BUREAUCRATS AND SOCIAL POLICY PROCESSES IN LOW AND MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES

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by

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines bureaucrats' engagement in social policy processes in low- and middle-income countries. Each paper in the dissertation investigates a different set of factors that affect the scope and nature of bureaucrats' policy engagement.

"The Millennium Effect?: When and Where does Bureaucratic Quality Matter for Human Development" looks at an international factor, the global advocacy for Millennium Development Goals, and examines its effect on the relationship between bureaucratic quality and social policy outcomes across different policy areas and task types. Designed as a cross-country comparative study, it uses country-level quantitative data.

"Trusting Relations, Learning Bureaucrats: International Organisations and Early-Stage Policy Diffusion" focusses on another international factor, the World Bank, and examines its role in the adoption of the conditional cash transfer model in Turkey and Indonesia. The study employs within-case process tracing with a comparative lens and uses data from interviews and document reviews.

"The Bargaining Bureaucrat: Policy Bargains and Effects of Political Context and Organisational Traits on Bureaucrats' Policy Influence" investigates the influence of individual bureaucrats in policymaking processes with a focus on the effects of political context and organisational traits. The study uses data from interviews and employs a novel analytical model built on bargaining

theory.

“After the Dust Settles: Mergers, Policymaking Processes, Mid-Level Bureaucrats” examines the effect of organisational structure on policymaking processes and bureaucrats’ engagement in these processes. It is a case study of the merger of five social policy agencies in Turkey and uses data from interviews and document reviews.

By putting a spotlight on the often-invisible bureaucrats, these four papers contribute to our understanding about the factors shaping the scope of bureaucrats’ policy influence in low- and middle-income countries. More generally, this dissertation draws attention to the need for a more systematic incorporation of bureaucracy into our analyses of social policy change.

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

1. INTRODUCTION

> "If policy is understood not simply as intended action but as what actually occurs consequent to intentions, then the place of civil servants in the development of modern social policy has been crucial."
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> (Heclo 1974, p.301)

Almost half a century ago Heclo declared that bureaucrats rather than economic development, elections, political parties or interest groups were the most important factor in the evolution of income maintenance policies in Sweden and Britain. Yet mainstream scholarly debates about social policy change and welfare systems have since remained curiously quiet about bureaucrats. Instead, they have focussed almost exclusively on political parties, elites, pressure groups, and features of political institutions in their efforts to explain the cross-country divergences and convergences in social policies.

Yet a growing body of empirical studies highlight the variety of roles bureaucrats play in social policy change and demonstrate that the extent of bureaucrats' policy engagement may range from critical and substantial to minimal and negligible. Bureaucrats may be the initiators of new policies; they may be the technical designers of policies put forward by elected officials; they may be the interlocutor with citizen groups about a policy idea; or they may be the resisters fighting against policy change. They may also be paper-pushers who ensure a policy moves through myriads of administrative steps or passive shirkers whose inaction hinders policy change.

Bureaucrats and their engagement in social policy processes lie at the heart of this DPhil dissertation. The four papers that make up this dissertation are all concerned with the factors that underlie the variation in bureaucrats' engagement in social policy processes. All four papers look at bureaucrats and social policies in low- and middle-income countries. Each of the four papers examines a different set of intra-bureaucratic and extra-bureaucratic factors that relate to bureaucrats' engagement in these policy processes. Together, they not only further our understanding about the factors underlying the variation in the substance and extent of bureaucrats' engagement in social policy processes, but they also contribute to a long-standing body of scholarly work looking inside the black box of bureaucracy.

The first paper, "The Millennium Effect?: When and Where Does Bureaucratic Quality Matter for Human Development", focusses on the conditions under which changes in bureaucratic quality have an effect on human development outcomes, with a particular focus on global advocacy efforts. Designed as a quantitative cross-country comparative study, it uses existing country-level data for low- and middle-income countries. The results presented in this paper provide suggestive evidence that a change in bureaucratic quality does not consistently bring about a change in human development outcomes and that a change in bureaucratic quality has an effect on human development outcomes more consistently when that outcome is promoted by global actors.

The second paper, "Trusting Relations, Learning Bureaucrats: International Organisations and Early-Stage Policy Diffusion", also focusses on international extra-bureaucratic factors and examines the role of a particular international factor, i.e. the World Bank, in the diffusion of a social assistance model, the conditional cash transfer, to Turkey in 2001 and Indonesia in 2005. The study employs within-case process tracing with a comparative lens and uses data from elite interviews and document reviews. The study findings underscore the crucial role of interpersonal relations vis-à-vis the effect of this international factor on the policy diffusion processes and national bureaucrats' roles in these processes.

The third paper, "The Bargaining Bureaucrat: Policy Bargains and Effects of Political Context and Organisational Traits on Bureaucrats' Policy Influence" investigates the influence of individual bureaucrats in policymaking processes with a focus on the effects of political context, an extra-bureaucratic factor at the national level, and organisational traits, intra-bureaucratic factor at the organisational level, on this influence. To this end, the study uses a layered comparative study. The primary layer focusses on the political context, comparing a period of short-lived coalition governments with a subsequent period under long-serving single-party governments in Turkey. The secondary layer focusses on the organisational context, comparing a large implementing agency with a small policy agency in the social policy realm. Using interview data on bureaucrats' experiences in policymaking processes and a novel analytical model built on bargaining theory, the paper puts forward a fresh perspective on bureaucrats' policy influence that treats bureaucratic policymaking as a policy bargain among bureaucrats at various ranks of the hierarchy as well as between bureaucrats and elected officials. The findings presented in the paper demonstrate the various ways in which political context and organisational traits affect bureaucrats' policy influence via their effects on their bargaining powers, risk calculations, and trust levels in policy bargains.

The fourth paper, "After the Dust Settles: Mergers, Policymaking Processes, Mid-Level Bureaucrats", focusses on the effect of an intra-bureaucratic factor, namely organisational structure, on bureaucrats' engagement in policy processes. It is a case study of the merger of five social policy agencies into a single new ministry in Turkey. Using data from elite interviews and document reviews, it examines the nature and scope of changes in policymaking processes and the engagement of mid-level bureaucrats in these processes in the aftermath of a merger that brought about substantial changes in organisational structure, cadres and staff. The study also probes the mechanisms underlying the changes in bureaucrats' engagement in policy processes, including changes in position, changes in cleavages, and changes in relations and communication channels. The findings of the case study suggest that in the case of the major reorganisation studied, observable changes occurred in both internal policymaking processes and mid-level bureaucrats' engagement in these processes. The direction, nature and scope of these changes, however, appear to vary across individual bureaucrats, which underlines the importance of individual-level factors in understanding the effects of organisational structure on bureaucratic behaviour.

To effectively capture the complexities of each of the intra- and extra-bureaucratic factors taken up in the papers, the dissertation draws upon various sub-disciplines and as a result speaks to a wide range of literatures, as demonstrated by the span of the literature review in this introduction as well as in the individual papers. The first paper, “The Millennium Effect?: When and Where Does Bureaucratic Quality Matter for Human Development”, in examining the effect of global advocacy efforts, task type, and policy area on the relationship between bureaucratic quality and social policy outcomes, speaks to international development and governance literatures. The second paper, “Trusting Relations, Learning Bureaucrats: International Organisations and Early-Stage Policy Diffusion”, in studying how bureaucrats’ engagement in policy processes are affected by external actors, speaks to literatures on policy diffusion and international organisations. The third paper, “The Bargaining Bureaucrat: Policy Bargains and Effects of Political Context and Organisational Traits on Bureaucrats’ Policy Influence”, in investigating the effects of political context and organisational traits on bureaucrats’ policy influence, speaks to the bureaucratic politics literature. Finally, the fourth paper, “After the Dust Settles: Mergers, Policymaking Processes, Mid-Level Bureaucrats” in studying the effects of reorganisation on mid-level bureaucrats’ engagement in policymaking processes, speaks to the public administration literature.

These four studies together represent an extensive inquiry into the factors that affect bureaucrats’ engagement in social policy processes in low- and middle-income countries. The overall structure of the dissertation takes the form of six parts, including this introduction. The remainder of the introduction provides a general background to the dissertation and the four papers that make up the dissertation. The next four parts present the four papers. The order of the papers is based on the level of the central factor investigated in the paper starting at the international level (with the first paper looking at global advocacy efforts and the second paper looking at international organisations) and going then to the national level (with the third paper looking at political context and agency type) and ending at the organisational level (with the fourth paper looking at organisational structure and reorganisation). The sixth and final part is the conclusion that synthesizes the findings of the four studies and discusses the broader theoretical contributions and policy significance of the dissertation.

2. BACKGROUND TO THE DISSERTATION

This section presents a general background to the four papers that make up the dissertation. The first part describes relevant literature's perspectives on bureaucrats’ roles in policy change. To this end, it reviews in broad strokes the literature on social policy in low- and middle-income countries, public policy literature, new institutionalist literature, and bureaucracy literature. It shows how all these literatures demonstrate a notable variation in the extent and nature of bureaucrats’ policy engagement. The second part reviews relevant literatures with a view to highlighting their insights about the factors shaping bureaucratic behaviour and bureaucrats’ policy engagement. It does so by first focusing on bureaucracy literature and its insights about intra-bureaucratic factors, and then reviewing bureaucratic politics literature and international relations literature for their insights on extra-bureaucratic factors at the national and international levels.

2.1. VARIATION IN BUREAUCRATS' POLICY ENGAGEMENT

This part of the introduction aims to position this dissertation in the broader literatures on social policy, public policy, new institutionalism, and public bureaucracy. More specifically, it evaluates each of these literatures' perspectives on the extent and nature of bureaucrats' engagement in policy processes. To this end, it begins by describing in broad strokes a growing body of research on social policy in low- and middle-income countries with a focus on their treatment of the role of bureaucrats. It then moves on to discussing some notable models of policy change in public policy literature with a view to highlighting the place of bureaucrats in these models. The section then turns to a body of new institutionalist studies on policy change with the same goal of showing the place of bureaucrats in these studies. Finally, it highlights some critical work in public bureaucracy literature and discusses their perspectives on bureaucrats' roles in policy change.

These four discrete bodies of literature are surprisingly aligned vis-à-vis their assessment of bureaucrats' roles in policy change. In all four bodies of literature, the extent and scope of bureaucrats' policy engagement ranges from substantial to negligible. It is this very variation in the type and scope of bureaucrats' engagement in social policy change that motivates the research question tackled in this dissertation.

2.1.1. Social Policy Literature

The existing body of research in social policy, for the most part, studies high-income countries of Western Europe and North America. Of the studies that look outside of these few countries, most either examine the macro-level dynamics underlying welfare systems or analyse single cases of social policy change in low- and middle-income countries. The amount of scholarly attention paid to bureaucrats in macro studies of welfare systems versus case studies of social policy change is considerably different. Bureaucracy seems to enter scholars' radar only when their investigative lens is positioned close to individual cases of social policy change. It is mostly overlooked when the lens is positioned farther to capture macro-level dynamics.

The studies that examine the macro-level dynamics aim to explain the "why" of particular welfare systems by focusing on a single country,[1] a single region,[2] or multiple regions.[3] In explaining the "why" of particular welfare systems, most of these research studies focus on structural and contextual

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[1] Many of the country-specific studies reviewed for this dissertation focus on Turkey (Adar2007; Alper 2012; Tokol 2012; Talas 1992; Taşçı 2010; Koray 2005; Akan 2011; Aybars & Tsarouhas 2010; Boratav et al. 2000; Buğra 2007; Buğra & Adar 2008; Buğra & Keyder 2006; Eder 2010; Elveren 2008; Gençler & Çolak 2012; Grütjen 2008; Yakut-Çakar 2007; Yücesan-Özdemir & Özdemir 2008; Buğra 2008; Waldner 1999). Other country-specific studies reviewed include studies on Bangladesh (Davis 2001), Brazil (Malloy & Parodi 1993), Uruguay (Finch 1993), and Argentina (Lewis 1993).

[2] Most of the region-specific studies reviewed for this dissertation were on Latin America (Huber 1996; Huber 2005; Barrientos 2004; Huber & Stephens 2012; Draibe & Riesco 2007b; Draibe & Riesco 2007a) and East Asia (Gough 2001; Goodman & Peng 1996; Gough 2004a; Aspalter 2002; Kwon 1998; White & Goodman 1998). Other region-specific studies reviewed include studies on Africa (Bevan 2004), the Middle East (Jawad 2009; Jawad & Yakut-Çakar 2010), Southern Europe and the Mediterranean (Andreotti et al. 2001; Gal 2010), Russia and Eastern Europe (Cook 2007), and Southeast Asia (Ramesh & Asher 2000).

[3] Almost all of the large-n quantitative comparative studies reviewed for this dissertation examined countries across multiple regions with the exception of a study focussing on Latin America (Segura-Ubiergo 2007). Some of them are attempts at finding patterns and clusters among all developing countries (Rudra 2007; Wood & Gough 2006; Gough 2004b), others explored determinants of social policy inputs and outcomes (Haggard & Kaufman 2008; Segura-Ubiergo 2007), including those with a focus on globalization (Garrett & Nickerson, 2005; Rudra & Haggard, 2005; Rudra, 2004).

determinants that are of an economic, political, or societal nature.[4] Among the economic determinants analysed in these studies are developmental strategies and macro-economic policies (Huber 1996; Boratav et al. 2000; Barrientos 2004; Gough 2004a; Huber 2005; Haggard & Kaufman 2008; Mares & Carnes 2009), level of economic development (Mesa-Lago et al. 1993), and fiscal imperatives (Lewis 1993; Malloy & Parodi 1993; Huber 1996). Political determinants discussed include the political elites (Grindle & Thomas 1989; Mkandawire 2001), coalitional alignments (Esping-Andersen 1990; Finch 1993; Waldner 1999; Kaufman & Nelson 2004; Huber 2005; Haggard & Kaufman 2008; Mares & Carnes 2009; Huber & Stephens 2012)[5], economic and social pressure groups (Abel & Lewis 1993; Aspalter 2002; Kaufman & Nelson 2004), features of political systems (Iversen & Soskice 2006), and institutional arrangements (Huber 2005; Segura-Ubiergo 2007). Most of the societal determinants studied are related to socio-political elements, such as coalitional alignments and social pressure groups, and are discussed in relation to the political institutions and power relations, including religion (Ertman 2009; Jawad 2009; Kahl 2009; Manow & van Kersbergen 2009; Gal 2010; Jawad & Yakut-Çakar 2010; Akan 2011).

The scant attention paid to bureaucracy and bureaucrats in these studies can partly be explained by their broader negligence of policy processes. Few of

[4] More conceptual essays focussing on what welfare regime and social policy mean in the context of developing countries were fewer in number yet provide a valuable lens for engaging with empirical studies as well as in applying existing welfare state paradigms to low- and middle-income countries (Mkandawire 2001; Gough 2005; Gough & Wood 2004; Walker & Wong 1996; Wood & Gough 2004; Mares & Carnes 2009).

[5] Among these, Huber and Stephens look at “power constellations”; Haggard and Kaufman look at “political (re) alignments; Mares and Carnes focus on “pivotal groups”; Finch, Kaufman and Nelson, and Huber analyse the role of unions.

these studies that examine the “why” of welfare systems in low- and middle-income countries look beyond the structural and contextual determinants to understand how the particulars of the policy processes matter in converting these macro-level determinants into the social policy outputs we observe. As pointed out by Kasza in his critique of the broader welfare regime literature (2002), few research studies look to the particulars of social policy process as a potential explanatory variable of the cross-country differences in welfare policies. When policy processes are overlooked, bureaucrats’ roles in social policy processes and more generally, their role in the evolution of welfare systems also end up being overlooked.

Another explanation of the near-absence of bureaucracy in these studies of welfare systems concerns some scholars’ view about the negligible effect of bureaucrats on the evolution of welfare systems. Huber and Stephens (2012), for example, argue that although bureaucrats in Latin American countries have more policy influence than their counterparts in advanced welfare states (because of weaker political parties, interest groups and civil society), bureaucrats can still not be considered part of the explanation for the divergences in welfare systems in Latin American countries. The authors contend that even when bureaucrats are the “immediate authors of state policy”, they still have to act within the constraints introduced by the interplay across the “clusters of power”, and thus do not have any real impact on the evolution of the welfare systems.

When we turn to case studies of social policy change in low- and middle-income countries, however, we see that bureaucrats do not always act within the constraints introduced by what Huber and Stephens calls the “clusters of power”. In some cases, bureaucrats are in fact part of these clusters of power. In other cases, they are able to challenge the constraints placed on them by other actors. These case studies reveal a variety of shapes and forms in which bureaucrats engage in and influence social policy change, such as “layering” by peripheral bureaucrats in Brazil (Falleti 2010), insurgent, technocratic processes in Mexico (Lakin 2008), informalisation among bureaucrats in Russia (Cook 2007), and reassertion of dominance by a bureaucratized patrimonial state in Brazil (Malloy 1979). The centrality of bureaucrats in these case studies of social policy change in low- and middle-income countries stands in direct contrast to their near-absence from the macro-level studies of the evolution of welfare systems in these countries.

This dissertation represents a step towards reconciling these two literatures on social policy in low- and middle-income countries with respect to their perspectives on the significance of bureaucrats. It puts a spotlight on policy processes and bureaucrats’ engagement in policy processes in its investigation of social policy change in low- and middle-income countries. By examining the factors underlying the variation in bureaucrats’ influence in social policy processes, it challenges Huber and Stephens’ blanket assertion about the negligible effect of bureaucrats on the evolution of welfare systems and calls for a more critical understanding about the factors and conditions that diminish or expand their effect. To this end, it draws upon literatures on public policy, new institutionalism, and bureaucracy, which are discussed in subsequent parts of this section.

2.2.2. Public Policy Literature

The theoretical public policy literature on policy change and policy processes have been developed based mostly on the policy experiences in high-income countries - and most often the United States - that have pluralist political systems. As a result, many of the theories and frameworks look at the intersection of the society and the state. These society-oriented frameworks, such as the advocacy coalition framework (Sabatier & Weible 2007) or policy networks (Howlett 2002; Adam & Kriesi 2007), do not pay any particular attention to bureaucrats or to bureaucracy's organisational dynamics. In these society-oriented frameworks, bureaucrats are considered as one of many actors in a policy sub-system or a network with no particular importance attached to their position or roles. It is only when we turn to a sub-group of state-centric analytical models of policy processes, such as the well-known policy models of Lindblom, Allison, and Kingdon, bureaucrats and their engagement in policy processes get some attention. However, these three models vary in terms of their scope for independent, effectual action by individual bureaucrats. Following a brief description of each of these models, this difference in their perspectives on bureaucrats' policy engagement is discussed in more detail.

Originally introduced by Lindblom (1959), "muddling through" is a metaphor used to describe the decision-making method of successive limited comparisons as opposed to a comprehensive rational method. In his seminal article, Lindblom argues that the rational comprehensive method of decision-making does not reflect the two key features of policy arena in democracies – that “policy does not move in leaps and bounds” but instead change comes almost always through incremental adjustments (p. 87); and that theories applied to policy problems are inadequate. According to Lindblom, policymaking process is “a process of successive approximation to some desired objectives in which what is desired itself continues to change under reconsideration” (p. 86).

Another landmark study on policy processes is Allison’s analysis of the Cuban missile crisis, which also challenges the rational actor model. Allison introduces organisational and bureaucratic behaviour, governmental politics and personality dimensions in explaining countries’ behaviour in times of crisis (1999). He brings into the picture elements such as misexpectation, limited attention, miscommunication, groupthink, and different styles of play across bureaucratic careerists, lateral entry types, and political appointees.

Kingdon’s *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies* is another seminal study on policy processes (2011). Kingdon develops the multiple streams model to explain the policy processes in the federal policy areas of health and transportation in the United States. His research questions concern the varying importance of participants and the processes of agenda setting. Arguing that “a description of the federal government as an organized anarchy is not far wide off the mark” (2011, p.85), Kingdon proposes a revised model whereby problems, policies, and politics, as the three streams of processes in agenda setting, “develop and operate largely independently of one another" but they come together at critical times when "a problem is recognized, a solution is available, the political climate makes the time right for change, and the constraints do not prohibit action"(p. 87). He calls such critical times as "policy windows" and highlights the critical role played by policy entrepreneurs at such critical times.

These three prominent state-centric models of policy processes differ with respect to their perspectives on the role of bureaucrats in policy change. More specifically, the models vary in terms of their scope for independent and effectual action by the bureaucrat. For Allison, bureaucrats and bureaucratic factors is one of the key determinants in government's policy processes in times of crisis. In a similar vein, Kingdon lists bureaucrats in the executive branch along with the President, the Congress, and forces outside of government as possible sources of agenda items and alternatives, and thus as participants in the policy process (2011, p.15). He then introduces a distinction between the participants, arguing that after the visible participants try to affect the agenda, they turn to specialists like bureaucrats and staffers in the less visible community for the alternatives from which they then make an authoritative choice (p. 70). Lindblom, on the other hand, mentions only administrators, that is politically appointed heads of administrations in the U.S. context, when referring to the hypothetical decision maker, and does not mention bureaucrats.

In these analytical models of policy processes, be they society-oriented or state-centric, the extent and scope of bureaucrats' role in policy change range from crucial and substantial to minimal and negligible. The four papers that make up this dissertation are all concerned with and try to explain this variation in bureaucrats' role in the specific case of social policy change in low- and middle-income countries. Also, three of the papers, namely "Trusting Relations, Learning Bureaucrats", "The Bargaining Bureaucrat" and "After the Dust Settles", conceptually draw on the state-centric models of policy processes presented in this section in capturing and analysing the myriad of policymaking episodes relayed by bureaucrats interviewed.

2.2.3. New Institutionalism

This section has so far discussed the variety of perspectives on the role of bureaucrats in policy change put forward in two bodies of research - namely empirical studies on social policy in low- and middle-income countries and theoretical public policy studies on policy processes. I now turn to new institutionalism and its perspective on policy change and the role of bureaucrats in this change.

Similar to empirical studies on social policy in low- and middle-income countries and theoretical studies on policy processes, the scope of the role assigned to bureaucrats in policy change in new institutionalist literature varies notably. On the one end of the spectrum is Hugh Heclo and his comparative study of the income maintenance policies in Sweden and Britain. With a focus on uncertainty as a driving force in policy processes, Heclo views policy making as "a form of collective puzzlement on society's behalf" (1974, p.305), which underlies his conclusion that bureaucracies are the most consistently important political factor for the social policies he studied.

Somewhere in the middle of the spectrum is Peter Hall, who builds on this social learning perspective in his studies about the shift of economic policy in Britain during 1970s (Hall 1989; Hall 1992; Hall 1993). Focusing on the role of ideas for social learning, Hall differentiates between three orders of policy change in terms of the magnitude of change, and he positions bureaucrats at the centre of the smaller first and second order policy changes, but not the larger, third order policy changes.

At the other end of the spectrum is Theda Skocpol's studies on social policy change in the US and their perspectives on the role of bureaucrats. In her seminal work, *Bringing the State Back In,* for example, Skocpol argues that civil officials and their official expertise was able to change policies in the United States in only a restricted policy area and during only a short period in early twentieth century (1985, p.14). In her later book *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States*, she makes a similar point in her structured polity perspective whereby not bureaucrats but politicians and administrators, i.e. the politically appointed heads of executive administrations in the United States, are put forward as "actors in their own rights" who develop policies that further their ideas, organisational and career interests (pp. 41–42).

Once again, this notable variation in the role assigned to bureaucrats in new institutionalist studies of policy change is at the heart of this dissertation. What factors help explain this variation in bureaucrats' roles in policy change? The new institutionalist literature offers insights about some of these factors, including the size of policy change (Hall 1993) and relative powers of politicians (Skocpol 1985), that have guided the analyses in two of the papers in this dissertation, namely “The Bargaining Bureaucrat” and “After the Dust Settles”. The same two papers plus “Trusting Relations, Learning Bureaucrats” on policy diffusion have also drawn on the rich array of conceptual tools put forward by various new institutionalist scholars in analysing policy change, which include isomorphic change (DiMaggio & Powell 1991), evolutionary change (Steinmo 2010), and the four-pronged change by displacement, layering, drift and conversion (Streeck & Thelen 2005). Finally, new institutionalist literature put forward helpful concepts to analyse the role of individual agency in policy change in ways that integrate, and not juxtapose, the institution and the agent, such as change agents (Mahoney & Thelen 2010) and policy entrepreneurs (Sheingate 2007). These concepts have helped this author overcome the analytical tension inherent in studying the influence of individual bureaucrats who are embedded in a chain of institutions and structures.

Having briefly discussed the variety of roles assigned to bureaucrats’ in new institutionalist studies on policy change, and introduced some relevant conceptual tools presented in this literature, I now turn to the literature on bureaucracy and its perspectives on the engagement of bureaucrats in policy processes.

2.2.4. Bureaucracy Literature

Given the wealth of relevant studies on public bureaucracy, this section, with no claims to being comprehensive in its coverage, discusses four well-known studies in this literature in order to demonstrate the range of perspectives in this literature with respect to the type and scope of bureaucrats' engagement in policy change. These studies are Chapman's *Profession of the Government* (1959), Rourke's *Bureaucracy, Politics and Public Policy* (1976), Page and Jenkins' *Policy Bureaucracy* (2005), and Page's *Policy without Politicians* (2012).

Chapman's study is more of a systematic description of the roles played by bureaucrats in policy change that uses the policy stages model. Chapman claims that "the great majority of bills presented to legislatures in west European countries are the work of officials" in that the public administration is both where bills originate from and where they get developed (p. 289). He contends that one of the three ways through which bills originate is from a bureaucrat who first identifies gaps in existing legislation or enlarged loopholes endangering efficiency of public services, and then seeks a superior's approval for a change in the law. Following the acceptance of the principle of a bill, then it is again a bureaucrat who prepares the first draft, and then after consulting with the immediate superior, seeks other departments' inputs to prepare a common draft (p. 290). Only when a common first draft is ready, those other than bureaucrats get informed about and are asked to contribute to the policy change process before it is sent to the minister and the cabinet of ministers.

Rourke describes his book as "an inquiry into the nature of the role that bureaucrats play in making policy decisions in contemporary government"

(1976, p.1). He identifies expertise and political support to be at the root of bureaucratic power, which allows these agencies to play a major role in policy decisions. Rourke singles out three primary channels through which bureaucratic expertise influences policies: (1) bureaucrats' ability to give advice to political officials that shapes their decisions; (2) bureaucracy's ability to carry out the tasks necessary for the policy's implementation; (3) the discretion that the bureaucracy has in implementing policies.

Page and Jenkins look at what they call "policy bureaucracies" with a focus on the role played by middle-ranking officials in policymaking in United Kingdom (2005). They examine both the relation between hierarchy and expertise, and the division of labour for decision-making within policy bureaucracies. Their research is of an exploratory nature and presents several interesting observations. Page and Jenkins observe that the level of technical expertise among the middle-ranking officials is not particularly high, and hence do not pose much of a challenge to the hierarchical authority. The authors point out that in many cases policy officials initiate new policies based on their maintenance and support work where they identify ideas for new policies. In terms of steering of the policy design process, middle-ranking bureaucrats use various cues from informal communications to estimate the ministerial intent and predict the policy alternatives that will be acceptable to the minister.

Finally, Page's comparative research and related book *Policy without Politicians* provide several valuable analytical categories and concepts related to "everyday policy making" driven by bureaucrats (2012). Page detects three sources that bring about the bureaucratic intervention in the form of decree-making: the need for procedural and substantive routinization of policy, the need for regularizing policy to address its perceived technical problems, and the need for policy adjustment to make the policy work better (p. 169). Based on his empirical research, Page identifies four types of decree-making processes based on the extent and nature of involvement by politicians, namely: directed bureaucratic policymaking, undirected bureaucratic policymaking, consequential policymaking, and policymaking with active politician involvement but without policy deliberation. Most relevantly, Page argues that even when bureaucrats seem to have full reign over decree-making, in reality they remain subordinates and face a plurality of constraints, such as having to conform to the precedent and avoiding potential vetoes.

As demonstrated by these four books, the public bureaucracy literature reveals a wide variety of ways in which bureaucrats' engage in policy change. Yet, scholars of public bureaucracy, similar to scholars of social policy, public policy, and new institutionalists, differ in their assessments about the scope of bureaucratic influence in policy change. Hence, the four papers that make up this dissertation aims to investigate more systematically the various factors that may explain this variation in the scope of bureaucratic influence. Moreover, the analyses in the two papers that examine the political and organisational factors affecting bureaucrats' policy engagement, namely "The Bargaining Bureaucrat" and "After the Dust Settles", draw upon the public bureaucracy literature with respect to the various ways and venues of bureaucratic engagement in policymaking processes.

2.2. EXPLAINING VARIATION IN BUREAUCRATS' ENGAGEMENT

> "The civil servants' level of involvement in the policy process varies across societies, and this may be due to organizational factors, to culture, to the party system."
>
> (Suleiman 1984b, p.6)

The first part of this section described in broad strokes the literatures on social policy in low- and middle-income countries, public policy, new institutionalism, and public bureaucracy with respect to their assessment of bureaucrats' roles in policy change. More specifically, it has underscored the notable variation in the type and scope of roles that bureaucrats are assigned in policy change in these literatures. This section now shifts to discussing the relevant literatures' insights about the factors that are relevant to explaining this variation in bureaucrats' engagement in policy processes. To this end, it provides an overview of the bureaucracy literature with a focus on the effect of intra-bureaucratic factors, the bureaucratic politics literature with a focus on the effect of extra-bureaucratic factors at the national level, and the international relations literature with a focus on the effect of extra-bureaucratic factors at the international level. It must be noted that these overviews aim to provide a general frame to position all four papers within and that critical reviews of these literatures are presented in the respective papers.

2.2.1. Intra-Bureaucratic Factors Affecting Bureaucrats' Behaviour

This part of the literature review begins with an overview of some of the foundational works on bureaucracy and bureaucratic behaviour by Max Weber, Anthony Downs, Herbert Simon, James March, and James Wilson.

Together, these studies have informed not only the framing research question tackled in the dissertation but they have also provided several conceptual tools, including limits of rationality, bureaucratic goals, and informality, which are extensively utilized in three of the papers, namely “Trusting Relations, Learning Bureaucrats”, “The Bargaining Bureaucrat” and “After the Dust Settles”, in analysing interviewed bureaucrats’ accounts of their engagement in policy processes.

The bureaucracy literature spans over a century and it seems only natural to turn first to Max Weber (1946; 1978) in presenting an overview of this literature and its insights about the intra-bureaucratic factors that shape individual bureaucrats’ behaviour in policy processes. Weber’s essays on bureaucracy dating back to late 19th century and early 20th century have in fact shaped the image of the bureau, the bureaucrat, and the bureaucracy for all subsequent scholars in this field. The image of the modern bureaucracy he left with us is predominantly one of technical superiority, efficiency, objectivity, and rationality. In contrast to this clear image, however, Weber’s description of the individual bureaucrat is highly ambivalent. On the one hand, he describes the professional bureaucrat as “chained to his activity by his entire material and ideal existence”, and argues that “in the majority of the cases, he is only a single cog in an ever-moving mechanism which prescribes to him an essentially fixed route to march” (1946, p.228). On the other hand, he describes the power of the trained bureaucrat as an expert as being overtowering the “political master” (1946, p.232), and argues that in a modern state the actual ruler is the bureaucracy (1978, p.1393). He goes as far as saying that “the idea that the bureaucrat is absorbed in subaltern routine and that only the ‘director’ performs the interesting, intellectually demanding tasks is a preconceived notion of the literati and only possible in a country that has no insight into the manner in which its affairs and the work of its officialdom are conducted” (1978, p.1404). This internal contradiction in Weber’s essays concerning the powers and abilities of the bureaucrat could in fact be seen as the first signs of an ever-lasting debate in the literature on the agency of the individual bureaucrat.

Subsequent research on bureaucratic behaviour pays particular attention to the decision-making function of bureaucracies. One of the earliest works in this field is Herbert Simon’s book on *Administrative Behavior* (first published in 1947) where he presents an analysis that closely links the individual behaviour with the organisational system. He argues that the very goals that shape individual behaviour are products of the position of the individual in an organisation and the pattern of organisational communication (1997, p.24). Viewing decision as a matter of compromise, Simon describes decision-making as a collective and interrelated process “supported by a rich network of partially formalized but partially informal communications” (p. 25). Simon’s assertions about bounded rationality and satisficing, and his discussion on informality in bureaucratic organisations have become widely used and valued conceptual tools in the bureaucracy literature. As such, Simon’s perspective on the nature of bureaucratic decision-making has directly informed the analyses in “The Bargaining Bureaucrat” and “After the Dust Settles”. His assertions about bounded rationality and satisficing bureaucrats, on the other hand, are critically assessed, and partially questioned in the findings put forward in “Trusting Relations, Learning Bureaucrats”.

In a later book Simon co-authored with March (first published in 1958), the authors analyse all types of organisations, and not exclusively administrative ones, with a focus on their decision-making and problem solving behaviour. In their analysis, they bring to the forefront some of the same concepts, such as bounded rationality and satisficing versus maximizing (March & Simon 1993). Two particularly pertinent issues March and Simon raise in this work are uncertainty and the motivation to perform. With respect to motivation to perform,[6] March and Simon identifies various types of cues that help the member of an organisation determine the set of behaviour to adopt: cues from the environment, cues from the formal hierarchy, cues emanating from the task itself, cues from the work rewards, and cues from the associates in the organisation (1993, p.53). Two of the papers examining intra-bureaucratic factors, namely “The Bargaining Bureaucrat” and “After the Dust Settles”, build upon March and Simon’s analysis on the motivation to perform in examining the individual, interpersonal and organisational factors underlying bureaucrats’ motivation to influence policymaking processes.

Downs’ *Inside Bureaucracy* published in 1967 is another landmark in bureaucratic behaviour literature. His line of reasoning on informality is particularly relevant: Downs explains the sources of formality in bureaucracy but then recognizes the importance of informality in “(contributing) to a

[6] Although March and Simon use the term “motivation to produce”, given the close association this term has with the productive sector, I opted for “motivation to perform” in an effort to be more inclusive of administrative organisations.

bureau's ability to perform its formal functions" (Downs 1967, p.65). Challenging Weber with respect to the impersonalized nature of bureaucracy, Downs argues that personal relationships and networks are a central feature of bureaucracies, not only because they allow bureaucrats to build their reputation and status, but also they help the bureau deal with its inflexibility in ways that contributes to its overall efficiency. Downs' view on the centrality of interpersonal relations to bureaucracy both shaped the research questions and informed the analyses in "Trusting Relations, Learning Bureaucrats" and "After the Dust Settles".

In his book *Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It*, first published in 1989, Wilson presents a comprehensive analyses of bureaucratic behaviour where he moves away from the assumptions about the self-interested, rational bureaucrat, and focusses on the various social and relational forces driving and motivating the bureaucrat, among which he includes peer expectations, attitudes and ideologies as well as views of fellow practitioners from outside the agency in the case of 'professionals'. (2000) Wilson's model of bureaucratic performance is particularly intriguing: unlike many rational choice theorists who see the bureaucrats as self-interested budget maximizers, he views bureaucrats as individuals trying perform their tasks in the face of the opposing forces of "constraint observance" and "goal attainment". He argues that the constraints often end up being the primary force shaping bureaucratic behaviour.

Building on these foundational theoretical studies on bureaucratic behaviour, a growing body of empirical studies on bureaucracy underscores other intra-bureaucratic factors, including organisational structure and individual traits of bureaucrats, to explain the variation in bureaucratic behaviour. Two of the four papers, “The Bargaining Bureaucrat” and “After the Dust Settles”, that examine intra-bureaucratic factors shaping bureaucrats’ engagement in policy processes both draw upon and build on these studies. Rourke, for example, puts forward internal politics of bureaucracy and nature of bureaucratic policy process as two critical factors shaping bureaucrats’ behaviour in policy processes (1976). According to Rourke, these two factors are in turn affected by the hierarchical structure of the agency, the level of influence of professionals and technocrats, the process’ degree of openness to public. In his comparative research on decree-making, Page identifies yet another set of factors as the sources of variation in bureaucratic behaviour in secondary policy making, which include the nature of the policy issue, the characteristics of the political system, and the nature of the individual bureaucrats (Page 2012).

Page is certainly not alone in highlighting the importance of the individual bureaucrat in explaining the differences in bureaucratic behaviour. In fact, several scholars of bureaucracy focus on the individual bureaucrat and his incentives, motivations, interests, and actions. In an attempt to decipher and analyse the variance in the behaviour of bureaucrats, a wide range of taxonomies have been proposed, most of which are functional. Examples of functional categories include superbureaucrats (Campbell & Szablowski 1979), higher civil servants (Suleiman 1984b), public officials versus public employees (Nordlinger 1981), careerists versus political appointees (Moe 1995), operators versus professionals versus managers (Wilson 2000), and the bureaucratic intellectual (Merton 1945). As an alternative to this functional categorisation of bureaucrats, Downs puts forward a taxonomy built on the types of goals pursued by the individual bureaucrat (1967). Recognizing that goals could be derived from not only private motives but also social functions, Downs argues that a bureaucrat could have bureau related goals, political action goals, and basic personal goals. Based on the way a bureaucrat prioritizes among these goals, he introduces five categories of bureaucrats, namely climbers, conservers, zealots, advocates, and statesmen. Rejecting the premise that the personality of the bureaucrat is the sole determinant of which category he falls in, he highlights the interaction between personality, position, and goal attainability as the driver of a bureaucrat's behaviour.

This literature that focusses on the individual level factors in explaining the variation in bureaucrats' behaviour have contributed to the backbone of the analyses in "The Bargaining Bureaucrat" and "After the Dust Settles" and helped untangle individual and organisational level factors. Furthermore, Downs' view that a bureaucrat's behaviour is shaped not only by his functional position or personality, and that bureaucrats' adjust their behaviour strategically in response to his position, milieu, and goal attainability, have informed the policy bargaining model put forward in "The Bargaining Bureaucrat".[7]

[7] It is also worth noting that there is also a sizable body of single-country and single-region empirical studies on bureaucracy, including Turkey (Heper 2001; Oktay 1997; Heper & Sancar 1998), Eastern Europe (Kulcsar 2001), France ((Suleiman 1984a), Bangladesh (Zafarullah & Khan 2001), Italy (Cassese 1984), Japan (Pempel 1984), the Middle East

2.2.2. Extra-Bureaucratic Factors Affecting Bureaucrats' Behaviour

Having presented an overview of the bureaucracy literature with a focus on the intra-bureaucratic factors that help explain the variation in bureaucrats' engagement in policy processes, the rest of this section will now turn to extra-bureaucratic factors and their effect on bureaucrats' behaviour. To this end, it will first review bureaucratic politics literature and look at the national level with a focus on the political context. It will then shift to extra-bureaucratic factors at the international level and briefly review international relations literature. It is worth noting again that this and the previous part of the introduction aim to provide only a wider theoretical frame for positioning the four papers, and that each paper includes a separate review of the literature directly relevant to its specific research question.

The literature on national-level extra-bureaucratic factors affecting bureaucratic behaviour is shaped, to a large extent, by rational choice theorists. Yet among the rational choice literature focusing on political institutions, public bureaucracy is far from being at the centre of attention, and is in fact "the neglected side of the story" (Moe 1990) with the legislature and the presidency getting most of the scholarly attention. For those rational choice scholars examining the extra-bureaucratic determinants of bureaucratic behaviour in general, and the engagement of bureaucrats in policy processes in particular, their primary focus has been on the structural

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(Merriam 2001), and more generally the developing countries (Montgomery 2001). These country- and region-specific studies highlight several other intra-bureaucratic factors including those related to recruitment and promotion policies for bureaucrats, and the socio-economic and educational background of bureaucrats. While these factors informed the data collection tools (e.g. the inclusion of questions on interviewees' educational background and questions on perspectives about promotion policies), they did not emerge as primary aspects of the final analyses presented in the relevant papers.

challenges posed to the executive and the legislature in controlling the bureaucracy. Using the principal-agent model, these studies highlight a wide range of structural challenges including the limited observability of actions, information asymmetry, costly performance and outcome verification, and multiple principals, to explain the variation in bureaucratic behaviour and influence (Moe 1984; Calvert et al. 1989; Hammond 1996; Dixit 2002). One of the four papers included in this dissertation, “The Bargaining Bureaucrat”, draws upon this literature in designing the study but then puts forward an alternative analytical model to the principal-agent model in presenting its findings.

Turning from national to international level extra-bureaucratic factors, we find the relevant body of research to be mostly developed by liberal international relations theorists. These scholars provide a wealth of analytical models and conceptual tools to examine the effect of international factors on bureaucrats’ engagement in domestic policy processes. These conceptual tools include the influence of epistemic communities (Haas 1992), global diffusion of policies affecting public management practices (Bennett 1997), normative influence of international organisations (Finnemore 1993), pressure by international organisations for public sector efficiency (Welch & Wong 2001), and Europeanization (Page & Wouters 1995; Beblavy 2009), among others. Two of the papers included in this dissertation, namely “The Millennium Effect?” and “Trusting Relations, Learning Bureaucrats”, have extensively drawn upon this literature for the conceptual tools used to explain their respective findings.

Although this section of the literature review presented intra- and extra-bureaucratic factors separately, they in fact interact with each other in shaping bureaucrats' engagement in policy processes. Hence, each of the four studies included in this dissertation were designed with this interaction in mind. To this end, each paper investigates a different set of factors and their interactions in a comparative frame. "The Millennium Effect?" investigates the effect of an international extra-bureaucratic factor, the United Nations' Millennium Development Goals, on the relationship between bureaucratic quality and social policy outcomes across different policy task types and policy areas. "Trusting Relations, Learning Bureaucrats" investigates the effect of another international extra-bureaucratic factor, the World Bank, on bureaucrats' engagement in initiating and designing the conditional cash transfer policy across different national contexts. "The Bargaining Bureaucrat" is concerned with the effect of a national-level extra-bureaucratic factor, namely the composition of the government as it relates to the degree of political control over bureaucracy, on bureaucrats' influence in policy processes and investigates the effect of the political context across different types of organisations. Finally, "After the Dust Settles" examines the effect of an intra-bureaucratic factor, namely organisational structure, on policymaking processes and mid-level bureaucrats' engagement in these processes across different organisations by looking at the case of a merger of five agencies.

Together, these four studies aim to further our understanding about the factors underlying the variation in the substance and extent of bureaucrats' engagement in social policy processes. In examining bureaucrats' engagement in social policy processes in low- and middle-income countries and the factors underlying the variation in their engagement, these four papers draw upon a rich body of scholarly work from various sub-disciplines of political science including public policy, public administration, bureaucratic politics, and international relations. Ultimately, the four papers aim to draw attention to the need for a more systematic incorporation of bureaucracy into our analyses of social policy change and welfare systems in low- and middle-income countries.

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CHAPTER 2

The Millennium Effect?: When and Where Does Bureaucratic Quality Matter for Human Development

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1. INTRODUCTION

Bureaucratic quality has been at the forefront of both academic and policy discussions about human development[8] patterns in low- and middle-income countries. These discussions mostly share an implicit assumption about the presence of a positive relationship between bureaucratic quality and human development whereby countries with higher levels of bureaucratic quality are considered to have better human development outcomes. As an extension of this, improvements in bureaucratic quality are assumed to translate into improvements in human development outcomes, which underlies a plethora of interventions to strengthen bureaucratic capacity and more recently, to the inclusion of “effective institutions” among Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).[9]

Underlying this widely shared assumption about the relationship between bureaucratic quality and human development are several mechanisms that concern the quality of policy design and implementation. A higher quality bureaucracy is assumed to have the capacity to design better health, education, and social protection policies for human development. A higher quality bureaucracy is also assumed to be more able to implement these policies effectively and efficiently. Relatedly, a higher quality bureaucracy is

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[8] Introduced into the global discourse on development in early 1990s, human development challenges an understanding of development that is exclusively about economic growth. It focusses on giving people the necessary freedoms and opportunities to lead the lives they value. Accordingly, human development is about health, education, a decent standard of living as well as human security and rights and environmental sustainability.

[9] The Sustainable Development Goals were adopted in 2015 to both continue and expand on the efforts under the Millennium Development Goals in addressing different dimensions of poverty. Among the targets of SDG #16 on Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions are “develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels” and “substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms”.

assumed to be more willing and able to minimize corruption and maximize high performance among the school teachers, nurses, doctors, and community workers, who are the implementers of these policies. Finally, a higher quality bureaucracy is assumed to be more capable of resisting elected officials who push for policies that risk undermining human development outcomes.

While there is a substantial body of empirical research consistently showing a positive relationship between bureaucratic quality and economic development (Evans and Rauch 1999; Baldacci et al. 2008; Ahlerup, Baskaran, and Bigsten 2016), a more nascent body of empirical research investigating the relationship between bureaucratic quality and human development have pointed towards a somewhat inconsistent relationship (Henderson et al. 2007; Holmberg and Rothstein 2011; Hallerod et al. 2013; Cingolani, Thomsson, and de Crombrugghe 2015; Hanson 2015). Thus, the nature of the relationship between bureaucratic quality and human development is at the heart of this paper. More specifically, our study focusses on the relationship between change in bureaucratic quality and change in human development outcomes. Does a change in bureaucratic quality always bring about a change in human development? If not, when and where do we more consistently see a change in bureaucratic quality having an effect on which kinds of human development outcomes?

Our hypothesis is three-fold:

H1: A change in bureaucratic quality does not consistently bring about a change in human development outcomes.

H2: A change in bureaucratic quality is more likely to have an effect on a human development outcome when that outcome is promoted by global actors.

H3: A change in bureaucratic quality more consistently brings about a change in a human development outcome that requires the undertaking of a “simple” bureaucratic task versus a “complex” bureaucratic task.

To investigate this research question and the related hypotheses, we capitalize on a discontinuity in global actors’ efforts around human development brought about by the United Nations Millennium Declaration in 2000 and the consequent Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). We first study the 1985-2015 period to investigate the relationship between changes in bureaucratic quality and changes in selected human development outcomes. Then, we separately study the period before the MDGs and the period after the declaration of the MDGs to investigate changes in this relationship. We, then, examine this relationship in the post-MDG period across different groups of countries that are considered to have had different levels of responsiveness to the global advocacy efforts for the MDGs. In all these analytic steps, we look at two MDGs concerning health and education as the dependent variables, specifically child mortality and primary education, with a view to identifying any cross-sectoral variation. Furthermore, we look at two indicators for each of these goals with one indicator capturing a relatively “simple” task and another indicator capturing a relatively “complex” task, to examine variation across task types. When put together, the sub-components of our analytical strategy allow us to investigate when and where change in bureaucratic quality matter for human development outcomes with a particular focus on global advocacy and policy task types.

Overall, we find support for our first and second hypotheses, and not for our third hypothesis:

- We do not find a statistically significant relationship between the bureaucratic quality variable and the selected human development outcomes during the 1985-2015 period suggesting that a change in bureaucratic quality does not consistently bring about a change in human development outcomes.
- The relationship is, however, statistically significant in the post-MDG period, suggesting that the global advocacy efforts around the MDGs might have played a role in the emergence of a more consistent relationship between changes in bureaucratic quality and changes in human development outcomes.
- To further probe the "millennium effect", we look at this relationship in different sub-groups of countries that are considered to have different levels of responsiveness to the global efforts around the MDGs. We first examine the relationship between bureaucratic quality and the selected human development outcomes in low-income countries and middle-income countries as low-income countries are considered to have been more influenced by the global MDG efforts. We find that the "millennium effect" is consistently there for low-income countries and not for middle-income countries. We then examine this relationship with a focus on the adoption of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), which was envisaged by global actors as "the primary strategy and implementation vehicle to reach the MDGs" in heavily-indebted poor countries (Titumir and Hossain 2005). We find that the

adoption of PRSP augments the relationship between bureaucratic quality and the selected human development outcomes for three of the four dependent variables. We contend that these findings together suggest that the relationship between changes in bureaucratic quality and changes in human development outcomes is likely to have been affected by the global efforts around the MDGs.

- We do not find support for our third hypothesis, i.e. our findings are consistent across "simple" and "complex" tasks of education and health service delivery. However, since our model does not measure effect size, we cannot rule out the possibility that task complexity matters for the size of the effect changes in bureaucratic quality have on human development outcomes.

This study contributes to our understanding about the relationship between bureaucratic quality and human development in three concrete ways. First, the suggestive evidence about the effect of the MDGs on the relationship between bureaucratic quality and human development outcomes contribute to a wider discussion on the influence of global actors in domestic social policy processes and bureaucracies' roles in these processes. Secondly, the analytical model draws attention to bureaucratic task type as a relevant factor, which has so far been ignored in empirical studies investigating the relationship between bureaucratic quality and human development outcomes. Finally, the findings raise questions about the generalisability of the relationship between bureaucratic quality and human development outcomes, which has implications for the good governance agenda in international development especially given the inclusion of effective institutions among the SDGs.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: the next section positions the study in the wider literature on bureaucratic quality. The third section begins by presenting the hypotheses tested and then lays out the analytical model employed and the data used with a view to highlighting the various challenges faced and the resulting limitations. The fourth section presents the study results and discusses the findings. The fifth and concluding section highlights the theory and policy implications of the findings, and puts forward research ideas to further investigate the findings emerging from this study.

2. SETTING THE BACKGROUND

This section of the paper aims to present in broad strokes what we know about bureaucratic quality and its effect on human development. It does so by first framing the bureaucratic quality research in its larger context and providing a definitional discussion, and then summarizing the literature on the relationship between bureaucratic quality and economic versus human development, and the relationship between bureaucratic quality and performance across task types. While an ever-growing body of literature investigates the determinants of bureaucratic quality (see (Cingolani 2013) for a comprehensive review of this literature), we are interested in its effects and not its determinants so we do not tackle it here.

Much of the theoretical framing and conceptualisation of bureaucratic quality has emerged as an extension of the scholarly work on state capacity. At times, bureaucratic quality has been equated with administrative capacity and treated as one of several aspects of the multi-dimensional concept of state capacity along with extractive and coercive capacities (Hanson and Sigman 2013). At other times, bureaucratic quality has been equated with state capacity itself whereby state capacity is taken to mean the bureaucratic ability to implement policies (Fukuyama 2013; Centeno, Kohli, and Yashar 2017). Nevertheless, what is clear is that the literatures on bureaucratic quality and state capacity, to a large extent, have evolved together. The theoretical framing for this study, accordingly, benefits from both.

Scholars' efforts in defining and measuring the highly complex concept of bureaucratic quality fall roughly into two groups. Scholars in the first group make the case for focusing on bureaucratic performance and using policy outcomes as a relatively straightforward and concrete way to measure a complex concept like bureaucratic quality (Andrews, Hay, and Myers 2010; Besley and Persson 2010; Hanson 2015). Others, following in the footsteps of Weber, focus instead on those organizational traits that are considered to underlie bureaucratic quality, including professionalism, meritocracy, impartiality (Evans and Rauch 1999; Rothstein and Teorell 2008). For the purposes of this study, since we investigate the very relationship between bureaucratic quality and policy outcomes, a focus on bureaucratic performance where bureaucratic quality is measured using policy outcomes is impracticable. Thus, we instead focus on the organizational traits of bureaucracy and define bureaucratic quality in terms of its Weberianness. Our definitional inclination is further solidified because of the data limitations concerning bureaucratic quality, an issue discussed in more detail in the next section.

Research on the relationship between bureaucratic quality and development has largely focused on economic development. The seminal study by Evans and Rauch (1999) demonstrated the positive effect of a Weberian bureaucracy, specifically meritocratic recruitment and predictable career ladder, in the core economic agencies on economic growth in low- and middle-income countries. Accordingly, meritocratic recruitment and predictable career ladder would contribute to more competent, purposive and cohesive bureaucrats who would then design policies with longer time horizons and promote effective external investments (Evans and Rauch 1999). Other studies looking at similar country contexts and analogous aspects of bureaucratic quality have presented supporting findings about the positive relationship between bureaucratic quality and economic development (Baldacci et al. 2008; Ahlerup, Baskaran, and Bigsten 2016).[10]

Only more recently, there has been an interest in the relationship between bureaucratic quality and development that goes beyond economic growth (Savoia and Sen 2015). A growing body of literature has investigated the effect of bureaucratic quality on various components of human development, including health outcomes such as child mortality and prevalence of tuberculosis (Cingolani, Thomsson, and de Crombrugghe 2015), child deprivation (Hallerod et al. 2013), overall public health and education

[10] It is worth noting that more recent studies have raised questions about the direction of causality between bureaucratic quality and economic development with a considerable body of evidence emerging about economic development being the precursor of bureaucratic quality (Ang 2016; Kurtz and Schrank 2007; Wilson 2016). The debate and its implications for policy priorities of international development aid remain unsettled.

provision (D’Arcy and Nistotskaya 2017), labour rights (Berliner et al. 2015), life expectancy, child mortality and maternal mortality (Holmberg and Rothstein 2011), poverty reduction (Asadullah and Savoia 2018; Henderson et al. 2007), child mortality and educational attainment (Rajkumar and Swaroop 2008), school enrolment and infant mortality (Hanson 2015).

Using a wide range of models and measures, these studies investigate either the direct effect of bureaucratic quality on human development or its moderating effect via increasing the efficacy of public spending on health and education. As such, they find a positive relationship between bureaucratic quality and human development for some human development outcomes and not for others. These studies generally fall short of systematically investigating this variation and examining when and where we more consistently find bureaucratic quality having an effect on which human development outcomes. Furthermore, while several of these studies put a spotlight on bureaucratic quality as a structural condition facilitating changes in human development and celebrate efforts to improve bureaucratic quality (Asadullah and Savoia 2018), they do not explicitly investigate the process of change itself, i.e. when and where *changes* in bureaucratic quality in fact translate into *changes* in human development outcomes.

This question about the process of change is also linked to scholarly efforts to understand why developing country states deploy their bureaucratic capacity differentially towards human development (Centeno, Kohli, and Yashar 2017). All states make decisions about how to distribute its limited resources across different policy domains, including security, economic growth and of course, human development. Bureaucratic capacity can be deemed as a type of resource that gets distributed across policy domains. More concretely, given that low- and middle-income countries have limited administrative capabilities and human resources in their public bureaucracies, decisions have to be made about which priority policy domains receive more of this resource. As an extension, if we consider that an improvement in bureaucratic quality represents an injection of additional resources into the state system; then the state must make decisions about the distribution of this additional resource across policy domains. As a result, an improvement in bureaucratic quality would be expected to translate into an improvement in a specific policy domain if the state chooses to distribute this additional resource toward that policy domain.

In our paper, building on these bodies of research, we investigate the conditions under which changes in bureaucratic quality are more likely to translate into changes in human development. We also introduce a theoretically grounded framing based on task types in investigating the effect of bureaucratic quality on different components of human development, which we believe has been lacking in the growing body of research on the relationship between bureaucratic quality and human development outcomes. Drawing from the conceptual toolbox of public administration scholars who investigate the determinants of bureaucratic performance (Pritchett and Woolcock 2004; Andrews, Pritchett, and Woolcock 2017), we investigate the relationship between bureaucratic quality and human development outcomes across different bureaucratic task types. The scholarly work examining the determinants of bureaucratic performance underscore the importance of an appropriate match between bureaucratic capabilities and the type of task that the bureaucracy is expected to accomplish. We, therefore, pay particular attention in our model to the types of task required by different human development outcomes, and investigate to see if the effect of bureaucratic quality on human development outcomes holds across different task types.

Overall, this study hopes to contribute to a commendable body of scholarly work looking at the relationship between bureaucratic quality and human development. It does so by highlighting and investigating the effect of global factors and the relevance of bureaucratic task types, two critical elements missing from scholars' efforts to understand the role of bureaucratic quality in achieving higher levels of human development. The next section presents the hypotheses tested towards this end, and describes the analytical model employed and the data used.

3. STUDY DESIGN, MODEL AND ANALYSIS

3.1. Hypotheses

In designing this study, our goal was to investigate when and where do we more consistently see changes in bureaucratic quality bring about changes human development outcomes. To this end, we test the following hypothesis:

H1: A change in bureaucratic quality does not consistently bring about a change in human development outcomes.

To examine this hypothesis, we study the relationship between bureaucratic quality and selected human development outcomes during the 1985-2015 period.

H2: A change in bureaucratic quality is more likely to have an effect on a human development outcome when that outcome is promoted by global actors.

To investigate this hypothesis, we take a two-step approach. First, we capitalize on a discontinuity in global actors' efforts for human development brought about by the United National Millennium Declaration in 2000 and the consequent Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). All UN member states and many international organisations committed to helping achieve the eight MDGs around poverty, hunger, education, child mortality, maternal health, and gender equality, among others. Each goal had clear indicators, targets, and deadlines.

We use the MDGs as a discontinuity in the global actors' efforts around certain human development outcomes. MDGs represent a shift in and refocusing of the priorities of international actors and bilateral donors vis-à-vis foreign aid disbursements and debt reduction efforts. For many countries, it also represents an overall increase in the national-level salience of those human development outcomes reflected in the MDGs. Thus, we study the period before the MDGs and the period after the MDGs until its replacement with the Sustainable Development Goals in 2015 as a first step in investigating the effect of global actors' efforts around specific human development outcomes on the relationship between bureaucratic quality and these outcomes. We predict to find a consistent relationship after the introduction of the MDGs and not before.

We further probe the "millennium effect" by examining the variation across different types of states for which empirical studies on the effects of MDGs revealed observable variation. Such observable variation concerns either the amount of acceleration in the improvements in human development outcomes (Mcarthur and Rasmussen 2016; McArthur and Rasmussen 2018) or the salience of MDGs in national policy and planning documents (Seyedsayamdost 2014, 2018). More specifically, empirical studies find the MDGs to have had more effect on low-income countries than middle-income countries (Mcarthur and Rasmussen 2016; McArthur and Rasmussen 2018). Furthermore, countries that adopted poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSP) are found to be more likely to align their national plans with the MDGs (Seyedsayamdost 2018), which should not come as a surprise given that the PRSPs were considered as a tool to promote the MDGs and were thus aligned with the MDG priorities (Fukuda-Parr 2010; Titumir and Hossain 2005). Accordingly, to further probe the "millennium effect", we examine the relationship between bureaucratic quality and the selected human development outcomes in low-income countries and middle-income countries separately for after the introduction of the MDGs. We also look to see if the relationship changes after the introduction of the PRSPs. We predict to find a more consistent relationship between bureaucratic quality and human development outcomes in low-income countries than in middle-income countries. We also predict to find that PRSPs further augment the relationship between bureaucratic quality and human development outcomes in the post-MDG period.

In investigating what we call the “millennium effect”, we look at human development outcomes in health and education sectors. To this end, we select one MDG on health (child mortality) and one MDG on education (access to primary education) with a view to capture any cross-sectoral variation in the relationship between bureaucratic quality and human development outcomes as well as the moderating effect of the MDGs. We predict no such variation.

H3: A change in bureaucratic quality more consistently brings about a change in a human development outcome that requires the undertaking of a “simple” bureaucratic task versus a “complex” bureaucratic task.

We investigate H2 across the different bureaucratic task types involved in improving human development outcomes. Such a theoretically grounded framing in investigating the effect of bureaucratic quality on different human development outcomes has been, to a large extent, lacking in the growing body of research on this relationship. Dependent variables studied in this existing body of research have often been selected on the grounds of comparability and data availability. Some public administration scholars examining bureaucratic performance focus on the match between bureaucratic capabilities and the type of task that the bureaucracy is expected to accomplish (Pritchett and Woolcock 2004; Andrews, Pritchett, and Woolcock 2017). Building on this public administration literature, we create two categories of task types in our model: simple tasks and complex tasks. Based on the relevant literature, we determine the level of simplicity/complexity of a task according to the intensity of transaction, the intensity of implementation, and the level of local discretion required in carrying out the task. The specifics of how we operationalise task types in our model are discussed in the next section.

We propose that the relationship between bureaucratic capacity and human development outcomes as well as the moderating effect of the MDGs on this relationship might vary across different task types. More specifically, we predict to find a more consistent relationship between bureaucratic quality and those human development outcomes that require more “simple” bureaucratic tasks. More concretely, we reason that while a fixed amount of improvement in bureaucratic quality may be adequate to bring about an improvement in a human development outcome that requires a relatively simple bureaucratic task, it may not be adequate to bring about an improvement in an outcome that requires a complex bureaucratic task.

3.2. Model Specifications

To test our hypothesis, we construct our model with the following specifications:

3.2.1. Dependent Variables

In selecting our dependent variables, we first selected one MDG on health (child mortality) and one MDG on education (access to primary education) with a view to capture any cross-sectoral variation in the relationship between bureaucratic quality and human development outcomes as well as the MDG's moderating effect on this relationship. We predict no such variation. We look at two indicators for each of the two goals with one indicator capturing a complex task and a second indicator capturing a simple task vis-à-vis the intensity of transaction required, the intensity of implementation, and the level of local discretion required in carrying out the task. We, thus, investigate the relationship between bureaucratic quality and human development outcomes for four dependent variables.

For the MDG on child mortality, we identify child mortality, captured by the indicator "under-five mortality rate", as the complex task, and measles immunization, captured by the indicator "the proportion of 1-year-old children immunized against measles", as the simple task. For the MDG on access to primary education, we identify enrolment in primary education, captured by the indicator "net enrolment rate in primary education", as the complex task, and enrolment of children in grade 1 of primary education, captured by the indicator "adjusted net intake rate to grade 1" as the simple task. Below we present a simplified and stylized description of these tasks.

Measles (MVCV1) immunization is typically delivered in health clinics/outposts around age 1. From central bureaucracy's perspective, the task involves building, staffing, and running health clinics; building and sustaining a functioning cold chain and supply side systems. From the street-level bureaucracy's perspective, the task entails abiding by the procedures of the cold chain, and administering and recording the vaccination. The task might also entail organizing public outreach activities to ensure parents bring their infants to the health clinics/outposts. The task involves a single bureaucratic actor, i.e. the ministry of health, requires low levels of local discretion, and entails a single transaction between the bureaucratic agent and the citizen. The intensity of implementation, from a logistical perspective, is moderate.

Ensuring that a child survives until age 5, on the other hand, depends on the effective implementation of various interventions for prevention and treatment, including the provision of quality antenatal and postnatal care, timely immunization of children, nutrition programs to address malnourishment, programs to reduce household air pollution, programs to provide adequate safe drinking water, programs to promote improved sanitation and hygiene, as well as improving the accessibility of quality health facilities for the effective treatment of childhood illnesses such as diarrhoea, pneumonia and malaria. The task is multi-dimensional and involves many bureaucratic actors, such as the ministries of health, infrastructure, agriculture, and environment. The task entails numerous transactions between various bureaucratic agents and the citizen. Some of the sub-tasks involved require moderate to high levels of local discretion. The logistical intensity of implementation for most of the sub-tasks involved is moderate to high.

Enrolment in first grade of primary school is typically a task carried out by individual schools. From central bureaucracy's perspective, the task involves building, staffing, and running schools. From the street-level bureaucracy's perspective, the task typically entails verifying the identity of the child to be enrolled and completing the necessary paperwork to officially enrol the child in school. The task might also entail outreach activities to ensure parents bring their children and the required documents to school during the enrolment period. The task involves a single bureaucratic actor, i.e. the ministry of education, requires low levels of local discretion, and entails a simple transaction between the bureaucratic agent and the citizen. The intensity of implementation, from a logistical perspective, is low.

Enrolment in primary school, on the other hand, depends on the effective implementation of various policies and interventions that ensure that children stay in school after enrolling in first grade. These include education policies and interventions that provide the basic ingredients of schooling, such as an accessible school building, able and present teachers, and learning materials; social assistance programs to prevent dropout of children from poor households; and health programs to prevent high levels of malnourishment and morbidity that bring about truancy and dropout. Thus, the task is multi-dimensional and involves many bureaucratic actors, such as the ministries of education, health, and social security. The task entails numerous transactions between various bureaucratic agents and the citizen. Some of the sub-tasks involved require moderate to high levels of local discretion. The logistical intensity of implementation of most of the sub-tasks involved is moderate to high.

Pre- and Post-MDGs: In testing the effect of the MDGs on the relationship between bureaucratic quality and selected human development outcomes, we run separate analyses for the 15-year-long period prior to the MDGs and the 15-year-long period since the declaration of the MDGs in 2000. When running the separate analyses for pre- and post-MDGs for a given DV, we use the same sample of countries, which is a limited dataset of countries that have at least one observation in each period for that DV. The sample of countries vary across the DVs. (See Annex 1 for a description of the datasets and Annex 4 for a list of countries)

3.2.2. Main Independent Variable

The primary independent variable of concern in our model is bureaucratic quality. In Model (3) in each table, we interact the bureaucratic quality variable with a binary variable on the country's income grouping as of 2000 (low-income vs. middle-income)[11] to investigate the nature of the relationship in low-income countries versus middle-income countries. In Model (4) for the post-2000 period, we interact the bureaucratic quality variable with a binary PRSP variable. The PRSP variable takes on a value of "1" only for those countries that ever adopted a PRSP and only for those years after that country adopted a PRSP.[12]

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[11] We used World Bank's historical classification by income data for this purpose.
[12] The PRSP data was prepared based on International Monetary Fund's website on Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (Source: http://www.imf.org/external/np/prsp/prsp.aspx, accessed on June 30, 2018)

3.2.3. Fixed Effects

We choose to use a two-way fixed effects model (country and time) that allows us to control for unobserved country and time effects. With this choice, we diverge from many studies that treat bureaucratic quality as a structural condition and examine the relationship between bureaucratic quality at one point in time and more recent development outcomes. Our model allows us to investigate the relationship between changes in bureaucratic quality and changes in selected human development outcomes within a country, controlling for global trends that may affect the selected human development outcomes.

3.2.4. Control Variables

Based on existing literature on the determinants of bureaucratic quality and the selected human development outcomes, we include a number of control variables. If not included as control variables, these time-varying variables might lead to a change in both the independent variable and the dependent variable, and thus confound the relationship between them. To this end, we include control variables on the level of democratization at the national level and the local level, a control variable on GDP per capita, and a set of control variables on civil, ethnic, and inter-state wars.

We include two governance related control variables in our model: level of democratization at the national level and level of democratization at the local level. The effect of national level democratization on bureaucratic quality and on human development has been widely researched and continue to be debated (Back and Hadenius 2008; Charron and Lapuente 2010; Hallerod et al. 2013; Hanson 2015; D’Arcy and Nistotskaya 2017). Local-level democracy and bringing the state closer to people by decentralizing the state, has remained a widely supported panacea among development practitioners for tackling ineffective bureaucracies and improving delivery of public services. Yet the scholarly debate on its relation to bureaucratic quality and human development outcomes continues (Faguet 2014). We also include an economic control variable, GDP per capita, which is time-variant and is expected to have an effect on both bureaucratic quality and human development outcomes.

Finally, we include a control variable for conflict. While previous research on the determinants of human development outcomes have predominantly been concerned with ethno-linguistic fractionalization and its effects on distributional preferences, we are here more concerned with the immediate and negative effects of violent conflicts on bureaucratic quality and human development via increased insecurity and physical destruction, displacement of populations, increased barriers to accessing services, among others. We are also cognizant of the potential role of civil and ethnic wars in changing political incentives of elected officials in ways that push them to improve public services to the groups represented by those who are a party to the civil and ethnic wars, which may positively affect not only human development outcomes but also bureaucratic quality via its effect on impartiality and meritocracy.

Time Lags: The independent variable in our model is lagged one year given the nature of the predicted relationship to the dependent variables. For all control variables, except conflict-related variables that are lagged one year as they are expected to have a more immediate effect on bureaucratic quality, we introduce two-year lags to control for their potential confounding effect.

3.3. Measurement and Data

In this section, we describe the measurement challenges we faced and the subsequent decisions we made with respect to the data used in our analyses. We first focus on bureaucratic quality, followed by our four dependent variables of human development outcomes and the control variables in our model.

3.3.1. Measuring Bureaucratic Quality

Development practitioners and scholars alike continue to strive for better measurements to capture bureaucratic quality. The challenge is three-fold. First, we are far from reaching a consensus on the underlying conceptualisation of what bureaucratic quality entails. Part of this conceptual disagreement stems from the differences in our purposes of measuring bureaucratic quality in the first place. As a result, some scholars focus on the institutional qualities of bureaucracy, such as professionalism and impartiality, to capture quality (Evans and Rauch 1999; Rothstein and Teorell 2008) while others advocate for a focus on performance and outputs (Andrews, Hay, and Myers 2010; Besley and Persson 2010; Hanson 2015). Secondly, bureaucracy and bureaucratic quality are multi-dimensional. Thus, capturing it in a single variable presents several thorny problems. Finally, cut vertically or horizontally, public bureaucracy consists of numerous actors. Capturing the quality of these heterogeneous actors at all levels of all public agencies in a single measure is an enormous task.

Given the magnitude of this three-fold challenge, scholars are yet to reach a consensus on a single ideal measure and have used a wide range of less-than-ideal measures to capture bureaucratic quality in their research. These measures diverge on four main fronts: objective vs. subjective measures, proxy vs. direct measures, time-variant vs. -invariant measures, composite vs. individual measures.

For our purposes, time variance spanning the 1985-2015 period was an overriding criterion combined with a preference for non-composite measures whose interpretation proved to be bewildering. Consequently, like many other scholars (Baldacci et al. 2008; Rajkumar and Swaroop 2008; Berliner et al. 2015; Ahlerup, Baskaran, and Bigsten 2016), we opted for using the International Country Risk Guide’s (ICRG) rating on bureaucratic quality, which is a subjective and direct measure that is time-variant and not composite. The primary purpose of ICRG’s measure of bureaucratic quality is to feed into an aggregate political risk assessment of countries for investors. The bureaucratic quality measure is constructed on a 4 point-scale with 0.5 intervals with 0 indicating the lowest quality and 4 indicating the highest quality. The scoring is done on a monthly basis by an expert on the country and is aggregated to annual values.

In line with its purpose to provide risk assessment to investors, ICRG's measure on bureaucratic quality focusses on bureaucracy's institutional strength and quality as a "shock absorber that tends to minimize revisions of policy when governments change". The aspects of bureaucratic quality that are taken into account in this subjective measure parallel institutional qualities of a Weberian bureaucracy including expertise, professionalism, autonomy from political pressure, and meritocracy.[13] ICRG's measure of bureaucratic quality, like most other measures, is an aggregate measure with a focus on the central bureaucracy.

3.3.2. Measuring Selected Human Development Outcomes

For measles vaccination rate, i.e. the coverage of the first dose of measles-containing vaccine at around age 1, we use the WUENIC dataset, which is World Health Organization and UNICEF's estimates of national immunization coverage. The estimates adjust nationally reported coverage rates based on other sources of information for purposes of reliability.

For under-five mortality rate, i.e. the estimated probability of dying between

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[13] ICRG methodology describes the Bureaucracy Quality variable as follows: "The institutional strength and qualityof the bureaucracy is another shock absorber that tends to minimize revisions of policy when governments change. Therefore, high points are given to countries where the bureaucracy has the ***strength*** and ***expertise*** to govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government services. In these low-risk countries, the bureaucracy tends to be somewhat ***autonomous from political pressure*** and to have ***an established mechanism for recruitment and training***. Countries that lack the cushioning effect of a strong bureaucracy receive low points because a change in government tends to be traumatic in terms of policy formulation and day-to-day administrative functions."[emphasis added by authors]

birth and exactly five years of age expressed per 1000 live births, we use the estimates generated by the UN Inter-Agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation. For legibility and comparability purposes, we use 1 minus the under-five mortality rate in our model.

For adjusted net intake rate in first grade, i.e. the total number of children of official primary school entrance age who are enrolled in primary education expressed as a percentage of the population of the same age, we use the World Bank's Education Statistics dataset that builds on data from the UNESCO Institute of Statistics.

For net enrolment rate in primary school, i.e. the total number of children in the theoretical age group for primary education enrolled in that level, expressed as a percentage of the total population in that age group, we also use the World Bank's Education Statistics dataset.

3.3.3. Measuring Control Variables

For national democratization, we opted to use the electoral democracy index in the Varieties of Democracy Version 6.2 dataset. The conceptualisation of the electoral democracy index focusses on "making rulers responsive to citizens", which is the very aspect of democratization that we are interested in examining in our model in terms of its effect on human development outcomes. The index is constructed as an aggregation of the indices measuring freedom of association, clean elections, freedom of expression, elected executive, and suffrage. It is scaled to vary from 0-1. For local democratization, we opted to use the local government index in the Varieties of Democracy Version 6.2 dataset. The index captures if there are elected local governments and if so, the extent to which they can operate without interference from unelected bodies at the local level. This index is built with the primary goal to capture local level democracy, which is the very governance variable we are interested in. It is scaled to vary from 0-1.

For the economic variable on gross domestic product per capita (PPP adjusted, constant in 2011 international dollar), we used International Monetary Fund's World Economic Outlook Dataset. For the conflict variables, we opted to use the Major Episodes of Political Violence dataset because of its focus on "magnitude of societal-systemic impact" of wars, as opposed to its human toll, given our reasons for including conflict as a control variable in our analysis. We include international wars, civil wars and ethnic wars as separate variables since we are interested in examining not only the direct disruptive effects of violence on human development outcomes but also the potential impact of civil and ethnic wars on the political calculations of rulers with respect to public service delivery.

3.3.4. Missing Data and Quality of Data

Our approach to missing data was two-fold. Our original dataset included 104 low- and middle-income countries. For the pre- and post-2000 analysis, if a country did not have at least one observation for a given DV in both of the periods, we dropped the country from the analysis. For missing data in our independent and control variables, we opted to use deletion and not imputation. (See Annex 1 and 4 for details)

We are cognizant of the potential bias introduced by data that is not missing at random, which is the case for the data we used in our analysis. In fact, an empirical study has demonstrated that data gap in human development outcomes included as part of MDGs is a significant predictor of poor MDG performance (Jacob 2017). Similarly, the ability to collect reliable data is likely to be correlated with bureaucratic quality as suggested by the use of census frequency as a measure of state capacity (Hanson 2015). Additionally, we also expect the measurement errors to be not random; they are likely to be correlated with bureaucracy capacity and time as the MDGs triggered intensive efforts to improve the quality of data collection on targeted human development outcomes. Using country-fixed effects mitigates potential biases arising from missing data to a large extent. Yet, we are unable to rule out the possibility of bias introduced by the non-random variation in the quality of data and the deletion of some countries from our dataset due to missing data.

4. FINDINGS

This section first presents the results from our analyses with a focus on our hypotheses on the relationship between bureaucratic quality and the selected human development outcomes, and the effect of MDGs on this relationship across different task types. It then describes some additional tests we conducted to test the robustness of our results. Finally, it turns to discussing the results and highlighting some plausible dynamics between global and domestic factors that may help interpret these results.

4.1. Results

In assessing our results against our hypotheses, we start with our first hypothesis and look at the coefficient estimates of bureaucratic quality variable in Model (2) for the entire period of 1985 – 2015 in Table 1. We find that across all four dependent variables, i.e. measles vaccination rate, under-five mortality rate, adjusted net intake rate, and net enrolment rate, the coefficient estimate for bureaucratic quality is not statistically significant.

We then move onto our second hypothesis and compare the coefficient estimates of bureaucratic quality variable in Model (2) across the pre- and post-MDG columns in Tables 2-5. We find that across all four dependent variables, the coefficient estimates for bureaucratic quality are statistically significant only in the post-MDG period, which provides some suggestive evidence for the “millennium effect”.

We then continue probing the “millennium effect”. In Model (3), we introduce a binary variable on the country’s income grouping (low-income versus middle-income) given findings from earlier empirical studies about the differential effects of MDGs on low-income versus middle-income countries. We interact this binary variable with the main independent variable of bureaucratic quality to investigate if the findings about the relationship between bureaucratic quality and the selected human development outcomes are consistent across low-income and middle-income countries. We find that in the pre-MDG period, we do not see a statistically significant relationship between bureaucratic quality and the selected human development outcomes in low-income countries or middle-income countries. In the post-MDG period, however, we see a statistically significant relationship between bureaucratic quality and the selected human development outcomes only in low-income countries and not in middle-income countries.

We continue probing the “millennium effect” by introducing a binary variable in Model (4) and interacting it with the bureaucratic quality variable to capture the effect of the PRSPs on the relationship between bureaucratic quality and selected human development outcomes. We find that for three of the four dependent variables (measles vaccination rate, under-five mortality rate, and net enrolment rate), the coefficient for the interaction term is statistically significant and positive, suggesting the augmenting effect of the PRSP’s on the relationship between bureaucratic quality and human development outcomes in the post-MDG period.

Taken together, these findings constitute suggestive evidence in support for our first and second hypothesis. That is, a change in bureaucratic quality does not consistently bring about a change in human development outcomes, and that global efforts around the MDGs for certain human development outcomes made it more likely that an improvement in bureaucratic quality had an effect on these outcomes. We see this effect for both education and health-related outcomes.

Our findings do not support our third hypothesis. That is, there was no suggestive evidence that task complexity had an effect on the relationship between bureaucratic quality and human development outcomes or on the MDG's effect on this relationship. When we compare the statistical significance and direction of the coefficient for the bureaucratic quality variable in Model (2) across complex tasks and simple tasks (i.e. Table 1 with Table 2 and Table 3 with Table 4), we find no difference. Since the coefficient sizes cannot be compared in any reasonable way across the dependent variables, we are unable to interpret if task complexity matters for the size of the effect bureaucratic quality may have on human development outcomes.

TABLE 1A: Selected Health Development Outcomes, 1985-2015

	Dependent variable:					
	Under-five survival rate (Complex Task in Health) and Measles immunization rate (Simple Task in Health)					
	Under-Five Survival Rate (1985-2015)			**Measles Immunization Rate (1985-2015)**		
	(1)	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(1)**	**(2)**	**(3)**
Bureaucratic quality (lag 1)	0.205	0.170	-0.050	1.653*	0.694	1.709
	(0.249)	(0.277)	(0.290)	(0.920)	(1.023)	(1.376)
GDP per capita (lag 2) (log)		-1.428*	-1.522*		-1.098	-0.689
		(0.755)	(0.786)		(2.617)	(2.531)
Electoral democracy (lag 2)		0.849	1.136		-6.417	-7.768
		(1.256)	(1.338)		(5.296)	(5.510)
Decentralization (lag 2)		2.402*	2.300*		4.650	5.134
		(1.270)	(1.346)		(3.617)	(3.609)
International war (lag 1)		0.060	0.056		-1.807	-1.783
		(0.182)	(0.157)		(1.112)	(1.267)
Civil war (lag 1)		-0.126	-0.125		-0.530	-0.526
		(0.157)	(0.165)		(0.630)	(0.604)
Ethnic war (lag 1)		-0.095	-0.074		-1.509**	-1.609**
		(0.152)	(0.147)		(0.710)	(0.687)
Bur. qual x Low income			0.537			-2.544
			(0.588)			(1.887)
Year-fixed effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Country-fixed effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	3,037	2,504	2,504	3,007	2,492	2,492
R2	0.004	0.066	0.073	0.009	0.032	0.038
Adjusted R2	-0.042	0.015	0.022	-0.037	-0.021	-0.015

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

() indicates clustering-robust standard errors

TABLE 1B: Selected Education Development Outcomes, 1985-2015

	Dependent variable:					
	Net Enrollment Rate (Complex Task in Education) and Adj. Net Intake Rate (Simple Task in Education)					
	Net Enrollment Rate (1985-2015)			**Adjusted Net Intake Rate (1985-2015)**		
	(1)	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(1)**	**(2)**	**(3)**
Bureaucratic quality (lag 1)	-1.671	-1.593	-2.325	-0.544	0.024	-2.336
	(1.224)	(1.295)	(1.588)	(2.288)	(2.646)	(3.588)
GDP per capita (lag 2) (log)		-4.911	-5.236		-5.330	-6.584
		(3.815)	(3.958)		(6.473)	(6.347)
Electoral democracy (lag 2)		-8.698	-7.394		-10.916	-5.396
		(6.128)	(7.476)		(9.980)	(9.603)
Decentralization (lag 2)		15.602**	15.083**		21.094**	20.125**
		(6.565)	(6.782)		(9.489)	(9.179)
International war (lag 1)		-2.371***	-2.400***		-4.235***	-4.359***
		(0.449)	(0.492)		(0.572)	(0.670)
Civil war (lag 1)		-0.499	-0.505		0.622	0.300
		(1.022)	(1.172)		(1.350)	(1.192)
Ethnic war (lag 1)		-0.390	-0.099		-1.549	-0.807
		(1.409)	(1.200)		(1.589)	(1.558)
Bur. qual x Low income			1.746			1.746
			(3.365)			(3.365)
Year-fixed effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Country-fixed effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	1,425	1,210	1,210	1,321	1,099	1,099
R2	0.015	0.091	0.094	0.001	0.051	0.061
Adjusted R2	-0.042	0.002	0.004	-0.092	-0.051	-0.040

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
() indicates clustering-robust standard errors

TABLE 2: Complex Task in Health – Under-Five Survival Rate

	Dependent variable:						
	Under-five survival rate (Complex Task in Health)						
	PRE-MDGs (1985-2000)			**POST-MDGs (2000-2015)**			
	(1)	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(1)**	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(4)**
Bureaucratic quality (lag 1)	0.228	0.067	0.058	1.046*	1.483***	0.007	1.088**
	(0.184)	(0.191)	(0.170)	(0.603)	(0.547)	(0.586)	(0.496)
GDP per capita (lag 2) (log)		-0.504	-0.508		-0.833	-0.799	-0.782
		(0.581)	(0.566)		(0.598)	(0.579)	(0.549)
Electoral democracy (lag 2)		0.175	0.187		0.417	0.632	0.649
		(1.078)	(1.058)		(1.216)	(1.152)	(1.158)
Decentralization (lag 2)		-0.269	-0.269		1.387	1.505	1.239
		(0.729)	(0.735)		(1.435)	(1.375)	(1.409)
International war (lag 1)		0.183	0.183		-0.630***	-0.575***	-0.510***
		(0.175)	(0.174)		(0.102)	0.103	(0.096)
Civil war (lag 1)		-0.192*	-0.192*		-0.005	0.024	-0.059
		(0.105)	(0.110)		(0.167)	(0.157)	(0.164)
Ethnic war (lag 1)		-0.157	-0.156		0.012	0.017	-0.035
		(0.136)	(0.133)		(0.083)	(0.079)	(0.115)
Bur. qual x Low income			0.022			2.541**	
			(0.368)			(1.121)	
Bur. qual X PRSP							0.793***
							(0.241)
Year-fixed effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Country-fixed effects	YES	YE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	1,477	1,115	1,115	1,664	1,484	1,484	1,484
R2	0.016	0.056	0.056	0.024	0.079	0.109	0.129
Adjusted R2	-0.071	-0.052	-0.053	-0.052	0.0004	0.032	0.055

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
() indicates clustering-robust standard errors

TABLE 3: Simple Task in Health – Measles Immunization Rate

	Dependent variable:						
	Measles Immunization Rate(Simple Task in Health)						
	PRE-MDGs (1985-2000)			**POST-MDGs (2000-2015)**			
	(1)	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(1)**	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(4)**
Bureaucratic quality (lag 1)	0.228	0.067	0.058	1.046*	1.483***	0.007	2.899
	(0.184)	(0.191)	(0.170)	(0.603)	(0.547)	(0.586)	(2.166)
GDP per capita (lag 2) (log)		-0.504	-0.508		-0.833	-0.799	0.414
		(0.581)	(0.566)		(0.598)	(0.579)	(4.279)
Electoral democracy (lag 2)		0.175	0.187		0.417	0.632	0.394
		(1.078)	(1.058)		(1.216)	(1.152)	(7.323)
Decentralization (lag 2)		-0.269	-0.269		1.387	1.505	5.662
		(0.729)	(0.735)		(1.435)	(1.375)	(5.118)
International war (lag 1)		0.183	0.183		-0.630***	-0.575***	-2.066***
		(0.175)	(0.174)		(0.102)	0.103	(0.481)
Civil war (lag 1)		-0.192*	-0.192*		-0.005	0.024	-0.765
		(0.105)	(0.110)		(0.167)	(0.157)	(0.891)
Ethnic war (lag 1)		-0.157	-0.156		0.012	0.017	-1.271
		(0.136)	(0.133)		(0.083)	(0.079)	(0.967)
Bur. qual x Low income			0.022			2.541**	
			(0.368)			(1.121)	
Bur. qual X PRSP							2.039**
							(1.010)
Year-fixed effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Country-fixed effects	YES	YE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	1,477	1,115	1,115	1,664	1,484	1,484	1,484
R2	0.016	0.056	0.056	0.024	0.079	0.109	0.043
Adjusted R2	-0.071	-0.052	-0.053	-0.052	0.0004	0.032	-0.039

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
() indicates clustering-robust standard errors

TABLE 4: Complex Task in Education – Net Enrollment Rate in Primary Education

	Dependent variable:						
	Net Enrollment Rate in Primary Education (Complex Task in Education)						
	PRE-MDGs (1985-2000)			**POST-MDGs (2000-2015)**			
	(1)	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(1)**	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(4)**
Bureaucratic quality (lag 1)	-0.509	-0.764	-0.352	6.875**	7.438**	-0.453	6.198**
	(0.774)	(0.809)	(1.076)	(3.371)	(3.091)	(1.957)	(2.959)
GDP per capita (lag 2) (log)		-4.537	-4.109		-4.034	-3.882	-4.151
		(5.471)	(5.438)		(2.958)	(2.905)	(2.810)
Electoral democracy (lag 2)		-5.947	-7.485		-6.348	-4.133	-6.162
		(5.637)	(5.428)		(5.746)	(5.251)	(5.228)
Decentralization (lag 2)		11.837***	11.864***		4.366	4.465	2.946
		(4.339)	(4.392)		(9.625)	(8.364)	(9.189)
International war (lag 1)		1.733***	1.844***		-3.766***	-3.560***	-3.760***
		(0.340)	(0.351)		(0.702)	0.667	(0.249)
Civil war (lag 1)		-0.514	-0.509		0.108	0.199	0.346
		(0.344)	(0.356)		(0.560)	(0.624)	(0.724)
Ethnic war (lag 1)		0.862	0.722		-0.338	-0.336	-0.443
		(0.696)	(0.771)		(0.980)	(0.997)	(0.773)
Bur. qual x Low income			-1.258			12.760**	
			(1.576)			(5.296)	
Bur. qual X PRSP							3.232***
							(1.250)
Year-fixed effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Country-fixed effects	YES	YE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	570	436	436	919	833	833	833
R2	0.004	0.138	0.144	0.055	0.119	0.166	0.158
Adjusted R2	-0.206	-0.100	-0.096	-0.058	0.0006	0.058	0.048

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
() indicates clustering-robust standard errors

TABLE 5: Simple Task in Education – Adjusted Net Intake Rate into First Grade of Primary Education

	Dependent variable:						
	Adjusted Net Intake Rate(Simple Task in Education)						
	PRE-MDGs (1985-2000)			**POST-MDGs (2000-2015)**			
	(1)	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(1)**	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(4)**
Bureaucratic quality (lag 1)	-0.056	-0.143	0.058	10.670**	10.623**	1.273	9.730**
	(1.786)	(2.250)	(0.170)	(5.395)	(5.012)	(2.235)	(4.813)
GDP per capita (lag 2) (log)		-14.496*	-14.556*		2.821	2.044	2.981
		(8.416)	(8.134)		(3.940)	(3.503)	(3.850)
Electoral democracy (lag 2)		-8.353	-8.042		-17.823**	-14.561**	-17.904**
		(11.184)	(8.953)		(7.461)	(7.037)	(7.322)
Decentralization (lag 2)		4.392	4.384		8.831	7.528	8.050
		(11.386)	(11.433)		(9.247)	(7.440)	(9.115)
International war (lag 1)		0.370	0.344		-5.972***	-5.638***	-5.688***
		(0.615)	(0.657)		(1.044)	(0.979)	(0.996)
Civil war (lag 1)		0.127	0.110		0.597	0.769	0.501
		(1.125)	(1.041)		(0.858)	(1.094)	(0.833)
Ethnic war (lag 1)		-0.457	-0.436		0.591**	0.586**	0.546**
		(1.349)	(1.387)		(0.271)	(0.288)	(0.242)
Bur. qual x Low income			0.257			18.385*	
			(3.371)			(10.603)	
Bur. qual X PRSP							1.833
							(1.601)
Year-fixed effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Country-fixed effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	518	378	378	866	778	778	778
R2	0.00001	0.039	0.039	0.041	0.110	0.143	0.114
Adjusted R2	-0.231	-0.266	-0.271	-0.080	-0.0011	0.025	-0.008

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
() indicates clustering-robust standard errors

4.2. Robustness of Results

To check the robustness of the study results, we re-run our analytical model changing two of its underlying assumptions. The first assumption concerns as to when we would expect to see the effect of the MDGs on global and national dynamics. In our core model, we assumed that starting the year after 2000, which is the original declaration year of the MDGs, there would be some effect on global and national dynamics. Based on historical studies of the evolution of the MDGs (Hulme 2009), however, the case could also be made that only after the Monterrey Conference in 2002 when governments and international organisations reached a consensus on financing for the development goals that some real flesh was put on the bones of the MDGs. As such, we run our three models for each of the four dependent variables for post-2002 (See Annex 3). We find the main results are, largely, consistent when we revise our underlying assumption about the point at which we would expect to see the effects of the MDGs.

The second assumption concerns the time lags chosen for the independent variable of concern (bureaucratic quality) and the control variables. After much deliberation, we had decided that certain variables would take longer to have an effect on the dependent variables of human development outcomes, such as GDP per capita, national- and local-levels of democratisation while others would have a quicker effect, such as conflicts and wars, and bureaucratic quality. In the original model, we accordingly lagged some variables by two years and others by one year. To see if the results are robust to changes in this underlying assumption about time lags, we run our models for each of the four dependent variables for post-2000 increasing the lags by one year. We find that the main results, mostly, remain consistent when we revise the underlying assumption about the time lags (See Annex 3).

4.3. Discussion of Results

The results suggest that a change in bureaucratic quality does not consistently bring about a change in human development outcomes in low- and middle-income countries. Then, what may explain this 'patchy' relationship between bureaucratic quality and human development outcomes, given that the results suggest that the MDGs might have had an effect on this relationship, particularly in low-income countries. Below, we walk through this question using a set of assumptions about the nature of bureaucratic capacity introduced in Section 2.

If we treated bureaucratic capacity as a limited resource that is controlled, to a large extent, by the political leadership in a country, then the political leadership would need to decide how to allocate this finite resource across different goals of the government, such as establishing security, collecting taxes, building infrastructure, providing health services, educating children. Such allocation decisions could take different forms, including decisions about bureaucratic structures and institutions, allocations of fiscal and human resources across bureaucratic agencies, and distribution of government's policy attention across the different goals. As an extension, if we treated improvements in bureaucratic quality as an injection of additional resources into the system, then the political leadership would need to decide how to distribute this additional resource across its different goals. Consequently, we would expect to see an improvement in bureaucratic quality translating into an improvement in a certain policy domain only if the state chooses to distribute this additional resource toward that domain.

Under this assumption, the question directly relevant to our study is why governments prioritise certain policy domains and goals over others, and how the introduction of the MDGs have an effect on this prioritisation. A large body of theoretical and empirical research would suggest that a government's prioritisation across different goals emerge as the outcome of the power interplays among political and social coalitions.[14] In other words, a government would prioritise a certain goal, such as increasing economic growth, preventing conflicts, decreasing maternal mortality, as a result of the outcome of these power interplays.

As such, the MDGs and the subsequent global efforts around the MDGs would need to affect the power interplays among the political and social coalitions as well as the policy preferences of these coalitions. It might do so by: (i) the introduction of material and normative sanctions and rewards by global actors that shift the policy priorities of these coalitions; (ii) the selective empowerment of social coalitions that had already been pushing for certain human development outcomes; and (iii) the introduction of globally based

[14] An impressive body of research on welfare systems could be cited here including (Grindle and Thomas 1989; Mkandawire 2001) with a focus on political elites, (Esping-Andersen 1990; Finch 1993; Haggard and Kaufman 2008; Huber 2005; Huber and Stephens 2012; Kaufman and Nelson 2004; Mares and Carnes 2009; Waldner 1999) with a focus on coalitional alignments, and (Abel and Lewis 1993; Aspalter 2002; Kaufman and Nelson 2004) with a focus on economic and social pressure groups.

coalitions that take part in national-level power interplays, among others (Fukuda-Parr and Hulme 2011; Fukuda-Parr, Yamin, and Greenstein 2014; Kelley and Simmons 2015; Bisbee et al. 2017). Accordingly, global efforts around the MDGs are more likely to be able to affect the domestic power interplays among coalitions and their policy preferences in low-income countries than in middle-income countries. In other words, the policy agenda in a low-income country is likely to be more responsive to global actors than the policy agenda in a middle-income country.

The differences in the responsiveness of low-income and middle-income countries may come about for a variety of reasons including differences in the relative influence of material and normative sanctions and rewards by global actors, and differences in the susceptibility of the preferences of political and social coalitions to global actors. Along similar lines, the intensive engagement of international organisations with the political and social coalitions in a country around the development of the PRSPs is likely to further increase the level of external influence on the domestic policy agenda. Consequently, in the aftermath of a PRSP, the political and social coalitions in a country are more likely to actively pursue the MDGs. To that end, they are also more likely to distribute additional resources, including improvements in bureaucratic quality, towards the achievement of the MDGs.

To probe some of these plausible reasons, we introduced a control variable on aid dependency[15] into our model (See Annex 2 for results) to see if aid dependency affects the relationship between bureaucratic quality and human development outcomes. The results provide limited support to the presence of such an effect, and only for the dependent variable of measles vaccination rate in post-2000 period. One possible interpretation of this result is that the material dimensions of power exerted by international development organisations, as opposed to the normative dimensions, (Bauhr and Nasiritousi 2012) may not be the main reason for low-income country governments' relatively high level of responsiveness to the MDG agenda.

The above discussion about the differences between low-income and middle-income countries with respect to their responsiveness to the global efforts around the MDGs can, to some extent, explain the differences in the post-MDG period. Yet we are still left with the finding that in middle-income countries we do not see a statistically significant relationship between changes in bureaucratic quality and changes in selected human development outcomes during the 1985-2015 period although we know from earlier empirical studies that human development had been on the policy agenda of several middle-income countries during this period (McArthur and Rasmussen 2018; Sarwar 2015; Seyedsayamdost 2018). One plausible explanation for this finding concerns the non-linear "patterns of progress" for human

[15] For aid dependency variable, we opted to use data on aid commitment. Although aid disbursement data more accurately reflects aid flows and is more appropriate for our analyses given our interest in the effect of foreign aid on the selected human development outcomes and on bureaucratic quality, it also has many missing observations prior to the year 2000. Thus, given the size and distribution of the missing observations in aid disbursement data, we decided to instead use aid commitment data from the OECD-DAC aid commitment dataset. The data includes all donors (DAC and non-DAC) and all types of aid (grant and others). To calculate aid dependency, we look at the ratio of aid commitment to a certain country to that country's GNI for the same year

development outcomes (Takeuchi, Samman, and Steer 2015). Because middle-income countries already have lower levels of child mortality and higher rates of access to primary education, achieving additional progress is harder. That is, the “home-stretch” of bringing primary school net enrolment rates from 95 to 99 per cent is more difficult than bringing net enrolment rates from 65 to 69 per cent. Similarly, the “home-stretch” of bringing under five mortality rates from 0.5 to 0.1 is more difficult than bringing it down from 5.5 to 5.1 per cent. Thus, one unit of improvement in bureaucratic quality as defined in terms of its Weberianness is less able to bring about an improvement in the ‘home-stretch’ as improvements in this ‘home-stretch’ are more likely to be brought about by more innovative and agile bureaucracies, and not simply by more Weberianness.

Another yet related plausible explanation concerns Weberian capabilities of middle-income countries. Because middle-income country bureaucracies already have relatively high levels of Weberianness even prior to a positive change in bureaucratic quality, they are more likely to have the minimum bureaucratic Weberian capabilities required for designing and delivering basic health and education services for most of the population. In other words, limited bureaucratic capacity does not impose a constraint on improvements in human development outcomes in middle-income countries. Thus, a positive change in Weberianness above this required minimum of bureaucratic quality is likely to have a less consistent positive effect on the selected human development outcomes.

Having presented the study results and discussed the findings, the next and final section of the paper will highlight the theoretical and policy implications of the study findings, and put forward ideas for future research to further investigate the study's findings.

5. CONCLUSION

The objective of our study was to investigate when and where a change in bureaucratic quality translates into change in which human development outcomes. The results from our analyses provide suggestive evidence that global advocacy efforts may have a role in translating improvements in bureaucratic quality into improvements in human development outcomes in low-income countries. This is true for both health outcomes and education outcomes. To our surprise, it is also true across human development outcomes that entail bureaucratic tasks with different levels of complexity.

Our findings add to a growing body of scholarly work investigating the effect of the MDGs and provide several pieces of suggestive evidence about the effect of global actors' efforts in furthering the human development outcomes in low-income countries via, what we posit to be, the targeted deployment of improvements in bureaucratic capacity. These findings also underline the need for more in-depth case studies to understand the channels through which global actors affect domestic power interplays among political and social coalitions, which then influence policy priorities and the deployment of improvements in bureaucratic capacity. Such in-depth case studies could particularly provide insights into the differences observed in our findings between low- and middle-income countries as well as the augmenting effect of the PRSPs.

These findings lead us to not only concur with recent studies about the need for more research to deepen our understanding about why developing country states deploy their bureaucratic capacity differentially towards human development (Centeno, Kohli, and Yashar 2017) but also why they deploy it differentially across different kinds of human development outcomes. In our study, we investigate one such factor, the global actors' efforts around the MDGs. The study findings regarding task types also underscore the importance of ongoing efforts pushing for a nuanced approach to supporting bureaucratic capabilities that is mindful of task types instead of the generalized efforts under the nebulous term of state capacity building.

Finally, it is our hope that this study contributes to the relentless efforts of development practitioners and scholars to understand divergences in human development paths in order to contribute to a convergence towards better human development outcomes for all. By highlighting where and when changes in bureaucratic quality translate into changes in human development outcomes, we hope we provide a critical lens to future good governance efforts in international development.

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Annex 1: Descriptive Statistics

Number of Countries, Range of Observations, Total Number of Observations

Analysis 1: 1985-2015

	Model 1			Model 2 + 3		
	# of Co.s	Obs./ Co	Total Obs.	# of Co.s	Obs./ Co	Total Obs.
Measles - Full Dataset	104	17-31	3007	99	1-29	2521
Measles – Limited Dataset	104	17-31	3007	95	14-29	2492
U5M - Full Dataset	104	17-31	3037	99	1-29	2533
U5M - Limited Dataset	104	17-31	3037	95	14-29	2504
NIR - Full Dataset	99	1-30	1428	95	1-27	1244
NIR - Limited Dataset	82	2-30	1321	72	2-27	1099
NER - Full Dataset	100	1-30	1342	96	1-28	1342
NER - Limited Dataset	84	2-30	1210	75	2-28	1210

Analysis 2: 1985-2000 vs. 2000-2015

	Model 1			Model 2 + 3			Model 4 (PRSP)		
	# of Co.s	Obs./ Co	Total Obs.	# of Co.s	Obs./ Co	Total Obs.	# of Co.s	Obs./ Co	Total Obs.
Measles 1985-2000	104	2-16	1447	95	1-14	1103			
Measles 2000-2015	104	16	1664	95	13-16	1484	95	13-16	1484
U5M 1985-2000	104	2-16	1477	95	1-14	1115			
U5M 2000-2015	104	16	1664	95	13-16	1484	95	13-16	1484
NIR 1985-2000	82	1-16	518	72	1-14	378			
NIR 2000-2015	82	1-16	866	72	1-16	778	72	1-16	778
NER 1985-2000	84	1-16	570	75	1-14	436			
NER 2000-2015	84	1-15	919	75	1-15	833	75	1-15	833

Introducing Aid Dependency Variable

	Model 1			Model 2 + 3			Model 4 + 5		
	# of Co.s	Obs./ Co	Total Obs.	# of Co.s	Obs./ Co	Total Obs.	# of Co.s	Obs./ Co	Total Obs.
Measles 1985-2000	104	2-16	1447	95	1-14	1103	83	1-14	1009
Measles 2000-2015	104	16	1664	95	13-16	1484	83	2-14	1137
U5M 1985-2000	104	2-16	1477	95	1-14	1115	83	1-14	1021
U5M 2000-2015	104	16	1664	95	13-16	1484	83	2-14	1137
NIR 1985-2000	82	1-16	518	72	1-14	378	64	1-14	349
NIR 2000-2015	82	1-16	866	72	1-16	778	64	1-14	642
NER 1985-2000	84	1-16	570	75	1-14	436	67	1-14	404
NER 2000-2015	84	1-15	919	75	1-15	833	67	1-14	693

Robustness Check #1

	Model 1			Model 2 + 3			Model 4 + 5		
	# of Co.s	Obs./ Co	Total Obs.	# of Co.s	Obs./ Co	Total Obs.	# of Co.s	Obs./ Co	Total Obs.
Measles	104	14	1456	95	11-14	1294	82	7-12	971
U5M	104	14	1456	95	11-14	1294	82	7-12	971
NIR	81	1-14	744	72	1-14	667	63	1-12	543
NER	84	1-13	795	75	1-13	718	66	1-12	590

Robustness Check #2

	Model 1			Model 2 + 3			Model 4 + 5		
	# of Co.s	Obs./ Co	Total Obs.	# of Co.s	Obs./ Co	Total Obs.	# of Co.s	Obs./ Co	Total Obs.
Measles	104	16	1664	95	14-16	1515	83	3-15	1218
U5M	104	16	1664	95	14-16	1515	83	3-15	1218
NIR	82	1-16	866	72	1-16	776	64	1-15	669
NER	84	1-15	919	75	1-15	831	67	1-15	722

Annex 2: Pre and Post Tables (introducing Aid Dependency variable)

TABLE 1.A

	Dependent variable:				
	Under five survival rate (pre-2000)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Bureaucratic quality (lag 1)	0.228	0.067	0.058	0.077	0.027
	(0.184)	(0.191)	(0.170)	(0.184)	(0.163)
GDP per capita (lag 2) (log)		-0.504	-0.508	-0.860	-0.891
		(0.581)	(0.566)	(0.657)	(0.631)
Electoral democracy (lag 2)		0.175	0.187	1.059	1.126
		(1.078)	(1.058)	(1.241)	(1.201)
Decentralization (lag 2)		-0.269	-0.269	-0.011	-0.019
		(0.729)	(0.735)	(0.733)	(0.736)
International war (lag 1)		0.183	0.183	0.180	0.177
		(0.175)	(0.174)	(0.182)	(0.177)
Civil war (lag 1)		-0.192*	-0.192*	-0.196*	-0.194*
		(0.105)	(0.110)	(0.102)	(0.106)
Ethnic war (lag 1)		-0.157	-0.156	-0.183	-0.179
		(0.136)	(0.133)	(0.126)	(0.122)
Bur. qual x Low income			0.022		0.116
			(0.368)		(0.336)
Aid dependency (lag 2) (log)				0.018	0.013
				(0.094)	(0.095)
Observations	1,477	1,115	1,115	1,021	1,021
R^2	0.016	0.056	0.056	0.084	0.085
Adjusted R^2	-0.071	-0.052	-0.053	-0.019	-0.018
F Statistic	21.493*** (df = 1; 1357)	8.474*** (df = 7; 1000)	7.414*** (df = 8; 999)	10.533*** (df = 8; 917)	9.505*** (df = 9; 916)

**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

() indicates clustering-robust standard errors

TABLE 1.B

	Dependent variable:				
	Under five survival rate (post-2000)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Bureaucratic quality (lag 1)	1.046*	1.483***	0.007	1.314**	-0.482
	(0.603)	(0.547)	(0.586)	(0.580)	(0.597)
GDP per capita (lag 2) (log)		-0.833	-0.799	-0.386	-0.285
		(0.598)	(0.579)	(0.573)	(0.562)
Electoral democracy (lag 2)		0.417	0.632	0.334	0.535
		(1.216)	(1.152)	(1.310)	(1.229)
Decentralization (lag 2)		1.387	1.505	2.517	2.651
		(1.435)	(1.375)	(1.870)	(1.797)
International war (lag 1)		-0.630***	-0.575***	-0.538***	-0.500***
		(0.102)	(0.103)	(0.052)	(0.054)
Civil war (lag 1)		-0.005	0.024	0.020	0.045
		(0.167)	(0.157)	(0.124)	(0.114)
Ethnic war (lag 1)		0.012	0.017	-0.040	-0.027
		(0.083)	(0.079)	(0.102)	(0.096)
Bur. qual x Low income			2.541**		2.631**
			(1.121)		(1.032)
Aid dependency (lag 2) (log)				0.120	0.133
				(0.085)	(0.083)
Observations	1,664	1,484	1,484	1,137	1,137
R^2	0.024	0.079	0.109	0.088	0.118
Adjusted R^2	-0.052	0.0004	0.032	-0.003	0.030
F Statistic	37.230*** (df = 1; 1544)	16.664*** (df = 7; 1367)	20.841*** (df = 8; 1366)	12.391*** (df = 8; 1033)	15.397*** (df = 9; 1032)

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
() indicates clustering-robust standard errors

TABLE 2.A

	Dependent variable:				
	Measles immunization rate (pre-2000)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Bureaucratic quality (lag 1)	3.071***	1.354	1.783	1.328	1.795
	(0.905)	(0.938)	(1.145)	(0.926)	(1.127)
GDP per capita (lag 2) (log)		2.079	2.284	2.115	2.419
		(5.295)	(5.326)	(5.697)	(5.757)
Electoral democracy (lag 2)		-7.745	-8.337	-4.711	-5.401
		(6.746)	(6.897)	(8.055)	(8.321)
Decentralization (lag 2)		-1.272	-1.262	-0.825	-0.774
		(5.675)	(5.709)	(6.400)	(6.436)
International war (lag 1)		-2.639***	-2.611**	-2.396**	-2.359**
		(0.991)	(1.048)	(0.931)	(0.984)
Civil war (lag 1)		-1.893**	-1.900**	-1.841**	-1.844**
		(0.748)	(0.740)	(0.765)	(0.758)
Ethnic war (lag 1)		-1.966***	-2.019***	-2.210***	-2.258***
		(0.752)	(0.750)	(0.655)	(0.669)
Bur. qual x Low income			-1.119		-1.153
			(1.793)		(1.823)
Aid dependency (lag 2) (log)				1.045	1.089
				(0.745)	(0.747)
Observations	1,447	1,103	1,103	1,009	1,009
R^2	0.023	0.088	0.089	0.086	0.087
Adjusted R^2	-0.065	-0.017	-0.017	-0.018	-0.018
F Statistic	31.180*** (df = 1; 1327)	13.605*** (df = 7; 988)	12.033*** (df = 8; 987)	10.663*** (df = 8; 905)	9.588*** (df = 9; 904)

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
() indicates clustering-robust standard errors

TABLE 2.B

	Dependent variable:				
	Measles immunization rate (post-2000)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Bureaucratic quality (lag 1)	1.458	3.905*	-0.953	2.982	-3.504
	(2.704)	(2.180)	(2.380)	(2.462)	(2.404)
GDP per capita (lag 2) (log)		0.282	0.395	3.684	4.049
		(4.340)	(4.328)	(4.313)	(4.289)
Electoral democracy (lag 2)		-0.203	0.504	2.087	2.814
		(7.406)	(7.336)	(6.594)	(6.499)
Decentralization (lag 2)		6.045	6.432	7.715	8.198
		(5.245)	(5.035)	(6.825)	(6.515)
International war (lag 1)		-2.373***	-2.192***	-1.399***	-1.261***
		(0.381)	(0.425)	(0.287)	(0.306)
Civil war (lag 1)		-0.626	-0.529	-0.473	-0.386
		(0.890)	(0.917)	(0.852)	(0.881)
Ethnic war (lag 1)		-1.150	-1.136	-1.420*	-1.374*
		(0.924)	(0.912)	(0.803)	(0.773)
Bur. qual x Low income			8.361**		9.507**
			(4.173)		(3.999)
Aid dependency (lag 2) (log)				1.684***	1.730***
				(0.650)	(0.638)
Observations	1,664	1,484	1,484	1,137	1,137
R^2	0.001	0.032	0.042	0.061	0.073
Adjusted R^2	-0.076	-0.050	-0.040	-0.033	-0.020
F Statistic	2.169 (df = 1; 1544)	6.540*** (df = 7; 1367)	7.559*** (df = 8; 1366)	8.325*** (df = 8; 1033)	9.060*** (df = 9; 1032)

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
() indicates clustering-robust standard errors

TABLE 3.A

	Dependent variable:				
	Net enrollment in primary (pre-2000)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Bureaucratic quality (lag 1)	-0.509	-0.764	-0.352	-0.819	-0.467
	(0.774)	(0.809)	(1.076)	(0.809)	(1.095)
GDP per capita (lag 2) (log)		-4.537	-4.109	-3.991	-3.612
		(5.471)	(5.438)	(5.653)	(5.698)
Electoral democracy (lag 2)		-5.947	-7.485	-5.028	-6.421
		(5.637)	(5.428)	(6.167)	(5.916)
Decentralization (lag 2)		11.837***	11.864***	10.433**	10.508**
		(4.339)	(4.392)	(4.821)	(4.809)
International war (lag 1)		1.733***	1.844***	1.661***	1.758***
		(0.340)	(0.351)	(0.369)	(0.384)
Civil war (lag 1)		-0.514	-0.509	-0.481	-0.480
		(0.344)	(0.356)	(0.338)	(0.351)
Ethnic war (lag 1)		0.862	0.722	0.879	0.784
		(0.696)	(0.771)	(0.797)	(0.872)
Bur. qual x Low income			-1.258		-1.019
			(1.576)		(1.624)
Aid dependency (lag 2) (log)				0.662	0.663
				(0.549)	(0.550)
Observations	570	436	436	404	404
R^2	0.004	0.138	0.144	0.129	0.133
Adjusted R^2	-0.206	-0.100	-0.096	-0.111	-0.109
F Statistic	1.946 (df = 1; 470)	7.791*** (df = 7; 341)	7.121*** (df = 8; 340)	5.859*** (df = 8; 316)	5.367*** (df = 9; 315)

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
() indicates clustering-robust standard errors

TABLE 3.B

	Dependent variable:				
	Net enrollment rate in primary (post-2000)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Bureaucratic quality (lag 1)	6.875**	7.438**	-0.453	8.577**	-1.660
	(3.371)	(3.091)	(1.957)	(3.395)	(3.556)
GDP per capita (lag 2) (log)		-4.034	-3.882	-3.486	-3.051
		(2.958)	(2.905)	(2.966)	(2.836)
Electoral democracy (lag 2)		-6.348	-4.133	-9.282	-6.847
		(5.746)	(5.251)	(5.966)	(5.440)
Decentralization (lag 2)		4.366	4.465	3.983	5.188
		(9.625)	(8.364)	(9.223)	(8.049)
International war (lag 1)		-3.766***	-3.560***	-3.760***	-3.631***
		(0.702)	(0.667)	(0.249)	(0.258)
Civil war (lag 1)		0.108	0.199	0.346	0.417
		(0.560)	(0.624)	(0.724)	(0.778)
Ethnic war (lag 1)		-0.338	-0.336	1.703***	1.746***
		(0.980)	(0.997)	(0.456)	(0.458)
Bur. qual x Low income			12.760**		13.418**
			(5.296)		(5.714)
Aid dependency (lag 2) (log)				0.794	0.729
				(0.513)	(0.522)
Observations	919	833	833	693	693
R^2	0.055	0.119	0.166	0.138	0.174
Adjusted R^2	-0.058	0.006	0.058	0.014	0.054
F Statistic	47.357*** (df = 1; 820)	14.253*** (df = 7; 737)	18.362*** (df = 8; 736)	12.072*** (df = 8; 605)	14.171*** (df = 9; 604)

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
() indicates clustering-robust standard errors

TABLE 4.A

	Dependent variable:				
	Adjusted net intake rate (pre-2000)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Bureaucratic quality (lag 1)	-0.056	-0.143	-0.223	0.054	0.060
	(1.786)	(2.250)	(3.062)	(2.211)	(3.075)
GDP per capita (lag 2) (log)		-14.496*	-14.556*	-13.816*	-13.811*
		(8.416)	(8.134)	(7.383)	(7.050)
Electoral democracy (lag 2)		-8.353	-8.042	-11.122	-11.145
		(11.184)	(8.953)	(10.633)	(8.391)
Decentralization (lag 2)		4.392	4.384	5.199	5.200
		(11.386)	(11.433)	(11.413)	(11.471)
International war (lag 1)		0.370	0.344	0.323	0.325
		(0.615)	(0.657)	(0.496)	(0.540)
Civil war (lag 1)		0.127	0.110	0.149	0.150
		(1.125)	(1.041)	(1.169)	(1.093)
Ethnic war (lag 1)		-0.457	-0.436	0.253	0.252
		(1.349)	(1.387)	(1.035)	(1.058)
Bur. qual x Low income			0.257		-0.017
			(3.371)		(3.491)
Aid dependency (lag 2) (log)				1.740	1.741
				(1.671)	(1.703)
Observations	518	378	378	349	349
R^2	0.00001	0.039	0.039	0.054	0.054
Adjusted R^2	-0.231	-0.266	-0.271	-0.247	-0.252
F Statistic	0.005 (df = 1; 420)	1.677 (df = 7; 286)	1.464 (df = 8; 285)	1.875* (df = 8; 264)	1.661* (df = 9; 263)

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
() indicates clustering-robust standard errors

TABLE 4.B

	Dependent variable:				
	Adjusted net intake rate (post-2000)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Bureaucratic quality (lag 1)	10.670**	10.623**	1.273	12.157**	0.688
	(5.395)	(5.012)	(2.235)	(6.061)	(5.063)
GDP per capita (lag 2) (log)		2.821	2.044	4.289	3.865
		(3.940)	(3.503)	(4.238)	(3.908)
Electoral democracy (lag 2)		-17.823**	-14.561**	-19.103**	-15.591**
		(7.461)	(7.037)	(7.482)	(7.078)
Decentralization (lag 2)		8.831	7.528	9.204	9.457
		(9.247)	(7.440)	(9.558)	(8.212)
International war (lag 1)		-5.972***	-5.638***	-5.526***	-5.340***
		(1.044)	(0.979)	(0.370)	(0.436)
Civil war (lag 1)		0.597	0.769	0.783	0.925
		(0.858)	(1.094)	(1.121)	(1.268)
Ethnic war (lag 1)		0.591**	0.586**	1.210*	1.239*
		(0.271)	(0.288)	(0.673)	(0.691)
Bur. qual x Low income			18.385*		17.296
			(10.603)		(10.812)
Aid dependency (lag 2) (log)				1.263	1.098
				(0.827)	(0.799)
Observations	866	778	778	642	642
R^2	0.041	0.110	0.143	0.121	0.143
Adjusted R^2	-0.080	-0.011	0.025	-0.011	0.012
F Statistic	32.744*** (df = 1; 768)	12.036*** (df = 7; 684)	14.239*** (df = 8; 683)	9.598*** (df = 8; 557)	10.299*** (df = 9; 556)

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
() indicates clustering-robust standard errors

ANNEX 3: ROBUSTNESS CHECK # 1 (POST-2002)

	Dependent variable:				
	Under five survival (post-2002)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Bureaucratic quality (lag 1)	1.196	2.024***	0.116	1.845***	-0.583
	(0.803)	(0.635)	(0.653)	(0.681)	(0.698)
GDP per capita (lag 2) (log)		-0.611	-0.621	-0.314	-0.208
		(0.574)	(0.559)	(0.555)	(0.560)
Electoral democracy (lag 2)		0.016	0.136	0.246	0.209
		(1.205)	(1.111)	(1.303)	(1.234)
Decentralization (lag 2)		0.890	1.031	2.358	2.473
		(1.320)	(1.228)	(1.902)	(1.774)
International war (lag 1)		0.062	0.114		
		(0.173)	(0.156)		
Civil war (lag 1)		0.069	0.095	0.087	0.104
		(0.168)	(0.159)	(0.120)	(0.112)
Ethnic war (lag 1)		0.036	0.047	-0.015	0.013
		(0.080)	(0.069)	(0.096)	(0.075)
Bur. qual x Low income			3.235***		3.465***
			(1.190)		(1.070)
Received aid (lag 2) (log)				0.105	0.143*
				(0.079)	(0.076)
Observations	1,456	1,294	1,294	971	971
R^2	0.028	0.074	0.112	0.084	0.124
Adjusted R^2	-0.057	-0.016	0.025	-0.020	0.023
F Statistic	38.293*** (df = 1; 1338)	13.461*** (df = 7; 1179)	18.593*** (df = 8; 1178)	11.462*** (df = 7; 871)	15.332*** (df = 8; 870)

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
() indicates clustering-robust standard errors

	Dependent variable:				
	Measles immunization rate (post-2002)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Bureaucratic quality (lag 1)	1.836	5.798*	-0.876	4.656	-5.266
	(3.469)	(3.504)	(2.966)	(4.032)	(3.349)
GDP per capita (lag 2) (log)		2.588	2.555	5.283	5.715
		(4.894)	(4.951)	(5.239)	(5.368)
Electoral democracy (lag 2)		-4.347	-3.929	1.148	0.996
		(8.157)	(7.988)	(7.026)	(6.841)
Decentralization (lag 2)		4.862	5.355	8.405	8.874
		(4.753)	(4.487)	(7.280)	(6.698)
International war (lag 1)		-3.146*	-2.964*		
		(1.819)	(1.759)		
Civil war (lag 1)		0.312	0.405	0.473	0.542
		(0.912)	(0.961)	(0.908)	(0.961)
Ethnic war (lag 1)		-0.929	-0.892	-1.294	-1.177
		(0.927)	(0.895)	(0.962)	(0.881)
Bur. qual x Low income			11.315*		14.158**
			(6.203)		(6.145)
Received aid (lag 2) (log)				1.199**	1.354**
				(0.581)	(0.556)
Observations	1,456	1,294	1,294	971	971
R^2	0.002	0.028	0.041	0.048	0.067
Adjusted R^2	-0.086	-0.066	-0.053	-0.060	-0.040
F Statistic	2.369 (df = 1; 1338)	4.864*** (df = 7; 1179)	6.253*** (df = 8; 1178)	6.297*** (df = 7; 871)	7.814*** (df = 8; 870)

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
() indicates clustering-robust standard errors

	Dependent variable:				
	Net enrollment rate in primary (post-2002)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Bureaucratic quality (lag 1)	11.633**	13.174**	0.712	16.684***	1.035
	(5.159)	(5.153)	(1.044)	(5.186)	(4.680)
GDP per capita (lag 2) (log)		-0.607	-0.428	-0.240	-0.117
		(2.995)	(3.173)	(3.199)	(3.256)
Electoral democracy (lag 2)		-4.543	-3.075	-7.036	-6.313
		(5.927)	(5.597)	(6.236)	(6.140)
Decentralization (lag 2)		1.854	1.727	2.429	3.331
		(8.303)	(7.080)	(6.863)	(6.165)
International war (lag 1)		0.259	0.174		
		(0.623)	(0.579)		
Civil war (lag 1)		-0.191	-0.218	-0.001	-0.002
		(0.442)	(0.450)	(0.507)	(0.501)
Ethnic war (lag 1)		-0.710***	-0.743***		
		(0.160)	(0.158)		
Bur. qual x Low income			18.332***		16.892**
			(6.885)		(7.371)
Received aid (lag 2) (log)				0.842*	0.856*
				(0.467)	(0.465)
Observations	795	718	718	590	590
R^2	0.098	0.141	0.198	0.190	0.203
Adjusted R^2	-0.026	0.013	0.077	0.059	0.072
F Statistic	76.150*** (df = 1; 698)	14.629*** (df = 7; 624)	19.270*** (df = 8; 623)	19.809*** (df = 6; 507)	18.410*** (df = 7; 506)

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
() indicates clustering-robust standard errors

	Dependent variable:				
	Adjusted net intake rate (post-2002)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Bureaucratic quality (lag 1)	17.183	18.586*	1.004	28.226***	0.075
	(10.713)	(10.795)	(2.320)	(9.027)	(15.294)
GDP per capita (lag 2) (log)		6.554	5.596	7.199	6.946
		(4.521)	(4.495)	(4.925)	(5.016)
Electoral democracy (lag 2)		-16.323*	-13.474*	-14.118*	-12.314
		(8.679)	(8.028)	(8.507)	(7.946)
Decentralization (lag 2)		5.449	3.939	4.334	5.516
		(5.481)	(7.063)	(6.493)	(8.616)
International war (lag 1)		2.083**	1.983*		
		(1.035)	(1.041)		
Civil war (lag 1)		0.276	0.207	0.426	0.419
		(0.922)	(1.014)	(1.320)	(1.324)
Ethnic war (lag 1)		0.919***	0.825***		
		(0.324)	(0.316)		
Bur. qual x Low income			32.780***		32.460*
			(9.923)		(17.486)
Received aid (lag 2) (log)				1.262	1.268
				(0.941)	(0.936)
Observations	744	667	667	543	543
R^2	0.056	0.099	0.153	0.137	0.153
Adjusted R^2	-0.081	-0.043	0.017	-0.011	0.006
F Statistic	38.523*** (df = 1; 649)	9.068*** (df = 7; 575)	12.974*** (df = 8; 574)	12.200*** (df = 6; 463)	11.917*** (df = 7; 462)

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
() indicates clustering-robust standard errors

ANNEX 4: ROBUSTNESS CHECK # 2 (CHANGING TIME LAGS)

	Dependent variable:				
	Under five survival rate (post-2000)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Bureaucratic quality (lag 2)	0.893*	1.168**	0.005	1.013*	-0.491
	(0.531)	(0.533)	(0.549)	(0.571)	(0.585)
GDP per capita (lag 3) (log)		-1.086*	-1.041*	-0.461	-0.370
		(0.580)	(0.566)	(0.576)	(0.559)
Electoral democracy (lag 3)		0.062	0.271	-0.020	0.223
		(1.168)	(1.088)	(1.289)	(1.197)
Decentralization (lag 3)		2.593	2.538	2.687	2.649
		(1.719)	(1.647)	(1.741)	(1.680)
International war (lag 2)		-0.656***	-0.616***	-0.585***	-0.552***
		(0.109)	(0.111)	(0.050)	(0.056)
Civil war (lag 2)		-0.082	-0.058	-0.052	-0.029
		(0.168)	(0.159)	(0.140)	(0.132)
Ethnic war (lag 2)		-0.026	-0.021	-0.038	-0.026
		(0.078)	(0.074)	(0.102)	(0.098)
Bur. qual x Low income			1.970*		2.195**
			(1.145)		(1.078)
Received aid (lag 3) (log)				0.143*	0.155*
				(0.087)	(0.085)
Observations	1,664	1,515	1,515	1,218	1,218
R^2	0.020	0.100	0.122	0.093	0.118
Adjusted R^2	-0.055	0.026	0.048	0.008	0.034
F Statistic	31.696*** (df = 1; 1544)	22.274*** (df = 7; 1398)	24.153*** (df = 8; 1397)	14.300*** (df = 8; 1113)	16.465*** (df = 9; 1112)

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
() indicates clustering-robust standard errors

	Dependent variable:				
	Measles immunization rate (post-2000)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Bureaucratic quality (lag 2)	0.719	2.282	-1.710	1.441	-4.271
	(2.441)	(1.913)	(2.594)	(2.251)	(3.144)
GDP per capita (lag 3) (log)		-1.062	-0.909	3.970	4.318
		(4.615)	(4.620)	(4.609)	(4.605)
Electoral democracy (lag 3)		-1.158	-0.441	-0.304	0.622
		(7.031)	(7.009)	(6.508)	(6.489)
Decentralization (lag 3)		10.617*	10.429*	9.203	9.058
		(6.366)	(6.140)	(6.467)	(6.290)
International war (lag 2)		-2.798***	-2.663***	-1.959***	-1.835***
		(0.321)	(0.353)	(0.256)	(0.268)
Civil war (lag 2)		-0.873	-0.792	-0.751	-0.665
		(0.788)	(0.817)	(0.800)	(0.833)
Ethnic war (lag 2)		-1.377	-1.358	-1.614**	-1.569**
		(0.863)	(0.854)	(0.758)	(0.736)
Bur. qual x Low income			6.759*		8.338**
			(3.700)		(4.093)
Received aid (lag 3) (log)				1.691**	1.737***
				(0.659)	(0.638)
Observations	1,664	1,515	1,515	1,218	1,218
R^2	0.0004	0.045	0.053	0.072	0.083
Adjusted R^2	-0.077	-0.034	-0.026	-0.015	-0.003
F Statistic	0.617 (df = 1; 1544)	9.426*** (df = 7; 1398)	9.746*** (df = 8; 1397)	10.776*** (df = 8; 1113)	11.221*** (df = 9; 1112)

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
() indicates clustering-robust standard errors

	Dependent variable:				
	Enrollment rate (post-2000)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Bureaucratic quality (lag 2)	5.259*	5.127**	-1.189	6.121**	-2.393
	(2.871)	(2.497)	(1.720)	(3.000)	(3.022)
GDP per capita (lag 3) (log)		-3.870	-3.667	-2.249	-1.698
		(3.036)	(3.066)	(3.192)	(3.168)
Electoral democracy (lag 3)		-6.717	-3.770	-8.495	-5.153
		(6.195)	(5.774)	(6.407)	(6.056)
Decentralization (lag 3)		8.800	7.965	7.897	7.602
		(7.223)	(6.488)	(7.503)	(6.884)
International war (lag 2)		-3.931***	-3.804***	-3.556***	-3.488***
		(0.351)	(0.348)	(0.544)	(0.511)
Civil war (lag 2)		0.389	0.565	0.494	0.628
		(0.840)	(0.999)	(0.930)	(1.023)
Ethnic war (lag 2)		-2.275	-2.048	-3.144	-2.650
		(1.986)	(1.789)	(3.299)	(3.013)
Bur. qual x Low income			10.424**		11.542**
			(4.884)		(5.588)
Received aid (lag 3) (log)				0.763	0.762
				(0.579)	(0.599)
Observations	919	831	831	722	722
R^2	0.041	0.140	0.178	0.154	0.187
Adjusted R^2	-0.074	0.029	0.070	0.036	0.072
F Statistic	34.699*** (df = 1; 820)	17.054*** (df = 7; 735)	19.841*** (df = 8; 734)	14.381*** (df = 8; 633)	16.120*** (df = 9; 632)

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
() indicates clustering-robust standard errors

	Dependent variable:				
	Adjusted net intake rate (post-2000)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Bureaucratic quality (lag 2)	8.151*	6.484*	0.039	7.805*	-0.774
	(4.203)	(3.511)	(2.371)	(4.536)	(4.764)
GDP per capita (lag 3) (log)		1.936	1.381	3.201	2.997
		(3.534)	(3.347)	(3.868)	(3.660)
Electoral democracy (lag 3)		-18.479***	-15.137**	-21.020***	-17.147**
		(6.600)	(6.721)	(6.598)	(6.886)
Decentralization (lag 3)		17.233**	14.267*	16.303**	14.700*
		(6.860)	(7.514)	(7.317)	(7.763)
International war (lag 2)		-6.622***	-6.426***	-6.168***	-6.072***
		(0.423)	(0.482)	(0.615)	(0.610)
Civil war (lag 2)		0.130	0.414	0.219	0.419
		(0.667)	(0.955)	(0.748)	(0.928)
Ethnic war (lag 2)		-2.049	-1.812	-3.559	-3.066
		(2.473)	(2.275)	(3.547)	(3.261)
Bur. qual x Low income			12.990		13.272
			(9.435)		(9.929)
Received aid (lag 3) (log)				1.020	0.957
				(0.833)	(0.825)
Observations	866	776	776	669	669
R^2	0.031	0.133	0.153	0.151	0.167
Adjusted R^2	-0.092	0.015	0.037	0.027	0.044
F Statistic	24.395*** (df = 1; 768)	14.940*** (df = 7; 682)	15.432*** (df = 8; 681)	12.954*** (df = 8; 583)	12.960*** (df = 9; 582)

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
() indicates clustering-robust standard errors

ANNEX 4: LIST OF COUNTRIES, ANALYSIS 1 (1985-2015)

Measles - Full dataset - Model 1

[1] Albania	Algeria	Angola	Argentina
[5] Armenia	Azerbaijan	Bahrain	Bangladesh
[9] Belarus	Bolivia	Botswana	Brazil
[13] Bulgaria	Burkina Faso	Cameroon	Chile
[17] China	Colombia	Congo	Congo, Democratic Republic
[21] Costa Rica	Cote d'Ivoire	Croatia	Cuba
[25] Czech Republic	Dominican Republic	Ecuador	Egypt
[29] El Salvador	Estonia	Ethiopia	Gabon
[33] Gambia	Ghana	Guatemala	Guinea
[37] Guinea-Bissau	Guyana	Haiti	Honduras
[41] Hungary	India	Indonesia	Iran
[45] Iraq	Jamaica	Jordan	Kazakhstan
[49] Kenya	Korea, North	Korea, South	Latvia
[53] Lebanon	Liberia	Libya	Lithuania
[57] Madagascar	Malawi	Malaysia	Mali
[61] Mexico	Moldova	Mongolia	Morocco
[65] Mozambique	Myanmar	Namibia	Nicaragua
[69] Niger	Nigeria	Oman	Pakistan
[73] Panama	Papua New Guinea	Paraguay	Peru
[77] Philippines	Poland	Romania	Russia
[81] Saudi Arabia	Senegal	Sierra Leone	Slovakia
[85] Somalia	South Africa	Sri Lanka	Sudan
[89] Suriname	Syria	Tanzania	Thailand
[93] Togo	Trinidad and Tobago	Tunisia	Turkey
[97] Uganda	Ukraine	Uruguay	Venezuela
[101] Vietnam	Yemen	Zambia	Zimbabwe

Measles - Full dataset - Model 2+3

[1] Albania	Algeria	Angola	Argentina
[5] Armenia	Azerbaijan	Bangladesh	Belarus
[9] Bolivia	Botswana	Brazil	Bulgaria
[13] Burkina Faso	Cameroon	Chile	China
[17] Colombia	Congo	Congo, Democratic Republic	Costa Rica
[21] Cote d'Ivoire	Croatia	Czech Republic	Dominican Republic
[25] Ecuador	Egypt	El Salvador	Estonia
[29] Ethiopia	Gabon	Gambia	Ghana
[33] Guatemala	Guinea	Guinea-Bissau	Guyana
[37] Haiti	Honduras	Hungary	India
[41] Indonesia	Iran	Iraq	Jamaica
[45] Jordan	Kazakhstan	Kenya	Korea, South
[49] Latvia	Lebanon	Liberia	Libya
[53] Lithuania	Madagascar	Malawi	Malaysia
[57] Mali	Mexico	Moldova	Mongolia
[61] Morocco	Mozambique	Myanmar	Namibia
[65] Nicaragua	Niger	Nigeria	Pakistan
[69] Panama	Papua New Guinea	Paraguay	Peru
[73] Philippines	Poland	Romania	Russia
[77] Saudi Arabia	Senegal	Sierra Leone	Slovakia
[81] South Africa	Sri Lanka	Sudan	Suriname
[85] Syria	Tanzania	Thailand	Togo
[89] Trinidad and Tobago	Tunisia	Turkey	Uganda
[93] Ukraine	Uruguay	Venezuela	Vietnam
[97] Yemen	Zambia	Zimbabwe	

U5 - Full dataset - Model 1

[1] Albania	Algeria	Angola	Argentina
[5] Armenia	Azerbaijan	Bahrain	Bangladesh
[9] Belarus	Bolivia	Botswana	Brazil
[13] Bulgaria	Burkina Faso	Cameroon	Chile
[17] China	Colombia	Congo	Congo, Democratic Republic
[21] Costa Rica	Cote d'Ivoire	Croatia	Cuba
[25] Czech Republic	Dominican Republic	Ecuador	Egypt
[29] El Salvador	Estonia	Ethiopia	Gabon
[33] Gambia	Ghana	Guatemala	Guinea
[37] Guinea-Bissau	Guyana	Haiti	Honduras
[41] Hungary	India	Indonesia	Iran
[45] Iraq	Jamaica	Jordan	Kazakhstan
[49] Kenya	Korea, North	Korea, South	Latvia
[53] Lebanon	Liberia	Libya	Lithuania
[57] Madagascar	Malawi	Malaysia	Mali
[61] Mexico	Moldova	Mongolia	Morocco
[65] Mozambique	Myanmar	Namibia	Nicaragua
[69] Niger	Nigeria	Oman	Pakistan
[73] Panama	Papua New Guinea	Paraguay	Peru
[77] Philippines	Poland	Romania	Russia
[81] Saudi Arabia	Senegal	Sierra Leone	Slovakia
[85] Somalia	South Africa	Sri Lanka	Sudan
[89] Suriname	Syria	Tanzania	Thailand
[93] Togo	Trinidad and Tobago	Tunisia	Turkey
[97] Uganda	Ukraine	Uruguay	Venezuela
[101] Vietnam	Yemen	Zambia	Zimbabwe

U5 - Full dataset - Model 2+3

[1] Albania	Algeria	Angola	Argentina
[5] Armenia	Azerbaijan	Bangladesh	Belarus
[9] Bolivia	Botswana	Brazil	Bulgaria
[13] Burkina Faso	Cameroon	Chile	China
[17] Colombia	Congo	Congo, Democratic Republic	Costa Rica
[21] Cote d'Ivoire	Croatia	Czech Republic	Dominican Republic
[25] Ecuador	Egypt	El Salvador	Estonia
[29] Ethiopia	Gabon	Gambia	Ghana
[33] Guatemala	Guinea	Guinea-Bissau	Guyana
[37] Haiti	Honduras	Hungary	India
[41] Indonesia	Iran	Iraq	Jamaica
[45] Jordan	Kazakhstan	Kenya	Korea, South
[49] Latvia	Lebanon	Liberia	Libya
[53] Lithuania	Madagascar	Malawi	Malaysia
[57] Mali	Mexico	Moldova	Mongolia
[61] Morocco	Mozambique	Myanmar	Namibia
[65] Nicaragua	Niger	Nigeria	Pakistan
[69] Panama	Papua New Guinea	Paraguay	Peru
[73] Philippines	Poland	Romania	Russia
[77] Saudi Arabia	Senegal	Sierra Leone	Slovakia
[81] South Africa	Sri Lanka	Sudan	Suriname
[85] Syria	Tanzania	Thailand	Togo
[89] Trinidad and Tobago	Tunisia	Turkey	Uganda
[93] Ukraine	Uruguay	Venezuela	Vietnam
[97] Yemen	Zambia	Zimbabwe	

Adjusted net intake rate - Full dataset - Model 1

[1] Albania	Algeria	Angola	Argentina
[5] Armenia	Azerbaijan	Bahrain	Bangladesh

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[9] Belarus             Bolivia             Botswana            Brazil
[13] Bulgaria           Burkina Faso        Cameroon            Chile
[17] China              Colombia            Congo               Congo, Democratic Republic
[21] Costa Rica         Cote d'Ivoire       Croatia             Cuba
[25] Dominican Republic Ecuador             Egypt               El Salvador
[29] Estonia            Ethiopia            Gabon               Gambia
[33] Ghana              Guatemala           Guinea              Guinea-Bissau
[37] Guyana             Haiti               Honduras            Hungary
[41] India              Indonesia           Iran                Iraq
[45] Jamaica            Jordan              Kazakhstan          Kenya
[49] Korea, North       Korea, South        Latvia              Lebanon
[53] Liberia            Lithuania           Madagascar          Malawi
[57] Malaysia           Mali                Mexico              Moldova
[61] Mongolia           Morocco             Mozambique          Myanmar
[65] Namibia            Nicaragua           Niger               Nigeria
[69] Oman               Pakistan            Panama              Papua New Guinea
[73] Paraguay           Peru                Philippines         Poland
[77] Romania            Russia              Saudi Arabia        Senegal
[81] Sierra Leone       South Africa        Sri Lanka           Sudan
[85] Suriname           Syria               Tanzania            Thailand
[89] Togo               Trinidad and Tobago Tunisia             Turkey
[93] Uganda             Ukraine             Uruguay             Venezuela
[97] Yemen              Zambia              Zimbabwe
205 Levels: Afghanistan Albania Algeria Andorra Angola Antigua and Barbuda Argentina
Armenia Australia ... Zimbabwe
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Adjusted net intake rate - Full dataset - Model 2+3

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[1] Albania             Algeria             Angola              Argentina
[5] Armenia             Azerbaijan          Bangladesh          Belarus
[9] Bolivia             Botswana            Brazil              Bulgaria
[13] Burkina Faso       Cameroon            Chile               China
[17] Colombia           Congo               Congo, Democratic Republic Costa Rica
[21] Cote d'Ivoire      Croatia             Dominican Republic  Ecuador
[25] Egypt              El Salvador         Estonia             Ethiopia
[29] Gabon              Gambia              Ghana               Guatemala
[33] Guinea             Guinea-Bissau       Guyana              Haiti
[37] Honduras           Hungary             India               Indonesia
[41] Iran               Iraq                Jamaica             Jordan
[45] Kazakhstan         Kenya               Korea, South        Latvia
[49] Lebanon            Liberia             Lithuania           Madagascar
[53] Malawi             Malaysia            Mali                Mexico
[57] Moldova            Mongolia            Morocco             Mozambique
[61] Myanmar            Namibia             Nicaragua           Niger
[65] Nigeria            Pakistan            Panama              Papua New Guinea
[69] Paraguay           Peru                Philippines         Poland
[73] Romania            Russia              Saudi Arabia        Senegal
[77] Sierra Leone       South Africa        Sri Lanka           Sudan
[81] Suriname           Syria               Tanzania            Thailand
[85] Togo               Trinidad and Tobago Tunisia             Turkey
[89] Uganda             Ukraine             Uruguay             Venezuela
[93] Yemen              Zambia              Zimbabwe
```

Net enrollment rate - Full dataset - Model 1

```
[1] Albania             Algeria             Angola              Argentina
[5] Armenia             Azerbaijan          Bahrain             Bangladesh
[9] Belarus             Bolivia             Botswana            Brazil
[13] Bulgaria           Burkina Faso        Cameroon            Chile
```

[17] China	Colombia	Congo	Congo, Democratic Republic
[21] Costa Rica	Cote d'Ivoire	Croatia	Cuba
[25] Dominican Republic	Ecuador	Egypt	El Salvador
[29] Estonia	Ethiopia	Gabon	Gambia
[33] Ghana	Guatemala	Guinea	Guinea-Bissau
[37] Guyana	Haiti	Honduras	Hungary
[41] India	Indonesia	Iran	Iraq
[45] Jamaica	Jordan	Kazakhstan	Kenya
[49] Korea, North	Korea, South	Latvia	Lebanon
[53] Liberia	Lithuania	Madagascar	Malawi
[57] Malaysia	Mali	Mexico	Moldova
[61] Mongolia	Morocco	Mozambique	Myanmar
[65] Namibia	Nicaragua	Niger	Nigeria
[69] Oman	Pakistan	Panama	Papua New Guinea
[73] Paraguay	Peru	Philippines	Poland
[77] Romania	Russia	Saudi Arabia	Senegal
[81] Sierra Leone	South Africa	Sri Lanka	Sudan
[85] Suriname	Syria	Tanzania	Thailand
[89] Togo	Trinidad and Tobago	Tunisia	Turkey
[93] Uganda	Ukraine	Uruguay	Venezuela
[97] Vietnam	Yemen	Zambia	Zimbabwe

Net enrollment rate - Full dataset - Model 2+3

[1] Albania	Algeria	Angola	Argentina
[5] Armenia	Azerbaijan	Bangladesh	Belarus
[9] Bolivia	Botswana	Brazil	Bulgaria
[13] Burkina Faso	Cameroon	Chile	China
[17] Colombia	Congo	Congo, Democratic Republic	Costa Rica
[21] Cote d'Ivoire	Croatia	Dominican Republic	Ecuador
[25] Egypt	El Salvador	Estonia	Ethiopia
[29] Gabon	Gambia	Ghana	Guatemala
[33] Guinea	Guinea-Bissau	Guyana	Haiti
[37] Honduras	Hungary	India	Indonesia
[41] Iran	Iraq	Jamaica	Jordan
[45] Kazakhstan	Kenya	Korea, South	Latvia
[49] Lebanon	Liberia	Lithuania	Madagascar
[53] Malawi	Malaysia	Mali	Mexico
[57] Moldova	Mongolia	Morocco	Mozambique
[61] Myanmar	Namibia	Nicaragua	Niger
[65] Nigeria	Pakistan	Panama	Papua New Guinea
[69] Paraguay	Peru	Philippines	Poland
[73] Romania	Russia	Saudi Arabia	Senegal
[77] Sierra Leone	South Africa	Sri Lanka	Sudan
[81] Suriname	Syria	Tanzania	Thailand
[85] Togo	Trinidad and Tobago	Tunisia	Turkey
[89] Uganda	Ukraine	Uruguay	Venezuela
[93] Vietnam	Yemen	Zambia	Zimbabwe

Measles - Limited dataset - Model 1

[1] Albania	Algeria	Angola	Argentina
[5] Armenia	Azerbaijan	Bahrain	Bangladesh
[9] Belarus	Bolivia	Botswana	Brazil
[13] Bulgaria	Burkina Faso	Cameroon	Chile
[17] China	Colombia	Congo	Congo, Democratic Republic
[21] Costa Rica	Cote d'Ivoire	Croatia	Cuba
[25] Czech Republic	Dominican Republic	Ecuador	Egypt
[29] El Salvador	Estonia	Ethiopia	Gabon

[33] Gambia	Ghana	Guatemala	Guinea
[37] Guinea-Bissau	Guyana	Haiti	Honduras
[41] Hungary	India	Indonesia	Iran
[45] Iraq	Jamaica	Jordan	Kazakhstan
[49] Kenya	Korea, North	Korea, South	Latvia
[53] Lebanon	Liberia	Libya	Lithuania
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[61] Mexico	Moldova	Mongolia	Morocco
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[69] Niger	Nigeria	Oman	Pakistan
[73] Panama	Papua New Guinea	Paraguay	Peru
[77] Philippines	Poland	Romania	Russia
[81] Saudi Arabia	Senegal	Sierra Leone	Slovakia
[85] Somalia	South Africa	Sri Lanka	Sudan
[89] Suriname	Syria	Tanzania	Thailand
[93] Togo	Trinidad and Tobago	Tunisia	Turkey
[97] Uganda	Ukraine	Uruguay	Venezuela
[101] Vietnam	Yemen	Zambia	Zimbabwe

Measles - Limited dataset - Model 2+3

[1] Albania	Algeria	Angola	Argentina
[5] Armenia	Azerbaijan	Bangladesh	Belarus
[9] Bolivia	Botswana	Brazil	Bulgaria
[13] Burkina Faso	Cameroon	Chile	China
[17] Colombia	Congo	Congo, Democratic Republic	Costa Rica
[21] Cote d'Ivoire	Croatia	Czech Republic	Dominican Republic
[25] Ecuador	El Salvador	Estonia	Ethiopia
[29] Gabon	Gambia	Ghana	Guatemala
[33] Guinea	Guinea-Bissau	Guyana	Haiti
[37] Honduras	Hungary	India	Indonesia
[41] Jamaica	Jordan	Kazakhstan	Kenya
[45] Korea, South	Latvia	Lebanon	Libya
[49] Lithuania	Madagascar	Malawi	Malaysia
[53] Mali	Mexico	Moldova	Mongolia
[57] Morocco	Mozambique	Myanmar	Namibia
[61] Nicaragua	Niger	Nigeria	Pakistan
[65] Panama	Papua New Guinea	Paraguay	Peru
[69] Philippines	Poland	Romania	Russia
[73] Saudi Arabia	Senegal	Sierra Leone	Slovakia
[77] South Africa	Sri Lanka	Sudan	Suriname
[81] Syria	Tanzania	Thailand	Togo
[85] Trinidad and Tobago	Tunisia	Turkey	Uganda
[89] Ukraine	Uruguay	Venezuela	Vietnam
[93] Yemen	Zambia	Zimbabwe	

U5 -- Limited dataset - Model 1

[1] Albania	Algeria	Angola	Argentina
[5] Armenia	Azerbaijan	Bahrain	Bangladesh
[9] Belarus	Bolivia	Botswana	Brazil
[13] Bulgaria	Burkina Faso	Cameroon	Chile
[17] China	Colombia	Congo	Congo, Democratic Republic
[21] Costa Rica	Cote d'Ivoire	Croatia	Cuba
[25] Czech Republic	Dominican Republic	Ecuador	Egypt
[29] El Salvador	Estonia	Ethiopia	Gabon
[33] Gambia	Ghana	Guatemala	Guinea
[37] Guinea-Bissau	Guyana	Haiti	Honduras
[41] Hungary	India	Indonesia	Iran
[45] Iraq	Jamaica	Jordan	Kazakhstan

[49] Kenya	Korea, North	Korea, South	Latvia
[53] Lebanon	Liberia	Libya	Lithuania
[57] Madagascar	Malawi	Malaysia	Mali
[61] Mexico	Moldova	Mongolia	Morocco
[65] Mozambique	Myanmar	Namibia	Nicaragua
[69] Niger	Nigeria	Oman	Pakistan
[73] Panama	Papua New Guinea	Paraguay	Peru
[77] Philippines	Poland	Romania	Russia
[81] Saudi Arabia	Senegal	Sierra Leone	Slovakia
[85] Somalia	South Africa	Sri Lanka	Sudan
[89] Suriname	Syria	Tanzania	Thailand
[93] Togo	Trinidad and Tobago	Tunisia	Turkey
[97] Uganda	Ukraine	Uruguay	Venezuela
[101] Vietnam	Yemen	Zambia	Zimbabwe

U5 -- Limited dataset - Model 2+3

[1] Albania	Algeria	Angola	Argentina
[5] Armenia	Azerbaijan	Bangladesh	Belarus
[9] Bolivia	Botswana	Brazil	Bulgaria
[13] Burkina Faso	Cameroon	Chile	China
[17] Colombia	Congo	Congo, Democratic Republic	Costa Rica
[21] Cote d'Ivoire	Croatia	Czech Republic	Dominican Republic
[25] Ecuador	El Salvador	Estonia	Ethiopia
[29] Gabon	Gambia	Ghana	Guatemala
[33] Guinea	Guinea-Bissau	Guyana	Haiti
[37] Honduras	Hungary	India	Indonesia
[41] Jamaica	Jordan	Kazakhstan	Kenya
[45] Korea, South	Latvia	Lebanon	Libya
[49] Lithuania	Madagascar	Malawi	Malaysia
[53] Mali	Mexico	Moldova	Mongolia
[57] Morocco	Mozambique	Myanmar	Namibia
[61] Nicaragua	Niger	Nigeria	Pakistan
[65] Panama	Papua New Guinea	Paraguay	Peru
[69] Philippines	Poland	Romania	Russia
[73] Saudi Arabia	Senegal	Sierra Leone	Slovakia
[77] South Africa	Sri Lanka	Sudan	Suriname
[81] Syria	Tanzania	Thailand	Togo
[85] Trinidad and Tobago	Tunisia	Turkey	Uganda
[89] Ukraine	Uruguay	Venezuela	Vietnam
[93] Yemen	Zambia	Zimbabwe	

Net Intake -- Limited dataset - Model 1

[1] Albania	Algeria	Angola	Argentina	Azerbaijan
[6] Bahrain	Bangladesh	Bolivia	Botswana	Brazil
[11] Bulgaria	Burkina Faso	Cameroon	Colombia	Costa Rica
[16] Cote d'Ivoire	Croatia	Cuba	Dominican Republic	Ecuador
[21] Egypt	El Salvador	Estonia	Ethiopia	Gambia
[26] Ghana	Guatemala	Guinea	Guinea-Bissau	Guyana
[31] Honduras	Hungary	India	Iran	Iraq
[36] Jamaica	Jordan	Kazakhstan	Kenya	Korea, South
[41] Latvia	Lebanon	Liberia	Lithuania	Madagascar
[46] Malawi	Malaysia	Mali	Mexico	Mongolia
[51] Morocco	Mozambique	Myanmar	Namibia	Nicaragua
[56] Niger	Nigeria	Oman	Panama	Papua New Guinea
[61] Paraguay	Peru	Philippines	Poland	Romania
[66] Russia	Senegal	South Africa	Sri Lanka	Suriname
[71] Syria	Tanzania	Togo	Trinidad and Tobago	Tunisia
[76] Turkey	Uganda	Uruguay	Venezuela	Yemen

[81] Zambia Zimbabwe

Net Intake -- Limited dataset - Model 2+3

[1] Albania Algeria Angola Argentina Azerbaijan
[6] Bangladesh Bolivia Botswana Brazil Bulgaria
[11] Burkina Faso Cameroon Colombia Costa Rica Cote d'Ivoire
[16] Croatia Dominican Republic Ecuador El Salvador Estonia
[21] Ethiopia Gambia Ghana Guatemala Guinea
[26] Guinea-Bissau Guyana Honduras Hungary India
[31] Jamaica Jordan Kazakhstan Kenya Korea, South
[36] Latvia Lebanon Lithuania Madagascar Malawi
[41] Malaysia Mali Mexico Mongolia Morocco
[46] Mozambique Myanmar Namibia Nicaragua Niger
[51] Nigeria Panama Papua New Guinea Paraguay Peru
[56] Philippines Poland Romania Russia Senegal
[61] South Africa Syria Tanzania Togo Trinidad and Tobago
[66] Tunisia Turkey Uruguay Venezuela Yemen
[71] Zambia Zimbabwe

Net Enrollment -- Limited dataset - Model 1

[1] Albania Algeria Angola Argentina Azerbaijan
[6] Bangladesh Bolivia Botswana Brazil Bulgaria
[11] Burkina Faso Cameroon Colombia Costa Rica Cote d'Ivoire
[16] Croatia Cuba Dominican Republic Ecuador Egypt
[21] El Salvador Estonia Ethiopia Gambia Ghana
[26] Guatemala Guinea Guinea-Bissau Guyana Honduras
[31] Hungary India Indonesia Iran Iraq
[36] Jamaica Jordan Kazakhstan Kenya Korea, South
[41] Latvia Lebanon Liberia Lithuania Madagascar
[46] Malawi Malaysia Mali Mexico Moldova
[51] Mongolia Morocco Mozambique Myanmar Namibia
[56] Nicaragua Niger Nigeria Oman Panama
[61] Papua New Guinea Paraguay Peru Philippines Poland
[66] Romania Russia Senegal South Africa Sri Lanka
[71] Suriname Syria Tanzania Togo Trinidad and Tobago
[76] Tunisia Turkey Uganda Uruguay Venezuela
[81] Vietnam Yemen Zambia Zimbabwe

Net Enrollment -- Limited dataset - Model 2+3

[1] Albania Algeria Angola Argentina Azerbaijan
[6] Bangladesh Bolivia Botswana Brazil Bulgaria
[11] Burkina Faso Cameroon Colombia Costa Rica Cote d'Ivoire
[16] Croatia Dominican Republic Ecuador El Salvador Estonia
[21] Ethiopia Gambia Ghana Guatemala Guinea
[26] Guinea-Bissau Guyana Honduras Hungary India
[31] Indonesia Jamaica Jordan Kazakhstan Kenya
[36] Korea, South Latvia Lebanon Lithuania Madagascar
[41] Malawi Malaysia Mali Mexico Moldova
[46] Mongolia Morocco Mozambique Myanmar Namibia
[51] Nicaragua Niger Nigeria Panama Papua New Guinea
[56] Paraguay Peru Philippines Poland Romania
[61] Russia Senegal South Africa Syria Tanzania
[66] Togo Trinidad and Tobago Tunisia Turkey Uruguay
[71] Venezuela Vietnam Yemen Zambia Zimbabwe

CHAPTER 3

Trusting Relations, Learning Bureaucrats: International Organisations and Early-Stage Policy Diffusion

1. INTRODUCTION

In September 2001, only two months after the first impact evaluation report of Progresa - a cash transfer program initiated in 1997 in Mexico – was released, half-way across the world, the government of Turkey announced the launch of a social assistance program that was almost identical with Progresa. About four years later, on the other side of the Asian continent, Indonesia followed suit and started the preparations for piloting a Progresa-like program that would eventually become the world's second largest conditional cash transfer (CCT) program. Turkey and Indonesia were the first countries in their respective regions to adopt the CCT model à la Mexico. The World Bank bureaucrats were involved in both of these cases of early-stage diffusion of the model. Yet, this cash transfer model was barely known inside the World Bank in 2001 and had acquired only limited internal support by 2005.

In examining these two cases of diffusion, this study aims to shed empirical light on the role of World Bank bureaucrats in early-stage inter-regional diffusion of the CCT model that took place even before the Bank itself formulated an institutional position on the model. Related to this question, the study investigates how these two early-stage inter-regional diffusion processes came about and what diffusion mechanisms were at play in these processes. More generally, the study aims to contribute to an under-researched topic – early-stage inter-regional policy diffusion and the role played by bureaucrats in international organisations (IOs) in inter-regional diffusion of a policy before such policy becomes widely accepted as a good practice internally or globally.

Based on the study's empirical findings, this paper describes the context and events underlying each case of diffusion, analyses the diffusion processes using a novel set of tests and concludes that learning was the primary mechanism of diffusion in both cases, and discusses the ways in which individual World Bank bureaucrats were able to influence national policy processes based on their trust-based relations with national bureaucrats.

The study employs within-case process tracing with a comparative angle. It uses a micro-level perspective and treats individuals as its unit of analysis. Data collected through 39 elite interviews and document reviews are used to reconstruct the diffusion processes in these two countries with a view to identifying the diffusion mechanisms at play and investigating the role of World Bank bureaucrats in these mechanisms. It should be noted that prior to the research while the World Bank's main tool of engagement in each country was known and informed the case selection, neither the diffusion mechanism nor the precise role played by World Bank bureaucrats were known to the author.

The empirical findings from these two cases of early-stage, inter-regional diffusion put forward new insights about both the ways in which IOs influence domestic policymaking processes, and the micro-dynamics of learning as a diffusion mechanism mediated by IOs. Drawing from studies in social psychology, organisational learning and policy learning, this paper underlines the importance of interpersonal relations, and more specifically positive affect and trust between international and national bureaucrats, in early-stage, inter-regional policy diffusion via learning. By treating the World Bank and the state apparatus as non-monolithic actors, the findings from the two case studies enrich our understanding of the important role of individual bureaucrats, be they international or national, in early-stage policy diffusion processes. Similarly, the findings highlight the crucial role of trust-based interpersonal relations between these bureaucrats in such cases of diffusion.

As such, the paper puts forward an alternative view of domestic policymaking processes and the engagement of IO bureaucrats in these processes, which is less about “powering” and more about “collective puzzlement” (Heclo 1974). More broadly, the findings from these two cases juxtaposed against earlier studies of CCT’s regional and global diffusion processes and the World Bank’s role in these processes (Sugiyama 2011; Brooks 2015; Hall 2015; Simpson 2017; Borges 2018) demonstrate how diffusion mechanisms and IOs’ roles in these mechanisms change across time and space even for the same policy. Thus, the paper makes the case for incorporating change into our conceptualisation of IOs’ engagement in global diffusion processes.

The rest of the paper proceeds in the following way. Section 2 presents a discussion of the relevant literatures on (1) transnational policy diffusion and its mechanisms, (2) influence of IOs in domestic policymaking processes, (3) influence of IOs in early stage diffusion (4) learning as a policy diffusion mechanism and role of IOs in learning. Section 3 describes the research design and methodology. The subsequent four sections present the main empirical findings. Section 4 presents findings concerning CCT model's diffusion process globally and to the World Bank. Section 5 reconstructs CCT model's diffusion stories to Turkey in 2001 and to Indonesia in 2005. Section 6 analyses the mechanisms of diffusion that were at play in the cases of Turkey and of Indonesia and concludes learning to be the primary mechanism at play in both cases. Section 7 presents the findings on the role played by World Bank bureaucrats highlighting the importance of trust-based, interpersonal relations between national and international bureaucrats. The conclusion, Section 8, discusses the theoretical and policy implications of these empirical findings.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

This section reviews and discusses the literatures directly relevant to the research questions tackled in the study, i.e. how do early-stage inter-regional diffusion processes come about, what diffusion mechanisms are at play in early-stage inter-regional diffusion processes, what role do bureaucrats at an IO play in cases of policy diffusion that occur prior to their organisation formulating an institutional position on that policy. It does so by first looking at two literatures with relatively wide scopes – the literature on transnational policy diffusion and its mechanisms, and the literature on influence of IOs on domestic policymaking processes. It then focusses in on those parts of these literatures that speak directly to the study's findings, i.e. IOs' influence in early-stage diffusion, and learning as a diffusion mechanism and the role of IOs in learning.

2.1. Transnational Policy Diffusion and Its Mechanisms

Despite the cross-disciplinary nature of the topic of policy diffusion and the diversity of cases studied, a general consensus have emerged in the literature regarding the kinds of mechanisms at play in the transnational diffusion of a policy (Elkins and Simmons 2005; Braun and Gilardi 2006; Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2006; Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett 2007; Shipan and Volden 2008; Marsh and Sharman 2009; Graham, Shipan, and Volden 2012; Gilardi 2013; Maggetti and Gilardi 2013; Obinger, Schmitt, and Starke 2013). In some cases, policy diffusion is viewed as the natural outcome of the "lesson-drawing" and "learning" stages of domestic policymaking processes (Rose 1991; Khamfula 1998; Boehmke and Witmer 2004; Simmons and Elkins 2004; Bouché and Volden 2011 Gilardi 2013). In other cases when a policy gains global acceptance and acquires a norm-like status, policy diffusion is considered to be the result of "emulation" conducted primarily for the purposes of sending a symbolic signal in quest for legitimacy (DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Finnemore 1993; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Johnston 2001; Elkins and Simmons 2005; Gilardi 2012; Graham, Shipan, and Volden 2012). In some other cases, some form of "coercion" is considered to drive the diffusion of a specific policy (Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett 2007; Sharman 2008; Gilardi 2012).

In their ideal forms, these diffusion mechanisms of learning, emulation, and coercion seem easily distinguishable. Yet when the tire hits the road and empirical observations lie farther from the ideal forms and closer to the definitional boundaries, empirically distinguishing between these mechanisms have been highlighted as being a particularly challenging endeavour (Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett 2007; Marsh and Sharman 2009). This paper puts forward a novel set of tests to empirically distinguish between learning, emulation, and coercion. These tests resemble a series of empirical “hoop tests” and “straw-in-the-wind tests” (A. Bennett 2010; Mahoney 2012) that build on the defining features of these three mechanisms. This section walks through each of these four tests. In Section 6, these tests are applied to the two cases of diffusion studied in this paper.

Test #1: The first test concerns the nature of the policy model that is diffusing and serves as a hoop test for emulation. The central question of this first dimension is “does the model have any social value or normative appeal attached to it at the time it diffuses to a certain country?”. If the answer is yes, then the primary mechanism might be, but does not have to be, emulation. If the answer is no, then the primary mechanism is not emulation.

Test #2: The second test concerns the nature of involvement of external actors and serves as a hoop test for coercion: is there a powerful country or IO that is playing the leadership role in the global diffusion of this policy and what is the nature of its involvement? For instance, are there implicit or explicit conditionalities involved? If the answer is yes and there is a powerful country or IO that is playing the leadership role in the diffusion process, then the primary mechanism might be, but does not have to be, coercion. If the answer is no, then the primary mechanism is not coercion.

Test #3: The third test has to do with the motives of the domestic policymakers, and is more of a "straw-in-the-wind" test (A. Bennett 2010; Mahoney 2012) that helps differentiate between emulation and learning: are the policymakers genuinely seeking a solution to a problem or are they simply trying to send a signal to domestic and international actors? If they are genuinely seeking a solution to a problem, then the primary diffusion mechanism is more likely to be learning than emulation. If they are simply trying to send a signal, then the primary mechanism is more likely to be emulation than learning.

Test #4: The fourth test concerns the depth and nature of learning that takes place in the course of the decision making process, and it also acts as a "straw-in-the-wind" test that helps differentiate between emulation and learning: do the key bureaucrats seem interested in learning about the model and what is the depth of learning for different national actors during the policymaking process? If the key bureaucrats demonstrate interest in learning about the model and in-depth learning takes places in the course of the policymaking process, then the primary diffusion mechanism is more likely to be learning than emulation.

This novel set of four tests put forward by this paper facilitate a systematic analysis of any transnational policy diffusion process with a view to identifying the particular diffusion mechanism at play.

2.2. Influence of IOs in Domestic Policymaking Processes

The literature on international organisations (IOs) draws attention to a variety of ways in which IOs influence domestic policymaking and continues to debate the different types of power IOs employ in realising their influence. This body of research on the types of power employed by IOs puts forward a wealth of conceptual tools that reflects the richness of the empirical evidence on the topic, including hard power versus soft power (Keohane and Nye 1998), material dimensions versus normative dimensions of power (Bauhr and Nasiritousi 2012), “logic of consequentiality” versus “logic of appropriateness” (Bauhr and Nasiritousi 2012). A parallel body of empirical research reveals a wealth of tools utilized by IOs in their exercise of power and influence, including: (1) hard power tools such as conditionalities (Appuhami, Perera, and Perera 2011), inducement, selectivity, paternalism and signalling (Stone 2004); (2) soft power normative tools such as contestation and integration (Bauhr and Nasiritousi 2012); and (3) soft power knowledge tools such as policy framing and marketing (Brooks 2005), creation of knowledge banks (Evans and Barakat 2012), organizing meetings and study tours (A. Bennett and Checkel 2015), and publication of data, information, and advice (Knill and Bauer 2016).

This paper builds on a growing strand in this literature, which focusses on a particular form of IO influence in domestic policymaking processes: the transnational diffusion of a policy whereby “policy decisions in a given country are systematically conditioned by prior policy choices made in other countries” (Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2006). For this particular form of influence in domestic policymaking processes, IOs have been portrayed as taking on the role of a policy diffusion agent who mediates the diffusion process. Accordingly, in this process, IOs have been found to use their hard power, their soft normative power, or their soft knowledge power. These three kinds power IOs use in their role as policy diffusion agents closely parallel the widely accepted mechanisms of policy diffusion discussed earlier, namely coercion, emulation, and learning. In other words, IOs have been found to influence the transnational diffusion of a policy via: (1) coercion using their hard powers, (2) emulation using their soft normative powers or (3) learning using their soft knowledge powers.

In building on this literature, this paper takes a step toward addressing two areas where the body of research is considered to be relatively thin: (1) particulars of IO influence in cases of early-stage policy diffusion; (2) micro-processes of learning as a diffusion mechanism and the role of IOs in learning. The rest of this section will discuss each of these two areas in the literature with a view to positioning the empirical findings of this study.

2.3. IO Influence in Early-Stage Diffusion

The process through which policy ideas are introduced to and acquire widespread acceptance inside an IO does not happen over night. In fact, there is a nascent yet growing body of empirical studies that treat IOs as the 'recipient' of policy diffusion. These studies track the diffusion of policy ideas into the IOs and examine the internal evolution of policy ideas (Park 2005; Vetterlein 2007; Nay 2012; Béland and Orenstein 2013). So, does an IO play any role in the global diffusion of a policy idea before that idea is widely accepted inside the organisation? Put differently, is having a united front as an organisation a necessary condition for an IO to be a policy diffusion agent itself?

In the absence of a widespread acceptance inside an IO, it would be hard to imagine a policy being ubiquitously forced by that IO onto different countries, or to be promoted widely for its normative value, or to be marketed as a best practice. Indeed, the existing body of empirical research on the role of IOs in transnational policy diffusion has mostly investigated cases where the policy at stake had already been widely accepted inside a given IO (Appuhami, Perera, and Perera 2011; Hall 2015). Yet, some empirical studies implicitly suggest that IOs do play a role in a policy's diffusion even in the absence of a united front, such as a study on the World Bank's role in the diffusion of a community driven development model to Afghanistan (Evans and Barakat 2012). Although these empirical studies are very few in number, they highlight the existence of a phenomena that is yet to be systematically investigated. This paper aims to highlight this gap and to take a step toward investigating the role an IO plays in the transnational diffusion of a policy before the policy gains widespread acceptance inside the IO itself.

2.4. Learning as a Diffusion Mechanism and Role of IOs in Learning

While this study identifies learning to be the most probable mechanism of diffusion at play in both cases studied, the empirical findings underscore an uneasy fit with the current conceptualisation of learning as a policy diffusion mechanism in the IR literature. As it will be discussed in detail in subsequent sections of the paper, the study findings identify interpersonal relations and more specifically emotive elements such as positive affect and trust between international and national bureaucrats as a crucial factor in the CCT model's diffusion to Turkey and Indonesia via learning.

However, the main axis of debate in the IR literature regarding learning as a policy diffusion mechanism has so far been about the limits of cognition, with many scholars weighing on the side of bounded rationality and the role played by heuristics and biases while others adopt a Bayesian point of view on rationality (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000; Elkins and Simmons 2005; Weyland 2005, 2006). Ultimately, however, both perspectives have assumed learning to be a cognitive process, and those that analysed IOs' roles in transnational learning did so by looking at the effect of IOs in these cognitive processes. Consequently, studies of learning as a diffusion mechanism have paid limited attention to non-cognitive aspects of learning. Even those few studies that have mentioned the "social" aspects of learning, such as in the cases of "channeled learning" (Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett 2007) or "social learning" (Boehmke and Witmer 2004), where the policy-salient information is found to be socially channelled and lessons appear to be drawn from peer countries, learning has still been assumed to be a purely cognitive process that is bounded by heuristics and biases introduced by these social aspects.

The IR literature's exclusive focus on the cognitive aspects of learning as a policy diffusion mechanism may partially be explained by its general tendency to focus on the role of organisations and as a result, discount the role of individuals and interpersonal relations in policy learning processes. Regardless, the interpersonal dynamics of learning as a policy diffusion mechanism and the role of IO bureaucrats in these dynamics remain mostly unexplored. As a result, scholars of diffusion are yet to consider the role of interpersonal social and emotive elements such as affect and trust in transnational policy learning mediated by IO bureaucrats. What makes the absence of social and emotive elements from studies of IOs' roles in transnational policy learning particularly puzzling is the considerable attention paid to socialization and other social concepts like empathy, affection, conformity and esteem in the studies of IOs' roles in emulation as a mechanism of policy diffusion (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Johnston 2001). Also ironically, interpersonal elements have received considerable attention in general theories of diffusion, including Rogers' foundational work on the diffusion of innovations that describes diffusion as "a very social process that involves interpersonal communication relationships" (Rogers 2003).

In addressing this gap in studies of IOs' roles in transnational policy learning regarding the interpersonal social and emotive elements, the paper builds on three strands of literature in social psychology, organisational learning, and policy learning. There is a long-standing body of research in social psychology that examines the social nature of the learning process as well as the credence of social information in decision-making (Bonaccio & Dalal 2006; Lee & Dry 2006; Collins et al. 2011). A strand in organisational learning literature that examines interpersonal trust as a facilitator of knowledge diffusion inside and across organisations also provides several useful conceptual tools, particularly regarding the antecedents of such trust (Mayer et al. 1995; Rousseau et al. 1998; Levin 2004).

Finally, a growing strand in public policy literature urges scholars to adopt a more systematised approach to policy learning and puts forward noteworthy typologies to this end (C. J. Bennett and Howlett 1992; Dunlop and Radaelli 2013). However, similar to the relevant IR literature, the cognitive aspects of learning also dominate this literature. Although some scholars of policy learning maintain that only individuals (and not organisations) can learn (Dunlop and Radaelli 2013; Dunlop 2017) and some empirical studies put their spotlight on the social aspects of learning, they still look past beyond the interpersonal and focus on policy networks, epistemic communities and the social environment (Dunlop 2017; Howlett, Mukherjee, and Koppenjan 2017). Emotions are practically absent in this body of research on policy learning. The only theoretical study of policy learning that brings up emotions does so incidentally and only to highlight its role as a trigger in information search in policy learning (Dunlop and Radaelli 2017). Thus, while this deepening conversation in public policy literature about policy learning provides a general framework to position this paper against, it does not provide the conceptual tools that accurately capture the interpersonal social and emotive elements of policy learning this study reveals.

Having presented the various relevant strands in literature this paper draws upon and contributes to, the next section shifts to describing the research design and methodology of the study.

3. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

3.1. Research Design and Methodology

Conceived as a theoretically motivated empirical study, two features of the research design and methodology are highlighted as they are uncommon in the IO and policy diffusion literatures. First, the study employs a micro-level perspective and treats individuals as the relevant unit of analysis. Second, it uses within-case process tracing with a comparative angle.

The decision to employ a micro-level perspective builds on an emerging consensus that while the macro-level studies employing a pattern-finding strategy and using event history analysis are approaching a point of saturation, there remains the need for more studies that investigate the mechanisms of diffusion at play (Weyland 2005; C. K. Lee and Strang 2006; Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett 2007; Marsh and Sharman 2009; Gilardi 2012; Maggetti and Gilardi 2013; Obinger, Schmitt, and Starke 2013). Using the micro-level perspective and putting micro-processes at the core of the analysis is a promising approach for studying the role of IOs in these diffusion mechanisms. Focussing on the micro-level processes can help identify the specific tools used by the IOs and their precise role in the diffusion process. The micro-level perspective can also help identify the precise mechanism at play in the early-stage, inter-regional diffusion of the CCT model given the aforementioned challenge posed by empirically differentiating between mechanisms of diffusion (Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett 2007; Marsh and Sharman 2009).

As an extension of its focus on micro-dynamics and processes, the study treats individuals as the relevant unit of analysis. That is, the study does not treat the World Bank or the national agencies as single, homogeneous entities. Instead, different preferences and behaviours of individuals in these organisations constitute a central part of the analyses. By treating individual national and international bureaucrats as the relevant unit of analysis, the study challenges an implicit assumption of diffusion literature in terms of its treatment of IOs. While the internal dynamics and workings of IOs have been a topic of study in the IO literature (Weaver 2007), diffusion literature has to a large extent treated a given IO as a homogeneous entity interacting with national counterparts as a united front. This study treats the relevant IO, the World Bank, as a heterogeneous bureaucracy staffed by individuals with divergent preferences and interests. As a result, the diffusion process of the CCT model into the World Bank is an intrinsic part of the analysis. In the same way, World Bank's internal workings during the CCT's diffusion to Turkey and to Indonesia constitute an essential part of the analysis.

Secondly, the study uses within-case process tracing with a comparative angle (Starke 2013). In other words, it employs a "process-tracing strategy" as opposed to a "pattern finding strategy" (C. K. Lee and Strang 2006), and it complements within-case analyses with cross-case analyses (Obinger, Schmitt, and Starke 2013). Similar to other policy diffusion studies employing a process-centred approach, it focusses on the policy decision-making process and the relations among those involved in policy decision-making and policy diffusion (Evans 2009). Designed as a hybrid between theory-testing and theory-building process tracing, the study uses existing theories of policy diffusion and IOs' role in policy diffusion as a general guide in the collection of the evidence but not so systematically as to stifle alternative causal stories from emerging. A comparative angle is also built into the design with the objective to draw some causal inferences from cross-case analysis while recognizing that much of the causal inference is likely to come from the within-case analyses (Fairfield 2013).

3.2. Case Selection

The cases were selected using a two-staged approach - the selection of the diffused policy followed by the selection of the countries of diffusion. Three reasons underlie the selection of the CCT model as the diffused policy to study. Firstly, an IO, the World Bank in this case, had already been identified as a critical player in the transnational diffusion of the CCT model (Hall 2007; Sugiyama 2011), which makes it a positive case for investigating the role of IOs. Secondly, the CCT model built on the Mexico's Progresa program is an example of a "hard" transfer of a policy program as opposed to a "soft" transfer of policy ideas and principles (Evans and Davies 1999). Studying the diffusion of a well-defined model and not a general policy principle (Weyland 2006) eliminates the possibility of "spurious diffusion", and facilitates the tracking of the diffusion process and the precise role played by an IO in this process (Braun and Gilardi 2006). Finally, IOs' roles in the diffusion of "bread-and butter" technical policies such as the CCT are relatively less studied compared to the diffusion of policy ideas and macro-level policies (Walt, Lush, and Ogden 2004), making it a particularly valuable case to study.

In terms of the selection of the countries of diffusion for the CCT model, given the study's primary concern with studying early-stage, inter-regional diffusion, a small subset of positive cases of early adopters outside of Latin America, the primary region of diffusion, was identified (Weyland 2006). The cases of Turkey and Indonesia were selected from this subset of positive cases as "diverse cases" so as to maximize variation on the tools potentially available to the World Bank in its engagement with the country-at-hand. (Seawright and Gerring 2008; Obinger, Schmitt, and Starke 2013; Starke 2013). Given that the role of the World Bank in the diffusion of the CCT constitutes a critical component of the research questions underlying the study, the two sets of official tools available to the World Bank in its engagement with countries, i.e. financial products and technical assistance, was considered as the most appropriate anchor in selecting from among this subset of positive cases. The case of Turkey and the case of Indonesia each represent one of these two tools available to the World Bank. In the case of CCT's diffusion to Turkey, the World Bank gave a loan, a financial product, to Turkey. In the case of CCT's diffusion to Indonesia, the World Bank provided technical assistance. By examining these two diverse cases, the study was able to explore the variation in the roles played by the World Bank when it employs its different tools of engagement.

3.3. Data Collection and Analysis

Elite interviews were the primary method for data collection. For each case, snowball/chain-referral sampling was used with multiple entry points that were identified through document reviews and personal contacts. Overall, 39 interviews were conducted in Ankara, Jakarta, Washington DC and via phone/Skype. Almost all individuals who were identified in documents reviewed and by interviewees as having engaged in the processes of CCT's diffusion to Turkey and Indonesia were interviewed.[16] Several individuals in the national

[16] See Appendix 1 for the anonymized list of interviews. The three individuals who were

agencies and the World Bank who were not supportive of CCT's adoption in Turkey and Indonesia were also interviewed in an effort to minimize confirmation bias. To further minimize confirmation bias, narrative interviewing was used as the main technique for elite interviewing.

Using narrative interviewing, interviewees were encouraged to tell the story of CCT's adoption by describing the events and their sequences as well as the individuals involved, their relations and conversations. The interviews were conducted on the basis of anonymity in an effort to encourage open and honest responses. Interviewees were given the option of having the interviews not recorded and to have sections of the interview be off-record. All interview recordings were transcribed. A three-part code tree was drafted using both the theoretical issues explored and the preliminary findings from a first read of the transcripts. This draft code tree was revised throughout the coding of the transcriptions using NVivo.[17] The coded transcriptions were then used for both a temporal reconstruction of the diffusion processes and their contextual analyses.

A preliminary document review was carried out before conducting the fieldwork to inform the interviews. The preliminary review included mostly documents provided by the World Bank Archives in response to access to information requests. An additional document review was conducted after transcribing and

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identified as having played an active part in the diffusion process yet who could not be interviewed were the Vice President of Indonesia, head of Bappenas (and later finance minister) in Indonesia, and the World Bank country director in Turkey.

[17] See Appendix 2 for the code tree used in the study.

coding the interviews with a view towards strengthening the evidentiary basis particularly in cases where individuals' accounts did not match. Documents reviewed included publicly available reports, program documents provided by the World Bank Archives in response to access to information requests as well as documents shared by interviewees.

4. TRACING THE GLOBAL DIFFUSION OF THE CCT MODEL

To investigate the role of the World Bank in the diffusion of the CCT model to Turkey in 2001 and to Indonesia in 2005, the diffusion episodes must be placed in their respective historical contexts. This section will reconstruct three periods in the global diffusion of the CCT model and use these stories to position the Turkey and Indonesia episodes in their historical contexts: the origins of the CCT model, its diffusion to the World Bank, its regional (Latin America) and global diffusion.

The "genesis" story of the CCT model, the story of the model's diffusion to the World Bank, and the story of the model's regional and global diffusion represent not separate but intersecting time periods. Together, these three stories demonstrate that the roles played by IOs in "bread-and-butter" technical policy diffusion is more complex and less clear-cut than the roles described in earlier research on this topic (Walt, Lush, and Ogden 2004). Instead of the separate loops of knowledge generation, policy standardization, and policy promotion described in this earlier research, the CCT model's diffusion stories suggest not separate but overlapping loops whereby changes in one loop continuously affect changes in other loops. More concretely, policy promotion is not something that takes place only after all knowledge is generated and the CCT model is standardized once and for all. Policy promotion takes place all throughout the global diffusion process with its nature evolving throughout the process. As new knowledge continues to be generated and the standard CCT model continues to evolve, the extent to which the model is accepted inside the IOs and the nature of their promotion of the model also change. To put it more directly, policy promotion by IO bureaucrats in earlier phases of a technical policy's global diffusion process, which is the topic at the heart of this paper, looks notably different from policy promotion by IO bureaucrats in later phases of the global diffusion process.

These three stories of CCT model's global diffusion also differ from earlier research on "bread-and-butter" technical policy diffusion with respect to the relative importance of national actors versus IOs in different loops of global policy diffusion. For instance, instead of IOs playing a critical role in policy standardization and policy marketing loops (Walt, Lush, and Ogden 2004), what we instead see in the case of the CCT is national bureaucrats from Mexico playing a critical role in knowledge generation, policy standardization and policy promotion of the CCT model. IOs, such as the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), are, in fact, initially the recipients of knowledge generated and policy promoted by Mexican bureaucrats. Only in later phases of the global diffusion process, bureaucrats from these IOs join Mexican bureaucrats in further knowledge generation and policy promotion.

The rest of this section is divided into three parts. The first part describes the “genesis” story of the CCT model. The second part talks about the CCT model’s diffusion to the World Bank. The third part presents in general strokes the regional and global diffusion of the CCT model with a view to positioning the Turkey and Indonesia episodes in the context of a global diffusion process spanning two decades.

4.1. The Genesis

Several popular accounts of the origins of the CCT model point to Mexico’s Progresa program as the pioneer program the model was built on (Rawlings 2004; Lomel 2008; Fiszbein and Schady 2009; Samson, Niekerk, and Mac 2010). Yet cash transfers with conditions related to health and education had been in use long before the launch of Progresa in 1997 in countries such as Chile, Honduras, and Bangladesh (The World Bank 1995; Morley and Coady 2003; Fiszbein and Schady 2009). Furthermore, targeted cash transfers were introduced in several countries throughout the 1990s as an extension of structural adjustment packages and post-crisis recovery programs either as a replacement for universal subsidies or to mitigate “the adverse effects of economic reforms on vulnerable groups and to enhance (their) political viability” (IEG 2011). Some of these cash transfers had education and health-related requirements attached to them including regular attendance in schools and regular visits to health clinics. Yet, it was Mexico with its Progresa program, and to a lesser extent Brazil with its Bolsa Familia program, that became globally recognized as the pioneer of the CCT model.

Indeed, the ability of Mexican bureaucrats and 'techno-politicians'[18] to take an existing program and transform it into what was perceived as a novel social assistance program can be seen as a testament to the importance of entrepreneurs in model creation and marketing, two critical elements for the early stages of policy diffusion (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). These national bureaucrats' focus on high quality evaluation of the program proved critical to the generation of widely-recognized 'evidence'. Their relentless efforts in branding and marketing the Progresa program to national bureaucrats in their region and to IO bureaucrats constitute a critical aspect of the model's subsequent regional diffusion and the role of IO bureaucrats in its inter-regional diffusion.

4.2. CCT's Diffusion to the World Bank

As early as mid-1990s, Mexican bureaucrats were engaging with some World Bank bureaucrats regarding their idea of a cash transfer program with conditions (interview 7). Thus, by the time the first evaluation results of Progresa were published in July 2001 (Skoufias and McClafferty 2001), a small number of World Bank bureaucrats working on Latin America and social protection already knew about the program through the intensive marketing efforts of Mexican

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[18] In this paper, "techno-politicians" refer to those individuals who are not elected but appointed to political positions, such as minister or head of a government agency, for their sectoral expertise. The term "techno-politician" captures the hybrid character of these individuals who are neither true technocrats nor politicians.

bureaucrats. The engagement of Mexican bureaucrats with these international bureaucrats at the World Bank as well as the IDB took various forms including meetings and presentations, which is notably similar to what Park calls “direct socialization” of IO bureaucrats by transnational advocacy networks through persuasion via dialogue (Park 2005). Yet Progresa had not yet become widely known or recognized across the World Bank by early 2000s as suggested by the absence of any reference to Progresa or cash transfers with conditions in the most pertinent World Bank publication on social protection from that period (The World Bank 2001).

A few World Bank bureaucrats’ initial exposure to Progresa and early evaluation results of the program, however, were sufficient for the inclusion of a cash transfer program based on the Progresa model as part of the loan discussions between World Bank bureaucrats and national bureaucrats of Colombia and Jamaica in 2000. Yet the push by World Bank sectoral and regional experts for the provision of loans for a cash transfer program was met with internal resistance from the World Bank legal counsels who considered the model to be in violation of its Articles of Agreement. In fact, the name “conditional cash transfer” was coined during these internal discussions in an effort to convince the counsels by highlighting the similarities between these cash transfers to families and conditional loans to countries (interview 7; interview 8)(IEG 2011). Ultimately, the technical bureaucrats at the World Bank were able to persuade the legal bureaucrats paving the way for the approval of the first World Bank loan agreement with a conditional cash transfer program in February 2001.

During the first half of 2000s, the CCT model's visibility inside the World Bank was mostly limited to bureaucrats working on social protection globally or on human development in Latin America (interview 7; interview 8) (Vermehren 2003; Rawlings 2004; de la Briere and Rawlings 2006). The CCT model started receiving wider visibility and credibility inside the World Bank in mid-2000s following a series of impact evaluations (interview 8) (Das, Do, and Ozler 2005; Rawlings and Rubio 2005; Schady and Araujo 2006; Schady and Filmer 2006). Only by the end of 2000s, the CCT model had become a widely celebrated social assistance model inside the World Bank. The model remains popular among developing countries despite recent findings questioning its cost-effectiveness and long-term impact.

4.3. CCT's Regional and Global Diffusion

In the 20 years since Progresa's launch in Mexico in 1997, more than 70 countries have implemented some form of a conditional cash transfer program for some period of time. Many of these programs used the Progresa model as a blueprint and received loans and technical assistance from the World Bank and the IDB.

Figure 1 on the adoption of CCT programs in Latin America and in the rest of the world captures some of the dynamics of the model's regional and global diffusion. The CCT model’s regional diffusion is characterized by two spikes – with the first spike coming in early 2000s representing the early adopters like Jamaica, Colombia and Nicaragua, and the second spike coming in mid-2000s representing the late adopters. The CCT model’s global diffusion, on the other hand, is characterized by a slow diffusion process through early 2000s followed by a spike in late-2000s. This period of slow global diffusion through early 2000s, which falls outside of both the spatial and the temporal clusters, is at the heart of this study. In fact, Turkey and Indonesia were the first countries in their respective regions to adopt the CCT policy based on the Progresa model.

Locating the CCT model’s diffusion to Turkey and to Indonesia in this historical context is necessary for a more fine-grained analysis of the role played by World Bank bureaucrats in these countries. Namely, when a World Bank bureaucrat presented the CCT model to Turkish bureaucrats soon after the economic crisis in February 2001, the general counsel of the World Bank had just approved the CCT model’s inclusion in a loan package to Colombia. When a World Bank consultant presented the CCT model to Indonesian bureaucrats and politicians in July 2005,

Figure 1:[19]



many World Bank bureaucrats, both in Washington DC and Jakarta, had heard of the existence of the model but were not aware of its particulars. Taking into account these time-specific contextual elements is critical for resisting the temptation to generalize the role and motivation of the World Bank bureaucrats in the diffusion of the CCT model through a 15 year-long period (Hall 2015), and is necessary for correctly identifying the nature of the role played by World Bank bureaucrats in CCT's inter-regional diffusion to Turkey and to Indonesia.

5. CCT'S DIFFUSION TO TURKEY AND TO INDONESIA

Having reconstructed the global diffusion of the CCT model to contextualize CCT's diffusion to Turkey and to Indonesia, this section presents the details of these two diffusion stories. These stories are crucial for understanding both the

[19] The core dataset underlying the graph was generously shared by Sarah M. Brooks and was used in her article on CCT's global diffusion (Brooks 2015).

diffusion mechanism at play and the role played by World Bank bureaucrats in this diffusion mechanism, which are taken up in subsequent sections.

Overall, the diffusion of the CCT model both to Turkey and to Indonesia is characterized by relatively fast decision making processes taking place inside a small circle of national and international bureaucrats. Although on paper the World Bank's involvement was different in these two cases, with Turkey receiving a loan and Indonesia receiving technical assistance, the similarities between the cases regarding both the diffusion process and the World Bank bureaucrats' engagement on the ground are striking. In both cases, the search for a new policy was triggered by an economic shock; i.e. the 2001 economic crisis in Turkey and the 2005 fuel subsidy adjustment in Indonesia. In both cases, the decision process concerning the CCT model's adoption was predominantly driven by bureaucrats with a single minister giving the ultimate approval. In both cases, World Bank bureaucrats played a critical role in the introduction of the idea of the CCT model and the subsequent decision-making process. In both cases, the national and World Bank bureaucrats used the fiscal and political enablers created by an economic shock as an opportunity to introduce a new social assistance model to improve existing social assistance delivery mechanisms. Finally, in both cases the trusting, positive interpersonal relations between national bureaucrats and World Bank bureaucrats emerged as an enabler of the model's diffusion. The rest of this section presents the events, processes, and dynamics underlying these general findings.

5.1.Diffusion of the CCT Model to Turkey

The CCT model was adopted by Turkey in 2001 as part of a larger social assistance project funded partially by a World Bank loan. The Social Risk Mitigation Project (SRMP) was designed and implemented in response to an economic crisis in February 2001 though some of its components, such as institution building and local initiatives were already under development prior to the crisis (interview 1) (The World Bank 2000). The decision concerning the SRMP was characterized by an unusually fast process for both the Turkish state and the World Bank. For the most part, a small group composed of national and international bureaucrats initiated and pushed forward the policymaking process.

5.1.1.Framing Events

Two events that unfolded in the immediate aftermath of the economic crisis mark the onset of the search for a social assistance intervention in the aftermath of the crisis. Both of these events had significant impact on the course of subsequent policymaking process concerning the SRMP. The first event took place during a cabinet-level meeting about the post-crisis World Bank loan package where the decision was made to allocate $500 million of the loan package for assistance to poor households following the suggestion of the state minister responsible for the social assistance portfolio (interview 27; interview 33; interview 36). This cabinet-level decision, in a way, set the boundaries of the fiscal space of the social assistance package making the subsequent policy process in part an exercise in pulling together a “just-large-enough” package of interventions.

The second event that marked the onset of the policy search is less distinct and less direct than this cabinet-level decision yet played a similarly pivotal role in shaping the course of the subsequent policymaking process. It concerns the decision of the World Bank lead economist in Ankara to invite a particular social protection expert from inside the organisation in the aftermath of the economic crisis. This social protection expert had worked in Turkey in the past and just been involved in the preparation of the loan agreements with Colombia and Jamaica that included the CCT model (interview 2; interview 4). The lead economist had been a peer reviewer during the preparation of the same loan agreement with Jamaica and considered the CCT model to be a suitable policy intervention for Turkey in the aftermath of the economic crisis (interview 4).

By inviting a social protection expert who just worked on designing a loan agreement that included the CCT model, this lead economist indirectly shaped the boundaries of the social assistance policy ideas that would be brought to the table during the designing of the loan agreement. Predictably, this social protection expert’s initial dialogues with national bureaucrats in Turkey as well as the preparatory document she presented as the possible set of social assistance interventions in the aftermath of the economic crisis included the CCT model (interview 2; interview 4; interview 6; interview 27; interview 35). More importantly, this document expressed a clear preference for the CCT model.[20]

Despite doubts raised by other World Bank bureaucrats about the appropriateness and viability of the CCT model in Turkey during early internal discussions,[21] the CCT model was pushed onwards as a recommended policy in World Bank bureaucrats' subsequent discussions with national bureaucrats. In less than six months after the initial introduction of the idea of the CCT model by a World Bank bureaucrat as one of several possible social assistance interventions, the agreement for a $500 million loan package that had the CCT as its largest component was signed in September 2001. Thus, these two "framing" events had notable impact on how the rest of the policy process unfolded in Turkey.

5.1.2.The Policymaking Process

During the six months following February 2001, the above-mentioned social protection expert at the Bank engaged with a small circle of bureaucrats from the Treasury, the State Planning Agency, and the Social Assistance and Solidarity Fund (SYDTF) concerning the CCT component of the SRMP. The SYDTF bureaucrat assigned to the task of designing the SRMP project emerged as the intermediary between the World Bank bureaucrats and the state minister in charge of the social assistance portfolio who was the ultimate decision maker.

[20] Internal project document (project concept note) shared anonymously.
[21] Internal project document (comments from peer reviewers to the project concept note) shared anonymously.

When the relevant World Bank bureaucrat introduced the CCT model to this small circle of national bureaucrats, it was in fact the first time these bureaucrats had heard of the model (interview 27; interview 33; interview 35).

Data from interviews and document reviews are insufficient to draw inferences with certainty about the precise event at which the decision to include the CCT model in the SRMP project was made. The most likely scenario involves the relevant World Bank bureaucrat persuading the above-mentioned SYDTF bureaucrat about the desirability of the CCT model followed by this SYDTF bureaucrat persuading the relevant state minister. During the same period, the World Bank bureaucrats also had direct meetings with the relevant state minister where they provided him with information about experiences from different countries regarding the main components of the SRMP project, including the CCT model (interview 1; interview 2). The acceptance of the CCT model by the relevant national bureaucrats and politicians, in return, facilitated subsequent internal World Bank review processes of the proposed project.

During subsequent months, the details of the various components of the SRMP project, including the CCT, were determined through a series of working meetings attended by national and World Bank bureaucrats, which was followed by the preparation of the project information document (PID). Also during this period, a social assessment of the crisis and a simulation of its impact on the welfare distribution were conducted by World Bank bureaucrats. Subsequently, the project appraisal was carried out by World Bank bureaucrats, which culminated in the preparation of the project appraisal document (PAD) that detailed out the various components of the SRMP, including the CCT.

Upon the signing of the relevant loan agreement between the World Bank and the Turkish authorities in September 2001, the CCT model was piloted by SYDTF and subsequently implemented nationwide. The relevant World Bank social protection expert was in fact involved personally in the technical design of the CCT's piloting and implementation. In addition to providing direct technical support, the World Bank bureaucrats facilitated strengthening of national bureaucrats' knowledge about the CCT model also through organizing study visits to Latin America and making relevant documents available during the preparations for the CCT's pilot and nationwide implementation (interview 1; interview 2; interview 6; interview 27; interview 33).

5.1.3. Notable Enabling Dynamics

Two notable dynamics are worth highlighting as the grease that oiled the wheels of CCT's diffusion to Turkey. The first dynamic concerns the motivation of the national and international bureaucrats engaged in the diffusion process. Specifically, the perceived desirability of the CCT model by the relevant World Bank bureaucrat and the relevant SYDTF bureaucrat was not limited to the model's ability to mitigate the negative effects of the economic crisis on poor households. They also viewed the CCT model as an opportunity to improve the overall approach and mechanisms for social assistance in Turkey (interview 2; interview 27). Thus, CCT's diffusion to Turkey contradicts the dominant view in the diffusion literature about the satisficing bureaucrat who draws lessons from other places because they are pushed to search for solutions in the face of an exogenous crisis (Rose 1991). In contrast, what we see in the case of CCT's diffusion to Turkey are bureaucrats who use the fiscal and political enablers created by an economic crisis as an opportunity to change what they perceive to be an inadequate, yet unbroken, social assistance system by adopting a good practice from another country.

The second dynamic that facilitated the diffusion process concerns the interpersonal relations between the national bureaucrats and the World Bank bureaucrats engaged in the policymaking process in Turkey. The interpersonal relations between some of the key national bureaucrats and the World Bank bureaucrats were characterised by positive affect and trust. In fact, some of these relations were social in nature and involved informal interactions in social settings.[22] Many of these relations were built progressively through repeated work interactions, particularly in risky and emotionally charged situations such as the relief efforts in the aftermath of the 1999 Marmara earthquake in Turkey (interview 1; interview 2; interview 27). In addition to these shared experiences, the pertinent national bureaucrats and Bank bureaucrats sharing the language of English as well as a commitment to poverty alleviation seem to have also

[22] Examples of such social interactions ranged from playing tennis together (Interview 5) to being called for help after police detention (Interview 27).

contributed to furthering mutual trust (interview 2). It is also worth highlighting that some of these relations between national bureaucrats and World Bank bureaucrats have persisted personally or professionally long after the diffusion of the CCT (interview 2; interview 5; interview 6; interview 27; interview 35). These interpersonal relations characterised by positive affect and trust seem to have played a major role in CCT's diffusion to Turkey. Not only national bureaucrats were willing to meet and listen to the World Bank bureaucrats' analyses and advice, they were also willing to trust the information and advice presented.

5.2. Diffusion of the CCT Model to Indonesia

5.2.1. Framing Events

The idea of the CCT model was initially discussed in Indonesia in the context of the compensation package to accompany a major fuel subsidy adjustment in 2005 and the overall transition from universal price subsidies to targeted social assistance programs (interview 10; interview 22). It was the idea of cash transfers, not only conditional but all types, that was initially brought to the attention of two key techno-politicians by World Bank bureaucrats in the country office and a consultant with expertise in cash transfers hired by the country office during informal meetings (interview 10; interview 21). Soon after, the idea of the cash transfers was shared with the Vice President by these techno-politicians.

At that point, the CCT program was left out of this compensation package by the Vice President during a private meeting attended by some cabinet ministers and

World Bank bureaucrats in July 2005. At this meeting, following a presentation by a World Bank bureaucrat and the above-mentioned consultant on compensation schemes with a focus on cash transfers, the Vice President opted for a short-term unconditional cash transfer (UCT) program instead of a long-term CCT program, to expand the compensation package (interview 9; interview 10; interview 19: interview 20; interview 21). Yet, the CCT idea had already started to gain traction among key techno-politicians, national bureaucrats, and World Bank bureaucrats in the country.

Before discussing the details of the subsequent policy process leading to CCT's eventual adoption, the links between the fuel subsidy adjustment and the CCT program are further examined to understand the precise nature of the framing events underlying the CCT's diffusion. One aspect of this link concerns the initial exposure of World Bank bureaucrats, national bureaucrats, and techno-politicians to the idea of the CCT model. The other link concerns the fiscal space created by the fuel subsidy adjustment that facilitated the introduction of new programs in general and the CCT model in particular.

By 2005, the fiscal pressure from the fuel subsidy made substantial adjustment a must for the new government (Ikhsan 2008; Widianto 2013). The general idea of targeted cash transfers came onto the political agenda of the President and the Vice President as part of the discussions on alternatives to fuel subsidies (interview 22). Concurrently, World Bank bureaucrats in the country office provided technical analyses of the potential welfare effects of different fuel subsidy adjustment options and accompanying compensation packages to top-level bureaucrats and techno-politicians (interview 20). At this point, while the pertinent World Bank bureaucrats in the country office had some general knowledge about targeted cash transfer models including the CCT, they decided to hire a short-term external consultant with expertise in the design of compensation schemes to help build the country office's internal knowledge base (interview 10; interview 21; interview 28).

The lack of a particular preference for hiring a consultant with expertise in the CCT model should be noted as it strongly suggests that the CCT model was not necessarily the preferred social assistance model among World Bank bureaucrats in the country office in 2005. It is also worth highlighting because this external consultant's knowledge about the CCT model played a critical role in influencing both the Bank and national bureaucrats. In other words, if the external consultant hired by the Bank happened to have expertise only on unconditional cash transfer programs or work-for-cash programs and no substantial knowledge about the CCT model, it seems highly unlikely that the CCT model would have diffused to Indonesia at this point in time.

The fiscal space created by the subsidy adjustment also played a critical role in the eventual adoption of the CCT model. The original idea of including a cash transfer program in the compensation package to accompany the fuel subsidy adjustment came at a time when the expansion of existing social assistance programs had proven to be too slow and too small to fill up the fiscal space created by the subsidy adjustment (interview 12). In fact, part of UCT's appeal was related to its ability to dispense large amounts of money in a relatively short period of time (interview 12; interview 18) (The World Bank 2005). Similarly, the idea of piloting the CCT model could find traction among national bureaucrats relatively easily in part because even after the compensation package came into effect, ample fiscal space remained for the introduction of new programs (interview 13; interview 18).

5.2.2. The Policymaking Process

The subsequent decision process concerning the piloting of the CCT model took place in a small circle of World Bank and national bureaucrats including techno-politicians. Only three months after the Vice President decided to include a short term UCT in the compensation package and exclude a longer term CCT, substantial support for the CCT model had already materialized among key Indonesian techno-politicians and bureaucrats. In fact, about a month after the first tranche of the UCT commenced in October 2005, a World Bank document already referred to the Government agreeing to piloting the CCT program upon the completion of the UCT in the third quarter of 2006 (The World Bank 2005). Thus, contrary to findings of an earlier study on CCT's adoption in Indonesia (Kwon and Kim 2015), it seems unlikely that CCT was introduced to replace the UCT because of the negative social and political reactions to the UCT, given the above-mentioned reference to the Government's agreement to piloting the CCT in a World Bank document as early as October 2005. This point is further supported by the fact that from the very beginning, UCT was designed to be a temporary program as demonstrated by the distribution of only four coupons to beneficiary families for the quarterly payments.

Data from interviews and document reviews are insufficient to draw inferences with certainty about the precise event at which the decision to pilot the CCT model was made. The most likely scenario involves a small group of World Bank bureaucrats and Indonesian techno-politicians and bureaucrats making use of the fiscal space and policy attention created by the fuel subsidy adjustment to introduce what they perceived to be the next generation of poverty alleviation programs. Several informal meetings between World Bank bureaucrats and Indonesian techno-politicians and bureaucrats in the aftermath of the above-mentioned meeting with the Vice President seem to have played a substantial role in the solidification of the bureaucratic support for the CCT model (interview 15; interview 18; interview 19; interview 20).

An informal fiscal green light for piloting the CCT program was given in early 2006. Subsequently, the techno-political and bureaucratic support for the CCT model solidified into a policy design process with technical support from the World Bank in the form of expert secondements and provision of technical documents (interview 12; interview 13; interview 14; interview 19; interview 20). In June 2006, a group of Indonesian bureaucrats and the key techno-politician attended an international conference on the CCT model organized by the World Bank where their support for piloting the CCT model in Indonesia was further solidified (interview 15; interview 19; interview 21). Soon after, the CCT pilot was included in the draft annual budget submitted to the Parliament for review and approval. Upon Parliament's approval, the piloting of the CCT model began in 2007 in seven provinces covering about half a million families. Its coverage has since been expanding; in 2016, 6 million families benefited from the CCT program in Indonesia.

5.2.3. Notable Enabling Dynamics

Mirroring the case of CCT's diffusion to Turkey, two similar dynamics oiled the wheels of CCT's diffusion to Indonesia. The first such dynamic concerned the national and World Bank bureaucrats' motivation. Similar to the case of CCT's diffusion to Turkey, the perceived desirability of the CCT model by the relevant World Bank bureaucrats and Indonesian bureaucrats was not centred on the model's ability to mitigate the negative effects of the fuel subsidy adjustment on poor households. They viewed the CCT model as an opportunity to introduce a more effective and targeted approach to poverty alleviation through social assistance (interview 10; interview 18). Thus, CCT's diffusion to Indonesia, like Turkey, is not the story of satisficing bureaucrats who draw lessons from other countries haphazardly in the face of a crisis (Rose 1991). The national bureaucrats in Indonesia, in contrast, used a fiscal and political opportunity, identified, and adopted a good practice from another country as part of their ongoing efforts to improve the social assistance system in their country.

The second dynamic concerned the interpersonal relations between the national bureaucrats and techno-politicians, and World Bank bureaucrats and consultants. These relations played a critical role in CCT's diffusion to Indonesia, even more so than they did in Turkey, because of the intensity of the anti-World Bank sentiment in the country (interview 9). Not only national bureaucrats were willing to meet and listen to World Bank bureaucrats' analyses and advice during at times backdoor meetings, they were also willing to trust the information and advice presented. In fact, on a number of occasions, national bureaucrats actively sought out technical support from individual World Bank bureaucrats (interview 10; interview 18; interview 20). These trusting and close interpersonal relations played a crucial role in enabling individual Bank bureaucrats to engage in a series of policy processes in Indonesia that eventually brought about the diffusion of the CCT.

Many of these interpersonal relations pre-existed the fuel subsidy adjustment. They were based on earlier interactions these individuals had while wearing other hats in different organisations (interview 9; interview 18). Similar to Turkey, working together during the particularly emotionally charged and intensive period in the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami is considered to have particularly strengthened the interpersonal trust between some of the national bureaucrats and the World Bank bureaucrats (interview 10; interview 18). Interestingly, some of the newer relations that were built in the process of responding to the fuel subsidy adjustment were in fact based on referrals from these long-lasting relations. Finally, it is worth noting that several of these older and newer relations existed personally or professionally even by the time the interviews were conducted for this study in 2014 (interview 10; interview 20).

5.3. Positioning the Diffusion in its Political and Economic Context

While these accounts of CCT's diffusion to Turkey and Indonesia focus mostly on micro-level processes, as shown by the framing events in both cases, the opening of a policy window as a result of domestic political and economic factors emerges as a precondition to CCT's early-stage adoption in both countries. Mirroring Fink's findings on privatization in telecommunications sector in OECD countries (2013), domestic contexts in both Turkey and Indonesia appears to be what motivated the initial search for new social assistance policies. More specifically, the 2001 economic crisis in Turkey and the 2005 fuel subsidy adjustment in Indonesia both hold the traits of a "problem stream" ripe for the opening of a policy window. Each of these events triggered the search for large-scale social assistance programs to support poor households and brought the CCT model to the policy agenda. Similarly, both 2001 in Turkey and 2005 in Indonesia were unique periods characterized by politicians and bureaucrats highly responsive to social needs. The responsiveness in Turkey was primarily related to the devastating earthquake in 1999 that put a spotlight on the deadly results of corruption and lethargy. Subsequently, it gave rise to a deep sense of mission and drive among both politicians and bureaucrats in Turkey (Interview

30; Interview 33). The 2001 economic crisis came as a second shock to the system and further heightened the sense of mission and high gear activity (Interview 30). In Indonesia, the government had just come to power through the first-ever direct presidential elections and had also just responded to the devastating tsunami that hit the region in December 2004. Thus, these periods held the traits of a “political stream” ripe for the opening of a policy window.

In the absence of such a policy window, it seems unlikely that there would have been adequate political or bureaucratic interest in finding new social assistance models, or adequate receptivity to the transfer of a model from another country. In fact, an earlier attempt by World Bank bureaucrats working in the education sector in Turkey for the introduction of a cash transfer program with conditions was outright rejected (Interview 3; Interview 34). Similarly, the social investment fund, which like the CCT was introduced in the aftermath of the 2001 economic crisis as part of the SRMP, had been repeatedly rejected or put on the backburner by national bureaucrats despite prior efforts of World Bank bureaucrats for its adoption in Turkey (Interview 1).

This link between the presence of a policy window and the introduction of new social assistance programs, including the CCT, was strengthened by fiscal factors, namely the presence of adequate fiscal space. However, contrary to earlier findings about the positive relation between economic recovery from the debt crisis and CCT’s diffusion (Brooks 2015) whereby a fiscal space is created from economic recovery, in the cases of both Turkey and Indonesia, the fiscal space used for CCT model's implementation came in the aftermath of economic shocks. For Turkey, this fiscal space was created by a World Bank loan that came in the midst of a deepening debt crisis and worsening risk of recession following an economic crisis. In this context, borrowing from the World Bank for the CCT program made economic sense since it both facilitated cash insertion into a contracting economy and demonstrated to other lenders the economy's continuing credibility (Interview 2; Interview 33: Interview 35). In the case of Indonesia, the fiscal space was created by a massive fuel subsidy adjustment. The introduction of new social assistance programs with fast and wide disbursement schemes came partly as a response to the perceived risk of economic contraction combined with this fiscal space whose size went well beyond the needs of balancing the budget (Interview 12; Interview 18) (The World Bank 2005). Even after the introduction of a large compensation package in the immediate aftermath of the fuel subsidy adjustment, the remaining fiscal space was still large enough that the inclusion of the pilot CCT program in the national budget did not raise any eyebrows (Interview 13; Interview 18).

Thus, the presence of a policy window combined with adequate fiscal space emerge as a precondition for the model to diffuse to Turkey and to Indonesia as early as it did. The presence of a policy window, however, was not a sufficient factor since it does not account for the emergence of the CCT model onto the policy agenda and its selection over alternative social assistance policies that were equally or more attractive to politicians for their positive electoral implications. The CCT model ended up diffusing to Turkey and Indonesia as early as it did because the policy window and fiscal space were coalesced with the active engagement of certain World Bank bureaucrats in the policy process using their trust-based inter-personal relations with national bureaucrats. Admittedly, it is probable that the CCT model might have diffused to Turkey and Indonesia at a later point in time even in the absence of a similar policy window and fiscal space given the faddish status the model acquired in the late 2000s.

6. LEARNING AS THE DIFFUSION MECHANISM AT PLAY

Having described the main events and enabling dynamics underlying the CCT's diffusion to Turkey and Indonesia, this section investigates the diffusion mechanisms at play in these two cases. Understanding the mechanism of diffusion at play is crucial to understanding the role of World Bank bureaucrats in these mechanisms. To this end, the section uses the four tests presented in the theory section of the paper to empirically distinguish between different kinds of diffusion mechanisms. The subsequent analyses of both cases strongly suggest learning to be the primary mechanism for CCT's diffusion to Turkey and Indonesia.

Test #1 (Hoop Test for Emulation): Does the Model Have Social Value or Normative Appeal?

With respect to the first test concerning the normative appeal of the model, the CCT model was in the nascent stages of becoming a globally recognized model in both 2001 and 2005. In 2001, the term CCT had just been coined and the model was just starting to find some traction in some Latin American countries and inside the World Bank. By 2005, the model had gained some level of popularity in Latin America but was still relatively unknown in the rest of the world. Similarly, it had found limited traction among the sectoral experts inside the World Bank, particularly in country offices. In fact, in the case of Indonesia, national bureaucrats were aware of the competing views inside the World Bank about the CCT model (interview 13). Thus, in neither 2001 nor 2005, the CCT had yet gained its faddish status inside the World Bank or reached a tipping point in its global diffusion.

Thus, short of being perceived as a hegemonic idea or a global fad by national bureaucrats, it is unlikely that the CCT model's diffusion to Turkey and to Indonesia was driven by its perceived normative value or quest for international legitimacy. Similarly, it also seems unlikely that the adoption of the CCT model was driven by its perceived social value. Such social value is often peer-based and more like a form of isomorphic mimicry (Brooks 2005; Berry and Berry 2007; Obinger, Schmitt, and Starke 2013). Neither Turkey nor Indonesia had substantial social contact or common cultural ties with Mexico or Brazil, the two recognized pioneers of the CCT model. Thus, overall, it seems highly unlikely that emulation was the primary mechanism of CCT's diffusion to Turkey and Indonesia.

Test #2 (Hoop Test for Coercion): Is a Powerful Country/IO Playing the

Leadership Role?

As regards the second test concerning the nature of the involvement of external actors, Mexico seems to be the only country at the time actively engaged in promoting the CCT model and it seems unlikely that Mexico was in a position to use any hard or soft power to coerce Turkey and Indonesia into adopting the CCT model. In terms of IOs, however, the World Bank was clearly involved in the diffusion of the CCT model to both countries. Then, the relevant question for the second dimension concerns the precise nature of the Bank's involvement.

Firstly, explicit conditions were not part of the interaction between the World Bank bureaucrats and national bureaucrats in Turkey or Indonesia concerning the CCT model (interview 2; interview 10; interview 35). More particularly, interviews with national bureaucrats and World Bank bureaucrats repeatedly refer to their equal relations and the national policymakers extensive "latitude for choice" (interview 1; interview 2; interview 3; interview 4: interview 5; interview 9; interview 15; interview 18; interview 22) (Weyland 2006). Also, there were several episodes in the past where proposals brought to the table by World Bank bureaucrats were rejected by national bureaucrats (interview 1; interview 3; interview 10), which supports the claims about the extensive "latitude for choice" and World Bank bureaucrats' limited ability to persuade national bureaucrats. Hence, the presence of explicit conditionalities seems unlikely in both of the cases.

Concerning implicit conditions, however, establishing their presence or absence based on interviews and accessible archival materials is relatively complicated. For instance, one cannot establish with any level of certainty the extent to which national bureaucrats took into account their CCT-related decision's implications for pending or future loans from the World Bank. Thus, the empirical observations do not allow us to eliminate the possibility that national bureaucrats and politicians may have been partly concerned about preserving good relations with the World Bank when adopting the CCT model. Yet even if the presence of such considerations by national bureaucrats and politicians were to be assumed, qualifying the primary diffusion mechanism to be at play in Turkey and Indonesia as coercion based only on this would be an overstretch of the boundaries of what constitutes reasonable interpretation.

Test #3 (Straw-in-the-Wind Test for Emulation vs. Learning): Are Policymakers Seeking a Solution to a Problem or Trying to Send a Signal?

Turning to the third test concerning the motives of domestic actors involved in the policymaking process, empirical observations are in concurrence in that the CCT model came on to the policy agenda as part of a search for a solution to a problem in both Turkey and Indonesia. As to the motives of the domestic actors, however, the empirical observations seem less conclusive. In both cases, national bureaucrats and politicians were concerned with both the impact of the economic shocks on poor households and its political ramifications via social unrest. Consequently, the assessment of the CCT model was likely made on one or both of these grounds. In other words, during the decision process, domestic actors were concerned with mitigating the negative effects of an economic shock on poor households and/or sending a signal to the public about government's responsiveness in an effort to prevent social unrest.

While empirical observations do not allow for deciphering the precise composition of motives, based on a counterfactual analysis, it seems more likely that in both Turkey and Indonesia the adoption of the CCT model was motivated more by a concern about the effects of the economic shock on poor households and a desire to improve social assistance systems. To put it differently, if the primary motive was sending a signal to the public to prevent social unrest, rapidly disbursed and highly visible unconditional cash transfers was a more obvious choice. In fact, in both countries, such cash transfers were carried out in the immediate aftermath of the shock and received sizable media coverage (Hastuti et al. 2006; Zabci 2006; Widjaja 2009). In contrast, the CCT model's adoption and piloting came several months after the economic shocks, at a time when the immediate risk posed by social unrest had long diminished (Gemici 2013). Thus, the third dimension of the litmus test seems to provide further support for the conclusion from the first test. That is, the mechanism at play in CCT's diffusion to Turkey and Indonesia is unlikely to have been emulation.

Test #4 (Straw-in-the-Wind Test for Emulation vs. Learning): What is the Depth of Learning?

Turning to the fourth test concerning the depth and nature of learning in the course of the policy making process, empirical observations suggest a relatively shallow learning by key decision makers and a relatively deep learning by key bureaucrats assigned the task of designing the CCT program. Even in cases of relatively shallow learning, however, the key decision makers requested information about different options available and the experiences of other countries (interview 1; interview 2; interview 10: interview 21; interview 33). On several occasions, national bureaucrats and World Bank bureaucrats were asked to present key decision makers in Turkey and in Indonesia with verbal information about the experiences of different countries with different social assistance models. This suggests that key decision makers were genuinely interested in learning about the models to assess their appropriateness and effectiveness although their learning was relatively shallow.

Together, these four tests strongly suggest that not emulation or coercion but learning to be the primary mechanism at play for the diffusion of the CCT model to Turkey and to Indonesia.

7. CLOSER LOOK AT LEARNING AND BANK BUREAUCRATS

When looked closer, both of the cases of diffusion consist of what could be construed as two consecutive stages of learning. The first stage involves a small circle of key bureaucrats, techno-politicians, and elected officials who make the initial decision to adopt the CCT model. Learning at this stage is relatively shallow and is mediated by World Bank bureaucrats and consultants. The second stage involves a small circle of bureaucrats who are assigned the task of planning CCT's implementation. Learning at this stage is relatively deep. It involves direct learning from implementers from other countries through conferences and study visits organized by World Bank bureaucrats as well as indirect learning mediated by World Bank bureaucrats and consultants. Moreover, this second stage goes beyond sheer policy planning; it represents a solidification and confirmation of the initial policy decision to adopt the CCT model. In other words, if the key bureaucrats were un-convinced of the desirability of the CCT upon acquisition of further information about the model and its technical and administrative requirements, they could have reversed the initial decision either by "shirking" or actively "sabotaging" the new policy (Brehm and Gates 1997) yet they did not.

When we examine World Bank bureaucrats' engagement in learning during these two consecutive stages of policy decision and policy design, the findings reveal a wide range of tools employed and roles played by these bureaucrats. During the policy decision phases in Turkey and Indonesia, World Bank bureaucrats were involved primarily in identifying and exploring different models of social assistance. In Turkey, World Bank bureaucrats presented a package of social assistance options at the initial stages of program design and soon after the crisis. In this package and subsequent presentations, the pertinent social protection expert at the World Bank expressed a particularly positive opinion about the CCT model (interview 2; interview 35).[23] In Indonesia, despite the

[23] Internal project document (project concept note) shared anonymously.

absence of a loan, the World Bank bureaucrats based in Jakarta hired an external consultant on cash transfers to build their own knowledge base, approached some key bureaucrats and techno-politicians with a view to providing technical support in their design of a compensation package, and facilitated informal meetings between these key actors and the external consultant (interview 10; interview 20; interview 21; interview 22). After the Vice President left the CCT model out of the compensation package, World Bank bureaucrats continued to engage with these key bureaucrats and techno-politicians through informal meetings regarding the piloting of the CCT model (interview 15; interview 18; interview 19; interview 20).

In both countries, the World Bank bureaucrats remained actively engaged in the technical design stage of the CCT program. In Turkey, Bank bureaucrats facilitated national bureaucrats' learning about the CCT model by organizing study visits, presenting them with relevant documents, and sharing their own technical expertise (interview 1; interview 2; interview 6; interview 27; interview 33). Similarly, in Indonesia, the World Bank bureaucrats facilitated strengthening of national bureaucrats' knowledge through organizing study visits, enabling participation in an international conference on the CCT, and by making relevant documents available (interview 12; interview 13; interview 15; interview 19: interview 20). Additionally, the World Bank seconded experts who provided technical guidance for the design of the pilot program (interview 18; interview 19; interview 21).

Overall, empirical observations suggest that the roles played by World Bank bureaucrats in these cases notably diverge from the roles put forward in existing studies of later-stage diffusion. Contrary to existing studies on IOs' roles in the diffusion of "bread-and-butter" technical policies (Walt, Lush, and Ogden 2004), for instance, the World Bank bureaucrats in these two cases do not appear to play any role in knowledge generation or standardization of the CCT model, which was undertaken by Mexican bureaucrats. In terms of Bank bureaucrats' role in the marketing of the CCT model at the policy decision phase, what is observed in the cases of Turkey and Indonesia does not resemble the kind of rigorous promotion described by scholars studying the role of the World Bank in later stages of CCT's global diffusion (Sugiyama 2011; Hall 2015; Clemens and Kremer 2016) or the kind of top-down advocate stance described by scholars studying the role of IOs in other policy diffusion processes (Ogden, Walt, and Lush 2003; Stone 2004). In fact, not only the Bank bureaucrats do not seem to have used any hard power in these two cases of CCT's diffusion, they also seem to not use soft power as we know it. Instead, the Bank bureaucrats' engagement resembles the kind of collective puzzlement described by Heclo vis-à-vis domestic actors' engagement in social policy reforms (1974). In other words, paralleling the powering versus collective puzzlement dichotomy shaping the policymaking literature, these two cases suggest that a similar dichotomy might indeed exist in international bureaucrats influencing domestic policy processes.

What empirical observations from these two cases suggest is that World Bank bureaucrats influenced domestic policy processes not through powering, be it hard or soft, but by being able to take part in the national bureaucracy's collective puzzlement in finding new policies. In other words, national and international bureaucrats were together engaged in collective puzzlement whereby individual bureaucrats brought their personal experiences and convictions to the table, learning from each other, and persuading each other. More concretely, in both the case of Turkey and the case of Indonesia, national bureaucrats were joined by World Bank bureaucrats in their search for a policy for mitigating the effects of a crisis on poor households. In the case of Turkey, a World Bank bureaucrat with recent exposure to the CCT model put it forward as a solution to this collective puzzlement but did so because of personal conviction and not because of World Bank's organisational position. In the case of Indonesia, the World Bank bureaucrats were exposed to the details of the CCT model almost at the same time with their national counterparts. Following this initial exposure, these Bank bureaucrats personally convinced of the fit of the CCT model to the Indonesian needs, put it forward as a solution to an ongoing collective puzzlement. Similar to the case of Turkey, they did so because of their personal conviction and not because of an organisational position. In fact, in both cases, other World Bank bureaucrats actively opposed the adoption of the CCT model by Turkey and Indonesia.

What is also revealed by these two cases of early-stage, inter-regional diffusion of the CCT model is the centrality of trust-based interpersonal relations between individual World Bank bureaucrats and individual national bureaucrats. These interpersonal relations is what seem to have enabled individual World Bank bureaucrats' to engage in the domestic policy process and influence the ultimate outcome of CCT's diffusion because the national bureaucrats were willing to trust the information and advice presented by these Bank bureaucrats. In other words, trust between the national bureaucrats and World Bank bureaucrats seem to have played a "mediating role" in learning about the CCT model (Levin 2004) that went well beyond making the model salient and available, and watching the "availability heuristic" do its magic. In Turkey, the key national bureaucrat was willing to trust the advice of the World Bank social protection expert concerning the appropriateness and effectiveness of the CCT model despite having limited knowledge about the details of the model. Similarly, in Indonesia, the key techno-politicians were willing to trust the advice of the World Bank bureaucrats/consultant concerning compensation schemes and the CCT model based on their presentations and assessments without having any prior knowledge about the model themselves. Thus, this paper contends that trust-based interpersonal relations played a critical role in both cases by allowing World Bank bureaucrats to access national decision making processes and influence the pertinent bureaucrats and techno-politicians regarding the value of the CCT model (interview 2; interview 4; interview 5; interview 9; interview 10; interview 18: interview 21).

Empirical observations from these two cases regarding World Bank bureaucrats' role in policy diffusion via learning align with findings from empirical studies of trust-based learning in organisational learning literature. This literature identifies interpersonal trust as a moderator variable in knowledge diffusion via learning. The antecedents of such trust include perceived competence, benevolence and integrity (Mayer et al. 1995; Rousseau et al. 1998; Levin 2004). Indeed, these antecedents were largely in place in both Turkey and Indonesia. National bureaucrats and World Bank bureaucrats in both countries respected each others' competences, counted on in each others' good will, and believed in a set of shared values (interview 2; interview 5; interview 9; interview 10; interview 18; interview 21) (Mayer et al. 1995), all of which contributed to their perceptions of mutual trustworthiness.

The suggestion that trust-based interpersonal learning was critical in CCT's diffusion to Turkey and Indonesia in no way implies that learning was based solely on social information mediated by World Bank bureaucrats and consultants or that cognition had no role in the learning process. Firstly, key national bureaucrats all took into consideration their prior experiences during both policy decision and design phases (interview 19; interview 33; interview 27). Secondly, particularly during the policy design phase, national bureaucrats learned directly about the CCT model and used this in-depth knowledge not only in designing CCT's implementation but also in verifying their initial assessment and confirming their earlier decision to adopt this model. The depth of learning as well as the degree to which the learning was social versus cognitive varied between different bureaucrats, techno-politicians, and elected officials who took part in the policy decision and design processes. Yet, for all of them, information and advice relayed by “trustworthy” Bank bureaucrats played a critical role in their ultimate decision to adopt the CCT model.

Taken as a whole, the empirical observations from both cases suggest trust-based interpersonal relations between national bureaucrats and World Bank bureaucrats to be an integral part of CCT’s early-stage, inter-regional diffusion. These interpersonal relations facilitated World Bank bureaucrats joining national bureaucrats in their collective puzzlement in search of new social assistance models. In the absence of such relations, it seems unlikely that the World Bank bureaucrats would have been able to engage with and influence the policy processes in Turkey and Indonesia to the extent that they did. Consequently, it seems unlikely that in the absence of such a relationship, these two countries would have adopted the CCT model as early as they did.

It is worth noting that this conclusion does not preclude the possibility that in the absence of these trust-based relations, the CCT model à la Mexico may have been adopted in Turkey or Indonesia at a later point particularly given the faddish status the model acquired in subsequent years. This suggestion also does not preclude the possibility that in the absence of this relationship, another cash transfer program with conditions may have been adopted in 2001 in Turkey and in 2005 in Indonesia. As described in an earlier section, several countries including Indonesia in 1998, designed cash transfer programs with conditions without any discernible influence from Mexico's Progresa program. In other words, the trust-based relations between World Bank bureaucrats and national bureaucrats was critical for the diffusion of the CCT model à la Mexico to Turkey and Indonesia as early as it did.

8. CONCLUSION

Taken together, the findings presented in this paper provide new insights into our understanding of IO's roles in early-stage policy diffusion processes. Although the World Bank employed different tools of engagement in the cases studied (financial services in the case of CCT's diffusion to Turkey and technical assistance in the case of CCT's diffusion to Indonesia), in both cases learning emerged as the primary mechanism of diffusion. Similarly, although the tools employed by the World Bank were different in Turkey and Indonesia, in both countries the World Bank bureaucrats influenced domestic policy processes not through powering but by being able to join national bureaucrats in their collective puzzlement in identifying new social assistance policies. Finally, in both of these cases of early-stage inter-regional diffusion, trust-based relations between national bureaucrats and World Bank bureaucrats played a critical role because it enabled World Bank bureaucrats to join national bureaucrats in their collective puzzlement and to influence these processes.

Possibly the most pertinent theoretical implication of this study is the need to incorporate interpersonal social and emotive elements into studies of IOs' roles in learning as a transnational policy diffusion mechanism, which is in no way a novel idea when put in the context of social psychology, innovation diffusion, and organisational learning literatures. In terms of the policy implications of this paper, the findings presented speak directly to the ongoing conversation in academic and policy circles concerning a new role for the World Bank that would focus on influencing policy changes in developing countries (Clemens and Kremer 2016). The cases of CCT's diffusion to Turkey and to Indonesia provide some clues about the elements that contribute to World Bank bureaucrats' effective involvement in policymaking processes, including the Bank's in-country presence that contribute to long-term, trust-based relations with national actors. In both cases studied, the decentralized nature of the World Bank operations allowed in-country Bank bureaucrats to build close relations with national bureaucrats and to provide timely input into time-sensitive decision processes (interview 4; interview 10; interview 18).

More broadly, this paper reconfirms the need to refrain from assuming uniformity of diffusion mechanisms and IOs' roles in these mechanisms across time and space (Sharman 2008). The findings presented in this paper from two case studies of early-stage, inter-regional diffusion of the CCT model are, to a large extent, at odds with findings presented in other studies of regional and global diffusion of the CCT model and the World Bank's role as a zealot for the CCT model in these diffusions (Sugiyama 2011; Brooks 2015; Hall 2015; Simpson 2017; Borges 2018). The findings are different because the studies focus on different time periods and geographic areas of CCT's diffusion, suggesting that time and space matter for the mechanism of policy diffusion and IOs' role in this mechanism. Recognizing that neither the relevant policy nor the relevant IO is static through a global diffusion process, incorporating this constant change into our conceptualisation of IOs' roles in global diffusion processes remains critical to empirical studies in this realm.

As important as the incorporation of continuous change into studies of IOs' roles in global diffusion is the recognition of IOs as non-monolithic actors. As demonstrated in the two cases studied in this paper, international bureaucrats in the same IO can pull and push in different directions regarding a specific policy's desirability and promotion, particularly prior to a policy becoming an international norm or at least a well-accepted component of an organisation's policy toolbox. Incorporating the internal heterogeneity of the IOs and the importance of individual bureaucrats into studies of IOs' roles in policy diffusion is crucial for future analyses to better approximate a highly complex reality, which is often tainted with some serendipity.

Finally, this paper further confirms the need for more studies about the micro-processes of policy diffusion and the roles played by IOs in these processes. As expressed by Dobbin et al. "for the more evidence we compile that narrows down the possible explanations of the diffusion of particular policies to certain countries in specific time periods, the closer we will be to understanding which mechanisms are at work, when, and where" (2007, 464). Further studies that investigate both positive and negative cases of diffusion using within-case process tracing with a comparative angle could be a fruitful next step in this regard.

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Appendix 1: List of Interviews

Interview 1, 18 March 2014, Washington, DC
Interview 2, 19 March 2014, Washington, DC
Interview 3, 21 March 2014, Skype
Interview 4, 24 March 2014, Washington, DC
Interview 5, 24 March 2014, Washington, DC
Interview 6, 28 December 2015, Skype
Interview 7, 29 May 2014, Washington, DC
Interview 8, 23 June 2014, Skype
Interview 9, 18 July 2014, Skype
Interview 10, 9 July 2014, Skype
Interview 11, 24 June 2014, Skype
Interview 12, 8 April 2014, Jakarta
Interview 13, 8 April 2014, Jakarta
Interview 14, 9 April 2014, Skype
Interview 15, 12 April 2014, Jakarta
Interview 16, 13 April 2014, Jakarta
Interview 17, 15 April 2014, Jakarta
Interview 18, 17 April 2014, Jakarta
Interview 19, 10 April 2014, Jakarta
Interview 20, 23 April 2014, Jakarta
Interview 21, 22 April 2014, Jakarta
Interview 22, 11 April 2014, Jakarta
Interview 23, 27 November 2013, Ankara
Interview 24, 29 November 2013, Ankara
Interview 25, 2 December 2013, Ankara
Interview 26, 28 November 2013, Ankara
Interview 27, 21 January 2014, Ankara
Interview 28, 2 December 2013, Ankara
Interview 29, 10 December 2013, Ankara
Interview 30, 17 December 2013, Ankara
Interview 31, 3 December 2013, Ankara
Interview 32, 16 December 2013, Ankara
Interview 33, 7 July 2014, Skype
Interview 34, 13 December 2013, Ankara
Interview 35, 20 December 2013, Ankara
Interview 36, 30 December 2013, Istanbul
Interview 37, 20 January 2014, Ankara
Interview 38, 24 December 2013, Ankara
Interview 39, 23 November 2015, Skype

Appendix 2: Code Tree used in Analyzing Interview Data (short version)

1. Actors
    a. Bureaucrats
    b. Politicians
    c. Consultants
2. Structural Factors/Conditions
    a. Capacity
        i. Administrative
        ii. Data Availability
        iii. Technical Knowledge
        iv. Technological
    b. Economic/Fiscal
        i. Economic Crisis
        ii. Fiscal Space
    c. Evidence
    d. Ideology/Culture
        i. Ideas about Poverty
    e. Individual Factors
    f. Institutional Factors
        i. National Bureaucratic Rules and Procedures
        ii. National Political Rules and Procedures
        iii. World Bank Rules and Procedures
    g. Leadership
    h. Policy Landscape
        i. Available Policy Options
        ii. Competing Policy Options
        iii. Existing Policies
        iv. Parallel Policies
        v. Policy Legacy
    i. Political Factors
        i. Concerns about Re-Election
        ii. Interest Groups
        iii. Political Opposition
    j. Temporal Factors
        i. Sense of Urgency
3. Diffusion of CCT Idea into World Bank
4. Events
    a. Significance of Event
        i. Adaptation/Modification
        ii. CCT Idea First Heard
        iii. Decision Made
        iv. Information Sharing/Learning
        v. Trustbuilding

    b. Timing of Event
        i. Decision
        ii. Implementation
        iii. Leading to Decision
        iv. Pre-Crisis
        v. Preparing for Implementation
    c. Type of Event
        i. Conference
        ii. Crisis
        iii. Field Visit
        iv. Formal Meeting
        v. Informal Meeting
        vi. Internal Work/Research
        vii. Joint Work
        viii. Study Visit
5. Issues of Contention
6. Relations
    a. Nature of Relationship
    b. Type of Relationship

CHAPTER 4

The Bargaining Bureaucrat: Policy Bargains and Effects of Political Context and Organisational Traits on Bureaucrats' Policy Influence

1. INTRODUCTION

Bureaucratic influence in policymaking processes has been a contested topic in both popular and scholarly debates. The power of bureaucrats to initiate, shape and resist policy change has been feared by some as the doom of democracy (Strauss 1961; Niskanen 1975) and celebrated by others as a last resort against corrupt politicians (Miller and Whitford 2016). As a result, the topic has received considerable attention among scholars of political institutions and public administration. However, much of this attention has focused on the policy influence of either bureaucracy as a whole or of selected bureaucratic agencies. The policy influence of individual bureaucrats and the determinants of this influence have received only scant attention. This paper aims to take a step toward addressing this gap in the literature by focussing on individual bureaucrats' policy influence and investigating the effects of political context and organisational traits on this influence.

To do so, this paper puts its spotlight on individual bureaucrats and their interactions in policymaking processes. Following in the footsteps of Brehm and Gates, this paper contends that individual bureaucrats and their interactions is what constitutes the "essence of bureaucracy" (2014, 27). It concurs with Nordlinger who argues that "a conception of state that does not have individuals at its core could lead directly to anthropomorphic and reification fallacies" since "only individuals have preferences and engage in actions that make for their realization" (1981, 9). Thus, this paper suggests that a study of bureaucratic influence with a focus on individual bureaucrats and their interactions would be able to reveal various aspects of the "crucible of administrative politics" (Rourke 1976, ix) that are currently overlooked by the existing body of research on bureaucratic influence.

In doing so, it joins a relatively nascent body of research that study individual bureaucrats' experiences in policymaking (Page and Jenkins 2005; Page 2012). Its contribution to this body of research is two-fold. First, it puts forward a novel analytical model based on bargaining theory to analyse bureaucrats' engagement in policymaking processes. Second, it goes beyond being an exploratory study on bureaucrats' influence in policymaking. Using this novel policy bargaining model, the study examines the effects of two major structural factors on individual bureaucrats' policy influence: the political context and organisational traits.

To this end, the study is designed as a layered comparison. The first layer focusses on the political context, and more particularly on cabinet types and government stability, with a view to capturing different levels of political control over the bureaucracy. For this layer, the study compares two consecutive decade-long periods in recent political history of Turkey: 1991-2002 period of short-lived coalition governments where different political parties tried to control the bureaucracy while in power yet their control was limited in scope and duration; and 2002-2013 period of long-serving single-party governments where a single political party tried to extend its control over the bureaucracy and was successful in doing so. The second layer of the comparison focusses on organisational traits and compares two types of social policy agencies in Turkey: the ministry of education typifying a large implementation agency and the ministry of development typifying a small policy agency. The study does not treat political context and organisational context as independent factors and highlights their interaction. More concretely, organisational traits are investigated not only in terms of their direct effects on bureaucrats' policy influence but also in terms of their moderating role on the effects of political context. To do so, the study examines the extent to which the effect of the political context on individual bureaucrats' policy influence varies across different types of organisations.

Given the study's primary interest in the policy influence of individual bureaucrats, its empirical focus remains on episodes of policymaking processes and the bureaucrats' experiences in these processes. To this end, data from 30 semi-structured interviews with bureaucrats from the selected agencies is analysed with a view to identifying the effects of political context and organisational traits on these bureaucrats' engagement and influence in policymaking processes. By rooting itself in bureaucrats' experiences in policymaking, the study aims to provide a fresh perspective to an impressive body of literature on bureaucratic influence that has itself increasingly questioned the fit of its conceptual tools to the reality of bureaucratic politics (Meier and

Krause 2003a; Carpenter and Krause 2015).

The paper adopts a novel analytical model, which is based on bargaining theory, to capture and analyse individual bureaucrats' accounts of their experiences in policymaking processes. It highlights the key elements of a bargaining situation, i.e. utility function, bargaining power, risk tolerance and trust, and explains their materialisation in the context of a policy bargain based on interview data. The paper also describes the different "styles of play" employed by bureaucrats when engaging in policy bargains, and illustrates them with examples of the tools of influence and resistance used by the bureaucrats interviewed.

With respect to the effects of political context on bureaucrats' policy influence, using the same analytical model, the study finds changes in political context and resulting changes in the level of political control to have an effect on individual bureaucrats' policy influence primarily through its effect on their risk calculations in policy bargains. Changes in the political context also affect the policy preferences, bargaining powers, and trust levels of the individuals engaged in a policy bargain, though less consistently and to a lesser extent. Similarly, the study findings suggest that organisational traits, such as agency size, level of expertise, appointment practices and organisational culture, have an effect on individual bureaucrats' influence in policy bargains through their effects on bureaucrats' informal bargaining powers, risk calculations, and trust levels. Findings also suggest that organisational traits of a bureaucratic agency play a moderating role vis-à-vis the effects of political context on bureaucrats' policy influence. That is, those organisational traits that facilitate bureaucrats' influence in policy bargains also serve as a partial shield against the effects of political context on bureaucrats' policy influence.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 opens with an overview of the literature on bureaucratic influence in public policy and positions this paper in this wider literature. It then presents the key elements of the bureaucratic policy bargaining model put forward by this paper and concludes with a definitional discussion on the concept of individual bureaucrats' policy influence. Section 3 describes the study design, method, and data collection. The empirical findings of the study are presented in Section 4 in four parts: (1) the first part provides a detailed discussion of the policy bargain model and presents the findings on the elements affecting policy bargains and bureaucrats' influence in these bargains; (2) the second part presents the different styles of play employed by bureaucrats in policy bargains; (3) the third part discusses the study's findings on the effects of political context on individual bureaucrats' influence in policy bargains; and (4) the fourth part presents the findings on the effects of organisational traits on the same. The paper concludes with a discussion of the theoretical implications of the study's empirical findings.

2. BACKGROUND DISCUSSION

The topic of bureaucratic influence in public policy has received considerable attention among scholars of political institutions and public administration. Yet, most theoretical and empirical investigations of the determinants of bureaucratic influence have looked either at bureaucracy as a whole or at selected bureaucratic agencies. This section starts with a brief overview of this expansive body of literature before proceeding to position this paper within a smaller body of research focusing on individual bureaucrats. It then introduces the analytical model of policy bargaining put forward in this paper and presents a definitional discussion of policy influence of individual bureaucrats against this analytical model.

2.1. Literature Overview

The topic of bureaucratic influence in policymaking has found particular traction among scholars of political institutions and more specifically, among legislative scholars in the United States (see Krause 2011 for a comprehensive review of this literature). Historically, research by legislative scholars investigating the factors associated with bureaucratic influence has focused on the legislature's decision to delegate its policymaking tasks to bureaucracy and the resulting discretion held by the bureaucracy. As such, bureaucratic influence has been treated as the result of this discretion and hence, the outcome of the legislature's delegation decision.[24] This expansive literature on bureaucratic influence in

[24] A primary research question investigated in this body of research has concerned the factors that influence this delegation decision. The degree of policy conflict, political competition, and political uncertainty, among others, have been put forward as relevant factors in this regard (Calvert, McCubbins, and Weingast 1989; Huber and Shipan 2002; McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1989; Moe 1995; Shepsle 1991). Another major area of investigation has focussed on the kinds of tools used by the legislature and the president to control bureaucracy and the limitations of these tools. To this end, scholars have undertaken theoretical and empirical studies on organisational design, administrative procedures, and political appointments, among other tools employed by the legislature and the president to control bureaucracy (Epstein and

policymaking has focused on the policy influence of either bureaucracy as a whole or of selected bureaucratic agencies. The individual bureaucrat has virtually been missing from these studies.

Compared to this expansive literature on bureaucratic politics, the body of literature examining individual bureaucrats' influence in policymaking has been somewhat limited. Even though a fascinating body of research investigating a wide range of case studies of policymaking underscore the influence of bureaucrats in many of these processes (Heclo 1974; Grindle 1977; Hall 1993; Weyland 2006), in most of these studies bureaucrats are treated more like an amorphous body and less like individuals with different preferences and traits. In a handful of case studies where individual bureaucrats are given distinctive faces, they are those who hold the top positions in their bureaucratic agencies (Allison 1999). Similarly, more systematic studies about individual bureaucrats' influence in policymaking processes focus exclusively on the highest echelons of

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O'Halloran 1994; G. a Krause, Lewis, and Douglas 2006; Lewis 2008; McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1989; Moe 1990).

It must be noted that over the past two decades, a growing strand in this literature have put forward an alternative conceptualisation of bureaucratic influence in policymaking that emerges as a result of the dynamic interactions between bureaucratic agencies and other political institutions. As such, bureaucratic influence has been considered to be not exclusively the outcome of legislative delegation or the failures of political control but instead as partly emerging through a series of interactions amongst political institutions (Carpenter 2001; Carpenter and Krause 2012, 2015; Krause 1999a; Miller and Whitford 2016).

The principal-agent model has ubiquitously provided the theoretical grounding and conceptual tools for this impressive body of literature. Using the principal-agent model, many theoretical and empirical studies in this literature have examined the determinants of delegation from the principal (the legislature and the president) to the agent (bureaucracy) with a focus on the problems of information asymmetry, moral hazard, and multiple principals (Calvert, McCubbins, and Weingast 1989; McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1989; Huber 2000; Huber and Shipan 2002). More recent studies have highlighted some of the shortcomings of a rather simplified version of the principal-agent model and have proposed embracing extensions of the principal-agent model by incorporating concepts like relational contracts and informal authority (Meier and Krause 2003b; Carpenter and Krause 2015; Miller and Whitford 2016).

civil service (Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman 1981; Cassese 1984; Pempel 1984; Suleiman 1984). A captivating body of more recent research that puts its magnifying glass beyond the higher echelons of bureaucracy and looks at individual bureaucrats and their interpersonal relations at various levels of the hierarchy (Brehm and Gates 1997, 2004) focus solely on the policy implementation function of bureaucrats and remains silent with respect to bureaucrats as policymakers.

Thus, this paper joins what could be considered a nascent body of empirical studies on individual bureaucrats' influence in policymaking processes that look beyond the highest echelons of bureaucratic agencies (Page and Jenkins 2005; Page 2012). Similar to the study by Page and Jenkins (2005) and the study by Page (2012), individual bureaucrats' descriptions about their experiences in policymaking processes constitute the main source of data for this study. Yet, this study diverges from both Page and Jenkins (2005) and Page (2012) in most other respects, including its research question, theoretical approach, and empirical findings. Firstly, whereas the studies by Page and Jenkins (2005) and Page (2012) are exploratory studies on the internal workings of policy bureaucracies and decree-making processes, this study is designed to investigate the effects of political context and organisational traits on bureaucrats' policy influence. Secondly, the empirical findings put forward in Page and Jenkins (2005) and Page (2012) portray bureaucrats as subordinates and highlight the limited nature of their influence in policymaking processes even when their engagement is extensive. This paper, in contrast, portrays a more diverse picture of bureaucrats with respect to their styles of play and their levels of influence in policymaking processes, and investigates the factors underlying this variation in their levels of influence. Thirdly, concerning the theoretical approach, this paper concurs with both of the studies' decision to not use the principal-agent model so commonly employed in studying bureaucratic politics (Page and Jenkins 2005, 153; Page 2012, 10). Yet, while the two studies selectively draw on bureaucracy theory with a focus on the tension between hierarchy and expertise, this paper offers an alternative analytical model built on bargaining theory.

2.2. Case for Using Bargaining Model

In order to investigate individual bureaucrats' influence in policymaking processes, this paper develops an analytical model based on bargaining theory. Bargaining theory's assumption of a situation in which two or more actors have a common interest to co-operate but have conflicting interests over exactly how to co-operate (Muthoo 2000) maps closely onto interviewees' descriptions about their experiences in policymaking processes as well as the seminal work of Heclo (1974) and Hall (1993) about the nature of policy change. It should, thus, not come as a surprise that in the introduction of one of his foundational work on bargaining, Schelling gives "maneuvering in a bureaucracy" as an example of a mixed-motive bargaining game defined by a mixture of mutual dependence and conflict between actors (1958).

This paper does not claim to being novel in its use of “bargaining” to describe policymaking processes. Prominent scholars, such as Allison (1999) and Hood and Lodge (2006), have utilized the bargaining metaphor in their respective seminal studies on policymaking processes (“Essence of Decision”) and bureaucratic politics (“The Politics of Public Service Bargains”). Yet, in these earlier uses of bargaining, the focus has been on inter-institutional interactions. Thus, bureaucrats were either treated as an aggregate unit and positioned against politicians, political parties, and their clients (Hood and Lodge 2006), or only those bureaucrats in highest positions were assumed to be engaged in policy bargaining. This paper does make a claim to be novel in using bargaining to examine all bureaucrats’ engagement in policymaking processes. Moreover, this paper’s use of bargaining goes beyond a simple metaphor and constitutes an attempt to systematically apply bargaining theory to bureaucratic policymaking processes.

Bargaining theory provides a rich and relevant conceptual toolbox that closely resonates with the dynamics underlying the experiences in policymaking described by the interviewees. As described in detail below, core elements of the model include respective parties’ utility functions and bargaining power. The model also talks about the effect of other ancillary elements, such as reputation and trust, outside options, coordinating principles, time horizon and discount factor, and risk tolerance, on the bargaining processes and outcomes.

2.3. Bargaining Model and Core Elements of Policy Bargains

The policy bargaining model is developed based on bureaucrats' accounts of their experiences in policymaking processes and adopts in addition to the two core elements put forward in bargaining theory (utility functions and bargaining power), two ancillary elements (risk tolerance and interpersonal trust).

2.3.1. Utility functions of respective parties, i.e. their preferences concerning the outcome of the bargaining, is the fundamental element of the bargaining model (Nash 1953). Respective parties' knowledge about each others' utility functions and their ability to communicate their preferences through explicit bargaining versus tacit bargaining are factors that shape both the process and outcome of a bargaining situation (Schelling 1956).

In the case of policy bargains, the utility functions of the respective parties refer to their preferences concerning a specific policy change. The utility functions of bureaucrats and elected officials concerning a specific policy change may involve self-interest such as a budget increase (Niskanen 1975) or re-election but do not have to (Hammond 1996).

2.3.2. Bargaining powers of respective parties is another fundamental element of the bargaining model (Schelling 1956). There are several aspects of bargaining power relevant to policy bargains. First is the relative bargaining powers of the respective parties, which may fall on a spectrum of power distribution ranging from "dictatorial bargains" to "symmetric bargains" (Manser and Brown 1980). Dictatorial bargain represents a bargaining situation where one party has absolute power to determine the bargaining outcome in accordance with his utility function. Symmetric bargain represents a bargaining situation where the respective parties have equal amounts of power. Most policy bargains fall in between these two extremes of power distribution.

Secondly, without going into the details of a long discussion about the various sources of influence, and the differences between power, influence, and authority (Simon 1957), it should be noted that there exists a difference between the bases of influence and the exercise of influence. In each policy bargain, respective parties make decisions about the extent to which they "invest" their influence bases while having some knowledge about the absolute size of the influence base of the other parties involved in the policy bargain.

2.3.3. Risk tolerance of respective parties is a relevant ancillary element highlighted in the real-life applications of the bargaining model (Muthoo 2000). Risk tolerance, as explicitly signalled or indirectly inferred, concerns respective parties' calculations about the risk of breakdown of the bargaining process and its repercussions. Outside options available to the respective parties in the case of a breakdown of the bargaining process would be one factor that affect their risk calculations and risk tolerance (Sutton 1986; Muthoo 2000).

In the case of bureaucrats' engagement in policy bargains, the act of engaging in a policy bargain could be considered a risk taking behaviour in and of itself. Most bureaucrats are not expected to initiate new policies, and they are certainly not expected to resist policies initiated by their superiors. As such, an intrinsic part of an individual bureaucrat's decision to engage in a policy bargain would concern his calculations about the risks of ex-post punishment. These calculations can be shaped by a bureaucrat's perceptions about the policies and practices of appointment in his agency, the viability of reversing a reappointment decision, personal costs of position changes, and outside options available in the case of an ex-post punishment.

2.3.4. Reputation and trust of respective parties is another ancillary element put forward as having an effect on the bargaining process and outcome, particularly in repeated bargaining situations. Along similar lines, reputation building and signalling are introduced as critical elements in bargaining situations when the parties are assumed to have incomplete information about the other party's preferences and value systems (Rubinstein 1985). Policy bargains inside bureaucracies almost always fall in the category of repeated bargaining situations, such as those between a general director and department head in the same directorate. As a result, reputation and trust emerges as a highly relevant element in policy bargaining processes inside bureaucracies as well as the outcomes of these policy bargains.

Together these four elements constitute the building blocks of the policy bargaining model. Section 4.1 further discusses the model against the empirical findings emerging from individual bureaucrats' accounts of their experiences in policymaking processes.

2.4. Policy Influence in Bureaucratic Policy Bargaining Model

When we change the unit of analysis from bureaucracy as a political institution or a single bureaucratic agency to an individual bureaucrat, and use the bargaining model instead of the principal-agent model to examine bureaucrats' engagement in policymaking processes, then how do we define policy influence? Following is a definitional discussion of bureaucratic policy influence that builds on both the existing literature (Krause 1999b; Carpenter 2001; Maggetti and Verhoest 2014) and the interview data.

As such, policy influence of an individual bureaucrat in a policymaking process is defined as the extent to which that bureaucrat (1) introduces and pushes through a policy change that is in line with his preferences; (2) resists a policy change initiated by elected officials and other bureaucrats because they conflict with his preferences; or (3) reshapes a policy initiative of elected officials and other bureaucrats so that the ultimate policy change is in line with his preferences.

According to this definition, policy influence is variable - that is, in different policymaking processes, the same bureaucrat could have more or less of an influence. Furthermore, when a bureaucrat is delegated the task of designing a policy by his superiors, but he does not introduce his preferences into the new policy (Page and Jenkins 2005; Page 2012), that bureaucrat is considered to have a low level of policy influence, if any, despite leading the policy design process. Finally, when an individual bureaucrat resists a policy change successfully despite the threat of ex-post punishment and eventually is punished, if the policy preferred by the bureaucrat remains intact, then the bureaucrat is considered to have a high level of policy influence.

3. STUDY DESIGN, RESEARCH APPROACH, MEASUREMENT STRATEGY, DATA COLLECTION

3.1. Study Design: A Layered Comparative Research Design

In designing a study to understand individual bureaucrats' policy influence with a particular focus on the effects of political context and organisational traits on this influence, I opted for a layered comparative study. The first and primary layer compares different political contexts and the second layer compares different organisational contexts. For the first layer, I opted for a cross-time comparison in a single country given the limitations of cross-national comparative studies in examining bureaucratic policy influence highlighted by both theoretical research (Hammond 2003)[25] and empirical studies (Page 2012).

The second layer for organisational traits was deemed necessary given the importance assigned by theoretical and empirical research to organisational

[25] Hammond argues that a comparative study of bureaucratic autonomy would need to measure both the institutional variables and the policy preference profiles, which he contends would over-complicate empirical research particularly given the difficulty of collecting data on each country's policy preference profile. As such, Hammond highlights the difficulty of conducting cross-national "meaningful empirical research" on bureaucratic autonomy. (Hammond 2003, 99)

traits, such as structure and reputation, as factors associated with bureaucratic influence and autonomy at the levels of both agency and individual bureaucrat (Howell and Lewis 2002; Wood and Bohte 2004; Carpenter and Krause 2012; Anderson and Potoski 2016). Thus, the study was designed to investigate both the direct effects of organisational traits on individual bureaucrats' influence in policymaking processes, and how bureaucrats in different organisational settings may be differentially affected by changes in their political context.

The study's focus on the effects of political context and organisational traits on bureaucrats' policy influence should not be interpreted to suggest that these are deemed to be the only or the main factors affecting bureaucrats' policy influence. The study is cognizant that several other factors may affect bureaucrats' engagement in policymaking processes, including policy types (Maggetti and Verhoest 2014), bureaucrats' personal traits (Downs 1967), and formal positions (Simon 1997), among others. In fact, the paper incorporates some pertinent empirical findings about these other factors in presenting its main findings. Yet these factors are not integral parts of the study design as viable empirical strategies could not be identified to systematically investigate their effects on individual bureaucrats' policy influence.

3.2. Research Approach: From Deductive to Inductive

The study was originally designed as a deductive study to test the theoretical predictions about the relationship between the number of veto players in a political system and the levels of bureaucratic influence in different types of organisations, and to investigate the causal mechanisms of this relationship (Peters 1997; Tsebelis 2002; Hammond 2003). Yet, after the first few interviews, it became clear that there was at best an uneasy fit between the principal-agent model underlying these theoretical predictions and the bureaucrats' experiences in policymaking processes. During the remaining interviews, more of the interview time was spent on collecting data on policymaking episodes and less of it was spent on asking questions testing the original theoretical predictions. A first round of data analysis using a theory-driven code tree confirmed this uneasy fit and the need to adopt a more inductive approach.

3.3. Case Selection

Given the study's cross-time, cross-organisational layered comparative design, the case selection involved decisions about the time periods and country, policy area, and bureaucratic agencies to be compared.

In selecting the *time periods and country*, various factors were taken into account. Primarily, there had to be discernible and theoretically relevant differences in the political contexts of the time periods studied. Theoretically, the number of political principals was identified as a highly relevant element of the political context given its effect on the degree of political control and level of bureaucratic autonomy (Huber 2000). Accordingly, the degree of political control is predicted to decrease and the level of bureaucratic autonomy is predicted to increase as the number of political principals increases. A variation in the composition of governments, i.e. coalition governments versus single-party governments, is a relatively clear and simple way to capture different numbers of political principals. Relevant theoretical studies in fact make predictions about the levels of political control and bureaucratic autonomy under coalition governments versus single-party governments (Hammond 1996; Peters 1997; Tsebelis 2002). Two secondary factors were taken into account in the selection of the *time periods and country*. The two periods compared had to be recent enough so that bureaucrats could recollect their experiences. Additionally, the duration of the two periods had to be long enough to detect some effect on levels of political control over the bureaucracy.

Using these factors, the 1991-2002 and 2002-2013 periods in Turkey were selected for this comparative study.[26] Turkey is a middle-income country with a hybrid regime. Founded as a parliamentary republic in 1923, the first multi-party elections were held in 1945. It has had a unicameral parliament except for a brief period during the 1960s. Military coups in 1960, 1971 and 1980 were followed by short periods of junta regimes. Despite increasingly free and fair elections since 1983, the military has remained present in political life as demonstrated by the e-coup in 1997 and more recently by the coup attempt in July 2016. Effective protection and provision of fundamental rights and civil liberties are far from

[26] More specifically, the first period extends from November 1991 to November 2002 with the formation and dissolution of governments marking the beginning and end of the period. The second period extends from November 2002 to January 2014 with the formation of a government marking the beginning and the date of the last interview marking the end of the period. For the first period, changes in the party composition of a government is considered to be a necessary and sufficient condition for it to be considered a change in government, which follows definitional arguments put forward by Dodd (1976) and Lijphart (1984) (as cited in Tsebelis 2002, p.304). During both periods, the context-specific litmus test used was seeking a vote of confidence from the Parliament.

realised, and continue to be part of an ongoing struggle for deepening the democracy in the country. Particularly since 1983, bureaucracy has become highly politicized and patrimonialism has emerged as a strong force in shaping bureaucratic appointments (Heper and Sancar 1998).

The last two decades in Turkish political history are clearly divided into two consecutive periods. The first one (1991-2002) is characterized by coalition governments many of which were also minority governments. The second one (2002 onwards) is characterized by a stable single-party government holding the majority in the legislature. During the first period there were six coalition governments two of which were minority governments as well as two single-party minority governments that lasted less than five months each. During the second period, four governments were in power all of which were majority governments and the party in power remained the same. In terms of the tenure of ministers responsible for social policies, there were eight ministers of education, 12 ministers of labor, and ten ministers of health during the first period, and only four ministers of education, four ministers of labor, and one minister of health during the second one.

During the first period, political parties represented in the parliament took turns trying out different coalition arrangements, many of which came apart soon after encountering a major policy challenge. The long chain of political crises of the first period was interspersed with economic crises in 1994, 2000 and 2001 as well as a devastating earthquake in 1999. During the second period, all three elections allowed a single party to form and sustain a majority government on its own. Economic and political turbulences encountered during this period were managed relatively more effectively with no ensuing major crisis. During the first period, political rights and civil liberties gradually improved and the end of the period was marked by the introduction of a set of major human rights reforms in 2002 as part of the EU accession process. During the second period, the gradual progress in political rights and civil liberties continued until a reversal towards the end of the period.

The bureaucracy was open to politicisation during both periods. Political parties in power tried to control the bureaucracy throughout both periods using a range of tools including bureaucratic appointments and reorganisations. During the first period, however, the political parties in power were limited in the scope and duration of their control over the bureaucracy due to their short tenures and weak control over the executive, legislature and judiciary. During the second period, on the other hand, a long-serving single-party government was able to increasingly expand and deepen its control of the bureaucracy. In short, these two successive, recent and relatively long periods in Turkish political history with discernible variation in terms of government composition and duration make them a good case for the purposes of this study. Section 4.3 describes the effects of these different political contexts on bureaucrats' influence in policymaking processes in Turkey.

With respect to the *policy area* to be investigated, social policy was identified as a good match for the purposes of the study. First, social policy allows for higher levels of possible variation in bureaucratic influence when compared to economic policy, which is considered to have consistently higher levels of bureaucratic influence (Gilardi 2002 and Elgie & McMenamin as cited in Maggetti & Verhoest 2014). Secondly, compared to agricultural policy or transportation policy, social policy area is populated with a diverse set of bureaucratic agencies, such as ministries of health, education, labour, housing, which allows for examining inter-organisational variation.

In selecting the *bureaucratic agencies* to be compared, the goal was to find diverse cases in terms of their organisational traits. To this end, four organisational factors put forward as relevant for bureaucratic behaviour, size, shape of hierarchy, expertise, geographic dispersion (Egeberg 2007) were taken into account in identifying the grounds on which diverse cases would be sought. Studying diverse cases on these grounds was expected to facilitate investigating how bureaucrats in different organisational settings may be differentially affected by changes in the political context. To this end, the ministry of education and the ministry of development (specifically the social sectors department) were selected. Among the ministries working in the social policy realm in Turkey,[27]

[27] The ministries working in the social policy realm in Turkey include the ministry of education, ministry of labor and social security, ministry of health, ministry of family and social policy, and ministry of development. Ministry of Family and Social Policy was created in 2011 by merging several smaller agencies under the Prime Ministry. The Ministry of Development was also created

based on staff size, shape of hierarchy, expertise and geographic dispersion, the ministry of education typifies a large implementation agency while the ministry of development typifies a small "policy bureaucracy" (Page and Jenkins 2005).[28] Section 4.4 describes the findings from this comparative analysis of the two ministries.

3.4. Measurement Strategy

Determining how to observe and measure bureaucrats' policy influence in order to compare their levels of policy influence in different political contexts and different organisational settings was a notable challenge. An earlier attempt at using the composition of social policy legislation as an output indicator of policymaking processes and bureaucrats' influence in these processes proved to be fruitless despite several months put towards the creation of the relevant dataset. Ultimately, the decision was to measure the levels of individual bureaucrats' policy influence as experienced and perceived by the bureaucrats.

In terms of measurement tools, while relevant metrics exist for surveys conducted as part of organisational research looking at delegation as a managerial practice, these tools seemed limited in terms of their applicability to a

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in 2011 but was essentially a continuation of the state planning agency in terms of its structure, functions and staff.

[28] The number of civil servants employed by the ministry of education was more than 700,000 in 2009 compared to about 300,000 at the ministry of health, 4000 at the ministry of labor and social security, and 1000 at the ministry of development. At the ministry of development, all civil servants are employed at the central public administration whereas at the ministry of education, only a small percentage of all civil servants are employed at the central public administration. At the ministry of development, over 30 per cent of civil servants hold post-graduate or doctoral degrees whereas at the ministry of education, less than 4 per cent of all civil servants hold post-graduate or doctoral degrees.

cross-time comparative political study (Brehm and Gates 1997; Rasul and Rogger 2016). Additionally, and arguably more importantly, conducting a representative survey on the effects of political context on bureaucrats in the high-stakes political environment of Turkey in 2013-2014 seemed impractical. Thus, elite interviews emerged as the most appropriate and viable data collection method. To this end, the study adopted the strategy to observe and measure individual bureaucrats' policy influence via their accounts of their experiences in policymaking processes.

3.5 Data Collection

The main source of data was semi-structured elite interviews conducted with 30 past and current bureaucrats[29] predominantly from the ministry of education and the social sectors department of the ministry of development.[30] (See Annex 1 for a list of interviews). In identifying the interviewees, snowball sampling was used with multiple entry points in each ministry and the average wave size was 2.4. The interviewees were predominantly mid-level and high-level bureaucrats.[31] Their political affiliations varied to some extent as each interviewee was asked to

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[29] For the purposes of this study, the term bureaucrat is used to mean an individual who is an appointed, as opposed to an elected, official of the state. Along the same lines as Riggs, both military and civil, transients and long-termers, higher and lower level personnel are considered as a bureaucrat (1997, 9). A context-specific inclusion-exclusion criteria used for the study is the legal framework for an individual's employment: an individual whose employment relations with the state falls under Law No 657 on State Civil Servants in Turkey is considered a bureaucrat. This paper focusses on mid- and high-level bureaucrats who have served in the central public administration located in the capital city. In the specific context, mid- and high-level positions refer to deputy under-secretary, general director, deputy director, department head, and unit head in the Ministry of Education headquarters in Ankara, and to deputy undersecretary, general director, deputy director, department head and tenured experts in the Ministry of Development.

[30] 12 interviewees served in the Ministry of Education, 11 interviewees served in the Ministry of Development, and 2 interviewees served in both.

[31] 13 of the interviewees were mid-level bureaucrats, 3 of the interviewees were high-level bureaucrats, and 12 of the interviewees served in both mid- and high-level bureaucratic positions.

recommend a bureaucrat who they thought would tell a story different from theirs. Overall, the 30 interviewees together provided a wide range of insights and experiences reflecting both mid- and high levels of the bureaucracy, both of the political periods under study, both of the bureaucratic agencies studied, and different political affiliations.[32]

During the interview, the interviewees were first asked about their general assessments about the differences in the policymaking processes between the two periods studied. Subsequent questions encouraged interviewees to share detailed descriptions of their personal experiences with a range of policymaking processes. The responses to these questions provided a rich pool of social policymaking episodes. This pool of policymaking episodes enabled investigating the interactions between bureaucrats across different echelons and between bureaucrats and elected officials, with a view to comparing them across the two periods. Finally, the interviewees were encouraged to provide examples of specific tools they used to initiate, influence or resist new policy changes (See Annex 3 for the interview guide).

All recorded interviews were transcribed. A draft code tree was created building on the key components of the relevant bureaucratic politics literature. Interview

[32] The interviews were conducted in Ankara over a 4-month-long from October 2013 through January 2014. The interviews were semi-structured and lasted from 35 minutes to over 2 hours (See Annex 3 for interview guide). Given the sensitivity of the topic, in an effort to encourage open and honest responses, all interviews were conducted on the basis of anonymity. Most interviewees agreed to voice recording while a few of the interviewees only allowed for note taking. All interviews were conducted in Turkish.

notes and transcriptions were coded using this code tree with NVivo software. The code tree was revised throughout the coding process (See Annex 2 for the code tree). The analysis was conducted and findings were synthesized using this coded data.

4. FINDINGS ON BUREAUCRATS' POLICY INFLUENCE

In this section, findings from the analyses of the interview data are presented in four parts. The first part presents the findings from the interview data vis-à-vis the elements affecting policy bargains and bureaucrats' influence in these bargains. The second part builds on the first part and discusses bureaucrats' different "styles of play" (Allison 1999, 179) in policy bargains with concrete examples of the tools of influence they employ. The third part discusses the study's findings on the effect of political context on individual bureaucrats' influence in policy bargains and the mechanisms underlying this effect. The fourth, and final, part presents the study's findings on the effects of organisational traits on policy bargains and individual bureaucrats' policy influence.

4.1. Understanding Policy Bargains and Bureaucrats' Influence in Policy Bargains

At the centre of interviewed bureaucrats' accounts of their experiences in policymaking processes were interpersonal interactions with other bureaucrats and elected officials, or what Brehm and Gates call "dyadic exchanges" (2014). As such, a bureaucrat's engagement in policymaking processes often consists of a series of dyadic interactions with bureaucrats in the same agency but in different vertical or horizontal positions, with bureaucrats in other agencies, and at times with the minister. Each of these interactions represents a single episode in a long process of policy bargaining inside and outside a bureaucrat's agency. As described by an interviewee, even after a bureaucrat persuades the minister of a new policy, a bureaucrat may remain engaged in pushing forward the policy: "The minister represents the political will. From the moment he says, you're right, this law should be introduced, you [as the bureaucrat] have to pursue it until it gets to the parliament.(...) It is critical that you lobby for it, that you pursue it, that you defend and justify it." (interview 12)

Using the policy bargaining model laid out in Section 2.3, the rest of this section presents the interview data on policymaking processes and outcomes against the four elements that shape policy bargains and bureaucrats' influence in these bargains, namely utility functions, bargaining power, risk tolerance, and interpersonal trust.

4.1.1. Utility functions: Utility functions of respective parties refer to their preferences concerning a specific policy change. In terms of the drivers of these preferences, interview data suggest that in several cases individual bureaucrats have policy preferences arising not from self-interest but altruistic concerns and principles such as equity and justice (interview 6; interview 7; interview 10; interview 22; interview 23). For instance, in describing a policy he initiated for children working on the street, one interviewee explained: "These are risky topics. If you push too hard, you might undergo an investigation, you might be discharged, you would run into trouble. But then, for us, we are able to face these risks because we base ourselves on universal principles such as human rights and right to education. Can everyone do this? They might not be able to. It depends on how much you care about an issue." (interview 10)

Interview data regarding the tools of influence employed by bureaucrats in policy bargains, which is presented later in this section, demonstrate bureaucrats' ability to influence the policy preferences of elected officials and other bureaucrats and more generally suggest that policy preferences of respective parties may be malleable and are thus variable. As suggested by the findings presented under interpersonal trust, changes in the utility functions of respective parties in the course of a bargaining process appear to be closely related to the levels of interpersonal trust between these parties. Type of policy also emerges as a relevant factor in the variability of utility functions. Some interviewees considered the variability of utility functions to be limited when the policy at hand concerned a politically salient issue. As one interviewee explained, although the influence of bureaucrats in policymaking processes varied depending on seniority, experience and age, "when it came to an important policy, we were equally excluded." (interview 20)

4.1.2. Bargaining powers: Interview data reveals various different sources of bargaining power. Respective parties in a policy bargain are considered to possess not only formal powers emerging from their position in the bureaucratic hierarchy or amongst political institutions but also informal powers stemming from their place in patronage networks, their technical expertise and perceived political loyalty. Bargaining skills or persuasion skills of a bureaucrat is also another relevant component highlighted by interviewees as part of his bargaining power (interview 6; interview 21). Accordingly, the persuasion skill of a bureaucrat is considered to be critical for turning one's influence base into real influence. That is, two bureaucrats with the same levels of influence base but different levels of persuasion skills would be expected to have different degrees of influence in a policy bargain.

Relatedly, interview data suggest that both the formal and informal sources of bargaining powers are seen to be relative and not absolute. That is, they are both considered to be dependent on the value attached to it by the other parties engaged in the policy bargain (interview 7; interview 8; interview 9; interview 10; interview 16; interview 27). For instance, if a political appointee values mostly loyalty and not expertise of a career bureaucrat, and the career bureaucrat has high levels of expertise but not much in the way of demonstrated loyalty, then the career bureaucrat is likely to have weak bargaining power in a policy bargain with this political appointee. Similarly, if a career bureaucrat values expertise and experience but not position in the hierarchy, then a political appointee with no expertise or experience who has a higher position than the bureaucrat is likely to have weak bargaining power in a policy bargain with the career bureaucrat.

Interview data also suggest that the values attached to the sources of power, partly due to their interactive nature, may evolve over time. As explained by an interviewee, a minister who attaches much value to loyalty and little value to expertise during the earlier days of his tenure may end up attaching more value to expertise and less value to loyalty as he starts feeling safer in his post (interview 23). Finally, the values attached to the various formal and informal sources of power appear to vary between different bureaucratic agencies, a dynamic that will be taken up in more detail in Section 4.4 on the effect of organisational traits on policy bargains.

4.1.3. Risk tolerance of a bureaucrat is closely related to his calculations about the risks of ex-post punishment, which are shaped by his perceptions about the policies and practices of appointment in his agency, the viability of reversing a reappointment decision, personal costs of position changes, and outside options available in the case of an ex-post punishment.

In interviewees' descriptions of policies and practices of appointment in their agencies, two particular practices stand out: "kızak", i.e. the demotion of bureaucrats to redundant positions, and "sürgün", i.e. the appointment of bureaucrats to positions in remote areas of the country (interview 3; interview 17). Accordingly, a bureaucrat could become the target of these practices as an ex-post punishment for his resistance in a policy bargain as well as because of his political affiliation or to open up his position for another bureaucrat higher up in the patronage networks. While elected officials have some leeway with respect to their use of “kızak” and “sürgün”, the administrative limits of these practices are set by law and are protected by administrative courts, whose changing role is discussed Section 4.3.3. Several interviewees explained how these practices give rise to disgruntlement among affected bureaucrats, many of whom use the administrative courts to challenge and reverse appointment decisions (interview 3; interview 19; interview 26; interview 29; interview 30).

In terms of the effect of appointment policies and practices on an individual bureaucrat’s policy influence via its effect on his risk calculations and risk tolerance, several interviewees suggested merit and strength of political capital as having an impact on the size of this effect (interview 16; interview 27; interview 29; interview 30). More concretely, in cases of selective promotions from inside the civil service, promoted bureaucrats with higher levels of merit and with stronger political capital in the patronage networks are considered to have higher levels of policy influence as they perceive themselves to be at lower risk of demotion.

Those with the lowest levels of policy influence are considered to be the bureaucrats with limited merit and weak political capital. First, they have limited outside options and thus lower levels of risk tolerance. As one interviewee put it in describing the behaviour of a certain bureaucrat in policymaking processes: “If (he) were to leave the position of a general director, he would not even be able to work under a head of unit. Such a person cannot take risks, he is bound to always look up.” (interview 30). Second, their protectors within the patronage networks may either not be willing to stand by them or even if they do, their influence may not be adequate. Consequently, they perceive themselves to be at higher risk of demotion. Thus, several interviewees describe these bureaucrats to be particularly risk averse in policy bargains (interview 16; interview 19; interview 30). As one interviewee put it: “The boundaries of bureaucrats (influence) is very fluid, they could be expanded or contracted easily. What determines these boundaries is how that bureaucrat comes to his position. For instance, if the prime minister wanted him to be in his position, his boundaries automatically expand. If he came to this position because the minister wanted to do someone a favour and said ‘oh well, maybe he should come too so he could get a high salary’, then his boundaries are very contracted and he moves within these boundaries very quietly.” (interview 16).

Another element highlighted by several interviewees with respect to the effect of appointment policies and practices on bureaucrats’ risk calculations concerns his outside options (interview 10; interview 12; interview 16; interview 29; interview 30). Accordingly, bureaucrats who had careers outside the civil service before their appointments were considered to have higher levels of risk tolerance compared to bureaucrats whose only career had been inside the civil service and whose skill-sets were limited in their transferability.

4.1.4. Reputation and trust are ancillary elements that have been theorized to affect bargaining processes and outcomes particularly in repeated bargaining situations, and policy bargains inside bureaucracies almost always fall in the category of repeated bargaining situations. Indeed, several interviewees underscored the centrality of reputation and trust in their ability to initiate, influence, and resist new policies in their agencies. Some of these interviewees underscored the importance of interpersonal trust including trust in others' honesty about their stated policy preferences and willingness to keep their side of the bargain (interview 6; interview 7; interview 10; interview 17; interview 20; interview 26) while some others emphasized the importance of trust in institutions including administrative courts and patronage networks for protecting them from ex-poste punishments (interview 26; interview 30).

Among those interviewees who talked about the centrality of interpersonal trust with their superiors in their ability to initiate, influence, and resist new policies, many focussed on their superiors' trust in their expertise, abilities, and interest in public good (interview 6; interview 7; interview 10; interview 20; interview 26). Some of these interviewees differentiated between more legible and fixed forms of trust, such as shared political allegiances, and less legible forms of trust that can be built only with time and repeated interactions (interview 6; interview 7). Other bureaucrats who talked about the centrality of interpersonal trust with their superiors explained a dynamic whereby some superiors in the bureaucratic hierarchy would obstruct any policy initiative from below as they would interpret such initiatives as an attempt by lower-level bureaucrats to rise in the ranks possibly at their expense (interview 17; interview 20). Thus, trust between bureaucrats that one is not after the other's position was deemed crucial to their ability to initiate and push upward new policies without being obstructed by threatened superiors.

Among those interviewees who talked about the importance of trust in institutions in bargaining processes and outcomes, one interviewee explained how a bureaucrat's trust in the administrative courts that are expected to protect civil servants from ex-post punishments in the form of unjustified dismissals, unfair appointments, and demotions, and the institutions that are set to enforce these laws affect his risk calculation (interview 26). Another interviewee underscored the differences in the policy influence of three different bureaucrats' who held the same general-director position and explained how a bureaucrat's trust in his patronage network and their willingness to protect him if faced with an ex-post punishment affect that bureaucrat's risk calculation and behaviour in bargaining situations (interview 30).

The various ways through which trust is considered to matter for the bargaining process and outcome reveal the close relation between trust and risk tolerance. More concretely, higher levels of interpersonal trust and trust in formal and informal institutions appear to increase a bureaucrat's policy influence by lowering the perceived levels of risk and increasing the predictability of the perceived risks.

So far, this section laid out the critical elements in policy bargains using empirical data from the interviews conducted for this study. Specifically, four elements of the bargaining model, namely utility functions, bargaining power, risk tolerance, and trust, were used to examine policy bargains and bureaucrats' influence in these bargains. Also using this analytical model, the next part describes various "styles of play"[33] adopted by individual bureaucrats when engaging in policy bargains.

4.2. Bureaucrats' "Styles of Play" in Policy Bargains

Using the bureaucratic policy bargaining model and the interview data on bureaucrats' interactions in policymaking processes, bureaucrats' styles of play in policy bargains are grouped into three categories: collaborative, adversarial, and obedient. It should be noted that these three categories are not meant to imply absolute permanence or consistency; yet given the repeated nature of policy bargaining games, they are expected to evolve into respective equilibria with occasional deviations. That is, since a bureaucrat's preferred style of play in policy bargains shapes the expectations of the other party about his style of play in future policy bargains who adjusts his style of play accordingly, a dyadic equilibrium is likely to be established after a few rounds of policy bargains.

[33] The term "styles of play" is borrowed from Allison's book *Essense of Decision* (1999). In his book, Allison makes the case that important differences exist between the behaviour of bureaucratic careerists, lateral-entry types, and political appointees, which are a function of their longer-range expectations.

4.2.1. Collaborative style of play assumes that the de facto preference of a given bureaucrat is to engage in a policy bargain and co-operate with the respective parties. Thus, even in the absence of a collusive arrangement in one bargaining situation, one of the parties would choose imposition by the other party in that specific bargaining situation over non-collaboration becoming the new equilibrium. Compared to adversarial and obedient styles of play, this style of play most closely mirrors Schelling's description of a bargaining game where we observe a mixture of mutual dependence and conflict.

For those interviewees who described policymaking episodes where they employed a collaborative style of play, some appear to adopt a "genuine" collaborative style of play while others seem to employ collaboration as a "covert" tool to influence policy processes. Among those who adopt a "genuine" collaborative style of play, the primary tactic for both pushing through and resisting policy changes is influencing the policy preferences, i.e. the utility functions, of a minister, political appointee or another bureaucrat. These interviewees view policy bargains to be more about influencing others' preferences through persuasion as opposed to forcing preferences onto others, which mirrors Carpenter's assertion that a bureaucratic agency's policy autonomy lies less in fiat than in leverage (2001). As one interviewee put it in describing his interactions in policymaking processes: "I never conditionally obeyed. I was either persuaded or I persuaded them." (interview 18) Another interviewee also highlighted the centrality of persuasion in his description of policymaking processes at the ministry of education: “Education is not an area with absolute truths. A policy you advocate for fiercely could be falsified by someone else. (...) As a result, what really affects what is done, what kind of policies are developed, is the effectiveness, the persuasiveness of the person who advocates for a policy. (...) His ability to influence (...) the decision makers.” (interview 6)

The tool most frequently mentioned by these interviewees involved reasoning and persuading the relevant party. Such reasoning or persuasion is done either directly or through the intermediation of a bureaucrat higher up in the echelons (interview 6; interview 13; interview 18; interview 19). According to some interviewees, the main venues where such opportunities of reasoning and persuasion present themselves include semi-formal meetings inside the agency and informal meetings outside the agency many of which seem to take place during shared car rides or work trips (interview 12; interview 28). Verbal informal discussions, as opposed to written documents or formal presentations, appear to be the more common form for these interactions (interview 6; interview 12; interview 21; interview 28). Bargaining skills, such as being eloquent and persuasive, is highlighted as being central to successfully changing the other parties’ policy preferences in these bargaining situations (interview 6; interview 18).

Using a delegated task as an opportunity to influence other parties' utility functions is mentioned in interviews as another tool used by bureaucrats who employ the collaborative style of play. More covert than open reasoning, this tool avails itself to bureaucrats who are frequently delegated tasks that require their technical expertise, such as preparing background documents, meeting agendas and draft legislations. Some bureaucrats' accounts of policymaking episodes involve cases where they use such tasks as an opportunity to influence the policy preferences of other parties; they do so by adjusting the technical analyses or the meeting agendas in ways that then help them indirectly shape others' policy preferences to be more closely aligned with their own (interview 3; interview 29).

Some interviewees' accounts of policymaking episodes suggest another "covert" tool available to those bureaucrats' for influencing the utility function of the parties in the bargaining process by changing the political calculations of the minister. For example, an interviewee described a tactic he employed to expand community centres across the country: he haphazardly opened community centres despite inadequate funding so as to create a political support base for better-funded community centres that would then help change the utility functions of elected officials and political appointees regarding the provision of additional funding to these community centres (interview 26). Another interviewee described his tactic in scaling up a pilot policy he initiated: he organised public events around the pilot policy where both the political appointees and the minister came to recognize the opportunity for political patronage presented by scaling-up of this policy, and thus changing their utility functions regarding the pilot policy (interview 20).

Along similar lines, some interviewees described policymaking episodes where they used external actors to put pressure on an elected official in ways that may change his political calculations. As a result, a bureaucrat is able to influence the utility function of an elected official or political appointee regarding a policy. The external actors mentioned by the interviewees ranged from civil society organisations and parent groups to national media and international financial institutions. For example, a bureaucrat described encouraging civil society organisations and parent groups to contact the minister for a policy change that he preferred so as to change the minister’s utility function regarding this policy (interview 26). Other interviewees described “hypothetical” cases where a bureaucrat would leak information to media about a controversial draft policy so as to raise the political stakes around it in an effort to shift the elected officials utility functions and force them to put the policy in the backburner (interview 19; interview 29).

Another “covert” tool utilized by bureaucrats who employed a collaborative style of play involved anonymously bringing in an ally player into the bargaining situation who held stronger bargaining powers than the other party did. For instance, an interviewee described a practice common in 1990s where bureaucrats shared their policy preferences with bureaucrats of the International

Monetary Fund, who would then bargain with elected officials for the inclusion of these policies in stand-by agreements (interview 24). Another interviewee described a policymaking episode where after unsuccessfully trying to change a minister's policy preference, he broke the formal hierarchy and used his personal relations to directly contact the prime minister to bring him in as an ally into the policy process to ensure that the bargaining outcome aligned with his policy preferences (interview 19).

4.2.2. Adversarial style of play assumes that the de facto preference of both parties in the absence of a collusive arrangement is not to cooperate. The failure to cooperate may bring about either a continuation of the policy status quo or a permanent breakdown of the relation with one party forcefully or voluntarily exiting the game.

Those interviewees who employed an adversarial style of play to certain policy bargains describe using both formal and informal tools in pushing forward and resisting new policies. Formal tools, such as processes of approval, exist in both the ministry of education and ministry of development for decisions with financial implications. Their goal is to establish legal accountability of individual bureaucrats and the minister vis-à-vis financial decisions. Such legal accountability seems to play some role in individual bureaucrats' calculations around following or resisting orders from above. This seems to be true particularly in those cases where there may be criminal implications due to suspected misconduct and fraud. Such formal approval processes requires all bureaucrats engaged in a hierarchical decision process to sign the relevant official document and thus co-share the legal responsibility of the decision. If a bureaucrat chooses to not sign, he would then need to include an official explanation of his disagreement with the decision. Several interviewees described episodes where they used this formal process to resist a policy decision and explained how they did so at the risk of straining relations and ex-post punishment (interview 2; interview 3; interview 5; interview 26; interview 23).

Another way in which interviewees described using formal processes as a tool for resistance concern the informal practice of verbal orders. While all orders in a bureaucratic agency must have a written paper trail for reasons of legal accountability, there seems to be cases where higher level bureaucrats or the minister gives a verbal order possibly to avoid a paper trail regarding a specific issue. Mid-level bureaucrats may, at the risk of straining relations and ex-post punishment, request the order in writing, which then forces the higher-level bureaucrat or the minister to give up on the issue or search for another mid-level bureaucrat who would accept verbal orders (interview 2; interview 16).

Bureaucrats seem to have access to another set of “more extreme” tools that they tap into when their previous attempts in a bargaining situation fail. These adversarial tools introduce higher risks of straining relations and ex-post punishment. Some of these tools resemble different types of strikes used by workers, such as work-to-rule strike and slowdown strike (interview 20; interview 29). Others involve quietly slipping in a major policy change into a larger legislation with the expectation that neither the minister nor the parliamentarians would notice it due to time pressure and capacity limitations (interview 24; interview 26).[34]

In all cases where a bureaucrat employs an adversarial style of play and chooses not to cooperate with his superiors in the absence of a beneficial collusive arrangement, he is likely to face some repercussions. In the best case scenario, the bureaucrat would be straining his relations with his superiors with some implications for future policy bargains. In the worst-case scenario, the adversarial style of play may bring about an ex-post punishment with the bureaucrat being forced to leave his position or exit the civil service (interview 26).

4.2.3. Strategic obedience assumes that the de facto preference of a given bureaucrat is to avoid engaging in a policy bargain and to unconditionally agree with the utility functions of his superiors in the bureaucratic hierarchy. As such, the bureaucrats who strategically adopt obedience as their style of play have high levels of risk aversion and thus, avoid any conflict during a bargaining situation regardless of their policy preferences (interview 12; interview 16; interview 17; interview 22). Similarly, these bureaucrats may also seek less

[34] The case of the intentional "slipping in" of a policy change by bureaucrats can be construed as a variation of a more commonly encountered case described by Page (2003) whereby ministers who typically do not know much about the law they are bringing in and do not notice what is being proposed in their name

discretion in policymaking processes to avoid conflict and possible blame (Krause 2011), and may prefer to focus only on the implementation of low-risk administrative tasks. Naturally, they would also be expected not to initiate new policies. As one interviewee from the ministry of education put it: “You know our society - a man who doesn’t produce anything does not make mistakes. This [attitude] is always there, it was there before, it is still there.”(interview 23)

Interviewees highlighted several factors that contribute to strategic obedience emerging as the preferred style of play for some bureaucrats. One set of such factors concerns organisational traits. As such, strategic obedience emerges as a prevalent style of play employed by bureaucrats in some bureaucratic agencies, such as the ministry of education, and a rare style of play in others, such as the ministry of development, for reasons that will be discussed in section 4.4. As one interviewee from the ministry of education put it, “There are those who can say “evet efendim (yes sir)” to everything coming from above” (interview 17). Another set of factors concerns the incentive structures built into the civil service in Turkey. An interviewee, for instance, commented that the lack of transparency and accountability in bureaucratic agencies mean that you do not need to do anything and added: “There is a saying in bureaucracy, do not make a sound until you reach 6400” (interview 12).[35] A third set of factors concerns the social norms and values of certain bureaucrats. For example, one interviewee underlined “biat kültürü (culture of fidelity)” as being common among bureaucrats

[35] The additional indicator 6400 is one of the highest ranks in the civil service ranking system that determines the additional salary and retirement benefits to civil servants.

whereby they are extremely responsive to all demands coming from above (interview 24).

4.2.4. Style of play in policy bargains and policy influence: The three styles of play in policy bargains described above provide individual bureaucrats with different kinds and levels of influence in policymaking processes that may evolve over time.

One would expect strategic obedience to represent the lowest levels of policy influence for a bureaucrat if we were to assume a one-time bargaining game. Yet, given the repeated nature of the policy bargains in bureaucratic agencies, low levels of policy influence may be limited to only the first few rounds of it. As a supervisor, a political appointee or a minister's trust in a strategically obedient bureaucrat builds after repeated policy bargains, the bureaucrat may end up with more bargaining power and more opportunities to influence the utility function of the respective parties. Thus, being strategically obedient in the first few rounds of policy bargains may enable a bureaucrat to initiate and push through new policy ideas in subsequent rounds.

The collaborative style of play similarly represents selective resistance and influence by a bureaucrat whereby the risk of straining relations and triggering ex-post punishments is minimized. However, similar to obedience, repeated policy bargains may allow the bureaucrat to gain trust of a minister or a superior, and potentially have more policy influence in subsequent policy bargains.

The adversarial style of play, in contrast, may allow a bureaucrat to have higher levels of policy influence in the first few rounds of the policy bargaining game. Yet, this higher levels of policy influence is likely to be short-lived by triggering ex-post punishment in the form of re-appointment or the voluntary exit of the bureaucrat from their position due to repeated deadlocks and inability to initiate new policies.

Having described the different styles of play employed by bureaucrats in their engagement in policy bargains as well as the implications of these styles of play for short- and long-term policy influence, the rest of this section will first examine the effects of political context and then the effects of organisational traits on bureaucrats' influence in policy bargains.

4.3. Effects of Political Context on Bureaucrats' Influence in Policy Bargains

Using the policy bargaining model, this section presents the findings about the effects of political context on individual bureaucrats' policy influence via its effect on utility functions, bargaining powers, risk tolerance, and trust.

4.3.1.Effects of political context on utility functions: A few of the reasons put forward by interviewees in explaining the changes in policymaking processes and their influence in these processes across the two time periods compared concern differences in the utility functions of elected officials and political appointees. Some of these differences in the utility functions seem to emerge as a result of the differences in the types of policies pursued across the two periods compared.

Large investment projects is highlighted by several interviewees in this regard as a type of policy that is driven almost exclusively by elected officials and political appointees with no space left for bureaucrats to engage in policy bargains (interview 20; interview 21; interview 24). Interviewees describe how the rent-granting opportunities presented by large projects firmly shape the policy preferences of elected officials and leave no space for bureaucratic influence on these preferences (interview 20; interview 24). While large investment projects were undertaken during both of the periods studied, during the 2002-2013 period, and particularly since 2011, large investment projects in the education and health sectors are seen to be overtaken by even larger "mega-projects" with multi-billion dollar budgets,[36] which some interviewees described as being completely driven by the prime minister and relevant ministers (interview 3; interview 20; interview 21). One interviewee described a recent case of severe ex-post punishment of a bureaucrat and his agency who attempted to resist such mega-projects (interview 4).

Another difference in the types of policies pursued across the two periods concerns their political salience. Some interviewees suggested that compared to

[36] Examples of mega-projects in education and health sectors include the FATIH project (for the integration of technology into education) and the integrated health campuses project (a PPP for merging city hospitals into single campuses).

coalition governments, the single-party majority governments were more effective in taking up politically salient policies (interview 3; interview 4; interview 22). However, having politically salient policies being brought to the policy agenda seem to have had different effects on bureaucrats' policy influence. Some bureaucrats highlighted their increased policy influence under single party governments in politically risky areas such as universal access to education, suggesting an unprecedented alignment of the utility functions of bureaucrats and elected officials. With the single party government having plenty of political capital, one interviewee described, a minister could publicly discuss the failures of the education system in reaching all children, and the bureaucrats could then use this visibility to initiate and push through new policies for improving access to education (interview 22). Other bureaucrats, in contrast, described how they were pushed to the sidelines by elected officials when it came to politically salient education policies, which were initiated top-down during the 2002-2013 period (interview 3; interview 4). In these latter cases, the utility function of the elected official was shaped primarily and firmly by political concerns, leaving limited space for any compromise in subsequent bargaining situations with bureaucrats.

Finally, it is worth highlighting a point put forward by couple of interviewees about the shock effect of the major earthquake in 1999 when thousands of people died as a result of ineffective and corrupt urban development policies. According to two interviewees, as a result of the earthquake, both the elected officials' and bureaucrats' utility functions shifted dramatically to focus more on public service and less on self-interest, and thus aligning their utility functions around a shared mission and bringing about the introduction of many progressive social policies in the couple of years after the earthquake (interview 11; interview 24).

4.3.2.Effects of political context on bargaining power: On the whole, the interview data underscore the relative importance of individual-level factors in shaping the bargaining power of bureaucrats. Many interviewees explain that the variation in their bargaining power over time has been influenced more by the characteristics of the individuals in higher positions in their organisation than the wider political context. As discussed earlier in this section, bargaining power is described by several interviewees as being dependent on the value attached to the formal and informal sources of power by the other parties engaged in the bargaining. Hence, many interviewees focused on the values and managerial styles of their superiors in explaining those policymaking episodes where they had particularly high or low levels of policy influence (interview 6; interview 10; interview 13; interview 17; interview 22; interview 27).

Still, according to some interviewees, political context seems to have had indirect effects on the bargaining powers of bureaucrats through its effect on the relative values respective parties attached to expertise, personal loyalty, place in patronage networks, and position in the hierarchy. In their description of the early phases of the 2002-2013 period, some interviewees highlighted the value attached to expertise by elected officials and political appointees as a result of their prioritization of getting things done yet lacking a loyal network of bureaucrats who had the expertise to get things done (interview 11; interview 24). Some interviewees contrasted this earlier phase with more recent years where personal loyalty and place in patronage networks have been assigned more value in bargaining episodes.

Broadly speaking, descriptions of policymaking processes during the 1991-2002 period reveal a less clear and predictable pattern in terms of the values elected officials attached to expertise, personal loyalty, place in patronage networks, and position in the hierarchy. While interviewees highlight the notable variation across ministers and political appointees in this regard, the variation seems to arise from individuals' personal characteristics and not from the political context. As described by some interviewees, while all elected officials during this period knew that their tenure would be short, a number of elected officials whose utility functions were shaped less by self-interest and more by public interest would highly value technical expertise and experience of bureaucrats in policy bargains in an effort to introduce effective policy changes during their short tenures (interview 11; interview 15; interview 17).

4.3.3. Effects of political context on risk calculations and tolerance: Changes in the risk calculations and tolerance of bureaucrats were particularly prominent in interviewees' explanations of the changes in their policy influence across the two periods compared. Interviewees described several dynamics in explaining the changes in their risk calculations and risk tolerance, many of which stemmed from the prevalence of position changes, and changes in the rules and practices of bureaucratic appointments.[37]

When asked to compare coalition governments of the first period and the single-party governments of the second period with respect to bureaucratic appointments, the interviewees predominantly described the single-party governments to have been more pervasive in the breadth and depth of new appointments and position changes(interview 3; interview 13; interview 19; interview 24; interview 29). More specifically, appointments motivated by political patronage are considered to have affected more bureaucrats during the second period. This perception does not fail to acknowledge that various episodes of political purges also took place during coalition party governments (interview 18).

The dynamics put forward by the interviewees in explaining the relative pervasiveness of new appointments and position changes during the 2002-2013 period fall into four groups: the single–party governments (1) having more time in power to be able to appoint people to more positions, (2) being more able to

[37] Generally speaking, politically motivated appointments appear to be an acceptable practice among the bureaucrats interviewed but only when it targets the higher echelons of the agency (interview 5; interview 14; interview 18; interview 22). Many of the interviewees agree with governments and ministers needing to work closer with high-level bureaucrats of their choice yet they also firmly believe in the need to balance this need with the principles of meritocracy (interview 05; interview 26). More specifically, several interviewees expect political appointees to have some technical expertise in the relevant policy area and ideally prefer selective promotions from within the ranks of the agency. Politically motivated appointments of bureaucrats from other agencies who have no relevant expertise or experience are strongly disapproved of by some bureaucrats (interview 21; interview 27). Along the same lines, several bureaucrats expect political appointments to involve only the high level bureaucrats who work directly with the minister and express an opinion against political overhaul of the entire agency (interview 13; interview 18; interview 23).

change the rules and practices of bureaucratic appointments, (3) being more able to weaken the institutional checks-and-balances on political appointments, and (4) having more power to be able to reorganize bureaucratic agencies in ways that facilitate mass-scale purges and signal unrestrained control over bureaucrats.

1. The first dynamic concerns the ***particularly long tenure of a single party*** during the 2002-2013 period that simply gave it enough time for appointments to more positions. As explained by one interviewee: “There is a reality, throughout the 1990s, the coalitions lasted for 1.2 years. What can you change during that period: the undersecretary and deputy undersecretary. If you are in power for 11 years, you can go all the way down to unit head.”(interview 24). Another interviewee underscored a similar dynamic: “I was always told, governments change, elections happen, you just keep on doing your work. During the 1990s, lower cadres did not change. (...) Deputy director, head of department, head of unit, experts were not touched.” (interview 13)

2. The second dynamic concerns the government’s ***ability to more effectively change the rules and practices of appointment***. A single-party majority government has more control over the parliament and more political capital with the public for amending the laws governing civil service more frequently. Indeed, the foundational law on civil service in Turkey was amended 41 times during the decade under coalition governments and 90 times during the first decade under

single party governments.[38] Most of the amendments during the first period were through decree laws while the vast majority of the amendments during the second period were through laws, signalling the relatively powerful political position held by the single-party governments in the parliament.

3. The third dynamic concerns a single-party government's ***ability to weaken the institutional checks-and-balances*** put in place to limit politically motivated bureaucratic appointments. Appointments to most high-level bureaucratic positions in Turkey necessitate triple-signature decrees involving the minister, prime minister, and the president. In the absence of such a decree, bureaucrats appointed to these positions remain "acting". Administrative courts play a similarly critical role given their power to overturn bureaucratic appointment decisions in ways that can protect bureaucrats against ex-post punishments or political purges. So both the president and the administrative courts are to act as institutional checks-and-balances limiting the depth and scope of politically motivated bureaucratic appointments.

   The single-party governments, however, were able to reshape the institutional checks-and-balances provided by the presidency and the judiciary through constitutional changes. Similarly, extensive political appointments to these institutions made them less relevant. Thus, some bureaucrats highlighted the resulting weakening of the role played by the president and the administrative courts in bureaucratic appointments as having had an impact on bureaucrats' risk calculations during the second period (interview 3; interview 19; interview 26).

[38] Calculated by author.

One interviewee talked about the threat of ex-post punishments, such as “kızak” and “sürgün”, having become more credible because of what he considered to be decreased levels of protection offered by administrative courts (interview 26). Similarly, in the absence of a credible veto threat by the president, ministers are perceived to act in a less constrained manner in the breadth and depth of their political appointments (interview 24; interview 29).

4. The fourth dynamic concerns a single-party government’s relatively high ***ability to restructure bureaucratic agencies***. The original design of a bureaucratic agency as well as the reorganisation of its structure and jurisdiction are considered parts of the toolbox available to political principals for controlling bureaucratic agencies (Moe 1995; Huber and Shipan 2002). The original structural design of an agency is considered to reflect elected officials anticipations about and efforts to engineer bureaucratic behaviour (Moe 1995). Along similar lines, the reorganisations of departments and jurisdictions is considered as a corrective measure by elected officials to break up the influence an agency (Huber and Shipan 2002). Thus, it should not come as a surprise that several interviewees considered the restructuring of their organisations as having had an effect on their policy influence. What is interesting is the differences in the causal channels highlighted by some interviewees with respect to this effect.

   Both the ministry of education and the state planning agency (the predecessor to the ministry of development), along with several other ministries, underwent a major restructuring in 2011, which several interviewees view as part of the single-party government’s overhaul of the central public administration in an attempt to further control bureaucrats (interview 4; interview 18; interview 21). The reorganisation of the ministry of education involved a major restructuring of the agency and brought about a large-scale purge of bureaucrats at different levels of the central administration. The reorganisation was led by the minister renown as a serial reformer. Thus, the bureaucrats expected the reorganisation for many months before its announcement. Some of the bureaucrats read the reorganisation as an excuse for a mass-scale purge and new appointments that had previously not been possible due to limitations introduced by the civil service code (interview 7; interview 18; interview 30).

For the state planning agency, however, the reorganisation neither involved a major restructuring nor a large-scale purge. It transformed the state planning agency to a ministry of development, and revised its jurisdiction and powers vis-à-vis other ministries and the government. The initial reorganisation process was part of a larger restructuring of the central administration agencies working on economic and financial policy, and the initial stages seems to have involved some high level bureaucrats from the state planning agency. It appears, however, that the final decision about the specifics of the restructuring was made last minute behind closed doors ignoring all previous attempts by these bureaucrats (interview 21). One interviewee at the state planning agency interpreted the unfolding of this process as an ex-post punishment by the government for previous episodes of resistance and criticism by the bureaucrats of the agency (interview 4). According to another interviewee, the reorganisation did not only limit the overall independence and power of the agency but also created a cautious atmosphere inside the agency with bureaucrats realizing the unrestrained power the current government could exert on their agency and

> themselves, and readjusting their risk calculations in their engagements in policy bargains (interview 21).

These empirical findings more generally suggest that an increase in the prevalence of position changes and changes in the rules of appointments that weaken the safeguards of meritocracy can have direct and indirect effects on the risk calculations of bureaucrats as they engage in policy bargains with their superiors and elected officials. The direct and more obvious effect is an increase in the credibility of the threat of ex-post punishments in the form of demotions and dismissals, particularly for those bureaucrats with weaker levels of political capital in the dominant patronage networks. The increased credibility of the threat of ex-post punishment can also have indirect effects. Firstly, those bureaucrats who choose to employ an adversarial style of play in policy bargains are now more likely to exit or be pushed entirely out of policymaking processes. As a result of this disproportional increase in exits by bureaucrats who employ an adversarial style of play, the remaining bureaucrats are more likely to be from among those who prefer collaborative or obedient styles of play. Secondly, the remaining bureaucrats are more likely to re-calibrate their risk calculations in ways that make them less risk tolerant and hence, more likely to prefer collaborative or obedient styles of play to an adversarial one.

4.3.4.Effects of political context on trust: As was mentioned in Section 4.1.4 on the role of trust in policy bargains, several interviewees explained the role of tenure and repeated interactions in building interpersonal trust (interview 6;

interview 16; interview 22). Such trust-building seems to be particularly relevant for those career bureaucrats who cannot immediately signal their expertise and trust-worthiness to a new supervisor (interview 6; interview 7). Accordingly, one interviewee suggested that both ministers and bureaucrats are likely to have less interest in building trust when the ministerial term is expected to be short (interview 11).

Given these dynamics around interpersonal trust highlighted by interviewees, it appears that for those bureaucrats who managed to remain in their positions or who were appointed to their positions under the single-party government, the generally longer ministerial tenures during the 2002-2013 period allowed for more time and more interactions for building higher levels of interpersonal trust compared to the 1991-2002 period. As one interviewee at the ministry of development explained: “There has been some stability in bureaucracy (during the 2002-2013 period) and some high-level bureaucrats have been in their positions for 7-8 years. This has some advantages and disadvantages. Its advantage is that the relations have moved forward and as a result things move forward faster” (interview 27).

All in all, findings from interview data strongly suggest that most bureaucrats’ policy influence was affected by changes in the political context. These changes are found to have an effect on individual bureaucrats’ policy influence through several mechanisms, some of which increase and others decrease levels of policy influence. These mechanisms include changes in respective parties' policy utility functions, bargaining power, risk tolerance and calculations, and trust levels. From among these, risk tolerance and calculations emerge as the primary mechanism. That is, changes in political context are found to affect bureaucrats' policy influence primarily via its effect on their risk calculations. As a result, while there seems to be some variation in the effects of political context on policy influence across individual bureaucrats, many of the interviewees consider their policy influence to have generally decreased under a single-party government. The effects of political context on bureaucrats' policy influence also seem to be moderated by the organisational traits of bureaucratic agencies, which is taken up next in the paper.

4.4. Effects of Organisational Traits on Bureaucrats' Influence in Policy Bargains

Before discussing the direct effects of organisational traits on bureaucrats' influence in policy bargains and its moderating role vis-à-vis the effects of political context on bureaucrats' policy influence, it is necessary to describe the organisational traits of the ministry of education and ministry of development to contextualise this discussion.

4.4.1.Organisational Traits of Ministry of Education and Ministry of Development: The ministry of education in Turkey is delegated with the primary role of coordinating the delivery of education services. The ministry's organisational design as well as cadre structure reflects this primary role.[39] The majority of the bureaucrats serve at the school level. Directorates are set up in 81 provinces and over 900 sub-provinces. The central administration offices that ensure the national coordination of the services including financial and human resource management, extend over three campuses in Ankara. The bureaucrats working at the central directorates are primarily teachers who serve in Ankara on temporary assignments with limited policy-level expertise. The minister holds all formal authority. Approval authority is delegated to the general directors only on routine administrative matters (interview 12). An exception to the absolute authority of the minister on policy matters is a semi-independent council composed of experts appointed by the minister, which has limited policy initiation and approval powers (interview 14; interview 16; interview 17; interview 19).

The primary role delegated to the ministry of development (formerly state planning agency) is the provision of advisory services to the government on the strategies and programs in economic, social, and cultural realms. Informally, it is expected to act as a check on governments' temptation to overspend at the expense of macro-economic stability (interview 24). Both its organisational design and cadre structure reflects its formal and informal roles. All bureaucrats serve at the central administration offices. They are hired into the ministry through a highly selective process. They are delegated considerable discretion vis-à-vis their primary task of conducting policy-relevant technical analysis

[39] Please note that the description of the central administration offices refers to the ministry of education's structure prior to the re-organisation in 2011.

(interview 2; interview 3; interview 27; interview 29).

4.4.2.Effects of Organisational Traits on Bureaucrats' Influence in Policy Bargains: Interview data from bureaucrats in the ministry of education and ministry of development reveal several organisational traits that affect bureaucrats' choice about "styles of play" in policy bargains and their policy influence. These organisational traits include: (1) agency size, (2) level of expertise, (3) appointment practices and staff turn-over as well as (4) elements related to organisational culture.

The joint ***effect of agency size and appointment practices*** on bureaucrats' risk calculations and tolerance for risk is particularly notable in this regard (interview 3; interview 17). The size of a bureaucratic agency relates to the depth of the central administration's hierarchy and the geographic breadth of the agency. In a large agency with positions across the country, such as the ministry of education, an ex-post reward could mean a new position multiple levels higher in the central administration with significant financial returns whereas an ex-post punishment could mean a new position as a school inspector in a remote corner of the country. As one interviewee at the ministry of development put it: "Imagine, a head of department at the ministry of education, the general director insists that he signs a policy document. If he doesn't he might not only lose his position but since they are all hired as teachers, you can be a teacher in Hakkari (a province known for its remoteness). Imagine, he has been a civil servant for 20 years, his children are in school. (...) And because he is afraid, he cannot say no (to the general director).” (interview 3) Thus, the risks of ex-post punishment associated with pushing onwards in a policy bargain on a divisive issue or resisting a policy idea from above are consequential for a bureaucrat. In a small agency with positions only in Ankara, such as the ministry of development, an ex-post reward could mean a new position one level higher with limited financial returns and an ex-post punishment could mean a new position one level lower and involves moving to the office across the hallway. Thus, the risks associated with pushing onwards with a divisive policy change or resisting a policy idea from above in a bargaining situation are relatively inconsequential.

Along similar lines, ***minimum requirements of hiring and promotion combined with appointment practices*** in an agency appear to have an effect on bureaucrats’ risk calculations and trust levels in policy bargains. In agencies where positions have high technical requirements, such as the ministry of development, the government is limited in its patronage based appointment practices because the pool of alternative and “more loyal” bureaucrats is smaller. The smaller size of the available pool of alternative appointees tempers the scale of staff changes through both regular appointments and agency restructuring (interview 2; interview 15). In contrast, in agencies where positions have low technical requirements, such as the ministry of education, the government practically has an unlimited pool of “more loyal” bureaucrats to choose from. Thus, bureaucrats in these agencies with low technical requirements are more likely to feel dispensable, which may affect their risk calculations.

A third notable organisational trait that is considered by some interviewees as having an effect on bureaucrats' policy influence concerns the ***scale and frequency of staff changes***. Several bureaucrats identify staff stability as being critical for bureaucrats' policy influence via its impact on the levels of interpersonal trust (interview 2; interview 13; interview 21). As such, the expectation of an always pending change in positions, as it has been in the case of the ministry of education, makes short-term pursuit of self-interest among bureaucrats more likely, which also affects their utility functions in policy bargains. In contrast, high level of staff stability with repeated interactions among bureaucrats, as it has been the case for the ministry of development, is likely to lead to interpersonal relations characterized by trust and reciprocity whereby policy initiatives from bureaucrats in lower ranks of the hierarchy are less likely to be perceived by the supervisors as a threat to their positions. As one interviewee explained in talking about his relations with his supervisor: "We've know each other (for almost ten years). He knows me and I know him. He feels the moments when I feel troubled. I feel his. He knows when I feel strong about a certain issue. I know his." (interview 27) Such strong and trusting interpersonal relations are likely to both encourage bureaucrats to employ a collaborative style of play in policy bargains and augment their bargaining power with respect to policy changes they feel particularly strong about.

Different aspects of ***organisational culture*** were highlighted by interviewees as having an effect on individual bureaucrats' policy influence in an agency. One such aspect of organisational culture concerned shared expectations about the vertical distribution of informal authority and more concretely, the prevalent norm in an organisation concerning the bargaining powers of respective parties. For instance, several interviewees at the ministry of development reported "uzman görüşü esastır (expertise dominates)" (interview 3; interview 8; interview 15; interview 29) as the norm in their agency demonstrating that in any given policy bargain, all parties are expected to attach more value to subject expertise and less value to position in hierarchy, thus increasing the relative bargaining power of bureaucrats with technical expertise who are often mid-level. As a result, using this informal authority in policy bargains is considered to be a common occurrence at the ministry of development (interview 2; interview 3; interview 27; interview 29).

In contrast, at the ministry of education, the ranks of hierarchy are less permeable in policymaking processes. Cases of high or mid-level bureaucrats having and using informal authority exist yet they are not considered to be the norm (interview 6; interview 10; interview 12; interview 13; interview 16; interview 17; interview 22). An interviewee who worked at both the ministry of development and the ministry of education explained this difference in organisational cultures with an interesting example: "Go and ride the elevators of the ministry of development and ministry of education, and go up and down a few times. At the ministry of development, a support staff and a high official would greet each other and say ‘good morning’. At the ministry of education, this would not happen because each speaks only to those of his rank.” (interview 8)

A second aspect of organisational culture highlighted by some interviewees concerns organisational norms about the desired behaviour of bureaucrats in policy bargains, a factor that has been highlighted in other empirical studies (Allison 1999; Page 2012). One interviewee explained how some bureaucrats who have been at the ministry of education for many years actively transmit a “bureaucratic culture” of obedience as the preferred style of game to young bureaucrats by saying “this will happen if the minister wants it, why are you throwing yourselves in fire if the minister doesn’t want it; they will hold you responsible for what you do but they won’t hold you responsible for what you do not do” which, according to the interviewee, is a frequently used riddle at the ministry (interview 16). In contrast, at the ministry of development, assistant experts are mentored by experts with an emphasis on the value of technical expertise and its role in policy processes. (interview 2) As one interviewee put it: “(in other ministries), the minister has an idea and (the bureaucrats) try to fill in the blanks (to turn this idea into a policy). Here (at the ministry of development) it is the opposite; the experts develop the policy opinion and persuade the superiors of this opinion” (interview 3).

4.4.3. Moderating Role of Organisational Traits on the Effects of Political

Context: This section of the paper has so far discussed the ways in which organisational traits including size, appointment practices, expertise and organisational culture affect policy bargains and the bureaucrats' influence in these bargains. Interview data also suggest that the same organisational traits play a moderating role vis-à-vis the effects of political context on policy bargains and bureaucrats' influence in these bargains. This moderating role appears most pronounced with respect to the extent and frequency of appointments and position changes inside an agency. As of January 2014, bureaucrats at the ministry of development seemed to have remained relatively unscathed compared to their peers at the ministry of education. As discussed earlier, even the reorganisation of the two agencies in 2011, which could be considered the ultimate tool of political control, seems to have had notably different effects vis-à-vis changes in staff and organisational structure. All in all, the findings strongly suggest organisational traits to be highly relevant both for bureaucrats' influence in policy bargains and for the effects of political context on this influence.

5. CONCLUSION

This paper set out to examine individual bureaucrats' policy influence with a focus on the effects of political context and organisational traits on this influence. To this end, it compared bureaucrats' engagement in social policymaking processes in two agencies in Turkey across two distinct political periods (short-lived coalition governments with limited and shifting political control versus long-serving single-party governments with extensive and stable political control over the bureaucracy). The paper rooted itself in individual bureaucrats' experiences in policymaking processes.

The paper introduced and employed the policy bargaining model, a novel analytical model developed based on bargaining theory, to capture individual bureaucrats' experiences in policymaking processes. It presented four critical elements in policy bargains, namely utility functions, bargaining power, risk tolerance, and trust. Section 4.1 applied this model to bureaucratic policymaking processes using the empirical data from the interviews and revealed several interesting findings about the drivers of utility functions, sources of bargaining power, factors affecting variation in risk tolerance, and the role of interpersonal trust in policymaking processes. Building on the policy bargaining model, the paper identified three styles of play adopted by individual bureaucrats in policy bargains, namely collaborative, adversarial and obedient, and in Section 4.2 presented a wide array of tools bureaucrats with different styles of play employ in influencing policymaking processes.

The paper also revealed several interesting dynamics vis-à-vis the effects of political context on bureaucrats' policy influence, which were presented in section 4.3. The findings suggest that changes in the political context have an effect on bureaucrats' policy influence primarily by forcing them to adjust their risk calculations to accommodate changes in the credibility of the threat of ex-post punishments. The findings also suggest that changes in the political context have an effect on bureaucrats' policy influence via its effect on policy preferences, bargaining powers, and trust levels of those engaged in policy bargains yet this effect is less consistent.

With respect to the effects of organisational traits on bureaucrats' policy influence, the study findings presented in section 4.4 identified agency size, level of required expertise, appointment practices, and organisational culture as particularly relevant traits that directly impact bureaucrats' informal bargaining powers, risk calculations, and trust levels. The study findings also highlighted the moderating role played by these organisational traits vis-à-vis the effects of political context on bureaucrats' policy influence. More specifically, organisational traits that promote individual bureaucrats' influence in policymaking processes also appear to act as a partial shield against changes in the political context that diminish such influence.

To be sure, the paper's empirical findings cannot be considered as generalisable since they are based on a limited number of interviews with bureaucrats from two social policy agencies in a single country. This certainly makes the findings less generalisable to other policy areas, types of agencies, and country contexts. Still, the findings offer several valuable contributions to our understanding of bureaucratic policy influence. Firstly, the paper puts forward a novel analytical model in examining bureaucratic policymaking processes and individual bureaucrats' engagement in these processes. By doing so, it hopes to advance a nascent body of empirical research on individual bureaucrats' influence in policymaking processes, which have mostly been exploratory and descriptive. While this paper does not undertake a complete application of the various extensions of bargaining theory, such as n-person bargaining (as opposed to two person bargaining), repeated bargaining (as opposed to one-time bargaining), hierarchical bargaining (where hierarchical structure is superimposed over sequential dyadic bargaining episodes), it contends that the policy bargaining model holds significant potential for the systematic analyses of various unique and complex dimensions of bureaucrats' influence in policymaking processes.

Secondly, by rooting its analyses in individual bureaucrats' experiences in policymaking, the study provides a fresh perspective to the existing literature on bureaucratic influence in policymaking processes, which has largely been devoid of individual bureaucrats. The study reveals notable variation in bureaucrats' influence in policymaking processes across individuals, bureaucratic agencies, and political contexts, and uses the policy bargaining model to explain this variation.

Finally, the paper highlights and takes a step toward addressing a notable gap in the bureaucracy literature by studying how changes in the political context affect the internal dynamics of bureaucratic agencies. Its findings highlight the various ways in which the political context shapes and re-shapes bureaucrats' interpersonal exchanges and relations, i.e. the "essence of bureaucracy" (Brehm and Gates 2014).

It is my hope that this empirical investigation of bureaucrats’ influence in policymaking processes and the novel policy bargaining model put forward to scaffold the analyses prove to be intriguing enough to trigger other scholars’ interest in studying this topic in other countries and policy areas.

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ANNEX 1: LIST OF INTERVIEWS

Interview 1, 27 November 2013, Ministry of Development
Interview 2, 11 November 2013, Ministry of Development
Interview 3, 14 November 2013, Ministry of Development
Interview 4, 14 November 2013, Ministry of Development
Interview 5, 14 November 2013, Ministry of Development
Interview 6, 15 November 2013, Ministry of Education
Interview 7, 3 December 2013, Ministry of Education
Interview 8, 28 November 2013, Ministry of Education and Ministry of Development
Interview 9, 6 December 2013, Ministry of Health and Agency of Social Services
Interview 10, 10 December 2013, Ministry of Education
Interview 11, 17 December 2013, Agency of Social Security
Interview 12, 4 December 2013, Ministry of Education
Interview 13, 5 December 2013, Ministry of Education
Interview 14, 11 December 2013, Ministry of Education
Interview 15, 17 December 2013, Ministry of Education and Ministry of Development
Interview 16, 17 January 2014, Ministry of Education
Interview 17, 19 December 2013, Ministry of Education
Interview 18, 16 December 2013, Ministry of Education
Interview 19, 27 December 2013, Ministry of Education
Interview 20, 21 October 2013, Ministry of Development
Interview 21, 21 October 2013, Ministry of Development
Interview 22, 24 October 2013, Ministry of Education
Interview 23, 22 October 2013, Ministry of Education
Interview 24, 24 October 2013, Treasury
Interview 25, 7 November 2013, IO working with Ministry of Education
Interview 26, 9 November 2013, Agency of Social Services
Interview 27, 11 November 2013, Ministry of Development
Interview 28, 11 November 2013, Ministry of Development
Interview 29, 11 November 2013, Ministry of Development
Interview 30, 28 December 2013, IO working with Ministry of Education

ANNEX 2: CODE TREE

1. Causal Mechanisms
    a. Mechanisms of Control
        i. Cabinet-Bureaucrat Relations
        ii. Minister-Bureaucrat Relations
        iii. Parliament-Bureaucrat Relations
        iv. Prime Minister-Bureaucrat Relations
        v. Political Patronage
            1. Appointments
            2. Career Advancement
            3. Honorary Advisory Positions
            4. Exile/Exit
        vi. Reorganisation of Departments/Jurisdictions
        vii. Rule of Law/Fear of Law
    b. Sources of Effect
        i. Authoritarianism
        ii. Checks & Balances
        iii. Coalition
        iv. Duration of Government
        v. Economic Crisis
        vi. Ideological Distance between Coalition Parties
        vii. Single Party
2. Discretion within Bureaucracy
3. Factors at Individual Level
    a. What kind of bureaucrats matter?
    b. What positions matter?
4. Factors at Organisational Level
    a. Capacity
    b. Perceived Expertise
    c. Workload
5. Factors at Policy Level
6. Factors at Team/Unit Level
7. Interviewee: (a) Current Age; (b) Education; (c) Ministry; (d) Period of Career; (e) Positions
8. Policymaking Process
    a. Basic Info (ministry, period, type of policy)
    b. Bureaucrats’ Tools for Influencing
    c. Bureaucrats’ Tools for Resisting
    d. Hierarchy in Practice
    e. Key Events and Steps of Process
    f. Original Source of Policy Idea

ANNEX 3: GENERIC INTERVIEW GUIDE

(FOR BUREAUCRAT WHO SERVED FOR SOME TIME BOTH 1992-2002 AND 2002-2012)

Overall Objectives:

(1) To investigate the relationship between the number of veto players and level of bureaucratic autonomy.
(2) To systematically explore the mechanisms that bring about changes in bureaucratic autonomy vis-à-vis social policymaking when the number of veto players decrease.
(3) To investigate if changes in bureaucratic autonomy vary across bureaucratic positions that require different levels of technical expertise.

<u>INTRODUCTION</u>

Introduction Objectives:

(1) To introduce self and establish credentials;
(2) To introduce research and why this is important topic;
(3) To convey to interviewee how important their opinions/experiences are for this research;
(4) Inform interviewee about confidentiality, anonymisation etc. and ethics and seek permission for tape recording the interview

Introduction Questions:

(1) Introduce self and establish credentials (Oxford, Bilkent, European Commission, GAP-BKI, IPC)
(2) Introduce research (DPhil topic, 4 papers, where does this interview fit)
    a. DPhil – social policymaking in middle-income countries and particularly roles bureaucrats play in social policy changes

"As a doctoral student, I am conducting four connected studies on the roles bureaucrats play in social policymaking and policy change."

    b. I'm conducting four different studies related to this general topic
    c. For one of the studies, I'm investigating if the way bureaucracy functions changes when the composition of the Parliament and the Government changes (so I'm looking at two different periods in Turkish political history: 1992-2002 and 2002-2012).

(3) I'm really excited about being able to hear your thoughts and experiences given your experience during both of these periods. You are one of the few people I'll be interviewing who can compare the two periods from the perspective of a bureaucrat. More specifically,
    a. How you and generally bureaucrats engaged in policy change processes during these two processes and if there was any difference
    b. When I talk about policy changes – I'm less interested in major reforms and new laws; and more interested in smaller policy changes and maybe new regulations;
    c. What your relations were with the Government and the Parliament in

initiating, drafting, and adopting such policy change processes

"Our meeting could take anywhere between 50 minutes to an hour. Thank you so much again for accepting to meet with me. And let me add that if at any point during our meeting you decide not to continue with the interview, please just let me know."

(4) To make sure that I am able to remember your comments fully and correctly, I would like to record our conversation on a voice recorder. I will not share the voice recordings from our meeting with anyone inside or outside the university. If my advisor or the two professors on my dissertation committee request to see a sample of the interview notes or transcripts, I'll share the notes with them only after anonymising the notes so that the name or the position of that person cannot be identified. So if you agree, I would very much like to record our conversation.

"Thank you for accepting to record our conversation. It'll very much contribute to the accuracy of the information I'll retain from our meeting"

a. (I sent an earlier information document about the research study. If you have any questions about this information, you can ask me now or at any point later.
b. Below we start, let me say that any information or opinions you share with me during our meeting, will be anonymised so that the source of the information cannot be identified. I will not use any direct quotes either.
c. I would ike to attach a list of all meetings at the end of my dissertation, which will only be available on University of Oxford's archives. Can I include your name on this list of people I interviewed for my research? (If not, then I'll only include the date of the interview and the name of the ministry without referring to your name or position)

WARM-UP QUESTIONS

Warm-Up Questions Objectives:

(1) To establish rapport and put the interviewee at ease
(2) To get a general sense of the dynamics within the bureaucracy and between the bureaucracy and the Government
(3) To gauge where the interviewee stands vis-à-vis different political/ideological, and organisational cleavages

Warm-Up Questions: [After establishing the most relevant/recent position the interviewee held before leaving civil service]

(1) What would you say are the main difference between the two periods (1992-2002 and 2002-2012) from the perspective of a bureaucrat?
(2) And more particularly, were the two periods different in terms of bureaucrats' engagement in initiating and developing policies?
   a. For example, regarding policies, programs or regulations that were under your unit's responsibility --- could you give an example of a small policy change that took place in your unit before 2002? For this example, could

you describe the process (how was it initiated, how was it developed, who made the decisions at what points)

b. Is this process different from how things would have been before 2002 ---- could you explain how?
    i. What were some different places or different people where the push for change come from? Period 1 vs Period 2 [Provide some example policy changes from a list of pre-selected policies to prompt concrete responses]
    ii. How did the content of the policy change get determined? Could you give an example? Period 1 vs Period 2 [Provide some example policy changes from a list of pre-selected policies to prompt concrete responses]

<u>CRITICAL QUESTIONS:</u>

Critical Questions Objectives:

(1) To understand what is happening vis-à-vis different dimensions of bureaucratic autonomy? (initiating policy, drafting content, constraints from the minister/Government, conflicts and have they are handled)

Critical Questions: [Prompt the interviewee to compare Period 1 vs 2 concerning these questions]

(1) When were the minister or the prime minister more engaged in initiating and determining the content of the policy change? And when were the heads of departments or experts more engaged in these processes?
    a. Period 1 vs Period 2

(2) Do you remember any situations when what the minister or prime minister prefered and when the head of unit or director general prefered were different? What happened in these situations? How was the ultimate decision made?
    a. Period 1 vs Period 2

(3) Were there cases that you can remember when a decision on a new policy/program of your unit were reversed by the Deputy Minister, the Minister or the Prime Minister? Can you talk about them? [Try to get experiences of reversal at different level]

(4) Were there cases when because of a decision your unit took on a new policy/program/regulation, you felt that you later received negative treatment from the supervisors or the Ministers? (probe about punishment – lowered budget, not being invited to events etc.)

(5) [If no preference divergence, veto, conflict, reversal or punishment, then] How did you ensure that the new policies and programs your unit drafts were in line with the preferences of the minister or the prime minister? [Probe about political signaling, signal-reading, preventive steps]

(6) I'm also very curious --- Are there cases when you or someone in your position was able to influence the preferences/choices of the Deputy Minister, the Minister or maybe even the Prime Minister?

(7) And if I may be bold --- What did you do for the succesful navigation of a policy change of your unit or department through the political maze of the Cabinet and the Parliament?
    a. During Period 1, what happened, for example, when the coalition parties in the Cabinet had different positions on a new policy?
    b. Similarly, what happened when the Parliament was too divided over a policy issue? How did you tackle or avoid these situations?
    c. Also, how frequently did the minister and the deputy ministers change in your ministry? What did this mean for policy and program changes concerning your unit?

(8) In your unit, which positions or which individuals played which roles for the initiation and drafting of a new policy or program or regulation? Who had the final word on the content of a new policy or a revision?
(9) Was this the same for all new policies/programs or did it depend on the policy/program?(If it varies) --- what are the things that made different policies/programs different?
(10) From among the experts or heads of units, were there some who were more involved in initiating or designing new social policies and programs?
(11) So what factors do you think affected the different levels of participation in policymaking of people who hold the same position within the hierarchy?

BASIC INFORMATION

Basic Information Objectives:

(1) To find out about bureaucratic experience of respondent (which ministries/depts/positions) to understand if in current position through meritocratic promotion or political appointment
(2) To find out about pre-bureaucracy experience of respondent (education and jobs)to understand if respondent is a professional with technical expertise or managerial administrator

Basic Information Questions:

(1) Also for me to be able to put in context your experiences and analyses, could you tell me a bit about your experiences in the civil service?
(2) And also before you joined the civil service?

Probes: when appointed to most recent position; past bureaucracy positions (ministry/department/position); education (major); work experience before joining the public bureaucracy

WRAP-UP

Anything else you would like to add or if you think our conversation left out some important aspects of bureaucrats' roles in policymaking during 1992-2002 and 2002-2012.

Thank you so much for your time and for sharing your thoughts and experiences. Would it be okey for me to contact you if I have any questions as I go through the notes (and voice records) of our meeting? Should I just email you or call you? Also, in the mean time, if you have any questions about my research study, please do not hesitate to contact me. Also, is there anyone you would recommend for me to meet with for this research topic?

CHAPTER 5

After the Dust Settles: Mergers, Policymaking Processes, Mid-Level Bureaucrats

1. INTRODUCTION

Reorganisation of bureaucratic agencies is a dual-purpose tool frequently employed by governments. The decision to reorganise a bureaucratic agency could be motivated by a government's desire to improve its performance or a need to adjust the degree of its political control over an agency. In the first case, attempts at reorganisation are often based on the assumption that changing organisational structure would help address inefficiencies stemming from inadequate coordination, inappropriate horizontal differentiation or excessive intra-organisational conflict. In the latter case, attempts at reorganisation aim to adjust an agency's political responsiveness by using the reorganisation as an opportunity to replace highly autonomous bureaucrats with more responsive ones and to disrupt existing networks of informal authority to re-establish more responsive ones.

In either case, reorganisation is a tool with potentially significant implications for policy quality and bureaucratic politics. Yet, the knowledge base about the effects of reorganisation remains surprisingly thin. There are only a handful of studies on the effects of reorganisation of public agencies on administrative operations and agency performance, and they suggest there to be either no notable change (Hood, Huby, and Dunsire 1985) or a highly variable scope of change (Hult 1987). Our knowledge is particularly limited concerning the effects of changes in organisational structure on the policymaking processes inside a public agency, which has implications both for agency performance and agency's political responsiveness. Those studies that focus on the changes inside an agency examine internal conflicts and relationships (Hult 1987; Egeberg 2007; Askim et al. 2008), and not policymaking processes.

This paper strengthens a relatively thin knowledge base about the effects of reorganisation by studying the case of a certain type of reorganisation: a merger. It focuses on changes in internal policymaking processes and the engagement of mid-level bureaucrats in these processes in the aftermath of a merger that brought about substantial changes in organisational structure, cadres and staff. More specifically, the study examines how internal policymaking processes and mid-level bureaucrats' engagement in these processes change in the aftermath of a major reorganisation.

The term internal policymaking processes is used in this paper to denote formal and informal processes inside a bureaucratic agency that affect the design of a policy. The paper examines change across several aspects of internal policymaking processes including their duration, the sources of policy initiatives, and the extent of consultation and participation. In addition to examining the changes in mid-level bureaucrats' engagement in internal policymaking processes, the paper also discusses the plausible mechanisms underlying these changes. More generally, the paper puts a spotlight on how mid-level bureaucrats, i.e. policy bureaucrats serving in agency headquarters who hold a position in the middle ranks of an organisational hierarchy, respond to and cope with major changes in their organisational environment.

The study focusses on mid-level bureaucrats because the extent and nature of their engagement in internal policymaking processes have consequences for both the technical quality and the degree of bureaucratic influence in policymaking processes. As argued by Carpenter in his seminal work on bureaucracy in the United States (2001), mid-level bureaucrats are in the best position in a bureaucratic structure for experimenting, learning, and innovating vis-à-vis public policies, all of which contribute to effective policymaking processes. As argued by Page and Jenkins in their study on policy bureaucracies in the United Kingdom, the nature of the interactions between mid-level bureaucrats and elected officials in policymaking processes is a critical piece of understanding the overall influence of bureaucracy in these processes (2005). Thus, changes in the scope and nature of mid-level bureaucrats' engagement in policymaking processes brought about by a reorganisation can, therefore, be expected to have consequences for both the policy performance of a public agency and its political responsiveness – i.e. the two main objectives of undertaking a reorganisation in the public sector.

To study the changes in internal policymaking processes and the engagement of mid-level bureaucrats in these processes, the paper focuses on the case of a merger that transformed the landscape of public agencies governing the social policy realm in Turkey. In 2011, five public agencies working under the Prime

Ministry's Office were reorganised and merged into a new ministry, the Ministry of Family and Social Policy. The merger was motivated by the government's concerns about both policy performance and political responsiveness. The idea to bring these agencies under a single organisational umbrella in an effort to improve the overall coordination of social protection and assistance policies had been on the policy agenda for at least a decade prior to 2011. Yet, the merger also coincided with a major overhaul of public administration by a government that had been increasingly tightening its grip on the bureaucracy. The changes in organisational structure were accompanied by all high-level bureaucrats in the merged agencies being replaced by political appointees, and the formal hierarchy being linked more directly and tightly to an elected minister.

Using data from elite interviews and document reviews, this case study provides a descriptive account of the reorganisation's substantial effect on organisational structure, cadres and staff, and examines changes in policymaking processes and mid-level bureaucrats engagements in these processes two years after this major reorganisation. The study also discusses interviewees' perspectives on plausible mechanisms underlying the changes in their engagement. Interviews were conducted with 19 bureaucrats whose experiences represent the variety of ways in which the merger affected mid-level bureaucrats. Some interviewees were forced to exit, others chose to exit. Of those interviewees remaining in the post-merger ministry, some were stalled in the ranks of the hierarchy, others were propelled upward while some others were demoted. Together, their experiences represent the myriad of ways in which individual bureaucrats were affected by, responded to and coped with major changes in their organisational environment.

The findings from the case study suggest that this major reorganisation did bring about some changes in internal policymaking processes and mid-level bureaucrats' engagement in these processes. The direction, nature and scope of these changes, however, seem to vary across individual bureaucrats. This variation highlights the importance of individual-level factors in understanding the relation between organisational structure, bureaucratic processes, and bureaucratic behaviour. The study findings also suggest that the reorganisation brought about the observed changes in mid-level bureaucrats' engagement in policymaking processes through several different mechanisms including changes in the relative and absolute position of a bureaucrat, changes in organisational cleavages, and changes in relations and informal channels of communication.

More generally, the findings from this case study support the predictions of earlier theoretical studies about the existence of a relation between organisational structure and policymaking processes (Egeberg 2007; Hammond 1986). The present study contributes to this literature in two particular ways. It specifies the scope and nature of the change in policymaking processes in the case of a public merger that had substantial effects on not only organisational structure but also cadres and staff. It also highlights that a change in organisational structure may be accompanied by not only a change in policymaking processes but also a change in mid-level bureaucrats' engagement in policymaking processes with possible implications for policy quality and agency's political responsiveness.

This paper first gives an overview of the body of theoretical and empirical research on the relation between organisational structure, policymaking processes, and bureaucratic behaviour, and the empirical research on reorganisations in the public sector. Section 3 describes the design, methodology, and data collection for the study. Section 4 presents a detailed description of the case including the scope of structural changes brought about by the merger in an effort to contextualize the findings. Section 5 presents the findings of the study in three parts: changes in policymaking processes, changes in mid-level bureaucrats' engagement in these processes, and mechanisms of this change. The paper concludes with a discussion of these findings and their implications.

2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

This section begins with a brief overview of the literature on the relation between organisational structure, policymaking processes, and bureaucratic behaviour. The section then moves onto the body of empirical studies on reorganisation and mergers in public administration. This is followed by a theoretical discussion about plausible mechanisms underlying the changes in mid-level bureaucrats' engagement in policymaking processes in the aftermath of the merger. The section ends with a discussion of concepts central to the study and its findings.

2.1. Relation between Organisational Structure and Bureaucratic Behaviour

The body of empirical studies examining the relation between organisational structure and policymaking processes in public agencies is surprisingly limited. Many of the empirical studies were carried out by a group of scholars in Norway in 1990s under the leadership of Morten Egeberg. These studies demonstrate the variety of effects that changes in organisational size, horizontal differentiation (i.e. the horizontal distribution of specialised tasks across units of an organisation) and vertical differentiation (i.e. the vertical separation of tasks and authorities across different levels of an organisation's hierarchy), can have on bureaucrats' contact patterns and information exchange in policymaking processes (Egeberg 1994, 1999, 2007). For instance, a study of road and rail infrastructure planning in Norway demonstrates how organisational size and resulting structural capacity matters for bureaucrats' ability to pursue new policies (Egeberg 1995). More specifically, the study finds that those bureaucrats in units with higher structural capacity were more able to pursue new policy interventions compared to their peers in units with lower structural capacity. Another study on the effects of a reorganisation of the transport ministry in Norway shows how a shift from a process-specialised (such as budget, planning, judicial affairs) to purpose-specialised (such as air transport, rail transport) horizontal structural arrangement increased sectoral bureaucrats' access to ministerial policymaking processes (Mortensen 1993 cited in Egeberg 2007).

Similarly, on the theoretical front, the inspiring work of Thomas Hammond (1986) remains to be built on. Hammond uses formal modelling to investigate the impact of different vertical and horizontal distributions of the advisory tasks and the operating tasks of bureaucrats on policymaking processes and outcomes. Accordingly, Hammond (1986) argues that different organisational structures, i.e. different arrangements of vertical and horizontal distributions of tasks, would make different subsets of policy options available to the decisionmakers in the higher echelons of the bureaucratic hierarchy. Hence, different organisational structures could ultimately lead to different policy decisions. Similarly, Hammond (1986) contends that different organisational structures would carry different policy problems to higher echelons of the bureaucratic hierarchy by pushing certain internal conflicts downwards and others upwards. So, under different organisational structures one would expect to see different policy problems being addressed.

2.2. Empirical Studies of Reorganisation in Public Administration

As also argued by Egeberg (1999), reorganisations in public administration present a unique opportunity to study the effects of organisational structure on policymaking processes by eliminating the limitations posed by synchronous research design with respect to making inferences about cause-effect relationship between structure and policymaking processes.

For the most part, however, empirical studies on reorganisations, mergers, and demergers in the public sector do not focus on internal processes (March and Olson 1983; Hood, Huby, and Dunsire 1985; Cole and Eymeri-Douzans 2010) with some notable case studies as exceptions (Maynard-Moody, Stull, and Mitchell 1986; Hult 1987; Askim et al. 2008; Gervais 2010). Those case studies that look at internal processes either do so with a view to understand the unfolding of the reorganisation process itself (Maynard-Moody, Stull, and Mitchell 1986; Askim et al. 2008; Gervais 2010) or when they examine the intra-agency effects of the merger, they focus on internal conflicts and intra-organisational relationships and not on policymaking processes. Thus, to the best of my knowledge, the empirical literature on reorganisations in public administration speak only indirectly to the effects of reorganisation on policymaking processes and the engagement of mid-level bureaucrats in these processes.

2.3. Mechanisms of Change in Mid-Level Bureaucrats' Engagement in Policymaking

Given these limitations of the literature on reorganisations in public administration, the study also draws on the wider bureaucracy literature regarding the relation between organisational structure and bureaucratic behaviour. It does so with the specific goal to identify some plausible mechanisms that could underlie the to-be-investigated changes in mid-level bureaucrats' engagement in policymaking processes in the aftermath of the merger. In the following paragraphs, these plausible mechanisms and their theoretical bases are presented under three groupings: changes in formal positions, changes in organisational cleavages, and changes in informal communication.

Changes in formal position: Changes in organisational structure brought about by a merger could translate into changes in the absolute and relative position of mid-level bureaucrats in the vertical and horizontal span of the organisation. Such changes in positions may bring about changes in mid-level bureaucrats' behaviour via changes in their tasks, functions, and goals. As argued by Simon, the very goals that shape the behaviour of a bureaucrat are the products of that bureaucrat's position in the organisation (1997). Hammond also links organisational structure and policymaking in bureaucracies via individual positions; he focusses on how structural features influence individuals' judgment and preferences in different locations, which then systematically affects problem perception, policy adoption, and conflict resolution (1996).

Hence, a change in the position of a bureaucrat may change the goals of that bureaucrat, which in turn may affect his behaviour in policymaking processes. For instance, a mid-level bureaucrat in the research unit of an agency is likely to have his goals and preferences in policymaking processes to be shaped primarily by a concern for sound policy analyses. If that bureaucrat were to be moved to an implementation unit in the aftermath of a reorganisation, his new position would then most likely lead him to be more concerned about a different set of issues in policymaking processes, such as fiscal viability and local ownership.

Changes in position may also bring about changes in the nature and frequency of contact a mid-level bureaucrat has with political leadership that then influences the extent to which political signals shape that bureaucrat's behaviour in policymaking processes. As put forward by Egeberg (2007), a bureaucrat's position is correlated with his contact with the political leadership, the emphasis put on political signals, and the amount of horizontal interaction. All of these factors affect the nature of a bureaucrat's engagement in decision processes (Egeberg 2007).

Hence, a change in the position of a bureaucrat may change that bureaucrat's behaviour via the changes in the strength of the political signals that bureaucrat is exposed to. For instance, a mid-level bureaucrat in a highly autonomous agency isolated from political actors is likely to value mostly the technical aspects of a policy proposal. If this agency were to be merged into a larger and highly politicised ministry and this bureaucrat were to be given a position in the advisory team to the minister, then it is very likely that his new position would then lead him to consider the political implications of a policy proposal alongside its technical aspects.

Changes in organisational cleavages: Building on Rourke's work, another plausible mechanism through which a reorganisation may impact mid-level bureaucrats' engagement in policymaking processes is via the lines of division inside an organisation, i.e. organisational cleavages (1976). In analysing the forces and factors shaping the outcome of policy deliberations inside a bureaucracy, Rourke pays particular attention to internal bureaucratic politics, which he contends "does as much to shape the structure of policy as the interaction between agencies and outside groups and organizations" (1976, 109). In dissecting internal bureaucratic politics, Rourke focusses on the principal groups participating in policy development and the differences in their policy preferences.

Rourke spells out several cleavages in the ranks of bureaucracy that produce differences in perspectives and generates internal disputes in policymaking, including: (1) political appointees vs. career administrators; (2) professional career employees vs. administrator career employees; (3) outside experts who enter policymaking processes in an advisory role vs. permanent employees (pp. 110–111). Rourke contends these cleavages to be highly relevant in the processes and outcomes of policymaking processes (1976).

Accordingly, a reorganisation could affect the relations and power distribution across these cleavages. Moreover, depending on which side of the cleavage a mid-level bureaucrat is positioned, it could impact the extent and nature of that bureaucrat's engagement in policymaking processes. For instance, a reorganisation could shift influence from career administrators to political appointees, which is likely to increase an agency's political responsiveness. In this case, a mid-level bureaucrat who is a career administrator is likely to find fewer opportunities to influence policy processes and more obstacles to initiating new policies. Similarly, a reorganisation could shift influence from professional career employees to administrator career employees, which is likely to increase the agency's risk aversion and to decrease mid-level bureaucrats willingness to initiate new policies.

Changes in informal communication: Finally, building on Herbert Simon's work with a focus on his arguments regarding organisational communication, changes in channels of informal communication emerge as another plausible mechanism that may underlie the changes in mid-level bureaucrats' engagement in policymaking processes in the aftermath of a merger (1997). Viewing decision as a matter of compromise, Simon describes policymaking as a collective and interrelated process "supported by a rich network of partially formalized but partially informal communications" (p. 25). Thus, one can expect that a reorganisation affects the network of organisational communications, which in turn affects both the individual bureaucrats' positions in this network and the overall collective policymaking process.

2.4. Key Concepts and Definitions

Before proceeding to describing the case and discussing the empirical findings of the study, it is important to clarify some of the terms used in the study, including organisational structure, mid-level bureaucrats, and policymaking processes. The term organisational structure has been used to capture a wide range of organisational traits in the relevant literature (Hall 1962; Pugh et al. 1968; Meyer 1972; Pennings 1973; Hood and Dunsire 1981). This paper uses a relatively narrow definition similar to Hood and Dunsire's (1981, 21), which denotes the internal administrative characteristics of an organisation such as size, hierarchy, horizontal differentiation, and geographic dispersion.

For the purposes of this study, mid-level bureaucrats are defined by their position in the organisational hierarchy. The term encompasses policy bureaucrats serving in agency headquarters. More specifically, it includes the positions of expert, head of unit, head of department and deputy director. It excludes the positions of assistant expert at the lower-end of the hierarchy and the positions of general director, deputy undersecretary and undersecretary at the upper-end.

Finally, the study uses the term policymaking processes to denote formal and informal processes inside a bureaucratic agency that affect the design and intended execution of a policy. For the purposes of this study, such policies include changes in the rules of qualifying for a social assistance program, revisions to the responsibilities of social workers working with vulnerable children, or introduction of a new process for disability diagnosis. They exclude administrative decisions, such as changes in promotion requirements inside the organisation, a decision to purchase new IT equipment for the agency headquarters, or a decision for the provision of additional training to agency staff.

This section has presented a theoretical and conceptual background to the study. It has highlighted the limited nature of the relevant knowledge base and has provided the theoretical background to the mechanisms of change explored in the interviews. In the next section, the research design and methodology will be described.

3. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

The study is designed as a case study of a merger of public agencies in the social policy realm in a middle-income country. Its objective is to identify the extent and nature of changes in policymaking processes and mid-level bureaucrats' engagement in policymaking processes in the aftermath of this merger. It pays particular attention to the mechanisms that may underlie the changes in mid-level bureaucrats' engagement in policymaking processes. More generally, the study is intended to underscore the relation between organisational structure, policymaking processes, and bureaucratic behaviour in policymaking processes.

The case studied represents as a sizable disruption in the landscape of public agencies governing the social policy realm in Turkey. In 2011, five key public agencies working on various social policy issues under the Prime Ministry's

Office in Turkey were merged into a new ministry, the Ministry of Family and Social Policy. The reorganisation was motivated by concerns about both policy efficiency and political control. The merger itself brought about notable changes in organisational structure and staff that are described in detail in Section 4.

The primary source of data for this study is in-depth elite interviews. Interviews were conducted with 19 bureaucrats[40] who worked in one of the pre-merger agencies and the post-merger ministry so as to enable a comparison of policymaking processes and their engagement in these processes before and after the merger (see Annex 1 for a list of interviews). Thus, neither those bureaucrats who worked in one of the pre-merger agencies but did not remain in the post-merger ministry nor those bureaucrats who worked in the post-merger ministry but did not work in one of the pre-merger agencies were interviewed.

The study was originally designed to use clustered random sampling with each cluster capturing mid-level bureaucrats in different positions in one of the five directorate-generals in the ministry. Due to low response rates to multiple rounds of phone and email requests for interviews using contact information publicly available, the interviewees were ultimately identified by snowball sampling with multiple entry points. Some of these entry points were respondents to the original requests for interviews while others were through mutual personal and

[40] Note that throughout the paper, “he” is used to refer to all interviewees regardless of their gender in an effort to preserve their anonymity.

professional contacts.[41] The average wave size was 2.3.

In terms of the characteristics of the interviewees, the following organisational attributes stand out:[42]

- While all 19 interviewees worked in the ministry in the immediate aftermath of the merger, only 15 were working at the ministry at the time of the interview. Three of the interviewees were employed in another public agency and one was formally employed at the ministry but in reality did not work there any more.
- Of the 19 interviewees, before the merger, five were employed at Social Services Agency, seven were employed at Social Assistance Agency, five were employed at Disability Agency, and two were employed at Family Research Agency.[43]
- Of the 15 interviewees who were working at the ministry at the time of the interview, 11 were department heads, two were deputy directors, and two were experts.

Bureaucrats' low response rate to interview requests is not an unusual occurrence in bureaucracy studies. In fact, as discussed by Hood and Dunsire

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[41] Several of these mutual contacts were bureaucrats I interviewed at the ministry of development and ministry of national education for another study.

[42] In terms of their demographic characteristics, three interviewees were women and 16 were men; eight of the interviewees were in their 30s, six were in their 40s and five were in their 50s. Three of the interviewees held PhD degrees, one held a masters degree, and fifteen held a bachelors degree. Five interviewees held their bachelors degree in social work and 14 held a bachelors degree in social sciences.

[43] Note that none of the interviewees were employed at the General Directorate of Status of Women (KSGM) prior to the merger. As a result, while KSGM is included in analysis of data from official documents and organisational websites, it is excluded from analysis using interview data.

(1981), elite interviewing with bureaucrats can be ripe with selection bias because researchers are more likely to gain access to fairly high-level bureaucrats or bureaucrats for whom career considerations are not important. In this study, the response rates might have further suffered as a result of factors unique to the case, including bureaucrats' cautious attitude in the uncertain post-merger environment and bureaucrats' busy schedules brought about by changes in their responsibilities.[44] The particularly low response rate required diverging from the study's original sampling method. Consequently, the bureaucrats interviewed were not a representative sample of the five pre-merger agencies or the positions held by mid-level bureaucrats.

However, it must be noted that the interviewees' experiences in the aftermath of the merger do capture, to a large extent, the variety of ways in which mid-level bureaucrats were affected by and responded to the merger. Some interviewees were forced to exit, some chose to exit, some chose to stay. Of those staying, some propelled upward in the ranks of the post-ministry, other were stalled, and some were demoted. Thus, despite being a non-representative sample of pre-merger agencies and bureaucrats' positions in these agencies, the interview data still captures the diversity of ways in which the reorganisation affected individual bureaucrats and arguably the variety of ways in which individual bureaucrats

[44] One interviewee also described how he has started ignoring emails sent to his official email address and calls to his external office line since the post-merger ministry's website made their email addresses and office phone numbers available to the general public. As a result of this transparency measure, many citizens have started taking up individual service problems directly with policy bureaucrats. As a way to cope with an overflowing email inbox and frequently ringing office phone, this particular interviewee said he started ignoring both. (Interview 2) If this is a coping strategy used also by other bureaucrats, it might partly explain the limited response to email and phone requests for interviews.

responded to these changes.

Given the above-mentioned cautious attitude among bureaucrats in the post-merger ministry, several measures were taken to address interviewees' concerns about potential negative repercussions for being interviewed and for providing honest opinions, and thus to mitigate selection bias. These measures included providing anonymity, not seeking a signature for the consent form, and giving the option of not being recorded. Since snowball sampling could aggravate selection bias, interviewees were explicitly asked for recommendations of potential interviewees whose views and experiences might differ from theirs as well as those bureaucrats who left the ministry since the merger. Even with these mitigating measures, the interviewees are likely to be more risk-taking, more open to external actors, and less bound by official rules and structures than the average mid-level bureaucrat in the post-merger ministry.

The interviews were conducted in Ankara from 13 November 2013 to 16 December 2013, i.e. about two years after the merger. The interviews were semi-structured using thematic guiding questions (see Annex 2 for guiding questions). The primary focus of data collected via interviews was on changes to organisational structure, policymaking processes, and the interviewee's engagement in policymaking processes. Data was also collected on other bureaucratic factors such as recruitment and promotion policies for bureaucrats, socio-economic and educational background of bureaucrats, and bureaucratic politicisation in order to inform and contextualise the core analysis. The interviewees were also asked specifically about their views vis-à-vis the three plausible mechanisms of change discussed in Section 1, i.e. changes in formal position, changes in organisational cleavages, changes in informal communication.[45]

All recorded interviews were transcribed. A draft code tree paralleling the analytical framework on the relation between organisational structure, policymaking processes and bureaucrats' behaviour in policymaking processes was revised based on an initial review of interview transcriptions and notes. (See Annex 3 for the code tree) The main revisions to the code tree at this stage concerned the inclusion of codes to capture the dynamics of the merger process, including uncertainty and the challenges of socio-cultural integration, which were strongly highlighted by interviewees in their responses to questions about changes in organisational structure and policymaking processes. The interview transcriptions and notes were then coded using this code tree with NVivo software. The analysis was conducted and findings were synthesized using this coded qualitative data. During the analysis, particular attention was paid to interviewees' pre-merger organisation and positional movement during the merger process.

[45] All interviews were conducted face-to-face and lasted from about 40 minutes to 2.5 hours. The interviews were conducted on the basis of anonymity in an effort to encourage open and honest responses. All interviewees were provided with either an electronic or hard copy of an information sheet prior to the interview in addition to the verbal research and consent related information provided prior to seeking their verbal consent. 14 interviewees agreed to voice recording, five interviewees agreed to only note taking. 15 of the interviews were conducted on the premises of the ministry of family and social policy, three at other public agencies, and one at a community centre in Ankara. All interviews were conducted in Turkish.

The second source of data was official documents and organisational websites. Information on institutional measures of pre-merger organisations and the post-merger ministry was collected through reviews of official documents including annual reports and strategic plans, and cached views of organisational websites at two points prior to the merger and two points after the merger. Following a line of earlier studies that utilize institutional measures with objective measurement techniques (Pennings 1973), the organisational data on structure, staff and cadres were extracted from these official documents and organisational websites with a view to develop a descriptive analysis of the effects of the merger on organisational structure and staff. The descriptive analysis presented in Section 4 uses a set of measures selected from two different studies on the structure of activities, concentration of authority, and line of workflow inside organisations (Pugh et al. 1968; Hood and Dunsire 1981).

4. BACKGROUND ON THE CASE

This section presents background information on the merger to help contextualize the study findings. The section begins with a description of the agencies merged and the merger decision before providing an analysis of the changes in organisational structure, official cadres, and staff brought about by the merger. It must be noted that this analysis on the scope of organisational changes is far from a formality as some earlier studies on public administration reorganisation have found little observable effect on bureaucratic structure (Hood, Huby, and Dunsire 1985). Thus, the analysis presented in this section not only establishes that the merger had observable effects on organisational structure, cadres, and staff, but it also shows that these effects were generally large yet with some notable variation across the agencies.

4.1. The Agencies Merged

Prior to their merger in 2011, the five merged agencies were responsible for different aspects of social assistance and social services, with SHÇEK (Social Services Agency) focusing on all aspects of social services and child protection, SYDGM (Social Assistance Agency) focusing on social assistance, ÖZİDA (Disability Agency) on persons with disabilities, ASAGEM (Family Research Agency) on family and social dynamics, and KSGM (Women's Status Agency) on gender equality. In terms of their functions, Disability Agency, Family Research Agency, and Women's Status Agency were exclusively focused on policy research and design. Social Services Agency and Social Assistance Agency, on the other hand, were both implementing agencies.[46] All five were agencies under the Prime Ministry's Office and they were reporting to state ministers. Table 1 provides a summary description of the organisational function, areas of focus, and history of the five agencies that were merged into the new Ministry of Family and Social Policy in 2011.

[46] Despite both being implementing agencies, Social Services Agency and Social Assistance Agency differed in their organisational structures and means of service delivery. As of 2010, the Social Services Agency was established through provincial directorates in all 91 provinces. It delivered protection and care services for vulnerable children, families, and elderly through 961 institutions. The Social Assistance Agency, in contrast, delivered cash and in-kind assistance to individuals and households through quasi-governmental and semi-independent foundations established in provinces and sub-provinces.

Table 1: Summary Information on the Merged Agencies

Agency	Est.	Main Function	Areas of Focus	Dispersion	Budget (2010, TL)	Staff at HQ
Social Services and Child Protection Agency (SHÇEK)	1983	policy design implementation coordination	social services child protection services for PwD	81 provinces, 35 sub-provinces, 961 institutions	2.4 billion	508
General Directorate of Social Assistance and Solidarity (SYDGM)	1986 (Fund) 2004 (DG)	policy design implementation coordination	social assistance poverty alleviation	(indirect) 973 semi-independent foundations in all provinces and sub-provinces	2.7 billion (Fund)	66
Administration for Disabled People (ÖZİDA)	1997	research input into policy design	persons with disability (PwD)	None	9.6 million	149
General Directorate of Family and Social Studies (ASAGEM)	2004	research input into policy design	family population "social problems"	None	7.3 million	62
General Directorate of Status of Women (KSGM)	1990	research input into policy design	gender equality women's empowerment	None	4.1 million[47]	56

4.2. The Merger

The merger was part of an overhaul of the public administration during 2011 at a time when the government intensified its efforts to increase bureaucracy's political responsiveness. The particular foundation law for the Ministry of Family and Social Policy was one of eight decree laws enacted a few days before the general elections in June 2011 that created new ministries and re-organised existing ones. Prior to 2011, the pre-merger agencies were working under the Prime Ministry's Office, reporting to state ministers, and enjoying considerable budgetary and policy autonomy. To increase the political control over these agencies, the reorganisation brought them under a single ministry, established a

[47] This is an inflation adjusted figure from 2009 (3.8 million TL) to 2010.

hierarchy that linked them more directly and tightly to a sectoral minister, and limited their budgetary autonomy by bringing them fully under the general government budget.

However, it must also be noted that the idea of merging social assistance and social services as well as policy design and policy implementation functions had been on the policy agenda with references to it in the eighth national development plan in 2000 and the 60th government's manifesto in 2007. Thus, the merger decision could be seen as motivated by concerns about both the political responsiveness and the policy performance of agencies in the social policy realm.

4.3. Changes in Organisational Structure

In examining the changes in organisational structure brought about by the merger, the study employed three of the objective measures of "bureaumetrics" (Hood and Dunsire 1981), i.e. change in size, shape of hierarchy, horizontal differentiation, and used data collected through document reviews.

(i) Changes in Size: Two commonly used measures for agency size are staff size and budget size. In terms of staff size, the merger brought about a notable expansion yet the relative change in staff size varied across individual agencies.[48] The merger also brought about a notable expansion in aggregate

[48] In 2010, the year before the merger, the total number of staff employed at the five agencies headquarters was 840 with the following breakdown: Social Services Agency (508), Disability Agency (149), Social Assistance Agency (66), Family Research Agency (62), Women's Status

budget size. [49]

(ii) Changes in Shape of Hierarchy: To compare the shape of hierarchy pre- and post-merger, the two measures used are the average height of the hierarchies (Hood and Dunsire 1981, 69), and the distance from a mid-level bureaucrat to the minister. Using organograms and personnel data from annual agency reports, it was found that the average height of the hierarchies increased for all agencies studied. (See Table 2) Similarly, the distance from the mid-level bureaucrat to the Minister increased for all agencies. It is worth noting, however, that the distance from the mid-level bureaucrat to the general director remained the same. In other words, the increase in the height of the hierarchy and the increase in the distance from the mid-level bureaucrat to the Minister were both driven by the increase in the highest ladders of the hierarchy with the creation of the positions of deputy minister, undersecretary and deputy undersecretary.

Agency (56). In 2012, the year after the merger, the number of staff employed at the new ministry was 1173. This represents approximately a 40 per cent increase in the aggregate staff size. Yet, the relative change in staff size varied considerably across individual agencies. For instance, for a bureaucrat in Social Assistance Agency or Family Research Agency, the merger meant moving to an organisation that employed about 20 times the number of staff at his home organisation while for a bureaucrat in Social Services Agency, the new ministry was only twice the size of his former agency.

[49] The realized budget of the five agencies prior to the merger totalled to about 5.3 billion TL. In 2012, the year after the merger, the realized budget of the new ministry was 9.7 billion TL,[49] which represents an 83 per cent increase in the aggregate budget size. It must, however, be noted that the merger process coincided with some notable changes in the social protection policies with fiscal implications. Thus, the changes in budget size must be interpreted with caution.

Table 2: Organisational Structure of Ministry and Merged Agencies

	Agency	Staff at HQ	Budget (TL, 2010)	Height of Hierarchy
POST-MERGER MINISTRY	Ministry of Family and Social Policy	1173 (2012)	9.7 billion[50]	9 (minister, deputy minister, undersecretary, deputy undersecretary, general director, deputy general director, head of department, expert, asst. expert)
PRE-MERGER AGENCIES	Social Services and Child Protection Agency (SHÇEK)	508	2.4 billion	6 (minister, general director, deputy general director, head of department, head of unit, professionals)
	General Directorate of Social Assistance and Solidarity (SYDGM)	66	2.7 billion	6 (minister, general director, deputy general director, head of department, expert, asst. expert)
	Administration for Disabled People (ÖZİDA)	149	9.6 million	7 (minister, general director, deputy general director, head of department, head of unit, expert, asst. expert)
	General Directorate of Family and Social Studies (ASAGEM)	62	7.3 million	6 (minister, general director, deputy general director, head of department, expert, asst. expert)
	General Directorate of Status of Women (KSGM)	56	4.1 million[51]	6 (minister, general director, deputy general director, head of department, expert, asst. expert)

(iii) Changes in Horizontal Differentiation: In terms of horizontal differentiation, i.e. the distribution of tasks across horizontal units of an organisation, the post-merger new ministry was more than an aggregation of the technical departments and units of the pre-merger agencies.[52] Taken as a whole, the merger has generally increased the horizontal differentiation in the technical realm. It has done so by: (i) dividing up aggregate technical departments into their sub-units, such as "department of assistance to health, elderly and disabled" being broken

[50] This is an inflation adjusted figure from 2012 (11.3 billion TL) to 2010.
[51] This is an inflation adjusted figure from 2009 (3.8 million TL) to 2010.
[52] It must be noted that since the research questions concern policy bureaucrats, horizontal differentiation concerning the support functions of the agencies, such as budget, legal affairs and external relations, were not included in this analysis.

up to “department of health and regular assistance” and “department of elderly and disabled”; (ii) by the creation of new departments, such as “department of housing assistance”; and (iii) by converting units in pre-merger agencies into departments in the post-merger ministry and introducing specialised units under these new departments, such as the unit of care services for people with disabilities under the Disability Agency becoming a department under the general directorate of services for people with disabilities and the elderly, with six specialised units under it.

Objective measures, taken as a whole, suggest that the merger studied has indeed brought about an observable and sizable changes in the main aspects of organisational structure, including size, shape of the hierarchy, and horizontal differentiation.

4.4. Changes in Cadres

Turning from organisational structure to cadres, three changes brought about by the merger are notable in terms of their direct effect on mid-level bureaucrats, which are discussed in detail in Annex 4. The first change concerns the introduction of the “expert” cadre in the post-merger ministry, which weakened the status of technical bureaucrats who were at the Social Services Agency prior to the merger. The second change concerns the elimination of the cadre of “unit heads” in the post-merger ministry, which weakened the status of mid-level managerial and technical bureaucrats most of whom were at the Social Services Agency before the merger. The third change concerns the introduction of the "ministerial advisor" cadre in the post-merger ministry for all high-level and many mid-level positions in the agencies merged, which allowed for sidelining many mid- and high-level bureaucrats in the aftermath of the merger.

These three changes in cadres brought about by the merger have had variable effects across the agencies and individual bureaucrats. The Social Services Agency and bureaucrats who were at this Agency prior to the merger were more acutely affected by these changes in cadres compared to other pre-merger agencies: (1) the general director, deputy directors and department heads formerly at the Social Services Agency became ministerial advisors in the aftermath of the merger; (2) the heads of unit were demoted and became researchers in the new ministry; and (3) the professional experts lost their status in the new ministry. For the other agencies, while the general directors, deputy directors and department heads also became ministerial advisors in the aftermath of the merger (see next section for a more detailed discussion on staff changes), the career experts retained their status with some of them being promoted to become department heads and deputy directors.

4.5. Changes in Staff

To track staff changes across the merger process, the study built a dataset of all personnel names available on cached organisational websites at three points in time with a total of 196 entries.[53] Based on this dataset, it appears that the majority of 15 deputy directors and general directors in the pre-merger agencies

[53] As a result of the large number of missing observations, a reliable analysis using objective measures was not considered possible for all department heads.

were not appointed to an equivalent position in the post-merger ministry. Of the three bureaucrats appointed to deputy director and general director positions in the post-merger ministry, two were originally from the Social Assistance Agency and one was from the Social Services Agency. Two of these three bureaucrats left their positions within a year after the merger [interview 13].

Interview data on staff changes confirm the overhaul at the deputy director and general director levels, and highlight two other notable changes in staff. The first change concerns the departure of mid-level bureaucrats in expert positions. Interview data suggests that several career experts from the Family Research Agency and the Social Assistance Agency exited the ministry within the first year of the merger for either other agencies or for the private sector; and those exiters were generally considered to be of higher calibre than their peers (interview 2; interview 7; interview 8; interview 16). In contrast, several interviewees stated that almost all the career experts at the Disability Agency and professional experts at the Social Services Agency remained in the ministry in the aftermath of the merger (interview 3; interview 5; interview 9; interview 12).

The second change concerns the department heads in the pre-merger agencies. As described in the preceding section on cadres, all department heads automatically lost their positions during the merger and were assigned to the cadre of ministerial advisor. According to interviewees, in the post-merger ministry, many department heads were external appointees (interview 8) while others were former experts promoted internally (interview 1; interview 2; interview 5; interview 7; interview 8; interview 9). Of those bureaucrats who were department heads in the pre-merger agencies, only a few were appointed as department heads or as acting deputy directors in the new ministry (interview 12; interview 14; interview 19).[54]

Overall, the findings suggest that the staff changes brought about by the merger had a selective effect on the bureaucratic positions and varied across the agencies studied. In terms of the positions, the merger represented a major overhaul of all high level positions and most mid-level positions with the exception of experts. With respect to experts, while the professional experts who were at the Social Services Agency prior to the merger faced a significant decline in their status, the career experts who were at the Social Assistance Agency, the Disability Agency, and the Family Research Agency prior to the merger either preserved their positions and perceived status or benefited from a promotion to higher echelons. Yet, it must also be noted that some of the career experts who were at the Social Assistance Agency and the Family Research Agency prior to

[54] Directly related to staff changes is changes in appointment practices in the aftermath of the merger. These changes are particularly relevant as they affect the extent to which appointment and promotion decisions are made on the grounds of expertise and meritocracy versus loyalty and patronage. Such changes in appointment practices can have implications for mid-level bureaucrats behaviour in policymaking processes through its effect on these bureaucrats' risk calculations as they engage in policy bargains (Beleli 2018). Interview data on changes in appointment practices of deputy director, general director and deputy under-secretary positions suggest that post-merger appointments to these positions, which were mostly from outside of the pre-merger agencies, were motivated by "social and political references", "elbow contact", and "political preferences" (interview 2, interview 3, interview 7, interview 8, interview 15, interview 17). One interviewee, however, stated that relevant experience and expertise did play a role in some of these appointments from outside (interview 5).

the merger left the new ministry in the aftermath of the merger.

Overall, the findings suggest that the merger has brought about notable changes in structure, cadres and staff of all agencies yet the size of the effect varied across the agencies. This finding parallels Hood, Huby and Dunsire's review of mergers and demergers in British central government departments over a 13-year period where they find that some agencies are "fireproof" and emerge from mergers and demergers unscathed while others suffer by being swallowed up or broken up (1985, 74–75). While none of the agencies proved to be "fireproof", the amount of "scathe" suffered seem to have varied across the agencies.

Among the agencies studied, the Disability Agency, the Social Assistance Agency, and the Family Research Agency have emerged relatively less scathed from the merger both in terms of their organisational structure, cadres and staff. For the Disability Agency, the main structural change concerned an increase in the upper echelons of the hierarchy and an increase in horizontal differentiation; the main cadre-related change concerned the annulment of head of unit cadre; and the main staff-related change concerned the de facto dismissal of department heads, deputy directors and general director. The Social Assistance Agency and the Family Research Agency also experienced an increase in the upper echelons of the hierarchy but there was no notable change for these two agencies in horizontal differentiation. Among the pre-merger agencies studied, the Social Services Agency was the one most dramatically affected by the merger in terms of its structure and cadres. The Agency was broken up across the new ministry and swallowed up by what used to be much smaller agencies than itself prior to the merger. While the professional expert staff of the Social Services Agency remained to a large extent in the new ministry, interview data suggest that they have experienced a notable decline in their status.

5. FINDINGS

Section 4 established that the merger had observable effects on organisational structure, cadres and staff. These effects were generally large yet also varied to some extent across the pre-merger agencies. Given these changes in organisational structure, cadres and staff, how were policymaking processes affected? Furthermore, were there changes in mid-level bureaucrats' engagement in policymaking processes in the aftermath of the merger? This section presents the main findings about the nature and scope of changes in internal policymaking processes and mid-level bureaucrats' engagement in these processes in the aftermath of the merger. It also discusses the plausible mechanisms underlying the changes in mid-level bureaucrats' engagement in policymaking processes.

5.1. Changes in Policymaking Processes[55]

[55] It must be noted that the focus of this section remains on policymaking processes and not on the day-to-day tasks and functions of bureaucrats. This is worth highlighting because several interviewees report no real change in their day-to-day operations in the aftermath of the merger (interview 2; interview 4; interview 5; interview 9). This finding parallels earlier studies about reorganisation in public bureaucracies. As noted by Hood, Huby and Dunshire, changes in government bureaus do not necessarily bring about changes in the functioning of bureaucrats,

A variety of perspectives were put forward by interviewees with respect to the scope and nature of changes in policymaking processes in the aftermath of the merger. These perspectives on changes in policymaking processes can be grouped under three thematic categories: (1) duration of policymaking processes; (2) sources of new policies, (3) participation in policymaking processes.

5.1.1.Duration of Policymaking Processes

Increase in the duration of policymaking processes in the aftermath of the merger was a point highlighted by several interviewees (interview 1; interview 6; interview 9; interview 14; interview 15; interview 17). As one interviewee put it: "Authority must be delegated clearly and, if it is not, you end up needing 10, 11, 12 signatures. This leads to loss of time. Now imagine that all 11 men have to be in their places, not a single one will go to the toilet, not a single one will go out to eat, not a single one will be attending a meeting, everyone remembers to appoint a proxy when they are out of office etc. and all 11 will agree on the matter" (interview 6).

Another interviewee described a similar dynamic: "It might take weeks for an official letter to be sent with the minister's signature. It leaves us and goes to the deputy director, the general director might be on a mission or a meeting. From him, it goes to the deputy undersecretary, and they are always busy, so it brews

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and an "iron law of inertia" might overpower the forces of change (1985, 72). A similar observation is also highlighted by Maynard et al. in that despite the tremendous value attached to changes in organisational chart during reorganisation, their interviews suggest that these changes did not alter the day-to-day operations of the agency that underwent reorganisation (1986, 307).

there for a bit longer. I'm not even taking into account the corrections; when there is a correction it goes back to the beginning. A second correction, rewind it all the way to the beginning. In summary, I would say that it has brought about a considerable unwieldiness in terms of decision making." (interview 1).

Paralleling this view on the duration of policymaking processes in the ministry, some interviewees described the decision processes in their former agencies as more agile and fast (interview 13; interview 14; interview 16). One interviewee, for example, likened his former Social Services Agency to a 4x4 vehicle in terms of its agility and speed in making decisions (interview 14). He described how the small organisational structure of the Social Services Agency was ideal for its tasks and "allowed for fast decision making mechanisms to work". The ministry, on the other hand, he added "is not a 4x4 vehicle but more like a trailer truck, not even a truck. You can carry more with a trailer truck but your agility cannot be that of a 4x4. You can learn to drive a truck well and drive it fast but that requires much more effort."

Two interviewees differentiated between bottom-up policymaking processes and top-down policymaking processes. In contrast to bottom-up policymaking processes, the two interviewees considered the top-down ones to have become faster in the aftermath of the merger. One interviewee explained how in the new ministry the minister and her team had a vision and mission from the very beginning and implemented a clear work plan by creating teams of experts (interview 9). Another interviewee, in contrast, viewed the top-down introduction of new policy ideas in the new ministry rather negatively, and explained: “Someone (referring to political appointees in higher positions) floats an idea, sometimes just jots it down on paper, says let’s start friends, and they start it. This is a mentality of lining the caravan up once on the road [i.e. making it up as you go along]. Our policy background preparations used to last one and a half years [in our former agency]” (interview 19).

5.1.2. Sources of New Policy Ideas

With respect to bottom-up policymaking processes, several interviewees considered their sources of new policy ideas to be, by and large, unaffected by the merger. It is worth noting, however, that where mid-level bureaucrats got new policy ideas from seem to have varied across the agencies prior to the merger. As a result, the cross-agency differences in the sources of new policy ideas seem to have carried over into the post-merger ministry.

Some interviewees who were at the Social Services Agency prior to the merger talked about continuing to look to the provincial directorates for identifying the problems to be addressed with new policies (interview 4; interview 14). Some interviewees who were at the Social Assistance Agency before the merger mentioned looking to civil society, academia, citizens and policies in other countries as their main sources of new policy ideas at their former agency as well as at the new ministry (interview 8; interview 13). Similarly, interviewees who were at the Disability Agency before the merger highlighted the continuity with respect to where they got new policy ideas from and talked about their interactions with citizens with disabilities and civil society (interview 5).

One plausible explanation of this continuity in the sources of new policy ideas concerns the relative stability of the external relations, networks, and “traditions” (interview 4) that appear to shape many mid-level bureaucrats’ sources of new policy ideas. Thus, while the internal structures were undergoing considerable change, mid-level bureaucrats’ external relations and networks seem to be not as much affected two years after the merger.

5.1.3. Participation in Policymaking Processes

When asked to compare the nature of policymaking processes before and after the merger, interviewees highlighted two particular areas: changes in the participants of policymaking processes, and changes in the extent of internal and external consultation.

Several interviewees who were at Social Services Agency prior to the merger reported a change in the participants of policymaking processes with provincial actors being not systematically included in the post-merger ministry. One interviewee explained how at the Social Services Agency the provincial director, head of department, and the Agency’s general director had constituted the key participants of policymaking processes prior to the merger (interview 14). The same interviewee highlighted the fact that these key people used to be “of the same harvest", which facilitated reaching a consensus in policymaking processes. Another interviewee highlighted the importance attached to the needs and views of the staff in the provinces at the Social Services Agency prior to the merger and stated that no policy used to be made without getting the views of the staff in the provinces about the policy's viability and risks (interview 4).

Some interviewees who were at the Social Assistance Agency prior to the merger also reported a change in the participants of policymaking processes (interview 7; interview 8; interview 13). One interviewee described the ease with which decisions about new policy interventions could be made at the Social Assistance Agency prior to the merger because of the participants in the process: "We (as experts) would come up with some policy ideas and present them to the Fund Council.[56] If they agreed, we would then research it and do the cost calculations (...) We were able to make decisions without needing legislative change as we had an extremely flexible legal framework." (interview 7) Another interviewee echoed a similar view and described a similar set of participants: "Ultimately, what mattered [at the Social Assistance Agency] was the (policy) idea the general director formed with the experts and described to the (state) minister, and the Fund Council would not reject (the ideas) they brought." (interview 8)

[56] The Fund Council of the Social Assistance Agency was a board composed of representatives from different ministries. It had the authority to approve all policy and spending proposals put forward by the Social Assistance Agency. The Fund Council was preserved in the aftermath of the merger; yet, in terms of its authorities, it was brought below the Minister of Family and Social Policy hierarchically.

Some interviewees highlighted the extent and nature of internal consultation in policymaking processes as an area of change yet they diverged in their assessment of the direction of change. Some believed that the extent of internal consultation decreased in the post-merger period. As one interviewee who was at the Disability Agency prior to the merger put it, “in the past, (decisions were made) via consultation because responsibilities were almost equally distributed, consultations took place and if a consensus did not emerge there would be more consultation, groups would be changed and there would be another round of consultation.(...) In the current system, there is still consultation but if there is a disagreement, it is resolved by the person higher in the hierarchy.” (interview 6). In contrast, another interviewee formerly at the Disability Agency thought that having all agencies under one ministry improved coordination and internal participation in policymaking processes (interview 3). These divergent assessments of the two interviewees could be interpreted as an indication of the opposing forces put in motion by mergers whereby simultaneously an increase in organisational hierarchy may hinder internal participation while an increase in institutionalised coordination may facilitate it.

Interviewees also highlighted various changes in the scope and nature of external consultation in policymaking processes. One interviewee who was at the Social Services Agency prior to the merger described the minister as someone who values participatory policymaking and argued that external participation has become more intensive and visible in the ministry (interview 12). Another interviewee who was at the Disability Agency prior to the merger drew attention to the changes in the way concerned citizens influence policies. Accordingly, at the Disability Agency citizens used to voice their concerns to bureaucrats who then took these concerns and other technical elements into account in developing policy ideas whereas at the new ministry, citizens reach directly to the minister who then request that the bureaucrats respond to these concerns (interview 6). Yet an interviewee who was at the Social Assistance Agency before the merger suggested a decline in their informal consultations with civil society and academia: “Before we became a ministry, we initiated these settings, without being prompted by anyone we used to go and say ‘we identified something like this, what do you think’. At the (new) ministry, we might not have been able to do this yet.” (interview 8). These perspectives about the changes in external consultation could be seen as an indication of a shift in the point of contact with citizens from mid-level bureaucrats to a politically elected minister. Such a shift in the point of contact with citizens could be the consequence of an increase in political control brought about by the merger and the resulting change in accountability relations.

Overall, the interview data suggest that mid-level bureaucrats from all four pre-merger agencies perceived there to be notable changes with respect to policymaking processes in the aftermath of the merger. In broad strokes, these changes include an increase in the duration of (bottom-up) policymaking processes and a change in the participants of policymaking processes as well as the extent of their participation. One area of policymaking where the interviewees did not perceive a notable change is where they, as individual bureaucrats, got new policy ideas from. There emerged no observable variation in these perceptions across the agencies studied.

5.2. Engagement of Mid-Level Bureaucrats in Policymaking

Mid-level bureaucrats can play a variety of roles in internal policymaking processes. They may identify a need on the ground that calls for a new policy and they may carry this issue onto the policy agenda of the agency. They may develop and propose new policy ideas in response to issues that are already on an agency's agenda. They may also provide technical input into shaping a policy change initiated by their superiors. In carrying out these roles, the extent of mid-level bureaucrats' engagement may range from none to all-encompassing while the nature of their engagement may involve excelling, satisficing (Simon 1997), shirking or sabotaging (Brehm and Gates 1997).

When interviewees were asked to compare their engagement in policymaking processes before and after the merger, several interviewees considered their ability to initiate, push through, and influence policymaking processes to have declined in the aftermath of the merger. Several of these interviewees were at the Social Assistance Agency before the merger (interview 10; interview 11; interview 13; interview 19). These bureaucrats talked about the significant role they played in initiating and pushing through new policies at the Social

Assistance Agency prior to the merger and gave examples of their highly entrepreneurial efforts in bringing about policy change before the merger (interview 19). As one interviewee put it: “If there was a thing you wanted to do (at Social Assistance Agency), you could do it” (interview 10). The same interviewee indicated that “with 633 (the founding law of the ministry), we felt that we were shackled.”

Some of the interviewees, on the other hand, considered the sources of their influence in policymaking processes as having remained intact but thought there to be changes in the realization of their influence. Two interviewees formerly at the Social Assistance Agency underlined what they considered to be a continuation of the importance attached to their expertise in policymaking processes but talked about these processes taking longer in the new ministry (interview 7; interview 8). An interviewee who was at the Social Services Agency before the merger echoed the same opinion; he underlined minister’s respect for field experience but talked about the importance of keeping his informal networks strong in order to initiate and influence policymaking processes inside the agency. Only one interviewee considered his ability to influence policymaking processes to have increased in the new ministry when compared to his time at the Disability Agency (interview 5).

Broadly speaking, interview data suggests there to be an overall decline in mid-level bureaucrats influence in policymaking processes. This perception seems to be strongest among the interviewees who were at the Social Assistance Agency prior to the merger. Interview data also suggests that a few of the interviewees had divergent perspectives vis-à-vis changes in their influence in policymaking processes. More concretely, it appears that a handful of the mid-level bureaucrats from all four agencies studied were able to use the merger process as an opportunity to either increase their influence or to preserve it by finding new ways to re-insert themselves in policymaking processes in the new ministry.

5.3. Perspectives on What Underlies Change in Policy Engagement

Having discussed interviewees' views on changes in policymaking processes and mid-level bureaucrats' engagement in these processes, this section presents the interviewees' perspectives on plausible mechanisms underlying the changes in their engagement in policymaking processes. These perspectives were sought during the interviews with direct reference to the three theory-based mechanisms laid out in Section 2: (i) changes in position, (ii) changes in organisational cleavages, and (iii) changes in informal communication.

5.3.1. Changes in the Position of the Bureaucrat

As discussed in detail in Section 2, changes in the position of a bureaucrat could impact his engagement in policymaking processes by changing his formal authority, goals, function, and distance to political leadership. Such positional changes could involve changes in the formal title and rank of an individual and/or changes in his relative position in the hierarchy vis-à-vis the top.

Interview data provide some support to this mechanism. First and foremost, those bureaucrats who experienced an absolute change in their vertical position during the merger, either by moving up or down the bureaucratic hierarchy, described a change in their formal authority vis-à-vis policymaking processes (interview 1; interview 5; interview 18). As one interviewee put it: “While I was an expert before, now as a head of unit, I have the authority to use initiative in some matters.” (interview 1). Another interviewee who went from being an expert in his former agency to being a department head in the ministry contrasted his limited engagement in policymaking processes as an expert to his current engagement: “As an expert, I did not have much of an opportunity to observe decision processes. (...) I remember times when we spent months and years in our room between four walls, as experts we went through such times.”

It should be noted that some interviewees also pointed out that since their upward movement was accompanied by a lengthening of the vertical hierarchy, the overall effect, in their opinion, had been an increase in their distance to the top (interview 1; interview 9). As explained by an interviewee: “of course in this hierarchical structure, we can say that the role and status of a head of department has fallen back and is now more like a head of unit.” (interview 9).

Secondly, some bureaucrats who experienced a change in their vertical position in the aftermath of the merger also talked about the resulting change in their functions that then affect their engagement in policymaking processes. For example, one interviewee who was an expert in his former agency and moved upward in the ministry and became a department head talked about his recent exposure to the politics involved in implementing new policy ideas. As he put it, as an expert: “You write your report and you are done. As an expert, we did not know how things are done in the real world. In this phase, I learned about this. (...) You have to play very serious political games. Things don’t happen by only convincing the minister.” (interview 2) Two interviewees who were experts in their former agencies and became department heads in the ministry talked about how citizens would now get directly in contact with them because of their new positions, which then forces them to spend considerable time in trying to resolve individual cases instead of engaging in policy-level matters (interview 1; interview 5)

Thirdly, several bureaucrats underscored the effect of the increase in the distance to the political leadership on their engagement in policymaking processes. Yet their accounts about the causes of this effect differ from Egeberg’s point about bureaucrats’ exposure to political signals (2007). Several of these interviewees talked about the indirect nature of their contact with political leadership in the ministry and contrasted it with their more direct access in their former agencies. Some of these bureaucrats viewed this change as inconsequential because of their good relations with their immediate superiors who relate their ideas upward (interview 12). Others talked about the risk of distortion of one’s ideas as a result of their inability to directly access political leadership (interview 2; interview 10). As one interviewee put it: “Now, if you say something from below, you say A and it comes out as Z from the top” and explains that as a result he now prefers to wait for ideas to come from above and influence them instead of initiating them and pushing them upward (interview 10).

Echoing this sentiment, another interviewee explained how the increase in the distance to the top has made bureaucrats less able to push their own ideas upward (interview 6): “Now I don’t have the chance to meet with our minister all the time and explain the details. When you can meet with someone face-to-face you can explain the reasons behind your views and the alternatives. In the current system, we can only present (policy) options to one level up.” Another interviewee explained how the increase in the distance to the top and the absence of direct contact have meant that people are less willing to relate problems upwards as they fear being held responsible for these problems: “There (in referring to his former agency), we encountered an attitude that was warmer and focused on solving problems; we were able to relay the problems more sincerely and it was met with more understanding in resolving it. These processes were shorter. But at the ministry, these processes are 3-4 times longer” (interview 15).

Only one interviewee argued that in his case, the distance to the top has decreased in the ministry because the undersecretary prefers to work directly with people at different levels of the hierarchy (interview 5). Accordingly, such direct access has facilitated “expert opinions to have one-on-one contact with the highest echelons”. Another interviewee explained a temporary dynamic in the earlier days of the ministry whereby the dismissal of all department heads and general directors forced those at the top to directly contact mid-level bureaucrats to tap into their expertise (interview 2).

In sum, several interviewees’ consider the changes in their absolute and relative positions brought about by the merger as one of their mechanisms underlying the changes in their engagement in policymaking processes by changing their formal authority, functions, and distance to political leadership. The direction, nature and scope of the effect, however, seem to vary across individual bureaucrats underscoring once again the heterogeneity of mid-level bureaucrats’ experiences in the aftermath of the merger and the importance of individual factors. The interview data reveals no discernible variation across the agencies with respect to the interviewees’ perceptions about this mechanism.

5.3.2. Changes in Organisational Cleavages

Changes in cleavages is another plausible mechanism underlying the changes in mid-level bureaucrats’ engagement in policymaking processes in the aftermath of the merger. Since the power distribution among different groups in internal bureaucratic politics is relevant for an individual bureaucrats’ engagement in policymaking processes, a change in the distribution of power among these groups brought about by the merger would be expected to have an effect on bureaucrats' engagement in policymaking processes.

Analyses of interview data reveal that the merger has indeed had some effect on inter-group cleavages and these groups' relative powers. First and foremost, as discussed in an earlier section on cadre changes, professional experts lost considerable status against career experts (interview 5; interview 14; interview 15). Professional experts seem to have responded to their loss of status in a variety of ways as it relates to their engagement in policymaking processes including disengagement, resistance, and informal influence. With respect to disengagement, a career expert explained how in response to their lower salaries, some professional experts had argued that they should work only as much as their pay and thus disengaged from substantive work and have undertaken only routine tasks such as responding to petitions (interview 5). With respect to resistance, the same career expert argued that some professional experts have intentionally blocked initiatives by career experts by lobbying those higher in the hierarchy (interview 5). Finally, some professional experts seem to continue influencing decision processes informally. As one interviewee explained: "When we gather around the table, here is one person with field experience and gets a lower salary but is able to put forward an opinion because of his topical knowledge. But the others are unable to put forward their views to address the problem. A very interesting situation indeed." (interview 15)

Another relevant inter-group cleavage in this regard concerns the political appointees from outside the merged agencies versus the career administrators and experts from the merged agencies. Some interviewees explained how in the aftermath of the merger, career administrators and career experts lost influence against political appointees who came from outside the merged agencies while several others argued that the influence of career administrators and career experts remained intact. For example, a career expert, in describing their treatment by their superiors who are political appointees from outside the merged agencies, said "They called us philosophers, which is ridiculous. When we started speaking, they started saying things like 'cut it short'." (interview 2). Another interviewee voiced a similar sentiment about the relative influence of political appointees and explained how with respect to a certain policy initiative, the political appointees "misled the minister, disturbed the work environment so everyone other than those who came from outside and were appointed to high positions were dissatisfied." (interview 19)

However, there were also those who considered their influence as experts to be intact in the new ministry. An interviewee who used to be at the Social Assistance Agency prior to the merger, for instance, explained how "if the minister did not know us, if the undersecretary did not value expertise, maybe then the advisors or those appointed from outside could have influenced decisions because there are numerous advisors to the minister. But we never felt their influence." (interview 8). Another interviewee who used to be at the Disability Agency shared a similar view and described the dynamics between career administrators and political appointees in policy discussions: “When knowledge is shared, those who don’t have it automatically become ‘salt-shakers’, they are dumped in the corner like a decoration, without any use. After their first, second, third words, they are already in offside position. So there is no real conflict or any attempt to claim that their word is more respectable.” (interview 6)

Overall, changes in inter-group cleavages and in the relative distribution of power across these groups emerge as another relevant mechanism vis-à-vis the changes in mid-level bureaucrats’ engagement in policymaking processes. Once again, the interview data suggest that the direction, nature and scope of this effect seem to vary across individual bureaucrats. Yet, no discernible cross-agency variation seems to exist with respect to the interviewees’ perceptions about this mechanism.

5.3.3. Changes in Channels of Informal Communication

Building on Simon’s conceptualisation of decision making as a collective process involving a network of formal and informal communications (1997), the study explored changes in channels of informal communication brought about by the merger as another plausible mechanism underlying the changes in mid-level bureaucrats’ engagement in policymaking processes in the aftermath of the merger. Interview data reveal a rich array of factors that appear to be directly or indirectly related to changes in informal communication channels and consequently on bureaucrats’ engagement in policymaking processes. These factors include organisational culture, interpersonal relations, changes in physical space and the nature of social interactions enabled by physical space, and size of organisation.

Several interviewees highlighted the organisational culture and interpersonal relations in their former agencies that enabled open, informal communication across the formal ranks of bureaucratic hierarchy. As one interviewee who was at the Social Assistance Agency prior to the merger put it: "our administrators and even our minister [in reference to the state minister responsible for the Agency] were very accessible, always accessible, accessible every moment unless they had a very special meeting. I thought that was because of its small size but I now realize that it was because its culture was conceptualized on communication and accessibility" (interview 16). Another interviewee who was at the Social Services Agency before the merger described a similar dynamic: "We had an organisational culture, so the communication channels were open. There was not a single person we could not reach by phone, including the general director. Now I cannot skip any ranks to talk about an issue or problem" (interview 15). An interviewee who was also at the Social Services Agency before the merger echoed a similar sentiment: "(At the former agency) you could walk into the general director's office whenever you wanted. Is it closed now, probably not. I shall not say that informal communication is less but we are trying to build it but the hierarchy has increased." (interview 4). The same interviewee explained how "informal relations contributed to formal relations" at the Social Services Agency and added: “Business does not get taken care of with official correspondence, mutual trust is necessary.” Several interviewees highlighted close interpersonal relations as a facilitator of informal communication in their former agencies; interviewees used words like “friendship” (interview 14), “family” (interview 8), “trusting” (interview 4; interview 14) and “sincere” (interview 5) in describing the relations at their former agencies.

The size of the organisation was another factor highlighted by some interviewees in discussing changes in channels of communication. As one interviewee who was formerly at the Social Assistance Agency explained in response to a question about informal communication networks and channels, “They have changed. We used to be 200 people, everyone knew each other. We came to a place with 2000 people. With an increase in numbers, people from different cultures came together. (...) But we preserve the bonds of affection with those in my department.” (interview 8)

Related to the size of the organisation, some interviewees highlighted the relation between organisational size, physical space and the social interactions and informal communication it facilitates (or hinders). One interviewee who was at the Social Assistance Agency prior to the merger stated: “In this new system, the bigger you are, the more unwieldy you become. For instance, we are unable to establish relations with people as a result of the vertical structure (referring to the tall building the ministry is located in). If we were situated horizontally, we would get to know each other. Even though our directorate (in the new ministry) consists of three floors, each person has developed a sense of belonging only to their own floor." (interview 10) Another interviewee who was also at the Social Assistance Agency echoed a similar sentiment: "Here (referring to the ministry) I don't see anyone outside of this floor. The floor is large, you would need to walk all around it, and our directorate is on three separate floors. There (referring to his former agency) because the floors were smaller, throughout the day you would be able to greet everyone and chat. Our cafeteria was similar, because of its small size you would be able to see everyone. The physical space has tremendous impact. Because after a while you would grow distant with someone you don't see, you wouldn't have very close relations." (interview 8)

The introduction of open offices at the ministry introduced as a response to inadequate office space was also highlighted by some interviewees as a change in physical space that had an impact on interpersonal relations and communication. One interviewee explained how, in reaction to open offices, people isolated themselves and stopped talking to each other leaving the smoking area outside as the only space for social interaction. (interview 6) These views put forward by the interviewees directly parallel Egeberg's point on the importance of the physical structure and how it is "face-to-face encounters that are assumed to be especially affected by the physical structure." (1994, 87).

In summary, echoing Mintzberg who uncovered "considerable activity outside the systems of formal authority and regulated flow processes” and demonstrated how “decision processes flow through the organization independent of the regulated system,” (1979, 46), several interviewees highlighted the centrality of informal processes and communication in their ability to influence policymaking processes in their former agencies. For several interviewees, these channels of informal communication appear to have shrunk or disappeared in the aftermath of the merger, thus limiting their engagement in policymaking processes primarily to formal channels. There seems to be some limited variation across individual bureaucrats: two interviewees mentioned being able to establish new channels of informal communication that allowed them to increase their influence on policymaking processes in the new ministry compared to their former agencies (interview 5; interview 12) while one interviewee reported no change in informal communication channels (interview 17). The interview data suggest no discernible cross-agency variation with respect to the interviewees’ perceptions about changes in informal communication as a mechanism underlying the changes in their engagement in policymaking processes.

6. DISCUSSION ON STUDY FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION

This case study of a merger of five social policy agencies in Turkey presents a wealth of empirical findings about changes in internal policymaking processes and mid-level bureaucrats engagement in these processes in the aftermath of a major reorganisation. The study also explores several plausible mechanisms to explain the changes in mid-level bureaucrats’ engagement in policymaking processes, namely changes in their position, changes in organisational cleavages, and changes in communication channels.

Overall, the study finds that the reorganisation had observable and generally substantial effects on the organisational structure, cadres and staff of the merged agencies with some cross-agency variation in the size of these effects. The findings suggest that this major reorganisation brought about various changes in internal policymaking processes, including their duration, their participants and the extent of participation. In terms of mid-level bureaucrats' engagement in policymaking processes, the findings suggest a general decline in their influence though with some notable exceptions. For instance, some mid-level bureaucrats were able to effectively cope with substantial changes in their organisational environment and preserve their influence by finding new ways of reinserting themselves into policymaking processes. Others were able to use the merger process as a springboard to increase their formal authority and informal influence. More generally, the study's findings about the diverse experiences of mid-level bureaucrats in the aftermath of the reorganisation underline the importance of individual-level factors in understanding the effects of changes in organisational structure on individual bureaucrats' behaviour.

The most interesting findings of the study concern the mechanisms underlying the changes in mid-level bureaucrats' engagement in policymaking processes. All three plausible mechanisms probed in the interviews, i.e. changes in the relative and absolute position of a bureaucrat; changes in cleavages; and changes in relations and informal channels of communication, found some traction among the interviewees. However, it should be noted that the presence of these three mechanisms does not preclude the possibility that other mechanisms were also at play vis-a-vis the changes in mid-level bureaucrats' engagement in policymaking processes. Needless to say, the findings on the mechanisms of change are based on a single case study and their external validity would need to be tested in other cases of reorganisation in public administration.

Although the interviews were conducted with a relatively small sample of mid-level bureaucrats, because their experiences in the aftermath of the reorganisation capture the variety of ways in which bureaucrats were affected by the merger, the findings about the changes in mid-level bureaucrats' engagement in policymaking processes and the mechanisms underlying these are considered to reflect, to a large extent, the diverse experiences of mid-level bureaucrats in the merged agencies.

The study findings are significant in two respects. Firstly, the findings contribute to a relatively thin body of empirical research on reorganisations in the public sector by focussing on a previously unexplored aspect, namely changes in policymaking processes and mid-level bureaucrats' engagement in these processes. Given that reorganisations are motivated by a government's concerns over policy performance and political control, and that the scope and nature of mid-level bureaucrats' engagement in policymaking processes are consequential for both the technical quality (Carpenter 2001) and the political responsiveness of policymaking processes (Page and Jenkins 2005), understanding changes in mid-level bureaucrats' engagement in policymaking processes in the aftermath of a reorganisation is crucial to assessing the extent to which the reorganisation accomplished its objectives. More concretely, a reorganisation introduced to improve policy quality may inadvertently undermine its own objective if the reorganisation diminishes the extent and quality of mid-level bureaucrats' engagement in policymaking processes. Similarly, a reorganisation introduced to decrease the political responsiveness of an agency and increase its policy autonomy can undermine its objective if the reorganisation diminishes the extent and quality of mid-level bureaucrats' engagement in policymaking processes. By putting its spotlight on mid-level bureaucrats, the study draws attention to the importance of understanding the effects of reorganisations on mid-level bureaucrats' behaviours in evaluating the outcomes of reorganisations.

Secondly, and relatedly, the findings about the three mechanisms probed in the interviews suggest that the unintended effects of reorganisations on mid-level bureaucrats' engagement in policymaking processes could be mitigated to some extent by paying attention to those factors affecting the cultural and social dynamics, such as perceptions of status change, physical space and managerial practices. This is a point highlighted also by an earlier empirical study focusing on factors affecting bureaucrats’ post-merger identification with a new agency (Lipponen, Wisse, and Jetten 2017).

Overall, this paper highlights a notable gap in our knowledge base about the effects of reorganisation in the public sector and takes a step toward addressing it by examining the changes in policymaking processes and mid-level bureaucrats’ engagement in these processes in the aftermath of a merger of social policy agencies in Turkey. It is my hope that the issues highlighted and the findings put forward in this paper are interesting enough to persuade other scholars to pursue empirical studies to further build our knowledge base on this consequential topic of reorganisation in the public sector.

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ANNEX 1 – LIST OF INTERVIEWS

Interview 1, 13 November 2013, Ankara, interviewee at Family Research Agency before merger

Interview 2, 13 November 2013, Ankara, interviewee at Family Research Agency before merger

Interview 3, 26 November 2013, Ankara, interviewee at Disability Agency before merger

Interview 4, 26 November 2013, Ankara, interviewee at Social Services Agency before merger

Interview 5, 26 November 2013, Ankara, interviewee at Disability Agency before merger

Interview 6, 26 November 2013, Ankara, interviewee at Disability Agency before merger

Interview 7, 29 November 2013, Ankara, interviewee at Social Assistance Agency before merger

Interview 8, 29 November 2013, Ankara, interviewee at Social Assistance Agency before merger

Interview 9, 2 December 2013, Ankara, interviewee at Disability Agency before merger

Interview 10, 2 December 2013, Ankara, interviewee at Social Assistance Agency before merger

Interview 11, 2 December 2013, Ankara, interviewee at Social Assistance Agency before merger

Interview 12, 3 December 2013, Ankara, interviewee at Social Services Agency before merger

Interview 13, 3 December 2013, Ankara, interviewee at Social Assistance Agency before merger

Interview 14, 5 December 2013, Ankara, interviewee at Social Services Agency before merger

Interview 15, 5 December 2013, Ankara, interviewee at Social Services Agency before merger

Interview 16, 10 December 2013, Ankara, interviewee at Social Assistance Agency before merger

Interview 17, 12 December 2013, Ankara, interviewee at Disability Agency before merger

Interview 18, 12 December 2013, Ankara, interviewee at Social Services Agency before merger

Interview 19, 16 December 2013, Ankara, interviewee at Social Assistance Agency before merger

ANNEX 2 – GUIDING QUESTIONS

Overall Objectives:

(4) To investigate if organisational structure influences the roles bureaucrats play in policymaking

(5) To systematically explore the mechanisms through which changes in organisational structure affect the roles mid-level bureaucrats play in policymaking

  a. Changes in position of bureaucrat (changes in goals – contact with political leadership – preferences)
  b. Changes in organisational cleavages (political appointees-career administrators; professionals – administrators; outside experts vs insiders)
  c. Changes in channels/networks of organisational communication

INTRODUCTION

Introduction Objectives:

(5) To introduce self and establish credentials;

(6) To introduce research and why this is important topic;

(7) To convey to interviewee how important their opinions/experiences are for this research;

(8) Inform interviewee about confidentiality, anonymisation etc. and ethics and seek permission for tape recording the interview

Introduction Questions:

(5) Introduce self and establish credentials (Oxford, Bilkent, European Commission, GAP-BKI, IPC)

(6) Introduce research (DPhil topic, 4 papers, where does this interview fit)

  a. DPhil – social policymaking in middle-income countries and particularly roles bureaucrats play in social policy changes

"As a doctoral student, I am conducting four connected studies on the roles bureaucrats play in social policymaking and policy change."

  b. I'm conducting four different studies related to this general topic

(7) For one of the studies, I'm investigating the effect of changes in organisational structure on policymaking processes inside a public agency. I'm particularly interested in understanding how changes in organisational structure affect bureaucrats and their involvement in policymaking processes. Not so much the major reforms (like the health reform in Turkey) but particularly the smaller policy changes that occur through

amendments or new regulations.

(8) I'm really excited about being able to hear your thoughts and experiences about
    a. The changes in the organisational structure that occurred in 2011
    b. And what it meant for your involvement in policymaking processes such as preparing regulations or amendment to regulations, new programs etc.

"Our meeting could take anywhere between 40 minutes to an hour. Thank you so much again for accepting to meet with me. And let me add that if at any point during our meeting you decide not to continue with the interview, please just let me know."

(9) To make sure that I am able to remember your comments fully and correctly, I would like to record our conversation on a voice recorder. I will not share the voice recordings from our meeting with anyone inside or outside the university. If my advisor or the two professors on my dissertation committee request to see a sample of the interview notes or transcripts, I'll share the notes with them only after anonymising the notes so that the name or the position of that person cannot be identified. So if you agree, I would very much like to record our conversation.

"Thank you for accepting to record our conversation. It'll very much contribute to the accuracy of the information I'll retain from our meeting"

    a. (I sent an earlier information document about the research study. If you have any questions about this information, you can ask me now or at any point later.
    b. Below we start, let me say that any information or opinions you share with me during our meeting, will be anonymised so that the source of the information cannot be identified. I will not use any direct quotes either.
    c. I would ike to attach a list of all meetings at the end of my dissertation, which will only be avaiable on University of Oxford's archives. Can I include your name on this list of people I intervieweed for my research? (If not, then I'll only include the date of the interview and the name of the ministry without referring to your name or position)

WARM-UP QUESTIONS

Warm-Up Questions Objectives:

(4) To establish rapport and put the interviewee at ease

(5) To get a general sense of the interviewee's perception about the changes that

occurred with the 2011 restructuring

(6) To gauge the (formal and informal) position of the interviewee in the organisation prior to the restructuring and since the restructuring

Warm-Up Questions:

[After establishing the formal positions the interviewee held prior to the restructuring and since the restructuring]

(3) Could you describe how things changed with the 2011 restructuring for your directorate general? (organisational structure, organisational locus, organisational demography, leadership)

(4) Could you describe how things changed for you personally inside the directorate general with the 2011 restructuring?

CRITICAL QUESTIONS:

Critical Questions Objectives:

(2) To investigate how the restructuring affected the interviewee's involvement in decision-making processes more generally and policymaking processes more particularly.

(3) To assess the mechanisms through which such change took place:

  a. Changes in position of bureaucrat (changes in goals – contact with political leadership – preferences)
  b. Changes in organisational cleavages (political appointees-career administrators; professionals – administrators; outside experts vs insiders)
  c. Changes in channels/networks of organisational communication

Critical Questions:

(12) I would really like to understand better how these changes affected your day-to-day involvement in decision processes and formal or informal responsibilities inside the directorate general.

  a. For example, how were regulations drafted or new programs designed prior to 2011 and what were some roles you had in these processes? It would be great if you could give some concrete examples. [Provide some example policy changes from a list of pre-selected policies to prompt concrete responses]

b. And have you been involved in drafting regulations or designing new programs in the new Ministry? Could you maybe give an example?
c. For this example, could you please describe the process (who initiated it, who developed it, who made the decisions at what points)
d. Is this process different from how things would have been before 2011 ---- could you explain how?
e. How would you compare your involvement in designing of policy changes between these two periods? How about initiating policy changes – for example amending a regulation or an ongoing program?

(13) I would really like to better understand why the restructuring might have brought about these changes for you and I'm guessing other bureaucrats in similar positions to you:
  a. I mean is that a correct assumption, were bureaucrats in similar positions to you from your directorate general and maybe others affected in similar ways or everyone's experience with the restructuring varied? (probe perceptions about what led to differences in experiences)
  b. So what do you think brought about these changes in your involvement in decision-making processes and particularly policy change processes in your directorate general?
    i. Changes in your formal position
      1. Your proximity to the leadership
      2. Your priorities/responsibilities due to new position
    ii. Changes in organisational dynamics
      1. Power Balance across Cleavages Changing
        a. Professionals vs Administrators
        b. Political Appointees vs Career Administrators
        c. Outside Experts/Advisors vs Inside Experts
      2. Channels/Networks of Communication Changing

BASIC INFORMATION

Basic Information Objectives:

(3) To find out about bureaucratic experience of respondent (which

ministries/depts/positions) to understand if in current position through meritocratic promotion or political appointment

(4) To understand the socio-economic and ideological background of the interviewee to guess the ideological cleavages he is more likely to belong to

(5) To find out about pre-bureaucracy experience of respondent (education and jobs)to understand if respondent is a professional with technical expertise or managerial administrator

Basic Information Questions:

(3) Also for me to be able to put in context your experiences and analyses, could you tell me a bit about your work experiences inside the civil service?

(4) And also before you joined the civil service? (work experience, schools he went to, major in school)

Probes: when appointed to most recent position; past bureaucracy positions (ministry/department/position); education; work experience before joining the public bureaucracy

<u>WRAP-UP</u>

Anything else you would like to add or if you think our conversation left out some important aspects of the organisational restructuring of 2011 and its effect on bureaucrats' involvement in policy change.

Thank you so much for your time and for sharing your thoughts and experiences. Would it be okey for me to contact you if I have any questions as I go through the notes (and voice records) of our meeting? Should I just email you or call you? Also, in the mean time, if you have any questions about my research study, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Also, is there anyone you would recommend for me to meet with for this research topic?

ANNEX 3 – CODE TREE

CODE GROUP 1: INDIVIDUAL BUREAUCRAT (the interviewee)

1.1: Demographic Characteristics:

1.1.1:Age – 20s, 30-40, 50 and above

1.1.2:Gender – Female, Male

1.2: Educational Background:

1.2.1: Level of Education- University, Masters, PhD

1.2.2: Area of Training – Social Sciences, Social Work, Hard Sciences

1.3: Job Characteristics:

1.3.1: Current Position – Below Daire Baskani, Daire Baskani, Above Daire Baskani, Outside Organization, Musavir

1.3.2: Pre-Merger Position - Below Daire Baskani, Daire Baskani, Above Daire Baskani, Tasra Teskilati, Musavir

1.3.3: Career Background – In One of the Merged Organization, In Another Organization

CODE GROUP 2: CHANGES REGARDING ORGANIZATIONAL FACTORS

2.1: Changes in Recruitment and Promotion Policies

2.2: Changes in the Organizational Demography/Composition of Staff: Age, Professional Background, Educational Background for Low-Level Bureaucrats, Mid-Level Bureaucrats, High-Level Bureaucrats

2.3: Changes in Levels of Bureaucratic Politicisation: political grip/influence, political appointments

2.4: Changes in Organizational Locus: Location of Ministry, Physical Structure

2.5: Changes in Distribution of Internal Portfolios

2.6: Changes in Tasks and Functions of Organization: policy agency, implementation/service agency, day-to-day tasks

2.7: "Iron Law of Inertia?": extent to which a bureaucrat feels the merger impacted his/her day-to-day work/functions

CODE GROUP 3: CHANGES IN POLICYMAKING PROCESSES

3.1: Changes in the Characteristics of Policymaking

3.2: Changes in the Processes of Policymaking

3.3: Changes in Mid-Level Bureaucrats' Engagement in Policymaking

3.4: Examples of Policymaking Pre-Merger

3.5: Examples of Policymaking Post-Merger

CODE GROUP 4: MECHANISMS LINKING CHANGES IN STRUCTURE TO CHANGES IN BUREAUCRAT'S ROLE IN POLICYMAKING PROCESSES

4.1: Change in the Position of the Bureaucrat:

4.1.1 Position change leading to change in goals of bureaucrat

4.1.2 Position change leading to changes in bureaucrat's contact with political leadership and exposure to political signals

4.1.3 Position change leading to changes in bureaucrat's judgment and preferences

4.2: Changes in Organizational Cleavages:

4.2.1 Principal groups participating in and influencing the policymaking process Pre-Merger: political appointees vs career administrators vs professionals/technocrats; internal experts vs external experts advising the political leadership

4.2.2 Principal groups participating in and influencing the policymaking process Post-Merger: political appointees vs career administrators vs professionals/technocrats; internal experts vs external experts advising the political leadership

4.2.3 Changes in the cleavages/Emergence of new cleavages with Merger

4.2.4 Changes in power distribution and status among principal groups

4.3: Changes in Channels of Organizational Communication

4.3.1 Changes in channels/processes of formal communication

4.3.2 Changes in channels/networks of informal communication

4.3.3 Reasons for changes in channels of informal communication: change of superior, change of the physical space, changes in social relations, changes in opportunities for social interaction/information sharing/collaboration/influence

4.4: Other Mechanisms Bringing About Changes in Policymaking Processes and Mid-Level Bureaucrats' Roles in Policymaking

4.4.1 Changes in levels of trust: trust-based delegation from superiors, trust-based information sharing from colleagues

4.4.2 Changes in level of political grip

4.4.3 Changes in degrees of horizontal specialisation/vertical differentiation: effect on levels of competition for high-level bureaucrats/decisionmakers attention (disperse allocation of attention); effect on levels of understanding of technical issues that a high-level bureaucrat/decisionmaker is able to develop; effects on risk of distortion of the intermediaries between mid-level bureaucrats and high-level decisionmakers

4.4.4 Changes in tasks and functions of individual bureaucrat: time allocation across different tasks; responsiveness to citizens vs responsiveness to elected officials (and political signals) vs responsiveness to technical analysis

CODE GROUP 5: DYNAMICS OF THE POST-MERGER TRANSITION PROCESS

5.1 Uncertainty and Contingency Aggravated by the Merger Process: Effects of higher levels of uncertainty on individual behavior and risk assessments

5.2 Differences in Administrative Traditions of Merged Agencies: Effects on socio-cultural integration

5.3 Internal Conflict: Nature of Conflict/Causes of Conflict, Intensity of Conflict, Consequences of Conflict (on emotions, on identity, on relations)

ANNEX 4 – ANALYSIS ON CHANGES IN CADRES

The merger brought about three cadre-related changes that had a direct effect on the positions of many mid-level bureaucrats. These changes concern the expert cadre, head of unit cadre, and ministerial advisor cadre.

(i) Expert Cadre: Interview data suggest that the expert and assistant expert cadres had been central to the technical expertise, analytic prowess, and ultimately the perceived status of all pre-merger agencies with the exception of the Social Services Agency. The experts and assistant experts' knowledge of foreign languages and ability to keep abreast of knowledge and developments from other countries, their high levels of education including doctoral degrees, their training in the most prestigious universities, and their high scores in civil service entrance examination were highly prized by several interviewees (interview 2; interview 7; interview 8; interview 11). Selected through competitive examinations, the assistant experts were generally graduates of bachelor's programs in social sciences. They underwent intense training and mentoring that culminated in the submission of a research thesis that moved them up to the expert cadre and established their area of expertise within their respective agencies.

Referred to as "kariyer uzmanı" (career experts), the source of knowledge and grounds for expertise of these experts at the Social Assistance Agency, Disability Agency, and Family Research Agency stood in stark contrast to the "meslek uzmanı" (professional experts) of the Social Services Agency. The professional experts at the Social Services Agency were almost exclusively trained as social workers or psychologists. They spent many years on the ground working with the beneficiaries of the Agency's social services for vulnerable children and individuals with disabilities, among others. Unlike career experts whose grounds for expertise was research, the source of knowledge of these professional experts was their professional training as social workers and psychologists combined with their experience on the ground (interview 18).

The post-merger ministry introduced cadres for experts and assistant experts whose requirements excluded the professional experts of the Social Services Agency. While career experts in four of the five pre-merger agencies preserved their status and benefits in the new ministry (interview 7), the professional experts who were at the Social Services Agency prior to the merger lost both symbolic and real status as measured by promotion opportunity and salary in the post-merger ministry.

(ii) Head of Unit Cadre: The second change in cadres that had a direct effect on mid-level bureaucrats concerned the position of head of unit (“şube müdürü”). The head of unit was a mid-level position combining managerial and technical tasks, which existed only at the Social Services Agency and the Disability Agency. Appointment rules for this position included an examination, which is unique among managerial cadres in the Turkish civil service. One interviewee described the “head of unit” position as the only real “career manager” position and contrasted it to higher positions such as department heads and deputy directors, both of which he considered to have easier requirements for promotion (interview 3). The post-merger ministry did not put in place a cadre for head of unit. It instead created the position of unit administrator (“birim amiri”), which neither corresponded to an equivalent cadre in the civil service nor had similar requirements for appointment. Moreover, the founding law of the post-merger ministry demoted those bureaucrats who were heads of units at their home agency to a researcher (“araştırmacı”) position.

(iii) Ministerial Advisor Cadre: The third relevant change in cadres concerned the cadre of ministerial advisor (“bakanlık müşaviri”). The founding law of the post-merger ministry annulled the positions of department heads, deputy directors and general directors in all five agencies and appointed them to the position of ministerial advisors. Technically, the ministerial advisor cadre was created as temporary and would be considered annulled if it became vacant for any reason. In other words, the ministerial advisor cadre was designed as attached to the specific individuals holding it. Thus, it existed only as long as that specific individual was a ministerial advisor and otherwise was automatically annulled.

This new cadre's salary range generally exceeded the salary ranges for the positions previously held by these bureaucrats. With their new cadre of ministerial advisorship and higher salaries, some of these mid and high-level bureaucrats requested their re-appointment to other agencies [interview 11], some asked to be posted to a position in the new ministry [interview 14], some chose to exit the civil service (interview 2), and others became what is commonly referred to as "ATM bureaucrats" by disengaging from the affairs of the post-merger ministry and engaging in other activities outside the civil service while continuing to receive their relatively high salaries [interview 18].

The temporary ministerial advisor cadre is perceived by some interviewees to have contributed to the relatively smooth merger process by offering an attractive exit option to bureaucrats who held mid- and high-level positions in pre-merger agencies (interview 6). In other words, it is considered to have facilitated the sidelining of many mid- and high-level bureaucrats who lost their positions in the aftermath of the merger.

CHAPTER 6

Conclusion

This concluding chapter summarizes and synthesizes the findings of the four papers that make up this dissertation. To this end, the chapter begins by restating the goals of the dissertation. It then summarizes the findings of the four papers and presents a synthesis of the findings as they relate to the overall goal and the framing question of the dissertation. The chapter then moves on to considering the academic and policy significance of these findings before closing with a discussion of future research areas to advance this research agenda.

1. Goals of the Dissertation

Bureaucrats and their engagement in social policy processes lie at the heart of this DPhil dissertation. The four papers that make up the dissertation represent an extensive inquiry into the factors that affect bureaucrats' engagement in social policy processes in low- and middle-income countries. Each of the four studies examines a different set of intra- and extra-bureaucratic factors that relate to bureaucrats' engagement in these policy processes. Together, they further our understanding about the factors underlying the variation in the substance and extent of bureaucrats' policy engagement. They also aim to highlight the need to take into account the role of individual bureaucrats and the bureaucracy in our analyses of social policy change and welfare systems. Finally, they contribute to a long-standing body of scholarly work looking inside the black box of bureaucracy.

2. Study Findings

The four papers and the studies underlying these papers demonstrate the complex and interactive ways in which intra- and extra-bureaucratic factors affect bureaucrats' engagement in policy processes. In this conclusion as well as in the dissertation, the order in which the papers are presented is based on the level of the central factor investigated in each paper - starting with extra-bureaucratic factors at the international level, going next to extra-bureaucratic factors at the national level, and ending with intra-bureaucratic factors at the organisational level.

The results presented in "The Millennium Effect?: When and Where does Bureaucratic Quality Matter for Human Development" provide suggestive evidence that the relationship between changes in bureaucratic quality as defined by its degree of Weberianness and changes in social policy outcomes is not categorical and that global advocacy efforts, such as those around the United Nations' Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), can influence this relationship. More concretely, the results suggest that changes in bureaucratic quality more consistently translate to changes in social policy outcomes when the said outcome is part of a global agenda. The results also suggest that the country context matters in that we find observable variation between those countries that were identified as being more influenced to the MDG agenda and rest of the countries. The paper also examines the relationship between bureaucratic quality and social policy outcomes across different social policy areas (education versus health) and policy task types (simple versus complex tasks). Our results do not provide support for the presence of any systematic variation across different policy areas or task types.

“Trusting Relations, Learning Bureaucrats: International Organisations and Early-Stage Policy Diffusion” takes a closer look at the effect of international factors on bureaucrats’ roles in social policy change. The study examines the role of a particular international factor, i.e. the World Bank, on bureaucrats’ role in the adoption of a particular social assistance policy (conditional cash transfer model) in Turkey and Indonesia. The findings presented in this paper highlight interpersonal relations as a crucial factor vis-à-vis the effect of an international factor on bureaucrats’ engagement in policy processes. More specifically, the study finds that in both cases of early-stage policy diffusion the World Bank bureaucrats were able to engage with and influence the bureaucratic policy processes in Turkey and Indonesia to the extent that they did because their relations with national bureaucrats were characterised by trust and positive affect. Put differently, the crucial role that the national bureaucrats played in the adoption of the conditional cash transfer policy in Turkey and in Indonesia were facilitated by the World Bank bureaucrats’ active engagement in policy processes, which itself was facilitated by the trusting interpersonal relations between national bureaucrats and Bank bureaucrats. More generally, the paper underscores the significance of individual bureaucrats (be they national or international) and their interpersonal relations in the adoption of an important social assistance policy model in two middle-income countries.

“The Bargaining Bureaucrat: Policy Bargains and Effects of Political Context and Organisational Traits on Bureaucrats’ Policy Influence” investigates the influence of individual bureaucrats in policymaking processes with a focus on the effects of political context, which is an extra-bureaucratic factor at the national level, and organisational traits, which is an intra-bureaucratic factor at the organisation level, on this influence. Using a layered comparative study design, the paper compares bureaucrats' engagement in social policymaking processes across two distinct political periods in Turkey (short-lived coalition governments with limited control over the bureaucracy versus long-serving single-party governments with extensive control over the bureaucracy) and two types of social policy agencies (a small policy agency and a large implementation agency). Employing a novel analytical model built on bargaining theory, the study findings suggest that: (1) changes in the political context have an effect on bureaucrats' policy influence primarily by forcing them to adjust their risk calculations to accommodate changes in the credibility of the threat of ex-post punishments; (2) organisational traits such as agency size, level of required expertise, appointment practices and organisational culture have an impact on bureaucrats' policy influence via their effect on informal bargaining powers, risk calculations, and trust levels; (3) organisational traits that promote individual bureaucrats' influence in policymaking processes also act as a partial shield against the effects of political context on bureaucrats' policy influence.

Finally, "After the Dust Settles: Mergers, Policymaking Processes, Mid-Level Bureaucrats" puts a spotlight on an intra-bureaucratic factor, namely organisational structure, and its effects on bureaucrats' engagement in policymaking processes. It is a descriptive case study of a merger of social policy agencies in Turkey with a focus on the changes in policymaking processes and mid-level bureaucrats engagement in policymaking processes as well as the mechanisms underlying the changes in the latter. The study findings not only highlight the relation between organisational structure and bureaucrats' engagement in policymaking processes but they also reveal an interaction between organisational factors and individual factors vis-à-vis their effect on bureaucrats' policy engagement. More specifically, the findings reveal observable variation among individual bureaucrats vis-à-vis the direction, nature and scope of the changes in their engagement in policymaking processes in the aftermath of the merger.

Taken together, the findings presented in the four papers highlight the variability of bureaucrats' engagement in social policy processes and the effect of international, political, organisational, and individual factors on this variation. The papers show the ways in which these intra- and extra-bureaucratic factors may interact with each other and as a result have complex effects on individual bureaucrats' behaviour in policy processes and ultimately on social policy outcomes. As importantly, they reveal the centrality of the human element, including individual traits and interpersonal relations, in bureaucrats' engagement in social policy processes. Together, the four studies shed some new light on the black box of public bureaucracy and its bureaucrats vis-à-vis their role in social policy change in low- and middle-income countries.

3. Academic Significance of Findings

The four papers build on a rich body of research spanning several sub-disciplines, including social policy, public policy, public administration, bureaucratic politics, international organisations (IO), and international development. They contribute to these literatures in four distinct ways.

First, with their focus on individual bureaucrats, the empirical findings from three of the four studies join a growing body of scholarly work asserting the centrality of individuals and interpersonal relations as the building block of bureaucratic policy processes (Page and Jenkins 2005; Page 2012; Brehm and Gates 2014). They examine the effect of international, political and organisational factors on social policy processes via their effects on individual bureaucrats' behaviour and their interpersonal relations. They also highlight the ways in which individual bureaucrats and interpersonal relations shape the effect of extra- and intra-bureaucratic factors on social policy processes. By focusing on individual bureaucrats and not treating bureaucratic agencies as monolithic actors, the papers are able to shed some light on the complex dynamics inside both bureaucratic agencies and policy processes, and thus bring forward a fresh perspective to the long-established literatures of bureaucratic politics and public policy

Second, all four papers focus on low- and middle-income countries. Given the disproportionate focus on high-income countries in the sub-disciplines of social policy, public policy, public administration, and bureaucratic politics, the empirical findings presented in the papers enrich the existing evidence base of these sub-disciplines. The papers also highlight the limitations vis-à-vis the applicability of the relevant analytical models of these sub-disciplines to low- and middle-income countries given that these countries generally differ from high-income countries in terms of the maturity and stability of their political institutions and the role of the state (versus non-state actors) in policy processes.

Relatedly, and thirdly, the papers contribute to the analytical models and conceptual tools in their respective sub-disciplines. “The Bargaining Bureaucrat: Policy Bargains and Effects of Political Context and Organisational Traits on Bureaucrats’ Policy Influence” introduces an analytical model built on bargaining theory to capture individual bureaucrats’ everyday experiences of influence in policymaking processes. This analytical model presents a valuable alternative to the time-honoured principal-agent model employed in most studies of bureaucratic politics. The model focusses on bureaucrats’ policymaking function instead of their policy implementation function, and looks beyond the highest echelons of bureaucratic agencies. It treats bureaucratic policymaking processes as a policy bargain among bureaucrats at various ranks of the hierarchy as well as between bureaucrats and elected officials. According to the policy bargain model, the process and outcome of these policy bargains are shaped by the respective parties’ utility functions (i.e. policy preferences), bargaining powers, risk calculations, and interpersonal trust levels.

“Trusting Relations, Learning Bureaucrats: International Organisations and Early-Stage Policy Diffusion” contributes to the IO literature by proposing an extension to the current conceptualisation of learning as a policy diffusion mechanism. Based on the study findings, the paper underlines the need for incorporating interpersonal social and emotive elements into our analysis of transnational policy learning processes, particularly when they are mediated by IO bureaucrats. This extended conceptualisation draws upon social psychology and organisational learning literatures, and challenges the IO literature's exclusive focus on reason and the limits of rationality in understanding policy learning processes and IOs' roles in policy diffusion via learning.

Finally, "The Millennium Effect?: When and Where Does Bureaucratic Quality Matter for Human Development" suggests the need for a more nuanced conceptualisation of social policy outcomes in our investigations of their determinants. Drawing upon public administration literature, the paper highlights the relevance of task complexity in state bureaucracies' ability to introduce and implement new social policies. Hence, it urges scholars to pay attention to the types of bureaucratic tasks involved in realising certain social policy outcomes when they examine the various determinants of these outcomes, and particularly when they focus on the relationship between bureaucratic quality and these outcomes.

Fourthly and more generally, the four papers together assert the need to pay systematic attention to bureaucrats in our investigations of social policy change and evolution of welfare systems. As such, the increasingly sophisticated analyses by non-purist power resource theorists and historical institutionalists could benefit from incorporating a more nuanced analysis of the bureaucrats' engagement in social policy processes. Such a nuanced analysis would pay attention to the various intra- and extra-bureaucratic factors that affect bureaucrats' engagement in social policy processes as well as the interaction of these factors. Bringing a nuanced understanding of bureaucrats into our analyses may help scholars of social policy account for the numerous deviant cases of social policy change. It may also strengthen the analytic prowess of state-centric approaches to understanding social policy change in low- and middle-income countries given the centrality of bureaucrats to the state in many of these countries.

4. Policy Significance of Findings

Before elaborating on the policy significance of each of the four studies that make up the dissertation, I must note that partly motivating this research project was my personal puzzlement arising from numerous professional encounters with individual bureaucrats in different policy processes in Turkey throughout the 2000s. How could bureaucrats have so much influence on policy processes? More perplexingly, why would an individual bureaucrat bother to try to influence policy processes? As someone who worked as part of international, non-governmental, and governmental efforts in good governance, institution strengthening, and social policy change, I believed that the inadequacy of our responses to these two basic questions limited our abilities to bring about positive change in these realms. Thus, the potential policy implications of these studies were central to the initial generation of the research questions and the subsequent development of the study designs.

The findings presented in “The Millennium Effect?: When and Where Does

Bureaucratic Quality Matter for Human Development" put forward both a hopeful message about the effects of global advocacy efforts in development and a more cautionary one for global good governance efforts for improving bureaucratic quality. The paper provides suggestive evidence for the presence of an effect by global MDG advocacy efforts on the relationship between bureaucratic quality and the social policy outcomes advocated for. Yet, it also suggests that the relationship between bureaucratic quality and social policy outcomes is far from being categorical. These findings invite development practitioners to re-examine their prevalent assumptions about the positive effects of bureaucratic quality on social policy outcomes when pushing for good governance reforms in low- and middle-income countries. As such, the paper urges development practitioners to pay particular attention to the role of political commitment, bureaucratic capabilities, and the international-national interplay of power and influence in developing their relevant 'theories of change' and designing governance interventions.

"Trusting Relations, Learning Bureaucrats: International Organisations and Early-Stage Policy Diffusion" also examines the international-national interplay of power and influence with a focus on the role of international organisations on social policy diffusion. In terms of its policy implications for international organisations, the findings speak directly to the ongoing conversation concerning a new role for the World Bank with a focus on influencing policy changes in low- and middle-income countries. The study provides some clues about the elements that contribute to Bank bureaucrats' effective involvement in policymaking processes. In both cases studied, the

World Bank's in-country presence contributed to long-term, trust-based personal relationships with national actors, which then increased Bank bureaucrats' ability to provide timely input into time-sensitive policy processes and as a result, influence national policymaking processes. These findings provide some support to the position that argues for further decentralisation of World Bank operations in an effort to increase its relevance and influence in national policy dialogues.

Turning from the international to the national-level, findings presented in "The Bargaining Bureaucrat: Policy Bargains and Effects of Political Context and Organisational Traits on Bureaucrats' Policy Influence" are directly relevant to the ongoing debates about civil service reform in low- and middle-income countries. With its focus on the policymaking functions of bureaucrats, the study contributes to a growing body of empirical studies demonstrating the long-theorized negative implications of politicisation on bureaucratic performance. The paper describes various changes in bureaucrats' behaviour in policy bargains in response to changes in their political context whereby a single-party government holding consecutive terms in power progressively deepens its political control over bureaucrats. The study findings also highlight what seems to be an inevitable trade-off in countries that are susceptible to high degrees of bureaucratic politicisation, between bureaucratic efficiency brought about by higher levels of political control by a unified and strong political power and "unintentional" bureaucratic autonomy brought about by a fragmented and weak political power.

“After the Dust Settles: Mergers, Policymaking Processes, Mid-Level Bureaucrats” highlights a major gap in our knowledge about the effects of organisational structure, and more particularly of public agency mergers, on bureaucrats’ behaviour in policy processes. Given that reorganisation, including mergers and demergers, is a frequently employed tool to address bureaucratic inefficiencies, this case study of a merger in the social policy realm suggests that mergers may end up hindering technical mid-level bureaucrats’ ability to effectively engage in policymaking processes and potentially worsen the technical quality of the policy outcomes. Overall, the paper draws attention to the need for a more cautious attitude to using reorganisation to address public inefficiencies and a more thoughtful approach to designing and implementing reorganisation processes in the public sector by placing the human element at its centre.

Needless to say, exploring the less charted waters of bureaucrats’ engagement in social policy processes in low- and middle-income countries came with several challenges and limitations concerning conceptualisation, measurement, and study design. The foremost of these challenges was capturing and measuring the extent and nature of bureaucrats’ engagement in social policy processes. Three of the papers tackled this challenge by putting the magnifying lens on individual bureaucrats’ experiences in policymaking processes and using semi-structured interviews as their primary source of data. A related challenge concerned the systematic aggregation of these individual level findings to organisational and national levels. The cross-organisational and cross-national comparative lenses adopted in these studies aimed to partly address this challenge of aggregation. On the other side of this very same coin of measurement limitations was the challenge of working with aggregate country-level indicators about bureaucracy in examining the evolution of social policies, which are known to be highly complex and thus in need of granularity of data.

Overall, each of the four studies represents an earnest attempt at studying the complex relationships between hard-to-measure concepts. Their goal is to move what I consider to be a consequential scholarly conversation about bureaucrats' engagement in social policy processes an inch further. They try to do so by putting a spotlight on particularly under-studied countries (i.e. low- and middle-income countries) and phenomena (e.g. individual bureaucrats' policy influence, public mergers, and early-state policy diffusion) as well as by using some novel analytical models (e.g. application of bargaining theory to analyse bureaucrats' engagement in policymaking processes). Thus, in spite of their various limitations of measurement and study design, it is my hope that these four studies together constitute an extensive inquiry into the factors that affect bureaucrats' engagement in social policy processes in low- and middle-income countries.

5. Future Research

Drawing a more complete picture of bureaucrats' engagement in policy processes and developing generalisable theories about the determinants of their engagement require, at the very least, many more empirical investigations of this topic. More specifically, such investigations would include: (1) as suggested in “Millennium Effect?: When and Where Does Bureaucratic Quality Matter for Human Development”, in-depth case studies examining the channels through which global actors affect domestic power interplays among political, bureaucratic and social coalitions, which then influence the deployment of additional bureaucratic capacity for certain policy priorities; (2) as recommended in “Trusting Relations, Learning Bureaucrats: International Organisations and Early-Stage Policy Diffusion”, empirical studies about the micro-processes of policy diffusion and the roles played by international and national bureaucrats in these processes with a view to understanding which mechanisms are at work when and where, and what roles do bureaucrats play in different mechanisms at different places and times; (3) as highlighted in “The Bargaining Bureaucrat: Policy Bargains and Effects of Political Context and Organisational Traits on Bureaucrats’ Policy Influence”, empirical studies on bureaucrats’ policy influence and the effects of political and organisational factors on this influence that adopt the bureaucratic policy bargain model with a view to test its generalisability; (4) as urged in “After the Dust Settles: Mergers, Policymaking Processes, Mid-Level Bureaucrats”, empirical studies of reorganisation in the public sector that examine its effects on internal policymaking processes and bureaucrats’ engagement in these processes. Future empirical investigations of these kinds would benefit from focusing on countries outside the more commonly studied northern democracies. A richer pool of investigations from countries outside northern democracies would facilitate the emergence of discernible patterns and analytical categories among these countries vis-à-vis bureaucrats’ engagement in policy processes.

In conclusion, the four studies that make up this dissertation aim to further our understanding about the factors underlying the variation in the substance and extent of bureaucrats’ engagement in social policy processes. More generally, they draw attention to the need for a more systematic incorporation of the role of bureaucrats into our analyses of social policy change and welfare systems. It is also my hope that this dissertation can make a small contribution to an impressive body of scholarly work on bureaucracy by putting its spotlight on the often-invisible individual bureaucrats.