Political Sociology of Unity and Division

Social Cleavages, Identity, and Institutions

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Abstract

Growing economic inequality and cultural heterogeneity has brought increased attention to the issue of 'unity in diversity', that is, the state of being joined together or being in agreement in the presence of actual and perceived differences among people. Despite the growing interest in 'politics in divided societies', many political-sociological aspects of this issue remain largely unexplored. At the heart of this thesis lies an interest in explaining how social forces shape political preferences regarding the tension between unity and diversity in contemporary democracies. More specifically, this research seeks to understand how social (and identity-based) cleavages affect public responses to the idea of solidarity-based welfare provision and the reconciliation of increased ethnic diversity with national unity (including the functioning of the welfare state). Drawing on the institutionalist view that pre-existing policy creates mass politics (policy feedback effect), the study also investigates whether institutional structures condition the association between social forces and political attitudes. Although several chapters put particular emphasis on policy feedback effects (e.g., Chapters 2, 3, and 5), they are still within the general scope of this thesis, that is, the 'social embeddedness of political attitudes'. The thesis consists of two parts: the first assesses the explanatory power of socioeconomic status and social policy structures in predicting public attitudes toward income inequality, redistribution, and taxation policies (Chapters 2 to 4), and the second examines how differences in occupational status and national identity result in differences in reactions to welfare chauvinism and multiculturalism (Chapters 5 and 6). Taken together, the findings of this study underscore the importance of social cleavages, identity, and institutional structures in explaining why and under what conditions people are more likely to sacrifice

part of their private interest or particularistic identity for the common good or the general welfare of all individuals in a community, in a situation of growing economic inequality and increased cultural plurality.

Keywords: social cleavages, identity, institutions, group polarization, social solidarity

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CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

SOCIAL CLEAVAGES, INSTITUTIONS, AND SOLIDARITY

Broadly speaking, the aim of this thesis is to understand the social forces that shape political preferences toward the issues of unity and diversity in industrialized democracies. More specifically, this research investigates the interplay between social (and identity-based) cleavages (e.g., socioeconomic status and in-group identification) and social structures (e.g., policy and demographic contexts) in determining individuals' political attitudes toward solidarity issues, such as inequality, redistribution, welfare chauvinism and multiculturalism. Although various solidarity-related topics are addressed, the 'social embeddedness of political attitudes' is a unifying thread that runs throughout the thesis, that is, the idea that politics does not exist in a vacuum of social circumstances and that the political arena and its actors and events are inextricably interwoven in the fabric of society (Lipset, 1960).

1. Policy feedbacks on mass politics

Much of this research is guided by the fundamental insight that 'policies create subsequent politics' (Schattschneider, 1935; Lowi, 1964; Wilson, 1973; Heclo, 1974). Policies are not only the product of political struggles (Easton, 1953; Brooks and Manza, 2006) but also the antecedent of political forces that reshape political actors' interests, identities, and cognitive interpretations of the social world (Pierson, 1993). Policies, once enacted, generate resources and incentives that influence the ways in which political actors define the gains and losses of various courses of action, which eventually restructures the

trajectory of policy development and implementation (Pierson, 1993; Myles and Pierson, 2001).

Scholars have examined how early policy decisions mobilise interests and incentives that affect the goals and capacities of elected officials and interest groups (Steinmo *et al*., 1992; Hacker, 2002; Hacker and Pierson, 2005). Skocpol (1992) shows how earlier policy choices transform state capacities, thereby affecting prospects for future policy initiatives. She describes how the corrupt pension system for Civil War veterans in the 19th century mobilised the coalition of organised interests and constrained subsequent policy-making efforts for a general old-age pension system in the United States (see also Weir *et al*., 1988). Similarly, Pierson (1994, 1996) argues that once welfare state programmes are in place, attempts to reverse the process (i.e., cutbacks of 'institutionalised' interests) provoke considerable opposition from interest groups associated with particular social policies. He argues that retrenchment is a far more challenging political enterprise than welfare expansions because it is "generally an exercise in blame avoidance rather than credit claiming, primarily because the costs of retrenchment are concentrated (and often immediate), while the benefits are not" (Pierson, 1996: 145). Electoral behaviour research suggests that individuals have a 'negativity bias'—they react more sensitively (or negatively) to potential losses than to potential gains. Politicians seek to avoid such negative reactions (or electoral punishment) by maintaining the status-quo rather than pursuing unpopular policy reforms (i.e., retrenchment) that may lead to a critical loss of votes (see also Weaver, 1986). In this respect, policy development is a path-dependent and self-reinforcing process in which pre-existing policy designs become 'locked-in' or produce institutional inertia (cf. North, 1990; Steinmo *et al*., 1992; Hall and Taylor, 1996).

In the feedback literature, while the function of political elites and organised interests has been well recognised, relatively less attention has been paid to the role of mass publics

(Pierson, 1993; Mettler and SoRelle, 1999; Mettler and Soss, 2004; Soss and Schram, 2007; Campbell, 2012). In general, mass publics are less likely to have clearly defined goals and interests than political elites; they are less conscious of policy incentives and cues, and they are often placed outside the sphere of policy-making (Soss and Schram, 2007). Among scholars of mass politics, public policies are often implicated as a "remote, eventual target of political action, or as an indeterminate object of citizen preferences" (Mettler and Soss, 2004: 55). On the other hand, students of policy development place emphasis on elected officials and political parties, regarding mass publics as "background influences on the more proximate policy actors" (Mettler and Soss, 2004: 55).

Bridging these disciplinary boundaries is critical for an understanding of how policy designs create patterns of political mobilisation among mass publics. In particular, much of the literature on mass feedback effects has centred around how mass politics is affected by social policy programmes, which are amongst the most 'eye-catching' policy areas that significantly affect the ways in which ordinary citizens cope with various life events—e.g., marriage, pregnancy, divorce, job loss, child rearing, relocation, disability, serious illness, retirement, and bereavement. Social policy designs directly affect the lives of vast populations, and thus mass feedback effects are most likely to be found. For instance, Campbell (2002) shows how U.S. Social Security transformed low-income seniors into a politically active and electorally significant constituency. She argues that Social Security enabled the elderly (programme recipients) to participate in political life by providing them with money, free time (retirement), and other political resources (see also Mettler, 2005). Low-income seniors who highly depend on Social Security actively involved in politics in an effort to protect or expand their benefits by, for example, writing letters to elected officials and voicing their concerns and requests.

2. Policy structures as the determinants of social cleavages

The notion that existing social policies create mass politics has been put forward by the comparative social policy literature. Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999) suggests that welfare states generate certain patterns of conflict structures among mass publics. He classified contemporary advanced nations into three qualitatively distinct groups: social democratic, conservative, and liberal regimes. For classification, he introduced two criteria, namely decommodification and stratification. Decommodification is defined as "the degree to which individuals, or families, can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living independently of market participation" (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 37), while stratification refers to the "articulation of social solidarity, divisions of class, and status differentiation" promoted by social policy (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 55). In social democratic welfare states, social rights are highly decommodified (free from market forces), and welfare benefits are distributed based on the principles of universalism and social solidarity. Conservative welfare states are characterised by moderate decommodification and the legacy of corporatism and etatism. In liberal welfare states, the market, rather than the state, plays a central role in the distribution of resources—e.g., means-tested poor relief and private insurance provision.

Building on the tripartite typology above, Esping-Andersen (1990, Chapter 9) further argues how different types of welfare regimes generate distinct patterns of social cleavages in the transition from industrial to post-industrial societies. In Sweden, the prototype of the social democratic regime, women have a higher share of employment in the public sector than in the private sector. In this context, the government is forced to curtail labour costs for public-sector employees to uphold and expand welfare-state employment. However, "the centralized solidarity-wage policy implies that such wage moderation will have to be

spread across the entire economy" (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 227). This serves as a backdrop for a conflict between male workers in the private sector and female workers in the public sector.[1] In Germany, the prime representative of the conservative regime, collective bargaining over wages is conducted in favour of the insiders at the expense of job expansion for the outsiders of the labour market (e.g., the unemployed). In the process of de-industrialisation, workforce numbers are reduced through retirement and unemployment policies and by restrictions on guest workers. This process creates a situation where a relatively small number of highly productive workers support a large group of unproductive nonworkers, leading to a potential conflict between the insiders and the outsiders. Finally, in the United States, the prototype of the liberal regime, those who are historically disadvantaged such as women and blacks are gradually incorporated into the established class boundaries. In this process, while class inequalities between men and women or whites and blacks shrink over time, new class differences emerge within each group (e.g., rich blacks vs. poor blacks).

Likewise, scholars have argued that different entitlement schemes—universalistic versus targeted programmes—produce distinct patterns of social stratification (Korpi, 1980; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Korpi and Palme, 1998; Rothstein, 1998, 2002; Larsen, 2008). Universal eligibility rules incorporate a full range of beneficiaries, irrespective of one's class and market position and thus generate broad, cross-class political coalitions. On the other hand, in means-tested welfare states, social programmes are selectively targeted at low-income categories. The disproportionate distribution of welfare benefits accentuates the contrast between the poor (net beneficiaries) and the rich (net contributors), thereby heightening the salience of inter-class conflicts. Korpi and Palme (1998) explicitly note

[1] Svallfors (1997) argues that gender cleavages are also stirred by female-specific backgrounds such as precarious market position (dependence on the welfare state) and care responsibilities (e.g., concern, consideration, and devotion to others).

that "[b]y discriminating in favor of the poor, the targeted model creates a zero-sum conflict of interests between the poor and the better-off workers and the middle classes who must pay for the benefits of the poor without receiving any benefits" (672).

The effects of different eligibility rules (universalism or targeted) on mass politics involve two different feedback processes. According to Pierson (1993), public policies have both 'resource/incentive' and 'interpretive' effects on mass publics. Resource/incentive effects are the impact of policy designs on material resources and incentives, while interpretive effects are the impact of policy designs on citizens' cognitive interpretations of the social world. Policies mobilise individuals' material self-interest but, at the same time, convey messages about citizenship and government, providing semantic cues that affect voters' symbolic orientations and behaviour patterns (Edelman, 1971; Schneider and Ingram, 1993). Universalism or targeted policies not only affect the constellation of material interests but also shape citizens' subjective values and norms such as interpersonal trust, social capital, and collective identity. Scholars argue that encompassing welfare services serve to diminish the salience of class boundaries, providing the moral basis for cross-class interdependence, reciprocity, altruism, sympathy, and collective solidarity (Marshall, 1950; Titmuss, 1973; Esping-Andersen, 1990). Likewise, prior studies suggest that personal contacts with universal welfare institutions increase social and political trust, while experiences with selective, need-tested welfare institutions undermine it (Kumlin, 2004; Kumlin and Rothstein, 2005).

Empirical research on the interplay between welfare states and social cleavages has yielded mixed results. Svallfors (1997) concluded that although the overall level of support for redistribution systematically differs across welfare regime types (that is, redistributive support is more widespread in the social democratic regime than in the radical and liberal counterparts), clear cleavage structures do not exist between countries. In other words,

attitudinal patterns between socioeconomic groups are largely similar across different welfare states (Norway, Germany, Australia, and the United States). He also shows that gender class cleavages are equally prominent across different regime types; the attitudinal divide between the public and private sectors are marginal even in the social democratic regime (for similar results, see Svallfors, 2003, 2004; see also Papadakis and Bean, 1993; Bean and Papadakis, 1998; Edlund, 1999; Gelissen, 2000; Arts and Gelissen, 2001; Andreß and Heien, 2001; Linos and West, 2003; Jæger, 2006; Larsen, 2008).

3. Open questions

Despite the theoretical rationale for the assumption that existing social policy affects mass attitudes and behaviour, empirical evidence has been somewhat inconclusive. Several factors, both theoretical and methodological, may help account for the unambiguous findings in the previous literature.

The welfare state literature suggests that universalistic social services reduce the salience of class conflicts because they cover a broad range of welfare beneficiaries including both the working and middle classes instead of specifying (or stigmatising) the target group (Korpi, 1980; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Korpi and Palme, 1998; Rothstein, 1998, 2002). Interestingly, however, Edlund (2007) proposes an alternative explanation, arguing that the social democratic model is supposed to have a more explicit class politics than the liberal counterpart because of the size of the welfare state and its redistributive profile. Relative to means-tested welfare provision, universalist welfare services exert a great impact on citizens' everyday lives, attracting widespread public interest and scrutiny. In other words, in the social democratic regime, "[i]t is likely that a substantially broader set of issues is considered and framed as *political and class relevant* rather than purely

private" (Edlund, 2007: 43; italics in original), which in turn may lead to a more pronounced class-based conflict and attitudinal polarisation.

Earlier policy choices have political consequences; however, under which circumstances do existing policy structures generate subsequent mass politics? Scholars argue that two conditions—visibility/traceability and proximity—must be met for a mass feedback effect to be present (Pierson, 1993; Soss and Schram, 2007; Campbell, 2012). In other words, social policies that are visible/traceable and/or proximate to citizens are more likely to produce mass feedback effects. In this respect, the mixed findings in previous studies could be a result of citizens being insufficiently aware of existing social policies that are theoretically expected to affect their policy perceptions. *Visibility/traceability* is defined as the extent to which the consequences of a particular policy is discernible and detectable for the public or the degree to which individuals can trace observed effects (e.g., specific benefits and costs) back to their initial government causes and their legislators' contributions (Arnold, 1990). It is the ability of mass publics to link earlier political choices with their specific consequences (i.e., 'policy-effects chain'). The degree of visibility (or traceability) differs across policies: some policies are highly visible (or traceable) and exposed to public scrutiny and debate, while others are 'hidden' and receive relatively little attention. Wilensky (1975, 1976) has introduced this idea to the analysis of taxation politics, arguing that the visibility of taxation policy explains the intensity of tax revolts in affluent democracies. Welfare systems that rely heavily on visible direct taxation such as taxes on personal income and property are more likely to evoke political resistance than those relying on less-visible indirect taxation such as sales and value-added taxes. *Proximity* refers to the extent to which a policy affects personal daily lives in tangible (immediate and concrete) ways (Soss and Schram, 2007). When a policy is highly proximate to citizens, mass feedback effects become more likely. In other words, if individuals identify a given

policy as highly relevant to their personal gains and losses, then they are more likely to react to it. Proximity is conceptually distinct from visibility /traceability: a policy can be both visible and distant (not proximate). For example, the foreign policies of the Iraq War are highly *visible* to the majority of Americans, but for those who experience them only through media coverage, the policies are *distant* from their daily lives, and only affect a small, isolated population such as U.S. military personnel and their families (Soss and Schram, 2007). These two conditions—visibility/traceability and proximity—are crucial for mass feedback effects to function because if citizens do not recognise or notice the existence of a particular policy and its potential or actual effects on their daily lives, then it does not make sense to assume that policy affects mass perceptions. Before we test mass feedback effects, we need to ask, in the first place, whether citizens are sufficiently well informed about the policy. Some of the previous empirical studies suggest that there is no or little relationship between welfare state structures and mass opinion. However, it is hardly surprising that people fail to respond to a policy that is 'hidden' and 'distant' from their everyday lives (and thus mass feedback effects are not present).

Another explanation for the inconsistent findings in the literature may be related to the problematic operationalisation of the 'welfare regime' concept. Previous empirical studies based on Esping-Andersen's typology have treated individual countries (or groups of countries) as the proxies of particular welfare regimes; however, *theoretical ideal types* (Esping-Andersen, 1990) cannot be fully exemplified by actual country cases (Svallfors, 1997; Jæger, 2006). If individual countries (or country clusters) do not adequately represent theoretically demarcated welfare regimes, then we cannot discern whether observed differences reflect differences across *welfare regimes* or those across *countries/regime members* (Jæger, 2006). Furthermore, highly abstracted regime classification might downplay or ignore potential variation within and across regime clusters (Kasza, 2002).

These problems are further compounded by 1) the misclassification of borderline countries, 2) the introduction of additional regime types, and 3) the small-N of country representatives. First, welfare state typologies differ significantly from one study to another (Bambra, 2007). For example, in some studies, Japan was classified as a conservative (or corporatist) welfare state (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Korpi and Palme, 1998), while in others as a liberal welfare state (Castles and Mitchell, 1993; Bambra, 2005). The question of which country belongs to which regime directly affects the validity of regime typologies and thus final results in empirical research. Second, some researchers have extended Esping-Andersen's (1990) three 'worlds' of welfare capitalism, proposing additional regime types—e.g., the southern or Mediterranean model (Leibfried, 1992; Ferrera, 1996; Bonoli, 1997), the radical or antipodean model (Castles and Mitchell, 1992, 1993), and the post-communist model (Fenger, 2007). Including a fourth or fifth regime type further complicates analytical efforts. Third, it is doubtful whether only one or two countries can sufficiently represent a particular welfare regime. For instance, 'country' differences between Sweden and the United States do not necessarily imply 'regime' differences between social democratic and liberal welfare states. The limited number of country representatives jeopardises the accuracy of empirical results (even if the regime classification itself is correct). A solution to this problem is to use quantitative regime type measures as empirical proxies for key dimensions of welfare regimes. This approach does not label individual countries with the tag of 'social democratic, conservative, or liberal welfare regime' in a qualitative and reductionist way. Moreover, since regime type indicators can vary across *individual* country cases, we can investigate potential cross-national differences *within* welfare regimes. In this respect, regime type indicators allow us to identify "countries' 'degree of membership' of the different regimes" (Jæger, 2006: 162).

4. Overview of the chapters

With these potential barriers in mind, this thesis explores the potential role of social policy settings in determining the link between social forces and political attitudes (policy-feedback effect). Specifically, this study addresses two research questions: (1) to what extent does the relationship between socioeconomic status and attitudes toward a redistributive government vary across different social policy settings and over time, and (2) to what extent are social (and identity-based) cleavages and macro-level contexts associated with anti-immigrant sentiments among native citizens?

The thesis consists of five separate papers, all of which address how social cleavages shape political attitudes toward solidarity issues. The main text is divided into two parts: the first deals with the relationship between socioeconomic status, social policy structures, and divergent attitudes toward inequality and redistribution (Chapters 2 to 4), and the second addresses the effect of social cleavages and identity on native citizens' attitudes toward immigration and cultural plurality in different policy contexts (Chapters 5 and 6).

Part I: Social cleavages, inequality, and redistribution. Chapter 2 explores the micro-level mechanism of the paradox of redistribution theory developed by Korpi and Palme (1998), that is, the hypothesis that attitudinal cleavages between low- and high-income earners become larger in the context of targeted social spending. Using data from three different social surveys, the study finds that different question wordings produce different results: some results confirm the polarization hypothesis, whereas others do not. It also attempts to explain the results by arguing that attitudinal polarization occurs when income earners' sense of ingroup favouritism and intergroup conflict is sufficiently triggered. Chapter 3 examines how tax policy structures condition the association between income status and attitudes toward taxation policies, focusing on the cost side of redistributive

politics (i.e., taxation). The results suggest that high-income earners are more likely to hold a negative attitude toward higher and more progressive tax policies in welfare states with higher levels of direct taxes. On the other hand, different degrees of tax concentration (or progressivity) across income levels do not significantly condition the income-attitude linkage. In contrast to Chapters 2 and 3, which investigate the spatial or cross-national variation in welfare attitudes, Chapter 4 addresses the temporal variation in welfare attitudes. Building on the welfare regime theory (Esping-Andersen, 1990), this chapter explores the association over time between social cleavages (e.g., occupation, income, and education) and redistributive attitudes in the United States, the typical representative (or prototype) of the liberal welfare regime. Specifically, Chapter 4 tests whether attitudinal cleavages between professional and manual workers have changed during the past decades. The findings indicate that there is a declining trend in the explanatory power of occupation in predicting redistributive attitudes over time and that the declining pattern could be attributable to the attitudinal convergence among those with different educational backgrounds.

Part II: Social cleavages, citizenship, and immigration. Chapter 5 examines whether the relationship between native workers' market status and their attitudes toward welfare chauvinism is conditioned by the social structures within which they are situated. Drawing on realistic conflict theory and its application to welfare chauvinism, it is argued that native workers shape or change their attitudes toward immigrants' access to social welfare depending on the circumstances in which the native workers perceive themselves to be in competition with, and hence feel threatened by, immigrant workers in the labor market. The results indicate that attitudinal cleavages between occupations become wider in the context of more generous and ethnically diverse welfare states. Finally, Chapter 6 investigates how native citizens' national identity is associated with their attitudes toward

multiculturalism in Canada. Building on the civic-ethnic typology of national identity, the chapter provides evidence for the indirect effect model, that is, the association between the two different types of national identity and attitudes toward multiculturalism is significantly mediated by perceived collective threat. In a strict sense, Chapter 6 does not fit into the theoretical framework of this thesis because it does not particularly address the institutionalist view that policy feedback plays a role in shaping mass attitudes. However, the chapter was included because it still falls within the general theme of this research, namely, the idea that social forces create political attitudes.

Three of the five core chapters have already been published in refereed journals: *Socio-Economic Review* (Chapter 2), *Social Indicators Research* (Chapter 3), and *Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science* (Chapter 6). The other two (Chapters 4 and 5) are either in preparation for submission or have been submitted for publication.

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CHAPTER 2

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Identity priming and public opinion on income inequality: robustness testing of the micro-level mechanism of the paradox of redistribution

Abstract

This study aims to contribute new insights into the 'paradox of redistribution' theory in light of identity priming. Korpi and Palme (1998) argued that low-income targeting leads to less redistribution and explained this trade-off as a result of coalition politics among different social strata. Indeed, recent empirical studies suggest that high-income earners tend to have more negative attitudes toward redistribution in the context of targeted spending (the polarization hypothesis). Contrary to most studies, which have relied on a single data source and measure, this study explores whether the polarization hypothesis is supported by multiple (both micro and macro) data sources. The findings of this study indicate that different question wordings produce different responses to inequality and redistribution. Some of the results confirmed the polarization hypothesis, whereas others did not. This paper attempts to explain these discrepancies by comparing the wording patterns of inequality-attitude measures and arguing that high- and low-income earners polarize their views in the context of low-income targeting when their sense of ingroup favoritism and intergroup conflict is sufficiently triggered.

Key words: identity, income distribution, inequality, institutional structure, preferences, welfare state

1. Introduction

Several recent studies have focused on the role of target efficiency—that is, the extent to which public transfers are targeted to those at the bottom of the income scale—as a key cross-national institutional variation that explains the micro-level mechanism of redistribution politics (Brady and Bostic, 2015; Sumino, 2016; Beramendi and Rehm, 2016). The theoretical underpinnings for this insight come from the seminal work by Korpi and Palme (1998; 'KP, 1998' henceforth), in which they argued that the skewed distribution of welfare benefits among different income groups creates a cross-class polarization of interests and identities, hence less government redistribution—called the 'paradox of redistribution'.

Despite growing interest in the concentration of transfer benefits, relatively little attention has been paid to the role of identity/conflict awareness. Let me explain this point by turning to the original 'paradox of redistribution' theory (KP, 1998). The KP's theory predicts that more targeted welfare systems result in less redistributive government: Targeted spending → redistribution. Here, 'redistribution' refers to the relative reduction in income inequality from market income to disposable (post-tax/transfer) income as a proportion of market income inequality (KP, 1998). The logic behind this process (targeted spending → redistribution) can be broken down into two components: the first in which given institutional structures (i.e. universal or targeted spending) mobilize coalitions (or conflicts) between different income groups, and the second in which formulated preferences are reflected in an actual redistributive policy. This micro-level mechanism can be expressed as: Targeted spending (a) → preference formation (b) → redistribution (c). Focusing on the former stage [(a) → (b)], this study hypothesizes that the relationship between income status and attitudes toward income inequality is conditioned by the degree

of targeted spending. In other words, attitudinal cleavages between income groups grow wider in welfare states with low-income targeting, in which redistribution politics tends to be a group-interested and conflict-driven process. An empirical study by Beramendi and Rehm (2016) indicates that a more low-income targeting leads to a more contested welfare state (i.e. more negative income slopes).

This study further specifies the above argument in light of identity awareness, arguing that the polarization process (Targeted spending → preference formation) occurs when individuals are exposed to a cue that elicits their sense of social identity (Tajfel, 1981) and self-categorization (Turner, 1985; Turner *et al*., 1987). In other words, targeted spending mobilizes coalitions (or conflicts) among income groups when members of high/low income groups articulate a sense of identity and conflict. This modifies the causal process as follows: Targeted spending (a) → identity priming (b_1) → polarization in attitudes (b_2) → redistribution (c), in which preference formation (b) is divided into (b_1) and (b_2). By 'identity priming', I mean an increased sensitivity to reducing inequality (e.g. redistributive policy) triggered by exposure to stimuli that evoke a sense of ingroup favoritism and intergroup conflict. In practice, this study argues that the polarization process [(a) through (b_2)] occurs when a survey question accentuates the contrast/conflict between high- and low-income earners.

To this end, unlike most previous studies that have replied on a single data source (e.g. ISSP) and single question item, this study attempts to provide a more comprehensive analysis using multiple data sources: the International Social Survey Program (ISSP, 2009), the European Social Survey (ESS, 2008), and the European Values Survey (EVS, 2008). From these surveys, I select a set of question items (inequality attitudes) with different question wordings, some of which emphasize the contrast/conflict between high- and low-income groups but others do not. The polarization process is expected to occur when

respondents are exposed to a survey question that is designed to prime their sense of group identity/conflict. The findings of this study indicate that differences in the question wording, even slight ones, can yield different results, and that the validity of the hypothesis that targeted spending contextualizes the association between income and inequality attitudes depends on how the outcome variable (inequality attitude) is asked or worded/phrased.

2. Theoretical framework and hypotheses

In this section, I briefly outline the 'paradox of redistribution' theory developed by KP (1998), and then identify the specific process of attitudinal polarization in the context of targeted spending. I then highlight the role of identity priming as a potentially important activator of ingroup favoritism and intergroup conflict that make the polarization process function.

2.1 Micro-level foundation of the paradox of redistribution

The welfare regime theory argues that the differences in social policy arrangements generate distinct forms of social structuring, political discourse, and attitudes (Korpi, 1980; Esping-Andersen, 1990; KP, 1998; Pierson, 2001; Rothstein and Steinmo, 2002; Larsen, 2008). The central idea is that institutional structures shape a collective understanding of redistributive politics—namely, whether and to what extent the well-being of the least well-off in society should be secured through statutory intervention or market-based solutions (Offe, 1992; Edlund, 1999). The political economy literature, on the other hand, highlights the conflict of material interest between income groups as the key motive for individualist behavior (Romer, 1975; Roberts, 1977; Meltzer and Richard, 1981). In this view,

individuals are assumed to behave in a way that maximizes their personal utility. For instance, low-income earners are more likely to support redistribution than high-income earners because it benefits them financially more than it does in their high-income counterparts (Luttmer, 2001; Alesina and Ferrara, 2005; Rehm, 2009; Sumino, 2014).

Synthesizing these two distinct theoretical traditions (i.e. institutionalist and political economy perspectives) prompts the following question: do different income groups respond uniformly to inequality across countries with different institutional structures? Political economists claim that income cleavages lead to differences in how people feel about inequality. But do high-income earners under a certain institutional context oppose egalitarian measures in the same manner as those under a different institutional context? If the answer is no, what might account for the differences?

Revisiting the 'paradox of redistribution' theory proposed by KP (1998) gives us a good starting point. They argued that target efficiency—"the proportion of program expenditures going exclusively to those below the official poverty line" (p. 662)—plays a crucial role in the process of welfare state politics. They theorized that there is a reverse relationship between targeting and redistribution, namely that a welfare state institution based on means-tested programs targeted exclusively at the needy results in less redistributive policy outputs. According to them, this trade-off is explained as a product of socio-political dynamics. Marginal welfare states with targeted income transfers, in which social programs 'unfairly' benefit a small portion of the population (i.e. those below the poverty line), produce a preference gap between high/middle-income and low-income groups, and this, in turn, causes a potential revolt against a redistributive political agenda. On the other hand, welfare institutions characterized by universal programs, which benefit a broad range of people regardless of recipients' market positions, mobilize cross-class alliances. Unlike means-tested transfer schemes, the comprehensive welfare state incorporates all citizens

without accentuating disparities between net contributors and net beneficiaries (Pierson, 1996). Because social welfare programs in the universal welfare state are generously designed to cover the entire population instead of labelling or stigmatizing the target group, the expected costs and benefits of the welfare state are less visible or calculable to both manual and better-off workers (Skocpol, 1992; Rothstein, 1998). In other words, the universal welfare state blurs the boundaries between group identities and generates a seamless and integrated public demand for redistribution. By contrast, in selective welfare states, identities are constructed along a constellation of class interests, which lead to group-based conflicts between 'us' and 'them' (Edlund, 1999). Residual welfare systems explicitly divide the population into welfare recipients and non-recipients, and hence, tend to be associated with greater polarization in preferences. This is not to say that institutional structures (i.e. target efficiency) *directly* explain welfare stakeholders' perceptions toward income inequality, but rather that the relationship between income and outcome attitudes is *conditioned*—strengthened or weakened—by the structure of social policy institutions, in particular, by the degree of targeting policy (Gingrich and Ansell, 2012).

The thrust of the above argument is two-fold: (1) reactions to redistributive policies differ across income groups—while the poor demand redistribution, the rich oppose it, and (2) such reactions of different income groups are not uniform across welfare sates with different degrees of targeted spending. These theoretical propositions lead us to the following two hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1. Higher-income earners are less supportive of reducing inequality. In other words, there exist attitudinal cleavages between income groups.

Hypothesis 2. Attitudinal cleavages between income groups grow wider in the context of targeted spending. High-income earners' opposition to reducing inequality becomes more intense in welfare states where transfer programs are 'unequally' targeted at low-income households.

This study does not intend to test the whole process of the 'paradox of redistribution' theory developed by KP (1998), in which they noted that,

(1) the institutional structures of welfare states are likely to affect the definitions of identity and interest among citizens. Thus, (2) an institutional welfare state model based on a universalistic strategy intended to maintain normal or accustomed standards of living is likely to result in greater redistribution than a marginal one based on targeting (p. 663; underlines added).

The underlying logic of these statements can be summarized as follows: first, institutional structures shape identity/interest-based preferences toward inequality, and second, such formulated preferences are translated to redistributive policy outputs, most likely through political representation. The first stage concerns the role of institutional structures in triggering broad alliances or antagonisms among income groups, while the second stage refers, though not explicitly, to the impact of public opinion on redistributive policy. Thus, the whole causal process is expressed as:

Targeted spending (a) → preference formation (b) → redistribution (c).

The interest of this paper is to explore the former part—the causal sequence from 'targeted spending' (a) to 'preference formation' (b). In this respect, while the present study draws upon the 'paradox of redistribution' theory, the main focus is on the micro-level mechanism behind the formation of preferences rather than on the causality from 'preference' (b) to

'redistribution' (c) or the aggregate-level relationship between 'targeted spending' (a) and 'redistribution' (c) (e.g. Kenworthy, 2011; Marx *et al*., 2013).

2.2 Identity priming in redistribution politics

Central to understanding the mechanism underlying the polarization process (Targeted spending (a) → preference formation (b); Hypothesis 2) is the role of identity awareness. The issue of who, or which income group, gets transfer benefits and who bears the costs is politically sensitive, and attracts scrutiny from welfare stakeholders. The uneven distribution of public transfers, which is closely linked to subjective economic well-being, affects stakeholders' reactions to the reallocation of income resources between 'our group' and 'the others'. In the context of low-income targeting, high-income earners are expected to be more resistant to reducing inequality and redistribution because targeting, they perceive, 'unfairly' benefits 'the others' (i.e. low-income groups) at the expense of 'our group'. This leads to the prediction that attitudinal differences between high- and low-income earners grow wider in countries with targeting policies.

Redistributive preferences cannot be explained only by individual calculations of rational self-interest but are largely a function of social identity (Tajfel, 1981) and self-categorization (Turner, 1985; Turner *et al*., 1987). Individuals' perceptions that they belong to a socioeconomic group and their emotional attachment to the group are a powerful regulator of inequality attitudes. The process of self-categorization, in which individuals place themselves into a group that shares similar concerns and interests, draws boundaries between 'us' and 'them', and individuals ascribe positive attributes to their own group and negative traits and prejudice to the others. The self-categorization process helps 'atomized' individuals recognize their social self and elicits intragroup cohesion and intergroup

conflict. Group polarization is particularly salient in the context of low-income targeting characterized by the reallocation of resources from high- to low-income groups.

This implies that the polarization process occurs when individuals' awareness of identities is stimulated, and when ingroup favoritism is triggered. In other words, attitudinal polarization (in the context of low-income targeting) is activated by an exposure to a stimulus that provokes a sense of belongingness and conflict. Hypothesis 2 predicts that targeted spending contextualizes the relationship between income position and attitudes toward inequality. Here, 'attitudes toward inequality' can be operationalized in a variety of ways (question wordings): some survey questions emphasize the contrast between those who benefit and those who contribute, but others do not. The polarization process (Hypothesis 2) is expected to occur when respondents are exposed to a question that is designed to prime their identification with a specific socioeconomic group (high/low-income status). Thus, the causal process described in the sub-section 2.1 will be modified as follows:

Targeted spending (a) → identity priming (b_1) → polarization in attitudes (b_2)

→ redistribution (c)

'Preference formation' (b) can be divided into two sub-processes: identity priming (b_1) and polarization in attitudes (b_2). This causal sequence suggests that if respondents were not exposed to a cue that stimulates their sense of identification (b_1), the process of attitudinal polarization (b_2) would be less likely to happen. In the empirical analysis that follows, I examine how the validity of Hypothesis 2 is susceptible to the question wording of inequality-attitude measures.

3. Research methods

3.1 Data

This study is based on individual-level data (aged 18-89) from three different sources: the International Social Survey Program (ISSP, 2009), the European Social Survey (ESS, 2008), and the European Values Survey (EVS, 2008). The three surveys include questions about attitudes toward inequality and redistribution, and cover (share) the same set of countries and time period (late-2000s). In this study, the analysis was restricted to capitalist democracies on which the KP theory is originally based, and macro-level data on target efficiency (OECD, 2008; Wang and Caminada, 2011) are fully available. To make the comparisons easier, this study used the same set of overlapping countries commonly covered by the three surveys. The analysis includes 20 countries: Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey. The three datasets were analyzed in combination with macro-level data (OECD, 2008; Wang and Caminada, 2011). Due to data constraints, Portugal and Turkey were included only in the models estimated using the OECD data, while Estonia and Slovenia were included only in the models estimated using the LIS (Wang and Caminada, 2011) data (for details, see appendix Table A3).

Missing data were handled using multiple imputation (MI) techniques because the use of listwise deletion results in loss of approximately 20% of the cases—mainly due to missing information on the (country-specific) household income variables—thus, may lead to biased and inefficient estimates (King *et al*., 2001). Imputation was carried out with Amelia II for creating five (m = 5) complete case datasets (Honaker *et al*., 2011). Missing

values were imputed separately within each country to account for the clustered data structure (Graham, 2009). Estimates from the five imputed datasets were pooled using Rubin's rules (Rubin, 1987; 1996; White *et al*., 2011).

3.2 Measures

The central aim of this study is to examine how question wordings affect the polarization process in the context of low-income targeting (Hypothesis 2). In essence, this study predicts that the polarization process is most likely to occur when survey questions elicit respondents' identification and self-categorization. To test this, I employ and compare a set of four different indicators (with different question wordings) of inequality attitudes (Table 1). The first two items are standard 'government redistribution' questions from the ISSP and the ESS. The ISSP asked the respondents whether they agree or disagree with the statement, 'it is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes', while the ESS has a similar but slightly different question item that asked whether or not respondents agree with the notion that 'the government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels'. The ISSP question explicitly refers to the contrast between 'people with high incomes and those with low incomes', which is expected to invoke respondents' awareness of group identity—e.g. high-income status (contributor) or low-income status (recipient). On the other hand, the ESS item is a less conflict-prone question in that it is vaguely worded as 'differences in income levels', with no reference to 'high vs. low' income earners. The third item was taken from the EVS, which asked respondents for their views on the statement: 'incomes should be made equal' or 'there should be greater incentives for individual effort'. Similar to the first and second items, this question asks about *income*

inequality, but with a more explicit reference to the conflict between income equality and incentives on effort. The fourth inequality-attitude item also comes from the EVS, in which respondents were asked to choose which of the following statements came closer to their own view: 'I would consider equality more important, that is, that nobody is underprivileged and that social class differences are not so strong', or 'I would consider personal freedom more important, that is, everyone can live in freedom and develop without hindrance'. This item is similar to the third one (i.e. equality vs. freedom), but different in that the two opposite values were worded in a more abstract way: 'equality' rather than 'income equality' and 'personal freedom' rather than 'incentives for effort'. In this sense, the fourth question is expected to send less explicit signals to respondents about the possibility that reducing income inequality might result in disincentives for effort and performance.

Table 1 summarizes the wording patterns of the four inequality-attitude items. The items were classified by whether or not they include specific words/phrases that trigger a sense of ingroup favoritism and intergroup conflict—namely, explicit references to (a) *income* inequality, (b) high vs. low incomes, and (c) incentives on effort.

Table 1 Classification of inequality-attitude items by question-wording patterns

	Identity/conflict priming words/phrases		
	(a) Income inequality/ differences	(b) High income v. low income	(c) Incentives on effort
Q1: Responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes. (ISSP 2009)	yes	yes	no
Q2: Government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels. (ESS 2008)	yes	no	no
Q3: Incomes should be made more equal. OR There should be greater incentives for individual effort. (EVS 2008)	yes	no	yes
Q4: I would consider equality more important, that is, that nobody is underprivileged and that social class differences are not so strong. OR I would consider personal freedom more important, that is, everyone can live in freedom and develop without hindrance. (EVS 2008)	no	no	no

Sources: ISSP (2009); ESS (2008); EVS (2008).

Unlike the phrases such as 'social class differences' and 'social inequality', 'income inequality/differences' (a) is specific since it identifies a particular dimension of socio-economic disparities (i.e. income), which is expected to invoke a sense of identity as a high/low-income earner. This specification is especially important because this analysis focuses on attitudinal cleavages across *income* lines (Hypotheses 1-2). 'High- vs. low-income status' (b) is also a potential trigger of identification and self-categorization. The phrase 'high/low incomes' elicits a sense of identity/conflict by making respondents aware, for example, that redistributive policy benefits low-income group but burdens high-income group. This would be less likely to happen if the question was asked in a more abstract fashion—for example, 'differences in income levels' (ESS). The phrase 'incentives on effort' (c) reminds high-income earners that they are economically successful because they worked hard for it, which leads to the justification of privileged status and existing income inequality. This process instills a sense of identity as a member of high-income group and triggers ingroup favoritism and outgroup prejudice (e.g. lazy low-income earners).

As presented in Table 1, Questions 1-2 (ISSP/ESS) share all features except 'high vs. low incomes'. Question 3 (EVS) is similar to Questions 1-2 because it addresses *income* inequality, but differs because it addresses the potential trade-off between income equality and incentives on effort. Question 4 also deals with the conflict between equality and freedom but in a more abstract way: 'equality' not 'income equality'; and 'personal freedom' not 'incentives for individual effort'. As presented in Figure 1, respondents' reactions to the four questions vary markedly both within and between countries.



Figure 1 Attitudes toward inequality, %. *Notes*: Countries were sorted in descending order by the sum of 'strongly agree' and 'agree' of the ISSP item (top left). To facilitate comparison, countries were presented in the same order for all figures. *N* = 20. *Sources*: ISSP (2009); ESS (2008); EVS (2008).

The primary independent variable of interest is household income. In the three surveys (ISSP, ESS, EVS), household income was reported in categories. The midpoint of each income interval was used as a proxy for actual income (Rueda *et al*., 2014; Rueda, 2014; Rueda and Stegmueller, 2015). The midpoint of the last open-ended category was extrapolated from the frequencies of the next-to-top and the top categories using a Pareto formula proposed by Hout (2004). To take into account the differences in price levels across countries, income values were adjusted by purchasing power parities (PPPs) in national currencies per US dollar (World Bank, 2008). To adjust for the differences in household compositions, household incomes were divided by the square root of household size (Buhmann *et al*., 1988). To reduce skewness, income values were transformed with a natural logarithm prior to analysis.

The analysis includes the following demographic controls: gender (female =1, male = 0), age (in years/10), age^2, educational attainment (primary, secondary, tertiary), and employment status (full-time employed, unemployed, student, retired, housekeeping, others). Although one may argue that party affiliation (or left-right ideological disposition) has a significant association with inequality attitudes (e.g. left partisanship leads to higher levels of support for egalitarian principles and practices), I prefer not to include this item in this analysis because of potential endogeneity bias problems (i.e. the possibility of reverse causation; see Cusack *et al*., 2006; but see Jæger, 2008; Margalit, 2013).

Target efficiency. To evaluate the distribution of public transfers across income groups, I use the concentration coefficient for public cash benefits. The concentration index, calculated in the same way as the Gini index, measures the extent to which public transfers are concentrated or dispersed across different income groups (Fields, 1979; Kakwani, 1986). Theoretically, the index lies between −1.0 (the poorest gets all public transfers) and +1.0 (the richest gets all public transfers). A score of zero indicates that public cash benefits are evenly distributed across the income scale. Negative and lower scores represent higher levels of progressivity—public cash benefits are targeted efficiently (or 'unevenly') to reduce income inequality.

For robustness purposes, this study uses two different sources of aggregate-level data on targeted spending: OECD (2008); Wang and Caminada (2011). Here, Wang and Caminada (2011) is an updated version of the concentration coefficient calculated by the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), the data source which KP's (1998) work was originally based on. As Figure 2 shows, OECD (2008) statistics indicate that the concentration coefficient varies greatly across countries, ranging from −.32 in Denmark to .35 in Turkey (mean = −.04; SD = .19; N = 18). Denmark, Great Britain and Finland have the highest levels of target efficiency with values less than −.20, while public transfers are highly

regressive in Turkey and Portugal with values more than .20. In Germany and Hungary, public cash benefits are (relatively) equally distributed across incomes. According to Wang and Caminada (2011), the concentration index ranges from −.31 in Great Britain to .16 in Poland (mean = −.08; SD = .14; *N* = 18). The target efficiency scores are highly negative in Great Britain and Denmark; close to zero in Slovenia and Hungary; positive and high in Poland and Austria. Both measures are largely consistent with each other (Pearson's r = .87; *N* = 16). The variation in values is larger in the OECD data (SD = .19) than in the LIS data (SD = .14), partly due to the inclusion of Turkey and Portugal, two highly regressive countries, in the OECD data.



Figure 2 Target efficiency across 20 countries. *Note*: Countries were sorted in descending order, with the same countries listed side by side to facilitate comparison. *Sources*: OECD (2008); Wang and Caminada (2011).

In addition to the concentration index, I also include the size of public transfers, defined as the percentage share of public cash transfers in household income (OECD, 2008; Wang and Caminada, 2011). Higher score represents greater proportion of redistributive benefits in household income. For instance, public transfers constitute about 35% of household income in Hungary and Poland, while they account for less than 20% in Great Britain and

Switzerland (Table 2). The size of public transfers is clearly distinguished from the concentration index, which is about *who* among different income groups receives cash benefits and not *how much* (KP, 1998; Barnes, 2015). For example, as shown in Table 2, although public transfers account for more than a 25% (OECD) of household income in both Denmark and Portugal, the degree of low-income targeting is very strong in Denmark (−.316), but rather weak in Portugal (.247).

Table 2 Size of public transfers and target efficiency, by welfare regime type

	Size of benefits		Target efficiency			Size of benefits		Target efficiency	
Regimes/countries	OECD	WC	OECD	WC	Regimes/countries	OECD	WC	OECD	WC
Social democratic					*Liberal*				
Austria	36.6	26.7	0.157	0.108	Great Britain	14.5	14.3	−0.275	−0.313
Sweden	32.7	24.6	−0.145	−0.128	*Non-classified*				
Belgium	30.5	7.9	−0.120	−0.244	Poland	35.8	32.5	0.185	0.157
Denmark	25.6	18.9	−0.316	−0.306	Hungary	35.1	35.7	−0.016	0.016
Norway	21.7	20.2	−0.183	−0.155	Slovak Republic	26.0	26.6	−0.056	−0.109
Netherlands	17.1	21.3	−0.198	−0.041	Portugal	25.5	-	0.247	-
Conservative					Czech Republic	24.3	20.8	−0.154	−0.218
France	32.9	26.2	0.136	0.077	Spain	21.3	20.7	0.063	0.068
Germany	28.2	21.2	0.013	−0.110	Turkey	16.9	-	0.347	-
Switzerland	16.0	17.5	−0.170	−0.066	Slovenia	-	27.5	-	0.011
Finland	14.4	23.2	−0.219	−0.127	Estonia	-	17.9	-	−0.099

Notes: Regime classification is based on Esping-Andersen (1990, pp. 51–52). Countries are sorted in descending order by the size of transfer benefits (OECD, 2008) within each welfare regime cluster. 'WC' = Wang and Caminada (2011).
Sources: OECD (2008); Wang and Caminada (2011).

Using the quantitative regime indicators—the concentration and size of public cash benefits—has at least two advantages over some other operationalizations of welfare regime. First, it seems obvious that cross-national variation in target efficiency cannot be captured within the framework of traditional regime typology. As shown in Table 2, while the regime classification roughly reflects the variation in the size of public transfers—the scores are comparatively high in the social democratic cluster and low in its liberal counterpart—the scores of target efficiency do not have clear between-regime differences or within-regime similarities. In previous empirical studies, capitalist democracies have often been clustered into three (or more) distinct regime groups. However, ideal types of

welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1990) cannot be interpreted as 'real entities'; groups of (or individual) countries cannot necessarily be treated as effective representatives of different welfare regimes (Svallfors, 1997; Jæger, 2006). The notion that welfare states are qualitatively distinct relies on the implicit assumption that each regime cluster has internal homogeneity. If this assumption does not hold (as in the case of target efficiency), potential within-regime variations are to be ignored. In this respect, employing quantitative measures allows for carefully capturing institutional differences across *individual* countries. Second, the concentration and size of cash benefits seem to affect people's preferences more straightforwardly than some other quantitative indicators. An indicator such as the size of social spending as a percentage of GDP appears less appropriate because welfare stakeholders might either not be aware of the level of government spending in their country, or it might not be evident to them as to what the 'percentage of national GDP' implies for the expected welfare benefits their households actually receive. In contrast, for welfare stakeholders, the proportion of public cash benefits in their household income (i.e. the size of public transfers) and the extent to which transfer benefits are distributed to their own income group relative to other 'rival' groups (i.e. the concentration of public transfers)—are more tangible and easier to calculate and thus to respond to.

Finally, to hold constant the effects of other macro-level factors, the following two variables were included in the analysis: market income inequality and economic development. Market income inequality was assessed by the Gini coefficient before taxes and transfers (OECD, 2005; Wang and Caminada, 2011), while economic development was assessed by gross domestic product (GDP) per capita adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP) in US dollars (IMF, 2005). In particular, controlling for 'market income inequality' adds strength to the causal inferences because the degree of targeted spending at the bottom is expected to be greater in countries where the distribution of market income

is highly concentrated at the top. All macro-level factors were standardized by subtracting their means and dividing by their standard deviations. For the four macro-level indicators, I used the values from a single year around 2005 (mid-2000s). Descriptive statistics are shown in appendix Table A1. The bivariate correlations between macro-level measures are presented in appendix Table A2.

3.3 Analytical approach

A cross-sectional multilevel modelling approach was applied to analyze hierarchically nested samples and simultaneously examine the interplay between macro-level factors (e.g. targeting) and short-term individual-level preferences (Goldstein, 1995; Kreft and de Leeuw, 1998; Snijders and Bosker, 1999). Another possible approach might be to analyze over-time trends in targeting policies and subsequent preferences *within* countries. Nevertheless, a multilevel modelling approach seems more justifiable given that the key motivation of this paper is to examine how pre-existing regime differences *across* countries would affect the association between income position and outcome preferences. Moreover, sufficient multi-year data on target efficiency are currently unavailable to carry out a longitudinal assessment. A series of two-level ordered logit models was estimated using MLwiN version 2.30 (Rasbash *et al*., 2014) via the 'runmlwin' command in Stata (Leckie and Charlton, 2012).

4. Results

The purpose of this study is to test how different indicators of inequality attitudes affect the micro-level process of the 'paradox of redistribution' (Hypothesis 2) in light of the

theoretical assumption that attitudinal polarization is induced when respondents place themselves into a particular income group, and articulate a sense of ingroup favoritism and intergroup conflict.

To explore this, I begin by comparing the results obtained from the ISSP and the ESS (Table 3). Estimated parameters in the left two columns are based on the ISSP 2009, while those in the right two columns are from the ESS 2008. As suggested in Hypothesis 1, higher income is indeed significantly associated with weaker support for redistribution (models 1-4). Model 1 shows that the coefficient of the interaction term between income and targeted spending (OECD) was positive and highly significant ($p < .01$), which lends support for Hypothesis 2 that low-income targeting contextualizes the relationship between income and inequality attitudes (the more targeted spending, the more attitudinal polarization). Model 2 shows that the interaction effect remains significant (but less marked; $p < .10$) when the same model was tested using the targeted-spending measure calculated by Wang and Caminada (2011). In models 3-4, Hypothesis 2 was re-examined using a slightly different inequality-attitude item that does not accentuate the contrast between high- and low-income earners (ESS). The results show that the interaction effect was in the expected direction but failed to reach statistical significance, regardless of which targeted-spending measure (OECD or WC) was used.

Table 3 Government should reduce income differences: comparison of ISSP 2009 and ESS 2008

	Q1. Govt. resp. to reduce income differences b/w high and low incomes (ISSP)				Q2. Govt. should take measures to reduce differences in income levels (ESS)			
	Model 1: OECD		Model 2: WC		Model 3: OECD		Model 4: WC	
Variables	coef.	s.e.	coef.	s.e.	coef.	s.e.	coef.	s.e.
Individual-level predictors								
Household income (equivalized)	−0.502***	(0.076)	−0.544***	(0.078)	−0.395***	(0.064)	−0.442***	(0.059)
Level-1 controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
Country-level factors								
Target efficiency (OECD)	0.246*	(0.108)	-	-	0.288*	(0.136)	-	-
Size of public transfers (OECD)	0.009	(0.085)	-	-	−0.071	(0.109)	-	-
Target efficiency (WC)	-	-	0.199†	(0.119)	-	-	0.221	(0.136)
Size of public transfers (WC)	-	-	0.030	(0.121)	-	-	0.033	(0.139)
Gini (market income)	0.151†	(0.089)	0.133	(0.093)	0.180	(0.109)	0.176	(0.104)
GDP(PPP)/capita	−0.196†	(0.106)	−0.269*	(0.120)	−0.043	(0.128)	−0.041	(0.133)
Cross-level interactions								
Income × Target efficiency (OECD)	0.324**	(0.102)	-	-	0.124	(0.088)	-	-
Income × Size of public transfers (OECD)	−0.226**	(0.080)	-	-	−0.082	(0.070)	-	-
Income × Target efficiency (WC)	-	-	0.179†	(0.103)	-	-	0.016	(0.079)
Income × Size of public transfers (WC)	-	-	−0.182†	(0.104)	-	-	0.026	(0.083)
Income × Gini (market income)	0.053	(0.083)	0.030	(0.080)	0.069	(0.070)	0.067	(0.062)
Income × GDP(PPP)/capita	0.138	(0.099)	0.033	(0.102)	0.027	(0.084)	0.069	(0.081)
Intercept variance	0.102	(0.035)	0.125	(0.043)	0.164	(0.055)	0.167	(0.056)
Slope variance (income)	0.082	(0.031)	0.082	(0.031)	0.060	(0.022)	0.050	(0.019)
Covariance b/w intercepts and slopes	0.009	(0.023)	0.028	(0.027)	0.033	(0.026)	0.040	(0.025)
VPC (variance partition coefficient)	0.030		0.037		0.047		0.048	
$N_{\text{individual}}$	23,050		22,562		34,961		33,236	
N_{country}	18		18		18		18	

Notes: Random intercept and slope (income) models. RIGLS (reiterated generalized least squares) with PQL2 (second order penalized quasi-likelihood). Intercept variances for the empty model (with no predictor) are: [Question 1] .343 with a VPC (variance partition coefficient) of .094 (OECD, 2008); .298 with a VPC of .083 (Wang and Caminada, 2011), [Question 2] .319 with a VPC of .089 (OECD, 2008); .259 with a VPC of .073 (Wang and Caminada, 2011). The countries included in each model are presented in appendix Table A3. Missing data were imputed using multiple imputation methods (Rubin, 1987). Estimated cut-points not displayed. 'WC' = Wang and Caminada (2011).
Sources: ISSP (2009); ESS (2008); OECD (2008); Wang and Caminada (2011).
†p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

Table 4 provides further results using alternative inequality-attitude items from the EVS 2008: 'income equality vs. incentives for effort' (models 5-6) and 'more important: equality vs. freedom' (models 7-8). Models 5-6 show that the coefficient of the interaction term (income and target efficiency) is positive and significant, indicating that higher income earners are more likely to favor incentives for effort rather than income equality in the context of targeted spending. On the other hand, models 7-8 show that the polarization process does not occur when the question item was phrased more vaguely (or more normatively) as 'equality vs. freedom'.

Table 4 Conflict between equality and freedom/incentives for effort, EVS 2008

	Q3. Income equality v. incentives on effort				Q4. More important: equality v. freedom			
	Model 5: OECD		Model 6: WC		Model 7: OECD		Model 8: WC	
Variables	coef.	s.e.	coef.	s.e.	coef.	s.e.	coef.	s.e.
Individual-level predictors								
Household income (equivalized)	−0.265***	(0.040)	−0.267***	(0.041)	−0.190***	(0.050)	−0.210***	(0.053)
Level-1 controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
Country-level factors								
Target efficiency (OECD)	0.272	(0.179)	-	-	0.178†	(0.101)	-	-
Size of public transfers (OECD)	−0.019	(0.139)	-	-	−0.004	(0.079)	-	-
Target efficiency (WC)	-	-	0.190	(0.197)	-	-	0.132	(0.096)
Size of public transfers (WC)	-	-	0.129	(0.212)	-	-	−0.129	(0.103)
Gini (market income)	0.041	(0.142)	0.050	(0.152)	0.036	(0.080)	0.076	(0.074)
GDP(PPP)/capita	0.057	(0.171)	0.093	(0.200)	0.057	(0.096)	0.019	(0.097)
Cross-level interactions								
Income × Target efficiency (OECD)	0.118*	(0.054)	-	-	0.062	(0.071)	-	-
Income × Size of public transfers (OECD)	−0.026	(0.042)	-	-	−0.118*	(0.054)	-	-
Income × Target efficiency (WC)	-	-	0.127*	(0.051)	-	-	0.071	(0.073)
Income × Size of public transfers (WC)	-	-	−0.087	(0.055)	-	-	−0.054	(0.077)
Income × Gini (market income)	0.013	(0.043)	0.023	(0.040)	0.030	(0.056)	0.035	(0.054)
Income × GDP(PPP)/capita	0.034	(0.055)	−0.026	(0.055)	−0.081	(0.070)	−0.047	(0.073)
Intercept variance	0.272	(0.091)	0.349	(0.117)	0.084	(0.029)	0.080	(0.028)
Slope variance (income)	0.019	(0.008)	0.017	(0.008)	0.036	(0.016)	0.036	(0.015)
Covariance b/w intercepts and slopes	−0.025	(0.020)	−0.040	(0.023)	−0.019	(0.016)	−0.019	(0.015)
VPC (variance partition coefficient)	0.076		0.096		0.025		0.024	
$N_{\text{individual}}$	27,422		26,430		26,010		25,186	
N_{country}	18		18		18		18	

Notes: Random intercept and slope (income) models. RIGLS (reiterated generalized least squares) with PQL2 (second order penalized quasi-likelihood). Intercept variances for the empty model (with no predictor) are: [Question 3] .257 with a VPC (variance partition coefficient) of .086 (OECD, 2008); .333 with a VPC of .092 (Wang and Caminada, 2011), [Question 4] .086 with a VPC of .026 (OECD, 2008); .068 with a VPC of .020 (Wang and Caminada, 2011). The countries included in each model are presented in appendix Table A3. Missing data were imputed using multiple imputation methods (Rubin, 1987). Estimated cut-points not displayed. 'WC' = Wang and Caminada (2011).
Sources: EVS (2008); OECD (2008); Wang and Caminada (2011).
†p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

To facilitate visualization, predicted probabilities were calculated based on the estimates from models 5-6 in Table 4. In Figure 3, the horizontal axis represents income position (in percentile); the vertical axis represents the predicted probability of strong support for income equality (v. incentives for effort). The dashed line illustrates the predicted probability for targeted spending, while the solid line corresponds to that for non-targeted spending. All other variables were held at their observed values, and then the estimated probabilities were averaged over all cases (Hanmer and Kalkan, 2013).



Figure 3 Predicted probabilities: support for income equality (v. incentives for effort). *Sources*: EVS (2008); OECD (2008); Wang and Caminada (2011).

5. Discussion

This study has attempted to provide a comprehensive picture of the role of targeted spending by using multiple data sources. Some evidence (models 1-2, Table 3) suggests that attitudinal cleavages grow wider in the context of targeted spending (Hypothesis 2), which lends some credence to the micro-level mechanism underlying the 'paradox of redistribution' (KP, 1998) and, more generally, to the institutionalist assumption that institutional structures have feedback effects on mass opinion (Pierson, 1993; Mettler and Soss, 2004). The result of model 1 (estimated using ISSP and OECD) was generally consistent with that of Beramendi and Rehm (2016) (i.e. the more low-income targeting, the more polarized attitudes), even though the analytical procedure was slightly different (e.g. level-2 sample, income measurement). This result (obtained from ISSP/OECD) was somewhat robust to the use of alternative targeted-spending measure (model 2, WC), though the significance level was less impressive ($p < .10$). However, the same hypothesis was not clearly evidenced when a slightly different question-wording was used (models 3-4, Table 3). Findings also indicate that the polarization process (Hypothesis 2) occurs when respondents were asked about their views on the conflict between income equality and

incentives on effort (models 5-6, Table 4), but not when a similar question was asked in a more indirect manner (models 7-8). These results indicate that different question wordings provoke different reactions to inequality and redistribution.

These inconsistent results could be explained by the function of identity priming. As presented in Table 1, Questions 1-2 (government redistribution) were worded in a similar manner, the only substantial difference being 'high- vs. low-income status'. The ISSP item, which clearly refers to the differences between high and low incomes, is expected to raise respondents' self-awareness of their identity as a high-income group (welfare contributor) or low-income group (welfare recipient). By contrast, the ESS question is vaguely worded as 'differences in income levels', thus sends less explicit signals and implications regarding the conflict between the groups. This process makes it less likely that high- and low-income earners polarize their inequality attitudes in the context of targeted spending (Hypothesis 2). On the other hand, Question 3 addresses not only the issue of reducing income differences but the potential trade-off between income equality and incentives on effort. The results (models 5-6) show that high-income earners prefer incentives for effort to income equality in welfare states with low-income targeting. As with Question 1, Question 3 is a conflict-prone question since it reminds respondents that reducing income inequality can be at odds with their striving for economic success. When asked in this manner, high-income earners may consider that the rich are rich because of their hard work, and that it is unfair to equalize income differences between hard-working high-income earners and 'lazy' low-income earners. This identification process might explain the polarization process (Hypothesis 2) observed in models 5-6 (Table 4). Finally, no significant interaction effect (Hypothesis 2) was observed for Question 4. In general, Question 4 was vaguely worded compared to the others: 'underprivileged' not 'low-incomes'; 'social class differences' not 'income inequality/differences'; and 'personal freedom (without hindrance)' not

'incentives on effort'. Question 4 also lacks stimuli that evoke a sense of ingroup favoritism and intergroup conflict such as (a) income inequality, (b) high vs. low incomes, and (c) incentives on effort (Table 1).

A few caveats are worth mentioning. First, the role of identity priming must be explored further using an experimental study design. The most basic form of inequality-attitude question would be: do you agree or disagree with the statement that inequality should be reduced. Respondents' answers to this question would differ depending on whether their sense of identity/conflict is induced or not. In an experimental study, one can randomly assign respondents to experimental and control groups and then contrast the outcomes after the experimental group received an intervention that provokes their sense of identity/conflict. The treatment for the experimental group would include introductory/guiding sentences (before the basic question) such as 'In [Country], you are in the top 20% of the income distribution' (using demographic data collected); 'By "inequality" we mean income differences'; 'Reducing income inequality implies that some of the money you worked hard for will be used to help low-income earners who need assistance'; and/or 'Please keep in mind that reducing inequality most likely entails tax increases on high-income earners (like yourself)'. Second, although this study sought to compare inequality-attitude items from different social surveys (ISSP, ESS, EVS), the comparison of different inequality-attitude measures should ideally be made using the same survey data. In this study, to harmonize potential inconsistences between the survey datasets, several efforts have been made: the same set of countries (level-2 sample), time-period, and explanatory variables and their measurements (Table A1).

Several implications can be noted. First, the empirical results from this study direct our attention to the role of identity priming in redistributive politics. Hypothesis 2 predicted that the uneven distribution of public transfers serves as a contextual cue in defining

expectations for the consequences of egalitarian practices. This notion is based on the premise that respondents are aware of their socio-economic status and their benefits/costs associated with an egalitarian goal. High-income earners become less willing to support egalitarian views in the context of low-income targeting because they consider that targeting unfairly benefits low-income group at the expense of their group. This mechanism does not function if a survey question fails to induce their sense of identity and conflict. Second, this study has provided a more detailed description of the 'paradox of redistribution' process (KP, 1998). The basic form of the 'paradox of redistribution' can be expressed as: targeted spending → redistribution. As argued in the theory section, the underlying (micro-level) logic of this process is that first, low-income targeting generates identity-based preferences toward inequality, and second, polarized preferences are translated to redistributive policy outputs. Thus, the 'paradox of redistribution' process can be illustrated as: Targeted spending (a) → identity priming (b_1) → polarization in attitudes (b_2) → redistribution (c). The whole 'paradox of redistribution' process occurs when each of these underlying events [from (a) through (c)] is activated. Interestingly, recent studies have shown that the aggregate-level relationship between target efficiency (a) and redistribution (c) can no longer be observed or at least has substantially weakened since the mid-1990s (Kenworthy, 2011; Marx *et al*., 2013). On the other hand, the results of this paper (models 1-2, Table 3) have provided some evidence in favor of the causal sequence from (a) through (b_2). These seemingly puzzling results could be explained by looking at the micro-level process—for instance, the link between attitudinal polarization (b_2) and actual policy outputs (c) is by no means as self-evident as is often assumed.

In conclusion, this study has presented suggestive evidence that the validity of the polarization hypothesis (Hypothesis 2) is susceptible to the question wording of inequality-attitude indicators, and has provided a theoretical rationale for why this might be the case

by suggesting that identity priming plays a crucial role in the micro-level mechanism of the 'paradox of redistribution'. A promising avenue for future research would be to expand on this line of interest and provide more rigorous (e.g. experimental) data to confirm its plausibility.

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CHAPTER 3

Sumino, T. (2016) 'Level or concentration? A cross-national analysis of public attitudes towards taxation policies', *Social Indicators Research*, 129(3): 1115–1134. doi: 10.1007/s11205-015-1169-1

Level or concentration? A cross-national analysis of public attitudes towards taxation policies

Abstract

This article examines the role of income status and policy context in jointly determining public responses to taxation policies. Based upon the notion that taxpayers' self-interested preferences are inextricably intertwined with the policy context, I hypothesise that high-income taxpayers react differently to taxation policies depending on their perceived tax burden associated with tax policy structures. Using international social survey data, I find that the link between income and tax support is conditioned by the tax system within which taxpayers are contextually situated. In countries with comparatively high levels of direct taxes, high-income taxpayers react more negatively to higher and more progressive taxation than do low-income counterparts. In contrast, in low-tax societies, attitudinal cleavages among income classes become less intense. Moreover, the results reveal that the impact of income on tax attitudes does not significantly vary across countries with different degrees of tax concentration. The article concludes with a discussion of the implications of these findings and directions for further research.

Keywords: class politics; policy feedback; income status; tax policy; public opinion

1. Introduction

Redistributive schemes are unlikely to succeed in the absence of public support for taxation policies. It is crucial for governments to mitigate potential tax revolts and other public reactions that may undermine the financial basis of the social security system, especially in times of fiscal retrenchment and increasing inequality (OECD 2008). Political scientists and sociologists have invested a great deal of effort into identifying the sources of citizen-initiated tax revolts (Lowery and Sigelman 1981; Beck and Dye 1982; Sears and Citrin 1982; Beck *et al*. 1990; Bowler and Donovan 1995; Bartels 2005; Rudolph 2009). One of the most common explanations is the economic self-interest hypothesis, namely, taxpayers behave in accordance with their material benefits and costs. For example, this view predicts that individuals with affluent economic resources and low market risks are more likely to manifest anti-tax sentiments than do less privileged categories. Indeed, previous empirical studies have shown that high-income earners are less in favour of progressive tax policies than low-income earners (Edlund 2000, 2003).

We know less, however, about the potential role of existing *policy structures* in shaping individual-level tax attitudes. The basic intuition here is that the development of self-interested preferences is *not* an 'atomistic' procedure but rather is inextricably embedded in social contexts (i.e., institutional settings). Put differently, self-interest and institutionalist theories are not independent of each other, but rather they simultaneously contribute to the development of taxpayers' policy attitudes. To date, such joint mechanisms have not been fully investigated, and several questions remain unanswered. For example, do taxpayers alter their preferences in response to the institutional context in which they are situated? If so, which tax policy dimensions are most responsible for these context effects? More specifically, do high-income taxpayers resist further tax increases or

progressive taxation in the same (or in a similar) manner regardless of the institutional environment? To answer these questions, the present paper explores how taxpayers contextualise their self-interest within a given policy situation. This is important for at least two reasons. First, it contributes to the policy-feedback literature by confirming that existing (tax) policy legacies can influence how citizens (taxpayers) perceive the potential gains and losses associated with a particular (tax) policy scheme. Second, the social policy literature dealing with the relationship between policy structures and mass politics has mainly focused on the 'spending side' of redistributive government (i.e., social benefits and services), whereas much less attention has been devoted to its 'financing side' (i.e., tax burden). The present paper aims at filling this lacuna by linking the literature: mass feedback effects and class politics over taxation policy.

The goals of this project are threefold. First, it focuses on two tax policy features: 1) the absolute amount of direct taxes; and 2) the relative distribution of tax burden across different income classes. In particular, the impact of the latter dimension (i.e., tax concentration) on tax preferences has barely been tested in existing studies. Second, this paper provides a theoretical framework for how these two institutional circumstances affect voters' tax preferences. Although the role of individual-level attributes in determining tax attitudes has been well documented in previous studies (Edlund 2000, 2003), the theoretical mechanisms underlying the association between tax policy contexts and mass attitudes remain unclear. This paper argues that the self-interested calculus of taxpayers is not exogenous but depends on the institutional arrangements in which stakeholders are socially located. Specifically, it hypothesises that the effect of income status on tax attitudes varies according to the perceived tax burden associated with a given tax system. Third, using survey data from 19 rich and middle-income societies, this paper provides empirical evidence for the claim that income and tax schemes jointly affect outcome attitudes. I find

that the downward impact of higher income is less prominent in countries with lower levels of direct taxes. Moreover, the empirical results reveal that the context effect of tax concentration is rather limited. In other words, the relationship between income and tax support does not significantly differ across countries with different levels of tax concentration.

2. Theoretical background and hypotheses

2.1 Self-interested tax attitudes

Economic self-interest has been regarded as an influential driving force in shaping voters' preferences towards redistributive policies (Romer 1975; Roberts 1977; Meltzer and Richard 1981). Individuals with lower labour market positions—i.e., those with few economic resources and high market risks—are expected to favour government-led social services because they tend to be the beneficiaries of such services. Conversely, grievances against redistributive government would be most prevalent among affluent, low-risk categories who contribute to the financing of such schemes. In essence, this approach assumes that individuals behave opportunistically based on a self-interested calculus. Scholars have argued that demographic profiles such as gender, age, employment status, and social class evoke distinctive patterns of self-interested responses. Those who benefit from the welfare system—e.g., females, the elderly, the unemployed, and low-income earners (or manual labourers)—are assumed to have strong incentives to defend it. This prediction has been evidenced by several empirical investigations (Hasenfeld and Rafferty 1989; Svallfors 1997; Edlund 1999a; Linos and West 2003; Jæger 2006; Sumino 2014).

The self-interest approach is equally applicable to the analysis of individuals' preferences towards *taxation*. Given that one's relative position on the income ladder directly affects his or her actual and perceived tax burden, we can assume that income position acts as an immediate trigger for the formation of self-interested aspirations regarding tax policies. The feeling of being burdened by the demands of the welfare state is expected to be most intense among high-income contributors and less so among low-income beneficiaries (Sears and Citrin 1982; Sears and Funk 1990), which in turn generates attitudinal polarisation among individuals with different income resources. Despite the logic, the empirical evidence is somewhat inconclusive. Some studies find systematic differences in tax attitudes among income groups (Edlund 2000; Barnes 2015), while others find no such differences (Lowery and Sigelman 1981). Thus, the first hypothesis is as follows:

> *Hypothesis 1.* Attitudinal polarisation towards tax policies exists among different income classes. High-income earners are less willing to favour higher and more progressive taxation.

2.2 Institutional feedback effects—tax level and concentration

Another theoretical approach is the institutionalist model, which emphasises the role of institutions (or policy structures) in preference development. This approach contends that policies, once put in place, have 'feedback effects' on political processes (Skocpol 1992; Pierson 1993; Mettler and Soss 2004). Policies are not only the consequence of political struggles (Easton 1953; Brooks and Manza 2006) but also the cause of political forces that reshape political actors' interests, identities, and cognitive interpretations of the social

world. Policies generate resources and incentives that influence the ways in which political actors define the gains and losses of various courses of action. Echoing this idea, the social policy literature has argued that different entitlement schemes—universalistic versus targeted programmes—produce distinct patterns of social stratification (Korpi 1980; Esping-Andersen 1990; Korpi and Palme 1998; Rothstein 1998, 2002; Larsen 2008). On the other hand, Svallfors (1997, 2003, 2004) suggests that although the overall level of support for redistribution significantly differs across welfare regime types (higher support in the social democratic regime than in the radical and liberal counterparts), clear cleavage structures do not exist between countries (see also Papadakis and Bean 1993; Bean and Papadakis 1998; Edlund 1999; Gelissen 2000; Arts and Gelissen 2001; Andreß and Heien 2001; Linos and West 2003; Jæger 2006; Larsen 2008).

Drawing on these arguments, one can assume that mass publics react opportunistically according to the incentives and constraints inherent in *tax policy structures*. This implies that the self-interest calculus discussed above is not an 'atomistic' procedure but rather is embedded in a given tax policy environment. In other words, stakeholders' reactions to tax policies are not uniform but differ systematically depending on the policy context, within which they contextualise their self-interested calculations. In brief, the linkage between income status and tax attitudes (Hypothesis 1) might be conditioned—either strengthened or weakened—by existing tax policy structures.

Then, which policy features may have an interaction effect on voters' attitudes towards taxation? I suggest two policy dimensions—*tax level* and *tax concentration*—that seem to have particular relevance to taxpayers' self-interest. 'Tax level' refers to the overall amount of taxes levied on households, while 'tax concentration' refers to the distribution of tax burden across income groups. These policy dimensions are conceptually distinct, the former reflecting the *absolute* level of tax burden, whereas the latter reflecting the *relative*

share of tax burden among households with different income resources. In the paragraphs that follow, I explain how these two policy features may contribute to the development of public opinion.

Tax level may have an interaction effect on the relationship between income status and tax attitudes. In countries with high tax levels, taxation policies are relatively *visible* to stakeholders and thus, are often recognised as a potential challenge to the pursuit of self-interested goals. A heavier tax burden increases the perceived tax price associated with social services and instils anti-tax sentiments especially among those who bear a relatively high 'tax cost' (i.e., the upper income class). As a result, in high-tax countries, the conflict of interest among different income categories becomes more salient and acute. By contrast, in low-tax societies where tax burdens are comparatively small or even 'latent', attitudinal polarisation among income classes becomes minor.[2] The argument can be summarised as follows:

Hypothesis 2a. Attitudinal differences across income classes become more evident in high-tax societies. High-income taxpayers are more reluctant to support taxation policies in countries with higher levels of direct taxes.

When examining the above proposition, this study pays particular attention to the level of *direct*— rather than *indirect*—taxation for two reasons. First, direct taxes are more visible and subject to public attention and scrutiny. Wilensky (1a975, 1976) suggests that the composition of taxation can affect mass perceptions towards tax burdens, arguing that

[2] Of course, this is not to say that tax resistance will be absent in low-tax societies nor that tax level is the only cause of a protest movement. For instance, Martin (2008) argues that in the United States not every tax increase (i.e., the absolute amount of taxes) causes a tax revolt but that American taxpayers react angrily when they understand that a policy change undermines their informal tax privileges—i.e., specific tax exemptions not codified in law but are part of the tax system in practice—that provide them with a shelter from potential market anomalies.

countries relying on visible forms of taxation (e.g., direct taxes on personal income) are more likely to face welfare backlash than those relying on less visible ones (see also Coughlin 1980; Hibbs and Madsen 1981). People are more sensitive (or responsive) to direct taxes than to less visible forms of taxation because the high visibility of direct taxes stimulates a feeling of 'being burdened', and this in turn provokes public discontent against redistributive government. Second, given that one's income status serves as the initial basis for self-interested calculations (Hypothesis 1), direct taxes on earned *income* play a more relevant role than do indirect taxes (e.g., sales and value-added taxes) in conditioning the income-attitude linkage. In other words, since the aim of this study is to test how different *income* groups react to taxation policies in different policy contexts, it is theoretically consistent to focus on direct taxes levied on *income* rather than indirect taxes levied on goods and services.[3]

Tax concentration may have an interaction effect on the link between income and taxpayers' responses. This idea derives from the work of Korpi and Palme (1998), in which they argue that the disproportionate distribution of transfer benefits gives rise to a zero-sum competition between net beneficiaries and net contributors. Welfare state institutions characterised by means-tested low-income targeting tend to split the population into those who benefit from the transfer scheme and those who do not, which leads to divergent definitions of interests and identities among social classes. Although the Korpi and Palme's (1998) model focuses on the benefit side of redistributive politics, the underlying logic can be extended to the financing side. That is, an unevenly distributed tax burden may affect the formation of interests and identities among different income categories—in countries where tax burdens are disproportionately concentrated in certain households (e.g., high-income earners), attitudinal cleavages become more intense than in countries where

[3] This is not to say that there is no relationship between *indirect* tax policies and mass opinion.

household taxes are proportionally distributed. This argument leads to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2b. Attitudinal differences across income classes grow wider in countries with concentrated taxation. High-income taxpayers become more reluctant to support taxation policies in countries where tax costs are unevenly (or 'unfairly') distributed across income groups.

Empirical evidence on the link between policy features and tax attitudes is sparse and inconsistent. For instance, Jaime-Castillo and Sáez-Lozano (2014) operationalise 'direct taxation' as the sum of direct taxes (i.e., incomes, profits, capital gains, and payrolls taxes) as a percentage of GDP, and demonstrate that attitudinal differences among socio-economic (occupational) classes are more salient in the context of higher direct taxes.[4] In contrast, Barnes (2015, supplementary material) finds no systematic relationship between tax schemes (tax level and progressivity) and mass attitudes (see also Ariely 2011).

3. Data and measures

3.1 Data

The analysis is based on data from the 'Role of Government IV' module of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) collected during 2005-2008. Although the ISSP contains

[4] Their work differs from the present study in that they assessed 'social class' using the International Socio-Economic Index (ISEI) and did not associate income status with tax preferences (as argued earlier, it is income position that *directly* determines one's actual and perceived tax burden and thus contributes to the formation of tax policy opinion), and in that they employed different measures of 'tax policy schemes' and 'tax attitudes'.

data from over 30 countries around the globe, the estimations were carried out using the data from 19 rich and middle-income societies for which key macro-level indicators (OECD 2008) are fully available.[5] After listwise deletion of missing cases, the effective sample sizes for the final models were 18,812 (tax level attitude) and 18,940 (tax progressivity attitude).[6]

3.2 Measures

The dependent variables—support for taxation policies—were measured using the following three response items:

Generally, how would you describe taxes in [R's country] today? (We mean all taxes together, including wage deductions, income tax, taxes on goods and services and all the rest)[7]
First, for those with high incomes, are taxes too high (coded −1), about right (0), or too low (+1)?[8]
Next, for those with middle incomes, are taxes too high (−1), about right (0), or too low (+1)?
Lastly, for those with low incomes, are taxes too high (−1), about right (0), or too low (+1)?

On the basis of these items, I calculate two similar, yet conceptually distinct, tax attitude indicators: the tax level index and the tax progressivity index. To do so, I follow the procedure described by Edlund (1999, 2000). The first measure, tax level index, reflects respondents' attitudes towards the overall amount of taxes, calculated by (thi + tmi + tli)/3,

[5] The included countries are Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Slovak Republic (available from a separate data file), South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States.
[6] Respondents aged 17 or younger were omitted.
[7] One disadvantage of using this question is that the word 'taxes' covers a wide variety of taxes including *indirect* taxes (i.e., taxes on goods and services). Ideally, 'taxes' should only refer to *direct* income taxes because the present study argues that tax attitudes are jointly motivated by income status and direct income taxes.
[8] 'Much too high' and 'too high' were coded as −1, while 'much too low' and 'too low' were coded as +1.

where ‘thi’ is the response score for the first item (taxes for those with high incomes), ‘tmi’ is the response score for the second item (taxes for those with middle incomes), and ‘tli’ is the response score for the third item (taxes for those with low incomes). The second measure, tax progressivity index, taps respondents’ attitudes towards the tax burden imposed on high-income earners when compared with that on their low-income counterparts, defined by (thi – tli)/2. The former measure concerns one’s support for overall tax increases *regardless of the target group* (high-, middle-, or low-income groups), while the latter measure represents one’s support for tax increases for high-income groups *relative to* low-income groups. Both measures can range from −1 (strongest agreement with lower or proportional taxation) to +1 (strongest agreement with higher or progressive taxation). As presented in Figure 1, the two attitude indices vary substantially within and across countries. Overall, support for higher and more progressive taxation is most prominent in South Korea, Germany, and Slovak Republic, and least so in New Zealand, Australia, and Canada. The two outcome variables are moderately correlated (pooled data: Spearman’s $\rho = .41$) but were estimated separately.



Figure 1. Distribution of tax attitudes by country
Notes: Two indices range from −1 (lowest support for tax increases and progressivity) to +1 (strongest support for tax increases and progressivity). For the tax level attitude index (left), countries are sorted by the proportion of the sum of ‘+1’, ‘+.67’ and ‘+.33’, while for the tax progressivity attitude index (right), countries are sorted by the proportion of ‘+1’. *N* = 18,812/18,940.

The primary independent variable of interest is income status. The ISSP 2006 contains country-specific variables coding respondents' household incomes. Actual/continuous income values are available for some countries, while for others, only income ranges/categories are given. For example, the income categories for the United States are as follows:

Less than $1,000 per year

From $1,000 up to $2,999

From $3,000 up to $3,999

[…]

From $110,000 up to $129,999

From $130,000 up to $149,999

More than $150,000

To convert these income intervals into pseudo-continuous scales, the midpoint of each bracket was assumed as a proxy for actual income—e.g., less than $1,000 = $500, from $1,000 up to $2,999 = $2,000, from $3,000 up to $3,999 = $3,500, and so on (see Rueda *et al*. 2014; Rueda 2014; Rueda and Stegmueller 2015). The midpoint of the last open-ended category (e.g., more than $150,000) was extrapolated from the frequencies of the next-to-top and the top categories using a Pareto formula proposed by Hout (2004).[9] Next, to take into account the differences in price levels across countries, income values were adjusted by purchasing power parities (PPPs) for actual individual consumption in national currencies per US dollar (OECD 2006; see also OECD 2012). Finally, to adjust for differences in household compositions, household incomes were deflated using an

[9] For several countries, household income is offered on an annual, not a monthly, basis. To gain comparability across countries, annual incomes were divided by 12.

equivalence scale of the square root of household size (Buhmann *et al*. 1988).[10] To reduce skewness, income values were transformed with a natural logarithm prior to analysis.[11]

Income and occupational classes are often regarded as interchangeable proxies for social stratification. Occupational status, defined using the International Socio-Economic Index (Ganzeboom *et al*. 1992) or the Erikson-Goldthorpe class schema (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992), could be considered an alternative option for analysing the impact of social stratification on tax attitudes. It could be argued that one's position on the income ladder presupposes one's occupational status in the labour market, and not vice versa. Nonetheless, the present study focuses exclusively on income position not only because the inclusion of the occupational status measure substantially reduces the number of effective observations but also because, as discussed above, tax burdens and corresponding reactions to tax policies (progressive income taxes, in particular) are determined primarily by one's position in the income distribution, not by one's occupational class.

Demographic characteristics that have been shown to affect tax attitudes (Lowery and Sigelman 1981; Edlund 1999b, 2003) were included as background controls: gender (female = 1, male = 0), age (years divided by 10), educational attainment (dummies for no formal qualification, lowest formal, above lowest, higher secondary, above higher secondary, and university degree), and working status (dummies for full-time, part-time or less, unemployed, student, retired, housekeeping, and others).[12] In particular, including 'educational attainment' as a potential confounder adds strength to the causal inferences because education may affect both one's current labour income (cause) and perceptions towards taxation (effect/outcome).

[10] Household size ranges from 1 to 34 (mean = 2.7; SD = 1.4). To reduce the influence of outlying values, respondents with 9 or more household members (0.2%) were recoded as 8.
[11] Respondents with zero income (0.3%), that is, Ln(0), were dropped from the data.
[12] Subjective (explanatory) variables such as political trust, political ideology, and self-rated social class were omitted from the analysis to avoid potential endogeneity issues.

The key macro-level factors are tax level and concentration. The level of taxes was measured by the share of taxes in household income (OECD 2008). This index reflects cross-national differences in the absolute amount of taxes imposed on households. Higher values indicate higher levels of income taxes and social security contributions. On the other hand, the concentration (or dispersion) of taxes was gauged by the concentration coefficient of household taxes, which taps the extent to which household taxes are disproportionately allocated across different income groups (OECD 2008). The concentration index is calculated in the same way as the Gini index: a score of zero indicates that all income groups pay an equal share of household taxes; a higher value indicates a more 'unequal' (concentrated) distribution of tax payments; a lower value indicates a more 'equal' (proportional) tax policy.

As presented in Figure 2, there is larger cross-national variation in the level of taxes than the concentration index. In the tax level measure, household taxes account for more than 30% of household income in the Nordic countries (Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Finland), Switzerland, and Germany, while the share is less than 10% in South Korea. On the other hand, the concentration coefficients of household taxes are highest in liberal welfare states (the United States, Ireland, Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada), and by far the lowest in Switzerland, followed by Sweden and Denmark. The two measures were only moderately correlated with each other (Pearson's $r = -.40$; $p > .05$).



Figure 2. Variation in tax level and concentration across 19 countries
Source: OECD (2008).

The two tax policy indices have an advantage over national-revenue measures such as the level of tax revenues as a percentage of GDP. It seems quite demanding to assume that the general public is well informed about their domestic tax-revenue structure. If individuals are not adequately aware of the revenue structure and its implications,[13] then it makes no sense to argue that individuals alter their self-interested calculations and subsequent reactions to taxation according to the policy context. In this respect, the tax policy measures used in the present study—the share of taxes in household income and the concentration of taxes across households—are more closely linked to personal self-interest and policy perceptions as they are designed to assess the tax burden at the household level. In contrast, national-revenue measures are less tangible for the general public, and thus, are less likely to contribute to the formation of individuals' preferences.

As a country-level control, I include 'market income inequality', measured by the Gini index of pre-tax and transfer income (OECD 2005). Although not the main interest of this paper, existing income disparities might significantly affect the causal mechanisms tested here. First, the degree of concentrated taxation may be greater in countries where the distribution of market income is highly unequal. In other words, market income inequality

[13] For related arguments, see Roberts and Hite 1994; Roberts *et al*. 1994; but see Edlund 2003.

might be a confounding factor for both tax progressivity and outcome attitudes. Moreover, drawing on Meltzer and Richard (1981), one could assume that income inequality (i.e., country-level context) might be associated with public demand for redistribution, namely the interaction effect of inequality on the link between income status and outcome attitudes (Finseraas 2008; Schmidt-Catran 2014). To test this alternative hypothesis, I use 'pre-tax and transfer Gini' (i.e., market income inequality) rather than 'post-tax and transfer Gini' (i.e., disposable income inequality) not only because the Metzler and Richard model originally refers to pre-tax and transfer market income inequality (Finseraas 2008) but also because post-tax and transfer inequality reflects (or includes 'information' about) the degree of redistributive efforts in a given country. 'Redistribution' can be defined as the reduction in inequality produced by taxes and social transfers (Wang and Caminada 2011):

$$r \text{ (redistribution)} = gini^{pre} \text{ (market income inequality)} - gini^{post} \text{ (disposable income inequality)}$$

$$\Leftrightarrow gini^{post} = gini^{pre} - r$$

As this definition suggests, '$gini^{pre}$' refers to the *initial* level of income inequality created in the labour market prior to redistribution (r), whereas '$gini^{post}$' refers to the level of inequality *adjusted* by redistributive efforts, including *taxation policies*. Given that 'taxation policies'—tax level and concentration—are the key explanatory variables of interest in this paper, it seems plausible to rule out any factors that reflect the degree of government intervention (i.e., taxes and social transfers) from the income inequality measure. Using 'post-tax and transfer income inequality', which conceptually *overlaps* with 'redistributive policy', makes it difficult to discern the effect of market inequality and that of government efforts such as redistributive taxation.

Another macro-level control is 'economic affluence', defined as gross domestic product (GDP) per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP) in US dollars (IMF 2005). One

could argue that the salience of class conflicts differs across countries with different levels of economic development. More specifically, attitudinal differences between income classes might be less salient in economically advanced countries. In societies where citizens in general have abundant economic resources to buy basic needs such as food and shelter, differences in attitudes towards redistributive taxation may become minor because both the rich and the poor do not 'desperately' depend on redistributive schemes. Thus, we can expect a (relatively) similar amount of support from the rich and the poor. On the other hand, in relatively impoverished societies, public attitudes deviate among different income groups because government redistribution serves as a 'refuge of last resort' that protects the very poor from disruptive market forces. In this scenario, we can expect an 'unbalanced' support from the rich and the poor—i.e., a very strong support from the poor and a relatively weak support from the rich.

3.3 Analytical approach

A multilevel modelling approach was applied to examine hierarchically nested samples and to jointly test the explanatory power of both individual- and country-level factors (Goldstein 1995; Kreft and De Leeuw 1998; Snijders and Bosker 1999). Given the ordinal/categorical nature of the outcome measures, I used an ordered logit link function. All models were estimated using MLwiN version 2.30 (Rasbash *et al*. 2014).

4. Results

The estimated results are shown in Tables 1 (tax level) and 2 (tax progressivity). As shown in the empty models (models 0a and 0b), the estimated between-country variances

were .219 and .328, with VPCs (variance partition coefficients) of .062 and .091, indicating that approximately 6.2% and 9.1% of the variations in the outcome variables are accounted for by differences between level-2 cohorts.

In models 1a and 1b, a set of individual-level variables was added. As predicted in Hypothesis 1, the effects of income status are negative and highly significant ($p < .001$), suggesting that high-income groups prefer lower and proportional tax policies. This is true even after allowing income slopes to vary across countries (models 2a and 2b). Several demographic controls were found to be significantly related to tax attitudes. Interestingly, highly educated respondents (with university degrees) accept tax increases, whereas they express resistance to a disproportionate taxation; support for tax increases and progressive taxation is stronger among the elderly, with a slight levelling off in the higher age categories; being a woman is associated with greater support for tax progressivity but not with support for tax increases; compared with full-time workers, students and retired persons express support for tax increases but not for uneven tax payments; housekeeping is inversely associated with support for higher and more progressive taxation. In models 3a and 3b, country-level factors were included.[14]

[14] The four country-level variables were standardised prior to analysis for ease of interpretation.

Table 1. Determinants of attitudes towards tax increases

	Model 0a		Model 1a		Model 2a		Model 3a		Model 4a		Model 5a	
Variables	coef.	s.e.	coef.	s.e.	coef.	s.e.	coef.	s.e.	coef.	s.e.	coef.	s.e.
Individual-level predictors												
Income			−0.095***	(0.021)	−0.165**	(0.057)	−0.169**	(0.058)	−0.161***	(0.046)	−0.165***	(0.034)
Female (ref. male)			−0.050	(0.028)	−0.054	(0.028)	−0.055*	(0.028)	−0.054	(0.028)	−0.055	(0.028)
Age			0.100***	(0.012)	0.105***	(0.012)	0.107***	(0.012)	0.107***	(0.012)	0.106***	(0.012)
Age squared			−0.014**	(0.005)	−0.013*	(0.005)	−0.013*	(0.005)	−0.013*	(0.005)	−0.013*	(0.005)
Primary education (ref. no formal qualification)			0.284***	(0.080)	0.253**	(0.081)	0.256**	(0.081)	0.248**	(0.081)	0.255**	(0.081)
Above primary			0.276***	(0.079)	0.245**	(0.080)	0.246**	(0.080)	0.239**	(0.080)	0.246**	(0.080)
Higher secondary			0.366***	(0.078)	0.351***	(0.079)	0.355***	(0.079)	0.346***	(0.079)	0.354***	(0.079)
Above higher secondary			0.374***	(0.077)	0.366***	(0.078)	0.371***	(0.078)	0.363***	(0.078)	0.370***	(0.078)
University degree			0.573***	(0.079)	0.556***	(0.080)	0.564***	(0.080)	0.554***	(0.080)	0.559***	(0.080)
Part-time (ref. employed full-time)			0.084	(0.046)	0.076	(0.046)	0.077	(0.046)	0.075	(0.046)	0.075	(0.046)
Unemployed			0.088	(0.076)	0.053	(0.077)	0.056	(0.077)	0.057	(0.077)	0.047	(0.077)
Student			0.458***	(0.074)	0.423***	(0.075)	0.430***	(0.075)	0.420***	(0.075)	0.424***	(0.075)
Retired			0.135**	(0.052)	0.100	(0.052)	0.102*	(0.052)	0.101	(0.052)	0.099	(0.052)
Housekeeping			−0.201**	(0.057)	−0.201**	(0.057)	−0.205***	(0.057)	−0.203***	(0.057)	−0.203***	(0.057)
Other working status			−0.071	(0.066)	−0.084	(0.067)	−0.085	(0.067)	−0.086	(0.067)	−0.085	(0.067)
Tax policy indicators												
Size of taxes							−0.133	(0.139)	−0.215	(0.143)	−0.275	(0.142)
Concentrated taxes							−0.179	(0.160)	−0.128	(0.163)	−0.198	(0.163)
Income * Size of taxes							-	-	−0.116*	(0.048)	−0.188***	(0.042)
Income * Concentrated taxes							-	-	0.069	(0.047)	−0.018	(0.048)
Country-level controls												
Gini (market income)							−0.080	(0.140)	−0.084	(0.139)	−0.037	(0.143)
GDP(PPP)/capita							−0.025	(0.123)	−0.027	(0.122)	0.082	(0.125)
Income * Gini (market income)							-	-	-	-	0.055	(0.041)
Income * GDP(PPP)/capita							-	-	-	-	0.140***	(0.038)
Intercept variance	0.219	(0.072)	0.231	(0.076)	0.239	(0.078)	0.245	(0.081)	0.232	(0.076)	0.222	(0.073)
Slope variance (income)					0.051	(0.019)	0.053	(0.020)	0.028	(0.012)	0.011	(0.006)
Covariance b/w intercepts and slopes					0.036	(0.029)	0.045	(0.030)	0.029	(0.022)	0.013	(0.016)
VPC (variance partition coefficient)	0.062		0.066		0.068		0.069		0.066		0.063	
N (individual)	18,812		18,812		18,812		18,812		18,812		18,812	
N (country)	19		19		19		19		19		19	

Notes: RIGLS (reiterated generalised squares) with PQL2 (second-order penalised quasi-likelihood). Scores of +.33, +.67 and +1 were collapsed into a single category because of the small number of subjects in the +.67 and +1 categories (see Figure 1, left). Responses were rated on a 5-point scale: (1) −1, (2) −.67, (3) −.33, (4) 0, and (5) +.33 or more. Estimated cut-points are not displayed. Cases are not weighted because data are not available for all countries.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

Hypotheses 2a and 2 b predicted that high-income taxpayers are less willing to support taxation in the context of high and progressive tax policy. To test these hypotheses, the interaction terms between income status and tax policy indices were added in models 4a and 4b. For tax level attitudes (Table 1), the interaction between income status and tax level was negative (β = −.116) and significant (p < .05). For tax progressivity attitudes (Table 2), the interaction effect was negative (β = −.111) but did not reach statistical significance (z = 1.43). In models 5a and 5b that include the interaction terms between income and macro-level controls, the interaction effects of tax level remained negative (β = −.188; −.180) and statistically significant (p < .001; .05), indicating that the marginal (downward) impact of higher income on tax attitudes is larger in high-tax societies. In particular, the random slope

variance was markedly reduced from .053 (model 3a) to .028 (model 4a), suggesting that the interactions introduced in model 4a account for nearly half (47%, [1− (.028/.053)]) of the income slope variance.

On the other hand, the tax concentration hypothesis (Hypothesis 2b) was not supported. There was no significant interaction between income position and tax concentration, suggesting that attitudinal disparities between income groups are independent of the degree of tax concentration in each society. For robustness check, I estimated the same interaction models (models 5a and 5b) using the effectiveness (inequality reduction) index for household taxes (OECD 2008; Wang and Caminada 2011) instead of the concentration coefficient of household taxes. The effectiveness index is defined as the distance between the Gini coefficient of before-tax earnings and that of after-tax earnings (i.e., inequality reduction by household taxes). This scale, which reflects the redistributive impact of household taxes, can be considered as an alternative proxy for progressive taxation (Kakwani 1977; Joumard *et al*. 2012). The results, however, showed that the interaction terms between income and the effectiveness index remained statistically insignificant ($p > .10$; not reported here).

Table 2. Determinants of attitudes towards progressive taxation

	Model 0b		Model 1b		Model 2b		Model 3b		Model 4b		Model 5b	
Variables	coef.	s.e.	coef.	s.e.	coef.	s.e.	coef.	s.e.	coef.	s.e.	coef.	s.e.
Individual-level predictors												
Income			−0.323***	(0.022)	−0.456***	(0.076)	−0.461***	(0.076)	−0.460***	(0.072)	−0.465***	(0.072)
Female (ref. male)			0.151***	(0.029)	0.145***	(0.029)	0.147***	(0.029)	0.147***	(0.029)	0.148***	(0.029)
Age			0.124***	(0.012)	0.132***	(0.012)	0.134***	(0.012)	0.135***	(0.012)	0.136***	(0.012)
Age squared			−0.033***	(0.005)	−0.033***	(0.006)	−0.033***	(0.006)	−0.033***	(0.006)	−0.033***	(0.006)
Primary education (ref. no formal qualification)			0.320***	(0.082)	0.268**	(0.084)	0.269**	(0.084)	0.265**	(0.084)	0.265**	(0.084)
Above primary			0.257**	(0.081)	0.222**	(0.083)	0.222**	(0.083)	0.218**	(0.083)	0.217**	(0.083)
Higher secondary			0.163*	(0.080)	0.151	(0.081)	0.152	(0.082)	0.147	(0.082)	0.147	(0.082)
Above higher secondary			0.050	(0.079)	0.044	(0.080)	0.042	(0.080)	0.038	(0.080)	0.037	(0.080)
University degree			−0.201*	(0.081)	−0.220**	(0.082)	−0.224**	(0.083)	−0.229**	(0.083)	−0.230**	(0.083)
Part-time (ref. employed full-time)			−0.011	(0.047)	−0.023	(0.047)	−0.025	(0.047)	−0.025	(0.047)	−0.026	(0.047)
Unemployed			0.207*	(0.081)	0.140	(0.082)	0.142	(0.082)	0.143	(0.082)	0.141	(0.082)
Student			−0.109	(0.075)	−0.146	(0.076)	−0.152*	(0.077)	−0.158*	(0.077)	−0.159*	(0.077)
Retired			0.007	(0.054)	−0.028	(0.054)	−0.031	(0.054)	−0.035	(0.054)	−0.038	(0.054)
Housekeeping			−0.299***	(0.059)	−0.305***	(0.059)	−0.310***	(0.060)	−0.313***	(0.060)	−0.315***	(0.060)
Other working status			−0.089	(0.069)	−0.107	(0.069)	−0.108	(0.069)	−0.110	(0.069)	−0.110	(0.069)
Tax policy indicators												
Size of taxes							−0.364*	(0.150)	−0.390*	(0.152)	−0.407**	(0.153)
Concentrated taxes							−0.365*	(0.172)	−0.357*	(0.174)	−0.376*	(0.176)
Income * Size of taxes							-	-	−0.111	(0.078)	−0.180*	(0.092)
Income * Concentrated taxes							-	-	0.048	(0.076)	−0.044	(0.106)
Country-level controls												
Gini (market income)							0.029	(0.152)	0.023	(0.153)	0.035	(0.155)
GDP(PPP)/capita							0.032	(0.132)	0.032	(0.133)	0.053	(0.135)
Income * Gini (market income)							-	-	-	-	0.079	(0.093)
Income * GDP(PPP)/capita							-	-	-	-	0.116	(0.082)
Intercept variance	0.328	(0.107)	0.321	(0.105)	0.331	(0.108)	0.252	(0.083)	0.255	(0.084)	0.257	(0.085)
Slope variance (income)					0.096	(0.034)	0.095	(0.034)	0.086	(0.031)	0.085	(0.031)
Covariance b/w intercepts and slopes					0.037	(0.044)	0.020	(0.038)	0.018	(0.036)	0.017	(0.036)
VPC (variance partition coefficient)	0.091		0.089		0.091		0.071		0.072		0.072	
N (individual)	18,940		18,940		18,940		18,940		18,940		18,940	
N (country)	19		19		19		19		19		19	

Notes: RIGLS (reiterated generalised squares) with PQL2 (second-order penalised quasi-likelihood). Scores of −.5 and −1 were combined into a single category due to the small number of subjects in the −1 category (see Figure 1, right). Responses were rated on a 4-point scale: (1) −.5 or less, (2) 0, (3) +.5, and (4) +1. Estimated cut-points are not displayed. Cases are not weighted because data are not available for all countries.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

To help interpret the substantive magnitude of the interaction effects, predicted probabilities were calculated using the parameter estimates from models 5a and 5b. The results are presented in Table 3. In the context of high-tax policy (52.5), the shift from the poor (10th percentile) to the rich (90th percentile) substantially decreases the probabilities of support for tax increases (−.225) and more progressive taxation (−.288), while in the context of low-tax policy (8.0) the effect of income on attitudes is less clear (−.047) or even works in the opposite direction (+.103). On the other hand, patterns of attitudinal gaps between income groups are similar across countries with different degrees of tax concentration (tax level attitudes: −.060 and −.083; tax progressivity attitudes: −.156 and −.207).

Table 3. Simulated probabilities of the interaction terms

	Support for tax increases			Support for more progressive taxes		
	A. Income (10th %ile)	B. Income (90th %ile	B−A	C. Income (10th %ile)	D. Income (90th %ile	D−C
Level of taxes	Pr (95% CI)	Pr (95% CI)		Pr (95% CI)	Pr (95% CI)	
Min. (8.0)	0.467 (0.325-0.610)	0.570 (0.404-0.719)	+0.103	0.638 (0.464-0.776)	0.591 (0.395-0.753)	−0.047
Max. (52.5)	0.363 (0.206-0.553)	0.138 (0.063-0.267)	−0.225	0.375 (0.196-0.619)	0.087 (0.036-0.208)	−0.288
Concentrated taxes						
Min. (0.22)	0.535 (0.332-0.724)	0.475 (0.261-0.683)	−0.060	0.712 (0.489-0.869)	0.556 (0.300-0.776)	−0.156
Max. (0.59)	0.348 (0.224-0.495)	0.265 (0.162-0.415)	−0.083	0.387 (0.235-0.570)	0.180 (0.091-0.325)	−0.207

Notes: All other variables are held constant at their means or medians. For the tax level index, the probabilities of scoring 0 or more are shown. For the tax progressivity index, the probabilities of scoring +1 are shown.

5. Discussion

Thus far, I have investigated how both demographic and contextual circumstances are associated with taxpayers' policy preferences, with a particular focus on the interaction mechanisms between income status and policy contexts. The theoretical model tested was based on the following two propositions: i) taxpayers' preferences are primarily motivated by self-interest; and ii) taxpayers situate their self-interest within a given policy context. With regard to the former proposition, income status was found to be a strong predictor of tax attitudes, while the latter proposition obtained mixed results. On the one hand, I found that the direction and magnitude of the effects of income status are conditional upon the absolute amount of household taxes. While higher income reduces the likelihood of pro-tax orientations in high-tax societies, attitudinal differences among income groups are less marked in low-tax societies. On the other hand, however, no interaction effect was detected between income position and concentrated taxation.

Before discussing the implications of these findings, several caveats should be acknowledged. First, the cross-sectional nature of the data limits any causal inferences regarding the direction of the observed associations. In particular, the question remains whether tax policies *cause* public opinion, or the other way around—i.e., public opinion

shapes tax policies. In this respect, it is important to note that the current study does *not* attempt to examine how macro-level features (i.e., tax policies) directly affect individual-level attitudes, but instead focuses on how policy features *condition* the effect of income status on outcome attitudes (Hypotheses 2a and 2b). Second, the relationship between the complexity of a tax system and mass attitudes is not fully recognised. The interaction theory examined in this study suggests that taxpayers behave differently depending on the tax system in which they are embedded. This notion presupposes that individuals are adequately aware of the implications that a tax structure may have on their personal economic lives. In countries with complex tax legislation, the general public is expected to find it more difficult to acquire sufficient knowledge about the system, which may distort or bias self-interested calculations and subsequent tax preferences.[15] Third, the present study could benefit from a more nuanced behavioural model that incorporates the distinction between labour income (e.g., wages) and capital income (e.g., rents, dividends, and interest) into its theoretical framework. A report by the OECD (2008) suggests that countries have different tax structures and different levels of distributional inequality for labour and capital incomes. Taking these additional macro-contexts into account would allow us, for example, to examine the potential interplay between self-interest and capital income taxation.

Several implications and directions for future research can be drawn. First, the empirical findings in this study strongly support an institutionalist understanding of tax behaviour. Based on the notion that previously enacted policies produce 'feedback effects' on mass publics (Pierson 1993; Mettler and Soss, 2004; Soss and Schram, 2007), the present study hypothesised that the effect of income status on tax attitudes differs systematically across

[15] In this regard, Edlund (2003) notes that "[t]he comparatively low degree of complexity and high degree of standardization, i.e. the high degree of *system transparency*, is likely to advance public understanding of social and tax policy" (p. 151, italics in original). Moreover, it could be argued that the better educated are more likely to accurately assess the impact of particular tax structures on their households.

policy contexts. The results indeed suggest that attitudinal cleavages among income groups become more salient in high-tax societies (Hypothesis 2a). This implies that further tax increases may result in polarised tax preferences between the rich and the poor. In contrast, the other policy feature—tax concentration—seems to have little to do with popular perceptions. Drawing on the work of Korpi and Palme (1998), I hypothesised that in countries where taxes are 'unequally' distributed across different income groups, high-income earners hold stronger anti-tax sentiments because they are disproportionately exposed to tax costs (Hypothesis 2b). This prediction, however, was not supported by the survey data. The relationship between income and policy attitudes was not conditioned by the disproportionate distribution of tax burden. Thus, it could be concluded that 'tax targeting' does not have an interaction effect on the income-attitude linkage. However, the insignificant result may be attributable to the limited variation in the tax concentration index coming from a relatively small number of country cases and/or to the choice of the proxy variable employed to measure the construct (i.e., the concentration coefficient of household taxes). A more theoretical explanation of this result is that relative to tax level, concentrated taxation might be invisible or 'hidden' to ordinary citizens. If taxpayers are not aware of, or do not notice, the degree of tax concentration in their country, then it is hardly surprising that they 'fail to react' to the policy context. Another theoretical interpretation is that taxpayers may perceive the burden (cost) associated with taxation policies to be high in comparison with the expected benefits they receive. If this is the case, the disproportionate distribution of tax costs must be evaluated *relative to* that of transfer benefits. An integrated model incorporating both transfer benefits and tax costs may provide a more accurate account of how taxpayers contextualise their self-interest within a given policy context.

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CHAPTER 4

Socio-economic status and the dynamics of preferences for income inequality in the United States, 1978-2016

Abstract

Although considerable evidence indicates that public preferences for income inequality and redistribution vary across socio-economic groups (i.e., occupation and income), much less is known about its temporal dynamics. The purpose of this study is to examine (1) whether the attitudinal distance between managerial/executive employees and low-skilled manual workers has changed (converged or diverged) over time; and explore (2) the reasons for and implications of the dynamics of preferences in the past several decades. Using the data from the General Social Survey 1978-2016 (23 survey years; N = 27,541), this study finds that the influence of occupational class has lost some of its significance in shaping public preferences for income inequality and that, this declining class effect can be explained in part by the attitudinal convergence between better- and less-educated citizens. Findings suggest that pro-equality coalitions across educational boundaries play a remedial role in bridging the occupational divide over government redistribution in the United States.

Keywords: dynamics of preferences, income inequality, socio-economic status (SES), United States

1. Introduction

Income inequality in the United States is among the highest in advanced capitalist democracies and has been given further impetus in recent years (Piketty & Saez, 2003). The share of the top 1% in total pre-tax income has climbed sharply from 8% in 1981 to 19% in 2012 (OECD, 2014). In the mid-1980s, the disposable income of the wealthiest 10% was around 11 times higher than that of the poorest 10%, but the ratio increased to 19:1 in 2013 (OECD, 2015). Despite this trend, government interventions in narrowing income inequality are rather limited in magnitude: the percentage reduction in income inequality before and after redistribution (i.e., public cash transfers and household taxes) is only 17%, with an OECD average of 34% (OECD, 2008).

Redistributive policy initiatives have been met with considerable resistance in the United States. Nicholas Calio, former assistant for legislative affairs to George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush, stated that income inequality is better tackled through expanding educational opportunities and economic growth, not by 'punishing' the rich for being successful (Nelson & Ojha, 2012). Likewise, a recent public opinion survey (ISSP 2010) suggests that Americans in general are either negative or ambivalent about redistributive policies: 53% disagreed or strongly disagreed, and 18% neither agreed nor disagreed with them. In the absence of popular support, elected officials are unlikely to pursue pro-redistribution policy reforms (or alter the status-quo) because they seek to avoid future electoral punishment or simply because they represent the interests of economic elites and other organized actors (Gilens & Page, 2014; Hacker & Pierson, 2010; Page, Bartels & Seawright, 2013).

What makes Americans support or oppose pro-equality policies? Socio-economic status has long been considered as a major arena of redistributive politics (Lipset, 1960). The

central idea is that individuals react differently to the reallocation of income resources depending on their position in the labor market: the poor favor redistributive policies because the expected gains (i.e., cash transfers) exceed the expected losses (i.e., household taxes), while the rich are often averse to redistribution because they perceive themselves as net contributors rather than as net beneficiaries. In fact, empirical research has shown that professional and managerial employees are more likely to oppose redistributive policies than low-skilled manual workers both within and across countries (Arts & Gelissen, 2001; Bean & Papadakis, 1998; Edlund, 1999; Guillaud, 2013; Jæger, 2006a; Linos & West, 2003; Roosma, van Oorschot & Gelissen, 2015; Svallfors, 1997).

However, most studies to date have been static or cross-sectional in nature, and its temporal dynamics remains relatively unexplored (for exceptions, see McCall & Manza, 2011; Pittau, Farcomeni & Zelli, 2016). In particular, little attention has been paid to the long-term pattern of redistributive attitudes—that is, the relative *distance in attitudes* between those with different socio-economic backgrounds over time. The purpose of this study is to extend previous research by developing and testing a theoretical model that explains the long-term trend of class-based redistributive politics in the United States. More specifically, this study investigates how the strength of the relationship between socio-economic status (i.e., occupation and income) and redistributive attitudes has changed during the past several decades and what mechanism explains the temporal shifts. Examining the long-term pattern in U.S. redistributive politics is important in its own right, but it also helps us understand a range of politico-sociological concerns such as the death of class voting, the welfare state as a system of stratification, and the confluence of self-interest and altruism.

Two premises underlie this article. First, the effect of socio-economic status on redistributive attitudes is not constant but varies across years. For instance, the literature

on voting behavior suggests that socio-economic status has declined in importance over time as a source of voters' party preferences (Clark & Lipset, 1991; Clark, Lipset & Rempel, 1993; Dalton, 1984; Franklin, 1992; Nieuwbeerta, 1996; Pakulski & Waters, 1996). Extending this argument, I hypothesize that Americans with different socio-economic backgrounds have become more similar in their views on redistributive policies during the past several decades. Second, the declining relevance of socio-economic status can be attributed in part to the waning of gender/racial and/or educational cleavages. The findings of this study indicate that better- and less-educated citizens are becoming more alike in their preferences for redistribution, and that this trajectory accounts for the attitudinal convergence across occupations.

2. Theories and hypotheses

In this study, the term 'socio-economic status' is defined as hierarchical divisions in society differentiated by unequal rewards and benefits derived from employment in the labor market—in particular, occupational class and income status. Differences in socio-economic status are associated with an uneven distribution of material resources and life chances, and such different material properties lead to inherent value differences. Individuals' beliefs about redistribution will differ depending on their market positions. Privileged individuals with abundant material resources and low market risks are more reluctant to support redistribution via income taxes to maintain their advantageous positions than those with limited resources and high market risks (Lipset, 1960). Indeed, professional and managerial employees tend to be more anti-redistribution than low-skilled manual workers (Edlund, 1999; Svallfors, 1997).

Drawing upon these arguments, this study asks: Does the attitudinal distance between those with different socio-economic status (e.g., manual vs. non-manual) in redistributive politics change (converge or diverge) over time? One possibility is that individuals with different socio-economic positions will converge in their views on redistributive policy. This prediction is derived from earlier research on class dealignment in party politics, which claims that social class has lost its ability to explain partisan loyalties (Clark & Lipset, 1991; Clark *et al*., 1993; Dalton, 1984; Franklin, 1992; Nieuwbeerta, 1996; Pakulski & Waters, 1996). This literature suggests that working-class voters have decreased their support for leftist (e.g., social democratic) parties while middle-class voters have become more supportive of these parties over time, which in turn has led to the decline of the class-party association.[16] This argument can be applied to the issue of economic inequality—that is, 'dealignment in redistributive politics'.

An important issue here is that 'support for the Left' and 'support for redistribution' are not necessarily the same construct, the latter being more specific and related to tangible material interests (i.e., transfer benefit and tax burden). Thus, some voters might have inconsistent preferences for 'party' choice and 'policy' choice (i.e., redistribution). For example, low-wage manual workers may favor redistributive policy that benefits them greatly but vote for a right-wing party because they oppose, for instance, the expansion of civil rights for racial and ethnic minorities.[17] Likewise, wealthy, upper-middle class members may vote for a left-wing party based on non-economic political beliefs (Frank, 2004; Gingrich & Häusermann, 2015; Heath *et al*., 1991; Oesch, 2008; van der Waal, Achterberg, & Houtman, 2007). Moreover, if the Left no longer has a distinctive

[16] However, using data from the American National Election Studies (ANES), Weakliem (2013) finds that professionals, relative to manual workers, have shifted towards the Democrats and that the effect of income on party choice has increased over the past several decades (1952-2004).

[17] The inconsistent voting behavior among low-skilled manual workers could be explained also by their weak class consciousness (Weakliem & Adams, 2011) and/or by the influence of non-class attributes such as ethnic and religious loyalties (Heath, Fisher, Sanders & Sobolewska, 2011).

ideological commitment to redistributive justice, then the conceptual divergence between 'support for the Left' and 'support for redistribution' becomes more obvious. As Evans and Tilley (2012) note, "ideological convergence by parties weakens the strength of the ideological signals sent to voters so that voters' left-right position becomes less relevant to their party choice" (p. 965; see also Evans, 1993; Evans & de Graaf, 2013; Evans & Tilley, 2011; 2017).

Another important issue is the causal relationship between 'support for the Left' and 'support for redistribution'. It is causally ambiguous whether (a) leftist partisanship generates positive reactions to redistribution or (b) a pro-redistribution view results in greater support for leftist parties. If party choice predicts attitudes toward redistribution, then one may expect that the decline in the class-party association leads to the decline in the class-policy attitude association. However, if policy attitudes precede party identification, then class dealignment in party politics may not entail the decline of class-based redistributive politics (because, in this case, party identification does not necessarily determine policy preferences). Thus, I first test the following proposition:

> *Hypothesis 1*: The effect of socio-economic status—(a) occupational class and/or (b) income status—on attitudes toward redistributive government has declined in salience over the past several decades (1978-2016).

Hypothesis 1 predicts that the association between occupation/income and redistributional attitudes is no longer as strong as it once was. This hypothesis leads to the next important question: why is the role of occupation/income becoming less important in redistributive politics? There may be several explanations for this. First, one may argue that the historical trend of upward social mobility accounts for the decline of class-based redistributive

politics. During the past several decades, employment has shifted from blue- to white-collar occupations—namely, the expansion of service sector and the decline of manual/production sector. Previous studies also show that professional and managerial employees are less likely to support redistributive policy than unskilled manual workers (Edlund, 1999; Svallfors, 1997). If so, and other conditions being equal, the compositional shift in the population from manual to non-manual labor may affect the distribution of policy attitudes among workers. The growing share of 'anti-welfare forces' (i.e., service class employees), and the shrinking share of 'pro-welfare forces' (i.e., unskilled manual workers), may bring down the amount of average support for redistributive policy. However, this argument does not necessarily apply to the shrinking gap in attitudes between different socio-economic positions because the question here is not about changes in aggregate preferences over time but about changes in the *distance* in attitudes between fractions/classes. In other words, even if the population share of groups (e.g., Groups A and B) changes, that does not necessarily alter the relative distance between attitudes within Group A and those within Group B.

Second, the long-term pattern of ascriptive (given-by-birth) cleavages such as sex and race might account for the decline in the class-attitude association. An attitudinal convergence between sexes/races might explain an attitudinal convergence between those with different socio-economic positions. Esping-Andersen (1990) argues that a realistic scenario for the post-industrial future in the United States, the prototype of liberal welfare regime, is that class differences diminish between sexes and between races. Historically, women and blacks were over-represented in, or even locked into, low-wage 'junk-jobs', but they have gradually shifted into a broader menu of employment niches such as managerial and executive positions that were previously dominated by white males. As the job prospects and employment conditions ameliorate among women and blacks, the

distinctiveness of 'low-wage working class' (or gender/racial bias in employment) weakens. The increased share of women/blacks in managerial-executive jobs blurs the conventional class boundary in occupations—such as 'good jobs' for white males and 'bad jobs' for women and blacks. Moreover, given that educational achievement predicts later job prospects and earnings (Figure 1), the narrowing educational gap between sexes and races (Breen, Luijkx, Müller & Pollak, 2010; Grusky & DiPrete, 1990) might also contribute to the decline in the association between socio-economic cleavages and redistributional attitudes.



Figure 1. Hypothesized causal sequence leading to redistributional preferences

Existing research indicates that women are usually more pro-redistribution than men (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2005) due to their vulnerable status in the labor market and their dependence on the welfare state (Svallfors, 1995). In the long-run, however, the gender gap in redistributional attitudes shrinks as women overcome the gender-barriers in education and employment. If the attitudinal distance between men and women declines, then the attitudinal distance between socio-economic groups might also decline. Along with gender effects, welfare politics is also a 'race-coded' issue (Gilens, 1996). The decline in racial segregation in the labor market might contribute to the decline of class distinctiveness in redistributive politics. African Americans are usually more supportive of welfare programs than white Americans because they generally earn less than whites and live in poverty. However, as African Americans continue to improve their socioeconomic status in the

labor market (and their educational levels), some of them may shift their attitudes toward a more anti-welfare direction. If the attitudinal distance between whites and blacks converges, then the attitudinal distance between socio-economic groups might also converge. From these arguments, I propose the following hypothesis:

> *Hypothesis 2*: Controlling for the effects of ascriptive characteristics—(a) gender and/or (b) racial divisions—explains the declining relevance of occupation/income in shaping attitudes toward redistributive government.

Third, educational attainment might also account for the decline in class-based redistributive politics. Education can be regarded as a strong confounder that affects both market position and political attitudes: higher education leads to better jobs and higher incomes (Treiman, 1970) as well as to greater anti-welfare preferences (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2005). Given that educational achievement is usually a causal antecedent of occupational/income status in the labor market (Figure 1), an attitudinal convergence between those with lower- and higher-education may explain an attitudinal convergence between socio-economic groups in the labor market. But why do better- and less-educated citizens become more alike in their views on redistribution over time? One explanation is that better-educated segments of society (traditionally anti-welfare forces) have become less resistant to redistributive policy due to the spread of post-materialist values (Inglehart, 1990) and/or the increased capacities of voters to make political decisions independent of interest-based political bargaining (Dalton, 1984). Better-educated citizens tend to enjoy a competitive advantage in the labor market (e.g., better jobs and income). Thus, to maximize their utility, it is 'rational' for them not to support redistributive policies (or tax increases). However, if better-educated citizens shape their political thinking based more on

egalitarian principles rather than on self-interested calculations, then the attitudinal distance between better- and less-educated citizens may decrease. In addition, rising inequality in the United States might also motivate well-educated citizens to undertake civic responsibilities (tax payments) to help others in need. Thus, I test the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3: Controlling for the effect of educational divisions explains the declining relevance of occupation/income in shaping attitudes toward redistributive government.

3. Data and measures

To test the hypotheses, I use data from the General Social Survey (GSS), a multistage probability sample of U.S. adults (18+) living in non-institutional arrangements, fielded regularly since 1972 by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC), with the average response rate of 74.0% (SD 4.6, min 61.3, max 82.4). The analysis was restricted to 23 survey years 1978-2016 (pooled N = 27,541), for which relevant variables were fully available with consistent question wording and response formats. The data were weighted using the OVERSAMP variable to correct for the overrepresentation of black respondents in 1987. The dependent variable, support for redistributive government, was assessed with the following item (EQWLTH):

> Some people think that the government in Washington ought to reduce the income differences between the rich and the poor, perhaps by (a) raising the taxes of wealthy families or by (b) giving income assistance to the poor. Others think that the government should not concern itself with reducing this income difference between the rich and the poor. Here is a card with a scale from 1 to 7. Think of a score of 1 as meaning that the government ought to reduce the income differences between rich and poor, and a score of 7 meaning that the government should not concern itself with reducing income differences. What score between 1 and 7 comes closest to the way you feel? (underlines added).

A strength of this item is that it clearly states that government-led inequality reduction implies (a) increased tax burden on rich families and (b) extra income to poor families, which allows respondents to undertake a more 'conscious balancing' of their benefits and costs associated with redistributive policy.

Occupational status. The GSS data contain respondents' occupational information coded by the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO). The ISCO codes were converted into a six-category EGP class schema (Erikson & Goldthorpe, 1992) based on the coding system developed by Ganzeboom and Treiman (1996). Occupational categories were distinguished between: (1) service class I (higher-level controllers and administrators), (2) service class II (lower-level controllers and administrators), (3) routine non-manual employees, (4) skilled manual workers, (5) unskilled manual workers, and (6) the self-employed. For the translation of ISCO-88 codes into six EGP class categories, I used the syntax provided by Svallfors (1997, pp. 303–304).

Income status. As a measure of one's income status, I use a question item that asked respondents to select a category (e.g., $40,000-49,999) that best represents their total annual household income from all sources before taxes. To convert the income intervals into (quasi-) continuous values, the midpoint of each income category was assumed to represent the actual income level of those who selected that category (Rueda, 2014; Rueda & Stegmueller, 2015; Rueda, Segmueller & Idema, 2014). The higher boundary of the open-ended top category was estimated using a Pareto distribution (Hout, 2004). To minimize the impact of inflation (or currency depreciation) over time, income midpoints were deflated by the consumer price index for all urban consumers. I use the annual average CPI-U-RS index for all items calculated by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), with 2016 as the base year. The GSS asks respondents to report their income in the year preceding the survey, so, for example, the 1982 income values reported in the 1983 GSS

data were adjusted by the CPI-U-RS score of 1982. Income values were then divided by the square root of household size and transformed with natural logarithm.[18]

Several demographic characteristics were included as potential covariates: gender, race (white, black, other), educational attainment (primary: less than high school, secondary: high school, tertiary: junior college, bachelor, graduate), age group (18-29, 30-49, 50-64, 65+), and employment status (full-time, part-time, unemployed, retired, student, housekeeping, other). The main effect of age group and its interaction with survey year were also included as controls not only because older cohorts are expected to have anti-redistribution attitudes but also because the attitudinal gap between the young and the elderly may change (diverge) over time (Pittau, Farcomeni & Zelli, 2016).

4. Results

The purpose of this study is *not* to analyze whether general attitudes have polarized on redistributive issues over time, but rather to examine the changes in the gap in support for redistributive government between occupational groups. Regarding mass polarization of policy views (that is not the focus of this study), Fiorina and Abrams (2008) report that Americans' attitudes on public policy issues have not changed over the past few decades (1984-2004; the National Election Studies (NES)). Likewise, the overall distribution of public attitudes toward redistributive government (EQWLTH in the GSS) has not changed substantially from 1978 to 2016 (for details, see Appendix Table A1).

I begin by examining the pattern of changes in the relationship between socio-economic status and policy attitudes. Figure 2 illustrates the trends in the proportion (%) of support

[18] Since this study used income as a proxy of socio-economic status in the labor market, it is more theoretically consistent to employ earnings from their labor jobs (RINCOME) rather than family income from all sources (INCOME). Nonetheless, family income (INCOME) was chosen for the analysis due to the large number of missing values for the personal wage variable (RINCOME).

for redistributive government in 'unskilled manual'/'low-income (bottom 20%)' (●) and 'service class I'/'high-income (top 20%)' (○) categories, and the 'difference' between the two (X = ● − ○). This approach is analogous to the Alford index of class voting (Alford, 1963), which is calculated by subtracting the percentage of non-manual workers voting for leftist parties from the percentage of manual workers voting for these parties. Dashed, dotted, and solid lines are least squares regression lines fitted separately to the observations (●, ○, and X). The result (Figure 2, left) indicates that the attitude gap (X) between unskilled manual and service class I workers shrinks by 22% from 29% ('● − ○' in 1978) to 7% ('● − ○' in 2016). The slope of the fitted line is significantly negative ($b = -.45$; $p < .001$) with an R-squared of .51. Throughout the survey period, unskilled manual workers are consistently more supportive of redistribution than service class I members (● > ○). The share of support among unskilled manual workers (●) has gradually decreased from 62% to 55% ($b = -.26$; $p < .01$; $R^2 = .35$), whereas that of service class I (○) has steadily increased from 32% to 48% ($b = .19$; $p < .05$; $R^2 = .23$). These two trajectories have led to the attitudinal convergence between the two occupational groups. This result is in line with Hypothesis 1a: the occupational class effect on redistributional attitudes has declined in significance during the past several decades.



Figure 2. Occupational and income divisions in redistributive politics, 1978-2016 *Note*. % support (EQWLTH = 1, 2, or 3) for the government role in reducing income differences. As EQWLTH is a 7-point scale, the category 4 was treated as neutral, and the categories 1-3 were regarded as 'support for (or positive attitudes toward) redistribution'. This procedure was used only for preliminary descriptive purposes (Figures 2-3); EQWLTH was modeled as ordinal in subsequent analyses (Table 1). *Source*. General Social Survey (GSS) 1978-2016. **p* < .05; ***p* < .01; *p**** < .001.

The temporal pattern of the income-attitude linkage is less pronounced (Figure 2, right). Although the attitude difference (X) between high- and low-income earners declines from 33% in 1978 to 21% in 2014 (followed by a relatively sharp drop to 10% in 2016), the slope of the fitted line is more gradual ($b = -.19$; $p = .055$; $R^2 = .21$) than that of occupational class. Attitudinal patterns have not changed much (i.e., nearly horizontal) for both low- and high-income groups. As a result, the distance in attitudes (X) is relatively constant, with minor fluctuations. In sum, occupational groups (service class I vs. unskilled manual) are becoming more similar in their views on redistributive government, while patterns of attitudinal convergence are less clear-cut between income groups.

Figure 3 shows the long-term pattern in the attitudinal distance between sexes, races, and levels of education. The top left figure indicates that there is no clear pattern of attitudinal convergence or divergence between men and women. Women (●) are consistently more supportive of redistribution than men (○); the attitudinal distance (X) is constant at around 7% ($b = -.04$; $p = .37$; $R^2 = .02$). The top right figure illustrates how the attitudinal gap

between races varies over time. The share of support among blacks (●) diminishes from 72% in 1978 to 62% in 2016 ($b = -.24$; $p < .05$; $R^2 = .23$), while the share of support among whites (○) is relatively stable at around 45% ($b = .00$; $p = .98$; $R^2 = .00$), which has led to the shrinking gap (X) between races ($b = -.25$; $p < .01$; $R^2 = .27$).



Figure 3. Gender, racial, and educational divisions in redistributive politics, 1978-2016 *Note*. % support (EQWLTH = 1, 2, or 3) for the government role in reducing income differences. As EQWLTH is a 7-point scale, the category 4 was treated as neutral, and the categories 1-3 were regarded as 'support for (or positive attitudes toward) redistribution'. This procedure was used only for preliminary descriptive purposes (Figures 2-3); EQWLTH was modeled as ordinal in subsequent analyses (Table 1). *Source*. General Social Survey (GSS) 1978-2016. *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; p*** $< .001$.

More striking is the pattern of change in the association between educational achievement and policy attitudes. The bottom left figure shows that those with primary education (●) are becoming less pro-redistribution ($b = -.25$; $p < .01$; $R^2 = .25$), whereas

better-educated individuals (○) are becoming more pro-redistribution over time (b = .30; p < .01; R^2 = .42). As a result, the attitudinal gap between the two groups declines from 23% in 1978 to nearly zero in 2016 (b = −.55; p < .001; R^2 = .58).

To further analyze these preliminary results, a series of logistic regression models were estimated in Table 1. Model 1a is a replication of Figure 2 (left figure). In this model, occupational class measures (main effect) and their interactions with survey year were included. Service class I members are significantly less pro-redistribution than unskilled manual workers ('service class I': b = −.71; p < .001), and the attitudinal distance between the two class categories significantly shrinks as time goes by ('service class I × year': b = .19; p < .001). The next model (1b) is a replication of Figure 2 (right figure). The results indicate that higher income is inversely associated with pro-redistribution attitudes ('income': b = −.40; p < .001) and that the negative income-attitude relationship significantly weakens over time ('income × year': b = .06; p < .001). Nevertheless, as model 1c shows, there is no significant pattern of change in the income-attitude association ('income × year': b = .02; p = .106) when income and occupation variables are estimated simultaneously. On the other hand, the declining effect of occupational class remained significant ('service class I × year': b = .21; p < .001).

Table 1. Determinants of support for redistributive government, 1978-2016

Variables	Model 1a (occupation only)		Model 1b (income only)		Model 1c (+ income)		Model 2a (+ gender)		Model 2b (+ race)		Model 3 (+ education)		Model 4a (+ controls)		Model 4b (combined)	
	coef.	s.e.	coef.	s.e.	coef.	s.e.	coef.	s.e.	coef.	s.e.	coef.	s.e.	coef.	s.e.	coef.	s.e.
Interactions																
Occupation (ref. unskilled manual)																
Service class I × Year	0.188***	(0.041)			0.208***	(0.047)	0.171***	(0.042)	0.182***	(0.040)	0.088	(0.047)	0.191***	(0.040)	0.095*	(0.047)
Service class II × Year	0.171***	(0.025)			0.186***	(0.031)	0.171***	(0.024)	0.175***	(0.025)	0.071*	(0.035)	0.168***	(0.023)	0.085*	(0.035)
Routine non-manual × Year	0.137***	(0.024)			0.128***	(0.025)	0.139***	(0.025)	0.121***	(0.023)	0.085**	(0.028)	0.143***	(0.023)	0.075**	(0.025)
Skilled manual × Year	0.043	(0.032)			0.038	(0.036)	0.036	(0.034)	0.033	(0.034)	0.021	(0.032)	0.036	(0.032)	0.011	(0.037)
Self-employed × Year	0.176**	(0.055)			0.228***	(0.056)	0.156**	(0.055)	0.174**	(0.054)	0.128*	(0.052)	0.203***	(0.056)	0.158**	(0.057)
Income × Year			0.055***	(0.013)	0.023	(0.014)									−0.007	(0.015)
Gender (ref. female)																
Male × Year							0.024	(0.019)							0.022	(0.019)
Race (ref. black)																
White × Year									0.012	(0.033)					0.011	(0.035)
Other × Year									−0.053	(0.042)					−0.087*	(0.038)
Education (ref. primary)																
Secondary × Year											0.076	(0.041)			0.111**	(0.040)
Tertiary × Year											0.175**	(0.054)			0.245***	(0.054)
Main effects																
Occupation (ref. unskilled manual)																
Service class I	−0.712***	(0.037)			−0.432***	(0.039)	−0.705***	(0.037)	−0.632***	(0.038)	−0.487***	(0.042)	−0.662***	(0.036)	−0.303***	(0.042)
Service class II	−0.472***	(0.027)			−0.259***	(0.030)	−0.549***	(0.026)	−0.399***	(0.027)	−0.245***	(0.034)	−0.439***	(0.026)	−0.187***	(0.033)
Routine non-manual	−0.263***	(0.027)			−0.166***	(0.025)	−0.369***	(0.028)	−0.214***	(0.026)	−0.149***	(0.030)	−0.249***	(0.026)	−0.150***	(0.027)
Skilled manual	−0.244***	(0.029)			−0.161***	(0.032)	−0.177***	(0.030)	−0.192***	(0.030)	−0.208***	(0.029)	−0.249***	(0.025)	−0.069*	(0.032)
Self-employed	−0.864***	(0.057)			−0.614***	(0.061)	−0.827***	(0.057)	−0.750***	(0.058)	−0.700***	(0.056)	−0.788***	(0.058)	−0.438***	(0.063)
Income			−0.401***	(0.014)	−0.340***	(0.014)									−0.235***	(0.017)
Gender (ref. female)																
Male							−0.341***	(0.027)							−0.301***	(0.030)
Race (ref. black)																
White									−0.806***	(0.036)					−0.666***	(0.040)
Other									−0.255***	(0.048)					−0.216***	(0.046)
Education (ref. primary)																
Secondary											−0.433***	(0.042)			−0.332***	(0.046)
Tertiary											−0.637***	(0.049)			−0.432***	(0.055)
Demographic controls	No		No		No		No		No		No		Yes		Yes	
Year	−0.080	(0.041)	0.017	(0.030)	−0.094*	(0.046)	−0.089*	(0.040)	−0.113*	(0.048)	−0.096*	(0.045)	−0.012	(0.043)	−0.166*	(0.078)
Pseudo R-squared	0.007		0.010		0.014		0.008		0.013		0.010		0.009		0.022	
Log pseudolikelihood	−52 095		−51 887		−51 739		−51 982		−51 757		−51 928		−51 971		−51 277	
Pooled *N*	27,541		27,541		27,541		27,541		27,541		27,541		27,541		27,541	

Note. Ordered logit model. Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. 'Demographic controls' include age group (ref. 18-29) and its interactions with survey year, and employment status (ref. full-time). Cut-points not displayed.

Source. General Social Survey (GSS) 1978-2016. *p < .05; p** < .01; p*** < .001.

Hypothesis 2 predicted that controlling for the effects of ascriptive attributes (gender and race) explains the declining importance of occupational class in redistributive politics. As shown in models 2a and 2b, although men and whites are indeed less likely to support redistribution, the attitudinal gap between sexes and between races does not significantly converge or diverge across survey years (cf. Figure 3). As a result, only 9.0% [gender (model 2a): 1 − (.171/.188) = .090] or 3.2% [race (model 2b): 1 − (.182/.188) = .032] of the variance in the interaction term 'service class I × year' (model 1a) can be explained by the ascriptive factors introduced in models 2a and 2b.

Model 3 examines the effect of educational attainment on the decline in class-based redistributive politics. The results show that better-educated citizens are less likely to support redistribution (main effects) and that the attitudinal gap between those with primary and tertiary education significantly diminishes over time ('tertiary × year': $b = .18$; $p < .01$), which is consistent with the preliminary results in Figure 3 (bottom left). More importantly, controlling for educational attainment makes the declining effect of occupational class ('service class I × year') less significant ($b = .09$; $p = .061$), accounting for 52.9% [1 − (.089/.188)] of the variance in 'service class I × year' (model 1a). This lends some support for Hypothesis 3—namely, the attitudinal convergence between educational groups explains the attitudinal convergence between occupational groups. The inclusion of other demographic controls (model 4a) does not substantially affect the declining effect of occupational class ('service class I × year': $b = .19$; $p < .001$). The main results remained valid even if all the predictors were entered in the equation simultaneously (model 4b). Given that government redistribution is a race-coded issue in the United States (Gilens, 1996), the same models (Table 1) were estimated for white respondents only (81.0% of the total sample). The results show that the conclusion remains unchanged when the analysis is restricted to the subsample (see Appendix Table A2; cf. Table 1).

5. Discussion

Scholars of inequality and mass politics have sought to understand how socioeconomic attributes and spatial/regime contexts affect individuals' perceptions toward redistribution (Arts & Gelissen, 2001; Bean & Papadakis, 1998; Berens & Gelepithis, 2018; Blekesaune, 2007; Breznau, 2010; Edlund, 1999; Jæger, 2006a; Linos & West, 2003; Svallfors, 1997; Sumino, 2016). On the other hand, scholars of electoral behavior have sought to explain the temporal process of class dealignment in party politics (Clark & Lipset, 1991; Clark *et al*., 1993; Dalton, 1984; Franklin, 1992; de Graaf, Nieuwbeerta, & Heath, 1995; Manza, Hout, & Brooks, 1995; Nieuwbeerta, 1996; Pakulski & Waters, 1996). The aim of this study was to explore the intersection of these two different fields by examining how the linkage between occupation/income and attitudes toward redistribution changes over time and identify what factor explains the temporal shifts. The findings of this study provided mixed evidence for the declining effect of socio-economic status on redistributive preferences. Occupational class has declined in its ability to explain individuals' attitudes toward redistribution (Hypothesis 1a), whereas income-based political cleavages remain relatively intact (Hypothesis 1b). Based on these results, this article further examined whether the waning of gender/racial (Hypothesis 2) and/or educational cleavages (Hypothesis 3) can account for the declining salience of occupational divisions (Hypothesis 1a). No evidence was obtained for hypothesis 2—namely, there is no significant attitudinal convergence (or divergence) between sexes and between races; ascriptive traits explain only a small portion of the decline in the occupation-attitude association (models 2a/b in Table 1). The results also showed that better- and less-educated citizens are becoming more alike in their views on redistributive policy, and that this attitudinal convergence accounts

for the substantial proportion of the decline in the occupation-attitude association (model 3 in Table 1).

There are a few caveats to the results. First, this study represents only a snapshot in time (1978-2016; less than 40 years) and does not provide an independent basis upon which to understand the larger picture of overall trends. The obtained results could be a limited reflection of much longer fluctuation processes (i.e., dealignment and realignment) and do not preclude the possibility of attitudinal 're-divergence' between occupations in subsequent years. Second, the overall validity of the results is highly dependent upon the measure of 'redistributive attitude'. In this study, redistributive attitude was measured by using EQWLTH not only because it is a standard measure of redistribution attitude but also because it is the only GSS item that has been asked for 35+ years (20+ time points) in a consistent manner. Given that a slight difference in question wording can yield different results in the study of redistributive politics (Sumino, 2017), a more nuanced evaluation of redistributive attitude would add further strength to the inferences drawn from the results.

Several implications can be drawn from this study. First, future research could further investigate the mechanism behind the attitudinal convergence among those with different educational backgrounds. Convergence could be explained by assuming that better-educated citizens (traditionally anti-welfare forces) are becoming more non-materialistic and/or increasingly concerned about rising inequality. Given that ascriptive attributes (e.g., gender and race) affect later educational attainment (Figure 1), one may argue that controlling for these effects explains some of the attitudinal convergence across educational boundaries. However, no evidence was detected for this explanation: the declining effect of education ('tertiary × year') remains highly significant even after controlling for gender and race effects (model 4b in Table 1).

Moreover, the findings also suggest that the decline in the association between occupation and redistributive preferences is partly explained by the attitudinal convergence between educational groups. Previous research suggests that most Americans are aware of rising inequality in recent years and see it as a 'problem', but they believe that their government should respond to the inequality issue by expanding education spending (i.e., equal chance of success), not by traditional redistributive solutions (Bartels, 2005; McCall & Kenworthy, 2009). However, better-educated Americans have become increasingly pro-redistribution during the past several decades (Figure 3). And if educational cleavages become more irrelevant for redistributive preferences over time (models 3-4 in Table 1), then one could expect a further decline in the role of occupational class in preference formation. Pro-equality coalitions across educational boundaries may function as antidotes for class-based redistributive politics in the United States.

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Appendix

Table A1. Distribution of redistributive attitudes (7-point scale), 1978-2016

	"1" = Government should reduce income differences "7" = No government action							
year	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	dk
1978	0.19	0.11	0.17	0.21	0.11	0.08	0.12	0.01
1980	0.17	0.09	0.16	0.20	0.12	0.07	0.16	0.03
1983	0.20	0.11	0.16	0.17	0.11	0.08	0.14	0.02
1984	0.21	0.12	0.15	0.17	0.13	0.08	0.12	0.02
1986	0.23	0.09	0.17	0.21	0.11	0.06	0.12	0.01
1987	0.23	0.09	0.17	0.20	0.12	0.06	0.12	0.01
1988	0.19	0.10	0.18	0.20	0.12	0.08	0.11	0.02
1989	0.18	0.13	0.19	0.20	0.11	0.07	0.10	0.02
1990	0.21	0.12	0.18	0.21	0.09	0.06	0.10	0.03
1991	0.20	0.12	0.17	0.20	0.12	0.07	0.09	0.03
1993	0.17	0.12	0.19	0.18	0.12	0.08	0.12	0.02
1994	0.14	0.09	0.16	0.21	0.15	0.08	0.15	0.01
1996	0.17	0.10	0.16	0.21	0.12	0.08	0.12	0.02
1998	0.15	0.10	0.17	0.21	0.11	0.08	0.16	0.02
2000	0.16	0.11	0.16	0.20	0.14	0.08	0.13	0.02
2002	0.19	0.09	0.18	0.19	0.14	0.07	0.12	0.01
2004	0.20	0.09	0.17	0.19	0.12	0.07	0.14	0.01
2006	0.21	0.09	0.16	0.21	0.13	0.08	0.11	0.01
2008	0.23	0.09	0.17	0.18	0.13	0.07	0.12	0.01
2010	0.18	0.08	0.16	0.18	0.16	0.07	0.17	0.01
2012	0.24	0.10	0.15	0.18	0.11	0.06	0.15	0.01
2014	0.22	0.10	0.15	0.17	0.14	0.07	0.15	0.01
2016	0.23	0.13	0.15	0.17	0.13	0.08	0.11	0.01

Note. 'dk' = Don't know.
Source. GSS 1978-2016.

Table A2. White subsample: Determinants of support for redistributive government, 1978-2016

Variables	Model 1a (occupation only)		Model 1b (income only)		Model 1c (+ income)		Model 2a (+ gender)		Model 3 (+ education)		Model 4a (+ controls)		Model 4b (combined)	
	coef.	s.e.	coef.	s.e.	coef.	s.e.	coef.	s.e.	coef.	s.e.	coef.	s.e.	coef.	s.e.
Interactions														
Occupation (ref. unskilled manual)														
Service class I × Year	0.160***	(0.049)			0.176**	(0.051)	0.145**	(0.050)	0.055	(0.052)	0.162**	(0.050)	0.067	(0.051)
Service class II × Year	0.146***	(0.032)			0.157***	(0.035)	0.140***	(0.031)	0.038	(0.038)	0.143***	(0.031)	0.042	(0.038)
Routine non-manual × Year	0.111***	(0.031)			0.104***	(0.030)	0.104***	(0.029)	0.066	(0.034)	0.119***	(0.029)	0.061*	(0.029)
Skilled manual × Year	0.035	(0.031)			0.029	(0.035)	0.034	(0.035)	0.016	(0.032)	0.027	(0.030)	0.018	(0.037)
Self-employed × Year	0.152**	(0.058)			0.201**	(0.060)	0.133*	(0.060)	0.096	(0.056)	0.176**	(0.059)	0.137*	(0.061)
Income × Year			0.051***	(0.013)	0.023	(0.013)							−0.004	(0.014)
Gender (ref. female)														
Male × Year							−0.000	(0.025)					−0.006	(0.026)
Education (ref. primary)														
Secondary × Year									0.044	(0.049)			0.087	(0.052)
Tertiary × Year									0.173**	(0.060)			0.242***	(0.065)
Main effects														
Occupation (ref. unskilled manual)														
Service class I	−0.697***	(0.042)			−0.437***	(0.042)	−0.688***	(0.042)	−0.491***	(0.044)	−0.642***	(0.042)	−0.344***	(0.042)
Service class II	−0.472***	(0.033)			−0.273***	(0.036)	−0.556***	(0.031)	−0.262***	(0.040)	−0.436***	(0.033)	−0.248***	(0.036)
Routine non-manual	−0.283***	(0.031)			−0.183***	(0.029)	−0.398***	(0.030)	−0.175***	(0.034)	−0.264***	(0.030)	−0.205***	(0.027)
Skilled manual	−0.229***	(0.029)			−0.149***	(0.033)	−0.152***	(0.032)	−0.192***	(0.028)	−0.219***	(0.029)	−0.076*	(0.033)
Self-employed	−0.818***	(0.058)			−0.591***	(0.062)	−0.783***	(0.059)	−0.673***	(0.056)	−0.741***	(0.059)	−0.478***	(0.064)
Income			−0.402***	(0.014)	−0.341***	(0.014)							−0.279***	(0.017)
Gender (ref. female)														
Male							−0.365***	(0.033)					−0.349***	(0.034)
Education (ref. primary)														
Secondary									−0.441***	(0.049)			−0.352***	(0.054)
Tertiary									−0.620***	(0.054)			−0.435***	(0.062)
Demographic controls	No		No		No		No		No		Yes		Yes	
Year	−0.086	(0.048)	−0.003	(0.030)	−0.098	(0.052)	−0.082	(0.045)	−0.083	(0.050)	−0.007	(0.048)	−0.103	(0.066)
Pseudo R-squared	0.006		0.009		0.012		0.008		0.009		0.008		0.017	
Log pseudolikelihood	−42 921		−42 773		−42 655		−42 817		−42 791		−42 824		−42 444	
Pooled *N*	22,309		22,309		22,309		22,309		22,309		22,309		22,309	

Note. Ordered logit model. Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. 'Demographic controls' include age group (ref. 18-29) and its interactions with survey year, and employment status (ref. full-time). Cut-points not displayed.

Source. General Social Survey (GSS) 1978-2016. *p < .05; p** < .01; p*** < .001.

CHAPTER 5

Welfare chauvinism in context: The conditional relationship between occupational status and attitudes toward immigrants in Europe

Abstract

This study examines whether the association between native workers' market position and their attitudes toward immigrants' social rights is conditioned by the social structures within which they are situated. Although the association between market status and welfare chauvinism has been well documented, relatively little is known about the specific context in which the attitudinal distance between occupations grows wider. Realistic conflict theory suggests that a stronger sense of competition and perceived threat generates a more negative attitude toward ethnic out-groups. Building on this notion, this study aims to theorize and empirically test how the salience of attitudinal cleavage across occupations is increased or decreased depending on the context in which competition and threat are experienced among native workers. Using data from the European Social Survey (ESS) 2008, this study finds that attitudinal polarization between those with low- and high-status occupations becomes more pronounced in more generous and ethnically diverse welfare states. The findings suggest that both generosity and diversity function as contextual cues triggering divergent voting patterns among native workers.

Keywords: welfare chauvinism, conditionality, occupation, immigrants, Europe

1. Introduction

The eligibility of immigrants for social welfare has been one of the most contested issues in European politics (Bommes and Geddes, 2003; Geddes, 2008). The strategy of linking the plight of working-class voters with the presence of immigrants is often used by right-wing politicians to stimulate and mobilize the manifestation of fear and frustration latent in the host society. Radical right-wing populism often claims that immigrants are a drain on the national welfare system, and that they are not equally eligible to receive publicly-funded welfare benefits. This line of argument contends that increased ethnic diversity erodes a sense of solidarity and undermines the functioning of the welfare state. If the trade-off between solidarity and diversity is true, then it leads to the 'progressive dilemma'—that is, the dilemma for progressives who pursue both solidarity-based generous welfare and equal respect for ethnic differences (Goodhart, 2004).

Immigrants' welfare eligibility boils down to the issue of citizenship and nationhood (Brubaker, 1989, 1990)—namely, the question of how immigrants should be incorporated into the national welfare state and what determines the boundaries of social citizenship. For those who define social citizenship as a status granted for the ethnically-defined population, only native citizens should take advantage of the risk-pooling scheme. On the other hand, for those who broadens the source of social citizenship beyond ethnic particularism, immigrants should not be excluded, or restricted, from social services/benefits (Kymlicka and Banting, 2006).

What explains these variations in native citizens' attitudes toward immigrants' social rights? Previous research suggests that individuals with a lower socioeconomic status (e.g., occupation, income, education) are more likely to hold a stronger sense of welfare chauvinism (van der Waal *et al*., 2011; Reeskens and van Oorschot, 2012; Mewes and Mau,

2013), and that welfare chauvinism is less prevalent in generous welfare states (Reeskens and van Oorschot, 2012; Mewes and Mau, 2013). Nonetheless, the literature on welfare chauvinism is still scarce and does not pay sufficient attention to the conditional effects of social structures on the association between market status and exclusionist attitudes. The aim of this study to fill this gap by theorizing and empirically testing the interaction mechanism between occupation-based welfare chauvinism and contextual factors. Drawing on realistic conflict theory, this study argues that native workers consider the presence of ethnic out-groups as threatening when they have a strong sense of inter-group competition over scarce welfare resources, and that a stronger sense of perceived threat generates more negative attitudes toward immigrants' welfare eligibility. This study also argues that the extent to which a native worker perceives immigrant workers as threatening will vary across different social structures (welfare generosity and ethnic heterogeneity) within which s/he is situated. Using data from the European Social Survey (ESS) Round 4, this study shows that attitudinal cleavages between occupations are significantly larger in countries with more generous welfare benefits and greater ethnic heterogeneity. The paper concludes by discussing the implications of these results and directions for future research.

2. Theories and hypotheses

2.1 Social citizenship in ethnically diversified societies

Generally, citizenship can be defined as "a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community" (Marshall, 1950: 28), in which all citizens have equal access to the rights and privileges that derive from its membership. The social dimension of nation-state membership, or social citizenship, extends the scope of entitlements to social welfare and

security. The concept of social citizenship is inextricably interwoven with the idea of a welfare state (Marshall, 1950; Korpi, 1989; Esping-Andersen, 1990). In a welfare state where social services are fully decommodified, social rights are guaranteed based on citizenship status rather than on the sale of labor power (Esping-Andersen, 1990; 1999), and "individuals, or families, can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living independently of market participation" (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 37). The granting of social rights alleviates the 'commodity status' of market participants by securing their access to publicly-funded welfare services.

However, in ethnically heterogeneous settings, the concept of social citizenship has to be redefined and extended as operating within a framework that reconciles equal treatment of all citizens and cultural plurality (Brubaker, 1990; Kymlicka, 1995; Joppke, 1999; Jennings, 2000; Joppke, 2007). Since social citizenship draws the line between the 'members' and 'non-members' of the welfare state, new immigrant arrivals raise the issue of how newcomer immigrants should be incorporated into the welfare system—in particular, the question of who is inside and outside the scope of social citizenship.

The ascriptive notion of social citizenship believes that social benefits and services should be restricted to native, ethnically defined populations—namely, 'welfare chauvinism' (Andersen & Bjørklund, 1990; Kitschelt, 1997). This notion stresses that the granting of social rights presupposes ethnic membership, and places immigrants outside the realm of social welfare. Only partially are social rights granted to immigrants, or granted only if restrictive preconditions are fulfilled. In this view, social citizenship serves as a 'buffer' that demarcates the boundaries of a national welfare state (Brubaker, 1990). This model could also be justified by the idea that a viable welfare state requires a high level of social cohesion—such as feelings of commonality, belonging, and mutual aid—which underlies the functioning of a welfare state (Marshall, 1950; Esping-Andersen,

1990). Ethnic nationalists might interpret this idea in an exclusionist way—that is, immigrants should be excluded from the welfare system to maintain a sense of 'social solidarity' in the host society. For ethnic nationalists, the term 'social solidarity' refers to the ethno-cultural ties that bind citizens altogether. Thus, cultural diversity is perceived as a threat toward solidarity-based redistribution. This idea leads to the exclusion of immigrants from equal access to social services and benefits.

On the other hand, the civic, republican view of social citizenship situates the idea of social citizenship as a matter of choice, keeping the door open to ethnic others. In principle, social rights are available for all citizens, including those with immigrant backgrounds, who share common political principles and goals. The republican ideal envisions a secular public domain that is free from manifestations of particularistic identities (e.g., ethnic, cultural, or religious), and thus social rights are granted on the basis of *individual* citizens not on distinct group identities. On this view, social solidarity is understood as a civic, ethno-culturally neutral sense of commonality and mutual trust. Republican solidarity derives from the fact that all citizens are connected in pursuit of the greater common good and the collective responsibility for fellow citizens who are in need of help (Silver, 1994). Similarly, the multicultural concept of social citizenship also has an inclusive vision of the welfare state, but unlike the republican view, it advocates a society in which diverse ethno-cultural minorities, including immigrants, are recognized and celebrated without being assimilated into the majority culture (Koopmans *et al*., 2005; Bloemraad *et al*., 2008). It is often suggested that ethnic diversity erodes national solidarity and general support for redistributive government (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; Goodhart, 2004). However, even under multicultural policy settings, social solidarity can be maintained or even fostered by 'destigmatizing' historically rooted feelings of prejudice, mistrust, and antipathy between different ethnic/racial groups (Kymlicka and Banting, 2006).

In sum, the ethnic, ascriptive principle of social citizenship defines the concept of social citizenship in a narrow and restrictive way, while the civic, republican and multicultural counterparts expand the range of membership beyond ethnically-defined boundaries. In the paragraphs that follow, I will argue how these different understandings of social citizenship are related to native workers' status in the labor market.

2.2 Market position and exclusionist attitudes toward immigrants

Realistic conflict theory suggests that negative attitudes toward out-groups occur when members of a group consider that between-group competition over scarce resources creates a situation in which a gain for one group results in a loss of the other (Campbell, 1965; Sherif and Sherif, 1969; LeVine and Campbell, 1972). Different socioeconomic groups are exposed to different levels of competition in the labor market. In advanced industrial societies, the majority of new immigrants occupy lower socioeconomic status compared to native workers. Native citizens with lower market positions perceive that they compete with immigrants (i.e., out-group) in the labor market, which in turn generates the perception that their economic interests are threatened by the inflow of newcomers (Blalock, 1967; Olzak, 1992; Betz, 1993). And those who view immigrant workers as threatening are expected to display anti-immigration views (Bobo, 1988; Scheepers *et al*., 2002). A number of studies have argued that market position explains attitudes toward cultural plurality—in particular, a lower status in the labor market leads to a more anti-immigrant sentiment (Scheepers *et al*., 2002; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Mayda, 2004) and voting for right-wing populist parties (Kriesi, 1998; Lubbers *et al*., 2002; Oesch, 2008). Similarly, native workers who have similar market positions to immigrants (i.e., low-status workers) are the beneficiaries of social services and benefits, and therefore they compete with immigrant

welfare recipients. A sense of competition and out-group threat produces the idea of exclusionism (Andersen and Bjørklund, 1990). Indeed, empirical studies find that a lower market status is associated with a stronger sense of welfare chauvinism (van der Waal *et al*., 2011; Mewes and Mau, 2012). Based on these arguments, I propose the following hypothesis as the basis for the interaction model (hypothesis 2):

Hypothesis 1: Paid workers with lower occupational status are more likely to believe that immigrants should be excluded, or restricted, from social welfare.

2.3 Direct effects of social policy and cultural diversity on welfare chauvinism

Dominant discourses on immigrants' access to welfare are socially embedded within contextual settings. It is plausible to assume that welfare chauvinism is more widespread in certain welfare states than in others (van der Waal *et al*., 2013). The issue of contextual variation in welfare attitudes can be approached from the perspective of collective solidarity in the welfare state. According to Esping-Andersen (1999), there are three types of welfare-state solidarity: residual, corporativist, and universalistic. The residual model is characterized by needs-tested welfare schemes targeted at those who are most vulnerable to market risks. This approach leads to an 'us' and 'them' identity discourse because it accentuates the division between self-reliant individuals whose risks are covered by private insurance and those who depend on publicly-financed welfare services. In the corporativist model, market risks are pooled among those who share similar occupational profiles. This approach mobilizes a collective sense of solidarity within occupational groups but generates a division between them. The universalistic model pools all individual risks universally 'under one umbrella'. Universalism blurs the boundaries between welfare

recipients and nonrecipients, which generates a broader sense of solidarity as the 'people'. This argument could be applied in the context of welfare chauvinism. A generous, universalistic welfare state may develop coalitions not only across native citizens with different class backgrounds but also across ethnic lines. In the universalistic welfare state where market risks are shared by the society as a whole, people have a broad conception of 'welfare beneficiary' that covers all individuals, including immigrants, rather than a select few. The universalist idea does not make the distinction between who gets benefits and who does not (cf. the residual model), which helps develop tolerant and inclusive narratives in society. Indeed, previous empirical research suggests that generous welfare spending is inversely associated with welfare chauvinism (Reeskens and van Oorschot, 2012; van der Waal et al., 2013). These arguments lead to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2a: A higher level of social spending is associated with a less exclusionist welfare attitude toward immigrants.

Another source of contextual cues would be ethnic heterogeneity, that is, the idea that greater ethnic diversity leads to greater welfare chauvinism. It has been suggested that diversity has the detrimental impact on social cohesion and welfare state (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; Goodhart, 2004). This argument is based on the assumption that people support taxation and redistribution because they imagine that the recipients are those who share common characteristics (e.g., cultural values, attitudes, and norms). A growing number of ethnic minorities makes it difficult for welfare stakeholders to imagine an ethnically homogeneous welfare state. If the general public believes that immigrants benefit disproportionately from public transfers, they may be more likely to hold the idea

that immigrants should be barred from receiving welfare benefits. This relationship is hypothesized as follows:

Hypothesis 2b: A higher level of ethnic heterogeneity is associated with a greater exclusionist welfare attitude toward immigrants.

2.4 Conditional effects of social structures

This study further argues that the effect of occupational status on welfare chauvinism (hypothesis 1) is conditioned by social structures within which individuals are embedded. Hypothesis 1 argues that those who compete with immigrants for social services tend to feel threatened by the influx of immigrants and hence consider that immigrants should be excluded from social welfare. In this process, the visibility of the welfare state would play a significant role. By 'the visibility of the welfare state', I mean the ability of native workers to consciously connect their labor-market positions with expected benefits drawn from the welfare state. In generous welfare settings, the welfare state is highly visible for low-status native workers because of their lived reality and everyday experience of how social services/benefits secure their livelihood. In such contexts, low-status workers are more conscious of their welfare-state benefits and hence subject to a stronger sense of inter-group competition and threat toward a diversified welfare state. On the other hand, high-status workers are more likely to support the view that immigrants should be granted equal access to social welfare in the context of more generous welfare benefits not only because they are relatively not in competition with immigrants for welfare resources but also because they are more conscious of how social services/benefits are linked to people's livelihoods and socio-economic wellbeing. In countries with low welfare benefits, high-status workers

are not expected to consider that social rights should be extended to immigrants because welfare services/benefits are not adequately accessible to native citizens, let alone immigrants. Such differences in welfare attitudes between low and high occupational status are expected to be larger in generous, contested welfare states. By contrast, in countries with limited welfare provision (i.e., low welfare-state visibility), transfer benefits are less visible, and hence the distance in attitudes between low- and high-status workers is expected to be small. From these arguments, I propose the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3a: Attitudinal cleavages between those with low and high occupational status grow wider in countries with higher levels of welfare benefits.

In addition, I also suggest that the impact of occupational status on welfare chauvinism varies across countries with different levels of ethnic heterogeneity. In ethnically diverse societies, where immigrant workers are highly visible, low-status native workers, or those who have similar market positions to immigrants, are more likely to perceive that they are in competition with immigrants for welfare resources and hence have a stronger sense of threat and welfare chauvinism. On the other hand, in ethnically diverse societies, high-status workers are expected to envision a relatively inclusive welfare state because high-status workers such as managers, supervisors, and personnel administrators are less likely to see immigrants as competing for scarce welfare resources, but rather as potential workers and consumers. Previous research suggests that there is only a weak direct association between ethnic diversity and welfare attitudes across countries (Mau and Burkhardt, 2009; van der Waal *et al*., 2011; Reeskens and van Oorschot, 2012; Sumino, 2014), whereas it remains unclear as to whether ethnic diversity conditions the relationship between

occupational status and welfare chauvinism. This reasoning leads to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3b: Attitudinal cleavages between those with low and high occupational status grow wider in ethnically heterogeneous countries.

3. Method

3.1 Data

To test the above hypotheses, I use data from the European Social Survey (ESS) Round 4 (2008), which provides a unique opportunity to examine the relationship between occupational status and welfare chauvinism across 20+ European countries. Since the key explanatory variable of this study is occupational status in the labor market, the analysis was restricted to market participants (i.e., employed adults) in working age (18-64 years), and those who are currently out of labor market (e.g. retired, disabled, and student) are omitted from the data. Non-citizen and foreign-born (non-native) respondents were also removed from the analysis because the primary interest of this study was on welfare chauvinism perceived by the native population. The analysis covered 22 capitalist democracies in Europe for which the relevant data were fully available. The included countries are: six social democratic (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden), four conservative (France, Finland, Germany, Switzerland), two liberal

(Great Britain, Ireland), and ten unclassified welfare states (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain).[19]

3.2 Measures

The dependent variable of this study is 'attitudes toward welfare chauvinism'. In the ESS 2008, respondents were asked, 'When should immigrants obtain rights to social benefits/services?', with answer options: (a) immediately on arrival, (b) after living in [COUNTRY] for a year, whether or not they have worked, (c) only after they have worked and paid taxes for at least a year, (d) once they have become a [COUNTRY] citizen, or (e) they should never get the same rights. The categories (a) and (b) represent the inclusive, tolerant form of social citizenship that does not impose any substantial restrictions on the social right of immigrants. The category (c) represents the principle of reciprocity, namely, that immigrants should not be offered welfare benefits/services unless they contribute to the financing of the welfare state (i.e., tax payment). The category (d) reflects the idea that social rights originate from formal citizenship status, while the category (e) represents an extreme form welfare chauvinism, namely, unconditional exclusion of immigrants from entitlement programs. In the analysis, welfare chauvinism was treated as a nominal (unordered) categorical variable because it does not have a clear ordering of 'time' requirements (i.e., *when* immigrants should obtain rights)—for example, (a) 0 year, (b) 1 year, (c) 1 year (at least), (d) not specified, and (e) not specified. Moreover, the time required for acquiring citizenship (category (d)) differs across European countries (van der Waal, 2011). The categories (a) and (b) were collapsed into one category as 'unconditional

[19] The typology was based on Esping-Andersen (1990). Due to data unavailability, the following countries in the ESS 2008 were not included in the analysis: Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Israel, Lithuania, Romania, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine.

access to social welfare', and the other categories were labelled (c) 'conditional upon reciprocity', (d) 'conditional upon citizenship', and (e) 'exclusion from social welfare' (Reeskens and van Oorschot, 2012). Figure 1 shows the relative frequency of the answers across the countries. The share of respondents who chose 'exclusion' is among the highest in Greece, Latvia, the Czech Republic, and Hungary; the lowest shares are found in Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and Poland.

Figure 1. Distribution of welfare-chauvinism attitudes among native citizens, by country



Notes: Countries are sorted in descending order by the share of respondents who chose 'exclusion from social welfare'. *N* = 18,064.
Source: ESS (2008).

Individual-level factors. Occupational status was measured by the International Socio-Economic Index (ISEI) developed by Ganzeboom and his colleagues (Ganzeboom *et al*., 1992; Ganzeboom and Treiman, 1996). The ISEI scale was coded based on the International Standard Classification of Occupations (4-digit ISCO-88). The scale ranges from 16 to 90 with higher scores representing higher occupational status—e.g., helpers/cleaners (coded 16), manufacturing laborers (20), civil engineering technicians (45), medical doctors (88), and judges (90). In this study, occupational status was treated

as continuous (ISEI) rather than as categorical (e.g., the EGP/Erikson-Goldthorpe-Portocarero class scheme) not only because the interest of this study is on the link between status 'level' and attitudes and not on attitudinal variation across qualitative categories (e.g., professional vs. unskilled manual class), but also because it allows for a more parsimonious, interpretable model for the analysis of conditional effects, namely, cross-level multiplicative interactions between occupation (continuous) and social structures (continuous). Several demographic variables were included as covariates: gender, age (in years), educational attainment (lower secondary or less, tertiary), household income (in quintiles) [20] . Attitudinal or self-rated subjective variables—e.g., political ideology, authoritarianism, national identity—were not included on the right side of the equation because of potential endogeneity issues.

Aggregate-level factors. Generosity of social policy was measured by the amount of cash and in-kind benefits per capita in constant US dollars on PPP basis (OECD, 2005). This is an internationally comparable indicator of the extent to which the government generously allocates its resources to welfare programs. Although the social-spending measure was conceptualized as a hierarchical variable in this study, it is also a possibility to assess differences in social policy system using a qualitative welfare-regime typology. According to Esping-Andersen (1990), the European countries analyzed in this study are classified as follows: social democratic (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden), conservative (Finland, France, Germany, and Switzerland), and liberal (Great Britain and Ireland). It is a common practice to examine the attitudinal differences between

[20] In the ESS, country-specific household income was reported in intervals. In this study, the midpoint of each income range was used for a proxy for actual income. The midpoint of the last open-ended category was estimated using a Pareto formula (Hout, 2004). The differences in price levels across countries were adjusted by purchasing power parities (PPPs) in national currencies per US dollar (OECD, 2007). Household income was equivalized by the square root of the number of household members (Buhmann *et al.*, 1988). The percentage of missing cases for income is relatively high at around 20%. Thus, income values were then converted into quintiles, and a missing dummy variable was coded as 1 if the data were missing on the income variable.

liberal (least generous) and social democratic (most generous) welfare states. However, the qualitative approach was not employed in this study because the liberal welfare regime will be represented by only two countries (Great Britain and Ireland), which means that the estimates may be heavily affected or biased by these two. Moreover, half of the sample countries remain unclassified or do not fit into the tripartite typology: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Bambra, 2007). For these reasons, the level of welfare generosity was measured individually for each country, not in groups.

Ethnic heterogeneity was measured using the data on international migrant stock (United Nations, 2005). The original migrant-stock indicator is calculated by the number of foreign-born population as a share of the total population, whereas this study proposes to use a migrant-stock measure adjusted by the country of origin: high-income countries or not. In the theory section, I argued that the influx of immigrants affects how native labor-market participants develop a sense of competition and threat. This argument presupposes that many immigrants are economically underprivileged in the labor market. To control for this assumption, any immigrants from high-income countries were excluded from the calculation of migrant stock. This adjustment is important because there are large differences in value between before and after the treatment—for instance, Belgium: 8.3% (non-adjusted) → 2.8% (adjusted), Ireland: 14.0% → 7.0%, and Switzerland: 24.4% → 10.9%, where a substantial share of immigrants originate from rich neighboring countries (for details, see Appendix Table A1). A 'high-income' country was defined as having a GNI (gross national income) per capita of 10,725 or more in US$ for the year 2005 (World Bank, 2017). Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. The correlation between generous social spending and ethnic heterogeneity is very small (Pearson's $r = -.14$; $p = .54$; for details, see Appendix Figure A1 and Table A1).

Table 1. Summary of descriptive statistics

Variables	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Welfare chauvinism	2.32	0.83	1	4
ISEI	45.3	16.5	16	90
Income	2.91	1.4	1	5
Education	2.19	0.69	1	3
Gender	0.48	0.50	0	1
Age	41.7	11.3	18	64
Welfare benefits/capita in US$	7241.6	3016	2036.5	12325.5
% foreign-born population	7.09	4.20	1.4	16.9

Notes: N = 18,064.

3.3 Analytical approach

Due to the nested structure of individuals from 22 countries, the study uses hierarchical regression modelling (Hox, 1995; Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002). Given the discrete nature of the dependent variable, the estimation was carried out with a multinomial-logit link function. The parameters were estimated using MLwiN 2.30 (Rasbash *et al*., 2014).

4. Results

The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between native citizens' market position and their attitudes toward welfare chauvinism, and then assess whether and to what extent this linkage is conditioned by the social structures within which native workers are located. To this end, a two-level multinomial logistic regression model was fitted to the data (Table 2). The results suggest that a higher occupational status (ISEI) is associated with a weaker sense of exclusionism. The coefficients of ISEI for the 'exclusion' and 'citizenship' contrasts (ref. 'unconditional access') are both negative and highly significant [$\beta = -.857$ (vs. exclusion), $-.200$ (vs. citizenship); $p < .001$], indicating that native workers on the higher end of the occupational ladder are less likely than their lower-status counterparts to prefer 'exclusion from social welfare' or 'conditional upon citizenship' over

'unconditional access to social welfare' (hypothesis 1) even after controlling for the effects of other socioeconomic characteristics (i.e., income and education). The effects of family income were inconsistent or modest at best. Native citizens with higher education tend to have a more tolerant view for immigrants' access to welfare. Older citizens are more likely to choose 'exclusion' or 'conditional upon citizenship' rather than 'unconditional access'. Table 2 also shows that the more generous the welfare state (in terms of the amount of benefits per head), the less people supporting the exclusive or restrictive/conditional criteria (hypothesis 2a). No significant association was detected between ethnic heterogeneity and outcome attitudes (hypothesis 2b).

Table 2. Determinants of welfare chauvinism in Europe: When should immigrants obtain rights to social benefits/services?

	Exclusion from social welfare		Conditional upon citizenship		Conditional upon reciprocity	
Variables	coef.	s.e.	coef.	s.e.	coef.	s.e.
Individual-level factors						
Occupational status (ISEI)	−0.857***	(0.085)	−0.200***	(0.049)	−0.034	(0.047)
Income (ref. 1st quintile)						
2nd quintile	0.007	(0.086)	0.065	(0.053)	−0.013	(0.052)
3rd quintile	−0.055	(0.091)	0.059	(0.053)	−0.006	(0.052)
4th quintile	−0.029	(0.099)	0.281***	(0.055)	0.274***	(0.053)
5th quintile	−0.239*	(0.109)	0.066	(0.058)	0.042	(0.056)
Missing dummy	0.776***	(0.084)	0.350***	(0.056)	0.286***	(0.053)
Education (ref. less than lower secondary)						
Upper secondary	−0.106	(0.073)	−0.137**	(0.050)	−0.112*	(0.048)
Tertiary	−0.931***	(0.099)	−0.553***	(0.058)	−0.460***	(0.055)
Gender (ref. male)						
Female	−0.067	(0.049)	−0.122***	(0.031)	−0.030	(0.030)
Age	0.007***	(0.001)	0.003**	(0.001)	0.002	(0.001)
Aggregate-level factors						
Generosity of social spending	−0.972***	(0.231)	−0.564***	(0.154)	−0.504***	(0.079)
Ethnic heterogeneity	0.075	(0.222)	0.031	(0.150)	0.020	(0.076)
Cross-level interactions						
ISEI × Generosity of social spending	−0.563***	(0.074)	−0.270***	(0.041)	−0.244***	(0.040)
ISEI × Ethnic heterogeneity	0.041	(0.056)	−0.251***	(0.040)	−0.172***	(0.039)
Constant	−0.875	(0.250)	1.124	(0.167)	1.282	(0.096)
Intercept variance	1.161	(0.363)	0.534	(0.163)	0.135	(0.042)
N individual	18,064		18,064		18,064	
N country	22		22		22	

Notes: Two-level multinomial logit (random intercept). RIGLS (reiterated generalized least squares) with PQL2 (second order penalized quasi-likelihood). The reference category is 'unconditional access to social welfare'. Non-citizen and foreign-born respondents were removed from the sample.
Sources: ESS (2008); OECD (2005); United Nations (2005).
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

The results also indicate the conditionality of the status-chauvinism association. The interaction terms between ISEI and generosity are negative and statistically significant [β = −.563 (vs. exclusion), −.270 (vs. citizenship), −.244 (vs. reciprocity); $p < .001$], suggesting that attitudinal cleavages across those with different ISEI scores become larger in the context of higher levels of social spending. Ethnic diversity has also a significant interaction effect on the association between ISEI and the probability of a native worker choosing 'citizenship' relative to 'unconditional access' (β =−.251; $p < .001$), suggesting that attitudinal cleavages across occupations are larger in the context of ethnically diverse society. No significant interaction effect was observed for the contrast of 'exclusion' and 'unconditional access' (β =.041; z = .073). The results remain essentially the same when two outlier (or potentially influential) countries—Estonia and Latvia—are excluded from the analysis (Appendix Table A2). These countries have ethnic-diversity scores that exceed two standard deviations from the mean (Figure A1 and Table A1).

To provide a more detailed indication of the interaction effects, predicted probabilities were calculated using the parameter estimates in Table 2. In Figure 2, the x-axis represents the income level (in percentiles), while the y-axis represents the predicted probabilities of the response categories. The symbol 'X' represents the difference in predicted probabilities between the categories (i.e. between exclusion/citizenship and unconditional access). As illustrated in Figure 2 (top left), in a more generous welfare state, a higher ISEI score is associated with a higher probability of choosing 'unconditional access', relative to 'exclusion'. This pattern is not observed in the context of non-generous social spending (top right). Similarly, native workers with higher ISEI scores are less likely to choose 'conditional upon citizenship' (ref. 'unconditional access') in the context of higher welfare benefits (bottom left), while attitudinal cleavages are constant across occupations in the

context of less generous spending (bottom right). These results are consistent with hypothesis 3a, that is, the greater the generosity of social spending, the greater the attitudinal differences between occupations.

Figure 2. Conditional effects of welfare generosity on the association between occupational status (ISEI) and welfare chauvinism: predicted probabilities with 95% CI



Notes: The shaded area represents the 95% confidence interval. All the other variables were held constant at their means.
Sources: ESS (2008); OECD (2005); United Nations (2005).

Figure 3 illustrates the conditional effect of ethnic diversity on the relationship between ISEI and welfare attitudes. In an ethnically diverse setting, differences in occupational status are associated with differences in the probability of choosing 'citizenship' relative to 'unconditional access (bottom left), while the gap in attitudes is relatively uniform in the context of low ethnic diversity (bottom right). In contrast, diversity does not significantly

condition the relationship between ISEI and the likelihood of 'exclusion' (ref. 'unconditional access). Attitudinal cleavages across those with different ISEI scores are relatively minor in the context of both high (top left) and low ethnic heterogeneity (top right).

Figure 3. Conditional effects of ethnic diversity on the association between occupational status (ISEI) and welfare chauvinism: predicted probabilities with 95% CI



Notes: The shaded area represents the 95% confidence interval. All the other variables were held constant at their means.
Sources: ESS (2008); OECD (2005); United Nations (2005).

5. Discussion

This study investigated the conditional effects of social structures on the relationship between occupational status and attitudes toward welfare chauvinism, which has been relatively underspecified in previous research. The findings suggest that native citizens who occupy marginalized positions in the labor market are more likely to hold the view that immigrants should be excluded or restricted from access to social benefits/services (hypothesis 1, Table 2). The results also show that an inclusive, tolerant view of social citizenship is more widespread in countries with higher welfare benefits (hypothesis 2a, Table 2), whereas there is no significant direct association between ethnic diversity and general attitudes toward welfare chauvinism (hypothesis 2b, Table 2). The primary interest of this study was to examine whether social structures condition the association between market position and welfare chauvinism. The findings suggest that the effect of occupational status on welfare chauvinism differs across countries with different social policy settings (hypothesis 3a) and different degrees of ethnic heterogeneity (hypothesis 3b).

There are several issues that may need to be addressed in future research. First, it is difficult to separate the effect of occupational status on attitudes toward redistributive government from its effect on attitudes toward immigrants. In this study, welfare chauvinism was operationalized using the ESS question: 'When should immigrants obtain rights to social benefits/services?' However, some respondents may express a negative view on immigrants' access to social welfare only because they take a skeptical stance on the redistributive role of government, not because they are anti-immigrant. Second, the phrase 'rights to social benefits/services' in the dependent variable is somewhat ambiguous. Some respondents may interpret it as meaning the full and equal access to welfare benefits,

while others may interpret it as meaning more restricted forms of welfare coverage. Third, the cross-border mobility of professional and high-skilled workers may create a sample selection bias. In generous, high-tax countries, privileged workers with high wages and high occupational status may consider shifting their economic activity to lower-tax countries to maximize their after-tax-and-transfer revenues. In this case, they are omitted from the analysis of attitudes among native citizens because of their non-resident status in their country of origin; these cases are to be treated as (wealthy) foreign workers in the countries in which they were surveyed, and hence are omitted from the analysis of native citizens' attitudes.

Several implications can be drawn from this study. First, the findings suggest that the visibility of the welfare state mobilizes and stimulates a competition-threat discourse among native workers. In generous welfare states, native workers are conscious of the transfer benefits provided by the welfare state. For low-status workers, in particular, the welfare state is highly visible because their standard of living is closely tied to the generous welfare system. In this context, attitudinal polarization is more likely to occur among native workers because they perceive that they compete with newcomer immigrants for scarce welfare resources. Of course, this does not mean that generous welfare states are more inclined towards welfare chauvinism. In fact, a sense of welfare chauvinism is more prevalent in welfare states with less generous benefits (Table 2). The argument here is that native citizens with different occupational status deviate their attitudes in the context of visible welfare benefits. Second, the results suggest that ethnic diversity functions as a contextual cue that polarizes attitudes among native workers. In ethnically diverse societies, native workers become more conscious of the presence of immigrants in the labor market, which in turn triggers attitudinal polarization across those with different market positions. In this context, individuals with high occupational status have a relatively inclusive notion

of social citizenship, while those with low occupational status consider that welfare benefits should be granted to immigrants under restrictive conditions (Table 2, Figure 3). Again, this does not mean that increased ethnic diversity is directly associated with greater support for welfare chauvinism (Table 2). Third, in generous and/or ethnically diverse welfare states, the issue of immigrants' welfare eligibility could become a divisive factor in electoral politics. If differences in occupational status lead to differences in attitudes toward social policy issues, then polarized attitudes between occupations may be reflected in electoral results. Indeed, a recent study suggests that issue partisanship (or the link between issue attitudes and party identification) has significantly increased over time (Baldassarri and Gelman, 2008). The expected causal sequence here is as follows: generous and/or ethnically diverse welfare state → polarized welfare attitudes → party choice. However, it has to be noted that the logic of party choice is more complex than the logic of welfare chauvinism in that it involves reflections on a wider range of social issues, not only on the issue of immigrants. Thus, the expected causal sequence (polarized welfare attitude → party choice) and its implications are speculative at best.

Appendix

Figure A1. Relationship between (adjusted) ethnic diversity and welfare generosity



Sources: OECD (2005); OECD (2005); United Nations (2005).

Table A1. Welfare generosity and ethnic diversity across 22 European countries

Country	Welfare generosity (cash and in-kind benefits/capita)	Ethnic diversity (% foreign-born population)		
		Adjusted	Raw	Difference
Austria	10360.0	10.5	13.8	3.3
Belgium	9631.6	2.8	8.3	5.5
Czech Republic	4450.0	2.9	3.1	0.2
Denmark	10763.7	4.8	8.1	3.3
Estonia	2732.6	16.9	17.2	0.3
Finland	9001.0	2.6	3.7	1.1
France	10208.2	7.6	11.0	3.4
Germany	9850.0	10.2	12.6	2.4
Greece	6090.1	8.4	10.5	2.1
Hungary	4724.6	2.9	3.6	0.7
Ireland	6783.1	7.0	14.0	7.0
Latvia	2036.5	16.4	16.7	0.3
Netherlands	8768.8	8.2	10.6	2.4
Norway	12325.5	4.8	7.8	3.0
Poland	3450.9	1.4	1.9	0.5
Portugal	5873.6	5.4	7.3	1.9
Slovakia	3079.3	2.0	2.4	0.4
Slovenia	5562.8	8.6	9.9	1.3
Spain	6685.3	7.2	9.3	2.1
Sweden	10964.4	7.8	12.5	4.7
Switzerland	8865.3	10.9	24.4	13.5
Great Britain	7107.5	6.6	9.8	3.2

Sources: OECD (2005); United Nations (2005).

Table A2. [Excluding Estonia and Latvia] Determinants of welfare chauvinism in Europe: When should immigrants obtain rights to social benefits/services?

	Exclusion from social welfare		Conditional upon citizenship		Conditional upon reciprocity	
Variables	coef.	s.e.	coef.	s.e.	coef.	s.e.
Individual-level factors						
Occupational status (ISEI)	−0.937***	(0.095)	−0.179***	(0.052)	−0.013	(0.049)
Income (ref. 1st quintile)						
2nd quintile	0.015	(0.093)	0.084	(0.056)	0.023	(0.054)
3rd quintile	−0.007	(0.097)	0.068	(0.056)	0.003	(0.055)
4th quintile	−0.045	(0.108)	0.299**	(0.058)	0.278***	(0.056)
5th quintile	−0.071	(0.115)	0.128	(0.061)	0.079	(0.059)
Missing dummy	0.750***	(0.091)	0.469***	(0.060)	0.372***	(0.055)
Education (ref. less than lower secondary)						
Upper secondary	−0.117	(0.077)	−0.099	(0.052)	−0.062	(0.050)
Tertiary	−0.992***	(0.106)	−0.595***	(0.061)	−0.475***	(0.057)
Gender (ref. male)						
Female	−0.100	(0.054)	−0.145***	(0.033)	−0.038	(0.032)
Age	−0.001	(0.002)	−0.003	(0.001)	−0.002	(0.001)
Aggregate-level factors						
Generosity of social spending	−0.947***	(0.280)	−0.311	(0.173)	−0.421***	(0.088)
Ethnic heterogeneity	0.160	(0.282)	−0.203	(0.176)	−0.007	(0.090)
Cross-level interactions						
ISEI × Generosity of social spending	−0.370***	(0.104)	−0.211***	(0.047)	−0.232***	(0.046)
ISEI × Ethnic heterogeneity	−0.078	(0.088)	−0.183***	(0.048)	−0.075	(0.046)
Constant	−0.997	(0.271)	0.967	(0.171)	1.155	(0.098)
Intercept variance	1.258	(0.412)	0.504	(0.162)	0.127	(0.042)
N individual	16,751		16,751		16,751	
N country	20		20		20	

Notes: Two-level multinomial logit (random intercept). RIGLS (reiterated generalized least squares) with PQL2 (second order penalized quasi-likelihood). The reference category is 'unconditional access to social welfare'. Non-citizen and foreign-born respondents were removed from the sample.

Sources: ESS (2008); OECD (2005); United Nations (2005).

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

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CHAPTER 6

Sumino, T. (2017) 'National identity and public attitudes toward multiculturalism in Canada: Testing the indirect effect via perceived collective threat', *Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science*, 49(3): 183-194. doi: 10.1037/cbs0000076

National Identity and Public Attitudes toward Multiculturalism in Canada: Testing the Indirect Effect via Perceived Collective Threat

Abstract

This article integrates research on national identity and collective threat to examine how these two factors jointly contribute to the formation of multicultural ideology in Canada. Specifically, this paper argues that ethnic and civic forms of national identity are associated with levels of perceived collective threat, thereby indirectly affecting multicultural attitudes (national identity → collective threat → multicultural attitudes). Results of structural equation modeling analyses indicated that: (1) ethnic national identity is positively, and civic national identity is negatively, associated with collective threat; (2) the direct effect of ethnic national identity on multicultural attitudes disappears when collective threat is taken into account; and (3) the relationship between ethnic/civic national identity and multicultural attitudes is significantly mediated by collective threat. These findings imply that a shift from an ethnic to a civic (or ethno-culturally thinner) conception of nationhood reduces levels of out-group threat and thereby indirectly generates positive multicultural ideology.

Keywords: identity, nationalism, collective threat, multiculturalism, public opinion

1. Introduction

Over the past few decades, there has been a growing interest among social scientists in understanding how citizens perceive and respond to cultural pluralism and diversity. There are two major lines of argument in this field. One focuses on the role of *national identity*, which is classified into ethnic and civic dimensions (Hjerm, 1998; Jones & Smith, 2001; Jones, 1997; Shulman, 2002; Smith, 1991; Wright & Reeskens, 2013), and explores how these different forms of national identity are associated with resulting reactions to cultural plurality. Existing research suggests that civic nationalists tend to be more tolerant of cultural plurality while ethnic nationalists are more reluctant to accept it (Hjerm, 1998; Kunovich, 2009). The other line of research emphasizes the importance of *collective threat* held by the dominant majority group. It argues that feelings of being threatened by out-groups are associated with less acceptance of multicultural principles and practices (Jackson, Brown, Brown, & Marks 2001; Verkuyten, 2009).

The two arguments—national identity (the ethnic-civic typology) and collective threat approaches—are closely intertwined with each other (as discussed below), but have been argued more or less separately. This study seeks to combine these two different approaches and examines the interplay between ethnic/civic national identity, collective threat, and multicultural attitudes. More specifically, the article addresses the following unanswered questions: (1) How, and to what extent, are ethnic and civic national identities associated with collective threat?; (2) Do the effects of ethnic and civic national identities on multicultural attitudes persist even when collective threat is taken into account?; and (3) Is the relationship between ethnic/civic national identity and multicultural attitudes direct and/or mediated via collective threat? To this end, this paper explores the intersection of identity and threat approaches, and identifies which factor—national identity or collective

threat—is primarily responsible for the formation of multicultural attitudes. This study also examines the direct effects of ethnic and civic national identities on collective threat, and then specifies an indirect model of multicultural attitudes—that is, national identity affects levels of collective threat, thereby *indirectly* influencing the formation of multicultural attitudes.

To test the significance of indirect paths (i.e., ethnic and civic national identities → collective threat → multicultural attitudes), structural equation models were estimated with the Mplus program (Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2015). The analysis was conducted using Canadian data from the ISSP 2003 (National Identity II), which contain rich information on public attitudes toward national membership, ethnic out-groups, and multicultural citizenship. Canada is an ideal testing ground for a study of this kind not only because of its enduring demographic reality (i.e., ethnically fragmented environment) but because of its strong multicultural policy tradition—e.g., the adoption of multiculturalism as an official policy in 1971, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Section 27) of 1982, the Canadian Multiculturalism Act of 1988, and the Broadcasting Act of 1991.

2. Theoretical Backgrounds and Hypotheses

2.1 National Identity and Attitudes toward Multiculturalism

Generally, the term 'national identity' is defined as "a collective sentiment based upon the belief of belonging to the same nation and of sharing most of the attributes that make it distinct from other nations" (Guibernau, 2007, p. 11). Depending on the interpretation of the 'attributes' that delineate the boundary between the inside and outside of a 'nation', two qualitatively different variants of national identity—ethnic and civic conceptions—can

be distinguished (Brubaker, 1992; Greenfeld, 1992; Smith, 1991). The ethnic type of nationhood puts an emphasis on the ascriptive requirements for national membership such as genealogical descent, race, ethnicity, and place of birth, which are fixed, static, and irrevocably sequential (Bar-Tal & Staub, 1997; Connor, 1994). In this view, national communities are understood as "named human populations with shared ancestry myths, histories and cultures, having an association with a specific territory, and a sense of solidarity" (Smith, 1986, p. 32) by which individuals are "forever stamped" (Smith, 1991, p. 11). On the other hand, the civic conception of national identity contends nationhood as a matter of 'choice', describing national identity as emanated from shared political principles, subjective 'feeling' of being a member of a nation, and equated citizenship. This view resonates with the notion of constitutional patriotism, which explicitly disjoins civic patriotism (politics) from ethnic nationalism (culture), and presumes a national identity of sharing democratic principles and procedures entrenched in people's consciousness instead of in prepolitical conditions such as ethnic myths, memories, and symbols (Calhoun, 2006; Habermas, 1998). This ethnic-civic typology has been subject to empirical scrutiny. Hjerm (1998) validated the conceptual division between ethnic and civic national identities using a cluster analysis of data from Australia, Britain, Germany, and Sweden. Likewise, Jones and Smith (2001) conducted a factor analysis on cross-national survey data and identified the dichotomous nature of national identity in 23 countries (see also Kunovich, 2009).[21]

The question, then, is how are these two forms of national identity linked with public reactions to multiculturalism. The term 'multiculturalism' here refers to the belief that diverse ethno-cultural identities should be recognized and celebrated without being assimilated into the majority culture. Ethnic nationalists are expected to be more resistant

[21] Note, however, that the ethnic-civic typology is not equally applicable to all national/cultural settings (Heath, Martin, & Spreckelsen, 2009).

to multiculturalism because they perceive those with different cultural backgrounds as 'outsiders' to their national community. In this view, ethnic others should be assimilated into the dominant culture or even excluded from the community in order to protect their ethnic lineage. In contrast, the civic conception of nationhood emphasizes a shared loyalty to political principles rather than ethnic ties. Membership is open to any 'candidates' who *choose* to belong to and pledge allegiance to the national community, regardless of their ascriptive conditions (Tamir, 1993). Although ethnic nationalism sees nationhood as a fixed and given entity, civic nationalism understands it as a dynamic and voluntarist process, in which non-members are incorporated as part of the community if they choose to follow legal and political systems.

In this respect, national attachment per se does not necessarily entail anti-multiculturalism sentiments. Civic nationalists are assumed to be supportive of multicultural principles and practices when those principles or practices are viewed as an integral part of the civic community's identity. In this respect, one would not necessarily expect civic nationalists in France, for example, to be multiculturalists given the strongly republican nature of the civic community. Canadians, however, often view the civic community as not just diverse, but defined by the multicultural nature of its society. Hence, the association between civic national identity and multicultural ideology makes more sense in the Canadian context than elsewhere.

In sum, ethnic nationalism tends to be particularist, intolerant, and exclusive, while civic nationalism is universalist, tolerant, and inclusive in nature (Brubaker, 1999; Ignatieff, 1993). Existing research provides some evidence for the relationship between national identity and attitudes toward cultural plurality. Hjerm (1998) finds that ethnic nationalists are more likely to manifest negative attitudes toward ethnic others than do civic nationalists. Kunovich (2009) also shows that the civic type of national identity is associated with more

tolerant and inclusive preferences than the ethnic counterpart. These arguments lead to the first hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1. Ethnic national identity is negatively associated with multicultural ideology, while civic national identity is positively associated with it.

Here the term 'multicultural ideology' refers to general support for culturally plural societies, in which the need for cultural maintenance and equitable participation is widely recognized (Berry & Kalin, 1995; Berry, Kalin, & Taylor, 1977).

2.2 Collective Threat and Attitudes toward Multiculturalism

Another approach focuses on the role of collective threat, or security/confidence, as the major source of out-group attitudes. An early mention of the security concept can be found in then Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau's speech to the House of Commons on 8 October 1971, in which he noted that "National unity [...] must be founded on *confidence in one's own individual identity*; out of this can grow respect for that of others and a willingness to share ideas, attitudes and assumptions" (Government of Canada, 1971; emphasis added). Building on this notion, scholars have argued that only when people feel secure and confident in their national community are they willing to accept those from different cultural backgrounds (Berry, 1984; Berry, Kalin, & Taylor, 1977; Kalin & Berry, 1994). Conversely, when people perceive ethnic others as 'threatening' to their collective self, they express less tolerance and greater hostility toward them. Collective threat includes both realistic and symbolic concerns (Stephan & Stephan, 1996, 2000). Realistic threat stems from competitive conflicts over limited resources such as income, job

opportunities, and social services[22], while symbolic threat is a feeling of insecurity regarding cultural values and norms. Perceived threat—either realistic or symbolic—can lead to hostile and discriminatory attitudes toward ethnic minorities (Harell, Soroka, Iyengar, & Valentino, 2012; Jackson, Brown, Brown, & Marks, 2001; McLaren, 2003; Scheepers, Gijsberts, & Coenders, 2002; Schlueter, Schmidt, & Wagner, 2008; Verkuyten, 2009; Wagner, Christ, & Pettigrew, 2008). In the context of Canadian society, a study by Corenblum and Stephan (2001) shows that, both among whites and aboriginal people in Canada, realistic and symbolic threats are associated with greater out-group antipathy. Esses, Dovidio, Jackson and Armstrong (2001) also argue that instrumental beliefs about zero-sum competition are associated with less favorable attitudes toward immigrants in North America. Therefore, I propose the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2. Greater collective threat is inversely associated with positive multicultural ideology.

2.3 Alternative Model – Mediation Hypothesis

Hypothesis 1 suggests that national identity is *directly* associated with multicultural ideology. However, there is a possibility that national identity first affects perceived threat and then *indirectly* determines individual reactions toward cultural plurality. This indirect model suggests that the relationship between national identity and multicultural attitudes is mediated *via* collective threat:

National identity → collective threat → multicultural ideology

[22] For the relationship between collective solidarity and welfare state politics, see Sumino (2014a, b).

This model postulates that in-group identification acts as a 'lens' through which individuals interpret and react to perceived threats (Corenblum & Stephan, 2001; Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006; Verkuyten, 2009).

This indirect effect has not been fully explored *in conjunction with the ethnic-civic distinction* in nationalism studies. For instance, previous studies have investigated the indirect impact of national identity on multicultural attitudes using identity items such as: 'Being Dutch is an important part of how I see myself' and 'My Dutch identity is an important part of my self' (Verkuyten, 2009); however, it remains unclear how *ethnic and civic forms* of national identification, instead of *general national attachment*, come into play in the mediation process.

The indirect model presupposes that identity generates threat perceptions, so first we need to clarify the linkage between two types of national identity and collective threat. Let us recall that the fundamental discrepancy between ethnic and civic national identities lies in the divergent definitions of 'who we are'. Ethnic nationalists adopt an essentialist understanding of national membership and envision a national community bound by ethnic lineage. In this view, out-groups are most likely perceived as threatening 'visible others' who might endanger in-group interests and symbolic values. In contrast, civic nationalists define collective interests and solidarity in a more inclusive and universalist way. They envisage a non-ethnic communion in which member citizens embrace shared legal norms and political institutions. For them, the presence or influx of ethnic others does not necessarily entail a zero-sum conflict of interest between 'us' and 'them'. Thus, I suggest the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3. Ethnic national identity is positively associated with collective threat, while civic national identity is inversely associated with it.



Figure 1. Indirect model. *Note*. Single-headed arrows represent hypothesized causal relationships among key constructs.

The three hypotheses proposed above are summarized in Figure 1. Hypothesis 1 (h1) addresses the direct effects of ethnic and civic national identities on multicultural ideology, while hypothesis 2 (h2) tests the direct effect of collective threat on multicultural ideology. Hypothesis 3 (h3) suggests that ethnic and civic national identities directly affect perceived collective threat. By following these steps, this study examines whether, and to what extent, the relationship between ethnic/civic national identity and multicultural ideology is mediated via collective threat.

3. Method

3.1 Data

To test the above hypotheses, this study uses Canadian data from the National Identity II module in the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) 2003, conducted by the Carleton University Survey Center between January and March 2004. The data consist of a stratified random sample of Canadian residents aged 18 and over, with a response rate of 42.7%. Given that the main focus of this study is on how the idea of multicultural citizenship is

perceived by the host society (i.e., Canadian citizens), 26 non-citizen respondents (2.2%) were removed from the data. 296 Quebec respondents (26.0%) were also omitted from the analysis because national identity (i.e., the question of 'who we are') and multiculturalism (i.e., the issue of minority rights) may have different meanings and implications in Quebec owning to its majority francophone culture and intercultural policy tradition (Berry & Kalin, 1995; Berry, 1984, 1996; Berry, Kalin, & Taylor, 1977; Johnston, Banting, Kymlicka, & Soroka, 2010; Soroka, Johnston, & Banting, 2007; Taylor, 2012). The issue of Quebec is discussed further in the results section.

3.2 Measures

Multicultural ideology was evaluated using four questions that assess respondents' preferences for mutual acceptance and accommodation of cultural diversity. The questions and response options are presented in Table 1. The first question asks general attitudes toward social and cultural integration of different racial and ethnic groups in Canada, while the second question asks whether citizenship should be granted under the *jus soli* principle. The third question is more specific in that it narrows down the conceptual scope of ethnic minorities to 'legal immigrants' and focuses on a particular field of multicultural policy, namely, equal rights and entitlements. The fourth question is similar to the first one, but refers more explicitly to the role of government in protecting ethnic minorities' cultural heritage. The first measure is evaluated as a dichotomous outcome and the latter three are assessed on a five-point ordinal scale, where higher scores indicate stronger support for multicultural principles and practices.

Table 1. Public attitudes toward multicultural principles and practices in Canada, %

Question wordings	Response percentages					*N*
1. Some people say that it is better for a country if different racial and ethnic groups maintain their distinct customs and traditions. Others say that it is better if these groups adapt and blend into the larger society. Which of these views comes closer to your own?	*It is better if groups adapt and blend into the larger society (coded 0)*			*It is better for society if groups maintain their distinct customs and traditions (1)*		
	66.3			33.7		691
	Disagree strongly (1)	*Disagree (2)*	*Neither agree nor disagree (3)*	*Agree (4)*	*Agree strongly (5)*	
2. Children born in Canada of parents who are not citizens should have the right to become Canadian citizens.	1.5	7.3	8.5	49.4	33.5	828
3. Legal immigrants to Canada who are not citizens should have the same rights as Canadian citizens.	7.6	36.5	17.3	29.6	9.0	814
4. Ethnic minorities should be given government assistance to preserve their customs and traditions.	25.1	42.8	18.1	11.3	2.7	813

About 34% of the respondents reported that it would be better for Canada if different racial and ethnic groups maintained their cultural distinctiveness, while around 66% were more in favor of assimilation. More than 80% of the respondents stated that children should have access to citizenship based on the place of birth. With respect to granting equal rights to legal immigrants, about 40% expressed positive views, while about 45% opposed it. Nearly 70% disagreed with the role of government in preserving ethnic minorities' customs and traditions. In this analysis, multicultural ideology was treated as a latent construct measured by the four observed variables above.

Ethnic and civic forms of national identity were measured with eight questions that asked, '[s]ome people say that the following things are important for being truly Canadian. Others say that they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is?'—(a) to have been born in Canada; (b) to have Canadian citizenship; (c) to have lived in Canada for most of one's life; (d) to be able to speak English or French; (e) to be a Christian; (f) to respect Canadian political institutions and laws; (g) to feel Canadian; and (h) to have Canadian ancestry. Agreement with the ascriptive requirements—i.e., (a) place of birth, (c) years of residence, (e) religion, and (h) ancestry—reflects the ethnic dimension of national identification, while agreement with the non-ascriptive, or universal, requirements—i.e., (b) citizenship, (d) language, (f) respect for legal and political systems,

and (g) subjective feeling—reflects the civic dimension of national identification. As shown in Table 2, more than 90% of respondents answered that it was 'fairly' or 'very important' for being truly Canadian to have citizenship, to respect institutions and laws, to feel Canadian, and to be able to speak English or French, while around 55% viewed Christianity and ancestry as 'fairly' or 'very important' criteria.

Table 2. Important attributes for 'being truly Canadian', %

	Not important at all	Not very important	Fairly important	Very important	
Items	coded 1	2	3	4	*N*
To have Canadian citizenship	0.4	1.6	14.3	83.8	838
To respect Canadian political institutions and laws	1.1	2.9	30.2	65.8	831
To feel Canadian	1.0	3.7	23.9	71.4	833
To be able to speak English or French	2.8	6.0	24.4	66.8	835
To have lived in Canada for most of one's life	3.1	17.0	29.1	50.8	838
To have been born in Canada	9.3	13.8	26.5	50.4	831
To be a Christian	24.0	18.1	22.8	35.0	828
To have Canadian ancestry	15.2	29.9	27.8	27.2	824

Note. Items are sorted in descending order by the sum of 'fairly important' and 'very important'.

Collective threat was assessed by four response questions that asked, '[t]here are different opinions about immigrants from other countries living in Canada. (By "immigrants" we mean people who come to settle in Canada). How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? (i) immigrants increase crime rates; (ii) immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in Canada; (iii) immigrants are generally good for Canada's economy (reversed); and (iv) immigrants improve Canadian society by bringing in new ideas and cultures (reversed). Answer options range from 'strongly disagree' (coded 1) to 'strongly agree' (5), with higher scores representing greater collective threat toward out-groups. As presented in Table 3, about 46% of respondents 'disagree strongly' or 'disagree' with the statement that immigrants increase crime rates or take jobs away, while about 26% 'agree' or 'agree strongly' with it. About 67% considered

that immigrants are good for economy and bring new ideas and cultures, while about 10% denied it. Around 25% of respondents gave neutral responses.

It is important to note that the self-reported measures above may suffer from response biases. Respondents may mask their true feelings and thoughts about sensitive issues such as racial and ethnic plurality in order to give socially desirable responses (Hjerm, 1998; Knoll, 2013). However, without additional surveys or experiments, it is difficult to quantify whether, and to what extent, a social desirability bias exists in the present data. One thing for sure is that the Canadian social survey employed in this study was administered using a self-completion mail-back questionnaire, which has been found to be more immune to social desirability biases than face-to-face interviews (De Leeuw, 1992).

Table 3. Collective threat perceptions in Canada, %

	<-- Less threat				More threat -->	
Items	Disagree strongly	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Agree Strongly	*N*
Immigrants…						
Increase crime rates	9.7	36.7	27.7	18.1	7.8	806
Take jobs away	7.7	40.2	24.8	20.7	6.6	818
Generally good for economy (reversed)	11.1	53.7	25.2	8.9	1.1	811
Bring new ideas and cultures (reversed)	13.3	55.0	21.1	8.6	2.1	815

Several demographic indicators were included as control variables: gender (female, male), age group (18-34, 35-54, 55-74, 75+), educational attainment (lower than high school, high school, tertiary/university), equivalized household income (classified into quintiles, 1st: $2,652-$21,213; 2nd: $22,361-$30,000; 3rd: $31,178-$41,245; 4th: $42,426-$49,497; and 5th: $50,000-$82,490, in Canadian $ per year)[23], ethnic origin (English,

[23] In the Canadian survey, household income was reported in categories. In this study, the midpoint of each category was used as a proxy for actual income—e.g., under $15,000 = $7,500, $15,000-$24,999 = $20,000, $25,000-$34,999 = $30,000, $35,000-$44,999 = $40,000, and so on (Rueda, Segmueller, & Idema, 2014; Rueda, 2014; Rueda & Stegmueller, 2015). The midpoint of the last open-ended category (i.e., $75,000+) was extrapolated using a Pareto formula proposed by Hout (2004). To adjust for differences in household compositions, household income was divided by the square root of household size (Buhmann, Rainwater,

French, other origin), immigrant background (immigrant parent/s, Canadian parents), community type (urban, suburb, village), and party identification (Conservative Party, New Democratic Party, Liberal Party, other party, no party).[24] Party identification was included because the New Democrats and Liberals are expected to be more multiculturalist and less likely to have a sense of ethnic national identity and collective threat than the Conservative counterpart.

Missing data dummies (1 = missing; 0 = not-missing) were included for age and income on which a substantial number of cases were missing (age: 11.6%; income: 12.7%).[25] The proportion of missing cases for each variable is as follows: national identity indicators (born: 1.3%; citizen: .5%; live: .5%; language: .8%; religion: 1.7%; respect: 1.3%; feel: 1.1%; ancestry: 2.1%), collective threat indicators (crime: 4.3%; economy: 3.7%; job: 2.9%; culture: 3.2%), multicultural ideology indicators (government: 3.4%, diversity: 17.9%, jus soli: 1.7%, equal rights: 3.3%), gender (.7%), education (1.7%), party identification (4.0%), ethnic origin (1.1%), immigrant background (.4%), and community type (.7%). Missing data were handled using pairwise deletion to take maximum advantage of the information available.

3.3 Analytical Approach

Structural equation modeling techniques were applied to test the expected interplay among the latent constructs—namely, two conceptions of national identity, collective threat, and

Schmaus, & Smeeding, 1988). Finally, equivalized income was converted into quintiles (for conversion into quintiles, see footnote 25).

[24] Political identification was measured by a single-item question: Generally, in federal politics, do you think of yourself as a (1) New Democrat, (2) Liberal, (3) Conservative, (4) Bloc Quebecois, (5) other party, or (6) no party.

[25] It must be noted that converting continuous data (age and income) into categories may result in loss of information (Osborne, 2012). Nevertheless, (age and income) categories were used in this analysis because of the necessity to include missing data dummies. Descriptive statistics for age and income are: age (mean 54.0; SD 14.8; min 18; max 94); income (mean 35,627; SD 15,781; min 2,652; max 82,490).

multicultural ideology. All analyses were performed with the software package Mplus Version 7.4 (Muthén and Muthén, 1998-2015). Given the categorical (non-normal) nature of the data, the mean- and variance-adjusted weighted least squares (WLSMV) estimator was used (Brown, 2006; Flora & Curran, 2004). The data were weighted by province and age to adjust for potential imbalanced probabilities of selection among subjects (Heath, Martin, & Spreckelsen, 2009). Bivariate correlations between key observed variables are presented in appendix Table A1.

4. Results

4.1 Factor structure of national identity and collective threat measures

I begin by identifying the potential latent constructs underlying the eight national identity items. The results of an exploratory factor analysis are presented in Table 4. An examination of eigenvalues and fit indices suggested that a two-factor solution was most appropriate and conceptually meaningful (the ethnic-civic typology). The first pattern was characterized by high loadings (>.80) for ancestry, birthplace and residence, and moderate loading (.40) for religion (i.e., being a Christian). This factor was interpreted to represent the ethnic conception of national identity. The second dimension, characterized by moderate loadings (>.50) for citizenship, respect, feel and language, was labeled civic national identity. The relatively weak contribution of language (.50) was probably due to the fact that language can be understood not only as an essential requirement for participating in political discourse but also as a representation of culture and ethnicity (Brubaker, 2004). Ethnic and civic dimensions of nationhood were modeled as latent variables in structural equation models.

Table 4. Factor structure of national identity items

	One-factor	Two-factor	
Items	F1	F1	F2
To have Canadian ancestry	**.81**	**.87**	−.07
To have been born in Canada	**.87**	**.88**	.00
To have lived in Canada for most of one's life	**.84**	**.80**	.10
To be a Christian	**.46**	**.40**	.14
To respect Canadian political institutions and laws	.13	−.34	**.63**
To feel Canadian	**.65**	.19	**.54**
To have Canadian citizenship	**.78**	.16	**.76**
To be able to speak English or French	.32	−.02	**.50**
χ^2/df	13.7	2.7	
CFI	.92	.99	
RMSEA	.123	.044	

Notes. Exploratory factor analysis. The first five eigenvalues are 3.47, 1.55, .91, .75, and .46 (eight items in total). An oblique rotation (geomin) was used to reflect the inter-correlation between the derived factors. Factor loadings greater than |.40| are in bold. CFI = comparative fit index. RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation. *N* = 842.

Collective threat was measured by a set of four items: crime increase, job competition, national economy, and cultural values. The four items reflect the different dimensions of collective threat. The first three refer to the realistic aspects of out-group threat such as public safety, employment opportunity, and economic benefit, while the fourth deals with the symbolic implications of increased cultural diversity. Different forms of threat may have different relationships to ethnic/civic national identity and multicultural ideology. For instance, civic nationalists may react more strongly to potential (symbolic) threats to democratic values than do ethnic nationalists. To test the multidimensionality of the four items, an exploratory factor analysis was conducted. An examination of eigenvalues (2.67, .55, .45, .32) or scree plot suggested a one-dimensional solution that accounted for 66.7% of the variance. Based on this, I decided to treat 'collective threat' as a single construct.[26]

[26] Note also that there is no clear pattern suggesting that the symbolic threat item (i.e., culture) has a distinct correlation pattern with other key items (c.f., public safety, job, and economy; see Table A1).

4.2 Direct Models

To examine the direct effects of national identity and collective threat on multicultural attitudes, two models were specified: one *without* collective threat, and the other *with* collective threat. Estimated results of the first model (without collective threat) show that the paths from ethnic and civic national identities to multicultural ideology were negative and statistically significant (β = −.23 [ethnic], −.13 [civic]; p < .001).[27] Fit indices are: χ^2/df-ratio = 1.46 350.5/240, CFI = .85, RMSEA = .024. This result only partially supports Hypothesis 1—that is, although stronger ethnic national identity is indeed associated with weaker multicultural ideology, civic national identity is negatively, rather than positively, associated with multicultural ideology. The second model, in which collective threat was added, shows that perceived threat is negatively associated with multicultural ideology (β = −.52; p < .001 with fit indices: χ^2/df-ratio = 1.42 = 496.4/350, CFI = .89, RMSEA = .023).[28] This result lends support to Hypothesis 2—greater collective threat is related to weaker multicultural ideology.

This model also suggests that, after the inclusion of collective threat, the relationship between ethnic national identity and multicultural ideology becomes insignificant (β = .09; p = .063), indicating that variation in multicultural ideology is attributable to variation in collective threat rather than to variation in ethnic national identity. Thus far, I have treated national identity and collective threat as competing explanations for the formation of multicultural ideology:

[27] Standardized estimates. The model includes the direct paths from demographic variables (i.e., gender, age, education, income, party identification, ethnic origin, immigrant background, and community type) to latent constructs (ethnic and civic national identities, collective threat, and multicultural ideology). Residual covariance between ethnic and civic national identities was specified. N = 776.

[28] For the direct model including collective threat, residual covariances among ethnic and civic national identities and collective threat were specified. N = 776.

National identity → multicultural ideology (hypothesis 1)

Collective threat → multicultural ideology (hypothesis 2).

Nonetheless, the latter explanation might be more feasible, given its strong and robust association with multicultural ideology. Now, there are two possibilities: either (1) ethnic national identity does not affect multicultural ideology both directly and indirectly, or (2) ethnic national identity does not affect multicultural attitudes directly, but instead does affect indirectly through collective threat (i.e., ethnic national identity → collective threat → multicultural ideology).

4.3 Indirect Model

Based on the above argument, I tested an indirect model—that is, the effects of ethnic and civic forms of national identity on multicultural ideology are mediated via collective threat. This model predicts that ethnic national identity is positively (or civic national identity is negatively) associated with the level of collective threat, which in turn undermines (or fosters) pro-multiculturalism orientations. Figure 2 illustrates the path diagram for this model. Ellipses represent latent factors, and rectangles represent observed variables. The model includes the paths from demographic controls to latent constructs (not shown in the diagram to avoid clutter; but see Table 5). As shown in Figure 2, the effect of ethnic national identity on collective threat is positive and highly significant (β = .51; p < .001), while civic national identity is negatively associated with collective threat (β = −.11; p < .001). These results are supportive of Hypothesis 3. Greater collective threat is, again, negatively associated with multicultural ideology (β = −.52; p < .001). This pattern of

correlations is consistent with the given causal model—that is, two forms of national identity determines the level of collective threat, and then the level of threat affects multicultural ideology.



Figure 2. Indirect model with collective threat as the mediator. *Notes.* Standardized estimates. $N = 776$.
$p^{**} < .01$. $p^{***} < .001$.

Several background variables were also significantly associated with the latent factors (Table 5). Women tend to have a stronger sense of civic national identity and multicultural ideology than men. Older adults are more likely to have a strong sense of national identity, and less multiculturalist, than younger adults. Higher education is associated with a weaker sense of national identity and multicultural ideology. The New Democrats and those who have immigrant parent(s) tend to have positive multicultural ideology, and a weaker sense of national identity and collective threat, than the Conservatives and those who have Canadian parents. Living in suburbs is related to stronger ethnic national identity and weaker multicultural ideology.

Table 5. Effects of demographic variables on national identity, collective threat, and multicultural ideology

	Ethnic national identity		Civic national identity		Collective threat		Multicultural ideology	
Variables	estimate	s.e.	estimate	s.e.	estimate	s.e.	estimate	s.e.
Gender (ref. male)								
Female	.08*	(.03)	.44***	(.07)	−.02	(.04)	.32***	(.06)
Age (ref. 18-34)								
35-54	.43**	(.13)	.27*	(.11)	−.14	(.18)	−.31**	(.10)
55-74	.65**	(.19)	.58**	(.19)	−.42**	(.16)	−.39***	(.08)
75+	1.13***	(.12)	.58**	(.21)	−.06	(.14)	−.29	(.16)
Missing data dummy	.62	(.40)	.43***	(.12)	−.40	(.24)	−.32	(.30)
Education (ref. lower)								
High school	−.24***	(.06)	−.58***	(.11)	−.21	(.12)	−.34*	(.14)
Tertiary/university	−.32***	(.06)	−.47**	(.16)	−.40	(.26)	−.46**	(.16)
Income (ref. 1st quintile)								
2nd quintile	.50***	(.08)	.32*	(.13)	−.00	(.20)	.13	(.07)
3rd quintile	.08	(.06)	.21	(.14)	−.03	(.07)	−.06	(.22)
4th quintile	−.23***	(.06)	.37	(.24)	.05	(.15)	−.12	(.17)
5th quintile	−.12	(.08)	.03	(.13)	−.03	(.11)	−.27*	(.12)
Missing data dummy	−.47***	(.06)	.14	(.17)	.25***	(.05)	.24	(.19)
Party identification (ref. Conservative Party)								
New Democratic Party	−.41*	(.16)	−.50***	(.13)	−.54***	(.06)	.49***	(.12)
Liberal Party	−.03	(.12)	−.21*	(.10)	−.35***	(.07)	.26***	(.06)
Other party	.01	(.40)	−.28	(.21)	−.02	(.27)	.57**	(.17)
No party	−.19***	(.06)	−.59***	(.17)	.05	(.07)	.00	(.12)
Ethnic origin (ref. English)								
French	.27	(.14)	−.02	(.11)	.12	(.09)	.12	(.11)
Other origin	.10	(.09)	−.16	(.21)	.10	(.06)	−.11*	(.06)
Immigrant background (ref. native parents)								
Immigrant parent(s)	−.75***	(.09)	−.33**	(.12)	−.43***	(.08)	.36***	(.10)
Community type (ref. urban)								
Suburb	.17***	(.04)	−.02	(.09)	.13	(.11)	−.41**	(.12)
Small village	.20**	(.06)	.18	(.21)	.22***	(.06)	−.16	(.14)

Notes. Standardized estimates with cluster robust standard errors by province. $N = 776$. $p^* < .05$. $p^{**} < .01$. $p^{***} < .001$.

To test the significance of indirect paths, the total effect of ethnic/civic national identity on multicultural ideology was decomposed into a set of direct and indirect effects (shaded boxes, Figure 2). The path from ethnic national identity to multicultural ideology is significantly mediated by collective threat ($\beta = -.27$; $p < .001$), while its direct effect is relatively negligible ($\beta = .09$; $p = .063$). On the other hand, civic national identity has a total effect of −.18 ($p < .001$) on multicultural ideology, part of which is a direct effect ($\beta = -.24$; $p < .001$) and the rest is an indirect effect ($\beta = .06$; $p < .01$). These results suggest that a substantial portion of the relationship between national identity and multicultural ideology can be accounted for by the indirect path via perceived threat.

In the present study, the Quebec sample was excluded from the analysis. However, the substantive results (e.g., factor structures and indirect effects) remained unchanged when the entire sample (including Quebec) was used. The models were also estimated separately for the Quebec sample only (N = 296). The whole design of this study was based on the premise that the concept of 'national identity' can be classified into ethnic and civic dimensions. To test the expected two-factor structure in Quebec, an exploratory factor analysis was conducted on the eight national identity items. An examination of eigenvalues and fit indices suggested a two-factor solution (over a one-factor solution). However, the pattern of factor loadings was somewhat unclear and not consistent with the hypothesized two-factor structure (see appendix Table A2). In other words, the conceptual boundary between ethnic and civic forms of national identity is relatively blurry and indivisible in the Francophone region. For example, several items (birthplace, residence, and language) had double (roughly equal) loadings on both factors, and thus it is uncertain to which factor they actually belong. The ambiguous factor structure could be explained in part by assuming that in Quebec, civic traits and ethnic lineage are regarded as inseparable components of national identity (i.e., the overlap of ethnic and civic conceptions), and that several traits such as birthplace and residence are considered equally important for the maintenance of both ethnic and civic forms of nationhood. The blurry factor structure in Quebec could also be attributed to the question wording for national identification: [s]ome people say that the following things are important for being truly *Canadian* ([s]elon certains, il faut posséder les traits suivants pour être réellement *canadien*)—namely, reference to 'Canada' rather than 'Quebec'. Since Quebec identity is often considered a 'national identity', these questions create some ambiguity. In Quebec, reference to Canada might be seen as meaning 'excluding Quebec'.

4.4 Indirect Model – Alternative Pathways

The mediation model assumes that national identity predicts collective threat, which in turn indirectly affects multicultural ideology. Nonetheless, direction of causality cannot be inferred from cross-sectional associations, such as in the present analysis. For example, the reverse causal sequence, in which collective threat is an antecedent of national identity, is also a theoretical possibility. It could be argued that individuals who feel greater threat from out-groups are more likely to consolidate ascriptive/exclusive type of national identity—i.e., collective threat → national identity. As Triandafyllidou (1998) puts it, "the identity of a nation is defined and/or re-defined through the influence of 'significant others', namely other nations or ethnic groups that are *perceived to threaten* the nation, its distinctiveness, authenticity and/or independence" (p. 594; emphasis added). In this case, it could be argued that the effect of collective threat on multicultural ideology is mediated via national identity (collective threat → ethnic and civic national identities → multicultural ideology). To test this alternative model, the total effect of collective threat on multicultural ideology was broken down into a set of direct and indirect effects (via national identities). Estimated results show that the path from collective threat to multicultural ideology ($\beta = -.52$; $p < .001$) was not significantly mediated via ethnic national identity ($\beta = .04$; $p = .064$) but was significantly mediated via civic national identity ($\beta = -.04$; $p < .001$). These results suggest that the indirect mechanism of ethnic national identity and collective threat is most likely unidirectional (ethnic national identity → collective threat), but the indirect pathways of civic national identity are more complex and involve more than a one-way function as modeled in Figure 2.

5. Discussion

Although the direct impact of national identity on multicultural ideology has been well documented, less is known about the potential mediation role of collective threat. This paper sought to provide an integrated model that bridges two different approaches—national identity model (the ethnic-civic typology) and collective threat model—and examined whether, and to what extent, the relationship between national identity and multicultural ideology is mediated by out-group threat. The major findings of this study are threefold. First, the *direct* path from ethnic national identity to multicultural ideology is rather limited and insignificant. The inclusion of collective threat to the model specification substantially attenuates the direct effect of ethnic national identity. Second is the relationship between ethnic/civic national identity and collective threat. Ethnic national identity is positively associated with collective threat, while civic national identity is inversely related to it. Third, this study has provided some evidence for the mediation hypothesis that ethnic and civic national identities shape collective threat, thereby affecting individuals' reactions to multicultural principles and practices.

These findings, however, must be interpreted with several caveats. In this paper, the term 'ethnic national identity' is rather loosely used. In ethnically fragmented societies such as Canada, 'ethnic nationhood' connotes different meanings to different persons. In particular, 'ancestry' does not necessarily have the same content for each individual—for example, it can include English, French, Scottish, Irish, German, Italian, or, more broadly, European. Furthermore, native-born citizens may apply different criteria for national membership to different categories of ethnic minorities (Kymlicka, 1995). The survey questions employed in this study do not distinguish between (1) newcomer immigrants and indigenous peoples, (2) Western and non-Western immigrants, and (3) national minorities and other ethnic

minorities. In this respect, a detailed definition of 'ethnic others' may enable a more nuanced understanding of the mediation process tested here.

Several implications can be drawn from this research. First, the positive association between ethnic national identity and collective threat implies that a shift from an ethnic to a more civic (or ethno-culturally thinner) conception of nationhood may alleviate perceived collective threat, thereby indirectly fostering positive multicultural ideology.[29] In Canada, the civic form of national identity is more prevalent than the ethnic counterpart, whereas more than half the respondents believe that nationhood should be defined by ascriptive traits such as ancestry and birthplace (Table 2). This orientation (ethnic national identity) is particularly prominent among the elderly, those who have native parents, and those living in suburbs and villages (Table 5). Second, given the strong relationship between collective threat and multicultural ideology, a reduction in out-group threat would help advance multicultural principles and practices. The level of collective threat is particularly high among those with native parents and those living in rural areas (Table 5). Third, the findings in this paper could be replicated in different spatial (cross-national) and temporal (longitudinal) settings to investigate the generalizability of the mediation model. For instance, little is known about whether, and to what extent, the indirect mechanisms suggested in this study vary across different political cultures and policy contexts (for the role of policy context versus political culture and support for multiculturalism, see Wright, Johnston, Citrin, & Soroka, 2016). Moreover, given the static nature of this study (ISSP 2003) and the dynamics of ethnic attitudes in Canada since the mid-2000s (Banting &

[29] This is not to say that greater civic national identity is *directly* related to more positive multicultural ideology. In fact, quite the opposite is the case because civic national identity is inversely associated with multicultural ideology (see Figure 2). However, given that collective threat is the major culprit of weak multicultural ideology, and that civic national identity is negatively associated with collective threat, civic national identity can have a positive *indirect* effect on multicultural identity.

Kymlicka, 2010; Reitz, 2011), more work must be done to validate the consistency of factor structures and indirect associations over time.

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Appendix

Table A1 Correlations between key variables

	Multicultural ideology				Collective threat				Ethnic national identity				Civic national identity			
Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
Multicultural ideology																
(1) diversity	1.00															
(2) jus soli citizenship	.12*	1.00														
(3) equal rights	.11	.19*	1.00													
(4) government assistance	.12*	.08	.26*	1.00												
Collective threat																
(5) crime	−.14*	−.21*	−.09	−.10	1.00											
(6) job	−.17*	−.19*	−.16*	−.09	.45*	1.00										
(7) economy	−.16*	−.25*	−.13*	−.08	.37*	.46*	1.00									
(8) culture	−.15*	−.22*	−.15*	−.25*	.35*	.43*	.50*	1.00								
Ethnic national identity																
(9) ancestry	−.11	−.13*	−.08	−.03	.20*	.31*	.21*	.21*	1.00							
(10) born	−.08	−.05	−.10	−.08	.18*	.28*	.17*	.20*	.63*	1.00						
(11) live	−.06	−.05	−.10	−.06	.13*	.23*	.16*	.18*	.56*	.68*	1.00					
(12) religion	−.09	.03	−.05	.05	.13*	.16*	.10	.12*	.40*	.35*	.36*	1.00				
Civic national identity																
(13) respect	.04	.06	.01	.01	−.06	−.14*	−.09	−.04	.01	−.03	−.00	.09	1.00			
(14) feel	−.00	.10	.01	−.04	.04	.03	.01	.00	.33*	.29*	.34*	.19*	.24*	1.00		
(15) citizen	−.02	.02	−.06	−.12*	.09	.12*	.04	.08	.29*	.38*	.39*	.19*	.16*	.40*	1.00	
(16) language	−.08	.04	−.02	−.09	.11*	.01	−.04	−.04	.15*	.14*	.18*	.16*	.15*	.19*	.25*	1.00

Notes: Spearman's rank correlation coefficients (p* < .001). Internal consistencies for the scales were as follows: multicultural ideology (Cronbach's α = .55; McDonald's ω = .67), collective threat (Cronbach's α = .83; McDonald's ω = .87), ethnic national identity (Cronbach's α = .86; McDonald's ω = .91), and civic national identity (Cronbach's α = .70; McDonald's ω = .82). McDonald's ω was also reported because Cronbach's α is known to provide biased estimates when a unidimensional set of items are not essentially tau-equivalent—i.e., having unequal factor loadings (Revelle & Zinbarg, 2009; Zinbarg, Revelle, Yovel, & Li, 2005; Zinbarg, Yovel, Revelle, & McDonald, 2006). Alpha and omega coefficients were computed using the 'psych' package in R (Revelle, 2016).

Table A2 Factor structure of national identity items in Quebec

	One-factor	Two-factor	
Items	F1	F1	F2
To have Canadian ancestry	**.84**	**.95**	.00
To have been born in Canada	**.76**	**.46**	**.40**
To have lived in Canada for most of one's life	**.74**	.39	**.45**
To be a Christian	**.65**	**.73**	−.04
To respect Canadian political institutions and laws	**.41**	−.33	**.75**
To feel Canadian	**.73**	.11	**.73**
To have Canadian citizenship	**.68**	.00	**.74**
To be able to speak English or French	**.48**	.27	.27
χ^2/df	3.2	1.1	
CFI	.94	.99	
RMSEA	.086	.020	

Notes. Exploratory factor analysis. The first five eigenvalues are 3.95, 1.23, .78, .60, and .45 (eight items in total). An oblique rotation (geomin) was used to reflect the inter-correlation between the derived factors. Factor loadings greater than |.40| are in bold. CFI = comparative fit index. RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation. *N* = 296.

CHAPTER 7: CONCLUDING REMARKS

CONTRIBUTIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

This research investigated the underlying social forces that create individuals' political attitudes toward solidarity issues in light of the interplay between social stratification, group identity, and institutions. In essence, the purpose of this study was to understand the political mobilization of interests and identities in divided societies, namely, the study of how the divergence of interests and identities across social groups shapes their political attitudes in the context of increased economic inequality and ethnocultural heterogeneity. To this end, this study was guided by two main research questions: (1) to what extent does the link between socioeconomic status and attitudes toward a redistributive government vary across different spatial/policy (Chapters 2 and 3) and temporal contexts (Chapter 4), and (2) to what extent do social forces—e.g., occupational status and its interaction with social structures (Chapter 5) and national identification (Chapter 6)—determine native citizens' attitudes toward immigrants?

1. Contributions to the literature

To answer the research questions, a series of theoretical arguments and empirical findings is presented, which the author believes has made important contributions to the field. Chapter 2 theorizes the micro-level mechanism of the paradox of redistribution (Korpi and Palme, 1998), which has been relatively underspecified in previous research. Drawing on the theory of social identity (Tajfel, 1981) and self-categorization (Turner, 1985; Turner *et al*., 1987), the paradox of redistribution process is specified by arguing that the polarization process (i.e., the causal sequence from targeted spending to polarized attitudes) functions

only when a sense of group favoritism/identity is sufficiently triggered, that is, targeted spending → identity priming → polarized attitudes → redistribution. Based on a comparison of findings obtained from different data sources, it is suggested that different question wordings produce different results: attitudinal polarization occurs in the context of targeted spending if the question wordings stimulate their sense of group favoritism and inter-group conflict.

In contrast to Chapter 2, which focuses on the benefit side of redistribution (i.e., transfer benefit), Chapter 3 emphasizes the cost-side (i.e., tax burden) of redistribution, addressing how two different dimensions of taxation (i.e., level and concentration) strengthen or weaken the effect of income status on public attitudes toward tax policies. To my knowledge, this chapter represents the first attempt to investigate the conditional effect of tax concentration/progressivity on the income-attitude association. The results revealed that the level/size of taxes plays a more prominent role than the concentration of taxes in the politics of redistribution; that is, attitudinal cleavages between low- and high-income earners grow larger in the context of high levels of taxation but not in the context of highly concentrated/targeted tax policies. The findings imply that the size of taxes is more visible than the concentration/progressivity of taxes, and that income earners react more strongly to the size of taxes that is expected to penalize their economic well-being in a more tangible way. Taking together the results presented in Chapters 2 and 3, the role of targeted redistributive policy in shaping welfare-state politics is conditional (Chapter 2) or marginal at best (Chapter 3).

Chapter 4 examines the temporal dynamics of redistributive politics in the United States. Although a number of studies have investigated the changes in the relationship between class and voting behavior over time, relatively little attention has been paid to the temporal pattern of the effect of socioeconomic status on attitudes toward a redistributive

government. This chapter analyzes whether or not the explanatory power of socioeconomic status varies across different points in time (1978-2014). The findings showed that the gap in redistributive attitudes between manual and nonmanual workers has shrunk over the last 35 years in the United States. It is argued that the declining effect of occupational status could be explained by the convergence in redistributive attitudes between those with different educational backgrounds.

The rest of the thesis (Chapters 5 and 6) addresses contested political attitudes in ethically diversified societies. Chapter 5 examines the variation in public attitudes toward the idea that welfare benefits should be restricted to native citizens. Although previous research has documented the direct relationship between occupational status and welfare chauvinism, less is known about the role of social structures in conditioning the occupation-chauvinism association. By applying realistic conflict theory to the issue of welfare chauvinism, it is argued that there is a larger attitudinal divide on welfare chauvinism between native workers in situations in which they perceive themselves to be in competition with, and feel threatened by, the presence of immigrant workers. The analysis revealed that the attitudinal cleavage between those with low and high occupational status grows larger in more generous and ethnically diverse welfare states, in which there is a strong sense of inter-group competition and threat among native workers.

Chapter 6 explores whether the association between two dimensions of national identity and attitudes toward multiculturalism is direct or indirect via collective threat perception. This chapter aims to fill the gap in the literature by focusing on the intersection of two separate approaches: the indirect effect model of exclusionism (i.e., identity → perceived threat → exclusionist attitudes) and the civic-ethnic typology of national identity. The findings showed that the linkage between ethnic/civic national identity and multicultural ideology is significantly mediated by collective threat. This indicates that a shift from an

ethnic, exclusionist conception of national identity to a more inclusive, ethno-culturally thinner conception of national identity alleviates the degree of perceived threat, thereby producing a more positive attitude toward multiculturalism in the host society.

The findings have several implications for the link between pre-existing social policy settings and social cohesion in major Western societies, particularly in the face of growing economic inequality and increased ethnocultural diversity. For instance, in Great Britain and Denmark, transfer benefits are relatively disproportionately targeted to low-income households. In these countries, the gap in redistributive attitudes between low- and high-income groups is more likely to grow larger because targeted spending evokes income earners' awareness of 'who benefits and who loses from redistribution', that is, the identity-based conflict between (low-income) beneficiaries and (high-income) contributors. This suggests that the uneven allocation of transfer benefits may serve as a dividing force that draws a line between the rich and the poor and hence may undermine social solidarity and the viability of the welfare state. In contrast, this scenario is much less likely in Austria, France, and Spain, where low-income targeting is relatively weak.

This thesis also explored the role of the concentrated tax burden (or tax progressivity) across income groups in determining attitudes toward taxation policies. The concentration of the tax burden is most prominent in the liberal welfare states, such as the United States, Great Britain, Canada, and Australia, and is least so in Switzerland, Sweden, and Denmark. In contrast to the concentration of benefits, the concentration of costs (or taxes) has no substantial impact on the link between income status and redistributive attitudes; the attitudinal distance between income groups is uniform across countries with different degrees of tax concentration. However, the level (or size) of taxes does matter. In welfare states with high levels of direct taxes (e.g., Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland, Germany, and Norway), the visibility of the tax burden is relatively high for taxpayers, which makes high-

income taxpayers more likely to react negatively to higher and more progressive taxation compared with their low-income counterparts.

Social policy settings also affect the interplay between occupational status and welfare chauvinism. In generous welfare states, such as Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Austria, social benefits are relatively tangible (or visible) for native workers because of their lived reality and everyday experience of how social services/benefits secure their livelihood. In this context, native workers, those with low-occupational status in particular, perceive that they are in competition for limited welfare resources with, and hence feel threatened by, immigrant workers in the labor market. A sense of out-group threat then creates divergent or 'divided' attitudes toward immigrants' access to social welfare.

All in all, these observations suggest that attitudinal cleavages become larger in certain social policy contexts. However, 'attitudinal cleavages' do not necessarily mean 'low aggregate support' for a redistributive and ethno-culturally inclusive welfare state. For instance, although the between-group variation in pro-welfare attitudes is relatively large in Sweden, Denmark, and Norway, the average levels of support (pro-welfare attitudes) in these countries are among the highest. What the results indicate is that our society (or public opinion) can become more divided or polarized under certain policy settings.

2. Limitation and future directions

Apart from the specific limitations discussed at the end of each chapter, there is a common limitation that cuts across most of the main chapters (in particular, Chapters 2, 3, and 5); that is, the direction of causality between policy structure and mass opinion remains at best speculative. Whereas the policy feedback literature predicts that policy generates mass politics, the policy designs may be an endogenous factor (i.e., causality may run from mass

politics to policy formation). The power resources approach (Korpi, 1983) argues that the distribution of power resources among socioeconomic classes exerts a significant impact on policy-making. 'Power resources' refers to the "capabilities of actors to reward or to punish other actors" (Korpi and Palme, 2003: 427), such as economic assets, labor power, and human capital. The unequal distribution of power resources in the labor market delineates individuals into homogeneous socioeconomic categories that share similar opportunities and constraints. Unequal opportunities and constraints then generate group identity, organized interests, and class-based collective action. This in turn creates different patterns of distributive market conflict and class politics, and eventually different trajectories of policy development. Similarly, Pierson (1994, 1996) argued that politicians are sensitive to voters' social policy preferences and pursue blame avoidance strategies to reduce the risk of electoral punishment. Drawing on this argument, Brooks and Manza (2006) suggested that if politicians respond to (or cannot ignore) voters' policy preferences, then mass opinion would influence social policy outputs through political representation.

It must be noted, however, that the possibility of reverse causation (i.e., mass politics influences policy formation) rests on two assumptions: (1) public preferences are explicit and unambiguous for elected officials, and (2) voters' preferences are adequately reflected in social policy outputs. For instance, if "mass opinion is either incoherent or if politicians are consistently able to deceive voters" (Brooks and Manza, 2006: 475), the causal path from public opinion to policy formation is unlikely to happen.

The reverse causality has important implications for the literature, including the present study. Previous research has suggested that the aggregate level of public support for the welfare state is highest in the social democratic regime, moderate in the conservative regime, and lowest in the liberal regime (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Svallfors, 1997; Gelissen, 2000; Andreß and Heien, 2001; Arts and Gelissen, 2001; Jæger, 2006). From the policy

feedback perspective, this rank order is understood to be the consequence of public responses to *pre-existing* policy features, that is, the idea that citizens' experiences with generous, encompassing welfare provision led to the strong public support in universalist social democratic countries and the relatively weak support in their marginal, market-based liberal counterparts. However, one cannot rule out the possibility that pre-existing public preferences affected the formation of social policy structures. In this case, welfare support is not the outcome of, but rather the precedent for, a social policy. The same argument applies to the proposition that different types of welfare-state institutions generate different patterns of social cleavage; that is, pre-existing patterns of social stratification may shape different types of welfare services. The same criticism applies to Chapters 2, 3, and 5 of this thesis.

To alleviate these threats to the validity of causal inferences, a potential analytical approach would be to carry out a social experiment, in which subjects are randomly assigned to treatment and control groups, and then differences in responses across the two groups are compared (Cook and Shadish, 1994; Heckman and Smith, 1995; Dunning, 2008). In social sciences, experimental designs (i.e., the random assignment of subjects to treatment and control groups) are costly and nearly impossible to implement on ethical and practical grounds. A realistic approach would be to apply a longitudinal research design. By using panel data, one can diagnose whether policy changes at time *t* correspond to changes in attitudes at *t+1*, or vice versa (i.e., attitude → policy), thereby identifying the temporal sequence between the two events. When drawing inferences from longitudinal data, it would be helpful to keep in mind that it is often difficult to explain the link between changes in attitude and changes in institutional structure not only because institutional change involves gradual, cumulative processes but also because attitudinal change may be

due to the long-term trend of generational replacement rather than an attitudinal shift within individuals (Svallfors, 2010; Campbell, 2012).

The results of this thesis suggest the need for further research on the interplay between identity priming, institutional visibility, and attitudinal polarization. Here, 'identity priming' refers to an increased sensitivity to solidarity issues (e.g., inequality reduction) triggered by exposure to stimuli that evoke a sense of ingroup favoritism and intergroup conflict. 'Institutional visibility' denotes the ability of individuals to consciously connect their belonging to a certain social group with the expected benefits and costs deriving from institutional arrangements. The attitudinal polarization process functions if these two conditions (i.e., identity priming and institutional visibility) are satisfied. For instance, attitudinal polarization does not occur if an individual is not sufficiently exposed to a stimulus that evokes a clear sense of us and them (identity priming). Similarly, attitudinal polarization is not expected if an individual does not consciously perceive that a given institutional setting is linked to the expected interests of the social group to which they belong (institutional visibility). Exploring the role (and interplay) of identity priming and institutional visibility would offer a promising avenue for future research on public attitudes toward the dilemma between unity and diversity. For instance, one can examine the effect of question wordings on identity priming. In social surveys, attitudes toward solidarity issues (e.g., redistributive government) have been measured in a variety of ways: some survey questions highlight the conflict of interest between social groups, whereas others do not. Attitudinal polarization is most likely to occur when subjects are exposed to a survey question that is designed to prime their sense of group identity/conflict. It is equally important to investigate the variation of institutional visibility among respondents. Some individuals may be significantly more conscious of, and thus more responsive to, pre-existing institutional settings. Future research could include survey questions on

whether and to what extent respondents are able to consciously trace the expected benefits and costs accruing to their social groups back to a given institutional environment.

3. Further clarification of the reported findings

Lastly, I conclude with a discussion of several important issues that require further clarification. The first issue concerns the relationship between changes in policy structure and changes in policy attitude. Chapter 4 examines the relationship between socioeconomic status and the dynamics of preferences for income inequality in the United States. However, the intersection between the dynamics of preferences (Chapter 4) and policy-feedback remains unexplored or untested. Future research could directly address this issue by conducting a longitudinal and/or cross-national analysis of social-policy effects (e.g., targeted spending) on redistributive attitudes. In evaluating policy effects, one should keep in mind that there are numerous variables that could explain the temporal change in attitudes within social groups. For instance, Chapter 4 found that there was a positive (linear) interaction effect of tertiary education (ref. primary) and year (Table 1), indicating that the negative effect of higher education decreases linearly with time (1978-2016). It must be noted that any social-policy indicators (or even irrelevant country-level variables) whose values increase or decrease constantly during the same period of time (1978-2016) could potentially explain the constant linear change in attitudes (i.e., the interaction effect of education and year). Thus, future studies should systematically address the possibility of a spurious relationship between changes in social policy and changes in policy attitude. Moreover, when assessing the dynamics of attitudes with the use of cross-national time-series data, one should also pay attention to the between and within effects of a macro-level variable on individual-level attitudes. Te Grotenhuis et al. (2015) argued that a cross-

national relationship between social security levels and average church attendance (individual-level attitude) does not necessarily imply a within-country (or over-time) relationship between social security and church attendance. The same argument would also apply to the analysis of changes in redistributive preferences across countries.

The second point of clarification concerns the theoretical inferences drawn from the different results obtained with different question wordings. In Chapter 2, it is inferred that the question wording of redistributive attitude matters based on the comparison of the estimated coefficients and standard errors of, for instance, models 1, 3, 5, and 7 (Tables 3 and 4, Chapter 2). The interaction effects are shown to be statistically significant in models 1 and 5 but less or not significant in models 3 and 7, indicating that these differences are attributable to the variation in how the dependent variable (i.e., redistributive attitude) is worded in each social survey (i.e., ISSP, ESS, and EVS). The argument here is about whether or not the interaction effect between income and targeted spending is consistently significant across the models with different question wordings. However, although Chapter 2 aims to clarify whether differences in the question wordings affect the results, it does not assess the *extent* of such effect. Thus, future research could also investigate the *size* of the wording effects. Given that the wording of the question on redistributive attitude differs in several important ways, such as in the choice of words and phrases (e.g., low inequality/differences, high versus low income, and incentives on effort; Table 1), it is important to pin down which, and to what extent, specific wording patterns affect the results.

The third issue is the causal interpretation of structural equation models (SEMs). Chapter 6 examines the associations between two types of national identity, collective threat, and multicultural ideology. It argues that national identity determines collective threat and thereby indirectly affects multicultural ideology. However, as noted in the Results section

of Chapter 6, the "direction of causality cannot be inferred from cross-sectional associations, such as in the present analysis" (p. 172). SEM is essentially a correlational method that explains how observed and latent variables are related to one another, and thus a major threat to the validity of causal inferences for SEM is that correlation does not necessarily imply causation (Bollen and Pearl, 2013; Taylor, 2013). For this reason, the alternative model ('Indirect model: Alternative pathways', p. 172) is also examined in the Results section (Chapter 6). Let me clarify this point (alternative indirect model) by presenting the estimated results in a bit more detail. In Chapter 6, I showed that the path from collective threat to multicultural ideology is not mediated via ethnic national identity ($\beta = .04$; $p = .064$). As shown in Table 1 below, it is the product of .437 × .091. Likewise, the coefficient for the indirect effect of collective threat through civic national identity ($\beta = -.04$; $p < .001$) is obtained as .167 × −.241.

Table 1. Indirect effects from collective threat to multicultural ideology

Alternative model	
Direct	−0.52***
Indirect	
via ethnic national identity	0.04 n.s.
THR → EN (0.437), EN → MULT (0.091)	
via civic national identity	−0.04***
THR → CN (0.167), CN → MULT (−0.241)	
Total	−0.52***

Notes: THR = collective threat, EN = ethnic national identity, CN = civic national identity, and MULT = multicultural ideology.
*p**** < .001.

This evidence, however, does not confirm the causal direction of the relationships. To further analyze the causality of the hypothesized effects, it would be a good starting point to explore the possibility of carrying out a cross-validation of the findings with additional sources of data and, more ideally, to replicate the cross-sectional study (Chapter 6) by using a longitudinal design.

Finally, the homogeneity of the items on 'multicultural ideology' is relatively low compared with the other constructs (i.e., ethnic and civic national identities, collective threat). The estimates of internal consistency for the 'multicultural ideology' scale showed a Cronbach's $\alpha = .55$ and a McDonald's $\omega = .67$ (Appendix Table A1, Chapter 6). In this study, 'multicultural ideology' is defined as "general support for culturally plural societies, in which the need for cultural maintenance and equitable participation is widely recognized" (p. 156). From the data available, the four items that best reflected the construct definition were chosen: (1) ethnic diversity versus assimilation, (2) *jus soli* citizenship, (3) equal rights, and (4) government assistance. Unfortunately, however, there is no established, widely accepted measure of 'multicultural ideology' in the literature. Given the relatively low interrelatedness of the items, there is clearly a need to develop and validate a standard measure of the construct in terms of both the question wording of each item and the selection/combination of items.

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