



IDENTITIES AND SENSE OF BELONGING OF MUSLIMS IN BRITAIN

**Using Survey Data, Cognitive Survey Methodology,
and In-Depth Interviews**

Sundas Ali
Nuffield College



Academic Supervisor:
Professor Anthony Heath

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Abstract

The scope and principal arguments of the research in this thesis are as follows. This thesis is centered on exploring the identities and sense of belonging of Muslims in Britain. There is a strand of academic research which claims that Muslims in Britain are withdrawn from mainstream Britain because they live in segregated ethnic enclaves, participate in non-mainstream religions, and politically organize themselves via ethnically and religiously homogenous networks. This thesis attempts to go beyond such existing research and advance our understanding of the identities and sense of belonging of Muslims in Britain. Accordingly, the research questions that guide the thesis are:

- 1. What is the strength and relative importance of British identity for Muslims in Britain and what are its drivers?**
- 2. What does ‘belonging to Britain’ mean to Muslims in Britain?**
- 3. What do the identities, British, Pakistani, and Muslim mean to Muslims in Britain, and how easy do they find it to integrate these identities?**

These questions are dealt with in three main empirical chapters, with the use of a multi-methods approach, combining survey data, cognitive survey methodology interviews, and in-depth qualitative interviews. The first empirical chapter presents regression results, from the Citizenship Survey and Ethnic Minority British Election Study, which confirm the strength of British identity for Muslims and present the various drivers that motivate it. These quantitative findings however do not tell us much about what ‘belonging to Britain’ really means for Muslims. The second empirical chapter delves further into this the concept. I ‘question’ the survey question ‘How strongly do you belong to Britain?’ through 30 cognitive interviews that are used to evaluate survey methodology. This exercise displays two key meanings of the question on belonging to Britain: a ‘cultural’ feeling (at ease) and an ‘affective’ feeling (feel attached). Most respondents interpreted the question as ‘cultural’, reflecting upon the practices, ethical values, and lifestyle that characterises a country. The third empirical chapter takes a look at the identities of Muslims, their national, ethnic, and religious identities through 61 qualitative in-depth interviews. The findings from the structured and unstructured identity questions help to understand the way Muslims in Britain relate to their British, Pakistani, and Muslim identities. The results from the structured identity question took a categorical view of identity as opposed to the themes that emerged from the unstructured identity questions and took a dimensional view of identity. These themes generated a six-group typology of identity with the groups: cultural, unambiguous, emotional, emergent, ambivalent, and none of the above. It was found that identities were not simply additive but were emergent and creative with processes of fusion and mesh. There were some tensions and contradictions in Muslims trying to integrate their different aspects of identity.

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Declaration of Authorship

I, Sundas Ali, hereby declare that this thesis is my own work except, where otherwise stated.

Signed:

Sundas Ali
Oxford, 19th April 2013

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

CHAPTER

1

Introduction

“The beginning of knowledge is the discovery of something we do not understand”

- Frank Herbert

Introductory Summary

In this introductory chapter I set out the problem and focus of this thesis. Firstly, I discuss the background and contextualise the research topic and present the research questions that give bearing to this thesis. And secondly, I look at the history and current trends for Muslim communities in Britain.

1.1 Contextualising the Research

As with any study, the research conducted in this thesis has a background and context. The broad topic of enquiry in this thesis, Muslims in Britain, grew from a wider interest in the events that have been unfolding globally in relation to Muslims. Arguably, the most significant event in relation to Muslims in the last century has been the attacks on 11th September 2001 (9/11), when two planes crashed into the twin towers in New York, United States (US), apparently carried out by Al Qaida, a militant group of Muslim extremists who opposed the policies and intervention of Western countries, most notably the United Kingdom (UK) and US, in relation to Muslim countries. This single event triggered almost a domino effect, with similar events occurring across Europe. In Britain, an event of almost similar magnitude was the London bombings of 7th July 2005 (also referred to as 7/7). With the occurrence of these events, Muslims in America and Europe (where they are immigrant communities) became trapped in an identity question. A debate was initiated about the loyalty of the immigrant Muslims and their subsequent generations towards their host countries.

The events of 7/7 were instrumental in initiating a debate about the attachment of Muslims in Britain to their nation and communities, making them an important point of focus for policy-makers, commentators, and academics. Prime Minister David Cameron's speech in 2011 was a recent reminder of these concerns in which he forcibly expressed the argument that multiculturalism has failed and is instead leading to the entrenchment of separate communities (echoing remarks of German Chancellor Angela Merkel), he claimed that:

“Under the doctrine of state multiculturalism, we have encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and apart from the mainstream.... We've even tolerated these segregated communities behaving in ways that run completely counter to our values This hands-off tolerance has only served to reinforce the sense that not enough is shared. And this all leaves some young Muslims feeling rootless. And the search for something to belong to and something to believe in can lead them to this extremist ideology what we see – and what we see in so many European countries – is a process of radicalisation” (Cameron 2011).

The events of 7/7 had puzzled many people in Britain. How could their fellow citizens, born and bred in Britain, plot and carry out such cruel acts? Questions arose about their British identity, and there was almost a conundrum about whether young Muslims are able to integrate their identities with the values of the nation. Which identity was more important for them? Their British or Muslim identity? Was there an order of priority in selecting their identities?

This area of research is complex and requires a detailed study, it is not as one dimensional as some opinion polling data would like us to believe. Despite calls for a better understanding on the Britishness and identities of Muslims in Britain, there is a lack of sound and comprehensive research on this topic; there is a gap in the existing academic literature. Research on Muslims has been conducted on such diverse aspects of life such as housing, employment, education, and political engagement (Modood et al. 1997, Sarwar 1991; Sellick 2004; Abbas 2005; Mustafa 2010). However little research exists regarding the multi-layered processes behind the sense of belonging and identities of Muslims in Britain. To fill this lacuna, this thesis will aim to address the key issues of interest surrounding the identities and sense of belonging of Muslims in Britain from a sociological perspective.

When there is a problem to solve – a question for which an answer is needed – then we have to do some work to find that answer. Sometimes this information is available in the existing literature, sometimes we need to start from scratch, as no or little information exists. When we have worked out what the nature of the problem is, then we can turn that into a precise research question which helps in working through how to answer it (Springett and Campbell 2006). The research questions that will guide this thesis begin by exploring the British identification of Muslims in Britain and then delve into their ethnic and religious identities.

The research questions are:

Research Question 1:

What is the strength and relative importance of British identity for Muslims in Britain and what are its drivers?

Research Question 2:

What does ‘belonging to Britain’ mean to Muslims in Britain?

Research Question 3:

What do the identities, British, Pakistani, and Muslim mean to Muslims in Britain, and how easy do they find it to integrate these identities?

Answering these questions would enable an understanding of how Muslims in Britain balance their national, ethnic, and religious identities. The research in this thesis will be carried out using mixed-methods. The first analytical chapter (Chapter Five) will look at all Muslims in Britain, first, second, and third generations, but the second and third analytical chapters (Chapters Six and Seven) will draw their data largely from second and third generation Muslims in Britain, with the exception of a few first generation Muslims and recent arrivals. The importance of studying the second generation is emphasised by Heath and Roberts (2008):

“It is important not to focus solely on the situation of recent migrants but to have regard for that of second-generation ethnic minorities, many of whom suffer substantial ‘ethnic penalties’ in the labour market (see for example

Heath and Cheung 2007). French experience and research (and indeed the Northern Ireland experience) suggests that, when ethnic minorities believe that they are denied the equality of opportunity that a liberal state professes, disillusionment and resentment may follow with implications for social order. Such resentment may well be even stronger in the second (and later) generations than among the migrants themselves (who may have frames of reference oriented more to their countries of origin)” (p.26).

From this they are saying that the second generation are important to study because they can perhaps relay much more to us about integration and cultural transmission than the first generation. And it is with research based on them that we can truly prepare for the future minority ethnic and religious generations.


1.2 History and Current Trends for Muslims in Britain

Muslims have had a long history in Britain with links forged from the Middle Ages onwards. In the Nineteenth Century Yemeni men came to work on ships, forming one of the country’s first Muslim communities. Following World War II, Britain received large and diverse flows of migration in response to labour shortages. Britain has a broader range of well-established ethnic minority migrant groups as opposed to other West European Countries (except France) and this is primarily because of Britain’s extended history with colonies outside of Europe as well as its early industrialization and demand for foreign labor, which facilitated a longer history of immigration than in many other West European countries (Maxwell 2012). Caribbeans were the first to arrive during the 1950s and enjoyed relative social integration due to familiarity with

British culture, the English language, and the Christian religion (Nanton 1999). Indians were the first South Asians to arrive in large numbers, and enjoyed relative economic success due to higher education and skill levels upon arrival and their likelihood of culturally adapting to British society because of their moderate Hindu or secular tendencies (Heath and McMahon 2005).

In the 1970s Bangladeshis and Pakistanis began to arrive in large numbers and eventually became the majority of Britain's Muslim population (Hiro 1991; Census 2001).¹ Bangladeshi and Pakistani immigrants tended to have less education than previous waves of Caribbeans and Indians, and because the British economy was not as strong in the 1970s and 80s as it was in the 50s and 60s, Bangladeshis and Pakistanis found social mobility difficult and remain the poorest ethnic minority groups in Britain (Heath and McMahon 2005). They arrived as migrant labour and were likely to occupy the lowest strata of the labour market. Additionally, they seemed to have occupied lower social positions because of the racism they experienced, which was thought to exacerbate their low socio-economic status (Layton-Henry 1992). Therefore, while research on ethnic minority alienation in Britain has studied all South Asians, Muslims have received the most focus, especially Bangladeshis and Pakistanis.

¹ Together Bangladeshis and Pakistanis comprise 59% of Britain's Muslim population (2001 Census).


Figure 1: Religious Groups in the UK (2001)

Source: Census 2001

Until a few years ago there had been difficulty in accurately calculating the number of Muslims in Britain due to the fact that the British Census asked its respondents only to indicate their ethnic group (Hunter 2002). For the first time in 2001, the UK Census included a question about religious affiliation and consequently found that there were approximately 1.5 million² Muslims living in Britain. Figure 1 shows us that as would be expected, Christians were the largest faith group, constituting 72 per cent of the population. After them, those without a religion (No Religion) formed the next largest group at 15.5 per cent, followed by those who did not state their religion (Religion Not Stated) forming 7.3 per cent. At 3 per cent, the Muslim population was the largest minority faith group in Britain (Census 2001). Figure 2 shows that compared to other minority faith groups in Britain, Muslims made up the largest proportion at 52 per cent.

² To be exact, 1,591,126 Muslims in the UK (2001 Census).

Figure 2: Minority Religious Groups in the UK (2001)




Source: Census 2001

Ten years on from these figures, although Muslims still make up the largest minority faith group, there has been some change in the overall figures for religious affiliation. The recently revealed 2011 Census shows a change in these figures (see Figures 3 and 4 below). The question asked on religion was the same as in 2001: ‘What is your religion?’ The 2011 census found there to be an increase in the number of Muslims, a rise from 1.6 million (2.7 per cent) to 2.7 million³ (4.8 per cent) over the ten years. And although Christians remain the largest group (33.2 million, representing 59 per cent of residents), they have decreased in numbers; the census found that there were four million fewer Christians in England and Wales in 2011 than ten years earlier (when they constituted 37.3 million, 72 per cent). Meanwhile the proportion of the population who reported they have no religion has now reached a quarter (25 per cent) of the population (Census 2011).

³ To be exact, 2,706,066 Muslims in England and Wales (2011 Census).


Abbas (2012) gives us his perspective on the new census findings. The 2011 Census revealed some interesting initial findings. It tells us that Britain has become even more diverse, that more and more people are engaged in mixed race relationships, that language is varied among people and that there are more religious minority groups. For some the increase in the Muslim population (from 1.6 million to 2.7 million) seems startling. However, according to Abbas it is not such a major surprise. It reflects the on-going experience of marriage migration, where wives and husbands from the subcontinent join their spouses in Britain, and with many as 10-15,000 people entering the UK every year through this process. It is also a function of birth rates, which tend to be higher among South Asian Muslims who tend to marry other South Asian Muslims, whether from the UK or from outside. This pattern is unlikely to have changed in any way. There is also the number of people, e.g. from Somalia, who come to the country seeking asylum and refugee, fleeing persecution in their native countries, often as a result of war, conflict and dislocation due to political issues. Britain has now become a home to these people who make up the fabric of society in increasingly observable ways through their various cultural characteristics as well as their obvious visibility in relation to skin colour and religion. In addition, the number of White converts, who are mostly women, into Islam also acts as a factor for the larger number of Muslims in the UK today.

Figure 3: Religious Groups in England and Wales (2011)



Source: 2011 Census

Figure 4: Change in Religious Groups in Britain, 2001-2011



Source: 2001 and 2011 Census

The other important dynamic around the recent increase in Muslim numbers is to do with the number of white Britons who are reverting/converting to Islam on an annual basis. It is difficult to estimate how many of the 1 million or so reflect an increase in the

number of white Muslims. Further data from the ONS will soon provide evidence to support conjectures around the notion that perhaps white Britons are feeling disaffected by Christianity or that white Britons are seeing Islam for its greater spiritual, intellectual, legal, or emotional depth rather than the somewhat problematic generalised media and political discourses on the topic. The other important issue here is to consider the role of white British women who convert to Islam. Sometimes it is done for love and marriage. Sometimes it is done because of the disaffection towards patriarchal majority society which has still not quite worked out how to deliver gender equality in practice. White Britons are turning to Islam in greater numbers, this can only be true at some level, but it is clear that there are a whole host of motivations that drive people to make that turn. However, this is outside the scope of this thesis.

Furthermore, the 2011 Census showed that the city of London has the largest Muslim population as compared to any other city in Britain; the figure makes up 40 per cent of Britain's total Muslim population and 8.5 per cent of London's total population. It showed London as being more ethnically diverse than the rest of the UK, with the highest proportion of people identifying themselves as Muslim. According to the 2001 census, forty per cent of London's Muslims were born in the UK, with significant numbers born in South Asia, Africa, and Europe. Almost two thirds of Muslims in London are of South Asian origin (24 per cent Bangladeshi, 22 per cent Pakistani, 7 per cent Indian and 7 per cent 'other' Asian). Nearly 20 per cent are White (who might be Arab), 13 per cent Black (12 per cent Black African), and almost five per cent from mixed groups and other ethnic groups (Mayor of London 2006).

The Muslim population in Britain as a whole is also ethnically diverse. Three quarters of Muslims (74 per cent) are from a South Asian ethnic background, predominantly Pakistani (43 per cent), Bangladeshi (16 per cent), Indian (8 per cent), and Other Asian (6 per cent). One in ten Muslims (11 per cent) are from a White ethnic group, 4 per cent are of White British origin and 7 per cent from another White background including Turkish, Cypriot, Arab, and Eastern European. A further 6 per cent of Muslims are of Black African origin, mainly from North and West Africa, particularly Somalia (Census 2001). One notable change in the 2011 Census was the inclusion of an 'Arab' ethnic category, and this has helped refine the British Muslim picture as many Arabic speaking British citizens who are Muslim could not find an appropriate category (such as Somali groups), and had in the past been selecting from 3 or 4 near matches (including White British).

Most Muslims in Britain belong to the Sunni tradition/sect of Islam, which accounts for 90 per cent of Muslims worldwide. However, there is also a sizeable number of Shi'a Muslims (BBC News 1997). It is worth noting that even within these overarching theological categories of Sunni and Shi'a Muslims, there is great diversity in sub groups as well as the range and extent of the practice of faith, an aspect I will discuss in more detail later. According to the 2011 Census, of all the religious groups in England and Wales, Muslims have the youngest age profile. Almost one third is below 15 years of age and 17 per cent are aged 16-24 years. Of the over 2.5 million Muslims in Britain, 46 per cent were born in the UK. The majority of these young British Muslims are either the 'one-point-five' generation or 'second generation plus' from migrant communities, with some being 'first' generation unaccompanied refugees and asylum seekers. Heath et al. (2013) define the 'first' generation as those who were born abroad and arrived as

adults, that is at age sixteen or older, a ‘one-point-five’ generation who were also born abroad but migrated before age sixteen, and a ‘second generation plus’ who were born in Britain and which also includes the small number of third-generation individuals whose parents were also born in Britain. I will stick to these definitions throughout this thesis.

National statistics on wealth, health, crime, and education show that 20 per cent of 16-24 year old Muslims are unemployed; 16 per cent of women and 13 per cent of men report poor health, the highest of all UK religious groups; 31 per cent of young British Muslims leave school with no qualifications compared to 15 per cent of the total population (Census 2001). Migration can take time to adjust to, as successive generations lay roots and find ways of applying and integrating their cultural and religious beliefs in their new context. Communities, families, and individuals can come under considerable strain and pressure as they make these adjustments.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have set out the focus and research questions of this thesis and reviewed the history, demographic trends, and recent developments of Muslims in Britain. I now turn to reviewing the existing literature on Muslims in Britain in the next chapter, before looking at the theoretical literature on identities and research methodology, after which the analytical chapters begin.

CHAPTER

2

Literature Review on Muslims in Britain

Introductory Summary

In this chapter I review the literature on Muslims in Britain highlighting the existing studies and empirical evidence on them. In doing so, I identify the findings, claims, and assumptions held about Muslims in Britain in existing academic research, which is important in order to understand how the research can be furthered in this thesis.

2.1 Literature Review on Muslims in Britain

A widespread belief in Western countries is that multiculturalism, defined as a programme for giving recognition to ethno-religious groups and their cultures, has failed and is instead leading to the entrenchment of separate communities with corrosive consequences for trust and solidarity (Heath and Demireva 2013). As well as politicians, these arguments have also been put forward by academics. For example Sniderman and Hagendoorn (2007) have argued that “Britain and the Netherlands have promoted multiculturalism to expand opportunities for minorities to enjoy a better life and to win a respected place of their own in their new society. It is all the more unfortunate, as our findings will show, that the outcome has been the opposite – to encourage exclusion rather than inclusion” (2007: 5).

Maxwell (2012) argues that ever since non-European migrants have been settling into Britain, one of the biggest debates has been whether they and their subsequent generations will integrate into the country’s cultural norms and values. There are some optimistic researchers who argue that most migrants and their descendents tend to adopt the host country’s symbols of integration such as nationality, language, and general

customs over time (Alba and Nee 2003; Brouard and Tiberj 2005), there is also evidence that migrants in Europe have strong levels of commitment to mainstream political institutions and of government satisfaction that are similar to, perhaps even more positive, than those of natives (Maxwell 2010; Roder and Muhlau 2010). But on the other side, there are researchers who disagree. There is a worry that migrants may hold onto parts of their homeland culture that are incompatible with European society. In particular, this worry has been for the Muslim migrants, who are suggested to be too conservative concerning their views on certain topics such as women and homosexuals (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007). And as discussed in the last chapter, attacks of violence in North America and Western Europe carried out by some Muslim militants serve as additional reasons for concern, as well as the fear that perhaps even moderate Muslims may provide support for terrorists (Caldwell 2006; Cesari 2005).

It has been suggested that since the late 1980s, the politics of ethnic minorities in Britain has shifted from “Black”⁴ politics of inclusion and equality to Muslim and South Asian demands for distinct religious and cultural rights (Ansari 2005a).⁵ Firstly, it has been claimed that the rise of Muslim politics is linked to their economic and social isolation. The summer 2001 riots in Oldham, Burnley, and Bradford and the attacks of July 2005 in London have been used as examples of the dangers of poor, alienated, and religiously and politically radicalized Muslims⁶.

⁴ Prior to the late 1980s “Black” was a common term used to unite the various non-white ethnic minorities in Britain, i.e. Caribbeans, Africans, Indians, Bangladeshis, and Pakistanis (Maxwell 2006).

⁵ The analytical categories “Muslim” and “South Asian” are sometimes used interchangeably in Britain, but should be considered as distinct – if overlapping – terms. The 2001 UK Census shows that 74% of Muslims are South Asian (Indian, Bangladeshis, or Pakistani), meaning more than 25% are non South Asian. The 2001 UK Census also shows that 50% of South Asians are Muslim, meaning exactly one half of South Asians are not Muslim. The groups most likely to be Muslim are Bangladeshis and Pakistanis, each at 92%. Source: UK Population Census.

⁶ The BBC documentary series *Panorama* aired a special “A Question of Leadership” on August 21, 2005, which questioned whether Muslim leadership in Britain (most notably the Muslim Council of Britain) was sufficiently focused on solving the serious problems of poverty and social exclusion, as well as

Secondly, it has also been claimed that Muslims in Britain develop anti-mainstream identities because they live in segregated ethnic enclaves where their friends, spouses, and business associates are all of the same ethnic group and religion, which in turn breeds ethnically and religiously isolated identities, they participate in non-mainstream religions, and politically organize via ethnically and religiously motivated networks (Ouseley 2001; Samad 1992; Kepel 1997; Sikand 1998; Fielding and Geddes 1998; and Koopmans and Statham 2004). Thirdly, it has been assumed that minority group identification with the host country is positively related with three main factors: improved socio-economic status, greater social engagement with the mainstream culture, and increased political/civic participation. According to these arguments improved socio-economic status will increase the likelihood of identifying with the nation as life becomes materially better in the host nation. Social engagement with the mainstream culture will increase the likelihood of identifying with the nation through social and familial relationships. Political and civic participation will increase the likelihood of identifying with the nation through acceptance of national symbols, institutions, and tangible involvement and investment in the community (Alba and Nee 2003).

There is something to be said here about the terms used by the academics, such as ‘politics’ and ‘demands’. These terms denote connotations of an in-group and out-group dynamic where the latter is trying to enter the former through negotiating certain conditions. On a wider level, Islamophobia is increasingly being seen as perhaps the greatest threat to democracy in Western countries today. The Runnymede Trust produced a report in 1997, which showed that there had been a rapid growth in anti-

sufficiently strict with radical elements of British Islam, which supposedly led to the July 7 and 21, 2005 bombings.

Muslim prejudice. Just as anti-Jewish feeling in earlier European history had led to the development of a new term to describe it (anti-Semitism), so the growing hostility to Muslims required a new word, 'Islamophobia'⁷, defined as "unfounded hostility towards Islam" which could lead to "unfair discrimination against Muslim individuals and communities, and to the exclusion of Muslims from mainstream political and social affairs" (The Runnymede Trust 1997).

Moncrief (2005) quotes the Australian lawyer, Stephen Hopper, who thinks that Muslims are being "dehumanized in the public discourse surrounding terrorism, in the same way Nazis dehumanized Jews before World War II". Swedish writer and leftist intellectual Guillou (2005) states that the rhetoric employed by the Nazis against Jews is now being used to target Muslims. He is of the view that the Nazis thought all Jews were part of an international conspiracy to control the world and subdue others in their own lands, and now the exact same thing is happening, only this time, Muslims are the victims of this hate. Where a group suffers rejection by the majority, 'reactive ethnicity', or 'oppositional culture' may be the result (Fordham and Ogbu 1986) which can lead them to have substantially different value orientations or world views as compared to the majority group. Their religion, the very characteristic under scrutiny, can become a pertinent aspect of their self-identification or give rise to a collective group identity, as interpreted by Anderson's (2006) well-known maxim, an 'imagined community'. This has in fact been the case because the prominence of religion as a marker of identity among Muslims has been noted by Hutnik 1985; Bochner 1982; Saeed et al. 1999; Dwyer 1999; Hopkins 2004; Tyrer and Ahmad 2006; and Jacobson 1998.

⁷Rather than being directed against a 'race' or a particular minority ethnic group, Islamophobia can be seen as a form of racism directed at people because of their religious beliefs.

In the wider scope, there have been worries about immigration making it one of the most important issues facing Britain. It is argued that this increased immigration can have economic and social consequences. The social consequences of immigration can lead to the dilution of 'traditional' culture or a more melodramatic outcome when this mix of mutually incompatible cultures whose irreconcilable differences could result in a 'culture clash'. These concerns are supplemented by fears about the integration of Muslims into British culture. There is widespread belief that a growing fraction of Muslims who live (and in many cases were born) in Britain do not think of themselves as British, have no aspiration to do so and do not want their children to do so either. Instead, it is feared, they subscribe to some other identity, creating little enclaves that resemble, as far as is possible, the countries from which they came or a model of the good society very different from what is generally thought of as 'Britain' (Manning and Roy 2007).

Such fears tend to be magnified by the statements by some British Muslims, which appear explicitly to reject a British identity and affirm another one. One of the 7/7 bombers appeared in a video saying, 'your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate atrocities against my people and your support of them makes you directly responsible, just as I am directly responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters' (Mohammad Sidique Khan). The use of the words 'your' and 'my' clearly expressed the people with whom he identified. There is a recognition that most British people know so little about Muslims that it is very hard to know how widespread these feelings are, calling for research to be conducted.

Muslim opinion polls are generally used as a major source of knowledge of British Muslim's attitudes for the media, commentariat, and even academics (for just a few examples see Field 2007 and Sagar 2006; 2009). However, these polls offer far from a straightforward picture of what Muslims think. With most of the questions asked in these polls determined by the media, who commissioned most of them and then reported the results, one has to ask to what extent did the British public see a picture of Muslim public opinion, and to what extent was it the media reflecting their own preferred narrative to create headlines and sell their newspapers? Following the attacks of 7/7, opinion polling data was used as a voice for Muslims to understand their views and loyalty towards Britain. Muslim public opinion polls are mostly taken at face value as the direct and unbiased voice of British Muslims, but Sobolewska and Ali (2012) show that most of the public opinion polls are commissioned by the media and suffer from similar framing effects to those seen in the general media coverage of Muslims. They found that at a time of national crisis, following the London terrorist attacks in 2005, it became especially clear that the media were following their pre-existing narrative on Muslims rather than responding to public interest. They analysed all public opinion polls conducted in the 18 months following the 7/7 attacks and all their broadsheet newspaper coverage to show that the media framing effects influenced both the creation of Muslim opinion polls, and their reporting.

2.2 The Construction of Muslim Identities

An aspect that has been of interest for the study of Muslims is the construction of their identities, their different aspects, and meanings. Studies have noted the importance or in some cases the centrality of religion to Muslim identity. An early indication of the

importance of religion to the identity of South Asian Muslims came from the research by Hutnik (1985) in which Muslim identity was listed by 80 per cent of South Asian Muslims as an important identity item. Hutnik's questionnaire measured the extent to which students asserted their individuality, by asking them to express their level of agreement with a number of statements⁸. Hutnik's finding is similar to the study of Bochner (1982) where he also discovered that Muslim identity was the strongest and most assertive among the main South Asian religious groups. Hutnik's findings are particularly significant as the study was carried out in 1985, prior to the 1989 Rushdie Affair, which is identified in much of the literature (Modood 1990) as a key moment in the development of British Muslim identity politics. The Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities by Policy Studies Institute (1994)⁹ confirmed Hutnik's earlier study in finding that 83 per cent of Pakistanis mentioned religion to be an important self-defining attribute. These findings are also confirmed by the results of Saeed et al. (1999) from self-identification surveys which asked respondents to write statements describing themselves, with some particularly related to their ethnicity¹⁰. Among this group, the 'Muslim' and 'Pakistani' identities were the top two categories mentioned, with 'Muslim' (85 per cent) being chosen nearly three times as often as 'Pakistani' (30 per cent). In 2001, the CS¹¹ asked participants to list the top ten things that would say something important about themselves. Muslims chose religion to be a more important marker of identity than ethnicity (O'Beirne 2004: 20).

⁸ Hutnik's (1985) sample comprised of Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi students aged 11-18, predominantly second-generation, from a school in Birmingham. The number of Muslim participants was very small, only 15.

⁹ The FNSEM contained a minority ethnic sample of 5,000 which included 1,200 Pakistanis and 600 Bangladeshis. It collected responses through interviewing household members across England and Wales.

¹⁰ The study was conducted on 63 second and third generation Pakistani Muslims in Glasgow, aged 14-17.

¹¹ Formerly known as the Home Office Citizenship Survey or HOCS. Since 2001, the questionnaire has incorporated a boost sample of approximately 5,000 adults aged 16 and over from minority ethnic groups (alongside approx. 10,000 adults in England and Wales). Conducted every two years, the survey carries out face-to-face interviews with respondents covering a wide range of issues, including race equality, faith, feelings about their community, volunteering and participation. It has now been discontinued.

This finding is supported by other research which has noted, since the 1980s, the importance of religion as a more significant marker of identity amongst Muslims than ethnicity (Bochner 1982; Hutnik 1985; Jacobson 1998; Saeed et al. 1999; and Archer 2003). The importance of religion as a marker of identity was also shown by the 2006 Global Attitudes poll¹² in which 72 per cent of Muslims in Britain said they believed that Muslims have a very strong (28 per cent) or fairly strong (44 per cent) sense of Islamic identity, and 77 per cent felt that this sense of identity was increasing. Eighty six per cent of Muslims felt this was a positive development (PEW Research Centre 2006). The 2007 CS asked its respondents about important aspects in their life, the question asked was: *What is the most important aspect of your identity?* With family being first pick by most Muslims, religion was the second most important aspect of their identity, chosen by over 31 per cent of Muslims. A mere 4 per cent of respondents thought their ethnic or racial background was the most important part of their identity and 2 per cent of them thought that national identity was. Sociologists influenced by modern theories of identity (Hall 1997a) would argue that this centrality of religion along with some degree of ethnicity for Muslims would suggest that their identities are fairly stable, as based upon these one or two identity categories. According to this interpretation their identities will tend to conform to modern conceptions of identity, i.e. essentialist connotations as opposed to constructivist approaches or in other words they confirm with ‘strong’ or ‘hard’ as opposed to the ‘weak’ or ‘soft’ connotations of identity. It will be interesting to probe through the research in this thesis whether Muslim identities actually conform to modern conceptions of identity, consisting of

¹²Through telephone and face-to-face interviews, this survey was conducted in 13 countries, including the UK and US.

essentialist as opposed to constructivist elements, i.e. do they have fixed identities as opposed to fluid ones?

However, poststructuralist and postmodern theories of identity (Hall 1997a; Bauman 1996) adopt very different views. They tend to suggest that people's identities have many different facets, that they frequently change and can contain considerable contradictions. According to these perspectives, people actively create their own identities. The argument presented here is that identities are no longer reducible simply to the social groups to which people belong. A number of scholars agree that identities are not fixed or given (Kahani-Hopkins and Hopkins 2002). Bourdieu (1989) argues that all forms of collective identity are products of a long, slow, and collective building operation. Elegantly put, identities are the product of an on-going process and as such should be treated as "verbs" rather than "nouns" (Bauman 1996). The dynamic nature of identity is emphasized by Martin's (1995) words, quoted in Kahani-Hopkins and Hopkins (2002), that "identity means change". Durkheim had in a way set the foundations for this thinking when he wrote "as we advance in the evolutionary scale, the ties which bind the individual to his family, to his native soil, to traditions which the past has given to him, to collective group usages, become loose... as intelligence becomes richer, activity more varied, in order for morality to remain constant, that is to say, in order for the individual to remain attached to the group with a force equal to that of yesterday, the ties which bind him to it must become stronger and more numerous" (Durkheim and Halls 1984). Some scholars argue that there is more than one identity. According to Castells, identity is people's source of meaning and experience. By identity, as it refers to social actors, Castells understands the process of construction of meaning on the basis of a cultural attribute, or related set of cultural attributes, that

is/are given priority over other sources of meaning. For a given individual, or for a collective actor, there may be a plurality of identities. Yet, such a plurality can be a source of stress and contradiction in both self-representation and social action (Castells 1997).

The CS asked some highly relevant questions in 2007, their respondents were asked: *How important is religion to your sense of who you are?*¹³ They were also asked about the importance of their ethnic or racial background and national identity and they could choose multiple answers.

Table 1: Important Aspects of Identity for Muslims

	Column Percentages		
	Importance of Religion, Ethnicity, and National Identity		
	Religion	Ethnicity	National Identity
Very important	75	58	54
Quite important	17	31	34
Not very important	5	8	9
Not at all important	1	2	2
Don't know	1	2	2
<i>N</i>	1,771	1,772	1,772

Notes: Variables are 'Importance of Religion' ("Importance of religion to sense of who you are"), 'Importance of Ethnicity' ("Importance of ethnic or racial background to sense of who you are"), and 'Importance of National Identity' ("Importance of national identity to sense of who you are").

Source: 2007 Citizenship Survey (Q1-Q4).

Table 1 shows that an overwhelming majority, seventy five per cent, of Muslims expressed religion to be 'very important' to their sense of being. In contrast just over fifty per cent thought their ethnicity or national identity was 'very important' to their identity. However if the categories 'very important' and 'quite important' are combined then the difference in responses between religion, ethnicity, and national identity is only marginal. These findings can put into question the validity of claims that emphasize the

¹³ Respondents had a choice of choosing: Occupation, Ethnic or racial background, Religion, National identity, Where you live, Interests, Family, Social class, Country family came from originally, Gender, Age and life stage, Income, Education, and No aspects important.

importance of fixed or grounded identities as being based on one or two core aspects rather than being more fluid and flexible. Another interesting finding was that while only five per cent of Muslims thought that religion was ‘not very important’ for them, a slightly larger proportion, nine per cent, felt that national identity was not very important to their identity.

Hopkins (2004) studied the identities and subjectivities of young Muslim men in Scotland aged 16-25, through 11 focus groups and 22 interviews focusing on four key themes: Scotland and ‘Scottishness’, the local community, being a young man, and being a Muslim. Although the majority of the young men identified themselves as Scottish Muslims, the meanings and associations of these identity markers varied in strength, nature and meaning, and the young men were also found to be connected with a global network of identifications linking them with family heritages in Asia and Africa. Hopkins found that these Muslim men identified themselves as Scottish Muslims rather than British Muslims and did not see a contradiction between being Scottish and being Muslim. Muslim men drew upon the different markers of ‘Scottishness’ in ways that simultaneously included themselves in the parameters of ‘Scottishness’, whilst also excluding themselves from belonging completely within its boundaries. Inclusive markers of Scottishness included the accent, drinking Iron-Bru (a popular Scottish soft drink), and liking football and the natural environment. When asked if there were certain things that they would say are not Scottish about themselves the most frequent response from the young Muslim men in this research related to drinking alcohol and being part of the ‘pub and club’ culture that they saw as being an important part of Scottish culture.

Here it is important to note that simply ticking a box 'Muslim' does not tell us much about religion being a pertinent form of identity for Muslims. It does not tell us whether that person is actually religious or practicing, or more religious than the person who ticked the box 'British'. Academic research supports this focus on the complexity of identity formation, and has focused on the diversity of Muslim experiences in Britain (Werbner 2001), the impact of various cultural and historical influences on British Muslim identities (Glynn 2002), as well as the political strategies behind Muslims having multiple identities (Kahani-Hopkins and Hopkins 2002). Such an investigation would also attempt to understand the influence of religion on their self-identification. However, even though Muslims may feel religion is important to their self-identification, identity research suggests that common identities usually mean different things to different people (Abdelal et al. 2006).

A survey commissioned by the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) shows that people identify with a range of characteristics (geography, symbols, people, values and attitudes, cultural habits and behaviour, citizenship, language, and achievements) when they construct their identity (Ethnos 2005). The CRE survey also argues that while religion and ethnicity are important for Muslim identity, many respondents did not feel those categories conflicted with also feeling British. Tyrer and Ahmad (2006) researched on Muslim women studying at universities in Liverpool, Manchester, Bradford, Birmingham, and London to explore their motivations, experiences, and identities. The authors found that Muslim women respondents rejected notions of an essential, authentic primordial ethnic identity which they should adhere to and instead, stressed the dynamic, contingent and fluctuating nature of their identities. While they acknowledged their formal ethnicities, or the ethnic identity that was 'expected of them'

through the hegemonic workings of ‘race’ such as university ethnic monitoring forms, women were also clear that parental or ancestral heritage did not determine who they were. Instead, they asserted their own agency in defining their identities in their own terms and subsequently displaced these in favour of a notion of ‘Muslim’ identities, which were highly subjective and felt to be more inclusive of other aspects to their identities. Almost without exception, respondents emphasised ‘being Muslim’ when discussing their identities in clear, coherent, and confident terms, while also highlighting the subtle racialised expectations they faced from others vis-à-vis their identities. Theories influenced by postmodernism tend to stress this complexity of being British and the diversity of ways in which, for example British people from different ethnic or national origins interpret British identity.

In light of these arguments, one might argue that Muslim identities go along with postmodern conceptions of identity which emphasize the role of choice that individuals have in constructing their identity. Postmodernist theories argue that identities have essentially become decentred and are a lot more fluid than before, i.e. that they conform to constructivist approaches resulting in ‘weak’ or ‘soft’ connotations of identity. Individuals can no longer find a core or centre to their identity, based on class or existing nation-states and that globalization in particular has had “a pluralizing impact on identities, producing a variety of possibilities and new positions of identification, and making identities more positional, more political, more plural and diverse; less fixed, unified or trans-historical” (Hall 1997b). Thus it would be interesting to probe whether postmodernist theories of identity tend to be closer in explaining Muslim identification, where identities are fluid with multiple acquirable facets such as religion, ethnicity, and national identity.

As well as considering the personal identity of Muslims, it is also important to look at their collective group identity. Classical communities, such as Christendom, the Muslim Ummah, and even the Middle Kingdom, were imaginable communities largely through the medium of a sacred language and written script. Yet such classical communities linked by sacred languages had a character distinct from the imagined communities of modern nations. One crucial difference was the older communities' confidence in the unique sacredness of their texts that were in their languages, and thus their ideas about admission to membership (Anderson 2006). Proof of this change is that until recently it was forbidden to translate the Qur'an, the holy book of Muslims, in any language. However, it should be noted that Arabic is still considered as the sacred language for Muslims. Showing the flag, being unashamed to be a Christian or a Muslim, denotes a situation in which the believer thinks of himself as being in a minority identity group (Roy 2004). This has become more apparent among large minority groups, such as Muslim migrants in Europe.

Arising from this distinct nature of the Muslim community is the question of whether this Ummah still exists today. When the term ummah appears in the Qur'an, it usually refers to human community in a religious sense, to "ethnic, linguistic or religious bodies of people who are objects of the divine plan of salvation" (Denny 1975). However, in the development of Islam the term ummah has come to mean Islam almost exclusively, and people assume that there is an association between the two. The most famous verse referring to the ummah is verse 3:110 from the Qur'an: "Ye are the best of peoples [ummah], evolved for mankind, enjoining what is right, forbidding what is wrong, and believing in Allah" (Ali 1992). Usually the term ummah is translated as

“community” or “nation”, or even “group consciousness of all Muslims” (Al-Ahsan 1992). The ummah is today considered very important for a number of Muslims. Some support that it has existed since Muhammad’s era. Others argue that ummah only re-emerged as a central concept during the Nineteenth Century and was applied to modern globalising processes by Mawdudi and Qutb in the twentieth century (Mandaville 2001). The challenge imposed by colonialism affected most Muslims and helped to generate a greater sense of universalism and the revitalisation of pan-Islamism that became prominent through the activities of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani as he sought to address the lack of Muslim unity and weak religious consciousness (Sutton and Vertigans 2005).

Ummah, in essence, is another form of identity. When an individual appears before others, he wittingly and unwittingly projects a definition of the situation, of which a conception of himself is an important part (Goffman 1959). It is argued that only in the ummah can the individual be fully himself/herself, as part of the confraternity of believers, a basic equalising mechanism that provides mutual support, solidarity, and shared meaning (Castells 1997). Religion and culture no longer have a relationship with a territory or given society, which is what Roy (2004) calls ‘de-territorialisation’. It means that religion has to define itself solely in terms of religion: there is no longer any social authority or social pressure to conform. Roy argues that through the weakening of prior social ties, identities are recast by reference to codes of comportment, values and beliefs, and not on a “substantial”, even reconstructed new identity (Roy 2004).

Tajfel’s (1972; 1978; 1979) social identity theory is highly relevant for this discussion since it asserts that group membership creates in-group/self-categorization and

enhancement in ways that favour the in-group at the expense of the out-group. The examples (minimal group studies) of Tajfel and Turner (1986) showed that the mere act of individuals *categorizing themselves* as group members was sufficient to lead them to display in-group favouritism. After being categorized in this way, Tajfel's (1979) theory assumes that individuals strive for a positive social identity; they seek to achieve positive self-esteem by positively differentiating their in-group from a comparison out-group on some valued dimension. This quest for *positive distinctiveness* means that people's sense of who they are is defined in terms of 'we' rather than 'I'.

For Smith (1995) a nation is 'a named human population sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members' (p.57). Such a definition makes us question whether Muslims, given their recent migration to Britain, can familiarise themselves or genuinely feel a part of a British nation state or have a British national identity? However, Smith also theorises that feeling a part of the British nation state can be understood as comprising ethnic elements *in combination* with elements that are politically based or 'civic'. Also Schopflin emphasises the multi-dimensionality of national identity: 'Ethnicity is the consciousness of sharing, while nationhood implies political demands legitimated by the doctrine of nationalism which declares that cultural and political boundaries should be congruent' (1995: 42). If nationhood is tied to cultural and political connotations then it can be argued that Muslims in Britain could identify themselves with a British nation state and acquire a civic form of national identity. According to Tajfel's (1979) social identity theory, an individual's national identity is bound to be just one of a great many aspects of his or her social identity.

However according to Tajfel (1979), to the extent that the fact of belonging to the group contributes positively to his/her sense of social identity, an individual will remain a member of the group. If the group fails to satisfy this requirement, this individual may:

- 1) Try to change the structure of the group (social change)
- 2) Seek a new dimension of comparison by which to enhance a sense of positive social identity (social creativity); or
- 3) Leave the group or distance himself from it (social mobility)

In all cases, individuals strive for psychological distinctiveness along positively valued dimensions. For the minority individual, achieving a sense of positive social identity is no mean task given that minorities almost always suffer inferior status in comparison with the majority. How do minorities respond to their position in the wider society? According to Tajfel (1978) there exists an underlying continuum, which ranges from total acceptance to total rejection of that position. An acceptance by the minority of its social and psychological inferiority is dependent on the perceived legitimacy and stability of the system of inequalities between the minority and majority group. It is claimed that the emergence of racism towards Muslims since the 1990s suggests that there has been something of a shift from racism directed at British African Caribbean youth to racism directed at Asian youth (Ranger et al. 1996). The Parekh Report commented: “recently, Muslims have emerged as the principal focus of racist antagonisms (“Islamophobia”) based on cultural difference” (The Parekh Report 2000). Arguably, experiences of discrimination may urge some Muslims to distance themselves away from a local civic community, a nation state, towards an imagined religious community, such as an ummah. We must probe whether experiences of

discrimination may lead Muslims to self-identify with an imagined 'religious' community (ummah) versus a more concrete and local 'civic' community (nation state).

It is agreed that culture defines accepted ways of behaving for members of a particular society. Thornton (1997) argues that societies have divisions between subcultures; these are social groups within society which have a lifestyle distinctive from the culture of the society as a whole. Besides studying Muslims as a distinct social group in Britain, the considerable diversity within Muslims may also be of interest as it may have a different implication in terms of their identification with mainstream British society. Perhaps it is also worth probing the impact of Muslim culture or subcultures in Britain as they may serve as important indicators for explaining Muslim identities. From a sociological perspective it is important to probe the significance of culture and social context for Muslims in identifying with the British mainstream society. The process by which individuals learn the culture of their society is known as 'socialization'. Although it is individuals who have identities, Scott and Marshall (2005) argue that identity is related to the social groups to which the individual belongs and with which they identify. Thus their identity comes from the expectations attached to the social roles that they occupy, and which they then internalise, so that it is formed through the process of socialization. In Western society, important agencies of socialization include the educational system, religion, the mass media, the occupational group and the peer group.

As mentioned earlier, even within the over arching theological categories of Sunni and Shia Muslims, there is great diversity in sub groups as well as the range and extent of the practice of faith, the Shias are divided into Twelvers and Seveners (or Ismailis). There are also small groups known as Boras. Hunter (2002) holds that there is no overall

solidarity within the Shia community and consequently they do not represent a distinct social and political force. Some of them belong to the Pakistani immigrant working class, while others are members of the business class. They are by no means all supporters of the Ayatullah Rouhullah Khomeini's Islamic revolution; some support it, but others oppose it or ignore it (p. 58). On occasions as, for example, in their response to the publication of Salman Rushdie's book *The Satanic Verses*, they easily collaborated with Sunni Muslims. The majority of Sunni Muslims are followers of the Hanafi school of Islamic law. While recognizing the importance of the *ulema* (religious leaders) and the *shari'a* (Islamic law), they also accept the idea of secular government and, indeed, of secular law. In Hunter's view they are therefore inherently adaptable and politically moderate groups, well capable of fitting into a multicultural society, if left free to practice their religion. Other Sunni Muslims adhere to different traditions, one of which is the Deobandi school, whose origins are to be found in the Indian theological centre in Deoband. Deobandis adhere to a stricter version of Islam and are less affected by other influences such as Hinduism.

The other tendency within British Sunni Islam is that of the Barelvi school. Like the Deobandis, the Barelvis¹⁴ represent a traditionalist group, particularly with regard to their social teaching, but their philosophy is influenced by Sufism and some elements of Shi'ism. Reference must also be made to the Ahmadiyya sect, which, according to Robinson (1998), combines Muslim teaching with recognition of Jesus and Krishna and the Mahdi in Egypt. The followers of Ahmadiyya have often been persecuted in Pakistan, and their Islamic credentials have been questioned. Nonetheless, there are

¹⁴ They emphasize a religious discipline that seeks to escape from the temptations of the flesh and the importance of *pirs* (saintly leaders), who act as models for implementing this discipline. They also believe in the ability of these *pirs* to intercede with God on their behalf- a belief influenced by Shi'a notions of the intercession of the imams. Because of these tendencies, many Barelvis belong to Sufi orders, of which the most important in England is the Naqshbendi.

some towns in England where Ahmadiyya followers are the main Muslim group. Because of their religious eclecticism and modern outlook, the Ahmadis can be said to be viewed positively by other British citizens (Hunter 2002: 58-59), although this is not how orthodox Muslims perceive them to be; they regard Ahmadis as heretical because they do not believe that Mohammed was the final prophet sent to guide mankind, as orthodox Muslims believe is laid out in the Quran (BBC 2010). I will look at whether Muslims in Britain tend to associate to subcultures, with distinct processes of socialization, which significantly influences their identity. If they do, then this would be supported by modern theories of culture and identity as they interpret identity to originate in a fairly straightforward way from involvement and socialization in particular cultures and subcultures. However, firstly even though Muslims may develop identities through their own social group or subculture, the process of British identification is a lifelong process which continues as people change jobs or roles and as society itself changes, and although members of a subcultural group have their distinctive ways, they are not completely different from other members, sharing much in common with their peers who do not belong to the subculture (Côté 1996). Second, identities can be formed through both cultures and subcultures to which people belong or in which people participate, therefore even if Muslims are immersed in their own subculture they are living in a wider culture of British society. Thus sociologists influenced by modernist theories of identity would argue that as well as having a subcultural identity, Muslims should also be expected to have a strong sense of cultural British identity.

2.3 Implications for Social Action

It is important to also think about how the research done in this thesis about the identities of Muslims in Britain is important for society? What are the implications of this research for policy-making and social action?

The discussion of pertinent theoretical arguments will demonstrate that the choice of self-identification with different groups has important implications for society. A significant contribution to the concept of self-identification is the work of Hutnik (1991) and Verkuyten (1992) which shows that the dichotomous model used in literature, where self-identification has been conceptualized as an option between two identities is simplistic. People may consider themselves to be members of two or more groups, e.g. British and Muslim in which case a single identity label would be insufficient. Hutnik (1991) argues that identity strategies of ethnic minority adolescents can be related to the extent to which they identify with both the majority and minority groups. Since identity with each of these groups can be dichotomized (high or low), there are four possible extreme strategy outcomes:

- a) Dissociation – high for their ethnic minority group, low for the majority group;
- b) Assimilation – high for the majority group, low for their minority group;
- c) Acculturation – high for both the ethnic minority and the majority group;
- d) Marginality – low for both their minority and the majority groups.

Although an ethnic group is defined as a population of human beings whose members identify with each other, usually on the basis of a presumed common genealogy or

ancestry, ethnicity is also defined from the recognition by others as a distinct group and by common cultural, linguistic, religious, behavioural or biological traits. Roy (2004) argues that a common feature of Christianity and Islam in the West is that the religious community is increasingly seen as an identity group, emphasising the “us and them” approach. Beside religiosity as a form of practice, religion becomes an identity group. Showing the flag, being unashamed to be a Christian or a Muslim, denotes a situation in which the believer thinks of himself as being in a minority identity group (Roy 2004). This has become more apparent among large minority groups, such as Muslim migrants in Europe. In our research on Muslims, we have used their religion as the common trait of their ethnicity. Thus according to Hutnik’s concepts, the minority ethnic group is of Muslims and the majority group is of Christians.

Heath et al. (2009) suggest that a helpful framework for analysing these issues is provided by Berry (1992), whereby there are two important issues that individuals and groups confront in culturally diverse societies. The first issue relates to the holding onto or furthering of one’s own cultural identity, where greater or lesser priority can be attached to the containment of one’s own cultural identity. The second issue relates to the kinds of relationships with the wider society, and especially whether there is an value in retaining or developing relationships with the other groups in society. This led Berry to present a four-fold typology of possible options, namely assimilation, integration, separation, and marginalization - which he terms acculturation options.

Discussing this four-fold typology, Heath et. al (2009) explain the qualities of all these types. Assimilation is where members of a minority group give up their unique minority cultural identity and adapt into the larger society. Berry emphasizes that this can occur

through the fusion of a non-dominant group into an established dominant group (Park and Burgess 1926; Gordon 1964) or instead by groups merging to form a new hybrid society, as with the concept of the ‘melting pot’ (Zangwill 1909). Integration, on the other hand, involves holding onto some degree of cultural distinctiveness while also maintaining relations with other groups in society. This integration strategy can also be thought in a more contemporary way, as multiculturalism.

Figure 5: Four Acculturation Strategies

Four Acculturation Strategies		<i>Is it considered to be of value to maintain cultural identity and characteristics?</i>	
		Yes	No
<i>Is it considered to be of value to maintain relationships with other groups?</i>	Yes	Integration	Assimilation
	No	Separation/Segregation	Marginalization

Source: Berry 1992: 82 (taken from Heath et al. 2009)

According to Heath et al. (2009), Berry defines separation as the scenario or strategy where ethnic identity and traditions are maintained to a level such that relations with the dominant group are not substantial. He conceptualises separation as taking place when the minority group adopt this strategy, and segregation as taking place when this strategy is imposed by the dominant group. Some commentators have suggested that

some groups of South Asian origin, perhaps Bangladeshis who continue to have high rates of geographical segregation, might be following the separation strategy (Heath et al. 2009). Finally, marginalization happens where the minority groups lose cultural and psychological contact both with their own heritage and with the larger society. Berry demonstrates empirically that this last option is likely to be associated with high levels of psychological distress (Berry 1984).

From a policy perspective, recent research by the Government Office for Science in its Foresight report by Ali & Heath (2013) suggests that identities can exercise a powerful influence on the health and wellbeing of communities, and their ability to build up social capital. Due to a number of drivers, the identities of individuals in the UK are likely to go through important changes over the next decade. The traditional notions of identities as simple categorisations will become less meaningful, with identities becoming more dynamic or volatile in nature. In fact the changes in technology will mean that citizens will be globally networked, hyper-connected individuals, which will have substantial implications for communities and social integration in the UK. This change in the nature of identities will affect society and impact the way people live their lives. This changing nature of identity in the UK will be increasingly important for policy makers for effective policy making and implementation. A failure to account for this change may lead to missed opportunities for certain areas of policy-making, for example to strengthen social integration, reduce exclusion, and so on. The report advises governments to benefit from drawing upon a deeper scientific understanding of people's evolving identities when developing, implementing, and testing policies. Policies will need to be more "iterative, adaptive, nuanced, and agile" (p.5) taking into account the multifaceted nature of people's identities. This recognition of the

importance of identity research for government gives value to our research and its usefulness in the coming years.

Conclusion

This chapter presented a range of claims and assumptions that are held in the existing academic research on Muslims in Britain, as well as a discussion on the nature of identity construction, and the way they are being constructed by Muslims. Having looked through the findings that currently exist on Muslims in Britain, I now turn to a discussion of the theoretical literature on identities.

CHAPTER

3

Theoretical Literature on Identities

Introductory Summary

In this chapter I discuss the theoretical literature on identities and how it has evolved over time with different approaches or school of thoughts. I also pay particular focus to the literature on national identity.

3.1 Defining Identity

In an attempt to understand the identification of individuals, sociologists agree that it is essential to explore the social context in which human behaviour takes place. At the most basic level, this involves understanding the culture of the society in which social action occurs. In Ralph Linton's (1955) words, "the culture of a society is the way of life of its members; the collection of ideas and habits they learn, share and transmit from generation to generation" and in Kroeber and Kluckhohn's (1952) elegant phrase, culture is a "design for living" held by members of a particular society. To a large degree culture determines how members of society think and feel: it directs their actions and outlook on life. Culture defines accepted ways of behaving for members of a particular society. The process by which individuals learn the culture of their society is known as 'socialization' (Becker 1993), a process which teaches members of society the norms or informal rules, which govern behaviour. Although this process begins at birth it is a lifelong process, which continues as people change jobs or roles and as society itself changes. In Western society, important agencies of socialization include the educational system, religion, the mass media, the occupational group and the peer group. Although it is possible for the sake of simplicity to treat each society as having a particular and distinct culture, in reality this is unlikely to be the case. First, migration and other international movements of people have led to the creation of ethnically and

culturally pluralistic societies, as in the case of Britain. Second, all societies have divisions between subcultures (Thornton 1997); these are social groups within society which have a lifestyle distinctive from the culture of the society as a whole, an example would be Muslims in Britain. Arnold (1970) argues that although members of a subcultural group have their distinctive ways, they are not completely different from other members, sharing much in common with their peers who do not belong to the subculture. Thus some Muslim women may wear the headscarf and pray five times a day but in many other ways they live conventional lives. While religion is a choice for Muslims, other social groups which Muslims have no choice about belonging to are gender, ethnicity, and social class; these exist independently of the choices made by individuals, and these too can lead to subcultural differences.

According to Cote (1996) the concept of identity is closely related to the idea of culture. Identities can be formed through the cultures and subcultures to which people belong or in which people participate. However, different theories of identity see the relationship between culture and identity in rather different ways. Those influenced by modern theories of culture and identity are more likely to see identity as originating in a fairly straightforward way from involvement and socialization in particular cultures and subcultures. For example, people living in Britain would be expected to have a strong sense of British identity. On the other hand, theories influenced by postmodernism tend to stress the complexity of being British and the diversity of ways in which, for example British people from different ethnic or national origins interpret British identity. Postmodernist theories of identity emphasize the role of choice that individuals have in constructing their identity. Next we go on to define the concept of identity in more detail in light of these theoretical perspectives.

Academics from across a range of disciplines have contributed to the subject of identity with varying theories and perspectives. Philosophers have participated to this dialogue through their literature on personal identity. They argue that personal identity theory is the philosophical confrontation with the most ultimate questions of our own existence: who are we, and is there a life after death? Discussions of personal identity go right back to the origins of Western philosophy, and most major figures such as Plato, Descartes, Locke and many others have had something to say about it (Korfmacher 2006). Sociologists, on the other hand, have tended to concentrate more on aspects of social identity. They argue that although identity is to do with the way an individual answers the question ‘Who am I?’ this is not purely a psychological question, it is also a social question because it concerns the groups with which we identify. This involves an element of choice, a degree of individual agency where the person decides they identify with the group (Woodward 2000).

Early sociologists rarely used the concept of identity although their work often implied a theory of identity. For example, most early studies of social class in Britain tended to see class identity as central to people’s sense of who they were. Studies of class consciousness often assumed that class identity was normally strong and as a result, other identities such as gender, sexuality, ethnicity and religion were downplayed. Some sociologists believe that studies such as these worked with a modern conception of identity. People’s identities were seen as fairly stable, as widely shared within social groups, and as based upon one or two key variables, such as class and nationality. More recently, poststructuralist and postmodern theories of identity have adopted very different views. They tend to suggest that people’s identities have many different facets, that they frequently change and can contain considerable contradictions. According to

these sorts of perspectives, people actively create their own identities. Identities are no longer reducible simply to the social groups to which people belong (Cote 1996).

Hall (1992) argues that ideas on identity have passed through three main stages in which particular conceptions of identity were dominant in thinking about society. These are: 1) the enlightenment subject, 2) the sociological subject and 3) the postmodern subject. According to Hall the early stages of modernity gave rise to a new and decisive form of individualism, at the centre of which stood a new conception of the individual subject and its identity. In pre-modern societies identities were largely based around traditional structures, particularly related to religion. A person's position in society and their identity came from the position they were born into, the notion of an 'ascribed' status as opposed to an 'achieved' one, which was seen as reflecting the will of God. People were not regarded as unique individuals with their own identity, but simply part of the 'great chain of being'. However with the advent of modernity or the enlightenment subject, this changed. Between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries a new conception of identity became dominant. Hall argues that this new conception of identity had two key features. First, the individual subject was seen as 'indivisible', each person had an identity in their own right and this identity was unified and could not be broken down into smaller, constituent parts. Secondly, the identity of each individual was unique. Rather than being part of something bigger – the great chain of being – the individual was seen as having a distinct identity of their own. According to Hall, this conception of identity stemmed from the ideas of the French philosopher, Descartes (1596-1650) who had a dualistic conception of humans, he believed that there was a basic distinction between the mind and matter. He held that each individual's mind was separate from every other individual's mind; consequently, each individual

was unique. This distinctiveness of the individual mind was expressed in Descartes' famous saying, 'Cogito ergo sum' – 'I think, therefore I am'.

By the nineteenth century a more sociological conception of the subject and individual identity began to develop. Hall sees this as resulting from changes in society. As industrialization and urbanization began to take hold, each individual was no longer envisaged as being unique and separate from other individuals. Rather, the relationship between the individual and society was mediated through 'group processes and...collective norms'. For example, an individual's identity was seen as being tied up with their membership of a particular social class, a specific occupational grouping, their origins in a particular region, their nationality, and so on. To Woodward (2000), identity is 'marked by similarity': you identify with others because of the similarities between you, and the differences between the group you identify with and other groups. Hall sees the theory of symbolic interactionism as a viable example of this conception of individual identity. From the viewpoint of the theory of symbolic interactionism, individual identity is only formed through interaction with others. For example, a particular class identity would encourage people to behave in particular ways and would associate them to particular subcultures. Hall comments that 'identity thus stitches the subject into the structure. It stabilizes both subjects and the cultural worlds they inhabit, making both reciprocally more unified and predictable'. This general approach to identity was not confined to interactionists. For example, functionalists such as Parsons (1951) saw identity in terms of the existence of social roles which fitted individual personalities into the social system. Woodward (2000) argues that identity also combines 'how I see myself and how others see me'; it is partly internal and subjective, but also partly external and dependent on the judgement of others. For example, you

may wish to regard yourself as British but you may not be entitled to British citizenship and this prevents you from establishing a British identity, at least in official terms. Thus, to Woodward, identity is always formed through a combination of individual agency and structural constraint. There are limits on the identities you can choose for yourself. Among the important structures which place constraints on individual choices are structures of gender, nationality and class.

Similarly, Jenkins (1996) argues that identities contain elements of the ‘individually unique’ and the ‘collectively shared’, i.e. that they are social as well as individual. While each individual has an identity which is personal to them, those identities are shaped through membership of social groups. Here cultures and subcultures can be an important source of social identity. Using the ideas of Morris (1934), Jenkins argues that identity is formed in the process of socialization. Jenkins defines social identity as “our understanding of who we are, and who other people are, and, reciprocally, other people’s understanding of themselves and of others”, making it both internal and external. Identity is something that is negotiable and which is created in the process of human interaction. People tend to associate themselves or identify with those who are similar to themselves in their culture or subculture and to feel more distant from those who are dissimilar (Cote 1996). So for example, people from Britain, France or Pakistan may see themselves as British, French or Pakistani, even if they are living outside their country of origin. For instance, some British people who have settled in Spain have relatively few social contacts with the local Spanish population, choosing instead to mix mainly with other Britons. They see themselves as British rather than Spanish, read English language newspapers, and make little effort to integrate into the local population or adopt Spanish culture. To Jenkins, social identity is about meanings, and

these meanings are socially constructed rather than about essential differences between people. According to Jenkins, identity is an integral part of social life. It is only by distinguishing the identities of different groups that people are able to relate to other people. Jenkins concludes, 'without social identity, there is, in fact, no society' (Cote 1996).

According to Hall (1992), the symbolic interactionist theory of identity and the idea of the sociological subject might have been appropriate analyses in times of modernity, but they have become increasingly inappropriate in late modernity or the postmodern era. In his view, contemporary societies are increasingly characterized by the existence of 'fragmented identities'. People no longer possess a single, unified conception of who they are, but instead possess 'several, sometimes contradictory or unresolved, identities'. This fragmentation of identity has a number of sources, including modernity and change, new social movements, identity politics, feminism, disciplinary power and surveillance and globalization. Hall argues that globalization has had the effect of reviving ethnic identity, often in opposition to existing nationalism. In modern societies nationality was an important source of identity used to create solidarity among citizens of different classes, ethnic origins and so on but with globalization this has not proved so easy. For instance, Hall argues that immigration has caused people to reaffirm national identity and created 'a revamped Englishness, an aggressive little Englandism, and a retreat to ethnic absolutism in an attempt to shore up the nation'. Thus Hall concludes that, in line with postmodern theory identity has become decentred. Individuals can no longer find a core or centre to their identity, based on class or existing nation-states and that globalization in particular has had 'a pluralizing impact on identities, producing a variety of possibilities and new positions of identification, and

making identities more positional, more political, more plural and diverse; less fixed, unified or trans-historical'. Hall argues that it is this uncertainty and diversity which has led some groups to try to create a more stable or unified identity through a renewed emphasis upon their ethnicity.

Bauman (1996) goes much further than Hall in advocating a postmodern view of identity. According to Bauman, identity has not just become fragmented; it has ceased to have any stable base whatsoever. Bauman argues that under modernity identity could be seen as similar to a 'pilgrimage' where a person mapped out their life, towards a desired identity, which was usually linked to their occupation. In contrast, postmodernity undermines pilgrimage as a life strategy by creating uncertainty. Bauman concludes that there are no lasting identities and that in a postmodern world identity has simply become a matter of choices, which are not even necessarily consistent or regular. Despite the differences between them, Hall and Bauman both argue that there has been a general movement away from relatively stable identities, based upon social factors such as class, towards more fragmented identities. Bauman in particular stresses the extent to which people can choose identities, while Hall places more emphasis on the increasing importance of ethnicity in shaping identity.

These views have been criticized on a number of grounds. Some sociologists deny that class has lost its importance as a source of identity. Marshall et al. (1988) argue that in Britain people still see themselves as members of classes and that class continues to influence people's beliefs as well as their life chances. McDonough (1997) also argues that 'pronouncing the death of class in British society does seem premature'. Jenkins (1996) argues against Hall's view that reflexivity – reflecting upon your identity – is

distinctively modern. Instead he argues that long before modernity, people were self-conscious about their identity, it is a universal feature of being human. Jenkins also believes that writers such as Bauman greatly exaggerate the degree to which identities are fragmented, short-lived and freely chosen in contemporary societies. He is sceptical about the claim that there is a distinctive postmodern type of identity as he is about the claim that modernity ushered in a radical change in identity. Unlike postmodernists, Jenkins believes that identity remains rooted in social experience and membership of social groups, and it is not something that can be changed at will. This discussion of social groups in relation to identity can be advanced by Tajfel's (1972; 1978; 1979; 1981) ideas of social identity.

The social psychologist Tajfel, himself a member of a minority group, pioneered the social identity theory in which he presents a sensitive and persuasive understanding of the social psychology of minority groups. He defines social identity as 'that *part* of an individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership' (Tajfel 1978: 63). The theory was originally developed to understand the psychological basis of intergroup discrimination. Tajfel et al. (1971) attempted to identify the *minimal* conditions that would lead members of one group to discriminate in favour of the in-group to which they belonged and against another out-group. According to social identity theory, a person has not one, "personal self", but rather several selves that correspond to widening circles of group membership. Different social contexts may trigger an individual to think, feel and act on basis of his personal, family or national "level of self" (Turner et al. 1987). Apart from the "level of self", an individual has multiple "social identities" as they divide their social world into distinct

classes or social categories (Tajfel 1972). According to Brown and Turner (2002), social identification refers to the process whereby the individual locates themselves or another person within a system of social categorization. The sum total of the social identifications the individual uses to define themselves is their social identity. Hogg & Vaughan (2002) define social identity as the individual's self-concept derived from perceived membership of social groups. In other words, it is an individual-based perception of what defines the "us" associated with any *internalized group membership*. This can be distinguished from the notion of personal identity which refers to self-knowledge that derives from the individual's unique attributes. After being categorized of a group membership, Tajfel's (1979) theory assumes that individuals strive for a positive social identity; they seek to achieve positive self-esteem by positively differentiating their in-group from a comparison out-group on some valued dimension.

But what do these pedagogical narratives tell us? "The worst thing one can do with words", wrote George Orwell half a century ago, "is to surrender to them". If language is to be an "an instrument for expressing and not for concealing or preventing thought", he continued, one must "let the meaning choose the word, and not the other way about" (Orwell 1953: 169-170). Brubaker and Cooper (2000) eloquently convey this argument in their article 'Beyond "identity"' by arguing that the social sciences and humanities have surrendered to the word 'identity'; that this has both intellectual and political costs; and that we can do better. Identity they argue, tends to mean too much (when understood in a strong sense), too little (when understood in a weak sense), or nothing at all (because of its sheer ambiguity). They find that uses of the word 'identity' not only reveal great heterogeneity but a strong antithesis between positions that highlight fundamental or abiding sameness and stances that expressly reject notions of basic

sameness. The former can be called ‘strong’ or ‘hard’ conceptions of identity, the latter ‘weak’ or ‘soft’ conceptions. In their view, identity is too torn between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ meanings, essentialist connotations and constructivist qualifiers, to serve well the demands of social analysis. To elaborate, the prevailing constructivist stance of identity – the attempt to ‘soften’ the term, to acquit it of the charge of ‘essentialism’ by stipulating that identities are constructed, fluid, and multiple – leaves us without a rationale for talking about ‘identities’ at all and ill-equipped to examine the ‘hard’ dynamics and essentialist claims of contemporary identity politics. ‘Soft’ constructivism allows putative ‘identities’ to proliferate. But as they proliferate, the term loses its analytical purchase. Brubaker and Cooper (2001) sum up this dilemma, “if identity is everywhere, it is nowhere” (p.1). They extend their enquiry by asking the following questions: if it is fluid how can we understand the ways in which self-understandings may harden, congeal and crystallize?; if it is constructed, how can we understand the sometimes coercive force of external identifications?; if it is multiple, how do we understand the terrible singularity that is often striven for- and sometimes realized – by politicians seeking to transform mere categories into unitary and exclusive groups? How can we understand the power and pathos of power politics? In place of the term ‘identity’, Brubaker and Cooper (2000) present three alternative terms: 1) Identification and categorization, 2) Self-understanding and social location and 3) Commonality, connectedness and groupness.

The Foresight report (Ali and Heath 2013) compiled by academics across the UK has done an important and comprehensive study of identities, and how identities are changing. It gives us some useful ways of looking at identity and how it has changed in the UK over time. The case presented in the report is that the UK has undergone

significant changes such as the recent economic downturn, effects of globalisation, an inflow of international migration, the transformative impact of social media, modern communications technology, and as a result this has created a new ‘digital’ world. The argument is that all these ‘drivers’ of change have had an impact on how people in the UK see themselves and their identities. While an individual’s ‘identity’ may have been thought to be singular, innate, and unchanging, there has been a step-change in understanding identities due to greater self-perception and the increasing amount of information available exploring this topic. The concept of identity is now open to multiple interpretations which reveal that people have many overlapping identities, and that these change in salience according to the context, and over time. There is growing evidence that identities are becoming more fluid and will continue to change, perhaps even more quickly, in future. This report brings to the fore the complex, multi-layered, and contextual nature of identity.

Having discussed the concept of identity in a broad and general sense, let me now consider more specific forms of identity such as national identity, which has been described by some academics to be a ‘fixed’ and by some to be a ‘chosen’ form of identity.

3.2 National Identity

There is no agreement among academics on the basic question of how the nation and national identity can be best defined. However, a broad and relatively neutral starting point for any exploration of the subject is Anderson’s (1983) well-known maxim that nations are ‘imagined communities’, since ‘the members of even the smallest nation

will never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the mind of each lives the image of their communion' (p.6). We might also reflect upon Billig's (1985) statement that having a 'national identity' means 'to possess ways of thinking about nationhood' and to be 'situated physically, legally, socially, as well as emotionally...within a homeland, which itself is situated within a world of nations' (p.8). Useful as these definitions undoubtedly are, they in turn raise further questions about how to understand national identity; such as what it is that members of any given nation believe they have in common with their fellow members, and why the image of the 'homeland' is such a powerful motivating force for vast numbers of people across the world. Studies that have sought to address such problems as these take a wide range of approaches to the subject, among which it may be helpful to distinguish four major strands. First, some theorists seem to suggest that the concept of national identity should be conflated with that of ethnic identity: in Connor's (1978) words, for example, the nation can be seen as 'a self-aware ethnic group' (p.388). According to this kind of approach, one can best understand the power and intensity of national allegiances if these are regarded as modern manifestations of a phenomenon that has existed throughout history and across the world - namely, the phenomenon of ethnicity. Hence, according to Fishman (1980), in modern as in pre-modern times ethnicity has mobilised 'communities of putatively common ancestry known to us as "peoples" or "nationalities"' (p.71) and provided 'an experience of deeply rooted, intimate, and eternal belonging' (p.94).

National identity can, alternatively, be understood as comprising ethnic elements in combination with elements that are politically based or 'civic'. The argument here is that nations, which are peculiarly modern phenomena, cannot be equated with ethnic

groups since nations are *political* entities as well as communities bound by ties of culture and feelings of solidarity. For Smith, for example, a nation is ‘a named human population sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members’. Thus, according to Smith (1991) ‘the nation has come to blend two sets of dimensions, the one civic and territorial, the other ethnic and genealogical, in varying proportions in particular cases’ (pp.14-15). Likewise, Schopflin (1995) emphasises the multi-dimensionality of national identity: ‘Ethnicity is the consciousness of sharing, while nationhood implies political demands legitimated by the doctrine of nationalism which declares that cultural and political boundaries should be congruent’ (p. 42). A different way of approaching the subject of national identity is through Tajfel’s (1979) social identity theory. According to this perspective, an individual’s national identity is bound to be just one of a great many aspects of his or her social identity. As is pointed out by Billig (1995) (who is largely critical of such an approach to the study of national identity), the focus of social identity theory is on ‘psychological features which are presumed to be universal and not linked to particular socio-historic contexts’ (p. 67).

Any study of national identity must take note of the arguments of many contemporary social theorists that global and societal changes in the late twentieth century - or in what is often called the postmodern era - are producing radical transformations in modes of identity construction. These transformations are said to take the form of a growing rejection of notions of fixed identities; in particular, perceptions of unified national identities are, apparently, challenged by processes of globalisation. Hence new identities are emerging which are fluid and hybrid; Hall (1992), for example, writes that the postmodern identity is a ‘moveable feast’, for individuals now have access to ‘a variety

of possibilities and new positions of identification...making identities more positional, more political, more plural and diverse' (p. 309). For Connolly (1989), the postmodern identity is one which 'treats as true the proposition that no identity is grounded in ontological truth...[It] assumes an ironic stance towards what it is even while affirming itself in its identity' (p. 331).

This brief review of four major approaches to the study of national identity should illustrate some of the complexities of the phenomenon under discussion here. If we turn our attention now to the specificities of the British case, the issues may immediately seem to become more intricate still. When one considers how an analysis of the subject of Britishness might proceed, three interlinked complicating factors appear to be of critical importance. First, determining the parameters of the 'nation' is a difficult task when it comes to Britain. When people in Britain, and especially in England, talk of their 'nation' it is not always clear where its boundaries lie. England can perhaps best be described as the dominant nation within the multinational state known as the United Kingdom; but if it is a relatively simple matter to differentiate between England and the United Kingdom, it is a harder task to separate notions of 'Britishness' from notions of 'Englishness'. Colley (1992) has argued that some sense of a common British identity emerged among the Welsh, Scottish, and English over the course of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries; however, for the Scots and Welsh there remains to this day a clear distinction between a (perhaps negotiable) political identification with Britain and an ethnic or national identification with Scotland or Wales. For the English, on the other hand, allegiance with England and allegiance with Britain tend to be regarded as one and the same thing: the English have, as Osmond (1988) states, 'a fused identity which can best be described as Anglo-British' (p. 26). Dodd (1995) argues that the ease with

which, for the English, Englishness, and Britishness slide into each other may be a consequence of ‘the intimate yet superior way in which the English have lived with so many other groups’ (p. 35).

Determining the parameters of the English or British nation becomes more difficult still when one considers that the British Empire once spanned the globe: we must remember that ‘prior to 1948, those in the British Isles and those in the British Empire were, formally, equal “subjects” of the Crown’ (Cohen 1994: 6). In the post-war years, great numbers of immigrants from the colonies and former colonies came to Britain and found, on arrival, that most white Britons were far from ready to accept them as British. Today the majority of the non-white population of Britain were born in this country, but often still find that popular definitions of Britishness and, all the more, of Englishness exclude them from membership of the nation. The process of European integration is a second complicating factor when it comes to the question of Britishness. Integration inevitably has many implications for notions of Britishness; most significantly, it raises the question of whether there is likely to emerge among the diverse peoples of the European Union a shared sense of European identity. According to Hutchinson (1994) many political leaders have recognised ‘the necessity to create a visible Community identity to overcome the problem of legitimacy posed by popular apathy’ (p. 141); hence they are seeking to promote symbolic expressions of European allegiance through, for example, creating a European flag and anthem and introducing Europe-oriented cultural policies in education. However, the evidence of survey data, such as that of the European Commission’s Eurobarometer, is that while general support for integration is reasonably solid across Europe as a whole, the various national identities are far from being challenged or undermined by a European identity.

Conclusion

It has come to light that there are a number of ways of looking at identity and defining it. The intellectual debates have been on-going for many decades and different schools of thought have contributed their part. There is a danger of identity becoming a fuzzy concept and for this reason, one must be clear of the approach they adopt. I use these existing theories on identity as useful benchmarks when looking at the identities of my Muslim respondents in the qualitative interviews. The vast literature on national identity shows the enormous interest in this field, but it must be further developed through research.

CHAPTER

4

Research Methods and Fieldwork

Introductory Summary

In this chapter I engage in a discussion on research methods in the social sciences, and then outline which research methods work best for my research questions. I then discuss the fieldwork and how it was conducted. There is a comprehensive presentation of the recruitment process, sample characteristics, interview process, and analysis of the data.

4.1 Research Methods

Through a mixed-methods approach of quantitative and qualitative research, I will develop an understanding of the process of identity-negotiation and construction that Muslims in Britain engage in as it relates to their sense of belonging and membership to Britain. Before alluding to the methodological details of the thesis, a discussion on research methods would prove useful.

4.1.1 Methods as Research Tools

Conceptions of research very often focus on methods of data collection; however, research methods are intimately linked to epistemology and theory. Methods are the tools that researchers use in order to gather data. These techniques for learning about social reality allow us to gather data using individuals, groups, and multimedia texts as our sources. Harding (1987) defines research methods in the following way:

“A research method is a technique for...gathering evidence. One could reasonably argue that all evidence-gathering techniques fall into one of the three categories:

listening to (or interrogation) informants, observation behaviour, or examining historical traces and records (p.2).”

Social research is embedded in multiple layers formed through theoretical perspectives of the researcher, the research question, and finally the research methodology (Van Meter & Stevens 2000). Initially academics believed that the methodology of the research was tightly intertwined with the philosophical assumptions of the researcher. Neuman (2003) defines epistemology or philosophical view as a paradigm. Buying from the philosophy of Thomas Kuhn, Neuman argues that a “paradigm is an integrated set of assumptions, beliefs, models of doing good research, and techniques for gathering and analyzing data” (p. 39). Creswell (2002) phrases these paradigms as *knowledge claims* which “means that researchers start a project with certain assumptions about how they will learn and what they will learn and what they will learn during their inquiry” (p.6). To gather our thoughts, these claims might be called paradigms (Neuman 2003; Lincoln and Guba 2000; Mertens 1998), philosophical assumptions, epistemologies, and ontologies (Crotty 1998), or more broadly they are conceived as research methodologies (Neuman 2000). If thought of philosophically, researchers make claims about what is knowledge (ontology), how we know it (epistemology), what values go into it (axiology), how we write about it (rhetoric), and the processes for studying it (methodology) (Creswell 1994; 2002).

Researchers in the past strictly associated qualitative and quantitative approaches to particular paradigms, i.e. positivist and constructivist, respectively. Both the paradigms adhered to their epistemological view, rejecting all other paradigms, resulting in a paradigm war. But the emergence of the ‘pragmatic paradigm’ came as an answer to the

prevailing thought of qualitative and quantitative approaches as dichotomous. Creswell (2002) explains that traditionally, it was the positivist assumptions that “governed claims about what warrants knowledge” (p.6). This position he says, is sometimes called the “scientific method” or doing “science” research, and is also called “quantitative research, positivist research, empirical science...” (Pp. 6-7). An alternative position or paradigm is qualitative research or constructivist research. But Creswell (2002) says that the situation has changed and now it is less about quantitative *versus* qualitative and that “research practices lie somewhere on a continuum between the two” (p.4). Mertens (1998) also suggests that both the approaches are in a continuum as proven by mixed-method strategies. A researcher adhering to certain knowledge-belief brings, with himself, a specific set of methodologies which give direction to the designing of research procedures.

Hence, mixing methods in research can be seen as a mode of legitimizing the use of multiple approaches in a research project in order to answer research questions (Johnson & Owuegbuzie 2004). Mixed methodology also acts as the interactive continuum which lies between the qualitative and quantitative poles; it allows the complementary combining of both-end methods where the results from one could be elaborated through the other method (Hanson et al. 2005). In a continuum it can augment one dominant method of research to develop from the results of the other method (Goodyear et al. 2005) or help expand the breadth of the research by giving the space to use different methods for different components of the research problem (Hanson et al. 2005). Mertens (2003) and Punch (1998) further define better usage of mixing methods by converging quantitative data with qualitative details such as obtaining statistical data from a sample population and then selecting individuals from the same sample to

provide depth to the results. Thus, the mixing of methods in various ways is a reflection of a qualitative-quantitative methodological continuum, where various research designs and chosen sequence of techniques fall on a different position along the continuum. An example where both quantitative and qualitative data are collected is census data being augmented with open-ended observations (Creswell 2002).

Quantitative researchers often use methods such as experiments, survey/questionnaires, evaluation, content analysis, and statistical analysis. Since the quantitative approach is based on positivist assumptions, methods of measurement are appropriate to this epistemological and theoretical belief system, which guides method selection and implementation. The qualitative approach lends itself to a different set of research methods (though this is not an exclusive list): ethnography, in-depth interviewing, oral history, auto-ethnography, focus group interviewing, case study, discourse analysis, and content analysis. Such a diverse range of methods makes qualitative research distinct in that it uses multiple methods within the context of one research project to ask and answer complex research questions (Hesse-Biber and Leavy 2006: 20). A comparison between quantitative research and qualitative research shows that without qualitative research there is much we would not understand about any social phenomenon (p.382).

Several studies have addressed mixed research designs (Greene et al. 1989; Hanson et al. 2005; Nastasi et al. 2007; Creswell et al. 2008). Based on extensive literature reviews and rigorous content analysis, Creswell et al. (2008: 67–68) categorize the designs as either ‘concurrent’ (designs that make use of qualitative and quantitative research concurrently) or ‘sequential’ (designs that are conducted sequentially).

According to Creswell et al. (2008: 67–70), these major designs can be further classified into five sub-designs:

- (i) ‘concurrent triangulation design’ (QUAN and QUAL data are collected and analyzed in parallel and interpretations are drawn based on QUAN QUAL results);
- (ii) ‘concurrent embedded design’ (QUAL data are collected within the QUAN design, between pretests and posttests, and interpretations are based on QUAN QUAL data);
- (iii) ‘sequential explanatory design’ (first QUAN data are collected and analyzed; then, to further explain the results QUAL data are collected and analyzed; finally, interpretations are based on QUAN QUAL data);
- (iv) ‘sequential exploratory design’ (first QUAL data are collected and analyzed; then, to further explore the problem QUAN data are collected and analyzed; finally, interpretations are based on QUAL QUAN data); and
- (v) ‘sequential embedded design’ (this ‘typically involves collecting qualitative data before an intervention begins or after it is complete’ (Creswell et al. 2008: 69); interpretations are then made based on data integration).

According to Creswell et al.’s (2008) classification, I will use (iii) ‘sequential explanatory design’, whereby I will begin with (already collected) quantitative data which I will analyse and will then compliment that by collecting and analysing qualitative data. In the end, my conclusions will be drawn from both quantitative and qualitative data. Using this mixed-method approach for my research will enable the process of *triangulation* or *confirmation* whereby more than one research method is

employed, in a way, almost like using different prisms to look at the research enquiry in order to arrive at a more informed and holistic model of knowledge building. For example, Madeline Altabe (1998) combined quantitative and qualitative approaches in order to study the relationship between ethnic diversity and body image disturbance. It is important to bear in mind that multi-method designs do not simply rely on more than one method of data collection for the sake of yielding “more data” per se. Triangulation has emerged as one of the major analytical tools for improving the validity and reliability of research (Golafshani 2003). The methodology, instead of suggesting a fixed method, gives space to include multiple ways for data collection and analysis. It not only improves validity and reliability of the research, but it also improves confidence in the research data, unveils unique findings and gives clarity to thought. When multiple-methods are used, the methods interact with each other and inform the research process as a whole. Additionally, multi-method designs help us to frame new research questions that would not otherwise be possible. Likewise, multi-method projects help us to ask questions previously posed in new and often more far-reaching ways. Some multi-method designs may even constitute the development of an emergent method (Hesse-Biber and Leavy 2006: 20).

4.1.2 Research Methods for my Research Questions

The research methods used to answer the research questions vary depending on the suitability of each method in effectively answering the question. The first research question explores the strength and drivers of British identity for Muslims in Britain. To understand the drivers for a large group of Muslims, survey data is available. Survey data has rarely been analysed for Muslims using multivariate modelling. In this thesis I

analyse survey data on Muslims from the Citizenship Survey (CS) and Ethnic Minority British Election Study (EMBES) to find answers for the first research question:

Research Question 1:

What is the strength and relative importance of British identity for Muslims in Britain and what are its drivers?

The CS was designed to provide information for the Home Office's public policy priorities towards local community empowerment. There are three main advantages to using the CS. The first advantage of the CS is its wealth of questions on the relevant variables for my analysis: national identity, socio-economic status, social and cultural interactions, and political and civic engagement. Secondly, it is the most recent survey to provide detailed data for ethnic minorities in Britain. Other common data sources for ethnic minorities in Britain are the Labour Force Survey (LFS) and the Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities (FNSEM). However, while the LFS is produced four times each year, it focuses largely on socio-economic variables and has none of the attitudinal and social behaviour variables relevant to my analysis. And, while the FNSEM has relevant attitudinal and social behaviour questions, it was last conducted over a decade ago in 1993-94. The third advantage to the CS is its relatively large sample size of ethnic minorities. The 2007 release provides a total representative sample of 14,095 individuals 16 years or older resident in England and Wales, this comprised a core sample of 9,336 people and a minority ethnic booster of 4,759. The results from the data analysis in Chapter Five will show that all the claims with regards to belonging to Britain are not entirely representative or substantive for Muslims in Britain. To develop a more nuanced understanding, we require an alternative investigative approach to

understand the identity processes and belonging for Muslims in Britain. This takes us to our second research question.

Research Question 2:

What does ‘belonging to Britain’ mean to Muslims in Britain?

One way to do this, which I undertake, is through an approach called Cognitive Interviewing in which I try to understand the meanings and processes of belonging to Britain for Muslims. More specifically, I do this by trying to understand the meanings of some of the questions being asked in the CS, with a view to revise and generate a more effective set of questions. Cognitive interviewing is established as a valid and reliable practical tool for forensic and health purposes, but its utility for the social sciences has yet to be fully exploited. Theoretically, cognitive interviewing is rooted in cognitive psychology (Davies and Thomson 1987; Kohnken et al. 1999; Py et al. 1997; Tulving and Thomson 1973) and rests upon two principal concepts: (i) memory for an event comprises a network of associations and, therefore, there will be several means by which a memory can be cued; and (ii) retrieval from memory will be more effective if at the time of retrieval the context surrounding the original events can be re-instated (Cutler et al. 1987; Memon and Bull 1991). Remembering some aspects of experience leads, by association, to others, but the sequence cannot be predicted and may appear convoluted to a third party. Cognitive interviewing is designed to facilitate accurate recall. A method that explores ways of understanding current survey questions through this perspective is commonly termed CASM (cognitive aspects of survey methodology). From this perspective, the respondent’s cognitive processes drive the survey response, and an understanding of cognition is central to designing questions and to understanding

and reducing sources of response error (Willis 2004: 23). Ordinary interviews focus on producing codable responses to the questions. Cognitive interviews, by contrast, focus on providing a view of the processes elicited by the questions. Concurrent or retrospective “think-alouds” and/or probes are used to produce reports of the thoughts respondents have either as they answer the survey questions or immediately after. The objective is to reveal the thought processes involved in interpreting a question and arriving at an answer. These thoughts are then analyzed to diagnose problems with the question. This activity is not carried out primarily for the purpose of developing general principles of questionnaire design, but rather, to evaluate targeted survey questions, with the goal of modifying these questions when indicated in these interviews.

Cognitive interviewing is an approach, accompanied by a set of discrete techniques, rather than a procedure. It has synergies with unstructured qualitative interviewing. It is crucial to appreciate that there is *no* standardisation, not even standardised prompts or a set of questions that allow open-ended answers. In order for the interviewee to access and retrieve from their memory effectively it is vital that their sequence of recall is not interrupted, e.g. by requests for clarification. One of the most important techniques in cognitive interviewing is that the interviewer remains silent while the interviewee recalls experience. However much an interviewee appears to be drifting into irrelevancies, they should remain uninterrupted. The interviewee must be encouraged to recall experience unrestrained by the editing normally expected in social conversation. Rapport is essential and the interviewer, therefore, needs to be socially skilled in order to put the interviewee at their ease and give them license to tell their story in detail. The interviewer needs to be very attentive to what the interviewee is saying, scribbling notes of anything that may call for greater elaboration and clarification subsequently. This

attentiveness and freedom from interruption seems to encourage interviewees to provide copious detail, apparently serving as affirmation that they are being taken seriously. The sample I used for the cognitive interviews is different from the CS sample which was much too large and not accessible. For the cognitive interviews, I use purposive sampling and snowballing to gather a small sample (30 respondents) of Muslims, consisting of many different ethnic origins. The size of the sample is large enough to allow me to draw some meaningful patterns and themes.

After probing into the drivers of British identification and understanding sense of belonging in Chapters Five and Six, I turn to the third research question, which is:

Research Question 3:

What do the identities, British, Pakistani, and Muslim mean to Muslims in Britain, and how easy do they find it to integrate these identities?

The questions being asked by these research questions relate to the different aspects of identity for Muslims in Britain, the impact of different subculture(s) on Muslim identities, and experiences of integration and discrimination. To answer these questions, once again quantitative research techniques become relatively superficial, instead qualitative research methods deem to be most compatible. The point in principle is perhaps demonstrated well by Leach's (1967) argument that an intensive study of a single village by one researcher can reveal a far wider explanatory system, thus undermine the numerically distracting conclusions from mass surveys of dozens of neighbouring villages (Leach 1967). Sapsford and Jupp (2006) provide an illuminating explanation of my case in point. Some research, they suggest, takes an essentially *positivistic* approach to the nature of knowledge about the social world: it takes the

nature of the world as relatively unproblematic – the main problems being how to measure it adequately – and it emphasizes the neutrality and separateness of the researcher from that which is under investigation. Such work is typically *reductionist*: it seeks to explain the whole by measurement and correlation of the behaviour of parts or aspects to it. Being *quantitative*, it works by measurement and analysis of relationships between the resulting numbers, and typically, it aspires to the methods of the natural sciences. Other studies, however, take a more *interactionist* perspective, looking at the “meaning of situations and actions for people, conceived as something not fixed and determinate but negotiated from moment to moment” (p.2). Studies from this perspective, they argue, are more likely to be *naturalistic*, trying to proceed by observation and participation in the situation as a whole or by relatively ‘open’ or ‘unstructured’ interviews with actors in it.

The term *qualitative* is inherently diverse and providing a definition for it is no mean feat (Ritchie and Lewis 2003). This reflects the fact that the term is used as an overarching category, covering a wide range of approaches and methods found within different research disciplines. Despite this diversity, a number of writers have attempted to capture the essence of qualitative research by offering working definitions or by identifying a set of key characteristics. Strauss and Corbin (1990) hold qualitative research to be “any kind of research that produces findings not arrived at by means of statistical procedures or other means of quantification” (p.17), seeking illumination, understanding and in-depth knowledge. In their *Handbook of Qualitative Research*, Denzin and Lincoln (2000) offer the following definition:

“Qualitative research is a situated activity that locates the observer in the world. It consists of a set of interpretive, material practices that makes the world visible. These practices...turn the world into a series of representations including field notes, interviews, conversations, photographs, recordings and memos to the self...This means that qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or to interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them” (p. 3).

Some of the key defining qualities highlighted by Denzin and Lincoln (2000) are supported in other definitions. In particular, there is a fairly wide consensus that qualitative research is a naturalistic, interpretive approach concerned with understanding the meanings which people attach to phenomena (actions, decisions, beliefs, values etc.) within their social worlds: “the way in which people being studied understand and interpret their social reality is one of the central motifs of qualitative research” (Bryman 1988: 8). As mentioned earlier, certain data collection methods have been identified with qualitative research such as: observational methods, in-depth interviewing, group discussions, narratives, and the analysis of documentary evidence. While quantitative research can tell us about the existence of an incidence, it does not tell us why. Qualitative methods of knowledge building, argue Hesse-Biber and Leavy (2006), are more effective than quantitative methods. Quantitative methods of knowledge building simply cannot answer the most pressing social questions of our time, not alone. The point in case here is that qualitative research is not simply an augment to quantitative research but rather can help us ask and answer a range of research questions, adding immeasurably to our overall repository of knowledge on any given subject.

Following on from the cognitive style interviewing, we conducted semi-structured in-depth interviews with Muslim respondents to explore our research questions. Let us now discuss in detail the fieldwork conducted for the cognitive and in-depth interviews.

4.2 Discussion of Fieldwork

I will now discuss how I selected my samples and recruited the interview participants for both the cognitive and in-depth interviews, paying focus to the methods and criteria, and demonstrating this through tree diagrams..

4.2.1 Selection of Samples and Recruitment Trees

To gather my sample for both sets of qualitative interviews (cognitive and in-depth), Purposive Sampling served to be the most useful method. As in all forms of non-probability sampling, not all members of the population under investigation have a chance of being selected. Purposive sampling, a method when the researcher knows in advance what characteristics her respondents must have to make possible her research aims, seeks out individuals with specific traits (Bernard 2000: 176; Hesse-Biber and Leavy 2006: 70; Henry 1990: 17). The researcher samples with a *purpose* in mind with one or more specific predefined groups they are seeking. I split this purposive sampling up into two parts: I started off by identifying respondents that matched my criteria of inclusion for interviews and then I contacted different gatekeepers. My sample population for the cognitive interviews was different to that for the in-depth interviews, although the method for selection was the same.

For the cognitive interviews, I was particularly interested in and interviewed respondents who:

- (1) Were currently living in Britain.
- (2) Belonged to the Islamic faith, i.e. were “Muslim”.
- (3) I. Were born and raised in Britain; OR
II. Were born and raised in [Country] (These respondents had lived, at least, up to the beginning of their adult life, i.e. 18 years, in [Country] before coming to Britain and have been living in Britain for at least 3 years); OR
III. Were born in [Country] and migrated to Britain at young age (i.e. <10).
- (4) Were adults (i.e. above the age of 18).

For the in-depth interviews, I was particularly interested in and interviewed respondents who:

- (1) Were currently living in Britain.
- (2) Belonged to the Islamic faith, i.e. were “Muslim”.
- (3) Belonged to the Pakistani ethnic group.
- (4) I. Were born and raised in Britain; OR
II. Were born and raised in Pakistan (These respondents had lived, at least, up to the beginning of their adult life, i.e. 18 years, in Pakistan before coming to Britain and have been living in Britain for at least 3 years); OR
III. Were born in Pakistan and migrated to Britain at young age (i.e. <10).
- (5) Were adults (i.e. above the age of 18).

To summarise, the research population consisted of respondents that were self-described adherents to the Islamic faith. They were young Muslim adults, most of who fell approximately in the same age category (18-35) and who thus presumably shared similar historical reference points. Within this population two groups were sought: second- and third-generation Muslim adults who were born and raised in Britain (the

off-spring of first-generation migrants) and those who were born in their country of origin and are currently living in Britain. For the in-depth interviews the respondents were of Pakistani ethnic origin, but for the cognitive interviews ethnic origin was not a selective criterion, any ethnic group was eligible. Since the cognitive interviews are aiming to tap and refine survey methodology, the sample of respondents was not filtered by ethnic origin to ensure that the refined question/s are representative of the concerns of as many ethnic groups as possible and can be more useful in the context of a questionnaire.

For the in-depth interviews, the ethnic group of Pakistanis was chosen for two reasons. Firstly, this group is a majority ethnic group in Britain's Muslim population (Hiro 1991; Census 2001)¹⁵. Three quarters of Muslims in Britain are from a South Asian ethnic background, predominantly Pakistani (43 per cent), Bangladeshi (16 per cent), Indian (8 per cent), and Other Asian (6 per cent). In London, almost two thirds of Muslims are of South Asian origin (24 per cent Bangladeshi, 22 per cent Pakistani, 7 per cent Indian and 7 per cent Other Asian). Secondly, Pakistanis (as well as Bangladeshis) tended to have less education when they first migrated to the UK than previous waves of Caribbeans and Indians, and hence they remain one of the poorest ethnic minority groups in Britain (Heath and McMahon 2005). I reason this will enrich the data with answers relevant for our questions on the importance of socio-economic status for self-identification. From a practical point of view, my familiarity with the language and culture of this group makes it more favourable. Including other Muslim ethnic groups, such as the Bangladeshis or Somalis, would have been interesting however doing so would introduce additional variations not central to our theory, such as cultural and

¹⁵ Together Bangladeshis and Pakistanis comprise 59% of Britain's Muslim population. Source: 2001 UK Census.

historical variations, which would be difficult to control for. Focusing on one ethnic group - the Pakistanis - would allow focus and substantive concentration on the theoretical arguments. A similar argument holds for the focus on just second and third generation British born Muslims rather than an inclusion of first-generation migrants.

For the Muslims who were born in Pakistan and are therefore first-generation migrants living in Britain, two distinctions were made. The first group were the migrants who came to Britain at young age (i.e. <10), and the second group were the more recent migrants, with at least five years of residency in Britain. They had lived, at minimum, up to the beginning of their adult life i.e. 18 years in Pakistan, before coming to Britain. The experiences of both these groups are bound to be different and hybrid. Since the first inflow of Pakistani migrants to Britain in the 1970s, the inflow has been remained large. Each year 250,000 Pakistanis come to Britain to visit, work or marry, with 10,000 or so Pakistanis admitted each year on student visas, with businesses sponsoring a couple of thousand Pakistani workers a year to plug gaps in the labour market. Links are reinforced by ingrained marriage customs: six of ten ethnic Pakistanis in Britain pick a spouse from Pakistan (O'Beirne 2004). The migrants that come to work or study in Britain as adults, usually come without families, have an apt understanding of the English language, are skilled or are seeking highly-skilled careers. With the tide of globalisation and increasing opportunities for skilled people around the globe, these skilled migrants do not necessarily want to settle down in Britain. Whereas the children of the migrants who came in the 1970s are lagging behind in terms of education and employment, the recent inflow of Pakistanis who have come for educational or employment reasons have an advantage in terms of their socioeconomic status. Having said that, within this recent inflow of Pakistanis there is diversity, and not all of them

are highly skilled or educated. For instance, some of them come to marry or come on student visas with admission to ‘bogus’ colleges and are attracted more by the financial aspect of earning higher incomes (as compared to Pakistan), although in labour-intensive jobs. The arrest in 2009 of ten Pakistanis across Britain, who had entered Britain on student visas, in connection with potential violent activities, although found not guilty, adds another dynamic to this group. Comparing this group of Pakistanis to second and third generation Pakistanis that were born in Britain has revealed some insightful and notable nuances for all our research questions.

The majority of my interview respondents were drawn from London (56 respondents from London to be exact), with some from other cities as well, 9 from Oxford, 3 from Nottingham, 2 from Birmingham, 2 from Leicester, and 1 from Oldham. Breaking it down by gender, 40 respondents were female and 33 respondents were male. Britain’s Muslim population is spread out across the UK (ninety seven per cent resides in the geographical area of England and Wales) and London has the largest of Britain’s total Muslim population (almost 40 per cent); in the 2001 Census 607,083 Muslims were reported to be living in the Greater London area. Muslims are spread out throughout the city with a concentration in East London, with the borough of Tower Hamlets and Newham having 34.5 per cent (71,000/36.4 per cent) and 32 per cent (59,000/24.3 per cent) respectively, and Redbridge and Waltham Forest having proportions of the population higher than 20 per cent. Although the theoretical aspects of the research were the driving factors behind the geographical location of the interviews, London was given preference for drawing the majority of interviewees because of its large number of Muslim population and due to the limited resources available for this research, i.e. time and money, London was a more feasible geographical location as compared to

other cities. Within London, most of my interview respondents were originally from the East London Boroughs of Newham and Waltham Forest. A small number of interview respondents were also drawn from Oxford and some respondents from Northern cities (mentioned above) to enrich the data with local anecdotes and particularities, and shed light on the kinds of differences that environment can make in the process of self-identification.

Figure 6




Map of London



To get access to interviewees, as well as identifying respondents through purposive sampling, I approached a number of gatekeepers to ensure that respondents were drawn from a range of points. All my gatekeepers responded positively. Firstly, a call for interviewees was sent out to organisational, society, and social network mailing lists,

specifying the criteria for inclusion. These gatekeepers were also contacted through other means, in person and over the telephone. Secondly, the technique of snowball sampling helped to identify persons. This technique, also referred to as chain sampling, involves asking people who have already been interviewed to identify other people they know who fit the selection criteria. It is a particularly useful approach for dispersed and small populations, and where the key selection criteria are characteristics that might not be widely disclosed by individuals or which are too sensitive for a screening interview (for example sexual orientation). To keep the sample frame diverse in terms of its respondents, participants were asked to identify people who meet the criteria but who are dissimilar to them in particular ways, and by avoiding family members or close friends (Ritchie and Lewis 2003: 94). This technique turned out to be particularly useful in bringing forward Muslims, for instance, who are members of Islamist groups and are cautious over making this fact public or homosexual Muslims who very often face intense opposition in traditional Muslim communities. But the element of trust and reliability ingrained in the snowballing technique, through the reassurance offered by persons to each other helped to bring these respondents forward. In addition, my existing contacts in the Pakistani community and fluency in the Urdu language placed me at an advantage, in particular for attracting Pakistan-born Muslims. The interviews began with multiple respondents, who were all unknown to each other, and they were then asked to recommend other respondents thus making the snowballing as far-reaching and diverse as possible. Let us use Recruitment Trees here to demonstrate my process of obtaining access to interviewees for both the cognitive and in-depth interviews. A recruitment tree displays the various access points of entry or gatekeepers used to get access to one's participants.

Figure 7 Recruitment Trees for Cognitive and In-Depth Interviews





¹⁶ London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) Students' Union Islamic Society Mailing List.





¹⁷ Sponsors for Educational Opportunity (SEO) Mailing List.

¹⁸ University of East London Islamic Society Mailing List.




¹⁹ Oxford University Islamic Society Mailing List.

²⁰ Oxford University Pakistani Society Mailing List.



²¹ The City Circle. The City Circle forms a network of professionals from the Muslim Community drawn mainly from the City of London . Among the main professions that are represented in the Circle, the main are: accountants, bankers, barristers, civil servants, doctors, engineers, it specialists, journalists, lecturers, lawyers, marketers, management consultants, psychologists, public relations executives, recruitment consultants, sales, scientists and teachers.

²² East London Mosque & London Muslim Centre.



I conducted 30 cognitive interviews and 61 in-depth interviews were, giving me a total of 91 interviews conducted from a total of 73 respondents. Some respondents were eligible for both types of interviews, cognitive and in-depth, and kindly took part in both (18 respondents took part in both the cognitive and in-depth interviews, so this meant that 12 respondents gave both types of interviews). The sample of respondents for the cognitive interviews was not restricted by ethnic background, so in those interviews my respondents were from a range of different ethnic groups. On the other hand, the sample of respondents for the in-depth interviews was restricted to those of Pakistani origin, who were either born in the UK or Pakistan. Within my sample there was a mixture of UK-born (of Pakistani origin) and Pakistan-born Muslims. The point of saturation in respondent answers did require me to change the interviewee sample, for example after a certain number of interviews it was realised that the answers I was getting were similar. Perhaps this was because thus far most of the respondents were relatively educated. But this led me to change my approach and also target the lesser-

²³ Waltham Forest College is located in Walthamstow, North-East London and enrolls over 10,000 students a year.

educated Muslims. Agar (1996: 135) notes that if the researcher finds the results are the same for a group of individuals and learns nothing new by sampling again from that population, then a point of “theoretical saturation” or “data adequacy” on this group of individuals is reached. The researcher may then opt to interview another group in the population to see if a different angle of vision onto the issue being researched is ascertained. By doing this, one enhances understanding through seeking multiple perspectives (Agar 1996: 172). Respondents were not selected on their degree of religiosity, as this is something that was explored in the interview. Instead the target was, with the help of the snowballing technique, to achieve a mixed sample which reflected respondents with varying degrees of religiosity, ranging from ‘liberal’ to ‘moderate’ to ‘practicing’, if such categories can be so crudely constructed. Thus respondents who identify themselves as “Muslim” were a sufficient condition for inclusion.

4.2.2 Sample Characteristics

It is important to look at the characteristics of the sample of my Muslim respondents, giving their country of birth, ethnic group, age, gender, highest education qualifications, and current occupation. I had collected other details on them as well, but for the sake of brevity have limited the information to the key aspects of interest. Table 2 presents this.

Table 2: Respondents for Qualitative Interviews

Muslim Respondents for Cognitive and In-Depth Interviews								
Respondents (Cognitive=C and In-Depth=ID)			Country of Birth	Ethnic Group	Age	Gender	Highest Educational Qualification	Current Occupation
R1	C1		UK	Bangladeshi	23	Female	Bachelor's Degree	Full-Time Job
R2	C2		UK	Indian	20	Female	A-levels	Student (Bachelor)
R3	C3		UK	Egyptian	22	Male	Bachelor's Degree	Full-Time Job
R4	C4		Turkey	Turkish	27	Female	Master's Degree	Student (Doctoral)
R5	C5		Belgium	Belgian	26	Male	Master's Degree	Student (Doctoral)
R6	C6		UK	White British	25	Female	Bachelor's Degree	Full-Time Job
R7	C7		UK	Somali	24	Female	Bachelor's Degree	Full-Time Job
R8	C8		UK	Bangladeshi	35	Female	Bachelor's Degree	Housewife
R9	C9		UK	Bangladeshi	19	Female	GCSEs	Housewife
R10	C10		UK	Cypriot	20	Female	A-levels	Student (Bachelor's)
R11	C11		UK	Iraqi	22	Female	A-levels	Student (Bachelor's)
R12	C12		UK	Nigerian	20	Male	A-levels	Student (Bachelor's)
R13	C13	ID1	UK	Bangladeshi	27	Male	Master's Degree	Full-Time Job
R14	C14	ID2	UK	White British	22	Male	Bachelor's Degree	Student (Master's)
R15	C15	ID3	UK	Indian	30	Male	GCSEs	Full-Time Job
R16	C16	ID4	Kenya	Pakistani	23	Female	Bachelor's Degree	Full-Time Job
R17	C17	ID5	Saudi Arabia	Saudi	25	Female	Bachelor's Degree	Student (Master's)
R18	C18	ID6	UK	Sudanese	22	Female	Bachelor's Degree	Student (Master's)
R19	C19	ID7	UK	Pakistani	25	Female	Bachelor's Degree	Full-time Job
R20	C20	ID8	Pakistan	Pakistani	33	Female	Bachelor's Degree	Freelancer (Self- Employed)
R21	C21	ID9	UK	Pakistani	21	Male	Bachelor's Degree	Full-Time Job
R22	C22	ID10	UK	Pakistani	25	Male	Bachelor's Degree	Full-Time Job
R23	C23	ID11	UK	Pakistani	26	Female	Bachelor's Degree	Student (Master's)
R24	C24	ID12	UK	Pakistani	19	Male	A-levels	Student (Bachelor's)
R25	C25	ID13	UK	Pakistani	24	Female	Bachelor's	Housewife

							Degree	
R26	C26	ID14	UK	Pakistani	23	Male	Bachelor's Degree	Full-Time Job
R27	C27	ID15	UK	Pakistani	27	Male	Master's Degree	Student (Doctoral)
R28	C28	ID16	UK	Pakistani	27	Female	Bachelor's Degree	Unemployed
R29	C29	ID17	UK	Pakistani	22	Female	Bachelor's Degree	Student (Master's)
R30	C30	ID18	Pakistan	Pakistani	26	Female	Master's Degree	Student (Doctoral)
R31		ID19	Pakistan	Pakistani	53	Female	Master's Degree	Full-Time Job
R32		ID20	Pakistan	Pakistani	24	Female	Master's Degree	Student (Doctoral)
R33		ID21	UK	Pakistani	33	Male	Doctorate	Full-Time Job
R34		ID22	UK	Pakistani	21	Male	Bachelor's Degree	Full-Time Job
R35		ID23	UK	Pakistani	24	Female	Bachelor's Degree	Part-Time Job
R36		ID24	UK	Pakistani	27	Female	Bachelor's Degree	Student (Master's)
R37		ID25	UK	Pakistani	35	Female	Master's Degree	Full-Time Job
R38		ID26	Pakistan	Pakistani	27	Female	Bachelor's Degree	Student (Master's)
R39		ID27	Pakistan	Pakistani	23	Male	A-levels	Student (Bachelor's)
R40		ID28	Pakistan	Pakistani	20	Female	FSc (equiv. to A-levels)	Housewife
R41		ID29	UK	Pakistani	27	Male	Bachelor's Degree	Full-time Job
R42		ID30	UK	Pakistani	24	Male	Bachelor's Degree	Unemployed
R43		ID31	UK	Pakistani	29	Male	Bachelor's Degree	Full-Time Job
R44		ID32	Pakistan	Pakistani	22	Female	A-levels	Student (PGCE)
R45		ID33	UK	Pakistani	26	Male	Master's Degree	Student (Doctoral)
R46		ID34	UK	Pakistani	27	Female	Bachelor's Degree	Full-Time Job
R47		ID35	UK	Pakistani	24	Female	Bachelor's Degree	Part-Time Job
R48		ID36	UK	Pakistani	32	Female	Doctorate	Full-Time Job
R49		ID37	UK	Pakistani	21	Male	GCSEs	Unemployed
R50		ID38	UK	Pakistani	28	Female	Bachelor's Degree	Housewife
R51		ID39	Pakistan	Pakistani	19	Female	Matrics (equiv. to GCSEs)	Housewife
R52		ID40	UK	Pakistani	26	Female	GCSEs	Unemployed
R53		ID41	UK	Pakistani	33	Male	Bachelor's Degree	Full-Time Job
R54		ID42	UK	Pakistani	35	Female	Bachelor's Degree	Full-Time Job
R55		ID43	UK	Pakistani	25	Male	A-levels	Full-Time

								Job
R56		ID44	Pakistan	Pakistani	24	Male	Masters	Full-Time Job
R57		ID45	Pakistan	Pakistani	48	Female	Bachelor's Degree	Housewife
R58		ID46	Pakistan	Pakistani	27	Male	Master's Degree	Full-Time Job
R59		ID47	Pakistan	Pakistani	25	Male	Bachelor's Degree	Full-Time Job
R60		ID48	Pakistan	Pakistani	46	Female	Bachelor's Degree	Part-Time Job (Self-Employed) & Housewife
R61		ID49	Pakistan	Pakistani	29	Male	Master's Degree	Full-Time Job
R62		ID50	UK	Pakistani	19	Female	GCSEs	Unemployed
R63		ID51	UK	Pakistani	21	Male	BTEC Level 3 (Vocational)	Full-Time Job
R64		ID52	UK	Pakistani	22	Male	Bachelor's Degree	Unemployed
R65		ID53	UK	Pakistani	27	Male	Master's Degree	Full-Time Job
R66		ID54	Pakistan	Pakistani	26	Male	MBA	Full-Time Job
R67		ID55	Pakistan	Pakistani	28	Female	FSc (equiv. to A-levels)	Student (English Course) & Housewife
R68		ID56	Pakistan	Pakistani	20	Female	A-levels	Student (Bachelor's)
R69		ID57	UK	Pakistani	19	Male	GCSEs	Full-Time Job
R70		ID58	UK	Pakistani	22	Male	GCSEs	Full-Time Job
R71		ID59	UK	Pakistani	18	Male	GCSEs	Full-Time Job
R72		ID60	UK	Pakistani	25	Female	NVQ Level 3 (Vocational)	Part-Time Job
R73		ID61	UK	Pakistani	29	Male	BTEC Level 3 (Vocational)	Full-Time Job

Source: Recruitment Trees.

Now let's look at how the interviews were conducted, giving the approach, limitations, and insights into how the interviews worked.

4.2.3 Interview Process

The interview procedures and practices for both types of my qualitative interviews, cognitive and in-depth, were different.

Although there is now general agreement about the value of cognitive interviewing, no consensus has emerged about best practices, such as whether (or when) to use think-alouds versus probes, whether to employ concurrent or retrospective reporting, and how to analyze and evaluate results. In part this is due to the paucity of methodological research examining these issues, but it is also due to a lack of attention to the theoretical foundation for applying cognitive interviews to survey pretesting. Belson (1981) pioneered a version of this approach in the mid-1960s by designing “intensive” interviews to explore seven questions respondents had been asked the preceding day during a regular interview administered by a separate interviewer. Respondents were first reminded of the exact question and the answer they had given to it. The interviewer then enquired, “When you were asked that question yesterday, exactly what did you think the question meant?” Interviewers then asked, “Now tell me exactly how you worked out your answer from that question. Think it out for me just as you did yesterday . . . only this time say it aloud for me.” Then interviewers posed scripted probes about various aspects of the question to test hypotheses about problems particular to each of the questions. Finally, after listening to the focal question once more, respondents were requested to say how they would now answer it. If their answer differed from the one they had given the preceding day, they were asked to explain why (Presser et al. 2004).

Cognitive interviewing is an approach, accompanied by a set of discrete techniques, rather than a procedure. It has synergies with unstructured qualitative interviewing. It is crucial to appreciate that there is *no* standardisation, not even standardised prompts or a set of questions that allow open-ended answers. In order for the interviewee to access and retrieve from their memory effectively it is vital that their sequence of recall is not interrupted, e.g. by requests for clarification. One of the most important techniques in cognitive interviewing is that the interviewer remains silent while the interviewee recalls experience. However much an interviewee appears to be drifting into irrelevancies, they should remain uninterrupted. The interviewee must be encouraged to recall experience unrestrained by the editing normally expected in social conversation. Rapport is essential and the interviewer, therefore, needs to be socially skilled in order to put the interviewee at their ease and give them license to tell their story in detail. The interviewer needs to be very attentive to what the interviewee is saying, scribbling notes of anything that may call for greater elaboration and clarification subsequently. This attentiveness and freedom from interruption seems to encourage interviewees to provide copious detail, apparently serving as affirmation that they are being taken seriously.

Adopting a similar approach to that of Belson (1981), for my cognitive interviews the most relevant questions from the CS were selected and explored with my sample of participants to understand the meanings of and processes involved in the questions. First, the questions were asked as they would have originally been asked face-to-face.

The questions asked were:

1) How strongly do you feel you belong to Britain?

Concurrently rather than retrospectively, using think-alouds and probes respondents were asked to explain what they thought the question meant and to lay out the process of working out their answer. After non-directly probing to illuminate how the answer was worked out, scripted probes were posed about various aspects of the question. These probes differed across questions and were devised to test hypotheses about problems particular to each of the questions. Finally, after being asked the questions once more, respondents were requested to say how they would now answer it. If their answer differed from the one they had given earlier, they were asked to explain why. Alongside this model, other approaches of cognitive interviewing were also consulted in the process of interviewing to arrive at the most efficient approach. As well as conceptual material surrounding British identification, a whole set of methodological issues surrounding survey methodology emerged out from the cognitive interviews.

The in-depth interviews were very different in nature and method from the cognitive interviews, because in my in-depth interviews I was trying to arrive at a detailed discussion with my Muslim respondents. The way Kvale (1996) describes interviews in his book is relevant for explaining the way my in-depth interviews worked. Kvale says that “If you want to know how people understand their world and their life, why not talk to them?” (p.1). In this sense, in an interview conversation the researcher listens and tries to understand the respondent, their point of view, and unfolds the meaning of their experiences, and uncovers their world different to scientific explanations. In Kvale’s

words, the “qualitative research interview is a construction site of knowledge”, it is “literally an *inter view*, an inter change of views between two persons conversing about a theme of mutual interest” (Pp. 1-2).

The in-depth interviews were semi-structured, with some questions allowing the respondents to give an unstructured and free-flow response and some requiring them to give a structured and choice/selection-based response. The interview was split into two parts, the first one explored various topics related to the identities of our respondents and the second part captured key information about them. A topic guide was constructed and used for the in-depth interviews, separated by the following sections:

In-Depth Interviews Topic Guide:

Part 1

1. Meanings of identity
2. Experiences of British national identification
3. Muslim cultures and sub-cultures
4. Collective group Muslim identity
5. Social implications

Part 2

1. Demographic information
2. Education, employment, and language skills

These topics were explored with the use of prompts to initiate discussion with the participant, with questions at-hand to serve as a back-up in case. In order to compare responses to existing data from other surveys there were a few questions with

categorical responses. The interview topic guide is included in the appendices. According to Walker (1985), in-depth interviews enable a conversation in which the researcher encourages the informant to relate, in their own terms, experiences and attitudes that are relevant to the research problem. It provides “the opportunity for the researcher to probe deeply, to uncover new clues, to open up new dimensions of a problem and to secure vivid, accurate, and inclusive accounts that are based on personal experience” (Burgess 1982: 107). The interviewer is not bound by a rigid questionnaire designed to ensure that the same questions are asked of all respondents in exactly the same way. An in-depth interview is not completely unstructured since the interviewer constantly “appraises the meaning of emerging data for his problem and uses the resulting insights to phrase questions that will further develop the implications of these data” (Dean et al. 1969: 302).

In qualitative research, since the researcher is very much a part of the research method his or her characteristics may introduce social dynamics that need to be considered. Ritchie and Lewis (2003) elaborate on this notion of reflexivity as being important in striving for objectivity and neutrality. We try to reflect upon ways in which bias might creep into our qualitative research practice, and acknowledge that our own backgrounds and beliefs can be relevant here (p.20). Before embarking on my interviews, I suspected a number of issues that might affect my interviews. Firstly, I knew that as a Muslim researcher (which is indicative by my headscarf), my access to Muslim respondents could be made swifter and their willingness to take part could be greater due to a certain degree of presumed familiarity and trust. Additionally, I stipulated that in the actual interview respondents might be more candid in their views to a Muslim interviewer than

they would be to a non-Muslim one. As well as these benefits, I had also calculated that being a Muslim woman interviewer might pose some difficulty. For instance, some Muslim men may object for religious reasons to meeting a Muslim woman alone, even if the interview is held in a public place. To counter any such obstacles, I came up with plan that in such a situation a male or female acquaintance would accompany me to the interview (the respondent would be informed of this arrangement in advance), with the hope that this would eliminate any objections the male respondent may have. Or alternatively the respondent may bring an acquaintance of theirs with them, if that arrangement suits them better. In some patriarchal Pakistani families, there is a possibility that a husband does not give permission to his wife to be interviewed alone. In such an incidence, an acquaintance of the respondent such as a sibling, friend or the husband himself may be invited to the interview as well.

Interviews are a rewarding but challenging form of measurement. Every interview has a life of its own. Assuring a consistently high-quality interview is a challenge that requires constant effort. They require a personal sensitivity and adaptability as well as the ability to stay within the bounds of the designed protocol (Web Centre for Social Research Methods). I had to do an ample amount of preparation for them. My role as an interviewer was complex and multifaceted, including a number of tasks. Firstly, as described in the previous section, I specified my sample and then located my respondents. After this, I had to enlist their cooperation by agreeing and adjusting to the time, place, and conditions that were best for them, often also paying for their food or drink if the venue was a café or coffee shop. Furthermore, to maintain the quality of responses in the interview, I kept my respondents motivated and attentive by speaking

about the importance of my research, so that they would take an interest in the subject area and answer with conviction.

Ethical standards were maintained throughout the research by anonymizing the personal information of all respondents to uphold confidentiality. I did not conceal my identity as a doctoral researcher and I informed my respondents that their interview will only be used for the purpose of my doctoral thesis, and absolute anonymity is guaranteed. For the sake of maximum input from the respondent, I maintained a neutral stance throughout the interview being mindful not to spill out my own views thus adhering to a ‘friendly non-committal approach’. To avoid misunderstandings as to the intention of the research, respondents were provided with a ‘Notes for Interviewee’ sheet prior to the interview, which clearly explained the purpose and procedure of the study. When asked questions about my research, its methods, or its relevance by my respondents, I gave honest answers and in most cases, respondents were very pleased that research was being conducted on such an important topic, they felt that although much was being said in policy circles and the media, there was not enough academic research being carried out on Muslims in Britain and they were grateful to me for this task.

With the assistance of my supervisor, I undertook a Risk Assessment Exercise on both the physical safety issues and challenging situations that could have arisen alongside consulting the protocols for safety from the National Centre for Social Research. As per the university requirement before starting the fieldwork, I submitted the ethics forms (Central University Research Ethics Committee). The modules offered by the

Professional Training for Social Scientists programme at the Said Business School, Oxford which are designed to deliver training for researchers in the social sciences also proved particularly helpful for my research, especially, the modules on ‘Research: Rights, privileges, responsibilities and morality’, ‘Managing ethics in the Social Sciences’, ‘Research Project Management’ and ‘How to Negotiate’.

In the first instance, through conducting a small number of pilot interviews in Oxford I pre-tested my interview questionnaire. Pre-testing dates to the founding of the modern sample survey, in the mid-1930s or shortly thereafter. The earliest references in scholarly journals are from 1940, by which time pre-tests apparently were well established. In that year Katz (1940) reported, “The American Institute of Public Opinion [i.e. Gallup] and Fortune [i.e. Roper] pre-test their questions to avoid phrasings which will be unintelligible to the public and to avoid issues unknown to the man on the street” (p. 279). Survey researchers have shown remarkable confidence in this approach. This faith in conventional pretesting is probably based on the common experience that a small number of conventional interviews often reveal numerous problems, such as questions that contain unwarranted suppositions, awkward wordings, or missing response categories. However, there is no scientific evidence to justify the confidence that this kind of pre-testing identifies the major problems in a questionnaire.

Conventional pre-tests are based on the assumption that questionnaire problems will be signalled either by the answers that the questions elicit (e.g. “don’t know” or refusals), which will show up in response tallies, or by some other visible consequence of asking

the questions (e.g., hesitation or discomfort in responding), which interviewers can describe during debriefing. However, as Cannell and Kahn (1953: 353) noted, “There are no exact tests for these characteristics.” They go on to say, “The help of experienced interviewers is most useful at this point in obtaining subjective evaluations of the questionnaire.” Similarly, Moser and Kalton (1971: 50) judged, “Almost the most useful evidence of all on the adequacy of a questionnaire is the individual fieldworker’s [i.e. interviewer’s] report on how the interviews went, what difficulties were encountered, what alterations should be made, and so forth.” This emphasis on interviewer perceptions is nicely illustrated in Sudman and Bradburn’s (1982: 49) advice for detecting unexpected word meanings: “A careful pilot test conducted by sensitive interviewers is the most direct way of discovering these problem words” (emphasis added). However, certain kinds of problems will not be apparent from observing respondent behaviour, and the respondents themselves may be unaware of the problems. For instance, respondents can misunderstand a closed question’s intent without providing any indication of having done so.

Moreover, because conventional pre-tests are almost always “undeclared” to the respondent, as opposed to “participating” (in which respondents are informed of the pre-test’s purpose; see Converse and Presser 1986), respondents are usually not asked directly about their interpretations or other problems the questions may have caused. As a result, undeclared conventional pretesting seems better designed to identify problems the questionnaire poses for interviewers, who know the purpose of the testing, than for respondents, who do not. Furthermore, when conventional pre-test interviewers do describe respondent problems, there are no rules for assessing their descriptions or for

determining which problems that are identified ought to be addressed. Researchers typically rely on intuition and experience in judging the seriousness of problems and deciding how to revise questions that are thought to have flaws. In recent decades a growing awareness of conventional pretesting's drawbacks has led to two interrelated changes. First, there has been a subtle shift in the goals of testing, from an exclusive focus on identifying and fixing overt problems experienced by interviewers and respondents to a broader concern for improving data quality so that measurements meet a survey's objectives. Second, new testing methods have been developed or adapted from other uses. These methods include cognitive interviews, behaviour coding, response latency, vignette analysis, formal respondent debriefings, experiments, and statistical modelling.

Conclusion

Having discussed the research methods and processes of fieldwork, the next chapter is the first empirical chapter and begins an investigation of the first research question, on looking at the strength and relative importance of British identity for Muslims in Britain and finding its drivers.

Appendices

4-1 Notes for Interviewee: Cognitive Interviews



MUSLIMS IN BRITAIN

Exploring Meanings of Survey Methodology

Description of Research

I am a doctoral student in Sociology at the University of Oxford. My research probes into the identity of Muslims in Britain and what it means for them to belong to Britain. As part of this, I am investigating how people interpret survey questions and the different meanings they associate to them, specifically to some questions in the *Citizenship Survey*. I am particularly interested in interviewing respondents who:

- (1) Are currently living in Britain.
- (2) Belong to the Islamic faith, i.e. are “Muslim”.
- (3) I. Were born and raised in Britain; OR
II. Were born and raised in Pakistan
(These respondents must have lived, at least, up to the beginning of their adult life (i.e. 18 years) in Pakistan before coming to Britain and currently have been living in Britain for some time); OR
III. Were born in Pakistan and migrated to Britain at young age (i.e. <10).
- (4) Are adults (i.e. above the age of 18).

Ethical standards will be maintained throughout the research as all personal information will be anonymized to uphold confidentiality. The interview will be recorded and transcribed in full. It will be available only to me. I will not be transcribing any information that could reveal your personal identity (e.g. name, address) and the information you give me will not be published except maybe in my doctoral work. In doing so, I want to assure you that your participation will be anonymous and confidential. Please feel free to let me know if there are any questions you do not feel comfortable with answering. And please bear in mind that during the interview you can withdraw your participation at any time without explanation.

The interview will start off with questions to elaborate on your identity and then move onto explore issues around your sense of belonging towards Britain. Lastly, I am going to ask you some general questions about your background. The interview itself should take around an hour/1.5 hrs.

I would like express my immense gratitude and thank you for agreeing to participate in my study. Your valuable contribution towards my research may lead to novel and new ways of conceptualizing some very important areas in the discipline of Social Science and towards the study of Muslims in Britain.

Please do not hesitate to ask any questions before, during or after the interview. Thank you for your time.

Best regards,
Sundas Ali (sundas.ali@nuffield.ox.ac.uk)

A4-2 Cognitive Interview Topic Guide



TOPIC GUIDE

MUSLIMS IN BRITAIN
Cognitive Interviewing

Supervisor: Prof. Anthony Heath
Researcher: Sundas Ali

Interview time period: May 2009-to date
Sample size = 20-30

Respondent Profile

Religious Group:
Muslim

Ethnic Group: Pakistani
(UK and Pakistan born)

Age Group: 18-35

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A2- MEANINGS OF QUESTIONS	5
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A4- SCRIPTED PROBES ABOUT QUESTIONS	6
A5- REPEAT QUESTIONS	6
A6- ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO SURVEY METHODOLOGY	7

BEGIN

Date:.....Time:.....Location:.....

A) COGNITIVE INTERVIEWING

Hypothesis: 1

H1: The positive identification of Muslims in Britain with the British mainstream is a function of three main factors: improved socio-economic status, social engagement with the mainstream culture and political/civic participation.

(British Identification is measured by the question: ‘**How strongly do you belong to Britain?**’- 2007 Citizenship Survey)

Objective(s):

- To explore meanings behind and conceptualise alternative approaches for selected questions from the 2007 Citizenship Survey.

Method:

- 1- Ask the questions being investigated as asked in the Citizenship Survey.
- 2- Enquire what the questions meant.
- 3- Probe the process of working out answer.
- 4- Then, after non-directively probing to illuminate how the answer was worked out, pose scripted probes about various aspects of the question. These probes differ across the questions and are devised to test hypotheses about problems particular to each of the questions.
- 5- Ask the questions once more to find out whether answers are the same as before or whether they differ.
- 6- Explore alternative questions to replace the ones being investigated.

A1- QUESTIONS FROM 2007 CITIZENSHIP SURVEY

YOUR COMMUNITY

FEELINGS ABOUT NEIGHBOURHOOD AND LOCAL AREA

I would like you to tell me how strongly you feel you belong to each of the following areas.

A1.1 SBeneigh

First, your immediate neighbourhood? (How strongly do you feel you belong?)

SHOW CARD

- (1) Very strongly
- (2) Fairly strongly

- (3) Not very strongly
- (4) Not at all strongly
- (5) DON'T KNOW

A1.2 SBeLoc

And now your local area. By this I mean the area within a 15-20 minute walk from your home. (How strongly do you feel you belong?)

SHOW CARD

- (1) Very strongly
- (2) Fairly strongly
- (3) Not very strongly
- (4) Not at all strongly
- (5) DON'T KNOW

A1.3 SBeGB

Britain? (How strongly do you feel you belong?)

SHOW CARD

- (1) Very strongly
- (2) Fairly strongly
- (3) Not very strongly
- (4) Not at all strongly
- (5) DON'T KNOW

IDENTITY AND SOCIAL NETWORKS

I'm now going to ask a couple of questions about how you see yourself.

A1.4 NatIdE (If in England)

What do you consider your national identity to be? Please choose as many or as few as apply.

SHOW CARD

- (1) English
- (2) Scottish
- (3) Welsh
- (4) Irish
- (5) British
- (6) Other – please specify

A1.5 FeBrit

To what extent do you agree or disagree that you personally feel a part of British society?

SHOW CARD

- (1) Strongly agree
- (2) Tend to agree
- (3) Tend to disagree
- (4) Strongly disagree
- (5) Don't know

DEMOGRAPHICS – PART 2

I'd like to know how important various things are to your sense of who you are. Please think about each thing I mention, and tell me how important it is to your sense of who you are? Please choose your answer from the card.

A1.6 ImpEth

How important is ethnic or racial background to your sense of who you are?

- (1) Very important
 - (2) Quite important
 - (3) Not very important
 - (4) Not at all important
- DON'T KNOW

A1.7 ImpRel

How important is religion to your sense of who you are?

- (1) Very important
 - (2) Quite important
 - (3) Not very important
 - (4) Not at all important
- DON'T KNOW

A1.8 ImpNat

How important is national identity to your sense of who you are?

- (1) Very important
 - (2) Quite important
 - (3) Not very important
 - (4) Not at all important
- DON'T KNOW

VALUES

The next few questions are about people's values.

A1.9 DualId

How much do you agree or disagree that it is possible to fully belong to Britain and maintain a separate cultural or religious identity?

SHOW CARD

- (1) Strongly agree
 - (2) Tend to agree
 - (3) Tend to disagree
 - (4) Strongly disagree
- DON'T KNOW

A1.10 VALS3

Different ethnic and religious groups should adapt and blend into the larger society.

SHOW CARD

- (1) Strongly agree
 - (2) Tend to agree
 - (3) Tend to disagree
 - (4) Strongly disagree
- DON'T KNOW

A1.11 VALS4

Different ethnic and religious groups should maintain their customs and traditions.

- (1) Strongly agree
- (2) Tend to agree
- (3) Tend to disagree
- (4) Strongly disagree
- DON'T KNOW

A2- MEANINGS OF QUESTIONS

When you were asked the following question, exactly what did you think the question meant?

A2.1 SBeneigh

How strongly do you feel you belong to your immediate neighbourhood?

A2.2 SBeLoc

How strongly do you feel you belong to your local area? By this I mean the area within a 15-20 minute walk from your home.

A2.3 SBeGB

How strongly do you feel you belong to Britain?

A2.4 NatIdE (If in England)

What do you consider your national identity to be?

A2.5 FeBrit

To what extent do you agree or disagree that you personally feel a part of British society?

A2.6 ImpEth

How important is ethnic or racial background to your sense of who you are?

A2.7 ImpRel

How important is religion to your sense of who you are?

A2.8 ImpNat

How important is national identity to your sense of who you are?

A2.9 DualId

How much do you agree or disagree that it is possible to fully belong to Britain and maintain a separate cultural or religious identity?

A2.10 VALS3

Different ethnic and religious groups should adapt and blend into the larger society.

A2.11 VALS4

Different ethnic and religious groups should maintain their customs and traditions.

A3- MEDIATING PROCESSES

Now tell me exactly how you worked out your answer from that question. Think it out for me just as you did a while ago . . . only this time say it aloud for me.

A3.1 SBeneigh

How strongly do you feel you belong to your immediate neighbourhood?

A3.2 SBeLoc

How strongly do you feel you belong to your local area? By this I mean the area within a 15-20 minute walk from your home.

A3.3 SBeGB

How strongly do you feel you belong to Britain?

A3.4 NatIdE (If in England)

What do you consider your national identity to be?

A3.5 FeBrit

To what extent do you agree or disagree that you personally feel a part of British society?

A3.6 ImpEth

How important is ethnic or racial background to your sense of who you are?

A3.7 ImpRel

How important is religion to your sense of who you are?

A3.8 ImpNat

How important is national identity to your sense of who you are?

A3.9 DualId

How much do you agree or disagree that it is possible to fully belong to Britain and maintain a separate cultural or religious identity?

A3.10 VALS3

Different ethnic and religious groups should adapt and blend into the larger society.

A3.11 VALS4

Different ethnic and religious groups should maintain their customs and traditions.

A4- SCRIPTED PROBES ABOUT QUESTIONS

A4.1 SBeneigh

How strongly do you feel you belong to your immediate neighbourhood?

SP A4.1: Did you think ‘immediate neighbourhood’ meant the residents living next door to you?

A4.2 SBeLoc

How strongly do you feel you belong to your local area? By this I mean the area within a 15-20 minute walk from your home.

SP A4.2: Do you think this question is asking you about taking part in activities such as working in your local area's community centres or your local council etc?

A4.3 SBeGB

How strongly do you feel you belong to Britain?

SP A4.3.1: Do you think this question is asking you whether or not you live in Britain?

**SP A4.3.2: Do you think this question is asking you whether have a legal right to remain in Britain?
(Permanent Residence/Naturalisation/British Passport).**

A4.4 NatIdE (If in England)

What do you consider your national identity to be?

**SP A4.4: Do you think this question is asking you about your nationality?
E.g. British nationality.**

A4.5 FeBrit

To what extent do you agree or disagree that you personally feel a part of British society?

SP A4.5: Do you think this question implies that you are not a part of British society? i.e. that you are an outsider? Was it intimidating?

A4.6 ImpEth

How important is ethnic or racial background to your sense of who you are?

**SP A4.6: Do you think this question should not equate ethnic and racial?
Do you interpret them differently?**

A4.7 ImpRel

How important is religion to your sense of who you are?

A4.8 ImpNat

How important is national identity to your sense of who you are?

A4.9 DualId

How much do you agree or disagree that it is possible to fully belong to Britain and maintain a separate cultural or religious identity?

SP A4.9.1: Do you think this question implies that your cultural and religious identities have to be kept away from British culture (however you define BC)?

SP A4.9.2: Do you think this question implies that you have to belong to Britain? I.e. it is expected of you or is compulsory.

A4.10 VALS3

Different ethnic and religious groups should adapt and blend into the larger society.

SP A4.9.2: Do you think this statement implies that ethnic and religious groups should have to make the effort to adapt and blend into the larger society? Is it a one-sided effort?

A4.11 VALS4

Different ethnic and religious groups should maintain their customs and traditions.

A5- REPEAT QUESTIONS

Finally, I will ask you these questions once more now. (If the respondent's answer differs from the one they had given earlier, ask them to explain why).

YOUR COMMUNITY

FEELINGS ABOUT NEIGHBOURHOOD AND LOCAL AREA

I would like you to tell me how strongly you feel you belong to each of the following areas.

A5.1 SBeneigh

First, your immediate neighbourhood? (How strongly do you feel you belong?)

SHOW CARD

- (1) Very strongly
- (2) Fairly strongly
- (3) Not very strongly
- (4) Not at all strongly
- (5) DON'T KNOW

A5.2 SBeLoc

And now your local area. By this I mean the area within a 15-20 minute walk from your home. (How strongly do you feel you belong?)

SHOW CARD

- (1) Very strongly
- (2) Fairly strongly
- (3) Not very strongly
- (4) Not at all strongly
- (5) DON'T KNOW

A5.3 SBeGB

Britain? (How strongly do you feel you belong?)

SHOW CARD

- (1) Very strongly
- (2) Fairly strongly
- (3) Not very strongly
- (4) Not at all strongly
- (5) DON'T KNOW

IDENTITY AND SOCIAL NETWORKS

I'm now going to ask a couple of questions about how you see yourself.

A5.4 NatIdE (If in England)

What do you consider your national identity to be? Please choose as many or as few as apply.

SHOW CARD

- (1) English
- (2) Scottish
- (3) Welsh
- (4) Irish
- (5) British
- (6) Other – please specify

A5.5 FeBrit

To what extent do you agree or disagree that you personally feel a part of British society?

SHOW CARD

- (1) Strongly agree
- (2) Tend to agree
- (3) Tend to disagree
- (4) Strongly disagree
- (5) Don't know

DEMOGRAPHICS – PART 2

I'd like to know how important various things are to your sense of who you are. Please think about each thing I mention, and tell me how important it is to your sense of who you are? Please choose your answer from the card.

A5.6 ImpEth

How important is ethnic or racial background to your sense of who you are?

- (1) Very important
 - (2) Quite important
 - (3) Not very important
 - (4) Not at all important
- DON'T KNOW

A5.7 ImpRel

How important is religion to your sense of who you are?

- (1) Very important
 - (2) Quite important
 - (3) Not very important
 - (4) Not at all important
- DON'T KNOW

A5.8 ImpNat

How important is national identity to your sense of who you are?

- (1) Very important
- (2) Quite important
- (3) Not very important

(4) Not at all important
DON'T KNOW

VALUES

The next few questions are about people's values.

A5.9 DualId

How much do you agree or disagree that it is possible to fully belong to Britain and maintain a separate cultural or religious identity?

SHOW CARD

- (1) Strongly agree
 - (2) Tend to agree
 - (3) Tend to disagree
 - (4) Strongly disagree
- DON'T KNOW

A5.10 VALS3

Different ethnic and religious groups should adapt and blend into the larger society.

SHOW CARD

- (1) Strongly agree
 - (2) Tend to agree
 - (3) Tend to disagree
 - (4) Strongly disagree
- DON'T KNOW

A5.11 VALS4

Different ethnic and religious groups should maintain their customs and traditions.

- (1) Strongly agree
 - (2) Tend to agree
 - (3) Tend to disagree
 - (4) Strongly disagree
- DON'T KNOW

A6- ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO SURVEY

METHODOLOGY

Do you think the questions I just asked you can be asked or worded in a different and better way? If yes, please suggest your ideas.

A6.1 SBeneigh

How strongly do you feel you belong to your immediate neighbourhood?

A6.2 SBeLoc

How strongly do you feel you belong to your local area? By this I mean the area within a 15-20 minute walk from your home.

A6.3 SBeGB

How strongly do you feel you belong to Britain?

A6.4 NatIdE (If in England)

What do you consider your national identity to be?

A6.5 FeBrit

To what extent do you agree or disagree that you personally feel a part of British society?

A6.6 ImpEth

How important is ethnic or racial background to your sense of who you are?

A6.7 ImpRel

How important is religion to your sense of who you are?

A6.8 ImpNat

How important is national identity to your sense of who you are?

A6.9 DualId

How much do you agree or disagree that it is possible to fully belong to Britain and maintain a separate cultural or religious identity?

A6.10 VALS3

Different ethnic and religious groups should adapt and blend into the larger society.

A6.11 VALS4

Different ethnic and religious groups should maintain their customs and traditions.

Closing questions

Would you like to add something you feel is important but we did not touch upon?
What did you think I was going to ask you? And is there anything I should have asked that I didn't?

Was there anything you found uncomfortable about the interview questions?

Would it be fine to get back to you in case I find that there are a few more questions or clarifications we need from you? If it is fine, how would you like me to contact you?

Lastly, can you recommend someone who I can contact for my research, who meets the criteria?

Thank you for your time and patience, and I would like to reassure you once again about the anonymity and confidentiality of your participation in the interview.

A4-3 Notes for Interviewee: In-Depth Interviews



MUSLIMS IN BRITAIN

Exploring Identities and Sense of Belonging towards Britain

Description of Research

I am a doctoral student in Sociology at the University of Oxford. My research probes into the identity of Muslims in Britain and what it means for them to belong to Britain. I am particularly interested in interviewing respondents who:

- (1) Are currently living in Britain.
- (2) Belong to the Islamic faith, i.e. are “Muslim”.
- (3) Belong to the Pakistani ethnic group.
- (4) I. Were born and raised in Britain; OR
II. Were born and raised in Pakistan
(These respondents must have lived, at least, up to the beginning of their adult life (i.e. 18 years) in Pakistan before coming to Britain and currently have been living in Britain for some time); OR
III. Were born in Pakistan and migrated to Britain at young age (i.e. <10).
- (5) Are adults (i.e. above the age of 18).

Ethical standards will be maintained throughout the research as all personal information will be anonymised to uphold confidentiality. The interview will be recorded and transcribed in full. It will be available only to me. I will not be transcribing any information that could reveal your personal identity (e.g. name, address) and the information you give me will not be published except maybe in my doctoral work. In doing so, I want to assure you that your participation will be anonymous and confidential. Please feel free to let me know if there are any questions you do not feel comfortable with answering. And please bear in mind that during the interview you can withdraw your participation at any time without explanation.

The interview will start off with questions to elaborate on your identity and then move onto explore issues around your sense of belonging towards Britain. Lastly, I am going to ask you some general questions about your background. The interview itself should take around an hour/1.5 hrs.

I would like express my immense gratitude and thank you for agreeing to participate in my study. Your valuable contribution towards my research may lead to novel and new ways of conceptualizing some very important areas in the discipline of Social Science and towards the study of Muslims in Britain.

Please do not hesitate to ask any questions before, during or after the interview. Thank you for your time.

Best regards,
Sundas Ali (sundas.ali@nuffield.ox.ac.uk)

A4-4 In-Depth Interviews Topic Guide



**IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS
TOPIC GUIDE
(Unstructured Part)**

MUSLIMS IN BRITAIN

**Supervisor: Prof. Anthony Heath
Researcher: Sundas Ali**

Interview time period: May 2009-to date
Sample size = 80-100

Respondent Profile

Religious Group: Muslim

Ethnic Group: Pakistani
(UK and Pakistan born)

Age Group: 18-35

CONTENTS

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BEGIN

Date:.....Time:.....Location:.....

B) IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWEING

Hypothesis: 2, 3, 4 & 5

H2: Muslims in Britain tend to associate to subcultures, with distinct processes of socialization, which significantly influence their identity.

H3: Muslim identities conform to modern conceptions of identity, consisting of essentialist as opposed to constructivist elements, i.e. they have fixed identities as opposed to fluid ones.

H4: Postmodernist theories of identity tend to be closer in explaining Muslim identification, suggesting that identities are fluid with multiple acquirable facets such as religion, ethnicity and national identity.

H5: Experiences of discrimination may lead Muslims to self-identify with an imagined 'religious' community (ummah) versus a more concrete and local 'civic' community (nation state).

Objective(s):

- To explore meanings behind and conceptualise the notion of identity.
- To explore whether the group dynamics of Muslim cultures and sub-cultures influence feelings of Britishness amongst Muslims in Britain.
- To explore the effects of prejudice and discrimination on the British identification of Muslims.

☀☀☀ B1- MEANINGS OF IDENTITY

☀☀☀ B1.1 TOPIC: Exploring your Identity

PROMPTS:

How would you describe your identity? (Multiple or singular? E.g. cultural, ethnic, religious, national; personal and social identity). You can define 'identity' and all its various facets, what should they mean?

Are you free in choosing/creating/constructing your identity? If yes, to what extent can you choose? Or is your identity fixed by external factors? i.e. How do you think a person's identity is created (is it created or fixed)? What is the process?

Is your identity important to you? How much and why?

What are the practices associated with your identity (s)? (ethnic, national, religious)

Are you a part of any social groups? Is this important? Do they make up your social identity? (Social groups may be based on interests, values, ethnic or social background, and kinship ties, e.g. social class, nationality, occupation, etc).

Are there any contradictions in your identity(s)? Do you ever find yourself in a situation where the different aspects of your identity dictate your different forms of

behaviour...for example when you find they disagree with each other? Explain. How do you resolve these contradictions?

Has your identity changed over time? Explain the process/stages/indicators of change.

☀☀☀**B1.2 Q:** How would you describe your identity, in key/single words?

☀☀☀**B1.3 Q:** From the following list of categories tell me which one you think best describes your identity.

If you want to choose more than one then rank them according to your preference (1, 2, 3 etc). 1 is the highest, 15 is the lowest.

SHOW CARD

- (1) British
- (2) Muslim
- (3) Pakistani
- (4) British and Muslim
- (5) Muslim and British
- (6) Pakistani and Muslim
- (7) Muslim and Pakistani
- (8) British, Muslim, and Pakistani
- (9) British, Pakistani, and Muslim
- (10) Muslim, British, and Pakistani
- (11) Muslim, Pakistani, and British
- (12) Pakistani, British, and Muslim
- (13) Pakistani, Muslim, and British
- (14) All are equal to me
- (15) None of these
- (16) Other- please specify.

☀☀☀**B1.4 Q:** Can you list for me ten things that would say something important about you. Which **three** of these would be the most important?

(Similar question asked in 2001 HOCS: R6a (B1.5 see below) **Variable** = [qrse11-qrse120](#) and R6b (Most important thing when describing oneself **Variable** = [qrimp1-qrimp20](#))

- (1)
- (2)
- (3)
- (4)
- (5)
- (6)
- (7)
- (8)
- (9)
- (10)

Examples: Religion, Ethnicity, Family, Marriage (Love/arranged), Schooling (State/Private/Muslim school), Language, Dress.

☀☀☀**B1.5 Q: (R6a HOCS)** Suppose you were describing yourself, which of the things on this card would say something important about you?

SHOW CARD

- A. Your age or life-stage
- B. The kind of work you do or did
- C. Your level of education
- D. Your level of income
- E. Your family
- F. Your ethnic group or cultural background
- G. The country your family came from originally
- H. Your nationality
- I. Your religion
- J. The colour of your skin
- K. Your social class (working class, middle class, etc)
- L. Your gender
- M. Any disability you may have
- N. Your sexuality
- O. Your interests
- Something else (SPECIFY)
- (Don't Know)
- (Refused)

☀☀☀**B1.6 Q: (R6b HOCS)** And which **one** of these would be the single most important thing to say about yourself?

☀☀☀ **B1.7 TOPIC: Exploring 'Muslimness'**

PROMPTS:

Do you think having a 'Muslim' identity means that you are a 'religious' or 'practicing' Muslim? (Feel free to define the words: 'religious' and 'practicing'). What does the term 'Religious identity' mean to you?

What does being 'Muslim' mean for you? In other words, what does your 'Muslimness' mean to you? E.g. for some, it is cultural, religious, a vehicle of identity politics, parental culture etc.

On a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 equals the least religious and 10 equals most religious, which number would you assign to your level of religiosity?

What does this number translate into? I.e. describe your level of religiosity (which indicators would you use? e.g. mosque attendance, praying etc).

If you had to describe in one word what kind of Muslim you are what would it be? What does it mean? E.g. Traditionalist, Islamist, Sufi, Progressive, Liberal, Pluralist, etc.

☀☀☀ **B2- EXPERIENCES OF BRITISH NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION**

Hypothesis: 1

H1: The positive identification of Muslims in Britain with the British mainstream is a function of three main factors: improved socio-economic status, social engagement with the mainstream culture and political/civic participation.

Objective(s):

- To help us understand factors which lead to experiences of ‘Britishness’ among Muslims living in Britain.

☀️☀️☀️ **B2.1 TOPIC: Britishness, Belonging and Home**

PROMPTS:

Where is ‘home’ for you? (In terms of country, city, or local area)

How often do you visit your ancestral country (Pakistan)? Generally, how are your experiences of that, how have they been? Explain your answer.

Society of Origin (Berry 1997)

How would you describe the cultural characteristics/culture of Pakistan (and the province you come from)?

Can you describe the political, economic and demographic conditions faced by people in Pakistan?

Why did you (or your parents) decide to come/settle down in Britain?

Do you plan to go back and settle down in Pakistan in the future?

(1) Yes

(2) No

Give reasons for your answer.

Would you say you ‘belong to Britain’? What does ‘belonging to Britain’ mean to you? Explain your answer.

Would you say you are British or do you feel British? (How would you define ‘British’ culture?). Or is it easier to be a Londoner/other regional identity? Explain your answer.

How would you define British identity? And is this your national identity?

What are the things that make you feel more or less British? Explain.

Demographic Factors

Gender (Male/Female)

Age

Country of birth

Ethnic and Religious Factors

Practicing/not practicing

Is a conflict between your ethnic identity (Pakistani) and being British?

Is there is a conflict between your religious identity (Muslim) and being British?

Socioeconomic Factors: Education and Occupation

Level of education

Occupation

Social, Cultural and Political Integration

Ethnic mix of your local area

Contacting public and/or government officials

Attending a rally

Taking part in a demonstration or protest

Signing a petition

Vote in Britain's local and/or national elections

Trust police, local council, and parliament

Discrimination by police

Group-level Acculturation (Berry 1997)

Would you say you (or your parents) have gone through any physical changes as a result of migrating to Britain? E.g. urbanization.

Would you say you (or your parents) have gone through any biological changes as a result of migrating to Britain? E.g. food-intake; exposure to new diseases.

Would you say you (or your parents) have gone through any economic changes as a result of migrating to Britain? E.g. new employment opportunities; better education; loss of status.

Would you say you (or your parents) have gone through any social changes as a result of migrating to Britain? E.g. new friendships; disrupted communities.

Would you say you (or your parents) have gone through any cultural changes as a result of migrating to Britain? E.g. what you eat; language shifts; religious conversions; changes to your value-systems.

☀☀☀ **B2.8 TOPIC: Political Participation, Foreign Policy, Freedom of Speech.**
PROMPTS

Do you think the Muslim community in Britain is politically active? (men/women)

Do you think that in British politics there is any political party that represents the interests of Muslims?

Can I ask you about your political preference? Which party do you support and why?

Which party did you vote for in the following British General Elections:

- (1) 1992
- (2) 1997
- (3) 2001
- (4) 2005

What is your view about Britain's foreign policy? E.g. in Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan?

What did you think about the Salman Rushdie issue, and Danish cartoons?

What do you think about Sharia law?
Do you think Islam is compatible with democracy?

☀☀☀ B2.9 TOPIC: Perceived Discrimination and Trust in Civil and Political Institutions

PROMPTS

How do you think other people in society (in Britain) view you? This could be in the workplace, educational institution, social associations, general public, etc? And is this important to you?

Have you ever felt that you have been treated unfairly for anything in Britain because of your race or religion? What did you do to overcome this?

Have you ever felt that you have been treated unfairly by the Police or the Courts in Britain because of your race or religion? What did you do to overcome this?

Do you trust the government, security services, police, local council, parliament, and the courts? If yes, how much? What does 'trust' mean for you? Does that impact on how British you feel? (Explain how).

Job Market Discrimination

☀☀B2.10 (RDisJob, HOCS 2007) Q: May I check, in the last FIVE YEARS, have you been refused or turned down for a job in the UK?

- (1) Yes
- (2) No
- (3) DON'T KNOW

☀☀B2.11 (RWhyJb, HOCS 2007) Q: Do you think you were refused the job for any of these reasons?

- (1) your gender
- (2) your age
- (3) your race
- (4) your religion
- (5) your colour
- (6) where you live
- (7) other reason – Can I ask what this other reason was?
- (8) DON'T KNOW
- (9) NONE OF THE ABOVE

☀☀B2.12 (RDisPro, HOCS 2007) Q: In the last five years, do you think you have been discriminated against at work with regard to promotion or a move to a better position?

- (1) Yes
- (2) No
- (3) DON'T KNOW
- (4) NOT APPLICABLE

☀☀B2.13 (RWhyPr, HOCS 2007) Q: Do you think you were refused the promotion for any of these reasons?

- (1) your gender
- (2) your age
- (3) your race
- (4) your religion
- (5) your colour
- (6) where you live
- (7) other reason – Can I ask what this other reason was?
- (8) DON'T KNOW
- (9) NONE OF THE ABOVE

☀☀☀ **B3- SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS**

Objective(s):

- To explore outcome measures for policy-making.

☀☀☀ **B3.1 TOPIC: Hutnik's (2003) 4 self-categorization categories**

1. Ask about meanings of Hutnik's 4 self-categorization categories:

Assimilation, Dissociation, Acculturation, Marginality

2. Show 4 S-C categories and ask where they would place themselves on that, and why?

3. Ask what they think about these 4 S-C categories- are they good?

What is your level of identification with the majority group (White Christians) and your minority group (Pakistani Muslims) in Britain?

- 1) **Assimilation:** High with the majority group (White Christians), low with the minority group (Pakistani Muslims);
- 2) **Dissociation:** High with the minority group (Pakistani Muslims), low with the majority group (White Christians);
- 3) **Acculturation:** High with both the majority group (White Christians) and the minority group (Pakistani Muslims);
- 4) **Marginality:** Low with both the majority group (White Christians) and the minority group (Pakistani Muslims).

☀☀☀ **B3.2 TOPIC: Berry's (1992 & 1997) 4 Acculturation Strategies**

1. Ask about meanings of Berry's 4 Acculturation Strategies:

Integration, Assimilation, Separation, Marginalization

2. Show Berry's diagram with 4 Acculturation Strategies (as a function of two issues) and ask where they would place themselves on that, and why?

3. Ask what they think about Berry's diagram- is it good?

Other ways of asking:

Do you think it is important or of value to maintain your religious identity and characteristics in Britain?

- (1) Yes
- (2) No

Explain your answer.

Do you think it is important or of value to maintain relationships with other religious groups?

- (1) Yes
- (2) No

Explain your answer.

Do you think it is important or of value to maintain your ethnic identity and characteristics in Britain?

- (3) Yes
- (4) No

Explain your answer.

Do you think it is important or of value to maintain relationships with other ethnic groups?

- (1) Yes
- (2) No

Explain your answer.

☀☀☀ B3.3 TOPIC: Majority group attitudes

Do you trust the majority group?

Do you think they trust you (and Muslims)?

Do you think the majority group (i.e. White Christians) are open to contact and friendship with you (a Muslim of Pakistani origin)? What are their attitudes towards immigrants and issues of immigration generally?

Are Muslims of Pakistani origin (both UK and non-UK born) doing enough to integrate into British society? What should they do? Reference points: 7/7 2005, Oldham riots.

What do you think multi-culturalism means? What should it mean? What does it mean to you?

Do you think the government should do anything to promote multi-culturalism and/or integration for Pakistani Muslims in Britain? Or what should it do? Should it improve their socioeconomic position?

What do you think about the government's strategy known within Government as 'CONTEST'. This is based on a policy that can be summed up in four words: Prevent, Pursue, Protect and Prepare.

Do you feel stressed or depressed at times? If yes, why? And how do you cope with it?

Others:

☀☀☀ Q: B2.2 (SethArea, 2007 HOCS) Now thinking about people in your local area (15/20 minutes walking distance). What proportion of all the people in this local area are of the same ethnic group as you? Would you say...

- (1) All the same,
- (2) More than a half,
- (3) About a half,
- (4) Or, less than a half?

☀☀☀ Q: B2.3 Now thinking about people in your local area (15/20 minutes walking distance). What proportion of all the people in this local area are of the same religion as you? Would you say...

- (1) All the same,
- (2) More than a half,
- (3) About a half,
- (4) Or, less than a half?

☀☀☀ **Q: B2.4** Now thinking about people in your local area (15/20 minutes walking distance). What proportion of all the people in this local area are of the same religious denomination as you? Would you say...

- (1) All the same,
- (2) More than a half,
- (3) About a half,
- (4) Or, less than a half?

☀☀☀ **Q: B2.5** (SRace, 2007 HOCS) What proportion of your friends are of the same ethnic group as you? Would you say...

- (1) All the same,
- (2) More than a half,
- (3) About a half,
- (4) Or, less than a half?

☀☀☀ **Q: B2.6** What proportion of your friends are of the same religion as you? Would you say...

- (1) All the same,
- (2) More than a half,
- (3) About a half,
- (4) Or, less than a half?

☀☀☀ **Q: B2.7** What proportion of your friends are of the same religious denomination as you? Would you say...

- (1) All the same,
- (2) More than a half,
- (3) About a half,
- (4) Or, less than a half?

☀☀ **B1.8 TOPIC: Muslim culture and Subcultures**
PROMPTS

How would you define Muslim culture? And do you feel a part of it? Does it impact your identity? If yes, how? Explain.

How would you define your religious denomination's culture? And do you feel a part of it? Does it impact your identity? If yes, how? Explain.

Are you a part of any Muslim organization(s)? If yes, which ones?

Are you a part of any [religious denomination] organization(s)? If yes, which ones?

Do you or did you ever attend a mosque (occasionally or regularly)? Is/was this a happy experience for you?

- (1) Yes, why?
- (2) No, why?

What do/did you learn at the Mosque?

- (1) Quran in Arabic
- (2) Meaning of Quran
- (3) History of Islam and its Prophets
- (4) Other, please explain.

Was the Maulvi Saab (religious teacher) strict? Did he try and impose his views on you? Did he ever/often use any form of emotional or physical violence towards you?

Did you ever feel that the values taught to you by your family and community members were contradictory to those taught to you at Mosque? If yes, then did you feel alienated at home? At the Mosque? Or both? No, why?

Did you attend a Muslim religious school? If yes, do you think it provided the ideal environment to promote the Muslim identity and faith? Do you think it provided a more balanced curriculum, hence removing confusion and contradiction between the values taught at home and school?

B 1.9 TOPIC: Muslim Collective Group Identity

PROMPTS

Do you think there is unity amongst the Muslim communities of Britain? If yes, would you say this can be described as an Ummah? (common religious affiliation). Why do you think this is?

Do you think there is unity amongst the Muslims in the world? If yes, would you say this can be described as an Ummah? (‘a global nation of Muslim believers’)? Why do you think this is?

Do you see yourself as belonging to an Ummah? (through a group, organization or community)?

In which ways do you think you are similar (commonalities) to other Muslims, non-Muslims, Pakistanis and non-Pakistanis in Britain?

In which ways do you think you are different to other Muslims, non-Muslims, Pakistanis and non-Pakistanis in Britain?

If you feel yourself to be a part of a Muslim community in Britain, what are the benefits of being a member? Does it enhance your social capital? (networks, norms and trust enabling participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives)

Does being part of a Muslim group, organization or community in Britain give you a positive sense of identity?

Do you think there are any negative things about being a part of the Muslim community in Britain?

Do you feel part of a British nation state? If yes, why? What are the benefits?

Others (not so important):

Do you think the Muslim religion is a ‘way of life’? I.e. it has a social, economic and political application.

Do you think the Quran is applicable to your daily life? Do you understand its practical aspect?

- (1) Yes, how?
- (2) No, then what does religion mean to you? Five pillars of Islam? An ideology?
- (3) Other, please elaborate.

Do you think Muslims in Britain should attend single sex schools? Explain your answer.

Are you content with the British state education system?

- (1) Yes, why?
- (2) No, why?

Do you think the British state education system provides a moral and spiritual environment? How is this important to you?

Do you think there is a shortage of authentic teaching materials and trained teachers for the teaching of Islam in British schools? Explain your answer.

Do you think that Muslims should be able to wear their Islamic dress in schools regardless of the standard uniform?

Did you ever feel that the values taught to you by your family and community members were contradictory to those taught to you at school?

- (1) If yes, then did you feel alienated at home and community? At school? Or both?
- (2) No, why?

Do you read any newspaper(s), occasionally or regularly? If yes, which one(s)? Why do you read these?

Do you watch any news channel(s), occasionally or regularly? If yes, which one(s)? Why do you watch these?

☀ B2.14 TOPIC: Social Classes

PROMPTS

Do you think social classes (the grouping of people by occupations) still exist in Britain?

Which social class would you say you belong to?

Which class would you say your social associates (friends and colleagues etc) belong to?

Closing questions

Would you like to add something you feel is important but we did not touch upon?

What did you think I was going to ask you? And is there anything I should have asked that I didn't?

Was there anything you found uncomfortable about the interview questions?

Would it be fine to get back to you in case I find that there are a few more questions or clarifications we need from you? If it is fine, how would you like me to contact you?

Lastly, can you recommend someone who I can contact for my research, who meets the criteria?

Thank you for your time and patience, and I would like to reassure you once again about the anonymity and confidentiality of your participation in the interview.

A4-5 Structured Interviews Topic Guide



**IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS
TOPIC GUIDE
(Structured Part)**

MUSLIMS IN BRITAIN

Supervisor: Prof. Anthony Heath

Researcher: Sundas Ali

Interview time period: May 2009-to date

Sample size = 80-100

Respondent Profile

Religious Group:
Muslim

Ethnic Group: Pakistani
(UK and Pakistan born)

Age Group: 18-35

CONTENTS

PAGE

C) STRUCTURED INTERVIEWING

C1- DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

3

C2- EDUCATION, EMPLOYMENT AND LANGUAGE SKILLS

6

BEGIN

Date:..... Time:..... Location:.....

C) STRUCTURED INTERVIEWING

Hypotheses: 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5

Objective(s):
- To record data for statistical patterns and trends.

C1-DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

Now I would like to ask some demographical questions.

Gender

C1.1 Are you:

- (1) Male
- (2) Female

Geographical Location

C1.2 Which town, borough and city do you live in?

.....

Year of Birth

C1.3 Which year were you born in?

.....

Age

C1.4 What was your age on your last birthday?

.....
.....

Country of Birth

C1.5 Which country were you born in?

- (1) England
- (2) Wales
- (3) Scotland
- (4) Northern Ireland
- (5) UK, Britain (don't know country)
- (6) Republic of Ireland
- (7) Pakistan
- (8) Other (type in country.....)

Country of Birth (Parents)

C1.6 Which country were your parents born in?

Father

- (1) England
- (2) Wales
- (3) Scotland
- (4) Northern Ireland
- (5) UK, Britain (don't know country)
- (6) Republic of Ireland
- (7) Pakistan
- (8) Other (type in country.....)

Mother

- (1) England
- (2) Wales
- (3) Scotland
- (4) Northern Ireland
- (5) UK, Britain (don't know country)
- (6) Republic of Ireland
- (7) Pakistan
- (8) Other (type in country.....)

Year of Arrival to UK

C1.7 In which year did you (or your parents) first arrive in this country, to settle down?
(If relevant)

.....

Citizenship

C1.8 Do you have British Citizenship? Or any others?

C1.9 Did you get this Citizenship(s) by birth?

C1.10 In which year did you get this Citizenship(s)?

C1.11 Do you want to apply for British Citizenship? If not, why?

Ethnic Group

C1.12 Please could you look at this list and tell me which of these best describes your ethnic group?

White

- (1) White - British
- (2) White - Irish
- (3) Any other White background

Mixed

- (4) Mixed White and Black Caribbean

- (5) Mixed White and Black African
- (6) Mixed White and Asian
- (7) Any other mixed background

Asian or Asian British

- (8) Asian or Asian British - Indian
- (9) Asian or Asian British - Pakistani
- (10) Asian or Asian British - Bangladeshi
- (11) Any other Asian/Asian British background

Black or Black British

- (12) Black or Black British - Caribbean
- (13) Black or Black British - African
- (14) Any other Black/Black British background

(15) **Chinese**

(16) **Any Other Ethnic Group** (type it in.....)

Islamic Denomination (If you are a Muslim)

C1.13 Were you born into your religion or did you convert into it?

- (1) Born into it
- (2) Converted into it

C1.14 Which Islamic denomination do you belong to?

- (1) Sunni (Hanafi; Deobandi; Bareilvi)
- (2) Shi'a (Twelvers; Severners (Ismailis); Boras)
- (3) Sufism
- (4) Kharijites:Ibadism
- (5) Ahmadis
- (6) None of these
- (7) Other (type in.....)

Marital Status

C1.15 What is your marital status?

- (1) Single, that is, never married or never in a legally recognised Civil Partnership
- (2) Married and living with husband/wife or in a legally recognised Civil Partnership and living with civil partner
- (3) Married and separated from husband/wife or in a legally recognised Civil Partnership and separated from civil partner
- (4) Divorced or Civil Partnership legally dissolved
- (5) ...or widowed?
- (6) Other (type it in.....)

If you are married, which ethnic group and religion does your spouse belong to?

Sexual Orientation

C1.16 What is your sexual orientation?

- (1) Heterosexual/Straight (attraction towards the opposite sex)
- (2) Homosexual/Lesbian or gay (attraction towards the same sex)

- (3) Bisexual (attraction towards both sexes)
- (4) Other (type it in.....)
- (5) Don't know

Health Status

C1.17 How is your health in general?

- (1) Excellent
- (2) Very good
- (3) Good
- (4) Fair
- (5) Poor
- (6) Very poor
- (7) Don't know
- (8) Other (type it in.....)

C2- EDUCATION, EMPLOYMENT, AND LANGUAGE SKILLS

Now I would like to ask some questions about your education, employment and language skills.

Education

C2.1 Which type of primary school did you attend?

- (1) State/Comprehensive
- (2) Grammar
- (3) Independent (Private/Public)
- (4) Prep
- (5) Religious (which one? Islamic, Catholic, etc.)
- (6) Other (type in.....)

C2.2 Which type of secondary school did you attend?

- (7) State/Comprehensive
- (8) Grammar
- (9) Independent (Private/Public)
- (10) Prep
- (11) Religious (which one? Islamic, Catholic, etc.)
- (12) Other (type in.....)

C2.3 What is the name of your primary school?

C2.4 What is the name of your secondary school?

C2.5 What is your highest qualification?

C2.6 In which year did you receive this qualification?

C2.7 Which academic/professional institution did you receive this from?

C2.8 Are you currently a part-time or full-time student?

C2.9 Which qualification and subject(s) are you studying towards? (If relevant)

C2.10 Which academic/professional institution are you studying this at? (If relevant)

Employment

C2.11 Do you currently have a paid job?

- (1) Yes
- (2) No

C2.12 Are you working as an employee or are you self-employed? (If relevant)

- (1) Employee
- (2) Self-employed

C2.13 What is the title and industry of your job? (If relevant)

C2.14 Which occupational class do you fall in?

- (1) Higher salariat (managers and administrators in large establishments, professionals);
- (2) Lower salariat (managers and administrators in small establishments, semi-professionals);
- (3) Routine non-manual labour;
- (4) Petty bourgeoisie (farmers, small employers and own-account non-professionals);
- (5) Manual foremen and technicians;
- (6) Skilled manual labour;
- (7) Semi- and unskilled manual labour.

C2.15 How much do you earn annually before tax? (If relevant)

C2.16 Have you had a paid job as an employee in the last five years? (If relevant)

- (1) Yes
- (2) No

Language Skills

C2.17 Which language do you speak most often at home?

- (1) English
- (2) Welsh
- (3) Punjabi
- (4) Gujarati
- (5) Bengali
- (6) Urdu
- (7) Hindi
- (8) Cantonese
- (9) Mandarin
- (10) Other (type in.....)

C2.18 How good are you at speaking English when you need to in daily life, for example to have a conversation on the telephone or talk to a professional such as a teacher or a doctor?

- (1) Very good

- (2) Fairly good
- (3) Below average
- (4) Poor
- (5) No opinion (DO NOT PROMPT)
- (6) Don't know

C2.19 How good are you at reading English when you need to in daily life?

For example: reading newspapers and magazines or instructions for medicine or recipes?

- (1) Very good
- (2) Fairly good
- (3) Below average
- (4) Poor
- (5) Cannot read English
- (6) No opinion (DO NOT PROMPT)

C2.20 And how good are you at writing in English when you need to in daily life?

For example: writing letters or notes or filling in official forms?

- (1) Very good
- (2) Fairly good
- (3) Below average
- (4) Poor
- (5) Cannot write English
- (6) No opinion (DO NOT PROMPT)

Closing questions

Would you like to add something you feel is important but we did not touch upon?

What did you think I was going to ask you? And is there anything I should have asked that I didn't?

Was there anything you found uncomfortable about the interview questions?

Would it be fine to get back to you in case I find that there are a few more questions or clarifications we need from you? If it is fine, how would you like me to contact you?

Lastly, can you recommend someone who I can contact for my research, who meets the criteria?

Thank you for your time and patience, and I would like to reassure you once again about the anonymity and confidentiality of your participation in the interview.

Appendix 4-6: Text to Gatekeepers (this is only one example)

Text sent to SEO (Sponsors for Educational Opportunity), London. SEO is a not-for-profit organisation. <http://www.seo-london.com/> .



MUSLIMS IN BRITAIN

Exploring Identities and Sense of Belonging towards Britain

Description of Research

Dear All,

I am a doctoral student in Sociology at the University of Oxford. My research probes into the identity of Muslims in Britain and what it means for them to belong to Britain.

I am particularly interested in interview respondents who:

- (5) Are currently living in Britain.
- (6) Are adults (i.e. above the age of 18).
- (7) Belong to the Islamic faith, i.e. are “Muslim”.
- (8) Belong to the Pakistani ethnic group.
- (9) a) Were born and raised in Britain;
OR
b) Were born in Pakistan and migrated to Britain at young age;
OR
c) Were born and raised in Pakistan.

If you fit this criteria and wouldn't mind being interviewed or can suggest someone else you know who fits this criteria and may be interested in being interviewed, please email me at: sundas.ali@nuffield.ox.ac.uk or call me on + 44(0) 785 938 3822. I would be immensely grateful for your help. The interview can be arranged around your schedule and should take around an hour/1.5 hrs.

Your valuable contribution towards my research may lead to novel and new ways of conceptualizing some very important areas in the discipline of Social Science and towards the study of Muslims in Britain.

I look forward to hearing from some of you. Thank you for your time.

Yours sincerely,
Sundas Ali

The call for interviewees in their newsletter:

Date: Thu, 2 Jul 2009 13:03:36 -0400

From: mariana.williams@seo-london.org

To: sundasali@hotmail.com

Subject: SEO Alumni Community - Saving, Investing & Returning Value



SEO London Alumni Newsletter

Summer with SEO

In This Issue

[The SEO Grow Project](#)

[The SEO Summer Picnic 2009](#)

[Career Academy: How can you help bring out the best in our 6th Form students](#)

[Paintballing!](#)

Keeping Track

One of our most important initiatives is to **keep track** of everybody. This is especially important as this year has seen many changes for our alumni.

If you have not been in touch recently please sign up to the Net Community [SEO Net Community](#)

You can also e-mail info@seo-london.org and let

July 2009

Dear Sundas,

We hope you are well and enjoying the sunshine after a tumultuous few months for all.

As I am sure you are aware our Class of 2009 have recently embarked on their internships, so a **big thank you to all the mentors and buddies** who are helping us support our new interns.

During our training week firms were impressed by the level of knowledge and focus demonstrated by the class; an achievement made possible by alumni feedback. Each year we refine and develop our programme using invaluable feedback from past classes to make sure we are providing relevant, useful and proactive support.

Despite a difficult and uncertain few months we have been glad to see that interest from our sponsor firms had remained steady.

Where we can, SEO London has provided support to those who have been most affected by the recession.

We will continue to offer support to those alumnus by highlighting any roles that we hear of. **We also look to the wider SEO Community to continue to make us aware of any opportunities available in your firm** that we may pass on to those looking for employment.

us know:

- Your current employer
- Your current division
- Your mobile number
- Your e-mail address

**FRIENDS OF
COLOMBIA**



**Join the Flora 5km
Marathon with SEO
and FOCSA**

**Scroll down and
check it out**

Hopefully with the improvement of weather (so far!) you will join us at our summer events!

Summer is all about good moods, good food and above all a bit of **relaxation** away from work. Check out some of the dates we have set up for you to enjoy just that!

There is also the opportunity to get involved with some **charity events** this summer, you can find more details of these below. We hope you will be inspired to get involved, if you are not already.

Warm wishes,
The SEO Team

SEO Alumni Doctoral Research

Sundas Ali (SEO 2007) looks for research participants as part of doctoral study



Studying her doctorate in Sociology at Oxford University, Sundas would very much appreciate you getting in touch if you fit the below criteria:

- (1) Are currently living in Britain.
- (2) Are adults (i.e. above the age of 18).
- (3) Belong to the Islamic faith, i.e. are "Muslim".
- (4) Belong to the Pakistani ethnic group.
- (5a) Were born and raised in Britain;
- (5b) Were born in Pakistan and migrated to Britain
- (5c) Were born and raised in Pakistan

Please follow the below link for more details.

[e-mail Sundas](#)

Thank you for your help!

HAVE A LOVELY SUMMER!

We hope that we hear from you with all your news and updates...and hopefully see you at some of our events!

Best Wishes, The SEO TEAM

SEO-London | 52-54 High Holborn | London | WC1V 6RL | United Kingdom

CHAPTER

5

Looking at Survey Data on Muslims:

The Citizenship Survey and Ethnic Minority British

Election Study

Introductory Summary

This chapter will study the first research question of this thesis, which focuses on the strength and relative importance of British identity for Muslims in Britain and the drivers that motivate it. This research question is derived from a strand of academic research (Alba and Nee 2003; Modood et al. 1997; Ouseley 2001; Samad 1992; Putnam 2007; Kepel 1997, Sikand 1998; Fielding and Geddes 1998; Koopmans and Statham 2004) which claims that Muslims are withdrawn from mainstream Britain because they live in segregated ethnic enclaves, are socially and culturally isolated, and politically organize themselves via ethnically and religiously motivated networks. Accordingly, the positive identification of Muslims with Britain is a function of three main factors: improved socio-economic status, social engagement with the mainstream culture, and political or civic participation. In this chapter, I attempt to challenge and better understand these claims by looking at data for Muslims from the 2007 Citizenship Survey (CS) for the question “How strongly do you belong to Britain?” and from the 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Study (EMBES) for the question “Would you say you feel more British or Ethnic?” I find a strong sense of British identity as well as some significant drivers for this for Muslims in Britain.

5.1 Drivers of British Identification and Sense of Belonging for Muslims in Britain

When I review the current academic literature and popular opinion, a few research claims can be generated about the British identification of Muslims in Britain. Commentators have linked the rise of Muslim politics to their growing economic and social isolation, and use the summer 2001 riots in Oldham, Burnley and Bradford, and

the London terrorist attacks on 7th and 21st July 2005 as examples of the dangers of poor, alienated, religiously, and politically radicalised Muslims (Panorama 2005). From this my first research claim is:

R1: Muslims are less likely than the majority group, Whites and Christians, to identify as British.

However with this claim that Muslims are less likely than Whites to identify as British, it is important to question the accuracy of this statement statistically. This is because the two groups, Whites and Muslims, are not mutually exclusive, i.e. not all Whites are non-Muslim, as a matter of fact at the time of the 2001 Census one in ten (11 per cent) of Muslims in Britain were White and this has increased even further as evidenced by the 2011 Census. Additionally, whereas Maxwell (2006) compared Muslims to ethnic groups (Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, Whites, Caribbeans, and Africans) in his analysis, I do not do this. Comparing Muslims with other ethnic groups is not appropriate as it can lead to double-counting and potentially misleading results, thus the more effective counter-group to compare Muslims with is another religious group, so either Christians (as the majority of them are White) or the collective non-Muslim group.

Researchers have suggested that the identification of minority groups with the host country is a function of three main factors: socio-economic status, social engagement with the mainstream culture, and political or civic participation (Alba and Nee 2003). For instance, in their words, “Status-attainment research reinforced the view that assimilation and social mobility are inextricably linked (and, conversely, that there is no assimilation if social mobility has not also occurred)” (p.28). According to these

arguments improved socio-economic status will increase the likelihood of identifying with the nation as life becomes materially better in the host nation. Social engagement with the mainstream culture will increase the likelihood of identifying with the nation through social and familial relationships. Political and civic participation will increase the likelihood of identifying with the nation through acceptance of national symbols, institutions, and tangible involvement and investment in the community.

When this general academic literature on ethnic minority identification is applied to Britain it is argued that poor socio-economic outcomes, weak social engagement with the mainstream culture, and ethnically based political and civic participation reduce identification with the nation for Muslims (Maxwell 2006). Arguments about the importance of socio-economic status for ethnic minority identification claim that while Indians have been economically successful and are therefore likely to identify as British, Bangladeshis and Pakistanis face severe socioeconomic disadvantages that have led to alienation from the British mainstream (Modood et al. 1997). However, despite the fact that Bangladeshis and Pakistanis are clearly the most economically disadvantaged ethnic groups in the country,²⁴ the 2003 CS shows that Bangladeshis and Pakistanis are more likely to feel British than Indians. However, in this chapter I argue that a better understanding of British identification among Muslims would focus on the complex ways in which individuals balance ethnic, religious, and mainstream networks and systems. In addition, I argue that although socio-economic outcomes clearly impact one's evaluation of society, perception of discrimination is more important for identity than socio-economic status, per se.

²⁴ The 2000/1 Households Below Average Income and Family Resources Survey shows that Pakistanis and Bangladeshis were the ethnic group most likely to live in low income households at approximately 60% of individuals, compared to under 30% for both Indians and Caribbeans. (See: <http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=269>).

R2: Low socio-economic status reduces the British national identification for Muslims.

The academic literature on social engagement with the mainstream culture claims that Muslims live in ethnically and religiously isolated enclaves where their friends, spouses, and business associates are all of the same ethnicity and religion, which in turn breeds ethnically and religiously isolated identities (Ouseley 2001; Samad 1992). In 2005, the former chair of the Equality and Human Rights Commission, Trevor Phillips, had made controversial comments about ethnic neighbourhoods in Britain and compared them to US-Style ‘ghettos’. He called for measures to prevent Britain from “sleepwalking” into racial and religious segregation. Phillips warned of the “nightmare” of “fully fledged ghettos” (Guardian 2005). I find the term ‘ghettos’ too strong and refer to ethnic ‘enclaves’ throughout my thesis. In his work Putnam (2007) presents an argument that ethnic diversity leads to less social cohesion. He explains the increasing ethnic diversity in advanced countries as being driven mostly by sharp increases in immigration. He argues that although in the long run immigration and diversity are likely to have important cultural, economic, fiscal, and developmental benefits, in the short run, however, immigration and ethnic diversity tend to reduce social solidarity and social capital. He presents new evidence from the US suggesting that in ethnically diverse neighbourhoods residents of all races tend to ‘hunker down’. Trust (even of one’s own race) is lower, altruism and community cooperation rarer, and friends fewer. I argue that while ethnic and religious-specific issues are important for Muslim organization in Britain they do not exclude identification with the larger British community.

R3: Weak social engagement with mainstream culture will negatively impact British national identification for Muslims.

When I review the academic literature on political and civic participation, there are claims that when Muslims are highly engaged this perpetuates isolated communities and reduce their identification with Britain. These arguments break into three main strands. The first argues that Muslim political activity in Britain is based on kinship networks and is often the offshoot of political movements from their country of origin (for South Asia, this is most notably the *Tablighi Jamaat* movement in Pakistan) and therefore does not promote British identity but rather reinforces ethnic difference (Kepel 1997; Sikand 1998). The second strand argues that Muslim political and civic activity has relied on mobilizing districts with high percentages of Muslim residents to subvert policy to their ethnic specific demands, often by taking over local chapters of the Labour Party with no regard for Labour Party platforms, a practice referred to as ‘ethnic entryism’ (Fielding and Geddes 1998). A third line argues that high levels of engagement are based on Muslim identities and seek increasing rights and recognition as Muslims, not as Britons (Koopmans and Statham 2004). According to this literature, the political and civic participation of Muslims is described as being mobilized in ethnic terms, and it is seen as reducing British identification. Some recent research by Heath et al. (2013) shows this not to be the case. They found minorities to have positive orientations towards and interest in mainstream British politics. While they acknowledged the real inequalities of opportunity that minorities face, and the likely implications of these inequalities for trust in British political institutions, they emphasized the many ways in which minorities, especially the second generation, are integrated into British political life. Second-generation engagement in the electoral

process and participation in the various legitimate channels of non-electoral participation are not especially different in profile or level from those of other British citizens. So contrary to previous research, Heath et al. (2013) find that Muslims are also integrated into British political life, and not just through ethnic and kinship networks.

R4: Political and civic participation among Muslims will reduce British identification for Muslims.

Academic literature argues that naturalized first generation migrants should have very high levels of identification with the host country because they have actively chosen to migrate, while the second generation will feel lost and not fully accepted in their country of birth, yet also without ties to the parents' culture (Gans 1979, Portes and Rumbaut 2001). In addition, recent arguments about segmented assimilation that were formed to explain alienated identities among Latin Americans in the US (Portes and Zhou 1993) have been applied to Muslims in Britain, claiming that the second generation is less likely to feel British than the first generation because of increasing socio-economic difficulties and dissatisfaction of reactive ethnicity (Modood et al. 1997; Fordham and Ogbu 1986).

R5: There are likely to be generational differences in the British identification of Muslims, with first generations feeling more British and second and third generations feeling less British.

In his new book, Maxwell (2012) presents a very interesting 'integration paradox' in which the main argument is that integration involves a set of trade-offs

whereby a positive outcome on one metric promotes a negative outcome on another metric or when a negative outcome promotes a positive outcome. When Maxwell applies this concept to ethnic minority migrant integration, he distinguishes three dimensions of integration – social, economic, and political – and examines the trade offs among them. Social integration measures migrants’ social and cultural interactions with mainstream society, economic integration focuses on educational and labour market outcomes, and political integration is the capacity to pursue ones’ interests in the political system. Maxwell focuses on the ways in which social integration outcomes have trade-offs with economic and political integration. The mechanism that activates these trade-offs is group mobilization. Maxwell claims that groups with better social integration outcomes will have less capacity for group mobilization because they are more likely to interact with mainstream society and less likely to need strong co-ethnic networks for survival. This creates a trade-off because their relatively weak capacity for group mobilization reduces their ability to respond to economic difficulties or apply political pressure. In comparison, socially segregated groups will have greater capacity for group mobilization because they are more likely to depend on co-ethnic networks for survival. This group mobilization then provides valuable resources for furthering economic integration and gaining political influence. According to Maxwell’s integration paradox, if the ethnic minority group has less social integration then it is more likely to have group mobilization, and less likely to have economic and political integration and vice versa. Therefore those that are more socially integrated are more likely to be economically and politically integrated as well. Although I do not test this integration paradox in my ordered logistic regression results, it is important to keep it in mind, as it is a new intellectual angle worth thinking about. And at the very least, I will look out for traces of this paradox in my results.

I attempt to test all of these five research claims. I will present two sets of nested models from regression analysis, the first being a pooled sample in which I compare Muslims and non-Muslims, and the second being a Muslims only sample. I do this with two surveys, the CS and EMBES, giving me a total of four sets of models.

5.1.1 Data and Measures

The data for my regression analysis comes from the 2007 CS and 2010 EMBES. The CS was designed to provide information for the Home Office's public policy priorities towards local community empowerment. There are three main advantages to using the CS for my analysis. The first advantage is its wealth of questions on the relevant variables for our analysis: national identity, socio-economic status, social and cultural interactions, and political and civic engagement. Secondly, it is one of the recent surveys to provide detailed data for ethnic minorities in Britain. The third advantage is its relatively large sample size of ethnic minorities. The 2007 CS provides a total representative sample of 14,095 individuals 16 years or older resident in England and Wales, this comprised a core sample of 9,336 people and a minority ethnic booster of 4,759.²⁵ The EMBES is a study funded by the ESRC, with the Electoral Commission as a collaborating partner. Using this study for my research provides me with a major advantage. The EMBES set out to provide a representative probability sample of the major established ethnic minorities in Britain – namely Indians, Pakistanis,

²⁵ The ethnic minority boost sample was obtained by two methods: 1) focused enumeration: two addresses to the left and the right of each core sample address were screened for the presence of ethnic minority adults, and, 2) high concentration boost: an additional sample of adults drawn from postcode sectors in which 18% or more of households were headed by an ethnic minority. The combination of methods ensures enough ethnic minorities and a diverse population that does not entirely come from ethnic minority dense neighbourhoods.

Bangladeshis, Black Caribbeans, and Black Africans. The total sample size was 2,787 respondents. With the exception of one respondent who refused to report their ethnicity, the composition of the other ethnic groups was:

Mixed white and Black Caribbean – 70 respondents

Mixed white and Black African – 23

Mixed white and Asian – 5

Other mixed – 9

Asian or British Indian – 587

Asian or British Pakistani – 668

Asian or British Bangladeshi – 270

Other Asian/British – 16

Black or Black British Caribbean – 597

Black or Black British African – 524

Other Black British background – 6

Other ethnic group – 11

Total: 2,787

The survey design was based on a clustered, stratified sample with areas of high ethnic minority density being over-sampled and areas with the lowest density (<2% ethnic minorities) being excluded for cost reasons. Professor Anthony Heath who led the project says: “in some respects EMBES is the most comprehensive study of ethnic minorities in Britain since PSI’s Fourth National Survey in 1994”.

I will now briefly discuss the CS and EMBES measures for my central variables. More details can be found in the Appendices. Starting off with the measures from the CS, the dependent variable I use to measure ‘British Identification’ in this survey is measured by the question: “How strongly do you belong to Britain?” which has the following response categories: ‘4-Very Strongly’, ‘3-Fairly Strongly’, ‘2-Not Very Strongly’, and ‘1-Not At All Strongly’.

The first of my independent variables is ‘Religion’ which is measured by the “Religion” variable, which has been coded as a binary variable with ‘1-Muslims’ and ‘0-Non-Muslims’, naming the variable as ‘Muslims’. The second category of independent variables, ‘Ethnic Group’, is measured by the “Ethnic” variable which has been coded into eleven dummy variables: ‘White Other, Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Other Asian, Black Caribbean, Black African, Other Black, Mixed Race, and Chinese and Other’. Because the multiple regression analysis does not work with each ethnic category included as a dummy variable, I have not included one of the dummies ‘White British’, making that my reference category.

The third category of independent variables, ‘Socioeconomic Status’, has two sets of measures: ‘Education’ and ‘Occupational Attainment’. The variable for ‘Education’ orders the “Highest academic qualifications received” and has seven dummy variables ‘Degree: Degree or equivalent (reference category), Above A-level: Above A-level below degree, GCE A-levels: GCE A-levels or equivalent, GCSE grades A-C: GCSE grades A-C or equivalent, GCSE grades D-E: GCSE grades D-E or equivalent, Foreign/Other: Foreign and other qualifications, and No Qualifications: No qualifications’. ‘Occupational Attainment’ is measured by two variables the first of

which, 'Occupation', measures the respondent's socioeconomic status and consists of six dummy variables of which I include five in the regression: 'Professional: Higher/lower managerial and professions' (reference category) measures whether the respondent is employed in higher or lower managerial and professional occupations or not. 'Intermediate: Intermediate occupations' measures whether the respondent is employed in intermediate occupations. 'Small Employers: Small employers; lower supervisory, and technical occupations' measures whether the respondent is employed by small employers or works in lower supervisory and technical occupations. 'Semi- (Routine): Routine and semi-routine occupations' measures whether the respondent is employed in routine and semi-routine occupations or not. 'Full-time Student: Full-time student' measures whether the respondent is a full time student or not. 'Other Occupation: Other Occupation (never worked or long term unemployed)' takes into account respondents who have never worked or have been long term unemployed. The second variable, 'Employed', measures the respondent's economic status, whether or not the respondent is employed, which I have coded as a binary variable with response categories '1-Employed' and '0-Not Employed'.

I also include control variables for gender, age, and country of birth from the CS. The "Gender" variable is coded as the binary variable 'Male' with response categories '1-Male' and '0-Female'. For age I use the question, "How old are you?", and code this as the variable 'Age' with six dummy variables: '16-24 years old, 25-34 years old, 35-44 years old, 45-54 years old, 55-64 years old, and 65-85+ years old (reference category)'. For country of birth I use the question "What country were you born in?" which I code as a binary variable 'Born in UK' with response categories '1-United Kingdom' and '0-Not United Kingdom'.

To measure the social and cultural engagement of Muslims in Britain with mainstream society and their religiosity, the CS has a number of questions about ethnic integration and religious behaviour, forming my fifth cluster of indicators, 'Social and Cultural Integration and Religious Activities'. Ethnic neighbourhood concentration is measured by the question "Are people in your local area of the same ethnicity?" for which respondents could answer from four response categories indicating different levels of ethnic compositions in their local area. I have constructed this as a binary variable (as the difference between the four coefficients was not much) called 'Mixed Ethnic Area' with the response categories '1-Not the same, mixed ethnic area' and '0-All the same, homogeneous ethnic area'. Religious activity is measured by the question "Do you actively practice religion?" which I code as a binary variable 'Religious' with a response of either '1-Yes' or '0-No'.

To measure political and civic engagement the CS has questions about political and civic activities. To measure political activity I use the question "Would you use your vote to influence a local decision?" and code it as a binary variable 'Use Vote' with a response of either '1-Yes' or '1-No' (contrary to previous years, the 2007 CS did not have the question "Did you vote in the last election?"). To measure civic activity I use the questions, "In the past 12 months, have you contacted a public official working for the local council?; have you contacted a government official?; have you attended a public meeting or rally?; have you taken part in a public demonstration or protest?; and have you signed a petition?", and code them as binary variables 'Contacted Public Official', 'Contacted Government Official', 'Attended a Rally', 'Part of Demonstration or Protest', and 'Signed a Petition', all with response categories of '1-Yes' or '0-No'.

Finally, five variables test the impact of perceived discrimination and trust in mainstream civic agencies and political institutions. Perception of discrimination is measured by the questions “How would the police treat you?” and “How would the courts treat you?” which I have coded as the variables ‘Discrimination by Police’ and ‘Discrimination by Courts’, all with the response categories: ‘2-I would be treated worse than other races, 1-I would be treated the same as other races, and 0-I would be treated better than other races’.²⁶ Trust in mainstream civic agencies and political institutions is measured by three questions: “Do you trust the Police?”, “Do you trust Parliament?”, and “Do you trust the local council?”

Now turning to EMBES, the dependent variable which best measures ‘British Identification’ in this survey is measured by the question: “Would you say you feel British or Ethnic?” with the response categories: ‘5-British not (Black/Asian)’, ‘4-More British than (Black/Asian)’, ‘3-Equally (Black/Asian) and British’, ‘2-More (Black/Asian) than British’, and ‘1-(Black/Asian) not British’. The first of my independent variables is ‘Religion’ which is measured by the “Religion” variable, which has been coded as a binary variable with ‘1-Muslims’ and ‘0-Non-Muslims’, naming the variable as ‘Muslims’. The second category of independent variables, ‘Ethnic Group’, is measured by the “Ethnic” variable, which has been coded into five

²⁶ The CS includes 16 questions on perceptions of discrimination by various actors: surgeons, local schools, housing departments, local councils, private landlords, armed forces, insurance companies, bank/building societies, job centres, courts, crown prosecution, home office, police, immigration authorities, prison service, and probation service. I chose to include the variables for the courts and the police, the former measures a national institution but may not be overly-determined to produce a negative response and the latter measures a national agency but may be overly-determined to produce a negative response. Another option to these questions on perceived discrimination was a series of questions on perceived discrimination in real life cases of being fired from employment or treated poorly at work. While this latter series of questions has the advantage of being closer to actual events, the sample size dwindles dramatically because it only includes people who have been fired from employment, treated poorly at work, etc. In addition the second set of questions remain based on perceptions, and are therefore not as useful as the first set, which retain a larger sample size.

dummy variables (this time less ethnic dummies than the CS as the EMBES only contains the ethnic groups and the Whites are not measured. I have included the five ethnic groups that have large N): ‘Indian (reference category), Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Caribbean, and African’.

The third category of independent variables, ‘Socioeconomic Status’, has three sets of measures: ‘Education’, ‘Occupation’, and ‘Economic Status’. The variable for ‘Education’ has been constructed by three variables: “Highest Qualification”, “British Qualifications?”, and “Type of Overseas Qualifications” and has five dummy variables: ‘Degree (reference category), A-levels, GCSEs, Vocational, and None’. ‘Occupation’ is measured by ‘R-Type of Work’ which consists of six dummy variables of which I include five in the regression: ‘Professional or higher technical; Managerial or senior admin’ (reference category), ‘Clerical’, ‘Small Business Owner’, ‘Foreman or Supervisor’, ‘Manual Work’, and ‘Never Worked or Other’. ‘Economic Status’ is measured by ‘R’s Employment Status’ and has seven dummy variables: ‘In Paid Work’, ‘In Full-time Education’, ‘Permanently Sick or Disabled’, ‘Retired’, ‘Looking after the Home’, and ‘Other’. Control variables for gender and age are also included. The “Gender” variable is coded as the binary variable ‘Male’ with response categories ‘1-Male’ and ‘0-Female’. For age I use the question, “How old are you?”, and code this as the variable ‘Age’ with six dummy variables: ‘16-24 years old, 25-34 years old, 35-44 years old, 45-54 years old, 55-64 years old, and 65-79 years old (reference category)’.

To measure the social and cultural engagement of Muslims in Britain with mainstream society and their religiosity, the EMBES has a number of questions about ethnic integration and religious behaviour, forming my fifth cluster of indicators, ‘Social and Cultural Integration and Religious Activities’. Residential spatial segregation is

measured by the variable “Members Same Ethnicity: Neighbourhood” and I have constructed this as a binary variable called ‘Mixed Ethnic Area’ with the response categories ‘1-Not the same, mixed ethnic area’ and ‘0-All the same, homogeneous ethnic area’. Religious activity is measured by the question “In the past 12 months, how often did you participate in religious activities or attend religious services or meetings with other people, other than for events such as weddings and funerals?” which consists of four dummy variables: ‘Very; Five times a day or once a day’, ‘Medium; At least once a week or month’, ‘Low; Only on festivals’, and ‘Not at all’.

To measure for generational change, I looked at when the respondents arrived in Britain and constructed a variable called ‘Age of Arrival in Britain’ using the following variables, ‘Age’, ‘Country of Birth’, and ‘Year or Age Came to Britain (RAW)’. This ‘Age of Arrival in Britain’ variable has seven dummies: ‘Born in Britain’, ‘Came as children, 4 years or younger’, ‘Came between 5 and 9 years of age’, ‘Came as 10+ years of age’, ‘Came as 18+ years of age’, ‘Came as 30+ years of age’, and ‘Came as 40to84 years of age’. I also include variables for English language fluency and citizenship. The ‘English Fluency’ variable is constructed using the measures ‘How good at English’ and ‘English Main Language’ and has five dummies to assess the level of fluency in English: ‘English Main Language’, ‘Very good’, ‘Fairly good’, ‘Below average’, and ‘Poor’. Citizenship is measured by the variable ‘British Citizen’ and has three dummies: ‘British Citizen’, ‘Another Country’, and ‘Both’.

The EMBES does not have the measures for political and civic engagement that the CS had about political and civic activities²⁷. Finally, four variables test the impact of experienced discrimination and trust in mainstream political institutions, politicians, and police. Experience of discrimination is measured by the question “Have you experienced discrimination in the last five years?” which I have coded as the variable ‘Experienced Discrimination’, with the response categories: ‘1-Yes’ and ‘0-No’. The questions that I use on trust are “Do you trust parliament at Westminster?”, “Do you trust British politicians generally?”, and “Do you trust the police?” and have coded these as ‘Trust Parliament at Westminster’, ‘Trust British Politicians’, and ‘Trust Police’ with the response categories ‘A Great Deal of Trust’, ‘High Trust’, ‘Medium Trust’, ‘Low Trust’, and ‘No Trust’.

To analyse the impact of these independent variables on the British national identity of Muslims, I conduct a series of ordered logistic regressions. Ordered logistic regression is appropriate when the response variable (in this case “How strongly do you belong to Britain?” and “Would you say you feel more British or Ethnic?”) consists of several categories that can be ranked in order, but for which the distance between values is unknown. This applies to the responses on my dependent variables (‘4-Very Strongly’, ‘3-Fairly Strongly’, ‘2-Not Very Strongly’, ‘1-Not At All Strongly’ and ‘5-British not (Black/Asian)’, ‘4-More British than (Black/Asian)’, ‘3-Equally (Black/Asian) and British’, ‘2-More (Black/Asian) than British’, and ‘1-(Black/Asian) not British’), which are in descending order of identification but not necessarily equally spaced.²⁸ The regression coefficients I report measure the impact of independent variables on the

²⁷ EMBES does not have measures for ‘Use Vote’, ‘Contacted Public Official’, ‘Contacted Government Official’, ‘Attended Meeting or Rally’, ‘Part of Public Demonstration or Protest’, and ‘Signed a Petition’.

²⁸ An example of a variable in descending order with equal intervals would be 1- \$40, 2- \$30, 3- \$20, 4- \$10.

likelihood of responding more positively or more negatively in the categories of British identification.

5.1.2 Results from CS: Untangling Belonging to Britain

Table 3 shows results for responses to the question “How strongly do you belong to Britain?” for faith groups in Britain. Firstly, a Chi-Square test²⁹ between these two variables (chi-square with 21 degree of freedom = 182.896, $p = 0.000$) indicates that there is a statistically significant relationship between the row and column variable, i.e. between which religion you belong to and feelings of British identification. Responses in the category “Very strongly” are more positive for Jews (53 per cent) than Christians (48 per cent), Hindus (47 per cent), Muslims (46 per cent), Sikhs (45 per cent), or those with no religion at all (37 per cent), suggesting that they are the group most likely to have a very strong attachment to Britain. However, when the two positive categories (“Fairly strongly” and “Very strongly”) are combined, Muslims are higher than Christians and Jews in positive identification with British national identity: 88 per cent of Muslims belong either “Fairly” or “Very” strongly to Britain, compared to 86 per cent of Christians and 81 per cent of Jews and are essentially equal to Hindus (89 per cent) but are significantly less than Sikhs (93 per cent). Responses for the category “Not at all strongly” give the highest response from Buddhists and Jews (6 per cent).

²⁹ A chi-square test is used when you want to see if there is a relationship between two categorical variables. This statistic is used to test the hypothesis of no association of columns and rows in tabular data. A chi-square probability of .05 or less is commonly interpreted by social scientists as justification for rejecting the null hypothesis that the row variable is unrelated (that is, only randomly related) to the column variable.


Table 3: British Identification by Religion

Religion	Row Percentages				N
	Very strongly	Fairly strongly	Not very strongly	Not at all strongly	
Christian	48	38	12	3	8,861
Buddhist	30	40	24	6	127
Hindu	47	42	9	2	743
Jewish	53	28	13	6	53
Muslim	46	42	10	2	1,756
Sikh	45	48	6	1	341
Any Other Religion	45	35	16	4	382
No Religion at all	37	42	17	5	1,662
<i>Total %</i>	<i>46</i>	<i>39</i>	<i>12</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>13,543</i>

Notes: Variables are ‘British Identification’ (“How strongly do you belong to Britain?”) and ‘Religion’ (“What is your religion?”).

Source: 2007 Citizenship Survey (Q1-Q4).

Displayed in graph form this time, Figure 8 shows results for responses to the question “How strongly do you belong to Britain?” for ethnic groups in Britain. A Chi-Square test between these two variables (chi-square with 30 degree of freedom = 200.542, p = 0.000) indicates that there is a statistically significant relationship between which ethnic group you belong to and feelings of British identification. Responses in the category “Very strongly” are more positive for Bangladeshis (51 per cent) than Whites (48 per cent), Indians (47 per cent), Pakistanis (46 per cent), Black Caribbeans (40 per cent), or Black Africans (39 per cent), suggesting that they are the group most likely to have a very strong attachment to Britain. The groups for Other Blacks and Chinese rank the highest in the “Not very strongly” category. Since 74 per cent of Muslims are South Asian (Census 2001) and we see that Bangladeshis, Indians, and Pakistanis rank higher than or almost equal to Whites in the “Very strongly” category these results make one question the first hypothesis that Muslims are less likely than whites to identify as British, and they encourage scepticism towards the notion of a national identification crisis among Muslims and South Asians in Britain.

Figure 8: Belonging to Britain by Ethnic Groups in Britain


Source: 2007 Citizenship Survey (Q1-Q4)

Figure 9 shows results for responses to the question “How strongly do you belong to Britain?” for Muslims in Britain broken down by ethnic groups. A Chi-Square test between these two variables (chi-square with 30 degree of freedom = 35.859, $p = 0.213$) indicates that for Muslims there is no statistically significant relationship³⁰ between which ethnic group you belong to and having different feelings of British identification. Responses in the category “Very strongly” are more positive for White Muslims (56 per cent) than Bangladeshi Muslims (51 per cent), Other Black Muslims (50 per cent), Indian Muslims (48 per cent), or Pakistani Muslims (46 per cent) suggesting that they are the group most likely to have a very strong attachment to Britain. Because there is only one Chinese Muslim respondent in this sample of 1,756, it wouldn’t make much

³⁰ Twenty one (47.7%) of the cells in Table 5 (Ethnicity*British Identification for the Muslim sample) have expected frequencies less than 5, thus according to some statisticians the chi-square test statistic for these two variables would be unreliable. For the Chi-Square test, it is generally assumed that expected frequencies of all the cells in contingency table (i.e. two variables are divided in rows and columns) be greater than 1 and at least 80% of the cells have expected frequencies greater than 5. When these assumptions are not met, other tests, such as Fisher's exact test, are more appropriate. The Fisher's Exact test is a procedure that you can use for data in a two by two contingency table. Twenty one (47.7%) of the cells in Table 5 (Ethnicity*British Identification for the Muslim sample) have expected frequencies less than 5, thus according to some statisticians this chi-square test statistic would be unreliable.

statistical sense to compare its wholesome positive response of 100 per cent in the “Very strongly” category with the other larger ethnic samples. When the two positive categories (“Fairly strongly” and “Very strongly”) are combined, although White Muslims (93 per cent) still rank the highest now Indian (90 per cent) and Pakistani (89 per cent) Muslims are higher than Bangladeshi Muslims (82 per cent). Responses for the category “Not at all strongly” yield the highest response from Black Caribbean Muslims (10 per cent) and those of Mixed Race (8 per cent).

Figure 9: British Identification for Muslims by Ethnicity



Source: 2007 Citizenship Survey (Q1-Q4)

As Figure 7 showed, South Asians (most of who are Muslims) not only have similar levels of British identification as Whites, they are also more likely to feel British than Caribbeans, a group generally considered more culturally and socially integrated. While recent research shows a troubling trend of growing alienation among Caribbeans (in particular political alienation, see Goulbourne 2005 and Maxwell 2005), they are still considered the most integrated ethnic minority in Britain because of higher

intermarriage rates with the white majority,³¹ the fact that Caribbeans are more likely to speak English, more likely to be Christian, and less likely to be racially harassed, compared to South Asians who are less likely to speak English, more likely to be Hindu or Muslim, and are more likely to be the object of racial harassment.³² The finding that Muslims and South Asians are more likely to identify as British than the more culturally integrated Caribbeans suggests that national identification is a flexible concept not necessarily at odds with non-Christian and non-English cultural practices, and, that Muslims feel more integrated than many observers claim.

So far I have made the claim that there isn't much difference between Muslim feelings of British identity and that of non-Muslims. To test this claim in another way, I will now conduct regression analysis.

³¹ The 2001 Census shows that 29 per cent of Caribbean men and 20 per cent of Caribbean women are married with another ethnicity compared to less than 10 per cent of Indian, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi men and women. The 1991 Census revealed that 27 per cent of Caribbean men had white partners, compared to 7 per cent of Indians, 5 per cent of Pakistanis, and 3 per cent of Bangladeshis while 15 per cent of Caribbean women had white partners, compared to 4 per cent of Indians, 1 per cent of Pakistanis, and 0 per cent of Bangladeshis (Census, April 2001, Office for National Statistics; Berrington 1996).

³² A 1999 Commission for Racial Equality Factsheet presents data from numerous studies which all claim that South Asians are more likely than Caribbeans to suffer from racial harassment and violent attacks (Commission for Racial Equality 1999). See also Nanton (1999) for an analysis of how Caribbeans are considered more integrated and closer to the British mainstream than South Asians.

Table 4: Ordered Logistic Regressions from the Citizenship Survey for the question “How Strongly do you Belong to Britain?” (Pooled Sample)

British Identification: “How Strongly do you Belong to Britain?”					
	A1	A2	A3	A4	A5
Muslims (<i>ref: Non-Muslims</i>)	0.07	0.11*	0.28***	0.28***	0.38***
Education (<i>ref: Degree</i>)					
Above A-levels		-0.00	-0.08	-0.08	-0.00
GCE A-levels		-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01
GCSE grades A-C		-0.00	-0.04	-0.05	-0.01
GCSE grades D-E		-0.16	-0.19*	-0.20*	-0.20
Foreign/Other		0.00	-0.09	-0.10	0.00
No Qualifications		0.39***	0.03	0.02	0.15*
Occupation (<i>ref: Professional</i>)					
Intermediate		-0.12*	-0.04	-0.05	-0.06
Small Employers		-0.11*	-0.08	-0.08	-0.02
Semi-(Routine)		-0.17***	-0.02	-0.03	-0.01
Full-time Students		-0.77***	-0.20	-0.21	-0.17
Never Worked/Long Term Unemployed		-0.40***	-0.03	-0.04	-0.04
Other		-0.38**	-0.15	-0.16	-0.05
Employed (<i>ref: Not employed</i>)		-0.42***	-0.09	-0.08	-0.07
Male (<i>ref: Female</i>)			0.04	0.04	0.05
Age (<i>ref: 65-85+</i>)					
16-24			-1.11***	-1.11***	-1.08***
25-34			-1.05***	-1.06***	-1.03***
35-44			-0.92***	-0.92***	-0.92***
45-54			-0.65***	-0.65***	-0.56***
55-64			-0.43***	-0.43***	-0.31***
Born in UK (<i>ref: Non-UK born</i>)			0.09*	0.10*	0.23***
Mixed Ethnic Area (<i>ref: Homogenous</i>)			-0.21***	-0.21***	-0.14*
Religious			0.23***	0.24***	0.17***
Use Vote				-0.52	-0.32
Contacted Public Official				0.01	-0.01
Contacted Government Official				-0.17	-0.09
Attended Meeting or Rally				-0.02	-0.13
Part of Public Demonstration or Protest				-0.27*	-0.15
Signed a Petition				-0.05	-0.02
Discrimination by Police					-0.09
Discrimination by Courts					-0.26***
Trust Police					0.26***
Trust Local Council					0.18***
Trust Parliament					0.29***
Pseudo R ²	0.00	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.05
N	13,925	13,895	13,690	13,687	10,136

Notes: Each cell gives the estimated coefficients. *= $p < .05$, **= $p < .01$, ***= $p < .001$.

Source: 2007 Citizenship Survey (Q1-Q4).

Table 4 presents Ordered Logistic Regression³³ results for the dependent variable: “How strongly do you belong to Britain?” for the sample as a whole. Five models are

³³ These Ordered Logistic Regressions were conducted using Stata’s `ologit` command which performs maximum likelihood estimation to fit models with an ordinal dependent variable, meaning a variable that is categorical and in which the categories can be ordered from low to high. To understand whether the

presented, as I want to see the effect of different independent variables. Model A1, the one I am interested in, contains a dummy variable for Muslims and non-Muslims, which will provide a direct comparison of Muslims and non-Muslims' identity statements. Model A2 tests the importance of socioeconomic status, through the variables of education, occupation levels, and economic status. Model A3 adds assorted demographic variables of gender, age, and country of birth along with variables for social and cultural integration (of living in an ethnically diverse area and religious practice). Model A4 brings in variables measuring political and civic participation. Model A5 adds variables for perceived discrimination and trust in mainstream civic agencies and political institutions. I exclude the ethnic group variables for reasons for multicollinearity³⁴. Model A1 shows that Muslims are more likely to belong to Britain than non-Muslims (when I add in the education and occupation variables) and this increases with the addition of more independent variables.

I have claimed that Muslims are not as alienated from British national identity as commonly assumed, but there is still the question of what factors make Muslims feel more or less British. I will now conduct a separate regression analysis for the Muslim sample only. Table 5 presents Ordered Logistic Regression³⁵ results for the dependent variable: "How strongly do you belong to Britain?" for the Muslim sample. Model B1 examines the relationship between the different Muslim ethnic groups and British identification, instead of the Muslims and non-Muslims dummy variable. Model B2

ordered logit approach is the best approach for my research, I tried alternative approaches as well and compared the results. First, I reduced the multiple ordered response categories of the dependent variable to a binary/high pair making it a simple logit, but the results obtained from this simple logit did not give more significant coefficients as compared to the ordered logit. An Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model was also tried but again more significant coefficients were not found. Therefore a multiple ordered logit was found to be the best approach for my research.

³⁴ Including both the Muslims and Ethnic Groups would lead to multicollinearity. Multicollinearity is when several independent variables in a multiple regression model are closely correlated to one another.

³⁵ Again, I used a multiple ordered logit here for the same reasons as given in Footnote 33.

tests the importance of socioeconomic status, through the variables of education, occupation levels, and economic status. Model B3 adds assorted demographic variables of gender, age, and country of birth along with variables for social and cultural integration (of living in an ethnically diverse area and religious practice). Model B4 brings in variables measuring political and civic participation. Model B5 adds variables for perceived discrimination and trust in mainstream civic agencies and political institutions. Separating these five models is useful because it allows me to first test the importance of the structural integration measures before arguing for the importance of our attitudinal variables. For example, one could argue that people with a high socioeconomic status are likely to have higher levels of trust or lower levels of perceived discrimination, and if high trust or low perceived discrimination lead to British identification then socio-economic status would have an indirect influence on British identification that was subsumed by the trust and discrimination variables. However, by separating the models I first conduct a rigorous test of the variables emphasized in the general literature before ruling them out as explanations.

Table 5: Ordered Logistic Regressions from the Citizenship Survey for the question “How Strongly do you Belong to Britain?” (Muslim Sample)

British Identification: “How Strongly do you Belong to Britain?”					
	B1	B2	B3	B4	B5
Ethnic Group (<i>ref: White British</i>)					
White Other	-0.13	-0.01	-0.04	-0.06	-0.29
Indian	-0.35	-0.31	-0.24	-0.25	0.25
Pakistani	-0.44	-0.41	-0.29	-0.30	0.23
Bangladeshi	-0.30	-0.31	-0.24	-0.26	0.23
Asian Other	-0.68	-0.59	-0.54	-0.55	-0.60
Black Caribbean	-1.72*	-1.66*	-1.70*	-1.72*	-2.01
Black African	-0.68	-0.64	-0.54	-0.55	-0.04
Black Other	-0.60	-0.68	-0.79	-0.79	-0.72
Mixed Race	-0.95	-0.88	-0.73	-0.72	-0.44
Chinese & Other	-0.65	-0.55	-0.51	-0.50	0.05
Education (<i>ref: Degree</i>)					
Above A-levels		-0.24	-0.26	-0.24	-0.14
GCE A-levels		0.19	0.22	0.23	0.17
GCSE grades A-C		0.43*	0.47*	0.46*	0.49*
GCSE grades D-E		0.05	0.10	0.11	0.17
Foreign/Other		0.27	0.17	0.17	-0.25
No Qualifications		0.38*	0.25	0.26	0.43*
Occupation (<i>ref: Professional</i>)					
Intermediate		-0.09	0.03	0.02	-0.21
Small Employers		0.06	0.12	0.11	0.12
Semi-(Routine)		-0.03	0.08	0.08	-0.15
Full-time Students		-0.61**	-0.28	-0.28	-0.47
Never Worked/Long Term Unemployed		-0.26	-0.18	-0.18	-0.36
Other		-0.39	-0.26	-0.24	0.03
Employed (<i>ref: Not employed</i>)					
		-0.35**	-0.29*	-0.29*	-0.20
Male (<i>ref: Female</i>)					
			-0.10	-0.11	-0.21
Age (<i>ref: 65-85+</i>)					
16-24			-0.58*	-0.57*	-0.46
25-34			-0.41	-0.42	-0.48
35-44			-0.22	-0.23	-0.19
45-54			-0.15	-0.15	0.11
55-64			-0.19	-0.20	0.14
Born in UK (<i>ref: Non-UK born</i>)					
			-0.17	-0.18	-0.04
Mixed Ethnic Area (<i>ref: Homogenous</i>)					
			-0.82*	-0.81*	-0.95*
Religious					
			-0.10	-0.10	-0.19
Use Vote					
				-0.42	1.39
Contacted Public Official					
				0.26	0.35
Contacted Government Official					
				0.03	0.44
Attended Meeting or Rally					
				0.14	0.02
Part of Public Demonstration or Protest					
				-0.07	0.08
Signed a Petition					
				-0.02	0.13
Discrimination by Police					
					-0.31
Discrimination by Courts					
					-0.24
Trust Police					
					0.26**
Trust Local Council					
					0.36***
Trust Parliament					
					0.18
Pseudo R ²	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.07
N	1,756	1,752	1,720	1,719	1,088

Notes: Each cell gives the estimated coefficients. *= $p < .05$, **= $p < .01$, ***= $p < .001$.

Source: 2007 Citizenship Survey (Q1-Q4).

Firstly measuring the effects of ethnicity alone, Model B1 shows that most of the Muslim ethnic dummy variables do not appear significant suggesting that there is little differentiation between Muslim ethnic groups on how strongly they feel they belong to Britain. However, the dummy variable for Black Caribbean Muslims is negatively significant, making them less likely to feel British as compared to White Muslims. This negative feeling among the Black Caribbean Muslims could be an issue of selective conversion. To explain, these Black Caribbean Muslims may be a case of selective conversion, they could have converted to Islam as a result of feeling discriminated by the mainstream British population and used Islam as an escape hence these negative feelings towards Britain. The addition of socioeconomic predictors to the models encourages me to question arguments that low socio-economic status produces anti-British sentiments amongst Muslims. First, analysing the impact of the educational level categories, the results show that the dummy variable of 'No Qualifications' for Muslims is statistically significant and suggests that they are more likely to belong strongly to Britain than Muslims who have a degree. Muslims with GCSE grades A-C, less educated than those with a degree, are more likely to belong strongly to Britain than those with a degree. These results do not support arguments that low educational outcomes reduce British identification but rather show that Muslims with less education feel more strongly associated to Britain than those with a degree, who are more likely to have a higher socioeconomic status. In fact none of the dummy variables that measure a high socioeconomic status, GCE A-levels and above A-levels, are significant indicators for British identification among Muslims. This finding suggests that educated Muslims are not necessarily more likely to belong to Britain because of their higher socioeconomic position.

It would be reasonable to stipulate that belonging to a higher socioeconomic status would elevate an ethnic minority in their status in society and then they would generally have a better lifestyle because of the increased choices and this would make them feel more British, but this is not actually the case. There could be two reasons for this, firstly, belonging to a high socioeconomic group makes the ethnic minority more likely to interact with the majority population and this could make them feel or perceive more discrimination, making them understand it with awareness. Secondly, Waters (1996) found in her work that one's ethnicity does affect their overall bearing in society, that their race is a hugely important, perhaps the most important, factor in forming their life. She argues that white Americans of European ancestry can be described as having a great deal of choice in terms of their ethnic identities in two aspects, firstly in choosing whether to claim any specific ancestry at all or just be "White" or American, and secondly which of their European ancestries to include in the description of their identities, becoming a sort 'symbolic ethnicity'. On the contrary, this option is not available for non-Whites as the symbolic ethnicity of the type described here is confined to White Americans of European origin. Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Asian Americans, and American Indians do not have the option of a symbolic ethnicity at present in the US.

Waters (1996) says that for all of the ways in which ethnicity does not matter for White Americans, it does matter for non-Whites. Who your ancestors are does affect your choice of spouse, where you live, what job you have, who your friends are, and what your chances are for success in American society, if those ancestors happen not to be from Europe. The reality is that White ethnics have a lot more choice and room for manoeuvre than they themselves think they do. The option of choosing among different

ethnicities in their family backgrounds exists because the degree of discrimination and social distance attached to specific European backgrounds has diminished over time. The situation is very different for members of racial minorities, whose lives are strongly influenced by their race or national origin regardless of how much they may choose not to identify themselves in terms of the ancestries. Farley (1991) also discusses this notion of optional ethnicity. Similarly, my finding of Muslims in a lower socioeconomic status feeling more British than those in a higher socioeconomic status (judged by educational variables here) may be because the Muslims that are in higher echelons of society cannot – despite their high achievements – afford this ‘optional ethnicity’, which the White majority group can afford. I will look out for this in my in-depth interviews.

Numerous measures of occupational categories are statistically insignificant for Muslims (Model B2) including the most important dummy variables for small employers (lower supervisory or technical), semi-(routine) and other occupations (never worked or long term unemployed), which directly measure unfavourable socioeconomic outcomes and show that low socioeconomic status is a statistically insignificant predictor of British identification among Muslims. Being a full-time student is negatively significant for Muslims making them less likely to identify as British as compared to Muslims in professional occupations. Some of these students are of course temporary residents, only here to study for a few years and from their point of view Britain is not their permanent home to which their loyalty or belonging is attached.

Employed Muslims are less associated to Britain than those that are unemployed. The dummy variable for employment (‘Employed’) is negatively significant for Muslims; employed Muslims are less likely to feel British, as compared to those not in work. One

theory for this result could be that Muslims in employment are more likely to interact with the majority population and perceive or experience discrimination in the workplace thus they feel less British than those out of work, who are receiving welfare support and assistance and have less interaction with the majority population. A study by Stainback and Irvin (2012) has examined how workplace racial composition affects an individual's experiences of racial discrimination. They found that working with predominantly same-race co-workers tends to diminish perceptions of racial discrimination. It may be that the employed Muslims in the sample of my results may have a larger composition of Whites as opposed to same-race workers, and thus experience or perceive racial discrimination, in turn affecting their British identification. Another angle to look at this is that employed Muslims are more aware of the formal procedures and policies in place to combat racism and anti-discrimination in the workplace.

Another point to consider is that unemployed people are less likely to have any qualifications thus it can be reasonable to expect a similar result for British identification from both the unemployed and uneducated groups. This is in fact the case, as I found earlier that Muslims who had no qualifications had a stronger British identification than their educated counterparts and I now find that unemployed people in both these groups foster a greater sense of attachment to Britain than their working counterparts.

Adding demographic variables and variables to test the importance of social and cultural isolation on British national identification present some interesting findings. Model B3 shows that the obvious formal indicators are less important than the subtle

measures of how social and cultural integration is experienced. For example, some research claims that religious activity and ethnically segregated enclaves have led to Muslim isolation from the British mainstream (Leiken 2005, Reiff 2005). Whereas Maxwell (2006)³⁶ in his study of the 2003 CS found ethnic concentration of neighbourhood to be statistically insignificant for Muslims, my findings show this predictor to be significant. Muslims living in ethnically mixed areas, measured by the ‘Mixed Ethnic Area’ dummy variable, report lower levels of attachment to Britain than those living in ethnically segregated areas. In other words, ethnically diverse areas seem to reduce feelings or ties towards Britain as compared to living in ethnically segregated areas that increase attachment towards Britain. My results show that whether or not Muslims practice their religion is an insignificant indicator for British identification among Muslims. In other words whether or not they actively practice their religion, shown by the variable ‘religious’, does not impact their attachment to Britain.

My finding that ethnically segregated communities do not actually reduce attachment to the broader British community suggests that Muslims may not be as isolated as commonly assumed (Simpson 2004: 666). It is interesting to note that this finding of ethnically mixed areas reducing British identification is not unique only to Muslims because my results for the pooled model found that everyone living in mixed ethnic areas (which includes non-Muslims) reported lower levels of attachment to Britain, although the coefficient from the Muslims model is larger. So the finding of the mixed ethnic area is not just being driven by the White characteristics, there is a strong Muslim effect. This finding of segregated areas being a driver of positive identification towards Britain is supported if I perform a cross-tab between the two variables “Are people in

³⁶ In his analysis, Maxwell (2006) looked at a number of ethnic groups, but did not provide detailed and thorough findings on Muslims. My analysis focuses solely on Muslim survey data from two more recent datasets.

the neighbourhood the same ethnicity?” and “How strongly do you belong to Britain?” I find that 67 per cent of Muslims living in ethnically segregated areas belong “Very Strongly” to Britain as opposed to those living in ethnically mixed areas, of whom only 45 per cent belong very strongly to Britain (see Appendices). One can also argue that the existing ethnic enclaves are not formed through intense desires to remain within one culture but rather are the most resource-deprived parts of Britain formed as a result of Muslims not having enough resources to move elsewhere (Peach 1998). Furthermore, because most Muslims are ethnic minorities, by definition they are more likely than the White majority to work, socialize, and have regular interactions with people of diverse ethnic backgrounds: 77 per cent of Whites in the CS claimed to have regular contact and conversations with people of different ethnicities, compared to 95 per cent of Indians, 94 per cent of Pakistanis, 95 per cent of Bangladeshis, and 94 per cent of Muslims.

The demographic variables ‘Gender’, ‘Country of Birth’, and ‘Age’ are considered next. The fact that gender is insignificant for British identification for Muslims suggests that while males and females face different challenges in life, those differences do not appear significant for predicting variation in British identification once numerous control variables are considered. The indicator ‘Country of Birth’ measures the importance of being born in Britain for national identity, and this is insignificant as well suggesting no difference between Muslims who were born in Britain and those not born in the UK.

Maxwell (2006) found in the 2003 CS that Muslims, Indians, Pakistanis, and Bangladeshis born in Britain were less likely to identify as British than those born elsewhere, which suggests that there are different dynamics between the two

generations concerning identity formation.³⁷ But he found “Country of Birth” to be a statistically insignificant predictor of British identification across all his four ethnic groups. By doing a simple cross-tab from the 2007 CS data, I see that there is not such a huge disparity between the UK and non-UK born, in fact the difference is virtually none; 89 per cent of Muslims born outside the UK have a ‘fair’ or ‘very’ strong attachment to Britain compared to 87 per cent of Muslims born in the UK and an equal proportion (2 per cent) of both these groups do “not at all strongly” identify with the British mainstream. Furthermore, ‘Country of Birth’ is an insignificant predictor of British identification in my Muslims model across all models (B3, B4, and B5), and so the mere fact of being born abroad or in Britain does not appear significant. In addition, because socioeconomic and spatial segregation variables did not seem to have an impact for Muslims and were not significant (Maxwell 2006), the above explanation of segmented assimilation also does not seem plausible. This reinforces my earlier argument about Muslims being civically and ideologically invested in Britain. In my analysis of EMBES data, I have added an independent variable to measure generational differences and I will see if there is a significant result there.

Next I look at the negatively significant variable ‘Age’. The only age dummy variable that is significant for Muslims is the 16-24 variable, and this is negative, making them less likely than older people to identify as British. The other age categories are not significant but their negative coefficients are smaller in value suggesting that the older age groups are more likely to belong towards the nation. The coefficients for these age dummy variables are negatively correlated with the age group, i.e. as the age group increases its coefficient declines clearly showing that older people have a closer affinity

³⁷ In the 2003 CS 86% of Muslims born abroad have “fair” or “very” strong attachment to Britain compared to 80% of Muslims born in Britain, for Indians it is 88% to 80%, Bangladeshis 89% to 77%, and Pakistanis 88% to 75%.

to Britain. The 2007 CS confirms this argument for Muslims, the older age groups respond most positively, 73 per cent of 75-84, 56 per cent of 65-74, and 53 per cent of 45-54 year olds, in the “Very strongly” category, compared to only 38 per cent of 16-24 year olds. As I found earlier full-time students are also negative in their feeling towards Britain. They are likely to be in the age category 16-24 so the two groups are correlated. What is it that unites them? In general, the age 16-24 is when identity is being formed, it is when the ‘identity-project’ is being undertaken; this is the time when he or she is more likely to experiment with different forms of identity and likely to identify less with the nation. The emergence of globalization has opened up new ways of belonging for young people; they can be more risk-taking and creative in their identity. Maybe it is just this age that makes young Muslims feel less British as they are trying different identities, or maybe they feel under attack due to geo-political events and the ‘war on terror’ and disagree with Britain’s foreign policies in Muslim countries.

The final set of explanations favoured by the academic literature is that high levels of political and civic engagement among Muslims are the result of ethnically and religiously based mobilization and therefore perpetuate ethnically and religiously segregated identities (Kepel 1994). Arguments about religiously segregated political identities draw on the observation that since the 1980s influential Muslim community leaders have inspired high turnout rates among Muslims to elect them as local councillors (Ansari 2005b; Husband 2002; Mustafa 2010). These Muslim leaders maintain their support in the community by lobbying government and extracting various Muslim-specific concessions, ranging from mother-tongue teaching in schools and Halal meals in school cafeterias to mosque contracts for various tasks of local government service delivery (Joly 1987: 19-23; Kepel 1994: 157-58). In addition, in

recent years Muslim politics have gained further salience in opposition to Blair's support for the US-led war in Iraq (Garbaye 2005: 10-11). However Maxwell (2006) showed that contrary to being a negative influence on national identity, vote turnout (measured by the question "Did you vote in the last election?") was positively significant for British identification among Muslims. While the 2003 CS did not allow for fine-grained analysis of Muslim reactions to specific political events, it was conducted well after the supposed rise of Muslim politics in the late 1980s, and right in the middle of the debate over the 2003 war in Iraq, yet it still showed that political activity among Muslims positively contributed to British national identity. A recent survey conducted by the IHRC also showed that while 44 per cent of Muslims were politically active concerning Muslim issues and felt the British government's policies were not favourable towards Muslims (especially the lack of legal protection from discrimination), 41 per cent of Muslims also felt a strong sense of belonging to Britain (Ameli and Merali 2004: 42-6).

When I test for predictors of political and civic engagement I find that none of their variables (use vote, contacted public or government officials, attended a rally, was part of a demonstration or protest or signed a petition) are significant indicators for Muslims. Arguments about ethnically segregated political identities use the term "ethnic entryism" to describe ethnic and kinship networks that allegedly hijack British politics for ethnically separate agendas (Fielding and Geddes 1998). However, the fact that political and civic activity does not have a statistically significant impact on British identification among Muslims suggests that their high levels of political and civic activity do not necessarily lead to ethnic or religious identities that contradict with British identity.

Thus the results so far encourage me to doubt the common claims that socio-economic difficulties, social and cultural segregation, and high levels of political activity are hindrances to British identification among Muslims. In fact I found the opposite, that Muslims in a low socioeconomic status with few or no qualifications or without a job felt more strongly attached to Britain than their more educated and employed counterparts. Full-time students were the only exception on this low socioeconomic scale as they expressed lower levels of British identification. Model B5 presents five additional attitudinal variables to explore arguments about the importance of perceived discrimination and trust in mainstream political institutions. While socio-economic variables alone may be insignificant predictors of British national identity for Muslims, material difficulties may still be important for Muslim British identity as they relate to perceived discrimination. Maxwell (2006) found that perceived discrimination was negatively significant for Muslim British national identity (he only used the variable ‘How would the courts treat you?’). I use both measures, for the courts and police, and my results show that perceived discrimination is not a significant indicator for Muslim British national identity (but note when I add only one variable for perceived discrimination, i.e. either for the courts or police, the discrimination variable does become a significant predictor for Muslim British national identity³⁸). Thus unfair and discriminatory outcomes can be important in impacting identification with the nation. Trust in the police and local council are positive significant indicators of British identification among Muslims, making them more likely to belong to Britain than those who do not trust the police and council.

³⁸ This could be due to multicollinearity, both the discrimination variables could be collinear.

It has been suggested that perceived discrimination cannot be separated from socio-economic outcomes as an explanatory variable because people with low socio-economic status are more likely to suffer discrimination and ethnic minorities are more likely to have low socio-economic status. While one may assume that ethnic minorities with low socio-economic status are more likely to suffer discrimination, a recent survey of 1125 Muslims in Britain conducted by the Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC) does not show a significant relationship between level of education and degree of discrimination, except in the case of British Muslims who had not obtained the GSCE, were less likely to experience discrimination (Ameli et al. 2004: 48). Therefore one should not automatically assume that low socio-economic status leads to disaffection with the mainstream, but rather consider how discriminatory experiences shape material outcomes and alienation, across socio-economic levels.

Model B5 also tests the importance of political trust in mainstream institutions and shows that Muslims have trust and are ideologically invested in mainstream British politics; trusting the British political institutions and politicians is a very important part of them belonging to Britain. Model B5 shows trust in police and local council as positively significant at $p < .01$ for British identification among Muslims. While levels of political trust have been declining across the Western world in recent decades (King et al. 1997), Tables 6 and 7 show that Muslims are much more likely than Christians to trust the parliament and their local council. Only 4 per cent of Christians have “a lot” of trust in Parliament, compared to 16 per cent of Muslims, 13 per cent of Hindus and Buddhists, 12 per cent of Sikhs, and 8 per cent of Jews. For trust in the local council only 7 per cent of Christians have “a lot” compared to 16 per cent of Muslims, 15 per cent of Hindus, 13 per cent of Buddhists, and 12 per cent of Sikhs. However, when

asked about potential discrimination by the courts (Table 8), only 1 per cent of Muslims believed they would be treated better than other races, compared to 5 per cent of Christians and 15 per cent of Jews. The same proportion of Muslims and Christians (8 per cent) believed they would be treated worse than other races. Maxwell (2006) thinks that this Muslim optimism can be pessimistically interpreted as a function of them being relatively new to Britain and coming from countries where politics was less transparent and less effective in comparison, but regardless of the cause it indicates that Muslims are in fact engaging in mainstream British identity and institutions, and are not as alienated as the media often portrays.

Table 6: Trust in Parliament by Religion

		Row Percentages							
		Religion							
Trust Parliament	Christian	Buddhist	Hindu	Jewish	Muslim	Sikh	Any Other Religion	No Religion	<i>N</i>
A lot	4	13	13	8	16	12	4	3	853
A fair amount	31	39	49	34	46	48	29	29	4,608
Not very much	43	30	30	42	30	32	43	43	5,498
Not at all	22	18	8	17	9	7	25	25	2,681
<i>N</i>	8,738	119	720	53	1,674	323	376	1,637	13,640

Notes: Variables are 'Trust Parliament' ("Do you trust parliament?") and 'Religion' ("What is your religion?").

Source: 2007 Citizenship Survey (Q1-Q4).

Table 7: Trust in Local Council by Religion

<i>Trust Local Council</i>	Row Percentages								<i>N</i>
	Religion								
	Christian	Buddhist	Hindu	Jewish	Muslim	Sikh	Any Other Religion	No Religion	
A lot	7	13	15	8	16	12	8	5	1,178
A fair amount	54	63	61	51	57	59	50	50	7,393
Not very much	31	21	19	26	22	25	30	33	4,016
Not at all	8	4	6	15	5	5	12	12	1,087
<i>N</i>	8,694	126	737	53	1,729	333	373	1,629	13,674

Notes: Variables are ‘Trust Local Council’ (“Do you trust the local council?”) and ‘Religion’ (“What is your religion?”).

Source: 2007 Citizenship Survey (Q1-Q4).

Table 8: Treatment of Courts by Religion

<i>Treatment of Courts</i>	Row Percentages								<i>N</i>
	Religion								
	Christian	Buddhist	Hindu	Jewish	Muslim	Sikh	Any Other Religion	No Religion	
I would be treated worse than other races	8	2	4	7	8	7	12	7	1,043
I would be treated better than other races	5	2	1	15	1	2	7	9	662
I would be treated the same as other races	69	64	56	44	60	62	59	69	9,367
Don't know/No opinion	18	33	38	33	32	29	22	16	2,987
<i>N</i>	8,928	129	756	54	1,784	341	385	1,682	14,059

Notes: Variables are ‘Treatment of Courts’ (“How would the courts treat you?”) and ‘Religion’ (“What is your religion?”).

Source: 2007 Citizenship Survey (Q1-Q4).

To sum up, contrary to claims that Muslims are alienated from British mainstream society my results show that they are almost as likely as Christians and Whites (Table 3 and Figure 8) to feel that they belong to Britain. Furthermore, my regression results from the pooled model also point to this finding. More specifically, my results suggest

that claims about low socio-economic status, ethnically and religiously isolated communities, and ethnically and religiously motivated political participation negatively influencing British national identification among Muslims are not an accurate account of Muslims in Britain. I argue that previous research that suggests this does not have grounds. Instead I argue that it is crucial to understand the nuances of how people experience socio-economic difficulties and ethnically and religiously based networks. While my results suggest that some socio-economic variables, particularly for employment status, GCSE grades A-C, full-time student, and no qualifications are significant indicators of British identification, they do not all suggest that socio-economic difficulties hinder British identification among Muslims. Instead we find the opposite, that Muslims in a low socioeconomic status with no qualifications or without a job felt more strongly attached to Britain than their more educated and employed counterparts. Even Muslims with GCSE grades A-C felt more British than those with a degree thus an improved socioeconomic status does not necessarily increase British identification. However, perhaps this claim is not entirely untrue because worth noting in the results is that Muslims with GCSE grades A-C did feel more British than those with no qualifications even though on the whole both groups reported a higher sense of belonging to Britain than those who had obtained a degree. Full-time students were the only exception on this low socioeconomic scale to express lower levels of British identification than those with a degree but we found this to be related age effects as most students are likely to be in the 16-24 age group, which was also negatively significant.

The results from the CS showed that ethnically segregated neighbourhoods and religious activity do not have a negative significant influence on British identification,

suggesting that Muslims can balance religious networks with connections to mainstream society. And while socio-economic outcomes are important for understanding national identification patterns, the unfair nature of discrimination can also be important. Muslim political and civic engagements were found to be insignificant indicators for building or destroying identification with the British mainstream. Further evidence of Muslim engagement with mainstream British society is the high level of political trust, showing that Muslims are balancing any ethnic and religious difficulties with a firm commitment to mainstream values and practices.

5.1.3 Results from EMBES: More British than we think

To compliment my ordered logistic regression results from the CS (Tables 6 and 7), I have done some further regression analysis (Tables 11 and 13) using EMBES data, this time my dependent variable being measured by the question, “Would you say you feel more British or Ethnic?” As before five models are presented for both the pooled sample (C1-C5) and Muslim sample (D1-D5). I have almost the same or very similar dependent variables as in Tables 6 and 7, but now I have added some additional variables to measure the generational change, the impact of English language fluency, and British citizenship.

Before I conduct the analysis, it is worth thinking about what the key findings were from the EMBES. Findings from the 2010 EMBES support some of our earlier findings about Muslims, that their level of disintegration in society is overemphasised. The survey found that ethnic minorities, a large proportion who are Muslims, are highly supportive of British democracy. Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) remain highly

supportive of the Labour party, with 68% (two-thirds) voting Labour. The Conservatives and Liberal Democrats – coalition partners in the current government – got only 16 per cent and 14 per cent of the BME vote respectively. They share the British norm of a duty to vote (although Ethnic minorities are somewhat less likely than the White British to register to vote, but among those who are registered turnout rates are very similar to white British ones), and the great majority identify with Britain. Concerns about the commitment of minorities to British norms and values are misplaced. Nor do Muslims show in general any lack of commitment to Britain or any enthusiasm for extremist politics. However, there is worrying evidence that second-generation citizens of Black Caribbean heritage do not feel that the British political system has treated them fairly. Black Caribbeans, not Muslims, are the group who feel most alienated. Finally, a majority of BME people believe that there is still prejudice in the UK society, including nearly three-quarters of Black Caribbean people. Indeed, over a third (36%) of ethnic minorities report a personal experience of discrimination (The Runnymede Trust 2012).

Let me start with some descriptive statistics. Table 9 shows results for responses to the question “Would you say you feel more British or Ethnic?” for the ethnic minority faith groups in Britain. Responses in the category ‘British not (Black/Asian)’ are the same for Christians, Muslims, and Sikhs (3 per cent), with Hindus lower (2 per cent) than them, and ‘Other’ being the highest (8 per cent). The next category ‘More British than (Black/Asian)’ shows that Muslims and Sikhs rank the highest (18 per cent) in saying they feel more British, with Hindus below them (15 per cent). Buddhists and Sikhs feel equally British and Ethnic. And it is clear that Christians and Hindus feel more Ethnic than British as compared to Muslims.

Table 9: British or Ethnic by Religion

	Row Percentages					<i>N</i>
	British or Ethnic					
	British not (Black/Asian)	More British than (Black/Asian)	Equally (Black/Asian) and British	More (Black/Asian) than British	(Black/Asian) not British	
Christian	3	6	43	25	19	799
Buddhist	0	0	100	0	0	2
Hindu	2	15	48	19	13	232
Jewish	0	0	100	0	0	1
Muslim	3	18	49	19	8	1,125
Sikh	3	18	52	15	10	164
Any Other	8	17	42	13	17	24
Religion						
<i>Total %</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>14</i>	<i>47</i>	<i>20</i>	<i>12</i>	<i>2,348</i>

Notes: Variables are 'British or Ethnic' ("Would you say you feel more British or Ethnic?") and 'Religion' ("What is your religion?").

Source: 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Study.

Now I turn to the regression results from EMBES. Firstly, Table 10 presents findings for the pooled sample. Model C1, the one I am interested in, contains a dummy variable for Muslims and non-Muslims, which will provide a direct comparison of Muslims and non-Muslims' identity statements. Model C2, along with ethnicity, tests the importance of socioeconomic status variables, education, occupation levels, and economic status. Model C3 adds assorted demographic variables of gender and age along with a variable for religiousness and ethnic diversity in neighbourhood. Models C4 and C5 bring to the model additional variables to measure generational change, English fluency, citizenship, discrimination, and trust. I exclude the ethnic group variables for reasons for collinearity. It becomes clear from model C1 that Muslims are more likely to feel British than non-Muslims.

Table 10: Ordered Logistic Regressions from the Ethnic Minority British Election Study for the question “Would you say you feel more British or Ethnic?” (Pooled Sample)

British or Ethnic: “Would you say you feel more British or Ethnic?”					
	C1	C2	C3	C4	C5
Muslims (<i>ref: Non-Muslims</i>)	0.63^{***}	0.79^{***}	0.94^{***}	0.88^{***}	0.79^{***}
Education (<i>ref: Degree</i>)					
A-levels		0.04	-0.07	-0.12	-0.17
GCSEs		0.17	0.06	-0.09	-0.22
Vocational		0.33	0.16	0.02	0.01
None		-0.06	-0.18	-0.08	-0.05
Occupation (<i>ref: Professional</i>)					
Clerical		0.47^{**}	0.50^{**}	0.55^{**}	0.34
Small Business Owner		0.82^{**}	0.63[*]	0.58	0.63[*]
Foreman or Supervisor		-0.10	-0.05	0.02	-0.07
Manual Work		-0.02	0.03	0.12	0.02
Never Worked or Other		-0.13	0.00	0.22	0.04
Economic Status (<i>ref: In Paid Work</i>)					
In Full-time Education		-0.35[*]	-0.24	-0.29	-0.21
Unemployed		-0.40^{**}	-0.46^{***}	-0.46^{**}	-0.37[*]
Permanently Sick or Disabled		0.02	-0.20	-0.29	-0.08
Retired		0.40[*]	0.45	0.40	0.62
Looking after the Home		-0.35[*]	-0.39[*]	-0.41[*]	-0.40[*]
Other		-0.28	-0.19	0.23	0.39
Male (<i>ref: Female</i>)			-0.14	-0.00	0.00
Age (<i>ref: 65-97</i>)					
18-24			0.06	-0.90[*]	0.11
25-34			-0.18	-0.75[*]	0.17
35-44			0.29	-0.20	0.52
45-54			0.31	-0.15	0.44
55-64			0.64[*]	0.33	0.82[*]
Mixed Ethnic Area (<i>ref: Homogenous</i>)			-0.14	-0.02	0.00
Religious (<i>ref: Very</i>)					
Medium			0.24[*]	0.26[*]	0.28[*]
Low			0.79^{***}	0.50[*]	0.58^{**}
Not at all			1.00^{***}	0.72^{***}	0.76^{***}
Age of arrival in Britain (<i>ref: Born in Britain</i>)					
Came as children, 4 years or younger				-0.09	0.10
Came between 5 and 9 years of age				-0.73^{***}	-0.49[*]
Came as 10+ years of age				-0.76^{***}	-0.54^{**}
Came as 18+ years of age				-1.16^{***}	-0.69^{***}
Came as 30+ years of age				-1.22^{***}	-0.57[*]
Came as 40-84 years of age				-1.17^{***}	-0.31
English Fluency (<i>ref: English Main Language</i>)					
Very good					-0.61
Fairly good					-0.37
Below average					-0.34
Poor					-0.34[*]
Citizenship (<i>ref: Another Country</i>)					
British Citizen					1.19^{***}
Both					1.24^{**}
Experienced Discrimination					-0.25[*]
Trust Parliament at Westminster					0.02
Trust British Politicians					0.06
Trust Police					0.25^{***}
Pseudo R ²	0.01	0.02	0.04	0.06	0.08

<i>N</i>	<i>2,239</i>	<i>2,103</i>	<i>1,970</i>	<i>1,757</i>	<i>1,528</i>
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Notes: Each cell gives the estimated coefficients. *= $p < .05$, **= $p < .01$, ***= $p < .001$.

Source: 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Study.

Next I have run the same regressions for the Muslim sample only in Table 11. In Table 11, Model D1 examines the relationship between the different Muslim ethnic groups and British or Ethnic identification. Model D2, along with ethnicity, tests the importance of socioeconomic status variables, education, occupation levels, and economic status. Model D3 adds assorted demographic variables of gender and age along with a variable for religiousness and ethnic diversity in neighbourhood. Models D4 and D5 bring to the model additional variables to measure generational change, English fluency, citizenship, discrimination, and trust. I want to see whether these additional variables will tell me something that I did not already know from my first set of ordered logistic regression results from the CS.

Firstly measuring the effects of ethnicity alone, Model D1 shows that most of the Muslim ethnic groups are not significant suggesting that there is no differentiation between Muslim ethnic groups on whether they feel British or Ethnic. However, the dummy variables for ‘Bangladeshi’ and ‘Black African’ (who may be recent arrivals) Muslims are negatively significant, showing some disillusionment amongst them, making them less likely to feel British. But not all of the ethnic groups are significant suggesting that not all Muslim ethnic groups feel less British.

Table 11: Ordered Logistic Regressions from the Ethnic Minority British Election Study for the question “Would you say you feel more British or Ethnic?” (Muslim Sample)

“Would you say you feel more British or Ethnic?”					
	D1	D2	D3	D4	D5
Ethnic Group (ref: Indian)					
Pakistani	-0.28	-0.17	-0.33	-0.21	-0.28
Bangladeshi	-0.59*	-0.50	-0.66*	-0.61*	-0.72*
Black Caribbean	-1.30	-1.14	-1.39	-1.51	-0.89
Black African	-1.52***	-1.36***	-1.54***	-1.22***	-1.24***
Education (ref: Degree)					
A-levels		0.14	0.05	-0.02	-0.20
GCSEs		0.23	0.14	0.09	-0.05
Vocational		0.66*	0.40	0.28	0.34
None		0.05	-0.05	0.11	0.24
Occupation (ref: Professional)					
Clerical		0.38	0.35	0.19	-0.09
Small Business Owner		-0.01	-0.14	-0.37	-0.43
Foreman or Supervisor		-0.31	-0.29	-0.29	-0.56*
Manual Work		-0.18	-0.27	-0.27	-0.42
Never Worked or Other		-0.36	-0.30	0.11	-0.44
Economic Status (ref: In Paid Work)					
In Full-time Education		-0.40	-0.52	-0.74**	-0.46
Unemployed		-0.27	-0.40	-0.52*	-0.56*
Permanently Sick or Disabled		0.40	0.13	-0.11	0.01
Retired		0.72*	0.57	0.36	0.69
Looking after the Home		-0.28	-0.35	-0.47*	-0.49
Other		-2.62**	-2.11*	-1.90	-1.40
Male (ref: Female)					
Age (ref: 65-97)					
18-24			0.02	-1.33*	-0.51
25-34			-0.51	-1.47**	-0.87
35-44			0.03	-0.82	-0.43
45-54			-0.10	-0.84	-0.49
55-64			0.36	-0.25	-0.06
Mixed Ethnic Area (ref: Homogenous)					
Religious (ref: Very)					
Medium			0.78***	0.83***	0.95***
Low			0.52	0.27	0.55
Not at all			1.01***	0.93**	0.90**
Age of arrival in Britain (ref: Born in Britain)					
Came as children, 4 years or younger				-0.09	0.05
Came between 5 and 9 years of age				-0.72*	-0.39
Came as 10+ years of age				-0.81**	-0.50
Came as 18+ years of age				-1.39***	-0.79**
Came as 30+ years of age				-1.37***	-0.50
Came as 40-84 years of age				-1.99***	-1.14*
English Fluency (ref: English Main Language)					
Very good					-0.52
Fairly good					-0.52
Below average					-0.22
Poor					-0.50*
Citizenship (ref: Another Country)					
British Citizen					1.71***
Both					2.17***
Experienced Discrimination					
Trust Parliament at Westminster					0.01
					-0.02

Trust British Politicians					0.15
Trust Police					0.21*
Pseudo R ²	0.02	0.03	0.05	0.09	0.13
N	1,070	992	941	838	730

Notes: Each cell gives the estimated coefficients. *=p<.05, **=p<.01, ***=p<.001.

Source: 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Study.

The addition of socioeconomic predictors to the models encourages me to question arguments that low socio-economic status produces anti-British sentiments amongst Muslims. The patterns from socioeconomic outcomes for Muslims are as follows. First, analysing the impact of the educational level categories, I see that none of them are significant except for ‘Vocational’, in other words Muslims with vocational qualifications feel more British. The results from the regressions in Table 6 also showed that educated people felt critical of Britain. However those results were based on data that had a large number of White people in the sample, therefore the effects of the control variables were most likely to have been affected by the characteristics of the White ethnic group. Next I see that none of the Occupation categories are instantly significant for Muslims in Table 10. However ‘Foreman or Supervisor’ becomes negatively significant when I add in variables for English fluency, discrimination, and trust.

It could be hypothesised that different jobs are occupied by different ethnic groups, in a way that one could label the “preference” (or suitability of) for immigrants for certain jobs. It could be that in the employment sector, there are ‘clusters of employment’ whereby people in the lower socioeconomic classes form their various niches of employment which form the lower employment sectors. People in these sectors are not competing for the same level of jobs that their counterparts in the higher socioeconomic classes are competing for in the high-level employment sectors. These employment

niches in the lower employment sectors could be taxi drivers, plumbers, and so on. The high and medium employment sectors are more likely to be occupied by the high and medium socioeconomic classes (that are mostly formed by the majority White population) and the lower employment sectors by the lower socioeconomic classes (that are mostly formed by ethnic minorities). Therefore going by this theory, in the lower employment sectors ethnic minorities don't feel or experience discrimination because they are interacting with mostly members of their own ethnic group. It is only when ethnic minorities enter the higher and medium employment sectors where they have more interaction with the majority White population that they might feel discriminated. Thus they are almost sheltered away in their employment niches. According to this theory, if ethnic minorities do feel discriminated, that feeling of discrimination is likely to be as a result of their socioeconomic position or class because they are not competing with the majority population in their employment niches, but are instead struggling to better their socioeconomic position. For example if a taxi driver is discriminated, he will think it is because of his low socioeconomic position. On the other hand, the ethnic minorities that succeed to the higher echelons of employment are likely to feel or experience discrimination because of their race. For example, if they get rejected for a job, they will feel like it is because of their race as they have equivalent qualifications to their White majority counterparts. I will test this hypothesis in my in-depth qualitative interviews to see if this is in fact the case because my quantitative results are of course probabilistic, not deterministic.

In the Economic Status categories, Muslims who are retired show a statistically significant positive result meaning they are more likely to feel British than those in paid work. Those in Other occupations feel less British. Those in full-time education, or

those who are unemployed, or looking after the home become negatively significant when I add in generational variables. This suggests that Muslim students feel less British.

When I add the dummy variable 'Religious' (D3) there are some interesting results about the impact of religiosity upon the British identification of Muslims. Muslims who are not that religious (who only take part in religious activities once a week or month) or are not at all religious (do not take part in any religious activities) feel more British than the very religious people (who take part in a religious activity five times a day or once a day). The demographic variable for gender, 'Male', does not show up as significant, and for age the two categories 'Age 18-24' and 'Age 25-34' become negatively significant when generational variables ('Age of arrival in Britain') are added, making younger Muslims feel less British than older Muslims.

Next I add in the Age of Arrival in Britain dummies (model D4) to measure the generational impact and this shows that Muslims who were born in Britain feel more British than those who migrated to Britain (as children or adults). If they came at a younger age, they are more likely to feel more British than if they came at an older age. And within the migrants, the older migrants feel less British than the younger migrants. Overall there is a very important 'born in Britain' effect. Those born in Britain feel more British. Adding in the English fluency and Citizenship variables gives me results that I would have expected (model D5), that Muslims who are poor at English feel less British than those who are very good at the language. And Muslims who are British citizens feel more British. Those who are British citizens or have citizenship of both the

UK and another country feel more British. As before it is also clear that Muslims who trust the Police feel more British.

It is important here to consider the issue of causal direction and how it may impact my regression results. I am aware that causal direction may exist between my dependent variables of British identification and explanatory variables such as trust and discrimination that may give alternative interpretations. So it may be possible that it is when you feel British that you are more likely to trust civic and political institutions, and not the other way round. But even if it were feasible to demonstrate convincingly a link between British identification and trust in cross-sectional data, it is impossible to establish the causal direction of such a link from data collected at a single point in time (cross-sectional data). Some researchers have used structural equation modeling to claim causal relationships based on cross-sectional data (e.g. LaRose et al. 2001). However, this technique does not test whether the modeler's assumptions about causal direction are correct. If I were to do a longitudinal study, then I could test for the causal direction of my variables.

Another important issue to consider here is that of interaction effects in my regression results. Let's start with a scientific definition of an interaction effect, it has been defined as: "the differing effect of one independent variable on the dependent variable, depending on the particular level of another independent variable" (Cozby 1997: 314). Or in simpler words, two independent variables interact if the effect of one of the variables differs depending on the level of the other variable. For example, I suspected that the mixed ethnic area variable could have interacted with the White ethnic variable, i.e. the negative impact of the mixed ethnic area variable might have been driven by the

Whites, but my EMBES results in which there were no Whites in the sample still showed a negative impact of the mixed ethnic area variable confirming the negative impact of the mixed ethnic area variable independent of other variables.

Below I provide a table summarising all these significant results for Muslims from the CS and EMBES.

Table 12: Summary of Significant Results³⁹ from the CS and EMBES Ordered Logistic Regressions (Muslim Samples)

Table 7 Muslims Sample SBegB (CS)	Table 13 Muslims Sample BritorEth (EMBES)
Ethnic Group: Black Caribbeans are negatively significant. <i>(ref: White British)</i>	Ethnic Group: Bangladeshis and Black Africans are negatively significant. <i>(ref: Indian)</i>
Education: GCSE A-C and No Qualifications are positively significant. <i>(ref: Degree)</i>	Education: Vocational (Education) is positively significant. <i>(ref: Degree)</i>
Occupation: Full-time Students are negatively significant. <i>(ref: Professional)</i>	Occupation: Foreman or Supervisor becomes negatively significant when variables of English language fluency and citizenship (English Fluency and Citizenship) and discrimination and trust (Experienced Discrimination, Trust Parliament at Westminster, Trust British Politicians, and Trust Police) are added. <i>(ref: Professional)</i>
Employed is negatively significant. <i>(ref: Not Employed)</i>	Economic Stataus: Retired is positively significant. Other (Economic Status) is negatively significant. In Full-time Education, Unemployed, and Looking after the Home become negatively significant when generational variables (Age of arrival in Britain) are added. <i>(ref: In Paid Work)</i>

³⁹ These are the ordered log-odds (logit) regression coefficients.

Age 16-24 is negatively significant. <i>(ref: 65-85+)</i>	Age 18-24 and 25-34 become negatively significant when generational variables (Age of arrival in Britain) are added. <i>(ref: 65-97)</i>
Mixed Ethnic Area is negatively significant. <i>(ref: Homogenous)</i>	Mixed Ethnic Area is not significant (but is negative in its coefficient). <i>(ref: Homogenous)</i>
Religious is not significant (but is positive in its coefficient). <i>(ref: Not Religious)</i>	Religious: Medium and Not at all are positively significant. <i>(ref: Very)</i>
Born in UK is not significant (but is negative in its coefficient). <i>(ref: Non-UK Born)</i>	Age of Arrival in Britain: Came between 5 and 9 years of age, Came as 10+ years of age, Came as 18+ years of age, Came as 30+ years of age, and Came as 40-84 years of age are negatively significant. <i>(ref: Born in Britain)</i>
No equivalent variables in CS.	English Fluency: Poor are negatively significant. <i>(ref: English Main Language)</i>
No equivalent variables in CS.	Citizenship: British Citizen and Both are positively significant. <i>(ref: Another Country)</i>
Trust Police and Trust Local Council are positively significant.	Trust Police is positively significant.

There are some robust results from this table that stand out:

- There is an important negative age effect whereby the young age groups feel less attached towards Britain.
- There is a strong negative effect of a mixed ethnic area suggesting that segregated ethnic enclaves are positive indicators for British identification.

- Those born in Britain also feel more positive than those who migrated to the UK, and the younger your age was at migration the more likely Muslims were to feel British.
- Citizenship also makes Muslims feel more British, and trust in civic agencies is a strong and positive indicator for belonging to Britain.

The headlines stories emerging from the data analysis in this chapter are as follows. It has come to light that claims and assumptions about alienated Muslims in Britain are exaggerated and in fact Muslims are almost as likely as the majority group, Whites and Christians, to identify as British. In addition, factors such as socio-economic difficulties and ethnically and religiously segregated networks that have been claimed to contribute to Muslim alienation have been shown to have a limited impact if any and not necessarily all in the direction of alienation from the British Mainstream. While it is true that Muslims face a variety of difficulties in Britain based on low economic resources and segregation into enclaves, I argue it is important to understand the complex ways in which Muslims experience these environments. And if anything, my results show that belonging to a low socioeconomic status and living in segregated enclaves is not necessarily at odds with feeling British. Perception or experience of discrimination works against fostering the feelings of belonging, and trust in civic and political institutions increases the feelings of belonging for Muslims. I see a prominent age impact, with younger Muslims feeling less British. There is a prominent ‘born in Britain’ and generational impact, in that the age that Muslims migrated to Britain makes

a difference to their attachment to Britain. Having citizenship and better English language skills are also important in understanding their attachment.

5.2 Understanding Meanings of “Belonging to Britain”

Having conducted regression analysis on the question of belonging to Britain, through the question “How strongly do you belong to Britain?” it is also a worthwhile exercise to think next about what this means for Muslims. I will now probe more deeply what “belonging to Britain” means for Muslims. When Muslims were asked this question in the CS in 2003, 2005, and 2007, over eighty per cent of them felt either British “very strongly” or “fairly strongly”, the percentage being slightly higher in 2005 and 2007. The number of Muslims who did “not at all strongly” feel British decreased from 2003 to 2007 by almost a half. During the course of this time a number of geopolitical events involving Muslims had taken place, in particular the 2001 Afghanistan and 2003 Iraq wars. In Britain the bombings by a group of young Muslims in July 2005 also attracted momentum surrounding the British Muslim community.

Although the findings in this chapter may be reliable, they are inadequate in their validity. In other words, since these findings are drawn from a question with a closed-ended categorical response scale they do not tell me much about what “belonging to Britain” really *means* for Muslims. We must understand the various meanings that strongly belonging to Britain – a proxy for national identity – can have for Muslims, and how effective it is as a measure of British national identity. For this, I use cognitive interviews to probe the meanings of survey questions through techniques such as Cognitive Aspects of Survey Methodology. Essentially, we ‘question’ the question. To

understand what *belonging to Britain* means for Muslims, I address this in next chapter with the use of Cognitive Interviews.

I also claim that religion as a pertinent form of identity for Muslims should not be taken for granted, because just by ticking a box 'Muslim' does not make the respondent more religious than a Muslim who happened to tick the box 'British'. Recent academic research supports this focus on the complexity of identity formation, and has focused on the diversity of Muslim experiences in Britain (Werbner 2001), the impact of various cultural and historical influences on British Muslim identities (Glynn 2002), as well as the political strategies behind multiple Muslim identities (Kahani-Hopkins and Hopkins 2002). To understand this complex identity formation, I conduct in-depth qualitative interviews, which are analysed in Chapter 6. Such investigation would also attempt to understand the influence of religion on their self-identification.

Conclusion

A number of interesting and important findings have presented themselves in this chapter. Despite survey data being available on Muslims, it has scarcely been analysed to understand the British identification of Muslims in Britain. The current findings on Muslims in Britain are mostly based on a few small surveys and there are no detailed and thorough analyses of Muslim survey data. By analysing data on Muslims from the CS and EMBES, my chapter aimed to fill this gap by generating new research with original findings.

In particular, in this chapter I have attempted to answer my first research question on what is the strength and relative importance of British identity for Muslims in Britain,

and what are its drivers? This research question arose from claims and assumptions made in the existing academic literature which I broke down into five research claims, set out in the beginning of this chapter. Firstly, that Muslims are less likely than Whites and Christians to identify as British. Secondly, that low socio-economic status will negatively impact British national identification for Muslims. Thirdly, that weak social engagement with mainstream culture will negatively impact British national identification for Muslims. Fourthly, that political and civic engagement will negatively impact British national identification for Muslims. And fifthly, that there are likely to be generational differences in the identification of Muslims towards Britain, with first generations feeling more British and second and third generations feeling less British. These research claims are tackled through data analysis from the CS and EMBES, and I find all of them to be not true except the last one.

Firstly, through regression analysis for the CS question “How strongly do you belong to Britain?” for both the pooled and Muslim sample, I present a range of findings. The pooled sample shows that Muslims are more likely than non-Muslims to feel British. When looking at findings on Muslims specifically, I find that the various Muslim ethnic groups, with the exception of Black Caribbean Muslims, are indifferent in their feelings of belonging to Britain. I then argue that although socio-economic difficulties can be important in explaining the attachment of Muslims to Britain, not many indicators for socio-economic difficulties are significant. My results actually suggest that Muslims in the lower echelons of socio-economic status (those with no qualifications) feel more British with the exception of full-time students and those without a job. So it is not the case that being from a higher socioeconomic status is likely to make you feel more British, i.e. educated Muslims are not necessarily likely to feel more British perhaps

their greater interaction with the majority population makes them more aware of the discrimination that is present, and they cannot after all afford the ‘optional ethnicity’ that Whites can. My results show that the effects of age and discrimination cannot be isolated from socio-economic outcomes. The younger Muslims feel less British. Being religious does not come out as having an impact on the British identification of Muslims. And my results also show that living in ethnically segregated areas does not reduce Muslim British identification but can actually work to foster it. Although Muslim political and civic engagement are found to be insignificant indicators for building or destroying identification with the British mainstream, Muslims have high levels of trust in mainstream civic agencies, political and law-making institutions, and are working to build a firm commitment to the larger British community.

Secondly, analysing data from EMBES confirms some of these findings as well as giving me some newer findings. As before, I conduct the analysis for the pooled and Muslim sample. In the pooled sample, I again find that Muslims are more likely to belong to Britain than non-Muslims. With the Muslims only sample, I find that with the exception of Bangladeshis and Black African Muslims who feel less British, there isn’t variation among the other Muslim ethnic groups. It also comes to light that Muslims with lower qualifications and in lower occupations feel more British. The full-time students, retired, unemployed, and those looking after the home feel less attached. Religiosity is measured with the frequency of religious activities in the EMBES and whereas in the CS it did not come out as significant for Muslims, it does have an impact here. I find that Muslims who are less active in religious activities feel more British, i.e. Muslims who are not at all religious feel British. Again the age impact is visible, the younger feel less British. I see a generational impact, in that the Muslims who migrated

at an older age feel less British as compared to those who migrated at a younger age. And the 'born in Britain' is also visible, suggesting greater Britain identification. Those who have citizenship of the UK and are have better English language skills feel more British as compared to those who don't.

The stories emerging in the chapter from the data analysed from the CS and EMBES are as follows. Muslims have high levels of belonging to Britain and British identity, except for Caribbean Muslims and African Muslims. The strength of belonging or British identity is only weakly related to education and occupation except for those with no qualification or vocational qualifications, full-time students, unemployed, and retired Muslims. Younger Muslims feel less British. The ethnic composition of a neighbourhood is a strong driver of belonging to Britain, with ethnically segregated neighbourhoods working to strengthen British identity. Religiosity is a significant driver of British identity, showing that those who are less religious have more attachment to Britain. Generational differences act as important drivers, the second and third generations (who were born in Britain) feel more British than those who migrated to Britain. Among those Muslims who migrated, those who migrated at a younger age feel more British and recent arrivals feel less British. Muslims with citizenship of the UK feel more British. Trust in civic and political institutions forms a solid driver of British identification.

This chapter has given me insights about the strength and relative importance of British identity for Muslims in Britain and the drivers that motivate it. The strand of academic research that claims Muslims to be withdrawn from mainstream Britain because they live in segregated ethnic enclaves and politically organize themselves via ethnically and

religiously motivated networks is unfounded. Furthermore, I find that the positive identification of Muslims with Britain is not a function of three main factors: improved socio-economic status, social engagement with the mainstream culture, and political or civic participation. Generational differences, English fluency, and citizenship are found to have an impact.

While it is true that Muslims face a variety of difficulties in Britain based on low economic resources and ethnic neighbourhood concentration, perhaps future research should attempt to understand the complex ways in which Muslims experience these environments. In particular, the complex ways in which Muslims experience difficult socio-economic environments and the dynamics of ethnic and religious segregated networks. My findings have showed that socio-economic difficulties and ethnically and religiously segregated networks that supposedly contribute to Muslim alienation have a limited impact if any and not necessarily all in the direction of alienation from the British Mainstream. The wider implications of the findings must also be considered, for example what is the role of ethnic bonding/concentration in neighbourhoods for the British mainstream society a whole, the generational differences and how will they change over time, and what will be the long-term implications of religiosity among Muslims impacting their British identification. How will these impact the community relations and British mainstream society.

The quantitative data has given me some useful insights about the strength and drivers of British identification for Muslims in Britain. Besides the limitations of quantitative data in really telling me about the sentiments of attachment or detachment, another limitation is that the question of belonging to Britain might not have been interpreted by

the respondents of the survey in the way intended, and so the results might not mean what they seem to be. This takes me to the next chapter in which I look at what belonging to Britain means to Muslims.

Appendices

A5-1 Tests of Significance for Tables 3, 4, and 5

- 1) “Religion” and “How strongly do you belong to Britain?” (Pooled sample)

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	182.896(a)	21	.000
Likelihood Ratio	179.239	21	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	52.299	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	13925		

(a) 2 cells (6.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.43.

- 2) “Ethnic group” and “How strongly do you belong to Britain?” (Pooled sample)

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	1200.542(a)	30	.000
Likelihood Ratio	199.820	30	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	61.096	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	13954		

(a) 2 cells (4.5%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.23.

- 3) “Ethnic group” and “How strongly do you belong to Britain?” (Muslim sample)

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	35.859(a)	30	.213
Likelihood Ratio	29.549	30	.489
Linear-by-Linear Association	7.446	1	.006
N of Valid Cases	1756		

(a) 21 cells (47.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .02.

A5-2 Explanation of Variables in Tables 6 and 7

Dependent Variable

British Identification (“How strongly do you belong to Britain?”)

1-Not At All Strongly, 2-Not Very Strongly, 3-Fairly Strongly, 4-Very Strongly.

Independent Variables

1. Religion

Muslims (“Religion”)

0-Non-Muslims, 1-Muslims.

2. Ethnicity

Ethnic Group (“Ethnic”)

White British: 0-Not White British and White Irish, 1-White British and White Irish.

White Other: 0-Not Any Other White Background, 1-Any Other White Background.

Indian: 0-Not Asian or Asian British (Indian), 1-Asian or Asian British (Indian).

Pakistani: 0-Not Asian or Asian British (Pakistani), 1-Asian or Asian British (Pakistani).

Bangladeshi: 0-Not Asian or Asian British (Bangladeshi), 1-Asian or Asian British (Bangladeshi).

Asian Other: 0-Not Any Other Asian/Asian British Background, 1-Any Other Asian/Asian British Background.

Caribbean: 0-Not Black or Black British (Caribbean), 1-Black or Black British (Caribbean).

African: 0-Not Black or Black British (African), 1-Black or Black British (African).

Black Other: 0-Not Any Other Black/Black British Background, 1-Any Other Black/Black British Background.

Mixed Race: 0-Not Mixed White and Black Caribbean; Mixed White and Black African; Mixed White and Asian; and Any Other Mixed Background, 1-Mixed White and Black Caribbean; Mixed White and Black African; Mixed White and Asian; and Any Other Mixed Background.

Chinese and Other: 0-Not Chinese and Any Other Ethnic Group, 1-Chinese and Any Other Ethnic Group.

3. Socioeconomic Status

Education (“Highest academic qualifications received”)

Degree: 0-Not Degree or equivalent, 1-Degree or equivalent.

Above A-level: 0-Not Above A-level below degree, 1-Above A-level below degree.

GCE A-levels: 0-Not GCE A-levels or equivalent, 1-GCE A-levels or equivalent.

GCSE grades A-C: 0-Not GCSE grades A-C or equivalent, 1-GCSE grades A-C or equivalent.

GSCE grades D-E: 0-Not GSCE grades D-E or equivalent, 1-GSCE grades D-E or equivalent.

Foreign/Other: 0-Not Foreign and other qualifications, 1-Foreign and other qualifications.

No Qualifications: 0-Not No qualifications, 1-No qualifications.

Occupational Attainment (“Respondent Socioeconomic Status” and “Respondent Economic Status”)

Occupation (“Respondent Socioeconomic Status”)

Professional: 0-Not Higher/lower managerial and professions, 1-Higher/lower managerial and professions.

Intermediate: 0-Not Intermediate occupations, 1-Intermediate occupations.

Small Employers: 0-Not Small employers; lower supervisory and technical occupations, 1-Small employers; lower supervisor, and technical occupations.

Semi- (Routine): 0-Not Routine and semi-routine occupations, 1-Routine and semi-routine occupations.

Full-time Student: 0-Not Full-time student, 1-Full-time student.

Other Occupation: 0-Not Other Occupation (never work or long term unemployed), 1-Other Occupation (never work or long term unemployed).

Economic Status (“Respondent Economic Status”)

0-Not Employed, 1-Employed.

4. Gender, Age, and Country of Birth

Male (“Gender”)

0-Female, 1-Male.

Age (“How old are you?”)

16-24 years old: 0-No, 1-Yes.

25-34 years old: 0-No, 1-Yes.

35-44 years old: 0-No, 1-Yes.

45-54 years old: 0-No, 1-Yes.

55-64 years old: 0-No, 1-Yes.

65-85+ years old: 0-No, 1-Yes.

Born in UK (“What country were you born in?”)

0-Not United Kingdom, 1-United Kingdom.

5. Social and Cultural Integration and Religious Activities

Mixed Ethnic Area (“Are people in the neighbourhood the same ethnicity?”)

0-All the same, homogeneous ethnic area, 1-Not the same, mixed ethnic area.

Religious (“Do you actively practice religion?”)

0-No, 1-Yes.

6. Political and Civic Participation

Use Vote (“Would you use your vote to influence a local decision?”)

0-No, 1-Yes.

Contacted Public Official (“Have you contacted public official working for the local council in the past 12 months?”)

0-No, 1-Yes.

Contacted Government Official (“Have you contacted a government official in the past 12 months?”)

0-No, 1-Yes.

Attended a Rally (“Have you attended a public meeting or rally in the past 12 months?”)

0-No, 1-Yes.

Part of Demonstration or Protest (“Have you taken part in a public demonstration or protest in the past 12 months?”)

0-No, 1-Yes.

Signed a Petition (“Have you signed a petition in the past 12 months?”)

0-No, 1-Yes.

7. Subjective Attitudinal Variables of Discrimination and Trust

Discrimination by Police (“How would the police treat you?”)

0-I would be treated better than other races, 1-I would be treated the same as other races, 2-I would be treated worse than other races.

Discrimination by Courts (“How would the courts treat you?”)

0-I would be treated better than other races, 1-I would be treated the same as other races, 2-I would be treated worse than other races.

Trust Police (“Do you trust the police?”)

0-Not At All, 1-Not Very Much, 2-A Fair Amount, 3-A lot.

Trust Council (“Do you trust the local council?”)

0-Not At All, 1-Not Very Much, 2-A Fair Amount, 3-A lot.

Trust Parliament (“Do you trust Parliament?”)

0-Not At All, 1-Not Very Much, 2-A Fair Amount, 3-A lot.

A5-3 Cut Points for Tables 6 and 7

Table 6: How strongly do you belong to Britain? (Pooled Sample)					
Cut Point 1	-3.57	-3.86	-4.42	-4.45	-3.54
Cut Point 2	-1.72	-2.00	-2.54	-2.57	-1.58
Cut Point 3	0.18	-0.06	-0.55	-0.58	0.53
Pseudo R ²	0.00	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.05
<i>N</i>	13,925	13,895	13,690	13,687	10,136

How strongly do you belong to Britain? (Muslim Sample)					
Cut Point 1	-4.51	-4.55	-5.71	-5.70	-5.07
Cut Point 2	-2.50	-2.53	-3.69	-3.67	-2.90
Cut Point 3	-0.30	-0.31	-1.43	-1.42	-0.35
Pseudo R ²	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.07
<i>N</i>	1,756	1,752	1,720	1,719	1,088

A5-4 Explanation of Variables in Table 12 and 13

Dependent Variable

British Identification (“Would you say you feel more British or Ethnic?”)

1-(Black/Asian) not British, 2-More (Black/Asian) than British, 3-Equally (Black/Asian) and British, 4-More British than (Black/Asian), 5-British not (Black/Asian).

Independent Variables

8. Religion

Muslims (“Religion”)

0-Non-Muslims, 1-Muslims.

9. Ethnic Group (“Ethnic”)

Indian: 0-Not Indian: Asian or Asian British, 1-Indian: Asian or Asian British.

Pakistani: 0-Not Pakistani: Asian or Asian British, 1-Pakistani: Asian or Asian British.

Bangladeshi: 0-Not Bangladeshi: Asian or Asian British, 1-Bangladeshi: Asian or Asian British.

Caribbean: 0-Not Caribbean: Black or Black British, 1-Caribbean: Black or Black British.

African: 0-Not African: Black or Black British, 1-African: Black or Black British.

10. Socioeconomic Status

Education (“Highest Qualification”; “British Qualifications?”; and “Type of Overseas Qualifications”).

Degree: 0-Not Degree, 1-Degree.

A-levels: 0-Not A-levels, 1-A-levels.

GCSEs: 0-Not GCSEs, 1-GCSEs.

Vocational: 0-Not Vocational, 1-Vocational.

None: 0-Not None, 1-None.

Occupation (“R-Type of Work”)

Professional: 0-Not Professional or higher technical; Managerial or senior admin, 1-Professional or higher technical; Managerial or senior admin.

Clerical: 0-Not Clerical, 1-Clerical.

Small Business Owner: 0-Not Small business owner, 1-Small business owner.

Foreman or Supervisor: 0-Not Foreman or supervisor; Skilled manual work, 1-Foreman or supervisor; Skilled manual work.

Manual Work: 0-Not Semi-skilled or unskilled manual work; Sales or services, 1-Semi-skilled or unskilled; Sales or services.

Never Worked or Other: 0-Not Never worked or other, 1-Never worked or other.

Economic Status (“R’s Employment Status”)

In Paid Work: 0-Not In Paid work, 1-In Paid work.

In Full-time Education: 0-Not In Full-time education, 1-In Full-time education.

Unemployed: 0-Not Unemployed, 1-Unemployed.

Permanently Sick or Disabled: 0-Not Permanently Sick or Disabled, 1-Permanently Sick or Disabled.

Retired: 0-Not Retired, 1-Retired.

Looking after the Home: 0-Not Looking after the Home, 1-Looking after the Home.

Other: 0-Not Other, 1-Other.

11. Gender and Age

Male (“Gender”)

1-Male, 0-Female.

Age (“How old are you?”)

16-24 years old: 0-No, 1-Yes.

25-34 years old: 0-No, 1-Yes.

35-44 years old: 0-No, 1-Yes.

45-54 years old: 0-No, 1-Yes.

55-64 years old: 0-No, 1-Yes.

65-79 years old: 0-No, 1-Yes.

12. Social and Cultural Integration and Religious Activities

Mixed Ethnic Area (“Members Same Ethnicity: Neighbourhood”)

0-All the same, homogeneous ethnic area, 1-Not the same, mixed ethnic area.

Religious (“In the past 12 months, how often did you participate in religious activities or attend religious services or meetings with other people, other than for events such as weddings and funerals?”)

Very: 0-Not Very; Five times a day or once a day, 1-Very; Five times a day or once a day.

Medium: 0-Not Medium; At least once a week or month, 1-Medium; At least once a week or month.

Low: 0-Not Low; Only on festivals, 1-Low; Only on festivals.

Not at all: 0-Not Not at all, 1-Not at all.

13. Arrival in Britain

Age of Arrival in Britain (“Age”; “Country of Birth”; and “Year or Age Came to Britain (RAW)”).

Born in Britain: 0-Not Born in Britain, 1-Born in Britain.

Came as children, 4 years or younger: 0-Not Came as children, 4 years or younger, 1-Came as children, 4 years or younger.

Came between 5 and 9 years of age: 0-Not Came between 5 and 9 years of age, 1-Came between 5 and 9 years of age.

Came as 10+ years of age: 0-Not Came as 10+ years of age, 1-Came as 10+ years of age.

Came as 18+ years of age: 0-Not Came as 18+ years of age, 1-Came as 18+ years of age.

Came as 30+ years of age: 0-Not Came as 30+ years of age, 1-Came as 30+ years of age.

Came as 40to84 years of age: 0-Not Came as 40 to 84 years of age, 1-Came as 40 to 84 years of age.

14. English and Citizenship

English Fluency (“How good at English” and “English Main Language?”).

English Main Language: 0-Not Englishmainlang, 1-Englishmainlang.

Very Good: 0-Not Very good, 1-Very good.

Fairly Good: 0-Not Fairly good, 1-Fairly good.

Below Average: 0-Not Below average, 1-Below average.

Poor: 0-Not Poor, 1-Poor.

Citizenship (“British Citizen?”)

British Citizen: 0-Not British Citizen, 1-British Citizen.

Another Country: 0-Not Another Country, 1-Another Country.

Both: 0-Not Both, 1-Both.

15. Subjective Attitudinal Variables of Discrimination and Trust

Experienced Discrimination (“Experienced Discrimination in last 5 years”)

0-No, 1-Yes.

Trust Parliament at Westminster (“Trust Parliament at Westminster”)

No Trust: 0-Not No Trust, 1-No Trust.

Low Trust: 0-Not Low Trust, 1-Low Trust.

Medium Trust: 0-Not Medium Trust, 1-Medium Trust.

High Trust: 0-Not High Trust, 1-High Trust.

A Great Deal of Trust: 0-Not A Great Deal of Trust, 1-A Great Deal of Trust.

Trust British Politicians (“Trust British Politicians Generally”)

No Trust: 0-Not No Trust, 1-No Trust.

Low Trust: 0-Not Low Trust, 1-Low Trust.

Medium Trust: 0-Not Medium Trust, 1-Medium Trust.

High Trust: 0-Not High Trust, 1-High Trust.

A Great Deal of Trust: 0-Not A Great Deal of Trust, 1-A Great Deal of Trust.

Trust Police (“Trust Police”)

No Trust: 0-Not No Trust, 1-No Trust.

Low Trust: 0-Not Low Trust, 1-Low Trust.

Medium Trust: 0-Not Medium Trust, 1-Medium Trust.

High Trust: 0-Not High Trust, 1-High Trust.

A Great Deal of Trust: 0-Not A Great Deal of Trust, 1-A Great Deal of Trust.

A5-5 Cut Points for Tables 12 and 13

Would you say you feel more British or Ethnic? (Pooled Sample)					
Cut Point 1	-1.65	-1.63	-1.58	-2.78	-0.45
Cut Point 2	-0.37	-0.36	-0.26	-1.36	1.10
Cut Point 3	1.92	1.98	2.13	1.15	3.65
Cut Point 4	3.91	3.98	4.18	3.25	5.77
Pseudo R ²	0.01	0.02	0.04	0.06	0.08
<i>N</i>	2,239	2,103	1,970	1,757	1,528

Would you say you feel more British or Ethnic? (Muslim Sample)					
Cut Point 1	-3.01	-3.05	-3.72	-5.13	-2.76
Cut Point 2	-1.48	-1.57	-2.19	-3.53	-1.06
Cut Point 3	0.85	0.83	0.31	-0.83	1.79
Cut Point 4	3.06	3.07	2.64	1.64	4.39
Pseudo R ²	0.02	0.03	0.05	0.09	0.13
<i>N</i>	1,070	992	941	838	730

CHAPTER

6

**Understanding ‘Belonging to Britain’ for Muslims
through Cognitive Interviews**

Introductory Summary

This chapter extends the findings of the last chapter by making an enquiry into what ‘belonging to Britain’ means to Muslims, through cognitive survey methodology. Thirty cognitive interviews have been conducted with Muslim respondents and I then use cluster analysis to give meaning to the findings. I discover there to be a different set of clusters for what the question means to respondents and how the respondents worked out their answers. I also discuss how the CS survey question can be improved.

6.1 ‘Questioning’ the Question

In the previous chapter I analysed data from the CS for the question “How strongly do you belong to Britain?” There were a number of interesting findings. One was that arguments about alienated Muslims in Britain are exaggerated. In fact Muslims are almost as likely to identify as British as Whites or Christians. In addition, factors such as socio-economic difficulties and ethnically and religiously segregated networks that supposedly contribute to Muslim alienation were shown to have a limited impact if any and not necessarily all in the direction of alienation from the British Mainstream. While it is true that Muslims face a variety of difficulties in Britain based on low economic resources and ethnic neighbourhood concentration, it is important to understand the complex ways in which Muslims experience these environments. While these quantitative findings from the CS gave me important insights into the indicators of British identification for Muslims, they did not really tell me what belonging to Britain *means* for Muslims.

The CS has asked this question “How strongly do you belong to Britain?” in its last three phases, 2003, 2005, and 2007. Findings in Table 13 show that at all times over eighty per cent of Muslim respondents felt either British “Very Strongly” or “Fairly Strongly”, the percentage being slightly higher in 2005 and 2007. The number of Muslims who did “Not at all Strongly” feel British decreased over the course of this time by almost half. During the course of this time a series of events involving Muslims were taking place, not to mention the Afghanistan and Iraq wars after 9/11. In Britain the bombings by a group of young Muslims in July 2005 also attracted high momentum surrounding the British Muslim community.

Table 13: British Identification over time for Muslims

	Column Percentages		
	British Identification		
	2003	2005	2007
Very strongly	42	47	46
Fairly strongly	40	43	42
Not very strongly	11	9	10
Not at all strongly	3	2	2
<i>N</i>	1,551	1,475	1,756

Notes: Variable is ‘British Identification’ (“How Strongly do you Belong to Britain?”)

Source: 2003; 2005; 2007 Citizenship Survey

Data such as this and the quantitative findings from the last chapter, however, does not tell me much about the sentiments or meaning of attachment or detachment of Muslims to Britain. To better understand this, I required an alternative investigative approach to understand the processes involved. Essentially, through cognitive survey methodology I ‘question’ the question being asked. In other words, I probe what this dependent variable really means to Muslims, what is it measuring? Jacobson (1998) found in her study of young British Pakistanis that the respondents referred to the fact that they are British in the sense that they have British ‘citizenship’ or ‘nationality’. A few of the

respondents, for example, seemed to reduce the meaning of being British to a matter of travelling on a British passport: one young man replied to a question about what it means to be British by saying that 'it is an advantage at airports, stuff like that'. A young woman spoke more explicitly about the fact that as far as she is concerned official nationality is lacking in emotive content, she commented:

It just – doesn't ring true, when, you know, nationality – I am British because I'm born here, but it just doesn't mean anything, to say I'm British – it doesn't conjure up an image, it doesn't hit me here [she puts her hand to her heart] or anywhere.

Similarly, a young man said:

I'm a British citizen, so I have to consider myself as British. You know, like in school, you have to be labelled as being in Class 3. But really you're just mucking about and you're always jumping about from this class and that – it's like, yeah, I'm there as a British citizen, but inside I'm Asian...Pakistani (Jacobson, 1998: 189).

It was clear from Jacobson's study that respondents quite frequently indicated that for them citizenship did not automatically bring about a sense of real belonging to British society. Thus an enquiry into the meaning of the questions in surveys, that probe into national identity, from the perspective of the respondent and from that of the designer or theorist would serve to be useful in our understanding of Muslim British national identity and sense of belonging to Britain. A useful exercise for this investigation would be the development, testing and evaluation of survey questions, stemming from the perspective commonly termed CASM (cognitive aspects of survey methodology). From this perspective, the respondent's cognitive processes drive the survey response, and an understanding of cognition is central to designing questions and to understanding and reducing sources of response error (Presser et al. 2004: 23). Optimally, an

understanding of cognitive processes will help me develop and design rules that govern choice of response categories, question ordering, and so on. Here I refer to the practice of cognitive interviewing. This activity is not carried out primarily for the purpose of developing general principles of questionnaire design, but rather, to evaluate targeted survey questions, with the goal of modifying these questions when indicated.

The reasoning behind such an investigation is also supported by current identity research showing how common identities usually mean different things to different people (Abdelal et al. 2005). This suggests that a strong British identity might mean different things to each of the Muslim respondents. Miller and Ali (2013) provide support for this idea in their work on national identity. In the empirical studies Miller examines, he finds there to be at least four different dimensions of national identity. The first is what he calls the “national attachment” dimension. It is operationalised in questions such as, “How important is being American to you?” and statements such as, “I am emotionally attached to America and emotionally affected by its actions”. These questions are aiming to test “How strongly a person identifies as an X, and how much that identity matters to them” (p.6). Next there is the “national pride” dimension which is measured through questions such as “How proud are you to be British?” or by making comparisons of the respondents’ country with other countries for example in running its affairs, or by asking the respondent to take pride in certain national achievements. Miller and Ali (2013) think that although one might be tempted to conclude that national attachment and national pride are strongly correlated, this perhaps need not be the case. National pride consists of a positive evaluation of the country’s achievement, and it is easily possible for someone to feel that while they

identify strongly with one's country, they do not see much reason to be proud of it at that moment in time.

The third dimension of national identity has to do with whether or not one has unconditional support for their nation, whether they possess an attitude of unconditional support for their country or whether they would choose to be a critical patriot. Miller and Ali (2013) call this the “uncritical/critical patriotism” dimension, also termed by others as “blind versus constructive patriotism”. It is measured by statements such as “I would support my country right or wrong”, or inversely, “My love of country demands that I speak out against popular but potentially destructive policies”. The fourth dimension Miller and Ali (2013) introduce is whether a person's national identity takes mainly a civic or mainly a cultural form. There is a distinction in the literature between cultural and civic understandings of national identity; for example, the former can be associated with a country's history and its achievements in the arts and sciences, and the latter with a country's political system and its economic performance. Therefore, to sum up, Miller and Ali (2013) argue that when trying to measure how ‘nationalist’ a person is, one must be aware of the complexity the term national identity carries. For this they identify four separate dimensions that are partially independent of each other, and we ought to be clear, they suggest, about which dimension of national identity we are evaluating.

Therefore, in the context of my research, I am attempting to understand the various meanings that strongly belonging to Britain – a proxy for national identity – can have for Muslims, and how effective it is as a measure of British national identity. Furthermore, there will be a discussion on whether Miller and Ali's (2013) different

dimensions of national identity are reflected in the responses I get from my qualitative work. I am probing into what the question “How strongly do you belong to Britain?”⁴⁰ means for a sample of Muslim respondents using cognitive interviewing as my investigative tool. Adopting a similar approach to that of Belson (1981) and using my own sample of participants (which I gathered through snowball sampling), I have attempted to better understand the meanings and processes involved in this question.

First, I asked this question as it would have originally been asked face-to-face. Concurrently rather than retrospectively, using think-alouds and probes respondents were first asked to explain what they think the question meant and to lay out the process of working out their answer. After non-directively probing to illuminate how the answer was worked out, I then posed scripted probes about various aspects of the question. Finally, the respondents were requested to answer the question once more, to see how they would now answer it. If their answer differed from the one they had given earlier, they were asked to explain why. In addition to Belson’s (1981) approach, I also asked respondents how the question could be worded differently. As well as conceptual material surrounding British identification, I had envisioned that a whole set of methodological issues surrounding survey methodology could emerge out from these cognitive interviews. Cognitive interviews have increasingly become a method that is widely used before conducting survey research. They are a useful tool in understanding

⁴⁰ I also selected a few more questions from the CS and asked about them in my cognitive interviews. These questions were: ‘How strongly do you feel you belong to your immediate neighbourhood?’; ‘How strongly do you feel you belong to your local area within a 15-20 minute walk from your home?’; ‘How strongly do you feel you belong to Britain?’; ‘What do you consider your national identity to be?’; ‘To what extent do you agree or disagree that you personally feel a part of British society?’; ‘How important is ethnic or racial background to your sense of who you are?’; ‘How important is religion to your sense of who you are?’; ‘How important is national identity to your sense of who you are?’; ‘How much do you agree or disagree that it is possible to fully belong to Britain and maintain a separate cultural or religious identity?’; ‘Different ethnic and religious groups should maintain their customs and traditions’; and ‘Different ethnic and religious groups should adapt and blend into the larger society’. Due to brevity and word count, I could not include the analysis for these questions in the chapter.

the effectiveness of questions that should be used in surveys.

6.2 Analysis of Data from Cognitive Interviews

A total of 30 cognitive interviews were conducted. Each respondent was asked to elaborate on their answer to the question in four ways:

1. Meaning of Question
2. Mediating Processes
3. Scripted Probes about Question
4. Alternative Approaches to Question

Respectively, this gave me four sections for analysis – for each of these four areas. Since each respondent had a different answer under each of these four sections, different typologies and patterns were found. A typology is a classification scheme containing two or more mutually exclusive categories that are used to compare different kinds of behaviour or types of societies (Kendall 2009: 126). In other words, typologies are specific forms of classification that help to describe and explain the segmentation of the social world or the way that phenomena can be characterised or differentiated. They may apply to groups of people within the population or to sets of phenomena like beliefs, circumstances, or behaviours (Spencer et al. 2003: 214). Patton describes typologies as “classification systems made up of categories that divide some aspect of the world into parts along a continuum” (2002: 457). When coding responses from our interviews it was noted that at times one respondent’s answer fell into multiple categories, i.e. in their answer one respondent often raised multiple issues, so one

respondent's answer may have created two or three categories. The process of creating categories was inductive, as the categories were created when reading through and coding the responses. A general question facing researchers in many areas of inquiry is how to organize observed data into meaningful structures, that is, to develop taxonomies. Cluster analysis is an exploratory method which aims at sorting different objects (categories in our case) into groups in a way that the degree of association between two objects is maximal if they belong to the same group and minimal otherwise. A more detailed account of this coding methodology will be given at a later point.

An examination of the responses enabled me to look at the difference *between respondents*. Through this inductive approach of analysis, the focus of the analysis rests on what respondents are telling us, we are creating theory out of their responses – trying to extract from what the respondents are telling us, rather than sticking with what the literature and existing models tell us. Glaser and Strauss (1967) suggest that one canon for judging the usefulness of a theory is how it was generated, and it is likely to be a better theory to the degree that it has been inductively developed from social research. Calling these “grounded theories” – that take hard study of much data – they think these are “worth the precious time and focus of all of us in our research, study and teaching” (p.4). Most often, they argue, sociological method has been concerned with verifying existing theories. This places an overemphasis on the verification of theory, and a de-emphasis on discovering what concepts and hypotheses are relevant for the area that one wishes to research. Therefore a major task confronting sociology today and an equally important enterprise is “the discovery of theory from data – systematically obtained and

analyzed in social research” (p.4). Generating grounded theory is a way of arriving at theory suited to its supposed uses.

6.2.1 Analysis of Responses from Question: “How strongly do you belong to Britain?”

The approach taken in my cognitive interviews was as follows. First, the question was asked in a structured manner to which the respondent chose one of the five options presented to them:

“I would like you to tell me how strongly you feel you belong to Britain?”

- (1) Very strongly
- (2) Fairly strongly
- (3) Not very strongly
- (4) Not at all strongly
- (5) DON'T KNOW

After this structured response, respondents were asked to elaborate on their answer in four sections. The first three were: ‘Meaning of Question’; ‘Mediating Processes’; and ‘Scripted Probes about Question’. After this, they were once again asked the question in its structured manner to see if their response had changed or not after having thought through their answer. Following this was the fourth section, ‘Alternative Approaches to Question’, which asked for their suggestions on how the question should be improved. Since respondents had different answers in the first two sections, different typologies

were found. Let me expand on this method more broadly first, and then discuss its application to my question.


The categories were constructed out of code words/key themes, jotted down when listening through the transcribed responses. In turn, for each of the four sections, these categories gave me a typology or classification scheme, also referred to as a coding frame, thus four coding frames for the question. In each coding frame, there were at times many categories and at other times fewer, depending on the richness of responses. In the case where there are multiple categories in a coding frame, those categories, although different, might be similar in the broader context. In such a case, I expected clustering which I understood through cluster analysis. Cluster analysis or clustering is the assignment of a set of observations (which, in my case, are the categories thus there was a clustering of categories, the objects of which are the responses) into subsets (called clusters) so that observations in the same cluster are similar in some sense. So it may be that I will have many categories that are clustered together and one or two that are outliers. As factor analysis in quantitative work can help explain patterns, cluster analysis in qualitative work can do the same. Cluster analysis divides data into groups (clusters) that are meaningful, by capturing the natural structure of the data. The term cluster analysis (first used by Tryon 1939) encompasses a number of different methods for grouping objects of similar kind into respective categories.

6.2.1.1 Responses to Structured Question

As the results in Figure 10 show, the majority of Muslim respondents answered as belonging “Fairly strongly” to Britain, with a significant number of them belonging

“Very strongly”. The number of those who expressed not belonging to Britain very strongly or not belonging to Britain at all was smaller, and suggests that this group of respondents is a minority.

Figure 10: Graph showing Muslim Belonging to Britain



This finding corresponds with my results from the CS data, presented in Chapter Five where both the descriptive statistics as well as regression results found that the majority of Muslim respondents belonged either very strongly or fairly strongly to Britain. Here the use of different methods has led to the same result, serving as a “cross-examination”. Using a multi-method approach for my research has enabled the process of *triangulation* or *confirmation* (Hesse-Biber and Leavy 2006: 20) whereby more than one research method is employed, in a way, almost like using different prisms to look at the research enquiry in order to arrive at a more informed and holistic model of knowledge building.

6.2.1.2 Meaning of Question

Following this method, I began constructing a coding frame for the first section of elaboration, Meaning of Question, for which respondents were asked: “When you were asked the following question, ‘How strongly do you belong to Britain?’ exactly what did you think the question meant?” A number of different responses were given on how the question was interpreted. Their responses were then read with a view to filter out all the different themes emerging from them. Every time a new theme was identified, a new category/typology was created with a name reflecting that theme. Selected key text (code words) from that theme was inserted into the category, creating a code. This process generated 12 different categories with a total of 55 codes. Only 35 per cent of respondents gave answers, which created more than one code. In other words, only 35 per cent of the answers from respondents raised more than one issue, i.e. fell into/created more than one category. From my sample of 30, this translates into 11 respondents; so 11 people gave an answer that fell into more than one category. The emergence of 12 categories from the respondents’ answers shows the diversity of the responses I got. There was actually a lot of overlapping of responses (i.e. similar answers) placing multiple codes into one category. There were only two categories which both had one code in them.

Figure 11 represents these categories in clusters for the first section, Meaning of Question. The squares inside the categories are their respective codes and correspond to different responses (*not* respondents), with the number of codes determining the size of a category. When mapping these categories on to the diagram, categories with similar themes were placed closer to each other, creating clusters. To demonstrate this point

let's take the largest cluster consisting of the categories: 'Values of Britain', 'British Ways of Life', and 'British Culture'. They all occupy themselves with ascribing certain characteristics to a country. This similarity that cuts across these three categories makes them similar in nature and thus they were placed at a close distance. Similarly, Rights and Responsibilities and Ownership of Country both place an emphasis on a person's realisation of their duties in a country. A similar approach was taken when placing clusters on the diagram, similar ones closer to each other and dissimilar ones further apart.


What I immediately notice when looking at Figure 11 is that a number of clusters are forming. While most Muslim respondents interpreted belonging strongly to Britain with its culture, values (personal and cultural), and its way of life, giving me the largest cluster, many others associated it with their own attachment to Britain, as feeling a part of it and its society, having a sense of belonging with it, and feeling British, giving me the second largest cluster. There were other less populated clusters, such as the one that understood belonging strongly to Britain as being familiar with its history and geography. A clear outlier is the category under which respondents interpreted the question to mean that Britain shapes their identity. The most populated category is that of British culture whereby most of the Muslim respondents interviewed interpreted the question to be asking them how strongly they belonged to British culture. When probed on this front, most respondents failed to define British culture using it as a pan-term with an assumed unknown meaning, or loosely referred to it as 'British culture... and things like that', whilst others gave more specific explanations, one interpreting it as its social activities, one as its music, and another saying:

Popular and literary culture...the kind of television programmes that we watch, the kind of books we would read, so in that respect yes that is fairly strong...

(Syed, 27 years old)

For Syed, the cultural aspects were important as indicated by his references to popular and literary culture, the TV programmes, and books.

**Figure 11: How strongly do you belong to Britain?
Clusters for ‘Meaning of Question’ (Section 1)**



KEY:

	Categories (in descending order of Code size)	Code Words
1	■ British Culture (10)	Closeness to British culture; Its cultures and traditions; Its Popular and literary culture; Music; Socially; Political; Food; Alcohol; Independent women; Rowdy youngsters; Football; Fish and chips.
2	■ Values of Britain (8)	British values; What Britain stands for; its Political values and ideologies; Personal values: Fairness and Teamwork; Efficiency; Queuing; Monarchy; Moral values; Pluralist society; Liberalism; Tolerance; Legal system; Christian values.
3	■ British Ways of Life (7)	Feel comfortable here; Completely used to here;

		Feel completely at ease; Familiarity; No surprises here; Feel close to the culture, environment, ways of living, and expectations; Way of life; British way of life; Multicultural way of living.
4	■ Feeling a Part of British Society/Britain (7)	Feeling a part of British society; Feeling a part of Britain/Country; Connected to Britain; Fitting into British life; Britain is a part of me.
5	■ Sense of Belonging (7)	Having a sense of belonging; Feel that I belong here; Thinking that it is my home.
6	■ Feeling British (4)	I am a British person; Feel 'British'; Sense of Britishness; Introducing myself as British; Having an inner gut feeling; Intrinsically knowing that you're British.
7	■ Rights and Responsibilities (3)	Have expectations as a citizen, but country also expects from me; Everything that as a citizen you are expected to be; Rights and responsibilities and duties; Can expect things from Britain; My voting rights; Human rights; Welfare; Freedom of speech; My role in this country.
8	■ Born and Bred in Britain (3)	Being born and bred here; Having roots here; My thinking was very basic; I was born here and I've lived here my whole life.
9	■ Ownership of Country (2)	Feel very strongly that Britain is my country; See myself as being from Britain; It is my country.
10	■ Knowledge of Britain (2)	Personally, knowing all parts of Britain; Knowing national, regional, and local diversities; Knowing its origins and history.

11	■ Geographical Segments (1)	How I relate to being in the whole of Britain; Going anywhere in Britain and being kind of comfortable; North and South – they face different issues; Have I travelled all parts of Britain.
12	■ Identity Shaping (1)	Whether identity is shaped by British culture and way of life; Defining personality; Point of influence in life; Providing role models.

The next category with the most number of responses corresponding to it is ‘Values of Britain’ showing that a significant number of respondents understood the question, of strongly belonging to Britain, to be asking them whether they were ardent believers of, quoting one respondent, ‘its values, culture, and traditions: what it stands for’, with some specifically giving importance to Britain’s ‘political values and ideologies’. There was also mention of certain personal values that exist in British society, such as ‘fairness and teamwork, e.g. team sports’. Related to this, is the next most popular category, ‘British Ways of Life’. Perhaps one response in particular summarises this typology most aptly, with concrete code words. Amal said this:

I took this question to mean how closely I kind of...it’s a bit of tricky one but yeah ...how comfortable I feel within Britain, how...what I’m completely used to...and yeah I feel really comfortable here obviously, I’ve been born and bred here. I feel completely at ease, the familiarity and all that...it’s a really difficult one isn’t it? (laughs)...so as an individual how comfortable I feel, how at ease, how close I feel to the culture, to the environment, the ways of living, the expectations, everything practically that as a citizen you are expected to be, and as a British citizen how closely I can relate to that...and that applies to me, yeah, that’s what I interpret that to mean...

(Amal, 24 years old)

An equal number of Muslims were of the opinion that belonging to Britain meant that they must feel a part of British society or Britain. This understanding of the question,

gathered in the category 'Feeling a Part of British Society/Britain', is certainly linked to those who made reference to British culture, but carries with it an emotional tone, as one person said, 'for me it meant to 'feel' a part of the country' (Shahnaz, 23 years old), or as one put it, of 'British Society' (Ashfaq, 21 years old). It was very much about being 'connected to Britain, and feeling a part of it' (Mehwish, 23 years old). In equal numbers were those who thought that the question meant them having a 'sense of belonging' with Britain, quoting one respondent, 'I felt it asked me to feel that I belong here' (Abdul Ahad, 22 years old), and another thought it equated to him 'thinking that it is my home' (Jamal, 26 years old). There were fewer people who interpreted the question as 'Feeling British'. This rather emotive and direct connection with feeling British was expressed in a number of ways, with one person saying the question prompted her to listen to her 'inner gut feeling of whether [she] felt British' (Hafsa, 27 years old) or as one person put it, it is was about 'intrinsically knowing that you're British' (Rihab, 20 years old). Others viewed the question as probing them about a 'sense of Britishness' (Luqman, 22 years old). One person made a rather intuitive and straightforward connection, 'I am a British person therefore of course I belong to Britain' (Haniya, 25 years old). One person translated this feeling of Britishness with whether they would 'introduce [themselves] as British to a foreigner' (Hawwa, 35 years old), and this would make them feel British, consequently making them belong to Britain.

There were then the group of respondents who understood belonging to Britain as it being a matter of give-and-take, or Rights and Responsibilities. For many respondents in this category, it was an equation whereby they are owed certain privileges by the country in exchange for a set of contributions. As one respondent put it, 'for me it

means the rights and responsibilities and duties. I can expect things from Britain, like I would expect certain rights to be maintained, such as voting rights, but at the same time I have certain responsibilities towards it. I have expectations as a citizen, but the country also expects from me' (Mahmud, 27 years old). For many others, it was just about one of these ends of the equation. One person interpreted belonging to Britain as '...the expectations, everything practically that as a citizen you are expected to be, and as a British citizen how closely I can relate to that' (Jaseena, 19 years old), putting emphasis on fulfilling their role and duties. Others held the other side of the equation, of examining what the country should be giving them, 'I can expect things from Britain' (Nawal, 22 years old), said one respondent. These 'things' were elaborated as 'voting rights, human rights, freedom of speech, and welfare facilities'. An equal number to this category of respondents were those who viewed belonging to Britain as being 'Born and Bred in Britain'. This category of responses was much smaller than some of the more popular ones discussed above. For this group of people, when considering whether or not they belonged to Britain, they understood the question to be asking them if they had 'roots here' (Aliya, 20 years old). As one person put it, my 'thinking was very basic, I was born here and I've lived here my whole life' (Salman, 22 years old), and another put it, 'I've been born and bred here, and so this tells me that I belong to Britain' (Sheraz, 30 years old). On one level, this meaning of the question makes the question seem very simple but on another level it makes the question a loaded one, asking people to connect it to their whole life.

Next in line were a small number of respondents for whom the question stirred within them a sense of ownership for Britain. Belonging to Britain for people in this category of 'Ownership of Country' meant that they owned the country, as one respondent put it,

‘I feel very strongly that Britain is my country’ (Mehnaz, 25 years old), or that they associate themselves very strongly with ‘being from Britain’ (Fouzia, 33 years old). An equal number of respondents interpreted belonging to Britain with the amount of knowledge they had of the country. In this category, ‘Knowledge of Britain’, one respondent explained, ‘I would view belonging to Britain as personally knowing all parts of it - its national, regional, and local diversities’ (Furat, 25 years old), and another specified, ‘knowing its origins and history’ (Yasmin, 23 years old). Last, but not least are the two smallest categories, ‘Geographical Segments’ and ‘Identity Shaping’. The first of these, ‘Geographical Segments’, is partly related to the ‘Knowledge of Britain’ category, but is instead more concerned with a sense of *connection* to all geographical parts of Britain, as opposed to having *knowledge* of them. One respondent explains, ‘For me, belonging to Britain means how I relate to being in the whole of Britain basically, so can I can go anywhere in Britain and be kind of comfortable...’ Another says, ‘Whether I have travelled all parts of Britain, because the North and South face different issues, there are a lot of contradictions and paradoxes’. The ‘Identity Shaping’ category brings together those respondents who understood the question of belonging strongly to Britain as being an identity shaper. Respondents elaborate in a number of ways, ‘for me this meant whether my identity is shaped by British culture and way of life’, or ‘whether Britain defines my personality’, or is a ‘point of influence in my life’, or ‘provides role models’.

Therefore the above analysis suggests that there are clearly two large sets of clusters emerging from the responses to the meaning of this question. The first one concerns itself with responses relating to British culture, values of Britain, and British ways of life, and the second one with responses relating to feeling a part of British society or

Britain, having a sense of belonging, and feeling British. The first cluster collectively depicts a ‘cultural’ feeling (*at ease*) and the second one an ‘affective’ feeling (*feel attached*). What this finding tells us is that the message being interpreted by this question by most people is a ‘cultural’ one, reflecting upon the practices, ethical values, and lifestyle that characterises a country. Whether or not this is what the survey practitioners were aiming for would be an interesting enquiry. One way to measure this would be to reflect on what policy makers (since the CS is carried out for the government) conceptualise national identity as, what they perceive its purpose to be. Perhaps policy makers through the CS were trying to tap the ‘affective’ dimension, and our results suggest that while some people felt this, many more actually felt the ‘cultural’ dimension. If we weigh our results on this scale - of what the question was intended to get at and what it actually got at - we can hope to arrive at some conclusion of how useful these survey questions are. If they are not getting at what policy makers want them to get at (i.e. if respondents are interpreting them differently), then how useful are they, if at all? A much more detailed discussion of this will follow near the end of this chapter, after all the four sections pertaining to the analysis of this question have been carried out.

If I measure my results against Miller and Ali’s (2013) four dimensions of national identity, I notice that “national pride” has not emerged at all in the results. The “uncritical/critical patriotism” dimension has emerged slightly with the category ‘Rights and Responsibilities’. Similarly, I see very little evidence for the fourth dimension in its cultural form, through the category of ‘Knowledge of Britain’. But I do see some evidence of the “national attachment” dimension, through the categories of ‘Feeling a Part of British Society/Britain’ and ‘Feeling British’. Miller and Ali (2013) are correct


in identifying that when measuring how ‘nationalist’ a person is, one must be aware of the complexity the term national identity carries. But the dimensions he brings forward are not abundantly, if at all, present in my responses to the meaning of strongly belonging to Britain.

6.2.1.3 Mediating Processes

Next I move onto analyse my pool of responses for the second section of elaboration, ‘Mediating Processes’, and begin making the coding frame for this. This section focuses on *how* respondents worked out their answer to the question “How strongly do you belong to Britain?” After asking them this question and what they thought the question meant, they were then asked, “Now tell me exactly how you worked out your answer from that question. Think it out for me just as you did a while ago . . . only this time say it aloud for me”. What I notice in Figure 11 is that the coding frame for this section consists of a larger number of codes than the coding frame for the first section. The reason for this is that my respondents gave longer answers for the second section, providing me with more material to analyse and code. Following the same procedure as before, the responses were read with a view to filter out all the different themes emerging from them. Every time a new theme was identified, a new category was created with a name reflecting that theme. Selected key text (code words) from that theme was inserted into the category, creating a code. This process generated 21 different categories with a total of 64 codes. Only 57 per cent of respondents gave answers that created more than one code. In other words, 57 per cent of the respondents raised more than one issue in their answer, i.e. fell into/created more than one category. From my sample of 30, this translates into 17 respondents; so 17 people gave an answer

that fell into more than one category. The emergence of 21 categories from the respondents' answers shows the diversity of the responses I got. There wasn't much overlapping of responses (i.e. not many similar answers), giving me many categories with a small number of codes in each.

**Figure 12: How strongly do you belong to Britain?
Clusters for 'Mediating Processes' (Section 2)**



KEY:

	Categories (in descending order of Code size)	Code Words
1	■ Ways of Belonging/Integrating (8)	Don't think I could belong to any other country; I don't want to belong to Britain; Have integrated by balancing religion and culture; Try and adapt to live with British people; Understand British culture; Give-and-take relationship; Can't cut yourself completely from British people; Can't alienate yourself; Reluctance-Acceptance; Britain needed skilled professionals.
2	■ Feeling British/Part of Britain (7)	Belong to Britain; Don't feel particularly British; Part of British Society; Like being here.
3	■ Respect for British People and Society (6)	England is so accepting

		<p>of other people; It's a social state; Every culture is represented; Love the people, the manners, the culture, the British queuing!! You have to respect that, the 'Good Morning' and the smiling at each other; Sincere and subtle people; Nice, friendly, and peaceful people; It's like 'live and let live'; British people are really nice and kind; I like British people; This society has given me a lot and I have a lot of respect for English people.</p>
4	<p>■ Is Britain 'Home'? /Britain is my Home (5)</p>	<p>Its home, you know there's no surprises; Do I consider Britain home?; Britain is my home.</p>
5	<p>■ Country Comparison (4)</p>	<p>Compared myself in Britain with being in a different country; If compared to people living in Pakistan, I think I'm lucky to be living in Britain.</p>
6	<p>■ British Ways of Life (4)</p>	<p>Know exactly how things work in Britain; Am most confident in Britain because I know it so well; Am completely at ease around here; Lived here all my life, I know everything that there is to know about Britain.</p>
7	<p>■ British Culture (4)</p>	<p>British culture is very different to mine; Have to match their culture and behave in the ways that they do; Different faith (religion) and beliefs (culture); They have different activities, they do different things;</p>

		Their idea of right and wrong is different; I understand British culture.
8	■ Impossible to become an ‘English’ person (2)	Would never be able to call myself an English person; Can’t change my race.
9	■ Defending Britain’s Values (2)	Would I defend Britain’s values; Support Britain’s value system.
10	■ Considered Ethnic Origin (2)	I am Pakistani; I am Turkish, that’s for certain.
11	■ Everyday images of this Country (2)	Majority White population, Alcohol, Unjust wars; Football, English flag, Beer, Music; Negative Connotations.
12	■ A Sense of History & Strong Identity (2)	A pretty old country with a history; Has roots; Strong identity; Stability and Cultural Development.
13	■ Like Britain’s Work Ethos and Values (2)	Like British culture of learning and reading; Admire their intellectual tradition and way of thinking; Positive competition; Values of Fairness and Teamwork.
14	■ Local vs. National identity (2)	Identify very strongly with London; Feel more like a Londoner than British.
15	■ Lifestyle/Religious Component (2)	Have similar lifestyle to people in Britain; I fit in because religion is not my lifestyle.
16	■ Rights and Responsibilities (2)	Have a responsibility, socially and politically.
17	■ Shared Joys and Frustrations (2)	Socially and Politically; The same things excite and make you angry.
18	■ Instinctive reponse (2)	Didn’t work it out; It’s the first thing that came up in my mind.
19	■ Shaped Identity (2)	Britain has been one of the main sources of

		influence in shaping my character and personality; Britain is central to my identity.
20	■ Born and Lived my whole Life in Britain (1)	I've lived here all my life here; I was born here.
21	■ Just a Visitor here (1)	I'm just a visitor here.

Figure 12 represents the categories for the section ‘Mediating Processes’, giving us a set of clusters. As before, the squares inside the categories are their respective codes and correspond to different responses (*not* respondents) with the number of codes determining the size of a category. What I notice from Figure 12 is that on the one hand, each category is less populated, i.e. there are fewer codes in each one as compared to the categories for the ‘Meaning of Question’ section. But on the other hand, I have a greater number of categories for ‘Mediating Processes’ and the responses are more spread out across them. This tells us that people have a greater variety of answers because they think much more differently when it comes to how they worked out their answer, there is more variation in their responses to this question as opposed to when they were asked ‘what’ they thought the question meant. In a way this result was expected as there would be greater heterogeneity on the ‘how’ aspect of the question which involves a greater deal of cognitive processes, as it requires respondents to look deeper into their life experiences, which are bound to be different for each person. When asked ‘how’ they worked out their answer, my respondents reflected on and questioned their thought process in much more detail with greater scrutiny. This opened up a window of life experiences which they consulted giving me a diverse range of answers, thus greater information and a greater number of categories. In contrast, for the ‘what’ aspect of the question which asked them what belonging to Britain meant, respondents tended to answer in a descriptive style perhaps with an assumption that they

were expected to give ‘standard textbook-type’ answers. This gave me a larger degree of homogeneity on that front with the overlapping of some answers.


The largest cluster in Figure 12 is made up of the categories ‘Ways of Belonging/Integrating’, ‘Feeling British/Part of Britain’, ‘Shaping Identity’, and ‘Impossible to become an English person’. The common theme that runs across the codes in these categories is the component of being a part of Britain, the ways to belong, and feeling British. Another cluster that forms consists of the categories ‘British Culture’, ‘British Ways of Life’, and ‘Everyday images of this Country’. It is the country’s culture and values that run across the codes in these responses. The next cluster that can be seen consists of ‘Respect for British People and Society’, ‘Like Britain’s Work Ethos and Values’, and ‘Defending Britain’s Values’. In this cluster, it is the values and ethos of British society that run across the categories. Another category with a number of responses is ‘Is Britain ‘Home’? / Britain is my Home’. Other smaller categories also appear. A similar approach was taken when placing clusters on the diagram, similar ones closer to each other and dissimilar ones further apart.

6.2.1.4 Scripted Probes about Question

After being asked what the question “How strongly do you belong to Britain?” meant and how it was worked out, respondents were presented with a list of probes about the question. These probes had been constructed beforehand and were constructed on the basis of other potential understandings of the question that the respondent could have. This process allows one to decipher whether the survey question being asked is measuring what it is designed to measure. Two scripted probes about the question were

put forward to respondents, the first was: “Do you think this question is asking you whether or not you live in Britain?” and the second was: “Do you think this question is asking you whether you have a 'legal right to remain in Britain?’”

Figure 13: Graph showing Muslim response to Scripted Probe 1 for the Question



It seems that when asked about their belonging to Britain, fifty per cent of respondents did not interpret this to be asking them whether or not they physically lived in Britain.

As one respondent explained the question was much broader in its reach:

I think my answer was along the lines of ‘I can actually belong to Britain if I want to’, that was my... I think it was a question of if I’d like to then will I be able to belong to Britain? And that’s the way I answered it, the question was bigger than just ‘living in Britain’...it was merely a question about if I can actually integrate with the mainstream British society if I wanted to...

A much smaller group, just thirteen per cent did think the question was asking about them being resident in Britain. Like one respondent put it, ‘Well...in a way it does. I mean, you feel for a country only when you live there’. Another thirty seven per cent of

respondents thought the question was not singular in its meaning and ‘living in Britain’ could very well be part of the question, but that’s not what it means entirely. Like one respondent said:


Yes, I included that to be a part of the question but I didn’t think this is what the question entirely meant. It wasn’t the whole question; you can live in Britain but feel that you don’t belong to it.

Similarly another respondent thought:

I think that played a part of it, but that’s not what I understood immediately. That did influence my answer but it’s not what first came to my mind. The first thing was the culture and traditions.

Therefore on the whole most respondents did not confuse the question with asking them about being resident in a country but on the other hand, neither was the question being interpreted as straightforward in its meaning.

Figure 14: Graph showing Muslim response to Scripted Probe 2



When asked whether belonging to Britain meant having a legal right to remain in Britain, again nearly half of the respondents did not think this to be the case. One of them pointed out that he thought the question was asking him about aspects of belonging to Britain if he did decide to obtain a legal right and remain in Britain, making the question a wider one than just asking about legal status:

I don't think the question meant this because although I am not a naturalised citizen, I am eligible for it if I want to take it up, it's just that I don't want to take it so my answer was on a higher level along the lines of what life would be like if I do want to take it up and that was my rationale for giving the answer.

And as another respondent summarised, 'Well, I think it's asking more about how a person feels from the heart than his/her legal status' and another put it very clearly, 'I actually didn't think of that at all'.

Nearly a third of the respondents did think the question was referring to their legal right to remain in Britain. This percentage is higher than for those who said yes to the last scripted probe. One respondent was very frank about this:

I did think of the fact that I do have a British passport, yes, I thought you know 'oh I have the passport, I should say I belong to Britain...I probably do belong to Britain (laughs)'...yeah I did, rather than something a bit more culturally valuable (laughs).

And then again there were those who felt the answer lies somewhere in the middle, with twenty per cent answering 'Yes and No' to this scripted probe. Having a legal right to remain in Britain may be a part of what the question is getting at, but it is by no means the only meaning. As one respondent stated:

Yes, but I wouldn't consider it to mean just that. I know some people who've been in a country for a long time but might not have the legal right, but they still feel they belong to Britain. So again I can use aspects of that question, so yeah you'd consider the legal right to live there.


A few respondents said that although they did not initially think that belonging to Britain as them having the legal right to remain in Britain, they did think of it once it was mentioned to them in the scripted probe:

I guess I didn't even think of it actually, I didn't really think of it, I just thought how much personally you feel you belong to it, and...but now that you mention it, that definitely becomes a part of it. When you mentioned it, I did think to myself, oh actually yeah why didn't I think of that? I would consider it to be a part of 'belonging' to Britain because I guess if you don't have the legal right you wouldn't really that you belong 'as well', but it's not the first thing that I thought of when the question was asked.


This suggests that over a half of respondents did associate some sort of legal definition to the question, rather than thinking of how they belonged to the country in affective or cultural terms.

6.2.1.5 Responses to Repeat Structured Question

Next, respondents were requested to answer the question in its structured form once more, to see how they would now answer it after having thought through their answer. If their answer differed from the one they had given earlier, they were asked to explain why.

Figure 15: Graph showing Muslim Belonging to Britain at Repeat Question

My findings show that from the total sample, only four respondents changed their answer. One respondent changed their answer from Fairly Strongly to Very Strongly, two went from Very Strongly to Fairly Strongly, and one went from Fairly Strongly to Not Very Strongly. So with the exception of one respondent, the movement in responses was downwards making them belong less to Britain, after having thought through their answer.

Figure 16: Graph showing Change in Response for Muslim Belonging to Britain

Having said this, the change in answers is very low when compared to those who stuck by their response. This suggests that most people are not likely to alter their response even after having thought about what the question means and how they worked out their answer. This could perhaps be explained by the structured nature of the question and the limited categorical response categories. As one respondent put it:


My answer was initially ‘very strongly’ and now... I suppose just put the same answer down for me as before... it doesn’t really make a difference because I don’t think these four options are really accurate anyway...what are they trying to measure? What does ‘very strongly’ or ‘fairly strongly’ mean? What is the difference between them? Rather than trying to ask people to choose one of these four options, you should let them speak about their experiences in detail of living in Britain. That will give you better results and you will learn much more. These four options are really arbitrary.

Therefore even if respondents felt differently about their answer they may have chosen the same response category simply because they didn’t feel the response categories effectively represented or measured their views.

6.2.1.6 Alternative Approaches to Question

Going beyond Belson’s (1981) approach, the cognitive interviews also asked the respondents how the question could be worded differently. The point of this exercise is reconfirmed by Miles and Huberman (1994) who say that “good qualitative data are more likely to lead to serendipitous findings and to new integrations; they help researchers to get beyond initial conceptions and to generate or revise conceptual frameworks” (p.1). And rightly, this exercise of asking respondents about the fitness of the survey questions proved useful as the respondents were able to be critical and gave me a number of interesting points and suggestions on how the question could be revised. Many comments, criticisms, and suggestions were put forward about the question; the figure below shows these.

Figure 17: Re-thinking the Question on Belonging to Britain



The criticisms of the question from some respondents (5) was that the question ‘can be judgemental’ in its wording. One respondent expressed it like this:

I don't think belonging to Britain is a good way of phrasing the question, because it depends on who you're asking, if you say something like that then people will assume that you don't see them as belonging.

Some respondents (4) said they did not like categories as ways of defining their identity.

One respondent put it like this:

When you asked me about my political ideas and national identity, I don't believe in belonging to just one category, I'm not left, I'm not right, I'm not fundamentally Islamic, I'm not atheist...I don't like to be categorised. Because I think in life course, people's thoughts and beliefs sometimes change and do you what I describe myself as? I describe myself as a Turkish girl who's a daughter of Ataturk who is the founder of our republic and we admire him a lot, he is very important for us. This means I'm a modern Turkish girl, who is educated, who is understanding of the world issues, who is definitely proud of being Turkish but also has good feelings about other nations and religions, is respectful to them, and who at the same time is Muslim.

Quite a number of respondents, the largest (8), said that the question was too vague or broad and that it needs to be made more specific. This response was a good representation of this criticism:

On closer inspect the question does ask whether you belong to a country, a citizen - but for some strange reason my interpretation was that the question is asking me for my faith and commitment to the values of this country. I suppose the use of the word "belong" are used in intimate private ways so perhaps if the aim of the question is to ask whether you actually "live" in a country then the word belong is wrong. However if the question intends to ask - how you feel you “fit” or “mix” into the British society then different words are needed. Perhaps use this format: “Do you feel you are truly British”? I think that would make one really analyse how British they are rather than a vague question.

Also, what does the word 'belong' mean? Its quite broad, like what part of Britain, does it mean culturally, working, paying taxes, or belonging in terms of do you have a visa or belonging in terms of culture?

However there were others (4) who thought that although the question was too broad, it was open-ended which gave them the freedom to construct their answer. One respondent put it like this:

The only thing...yeah it's a bit vague...Britain being...you know, you have to then make your own...yeah but I would leave it at that because people can take it to mean so many different things...maybe the question should say 'British culture'...to say 'Britain' is big isn't it? Well what do you mean, British culture, British work life or, you know what do you mean by Britain? But yeah no that's good, I wouldn't change that...

Another said:

They have to be open-ended though, no? To some extent, right? I mean you can't really have leading questions (which are specific questions), so I would rather have...I think if I was to give you any suggestion, I would probably want to make it easier for people to answer them, but that wouldn't be very good from the questionnaire's point of view. So ideally to make the questions 'better' I would make them more specific, so like I think it was very helpful when you said 'what does it mean to...like when you said how strongly do you feel you belong to Britain?' I just felt like 'belong to Britain' just could mean so many things...but then that's the point of the question you see...if we make the questions more specific then that will be 'leading' though right? That would make the questions less open-ended. As an interviewee you want it to be more specific but you also know that it will limit your response, so that's probably not good for the purposes of your investigation.

Quite a number of respondents (5) thought that the question was too structured, or that its words were too 'textbook-type' for them, one respondent said:

I think it was too long, a long string of similar boring questions. I think it would have been better to ask me to narrate a story. The questions are just repetitive, I think these questions would serve better for someone who is actually a confused person and who could actually change during the course of this interview. For me, I think it gets boring, because I have a very strong

headedness about this issue in particular, and you would have been better off had you just asked me to narrate my story, and just asked for my opinion, rather than asking these individual questions to me which gets really boring and cumbersome. All the questions seem fine to me.

There were a number of suggestions about how the question could be improved. One suggestion was that the question could be asked in a dual way, so make it a two-way question. In other words, people can be asked not only whether they belong to Britain, but also whether Britain belongs to them. The respondent put it like this:

I think you asked a good question, whether I would go and fight for it...when you say if I belong to Britain, its not only about me belonging, its also if Britain belongs to me, if its my country, if I should fight for it, if I should work for it, if I should defend it, I think that's what it means. Cricket tests are another form of loyalty! (laughs)... although it doesn't risk your life but that depends where you're from!

In this sense, the question can be reversed and people can be asked whether Britain belongs to them, and this would involve a sense of ownership and loyalty. One respondent felt the term 'belonging to Britain' was asking something too broad, or rather the word 'nation' was too broad. Instead the question can be localised to ask people about their belonging to smaller segments of Britain:

How can I ascribe myself to the whole country? How do you expect me to belong to the entire nation of Britain, there are so many variations in the North and South. I think a better question would be to ask about people's local identity and whether they belong to their locality. That is a more measured way of knowing about how.

Another put it like this:

I think the question is fine. I am an immigrant so have stronger feelings for a place instead of the entire entity. May be if you want narrower results, you

could ask people if they like identify strongly with a particular area/city/region.

A few respondents (3) thought that the question showed that there are social problems in Britain, one said:

The word 'belong' is used quite a bit in the questions...I think the whole belong question...the idea of belong, I think it really comes to this, I really think that at the end of the day this is what they're asking you...to what extent do you feel part of British society...I think its implied in there somewhere that you are an outsider, you know? So how much do you...I mean there's never going to be that thing of...there's a question of you're a part of British society...there is never going to...there's never going to be that mindset in this country where people are going to be like, without question, you are part of this society...you see there are like surveys being done, that in itself says so much about this place. I think the belong questions are a bit difficult...its not that they're not very specific, its just that they're...the 'belong' is very open, the 'belong' is not specific enough, but also that 'belong' has like...I think its just become a very loaded word as well with these assumptions of the 'we', the 'other'...I think its just...I think to ask someone who's born and raised in a country whether they belong there...I think this is really just the perfect sign of what's actually happening in this country, you see? You were born and raised here, and have no other home...and then I have to ask you, do you actually belong here? I think that shows you the problem, that there is a problem of integration. And of course there are White English people who are politically active, or who are say hippies, or whatever...I've been called a hippy...people who are living in derelict land somewhere up North...they're not contributing much to society, so are we going to question their belonging? So I think its actually...at the end of the day, a lot of these questions are racist...I mean for this to be a government run survey...

These respondents had also pointed out that the term 'belong' was too broad and that it should be more specific on what it is actually asking. Furthermore, they felt that questioning the loyalty of British born Muslims was offensive; the above respondent gave an example of other groups in society who were not contributing much to society, but their loyalty was not under the spotlight. The table below presents these concerns and their solutions.

**Table 14: Concerns and Solutions for the Citizenship Survey Question
“How Strongly do you Belong to Britain?”**

Description of Concern	Proposed Solution
Can be judgemental	<i>Re-word question or abolish altogether</i>
Two-way question	<i>Make more specific</i>
Don't like categories	<i>Make response open-ended</i>
“Nation” too broad	<i>Localise the question</i>
Shows social problems	<i>Re-word question or abolish altogether</i>
“Belong” too loaded	<i>Make more specific</i>
Vague/Broad	<i>Make more specific</i>
Too structured	<i>Make response open-ended</i>
Vague but open-ended	<i>Make more specific</i>

These concerns and solutions about the question show us the different ways in which the question can be interpreted and how it can be improved. Through the four sections of the cognitive interviews, this chapter focused on scrutinising the question to better understand what ‘belonging to Britain’ means. Some alternative suggestions on how to word the question would be:

“Do you feel at home in Britain?”

“Do you think Britain is your country?”

Or to ask a lighter and less-loaded question (with easier words that people can understand), perhaps this is a good one:

“If there was a cricket match between England and Pakistan, which team would you support?”

One respondent made this detailed suggestion for asking about British identification:

I would like to add a question about whether you can shed your life for this country, but the real issue in this case is that everyone will say YES, because they claim to be British. But its what you can get out of it, and the intelligent way to get the answer from them is when you're done with the interview, its more through deception, just talk to them a bit and then narrate a story about the army, and how its bad in this country for people like us, and then just observe what they think, and then they'll give you the right answer. If they're very British, then they'll say no its not bad, its good and we should fight for this country, and I will lay my life for this country. If you ask in the interview, would you lay your life for this country, would you join the army? They'll say yes I will! When in reality they wouldn't, their family wouldn't allow them to. Hopefully you'll be able to reach a good conclusion and that will help the society in general and the policy makers in particular to solve many of these crises issues.

This suggestion was more intense than the previous few suggestions. And out of interest, I even asked a few of my respondents the question, "Would you give your life for the country, i.e. would you join the British Army and defend the country? There were mixed responses, and quite a number of them said they would because Britain has offered them so much and this is where their family lives, so they have a stake in the country. Some of them said they would not, for two sets of reasons: firstly, because they did not like to be in the army which would involve them physically fighting. One respondent said he would not mind becoming a medical doctor for the British Army, but did not like fighting. These respondents also said that they wouldn't want to fight for any country, let alone Britain. So even if it was Pakistan, they would not fight for it. And the second reason was that they disagreed with the foreign policies and wars of Britain and would not fight for this reason. They said they disagreed politically with the government's policies. Now let's look at how the cognitive interviewing methods can be improved for future research on identities.

6.3 Exploring Current and New Methods of Cognitive Interviewing

Policy makers could use a better understanding of identities as a framework to explore how policies might influence different groups of people, and to respond rapidly to avoid unintended consequences. This can only be done if the data being collected on identities is measuring what it should and is effective. My cognitive interviewing had intended to inform us whether or not one such survey question from the CS on British identity was in fact measuring what it should. How can the data that we collect on identities be improved? One way is to design more effective survey questions, and we can test for this effectiveness through cognitive interviewing. Whilst conducting the interviews I noticed that there isn't an established technique for cognitive interviewing. There is currently no standard method. Although I used Belson's (1981) method, which worked well, it is nearly three decades old and is perhaps outdated. I added some additional practices to it when using it.

Conclusion

This chapter has generated some original and insightful findings. Having scrutinised the question on belonging, respondents were asked what they thought the question meant, and there emerged two distinct dimensions of interpretation, one of a cultural (at ease) feeling and one of an affective (feeling attached) feeling, in distinction to each other. The CS was trying to tap the affective dimension, and some respondents definitely expressed that, but many others felt the cultural dimension, of feeling *comfortable* with the British ways of life, British culture, and its values, leading to a sort of acculturation measure. The importance placed on 'being comfortable' was paramount, and this feeling of comfort is achieved through 'knowing' what the British culture is and what

Britain's ways of life are and being happy with them. In a sense, they are 'sharing' the British culture and its values. It should be stressed here that simply knowing the British culture and ways of life was not enough; this was only the first layer. The second layer involved them having a *liking* for this, so not only did they know about the British society and its culture, they consciously liked it too. Thus a distinction should be made here between those who, with full knowledge of British culture and its ways of life, like and dislike it. But overall, the level of belonging for Muslims to Britain is on the high end. In other words, the number of Muslims who feel they strongly belong to Britain is higher than claimed (as shown in Chapter 4 and confirmed in Section 6.1 of this chapter), and therefore it is not such a major social problem that needs fixing.

This chapter has demonstrated that for my Muslim respondents belonging to Britain is not about emotion and pride, but about the culture and values and ways of life. My respondents go beyond Miller and Ali's (2013) four dimensions of national identity, 'national attachment', 'national pride', 'uncritical/critical patriotism', and 'civic/cultural forms of identification'. They belong to Britain, they feel in-line with British ways of life. I further Jacobson's (1998) argument that being British for my Muslim respondents is not just about a British passport; instead it is a very British way of feeling British. It is a more systematic way of belonging, where the respondents feel 'in-tune' and 'in-touch' with the practices and culture of the country, the familiarity they have, the ease. It is not the American way of 'hands-on-heart', but the British way, which is a bit more understated. If I look back to my quantitative results in Chapter Five, I had found that Muslims who feel discriminated by British institutions feel less British and those who trust the police feel more British. That makes sense intuitively in light of the findings of this chapter whereby Muslims associate these very institutions to an idea of belonging

to Britain, they immerse their concepts of belonging through these frameworks of the local council, court, politicians, parliament, and police, in society, and if these very institutions discriminate against them then that violates their concept of belonging, which is in-tune with trusting institutions, fair treatment, fairness, and tolerance.

CHAPTER

7

**Exploring Identities of Muslims through In-Depth
Interviews**

Introductory Summary

In this chapter I go beyond understanding just the British identification of Muslims and start to explore the other identities that Muslims in Britain may have, such as their ethnic and religious identities. I do this by analysing the data collected from the in-depth interviews carried out with my sample of Muslim respondents. The in-depth interviews will allow a better understanding of the problems of identity formation among Muslims in Britain. There were a combination of structured and unstructured questions in the in-depth interviews. I begin by looking at the quantitative results from a structured identity question that was asked in the in-depth interviews and then try to understand how those results relate to the responses from the unstructured questions. In other words, I try to understand what the identity categories from the structured question mean to our respondents. First, I find that Britain is ‘home’ for many of the respondents; they are firmly wrapped in the fabric of British society, maintaining a strong British identity. There are thicker and thinner versions of this British identity. Second, I find that Islam has a very strong impact on the religious identity of many of the respondents, they internalise Islam in their religious identity, except for the ‘secular Muslims’ who think of Islam as a cultural tradition. And third, I find that some respondents think of their Pakistani identity simply as heritage, except those who recently migrated to Britain. With all three of these themes, there are variations of emphasis and salience. Although the quantitative (structured question) and qualitative (unstructured questions) findings of our in-depth interviews confirm each other broadly, they take a different view of identity. The results from the structured identity question take a categorical view of identity as opposed to the themes that emerged from the qualitative results that take a dimensional view of identity. Furthermore, I notice that there is a creational aspect of identities in which identities are not simply additive for some of our respondents, but

they have identity processes of fusion, mesh, and emergence. Another important finding in this chapter is that for some of our respondents, the fusion of identity is not always accepted as they have tensions in trying to integrate their different aspects of identity.

In previous chapters I analysed survey data for Muslims in Britain from the CS for the question ‘How strongly do you belong to Britain?’ and from the Ethnic Minority British Election Study for the question ‘Would you say you feel more British or Ethnic?’ That analysis presented a number of findings. While these findings were insightful they were limited and did not help to fully understand what “belonging to Britain” means for Muslims in Britain and how they worked out their answers. To understand this thought-process, I then conducted out cognitive interviews with Muslim respondents. By tapping into their cognitive processes, I was able to dissect a wealth of information about their feelings of national identity. However, what I wasn’t able to do was to explore the other dimensions of their identity such as their ethnic and religious identities. This chapter will attempt to understand these other identities, as well as the British identity, through in-depth interviews carried out with a sample of Muslim respondents living in Britain. Most of these respondents are of Pakistani ethnic origin and were born in the UK, with some as recent arrivals who were born in Pakistan. There will also be a reflective section on the tensions and contradictions that exist when the respondents try to integrate their identities.

7.1 Looking at Muslim Identities with a Qualitative Angle

The qualitative data in this chapter is aiming to complement my quantitative data in previous chapters. Using qualitative data for research involves three stages. Firstly, data

is collected (this is done in my research through carrying out qualitative in-depth interviews through gatekeepers and snowballing). Secondly, through some method of analysis one looks for meanings in the data (I did this by transcribing and coding the interviews). And thirdly, one aims to arrive at a theoretical leap from the data (I did this by focusing on what respondents were saying in the interviews through thematic analysis).

Now I will just expand here on my method of analysis for this chapter, in-depth interviewing. As a qualitative researcher in this chapter I wanted to know my subject. The texts on qualitative research emphasize the importance of this exercise, as Bogdan and Taylor (1975), for example, talked about the need for the researcher to “see things from [a participant’s] point of view (p.14). Bryman (1988), meanwhile, says that, “the most fundamental characteristic of qualitative research is its express commitment to viewing events, action, norms, values etc. from the perspective of the people who are being studied” (p. 61). Yet, as with the quantitative researcher, the ultimate goal of the qualitative researcher is rarely, if ever, the mere replication of ‘the native’s point of view’, for usually the qualitative researcher’s eye is focused on a broader target (Silverman 2004: 64). That target can vary from being something as vast and amorphous as another ‘culture’ (Malinowski 1944) or as intricate as a symbol system (Geertz 1984), to something as localized as a ‘moral order’ (Garfinkel 1967) or as apparently mundane as ‘the common-sense world of daily life’ (Schutz 1962).

Thematic analysis is the most common form of analysis in qualitative research. It involves a process of identifying, examining, and recording patterns or themes within data. From the themes evolve categories or typologies of analysis, which help to

organise the patterns or themes. Thematic analysis is performed through the process of coding in six phases to create established, meaningful patterns. These phases are: familiarization with data, generating initial codes, searching for themes among codes, reviewing themes, defining and naming themes, and producing the final report.

To elaborate further, my analysis of the qualitative data in this chapter identifies the typology with the patterns or themes rather than strengths of effects or significance. Qualitative data, most usually in the form of words rather than numbers, is the staple of many fields in the social sciences. Miles and Huberman (1994) describe qualitative data as a “source of well-grounded, rich descriptions and explanations of processes in identifiable local contexts... Words, especially organized into incidents or stories, have a concrete, vivid, meaningful flavour that often proves far more convincing to a reader - another researcher, a policymaker, a practitioner - than pages of summarized numbers” (p.1). According to sociologist Babbie (2001) qualitative analysis, which involves non-numerical data, requires summarizing and condensing a large amount of information, such as written documents, field notes and field recordings, into more manageable data. Qualitative analysts comb through the data, searching for patterns and themes. One basic way to organize such detailed material is to construct a typology for categorizing or grouping the patterns and themes that emerge in the analysis.

To analyse the large amounts of data generated from the in-depth interviews, the qualitative interviews were recorded and transcribed, because relying on interviewer notes and memory can lead to error as well as restricting spontaneous probing in the interview due to the pressure of trying to make accurate notes in a short period of time. Telephone and email communication was at times used for the interview when a face-

to-face interview was not possible, in which case field notes were made. Thinking a bit more about transcription as a method, it is a pivotal aspect of qualitative inquiry and can affect how data are conceptualized (Oliver et al. 2005). Transcription is practiced in multiple ways, often using naturalism, in which every utterance is captured in as much detail as possible, and/or de-naturalism, in which grammar is corrected, interview noise (e.g. stutters, pauses, etc.) is removed and nonstandard accents (i.e. non-majority) are standardized. Largely emerging in linguistics (Ochs 1979) and linguistic anthropology (Duranti 1997), scholars from diverse disciplines (Lapadat and Lindsay 1999; Mishler 1984; Sandelowski 1994; Tilley 1998) have begun to recognize the centrality of transcription in qualitative research (Poland 2002) and how it can powerfully affect the way participants are understood, the information they share, and the conclusions drawn. For the purpose of anonymity, all the person names used in this chapter are pseudonyms of their actual names.

The data reading or data immersion process was a process in which I transcribed, read, and reread the interviews until I was to a high degree familiar with them. The transcription and immersion process started after the first interview, to identify emerging themes and to reformulate the questionnaire guidelines for the next interview. The process of data coding involved the dissecting and labeling of data into meaningful categories (which formed the typology). The purpose of coding was to separate the information into themes so that the information derived from all interviews could be sorted and compared. Codes were assigned to sentences and whole paragraphs. Coding and re-coding continued until the data had been saturated, meaning that all the data had been readily classified and no new information emerged from the data as additional transcripts were coded (Miles and Huberman 1994).

When coding the in-depth interview data, my research questions as well as the already existing research and theories on the subject played a role in guiding my inquiry and framing the interpretation (deductive approach) when analysing the transcribed interviews. At the same time, however, it was important to remain open to allowing for unthought-of themes to emerge (inductive approach) from the data collected, un-bound by existing theory. In this sense, there was an attempt to combine the Discourse Analysis (DA) and the Grounded Theory (GT) approaches. Neither wholly inductive nor deductive, but a mixture of both, this approach more closely resembles what Miles and Huberman (1994) describe as “...starting with some general themes derived from reading the literature and adding more themes and subthemes as you go...you have a general idea of what you’re after and you know what at least some of the big themes are, but you’re still in discovery mode, so you let new themes emerge from the texts as you go along” (Bernard 2000: 445).

Figure 18: Model for interpreting Qualitative Data




Figure 18 demonstrates this method of interpretation for the qualitative data, while testing the existing theories the data would also be able to generate new theories previously un-thought of (Boyatzis 1998). The heart of this method involves identifying

themes in texts and coding the texts for the presence or absence of those themes (Bernard 2000: 444).

The GT approach involves the generation of analytical categories or themes and their dimensions or drivers, and the identification of relationships between them (Ritchie and Lewis 2003). This approach emphasizes coding that sticks close to the text and then constructs increasingly abstract categories and domains by analyzing the relationships among codes. This inductive process allows the theory to emerge from the data (Strauss and Corbin 1998) and thereby stays close to the meanings and experiences of individuals within the context of their relationships. The central objective of GT is to discover the course of a social process people choose to follow and to advance development of a theory with respect to that social process (Marcellus 2005). In this process of coding, the goal was to understand the respondent's perspective and to report their perspective without intentionally imposing the researcher's viewpoint or the current knowledge and theories of identity on the data.

The coding scheme was therefore both deductive and inductive, meaning that codes were developed based on predetermined theoretical categories as well as on similarity in the Muslim's responses. The emerging codes were reviewed for consistency and distinctness. Once all the data was coded the process of data reduction began. This allowed the researcher to get the bigger pictures from the data and to distinguish between primary and secondary themes, to abstract again from the particular to the conceptual (Ellsberg and Heise 2005). On the whole, although I was open to both the deductive and inductive approaches, my interpretation of the qualitative data became more skewed towards the inductive approach, where I focused on what my respondents

were telling me and looked for themes that emerged that way, adopting a GT approach. As well as identifying new themes, I also looked out for themes that had already been measured quantitatively and cognitively through survey data and cluster analysis in previous chapters.

Although there have been previous studies of British Pakistanis and their Britishness, none of these have used GT methodology to study this issue. The GT approach prefers that the research material develop its own codes as new themes arise from the research material. GT also suggests that the material that is collected influences the type of respondent interviewed. So as you collect the material, you re-evaluate which ‘type’ of participant needs to be interviewed next. My interviews were influenced by the incoming material, i.e. I used purposive sampling to help and fill in the gaps for the participant types that I felt were missing, but my sample was also influenced by the network (and thus the snowball sample). GT prefers the codification of every concept/sentence, and I looked for the emergence of unthought-of themes, un-bound by existing theory.

When coding the interview responses for the Muslim respondents, I found a number of analytical themes that I categorized into a six-group typology of identity. The six groups in the typology represent different modes of relating to the three identities: British, Pakistani, and Muslim. There are thinner and thicker versions of these three identities and they fall into different groups in the typology.

The six groups in the typology are:

1. CULTURAL IDENTITY
2. UNAMBIGUOUS IDENTITY
3. EMOTIONAL IDENTITY
4. EMERGENT IDENTITY
5. AMBIVALENT IDENTITY
6. NONE OF THE ABOVE

Each group represents a theme that has been weaved together through codes from the interview responses. The codes act as the dimensions or drivers within each theme. After going through the typology in detail I will also reflect on the tensions and contradictions that exist for my Muslim respondents when there is an interplay of their different identities (national, ethnic, and religious), i.e. how easy do they find it to integrate them?

I begin by looking at the quantitative results from the structured identity question that was asked in my interview guide and then try to understand the meanings of these results through the responses from the unstructured and open-ended questions on identity.

7.2 Structured Identity Question – The Quantitative Results

In my in-depth interviews I included a structured question on identity and so I begin with looking at the quantitative results from this. The question was worded like this:


“From the following list of categories tell me which one you think best describes your identity. If you want to choose more than one then rank them according to your preference (1, 2, 3, etc.). 1 is the highest, 15 is the lowest.

- (1) British
- (2) Muslim
- (3) Pakistani
- (4) British and Muslim
- (5) Muslim and British
- (6) Pakistani and Muslim
- (7) Muslim and Pakistani
- (8) British, Muslim, and Pakistani
- (9) British, Pakistani, and Muslim
- (10) Muslim, British, and Pakistani
- (11) Muslim, Pakistani, and British
- (12) Pakistani, British, and Muslim
- (13) Pakistani, Muslim, and British
- (14) All are equal to me
- (15) None of these
- (16) Other- please specify.

Figure 19 shows the results of the selection that the respondents made. There are a number of stories that come out from these results. The first story that comes out from these results is of multiple identities. A large number of our respondents chose a category that has more than one identity (seventy five per cent). These respondents went

beyond selecting a category that has a singular identity and selected a category with more than one identity. The next story that comes out is that the selection of the Pakistani identity is rare. This is concluded by looking at how many of my respondents selected a multiple identity category in which the Pakistani identity comes first, and it can be seen that the percentage of respondents who selected these categories is very low. From this it can be induced that the role of the Pakistani identity is relatively minor.

Figure 19: Structured Identity Question: Categories of Self-Identification⁴¹



Another story is that a high percentage of respondents selected a multiple identity category in which the British identity is included, and also those categories in which both the British and Muslim identities appear together. There seems to be a significant

⁴¹ This graph is derived from our in-depth interviews with 83 Muslim respondents.

number of Muslims who selected a multiple identity category in which the British identity comes third. And there doesn't seem to be that much difference between the selection of these two categories, 'British, Muslim, and Pakistani' and 'Muslim, British, and Pakistani'. Of those who selected a singular identity category, the Muslim identity had the highest percentage of selection, with British identity being the next most commonly selected singular identity category. This exercise of including the structured identity question in the in-depth interviews was useful in that it was a question that I constructed myself with a variety of response categories, that allowed a selection of a single, double, or triple identity category. A question with response categories such as these has not been tested on Muslim respondents in previous empirical studies or national surveys, making it the first time in my research. The results from this question provide me with preliminary ideas to bounce on before delving into the detailed responses from the unstructured identity questions. While this question offered my respondents a diverse set of response categories allowing them some space to customize their identity like never before in a structured identity question, and has given me a peak into their identity preferences through the results emanating from it, albeit through an artificial selection of identity categories, it does not tell me what these categories mean to the respondents as identity in this question is viewed as additive and discrete. To arrive at a more meaningful understanding of identities for Muslims let me now turn to the responses from the unstructured questions in the in-depth interviews, where identity can be understood as a process. In other words, what is the typology that emerges from the articulated responses and what are its drivers?

Before analysing the typology I would like to first bring forward the interview responses from the unstructured identity questions that mention dual and multiple

identities as these confirm my findings from Figure 19. I do not include these responses in the typology as previous research has found evidence of dual and multiple identities among Muslims, and in the typology I instead wanted to bring out the new findings related to the identity of Muslims.

There were some Muslim respondents from my interviews for whom there did not seem to be a competing nature of identities; they did not give more importance to one identity label over another. For them having multiple labels of identity was acceptable as each of their identities contained a level of tolerance allowing each other to co-exist, they could balance them simultaneously. They very comfortably had dual and multiple identities. These respondents flamboyantly selected a range of influences and/or experiences that were important to their sense of being, and these came together to form a multiple and diverse identity.

Gulshan, a 48 year old housewife living in London who recently came from Pakistan referred to herself as ‘Pakistani and Muslim’. Zoya, a 22 year old undergraduate student at Oxford University, described herself as ‘British Asian or Pakistani’. She explained this by saying, ‘I wouldn’t say just British. I have dual nationality, for both Britain and Pakistan’. Nuzhat, an undergraduate at the University of East London, said:

I would say I’m a British Pakistani. My parents are Pakistani and I was born in Britain and obviously I have a role in this society because I’m being born brought up in this society so I would say I’m a British Pakistani Muslim. But this is not in the order of importance. Britain doesn’t always come first for me but I would never alienate anyone by my religion because we have to live by their rules as well. I’m Muslim first and then British before Pakistani because I’m born here.

(Nuzhat, 20 years old)

The way Ishtiaq, a medical student at Oxford University who came to the UK at a young age, defined his identity informs me of the diversity present in his understanding of himself, ‘I would define my identity as British, Muslim, young, medical student, sportsman, Pakistani, and a university student’. He selected ‘British and Muslim’ from the list of options, and then told me about the experiences which formed this multiple identity and which layers are more important:

I was born in Saudi Arabia and lived there until I was 13 and then moved to the UK, and went to boarding school...I am typical and atypical of the Muslim community in Britain. I am different I think because I went to a boarding school. My boarding school had a huge impact on me, it taught not only about good academics but also how to be a man. It taught us how to eat, table manners, etc. It was very rich in sports. I struggled first and was behind, but then I picked up. I think it was expected of me to do well in life, if I hadn't then that would have been a shame. I think by coming to Oxford, I averted failure. My Pakistani identity is not very strong; when I go there it seems like a holiday. But when I go to Saudi Arabia, I feel that's home - although, I don't imagine myself living in Saudi Arabia. I do see myself living in Oxford; this is a nice place to work in. The things I like about Britain are its generous welfare services, its emphasis on traditions (at least in the older people), but I think people can be very cold here. They are polite but don't go out of their way, maybe they think if they ask us about ourselves, we will think they're strange or something. But when I do talk to them, they are very nice.

(Ishtiaq, 22 years old)

Murtaza, an undergraduate student at LSE, was born in Britain and certainly ascribed to having multiple identities, ‘I would call myself a third generation British Pakistani Liberal Muslim’, and described each aspect of his identity, justifying his selection and merging the most important parts together:

I speak about this with my friends. I definitely wouldn't call myself English because it is largely associated with drinking, etc. And I wouldn't say I'm purely Pakistani either, so British Pakistani is good. And third generation

because my grandfather actually came here 55 years ago, so my father was born here.

He chose these multiple identities because each of them offered him something different, his British identity was strong because his family had been settled in Britain for over five decades. Interestingly, he associated the English identity to drinking, rather than the British identity that seemed to be a safer selection for him to make.

Although there were multiple identities among these respondents, some of them did favour some over others. For example, Kaneeza, a working professional (a member of the UK parliament) who lives in London, was born in Pakistan and migrated to the UK as an adult, having also lived in other countries. She has multiple experiences that led her to define her identity as one that is multiple, saying ‘like most people I have multiple identities’. However she then went onto signal that these multiple layers of identity have different meanings and levels of attachment; some are more meaningful whilst others are less so. Kaneeza was clear in her strong feelings for the UK as opposed to Pakistan and the US:

I do not feel Pakistani at all, even when I am in Pakistan and am talking to people, I do not refer to them as ‘us’, I refer to them as ‘you’. I am 54 and left Pakistan when I was 18. I lived 3 years in Bangladesh, so lived in Pakistan for 15 years so that’s less than 30 per cent of my life. My parents did not originate from Pakistan, they migrated from India and all my siblings have left, so it was a stopping point along the way before you moved elsewhere.

(Kaneeza, 42 years old)

There has only been a limited amount of work done on the multiple identities of Muslims (Tyrer and Ahmad (2006) and Citizenship Survey (2007)) although the wider academic literature has addressed multiple identities. Graumann (1983) says in his work

that identity is the complex way a person identifies with, and is identified by, his environment, and multiple identities result from the many ways a person has been successfully identified. Identities coexist and sometimes the dominance of one over others becomes evident and a vertical structure of identities arises.

7.3 Unstructured Identity Questions – The Typology

The above quantitative results were the product of a structured identity question from the in-depth interviews, and in this kind of approach I used a positivist claim for developing knowledge. These results provide me with initial ideas to reflect on but to gain a fuller understanding of the identity processes and what these categories mean to my Muslim respondents, I will now turn to the answers from the unstructured questions on identity in the in-depth interviews. These unstructured or open-ended questions are the foundation of qualitative research, where one becomes an inquirer that “makes knowledge claims based primarily on constructivist perspectives (i.e. the multiple meanings of individual experiences, meanings socially and historically constructed, with an intent of developing a theory or pattern)” (Creswell 2002: 18). I collected open-ended, emerging data with the primary intent of developing themes from the data that are represented in a six-group typology of identity. I will now go through each of the groups in the typology discussing the themes of each.

Typology Group 1: CULTURAL IDENTITY

This group of Muslim respondents related to their identity, Pakistani or Muslim, with cultural references. Within this group there were two themes, ‘Simply Heritage’ and

‘Secular Muslims’, which were made up of various dimensions or drivers (generated from codes) such as references to Pakistan being heritage, adversity towards Pakistan, feelings of association but not belonging, Islam being conceived as a cultural tradition, and differentiating between religious teachings and practical life. The respondents articulated that they liked to hold on to this identity from a cultural angle which meant appreciating certain values and aspects associated to this identity but not actually applying it to their daily lives. Rather than wearing these identities around with them as a badge they instead preferred to look at them from a distance, almost like displaying them as a showpiece.

One of the themes that emerged from the codes in this group is ‘Simply Heritage’. These were the respondents who conceptualised their Pakistani identity in cultural terms and made references related to heritage. Some of them had feelings of indifference or adversity towards Pakistan for multiple reasons, and others just wanted to associate with it but not necessarily belong to it. Kaneeza, a working professional (a Member of the UK Parliament) was born in Pakistan and came to Britain as an adult. She is now settled in London with her family, she said:

I think Pakistan is so dysfunctional as a country that its not something that you’re desperately keen to belong to or identify with. My mother still lived there, and my father died early. But they went full of great hopes for the country and they made great personal sacrifices for the country which remain unfulfilled as we see the mess the country is in, so that also affects my ability to identify with it. Had what they had hoped for become a success, then maybe I would have felt differently, but I am not sure, I can only hypothesise. For me it is simply heritage now.

It is clear that for her Pakistan symbolised no more than just heritage, it is not the place where she thought she could base herself, despite her parents making personal sacrifices

for the country. The country failed their hopes and this has weighed on Kaneeza's decision to move away. She elaborates on her reason for not wanting to live there:

If you are a thinking woman, Pakistan isn't the place for you, except for in a very small elite. If you come to the UK and you're the right class, you're educated, and you have the right kind of background, then they don't care about your skin colour or your religion. I was never religious; I was brought up in a very liberal environment. I came to the UK because it felt more comfortable to be a small fish in small pond rather than being a small fish in a big pond, the US was just too vast and diverse, and that's rather daunting. There are such disparities and understanding of cultures, someone once asked me in New York, is Pakistan where the elephants are from? You would never hear that here. So it was really about to what level of ignorance you were prepared to put up with for a very small number of educated people who you would also encounter here: London was just much more comfortable.

(Kaneeza, 42 years old)

Kaneeza was fond of the educated culture that exists in Britain where she can freely exercise her mind and opinions. She said that being a part of the 'right class' determines one's position in society when they do land in Britain, and this is the country she saw herself feeling 'more comfortable' in.

Adil, an undergraduate student at Birmingham University, told me that for him the Pakistani culture was an aspect of pride:

I would tell people I have a British passport but my parents were born in Pakistan. I wouldn't be ashamed of saying that I have Pakistani roots. I feel proud of that. I love the Pakistani culture, the way my parents are and how they've brought us up. Pakistani culture has a lot of Islamic ethics involved into it and the family dynamics are quite good as well, everyone has respect regardless of who it is. And I also play a lot of cricket which keeps me very connected to Pakistan. But I couldn't imagine myself living there, I like its cultural values but I wouldn't want to live in the country.

(Adil, 19 years old)

For Adil the influences from Pakistani culture that he mentioned are of importance to him are his parents, his upbringing, the family dynamics and values of respect, the Islamic ethics, the cricket, and so on. He appreciated these cultural aspects but he did not want to live there. This sort of identification can be called ‘symbolic identification’ (Gans (1979) and Waters (1990)) which has long been linked to ethnic pride, ancestry, and leisure time activities. The work done by Waters (1996) on White migrants and their symbolic choices highlights the importance of choice as an appealing strategy as it gives them the option to choose, “even among those who have a homogenous background and do not need to choose an ancestry to identify with, it is clear that people do choose to keep an ethnic identity” (Waters 1996: 51). This exercise of personal choice allows the individual to have their own unique symbolic ethnicity of their minority group, and at the same time belong to the majority group and having a sense of conformity and normality.

Another theme that emerged in this group is ‘Secular Muslims’, these were the respondents who although Muslim by faith and perhaps also followers of the five pillars of Islam (the rituals of their religion), did not actually *feel* religious, their understanding of religion was very cultural. Naila, who was born and bred in Britain, and is now studying for her pharmacy degree in Kings College London, said that she would describe herself as a ‘secular Muslim’:

I don’t actually feel like a Muslim because I don’t practice the religion, I am just a Muslim by name. You can say I separate religion from my daily affairs.

(Naila, 22 years old)

For Naila, internalising her religious identity was not an option as she saw her religion and daily activities as two separate compartments, she remarked ‘my religion is spiritual, I keep it inside me, I don’t like to show it off...and to be honest I don’t think it can be applied to my daily life...I like to see religion and my daily life as two separate entities, one is spiritual and one is practical, and they don’t...and can’t overlap’. Aarzo, born in Pakistan and having lived in many countries but now living in London and working as a free-lance writer, had a view that she did not want her religion to be a showcase for others to see. She said this:

I don’t believe in exhibiting my religion, I don’t like to define myself by my religion on a daily basis. I believe in secularism that religion should be separate from the state.

(Aarzo, 31 years old)

Aarzo did not have an Islamic upbringing and did not believe in adopting the religious symbols such as the headscarf, or even the Pakistani traditional dress. For her religion was almost an additional cultural segment alongside her Pakistani identity. Kausar, a lawyer by profession working in London, said:

I would call myself a secular Muslim. What I would say to people is that your religious identity is there, but that doesn’t define who you are on a daily basis. Islam does not ask you to do that, Islam is so flexible. So don’t get bound by the ritual in Islam, the only thing you need to derive from Islam which will affect your daily choices is what you consider to be a good life and how you live your good life.

(Kausar, 28 years old)

Her concept of religion was that Islam does not have to translate in to your daily life and that it is flexible. She thought that Islam should be used as moral benchmark for living a good life, or in other words a moral guidebook from which you can derive your values.

Her view of Islam was cultural rather than practical, she thought the former provided her with values and the latter was loaded with rituals. She thought that Islam is personal to the human being and it is up to the individual to select from it the cultural aspects if and when they think it will help them live a good life. In this way, she described it as an ‘ephemeral cultural Islam which does not last very long and reappears when the need arises to consult it’.

This concept of being a believer but not belonging to the religion has been found in Voas and Crockett’s (2005) study where they discuss the concept of ‘Believing without Belonging’, which they argue has become the catchphrase of much European work on religion in the past decade. They examine the idea that religious belief is fairly robust even if churchgoing is declining using data from the British Household Panel Survey and the British Social Attitudes surveys. The evidence suggests that belief has in fact eroded in Britain at the same rate as two key aspects of belonging: religious affiliation and attendance. They find this decline to be generational and only about half of parental religiosity is successfully transmitted to their children, while absence of religion is almost always passed on.

Typology Group 2: UNAMBIGUOUS IDENTITY

This group of Muslim respondents were firm about their identity, they had an unwavering sense of allegiance to it. All the three identities, British, Pakistani, and Muslim came across as salient and fell into this group. Within this group there were three themes, ‘Britain is Home’, ‘My Religion is always First’, and ‘Pakistan is Home’ which were made up of various dimensions or drivers (generated from codes) such as

the values and culture of Britain, feelings of home and belonging for Britain, Religion providing them a unique connection, internalising Islam, Islam as a support system, reliance on God, the intrinsic value of being born as a Muslim, Pakistani roots, culture and heritage of Pakistan, and Pakistan providing them a safe haven.

One of the themes that arose in this group was ‘Britain is Home’ which brought together feelings of belonging for Britain. When coding the responses in this theme, I was interested in knowing, what does it mean for these respondents to be ‘British’? For them, there was no confusion whatsoever about their British identity and for them it meant something deep. Britain was the country to which they belonged, they had as similar aspirations as non-Muslims, and just wanted to live life in as normal a way possible. They made references to feeling very comfortable with their British identity, with the ways of life in Britain, its values of fairness, meritocracy, justice, the laws, the mannerisms of English people, their sense of humour, intellect, efficiency, and work ethic. One of the respondents even questioned me and felt upset for highlighting his Muslim identity, saying ‘Why is it important? Why are these questions being asked? I just want to get on with my life, and when people ask you about whether you feel Muslim or British, I just don’t understand why it matters. Why is my loyalty being questioned? I think of Britain as my home, this is where I was born and grew up, and this is where I will continue to live and raise a family’ (Tahir, 24 years old).

Nabila, an academic researcher at Oxford University, told me about her feeling of belonging at ‘home’ in Britain:

I really have no confusion about my identity whatsoever. Maybe because being academically inclined, I have researched so much into identity issues

that I am not confused anymore. I am completely British. Yes, I have ethnic roots from Pakistan but I do not feel Pakistani at all. I haven't been back for a long time. And I feel that I like Pakistani people less and less. I am certain that my home is Britain, this is where I belong..

(Nabila, 32 years old)

Similarly, Majid, who was born and grew up in Britain but his family had migrated from Pakistan many years ago, told me that he was happily settled in Britain and liked to think of himself as 'English':

I identify myself with Britain, in fact with English people. I think my mannerisms are very English. And I personally think English people are very intelligent. They are efficient and work hard. They also have a sense of humour that I like, a subtle sense of humour. I see myself in English people.

(Majid, 24 years old)

Sohail, a recent undergraduate from Oxford University, working in a consulting firm in London told me that although he thought of himself as British and Pakistani, and made visits to Pakistan often, for him the British part came first and this was his permanent abode for various reasons:

I identify myself as a British Pakistani, because I've grown up in Britain, I abide by British laws, and that's my culture. I go to Pakistan once every two to three years, and to be honest, I go there for about a month and that's usually for a wedding, and I move from house to house visiting people who I don't really know...they are relatives. So I don't get a chance to really see the country. I only visit Karachi, so the suburban area, I have memories of visiting the beach there.

I wouldn't think of living in Pakistan, No, I couldn't see myself living there. I couldn't find good job opportunities there, my prospects are better here, I'm more comfortable here, my lifestyle and choices. I do very much enjoy going there though, I didn't as a child but now I have more independence so now I enjoy it.

I have mixed feelings about Pakistan being my home. When I'm in Britain I like to think that I can return to Pakistan, that it is my ultimate home, and I

suppose seeing a lot of people who look like me makes it feel like home. But I feel very different when I'm out there...I feel I have a problem because I can understand Urdu but I cannot speak it very well, so that's an inherent barrier that I face.

I suppose there's a different way of thinking there...I feel like there are a lot of conversations that take place that I can't get involved in. These conversations might be about politics, or so simple as places they have visited, or family history. There is a sense of apartness.

For example, when I see a Pakistani politician speak or if there's a press conference, or the way they frame things it's very different from the British way, it's not structured. It's more emotive, I come to it from a more British angle, that's the way I've been taught...for example Asif Ali Zardari.

This is my home, Britain..but I do feel a bit different here as well. I work for a very English firm, and am surrounded by a lot of English people with English traditions such as going to the pub after work, and they talk a lot about drinking and I feel like these are conversations I can't partake in (*laughs*)... I go and socialise but don't stay there for hours and hours and get drunk, I usually have an orange juice and depart after that. So in these things I do feel a sense of apartness from British people. I would call London my home, more than Britain, I do feel very London.

(Sohail, 24 years old)

Sohail brought out some interesting angles of comparing Britain and Pakistan, and his sense of 'apartness' from both at times. For him his skin colour did make him feel familiar to people in Pakistan when he visited, but in reality he did not really 'fit in'. Furthermore, their ways of thinking and language were inherent barriers for him to cross. He had been 'taught' in British ways and this is why he could not relate to the Pakistani way of doing things, for example of conducting politics which he said were emotive as opposed to the structured way he had seen in British politics. He thought of British people and their culture to be more balanced, he abided by their rules and laws and called it his own culture, and his job prospects were also better in Britain. He felt that his British upbringing was reflected in his own lifestyle, the way he dressed and spoke, all very 'subtle'. However there were aspects he could not connect with his English colleagues at work, such as their conversations on drinking.

Furthermore, respondents in this group also mentioned the other aspect they liked about being British – the equality of opportunity in Britain. Rida, a medical doctor by profession working in London said:

I am a Belgian born Pakistani who has enjoyed learning both Asian and Belgian values. I do not see myself as a British at all as I have only lived/worked in the UK as a European migrant who is still learning about a new society a new way of living...in other words I am still familiarising myself with “the British way” of handling with everyday chores.

I must admit that working in the UK has been more enjoyable than working in Belgium. There are several reasons to this. In Belgium there are many restrictions in terms of what you are allowed/not allowed to wear at the workplace. No head cover is allowed at all...Hijaab, cap, hoodie...nothing that covers your head or which reveals your religious belief. We are encouraged to blend with the rest of the people around us. Very few companies would accept such accessories. For instance people who work in warehouses, who have no interactions with clients or higher level colleagues, they may be allowed to wear a hijaab. Also in Belgium there are tensions within their own communities. There are 3 main communities in Belgium: the French speaking mainly living in the South, The Dutch speaking living in the North and the German speaking living near the German border. These 3 communities are very nationalistic and you do find a lot of racism amongst them even though they are all Belgians. How can you expect a society to accept other foreigners when they are already finding it hard to accept natives who live in a different region. When I came to work in the UK, I noticed that it is more tolerant here...in London especially there are people from all over the world working here, it is so diverse and I did not feel excluded here.

(Rida, 29 years old)

Rida mentions that for her, feeling a part of Britain lay in acknowledging that Britain allowed the freedom to work and express yourself. She felt that the ‘freedom to practice’ was a strong issue for Muslims in Britain, especially when compared to the situation faced by other Muslims in other European countries such as her own example

of Belgium, or notably the ban of religious insignia in France, among other countries, such as Turkey.

Almost all of them had positive statements to say about being British, and the negative comments were mainly referring to perceived discrimination. These responses are what Jacobson (1998) terms as “upholding inclusive cultural boundary of Britishness” (p. 69). The exclusions they felt were in relation to some cultural aspects of British culture which they could or would not participate in, such as drinking. For them being British meant more than just a nationality or passport.

Being British for this group of respondents was about the British values of fairness, justice, and equality and identifying with certain parts of its culture (way of thinking, intellect, manners, work-ethic, cultural jokes, and intellect). In addition, living in a diverse mixed society and feeling comfortable to be themselves and to practice their professions were all aspects of identifying with being British rather than any other nationality. These are the aspects that they felt made them British. They did not suggest that flying a flag or celebrating St George’s Day made them feel British. It seems that the subtlety of feeling British lied in their appreciation of the strong foundations of the country, and their feelings of belonging and connectedness.

The importance of a British identity being more than just a nationality or passport has been emphasised by Heath and Roberts (2008), “any decline in British identity might have important consequences for British society. While most residents of the UK and Northern Ireland officially hold British citizenship and a British passport, British

identity is more than an official category. It may also provide a sense of attachment to the state and this may have a role in promoting social cohesion within the nation”.

Another theme that came out in this group was ‘My Religion is always First’, in which the respondents gave prime importance to their Muslim identity, preferring it over their other identities and being very sure about it. They made references to their Muslim identity as providing them a unique connection, a support system, reliance on God, and the intrinsic value of being born as a Muslim. They undoubtedly had a strong allegiance to their Muslim identity and the way they practiced it seemed to point to a fairly orthodox way of practising it.

Haaris, who has been living in Britain for three years for employment purposes, explained how religion is the most important aspect for him:

I think the religion is the most important thing, probably. Pakistani comes as secondary, probably because it comes under consideration when religion comes into mind, so I think the main identity is the religion, not Pakistan. And obviously I am born in Pakistan, I’ve also lived in Indonesia, and then I came to the UK afterwards, but I will still consider myself Muslim first, maybe I have some connections with these countries but the main identity is to do with religion. Being Pakistani is important, but for the social issues probably, nothing to do with the religion. Religion is something different, not something to do with Pakistan or some other country, that’s what I think.

(Haaris, 29 years old)

For him his religion went beyond his national identity, it provided him a connection that superseded any other ties he had. Ilqa, an undergraduate student at City University in London, told me how she saw her identity and took me through the reasoning for the

ordering that she chose. For her the reason of being born as a Muslim was enough to make it the most important part of her identity:

I would say I am a Muslim British. Muslim is more important because this is my religion; this is what I am born with. I was not born British but I was born Muslim and all my family belong to the Muslim faith. My beliefs are this and I have always been taught to be a Muslim, and follow their practices. Muslim is my religion and British because I am living here and Pakistan because I was born there. But the most important would be 'Muslim', because religion comes first in your life. It might not come for everyone, but for me it does because I see it this way. I was born in the Islamic religion and in Pakistan, so religion came first, and Pakistan the country where I was born came second, and then I came here so British came third. But as I live here, this country is now like my country so British comes first... but still it would be Muslim British.

(Ilqa, 19 years old)

Naila, an undergraduate student living in East London, was very firm that for her Islam always took priority in her self-identification, and she signalled this through her dressing as well. She said:

My faith is what keeps me going wherever I go. I wouldn't define myself by my nationality first; it has always been my religion. We're an outspoken family, and no one forced me to wear my scarf. I read about my religion and understood it. As a family we've relied on God a lot, it has kept us together. I attended youth club classes on Islam. My faith has grown a lot stronger and I rely on God a lot, this has made me wear the jilbab.

She described her experiences in her community especially around the time of 7/7, which hadn't been so pleasant, but according to her, her outspoken personality cannot easily be subsumed into the majority culture, she said:

I do feel that some non-Muslim people don't like my Islamic dress, and I have had some fights with them. I hang around with Black people quite a lot because they live in my area. I feel like I need to make a positive change, my role in this country is to make a positive change for a brighter future.

We have been given so many more opportunities than Muslims in other countries. I think there are a lot of narrow minded and ignorant people here. I got into a lot of physical fights after 9/11 and 7/7, people stereotyped us here. After 9/11, I got into a fight in a car park because a group of white boys threw cigarettes on my mum. But I got onto them and made them apologise to my mum. Another serious incident is when a women who was just murmuring and she came up with glass bottles and tried hitting me, I got into a fight, punched her. It was on the same day as 7/7. On the trains, people don't sit next to you. But now with the Iraq enquiry, people are realizing that Muslims are not all to blame. My friends and family have been intimidated. A lot of people have sworn at me. An old woman constantly says racist things to me. But even my Pakistani cousins say this to me, *so there is ignorance unless you educate them.*

(Naïla, 19 years old)

Amna, an undergraduate student from UCL, thought that her religion was more important because of the history of her nation, she said:

We're not proud that we're Iranians or Arabs, you know how they are. We are proud to be Muslims. I mean that was the reason for why we wanted a separate state for ourselves. I think the Muslim aspect is more important for us, than the Pakistani aspect. We're very sensitive about Muslim issues, be it in Kashmir, Afghanistan, Iran or Saudi Arabia. We scream strongly about their issues, we have strong opinions about any injustices going on in those countries. Maybe that's why we suffer, because that is not reciprocated, no one cares about us.

(Amna, 26 years old)

Farzana, a postgraduate student at LSE, thought that her religious identity was the most important aspect for her, and it was almost inseparable from her:

I feel more Muslim, then British and then Pakistani. Like Zakir Naik said on Islam Channel, when you ask people about whether they are Muslim first or British first, its like asking a man are you a man or British? Just like you can't separate your gender from you, you cannot separate your 'Muslim' element from you.

When I was growing up, there was confusion in my identity but I have never thought of myself as 'British', I always thought of myself as Muslim first.

My Muslim identity has become stronger, I didn't use to wear the Hijaab two years ago, now I do. I used to compromise on my prayers, but now I just pray wherever I am, in the office, in the bus etc. I just ask people if it would be ok that I can use a small corner of the room to pray and they say yes, they don't mind, and in fact they ask me questions as well.

I would say I'm Muslim first. Nationality is one thing when they ask you where you're from, but I wouldn't put it above religion. So I don't have that strong an allegiance to Pakistan than I do to my religion. Religion plays a more prominent role in my day-to-day life than nationality does. I realise everyday that I am Muslim, more than I probably do Pakistani. Pakistani would come second because I was born there, that has a huge impact. Whereas if you're born here you feel you can identify with other British people, it could be that you were born in the same hospital or something so you started from the same place. But I feel that I started in Pakistan. And then British last because we got our nationality pretty late as well.

Kamran, who was born and grew up in North London, working at a youth club there, said:

Before anything, I'm Muslim and then people need to know your background. People should know where you're from, otherwise it looks like you're embarrassed. I think I'm more British than Pakistani as most of my family is here, we speak in English. I speak Urdu just to my dad. I follow the orthodox or mainstream version of Islam...you know we are *Sunnis*. We try to complete the five pillars of Islam...we don't get caught up in the politics of Islam...you know Shias, they are constantly mourning the past, who should have been the caliph...and so on...I mean that is not important anymore...we need to move on. I think being an orthodox Muslim I am less fussed...I don't argue with the Shias but they like to justify and prove their point.

Bina, a college student studying for her A-levels in London, described religion as her primary base, 'Religion is my primary base, but I have a Pakistani and British upbringing' (Bina, 18 years old).

For some of the participants, the strength of this identity was determined by everyday, routine practices. Depending on which source or code of conduct these practices are

being derived from, forms their identity. For example, one of my participants, Maryam, a medical student at Imperial College London, told me that she followed a set routine without which she felt incomplete.

The first thing I do every morning is read the morning prayer, then before I eat each meal I read a mini prayer...you see there are small prayers to be read before each action, be it eating, sleeping, wearing new clothes, and so on...and when I go out of the house I follow a code of conduct which my religion demands of me, one of modesty, humility, charity...and how to deal with people at work and with my neighbours.

(Maryam, 24 years old)

Aliya, a young housewife living in London, told me:

My Muslim identity is the most important to me because it transcends every other identity of mine; it's a part of my daily life. I teach my kids how Islam has a rule for everything, even smiling at your neighbour is a form of reward...and in my own life as a housewife, my religion gives me a lot of reward for the duties that I carry out. There is so much blessing in looking after your husband and children, each single act you do for them is you fulfilling your duty as a wife and mother, and Allah will reward me for that. I don't like these modern Muslim feminist arguments of equality with men. Islam has assigned separate roles for man and woman and if they both fulfil their roles then that will be better for their family and society. So Islam tells me how to be a good daughter, wife, and mother. Every day of my life is dictated by small teachings.

(Aliya, 25 years old)

This sort of identity seems to be 'action-driven' whereby the person makes a conscious effort to mould their lifestyle according to their religious teachings or texts. In Jacobson's work (1998) she highlighted that one major reason why Islam is a source of social identity for young Muslims is because "the content of its messages is accessible and appealing to the young people" (p.126). This is what my respondents were saying, that they could understand the practical aspects of Islam, they thought of these practices

as a ‘way of life’. It influenced all aspects of their lives, their family, and relations with the community.

Musa, a first generation migrant who came to work in Britain as a professional, told me that his most important identity was his religious one and if he had to give up any of his identities that would definitely be his ethnic or civic one, but not his religious one. He said:

My religion is more important to me than my nationality, as a Muslim I can live anywhere. If I had to give up any of these, I would give up Pakistani and British, but not Muslim. I call myself British because we have lived here in Britain and gone through the process and now we have our rights. I stayed here because of better facilities and it’s a welfare state. They have equal rights here, culturally rich. It’s a multi-cultural society, everyone gets equal opportunities. Universal system here, people from all over the world live here. People come here for economic reasons and education. Third world countries do not have these facilities. There are not many resources to uplift you in Pakistan. It’s a natural trend that humans want to go further, from village to city, and I made that effort too. The system is well-established here so people of all merits can fit in here.

(Musa, 57 years old)

Therefore although his religious identity was the most important one for him, Britain had given him more comforts and it was for these facilities and comforts that he was living in Britain, but he wouldn’t give up his religious identity. Yusuf, who was born and bred in Britain, thought of his religious identity as the most important for him, he told me:

Religion is the most important force for me, because Pakistan and Britain are countries so I see them as nationalities. But a Muslim can be of any nationality. You can’t give similar labels British, Pakistani, and Muslim because you can have a Pakistani born in Britain who doesn’t feel very religious or Muslim. When I was growing up, I didn’t know much about my religion, I just went to *Madrassah* to learn the *Quran* and it was all a bit of

fun, going to *Madrassah* was a time when you hung out with your mates and sometimes took fun out of each other. It is only when I was 13 or 14 years old that I started becoming more religious. My siblings (there are 5 of us) had a big impact on me, I have learnt my religion from them, and they are religious. I have now been religious, or shall I say practising, from a young age of 13/14. I have lived in Newham all my life. My father came to this country in 1969 and we have lived in Newham since then. My elder brother is nearly 40 now.

(Yusuf, 25 years old)

He drew his influences from his siblings who were ‘very religious’ and had a ‘big impact’ on him, their religiosity influenced him. In her study, Jacobson (1998) considered the interrelationship between religious and ethnic identities maintained by young British Pakistanis, and addresses the question of why religion is a more significant source of social identity for these young people than ethnicity. She argues that there are two basic manifestations of this greater significance of religion. First, it is manifest in the nature of the fundamental distinction made by many young British Pakistanis between religion and ethnicity as sources of identity. This distinction rests on the assumption that whereas Pakistani ethnicity relates to a particular place and its people, Islam has universal relevance. The greater significance of religion is manifest, secondly, in the contrast between the essential characteristics of the social boundaries delineating the two forms of social identity. The social boundaries that encompass expressions of religious identity among young British Pakistanis are pervasive and clear-cut in comparison to increasingly permeable ethnic boundaries. In another study, Jacobson (1998) focuses on the ways in which Islamic religion still engenders powerful loyalties within what is now a predominantly secular society and how, in their continual adherence to their religion, many young British Pakistanis find a welcome sense of stability and permanence. By presenting material collected in field-work study and by using extensive quotations from interviews, Jacobson argues that in a world where

concepts of identity are always being challenged traditional sources of authority and allegiance still survive.

Another theme for this group of respondents was 'Pakistan is Home', for whom their Pakistani identity was much stronger than their British identity, although they were born and grew up in Britain. Annie explained that no matter how long she lived in Britain, her Pakistani roots would never change, saying 'heritage is a huge thing for me'. Nasreen, a young married woman with children, preferred Pakistan to Britain. She said:

Muslim is my religion and British because I was born here, and my background is from Pakistan. I got married in Pakistan and my in-laws are there. If I had money I would live in Pakistan, children are more clever there, they can handle a lot of things: school, religion, cooking etc. Society makes you learn about cultural things faster over there, about social norms and customs. But over here your parents take care of everything and you don't stand on your feet until you get married.

It is clear that for her the society of Pakistan had certain norms that she liked. She further told me why she didn't feel British:

I don't really feel British, I've never really thought about it. I was born here and I've lived here. My Pakistani culture has more of an impact. My parents have said that your culture and religion comes first before anything else. Britain is a lot more modern now, young girls have a mobile now whereas when my mum was growing up society wasn't like that. I don't see a contradiction between British and Muslim, because I don't really feel British. My home is Pakistan. I've lived there for 6 months. I don't think Muslims are discriminated here, its equal to any other religion, Hindu, Sikhs etc. I've never seen or heard of any discrimination. I'm proud to be a Muslim (Nasreen, 25 years old).

Sakina, an undergraduate student from LSE, explained that this attachment to her country of origin, despite not visiting it that often, came from her parents who constantly reminded her of their temporary status in Britain, a fear bred by geo-political

events and the situation of Muslims worldwide, and other examples where immigrants had been sent back to their country such as the Ugandan Asians expelled by Idi Amin in 1972. She said:

When I was growing up my parents always said to us that we are not permanent residents in this country, if things get bad we may have to go back to Pakistan. My parents migrated here, and I was born here in Oxford and always lived here. When 7/7 happened, it made me realise that we had thought that we were safe, that our community was fine. But in fact it wasn't, and 7/7 exposed that our community had problems...

(Sakina, 27 years old)

Daniyal, who was born and grew up in Leicester, studying for his undergraduate degree at UCL said:

When I go to Pakistan, it felt like home, I sometimes feel more comfortable there than I do here, it's the place to be. Everyone there is of the same race as me, they're Pakistani and Muslim. You just fit in perfectly, you don't get noticed, you don't stand out. Most British people are tolerant, I have thought about moving to the Middle East.

(Daniyal, 19 years old)

For him his Pakistani roots were an immense source of pride and he just 'fitted in' whenever he went back there. Similarly Ayesha, born in Britain, felt Pakistani:

I would say I'm from Pakistan, I was born there. I then came here 3 or 4 years later. I've been back 5 or 6 times, don't remember much of it. It's ok to go back for like a week, but I'm not used to the lifestyle there. Everything there is very slow, no one is rushed on their feet. People are lazy. I like that you just blend in with everyone there, it's the culture, it's your own so it's just different.

(Ayesha, 20 year old)

Typology Group 3: EMOTIONAL IDENTITY

The themes that came out for this group of respondents were indicative of an emotional identity, in relation to their Muslim identity. Within this group there were two themes, ‘Born-again Muslims’ and ‘Ultra-Orthodox Muslims’. There were a number of dimensions or drivers that made up these themes such as having reflective feelings of Islam, a deeper understanding and knowledge of the religion as compared to their parents, life-changing experiences, swinging between two extremes of behaviour, historical struggles, stories of oppression, and conservative behaviour and attitudes.

One of the themes that arose for this group of respondents is ‘Born-again Muslims’. They claimed to be ‘born-again’ Muslims in the sense that they had learnt about their religion independently, on their own terms. This gave them a greater sense of belonging to Islam as they had discovered it. Raza, a medical student at Kings College London, said:

I think there is a wave of these ‘born-again Muslims’ who see themselves as Muslim first, and I am a part of that. I don’t belong to any nation, I believe in belonging only to my religion, it’s a global religion.

(Raza, 25 years old)

These Muslims imagined having a more refreshed and intellectual understanding of religion than their elders. In their view, their elders followed a ritualistic and traditionalist version of Islam, as was culturally prescribed to them, they did not do ‘any thinking for themselves’. This they said was not the true essence of Islam. As Sana, who was born and grew up in Britain, working as a community worker in Birmingham said:

I think my Mother just prays five times a day but she doesn't really relate Islam to her life. She doesn't reflect on the Islamic texts and teachings, she follows a Pakistani version of Islam. I have made some friends and we all meet and study the Quran together, we read the English translation of the Quran and understand the meaning behind the Arabic. I take part in my community and help the people around me, I am always thinking about how to improve myself and become a better Muslim, and I am reflective.

(Sana, 28 years old)

These respondents certainly portrayed a sense of superiority of their version of Islam. But they often faced resistance from their elders who thought they are being 'brainwashed' by extremist groups and individuals who had their own agendas. Zain, an undergraduate student at City University in London, explained:

I feel so happy that I have a...you know a deeper understanding of my religion than my family...but my father is always saying to me, Son don't hang out with these groups of so-called 'Muslims' in mosques and cafes...they want to involve you in their own game, they have agendas...I don't know why my father says this, I mean I have a brain you know, I can think for myself, I am an adult...its my choice anyway. My father never taught me the basics of my religion, so now I am learning it with my new friends who have better knowledge.

(Zain, 25 years old)

These respondents said that they learnt about Islam from sources and influences different (and which they claim are more correct) to the ones their parents had and as a result their understanding of Islam is perhaps more 'pure'.

One of these Muslim respondents, Ammar, described his identity as being one which very often moves from being less religious to being very religious, in a way that his activities shifted from being 'un-Islamic' to 'Islamic'. An undergraduate student at the University of East London, Ammar described his Muslim identity as one that constantly

swings between two poles, almost like a pendulum. He described it in the following way:

I think that my identity as well as of many other young Muslims around me is like a pendulum, which swings between heathenism and extremism. By this I mean we either become immersed in forms of heathenism...such as clubbing, drinking, and so on...or we endorse ourselves in forms of extremism and become ultra religious, we keep beards, radically change our dressing, start going to mosques, religious classes, preaching Islam, etc. This is not healthy...Islam asks us to be balanced.

(Ammar, 23 years old)

Another respondent, Sumera, a student at the University of East London, said this:

I used to be a very liberal Muslim but after 9/11, I started wearing the *Hijaab* and *Abayah*...I wanted to become a proper Muslim, I wanted to make up for all the lost times of being a good Muslim...I mean I used to wear mini skirts and so on...now I want to be a better Muslim.

(Sumera, 27 years old)

A second theme that emerged for this group of respondents was 'Ultra-orthodox' Muslims. There were a very small number of Muslim respondents in my sample who fell under this theme. They had a very conservative view and seemed to have a one-dimensional view of religion. Some of these respondents belonged to a sect, namely the Shia sect, or to a particular movement within Islam, namely the Ahmadis, and some were a part of Islamic organizations which preached a particular ideology of Islam. In one way or another, this group of Muslim respondents seemed to have a religious identity (sect, movement, or ideological) which they thought of as being superior based on its intellectual or historical foundations.

Shaista, an Ahmadi by birth, was born and grew up in Britain. Studying for her undergraduate degree at LSE, she told me:

I would say I am a Muslim first before any other identity, or actually an Ahmadi Muslim...my identity is different to my non-Ahmadi Muslim friends, they are not as sentimental as I am about my religion...like whenever we have discussions on Islam, I defend my faith more than they do...I think my community of Ahmadis are very attached to our founder Mirza Ghulam Ahmad...he was born in 1835 and we regard him as the messiah and a prophet...so we think he was the last prophet...we do think we have the right interpretation of Islam...

(Shaista, 20 years old)

Shaista explains to me that ‘the Ahmadiya community is regarded by orthodox Muslims as heretical because we do not believe that Mohammed was the final prophet sent to guide mankind’, as mainstream orthodox Muslims believe is laid out in the Quran. Ghulam Ahmad saw himself as a renewer of Islam and claimed to have been chosen by *Allah*.

Fariha, a housewife who was born in Pakistan and has now been living in London for ten years, told me her about her Muslim identity with many repeated references to her Ahmadi identity:

I have been living in Britain for many years now...but I would still call myself a Muslim first, I belong to a family of Ahmadi Muslims...we are a tight global community and no matter where we go, we never forget that. I recently met Mirza Ghulam Ahmad...it was a life-changing experience, I have to say I was not that religious before but now I am a practising Muslim...I think I am proud to be an Ahmadi because at least I know a lot about my religion...my other friends who are not Ahmadi don't know that much about Islam. They need to learn more, and sometimes I tell them about my beliefs but we often get into arguments. I think I feel more comfortable among my Ahmadi friends...and you know I can't forget that Pakistan threw us out...this incident makes us more closer as a community in Britain, we meet up here, and we feel safe here in Britain.

(Fariha, 36 years old)

Fariha's reference to Pakistan throwing her community out is explained by the 'anti-Qadiani movement' that was formed in Pakistan in 1953 against the Ahmadiyya. She told me that the Ahmadi community feels like a relentlessly persecuted community in Pakistan, they feel that 'their personal and political rights have eroded' over the years under pressure from orthodox Muslim groups.

Rania, an Ahmadi Muslim, was born in Britain and recently graduated from Nottingham University, she told me this about her identity:

As I was born in England I would say I feel a close connection to my British ties, but because my family are very cultured I strongly associate myself with my Pakistani culture and hence when I think of my identity I see myself as a British Pakistani. Another identity I would attach to my identity of a 'British Pakistani' is being an Ahmadi Muslim. While growing up, my parents have always told me that I am an Ahmadi Muslim and I have always known that I believe differently to other Muslims around me and hence this apparent 'difference' has become a part of who I am and I see myself and consider myself an Ahmadi Muslim first and foremost and second to that comes my identity of being a British Pakistani.

Labelling myself an Ahmadi makes me somewhat different to my non-Ahmadi friends as I associate and link myself to a particular community and a leader (Khalifah) who I follow and try to obey in my everyday life and decisions I make. Often when I am questioned on doing something differently my reply is 'I do this because I am an Ahmadi'. This explains why from the three identities I have mentioned above, my identity of being an Ahmadi is the strongest. Most of my friends have always been non-Ahmadi and on a day to day base I haven't really felt any difference when reading my prayers (*Salah*), praying before eating, reading *Quran* etc... In that sense we are all Muslims and following the *Quran* and *Sunnah*. It is only when perhaps we look closely to the differences in our beliefs that we can identify the differences that lie between us. It is at this point where I lose an element of connection with my non-Ahmadi friends as my core beliefs in life are separate to theirs and is something that I can only share with my Ahmadi friends, family and community, which for me is what unites Ahmadis all around the world.

For Rania her upbringing played a role in her identifying herself as an Ahmadi Muslim identity. She felt this difference because she was told that they believed differently, and as then her frames of reference for this identity grew as she interacted with non-Ahmadi friends whose core beliefs differed from hers, and it was at these moments when she felt her in-group Ahmedi identity kicks in. She then expands on this by telling me how she internalised an emotional understanding of her Ahmadi Muslim identity:

I guess because Ahmadis are a minority in the Muslim world and in many countries declaring oneself as an Ahmadi is a matter of life and death; the struggles we face as a community make my identity as an Ahmadi an emotional one. Primarily one emotion I feel is pride...this is because I'm proud of the achievements my community has made despite the on-going troubles we face. Pride, because I am satisfied and honoured to be a part of a community that only promotes peace! Regardless of what anyone may do or say towards us we don't retaliate and for me that is something to be very proud of. This being mainly because it is in human nature to react in a negative way when someone is attacking us and to stop yourself from doing so is extremely challenging. There is also a sense of sadness attached to this identity... because of the fact that I feel as Ahmadis we are not given our rights and we are discriminated against, which in turn makes me more firm in my belief and in my identity as an Ahmadi. Contentment is another emotion I feel in that it is very satisfying to be a part of a community that we believe is the chosen one and makes me feel very blessed. This feeling of honor of being a part of this community promotes a sense of unity with other Ahmadi Muslims around the world. Anticipation is another emotion - a sense of excitement about the successes of Ahmaddiyyat and the hope that inshAllah one day everyone will see the truthfulness of Ahmaddiyat and every Ahmadi will be able to practice their religion openly without any fear and will be able to go to do *Umrah* and *Hajj* without hiding their identity of being an Ahmadi Muslim.

She described her emotional Ahmadi identity as being the construct of four key elements: pride, sadness, contentment, and anticipation. When I asked her whether she considered her community to be more orthodox as compared to the mainstream global Muslim community, she answered in the positive and gave me her reasons:

Yes indeed the Ahmadi Muslim community is more orthodox compared to some non-Ahmadi sects. As an Ahmadi there are rules you have to follow, such as have simple weddings, all Ahmadi women should wear *Hijab*, going to the cinema is only encouraged to watch decent and more educational movies, halloween and birthday parties are not allowed. Like in any sect, not all Ahmadis follow these rules exactly, but we do have a guideline as to what is the correct Islamic way of living, which of course can seem very difficult to abide by at times, but it is also a blessing that we have a *Khalifah* that can guide us today in a world where there is immorality and corruption. This for me is a way of protecting our community as a whole.

(Rania, 21 years old)

The aspects which Rania thought made her community more orthodox were their rules guiding them on their general lifestyle and dressing and ways to spend their time and money. One of the aspects that hold together this emotional community of Muslims is their leader, who they consider as their religious leader, or *Khalifah*. This is indeed a strong factor in keeping them united, as the global Muslim community has been disintegrated since the Islamic Caliphate, the Ottoman Empire, collapsed in 1924. To have a religious leader that acts as ‘protection’ or a shield in an unstable world is comforting and secure for the Ahmadis.

Other than the Ahmadi identity, a couple of my respondents belonged to the *Shia* sect of Islam. A *sect* is a subgroup of a religious, political or philosophical belief system, usually an offshoot of a larger religious group. Zarka, who was born and grew up in Bristol, now working in London as a pharmacist, told me how she would define her Muslim identity:

I would call myself a Muslim first, in fact a Shia Muslim. For me the Shia identity is the most important one...just saying Muslim is too blurry for me

because there are so many Muslims in the world. I don't see myself as belonging to the global Muslim community because I don't agree with the majority orthodox version of Islam.

Zarka's community of Shias makes up 10-20 per cent of the world's population and differ from the Sunnis over their point on who should have succeeded Prophet Muhammad after his death. Shias hold the lineage of the prophet to be the rightful successor whereas Sunnis believe that the title should have been given to the most deserving person, whether the prophet's blood or not. The two communities have continued this dispute and in Muslim countries this difference is pronounced leading to severe discrimination and feelings of alienation. Zarka explained:

I don't really feel my Shia identity to be under scrutiny in England but in Pakistan where my family live, they feel it on a day to day basis. They don't reveal their identity so they don't get denied job opportunities, its almost a taboo to be a Shia in most Muslim countries, except Iran and Iraq. But it is this global struggle which makes me quite defensive about my Shia identity...I feel like I need to know more about my religion so I can defend it...my Sunni friends don't know that much about their religion actually...maybe because they never felt discriminated, they are the majority. But I remember when we were young I would attend religious classes with my cousins and we would learn the basic facts of why we are Shia...maybe we were being prepared to combat the discrimination we might face....we are also more conservative than Sunnis I think, the women in our community cover more, and attend mosques, Islamic classes...from a young age we socialize together with our Shia friends and family, so we don't feel confused in our identity. We also pray differently, we have some differences.

(Zarka, 26 years old)

A very small number of the respondents belonged to an ideological organization that influenced their Muslim identity. Umair, who was born and grew up in Britain, chose to

belong to an ideological political organization that claims to be working to establish an Islamic state all over the world. He told me:

I don't have a national identity, I would say I am a global citizen...I mean the group of Muslims that I mix with and have a bonding with, we don't feel British. We feel Muslim first, and our struggle is on-going all over the world. We are witnessing the injustices that are taking place in Muslim countries at the hands of Western non-Muslim countries...why would I want to be British then? I have a different ideology and I am working with my brothers (in Islam)...we have regular activities where we meet up and work together.

(Umair, 24 years old)

His Muslim identity was wrapped up in the sentiments and activities with the group of 'Muslim Brothers' that he associated himself with. But when I asked him about what he did in his spare time for leisure, he mentioned that he helped out in 'community events' or volunteered in his neighbourhood. He was then unconsciously contributing to British society, he said 'well I live here so I have to do my bit somehow...although I might not agree with most things here, I still live here and go out everyday so yeah...I do take part in events and help out in my local community'.

Typology Group 4: EMERGENT IDENTITY

For this group of respondents their identities went beyond notions of single, dual, or multiple identities, instead they were emergent and dimensional. They had many different and overlapping identities and context was crucial to understanding them. Within this group there were three themes, 'Anglo-Pakistani', 'Kaleidoscope Identity', and 'Liberal Muslims' which were made up of various dimensions or drivers (generated from codes) such as a new cultural identity, creative and unconventional identities, and

liberal attitudes and lifestyles. The respondents chose to mix various elements of British, Pakistani, and Muslim identities and other cultures that exist in Britain to create their own fused and mesh identities.

One theme that was found for this group of respondents was ‘Anglo-Pakistani’ identity, a fusion identity that had been created as a result of both their ethnic and British cultures mixing. The respondents’ Pakistani culture had adapted itself into British culture, and also picked up parts of other cultures leading to the emergence of this fused identity. Asad, a working professional in London told me:

I am Muslim, of Pakistani origin who is now defined by his dual identity as British as well as Pakistani. I am considered “British Asian” to others – where the colour of my skin is second to my citizenship – where my background and culture is now expected to be aligned with the values instilled into every child that are uniquely British.

(Asad, 26 years old)

Sabeen, an undergraduate student in London, described to me:

Most of my friends are Pakistani but having said that, they are all born and bred here so that is a very different kind of Pakistani-ness to that of those who are directly from Pakistan. It is one thing to listen to Asian music and another thing to actually feel Pakistani. Most of the Asian music that British Pakistanis listen has been developed here in Britain, so it is not even Pakistani music originating from Pakistan. I think British Pakistanis here feel part of an ‘Asian’ community more than a Pakistani community, they like Bollywood films and listen to Asian Music (which is usually composed by artists from across the Indian subcontinent and not just Pakistan. I am ‘Asian’ in so many ways but not Pakistani. On forms, if I have to choose I usually pick British Asian Pakistani, I don’t write in the ‘Other’ field.

(Sabeen, 29 years old)

This Anglo-Pakistani identity was constructed in a way that it selected the Pakistani culture that had blossomed in Britain, instead of the Pakistani culture that existed in

Pakistan. So it is not the case that Pakistan was not important to these respondents, but the Pakistani culture that existed in the lives of the respondents was more accessible and one they could relate to as opposed to the native one their parents related to. In the words of Brotton (2013), who described a cartographic genealogy of globalism, “Everything is related to everything else, but near things are more related than distant things”. This means that although these respondents were related to Pakistan, they were more related to their near version of Pakistani culture than the more distant culture that existed in Pakistan. As one respondent said:

We need to feel part of this Asian community here in many ways because there aren't many of us here. But if you go to Pakistan you will see that there isn't such a strong community aspect there, because people don't need to feel a part of a community to feel secure if they live in Pakistan.

British Asian/English-Asian (this is my national identity). I would identify more with English Asian. I said British only because it is just a more commonly used term. I don't associate very much with Scotland, Wales, or Ireland, hence I said English. I think English means anyone who's spent a substantial amount of time living in England, have the legal right, and can identify with the English culture. Muslim, Girl, Graduate, Employee (I work), Outgoing, Confident (this is my personal identity). British, Asian, Girl, Employed, Graduate, Out-going, a bit shy.

(Sakina, 27 years old)

This fusion identity is something new; it has emerged out of the dialogue between the two identities, British and Pakistani. But from what the respondents say, it is interesting to note that this fusion identity is not just a simple average of the two cultures, British and Pakistani, but also draws influences from various other cultures, including Indian, Sikh, and Bangladeshi. It is selective, but rather just being a mix, it is something more emergent. It is almost a new creation in its own right. In some ways, this is in line with the general theoretical approach that identities are always in flux, or in more precise

terms, it is in line with the modern conception of identity, as discussed in our chapter on the academic literature on identities.

Is this fusion identity different from the traditional, modern, and post-modern concept of identity? In some ways, this is the nature of identities - identities are always evolving. But in another sense what we have is something different, what we have is *emergent*. We see that this process of the interaction, the dialogue with not just the White group but with the other Asian groups, gives us something new and different. What our respondents are telling us has similarities with the pan-ethnic identity notion that has been found in other groups, but in our case it isn't simply a matter of a pan-ethnic identity.

The academic literature on pan-ethnicity has found something similar, more specifically the growing literature on Latinos. Lopez and Espiritu (1990) study Mexican, Columbian, and Venezuelan identities and find this notion of pan-ethnicity because these groups are coming to think of themselves as Latinos. Similarly, Caribbeans in Britain had started off thinking of themselves as Trinidadians, Jamaicans, or Guyanans and then very quickly as they mixed with each other, rather than having their separate island identities, they came to have a much more pan-ethnic West Indian identity. This may also be changing with Black African and Black Caribbean groups because they are evolving into a much broader black ethnic identity.

Another theme to emerge among this group of respondents was 'Kaleidoscope Identity' which involved creatively selecting different aspects of one's life and forming his or her

identity. So for these Muslim respondents, their identities were not simply additive, there was an element of meshing their different identities.

Annie, a housewife from London, told me how she had formed her 'mesh' identity:

I know I am a Muslim and Pakistani culture plays into it. But I think I've taken certain parts of my Pakistani culture and rejected that and taken certain parts of the British culture and have implemented that with my Muslim faith, so I feel like I've made my own kind of a culture, its not all necessary Pakistani, British, nor Muslim: it's a mesh of things that I think are right. So I have fluidity.

Just as she liked certain parts of her British culture, she then went on to tell me how she also valued Pakistan:

Pakistan is my roots, even though I was born here (Britain). I am proud to be a Pakistani. Heritage is a huge thing for me. We love to hate it, but we love it. Its just culture isn't it. I love it more because I lived there. We have families there, open space, etc. There's *Azaan* 5 times a day.

(Annie, 25 years old)

Ayesha, a 20 year old university student from London, described herself in the following way, 'Hardworking, sociable, and fun'. For Ayesha, her personality traits seemed to define her before any national, ethnic, or religious identity. Tahir, a young professional in London, was very unique in forming his identity. He said:

I refer to identity as the person other people see me as and how I see myself. I would see myself as a British Pakistani Muslim Gay Fun laidback person. A mixture of cultures and society where who I am is not set in stone and I don't always feel like I need to relate to just one aspect of it. Whereas on the other hand how other people see me can be more defined as they see me as Asian because of my skin colour and British because of my accent, the visible aspects of my identity.

(Tahir, 28 years old)

The answers under this theme suggested that some of our Muslim respondents did not want to attach themselves to having a singular or dual identity; instead they went beyond this and created space for multiple layers of identification. This is also found in the Foresight report (Ali and Heath 2013), which considers several aspects of identities including ethnic, religious, and national identities. The case it presents is that a person can have all these identities simultaneously, although one identity might be more important under particular circumstances, depending on the context. Identities are therefore culturally contingent and highly contextual, but can also be strongly associated to behaviours.

This theme also includes those respondents who thought of themselves as global citizens as they had travelled to many locations and felt that restricting themselves to one identity label did not describe their identification in a complete way. Soha, a freelance writer living in London, said this:

What if somebody...well, Muslim is a different thing right, it's a religion, and Pakistani or British is your nationality. I obviously consider myself Pakistani... I'm actually very strongly Pakistani and at one level I don't think...at another level...ok I think of myself as very strongly Pakistani but at another level I also think of myself as a global citizen so its not that, I mean I...I've lived in so many places. Pakistan would be my home. I don't believe in exhibiting my religion, I don't like to define myself by my religion on a daily basis. I believe in secularism that religion should be separate from the state.

(Soha, 30 years old)

Moona, an undergraduate student from London, said:

I have travelled so much that I would call myself a global citizen. I like to have an identity that encompasses all the places I have ever lived in...I don't want to restrict myself.

(Moona, 25 years old)

There were also some Muslim respondents who had local identities, e.g. Londoner. Kasinitz et al. (2004) has done work on this and says that sometimes being a 'New Yorker' is fine because if you're a New Yorker, you are still American but being American is a broader category and not everyone might relate to that. So is Londoner being fine too? Haseena, a housewife from London, says: 'I would say my identity is of a Londoner, or actually of an 'East-Londoner', a very local identity' (*Haseena, 27 years old*). Amjad, working in London, says:

I would say my identity is of a Londoner, or actually of an 'East-Londoner', a very local identity. I can't say London because London is very different, there are parts of it which are very tolerant. I grew up in an area near Green St in East London, was born in Barking. Barking used to be more White, but now it has become more mixed, which the BNP etc. do not like. In that area you didn't want to associate yourself with being English because the people who called themselves English were the local guys who played football, had alcohol, swore at your mum because she wore a scarf, so you didn't want to do associate yourself to something who opposes you. They didn't explicitly say 'I'm English' and so on, but you knew it when they wore a football shirt which said England on it. Maybe if I'd grown up in an area where there were more tolerant people then I wouldn't have minded calling myself English. There was also a sense of local youth culture, you would hang out together and listen to similar music. At school, it was different, there was a sense of 'jovial racism' between ethnic minorities (Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Indian and Caribbean people), we could joke around and call each other names like Paki, it was fine, it was just a joke. The White people probably thought they can't do that. My school was very mixed, we had so many different languages spoken just in my year. I don't call myself British. Even when I'm abroad I just say I am from London. But people are not satisfied with that, they want to know where you're really from, and I get frustrated by that. I then just say that my parents are from Pakistan.

(Amjad, 23 years old)

Similar responses were found in the research conducted in New York on ethnic minority groups by Kasinitz et al. (2004). They found that White respondents identified with New York as a multicultural and diverse city, respondents were less likely to identify

with being ‘American’ due to the connotations and the variety that geographically encompasses the USA. This is also because London, like New York, is very cosmopolitan and they are like ‘world cities’:

“Many respondents sidestepped this ambivalent understanding of the meaning of being American by describing themselves as ‘New Yorkers’. This term is open to them even as blacks or Hispanics or Asians, and it embraces them as second generation immigrants. A New York identity reflects the dynamic cultural creativity familiar to them, but not necessarily the larger white society. ‘New Yorkers’ for our respondents, can come from immigrant groups, native minority groups, and they can be Italians, Irish, Jews and the like. The changes necessary to become a ‘New Yorker’ are not nearly so large as those required to become an ‘American’” (Kasinitz et al. 2004: 17).

This multicultural and varied attitude to identity is mirrored by Natasha Warikoo’s work on Indo-Caribbean youth in New York City (Warikoo 2004). Through ‘cosmopolitan’ ethnicity she describes second generation teens that are able to pursue multi-dimensional identities through a variety of music, ethnic clothing, films, and social networks, “...given that the youth I studied expressed security and no ‘identity crisis’ with their multifaceted identities, we should question the notion of ethnic identity as one coherent, essential core of the individual. Second, individuals choose different types of identity in different realms of their lives, as I observed in the differences in individual identities in different situations and realms of life (Warikoo 2008: 385). Identity to this group of respondents most certainly exists in the plural.

Another theme to emerge for this group of respondents was 'Liberal Muslims'. These were a few Muslim respondents who very openly described their identity as liberal where they selected parts of British culture into their lifestyle, such as homosexual relationships, drinking, clubbing, and socializing.

Tahir, who was born in Pakistan and then migrated to Britain at a young age with his family told me that he had created his own identity where he wanted to adopt parts of British culture that he thought were more accommodating towards his personality, parts which his own country would deny him. He said:

I would see myself as a British Pakistani Muslim Gay Fun person. A mixture of cultures and society where who I am is not set in stone and I don't always feel like I need to relate to just one aspect of it.

(Tahir, 27 years old)

He told me that Pakistan would not acknowledge his personal identity as a Gay Muslim, he would be looked down upon and be an outcast there, as well as in other Muslim countries. Britain on the other hand, has given him the personal freedom to exist in his entirety and for this reason he will never want to move away from Britain. He does practice the ritualistic elements of Islam although he described his views as liberal, he said he 'prays sometimes, keeps the fasts in Ramadan, and gives to charity'.

Saad, a working professional in London, told me about his liberal way of practising Islam and that he did not want to be restricted by certain rules in Islam. He said:

I would call myself a liberal Muslim...because I do not eat halal meat, I sometimes drink alcohol, and I used to go clubbing. I don't pray... Maybe this is because all my friends are White, I have never had any good Pakistani friends...I went to a majority White school...and my parents are

not religious. I don't see anything wrong with my choices. I don't think that Islam is the only correct religion, I think there are many different paths to God, and all the world religions have their own way...how can God only favour Muslims? I don't like the narrow-minded Muslims...I mean I interacted with a few of them at my university Islamic society, and they vehemently disagreed with me, they said I was saying that Islam is not the best religion...but I have so many good non-Muslim friends...how can I believe that what they believe is less than what I believe? Maybe later on in life, I will have a better understanding of Islam...but right now, I am a liberal Muslim. My life is a journey, and maybe one day I will understand what some practising Muslims believe, I want to keep an open-mind.

(Zulfikar, 23 years old)

Jacobson's (1998) research into young Muslim British Pakistanis suggests that even if Muslims do not practice their religion thoroughly, the religion serves as a benchmark or ideal for them to which they can strive. And they do signal to the Muslim community that although they are not fully practising, they stay away from some things that are considered haram (not allowed) in Islam such as abstinence from alcohol, and measures such as occasional mosque attendance confirms their sense of being Muslim, even if that is marginal, they don't want to completely lose that identity.

Nadeem, an undergraduate student at LSE, told me how he did not practice his religion:

I am a Shia Muslim but to be honest I don't practice, I have had a fairly liberal upbringing, my parents do not practice at all, my mother and sister wear Western clothes...and I am not ashamed to say that I have a girlfriend, I do have my limits...so I don't conduct the relationship like White people do, but I am open to the idea of choosing your life partner. I also don't restrict my diet to halal only. I have friends from all over the world, Muslim and non-Muslim. For me it doesn't matter what religion they are as long as they are good human beings.

In this group the formation of creative and unconventional (fused and mesh) identities extends our understanding of identity formation as we currently understand it from existing academic literature. The existing academic literature informs us of dual and

multiple identities, a dimensional or diciest type of understanding of identity, which takes us beyond singular notions of identity, but now this notion of creative and unconventional identities takes us beyond dual and multiple identities as well. The recent Foresight report (Ali and Heath 2013) brings out this idea that “identity is not a simple notion” (p.4). People can have many different and overlapping identities and context is crucial to understanding them.

Typology Group 5: AMBIVALENT IDENTITY

For this group of respondents, their identities were constantly dwindling between strong and weak poles. In a state of ambivalence, they had simultaneous, conflicting feelings towards their Pakistani or British identity. Stated another way, their ambivalent identity meant they experienced having thoughts and/or emotions of both positive and negative valence towards their identity. Within this group there were four themes, ‘Push and Pull Pakistanis’, ‘More British than I think’, ‘Acceptance and Reaction of Others’, and ‘Perplexed Identities’ which were made up of various dimensions or drivers (generated from codes) such as mixed feelings towards Pakistan, estrangement and ambivalence, political situation in Pakistan, habits linked to Pakistan, couldn’t escape being British, identity-based grievances, context-dependent identities, ostracization and exclusion, identity crisis, and confusion.

The first theme that came out in this group was ‘Push and Pull Pakistanis’ in which there were respondents whose feelings towards Pakistan were mixed. For some respondents, Pakistan was no longer their ‘home’, there seemed to be an estrangement from Pakistan. They didn’t want to associate themselves to Pakistan anymore. There

was ambivalence from being Pakistani, as for them there was nothing positive happening about Pakistan. But for others, they had a feeling that they couldn't escape being Pakistani and were in reality more Pakistani than they would like to think. This theme describes a sort of a 'push and pull' relationship with Pakistan.

Nabila, an academic working at Oxford University, who was born and grew up in Britain said this:

I don't like to associate myself to Pakistan because there is nothing positive going for the country. Why would I or other British Pakistanis want to be called Pakistani? The country has such a bad name in the UK, it is associated with all things bad. I am from Azad Kashmir and I usually say to people that I am from Azad Kashmir. When they ask me more, then I say from the Pakistani side, or I just say North Pakistan. I think people in Britain view Azad Kashmir as very different to the rest of Pakistan, for political reasons. But when you go to Pakistan you see that parts of Pakistan are so different from each other, like Punjab, Sindh, NWFP, Baluchistan, etc. But I don't feel connected to Pakistan; I need a positive reason to be. I need a project or some sort of stake there, maybe I'll go for an FCO project which probes into the identity of Pakistani youth: how do they perceive the West in relation to the Muslim world.

(Nabila, 29 years old)

For Nabila she needs a positive reason or some sort of stake to belong to Pakistan. Her judgement of her Pakistani roots is also based on the judgement that other people hold about the country, 'it is associated with all things bad'.

Atiqa, a DPhil student at Oxford University, was born and grew up in Pakistan and came to the UK for her postgraduate education. She said that although she used to think that her Muslim identity was more important than any other, she now realises that in actual fact, she cannot escape her Pakistani identity, she explained:

Even if I want to say I'm Muslim and that my national identity is not that important, people will not let me escape my Pakistani identity. They will keep on reminding me that I am Pakistani. There is so much going on in Pakistan that we cannot de-attach ourselves from it. And in some ways, why should we de-attach? Because after all, the other Muslim countries also give importance to their national identities, the Arabs, etc.

(Atiqa, 28 years old)

Atiqa thought that on the global scale of things Pakistan is so important and this is why she has to be answerable for it. She told me that she used to think that her Muslim identity should overtake her ethnic affiliations, but as she has interacted with people she has found herself in an unescapable position, people have 'put her into a box' which represents Pakistan. In this way, her Pakistani identity has become ascribed. And she gives me an example of other Muslim countries, especially the Arab ones, who hold on to their national identity with a high regard.

Sadia, a postgraduate student in London, said although she selects the dual identity options on the forms, she is perhaps more Pakistani than she thought:

When I have to choose on these forms, I always choose the option which says 'British-Pakistani'. But I don't feel very Pakistani, although having said that one of my cousins said that she couldn't tell that I am not Pakistani (this is when I spoke to my mother in Punjabi), she thought my Punjabi was perfect. So maybe I am more Pakistani than I would actually like to think. But I wouldn't want to live there. I can live anywhere in the world but Pakistan, it's just not meritocratic there.

(Sadia, 22 years old)

For Sadia it was important to dress in a traditional way, in fact she was wearing Shalwar Kameez at the interview, and she could speak Punjabi at home, she ate Pakistani food and had Pakistani friends but just could imagine herself to live in Pakistan, she valued Britain for its fairness and meritocratic principles. She described her relationship with

Pakistan as ‘love from a long-distance’ where she said ‘you fantasise about the way Pakistan is, but when you go near it, you cannot digest the daily routine of life there’.

Shehla, working at a London investment bank, was born and grew up in Britain. She linked her values and habits at home to Pakistan. She said:

I’m British, but a lot of my family and ethical values are culturally stemming from having the Pakistani background but I think I have found the balance. I’m in touch with my Britishness but I’m in touch with my Pakistani side as well, but another dimension is Islam which probably has nothing to do with our culture. I think I’d define myself as British Muslim out of everything else but I’m quite Pakistani as well like when I’m at home, I love our food and shalwar kameez. When I go to Pakistan, everyone treats me very special there because I come the UK, they think we are somehow more special than they are...that makes me laugh, they are really impressed by us.

(Shehla, 29 years old)

For Shehla, her Pakistani identity was limited to its food and clothing, and a select group of her friends. She did not enjoy her visits to Pakistan, she referred to her cousins as having different values, they were ‘more cunning’ she thought, they weren’t as honest or straightforward as she was.

Anila, an aspiring business woman working in the city of London, says that although she might call herself Pakistani, it is not strategic for her career right now given the political situation in Pakistan. She explained:

Pakistani maybe but the Pakistani thing is under so much scrutiny at the moment, and because I’m so early on in my career and reputation I think the Pakistani aspect would end up damaging me in my business capacity. I’m writing a biography of myself at the moment and I’ve been advised not to use it. A senior guy at my firm uses his origins ‘Pakistani from Jhelum’, but because he has made it to the top he can use it. It’s the political

situation and the whole terrorism thing; so many people got arrested in Walthamstow, like 300-400 even though most of them were found innocent.

(Anila, 28 years old)

She was born and grew up in Britain, and after completing her university education up to a Masters, she worked in a few banks where she thought she was given praise due to her Muslim identity, and she said she started using this to her advantage. In her networking circles her Pakistani identity was less liked.

Murtaza, who hails from Birmingham, thought that the identity of British Pakistanis is affected by the length of time they've been present in the country. He differentiated himself and his family from the more recent arrivals by saying:

...So there is a difference between my family and people who came in the 70's, you can just tell the way people are and the way people behave and so on. My family is more established and more liberal in certain points of view. I'm from Birmingham and there's a lot of Pakistanis there, and a lot of them came from the 70's and have a slightly different mentality within that, and mainly because they still hold on a lot more to the culture and values of Pakistan in the 70's, whereas because our family came early its different.

The cultural values of the Pakistani settled communities in different parts of England are therefore varied and according to Murtaza they hold onto their culture in different ways. He also told me that he visits Pakistan more often with his family whereas some of his other friends from Birmingham hardly ever visit, perhaps due to their parents not being that well-off or them not being interested in their parents' country of birth. He said his father had done a PhD from a UK university and is a working professional career which has made a difference to their lifestyle in that they have better economic

options, and this might not be the case for his friends whose parents had studied at universities in Pakistan and their employment options in Britain were limited.

Another theme that came out for this group of respondents was ‘More British than I think’. Leena, who came to Britain when she got married, said:

I think I am more British than I would like to admit. At the moment, I’m feeling very homesick and nostalgic so I am saying that I don’t feel British, but when I go to Pakistan, I think I will realise how British I am or how much Britain has given to me. People say to me that you will have a culture shock when you go back to Pakistan, because I am now so used to the lifestyle here. I like the lifestyle here, and when I first came to this country, I did not have a culture shock because of this country. The only culture shock I did have was because of the culture at my in-laws house, it was very harsh.

(Leena, 30 years old)

These were the respondents who had a mixed relationship with Britain, and although they would have liked to think that they are not that British, but in reality when they go away from Britain, they realise that their personality is in fact British. In this sense, they could not escape being British, it was ingrained in them.

A third theme that came out was ‘Acceptance and Reaction of Others’. These were the respondents who were of the view that their identity did not just depend on their own view of themselves but also on how others perceived them, so they were unsure of their identity as they thought it was left to the reaction and acceptance of others in society which of course varied. Rashid, a DPhil student at Oxford University, said:

I...errr...I think identity is not just something you form within yourself; it’s also something that requires acceptations by other people so you can’t just speak in a vacuum. If I could speak completely freely I would say I’m an Englishman of colour but that may just sound odd or archaic to anybody I

explain to, so I just say I'm a Britain and leave it to that. Well, and Englishman of colour, I suppose. Because there doesn't have to be an idea that an Englishman can only be White, but there you go! That's what this is all about I suppose.

(Rashid, 27 years old)

For Rashid, he was ambivalent about the way he perceived himself. His own preference was to call himself an 'Englishman of colour' because he was born and grew up in Britain, and he has acquired an education at one of the best universities of the country, he said, 'I walk and talk like an Englishman...but I still do not openly call myself an Englishman, or even Englishman of colour...I am just saying this to you now, but in normal cases I would just say that I am a Britain'.

Mazhar, a middle-aged man who was in the past associated to a political organisations that claim to be working for an Islamic state, said he would call himself 'British and Pakistani'. Having been a part of one political organization himself, he had experienced very intimately how the culture of such an organization can influence a person's identity. He told me that when he was a part of the organization, he called himself 'Muslim first' because of the strong group culture it imposed on its members. And then having left that organization, he tried to fit into mainstream British culture, but he felt that ethnic minorities will never become first-class citizens in Britain even if they achieve the highest of positions in its establishment. He said:

Grievances are not always class-based, they could be identity-based rather than economic based. A friend of mine once said even if you're a very rich British Pakistani, you're still like the working class. He's exactly right, he's a leftist so he's got his leftist angle but in essence what he's trying to say is that he's still an outsider; he's not a part of the establishment. So I would be careful in putting all grievances under economics (which is a leftist analysis), I think we can go beyond that to identity-based grievances. And

the second factor I think is ideology, so adopting a certain narrative leads one to put all grievances within an ideological framework. So if you feel disenfranchised for an economics or identity-based reason, rather than seeing it as a racial problem that Britain has always been a snobbish society (even with the Scottish, Welsh, and Irish), you see it as a Muslim problem, that these guys hate Islam and then you adopt a world-view.

(Mazhar, 45 years old)

Mazhar termed this as ‘identity-based’ grievances and he felt that a person’s ideological framework played into how they conceptualized their position in society. This process of identity formation arises in the Foresight report (Ali and Heath 2013), saying that whether or not a person feels they are included or excluded from a group is important in forming their identity. People’s identities are partly created by group membership, but also they may choose to adopt an identity that is different from the way in which others stereotype them.

Adnan, a working professional from London, gave me a rich description of how his identity changed faces depending on the context. He said:

I am also Muslim – I am the ‘other’ when certain issues are raised. I am a representative for the 1.3 Billion Muslims when the politics and religion are galvanised in the media. I am the ‘outsider’ when nationalist parties discuss immigration, I am the ‘better’ when I visit my home country – and I am a ‘minority’ when a party runs for elections.

(Adnan, 30 years old)

When talking about belonging, many respondents referred to feeling a sense of belonging themselves, but also feeling at times ostracized and excluded from wider British society. Aspects of prejudice and discrimination were discussed – that no matter how British they feel, or how many times they state it, their allegiances are questioned. Stereotypes of Islam and Muslims in the media of course reinforced this paranoia. Cases

of stereotyping and discrimination have been discussed in Ameli et al. (2004) and Abbas (2005) and of Islamophobia (Allen and Nielsen 2002 and The Runnymede Trust 1997). This has increased in recent times and government policies regarding preventing extremism have also meant that Muslims are wary of surveillance and increasingly sensitive about external perceptions and assumptions regarding Islam and Muslims. This can and is perceived as a threat to identity and to belief, and thus the reaction from this cohort is to hold on to and tighten the link with their religious identity. As an individual, religious identity becomes more significant when threatened.

Another theme that emerged in this group was 'Perplexed Identities'. There were some respondents who when asked about their identity thought they were confused and jumbled between their different loyalties. Zainab, an undergraduate student from Birmingham but studying at Nottingham University, thought it was fine to be confused. She said:

I feel more Indian than British...but to be honest, I am confused. Well, I think I can be confused because it doesn't matter that much.

(Zainab, 19 years old)

Fawad, an undergraduate student from the University of Leicester, said: 'I am not sure about my identity...I don't want to choose...' *(Fawad, 20 years old)*.

For these respondents their identities seemed to be always in flux, and perhaps they liked being 'on the edge' of Britishness. It is a reflection of the fact that they have multiple choices. This is perhaps because there are more conflicts and 'cross-pressures'

now, propelling people in different directions so they don't necessarily have to choose a fixed identity.

There were some respondents who thought it was not fair to put labels on Muslims because that meant imposing some sort of preconceived idea on them or putting them into boxes. Jafar, a college student studying for his A-levels in London, said:

When selecting my identity on a form, I would select 'Other': Muslim and Londoner, because 'Muslim' is not enough. I hate all these labels of 'British', 'Muslim' etc. I think they are just rubbish, what is it trying to tell me? What are they trying to impose? Or get at? I am happy to not know what my core identity is...to be honest, I am just going with the flow...I like all my different sides, and people see me as someone who has lots to offer, from my British side, my Muslim side, and my Pakistani side...

(Jafar, 18 years old)

There was a sense of irritation with the idea of labelling and the normative judgements the labels involved.

Some of the respondents were of the view that the term British was being over-used by people these days, and that we must question what the term really means. Ahad, a young employee from London, thought that being British did not have any significant meaning, he said:

Hmmm...British...see I don't think it has any real meaning, I think it has become a cover up for those people who want to hang on to a vague notion of being British, and want to avoid the possibility of a more defined identity (English, Scottish, or Welsh) or does the term actually mean something for the people who use it? I don't think so...

(Ahad, 18 years old)

Kaneeza, working in London, thought that the term British wasn't meaningful in its use.

She said:

'British' is a technical definition for England, Scotland and Wales. It has no legal standing in the sense that you can't be a British citizen, of the UK and Northern Ireland. So it is an acceptable term used by people who don't want to define themselves by the country, the sub-group of the country, so they think that people just find British easier. I think it is used by people who are less comfortable with saying that I'm Scottish, Welsh, or English

(Kaneeza, 54 years old)

According to these respondents, it had sort of become a 'hanger' for those who didn't want to be more specific about their identity. One respondent, Neelam an undergraduate student in Nottingham, when asked the question about her identity, reversed the question and began to probe: 'What is there unique about being British? How can you feel British?'

Umar, an unemployed respondent living in East London, described that being British for him meant:

I think being British means multicultural, because if you look at their history, they conquered and incorporated many people into their culture. People like Nick Griffin represent some people in society, and that's fine, we need to have that dialogue with them, we need their views to be exposed because otherwise how will these issues be tackled? By coming on the BBC, Nick's weak arguments were exposed; people saw that he was actually confused and that his arguments weren't that strong.

(Umar, 21 years old)

Murtaza, who described himself as a 'British Pakistani Liberal Muslim' told me that although he thought that Britain is a 'good place for Muslims to live', they still faced an 'identity crisis'. He said:

For me the most important parts of my identity label are the British and Pakistani bits. I think Britain is a good place for Muslims to live, compared to some other countries such as France, Switzerland, or Spain etc. Halal meat isn't so easily available there and in France there are no student Islamic societies, they are not allowed. If I had to choose between my British and Pakistani parts, I would give up my British part if need be, but not my Pakistani part. For me being Pakistani is more important than being British, because I like the Pakistani culture; its emphasis on family and respect. I think there is an identity crisis in our generation, we are the most confused ones, and I think the biggest struggle will be marriage; we will have problems finding spouses. I started thinking about my identity when I went to university. I lived in a flat with all white people and they would go out everyday and drink. I would go and drink juice but didn't enjoy myself. In my second year, I moved with Pakistani friends and that was much better, we used to hang out and cook as well. I like Britain but I would like to move to another country, I don't like the weather here. I am thinking of the Bahamas or Canada.

(Murtaza, 24 years old)

This theme was explored in Vadher and Barrett (2009)'s study where they explored what it means to be British from the perspective of young British Indian and Pakistani adults. Fifteen respondents were interviewed using a semi-structured schedule in order to explore their self-descriptions and self-categorizations, and how different contexts influence their identifications as British and as Indian or Pakistani, their sense of patriotism, and their perceptions of racism, discrimination, and multiculturalism. Grounded theory methodology was used to analyse the interviews. The respondents' identifications and the role of context, threat and racism were studied in detail, and a model of how these individuals defined the boundaries of Britishness, and how they positioned themselves in relationship to these boundaries, was derived from the data. Six boundaries of Britishness were identified, these being the racial, civic/state, instrumental, historical, lifestyle, and multicultural boundaries. Participants used these boundaries flexibly, drawing on different boundaries depending on the particular context in which Britishness was discussed.

Typology Group 6: NONE OF THE ABOVE

The themes that emerged in this group all led to the notion of a minimal British identity, the themes were ‘Not Permanent Residents Here’, ‘Just Living Here’, ‘Forms, Travel, and Nationality, and ‘Cannot Belong Here’, which were made up of various dimensions or drivers (generated from codes) such as fear of being sent back to Pakistan, deep connectedness or expectations to return to Pakistan, not being able to integrate into Britain, and reactions of White people. The responses of the Muslim respondents in this group indicated that they either did not want to or could not belong to Britain. This included respondents both who were born in Britain and those who had recently migrated to Britain for education or work.

One theme to emerge was ‘Not Permanent Residents Here’ which was based on respondents’ answers that were referring principally to the idea that Britain was not *really* their country. A small number of respondents said that even if they had lived in Britain for many years or grown up in it, they were fearful that they could be expelled from it or the circumstances may turn ugly and they might not feel comfortable living in Britain. And a slightly larger number of respondents told me that they had come to Britain for a fixed purpose (for education or employment) after which they would return; they had no intention to stay permanently, with one respondent saying that even if he did want to belong to Britain he would be fooling himself because he would never be fully accepted. Sadia, who lives in Oxford and is studying for her Masters at the University of Buckingham in London, said:

When I was growing up my parents always said to us that we are not permanent residents in this country, if things get bad we may have to go

back to Pakistan. My parents migrated here, and I was born here in Oxford and always lived here. When 7/7 happened, it made me realise that we had thought that we were safe, that our community was fine. But in fact it wasn't, and 7/7 exposed that our community had problems, and the way people have been since then...you know you can tell that White people want to know more about us, about how we think, they didn't react in the same way as Americans did after 9/11 but they did change the way they see us...

(Sadia, 22 years old)

Despite having been born and bred in Britain, Sadia did not feel as though she had a permanent connection to Britain, as she said 'we are not permanent residents here'. A part of this feeling was triggered by her upbringing and advice from her family and a part by the events and reactions of others in her community.

Another theme to emerge was 'Just Living Here'. Hannah, a postgraduate student at Oxford University, felt that she had strong ties to her home country that had sponsored her to study in the UK and she will certainly return there upon completing her studies.

She said:

I am a Pakistani Muslim, studying here, going back to Pakistan after finishing studies. And my Rhodes scholarship expects that from me. I'm clearly not British, my accent shows that too. My Muslim identity became very important to me as I was growing up. Identity crises never end. Pakistan is going through a huge identity crisis at the moment, it was born out of India and people have still to find their solid identity. Even in other countries like India or the US, some people in the South might not identify with people in the North. It's about identifying with that culture, and if they don't then they are just co-existing. *Allah* has deliberately made differences in the human race, of different skin colours, languages and beliefs and the racism or discrimination that we see is a manifestation of that.

(Haseena, 23 years old)

She also gave an interesting analysis of identity and thought that identity crises never actually end, they are on-going. And if one doesn't identify with the culture of the

country they are residing in, then they are simply ‘co-existing’ there. She reasoned these differences in the human race to be chosen by God, and as a result of this she thought racism and discrimination were bound to exist. Similarly, Asma, an undergraduate student at Queen Mary, University of London said, ‘I would say I am from Pakistan and I live in London. I’m a medical student, and will go back to Pakistan after finishing my degree, my family is there so I belong there. But yes I would like to gain a couple of years of experience in my field before I return, I’ve spent so much money on my education here so it would be a shame if I didn’t gain some work experience before going back’ (*Asma, 19 years old*).

Khalid, a postgraduate student from London, described his primary identity as Pakistani and his connection to Britain as ‘simply living here’, and not really belonging to the country. For Khalid, taking part in British cultural activities was a hindrance in him integrating in to British life, he says he does not relate to ‘their culture’. He said:

I would usually say I am Pakistani. I would only say religion if someone asked me, not otherwise. I don’t think of myself as British, I would say London. I am just living here, I don’t really belong here. I don’t take part in their norms and activities: pubs, drinking, football, etc. I’m not into their culture. I just like going out with my friends and meeting new people.

(Khalid, 24 years old)

Mohsin, who was born and grew up in Pakistan, and is studying for his Masters degree at SOAS, University of London said:

I would choose ‘Pakistani and Muslim’. If I was in Pakistan, I would choose just ‘Muslim’. This is because I am already Pakistani so I don’t need to choose that there. It is only through experience of living in Britain that I have come to choose ‘Pakistani and Muslim’ because I have to tell them I am from Pakistan.

(Mohsin, 23 years old)

Haaris also mentioned that he would think of himself as Pakistani no matter how long he lived in Britain:

Emm, I'm not considering myself as British even though I am living here for long, I just consider myself as a Pakistani living in Britain, and obviously Muslim. I normally say, like...when I meet somebody, I will just say, I am from Pakistan. Obviously I consider myself as Pakistani even though still living after five, six, seven years or maybe ten years time I will say the same thing...that's what I think so far!

(Haaris, 29 years old)

Another theme that emerged was 'Forms, Travel, and Nationality'. Nosheen, who came to Britain as a minor and grew up there, said she thought of her British identity when she filled in forms or goes to another country. She said:

Pakistani Muslim living in Britain. Because there are so many Muslims here... you kind of have to say where you're from, it gives you an identity. When people ask I usually just say London and if they ask more, then I say I'm originally from Pakistan, I was born there. British comes into my mind more when I am filling in forms, or when I'm in another country...then I would say I'm British. So it depends on who you're with.

(Nosheen, 20 years old)

One of my respondents, Sameera who works as a social worker in Oldham, said this:

Muslim, Pakistani-British. I feel British when I am travelling somewhere and we have to fill in forms, and also when we speak about rights, for example faster queues in airports, don't need a visa when we go somewhere.

(Sameera, 23 years old)

Nadia, a first-generation migrant, who is a housewife and works in London, said:

I am Muslim and Pakistani-British. I feel British when I am travelling somewhere and we have to fill in forms, and also when we speak about rights, for example faster queues in airports, don't need a visa when we go somewhere...

(Nadia, 46 years old)

And some of my respondents referred to their British identity as a nationality. Ilqa, who migrated to England when she was 11 years old with her family and sought asylum, is now settled in Britain and receiving all the welfare benefits that British society has to offer. She is very strong about her nationality being British which she first confuses with identity but then realises that the two are different:

I would say my identity is British. Its like my nationality is British but Identity, I really don't know...

(Ilqa, 19 years old)

This finding is similar to that found in Jacobson (1998) where young British Pakistanis referred to the fact that they are British in the sense that they have British 'citizenship' or 'nationality'. A few of the respondents, for example, seemed to reduce the meaning of being British to a matter of travelling on a British passport.

Another theme was 'Cannot Belong Here'. Farrukh, who was born and grew up in Pakistan, came to the UK solely for his undergraduate education, but then continued to do his Masters here and then began a full-time job, thought that despite him having lived in Britain for six years, he could never 'really integrate into British culture and society', he identified himself to the culture of the country where he was born and brought up. He said:

I am Pakistani. My colour of skin is Pakistani, South Asian to be specific. I can never be British, nor am I, neither do I claim to be... and people will never accept me as purely British. What else am I? I'm Pakistani. I was born and brought up there, my culture is Pakistani. I am Muslim but that's my religion, not my culture. My culture might have some influences from my religion but other than that I am a Pakistani because Muslims do not have a similar culture across the board. My cultural identity is the most important because it defines who I am, and religion has some influences on my culture. I am a nationalist Pakistani.

But he went onto explain that he did prefer living in Britain over Pakistan because he had faced racial discrimination there for having a dark skin colour, saying 'from a young age I was picked on for my skin colour, I felt like the other children didn't like me', which had hampered his self-esteem but motivated him to excel in his education to stand out. On the contrary, he had excelled in Britain personally and professionally as the institutions he studied at and worked in recognised his 'calibre' and rewarded his 'hard work and efforts', his skin colour was not a point of attention here. In my view, he held a deep connectedness to Pakistan and spoke very fondly of it, but was also very aware of the ground realities there, and given his personal experiences he was not sure if he could work with the mindset there. He explained that although he was happy living in Britain but he had encountered negative reactions of some White people, especially those who belong to the Conservative party, which led him to think that even if wanted to integrate in Britain, he would never *really* be able to. He said:

A month ago, I went to this campaign event being organised by the Conservative Party in my borough, I just wanted to help. I am a conservative in my views, so I thought this would be the right party to help and become a member of. One of the members said to me, 'which country are you from? And I said Pakistan, and then he said, 'are you trying to become English by joining this party?' I was of course very shocked and hurt at the same time. I did not expect this from an educated member of the party, my borough is very affluent and the people who live here are highly educated. But this really made me think. Here I am, educated from some of

the best universities in Britain and working in the city of London, living in a high-end borough of London, but I am not able to fit in here. This means no matter how high you go in British society, there will always be someone who will remind you that you don't belong here. If I looked White then maybe I wouldn't have gotten this reaction. The Pakistanis living in Britain are kidding themselves that they can fit in here, unless they marry White people and their skin colour changes over generations, they will always remain different. I might sound pessimistic, but at least I am a realist. In Pakistan I think your skin colour helps you more than your class, if you are fair and white then people accept you more, but in Britain your class helps you more, if you are educated, cultured, and in a respected profession then you are accepted more...but even then you are never fully accepted because you look different.

(Farrukh, 24 years old)

In summary, this group of respondents prefer to have a minimal British identity, and are more inclined towards their Pakistani identity. The effects of mainstream British culture play a minor role in their lives, and they use their British identity when it is suitable or convenient for them. They refer to themselves as Pakistanis, and while some of them practice the Pakistani cultural values in their daily lives, others have a more ephemeral connection to it, or one that offers them security that if ever compelled to leave Britain, that is where they would go.

The table below summarises the typology with its categories and themes. The largest group of respondents fell in typology group five, suggesting that most of my Muslim respondents had ambivalent identities for all three types of identities. In other words, for each of these three identities - Pakistani, British, and Muslim – a significant number of respondents felt somewhere in the middle about them and this was due to a number of reasons. Having said that, the next largest two groups were two and four, suggesting that many of the respondents had identities that were either unambiguous or emergent. All three types of identity - British, Muslim, and Pakistani - were visible across all

typology groups, but British and Muslim were most significant, i.e. more positively chosen and favoured.

Typology of Identity for Muslims in Britain – Groups and Themes

Groups	Themes
1. CULTURAL IDENTITY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Simply Heritage • Secular Muslims
2. UNAMBIGUOUS IDENTITY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Britain is Home • My Religion is always First • Pakistan is Home
3. EMOTIONAL IDENTITY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 'Born-again' Muslims • Ultra-Orthodox Muslims
4. EMERGENT IDENTITY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Anglo-Pakistani Fusion • Kaleidoscope Identities • Liberal Muslims
5. AMBIVALENT IDENTITY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Push and Pull Pakistanis • More British than I think • Acceptance and Reaction of Others • Perplexed Identities
6. NONE OF THE ABOVE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Not Permanent Residents Here • Just Living Here • Forms, Travel, and Nationality • Cannot Belong Here

This typology of identity highlights that the national, ethnic, and religious identities of my Muslim respondents are relevant for them at varying degrees. Although the Pakistani identity was less significant, it did however emerge in a newer way (the

Anglo-Pakistani) as compared to the British and Muslim identities which were thought of in their conventional way.

7.4 Interplay between Identities – Tensions and Contradictions

I want to now reflect on the interplay between the identities of British, Pakistani, and Muslim for my respondents. How easy do they find it to integrate these together? What are the tensions or conflicts in doing this? It was evident that for some, although a small number, of the Muslim respondents fusion between their identities was not always possible, or acceptable. These tensions and contradictions played out in a number of ways. For some there was a tension between their Islamic values and British ways of life, for example on issues such as drinking alcohol. Some felt like ‘fish out of water’ and some were conscious of the reactions of ‘White British’ people towards them in aspects such as their dress and clothing.

The respondents who felt their Islamic values were incompatible with certain British cultural aspects contextualised their identity in that they explained how certain situations often required them to choose their Muslim identity over their British identity. In such situations, they felt they had to signal their religious identity as a reason for not wanting to participate in such activities. Tahira, British by birth and now working as a lawyer in London explained her situation:

Sometimes you do have to choose being Muslim over being British, in situations like when friends or colleagues ask you to come to dinner with them or to the bar, I just say beforehand that I don’t drink and if the place has alcohol, I will not go. It depends on what the function/purpose of the event is, if it is constructive then I would go, but if its just a social then I

avoid it because there comes a point during the event when I would feel uncomfortable.

(Tahira, 32 years old)

Fatima, born and bred in Britain and a recent graduate from the LSE, gave an example that is relevant here. She said:

I just graduated recently, and I didn't want to shake hands with the degree benefactor because Islam does not allow females and males to touch each other if they are not married...some Muslims take a different view on this that it is fine to shake hands because the intention is not bad, it is a formal or official event and so there's nothing wrong with shaking hands. But I disagree with them, I take a stricter view...so I just called the degrees office up, and before I knew it, the woman was calling up all the people concerned and they just sorted it out, they were absolutely fine with it. I had to stand at the end of the queue, and when it came to my turn, the degree benefactor just bowed down to me instead of shaking my hand and I found that so sweet. I had decided that if he forgets and reaches out to shake my hand, you know if there is some mistake, I would just do it, I wouldn't put him on the spot, but I am happy that he remembered. My mum did say to me why didn't you just shake his hand, but I said no I wouldn't. Sometimes in necessity I do, but at other times I just make it clear and it does get very embarrassing for the other person.

Fatima's response tells me that she faces some cultural constraints that prevent her from fully integrating into British culture. She gave me another example:

Once at my friend's wedding, one of her guests reached out to shake my hand, he was an American non-Muslim, but I said no I'm really sorry. He was really embarrassed, but I went up to him later on and explained. He said no that's fine; he had been to Iraq and was aware of some cultural issues. I try to have a consistent policy because I don't want to shake once and then not at other times, as then people will think I am hypocritical. So in situations like these you have to choose between being British or Muslim.

(Fatima, 21 years old)

A very small number of Muslims in my sample were currently or had been in the past associated with an Islamic political organisation in the UK which claims to be working to establish an Islamic state (the name of this organization is kept hidden due to the sensitive nature of this topic). Being associated with this organisation influenced their identity significantly. My conversations with them were insightful and quite different from the other respondents I spoke to. It was these small of group of people for whom living in Britain was equivalent to living like ‘fish out of water’. They felt alienated and did not feel like they belonged to Britain at all, for them Britain was definitely not home.

Parveen, who grew up in Britain and now works as a teacher in London, told me that in the past she had nearly been convinced into joining this organization. That part of her life was certainly not the most pleasant, although quite interesting as she was able to get an insight into the workings of this organization. She became interested in her religion at secondary school and wanted to learn more about it, so she started attending some lunchtime Islamic classes at her secondary school, and this began her journey into the organization. She said:

I remember the first time I became interested in my religion was when someone asked me “Why do Muslims fast?” and I was clueless. I thought what kind of a Muslim am I? I don’t even know the answer to the most basic questions in my religion. I then heard of these Islamic classes in my school and started attending them. The teacher was a young lady who also worked in my school as a science laboratory technician. She had a very calm personality and I admired her aura, she looked so happy and content all the time. I wanted to learn more about her, how she became religious, how often she prayed... I just saw her as a role-model.

For Parveen, her pull towards Islam was through outside factors, and not her home or her parents, but she went onto tell me that even fellow Muslims could be

biased in their interpretation of the religion and have their own agenda, she told me her story:

She was very sweet and invited me to her house where she had also invited other young women, it was like a study circle and sometimes just a social, but which eventually turned into some sort of a discussion about a particular organization, and how it serves the needs of Muslims living in Britain. I sensed a recurring pattern each time I went to her house, the same topic would come up, i.e. the problems with British society, its ways of doing things, and how we Muslims just didn't fit in. After a few weeks, the teacher asked me if I wanted to become a member of the organization. I was confused; I mean I was only 18 years old. I didn't share this with my parents, because I was enjoying this newly found company of the Muslim girls I was meeting regularly... it was a nice group of young women who in my eyes were practising Muslims, and that's what I wanted to be as well. I wanted to keep these friends for my religion. My teacher suggested that I start attending weekly study circles at her house. My father was unhappy about this, he sensed that I was being brainwashed perhaps, he read some of the fliers that I would bring home and he expressed his concern. But I continued going to the classes with the excuse that I wanted to simply learn about my religion.

The religious training provided by this organisation was structured with classes, books, teachers, and social events and it was due to this that she felt a strong bonding to the organization:

Every week, me and the other group of girls would study the literature of the organization, on the economic, political, and social system of Islam and how it was superior to the Western systems (capitalism, communism, etc). It was all interesting theoretically, but the minute I walked out of the class, it was not relevant to my life, I did not know how to apply that knowledge to my daily existence. My teacher described us 'fish living out of water', she said 'for us living in Britain is like having no oxygen'. For some time, I started believing this, I became very isolated in my life, I did not want to see my friends because they did not believe in all these ideas, and so on. And this organization demanded that its students and members dress in a certain way. I used to wear a *Hijab* (headscarf), but not an *Abaya* (full length dress covering the whole body), but my teacher and the other girls suggested (and indirectly pressurised) me to wear it. I started wearing it for a short period of time but felt under enormous mental pressure and started fearing these women, they were almost schooling me into their ways, and the penalties of

not conforming would be social isolation and the feeling of being an ‘outsider’.

She further told me that as time went on, she began to feel the ‘extremist’ tendencies of the organization and started making comparisons to her family, who she began to think were perhaps more moderate Muslims, in a Pakistani cultural way. She said:

My own family was not religious to this extreme and when they saw this change in me they did sense that something was wrong but I did not want to let go of this group of friends or maybe I didn’t know how to exit, so I just kept on going along and pleasing them. I learnt that members of this organization even married each other and became a stronger unit. There were a good number of educated working professionals in the organization, so they were very much a part of British society and most of them had been born in Britain, but they differentiated themselves by this ideology. With time I no longer felt that I was learning about my religion, instead I was being trained to join this organization, and to attract more girls into the study circles. I questioned my affiliation with them and desperately wanted to get out.

She eventually naturally moved away from the organization and realised that she had been excluding herself from British society and people. She wanted to interact and ‘live’ in the true sense, in Britain. She said:

My luck helped me because the university I got accepted into was out of London. I moved away with a sigh of relief but learnt that they have members in that city too who were keen to invite me to their circles, it was scattered across the country. But I slowly built the courage to tell them that I did not want to be a member of their group anymore. The reason why I left them really was because they weren’t relevant in my life, they were abstract in their thoughts and ideas. I did not want to be abstract, I wanted to be involved in my community, I wanted to be a part of my society and to interact with it. I wanted to breathe in my society, to swim like fish in the water, and not die out of it. And now over the years, I have taught myself about my religion in my private time, not being influenced by any one person or organization, it is a matter between me and Allah.

(Parveen, 24 years old)

A small number of my respondents were convinced that no matter how hard they try, they would still not be fully accepted by White British people. Rashid, a graduate from Oxford University, said:

I have completed a DPhil from Oxford, I dress like an Englishman, speak like an Englishman, and everything about me appears to be English except my skin colour. I am no less than an English person who has the same qualifications and credentials as me, except my skin colour. I think it is sad but true that skin colour does make a difference. No matter how much you achieve, how high you go up the ladder, your skin colour will make a difference.

These responses suggest that perhaps notions of the old-type or ‘old-school racism’ still exist in societies. Although some academics argue that we have now moved onto a new-type of racism in Europe, namely Islamophobia, the responses from these small number of people in my sample suggest that this old-type racism has not yet been completely wiped out by the new-type. In fact it may be that the old-type is stronger and is likely to exist for some time yet. Islamophobia has been driven by geopolitical events and international conflicts and is labelled as the ‘new threat’ but it may fade out as soon as a new threat comes to life. But perhaps the old-type of racism that is based on skin colour is less likely to fade out as long as human beings exist. And in cases where the basis of discrimination is based on skin colour, and not religion then the skin-colour effect is stronger than the religion-effect. Some of the reactions by my respondents can also be described by the Minimal Group Paradigm which is a methodology employed in social psychology. While it may be used for a variety of purposes, it is most well known as a method for investigating the minimal conditions required for discrimination to occur between groups. Experiments using this approach have revealed that even arbitrary and virtually meaningless distinctions between groups (e.g. the colour of their shirts) can trigger a tendency to favour one’s own group at the expense of others.

But there were not conflicts in all types of identity mergence, in particular for the respondents who felt that there was not much difference between their Pakistani and Muslim identities. For them the difference in these identities was not distinct. Annum, who came from Pakistan to study for postgraduate degree at Oxford, said:

I am Muslim and Pakistani. I don't think there is much difference between them. I think they can be substituted for each other....in Pakistan there is a high percentage of Muslims, so when someone says they are from Pakistan, I assume they are Muslim.

(Annum, 24 years old)

Given the historical background of how Pakistan was formed as a country when those who migrated to Pakistan from India were in large numbers Muslim and the political movement led by Mohammad Ali Jinnah was mobilised on religious grounds, it is not surprising that there exists an almost natural affinity between the Pakistani and Muslim aspects of the people who live in Pakistan. And my respondents who are studying in Britain or the first generation migrants do feel a sense of harmony between these two identities. This affinity is not to be seen between the British and Muslim identities as there is no episode of historical significance when gels them, the British and Muslim identities do require a more social construction.

The connection between Pakistani and British identity was in some cases problematic where the respondents felt that there were 'outdated' parts in one of these cultures which had to be taken out and replaced with the more modern parts of the other culture. Annie, mentioned earlier also, was born and spent her childhood in Pakistan and then

migrated to Britain with her family. She grew up in Britain but got married to a relative from Pakistan who now lives with her in the UK. She said this:

Some parts of Pakistani culture are so out of date, the stereotypical ideals of women being subordinate to men, women being passive. My husband disagrees with it more than me. I like my husband having the last word but I want him to consult me as well, which we do now. I like the independence that British culture gives you but I don't like late nights, parties, and clubbing. I don't have to be at home at a certain time. I like the British free mind-set.

(Annie, 25 years old)

In this way the Pakistani identity was unproblematic or more manageable alongside the British identity as compared to the Muslim identity; it allowed a hierarchical existence of identities to exist making it more multicultural than the Muslim identity maybe because it was understood more in cultural terms whereas the Muslim identity was understood more in emotional terms and allowed less space for a clinical procedure where certain aspects of each identity can just be swapped or replaced.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I had hoped to provide an alternative prism through which we can understand the identities of Muslim in Britain. I did this by analysing qualitative in-depth interviews data, so that I could understand issues that surveys aren't able to fully grasp. The material analysed gave rise to a number of groups and themes, out of which I formed a six-group typology of identity. These categories can also be described as the analytical distinctions that emerge from the data. Hamill (2013) calls this an 'analytical leap', in other words trying to extract from what the respondents are telling me, rather than being influenced by the existing literature and models. To begin with, the structured identity question from the interviews generated some interesting stories

which then led me to listen to the responses from the unstructured identity questions to gain an understanding of the views that shape these results. The themes that emerged from these detailed responses form a typology, with the following identity groups: Cultural, Unambiguous, Emotional, Emergent, Ambivalent, and None of the Above.

This typology shows the differences in identity formation among Muslims in Britain. The doctrinal differences of Sunni and Shia do not come out on a large scale, only by a small number of respondents. The other differences that do emerge are differences based on movements, such as the Ahmadis, or political ideologies, such as those practiced by Islamic political groups/parties. As found from the cognitive interviews, identities from the in-depth interviews also brought out the cultural and emotional dimensions. The existing empirical studies on Muslims in Britain had recognised and covered the presence of dual and multiple identities but my research has shed light on the emergent, fused, and creative identities that Muslims living in Britain have in current times. There are also tensions and contradictions that exist as the identities of these Muslims play out with each other.

In the typology of identity I found there to be manifestations of all three types of identity, British, Pakistani, and Muslim with thinner and thicker versions of each. The British identity had varied understandings and acceptance by the respondents interviewed. It was viewed by some respondents as a minimal identity as they were simply residing in Britain and did not think of themselves as permanent residents of the country. Some Muslims had a cultural understanding of Britain in their life, even if they did not readily adopt all aspects of its culture but they gave value to some of the cultural elements. There were respondents who did not realise how British they were, and some

were put off by the reactions of the majority people around them. Some Muslims had created their own version of their British identity integrating some of its liberal tenets in their life and many were very firmly grounded in the belief that Britain is their home. This is the country to which they belonged, and they had as similar aspirations as non-Muslims and just wanted to live life in as normal a way possible. They felt very comfortable with their British identity, with the comfortable ways of life in Britain, the values of fairness and justice, the meritocracy, and so on. They felt integrated. But there were those for whom their local or global identity was more important; they chose to belong to their city, region, or the world rather than to their nation.

The Pakistani identity had different levels of attachment for the respondents. It had a minimal place in the life of some respondents who had been born and bred in Britain, they understood it as simply culture or simply heritage with not much practical relevance in their lives. For some, there was a sense of estrangement or apprehensiveness from their Pakistani identity and they wanted to disassociate themselves from it, but for others they were proud to have Pakistani roots and vividly enjoyed some of its cultural aspects, the ambivalent set of respondents. There were also those who created a new type of ethnic cultural identity, one which had influences from their 'British Pakistani' or 'Asian British' identity, giving rise to a fused and meshed Anglo-Pakistani cultural identity. Those who had recently migrated to Britain were clear of their allegiance and loyalty to Pakistan with no apparent desire to remain permanently in the UK, and some British Muslims also viewed it as their home.


The Muslim identity had varied understandings, weak, moderate, and strong. There were some secular Muslims who thought of their Muslim identity as a cultural tradition.

There were emotional dimensions, some had adopted the religion with their own understanding and influences, and some were locked in a more orthodox environment by their sect or ideological affiliations. There existed some liberal understandings of the Muslim identity where the respondents did not practice the religion and had readily integrated parts of British culture in their lives which were incompatible with their Islamic values. Many more had a solid Muslim identity and gave it utmost importance in their lives seeing it spiritual and practical relevance in a balanced way. There was some alienation among British Muslims who either felt ostracized from the majority group due to their reactions or those who chose to be alienated, in particular those belonging to political religious groups.

In summary, I saw variations of emphasis and salience for all three types of identity through the typology. There was certainly a shift away from the dual and multiple understandings of identity towards more dimensional, emergent, and constructive ones. And there were those for whom fusion was not that easy; either as a result of perceived contradictions or incompatibilities in their British and Muslim cultures, e.g. alcohol drinking or, as a result of pressures and tensions in being Muslim or in the treatment by others (by the non-ethnics and co-ethnics).

Within the unambiguous group, there did arise a hierarchy of the British, Muslim, and Pakistani identities. Figure 20 is one way to visualise this difference; the size of the components represent the importance of each identity compartment for Muslims in Britain.

Figure 20: Pyramid of Muslim Identities



There were some thoughts that came out from the earlier chapters that I want to reflect on briefly here and relate to the in-depth interview responses. One aspect that came to attention when overviewing the Muslim communities in Britain was the diversity that exists within them, which is a result of the different religious school of thoughts (Sunnis, Shias, Ahmedis, Ismailis, and so on) in Islam and the different intra-ethnic identities among Muslims. Among Pakistanis, the intra-ethnic identities are Punjabis, Balochis, Pashtuns, Sindhis, Urdu-speaking, and Mirpuris. Since survey data does not capture this diversity, I was interested in finding out if this diversity was found in my in-depth interviews. With the exception of the Ahmadi difference, the others did not come out as a point of difference among the Muslims, in fact most of the respondents did not mention their religious doctrinal or intra-ethnic identities. Another concept that I

wanted to probe into from the academic literature on identities was whether Muslim identities are fixed or fluid and again the survey data does not address this. The modern school of thought understands identities to be essentialist as opposed to constructivist, whereas postmodernist theories of identity understand identities to have multiple acquirable facets. Which of these accounts are closer in explaining Muslim identification? Are Muslim identities composed of multiple facets such as religion, ethnicity, and national identity? In the in-depth interview responses, I did find modern conceptions of identity. All the three types of identities explored in the interviews - national, ethnic, and religious - had subcultures in them, i.e. within the religion stream of identities there were the secular, practising, liberal, and ultraorthodox Muslims. Furthermore, there were hybrid, multiple, and shifting identities. To some extent, it is not surprising that my sample of Muslim participants had multiple identities as they live in a multicultural country, and especially London, where the majority of the sample is drawn from. The term 'Asian' came out and so did 'East Londoner'. Another idea I wanted to explore was whether experiences of discrimination lead Muslims to identify with an imagined community (Ummah) as opposed to a civic community (Nation State), but there were only a small number of respondents who preferred to have a global Muslim identity.

CHAPTER

8

Conclusions

Introductory Summary

In this concluding chapter I would like to bring together the thesis by discussing the findings from each of the research questions as explored in their respective chapters and reflect on their greater bearing. I will also shed light on the theoretical and methodological contributions, limitations of the research conducted in this thesis, implications for policy-making, and new avenues for future research on this topic.

8.1 Discussion of Findings

This thesis has served as a highly relevant research project into the issues of identity that permeate among Muslims in Britain, especially at a time when there has been scrutiny and curiosity about the integration and commitment of Muslim communities. As mentioned previously, Muslims in Britain and those in my sample of interviews have experienced intense spotlight and scrutiny over their religious identity. The mixture of events that have exacerbated this occurrence include events such as 9/11, the 7/7 London bombings; the Iraq war; the Afghanistan war; the Israel/Palestine conflicts; and a focus from policy-makers, think tanks, and government initiatives (such as the CONTEST strategy and PET – Preventing Extremism Together working groups. Pressure from opinion polls and surveys, and the banning of religious clothing and other symbols among some European countries (hijabs, face coverings, mosques, etc) has placed a constant spotlight on Muslims, and thus on Muslim identity, and questions have arisen on how well they can integrate into British mainstream culture. Do they belong to Britain? And can they balance their different identities?

In this thesis, data was analyzed from national surveys as a starting point to examine the

British identification and sense of belonging of Muslims in Britain, followed by cognitive and in-depth interviews to understand and digest the meanings of belonging and processes of identity formation among Muslims in Britain. Such a detailed study aims to inform not only the sociological understanding of identity, but also to have implications for policymakers and commentators.

There has been much debate in the media, policy circles, and academia about the identities of Muslims in Britain. The puzzles of this debate have been whether Muslims in Britain feel attached to Britain, and whether they feel integrated. Can they successfully merge their religious, ethnic, and national identities? Or are they divided and conflicted in terms of their identities?

When reviewing the existing academic and general literature, I found there to be claims and assumptions made about Muslims in Britain which I set out to investigate. There is a strand of academic research which claims that Muslims in Britain are withdrawn from mainstream Britain because they live in segregated ethnic enclaves, participate in non-mainstream religions, and politically organize themselves via ethnically and religiously homogenous networks. Furthermore, the positive identification of Muslims in Britain has been linked to three main factors: improved socio-economic status, social engagement with mainstream culture, and political or civic participation. The research in this thesis attempts to go beyond such existing research and advance our understanding of the identities and sense of belonging of Muslims in Britain. I used a mixed-methods approach, combining survey data, cognitive

survey methodology interviews, and in-depth qualitative interviews to address these questions. It is important to establish the connections that cut across the substantive chapters and on their respective contributions to answer the research questions of this thesis. Since this study is designed such that the chapters build upon one another, the ways in which the chapters inform one another is crucially important.

Research Questions Revisited

The three research questions that guided this thesis are:

- 1. What is the strength and relative importance of British identity for Muslims in Britain and what are its drivers?*

To address this research question that was derived from the existing academic literature, in my first empirical chapter (Chapter Five) I embarked on studying the strength and relative importance of British identity for Muslims in Britain and understanding the drivers that motivate it. The existing academic literature generates some claims and assumptions about Muslims in Britain. Firstly, it has been suggested that Muslims are less likely than Whites to identify as British. Secondly, that low socio-economic status will negatively impact British national identification for Muslims. Thirdly, that social and cultural isolation will negatively impact British national identification for Muslims. Fourthly, that high political and civic engagement will negatively impact British national identification for Muslims. And fifthly, that there are likely to be generational differences in the identification of Muslims towards Britain.

There were a number of findings that emerged from the data analysis of the CS and EMBES. Firstly, a major finding was that Muslims in Britain were shown to be almost as likely as Christians and Whites to feel British, in fact more likely to feel British than Whites in the regression results, i.e. also including controls. Among the different Muslim ethnic groups I found there to be some variation in feelings of British identification among the Black Caribbeans, Black Africans, and Bangladeshis; they feel less British. But on the whole, ethnicity was not found to be a major driver of British identification for Muslims.

Second, although researchers have argued that socio-economic difficulties can be important in explaining the attachment of Muslims to Britain, very few significant indicators are obtained. Socio-economic difficulties do not necessarily reduce British identification and in fact Muslims in low socio-economic positions feel more British than those in higher positions. The role of socioeconomic status as a driver of British identification is low for Muslims in Britain, and in the opposite direction to what the existing academic literature suggests.

Third, an understanding of ethnically and religiously based networks is paramount, serving as potential significant contributors in explaining Muslim disaffection. My findings suggest religious activity to have a negative impact on the belonging of Muslims to Britain. This can perhaps be explained by my findings from the in-depth interviews where Muslims who belonged to an Islamic political party, a religious based network operating with its own ideology, were in fact more practicing in their religion, and also felt less British. The impact of ethnic neighbourhoods, on the

other hand, is found to be positive. Muslims living in a neighbourhood with a large population of their own ethnic group did not feel less British, rather the opposite.

Fourth, I find there to be differences among generations in their levels of belonging. Muslims who migrated at a younger age feel more British than those who migrated in an older age. And there is also an important ‘born in Britain’ effect. Having British citizenship and being fluent at the English language are found to have a positive impact. Fifth, I found that Muslims have high levels of trust in mainstream civic and political institutions, which also promotes positive identification with the British mainstream. This is an intuitively appealing idea that is supported by the data.

The contribution of Chapter Five has been two-fold. Using two national surveys, the CS and EMBES, I first attempt to understand and confirm the strength of British identity for Muslims in relation to non-Muslims in Britain. I do this using a more sophisticated statistical technique of regression analysis and also by including controlling variables whereas previous academic research had relied on descriptive statistics. I show that this is higher than some previous academic research claims. Second, I investigate the different drivers that motivate the British identity of Muslims. As established, previous academic research has discussed the direction of these drivers but my research has shown that most of these directions are unfounded in the empirical data. These were poorly understood and under-researched attitudes. As well as testing for the significance of some drivers that have already been tested in previous academic research, I added some additional drivers. My findings show which factors do matter and are significant drivers for the British identity of Muslims. Thus my findings have advanced the previous statistical analyses done on Muslims in Britain. Some of the striking drivers of

interest that I found were the impact of religiosity, ethnic enclaves, generational differences, British citizenship, and English language ability. These have important implications for policy and for updating the claims and assumptions made in some previous academic research.

2. What does 'belonging to Britain' mean to Muslims in Britain?

The next and second empirical chapter, Chapter Six, builds on the previous chapter by conducting an exploratory analysis of the concept of 'belonging to Britain'. Despite the reliability of the empirical data analysed in the first chapter, it was inadequate in its validity. Though useful in providing a set of drivers, the quantitative results were limited in providing a meaningful understanding of belonging to Britain for Muslims. The results were based on a question that has a closed-ended categorical response scale. This measure did not tell me what "belonging to Britain" really *meant* for Muslims. To understand the meanings and the processes involved I delved into a deeper enquiry. For this, I 'questioned' the survey question 'How strongly do you belong to Britain?' through conducting cognitive interviews, a technique used to evaluate survey questions.

This exercise displays two key meanings of the question: a 'cultural' feeling (at ease) and an 'affective' feeling (feel attached). Most respondents interpreted the question as 'cultural', reflecting upon the practices, ethical values, and lifestyles that characterises a country. There was thus an important distinction to be made about how Muslims interpreted belonging to Britain. It was interpreted in affective terms as opposed to emotive. This is a very British way of feeling British, rooted more in cultural terms instead of being loaded with emotions. I theorise that this is a very British

way of feeling British. Perhaps survey practitioners had intended to tap the ‘affective’ dimension and need to revise survey questions.

The important contributions of this chapter were that it helped me better understand the meanings of belonging to Britain using the cognitive processes of Muslims. As well as this substantial understanding, there was also a methodological understanding of the survey design and questions.

3. What do the identities, British, Pakistani, and Muslim mean to Muslims in Britain, and how easy do they find it to integrate these identities?

One aim of this thesis was to understand the other identities of Muslims in Britain as the dynamics of their identity are not simple or one-dimensional; there are different levels and one must look deeper to understand the processes involved. Going beyond understanding the British identification of Muslims, in the third empirical chapter (Chapter Seven) I take the enquiry of Muslim identities one step further. As well as understanding the British identification, I wanted to find out what their Pakistani and Muslim identities meant to them. The qualitative in-depth interviews generated a number of findings to enhance this area of enquiry.

I began by looking at the quantitative results from a structured identity question that was asked in the in-depth interviews and then tried to understand how those results relate to the responses from the unstructured questions. Through a six-group typology of identity for Muslims in Britain, I saw variations of emphasis and salience for all three types of identity (British, Pakistani, and Muslim) through the typology, there were

thinner and thicker versions of each. The typology presented different modes of relating to these three identities, these modes were: cultural, unambiguous, emotional, emergent, ambivalent, and none of the above.

Although the quantitative (structured question) and qualitative (unstructured questions) findings of my in-depth interviews confirm each other broadly, they take a different view of identity. The results from the structured identity question take a categorical view of identity as opposed to the themes that emerged from the qualitative results which take a dimensional view of identity. Furthermore, I noticed that there is an emergent and creative aspect of identities in which identities are not simply additive for some of my respondents, but they have identity processes of fusion and mesh.

Linking the findings of this chapter back to the quantitative findings in Chapter Five, I found that some findings from this chapter challenged and some confirmed the quantitative findings of Chapter Five. First, in line with the findings from Chapter Five, I found that claims of an identity crisis among Muslims in Britain are exaggerated as 'Britain is home' comes out to be the largest cluster of responses emerging from the in-depth interviews. I found religion to have a moderate influence on the identities of the Muslims I spoke to. Religious activity did not have a negative influence as was found in the survey data. Instead of religious activity affecting the identity of Muslims, it was true for a small number of Muslims that their association with an Islamic political organisation influenced their Britishness. For them associating themselves to a global Islamic party was more salient than belonging to just a nation.

Another important finding in Chapter Seven was to understand that for some of my respondents, the fusion of identity is not always accepted as they have tensions in trying to integrate their different aspects of identity.

I find that the results from each of the empirical chapters are linked and compliment each other making them fit together. This work has contributed to debates in the academic community and further afield. Let me now discuss the theoretical and methodological contributions.

8.2 Contribution

This thesis has made theoretical and methodological contributions, both which I will discuss in turn below.

Theoretical

This thesis is the first comprehensive mixed-method study of the national, ethnic, and religious identities of Muslims in Britain, and contributes to the academic literature on Muslims in Britain. It makes some important theoretical contributions in that it advances our understanding of identities and what they mean to individuals, most significantly what national identity means. Existing theories found in mainstream academic literature on national identities have played a limited role in telling us about the identities of the respondents in this research. Jacobson's thesis was on the subject of ethnic and religious identities among second-generation British Pakistanis (published by Routledge as *Islam in Transition* in 1998). Although valuable her findings are now

outdated and not so relevant in the current climate of Muslims in Britain, whose situation or *schema* has changed in profound ways since 1998, when her findings were published. In her book she focuses on the ways in which Islamic religion still engenders powerful loyalties within what is now a predominantly secular society and how, in their continual adherence to their religion, many young British Pakistanis find a welcome sense of stability and permanence. By presenting material collected in field-work study and by using extensive quotations from interviews, the author argues that in a world where concepts of identity are always being challenged traditional sources of authority and allegiance still survive. I argue that this understanding of religious identity among second and third generation Muslims in Britain is overly simple and does not cover the diversity that exists in the way Muslims understand and relate to their Muslim identity. While many Muslims do hold strong religious identities, the *way* they practice those identities differs. While their religious identity might be very strong and their primary identity, the way that identity translates into their lives is varied, they have different modes of relating to their Muslim identity. The Muslim identity has dimensions that range from ultra-orthodox (representing sects, movements, and ideologies), orthodox, cultural, emotional, liberal, and secular. My research brings out the differences of identity formation within the Muslim identity, and without considering these dimensions an understanding of the Muslim identity is incomplete.

As well as the diversity that exists in the Muslim identity of Muslims in Britain, I also found there to be diversity in their British identity. There were cultural and emotional dimensions in their British identity, in their 'belonging to Britain'. Therefore Jacobson's conceptualisation of what national identities mean to second and third generation Muslims has been updated by my findings from the cognitive and qualitative

interviews. I further Jacobson's argument that being British for my Muslim respondents is not just about a British passport or nationality, instead it is a very 'British' way of feeling British. It is a more systematic way of belonging, where the respondents had devised their belonging in a systemised way based on certain practices, norms, and culture of the country, that made them feel 'in-tune' and 'in-touch' with it, the familiarity they have, the ease. But there was diversity in these feelings too.

It is the case that being British is not simply a matter of holding a passport or citizenship which intrinsically suggests that British identity does not contain a feeling of belonging for Muslims. This might be the case for some, and my findings did confirm this in line with Jacobson (1998). However for many more of my respondents this was not the case. They suggested to me that there is more to unveil about their Britishness. When my respondents started elaborating on their definitions and processes of what belonging to Britain meant it came to light that not only do many of them belong but the way they belong *matters*. It matters because the way they belong is determined by their definition of belonging. If belonging means adopting the mainstream culture of Britain which is what many of them interpreted belonging to Britain as meaning, then they did not really belong as they saw some aspects to contradict with their beliefs. But when I probed them on their processes of working out their answer then it came to light that their idea of belonging to Britain was rooted in its higher culture, of the values and norms that it represents. To them, this was the culture to which they aspired and belonged. As contributors and stakeholders of British society they had faith in its procedures and processes, its legal system, fairness, equality, and meritocracy. They felt that even if they did not partake in some of the contradictory cultural aspects such as drinking, they were very much immersed in the other subtle

ways of belonging. My research has thus made this distinction of cultural and emotional ways of belonging to Britain for Muslims in Britain.

Furthermore, my findings have highlighted that most of my Muslim respondents had a sense of familiarity and feeling of being ‘at home’ in Britain, not in Pakistan. Pakistan was a strong aspect of identity for some, but for many more Muslims in my sample, Britain was their home. By many respondents, the Pakistani identity was either fervently favoured or rejected, but there were some respondents who chose to merge it with their British or Asian influences creating a new cultural identity. Thus the Pakistani identity was adapted to in different ways by the respondents, highlighting at one end the diversity that exists in its adaptation, and on the other that it is also dynamic and changing. The most notable way this was demonstrated was by the Anglo-Pakistani identity. This shows that some respondents did want to hold onto it.

In addition this thesis advances our understanding of what national identities can mean to individuals. The findings from the cognitive interviews take us beyond Miller and Ali’s (2013) four dimensions of national identity, ‘national attachment’, ‘national pride’, ‘uncritical/critical patriotism’, and ‘civic/cultural forms of identification’. My respondents informed me that for them belonging to Britain was not about emotion and pride, but about the culture (different to Miller and Ali’s concept of culture which he operationalized as a country’s political system and its economic performance), values, and ways of life. For them this meant feeling in-line with British ways of life. They felt ‘in-tune’ and ‘in-touch’ with the practices and culture of the country, the familiarity they have, the ease.

Discovering the different dimensions - cultural and emotional - of all the three identities (British, Pakistani, and Muslim) as well as the emergent identities - dynamic and creative - is perhaps the most important contribution that this thesis makes in terms of understanding the nature of identities.

Methodological

The research in this thesis has made some methodological advancements. Firstly, the mixed-methods design of this thesis has generated findings that helped me better understand the subject and address the research questions. The nature of the research questions required me to deploy both quantitative and qualitative techniques, and as a result this thesis has advanced our understanding of Muslims in Britain by a huge leap. No other study has focused on the issue of identities and belonging as well as the ethnic and religious identities of Muslims in Britain, over years of research like this thesis has, using a rigorous mixed-methods approach to get to the depth of the issues at hand. Let me expand on this.

Using a mixed-methods approach, specifically a sequential explanatory design, for the research in this thesis has not only opened up new and unique intellectual avenues of thinking about the subject, but has also contributed in methodological terms to the field more broadly. The findings in this thesis have assured that a mixed-methods design can successfully be used to address important sociological topics that need to benefit from the richness of both methods. The mixed-methods approach improves validity and reliability and also increase confidence in the research data. The mixed-methods approach used in this thesis combined a unique set of methods, survey data, cognitive

interviews, and in-depth interviews. As discussed in the research methods chapter (Chapter Four), mixed-methods, instead of suggesting a fixed method, gives space to include multiple ways for data collection and analysis and can be emergent. In this thesis, it has indeed been emergent as I had not initially thought of using cognitive interviews but the findings from the survey data led me to think more deeply on what the question really meant to the respondents. This sort of emergent method can only come to life and develop in a mixed-methods framework where there is flexibility to experiment with different methods, where finding the most accurate answers to the puzzles or research enquiry becomes more important than the methods themselves. In the process, I devised a new research question probing what ‘belonging to Britain’ means to my Muslim respondents, whereas at the outset this was not one of my research questions (and may not have come to the fore had it not been for mixed methods) but as the research evolved, I weaved this question into the thesis as I thought it would inform my research enquiry and topic leading me to find more novel answers.

Secondly, this thesis also advances the practices used and tools of analysis for cognitive aspects of survey methodology that was employed for the cognitive interviews. Using Belson’s (1981) model as a beginning point, I added an element at the end asking my respondents to suggest alternative ways of wording the question, giving me a set of methodological innovations surrounding the survey question that I was looking at. My interview technique merged the cognitive procedures of the respondents in a five-fold method allowing room for their thoughts on the meaning of the question, their process of working out the answer, probes, and suggestions for improving the question. When it came to analysing the data that flowed from the cognitive interviews, I found there to be no established formal frameworks for me to use as this methodology is on the horizons

of expanding in the social sciences. With this in mind, I devised my own technique using cluster analysis.

It appears that the discipline of sociology has great potential for making use of mixed methods research. However, one's choice of mixed methods research for a particular study would depend on the research purpose, the research questions, the economic and political aspects of the project, and the requirements of the research context. Needless to say, a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of mixing qualitative and quantitative components at different stages of the study would be helpful to researchers. I strongly feel that by developing more carefully informed opinions about mixed methods research and by making creative use of a range of mixed-method designs the quality of research in the field of sociology could be further improved.

8.3 Limitations

As with any study, this thesis also had its limitations and these should be reflected on to improve future research. Firstly, I am aware that in my regression models there could have been issues of causal direction which is important to consider and to an extent inexhaustible problem in social research. In the case of this thesis, it was not possible to rectify the issue here as I had cross-sectional data. Secondly, although the first two empirical chapters of this thesis, the quantitative chapter (Chapter Five) and cognitive survey methodology chapter (Chapter Six), were based on data from Muslim respondents of any ethnic group, not limited to any one ethnic group, but the third empirical chapter, the in-depth interviews (Chapter Seven), was based on data on Muslims from one ethnic group, Pakistani Muslims. This can be thought of as a

limitation for the findings of that chapter especially because the focus of the thesis was to study all Muslims in Britain, but due to the limitation of time and resources, only the Pakistani ethnic group was selected for the in-depth interviews.

Future researchers can expand the findings of that chapter by interviewing other Muslim ethnic groups in Britain. Similarly, the geographical location for selecting my in-depth interview respondents was confined to London, for reasons of representation. This can also be broadened by future researchers to include other cities to represent Muslims from different regions across the UK where views can be quite different. For instance, the identities of Muslims in the North, in cities like Bolton where there are small concentrated pockets, almost like Pakistani villages, of Muslim communities who do not have that much interaction with White people on a day to day basis will be starkly different to the Muslim respondents that hail from a diverse and fast-paced city like London, as studied in this thesis. Although the Muslims interviewed in this thesis were mostly from ethnically concentrated areas in East London, they still have more perspective of the mainstream British society. I can say this also because I have visited Bolton many times in my childhood, and can add some observational insights from those trips, life in those cities for Muslims were very different, there is less compulsion to engage with White people, you can walk streets without seeing a single White person. On one street, you are likely to find people all from one ethnic background, and the chances they all know and socialise with each other very frequently, in their native language. When I compare that to London where I grew up, although there are towns with large Pakistani, Bangladeshi, or India populations, they are still more engaged with other communities. This may be to do with the greater economic activity and infrastructure of London as compared to the less industrialized cities. Or another case

would be the identity of Muslims living in the Midlands, in cities like Birmingham which has the UK's largest Muslim community (after London), and where Whites are predicted to become a minority by 2020, as seen in Leicester, Luton, and Slough (Doughty 2013). It would be interesting to look at what the dynamics of the Muslims' identities are in these cities where they are not a minority anymore. Again, from personal experience I have seen that the Muslim communities in these areas are more inclined to hold onto the customs and practices they came with, and are less open to change. And being in larger numbers in these cities, they are less compelled to change.

8.4 Implications for Policy-Making

The implications of this research for policy-making are paramount. The rampant debate currently spreading across Europe regarding multiculturalism and integration is highly relevant to the premise of this research. The research has highlighted the nuanced differences in the identity of Muslims and shown that it is emergent and dimensional, continually changing. The perpetual assumption among the right-wing tabloid press as well as some think-tanks and policy groups; that all Muslims have and hold the same values, choices, and preferences is not justified; and I hope this research has drawn attention to this. The material from these interviews has provided rich analysis on Muslim identity. Policy-makers can use the research conducted in this thesis to better understand the views and challenges of a group that is of interest to the wider society in Britain. From parliamentarians to think-tanks, the findings in this thesis can be used as a guide to inform their policies. For example, the Labour Party's new approach is of integration, as demonstrated by the think-tank 'British Future' being run by a left-wing politician, Sunder Katwala. British Future addresses the issues of identity and

integration and surveys minority views, and one of its calls is for the adoption of and English national anthem, which won the support of Prime Minister David Cameron. It is actors and bodies like these that can be informed by the research in this thesis, to understand whether their policies are effective or not. Besides from the large majority of Muslims who feel at home in Britain, we cannot overlook the small alienated group of Muslims who feel marginalised, they must be brought back into mainstream society. It is this group that feels marginalised, they feel under attack by the British government's policies on integration. One way to do this is to understand the socioeconomic difficulties and discrimination challenges faced by these Muslims. Through promoting their success in education, they will be presented with better life opportunities and as they venture out, they will get exposed to people from other communities. They feel cut off from society because of the ties they have with political and ideological parties/groups such as *Hizb ut Tahrir* that provide them an alternative 'bonding community'. But this community is no more than an almost invisible community which reinforces the idea of 'otherness'. Additionally, there is a need to address the existence and operation of these ideological and political parties/groups that seek to influence Muslim minds in a radical sense. Of course, the process of Muslims feeling marginalized is not one way, it is also affected by the negative reactions from the White British people, and so we must not rule out the role of this, and little can be done to change this. Greater interaction and community events between minority ethnic groups and White British population could begin this process.

8.5 Perspectives for Future Research

While the research done in this thesis has shed light on arguably one of the most important and interesting aspects concerning Muslims in Britain, their identities and sense of belonging, nonetheless the findings of this thesis pose some further questions and interesting angles of enquiry for future research.

Firstly, while my research has to some extent addressed the misconception that Muslims do not necessarily need to be living in mixed communities to feel more British, future research must still probe how these ethnic communities are developing their own ethnic versions of British identity. How are they incorporating and adapting their ethnic and religious ties to British culture? It is paramount to understand the dynamics of change in these ethnic communities. Secondly, there can be research carried out in to how the different Muslim ethnic groups in Britain (the Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, Indians, and Somalis) are intersecting with each other, how are they bonding and bridging? What are their community ties? Here it is relevant to refer to Raya (2012) who terms this as ‘pan-ethnic’ ties. She says, “interethnic friendship is formed in a ‘pan-ethnic’ pattern whereby those with similar ethnic/racial categorisation and cultural traits such as Muslim Indians and Pakistanis, or mixed White and Black Caribbean and Black Caribbean, are more likely to nominate one another as close friends” (p. 1). Thirdly, how are these groups relatively negotiating their place in society, what are the social networks they occupy? What is their relative social and human capital like? Another area to explore could be how the Muslim political networks intersect with the wider social and political environment.

There is also some worth in future researchers comparing the situations of Britain with that of Muslims across the Atlantic, in America and Canada. I have identified four differences between these countries, which could be explored further:

1. Differences in immigration patterns - Canada takes immigrants who are more educated and skilled, whereas in the UK and Western Europe they come as poor labourers.

2. Canada/US have more economic growth, jobs, and resources. Greater prosperity means less competition for jobs and resources, and hence less prejudice towards immigrants.

3. Geography - US/Canada are separated from other countries by oceans, whereas for Western Europe these immigrants often come from nearby countries where it's more difficult to control the flow of immigrants (ex. North Africa and France) - it's just like the US and Mexico or Cuba.

4. History - there's an established history of people living here in the UK, so immigrants are treated like newcomers. In Canada/US people haven't been there for as long, especially Canada, so people are less prejudicial towards immigrants.

Now I turn to my concluding remarks.

Concluding Remarks

The issues explored in this thesis, of the identities and sense of belonging of Muslims in Britain and the extent to which they are loyal to the country they live in, are hugely timely and relevant in the context of Britain, but also more widely for the world we live in today which is curious about the clash of cultures between the believers of Islam and those of other religions, most notably in Western countries. These topics in one way or another very frequently make headlines in the news, are under the spotlight of government policies, and focus of research by pollsters, think-tanks, and academia. The research conducted as part of this thesis has taken forward the existing epistemology or theory of knowledge in the field of sociology, surrounding Muslims in the British context. The existing empirical studies in academic research had not presented a comprehensive overview of Muslims in Britain. Through a mixed-methods approach, this research has challenged easy generalisations and assumptions about the topic, added theoretical contributions, and offered heedful and measured insights into some of the most tangled issues facing Britain in relation to its Muslim community, and indeed the global society today. This thesis may form a basis on which future research can draw on to develop this field of research even further. There is a need for greater understanding of how the sociological study of Muslims has evolved in several different contexts around the world and with that understanding, an appraisal of the common theoretical ground that exists between countries such as the United States and Britain. Such a global debate has the potential to inform how sociologists and policymakers approach future challenges in the field.

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