the flesh, vindicated in the Spirit, seen by angels, preached among the nations, believed on in the world, taken up in glory (adsumptum est in gloria)) adsumptum est is applied not only to incarnation but also ascension, with the passion, resurrection and ascension seen together as one progressive movement. So Doignon concludes: ‘L’Incarnation et l’Ascension sont donc dans le prolongement l’une de l’autre, et l’unité de ces mystères est très heureusement rendue chez HILAIRE par l’emploi de adsumo’.

For Hilary, the dispensatio of the Son is framed by incarnation and ascension/glorification so that the adsumptio into glory is simply the culmination of Christ’s adsumptio of humanity.

Hilary’s use of ‘assumption’ language for both the ascension and the incarnation further demonstrates the progressive nature of the fulfillment of human destiny. Humanity is assumed into union with Christ initially in the incarnation, but this is carried through to a further assumption of Christ into the glory of the Father. Humanity is glorified by being carried through the entirety of Christ’s incarnate existence.

The break with traditional incarnation language, Scully argues, reflects the novelty of Hilary’s thought. Hilary’s appropriation of adsumere language, as

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17 Ibid., 134.
18 Ibid.
opposed to *induere*, to speak of the incarnation demonstrates how his idea of the incarnation is different from that of his predecessors and contemporaries.\(^\text{19}\) This is more than Christ clothing himself with humanity, what *induere* suggests, for this image leaves humanity something external to Christ. For Hilary, Christ takes humanity into himself.\(^\text{20}\) Hilary often speaks of Christ’s ‘assumption’ of humanity as one of ‘all humanity’ or ‘all flesh’.\(^\text{21}\) For Hilary, in the assumption of one particular human, all humanity is assumed. Indeed, Christ assumes *corpus uniuersi humani generis*.\(^\text{22}\)

*Corpus uniuersi humani generis: Christ as the meeting place of God and humanity*

This idea of humanity being ‘assumed’ by Christ, and further into the divine life in Christ, begs the question of who or what is being assumed. Is humanity *tout court* assumed in the one person of Christ? Is this a generic understanding of humanity, or does it refer to each individual human being? This is a central question in Hilary scholarship, and while universal assumption in Hilary is not the focus of this chapter, a brief introduction to the discussion will assist my argument here. It is unnecessary to trace the history of scholarship on this issue,\(^\text{23}\) which is often not directly related to Hilary at all, but a critique of Hilary by associating him with Greek Christian ‘Platonic’ thinking. Scully has lucidly

\(^{19}\) Scully, ‘Soteriology’, 174.

\(^{20}\) Ibid., 175.


\(^{22}\) *Trin.* 2.24, SC 443:314. Pettorelli, ‘Thème’, 230, notes that there are three uses of the expression ‘universitas generis humani’ in all Latin literature outside of Hilary (*Cic. De nat. deor.* 2.164; *Plin. Nat.* 7.6; *Salv. Gub.* 3.57) but there are at least a dozen uses of the phrase or its equivalent ‘universitas nostra’ in Hilary (see Pettorelli, ibid., 230n61).

\(^{23}\) See n2 above for summary of scholarship.
negotiated the rough terrain of misreadings of Hilary’s view of a universal assumption of all humanity in the incarnation, and offers the most extensive study available on the issue, at least as pertaining to *Psal.*

She further proves that the notion that Hilary’s idea of universal assumption is not to be associated with the supposed Greek physicalist doctrine, which was so vehemently rebuked by nineteenth-century protestant critics like Ritschl, Herrmann and Harnack is erroneous. The critique is that several Greek theologians of early Christianity taught a ‘theory of universal incarnation that views redemption as an automatic physical transformation, resulting from Christ’s assumption and redemption of the general nature of the human race’ with the implication that this is ‘heterodoxy’, or at least a diminished version of a more pristine primitive Christianity due to Platonic influence.

In *Psal.* in particular Hilary is quite clear that Christ does not assume a generalized human nature in the incarnation, but a ‘nature which includes the multiplicity of humanity’. There is therefore no Platonic idea of Christ assuming a generic humanity in Hilary’s model of universal assumption. Hilary’s view actually functions as a clear rejection of the assumed correlation between Platonic philosophy and this ‘physicalist’ or mystical model of redemption, as Scully has pointed out. While scholars have often taken either a position of Hilary as a

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26 Wilhelm Herrmann, *Gregorii Nysseni sententiae de salute adipiscenda* (Halle, 1875), 27-37.


28 E.g., Ibid., 295-96. Referenced in Scully, ‘Soteriology’, 162. For a contrary example, see Beeley, *Gregory*, 147, who states that Gregory’s Greek model of universal assumption is not automatic.


‘Greek’ ‘Platonic’ thinker on this issue, or denied that Hilary actually held a position of universal assumption in order to shield him from such a Platonized conception, his idea of the universal assumption of all humanity in Christ actually avoids the (modernly constructed) dichotomy entirely. Pettorelli, Burns, and Scully have demonstrated that Hilary’s teaching has its roots in pre-Nicene Latin theology and Latin Stoic philosophy.

Rather than Platonism, Hilary’s view of Christ containing all humanity in himself in the incarnation is supported by ideas and terminology present in his Latin Stoic heritage. Scully writes, ‘Christ’s assumption of all humanity depends, for Hilary, on the prior unity of the human race such that it can be assumed, as one entity, into Christ’. To account for this prior unity of humanity Hilary utilises the Stoic term *uniuersitas*. While this is particularly significant to Hilary’s discussion in *Psal.*, it is present from his *Mat.* and is a foundational concept to divine-human relations in *Trîn.* At *Trîn.* 11.16 He argues that Christ ‘contains in himself the nature of us all (*uniuersitatis nostrae . . . naturam*) by the assumption

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33 See Scully’s discussion, ‘Soteriology’, 164-69, of Latin syncretized Platonism, which transformed the Platonic understanding of ‘Form’, meaning that even if Hilary was influenced by ‘Platonism’, the type of Platonic thought which would have influenced him would not yield to a generic assumption of human ‘Form’ anyway. But, even so, Hilary’s philosophical source is Stoic (though these lines cannot always be definitively drawn in late antiquity as there was much overlap).

34 See Burns, *Christology*, 103-08; *Model*, 87-100; Scully, ‘Soteriology’, 169-72; and Pettorelli, ‘Thème’, 213-33, for the Latin philosophical heritage of Hilary’s view of Christ’s universal assumption.


36 See *Mat.* 4.12, SC 254:130.
of the flesh’. For the Stoics, this *uniuersitas* is the ‘universal city’, the home of not only humanity, but, as Cicero explained, a ‘home or city of gods and people’. Hilary borrows this Stoic understanding of *uniuersitas* by making the body of Christ the Stoic’s ‘universal city’. The ‘city’ metaphor thus allows Hilary not only to see all of humanity as a united, single ‘society’ able to be assumed by Christ, but also as the ‘meeting place of God and men’. Further, this ‘universal city’ is seen as the literal body of Christ. At *Trin.* 2.24 Hilary writes of Christ’s assumption of humanity as an assumption of *uniuersi generis humani corpus* and in this bodily assumption, in the *admixtio* of the divine and human, the *naturam uniuersitatis nostrae* becomes a *societatem sanctificatum in eo*. Illustrating precisely how Hilary’s mystical soteriology is not an assumption of a generic humanity, Scully adds that Hilary does not merely adopt the Stoic conception of unity, but goes beyond Stoicism. Whereas the Stoics saw the members of the

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37 *Trin.* 11.16, SC 462:322. See Scully, ‘Soteriology’, 180-184 for a brief summary on the assumption of humanity by Christ in *Trin.* The language of *similitudo* to describe the relationship of Christ’s humanity to other humans in *Trin.* can at first glance be seen to show distinction, rather than unity. But Hilary transforms the use of *similitudo*, both in trinitarian and christological discussions. He argues that this language of ‘likeness’ is used of the Father and the Son to demonstrate unity and equality (e.g., *Trin.* 1.29; cf. 3.23 and 7.18 for ‘similar’ and ‘equal’ power of Father and Son; See Scully, ‘Soteriology’, 180-81; Burns, *Model*, 141; see Weedman, *Trinitarian*, 163-73, for the Homoiousian influence on Hilary in this regard). He speaks of Christ’s humanity being ‘similar’ to that of others, particularly in Book 10 (see Weedman, ibid., 163-73, and his ‘Martyrdom’, 24-26). But, as we have seen in the last chapter, this was not to separate Christ from our humanity, but indeed makes him the truest humanity of all.


40 See *Trin.* 9.13. See Burns, *Christology*, 102-108 for this discussion in Hilary’s *Mat.*, and for its background both in secular writings, as seen in my discussion here, and also how this secular usage was absorbed also in Hilary’s theological tradition. There is no precedent in Hilary’s Latin theological tradition for his full doctrine of universal assumption in Christ, but the Stoic language of *uniuersitas, civitas,* and *corpus,* in reference to the whole human race had been appropriated in Latin Christian tradition (e.g., Cyprian, *De catholicae ecclesiae unitate* 23; Lactantius inst. 7.24.6; *epitome* 67; Tertullian *Adv. Marc.* 3.23; See Burns, ibid., 104-6).

41 Scully, ‘Soteriology’, 171.


43 *Trin.* 2.24, SC 443:314.
universal city to be united as something like a body, ‘Hilary now takes all abstraction out of the scenario. The members of this city are not like a body, they are a body; they are the concrete body of a particular person Jesus Christ’.\textsuperscript{44} With Hilary, not only is this idea not a generalized conception, it is becoming more particularistic.

At Psal. 13.1, Hilary lays the ground work for this initial universal city which Christ assumes. The city is comprehensive and universal, but it is united in ‘contagion’: every inhabitant is conflicted with disease.\textsuperscript{45} Burns notes similarities in Hilary’s use of the city metaphor and ‘the city in plague’ at the end of Lucretius’s \textit{De Rerum Natura}.\textsuperscript{46} Lucretius seems to have presented an extremely pessimistic view of the human condition based upon Thucydides’ treatment of the plague of Athens in the \textit{Historiae} (2.47-52). The difference between Hilary and Lucretius is that Hilary looks to the divine for a cure.\textsuperscript{47} To diagnose this disease of the \textit{societes}, Hilary turns to the biblical figure of Adam. So again we see that this is not a Platonic or generalist theory which inspires Hilary’s view of humanity’s assumption in Christ, it is particularist.\textsuperscript{48} The Adam protology is used in \textit{Psal.} as a diagnosis of the humanity \textit{animae infirmis admixtionem} in \textit{Trin.} discussed in the previous chapter. Human unity in Adam’s sin results in \textit{humilitas, corruptio},

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{44} Scully, ‘Soteriology’, 172. Hilary’s use of ‘city’ language is greatly elaborated upon in \textit{Psal.} The idea of a universal assumption of all humanity, and the Stoic category of \textit{uniuersitas}, however, is present throughout his writings, and provides important constructive building blocks for his view of the glorification of humanity.
\item \textsuperscript{45} Burns, \textit{Model}, 102-103. See ibid., 103n4, for Augustine’s use of Hilary’s discussion to support his view of original sin in \textit{c. Iul.} 2.8.
\item \textsuperscript{46} \textit{De rer. nat.} 6.1138-1251.
\item \textsuperscript{47} Burns, \textit{Model}, 104.
\item \textsuperscript{48} See Sculy, ‘Soteriology’, 194n102 for references showing a tradition of early Christian views of all humanity being united in Adam’s fall, from Latin and Greek sources, which argue from the figure of Adam and are not dependent upon Platonic universals.
\end{itemize}
infirmitas, and mors,\textsuperscript{49} and, as we have seen in the previous chapter, the lived life of Christ is the salvific destiny of that humanity. The Adam-Christ parallel in Psal. provides a framework in which the redemptive lived experience of Christ is seen to universally transform humanity. The infirmitas humanae is assumed in divinam naturam.\textsuperscript{50} Scully notes that Hilary enlarges the Adam-Christ parallel to our bodies, which were first condemned under the curse of Adam, but are conformed to Christ’s innocence: ‘Hilary consistently uses the parallel between Adam and Christ to transform the unity of humanity from the unity of Adam’s sin into a definitive unity in Christ’s good’.\textsuperscript{51}

In this transformation of the uniuersi generis humani corpus, humanity in Christ is a unity ‘by the society of our nature in the communion of the immortal God’.\textsuperscript{52} Thus, ‘L’homme se découvre associé à la destinée même du Christ’.\textsuperscript{53} This is because our humanity becomes Christ’s. Christ assumes our very humanity so that the perfection of human destiny is a concorporeal conforming to Christ himself.\textsuperscript{54} It is not only a conformation to holiness but ‘to him who alone is holy’,\textsuperscript{55} and this is a unity ‘in the immortal communion of God’ because Christ himself is that divine unity lived in human existence. Christ is himself what it looks like for the divine life to be lived out in the human condition, and what it looks like for

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., 189. See Trin. 6.25, SC 448:218: adsumptionem corporae humilitatis; Trin. 3.16, SC 443:364: ut . . . carnis corruptio absorberetur; Psal. 9.4, SC 515:304: in divinam naturam humanae adsumptionis absorbeatur infirmitas.

\textsuperscript{50} Psal. 9.4, SC 515:304. This passage is an interpretation of 1 Corinthians 15.22-28, and in reference to the finis, when God becomes Omnia in omnibus (1 Cor 15.28), discussed in detail below.

\textsuperscript{51} Scully, ‘Soteriology’, 190.

\textsuperscript{52} Trin. 9.13, SC 462:40: naturae nostrae societate in communione diuinae immortalitatis unita.

\textsuperscript{53} Dupont-Fauville, Hilaire, 175.

\textsuperscript{54} Pettorelli, ‘Thème’, 222.

\textsuperscript{55} Dupont-Fauville, Hilaire, 175.
\end{footnotes}
that human condition to be united to the divine. For Hilary, Christ exists himself as the triune life lived in human terms.\textsuperscript{56}

*Exchange of glory: John 17.1-6*

The impact of Hilary’s view of Christ’s universal assumption, of humanity being ‘concorporeal’ with Christ, is seen vividly in his polemical engagement with Homoian readings of Jesus’s prayer in John 17.1-6, which leads into Hilary’s reading of the effectual outworking of Christ’s prayer in 1 Corinthians 15.21-28. In John 17 Jesus prays:

Father, the hour has come, glorify your Son so that your Son may glorify you, just as you have given him power over all flesh, so that he might give eternal life to all that you gave him. This is eternal life: that they know you, the only true God, and the one you sent, Jesus Christ. I glorified you on the earth by accomplishing the work that you gave me to do. So now glorify me, Father, with yourself, with the glory that I had with you before the world existed. I have manifested your name to the people whom you gave to me.\textsuperscript{57}

In these words, Hilary contends, Christ exposes his entire work and ministry, ‘while strengthening the truth of the faith against every inspiration of the devil’s deceitfulness’.\textsuperscript{58} Homoians argued that Christ’s request for glory indicates a want or need in Christ, that he is lacking something that he must request from the Father and therefore is not true God as the Father is.\textsuperscript{59} Hilary contends that the

\textsuperscript{56} For a discussion of this in Hilary, and its implications for contemporary trinitarian thought, see my ‘Eucharistic Priority’.

\textsuperscript{57} John 17.1-6 as quoted by Hilary at *Trin.* 3.9, SC 443:350.


\textsuperscript{59} The Homoian argument is clear throughout Hilary’s polemic against it in *Trin.* 3. Kopecek, *Neo-Arians*, 296-97, comments that John 17.3 is ‘the only absolutely identifiable quotation from scripture in the entire Syntagmation’, demonstrating the significance of the passage in Heteroousian use as well. John 17.3 remains a heavily used Homoian polemical text also in later Homoian writing. See *Scol. Aquil.* 24 (304V), 66 (399V), 87 (346V); *Serm. Ar.* 1.1; *Conel. Max.* 15.15. References in Ayres, *Augustine*, 100n13.
idea of want in Christ is actually forbidden in the passage, as the request for glory is completed by, ‘that the Son may glorify you’: ‘Therefore the Son is not weak, who, when he is glorified, will make a return, an exchange of that very glory’. If a receiving of glory demonstrates a lack in the receiver, than one must also say that the Father is in want as he also receives glory from the Son, which the Homoians could never admit. Hilary argues,

The prayer for glory to be given and returned neither takes anything away from the Father nor weakens the Son, but shows the same power of divinity in both (*eandem diuinitatis ostendit in utroque virtutem*) when the Son prays to the Father to be glorified and the Father does not reject as unworthy glorification by the Son. These things show a unity of power in the Father and the Son by an exchange of glory (*vicissitudinem . . . clarificationis*) given and returned.61

That there is an ‘exchange of glory’ prohibits Christ’s request for glory from implying any diminution or need, indeed, quite the opposite, for Hilary, it demonstrates equality in the glory and power of the Father. This is further illustrated by Hilary in that Christ is glorified at the 'hour' of his passion, both as the 'rocks and stones' of the tomb could not contain his body, and as the Centurion professes Christ to be God's Son.62 The request does not allow for subordination as Christ is glorified in this very point of humiliation.63 This exchange of glory in the passage is a particularly easy polemical offer to the Homoian argument, but, as Pelland notes, ‘Hilaire va très au-delà de ce niveau

60 Ibid., 3.12, SC 443:356: *Non ergo Filius est infirmus, vicem clarificationis ipse cum clarificandus sit redditurus*.

61 Ibid.

62 Ibid., 3.10.

63 This makes Newlands’ statement, *Hilary*, 126, that in Hilary the ‘significance of the cross is gone and is characteristically replaced by the motif of glorification’ virtually nonsensical. The cross is itself a central point of glorification for Hilary.
polemique; il sera, du reste, le seul de son temps à offrir une explication satisfaisante de l’ensemble de cette péricope difficile [of Jn 17].

John 17.2-3 give Hilary grounds for how the Son glorifies the Father in return. The Father is thus glorified through the Son by being made known to humanity: ‘And this was the glory, that the Son received from him: power over all flesh, for he himself was made flesh, that eternal life was to be returned to the perishable and corporeal, ones subject to death’. Hilary uses this idea of the ‘Sender’ and the ‘Sent’ to elaborate his polemical argument for divine equality of the Father and the Son through the exchange of glory in John 17. That the acknowledgement of the Son is necessary for salvation demonstrates his equal divinity with the Father. The ‘Sender’ and ‘Sent’ of John 17 thus indicate the ‘Begetter’ and ‘Begotten’ and fully associate the Son in the Godhead. In John 17.2-3 ‘The faith is instructed to piously confess Begetter and Begotten’.

This clarifies Christ’s words in the johannine passage, ‘I glorified you above the earth by accomplishing the work that you gave me to do’ as not a statement of subordination but rather a statement of equality with his Father. It is important for Hilary that this work is carried out from within the reality of those who are ‘perishable and corporeal’. In Trin. 3.15, in the midst of his discussion of the exchange of glory, Hilary emphasises: ‘The Son of God is seen as human; but God emerges in his human actions (Deus in operibus hominis existit)’, and this has grand implications for humanity: ‘The Son of God is crucified; but on the cross

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64 Pelland, ‘Subjectio’, 433.
65 Trin. 3.13, SC 443:358.
66 Trin. 3.14-15.
67 Ibid. 3.14.
68 Ibid. 3.14, SC 443:360: ad gignentis et geniti confessionem fides religionis instruitur.
God conquers human death. Christ, the Son of God, dies; but all flesh is made alive in Christ (omnis caro uiuificatur in Christo). The Son of God is in hell, but humanity is carried back to heaven’. Colossians 2.9, in Christ ‘all the fullness of divinity dwells bodily’, governs this discussion in Hilary, and his single subject Christology and its relationship to revelation and human knowledge of God lead to significant anthropological conclusions in his reading of Christ’s prayer in John 17.

The Son glorifies the Father through his works in the world but Hilary still must address how it is that the Son is glorified, and indeed, with the glory that he had with the Father before the world was, when Hilary has made clear that the Son has lost nothing of his divinity in the incarnation. At Trin. 3.16, Hilary argues that the Son still possessed the ‘fullness’ of the Godhead in the incarnation as he did prior to it, but ‘the Word was made flesh’, and

Therefore, since the Son is the Word, and the Word was made flesh, and the Word is God, and was in the beginning with God, and the Word was Son before the arrangement of the world, the Son, now made flesh, prays that this flesh might begin to be to the Father as the Word (ut hoc Patri caro inciperet esse quod uerbum); that what was of time, might receive the splendour of the glory which is without time; that the corruption of the flesh might be swallowed up, transformed into the power of God and the incorruptibility of the Spirit.

The Son’s request for glory was thus for his assumed humanity. It is a prayer that the very flesh, ‘pierced and recognized on account of the cross’ would be transfigured into the divine life. This flesh, here in 3.16, is specifically the flesh of Christ himself. Hilary emphasizes that this request is for that flesh bearing the

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69 Ibid. 3.15, SC 443:360-62.

70 Beckwith, Hilary, 136.

71 Trin. 3.16, SC 443:364. The use of the johannine prologue in this discussion helps to bring Hilary’s trinitarian anthropology full circle, as the prologue was at the foundation of Hilary’s discussion (see Chapter 1 of this thesis). The capitalised ‘Spirit’ here is simply a following of the critical edition of the Latin text.

72 Ibid., 366.
marks of the cross, the glory of which was shown in transfiguration on the
mountain, which ascended to heaven and sat at the right hand of God, where he
was seen by Peter and Stephen. Burns pushes this point of the singular reference
to Christ’s flesh alone here, and there is clearly in Book 3 still a focus on glory as
an outward, visible appearance and eschatological reigning of Christ. Weedman
notes that at this point in the discussion Hilary is still following his Latin
background (before fully embracing his christological framework of Philippians 2
developed during his exile). Novatian claims that the Son’s flesh receives glory
after the ascension, when he is ‘manifestly proved to be God’ (Deus
manifestissime comprobatur). Hilary is following similar lines in Book 3, where
‘glory’ is something similar to ‘honour’, and is external and visible in the Son. This is ultimately a visible demonstration of Christ’s divinity.

Yet, even at this point in Trin., Burns’s assessment is too strong. As Burns’s
erudite study of christology in Mat. itself demonstrates, Hilary had already
articulated, if in inchoate form, the view of Christ’s adsumptio which included all
humanity within it. Further, the reference to the transfiguration in this passage
corresponds to Hilary’s use of the transfiguration in the midst of his discussion of
1 Corinthians 15 and the glorification of Christ’s flesh at Trin. 11.37 and 38, and
there it directly associates humanity in this eschatological transfiguration
anticipated by Christ on the Mount. When Hilary interprets John 17 in Trin. 9,
the end of this glorification of Christ’s humanity is directly stated: ‘For this was

73 Ibid.
74 Burns, ‘Confrontation’, 296.
75 Trin. 13, CCSL 4:57, referenced in Weedman, Trinitarian, 134.
76 Weedman, Trinitarian, 134.
77 Burns, Christology, 97-112.
78 Trin. 11.37-38, SC 462:358-60.
being acquired by humanity: to be God’. A key difference in the two discussions is that Hilary’s Philippians 2 christological paradigm drives his exegesis of John 17 in Book 9, rather than only Colossians 2.9 as at Book 3, though Colossians 2.9 remains important. Hilary’s emphasis is certainly more directly on glorification of other human beings in Christ’s glorified body in Book 9, but being that Hilary himself does not wish to divide the discussions of the passage in Book 3 and Book 9 (he references his discussion ‘libro alio’) drawing a firm line between them seems to go against his intention.

Nevertheless, given the discussion at 9.28-42, ultimately Hilary certainly makes clear that due to Christ’s assumption of humanity into one ‘body’, concorporeal with him, his human progression cannot remain only a christological reality, but is necessarily also an anthropological one. 

_Trin._ 9.38 in particular eloquently makes this point, and Hilary's Philippians 2 christological dynamic is clearly framing the discussion:

But the incarnation (dispensationis) is summed up in this, that now the whole Son, human as well as God, by the indulgence of the Father’s will was in the unity of the Father’s nature, and he who remained in the power of the nature, would remain also in the origin of that nature (in genere naturae). For this was being acquired by humanity: to be God. . . . The Word made flesh would in its turn also be in the nature of God.

This statement is prefaced with an outline of Hilary’s forma Dei-forma serui christology. He continues in 9.39 to say that the forma servi was to remain in

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79 _Trin._ 9.38, SC 462:90: _Id enim homini adquirebatur, ut Deus esset._

80 Ibid. 9.31, SC 462:76.

81 Ibid. 9.38, SC 462:90. Again, the reader should note the johannine prologue connection.

82 Ibid., 88-90: _Sed dispensatione adsumptae carnis et per exinanientis se ex Dei forma oboedientiam, naturae sibi nouitatem Christus homo natus intulerat, non uirtutis naturaeque damno sed habitus demutatione. Exinanientis se igitur ex Dei forma, serui formam natus acceperat; sed hanc carnis adsumptionem ea cum qua sibi naturalis unitas erat Patris natura non senserat._
the *forma dei*. This glorification of the *forma servi* was testified to at the time when Judas went out to betray him by ‘a manifestation of joy’ (*gratulatione*), as ‘that most beautiful of his hope (*pulcherrima illa spei suae*)’. Again, it is clear that this glorification of humanity depends upon the unity of Christ’s person. Hilary’s reading of Christ’s prayer in John 17 thus moves from trinitarian polemic to a strong anthropological conclusion. It is about the Son being true divinity, and at the same time about humanity coming to be in some sense included in that divinity, so that the confession that ‘Jesus is Lord in the glory of God the Father’ (Phil 2.11) and that eternal life is in knowing both Sender and Sent is inseparable from Christ ‘even in the humiliation of his humanity’. Indeed, this reference again to Philippians 2 shows how closely the discussion is framed by Hilary’s *forma Dei-forma servi* dynamic. Thus, ‘incorporation within the body of Christ in successive stages is the dynamic source for the progressive transformation of the believer’. The glorification of humanity, its salvation, its progression to the perfection of potentiality, is fully and entirely seen within the confines of the lived life of Christ as it carries humanity to that final end in himself.

When Hilary discusses the ‘anointing’ of Christ in Hebrews 1.9 and the baptism of Christ this is again emphasized. The Son is God by birth, and has no need of anointing or promotion, but this anointing concerned ‘that which needed anointing to make progress (*profectu*) through the increase of the mystery (*per

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83 Ibid. 9.39, SC 462:94.
84 Ibid. 9.40, SC 462:94.
85 Ibid. 9.42, SC 463:102: *etiam sub hominis humilitate*.
87 At *Trin.* 9.55, SC 462:130, Hilary uses the parable of the Vine and the branches to illustrate the participation of all humanity in this glorification of Christ’s humanity.
incrementum sacramenti): it is that by the anointing homo noster was sanctified to exist as Christ’.\textsuperscript{88} The forma servi which he assumed in mysterio carnis is anointed, and this assumed humanity is ‘our human’.\textsuperscript{89} Further, in the narrative of Christ’s baptism, Christ, who is in need of nothing, is not perfected but he perfects the mysteries of human salvation, sanctifying humanity by assuming and washing it. And in the announcement of the Father regarding his Son at his baptism the sonship of humanity through adoption is also announced.\textsuperscript{90} In Christ’s assumption, all humanity is directly implicated in the human life of Christ. As he shares in all ‘the circumstances of our nature’, so does humanity share in his perfect nature. This Hilary calls the ‘mystery of great piety’ (1 Tim 3.16), and this discussion is directly connected with that of 1 Corinthians 15, which, as mentioned above, is central to Hilary’s argument for the perfection of human potentiality.\textsuperscript{91}

**Double adsumptio and human progress**

Paul Burns makes a compelling case for Hilary’s reading of the Psalms in the Tractatus as a model for the Christian life, moving through three stages from vir saecularis to baptismum to the final demutatio.\textsuperscript{92} He also rightly connects this movement with the life of Christ. This proiectio of humanity can only be comprehended as directly dependent upon christology. So that ‘incorporation into

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{88} Trin. 11.19, SC 462:332.
\item \textsuperscript{89} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{91} In Hilary’s discussion of this ‘mystery of great piety’ his important move of using ‘assumption’ language in reference to both the ascension and the incarnation makes a profound impact on his argumentation.
\item \textsuperscript{92} Burns, Model, 15.
\end{itemize}
the stages of “the body of Christ” is the means by which and within which the Christian hope is accomplished’.\textsuperscript{93} The foundation of the three stages of the perfection of human potentiality through bodily union in Christ, is the life of Christ itself, and is particularly governed by Philippians 2.6-11.\textsuperscript{94} This is firmly developed in \textit{Trin.} prior to \textit{Psal.}\textsuperscript{95} Hilary further offers a possible framework for the three stages of the Christian life in \textit{Trin.} 9.6 in three stages of the life of Christ: God before assuming humanity, God and human before death and resurrection, and \textit{totus homo totus Deus} after the resurrection-ascension-glorification.\textsuperscript{96} The movement of Christ in descent and ascent—the double \textit{adsumptio} of Christ—is the movement of human \textit{prouectio}.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{93} Ibid., 221. Burns writes of Hilary’s use of Philippians 3.20-21 (discussed in detail below) which is continually linked to Philippians 2.6-11 (see \textit{Psal.} 143.7): ‘For Hilary the Philippians treatment of the glorified Christ and the ultimate transformation of humans are intrinsically linked’ (see \textit{Psal.} 141.8).
\item \textsuperscript{94} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{95} Burns, ibid., 2, 224, argues that the structure for the progression of the Christian life in \textit{Psal.} is in fact the autobiographical narrative of \textit{Trin.} 1.
\item \textsuperscript{96} \textit{Trin.} 9.6, SC 462:24. While Burns does not make the connection explicit with Hilary’s three stages of Christ’s life in \textit{Trin.} 9.6, he does note that Hilary applies the progress of the life of Christ in Philippians 2.6-11 ‘to important features of the dynamic foundation for his three-stage model of Christian progress’ (\textit{Model}, 153), and states that the use of Philippians 2 in \textit{Trin.} is ‘anticipating perhaps the pattern in the \textit{Tractatus}’ (Ibid., 149n48).
Descourtieux perhaps hints at this with the reference to the three stages of the incarnation in \textit{Trin.} 9.6 at Hilary’s discussion in \textit{Psal.} 2.27, SC 515:260, in which he utilises the connections of John 17.1,5, 1 Corinthians 15.53-54 and Philippians 2.6 to discuss the resurrection and glorification of Christ’s humanity (261n5).
Ayres, \textit{Nicea}, 310-12, observes that the modeling of Christian progress on the life of Christ becomes a distinctive pro-Nicene trait, giving examples of Augustine and Gregory of Nyssa: ‘the basic structuring principles of the process of purification that pro-Nicenes think constitutes Christian life’ includes first ‘the action of the immediately present consubstantial Word drawing Christians towards God in union with him’ and second ‘this strategy begins to point towards the importance of rethinking one’s identity within the body of Christ’. Burns, \textit{Model}, 37n65 and 224, notes how Hilary anticipates these developments in Gregory and Augustine, and this theme generally throughout the 380s and 390s, and contends: ‘Now we can credit Hilary with his anticipation of the developments of the expanded pro-Nicene strategies that became prominent in these Greek and Latin writers of the next generation’ (224).
This christological focus has not been neglected in Hilary’s recent interpreters, and I think Burns’s discussion of this in \textit{Psal.} is insightful and correct. It is, however, the development of the distinctly trinitarian foundation of Hilary’s anthropology in anti-Homoian polemic in \textit{Trin.} that makes the \textit{Psal.} discussion possible.
In *Trin.* 2.24-25 Hilary clearly explicates his view of the fulfillment of human destiny in the double movement of incarnation and glorification in Christ’s humanity:

... through the society of this *admixture* the *corpus universi generis humani* might emerge sanctified in him: that as all would be established in him because he wished to become corporeal, so in return he would be reproduced again in all things himself through the invisible part of him. The image of the invisible God did not reject the shame of a human origin, and passed through all the insults of our nature by conception, birth, crying, and cradle.\(^{97}\)

Further,

He through whom humanity was made had no need to be made human, but we ourselves needed God to become flesh and dwell in us, that is to say, by the assumption of one flesh he might inhabit all flesh (*uniuersae carnis*). His humility is our nobility, his insult is our honour. What God is, remaining in the flesh, we in turn (*uicissim*) will be: restored in God from the flesh.\(^{98}\)

It is his reading of John 17.1-6, which culminates in the discussion of the *subjectio* in 1 Corinthians 15, within the framework of an understanding of an universal humanity that enables Hilary to speak with such bold words regarding human glorification in the assumed body of Christ.\(^{99}\) As Pelland notes, ‘Son renoncement à la condition de Dieu, au plan de la *dispensatione salutis*, n’est qu’une étape. L’unité parfait du Père et du Fils avant l’Incarnation se traduira finalement jusque dans la glorification de la chair du Christ, de façon à ce qu’au terme comme au début, leur unité soit parfait’.\(^{100}\) And through this second step of the double

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\(^{97}\) *Trin.* 2.24, SC 443:314-16.

\(^{98}\) Ibid. 2.25, SC 443:316. Note the use of *uicissim*, the same word used to describe the exchange of glory between the Father and the Son. There is a sense of ‘exchange’ between divinity and humanity in Christ’s incarnation: God assuming humanity, and humanity being elevated into God.

\(^{99}\) Athanasius also speaks of an *apotheosis* as being the point of humanity’s union with Christ’s humanity. The process of deification has already taken place in Christ’s human body (*Ar.* 3.17), and humanity follows in this. But, for Athanasius, this following of Christ through to glorification is more of a matter of emulation than an ontological participation. See Hanson, *Search*, 457.

\(^{100}\) Pelland, ‘Subjectio’, 434. See *Trin.* 9.38 and *Psal.* 2.27.
movement of Christ’s assumption, Christ’s flesh is not only united to the divine nature, ‘elle lui est totalement intégrée’.\textsuperscript{101}

\textit{His glorious body: completed in \textit{eo} (Phil 3.21)}

This strong ‘bodily’ unity of all humanity with Christ and with the divine through Christ was clear from Hilary’s \textit{Mat.} forward. Indeed, at \textit{Mat.} 16.9, Hilary refers to human salvation itself as ‘Christ in a body that he assumed from humanity’.\textsuperscript{102} So in \textit{Psal.}, particularly in relation to the interpretation of Philippians 3.21 (He will transform the body of our humiliation so that it may be conformed to the body of his glory), the transformation of human bodies into Christ’s glorious body is a central theme.\textsuperscript{103} This Philippians 3.21 connection, especially regarding the key discussion of 1 Corinthians 15, takes a central place in Hilary’s thought in \textit{Trin.}, and it is here that these ideas make perhaps their most critical developments.

In \textit{Psal.} 14.8, Hilary uses the work \textit{conscendentibus} to evoke the idea of a mystical climbing to the repose of the mountain of the Lord to describe the continual theme of \textit{prouectio} present throughout his thought.\textsuperscript{104} In \textit{Trin.} it is clear that the incarnate Christ is the one ‘climbing’ toward God, together with the humanity he assumed so that the humility of the incarnation is seen as the way of promotion (\textit{prouectio}).\textsuperscript{105} The goal of this promotion is ‘to rest finally in the glory

\textsuperscript{101} Dupont-Fauville, \textit{Hilaire}, 171. See again \textit{Trin.} 9.38. See Scully, ‘Assumption’, 65: ‘The incarnation’s assumption of humanity culminates in the eschaton where Christ \textit{assumes} humanity even \textit{into} his own divinity’.\textsuperscript{101}

\textsuperscript{102} \textit{Mat.} 16.9, SC 258:56.

\textsuperscript{103} See \textit{Psal.} 1.15; 9.4; 14.5; 51.22; 52.17; 61.4; 5; 62.10; 67.37; 91.10; 118.4.1; 118.17.12; 121.1; 128.9; 135.5; 136.11; 138.37; 143.21; 150.2. References in Descourtieux, ‘Introduction’, 70.

\textsuperscript{104} \textit{Psal.} 14.8 SC 515:340. see Descourtieux’s note at SC 515:341n5.

\textsuperscript{105} See \textit{Trin.} 9.4, SC 462:22.
of the body of Christ’.\textsuperscript{106} The destiny of human perfection in the divine is thus located in Christ’s glorified body.\textsuperscript{107} From the beginning of \textit{Trin.} Hilary notes this ultimate destiny of humanity: ‘[Christ] ascended to our God and Father that \textit{our human (homo noster)} might be glorified into God’.\textsuperscript{108} The Word even brings the ‘assumed humanity’ (\textit{adsumptus homo}) into union with God’s own nature (\textit{in unitatem Dei naturalis}).\textsuperscript{109}

Philippians 3.21 becomes Hilary’s primary explanatory tool to illustrate this reality. Within his Philippians 2 christological framework, Hilary interprets John 17.1-6 through the filter of Philippians 3.21. And this perceived inherent connection between the Philippians passages enables his reading of John 17.

In \textit{Trin.} 9.8, Hilary writes:

Having set forth the fullness of divinity dwelling bodily in him, he then places under it the mystery of our assumption, saying: ‘in Him you are made full’ (\textit{repleti}). For as the fullness of divinity is in Him, so we are made full in Him. Sensibly, he does not say ‘you are made full’, but: ‘in Him you are made full’, because through the hope of faith in eternal life all who are or will be regenerated are made full and abide now in the body of Christ.\textsuperscript{110}

Philippians 3.21 is used to interpret how exactly humanity is to be made full: ‘and afterwards they will be made full (\textit{replendi}) no longer in him (\textit{in eo}), but in themselves (\textit{in ipsis}), at the time of which the apostle says “[he] will transform

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{106} \textit{Psal.} 14.17, SC 515:354.
\item \textsuperscript{107} See Scully, ‘Soteriology’, 193, for Christ’s body as the ‘location’ of salvation.
\item \textsuperscript{108} \textit{Trin.} 1.33, SC 443:264. Emphasis mine. There is some precedent for Hilary’s thought in his inherited tradition. Tertullian spoke of Christ, in becoming flesh, as returning humanity to ‘the beginning’ in its original flesh (\textit{Mon.} 5.3, CCSL 2:1234), and even referred to the resurrection of humanity as being raised on account of ‘our body being joined with him’, as our bodies are ‘members of Christ’ (Ibid., 16.7, CCSL 2:1312. See also \textit{Res.} 48-63 where Tertullian interprets Philippians 3.20-21: human bodies are clothed in immortality (53), the mortal is absorbed by life (54) and not by destruction (\textit{perditio}) (55) but by a change (\textit{demutatio}) which is a new way of being: nec \textit{alius efficaciatur, sed aliud}. See d’Alès, \textit{Tertullien}, 150-51.
\item \textsuperscript{109} \textit{Trin.} 9.38, SC 462:90.
\item \textsuperscript{110} \textit{Trin.} 9.8, SC 462:28.
\end{itemize}
(\textit{transfiguravit}) the body of our humiliation, to conform his body of glory’’.\textsuperscript{111} So humanity is made full in Christ through his assumption of flesh, but the futurity of \textit{replend}\textsuperscript{112} (‘will be made new’ or ‘complete’ or ‘shall be replenished’) in reference to Philippians 3.21 moves beyond being made complete ‘in him’ in his assumption of humanity to the astonishing statement of human beings being made complete \textit{in ipsis}.\textsuperscript{113} In \textit{Trin.} 9.9, Hilary continues this discussion by reading further in Colossians 2: Christian circumcision is not with the hands but in Christ through baptism, by which one shares in his resurrection. Hilary says this is the second birth into the ‘new humanity’ (\textit{nouum hominem}), putting off the old human and putting on the new because \textit{regeneratio baptismi resurrectionis est uirtus} (cf. Phil 3.10).\textsuperscript{114} The following sections of \textit{Trin.} 9 continue the theme of resurrection, both as a demonstration of the divinity of Christ, as he shares inseparably in the operations of the Father in his resurrection,\textsuperscript{115} and in order to show humanity’s sharing in his resurrection, as ‘he quickened us together with

\textsuperscript{111} Ibid. See Weedman, \textit{Trinitarian}, 177-78, for a discussion of how Hilary moves, largely due to his use of Philippians 3.21, from describing our resurrected bodies as ‘angelic’ or like the angels in \textit{Mat.} to Christ’s body itself in \textit{Trin.} fulfilling the role given to angels in his early work. See also Fierro, \textit{Sobre la gloria}, 281 and Burns, \textit{Christology}, 28.

See n117 below on Hilary’s use of \textit{transfiguravit} versus \textit{tranformabit}.

\textsuperscript{112} Jean Doignon, ‘Comment Hilaire de Poitiers a-t-il lu et compris le verset de Paul Philippiens 3.21?’ \textit{VC} 43 (1989): 131n45, notes that -\textit{ndus} takes the place of the future passive participle in late Latin.

\textsuperscript{113} Doignon’s study of Philippians 3.21 in Hilary, ‘Comment’, 127-37, brings attention to the contrast he makes between \textit{repleti} and \textit{replendi}, particularly in relation to his variation in \textit{transfigurere} when citing Philippians 3.21 either as \textit{transformauit} (\textit{Trin.} 9.8; 11.35; \textit{Psal.} 14.5; 91.9) or \textit{transformabit} (\textit{Psal.} 1.15; 124.4; 141.8).

\textsuperscript{114} \textit{Trin.} 9.9, SC 462:32.

\textsuperscript{115} Ibid. 9.10-12., e.g. 9.12, SC 462:38: \textit{Denique nunc per operationem Dei excitatus Christus a mortuis est, quia opera Dei Patris ipse natura a Deo non differenti operatus est.}
him’. For in the double *adsumptio* of Christ he unites ‘the society of our nature in the communion of divine immortality’.

Deus totus: *subjection and the finis of humanity (1 Cor 15.21-28)*

Hilary again utilizes Philippians 3.21 in a similar context at *Trin.* 11.35-49, and here it is provided as an exposition of 1 Corinthians 15. 1 Corinthians 15.21-28 played an important polemical role for both Tertullian and Novatian, and was made a significant aspect of trinitarian and anthropological discussion by Origen. Tertullian at *Prax* 3 and 4 interprets the passage to form an argument regarding Father-Son relations, essentially to illustrate that the distinction of the Father and the Son is not an obstacle to their unity. The relations between the Father and the Son in this passage suffice for Tertullian to establish their distinction in antimonarchian polemic. Novatian closes his *De Trinitate* with an exposition of 1 Corinthians 15.21-28 and, as Tertullian, reads the passage as a commentary on

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116 Ibid. 9.10, SC 462:32.

117 Ibid. 9.13, SC 462:40: *naturae nostrae societate in communione diuinae immortalitatis unita*. Hilary’s use of *transformauit* at *Trin.* 9.8 and at points in *Psal.* (see note above) rather than *transformabit*, the tense of the Greek and most Latin versions of Philippians 3.21, is significant as it shows his intentional emphasis on the ‘double assumption’ of Christ and how already in Christ’s assumption of all humanity the process of this transformation has begun, though it is also still in process and we await *replendi*. See Doignon, ‘Comment’; Scully, ‘Soteriology’, 186n82; Burns, *Model*, 223.

118 On Philippians 3.21 as an explanation of 1 Corinthians 15.28, see Doignon, ‘Comment’, 132-33.


120 *Prax.* 4. See d’Alès, *Tertullien*, 70. A central issue in scholarship on both Tertullian and Novatian is whether they imagined the final eschatological ‘subjectio’ of the Son to the Father, which is seen as the ‘finis’, to be an end of the distinct identity of the Son, so that God being ‘all in all’ would mean that the Father will exist as the sole identity of the Godhead. See also Pelland, ‘Une passage’, 49-50, for Tertullian. See Ibid, 51-52, for Novatian. Tertullian and Novatian should not be understood to promote an ending of the Son’s identity (indeed, they were writing against such monarchian theologies!), though, particularly Novatian, leaves open the question of the mode of the Son’s being after the *dispensatio*. See Novatian *Trin.*, 7:38; 13:69; 14:77; 18.100; 18.108; 28.156; cf. Tertullian *Prax.* 8. References in Pelland, ibid., 51n126.
relations between the Father and the Son within the Godhead.\textsuperscript{121} Hilary transforms the nature of the discussion in his pro-Nicene polemic by reading the passage in reference to divine-human relations, as opposed to the project of Novatian and Tertullian in reference to intra-divine relations.\textsuperscript{122} Origen had previously followed similar lines of interpretation of the 1 Corinthians text, taking an entirely different approach than Tertullian and Novatian (and Marcellus). For Origen, the \textit{traditio regni} and the \textit{subjectio} of the Son do not concern the internal divine life, but ‘l’assomption définitive des élus par le Verbe Incarné’.\textsuperscript{123} In the fourth century, the passage became increasingly significant, primarily due to Marcellus’s interpretation which capitalized upon the potential monarchian reading.\textsuperscript{124} It is not surprising then that in anti-Marcellan polemic fourth-century writers like Hilary will find utility in Origen’s soteriologically focused reading, as opposed to the ontologically driven understanding of Tertullian and Novatian.\textsuperscript{125}

At \textit{Trin.} 11.8 Hilary reports that his opponents read the \textit{subjectio} of 1 Corinthians 15.27-28 as proof of the Son’s subordination.\textsuperscript{126} He responds in 11.9 by quoting 1 Timothy 3.16. The \textit{magnus pietatis sacramentum} is simply the

\textsuperscript{121} Pelland, ‘Une passage’ 51-52; \textit{Trin.} 31.

\textsuperscript{122} See Ibid., 51n127. What is striking is how Hilary seems to utilise Tertullians reading of the passage in \textit{adv. Marc.} 5.9-10, so that when he finds himself in a polemical situation against Marcellus, he does not use Tertullian’s anti-monarchian polemical reading of the passage, but adapts his anti-Marcion reading.

\textsuperscript{123} Pelland, ‘Marcel’, 693. See Origen, \textit{Jo.} 1.92-93, SC 120:109; \textit{Princ.} 3.5.6.

\textsuperscript{124} It is important to note here that Marcellus is following traditional lines of interpretation, and not being revolutionary. While earlier writers such as Tertullian and Novatian were indeed arguing against monarchian readings, Marcellus is continuing the traditional line of interpretation which they followed, focussing on Father-Son relations. While the basis for Hilary’s reading can be found in Origen’s thought, and was further used by Eusebius of Caesarea against Marcellus (see note below), Hilary is taking this line of thought in a rather novel direction.

\textsuperscript{125} Eusebius \textit{e.th.} 3.15, PG 24:1029, finds Origen’s reading to be polemically useful against Marcellus’s reading of the passage. Ps.-Athanasius’s reading also utilizes Origen’s \textit{Hom. in. Lev.} 7.2 to construct something similar to Hilary’s reading of humanity being glorified as members of Christ’s body. See Pelland, ‘Marcel’, 693.

\textsuperscript{126} \textit{Trin.} 11.8, SC 462:308.
‘dispensation of the assumption of flesh by the Lord’. But the consummation of this assumption is that it is ‘received up in glory’, so that the sacramentum includes this second assumption, and through faith in this mystery ‘we are prepared to be received (adsumi) and conformed (conformes) to the glory of the Lord’. Both sides of the double assumption of Christ are the sacramentum because ‘through the assumption of the flesh there is a manifestation of the mystery in the flesh’. This ‘double assumption’ is seen as the one dispensatio. As the subjectio of 1 Corinthians 15 is part of the fullness of the dispensation—the incarnate existence of Christ—it is in tempore and therefore is seen to refer to divine-human relations and not to the relations of Father and Son in the Godhead and thus cannot equate to a subordination of the Son, but rather an aspect of the dispensatio when humanity is submitted to divinity. As Weedman observes, ‘By looking at the entire dispensation we recognize that the incarnation is not a weakness in God but a true sacramentum—a hidden reality that was revealed to us in the Son’s flesh and which, by being assumed in glory signals the perfection of everything’.

At 11.21 Hilary returns to the 1 Corinthians passage in order to give a full explanation of this great sacramentum. There are three primary points of dispute: the finis, traditio, and subjectio. Hilary claims that his opponents’ objective is to

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127 Ibid., 11.9, SC 462:310.
128 Ibid., 312. Hilary claims here that both adsumptionem carnis and claritatis adsumptio are the same magnae pietatis sacramentum.
129 Ibid.
131 Ibid. 11.30, SC 462:350.
132 Weedman, Trinitarian, 175.
show that Christ ceases to exist in the *finis*, that he loses his kingdom in the *traditio* and that he strips himself of his divine nature when he is subjected.\textsuperscript{133}

Hilary contends that the *finis* does not indicate an end in terms of a cessation, but rather in terms of a goal\textsuperscript{134}: ‘All things stretch out towards an end, not in order to not be, but that they might remain in him to whom they have stretched out for’.\textsuperscript{135} This end

is not a blessed disappearance, non-existence is not the fruit, and abolition is not the payment set for each one’s faith. The end of the blessedness set forth is a boundless measure (*inexcessus modus*), and they are blessed who endure until the end of blessedness brought to perfection (*consummandae*), when the longing of faithful hope has no aim beyond itself. The end, therefore, is the state of unalterable continuation (*manendi inmobilis*) towards which they are stretched out.\textsuperscript{136}

As Christ is the end of the law (Rom 10.4) through fulfilling it, not annihilating it,\textsuperscript{137} so is all that Christ subjects to the Father fulfilled by advancing to the perfection of their destiny. This *finis*, which will be accomplished through *traditio* and *subjectio*, is the perfection of humanity’s hopeful mutability. So Pelland writes, ‘l’acte par lequel le Fils remettra au Père ce que le Père lui avait soumis, qui achèvera de porter toutes choses à leur condition définitive’.\textsuperscript{138} At the point of ‘subjection’, when God becomes ‘all in all’, the perpetual increase of human potentiality enters into the true end of its hope: the divine perfection.

Hilary proceeds to argue that in the *traditio* of the kingdom, just as when the Father delivered all things to the Son (Lk 10.22) and gave all authority to him

\textsuperscript{133} Trin. 11.25, SC 462:340.

\textsuperscript{134} See Pelland, ‘Subjectio’, 424.

\textsuperscript{135} Trin. 11.28, SC 462:344: *Tendunt enim ad finem omnia, non ut non sint, sed ut in eo ad quod tetenderint maneant*.

\textsuperscript{136} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{137} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{138} Pelland, ‘Subjectio’, 425.
(Matt 28.18) without any loss in himself, so the Son has no loss in himself when he delivers the kingdom over to the Father. In *Trin.* 11.37 Hilary returns to the ‘kingdom’ discussion, and in 11.39 he makes clear that the deliverance of the kingdom by the Son to the Father is in no way a dissolution of the Son’s reign (which humanity shares in, in the *regnantis corporis sui claritate*), but a submission of his assumed humanity, ‘our human’, to the Father: ‘He will deliver the kingdom to God the Father, not so as to give away his power by the delivering, but that we, being conformed to the glory of his body, will be the kingdom of God’. The *uniuersum genus humanum* is transformed into the glorious kingdom of God by being conformed to the King’s reigning body. He references Luke 17.21 in support, ‘The Kingdom of Heaven is within you’, in his interpretation of a human ‘body’ as the kingdom of God. All of this is in the context, once again, of resurrection, as Christ is the ‘first-fruits of the dead’ (1 Cor 15.20-21), and all that is said on the point concerns the *sacramentum corporis*.

The subjectio of 1 Corinthians is more complicated, and the Homoian reading poses a greater threat to Hilary. He divides his explanation into three sections.

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139 *Trin.* 11.29, SC 462:346.

140 Ibid. 11.37, SC 462:360.

141 Ibid. 11.39, SC 462:362: *nos conformes gloriae corporis sui facti regum Dei erimus*.

142 Ibid. Here contains Hilary’s only reference of Matthew 5.8 in *Trin.* as well. After a quotation of the verse he writes: *Tradet autem Deo Patri regnum, et tunc quos regnum Deo tradiderit Deum uidebunt.*

143 Hilary’s argument seems to influence Ambrose’s reading of the Corinthians passage when he argues that the Kingdom which is submitted to the Father is the people of God itself (see *Fid.* 5.12.146ff; 5.18.225. References in Ayres, *Augustine*, 157).


145 See Weedman, *Trinitarian*, 176, for a discussion of these three stages of subjectio.
The first two steps of the *subjectio* are subjections to Christ. In *Trin.* 11.30-34 Hilary speaks of the first subjection, that of the subjection of Christ’s enemies.146

The second phase of subjection is the subjection of the final enemy, death, for ‘in the subjection of his enemies death is conquered, and, death conquered, life immortal follows’.147 The result of this subjection is that of Philippians 3.21: our bodies of humiliation refashioned to be conformed to the body of Christ’s glory. This is another subjection, of the body to glory, which is a ‘conceding from one nature to another, for [the nature], according to what it is in itself, is ceasing, and is subjected to him, in whose form it passes’.148 He continues, ‘It ceases, not in order to not exist, but to make progress’.149 This is the culmination of the natural progression of humanity, its hopeful mutability; it is the perfection of human potentiality and is completed by the third stage of subjection, that of Christ himself to the Father.

Whereas in the first two stages of *subjectio* things are subjected to Christ, this final subjection is of Christ himself. This third stage provides the Homoians with the strongest arguments for the Son’s subordination in 1 Corinthians 15, but it is also utilised as the most constructive aspect of Hilary’s interpretation of the passage, indeed, it is in a sense (within the framework of his Philippians 2 christology and read intertextually with verses like Philippians 3.21) the culmination of his entire theological vision. As it can be seen as an eschatological

146 Ibid. 11.32-34. See Jean Doignon, ‘Les implications théologiques d’une variante du texte latin de 1 Corinthiens 15,25 chez Hilaire de Poitiers’, *Aug* 19.2 (1979): 245-58, for a discussion of the variation of Hilary’s quotations of 1 Corinthians 15.25 as either *sub pedibus suis* and *sub pedibus eius* (or *ipsius*).

147 Ibid. 11.35, *SC* 462:356.

148 Ibid., 358.

149 Ibid.: *Desinit autem, non ut non sit, set ut proficiat*. See also 11.36.
finis of the Christian life, so might it be read as consummation of Hilary’s trinitarian anthropology.

Hilary summarizes this third stage of subjectio in Trin. 11.36: after all things are subjected to the Son,

... then he is himself subjected to him who subjects all things to himself. Just as we are subjected to the glory of his body’s rule, so by the same mystery he, reigning in the glory of his body, is himself subjected to him, [to whom] the uniuersa is subjected. For we are subjected to the glory of his body that we may be in that splendour by which he reigns in the body because we shall be conformed to his body (quia corporis eius conformes erimus).\(^\text{150}\)

Hilary clearly evokes Philippians 3.21 here. He continues with reference to the transfiguration in the gospel narrative (Matt 16.28-17.2)\(^\text{151}\) and the promise of Christ to the disciples that they would participate in this bodily transfiguration; that they would be, as Christ in Matthew 16, ‘shining in the splendour of the sun’\(^\text{152}\). Hilary’s discussion continues leading to a full explanation at the end of Book Eleven (11.49). As a result of the subjection of the Lord himself to the Father, God will be ‘omnia in omnibus’ (1 Cor 15.28).\(^\text{153}\) He proceeds to interpret the nature of this subjection at 11.40:

According to the dispensation, by his divinity and his humanity, he is the mediator between humans and God, having in himself by the dispensation what is of flesh, and by the subjection will in all things attain what is divine, that he may not be God in part, but entirely God (Deus totus). The purpose of the subjection is then nothing other than that God may be all in all, with no part of the nature of his earthly body remaining in him; That whereas there was a holding together of two in him, now he might be God only (Deus tantum). Not by the body being cast away, but by being transferred through subjection, neither by being annihilated through desertion, but by being changed by glorification: adding humanity to his divinity (acquirens sibi Deo potius hominem), rather than losing his divinity on account of his humanity. He is truly subjected to him, not to cease to exist, but that God may be all in all;

\(^{150}\) Ibid. 11.36, SC 462:358.

\(^{151}\) Ibid. 11.37, SC 462:358-60.

\(^{152}\) Ibid. 11.38, SC 462:360.

\(^{153}\) Ibid. 11.40, SC 462:364.
having, in the mystery of the subjection, to continue to be what he no longer is, not having, by desertion, to deprive himself of existence.\textsuperscript{154}

Christ subjects his assumed humanity to the Father, that he who is both divine and human might become ‘all God’ (\textit{Deus totus}). Hilary continues in 11.42: ‘God may be all in all: the whole [Christ], leaving behind the dispensation by which he is human, will now be remaining in God’.\textsuperscript{155} Such a strong assertion of the deification of Christ’s humanity is easily misunderstood. Wild claims that here Hilary argues that Christ was ‘two beings’ before, God and human, but in this subjection becomes totally or entirely divine. His glorification ‘divinizes Him to the point that His human and creaturely qualities are so done away with as to be negligible’.\textsuperscript{156} Properly locating Hilary’s discussion in the context of his overall trinitarian anthropology, however, counters this interpretation. First, Hilary’s christology, committed to the unity of Christ, does not allow for an understanding

\textsuperscript{154} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{155} Ibid. 11.42, SC 462:368. See also discussion at \textit{Psal.} 9.4, SC 515:304: God will be all in all, ‘since the weakness of the humanity assumed will have been absorbed . . . in the divine nature’. Cf. \textit{Psal.} 1.18.

\textsuperscript{156} Wild, \textit{Divinization}, 142.
of ‘two beings’ in the incarnation.\textsuperscript{157} Second, the \textit{regnans corpus} of \textit{Trin.} 11.36-38 demonstrates clearly that Christ remains embodied (i.e., containing his ‘creaturely qualities’) in glorification and subjection. Wild has underlined here the continual refrain of modern interpreters of Hilary’s anthropology. This kind of glorified, perfect, divinized humanity does not seem to be genuinely human given modern anthropological presuppositions. But, as I pointed out in the previous chapter of this thesis, reading Hilary through the lens of modern anthropological understanding and concerns has vast interpretive consequences, and can cause the reader to not only misread Hilary’s argument, but at points to read him entirely against himself, arguing contrary to the point of his own argument. Here we see how approaching Hilary’s argument by applying modern pre-understandings of the human condition to the humanity of Christ affects not only one’s understanding of the human suffering and experience of Christ in Hilary, but also the glorification of Christ’s humanity (and thus of humanity \textit{tout court}). The glorification of humanity in Christ is not, for Hilary, a doing away with human and creaturely qualities. This becoming ‘all divine’ in glorification is not

\textsuperscript{157} Weedman provides a more faithful reading. In the subjection of the body to become ‘all God’ Hilary proposes ‘two bodies’ for Christ, Weedman, \textit{Trinitarian}, 177, suggests. The first body borrows its glory through association with the divine nature. ‘This is the incarnate body which, though similar to human bodies, nevertheless borrows its glory by containing within it two natures. This would also seem to be the body Hilary describes in Book Ten’. The second body is the one that has advanced to a more complete glory, through an increase of glory granted to the body (11.42. See my discussion of this passage and the ‘increase in glory’ of Christ’s human body in the previous chapter). Our hope is thus not only to go through a transformation to a body similar to Christ’s (becoming human as Christ was), but that Christ’s human body itself is glorified and transformed, the glory of his own humanity is increased (Weedman, \textit{Trinitarian}, 177). This is a useful analysis as it assists us to see how the perfection of humanity is truly and fully a christological progress, not only in union with Christ’s humanity so as to attain his human perfection as seen in his life, suffering, death, and all his human experiences, but we are carried through beyond even that way of being human to this \textit{Deus totus}. Christ’s perfect and sinless humanity, and the lived experience of that human life, seen in Book 10, is the destiny for our humanity, but even that perfect humanity progresses from glory to glory. The eschatological fulfillment of the fullness of humanity in Book 11 therefore depends upon the progressive and holistic perspective of Christ’s entire lived life and experience seen in Book 10 (See Ibid., 178-9) (This is why, as suggested here, a misreading of Hilary’s trinitarian anthropology regarding Christ’s incarnate experience in Book 10 leads to a misreading of his glorified humanity here). This perspective is clear, particularly in the discussion of the movement of the \textit{imago Dei} from \textit{in eo} to \textit{in ipsis} in our humanity.
beyond the scope of Hilary’s anthropology. As we have seen in the discussion of Christ’s suffering in the previous chapter, Christ’s humanity defines what it is to be human. He is the destiny of all humanity. Thus here, in his glorification, the subjection of the human condition to divinity is to be seen as genuinely what it is to be human, not something beyond human or which makes humanity ‘negligible’. Humanity separated from God in sin and suffering is indeed a humanity closer to negligible for Hilary. This is, rather than a doing away with humanity, a perfection of human potential. What all humanity exists as potentially, in hopeful mutability, is becoming perfected through the human condition being united to the trinitarian life in Christ. Humanity is not lost in any way in Christ becoming totus Deus, for it is here that it becomes totus homo. Christ, existing as trinitarian communion lived in human terms, subjects humanity to the glory of divinity that God might be ‘all in all’, and in doing so carries humanity into its destined life of infinite increase.

The consummation of the Image: from in eo to in ipsis

At the closing of Trin. 11, Hilary provides a summary statement of this fulfillment of human potentiality, in which humanity is fulfilled through conformity to the divine image. He argues that God being omnia in omnibus is the progress of our assumption (adsumptionis nostrae profectus est), again stating that the forma serui will be brought into the glory of the forma Dei. These ‘gains’ (lucra) are for us; this is our progress (nostri profectus), for it is we who are ‘going to be conformed to the glory of the body of God’ (gloriae corporis Dei).

\(^{158}\) The subjection of Christ’s body, ‘through which the carnal in him is
swallowed up (*deoratur*) into the spiritual nature’, is again not a ceasing to be human, but, indeed, ‘we shall advance in the glory of our conformed humanity, renewed in the knowledge of God, and transformed to the image of the Creator’, for ‘[Christ’s] humanity which advances [to this end] is our humanity’. It is through this ‘being conformed to the glory of the body of God’ that humanity is not only made after the image of God, but made itself ‘the perfect image of God’ and ‘obtains the perfection of its nature’.

Here we see the theological import of the past-future distinction made in Hilary’s intertextual reading of Philippians 3.21 and Colossians 2.9-10 in *Trin.* 9.8 discussed above. Through the assumption of humanity in the incarnation we are now ‘completed in him’ (*in eo repleti sumus*). Humanity is therefore completed by Christ in the incarnation, but not only initially, as ‘everything that the human nature of Christ experiences, we experience as well, precisely *in eo*’. This progressive experience *in eo* leads to a fulfillment of human potentiality so that in the conformity to the ‘body of God’, there is a completion of this process when humanity is *replendis* not only *in eo*, *sed in ipsis*.

The movement from *in eo* to *in ipsis* has caused some difficulty for interpreters. Classically this has been understood as *in eo* being some intermediate state in which the separated soul dwells in Christ’s body until a time

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159 Ibid., 382.
160 Ibid., 380.
162 *Trin.* 11.49, SC 462:382: *constitutionis suae obtinet perfectionem*. Pelland, ‘Subjectio’, 439, summarises it this way: ‘Car ce qui s’est opéré en lui doit aussi s’accomplir en nous. Ce qui est charnel doit être si bien assume par l’Esprit, investi par le divin (*in naturam spiritus devoratur*) et conformé au corps du Christ glorieux, qu’il devienne à son tour l’image de Dieu’.
when it can be reunited with its own body and be completed ‘in ipsis’, apart from or outside of the body of Christ. So Wild writes:

We are in the body of Christ in His kingdom, for His is the only body there. After our souls are reunited to our bodies, we shall be in the kingdom of the Father with our own bodies. We are completed in Christ only when His body is divinized and immortal. We are completed in ourselves when our bodies are also immortalized.\(^{165}\)

Wild is following Coustant when he refers to these successive periods as the kingdom of the Son and the kingdom of the Father.\(^{166}\) Hilary, however, directly rejects a glorified or eschatological existence outside the body of Christ in Psal.,\(^{167}\) and the discussion in Trin. seen throughout this chapter will support this explicit denial.

Both Trin. 9.8 itself and Hilary’s overall anthropological vision, in which conformation to Christ does not end our human existence but brings us into the full humanity we are intended to be, cannot support a future glorification in ipsis which is defined over against in eo. Hilary’s argument in Trin. 9 is to be read rather that in our glorification in Christ’s body we are so united to him that we are in our very selves glorified (in the sense that our glorification is not separated from Christ’s but in Christ’s, and in Christ we are being glorified into our true selves). The passage evidences that our glorification is not apart from, in the sense of being outside of Christ, but in some way individually distinct from (i.e., we do not lose our identity so as to cease to exist as who we are, or to become something other than our human selves in glorification—consistent with his non-Platonic view of universal assumption). This is the result not of a glorification outside the

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\(^{167}\) See *Psal.* 62.4; Scully ‘Assumption’, 140-41.
Body of Christ, but of the glorification of Christ’s body becoming the full reality of our existence and identity. We were glorified in the *adsumptio* of our humanity in Christ, yes, but this comes to fruition in our final glorification in resurrection and the final *subjectio* in the *adsumptio* of Christ by the Father. These are not separate glorifications, *in eo* and *in ipsis*, but the initiation and culmination of the same.¹⁶⁸

This fulfillment is a physical, ‘bodily’ reality. Humanity is present *in eo* currently as Christ is with the Father in his *regnans corpus*, but when it comes to reign with Christ in that reigning body, it is itself fulfilled and perfected.

**Knowledge of the Trinity and human perfection**

*Trin.* 11.49 layers another aspect to the ‘being conformed to the body of God’ and ‘becoming the perfect image’: that of *knowledge*. Hilary writes that part of this glorified humanity obtaining the perfection of its nature is ‘knowing its God, and through that knowledge, God’s image, and progressing through piety to eternity, and by eternity will be forever the image of her creator’.¹⁶⁹ Hilary’s connections of the epistemological and ontological progression of humanity have been noted throughout this thesis, particularly regarding the *progressus in infinitum* in Chapters 2, the movement from the invisible to visible in knowing God in Chapter 3, and the image discussion in Chapter 4. All of these are ultimately located in trinitarian discourse, and all of them feed into Hilary’s argument regarding the final glorification of humanity, which also fundamentally finds itself within the confines of trinitarian argumentation. In *Trin.* 3.16, in the

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¹⁶⁸ This is simply the outworking of the ‘double assumption’ of humanity by Christ and Christ by the Father, of the fullness of the *magnus pietatis sacramentum*.

midst of the John 17 discussion, Hilary argues that in the glorification of the Father by the Son at the hour of his passion God was ‘being glorified in the flesh (in carne) before an ignorant world’.\textsuperscript{170} Again we see that the fleshly, material nature of revelation is central to Hilary’s thought. The epistemological restrictions of human finitude demand this type of humane, material reception of the divine. Just as divine generation, divine infinity, divine unity, and the divine image have all been, for Hilary, manifested in the humanity of Christ—the solus testis fidelis of God—so here in the culmination of Hilary’s anthropological vision, revelation or manifestation through Christ’s human condition, the dispensatio, the magnus pietatis sacramentum, is the basis of our knowledge.

\textit{Trin. 11.44-48}, leading to Hilary’s climactic 11.49, is an extended discussion of the restrictions of human knowledge of the divine in the midst of Hilary’s arguments regarding the subjectio of 1 Corinthians 15. God is only known by devotion and his nature cannot be described,\textsuperscript{171} God cannot be circumscribed by earthly minds, nor can his wisdom be approached by human thought: ‘the unsearchable paths of his knowledge cannot be sought, they abandon pursuit’.\textsuperscript{172} His judgments are inscrutable (inexcrutabilium), his ways unsearchable (inuestigabilium), his mind unknown (incogniti), his counsel incomprehensible (non communicati intellegentia). God is only to be understood in his ‘boundless expanse’ (profundum).\textsuperscript{173} But this ‘boundlessness’ entered into finite human space, condescended to human ways of knowing, for ‘nothing falls within the

\textsuperscript{170} Ibid. 3.16, SC 443:362. Emphasis mine.
\textsuperscript{171} Ibid. 11.44, SC 462:372.
\textsuperscript{172} Ibid. 11.45, SC 462:374: nec uiae cognitionis eius investigabiles se consectantum studiis derelinquunt.
\textsuperscript{173} Ibid. 11.47, SC 462:376.
realm of sensus unless it is subjected sensui.\textsuperscript{174} The ineffable mystery of the Father and the Son ‘pour nous être manifesté, a été traduit dans la chair du Fils’.\textsuperscript{175}

Hilary wields his favoured Pauline phrase ‘mystery of great piety’ to solidify this point. Because the Word assumed humanity, the mystery of great piety was ‘a mystery no longer hidden, but manifested in the flesh’.\textsuperscript{176} This manifestation in the flesh is the appropriation of the divine mystery of the triune life of Father and Son to human life and understanding; it is the visibility of the invisible, and the culmination of Hilary’s theology of the divine image. As Scully notes, for Hilary, ‘revelation . . . transforms. Revelation and glorification, then, are two sides of the same coin. Glorification is reception of full revelation; full revelation eliminates the barrier between perceived and perceiver’.\textsuperscript{177} Indeed, ‘flesh, which in the forma servi only expressed Christ’s human condition, becomes, in the form of God, the image, expression, and reflection of God’.\textsuperscript{178} The Son working the works of God in the flesh reveals to humanity who the Father is, and in his act of subjection he is subjecting ‘the visible to the invisible’ and accomplishes ‘ultimement sa function

\textsuperscript{174} Ibid. 11.46, SC 462:374.
\textsuperscript{175} Pelland, ‘Subjectio’, 450.
\textsuperscript{176} Trin. 11.9, SC 462:310.
\textsuperscript{177} Scully, ‘Assumption’, 243. The ‘elimination’ of the ‘barrier’ might be misplaced language. This gives the impression of Hilary arguing toward a solution to the 20\textsuperscript{th} century hermeneutical problem of the ‘epistemic gap’ between the knower and the known. See my ‘Eucharistic Priority’ for how Hilary’s epistemological arguments avoid this type of ‘problem’ altogether. Revelation in Christ is for Hilary not a closing of an epistemic gap, as if humans could receive certain knowledge which would allow them to know the inconceivable God, it is knowledge of God mediated to humanity through entering into and inhabiting human materiality. Hilary believes knowledge of God is gained in revelation, this is true, but the infinite ontological distinction between Creator and creature prevents any bridging or overcoming of an epistemic gap or ‘barrier’. If Scully means by ‘eliminates’ here that any perceived epistemic gap is nonexistent and a misconception of the ‘problem’ itself, then I think the nuance of the discussion in Hilary has been properly observed, but this does not seem to be the case in the quotation above, though her recognition of the connection of revelation and glorification is a keen and valuable contribution.

de parfait image, révèle la pleine égalité avec le Père de celui qui devient par là même, «Deus Omnia in omnibus».\textsuperscript{179} The dispensation of the flesh, that great mystery of piety, is thus a testimony of the full equality of the Father and the Son; it is a manifestation of the ‘mystery of homoousios’\textsuperscript{180} The process of transformation of humanity through conforming to Christ’s glorified body, the culmination of Hilary’s anthropological vision, is thus a direct result of and central aspect of his trinitarian argumentation, and indeed, where human flesh itself becomes the expressed image of the divine.\textsuperscript{181} Human consummation in the image of God, the movement from visible to invisible, from \textit{in eo} to \textit{in ipsis}, derives from and is necessitated by God existing as Trinity. For Hilary, because God exists as Trinity, in this type of Father-Son equality, humanity exists in this fashion and moves in this way in progression toward perfection. God as Trinity grants to humanity not only its origination in creation but also its directional orientation—its destiny and fulfillment.

\textit{From adsumptio to adsumptio: a certain hopeful direction}

From the beginning of Hilary’s writings, the body-soul connection, discussed in the previous chapter, was a crucial aspect of this argument. The united simplicity of body and soul as a result of the resurrection-ascension-glorification ‘allows human nature to partake in the simplicity of the divine nature’.\textsuperscript{182} This is

\textsuperscript{179} Pelland, ‘Subjectio’, 450.

\textsuperscript{180} Gilles Pelland, ‘Gloriam ex conspectus gloriae (Hilaire, Tr ps 118, heth, 8)’, \textit{Greg} 72.4 (1991), 763.

\textsuperscript{181} Burns, \textit{Model}, 223, notes that Hilary uses his understanding of the full divinity of the Son ‘in order to provide the means and the pattern for the resurrected body’. He continues on 224 stating that for Hilary, ‘If Christ is not fully divine then the ultimate hope of the Christian for eternal life of body and soul cannot be realized’.

\textsuperscript{182} Scully, ‘Assumption’, 156.
what makes the ‘bodily’ focus of the consummation of human progress in Hilary so important. The spiritualisation or glorification of Christ’s body accomplishes this union of the human person which is in turn effectuated through union with the divine perfection. Human potentiality, the mutability of humanity, moves in a certain hopeful direction. Indeed, human hope depends upon this hopeful mutability, this natural condition of progress which is certainly and necessarily directed toward this specific end.

The simple fact that humanity was created by such an infinitely perfect Creator necessitates this reality for Hilary. For, as Descourtieux notes, ‘[notre] esprit est doté d’une mobilité qui est bien le signe de son origine divine’. Or in Hilary’s own words: ‘Each and every soul (mens) is carried by natural instinct towards the knowledge and hope of eternity, because just as the divine origin of our souls is believed to be innate and imprinted upon all, so the soul (mens) knows itself to have no small affinity with heaven in its origin’. Human potentiality is only fulfilled in Christ, who is definitive of the true fullness that humanity is destined to become. The last word of the magnum pietatis sacramentum is thus ‘notre assumption avec le Christ dans la plénitude de Dieu’. The mystery of great piety, the dispensatio, the dwelling of the Word in humanity which brings about this human perfection is not complete until the subjection of the human to the divine. The incarnation involves a progression from adsumptio to adsumptio,


184 Psal. 62.3, CCSL 61:206. See Burns, Model, 198-216 for an insightful exploration of the connection of the origin and destiny of humanity in Psal., particularly regarding Psal. 118.10 and 129.3-6, one of three main sets of texts in which Burns traces the final demutatio (see ibid., 198). Burns writes (ibid.) ‘the focus on this extended treatment of human origins is designed to set up the parameters of the ultimate demutatio. For Hilary employs the human components at creation to anticipate the vital constitutive elements in the final transformation after the resurrection. At stake for Hilary is the relation of body, soul, and spirit throughout each of the three stages of the Christian life’.

humanity assumed by Christ and Christ, containing all humanity in himself, assumed by the Father. This ‘double assumption’ is the two-sided coin of Hilary’s progressive vision of humanity, the culmination of his trinitarian anthropology.

Conclusion

In Hilary’s central discussion of the glorification of humanity in the glorified body of Christ in reference to John 17 and 1 Corinthians 15, his anthropological vision of human potentiality progressing into the infinite divine perfection is seen to come to an eschatological fruition. We have seen the centrality of this progression in each successive chapter of this thesis: from human destiny in potential creation in the eternal generation of the Son, to the progressus in infinitum into the divine life, to the naturae nostrae gradum toward the infinite Trinity, to the destiny of humanity defined in the person of Christ, the true Image, to here in this chapter, the culmination of human potentiality in glorification into the divine perfection.

Philippians 2:6-11 taken as a hermeneutical key for interpreting christological biblical texts has enabled Hilary to promote an anthropological vision in which the lived life of Christ functions as the definition and destiny of all human life. Here, in Hilary’s discussion of the glorification of that definitive human being, that destiny is brought into its full potentiality, that God might be omnia in omnibus. The progression of all humanity in the assumed human life of Christ makes Christ himself, his literal and actual humanity united to divinity, the location, the geographical boundary of human salvation: the fulfillment of human potentiality. He is both the source and the goal of humanity's hopeful mutability.
CONCLUSION

A hope greater than expected

Our destiny, our nature and our home
Is with infinitude, and only there;
With hope it is, hope that can never die,
Effort and expectation and desire
And something evermore about to be.
- Wordsworth, The Prelude, 6.654-8

In the beginning of this thesis I stated that it would 'reenvision' Hilary's thought, reframe it along the lines of the inseparable and inherent connection of knowing the divine and knowing humanity. This began in Chapter 1 by exploring the necessary relationship between divine generation and creation in Hilary through his reading of John 1.1-4. It is in his reading of the johannine prologue where he claims to have found 'a hope greater than expected',¹ in which humanity, aided by its educative embodied existence,² is destined for life and progress, not death and regress. In Chapter 2 we saw that through Hilary's transformation of the language of divine infinity in his polemical engagements, and through his original reading of Proverbs 8.22, based upon the exegetical foundation of John 1.3-4 seen in Chapter 1, humanity, being 'potentially' created in the infinite life of the Son, is destined for progressus in infinitum, an infinite progression into the infinite life which is its origin. Hilary's doctrine of divine infinity necessitates

¹ Trin. 1.11, SC 443:224.
² Ibid., 1.14.
human progress towards and in God, and governs all his theological discourse. The finite restrictions of human finitude lead to the necessary conclusion that God is infinitely beyond human comprehension, and perpetuates the mind's progress in the knowledge of God. The limitations of finite human knowing can receive knowledge of God only through his condescension in revelation, and this condescension effectuates human progress through union with divine perfection.

In Chapter 3, through Hilary's polemical and inter-textual reading of John 10.30 and 14.9, we began to see how this mens infinita unfolds. Divine condescension takes on the very shape of the human condition in the incarnation, and through the divine unity of the Father and the Son revealed in the human Jesus, humanity is raised as through 'a ladder of our nature' to the vision of the triune God. This is a humane condescension which brings about an analogical and analogical process of knowing God that works within the confines of humane epistemological restrictions to elevate humanity beyond them. Human, embodied existence is thus useful and productive for knowledge of God, a necessary, and indeed, due to the incarnation, good aspect of human progression towards the divine. The physical, material, temporally conditioned, bodily reception of the knowledge of God, through his condescension into this very embodied existence, thus has immense ramifications for Hilary's trinitarian doctrine and anthropology. The Trinity, and how humanity knows God as Trinity, shapes all discourse of the nature of humanity. The begotten God, who is Life and received his birth from Life, reveals his union with the Father and manifests his divinity from within the human condition. And in doing so, elevates that condition to God
from within humanity itself. The finite potentiality of humanity is therefore, far from a negative aspect of being human, a hopeful reality.

In Chapter 4 we saw that Hilary’s distinct developments regarding eternal generation, divine infinity, and divine unity enabled him to transform the ambiguous language of the divine ‘image’ so that it took on a distinctively pro-Nicene expression. In doing so, he also was able to greatly further the natural anthropological implications image discourse has in Christian theology due to its understanding of humanity in the imago Dei. Hilary capitalizes on the revelation of God, the vision of God in Christ, as corporaliter, so that ‘the revelation of God to humanity reveals humanity to itself’. Indeed, only in the contemplation and love of the Trinity does ‘the mystery of the human condition finds its explanation’. For Hilary, in Christ’s lived human life, including his manner of suffering and human experience due to his Philippians 2 christological paradigm and Stoic psychological categories, we see the fullness of human potentiality, and finally that potentiality brought into the fullness of divine perfection. The destiny of all humanity is completed in the human life of Christ. Humanity, who was animae infirmis admixtionem, becomes in both body and soul the very image of God.

Chapter 5 demonstrated that the entire human coming to image God, the movement from imaging in eo to in ipsis, comes to fruition through Christ’s glorification which is expounded upon in Hilary’s intertextual reading of John 17.1-6, 1 Corinthians 15.21-28, and Philippians 3.21, understood within his overarching Philippians 2 christological framework. For Hilary, Christ’s

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4 Ibid., 8.53 SC 448:466; 8.54 SC 448:466.
5 Descourtieux, 'Introduction', 63.
6 Ibid., 64.
adsumptio of humanity in the incarnation is an assumption of all humanity, though not in a generic sense of 'human nature' abstractly understood. It is in fact entirely particularist. God the Son, in the very human body of Jesus, assumes corpus universi humani generis, and is the meeting place of the divine and human. This enables the narrative of Christ's life, death, resurrection, and ascension to be that of all humanity. All humanity is implicated in Christ's life and, finally, glorification. The incarnation thus involves a double adsumptio, of humanity by Christ and of Christ (and all humanity in him) by the Father. Christ himself is humanity's origin and destiny as his body is the literal geographical boundary of salvation, of the coming of humanity into the fullness of its potentiality. He is the source and goal of humanity's hopeful mutability.

A reenvisioning of Hilary's theology along the lines of divine-human relations, of the Trinity exegeting human existence, requires approaching Hilary's thought from within the confines of its own categories of the condescension of an infinite God within finite human limitation, which directly determine what it means for that humanity to know and be related to this God. One cannot approach Hilary's text with anachronistic trinitarian and theological categories which presuppose what 'trinitarian doctrine', or 'christology', or 'anthropology' are. When studying fourth-century thought, the first things that spring to mind when discussing trinitarian theology are not necessarily the doctrine of creation, the nature of humanity and human knowing, the progress of salvation, or the sheer rawness of the bodily locality of the space where the divine meets the human, but Hilary's trinitarian argumentation led him here to these matters which for him are inherent to theological discourse. This has become clear through examining his main trinitarian arguments. In eternal generation we see the potential creation of
humanity, which effectuates its origin and destiny, in the infinite and eternal life of God we see the *progressus in infinitum* of that humanity in process towards perfection, in the unity of the Father and Son, revealed in a way appropriate to human epistemological restrictions, there is a 'ladder of our nature' towards that divine perfection, and in the life of Christ, his entire lived existence and his final glorification, the effectuation and completion of that perfect human destiny. Hilary assessed the arguments of his opponents, the words of Scripture, and his own theological heritage by this paradigm of divine-human relations. This is not due to an anthropomorphising of the Trinity, the movement is not from anthropology to Trinity, but vice versa. Hilary's theology is *humane* in that it recognises that the trinitarian life itself inhabited human space; that Christ, in his human condition, is the *solus testis fidelis* of divinity. It is here, the locative position of the unity of divinity and humanity, where divine wisdom and knowledge entered the human condition, that Hilary's thought is understood at its centre as a trinitarian anthropology, and not an anthropological Trinity.

This perhaps opens up new possibilities not only for Hilary studies, but for our understanding of fourth-century thought as a whole. Our questions of what really matters to these Christians, what their primary categories of thought are, must in many ways be reassessed, and not only regarding what they argue for concerning God, but how they approach what it means to think towards God at all. With Hilary, depictions of the fourth-century as debates surrounding metaphysical abstractions of the divine, rather than a lived, *performed*, reality, simply have no foundation. This reading of Hilary aids the contemporary re-narration of fourth-century theological development as Hilary's theology is a holistic vision of human
life with God, which is uncompromisingly theocentric, but expressly lived in human life. It refuses abstraction as it concerns the trinitarian life spilling out over into human existence: divine perfection defining and fulfilling human potentiality. So that humanity's incomplete and mutable state is indeed a hopeful one.

Hilary's overall theological vision is coherent only when his own concerns and theological structures are taken as the primary reference points for understanding his arguments. His thought is unintelligible when approached through anachronistic categories, but not when allowed to speak from its own. Hilary's theology reconstructed within his framework of trinitarian anthropology is not only coherent, but provides avenues to reassess the nature of fourth-century theology, and in a way which implicates the nature of humanity in that theological discourse. Hilary's overall vision does this in such a way that imperfect, mutable, finite human existence is defined by God's perfect, immutable, and infinite life, so as to place the human condition in a state of perpetual progress from potentiality to perfection.

In the quest for what it means to be a human being, Hilary submits to us at least this one intimation: hope.

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7 See examples of readings of the fourth century by Ayres, Nicaea, and Anatolios, Retrieving Nicaea, in Chapter 1.

8 So Lionel Wickham's comments, review of Weedman, Trinitarian, JEH 60.2 (2009):330-31, that Trin. 'is a work whose incoherences ... are matched by obscurity of expression', is entirely true when compared to twenty-first century theology or presumed historical paradigms for fourth-century Christianity. Scully, 'Assumption', 252. aptly summarizes this problem in Hilary scholarship: 'Either Hilary is historically uninteresting because we insist on categorizing his theology according to modern judgment and assimilating him to his peers—in so doing eliminating all his individuality—or we recognize Hilary's individuality only to throw up our hands at Hilary's "incomprehensibility" because we no longer know how to classify or study him'. See also Beckwith, Hilary, 210, who claims that scholars 'struggle to assess Hilary's own contribution to the history of Christian thought', and 'are reluctant to credit Hilary with his own theological and exegetical creativity'. 
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