Journal article
If at first you dont succeed: An experimental investigation of the impact of repetition options on corporate takeovers and the provision of public goods
- Abstract:
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This paper models, and experimentally simulates, the free-rider problem in a takeover when the raider has the option to “resolicit,” that is, to make a new offer after an offer has been rejected. In theory, the option to resolicit, by lowering offer credibility, increases the dissipative losses associated with free riding. In practice, the outcomes of our experiment, while quite closely tracking theory in the effective absence of an option to resolicit, differed dramatically from theory when ...
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- Publication date:
- 2006-01-01
Item Description
- UUID:
-
uuid:302c60be-4c90-49a0-934d-a3d52a121fec
- Local pid:
- oai:eureka.sbs.ox.ac.uk:1110
- Deposit date:
- 2011-11-09
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- Copyright date:
- 2006
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