

Women and the War of Words:

A Social Data Science Analysis of Gendered Political Communication
Strategies During Russia's 2022 Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine



Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
DPhil in Social Data Science in the Oxford Internet Institute at the
University of Oxford

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Hilary Term 2025

Word Count: 51,594

Abstract

This thesis investigates gender differences in political communication and digital diplomacy between Ukrainian politicians and international figures before and during Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion, from February 2021 and March 2023. Three integrated articles analyse original datasets of tweets and Facebook posts from Ukrainian politicians and the international figures they target most, using structural topic modelling, social network analysis, and statistical regression. Disaggregating data by originator gender tests theories of gendered approaches to conflict and gender affinity on social media, informed by literature on the historical tension between Ukrainian feminism and nationalism. **Chapter 3** applies a mixed-methods approach to 79,000 Facebook and Twitter posts from Ukrainian politicians to analyse gender differences in narrative and interaction during 23 February to 28 June in 2021 and 2022. The data show politicians update Ukrainians on Facebook during both periods but shift their Twitter strategy in 2022 towards digital diplomacy. Women produce more interactive communication and reports of human suffering, while men's posts are more authoritative. **Chapter 4** analyses 130,000 tweets by 74 Ukrainian politicians and 223 international figures from 11 February 2022 to 8 March 2023. These data show women do not convey pacifist narratives, and only men have significant narrative overlap with other men. **Chapter 5** examines how men and women Ukrainian politicians initiate dialogue with international figures by analysing a subset of 14,000 dialogue attempts from Chapter 4. Women's attempts surge in the first weeks of the invasion, but later men become the primary initiators. These analyses demonstrate that women—often excluded from conflict narratives—actively try to shape wartime digital diplomacy, with Ukrainians balancing nationalism and feminism in the digital realm. In doing so, they challenge dominant theories that portray women as pacifist during conflict. These findings advance understanding of gendered political communication and provide policy insights for countering information warfare.

Keywords: Political communication, digital diplomacy, gender, feminist international relations, Women and Peace Hypothesis, Ukraine, conflict, computational social science

Acknowledgements

This doctoral thesis would not have been possible without the mentors, friends, and communities I have been lucky to learn from during the past five years. I am most grateful to my supervisor, Professor Philip Howard, for his thoughtful feedback and forward-looking advice. Thank you for challenging me, inspiring me, and for encouraging me when the finish line felt unattainable. I have also received wonderful mentorship from Professor Caroline Pond, my College Advisor at Green Templeton College.

My assessors for Transfer of Status, Confirmation, and the final Viva have also provided me with invaluable feedback and advice. Thank you to Dr. Jonathon Bright, Professor Helen Margetts, Professor Jennifer Cassidy, Professor Sarah Oates, and Professor Katharine Wright for helping immensely to improve all phases of this thesis.

To my classmates at the Oxford Internet Institute and in the Social Sciences Division—thank you for your constant friendship, motivation, and inspiration. I have learned so much from all of you. A special thank you to Dr. Hannah Bailey for generously sharing your expertise in methods. Your students are incredibly lucky to have you as their professor. I am also grateful to the wider community of students who helped me through my final year with weekly, sometimes daily, focussed writing sessions.

I have been fortunate to build a network of mentors and colleagues within and beyond academia. Thank you to Professor Frauke Zeller for being my longest-standing mentor and friend. To Nina Jankowicz, for explaining what disinformation was to me in 2017 and for being my friend and mentor ever since—you are inspiring a new generation to stand up to authoritarianism and to defend truth. Thank you to Professor Olga Onuch, Adnan Raja, Ruty Korotaev, and Katria Tomko for your guidance, advice, and support. I have also learned immensely from my colleagues at the Weizenbaum Institute in Berlin—thank you, Dr. Elizaveta Kuznetsova and Martha Stolze. I am deeply appreciative of the feedback I have received from all of you, as well as from conference reviewers at ICA and APSA, who have helped me refine and strengthen my work. You have all taught me what it means to find my own academic community.

Throughout this process, I have been privileged to stay connected to my alma mater, The Creative School at Toronto Metropolitan University, by representing it and teaching students in intensive programmes in the United Kingdom. Thank you to Charles

Falzon and Sadia Kamran for your continued support, and to Professor Jonathon Anderson for the opportunity to teach alongside you.

My family and the Ukrainian Canadian community are the reason I am here today. My late grandfather, Nicolae Pavliuc, fled communist Romania for Canada, where he was a professor of Ukrainian language at the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, University of Toronto. He inspired me to become the second Dr.—and hopefully one day, Professor—Pavliuc. My parents, Irene Mazurenko Pavliuc and Vladislav Pavliuc, instilled in me the belief that I could achieve anything through hard work, including earning a doctorate from one of the world’s leading universities. My mother has also spent countless hours proofreading every chapter draft I sent her way. My partner, Keir Ferguson, thank you for being my rock, my sounding board, and my therapist through both the most exciting and the most difficult moments of this journey. Diana Whistance-Smith and Tamara Lebed, you have both encouraged me and brought me joy when I needed it most. My Ukrainian Canadian community in Toronto has grounded my values in supporting the oppressed and remembering where I come from, and I will always be grateful for that foundation.

I am immensely thankful to all organisations that have financially supported my doctoral research. This work could not have been completed without support from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, the Oxford Internet Institute Shirley Scholarship, the Ukrainian Canadian Credit Union, the Canadian Institute for Ukrainian Studies, the Norwegian Research Council, and the Weizenbaum Institute.

Finally, I wish to thank all Ukrainians and global allies who continue to support Ukraine in its fight for survival and its right to a fair and just peace. To the women politicians who came to London after the full-scale invasion—you inspired me to use my research to amplify Ukrainian women’s voices.

This thesis is dedicated to my grandfather and to all Ukrainians—past, present, and future—who are, and will always be, the voice of Ukraine.

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List of Acronyms

- API:** Application programming interface
- APSA:** American Political Science Association
- CEO:** Chief executive officer
- CSO:** Civil society organisation
- DEI:** Diversity, equity, and inclusion
- EU:** European Union
- ICA:** International Communication Association
- IR:** International relations
- IT:** Information technology
- NAFO:** North Atlantic Fellas Organisation
- NATO:** North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
- OLS:** Ordinary least squares
- SNA:** Social network analysis
- SOE:** Special Operations Executive
- STM:** Structural topic modelling
- UK:** United Kingdom
- UN:** United Nations
- US:** United States
- USSR:** Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
- WPH:** Women and Peace Hypothesis
- WPS:** Women, Peace and Security

Chapter 1: **Women and the War of Words**

“Women’s war has its own colours, its own smells, its own lighting, and its own range of feelings. Its own words.”

Belarusian-Ukrainian investigative journalist Svetlana Alexievich in
The Unwomanly Face of War (1988, English translation 2017)

1.1 Introduction

The development of digital technologies facilitates unprecedented levels of connectivity, allowing individuals to engage in real-time interactions regardless of geographical boundaries. Social media provide spaces for diverse voices to be heard, challenging traditional power structures and amplifying the voices of women in times of war that are traditionally dominated by men. The conflict narratives disseminated on social media play an important role in shaping public opinion and influencing international responses, thus shaping the course of wars.

Amid rapid developments in digital technology and increasing geopolitical tensions, the relationship between political communication and gender studies during wartime presents a compelling topic for academic inquiry. Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine serves as an illuminating case study to explore the gendered dimensions of wartime communication in the digital age as it underscores the urgent need to examine the communicative strategies employed by political actors during times of crisis.

Russia’s full-scale invasion marked a pivotal moment in Ukrainian history, preceded by the Ukrainian people’s pro-European Union protests in late 2013, called the

Euromaidan uprising. In 2014, Russia subsequently annexed the Crimean peninsula and invaded eastern Ukraine using armed groups and proxy forces (Mykhnenko, 2022). On 24 February 2022, Russia launched its full-scale assault, deploying forces through various entry points including its own territory from the east, through Belarus from the north, and through Russian-occupied Crimea in the south. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy had warned of the Russian threat and tensions escalated in the lead-up to the invasion, with Western leaders condemning Russia's military build-up and issuing warnings of substantial sanctions (Reuters, 2022).

From the start of the full-scale invasion, Ukrainian politicians, including women leaders, played a key role in rallying domestic and international support for Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. President Zelenskyy published videos from Kyiv saying “We are here” to show domestic and international audiences that Ukraine would resist (Hopkins, 2022). Martial law required all men of military age to remain in the country—but women, including women politicians, retained the freedom to leave, so many travelled to allied countries such as the United Kingdom to solicit financial, military, and moral support for the Ukrainian resistance (Rogers & Sleigh, 2022).

1.1.1 Summary of Thesis Argument and Rationale for Topic Selection

This thesis examines the gendered political communication strategies of Ukrainian politicians and the international figures they target most on social media before and during the first year of Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion. How do the gendered political communication strategies of Ukrainian politicians and international figures evolve before and during the first year of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine? What do their behaviours tell us about assumptions regarding women's pacifism and approaches to conflict communication? This thesis collects and analyses data to question the underlying assumptions of theories on gendered approaches to conflict, communication, and

interaction (Dolan, 2008; Gilligan, 1995; Kent & Taylor, 1998; Reardon, 1993; Tessler et al., 1999), all of which are outlined in the literature review in Chapter 2. It reflects on the unique history of nationalism and feminism in Ukraine, along with how the findings from this thesis can inform other democracies' strategies for building societal resilience in the face of physical and information warfare.

The core argument of this thesis is that Ukrainian women politicians played an important yet under-valued role in shaping wartime political communication and digital diplomacy during Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Women adopted communication styles that centred human suffering and appeals for international support, carving out a space for themselves as credible actors in conflict diplomacy while challenging long-standing assumptions that cast them as inherently pacifist. In doing so, this thesis advances debates around the Women and Peace Hypothesis by examining how women did not conform to gendered expectations of pacifism in the digital sphere. Women's efforts, however, also exposed the double-edged nature of social media. While it amplified their visibility and enabled direct outreach to global audiences, women often failed to secure reciprocal engagement which reinforced patterns of gendered silence. Recognising women's contributions is vital for understanding the dynamics of conflict communication and for ensuring that their voices are meaningfully integrated into both historical accounts and policy responses.

Two time-periods were chosen to understand how gendered political communication evolved before and during the full-scale invasion. The first was from 23 February 2021 to 28 June 2021, dubbed the Pre-wartime period in Chapter 3, as it was before the 24 February 2022 full-scale invasion (while Russia's initial invasion of Ukraine began in 2014, the labelling of this period as pre-war refers to the full-scale invasion). The second time-period was from 11 February 2022 to 8 March 2023,

capturing the entire first year of the full-scale invasion, as well as two weeks prior to it, and after the one-year anniversary.

Scholars have long studied Russian propaganda and strategies for influencing domestic and international politics, both during the existence of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) from 1922-91, and since the 1990s (Berryman, 2015). This focus on Russian tactics has at times lead to Ukrainian voices and actions being understudied—or framed primarily in relation to research findings on Russia. By placing Ukrainian politicians at the centre of analysis, this thesis aims to anchor their actions in empirical findings that can contribute to more research on Ukraine and facilitate its inclusion in future comparative studies.

1.1.2 Timeline of the First Year of Russia's 2022 Full-Scale Invasion

The political context surrounding the full-scale invasion has greatly evolved since the end of the study period in March 2023. This section hence summarises key moments during the first year of the war to remind the reader of the context in which I collected the data for this thesis. This summary is mainly composed from desk research on timelines of the war constructed by news outlets and from my own research on key narratives found to be used by Ukrainian politicians (Davis Jr. & Fitzgerald, 2025; Pavliuc, 2025a; Staff, 2023).

From February to March 2022, the invasion began with a series of devastating missile attacks on civilians and infrastructure across Ukraine, sparking immediate concern over the humanitarian crisis and potential nuclear fallout (Davis Jr. & Fitzgerald, 2025). International support materialised, with some allies providing bipartisan financial aid and diplomatic backing. The early phase of the war also featured President Zelenskyy's speeches, which focussed on the courage of the Ukrainian people as they resisted the Russian advance (Dyczok & Chung, 2022).

On 1 April 2022, the discovery of the Bucha massacre shocked the world, revealing the mass murder of unarmed civilians and destruction of infrastructure by retreating Russian soldiers in the Kyiv region (Davis Jr. & Fitzgerald, 2025). This atrocity prompted calls for accountability and for military support (Pavliuc, 2025a). Ukrainian politicians began advocating Germany for the delivery of Leopard advanced battle tanks, though these requests did not initially gain traction. On 20 May 2022, the last Ukrainian soldiers defending the Azovstal Iron and Steel Works in Mariupol surrendered to Russian forces after a 13-week siege (Zinets & Balmforth, 2022).

As the conflict continued through the summer and autumn of 2022, Ukrainian forces reclaimed territory in the north, which led to growing optimism about Ukraine's military capabilities (Davis Jr. & Fitzgerald, 2025). Russia's retreat from northeastern Kharkiv *oblast* (province) in September 2022 was swiftly followed by a renewed mobilisation drive in Russia, prompting many men of military age to flee the country. Russia also organised referenda—which many Western and Ukrainian government officials condemned as shams—on 23-27 September 2022 to measure support for independence among the populations of four eastern *oblasts* of Ukraine (Goncharenko, 2022). Russia formally claimed to annex the entire *oblasts* on 30 September 2022, despite not controlling all their territory. A week after the so-called annexations, the bridge connecting Russia to Crimea (completed in 2018) was severely damaged by an explosion, prompting widespread reaction on social media on both sides of the conflict (Klumbyté & Yermieieva, 2024).

As winter approached, Russia escalated its attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure, bringing renewed focus to the humanitarian toll of the war (Davis Jr. & Fitzgerald, 2025). In December 2022 President Zelenskyy visited Washington, D.C. shortly after former US President Joseph Biden announced a new tranche of military aid

to Ukraine. This aid included much sought-after Patriot missile systems, which provide long-range air defence (Partridge, 2022). By early 2023, as the war entered its second calendar year, Germany announced its long-awaited decision to send Leopard advanced battle tanks to Ukraine, a development that Ukrainian politicians had pushed for since April 2022 (Kushnikov, 2023).

President Biden made a surprise visit to Kyiv just before the first anniversary of the full-scale invasion to announce additional military equipment to Ukraine (Davis Jr. & Fitzgerald, 2025). On 24 February 2023, President Zelenskyy held a commemoration ceremony in central Kyiv. Civilians and politicians abroad also organised protests and commemoration ceremonies in support of Ukraine, mostly in Europe and English-speaking countries (Staff, 2023).

1.1.3 Key Terms

This section provides an overview of the key terms used throughout this thesis.

Table 1.1

Key Terms Used in this Thesis

Key Term	Type	Definition
Political communication	Foundational concept	All political discourse by, to, or about political actors (McNair, 2017).
Digital diplomacy	Foundational concept	The use of digital technologies to conduct relations between states (Bjola, 2015). In this thesis, digital diplomacy is studied as a communicative space constituted by digital platforms through which political actors engage, rather than as a foreign policy function.
Gender	Foundational concept	Performed characteristics that align with being men, women, or non-binary (no individuals were found to align with the latter in this thesis), that are shaped by social and cultural norms (Butler, 2025).
Ukrainian politician	Entity of study	Member of parliament or cabinet minister serving in the 9 th <i>Verkhovna Rada</i> (Parliament) of Ukraine, which commenced 29 August 2019 (full list in Appendix A).
International figure	Entity of study	Twitter account @-mentioned by Twitter accounts of Ukrainian politicians more than 10 times collectively between 11 February 2022 and 8 March 2023. International figures were mainly politicians, diplomats, journalists, businesspeople, academics, and members of international organisations from Europe, North America and Asia (Appendix C). They had an average of 1.52 million followers on Twitter.

Political actor	Entity of study	Term used to describe all Ukrainian politicians and international figures analysed in this thesis as one group.
Narrative	Analytical concept	A description of an event or multiple events consisting of an actor, setting, and action (Coticchia & Catanzaro, 2022; Porter Abbott, 2020). In this thesis, I study the thematic dimensions of narratives.
Interaction	Analytical concept	The use of the @-mention affordance on Twitter to directly contact another Twitter user.
Dialogue	Analytical concept	Open and reciprocal discussion aiming to build trust and reach long-term social goals (Kent & Taylor, 1998). In this thesis, a dialogue attempt is operationalised as a one-way interaction (@-mention) from a Ukrainian politician to an international figure, or vice versa.
Salient conflict	Analytical concept	A conflict that is perceived as existential by those affected.
Digital proximity	Analytical concept	“The feeling of nearness to a location or event that is facilitated by networked connections to people on social media who are physically near to, or virtually discuss, the location or event” (Pavliuc, 2024, p. 139).
Gender affinity effect	Theory	Theory positing that individuals tend to form alliances and connections with others who share their gender identity (Dolan, 2008).
Women and Peace Hypothesis	Theory	Theory positing that men are inclined towards combat, while women favour compromise in international relations (Reardon, 1993; Tessler et al., 1999).
<i>Berehynia</i>	Cultural metaphor	A figure from pre-Christian Ukrainian folklore who symbolises femininity, national identity, and moral virtue, but who is instrumentalised to place unrealistic expectations on modern Ukrainian women to be perfect mothers and citizens (Rubchak, 2001, 2009). In this thesis, I use the <i>Berehynia</i> as a cultural metaphor to interpret how Ukrainian women politicians navigated gendered expectations in their wartime communication.

Source: Author’s compilation of definitions listed in this thesis, drawn from Chapters 2 to 5.

Table 1.1 collates the key terms used in this thesis, with details on how they are operationalised or which scholars they originate from. They include key concepts, actors studied, communication types, and theories.

1.2 Outline of Thesis

This thesis integrates three distinct but related studies that analyse Ukrainian and international political communication and digital diplomacy before and during the first year of Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion. By illuminating the differences in gendered use of narrative and interaction, I uncover previously unseen and under-prioritised knowledge on how political communication unfolds during conflict. Each chapter

analyses a different time-period, language, social media platform, or user group to produce specific knowledge on gendered political communication on Facebook and Twitter (renamed X in July 2023, four months after data collection was completed for this thesis) before and during the full-scale war, and how Ukrainian politicians and international figures discuss the conflict on Twitter. These chapters report on the collection and analysis of gendered differences in terms of platform use and communication style during conflict and compare the conclusions with traditional Western theories about gender, conflict, and communication (Dolan, 2008; Gilligan, 1995; Kent & Taylor, 1998; Reardon, 1993; Tessler et al., 1999). The theories I engage with are outlined in detail in Chapter 2.

1.2.1 Thesis Structure

This thesis comprises of an introduction, literature review, three empirical chapters formatted as traditional academic articles, and a conclusion. Following this introductory section, the second chapter provides a review of literature on gender and political communication during war on social media. I summarise the historical and theoretical context of gendered political communication during conflict and the modern era of wartime digital diplomacy on social media. I also outline my methodological framework, which applies the social data science methods of structural topic modelling (STM), social network analysis (SNA), and ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to the study of wartime gendered political communication.

The third chapter, titled “Decoding Gendered Political Communication on Facebook and Twitter Before and During Russia’s 2022 Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine”, published in *Digital War*, is the first of three substantive chapters towards this integrated thesis. This chapter is the first of its kind to document and analyse how Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine impacts women and men politicians’ use of narrative and

interaction on Facebook and Twitter. The 79,000 Facebook and Twitter posts published by 210 Ukrainian politicians over two four-month time-periods in early 2021 and 2022 are analysed using STM and SNA to test theories of gendered approaches to conflict and interaction. While Facebook is used to update Ukrainians in their own language before and during the full-scale war, Twitter becomes a hive of English-language activity in 2022 aimed at engaging international figures and civilians to communicate Ukraine's need for support.

The fourth chapter, titled "Gender and Narrative in Digital Political Communication During Russia's 2022 Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine", published in *Media, War & Conflict*, builds on the finding from Chapter 3 that Ukrainian politicians use Twitter to engage in digital diplomacy with international figures. It expands the study period in Chapter 3 to tweets from the first year of the full-scale invasion from both Ukrainian politicians and international figures—all Twitter accounts they mention directly in a tweet (using the "@" symbol) more than 10 times. This allows me to apply the Women and Peace Hypothesis, the gender affinity effect, and literature on the tension between feminism and nationalism in Ukraine to the data. I apply STM to the data to analyse how Ukrainian politicians interact with international figures on whom they depend for military, economic, humanitarian, and moral support. I analyse 130,000 tweets to measure how men and women approach conflict through narrative, and between whom these narratives tend to converge. Findings indicate that women's narratives are just as militaristic as men's, and that men tend to have higher convergence in narrative with other men than women do with other women.

The fifth and final substantive chapter, titled "A Computational Analysis of Gender and International Dialogue on Twitter During Russia's 2022 Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine", investigates how men and women Ukrainian politicians and international

figures engage in dialogue on Twitter during the first year of Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion. This chapter uses the same dataset collected for Chapter 4, but dives into a subset of tweets that contain 14,497 @-mentions between Ukrainian politicians and international figures. I apply OLS regression to this dataset of social network interactions to map gendered differences in dialogue attempts between Ukrainian politicians and international figures. I find that women Ukrainian politicians initiate the most dialogue with international figures at the onset of the full-scale invasion, but that men sustain most interactions over time.

In the sixth and final chapter, I conclude by summarising empirical findings and theoretical advancements of this thesis and discuss future research and policy recommendations. A summary table of my empirical chapters is below.

Table 1.2

Overview of Research Questions (RQ), Hypotheses (H), Data Sources, and Analytical Methods in Chapters 3 to 5

Ch.	Primary Research Question	Research Questions & Hypotheses	Data	Methods
3	How does gender impact Ukrainian wartime political communication on Facebook and Twitter?	RQ1: How does Ukrainian politician usage of Facebook and Twitter differ according to time-period, gender, and language?	Content and interactions (“@” mentions) from tweets and	STM, manual analysis, descriptive statistics
		RQ2: To what extent do the narratives Ukrainian politicians discuss on social media fit expectations of gendered discourse?	Facebook posts published by Ukrainian politicians	STM, manual analysis
		RQ3: How do interaction styles of more prominent and less prominent Ukrainian politicians on social media fit expectations of gendered discourse?	before and during the war	SNA, network statistics
4	How do men and women Ukrainian politicians and international figures differ in their use of narratives during war?	H1: Tweets sent by men include a higher frequency of combative and diplomatic narratives, whereas those sent by women show a higher prevalence of narratives about human trauma and suffering.	Content from tweets published by Ukrainian politicians and international figures during the first year of the war	STM, manual analysis
		H2: If a sender and receiver of a tweet are the same gender, then their narratives converge.		
5	Where are, and are not, the	H1a: If a Twitter user is a woman, they will make more attempts at dialogue than men Twitter users.	Interactions (“@” mentions)	OLS linear regression,

women in dialogue between Ukrainian politicians and international figures during Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine?	<p>H1b: If a Twitter user is a woman Ukrainian politician, they will make more attempts at dialogue than Twitter users who are men Ukrainian politicians.</p> <p>H2a: If a dialogue source and target are the same gender, then there will be more dialogue attempts between them over time.</p> <p>H2b: If a dialogue attempt is between international figures and Ukrainian politicians of the same gender, then the reciprocal interaction will be sustained for a longer period.</p>	from tweets published by Ukrainian politicians and international figures during the first year of the war	SNA
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Source: Author's compilation based on literature, data and analyses presented in Chapters 3 to 5.

Table 1.2 summarises the overarching questions answered in the three empirical chapters in this thesis, the specific research questions and hypotheses tested for each chapter, and the data and methods used. It shows that each of the three empirical chapters are highly related, forming one cohesive thesis.

1.2.2 Data and Methods

The analysis and ideas I present in this thesis are the culmination of five years of studying the relationship between political communication, conflict, and gender. During this period, I compiled two databases of socio-demographic data on 459 Ukrainian politicians and 417 international figures (mainly European and North American politicians, diplomats, journalists, and businesspeople. See Appendix C for full list), collected more than 200,000 of their posts from Facebook and Twitter, and analysed the data using a suite of social data science tools. I also developed a methodological framework for using STM, SNA, and OLS regression to analyse gender-disaggregated social media data to uncover differences in both the narrative and interaction strategies of men and women political actors during war.

Beyond my direct focus on my doctoral research, I have also found many opportunities to engage with the wider academic and policy community on digital diplomacy, countering foreign malign influence, and computational methods for studying political communication. I have delivered talks, training sessions, and other expert

commentary at more than 135 public and closed-door gatherings in 16 countries, most notably to NATO, Chatham House, and the United Nations Development Program. I have also presented my research at the International Communication Association (ICA) and American Political Science Association (APSA) conferences and various policy fora where I have received constructive criticism on my work both from communities who study political communication, and those who produce it in political and government contexts. The knowledge I have gained from these engagements has been invaluable towards helping me consider the broader implications of my research.

1.2.3 Rationale for Choices in Study Design

Several study design choices I made are explained below.

1.2.3.1 Level of Analysis: Justification for Elite Political Actors Studied

Ukrainian politicians were central to this thesis because, while diplomacy is typically conducted by diplomats, politicians are the ones who craft the government policies that diplomats implement. During the full-scale invasion, politicians were the primary decision-makers and public-facing communicators of Ukraine's foreign, military, and general government policy. The international figures whose communications were analysed in this thesis were not hand-selected by me but rather were identified based on who Ukrainian politicians most frequently @-mentioned on Twitter. This focus emerged empirically from findings in Chapter 3, which showed that Ukrainian politicians actively used Twitter for digital diplomacy with other international, mainly Western, figures. Notably, the top 20 accounts they mentioned were leading political and military figures from countries providing Ukraine with military, financial, and moral support—making their reactions to Ukrainian politicians an essential aspect to document.

The social media users studied in this thesis should be considered elite, rather than members of the general public. The conscious choice to study this subset of society allowed for a focussed analysis of the highest level of global political communication and digital diplomacy during the war and to highlight how elite men and women political actors approached wartime communication. While communication strategies of elite political actors shifted throughout the war, so did the strategies of global publics supporting Ukraine (Boichak & Hoskins, 2022; Pavliuc, 2024). They did so through social media-enabled donation efforts for military aid, decentralised and coordinated campaigns, and collective actions against Russian propaganda. These acts of participatory warfare, the use of digital technologies to actively support one side in a conflict (Boichak & Hoskins, 2022), and their links to communications from elite political actors merit further study—but are not the focus of this thesis.

The elite political actors studied in this thesis also appear to share very similar ideological and political foundations. This similarity is not surprising as the selection criteria for the international figures studied are the ones whom Ukrainian politicians collectively mention more than 10 times during the first year of the full-scale invasion. This thesis, therefore, mainly focusses on elite political actors who are supportive of Ukraine, rather than Russia. There is a whole other digital community of elite political actors and general publics who work to promote the Russian perspective of the full-scale invasion, mainly that Russia is justified in its invasion and that Ukraine should be a part of Russia. However, that side of the information war is not within the scope of this thesis. A plethora of research exists on Russian propagandistic communication tactics on social media, their actors, and their networks. This thesis aims to document and analyse the pro-Ukrainian side, to contribute to knowledge on countermeasures to Russian

propaganda, in this case broadly understood as being conducted through elite political communication and digital diplomacy.

1.2.3.2 Social Media Platform Selection: Justification for Facebook and Twitter

Twitter has long been documented as the digital venue where influential actors go to receive breaking news updates, engage with other users, and set agendas. Up until the decisions announced after the takeover of Twitter by Tesla Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Elon Musk in 2023 (after the period of study for this thesis ended in March 2023), Twitter was frequently used by politicians, diplomats, journalists, and businesspeople to influence global agendas (Claesson, 2024; Gilardi et al., 2022). At the start of the full-scale invasion, Twitter was a popular platform for dissemination of real-time updates on the invasion—down to tweets and images of minute changes in frontline locations, analyses of the invasion’s early days, and, most importantly, updates from Ukrainian politicians (Pavliuc, 2025b). Zelenskyy’s daily video addresses, along with updates from other Ukrainian politicians, were frequently published in English to Twitter, making it an ideal platform on which to study Ukrainian political communication and digital diplomacy.

Facebook was selected because it was used to organise the Euromaidan protests and was a key tool for protest leaders to provide frequent updates to Ukrainians (Ronzhyn, 2014). It has also been utilised by citizens in both urban and rural areas of Ukraine (Puhach & Mezentsev, 2021). At the time of data collection, both Facebook and Twitter offered free data access portals to researchers.

Telegram and Instagram were also considered for inclusion in this thesis but ultimately were not used. While Telegram was popular among Ukrainian politicians and citizens, its limited global reach among elites and the tendency of Ukrainian politicians to post there in Ukrainian (rather than English) made it less suitable for studying political

communication and digital diplomacy. Similarly, Instagram's image-based focus made it less comparable to Twitter, and while its use in digital diplomacy campaigns has grown, it did not appear to be as widely used during the study period by Ukrainian politicians.

1.2.3.3 Thesis Structure: Justification for Integrated Thesis

The choice to produce an integrated thesis rather than a monograph was a deliberate and practical one. The integrated structure enabled me to format each chapter as a publishable manuscript, while together all three chapters built a coherent argument about gender, political communication, and digital diplomacy during wartime. It also ensured close engagement with ongoing scholarly debates, as two out of three chapters were already published in peer reviewed journals by the completion of this thesis.

1.2.3.4 Data Selection: Justification for Using a Subset of Analysed Data for Chapter 5

I chose to re-analyse a subset of the data from Chapter 4 in Chapter 5, simply because I felt that the richness of the data could not be fully explored in just one study. In Chapter 4, the entire dataset of tweets produced by Ukrainian politicians and international figures during the first year of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine uncovered deeply interesting results on the nature of gendered communication during conflict, and how these two key conflict stakeholders mirrored each other's narratives. In Chapter 5, I shifted from narrative analysis to network analysis, analysing only the tweets that were direct @-mentions from one of these groups to the other. While these tweets were present in the dataset used in Chapter 4, homing in on them in Chapter 5 with a different quantitative method allowed me to uncover deeper knowledge on digital interaction during conflict that was not explored in Chapter 4.

1.3 Significance of Research

The three empirical chapters in this thesis presented significant data for the study of political communication, and the differing approaches and contributions by men and women during Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Chapter 3 was the first of its kind to measure differences in strategy by Ukrainian politicians on Facebook and Twitter amid wartime, finding that Facebook was used to update Ukrainian constituents while Twitter became the arena of a massive strategy shift towards digital diplomacy with the West. Findings on gendered differences in interaction and narrative use revealed how politicians balanced multiple personas and target audiences during the crisis.

Chapter 4 extended this analysis by examining how these Ukrainian politicians interacted with the international figures on whom they relied for military, economic, humanitarian, and moral support. The study analysed 130,000 tweets to measure how men and women approached conflict through narratives, and between whom these narratives tended to converge. Findings showed that women's narratives were just as militaristic as men's, and that men demonstrated greater convergence in narrative with other men than women did. These results contributed to theory development on gender, political communication, and conflict, but also to the development of societal resilience and strategic communications campaigns in other countries during conflict.

Chapter 5 continued to analyse the actions of Ukrainian politicians and international figures but examined how their interactions evolved during the first year of the full-scale invasion through dialogue attempts, and which gender differences shaped their communications. Findings rounded out this thesis by bringing to light the dissemination methods of narratives through dialogue attempts.

In summary, this thesis underscores the importance of disaggregating data by gender to analyse differences in political communication and digital diplomacy. Without such disaggregation, the distinct contributions and challenges faced by women during war may be overlooked and reinforce outdated assumptions about gendered approaches to conflict. Furthermore, this research contributes to the decolonisation of Russian and Eastern European studies by positioning Ukraine as an object of study, rather than subsuming it under broader post-Soviet frameworks (Stech, 2024). By comparing Ukraine's political communication strategies with those of other democracies, future research can offer a more comprehensive understanding of how nations build resilience against both physical aggression and information warfare. Finally, this thesis positions digital diplomacy as a countermeasure to Russian propaganda, demonstrating how Ukrainian politicians use social media to shape international opinion with emotive and authoritative tones. As conflicts increasingly unfold in the real world and online, understanding the mechanisms of gendered political communication and digital diplomacy is essential for scholars, policymakers, and practitioners who must navigate and respond to contemporary geopolitical crises.

Chapter 2: **Theoretical Background to Gendered Political Communication on Social Media During War¹**

“Telling one’s story is a form of justice.”

Sasha Dovzhyk, speaking at a memorial event for Ukrainian writer Victoria Amelina, 12 February 2025

2.1 War, Through Women’s Words

Those directly impacted by war understand that it is not only fought on battlefields but also in memories, social media posts, and history books. As a Ukrainian writer and war crimes documentarian, Victoria Amelina captured the voices of Ukrainian women who documented Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion. In doing so, she became not only a witness but also an active participant in shaping justice through words.

When institutional justice lags or feels uncertain, storytelling can become a weapon, wielded with the same force as a Javelin anti-tank missile or a case at the International Criminal Court. Social media heighten this power. They give women—whether relatives of soldiers near the front lines or politicians at the highest levels—a platform to record history in real time, challenge propaganda, and rally support for their people and country. In conflicts where the erasure of national identity serves as a key battleground, women’s voices are not merely narrating the war—they are fighting it with “storytelling power” (Amelina, 2025).

¹ Sections of this chapter are forthcoming in the *Handbook on Media, War and Conflict Studies*, part of the ICA Handbook Series, a joint venture between ICA and Routledge.

Amelina's own story ended when she died aged 37 from injuries caused by a Russian missile attack in Kramatorsk, Ukraine, on 1 July 2023. Other women continue her work by documenting and sharing their wartime experiences, wielding storytelling as a step towards justice. Their efforts raise fundamental questions: What is the modern context of gendered political communication on social media during war? How has the war of words evolved, in terms of gender, over time?

This chapter aims to answer these questions by outlining the key elements of gendered political communication during war on social media from both historical and contemporary perspectives. I begin by outlining key theories and thinkers around women's approaches to conflict and communication styles. After introducing political communication as a concept that encompasses both narratives and interaction styles of political actors, I then explore digital diplomacy as a communicative space for gendered narratives and interactions during conflict. I further outline a methodological framework for studying gendered political communication on social media during war, considering both the agency of women and the impact of digital technologies on geopolitical power struggles. Finally, I explain how this framework is applied in the empirical chapters of this thesis.

2.2 History and Theories of Gendered Political Communication

During War

Periods of war are important moments to learn about women's access to political power. Some scholars argue that war limits women's opportunities for advancement, while others say that women can seize peace-building periods to gain political representation (Paxton et al., 2020). This double-edged dynamic is evident in how women are impacted by war and how they shape it through their own actions and communication.

Feminist international relations (IR) theory argues that war affects men and women differently in terms of physical violence, economic impact, and physical displacement (Enloe, 1990; O’Sullivan, 2019; Sjoberg, 2016). While men are more likely to serve in combat roles resulting in battlefield casualties, women are more affected by internal and external displacement, sexualised violence, torture, and other wartime atrocities (Paxton et al., 2020). Societies in war can also undergo a cultural shift where traditional gender roles are challenged. An awareness of women’s presence in combat roles can cause this shift, which may help alter stereotypes of women as weak and pacifist (Enloe, 1990). In present day Ukraine, for instance, 22% of the armed forces are women (Hendrix & Korolchuk, 2022), complicating narratives that frame women solely as passive victims of war. Historically, women have also played important roles in resistance movements, with one third of rebel fighters during Ethiopia’s civil war in the 1980s being women (Bloomfield et al., 2003). War places specific burdens on women and drives cultural shifts around their roles in conflict. In response, some women work to influence national opinion through public communication (Pavliuc, 2025b).

Beyond direct participation in conflict, women have long leveraged public communication tools to highlight the human cost of war and advocate for justice. Mary Wollstonecraft (1759-97), a writer who lived in Paris from 1792-95 during the French Revolution, wrote extensively about the events occurring around her. Though untrained, her writings were arguably the first war correspondences a woman authored in English (Wollstonecraft, 1795). Following in her footsteps was American journalist Martha Gellhorn (1908-98), who influenced the style in which war reporting was written with her passionate, yet clear and lucid, reporting on the effect of war on civilians throughout her career as a war correspondent (Ruiz, 2024). Eleanor Roosevelt, as First Lady of the United States, used press conferences and personal visits to the front lines to shape

public narratives about the First World War (1914-18), later channelling her influence into drafting the UN Declaration of Human Rights (Ehrhardt, 2019). More recently, Ukrainian writer Victoria Amelina used her platform to share her own experiences of war and to amplify the voices of other human rights defenders and war crimes documenters, cementing their historical and legal value (Pavlyshyn, 2023). Ukrainian women influencers also took to TikTok at the start of Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion to share what daily life was like under Russian bombardment (Kalnes & Bjørge, 2025). These examples illustrate how women continue to shape public discussions about war, challenge dominant narratives, and expand the scope of political communication.

2.2.1 Women's Voices in War: The Struggle for Recognition

Svetlana Alexievich and Cynthia Enloe offer two of the most compelling frameworks for understanding women's participation in wartime and political discourse. In *The Unwomanly Face of War* (1988, English translation 2017), Alexievich critiqued male-centric accounts of war, arguing they documented only men's senses, notions, and voices, while systematically silencing women's experiences. She asked: Do women choose to remain silent during war, or are their accounts simply not recorded? Alexievich's work constructed a women's history of war, capturing the sensory, emotional, and lived dimensions of their stories. However, women's presumed exclusion and silence have sometimes been advantageous in irregular warfare. During the Second World War (1939–45), the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) sent women into occupied Europe as spies, radio operators, and saboteurs, exploiting the assumption that women were uninvolved in warfare—a perception that made them less conspicuous than men (Carlomagno, 2019).

Contemporaneously with Alexievich, Enloe's *Bananas, Beaches, and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics* (1990) examined women's participation,

or lack thereof, in international politics. She argued that historical failures to document women's voices have resulted in misunderstandings of how countries create and sustain power relations. Both women asked the question that Enloe so succinctly posed: "Where are the women?" (Enloe, 1990, p. 7). This question continues to be explored by theorists seeking to unravel the gendered dimensions of conflict approaches and communication.

In the modern era, Wright has examined gendered silence in Western responses to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine (Wright, 2023). Her work shows how the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda—which underpinned military cooperation between Ukraine and NATO—was ignored at the onset of the invasion, possibly because NATO no longer needed it to justify its engagement with Ukraine, a non-NATO country. This silence was both deliberate and revealing, reinforcing the urgency of research that prioritises women's perspectives.

Disaggregating data by gender has often been recommended as a means of understanding women's contributions to conflict and diplomacy (Alexievich, 2017; Cassidy, 2017), but doing so is not without its drawbacks. Van Doorn & Van Zoonen (2009) argue that studying gender differences within a binary framework can entrench existing stereotypes, forcing data to be interpreted through a restrictive lens that fails to account for the spectrum of gender identities. They suggest that social media architectures influence how individuals communicate online, making gendered differences in data appear more pronounced than they may truly be. However, researchers still argue for the analysis of gender-disaggregated data to highlight women's voices and contributions to political communication and digital diplomacy (Cassidy, 2017), particularly during conflict (Alexievich, 2017; Wright, 2023).

Scholars have proposed several theories to help explain how gender shapes communication and interaction during conflict. Understanding these dynamics is

essential for assessing how political actors leverage their gendered identities in narrative construction, influence, and digital engagement.

2.2.2 The Women and Peace Hypothesis

The Women and Peace Hypothesis (WPH) posits that men are often inclined towards combat, while women tend to favour compromise and non-military solutions in IR (Reardon, 1993; Tessler et al., 1999). This traditional perspective perpetuates stereotypical gender roles, depicting women as motherly and pacifist and men as aggressive and combative, despite historical evidence of women's presence in combat (Gizelis, 2018; Peterson & Runyan, 1993). Popular figures such as former US President Barack Obama and Harvard psychologist Steven Pinker have echoed the WPH, calling women pacifist influences and stating that women would have started fewer wars than men if they had more political or institutional power throughout history (Chappell, 2019; Pinker, 2011).

Recent research has questioned the WPH's applicability during salient conflicts—those perceived as existential by those affected—such as in Israel and Ukraine (Aharoni, 2017; Ben Shitrit et al., 2017; Bukkvoll & Steder, 2023; Conover & Sapiro, 1993; Pavliuc, 2025a). Adding to these challenges, scholars have found that military threats made by women leaders tend to be viewed with more credibility than those made by men (Schwartz & Blair, 2020). The WPH can also inform the types of narratives men and women political actors produce during wartime. Women, cast as motherly and protective, may emphasise war's human toll. Men, expected to support combat, tend to adopt more militarised narratives.

2.2.3 Gendered Interaction Styles in Conflict Communication

Beyond narrative content, gendered differences in communication extend to interaction styles, which can be measured using social media data (Gilligan, 1995; Meeks, 2016; Phillips, 2014). Research shows that women tend to adopt more interactive and collaborative approaches than men, enabling them to use social media strategically to build consensus and mobilise support (Bossetta, 2018; Gilligan, 1995; Pavliuc, 2025b). Women politicians, in particular, exhibit higher relational power on social media, engaging in more conversational and participatory interactions compared to their male counterparts (McGregor & Mourão, 2016; Meeks, 2016). During the Euromaidan uprising, Ukrainian women demonstrated a strategic use of social media's interactive features to increase their visibility and activate support (Phillips, 2014). While some research has assessed the impact of incumbency on politicians' social media interactions during elections (Christine Banwart & McKinney, 2005), scholars have yet to fully examine how prominence influences communication styles during conflict.

2.2.4 Dialogic Communication and Gendered Political Engagement

Dialogic communication theory emphasises open and reciprocal discussion as a means to build trust and reach long-term social goals (Kent & Taylor, 1998). This form of communication is often linked to feminine-coded styles of behaviour and is sometimes criticised for being too emotional and sensitive (Stewart, 1978; Tench et al., 2017), which may reinforce the gendered stereotype that women's political participation is weak and lacks authority. There remains a dearth of scholarly research on how gender influences dialogic communication, warranting further inquiry into how it shapes diplomatic interactions. Dialogic approaches can be effective in conflict communication, as they encourage consensus-building and broaden participation in political discourse.

2.2.5 The Gender Affinity Effect in Political Communication

Another relevant theory is the gender affinity effect, which posits that individuals form deeper connections and alliances with those who share their gender identity (Albaugh & Baisley, 2023; Dolan, 2008). Although primarily tested on voting patterns, this effect may also shape patterns of interaction on social media. Some studies have found a positive effect of gender affinity in social media engagement between women politicians and the constituents whom they represent (Yarchi et al., 2020). However, others have reported mixed results, indicating that the strength of the gender affinity effect may depend upon its contexts (Wang et al., 2016).

Researchers have rarely studied the gender affinity effect in conflict settings, where political alliances are shaped not only by gender but also by nationalistic and security concerns (Pavliuc, 2025a). Understanding how gender affinity operates in political interactions during war offers an opportunity to test this theory beyond traditional electoral contexts.

2.2.6 The Ukrainian Context of Feminism and Nationalism

Ukrainian nationalist and feminist movements have been uniquely intertwined throughout history, shaped by repeated episodes of Russian aggression (Mayerchyk & Plakhotnik, 2015). Discussions on nationalism, identity, and gender roles were prevalent after Ukraine regained independence in 1991, intensified during the Euromaidan protests of 2013–14, and continued in the wake of Russia's initial 2014 invasion (Channell-Justice, 2020; Mayerchyk & Plakhotnik, 2015). Feminist movements in Ukraine have often had to operate within nationalist frameworks, with women activists leveraging nationalist sentiments to advocate for gender equality alongside statehood (Kis, 2007; Phillips, 2014). Given this context, the applicability of the WPH to Ukraine is particularly intriguing, as women's movements have been deeply embedded within

nationalist struggles against the persistent threat posed by Russia, a country that sees itself in a permanent state of conflict with its Western neighbours (Rumer, 2019).

A key cultural construct in this dynamic is the myth of the *Berehynia*, a figure from pre-Christian Ukrainian folklore who symbolises a fusion of femininity, national identity, and moral virtue (Rubchak, 2001, 2009). It is often invoked as a cultural metaphor for the unrealistic expectation that contemporary Ukrainian women must embody both maternal and patriotic societal roles (Mayerchuk & Plakhotnik, 2015; Rubchak, 2009; Zlobina, 2015). This metaphor may shape how women political actors communicate during wartime, as they navigate between elevated expectations of maternal pacifism and patriotic duty.

Researchers have often overlooked Ukraine in Eastern European and post-communist scholarship, where findings on Russia have sometimes been assumed to generalise to other former Soviet republics (Kuhar & Paternotte, 2017). This gap underscores the need for research that focusses on Ukraine, particularly in the context of conflict. Ukraine's geopolitical position—situated between Eastern and Western influences—makes it a valuable case for broadening theoretical understandings of gender and conflict communication.

Together, the theories outlined in this section provide a foundation for examining how gender influences wartime political communication. They suggest that women and men approach conflict discourse differently in terms of narrative framing, interaction styles, and alliance formation. However, the argument that these differences are essentialist—that they come naturally to men and women—should be avoided (Enloe, 1990). There are deep, longstanding, societal expectations of how men and women should behave in all public and private fora, and they are re-constructed daily, on a global scale (Butler, 2025). The goal of this thesis is therefore to analyse the differences

that do exist, document them, and challenge the constraints placed upon men and women in political communication during conflict. By examining differences, this thesis contributes to broader discussions on inclusion, diversity, and openness in wartime political communication, so all faces can be seen, and voices can be heard.

2.3 Political Communication: An Amalgam of Narrative and Interaction

Political communication encompasses all political discourse by, to, and about political actors (McNair, 2017). It has two key components: what is said, and how it is disseminated. In this doctoral thesis, the *what* is the narratives used by message senders and the *how* is their interaction and targeting actions—operationalised as the tactic of directly reaching out to another social media user with an @-mention. These targeting actions enable social media users to ensure messages reach certain audiences. Together, these elements shape political discourse in both traditional and digital contexts.

2.3.1 What is a Narrative?

Narratives serve as powerful tools in political communication, designed to convey relevant facts and persuade audiences to align with a sender's viewpoint (Coticchia & Catanzaro, 2022). They consist of an actor, setting, and action, and operate at a strategic level that aims to influence audiences to adopt certain viewpoints or take certain actions. Narratives play a crucial role in shaping shared meaning and building digital connections between those in warzones and distant observers (Pavliuc, 2024; Roselle et al., 2014; Wagnsson & Lundström, 2023).

Scholars conceptualise narratives as weapons in *narrative wars*, where opposing sides each spread their own narratives in influence operations (Wilson et al., 2018). In the context of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia has employed narratives that aim

to deny Ukrainian sovereignty, dehumanise Ukrainians, and garner support for its conquest of Ukraine (Aleksejeva et al., 2023; Khaldarova, 2021; Oates, 2023). While both Ukraine and Russia have been found to engage in social media manipulation (Bradshaw et al., 2021), Russia's systematic use of dehumanisation underscores the importance of narrative warfare in shaping public perceptions of conflict. Measuring differences in narrative use by gender enables a deeper understanding of how political actors leverage them during wartime.

2.3.2 How are Narratives Disseminated by Political Actors on Social Media?

Narratives cannot influence target audiences without political actors or media outlets disseminating them, so how is this done? In developed countries, which had near-universal literacy from the late 19th century, newspapers became mass media, followed in the 20th century by radio and television, all of which were utilised for political ends (Boichak & Hoskins, 2022). Previously, news and information were disseminated to the masses via church sermons and street oratory (Debby, 2022). Journalists such as Martha Gellhorn used their platforms to disseminate narratives regarding the traumas civilians faced during war. Similarly, Eleanor Roosevelt leveraged press conferences and her UN role to garner media attention for her aim of establishing universal human rights. These interactions relied on different communication tools that enabled narratives to be disseminated to large audiences, following a one-to-many model.

Digital technologies, particularly social media platforms, have transformed political communication by enabling new forms of interaction. These platforms have shifted the traditional one-to-many model to a publicly visible one-to-one model, where elite political actors can engage directly with each other through @-mentions, likes, comments, and shares on public platforms such as Twitter, while being observed by local

constituents and global audiences. As a 21st century writer, Victoria Amelina utilised social media to share her writings and thoughts on the war instantly with her followers. The visibility of these interactions has profoundly influenced how political actors conduct communication and diplomacy (Manor & Segev, 2020).

2.3.3 Social Media: Modern Tools in Wartime Digital Diplomacy

Social media have fundamentally changed how war is conducted in the modern era (Patrikarakos, 2017). The constant connectivity the internet affords has, in some ways, lifted the fog of war, but in other ways it has made it denser than ever before (Dyczok & Chung, 2022; Pavliuc, 2024). During the past 60 years, rapid advances in satellite technology have enabled civilian and soldier connectivity, and therefore instant global updates of enemy positions. This connectivity also allows for instantaneous sharing of destruction and suffering. Conversely, social media enable individuals or groups aligned with one side of a conflict—whether state-affiliated or not—to develop and run propaganda campaigns that shape public perceptions by promoting specific narratives (Howard, 2020). This dynamic is driven by how social media platforms' algorithms prioritise content users see, and therefore to which viewpoints they are exposed.

This type of information control, however, is not without historical precedent. During the First World War, shortly after the invention of radio, governments quickly took control of broadcasting, making it illegal to transmit—and, in some cases, even receive—signals not authorised by the state (Ruben, 2010). Users may also actively choose to engage only with content that aligns with their worldview, thereby influencing the types of content social media algorithms show them in the future (Dubois & Blank, 2018).

The digital architectures of social media platforms shape their utility for leaders and citizens alike in times of peace and conflict (Bossetta, 2018). Both Twitter and

Facebook enable users to follow public pages via unidirectional follows. While Facebook has a massive user base of over two billion daily active users (Bell, 2023), Twitter functions as a hub for social actors such as political elites, journalists, and academics (Gilardi et al., 2022). Notably, women politicians have used Twitter as part of their electoral strategies (Wagner et al., 2017), indicating its significance in political communication. During the 2013-14 Euromaidan uprising, both Facebook and Twitter were crucial in facilitating communication and coordination among Ukrainian protesters (Lokot, 2021; Onuch et al., 2021; Ronzhyn, 2014). Facebook served as a platform for receiving protest updates and organising collective actions, while protesters used Twitter to reach foreign audiences and provide tactical updates. These uses reflected each platform's distinct functionalities and user demographics.

The heightened role of social media in conflict has not gone unnoticed by politicians and other influential stakeholders. Civilians increasingly demand updates from their leaders during crises (Heemsbergen & Lindgren, 2014). Politicians use social media to engage in digital diplomacy, defined as the use of digital technologies to conduct relations between states (Bjola, 2015). Beyond its functional role in foreign policy, digital diplomacy can also be viewed as a communicative space on digital platforms, which are leveraged by political actors. Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and the subsequent international response, has sparked research on how digital technologies are leveraged by diplomats, politicians, and global citizens to facilitate support for countries affected by conflict (Andrianova, 2024; Kutidze, 2023; Manor, 2023). This increased focus on wartime digital diplomacy highlights the need to understand how new tactics will shape future strategies during conflicts and crises (Manor, 2023). Social media also facilitate the communication of a conflict's salience to global audiences by creating digital proximity, a sense of closeness to the war through

networked connections and content shared by those physically nearer to the conflict (Pavliuc, 2024).

Digital diplomacy is also a means of communication in hybrid warfare, used to counteract propaganda disseminated by one side of a conflict against another. Diplomatic actors may employ either counter-narrative approaches—directly rebutting individual propagandistic claims—or counter-brand approaches, which centre the key narratives that communicators wish to project rather than amplifying propagandistic messages (Pamment, 2022). Communicators can also highlight an adversary’s harmful behaviours as part of the counter-brand approach.

Researchers have emphasised the importance of applying a gender lens to theoretical frameworks on diplomacy to increase the visibility of women who have been historically excluded from wartime discourse (Alexievich, 2017; Cassidy, 2017). In the second edition of her book, Enloe offers cautious optimism about the internet’s potential to facilitate higher visibility of women in international politics (Enloe, 2014). As digital diplomacy continues to evolve, exploring how it is shaped by gender dynamics remains crucial for informing more inclusive and effective global communication strategies.

2.4 A Social Data Science Approach to Studying Gendered Political Communication Strategies During War

The historical and theoretical perspectives outlined above are operationalised in my methodological framework for analysing gendered political communication on social media during conflict. This framework enables a systematic analysis of both content and interaction in large datasets with a theory-driven disaggregation by gender. At the core of this research is the application of a gendered lens to wartime communication strategies. Drawing on theories such as the WPH and the gender affinity effect, this thesis examines how gender shapes both the construction and dissemination of political messages during

Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. I achieve this by disaggregating all the data I analyse by gender, to illuminate differing content and interaction strategies of men and women.

2.4.1 Computational Methods Applied in this Thesis

To analyse political communication as an amalgam of narrative and interaction, this thesis employs three social data science methods: structural topic modelling (STM), social network analysis (SNA), and ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. STMs are probabilistic modelling techniques that calculate prominent topics within the documents they are fed by examining word co-occurrence patterns (M. E. Roberts et al., 2013, 2019). They can also track the prevalence of certain topics in other metadata that are catalogued in a dataset, such as a social media poster's gender or prominence, or the date a post was published (Blei, 2003). Previous applications of STM have provided insights into crisis events, such as the downing of flight MH17 by Russia in 2014, by analysing key topics in a large dataset of Twitter discourse (Mishler et al., 2015). I apply STM in Chapters 3 and 4 to uncover the narratives used by Ukrainian politicians and international figures, disaggregated by gender and time-period.

I converted the outputs of the STM into narratives through an iterative, manual process, with the core objective of maintaining the essence of the input documents. First, I read the top 30 words per topic and drafted an initial topic summary. This process was conducted twice, allowing overlapping themes in later topics to inform earlier summaries. Next, I read the STM-generated top tweets for each topic, and the topic summaries were revised to ensure they accurately captured the essence of the most relevant tweets. I then analysed these finalised topic summaries in Chapter 3, comparing them across genders based on the STM's calculation of the effect of metadata variables such as gender, time-period, and prominence, depending on the research question.

In Chapter 4, I further distilled the topic summaries into the thematic dimensions of narratives by identifying the key actors, settings, and actions present. For example, the topic summary “continued financial support and partnership with Europe” was distilled into the narrative that “the West is providing support to Ukraine.” Throughout this process, I took great care to summarise only these three dimensions without inferring intent, about which no data were collected. Scholars who use STMs refer to them as tools for amplified reading, as they enable researchers to process far more text than would be possible without automation (Bail, 2019).

Complementing STM’s content analysis, SNA quantifies interaction patterns within social media posts, through the calculation of network statistics that measure social media users’ connections with others in a dataset. SNA can shed light on communication strategies employed by message senders, including the dissemination of gendered disinformation and the interactions between accounts in a Russian troll farm (Jankowicz et al., 2021; Kriel & Pavliuc, 2019). I utilise SNA in Chapters 3 and 5 to analyse the interaction styles of Ukrainian politicians, and examine how they attempt to initiate dialogue with the international figures from whom they seek support. This is achieved by distilling datasets of social media interactions into source-target tables, which capture the message sender—or source—and the target of that message. I then further analyse the patterns in source-target relationships using OLS regression in Chapter 5.

Together, STM, SNA, and OLS regression are powerful methods that enable me, as a social data science scholar, to understand political communication as an amalgam of narrative and interaction. These tools also enable the disaggregation of social media data by gender to analyse differing strategies used by Ukrainian politicians and international figures. By focussing on the social media communication of these actors during the lead-

up to, and first year of Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, I contribute to a broader theoretical and empirical understanding of gendered political discourse during wartime. This has important implications for future conflict and crisis communication strategies.

Chapter 3: **Decoding Gendered Political Communication on Facebook and Twitter Before and During Russia's 2022 Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine²**

Abstract

This chapter analyses along gender lines Ukrainian political communication in both English and Ukrainian on Twitter and Facebook during comparable periods before (February to June 2021) and during (February to June 2022) Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. An original database of Ukrainian politicians' socio-demographic attributes is created and analysed using a novel mixed-methods approach of structural topic modelling and social network analysis that transcends traditional content analysis. Overall, politicians' use of narrative and interaction on social media differs along gender lines. Women are more collaborative and interactive, seeking support from the West and promoting themselves and their country. Men more frequently use military and combative terms. While politicians continue to update their constituents directly on Facebook in Ukrainian, English-language tweeting on Twitter increases 58% after the full-scale invasion begins. All politicians use social media to disseminate narratives of Ukrainian bravery and the need for Western support, but their styles do not consistently align with current theories of gendered communication during conflicts.

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² This chapter is published: Pavliuc, A. (2025). Decoding gendered political communication on Facebook and X/Twitter before and during Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. *Digital War*, 6(1). <https://doi.org/10.1057/s42984-025-00104-8>.

The data collected in this chapter was approved by Oxford Internet Institute's Departmental Research Ethics Committee (DREC) on behalf of the Social Sciences and Humanities Inter-Divisional Research Ethics Committee (IDREC) in accordance with the procedures laid down by the University of Oxford for ethical approval of all research involving human participants, approval number SSH_OII_CIA_21_098.

3.1 Introduction

All but a handful of wars were fought, communicated, won or lost, before social media were invented. With it, every word and action of leaders and civilians alike is recorded as it becomes history. Social media present an opportunity to promote women's voices after historical exclusion from national memories and narratives and, in Ukraine, the historical elevation of nationalism above feminism (Alexievich, 2017; Phillips, 2014; Shevtsova, 2024). Men and women leaders are generally assumed to approach conflict differently, with men assumed to be inclined towards combat, and women to compromise (Reardon, 1993; Tessler et al., 1999).

Ukraine, Europe's second largest country by area, was part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics from 1922 until it regained independence in 1991. Since then, Ukrainian citizens have mobilised through multiple protest movements, demanding European integration and free and fair elections whenever their leaders strayed from these ideals (Onuch, 2022). On 24 February 2022, Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine³ after years of fighting in eastern Ukraine and the illegal annexation of Crimea after Ukrainian democratic protests in 2013-14, labelled the Euromaidan uprising (Walker, 2023).

Since Euromaidan, women have been vital to Ukraine's wartime efforts (Mayerchyk & Plakhotnik, 2015; Onuch & Martsenyuk, 2014). Women comprise 22% of the Ukrainian Army and have used the participatory power of social media to collect donations and supplies for the army (Hendrix & Korolchuk, 2022; Patrikarakos, 2017). Ukrainian women politicians make up 20% of the Ukrainian Parliament and have travelled the world to solicit support from allies (Rogers & Sleigh, 2022). Social media

³ For brevity, the two time-periods analysed in this study are referred to as the Pre-wartime and Wartime periods. While Russia invaded Ukraine and annexed Ukrainian territory in 2014, the full-scale war is considered to have begun on 24 February 2022 and is used as the indicator of the beginning of the Wartime period.

have enabled both women and men to confer Ukraine's legitimacy as a state and enable collective protest (Boichak & Jackson, 2020; Gruzd & Tsyganova, 2015; Onuch et al., 2021; Ronzhyn, 2014). Understanding how women leaders use social media to communicate wartime narratives is paramount to understanding modern political communication during conflict and adding historically excluded voices to academic literature.

This study is the first of its kind to document and analyse how Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion impacts Ukrainian women and men politicians' use of narrative and interaction on Facebook and Twitter. I analysed 56,433 Facebook and 22,789 Twitter posts of 210 women and men members of Ukrainian Parliament and cabinet ministers who were active on social media before or during Russia's full-scale invasion using structural topic modelling (STM) and social network analysis (SNA).

3.2 Gender and Social Media in Modern Conflict

Twenty-first century warfare has been transformed by social media—how it is waged, communicated, covered, and consumed (Patrikarakos, 2017). The digital architectures of social media platforms dictate how they are employed by influential users, such as politicians, and the general public during peace and war (Bossetta, 2018). Both Twitter and Facebook have open public pages and similar network structures with unidirectional follows, meaning the person followed does not have to approve or reciprocate the action. Both timelines employ a mix of chronological and algorithmic ordering of posts, though post length limits vary between 240 characters on Twitter and 63,206 on Facebook. These digital architectures curate the experiences of vastly different user bases. Facebook has more than 2 billion daily active users (Bell, 2023) and has been found to be commonly used among American political candidates, likely due to the perception that their electorates are on Facebook and thus see their campaign messages (Bossetta,

2018). While Twitter's 239 million daily active users are one eighth of Facebook's, Twitter is considered to be a place where political elites, journalists, academics, and other social actors congregate to share 240-character updates and advance their own agendas (Gilardi et al., 2022). Women politicians also tend to use Twitter more and transform their strategies to increase their chances of electoral success (Wagner et al., 2017). Social media are also increasingly relied upon during crisis events (Reuter et al., 2018).

Facebook was widely used among Ukrainians during the 2013-14 Euromaidan uprising to receive updates from protest leaders and political figures and to organise collective actions (Onuch et al., 2021; Ronzhyn, 2014). Protesters also used Twitter to reach foreign audiences and provide brief tactical updates, such as on police whereabouts (Ronzhyn, 2014). Studying how Ukrainian politicians utilise Twitter before and during full-scale war is of interest, especially in relation to Ukraine's need for military and financial support from Western countries. Because Facebook and Twitter have distinct architectures and audiences, and are used for specific purposes, it is assumed that they are used for different purposes during times of war. The first research question asks: How does Ukrainian politician usage of Facebook and Twitter differ according to time-period, gender, and language (**RQ1**)?

3.2.1 Gendered Discourse in Politics During Conflict

Gendered differences in political discourse on social media during conflicts are understudied partly because social media mobilisation during war and protest is a relatively recent phenomenon (Howard et al., 2011; Onuch et al., 2021; Ronzhyn, 2014). Feminist writers have long called for more focus on women's contributions to conflict and international politics, as well as more direct questioning of why women appear to be absent from these sections of global history (Alexievich, 2017; Enloe, 1990). Recent

scholarship on Western responses to Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine noted a distinct lack of discussion around women as active participants in conflict outcomes, and called for more opportunities for women to be included in public discussions around peace and security (Wright, 2023). Both conflict and communication are gendered phenomena that require disaggregation through a gendered lens to uncover historically overlooked patterns (Alexievich, 2017; Cassidy, 2017).

The Women and Peace Hypothesis (WPH) postulates that women and men approach international relations (IR) and conflict differently (Reardon, 1993; Tessler et al., 1999). Women are assumed to hold pacifist views, be willing to accept compromise to solve interstate disputes, and to not believe war is as necessary or appropriate as often as men do. This pacifism stems from women's presumed roles as *life-givers* and mothers who are expected to strive to eliminate violence and find non-violent compromises (Runyan & Peterson, 2014). The maternalistic explanation of women's pacifism, though, has long been contested (Aharoni, 2017; Conover & Sapiro, 1993), including in Ukraine (Plakhotnik & Mayerchuk, 2010), potentially because women's lack of access to legitimate, masculinised power has historically required compromise to obtain at least partial objectives. Men are assumed to hold the combative view that war is necessary and appropriate in certain situations, and that violence can indeed solve interstate disputes. Men are seen as *life-takers*, willing to fight in the name of protecting women and children, as is perceived to be their fatherly responsibility. However, women are less likely to call for peace if they are in a country engaged in a highly salient conflict, because the conflict is the central preoccupation of both individuals and states for their survival (Aharoni, 2017; Tessler et al., 1999). In societies outside of the United States and Western Europe, including in the Middle East, men's and women's attitudes towards pacifism and war appear similar (Abduljaber & Kalin, 2019; Tessler et al., 1999).

Ukraine is an ideal country on which to test the WPH, given that Ukrainian women have historically had to prioritise nationalist movements over feminist ones, or creatively merge them to continue their work and gain visibility for their actions and sacrifices (Channell-Justice, 2020; Mayerchyk & Plakhotnik, 2015; Phillips, 2014). Throughout both the Euromaidan uprising and subsequent Russian invasion of eastern Ukraine, women have either been discouraged from participating or erased from their combat roles by being officially listed as medics (Martsenyuk et al., 2016; Phillips, 2014). In response, some formed “Women’s Squads” to bring attention to their contributions to the Euromaidan protests (Phillips, 2014). Ukrainian women have also historically been compared to the cultural metaphor of the *Berehynia*, the matriarch of the nation who is also held to unattainable standards of being a perfect citizen, worker, and mother. (Plakhotnik & Mayerchyk, 2010; Rubchak, 2009). Studying differences in Ukrainian men and women politicians’ communication styles as the public outputs of their approaches to IR can shed light on how the WPH plays out in Ukraine during a highly salient conflict, given that much research on the WPH has been conducted on populations who are not in conflict zones when they are surveyed (Hargrave & Langengen, 2021; Runyan & Peterson, 2014).

Gendered differences in conflict approaches can be observed through how Ukrainian politicians deploy narratives in their communication on social media during war. Coticchia and Catanzaro (2022) outline a framework for structuring communication as a composition of building blocks—frames and narratives—into strategic narratives, master narratives and ideologies. Within this framework, a narrative is defined as a description of an event or multiple events that includes an actor, setting and action, such as the outcome of a battle in a conflict (Porter Abbott, 2020). This framework is used to answer the second research question, which explores the thematic dimension of

narratives: To what extent do the narratives Ukrainian politicians discuss on social media fit expectations of gendered discourse (**RQ2**)? Given assumptions that women are more collaborative and seek compromise to solve disputes, it is assumed that women would use social media to promote narratives of international solidarity and support, while men would promote military strength and the importance of beating the enemy (Aharoni, 2017; Hargrave & Langengen, 2021; Tessler et al., 1999). However, due to the war's salience and contestations of women's pacifism, women are not expected to promote narratives of compromise, pacifism, or peace at any cost.

3.2.2 Gendered Interaction Styles

Communication styles of women and men do not only differ through content, but also interaction style. Women are understood to be more interactive and collaborative in their communication than men, and this feminine style is considered to be subordinate to men's lone-wolf styles in politics and business (Gilligan, 1995). Engaging in alliance building and collaboration to build consensus around a preferred decision or objective can be considered more strategic on social media because platforms afford and encourage the use of interactive features, such as the ability to mention another user directly using the "@" symbol on Twitter (Bossetta, 2018).

Women social media users have a stronger sense of group awareness and cohesion on social media and are more interactive than men (Wagner et al., 2017). Women political candidates in the United States have been found to have higher relational power on social media (in the form of number of replies and centrality within a network) when they run against men (McGregor & Mourão, 2016), and to be more conversational and interactive than men who communicate more formally and straightforwardly (Meeks, 2016). During the Euromaidan protests in 2014, Ukrainian women were found to use the networked affordances of social media, including the

ability to directly engage with multiple people, more strategically than men (Phillips, 2014). While existing work has studied the impact of incumbency on gendered political communication strategies during elections (Christine Banwart & McKinney, 2005), there is a gap in the literature in understanding how the prominence of a politician (which being an incumbent affords) impacts their interactions on social media during war. To understand whether women engage in more strategic interaction on social media during times of war, and to what extent doing so correlates with political prominence, the third research question asks: How do interaction styles of more prominent and less prominent Ukrainian politicians on social media fit expectations of gendered discourse (**RQ3**)?

3.3 Methodology

In this chapter, STM and SNA were used to understand gendered political communication strategies of Ukrainian politicians on Facebook and Twitter before and during Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion. A topic model takes social media posts as input documents, and studies the co-occurrence of words within the corpus of documents to uncover patterns (M. E. Roberts et al., 2013, 2019). STMs are an extension of the Latent Dirichlet Allocation topic model. They incorporate metadata about the documents into the model and establish the effect sizes of metadata on topics (Blei, 2003). STMs have previously been used to uncover key topics discussed by Twitter users after Russia shot down civilian passenger flight MH17 on 17 July 2014, killing all 298 people on board (Mishler et al., 2015). SNA can uncover interaction patterns in large amounts of social media posts, and uncover communication strategies of message senders (Jankowicz et al., 2021; Kriel & Pavliuc, 2019).

3.3.1 Data Collection

The first step in building a database of Ukrainian politicians was to create a spreadsheet containing the names and political parties of the 459 members of the Ukrainian Parliament and cabinet ministers. This information was collected from the Wikipedia page for the Ukrainian *Verkhovna Rada* (Parliament) ('List of Members of the Parliament of Ukraine, 2019–2023', 2022). The gender of politicians was not listed but was deduced from their first names. For example, the first name *Kira* was assumed to be a woman and the first name *Andrij* was assumed to be a man. Any names that were ambiguous to the Ukrainian-speaking researcher who is familiar with Ukrainian names were checked by searching the politician's name on Google and determining their gender from their image and further context. In the absence of an official, self-identified, gender column this procedure was the only option. A manual evaluation that the gender identity politicians present in their profile photo matched the gender marking in the gender column of the database was conducted as each politician's user ID was added to the database.

To collect Facebook posts from Ukrainian politicians, their names were searched and added to a list on CrowdTangle, which allowed for groups of Facebook pages to be categorised and analysed in-house, or for their information to be downloaded locally for further analysis (CrowdTangle Team, 2022). Each politician's name was searched in both Latin and Cyrillic characters using the Add Page function and their user ID was added to the database when the individual was found. Searching for their names in Cyrillic was valuable because 36% of Ukrainian politicians had their names listed in Cyrillic on Facebook, and because Cyrillic names can have multiple spellings when transliterated into Latin characters. For example, the first name *Леся* can be transliterated to *Lesia*, *Lesya*, or *Lesiya*. After this detailed and manual search process, 198 profiles

were located and added to the list. CrowdTangle only allows verified profiles or pages with over 25,000 likes or followers to be added to lists, so some politicians' profiles or pages could not be added or analysed in this chapter (Fraser, 2020). After the list of 198 politicians was created, the Get History function in CrowdTangle was used to download each politician's entire history of social media posts into a spreadsheet. This gathered a total of 191,288 Facebook posts from the 198 politicians. The final two datasets for this analysis (Pre-wartime: 23 February to 28 June 2021, Wartime: 23 February to 28 June 2022), after deleting blank posts, gathered 17,815 and 38,628 posts, respectively.

For Twitter collection, a similar process was followed where each politician's name in Latin and Cyrillic characters was searched in Twitter's list function (Pavliuc, 2022). This process gathered 122 profiles, with no minimum follower amount. After finalising the list, it was exported, and used to collect all tweets through the Tweepy Twitter collection package in Python. Twitter only allows the most recent 3,200 tweets to be scraped from users through its application programming interface (API). Scraping the 122 profiles for their 3,200 most recent tweets gathered 99,894 tweets. Only 13 profiles gathered around 3,200 tweets, meaning that their oldest tweets were probably not captured using this collection method. Nonetheless, all 13 profiles had full datasets in the Pre-wartime (23 February to 28 June 2021) period, meaning that full samples were gathered for all profiles in the time-periods analysed in this chapter. The final two datasets for this analysis (Pre-wartime: 23 February to 28 June 2021, Wartime: 23 February to 28 June 2022), after deleting blank posts, gathered 3,022 and 19,767 posts, respectively. The Ukrainian politician database is available in Appendix A.

3.3.2 Metadata for STM and SNA

Metadata analysed in this chapter are outlined below. Platform, time-period, gender, and language were analysed in RQ1 (though the latter two were not included in the STM for

RQ1), gender was analysed in RQ2, and gender and prominence were analysed in RQ3. Political party lean (pro-Ukrainian or pro-Russian) was considered as a variable in this chapter, with members of the Kremlin-linked political party “Opposition Platform – For Life” categorised as pro-Russian (Staff, 2022). It was ultimately not included because only 16 politicians had Facebook or Twitter accounts that could be analysed, and the findings did not yield noteworthy results.

3.3.2.1 Gender (Woman or Man)

Gender of Ukrainian politicians was the main variable compared against others in this chapter. During the course of this research no current Ukrainian politicians were found to self-identify as non-binary.

3.3.2.2 Platform (Twitter or Facebook)

Twitter and Facebook were selected due to their popularity in Ukraine and differing audiences. Telegram was also considered as a data source, but the search function on Telegram proved to be highly rigid and was therefore less reliable to find politicians’ pages when their names were searched in Latin and Cyrillic characters.

3.3.2.3 Time-Period (Pre-Wartime or Wartime)

The Wartime period analysed in this chapter ran from 23 February 2022 (the day before Russia launched its full-scale war on Ukraine) to 28 June 2022. This four-month, 126-day period captures the entire first shock of the war, and the period where politicians would have transitioned towards and likely settled into new political communication strategies on their social media profiles. The Pre-wartime period, 23 February to 28 June 2021, was selected to avoid any effects of seasonality. This time-period in 2019 or 2020 was not selected because presidential elections were held on 31 March and 21 April 2019, and the Covid-19 pandemic that began in early 2020 would likely have altered

politicians' use of narrative and interaction on social media. The gradual build-up of Russian troops on Ukraine's border began in March 2021, but did not become prominent in the news until months later. Ukraine was on the verge of full-scale war with Russia since Russia's annexation of Crimea and parts of eastern Ukraine in 2014. The chosen Pre-wartime period captures as typical of a time-period as possible before the full-scale invasion in 2022.

3.3.2.4 Politician Prominence (Prominent or Less Prominent)

Politicians were labelled as prominent in the database if they were cabinet ministers, political party leaders, or current or former presidents. These criteria labelled 52 politicians as prominent, of which 24 had Facebook accounts, and 19 had Twitter accounts that could be analysed in this chapter. The remaining politicians were classified as less prominent. This variable was originally included in the STM but the findings did not yield noteworthy insights. It remained included in the SNA.

3.3.3 Methods: Descriptive Statistics

Analysing how Ukrainian politician usage of Facebook and Twitter differed according to time-period, gender, and language in RQ1 required a compilation of descriptive statistics. After the Facebook and Twitter data were collected, they were imported into a Python Jupyter notebook. Posts falling within the Pre-wartime and Wartime periods were categorised as such. The gender of each politician was merged with each social media post to calculate how many posts were published to each platform by women or men, as well as the total number of politicians posting to each platform. The Google Translator package in Python was used to add a new column of language to each Facebook and Twitter post. A manual evaluation of a random sample found the translations to appear accurate by a fluent reader and speaker of Ukrainian and English. The English-translated

social media posts were used throughout this chapter and fed into the STM. All descriptive statistics for RQ1 are in Table 3.1.

3.3.4 Methods: STM


An STM was used to analyse differences in narrative use along the lines of social media platform and time-period (RQ1), and separately, gender (RQ2). To prepare the data for the STM, the documents (Facebook and Twitter posts) were cleaned in a Jupyter notebook where all hyperlinks, symbols, and extra spaces were removed. The Facebook and Twitter data were processed separately until they were merged. The final dataset containing the cleaned posts, time-period, gender, and platform was fed into the STM.

To run the STM, the “STM” package in R was used, and accessed through a Jupyter notebook (M. E. Roberts et al., 2019). R code from STM tutorials and the official STM documentation were compiled according to the needs of this chapter (Bail, 2019; Caberlin, 2020; Monroe, 2020; M. E. Roberts et al., 2019). The Document column was processed through the `textProcessor` function which created a corpus, converted the text to lowercase, stemmed the words, and removed punctuation, insignificant words, and numbers from the documents. The corpus was then run through the `prepDocuments` function which removed highly frequent terms from the corpus and deleted documents with no words.

Once the documents were prepared six topic models were then run on the data, searching for 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, and 80 topics. Each model incorporated the prevalence of all metadata (gender, time-period, and platform). After all models were run, they were visually compared for differences in two common metrics of topic quality: exclusivity (how unique words are to a given topic) and semantic coherence (how often words that are probable to co-occur appear in the same document) in Figure 3.1 (Caberlin, 2020).

Figure 3.1

Comparison of Exclusivity and Semantic Coherence in Models with 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, and 80 Topics



Source: Author's calculations based on data collected from 23 February to 28 June 2021 and 23 February to 28 June 2022.

The models with 30, 40, and 50 topics contained several outlying topics with low exclusivity, meaning that 30 to 50 topics were not enough to capture the range of topics discussed in the data. The models containing 60 and 80 topics contained ones with low semantic coherence, meaning words that were calculated as probable to co-occur in given documents did not. Due to these shortfalls, the model with 70 topics was chosen for onward analysis in this chapter.

After selecting the 70-topic STM, the top words per topic and effects of metadata on each topic were exported for further analysis. To finalise the topics, a manual process of selecting two to five top words which captured the essence of each topic was conducted. Four topics were identified to contain only insignificant words and were not included in the analysis. The 66 final topics were boiled down further in a new variable of 14 larger topic groupings, which were operationalised as narratives in this chapter and were used to answer RQ1 and RQ2. These narratives included ‘call for support’, ‘people

affected by war’, and ‘Ukrainian culture’. Appendix B displays a granular breakdown of all 70 topics, estimates, standard errors, T-values and P-values.

The resulting narratives, and their likelihood of being used on Facebook or Twitter, and before or during war, were analysed to answer RQ1. The patterns in narrative usage are discussed in the Results section for RQ1, based on Table 3.2.

To analyse the extent to which narratives Ukrainian politicians discuss on social media fit expectations of gendered discourse (RQ2), the narratives were summarised by whether they were more likely to be used by women, if the effects were significant and the T-value was negative, men, if the effects were significant and the T-value was positive, or by both genders, if there was no significant effect of gender on the narrative. The patterns in gendered narrative usage are discussed in the Results section for RQ2, based on Table 3.3.

3.3.5 Methods: SNA

Analysing interaction styles of Ukrainian politicians along gender and prominence lines in RQ3 required accessing the original Twitter data and extracting all instances where a politician mentioned another Twitter user with the @ symbol. After each @-mention was extracted and added as a new row (as a target node) to a dataset of interactions alongside the politician who sent the tweet (the source node), the gender and prominence of each source politician was added to each row. This final dataset was uploaded into Gephi, a network analysis and visualisation software (Bastian et al., 2009). In Gephi, the weighted network was produced and network statistics for each node were calculated. These included the number of times a politician mentioned, or was mentioned by, another account (out- and in-degree), and their influence relative to their neighbours (Eigen centrality) (Grandjean, 2015). The network statistics of Ukrainian politicians were then

averaged by gender and prominence and displayed in Table 3.4. The top 20 mentioned Twitter accounts by men and women politicians are displayed in Table 3.5.

3.4 Findings and Analysis

3.4.1 Platform Differences by Gender, Language, and Time-Period

The first research question (RQ1) analysed how Ukrainian politician usage of Facebook and Twitter differed according to time-period, gender, and language. Statistics quantifying posts are in Table 3.1, and the results of the STM are in Table 3.2.

Table 3.1

Posts of Politicians on Facebook and on Twitter Before and During Wartime

Facebook Posts (N=56,443)				
Pre-Wartime (N=17,815; 32% of all Posts)			Wartime (N=38,628; 68% of all Posts)	
N posts (% of posts)	Women	5,481 (31)	Women	11,274 (29)
	Men	12,334 (69)	Men	27,354 (71)
N politicians posting (% of politicians)	Women	46 (27)	Women	50 (28)
	Men	126 (73)	Men	131 (72)
N posts per language (% of posts)	Ukrainian	13,951 (78)	Ukrainian	27,841 (72)
	Russian	1,700 (10)	Russian	4,321 (11)
	English	62 (0.4)	English	991 (3)
	Other	2,102 (11.6)	Other	5,475 (14)
Twitter Posts (N=22,789)				
Pre-Wartime (N=3,022; 13% of all Posts)			Wartime (N=19,767; 87% of all Posts)	
N posts (% of posts)	Women	509 (17)	Women	9,832 (49)
	Men	2,513 (83)	Men	9,937 (51)
N politicians posting (% of politicians)	Women	10 (24)	Women	25 (49)
	Men	31 (76)	Men	51 (51)
N posts per language (% of posts)	Ukrainian	2,000 (66)	English	15,620 (79)
	English	636 (21)	Ukrainian	2,750 (14)
	Russian	242 (8)	Russian	255 (1)
	Other	144 (5)	Other	1,142 (6)

Source: Author's calculations based on data collected from 23 February to 28 June 2021 and 23 February to 28 June 2022.

Table 3.1 shows that Facebook posts analysed according to gender and language appeared to remain proportionately stable between the Pre-wartime and Wartime periods.

While the number of posts doubled between the 2021 and 2022 periods, the proportion of

Facebook posts by women and men politicians, of women and men politicians posting, and of the languages they posted in remained similar, with no more than a 6% change.

The greatest difference in posting behaviour was the increase in English-language tweeting on Twitter. In the Pre-wartime period 21% of tweets were in English while in the Wartime period, 79% were in English. Ukrainian language tweeting also decreased from 66% during the Pre-wartime period to 14% during the Wartime period. Russian language posting also changed between the Pre-wartime and Wartime periods, increasing slightly from 10% to 11% on Facebook but declining from 8% to 1% on Twitter.

Table 3.2

Distribution of Narrative Topics According to Platform and Time-Period

Narrative	Distribution of Narrative Topics on Facebook, Twitter, or Both			Distribution of Narrative Topics Pre-Wartime, Wartime, or Both		
	Facebook	Both	Twitter	Pre-Wartime	Both	Wartime
Government affairs and infrastructure	18	2	3	14	6	3
Military	4	0	0	0	1	3
Ukrainian culture	3	1	1	4	0	1
People affected by war	3	0	3	3	1	2
Sanctions	3	0	1	0	1	3
War – optimism	2	0	1	2	0	1
Youth	2	0	0	2	0	0
Social/TV Media	2	0	1	1	0	2
Russia aggressor	2	0	4	0	1	5
Global impact of war	1	0	2	2	1	0
Call for support	1	0	3	0	1	3
War	0	0	2	1	0	1
Accuse pro-Russian politicians	0	0	1	1	0	0
<i>Total narratives</i>	<i>41</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>22</i>	<i>30</i>	<i>12</i>	<i>24</i>
<i>% of total topics</i>	<i>62</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>33</i>	<i>45</i>	<i>18</i>	<i>37</i>

Source: Author's calculations based on data collected from 23 February to 28 June 2021 and 23 February to 28 June 2022.

Note: 'Both' refers to narratives used on both platforms and during both time-periods. A narrative was categorised as being used on both platforms and in both time-periods if its P-value was > 0.1. Narratives with more than three topics are in bold.

Table 3.2 shows that government affairs and infrastructure narratives were more likely to be discussed on Facebook during Pre-wartime. This is not surprising since Facebook was the platform where politicians communicated in Ukrainian, presumably with their local

constituents, roughly equally during the Pre-wartime and Wartime periods. Table 3.2 also shows that Twitter was a platform where politicians named Russia as the aggressor, called for support from the West, and discussed people affected by the war (the latter also appeared on Facebook). Narratives describing people affected by the war, optimism about the war, and the war in general (without overt optimism) were discussed both before and during the 2022 full-scale invasion, likely due to the ongoing 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea and parts of eastern Ukraine (Walker, 2023). This persistence of some forms of political discontent and violent conflict since 2014 may explain the blurred lines between Pre-wartime and Wartime narratives.

Table 3.1 further shows that Twitter was the platform where posting behaviour changed considerably between the Pre-wartime and Wartime periods. There was a six-fold increase in Twitter posting after the Wartime period began, with women politicians increasing their proportion of tweets from 17% of all Pre-wartime tweets to 49% of all Wartime tweets. The number of women posting to Twitter also increased from 24% during the Pre-wartime period to 49% during Wartime.

3.4.2 Gender Differences in Narrative Use by Ukrainian Politicians

The second research question analysed the extent to which Ukrainian politicians' discussions on social media fit expectations of gendered discourse (RQ2). Table 3.3 below shows the differences in narrative use among women and men, including between those pertaining to the war from a tactical or optimistic perspective, calls for support, and discussion of people affected by the war.

Table 3.3 further shows that both women and men often discussed government affairs and infrastructure, with six narratives spanning use by both genders. Such narratives included discussing Ukraine's Diya app (which allows citizens to access digitised government services), corruption reform, loans and mortgages, and the

environment. Women most significantly discussed crime, prosecutions, and the Russian Orthodox Church, while men discussed trade unions, the economy, and natural resources.

Table 3.3

Distribution of Narratives Used by Women, Men, or Both

Narrative	Women	Both	Men
Government affairs and infrastructure	7	6	10
People affected by war	3	1	2
Call for support	2	1	1
War – optimism	2	0	1
Social/TV Media	2	0	1
Russia aggressor	1	0	5
Global impact of war	1	0	2
Youth	1	0	1
Ukrainian culture	1	4	0
Military	0	1	3
Sanctions	0	1	3
War	0	0	2
Accuse pro-Russian politicians	0	0	1
<i>Total narratives</i>	<i>20</i>	<i>14</i>	<i>32</i>
<i>Total war-related narratives</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>20</i>
<i>% of total topics</i>	<i>30</i>	<i>21</i>	<i>48</i>

Source: Author's calculations based on data collected from 23 February to 28 June 2021 and 23 February to 28 June 2022.

Note: 'Both' refers to narratives used by both genders. A narrative was categorised as being used by both genders if its P-value was greater than 0.1. Narratives with more than three topics are in bold.

Narratives most highly discussed by women were calls for support, optimism about winning the war, and mentions of social and television media. Women's calls for support included pleading to UK and EU leaders (by mentioning several Twitter usernames of leaders) and NATO to provide Ukraine with air defence systems, using the hashtag #CloseTheSky (Appendix B). This call was made early in the war by Ukrainian politicians and civilians alike after a maternity hospital was bombed in Mariupol, eastern Ukraine, on 9 March 2022 (Demianyk, 2022). Women also expressed optimistic views about the war by discussing the EU granting Ukraine candidate member status and discussing how communities will repair war-damaged buildings and contaminated land.

Mentions of social and television media appeared to be encouraging their audiences to follow them on social media and watch their television interviews.

Narratives most highly discussed by men included calling Russia the aggressor, discussing the military, and sanctions. In discussion about Russia as the aggressor, men mentioned “Kremlin lies” and “Nazi propaganda”, used the terms “crook” and “rashist”—a term used to describe Russian fascism under Vladimir Putin’s rule (Kamusella, 2022; Motyl, 2016), and bluntly called Russia the aggressor, and Putin evil (Appendix B). One topic encouraged bravery using the #FightLikeUkrainian hashtag alongside the latter ‘Putin’ and ‘evil’ terms. Military topics mainly included discussion of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, tanks, missiles, and aircraft, and the verbs “fight”, “defend”, and “courage”. Men’s discussion of sanctions included calling for a “block” on popular Western internet platforms such as Google, Microsoft, Meta, and Netflix, and sanctions on Russian oil and companies.

3.4.3 Interaction Differences by Gender and Prominence

The third research question analysed how interaction styles of more prominent and less prominent Ukrainian politicians on social media fit expectations of gendered discourse (RQ3).

Table 3.4

Average Network Statistics for Politicians, by Gender and Prominence

Network Statistic	Women	Men	More Prominent	Less Prominent
In-degree	3.32	3.23	8.46	2.13
Out-degree	192.56	70.60	124.15	109.82
Component Number	0.04	0.02	0.00	0.03
Eigenvector Centrality	0.08	0.07	0.21	0.04
Closeness Centrality	0.48	0.63	0.65	0.57
Betweenness Centrality	5753.88	1876.06	2676.95	3318.29
Modularity Class	9.48	9.73	6.38	10.35
<i>N accounts</i>	<i>25</i>	<i>48</i>	<i>13</i>	<i>60</i>

Source: Author’s calculations based on data collected from 23 February to 28 June 2021 and 23 February to 28 June 2022.

Table 3.4 displays the average network statistics for politicians according to their gender and prominence. Despite fewer women politicians using Twitter during both Pre-wartime and Wartime periods and tweeting less than men during both time-periods, women politicians had a higher average out-degree than men, meaning that, on average, women used the @-mention function to interact with people on Twitter more than men did. Unsurprisingly, prominent politicians had a higher average in-degree, meaning that they received more @-mentions on Twitter than non-prominent politicians. Prominent politicians had high node influence relative to their neighbours (eigenvector centrality), and alongside men politicians, were highly central in the entire network (closeness centrality).

Other network statistics, which capture centrality of nodes in a network according to different metrics, show that women politicians tended to be in dense network regions (component number, modularity class), and often acted as bridging nodes between those dense regions (betweenness centrality). The latter result is likely skewed towards women because of woman politician Inna Sovsun, an outlying node (out-degree=2,250), which was over four times higher than the second highest out-degree for a politician, Oleksiy Goncharenko (out-degree=452).

Table 3.5 below displays the 20 Twitter users who were @-mentioned most by women and men politicians. Two of them were Ukrainian politicians and two the Twitter accounts for the Ukrainian *Verkhovna Rada* (Parliament). The other 16 were European or American politicians, or security or government bodies and their leaders. Despite women only comprising 20% of Ukrainian politicians, they produced 47% of mentions to top Ukrainian and Western leaders and organisations.

Table 3.5*Twitter Users with Highest In-Degrees from Ukrainian Politicians*

Twitter Username	Total In-Degree	In-Degree from Women Politicians	In-Degree from Men Politicians	Account Type
@ZelenskyyUa	36	15	21	Ukrainian politician
@NATO	32	12	20	Western organisation
@BorisJohnson	32	17	15	European politician
@POTUS	30	15	15	American politician
@vonderleyen	27	13	14	European politician
@DmytroKuleba	25	11	14	Ukrainian politician
@AndrzejDuda	24	9	15	European politician
@EU Commission	24	9	15	European government
@Europarl EN	24	11	13	European government
@EmmanuelMacron	23	13	10	European politician
@EP President	23	12	11	European politician
@ua_parliament	23	13	10	Ukrainian government
@UN	21	9	12	Global organisation
@verkhovna rada	21	9	12	Ukrainian government
@eucopresident	20	10	10	European politician
@antonioguterres	19	9	10	Global leader
@OlafScholz	19	9	10	European politician
@trussliz	18	10	8	European politician
@BWallaceMP	18	10	8	European politician
@Bundeskanzler	17	9	8	European government
<i>Total mentions</i>	<i>476</i>	<i>225</i>	<i>251</i>	

Source: Author's calculations based on data collected from 23 February to 28 June 2021 and 23 February to 28 June 2022.

Overall, the analysis of Twitter interactions along gender and prominence lines indicates that women made more use of Twitter's interactive affordances by mentioning more people, while prominent politicians were highly influential relative to their colleagues.

3.5 Discussion

This chapter contributes to scholarship on gendered discourse, political communication, and conflict studies by illuminating how war impacts gendered political communication on social media. Findings indicate that gender and social media platform influence Ukrainian politicians' communication styles and strategies, with women using Twitter to strategically convey the human elements of the war and engage in more conversational

interactions with influential leaders than men. These data indicate the importance of analysing political communication about IR through a gendered lens (Cassidy, 2017).

RQ1 asked how politician usage of Facebook and Twitter differed according to time-period, gender, and language. Activity on Facebook, according to gender and language, remained proportionately stable between the Pre-wartime and Wartime periods (Table 3.1), and government affairs and infrastructure narratives were more frequently discussed on Facebook than Twitter (Table 3.2). Facebook may have already been a platform where Ukrainian politicians communicated with their own local constituents effectively, given that it has previously been highly effective among Ukrainian feminists and Euromaidan protesters (Phillips, 2014; Ronzhyn, 2014). Ukrainian politicians likely did not see Facebook as a platform where they could further their new wartime political needs of Western support and sanctions with new audiences.

Twitter was found to be a platform where Ukrainian men and women politicians recognised the potential to communicate their country's needs with the West through calls for support and sanctions. Between the Pre-wartime and Wartime periods, women politicians' proportion of Twitter use increased from 10% to 49%, and English-language tweeting increased from 21% to 79% (Table 3.1), showing that the war drove more women politicians to actively communicate with their networks. During the Wartime period, Twitter became a key platform for Ukrainian politicians to engage with Western leaders, with women playing a greater bridging role through higher out-degrees (Tables 3.4 & 3.5). This finding matches previous research on gendered interaction strategies during election cycles, where women were found to be more conversational and interactive on social media than men (Meeks, 2016). More broadly, it also showcases the importance of Twitter for conducting diplomatic communication with other elite political actors during conflict.

RQ2 examined the extent to which narratives Ukrainian politicians discussed on social media fit expectations of gendered discourse. Women Ukrainian politicians discussed war-related narratives more optimistically than men, shared more narratives about civilian trauma, and published more calls for support from the West (Table 3.3). While there was no direct evidence of pacifist views by women, or any calls for compromise, women referenced military and aggressive terms less often than their male counterparts who were more likely to discuss the military and sanctions. Men used hashtags such as #FightLikeUkrainian on Twitter, named types of tanks, missiles, and aircraft, and more often used verbs such as “fight” and “defend” than women. These findings align with the WPH for men, but not for women, as they displayed no pacifist views in their narratives and were only less likely to discuss the military and aggression as vigorously as men did (Aharoni, 2017; Tessler et al., 1999). This misalignment is not surprising for women, given that they tend to be as supportive of combat as men during salient conflicts (Aharoni, 2017). Ultimately, both men and women Ukrainian politicians aimed to influence Western leaders to support Ukraine militarily and with humanitarian aid through their use of narrative on Twitter (Coticchia & Catanzaro, 2022).

RQ3 asked how the interaction styles of more and less prominent Ukrainian politicians on social media fit expectations of gendered discourse. Women’s collaborative expectations were upheld through their increased interactions with Western leaders and organisations on Twitter (Table 3.5). Through this behaviour, women politicians exemplified the feminine expectation of alliance building and relationship development to build a consensus of backing for Ukraine with the West through calls for support. This finding aligns with existing evidence that women have stronger senses of group awareness and cohesion and use social media more strategically to achieve their objectives (Gilligan, 1995; Phillips, 2014; Wagner et al., 2017). Despite Twitter's short

character limit and its typical usage for promoting political agendas, Ukrainian politicians also tailored their narratives to appeal to Western leaders, showing that differing platform audiences, architectures, and crisis events can impact communication strategies (Bossetta, 2018; Gilardi et al., 2022; Reuter et al., 2018).

Women politicians may also have flocked to social media to interact with Western leaders at the onset of the full-scale invasion because they saw it as a space where they could increase their visibility during conflict, given that most other arenas of conflict tend to be dominated by men (Alexievich, 2017; Enloe, 1990). Their actions show that they were trying to be active participants in public communications about the war, and that they saw social media as spaces where they could share their own experiences, and those of their constituents. Ukrainian women's use of social media as emancipatory tools to make their voices heard appears to be a growing trend that allows them to walk the line between prioritising nationalism and feminism simultaneously, taking advantage of the fragmented nature of social media and its ability to target different audiences with different messages, or a combination of both (Phillips, 2014; Shevtsova, 2024).

Ukrainian women's historical merging of nationalism and feminism materialised through the narratives they used during the start of the full-scale invasion, namely their messages regarding the human impact of the war (Channell-Justice, 2020; Mayerchyk & Plakhotnik, 2015). Perhaps they erred towards these more feminine, human-oriented, narratives because they felt they could not go so far into the male-dominated terrain of combative narratives. In doing so, they may have sought to strike a balance between conforming to gender norms—by adopting less combative narratives—and fulfilling the demands of nationalist mobilisation during a highly salient conflict.

Were Ukrainian women politicians taking on the role of digital *Berehynias*? Perhaps their aim was to project themselves as mothers of the nation by communicating empathetic narratives regarding civilian trauma within the militarised context of war. While the *Berehynia* metaphor has been criticised for holding Ukrainian women to unattainable standards as perfect citizens, workers, and mothers (Rubchak, 2009), Ukrainian women politicians appeared to have used social media to weave together narratives that positioned them as motherly, patriotic citizens who were working hard to support their nation as its elected representatives. Women politicians' motivations for crafting more feminine narratives that emphasised the brutality of war on civilians deserve further qualitative inquiry, as do the reactions to these narratives by their key target audiences of European and American politicians.

A limitation of this chapter is that some subsets of data (i.e., Pre-wartime posts on Twitter) were small and may not have been well reflected in the topic model. To overcome this weakness, a larger time-period of Pre-wartime may be selected in future research on political communication during Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter demonstrates the value of disaggregating political communication by gender during wartime to reveal differing narrative and interaction strategies. Results indicate that Ukrainian women politicians leverage the interactive affordances of social media to build and maintain connections with Western leaders and organisations through calls for support and discussion of the damage caused by Russia. Target audiences and communication strategies on Facebook and Twitter also appear to be distinct, with Ukrainian politicians using Facebook to update constituents and Twitter for appeals to Western leaders.

These findings have broader implications for both scholarship and policy on wartime communication strategies. First, the differing tactics of men and women indicate that women's voices, even during traditionally male-dominated periods of conflict, should be documented and analysed, as their approaches may offer useful ideas for crafting strategies to target different audiences. Human-oriented, empathetic narratives may be effective tools in future strategic communications campaigns for democracies facing conflict. Second, this research suggests that political communication strategies are profoundly disrupted during war, making it vital to continue studying emerging actors in digital wartime communication. Finally, while not the primary focus of this research, Ukrainian politicians are constantly adapting their communication strategies to counter Russian disinformation about Ukraine and the war. Their efforts represent a small but crucial part of the broader Ukrainian effort to counter Russian propaganda, which also includes Ukrainian civil society, citizens, and global supporters.

The increased engagement of Ukrainian politicians with Western leaders on Twitter warrants further investigation. To close the communication loop initiated by Ukrainian politicians, future studies should analyse the war-related narratives of the Western leaders and international figures Ukrainians most frequently mentioned, using Coticchia and Catanzaro's (2022) narrative framework. This line of inquiry would illuminate the strategies employed by the most elite actors engaged in political communication and digital diplomacy in support of Ukraine during Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion.

Chapter 4: **Gender and Narrative in Digital Political Communication During Russia's Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine⁴**

Abstract

This chapter analyses the gendered differences in digital political communication of Ukrainian politicians and international figures on Twitter during Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion. Narratives are captured using a structural topic model of 130,000 tweets by 74 Ukrainian politicians and the 223 international figures they target most to understand how men and women use different narratives during war. Men's communications concentrate on military and diplomatic narratives while women's focus on civilian trauma and Russian war crimes but contain no calls for compromise, challenging Western theories that women are more pacifist than men. A gender affinity effect is evident between men Ukrainian politicians and international figures, possibly due to men's higher positions of power. These findings contribute knowledge to how gender impacts narrative use during armed conflict.

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⁴ This chapter is published: Pavliuc, A. (2025). Gender and narrative in digital political communication during Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. *Media, War & Conflict*. <https://doi.org/10.1177/17506352241309225>.

The data collected in this chapter was approved by Oxford Internet Institute's Departmental Research Ethics Committee (DREC) on behalf of the Social Sciences and Humanities Inter-Divisional Research Ethics Committee (IDREC) in accordance with the procedures laid down by the University of Oxford for ethical approval of all research involving human participants, approval number SSH_OII_CIA_21_098.

4.1 Introduction

Social media have upended how wars are fought in the 21st century, making them important virtual terrains in which to apply existing theories of gender, political communication, and social networks during war (Aharoni, 2017; Manor, 2023; Margianta, 2014; McNair, 2017; Patrikarakos, 2017; Ronzhyn, 2014). Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and the following unprecedented international communicative response to the invasion by politicians, businesspeople, diplomats, and concerned citizens, has inspired inquiry on how people facilitating support for a country are re-shaping societies through their use of digital communication technologies (Manor, 2023).

This chapter aims to quantify how gender impacts narrative use in political communication of Ukrainian politicians and the international figures they target on Twitter during the first year of Russia's full-scale invasion. Political communication is defined as "all political discourse", including communication by, to, and about political actors or processes, including conflicts (McNair, 2017, p. 4). Narratives are a tool in political communication, defined as a description of an event or multiple events that includes an actor, setting and action (Coticchia & Catanzaro, 2022).

On 24 February 2022, Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, eight years after Ukraine's pro-European Euromaidan uprisings, and the subsequent annexation of the Crimean peninsula and parts of eastern Ukraine through Russian armed groups and proxy forces (Mykhnenko, 2022). Ukrainian women politicians played a key role in the first months of the invasion as they were exempt from Martial law that barred men from leaving Ukraine during wartime and travelled to Europe and North America to facilitate support for Ukraine through both digital and physical diplomatic efforts (Rogers & Sleight, 2022). On Twitter, Ukrainian politicians began to target European and

American leaders and international bodies to appeal for global military and humanitarian aid, as well to condemn Russian atrocities (Pavliuc, 2025b). Women were found to produce more calls for support than men, and to directly target international figures with tweets. These digital communicative efforts by the main responders to the full-scale invasion—Ukrainian politicians and the international figures they targeted on Twitter—deserve deeper academic attention.

This chapter adds the voices of Ukrainian politicians to research on digital political communication of international figures during conflict, with an emphasis on the gendered differences in their communication strategies. By analysing tweets from both Ukrainian politicians and the international figures they targeted most during the first year of the full-scale invasion, this study therefore asks: How do men and women differ in their use of narratives during war?

4.2 Gender and International Relations

Scholars who adopt the lens of feminist international relations (IR) theory emphasise that men and women experience conflict differently in terms of physical violence, economic impacts, and physical displacement (Enloe, 2014; O’Sullivan, 2019b; Sjoberg, 2016). The value of the gender-based approach to the study of war has long been questioned, with scholars claiming that it does not alter our understanding of war in significant ways beyond its impact on individuals (Elshtain, 2009). However, in its fourth decade, the feminist approach to IR has contributed substantial work on the levels at which gender subordination in war generates imbalanced power relations, and therefore the importance of continuing to study gender differences at individual, state, and conflict levels (Cassidy, 2017; Monforte, 2021; Sjoberg, 2011). Strides have also been made to contribute knowledge and nuance on gender and international security in Central and Eastern Europe, including Ukraine, as the region’s feminist movements have developed

distinctly amid Russian imperial aggression and active conflict (O'Sullivan, 2019a; O'Sullivan & Krulišová, 2023a, 2023b).

Gender and internet scholars have long studied the gendered differences of communication on social media, which has fed into studies of feminism and IR. A landmark study by Sandra Herring (1994) analysed the differences in gendered communication patterns in online chat forums, finding that women were more personal and strived to avoid tension and conflict, and that men's communication patterns were more authoritative. Similar research has continued to apply a gender lens to the study of online communities, from fandom to IR (Cassidy, 2017; Morrissey, 2016). Van Doom & van Zoonen (2009) provided a critique of such research on gender differences, stating that they arise from mutually shaping forces. They argued, first, that while gendered differences in communication have been found, the methodologies used to discover them do not challenge the gender binary dichotomy and do not allow space for gendered differences in communication to be sources of power for women. Second, they argued that external and mutually shaping forces are operating. Users, regardless of gender, are at the mercy of corporate design choices of online platforms based on pre-formulated platform architectures. Both social norms of platforms and terms of service that restrict certain topics constrain potential discussion topics. Studying gendered differences remains important, as long as the constraints and architectures of social media platforms, along with the opportunities of social media for women's voices and expression, are considered.

To help explain the role of gender in digital political communication in the contemporary wartime context Ukraine requires, this chapter examines the Women and Peace Hypothesis (WPH) and the gender affinity effect within the context of Ukrainian feminism and nationalism.

4.2.1 Feminism and Nationalism in Ukraine

Ukraine has a rich history of feminist writings and political activities that have often been deeply intertwined with nationalist movements, making them valuable cases in which to study gendered nuances in conflict approaches (Channell-Justice, 2020; Kis, 2007; Martsenyuk, 2015; Phillips, 2014; Shevtsova, 2024; Zychowicz, 2020). This history has evolved alongside the persistent threat from neighbouring Russia, which sees itself in a state of “permanent war” (Rumer, 2019). Feminist movements have had to accept their political context and adopt nationalistic framings to be taken seriously as fighters for statehood, alongside gender equality, given that the current territory of Ukraine was not unified for most of the 19th and 20th centuries (Kebalo, 2007). Social stigmas around feminism in the Ukrainian modern context have persisted, with Ukraine’s only former woman prime minister, Yulia Tymoshenko, publicly disavowing feminism and voting against gender equality legislation (Kis, 2007; Zychowicz, 2011).

This prioritisation of statehood sparked the creation of innovative feminist movements despite backlash from those who claimed that feminist actions took away from the cause of nationalism (Channell-Justice, 2020). During Euromaidan, women were discouraged from participating in more dangerous—and therefore visible—activities, so some of them formed “Women’s Squads” in response, generating visibility and coverage for their contributions (Phillips, 2014, p. 414). The same discouragement persisted against women in the Ukrainian Armed Forces fighting in Donbas in eastern Ukraine, where women in combat roles were often officially listed as medics and logistical supporters, leaving them without appropriate state support in case of injury (Martsenyuk et al., 2016). In explaining why they joined the Euromaidan protests, Ukrainian women referenced both civic duty and motherhood, and that activism was a form of mothering and part of their national duty (Nikolayenko & DeCasper, 2018).

The Ukrainian metaphor of women being mothers of the nation originates from the *Berehynia*, a figure who combines traditional ideals of femininity with nationalistic sentiment. In modern day, the *Berehynia* is seen by some feminist scholars both as a symbol who gives visibility to women in national myths of Ukraine, but who also subjugates them to unrealistic feminine expectations of ideal mothers and citizens (Rubchak, 2001; Zlobina, 2015). These actions and histories show that Ukrainian women's movements get the most traction when their goals align with independence movements, including when this requires support for combat against those who wish to suppress Ukrainian statehood.

4.2.2 Women and Peace Hypothesis

The WPH posits that men are prone to combat while women are more pacifist and seek compromise and non-military solutions to IR issues (Tessler et al., 1999). Despite women's historical presence in combat, women are assumed to be *life-givers*, while men are *life-takers*, reinforcing the stereotypical roles of women as mothers and men as combatants (Elshtain, 1985; Fröhlich et al., 2013; Gizelis, 2018; Peterson & Runyan, 1993). Beyond this traditionalist explanation, women's lack of access to institutionalised power may explain why they have historically adopted more compromising and tolerant positions than men (Tickner, 1988; Togeby, 1994). During the past few decades of inquiry into gendered approaches to IR, the WPH has remained the common ideology, despite it being questioned for as long as it has been coined (Sjoberg & Gentry, 2007; Sylvester, 1987; Zur & Morrison, 1989). Its verity is particularly contested during highly salient conflicts that engulf entire nations or groups and make the need for conflict the only route towards peace (Aharoni, 2017; Conover & Sapiro, 1993). Immediately after Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion, Ukrainian feminists published an op-ed stating that

Russia's war crimes had left them with no option but to demand the arming of Ukraine, as "pacifism kills" (Tsybalyuk & Zamuruieva, 2022).

Studies of gendered attitudes towards peace are most valid in wartime populations with a direct stake in the conflict outcome, rather than in peacetime contexts where reactions to conflict are speculative. Many studies, such as those by Wilcox et al. (1996) and Jelen et al. (1994), focus on populations not directly impacted by conflict, often finding women more pacifist than men. For instance, Wilcox et al. found that women in nine out of 11 major cities were less supportive of military action in the Gulf War than men, and Jelen et al. found that women in four out of six Central and Western European countries were more supportive of peaceful solutions. Togeby (1994) noted that Danish women were more likely to support cuts in military budgets than men, possibly due to their distance from foreign policy decision-making. Gizelis (2018) highlighted that these findings did not account for women's participation in military campaigns, questioning the validity of analysing non-conflict populations on the WPH.

In contrast, the concept of conflict salience helps explain why women in active conflict zones, such as in Ukraine, display fewer pacifist tendencies. Tessler et al. (1999) found that men and women in Middle Eastern populations had similar attitudes towards conflict during the Gulf War, likely due to their proximity to the threat. Studies of prolonged conflicts between Israel and Palestine and Ukraine and Russia have shown minimal gender differences in attitudes towards peace and conflict. For instance, Israeli students showed positive responses towards "peace encounters" regardless of gender (Yablon, 2009), and Ben Shitrit et al. (2017) found little difference in attitudes towards direct and indirect political aggression among Israeli Jews. Similarly, Bukkvoll & Steder (2023) found minimal gender differences among Ukrainians in their willingness to fight after the 2022 full-scale invasion. These findings underscore the greater value of

studying gendered conflict approaches in populations actively engaged in conflict rather than in peacetime populations who may not accurately predict their reactions in a real conflict scenario.

4.2.3 Gender Affinity Effect

The gender affinity effect posits that individuals tend to form connections and alliances with others who share their gender identity (Dolan, 2008). In the realm of politics—where this effect has mostly been tested on mass voting patterns towards politicians—women politicians may strategically appeal to women voters, leveraging shared gender identity to establish a sense of affinity and thus to garner support (Dolan, 2008). Analyses of the effect have found mixed results. In a study of 50 parliamentary elections in 24 countries, Ortega et al. (2023) found a small effect of gender on voting patterns. Albaugh & Baisley (2023) found a positive affinity between women voters and a former woman premier of Ontario, Canada. Badas & Stauffer (2019) found mixed results, where there was a positive gender affinity effect in US non-partisan elections but found no effect in partisan elections.

Not enough research has been conducted on other forms of gender affinity in politics beyond voting, such as gender affinity through social media interactions. Samuel-Azran & Yarchi (2023) uncovered a positive gender affinity effect in social media posts by women politicians in Israel, indicating higher engagement when they discuss other women politicians compared to their posts about men politicians. On the other hand, no gender affinity effect was found when comparing engagement between Twitter users and Hilary Clinton and Donald Trump during their 2016 US presidential election campaigns (Wang et al., 2016). Both studies that analysed social media engagement measured reactionary metrics between masses of constituents and the politicians who represent them. Beyond affinity between audiences and politicians

measured by vote counts and post engagement, research has not yet tested how the gender affinity effect emerges on a smaller scale through convergence of narrative in IR, as this present study aims to uncover.

4.2.4 Narratives in Digital Political Communication

A crucial component of digital political communication is the use of narratives (Coticchia & Catanzaro, 2022). Narratives contain three key elements: an actor, setting, and action (Coticchia & Catanzaro, 2022; Miskimmon et al., 2018; Roselle et al., 2014). The effective use of narratives can persuade an audience that does not have personal experience with an event, making them potent forces in situations such as wars where potential supporters are unlikely to ever have been in or near live combat (Wagnsson & Lundström, 2023). The thematic dimension of a narrative is also an important vessel through which to convey shared meaning and consensus—the key elements of soft power—through a group’s culture, values, and policies (Roselle et al., 2014). The Ukrainian government sends narratives not only via social media posts but also through political speeches, parliamentary addresses and website updates (Pham, 2023). Videos and summaries of such communications are often catalogued and shared digitally, including on Twitter (*Video Collection—Official Web Site of the President of Ukraine*, n.d.; Volodymyr Zelenskyu / Володимир Зеленський [@ZelenskyUa], 2022).

4.2.5 Diplomatic Narratives in Digital Political Communication

Diplomacy, a tool through which international relations are borne out, is increasingly conducted in the online realm where electorates and international publics can observe the actions and inactions of state officials through diplomatic communication (Bjola, 2015). States utilise social media for digital diplomatic communication along with websites, video conferencing and email (Verrekia, 2017; Zhanaltay, 2024). Twitter has been found

to be the top choice of world leaders and governments, though many are also active on Instagram, TikTok, YouTube, Facebook and Telegram (Manor & Segev, 2020; Zhanaltay, 2024). The gender balance of diplomats continues to be generally skewed towards men, and women tend to hold fewer high-profile ambassadorships (Azzahra & Latifah, 2021; Towns & Niklasson, 2017).

While the key actors of diplomacy tend to be seen as diplomats, ministries of foreign affairs and embassies, Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine caused a paradigm shift in how and with whom Ukrainian politicians communicated on Twitter (Pavliuc, 2025b). Politicians broadened from mainly communicating with their constituents to also targeting international politicians with diplomatic narratives. This turn built on an ongoing increase in the use of social media by Ukrainian diplomats, politicians, and citizens during and after the Euromaidan protests in 2014 (Lokot, 2021; Lyebedyev & Makhortykh, 2018; MacDuffee Metzger et al., 2016; Onuch, 2015).

4.2.6 Hypotheses

The key actors analysed in this chapter are Ukrainian politicians and the international figures they frequently targeted on Twitter during the first year of the full-scale invasion. The tweets from these groups are combined and analysed along gender lines to explore how they differ in their use of narratives during war. This research aim is broken down into two hypotheses:

H1: Tweets sent by men include a higher frequency of combative and diplomatic narratives, whereas those sent by women show a higher prevalence of narratives about human trauma and suffering.

This hypothesis tests the WPH, which is operationalised as male discussion around combative and diplomatic narratives, as men are assumed to be more combative and utilise their higher access to political power. Women are expected to use more

narratives about human trauma and suffering because, according to the WPH, they are *life-givers* and wish to stop actions that could kill more Ukrainians. However, given the salience of Russia's invasion, it is expected that women will discuss the human impact of the war in a way that supports further combat to achieve the Ukrainian goal of victory, rather than supporting any pacifism or compromise. This is particularly expected to be found with Ukrainian women politicians, who have historically had to intertwine feminist and nationalist movements.

H2: If a sender and receiver of a tweet are the same gender, then their narratives converge.

This hypothesis tests whether the gender affinity effect holds during conflict and within IR communication by measuring the overlap of narrative use by men and women Ukrainian politicians and the international figures they targeted most on Twitter. It is assumed that Ukrainian politicians and international figures of the same gender will have more converging narratives than between these two groups with differing genders, following patterns during election periods between candidates and voters of the same gender.

4.3 Methodology

4.3.1 Data Collection

All tweets published by Ukrainian politicians and by the Twitter accounts they collectively @-mentioned more than 10 times in the first year of Russia's full-scale invasion (labelled international figures, based on the composition of these accounts) are analysed in this chapter. To facilitate collection of Ukrainian politician tweets, I created an original database of Ukrainian politicians and cabinet ministers serving in the government that commenced 29 August 2019, including their names (in Latin and Cyrillic alphabets), genders, political parties, prominence, and Twitter usernames. I

collected attributes from official Ukrainian government websites, determined gender based on each politician's first name and photo, and located Twitter profiles by conducting searches using both Latin and Cyrillic alphabets on Twitter. This manual search enabled me to confirm that each profile belonged to a politician, rather than an unrelated individual with the same name. Out of the 459 politicians serving in Ukraine during the study period (20% of whom were women), 111 Twitter accounts were located (in which 27% were women). Only three out of 111 Twitter handles did not reflect politicians' names (@1971BY, @3TrAmvL026aJRar, and @AndrejS53143272), but upon closer inspection each profile contained their name and political position in their biography, or in recent tweets. The full Ukrainian politician database is available in Appendix A.

The Twitter application programming interface (API), a data access point some social media platforms use to make structured data available outside of their organisations, was used to collect up to 3,200 tweets from all Ukrainian politicians who had a Twitter account. Of those 111 politicians, 74 tweeted during the study period of 11 February 2022 and 8 March 2023. This date range was selected to capture the build-up to the full-scale invasion on 24 February 2022, the first year of the war, and the commemoration of the one-year anniversary. Data collection was conducted on 10 February 2023 (after Twitter's announcement that it was cutting off free access to its data) and again on March 10, 2023. These two datasets were merged, and duplicate tweets were deleted. This repeated collection enabled more tweets to be captured from prolific tweeters for whom only 3,200 tweets could be collected at a time. In total, 38,418 tweets came from the 74 Ukrainian politicians who were active on Twitter between 11 February 2022 and 8 March 2023. The two accounts that hit the limit of 3,200 tweets while scraping had full datasets for the study period.

Ukrainian politicians mentioned 6,446 unique usernames 25,584 times in their 38,418 tweets. The most highly mentioned accounts were former UK prime minister Boris Johnson (536 mentions), former US president Joe Biden (436 mentions), former UK prime minister and foreign minister Liz Truss (389 mentions), EU President Ursula von der Leyen (325 mentions), former UK defence minister Ben Wallace (316 mentions), the United Nations (271 mentions), and NATO (236 mentions). Of the 417 accounts that Ukrainian politicians mentioned on Twitter more than 10 times in the first year of the full-scale invasion, the 225 from individual accounts who did not identify as Ukrainian were selected for analysis in this chapter. Accounts representing organisations were excluded to only study communication between accounts representing individuals (171 accounts omitted, such as @NATO and @UN). Accounts belonging to Ukrainians were also excluded to only study communication between Ukrainian politicians and international figures (63 accounts omitted, including Ukrainian news outlets and Ukrainian government ministry and embassy accounts). The regions from which these 225 accounts originated were Europe (167 accounts, including Georgia and Turkey), North America (46 accounts), and Asia (four accounts from Japan, Taiwan, Israel and the United Arab Emirates). Eight individuals were labelled as international, as they headed organisations such as the World Bank and the United Nations. According to job type, these account holders comprised of 184 politicians, 15 individuals (including academics and business owners), 10 journalists, 10 diplomats, and six people affiliated with international organisations. The 225 accounts had an average of 1.52 million followers on Twitter. These common recipients of Ukrainian politicians' tweets are referred to as international figures in this chapter, given that the group contains politicians, diplomats, journalists, businesspeople, and members of international organisations from Europe, North America and Asia.

Each international figure's most recent 3,200 tweets were collected using the Twitter API, comprising a total of 278,234 tweets between 11 February 2022 and 8 March 2023. Like for the Ukrainian politicians, collection was conducted twice, on 10 February 2023 and 10 March 2023, with duplicate tweets deleted. Of the 225 international figures whose tweets were collected for this chapter, 223 were found to have tweeted during the time-period of interest. A full list of the database of international figures is available in Appendix C.

Only tweets from international figures that pertained to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine were of interest to this chapter. The 278,234 tweets were filtered according to a list of 1,198 key terms about Ukraine and the full-scale invasion (Appendix D). These terms included all 461 city and village names in Ukraine ('List of Cities in Ukraine', 2023), all Twitter handles (111) and last names (459) of Ukrainian politicians, and war-related terms (216). The latter included weapon names drawn from a random sample of tweets in the dataset and a Wikipedia page of weapons donated to Ukraine ('List of Military Aid to Ukraine during the Russo-Ukrainian War', 2024), and names of key Russian politicians, military commanders, and oligarchs. The list was kept broad because the topic analysis would exclude anomalous unrelated tweets that may be picked up by the above search terms. For example, the word "leopard" was added because it is the name of a battle tank that the Ukrainian government requested for months early in the war, and its animal meaning was unlikely to be a major topic of interest in the Twitter accounts studied. This filtering process was not run on the tweets from Ukrainian politicians as it was assumed that all their tweets were relevant to studying their communications since Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022. This data collection and filtering process yielded 91,838 tweets from international figures,

contributing to a total dataset of 130,256 tweets, inclusive of all tweets from Ukrainian politicians.

Table 4.1

Descriptive Statistics of the Four Studied Groups

Gender	Women		Men		Total
	Ukrainian Politicians	International Figures	Ukrainian Politicians	International Figures	
N accounts	25	61	49	162	297
N tweets	17,168	76,586	21,250	201,648	316,652
N tweets about Ukraine (% of N tweets)	17,168 (100)	27,466 (36)	21,250 (100)	64,372 (32)	130,256 (41)

Source: Author's calculations based on data collected from 11 February 2022 to 8 March 2023.

Note: It is assumed that all tweets by Ukrainian men and women politicians are about Ukraine.

Table 4.1 outlines the number of Twitter accounts in each user group and how many tweets they published in the first year of Russia's full-scale invasion. It also shows the percentage of international figures' tweets that are about Ukraine.

4.3.2 Methods

Structural topic modelling (STM) was used to provide empirical evidence for the research questions outlined above, using the STM package in R, a programming language. STMs calculate prominent topics in input documents based on word co-occurrence (M. E. Roberts et al., 2013), and establish the effect of metadata on topics (Blei, 2003). All hypotheses analysed communication patterns of four user groups: women Ukrainian politicians, men Ukrainian politicians, women international figures, and men international figures.

The STM was run on 130,256 tweets and their metadata for gender (man or woman), user group (Ukrainian politician or international figure), and date (11 February 2022 to 8 March 2023). The pre-selected number of topics was 100, and the statistical outputs of the STM for gender and user group are available in Appendix E and Appendix F. The 51 topics that had an estimate of more than 0.015 on at least one day in the 13-

month study period were selected for further analysis. This threshold was selected to exclude topics that were persistently below this value, and to exclude 13 topics whose summaries contained mostly stop words and did not provide further value to the analysis. One of these 13 topics did pass the 0.015 threshold but was still excluded from the analysis on the basis that it did not provide further value.

The 50 topics that passed the thresholds for inclusion in the analysis were then condensed into one sentence that captured a summary of the topic. For example, a topic whose top words included “support”, “continue”, “partner”, “macron”, “swedishpm”, “financial”, and “assist” was summarised as “continued financial support and partnership with Europe”. Next, each topic summary was further boiled down into the narrative it communicated, namely the setting and action of the topic summary as the actor was often the tweet sender group. For example, the narrative for the topic summary above was listed as “West providing support to Ukraine”. The narratives derived from the topic summaries are used to inform both hypotheses. The full list of topic summaries, narratives, genders, and groups is available in Appendix G.

4.4 Findings and Analysis

4.4.1 Gender Differences in Narrative Use by Ukrainian Politicians and International Figures

Table 4.2 below shows the 18 narratives used by men and women during the first year of the full-scale invasion, comprised of the 50 topics that were selected for this chapter. The narratives most used by men discussed diplomatic efforts (7) and support for Ukraine from the West (5), as well as narratives about the strength of the Ukrainian army (4). Topics within these narratives mainly highlighted diplomatic engagements between Ukrainian and international leaders, announcements of and gratitude for international

support, and Ukrainian territory liberation (for more detail on these topics see Appendix E). Women tended to use narratives about Russia’s destruction of Ukrainian land and people (4) and its war crimes (3), which both focus on human trauma and suffering. Topics within these narratives included missile attacks on Kyiv, Ukrainian blood and homelessness, and Russian genocide and other committed atrocities (Appendix F). Four narratives were used by both genders, including narratives of diplomacy and international support, as well as calls for support, which were also used by both women (1) and men (2).

Table 4.2

Distribution of Narratives, by Women, Men, or Both Genders

Narrative	Men	Women	Both	Total
Diplomacy between Ukraine and West	7	0	1	8
West providing support to Ukraine	5	1	1	7
Ukrainian military is strong	4	1	0	5
Call for support for Ukraine against Russia	2	1	1	4
Russia commits war crimes	1	3	0	4
Russia destroys Ukrainian land/people	0	4	0	4
Call for action to stop Russian invasion	1	1	0	2
Russia spreads lies/disinformation	2	0	0	2
Russia's war impacting energy/climate	2	0	0	2
Ukrainian government is functioning	0	2	0	2
Ukraine is European nation	1	1	0	2
Ukraine will win the war	0	2	0	2
Belarus will fight for its freedom	0	1	0	1
Discussion of viral Twitter topics	0	0	1	1
Russia is making nuclear threats	0	1	0	1
Russia is mobilising troops	1	0	0	1
Russia must allow Ukrainian grain exports	1	0	0	1
Ukrainian heroes have eternal memory	1	0	0	1
<i>Total narratives</i>	28	18	4	50
<i>Total accounts</i>	211	86	N/A	297
<i>Total tweets</i>	85,662	44,634	N/A	130,256

Source: Author’s calculations based on data collected from 11 February 2022 to 8 March 2023.

Note: “Both” refers to topics used by both genders. A topic was categorised as being used by both genders if its P-value was greater than 0.1. Narratives with more than four topics are in bold.

A deeper look into topics feeding specifically into Ukrainian women politician’s narratives found that their most-used topics were attacks and murders of Ukrainian children and mothers, war crimes, the need for anti-missile systems, and victory for Ukrainian statehood (Appendix E). Intertwining discussions of Russian atrocities against

Ukrainian people with calls for anti-missile systems and victory may have been a strategy to use narratives about human trauma as emotionally driven appeals for more military support from international figures and publics. This would have allowed them to present themselves as *Berehynia* characters who act as mothers of the nation, while also promoting nationalism through calls for military support.

4.4.2 Gender Differences in Affinity, Measured by Narrative Convergence

Table 4.3

Distribution of Narratives, by Gender and User Group

Narrative	Men		Women		Both				Total
	Int'l Figs	Ukr. Pols	Ukr. Pols	Int'l Figs	Men & Wmn Int'l Figs	Men Ukr. Pols & Int'l Figs	Wmn Ukr. Pols & Int'l Figs	Men & Wmn Ukr. Pols	
Diplomacy between Ukraine and West	4	2	0	0	1	1	0	0	8
West providing support to Ukraine	2	2	1	0	1	1	0	0	7
Ukrainian military is strong	2	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	5
Call for support for Ukraine against Russia	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	4
Russia commits war crimes	1	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	4
Russia destroys Ukrainian land/people	0	0	3	0	0	0	1	0	4
Call for action to stop Russian invasion	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2
Russia spreads lies/disinformation	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Russia's war impacting energy/climate	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Ukrainian government is functioning	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	2
Ukraine is European nation	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	2
Ukraine will win the war	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	2
Belarus will fight for its freedom	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Discussion of viral Twitter topics	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Russia is making threats	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Russia is mobilising troops	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Russia must allow Ukrainian grain exports	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Ukrainian heroes have eternal memory	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
<i>Total narratives</i>	<i>15</i>	<i>11</i>	<i>13</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>50</i>

Source: Author's calculations based on data collected from 11 February 2022 to 8 March 2023.

Note: "Both" refers to topics used by both genders. A topic was categorised as used by both genders if its P-value was greater than 0.1. Narratives with topics used by men or women from both groups are in bold. The column for all genders and groups was excluded from this table because no narratives aligned with it.

Table 4.3 shows the use of the 18 narratives by all possible combinations of men and women Ukrainian politicians and international figures. The columns under "Both" indicate topics for which statistically significant differences towards any group were

found, meaning that individual topics were used either by both men and women or by both Ukrainian politicians and international figures.

Men Ukrainian politicians and international figures appeared to have more convergence of narratives than women, having both discussed topics that fit into five narratives. Narratives revolving around diplomacy between Ukraine and the West were used in four topics by men international figures and two topics by men Ukrainian politicians, as well as one further topic that was used by both groups. Similarly, narratives about the West providing support to Ukraine, the Ukrainian military being strong, calling for support for Ukraine against Russia, and Russia's war impacting energy and climate were used by both groups of men.

Only two narratives were discussed by women Ukrainian politicians and women international figures. One topic under the narrative of Russia destroying Ukrainian land and people was used by both groups of women, and one narrative about the Ukrainian government continuing to function was engaged with by both groups of women. The delineation between diplomatic and militaristic narratives used by men and narratives about human trauma and suffering used by women in both hypotheses may have been partially caused by men's presence in higher positions of power that enabled them to participate in more diplomatic engagements. Women may also have been conforming to their expected duty as carers for human life and focussing on the human cost of war.

4.5 Discussion

Men international figures and Ukrainian politicians used more military-oriented and diplomatic narratives that communicate authority, while women focussed more on civilian harms and war crimes against Ukrainian people, confirming H1. It is more likely that men were able to engage in such diplomatic discussions because of their higher access to power. Women may have used more narratives about human trauma and

suffering to align with their expected *life-giving* perspective in the WPH. Ukrainian feminists' historical need to merge gender equality movements with nationalist ones may also be reflected in Ukrainian women politicians' use of narratives about human trauma and suffering, as injured and victimised Ukrainian civilians are often women and children. Using such narratives to imply the need for more military support may enable them to balance their dual roles as both mothers of the nation and nationalists who will support their country at all costs. These findings show that the gender differences that numerous studies have found can be sources of power, given that women may have used narratives that matched gendered expectations of them to call for more military support through emotional appeals. However, women's lack of discussion about diplomatic efforts and state-to-state relationships, the ones most visible to international figures in the highest positions of power, may show how offline oppression (in this case women's lack of access to institutionalised power) translates into online digital platforms.

This raises the question: Does the salience—or the persistent threat—of conflict, shaped by a country's geopolitical situation, determine whether the WPH applies? In Ukraine, where proximity to Russia has necessitated prioritising nationalism over feminism, Russia's *permanent war* mentality makes the threat perpetually salient for Ukrainians. This challenges the traditional understanding of salience, suggesting that constant threat perception may supersede gendered attitudes towards conflict. The notion of salience, often associated with an active conflict, becomes nuanced in this context. In countries frequently under the threat of attack, with populations harbouring higher threat perception, the likelihood of having pacifist women decreases as they comprehend the enduring consequences. Theories about women's pacifism may therefore not be directly applicable to a country such as Ukraine, which has confronted persistent external threats for centuries.

The gender affinity effect was observed between men more than between women, where men Ukrainian politicians and international figures often discussed narratives about diplomacy and the military. This therefore partially confirmed H2 that the gender affinity effect would be observed between both men and women. Given that literature on the influence of gender on social media interactions is nascent, this finding begs for deeper inquiry into the gendered affinities between influential people on social media, building on the current body of work on gender affinity between influential people and the masses who vote for them and engage with their social media content.

This chapter faces challenges stemming from the contemporary constraints of limited data availability and restricted API access, marking a transition into an era of potential data scarcity in computational social science research. The evolving landscape poses concerns for this study's generalisability amid increased barriers to accessing the Twitter API. The study's focus on the Russian 2022 full-scale invasion captures a specific moment in the dynamic landscape of IR and hence requires caution when extrapolating findings to different temporal and geopolitical contexts. Finally, in terms of variables in this chapter, the prominence and job type of individuals studied was not included in the analysis, despite possibly being a factor in how individuals communicate on Twitter.

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter analysed the narrative use of men and women Ukrainian politicians and international figures on Twitter to understand how men and women used narratives differently during Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion. By adopting a gender lens in the analysis of wartime digital political communication that is sensitive to Ukrainian historical tensions between nationalism and feminism, we gain an understanding of the varied and impactful contributions that women make in shaping narratives. Findings

indicated that while men and women did use different narratives they both, in their own ways, advocated for Ukrainian victory and for more military support. This is significant because women appear to be using all tools at their disposal to support Ukraine through emotional appeals about human suffering and war crimes to call for more military aid. This opens two future research areas. First, how do men and women use the interactive elements of social media to forge meaningful connections with their target audiences? This would uncover how dialogue, a key element of strategic and diplomatic communication, unfolds on social media, and how women work to interact with people in high positions of power who are more often men. Second, further research on the impact of women's communication strategies to different target audiences could produce recommendations and best practices for both men and women in digital political and conflict communication.

Chapter 5: **A Computational Analysis of Gender and International Dialogue on Twitter During Russia’s 2022 Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine**⁵

Abstract

This chapter explores how men and women Ukrainian politicians and international figures engage in dialogue on Twitter during the first year of Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. A social network and regression analysis is conducted on an original dataset of 14,497 Twitter interactions between 74 Ukrainian politicians and the 223 international figures they target most during the study period of 11 February 2022 to 8 March 2023, disaggregated by gender of sender and recipient, and date. Findings reveal that women comprise 65% of dialogue attempts during the first month of the invasion. However, men maintain at least 47% of interactions with other men as the conflict progresses, suggesting women’s early engagement does not translate into sustained dialogue. The findings underscore the need to consider gender when analysing political communication strategies and the effectiveness of outreach efforts during crises.

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⁵ This chapter will soon be submitted to a special issue in *Post-Soviet Affairs* titled, “The Informational Battlefield: Disinformation and Media in the Context of All-Out War”.

The data collected in this chapter was approved by Oxford Internet Institute’s Departmental Research Ethics Committee (DREC) on behalf of the Social Sciences and Humanities Inter-Divisional Research Ethics Committee (IDREC) in accordance with the procedures laid down by the University of Oxford for ethical approval of all research involving human participants, approval number SSH_OII_CIA_21_098.

5.1 Introduction

Human relationships, shaped through dialogue, are critical both during conflict and long after a solution has been agreed on. The internet has made dialogue between politicians a public spectacle that is no longer confined to in-person interactions behind closed doors. In the digital public square, political actors shape diplomacy and international relations (IR) through their communication strategies, which differ by gender (Manor, 2023; Margianta, 2014; Pavliuc, 2025a). While the outcomes of conflicts are shaped by military actions, the support those in a conflict receive from allies greatly modifies their political environment.

This chapter analyses the interplay between dialogue, gender, and IR during Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine that started on 24 February 2022—a conflict that has elicited high levels of engagement on social media. From diplomatic campaigns of politicians to Ukrainian and global civilian participation in the war effort, social media platforms have become crucial sites for disseminating information and commentary about the progress of the conflict (Asmolov, 2022; Boichak & Hoskins, 2022).

Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine caused a major shift in diplomatic relations not only between Ukraine and Russia, but between Ukraine and the international allies on which it depended for military, economic, and humanitarian aid (Mykhnenko, 2022). As Russian tanks advanced into Ukraine's north, east, and south, international leaders and commentators publicly condemned the invasion and responded with words of support, economic sanctions, military assistance, and financial aid (Pavliuc, 2025a). Yet behind closed doors, some leaders expressed doubt about Ukraine's ability to withstand the assault (Shuster, 2024). Ukrainian civilians, professional commentators, and politicians simultaneously mobilised to solicit condemnations of Russia and support for their own country. During the months

immediately following the invasion, the internet became a primary channel of communication between Ukrainians in the country-wide warzone and the international figures whose support they desperately needed. These efforts unfolded against decades of Russian propaganda designed to dismantle Ukraine's identity and sovereignty, and create an "information fog" to bring Ukraine further into Russia's orbit (Dyczok & Chung, 2022, p. 146; Pomerantsev & Weiss, 2014; Snyder, 2018). This attitude has been promulgated by Russian President Vladimir Putin, who has expressed a desire to re-create a Russian empire akin to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), which collapsed in 1991 (Oates, 2023).

While Ukrainian politicians developed offline and closed-door communications with international leaders during the war, they also broadcast their messages publicly on social media (Pavliuc, 2025a). Platforms such as Twitter enable politicians to spread messages to their constituents and interested international audiences. This public, and performative, element of modern digital diplomacy is increasingly expected by citizens who wish to see how their elected officials are responding to crises (Heemsbergen & Lindgren, 2014). Data collected from such social media allow for the disaggregation of gender in political communication, uncovering previously unseen patterns in how men and women approach and respond to crisis events (Cassidy, 2024; Enloe, 1990; Wirtz & Zimbres, 2018).

While existing scholarship has predominantly focussed on Russian propaganda directed at Ukraine, the United States, and Europe—as well as the public communications of prominent (typically men) world leaders—there has been little inquiry into women's contributions to digital diplomacy and political communication during conflict. Women's voices and experiences tend to be erased and overlooked in historical accounts of conflict (Alexievich, 2017; Enloe, 1990; Sjoberg, 2016). More

academic focus is therefore needed on the role of Ukrainian women political actors, rather than only the actions of their male counterparts and adversaries.

This chapter analyses the gendered dimensions of communications between Ukrainian politicians and their main international allies on Twitter during the first year of Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. This intersection of political communication, conflict studies, and gender is essential to understand. It is particularly important given the strategic value of alliance-building during war, the well-documented differences in how men and women approach digital communication, and the real-world impacts of relationship building on conflict outcomes. Therefore, this study asks: Where are, and are not, the women in dialogue between Ukrainian politicians and international figures during Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine? What do these patterns reveal about women's agency and IR in digital spaces? This research is broken down into four theory-driven hypotheses, for which I constructed a dataset of 14,497 interactions from 130,256 tweets posted by 74 Ukrainian politicians and the 223 international figures they targeted most during the first year of the full-scale invasion.

5.2 Gender and Communication in International Relations

This chapter investigates the gendered dimensions of digital diplomacy during conflict. It is guided by Enloe's seminal question, "Where are the women?", which examines how women shape IR (Enloe, 1990, p. 7). Feminist IR theory argues that men and women experience conflict differently in terms of physical violence, economic impacts, and physical displacement (O'Sullivan, 2019b; Sjoberg, 2016). These gendered impacts often perpetuate power imbalances (Alexievich, 2017; Monforte, 2021; Sjoberg, 2011). However, as Kratochvíl and O'Sullivan document, Ukrainian women's responses to Russia's invasion defied assumptions of pacifism and passivity by active resistance and producing "emancipatory discourses" during conflict (2023, p. 348). This chapter further

assumes that gender differences in the impacts of conflict foster gendered reactions, making the analysis of men's and women's communications during conflict a vital area of study.

Digital diplomacy, the use of digital technologies to achieve foreign policy objectives, offers a space for exploring dialogue formation between politicians and international figures (Bjola, 2015). The need to disaggregate digital diplomacy by gender is reinforced by evidence of "gendered silence" in Western responses to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, as noted by Wright (2023, p. 237). Wright's call for more feminist research on public diplomacy is based on findings that NATO excluded Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) principles in its initial communications and that women were not afforded agency in Western responses to the war.

Scholars who critique feminist research argue that methodologies must challenge the traditional gender binary and should frame any differences as sources of power for women (van Doom & van Zoonen, 2009). They contend that external factors such as algorithmic curation decisions and platform architectures can intersect with gender, suggesting that gender alone may not be the dominant force influencing online behaviour. Despite these critiques, disaggregating gender remains vital to understanding women's unique contributions to diplomacy (Cassidy, 2017), and to revealing the current state of power relations (Steans, 1998). Understanding gendered dynamics not only illuminates women's unique contributions but also documents them as acts of empowerment and resistance to foreign aggression (Allen, 2022). Additionally, contrasting Ukrainian actions with those in other nations is crucial for ensuring that Ukrainian voices—both men's and women's—are documented during conflict (Kratochvíl & O'Sullivan, 2023; O'Sullivan, 2019b). Women in conflict zones are not just victims but active decision makers, and more work is needed to untangle their

contributions to resistance and resolutions in conflict (Asuinura & Kipo-Sunyezi, 2024; Wright, 2023).

5.2.1 Gendered Interaction Styles in Digital Diplomacy

Digital diplomacy is a key component of digital political communication, which encompasses all political discourse conducted by, about, and towards political actors (McNair, 2017). Nye describes public diplomacy as a government instrument to achieve foreign policy objectives that leverages communicative and cultural resources (2008). In 2022, Twitter was an important platform for digital diplomacy, where elite social actors—including politicians, journalists, and academics—exchanged views, set agendas, and conducted diplomatic campaigns (Claesson, 2024; Gilardi et al., 2022). However, studying Twitter has become increasingly hindered after Tesla CEO Elon Musk’s takeover and subsequent restrictions to data access for researchers in 2023, resulting in an abrupt decline in new data from the platform.

After the onset of the full-scale invasion, Ukrainian politicians shifted towards tweeting in English on Twitter and engaging with international figures to call for military support and solidarity, while their strategy on Facebook continued to be to update constituents on the war in Ukrainian (Pavliuc, 2025b). This shift reflected the increasing usage of social media to engage local and international audiences during protests and wars in Ukraine (Onuch, 2015). Manor has posited that learnings from Ukraine’s digital diplomacy during Russia’s full-scale invasion have re-shaped the field, marking the importance of continuously studying ever-evolving digital diplomatic practices during crises (2023).

Dialogic communication theory provides a useful framework for analysing the dynamics of dialogue by focussing not only on what is communicated, but also on how it is conveyed. Dialogue—the “process of open and negotiated discussion”—is itself an

objective of communication that can be fostered and leveraged to achieve objectives over time (Kent & Taylor, 1998, p. 325). Dialogue occurs when both parties engage in sincere and reciprocal interaction, building trust in the relationship. While dialogic communication theory originates from public relations literature, it has been adapted by public diplomacy scholars to measure the degree to which digital diplomatic efforts foster dialogue, a key affordance of social networking sites (Ittefaq, 2019; Kampf et al., 2015). Despite a recent “narrative turn” in the study of IR (Coticchia & Catanzaro, 2022; G. Roberts, 2006), the way that narratives are transmitted—through dialogue and interaction—remains critical to understanding the entire process of dialogue. Social network theory further supports this approach by focussing on the interconnectedness of actors and centring the role of social relationships in transmitting information (Liu et al., 2017).

Politicians engage in dialogue and interaction differently during decision-making processes, such as negotiations regarding support during a conflict, depending on their gender. Critics have long dismissed the practice of dialogue as a “touchy-feely” activity, saying it utilises excessive emotion or sensitivity (Stewart, 1978, p. 197). These traits are often associated with femininity and, by extension, seen as less suited to leadership (Eagly & Karau, 2002). Scholars have similarly framed diplomacy as the soft alternative to masculinised hard power (Towns, 2020).

Prior studies also show gender-based differences in interaction during decision-making processes throughout critical events such as wars, protests, and elections, with men favouring hierarchical decision-making (low interactivity) and women opting for strategic interactions to build alliances and consensus for their goals (high interactivity), particularly in politics (Gilligan, 1995; Meeks, 2016; Phillips, 2014). Studies also suggest that women in politics exhibit stronger senses of group cohesion on social media

(Hu & Kearney, 2021; Laor, 2022). Strauß et al. (2015) find that interaction, alongside personalisation, positivity, relevancy, and transparency are effective strategies when communicating with stakeholders. Given that scholars find interaction and dialogue to be effective strategies in stakeholder communication, understanding these dynamics is essential for examining the gendered dimensions of digital diplomacy during conflict.

5.2.2 Gendered Approaches to Conflict

The Women and Peace Hypothesis (WPH) suggests that women are generally more compromising and pacifist in their approach to conflict, while men are more combative (Gizelis, 2018; Runyan & Peterson, 2014; Tessler et al., 1999). These differences tend to emerge in evidence from survey-based studies on populations who are not living through a salient conflict—one that directly impacts people’s lives in important ways—during the time of study (Runyan & Peterson, 2014; Tessler et al., 1999). Data supporting the WPH may also stem from power imbalances between genders that compel women to seek compromise to achieve partial objectives.

The WPH is highly contested by data from states involved in salient conflict, such as in Ukraine, which Russia first invaded in 2014 (Aharoni, 2017; Conover & Sapiro, 1993; Sjoberg & Gentry, 2007). Ukrainian and Central European feminists argue that pacifism is a luxury afforded to those not directly involved in conflicts (Shevtsova, 2024; Stern & Towns, 2022). This perspective was succinctly encapsulated by the phrase “pacifism kills”, expressed by Ukrainian feminists at the start of the 2022 invasion (Tsymbalyuk & Zamuruieva, 2022). Furthermore, Bukkvoll and Steder found in an April 2022 survey of Ukrainians—just two months after the onset of the full-scale invasion—that there were no significant gendered differences in willingness to fight against Russia (2023). The WPH provides a solid basis for inquiry into how women engage in dialogue and network-building towards military victory, rather than compromise, given Ukrainian

women politicians' calls for international support for the war effort and international condemnation of Russian human rights abuses in Ukraine, two messages whose resonance would likely benefit from the trust-building that dialogue supports (Pavliuc, 2025a).

This chapter seeks to address the gaps in knowledge on women's approaches to conflict and dialogue by testing gendered approaches to digital diplomacy, focussing on how narratives are communicated through dialogue on social media. It is expected that women, and in particular Ukrainian women politicians, exhibit higher levels of dialogic communication compared to their male counterparts, demonstrating a preference for strategic interactions to build alliances and consensus for their goals.

H1a: If a Twitter user is a woman, they will make more attempts at dialogue than men Twitter users.

H1b: If a Twitter user is a woman Ukrainian politician, they will make more attempts at dialogue than Twitter users who are men Ukrainian politicians.

5.2.3 Gender Affinity as an Evaluation Metric for Successful Dialogue

Affinity, a sense of connection and empathy between people, is a central goal of dialogic communication and trust-building efforts (Albaugh & Baisley, 2023). In the context of digital diplomacy, affinity can support dialogue that fosters international cooperation and support. The "gender affinity effect" posits that individuals of the same gender identity have more affinity with each other than between those with different gender identities, making it a useful metric for evaluating the success of dialogic communication between political actors (Dolan, 2008, p. 79). Traditionally, the gender affinity effect has been tested on voting behaviours, which represents a one-to-many communication dynamic. For instance, Ortega et al. (2023) and Albaugh and Baisley (2023) observed small but significant gender affinity effects on voting patterns, while Wang et al. (2016) found no

effect of gender affinity on mass support for Hillary Clinton on Twitter. These mixed findings suggest that the gender affinity effect may vary based on the type of interaction studied, and that more research on gender affinity in varying contexts is needed.

Testing the gender affinity effect through the lens of dialogue, operationalised as @-mentions on Twitter, offers a novel way to assess the presence and impact of gender affinity in political communication. In terms of narrative convergence between genders as a sign of gender affinity, recent research found that Ukrainian men politicians and international figures had more narrative convergence with each other than with women, likely due to men's greater access to power (Pavliuc, 2025a). Power dynamics may moderate the gender affinity effect, so researchers must explore how it manifests during crises and high-stakes events.

Given the vital role of affinity in successful dialogue, this chapter proposes that gender affinity can serve as a meaningful evaluation metric for dialogic communication. Specifically, it is expected that the gender affinity effect will be observable between Ukrainian politicians and international figures of the same gender, reflecting a higher likelihood of reciprocal and supportive interactions.

H2a: If a dialogue source and target are the same gender, then there will be more dialogue attempts between them over time.

H2b: If a dialogue attempt is between international figures and Ukrainian politicians of the same gender, then the reciprocal interaction will be sustained for a longer period.

By testing H2a and H2b, this chapter elucidates how gender influences communication styles and their success in achieving affinity through dialogue.

5.3 Methodology

5.3.1 Data Collection and Cleaning

To test these hypotheses, a dataset of 316,652 tweets was collected from 74 Ukrainian politicians and the 223 international figures that Ukrainian politicians tagged in tweets with an @-mention more than 10 times collectively between 11 February 2022 to 8 March 2023. This date range was selected to capture the build-up in the two weeks prior to Russia's full-scale invasion on 24 February 2022, and to capture tweets around the first anniversary on 24 February 2023. A narrative analysis was previously conducted on these data by the author (Pavliuc, 2025a). The 11,118 tweets that contained dialogue attempts—@-mentions by one user group of the other—resulted in 14,497 interactions between Ukrainian politicians and international figures, forming the final, cleaned, dataset used to analyse dialogue in this chapter. This 3,379-row increase was caused by some tweets containing more than one @-mention, a common behaviour of Twitter users who @-mention multiple people in one tweet.

Four original qualitative and quantitative datasets were created for this chapter. The first was of socio-demographic attributes of 459 Ukrainian politicians and ministers in the parliamentary session, which began on 29 August 2019, under the presidency of Volodymyr Zelenskyy. This database contained politicians' names, genders and 111 Twitter handles that could be located. The database of Ukrainian politicians is available in Appendix A. A total of 38,418 tweets from the 74 Ukrainian politicians who tweeted between 11 February 2022 to 8 March 2023 were collected using the Twitter application programming interface (API) in March 2023, forming the second dataset in this chapter.

The third dataset of the names and attributes of international figures was created by calculating which Twitter handles of non-Ukrainian individual accounts were mentioned more than 10 times collectively by Ukrainian politicians in their dataset of

tweets mentioned above. This method was employed to capture the collective international target audience of Ukrainian politicians on Twitter. In total 417 Twitter accounts were mentioned, but only accounts belonging to individuals (rather than organisations) were kept for this chapter, given the focus on the gender of people engaging in communication by social media. Accounts belonging to Ukrainians (who were not politicians) and to any Ukrainian organisations were also excluded to focus solely on interactions between Ukrainian politicians and international figures. The database of international figures is available in Appendix C. Finally, 278,234 tweets from the 223 international figures who tweeted during the study period were collected using the Twitter API in March 2023. Only tweets from international figures that pertained to Ukraine were used to study the subset of dialogue in this chapter, given that international figures outside of Ukraine tweeted about a wide range of topics beyond Russia's full-scale invasion. This subset of Ukraine-related tweets was created by only keeping tweets with a keyword match to a list of 1,198 Ukraine-related terms. This list consisted mainly of names of Ukrainian cities, villages, and politicians, as well as war-related terms that were mainly names of weapons that international allies had donated to Ukraine. The list of key terms is available in Appendix D.

Gender was determined in the same way for Ukrainian politicians and international figures. First, all Ukrainian politician and international figure names, Twitter profile photos, and self-identified genders (where available) were analysed manually, and the most likely gender was recorded. In the rare instance where a profile photo was not of the individual, a Google search was conducted to confirm the most likely gender. There were no cases where the researcher was unsure of the gender of the politician or international figure.

The final data preparation task was to create a subset of tweets from Ukrainian politicians and international figures that only had tweets including an @-mention. This process yielded 11,118 tweets, which contained 14,497 @-mentions. These 14,497 @-mentions were operationalised as dialogue attempts, because they were assumed to represent an attempt from one user group at soliciting an engagement, or dialogue, from the other. This study treated the data as a social network, distilling the initial dataset into its social interactions and analysing the patterns within it.

Table 5.1

Descriptive Statistics of the Four Studied Groups

Gender	Women		Men		Total
	Ukrainian Politicians	International Figures	Ukrainian Politicians	International Figures	
N accounts	25	61	49	162	297
N tweets	17,168	76,586	21,250	201,648	316,652
N tweets about Ukraine (% of N tweets)	17,168 (100)	27,466 (36)	21,250 (100)	64,372 (32)	130,256 (41)
N tweets with @-mentions to other user group (% of N tweets about Ukraine)	1,815 (11)	2,109 (8)	3,649 (17)	3,545 (5)	11,118 (8)
N @-mentions in tweets with @- mentions to other user group	3,279	2,188	5,244	3,786	14,497

Source: Author's calculations based on data collected from 11 February 2022 to 8 March 2023.

Note: It is assumed that all tweets by Ukrainian men and women politicians are about Ukraine.

Table 5.1 outlines the number of Twitter users in each group and how many tweets they published in the first year of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. It also shows the percentage of international figures' tweets that are about Ukraine, how many tweets each group published that contained an @-mention of the other group (indicating dialogue), and how many @-mention interactions were in those tweets. The networked dataset, which contained tweet senders as sources and accounts @-mentioned as targets and their metadata, contained 14,497 rows and was used for analysis in this study.

5.3.2 Measuring Gender and Dialogue Over Time: OLS Regression

Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression was used to measure changes in dialogue attempts from men and women Ukrainian politicians to men and women international figures as sources (H1a, H1b), and from men and women international figures to men and women Ukrainian politicians as sources and targets (H2a, H2b). OLS regression measures the effect of a dependent variable on an independent variable according to a linear function. A linear function was chosen because it captured the key trends in the data while maintaining analytical clarity and interpretability. It is frequently used in social science research to measure linear relationships between variables and to predict future relationships, including the impact of Twitter usage on state leader followership or political involvement (Haman, 2020; Park, 2013). The regression model was accessed using the Statsmodels statistical modelling library in Python, a programming software (Seabold & Perktold, 2010).

Table 5.2

Descriptive Statistics of the Dialogue Attempts Studied

Dialogue Attempt Type		N Dialogue Attempts (% of Total @-Mentions)
Source	Target	
Men Ukrainian politicians	Men international figures	3,957 (27)
Men international figures	Men Ukrainian politicians	3,183 (22)
Women Ukrainian politicians	Men international figures	2,136 (15)
Women international figures	Men Ukrainian politicians	1,854 (13)
Men Ukrainian politicians	Women international figures	1,287 (9)
Women Ukrainian politicians	Women international figures	1,143 (8)
Men international figures	Women Ukrainian politicians	603 (4)
Women international figures	Women Ukrainian politicians	334 (2)
<i>Total @-mentions in tweets</i>		<i>14,497</i>

Source: Author's calculations based on data collected from 11 February 2022 to 8 March 2023.

Table 5.2 shows the eight dialogue attempt types (dependent variables) studied to answer the hypotheses. For H1a, the dependent variable was the gender of the source of a tweet that contained an @-mention to an individual in the other group of study. H1b broke down the source of a tweet by both gender and user group. For H2a, the dependent variable incorporated the target of a tweet to measure whether individuals were attempting dialogue with people who share their gender identity. H2b broke these relationships down further to measure in granular detail all types of dialogue attempts captured in the data. The independent variable was time, measured by month. Statistical significance of each model was measured by its p-value.

5.4 Findings and Analysis

This section outlines the results of four OLS regression models applied to Twitter data of dialogue attempts between men and women Ukrainian politicians and the international figures they targeted most during the first year of Russia's full-scale invasion. H1a and H1b examine the proportion of women and men as sources of dialogue (senders of tweets to the other group), to understand how attempts to foster dialogue evolved over time. H2a and H2b incorporate both the gender and user group of sources and targets.

5.4.1 Gender Differences in Dialogue Attempts, by Source

Figures 5.1a and 5.1b below show patterns in dialogue attempts over time for all men and women, regardless of whether they are a Ukrainian politician or an international figure. Women's proportions of dialogue attempts (65%) were 31% higher than men's (34%) in February 2022, the period that included the build-up to the full-scale invasion on 24 February 2022, and the first week of the conflict. From March 2022 onwards, men's proportions of dialogue attempts were at least 58%.

Table 5.3

OLS Regression Results for Men’s and Women’s Dialogue Attempts

Gender	Coefficient	Std. Error	T-Value	P-Value
Men	0.0174	0.005	3.448	0.005**
Women	-0.0174	0.005	-3.448	0.005**

Source: Author’s calculations based on data collected from 11 February 2022 to 8 March 2023.

Note: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.

Figure 5.2 and Table 5.3 display the results of the OLS regression model for measuring the proportions of men’s and women’s dialogue attempts. The coefficient for men is 0.0174 (p = 0.005), indicating a statistically significant positive trend in men’s dialogue attempts over time. The coefficient for women is the opposite at -0.0174 (p = 0.005). The results show that women put in a high degree of effort to initiate dialogue during the build-up to, and early days of the full-scale invasion. This level of effort, though, was not sustained throughout the first year of the full-scale invasion.

5.4.2 Gender and User Group Differences in Dialogue Attempts, by Source

Figure 5.3a

Dialogue Attempts by Four User Groups, by Number of Tweets





Figure 5.3b

Dialogue Attempts by Four User Groups, by Proportion of Tweets (Normalised)




Source: Author’s calculations based on data collected from 11 February 2022 to 8 March 2023.

Figures 5.3a and 5.3b show dialogue attempts over time broken down by gender and user group. Figure 5.3b, which shows normalised values, indicates that Ukrainian women

politicians made up 60% of dialogue attempts in February 2022, making their efforts that month the highest proportion of dialogue attempts by any group throughout the first year of the full-scale invasion. Their share of attempts dropped by 34% from February 2022 (60%) to March 2022 (26%) and generally continued to decline thereafter. After February 2022, all other groups increased their share of dialogue attempts, with men Ukrainian politicians’ dialogue attempts comprising at least 34% of attempts on any given month from March 2022 onwards, after only comprising 21% of attempts in February 2022.

Figure 5.4

Trendlines from OLS Regression for Dialogue Attempts of the Four User Groups



Source: Author’s calculations based on data collected from 11 February 2022 to 8 March 2023.

Table 5.4

OLS Regression Results for Dialogue Attempts of the Four Groups

User Group	Coefficient	Std. Error	T-Value	P-Value
Men international figures	0.0103	0.003	3.271	0.007**
Men Ukrainian politicians	0.007	0.004	1.978	0.071
Women international figures	0.0042	0.003	1.565	0.144
Women Ukrainian politicians	-0.0216	0.007	-3.132	0.009**

Source: Author’s calculations based on data collected from 11 February 2022 to 8 March 2023.

Note: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.

Figure 5.4 and Table 5.4 present the OLS regression results for dialogue attempts across the four user groups. Women Ukrainian politicians exhibit a statistically significant negative coefficient of -0.0216 ($p = 0.009$), meaning they decreased their proportion of dialogue attempts over time. Similarly, men international figures show a statistically significant positive trend with a coefficient of 0.0103 ($p = 0.007$). While the coefficients for men Ukrainian politicians (0.007 , $p = 0.071$) and women international figures (0.0042 , $p = 0.144$) are positive, they are not statistically significant. These findings reveal that it was Ukrainian women politicians leading the dialogue attempts at the start of the full-scale invasion, making them *first responders*, but the initiative was not sustained after March 2022.

5.4.3 Gender Differences in Dialogue Attempts, by Source and Target

Figure 5.5a

Dialogue Sources and Targets Between Men and Women, by Number of Tweets





Figure 5.5b

Dialogue Sources and Targets Between Men and Women, by Proportion of Tweets (Normalised)



Source: Author’s calculations based on data collected from 11 February 2022 to 8 March 2023.


Figures 5.5a and 5.5b show the types of dialogue attempts present in the data, considering both the source and target gender of individuals studied. They show that in February 2022, women targeted both men (40%) and women (24%) with dialogue

attempts. However, women’s dialogue attempts towards both men and women decreased from March 2022 onwards to a maximum of 31% and 11% of monthly attempts, respectively. It is also clear that dialogue between men (where they are both the source and the target) became the most prevalent type of dialogue from March 2022 onwards, comprising at least 47% of interaction types. Dialogue attempts from men to women started off small at 4% in February 2022 but grew to a maximum of 19% during the study period.

Figure 5.6

Trendlines from OLS Regression for Dialogue Sources and Targets Between Men and

Women



Source: Author’s calculations based on data collected from 11 February 2022 to 8 March 2023.

Table 5.5

OLS Regression Results for Dialogue Sources and Targets Between Men and Women

Source and Target Type	Coefficient	Std. Error	T-Value	P-Value
Men to men	0.0147	0.004	4.188	0.001***
Men to women	0.0026	0.003	0.978	0.348
Women to women	-0.0082	0.003	-3.003	0.011*
Women to men	-0.0092	0.003	-3.421	0.005**

Source: Author’s calculations based on data collected from 11 February 2022 to 8 March 2023.


Note: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.

Figure 5.6 and Table 5.5 show the results of the OLS regression model that measured source and target type as a dependent variable against time. The most statistically significant source and target type was dialogue between men, with a positive coefficient of 0.0147 ($p = 0.001$), which increased proportionally throughout the study period. The second most statistically significant type was dialogue attempts from women to men, which displayed a negative coefficient of -0.0092 ($p = 0.005$), suggesting a decline over time. Dialogue between women also showed a statistically significant decrease, with a coefficient of -0.0082 ($p = 0.011$). Dialogue from men to women was not statistically significant, with a coefficient of 0.0026 ($p = 0.348$).

5.4.4 Gender and User Group Differences in Dialogue Attempts, by Source and Target

Figure 5.7a


Dialogue Sources and Targets Accounting for Gender and User Group, by Number of Tweets



Source: Author’s calculations based on data collected from 11 February 2022 to 8 March 2023.

Figure 5.7b

Dialogue Sources and Targets Accounting for Gender and User Group, by Proportion of Tweets (Normalised)




Source: Author’s calculations based on data collected from 11 February 2022 to 8 March 2023.

Figures 5.7a and 5.7b show values for frequency of source and target dialogues in relation to the sampling period, broken down by gender and user group. In February 2022 the most dialogue attempts were from women Ukrainian politicians towards men international figures (36%), but their attempts greatly decreased in proportion throughout the year, hitting their lowest point of 3% in March 2023. The source and target types taking up the highest proportion after February 2022 are from men Ukrainian politicians towards men international figures (at least 22%), and from men international figures to men Ukrainian politicians (at least 18%).

Figure 5.8

Trendlines from OLS Regression for Dialogue Sources and Targets Accounting for Gender and User Group



Source: Author’s calculations based on data collected from 11 February 2022 to 8 March 2023.

Table 5.6

OLS Regression Results for Dialogue Sources and Targets, Accounting for Gender and User Group

Source and Target Type	Coefficient	Std. Error	T-Value	P-Value
Men international figures to Men Ukrainian politicians	0.0102	0.002	4.462	0.001***
Women international figures to Men Ukrainian politicians	0.0051	0.003	2.012	0.067
Men Ukrainian politicians to Men international figures	0.0046	0.003	1.517	0.155
Men Ukrainian politicians to Women international figures	0.0025	0.002	1.333	0.207
Men international figures to Women Ukrainian politicians	0.0002	0.001	0.136	0.894
Women international figures to Women Ukrainian politicians	-0.0008	0.001	-1.23	0.242
Women Ukrainian politicians to Women international figures	-0.0073	0.003	-2.314	0.039*
Women Ukrainian politicians to Men international figures	-0.0143	0.004	-3.668	0.003**

Source: Author’s calculations based on data collected from 11 February 2022 to 8 March 2023.

Note: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.

Figure 5.8 and Table 5.6 present the OLS regression results for dialogue patterns between all eight gender and user groups over time. Dialogue attempts from men international figures to men Ukrainian politicians were the most statistically significant,

with a positive coefficient of 0.0102 ($p = 0.001$). The second most statistically significant type of dialogue attempt was towards men international figures, but from Ukrainian women politicians and in the negative direction, with a coefficient of -0.0143 ($p = 0.003$). These significant but diverging findings show that while men international figures were common targets of dialogue attempts, men Ukrainian politicians increased how much they targeted them, while women Ukrainian politicians decreased this behaviour over time. The third statistically significant type of dialogue attempt was from women Ukrainian politicians towards women international figures, though the coefficient was negative at -0.0073 ($p = 0.039$). This means that women Ukrainian politicians decreased this type of dialogue attempt over time after a strong initial push. No other source-target pair showed statistically significant dialogue attempts in both directions, indicating a lack of sustained dialogue.

Table 5.7

Summary of Key Phases of Dialogue During the First Year of Russia's Full-Scale Invasion

Phases	Key Findings	Major Events
Women launch attempts at dialogue (February 2022 to March 2022)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> At the start of the war, women's proportions of dialogue attempts are 65%, much higher than men's, at 34% (Fig 5.1b) Women Ukrainian politicians' proportions of dialogue attempts are 60%, the highest monthly proportion recorded for one user group (Fig 5.3b) 36% of Ukrainian women politicians' dialogue attempts are targeted towards men international figures (Fig 5.7b) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Russia launches full-scale invasion on 24 February 2022 President Zelenskyy begins delivering daily speeches Four Ukrainian women politicians travel to London, UK
Men dominate dialogue attempts (April 2022 to March 2023)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> As the war progresses, men's proportions of dialogue attempts are at least 58% (Fig 5.1b) Men Ukrainian politicians comprise at least 34% of dialogue attempts (Fig 5.3b) Ukrainian women politicians' dialogue attempts drop by 34% to 26% and continue to decline (Fig 5.3b) Women's dialogue attempts towards men and women drop to a maximum of 31% and 11% of monthly attempts, respectively (Fig 5.5b) Dialogue between men is most prevalent, comprising at least 47% of interactions Dialogue attempts from Ukrainian women politicians to men international figures drop to 3% in March 2023 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Bucha massacre discovered after Russian retreat Ukraine withdraws from Mariupol after long siege The Crimean Bridge is severely damaged by explosion President Zelenskyy visits US after approval to supply Patriot missile systems The one-year anniversary, on 24 February 2023, is marked with a commemoration in Kyiv, and global political events and protests

Source: Author's calculations based on data collected from 11 February 2022 to 8 March 2023.

Table 5.7 outlines the key events from the first year of Russia's full-scale invasion, compared against the findings outlined in Figures 5.1 to 5.8. The timeline is informed by several news articles and timelines produced by reputable news outlets on the first year of the war (Davis Jr. & Fitzgerald, 2025; Staff, 2023), and full details of major events are outlined in Chapter 1. Overall, there were several notable and significant attempts by women to engage in dialogue at the onset of the full-scale invasion, but men's dialogue attempts took up a much greater proportion of interactions after women decreased their engagement after March 2022.

5.5 Discussion

This research aimed to quantify the impact of gender on dialogue attempts by Ukrainian politicians and the international figures they targeted most frequently with @-mentions on Twitter during the first year of Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Given the importance of digital technologies, network-building, and dialogue in the modern landscape of warfare, this chapter merged these avenues with the understudied dimension of gender during conflict.

The initial research question in this study echoed Cynthia Enloe's query: Where are, and are not, the women in dialogue during Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine? Gendered differences emerged in both dialogue sources and targets, with women being most active at the onset of the invasion but men taking over for most of the year studied. This partially confirmed H1a, that women Twitter users would make more attempts at dialogue than men, but only at the onset of the full-scale invasion. This finding raises further questions about why women reduced communications after their initial surge in dialogue attempts after comprising the highest proportion of attempts in the dataset in February 2022 (65%, Figure 5.1). Why did they curtail engaging with international political actors? This finding also underscores the importance of continuously studying

the evolving practices of political actors in digital diplomacy, particularly in fast-moving conflict environments (Manor, 2023).

H1b, that women Ukrainian politicians would engage in more attempts at dialogue than men Ukrainian politicians, was also only confirmed at the start of the full-scale invasion. Women Ukrainian politicians' dialogue attempts dropped from 60% of all attempts in February 2022 to 26% in March 2022, and proceeded to dwindle throughout the year. Given that the invasion affected all regions of Ukraine, it is not surprising that women Ukrainian politicians increased their dialogue attempts at the start of such a highly salient conflict and took on the role of first responders. These dialogue attempts may be Ukrainian women politicians' public efforts to prove that they are not pacifist, and will use the tools available to them—such as social media—to contribute to securing international military and financial support for Ukraine (Tessler et al., 1999; Tsymbalyuk & Zamuruieva, 2022). It does not, however, explain why men Ukrainian politicians did not increase their dialogue attempts to the same degree at the start. One possible explanation is that dialogue is often perceived as a more feminine activity, aligning with women's typically higher preference for interaction and consensus-building communication styles (Gilligan, 1995; Stewart, 1978). This may explain why men Ukrainian politicians did not initially flock to Twitter with the same force that women did.

Perhaps women viewed social media as a level playing field where they could engage in “emancipatory discourse” during wartime, a period otherwise dominated by men (Kratochvíl & O'Sullivan, 2023, p. 348). At the onset of the full-scale invasion, Ukrainian women politicians actively used social media to appeal to international figures, calling for support and highlighting the civilian tragedies inflicted by Russia (Asuinura & Kipo-Sunyhzi, 2024; Pavliuc, 2025a). However, they ultimately failed to

achieve “open and negotiated discussion” with men or women international figures, despite their initial attempts (Table 5.7) (Kent & Taylor, 1998, p. 325). This raises another question: Why did Ukrainian women politicians drastically reduce their dialogue attempts as the invasion continued? It is possible that they maintained substantive interactions with selected partners. Alternatively, they may have disengaged after recognising that their efforts were not producing positive outcomes, as suggested by the data in this chapter.

H2a, that dialogue sources and targets of the same gender will have more dialogue attempts between them over time, was confirmed only for men’s communications. After the start of the full-scale invasion, women were rarely the targets of dialogue. Instead, both men and women increasingly directed their dialogue attempts towards men. Further, men increasingly engaged with other men as the war progressed, comprising at least 47% of interactions after March 2022. This lack of sustained interaction with women can be seen as another form of “gendered silence”, initially observed by Wright (2023, p.237). One possible explanation is that international figures prioritised dialogue with men Ukrainian politicians because Ukraine’s president and most of his ministers in defence and foreign affairs-related posts are men. International figures may have perceived greater strategic value in engaging with these individuals, given their positions of power.

This exclusion of women from political dialogue is part of a longstanding pattern in which women have less access to institutionalised power and, therefore, fewer opportunities to participate in high-stakes discussions. Such dynamics reinforce the inertia against the WPS agenda, which aims to increase women’s participation in conflict resolution and decision-making. If Ukrainian women politicians struggle to engage in even low-stakes dialogue on Twitter with international figures, how can they gain access

to more substantive diplomatic negotiations, such as closed-door talks and broader foreign policy discussions?

H2b, that dialogue attempts between international figures and Ukrainian politicians of the same gender would hold reciprocal interaction for a longer period, was only confirmed for men's communications. Proportionally, a higher gender affinity (Dolan, 2008) between men Ukrainian politicians and men international figures was observed through sustained dialogue, though only one of these dialogue directions was statistically significant. This affinity did not extend to women Ukrainian politicians and international figures, likely due to the lower representation of women in both Ukrainian and international positions of top political power. The lack of reciprocal dialogue attempts from international figures to Ukrainian politicians, regardless of gender, is also notable.

In his book *Showman*, Shuster (2024) anecdotally described how many international leaders initially doubted Ukraine's ability to resist Russia's full-scale invasion, viewing attempts to safeguard the country's future as a lost cause. This anecdotal perspective aligned with the data: if international figures did not believe Ukraine would withstand the invasion, they may have been hesitant to engage in dialogue at its start. Russia initially claimed it would seize Kyiv in just three days, making Ukraine's survival uncertain. However, as Ukraine demonstrated its ability to slow Russian advances and reclaim territory, international figures may have recognised the value of dialogue—particularly with Ukrainian men politicians.

This chapter successfully tested hypotheses on the gendered dimensions of digital diplomacy during war, but it has limitations. Notably, it does not measure power as a key factor influencing who is targeted for dialogue. While power may not necessarily impact who *initiates* dialogue attempts, it is a crucial variable in determining who *receives* them.

The study's reliance on Twitter data presents both strengths and limitations. At the time of data collection, Twitter was a highly valuable platform for analysing digital diplomacy during crises and conflicts. However, since then, digital diplomacy has become increasingly fragmented with political actors spreading their engagement across multiple platforms. Twitter has traditionally been a central space for agenda-setting by politicians, diplomats, journalists, activists, and public intellectuals (Gilardi et al., 2022), but its influence appears to be waning (Claesson, 2024). Future research should adopt a multi-platform approach, incorporating platforms such as BlueSky, LinkedIn, Instagram, and TikTok alongside Twitter when data collection is possible. Expanding beyond Twitter is essential for capturing the evolving landscape of digital diplomacy.

Ultimately, this chapter underscores the importance of moving beyond message content in digital diplomacy studies to examine how political actors establish and sustain relationships in IR. Ukrainian politicians, particularly women, engaged in strategic communication that countered Russia's "information fog" (Dyczok & Chung, 2022, p. 146), yet their voices were met with silence from key international figures. Ignoring women's calls for dialogue in moments of crisis raises concerns about the performativity of initiatives such as the WPS agenda. As digital diplomacy continues to evolve, disaggregating data by gender ensures that women's contributions are documented (Cassidy, 2017), and that inclusive diplomatic efforts can be effectively evaluated.

5.6 Conclusion

This chapter found that gender played a significant role in shaping dialogue attempts between Ukrainian politicians and international figures on Twitter during the first year of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Women, particularly women Ukrainian politicians, were highly active in initiating dialogue at the onset of the full-scale invasion but retreated as men's interactions with other men became dominant over time. These

findings highlight the broader implications of gender in digital diplomacy and IR. The lack of dialogic responses to Ukrainian women politicians likely stems from their lower-ranking positions in government, limiting their agency in shaping high-stakes political discussions. However, this also reflects the long-term consequences of excluding women from positions of power, negotiations, and wartime diplomacy in both online and offline spaces. This chapter set out to ask where the women are in dialogue during war, and found that, despite their initial attempts, they are largely absent from sustained dialogue with international figures, raising important questions about the barriers to women's agency in digital diplomacy.

These findings have broader implications for both digital diplomacy and countering foreign malign influence. Dialogue formation is not only a means of political communication but also a tool for shaping international alliances and information environments. Future research should comparatively analyse Russian and Ukrainian dialogue attempts, examining both network formation and narrative strategies. This would provide a fuller picture of digital diplomacy as both a mechanism of Russian propaganda operations and a countermeasure in Ukraine's strategic communication efforts. Given that Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine has been described as a war on gender (Kratochvíl & O'Sullivan, 2023), understanding the role of gender in digital diplomacy is crucial for designing more effective strategies to counter disinformation and support inclusive international engagement.

Further research is also needed to understand the disappearance of some women from digital diplomacy. Did Ukrainian women politicians feel they had achieved their objectives in the early months of the full-scale invasion, leading them to step back? Or did the lack of sustained engagement from international figures discourage their participation? These questions are critical for assessing how women's communication

strategies are overlooked in conflict settings and for ensuring their voices are not lost in future diplomatic efforts.

Chapter 6: **Discussion and Conclusion**⁶

6.1 Where Are the Women?

Cynthia Enloe asked, “Where are the women?” in 1990 (Enloe, 1990). My answer is that they are here, taking on new roles in international political communication and digital diplomacy, making every effort to support their country in its time of need while maintaining agency throughout the process. By documenting their role in digital diplomacy during Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, my findings reveal Ukrainian women’s contributions in future histories of war. I argue that Ukrainian women politicians, far from embodying pacifist stereotypes, strategically used digital diplomacy to highlight human suffering and mobilise international support. Their efforts, and international reactions to them, revealed both the emancipatory and silencing effects of social media during war.

6.1.1 Research Questions and Hypotheses

I set out to answer two overarching research questions in this thesis. The first asked how the gendered political communication strategies of Ukrainian politicians and international figures evolved before and during the first year of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The second examined what these behaviours revealed about women’s pacifism and approaches to conflict communication. These questions were

⁶ Sections of this chapter are forthcoming in the *Handbook on Media, War and Conflict Studies*, part of the ICA Handbook Series, a joint venture between ICA and Routledge.

addressed through detailed research questions, hypotheses, and robust analyses in Chapters 3 to 5.

Chapter 3 examined how gender shaped Ukrainian wartime political communication on Facebook and Twitter before and during the onset of Russia's full-scale invasion, through three research questions. RQ1 explored how politicians' use of Facebook and Twitter varied by time-period, gender, and language. Gender and social media platform influenced Ukrainian politicians' communication styles and strategies: During the full-scale invasion, women used Twitter to strategically convey the human dimensions of the war and engaged in more conversational interactions with influential leaders than men. Both genders used Facebook before and after the full-scale invasion to update their constituents in Ukrainian. RQ2 assessed the extent to which the narratives discussed by Ukrainian politicians on social media aligned with expectations of gendered discourse. Women discussed war-related narratives more optimistically than men, shared more accounts of civilian trauma, and issued more calls for support from the West. While there was no evidence of pacifist views or calls for compromise among women, they referenced military and aggressive terms less frequently than their male counterparts, who more often discussed the military and sanctions. RQ3 investigated how the interaction styles of more and less prominent Ukrainian politicians aligned with gendered expectations. Women's collaborative tendencies were reflected in their increased interactions with Western leaders and organisations on Twitter, which rose more sharply than men's during the onset of the full-scale invasion.

Chapter 4 built on these findings by analysing how men and women Ukrainian politicians and international figures differed in their use of narratives during the first year of the full-scale invasion. H1 proposed, and confirmed, that tweets sent by men would contain a higher frequency of combative and diplomatic narratives, while those sent by

women would more often convey narratives centred on human trauma and suffering. H2 suggested that when the sender and receiver of a tweet shared the same gender, their narratives would converge. This hypothesis was only supported in the case of men, among whom gender affinity was evident in the convergence of narratives related to diplomacy and the military.

Chapter 5 analysed a subset of tweets from Chapter 4 that included @-mention interactions to ask: Where are—and where are not—the women in dialogue between Ukrainian politicians and international figures during Russia's full-scale invasion? H1a proposed that if a Twitter user were a woman, they would make more dialogue attempts than men Twitter users. This hypothesis was partially confirmed, as women made more dialogue attempts only at the start of the full-scale invasion. H2b posited that if a Twitter user were a woman Ukrainian politician, they would make more attempts at dialogue than Twitter users who were men Ukrainian politicians. This was also only partially confirmed, as women Ukrainian politicians decreased their dialogue attempts following the onset of the war. H2a posited that if a dialogue source and target were the same gender, then there would be more dialogue attempts between them over time. This hypothesis held true only for men's dialogue attempts. Finally, H2b suggested that if a dialogue attempt occurred between international figures and Ukrainian politicians of the same gender, then the reciprocal interaction would be sustained for a longer period. This was again only confirmed for men Ukrainian politicians and international figures.

How did the gendered political communication strategies of Ukrainian politicians and international figures evolve before and during the first year of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine? What did their behaviours tell us about assumptions regarding women's pacifism and approaches to conflict communication? My research showed that women did not express pacifist views in their narratives during high-stakes conflict

(Chapters 3 and 4). I also demonstrated that, while women actively engaged in dialogue and diplomacy on social media, men tended to achieve affinity with other men through their narratives and interactions (Chapters 4 and 5). These findings underscore the need to recognise and showcase women's contributions to conflict communication and diplomacy, ensuring their voices shape both historical narratives and future policy responses.

This thesis employed a novel methodological framework that combined structural topic modelling (STM), social network analysis (SNA) and ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to analyse social media data disaggregated by gender and interpreted with a theory-driven approach. STM proved highly valuable for analysing large corpora of social media data and for disaggregating data by gender, language, time-period, and prominence into the topic modelling process. Chapter 3 incorporated the most metadata of the three empirical chapters, making it a particularly rich study with findings on gendered political communication over time and across languages. SNA enabled the narratives captured by the STM to be studied in terms of their dissemination and the actors involved. OLS regression allowed me to synthesise complex patterns in dialogue attempts into interpretable findings. This framework resulted in a comprehensive overview of gendered political communication during conflict. The integration of these methods with political communication and gender theories advanced both empirical understanding and methodological innovation in the study of digital diplomacy and wartime discourse.

In the following sections I discuss the findings of all three empirical chapters in the context of literature outlined in Chapter 2. Finally, I outline limitations, policy recommendations, and key directions for future research on gender, digital diplomacy, and political communication as a form of democratic resilience to information warfare.

6.1.2 Ukrainian Women Politicians and International Figures do not Express Pacifism on Twitter

The main theory this thesis set out to address was the WPH, which posits that women hold pacifist and conciliatory views on conflict, while men hold combative ones (Chapter 2). While this theory has long been contested, particularly during salient conflicts where survey data shows low pacifist views by women, it remains a conventional assumption to this day (Aharoni, 2017). For example, Harvard psychologist Steven Pinker has called women a pacifying influence throughout history with war being a man's domain, and former US President Barack Obama has stated that there would be fewer wars with more women in political leadership roles (Chappell, 2019; Pinker, 2011). The contestation extends to recent work which has found that women leaders tend to be viewed with more credibility than their male counterparts when making military threats (Schwartz & Blair, 2020). The ongoing mismatch between women as pacifying influences, yet simultaneously as credible decision makers of military threats, indicates the importance of adding more evidence to theories of women's approaches to conflict.

My research found only partial support for the WPH, as men frequently used combative narratives during the war (Chapters 3 and 4). I found no cases of women expressing pacifism or calls for compromise, though their use of emotive narratives may have reflected an alignment with the life-giving expectation of the WPH—albeit not in a pacifist or conciliatory way. Women published repeated calls for support, expressed optimism about winning the war, and communicated emotive narratives that reported civilian trauma and alleged human rights abuses (Chapters 3 and 4). The combination of their initial burst in dialogue attempts at the onset of the full-scale invasion (Chapter 5), alongside findings that they made more calls for support than men (Chapters 3 and 4), further challenges assumptions of women's pacifism during war. They used both

narrative and interaction, most notably through appeals for air defence capabilities such as a “no fly zone” (Appendices B and E), to garner military and moral support for Ukraine.

I argue that Ukrainian women politicians’ use of emotive narratives functioned as a rhetorical strategy, drawing on pathos to forge emotional connections and digital proximity with international figures, their key target audience on Twitter. This contrasts with men’s use of ethos-based rhetorical devices of authoritative appeals, reflected through their discussion of diplomatic visits and military strength. These differences suggest that men and women shared the same strategic intent—to gain military support—but used different narratives and rhetorical devices to communicate their message. This may have been shaped by societal expectations for women to be more emotional in their communication and to be more closely attuned to the needs of their constituents. Women may also have felt that, if they did not foreground human rights in their narrative choices, no one else would.

While outside the time frame of this thesis, discussions around Russia’s full-scale invasion have intensified since US President Donald Trump returned to office in early 2025. Amid uncertainty around what types of concessions, if any, the US will request from Russia in a possible ceasefire agreement, Ukrainian political and civil society leaders alike have intensified their calls for a just peace—one that addresses the root causes of the war and seeks justice for all those impacted by it (Staff, 2025). Oleksandra Matviichuk, Nobel Laureate and founder of the Centre for Civil Liberties, has called for more focus on the human element of peace negotiations, and has argued that just peace means a ceasefire deal that follows a victim-centred approach, with support for the rights of civilians, particularly victims of violence, children, missing persons, and refugees (Matviichuk, 2025). Within the context of uncertain peace negotiations, Ukrainian

women politicians' human rights-oriented narratives may prove to be powerful messages, demonstrating what is at stake if a just peace is not achieved.

6.1.3 Ukrainian Women as Digital Berehynias

Ukraine has a rich history of feminism and movements for equality, which have been intertwined with nationalist and patriotic efforts in response to Russian imperialism (Chapter 2). The *Berehynia* is a Ukrainian cultural metaphor of the mother of the nation—an idealised figure expected to care for her household, excel as a worker, and uphold the moral values of her country. This ideal is a double-edged sword, holding Ukrainian women to unattainable standards not equally applied to men, a dynamic present in many other societies (Rubchak, 2009).

Women Ukrainian politicians may have attempted to thread the needle between their need to appear motherly while also appearing patriotic to their country (Chapter 3). This may have been another reason they chose to report on civilian traumas and alleged human rights abuses, as such emotive narratives allowed them to show how their *national family* was suffering, and that they, as leaders of their nation, were doing what they could to stop the pain. The social media dimension of this phenomenon leads to the question of whether Ukrainian women politicians were trying to be contemporary digital *Berehynias*, by using all tools at their disposal to communicate their patriotic and motherly messages, while men chose to focus on military and diplomatic narratives over human rights-oriented ones (Chapter 3). The men may have seen such topics as too feminine for them to touch upon, further allowing societal expectations of narrative use during conflict to become more entrenched.

6.1.4 Digital Proximity to Salient Conflict and the WPH

The salience of a conflict is a key variable that could influence women's approaches to war, as when women directly experience conflict and its harmful impacts, they may prioritise security and justice over peace at any cost (Chapter 2). Chapter 4 explored how the salience of Russia's full-scale invasion could explain why Ukrainian women politicians did not conform to pacifist expectations. This same reasoning may also help explain why international women figures did not express pacifist views in their wartime narratives. However, this raises an important question: How do people in conflict zones reach out to those living a safe distance away?

I argue that digital proximity, "the feeling of nearness to a location or event that is facilitated by networked connections to people on social media who are physically near to, or virtually discuss, the location or event" (Pavliuc, 2024, p. 139), plays a crucial role in this process. Social media have enabled digital proximity, as wartime communication has moved light-years beyond the slow pace of newspapers, radio, and even television, to a paradigm where anyone directly impacted by a conflict can share it with the world in an instant.

Ukrainian politicians, particularly women at the start of the full-scale invasion, actively worked to cultivate digital proximity with international figures. By sharing the lived trauma of war through social media, they sought to make foreign audiences not just aware of, but emotionally invested in, the conflict (Chapters 3 and 4). They shared the piercing sound of air raid sirens, images of civilian victims—bloody and charred remains, faintly blurred to avoid censorship—and damaged homes which emanate deeply personal artifacts such as excerpts from children's diaries written during the siege of Mariupol (Pavliuc, 2024). Ukrainian women politicians also sought to engage directly with international figures by @-mentioning them on Twitter at the onset of the full-scale

invasion (Chapters 3 and 5). They employed this strategy during a period of uncertainty about the extent of international support for Ukraine and its capacity to repel Russian military advances. These efforts were not just about information-sharing but about forging a visceral connection that could drive political, military, and humanitarian support.

The way people in conflict zones use digital proximity to influence global solidarity warrants further attention. How is digital proximity constructed? Through which platforms and media formats? How can success of these efforts be measured, and what determines which messages resonate most? Salience influences how both men and women respond to war, and digital proximity helps spread and intensify that salience among international audiences. Understanding how these dynamics operate can provide rich knowledge on how conflict narratives are shaped, how global support is mobilised, and how digital diplomacy functions in the modern era.

6.1.5 The Emancipatory and Silencing Effect of Social Media on Women

The affordances of social media enable more direct and immediate communication (Bossetta, 2018), which in turn removes traditional barriers to diplomatic dialogue (Chapter 2). Ukrainian women politicians leveraged these affordances at the onset of the full-scale invasion by using Twitter to publish calls for support from international figures (Chapter 3), share stories of how the war is impacting Ukrainian civilians (Chapters 3 and 4), and to attempt to engage with high-profile international figures (Chapters 3 and 5).

While social media gave women Ukrainian politicians greater access to international figures, it did not guarantee engagement or influence. Despite the initial surge in political communication by Ukrainian women, their voices did not converge with international women politicians, nor did their dialogue attempts yield meaningful

engagement (Chapters 4 and 5). Meanwhile, men did have narrative convergence and reached out to each other with dialogue attempts. Over time, as responses to women's communications failed to materialise, Ukrainian women politicians' attempts at dialogue decreased, reflecting a broader “gendered silence” effect (Wright, 2023, p. 237). Social media, which theoretically offer an equal playing field, instead became a black hole—one where women could speak, but their voices often went unheard.

Ukrainian politicians carefully shaped their public communication to appear strong and capable during war, knowing their actions would be judged by both local constituents and international audiences. Despite their early and active role in digital diplomacy, Ukrainian women politicians largely faced neglect by international figures—many of whom have publicly endorsed the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda (Wright, 2023). Their silence, especially in response to human rights-oriented narratives, revealed the performative nature of WPS commitments when they failed to translate into meaningful engagement.

Social media provide a platform for women to be more visible and vocal, but their emancipatory potential is contingent on interactivity and response. Without engagement, women's participation in digital diplomacy risks becoming symbolic rather than impactful. If WPS agendas are to be meaningfully operationalised through social media, they must extend beyond rhetoric and translate into substantive interactions that acknowledge and increase visibility of women's contributions to digital diplomacy during conflict.

6.1.6 Political Communication Narratives as a Counter-Brand Strategy

Against Russian Propaganda

Ukrainian political communication styles can be framed as a counter-brand strategy against Russian propaganda (Chapter 2). Counter-brand narratives proactively highlight

the identity and perspective of message senders, while also explaining the hostile tactics used by an adversary (Pamment, 2022). For example, as seen in Chapter 3, when Ukrainian women politicians tweeted narratives about Russian aggression against Ukrainian civilians, they were countering the common Russian propagandistic claim that Russia is the victim in the war (Zhang & Zhou, 2023). Similarly, when Ukrainian politicians asserted that global unity would win the war, they were countering Russia's frequent claim that Ukraine, and the West, are divided, consumed by internal conflicts, and ultimately failing (Oates, 2023). Finally, Russian President Vladimir Putin and former President Dmitrii Medvedev have claimed since at least 2008 that Ukraine is not a state (Düben, 2020), at times even bluntly stating that "Ukraine is Russia" (Dickinson, 2024). Many of Ukraine's top narratives—such as those emphasising the devastation of Ukrainian civilians' lives by Russia, the strength of the Ukrainian military, and the urgent need for international support—aimed to counter this narrative (Chapter 3).

Men and women framed their counter-brand messages differently, with women focussing more on emotive, human-oriented narratives, and men on militaristic and authoritative ones. These differing uses of pathos and ethos served distinct strategic functions for different target audiences. Any broad-based communications campaign requires a range of tailored messages with different tones and themes, depending on the target audience. Hence, while this thesis found instances of women's communications not soliciting responses (Chapters 4 and 5), it also identified rich differences in narrative approaches that can be valuable to future digital diplomacy campaigns by democracies that aim to forge societal resilience to propaganda and information warfare.

6.1.7 Ukrainian Politicians' Efforts to Counter Russian Propaganda within Broader Civil Society

The communication efforts of Ukrainian politicians were central to this thesis but sat within broader initiatives by Ukrainian civil society to engage with allies to counter Russian propaganda and obtain more support for Ukraine. Politicians engaged in diplomatic outreach by communicating with international leaders, policymakers, journalists, and business figures, while broader civil society participated through public communication that aimed to foment digital proximity and conduct participatory warfare (Boichak & Hoskins, 2022).

From the onset of the full-scale invasion, Ukrainian politicians, civil society organisations (CSOs), everyday citizens, and international allies mobilised their communication efforts. CSOs solicited international donations via social media and promoted Ukraine's resistance (Zaremba & Martin, 2023). Global citizens also engaged in counter-propaganda efforts, such as the North Atlantic Fellas Organisation (NAFO)—a grassroots, spontaneously coordinated trolling effort that directly challenged Russian diplomats' disinformation on Twitter (Kasianenko & Boichak, 2024). This group even succeeded in pressuring a Russian diplomat into temporarily withdrawing from the platform and received public praise from several Ukrainian and international politicians (Gault, 2022).

Ukrainian politicians' efforts to counter Russian propaganda with a counter-brand strategy was just one piece of the country's broader toolkit. The government also collaborated with civil society in several ways, such as supporting the arms-length IT Army of Ukraine and incorporating civil society actors into public communications planning (Kalenský & Osadchuk, 2024). Both politicians' and civil society efforts not only countered Russian propaganda but also helped to establish alliances and foster

digital proximity with international audiences, thereby strengthening cross-border solidarity with Ukraine.

6.1.8 Limitations & Ethical Implications

While I aimed to conduct rigorous and meaningful analyses in this thesis, I recognise several overarching limitations and ethical implications that should be considered when interpreting and generalising the findings.

A first limitation of my research concerned the potential impact of prominence on communication choices of Ukrainian politicians and international figures. I addressed this in Chapter 3 by quantifying the political prominence of Ukrainian politicians, but due to the lack of significant findings, I decided not to carry this variable forward in subsequent chapters. In hindsight, I acknowledge that international heads of state and top ministers may have been more likely to engage in dialogue with higher-profile Ukrainian politicians, and my decision not to explore this further left a gap. Future work could build on this by developing more robust ways of quantifying prominence and assessing its relationship with gendered political communication styles.

The second limitation lay in my treatment of gender as a binary variable. This decision stemmed from the available data. No politicians or international figures appeared to self-identify as non-binary during the iterative, manual process used to determine the gender of all studied users. I acknowledge that this binary approach risked erasing gender diversity, though every step was taken to ensure accurate gender identification. Future research focussing on other individuals, whether at the elite political level or within broader civil society, would likely encounter greater gender diversity that must therefore be reflected in future research designs.

Third, I examined digital diplomacy exclusively on Twitter. This decision was partially data-driven, as no diplomatic narratives were found to be communicated by

Ukrainian politicians on Facebook. However, governments and politicians increasingly utilise a wider array of social media platforms for digital diplomacy, such as Instagram, Telegram, BlueSky, TikTok, and LinkedIn. The fragmentation of digital diplomacy across platforms is likely to intensify as political actors decrease their reliance on Twitter following its takeover by Elon Musk in October 2022 (Druckman, 2023). Future research must adapt to this evolving environment by expanding to additional platforms.

Fourth, the findings about gendered political communication may not generalise to other conflicts and contexts. Ukraine has a long history of feminist and nationalist movements (Chapter 2). I focussed on Ukrainian politicians and interpreted the findings through the lens of Ukrainian literature, which, while limiting generalisability, strengthened the body of research on Ukraine for future comparative studies. Findings on international figures may be more broadly applicable to trends in gendered political communication within European and North American democracies and beyond, as most international figures in the dataset operated from these regions.

Fifth, regarding methods, I used ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to analyse changes in dialogue attempts over time by gender and user group (Chapter 5). However, the linear nature of OLS regression presents a limitation as it may have oversimplified patterns that are rarely linear in the social world. I selected this method to provide a straightforward and interpretable analysis and accompanied it with visualisations of dialogue attempts over time to identify key turning points in interaction. I am confident in the results of Chapter 5 but recognise that they would have relied less on supplementary figures had I used a curved function such as polynomial regression.

The final limitation concerns the rapidly changing landscape of social media data access for researchers. Soon after I completed data collection for this thesis, both Facebook and Twitter significantly restricted researcher access. Facebook deprecated its

CrowdTangle interface, while Twitter eliminated its free application programming interface (API) in favour of a paid model. Future research on political communication and digital diplomacy will not only need to span multiple platforms to capture the full picture (given the increasing fragmentation of digital diplomacy) but will also require substantial funding to pay for data access on platforms such as Twitter and Reddit. Additionally, researchers will need to develop more advanced technical skills to access APIs that still offer free data, such as Telegram. To ensure their own voices are heard, scholars will also need to engage in the policy process in their respective countries to ensure that researcher access to social media data is enshrined in future online safety policy.

An important ethical implication of this research lies in the role of algorithmic bias in shaping digital diplomacy. All political actors studied were very likely aware that the visibility and engagement of their posts were ultimately subject to the algorithmic choices of the social media platforms they used. This awareness may have influenced their strategic use of direct @-mentions, which guaranteed that their intended targets—or at least the staff managing their online presence—would receive notifications independent of algorithmic curation. More broadly, the practice of digital diplomacy unfolds within algorithmically constructed and privately governed spaces, meaning that technology companies can exert control over the conditions of diplomatic communication. This raises questions about the future of digital diplomacy, as the so-called global public square is in fact a privately owned and controlled digital space.

6.2 Policy Recommendations

The findings from this thesis have several important implications in the policy domain, from lessons on women's communication strategies to the importance of listening to scholars when crafting legislation to counter online harms. This thesis demonstrates that

there are differences in how men and women communicate during conflict, shaping the narratives they project. The first recommendation is therefore to seek lessons from diverse communication strategies that target different audiences to craft more broad-reaching communications campaigns. Democracies developing counter-propaganda campaigns and strategic communications efforts must engage with diverse voices to understand how they communicate with their audiences and which messages resonate most. For example, working with minority diasporic communities—who are often targeted by foreign malign influence campaigns—can help refine messaging to ensure credibility and impact. Similarly, listening to women and other underrepresented groups, and amplifying their voices, can help communications reach wider audiences with a more authentic and persuasive voice.

Second, it is essential to clearly communicate the importance of equality between genders and identities and how these relate to protecting national security during peace and conflict. Policies around WPS, diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI), and countering disinformation and propaganda can often seem abstract or politically charged, which can hinder broad-based support. Simplifying the language around these efforts and explaining their real-world importance in a neutral, practical way can help more people understand why these issues matter. De-politicising and de-escalating discussions on these topics can lead to greater public and institutional buy-in, ultimately making these initiatives more effective. Countering gender and identity-based disinformation must be framed as a national security issue, as attacks against some identity-based groups which aim to silence them are attacks on the free speech of an entire nation.

Third, on social media regulation, it is critical that scholars seek out the opportunity to influence policy debates around social media data access for studying online harms. In the UK, the British Broadcasting Corporation and the Royal Society

have hosted workshops with disinformation and propaganda researchers to understand their data access needs, which I was grateful to contribute to in February 2025. Key highlights from these discussions included the urgent need to communicate how malign actors pollute and influence democratic information environments—an effort that has suffered since the deprecation of Facebook’s CrowdTangle and Twitter’s Academic API. This has resulted in gaps in knowledge about disinformation and propaganda targeting democracies at a time when these insights are needed most. We also discussed the importance of access to different types of social media data, including metadata and algorithmic filtering choices, rather than just the text of social media posts. Scholars from all countries should strive to engage in such policy discussions to shape the future of their data access.

6.3 Future Research

Building on the research track developed during this doctoral thesis, I plan to further investigate how leaders use social media to foster societal resilience during war, how women project their voices and experiences of conflict to international audiences, and how Ukrainian narratives can inform counter-propaganda efforts by allied countries against Russian propaganda. I also aim to examine the fragmentation of digital diplomacy across platforms, using a cross-platform approach to assess how political actors engage with different audiences in volatile information environments. In addition, I will explore whether Ukrainian politicians’ communication strategies were primarily top-down or reflected narratives emerging from civil society, analysing information flows between these groups to understand whole-of-society approaches to countering propaganda and to forging digital proximity with global audiences. This work will incorporate existing automated narrative analysis methods to systematically map strategic messaging and influence patterns (Romaniuk et al., 2025).

Future studies should continue to analyse the war-related narratives of the Western leaders and international figures most frequently mentioned by Ukrainian politicians, using Coticchia and Catanzaro's (2022) narrative framework, to assess how Ukraine's strategic messaging influenced external actors. Further research should also examine how men and women use interactive elements of social media to build meaningful connections with target audiences and whether women's communication strategies generate different engagement patterns or outcomes. Additionally, more qualitative work is needed to understand why Ukrainian women politicians reduced their dialogue attempts over time—whether they felt they had achieved their objectives early in the invasion or if they were discouraged by the lack of sustained engagement from international figures. More broadly, research should continue investigating how digital proximity shapes dialogue formation in IR and how digital diplomacy can be leveraged more effectively to support women's inclusion in conflict communication and decision-making.

6.4 Conclusion

Throughout this doctoral thesis, I conducted a mixed-methods big data analysis of two social media platforms, using original databases of attributes of Ukrainian politicians and the international figures they most frequently targeted for support. I maintained a gender lens throughout the research to highlight the voices and actions of women during war—a time when men's voices have traditionally dominated. I also incorporated theories of Ukrainian feminism and nationalism into my research to assess whether they provided a more accurate explanatory framework than Western theories on conflict approaches and gendered political communication styles in Ukraine. This contribution was crucial for advancing academic knowledge about a country that has historically been viewed as a

borderland between the West and Russia, even though Ukrainian people have centuries of their own nationhood and cultural traditions.

My research revealed several findings on gendered political communication during war. First, Ukrainian politicians used Facebook for updating constituents and Twitter for digital diplomacy. Second, women were more interactive and focussed on narratives about human suffering, while men adopted an authoritative style, emphasising military and diplomatic visits and support. Third, neither Ukrainian nor international women conveyed pacifist narratives, though men expressed more combative military rhetoric, therefore finding only partial support for the WPH during the war. Fourth, gender affinity emerged in both narrative convergence and interactions, with men Ukrainian politicians engaging more with men international figures. Finally, while women initially led dialogue attempts, men soon became the dominant instigators.

These findings carry important implications for policy and future research. As outlined in the policy recommendations, recognising and leveraging diverse communication strategies—particularly those of women and other underrepresented groups—can strengthen digital diplomacy efforts and help counter disinformation and propaganda more effectively. Additionally, ensuring the inclusion of women in decision-making processes at all stages of conflict response is essential for achieving the WPS agenda. Looking ahead, further research should continue exploring the role of gender in digital diplomacy, the fragmentation of political communication across platforms, and the broader dynamics of narrative influence in international relations.

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Appendix

Outline

Appendix A: Database of Ukrainian Politicians and Cabinet Ministers in *Verkhovna Rada* (Parliament) Commencing 29 August 2019

Appendix B: Topics Used by Women, Men, and Both Genders on Facebook and Twitter

Appendix C: Database of International Figures

Appendix D: Ukraine-Related Keywords

Appendix E: Topics Used by Women, Men, and Both Genders on Twitter

Appendix F: Topics Used by International Figures, Ukrainian Politicians, and Both

Appendix G: Topic Summaries and their Narratives, Genders, and User Groups

Appendix A*Database of Ukrainian Politicians and Cabinet Ministers in Verkhovna Rada (Parliament)**Commencing 29 August 2019 (Order = Facebook Username, N=459) (Chapters 3, 4, and 5)*

Name (Latin)	Name (Cyrillic)	Prominence	Party	Gender	Facebook Username	Twitter Username
Andriy Puzychuk	Пузійчук Андрій Вікторович	No	Batkivshchyna	M	a.puziichuk	
Oleksandr Kubrakov	Кубраков Олександр Миколайович	No	Servant of the People	M	Alexander Kubrakov	AlexanderKubrak
Anastasia Krasnosilska	Радіна (Красносільська) Анастасія Олегівна	No	Servant of the People	F	Anastasia Radina	AnastasiaRadina
Anatoliy Kostiukh	Костюх Анатолій Вячеславович	No	Servant of the People	M	Anatolii Kostiukh	
Andrey Motovilovets	Мотовиловець Андрій Вікторович	No	Servant of the People	M	Andrey Motovilovets	
Andriy Osadchuk	Осадчук Андрій Петрович	No	Holos	M	Andrii Osadchuk	
Andriy Zhupanyn	Жупанин Андрій Вікторович	No	Servant of the People	M	Andrii Zhupanyn	
Andriy Klochko	Клочко Андрій Андрійович	No	Servant of the People	M	Andriy Klochko	
Andriy Ivanchuk	Іванчук Андрій Володимирович	No	Unaffiliated	M	andriy.ivanchuk.111	
Anna Kovalenko	Коваленко Анна Миколаївна	No	Servant of the People	F	Anna Kovalenko	AnnaKovalenko39
Anna Skorokhod	Скороход Анна Костянтинівна	No	Servant of the People	F	Anna Skorokhod	
Antonina Slavytska	Славицька Антоніна Керимівна	No	Opposition Platform — For Life	F	Antonina Slavytska	
Arsen Avakov	Аваков Арсен Борисович	Yes	People's Front	M	Arsen Avakov	AvakovArsen
Artem Chornomorov	Чорноморов Артем Олегович	No	Servant of the People	M	Artem Chornomorov	
Oleksandr Skichko	Войцехівський Віталій Олександрович	No	Servant of the People	M	askichko	AlexandrSkichko
Mykola Babenko	Бабенко Микола Вікторович	No	Bila Tserkva united	M	BabenkoMV	
Oleksandr Bakumov	Бакумов Олександр Сергійович	No	Servant of the People	M	bakumov.sluganarodu	
Pavlo Bakunets	Бакунець Павло Андрійович	No	Self Reliance	M	bakunetspavlo	
Taras Batenko	Батенко Тарас Іванович	No	Unaffiliated	M	batenko123	batenko_taras
Solomiya Bobrovska	Бобровська Соломія Анатоліївна	No	Holos	F	BobrovskaMP	
Bohdan Kytsak	Кицак Богдан Вікторович	No	Servant of the People	M	Bohdan Kytsak	
Viktor Bondar	Бондар Віктор Васильович	No	Unaffiliated	M	bondarvictory	
Iryna Borzova	Борзова Ірина Наумівна	No	Servant of the People	F	borzova.iryna	

Name (Latin)	Name (Cyrillic)	Prominence	Party	Gender	Facebook Username	Twitter Username
Liudmyla Buimister	Буймістер Людмила Анатоліївна	No	Servant of the People	F	Buimister.public	
Davyd Arakhamia	Арахамія Давид Георгійович	No	Servant of the People	M	David Braun	arakhamia_david
Denys Maliuska	Малюська Денис Леонтійович	Yes	Independent	M	Denis Malyuska	
Eduard Proshchuk	Прошчук Едуард Петрович	No	Servant of the People	M	deputat.proshchuk	EduardProskuk
Oksana Dmytriyeva	Дмитрієва Оксана Олександрівна	No	Servant of the People	F	Dmytriyeva.Official	
Dmytro Kuleba	Кулеба Дмитро Іванович	Yes		M	Dmytro Kuleba	DmytroKuleba
Dmytro Mykysha	Микиша Дмитро Сергійович	No	Servant of the People	M	Dmytro Mykysha	
Dmytro Natalukha	Наталуха Дмитро Андрійович	No	Servant of the People	M	Dmytro Natalukha	DmytroNatalukha
Dmytro Razumkov	Разумков Дмитро Олександрович	No	Servant of the People	M	dmytro.razumkov	DRazumkov
Dmytro Kostiuk	Костюк Дмитро Сергійович	No	Servant of the People	M	DmytroKostiuk.SlugaNarodu	
Denys Shmyhal	Шмигаль Денис Анатолійович	Yes		M	dshmyhal	Denys_Shmyhal
Maksym Dyrdin	Дирдін Максим Євгенович	No	Servant of the People	M	DyrdinMaksym	maksym_dyrdin
Hennadiy Kasai	Касай Геннадій Олександрович	No	Servant of the People	M	genadiy.kasay	
Heo Leros	Лерос Гео Багратович	No	Servant of the People	M	Geo Leros	
Oleksandr Horobets	Горобець Олександр Сергійович	No	Servant of the People	M	gorobez.oleksandr	
Halyna Yanchenko	Янченко Галина Ігорівна	No	Servant of the People	F	Halyna Yanchenko	HalynaYanchenko
Halyna Vasylychenko	Васильченко Галина Іванівна	No	Holos	F	halyna.vasylychenko.officialpage	
Ihor Kryvosheyev	Кривошеєв Ігор Сергійович	No	Servant of the People	M	Ihor Kryvosheyev	IKryvosheyev
Ihor Umansky	Уманський Ігор Іванович	Yes	Independent	M	ihor.umanskyi	
Iryna Konstankevych	Констанкевич Ірина Мирославівна	No	Unaffiliated	F	IrynaKonstankevych	konstankevych1
Ivan Yunakov	Юнаков Іван Сергійович	No	Servant of the People	M	Ivan Yunakov	
Ivanna Klympush-Tsyntsadze	Климуш-Цинцадзе Іванна Орестівна	No	European Solidarity	F	Ivanna Klympush-Tsyntsadze	IKlympush
Oleksandr Kachura	Качура Олександр Анатолійович	No	Servant of the People	M	kachuratut	OAKachura
Kira Rudyk	Рудик Кіра Олександрівна	Yes	Holos	F	Kira Rudik	kiraincongress
Olena Kopanchuk	Копанчук Олена Євгенівна	No	Servant of the People	F	kopanchuk	
Ihor Kopytin	Копитін Ігор Володимирович	No	Servant of the People	M	Kopytin.Ihor	
Mykola Kucher	Кучер Микола Іванович	No	Unaffiliated	M	KucherMykola	

Name (Latin)	Name (Cyrillic)	Prominence	Party	Gender	Facebook Username	Twitter Username
Artem Kultenko	Культенко Артем Валерійович	No	Servant of the People	M	kultenko.artem.sn	
Artem Kunayev	Кунаєв Артем Юрійович	No	Servant of the People	M	kunayev.a	
Larysa Bilozir	Білозір Лариса Миколаївна	No	Unaffiliated	F	larysabilozir	LarysaBilozir
Lesia Vasylenko	Василенко Леся Володимирівна	No	Holos	F	Lesia Vasylenko	lesiavasylenko
Lesia Zaburanna	Забуранна Леся Валентинівна	No	Servant of the People	F	lesiazaburanna	LZaburanna
Yelyzaveta Yasko	Ясько Єлизавета Олексіївна	No	Servant of the People	F	Lisa Yasko	LisaYasko
Musa Mahomedov	Магомедов Муса Сергєєвич	No	Opposition Bloc	M	magomedov.public	
Maria Mezentseva	Мезенцева Марія Сергіївна	No	Servant of the People	F	Maria Mezentseva	mezentseva_dep
Mykhailo Fedorov	Федоров Михайло Альбертович	Yes	Independent	M	Mykhailo Fedorov	FedorovMykhailo
Mykhailo Ananchenko	Ананченко Михайло Олегович	No	Servant of the People	M	Mykhailo Ananchenko	
Mykhailo Tsymbaliuk	Цимбалюк Михайло Михайлович	No	Batkivshchyna	M	mykhailotsymbaliuk	m_tsymbaliuk
Mykhailo Volynets	Волинець Михайло Якович	No	Batkivshchyna	M	MykhailoVolynets	MykhailVolynets
Valentyn Nalyvaichenko	Наливайченко Валентин Олександрович	No	Batkivshchyna	M	nalyvaichenko.valentyn	
Nataliya Korolevska	Королевська Наталія Юріївна	No	Opposition Platform — For Life	F	Nataliya.Korolevska	NKorolevska
Nataliya Prykhodko	Приходько Наталія Ігорівна	No	Opposition Platform — For Life	F	Nataliya.Prykhodko.nardep	
Oleh Nemchinov	Немчінов Олег Миколайович	Yes	Ukrainian People's Party	M	nemchinov.oleh	ONemchinov
Yuriy Boiko	Бойко Юрій Анатолійович	Yes	Opposition Platform — For Life	M	official.yuriy.boiko	
Oleh Urusky	Урусський Олег Семенович	Yes		M	oleguruskyi	
Oleh Kulinich	Кулініч Олег Іванович	No	Unaffiliated	M	OlehKulinich	
Oleksandr Korniyenko	Корнієнко Олександр Сергійович	No	Servant of the People	M	Oleksandr Korniyenko	OlekKorn
Oleksandra Ustinova	Устінова Олександра Юріївна	No	Holos	F	Oleksandra Ustinova	SashaUstinovaUA
Oleksii Reznikov	Резніков Олексій Юрійович	Yes	Independent	M	Oleksii Reznikov	oleksiireznikov
Oleksii Zhmerenetskyi	Жмеренецький Олексій Сергійович	No	Servant of the People	M	oleksii.zhmerenetskyi	zhmerenetskyi
Oleksiy Chernyshov	Чернишов Олексій Михайлович	Yes	Independent	M	oleksiy.chernyshov	
Oleksiy Movchan	Мовчан Олексій Васильович	No	Servant of the People	M	oleksiy movchan	

Name (Latin)	Name (Cyrillic)	Prominence	Party	Gender	Facebook Username	Twitter Username
Olena Moshenets	Мошенець Олена Володимирівна	No	Servant of the People	F	Olena Moshenets	ElenaMoshenets
Olena Shuliak	Шуляк Олена Олексіївна	No	Servant of the People	F	Olena Shuliak	OlenaShuliak
Olena Moshenets	Мошенець Олена Володимирівна	No	Servant of the People	F	olena.moshenets.vru	
Olha Koval	Коваль Ольга Володимирівна	No	Servant of the People	F	Olga Koval	
Olha Stefanyshyna	Стефанишина Ольга Анатоліївна	No	Holos	F	Olga Stefanishyna	StefanishynaO
Olha Stefanyshyna	Стефанишина Ольга Анатоліївна	No	Holos	F	olga.kravets.797	
Andriy Parubiy	Парубій Андрій Володимирович	No	European Solidarity	M	Parubiy.supporters.page	AndriyParubiy
Oleksandr Pasichnyi	Пасічний Олександр Станіславович	No	Servant of the People	M	PasichnyiOleksandr	
Pavlo Frolov	Фролов Павло Валерійович	No	Servant of the People	M	Pavlo Frolov	
Pavlo Sushko	Сушко Павло Миколайович	No	Servant of the People	M	Pavlo Sushko	pavlo_sushko
Petro Pavlovskyi	Павловський Петро Іванович	No	Servant of the People	M	PetroPavlovskyi	
Petro Poroshenko	Порошенко Петро Олексійович	Yes	European Solidarity	M	petroporoshenko	poroshenko
Mustafa Dzhemiliev	Джемілев Мустафа	No	European Solidarity	M	president.dzhemiliev	MDzhemiliev
Roksolana Pidlasa	Підласа Роксолана Андріївна	No	Servant of the People	F	Roksolana Pidlasa	
Roman Lozynskyi	Лозинський Роман Михайлович	No	Holos	M	Roman Lozynskyi	RLozynskyi
Renat Kuzmin	Кузьмін Ренат Равелійович	No	Opposition Platform — For Life	M	RRKuzmin	Renat_Kuzmin
Yaroslav Rushchyshyn	Руцишин Ярослав Іванович	No	Holos	M	rushchyshyn.yaroslav	
Ruslan Strelets	Стрілець Руслан Олександрович	Yes		M	ruslan.strelets	
Rustem Umerov	Умеров Рустем Енверович	No	Holos	M	rustemumerov.ua	rustem_umerov
Oksana Savchuk	Савчук Оксана Василівна	No	Svoboda	F	SavchukOks	
Serhii Babak	Бабак Сергій Віталійович	No	Servant of the People	M	Serhii Babak	
Artem Dubnov	Дубнов Артем Васильович	No	Servant of the People	M	sluganarodu.dubnov	
Oleksandr Kovalchuk	Ковальчук Олександр Володимирович	No	Servant of the People	M	sluganarodu.kovalchuk.152	
Oleksandr Litvinov	Літвінов Олександр Миколайович	No	Servant of the People	M	sluganarodu.litvinov	
Sofiya Fedyna	Федина Софія Романівна	No	European Solidarity	F	Sofiya Fedyna	
Inna Sovsun	Совсун Інна Романівна	No	Holos	F	sovsun.inna	InnaSovsun
Ruslan Stefanchuk	Стефанчук Руслан Олексійович	No	Servant of the People	M	stefanchuk.official	r_stefanchuk

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Sviatoslav Yurash	Юраш Святослав Андрійович	No	Servant of the People	M	Sviatoslav Yurash	SviatoslavUA
Sviatoslav Vakarchuk	Вакарчук Святослав Іванович	No	Holos	M	sviatoslav. vakarchuk	s_vakarchuk
Yulia Svyrydenko	Свириденко Юлія Анатоліївна	Yes		F	Svyrydenko. Yulia	YuliaSvyrydenk 3
Serhiy Taruta	Тарута Сергій Олексійович	No	Batkivshchyna	M	taruta	
Anton Poliakov	Семінський Олег Валерійович	No	Servant of the People	M	telegram.poliakov. anton	
Tetiana Plachkova	Плачкова Тетяна Михайлівна	No	Opposition Platform — For Life	F	tetianaplachkova	
Viktor Medvedchuk	Медведчук Віктор Володимирович	No	Opposition Platform — For Life	M	v.v.medvedcuk	Medvedchuk20 24
Vadym Halaichuk	Галайчук Вадим Сергійович	No	Servant of the People	M	vadym.galaychuk	VadymHalaichu k
Vadym Ivchenko	Івченко Вадим Євгенович	No	Batkivshchyna	M	vadymIvchenko	Ivchenko_Vadi m
Vadym Novynskyi	Новинський Вадим Владиславович	No	Opposition Bloc	M	VadymNovynskyi	
Vadym Rabinovych	Рабінович Вадим Зіновійович	No	Opposition Platform — For Life	M	vadymrabinovych	
Valeriy Sterniychuk	Стернійчук Валерій Олександрович	No	Servant of the People	M	valeriistern	
Vasyl Moka	Мокан Василь Іванович	No	Servant of the People	M	Vasyl Moka	
Vasyl Petyovka	Петьовка Василь Васильович	No	Unaffiliated	M	vasylpetyovka	
Iryna Venediktova	Венедіктова Ірина Валентинівна	No	Servant of the People	F	VenediktovaIryna	VenediktovaIV
Vadym Hutsait	Гутцайт Вадим Маркович	Yes		M	vgytzait	
Viktor Baloha	Балога Віктор Іванович	No	United Centre	M	ViktorBaloga	ViktorBaloha
Vitaliy Bezghin	Безгін Віталій Юрійович	No	Servant of the People	M	Vitaliy Bezgin	
Vladyslav Krykliy	Криклій Владислав Артурович	Yes	Servant of the People	M	Vladyslav Kryklii	
Volodymyr Ariev	Ар'єв Володимир Ігорович	No	European Solidarity	M	Volodymyr Ariev	VolodymyrArie v
Volodymyr Kreidenko	Крейдєнко Володимир Вікторович	No	Servant of the People	M	Volodymyr Kreidenko	
Volodymyr Tsabal	Цабаль Володимир Володимирович	No	Holos	M	Volodymyr Tsabal	
Volodymyr Viatrovych	В'ятрович Володимир Михайлович	No	European Solidarity	M	Volodymyr Viatrovych	viatrovych
Yaroslav Yurchyshyn	Юрчишин Ярослав Романович	No	Holos	M	Yaroslav Yurchyshyn	yarlyur
Yevheniya Kravchuk	Кравчук Євгенія Михайлівна	No	Servant of the People	F	Yevheniya Kravchuk	kravchukev
Yulia Tymoshenko	Тимошенко Юлія Володимирівна	Yes	Batkivshchyna	F	Yulia Tymoshenko	YuliaTymoshen ko

Name (Latin)	Name (Cyrillic)	Prominence	Party	Gender	Facebook Username	Twitter Username
Yuriy Kamelchuk	Камельчук Юрій Олександрович	No	Servant of the People	M	Yuriy Kamelchuk	YuriyKamelchuk
Zhan Beleniuk	Беленюк Жан Венсанович	No	Servant of the People	M	Zhan Beleniuk	
Yana Zinkevych	Зінкевич Яна Вадимівна	No	European Solidarity	F	Zinkevych2019	
Valeriy Zub	Зуб Валерій Олексійович	No	Servant of the People	M	zub.valeriy	
Oleksandr Aliksiychuk	Аліксійчук Олександр Васильович	No	Servant of the People	M	Аліксійчук Олександр	
Anastasiya Liashenko	Ляшенко Анастасія Олексіївна	No	Servant of the People	F	Анастасія Ляшенко	
Anna Purtova	Пуртова Анна Анатоліївна	No	Servant of the People	F	Анна Пуртова	Purtova_aa
Akhtem Chyihoz	Чийгоз Ахтем Зейтуллаєвич	No	European Solidarity	M	Ахтем Чийгоз	ahtem_chiygoz
Bohdan Yaremenko	Яременко Богдан Васильович	No	Servant of the People	M	Богдан Яременко	1971BY
Viktoriya Siumar	Сюмар Вікторія Петрівна	No	European Solidarity	F	Вікторія Сюмар	
Vladlen Nekliudov	Неклюдов Владлен Михайлович	No	Servant of the People	M	Владлен Неклюдов	
Volodymyr Zelensky	Зеленський Володимир Олександрович	Yes	Independent	M	Володимир Зеленський	ZelenskyyUa
Dmytro Hurin	Гурін Дмитро Олександрович	No	Servant of the People	M	Дмитро Гурін	
Dmytro Lubinets	Лубінець Дмитро Валерійович	No	For the People	M	Дмитро Лубінець	lubinetsz
Dmytro Solomchuk	Соломчук Дмитро Вікторович	No	Servant of the People	M	Дмитро Соломчук	
Dmytro Chorny	Чорний Дмитро Сергійович	No	Servant of the People	M	Дмитро Чорний	
Yehor Cherniev	Чернев Єгор Володимирович	No	Servant of the People	M	Єгор Чернев	
Ivan Krulko	Крулько Іван Іванович	No	Batktivshchyna	M	Іван Крулько	IvanKrulko
Ihor Vasyliv	Василів Ігор Володимирович	No	Servant of the People	M	Ігор Васильєв	
Ihor Huz	Гузь Ігор Володимирович	No	Unaffiliated	M	Ігор Гузь	Igor_Guz
Iryna Vereshchuk	Верещук Ірина Андріївна	Yes	Servant of the People	F	Ірина Верещук	IrynaVereshchuk
Roman Kaptelov	Каптелов Роман Володимирович	No	Servant of the People	M	Каптелов Роман	
Maksym Pashkovskiy	Пашковський Максим Ігорович	No	Servant of the People	M	Максим Пашковський	
Maksym Tkachenko	Ткаченко Максим Миколайович	No	Servant of the People	M	Максим Ткаченко	
Nina Yuzhanina	Южаніна Ніна Петрівна	No	European Solidarity	F	Ніна Южаніна	
Oksana Hrynychuk	Гринчук Оксана Анатоліївна	No	Servant of the People	F	Оксана Гринчук	
Oleh Makarov	Макаров Олег Анатолійович	No	Holos	M	Олег Макаров	

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Oleksandr Haidu	Гайду Олександр Васильович	No	Servant of the People	M	Олександр Гайду	
Oleksandr Zavitnevych	Завітневич Олександр Михайлович	No	Servant of the People	M	Олександр Завітневич	
Oleksandr Merezhko	Мережко Олександр Олександрович	No	Servant of the People	M	Олександр Мережко	3TrAmvL026aJRar
Oleksandr Saliychuk	Салійчук Олександр В'ячеславович	No	Servant of the People	M	Олександр Салійчук	
Oleksandr Tkachenko	Ткаченко Олександр Михайлович	Yes	Servant of the People	M	Олександр Ткаченко	otkachenkoua
Oleksiy Honcharenko	Гончаренко Олексій Олексійович	No	Unaffiliated	M	Олексій Гончаренко	GoncharenkoUa
Oleksiy Ustenko	Устенко Олексій Олегович	No	Servant of the People	M	Олексій Устенко	
Pavlo Yakymenko	Якименко Павло Віталійович	No	Servant of the People	M	Павел Якименко	pavlo_yakymenko
Roman Kostenko	Костенко Роман Васильович	No	Holos	M	Роман Костенко	
Roman Sokha	Соха Роман Васильович	No	Servant of the People	M	Роман Соха	
Rostyslav Tistyk	Тістик Ростислав Ярославович	No	Servant of the People	M	Ростислав Тістик	RostyslavTistyk
Serhiy Bunin	Бунін Сергій Валерійович	No	Servant of the People	M	Сергій Бунін	
Serhiy Vlasenko	Власенко Сергій Володимирович	No	Batkivshchyna	M	Сергій Власенко	
Serhiy Rakhmanin	Рахманін Сергій Іванович	No	Holos	M	Сергій Рахманін	
Serhiy Shtepa	Штепа Сергій Сергійович	No	Servant of the People	M	Сергій Штепа	
Stepan Kubiv	Кубів Степан Іванович	No	European Solidarity	M	Степан Кубів	
Yuliya Hryshyna	Гришина Юлія Миколаївна	No	Servant of the People	F	Юлія Гришина	
Yuriy Mysiahin	Мисягін Юрій Михайлович	No	Servant of the People	M	Юрій Мисягін	
Yaroslav Zhelezniak	Железняк Ярослав Іванович	No	Holos	M	Ярослав Железняк	
Arsen Pushkarenko	Пушкаренко Арсеній Михайлович	No	Servant of the People	M		A_Pushkarenko
Roman Abramovsky	Абрамовський Роман Романович	Yes	Independent	M		abramovskyy_r
Oleksandr Dubinsky	Дубінський Олександр Анатолійович	No	Unaffiliated	M		alexdebinskyi
Oleksandr Lukashev	Лукашев Олександр Анатолійович	No	Opposition Platform — For Life	M		AndrejS53143272
Andrii Kholodov	Холодов Андрій Іванович	No	Servant of the People	M		AndriiKholodov
Anton Kisse	Кіссе Антон Іванович	Yes	Unaffiliated	M		AntonKisse

Name (Latin)	Name (Cyrillic)	Prominence	Party	Gender	Facebook Username	Twitter Username
Anton Yatsenko	Нагорняк Сергій Володимирович	No	Unaffiliated	M		AntonYatsenko
Andriy Bogdanets	Богданець Андрій Володимирович	No	Servant of the People	M		BogdanetsA
Oleksandr Feldman	Фельдман Олександр Борисович	No	Unaffiliated	M		Feldman_Ukraine
Roman Hryshchuk	Грищук Роман Павлович	No	Servant of the People	M		grishchukroma
Hryhoriy Nemyria	Немиря Григорій Михайлович	No	Batkivshchyna	M		HryhoriyNemyria
Iryna Friz	Фріз Ірина Васиївна	No	European Solidarity	F		IrynaFriz
Iryna Herashchenko	Герашенко Ірина Володимирівна	No	European Solidarity	F		IrynaGerashche2
Volodymyr Kabachenko	Кабаченко Володимир Вікторович	No	Batkivshchyna	M		KabachenkoVol
Illia Kyva	Кива Ілля Володимирович	No	Opposition Platform — For Life	M		kivailya
Serhiy Labaziuk	Лабазюк Сергій Петрович	No	Unaffiliated	M		LabaziukSerhiy
Anzhelika Labunska	Лабунська Анжеліка Вікторівна	No	Batkivshchyna	F		Labunska_A
Viktor Liashko	Ляшко Віктор Кирилович	Yes		M		liashko_viktor
Mariana Bezuhla	Безугла Мар'яна Володимирівна	No	Servant of the People	F		marianabezuhla
Oleksandr Marikovskiy	Маріковський Олександр Валерійович	No	Servant of the People	M		Marikovskiy
Maryna Bardina	Бардіна Марина Олегівна	No	Servant of the People	F		MarynaBardina
Ihor Molotok	Молоток Ігор Федорович	No	Unaffiliated	M		MolotokIgor
Maria Ionova	Іонова Марія Миколаївна	No	European Solidarity	F		MPMaria_Ionova
Nestor Shufrych	Шуфрич Нестор Іванович	No	Opposition Platform — For Life	M		NShufrich
Olena Kondratiuk	Кондратюк Олена Костянтинівна	No	Batkivshchyna	F		Ole_Kondratiuk
Yuriy Pavlenko	Павленко Юрій Олексійович	No	Opposition Platform — For Life	M		Pavlenko_Yurij
Pavlo Melnyk	Мельник Павло Вікторович	No	Servant of the People	M		Pavlo_Melnik
Rostyslav Pavlenko	Павленко Ростислав Миколайович	No	European Solidarity	M		rostpav
Serhiy Demchenko	Демченко Сергій Олексійович	No	Servant of the People	M		SergijDemchenko
Serhiy Alekseyev	Алексєєв Сергій Олегович	No	European Solidarity	M		SerhiyAlekseyev
Serhiy Lyovochkin	Львовчкін Сергій Володимирович	No	Opposition Platform — For	M		serhiylovochkin

Name (Latin)	Name (Cyrillic)	Promi- nence	Party	Gender	Facebook Username	Twitter Username
Life						
Stepan Ivakhiv	Івахів Степан Петрович	No	Unaffiliated	M		Stepan_Ivakhiv
Oleh Syniutka	Синютка Олег Михайлович	No	European Solidarity	M		synyutka
Valeriy Lunchenko	Лунченко Валерій Валерійович	No	Unaffiliated	M		V_Lunchenko
Vadym Stolar	Столар Вадим Михайлович	No	Opposition Platform — For Life	M		vadimstolar
Valeriy Dubil	Дубіль Валерій Олександрович	No	Batkivshchyna	M		Valerii_Dubil
Yuriy Vitrenko	Вітренко Юрій Юрійович	Yes		M		VitrenkoYuriy
Volodymyr Zakharchenko	Захарченко Володимир Васильович	No	Servant of the People	M		VolodymyrZak ha3
Vadym Prystaiko	Пристайко Вадим Володимирович	Yes		M		VPrystaiko
Hanna Lichman	Лічман Ганна Василівна	No	Servant of the People	F		
Olena Kryvoruchkina	Криворучкіна Олена Володимирівна	No	Servant of the People	F		
Tetiana Hryshchenko	Грищенко Тетяна Миколаївна	No	Servant of the People	F		
Yulia Yatsyk	Яцик Юлія Григорівна	No	Servant of the People	F		
Maryna Nikitina	Нікітіна Марина Вікторівна	No	Servant of the People	F		
Olha Vasylevska-Smahliuk	Василевська- Смаглюк Ольга Михайлівна	No	Servant of the People	F		
Viktoriya Hryb	Гриб Вікторія Олександрівна	No	Opposition Bloc	F		
Nataliya Pipa	Піпа Наталія Романівна	No	Holos	F		
Tetiana Riabukha	Скрипка (Рябуха) Тетяна Василівна	No	Servant of the People	F		
Viktoriya Vahnier	Вагнер Вікторія Олександрівна	No	Servant of the People	F		
Olena Lys	Яценко Антон Володимирович	No	Servant of the People	F		
Hanna Bondar	Бондар Ганна Вячеславівна	No	Servant of the People	F		
Yuliya Didenko	Діденко Юлія Олександрівна	No	Servant of the People	F		
Halyna Mukhailiuk	Михайлюк Галина Олегівна	No	Servant of the People	F		
Halyna Tretiakova	Третякова Галина Миколаївна	No	Servant of the People	F		
Olha Saladukha	Саладуха Ольга Валеріївна	No	Servant of the People	F		
Alina Zahoruiko	Загоруйко Аліна Леонідівна	No	Servant of the People	F		
Daria Volodina	Володіна Дар'я	No	Servant of the	F		

Name (Latin)	Name (Cyrillic)	Promi nence	Party	Gender	Facebook Username	Twitter Username
	Артемівна		People			
Olha Savchenko	Савченко Ольга Станіславівна	No	Servant of the People	F		
Ella Riepina	Рєпіна Елла Анатоліївна	No	Servant of the People	F		
Yuliya Ovchynnikova	Овчинникова Юлія Юріївна	No	Servant of the People	F		
Lada Bulakh	Булах Лада Валентинівна	No	Servant of the People	F		
Anna Kolisnyk	Колісник Анна Сергіївна	No	Servant of the People	F		
Marharyta Shol	Шол Маргарита Віталіївна	No	Servant of the People	F		
Iryna Allakhverdiyeva	Аллахвердієва Ірина Валеріївна	No	Servant of the People	F		
Olena Vintoniak	Вінтоняк Олена Василівна	No	Servant of the People	F		
Viktoriya Podhorna	Подгорна Вікторія Валентинівна	No	Servant of the People	F		
Olena Khomenko	Хоменко Олена Вікторівна	No	Servant of the People	F		
Tetiana Tsyba	Циба Тетяна Вікторівна	No	Servant of the People	F		
Olha Rudenko	Руденко Ольга Сергіївна	No	Servant of the People	F		
Yuliya Lyovochkina	Льовочкіна Юлія Володимирівна	No	Opposition Platform — For Life	F		
Olha Bielkova	Белькова Ольга	No	Batkivshchyna	F		
Alyona Shkrum	Шкрум Альона Іванівна	No	Batkivshchyna	F		
Yuliya Klymenko	Клименко Юлія Леонідівна	No	Holos	F		
Yulia Laputina	Лапутіна Юлія Анатоліївна	Yes		F		
Maryna Lazebna	Лазєбна Марина Володимирівна	Yes	Independent	F		
Liubomyra Mandziy	Мандзій Любомира Степанівна	Yes	Independent	F		
Olha Buslavets	Буславець Ольга Анатоліївна	Yes	Independent	F		
Svitlana Fomenko	Фоменко Світлана Валеріївна	Yes	Independent	F		
Anatoliy Drabovskyi	Драбовський Анатолій Григорович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Petro Yurchyshyn	Юрчишин Петро Васильович	No	Unaffiliated	M		
Hennadii Vatsak	Вацак Геннадій Анатолійович	No	Unaffiliated	M		
Oleh Meidych	Мейдич Олег Леонідович	No	Batkivshchyna	M		
Viacheslav Rublyov	Рубльов Вячеслав Володимирович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Ihor Palytsia	Палиця Ігор Петрович	No	Unaffiliated	M		

Name (Latin)	Name (Cyrillic)	Prominence	Party	Gender	Facebook Username	Twitter Username
Dmytro Kysylevskyi	Кисилевський Дмитро Давидович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Maksym Buzhanskyi	Бужанський Максим Аркадійович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Kyrylo Nesterenko	Нестеренко Кирилл Олександрович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Viacheslav Medianyuk	Медяник В'ячеслав Анатолійович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Yuriy Koriavchenkov	Корявченков Юрій Валерійович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Denys Herman	Герман Денис Вадимович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Dmytro Shpenov	Шпенев Дмитро Юрійович	No	Unaffiliated	M		
Vladyslav Borodin	Бородін Владислав Валерійович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Serhiy Severyn	Северин Сергій Сергійович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Oleksandr Trukhin	Трухін Олександр Миколайович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Fedir Khrystencko	Христенко Федір Володимирович	No	Opposition Platform — For Life	M		
Yuriy Solod	Солод Юрій Васильович	No	Opposition Platform — For Life	M		
Maksym Yefimov	Єфімов Максим Вікторович	No	Unaffiliated	M		
Valeriy Hnatenko	Гнатенко Валерій Сергійович	No	Opposition Platform — For Life	M		
Andriy Aksonov	Аксьонов Андрій Анатолійович	No	Unaffiliated	M		
Oleksandr Kovalyov	Ковальов Олександр Іванович	No	Unaffiliated	M		
Yevhen Yakovenko	Яковенко Євген Геннадійович	No	Batkivshchyna	M		
Serhiy Mahera	Магера Сергій Васильович	No	Opposition Bloc	M		
Volodymyr Moroz	Мороз Володимир Вікторович	No	Opposition Platform — For Life	M		
Ihor Herasymenko	Герасименко Ігор Леонідович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Volodymyr Areshonkov	Арешонков Володимир Юрійович	No	Unaffiliated	M		
Serhiy Kuzminykh	Кузьмініх Сергій Володимирович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Robert Horvat	Горват Роберт Іванович	No	Unaffiliated	M		
Mykhailo Laba	Лаба Михайло Михайлович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Vladislav Poliak	Поляк Владіслав Миколайович	No	Unaffiliated	M		

Name (Latin)	Name (Cyrillic)	Promi nence	Party	Gender	Facebook Username	Twitter Username
Yevgeniy Shevchenko	Шевченко Євгеній Володимирович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Oleksandr Ponomaryov	Пономарьов Олександр Сергійович	No	Opposition Platform — For Life	M		
Serhiy Minko	Мінько Сергій Анатолійович	No	Unaffiliated	M		
Ihor Fris	Фріс Ігор Павлович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Oleksandr Matusevych	Матусевич Олександр Борисович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Vasyl Virastyuk	Вірастюк Василь Ярославович	No	Vacant[4]	M		
Volodymyr Tymofiychuk	Тимофійчук Володимир Ярославович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Oleh Dunda	Дунда Олег Андрійович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Valeriy Koliukh	Колух Валерій Вікторович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Mykola Halushko	Галушко Микола Леонідович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Oleksandr Danutsa	Дануца Олександр Анатолійович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Ihor Murdiy	Мурдій Ігор Юрійович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Yuriy Kuzbyt	Кузбит Юрій Михайлович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Oles Dovhyi	Довгий Олес Станіславович	No	Unaffiliated	M		
Oleh Voronko	Воронько Олег Євгенійович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Oleksiy Kuznietsov	Кузнецов Олексій Олександрович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Oleksandr Sukhov	Сухов Олександр Сергійович	No	Unaffiliated	M		
Serhiy Velmozhnyi	Вельможний Сергій Анатолійович	No	Unaffiliated	M		
Serhiy Shakhov	Шахов Сергій Володимирович	Yes	Unaffiliated	M		
Mykola Kniazhytskyi	Княжицький Микола Леонідович	No	European Solidarity	M		
Mykhailo Bondar	Бондар Михайло Леонтійович	No	European Solidarity	M		
Yaroslav Dubnevych	Дубневич Ярослав Васильович	No	Unaffiliated	M		
Orest Salamakha	Саламаха Орест Ігорович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Andriy Lopushanskyi	Лопушанський Андрій Ярославович	No	Unaffiliated	M		
Andriy Kit	Кіт Андрій Богданович	No	Unaffiliated	M		
Ihor Nehulevskyi	Негулевський Ігор Петрович	No	Servant of the People	M		

Name (Latin)	Name (Cyrillic)	Promi nence	Party	Gender	Facebook Username	Twitter Username
Artem Dmytruk	Дмитрук Артем Геннадійович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Oleh Koliev	Колев Олег Вікторович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Oleksiy Leonov	Леонов Олексій Олександрович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Oleksandr Horniuk	Горенюк Олександр Олександрович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Stepan Cherniavskiy	Чернявський Степан Миколайович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Ihor Vasylkovskiy	Васильковський Ігор Ігорович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Serhiy Koleboshyn	Колебашин Сергій Валерійович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Anatoliy Urbanskyi	Урбанський Анатолій Ігорович	No	Unaffiliated	M		
Dmytro Nalyotov	Нальотов Дмитро Олександрович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Andriy Bobliakh	Боблях Андрій Ростиславович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Yurii Shapovalov	Шаповалов Юрій Анатолійович	No	Unaffiliated	M		
Kostiantyn Kasai	Касай Костянтин Іванович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Maksym Berezin	Березін Максим Юрійович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Roman Ivanisov	Іванісов Роман Валерійович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Viktor Mialyk	М'ялик Віктор Ничипорович	No	Unaffiliated	M		
Serhiy Lytvynenko	Литвиненко Сергій Анатолійович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Ihor Vasyliiev	Васильєв Ігор Сергійович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Andriy Derkach	Деркач Андрій Леонідович	No	Unaffiliated	M		
Maksym Huzenko	Гузенко Максим Васильович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Mykola Zadorozhniy	Задорожній Микола Миколайович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Ivan Chaikivskiy	Чайківський Іван Адамович	No	Unaffiliated	M		
Mykola Liushniak	Люшняк Микола Володимирович	No	Unaffiliated	M		
Volodymyr Hevko	Гевко Володимир Леонідович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Oleksandr Kunyskyi	Куницький Олександр Олегович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Andriy Odarchenko	Одарченко Андрій Миколайович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Viktoriya Kinzburska	Кінзбурська Вікторія Олександрівна	No	Servant of the People	M		
Yuriy Zdebskyi	Здебський Юрій Вікторович	No	Servant of the People	M		

Name (Latin)	Name (Cyrillic)	Promi- nence	Party	Gender	Facebook Username	Twitter Username
Yevhen Pyvovarov	Пивоваров Євген Павлович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Dmytro Shentsev	Шенцев Дмитро Олексійович	No	Opposition Bloc	M		
Dmytro Liubota	Любота Дмитро Валерійович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Oleksiy Kucher	Світлична Юлія Олександрівна	No	Servant of the People	M		
Oleksiy Krasov	Красов Олексій Ігорович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Pavlo Pavlish	Павліш Павло Васильович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Ihor Kolykhaiev	Козир Сергій В'ячеславович	No	Unaffiliated	M		
Volodymyr Ivanov	Іванов Володимир Ілліч	No	Servant of the People	M		
Oleksiy Kovalyov	Ковальов Олексій Іванович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Mykola Stefanchuk	Стефанчук Микола Олексійович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Oleksandr Hereha	Герега Олександр Володимирович	No	Unaffiliated	M		
Ihor Marchuk	Марчук Ігор Петрович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Liubov Shpak	Шпак Любов Олександрівна	No	Servant of the People	M		
Oleh Arseniuk	Арсенюк Олег Олексійович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Andriy Strikharskyi	Стріхарський Андрій Петрович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Serhiy Nahorniak	Рудик Сергій Ярославович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Maksym Zaremskyi	Лис Олена Георгіївна	No	Servant of the People	M		
Heorhiy Mazurashu	Заремський Максим Валентинович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Valeriy Bozhyk	Мазурашу Георгій Георгійович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Oleh Seminskyi	Божик Валерій Іванович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Maskym Zuyev	Зуєв Максим Сергійович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Anatoliy Hunko	Гунько Анатолій Григорович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Borys Prykhodko	Приходько Борис Вікторович	No	Unaffiliated	M		
Oleksandr Yurchenko	Юрченко Олександр Миколайович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Maksym Perebyinis	Перебийніс Максим Вікторович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Serhiy Shvets	Швець Сергій Федорович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Mykola Tyshchenko	Тищенко Микола Миколайович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Andriy Herus	Герус Андрій Михайлович	No	Servant of the People	M		

Name (Latin)	Name (Cyrillic)	Promi- nence	Party	Gender	Facebook Username	Twitter Username
Mykhailo Radutskyi	Радуцький Михайло Борисович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Denys Monastyrskyi	Монастирський Денис Анатолійович	Yes	Servant of the People	M		
Danylo Hetmantsev	Гетманцев Данило Олександрович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Serhiy Kalchenko	Кальченко Сергій Віталійович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Sergii Ionushas	Іонушас Сергій Костянтинівич	No	Servant of the People	M		
Vadym Strunevych	Струневич Вадим Олегович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Volodymyr Voronov	Воронов Володимир Анатолійович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Yuriy Aristov	Арістов Юрій Юрійович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Yuriy Kisiel	Кісель Юрій Григорович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Artem Kovalyov	Ковальов Артем Володимирович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Roman Babii	Бабій Роман Вячеславович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Oleh Marusiak	Марусяк Олег Романович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Mykola Kyrychenko	Кириченко Микола Олександрович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Pavlo Khalimon	Халімон Павло Віталійович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Oleh Bondarenko	Бондаренко Олег Володимирович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Mykhailo Kriachko	Крячко Михайло Валерійович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Liudmyla Marchenko	Марченко Людмила Іванівна	No	Servant of the People	M		
Volodymyr Kozak	Козак Володимир Васильович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Oleksandr Sova	Сова Олександр Георгійович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Volodymyr Vtras	Ватрас Володимир Антонович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Roman Mulyk	Мулик Роман Миронович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Oleh Tarasov	Тарасов Олег Сергійович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Yevhen Brahar	Брагар Євгеній Вадимович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Marian Zablotskyi	Заблоцький Мар'ян Богданович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Oleksandr Kabanov	Кабанов Олександр Євгенійович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Fedir Venislavskyi	Веніславський Федір Володимирович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Yevhen Petruniak	Петруняк Євген Васильович	No	Servant of the People	M		

Name (Latin)	Name (Cyrillic)	Prominence	Party	Gender	Facebook Username	Twitter Username
Oleksandr Fediynenko	Федієнко Олександр Павлович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Yelizaveta Bohutska	Богущька Єлизавета Петрівна	No	Servant of the People	M		
Artem Nahayevskiyi	Нагаєвський Артем Сергійович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Mykyta Poturayev	Потураєв Микита Русланович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Dmytro Pryputen	Припутень Дмитро Сергійович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Maksym Pavliuk	Павлюк Максим Васильович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Bohdan Torokhtiy	Торохтій Богдан Григорович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Andriy Kostin	Костін Андрій Євгенович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Ruslan Horbenko	Горбенко Руслан Олександрович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Nelli Yakovlieva	Яковлева Неллі Іллівна	No	Servant of the People	M		
Serhiy Hryvko	Гривко Сергій Дмитрович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Yuriy Zaslavskiyi	Заславський Юрій Іванович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Andriy Zadorozhnyi	Задорожний Андрій Вікторович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Ostap Shypailo	Шипайло Остап Ігорович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Ivan Shynkarenko	Шинкаренко Іван Анатолійович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Olha Sovhyria	Совгіря Ольга Володимирівна	No	Servant of the People	M		
Taras Tarasenko	Тарасенко Тарас Петрович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Mykola Solskyi	Сольський Микола Тарасович	Yes	Servant of the People	M		
Mykhailo Novikov	Новіков Михайло Миколайович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Anatoliy Ostapenko	Остапенко Анатолій Дмитрович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Ivan Kalaur	Калаур Іван Романович	No	Servant of the People	M		
Vasyl Nimchenko	Німченко Василь Іванович	No	Opposition Platform — For Life	M		
Serhiy Larin	Ларін Сергій Миколайович	No	Opposition Platform — For Life	M		
Serhiy Dunayev	Дунаєв Сергій Володимирович	No	Opposition Platform — For Life	M		
Taras Kozak	Козак Тарас Романович	No	Opposition Platform — For Life	M		

Name (Latin)	Name (Cyrillic)	Promi- nence	Party	Gender	Facebook Username	Twitter Username
Yuliy Ioffe	Юффе Юлій Якович	No	Opposition Platform — For Life	M		
Mykhailo Papiyev	Папів Михайло Миколайович	No	Opposition Platform — For Life	M		
Ihor Abramovych	Абрамович Ігор Олександрович	No	Opposition Platform — For Life	M		
Dmytro Isaienko	Ісаєнко Дмитро Валерійович	No	Opposition Platform — For Life	M		
Mykola Skoryk	Скорик Микола Леонідович	No	Opposition Platform — For Life	M		
Hryhoriy Surkis	Суркіс Григорій Михайлович	No	Opposition Platform — For Life	M		
Ihor Kisilyov	Кісільов Ігор Петрович	No	Opposition Platform — For Life	M		
Yuriy Zahorodnyi	Загородній Юрій Іванович	No	Opposition Platform — For Life	M		
Anatoliy Burmich	Бурміч Анатолій Петрович	No	Opposition Platform — For Life	M		
Oleksandr Koltunovych	Колтунович Олександр Сергійович	No	Opposition Platform — For Life	M		
Hryhoriy Mamka	Мамка Григорій Миколайович	No	Opposition Platform — For Life	M		
Volodymyr Kaltsev	Кальцев Володимир Федорович	No	Opposition Platform — For Life	M		
Viktor Chornyi	Чорний Віктор Іванович	No	Opposition Platform — For Life	M		
Vitaliy Bort	Борт Віталій Петрович	No	Opposition Platform — For Life	M		
Mykhailo Makarenko	Макаренко Михайло Васильович	No	Opposition Platform — For Life	M		
Oleh Voloshyn	Волошин Олег Анатолійович	No	Opposition Platform — For Life	M		
Oleksandr Puzanov	Пузанов Олександр Геннадійович	No	Opposition Platform — For Life	M		
Suto Mamoiian	Мамоян Суто Чолоєвич	No	Opposition Platform — For Life	M		
Oleksandr Kachnyi	Качний Олександр Сталіноленович	No	Opposition Platform — For Life	M		

Name (Latin)	Name (Cyrillic)	Promi nence	Party	Gender	Facebook Username	Twitter Username
Serhiy Soboliev	Соболев Сергій Владиславович	No	Batkivshchyna	M		
Ivan Kyrylenko	Кириленко Іван Григорович	No	Batkivshchyna	M		
Andriy Kozhemiakin	Кожем'якін Андрій Анатолійович	No	Batkivshchyna	M		
Oleksandr Abdullin	Абдулін Олександр Рафкатович	No	Batkivshchyna	M		
Kostiantyn Bondariev	Бондарев Костянтин Анатолійович	No	Batkivshchyna	M		
Vitaliy Danilov	Данілов Віталій Богданович	No	Batkivshchyna	M		
Oleksiy Kucherenko	Кучеренко Олексій Юрійович	No	Batkivshchyna	M		
Andriy Nikolayenko	Ніколаєнко Андрій Іванович	No	Batkivshchyna	M		
Mykhailo Zabrodskyi	Забродський Михайло Віталійович	No	European Solidarity	M		
Artur Herasymov	Герасимов Артур Володимирович	No	European Solidarity	M		
Mykola Velychkovych	Величкович Микола Романович	No	European Solidarity	M		
Ruslan Knyazevych	Князевич Руслан Петрович	No	European Solidarity	M		
Maksym Savrasov	Саврасов Максим Віталійович	No	European Solidarity	M		
Oleksiy Liubchenko	Любченко Олексій Миколайович	Yes		M		
Serhiy Bessarab	Бессараб Сергій Борисович	Yes	Independent	M		
Serhiy Marchenko	Марченко Сергій Михайлович	Yes		M		
Andriy Taran	Таран Андрій Васильович	Yes	Strength and Honor	M		
Illia Yemets	Ємець Ілля Миколайович	Yes	Ukraine - Forward!	M		
Maksym Stepanov	Степанов Максим Володимирович	Yes		M		
Yuriy Poliukhovych	Полухович Юрій Юрійович	Yes		M		
Serhiy Shkarlet	Шкарлет Сергій Миколайович	Yes	Party of Regions	M		
Vitaliy Shubin	Шубін Віталій Миколайович	Yes	Independent	M		
Herman Halushchenko	Галущенко Герман Валерьевич	Yes		M		
Pavlo Kukhta	Кухта Павло Андрійович	Yes	Holos	M		
Ihor Petrashko	Петрашко Ігор Ростиславович	Yes	Independent	M		
Roman Leshchenko	Лещенко Роман Миколайович	Yes		M		

Source: Author's curation of politician names, information, and social media handles.

Appendix B

Topics Used by Women, Men, and Both Genders on Facebook and Twitter (Order = T-value,

N = 70) (Chapter 3)

Gender of Topic	Topic	Top Words	Estimate	Std. Error	T-value	Pr(> t)	Sig.
Women	Call for support (#, @)	No fly zone, help, UK leaders	-0.0233	0.000584	-39.847	< 2e-16	***
Women	People affected by war	Children, women, die, mother	-0.00748	0.000528	-14.153	< 2e-16	***
Women	NA	Know, look, like	-0.00517	0.000379	-13.65	< 2e-16	***
Women	People affected by war	Mariupol, civilian, humanitarian, evacuate	-0.00626	0.000552	-11.341	< 2e-16	***
Women	Government affairs and infrastructure	Crime, prosecutor, evidence	-0.00638	0.000565	-11.302	< 2e-16	***
Women	Government affairs and infrastructure	Moscow, church, orthodox	-0.0055	0.000515	-10.696	< 2e-16	***
Women	Call for support (#, @)	NATO, closthesky, EU leaders	-0.00584	0.000563	-10.378	< 2e-16	***
Women	People affected by war	Stay home, shelter	-0.00286	0.000305	-9.372	< 2e-16	***
Women	Youth	Children, school	-0.00467	0.000507	-9.209	< 2e-16	***
Women	Social/TV Media	Espresso, talk, broadcast	-0.00483	0.000537	-8.997	< 2e-16	***
Women	Global impact of war	Chernobyl, nuclear, threat, Enerhodar	-0.00414	0.000484	-8.547	< 2e-16	***
Women	Government affairs and infrastructure	Parliament, council, Strasbourg	-0.00302	0.000358	-8.433	< 2e-16	***
Women	Government affairs and infrastructure	Nurse, cancer, medic, save	-0.00455	0.000548	-8.307	< 2e-16	***
Women	Government affairs and infrastructure (@)	UA Holos party politicians	-0.002	0.000285	-7.037	1.98E-12	***
Women	Social/TV Media	Telegram, Whatsapp, Instagram	-0.00219	0.000398	-5.502	3.76E-08	***
Women	Government affairs and infrastructure	Covid vaccine, health	-0.00228	0.000443	-5.139	2.78E-07	***
Women	Russia aggressor (#)	Stopputin, destroy, kill, buchamassacre	-0.00272	0.000715	-3.805	0.000142	***
Women	Government affairs and infrastructure	Tax, pensions, budget	-0.0013	0.000492	-2.65	0.00805	**
Women	War - optimism (@)	EU membership, union, status	-0.00133	0.000659	-2.024	0.042974	*
Women	Ukrainian culture	Easter, holiday, Happy, vyshyvanka	-0.00158	0.000877	-1.802	0.071471	.
Women	War - optimism	Community, district, repair, territory	-0.00094	0.000528	-1.786	0.07416	.
Both	Government affairs and infrastructure	Oligarch, asset, fund	-0.000526	0.000385	-1.366	0.171952	

Gender of Topic	Topic	Top Words	Estimate	Std. Error	T-value	Pr(> t)	Sig.
Both	Government affairs and infrastructure	Corruption, reform	-0.00043	0.000318	-1.348	0.177544	
Both	Military	Martial law, military	-0.0008	0.000628	-1.278	0.20121	
Both	Government affairs and infrastructure	Transport, car, rail	-0.00027	0.00035	-0.764	0.4451	
Both	Ukrainian culture	Kobzar, literature, Shevchenko	-0.00028	0.000373	-0.746	0.456	
Both	Ukrainian culture	Culture, history, nation	-0.00017	0.000425	-0.405	0.685547	
Both	Government affairs and infrastructure	Forest, zoo, environment, nature	0.0000489	0.000379	-0.129	0.8974	
Both	NA	Time, year, ago	0.0000214	0.000195	0.109	0.9129	
Both	Government affairs and infrastructure	Loans, mortgages, agreements	0.0000327	0.00027	0.121	0.903719	
Both	Call for support	Humanitarian aid, bulletproof, thank	0.000146	0.000722	0.203	0.83938	
Both	NA	Today, another, yesterday	0.0000189	0.0000355	0.531	0.595166	
Both	Sanctions	SWIFT, IBAN, bank	0.000151	0.000235	0.644	0.519559	
Both	Ukrainian culture	Ukraine, language, resist	0.0000964	0.000105	0.918	0.35883	
Both	People affected by war	Kyiv, curfew	0.000296	0.000292	1.016	0.30971	
Both	Ukrainian culture	Eurovision, kalush	0.000462	0.000452	1.022	0.306561	
Both	Government affairs and infrastructure	Diya app, service, convenience	0.000674	0.000535	1.26	0.207798	
Men	Government affairs and infrastructure (@)	Ukraine, ministry, EU/US/CA leaders	0.000778	0.000455	1.71	0.08722	.
Men	Government affairs and infrastructure	Understand, country, fact, politician	0.000791	0.000409	1.933	0.05324	.
Men	Russia aggressor (#)	Report, Kremlebot, journalist	0.000593	0.000294	2.015	0.0439	*
Men	Government affairs and infrastructure	Verkhovna Rada, law	0.001183	0.000571	2.073	0.03822	*
Men	People affected by war	Necessity, work, wartime	0.000379	0.000143	2.646	0.008144	**
Men	Sanctions (@)	Sanctions, boycott, Russian companies	0.001561	0.000574	2.721	0.00651	**
Men	Government affairs and infrastructure	Develop industry, economy	0.001175	0.000428	2.747	0.006009	**
Men	Russia aggressor (#)	World, war, Putin, evil, fightlikeukrainian	0.001092	0.000378	2.889	0.003869	**
Men	Sanctions	Sanction, Russian oil	0.001532	0.000494	3.099	0.001942	**
Men	War	Belarus, Minsk, Lukashenko, border	0.001584	0.000369	4.289	1.79E-05	***
Men	Government affairs and infrastructure	Servant, people, deputy	0.00147	0.000338	4.352	1.35E-05	***

Gender of Topic	Topic	Top Words	Estimate	Std. Error	T-value	Pr(> t)	Sig.
Men	Youth	Youth, sport, Ukraine	0.002634	0.000589	4.472	7.78E-06	***
Men	NA	Urgent, sign, fuck, wait	0.000722	0.000155	4.671	3.00E-06	***
Men	Accuse pro-Russian politicians	Yanukovych, treason, Medvedchuk, Sharia	0.002246	0.000476	4.715	2.42E-06	***
Men	Global impact of war	Grain exports, Black Sea	0.002467	0.000475	5.195	2.05E-07	***
Men	People affected by war	Occupy, Crimea, Donbas, deport	0.002753	0.000506	5.446	5.17E-08	***
Men	Global impact of war	Gas, energy, price, supply	0.002335	0.000386	6.054	1.42E-09	***
Men	Military	Tank, aircraft, missile	0.004568	0.000699	6.532	6.54E-11	***
Men	Government affairs and infrastructure	Cabinet, state, ministry	0.002358	0.00036	6.558	5.47E-11	***
Men	Government affairs and infrastructure	UA city names (Kharkiv, Cherkasy, Donetsk)	0.003926	0.000504	7.785	7.04E-15	***
Men	War - optimism	Victory, soon, definite	0.002632	0.000294	8.939	< 2e-16	***
Men	Social/TV media	Video, news, platform	0.001957	0.000215	9.097	< 2e-16	***
Men	Sanctions (@)	Block Google, Microsoft, Meta, Netflix	0.003898	0.000397	9.827	< 2e-16	***
Men	Russia aggressor	Russia, aggressor, invasion, Ukraine	0.004246	0.000402	10.55	< 2e-16	***
Men	Government affairs and infrastructure	Southern cities, Odesa, Mykolaiv	0.00019	0.000175	10.875	< 2e-16	***
Men	Russia aggressor	Burn, crook, rashist	0.00246	0.000222	11.046	< 2e-16	***
Men	Call for support (#, @)	Support, Ukraine, Poland, international leaders	0.005593	0.000506	11.062	< 2e-16	***
Men	Government affairs and infrastructure	Economy, natural resources	0.003965	0.000326	12.166	< 2e-16	***
Men	Russia aggressor	Kremlin, lie, Nazi, propaganda	0.005204	0.000418	12.454	< 2e-16	***
Men	War (@)	Ukraine, meet, discuss, security, US leaders	0.007414	0.000591	12.545	< 2e-16	***
Men	Military	Courage, defend, fight	0.00852	0.000641	13.294	< 2e-16	***
Men	Government affairs and infrastructure	Trade union, worker	0.005237	0.000339	15.469	< 2e-16	***
Men	Military	Command, armed, forces	0.00962	0.000594	16.178	< 2e-16	***

Source: Author's calculations based on data collected from 23 February to 28 June 2021 and 23 February to 28 June 2022.

Appendix C

Database of International Figures (Order = Alphabetical by Twitter Handle, N = 417)

(Chapters 4 and 5)

Twitter Handle	Username	Gender	Type	Country	Theme
_Friedrichmerz	Friedrich Merz	M	Politician	Germany	Politics
_Jakubjanda	Jakub Janda 楊雅譽	M	Individual	Czech Republic	Foreign Affairs
A_Anusauskas	Arvydas Anušauskas	M	Politician	Lithuania	Defence
Abaerbock	Außenministerin Annalena Baerbock	F	Politician	Germany	Foreign Affairs
Adamkinzinger	Adam Kinzinger #Fella	M	Journalist	USA	Journalism
Ahuitfeldt	Anniken Huitfeldt	F	Politician	Norway	Foreign Affairs
Alain_Berset	Alain Berset	M	Politician	Switzerland	Politics
Alarkaris	Alar Karis	M	Politician	Estonia	Politics
Alexanderdecroo	Alexander De Croo BEEU	M	Politician	Belgium	Politics
Aliciakearns	Alicia Kearns Mp	F	Politician	United Kingdom	Politics
Alivelshi	Ali Velshi	M	Journalist	USA	Journalism
Andersostlund	Anders Östlund - Ī	M	Individual	Sweden	Foreign Affairs
Andrejplenkovic	Andrej Plenković	M	Politician	Croatia	Politics
Andrzejduda	Andrzej Duda	M	Politician	Poland	Politics
Anitaanandmp	Anita Anand	F	Politician	Canada	Defence
Annlinde	Ann Linde	M	Politician	Turkey	Foreign Affairs
Anthonyrota	Anthony Rota	M	Politician	Canada	Politics
Antoniocostapm	António Costa	M	Politician	Portugal	Politics
Antonioguterres	António Guterres	M	Politician	International	Politics
Apmassaro3	Paul Massaro	M	Individual	Usa	Foreign Affairs
Arekmularczyk	Arkadiusz Mularczyk	M	Politician	Poland	Foreign Affairs
Baerbelbas	Bärbel Bas	F	Politician	Germany	Politics
Benjaminhaddad	Benjamin Haddad	M	Politician	France	Politics
Billbrowder	Bill Browder	M	Individual	USA	Economics
Borisjohnson	Boris Johnson	M	Politician	United Kingdom	Politics
Brihasselman	Britta Haßelmann	F	Politician	Germany	Politics
Bujar_O	Bujar Osmani	M	Politician	Macedonia	Foreign Affairs
Bundeskanzler	Bundeskanzler Olaf Scholz	M	Politician	Germany	Politics
Bwallacemp	Rt. Hon Ben Wallace Mp	M	Politician	United Kingdom	Defence
C_Lindner	Christian Lindner	M	Politician	Germany	Politics
Cafreeland	Chrystia Freeland	F	Politician	Canada	Politics
Charlesmichel	Charles Michel	M	Politician	European Union	Politics
Christogrozev	Christo Grozev	M	Journalist	Bulgaria	Journalism
Commonsspeaker	Sir Lindsay Hoyle	M	Politician	United	Politics

Twitter Handle	Username	Gender	Type	Country	Theme
				Kingdom	
D_Boeselager	Damian Boeselager	M	Politician	European Union	Politics
Davidmalpasswbg	David Malpass	M	International Organisation	International	Economics
Defensiemin	Kajsa Ollongren	F	Politician	Netherlands	Defence
Dkovachevski	Dimitar Kovachevski	M	Politician	North Macedonia	Politics
Dominicraab	Dominic Raab	M	Politician	United Kingdom	Politics
Donaldtusk	Donald Tusk	M	Politician	European Union	Politics
Drtedros	Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus	M	International Organisation	International	Humanitarian Aid
Edeponcins	Etienne De Poncins	M	Diplomat	France	Foreign Affairs
Edgarsrinkevics	Edgars Rinkēvičs	M	Politician	Latvia	Foreign Affairs
Ediramaal	Edi Rama	M	Politician	Albania	Politics
Eduardheger	Eduard Heger	M	Politician	Slovakia	Politics
Edvardssmiltens	lv Edvards Smiltēns	M	Politician	Latvia	Politics
Eeriknkross	Erik N Kross	M	Politician	Estonia	Politics
Eliimets	Eva-Maria Liimets	F	Diplomat	Estonia	Foreign Affairs
Elisabeth_Borne	Élisabeth Borne	F	Politician	France	Politics
Elonmusk	Elon Musk	M	Individual	USA	Private Sector
Elzbietawitek	Elżbieta Witek	F	Politician	Poland	Politics
Emmanuelmacron	Emmanuel Macron	M	Politician	France	Politics
Ep_President	Roberta Metsola	F	Politician	European Union	Politics
Eucopresident	Charles Michel	M	Politician	European Union	Politics
Flotus	Jill Biden	F	Individual	USA	Politics
Francis_Scarr	Francis Scarr	M	Politician	United Kingdom	Politics
General_Pavel	Petr Pavel	M	Politician	Czech Republic	Politics
General_Pavel	Prezidentpavel	M	Politician	Czech Republic	Politics
Gerard_Larcher	Gérard Larcher	M	Politician	France	Politics
Giorgiameloni	Giorgia Meloni	F	Politician	Italy	Politics
Gitanasnauseda	Gitanas Nausėda	M	Politician	Lithuania	Politics
Glandsbergis	Gabrielius LandsbergisLT	M	Politician	Lithuania	Foreign Affairs
Goeringeckardt	Katrin Göring-Eckardt	F	Politician	Germany	Politics
Grantshapps	Rt Hon Grant Shapps Mp	M	Politician	United Kingdom	Politics
Haluk	Haluk Bayraktar	M	Individual	Turkey	Defence
Hpevkur	Hanno Pevkur	M	Politician	Estonia	Defence
Ignaziocassis	Ignazio Cassis	M	Politician	Switzerland	Foreign Affairs
Ilhankyuchyuk	Ilhan Kyuchyuk	M	Politician	European Union	Politics
Imurniece	Ināra Mūrniece	F	Politician	Latvia	Politics
Ingridasimonyte	Ingrida Šimonytė	F	Politician	Lithuania	Politics

Twitter Handle	Username	Gender	Type	Country	Theme
Iowbobseely	Bob Seely MP	M	Politician	United Kingdom	Politics
Jamescleverly	James CleverlyGB	M	Politician	United Kingdom	Foreign Affairs
Jamila_Anna	Jamila Schäfer	F	Politician	Germany	Politics
Janezlenarcic	Janez Lenarčič	M	Politician	European Union	Humanitarian Aid
Janlipavsky	Jan Lipavský	M	Politician	Czech Republic	Foreign Affairs
Jaronad	Jaro Nad	M	Politician	Slovakia	Defence
Jciesz	Janusz Cieszyński	M	Politician	Poland	Politics
Jdbalartmsnbc	José Díaz-Balart Reports	M	Journalist	USA	Journalism
Jensstoltenberg	Jens Stoltenberg	M	International Organisation	International	Defence
Jeppekofod	Jeppe Kofod	M	Politician	Denmark	Foreign Affairs
Jjansasds	Janez Janša	M	Politician	Slovenia	Politics
Joe Biden	Joe Biden	M	Politician	USA	Politics
John_Sipher	John Sipher	M	Individual	USA	Defence
Johnedherbst	John Herbst	M	Diplomat	USA	Foreign Affairs
Jonasgahrstore	Jonas Gahr Støre	M	Politician	Norway	Politics
Josepborrellf	Josep Borrell Fontelles	M	Politician	European Union	Foreign Affairs
Juliadavisnews	Julia Davis	F	Journalist	USA	Journalism
Justintrudeau	Justin Trudeau	M	Politician	Canada	Politics
JY_Ledrian	Jean-Yves Le Drian	M	Politician	France	Politics
Kadrisimson	Kadri Simson	F	Politician	European Union	Politics
Kaelinirene	Irène Kälin	F	Politician	Germany	Politics
Kajakallas	Kaja Kallas	F	Politician	Estonia	Politics
Kamalaharris	Kamala Harris	F	Politician	USA	Politics
Karenho51782241	Karen Hodge	F	Individual	USA	Culture
Karimkhanqc	Karim A. A. Khan KC	M	International Organisation	International	Justice/Law
Karlnehammer	Karl Nehammer	M	Politician	Austria	Politics
Kasiamadera	Kasia Madera	F	Journalist	United Kingdom	Journalism
Katrinjak	Katrín Jakobsdóttir	F	Politician	Iceland	Politics
Keir_Starmer	Keir Starmer	M	Politician	United Kingdom	Politics
Kgeorgieva	Kristalina Georgieva	F	Individual	International	Humanitarian Aid
Kirilpetkov	Kiril Petkov	M	Politician	Bulgaria	Politics
Kishida230	岸田文雄	M	Politician	Japan	Politics
Klausiohannis	Klaus Iohannis	M	Politician	Romania	Politics
Kmitsotakis	Kyriakos Mitsotakis	M	Politician	Greece	Politics
Krisjaniskarins	Krišjānis Kariņš	M	Politician	Latvia	Politics
Kubiliusa	Andrius Kubilius	M	Politician	European Union	Politics
Leadermccconnell	Leader McConnell	M	Politician	USA	Politics
Lindseygrahamsc	Lindsey Graham	M	Politician	USA	Politics

Twitter Handle	Username	Gender	Type	Country	Theme
Lordashcroft	Lord Ashcroft	M	Politician	United Kingdom	Politics
Luigidimaio	Luigi Di Maio	M	Politician	Italy	Politics
Manfredweber	Manfred Weber	M	Politician	European Union	Politics
Marcusfaber	Marcus Faber	M	Politician	Germany	Politics
Marinsanna	Sanna Marin	F	Politician	Finland	Politics
Market_A	Markéta Pekarová Adamová	F	Politician	Czech Republic	Politics
Mastrackzi	Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann	F	Politician	Germany	Politics
Masudgh	Masud Gharahkhani	M	Politician	Norway	Politics
Matasmaldeikis	Matas Maldeikis MP LT	M	Politician	Lithuania	Politics
Mathiascormann	Mathias Cormann	M	International Organisation	International	Economics
Mattia_N	Mattia Nelles	M	Politician	Germany	Politics
Mattimaasikas	Matti Maasikas	M	Diplomat	European Union	Foreign Affairs
Mblaszczak	Mariusz Błaszczak	M	Politician	Poland	Politics
Mcfaul	Michael Mcfaul	M	Diplomat	USA	Foreign Affairs
Melaniejoly	Mélanie Joly	F	Politician	Canada	Foreign Affairs
Melindaharing	Melinda Haring	F	Individual	USA	Foreign Affairs
Melsimmonsfcdo	Dame Melinda Simmons	F	Diplomat	United Kingdom	Foreign Affairs
Mevlutcavusoglu	Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	M	Politician	Turkey	Foreign Affairs
Michealmartintd	Micheál Martin	M	Politician	Ireland	Foreign Affairs
Mincolonna	Catherine Colonna	F	Politician	France	Politics
Minpres	Mark Rutte	M	Politician	Netherlands	Politics
Miro_SPD	Michael Roth Mdb EUUA	M	Politician	Germany	Politics
Mohamedbinzayed	محمد بن زايد	M	Politician	United Arab Emirates	Politics
Morawieckim	Mateusz Morawiecki	M	Politician	Poland	Politics
Mscheusgen	Christoph Heusgen	M	Diplomat	Germany	Foreign Affairs
Nadinedorries	Rt Hon Nadine Dorries MP	F	Politician	United Kingdom	Politics
Naftalibennett	Naftali Bennett בנט	M	Politician	Ireland	Politics
Nanasajaia	Nana Sajaia	F	Journalist	USA	Journalism
Netanyahu	Benjamin Netanyahu - בנימין נתניהו	M	Politician	Israel	Politics
Nicolaeciuca	Nicolae Ionel Ciucă	M	Politician	Romania	Politics
Niinisto	Sauli Niinistö	M	Politician	Finland	Politics
Nouripour	Omid Nouripour	M	Politician	Germany	Politics
Olafscholz	Olaf Scholz	M	Politician	Germany	Politics
Olivervarhelyi	Oliver Varhelyi	M	Politician	Belgium	Politics
P_Fiala	Petr Fiala	M	Politician	Czech Republic	Politics
Pa_Anglade	Pieyre-Alexandre Anglade	M	Politician	France	Politics
Pabriks	Artis Pabriks	M	Politician	Latvia	Defence
Pace_President	Tiny Kox	M	Politician	European	Politics

Twitter Handle	Username	Gender	Type	Country	Theme
				Union	
Parmeling	Guy Parmelin	M	Politician	Switzerland	Politics
Petras_Petras	Petras Austrevicius	M	Politician	European Union	Politics
Piotrglinski	Piotr Gliński	M	Politician	Poland	Politics
Pljonson	Pål Jonson	M	Politician	Sweden	Defence
Pontifex	Pope Francis	M	Individual	Vatican City	Culture
Potus	President Biden	M	Politician	USA	Politics
Pritipatel	Priti Patel Mp	F	Politician	United Kingdom	Politics
Profgrodzki	Tomasz Grodzki	M	Politician	Poland	Politics
Rafaelmgrossi	Rafael Marianogrossi	M	International Organisation	International	Nuclear
Ragipsoylu	Ragıp Soylu	M	Journalist	Turkey	Journalism
Ratasjuri	Jüri Ratas	M	Politician	Estonia	Politics
Rauzbigniew	Zbigniew Rau	M	Politician	Poland	Foreign Affairs
Repandy Levin	Rep. Andy Levin	M	Politician	USA	Politics
Repbrianfitz	Rep. Brian Fitzpatrick us	M	Politician	USA	Politics
Repcohen	Steve Cohen	M	Politician	USA	Politics
Rephartzler	Archive: Rep. Vicky Hartzler	F	Politician	USA	Politics
Repjasoncrow	Rep. Jason Crow	M	Politician	USA	Politics
Repjoewilson	Joe Wilson	M	Politician	USA	Politics
Repmarcykaptur	Marcy Kaptur	F	Politician	USA	Politics
Repmgriffith	Morgan Griffith	M	Politician	USA	Politics
Repslotkin	Rep. Elissa Slotkin	F	Politician	USA	Politics
Rhonddabryant	Chris Bryant	M	Politician	United Kingdom	Politics
Ricarda_Lang	Ricarda Lang	F	Politician	Germany	Politics
Rimaabdulmalak	Rima Abdul Malak	F	Politician	France	Culture
Rishisunak	Rishi Sunak	M	Politician	United Kingdom	Politics
Rkiesewetter	Roderich KiesewetterEUDEUNUA	M	Politician	Germany	Politics
Robertametsola	Roberta Metsola	F	Political Organisation	European Union	Politics
Robinwagener	Robin Wagener UA	M	Politician	Germany	Politics
Rterdogan	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	M	Politician	Turkey	Politics
S_Sommaruga	Simonetta Sommaruga	F	Politician	Switzerland	Politics
Saakashvilim	Mikheil Saakashvili	M	Politician	Georgia	Politics
Sanchezcastejon	Pedro Sánchez	M	Politician	Spain	Politics
Sandumaiamd	Maia Sandu	F	Politician	Moldova	Politics
Seblecornu	Sébastien Lecornu	M	Politician	France	Defence
Secblinken	Secretary Antony Blinken	M	Politician	USA	Politics
Secdef	Secretary Of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III	M	Politician	USA	Defence
Senatorcardin	Senator Ben Cardin	M	Politician	USA	Politics
Senatormarkdaly	Senator Mark Daly	M	Politician	Ireland	Politics

Twitter Handle	Username	Gender	Type	Country	Theme
Senatorwicker	Senator Roger Wicker	M	Politician	USA	Politics
Senblumenthal	Richard Blumenthal	M	Politician	USA	Politics
Senschumer	Chuck Schumer	M	Politician	USA	Politics
Shpapuashvili	Shalva Papuashvili GE	M	Politician	Georgia	Politics
Speakerpelosi	Nancy Pelosi	F	Politician	USA	Politics
Stevedaines	Steve Daines	M	Politician	USA	Politics
Stewartmcdonald	Stewart Mcdonald MP	M	Politician	Scotland	Politics
Sumlenny	Sergej Sumlenny	M	Individual	Germany	Academia
Svenjaschulze68	Svenja Schulze	F	Politician	Germany	Politics
Swagenknecht	Sahra Wagenknecht	F	Politician	Germany	Politics
Swedishpm	Swedishpm	M	Politician	Sweden	Politics
Swsjoerdsma	Sjoerd Wiemer Sjoerdsma	M	Politician	Netherlands	Politics
Timmydooley	Timmy Dooley	M	Politician	European Union	Politics
Timothydsnyder	Timothy Snyder	M	Individual	USA	Academia
Tobias_Ellwood	Tobias Ellwood Mp	M	Politician	United Kingdom	Politics
Tobiaslindner	Dr. Tobias Lindner	M	Politician	Germany	Politics
Tobiasthyberg	Tobias Thyberg	M	Diplomat	Sweden	Foreign Affairs
Tomtugendhat	Tom Tugendhat	M	Politician	United Kingdom	Politics
Tonihofreiter	Toni Hofreiter	M	Politician	Germany	Politics
Trussliz	Liz Truss	F	Politician	United Kingdom	Politics
Tsihanouskaya	Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya	F	Politician	Belarus	Politics
Urmarsreinsalu	Urmars Reinsalu	M	Politician	Estonia	Foreign Affairs
Usambkyiv	Ambassador Bridget A. Brink	F	Diplomat	USA	Foreign Affairs
Valstsgriba	Egils Levits	M	Politician	Latvia	Politics
Vcmilyte	Viktorija Cmilyte- Nielsen	F	Politician	Lithuania	Politics
Vdombrovskis	Valdis Dombrovskis	M	Politician	European Union	Politics
Velshimsnbc	Velshi On MSNBC	M	Journalist	USA	Journalism
Violapamherd	Viola Amherd	F	Politician	Switzerland	Politics
Violavoncramon	Viola Von Cramon UAEU	F	Politician	European Union	Politics
Vonderleyen	Ursula Von Der Leyen	F	Politician	European Union	Politics
VP	Vice President Kamala Harris	F	Politician	USA	Politics
Vystreil_Milos	Miloš Vystrčil	M	Politician	Czech Republic	Politics
Wbhoekstra	Wopke Hoekstra	M	Politician	Netherlands	Foreign Affairs
Wolfblitzer	Wolf Blitzer	M	Journalist	USA	Journalism
Xavier_Bettel	Xavier Bettel	M	Politician	Luxembourg	Politics
Yaelbraunpivet	Yaël Braun-Pivet	F	Politician	France	Politics
Ylvajohansson	Ylva Johansson	F	Politician	European Union	Politics

Twitter Handle	Username	Gender	Type	Country	Theme
Yuemillward	Yue.D.Millward	F	Individual	Taiwan	Culture
Zingeris	Emanuelis Zingeris	M	Politician	Lithuania	Politics
Zuzanacaputova	Zuzana Čaputová	F	Politician	Slovakia	Politics
Zygispavilionis	Žygimantaspavilionis	M	Diplomat	Lithuania	Foreign Affairs

Source: Author's compilation of international figures names, information, and Twitter usernames.

Appendix D

Ukraine-Related Keywords (Order = Alphabetical, N = 1,198) (Chapters 4 and 5)

City and Village Names		Ukrainian Politician Twitter Handles	Last Names of Ukrainian Politicians		War-Related Terms (Weapons, Russian Political Names, Hashtags, etc.)
Alchevsk	Mykolaiv	1971BY	Abdullin	Marchuk	Abramovich
Almazna	Mykolaivka	3tramvl026ajrar	Abramovsky	Marikovskiyi	Ammunition
Alupka	Myrhorod	A_Pushkarenko	Abramovych	Marusiak	Amnesty
Alushta	Myrnohrad	Abramovskyy r	Aksyonov	Matusevych	Annex
Amvrosiivka	Myronivka	Ahtem_chyigoz	Alekseyev	Mazurashu	Anti-aircraft
Ananiv	Nadvirna	Alexanderkubrak	Aliksiychuk	Medianyk	Anti-drone
Andrushivka	Nemyriv	Alexandrskichko	Allakhverdiyeva	Medvedchuk	Anti-tank
Anratsyt	Netishyn	Alexdubinskyi	Ananchenko	Meidyeh	Antonov
Apostolove	Nikopol	Anastasiaradina	Arakhamia	Melnyk	Atacam
Armiansk	Nizhyn	Andrejs53143272	Areshonkov	Merezhko	Azov
Artemivsk	Nosivka	Andriikholodov	Ariev	Mezentseva	Baykar
Artsyz	Nova Kakhovka	Andriyparubiy	Aristov	Mialyk	Bayraktar
Avdiivka	Nova Odesa	Annakovalenko39	Arseniuk	Minko	Belarus
Bakhchysarai	Novhorod-Siverskyi	Antonkisse	Avakov	Mokan	Black Sea
Bakhmach	Novoazovsk	Antonyatsenko	Babak	Molotok	Blue and yellow
Bakhmut	Novodnistrovsk	Arakhamia david	Babenko	Monastyrskiyi	Bomb shelter
Balakliia	Novodruzhesk	Avakovarsen	Babii	Moroz	Bortnikov
Balta	Novohrodivka	Batenko_taras	Bakumov	Moshenets	Botashev
Baranivka	Novoiavorivsk	Bogdanetsa	Bakunets	Moshenets	Bucha
Barvinkove	Novomoskovsk	Denys_Shmyhal	Baloha	Motovilovets	Caesar
Bashtanka	Novomyrhorod	Dmytrokuleba	Bardina	Movchan	Chornobyl
Baturyn	Novoselytsia	Dmytronatalukha	Batenko	Mulyk	Closethesky
Berdiansk	Novoukrainka	Drazumkov	Beleniuk	Murdiy	Counter offensive
Berdychiv	Novovolynsk	Eduardprosk	Berezin	Mykhailiuk	Counteroffensive
Berehove	Novyi Buh	Elenamoshenets	Bessarab	Mykysha	Crimea
Berestechko	Novyi Kalyniv	Fedorovmykhailo	Bezghin	Mysiahin	Deripaska
Berezan	Novyi Rozdil	Feldman_Ukraine	Bezuhla	Nahayevskiyi	Donetsk
Berezhany	Obukhiv	Goncharenkoua	Bielkova	Nahorniak	Drone
Berezivka	Ochakiv	Grishchukroma	Bilozir	Nalyotov	Energoatom
Berezne	Odesa	Halynayanchenko	Bobliakh	Nalyvaichenko	F-16
Bershad	Okhtyrka	Hryhoriynemyria	Bobrovska	Natalukha	Fighter jet
Beryslav	Oleksandriia	Igor_Guz	Bogdanets	Nehulevskiyi	Fighter plane
Bibrka	Oleksandrivsk	Iklympush	Bohutska	Nekliudov	Foreign legion
Bila Tserkva	Oleshky	Ikryvosheyev	Boiko	Nemchinov	Freeze asset
Bilhorod-Dnistrovskiyi	Olevsk	Innasovsun	Bondar	Nemyria	Frolov
Biliaivka	Orikhiv	Irynafriz	Bondarenko	Nesterenko	Frozen asset
Bilohirsk	Ostroh	Irynagerashche2	Bondariev	Nikitina	Full invasion

City and Village Names		Ukrainian Politician Twitter Handles	Last Names of Ukrainian Politicians		War-Related Terms (Weapons, Russian Political Names, Hashtags, etc.)
Bilopillia	Ovruch	Irynavereshchuk	Borodin	Nikolayenko	Full war
Bilozerske	Pavlohrad	Ivankrulko	Bort	Nimchenko	Gazprom
Bilytske	Perechyn	Ivchenko Vadim	Borzova	Novikov	Genocidal
Blahovishchenske	Pereiaslav	Kabachenkovol	Bozhyk	Novynskyi	Genocide
Bobrovytsia	Peremyshliany	Kiraincongress	Brahar	Odarchenko	Gerasimov
Bobrynets	Pereshchepyne	Kivailya	Buimister	Osadchuk	Gmlr
Bohodukhiv	Perevalsk	Konstankevych1	Bulakh	Ostapenko	Goryachev
Bohuslav	Pershotravensk	Kravchukev	Bunin	Ovchynnikova	Grain initiative
Bolekhiv	Pervomaisk	Labaziukserhiy	Burmich	Palytsia	Grain ship
Bolhrad	Pervomaisk	Labunska A	Buslavets	Papiyev	Granar
Borshchiv	Pervomaiskyi	Larysabilozir	Buzhanskyi	Parubiy	Guryev
Boryslav	Petrovske	Lesiavasylenko	Chaikivskyi	Pashkovskyi	Heavy weapon
Boryspil	Piatykhatky	Liashko viktor	Cherniavskyi	Pasichnyi	Himar
Borzna	Pidhaitsi	Lisayasko	Cherniev	Pavlenko	Holodomor
Boyarka	Pidhorodne	Lubinetzs	Chernyshov	Pavlenko	Hostomel
Brianka	Pivdenne	Lzaburanna	Chornomorov	Pavlish	Howitzer
Brody	Pochaiv	M tsymbaliuk	Chorny	Pavliuk	International Criminal Court
Broshniv-Osada	Podilsk	Maksym dyrdin	Chyihoz	Pavlovskyi	Ivanchuk
Brovary	Pohrebyshche	Marianabezuhla	Danilov	Perebyinis	Izuym
Bucha	Pokrov	Marikovskyi	Danutsa	Petrashko	Izyum
Buchach	Pokrovsk	Marynabardina	Demchenko	Petruniak	Javelin
Burshtyn	Polohy	Mdzhemilev	Derkach	Petyovka	Kadyrov
Burn	Polonne	Medvedchuk2024	Didenko	Pidlasa	Kakhova
Busk	Poltava	Mezentseva_dep	Dmytriyeva	Pipa	Kalibr
Chasiv Yar	Pomichna	Molotokigor	Dmytruk	Plachkova	Kalush
Cherkasy	Popasna	Mpmaria Ionova	Dovhyi	Podhorna	Kara-Murza
Chernihiv	Pripyat	Mykhailvolynets	Drabovskyi	Poliak	Karlivka
Chernivtsi	Pryluky	Nkorolevska	Dubil	Poliakov	Kharkov
Chernobyl	Prymorsk	Nshufrich	Dubinsky	Poliukhovych	Kiev
Chervonohrad	Pryvillia	Oakachura	Dubnevych	Ponomaryov	Kinzhal
Chervono-partyzansk	Pustomyty	Ole Kondratiuk	Dubnov	Poroshenko	Klitchko
Chornomorsk	Putyvl	Olekkorn	Dunayev	Poturayev	Kremlin
Chortkiv	Pyriatyn	Oleksiireznicov	Dunda	Proshchuk	Kutozov
Chudniv	Radekhiv	Olenashuliak	Dyrdin	Prykhodko	Lavrov
Chuhuv	Radomyshl	Onemchinov	Dzhemiliev	Pryputen	Leopard
Chyhyryn	Radyvyliv	Otkachenkoua	Fediyenko	Prystaiko	Lugansk
Chystiakove	Rakhiv	Pavlenko Yuriy	Fedorov	Purtova	Luhansk
Debaltseve	Rava-Ruska	Pavlo Melnik	Fedyna	Pushkarenko	Lukashenka
Derazhnia	Reshetylivka	Pavlo_sushko	Feldman	Puzanov	Lukashenko
Derhachi	Rivne	Pavlo yakymenko	Fomenko	Puziychuk	Lvova
Dnipro	Rodynske	Poroshenko	Fris	Pyvovarov	Makarov

City and Village Names		Ukrainian Politician Twitter Handles	Last Names of Ukrainian Politicians		War-Related Terms (Weapons, Russian Political Names, Hashtags, etc.)
Dniprorudne	Rohatyn	Purtova aa	Friz	Rabinovych	Mariupol
Dobromyl	Romny	R stefanchuk	Frolov	Radutskyi	Martial law
Dobropillia	Rovenky	Renat_Kuzmin	Haidu	Rakhmanin	Mass grave
Dokuchaievsk	Rozdilna	Rlozynskyi	Halaichuk	Razumkov	Matviyenko
Dolyna	Rozhyshe	Rostpav	Halushchenko	Reznikov	Medvedev
Dolynska	Rubizhne	Rostyslavtystyk	Halushko	Riabukha	Mercenary
Donetsk	Rudky	Rustem_umerov	Herashchenko	Riepina	MH17
Drohobych	Rzhyshechiv	S_vakarchuk	Herasymenko	Rublyov	MI-8
Druzhba	Sambir	Sashaustinovaa	Herasymov	Rudenko	Mig-29
Druzhkivka	Sarny	Sergijdemcenko	Hereha	Rudyk	Military operation
Dubliany	Selydove	Serhiyalekseyev	Herman	Rushchyshyn	Minsk
Dubno	Semenivka	Serhiylovochkin	Herus	Saladukha	Mishustin
Dubrovysia	Seredyna-Buda	Stefanishynao	Hetmantsev	Salamakha	Mortar
Dunavtsi	Sevastopol	Stepan_Ivakhiv	Hevko	Saliychuk	Moscow
Dzhankoi	Shakhtarsk	Sviatoslavua	Hnatenko	Savchenko	Moskva
Enerhodar	Sharhorod	Synyutka	Honcharenko	Savchuk	Naryshkin
Fastiv	Shchastia	V_Lunchenko	Horbenko	Savrasov	Nasam
Feodosia	Shcholkine	Vadimstolar	Horniuk	Seminskyi	Naval block
Hadiach	Shepetivka	Vadymhalaichuk	Horobets	Severyn	Navalny
Haisyn	Shostka	Valerii_Dubil	Horvat	Shakhov	Nikolsky
Haivoron	Shpola	Venediktovaiv	Hryb	Shapovalov	No to war
Halych	Shumsk	Viatrovyeh	Hrynychuk	Shentsev	No war
Henichesk	Sievierodonetsk	Viktorbaloha	Hryshchenko	Shevchenko	Nordstream
Hertsia	Simferopol	Vitrenkoyuriy	Hryshchuk	Shkarlet	Novodanilovka Nuclear power plant
Hirnyk	Siversk	Volodymyrariiev	Hryshyna	Shkrum	
Hirske	Skadovsk	Volodymyrzakha3	Hryvko	Shmyhal	Oblast
Hlobyne	Skalat	Vprystaiko	Hunko	Shpak	Occupied territor Occupied territories
Hlukhiv	Skole	Yarlyur	Hurin	Shpenov	
Hlyniany	Skvyra	Yuliasvryydenk3	Hutsait	Shtepa	Occupied territory
Hnivan	Slavuta	Yuliatymoshenko	Huz	Shubin	Odessa
Hola Prystan	Slavutych	Yuriykamelchuk	Huzenko	Shufrych	Okhtyrka
Horishni Plavni	Sloviansk	Zelenskyyua	Ioffe	Shuliak	Olenivka
Horlivka	Smila	Zhmerenetskyi	Ionova	Shvets	Ovsyannikova
Horodenka	Sniatyn		Ionushas	Shynkarenko	Partial mobiliz
Horodnia	Snihurivka		Isaienko	Shypailo	Patrushev
Horodok	Snizhne		Ivakhiv	Siumar	Pavlyuk
Horodyshche	Snovsk		Ivanchuk	Skichko	Peskov
Horokhiv	Sokal		Ivanisov	Skorokhod	Petersberg
Hrebinka	Sokyriany		Ivanov	Skoryk	Polishchuk
Huliaipole	Soledar		Ivchenko	Slavytska	Prigozhin
Ichnia	Sosnivka		Kabachenko	Soboliev	Prigozhyn

City and Village Names	Ukrainian Politician Twitter Handles	Last Names of Ukrainian Politicians		War-Related Terms (Weapons, Russian Political Names, Hashtags, etc.)
Illintsi	Starobilsk	Kabanov	Sokha	Prokhorov
Ilovaisk	Starokostiantyniv	Kachnyi	Solod	Putin
Inkerman	Saryi Krym	Kachura	Solomchuk	Putinwarcriminal
Irmino	Saryi Sambir	Kalaur	Solskyi	Rammstein
Irpin	Stebnyk	Kalchenko	Sova	Ramzan
Irshava	Storozhynets	Kaltsev	Sovhyria	Red cross
Ivano-Frankivsk	Stryi	Kamelchuk	Sovsun	Referend
Iziaslav	Sudak	Kaptielov	Stefanchuk	Rocket launcher
Izium	Sudova Vyshnia	Kasai	Stefanyshyna	Rosatom
Izmail	Sukhodilsk	Khalimon	Stepanov	Rostov
Kadiivka	Sumy	Kholodov	Sterniychuk	Rotenberg
Kaharlyk	Svaliava	Khomenko	Stolar	Ruble
Kakhovka	Svatove	Khrystencko	Strelets	Russia
Kalush	Sverdlovsk	Kinzburka	Strikharskyi	Russianwarcrimes
Kalynivka	Sviatohirsk	Kisiel	Strunevych	Russo
Kamianets-Podilskyi	Svitlodarsk	Kisilyov	Sukhov	S-400
Kamianka	Svitlovodsk	Klochko	Surkis	Saboteur
Kamianka-Buzka	Synelnykove	Klymenko	Sushko	Sadovy
Kamianka-Dniprovka	Talne	Klympush-Tsyntsadze	Svyrydenko	Sanction
Kamianske	Tarashcha	Kniazhytskyi	Syniutka	Scale invasion
Kamin-Kashyrskyi	Tatarbunary	Knyazevych	Taran	Scale war
Kaniv	Tavriisk	Koleboshyn	Tarassenko	Sechin
Karlivka	Teplodar	Koliev	Tarasov	Send weapon
Kerch	Terebovlia	Kolisnyk	Taruta	Shelling
Kharkiv	Ternivka	Koliukh	Tistyk	Shoigu
Khartsyzk	Ternopil	Koltunovych	Tkachenko	Sievierodonetsk
Kherson	Tetiiv	Kolykhaiev	Tkachenko	Simonov
Khmelnyskyi	Tiachiv	Kondratiuk	Torokhtiy	Simonyan
Khmilnyk	Tlumach	Konstankevych	Tretiakova	Slava
Khodoriv	Tokmak	Kopanchuk	Trukhin	Snake island
Khorol	Toretsk	Kopytin	Tsabal	Sobyanin
Khorostkiv	Trostanets	Koriavchenkov	Tsyba	Soviet
Khotyn	Truskavets	Korniyenko	Tymbaliuk	Starlink
Khrystynivka	Tulchyn	Korolevska	Tymofiychuk	Stefania
Khust	Tysmenytsia	Kostenko	Tymoshenko	Stephania
Khyriv	Uhniv	Kostin	Tyshchenko	Storm shadow
Kiliia	Ukrainka	Kostiuk	Umansky	Su-35
Kirovsk	Ukrainsk	Kostiukh	Umerov	Sukhovetsky
Kirovske	Ustyluh	Koval	Urbanskyi	Sunflower
Kitsman	Uzhhorod	Kovalchuk	Urussy	Surovikin
Kivertsi	Uzyn	Kovalenko	Ustenko	Territorial

City and Village Names	Ukrainian Politician Twitter Handles	Last Names of Ukrainian Politicians		War-Related Terms (Weapons, Russian Political Names, Hashtags, etc.)
				integrity
Kobeliaky	Vakhrusheve	Kovalyov	Ustinova	Transnistria
Kodyma	Valky	Kozak	Vahnier	Tsokov
Kolomyia	Varash	Kozhemiakin	Vakarchuk	Tvorchi
Komarno	Vashkivtsi	Krasnosilska	Vasylchenko	Ugledar
Komsomolske	Vasylivka	Krasov	Vasylenko	Ukrain
Konotop	Vasylkiv	Kravchuk	Vasylevska-Smahliuk	Unitedwithukraine
Kopychyntsi	Vatutine	Kreidenko	Vasyliiev	Usmanov
Korets	Velyki Mosty	Kriachko	Vasyliv	Verkhovna
Koriukivka	Verkhivtseve	Krulko	Vasylkovskyi	Volvonach
Korosten	Verkhnodniprovsk	Krykliy	Vatras	Wagner
Korostyshiv	Vilniansk	Kryvoruchkina	Vatsak	War crime
Korsun-Shevchenkivskyi	Vilnohirsk	Kryvosheyev	Velmozhnyi	Warcrime
Kosiv	Vynnytsia	Kubiv	Velychkovych	Ykraina
Kostiantynivka	Volnovakha	Kubrakov	Venediktova	Zaluzhnyi
Kostopil	Volochysk	Kucher	Venislavskyi	Zaporizhzhia
Kovel	Volodymyr	Kucher	Vereshchuk	Zaporizhzhya
Koziatyn	Vorozhba	Kucherenko	Viatrovych	Zelenska
Kramatorsk	Vovchansk	Kukhta	Vintoniak	Zelensky
Krasnodon	Voznesensk	Kuleba	Virastyuk	Zmiya
Krasnohorivka	Vuhledar	Kulinich	Vitrenko	ZNPP
Krasnohrad	Vuhlehirsk	Kultenko	Vlasenko	Zolotov
Krasnoperekopsk	Vylkove	Kunayev	Volodina	
Krasnyi Luch	Vynnyky	Kunyttskyi	Voloshyn	
Krasyliv	Vynohradiv	Kuzbyt	Volynets	
Kremenchuk	Vyshhorod	Kuzmin	Voronko	
Kremenets	Vyshneve	Kuzminykh	Voronov	
Kreminna	Vyzhnytsia	Kuznietsov	Yakovenko	
Krolevets	Yahotyn	Kyrychenko	Yakovlieva	
Kropyvnytskyi	Yalta	Kyrylenko	Yakymenko	
Kryvyi Rih	Yampil	Kysylevskyi	Yanchenko	
Kupiansk	Yaremche	Kytsak	Yaremenko	
Kurakhove	Yasynuvata	Kyva	Yasko	
Kyiv	Yavoriv	Laba	Yatsenko	
Ladyzhyn	Yenakieve	Labaziuk	Yatsyk	
Lanivtsi	Yevpatoria	Labunska	Yefimov	
Lebedyn	Yunokomunarivsk	Laputina	Yemets	
Liuboml	Yuzhne	Larin	Yunakov	
Liubotyn	Yuzhnoukrainsk	Lazebna	Yurash	
Lokhvytsia	Zalishchyky	Leonov	Yurchenko	
Lozova	Zalizne	Leros	Yurchyshyn	

City and Village Names	Ukrainian Politician Twitter Handles	Last Names of Ukrainian Politicians	War-Related Terms (Weapons, Russian Political Names, Hashtags, etc.)
Lubny	Zaporizhzhia	Leshchenko	Yurchyshyn
Luhansk	Zastavna	Liashenko	Yuzhanina
Lutsk	Zavodske	Liashko	Zablotskyi
Lutuhyne	Zbarazh	Lichman	Zabrodskyi
Lviv	Zboriv	Litvinov	Zaburanna
Lyman	Zdolbuniv	Liubchenko	Zadorozhniy
Lypovets	Zelenodolsk	Liubota	Zadorozhnyi
Lysychansk	Zhashkiv	Liushniak	Zahorodnyi
Makiivka	Zhdanivka	Lopushanskyi	Zahoruiko
Mala Vyska	Zhmerynka	Lozynskyi	Zakharchenko
Malyn	Zhovkva	Lubinets	Zaremskyi
Marhanets	Zhovti Vody	Lukashev	Zaslavskyi
Marinka	Zhydachiv	Lunchenko	Zavitnevych
Mariupol	Zhytomyr	Lyovochkin	Zdebskyi
Melitopol	Zinkiv	Lyovochkina	Zelensky
Merefa	Zmiiv	Lys	Zhelezniak
Miusynsk	Znamianka	Lytvynenko	Zhmerenetskyi
Mohyliv-Podilskyi	Zolochiv	Mahera	Zhupanyn
Molochansk	Zolote	Mahomedov	Zinkevych
Molodohvardiisk	Zolotonosha	Makarenko	Zub
Monastyryshche	Zorynsk	Makarov	Zuyev
Monastyryska	Zuhres	Maliuska	
Morshyn	Zvenyhorodka	Mamka	
Mospyne	Zviahel	Mamoian	
Mostyska	Zymohiria	Mandziy	
Mukachevo		Marchenko	

Source: Author's compilation.

Note: Some war-related terms are stemmed (such as "Ukrain") to ensure they capture all possible word endings, such as "Ukraine" and "Ukrainians".

Appendix E*Topics Used by Women, Men, and Both Genders on Twitter (Order = T-value, N = 100)**(Chapter 4)*

Gender of Topic	Topic Summary	Estimate	Std. Error	T-value	Pr(> t)	Sig.
Women	Unity and need for #noflyzone	-0.0234	0.000411	-56.98	<2e-16	***
Women	Murder of children, mothers and families	-0.00788	0.000253	-31.17	<2e-16	***
Women	Calls for action, standwithukraine, stoprussia	-0.00783	0.00027	-29.04	<2e-16	***
Women	Call for help, support, and quick rebuilding	-2.21E-03	9.00E-05	-24.54	<2e-16	***
Women	Fight for freedom in Belarus	-0.00778	0.000338	-23.06	<2e-16	***
Women	Atlantic Council, live event, watch	-0.00365	0.000171	-21.41	<2e-16	***
Women	Canadian embassy, Justin Trudeau	-0.00417	0.000199	-20.99	<2e-16	***
Women	Evacuating azovstal, mariupol	-0.0038	0.000197	-19.28	<2e-16	***
Women	Diversify energy from fossil fuel, crucial	-0.00263	0.000137	-19.25	<2e-16	***
Women	Warnings and concerns about repeated events	-0.0047	0.000262	-17.91	<2e-16	***
Women	Staying strong and keeping the light	-0.00221	0.000128	-17.32	<2e-16	***
Women	Love, authenticity	-1.17E-03	7.87E-05	-14.84	<2e-16	***
Women	Ukrainian people, blood, homeless	-1.16E-03	8.74E-05	-13.27	<2e-16	***
Women	Missile attacks on Kyiv	-0.00534	0.00041	-13.04	<2e-16	***
Women	Symbolic march and home representations	-0.00226	0.000189	-11.96	<2e-16	***
Women	Ukrainian parliament actions and resolutions	-0.00457	0.000382	-11.95	<2e-16	***
Women	Genocide, murder, and atrocities	-0.00321	0.000271	-11.84	<2e-16	***
Women	Media-related discussions and interviews	-0.00204	0.000173	-11.8	<2e-16	***
Women	Pride in Ukrainian Eurovision performance	-0.00249	0.000239	-10.43	<2e-16	***
Women	Continuation of defence and courage	-0.00107	0.000132	-8.072	6.97E-16	***

Gender of Topic	Topic Summary	Estimate	Std. Error	T-value	Pr(> t)	Sig.
Women	Celebrate Ukrainian statehood, victory	-0.0014	0.000191	-7.323	2.44E-13	***
Women	International justice and war crimes	-0.00181	0.000317	-5.701	1.20E-08	***
Women	Winter critical infrastructure, power outages	-0.00086	0.000163	-5.266	1.39E-07	***
Women	Reflection on civil society, moving forward	-4.92E-04	1.03E-04	-4.779	1.76E-06	***
Women	Criticism of Switzerland's neutral stance	-0.00067	0.000145	-4.61	4.03E-06	***
Women	Hope during Christmas and New Year's	-5.23E-04	1.17E-04	-4.465	8.00E-06	***
Women	Calls for prayers, peace, free Ukraine	-4.21E-04	9.56E-05	-4.404	1.06E-05	***
Women	Invitations to join and speak out	-0.00061	0.000155	-3.952	7.76E-05	***
Women	Russia is a global threat	-0.0003	8.21E-05	-3.659	0.000253	***
Women	Complete destruction, breaking, reality	-1.76E-04	6.20E-05	-2.845	0.00445	**
Women	(Stop words)	-2.59E-04	9.48E-05	-2.73	0.00633	**
Women	Nuclear power plant safety concerns	-0.00047	0.00027	-1.739	0.082	.
Women	Human rights of abortion, LGBTQ, women, protection	-0.00045	0.00026	-1.72	0.0854	.
Both	Poland's role in providing refuge	-0.00026	0.000183	-1.413	0.158	
Both	News updates on Russian propaganda	-0.00023	0.000183	-1.277	0.201	
Both	NAFO fellas, Georgia, Wagner, Bakhmut	-7.25E-05	1.82E-04	-0.399	0.69	
Both	Council of Europe, news, follow	6.69E-05	1.04E-04	0.644	0.519	
Both	Ukrainian, EU leadership, Brussels	0.00018	0.000215	0.838	0.402	
Both	Take part, judo, championship	0.000143	0.00012	1.19	0.234	
Both	(Stop words)	1.37E-04	1.10E-04	1.243	0.214	
Both	Humanitarian aid urgency	0.000329	0.000219	1.499	0.134	
Men	Ukraine, war, yesterday	2.45E-05	1.34E-05	1.827	0.0678	.
Men	Liberation of Kharkiv region	0.000559	0.000298	1.88	0.0601	.
Men	Educational plans, Ilya Ponomarenko	0.000347	0.000125	2.764	0.00571	**
Men	Sanctions and pressure on oligarchs, Iran	0.000963	0.000326	2.951	0.00317	**

Gender of Topic	Topic Summary	Estimate	Std. Error	T-value	Pr(> t)	Sig.
Men	Military and government officials	0.000687	0.000218	3.148	0.00165	**
Men	Serious questions and debates	3.04E-04	9.01E-05	3.373	0.000743	***
Men	Assessment of the invasion, good start	4.26E-04	1.15E-04	3.717	0.000201	***
Men	Reflection on suffering and destruction	2.78E-04	7.27E-05	3.829	0.000129	***
Men	Discussing readiness, huge changes	1.90E-04	4.87E-05	3.898	9.72E-05	***
Men	Global challenges, energy, climate impact	0.000995	0.00025	3.982	6.85E-05	***
Men	Public, conflict, felt, Kazakhstan	2.09E-04	4.53E-05	4.606	4.11E-06	***
Men	Eternal memory, glory for heroes	0.000689	0.000148	4.646	3.39E-06	***
Men	(Stop words)	3.78E-04	7.44E-05	5.083	3.72E-07	***
Men	Calls for isolating and defeating Russia	5.75E-04	1.09E-04	5.283	1.28E-07	***
Men	Bipartisan US support	0.001072	0.000198	5.408	6.39E-08	***
Men	Awareness-raising events, campaigns, Austria	3.84E-04	6.77E-05	5.665	1.48E-08	***
Men	Lithuania, Poland, condolences	0.001238	0.00021	5.883	4.05E-09	***
Men	Dmytro Kuleba meetings with foreign counterparts	6.49E-04	1.09E-04	5.956	2.59E-09	***
Men	(Stop words)	0.000727	0.000117	6.197	5.76E-10	***
Men	Fighter jet, promise, ambassador	5.45E-04	8.72E-05	6.248	4.17E-10	***
Men	Gratitude for diplomatic visits and support, Estonia	0.001068	0.000153	6.967	3.25E-12	***
Men	Common goals and expectations	3.95E-04	5.56E-05	7.105	1.21E-12	***
Men	Solidarity messages from France	0.001903	0.00026	7.316	2.58E-13	***
Men	Forces, defence, and military capabilities	0.001369	0.000187	7.337	2.20E-13	***
Men	Military aid announcements	0.001829	0.000245	7.45	9.37E-14	***
Men	Official confirmations and diplomacy	7.21E-04	9.22E-05	7.813	5.62E-15	***
Men	Condemn sham referendums in occupied territories	0.00173	0.000212	8.166	3.23E-16	***

Gender of Topic	Topic Summary	Estimate	Std. Error	T-value	Pr(> t)	Sig.
Men	Demand, consider, request, remove	5.80E-04	6.63E-05	8.752	<2e-16	***
Men	Discussing collections for Bayraktar drones	7.54E-04	8.27E-05	9.117	<2e-16	***
Men	Discussions on gas and energy prices	0.002682	0.000282	9.514	<2e-16	***
Men	German weapons delivery, Leopard tanks	0.003537	0.000355	9.962	<2e-16	***
Men	Discussions with US government defence	1.10E-03	1.02E-04	10.73	<2e-16	***
Men	Analysis and data, himars	0.001698	0.000157	10.82	<2e-16	***
Men	Welcoming reception of EU candidate status	0.001808	0.000166	10.89	<2e-16	***
Men	Country mobilisation, citizen, return	4.86E-04	4.37E-05	11.11	<2e-16	***
Men	Allow food, grain exports, Black Sea	0.002771	0.000246	11.25	<2e-16	***
Men	Elon Musk, tweet, Starlink	0.00218	0.000191	11.42	<2e-16	***
Men	Amnesty International is morally bankrupt	9.51E-04	8.16E-05	11.66	<2e-16	***
Men	Urgent call for Russia to stop unprovoked war	1.41E-03	1.18E-04	11.91	<2e-16	***
Men	Learning, problem management, and collaboration	8.03E-04	6.69E-05	11.99	<2e-16	***
Men	Congratulations Czech Republic, peace	0.002759	0.000212	13	<2e-16	***
Men	Crimea bridge, artillery, long range, control	0.001953	0.000149	13.08	<2e-16	***
Men	Individual expertise and people	5.98E-04	4.53E-05	13.21	<2e-16	***
Men	Scholz, Nord Stream, late, correct	0.001981	0.000149	13.32	<2e-16	***
Men	Trump corruption, fraud, influence	1.50E-03	1.09E-04	13.68	<2e-16	***
Men	Statement, conference, Latvian foreign affairs	0.003542	0.000252	14.08	<2e-16	***
Men	European security and NATO	0.003438	0.000235	14.63	<2e-16	***
Men	Latest defence intelligence assessments	0.003254	0.000192	16.97	<2e-16	***
Men	Rules-based order, EU, Japan	0.002301	0.000132	17.49	<2e-16	***
Men	Recent cases and their role	1.21E-03	6.34E-05	19.07	<2e-16	***
Men	Discussions on cooperation and relationships	0.00501	0.000248	20.18	<2e-16	***

Gender of Topic	Topic Summary	Estimate	Std. Error	T-value	Pr(> t)	Sig.
Men	Intergovernmental programming, Poland	0.00479	0.000215	22.31	<2e-16	***
Men	Kremlin propaganda and lies	0.00563	0.000252	22.34	<2e-16	***
Men	Open discussion on various topics	1.12E-03	4.91E-05	22.74	<2e-16	***
Men	Media personalities and opinions	0.005309	0.00022	24.18	<2e-16	***
Men	Continued financial support and partnership with Europe	0.00633	0.00022	28.79	<2e-16	***
Men	Diplomatic preparations and current activities	1.47E-03	4.78E-05	30.76	<2e-16	***
Men	Russian negotiations, bluff, blowback	0.005578	0.000174	31.98	<2e-16	***
Men	Reports on Russian mobilisation, fascism	2.99E-03	8.87E-05	33.71	<2e-16	***

Source: Author's calculations based on data collected from 11 February 2022 to 8 March 2023.

Note: "Both" refers to topics used by both genders. A topic was categorised as being used by both genders if its P-value was greater than 0.1.

Appendix F

Topics Used by International Figures, Ukrainian Politicians, and Both (Order = T-value, N = 100) (Chapter 4)

Group of Topic	Topic Summary	Estimate	Std. Error	T-value	Pr(> t)	Sig.
Int'l figure	Diversify energy from fossil fuels, crucial	-7.70E-03	1.11E-04	-69.24	<2e-16	***
Int'l figure	Russian negotiations, bluff, blowback	-1.04E-02	1.75E-04	-59.23	<2e-16	***
Int'l figure	Assessment of the invasion, good start	-0.00581	0.000133	-43.83	<2e-16	***
Int'l figure	Kremlin propaganda and lies	-0.00789	0.000239	-32.95	<2e-16	***
Int'l figure	Open discussion on various topics	-1.54E-03	4.84E-05	-31.81	<2e-16	***
Int'l figure	Media personalities and opinions	-0.00709	0.000225	-31.43	<2e-16	***
Int'l figure	Dmytro Kuleba meetings with foreign counterparts	-3.67E-03	1.17E-04	-31.29	<2e-16	***
Int'l figure	German weapons delivery, Leopard tanks	-0.00876	0.000295	-29.69	<2e-16	***
Int'l figure	Scholz, Nord Stream, late, correct	-3.79E-03	1.32E-04	-28.7	<2e-16	***
Int'l figure	Invitations to join and speak out	-4.23E-03	1.50E-04	-28.19	<2e-16	***
Int'l figure	News updates on Russian propaganda	-0.0049	0.000181	-27.13	<2e-16	***
Int'l figure	Continuation of defence and courage	-0.00392	0.000146	-26.85	<2e-16	***
Int'l figure	NAFO fellas, Georgia, Wagner, Bakhmut	-4.24E-03	1.60E-04	-26.55	<2e-16	***
Int'l figure	Latest defence intelligence assessments	-0.00473	0.000189	-25.05	<2e-16	***
Int'l figure	Fight for freedom in Belarus	-0.00709	0.000287	-24.69	<2e-16	***
Int'l figure	Public, conflict, felt, Kazakhstan	-1.11E-03	4.52E-05	-24.54	<2e-16	***
Int'l figure	Urgent call for Russia to stop unprovoked war	-2.77E-03	1.20E-04	-23.06	<2e-16	***
Int'l figure	Human rights of abortion, LGBTQ, women, protection	-0.00525	0.000243	-21.61	<2e-16	***
Int'l figure	Statement, conference, Latvian foreign affairs	-0.00505	0.000239	-21.13	<2e-16	***
Int'l figure	Poland's role in providing refuge	-0.00385	0.000183	-20.99	<2e-16	***
Int'l figure	Serious questions and debates	-1.69E-03	9.05E-05	-18.68	<2e-16	***

Group of Topic	Topic Summary	Estimate	Std. Error	T-value	Pr(> t)	Sig.
Int'l figure	Atlantic Council, live event, watch	-0.00317	0.000171	-18.6	<2e-16	***
Int'l figure	Solidarity messages from France	-0.0043	0.000242	-17.79	<2e-16	***
Int'l figure	Ukraine, war, yesterday	-2.57E-04	1.47E-05	-17.49	<2e-16	***
Int'l figure	Amnesty International is morally bankrupt	-1.37E-03	7.84E-05	-17.45	<2e-16	***
Int'l figure	Ukrainian, EU leadership, Brussels	-0.00344	0.000201	-17.1	<2e-16	***
Int'l figure	Global challenges, energy, climate impact	-0.00396	0.000235	-16.84	<2e-16	***
Int'l figure	Analysis and data, himars	-2.29E-03	1.42E-04	-16.07	<2e-16	***
Int'l figure	Rules-based order, EU, Japan	-1.95E-03	1.21E-04	-16.05	<2e-16	***
Int'l figure	Reports on Russian mobilisation, fascism	-1.49E-03	9.67E-05	-15.45	<2e-16	***
Int'l figure	European security and NATO	-0.00349	0.00023	-15.2	<2e-16	***
Int'l figure	Crimea bridge, artillery, long range, control	-0.00232	0.000161	-14.36	<2e-16	***
Int'l figure	Media-related discussions and interviews	-0.00278	0.000197	-14.11	<2e-16	***
Int'l figure	Official confirmations and diplomacy	-1.32E-03	9.53E-05	-13.79	<2e-16	***
Int'l figure	Intergovernmental programming, Poland	-0.00281	0.00021	-13.39	<2e-16	***
Int'l figure	Elon Musk, tweet, Starlink	-0.00236	0.000185	-12.77	<2e-16	***
Int'l figure	Trump corruption, fraud, influence	-1.34E-03	1.06E-04	-12.61	<2e-16	***
Int'l figure	(Stop words)	-0.00171	0.000141	-12.15	<2e-16	***
Int'l figure	Reflection on civil society, moving forward	-0.00122	0.000103	-11.83	<2e-16	***
Int'l figure	Common goals and expectations	-7.10E-04	6.02E-05	-11.78	<2e-16	***
Int'l figure	Canadian embassy, Justin Trudeau	-0.00201	0.000183	-11.01	<2e-16	***
Int'l figure	Bipartisan US support	-0.0019	0.000192	-9.86	<2e-16	***
Int'l figure	Fighter jet, promise, ambassador	-9.93E-04	1.05E-04	-9.449	<2e-16	***
Int'l figure	Learning, problem management, and collaboration	-4.67E-04	6.16E-05	-7.582	3.43E-14	***
Int'l figure	Pride in Ukrainian Eurovision performance	-0.00157	0.000223	-7.037	1.97E-12	***
Int'l figure	Condemn sham referendums in occupied territories	-0.0017	0.000248	-6.851	7.36E-12	***

Group of Topic	Topic Summary	Estimate	Std. Error	T-value	Pr(> t)	Sig.
Int'l figure	Sanctions and pressure on oligarchs, Iran	-0.00216	0.000331	-6.522	6.96E-11	***
Int'l figure	Military and government officials	-0.00133	0.000227	-5.852	4.86E-09	***
Int'l figure	Reflection on suffering and destruction	-3.75E-04	7.35E-05	-5.097	3.46E-07	***
Int'l figure	Calls for prayers, peace, free Ukraine	-3.83E-04	9.14E-05	-4.192	2.76E-05	***
Int'l figure	Congratulations Czech Republic, peace	-0.00054	0.000231	-2.314	0.0207	*
Int'l figure	Love, authenticity	-1.40E-04	6.43E-05	-2.17	0.03	*
Int'l figure	Staying strong and keeping the light	-2.25E-04	1.16E-04	-1.938	0.0526	.
Int'l figure	(Stop words)	-1.90E-04	1.13E-04	-1.682	0.0926	.
Both	Discussing collections for Bayraktar drones	-1.51E-04	1.03E-04	-1.472	0.141	
Both	Discussions on cooperation and relationships	-0.00033	0.00026	-1.256	0.209	
Both	Criticism of Switzerland's neutral stance	-1.82E-04	1.46E-04	-1.246	0.213	
Both	Take part, judo, championship	4.58E-06	1.05E-04	0.044	0.965	
Both	Military aid announcements	0.000108	0.000257	0.421	0.674	
Both	Awareness-raising events, campaigns, Austria	5.98E-05	6.81E-05	0.878	0.38	
Both	Warnings and concerns about repeated events	0.000243	0.000236	1.028	0.304	
Ukrainian pol.	International justice and war crimes	0.000762	0.000314	2.428	0.0152	*
Ukrainian pol.	Diplomatic preparations and current activities	1.51E-04	5.55E-05	2.727	0.00639	**
Ukrainian pol.	Individual expertise and people	1.49E-04	4.95E-05	2.997	0.00272	**
Ukrainian pol.	(Stop words)	2.35E-04	7.12E-05	3.295	0.000985	***
Ukrainian pol.	Genocide, murder, and atrocities	0.00099	0.000278	3.565	0.000364	***
Ukrainian pol.	Allow food, grain exports, Black Sea	0.000921	0.000248	3.721	0.000199	***
Ukrainian pol.	Educational plans, Ilya Ponomarenko	6.21E-04	1.50E-04	4.147	3.37E-05	***
Ukrainian pol.	Evacuating azovstal, mariupol	0.001062	0.000175	6.082	1.19E-09	***
Ukrainian pol.	Lithuania, Poland, condolences	0.001489	0.000241	6.186	6.18E-10	***
Ukrainian pol.	Discussions on gas and energy prices	0.002153	0.000313	6.89	5.60E-12	***

Group of Topic	Topic Summary	Estimate	Std. Error	T-value	Pr(> t)	Sig.
Ukrainian pol.	Humanitarian aid urgency	0.002165	0.000278	7.774	7.63E-15	***
Ukrainian pol.	Recent cases and their roles	6.41E-04	7.77E-05	8.249	<2e-16	***
Ukrainian pol.	(Stop words)	8.57E-04	1.03E-04	8.344	<2e-16	***
Ukrainian pol.	Demand, consider, request, remove	7.29E-04	7.52E-05	9.687	<2e-16	***
Ukrainian pol.	Nuclear power plant safety concerns	0.003322	0.00033	10.06	<2e-16	***
Ukrainian pol.	Winter critical infrastructure, power outages	1.94E-03	1.84E-04	10.58	<2e-16	***
Ukrainian pol.	Discussing readiness, huge changes	7.05E-04	6.14E-05	11.48	<2e-16	***
Ukrainian pol.	Council of Europe, news, follow	0.001369	0.000111	12.32	<2e-16	***
Ukrainian pol.	Discussions with US government defence	1.64E-03	1.23E-04	13.37	<2e-16	***
Ukrainian pol.	Hope during Christmas and New Year's	2.02E-03	1.31E-04	15.4	<2e-16	***
Ukrainian pol.	Country mobilisation, citizen, return	9.19E-04	5.43E-05	16.94	<2e-16	***
Ukrainian pol.	Complete destruction, breaking, reality	1.32E-03	7.45E-05	17.74	<2e-16	***
Ukrainian pol.	Ukrainian people, blood, homeless	1.84E-03	1.01E-04	18.21	<2e-16	***
Ukrainian pol.	Call for help, support, and quick rebuilding	1.62E-03	8.67E-05	18.64	<2e-16	***
Ukrainian pol.	Liberation of Kharkiv region	0.006572	0.000347	18.94	<2e-16	***
Ukrainian pol.	Eternal memory, glory for heroes	3.88E-03	1.85E-04	21.04	<2e-16	***
Ukrainian pol.	Symbolic march and home representations	3.90E-03	1.69E-04	23.03	<2e-16	***
Ukrainian pol.	Missile attacks on Kyiv	0.012145	0.000486	25	<2e-16	***
Ukrainian pol.	Welcoming reception of EU candidate status	4.71E-03	1.82E-04	25.93	<2e-16	***
Ukrainian pol.	Ukrainian parliament actions and resolutions	0.011401	0.000424	26.9	<2e-16	***
Ukrainian pol.	Forces, defence, and military capabilities	0.005416	0.000185	29.34	<2e-16	***
Ukrainian pol.	Celebrate Ukrainian statehood, victory	5.74E-03	1.94E-04	29.58	<2e-16	***
Ukrainian pol.	Russia is a global threat	3.10E-03	9.81E-05	31.63	<2e-16	***
Ukrainian pol.	Calls for isolating and defeating Russia	4.61E-03	1.43E-04	32.18	<2e-16	***

Group of Topic	Topic Summary	Estimate	Std. Error	T-value	Pr(> t)	Sig.
Ukrainian pol.	Murder of children, mothers and families	0.010066	0.000296	34.04	<2e-16	***
Ukrainian pol.	Continued financial support and partnership with Europe	0.011487	0.000256	44.88	<2e-16	***
Ukrainian pol.	Gratitude for diplomatic visits and support, Estonia	8.34E-03	1.72E-04	48.46	<2e-16	***
Ukrainian pol.	Unity and need for #noflyzone	0.024804	0.000507	48.93	<2e-16	***
Ukrainian pol.	Calls for action, standwithukraine, stoprussia	0.016192	0.000298	54.42	<2e-16	***

Source: Author's calculations based on data collected from 11 February 2022 to 8 March 2023.

Note: "Both" refers to topics used by both user groups. A topic was categorised as being used by both user groups if its P-value was greater than 0.1.

Appendix G

Topic Summaries and their Narratives, Genders, and User Groups (Order = Expected

Topic Proportions, N = 50) (Chapter 4)

Topic Summary	Narrative	Expected Topic Proportions	Gender	Group
Assessment of the invasion, good start	Ukrainian military is strong	0.33	Men	Int'l figure
Continued financial support and partnership with Europe	West providing support to Ukraine	0.25	Men	Ukrainian pol.
Missile attacks on Kyiv	Russia destroys Ukrainian land/people	0.25	Women	Ukrainian pol.
Russian negotiations, bluff, blowback	Russia spreads lies/disinformation	0.24	Men	Int'l figure
Urgent call for Russia to stop unprovoked war	Call for action to stop Russian invasion	0.24	Men	Int'l figure
International justice and war crimes	Russia commits war crimes	0.24	Women	Ukrainian pol.
Reports on Russian mobilisation, fascism	Russia is mobilizing troops	0.18	Men	Int'l figure
Military aid announcements	West providing support to Ukraine	0.17	Men	Both
European security and NATO	Diplomacy between Ukraine and West	0.17	Men	Int'l figure
Calls for isolating and defeating Russia	Call for support for Ukraine against Russia	0.17	Men	Ukrainian pol.
Unity and need for #noflyzone	Call for support for Ukraine against Russia	0.17	Women	Ukrainian pol.
Global challenges, energy, climate impact	Russia's war impacting energy/climate	0.16	Men	Int'l figure
Fight for freedom in Belarus	Belarus will fight for its freedom	0.16	Women	Int'l figure
Liberation of Kharkiv region	Ukrainian military is strong	0.16	Men	Ukrainian pol.
Celebrate Ukrainian statehood, victory	Ukraine will win the war	0.16	Women	Ukrainian pol.
Ukrainian people, blood, homeless	Russia destroys Ukrainian land/people	0.16	Women	Ukrainian pol.
Murder of children, mothers and families	Russia commits war crimes	0.15	Women	Ukrainian pol.
Ukrainian, EU leadership, Brussels	Diplomacy between Ukraine and West	0.014	Both	Int'l figure
Gratitude for diplomatic visits and support,	West providing support to Ukraine	0.014	Men	Ukrainian pol.

Topic Summary	Narrative	Expected Topic Proportions	Gender	Group
Estonia				
Kremlin propaganda and lies	Russia spreads lies/disinformation	0.013	Men	Int'l figure
Sanctions and pressure on oligarchs, Iran	Call for support for Ukraine against Russia	0.013	Men	Int'l figure
Discussions on gas and energy prices	Russia's war impacting energy/climate	0.013	Men	Ukrainian pol.
Ukrainian parliament actions and resolutions	The Ukrainian government continues to function	0.013	Women	Ukrainian pol.
German weapons delivery, Leopard tanks	West providing support to Ukraine	0.012	Men	Int'l figure
Condemn sham referendum in occupied territories	Russia commits war crimes	0.012	Men	Int'l figure
Continuation of defence and courage	Ukrainian military is strong	0.012	Women	Int'l figure
Forces, defence, and military capabilities	Ukrainian military is strong	0.012	Men	Ukrainian pol.
Discussions on cooperation and relationships	Diplomacy between Ukraine and West	0.011	Men	Both
Dmytro Kuleba meetings with foreign counterparts	Diplomacy between Ukraine and West	0.011	Men	Int'l figure
Hope during Christmas and New Year's	Ukraine will win the war	0.011	Women	Ukrainian pol.
Genocide, murder, and atrocities	Russia commits war crimes	0.011	Women	Ukrainian pol.
Allow food, grain exports, Black Sea	Russia must allow Ukrainian grain exports	0.011	Men	Ukrainian pol.
Statement, conference, Latvian foreign affairs	Diplomacy between Ukraine and West	0.01	Men	Int'l figure
Human rights of abortion, LGBTQ, women, protection	The Ukrainian government continues to function	0.01	Women	Int'l figure
Welcoming reception of EU candidate status	Ukraine is European nation	0.01	Men	Ukrainian pol.
Warnings and concerns about repeated events	Russia destroys Ukrainian land/people	0.008	Women	Both
NAFO fellas, Georgia, Wagner, Bakhmut	Discussion of viral Twitter topics	0.008	Both	Int'l figure
Congratulations Czech Republic, peace	Diplomacy between Ukraine and West	0.008	Men	Int'l figure
Symbolic march and home representations	West providing support to Ukraine	0.008	Women	Ukrainian pol.

Topic Summary	Narrative	Expected Topic Proportions	Gender	Group
Humanitarian aid urgency	Call for support for Ukraine against Russia	0.008	Both	Ukrainian pol.
Calls for action, standwithukraine, stoprussia	Call for action to stop Russian invasion	0.008	Women	Ukrainian pol.
Poland's role in providing refuge	West providing support to Ukraine	0.007	Both	Int'l figure
Pride in Ukrainian Eurovision performance	Ukraine is European nation	0.007	Women	Int'l figure
Bipartisan US support	West providing support to Ukraine	0.007	Men	Int'l figure
Latest defence intelligence assessments	Ukrainian military is strong	0.007	Men	Int'l figure
Lithuania, Poland, condolences	Diplomacy between Ukraine and West	0.007	Men	Ukrainian pol.
Nuclear power plant safety concerns	Russia is making nuclear threats	0.007	Women	Ukrainian pol.
Eternal memory, glory for heroes	Ukrainian heroes have eternal memory	0.007	Men	Ukrainian pol.
Winter critical infrastructure, power outages	Russia destroys Ukrainian land/people	0.007	Women	Ukrainian pol.
Diplomatic preparations and current activities	Diplomacy between Ukraine and West	0.006	Men	Ukrainian pol.

Source: Author's calculations based on data collected from 11 February 2022 to 8 March 2023.