

Procopius and the Persian Wars

Abstract of the thesis 'Procopius and the Persian Wars' by Geoffrey Greatrex (Exeter College), submitted for the Degree of D. Phil., Hilary Term 1994.

This thesis takes as its focus book I of Procopius' *Persian Wars* in an attempt to investigate both the events it describes and the way in which they are reported.

A two-fold approach has therefore been employed, on the one hand dealing with the actual events, and on the other with Procopius' handling of them compared to that of other sources. While the first chapter thus considers Procopius himself and the genre of 'classicising' history, the second provides the fifth-century background to the events. Subsequent chapters generally consider the events in question first, before going on to examine Procopius' account in detail.

The third chapter investigates Procopius' information on Sasanian history and the Hephthalite Huns, which is remarkably detailed. The following chapter considers his account of the war waged against the Persians under the Emperor Anastasius (502-506), and concludes that he is offering a very partial account. Chapters five and six consider the centrepiece of *Persian Wars* I: the campaigns of 530 and 531, including Belisarius' victory at Dara and defeat at Callinicum. Close comparison with the chronicler John Malalas is undertaken in the case of the latter battle.

Chapter seven analyses Procopius' excursus into southern Arabian affairs, where he seems to have had access to good geographical and historical information. Chapter eight considers the final events reported in *Persian Wars* I, which, it is argued, were added at a later stage; his account of the Nika riot in Constantinople is omitted from consideration, but his final detailed excursus on internal Persian history and his report on the coup at Dara are examined.

A conclusion is offered at the end, emphasising the general accuracy of Procopius, particularly concerning events of his own day, and seeking to account for his selectiveness in the deployment of information.

in a considerably stronger position than the Persians.⁹




1 The Transcaucasus and the Roman-Persian marchlands in the sixth century (after Hewsen, Whitby and Blockley)

An important development which took place over the fifth century was the rise in importance of the Transcaucasian region - Armenia, Lazica and Iberia. The partition of Armenia under Theodosius I in 387 had helped to defuse tensions in the region, and it was not until 428 that the Persians deposed the last Arsacid monarch in the territory under their control; yet the Roman fortification of Theodosiopolis (Erzurum) in the 420s

⁹ *Contra* Hannestad and Z. Rubin (q.v. n.2), who both see the Romans as the weaker party in this period, as does Synelli - at any rate in 441, cf. p.69. Howard-Johnston too is unwilling to see Persian demands for money as a sign of weakness, 'The Great Powers' (despite the explicit statement of Joshua §18 on the empty treasury of Balash).

Cf. Greatrex, 'The Two Fifth Century Wars' and Elishē, *History of Vardan and the Armenian War*, tr. and comm. R.W. Thomson, London 1982, p.61 [7] on Roman compliance with Yadzgerd's demands, cp. Marcellinus *comes*, a.441 (both mentioning Anatolius specifically); but no mention is made of regular payments being agreed, *contra* (e.g.) E. Stein, *Histoire du Bas-Empire*, vol. 1, Paris 1959 (henceforth Stein I), p.357 and C. Capizzi, *L'imperatore Anastasio I*, Rome 1969, p.181.

On Persian difficulties against the Kidarites and Hephthalites, v.i. chapter 3 (a).




1 The Eastern frontier, c.502, after Dillemann and Whitby

was taken prisoner and died in Persia.¹⁰

The fate of the city is disputed: Zachariah (VII.3) reports that the inhabitants were treated mercifully by Kavadh, while Joshua (§48) asserts that the city was plundered and burnt, and captives carried off. Joshua's version is usually believed, but it seems unlikely that the city was utterly destroyed by the Persians, since by his own account Kavadh then proceeded to garrison it, having made Constantinus a general. For it is clear that no resistance had been offered to the Persians, and Kavadh will not have wanted to encourage other cities to hold out against him, which they would be likely to do if he was

¹⁰ Poor defences: Proc. x.18-19 on Anastasius' extensive repairs there after the war, and q.v. n.5 on the poor condition of defences along the frontier generally.

The alternative tradition on Constantinus may stem from Eustathius of Epiphaneia, who died in 503, and thus may have believed erroneously that he perished in Persian territory. It is reported by Mal., p.398, while Zach. VII.3 also makes no mention of treachery. The story of the betrayal may then be an invention to excuse the ease with which Theodosiopolis fell, especially compared to Amida.




2 The main area of campaigns in the Anastasian War (after Dillemann, fig. XXXVIII, p.293)

in November, in which the *duces* of Armenia and Mesopotamia, Eugenius and Olympius, were defeated by a Persian army, despite initial success.¹⁵ At this point the Roman forces, under the *dux* Eugenius, counter-attacked and retook the city of Theodosiopolis (Joshua §52). Despite a general tendency to suppose that this is Armenian Theodosiopolis, this is nowhere stated by any source, and the geographically more likely

¹⁵ Joshua §51; the engagement took place to the east of Constantia, near Tell Bešmé, cf. Dillemann, p.189 and n.5 for the position of the place on the route between Amida and Constantia; John of Ephesus in F. Nau, 'Analyse de la seconde partie inédite de l'histoire ecclésiastique de Jean d'Asie', *ROC* 2 (1897), p.464, also mentions an engagement at Tell Bešmé in 503.

On Eugenius, cf. *PLRE* II, s.v. Eugenius 6. On Olympius - Theophanes' Alypius, A.M. 5996 - *op. cit.*, s.v. Olympius 14: he was *dux* of Mesopotamia since (cf. e.g. *Notitia Dignitatum*, ed. O. Seeck, Berlin 1876, *Oriens* XXXVI, pp.77-79), Constantia is in Mesopotamia, not Osrhoene, *contra PLRE*.




1 The main area of campaigning in the first Persian War of Justinian

to convey news of Justinian's accession. He was received by Kavadh in July, and was sent back to the Emperor with a letter: Malalas provides the text of this letter, in which Kavadh repeats the familiar request for money.²⁷ Relations between the two sides were soured once more, however, by the Samaritan revolt which broke out in May/June 529 in Scythopolis, and quickly spread. It was only with the help of Arab allies that the

²⁷ Mal. pp.449-450. Worthy of note too is Kavadh's claim that the Persian treasury is still empty, and the reference to a (probably fictitious) agreement concerning mutual aid, cf. ch.2 n.3 - though it is accepted by Synelli, p.120, and identified with the treaty alluded to in Joshua §8.

Theophanes puts Hermogenes at Antioch on 22 May, while Malalas (pp.447-448) says that he was at the Persian court in July. On the slow progress of this diplomatic activity, cf. Scott, 'Diplomacy in the sixth century', p.160.



3 Lazica and Armenia in the reign of Justinian (after Isaac, Hewsen and Bryer and Winfield)


could be assailed more easily, especially following the installation of a *marzban* at Mtskheta around 520. The Roman regaining of Lazica in 521/2 must have persuaded Kavadh that it was necessary now to strengthen the Sasanian grip on Iberia and ensure continued control of that important bargaining chip, the Dariel Pass.⁷⁴

It is remarkable how much ground Procopius covers in this section, and it is no easy task to establish the chronology of the events referred to. The first appears to be the defection of Gourgenes to the Roman cause (xii.5) as a result of Kavadh's Zoroastrian zealotry. In response to Gourgenes' appeal Justin first despatched Probus in order to recruit Huns to defend Iberia (xii.6). After this proved unsuccessful (xii.9), Justin sent

⁷⁴ Toumanoff *CMH*, p.601, on Kavadh's resumption of Zoroastrianising after his restoration. On Vakht'ang Gorgasal, once erroneously identified with Procopius' Gourgenes (e.g. by Toumanoff, *Studies*, p.369), cf. Braund, (pp.603-608), who also notes the strength of Christianity in Iberia. On his role in the revolt in the 480s, cf. Toumanoff, *CMH*, pp.600-601 and Grousset, p.216.

On the installation of a *marzban* at Mtskheta, q.v. ch.2 n.27.

was raging; it is also clear from the position of the entry that 528 must be the correct date.⁹ Zachariah, on the other hand, provides no chronological clues, but firmly places the episode at Thannuris. It appears from his account that the Romans persisted in their attempts to build a fort there, despite having been driven off by the local tribes in




1 The eastern frontier around Nisibis (after Dillemann, Honigmann and Kennedy and Riley)

the preceding year. But while the dating of the incident to 528 conflicts with none of the sources and may be accepted without hesitation, its location is more problematic. Three possible locations may be distinguished. Underlying the whole discussion is the assumption that Zachariah and Procopius are both referring to the same event; given the similarity between their two accounts of the battle which took place during the

⁹ Cf. G. Sotiriadis, 'Zur Kritik des Johannes von Antiochia', *Jahrbücher für Classische Philologie* supp.XVI (1888) (henceforth Sotiriadis), p.115 on the date, spring or summer 528, accepted by Bury, *HLRE* II, p.81. Also Shahid, *BASIC* I, III, who places the attempt in summer 528; he also correlates the three sources and considers that Atafar/Tapharas is to be identified with Jabala, father of al-Harith the Ghassanid.


allowed closer contact with the Emperor via Antioch; Procopius' description of the city as *πρὸς τῷ Ευφράτῃ ποταμῷ* (xiii.11) is slightly inaccurate, since *πρὸς* would usually imply immediately adjacent to, while the Euphrates is actually situated 24 km away from the city.²¹



2 The southern section of Dara (after Whitby, 'Dara', p.740)

Although one of the Persian objectives in marching on Dara doubtless was the capture of the city (xiii.12), especially if it were more vulnerable owing to repair work, it seems more likely that the elimination of a Roman army poised on the frontier was the main brief of the Persian commanders. Their invasion of Roman territory took place in July, according to Theophanes (A.M. 6021). Evidently Belisarius anticipated that they would come from the south, where the gate opposite Nisibis (xiii.13) was probably situated; it may plausibly be identified with the gate facing Ammodius referred to in the *de Aedificiis*

²¹ Q.v. ch.5 n.64 on Rufinus. Celer had made Hierapolis his initial base during the Anastasian war; in recounting this, Joshua also describes the city as lying on the Euphrates, §65. F. Millar, *The Roman Near East 31 B.C. - A.D. 337*, Cambridge Mass. 1993, p.243, for the distance to the Euphrates.



1 The battle of Dara: phase 1


Procopius' description of the Persian deployment is brief, but paralleled in the slightly later work, the *Strategikon*, where the Persian tendency to divide their line into three is noted, as well as that of keeping the front of the formation even and dense. It also mentions the Persian technique of deferring combat when their opponents are clearly ready for battle.³⁶ Thus while the Persians may have been genuinely surprised at the improvement of discipline among the Romans, they may also have deliberately decided not to come to close quarters immediately. The despatch of some cavalry from their right wing (xiii.25-28) was doubtless intended to test the mettle of the Romans; the Persian detachment was thrown back, however, by the forces of Bouzes and Pharas, who employed the 'Scythian' tactic of suddenly wheeling about to face their pursuers, having initially given ground. Such a manoeuvre, at least against the Persians, is not recommended by the *Strategikon*, on account of their good discipline.³⁷

There follows at this point a lengthy description of the victories of the wrestler

³⁶ *Strategikon* XI.1, pp.354-356; cp. Mal. p.453 for the three-fold division here.

³⁷ *Strategikon*, XI.1, pp.358-360, on not using the tactic against the Persians; XI.2, p.364 on the 'Scythian' tactic. The author does recommend charging the Persians, however, to minimise losses from archery (XI.1, p.358).

powerful local tribe.⁴⁶




2 The battle of Dara: phase 2

The success of the Kadiseni was short-lived, however, on account of the onrush of Sunicas' Huns and Pharas' Heruls, who were able to attack both flanks of the attackers (xiv.40; phase two on the diagram). The Persians were thrown back in disorder, and their cavalry sought the shelter of the infantry phalanx. The Romans maintained their discipline and formed up opposite the phalanx (xiv.43). Peroz's stealthy strengthening of his left wing might easily have won the day for the Persians (xiv.44), had it not been perceived by the Roman commanders, who were able to take measures to meet the

⁴⁶ Nöldeke dealt with the Kadiseni, or Qadišayê as he called them, in detail in 'Zwei Völker', pp.157-161; p.158 n.3 for the suggestion of John of Antioch's error. Joshua §23 on their revolt against Kavadh, at §58 they are in his army again; Nöldeke also accepts Theophanes' Cadusii (A.M. 5998) as Kadisenoi, p.159, as he does Theophylact's Kadasenes (III.v.5) though Whitby, *History*, p.78 n.18 places them by the Caspian Sea. Q.v. also ch.4 n.4 and note Gadar the Kadisene operating in the Martyropolis area in Zach. IX.5.

Nöldeke, *art.cit.*, p.161, suggested that they were most probably a powerful local tribe, and Maenchen-Helfen, p.440, accepts that they had no connection with the Huns, cf. also Brunner in *CHIr*, p.761; yet Christensen, p.347 n.4, and Marquart, *Ērānšahr*, p.77 n.2, cling to the view that they were a branch of the Hephthalites. On the *numerus Cadisianus*, see Haussig in Altheim-Stiehl, *Finanzgeschichte der Spätantike*, p.107 (who considers them to have been Huns), and in Altheim, *Geschichte der Hunnen*, vol.2 pp.11-12, where he asserts that they are Hephthalites or their neighbours (despite the obvious geographical indications to the contrary).


threat; it is a tribute to the manoeuvrability of the Huns that Sunicas and Aigan's men were able to take part in the engagements on both flanks. The 1200 Huns, in conjunction with Belisarius' men, placed to the left of the Roman right wing, ensured that the same technique that led to the Persian defeat on the left was repeated on the right; for while the Persians threw more forces into the attack, notably the Immortals, the Romans had correspondingly more shock cavalry to throw against the flank of the advancing attacker (xiv.44-47, phase 3).



3 The battle of Dara: phase 3

The attack of the Huns and the forces with them drove a wedge through the middle of the advancing attackers (xiv.47, phase 4), and the ensuing *mêlée* heavily favoured the Romans. The death of the Persian standard-bearer dealt Persian morale a further blow, and was followed by that of Baresmanas himself. The valorous deeds of Sunicas were sufficient to attract the notice of both Malalas (p.453) and Zachariah (IX.3); Malalas reports that he killed a Persian exarch Sagos, who should therefore be identical with Procopius' Baresmanas (perhaps the name of the *marzban*, if this is what Procopius' Baresmanas represents). Zachariah notes the havoc wreaked by Sunicas and another Hun - probably Simmas - with only 20 men each. The Persians then turned to flight

(xiv.50), in the course of which many were killed.⁴⁷ The infantry, who might have attempted to cover the retreat of the cavalry, as seems to have happened initially on the Persian right, instead turned to flight themselves, and suffered heavy losses; this is picked up by Zachariah, who reports that Bouzes and the Heruls inflicted large casualties on the infantry to the east of the city. The care of Belisarius and Hermogenes not to allow the Romans to pursue too far was sensible: the Roman army was thrown into disorder following its victory over Gelimer in December 533 (IV.iv.1).




4 The battle of Dara: phase 4

The victory of the Romans in the field was indeed the first since the war of 420-422 (xiv.54). Nothing more is known about the skirmishes between the two sides mentioned at xiv.55, though Zachariah (IX.3) refers to the Persians ravaging the Thannuris area following their defeat, which was presumably opposed by some Roman forces. Malalas adds that after the battle Belisarius captured some Samaritans, who had been negotiating

⁴⁷ The mention of the forgetting of *αλκη* recalls Hdt. IX.70, the battle of Plataea, also noted for its troop manoeuvres. Chapot, pp.58-59, considers Persian discipline to have been marred by their excessive dependence on their commander, cp. xiv.50 for Persian horror at the death of Baresmanas.

At xvii.26 Proc. implies that the Persians had lost over half their army, i.e. over 25,000 men; but this is no doubt an exaggeration.




1 The battle of Callinicum: phase 1

within bowshot (XI.1, p.358). In general the exchange of missile fire appears to have had little impact on the course of battles on the Persian front, since both sides were accustomed to archery (unlike the Goths).⁹⁹

According to Procopius two thirds of the day was spent in the exchange of arrows (xviii.35), though there was no doubt some *mêlée* between the two sides (cf. xviii.31), before the Persian breakthrough in the south occurred. Malalas' detail concerning the Persian attack on Sunicas and Simmas may have been part of this limited combat before the Persians gained the decisive advantage. This the Persians achieved by employing a similar device to that used at Dara, concentrating their forces on one flank; on this occasion, it proved effective, and the Arabs and Isaurians were unable to withstand their onslaught (xviii.36, cp. Mal. p.463). The majority of al-Harith's men took flight at this point, though (according to Malalas) their chief valiantly stood his ground. Both Procopius (xviii.36) and Malalas (p.464) mention the suspicion that there was treachery among the Arabs, and for this reason they fled so quickly; doubtless this was felt at the

⁹⁹ On Roman and Persian archery, q.v. ch.1, pp.20-22, and cf. Coulston, 'Roman, Parthian and Sassanid tactical developments', p.67, on battles not being decided by archery.




2 The battle of Callinicum: phase 2

time, and advanced by both Belisarius and Hermogenes as a contributory factor to their defeat, but it is possible that the Arabs genuinely were overcome by the Persian attack. Al-Harith's conduct seems to have been commendable, and it should be noted that Procopius does not express an opinion regarding the rumour of the Arabs' treachery, let alone accuse al-Harith himself. Nevertheless, given his appraisal of the phylarch at xvii.48, it may be felt that the implication is sufficient.¹⁰⁰

The Roman right wing, both the Saracens and the Isaurians, thus collapsed under the impact of the Persian charge. They were thus able to set about enveloping the Roman position, causing the whole army to move north in an attempt to escape across the river. There were exceptions, however, most notably Ascan, who may have been the first to bear the brunt of the Persian attack once the left wing had disintegrated (diagram:


¹⁰⁰ Rubin, *ZI*, p.287, countenances the possibility of treachery on the part of the Arabs; it is vigorously rejected by Shahîd, 'Procopius and Arethas', pp.44-48 and *BASIC* I, XI. He rightly points to al-Harith's subsequent role in meeting Sittas with his forces in Amida in the same year, which strongly suggests that he was not viewed as a traitor, and indeed, as Shahîd argues, he had little to gain from betraying the Romans. Other phylarchs, perhaps jealous of his position ('Procopius and Arethas', p.55), may have sought to undermine his position, however. On Abrus (Mal. p.463), cf. Shahîd, 'Byzantium and Kinda', *BZ* 53 (1960), p.67 n.19 and Nöldeke, *Ghassanischen Fürsten*, p.17; also *PLRE* III, s.v. Abrus.



3 The battle of Callinicum: phase 3

phases two and three).¹⁰¹ The Roman army hence changed its facing by ninety degrees: both Malalas and Procopius refer to the river ending up at the backs of the Roman troops (Mal p.463, Proc. xviii.44), so that encirclement was no longer possible. Belisarius' tactics of fighting an infantry battle here were clearly the best means available to him of preventing further casualties, and ensuring that the most troops possible reached safety along the Euphrates as possible (diagram: phase four). The infantry formation described by Procopius (xviii.46) resembles one in the *Strategikon* on the drilling of infantry to resist enemy cavalry charges. It is unlikely that by this stage Belisarius' troops had kept hold of their lances with which to fend off the Persian horse, but the bowmen protected by the shield wall would have been able to inflict considerable damage on the attackers. The discipline of the infantry which remained on the south bank is attested by their steadfastness in the face of the enemy charges; the technique of clashing shields to distress enemy horses (xviii.48) was often employed in the ancient world. Malalas' insistence that Belisarius was among the first to take flight has seldom been treated seriously, and is rightly viewed as reflecting the hostility of his source, who

¹⁰¹ Proc. xviii.38 seems to indicate that Ascan's Huns were adjacent to the Isaurians.




4 The battle of Callinicum: phase 4

prefers to exalt the bravery of Sunicas and Simmas. While the exploits of these Huns are passed over by Procopius, they are clearly not incompatible with his account, although they have been exaggerated to such an extent as to seem as if they actually achieved a victory over the Persians.¹⁰²

The final discrepancy between the two comes over the aftermath of the engagement: Procopius (xviii.50) claims that the Romans only arrived at Callinicum on the day after the battle, having passed the night on the island on which they had sought refuge, while Malalas (p.465) asserts that the Romans arrived at Callinicum on the day of the battle, having pursued the Persians for two miles. Again, the propagandistic version of Malalas must be rejected in favour of Procopius' more plausible account, just as Procopius' statement that the Persians despoiled the corpses, rather than the Romans, should also be preferred. As has been pointed out, it is unlikely that the Romans could have despoiled the Persian corpses on the day after the battle, since they would have been in

¹⁰² *Strategikon* XII.16 (pp.442-444) for the close infantry formation, cp. XI.I, p.356, on the Persians being disturbed by a close infantry formation, and *Περὶ Στρατηγίας* 36. On Mal.'s bias here, q.v. nn.95 and 97. Some have given his account greater credence, however, cf. E. Jeffreys, 'Malalas and his sources', *Studies in Malalas*, p.210, and Shahid, *BASIC* I, XI.


Diocletian clearly must come from an earlier source.³ Perhaps the most important part of this digression is his account of the shift in the Roman frontier under Diocletian: this has occasioned much debate, both as to when this was undertaken and what the causes were. These will be dealt with in detail below.



1 Southern Arabia in the sixth century

At first sight, events unfolding hundreds of miles to the south of Mesopotamia and the Roman frontier in Arabia might appear to have little relevance to the war being waged between Rome and Persia. While Procopius' geographical digression serves to bring out the complex connections of the Romans with this area, the interests of both sides had long conflicted in the Arabian peninsula: the much disputed Nemara inscription of the

³ Note (for instance) the detail concerning Abraha being the slave of a Roman (xx.4). N. Pigulewskaja, *Byzanz auf den Wegen nach Indien*, Berlin 1969 (henceforth Pigulewskaja), p.184, considers that Proc. acquired the information himself at first hand, though there is no evidence that Proc. visited the region himself. Shahîd, *BASIC I*, IX 'Abu Karib', suggests that Proc. could have made use of official documents in Constantinople on Arab affairs. *V.i.* n.51 for the possibility that Proc. made use of Priscus and Olympiodorus.



2 The harbour of Adulis (after Casson)

Cosmas puts the distance of Adulis from the sea as two $\mu\lambda\iota\alpha\iota$ (II.54, p.365), while the *Periplus* (ch.4) gives precisely the same figure as Procopius (xix.22) - twenty stades. The port of Adulis was known as Gabaza, where there was a customs-house.⁴⁰ Procopius' figures for the journey between Bulicas and Adulis (xix.22) cannot be compared with any other ancient authors, however, since

Bulicas is nowhere else mentioned; Carpentier's suggestion that it lay on the same latitude as Adulis at modern Ghalefka seems entirely plausible. This would make the journey approximately 400 km, so that five full days is not an unreasonable figure, although Pliny talks of completing the journey from Ptolemais, further up the western coast, to Adulis in only two days, despite the longer distance involved. While Nonnosus (p.181) puts the journey from Adulis to Axum at fifteen days, the *Periplus* (ch.4) reckons it at eight days, so that Procopius' figure of twelve days is clearly not unrealistic.⁴¹

Procopius draws a distinction between the Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf (xix.19-20), which ancient authors were not always careful to observe: thus on the one hand Cosmas

⁴⁰ On Adulis, cf. Casson, pp.102-106 and his article 'The location of Adulis' in L. Casson and M. Price (eds.), *Coins, Culture and History in the Ancient world: Numismatic studies and Other studies in honor of Bluma L. Trell*, Detroit 1981, pp.113-122 and Wolska-Comus' edition of Cosmas (vol.1), p.367. On the question of Proc.'s sources, q.v. n.3.

On Gabaza, cf. *Mart. Areth.* VII.29 (pp.749-750) and Carpentier's note 'I'; a map illustrating Cosmas' text (II.55) also refers to Gabaza and its customs-house, cf. Wolska-Comus' edition (vol.1), p.367. Casson, 'The location of Adulis', pp.118-120, argues that the harbour referred to in Cosmas and Proc. should be distinguished from the main harbour, situated at Gabaza (Massawa harbour, to the north, and considerably more than 20 stades/2 miles from Adulis); he points out that there is only a beach to the east of Adulis, at the modern village at Malcatto. (See fig.2).

⁴¹ Carpentier in *ASS Oct*, vol.X (*Mart. Areth.*) note 'I', pp.749-750, where he places Ghalefka near Beit-el-Fakih; D.H. Müller, *RE* III (1899), cols. 1045-1046, s.v. Bulicas, identifies it with modern Ghahafika. Christides, 'The Himyarite-Ethiopian War', p.121, suggests that the Daikkeon Antron in the Acts of Gregentius (text in A.A. Vasiliev, 'Zhitie sv. Grigentiya, spiskopa Omiritskavo', *Vizantiskij Vremmenik* 14 (1907), p.62) may be another name for Bulicas. Pliny, *NH* VI.34.173 for the two day journey; although the location of Ptolemais is disputed, Casson, *Periplus*, p.101, puts it at the furthest south possible, modern Aqiq, which is still further from Adulis than the Arabian coast.

