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Biography:

Jed Fazakarley was awarded a D. Phil. in History by the University of Oxford in 2014. His thesis concerned the social and political identities of Muslim communities in England and the operation of political and governmental multiculturalism in Britain during the second half of the twentieth century. He is currently a post-doctoral research fellow in History based at The Oxford Research Centre in the Humanities, University of Oxford. His work, which is funded by a grant from the Mellon Foundation, concerns the transnational political activity of diasporic communities in twentieth century Britain.

“Multiculturalism’s Categories and Transnational Ties: the Bangladeshi Campaign for Independence in Britain, 1971”.

Abstract

Accounts of the changing categories operative within British multiculturalism have commonly focused upon the gradual division of identities. Analysing the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War’s effects in Britain, this article suggests that a narrative of categorisations in British multiculturalism must be more complex, sensitive to shifts in time and both bottom-up and top-down factors. Whilst the mobilisation of second-generation British Bangladeshi community organisations in the 1980s firmly established Bangladeshis as a distinct constituency of multiculturalism, the 1971 campaign, conducted in a context less sensitive to the internal diversity of ethnic minorities, contributed to a more partial recognition of Bengalis as distinct. Such categorical shifts, the article suggests, are therefore the result of both domestic and transnational politics. In the British Bangladeshi community, ‘homeland’ political issues, particularly those centred on the relationship between Bangladeshi culture and Islam, have mapped heavily onto British struggles about how the community is framed. The transnational mobilisations, by bringing British Bangladeshis into increased contact with mainstream institutions, have often assisted rather than frustrated integration. Nevertheless, the importation of Bangladeshi political conflict to Britain has at times been resisted by British elites, reflecting again the importance of the dialect between bottom-up and top-down action in producing multiculturalism’s structure.

Whilst there is much disagreement about of what British multiculturalism has consisted, there is wide acceptance that it involved the state positing the existence of separable ethnic or cultural categories.¹ For the state, ‘ethnicity’ and ‘culture’ were closely related (perhaps coterminous) and often indistinct from terms such as ‘religion’ and ‘race’. These categorisations of peoples were not only indistinct and inconsistent and the categories applied varied between localities and shifted over time.²

One version of the history of British multiculturalism, often presented by critics, suggests a linear erosion of categories, encouraged by the state’s ‘divide and rule’ tactics. In this scheme,

Commonwealth immigrants, discovering the significance of their being 'non-white' in a nation that styled itself as white, organised together as 'Black'. Later, according to this argument, forces within and without ethnic minority communities combined to foreground the cultural specificities of Asian and West Indian groups, and so break this 'Black' alliance apart. It is further suggested by these accounts that, since around the time of the Rushdie affair, the religious identities of ethnic minority, and especially Asian, communities have been stressed by the state, which is eager to bolster the conservative religious leaders within a community.³ This narrative, in its treatment of the recent past, mirrors elite criticisms of multiculturalism that have grown in salience since the riots in northern towns in 2001.⁴ Though different commentators attribute differing significance to various causes of this supposed disunity, there is thus much agreement that the history of multiculturalism has entailed a march towards division. Such criticisms of multiculturalism – alongside Britain's increased demographic diversity since it became a country of net immigration in the 1990s, and the hollowing out of local government from the late 1980s – inspired the reform of a 'post-colonial' style of British multiculturalism, in which a limited, if locally varied, number of ethnic communities were posited and given specific recognition based on their supposed 'special needs'. Post-millennial programmes have focused on 'community cohesion' and the prevention of extremism, whilst not entirely abandoning multiculturalism's conception of identifiably distinct communities, and have sought to be more inclusive and thematic.⁵

This critical narrative of multiculturalism is not without merit, though many of its claims should be qualified. Firstly, it must be acknowledged that ethnic minority communities in Britain, including Muslim communities, have always organised on a religious basis.⁶ Furthermore, religious organisations have, at times, had ends in common with more secular groups. In Bradford, for instance, the city's most prominent Muslim group, the Bradford Council of Mosques (BCM), worked alongside organisations that were self-consciously secular in campaigns against local headmaster Ray Honeyford's xenophobic comments and for the provision of *halal meat* in city schools.⁷ This reflects both the willingness of Muslim organisations to make alliances across religious lines and the potential for secular organisations, such as the Asian Youth Movements (AYMs,) to campaign on a religious basis in the public sphere (even whilst framing these issues in terms of 'culture'). It can also be questioned to what degree the identities ascribed to ethnic minority communities in Britain have been the products of any malevolence on the part of the state. Positing the existence of a limited number of ethnic communities that are relatively internally homogenous is 'bureaucratically convenient' where limited resources are apportioned to specific ethnic communities.⁸ Furthermore, the identities both ascribed to and claimed by ethnic minority communities in Britain have been

locally varied, highly contextual, and shifting over time. This local variance is symptomatic of the general localisation of British multiculturalism owing to the tendency, particularly in the 1950s-70s, for the centre to delegate potentially sensitive 'race' issues to special structures including particular local authority employees, Community Relations Councils (CRCs), and, later, 'race' committees.⁹

Shifts in ascribed and claimed identities must also be regarded as a product of both top-down and bottom-up processes. Recent work on diasporic communities has correctly emphasised that '[p]olicies of nation-states play a dialectical role in the creation and maintenance of ethnic groups'.¹⁰ The other element of this dialectic, or at least its most directly political manifestation, is action by ethnic groups, or organisations claiming to represent them. In post-war Britain, the local and national state has contributed to the perception of certain communities as distinctive in various ways by providing specialised resources and commissioning reports that frame ethnic data in certain ways.¹¹ The passage of the 1976 Race Relations Act, which outlawed practices that unintentionally disadvantaged ethnic minorities, encouraged the development of ethnic monitoring procedures. This required local authorities to give employees and service users a limited list of ethnic identities to choose from in identifying themselves, which were then used for statistical purposes. Since 1991, the British government has also included a question on ethnic origin in the national census.¹² Some local authorities also instituted 'race' committees in the 1970s and 1980s with non-councillor representatives from ethnic minority communities, sometimes on a quota basis. By 1991, Manchester's committee had 26 directly elected ethnic minority members – ten Afro-Caribbeans, eight Pakistanis, four Indians, Africans, and Chinese, and two Bangladeshis, Middle Easterners and Vietnamese.¹³ In Birmingham, ethnic minority organisations affiliated to council-created umbrella groups representing Black churches, Afro-Caribbeans, Chinese, Hindus, Sikhs, Pakistanis, Irish and Vietnamese.¹⁴ In these cases, determinations about the groups included in local multicultural structures were made in a crudely top-down fashion. However, ethnic minority communities have been able to challenge the operative categories of multiculturalism at local and national level. There was a successful campaign amongst British Irish people for inclusion of 'Irish' as an ethnic category on the 2001 census.¹⁵ A campaign by the Federation of Muslim Organisations in Brent in the mid-1980s suggesting that Muslims in the borough should be conceived of in religious terms led to new education guidelines in the area and the introduction of religious monitoring.¹⁶ The willingness of local authorities, particularly around the time of multiculturalism's heyday in the 1980s, to foster organisations claiming a distinct identity has meant, somewhat paradoxically, that ethnically-specific mobilisation can combine with an increased level of integration amongst minority communities.

British Bangladeshis, as discussed below, were also engaged in this process, with second-generation community organisations seeking, and winning, recognition of the distinctiveness of British Bangladeshis' cultural characteristics and material deprivation and special provisions in light of this. In an earlier time, the British Bengali campaign for Bangladeshi independence also drew attention to the distinctiveness of Bengali culture and identity. However, recognition of this was rendered partial by the depoliticisation of 'race' favoured by elites at that time; by a conception, and self-conception, of many British Bengalis as sojourner migrants; and to the related 'encapsulation' of British Bengali communities. The campaign for independence, and the values it embodied, particularly secularism and cultural nationalism, informed the second-generation organisations mentioned above. However, in more recent decades, these second-generation activists have been challenged in British Bengali communities by Islamist organisations professing a 'deculturated' form of Islam that more decisively separates Islam from secular Bengali culture. These organisations, such as the East London Mosque (ELM) and Young Muslims Organisations (YMO), have been assisted by the political savvy of their leaders; their involvement in powerful, influential and resourceful transnational Islamist networks (particularly through the Jamaat-e-Islami political party); and by their ability to capitalise on 'community cohesion' initiatives and so build strong relationships with local authorities and political parties. This study therefore emphasises the contested, shifting and local nature of the categories operative within British multiculturalism, but also the significance of complex transnational networks to their determination.

II

Bengalis have been present in Britain since at least the seventeenth century, primarily as *lascars* (foreign-born seamen) and students. Following the First World War, a small number of *lascars* formed settled communities in port areas, including London, Glasgow and Tyneside, with some moving inland to the Midlands in search of work. The outbreak of the Second World War caused another spike in the demand for Indian labour in Britain, and by 1942, over 3,000 Indians were employed in British industry. Though many of those Bengalis who contributed to the British war effort returned to their homeland in peacetime, further groups of *lascars* sought to make lives for themselves ashore, whilst increasing numbers of non-seamen also migrated into manual trades. This migration came overwhelmingly from the eastern district of Sylhet, and comprised rural landholders with sufficient capital to invest in migration.¹⁷

Like all British Asian migration of this period, Bengali migration to Britain gathered pace through a 'chain' process: single men moved from East Bengal to certain areas of Britain, to be followed by kin, friends and neighbours. These migrants came largely from the rural areas of the north-eastern district of Sylhet. As discussed below, Sylhet has a distinct regional culture, including its own language and literary tradition. British Bengalis from Sylhet, easily the majority of the community, were therefore separated socially and spatially to a degree from urban Bangladeshi migrants who spoke standard Bengali. Even more so than other Asians, East Bengali pioneer migrants reconstituted their families in Britain only slowly and unevenly. This reflects both the financial struggles of British Bangladeshi men trapped in low-paying jobs and concerns about Britain being unsuited to the raising of a Bengali Muslim family. Although some Bengali families were relatively settled in Britain in the 1960s, there are many cases of male pioneer migrants sending for their dependents only in the 1980s. Very physical transnational ties between British Bangladeshis and their homeland – visits to Bangladesh, sometimes lasting years, and burial in the country of origin – were therefore deeply enduring.¹⁸

These migration patterns meant that East Bengali communities in Britain inhabited distinct neighbourhoods from other ethnic minority groups, including Pakistanis. East and West Pakistani communities often had little contact, and the differences in class profile and language may have added to suspicions between them.¹⁹ Distinctions between East and West Pakistani communities were often not perceived by elites, however. For example, the statistics on 'immigrant' pupils kept in Bradford from 1963-4 distinguished only between 'Indians' and 'Pakistanis'.²⁰ Estimates of the 'coloured immigrant' population in Birmingham were, likewise, sub-divided into the categories of 'Indian', 'Pakistani' and 'West Indian'.²¹ The Pakistani High Commission (PHC) itself was often involved in the arena of 'community relations', despite its role in refusing passports to potential East Pakistani migrants, cutting off funding to separatist Bengali students, and in general maintaining a poor relationship with and superior attitude towards East Pakistanis.²² Central government, meanwhile, often bracketed all Commonwealth immigrants together in its legislation and directives, for example when advising local authorities to limit the proportion of such immigrants in their schools at one third, and when providing funding for local work with any immigrants 'whose language or customs differ from those of the community'.²³ The operative categories in this early phase of British multiculturalism were therefore broad but contextual.

This categorical breadth reflected the salience for elites of the fact that 'Commonwealth immigrants' were all 'non-white', as well as low levels of understanding of ethnic minority

communities, and the lack of representation they received on early 'community relations' bodies.²⁴ A further reason for this indistinct conception of ethnic minorities was the relative 'encapsulation' of, particularly, Pakistani and Bangladeshi migrants in this period. In a 1979 study of (West) Pakistanis in Rochdale, Anwar suggested that the community was 'encapsulated' by its concentration in particular sorts of work and shift-patterns, by its religious life, and by the mediation of its contact with local elites through 'community leaders' and kinship networks.²⁵ Aside from any sociological features of ethnic minority communities, this 'encapsulation' also reflects the aforementioned desire amongst white elites to depoliticise 'race'. These factors all therefore contributed to an indistinct conception of 'Commonwealth immigrants' amongst British elites in the first decades of post-war immigration.

III

Bengali Muslims were amongst the most impassioned supporters of a Pakistan state in the lead-up to the partition of India in 1947. However, it has been argued that this support originated primarily from a desire amongst middle-class Muslims for economic independence from the Hindu middle-classes of Bengal, who dominated the economy of the region, rather than from strong preference for a Muslim state as an end itself.²⁶ Dissatisfaction of East Pakistanis with the post-partition government based in West Pakistan soon emerged, reflecting in part the marginalisation of the Bengali language following the creation of Pakistan and the establishment of Urdu as its official language. Campaigns supporting official status for Bengali grew in strength the 1950s, culminating in the killing of five Bengali student protestors in Dhaka in February 1952 by Pakistani police. Although the language issue was initially championed primarily by students and elites, subsequent celebrations of 'Language Martyrs Day' became more popular affairs.²⁷ Aside from linguistic questions, Bengalis felt that their province was being economically exploited by the Pakistani government, with international aid being spent overwhelmingly in the West despite the East's larger population.²⁸ Criticisms of the Pakistani government's apparent indifference towards the Eastern wing became more acute following the devastating Bhola cyclone of 1970. Yahya Khan's military dictatorship was accused by Bengali politicians of failing to prepare for such a cyclone despite similar disasters having occurred in the 1960s; failing to mobilise the air force to provide aid to East Bengal; and suppressing details of the horrific effects of the cyclone (which claimed over 250,000 lives).²⁹ The apparent neglect by the Pakistani government was a prominent feature of campaign literature produced by British Bengali activists supportive of independence.³⁰

Support for increased Bangladeshi autonomy, if not complete independence, was not a unanimous opinion within East Bengal in this period. Perhaps the most vehement opposition to separation came from Islamist organisations, chief amongst them the Jamaat-e-Islami. For the Jamaat – which in this period was numerically small but highly organised in a cadre-type structure – Bangladeshi independence would betray the movement for a single Muslim state in the Indian sub-continent with an identity based heavily upon Islam. Nevertheless, in the Pakistani elections of December 1970, the Awami League, a nationalist, secularist, and social democratic party, won 167 of East Pakistan's 169 parliamentary seats. The League's manifesto called for an extensive increase in autonomy for East Pakistan, but not independence. After negotiations between the party's leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, and West Pakistani leaders failed, the West launched a pre-emptive purge of Bengali intellectuals, activists, and army officers sympathetic to the independence movement. In an initial phase of guerrilla warfare, the militia supporting Bangladeshi independence, the Mukhti Bahini, suffered a series of major losses. Islamist paramilitary groups such as Al Badr collaborated with the Pakistani army, and committed mass murders of Bengalis supportive of independence.³¹ Despite the devastation thus caused to East Pakistan, the entry of India into the war on the East Bengali side in December turned the tide of the war. After a series of heavy reverses, West Pakistan surrendered on December 16th.

IV

The outbreak of war caused consternation in Britain. This was heightened by a failure to anticipate the strength of British Bengali feeling. The Community Relations Officer (CRO) for Oldham admitted that he was surprised by the size of a pro-independence march organised on April 1st.³² As India entered the war, anxiety increased. Lord Wade, chair of the Yorkshire Committee for Community Relations, expressed hope that 'all who have come here from the Indian subcontinent will remember that they are first and foremost citizens of this country and will not wish to disturb the peace...'³³

By that time, however, the war had already led to isolated violent incidents. The first occurred in Birmingham in March at a pro-independence meeting attended by 6,000 people. A Bengali man was stabbed by a West Pakistani and ten people were arrested, most for 'threatening behaviour'.³⁴ A further stabbing – again, apparently, of a Bengali by a West Pakistani -- occurred at another Birmingham rally the following month.³⁵ There was a more serious outbreak of violence at a market in Stepney in mid-May. A number of people 'fought hand-to-hand with sticks and knives'

according to a report in the *East London Advertiser*, and a number of stalls owned by West Pakistanis were vandalised. Four men were hospitalized, and at least six arrests made for 'threatening behaviour' and the carrying of offensive weapons.³⁶ Uniquely, these events attracted national press attention, with the *Daily Express* reporting that 'militant Bangli Desh [sic] extremists' had thrown petrol bombs at West Pakistani stalls. In contrast to the apparent elite ignorance about the strength of feeling in British Pakistani communities evidenced in the spring, a spokesperson for the Metropolitan Police complained that '[w]e are trying to contain a civil war'.³⁷ In June, fifty Pakistanis fought 'a pitched battle' in Rochdale, leading to a response from eight police cars.³⁸ In September, a pro-independence rally attended by over 1,000 demonstrators became violent when 200 West Pakistanis arrived.³⁹

This enumeration of incidents reported by the press may underestimate the violence. British Bangladeshi nationalist activists have suggested that minor violent incidents were common during the war.⁴⁰ Comments that directly addressed the encapsulation of such violence were offered by Keighley's CRO, the Bengali Dr S. Mujahid. He remarked after the war that he did not know 'whether the citizens of Keighley are conscious of the fact that their town has gone through some precarious moments during the last year' due to 'a lot of tension between East and West Pakistanis in the community'.⁴¹ However, no such incidents were reported in Keighley's local press. Where local press did report on these incidents, specifics regarding the ethnicity and political affiliations of the participants, victims and perpetrators, are often lacking. The incidents are sometimes corroborated elsewhere, but primarily in the oral testimony of pro-independence Bengali activists. However, sufficient evidence does exist to suggest that inter-community violence during the war attracted local and, less often, national media attention in Britain, but that the encapsulation of British Asian communities in this period may have led to the press underestimating the seriousness of the conflict and failing to communicate its subtleties.

Aside from violent incidents, the war occasioned many organisational shifts in Britain. British campaigns for Bangladeshi autonomy predated the war. A London branch of the Awami League was established in the 1960s. Visits from nationalist leaders, such as Rahman in 1969 and Maulana Bhashani, founder of the Awami League, in 1954, helped to spread secessionist politics amongst British Bangladeshis and led to the formation of British party branches.⁴² In the first month after the outbreak of war, over a hundred local committees were formed, including three in East London alone. This led to a certain amount of disorganization and inefficiency as, although coordination increased as the war went on, total cooperation between groups working in different areas was not

achieved.⁴³ Aside from inspiring the creation of new organizations, the war caused rifts within established 'Pakistani' groups. Despite being numerically fewer than West Pakistanis, East Pakistanis often held leadership positions in putatively general British 'Pakistani' organisations due to their earlier arrival.⁴⁴ Tassaduq Ahmed, a prominent Bengali community leader in East London, had founded the National Federation of Pakistani Associations (NFPA), which had a largely Bengali leadership, and was head of the League of Pakistanis (LOP). The League was formed in 1965 but then split when Ahmed formed a new League of Bangladeshis.⁴⁵ Whilst some East Pakistanis in the NFPA called for Bengalis to form a new organisation, the group, which was only a very loose confederation of local Pakistani Welfare Associations (PWAs), continued in its original form.⁴⁶ Other organisations, such as the East London PWA, changed their names to reflect disassociation from Pakistan.⁴⁷

These new pro-independence organisations and factions became most visible through public demonstrations. A rally outside the PHC office in Bradford was begun in February and lasted until late March.⁴⁸ A later demonstration outside the PHC building in London was covered on national television.⁴⁹ Marches in Oldham, London, Luton and Bradford in the spring attracted thousands of attendees. Perhaps the largest demonstration occurred in London in August, with 10,000 people reportedly in attendance.⁵⁰ In 1971, the arrival of the touring Pakistani cricket team was greeted by crowds chanting 'stop the murder, stop the cricket'.⁵¹ Protestors repeatedly turned out in large numbers at tour matches, with a peak of 3,000 at the first test match in Birmingham. Material handed out at a game in Worcester asked spectators '[c]an you, in all honesty, support representatives of such bestial murders?' The tour match with Yorkshire led to a hunger strike outside Bradford cricket ground, where up to 200 people gathered in support.⁵² Protests often occurred alongside fundraising events. The total amount of money raised during the war has been put at £430,000, most of which was used to fund the Bangladeshi national bank after independence.⁵³

Aside from its direct effects upon community mobilization, the war had an indirect impact upon British politics. In the early 1970s, British Asians were less closely tied to the Labour Party than they would later become, with community-party allegiances being highly contingent, formed mostly by elites.⁵⁴ The 1971 war further complicated the relationship between Labour and Pakistanis and Bangladeshis. In general, Labour pursued a pro-independence line, whilst the Conservative government stressed the right of the Pakistani government to settle the 'internal dispute'.⁵⁵ In the 1971 local elections in Bradford, Labour selected Munawir Hussain, an East Pakistani leader and

supporter of independence, to contest Manningham ward, which had a large West Pakistani population. Mian Nawaz, chair of the Bradford branch of the Pakistan People's Party said that a 'vigorous campaign' would be launched against Hussain.⁵⁶ Bradford West CLP's new and outgoing secretaries, Brian Rhodes and Garfield Rawnsley, described Nawaz's demand as 'bordering on the insane', objecting to ethnicity becoming a factor in local politics. The *Telegraph and Argus* agreed that it was 'ridiculous that [the war] should play any part in an election in Britain or Bradford'. Nevertheless, West Pakistani community groups in Bradford pledged support to the Conservatives.⁵⁷ Notably, one of these, the Pakistani Immigrant Welfare Association, had been strongly supportive of Labour as recently as 1969.⁵⁸ Nawaz later decided to stand as an independent candidate himself. Neither Hussain nor Nawaz discussed Pakistani issues in their election addresses, focusing on the issue of equal rights for ethnic minorities, reinforcing the finding of Eade in East London that ethnic minority candidates may speak to different communities in different languages, figuratively and literally.⁵⁹ Ultimately, the Tories won Manningham, with their candidate defeating Hussain by 188 votes, whilst Nawaz received 163.⁶⁰ Elsewhere, Liberal candidate Cyril Smith's victory in the former Labour seat of Rochdale in a 1972 by-election has been attributed to Pakistani voters turning away from Labour owing in part to its support for Bangladesh.⁶¹

These various events and dynamics encouraged acknowledgement of the distinctiveness of East Pakistanis in Britain. Labour and Liberal MPs observed that the 'common feeling' amongst East and West Pakistanis had broken down in south Asia.⁶² Furthermore, many observed, as Clifford Longley did in *The Times*, that '[d]ivisive prejudices run deep. They were submerged in the effort to face common difficulties in Britain, but have been rekindled by events at home...'⁶³ This also had institutional effects, with Ahmed's new League of Bangladeshis taking over one of the two seats reserved for Pakistanis on the UK Immigrants Advisory Service (UKAIS).⁶⁴ Bentley, in a 1972 article for the CRC's journal *New Community*, observed that whilst 'the majority white group may think of all Asians as "Pakistanis"' much of the time, '[t]here are occasions... when they recognise finer distinctions and seek to incorporate them into the framework of legally enforceable practices structuring intergroup relations'.⁶⁵ Occasions in which groups made claims to separate nationhood were especially likely to encourage such categorical shifts, reflecting the emphasis placed within British multiculturalism upon national groups. This has also informed the mobilisations in Britain for an independent Khalistan and Kashmiri self-determination.⁶⁶

However, despite drawing greater attention to the specificity of British Bangladeshi communities, the independence also increased the integration of these communities into

mainstream institutions, for example by bringing them into closer association with the Labour Party.⁶⁷ Campaigners gained experience of British political culture. Less obviously, the war encouraged British reflection on the place of Bangladeshi and Pakistani communities within the nation. Throughout the war, there were reports that British Asians were prepared to return to their homelands to fight in the war or had even offered their services.⁶⁸ Although this was not in reality a common step, concern was expressed in Bradford that the situation would be 'very difficult' if all eighteen Asian doctors in the city volunteered for the war effort.⁶⁹ A cartoon appeared in the *Oldham Evening Chronicle* featuring two white men in adjacent hospital beds about to be attended to by a Pakistani doctor. One of the men brandishes a half-eaten newspaper front-page with the headline "WAR IN PAKISTAN" and says to his fellow patient, '[q]uick, eat that! I don't want him to join up before he's done my appendix.'⁷⁰ Although on one level a joke about 'funny foreigners', the Oldham cartoon is evidence that, in the popular mind, a certain group of middle-class British Pakistanis had gained a position of importance within the community.

V

The effects of campaigning for Bangladeshi independence upon British multiculturalism were mediated by an elite preference to depoliticise ethno-political issues and by the encapsulation of the British Bengali community. By the 1980s, the second-generation, oriented more decisively towards Britain, had begun to establish independent community organisations, whilst 'race' had become a more explicit factor in local and national British politics – as reflected in the passage of the 1976 Race Relations Act – rather than being embedded solely in debates about immigration. 'Race equality', and similarly-named, structures at local level actively sought ethnic minority involvement.⁷¹ Second-generation Bengali' organisations emphasised new priorities, such as opposing racial attacks and encouraging culturally-specific provisions, but the values of 'secularism, nationalism, socialism and democracy', salient in the 1971 campaign, remained important to them.⁷² In the East End, the Federation of Bangladesh Youth Organisation's (FBYO) journal, *Jubo Barta*, often referenced the independence campaign as an inspiration.⁷³ Many youth organisations were involved in commemorations of Language Martyr's Day and/or independence day.⁷⁴ There are now replicas of the Shaheed Minar, a memorial to Bangladeshi Language Martyrs erected in Dhaka, in Oldham and East London. Campaigns for linguistic recognition, central to Bangladeshi nationhood, were also undertaken in Britain.⁷⁵ As Alexander shows, the placement of the Shaheed Minar in Spitalfields in a park named for Altab Ali – whose murder in 1979 did much to encouraged self-defence mobilisation

– tied together numerous struggles, varying in geographical location and thematic emphasis, of continued importance to the community.⁷⁶

A main aim of second-generation organisations was to foster recognition of the distinctiveness of Bengali culture and provisions from local authorities on this basis. A primary demand of these new community organizations was the employment by local authorities of Bangladeshi staff to work with Bangladeshi communities.⁷⁷ The GLC employed many Bangladeshi staff members whilst under Labour control from 1981.⁷⁸ The London Borough of Tower Hamlets was slower to act, but by the late 1980s had an ‘Asian’ liaison officer as well as a Bangladeshi assistant CRO.⁷⁹ Both the FBYO Development Officer and Ayub Ali, former chair of the Progressive Youth Organisation (PYO), another Bengali youth group, received social services posts.⁸⁰ By developing links with local authorities, community organisations were able to position members to take newly-created jobs, as well as lobbying for the posts themselves.⁸¹ Greater attention was paid to the specificity of Bangladeshis not only for cultural reasons, but in recognition of their precarious economic position in Britain. Whilst the 1985 Swann Report largely collapsed Bangladeshis into the broader category of ‘Asian’, it did consider their cultural specificities as well as the community’s educational underperformance.⁸² Swann reflected increased concern about the particular disadvantages faced by British Bangladeshis, which culminated in the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee (HCHAC) report on the communities in 1986.⁸³ By the 1980s, therefore, the British Bengali community was established as distinct within British multiculturalism and was, at least in certain localities, provided with significant specialised services. Whilst the increase of such services may have benefited the community as a whole, the new availability of posts and services led to organisational competition. Accusations of misusing local authority access formed part of the fatal factional struggle in Bangladeshi Educational Needs in Tower Hamlets (BENTH), an umbrella organisation formed in 1983 in association with the Inner London Education Authority (ILEA) to vet community funding applications.⁸⁴

The split in BENTH reflected to a significant degree a tension between Sylheti and non-Sylheti Bengalis. As mentioned, the vast majority of British Bangladeshis are Sylhetis, speaking a distinctive dialect of Bengali and coming from rural origins. The tendency of local authorities to rely on middle-class non-Sylhetis, speakers of standard Bengali from urban origins, was a major issue for more radical Sylheti community activists. This more radical BENTH faction repeatedly emphasised that ILEA should recruit employees that could speak Sylheti, not standard Bengali.⁸⁵ Failure to employ Sylheti speakers was sometimes regarded as a ‘conspiracy’, but the ‘anti-Sylheti’ and

'middle-class non-Sylheti' Bengalis who 'misled' local authorities into believing they had fluency in Sylheti were also criticised. Those appointed through such deceptions, it was claimed, included members of the more middle-class faction that had previously controlled BENTH. It was also suggested that such middle-class non-Sylhetis were active in writing material on the Bangladeshi community that denigrated Sylhetis. Such disputes were at their sharpest in 1985 following the production by F.M. Bhatti, a 'Westernised' Bengali, of a pamphlet for ILEA that was supposedly anti-Sylheti.⁸⁶ Demands for Sylheti provisions were met to an extent in London, with Sylheti-speaking social workers, interpreters and translators being employed by the local authority, and at least one Sylheti-speaking officer being engaged by the local police.⁸⁷ The 1986 HCHAC report on *Bangladeshis in Britain* drew attention to the need for Sylhet-speaking staff, as well as for material translated into the language.⁸⁸

Apart from its specifically Sylheti characteristics, the 'Bengali culture' promoted by second-generation community groups in the 1980s was inclusive of Islam. A number of youth groups organised Eid celebrations as well as commemorations of the Language Martyrs.⁸⁹ The FBYO, in encouraging Tower Hamlets to appoint more Bengali staff, suggested that Bangladeshi communities needed social workers with an 'understanding of the ethnic communities' cultural & social background and... religious and moral value systems'.⁹⁰ BENTH, though not foregrounding religious education, tied together 'cultural', linguistic and religious educational demands.⁹¹ This elision of culture and religion can be seen in many oral interviews with British Bangladeshis. For example, one interviewee for *Bangla Stories* recalls that his father wondered 'which culture would his children grow up with? Muslim culture or Western culture? Because of this, he sent us to Bangladesh... to know Bengali culture'.⁹² Second-generation Bengali community leaders were aware of operating in a community with a culture heavily informed by Islam, especially when working with girls and women.⁹³ This is the case despite the reputation of such second-generation British Asian community organisations as primarily 'secular'.⁹⁴ This may simply reflect the 'thin' nature of the 'secularism' associated with Bengali nationalism. Sheikh Mujib defined this in a 1972 Bangladesh Assembly speech as requiring simply that 'nobody [is] allowed to use religion as a political weapon'.⁹⁵ Even this relatively mild vision of a secular society has been anathema to the Jamaat-e-Islami in Bangladesh, however, which has dismissed Awami League leaders as 'Hindu' and seeks enshrinement of *sharia* in Bangladeshi law.⁹⁶

The precise relationship between religion and Bengali culture is in fact highly contested in both Britain and Bangladesh. Researchers in East London and elsewhere have observed the growing

popularity amongst young Muslims of a 'deculturated' Islam that stresses the primacy of the Koran and dissociates itself from the more culturally-inflected Islam of the first generation.⁹⁷ The popularity of this current of Islam has been increased by the proactive emphasis upon youth projects adopted by such Jamaat-influenced organisations as the YMO and ELM. In this environment, events and spaces associated with Bangladeshi nationhood are controversial. One ELM activist has described the Shaheed Minar replica in Whitechapel as a 'secularist, anti-Islamic kind of challenge', whilst Ansar Ahmed Ullah of the secular nationalist Nirmul Committee (NC) has suggested that ELM figures and their allies 'don't believe in Bengali nationalism, and... would delete Bengal's history and heritage'. The NC continues its attempts at 'rehabilitation of Bangladesh liberation war ideals' and to bring alleged Bangladeshi war criminals in Britain to justice.⁹⁸ Whilst there were rumours during the war that the Pakistani government was sending 'spoilers' to upset pro-independence activities in the British Bengali community, a number of these alleged war criminals moved to Britain since the war.⁹⁹ Political migration to Britain, in this case of Bangladeshi Islamists in the post-independence period following the proscription of the Jamaat, represents another form of movement that adds to the nexus of overlapping ethnic and political diasporas present in the country. Apart from its struggle against secular Bangladeshi nationalism, the Jamaat in Britain contests other transnational Muslim networks for support and influence. Its antagonistic relationship in East London with Hizb-ut-Tahrir, another transnational Islamist organisation created in part through processes of proscription and exile, are portrayed in the much-discussed members of former Hizb member Ed Husain.¹⁰⁰

In their search for support in both Britain and Bangladesh, Islamist organisations are still harmed to a degree by their history of collaborationism, but in general secular Bengali activists lament the success of deculturated forms of Islam in attracting young Bengalis, and feel that the concept of Bangladeshi nationalism means increasingly little to youths in Britain. For older Bengalis, this is tied in to the rise of the Jamaat in Bangladesh, which was assisted by the military dictatorships that ousted the Awami League from power, also threatening the democracy that independence was supposed to stabilise.¹⁰¹ Attitudes to the war of independence are therefore part of, or mapped onto, present-day conflicts within British Bengali civic society, which in turn reflect ongoing political struggles in Bangladesh.¹⁰²

VI

This article has considered the operation of categories within British multiculturalism and the kinds of action that can alter it. Although local and national authorities have done much to determine the

categories at work, elites have been sensitive to bottom-up action. Prior to the late 1970s and the greater incorporation of ethnic minorities into the institution of multiculturalism, however, recognition of particular identities was restricted by the 'encapsulation' of British Asian communities and by the political decentralisation of sensitive 'racial' issues. Major global events such as the 1971 war penetrated British elite consciousness, but a full appreciation of the conflict's significance for British Asian communities was prevented. This is reflected in possible under-reporting of instances of violence generated by the conflict, as well as the surprise expressed by elites at initial pro-independence protests in Britain. It is also demonstrated by the belief held by local elites that international events 'should not', for example, influence local elections or engender violence in Britain.

The localisation of ethnic politics, demographic differences across areas, as well as the perception that certain forms of difference were relevant to particular areas of policy and governance produced shifting, uneven and overlapping categorisations. Some categories, such as 'Sylheti', were given social significance only in particular localities and in an ephemeral manner. It is therefore incorrect to assume, as some have, that British multiculturalism was unaware of, or dismissed, religious claims prior to the Rushdie affair.¹⁰³ However, it is true that religion has only broken free of other more generalised categories (of a 'cultural' or ethnic sort) in more recent times. This also reflects the fact that apparently divergent terms, such as 'ethnicity', 'culture' and 'race', have not necessarily been given distinctive or consistent content by elites. These various types of category have also intersected with facets of identity such as class and gender. Bangladeshi women's organisations, many of which trace their origins to the campaign for independence, were able to leverage their distinctive constituencies to win state funding by the 1980s.¹⁰⁴ However, multicultural structures were often relatively uninterested in who made provision for ethnic minority women so long as organisations seeking funding were able to claim ethnic specificity for their work, leading to male-run organisations often being funded to undertake work with ethnic minority women and girls.¹⁰⁵

These categorisations, as demonstrated by this case study, are determined not only by domestic factors, but also by the transnational aspects of British multiculturalism. Whilst the independence and self-determination mobilisations of East Pakistanis, Kashmiris and pro-Khalistan activists in Britain have been most immediately concerned to advance just such self-determination they have also, whether consciously or not, acted to destabilise the generalised categories, often fixated upon nation, of British multiculturalism. Furthermore, where actors within a community

possess different transnational links, these can map onto conflicts within these local communities. In East London, even as the significance of Bengali culture to the local landscape has been institutionalised through projects such as the 'Banglatown' regeneration and the twinning of Tower Hamlets and Sylhet, Bangladeshi nationalism has been assailed by a deculturated form of Islam that looks towards the *ummah* in general, and especially to the Arab world, rather than Bangladesh.¹⁰⁶ This deculturated form of Islam, as represented by institutions such as the ELM and YMO, has tapped in to contemporary 'community cohesion' discourses and become a valued partner for the local authority in youth work, educational programmes and anti-drug campaigns.¹⁰⁷ Again, however, the state has sought to mediate the forms taken by these transnational links, as evidenced by the Home Office's great concern with vetting the applications of foreign imams seeking work in Britain.¹⁰⁸

For scholars, the growing influence of such religious movements, supported by their own transnational linkages, highlights the importance of transnational studies that take a long rather than a 'snapshot' view and demonstrates that the international dimension of British multiculturalism is no longer reducible to 'post-colonial' relationships between settler migrants and their 'homelands'.¹⁰⁹ Whilst some studies have seen the success of movements like those for Khalistani independence and Kashmiri self-determination within the diaspora as symptomatic of 'loss' of identity through migration, the mobilisation in support of Bangladeshi independence occurred at a time when the transnational ties of British Bengalis were salient, physical and multifaceted. Transnational politics can therefore reflect both the power of fading but romanticised links to a 'homeland', or the existential significance of ties to country of origin where a community's status as settler or sojourner is uncertain.¹¹⁰

Such shifting transnational ties, whatever their character, do not necessarily inhibit 'integration'. The British campaign for Bangladeshi independence, for instance, increased Bengali contact with British institutions, including political parties, parliament, local media and community relations workers. One of the campaign's legacies was a highly active Bengali civic society with experience of campaigning and close links to the Labour Party. This point – that identification with countries of origin and with the 'host' society or new homeland is not a 'zero sum' affair – has been made by anthropological scholars of transnationalism such as Peggy Levitt.¹¹¹ However, such anthropological studies, tending to be focused on the self-identification of specific communities, rarely attempt to consider whether and how such dual identifications are recognised by the wider society. In the case of Bangladeshis, elite actors appear to have been comfortable with lobbying,

demonstrations and fundraising in support of independence. On the other hand, metropolitan violence in relation to the war was regarded as potentially disastrous for community relations, whilst the independence campaign's interrelation with local politics, though perfectly legal, was regarded as improper. Nation-states can therefore play a role both in determining which ethnic identifications are recognised, and how these identifications, including their transnational elements, are mediated.

¹ Gilroy, 'Ain't no Black in the Union Jack', 17; Anthias and Yural-Davis, *Racialized Boundaries*, 145.

² Fazakarley, "Muslim Communities in England".

³ Ramamurthy, *Black Star*, 65; Ramamurthy, "Politics of Britain's Asian Youth Movements", 56-8; Shukra, *Changing Pattern of Black Politics*, 59-66.

⁴ Independent Review Team, *Community Cohesion*.

⁵ Vertovec, "Super-diversity", 1024-54; Macdonald et al., *The Report of the Macdonald Inquiry*.

⁶ Fazakarley, "Muslim Communities"; Tariq Modood, "British Asians Muslims and the Rushdie Affair", 260-77.

⁷ Bradford Local Studies Library (BLSL), Bradford, UK, Bradford Heritage Recording Unit (BHRU) interviews, ACC C0055. *Guardian*, 11/3/85; *Observer*, 15/9/85.

⁸ Ellis, *Breaking New Ground*, 14.

⁹ Garbaye, *Getting into Local Power*, 48.

¹⁰ Kalra, Kaur and Hutnyk, *Diaspora & Hybridity*, 17.

¹¹ Select Committee on Race Relations and Immigration (SCRR), *The West Indian Community* (London : HMSO, 1977); Committee of Inquiry into the Education of Children from Ethnic Minority Groups, *Education for All* (London : HMSO, 1985), 653-759; House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, *Bangladeshis in Britain* (London : HMSO, 1986).

¹² Finney and Simpson, 'Sleepwalking to Segregation', 32-7.

¹³ Manchester City Library (MCL), Manchester, UK, MCC Race Unit, "Ethnic Minorities Directory", [1991], 12-3.

¹⁴ Garbaye, "Birmingham", 100.

¹⁵ Nagle, *Multiculturalism's Double-bind*, 125.

¹⁶ *Guardian*, 2/4/86; Cross, Brah and McLeod, *Racial Equality and the Local State*, 31-2.

¹⁷ Visram, *Asians in Britain*, 1, 267-9; Visram, *Ayahs, Lascars and Princes*, 190; Choudhury, *Routes and Tales of the Bangladeshi Settlers*, 71; Gardner, *Age, Narration and Migration*, 90.

¹⁸ "Bangla Stories", <http://www.banglastories.org/>, accessed 8/06/14, Choudhury, *Routes and Tales*.

¹⁹ BHRU, *Here to Stay: Bradford's South Asian Communities* (Bradford : City of Bradford Metropolitan Council, 1994), 69; Kibria, *Muslims in Motion*, 82.

²⁰ West Yorkshire Archive Service Bradford (WYASB), Bradford, UK, Barkerend Immigrant Education Centre (BIEC) papers, 42D92/56, City of Bradford Education Department to BIEC, 1963.

²¹ *Ibid.*, Town Clerk's papers, BBD 1/7/T9644, BBD 1/7/T9644, City of Birmingham, "Answers Supplied... to a Questionnaire Submitted by the Association of Municipal Corporations", [1962].

²² Asghar, *Bangladeshi Community Organisations*, 22.

²³ Department of Education and Science, *The Education of Immigrant Children* (London : HMSO, 1965);

Legislation.gov.uk, "Local Government Act 1966, Section 11",

<http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1966/42/section/11/enacted>, accessed 17/06/15.

²⁴ Hill and Isaacharoff, *Community Actions and Race Relations*, 5-7.

²⁵ Anwar, *The Myth of Return*.

²⁶ Rafiuddin Ahmed, "Introduction" in Ahmed ed., *Religion, Nationalism and Politics*, 19.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 24; M.G. Kabir, "Religion, Language and Nationalism in Bangladesh" in *ibid.*, 42; and B.M. Monoar Kabir, "The Politics of Religion: the Jamaat-i-Islami in Bangladesh", in *ibid.*, 126

²⁸ Lawrence Ziring, *Bangladesh from Mujib to Ershad*, 21.

²⁹ Ahmad, *A Socio Political History of Bengal*, 236-7; O'Donnell, *Bangladesh*, 84-5.

³⁰ LSE Library, Peter Shore papers, SHORE/19/66, Democratic People of Pakistan to Shore, 31/3/71.

³¹ Mubashar Hasan, "Historical Developments of Political Islam with Reference to Bangladesh" in *Journal of African and Asian Studies* 47:2 (April, 2012), 159-60.

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- ³⁶ *East London Advertiser*, 14/5/71, 25/5/71.
- ³⁷ *Daily Express*, 14/5/71.
- ³⁸ *Manchester Evening News*, 29/6/71
- ³⁹ *Luton News*, 2/9/71, 30/9/71.
- ⁴⁰ Swadhinata Trust, "Mr. Ajmat Ullah", http://www.swadhinata.org.uk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=131&Itemid=161, and "Mr. Tunu Miah", http://www.swadhinata.org.uk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=151&Itemid=182, accessed 26/09/2014.
- ⁴¹ Keighley Local Studies Library (KLSL), Keighley, UK, BK61, KCRC papers, KCRC, *Annual Report, 1971-2*, 2.
- ⁴² *Guardian*, 19/2/62; *The Times*, 12/3/71; Asghar, *Bangladeshi Community Organisations*, 23; Glynn, "The Spirit of '71", *Socialist History Journal* 29 (2006), 58; John Eade and David Garbin, "Competing Visions of Identity and Space", 184.
- ⁴³ Ahmed, *Bengal Politics in Britain*, 136-40
- ⁴⁴ Asghar, *Bangladeshi Community Organisations*, 22-3.
- ⁴⁵ *The Times*, 28/5/71
- ⁴⁶ *The Times*, *ibid.* and 1/5/71.
- ⁴⁷ Shaw, *A Pakistani Community in Britain*, 57.
- ⁴⁸ Swadhinata Trust, "Mr. Sultan Shariff", http://www.swadhinata.org.uk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=148&Itemid=178, accessed 26/09/2014.
- ⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, "Bengali Freedom Movement in the UK", http://www.swadhinata.org.uk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=80&Itemid=106, accessed 26/09/2014.
- ⁵⁰ *Guardian*, 2/8/71.
- ⁵¹ *Manchester Evening News*, 27/4/71; *The Times*, 29/4/71.
- ⁵² *Birmingham Post*, 1/5/71, 4/5/71, 6/5/71, 20/5/71, 9/6/71, 26/6/71; *Bradford Telegraph and Argus*, 8/7/71, 9/6/71; *Guardian*, 9/7/71; *Observer*, 2/5/71, 9/5/71, 6/6/71.
- ⁵³ Ahmed, *Bengali Politics*, 130.
- ⁵⁴ Scott, "West Pakistanis in Huddersfield"; *Guardian*, 5/6/70.
- ⁵⁵ *Hansard*, HC Deb, 14/5/71, vol. 817, cc. 753-847; 4/11/71, vol. 825, cc. 379-456.
- ⁵⁶ *Bradford Telegraph and Argus*, 26/3/71
- ⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 27/3/71, 29/3/71, 8/5/71
- ⁵⁸ Bentley, "Intergroup Relations in Local Politics", 46.
- ⁵⁹ *Bradford Telegraph and Argus*, 11/5/71; Eade, *Politics of Community*, 62.
- ⁶⁰ *Bradford Telegraph and Argus*, 14/12/71
- ⁶¹ Anwar, *Myth of Return*, 140-1.
- ⁶² *Hansard*, HC Deb, 14/5/71, vol. 817, c. 794
- ⁶³ *The Times*, 1/5/71.
- ⁶⁴ *Ibid.*
- ⁶⁵ Bentley, "Intergroup Relations", 44.
- ⁶⁶ Dusenberry, "A Sikh Diaspora?", 33; Biswas, "Nationalism by Proxy", 286; Ellis and Khan, "Diasporic Mobilisation and the Kashmir Issue", 473.
- ⁶⁷ Glynn, "The Spirit of '71", 69.
- ⁶⁸ *Luton News*, 19/8/71, 2/12/71; *Guardian*, 6/12/71; *The Times*, 6/12/71.
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- ⁷⁰ *Oldham Evening Chronicle*, 4/12/71
- ⁷¹ Fazakarley, "Muslim Communities", chapter 7.
- ⁷² Kabir, *Young British Muslims*, 34.
- ⁷³ *Jubo Barta*, 2/86, 3/86.
- ⁷⁴ THLHLA, L/THL/A/32/3/2, Policy Committee papers, 1979-80, "Spitalfields Project", [1979], 29; LSE Library, Shore papers, SHORE/21/28, FBYO to Shore, [1983]; SHORE/21/29, Bangladeshi Youth Approach to Shore, 13/1/86.

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- ⁷⁵ Jubo Barta, 2/86, 7
- ⁷⁶ Alexander, "Contested Memories", 602. See also Eade and Garbin, "Competing Visions of Identity and Space", 186.
- ⁷⁷ THLHLA, Policy Committee papers, L/THL/A/32/2/9, FBYO to LBTH, 22/5/84; Daniel Silverstone, *The Bengali Community in Tower Hamlets: Final Report* (London : LBTH Social Services Directorate, 1978), 26; *The Asian*, 8/78.
- ⁷⁸ John Eade, "Bangladeshi Community Organization and Leadership", 321.
- ⁷⁹ *Asian Times*, 17/7/87; THLHLA, Policy Committee papers, L/THL/A/32/2/8, CRE, "THCRE and THARJ...", 25/4/83.
- ⁸⁰ John King, *Three Asian Associations in Britain*, 47; *Spitalfields News*, Spring 1983.
- ⁸¹ Asghar, *Bangladeshi Community Organisations*, 2.
- ⁸² Committee of Inquiry into the Education of Children from Ethnic Minority Groups, *Education for All* (London : HMSO, 1985), 66, 87, 118-25.
- ⁸³ HCHAC, vol. 1, iv.
- ⁸⁴ *BENTH Bulletin* 15-8, 1/85, 4.
- ⁸⁵ *BENTH Bulletin* 6, 1/84, 6; 15-18, 1/85, 3; 19-21, 4/85, 9.
- ⁸⁶ *Ibid.* 15-18, 1/85, 3-4, 8-9.
- ⁸⁷ THLHLA, Policy Committee papers, L/THL/A/32/2/10, "Translating / Interpreting Services", 19/3/86; *Spitalfields Neighbourhood News*, 11/85.
- ⁸⁸ HCHAC, *Bangladeshis in Britain*, vol. 1, vi-vii, xii-xiv.
- ⁸⁹ *The Asian*, 9/78; THLHLA, Policy Committee papers, L/THL/A/32/3/2, "Spitalfields Project", [1979], 29.
- ⁹⁰ THLHLA, *ibid.*, L/THL/A/32/2/9, FBYO to LBTH, 22/5/84.
- ⁹¹ Eade, *Politics of Community*, 151.
- ⁹² Bangla Stories, "Families Reunited", <http://www.banglastories.org/the-bengal-diaspora/history/families-reunited.html>, accessed 24/3/14.
- ⁹³ King, *Three Asian Associations*, 57.
- ⁹⁴ David Garbin, "A Diasporic Sense of Place", 115.
- ⁹⁵ Quoted in Maniruzzaman, "Bangladesh Politics", 192.
- ⁹⁶ Zeitlin, "Watching the International Crimes Tribunal".
- ⁹⁷ Eade, "Identity, Nation and Religion", 388.
- ⁹⁸ Eade and Garbin, "Competing Visions", 187-8; Alexander, "Contested Memories", 604-5; Eade and Garbin, "Changing Narratives", 141.
- ⁹⁹ Ahmed, *Bengal Politics*, 145-6; Channel 4, *Dispatches: the War Crimes Files*, originally aired 3/5/95.
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- ¹⁰⁴ THLHLA, Housing Committee papers, L/THL/A/36/1/3, LBTH Director of Housing, "GLC Sub-Cttee...", 3/6/85; Policy Committee papers, L/THL/A/32/2/10, LBTH, "THIAP 1985/6: Revenue"; L/THL/A/32/2/10, "THIAP 1985/6 -- 1986 Easter Holiday Project".
- ¹⁰⁵ Fazakarley, "Muslim Communities", 279-80.
- ¹⁰⁶ DeHanas, "Of Hajj and Home", 457-74; Kibria, *Muslims in Motion*, 93.
- ¹⁰⁷ Eade and Garbin, "Competing Visions", 188.
- ¹⁰⁸ McGhee, *The End of Multiculturalism?*, 76.
- ¹⁰⁹ Levitt and Glick Schiller, "Conceptualising Simultaneity", 288.
- ¹¹⁰ Kalra, Kaur and Hutnyk, *Diaspora & Hybridity*, 21-2.
- ¹¹¹ Levitt, *The Transnational Villagers*.

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