From delegation to participation: citizen politics in Grenoble and Toulouse, 1958-1981

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Abstract

Examining the period between 1958 (the inception of the Fifth Republic) and 1981 (election of François Mitterrand as President and Socialist parliamentary majority), my research sought to answer the question: why and how did grass-roots mobilisation in favour of citizen participation develop in two French cities, Grenoble and Toulouse?

The thesis first develops a general conceptual framework within which to analyse each locality. It elaborates the notion that there existed two public action cycles in France. The first was a ‘reform cycle’ (1958-1968) which preceded, and was interrupted by, a more critical ‘contention cycle’ which developed post May 1968 (ending by about 1981); both were triggered by major political crises. The reform cycle was marked by a high level of extra-party organisation through clubs and educational associations, which attempted to change patterns of interaction between civil society and the political process. In contrast, the contention cycle that followed May 1968 was far more radical in its critique, range of themes, organisational structures and forms of action.

In the case studies, I explore the contrasting experiences of Grenoble and Toulouse during the two cycles. We see how the development of powerful associative currents in Grenoble during the reform cycle facilitated the emergence in 1964 of a citizen action movement, the Groupe d’action municipale (GAM). The success of the GAM in coming to power in coalition with other parties of the non-Communist Left created a municipality determined to institute improved participationary practice. This commitment to new forms of democracy from within city hall meant that the contention cycle in Grenoble did not precipitate major pressure for fundamental change in local government structures.

However, in Toulouse, the reform cycle had no comparable impact upon city politics or associative life in the 1960s. The local associative world was far more fragmented and unable to exert any substantial influence. The traditionalist Socialist administration and subsequently a centre-right, conservative municipality were then confronted with sustained grass-roots opposition in the aftermath of May 1968. What occurred in the city during the contention cycle was typical of patterns elsewhere in France. For close to a decade, a small core of associations, seeking a radical overhaul of municipal decision-making, consistently challenged city hall, using a mixture of diplomatic approaches and direct action techniques.

I draw two central conclusions from my research, one empirical, the other conceptual. Firstly, evidence from both the national and local level indicates that associations played a key role in the public action cycles. This challenges the traditional view of France as having inherently weak associative structures. Secondly, my research questions the frequently made connection between a so-called ‘new middle class’ and innovative forms of political action, showing the term ‘new middle class’ to be misleading and inexact.
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Abbreviations

ADCV  Association pour la défense du cadre de vie
ADELS Association pour la démocratie et l’éducation locale et sociale
ADTC Association pour le développement des transports en commun, voies cyclables et piétonnières dans l’agglomération grenobloise
ADUA Association de démocratisation de l’urbanisme et de l’architecture
ASF Association syndicale des familles
ATE Association toulousaine d’écologie
CAPT Centre d’action politique de Toulouse
CARNACQ Carrefour national des comités de quartier
CCIF Centre catholique des intellectuels français
CDEE Comité d’expansion économique
CDSQ Commission pour le développement social des quartier
CENG Centre d’études nucléaires de Grenoble
CFDT Confédération française démocratique du travail
CFTC Confédération française des travailleurs chrétiens
CGC Confédération générale des cadres
CGL Confédération générale de logement
CGT Confédération générale du travail
CIFAS Centre d’information de formation et d’action sociale
CIPES Centre d’information politique, économique et sociale
CIR Convention des institutions républicaines
CLUQ Comité de liaison des unions de quartier
CNAF Caisse nationale des allocations familiales
CNAPF Confédération nationale des associations populaires familiales
CNJA Centre national des jeunes agriculteurs
CNI Centre national des indépendants
CNL Confédération nationale de logement
CODIQUANT Comité pour l’étude et la défense des intérêts du quartier Nord de Toulouse
CREPT Centre de réflexion et d’études politiques de Toulouse
CSCV Confédération syndicale du cadre de vie
CSF Confédération syndicale des familles
CUTC Comité d’usagers des transports en commun
DATAR Délégation à l’aménagement du territoire et à l’action régionale
ENSA  Ecole Nationale supérieure d’Aéronautique
FGDS  Fédération de la gauche démocrate et socialiste
FO  Force ouvrière
FOL  Fédération des œuvres laïques
GAM  Groupe d’action municipale
GIAM  Groupe d’information et d’aménagement
GO95  Grenoble objectif ‘95
GROP  Groupe de recherches ouvrier-paysan
IEPG  Institut d’études politiques de Grenoble
INSEE  Institut national des statistiques et des études économiques
JEC  Jeunesse étudiante chrétienne
JOC  Jeunesse ouvrière chrétienne
MJC  Maison des jeunes et de la culture
MLO  Mouvement de libération ouvrière
MLP  Mouvement de libération du peuple
MRG  Mouvement des radicaux de gauche
MRP  Mouvement républicain populaire
ONIA  Office national industriel de l’azote
PCF  Parti communiste français
PEC  Peuple et culture
POS  Plan d’occupation des sols
PS  Parti socialiste
PSA  Parti socialiste autonome
PSU  Parti socialiste unifié
RI  Républicains indépendants
RPF  Rassemblement du peuple français
RPR  Rassemblement pour la République
SDAU  Schéma directeur d’aménagement et d’urbanisme
SFIO  Section française de l’internationale ouvrière
SOGREAH  Société grenobloise d’étude et d’applications hydrauliques
UCGS  Union des groupes et clubs socialistes
UCIL  Union des comités d’intérêts locaux, Lyon
UCRG  Union des clubs pour le renouveau de la gauche
UCQ  Union des comités de quartier
UCQ-ADACVT  Union de comités de quartier et des associations de défense et d’action pour le cadre de vie à Toulouse
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronyme</th>
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<tr>
<td>UD</td>
<td>Union départementale</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>Union pour la démocratie française</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDHEC</td>
<td>Union des habitants des Eaux Claires</td>
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<td>UDR</td>
<td>Union des démocrates pour la République</td>
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<td>UFCS</td>
<td>Union féminine civique et sociale</td>
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<td>Union des forces démocratiques</td>
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<td>UGS</td>
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<td>UNAF</td>
<td>Union nationale des associations familiales</td>
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<td>UNEF</td>
<td>Union nationale des étudiants de France</td>
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<td>UNR</td>
<td>Union pour la nouvelle République</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAM</td>
<td>Union socialiste et d'action municipale</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZUP</td>
<td>Zone à urbaniser en priorité</td>
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Introduction

'The individual's role is to live first and foremost his daily life: his personal concerns and those of his family absorb him. The number of citizens who follow public affairs with the desire to take part in them is limited, and this is fortunate. A polity or nation where numerous citizens discussed politics everyday would be close to ruin [...] The plain citizen who is a true democrat makes a judgement in silence about the government of his country; and when he is consulted at regular intervals, for the election of a member of parliament for example, he expresses his agreement or disagreement.'

'Democracy is not a question of periodically putting a voting paper in a ballot box, delegating power to one or several elected representatives, only then to be uninterested, to keep a distance, to stay quiet for five or seven years. Democracy is the continuous activity of the citizen, not only in state affairs, but in those of the region, the commune, the cooperative, the association, the profession. If this vigilant presence does not make itself felt, those who govern (whatever their guiding principles may be) [...] soon give way either to arbitrary temptations or routines and allegedly established rights.'

During the late 1960s, 'participation' became something of a political buzz-word in advanced democracies and the international scale of the subsequent debate over more inclusive government has stimulated sustained academic analysis and comment. In France, pressure for a change in democratic processes developed outside the political parties soon after the establishment of the Fifth Republic. May 1968 launched a more radical period of activity, but the issue had, however, receded from the political foreground by the early 1980s. Examining the period between 1958 (the inception of the Fifth Republic) and 1981 (election of François Mitterrand as President and first Socialist government since the Fourth Republic), this thesis addresses the question: why and how did grass-roots mobilisation in favour of citizen participation develop in two French cities, Grenoble and Toulouse?

Participation, as it is understood here, concerns that area of citizenship which T.H. Marshall termed 'political.' If Marshall himself explored the issue through suffrage and, more particularly, the integration of the working class, I define citizen participation to mean an extension of political citizenship which gives the possibility of contributing to public policy decision-making processes beyond simply delegating

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3 This is an enormous literature to which no footnote can do justice. Participation is obviously linked to wider questions concerning democracy and citizenship, and there are few prominent political scientists who have not addressed the issue. For a useful general introduction to the vogue of the 1960s and 1970s, see C. Pateman, *Participation and Democratic Theory* (Cambridge: CUP, 1970); G. Parry (ed.), *Participation in Politics* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1972).
4 All references to Grenoble and Toulouse refer to the central communes unless otherwise specified.
authority at moments of election.\(^5\) Clearly, this covers a wide area -- the referendum, committee consultation processes, the right to speak at council meetings -- and is often difficult to define. The literature is littered with criticisms of what Sartori, for example, has called a ‘fuzzy’ notion.\(^6\) However, my primary focus is on the local actors and associations who sought to challenge the political and administrative status quo at city level, promoting a more inclusive, decentralised form of decision-making. As such, the vagueness of the term is less a problem for the study than for the activists who constitute the object of interest.

Preoccupations with local or communal democracy are, of course, nothing new. One only has to look, for example, at Tocqueville or Mill to see the theme treated in classic political texts.\(^7\) But as Duverger points out, freedom in French democratic tradition has generally been characterised by the possibility for the citizen to resist the pressure of authority, in contrast to what he sees as an Anglo-Saxon emphasis on participation in decision-making: ‘Democracy [in France] means the citizen as opposed to authority, and not the citizen as participating in authority.’\(^8\) With a highly centralised state decision-making process and in the absence of strong intermediary bodies, citizens’ freedom was to be protected at national level against the power of the state by their directly elected representatives in parliament, and in the communes.\(^9\)

Indeed, during the Third and Fourth Republics, national political careers tended to be

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\(^5\) T. H. Marshall, *Citizenship and Social Class: and other essays* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950). Marshall had noted: ‘By the political element, I mean the right to participate in the exercise of political power, as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of such a body. The corresponding institutions are parliament and councils of local government.’ (p. 11)


\(^7\) A. de Tocqueville, *De la démocratie en Amérique* (Paris: Gallimard, 1951), especially Part One, Ch.V; J. S. Mill, *Considerations on Representative Government* (Oxford: OUP, 1912), Ch.XV ‘Of local representative bodies.’


\(^9\) It is interesting that already in the mid-nineteenth century, Tocqueville’s writings on communal life in America had criticised the centralised and non-participatory culture that he identified in France and other parts of Europe. See A. de Tocqueville, *De la démocratie en Amérique* (Paris: Gallimard, 1951), particularly Ch.5 (Part 1) where Tocqueville idealises communal institutions in New England: ‘The New England commune brings two advantages which, everywhere that they are found, arouse keen interest; these are independence and power [...] In Europe, it often happens that those who govern themselves regret the lack of communal spirit [...] By making the commune strong and independent, they fear sharing social power and exposing the state to anarchy.’ (pp. 65-66).
built upon a local base to which the député (also often a mayor) was accountable for his success in the defence and promotion of interests.  

In the localities, democracy tended also to mean the delegation of responsibility by direct election, but in an arena where autonomy was (in principle at least) tightly circumscribed. During the 1960s, several studies of the relationship between local inhabitants and elected officials in small French communes identified the kind of authority relations that Duverger was describing. Wylie’s work on Chanzeaux reveals that residents ‘willingly delegated power to run what few affairs they had in common, as long as the leaders in turn exercised their authority with a minimum of interference in the daily life of the individual.’ In a broader work, Kesselman notes the atrophy of ‘meaningful political debate’ in a system where stability had become an overriding preoccupation and paternalist leadership a prevalent style.

Although Kesselman claims a general applicability of his analysis that ‘local consensus in France has consisted of a negative agreement not to regard local government as an instrument to achieve substantial change,’ it holds historically less true for larger towns or cities. Municipal socialism in the 1920s and 1930s is one example of this; Mendès France’s administration of Louviers was regarded as a model of its kind in the 1950s, and in the first decade of the Fifth Republic, the successors of the post-war generation of mayors responded to the rapid urban growth since the war by using local government to reorganise and revitalise their municipalities. Kesselman certainly acknowledges the vulnerability of what he called the ‘negative consensus.’ While not specifically noting in 1966 that his prediction was already a reality in certain localities, notably in Grenoble with the arrival in power of the GAM, he commented: ‘[e]conomic prosperity, better communications, and the rise of what the

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14 Ibid., p. 164.
15 Ibid., p. 164.
French call les forces nouvelles...may all contribute to the development of a more activist outlook and a reduced emphasis on consensus at the local level.16

There are few comparative French city studies focusing on political or associative life. The majority of urban research on France has tended to consist of single case studies, and even here there has been a bias towards urbanisation and local development. One thinks particularly of the Marxist school of the 1960s and 1970s and the studies by Bleitrach, Huet and Lojkine,17 and more recent work by LeGalès.18 The monographs by Jean Petaux on Nantes and Jacques Lagroye on Chaban Delmas in Bordeaux are relatively rare examples of published academic scholarship specifically addressing city politics,19 although a number of doctoral theses have focused in this direction.20 A work in the late 1980s examined participation in a Franco-British comparative perspective, using several small towns as examples, but this looked less at the details of local politics than at the general mechanisms linking citizen and local government.21

The present study builds on earlier research which looked at Grenoble between 1965 and 1995.22 The city is an obvious point of interest given the emergence in late 1964 of the Groupe d’action municipale (GAM), a citizen action group which successfully contested the municipal elections of March 1965 in an alliance with the Section française de l’internationale ouvrière (SFIO) and the Parti socialiste unifié (PSU). The arrival in power of the GAM, the first structure of its kind in post-war France, presaged the development of a highly original approach to urban government, and was followed by the national GAM movement in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

16 Ibid., p. 164.
GAM leader (and subsequently PS député), Hubert Dubedout, became mayor of Grenoble and led three administrations (1965-1983) which promoted citizen involvement in local decision-making as a central priority.

The ideal second case would have been a control, a city with comparable growth rates, socio-professional and economic structures, but a different political and associative life. One could then isolate mobilisation conditions much more clearly. However, this kind of approach was made unworkable by basic difficulties. Principally, the growth of Grenoble between 1954 and 1962, precipitating in large part the urban crisis and debate that led to the GAM, was wholly exceptional -- almost 40%. No other city of over 100,000 inhabitants came close to this figure in those eight years, the average for the fastest growing twenty being 19.8% (see Appendix 1b). In addition, advanced industry and research meant that certain socio-professional categories -- notably the intellectual and technical middle class -- were considerably over-represented. Grenoble had the highest concentration of engineers outside Paris in the early 1960s, and engineers formed 32% of GAM activists. Potential independent variables turn out to be closely connected to the political outcomes.

Given the unworkability of a convincing control, I decided to look first and foremost for a locality that offers both parallels in terms of development and contrasts in terms of politics. Toulouse, with this criterion, was immediately compelling. Toulouse is the only other large French city to have undergone as radical a change as Grenoble, qualitatively as much as quantitatively, since the Second World War. While their trajectories have been very different, both have evolved from being largely unremarkable provincial cities to become internationally recognised science and research centres, 'the duettists of the high-tech.' By the late 1970s, Toulouse and Grenoble were leading university centres dedicated to the development of advanced technologies, and have the largest engineering and scientific teaching facilities outside

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These academic activities are in turn complemented by the presence of very modern industry (particularly information technology, aviation, space, electronics).

The sociological dimension of these developments is significant. The intellectual and technical professional middle class was prominent in citizen participation politics in Grenoble and an initial hypothesis was that there might be a connection between the growth of a certain section of the middle class and the emergence of certain forms of political movement. Unlike Grenoble, the presence of these groups was not strongly felt socially and economically in Toulouse until the early 1970s, a situation much closer to the norm in provincial French cities. At an associative level, weak activity in the 1960s gave way to a well-coordinated neighbourhood committee movement during the subsequent decade, with a long-term battle fought by a core of citizen participation activists against a resistant and well-implanted centre-right administration under Pierre Baudis.

**Source material on Grenoble and Toulouse**

Although there is an unusually large amount of literature on Grenoble that explores this period, surprisingly, none has looked in any real detail or in an academic perspective at the development of the GAM and the associative world out of which it emerged. Part of the problem has been that much of the analysis has been undertaken by those who were either in or sympathetic to the Dubedout administration. This has led both to some degree of partiality, and to an information

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27 A. Rousseau, Grenoble GAM member; P. Bolle, founder member of the GAM; P. Frappat, municipal councillor 1971-77 (PSU then PS); J.-P. Motte, sociologist working at the *Agence d'urbanisme de la région grenobloise*, politically close to the administration (PS); J.-F. Parent, urbanist, politically close to the administration (PSU then PS); J.-L. Schwartzbrod, councillor 1971-1983 (GAM then MRG); L. Ratel, information director in Dubedout's cabinet and editor of the municipal magazine *Grenoble* until 1983 (PS). In terms of the collaborative ventures, Delbard et al. contains at least two well-known PS
deficit resulting from a lack of exploration of developments which were so much a part of the immediate context that they hardly appeared worthy of explanation. The same information is frequently recycled with significant gaps.

In the literature, political life in Toulouse is little-covered either in academic or non-academic literature, as is the case for most French provincial cities with the exception of Grenoble. While there are several texts that give excellent general accounts of life in Toulouse during the 1960s and 1970s, there is very little in terms of political analysis. For associative life, one is completely dependent on local university theses, and even here there is nothing on club activity during the early 1960s for example. The city, therefore, presents a different kind of challenge. Where much of what has been written in Grenoble needed to be un-picked and examined more closely, political and associative structures in Toulouse had to be re-constructed on paper in the absence of a body of supportive secondary material.

This difficulty in the Grenoble case, combined with the lack of published secondary material on Toulouse, dictated a heavy reliance upon primary sources for the city case studies and I spent fifteen months carrying out fieldwork. Material from both municipal, prefectoral and departmental archives (Haute-Garonne, Isère) was complemented by party, association and private collections. A wide range of documentation, particularly association membership records, has not been previously used. For example, despite extensive comment and analysis of the Grenoble GAM since the Dubedout victory of 1965, this study is the first that makes use of GAM membership records to analyse the membership base (see Chapter Two).

A persistent obstacle to this approach was the variable availability of material, particularly when trying to compare directly a similar phenomenon in both cities. For example, while the PSU archives in Toulouse (to which I had unlimited access) provided an excellent documentary resource on the life of the local party, the local PSU activists in Grenoble were unable to locate the Isère federation archives which appear to have been dispersed. Another problem was the variable method of storing association records in prefectures (depositions according to the 1901 law). While I could carry out my own census of neighbourhood activity during the 1930s in Toulouse using prefecture files from the period, this was refused in Grenoble, where recent computer data protection laws were invoked to prevent public access to documentation.

I undertook fifty-seven semi-directive interviews with activists or local political figures, asking a number of standard questions about personal political or associative engagement, subsequently exploring more general details which could be correlated with the printed sources. Some interviews lasted up to three or four hours over several visits, others were much shorter. The average was about an hour. All interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed. The choice of whom to see was based on two priorities. The first was the uncovering of networks: it became clear from early on that a relatively small number of people in both cities were responsible for much of the citizen politics mobilisations. I therefore asked one interviewee after another whom I should contact and cross-checked the information. This was sometimes difficult as rivalries or disagreements meant that certain names would not necessarily be immediately forthcoming.

The second priority was to see individuals who may not have been part of the main networks I was interested in, but who could offer important insights from their various positions. In addition to interviews carried out personally, I have had access to about twenty transcripts from other studies. This is particularly useful in relation to individuals who are now deceased, such as Louis Bazerque (mayor of Toulouse 1958-1971) and Pierre Baudis (mayor of Toulouse 1971-1983). It is also beneficial because many of these interviews were carried out in the 1970s and 1980s when events were
more recent. There is clearly an accuracy issue which arises when interviewing individuals thirty years after events. On occasions, memories were very confused and I discarded the resulting interview material.

In addition to primary sources and published works on the two cities (identified in specific sections of the bibliography), I drew on a considerable number of history, sociology and political science theses. These were mainly undergraduate degree or masters’ level small-scale studies (mémoires) of local neighbourhood groups or associations; few doctoral theses on local life in Grenoble or Toulouse have really touched on the areas under examination in this study. Unfortunately, the variable quality of sub-doctoral research, where inferences are sometimes drawn on the basis of relatively little fieldwork, means that the material often has to be used with care and double-checked where possible.

A problem that frequently arises with the local secondary sources is one of partisanship. As pointed out above, many of the Grenoble works were undertaken by engaged academics, and similar difficulties affect Toulouse. While there are amusing examples, such as a mémoire on the most dynamic Toulouse neighbourhood association, the Comité pour l’étude et la défense des intérêts du quartier Nord de Toulouse, written by the President’s daughter (extremely approving), more notable are Marxist influences during the 1970s, an issue which of course applies also to the more general literature. Where such influences were strong, for example in the Geography and Sociology faculties of Toulouse, research can carry a heavy ideological baggage. This is as true for students’ work as for that of their professors. The orientation given by certain academics is frankly admitted.

The local and the national, what relationship?

City politics do not operate in a vacuum. From the very earliest stages of the research, it became clear that an integral part of the explanation for what happened in Grenoble

30 Interviews with André Boudou and Christian Béringuier, geography professors at the University of Toulouse-le-Mirail.
and Toulouse lay with the wider national context, and the relationship between local and national. The debate between J. Caulfield and R. Harris about the nature of urban politics in Canada during the 1960s provides a useful introduction to the conceptual issues.\(^3\) To summarise, Harris made two central claims: firstly, that local conditions were not decisive factors in the appearance and timing of municipal reform movements in cities: the context provided by general movements for social change mattered primarily. Secondly, to the extent that local conditions were significant, they are not usefully seen as being distinctively urban. In response, Caulfield took the opposite view: local factors outweigh any wider climate, and there exist quite distinctive urban pressures that set cities or towns apart.

This disagreement has in fact much to do with nuances in the balance of influences, and less to do with fundamentally opposing theoretical positions. My research on Grenoble and Toulouse leads me to take a position between that of Harris and Caulfield. While the former is certainly right to insist on the considerable importance of wider climate, there were, however, conditions intrinsic to the urban environment which gave a particular shape to local initiatives. Indeed, the citizen participation movements and neighbourhood associations examined in this thesis were generally intimately related to France’s major urban infrastructural and environmental problems, resulting from spectacular post-war town and city growth.

The question of distinctively ‘urban’ issues had, of course, been addressed in France by Castells and other prominent sociologists during the 1970s in an attempt to identify whether it was possible to develop a distinctively urban sociology.\(^3\) Although Castells eventually abandoned attempts to construct an overarching theory of social relationships in the city, the ‘collective consumption’ conflicts (public service provision -- housing, education, transport, leisure and cultural facilities) that he highlighted, particularly in his analysis of urban movements, demonstrate the scale of

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the management challenge faced by state and local authorities in France. If the country was still a relatively rural society in the 1940s -- compared to Britain or West Germany -- its urbanisation rate soon reached dramatic proportions, as Appendix 1a shows.33

Where Caulfield and Harris both make an error in their analysis, though, is in their tacit assumption that the local is somehow totally separable from the national, or even international. While Agnew undoubtedly goes too far in claiming that for political behaviour, '[i]t is the local reality that determines the total picture, and not the reverse,' it is important not to attempt to compartmentalise the local (urban or not).34 As the case of the Grenoble GAM will show, a group whose ethos was substantially influenced by wider contemporary currents within a local situation of urban infrastructural crisis itself became a reference point for those wider currents, inspiring the eventual emergence of a substantial nationwide movement. It is, therefore, more appropriate to speak of a dialectical relationship between local and national, both levels constantly affecting one another.

**Participation and public-action cycles: explaining the emergence of a theme in French politics**

The attempt to connect local and national immediately raises the issue as to whether it is possible to develop a broad conceptual framework which can help us understand the debates and action forms35 that structured the participation debate within French society during this period, from the establishment of the Fifth Republic to the first years of the Mitterrand government.

There is a tendency in the literature, both on France and more widely, to assume that demands for citizen participation were largely the product of the late 1960s.36

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33 In the early 1950s, Britain was 81% urbanised (1951), West Germany 71% (1950) and France only 57% (1954). Source: A. Lamache, 'L'Habitat', *Vers la Vie nouvelle* (1962), p. 31.
36 For an example of this kind of approach, see A. Mabileau et al. (eds.), *Les citoyens et la politique locale. Comment participent les Britanniques et les Français*, p. 267.
Furthermore, in the New Social Movement literature (NSM) which is central to consideration of such questions, the procedural issue of participation is frequently conflated with substantive issues, such as equal rights for women or better protection for the environment. Yet in terms of challenges to the established order, the period covering the early to mid 1960s is equally as important. In the United States, the participation theme was initially popularised by the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), whose Port Huron statement of 1962 called for the establishment of a ‘democracy of individual participation,’ breaking both with dominant post-war pluralist assumptions and established Left-philosophy.37 Such a standpoint was a staple of the American New Left for the next decade.

If France was not unique in experiencing such forms of political demand, the intention here is not to build conceptual frameworks that may necessarily be readily applied elsewhere. The fact, for example, that participatory democracy was a concern simultaneously in both the United States and France in the early 1960s should not disguise major differences. The American New Left had begun as a student reaction against prosperous suburban, conformist middle-class life, with the participatory element drawing on the experience of civil rights activists in the South.38 In contrast, that part of the French New Left most vocal about participation belonged generally to older age cohorts (30-40 years old) and was deeply troubled by the political crises of the late 1950s, as well as by the perceived passivity of the population at large.

Sociological explorations of the New Left and later NSMs have emphasised the centrality of a ‘new middle class’ or ‘new class.’ Theories about new elements of the middle class are, of course, recurrent in twentieth century sociology; but earlier representations, emerging from Weimar Germany and 1950s America, were particularly gloomy, emphasising a growing white-collar population as ‘political eunuchs’ or ‘little people.’39 During the 1960s, however, a far more dynamic

interpretation began to develop in a diverse international literature. From the ‘new class’ polemic over the American New Left to more recent NSM interpretations, the ‘new middle class’ has no longer been portrayed as a politically impotent, but as a powerful reforming force. Indeed, the idea of a highly-educated group that breaks with patterns of class conflict to posit a universalist, quality of life-centred politics, has almost become received wisdom in certain quarters. In the words of the influential Offe definition, ‘[n]ew middle class politics in contrast to most working-class politics is typically a politics of a class but not on behalf of a class.’

‘New middle class,’ however, is a sociological portmanteau, riddled with definitional inconsistencies. Its inclusiveness is often determined by the activities of groups whose previous specification it is supposed to provide. Indeed, in the social movement literature, one of the most serious problems is the consistent refusal to include managerial professions from the commercial sector -- groups which are clearly as much of a post-war growth phenomenon as the (mainly public sector) teachers, health, social and cultural professionals that are at the core of most ‘new middle class’ definitions. It is very difficult to avoid the conclusion that many recent ‘new middle class’ models are simply short-hand for a postmaterialist Left. Moreover, the extent to which there is any ideological unity amongst the component groups needs to be demonstrated rather than assumed.

A useful general commentary may be found in V. Burris, 'The Discovery of the New Middle Classes', Chap. 1 in A. J. Vidich (ed.), The New Middle Classes. The seminal work from the United States on the 1950s is C. Wright Mills' White Collar (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), which was strongly influenced by Speier's approach.


A later wave of 'new class' theory was led by A. Gouldner, The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class: A Frame of Reference, Theses, Conjectures, Arguments, and an Historical Perspective on the Role of Intellectuals and Intelligentsia in the International Class Contest of the Modern Era (London: Macmillan, 1979).


C. Offe, 'New social movements: challenging the boundaries of institutional politics', p. 833.


A recent undertaking using cross-European data found no conclusive evidence of a coherent ideological framework; see E. Scarbrough, 'In Search of New Middle Class Radicalism', Paper
Perhaps most importantly, how much can the term tell us about the evolution of participation politics? How can we establish a link between the socio-structural dimension and the chronology of mobilisation? French socio-professional statistics indicate a substantial change in the relative position of the non-commercial middle class in French society during much of the post-war period, but critical activity has not followed a steady rhythm. We see a specific mobilisation demanding greater democratisation of the political process in the first years of the Fifth Republic and, in the aftermath of May 1968, this is followed by a different pattern of activity, which itself declines by the early 1980s. Before even looking at local variations, therefore, it is necessary to consider a more dynamic theory to account for national patterns.

The early appearance of the movement for improved participation also renders the Inglehart cultural change model an inadequate tool. Inglehart posits an inter-generational shift from materialist towards postmaterialist value priorities that has taken place since the end of the Second World War. What is meant by ‘postmaterialist’ can be broadly described as non-materialist / non-economic quality of life issues. Inglehart claims that those people who have grown up in conditions of relative economic prosperity will have a fundamentally different worldview to those who did not experience material comfort. His model identifies the first postmaterialist generation as having been born between 1946 and 1955, and identifies this group in the student movements of the 1960s and, most notably, in subsequent new social movements, together with later generations of postmaterialists.

44 In a comparative context, H. Kriesi et al., studying NSMs in Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland and France between 1975 and 1989, find that France is an exception with no protest wave during the 1980s (New Social Movements in Western Europe (London: UCL Press, 1995)). J.-W. Duyvendak, who carried out the French case study for this project, notes that although France seemed to be at the heart of European NSM momentum during the 1970s, political mobilization subsequently 'seemed to have vanished.' (The Power of Politics: New Social Movements in France (Oxford: Westview Press, 1995), p. 4).


46 Two of Inglehart's criteria for identifying postmaterialists relate to participation ('give people more say in the decisions of the government,' 'give people more say in how things are decided at work and in their community').

Postmaterialism as a concept has sustained much criticism, particularly in terms of the priorities which are used to frame the postmaterialist/materialist division. But even if Inglehart's observations may be valid for certain age cohorts, the empirical evidence from both the city studies and the wider national conceptual framework developed below indicates that the generations involved in early pressure for improved citizen participation were not born into conditions of material prosperity in the post-war period. On the contrary, they had experienced the depression and the Second World War. In other words, we must look beyond postmaterialist value change explanations for understanding the emergence of new patterns of political demands.

I suggest that the notion of cycle provides an explanatory framework. Cycles are more traditionally thought of in economic or business terms, but the political science literature also uses the idea to account for variations in the stability of political or social systems. More particularly, we are provided with a tool which can be used to explain not just why a certain phenomenon occurs, but why it ebbs or disappears. Approaches vary widely: some emphasise the regularity and repetition involved in cyclical activity, others identify random occurrence or irregular shape. In relation to the 1960s and 1970s, a range of cyclical theories have been developed, varying from the cultural (Brand), to the essentially behavioural (Hirschman), to the political (Tarrow).

Brand proposes a 'cultural' or 'modernisation' critique, occurring at regular intervals, the latest of which is the period in question. This model elaborates a 'sequence of basic social moods' within which NSMs have emerged in recent decades:

'From the conservative 1950s with their emphases on private and material values, to the technocratic reform enthusiasm, the optimistic cultural-revolutionary thrust and moral radicalism of the 1960s, changing to the sobering 1970s which saw a growing

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crisis consciousness, finally giving way to the neo-conservative “post-modern” zeitgeist of the 1980s.\textsuperscript{50}

Within this sequence, it was the specific mood of the 1960s and 1970s which stimulated the new movements of that period. A decade later, mobilisation had declined, along with the utopian visions that had frequently characterised it.\textsuperscript{51}

These changing climates since the 1950s are persuasively evoked by Brand, but in a more descriptive than explanatory framework, begging the question as to why they evolve in such a way, and how variation between countries may be accounted for. When he speaks of a ‘dramatic shift of personal attention to the public sphere,’ resulting from criticism of the ‘shadowy side of the “affluent society,”’ the specific factors that stimulated this shift remain obscured. While we are given more information about the 1970s, particularly the impact of the oil shock and the threat to previously unhampered post-war growth, 1968, one of the pivotal years of the period, is not mentioned. Ultimately, this remains a general account that requires greater substantiation if it is to acquire an analytical utility.

In contrast to the cultural model, Hirschman provides a participation theory based on behavioural patterns. Initially writing in Paris, inspired by the tenth anniversary of May 1968 with newspapers and articles noting how remote an event it seemed, he develops the question as to whether societies oscillated between periods of preoccupation with public issues and periods of concentration on individual improvement and private welfare goals.\textsuperscript{53} The hypothesis seeks to emphasise the importance of consumer disappointment in triggering preference changes, both in relation to material goods and expanding collective services, such as education or healthcare. Where such services exist in larger quantities than before, in response to social pressure, but where quality slips, individual expectations are thwarted and there is a turn to public action in order to secure greater gains. While the French context is not explicitly explored, Hirschman provides a plausible context for the suggestion that

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., pp. 29-30.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., p. 23.
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., p. 30.
the student revolt was largely the consequence of such a situation. Later, the frustrations of participation, particularly excessive demands and over-commitment, eventually lead to a return to private preoccupations.54

This analysis of public action marks a distinct departure from rational-choice oriented economist theories, and Mancur Olson in particular,55 in that Hirschman rejects the idea that group mobilisation in search of public goods relates simply to a cost-benefit calculation of material or status gains. The effort of 'striving' towards a public action goal, of expending energy and time, is seen as part of the benefit. The 'free-rider' problem and the question of selective incentives do not arise for '[p]ublic oriented action belongs [...] to a group of human activities that includes the search for community, beauty, knowledge and salvation. All these activities carry their own reward.'56 Indeed, the justification of this aspect of the argument is partly based on an observation from Pascal concerning the nature of the search for God,57 linking usefully to aspirations expressed by Left Catholic (and also a smaller number of Protestant) activists in France who figure prominently in movements analysed in this study.

While the public-private explanation offered by Shifting Involvements is stimulating, it is ultimately stymied by the fact that it remains a somewhat speculative essay, lacking both in empirical evidence and in any consideration of the role played by politics, culture and ideology in the stimulation of public action. By emphasising consumption patterns so resolutely, Hirschman risks being overly mechanistic in his understanding of mobilisation patterns. Furthermore, in the French case, there is a problem of chronology. An upturn in public action in France can be identified in the late 1950s, much influenced by political problems such as the rise and fall of Mendesism and the Algerian War. Given that the preface to Shifting Involvements indicates that the period in question is 1968-1978, the earlier public action is problematic both in its political connections, and its timing.

54 Ibid., Chapter Six: 'The Frustrations of Participation in Public Life - I', pp. 92-102.
56 Ibid., p. 85.
57 Ibid., p. 85.
Unlike Hirschman’s insistence on motivation stemming from collective consumption patterns and expectations, the best-known and most empirical cyclical schema, that proposed by Tarrow, explores political structures rather than individual motivating factors for public action. Tarrow initially used the term ‘protest cycle’ to connect the so-called ‘new politics’ agenda to existing political paradigms as well as to previous eras. 58 While NSM theorists had concentrated on trying to show how the social movements of the post-1968 era could be distinguished in both theme and organisation from conventional politics, he offers a hypothesis which moved in the opposite direction:

‘What happened in Western Europe and the US in the 1960s and 1970s was [...] but the latest in a sequence of cycles of protest that grew periodically out of the basic conflicts of capitalist society. Though the content of the cycle was new - as were to some extent, its actors and forms of action - it followed a parabola similar to that of past waves of mobilisation.’ 59

The immediate problem of this early Tarrow approach is that its theoretical assumptions were built largely on empirical data from Italy. While a wider applicability is claimed, the parabola of the ‘protest cycle’ can only with extreme difficulty be applied to France. According to Tarrow, cycles begin within institutions through organised forms of collective action. They move from there to an intensive peak of mobilisation, with the cycle declining through a mixture of violence and institutionalisation. The unexpected explosion of May 1968, which quickly calmed to leave a longer-term legacy, clearly does not fit. Indeed, Tarrow himself dismissed May 1968 as relatively insignificant in relation to what happened in Italy. 60 Furthermore, the emphasis on ‘protest,’ defined in terms of ‘disruptive collective action,’ 61 does not fully capture the extent of the challenge to the establishment that manifested itself in France during the 1970s; neither can it help us understand what was happening prior to 1968.

60 'While the French Events were spectacular their duration was brief and their social effects were quickly reversed' (Tarrow, Democracy and Disorder, p. 6.)
61 Ibid., p. 4.
More recently, without explicitly explaining why, Tarrow has changed terminology and begun to speak of contention cycles. Although his definition of contention still emphasises disruption as a key element of collective action, semantically the term itself captures a wider range of activity. ‘Protest’ is a word which suggests that argumentation and discussion have been exhausted; it has a strongly negative connotation in the sense of being against, rather than for something. In contrast, ‘contention’ implies more readily the presence of a counter-discourse or ideology which challenges prevailing or established notions. This is certainly a more appropriate form of description for capturing the French experience of the late 1960s and 1970s, and is employed in the conceptual framework developed below.

I conceptualise the evolution of post-war French participation politics through two public-action cycles, with the term cycle being understood to mean a period through which a phenomenon runs to completion, rather than a historically recurrent round of events. The first was a ‘reform cycle’ (1958-1968) which preceded, and was interrupted by, a more critical ‘contention cycle’ that developed post May 1968 (ending by about 1981). Both cycles were triggered by major crises in France, although the nature of these crises was very different. While the collapse of the Fourth Republic and the Algerian Crisis created what were largely political difficulties, May 1968 represented at once a political, cultural and social tremor whose broader implications for France went further than the turmoil a decade earlier. The cycles are explained fully in Chapter One

The labels ‘reform’ and ‘contention’ should be understood as the level of opposition to existing social, political and economic structures expressed by the critiques of the respective periods. ‘Reform’ is intended essentially to signify the desire for major improvement without a wholesale attack on prevailing value systems. In contrast, ‘contention’ reflects a stronger, more radical challenge, which

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64 One should note, however, that this is not the sense given to reform cycles by Tarrow, who refers to government reform, rather than public-action. See S. Tarrow, *Struggle, Politics and Reform: Collective Action, Social Movements and Cycles of Protest* (Cornell University: Centre for International Studies, 1989), pp. 91-103.
went much further in seeking a re-balancing of the relationship between citizen and state. Ideas which had sometimes already been expressed in the 'reform' cycle acquired a greater resonance, or were given a new, more forceful terminology. The contention cycle included disruptive protest, but it was simultaneously also an intellectual and cultural discontent, which engaged moderates as much as revolutionaries.

Ideologically, both cycles embody a certain 'climate of opinion.' Such an idea is admittedly fluid, difficult to quantify precisely, but it can help us to understand the evolution of political themes and changing patterns of activism. Carl Becker used the term to suggest that the persuasiveness of arguments depended less upon their intrinsic logic than the context in which they were enunciated.65 There are moments and contexts in which certain ideas or clusters of them become generalised, fashionable, acquire an audience, stimulate mobilisation. Temporally, climates of opinion have no fixed duration and need not refer to coherent ideological systems or philosophical norms.66 This is close to Lucien Nizard's conception of a nebuleuse, a situation in which ideas that are not always directly compatible (and may even be contradictory) seem to reflect a more general mood, and in turn provoke further discussion.67

The precondition for the development of the reform cycle was the political crisis of the late 1950s, created by several interlinking factors: most importantly, the failure of Mendesism, the toll that the Algerian crisis was taking on the country (particularly on the credibility of the non-Communist Left) and ultimately the collapse of the Fourth Republic.68 Within this increasingly unstable context, the perceived need amongst many reform-minded activists was to develop blueprints for political renewal outside

66 Climate of opinion is a term more usually found in historical than in political science literature where the idea of political culture has been more prominent in evoking cultural or intellectual context. I suggest that climate of opinion is a more supple notion than political culture in explaining political change. For more on the political culture and political change debate, see H. Eckstein, 'A Culturalist Theory of Political Change', American Political Science Review, 82/3 (1988), 789-804.
68 By non-Communist Left, I refer to the Mendesist Radicals, the SFIO, the PSU, the Mitterrand faction of the UDSR and other small Socialist parties.
the parties, particularly the _Parti communiste français_ (PCF) and SFIO, regarded by them as ossified and resistant to reform. This frustration with the established parties translated into a burgeoning movement of associations, clubs, magazines and periodicals. Of most significance in the context of participation were the study and discussion clubs (*sociétés de pensée*) which helped constitute -- in the words of Robert Gildea -- 'a new public sphere.'

A crucial structural base was provided by the establishment of the discussion clubs, and the publications associated with them; indeed, the clubs symbolise the uniqueness of the French context with no truly comparable phenomena elsewhere at this time. Through the activities of organisations such as _Club Jean Moulin_, _Citoyens 60_, _Cercle Tocqueville_, _ADELS_ (Association pour la démocratie et l'éducation locale et sociale) and _Association des jeunes cadres_, it is possible to trace the emergence of a fresh agenda with local as well as national applications. Although some of these groups, notably ADELS, remained outside party politics, most lost their original identity and goals through entering the fledgling new Socialist institutions from the _Fédération de la gauche démocrate et socialiste_ (FGDS) -- 1965 -- onwards.

The reform cycle was certainly not a revolt of the young, but a more considered engagement by those with varying political experiences and expectations who had found that the political parties could offer them very little. However, it is not very easy to identify any single 'generation' as such. Empirical material from this study and secondary data suggests that the average age of participants was between 30 and 40 (born 1920-1930) and a considerable difference of experience opens up around the Second World War. For, clearly, 1930 as year of birth excludes any but marginal participation in the Resistance, which had played an important role in changing the perceptions and expectations of those who were a part of it (but still might have influenced younger individuals who, for example, were members of families connected to the Resistance or who ran errands for its fighters).

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The use of 'generation' as an analytical tool is thus extremely problematic. To pursue further the example of the Resistance generation, firstly does it mean those who come of age between 1939-45 and fought in the Resistance, or everybody who fought? Secondly, can it simply mean those who came of age between 1939 and 1945 regardless of their role in the Resistance? Mannheim offered the tools to deal with the second question in his differentiation between generation as location (simply being born at the same moment), generation as actuality (being exposed to and integrating the prevailing social, political, economic or cultural issues of that moment) and generation unit (group engagement in a particular direction within an actual generation). Yet even here, the term is still defined in terms of youth, which makes it difficult to measure the effect of the Resistance on those who were perhaps already thirty or forty at the outbreak of war.

Despite these problems, I suggest that it is nonetheless useful to define approximate political generations using dominant events approximately around the age of majority. Given that most of those in the sociétés de pensée were aged between about 30 and 40, we can speak of the involvement of a resistance generation (born c1918-c1924) and a post-war reconstruction / Cold War generation (born c1924-c1934). There was also some input via UNEF from a generation of the Algerian War (born c1934-c1942). As I will show, the student / lycéen revolt in 1968 involved a new ‘baby boom’ generation (c1948-c1953) -- corresponding closely to Inglehart’s postmaterialists -- led by those politicised during the Algerian War. Invariably, there are drawbacks and flaws in this kind of periodisation, which can never be exact. But if we fail entirely to address what Mannheim termed ‘the historical dimension of the

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70 For a good historiography of the issue, including the work of Mannheim and Febvre in the 1920s, see A. Spitzer, 'The Historical Problem of Generations', American Historical Review, 78/4 (1973), 1353-85. There is also a general outline which includes the French literature in V. Drouin, Enquêtes sur les générations et la politique, 1968-1985 (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1995), pp. 17-64.


72 However, the actual age can vary depending on the event. In the case of the Resistance, those under 21 were the exception rather than the rule, with many recruits fleeing from the STO ('Service de travail obligatoire') which took men of military age. The same is true of participation in the Algerian War, although here the student protesters would not have necessarily reached military age. In the case of May 1968, there was a heavy involvement of a younger cohort of lycéens and young students.

73 The year ranges for the reconstruction / Cold War and Algerian War generations are based on an article by M. Winock, 'Les générations intellectuelles', Vingtième Siècle, 22 (1989), 17-38. Winock is, however, more vague about the Resistance and 1968 generations.
social process,\textsuperscript{74} that is to say specific experiences and influences depending on temporal context, it becomes much harder to identify some of the frustrations and conflicts that arose during the first decades of the Fifth Republic.

May 1968 interrupted the reform cycle and instigated a contention cycle which introduced new themes and action forms as well as serving to radicalise many existing or embryonic initiatives. Its causes were complex. While one can identify an element of the student consumer dissatisfaction and aspiration to attain that which Hirschman had described, the outburst was also due to the coincidence of a number of administrative, cultural, political and generational issues. There was certainly no single explanation or one clear strand of action. At the level of social movements, for example, an eclectic mix of ideological elements were engaged in a broad range of activities by the mid 1970s, from urban quality of life to environmental campaigns. There were the \textit{gauchistes}, the feminists, the anti-nuclear protesters, the Third World activists. The vocabulary of the period, which spoke of ‘luttes’ (battles), expresses the nature of an anti-authority, anti-establishment mood. Indeed, certain key confrontations, such as Lip, Larzac or Creys-Malville, were to acquire a significance beyond the immediate issue area, drawing a multifarious collection of activists from many different contexts.

At the same time, however, a significant number of initiatives were developing which had been partly inspired by the themes of May 1968, without necessarily sharing the more revolutionary aspirations and tactics. The exponential growth of neighbourhood associations designed to provide an intermediary level of representation between citizen and local administration, is one key example. While some were indeed used as bases for the New or Extreme Left, many were a more moderate expression of the widely articulated desire for new forms of participation in local government, particularly through associations. Such was the importance of the theme in the mid 1970s that the municipal elections of 1977 saw it being raised to a high position in manifesto commitments, particularly on the Left, even if few of the

Socialists bold manifesto commitments of this period regarding local democracy were finally enacted in the decentralisation legislation of 1982-3.

The cycle had faded by the early 1980s, with a declining mobilisation and, in the case of participative themes, a heavy recuperation by political parties. The election of François Mitterrand in 1981 also had a substantial impact; the first Left government of the Fifth Republic was, after all, expected to install the new Jerusalem. New social movements and neighbourhood committees did not disappear, but the scale of action diminished and the citizen participation theme as a central ideological rallying point no longer enjoyed the prominence that it had achieved a decade earlier. Importantly, the notion was also changing in meaning. While participation in municipal government during the contention cycle had above all come to signify the belief in local associative democracy, rising unemployment and social marginalisation led to a shift in emphasis. Participation as 'inclusion,' social as much as political citizenship, providing a voice for the excluded, now became an increasingly visible question.

**Grenoble: the laboratory of citizen participation**

Having explored the national cycles in detail in Chapter One, subsequent chapters return to the question of local mobilisation to examine further the question of how and why pressure for citizen participation emerges in individual cities. Chapter Two focuses on the background to the emergence of the Grenoble GAM in late 1964. Looking firstly at patterns of local development, it then considers various aspects of the city's social, political and associative life since the 1930s, before exploring the mechanisms by which the participationist currents of the reform cycle were given specific shape in a municipal action group which contested the elections of 1965. The importance of a number of different variables are considered: socio-professional evolution tied to patterns of industrial advance, associative activity, the role of specific individuals and the importance of contingency.

The circumstances by which the newly-created GAM was able to compete in municipal elections and become a central player in the new GAM-PSU-SFIO council
of 1965 under GAM mayor, Hubert Dubedout, are analysed at the beginning of Chapter Three. Using the concept of political opportunity structure (POS), I show how an innovative non-Communist Left alliance structure developed. A second section then examines how successive Dubedout administrations attempted to make citizen action politics a reality in Grenoble. Following such initiatives, both pre- and post-1968, we see how policies pursued by the municipal council served to dampen contention cycle activity in the city during the 1970s, with the reformers in power dynamised by the momentum of May 1968.

**Toulouse: less exceptional**

Although it is not possible to find a precise mechanical explanation as to why a phenomenon occurred in one locality and not another, the research nonetheless sought to draw out the differences between Grenoble and Toulouse in terms of the factors that facilitated the emergence of the GAM in the former, while there was little more than a ripple in the latter until the late 1960s. Isolating different patterns of development and different associative traditions as key variables, Chapter Four (paralleling Chapter Two on Grenoble) maps out reform cycle activity in the city until 1968.

The final chapter of the thesis deals with Toulouse during the contention cycle, the moment at which there was a real effervescence over quality of life issues and the political management of the city. Analysing a range of associations and movements, from an unsuccessful GAM to the first environmental movements, I demonstrate how the absence of any real reform cycle legacy, either at the level of the local council or the associative world, contributed to a polarisation between council and a small group of politically-engaged associations as participation became linked to a number of other quality of life-centred grievances. In this respect, Toulouse was far more typical than Grenoble in its patterns of contention cycle activity.
Chapter One: Citizen participation and public action cycles

Reform cycle

During the late 1950s and early 1960s, there was a febrile atmosphere in France. By 1958, the colonial crisis had brought the country close to civil war and the political fallout from the North African entanglement wrecked the Fourth Republic, giving Charles de Gaulle the possibility to return to government after an absence of some twelve years.¹ For many, particularly on the non-Communist Left, bitter disappointment had been felt at the fall of the Mendès administration (June 1954 - February 1955) which had promised a new approach not just to foreign policy, but to basic questions of economic management and political practice. The failure of subsequent Radical (Faure, Bourgès-Manoury, Gaillard) and Socialist (Mollet) governments to stem the increasingly unstable situation in Algeria, and doubts about their ethical credibility in relation to widespread use of torture, resulted in significant departures from both parties.

This breakdown in the credibility of the established political elite and the crisis that France faced in the early years of the Fifth Republic stimulated a range of activity which took place beyond political parties, including the emerging PSU, and which was of central importance in shaping the reform cycle. Through a shifting series of preoccupations and organisational forms, an attempt to rethink economic, political and social life was taking place in the face of a perceived malaise within France. There was no single identifiable line which one can point to as dominant; this was a peculiar stream of ideas which, taken together, constituted a substantial corpus of dissent with sufficient community of interest to merit the term ‘climate of opinion.’

From the inside, Michel Crozier, a member of the Club Jean Moulin board from 1960 to 1970, and contributor to Esprit, offers a useful description of what was happening:

‘The change is subtle. On the surface the difference is barely perceptible, but below the surface a mutation has occurred [...] The fashion today is for reform by concrete

¹ De Gaulle had resigned as Prime Minister in January 1946, having formed the first post-Liberation government in September 1944.
commitment, for contacts through participation, for responsibility. The turning point came in the period of Pierre Mendès France. His career, which suddenly gave significance to the political game which had been made completely sterile by its remoteness from life, had a profound effect on the younger generation. 'Crozier goes on to write of the need to 'make contact between spiritual family and spiritual family' and 'the horror of a priori formulas and systems.'  

Such activity is perhaps best illustrated by a specific group of clubs, predominantly on the non-Communist Left of the spectrum, that Janine Mossuz terms sociétés de pensée. These discussion and study forums, attempting to generate a momentum for reform, appeared both at national and local level between about 1955 and 1963. The sociétés are to be distinguished from another emerging structure, clubs de combat politique, which were more obviously resources for individual politicians to position themselves in the conflicts over the future shape of the Left. One thinks here, for example, of Mitterrand's Ligue pour le combat républicain (1959), Savary's Socialisme et démocratie (1963) or Hernu's Club des Jacobins (1951), the oldest club of the period by some four years. The key difference between the two kinds of club, at least until 1963-4, was that the latter's commitment to political action stood in contrast to the desire of the sociétés de pensée to go 'back to basics,' rethinking France from a vantage point beyond the tainted party fray.


3 J. Mossuz, Les clubs et la politique en France (Paris: Armand Colin, 1970). Although she does not acknowledge the reference, Mossuz seems to have borrowed the term from Augustin Cochin who worked extensively on the revolutionary clubs of the late eighteenth century. Cochin's definition is interesting to the extent that it corresponds quite closely to what was happening in the 1960s: 'One sets oneself up with public spirited board: it's a question of enlightening and guiding opinion, getting people interested in the public good and eventually in reforming the state.' A. Cochin, Les sociétés de pensée et la révolution en Bretagne (1788-1789) (Paris: H. Champion, 1925), p. 7.


5 For a useful discussion which illustrates the diverse nature of the club scene, see the debate organised by Claude Vajou, 'Pourquoi des clubs? ', Revue Politique et Parlementaire 746 (1964), 3-23. There are contributions from representatives of Citoyens 60, Club des Jacobins, Club Jean-Moulin and France-Forum.
Historically, clubs had appeared at moments of major crisis, most obviously in 1789 and 1848. While Peter Amman concludes that they were ‘a characteristic revolutionary phenomenon of a society in transition to modernity [...] obsolete in a world of assembly lines, recognised labour unions, and mass parties,’ their re-emergence in the late 1950s suggests that such an observation under-estimates their enduring place in French political life, where mass parties were the exception rather than the rule and where trade unions were weak and divided. A distinction needs also to be made between the kind of wholesale challenge to the existing status quo represented by the substantial club mobilisation of the early years of the Fifth Republic and the later sporadic use of political clubs by various party factions or leaders during the 1970s and 1980s in order to bolster their strength.

Within the sociétés de pensée, one should not however assume any homogeneity. Firstly, a distinction has to be made between those who eventually explicitly engaged politically, and those who remained ‘pure’ (most notably, Association pour la démocratie et l’éducation locale et sociale -- ADELS, Centre d’action politique de Toulouse -- CREPT, Positions, and Rencontres); this is shown in Appendix 2. Secondly, a further distinction, which cross-cuts the first, exists at the level of goals. Some groups (ADELS, Club Jean Moulin, Citoyens 60, Démocratie nouvelle and Association des jeunes cadres) elaborated a more pro-active mission, emphasising their role in encouraging a better informed and engaged citizenry, ‘new democrats.’ Others had a quite different conception; Technique et démocratie, for example, was concerned to reconcile political life with the technical demands of modern public policy.

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8 Although heavily involved with the clubs, ADELS gradually became closer in conception to a cultural and education association such as Peuple et Culture. It was originally established in 1959 under the title Association démocratique des élus locaux et sociaux by the UFD (Union des forces démocratiques), an umbrella predecessor to the PSU formed by Mendesists to contest the 1958 legislative elections. ADELS was subsequently renamed the Association pour la démocratie et l’éducation locale et sociale in 1964. The goal was to be a centre for popular education and social / civic training and ADELS was recognised (agrée) in the same year by the Ministère de la Jeunesse et des sports. For a brief history of ADELS, see Daniel Garcia, ‘Un laboratoire de la démocratie locale’, Le Monde, 10 April 1983.
9 Based on the term ‘nouveaux démocrates’ which consistently appears in club documentation at this time.
Despite these differences, all shared a profound suspicion of established politics in France. A publication by the Club Jean Moulin in 1965, *Un parti pour la gauche*, expressed what was a unifying perspective amongst the sociétés de pensée: 'A young Frenchman interested by public life and wishing to hold a post of political responsibility, be it permanent or part-time, is currently, if he is demanding, put off by the parties.'\(^{10}\) It was not that party activists were despised or seen as unprincipled *per se* (although certain leaders, such as Mollet, were certainly viewed with profound suspicion not to say disdain). Rather, the problem was the nature of party apparatuses and the way in which electoral and organisational logic could override internal debate creating barriers and inertia. The result was a 'linkage failure.'\(^{11}\)

This anti-party stance was well reflected in the contrast between the Assises de Vichy and the Convention du Palais d'Orsay, both held in 1964. The origins of the Assises lay with the Club Jean Moulin, Cercle Tocqueville and Citoyens 60 who, in 1962, had distributed a 'Questionnaire on citizen participation in the democratic functioning of economic, social and political life' in order to establish a precise idea of the number and nature of discussion and study clubs existing in France. The Club Jean Moulin planned to create a coordinating structure entitled the *Front d'organisations civiques* (FOC).\(^{12}\) However, the FOC never materialised and the Assises de Vichy of April 1964 represented the first attempt at co-ordination. At the invitation of eleven sociétés de pensée, over a thousand clubmen attended, working on a number of core themes (information, education, Europe, co-operation, democracy in the workplace, regional structures) and planning a project on new forms of political participation.

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\(^{11}\) For a useful discussion of this concept which describes the flawed relationship between political representatives and those they represent, see K. Lawson, 'When Linkage Fails', in K. Lawson and P. H. Merkl (eds.), *When Parties Fail: Emerging Alternative Organizations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). The volume also contains a chapter by F. Wilson, 'When Parties Refuse to Fail: The Case of France' which deals briefly with the reform cycle period and the reconstruction of the non-Communist Left.

The *Assises* was very much a meeting for those who were not ‘names,’ and who were suspicious of many of the men of the Fourth Republic. Indeed, Mossuz notes that the *Club des Jacobins* (led by Charles Hernu), which had wanted to participate in the *Assises*, was refused for this very reason of notoriety. However, the conference suffered from being more the product of a general mood than of a clear organisational pattern. As Georges Lavau, himself engaged in the *Club Jean Moulin*, warned in a speech at the end of the gathering:

‘*Forces vives*, clubs, groups, there is, however, a certain difficulty which shows that we are witnessing a highly variable phenomenon. There are true clubs, there are professional associations, there are trade unions, or trade-unionists, or fractions of unions [...] Who holds positions of responsibility in these clubs, for what are they responsible, in whose name do they speak, and to whom are they responsible?’

In contrast, the *Convention du Palais-d'Orsay*, held in June by the *clubs de combat politique*, was an attempt to create a federating structure for a series of well-organised political clubs in anticipation of the 1965 presidential election. It brought together many known figures, including Mitterrand, and resulted in the creation of the *Convention des institutions républicaines* (CIR), which became a central player in the *Fédération de la gauche démocrate et socialiste* (FGDS) and the subsequent reconstruction of the French Socialist Party. While the delegates at the *Assises de Vichy* saw being a political personality as a problem, this was not the case at the *Convention du Palais-d’Orsay*. The clubs represented were not afraid of the political fray, and impatient with those whom they saw as shying away from action. A *Club des Jacobins* leaflet announced the timetable, themes and outcome: ‘9.30am, The Republic; 11am, Combat; 3pm, Unity.’

**A new citizenship?**

If the *sociétés de pensée* had not projected a clear agenda at the Vichy gathering, what I term the ‘new democrat’ core (*ADELS, Club Jean Moulin, Citoyens 60, Démocratie*

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nouvelle and Association des jeunes cadres) were nonetheless pursuing a broadly similar path in emphasising the promotion of active citizenship through information, education and participation. While most also tackled wider issues, such as the Algerian War, the economy or Europe, there was a central emphasis on the state of democracy in France. The starting point tended to be the perception that French society was in danger of becoming passive and depoliticised,\textsuperscript{16} that a healthy democracy was not just a question of reforming the party system, but of modifying the way in which individuals related to, and were included within, decision-making procedures in the public sphere.

Within this ‘democrat core,’ emphases varied considerably. The Club Jean Moulin, which was a central intellectual influence in the reform cycles and most visible in its published output, projected a distinctively national political and economic overview.\textsuperscript{17} Its work dealt with major internal as well as some foreign policy issues. On internal questions, the inter-related themes of political participation, education, decentralisation, and the opening of oligarchies such as political parties and trade unions, were to be consistently prominent.\textsuperscript{18} There was also a considerable interest taken in democratic planning, which paralleled and was influenced both by Conféderation française des travailleurs chrétiens (CFTC) work and by the kind of thinking expressed by Mendès France in \textit{La République Moderne} (1962).\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{16} For a specific debate on the question of depoliticisation, see the work edited by G. Vedel, \textit{La dépolitisation: mythe ou réalité} (Paris: Armand Colin, 1962). Vedel was a prominent academic and member of the Club Jean Moulin. The depoliticisation issue linked to discussion of the notion of civisme, civic education, which became an increasing fashion during this period; see M. Merle, ‘Réflexions sur le problème du civisme’, \textit{Revue Française de Science Politique}, 8/4 (1958), 782-802 and J. Jousselin, ‘La formation civique est-elle encore possible’, \textit{Économie et Humanisme}, 126 (1960), 3-16. Civisme was, however, attacked by some on the Left as a tranquillisier, an alibi for politics. An example can be found in article by R. Pascal, ‘Le civisme alibi du politique’, \textit{Économie et Humanisme}, 130 (1961), 26-35.

\textsuperscript{17} The club published extensively under its own name at Editions du Seuil. See Club Jean Moulin, \textit{L'État et le citoyen} (1961); \textit{Deux pièces du dossier Algérie: pour une politique du rapatriement: la solidarité économique franco-algérienne} (1962); \textit{La force de frappe et le citoyen} (1963); \textit{Un parti pour la gauche} (1965); \textit{Pour une politique étrangère de l'Europe} (1966); \textit{Que faire de la révolution de mai} (1968); \textit{Les citoyens au pouvoir, 12 régions, 2000 communes} (1968); \textit{Quelle réforme, quelles régions?} (1969). From 1964, some of these works appeared in the \textit{Collection Jean Moulin}, alongside other texts. See C. Alphandery, \textit{Pour une politique du logement} (1965); P. Avril, \textit{Un président pour quoi faire} (1965); C. Bruclain, \textit{Le socialisme et l'Europe} (1965); Groupe de recherches ouvrier - paysan (GROP), \textit{Pour une démocratie économique} (1964); A. Grosser, \textit{La politique extérieure de la Vé République} (1965).


\textsuperscript{19} See \textit{L'État et le Citoyen}. The Club Jean Moulin also held a study session on the question of planning and democracy in 1961. The proceedings were presented in an article by C. Alphandéry, ‘Peut-on fixer des objectifs sociaux au progrès économique’, \textit{Esprit}, 303 (February 1962), pp. 161-72.
In the latter context, one should note that the French planning administration was already going some way towards the inclusion of the *forces vives*\(^{20}\) by creating structures for participation, some of which had already existed during the Fourth Republic.\(^{21}\) However, the growing emphasis upon this mode of action early in the Fifth Republic can also be seen as an attempt by the Gaullists to create a depoliticised or at least de-partisanised backdrop for French modernisation. Legitimised centrally-controlled planning was one element of this, particularly if opposition local elites could be by-passed in the process. One fundamental problem in relation to the perceptions of activists in the 'new public sphere' was that this version of participation bordered on corporatism. Furthermore, it took place in a system where the reins of power were seen to be too tightly controlled in Paris, and political activity reserved for the select few.\(^{22}\)

For the Jean Moulin group, the citizen was above all to learn how to participate effectively and democratically in decentralised political structures:

>'If you are scared that we French will drive the national locomotive badly, let us try the departmental choo-choo (‘le teuf-teuf départemental’) or the municipal bicycle. Why doesn’t the Minister of Finance take his hand off the brake, holding us from behind to stop us falling. Perhaps we will be able to keep our balance.'\(^{23}\)

But Michel Crozier, who wrote the sections on citizenship in *L'Etat et le Citoyen*,\(^{24}\) did not exclusively blame excessive and constraining authority structures.\(^{25}\) He also

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20 *Forces vives* is a label that appeared in the late 1950s to describe the most dynamic reformist elements in civil society - to be found most obviously within the clubs, some trade unions (particularly CFTC), farmers associations (particularly CNJA), cultural and education groups. However, the label was never very well-defined, even in *Revue Française de Science Politique* which regularly monitored developments amongst the *forces vives* in the early 1960s. For a useful discussion of the problem, see H. Graham, 'The Religious Origins and Modern Resurgence of French Anarchism with Particular Reference to Three Political Clubs', pp. 446-466.

21 For example, the *Comités départementaux d'expansion économique* (CDEE) were instituted by decree in December 1954, during the Mendès premiership. They were designed for the economic promotion of individual départements and included various *forces vives*, from trade-unionists to family associations, in their general assemblies. The committees were linked to wider regional structures, whose role would grow once CODER was established in 1964.


23 Club Jean Moulin, *L'Etat et le citoyen*, p. 343. These ideas preceded and, given Rocard's presence in the club, certainly inspired his highly successful catch-phrase of 1965, *Decoloniser la Province*.

24 Although the work contains no individual names, Crozier published a similar version of his chapter in *Esprit* under his own name. See M. Crozier, 'Le citoyen', *Esprit*, 2 (February 1981), 193-211.

25 For Crozier's full and celebrated analyses of French society during this period, see M. Crozier, *Le phénomène bureaucratique: essai sur les tendances bureaucratiques des systèmes modernes et sur*
criticised the individual French citizen as being incapable of demonstrating a sense of responsibility which could lead to an effective challenge to the power of the state; the citizen 'prefers to deal with an authority which imposes solutions and allows an abdication of responsibility, he prefers to stay free and also limit any social constraint which may be placed on him.'

The general approach taken by the Club Jean Moulin partly reflected its composition, with a heavy presence of senior civil servants, many of whom had been close to Mendès France. In the eyes of de Gaulle, these were the 'young clerks who criticise during the evening in the back-rooms of opposition ('les sentines de l'opposition') the ministerial decisions to which they have applied their intelligence during the day.' Additionally, a number of intellectuals, some highly prominent, most also Mendesist, quickly joined the group; alongside Crozier were Maurice Duverger, Georges Lavau, Georges Vedel, and Roland Cayrol. There were also a number of political and trade union figures including Michel Rocard (ex-SFIO), Pierre Avril (ex Radical Socialist), Lucien Douroux (Centre national des jeunes agriculteurs - CNJA) and Marcel Gonin (CFTC). This was, in fact, anything but a grass-roots movement, representing a cross-section of the progressive administrative and intellectual elite, some of whom had strong ties from the Resistance. Crozier later

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de la participation dans une commune', Projet, 44 (1970), 394-98) as well as in the academic literature. In this respect, one of the best-known analyses is that of S. Hoffmann, 'Paradoxes of the French Political Community', in S. Hoffmann et al., France: Change and Tradition (London: Victor Gollancz, 1963), pp. 8-9.

27 Georges Boris, Jean Saint-Geours, Stéphane Hessel, Etienne Hirsch and Simon Nora had all been in the Mendès cabinet (1954-5). Other prominent civil servants and Mendesist sympathisers included François Bloch-Lainé (director-general of the Caisse de dépôts et consignations) and Claude Alphandery (Ministry of Finance). However, the acceptance of Fifth Republic institutions by the Club drove a wedge between Pierre Mendès France, a resolute opponent of the 1958 settlement, and many of his allies and sympathisers. On the Mendesist networks, there is an excellent short piece by P. Rotman, 'Le diaspora mendésiste', Pouvoirs, 27 (1982), 5-20. For an inside view of the Club Jean Moulin, see G. Suffert, De Defferre à Mitterrand: la campagne présidentielle (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1966).


29 For a useful discussion of the role of the intellectual in French society, see S. Hazareesingh, Political Traditions in Modern France (Oxford: OUP, 1994), pp. 33-64. In comparison to contemporaries such as Jean-Paul Sartre, the Jean Moulin academics were less the idealistic intellectuels engagés than pragmatic reformers.

30 In Rocard's case though, the decision of the Club Jean Moulin in 1966 to join the FGDS led to his departure. For a discussion of this, see J.-L. Andréani, Le mystère Rocard (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1993), pp. 94-5.

noted that the club provided a certain opportunity for academics to gain the ear of civil servants.  

In contrast, *Citoyens 60*, created by Jacques Delors, more explicitly extended the notion of citizenship into the realm of associative engagement -- cultural organisations, family groups and youth centres. This reflected to a large extent a strong social Catholic influence which was also evident in the *Club Jean Moulin* and many *sociétés de pensée*. A political off-shoot of the association *Vie nouvelle*, *Citoyens 60* (as well as Delors himself) drew heavily upon the personalism of Emmanuel Mounier. Emphasising internal spiritual transformation as well as participation in the wider community, personalism was both a means of individual development and a commitment to a socialist order. In practice, for *Citoyens 60* this meant that 'political action in its proper sense was inseparable from the daily activities of men and women in their different environments, the neighbourhood, the town, the workplace. It was a matter of bridging the classic gap between, on the one hand, politics as state science, reserved for a minority elite, and, on the other, societal transformation, led at the base by trade union, social and cultural activists...'

The reform cycle and municipal politics

If many of the general ideas enunciated by the *sociétés de pensée* were applicable to the local level, some groups went further than others in their attention to it. ADELS, whose raison d'être was engagement with local social and political issues, led the way with a wide range of educational activities and publications, most notably *Correspondance municipale* (which later became *Territoires*). At the same time,

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32 M. Crozier, 'Comment je me suis découvert sociologue. Réflexions sur un apprentissage qui ne sera jamais terminé', *Revue Française de Science Politique*, 46/1 (1996), p. 87. In fact, Crozier's research centre, the COS (*Centre de sociologie des organisations*), was housed for a time in the same building as the *Club Jean Moulin* (rue Geoffroy-Sainte-Hilaire).

33 Delors, at that time working at the Bank of France (until 1962), had briefly been a member of the PSU, but had been too frustrated by the factional struggles. He would run *Citoyens 60* until 1965, when Pierre Lavau took over.

34 The case of the Club Jean Moulin was complex though. While the majority of its membership was certainly not Left Catholic, this tendency was prevalent amongst the minority who ran the club. Particularly important in this respect was the club's secretary general from 1958, Georges Suffert, editor of *Témoignage Chrétien* (1953-58) and close to *Esprit*. There were also other figures from *Esprit* such as Olivier Chevrier and Jean Ripert. See H. Graham, 'The Religious Origins and Modern Resurgence of French Anarchism with Particular Reference to Three Political Clubs', p. 311.


Democratic nouvelle in Marseilles and the Cercle Tocqueville in Lyon, for example, were developing their own publications and working groups on urban matters. The CREPT in Toulouse, however, more preoccupied by the fate of the Midi-Pyrenées region than municipal problems, did not undertake any such projects.

The theme of municipal democracy has to be seen both in the context of the wider political climate in France and in terms of the rapid expansion of urban areas since the Second World War. The growth of cities and towns was posing ever more complicated infrastructural and resource problems, and in consequence questions emerged about the desires and frustrations of citizens. Thus, in Communes et démocratie, a publication spearheaded by ADELS in advance of the 1965 municipal elections, one sees the demand that the necessity for technical decision-making be offset by a greater degree of local participation. Noting that episodic elections 'hardly compensate for the desire of electors to give - and to discuss with others - their opinions on measures that it might be useful to undertake in their commune,' the text proposed a range of initiatives, including better information, extra-municipal committees, the decentralisation of services and the occasional use of the referendum.

The only common statement on municipal problems from the sociétés de pensée came during the municipal election campaign of March 1965. It was issued by a number of groups who had been present at the Assises de Vichy in 1964, where documentation on communal management had been given to delegates. The statement was something of a follow-up in preparation for the municipals. Interestingly, technical questions occupy a large part of the text (the necessity for clear planning,

37 The main branch of Cercle Tocqueville in Lyon had refocused after the end of the Algerian War, concentrating in large part on urban matters. In a bi-monthly newspaper, En Bref Municipal, specific issues such as transport, housing or sanitation were addressed. At the same time, the group was looking more widely at the question of local democracy through a 'Centre d'information et de formation et politique.' However, at the level of municipal power, the Cercle seems not to have had a significant impact beyond a plagiarism scandal with local UNR boss, Herzog, in 1965. See Le Monde, 5 February 1965.
39 Ibid., vol.2, p. 34. ADELS' early endorsement of the referendum would later create differences with the GAM movement which was suspicious of this form of direct democracy, seeing it as a way of presidentialising local politics through mayoral plebiscite. See M. Paoletti, La démocratie locale et le référendum (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1997), pp. 69-70.
40 ADELS, Association des jeunes cadres, Cercle Tocqueville, CIPES, Citoyens 60, Club Jean Moulin, Démocratie nouvelle, Positions.
land allocation, housing provision and infrastructural development), while on a political level, the parties are vigorously criticised for 'conflicts over influence, petty quarrels and alliances only aimed at consolidating established interests.' Emphasising the desirability of greater local democracy, the text notes that 'the reconstitution of the national democratic fabric demands that we rediscover collective dialogue. We have necessarily to start in the communes.'

On the ground, there was certainly a clear associative effervescence at a local level, although not on the scale witnessed a decade later. Rovan and Mendès France had noted this dynamism in their work of the early 1960s, with Rovan going as far as to speak of the development of a 'parallel representative system.' Indeed, across France, there was a wide range of family associations, cultural and educational groups as well as numerous tenants' associations and neighbourhood committees that had often emerged in response to the collective consumption deficiencies that accompanied the post-war housing boom. One of the best-known tenant’s groups was that of Sarcelles, established in 1964-5 with the heavy involvement of Claude Neuschwander (Club Jean Moulin). Castells' work on this housing development masterminded by the SCIC (Société centrale immobilière de la Caisse des dépôts), a branch of the Caisse des dépôts et consignations (François Bloch-Lainé), brought the case to prominence.

By entering the political arena and attempting to take power, the Groupes d’action municipale -- citizen action movements -- marked a clear break in associative

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41 For extracts and commentary on the text, see Claude Vajou, 'La Vie des Clubs,' Revue Politique et Parlementaire 754 (March 1965), 100-101 and 755 (April 1965), 86-7.
42 In 1965, 17,238 associations were declared to prefectures according to the 1901 Law. By 1976, the figure was 32,703. It has to be remembered that these figures identify only those groups who sought official recognition. Figures from R. Balme, 'La participation aux associations et le pouvoir municipal', Revue Française de Sociologie, 28/4 (1987), p. 601 and C. Bachmann and N. Le Guennec, Violences urbaines: ascension et chute des classes moyennes à travers cinquante ans de politique de la ville (Paris: Albin Michel, 1996), p. 265.
44 Sarcelles was a large housing estate ('grand ensemble') in the Paris suburbs. On participation structures in the development, see C. Neuschwander, 'Sarcelles: participation dans un grand ensemble', Projet, 32 (1969), 149-63. The Communist-controlled municipality was also well-known as being a (successful) pilot for increased citizen involvement in local decision-making, unusual both for the PCF and for the time.
behaviour and the example of the Grenoble GAM, the first in France, was of crucial importance. Through their taste for active political engagement to resolve the concrete, immediate problems of urban life, the GAMs distinguished themselves from the discussion and study groups of the reform cycle. In communes, while there had been a pattern of local sectoral (parent-teachers associations, sports and cultural groups) and territorial interests (neighbourhood groups, tenants organisations) battling to get their interests taken into account by the mairie, the ambition of the GAMs was to replace existing elites in the name of a decentralised, participative democracy. Moving beyond pressure politics or simple debate, the GAMs applied (and developed) in the local arena many of the new public sphere doctrines. However, they did not assume a significant presence nationwide until after 1968.

Dissemination and wider debate

The sociétés de pensée obtained a high external profile by effective publicity and dissemination - the Club Jean Moulin, for example, published through Editions du Seuil, a leading house with a Left-Catholic leaning, whose director, Paul Flamand, was also a member of the club. The thirteen books of the Club Jean Moulin series sold 110,000 copies, of which L'Etat et le Citoyen accounted for 20,000. In the media, sympathetic periodicals and magazines, such as Esprit, Economie et humanisme, Témoignage Chrétien, France-Observateur, L'Express or La Nef, ran numerous articles on related issues. Le Monde also provided considerable coverage of


47 Editions du Seuil had been established in 1935, but would not have a significant output until 1945, when it marked itself ideologically by publishing Henri Perrin's Journal d'un prêtre-ouvrier en Allemagne. The Rue Jacob editors would then take a particular interest in questions such as decolonisation, the evolution of the Church, the Algerian War and the relationship between citizen and state. This is reflected in the Collection Club Jean Moulin, published by Seuil between 1964 and 1969 (see footnote 17, p. 38). Works by Jean Moulin members were also published in other series, for example, M. Crozier, Le phénomène bureaucratique and F. Bloch-Lainé, Pour une réforme de l'entreprise (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1963). A further reflection of Seuil's orientation was the Collection Peuple et Culture, organised in liaison with the association. On Seuil, see R. Rieffel, 'L'édition de sciences humaines et sociales', in P. Fouche (ed.), L'édition française depuis 1945 (Paris: Editions du Cercle de la Librairie, 1998).

club events, although unsurprisingly ORTF (the state broadcasting service) tended to ignore such matters.49

Certainly the media impact greatly exceeded the statistical weight of the membership: Mossuz notes: 'the clubs have been the object of such press attention, they have been the stars of so many articles that one may have got the impression that finally the malaise of the "clubmen" was that of a large number of French citizens.'50
Yet, despite such cautionary comments, the movement did articulate a real groundswell of frustration, and the wider intellectual reference points can be seen on Joseph Rovan’s work, *Une idée neuve: la démocratie* (1960),51 or Pierre Mendès France’s, *La République moderne* (1962). In conjunction with the Club Jean Moulin’s work *L’État et le Citoyen* (1961), these two works provide arguably the most important critiques of the period.52

Equally important for discussion and dissemination were the external networks available to the société de pensée. Many connections existed with the CFTC (later Confédération française démocratique du travail - CFDT), and not just through the Groupe de recherches ouvrier-paysan (GROP) -- Jacques Delors, for example, heavily involved with the CFTC, frequented the Club Jean Moulin, briefing its members on trade union issues.53 At the same time, there were close links with factions (notably Motion B supporters) of the PSU -- besides his Club Jean Moulin commitment, Michel Rocard held the presidency of ADELS for three years (1963-66).

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51 Rovan had been on the editorial board of *Esprit* in the immediate post-war period, also becoming Secretary-General of *Peuple et Culture* in 1945, a position in which he remained until 1978.

52 For a useful review of all three works, see J. M. Albertini, 'Prospectives démocratiques', *Economie et Humanisme*, 144 (1963), 25-40. There is also a special edition of *Le Nef*, entitled 'Les formes nouvelles de la démocratie' (April-June 1961), which contains contributions from Rovan, Mendès France, Duverger and others. A discussion of Pierre Mendès France's own book can also found in his journal *Cahiers de la République* 49 (October 1962).

Collaboration also took place with education and cultural groups, such as *Peuple et Culture* and *Economie et humanisme*. ADELS and *Citoyens 60* worked closely with *Peuple et Culture* on their analysis of municipal government, *Communes et démocratie*.\(^5^4\)

In terms of public debate, increasing numbers of meetings were being held across the country, often organised by those close to the discussion clubs, but appealing to a wider audience. For example, the *Forum* movement, created in August 1957 by a group of Mendesist radicals close to *L'Express*, organised events in 36 towns and cities, focusing on a range of major economic and political questions of the moment, particularly Algeria. A similar structure organised by Jean Daniel and André Philip, *Amis de l'Express*, overlapped with the activities of the *Forum*.\(^5^5\) Yet if urban areas were the more obvious focus, there was also a rising level of organisation in rural France, particularly amongst the agricultural trade unionists of the CNJA, which is partly what the GROP had tried to harness.\(^5^6\)

Many specifically Catholic associations also mobilised. Alarmed by an apparent lack of civic consciousness during the crisis of May 1958, the *Secrétariats sociaux*, for example, established a specific political information and civic education service.\(^5^7\) Several major conferences also addressed the issues raised by the *sociétés de pensée*. In early 1962, the MRP-influenced *France-Forum* organised *La démocratie à refaire*,\(^5^8\) followed shortly after by *La mort des partis politiques*, put together by the *Centre catholique des intellectuels français*.\(^5^9\) In 1963, the annual *Semaines sociales*

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\(^5^4\) See footnote 38, p. 42.

\(^5^5\) Interview with Jacques Christol, *Forum / Amis de l'Express* organiser in Toulouse.

\(^5^6\) On the aims of the GROP, see the statement of intent given by its President (André Jeanson, CFTC Vice-President) and Secretary General (Michel Debatisse, CNJA Secretary General) in GROP, *Pour une démocratie économique*, pp. 7-12. There also some useful observations in F. Georgi, *L'invention de la CFDT*, pp. 58-68.

\(^5^7\) The *Secrétariats Sociaux* was a non-specialised social Catholic association which acted as a federating body for a number of research centres based in large French cities. It was closely linked to the *Semaines Sociales* and the newspaper, *Chronique Sociale*. For more information on these associations, see W. Bosworth, *Catholicism and Crisis in Modern France*, pp. 173-178.

\(^5^8\) *France-Forum* was a publication established by several prominent MRP figures in 1957, most notably, Etienne Borne, Maurice Fontanet, Jean Lecanuet and Henri Bourbon. This magazine, backed by the *bureau politique* of the MRP, was intended to narrow the gap between intellectuals and the party. Ideologically, it was strongly influenced by personalism. For the proceedings of the 1962 conference, see *France-Forum, La démocratie à refaire* (Paris: Editions Ouvrières, 1963)

\(^5^9\) The CCIF was something of a Church think-tank containing a wide range of ideological tendencies. Etienne Borne (MRP, *France-Forum*) was General Secretary at this time. Georges Suffert (*Témoignage*
The activists of the reform cycle

The sociétés de pensée generally attracted individuals from outside the parties. Some had been members of the older formations, such as the Radicals, SFIO, PC or MRP, and found themselves disenchanted or out of line with prevailing thinking. Others were close to the New Left -- UGS (Union de la gauche socialiste), PSA (Parti socialiste autonome), PSU -- or were readers of the non-Communist Left or Catholic Left press (particularly Esprit, l’Express, Témoignage chrétien, France Observateur). There were also UNEF figures, particularly as a result of the mobilisation over the Algerian War, and a certain number of trade unionists, mostly CFTC/DT.

Practising Catholics were a strong or even dominant element in many sociétés de pensée (particularly the CREPT, Positions, Démocratie nouvelle, Cercle Tocqueville, GROP) and a crucial part of the reform cycle. The clubs later provided a path into the new Socialist Party for many Catholics who had found it difficult to engage on the traditional Left due to its latent anti-clericalism; the PSU was their other main entry point. There was also a strong presence in UNEF, with progressive Catholic students, either from the JEC (Jeunesse étudiante chrétienne) or considering themselves of JEC inspiration, holding a 'virtual monopoly' on the presidency from 1956 to 1965. Indeed, with the crisis of the JEC after 1957, and the right-wing drift of the MRP, UNEF became a key area of engagement for such students.

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60 The Semaines Sociales were started in 1904 and constituted a mobile forum, held in different cities, where attempts were made to elaborate a general doctrine of social Catholicism. For details of the 1963 meeting, see Semaines Sociales de France, La société démocratique (Lyon: Editions de la Chronique Sociale de France, 1963).

61 J. Mossuz, Les clubs et la politique en France, pp. 7-8. This observation is entirely confirmed by interview data carried out in Grenoble and Toulouse.

62 F. Wilson, The French Democratic Left, p. 79.


64 Eighty office-holders resigned from the JEC in 1957 in protest at interference by the Church hierarchy, and continued to refer to themselves as JECistes by 'inspiration'.
Although the rise of Left-oriented Catholic activity originates in the period between the wars, as does the establishment of the journal _Esprit_, the emergence of a highly visible Catholic political and associative Left was largely a post-war phenomenon. A number of factors contributed to this evolution, particularly the role of Catholics in defending the Republic in the Resistance (which facilitated significant contacts with the traditional Left), and the gradual softening of Church doctrine on socialism, more noticeable after the Second Vatican Council (1962-5). At the same time, the intransigent attitude of the MRP towards Pierre Mendès France, and a certain conservatism over the colonial crisis, had alienated progressive Catholics from the party and contributed to the development of solid Mendesist currents amongst Catholics, symbolised initially by their increased membership of the Radical Party, and later by their presence in the _sociétés de pensée_.

Both Wilson and Mossuz give the age range of those participating in the early 1960s at generally between 30 and 40 years old, a figure confirmed from my own interviews. But some were slightly younger, particularly the UNEF activists, while many of the leaders and ideological agenda-setters were already over 40. Although it is certainly not easy to identify any single generation that was central, the bulk of reform cycle activists were members of the post-war reconstruction / Cold War generation (born c1924-c1934), led by men of the Resistance generation (born c1918-c1924), with fringe participation from younger Algerian War activists.

A considerable number of both the Resistance and the post-war reconstruction / Cold War generation had placed their faith in Charles de Gaulle in 1958, but rapidly become disillusioned with what they perceived to be an authoritarian and distant style.

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On Catholic associative life during this period, detailed analysis may be found in W. Bosworth, _Catholicism and Crisis in Modern France: French Catholic Groups at the Threshold of the Fifth Republic_ (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962). Useful details on Catholic womens’ associations may also be found in M.-T. Renard, _La participation des femmes à la vie civique_ (Paris: Les Editions Ouvrières, 1965).


67 _Ibid._, p. 8; F. Wilson, _The French Democratic Left_, p. 83.
The Resistance generation had already been profoundly unhappy about the failure of the Fourth Republic to realise highly-held expectations and ideals. In the late 1950s, for those with progressive tendencies Communism appeared dogmatic and sectarian, the centre and left opportunist, divided and dominated by discredited politicians perceived as closed to new ideas. In a sense, the conclusions may have been close to Malraux’s remark: ‘Between the Communists and the Gaullists there is nothing.’

Although precise socio-professional details for individual clubs are generally unavailable, it seems that the sociétés de pensée were dominated by the technical, intellectual and managerial middle class -- engineers, teachers and cadres -- with a substantial presence of the liberal professions. However, one should note some significant variations in milieu. As we have already seen, the Club Jean Moulin brought together top civil servants and intellectuals, and while it was at the centre of discussion club activity, some were wary. Delors, for example, collaborated but never felt wholly comfortable. Another example is provided by the Rencontres groups intended to bridge the gap between ‘ghettoised groups’ (namely civil servants and the military) and the wider public. The presence of military officers, in general from the École supérieure de Guerre, was nonetheless something of an exception in the sociology of the ‘reform cycle.’

These variations aside, several commentators claimed to have identified the emergence of a ‘new middle class’, linked to the notion of a specific generational mobilisation. Jacques Vrignaud, introducing a discussion on the clubs in Revue Politique et Parlementaire in June 1964, wrote: ‘The new generations want political

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70 Jean Mialet, founder of Rencontres, gives a description of the group in France-Forum, La Démocratie à refaire, pp. 40-45.
71 See, for example, Claude Vajou’s, ‘Pourquoi des clubs?’ Gabriel Bergougnoix (Citoyens 60) speaks of ‘nouvelle classes moyennes de la société industrielle dont les techniciens du secteur public et du secteur privé forment une large part.’ (p. 4). From another perspective, Poperen also notes the presence of a ‘new middle class’ element in the clubs, but has different reasons for emphasising this, namely the need to emphasise a certain marginality from socialist politics (J. Poperen, La gauche française: le nouvel âge 1958-1965 (Paris: Fayard, 1972), pp. 359-367). Even Mossuz uses a value-laden term, observing ‘un nombre non négligeable de citoyens appartenant aux couches socio-professionnelles <de l’avenir> (universitaires, cadres, techniciens notamment).’ (J. Mossuz, Que sont devenus les clubs?, p. 964)
action to put them in contact with real and concrete problems, and for it to lead to participation in the management of public affairs. This preoccupation was not completely absent from the old parties, but is preponderant in the clubs where the new political elite is being trained.\textsuperscript{72} However, this was not in itself a particularly original phenomenon. One can certainly make parallels with the ‘Young Turks’ of the Radical Party during the 1930s, particularly given the involvement of Pierre Mendès France during both periods.\textsuperscript{73}

Politically, such questions were significant. Defferre’s strategy for a new federation of the Left in 1964-5 hinged specifically on expanding the electorate of the non-Communist Left in the direction of these ‘new generations.’ With the need to overtake the Communists and then win with them an absolute majority in the presidential elections, the Socialists could no longer simply count on their own diminished traditional support base (13% in 1962 to the PCF’s 22%). Defferre therefore sought to widen the scope of his party’s appeal, establishing a support committee \textit{Horizon 80}, which was mostly composed of clubmen and newcomers to politics. In an individual capacity were to be found members of the \textit{Club Jean Moulin} (Olivier Chevrillon, Georges Suffert, Claude Neuschwander), \textit{Cercle Tocqueville} (Claude Bernardin), \textit{Club des Jacobins} (Charles Hernu), \textit{Citoyens 60} (Gabriel Bergougnoux, Pierre Lavau), \textit{Association des jeunes cadres} (Jacques-Antoine Gau), \textit{SGEN-Reconstruction} (Paul Vignaux). The aim was to attract the \textit{forces vives} which could then deliver the support of their members, and to rebuild the SFIO by establishing a new party incorporating the Radicals and MRP.

The PSU embodied the non-Communist Left opposition to this project and the debate over the ‘new middle classes’ was particularly visible within it at this time. A dispute, between what became known as Motion B ‘modernists’ and Motion C ‘unitarists’ at the party’s conference at Alfortville in January 1963, had pitched figures such as Michel Rocard (ex-SFIO student leader) and Gilles Martinet (son-in-law of

\textsuperscript{72} In \textit{Revue Politique et Parlementaire} 764 (1964), p. 2.
\textsuperscript{73} For an outline of the ‘Young Turk’ phenomenon, see Alexander Werth’s article, ‘Le mouvement \textit{<Jeune Turc>: un phénomène radical de l’entre-deux guerres}, \textit{Cahiers de la République} 2 (1956), 100-105. The comparison with the 1930s is all the more pertinent given the influence during both periods of Pierre Mendès France, first as a ‘Young Turk’ himself and subsequently as an inspirational public figure.
Nemi) against Jean Poperen (ex-PCF). Motion B essentially read the advance of Gaullism not as a historical accident but as the consequence of a new French society. A long-term counter-strategy was therefore needed, focusing attention on capturing the new centres of power and attracting the so-called couches nouvelles -- engineers, technicians, young cadres, highly qualified workers. In contrast, Motion C both doubted the existence of the new social groups as a coherent bloc and still maintained the central importance of the entire salaried workforce. It also rejected what became termed the 'régimisme' of Motion B, that is treating Gaullism as a durable phenomenon.

It is within this climate that events in Grenoble during 1964-5 have to be situated. For the national scrutiny accorded to Dubedout’s victory was not just the fact of a citizen action group winning the municipal election; it was an interest in the qualitative nature of those who had mobilised. As Pierre Clermont later wrote: ‘[T]he significance of the Grenoble experience went beyond the local to the national level [...] it became the symbol of the social category which brought it about.’74 Indeed, the question of the ideological position of the ‘new middle class’ was extensively politically debated during these years of dispute over the future shape of the Left, for on it hung electoral strategy and also the intellectual legitimacy of the competing claims of the SFIO, PCF and PSU for the leadership of the left. Although with retrospect, one sees that it was indeed these categories that made a decisive impact upon the new Socialist Party, such an outcome was far from clear in the mid-1960, either to partisans or to opponents of such a development.

Evolution of the cycle

As early as December 1963 and the proposal of Defferre’s candidacy for the 1965 presidential elections, six sociétés de pensée had issued a declaration implicitly supporting him (Cercle Tocqueville, Club Jean Moulin, Citoyens 60, Démocratie nouvelle, GROP, Association des jeunes cadres).75 The declaration is particularly

75 For extracts and a detailed commentary, see Raymond Barillon, ‘Divers clubs et syndicats souhaitent que l’élection présidentielle soit l’occasion d’un renouveau politique,’ Le Monde, 17 December 1963.
interesting since it encapsulates the various strands of the 'new public sphere', from the preoccupations about French democracy to the battle for the heart of the CFTC. This kind of political engagement, which became clearly evident from 1965 onwards when a number of discussion groups joined the FGDS, would in a sense be their undoing. For in moving closer to the status of clubs de combat politique, playing within the new structures of the non-Communist Left, they were exposing themselves to the kind of conflicts of influence and party in-fighting that they had so strongly criticised in the established order.

This phenomenon exposed, as Mossuz has observed, a division between those who, in the absence of a club, would have simply become involved in family, professional or cultural associations and those who wanted some form of political activity and were looking for a suitable party: So long as the clubs themselves were not committed to a specific grouping, both elements could coexist without major difficulties. The problem emerged as soon as the identity of a club seemed to be transformed into an active political unit. Citoyens 60 was particularly affected by arguments over the merits of direct political engagement, thrown into increasing disarray over its connections to the evolving non-Communist Left structures.

The position of the sociétés de pensée which chose to commit to or associate with the FGDS mirrors the conception of politics elaborated in the Reform Democrat clubs of the United States during the 1950s and early 1960s. In his study of the phenomenon, James Q. Wilson speaks of 'amateur' politics, defining the term not as dabbling, lack of professionalism or ineptitude, but as the commitment to a certain way of doing politics that made public policy deliberate and not the 'accidental by-product of a struggle for personal and party advantage.' Amateurism was about not falling into the traps of professional politics: the demands of the machine, election winning and the distribution of rewards to those who have faithfully backed the party

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76 Within the FGDS, the sociétés de pensée, anxious to avoid fusion with Mitterrand's CIR, joined the UCRG (Union des clubs pour le renouveau de la gauche), a structure organised by Savary's club, Socialisme et démocratie in the Autumn of 1965.
elite regardless of policy or performance. The ‘Amateur Democrats’ were, of course, operating in an entirely different context and pushing for change from within the party. But there was a similar generational, professional middle class resistance to established elites in the political system.

However, there was no clear agreement within or between the clubs about the merit of joining the FGDS. Fundamentally, could a structure that contained large elements of the old party elite and was led by men of the Fourth Republic be trusted? The Club Jean Moulin was substantially weakened in 1966 after its associate membership of the FGDS provoked the departure of those who did not think so, or who were Gaullists. A subsequent refusal to join the new PS in 1969 could not re-invigorate the club (it disappeared in 1970). The discredit attached to all the political leaders of the Fourth Republic -- with the possible exception of Pierre Mendès France but certainly not Mitterrand -- meant that some activists were peculiarly loath to entertain political affiliation (some, particularly more conventional middle-class Catholics were still attracted by the General, if not by his party).

Those hostile to or unconvinced by Mollet, Mitterrand and their alliance in the FGDS were at the centre of the Rencontre socialiste, held in Grenoble in April 1966. This gathering was a clear expression of what became known as the deuxième gauche (Second Left). Drawing on the symbolic significance of the city after the Dubedout victory of March 1965, the signatories of the call for the meeting were a mixture of clubmen (Démocratie nouvelle, Cercle Tocqueville, Association des jeunes cadres, Citoyens 60), journalists (Nouvel observateur, Esprit, Débat Communiste), association members (Christianisme social, Jeunesse universitaire chrétienne, UNEF), academics and PSU politicians, most notably Rocard. The Rencontre was spearheaded by the new head of Citoyens 60, Pierre Lavau, who had replaced Delors.

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80 Ibid., p. 9.
81 Despite the myth, there is some discussion about whether it was in fact at Grenoble that Rocard’s famous slogan ‘Decolonise provincial France’ (‘Décoloniser la province’) was launched. See J.-L. Andréani, Le mystère Rocard, pp. 443-47.
82 For an insider account of the significance of the Grenoble meeting, see P. Lavau, ‘La rencontre socialiste de Grenoble’, Citoyens 60, Special Issue (1966), pp. 2-8.
In essence, the period 1965-6 marked the beginning of the end for most *sociétés de pensée* as think-tanks of a new public sphere. If they had been designed to create engaged, informed citizens able, should they wish, to participate in either political or associative life, their paths had now irreversibly crossed those of the non-Communist Left reconstruction movement. While some groups survived, the next seven to eight years saw the gradual disintegration of this part of the club scene. With the three-phase entry of many clubmen into the PS (with Savary in 1969, with Mitterrand in 1971, and Rocard in 1974), a dynamic that had developed in the absence of strong parties on the non-Communist Left was largely recuperated by the new Socialist Party.
Contention cycle

The 'reform cycle,' whilst evolving, did not come to a discernible end before the explosion of May 1968, and its relationship with the contention cycle depends in considerable part on the view that one takes of the events of that year. If one follows Crozier’s interpretation which certainly has a partial validity, 1968 was an explosion connected to some of the key grievances that had motivated the activists of the sociétés de pensée, including himself. Writing in 1970, Crozier saw the crisis of May as a 'questioning of a French style of action and an instinctive revolt against what I have called the blocked society.' There is a clear connection with the critique of state power to be found in L'Etat et le Citoyen, with its worries about the gulf between governing elites and civil society.

But despite this element of apparent continuity, discontinuity is most striking. Firstly, the turmoil was wholly unexpected, 'a complex affair of chance which only came about because certain random elements fused together.' With the benefit of hindsight, some of the roots of May 1968 can be identified, but nobody had been seriously predicting this level of mobilisation. Although Pierre Viansson-Ponte’s famous front page editorial, 'France is bored,' has been misinterpreted as some form of premonition, a year later the political editor of the Le Monde himself wrote that Easter had been calm and events at the university of Nanterre during March and April had passed relatively unnoticed: ‘During the first beautiful days, whilst the Easter holidays were coming to an end, there were no hints of the coming explosion and the

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84 M. Crozier, La société bloquée, pp. 170-1.


chain reaction which were to shake national life [...] the climate was not one of crisis.'

Secondly, the range of themes addressed during the student revolt went well beyond political or administrative critiques. Indeed, there was a very strong cultural element to May 1968 (shared in many other advanced industrialised societies) which attacked underlying value systems as much as administrative or institutional norms. That one of the triggers at Nanterre had been the separation of males and females in halls of residence is wholly exemplary of a substantial questioning of societal norms that many of those involved in the 'reform cycle' did not feel close to or necessarily sympathetic with. Perhaps the crucial element in understanding the difference was the generational trigger, for the student revolt was a mobilisation of the young. Some of the leaders were characteristically slightly older, already active during the Algerian War, and often assistants in the overcrowded and excessively hierarchical universities.88 The actions of the students and lycéens represented an expression of anger and frustration on the part of an age cohort predominantly born after the Second World War.89 In Inglehart's terms, these were the first post-materialists who, while not monopolising such activity, played a significant role in many of the movements of the 1970s and 1980s.

For the purposes of this thesis, it is less the actual events of May 1968 that are important than the cycle that they triggered. The students' and workers' strikes were over in a relatively brief moment. De Gaulle's regime wavered, recovered and then the General misplayed his hand in an attempt to combine relatively popular regional reform with an attack on the Senate in the 1969 referendum (whose loss provoked his resignation). Yet it was only really in the aftermath of the confrontation that the full effects became clear. During the 1970s, May 1968 inspired an extraordinary range of currents, as much intellectual and cultural as political; few sectors were immune from

88 For example, Alain Geismar (born 1939, trade union activist) or Alain Krivine (both 1941, revolutionary left leader). Some of the other leaders were in their early twenties - Daniel Cohn Bendit (born 1945), Jacques Sauvageot (born 1943). For a full exploration of this group, see P. Rotman and H. Hamon, Génération (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1987 (Vol.1), 1988 (Vol.2)).
89 Of particular importance for the lycéens had been the Anti-Vietnam committees which had appeared around many secondary schools.
the impact. Indeed, such is the power of May in the popular imagination that twenty years later, 60% of French citizens believed it to have had a significant impact on the country.  

It should be remembered that the early years of the reform cycle had been quite specific in character. A comparatively small number of activists, mostly in their thirties, were involved in the network of clubs, associations, magazines and newspapers that set a fairly coherent agenda for the reconstruction of French political, social and economic structures. The ‘new public sphere’ was characterised by discussion, debates and publication. Some activists also tried to insert themselves into the political process, others engaged at a local level in cultural, religious or educational groups. Mass demonstrations (except in relation to the Algerian crisis), or direct tactics such as occupations or sit-ins were not really a part of the tactical repertoire, nor probably appropriate to the ends espoused. Movements in favour of the redefinition of the participatory framework were still unusual, although they certainly increased in the wake of the Grenoble GAM success of 1965.

In contrast, the contention cycle was clearly more disruptive and thematically far-reaching in its challenge to the established order, sometimes targeting those who had been reformers of the early to mid 1960s. The student protests of May 1968 also served to energise a wide variety of activists, predominantly on the Left, whose political colours ranged from moderate to extreme. This resulted in a large number of issues and tactics, some of which were not always compatible, but which expressed a general disillusion with the status-quo. Within a changing climate, ‘participation’ acquired connotations that were generally far more ambitious than a decade earlier, becoming a buzz-word, almost a cliche, that continued to resonate throughout the 1970s. The obvious example, which illustrates the extent of preoccupations with participatory principles post-1968 was the rising stock of autogestion, the deeply

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90 SOFRES, *L'état de l'opinion* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1989), p. 52. In response to the question: 'Would you say that the events of May 1968 brought changes to French society?,' 67% of PCF voters replied 'A lot or a fair amount,' compared to 64% PS, 58% RPR, 53% UDR and 58% FN. Amongst professions, it was the salaried middle class that were most positive. The figures was as high as 75% for cadres and professions intellectuelles supérieures.
ambiguous principle of self-management, discussed as much within the new Socialist Party as in the movement sphere.91

Particularly striking, in contrast to the reform cycle, was the repertoire of contention. There was a proliferation of non-violent direction action; demonstrations, sit-ins or disruption of council meetings became acceptable tactics for some, particularly in the more ‘expressive’ campaigns.92 Indeed, the language of the period referred consistently to ‘battles’.93 The Creys-Malville (Isère) confrontation of 1977 over a new super-breeder reactor, during which a demonstrator was killed, was perhaps the most notorious episode in the early history of environmental campaigns.94 Larzac, the ‘battle’ to defend peasant land rights against military encroachment in Averyon (‘Gardarem lo Larzac’) is another mythical example of non-violent direct action.95

In terms of structure and dynamics, the participation debate shifted significantly away from the centre of gravity of the sociétés de pensée a decade earlier. Firstly, the momentum coming from local mobilisation was such that it was no longer a question of organising debates or forums concerning the re-invigoration of democracy. The reality of the increased level of activity rendered somewhat redundant the criticism of citizen passivity that had been prevalent in the sociétés de pensée during the first years of the Fifth Republic. Secondly, the ‘new public sphere’ of the 1960s had developed in the absence of a strong party on the non-Communist Left. As many of those active

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91 That autogestion could be embraced by the diametrically opposed Rocardian and CERES wings of the new PS, and later by the PCF as well, is an illustration of the scope for interpretation.
92 This use of ‘expressive’ draws on Parkin’s study of CND in 1969 which was one of the first to identify what would become a hallmark of such protest action. Parkin makes a distinction between typically instrumental working-class activism and the more expressive nature of middle-class humanitarian or moral protest. See F. Parkin, Middle Class Radicalism: The Social Bases of the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1968), p. 41.
93 This more confrontational approach was also evident more widely in Western Europe and North America. For a general account, see R. Dalton, M. Keuchler, and W. Börklin, The Challenge of the New Movements, in R. Dalton and M. Keuchler (eds.), Challenging the Political Order (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990).
94 The Superphoenix reactor had been part of a new generation of nuclear reactors designed to use 60 times less uranium and produce plutonium (needed for the nuclear arms) as a by-product. It is now to be closed having successfully produced electricity for only ten months of its twenty years existence.
in the reflection groups were now moving towards or were already members of the new Socialist Party, one can see in part why the issues were so visible within the PS, particularly after the entry of Rocard and the *Troisième composante* at the *Assises du Socialisme* in 1974, where *autogestion* had been a prominent theme.

While this is a necessary simplification of a complex series of processes, the essential is that the discussion clubs had lost their importance as a focal point, outflanked from below by direct action and from above by organised conventional political activity. Most had disappeared by the early 1960s, but a few, most obviously ADELS --particularly through its journal *Correspondance Municipale* (established in 1958) -- still continued to play a significant role. New groups were also created. *Echanges et Projets*, developed by Delors in 1973-4, was a small association (about 200 members) which was intended as a heavyweight social affairs think-tank closed to those holding political mandates and to cabinet officials. In comparison to *Citoyens 60*, this was a much more elitist project, drawing heavily, but not exclusively, on the Parisian bourgeoisie. It was in certain respects, a *Club Jean Moulin* 'mark two,' but in a changed context.

**Local democracy and the contention cycle -- citizen groups and neighbourhood committees**

Whether it be through the neighbourhood committees -- *comités de quartier*, user groups (particularly in the transport sphere) or emerging ecologist structures -- the profile of local associations was raised substantially during the early 1970s. Although it is difficult to link together the myriad of different groups under one umbrella term, the common denominator in the effervescence was the question of 'quality of life.' On the one hand, this concerned classic collective consumption issues that range from the standard of public housing to the provision of adequate leisure facilities. On the other, 'quality of life' was also increasingly seen in more 'expressive' terms -- the provision

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96 The association has partly to be seen in the light of Delors' experiences as adviser to Chaban-Delmas, and his attempts to develop a programme for reform that was not inextricably bound by the constraints of being labelled 'Left' or 'Right.' The membership level was low partly because the group existed by invitation only, partly also because an equivalent of 10% of members' tax bills was taken to pay for premises and publications. See C. Grant, *Delors: Inside the House that Jacques Built*, pp. 37-8. 97 There were civil servants, entrepreneurs, cadres, university teachers and also some trade unionists. Some were former *Club Jean Moulin* and *Citoyens 60* members.
of green spaces in city centres, the preservation of quartier traditions and so on. Here, one comes close to the kind of values identified by Inglehart in his post-materialist categories. In describing the overall phenomenon, I adopt the short-hand term used by Augustin Antunes, ADCV (‘Association pour la défense du cadre de vie’).⁹⁸

Given the wider academic literature’s frequent use of the label ‘New Social Movement’ (NSM) in labelling the grass-roots activism of the period, it is worth clarifying the difference between ADCV and NSM (although Antunes does not address the issue himself). This is a difficult distinction to make since there are obvious overlaps in themes and sometimes tactics. However, to the extent that some ADCVs had a relatively limited constituency (often localised) and little capacity for substantial protest mobilisation, one should not see them invariably as NSMs. In this, I follow Alan Scott’s useful distinction that ‘[s]ocial movements are to be distinguished from other collective actors, such as political parties and pressure groups in that they have mass mobilization, or the threat of mobilization, as their prime source of social sanction, and hence of power.’⁹⁹ Some ADCV’s may therefore be closer to pressure groups.

These associations did not emerge out of a vacuum in the early 1970s. Local associative life in France had hardly been moribund during the 1960s,¹⁰⁰ and it is important not to see the events of May as provoking an organisational watershed in the sense of a sudden rush to form defence associations where none had existed before.¹⁰¹ Returning to some of the prominent literature of the reform cycle -- for example, Rovan (Une idée neuve: la démocratie), Mendès France (La République modene) or Aubin (Communes et démocratie) -- there is no doubt that ‘quality of life’ activity was already tangible a decade earlier. However, in urban areas, where the

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⁹⁹ A. Scott, Ideology and the New Social Movements (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990), p. 6
¹⁰⁰ Cf. Reform cycle section in this chapter.
¹⁰¹ Unfortunately, we have little reliable statistical means of comparing the dynamism of the two periods. National data on numbers of associations is unavailable, and association membership levels are probably a better indicator of civic culture than of effective activity. At a general level, a widely-disseminated INSEE survey in 1967 claimed that only 28.3% of the population belonged to any kind of association, a surprisingly low figure probably partly due to a badly designed enquiry which omitted sports clubs. 28.3% certainly seems implausible in comparison to SOFRES data of 1977 which at 52% would indicate a 24% rise. Even if the 1967 figures was accurate, one would still need to be able to examine individual categories of association (not possible for the 1967 survey), to be sure of any sectoral trend.
ADCV’s were concentrated, the material situation had changed. Grenoble was something of an exception in its problems during the early 1960s: the full impact of urban growth patterns in France only started to be felt in most towns in the mid to late 1960s. Sustained increases in the urban population (19%, 1954-1962; 18%, 1962-1968) were posing cumulative infrastructural, human and environmental problems, which also became more politically unacceptable in the post-1968 climate.

In this more challenging context, the notion of ‘associative democracy’ occupied an increasingly important place. While mechanisms such as extra-municipal committees and municipal referenda were also widely discussed, associations were often portrayed as a crucial intermediary linkage structure, ‘an idealised framework for local democracy.’ Indeed, when one looks at the special periodical editions addressing civic revitalisation and democratisation, the emphasis clearly reflected developments on the ground, as well as further structuring the debate: ‘Vie associative: la démocratie risquée’ (Projet), ‘La démocratie par l’association’ (Esprit), ‘La commune et la vie associative’ (Correspondance Municipale), ‘Pour un nouveau pouvoir de l’association’ (Echanges et Projets), ‘Contre-pouvoirs dans la ville’ (Autrement).

Indeed, a distinct political agenda emerged to characterise ADCV behaviour during the ‘contention cycle.’ The demand for participation was often expressed as à basic point of departure and, in many urban areas, one can speak of the emergence of a claim of droit à la ville or droit à la cité.104 Droit à la ville was based on the desire both to transform the relationship between citizens and state representatives or elected officials, and to improve collaboration and interaction amongst citizens. The guiding principle saw cities and towns as the domain of their occupants; it was, therefore, for them to decide, or at least be consulted effectively, in respect to the local policies

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104 See A. Antunes, 'La défense du cadre de vie', and also J. Ion, 'Cité, cités et droit de cité: Urbanisation périphérique et groupes sociaux en France (1955-1985)', Espaces et sociétés, 51 (1987), 9-19. The notion was, in fact, first widely disseminated by Henri Lefebvre in his 1968 work Le droit à la ville (Paris: Anthropos, 1968). However, Lefebvre’s elaboration of the idea had less to do with citizen participation explicitly than with the transformation of urban life and social relations. Furthermore, he was insistent that it could only be the working class which was capable of promoting such a development. (pp. 132-3).
formulated and executed in their name. This directly developed ideas already in circulation, in more embryonic form, in the mid-1960s.

Many comités de quartier tended to build on the theme of droit à la ville as they attempted to establish themselves as intermediary bodies between local territory and external authorities. If neighbourhood committees had existed before 1968, the post-May climate inspired the creation of increasing numbers, and contributed to the new register of debate. Such was the expansion of the comités de quartier that a national liaison structure, the Carrefour national des comités de quartier (CARNACQ) was established in 1976, based in Marseilles. Also created in 1976 was a national association that attempted to coordinate pressure for an improved quality of life in the quartiers, the Confédération syndicale du cadre de vie (CSCV). The CSCV grew out of an older Catholic association, the Confédération nationale des associations populaires familiales (CNAPF) which had been closely linked to the MLO (Mouvement de libération ouvrière).

At the same time, attention began to turn to the Bologna example of decentralised participatory democracy under the PCI -- the Consiglio di quartiere. Dating from 1963, the far-reaching Bologna initiative which allowed the development of semi-autonomous sub-units of local government seems to have been taken seriously in France only in the mid-1970s. The prominence of the participation theme by this point

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105 A. Antunes, 'La défense du cadre de vie', p. 43.
106 Besides localised examples such as the Grenoble GAM, see ADELS' collaborative text, Communes et démocratie (mentioned in footnote 38, p. 42).
107 The comités de quartier of the 1970s are only patchily covered in the literature, mostly through engaged journals. On the Parisian groups, see R. Failliot, 'Il y a aussi ceux qui préfèrent "participer".', Autrement, 6 (1976), 168-73; P. Mignon and O. Mongin, 'Genèse de notre association de quartier VDL XIV', Autrement, 6 (1976), 20-32. For a useful collection of general articles, see Economie et Humanisme 261 (1981). There were also numerous articles in Correspondance Municipale. Specific Toulouse and Grenoble references will be covered in the relevant chapters.
108 There were originally five founding umbrella groups, the Plateforme parisienne (Paris), the UCIL (Union des comités d'intérêts locaux, Lyon), CIQ (Confédération générale des comités d'intérêts de quartiers, Marseilles), CLUQ (Comité de liaison des unions de quartier, Grenoble). They were later joined by others including the UCO (Union des comités de quartier, Toulouse).
110 The Mouvement populaire des familles (MPF), an important Catholic working-class organisation, split in 1950 over the issue of politicisation. One faction, which wanted to concentrate on family issues and associative life created the MLO, another the Mouvement de libération du peuple (MLP) which was close to the PCF. For more detail, see Jean-Marie Donegani, 'De MPF en PSU: un mouvement entre en socialisme', Autrement, 8 (1977), 107-15.
was such that even in cities like Toulouse whose political elites were not particularly sympathetic to the principle of comités de quartier, some studies were quietly undertaken. A delegation from the Agence d'Urbanisme de l'agglomération toulousaine (AUAT) visited Bologna in November 1974.\(^{112}\)

The position adopted by comités de quartier varied between, and even within, individual localities, much depending on the attitudes of key figures in the neighbourhood committees and in the municipal councils. The discussion here has centred on those groups which articulated demands for a changed relationship between citizen and local government, but not all comités de quartier adopted such a pro-active approach. Some remained essentially defence committees, reacting only to perceived threats to local well-being or mobilising to obtain specific improvements. Others preferred to concentrate on the act of engagement with immediate local questions which provided civic training and political education (closer to the J.S. Mill conception).\(^{113}\)

The role of the GAMs

A significant contribution to new thinking on urban politics came from the national GAM movement. The Grenoble GAM, created in 1964 and the first in France, had been an unusual by-product of the 'reform cycle.' But while the election of this citizen action group in coalitions with the PSU and SFIO was a novelty, its emphasis on participation and concrete urban problems rather than a priori ideological positions generally accorded with société de pensée perspectives. This was a widely desired initiative that was not yet commonplace. The Dubedout success subsequently stimulated the creation of other groups and a series of national meetings was held in 1968-9 to develop a common charter. In the 1971 municipals, 103 GAMs presented lists or were part of coalitions. However, only six were in large communes (over

\(^{112}\) See AUAT, 'Bologne: un urbanisme différent', written by AUAT after a study week with councillors and technicians in Bologna, 4 - 9 November 1974. The initially confidential report looked at general urban strategies, including the participation initiative.

\(^{113}\) See, for example, R. Failliot (president of a comité de quartier in the XVth arrondissement of Paris), 'Il y a aussi ceux qui préfèrent "participer".', Autrement, 6 (1976), 166-73.
100,000 inhabitants), where it appeared to be much more difficult to organise politically in the face of well-implanted party machines.\textsuperscript{114}

GAM philosophy rested on the need to modify profoundly the relationship between administration and administrated in municipal government, but within the context of humanist and technically competent management techniques. Yet despite this apparent moderate stance, there was a clear difference in rhetoric between the agenda of the Grenoble GAM in 1964 and the national charter five years later. Providing a useful illustration of the transition from 'reform' to 'contention' cycle, the 1969 text is altogether more radical in its anti-capitalist language, emphasising the alienation of urban society. This was a theme, important in the 1970s, that had not explicitly figured in earlier material. As Robert de Caumont, one of the national GAM leaders, later wrote 'It is not perhaps completely by chance that [the GAM] discovered its national identity in May 1968, assimilating without difficulty the essential message of the "events," while making it operational in areas of daily life.'\textsuperscript{115}

Indeed, while making general observations about political, economics and society, the GAMs were purely urban movements and, as such, constituted the best-organised non-party response to the difficulties being experienced in urban France. However, while it was estimated that their candidates received about 15% of the vote in areas where they stood in 1971, many GAMs quickly disappeared from the political scene; about half of the groups that had contested the municipals had ceased to exist within two years. This, in large part, reflected the entry of many members into the new Socialist Party. A GAM survey in 1971 showed that 19% were already in the party (6% PSU, 0.08% PCF), and the PS seems to have provided an increasingly attractive option for GAMists seeking a more national political project.\textsuperscript{116}

Many ADCV activists of the 1970s were also members of the PS, reflecting in part the renewed credibility of the reconstructed party as a progressive political force. But

\textsuperscript{114} There were GAM candidates in lists in Marseille, Nîmes, Montpellier, Grenoble, Nancy and Le Mans. Source: M. Sellier, 'Les Groupes d'action municipale' (thesis), Annexe 7, p. 37.

\textsuperscript{115} R. De Caumont, 'Les GAM: une stratégie, des techniques pour changer le quotidien', Autrement, 6 (1976), p. 156.

\textsuperscript{116} Survey cited in M. Sellier, 'Les Groupes d'action municipale' (thesis), pp. 96-114.
certain factions were better disposed to this kind of activity than others. The Rocardians, for example, frequently Left Catholic, were generally the element of the PS most engaged in ADCVs.\textsuperscript{117} Furthermore, much depended on local configurations. In a city like Grenoble, with the GAM and PSU dominating the municipality from 1965 and creating a powerful \textit{deuxième gauche} tendency, the local PS was strongly marked once activists from these groups joined. In consequence, one found a greater PS presence on the ground than in Toulouse, where there was no real GAM, and where Catholic Rocardians constituted an embattled minority in an anti-clerical, traditionalist local party.

One should note, though, that a generally more radical component of the urban movements and neighbourhood committees was the non-Rocardian PSU, defined here as those who remained in the party following the \textit{Assises}, many of whom had joined after 1968.\textsuperscript{118} This element, which worked closely with the first Ecology groups on the \textit{Convergence} platform in 1977-8, was strong in both Toulouse and Grenoble.\textsuperscript{119} However, its activity during the contention cycle in the two cities differed enormously due to the institutionalisation of participation politics that the \textit{deuxième gauche} was undertaking in Grenoble. This satisfied a demand that was frustrated in Toulouse, resulting in a major challenge to Pierre Baudis’ administration (1971-1983), spearheaded by the post-Assises PSU, but also drawing in the PS Rocardians.

The activists of the contention cycle

Many activists and commentators were hoping (in vain) that the urban protests of the 1970s would lead to a general working-class mobilisation, creating a certain revolutionary dynamic. This was particularly true of the urban movement literature dominated by a small group of sociologists around Manuel Castells, who led the field

\textsuperscript{117} The Left Catholics were generally either in the Rocardian or CERES factions. See H. Portelli, ‘Au rendez-vous du Parti socialiste’, \textit{Esprit}, 4-5 (April - May 1977), 178-84.

\textsuperscript{118} While it is difficult to find precise national figures, the average year of joining for those members of the post-Assises Toulouse PSU had been 1970 (calculated from membership records for 1976 in the PSU Haute-Garonne Federation Archives). Unfortunately, the PSU was unable to locate its archives in Isère (Grenoble).

\textsuperscript{119} For the 1977 municipal elections, there were numerous alliances (often under the label \textit{Convergence}), linking the PSU with environmental, regional other social movements. The agreement also remained in place for the 1978 legislatives.
of Marxist movement analysis until 1983. Rejecting previous schools of thought such as ‘community power’ which had placed enormous emphasis on the individual, Castells, drawing heavily on Althusser, adopted a method that entailed a decentering of the subject. The individual actor in the city did not merit a place in a form of analysis which perceived the world in terms of social structures, locked in a conflict determined by the conditions of monopoly capitalism. The ideological framework was closely linked to the notion of fated classes.

The consequence of such a method was that detailed analysis, such as that of La crise du logement social, gave no consideration to factors such as activist profile, leadership or the relative influence of social groups within a given movement. Although methodologies differed, this was also true of the planning literature with Lojkine later speaking of ‘an empirical analysis of local urban policy which reduced the role of individual actors to very little.’ However, Castells, along with colleagues such as Cherki and Mehl, considerably modified his thinking in the early 1980s. The most thorough-going change came in Castells’ 1983 work, The City and the Grassroots. Speaking of ‘intellectual failure’ and the ‘excess of theoretical formalism that flawed social sciences in general and some of our earlier work in particular,’ Castells proposes an approach which fully integrated concrete reality as the subject and not the theoretical object of investigation. This entailed a far more open attitude to the dynamics of urban contention: ‘Although class relationships and class struggle are fundamental in understanding urban conflict, they are not, by any means, the only primary source of urban social change.’

The collapse of Castells’ earlier approach to the study of urban movements had come about partly because empirical findings were so clearly in contradiction with the theory. Firstly, the significance of the movements, at the level of system change

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120 Of Spanish origin, Castells, a doctoral student of Alain Touraine, had begun his university career at Nanterre in 1966 as an Assistant, and was an active leader during the 1968 protests. Briefly expelled from France, he returned in 1970 and remained until 1977. For more information on Castells, see the interview by Bob Caterall, ‘Citizen movements, information and analysis: an interview’ in City 7 (1997), 140-155.
121 Castells et al., Crise du logement et mouvements sociaux urbains.
123 For a useful account of this transition, see M. Amiot, Contre l’état, les sociologues, particularly Ch.6.
124 M. Castells, The City and the Grassroots, xvi-xvii.
125 Ibid., p. 291.
predicted by the Marxist school, was far below expectations. Secondly, the central actors in many radical urban movements tended not to be working class but educated middle class -- although there were sectors where this was less the case, for example, the squatters movement. This middle class preeminence had already been noted on the ground in the early 1970s. The local branch of the Grenoble PSU had remarked that its expectations were being frustrated:

'It is almost uncontestable that reformism in the working class has barely brought it towards contention activity on quality of life questions [...] it is clear that salaried workers of the cadre moyen variety are those who raise most immediately problems of power and policy output in the city.'

If the Castells school was reluctant to address this, other sociologists were more willing to engage with the issue, often critical of what they tended to term the nouvelle petite bourgeoisie (NPB), a label reflecting Marxist hegemony in the field until the early 1980s. Garnier and Goldschmidt, in a highly polemical analysis, spoke of a social group that used notions of citizenship to try and take power in the city, acting as local relays of bourgeois hegemony. Such activity was seen to be epitomised in the GAMs which acted as a 'trojan horse' of the 'NPB'. In the only major academic study of the GAMs, Sellier was also negative, noting that the actions of the nouvelle petite bourgeoisie were determined by: 'an ideal of better living which is a pure historical and cultural fabrication of their group.'

Sellier gives a portrait of the typical GAMist of the early 1970s:

'A man between 30 and 40 years old, married, having three children of school age; he is not originally from his commune of residence; he has generally been in higher education and has a degree; he is a cadre supérieur or cadre moyen; his income is high; he owns his own home; he frequently lives in a detached house; although his origin is often difficult to determine, he seems to be a migrant; he is a Christian.'

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126 See D. Mehl, 'Les voies de la contestation urbaine', Annales de la recherche urbaine, 6 (1980), 26-62. The article recognises that sociologists had been encouraged more by theoretical models than empirical reality.
128 PSU Informations (Isère) 6 (1972), pp. 5-6.
130 Ibid., p. 194.
At an occupational, religious and age level, the somewhat clichéd profile appears to parallel that of many société de pensée adherents a decade earlier, although only 6% of GAMists had been members of such discussion groups. Unfortunately, we do not have sufficient information about place of origin and residence to make more detailed comparisons.

The term cadres, however, covers a very wide range of occupations. Cadre supérieur, for example, can include a production plant engineer or senior cabinet official. The GAMs did not generally include the latter (the calibre of figure that had been prominent in the Club Jean Moulin, for example). According to a survey carried out by Sellier, the GAM movement was particularly composed of engineers, technicians and teachers who tended to view the Club Jean Moulin as too technocratic and its members as close to the establishment. In Toulouse, an ex-member of a Pisani cabinet who attempted to launch a GAM in 1969 failed partly because of such suspicion. Hubert Dubedout, a former marine officer, also had to prove himself to many Grenoble New Left activists.

While there is again a source problem in finding socio-professional statistics on the neighbourhood committees or ADCVs that would permit a sufficiently detailed overview, local information on the post-1974 PSU and Ecologists in Grenoble and Toulouse, gives us an indicator as to the composition of the more radical non-GAM ‘quality of life’ movements. In comparison to the GAMs, there are certainly similarities in the pre-eminence of the professional, non-business middle class, and the minimal presence of workers. However, there is an important variation, namely that engineers tend to be less heavily represented, and one sees the dominance of pedagogical professions (school and university teachers, animateurs, educateurs) and the expanding social services sector (nurses, social workers). Indeed, these groups are seen by Bidou, Mendras and Reynaud as the activist core of a ‘new middle class’ or ‘central constellation’ as Mendras calls it.

134 M. Sellier, ‘Les Groupes d’action municipale’ (article), p. 49. In fact engineers (14%), teachers (18%) and technicians (12%) accounted for about 44% of the total GAM membership in 1971.
mirrors these findings, although as the Introduction has shown, the label 'new middle class' is highly problematic (see p. 19).

One should also take note of contrasting generational dynamics. From membership records and electoral candidates in Grenoble and Toulouse, the average date of birth for post-1974 PSU and Ecologist activists emerges as 1943, reflecting the fact that there were figures from both the 1968 and Algerian War generation. While the young cohort of May 1968 played a significant role in the 'quality of life' movements of the 1970s, they were not necessarily dominant. In comparison, though, the GAMists of 1971 were slightly older (almost 80% had been born before 1941). Although a sizeable proportion (about 20%) were under thirty, this signified the presence of a number of individuals in their late 20s, rather than the younger students of the May revolt.

Towards the end of the cycle: the normalisation and banalisation of participation politics

In exploring the evolution and changing dynamics of the 'participation' debate within the contention cycle, one has to look at the attitude of parties as well as grassroots activity. For while in certain localities, pressure from the neighbourhood committees and ADCVs was also connected to the rhythm of wider conflicts (for example, regionalist or ecologist activity), the behaviour of the political elite, particularly on the non-Communist Left, had a substantial impact. As Franck Sérusclat notes, if May 1968 had failed to have a revolutionary effect at national level, in the communes it had put considerable pressure on local councillors to change their decision-making style in favour of some form of citizen participation.

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137 Source: M. Sellier, 'Les Groupes d'action municipale', pp. 96-114.

Nationally, attempts to address the question of real citizen participation were most in evidence during the presidency of Giscard d’Estaing (1974-1981). While de Gaulle had used the slogan of participation as an immediate palliative to the pressure of May 1968, and promoted a referendum on regionalisation and reform of the Senate to recoup his position in 1969, neither he nor Pompidou appeared able to grasp the nettle of improved local democratic structures. In contrast, Giscard d’Estaing established two committees during his presidency (Delmon, Guichard) both of which considered the issue.139 Indeed, Giscard’s club, Perspectives et Réalités, reflecting the position of the Parti Républicain, had adopted a particularly positive rhetoric, noting the need for ‘real permanent participation structures which bring inhabitants and elected representatives in contact with one and other.’140

The new emphasis on local democracy was also taken seriously in planning circles. A report given by the Commission vie sociale for the seventh plan (1976-1980) noted that ‘the participation of inhabitants in public life is indispensable, in order to give them more direct control over their living environment, to encourage innovation and to enrich social life.’141 The Ministère de l’Equipement had organised a conference in Marly in 1976, with the specific theme of ‘Participation and urbanism,’142 and a further meeting was held in Montpellier in 1978, entitled ‘Daily life in an urban environment.’ Both events serve to illustrate growing attempts to link planning to the aspirations being expressed during the period, and are also evidence of the on-going dialogue between social scientists and planners which had been a feature of the Fifth Republic.143

There were, however, relatively few legislative initiatives. While Giscard d’Estaing supported Barre’s proposals in 1978 to codify legally the use of local referenda, the

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139 Pierre Delmon looked particularly at the role of associations, while Olivier Guichard dealt more with local responsibilities and citizen participation. For a detailed discussion of these two reports and the government response, see J.-P. Muret, ‘La participation à travers des textes’, in Participation et urbanisme (Colloques de Marly) (Paris: Centre de recherche d’urbanisme, 1977).


141 Ibid., p. 218.

142 Published by the Centre de recherches d’urbanisme (1977). Participants at Marly included François Bloch-Lainé (cf. Club Jean Moulin, Espaces et Projets), Oliver Guichard as well as a number of academics including the sociologist Albert Meister.

idea was eventually dropped by the government. Certainly, there were no moves to bring forward legislation on extra-municipal committees or to oblige communes to enter systematically into dialogue with local associations or neighbourhood committees.\textsuperscript{144} The strategy appears to have been to recognise and support local democracy without moving towards a legally-binding institutionalisation of intermediary bodies. In this respect, a number of administrative measures were taken: for example, the Ministère de la Qualité de la Vie (later the Ministère de l'Environnement et du Cadre de Vie) created an internal 'Associative life' division which issued a range of information and advice for associations.

The PS was also paying increasing attention to the question, with the arrival of the PSU and Troisième Composante in 1974 marking the beginning of the golden age of autogestion in the party. Although vaguely defined and fought over by the CERES and Rocardian currents, the term nonetheless provided a general ideological base which allowed citizen participation to move high on their party's municipal agenda. The difference in ambition between the PS programme of 1972 and the party's proposals for the Union of the Left manifesto of 1978 well illustrates the changing priorities. The PS had simply noted in the earlier text that consultation of associations, neighbourhood and transport user groups would be developed.\textsuperscript{145} However, by 1978, there were promises to ensure democratic participation through regular consultation and measures to improve the involvement of the inhabitants of large towns and cities in the management of communal affairs. In particular, Paris was to have elected conseils d'arrondissement in charge of local infrastructure and services.\textsuperscript{146}

\textsuperscript{144} There were only two steps taken in this domain (laws passed 1976). Firstly, associations were to have the right, should they wish it, to participate in the elaboration of the POS (Plan d'occupation des sols), the blueprint for future development drawn up in individual communes. Secondly, they could help bring prosecutions (partie civile) in cases of environmental damage. Both measures were passed with considerable opposition from many within the majority, but with the support of Socialist votes from the deuxième gauche.


\textsuperscript{146} Parti socialiste, Le Programme commun de gouvernement de la gauche: propositions socialistes pour l'actualisation (Paris: Flammarion, 1978), pp. 101-2. This idea, largely intended to undermine Chirac in the capital, was later developed to include Lyon and Marseilles (PLM laws of 1982/3). The PLM project was vigorously opposed by the Right which accused Defferre of developing a scheme that targeted the power of the mayors of Paris and Lyon while improving his chances of re-election in Marseilles. For an analysis of the success of these big city decentralisations, see S. Biarez and M. F. Souchon-Zahn, 'Des associations actives dans les grandes villes', Projet, 203 (1987), 57-72.
For its part, the PCF had been initially hostile to autogestion, but had accepted enough of the idea by 1976 in order to be able to agree a common programme with the PS for the 1977 municipal elections which were crucial for its own developments as well as for its alliance strategy with the Socialist Party. In any case, after isolated experiments, such as Sarcelles, in the late 1960s, Communist mayors were cautiously starting to adopt a more inclusive form of municipal decision-making.\(^{147}\) While they always unequivocally underlined that the power of the municipal council could not be displaced or downgraded by, for example, the decentralisation of decision-making to individual neighbourhoods or sectors, they were increasingly drawing on citizen participation as a way of strengthening their bargaining position vis-à-vis the French state.\(^{148}\) Areas of common ground with the PS therefore existed on the question of the encouragement of participation and associative life, even if some Socialists were pushing further towards a more radical, often utopian, notion of power redistribution at local level.

Municipal elections in 1977 marked the high water-mark in the priority accorded to local participation, both on the left with the PS, PCF and PSU all consistently emphasising the ambition in their campaign material, and in the centre with Giscardian commitments to greater participation also in evidence. However, the notion had so many different implications for the main parties, and for factions within them, that it is very difficult to establish cogent comparisons between political families. This ambiguity partly explains the relative ease with which the notion of improved citizen participation had been recuperated, even normalised or banalised, within the mainstream political debate by the late 1970s, as Paoletti and Nevers amongst others have observed.\(^{149}\)


The recuperation of the theme by political parties, particularly the Left, served to draw the wind out of ADCV sails. It also seemed to neutralise the wider debate -- for example, there is a striking lack of periodical articles dealing with the question of local democracy after 1978. Nevers speaks of normalisation as a ‘trap’ for the associative world for precisely this reason. The recuperation went far enough to remove the issue as a politically contentious one without giving major ground at the legislative level. Once the Union of the Left came to power in the 1981 legislative elections with a PS majority, little was done to implement Socialist promises of the late 1970s, the PLM project (with its more strategic motivations) being an exception.

The period of recuperation was followed by the further downgrading of the participation priority by the time of the next municipal contest in 1983. While still present, it generally no longer enjoyed the privileged status of a few years previously. On the one hand, the ‘associative myth,’ which had seemed to offer an alternative model of municipal management, was increasingly discredited amongst the political elite, particularly the Socialists who had initially tended to be the most enthusiastic. The disillusion occurred for two principal reasons. Firstly, contributory local participation was generally a minority, middle-class pursuit as Conan and Domenach had already pointed out in their 1977 critique of the Grenoble experience. A study by Stéphane Dion has shown how five Left-controlled councils (3 PS and 2 PCF in terms of majority), where post-1977 participative experiments were undertaken, progressively abandoned them partly because of this low-level of interest and the over-representation of specific social groups.

Secondly, during the early 1980s, with unemployment rising and social exclusion starting to become a major concern in French cities, the need was felt to shift attention away from the forces vives towards what Donzelot has termed the ‘non-social

150 In comparison to the rash of publications in the mid-1970s. Cf. p. 61.
152 See footnote 146, p. 71.
The question of participation was now, therefore, acquiring an additional dimension: one of integrating the disenfranchised, a task which became particularly urgent following the first major urban riots in the suburbs of Lyon during 1981. Socialist Prime Minister, Pierre Mauroy, gave Mayor of Grenoble, Hubert Dubedout, responsibility for running the CNDSQ (Commission nationale pour le développement social des quartiers), a body set-up in the aftermath of the violence to deal with the growing problem of France’s subsidised public housing (HLM) estates.

Waning of the cycle

By the late 1970s, the more general contention cycle (in which participation was one important but not the only significant theme) was waning, with reduced pressure on local and central institutions. Explanations for the decline are complex. However, there are three important overlapping factors to consider. Firstly, as we have seen, political parties were able to recuperate themes and also activists. While there was clearly a core that remained in groupuscules, associations or new parties such as the Ecologists together with the Socialist Party had been able to recruit effectively amongst the 1968 generation. As Roland and Cayrol show, about 10% of PS members in 1974 were less than twenty five years old, with 31.2% less than thirty. Compared, for example, to the situation during the reform cycle, where there was no credible electorally successful party of the non-Communist Left, the PS represented a powerful national force which, because it was an broad church (albeit factionalised), could act as a rallying point.

Secondly, there was clearly a problem of momentum at the intellectual level, a particular difficulty for the extreme left which had played a significant role in the generation of ideas during the contention cycle. By the mid-1970s, as the economic impact of the first oil shock was being felt and the reformism of the PS and even of

156 For an analysis of the issues surrounding urban decline, see C. Bachmann and N. Le Guennec, Violences urbaines: ascension et chute des classes moyennes à travers cinquante ans de politique de la ville (Paris: Albin Michel, 1996).
157 A useful outline of evolving government neighbourhood policy is provided by F. Ménard, 'L'histoire des politiques de quartier', Informations sociales, 45 (1995), 76-87. The DSQ provided a more solid structure than previous initiatives, such as the Habitat et vie sociale committees of the 1970s.
the Giscard administration was becoming clear, the leftists were under considerable pressure to deliver something more than an increasingly distant utopia. However, such delivery proved elusive. Leading figures, such as ‘new philosophers’ André Glucksmann and Bernard-Henri Lévy began to turn away, their change of direction taken as symptomatic of a wider ideological disintegration. The collapse of the Union of the Left after the 1978 legislatives also had a considerable negative impact upon expectations of radical change.

Thirdly, momentum was being lost through both real fatigue and frustration at the costs of public action, a problem evoked by Hirschman in *Shifting Involvements*. Hirschman describes a point at which participants begin to realise that the expenditure of intellectual and physical energy is failing to achieve substantial benefits. If the expression ‘running out of steam’ seems colloquial, it seems well to capture the mood of the very last years of the 1970s. Indeed, several of those interviewed emphasised intensely practical concerns. Activism is highly time-consuming, and in many cases the young adults of May 1968 later found themselves with job responsibilities or families which simply made it more difficult to engage effectively.

Mitterrand’s election victory of 1981 drew the curtain on a period which had already seen a slowing of momentum. However disappointing the performance of the government might later have been, the arrival of Mitterrand in power was greeted with euphoria across most of the left and expectation of a substantial social and political transformation were high. At a quantitative level, Duyvendak’s national aggregate analysis of NSM activity in France shows a substantial fall between 1980 and 1984, particularly marked in 1980-81. Other sources also indicate that while there was a continued rise in the number of associations (declared according to the 1901 law) created annually, within this trend one can discern an overall downturn in public-centred associative activity.

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161 J. Ion, *La fin des militants* (Paris: Editions de l’Atelier, 1997), p. 45. For statistical data on the early 1980s, see J. Antoine and V. Camus, ‘Que disent les décentralisés?’, *Projet*, 185-6 (1984), 527-8. One section of the article shows that while membership of sports and leisure associations remained stable (17%), that of parent teacher associations fell sharply (down about 7% to 11%). Taken together with a slight drop in those wanting greater participation in communal life (51% to 47%), Antoine and Camus
Nonetheless, it is important not to see the evolution of the cycle as either mechanical or absolute in chronological terms. Of course 1981 did not mark the end of contention *per se*, nor did it signal the disappearance of May 1968 as a reference point. If the level of activity was lower, many NSMs, ADCVs and *comités de quartier* kept going and new groups were created. However, in terms of climate, there is little argument, either in the literature or amongst activists interviewed, with the observation that the contention cycle and the 'years of utopia' had passed.162

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Chapter Two: Grenoble and the reform cycle: the creation of the GAM

Background: post-war boom and the influx of the middle class professionals

A city of little over 100,000 inhabitants in 1946 saw a population increase of more than 50% within twelve years. Within this period, census data shows an increase of some 38% between 1952 and 1962, the most rapid city expansion in provincial France. The demographic explosion, three-quarters of which was accounted for by migration, meant that by 1962 only 26.5% of Grenoble inhabitants had been born in the city (a further 24.3% had been born in Isère, the department of which Grenoble is the main city). But dramatic as this statistic seems, comparable figures can also be found from the 1920s. The city had experienced earlier waves of migrants diluting the number of ‘true’ Grenoblois. However, in the 1920s the immigrants had been predominantly workers and employees, relatively unskilled labour from the adjacent Alpine region. An important distinguishing feature of the 1950s was the arrival of large numbers of cadres moyens and cadres supérieurs, connected largely to changing patterns of local economic development.

For much of the twentieth century, Grenoble had been an industrial centre. Although the city’s growth had taken off during the Second Empire with a flourishing glove trade, it was the development of hydro-electricity from the 1870s onwards that facilitated the emergence of a technologically ‘modern’ city. The new source of energy had stimulated a range of locally owned industries connected to electrical equipment, piping and hydraulics, most notably Neyret-Beylier (becoming Neyrpic in 1948), Bouchayer-Viallet and Merlin-Gerin, three plants at the heart of the Grenoble economy. Crucial to this evolution was the emergence of a class of industrial entrepreneurs ready to exploit and build upon the potential offered by the new

2 In 1926, for example, only 29% of the municipal population had been born in the five communes of the agglomeration. See C. Marie, Grenoble: évolution du comportement politique dans une ville en expansion (Paris: Armand Colin, 1966), p. 58.
Following the Second World War, while more traditional manufacturing, in particular the glove trade, was gradually declining, the electrical, hydraulic, metallurgical and chemical sectors expanded rapidly. Industrial employment in the Grenoble agglomeration doubled in the first fifteen years after the War. In parallel to this expansion, a major boost was given by the decentralisations that commenced in earnest during the premiership of Pierre Mendès France (1954-6). Under the influence of physicist, Louis Néel (Nobel Prize, 1970), Grenoble obtained the installation of a Commissariat à l'énergie atomique laboratory in 1956-7, which became known as the Centre d'études nucléaires de Grenoble (CENG). If hydroelectricity had placed the city at the cutting edge of energy technology at the end of the nineteenth century, the CENG with its nuclear reactor helped to sustain this position. Although the industry spin-offs were more limited, the presence of the laboratory reinforced the city's reputation as a top-class research centre.

Indeed, the construction of the CENG stimulated the creation of other laboratories, for example, the Société industrielle des combustibles nucléaires (SICN) and the Centre d'études et de recherche des combustibles atomiques (CERCA). At the same time, other research facilities not directly connected to the new atomic projects were put in place. In 1955, Neyrpic opened the Société grenobloise d'études et d'applications hydrauliques (SOGREAH), a hydroelectric research lab that employed almost 900 people by the 1960s, 60% of them engineers and technicians. Other sites included the SECEMAEU, studying new metals, and the SAMES (Société anonyme des machines électrostatiques), researching high-tension generators and particle acceleration. The latter was financed by a number of local companies, including Neyric.

Research in the city benefited from the long-standing industry-university cooperation in Grenoble, which was a significant element in the city's dynamism, and

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relatively rare in France. For example, the SAMES demonstrates, as Michel Grossetti puts it,
‘the perfect complementarity that existed at the time between a significant scientific potential, academics open to applied research, local industrialists capable of investing in a business in its infancy, and a reservoir of engineers and researchers trained locally.’

This industry-university relationship which, while far from unique in France, was nonetheless unusually successful and found symbolic expression during 1947 in the creation of an association, les Amis de l’université, by Paul-Louis Merlin, founder of Merlin-Gerin.

The city’s modernity was reflected in the socio-professional balance. Although the percentage of workers remained constant at about 42% between 1954 and 1962, two developments are striking: Firstly, the decline in the presence of the petit bourgeois (shopkeepers, artisans) from 11.4% to 8.6% of the total active population. Secondly, the increase in cadres moyens and cadres supérieurs / professions libérales from 18.03% to 22.5%. Comparison between the census of 1954 and 1962 is problematic, but the aggregate categories in Appendix 3a illustrate the enlargement of these middle-class groups. The changes in those categories containing technicians and engineers come as little surprise, but equally significant is a virtual tripling in the number of lycée / university teachers and the literary and scientific professions -- from 560 to 1522.

But in addition to quantitative data, one has also to look at developments qualitatively. In Grenoble, it was not just that industry, science and university were strong in the 1950s, attracting a highly-qualified population; there was a symbol that also counted. The city’s reputation as a dynamic centre, combined with a location in the heart of the Alps close to the ski-slopes, evidently served to create a magnet for many who identified themselves with a ‘new’ France. Beyond the laboratories and the production plants, there was also a flourishing intellectual climate. The Faculty of Law and Economics, for example, was unusual for France in containing a strong

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political science component, probably the most active aside from the *Fondation nationale de science politique* (FNSP) in Paris.

**Municipal Politics**

Between the wars, Grenoble could be characterised as a city of the Left, a feature that had much to do with the industrial success that had attracted so many workers and employees -- 52% of the population by 1936. The municipal socialism of Paul Mistral (mayor 1919-32) particularly marked the city, with a consistent engagement on urban issues combined with an uncompromising rhetoric championing the cause of the working classes. However, with the Radicals increasingly restless, the socialist-radical alliance that had elected and supported Mistral gradually disintegrated under Socialist mayor Léon Martin (1932-5). While the collapse of this alliance led to Socialist defeat in 1935 and the election of a Radical-Moderate council, a clear signal of Grenoble’s political orientation was given by the massive success of the Popular Front in May 1936: Martin was elected député for Grenoble with nearly 60% of valid votes. Three years before the Second World War, the city of Grenoble was an SFIO stronghold.

In 1945, Martin returned to city-hall with a coalition of Socialists, Communists and Radicals winning some 54% of the vote. But the municipal elections of 1947 in France were marked by the dramatic entry of the *Rassemblement du peuple français* (RPF) winning with its allies some six million votes (40% of votes cast) nationwide with some spectacular gains. RPF mayors were elected in Bordeaux, Rennes and Strasbourg. The Gaullists were also able to get a mayor, Marius Bally, elected in Grenoble, the Socialist vote having collapsed to the profit of RPF, PCF and MRP. But with an unstable majority and a very strong Communist presence, Bally found it impossible to sustain his administration and resigned after violent RPF-PCF clashes during a visit by de Gaulle in mid 1948. In the absence of an alternative solution, new elections were called and Léon Martin became mayor once more in 1949, forming a broad-based coalition (SFIO-MRP-Radical-Independent) in order to marginalise the

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However, Martin’s return to office owed much more to his personal status than the strength of the SFIO. While the party recovered from its low point in 1947, in Grenoble municipal elections the first party of the Left was the PC, which attracted 39.3% of the vote in 1949 before falling to 27% on the first ballot in 1959 (only overtaken by the non-Communist Left in 1965). Martin remained in power by relying on the MRP, steering a path between Communists and Independents. Finally, in 1959, under a new electoral system, Grenoble elected a UNR-Independent-MRP alliance under Gaullist, Albert Michallon. This was somewhat unusual, for while victorious nationally, the UNR had less success in challenging the centre-left coalition that ruled many large French towns.

In socio-professional terms, the Michallon municipality, dominated by legal, medical and commercial interests, represented the established Grenoble bourgeoisie (see Appendix 6). Twelve of the Michallon team were outgoing councillors and there is no real sign of the ‘new’ population that was to emerge so strongly in 1965. However, several of the MRP councillors represented a certain current of progressive Catholic thinking that was very close to later GAM themes. One was in charge of *Economie et Humanisme* in the city, while another worked closely with the neighbourhood associations, know as *unions de quartier*. Indeed, MRP first ballot election material was distinctive in its preferred methods of local government: contact with user groups and neighbourhood associations, use of para-municipal committees to decide policy.

The results of 1959 appear to confirm the observations of Christiane Marie who, in a detailed study of electoral behaviour in Grenoble, shows how during the Fourth

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6 This status was due not only to the local prestige of having been mayor and député of the city, but to Martin’s wartime record. He had been one of the eighty députés to oppose the granting of special power to Pétain in July 1940. However, he was too old for the Resistance (born 1873).

In Grenoble, the neighbourhood associations have always been referred to as *unions de quartier*. In Toulouse, they are known as *comités de quartier*, the more common label elsewhere in France. However, this does not appear to have an obvious significance.

8 See *L’Isère* (28 February 1959), MRP newspaper. Archives Municipales de Grenoble (AMG), 1-K-349.
Republic the city drifted away from its leftward anchor. Beyond national political factors which affected the vote, this trend is attributed by Marie to the nature of Grenoble’s post-war industrial growth with the increasing number of *cadres moyens* and *cadres supérieurs*: The development of quality industry and research swelled the tertiary sector, especially *cadres* and technicians less sensitive to political ideologies, not hesitating to change vote in order to obtain greater efficiency.

Marie’s interpretation is unfortunately impossible to prove statistically, and reflects in part contemporary sociological preoccupations with the political and social identity of the *cadres*. It was certainly not controversial to assert these groups were unlikely to see either the sclerotic, stalinist PCF or the moribund SFIO as vehicles for their political interests. However, by the early 1960s, it was difficult to characterise Grenoble politically as either a city of the Left or the Right.

**Associative life in the quartier**

One of the important relays for the GAM element of the SFIO-PSU-GAM coalition elected in 1965 would be the *unions de quartier*, neighbourhood committees subsequently placed at the centre of attempts by the Dubedout administration to create a new form of local democracy. Many GAM members were closely connected to *unions de quartier*, and the structures embodied the kind of participative approach to the resolution of urban problems that the GAM so aspired to implement. This section explores the emergence of the *unions de quartier* in Grenoble, looking in particular at what makes them distinctive in relation to other forms of organisation in the neighbourhoods.

**Inter-war period**

As late as the 1950s and 1960s, the religious cleavage was still substantially affecting local associative activity in France. In a study of St Etienne, Jacques Ion observes that neighbourhood life generally functioned in a self-regulating fashion beyond direct

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10 Ibid. This argument is summarised in an analysis of the 1965 municipal elections, pp. 207-217.
11 Ibid., p. 217.
municipal control. But at different levels, whether through school, after-school or social and recreational activities, it reflected the secular (laïque) conflict. While the local context is fundamental in understanding the vitality and success of associations on the ground, 'one has to look elsewhere, to supra-territorial ideological cleavages, for the reference point which explains why they were established.' This is essentially in line with the MacRae hypothesis that French associative life was hampered by the same national cleavages that fed multipartism.

The conflict between parish activity and the amicales laïques in Grenoble certainly reflected the religious cleavage. Developed originally around primary schools across France in the 1920s, the amicales laïques aimed to provide a range of sporting and cultural activities after school and during weekends or vacation. These associations were an arm of the secular education lobby with a wider co-ordinating organisation at department level, the Fédération des œuvres laïques (FOL). Backed particularly by the SFIO, the radicals and the freemasonry, they provided explicit competition for Church organisations, and in many cases extended their sphere of activity from children’s leisure pursuits to a full range programme for adults as well. Although cities such as Toulouse or St Etienne had a more developed structure of amicales / cercles laïques in individual quartiers, the Grenoble organisation seems to have been very effective.

Beyond the inherently anti-clerical agenda of the amicale laïque, the hand of the Socialist Party could also be seen in the amicale, a concept which aimed to develop the social bonds of local communities. The amicales first developed in the cité-jardins of Grenoble, new social housing projects built in the suburbs during the 1920s in order to solve the problem of working-class accommodation. The earliest was the Société amicale de la cité jardin de Rondeau (1927); another two followed shortly

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15 Doctor Léon Martin, Socialist mayor (1932-5, 1949-1959) and Freemason, was the driving force in establishing an Amicale laïque in Grenoble (1924). The structure was well implanted with about 7,000 members. The Ministère de l’Instruction Publique et des Beaux-Arts gave a small subsidy, and prefectural records describe the association as very powerful (Archives départementales de l’Isère (ADI), 96-M-12). As well as providing leisure facilities, the Amicale was involved in establishing a support group for the unemployed (Comité d’aide aux chômeurs) during the 1930s.
after. This is typical of wider patterns of urban sociability in France. One sees a similar phenomenon in the *cité-jardins* of Paris, for example, where residents organised a number of mutual aid and leisure groups, as well as co-operative shops.

A recent publication on the Rondeau group in Grenoble gives an insight into its origins and activities. While there were never official links with the SFIO, many of the founders of the *Amicale de Rondeau* were party members, and the association was renamed *Amicale de la cité-jardin Paul Mistral* in honour of the mayor after his death in 1932. This was a variation on the machine politics -- ensuring a base through para-political associations -- that was part of the broader Socialist strategy during this period: ‘Rather than the Radical model built on insertion within a clientilist base and personal allegiances, cemented by “political passion”, a mode of participation and “mass mobilisation” was used which drew on a huge array of para-political associations.’ Similar tactics can also be seen in Communist municipalities, part of what Annie Kriegel referred to as the ‘counter-society’ strategy.

The immediate role of the *amicale* was one of financial and material help for the poorest families or the bereaved. But another key function was the organisation of leisure activities, such as *boules* or street parties; subscriptions were also used to fund an annual coach trip each July. The detail is significant, for the *amicales* were not just a product of local solidarity *per se*, but also a symbol of the age. In terms of available distractions, there was no television or access to motor-cars. If one lived in Rondeau, for example, even getting into the city-centre involved a long walk to the nearest bus. Changing lifestyles, with changes in technology and greater mobility, contributed to the decline of the *amicales* after the Second World War.

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16 In 1932, *Société amicale du quartier et de la Cité des Abattoirs; Amicale de la Cité Jean Macé* in 1934.
17 Of particular interest in this context is Katherine Burlen’s work on Henri Sellier, mayor of Suresnes (1919-1941) and one of the key figures in inter-war municipal socialism. K. Burlen (ed.), *La banlieue oasis: Henri Sellier et les cités-jardins* (Saint-Denis: Presses universitaires de Vincennes, 1987).
The success of such associations, particularly the *amicales laïques*, had in part prompted the campaign of specialised action launched by the Church across France at the end of the 1920s, which aimed at evangelising specifically targeted socio-economic and cultural milieu. This initiative took on a particular urgency in Grenoble where local Catholic leaders were increasingly worried by the influence of Socialist and Radical-dominated municipal government. The Church began an offensive in the late 1920s with a 'counter-society' project, which included targeting working-class neighbourhoods. The *Jeunesse ouvrière chrétienne* (JOC), for example, became well implanted in the popular *quartier* of Berriat, an SFIO bastion, and continued its work for several decades.\(^{21}\)

However, in contrast to this pattern of neighbourhood organisation influenced by divisions beyond local territorial boundaries, the *unions de quartier* represented something of a departure. Nominally politically neutral, they attempted to act as intermediary bodies, communicating the interests of local inhabitants to external authorities, usually city-hall. The first *union de quartier*, the *Union des propriétaires et des habitants du quartier de l'Île Verte*, was created in July 1926, with three others following by 1928.\(^{22}\) This was a period of major expansion in Grenoble, and Île Verte was an outlying area of the city which had seen housing construction without parallel infrastructural support. The frustrated residents mobilised, the aim of the *Union* given as the ‘study and realisation of road improvements, water distribution, street lighting and other projects.’\(^{23}\) This immediate functional role was later complemented by social activities, such as a Christmas tree for local children or help for the elderly in winter.\(^{24}\) Further *unions de quartier* were created through the early 1930s, although at this point there was no consistent pattern across the city.\(^{25}\)

\(^{22}\) *Union des propriétaires et des habitants du quartier des Eaux-Claires* (1927); *Association des intérêts du quartier du Polygone* (1928); *Syndicat de défense des quartiers de l'Abbaye, Villebois, Croix Rouge et Chatelet* (1928). ADI, 97-M-4. This data is based on official declarations to the prefecture. It is much harder to track associations which may have existed informally without registering under the 1901 law.
\(^{23}\) ADI, 97-M-4.
\(^{24}\) Details given in an article in *Le Progrès*, 10 July 1962.
\(^{25}\) *Comité de défense du quartier de la Capuche* (1930); *Syndicat de défense des habitants du quartier des Alliés* (1932); *Société Amicale du Quartier et de la Cité des Abattoirs* (1932); *Amicale de la Cité Jean Macé* (1934).
While it was not until some thirty years later that a recognised political role for these neighbourhood committees began to develop, their appearance in Grenoble during the inter-war period marks an early sign of an interesting organisational entity in the process of being constituted. With the focus on collective community infrastructural needs and without the divisive links to political parties or the Church, the unions de quartier were thus able to provide a new paradigm for local mobilisation that was not yet widely developed in France. However, Grenoble was certainly not the first city to develop such groups. Lyon, for example, had an even older tradition of unions de quartier dating back to battles over urban infrastructure at the turn of the century.26

Post-war Grenoble: the gradual ascendancy of the unions de quartier

Many of the unions de quartier established in the inter-war years had gone into hibernation before the Second World War, and in the immediate aftermath of the conflict the more socially-oriented groups were most active in Grenoble. At first, a series of communes libres appeared whose function was essentially neighbourhood charity and material support, and which could also be found in other cities.27 At the same time, a number of family associations were established, usually part of wider national federations and often linked to a new central structure, the Union nationale des associations familiales (UNAF).28 One of the most dynamic groups was the Catholic-Left dominated Confédération syndicale des familles (CSF) which looked after the interest of working class families. Its aims were to study problems and help create practical solutions to issues as diverse as housing, schooling, cultural facilities or social services. The CSF was represented locally through the ASF (Association syndicale des familles) which had sections in individual quartiers.

26 For a detailed study of the Lyon groups, see T. Joliveau, 'Associations d'habitants, urbanisation et politiques urbaines: Comités de quartier et associations de défense du cadre de vie dans l’agglomération lyonnaise 1880-1983' (Thèse de doctorat, Lyon II (Geography), 1983).
27 Barely documented in secondary sources, the most effective way of identifying such associations is through the Journal Officiel which lists daily those associations declared to local prefectures according to the 1901 Law.
28 For useful general outlines of the various family associations see Informations Sociales 6-7 (1978), 'Les associations familiales,' and also Correspondance Municipale 194-195 (1979), 67-71.
Beyond the ASF, municipal archive records carry records of other such family groups operating in Grenoble quartiers in the immediate post-war period. For example, in Beauvert, the Association familiale de l’Union des femmes françaises (UFF) du quartier Beauvert was established in 1946 to achieve broadly the same aims as the CSF/ASF. The association was launched by a prominent local Socialist, Alexandre Boissieu, who later took the initiative in establishing an union de quartier in Beauvert. However, while Boissieu was known for his anti-clerical views, the departmental structure to which the Association familiale was linked, the Union départementale des associations de familles de l’Isère (UDAF, itself federated to the UNAF), contained a number of leading MRP figures. Here, therefore, the religious cleavage seems less evident than might be expected given the inter-war associative patterns.

By the mid 1950s however, the unions de quartier were beginning to emerge again in Grenoble. Bolle et al. note a historic connection between their appearance and urban development in the city, an entirely justified observation given the parallel between the growth of the late 1920s and the experience of the post-war boom. Unions de quartier in the latter period were first created or re-activated in the peripheral areas of the city, particularly the south, where the most dramatic consequences of the expansion could be felt. In some, the presidents were the same as during the 1930s (Alliés-Alpins, Ile Verte). In others, for example, the Comité de quartier de Capuche, younger residents drew inspiration from the earlier initiatives.

29 ADI, 50-J-236.
30 The relationship is unclear between this local association and the UFF itself, which was largely a PCF-oriented structure developed as a support network during the Resistance. On the UFF’s history, see M.-T. Reynaud, La participation des femmes à la vie civique, pp. 47-51.
32 P. Bolle, C. Pouyet, and P. Vergès, ‘La participation des citoyens au développement urbain’, in P. Bolle (ed.), L’information, l’éducation et la participation des citoyens dans les processus de développement urbain (Paris: Ministère de l’Equipement et du Logement, 1968), p. 381. This is the only comprehensive analysis undertaken of a subject that has been somewhat neglected since the 1960s.
33 The pressure of urban living conditions is partly illustrated by the overall population density of the commune which jumped from 6,605 to 9,037 inhabitants / km² during the same period, the highest concentration in any major city with the exception of Lyon and Paris. Data calculated from commune sizes given in INSEE, Recensement général de la population de Mai 1954: Population légale (Résultats statistiques) (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale / Presses Universitaires de France, 1956).
34 For brief histories, see the series Connaître son quartier in the municipal magazine Grenoble, particularly 19 (December 1969) and 20 (February 1970).
In contrast to later conceptions of participative democracy, it should be emphasised that these groups were generally focused on the satisfaction of primary needs -- inadequate schools, lack of transport, leisure or communication facilities. While some did develop wider notions of representativity, their activity in the late 1950s and early 1960s generally still remained, in Parkin’s terms, more ‘instrumental’ than ‘expressive.’ This initial emphasis was reflected in their multi-class composition. While the notion of participation in the organisation of the neighbourhood was a theme that later tended to become monopolised by the middle classes, this was not uniformly the case, and certainly not in the early years of the Fifth Republic. As François Hollard (CLUQ president 1971-2 and Muncipal Councillor in charge of relations with the unions de quartier, 1971-77) notes: ‘It was not the middle class neighbourhoods which began. It was the workers’ areas. But for simple reasons - when you have no heating in your house and you live in an HLM...’

Hollard’s comments reflect the fact that in the early 1960s one of the more active neighbourhood groups in Grenoble was a tenants’ association in a strongly working-class area, Teisseire, led by André Perrin, a metal worker at the SECEMEAU. Indeed, such was the dynamism and efficiency of Perrin’s association that even the regional daily, Le Progrès, remarked on it. However, the long battle over inadequate heating facilities illustrates neighbourhood activity within a very different paradigm to the ‘new middle class’ idealistic model suggested by Bidou and others. For Perrin was not a mobile middle-class professional looking for social roots and a particular quality of life in the quartier, but a worker born in Grenoble fighting over basic quality of life issues.

The tenants’ associations were in fact slightly different to those calling themselves unions de quartier. Firstly, their relationship with external authorities was more complex to the extent that it was the building construction companies, often in the private or semi-private sector, who were responsible for many basic amenities.

35 Parkin’s distinction made in Middle Class Radicalism: The Social Bases of the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. See Chapter One, footnote 92, p. 58.
36 Interview with François Hollard.
37 Le Progrès, 7 April 1964.
38 For documents on the Teisseire group, see ADI, 4332-W-65.
Tenants' associations in HLMs thus targeted the companies over questions such as heating and social centres for the residents; although the CNAF (*Caisse nationale des allocations familiales*) and the municipalities also had a role in the latter. Secondly, there were a number of wider (and competing) organisational structures which promoted the interests of tenants -- most notably, the CNL (*Confédération nationale de logement*), close to the Communist Party, and the CGL (*Confédération générale de logement*), created by Abbé Pierre. Furthermore, these organisations limited themselves to issues of housing, and not of citizen representation *per se*.39

The *unions de quartier*, on the other hand, represented first and foremost a defined territory, not normally defined in terms of single housing estates. Indeed, it was often the case that an HLM, together with its tenants' group would be part of a wider *union de quartier*. While both would work to target the communal administration over issues for which it was responsible (including most local sanitary, transport, cultural and leisure infrastructure, as well as elements of urban planning), the *unions de quartier* were not concerned with housing issues *per se*. Their remit was the *quartier*, and the representation of the wishes and frustrations of local inhabitants. Despite the creation of the CARNACQ which was more of a meeting-point than a national support structure (see p. 62), other national bodies, such as the CNL or CGL, did not promote or aid the *unions de quartier*.

While the Grenoble myth tends to suggests a certain originality in terms of intermediary bodies in the neighbourhoods, parallels can be found elsewhere. Toulouse had considerable numbers of *quartier* and tenants' groups at this time, and in many areas of rapidly urbanising France, residents found themselves obliged to mobilise in order to obtain satisfactory living standards. But if Grenoble was not alone in experiencing neighbourhood frustration, there were four factors that created a very powerful base for the *unions de quartier*. Firstly, at a grievance level, the city's unprecedented expansion (38% in six years between 1954 and 1962) was provoking

chaos in the south of the city. The rush to build during the late 1950s in order to keep up with the population inflow led to barely controlled construction, often beyond the remit of planners. Many buildings were half-finished before the bureaucratic machine gave a decision on permits, by which time it was too late to affect modifications or refuse a project. This situation of rampant construction and the accompanying population led to parts of Grenoble being known as the 'Far West'.

Secondly, although neither the Martin (SFIO) nor Michallon (UNR) administrations sought to integrate the unions into decision-making, there was an impetus for inclusion coming from the MRP Social Affairs adjoint (and Economie et Humanisme member). Germaine Voisin felt that it was not simply a lack of responsiveness from the municipal council that was the problem, but also the isolation of many councillors in terms of a lack of solicitation from the public. Partly at her impulsion, an informal association, the Groupe d'études de quartier was established in 1959 to bring together unions de quartier presidents and other interested parties. Voisin subsequently suggested to the presidents that their efficacy as pressure groups would be enhanced if they co-ordinated their activities. By March 1960, 5 unions de quartier had decided to create a liaison group which was named the CLAQ in 1961 (Comité de Liaison des Associations de Quartier).

With the addition of a further two groups in 1962, the CLAQ became and has remained the CLUQ (Comité de liaison des unions de quartier). It is useful to note the geographical situation of these initial CLAQ/CLUQ collaborators. Of the seven members of the CLUQ in 1962, four (La Capuche, Beauvert, Alliés Alpins, Grenoble-Sud) were in the fastest growing southern suburbs with population increases between

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40 See, for example, her article, 'Participation familiale à la gestion municipale' in Familles d'Isère, 12 (February 1965), p. 1. 'Too often, municipal councillors feel isolated. People do not come to them because of ignorance (we do not know exactly what the role of a councillor is), because of shyness (we don't dare disturb them), because of a lack of civic responsibility (we have got representatives, let them get on with it). They are unfortunately neither omniscient nor omnipresent. They need frequent contacts with the population and the most active groups in order to know what is going wrong, or what could be done.'

41 Interview with François Hollard.


43 The initial five were Alliés-Alpins, Grenoble-Sud, Ile Verte, Eaux Claires, La Capuche. They were joined by St Laurent and Beauvert in 1962.
1954 and 1962 of over 100%. The other three (Ile Verte, Saint Laurent and Eaux Claires) were older quartiers, but also slightly peripheral. Significantly, there were no unions de quartier in the city centre until 1964, reflecting the less dramatic infrastructural crisis. The major problem to affect the centre and arouse discontent was inadequate water supply, and this was addressed by Dubedout’s users’ association explored below (see p. 105).

Thirdly, if this collaboration gave the unions de quartier the chance to be more than just isolated voices amidst the growing urban chaos of Grenoble, the calibre of many of those making up the CLUQ also raised its profile. For an interesting mix of local political and trade union activists could be found in the committee. Its first presidents, Joseph Ravier-Piquet and Alexandre Boissieu, were both well-known Socialists and former councillors. One also finds a number of MRP and Communist Party members, including the Grenoble PC section de ville secretary, Jean Giard. This cross-party participation seems to have helped the CLUQ as a credible body. Since no party was dominant and since the CLUQ’s credibility depended in its remaining non-exclusive, the committee was not politicised and non-political activists were not in any way discouraged from taking part. If it had been otherwise, the structure would have disintegrated. CLUQ documentation consistently emphasised neutrality in order to avoid internal ideological conflict, and to maintain a legitimacy as representative of whole communities and not just specific segments.

Indeed, the wider ethos of the unions de quartier was to avoid taking a political position. Some individual unions de quartier were well-known for being able to guard this balance. The Union des habitants des Eaux-Claires (UDHEC) contained a number of active members from very different political families, including the Gaullist député Jean Vanier and several prominent Communists. Indeed, in the municipal elections of 1959, it issued a pamphlet requesting local inhabitants to use the list vote to support local candidates, whatever their denomination. However, the membership and office-holders of other unions de quartier were sometimes more

45 ADI, 37-J-6. 8 candidates were claimed to be from the quartier - 3 PC, 2 UGS, 2 IND, 1 MRP.
homogeneous in their political outlook, even if these were not explicitly advertised. The *unions de quartier* of Teisseire and Grenoble-Sud, for example, both strongly working-class areas, were close to the Communists. Alliés-Alpins, on the other hand, contained a large number of MLP, CFTC and other Catholic Left activists.

**Influence of the Church**

Specialised action focused on particular groups had marked Church activity in the neighbourhoods during the 1930s. The war, Occupation and Resistance discredited the reactionary and conservative pro-Vichy forces in the Church and strengthened its social Catholic element, just as the power of the PCF reached its zenith at the Liberation. The creation of the MRP was one response to this development. Another was the increased concern about the fate of the urban working-class populations, both materially and spiritually. With the rural exodus gathering speed post-1945, there was a perceived need to avoid mass secularisation that had accompanied urbanisation in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and to help those in difficulty during the housing crisis of the 1950s. City missions began to appear across the country: to Grenoble the *Mission de France* sent two worker-priests, Georges Mollard and Francis Correnwinder. The Mollard / Correnwinder mission was based in an HLM complex in the southern *quartier* of Malherbe, near to the main Neyrpic plant. Their commitment to the local community, which included themselves physically building a Church as well as close involvement in the foundation of the local *union de quartier*, produced a loyal network of supporters.

Although the worker priest experiment was officially ended in 1954, Mollard and Correnwinder were allowed to continue in Grenoble under a contract between the local bishop and the *Mission de France*. Their final expulsion in the 1962 caused outrage in progressive Catholic circles and brought together both working and middle-class people.

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46 Cf. Chapter One, footnote 110, p. 62.
47 For full details, see the short thesis by R. Hackett, 'Le centre oecumenique St Marc de Grenoble' (Séminaire d'histoire religieuse contemporaine: Mémoire, IEP, Grenoble, 1972).
48 While the *Mission de France* had tended to emphasise less the *quartier* than the workplace, such worker-priest activity in the neighbourhood was not unusual. Particularly active in southern French cities, such as Marseilles and Toulouse, though not in Grenoble, was the *Mission St Pierre St Paul*, set up by the Père Loew. This mission’s work was specifically centred around the *quartier*, seen as the basis of community life. For more details see R. Wattebled, *Stratégies catholiques en monde ouvrier dans la France d'après-guerre* (Paris: Editions Ouvrières, 1990), p. 137
class congregants in a vigorous campaign against the bishop of Grenoble, André Fougerat.\textsuperscript{49} One sign of the mobilisation of Catholic Left networks was the involvement in demonstrations outside the Bishop's residence of law professor, Gérard Destanne de Bernis who led the intellectual debate on union recognition during the Neyrpic conflict.\textsuperscript{50} Many of those involved with the worker priests also worked at Neyrpic and helped to facilitate the unusual co-operation between cadres and workers in the strike that began six months later.\textsuperscript{51} Here, religion served as a bridge across class and political affiliation.

While the Mollard / Correnwinder episode was specific to one quartier of the city, the wider concern caused by their expulsion and the connection made by Boulloud between the religious networks and the Neyrpic strike is interesting in the wider context of Grenoble’s associative life during the early 1960s. For, as I will show in the following section, progressive Catholic currents were at the heart of the intellectual and social effervescence that marked the city in this period. The quarrel with Fougerat over the fate of the worker priests, which had exacerbated existing tensions resulting from his warning-off of some some of his more engaged congregants during the Algerian crisis, created further division. To a certain extent, it symbolised a developing, more general conflict in Grenoble between a conservative establishment and reformist middle class.

**Grenoble associative life and the reform cycle**

The chance location in 1940 of the Vichy-sponsored *Ecole des cadres* in Uriage, a hill village just a few kilometres from Grenoble was to have a substantial impact on the city after the war.\textsuperscript{52} Following increasing tension with the Vichy authorities and the

\textsuperscript{49} Although the demonstrations were peaceful, such was the sense of anger that the police took the unusual step of putting protective cordons around the Bishop's residence., See *Le Progrès*, 17/18/19 July 1962.

\textsuperscript{50} De Bernis' presence is noted by *Le Progrès*, 13 July 1962

\textsuperscript{51} Interview with Georges Boulloud (PSU, CGT Neyrpic): 'There were a lot of engineers and cadres there from Neyrpic and elsewhere. The Neyrpic CGC boss, Louis Greslou, had been president of the Malherbe union de quartier. The sermons of Georges [Mollard] were an education and it is because of that that there was unity inside Neyrpic because there were engineers and cadres influenced by someone like that. I am sure that if there had not been those priests, we would never have had those relationships. In that milieu, it counted for a lot.'

occupation of the free zone, the founders of the Ecole des cadres gradually moved into the Resistance, pursuing further their discussion and reflections. As the war drew to an end, those involved in the clandestine movement targeted Grenoble as the testing-ground for their societal blueprints. It was to be a 'model city,'\textsuperscript{53} the 'avant-garde capital of the France of the future.'\textsuperscript{54}

After the Liberation, Joffré Dumazedier and Benigno Cacérès, together with other Uriage figures, including Simon Nora (cf. Club Jean Moulin) established the workers' education group, Peuple et Culture in Grenoble, whose headquarters transferred to Paris in 1946. The Grenoble branch worked closely and successfully with the CFTC and CGT to establish a new cultural base through a Maison de la Culture.\textsuperscript{55} At the same time, a local branch of Economie et Humanisme, formed during the War, also with close links to Uriage, gradually expanded its activities, creating a study centre in the city, the Association dauphinoise d'étude des complexes sociaux.\textsuperscript{56}

Beyond the influence of Uriage, a different resistance network (Front National), bridging the divide between Catholics and Communists, had played a part in Chrétiens dans la cité. This oecumenical association founded in 1945 aimed to bring Catholics and Protestants together to debate not theological, but social, political and economic issues, such as national modernisation or European collaboration.\textsuperscript{57} It included a number of Jeune République activists, including Chrétiens dans la cité's leader Jean Réal. In short, with their commitment, heavily inspired by wartime and Resistance experiences, to the construction of a new social, economic and political order in France, these various groups made a substantial contribution to local associative vibrancy. Indeed, Economie et Humanisme was represented within the

\textsuperscript{53} Testimony of Jean-Claude Domenach cited in A. Delestre, Uriage, une communauté et une école dans la tourmente 1940-45, p. 291.
\textsuperscript{54} Testimony of Hubert Beuve-Méry cited in J. Hellman, The Knight-Monks of Vichy France. Uriage, 1940-45, p. 222.
\textsuperscript{56} The only detailed analysis of Economie et Humanisme is the excellent work by D. Pelletier, Economie et humanisme: de l'utopie communautaire au combat pour le tiers monde (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1996).
municipal council via two MRP councillors, both later becoming members of the 
GAM (Germaine Voisin, Madeleine Perrot).

But with the Algerian crisis and the collapse of the Fourth Republic, there was a 
distinct shift in gear. A flourishing climate of debate existed from the late 1950s, with 
numerous conferences, lectures and meetings.\textsuperscript{58} The older groups -- most notably 
\textit{Chrétiens dans la cité, Peuple et Culture, Economie et Humanisme} and \textit{Vie nouvelle} -- were heavily engaged, with other associations established in the late 1950s or early 
1960s as part of the reform cycle also prominent, particularly CIFAS \textit{(Centre 
d’information de formation et d’action sociale), Cercle Tocqueville, Citoyens 60, and the Association des jeunes cadres}. While most were local branches of national 
movements, CIFAS and \textit{Chrétiens dans la cité} were specifically 
grenoblois. All were 
either religiously-inspired or heavily influenced by the Catholic Left. \textit{Clubs de combat politique} were not much in evidence.\textsuperscript{59}

Given the local dynamism since the Second World War, it would therefore be less 
accurate to speak of a ‘new public sphere’ in Grenoble than of an ‘expanded public 
sphere.’ Of particular importance in structuring the intellectual debate were a number 
of prominent academics on the Catholic Left. Most prominent was political scientist, 
Georges Lavau (local leader of \textit{Jeune République}) together with law professors, Henri 
Bartoli (MLP, then PSU) and Gérard Destanne de Bernis (close to PC, former UNEF 
president), all at the \textit{Faculté de droit et des sciences économiques}.\textsuperscript{60} Also highly 
active but politically non-engaged was Jean-Louis Quermonne, head of the \textit{Institut 
d’études politiques de Grenoble} (IEPG) from 1958-1969.\textsuperscript{61} In a longer-term optic, the

\textsuperscript{58} Interview data confirmed by press listings \textit{(Le Dauphiné Libéré)}. 
\textsuperscript{59} There was, however, a small section of \textit{Horizon 80,} a group formed in 1964 primarily to back Gaston 
Defferre’s bid for leadership of the Left. It also aimed to promote, like so many other clubs, a new kind 
of political action which opened up the field beyond the political parties. 
\textsuperscript{60} Both Lavau and Bartoli had teaching posts in Paris by the early 1960s. Lavau, Director of Studies of 
the FNSP from 1962, was heavily involved in the \textit{sociétés de pensée}, joining the \textit{Club Jean Moulin} and 
directing a committee in the GROP (‘Antenne d’enquêtes et d’études politiques’). He also spoke and 
write widely on the question of the renewal of the non-Communist Left. Lavau’s brother, Pierre, took- 
over \textit{Citoyens 60} from Jacques Delors in 1965. For his part, Bartoli, professor at Paris I, played a 
leading role in the PSU’s \textit{Centre d’études socialistes}. 
\textsuperscript{61} Quermonne chaired a local Algerian solidarity group, \textit{Association dauphinoise nord-africaine} (ADNA), 
and used an IEP flat in Grenoble to establish a training centre for the future civil servants of an 
independent Algeria. In an interview, he recounts that the top job at the IEP should have gone to Lavau, 
but that someone with such a high political profile could not have been appointed. See J.-Y. Sabot, \textit{Le 
engagement on the part of the academics also found expression in the creation of the *Institut d'études sociales* at the university in 1958 (headed by Bartoli and subsequently De Bernis) which functioned as an education centre for trade unionists.62

**Emerging preoccupations with the basis of local democracy**

The coincidence of this intense burst of associative activity around the discussion and popular education groups with the mobilisation in the *quartiers*, contributed to an increasingly vigorous critical climate in Grenoble. Simultaneously identifiable at both the more general political and the concrete local level, there was clearly also a cross-fertilisation between the two. For many of the notions that appeared concerning the nature of urban government and local democracy arose as much from wider debates stimulated by the agony of the Fourth Republic and construction of the Fifth Republic, and conducted in groups such as *Economie et Humanisme* or the *Club Jean Moulin*, as from the day-to-day problems of city administration.

In its programme of 1962-3, the Isère branch of *Peuple et Culture* set up new urban and rural committees. The urban committee had as its central theme the provision of social, cultural and outdoor facilities. *Peuple et Culture* noted that the issue was of particular importance in Grenoble where residents had suffered the extension of the city without parallel collective infrastructure. However, its ambitions had a political dimension. One of the key stated aims was: 'to facilitate the convergence of activists’ efforts in the various sectors of family, social, civic and cultural action in order to facilitate common initiatives capable of providing local democracy with real substance.'63 Significantly, the *Peuple et Culture* committee co-operated closely with the *unions de quartier* in pursuing these goals.

This co-operation in part reflects the fact that there an overlap of personnel. If local and national debates were influencing one and other, it is important also to note that the same individuals could often be found in different organisations, contributing to

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increasingly dense, multistranded networks on the Grenoble non-Communist Left.\textsuperscript{64} Given that three leading figures (Bernard Dudek, François Hollard, Bernard Gilman) in the Isère federation of \textit{Peuple et Culture} also resided in Alliés-Alpins (a crossroads for PSU, CFTC and other non-Communist progressive Left activists), it comes as no surprise that \textit{Peuple et Culture} was able to have good contacts with the \textit{unions de quartier}. Indeed, one begins to see the importance of a relatively small number of activists in structuring local associative activity; the same names recur for much of the 1960s.\textsuperscript{65}

One of the networks that later came to play a key role in the GAM could be found in embryonic form as the \textit{Groupe d'études urbaines et municipales}. The central objective of this informal urban study group, created in May 1963, was to obtain democratic participation in municipal government, and to ‘develop new structures which could provide a human face for urban democracy.'\textsuperscript{66} Three projects were adopted, which closely reflect wider reform cycle preoccupations. First, analyse the existing situation in Grenoble, second, inform the population, third, organise training and education classes.

While precise membership lists of the \textit{Groupe d'études urbaines et municipales} are unavailable, interview material has given a good indication of those involved and how the group was put together. Here, one sees a majority of \textit{cadres moyens} and \textit{cadres supérieurs}, with a considerable number of academics, technicians and engineers. Once again, there is a heavy presence of the Catholic and Protestant Left with many associative connections. Several participants were members of the \textit{Cercle Tocqueville}, the CFTC, \textit{Economie et Humanisme, Peuple et Culture} and the \textit{unions de quartier}.

Figure I provides a basic illustration of the composition, showing some of the multiple

\textsuperscript{64} A network is ‘dense’ when it is highly interconnected, with many of a persons’ associates being associates of one another. ‘Multistranded’ refers to the existence of several links between the same individuals, membership of the same associations, for example. See Chapter Twelve, ‘The Structure of Relations and Networks,’ in C. S. Fischer, \textit{To Dwell Among Friends: Personal Networks in Town and City} (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).

\textsuperscript{65} While participatory democracy as a theme would generally be attached to the professional middle class, the situation was more complex in \textit{Peuple et Culture}. The organisation attracted a wide-range of activists and the idea for the \textit{Commission urbaine}, for example, came from a member who was a CGT organiser and employee at Caterpillar.

\textsuperscript{66} Group programme, May 1963.
strands mentioned immediately above. In order to avoid over-complex charts, it is based on just four individuals, but is representative of the group.

**Figure I: Individual trajectories within the Groupe d'études urbaines et municipales**

| 1 | Christianisme Social |
| 2 | Cercle Tocqueville |
| 3 | CFTC Commission économique et politique |
| 4 | PSU | Peuple et Culture | Economie et Humanisme | Union de quartier des Alliés Alpins |

The presence of the CFTC in these study sessions reflects the wider evolution in the direction taken by the union which allowed it to help reinforce the link between industry and university, and presaged a major presence in the GAM. As early as the mid 1950s, the Isère CFTC Federation had a strong Reconstruction current calling for a more explicit political engagement. To the annoyance of the national leadership, the federation backed Pierre Mendès France and the Front Républicain in the 1956 elections, marking a definitive rupture with the traditional political ally of the CFTC, the MRP.68 By 1963, elements of the UD69 leadership felt that with the end of the Algerian War, in which the UD-CFTC had been highly involved, something new was needed to ‘insert the union into local and regional political life.’70 Two members (and later GAM activists) of the CFTC’s Commission économique et politique therefore

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67 Based on interviews. 1, Pierre Ducros, university professor (physics); 2, Charles Roig, university teaching assistant (political science); 3, Yves Droulers, engineer (CENG); 4, François Hollard, employee (départemental veterinary services).
68 For a history of the Isère Federation, see J. Bron, La CFDT en Isère (Grenoble: Presses Universitaires de Grenoble, 1984).
69 UD = Union départementale, that is the Isère Federation of the national union
participated in the *Groupe d'études urbaines et municipales*. However, the union remained extremely cautious, reluctant to make any firm commitment.

Michel Pignon, the CFDT General Secretary in Isère since 1993, while clearly proud of his union’s achievements, offers a useful commentary:

‘The history of the CFDT in Isère can be explained by its concern to avoid being limited to the tradition sphere of trade unionism. From the Liberation onwards, the Reconstruction group, with much influence in Isère, moved in this direction. Subsequently, the policy of the departmental federation has been to enlarge its sphere of influence looking for reference points, experiments and new contacts. The trade union’s distinctiveness is linked to a local context mixing an industrial base with bold social and cultural initiatives. The characteristic of the CFDT in Isère has always been a meeting point for people from different milieu: trade unionists thus found themselves in contact with intellectuals and university professors. If the cross-over between ideas and action has given Grenoble the image of a *social and cultural laboratory* that is often talked about, the CFDT has certainly played its part.’

In fact, the *Groupe d'études urbaines et municipales* did not gather any momentum, due partly to the technical problems encountered. Participants discovered that they did not have an adequate grasp of issues such as local budgets or municipal procedure. It was not just a question of expertise, but of access and information. Indeed, the information problem was precisely the kind of issue being raised more widely in the debate on democracy in the Fifth Republic. Yet despite this, the group was able to take stock of the inadequacies of the existing municipal elite:

‘The group had failed technically in terms of its knowledge of how municipal management operated, but politically it had not failed in the sense that we realised that there was an enormous deficit in terms of knowledge, citizen awareness and also in terms of the training of elected representatives’

**Neyrpic**

Simultaneous to these early structured reflections on the future of the city, there developed a serious industrial dispute at the Neyrpic plant which served both to build

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71 Charles Roig and Yves Droulers.
74 Interview with François Hollard.
75 Information was one of the core themes of the *Assises de Vichy* in 1964. See also R. Aubin et al., *Communes et démocratie*, vol.2, pp. 57-68.
76 Interview with François Hollard.
new social alliances and strengthen the engagement of the associative milieu. Neyrpic, specialising in electrical engineering, the second largest enterprise in Grenoble, had a reputation for being the most socially advanced, a product of benevolent Catholic paternalism on the part of the owners. Salaries were commonly ten to twenty percent higher than the Grenoble average and in January 1962, the CGT had signed a deal recognising the on-site trade union section and linking wages to purchasing power. Unfortunately, subsequent financial problems led to a takeover by Alsthom and a thorough shake-up in labour relations. The new director reneged on the earlier recognition and wage deal, and began a period of restructuring which was totally unacceptable to the workforce. The ensuing conflict, beginning in December 1962, became preoccupied for Grenoble for much of the first half of 1963 until a preliminary accord was negotiated in early July.  

The dispute is extremely well documented in the secondary literature, not least because Pierre Belleville used it as a case study for his new working class thesis. The involvement of engineers and technicians alongside workers in a strike that was as much about non-material conditions (such as management style and union recognition) as salaries, provided much ammunition for the proponents of the new working class, who claimed that those working in advanced industries develop a profoundly different consciousness of their role in the production process. Indeed, the basic Marxist attachment to the importance of the industrial working class in bringing about fundamental political and social change had come under attack from the hypothesis, proposed by Belleville, and more famously, Serge Mallet. Mallet, the more radical of the two, claimed that the old working class, associated with traditional sectors of industry (mining, construction etc.) was on the wane. The new revolutionary class, capable of working for ‘human liberation’ consisted of workers, technicians and cadres in the most advanced industrial sectors. While Belleville took a different view, emphasising the complementary roles of ‘old’ working class

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and the new technical workers, both perspectives was highly revisionist and rejected by the PCF when it first appeared.

For the purposes of this thesis, several aspects of the Neyrpic strike are significant. Firstly, it served to politicise groups of engineers and technicians, who may have otherwise remained external to workplace conflict. Some of these later found their way into the GAM. One Neyrpic engineer and GAM member certainly confirms that this overall sense of engagement was widely-held. Secondly, the general response in the city was considerable, partly related to the fact that Neyrpic, a long-established local firm, was now perceived to be at the mercy of hostile outside forces. Immediate support came from within the university where a number of academics led by the dean of the law faculty created a solidarity committee (Comité universitaire de solidarité avec les travailleurs, ingénieurs et cadres de Neyrpic); a few months later, De Bernis organised a national conference on the subject of union recognition (May 1963).

Perhaps as unusual as the university’s intervention was the number of associations which, at the height of the dispute in March 1963, attended a protest meeting presided over by the head of the law faculty. In addition to the ‘usual suspects,’ the main unions (CGC, CGT, FO, CFDT) and the parties of the Left (PS, SFIO, PCF), the MRP, the young farmers of the CNJA were also represented, together with wide-range of education, cultural and leisure groups such as Vie nouvelle, Peuple et Culture, Economie et Humanisme and the FOL. It was no surprise to those present that the official representative of city hall at this gathering was MRP councillor, Germaine Voisin. Michallon’s refusal to involve himself in the conflict further served to alienate the forces vives, already unhappy with his style of urban management.

80 P. Belleville, Une nouvelle classe ouvrière, see Introduction and Chapter One ('Moins d'ouvriers').
81 Interview with Jean Rolland.
82 Le Dauphiné Libéré, 30 March 1963. The associative presence reflects the full range of the forces vives. Besides those listed above could be found the Comité universitaire, CNJA (Centre national des jeunes agriculteurs), Association départementale des maisons de jeunes, Economie et Humanisme, Peuple et Culture, Vie nouvelle, Union locale des maisons de jeunes, Cercle pour la liberté de la culture, Fédération des auberges de jeunesse, ASF (Association syndicale des familles), Tourisme et Travail, Centre d'éducation des méthodes actives, Fédération régionale des anciens d'Algérie.
Towards the GAM: transforming a critical climate into a practical project

Disenchantment with Michallon over his handling of Grenoble’s anarchic expansion intensified throughout the 1960s as the city’s problems became increasingly serious. The phenomenon was not simply the fault of the new Gaullist mayor, for the Martin administration had also been negligent. However, the accelerating population inflow meant that Michallon could not delay proposing clear solutions. The city was becoming an example of urban disfunction with a chronic shortage of infrastructure and major traffic congestion. In fact the Haut Commissariat du Plan had already noted in the early 1960s that Grenoble was equipped for a population of 40,000 not of 150,000.83 Jean Verlhac (PSU), who became adjoint d’urbanisme in 1965 was even more negative: ‘The example of Grenoble is interesting in that it shows often through absurd situations the damage caused by uncontrolled and unplanned urban growth, damage that will often be impossible to remedy within a generation.’84

It was not that Michallon was unaware of the problems facing his city. On the contrary, he seems to have understood that significant and co-ordinated intervention was needed. As early as 1960, the communes of Grenoble and Echirolles had requested the creation of a ZUP (Zone à urbaniser en priorité) to help relieve housing pressure in the centre of Grenoble. This was followed by the appointment of Parisian architect, Henri Bernard, to draw up a blueprint for Grenoble and its surrounding communes. Michallon also asked the Prefect for the creation of a Groupement d’urbanisme (14 communes) to help coordinate future urban planning. His pursuit of the Winter Olympics of 1968 for Grenoble (obtained January 1964) was aimed not only at prestige, but at securing much-needed infrastructural credits.

But little was accomplished on the ground, especially for the peripheral neighbourhoods. There was this widespread perception of inefficacy, and the problem of social and cultural infrastructural provision at city level also served to widen the breach between the municipality and its critics. Louis Néel, head of the CENG, had complained: ‘Is it reasonable to attract new researchers and students without a winter

swimming pool, without reception facilities, without a concert hall, without a reasonable theatre, without a housing policy for single people? Indeed, the movement that developed in 1964 to support the establishment of a *Maison de la Culture* in the city reflected a growing frustration with what was felt to be a non-engaged and reluctant cultural policy on the part of the incumbent administration. It seems likely that it was not just innate conservatism on the part of Michallon, but his narrow conventional social and political base which engendered a reluctance on his part to promote any project that could become difficult for the municipality to control. Moreover, his constant appeals to the prefect and the services of the state suggest also that he had not understood the necessity of himself being able to tap the necessary technical competence amongst his *adjoints*, his own *cabinet*, or in developing his municipal services.

**Commission des équipements urbains**

In November 1963, an unexpected opportunity presented itself that paved the way for the creation of the GAM, twelve months later. A decision was taken by the President of the *Comité d'Expansion Economique de l'Isère*, Jean-Louis Sylvain, with the backing of the Prefect, Maurice Doublet, to set up ten committees to look at the success of different aspects of the Fourth Plan and to develop proposals for the Fifth (1966-1970). These Commissions, which brought together a wide range of local individuals from industrialists to cultural *animateurs*, were unusual. No other CDEE seems to have gone as far in promoting local participation in the plan. Ironically, a

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86 This is an observation made by Philibert, first director of the *Maison de la Culture* and former member of *Chrétiens dans la cité*, Michel Philibert, '1964-1967: comment Grenoble a fait sa maison de la culture', *Rouge et Noir*, 95 (1978), 18-20. For more details on the project, see also P. Frappat, *Grenoble: le mythe blessé*, pp. 330-347.

87 The *Comité d'expansion économique de l'Isère* was a departmental study group, mainly funded by the *Conseil Général* whose role it was, as the name indicates, to promote the economic growth of Isère. Most départements had a *Comité d'expansion économique*, a body which developed spontaneously in certain areas after the Second World War before being institutionalised by a law of 1954 under the government of Pierre Mendes France. Participation in the CDEE varied considerable from department to department but generally the Assemblies were composed of *Conseillers généraux*, employers, mayors, professional groups (*Chambres d'agriculture*, *Chambres de commerce*, *Associations industrielles et commerciales*), trade unions (CFDT, FO from time to time, no CGT who rejected the idea on the grounds of under-representation) and other interested parties (banks, private transport, family associations, nationalised industries, tourism organisations). The Isère CDEE had a particularly high presence of academics. In the early 1960s, two members of the *bureau* were from the university of Grenoble (Veyret, Perrot). In the *Assemblée Générale*, eight place were reserved for academics.

structure established to facilitate Gaullist modernisation plans and political designs, unwittingly contributed to the formation of a movement that would reject most of what Gaullist politics represented.

Several of the Commissions were chaired by the academics who were members of the CDEE Assembly, notably Quermonne (head of the IEPG), De Bernis (Faculty of Law and Economics) and Veyret (Faculty of Geography). Quermonne’s *Commission des équipements urbains* proved to be crucial to the GAM. It brought together a number of representatives from a diverse range of structures — trade unions, local businesses, the chambers of commerce, cultural and education associations, neighbourhood committees. In this Commission were to be found seven future members of the GAM, most of them to be key participants in the movement: Hubert Dubedout (CENG), Bernard Gilman (*Peuple et Culture*), Yves Droulers (UD-CFDT *Commission économique et politique*), Aimé Maurin (former General Secretary of the UD - CFDT), Pierre Mas (CFDT), François Hollard (*Peuple et Culture, CLUQ*), Pierre Bolle (IEPG).

Some of these people knew each other, others did not. The Commission provided an opportunity for a diverse group of people to sit down and confront the same problems, to learn to work together and, for some, to understand that they shared a common perspective of Grenoble’s difficulties. It was a meeting point for a number of individuals who had been considering the city’s future through different lenses and whose paths might not necessarily otherwise have crossed, or only conflictually (for example, André Perrin of the CGT and leader of the Teisseire neighbourhood group alongside Paul-Louis Merlin, director of Merlin-Gerin). At the same time, the work on the Plans was intended to provide a precise assessment of concrete issues not just discussion. Information barriers of the kind that those in the *Groupe d'études urbaines et municipales* had been obliged to confront were less evident here, which meant that

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89 There were 55 members of Quermonne’s committee, with three sub-groups (Housing and sanitation; Educational, social and cultural facilities; Urban and déparmentale infrastructure).

90 There had been some dispute about *Peuple et Culture* participating in any government structure. This arose because of a strong *Peuple et Culture* connection to the Communist Party, and therefore a hostility towards being seen to ‘collaborate’ in the economic structures of Gaullist France. The controversy would become even fiercer at the moment of the 1965 municipals when Gilman ran as a candidate, provoking resignations from two more hardline senior local *Peuple et Culture* activists. Source: interview with Bernard Gilman.
those who later joined the GAM arrived having quite a detailed knowledge of local infrastructural questions.

While these Committees were in session (1963-5), Dubedout had occasion to create the famous water users’ association, the *Syndicat des usagers du service des eaux de la ville de Grenoble* in 1964. If the future mayor of Grenoble and resident not of the new southern quartiers, but of the city centre, was frustrated with his water supply, he could have probably just gone to the City Hall and complained. His status as Head of External Relations at the CENG would in all likelihood have won him an audience and perhaps even a practical response. Instead, he had an associative reflex which greatly impressed Grenoble activists, and involved Alliés Alpins which also had water problems. In order words, he appeared not simply concerned with his own personal convenience. Through the *Syndicat des usagers du service des eaux*, he had further contact with Alliés Alpins activists, several of whom he had met in the *Commission des équipements urbains*. The encounters between Dubedout and the Alliés Alpins residents proved important for later cooperation in the GAM; the social milieu were very different with certain initial suspicions, quickly assuaged, about the ‘bourgeois’ from the centre of town.

The water episode illustrated a crucial point for the future GAMists, a point that was also being absorbed by the participants of the *Commission des équipements urbains*. If the incumbent administration had been ineffective, it was not simply through a lack of financial resources or inadequate time devoted to managing the city, although both of these were problems: it was also for want of technical competence. The GAM’s later insistence on the technical aspect of urban problems was not simply a consequence of having such a large number of engineers in the movement. It was because the problems of the unions de quartier or the issues dealt with in the *Commission des équipements urbains* had shown that good intentions were not

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91 Although we have very little data on the composition of this group, newspaper articles in *Le Dauphiné Libéré* give some details. Amongst the office-holders of the bureau, five were cadres supérieurs of which three engineers. The members of the bureau, however, show more diversity with several employees and a housewife. The total size of the association seems initially to have been about thirty. See *Le Dauphiné Libéré*, 28 January 1964.

92 François Hollard and Bernard Gilman.

93 Interview with Louis Liénard.
enough to control the development of a rapidly changing city. Whatever the political goals, a mastery of the questions involved was needed. Yet one sees here the roots of two fundamental difficulties with the GAM project. Firstly, the balance between greater democracy and technical efficacy was not always clear. Secondly, the level of expertise needed to be able to participate effectively in complex urban management questions risked excluding substantial elements of the population.

The formation of the *Groupe d'action municipale* (GAM)

'A legend as persistent as it is untrue would like the GAM to have emerged, like Venus from the foam of the sea, or at least the swirls of the Grenoble waters,' Bernard Montergnole, GAM member and subsequently PS deputy.  

The water users' association has often been taken to have been the sole precipitating factor in the history of the citizen action group. Certainly Dubedout's arrival in power is almost inextricably linked to the his water difficulties, but his intervention in public life came relatively late. A range of activities, particularly the *Groupe d'études urbaines et municipales* as we have seen, had already prepared the ground. Without the associative network, Dubedout might have ended up allied to the Gaullists, as did other modernisers in early in the Fifth Republic.

Without Dubedout, however, the associative militants lacked an effective political expression. Certainly, the GAM was shaped by the presence in its ranks of the core associative and trade union elements pursuing initiatives in local democracy characteristic of the early 1960s. But while Grenoble was certainly experiencing an associative effervescence, there was no sign of any real alternative political structures emerging at that time. The *Groupe d'études urbaines et municipales* had run out of steam, and if anything, there was less activity on specifically urban questions outside the state sponsored CDEE planning review, which the Prefect hoped would harness the *forces vives* to the Gaullists locally and nationally. Prior to the emergence of the GAM in 1964, there was more striking political activity in neighbouring Lyon, for example, where the *Cercle Tocqueville* was well organised at this level. In this sense,

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94 'Quelques points d'histoire,' in *GAM Informations* 9 (January 1967).
Dubedout’s intervention was crucial to give a real direction to a drifting set of preoccupations.

In the Commission des équipements urbains, Quermonne recalls detecting a sentiment on the part of the assembled individuals that something more global than sectoral pressure groups such as Dubedout’s or that for the Maison de la Culture was necessary.\(^95\) To their eyes, none of the political parties had the vision, energy or technical expertise to overcome Grenoble’s infrastructural problems, let alone create an environment for a successful winter games in 1968. Indeed, according to Pierre Bolle (IEPG professor and secretary of Quermonne’s committee), Louis Néel (director of CENG) and industrialist Paul-Louis Merlin were so worried about Grenoble’s future as a centre for industry and science that they decided that Michallon had to be prevented from gaining a second term in office, and set about deciding an appropriate strategy.\(^96\)

With the municipal elections of 1965 approaching, Dubedout was encouraged by Néel to try and develop a political alternative, and given a certain amount of time-off from his responsibilities at the CENG to do so.\(^97\) Drawing on contacts made in the Commission des équipements urbains, as well as colleagues at the CENG, Dubedout was able to assemble a number of different sets of activists amongst the Grenoble population. Firstly, those who were highly politicised and engaged in or around the PSU (and previously MLP, Jeune République etc.), as well as in associations. Secondly, those who played a part in trade union, cultural, educational or intellectual life through associations, but who remained suspicious or outside party politics. Finally, there were those, like himself, who had little history in Grenoble’s associative or political world, but who wished to work towards the modernisation and future of the city.

This combination was made possible firstly because Dubedout was persuaded by politically committed activists around him in the GAM to drop his initial conception.

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\(^95\) Interview with Jean-Louis Quermonne.
\(^96\) Interview with Pierre Bolle.
\(^97\) Interview with Pierre Bolle.
of a technical group which would run for election primarily on the basis of competent management.\(^98\) While he later became a symbol of the *deuxième gauche*, elected a PS député in 1973 and subsequently appointed by Mauroy in 1981 to head the CDSQ (*Commission pour le développement social des quartier*),\(^99\) at the outset it was not very easy to position this Catholic former naval officer on the standard political spectrum. Although he was not associated with it, his preferences in fact seemed closer to some of the thinking being expressed by Jean Barets’ club, *Technique et démocratie*, which emphasised humanist values and modern scientific processes as essential guides to political decision-making.\(^100\)

Following the advice of Quermonne, the advisers to which Dubedout turned for help in constructing the GAM -- particularly Droulers and Roig (heavily committed to the CFTC *Reconstruction* current), as well as a number of associative activists from the *Commission des équipements urbains* -- represented a somewhat different current. While deeply critical of the political status quo, they situated themselves fairly unambiguously on the Left and one of their priorities was to ease Dubedout in that direction.\(^101\) They were not prepared to embrace a purely managerial approach which, in their eyes, was far too close for comfort to the notion of depoliticised administration that the Gaullists had been trying to encourage, appealing to the professional middle classes by playing on a frequently-held hostility to the old parties of the Fourth Republic.

The solution adopted was typical of reform cycle thinking in its pragmatism and de-ideologised conception of local government. It could satisfy partisans of the *deuxième gauche* without unduly alarming the less committed elements of the GAM. Central to the platform was the desire was to create a new urban politics starting not

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\(^98\) Y. Droulers and C. Roig, *Rapport sur le Groupe d’action municipale* (Grenoble: Internal CFDT document, 1965). This was confirmed in interviews with other actors, notably Pierre Bolle, Pierre Ducros and Daniel Hollard.

\(^99\) Many had been expecting a ministerial appointment for Dubedout in 1981. His failure to enter the government is attributed to the civil war in Isère between Mermaz, mayor of Vienne (former CIR and Mitterrand loyalist), and the Grenoble PS (strongly Rocardian). Dubedout consistently attempted to remain above party in-fighting, but nonetheless may have been its victim. See L. Ratel, *Hubert Dubedout: le bâtisseur*, pp. 207-211.


\(^101\) Interview with Charles Roig.
from a priori ideological standpoints, but from concrete everyday problems, problems that were to be solved with maximum citizen participation and minimum party manipulation:

'It is necessary to leave behind the old system of 'notables' which was driving citizens to depend entirely on several well-known figures acting most often without answering to anybody concerning the mandate with which they had been entrusted. The elaboration of policy concerns all citizens, even those who do not identify with a party. Equally, one has to ensure the active involvement of all organisations which express the needs of the population.'

In the same tract, there was also a strong commitment to social justice:

'The GAM has never tried to politicise the elections, nor to hide the political importance of the municipal elections in a large town such as Grenoble. For its part, it has chosen policies which take into account the largest number of people as possible and most particularly THE MOST DISADVANTAGED.'

This language contrasts substantially with the more radical direction taken by the GAM after 1968, when alienation and autogestion were key elements of the vocabulary. However, it should be emphasised that the early Grenoble GAM programme was far from being a detailed manifesto. The speed with which the group had been assembled, the absence of figures with prior political experience and the lack of any serious expectation of power, meant that the strategies of GAM municipal management were only fully worked-out during the first mandate, 1965-1971.

The composition of the GAM

The GAM was a coalition of seasoned militants looking for a structured basis to implement their preoccupations and a new opportunity for certain individuals who wished to involve themselves in municipal affairs outside the parties. However, the central core of the group was dominated by the former. Here were to be found activists from the unions de quartier and the CFDT, Cercle Tocqueville, Vie nouvelle 1

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102 GAM leaflet, 6 March 1965.
103 Detailed documentary information on GAM membership patterns is scarce. The analysis here is based on examination of a membership list from January 1967 providing occupational details, and on interviews with twelve central GAM activists (Pierre Bolle, Pierre Coll, Yves Droulers, Pierre Ducros, Bernard Gilman, François Hollard, François Lalande, Louis Liénard, Pierre Mas, Charles Roig, Jean Rolland, Albert Rousseau).
Citoyens 60, Association syndicale des familles and Christianisme social.\textsuperscript{104} Notable is a considerable Catholic-Left involvement, with a number of currents represented, ranging from former MLP members to Vie nouvelle’s local leadership, as well as a Protestant minority which exercised significant influence.\textsuperscript{105} While it is difficult to determine the precise impact of these religious currents, their presence mirrors the wider patterns observed in Chapter One, with Catholic engagement a significant feature of the reform cycle.

Amongst GAM ranks, the CFDT (the CFTC having recently deconfallationalised) bulked large. The membership of nine senior local figures reinforced the tentative engagement that had been undertaken in the Groupe d’études urbaines et municipales of 1963.\textsuperscript{106} Although the unions’ agenda had moved further by 1965 with the suggestion of explicit involvement in local political life, there was still great sensitivity within the UD-CFDT regarding a more ‘political’ outlook. Although discreetly backed by UD Secretary-General François Genas, the key proponents of this line of action within the Commission économique et politique had to tread carefully.\textsuperscript{107} But while there was an intense debate about the issue, the view was taken that the union should try and ally itself with broader forces working for social and economic change. In early 1965, once it was clear what the GAM represented, the Federal Committee took the decision to allow three of its officials (Pierre Coli, Aimé Maurin, Yves Droulers) to be candidates in the March elections. They had to resign from their union responsibilities since the statutes did not allow simultaneous political and trade union office-holding, but they were to keep a close liaison with the Commission économique et politique.

\textsuperscript{104} For the 1965 municipals, Vie nouvelle and Citoyens 60 members could be found on lists in about 75 communes, although not in their associative capacity. See G. Adam, ‘Elections Municipales’, Vers la Vie nouvelle, 66/4 (1965), 16.
\textsuperscript{105} In particular, Pierre Bolle (Groupe d’études urbaines et municipales), Pierre Ducros (Christianisme social, Cercle Tocqueville, SNESUP) and François Hollard (CLUQ, Economie et Humanisme).
\textsuperscript{106} Five GAM members were former or current bureau members of the UD-CFDT (Union départementale, Isère). They were Maurin (Secretary-General, 1956-61), Libérelle (Assistant Secretary-General, 1957-8), Coli (Secretary 1948-9), Leysisieux (Bureau member 1961-2) and Chevalier (Secretary UL-CFDT - Union locale, Grenoble). Two of these figures, Maurin and Coli were in the UD-CFDT Commission Economique et Politique together with four other GAM members, Droulers (Head), Roig, Mas and Rolland.
\textsuperscript{107} Interview with Charles Roig who emphasises the polarisation of opinion within the CFDT on this issues.
In terms of residence patterns, about a third of GAMists were from the fastest-growth southern quarters, with just over a fifth inhabiting the city centre. The cluster of members in three areas of the south -- Alliés-Alpins, La Capuche and Eaux Claires -- is highly significant. As we have already seen, Alliés-Alpins was a particularly important activist cross-roads, and the unions de quartier of La Capuche and Eaux Claires were also highly active. Indeed, Eaux Claires was one of the most explicit proponents of the ideal of local democracy as represented by the concept of the neighbourhood associations. The unions de quartier president, although not a member of the GAM, wrote to Dubedout during the election campaign, wishing him every success and hoping for a development of GAM methods and resources once the municipals were over.

Professional characteristics

A general socio-professional analysis of the GAM indicates that it was overwhelmingly a middle-class mobilisation, with a specific concentration amongst technical and intellectual groups (see Appendix 7a). Over 50% of members were engineers and teachers (both university and school), with few working-class or petit bourgeois (shopkeepers or artisans) adherents. The GAMists tended to be young, generally aged between 30 and 40, and of recent implantation in the city. Interestingly though, the presence of engineers (32.0%) and liberal professions (14.7%) is much stronger than the national GAM statistics presented by Sellier, which already themselves indicate a considerable over-representation. Indeed, engineers were also prominent in other aspects of Grenoble life. Records of the parent-teachers association in the city, for example, reveal that this profession constituted 23% of candidates (37 out of 164) for the central committee between 1960 and 1968. Sellier later found that 31% of GAMists were members of parent-teachers associations.

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108 Calculated from the first GAM membership list. Personal archives of Pierre Coli.
110 M. Sellier, 'Les Groupes d'action municipale' (thesis and article).
111 Calculated from information given in the Bulletin trimestriel de l'Association des parents élèves des Lycées et Collèges de Grenoble. ADI, PER1159/1.
112 M. Sellier, 'Les Groupes d'action municipale' pp. 96-114 (GAM questionnaire results).
But basic socio-professional details present an incomplete picture of the movement. Firstly, several influential GAM activists amongst the inner circle dominated by the associative and trade union networks, had not a middle-class but a working-class occupational background. These individuals, notably four who became GAM councillors in 1965 (two of whom were adjoints in key posts, social affairs and culture) all came from in and around the Alliés-Alpins. In the membership analysis presented in Appendix 7a, their presence is somewhat masked by the label used; for example, one who had become an instiuteur had formerly worked in a tractor company and was self-educated; another had started as a groom in a bank at the age of fourteen, but had become Secretary-General of the housing cooperative Baticoop in Grenoble.

Secondly, there is a need to dissect individual occupational categories. If one examines the ‘engineers’ in the GAM, the complexity of the movement becomes further evident. Dubedout, for example, stated his occupation as engineer at the CENG even though his function was as director of External Affairs, an important management position. The status implications of this are further enhanced by his history as a former marine officer, which gave him a certain social standing not shared by most of the research engineers in the CENG. Indeed, there were several other GAM ‘engineers’ who occupied management positions in the CENG (generally inhabiting the boulevards or the city centre), and the movement was in certain respects a meeting of different milieus from within the research centre. While reference is often made to the role of ‘engineers’ as a group, a particular legacy of the 1930s and 1940s, one has to make distinctions between general profession and workplace position.

In addition, there were also obvious differences in politicisation. Several CENG research engineers in the GAM were UD-CFDT office-holders (two from the Commission économique et politique) and who found their way into the movement through the union route. Others were less explicitly political, even hostile to the Left.

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113 By this I do not mean generational mobility in comparison to parents, but the profession of the individual concerned during his/her working life.

114 For an excellent discussion of the representation of the engineer in France during this period, see L. Boltanksi, *Les cadres*, pp. 120-132.
but whose doubts were assuaged by the confidence they had in Dubedout. Besides the CENG contingent, the GAM also attracted engineers from privately-owned industrial enterprises, such as Neyrpic or Merlin Gerin. These employees existed in a far more politicised workplace, particularly at Neyrpic after the dispute of 1963. While the CENG was certainly not without some management-employee tensions, the context was entirely different.

In sum, one has to be careful not to use too broad a brush to label the GAM. Certainly, it was a movement that appealed particularly to those working in the advanced technical professions, and the fact of recent implantation in the city makes the label ‘new’ middle class an appropriate one in this particular sense. Using both geographical and occupational criteria, it is possible to identify a group of individuals connected to the expansion of scientific research, modern industry and higher education facilities, whose ‘newness’ lay precisely in the combination of residential mobility and connection to the fastest-growing industrial sectors of the city. However, the reservations about the ‘new’ middle class category made in the Introduction (p. 19) apply in the sense that one would still have to include in such a definition commercial cadres (for example, sales and advertising executives) who were relatively under-represented in the GAM and associative life in general. Finally, the numerically insignificant, but qualitatively important engagement of non middle-class activists tends to be missed in accounts which emphasise above all the ‘new middle class’ character of the GAM.

GAM: movement or party?

Classifying the Grenoble GAM thus presents something of a conceptual dilemma. Its raison d'être, to contest the 1965 municipal elections as an organisational entity, immediately marks it from the clubs of the reform cycle. For a club is classically an adjunct to the electoral process, rather than a part of it, a place for discussion, training, writing or regrouping away from the party political fray. Even those that became involved in the political process, such as Club Jean Moulin or Citoyens 60, either joined a federation or gave their backing to specific initiatives rather than standing at elections. Their engagement as structures in elections was never direct (Technique et
démostatie is the one obvious exception, fielding candidates in the legislative elections of 1968.)

More than a club then, at first view it appears that the GAM might be an interesting early example of a New Social Movement (NSM). Here was a predominantly middle-class group, emerging in the mid 1960s, rejecting both the structure and ideology of political parties, criticising many of the alienating consequences of modern urban life and pushing forward citizen-based quality of life concerns, most particularly highly-inclusive forms of local democracy. Indeed, NSM theory has been seeking to categorise as NSMs precisely those groups emerging since the 1960s which have chosen to define themselves outside the conventionally accepted party political system in order to articulate new demands. However, despite the commitment to political innovation, measured against the social movements which began to emerge in the late 1960s in advanced industrialised countries, the GAM falls short in terms of its relatively limited forms of mobilisation.

At the same time, the GAM’s engagement in the electoral process immediately poses the question of party. Are groups which contest elections within the established political arena de facto parties? For example, the varying electoral success of the Greens across Western Europe has brought to light the existence of an ‘intermediate’ category which blurs the boundaries between party and movement. In this respect, Katzenstein’s description of the German Greens as being ‘a hybrid between social movement and political party’ highlights the conceptual issues raised by the political engagement of what had been seen as a highly mobilised NSM. Indeed, the Greens’ accession to national power in the 1998 German Bundestag elections raises more dramatically the question of how far institutionalisation within government determines the difference between movement and party, a question already arising in the länder.

116 cf. p. 60.
I label the Grenoble GAM an urban political movement: political rather than social movement because of its electoral commitment and lack of mass mobilisation; a movement rather than a party for two central reasons. First, the group was formed to address a series of local issues and did not have electoral ambitions beyond the city (such as representation in the National Assembly). Second, GAM membership did not present an incompatibility with adherence to a political party. Several GAMists were PSU members, and one was in the SFIO. Eventually, with the creation of the PS, double-membership became virtually the norm, with the PS providing the national horizon lacking in the GAM.

**Dubedout as political entrepreneur**

In certain respects, the creation of the GAM mirrors the kind of processes described from the outset by resource mobilisation theory (RMT) looking at social movements. Writing in 1973, Obserschall, for example, made two observations of significance for both subsequent social movement research and for the present analysis. Firstly, he emphasised that preexisting structures were essential for efficient mobilisation. For example, the rapid rise of the Free Speech Movement (FSM) at Berkeley University, California was only possible because of a ‘prior network of political, civil rights and special interest groups.’ Secondly, he saw as crucial the role of movement leaders as political entrepreneurs, the ‘architects of organisation’ who dynamise individuals and obtain resources. Political entrepreneurship as a concept was also developed by other rational choice analysts in the 1970s.

The importance of networks was clearly crucial to the ability of the GAM to grow, and to develop relays in diverse sectors of the population. Dubedout seems to have played the role of ‘political entrepreneur,’ providing credible leadership skills and catalysing the energies of a number of activists who had not found a clear structure of political expression. Yet, one should be careful about the connotations of the term.

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119 Ibid., p. 157 ff.
Given the precarious early position of the GAM, Dubedout could have had no serious expectation of becoming mayor. He was not an *arriviste*, seeking to capitalise upon a network, nor did he have much prior knowledge of the political world. Indeed, in this respect, he was dependent upon close advisors who could help him navigate the tricky negotiations that followed on the municipal elections of 1965.

It is impossible to have any certainty regarding Dubedout’s ambitions, incentives, gains or risks that engagement in the GAM may have had for him. However, this question of individual cost / benefit calculation which forms a staple of rational choice explanations of public action is easier to resolve for a number of GAM members who have been interviewed at length about their political engagements. What emerges is a considerable challenge to the utilitarian psychological model which assumes the existence of a ‘pseudo-universal individual’ prevalent in rational choice analysis.

While a marginal number of GAMists seem to have joined the movement in the hope that participation in municipal government would bring them a certain amount of professional advance, this crude form of incentive is far removed from the religious inspiration and background of many associative and trade union activists within the inner core of the GAM.

The problem for Olsonian-inspired analysis is the failure to distinguish between ‘economic’ (Olsonian) and ‘rational’ man. As J. Elster notes:

‘There can be no way of justifying the substantive assumption that all forms of altruism, solidarity and sacrifice really are ultra-subtle forms of self-interests, except by the trivialising gambit of arguing that people have concern for others because they want to avoid being distressed by their distress.’

Although many NSM theorists are well aware of the shortcomings of economic-centred rational choice explanations for political engagement, the role of values has

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121 Dubedout died in 1986.
123 Several GAMists mention a property developer and an architect whose motives for joining the GAM seemed linked to the hope of gaining municipal contracts in the event of victory. ‘At the beginning, when we were presenting a municipal list, there were no criteria for membership. There was no recommendation. Therefore someone like [name to be kept private] could very well say, “I’m interested by the GAM,” without us making him confess whether his reasons were valid or not.’ Interview with Albert Rousseau, confirmed in an interview with Yves Droulers.
not been extensively addressed. Indeed, as far as religion is concerned, besides a small amount of work on African-Americans, this is a neglected field.

Because questions other than individual preference and psychology have guided this thesis, and because also of the limited data available from which inferences may be drawn, I do not intend to make any more than tentative observations about why people participate. However, the importance of the non-Communist Catholic and Protestant Left needs to be noted. For most of these activists, particularly those working in the public sector, it was difficult to see any selective incentives. Certainly, the small number who became municipal councillors may have seen advantages, but few stayed for more than one mandate, and the initial agreement was that none should stay after two terms in office, or attempt to acquire any further political posts.

Furthermore, the workload was punishing, with many meetings -- even those concerning the Olympic Games of 1968 -- held in evenings because all councillors (including Dubedout) continued with their jobs.

Furthermore, what frequently emerges from their comments about motivation is a basic commitment to upgrading the common good. As one Left-Catholic, who headed a transport action group in Grenoble during the early 1970s, explains:

'It is a sort of personal disinterest. We are activists because we believe it needs to be done, because we think that it is good for the community. We are not sure that we are totally correct in the ideas that we defend. But it is a kind of moral demand. We feel the need to defend our ideas, but more to to influence those in power more than to take power. Or to take power if there is no other alternative.'

Without idealising this form of activism, it is important to be aware of this aspect, particularly given the important role that Catholics played more generally within the reform cycle. Certainly, there is no evidence that Dubedout or his original cohort of GAM councillors used public office for private or professional gain.

125 In an article on values and rational choice, M. Hechter also notes that research programmes need to be extended in this direction. See M. Hechter, 'Role of Values in Rational Choice Theory', *Rationality and Society*, 6/3 (1994), 318-33.

126 For an interesting recent article demonstrating the role that religion serves for individual and collective action amongst the African-American population, see F. C. Harris, 'Something Within: Religion as a Mobilizer of African-American Political Activism', *The Journal of Politics*, 56/1 (1994), 4268.

127 Interview with Jean Silvardière.
Conclusion

Highly specific local factors in a facilitating national climate account for the emergence of the GAM in late 1964. Crucial were associative patterns which predated the massive expansion of the 1950s. The neighbourhood committees of the inter-war period provided a model which could be built upon twenty years later, and Resistance experiences linked to the Uriage École de cadres experiment turned the city into a laboratory in the first years following the Liberation. In others words, even before a more generalised reform cycle, there were forces at work in the city seeking to define a distinctive public sphere.

The reform cycle coincided with unprecedented growth in the city: large numbers of relatively young, educated, professional migrants arrived amidst infrastructural chaos. An urban planning breakdown provided the immediate point of grievance and the new arrivals were willing recruits. However, their activism was refracted through the lens of reform cycle themes as the sociétés de pensée were established, locally as nationally, and existing associations also mobilised. The example of the Groupe d'études urbaines et municipales, bringing together associative and trade union activists, is a perfect example of the synergy created between practical local questions and broader political discontent. Indeed, the GAM had rather less to do with a tangible collective mobilisation in the city than serving to link various small groups preoccupied by Grenoble’s problems.

Referring to Dubedout’s water problems, which had catalysed the former naval officer into civic action, Jacques Julliard described the GAM as the ‘Club Jean Moulin coming down off its reforming throne to deal with the taps.’ Yet the incapacity of the Grenoble reform cycle associations to organise themselves politically made the likelihood of any concerted attempt to gain some kind of elected mandate in the city almost zero. An accidental meeting of different milieu, unwittingly provided by the French state in the Commission des équipements urbains was of key

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importance. The GAM was initially a collaboration of two currents -- associative and technical -- resulting from entrepreneurial initiatives taken by Dubedout.
Chapter Three: The emergence of a new Grenoble political elite and the institutionalisation of participation politics

The 1965 municipals: political opportunities and insertion into the electoral process

Although political opportunity structure (POS) has had a particular vogue in recent NSM enquiry, it has a much older pedigree in urban analysis going back to Peter Eisinger in 1973. In a sense, POS is a more elaborate way of stating the importance of political context, and is at its most interesting in comparative work.¹ The social movement literature increasingly views POS as fundamental in explaining the emergence of movements. In the context of cycles, a number of studies insist on the importance of POS in explaining the appearance of 'initiator' or 'early riser' movements in reform, protest or contention cycles, whose activities then inspire further mobilisation.²

Given the nature of the GAM as a political movement, this section develops the idea of POS slightly differently to show how the GAM was able to enter the arena of party politics. It might be argued of course that, following the kind of approach adopted by Tarrow or McAdam, POS could be used as a way of explaining the broader climate in which the GAM was created: within the reform cycle specific political opportunities might be identified which 'provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure.'³ However, given the absence of initiatives similar to the GAM elsewhere in France at the time, and given the fragility of Grenoble’s urban reform networks in terms of

¹ While Eisinger used it to examine why distinctive patterns of urban protest emerge within the political and institutional environment of American cities, others have adopted a trans-national approach; for example, Banaszak has compared the American and Swiss woman suffrage movements, Kitschelt has looked at European anti-nuclear movements, while Kriesi et al. have examined national patterns in the context of European ecology, gay rights, peace and women's groups. See P. K. Eisinger, 'The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities', American Political Science Review, 67/1 (1973), 11-28; L. A. Banaszak, Why Social Movements Succeed or Fail: Opportunity, Structure and the Struggle for Woman Suffrage (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996); H. Kitschelt, 'Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies', British Journal of Political Science, 16/1 (1986), 57-85; H. Kriesi et al., New Social Movements in Western Europe (London: UCL Press, 1995).


³ S. Tarrow, Power in Movement, p. 85.
enduring organisation prior to Dubedout's intervention little more than six months before the 1965 elections, it would be difficult to identify structural features that were clearly encouraging political or social movements. Furthermore, as I will show, in terms of electoral opportunities, the odds were heavily stacked against the GAM.

In terms of GAM electoral participation, the POS is defined as consisting of two inter-interlinking variables: the electoral system (variations of proportional representation or first-past-the-post methods) and the prevailing alliance preferences of established political parties. It is these two inter-related factors which controlled the environment in which the group could operate. I suggest that the POS militated both against the kind of non-Communist Left / citizen action list that eventually emerged, and against the GAM being able to run for office as anything other than a junior coalition partner. Indeed, if anything, it was the parties of the Centre and Right who were the most open to a deal with Dubedout's group -- a somewhat ironic situation given the hostility to them felt by the majority of GAM activists. To draw on Chris Rootes' useful observation about the neglected role of contingency in POS analysis, I argue that it was not a changed local political opportunity structure which allowed the SFIO-PSU-GAM accord, but contingency in consequence of the failure of expected outcomes.4

The GAM was in a curious position. Recently formed, totally untried on the municipal scene and composed of politically inexperienced individuals, few in the group expected to be in power, and certainly not to see Dubedout as mayor of Grenoble. How therefore could it attempt to realise the ambition of promoting an alternative form of municipal politics? In terms of the technicalities of electoral competition, proportional representation had already been eliminated for large towns in 1959, when a two ballot system was introduced. But even under this modified electoral mechanism, it would have at least been possible for the GAM to put together a list for the first ballot in order to test support. Depending on the outcome, the rules allowed for the combining of forces with other groups for the second.5

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5 Under the new 1959 system, towns > 60,001 inhabitants would still elect 37 councillors but PR was abandoned in towns of less than 120,000 inhabitants, where instead there was a two ballot election,
However, the rules for the municipal elections of 1965 made the situation much more challenging, for that contest had become entangled with the nomination stages of the first popular direct presidential election of the Fifth Republic scheduled for December 1965. The Gaullists sought to undermine the Third Force majorities that ruled most municipalities in order to drive the centrists in them towards the UDR, leaving municipal socialists only with unwelcome potential PCF allies. They particularly aimed at Defferre’s centre-right alliance in Marseilles in order to contrary his bid to create the new Grande Fédération (joining the MRP and the Radicals to the SFIO with the aim of bolstering his presidential candidacy and providing a plausible alternative candidacy to the UNR). If Defferre lost his centre-right allies, he would lose Marseille, and cease to pose a presidential threat to the UNR; if he made too many concessions to the Marseille right, he might keep the city but that would torpedo his national strategy.

The Pompidou government consequently modified the two ballot, first-past-the-post system used in communes with more than 30,000 inhabitants. The new rules had several distinctive features which impacted significantly upon local election strategy. It was necessary to have obtained 10% of the vote on the first to qualify for the second ballot. A list winning a majority (over 50%) on the first ballot took all the council seats. If no list swept the first round, the list which obtained a plurality (more than any other list) in the second ballot won all the seats in the Council. Furthermore, no merging of lists between ballots was permitted. The intention was to promote early list agreements before the first ballot to precipitate the kind of re-alignment favourable to the Gaullists outlined in the previous paragraph.6

'scrutin majoritaire.' On the first ballot, electors marked their preferred candidate (but no numbered ranking system as in Italy, for example). They were allowed to 'panacher' the lists, that is, cross out candidates from one list and insert candidates from another. Candidates were re-elected if they gained a majority of votes and more than 25% of those registered.

In the second ballot, lists could be merged or new candidates added. All that was required was a simple majority to be elected as a councillor. In principle, the system allowed for candidates from different lists to be elected. But in practice, the favourite list tended to win all the seats.

6 If this was the intention, the outcome of the 1965 municipal elections was at least a qualified success. While the Gaullists increased their vote, the real winners of the election were the PCF, who gained nine towns over 30,000, at the expense of the Left and Centre-Left. The SFIO came off worse, losing eight councils. The Gaullists' most dangerous opponents were of course the non-Communist Left.
On the Left, attitudes to the GAM during the opening of serious negotiations towards the end of 1964 did not bode well, for none of the parties wished to negotiate with it at the outset. The Communists were implacably opposed to non-party structures, while the GAM saw the PCF as representing the worst example of the triumph of ideology and apparatus over everyday participatory urban politics. The essential position of the PCF was that a Union of the Left (PCF - SFIO - PSU) could be constructed. The Communist insistence on alliance with the Socialists was also influenced by the fact that they too were out to undermine Defferre’s plans which, if successful, could have again isolated the party. The PCF’s hostility to the GAM only increased in the aftermath of the elections, as the party became marginalised.

The PSU also felt some initial suspicion towards the GAM, despite the presence of several of their own members in Dubedout’s group. While some commentators have retrospectively portrayed the successful GAM-PSU entente as the pre-ordained outcome, this was not the case. The party was wholeheartedly committed towards an alliance with the PCF, particularly given an unusually strong PSU local working-class base, consisting of former MLP members, many in the CGT. Furthermore, despite the water episode, Dubedout himself was relatively unknown on the local scene, apparently apolitical and occupying a professional position that appeared to place him beyond the PSU’s natural constituency. It was not until negotiations with the PCF reached an impasse that the PSU looked seriously at the question of an accommodation with the GAM.

For its part, the SFIO was also committed to reaching a deal with the PSU and PCF if possible. There were thoughts about an alliance with the MRP and potentially a Third Force list against both UNR and Communists, but several factors militated against this alternative. Most importantly, the strong latent anti-clericalism in both SFIO party base and elements of the leadership made a first ballot deal with the MRP

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7 See, for example, L. Ratel, *Hubert Dubedout*, who claims that the PSU could claim a 'natural paternity' towards the GAM, p. 36. It should be noted, however, that everything took place in a very short space of time. While the GAM was properly constituted by December 1964, its creation was not publicly announced until 8 January 1965, some eleven days before the breakdown of negotiations between PSU, SFIO, and PCF. Inattentive analysis may therefore have taken precipitousness for inevitability.

8 Such was the strength of the MLP locally that one third of CGT activists in the metallurgy industry were members of the party. Source: C. A. Micaud, 'The "New Left" in France', *World Politics*, 10/4 (1958), p. 545.
difficult to achieve in Grenoble. This was coupled with the impression that the MRP was moving rightwards and was an unreliable ally. The strong Catholic presence in the GAM also posed a problem for some Socialists. It also seems that the more defensive, conservative Molletist SFIO members saw Dubedout, who had resigned from the navy at the beginning of the Algerian War in frustration at the bloody impasse in which he saw France heading, not only as a technocrat but as a sort of deserter or conscientious objector.

The most positive initial response to the GAM came in fact from the Centre and the Right, where Dubedout was seen as a desirable partner; indeed, he seemed to be precisely the kind of candidate that the Gaullists were looking for. Planning to boost UNR core support in the municipals through an appeal to de-politicised municipal management, Jacques Baumel, senior party strategist and propaganda specialist, had written to party activists across France: ‘You need to move beyond the narrow circle of our activists and make more contacts with local professionals [...] The contribution of young active elements (managers, doctors, vets, civil servants) is essential for our future’9 Of necessity more politically discreet, the prefect of Isère, Maurice Doublet, close to the Gaullists, made an apparently non-partisan appeal to engineers:

‘It is appropriate for engineers to be aware of their responsibilities in society. Engineers are first and foremost citizens, invested, in consequence, with precise, concrete and immediate obligations. [...] They must get involved in economic, political and social life.’10

Interest in Dubedout was increased by the tensions that existed with the ruling municipal coalition. Michallon was deeply unpopular with many fellow Gaullists -- particularly Grenoble député Jean Vanier -- as well as with the Independents and the MRP. A perceived autocratic style and ineffectiveness in managing Grenoble’s problems had raised doubts about his viability as a unifying candidate for a centre-right list in 1965. With the local Gaullist party in disarray over the nomination, Jacques Baumel used a lecture visit to Grenoble in early January to try and calm nerves.11 At the same time, he asked Maurice Doublet, the local Prefect, to set up a

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11 Baumel came to speak on 9th January, the day after the official announcement of the GAM’s existence.
meeting with Dubedout. While the circumstances of this encounter remain somewhat unclear and enshrined in local lore, it seems that Dubedout was not prepared to associate himself with a municipal team whom he regarded as having failed the city.\(^\text{12}\)

If the Gaullists saw Dubedout as their kind of man, many in the MRP were similarly impressed. The party’s two more socially progressive councillors, Germaine Voisin and Mme Jean Perrot (*Economie et Humanisme*), both of whom later joined the GAM, were particularly active in pushing for contacts to be made.\(^\text{13}\) But the MRP was also deeply divided. Younger elements wanted to follow the signal given by the 1964 cantonal elections in which the expanding south of Grenoble, containing most new electors, had strongly voted Left (see Appendix 8). However, more Conservative members of the party sought the stability of the centre-right alliance, expressing fears that, should the MRP cut loose from this mooring point, it would find itself totally marginalised. The internal debates reveal the anxiety of a party whose ambiguous identity was putting its future in jeopardy.

**Communist errors**

Ultimately, the GAM was able to compete on the non-Communist Left due to a series of major tactical blunders made by the PCF, which effectively excluded the PCF from Grenoble municipal politics until 1977. The party’s problems had begun with the cantonal elections of 1964 when an ill-judged decision to stand down the better-placed Communist nominee for the SFIO candidate, Georges Martin (son of former mayor Léon Martin), in the Canton sud, had given an unfortunate signal to the electorate and created a blaze of controversy within the party (for results, see Appendix 8).\(^\text{14}\) The

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\(^\text{13}\) Minutes of MRP local and départemental bureau meetings, January - March 1965 (ADI 59 J 24/5).

\(^\text{14}\) The Isère PCF Section was trying to pursue a *département*-wide Union of the Left (*Union de la Gauche*) strategy for the second ballot of the 1964 Cantonal and judged that, in the Canton Sud, Georges Martin, the SFIO candidate, would have a better chance of winning. Thus, in exchange for SFIO withdrawal in Vizille, a neighbouring traditionally Communist canton, the PCF agreed to withdraw its candidate, Jean Giard, in the Canton Sud where the incumbent was Grenoble mayor, Michallon. Unfortunately, the local SFIO in Vizille refused the deal and maintained their candidate. The PCF nonetheless kept the bargain and thus failed to win either seat. Strategically, the decision to stand aside was calamitous. Vizille, while important to the Communists, was small compared to the Canton Sud and Paul Rochas, Federal Secretary of Isère, was forced to deliver a humbling auto-critique on the occasion of the XVIIth PCF Congress in May 1964. He claimed to have ignored advice from the Central Committee to abandon the deal and to have signed the SFIO-PCF agreement without reconsulting the local branches in the light of the decision from Paris. It is uncertain how involved the central party
PCF, determined to make-up for leniency in 1964, decided on a show of force for the 1965 municipals. Basing its argument on past municipal election results, the party demanded a Communist mayor and a list composed of 18 PCF, 15 SFIO, 3 PSU and 1 local notable, who was to be nominated by the PCF in agreement with the other parties. In effect, the Communists were asking for a majority as well as the mairie, and refused to negotiate a programme before the division of seats was decided.

The SFIO would not accept both a Communist majority and mayor. Its (correct) analysis of the 1964 results and Martin's success pointed to a strengthening Socialist vote. While the PCF was ahead in the Canton sud as a whole, if one examines the Grenoble section of the canton, the SFIO had overtaken the Communists. Mindful also of the narrowing gap between the two parties in Grenoble, the SFIO therefore launched what they took to be a realistic counter proposal: 16 PCF, 15 SFIO, 4 PSU, 2 non-party notables15 and possibly a Communist mayor, but without a PCF majority. For its part, the PSU also wanted to avoid any single party having the majority, but disliked the idea of any non-party notables.

Negotiations stalled consistently on the same basic issues with the PCF insisting on its initial proposition. As local Communist Secretary, Jean Giard, now admits, the party was making major errors:

'We got it wrong, trapped by the error made in 1964 - the error of opportunism. And so trapped were we that we made a sectarian mistake in 1965. If we had accepted the proposition and been elected, there would in any case have been a Communist mayor. This two years ahead of the 1967 legislatives, and three years from the Olympic Games. All that should have allowed us to improve our reputation and influence...a Communist mayor of Grenoble organising the Olympics would have been tremendous [...] I think that we had the wrong tactics because we had a bad analysis of the political situation and the evolution of that situation. Political changes were underway which were the result of a profound sociological evolution, and we did not take that into account. We should have undertaken a better analysis and not made the reverse

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15 'Personnalités apolitiques' is difficult to translate precisely; 'non-party notables' is the closest and is used throughout the thesis in connection with this term.
mistake of 1964 [...] We should have accepted the proposals made to us; we had to accept them.'

By mid-January, negotiations had broken down. For the PSU, new allies had to be found and the leadership took a closer look at the GAM. Immediate contacts were facilitated by a number of credible PSU figures, including the brother of one of its local leaders, being in both organisations (bi-GAM). According to PSU participants, it was the attitude of Jean Verlhac which was decisive. His gamble was that Dubedout, while politically untested, would be a highly competent potential mayor, (although the prospect of victory still remained remote). Furthermore, the core GAM activists around him represented a set of values with which the PSU could identify. If the GAM promoted an approach to local politics that was less explicitly ideological than the PSU’s more general societal analyses, it was felt that the emphasis on participation and a new approach to municipal management would provide a shared starting-point. Critical, though, was the trust created by the contacts between the leading members of the two groups, with the PSU quickly convinced that Dubedout was sincere and not simply a political arriviste.

The PSU working-class elements, however, were less easy to persuade. Even Georges Boulloud (senior CGT trade unionist and PSU activist), who later became a staunch ally of Dubedout at city-hall, felt concerned, particularly after reports leaked of Baumel’s solicitation earlier in January: ‘For Verlhac, this certainly didn’t have the same significance as it did for me. For me, Dubedout was right-wing and I lost a lot of sleep over it. I said to Verlhac: “This guy is going to ruin us is in the next three months.” I had the impression of betraying all my values. I had not been an activist for twenty-five years to end up doing these kind of ridiculous things. Luckily Verlhac was

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16 Interview with Jean Giard who, since this interview, has also expressed these observations in public. See his recollections in P. Ducros et al. (eds.), Action municipale, innovation politique et décentralisation: les années Dubedout à Grenoble (Grenoble: Editions La Pensée Sauvage, 1998), 51-56.

17 This analysis is based on interviews with three leading PSU local activists (Michel Hollard, Marc Serratrice and Georges Boulloud) and two members of both PSU and GAM (bi-GAM), François Hollard (brother of Michel) and Bernard Gilman. Serratrice was also a well-known figure at national level.

18 Jean Verlhac was a senior national-level PSU tactician who would not have been in Grenoble at all had he not been seriously injured in the Charonne episode of 1962 and forced to leave Paris in order to recuperate. Verlhac’s path to the PSU had been the Union des Chrétiens Progressistes, La Quinzaine and finally the UGS. See J.-F. Kesler, De la gauche dissidente au nouveau Parti socialiste (Toulouse: Privat, 1990), pp. 441-43.

19 Interview with Marc Serratrice.

20 Interview with Marc Serratrice.
there. Because if it had been me making the decisions, the problem would have been quickly solved. We would not have done a deal.21 Even once influential figures such as Boulloud had been persuaded, the local party had to work extremely hard to get the GAM deal accepted by the former MLP rank-and-file.

Negotiations with the SFIO were the most difficult. Problems of generation and religion created tensions which had not arisen with the young, Christian-dominated PSU. Furthermore, there was a question of pride. The SFIO had held the post of mayor for considerable periods of time in Grenoble with a strong tradition in the city, linked particularly to Léon Martin, who became mayor for the last time in 1953 at the age of 80. It was Martin’s son, Georges, who was originally the party’s designated candidate for mayor in the event of victory in the 1965 municipals. Martin was not seen as competent by either the GAM or PSU, but persuading the SFIO to back down took some time. A compromise was, however, eventually reached, once Georges Martin had let it be known that he did not wish to be mayor. Dubedout would hold the position in the event of victory, but Martin would have his name first on the list. The PSU and GAM would have a majority on the Council; 19 seats to the SFIO’s 17.

Placing Georges Martin as tête de liste was not just a question of saving face for the SFIO: it also enabled the Socialists to deliver their traditional electorate. While the local party was increasingly weak as an organisation, its clientele was still a necessary component for a non-Communist Left victory. Outside the higher echelons of the SFIO, PSU and GAM, nobody knew for sure that Dubedout would be mayor in advance of the second ballot. According to the SFIO local secretary of the time: “Many people voted for this list thinking that Martin would be mayor - all the old Grenoblois. This was a somewhat conservative group and we needed its votes. The PSU and GAM alone could never have won. The only way to have been sure of getting through would have been an SFIO-PCF list.”22

21 Interview with Georges Boulloud.
22 Interview with Gilbert Desseux.
Election campaign

Three lists declared in Grenoble for the 1965 municipal contest, the *Liste d'Entente Municipale* (UNR-MRP-Radicals-Independents), the *Liste d'Union Socialiste et d'Action municipale* - USAM (SFIO-GAM-PSU) and the *Liste Communiste* (PCF). However, the late finalisation of both the Michallon and Martin lists, some two weeks before the first ballot, left relatively little time for a major campaign. Given the strength of the Communist Party, this was very much a triangular race: the critical problem for the Martin list was to finish ahead of the PCF in the first ballot, an outcome that was possible but far from certain judging by the results from the 1964 Cantonals (see Appendix 8).

Given the innovative approach to urban management that followed, and the interpretation of the SFIO-GAM-PSU victory as the symbol of a major sociological change in Grenoble, the USAM programme was short on any real detail, giving seven broad pledges and a statement of method. It promised to work for full employment, the defence of workers menaced with redundancy, the modernisation of urban infrastructure, increased school and university facilities, better cultural and sports funding and improved hospital services. Only in the commitment to participation did the new GAM political ethos clearly show through:

> 'We are convinced that to reach our objectives, it is necessary to put in place methods of democratic management associating the population with municipal tasks and allowing it to participate with full knowledge of the facts in the battles that its representatives may have to support.'

For his part, Michallon defended himself on his record with a slogan of ‘clarity, efficiency, continuity’, particularly attacking what he termed the unknown, inexperienced organisation represented by Dubedout. The Communists also did their best to discredit the USAM list through attacks on the GAM. In what was to become a familiar pattern of attack, Dubedout himself was attacked as an apolitical technocrat:

> 'The reaction has many faces and hypocritical masks are not lacking. One is that of apoliticism; it is the mask worn by M. Dubedout - whose close links with the prefecture are public knowledge - and also by the distinguished “technicians” of his

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team who claim, as moreover the government trumpets, that municipal problems are purely technical.\textsuperscript{24}

Communist strategy also included the endorsement of a new approach to participation along similar lines to GAM thinking,\textsuperscript{25} and the use of the religious card, contrasting its ‘democratic and secular list’ with an ‘unprincipled’ Catholic GAM component of the USAM, consisting particularly of CFDT activists and Vie nouvelle members.\textsuperscript{26}

Yet despite PCF efforts, the result of the first ballot showed the total reversal of positions on the Left in comparison to the Municipals of 1959. The USAM list outflanked the Communists by a margin of 10\%, and relegated them from their position as first party of the Left. But it was far from clear what the PCF would do in the second ballot. Early in the campaign, Georges Marchais had come down to Grenoble to confirm with PCF tête de liste, Raymond Perinetti, that in no circumstances would the party stand aside - obviously an attempt to allay doubts following the debacle of 1964. Following the first ballot, the party seemed split on the course of action. The national secretariat demanded withdrawal without any recommendation for the next round. But angry and resentful that its strategy had failed, the Isère bureau favoured maintaining the list. Perhaps the federation’s advice was for hardened activists; had the Grenoble section endorsed it politically, it risked being abandoned by much of its remaining electorate. The Grenoble section of the PCF eventually called on its electors to vote to reject Michallon. This line seems generally to have been followed and the Liste d’Union Socialiste et d’Action Municipale was elected with just under 52\% of the vote (see Appendix 9 for results).\textsuperscript{27} Dubedout was immediately announced as the mayoral choice by the non-Communist Left, and subsequently endorsed by the new conseil municipal.

\textsuperscript{24}Ecole et démocratie 5 (1965), 1. ADI PER 1317/1.

\textsuperscript{25}Pour une gestion municipale démocratique à Grenoble: Les solutions du Parti communiste française. Undated PCF brochure, ADI 50-J-221. In a statement that could have come from the GAM, Perinetti writes: ‘Through broad-based committees, including representatives of trade unions, sports groups, neighbourhood committees, youth and womens’ organisations, solutions in every case must be studied with the participation of those users affected.’

\textsuperscript{26}Undated PCF brochure. Although they are not named, the reference is to Aimé Maurin and Yves Droulers of the CFDT, Robert Blanc and Jean Rolland of Vie nouvelle.

\textsuperscript{27}The total Left vote had slipped an 3\% between the two ballots. In the Communist bastions of the city (vote higher than 30\%), the average difference was just under 4\%. While such measurements can only be an approximate indicator of voting behaviour, they confirm that Republican discipline had held in general, with a small leakage.
A new municipal elite

The Dubedout team had a distinct profile, although there were also considerable differences between its constituent elements. (see summary in Appendix 10 which includes Michallon candidates for comparison). Firstly, and unusually given the characteristically slow rate of turnover in French municipal politics, it was without any real political experience. Only one individual (SFIO) had previously held public office (as a municipal councillor). As Bernard Gilman, Dubedout’s cultural *adjoint* until 1977, later remarked:

‘When I re-read the declaration that we made at the time, you must admit that we were pretty full of bravado and determination - we were novices, inexperienced at many levels. None had held any municipal responsibility. We had to get to grips with a whole range of realities that we knew nothing about.’

What characterised the GAM candidates, however, was considerable experience of the associative world, particularly in the CFTC/CFDT (see Appendix 7b).

Secondly, there was a very small number of native Grenoblois (those actually born in the city), particularly amongst PSU and GAM members. This notion of ‘new’ and ‘old’ city dwellers is further illustrated by the fact that nineteen, over half the newly-elected councillors lived in the southern *quartiers* of the city, the most affected by immigration and rapid growth and most of these were GAM/PSU rather than SFIO. Generationally, both GAM and PSU councillors were much younger than their Socialist colleagues (and those on the Michallon list). The SFIO average age reflects the general decline in the Isère federation: by the end of the 1960s, the percentage of members over 50 years old was 61%, as opposed to 31% aged between 30 and 49, and just 8% under the age of 30. This sclerosis was partly the consequence of national-level decline, but also the reflection of a very personal network of activists around former mayor Léon Martin, which accompanied him into retirement in 1959.

In occupational terms, the GAMists tended to belong to the technical professions, with the PSU having fewer engineers and more teachers amongst its councillors. This

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30 Interview with Gilbert Desseux.
was also typical of the national party in the early 1960s -- 23% of PSU members were teachers, only 1.5% engineers (although this changed by the 1970s). Once again, SFIO candidates stand in contrast to both PSU and GAM by the presence of small shopkeepers, while the Michallon list with five lawyers and a number of merchants contained social forces almost wholly unrepresented on the non-Communist Left. Amongst Dubedout councillors, there was just one lawyer (Radical Party).

The contrast with both SFIO and Michallon candidates is striking when one combines age, profession and place of origin. The GAM-PSU combination displayed distinctive sociological traits which, despite the initially unfavourable political opportunity structure (that is PSU attachment to the PCF), did indeed make the agreement on the dominant ideological axis within the new administration seem natural. Like the GAM itself, these candidates represented a ‘new’ middle class of Grenoblois, often migrants, relatively young, outside the traditional bourgeoisie, and ready to break with conventional political practice. These were in many ways the representatives of a ‘new’ France, but only one part of that ‘new’ France: managers, advertising executives or sales representatives are remarkable by their absence.

Gilles Martinet, writing in 1955, had posited the existence of two New Lefts in France, one of L’Express, one of the Observateur. The former was perjoratively characterised as essentially Mendesist, committed to reforming capitalism, while the latter was credited with a much stronger socialist identity, and could be found in some of the dissident clusters outside the SFIO and PCF, such as the Nouvelle Gauche. If this simplification held approximately true in the mid-1950s, the creation of the PSU (with the presence of Pierre Mendès France) blurred the distinction, and the appearance of the new public sphere (sociétés de pensée etc.) added a further division amongst new left currents, between those who wanted to engage from the outset within the party arena, and those who sought to re-think politics from the refuge of discussion and study forums. Yet, it is interesting that a survey of the reading habits of

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31 Source: G. Nania, Le PSU avant Rocard, pp. 116-7. Unfortunately, no party membership records for Grenoble are available.
Grenoble’s new councillors in 1965 found that almost all L’Express readers were from the GAM and that a majority of PSU councillors read Le Nouvel observateur.33

During the first term of office (1965-1971), the GAM-PSU coalition in Grenoble represented an eclectic combination of New Left currents, which both within their respective political structures and within their parties were not always moving in the same direction. This was particularly noticeable in the aftermath of May 1968, and also in relation to entry dates into the new Socialist Party. However, in terms of municipal management, the two groups of councillors worked well together. In particular, given the general hostility of the SFIO cohort (of which the key figures would run with the PCF in the subsequent municipal elections), Dubedout relied on the apparatus-experienced Jean Verlhac to negotiate the internal politics of the administration. The Dubedout-Verlhac entente was crucial, particularly given that the latter was adjoint d’urbanisme, arguably the key post (apart from the mayor) for influencing the future shape of Grenoble.

Critical opinion and the interpretation of the 1965 result

The Grenoble election attracted substantial national attention, with two key questions raised by the Dubedout victory. Firstly, did the SFIO-PSU-GAM alliance (conforming neither to the Defferrist Third Force model nor the increasingly popular notion of Left Union between FGDS and PCF) provide a blueprint for a wider revival of the non-Communist Left? Hailing Dubedout’s coalition as a new way forward for the centre-left, Maurice Duverger certainly thought so: ‘Between the strategy of that of Marseilles and that of Paris, there is the strategy of Grenoble [...] which seems more suited to SFIO interests and the evolution of French society.’34 The new model would prevent the Socialists both from melting into ‘a vast heterogeneous centre’ and from being the junior partners in an alliance with the PCF.

Other commentaries from the New Left went further. In an article entitled, ‘Le coup de Grenoble’, L’Express described the emergence of ‘a New Left, moving

beyond the traditional limitation of parties and political machines to gather support from the *forces vives* of the population.\textsuperscript{35} Going further in terms of the sociological implications, Gilles Martinet, picking up the broad thrust of the PSU Motion B analysis, noted that the victory had only been possible because: 'the new classes that we have so talked about and discussed so much recognise their own outlook in the programme and candidates presented.'\textsuperscript{36} Georges Lavau (Club Jean Moulin, GROP) writing in the *Revue Française de Science Politique*, concurred:

'The Dubedout victory has frequently been seen as the first real breakthrough of the "new classes", a point of view which seems at first sight all the more plausible as Grenoble is one of the bastions of these new groups. We must concede that there are many elements which tend to substantiate such an interpretation.'\textsuperscript{37}

But interpretations varied of course according to what one wished to see. If some were attempting to emphasise the significance of the new middle classes, Alix Berthet, former PSA figure, and semi-detached member of the increasingly Rocardian Grenoble PSU, pointed out that in fact the new middle class in no way constituted a political unit and voted left, centre or right, situating themselves on different points of the political chessboard.\textsuperscript{38} However, Berthet represented a current of opinion on the non-Communist Left profoundly suspicious of Dubedout, and his interpretation fitted very closely with the Poperenist distrust of Rocardian theses on French societal evolution. The exchanges that took place over the question of the Grenoble new middle class well illustrate the kind of politicisation of the analysis of sociological trends that so characterises the wider international debate.

In contrast to the sociological controversy, Viansson-Ponté, writing in *Le Monde*, preferred to develop the wider debate about depoliticisation and the end of ideologies that had been so fashionable both in France and elsewhere during the early 1960s.\textsuperscript{39} Under the heading 'The Elections of M. Dubedout,' he claimed that

'[d]espite the number of re-elections and the rarity of changes, there have nonetheless been several dozen Dubedouts who have emerged into the political arena in localities of varying size. While people are eager to speak of “depoliticisation,” the Dubedouts

\textsuperscript{35} *L'Express*, 29 March 1965, 24-27.
\textsuperscript{36} G. Martinet, "Grenoble: le succès le plus prometteur", *L'Espoir Socialiste*, 752 (3 April 1965), p. 3.
\textsuperscript{39} See, for example, G. Vedel (ed.), *La dépolitisisation: mythe ou réalité.*
show in fact that the issue is one of "departisation." Their commitment and sometimes their success proves that the evolution of France is giving rise to new types of behaviour and original forms of political action.\textsuperscript{40}

Critical of the attempts by commentators and journalists to decode events in Grenoble, local PSU boss, Jean Verlhac, issued his own analysis:

'The truth is doubtless more simple, even if it does not quite correspond to the desires of the myth-makers, journalists, teachers and strategists [...] The truth is that in Grenoble, the conflict between the old and the new is more apparent and more brutal than anywhere else, and that is why Grenoble remains clearly an example that one should be careful not to generalise, and especially not to confuse with the desire for stability expressed by the electors of Bazerque in Toulouse or Pradel in Lyon [...]\textsuperscript{41}

Accusing (somewhat inaccurately) Viansson-Ponté of having portrayed Dubedout as apolitical, Verlhac insisted that the election was highly political and that the new mayor would be far from a technical manager.

This emphasis on the avant garde and the conflict of old versus new seems effectively to capture one element of the victory. But the low-point for the non-Communist left of the 1962 legislatives had passed prior to the creation of the GAM. In terms of votes, the 1964 Cantonals had already shown the combined forces of the Left (PCF, SFIO, PSU) reaching 57% in the first ballot in Grenoble, falling slightly to 55% in the 1965 municipals (see Appendix 8). Furthermore, in the much watched Canton sud, the Left seemed to suffer a greater reverse in the municipals of 1965 - 55% as opposed to over 60% (of which 35% SFIO-PSU) the year before. On the basis of the 1964 cantonals (in which mayor Michallon had been beaten by Socialist Martin in the Canton sud), it was arithmetically possible for an SFIO-PCF-PSU list to take Grenoble in the municipals. In other words, if the so-called nouvelles couches were important in helping Dubedout to power in 1965, it seems that many were probably already voting for parties of the Left in 1964 (although the turnout in the Cantonals was only 45%).

\textsuperscript{40} P.Viansson-Ponté, 'Les Elections de M. Dubedout', \textit{Le Monde}, 30 March 1965.

\textsuperscript{41} J. Verlhac, 'Grenoble: un choix politique et non une formule magique', \textit{L'Espoir Socialiste}, 753 (10 April 1965), pp. 1-2. This article is also published nationally in \textit{Tribune Socialiste}, 234 (3 April 1965), p. 2.
A distinction has thus to be made between an election that the Left probably could have won, and a set of circumstances which allowed a number of non-party actors to enter the non-Communist Left, and then heavily to influence its reconstruction in the south of Isère. One cannot of course say with any certainty that an SFIO-PCF-PSU list would have prevailed at the second ballot, especially if a Communist mayor was being proposed, for such a proposition might well have alienated voters attracted by the apparently non-ideological approach of the young GAM candidates. But the point to be emphasised is simply that the GAM did not single-handedly turn around the electoral fortunes of the Grenoble Left in 1965. This seems already to have occurred, with the 1964 cantonals crucially forecasting not just a Left victory, but a reversal of Communist / non-Communist positions.

Crucial elections generally become so only after electoral success has been consolidated by success in power. However, the reputation of the new administration at national level was rapidly solidified by two events, even before the Dubedout team had achieved many of its key local policy goals. Firstly, there was the *Rencontre socialiste* of 1966, conceived with the ambition of rethinking the shape of socialism in France, and held in Grenoble precisely because of the electoral success of the GAM-PSU-SFIO list. Secondly, Pierre Mendès France ran successfully in the 1967 legislatives (Second Isère constituency, main Grenoble cantons), thanks to an unusually successful PSU branch and impressed both by the social and economic dynamism of the city, and the work of what he termed 'an exemplary municipality in terms both of political composition and of policy.' The association of the name with the city was enough to give a further impetus to the growing myth of Grenoble as a laboratory of the New Left, although Pierre Mendès France was to be defeated in the backlash elections that followed the events of May 1968.

**Citizen democracy in action**

A new participative approach had been promised by the GAM, and incorporated as part of the non-Communist Left’s programme. With the spectacular victory of March

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42 P. Lavau, 'La rencontre socialiste de Grenoble', *Citoyens 60*, Special Issue (1966), p. 4.
1965, the GAMists wanted to capitalise on their momentum and move ahead quickly with what they saw as a key element in a new administrative style: citizen democracy. Initially, two strategies were envisaged: extra-municipal committees and close collaboration with the unions de quartier. The committees were to serve as semi-technical policy-making fora while contacts with the unions de quartier were to facilitate the flow of information and the expression of local opinion.

Although the SFIO remained unenthusiastic, the PSU and GAM made sure that extra-municipal committees were operational within three months, looking at a range of issues from teaching to culture to urban affairs. The original blueprint, developed by GAM councillor, Yves Cuny, was that each should be chaired by an adjoint, with members comprising three councillors and three non-elected figures (one designated by each of the three coalition groups - SFIO, GAM and PSU). The committees would then invite representatives from trade unions, neighbourhood groups, sports or cultural associations, depending on the issues in question. Most importantly, as the Cuny working paper emphasises, this was not a process that was automatically open to a Bloggs or Dupont: 'the recruitment of random individuals is not envisaged.' The intention, rather, was to allow for intermediary bodies - corps intermédiaires - to contribute to the policy process.

At the same time, the GAM remained a vigorous intellectual resource both for its own councillors and close allies in the PSU. GAM councillors, including the mayor would meet together once a week, inviting other members of the movement to join them. The desire not to become a political clique removed from the activist base was strong. With the approval and participation of its elected representatives, the GAM established a series of sectoral committees which shadowed the main municipal committees and issued proposals or suggestions. These were disseminated through a quarterly newsletter which would often contain detailed analysis of complex policy areas such as communal finance mechanisms or intercommunal cooperation.

45 Cuny, 'Commission extra-municipales', p. 3.
One of the most distinctive policy approaches by the municipality was the attempt
to define the quartier as an operational area, both for the development of local
infrastructure (youth, social, cultural and leisure facilities) and for improved
democracy through the unions de quartier. A number of measures were taken to
encourage neighbourhood organisation. The premier adjoint was given responsibility
for developing contacts with the unions, and a Bureau des quartiers was established at
city hall. Municipal buildings were also available for its meetings and, in 1969,
councillors agreed a grant for the CLUQ in order to pay a secretary half-time.
However, the acceptance of subsidies and municipal facilities were a source of
controversy within the CLUQ, with concerns expressed about losing independence
and a more limited room for manoeuvre.

Between 1965-1971, the number of unions de quartier almost doubled, with eight
new groups created, taking the total to twenty. The geographical pattern is significant,
for from a concentration in the southern and eastern extremes of the city, the unions
de quartier were now increasingly appearing in older areas of Grenoble, notably the
centre which had previously had no neighbourhood committees. This was certainly in
large part a response to changes which had taken place in and after the elections of
1965. The Dubedout administration’s emphasis on dialogue with the unions had led to
a fear in those areas without such structures that they would find themselves
marginalised. That Michallon’s electoral strong-hold had been in the city-centre, with
the Right now having no representation in a non-Communist Left council dominated
by southern inhabitants, may also have served as a motivating factor for some.
However, this is difficult to prove as all unions de quartier continued to claim a non-
partisan position.

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46 The premier adjoint was responsible for external relations and information in the municipality. The
post was held first by Georges Martin (SFIO). But after three years, he gave up the position and
Maurice Gleizes (SFIO, deuxième adjoint sport) took over. Gleizes' relations with Dubedout were
difficult, and unions de quartier were not a priority for him. From 1971, a conseiller délégué (PSU-
GAM) was appointed to liaise with the unions de quartier.
47 See S. Ribeaud, 'Le nouveau visage du Comité de Liaison des Unions de Quartier - Une subvention
discutée mais bienvenue', Le Dauphiné Libéré (10 February 1971)
48 The new electoral law of 1965 allowed for no minority representation in large towns, the winning list
taking all the seats. See above, p. 122.
The developing mythology of the *unions de quartier*

While conceptions continued to vary, with *unions de quartier* often remaining strictly functional (particularly in the centre), one can nonetheless identify expressions of the increasing importance being attached to the role of neighbourhoods in city life. The newspaper of the UDHEC, for example, regularly spoke of a 'a quiet civic revolution' carried out by UDHEC, which aimed to make participation the golden rule of a true democracy. The *quartier* is frequently referred to as a 'village,' inhabited by residents who promote 'a widely-held communalist ethos.' There was also periodic reference to what is somewhat metaphysically termed a 'mysterious alchemy' which allows the notion of new democracy to flourish.

The *Bulletin d'information du quartier Notre-Dame et alentours* preferred to emphasise more fundamental communitarian ideals. One finds little reference to the concept of neighbourhood democracy as such. It is human contact and solidarity that is of most importance, encouraging inhabitants not to remain isolated in their own private existence:

'Man does not exist to be happy like moles in their burrows [...] man exists to grow, but not like Robinson Crusoe on his island. We show solidarity with one and other. Put in place useful structures, provide activity at a human level, these are the objectives of a neighbourhood association.'

This kind of rhetoric fits at first sight with Catherine Bidou's findings amongst what she called the 'new middle-class' communities of three urban peripheral communes - Ploumeron (Brest), St Thomas (Montpellier), St Clément (Blois) - and a quartier in the XII arrondissement of Paris. In her view, such ideas partly reflect attempts to integrate into the local community, an observation also made by Sellier who thinks that the *nouvelle petite bourgeoisie*, as she calls them, are essentially upwardly mobile but in an ambiguous social position. Realisation of municipal infrastructure and construction of *unions de quartier* can therefore be conceptualised

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49 See *Bulletin d'Information et de Liaison du Quartier des Eaux-Claires* (1966-Spring 1983), subsequently become *Liaison Eaux-Claires*. For the first exposition of the notion of 'révolution civique tranquille,' see no. 12 (Summer 1970).
as a support for their socialisation.53 Such ‘new middle class’ involvement in *quartier* infrastructure is also particularly emphasised by Jacques Ion *et al* in their 1972 study of urban socio-cultural facilities.54

Bidou, Sellier, together with Bolle *et al*. in their specific study of Grenoble, all maintain that the idea of the *quartier* as village or as local community is particularly prevalent amongst highly educated urban migrants. Furthermore, for Bolle *et al*. it is not based on reality as such, but an idealised view of urban existence:

’It seems that, in certain cases the *quartier* does not have a true existence before the creation of an association. The *quartier* is not therefore a lived reality, but the expression by some inhabitants of the willingness to appropriate urban space, of the desire to construct a community along the lines of a “model” derived from an idealised image of the traditional village. The search for roots by urban migrants is therefore undertaken through reference to a past way of life, and not by the invention of original forms of urban society.’55

However, one has to be careful about such observations. Although Eaux-Claires was indeed a fast-growing migrant *quartier* with a considerably above-average presence of the non-business, salaried middle class (30% in the *quartier*, compared to 20% in Grenoble), key figures in the UDHEC did not fit this profile. Its president André Chabert (close to the MRP) and vice-president, Roland Anselmet (PCF) in 1965 were both employees (SNCF and *Le Dauphiné Libéré*), with ten years’ experience in neighbourhood activities. In contrast, Notre-Dame was an older area with a large Mediterranean (Italian, North African) immigrant working-class population. Here, a neighbourhood identity existed through a flourishing street and café life, with very distinct patterns of socialisation that contrasted with both the southern *quartiers* and the more bourgeois city centre.

This is not to dispute the findings of Bidou, Ion, Sellier and Bolle *et al.*, per se (although their new class terminology is clearly not satisfactory). The idealisation of the *quartier* is in many cases a product of aspirations expressed by mobile middle-class populations, particularly through an emphasis on local democracy. Indeed, it gradually became apparent in Grenoble that such social groups were heavily over-

55 P. Bolle *et al.*, ‘La participation des citoyens au développement urbain,’ VI.
represented in the unions de quartier. However, examples such as Chabert and Anselmet, praised during the fortieth anniversary of the creation of the UDHEC as 'emblematic neighbourhood figures through their activism and personal engagement in public life,'\textsuperscript{56} demonstrate the existence of a more complicated pattern of activism and support for the initiatives being pursued by the new Dubedout administration.

**The contention cycle and the second Dubedout mandate.**

As elsewhere in France, the immediate events of 1968 themselves were certainly of less consequence for the future of Grenoble municipal politics than the longer-term legacy. However, the defeat of Pierre Mendès France by a Gaullist candidate in the elections of June was certainly a blow for the moderate local non-Communist Left, and this failure was also seen as symbolic of the wider fate of the May movement. For its part, the GAM had unreservedly backed the strikes in May, hoping that fundamental reforms could be achieved:

'The GAM declares itself in solidarity with the movement underway in businesses, universities, public administration and various professions. It emphasises the convergence between its objectives and the claims for greater influence and improved quality of life expressed by the workers.'\textsuperscript{57}

A further editorial in the group's newspaper, GAM-Informations, expressed bitter disappointment six months later: 'May had produced a great surge of hope [...] June did not bring these hopes to fruition. For our part, we regret the disappearance from parliament of a man who understood the crisis and had proposed reforms able to bring the country out of its rut.'\textsuperscript{58}

Despite Mendès' defeat, both the Grenoble GAM and PSU had emerged from 1968 reinforced in membership terms. GAM numbers had jumped from 85 in 1967 to 134 in 1969, a 50% increase. While no figures are available for the local PSU, interview sources indicate that Grenoble was in line with national trends, which saw the party

\textsuperscript{56} Annie Deschamps, Premier adjoint since 1995. See 'Une soirée sous le signe de l’émotion,' Le Dauphiné Libéré, 9 December 1997.
\textsuperscript{57} Editorial in GAM Informations 16 (May 1968), p. 1.
\textsuperscript{58} GAM Informations 18 (November 1968), p. 1.
expand its membership by 33% in 1968.59 Yet the recruitment base was somewhat different. While the PSU expanded heavily amongst students, who constituted 18% of new party members nationally in 1968,60 the local GAM membership, including new recruits, was characterised by slightly older generations, the typical activist being between 30 and 50 years old, 'mature but still young.'61 The difficulty, though, with the GAM expansion is knowing whether it would have taken place in the absence of the events of May. The successes of the Dubedout municipality may well equally have served as a catalyst.

The position taken by the GAM in 1968 is symptomatic of the extent to which any initial ambiguity about its political colours had been removed. While this had been the goal from the outset for some in the group, it was clear that Dubedout himself was evolving politically as a consequence of his experiences in power, quite the contrary of Berger et al.'s 1969 analysis which portrayed him undertaking a new style of apolitical, technocratic administration.62 As he later explained in George Ras' Journal d'un maire in 1975:

'I discovered along the way the interest and even the necessity for political reflection. It's normal. I noticed that life in a big city involves a whole series of obstacles and relationships which are essentially political in nature [...] If I had stayed as politically naive as I was in 1965, it would have been useless.'63

Yet, despite increasingly ambitious policy preferences which anchored them on the avant-garde of the reformist non-Communist Left, Dubedout and the GAM continued to resist thinking in terms of the confrontation of two blocs, preferring instead to emphasise concrete, everyday issues as a point of departure.

However, May 1968 did open up a certain number of ideological tensions between GAM and PSU, whose nature is partly explained by the membership differences, particularly in age cohort, outlined above. Many GAMists, if supportive of the desire for wholesale societal change expressed in May 1968, were suspicious of the new

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61 Interview with Pierre Coli. Such observations are confirmed by other former GAM members. No age statistics are available from archives.
more revolutionary currents within the PSU and disgusted by events on the city’s university campus, which experienced high levels of violent conflict and infrastructural damage. While the local PSU leadership, still in the hands of long-standing activists was working to bring the party under control, Dubedout, for his part, tried to keep a certain distance, aware no doubt of the electoral dangers of being associated with the post-1968 ideological excesses.⁶⁴

The relationship between GAM and PSU councillors was also put under a certain amount of strain by the early entry of several GAM members, one a senior figure (Yves Droulers), into Savary’s Parti socialiste in 1969.⁶⁵ The Socialists of Isère, as elsewhere, were divided between modernisers and the old-guard, which was viscerally hostile to the GAM (a hostility that resulted in several SFIO councillors defecting to the PCF list in 1971). There was good reason to help defeat this old-guard by joining the modernisers in the PS, especially if this created an alternative to excessive dependence upon an uncertain PSU. But Droulers’ early membership of the Socialist Party, encouraged by Dubedout, also reflected an attempt to resolve a broader problem in the GAM: how to overcome the structural limitations of a local reform movement detached from an effective political vehicle to promote national-level change. Between 1969 and 1975, the PS gradually became the chosen vehicle for the articulation of these wider preoccupations.

The evolution of the local Socialist Party, with the appearance of the first PS bi-GAMS (members of both groups) and the departure from the Dubedout team of the SFIO caciques, meant that the municipal election of 1971 was fought with a non-Communist Left that was less fractious in terms of its attitude towards the GAM (for results, see Appendix 11). Three outgoing SFIO councillors ran on a PCF-dominated list in 1971, including the premier adjoint, Maurice Gleizes. A fundamental change since 1965 was that Dubedout was no longer unknown, had managed Grenoble successfully (if at some cost in terms of local taxation) at the head of what was clearly not an ideologically neutral administration, and hence had a reserve of political capital

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⁶⁴ One of the key accusations of the Centre and Right in the 1971 municipal elections was that Dubedout was a ‘trojan horse’ for an extremist PSU, a charge that was essential to be able to refute in order to appeal to the kind of centrist voters who had been attracted by the GAM in 1965.⁶⁵ L. Ratel, Hubert Dubedout: le bâtisseur, p. 129. Confirmed in an interview with Yves Droulers.
that was lacking six years earlier. In 1971, he headed a PS-PSU-GAM-dominated list (10 GAM, 10 PSU, 14 PS, 2 Objectif 72, 1 CIR), and was comfortably returned to office, although the abstention rate was at a record 41.5%, somewhat above an already high national average of 38% in large towns.\(^6^6\)

In terms of the balance of power within the non-Communist Left, GAM representation (10 councillors) was slightly improved on its previous 9. If one includes bi-GAM (2 PS and 1 PSU), there were thirteen GAM members in the council compared to ten five years earlier. The PSU-GAM presence was therefore numerically reinforced, but the rapprochement with a rejuvenating Socialist Party meant that this alliance, while still important, was less critical than during the first Dubedout administration. Nonetheless, generational differences were still evident: the average age of PS councillors remained 51, compared to 44 (GAM) and 39 (PSU),\(^6^7\) GAM average age rising from 38 in 1965 (see Appendix 12). Certainly, since only four out of ten 1971 GAM councillors in Grenoble had been members of the previous municipality, notabilisation was not the cause. Rather, it confirms that the GAM was a generational phenomenon, and not an organisation that particularly appealed to the younger age cohorts that were at the centre of the May 1968 protests.

A renewed drive for participation, but problems with the unions de quartier

Participation continued to be a major priority for the second Dubedout administration. If May 1968 had unleashed wider participatory pressures, the municipality drew on the momentum, rather than allowing energy to be channelled against it. The debate in Grenoble was already one stage ahead of most of urban France: while neighbourhood committees were battling to establish themselves as intermediaries between municipal council and citizenry in various cities, the Dubedout team, dissatisfied by early

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\(^6^6\) In 1965, the Grenoble abstention rate was only slightly above the average for towns over 100,000 inhabitants at 32% (national 31%). Source for national statistics: F. Bon and J. Ranger, 'Bilan des élections municipales de mars 1971 dans les villes de plus de 30,000 habitants', Revue Française de Science Politique, 22/2 (1972), p. 214.

While the 1971 Grenoble abstention rate remained stable between ballots (43.3% on the first and 42.9% on the second), it was not necessarily the same people who abstained at each ballot. Out of 34,350 electors who abstained at the first ballot, 7,674 then voted in the second. Equally, 6,908 electors who had voted at the first then abstained. Source: A. Lancelot, 'Les élections municipales', Projet, 56 (1971), p. 654.

\(^6^7\) The average age is based on those who ran under the GAM label. If one includes the three bi-Gams, the figure drops to 42.5.
experiences, was already trying to move towards more inclusive structures. Where the 1968 cleavage appeared most obviously in local politics was in the emergence of political ecology, and the challenge posed by the post-1974 PSU.

Even before the early 1970s, when France as a whole felt the full impact of the participatory claims resulting from May 1968, the shortcomings and difficulties of neighbourhood democracy, as based on the *unions de quartier* model, were becoming clear in Grenoble. After the first few years in office, municipal councillors observed, in Jean Verlhac’s words that: ‘the quasi-monopoly of the *unions de quartier* was not allowing the municipality to have regular contacts with the entire population.’68 These difficulties were reflected in the internal PSU-GAM-PS document of February 1971 dealing with the proposed future programme of the administration. It noted that:

’a systematic attempt will be undertaken to create new routes for popular expression and to multiply the municipality’s points of contact. With this ethos, we shall proceed with a challenge to the *unions de quartier* as privileged intermediaries. The municipality will in effect be open to other permanent or spontaneous groups.’69

The major question of the representativity of the *unions de quartier* as legitimate communicators and negotiators for individual neighbourhoods rested both on quantitative and qualitative issues. At a quantitative level, Bolle *et al.* found that in 1967-8, only 6,100 people (6.5% of the Grenoblois) were members of a neighbourhood committee.70 There were, nonetheless, wide variations. Certain southern *unions de quartier* managed to attract 15-20% of the population, while the percentage in the city centre associations was far lower (although these latter areas had a higher population density).71 The only Grenoble survey to follow that of Bolle *et al.*

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68 J. Verlhac, ‘Le rôle d’une municipalité’, in M. Rocard (ed.), *Des Militants du PSU* (Paris: Epi, 1971), 125. One should note that the frankness of these comments also reflects the fact that Verlhac’s background was not in the associative left that was at the heart of the GAM. While in favour of new participation structures, he was not a major player in their formulation or implementation.


70 P. Bolle *et al.*, ‘La participation des citoyens au développement urbain,’ p. 35. Even this average is slightly over-estimated. The percentage was based on 1962 census figures of an adult population of 92,100, since later data was not yet available. If one uses INSEE statistics from 1968, which reflect more accurately the adult population at the time of this *unions de quartier* survey (122,068), there is a 5% membership rate.

was in 1985, giving a participation rate of 5%.\textsuperscript{72} We are therefore unable to see whether there was an upward curve during the contention cycle, followed by a fall in the early 1980s. In 1977, SOFRES found a 7% rate nationally of those claiming to be a member of a neighbourhood association or municipal committee, not an exact comparison but a useful indicator.\textsuperscript{73}

Table 1: Analysis of office-holders and bureau members of Grenoble unions de quartier in 1967-8\textsuperscript{74}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Socio-professional categories</th>
<th>Unions de quartier members (%)</th>
<th>Grenoble population (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Industriels - gros commerçants - professions libérales – cadres supérieurs</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artisans - petits commerçants</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cadres moyens - employés</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>24.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contremaîtres - ouvriers - personnel de service</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>37.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This relatively low participation was compounded by a socio-professional imbalance that was moving in favour of the middle class, a trend also evident in wider studies of associative life.\textsuperscript{75} As housing conditions and basic infrastructure improved, the working-class component in Grenoble neighbourhood committees became less apparent. Indeed, amongst office-holders, Bolle et al. note that teachers and engineers were particularly over-represented, reflecting, in their view, the fact that these groups were ‘most suited’ to communicate effectively with councillors and municipal technicians in the search for better information and local infrastructure.\textsuperscript{76} Even from within the unions de quartier, there was recognition of the difficulties. François


\textsuperscript{74} P. Bolle et al., ‘La participation des citoyens au développement urbain,’ p. 39. The aggregation of socio-professional categories does not allow us a very clear overview. Particularly frustrating is the linking of cadres supérieurs with commercial interests, and of cadres moyens with employees. Furthermore, there were problems with the data set, as the authors acknowledged. Some areas did not fill in any questionnaires, notably Teisseire. Commenting on the low showing of the working class, Bolle et al. remark: ‘Il faut tenir compte que ce sont peut-être ces mêmes personnes qui ont le moins répondu aux questionnaires, par méfiance le plus souvent,’ p. 39.


\textsuperscript{76} P. Bolle et al., ‘La participation des citoyens au développement urbain,’ p. 39.
Hollard commented in 1970 that: 'It is essential for the unions de quartier to affirm their representativity. To do this, they must make more certain of drawing in all the socio-professional categories of the quartier.'

If there were concerns over numerical weakness and socio-professional imbalance, the changing nature of quartier infrastructural questions also raised a number of representativity questions. In a sense, the easiest role for the unions de quartier was that as defender of neighbourhood interests, pressuring the municipality over facilities or other concerns, such as noise pollution. But once these facilities were constructed, and with an incumbent administration highly committed to the notion of quartier as focal point for municipal activity, problems started to emerge. For the union de quartier began to appear simply as one neighbourhood association amongst many (for example, sports clubs or family groups such as the ASF). If these associations were federated to the union de quartier, as was uniquely the case in Alliés-Alpins, there was not necessarily a difficulty. If not, then it became difficult to recognise the union as privileged intermediary.

A further element which caused problems was the the increasing technicality of urban management which appeared to impose de facto limits on how far participation could really go. A particularly striking example of this was the Plan d'Occupation des Sols (POS). The municipality had instigated a systematic series of consultations with the unions de quartier in the course of 1975. While the process worked well in certain areas, overall the administration was fairly disappointed with the level of local input. The municipal magazine noted that:

'One has to recognise that the POS itself is a fairly dry and abstract document which does not lend itself easily to indepth citizen participation [...] Paradoxically and unfortunately, the only pressure for modification of the main lines of the POS defined by the councillors, and agreed by the inhabitants to whom they were proposed, came from the state administration.'


78 Conceived legally in 1967, the POS was a five-year plan which defined the main lines of development in individuals communes. It concerned such issues as urbanisation zones and COS (Coefficient d’occupation des sols). Drawn up by communal agencies in collaboration with the state (principally Ministère de l’Equipement through départemental relays), it was difficult to change, and therefore had to be carefully conceptualised.

New approaches

Without directly marginalising the unions de quartier, attempts were made from the early 1970s to develop better contacts with sectoral neighbourhood associations, such as parent-teacher groups. Information was also improved, with better communication of council proposals, and the practice of 'quartier visits' by councillors was developed to foster direct links without intermediaries. Residents could meet their elected representative, express their ambitions or frustrations and be informed about municipal policy. For the councillors, this was an opportunity to be 'on the ground,' and marked something of a break with older communal traditions of the 'administrators' receiving the 'administered' at city-hall.80

However, there were some complex functional issues to resolve. A growing element of the administration's strategy was not just to solicit opinion, but to give people control over their immediate environment through a stake in the management of local cultural and social infrastructure. Here, relationships were immediately much more complicated, for the unions de quartier were neither qualified nor enthusiastic about taking responsibility in this area. Furthermore, running MJC s (Maisons des Jeunes et de la Culture), for example, was often a highly contested arena, with considerable disputes involving the CAF (Caisse des Allocations Familiales), the local MJC federation, the trade unions and the municipality. This became particularly evident after 1968 with 'huge employer-employee difficulties within the socio-cultural infrastructure.'81 In particular, the MJC s saw a significant conflict with the Communists over the content and structure of local socio-cultural activity.82

By the mid-1970s, a decade after the GAM had come to power, it was now as Socialist Party members that many GAMists, together with former PSU activists sought to create a fresh agenda. Indeed, within the municipal council, the major participative impetus continued to come mainly from those with a history in the GAM

80 Although the 'quartier visit' was in and of itself certainly not anything new. Herriot and Pradel had already adopted such tactics in Lyon several decades earlier.
81 Interview with François Hollard, 2 September 1998.
82 For more details, see J.-P. Motte, Politique et actions sociales municipales: Grenoble 1965-1983 (Grenoble: Privately Published, 1985), pp. 44-46
and PSU. Whilst the majority of GAMists had joined the PS by the end of 1974 (now part of the Rocardian current, dominant within the local party), the GAM continued to function as a parallel ‘think-tank’ structure. Membership stood at 70 in 1975, although only 25 of these had been part of the movement at its inception.

The rhetoric of the GAM newspaper, *GAM-Informations*, provides an illustration of the political journey that had taken place since 1965. The caution of early GAM material seeking political renovation had been replaced by a much more explicit rhetoric. The goals now were to fight not just for a self-managing society (*société autogestionnaire*) but also a ‘socialist society’. At this level at least, the movement’s thinking was in tune with that of the Rocardian former PSU members within the PS. But one should remember the ambiguity of the *autogestionnaire* label, which was also the calling card of those in the PSU who had resisted the Socialist Party and were now starting to construct the first of many Red-Green alternative platforms. As a slogan of a post-1968 idealism, it was clearly a rallying point, but one behind which many substantially different conceptions of society were assembled.

The *autogestionnaire* ambition was evident in the decentralisation blueprint put forward by the GAM in 1975 regarding the creation of *comités de secteurs*. In an article tellingly entitled ‘A time to invent,’ and clearly inspired by the Bologna model, Hubert Dubedout explained that it was now desirable to create *conseils de secteurs*, elected by universal suffrage, and having direct responsibility for the budget, implementation and management of numerous local services. This was to be the centrepiece of the 1977 municipal election campaign:

‘New relays for democratic practice must be instituted. At a time when cities and agglomerations are growing increasingly dense, making it more difficult for the population to be truly responsible for life in their municipality, this initiative launched by the Grenoble GAM signifies the necessity of ensuring power sharing at the closest and most human levels.’

However, the idea of sectors which, for efficiency reasons, would be larger than individual *quartiers*, created some consternation amongst the *unions de quartier* concerned about the threat to their position. More importantly, there was also

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85 Ibid., p. 2.
considerable resistance to the political element of the plan -- direct election -- from within the Socialist Party. While some PS councillors backed the ideas, there was widespread unease within the party about making the transition from a close collaboration with the associative world to a situation where rival power bases to the conseil municipal could emerge, a concern for the PCF as well, which was implacably opposed to a new level of elected bodies. Dubedout was obliged to include the PCF in his list for the 1977 municipal election as a consequence of national list agreement. Although an accord on the decentralisation of services was agreed, the Union of the Left programme watered down the ‘Bologna model’, failing to promise direct elections to the new sectoral councils that would have responsibility for the decentralised policy sectors.

But even as the Dubedout municipality, successfully re-elected in 1977, was trying to establish the new sectors, and at the height of the Socialist love-affair with the notion of participation and associative democracy, a strong attack was made on the administration’s achievements in this domain from within one of the intellectual bastions of the Left in Grenoble, the IEPG. Claude Domenach, the director, and Eric Conan, a young student, published an article in *Esprit* which castigated the municipality for having developed a system of consultation where only a privileged, educated minority controlling not the ‘means of production’ but the ‘means of participation’, cultural capital in other words, were pre-eminent. Given the myth of Grenoble, there was a great risk, they claimed, that other cities now embracing citizen democracy would simply waste their ideals and energies.

Conan and Domenach, both close to the PS, used their criticism as a way of urging a bolder approach to the decentralisation of power. Indeed, they backed a sectoral scheme of the kind existing in Bologna and envisaged by the GAM in 1975-6 which,

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86 The PCF position on democratic communal management was based firmly on the notion of autogestion communale, that is to say greater decentralised power placed in the hands of municipal administrations within the context of strengthened départements and regions. The party claimed that integrating the associative world into formal decision-making procedures would politicise associations, damaging their independence. See ‘Propositions du PCF pour une réforme des collectivités territoriales’ (Association nationale des élus communistes et républicaines, 1977).

87 E. Conan and C. Domenach, ‘Partager le pouvoir, l’exemple de Grenoble’, *Esprit*, 10 (October 1977), p. 116. This collaboration between director and student should partly be seen in the context of the climate within the IEP in the aftermath of 1968 with attempts to achieve new ways of functioning. Eric Conan was also, however, the son of Michel Conan, a civil servant at the DGRST, who was commissioning a number of participation studies, some of which were carried out by IEP researchers.
they claimed, could properly remove the distance between the administrator and administered. Their argument about low levels of participation touched a point that has been raised at both the general theoretical level in political philosophy and on the ground in Grenoble and elsewhere. Indeed, the argument coming from the Communists and many on the centre and right (although obviously for different reasons) was precisely that a minority should not be allowed to reach a privileged position in public-policy decision-making. As the centre-right campaign material of the list led by Guy Cabanel in 1971 had argued: ‘Schools of democracy, schools of civics, yes; political pressure groups in the hands of citizenship activists, no.’

Yet there were also those on the non-Communist Left who were having doubts, not about the merits per se of the general goal of greater participation, but about the practical viability. Furthermore, a potential political price might be paid, not just in terms of failing to achieve a new citizenship that could be the rule rather than the exception, but in terms of popularity. In relying too extensively on these networks, the Dubedout municipality was at risk of cutting itself off from majority public opinion. Indeed, Michel Destot, current mayor of Grenoble and young PS councillor in charge of information at city hall between 1977 and 1983, criticises what he terms ‘the illusion that we could work only with pointless relays (‘relais d’opinion futiles’) based on associations or association office-holders. It is often one of the faults of the associative left to imagine that the associative fabric is itself and only itself representative of the population.’

Although less dangerous than those from within the non-Communist Left, attacks on the GAM continued from certain Marxist writers. In 1978, Jean-Pierre Garnier and Denis Goldschmidt wrote a colourful indictment of the GAM and the so-called nouvelle petite bourgeoisie, claiming that notions of participation and local democracy were nothing less than an accord passed between the ruling bourgeoisie and rising middle classes. In the view of Garnier and Goldschmidt, responsibility for running urban areas was delegated to the latter on the understanding that they would do nothing to alter fundamentally the status quo of social and economic relations, thereby reinforcing French monopoly capitalism. The ‘imposture’ of an ‘urban revolution’

88 GERM (Group d'études et de réalisations municipales) newsletter 1 (November 1970). The GERM was a think-tank style group set up by the Centre-Right in the run-up to the 1971 municipal elections. It was partly aimed as a response to the GAM.
89 Interview with Michel Destot.
was nothing less than ‘the construction as preventative counter-revolution destined to 
stave off the truly “revoluting” possibility of autonomy for working-class 
movements.’

Challenging the Dubedout administration: municipal opposition during 
the contention cycle

If the avant-garde participationist approach adopted by the Dubedout municipalities 
essentially neutralised the kind of pressures that were emerging in other cities for a 
new local constitution, the contention cycle saw opposition emerge on other fronts, 
most notably through political ecology. In the conflict between Les Amis de la Terre 
(later the Ecologie-Autogestion platform) and the non-Communist Left, one sees the 
existence of different levels of ‘new politics.’ For the GAM ‘new politics’ of the 
1960s, even though it had evolved to include the buzzwords of the 1970s, was not the 
same either in theme or disposition as that represented by political ecology. This 
section aims therefore to explore this distinction, which can usefully feed into the 
broader literature that frequently tends to speak of ‘new politics’ as a series of shared, 
not necessarily oppositional, agendas.

Although a regional environmental protection association, the FRAPNA 
(Fédération Rhône-Alpes de protection de la nature) had been established in the early 
1970s, political ecology in Grenoble only really developed its first formal structures 
with the creation of Les Amis de la Terre in 1976. The development of the Super-
Phoenix fast breeder reactor was the central catalyst for this group and Creys-Malville, 
the site of the project, quickly became the focal point for early activity. Les Amis de la 
Terre, with a strong contingent of PSU or former-PSU members, collaborated with 
this party and other movement activists to form the list Grenoble-Ecologie pour 
autogérer la cité in order to contest the municipal elections of 1977. Its high first 
ballet score, just over 9%, certainly deprived Dubedout’s Union of the Left list of a 
first ballet victory (49.20%).

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92 Nationally, Les Amis de la Terre had existed since 1970. But each local group was fairly autonomous so long as it remained in accordance with the basic principles of an organisation which functioned more as a network, becoming known as the RAT (Réseau des Amis de la Terre).
The quarrel with the Dubedout administration remained primarily about nuclear energy, a difficult issue for the GAM engineers from the CENG. Despite Brice Lalonde's contention that it was the Socialist Party that was under attack and not Dubedout (by now a PS député), to local commentators and activists it seemed to be the reverse. The PS itself had been fairly cautious about Superphoenix, and the Socialist-controlled Isère Conseil général voted in favour of delay. While the mounting violence at Creys-Malville (which eventually resulted in the death of a demonstrator) forced the established political parties, with the exception of the PSU, to keep their distance from the protests, it was largely Dubedout's behaviour that increasingly enraged ecologists in Grenoble.

For the ecologists, it was already a problem that Dubedout was closely connected to the CENG, and a conditional supporter of nuclear power. But relations were aggravated by two high-profile incidents. Firstly, the apparent readiness of the mayor to consider plans in 1975 (from Rhône-Poulenc, later targeted by Les Amis de la Terre over pollution issues) to build a small local reactor to supply electricity for the collective urban heating system in the city. Secondly, Dubedout's refusal to support those taking 15% of their electricity bills in 1977 with the aim of withholding that part used for the development of nuclear power. The ecologists were furious and accused the mayor of double standards -- on the one hand being sympathetic to concerns about Superphoenix, but on the other refusing to support direct protest action.

Activist base

Although one should be careful about excessive generalisation from candidate information alone, the occupational categories of ecologist candidates in the 1977 municipal elections offer a clue as to the evolution of 1970s 'new politics' activists in Grenoble (see Appendix 15). The sizeable representation of teachers is significant,
as is the appearance of *animateurs*, students, the unemployed and artists. Certainly compared to the GAM a decade earlier, what is striking is the low presence of the technical professions (engineers, technicians). Equally absent, however, is the working class, a fact that is well-known and holds true comparatively in Western Europe and North America. Instead, one sees the dominance of pedagogical occupations, and the engagement of more ‘marginal’ groups.97 As far as religious influence is concerned, interview data suggests that while the Catholic and also Protestant presence was still significant, it was less defining than amongst the currents of the reform movement.98

In terms of age, one clearly sees amongst *Grenoble-Ecologie* candidates what might be described as a ‘post-materialist’ generation’, coming to political maturity around or after 1968. Fifty percent of candidates were born between 1945 and 1955, the first clearly post-materialist age cohort according to Inglehart.99 Yet the average date of birth for the political ecologists (1943) also reveals the presence of older activists and one should not overlook another albeit smaller but significant component: those close to or in the PSU who had never accepted the political pragmatism of either the GAM or the Rocardian entry into the PS in 1974. This group supplied some of the key figures for ‘Red-Green’ activism in Grenoble during the 1970s, a feature also notable in Toulouse.

To speak of modernist and anti-modernist currents would be to over-simplify, but one should note that what the GAM represented in the mid 1960s was a dissatisfaction with existing politics combined with a determination to institute an efficient and humane management of urban growth. While 1968 radicalised the anti-capitalist rhetoric, the GAM never embraced the kind of movement themes -- ecology, Third World, feminism, pacifism -- that came to the fore in the 1970s, and which represented a much more fundamental refusal of advanced industrialised society. At the same time, the tactics employed by these latter groups expressed a greater level of

97 Cf. Chapter Two on socio-professional characteristics of the contention cycle.
99 R. Inglehart, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*, p. 85. Although Inglehart’s cohort is 1946 - 1955, this is a nuance and does not affect the argument.
frustration and intolerance of the existing status quo. The conflict between Dubedout and the political ecologists should thus always be seen in these terms, and may be better understood in consequence. There are different sorts of ‘new politics’ movements and not all of them are always easily compatible.

Public transport and pressure-group politics

If the ecologists prioritised public transport and the fight against the car -- an important emerging issue during the contention cycle -- they did not have a monopoly in this area. Like many cities in France, including Toulouse, financial viability and continuing urban expansion in the late 1960s had combined to necessitate a clear plan for an efficient integrated transport network in the Grenoble agglomeration. But Dubedout’s administration was not strong on such questions; the GAM, for example, had never really worked on transport issues. In an attempt to dynamise thinking, the mayor therefore established an extra-municipal committee in 1972 to act as a ‘brains-trust’ within participationist frameworks. It included councillors, CFDT activists, union de quartier representatives and a delegate from the private (subsidised) transport operator SGTE (Société grenobloise des tramways électriques).

Dissatisfaction with the quality of the debate led Jean Silvardière, one of the CFDT’s delegates in the committee, to undertake a personal initiative two years later in 1974. Together with a number of colleagues and acquaintances, he established an association intended to promote improved public transport in the Grenoble agglomeration and to combat the automobile. The Association pour le développement des transports en commun, voies cyclables et piétonnières dans l’agglomération grenobloise (ADTC) quickly established itself as a substantial pressure group in Grenoble, with 1000 members by the end of 1974. Its core activist base was dominated by the Catholic non-Communist Left, and consisted overwhelmingly of engineers (CENG), researchers and teachers. In terms of trade unions, the CFDT predominated.

100 However, Grenoble was fairly exceptional in not seeing a slight rise in passenger numbers in the second half of the 1960s (+6%), numbers which fell heavily in most major provincial cities; for example, Lyon -11%, Marseille -22%, Lille -19%, Bordeaux -21%, Toulouse -15%, Strasbourg -17%, Le Havre -11%. Source: M. Marly and J.-P. Neuman, 'Les Transports Urbains à Toulouse' (Mémoire de Maîtrise, CIEU / Université de Toulouse le Mirail, 1975), p. 148.
The relationship between municipality and the ADTC is interesting for a number of reasons, not least that there are certain parallels with the story of Dubedout’s water user group: Silvardièire was also an engineer at the CENG, taking a personal initiative to mobilise on a sectoral issue. These parallels were certainly not lost on several Socialist Party councillors who initially feared that the ADTC might lead Silvardièire to become involved in a challenge to the incumbent municipality. However, despite the general Catholic Left orientation of the ADTC, the group was not explicitly political and certainly had no electoral pretensions. Its aim, rather, seems to have been to act as an independent transport pressure group, whatever the colour of the municipal administration. To this end, a clause in its constitution excluded any person holding public political office be it communal, departmental, regional or national level (a device which also reflected a certain distrust).

In relation to the emerging ecology movement in Grenoble, ADTC presented both similarities and differences. The activist networks were certainly not the same. While in socio-professional terms, there are clear parallels, most notably the presence of large numbers of teachers and researchers, one did not find PSU or heavily politicised individuals in the association. This was to a certain extent reflected in the spirit of ADTC whose emphasis on practical, technically viable solutions resembled the GAM more than it did contention cycle movements. It did not engage in non-violent direct action or demonstrations. Its only public popular rallying point was the Fête du vélo, an annual bicycle festival held from 1974 onwards.

However, in terms of generation, ADTC was closer to the Amis de la Terre -- Silvardièire was born in 1942, and Bruno Vigny (vice-president) in 1944. Silvardièire emphasises the generation gap between himself and Dubedout, who was of course twenty years older (born 1922).101 This showed particularly in what Silvardièire identifies as the mayor’s modernist vision of the city. Dubedout and his administration had been favouring the idea of constructing an urban cable-car network (POMA 2000) in Grenoble to relieve congestion. The bicycle and tramway, promoted by the ADTC

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101 Interview with Jean Silvardièire.
were initially perceived as outmoded, symbols of a bygone age. Ultimately, the association was situated somewhere in between the GAM and Amis de la Terre, representing an environmental sensitivity generally not as widely felt in the former, but less militant than the latter. Table 2 situates the ADTC within different types of non-party structures in Grenoble.

Table 2: Typology of principle ‘quality of life’ organisations in Grenoble, 1964-1977

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Date of creation</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Range of agenda</th>
<th>Direct protest</th>
<th>Electoral participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GAM</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Urban political movement</td>
<td>Primarily urban, but extends more widely</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Les Amis de la Terre</td>
<td>1976 (local branch)</td>
<td>New social movement</td>
<td>National, international societal critique, heavily emphasising ecology</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No (although activists run on ecologist lists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenoble-Ecologie</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Temporary party to contest 1977 municipals</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRAPNA</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>ADCV - Pressure group (Region)</td>
<td>Specific area: environmental protection</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADTC</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>ADCV - Pressure group (Grenoble)</td>
<td>Specific policy area: transport</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The relationship between administration and the ADTC illustrates some degree of tension in the participationist ethos. For sectoral pressure groups did not fit easily within the kind of democratic model being developed in Grenoble. By using a combination of extra-municipal committees and quartier-based structures, the municipality was constructing an increasingly institutionalised system in which it would establish consultative processes for specific sectoral questions, such as transport or culture, and resulting proposals could then be considered at neighbourhood level as necessary. In the eyes of many councillors, the ADTC risked hijacking the agenda, and potentially embarrassing elected representatives who had no voice within the association.

102 There is considerable dispute over the ‘paternity’ of Grenoble’s highly successful tram network which finally opened n 1987. The ADTC claims responsibility for the successful development of the idea in the mid 1970s, although the PS and PCF claim to have been favourable from early on.
103 For more on ADCVs, see Chapter One, ‘Local democracy and the contention cycle – citizen groups and neighbourhood committees’, 59 ff.
Conclusion

The success of reform currents in taking control of Grenoble in 1965 allowed a local political climate to develop which mitigated the impact of post-1968 urban conflicts. Yet the failure to engage with the so-called ‘new politics’ post-May 1968 led to different grassroots challenges. While participation was a theme that could overcome generational differences, it was clear that ecology, for example, exerted a far stronger appeal on the first post-materialists. A further problem for Dubedout in the face of the ecologist challenge was that by 1977, a certain degree of notabilisation had transformed the GAMists from outsiders to insiders in the political system. Dubedout was from 1973 onwards a PS député, and while remaining a member of the GAM, had entered the game of national politics. This made him a target for those suspicious of established politics on the Left, even though he himself refused to play the factional game within the PS.

As for citizen participation, it is important to note the difficulties that were experienced from a very early stage, and never resolved satisfactorily. The variable but relatively low interest shown by the population at large, and the increasing socio-professional homogeneity of the unions de quartier were constant problems for the municipality. The ‘laboratory’ had not produced satisfactory results, and at the beginning of the 1980s, the difficulties in moving towards more participatory forms of urban government were beginning to be widely confirmed in other experiments. This did not as such dissuade the municipality. Dubedout’s 1983 municipal programme (PS-PCF-Ecologist list) promised that the conseils de secteurs would in future be elected by universal suffrage, the GAM’s original plan of 1976-7. However, there was an optimistic nuance in the text; such measures would ‘depend on future legislation,’ legislation that was never in fact brought forward by the PS.

Dubedout lost the 1983 election in a defeat seen as highly symbolic, with Serge July noting in Libération that Grenoble had been an oasis for the Left during the crossing of the desert that was the 1970s. Indeed, despite the fact that local

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104 See S. Dion, La politisation des maines, pp. 179-196. cf. Chapter One, footnote 154, p. 73.
105 From the electoral programme of the ‘Union of the Left and Ecologist List,’ published in Le Dauphiné Libéré, 4 March 1983.
variables were crucially important, the result was widely perceived to be a judgement on Mitterrand’s first years.\footnote{For good analyses of the 1983 result, see especially P. Bréchon, 'Comment expliquer l’échec de la municipalité Dubedout à Grenoble', \textit{Cahiers D'Histoire}, 28/2-3 (1983), 59-78, and J.-P. Motte, 'Grenoble: questions sur un socialisme municipal', \textit{Esprit}, 5-6 (May-June 1983), 294-301.} Dubedout’s departure certainly symbolised the end of a vision of participatory democracy that neither his successor as mayor, Alain Carignon (RPR, 1983-1995), nor his \textit{dauphin} in the Socialist Party, Michel Destot, had any intention of pursuing. Indeed, the arrival of Carignon marked the emergence of a new kind of semi-populist, mediatised local politics (also seen with Dominique Baudis in Toulouse) that has much influenced the strategies of the local PS.\footnote{Interviews with Michel Destot and Annie Deschamps.}

On both Right and Left, there has been a recognition that the \textit{unions de quartier} are a permanent heritage of the Dubedout era, but the notion of the neighbourhood committees as the crucial link between population and municipality continues to be resisted, without any clear alternative emerging. The Right has never supported the idea of directly-elected sub-municipal structures, which was ultimately Dubedout’s solution to the \textit{unions de quartier} problem. On the Left, given the electorally quite precarious position of the PS since the late 1980s, such a suggestion looks certain never to be resurrected, thanks both to the political risks involved, and a lack of enthusiasm for ideas that are seen to belong to another period.\footnote{Interview with Michel Destot.}
Chapter Four: Toulouse before 1968: a marginalised reform minority

Background: a city without an industrial vocation

Although both Grenoble and Toulouse are now hailed as leading French technological centres, it is only in the last twenty years that the latter has achieved this rank. In the 1950s, when Grenoble was a modern, industrial city in the sense of both advanced production and applied research capabilities, Toulouse was still some way behind. Yet the explanation is certainly not connected to the city's intellectual dynamism. In the scientific domain in particular, its university and institutes have long been leading players in France.¹ For example, as early as 1913, Grenoble and Toulouse, together with Nancy, were training almost 80% of those studying for diplomas in industry-applied science.² It is, rather, the contrasting industrial development trajectories followed by the two cities that have been determinant.

The essential difference can be traced back to the race to produce hydro-electricity at the end of the nineteenth century. Toulouse, like Grenoble, had hydro-electric potential nearby and the technical competence to exploit it. As Socialist mayor Albert Bedouc (optimistically) commented in 1906:

'No large town in France, except Grenoble, is better placed to benefit from the industrial propulsion that hydro-electricity creates everyday through its competition with steam [...] Toulouse is destined to become, very shortly, the capital of a very important industrial region.'³

To stimulate the process, the municipality facilitated the creation of an Institut d'électrotechnique (1908); meanwhile the Compagnie des chemins de fer du Midi established hydro-electric plants in the mountains.

Significantly, however, it was Grenoble factories which provided the equipment for the production of the electricity in the Pyrenees, and Toulouse was quickly overtaken

³ M. Grossetti, Science, Industrie et Territoire, p. 54.
in the race to develop both the new power source and the related infrastructure. While entrepreneurs in the Alps created a substantial metallurgy, electricity and hydraulics capacity, the capital of the South-West seemed to have missed its chance. Nonetheless, despite this set-back, an aviation industry in Toulouse began to emerge which eventually resulted in prestige projects such as the Caravelle, Concorde, and Airbus. The first aircraft were built in Toulouse in 1912 by Latécoère, the engineer son of a local industrialist; Latécoère’s head of production left to establish the city’s second aircraft facility, Dewoitine, in 1919.

Dewoitine was nationalised in 1937 to eventually become Sud-Aviation (Caravelle) and later SNIAS (Concorde and Airbus). The development of the aviation sector was hardly surprising given its strategic nature. The city already had a number of older military production facilities (Cartoucherie, Arsenal, Poudrerie) and, therefore, a pool of relatively skilled workers. Furthermore, given its distance from Germany, Toulouse was an ideal base for aircraft manufacture. However, the various nationalisations linked to a wider pattern of state activity in Toulouse which, in the 1930s, consisted of a large facility exploiting ammonia (ONIA - Office national industriel de l’azote), and a tobacco factory. In effect, local industry was dominated by the state, particularly during the First World War when demands for equipment (from munitions to clothing) provided a massive boost for the city’s economy. By 1918, the Cartoucherie (munitions plant) was employing 14,730 people, as opposed to less than 1,000 before the War.

Jean Coppolani well identifies the essential problem when he speaks of acquired tradition. If Toulouse was a city without a natural industrial vocation, in terms of primary materials nearby or easy access to a port, it was not alone. Grenoble was in a similar position, but was able to acquire a modern industrial base through gradual private/public investment and development. The aviation initiatives remained

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5 ONIA is an interesting case. Following World War One, the Treaty of Versailles gave France the right to exploit the Haber ammonium procedure used in several German factories. As no French industrialist took up the offer, the government created an autonomous office (100% state-financed) to deal with the issue. ONIA had just one factory, Toulouse, which opened in 1928.

isolated examples of innovation in a city whose local bourgeoisie generally appeared unable to follow the same entrepreneurial path, mirroring the stagnant agriculture and declining population of the region. Coppolani goes as far as to claim that had the state not intervened, creating ONIA or consolidating aircraft production, Toulouse would not have had any large-scale production capacity even in the 1960s.7

Comparing the two agglomerations even as late as 1962, the patterns of economic evolution are very clear (see Appendix 4a).8 Leaving aside the building trade, which was flourishing in both cities on the back of rapid urban expansion, the largest industrial entities in Grenoble were related to electrical construction and machinery, those of Toulouse to aviation and chemicals (primarily ammonia production). Both specialisation and patterns of ownership reflect the divergent experiences of the late nineteenth century and the importance of government intervention in Toulouse. Appendix 4b shows the extent to which the state was at the centre of industrial development in the South-West, in sharp contrast with the situation in Grenoble.

These economic structures influence social-professional composition in a number of ways. Firstly, the absence of a local industrial élite meant that the Toulouse bourgeoisie was dominated by a more traditional group around the legal professions (especially in the Law Faculty of the University), commercial and land/property interests -- a survey in 1962 showed that there were 80 aristocratic, landowning families residing in the city.9 One consequence of these patterns was that the university-industry dynamic, so significant in Grenoble, was almost impossible to realise until much later. Although scientific research seems not to have been harmed,10 there were inadequate opportunities to cultivate a home-grown research and development environment.

Secondly, while INSEE socio-professional data (See Appendix 3a) suggests a growing technical, managerial and intellectual middle-class presence at the expense, in particular, of the working class, and at an above average rate for the métropoles

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8 It should be noted that while the agglomeration of Grenoble extended across thirteen communes in 1962, the agglomeration of Toulouse was limited to Toulouse and Blagnac.
one key factor distinguishes Toulouse in this respect. The presence of technicians and engineers (4.1% of the active population compared to 6.6% in Grenoble in 1962) was not just quantitatively but, perhaps more importantly, qualitatively different. The so-called 'industrie de pointe,' advanced technical activity that marked Grenoble, was less evident. Until the successes of Concorde and Airbus and the major technology sector expansion in the 1970s, it would not be possible to identify this kind of evolution in Toulouse. Indeed, patterns of residence at this time, with many in the 'knowledge' industries residing in the suburbs of the agglomeration rather than the central commune, meant that Toulouse itself never felt the kind of impact that Grenoble experienced in the late 1950s and early 1960s.

**Municipal politics**

From 1924 until 1971, the municipality was in the hands of Socialists for all but the period of the Second World War. While still dominated by the Radical regional bosses (the Sarraut brothers, owners of *La Dépêche du Midi*), the 'pink city,' late nineteenth-century heartland of the Radicals, started to resemble a 'red city' by the mid 1930s with the SFIO winning almost 56% of the vote in the municipal elections of 1935. This pattern of SFIO dominance was reflected more widely in the department of Haute-Garonne, where it captured some 54% of the vote in 1935. With the city and department, the SFIO also inherited the clientilist structure of politics from their Radical predecessors. The Communist Party, marginalised on the extreme left, between 1919 and 1935 never exceeded 7% in municipal elections. It was not able to gain any significant foothold until after the War, helped by its Resistance record and

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11 *Eight métropoles d'équilibre were created in 1963: Strasbourg, Nancy-Metz, Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing, Nantes-Saint Nazaire, Bourdeaux, Toulouse, Lyon-St Etienne, Marseilles-Aix. Their average professional middle class population was 16.4% of the active population (categories: 'professions libérales et professions littéraires', 'cadres supérieurs', 'cadres moyens'). Toulouse was the highest at 19.3%. The average for towns larger than 50,000 inhabitants was 15.5% of the active population, putting Grenoble well above at 22.5%. Source J. G. Charré and L. M. Coyaud, *Les villes françaises. Étude des villes et agglomérations de plus de 5000 habitants* (Paris: Centre de recherche d'urbanisme, 1973), Vol.3, 2.*

12 *Despite the efforts of Socialist mayor, Ellen-Prévôt, to dissuade the Vichy authorities (to whom he had given his allegiance), the city was placed under Special Delegation in 1940.*
the collaboration with Vichy of prominent local Socialists, including mayor Gabriel Ellen-Prévôt.\textsuperscript{13}

The power of the Left in the city was well illustrated at the Liberation when a quasi-revolutionary atmosphere prevailed for a time. Two elements were particularly notable. Firstly, the formation of Comités de libération d'entreprise, workers' groups (‘Soviets’ to their critics) which took control of the key industries in the city -- SNCASE (later Sud-Aviation), Cartoucherie, Poudrerie, ONIA -- as well as the transport network. Secondly, mayor Raymond Badiou (SFIO, 1945-1958) took advantage of the climate for radical change in 1974 to municipalise key local services -- notably, gas, electricity and the tramways. Such developments contributed to an early souring of relations between the Left and de Gaulle who, in the words of Jean Estèbe, felt the city to be his ‘achilles heel,’ with the Americans increasingly concerned about the ‘Red Republic’ of the South-West.\textsuperscript{14}

With the municipal elections of 1947, a post-war realignment in Toulouse politics was becoming clear (see Appendix 5 for results, 1947-1959).\textsuperscript{15} While the Radicals and the SFIO were considerably weakened in comparison to their earlier power, the Communists, the Gaullists and the MRP emerged strongly, as was the case more generally in France, aided by their Resistance records and the impact of the Cold War on French politics. Nonetheless, it should be noted that the Gaullist score in 1947 (28.1\%) was well below the average for French towns (38\%) though well up on its performance in the legislative election of November 1946 (8\%). This early sign of a resistance to Gaullism was confirmed during the early years of the Fifth Republic when Toulouse and its department manifested a considerable opposition to the new regime.

\textsuperscript{13} For details of the career of Ellen-Prévôt, see S. Arrecgros, 'La carrière politique de G. Ellen-Prévôt, dernier maire de Toulouse sous la IIème République: 1877-1952' (Mémoire de maîtrise, Université de Toulouse le Mirail, 1992).


The political balance of the municipality, headed by the Socialist Raymond Badiou from 1944 until 1958, underwent considerable mutation between 1947 and the end of the Fourth Republic. In accordance with the evolving national political situation and, most importantly, the emerging Cold-War cleavage, the initial inclusion of the PCF in an SFIO-PCF-MRP *entente* in 1944 gave way by 1948 to the marginalisation of the party. This left the SFIO and MRP without a convincing base (15 seats and some 40% of the vote), which necessitated a broadening of the ruling coalition. Badiou persuaded three Gaullists and a Radical to back him, producing a majority of twenty out of thirty-seven seats.

Municipal elections in 1953 saw the revival of the Toulouse Radicals who fought the campaign in an alliance with the CNI, made possible by the centre-right coalition at national level. The results illustrate a clear evolution amongst the electorate in favour of the SFIO and the Radical-CNI alliance to the detriment of the RPF, MRP and PCF.\(^\text{16}\) Despite the advance of the Radicals and Independents, the SFIO was able to hold city hall, its alliance with the MRP leaving the two parties as the biggest bloc but still in a minority on the Council in 1954; and so in 1954, Badiou included the Radicals and Independents in the *Conseil Municipal* majority. This coalition, characteristic of ruling municipal coalitions in many French towns in the Fourth and early in the Fifth Republics, remained largely unchanged until 1959.

### From Badiou to Bazerque

May 1958 and the creation of the Fifth Republic split the SFIO nationally and locally. However, victorious nationally, the UNR had less success in challenging the centre-left coalition that ruled Toulouse, as in many large French towns. Totally opposed to the SFIO’s support for de Gaulle in the referendum of 28 September on the new Fifth Republic Constitution and opposed to the war in Algeria, Raymond Badiou resigned from the party and joined other dissident Socialists in the PSA. In October, he resigned as mayor and SFIO candidate, Louis Bazerque, was elected at the third ballot (but by only 14 out of 37 councillors). Bazerque’s initially tenuous position was, however, strengthened by the municipal elections of March 1959 which not only

testified to the SFIO’s power of resistance in the face of the challenge from both PSA and UNR, but to the power of the Left in Toulouse. The combined vote of the PCF, PSA and SFIO represented 57% of valid votes cast (37% of the register), but they were incompatible allies.

The first Bazerque administration, 1959-1965, was based on an unusual SFIO-UNR-Union Nationale coalition with the opposition consisting of the PCF plus PSA (PSU from 1960). Despite the ruling group declaring itself ‘apolitical,’ the cleavage between majority and opposition reflected the division between those who backed the Gaullist regime and those who continued to fight against the new political order of the Fifth Republic. At the moment of the Algerian crisis in 1960-62, the SFIO-UNR rapprochement provoked bitter criticism from the local PSU, now led by Badiou. This was hardly surprising given the tension within Socialist ranks that had provoked his departure in 1958. Indeed, Toulouse’s many connections with the Algerian conflict meant that the period was highly charged with periodic violence within the city, for Toulouse was linked to Algeria by proximity, numerous family ties and the presence in the city of three parachute regiment bases (the South West being the main garrison area for the intervention forces). At the moment of the evacuation of the French Algerians, in mid 1962, the air bridge between Oran and Toulouse transported 100,000 people into the region.

Table 3: Votes in favour of referendum propositions, 1958-62 (Source: Le Monde)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposition</th>
<th>Toulouse</th>
<th>Haute-Garonne</th>
<th>Grenoble</th>
<th>Isère</th>
<th>France</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Endorsement of direct election of the President</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>61.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(28 October 1962)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endorsement of Algerian independence</td>
<td>86.5</td>
<td>87.2</td>
<td>88.8</td>
<td>90.7</td>
<td>90.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8 April 1962)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endorsement of Algeria’s right to self-determination</td>
<td>68.9</td>
<td>69.3</td>
<td>74.2</td>
<td>72.7</td>
<td>75.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8 January 1961)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endorsement of the Fifth Republic Constitution</td>
<td>73.6</td>
<td>75.7</td>
<td>74.6</td>
<td>74.9</td>
<td>79.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(28 September 1958)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One can better understand the political problem posed by the Socialist-Gaullist pact if one looks at the attitude to de Gaulle manifested in Toulouse through the referenda
held between September 1958 and October 1962. Particularly notable was the rejection of the proposal to institute direct election of the President every seven years. Amongst French cities, only Toulouse (48.5% in favour) and Marseilles (46.7% in favour) voted against the proposition. The national average of approval was 61.8%, with an average of 61.2% in the large cities. Furthermore, Toulouse’s vote was fully in line with that of its department, Haute-Garonne, which was consistently underwhelmed by de Gaulle’s use of the plebiscitary referendum.

A push for modernisation

Badiou’s vision for Toulouse was based partly on his desire to maintain a harmony within the Midi-Pyrenées region. His priority was to avoid an imbalance between the only major city and its surrounding countryside — a long-term structural problem, particularly acute in recent decades. Under his supervision, and following government policy of the immediate post-war period, the architect J. Nicod, drew up an urbanisation plan in 1947 which aimed to limit land for construction to about 25% (30km²) of the total area of the commune; a further 80km² of rural land would be protected. Toulouse was not to be a city with an industrial vocation but an administrative, intellectual and commercial centre.

However, state planners, increasingly worried by the economic condition of the South West, were starting to make the decisions that would ensure Toulouse’s emergence as a high-technology capital by the late 1970s. As early as 1947, Jean-François Gravier had written, in the highly influential *Paris et le désert français*, of the necessity to promote regional specialisation and recommended the decentralisation of ENSA (*Ecole nationale supérieure d’aéronautique*). The idea of promoting Toulouse as an aeronautic centre was being seriously considered by the local prefectural services from the mid 1950s. For the city to work as an aeronautic centre,

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18 In the 1950s, the only other town in the region with a population of more than 50,000 inhabitants was Tarbes. For a contemporary account of Toulouse’s increasing dominance, See S. Thepot, ‘Le dynamisme de Toulouse étouffe les villes de Midi-Pyrénées’, *Le Monde* (30 January 1997).
development and research were essential, so the construction was recommended of a science complex at Rangueil in the south-east of the commune: 'the motor of our economic resurrection.' This complex would be situated on a new science faculty campus whose construction, a pilot for future French campus schemes, had been agreed by the Ministry of Education in 1957.

In 1963, final approval by the interministerial committee was given for the transfer of ENSA and the CNES (Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales) to the new Rangueil site. In the same year, DATAR was created and Toulouse was one of the eight agglomerations declared a métropole d’équilibre, giving the city development priority. Over the next decade, a major accumulation of public-sector knowledge-related activity was instigated. In terms of aeronautics and space research, the city became home to the CEAT (Centre d’essai aéronautique de Toulouse), ENICA (Ecole nationale d’ingénieurs de construction aéronautique), ENAC (Ecole nationale de l’aviation civile), ENSA (which become ENSAE with the addition of espace) and the CNES. The decentralisation of ENSA was also accompanied by an associated research laboratory specialising in computation and automation, the CERT (Centre d’études et de recherches de Toulouse). In addition, there were four grandes écoles d’application already in place in the city, most notably ENSEEIHT (Ecole nationale supérieure d’électrotechnique, d’électronique, d’informatique et d’hydraulique de Toulouse).

Behind this emphasis on research-led development lay a grander ambition on the part of the local prefectoral services: Toulouse could become a major agglomeration of possibly up to a million inhabitants by the year 2000 (currently 650,00 compared to 238,000 in 1954). The strategy was not made explicit for fear of provoking the hostility of already sceptical elements of the local elite, including Badiou who ‘would have resigned’ if he had been told of such an idea. In order to catalyse greater support and avoid imposing the schemes, the prefecture launched a series of Journées d’études économiques in 1955, bringing together interested parties, including trade

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21 François Laffont, Head of the prefectoral economic service, later Secretary General of the Marie de Toulouse. Interview transcript kindly lent by Michel Grossetti and Jean-Yves Nevers.

22 Three of the grandes écoles were descendants of the three technical institutes established 1906-1909. (chemistry, electricity, agriculture). The fourth was a school of chemical engineering created in 1954. It became ENSI (Ecole Nationale Supérieure d’Ingénieurs) in 1975.

23 Interview with François Laffont.
unions and academics. The university was, in fact, extremely supportive with some Toulouse academics active in promoting the new vision of the city. Leading physicist, François Cambou, for example, worked closely with Bazerque on a plan to attract American high-technology company, Motorola.24

The arrival of Louis Bazerque as mayor in 1958 marked the emergence of a new approach on the part of the municipality. In contrast to Raymond Badiou’s attempts to restrict the growth of Toulouse, Bazerque’s vision was ambitious, seeking rapid modernisation and expansion. While his personal relations with the prefecture were often far from harmonious, his conception of the city’s future fitted well with that of the prefectoral and regional planners. His clever choice of Secretary General -- François Laffont, former head of the Prefectural Economic Services in Haute-Garonne -- seemed to suit all parties involved. In a system still dominated by prefectoral tutelle, Laffont’s excellent contacts with the state apparatus created what he himself describes as a ‘perfect osmosis.’ This was not without political costs for Bazerque, given the Gaullist domination of the state machinery.

Bazerque quickly manifested his intentions with the instigation of the Le Mirail ZUP (Zone à urbaniser en priorité) project in 1960. Toulouse, like most French cities, was experiencing on-going housing shortages; to resolve existing problems as well as to facilitate future development, further capacity was needed. Le Mirail was intended to be a satellite city within the commune, housing up to 100,000 inhabitants on 6.8km². Designed by the architect George Candilis, Le Mirail was, at the time, the most ambitious project of its kind in France. Coinciding with the advancement of plans to develop the Rangueil site (itself also a model campus for future university expansion) as a science university and technology centre, it projected a radically different vision of what Toulouse should become. Bazerque’s vision was very much in line with the state’s ambitions for regional growth which found their most cogent expression in DATAR’s métropoles d’équilibre.

Politically, the dual ‘sin’ of Bazerque not only in backing the General in the wider context of the Algerian crisis, but also collaborating with the Gaullist planning

machinery in a project that ran so clearly counter to Badiou’s vision, served to reinforce the PSU’s anger. While the decentralisation that was beginning to bear fruits was in line with the party’s conception of regional economics, *L’Action Socialiste*, the monthly regional PSU newspaper, contains consistent critiques of Bazerque’s urban planning. From the outset, there was particular opposition to the *Le Mirail* on two levels. Firstly, that the project was an invitation to rampant property speculation, an accusation that was later to take on a more serious aspect amidst suspicions of municipal corruption. Secondly, that the utopia of a satellite city was being favoured at the expense both of much-needed urban infrastructure for existing areas and of renovation for the most run-down parts of the city centre, such as Saint-Georges.\(^{25}\)

The PSU took a consistent interest in the infrastructure difficulties that Toulouse was facing. While the expansion of the city had not proceeded at the astonishing speed of Grenoble between 1954 and 1962, many of the problems were similar -- anarchic planning unmatched by basic facilities, such as adequate transport and a consistent water supply. Although these issues did not generate the same degree of popular response, the city was equally badly equipped in certain areas. In the early 1960s, *L’Action Socialiste* periodically devoted space to the issue, particularly to transport questions, which took on great importance in advance of the 1971 elections. The paper also campaigned for an improvement in water provision during the 1965 campaign, complaining about dirty and erratic supplies.\(^{26}\) However, the underlying critique remained centred on Toulouse’s inexorable growth and Bazerque’s grandiose vision for the city.

**Associative life in the quartier**

While the creation of the Grenoble GAM at the end of 1964 was facilitated by a network of militants and associations focused on local questions, Toulouse witnessed far less structured contention at this level until the late 1960s and early 1970s. The early creation of the *unions de quartier* in Grenoble and their legitimisation in the


Dubedout administration avoided the situation in Toulouse, where the post-1968 effervescence of urban movements, and their exclusion from the decision-making process in a centre-right municipality, created a certain climate of radical opposition to the local political elite. The analysis here looks at activity in the quartier and the clubs until the end of the 1960s.

Inter-war period

From the mid-1920s until just before the Second World War, just under twenty quartier-based amicales laïques / cercles laïques were declared to the prefecture. As we have seen in the case of Grenoble, these groups provided a variety of social functions, initially centred around schools. Socialist-linked activity through the amicales and amicales laïques was, however, more evident in Toulouse, with the SFIO apparatus extremely well-implanted. Well-known municipal figures could often be found amongst the members of these groups. The Cercle laïque Saint Agne (1930, Empalot quartier) was presided over by an adjoint to the mayor, while the Cercle laïque Etienne Billières (1934) counted a young Socialist councillor among its founders.

Lacking, though, is the development of independent citizen mobilisation, such as became apparent in the unions de quartier of Grenoble. Although prefectoral records in Toulouse record one such group, the Syndicat de défense des intérêts des lotis de la cité jardin des Fontaines, created in a new housing development in 1931, this is the only trace of any such associative activity before the late 1940s. Thus, while the observation by Bolle et al. concerning the connection between the appearance of neighbourhood committees and rapid urbanisation appears to hold true for Grenoble, it clearly does not work for Toulouse at this time. But as far as the 1920s and 1930s are concerned, there is little intrinsic reason as to why it should not. The pace of growth in the two cities was not particularly different. Between 1906 and 1936, both

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27 Prefectoral records, Toulouse (Bureau des Associations).
28 Documentation is relatively scarce. For details of the Saint-Agne association, see R. Armengaud and H. Vieu (eds.), Un quartier de Toulouse d'Empalot à Port-Garaud (Toulouse: Association les Amis des Archives de la Haute Garonne, 1998). On Fontaine-Lestaing, see P. Piste et al., Un quartier à Toulouse: Fontaine Lestang (Toulouse: Privately published, 1980). These are the only works available to provide any detail about such activity.
29 Bolle et al., 'La participation des citoyens au développement urbain', p. 5.
experienced a population boom (31% in Grenoble, nearly 43% in Toulouse) and the major inflow of inhabitants, largely the result of rural exodus, provoked a surge in housing construction and resulted in infrastructural inadequacies.  

Why, then, did unions de quartier not start to appear in Toulouse? Such a question is clearly difficult to answer although there are possible circumstantial reasons which may have played a part. One possible hypothesis is that the lack of activity may be related to the wide penetration of the cercles laiques. For example, it was consistently difficult to create a lasting comité de quartier in Fontaine-Lestaing before the 1980s, the cercle laïque being still too powerful to leave a place for another association. Indeed, given Socialist hegemony during the 1930s and the growing network of cercles laiques, centred initially around primary schools, but extending to a whole range of social activities, discontent may well have been expressed, managed or deflected through these channels.

This hypothesis, however, cannot really account for the change in the pattern of neighbourhood associative life in Toulouse immediately after the Second World War. Although a significant number of amicales / cercle laiques were still being created, the period saw a proliferation of local tenants groups and quartier ‘defence’ committees (twenty between 1945 and 1954), as well as eight communes libres. It seems that there may be no clear single reason to explain the ten to fifteen year difference between the two cities. If Grenoble did develop neighbourhood committees during the late 1920s and 1930s, it could have been chance, an element of fashion in a smaller city, or different expectations. There can be no certainty as to why a certain phenomenon did not occur at a given time in another locality. The reality was simply that the associative tissue of Toulouse during the 1930s was dominated by a very specific type of ideological divide -- between Church parish and republican secular values, strongly promoted by the Radical and Socialist parties. In this sense, it was wholly typical of wider French patterns.

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30 Two solutions to housing problems were adopted; the first, shaped by municipal socialism, placed a major emphasis on collective housing. This was achieved by OPHBM (Office public d'habitations à bon marché), which both cities applied to establish in the early 1920s. The second, envisaged by the Loi Loucheur of 1928, encouraged the building of individual homes - pavillons.

31 Observations in interviews with Christian Béringuier and Paul Pistre. The UFCS had created a group in 1969, but this did not last long.

32 Data from prefectoral records, Toulouse (Bureau des Associations).
Post-war period: diffuse activity

But the major contrast with Grenoble lies not so much in the 1930s, as in the 1950s and 1960s. The numerous tenants groups and defence committees of Toulouse were isolated in their activities, often short-lived, and unable to impose any kind of coordinated presence. What was emerging in Grenoble was a general conception of the role of an union de quartier as intermediary body between local authorities and the population of self-designated sectors of the city. Despite differences in activities and emphases, the unions de quartier were able to group together from 1960 onwards, and further stimulate a dynamic in which Grenoble was criss-crossed by a specific set of structures. In contrast, the first coordinating structure in Toulouse, the Union des comités de quartier (UCQ) appeared only in 1970.

None of the conditions seemed right. Firstly, there was no clear paradigm inherited from the 1930s, no tradition of purely territorial organisation on which to build. Secondly, patterns of growth were different. While Toulouse had experienced well above-average expansion, the near-anarchic construction that took place in the south of Grenoble at the height of the population boom, found no parallel in Toulouse. Major infrastructural problems existed, but not on the same scale and not concentrated in neighbouring areas which undoubtedly facilitated collaboration in Grenoble.\(^ {33}\) Thirdly, there was no equivalent associative impulsion as that provided by Uriage-inspired Resistance networks in Grenoble after the Liberation, and reform cycle associations of the early 1960s, such as Citoyens 60, were less prominent or absent. Finally, as we have seen, the continued presence of strong para-political groups may have inhibited any newer forms of organisation.

But despite these differences, certain areas were well-organised. In Empalot, for example, a heavily working-class area where a large-scale HLM project had been undertaken in the late 1950s, residents created a tenants’ association in 1962 to resolve their heating difficulties.\(^ {34}\) The tenants group then worked together with a

\(^{33}\) Four of the five unions de quartier (Alliés-Alpins, Grenoble-Sud, Ile Verte, Eaux Claires, La Capuche) which formed the CLAQ in 1960 were in adjacent areas in the south of Grenoble. See p. 90.

\(^{34}\) Cf. Association des résidents de Teisseire, Grenoble. See p. 88.
number of JOC activists (who were assisting the urban integration of rural migrants), and the Cercle laïque Saint-Agne to pressurise the municipality for the construction of a social centre, and later a health-care unit in the quartier. It took the events of 1968 to precipitate a structure calling itself Comité de quartier d'Empalot to emerge, with the central goal of making the area ‘more welcoming and more human,’ a less obviously instrumental aim than six years earlier.

The most prominent group, however, was the Comité pour l'étude et la défense des intérêts du quartier Nord de Toulouse (CODIQUANT). Created in 1963 in order to oppose the installation of a fat rendering plan in a peripheral, partly agricultural area of the city, which had been designated as a zone for industrial development. The CODIQUANT evolved to become a more general watchdog of the interests of a considerable area of northern Toulouse, spearheading campaigns on a number of quality of life issues, such as noise pollution and local transport. Over some three decades, the committee has remained the central dynamic force in Toulouse comité de quartier activity, with a leading coordinating role in the Union des comités de quartier (UCQ). However, in contrast to the Alliés-Alpins in Grenoble, for example, the CODIQUANT was isolated in the north of the city, without extensive associative network to tap into in other parts of the city.

In terms of membership base, the CODIQUANT was dominated by the middle class, with virtually no workers. Its long-term president, Marc Miguet, highly active in the wider urban infrastructure conflicts through the 1970s, was a middle-school teacher, Left Catholic, member of the Equipes enseignantes (Catholic teachers working in state schools) and of the PSU Federal bureau in Haute-Garonne. However, this was not an association of the intellectual or technical professions. Cadres moyens, cadres supérieurs and professions libérales were not particularly over-represented (16%) in terms of the overall balance of the quartier (13.5%). In fact, it was employees, shopkeepers and artisans who were disproportionately present in the association (see Appendix 13a).

35 Armengaud and Vieu, Un quartier de Toulouse d'Empalot à Port-Garaud, p. 164.
37 For a supportive analysis of the Comité du quartier Nord, see A. Miguet, 'Un exemple de vie associative: Le comité du quartier Nord de Toulouse' (Mémoire, IEP de Toulouse, 1981). The author is the daughter of the President, Marc Miguet.
Perhaps the most striking feature of the membership statistics is that in an area containing, by the late 1960s, more than 30,000 inhabitants, there were only 330 paying a subscription to their neighbourhood committee (about 1% compared to 6.5% during the same period in Grenoble; see p. 145). Although there were also a number of sub-defence committees (groups federated to the central CODIQUANT) operating in the quartier nord whose members were not counted in this survey, this question of representativity fed into the difficult terrain of the relationship between the Committee and the municipal authorities. As François Bonnier notes, there was a dual problem for a fledgling comité de quartier at this time. On the one hand, it needed to prove to the mairie that it truly represented the neighbourhood before it was taken seriously; on the other, in order to gain local support, it had to produce results for their quartier, a general problem for pressure groups.38 This generated something of a catch-22 situation which was difficult to resolve.

Indeed, relations with the Bazerque municipality were initially minimal. From the perspective of the association, little encouragement was to be had from the municipal councillors, who tended to take the attitude that they had been elected for six years and therefore best entitled to judge what was in the interests of individual quartiers. This reflected an outlook typical of traditional republican élus -- that they were chosen by universal suffrage to represent the population as a whole during their period of office. Gradually, as the CODIQUANT established itself, it was taken more seriously, but some of its best results in the 1960s were achieved in bypassing the councillors altogether. For example, it developed relations with the technical staff in the mairie for questions of traffic-flow improvement or street-lighting, while the association went direct to the management of the STCRT (bus franchise-holder) for the extension of a bus line.

However, beyond more functional questions, the association developed a distinct identity through an emphasis on local democracy or what one could term territorial participation. As Miguet puts it:

38 F. Bonnier, 'Les pratiques des associations de quartier et les processus de récupération', Espaces et sociétés, 6-7 (1972), 30.
'People realised that many councillors were not serious. We saw them during electoral campaigns and then - pssst - they disappeared. Increasingly, people wanted to be involved in issues which concerned them; whence the idea of a true participative democracy.'

While this kind of approach was certainly exceptional in Toulouse during the mid 1960s, it fits closely with ideas emerging in the Grenoble Groupe d'études urbaines et municipales and GAM, and more widely with the themes of the reform cycle as expressed at municipal level by associations such as ADELS.

Despite Miguet's active position in the party, the PSU was not directly involved in the CODIQUANT, which in any case claimed independence from any political apparatus. As already noted, the party was keeping tabs on urban problems, but these issues did not yet have the priority that they had after 1968 when the PSU, both in Toulouse and nationwide, engaged more forcefully in urban conflicts. An illustration of the familiar local party approach of the early 1960s came in an article in L'Action Socialiste of July 1964, following a public meeting called by the CODIQUANT to draw attention to the threat to the quartier posed by a proposed abattoir. Praising the association as an example to imitate in the realm of a 'democratic response to increasingly authoritarian practises,' the article nonetheless emphasises that the fundamental question remained the size of Toulouse (Badiou's obsession).

Beyond neighbourhood defence or participation, a wide variety of other groups were active in the quartiers. Like Grenoble, there were numerous ASF branches, linked to the CSF. Also present, and working with the ASF, was the UFCS (Union feminine civique et sociale), a national organisation created in the inter-war period, which sought to promote reforms on a range of issues, from housing to culture. Indeed, Ledrut and Giami's study of the quartier nord in 1968 shows the existence of 114 associations operating in the area: about 35% were sports clubs, while over 10% were mutual aid or charitable groups. Three-quarters of the associations were local.

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39 Interview with Marc Miguet.
40 L'Action Socialiste, 29 (July 1964).
41 For more on the activities of the UFCS, see M.-T. Renard, La participation des femmes à la vie civique, pp. 42-47. The UFCS was given official recognition as a movement for popular education in 1959.
The Church and the quartier

Worker-priest activity in Toulouse could be identified in the neighbourhoods, but was more evident in industry (notably ONIA, Latécoère and SNCASE) where the priests had achieved a certain level of notoriety. The local religious hierarchy clearly viewed their approach as too politicised and they had been repeatedly warned; most were suspended by Archbishop Saliège in 1954, following the French Church’s termination of the experiment. The particular bone of contention in the city, as often elsewhere in the country, was a high-level of engagement in the CGT, and persistent complaints by the authorities that the priests were stirring-up discontent in factories.43

Meanwhile, a different and more discrete presence had developed in certain quartiers, although this was nominally organised across parish and not strictly neighbourhood boundaries. The Mission St Pierre St Paul, established by the Père Loew in Marseilles, had been given permission to operate in a central parish, Patte d’Oie. Eschewing the politicisation often associated with the kind of Mission de France activity which had created the difficulties outlined above, Loew’s group emphasised the importance of the quartier as a central focus for their operations.44 However, they shared the central preoccupation of reducing the separation between the urban working-class and the Church.

The parallel with Mollard and Correnwinder’s impact on Malherbe in Grenoble is instructive. University professor, Jean Froidure, a Toulouse Vie nouvelle leader in the early 1960s and resident of the Patte-d’Oie parish, recalls that the activities of the worker priests facilitated the making of acquaintances and friendships across class and religious cleavages that would otherwise have been impossible.45 According to Froidure, the influence of the worker-priests also served to reduce tensions with the local amicale laïque: ‘They were so simple and authentic that all the warnings from

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43 Renseignements Généraux Files, ADHG 2273-46.
45 Interview with Jean Froidure.
the secularists (‘laiques’) or Communists simply died away. There was a climate of trust. No problem.’

A similar level of co-operation appears to have existed in Empalot where (as noted above) JOC activists worked with the amicale laïque and the tenants’ association to obtain local facilities. However, these were certainly not yet typical relationships between secularist and Church groups in the quartier. More often, there tended to be a great distance, usually leading to rivalry or hostility.46 Although this division was slowly diminishing with the erosion of the religious cleavage, the inclusive union / comité de quartier structure, the territorial conception bridging these older forms of social segregation in the neighbourhoods, remained the exception rather than the rule in Toulouse (in contrast to Grenoble).47

City-level associations and the reform cycle

While the Algerian crisis caused perhaps even greater reverberations in the city, Toulouse did not experience the same level of structured discussion and study activity during the reform cycle as Grenoble. The range of networks that linked the university, CFTC, unions de quartier and numerous associations in Grenoble during the early 1960s were much weaker here. Explanations as to why this should be so will inevitably be incomplete, but two central points need to be emphasised. Firstly, a very broad range of politically-committed individuals were drawn to Grenoble in the first post-war decades. There was a coincidence of currents that cannot simply be put down to the economic trends that were attracting a growing professional middle class. The proximity of Uriage and its influence on the role of Resistance networks in Grenoble after the Liberation is a key example that needs to be taken into account. Another is the presence of a number of Mendesists and certain extreme left activists in Grenoble’s Law and Economics Faculty.

46 Interview with Paul Pistre.
47 A further example of the complex relationship between Catholic activists and the amicales can be found in work on the quartier of Hohberg in Strasbourg by N. Duc Nhuân, Revendications urbaines, étude sur les luttes urbaines menées par le groupes sociaux résidentiels (Paris: Centre de sociologie urbaine, 1975), pp. 110-111. It shows how supra-territorial cleavages were gradually overcome in local associative life.
Secondly, if one leaves aside those amongst the migrants who were already politicised or engaged in cultural or educational associations, it is nonetheless true that the professional middle-class inflow also provided an important audience, support and potential recruitment base. The interaction between a certain associative tradition and the rapidly changing social base of the city generated a further dynamism in the late 1950s and early 1960s, seen particularly in the creation of the GAM. Both these factors were missing in Toulouse, which experienced neither a dense associative movement nor a substantial socio-professional evolution in the first two post-war decades which could act as a support or catalyst. Reform cycle activity could be seen in the city mainly through initiatives undertaken by a small number of activists in two groups, the CREPT (Centre de réflexion et d’études politiques de Toulouse) and Vie nouvelle.

The creator of the CREPT, Jacques Christol, had a political background typical of reform activists of his generation.48 A young doctor who was finishing his medical studies in Toulouse, Christol describes himself as a moderate Left Catholic and Mendesist, and had been president of the Toulouse UNEF (AGET-UNEF) in the mid-1950s, before taking charge of the Jeunesses radicales de l’Aude (a neighbouring department, also an old Radical stronghold which had become a Socialist bastion).49 In 1957, he set up the Forum de Toulouse, which was linked to the national Club de l’Express. The Forum, essentially student-oriented and attracting many Mendesist Radicals, looked at issues ranging from the economy to constitutional reform to torture in Algeria. Christol was also involved, alongside leading PSU figures such as Raymond Badiou and Alexandre Montariol in a group called the Comité des intellectuels pour le sauvegarde des libertés, established after May 1958.50

The CREPT was established in 1962. Inspired in large part by the activities of the Club Jean Moulin, Christol intended it to be a forum for the renewal of political and economic ideas outside the parties, and brought together about 40-50 people by

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48 Material based on interview with Jacques Christol.
49 AGET-UNEF is the Toulouse branch of the national union of students: Association Générale des Étudiants de Toulouse.
50 Nothing on club or associative activity during this period is documented in secondary sources. The material here is obtained from Renseignements Généraux Files (ADHG 2221-153) and interview data.
invitation for monthly meetings, which followed an unusual format with no open debates. Following an exchange of propositions by two discussants with opposing views on a specific theme, each participant was invited to give his/her opinion once without further discussion. The meeting would then end. No minutes were kept, no documentation issued. This was designed, in part, to protect those who may have felt reticent about speaking out in public, particularly civil servants, a number of whom served with the DATAR.

Themes were wide-ranging, but concentrated particularly on regional issues facing the Midi-Pyrenées. Curiously, municipal questions did not constitute a preoccupation, despite the ongoing Badiou-Bazerque dispute over the development of Toulouse and the hostility felt towards the local political elite. Offering a comparison with Grenoble, Bernard Kayser, CREPT participant and university geographer, offers an explanation:

'The GAM's interest was to reflect about the city and to take power. In Toulouse, this did absolutely not exist: Toulouse was firmly held by the SFIO --- it was not our subject. Our subject was really development --- how to get the region out of the situation in which it found itself.'

In occupational terms, the club was almost exclusively professional middle-class and generally young. There were a number of university professors, engineers as well as civil servants (including those associated with DATAR). A substantial proportion of members were Left Catholics with recruitment partly based on JEC, AGET-UNEF and Vie nouvelle networks. Some of these individuals, including Christol never fully engaged politically; others were close to the PSU and in the embattled Rocardian minority of the local PS during the 1970s. The common sentiment which brought them into the CREPT, as with so many other French sociétés de pensée, was a distrust of and discomfort with the established party machines. Given SFIO and also residual Radical strength (particularly through the La Dépêche du Midi), the CREPT had more the air of a besieged enclave than the base for a new offensive in Toulouse.

Nationally, however, it was not simply a forgotten provincial group, but was well-

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51 In addition to Jacques Christol, four regular members of the CREPT were interviewed: Jacques Curie, Bernard Kayser, Yves Labrousse, Jean Lauzeral.
52 Interview with Bernard Kayser.
53 The university staff were from a number of faculties, including geography, history and law. However, the law professor who regularly attended the CREPT was considered by other club members to be an isolated example in an otherwise highly conservative faculty.
connected into the wider reform network of the time, participating as an inviting club in the Vichy *Assises de la democratie* in April 1964.\(^{54}\)

For its part, *Vie nouvelle* was well-established in the city with about three hundred members, but intellectually isolated there like the CREPT. The Toulouse group provided a meeting point between an older MRP-style social Catholicism and a younger cohort close to the ideas of the PSU, providing an interesting mix. On the one hand, for example, there was the Privat family, owners of the reputed publishing house and part of the Toulouse establishment; on the other, there was a group of junior university teachers, recently arrived in the city, and quite surprised to find themselves in the elegant drawing-rooms of the city centre.\(^ {55}\) The same dynamic was not found in the predominantly young, immigrant *Vie nouvelle* of Grenoble.

Although it was primarily the younger members of *Vie Nouvelle* that could be found in the CREPT and later the CAPT (*Centre d’action politique de Toulouse*), other *Vie nouvelle* members also played a role in local life. Pierre Pariselle, for example, director of the *Poudrerie* between 1960 and 1969, was also President of the body supervising the *Maisons de Jeunes et de Culture* (MJC) in Haute-Garonne. Transferred to Paris in 1969, his progressive influence was missed by activists in the bitter conflicts over the role of the MJCs that followed May 1968.\(^ {56}\) Pariselle had also participated in a study of living conditions in Toulouse housing estates, undertaken in 1961-2 by a team which mainly included academics, but also contained a representative from *Economie et Humanisme*.\(^ {57}\)

On the Catholic Left, there were, however, problems with the PSU, which in part prohibited the construction of more closely-linked associative networks in Toulouse during the early 1960s. The PSU, locally as nationally, had to deal with the fusion of very different traditions and the religious cleavage created tensions.\(^ {58}\) There was

\(^{54}\) See Chapter 1, section 1.1.

\(^{55}\) Based on interview material with three former *Vie nouvelle* members, Jean Froidure, Yves Labrousse and Geneviève Raynal.

\(^{56}\) Armengaud and Vieu, 148.

\(^{57}\) This report, which reached generally favourable conclusions, was jointly funded by the *Comité d’expansion régionale* and the *Centre d’études et de recherches sociologiques de l’université de Toulouse*. Its findings were developed by Raymond Ledrut who was a member of the team. See R. Ledrut, *L’espace social de la ville* (Paris: Anthropos, 1968).

\(^{58}\) For a useful summary of the difficulties, see J.-F. Kesler, *De la gauche dissidente au nouveau Parti socialiste*, Chapter 6.
particular suspicion between former SFIO activists, who had come through the PSA, and Catholic elements of the UGS, notably the MLP contingent. In Grenoble, the issue resolved itself fairly rapidly with the Catholic element and a Protestant minority within the local party getting the upper-hand, reinforced by the arrival in 1964 of Jean Verlhac, a prominent Catholic figure nationally. In Toulouse, the essential difference was that the balance of forces, at least until the late 1960s with the departure of the older local leaders, weighed in favour of the secular Socialist tradition, epitomised in prominent figures such as Alexandre Montariol and Raymond Badiou.

The climate within the party was certainly not one of open conflict, but there was a feeling that contacts within the PSU between individuals preoccupied with similar issues were hampered by the religious cleavage. For example, in 1966, Raymond Ledrut, sociologist and PSU member, established an indisciplinary research group, the CIEU (Centre interdisciplinaire d'études urbaines) at the university. Yet, there was no structure for urban reflection which brought together academics and activists, in contrast, for example, to the Groupe d'études urbaines et municipales in Grenoble. It seems likely that the religious issue got in the way. As Jean Froidure, engaged in both the PSU and Vie nouvelle, notes of the activity in his neighbourhood: 'All these initiatives undertaken by the parish in Saouzelong-Rangueil, the fact that priests from the St Pierre St Paul mission were present, were sufficient for it not to be of interest elsewhere.'

The 1965 Municipals

Given the absence of any effective local challenge to the Toulouse political parties, the 1965 municipals took place in conditions that were influenced by wider national considerations. If local resistance to the Fifth Republic constitution made Bazerque's alliance with the UNR uncomfortable for some within the SFIO, the evolving national electoral strategies of the party soon made a renewal of the pact for the 1965 municipals near impossible. Bazerque fitted well into the characteristic mould of municipal socialist in the Fourth Republic, with an SFIO mayor leading a coalition

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59 See Kesler, De la gauche dissidente au nouveau Parti socialiste, pp. 441-444.
60 Interview with Jean Froidure.
including the centre and the right. Defferre’s blueprint to rebuild the SFIO and fight the presidential election of 1965 required Bazerque to ditch his UNR allies and renew contact with the centre and right (as Defferre in Marseille). Furthermore, as Chapter Three shows, the new electoral law of 1964 necessitated pre-election alliances in order to ensure victory. This measure also served to preclude a renewal of the local SFIO-UNR entente. A joint campaign would have been politically costly to the SFIO.

Bazerque headed a middle-class centre-left alliance comprising Socialists (19), Independents (9), Radicals (5) and the MRP (4). Only two other groups contested the elections -- the Gaullists and a Union of the Left list (comprising the PSU and PCF). Although it is difficult to rely on broad socio-professional categories, one can, nonetheless, undertake a general analysis. In terms of the 1959-1965 evolution, an obvious change is the elimination of working-class representation and the replacement of the instituteurs by several university professors (see Appendix 6 for details). Leaving aside such factors as whether the same councillors all chose to stand in 1965, these developments are primarily a consequence of the new electoral system. Given that the instituteurs and workers in the Toulouse conseil municipal were predominantly PCF and PSU, the denial of minority representation in the local government of large towns and cities inevitably had an impact upon the occupational balance of the local council. In 1965, Bazerque kept his majority in Toulouse by moving right, just as Defferre was constrained to do in Marseille (see Appendix 9 for results).

The CAPT

Within the CREPT, there were a number of individuals who wished to go further in their political activities, but outside the parties. Feeling a discussion group to be inadequate, they wanted to form a club in which to act more concretely. The CREPT had played no real part in the Monsieur X launch of Defferre’s candidacy, nor in Mitterrand’s alternative strategic vision. Initially CREPT members were put off by the support for Mitterrand of La Dépêche du Midi (arranged for Mitterrand through the influence of Vichy special police contacts). For, despite its hostility to De Gaulle, La
Dépêche du Midi’s pro Algérie Française stance had left a bitter taste for Christol and his allies. But in the wake of Mitterrand’s unexpectedly close challenge to de Gaulle in 1965, it was decided to establish the CAPT. Consisting largely of middle-class Left Catholics, many recruited from the CREPT, it enjoyed a vigorous life for a couple of years before gradually going into decline in the period 1969-1971.61

The stated aim of the group was, in fact relatively vague: ‘The goal of the CAPT is to create an autonomous form of political action, working with the parties of the Left, in political activity undertaken in common both at local and at national level.’62 In reality, there were three central goals. Firstly, to work for the reconstruction of the non-Communist Left, whilst remaining autonomous in relation to party machines. Secondly, to provide an information service in order to educate citizens and encourage a renewed participation in local and national political life. Thirdly, to help city groups working to improve infrastructure and services.

Like the CREPT, the CAPT was closely linked to the wider Left-renewal networks. One of its first acts was to join Savary’s UCRG (Union des clubs pour le renouveau de la gauche), subsequently entering the FGDS through the en bloc adhesion of the UCRG. As such, it qualifies in Mossuz’s classification as a club-wagon, a means of action within new Socialist structures for those without party backgrounds, whilst maintaining the club as a basis of organisation.63 The group also participated in the Rencontre socialiste, hosted by Grenoble in April 1966. These national links might have implied a suspicion of Mitterrand, but locally, there were close connections with Mitterrand’s CIR, and both groups were members of the executive committee of the FGDS Federation in Haute-Garonne. Indeed, the CIR and CAPT were the driving forces in the successful electoral campaign of Mitterrand protégé (and parachuté), André Rousselet, during the 1967 legislatives.64

Rousselet’s campaign, which defeated Pierre Baudis (running as Centre démocrate) in the central Toulouse constituency, was interesting in that it brought

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61 Six members of the CREPT were interviewed: Jean-Pierre Amalric, Gérard Bérut, Jacques Christol, Yves Labrousse, Jean Lauzeral, Geneviève Raynal.
64 The local CIR branch was controlled by André Estrade, a former president of the Association des Déportés du Travail in Haute-Garonne.
together in common cause a number of currents that had previously been implacably hostile to one and other, *La Dépêche du Midi* (backing the Socialists in 1967) and the Catholic Left of the CREPT and *Vie nouvelle*. If this rapprochement partly reflected the kind of co-existence between religious and anti-clerical elements that was an essential element in the reconstruction of the non-Communist Left, local contacts were also essential to clear the path. Therefore, members of the CIR worked to reassure both sides, and there were no internal problems of his nature during the campaign.65

At the municipal level, the CAPT also undertook a certain number of initiatives. In 1967, a series of political classes, entitled *Cycle d'introduction à la vie politique*, were organised, symbolically held in Empalot, a relatively deprived area of the city. The emphasis very clear: 'It is fashionable to claim that the French are not interested in politics. But it is information which is lacking, preventing many citizens from judging, understanding and participating.'66 During the same year, in collaboration with the CIR, a *Commission d'études urbaines* was set up. Contacts were made in particular with Marc Miguet of the CODIQUANT, who created a transport user group, the first in France, during the first months of 1967 (see Chapter Five, p. 190).

The *Commission d'études urbaines*, a study group looking at municipal questions represented the nearest equivalent to Grenoble's *Groupes d'études urbaines et municipales* or the work of the *Cercle Tocqueville* in Lyon after 1962. Indeed, such activity fits perfectly with the reform cycle preoccupations outlined in Chapter One. However, what marked the *Groupe d'études urbaines et municipales* and the Grenoble GAM, in contrast to the CAPT, were their specific and unremitting preoccupation with immediate urban issues as the primary goal. In the CAPT, municipal politics and citizen participation were important, but not distinctive themes. They formed part of the wider questioning of established patterns of French political life. One sees another illustration in the UCRG's committee on reform of local structures, set up mid 1967 with *Socialisme et démocratie*. The remit was vast; from the role of the mayor to the prefectoral *tutelle* to regional planning and the role of

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65 Information from Yves Labrousse and Rober Lopin, technical manager at *La Dépêche du Midi*. Unusually, for the newspaper's staff, Lopin was a leading member of the CIR.
CODER, the entire administrative and political structure of sub-national government was up for discussion.67

André Rousselet was defeated at the hands of Pierre Baudis in the June 1968 legislatives. The world of the clubs in Toulouse, as elsewhere, was given a severe jolt as the FGDS disintegrated and the non-Communist Left struggled to regroup. In Toulouse, the CIR and CAPT broke with the SFIO and, unlike many of the clubs in the UCRG, the CAPT, still extremely close to the CIR, refused to join Savary’s Parti socialiste in early 1969. Those CAPT activists interested in pursuing their political engagement joined the party at or after Epinay in 1971. Meanwhile, the club gradually lost its impetus, effectively becoming subsumed within the CIR.

Conclusion

In Toulouse, the associations which were at the forefront of reform pressure in Grenoble during the 1960s were never able to develop as fully. There was neither a comparable associative tradition, nor the same scale of urban crisis and large-scale influx of professional middle class migrants that had characterised the Alpine city. Reform activists -- mainly Left Catholics -- were an embattled minority in Toulouse, concentrating during the 1960s less on municipal matters than the wider fate of their city in regional development through the CREPT. Furthermore, while the GAM focused the Grenoble associative world away from party politics, at least until 1969 and the first GAM departures to the PS, the Toulouse reform networks were heavily involved in attempting to influence the shape of the non-Communist Left.

The comparison illustrates the extent to which variations in local factors matter in shaping outcomes within a wider political context. In the case of Grenoble, we saw a clear illustration of the dialectical relationship between local and national outlined in the introduction (see p. 18). Events in the city were shaped by the reform cycle, but also by a specific set of local circumstances which enabled an innovative political movement -- the GAM -- to develop, whose success in turn impacted significantly upon the national level. In Toulouse, while the CAPT would certainly play a part in

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67 Details from UCRG work text, June 1967. Private archives of Jean Lauzéral.
the wider club movement -- notably through the UCRG -- the reform cycle remained unremarkable and certainly not a reference point.

The events of May had their own particular extension in Toulouse, with the parading of the black anarchist flag on the balcony of city hall in the presence of Louis Bazerque. Beyond the immediate drama, the revolt was to stimulate a far more dynamic range of reflections on urban issues, particularly as the consequences of rapid growth began also to become particularly acute. The cumulative effects on infrastructure capacity of sustained population increases were being strongly felt in the city by the end of the 1960s, generating a greater range of grievances. Although the 1954-62 growth rate (22.4%) had certainly been less spectacular than that of Grenoble (see Appendix 1b), Toulouse expanded a further 15% in population terms between 1962 and 1968 (see Appendix 1c). Over the twelve years between 1954 and 1968, 100,000 new inhabitants had been counted in Toulouse, over 70% of whom were migrants.

The Toulouse GAM: an entrepreneur without an activist network

Inspired by developments in Grenoble, a GAM was launched in Toulouse during 1969. The aim, according to its founder, Henri de Lassus, was 'to translate into political terms the expectations of that part of the population which had been mobilised by the events of May 1968 against the ageing conservatism of the Gaullist ministerial teams.' The Toulouse GAM adhered to the national GAM charter and aspired, in common with the wider ethos shared by signatory groups, to combine a more democratic form of municipal government with effective urban management. However, the membership consisted of only about 20-30 individuals (the majority cadres supérieurs) and had little real influence, save that several GAMists were solicited for different lists in the 1971 municipal elections; the resulting political divisions caused the disintegration of the group which disappeared after March 1971.

Although catalysed by the events of May, De Lassus was certainly neither a part of the 1968 post-war generation, nor the typical GAMist or professional middle-class
social movement actor. A Paris-born (1938) *centralien* (engineer) who had studied at the School of Management at MIT in the United States, he had been a member of Edgard Pisani's *cabinet*, 1965-7 (at Agriculture, then *Equipement*), and was active in the club *Technique et démocratie*. This professional profile and club commitment places him rather more in the mould of the *Club Jean Moulin* civil service elite. However, rather than moving in the direction of the new Socialist Party structures, De Lassus joined the Radical Party in 1967, prior to thoughts about a GAM initiative.²

Like Dubedout in Grenoble, De Lassus was an outsider in Toulouse, having moved there with the aim of starting a business. His recent arrival, combined with a lack of prior links with the Toulouse activists of the CREPT or CAPT, meant that he was relatively isolated on the local scene. Moreover, his government connections as a high-ranking civil servant and his perceived political ambition aroused a certain amount of suspicion in the CAPT and neighbourhood committees. But even if contacts had been better, the absence of an associative network prioritising local reform meant that there was an inherent structural obstacle to launching a GAM. Dubedout had been able to draw on currents that were not only studying urban problems, but were also very close to an activist base in the *quartiers*. The CREPT and CAPT, while in many respects sharing the political worldview of Grenoble reform cycle associations, had a wider set of preoccupations, particularly after the creation of the FGDS. Municipal politics were but one strand in the wider priority of non-Communist Left reconstruction.

De Lassus prefers sociological explanations for his lack of success. In an observation mirroring Sellier's work, which emphasises the success of the municipal action groups in communes where there was a heavy presence of *cadres administratifs / moyens*, he thinks that Toulouse was insufficiently advanced at a socio-professional level to allow a GAM to succeed. In his view, the initiative to launch a Toulouse GAM came some ten to fifteen years too early in terms of population evolution. Making a comparison with Montpellier in particular, he comments: 'Here, there was

² The Radical Party at this time had become an odd mix of the old guard and younger managers and technocrats closer to Servan-Schreiber: 'the marriage of the 'cassoulet and the computer.' De Lassus later forged a political career in the MRG (*Mouvement des radicaux de gauche*), now *Parti radical de gauche*, allied to the PS.
clearly a far greater sense of movement. Frêche [PS mayor of Montpellier from 1977] who was an old Toulousain, said to us at the time: “You’ll never get anywhere because Toulouse is a bourgeois town with far fewer cadres.”

Admittedly, Montpellier had a somewhat larger professional, salaried middle-class population in 1968 -- 26.3% compared to 22.6% in Toulouse (26.3% in Grenoble), although in the technical categories it was behind Toulouse. In terms of population growth and migration patterns which were important in the definition of the ‘new’ middle class of Grenoble, there is also statistical evidence to point to more substantial differences between the two cities. Montpellier was faster growing, experiencing an influx between 1954 and 1968 of about 57,000 migrants in a total population increase of 80%. While Toulouse had seen an influx of about 75,000 migrants, its total increase over the twelve years was dramatically lower, at 41%.

Yet as we have seen in relation to the importance of associative tradition in the Grenoble experience, there are real problems with sociological determinism in explaining political outcomes. Both case studies in this thesis demonstrate that networks also hold an important place in terms of the importance of the structural capacity for political organisation. Furthermore, the very assumption that the ‘new middle class’ will inevitably turn towards GAM-style structures may only be partially correct. Jean Coppolani, observing the growing presence of these professional groups in Toulouse during the late 1960s, notes that their vote may have swung the city towards the centre-right in 1971. Pierre Baudis was able to include on his 1971 municipal list the Concorde test-pilot, a symbolic presence which was influential in the aeronautics sector.

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3 For the 1971 Montpellier municipals, Georges Frêche (PS) who was close to the GAM, led a list of 10 PC, 10 PS, 10 Radicals, 4 GAM, 3 Objectif 1972. However, it was not until 1977 that Frêche could lead the Left to power in Montpellier.

4 Included here are INSEE groups 3 (Professions libérales et cadres supérieurs) and 4 (Cadres moyens), without liberal professions. In terms of the technical professions, Toulouse had 1.4% engineers and 4.1% technicians (1.2% and 3.3% in Montpellier; 2.6% and 5.5% in Grenoble).

5 J. Coppolani, Connaissance de Toulouse, p. 66.

Comité d'usagers des transports en commun: the advent of the urban conflict ('lutte urbaine') in Toulouse

The Comité du Quartier Nord was at the centre of Toulouse’s first city-wide quality of life campaign. Created in May 1967 as a coalition of eight local associations (comités de quartier, tenants associations, parent-teacher groups and women’s organisations), the Comité d’usagers des transports en commun (CUTC) grew to fifty member groups by 1971, including the unsuccessful GAM. The Quartier Nord activist Marc Miguet became CUTC president, with the campaign for improved transport lasting some five years until mid-1972. During this time, the role of the CUTC was essentially one of co-ordination. Individual associations organised their own campaigns in different areas of the city, and the central committee produced the more technical transport analysis, press conferences, information distribution and so on. Coming well ahead of the Paris transport movement (1969) and the ADTC of Grenoble (1974), the CUTC seems to be one of the earliest such mobilisations in France.

As in other provincial cities, the bus services of Toulouse were not publicly run until the 1970s. With the exception of the period August 1944 - July 1947 (post-war municipalisation), public transport since the beginning of the nineteenth century had been franchised to a private operator with monopoly rights. Furthermore, contracts in 1865 had dispensed the company of any obligation to extend or develop new lines unless they were financially viable. These two principles -- financial viability and monopoly exploitation -- remained in force right up until the period in question in this thesis. If the operator, the STCRT (Société des transports en commun de la région toulousaine) since 1920, chose not to operate a particular route for economic reasons, it could not be forced to change its mind, nor could anyone else step in.

For the CUTC, such a situation was unacceptable. Not only were areas of the commune itself without bus routes, but traffic congestion had led to the service being

7 The founding groups were two comités de quartier, 3 amicales des locataires (linked to the Fédération des locataires de la Haute-Garonne), the Haute-Garonne parent-teacher federation, UFCS (Union féminine civique et sociale), CSF (Confédération syndicale des familles). They were later joined by other comités de quartier and tenants’ groups, as well as student residence representatives. Support was lent by the Centre Démocrate, CIR, PC, PSU, CFDT and CGT.
the slowest in major French cities.\footnote{An average of 9.5km/h in 1969 compared to 12km/h in Paris, 13km/h in Marseille, 12.7km/h in Lyon, 11km/h in Lille. No figures available from Grenoble for 1969, but the figure was 13.3km/h in 1970. Source: M. Marty and J.-P. Neuman, 'Les Transports Urbains à Toulouse', p. 29.} What triggered the creation of the group though was the fact that the STCRT contract expired on 31 December 1967. The time therefore seemed propitious to launch a collective pressure group action, and three central demands were articulated. Firstly, that the service be taken into public control by a body that would co-ordinate not only buses, but traffic as a whole in order give priority to public transport. Secondly, that this body be composed of local authorities, workers representatives, transport technical experts and user representatives. Thirdly, that local transport should be subsidised by public finance and local industry. There were also numerous practical suggestions for easing city-centre congestion, such as park-and-ride schemes.

However, while articulating widely-held grievances about the transport network in Toulouse and raising awareness, the CUTC faced an uphill struggle. Firstly, it was mobilising at city-wide level on qualitative questions. This type of action is classically far more difficult to manage than the kind of geographically-targeted campaign which is limited to one or two very concrete demands, such as the improvement of a bus route in a specific area. Secondly, the users most affected tended to be schoolchildren, housewives and the elderly. With the gradual increase in use of the motor-car, public transport dependency was falling. By 1967, only about 15-20% of the population used the buses.\footnote{Source: S. Guyot, 'Les transports publics dans l'agglomération toulousaine' ( Mémoire, IEP de Toulouse, 1977), p. 67.} Many factories, such as Sud-Aviation, organised their own coach transport, and there was not the same scale of commuting problem for workers as existed in Paris, for example.\footnote{For details of the later Parisian transport users campaign, see J. Verdès-Laroux, 'Les conditions de transport: objet de mobilisation', Sociologie du Travail, 16/3 (1974), 225-46.} This sociological dimension inevitably affected the impact of the movement in Toulouse.

For its part, the municipality did not move quickly to resolve the fundamental issues raised by the committee. The concession was renewed on an annual basis from 1967 until 1970, and Bazerque declared himself in favour of a national financing system for public transport. The city did subsidise the purchase of new buses: the fleet expanded from 215 in 1967 to 250 in 1969 and to 365 in 1971.\footnote{Source: Beringuier et al., Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées: La Transition, p. 295.} However, for reasons
unclear, there was no improvement in passenger numbers or quality of service.

Finally, in January 1970, the council, together with the conseil général, approved a plan by Bazerque to create a private-public company (SEM - Syndicat d'économie mixte), and authorisation was later given for the municipality to acquire a majority holding in the SEMTAT (Société d'économie mixte de transports de l'agglomération toulousaine). This meant the purchase of 55% of the private company operating the transport network (STCRT), with the SEMTAT then contracting bus operation back to the private sector, a solution that did not satisfy the CUTC still campaigning for full public ownership.12

Table 4: Comparison of CUTC and ADTC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CUTC</th>
<th>ADTC (Grenoble)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date of creation</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General type</td>
<td>ADCV (Antunes' term, see p. 60)</td>
<td>ADCV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific form</td>
<td>Social movement</td>
<td>Pressure group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure</td>
<td>Federation of local associations</td>
<td>Unitary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct protest mobilisation</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demands for participation in new transport structures</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecologist traits (anti-car, pro cycle)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-professional base</td>
<td>Strong professional middle class element, but wider social coalition.</td>
<td>Predominantly professional middle class (engineers, researchers, teachers)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Over these years, there were a variety of CUTC strategies. On the diplomatic front, it organised a survey of popular opinion, and also sent written questions to the Colloque de Tours, organised by the Association des maires de France in May 1970 to address key public transport questions (but to which users’ groups were not invited). At the same time, in the wake of May 1968, more direct forms of action were used in order to exert pressure on both the STRCT and the municipality. One campaign, spearheaded by the CSF through local branches, used tactics such as the blocking of buses in a depot, and the placing of symbolic bus stops in a poorly served area on the southern edge of the city. As a CSF tract noted: 'They CONSTRUCT, they BUILD. All well and good. But at the same time, water, electricity, gas and public

12 See CUTC Information No.1 (1970), ‘Pour être bien transportés et non pas roulés.’ The committee condemned what it termed an ‘illusory reform’ and called for ‘a radical measure to create a public transport system at the service of all users and managed by the whole community.’
transport are part of basic collective infrastructure. And that is forgotten. This kind of mobilisation using direct action puts the CUTC more in the category of social movement than pressure group (see Table 4).

Yet what turned transport into an explosive electoral issue for the municipals of 1971 was not so much the activity and frustration expressed by the CUTC, but the manner in which Bazerque managed the transition from private monopoly to SEM. For at this point, the PSU stepped in to denounce what it termed ‘a mysterious and perhaps scandalous affair.’ The party had consistently advocated a publicly-owned transport system in Toulouse (Badiou, of course, had instigated the 1944 municipalisation). It also suspected Bazerque more generally of dishonesty, and saw the opportunity to exploit the transport question in the months leading up to the March ballot. While it is difficult to say with any certainty how important a factor the transport scandal was in the defeat of Bazerque in 1971, it undoubtedly tarnished the mayor’s image.

The CUTC gradually ran out of steam after the arrival of Pierre Baudis as mayor in 1971. While an interministerial decree had blocked Bazerque’s original plans, the new solution instigated in 1972 was very similar with the services operated by a private company under the supervision of a societe mixte, the SEMVAT (Société d’économie mixte des transports publics de voyageurs de l’agglomération toulousaine). With the franchising question now definitively resolved, and a new series of wider urban problems emerging as a result of traffic difficulties, the raison d’être of the transport users’ association was removed. While it could have continued to push for full public ownership, this was highly unrealistic given the composition of the new council.

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15 The municipality was preparing to purchase 78% of the STCRT, rather than the 55% originally envisaged, considerably increasing the costs. The question posed by the PSU was a dual one. Firstly, if the justification for purchasing the extra shares was related to the procurement of land on which depots and transport infrastructure would be constructed, why had the city not found space on its own reserves? Secondly, why was the land to be purchased apparently considerably over-valued? In the eyes of Achille Auban, the PSU’s principle spokesman in Toulouse on the issue, the answer lay in the fact that the land had been valued as suitable for property development, which massively increased the profits of STCRT shareholders and placed Bazerque’s motives under suspicion. These views were diffused both in the local press and in Le Monde. See ‘Le rachat des transports en commun de Toulouse: Le PSU met en accusation le maire socialiste, M. Bazerque’, Le Monde, 26 January 1971.
16 For a colourful account of the 1971 campaign, which includes details of the transport drama, see Béringuer et al., Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées: La Transition, pp. 283-298. See also H. Regnier, ‘Les élections municipales de 1971 à Toulouse et le succès de Pierre Baudis.’
majority, and other more pressing urban issues had started to preoccupy the central activists (see below: ‘Transport and environment issues: towards the UCQ-ADCAVT’).

The UCQ and the municipality

The experience of working together in the CUTC paved the way for seven comités de quartier (five of which had been created after 1968) to create a permanent federating body, the Union des comités de quartier (UCQ), which was intended to be a similar kind of structure to the CLUQ in Grenoble or the UCIL in Lyon. Once again, it was the CODIQUANT which was at the centre of the initiative, and Miguet became president. The UCQ almost immediately obtained a monthly column in La Dépêche du Midi, but swiftly came to greater public attention as a result of organising a round-table with representatives from the three lists in competition during the 1971 municipals. New member associations gradually joined over the next few years, taking the total to fifteen.

However, this liaison committee suffered from a number of structural problems. Firstly, the commune of Toulouse was not clearly or systematically divided between neighbourhood associations. Although territorial disputes did periodically occur in Grenoble, by the early 1970s it was possible to produce a map of the city entirely criss-crossed by unions de quartier. This was partly the consequence of the legitimisation provided by the preferences of the Dubedout administration. As we have seen, the unions de quartier had initially been concentrated in the more marginalised, fastest-growing, worst-equipped areas of the city. The victory of an administration dominated by inhabitants from those same southern quartiers -- and committed to new forms of democracy using neighbourhood committees as relays -- had a certain dynamising affect on the older city centre. There was certainly a fear of marginalisation in new forms of decision-making process. In Toulouse, with neither

18 See ‘Chronique de l’Union des Comités de Quartiers: Table ronde avec les candidats,’ La Dépêche du Midi, 12 March 1971. The article notes that the aim of the meeting was ‘note to superficially review endless municipal questions, but to make the needs and aspirations of the quartiers felt.’
Louis Bazerque (1965-71) nor Pierre Baudis (1971-83) pursuing this form of participatory logic, the same incentives did not exist.

Secondly, not all *comités de quartier* joined the UCQ due to both worries about limits to their independence as well as concern about politicisation. Indeed, one can identify a central core of non-Communist Left activists in the UCQ, more frequently from the PSU than the PS. There was also some penetration of extreme-Left *groupuscules*, although this remained marginal. One example of a more radical *comité* was that of Empalot, created initially as a ‘Student-Worker’ association at the height of the May revolt. Heavily centred on the local MJC, which was later locked in a bitter dispute with the Baudis municipality over the role of cultural centres (cf. *Vie nouvelle* involvement, p. 181), the influence of 1968 was defining, and the conflicts of the early 1970s attracted national attention.¹⁹

Despite the ideological sympathies of many prominent activists within its member associations, the UCQ claimed political neutrality and avoided adopting explicit positions in terms of classic left-right issues. However, its criticism of prevailing methods of local government, combined with continued emphasis on transport issues as well as a growing concentration on related environmental themes, inevitably created opposition to the Baudis municipality. Indeed, the UCQ’s close involvement with a number of anti-road, pro-public transport campaigns in the early 1970s led to a broadening of its remit in 1976. Becoming the UCQ-ADACVT, *Union de comités de quartier et des associations de défense et d’action pour le cadre de vie à Toulouse*, it included a number of quality of life-centred groups whose basis of representation was sectoral rather than territorial.

In terms of political practice, the central demands were for improved information, consultation and participation. Such priorities were in fact similar to those that formed the foundation of the Grenoble experiment, which was much examined in Toulouse as

¹⁹ See particularly *Le Monde*, 13 May 1972, although there was also coverage on *France-Culture*. The battle between the MJC and the Baudis municipality hinged essentially on the fact that the latter did not appreciate the radical turn taken by the cultural centre in the aftermath of 1968. It used its control over the funding of the director’s post (70% municipal resources, 30% from the state via the *Fonds pour la Jeunesse et l’Education Populaire*) to try and exercise leverage, claiming incompetent management. The backlash and the attempt to maintain local autonomy resulted in the creation of a *Comité de soutien de la MJC Empalot*, presided over by Pierre Pariselle, former director of the *Poudrerie Nationale*. 
elsewhere in France: ‘We built on the ideas of Dubedout. They were in the air;’\textsuperscript{20} ‘for us Grenoble was a reference point.’\textsuperscript{21} However, the \textit{comités de quartier} had provoked little response from Bazerque whose conception of urban management was essentially \textit{dirigiste}, leading from the top. Indeed, electoral leaflets from the SFIO-led list for the two ballots of 1971 made no mention of an intermediary role for \textit{comités de quartier}, and only very limited reference to devices for improving the connection between citizen and council. They simply proposed municipal and social support offices in individual \textit{quartiers}.

On the other hand, Baudis consistently emphasised a participatory conception of local democracy in his election agenda. Where Bazerque was listing issues such as employment, traffic-management and local finance as central priorities, Baudis spoke of his desire to create ‘a true municipal democracy.’\textsuperscript{22} With a rhetoric little different to that of Dubedout, he promised:

‘Open management through extra-municipal committees and \textit{unions de quartier}, supported by city-hall annexes on the periphery and a general consultation in three years. In all areas, we will associate the people of Toulouse with planning and management.’\textsuperscript{23}

The commitments seemed to be extensive, and generally in accordance with the UCQ’s preferences for decision-making procedures. In promoting the idea of extra-municipal committees, the UCQ had emphasised that they should not be ‘listening centres’, but have ‘real powers for consultation and proposition.’\textsuperscript{24}

Once in power though, the Baudis administration showed a marked reluctance to implement these commitments. The consultation promised by 1974 did not take place, nor were extra-municipal committees introduced. However, a magazine, \textit{Capitole Informations}, was created to improve information and a certain number of city-hall satellites (\textit{mairies annexes}) were developed to reduce administrative distance.\textsuperscript{25}

\textsuperscript{20} Interview with Marc Miguet.
\textsuperscript{21} Interview with Julien Savary.
\textsuperscript{22} ‘Toulouse pour tous avec Pierre Baudis.’ Electoral leaflet for 14 March 1971 (first ballot).
\textsuperscript{24} Cited in \textit{Information des Quartiers Nord} 17 (September 1973), 1. Source: PSU Haute-Garonne archives.
\textsuperscript{25} Eight were created between 1971 and 1977, covering particularly the periphery of the commune (Bellevillers, Croix-Daurade, Minimes, Saint-Simon, Sauze-long-Rangueil) as well as certain areas just outside the centre (Bonnefoy, Empalot, St Cyprien). Politically, while their degree of support for the mayor varied, none of these areas were Baudis strongholds, his power base being the centre.
fact, despite manifesto commitments, Pierre Baudis and Guy Hersant (councillor in charge of relations with neighbourhood committees, 1971-1977),\textsuperscript{26} seemed to be locked into a logic of delegation with a degree of consultation. An exchange in an early meeting between the UCQ and Baudis illustrates the thinking of the new mayor. To a question which asked how, given that there were only 37 municipal councillors, the population could be adequately consulted, Baudis replied that:

'It is difficult to accept that such and such an organisation is the representative of a quartier [...] there is no better means than universal suffrage. No association can claim to have the monopoly on representation and we have to bring in to the process all who wish to contribute.'\textsuperscript{27}

In a 1977 interview, Guy Hersant makes similar points, noting that the comités de quartier represented only a tiny fraction of the population:

'Overall, approximately one percent of the population is directly involved, most of the time because the neighbourhood committee seems to be a defence group. A defence group which defends certain things against others, of course, which makes a considerable proportion of the population seem reticent, neutral or indifferent.'\textsuperscript{28}

Hersant's rhetoric, it should be emphasised, is not hostile, but cautious. He indicates, later in the interview, that he would like the comités de quartier to be stronger, more representative, but sees such a goal as being difficult to realise. He was in fact a consistent supporter of the comités de quartier within the administration (Bertrand Verdier (PSU leader, 1974-1981) notes that the relationship between the comités de quartier and Hersant were cordial partly due to the fact that the latter had a son-in-law in the PSU, who ran one of the committees).\textsuperscript{29}

These criticisms of neighbourhood committees mirror the central reservations emerging in Grenoble during the early 1970s. The key problems of low-levels of participation and developing appropriate representative structures for the quartier, that reflect the full range of active associations, were all prominent issues for Dubedout as we have seen. The critical difference was of course that his administration intended to

\textsuperscript{26} Hersant later become adjoint à l'urbanisme in 1977, and continues to serve under mayor Dominique Baudis.

\textsuperscript{27} Transcript of meeting between UCQ representatives and Pierre Baudis, 3 July 1971. Source: Archives of the Comité de défense des Berges de la Garonne et du Centre-Ville.

\textsuperscript{28} Interview transcript in J.-P. Wolff, 'Pouvoir urbaine et politique locale dans l'agglomération toulousaine' (TER, Université de Toulouse le Mirail, 1976), p. 173.

\textsuperscript{29} Interview with Bertrand Verdier.
remedy these difficulties by going even further down the path both of decision-making and service-delivery decentralisation. Despite the rhetoric of Pierre Baudis, there is little suggestion that he had any such commitment really to experiment with participatory models.

There were no official, structured links between the *comités de quartier* and the municipality in Toulouse. The latter consulted where it felt necessary, usually through individual councillors responsible for specific portfolios. Councillors, at their discretion, responded to requests from the *comités de quartier* for discussion of matters of concern.¹⁰ Hersant, as *conseiller délégué*, regularly attended individual neighbourhood meetings. There was no question, he emphasised, of simply ignoring those with whom the administration disagreed. Although Hersant is not explicit about the political costs, it was clearly untenable to adopt a closed-door policy to those campaigning essentially on quality of life questions, whether or not they were ideologically opposed to the Baudis municipality. From a *comité de quartier* perspective, this translated into a frustrating relationship in which access was not systematically refused, but where, as one activist puts it, he and his colleagues had the impression of punching an eiderdown: ‘Your hand sinks in, but doesn’t get anywhere.’³¹

Although Baudis was reticent about formal contacts with the *unions de quartier*, in 1974 the Socialist-controlled *conseil général* established a *Commission d’information et de consultation du Grand Toulouse*, which had been requested by the UCQ. Jacques Pous, a PS *conseiller général*, noted that: ‘the departmental councillors know that information and consultation represent an indispensable precondition for improving the citizens’ way of life.’³² However, as Neuman and Marty point out, if

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¹⁰ In the only general analysis of *comités de quartier* in Toulouse (which looks also at Rennes), F. Bonnier developed the notion of ‘recuperation’ as a general municipal response; that is to say, varied strategies to bring the neighbourhood groups within the sphere of influence of the municipalities. However, as Bonnier admits, such a hypothesis was not really appropriate for Toulouse in 1971. Indeed, subsequent to his work, it became evident that there was not so much a strategy of recuperation as of selective consultation and containment. See F. Bonnier, ‘Les associations de quartier à Toulouse; modalités et signification de leur insertion dans le système politique urbain’ (*Mémoire, Université de Toulouse le Mirail, 1971*), p. 116.) A published summary of the general arugment may be found in F. Bonnier, ‘Les pratiques des associations de quartier et les processus de récupération’, *Espaces et sociétés*, 6-7 (1972), 29-35

³¹ Interview with Louis Daffos.

consultation was part of the PS agenda, it also provided an opportunity for the conseil général to expand its activities, caught as it was between hostile administrations at both city and national level. The UCQ and conseil général agreed to work together in order to elaborate counter-proposals for the Schéma directeur d’aménagement et d’urbanisme (SDAU), which at that time included no provision for public consultation.

**Transport and environment issues: towards the UCQ-ADCAVT**

If the public transport campaign of the late 1960s had been based on inadequate local services, efficiency had also been affected by considerable traffic congestion in Toulouse, where an IFOP survey of major cities in 1968 had found that concern over traffic flow and parking facilities were some of the highest in the country (see Table 5). The necessity to relieve the car pressure, imposed by the combination of a growing car-owning population and increasing commuter traffic between the suburbs and the city-centre, led to three major schemes, which all resulted in major confrontation between municipality and defence committees -- extension of the southern ring-road (Rocade sud) and conversion to car use of the city-centre sections of the Canal du midi and the banks of the Garonne (Berges de la Garonne).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Difficulties felt</th>
<th>Toulouse</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Lowest</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Highest</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Traffic-flow</td>
<td>72.5</td>
<td>60.7</td>
<td>St-Etienne</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Rennes</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>Grenoble</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Lyon</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parking</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>Lille</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Nice</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>Strasbourg</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>Lille</td>
<td>56.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noise</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Rennes</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Nice</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bad air quality</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>Rennes</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Rouen</td>
<td>37.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ugly quartiers</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>Nice</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>St-Etienne</td>
<td>39.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schools</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>Nice</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>Clermont-Ferrand</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green spaces</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>St-Etienne</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>Marseille</td>
<td>23.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports facilities</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>Toulouse</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Rennes</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

34 The SDAU constituted the overall urban planning blueprint for agglomerations, and had been introduced by the 1967 Loi d’orientation foncière. 63 communes were included in the Toulouse SDAU, which had been delayed firstly by the change in municipal administration in 1971, then by co-ordination difficulties both between communes and state structures and between the communes themselves - there was no pluri-communal structure (such as a district urbain or communauté urbaine) due to longstanding and deep-seated tensions between Toulouse and its neighbours.  
35 Béringuier et al., Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées: La Transition, p. 161.
All three disputes -- Rocade-Sud, Berges de la Garonne, Canal du Midi -- implicated, of course, state planners (primarily the Direction départementale d'équipement - DDE) as well as the municipality. But in as much as the accord of city hall was needed for such schemes to be realised, campaigners primarily blamed the Baudis team for failing to consult or to take into account local opinion. The campaigns, which started to take shape in 1974 (creation of the Association de défense contre l'autoroute-rocade sud de Toulouse, Comité de défense des Berges de la Garonne et du centre de Toulouse and Comité pour la Sauvegarde des Berges du Canal), combined more established participation demands with an environmental awareness that mirrored increasingly discernible trends not just in France, but across the developed world.36

In challenging expressway construction, the defence committees also promoted improved public transport, taking on, to a certain extent, the mantle of the CUTC. However, the difference in reference points is significant. Nowhere in CUTC publications had there been any real discussion of the role of the car or the impact on the environment of uncontrolled road expansion. Like the tenants’ groups or neighbourhood committees which aimed to secure proper heating, street-lighting or improved water-supplies, CUTC goals had been determined by instrumental, classic collective-consumption problems. If tactics certainly expressed changing repertoires of contention in the immediate aftermath of 1968, the issue-base was not a dramatic departure. Securing the improvement of public services was the overriding aim.

In contrast, the defence committees formed to prevent the construction of the Rocade-Sud, Berges de la Garonne and Canal du Midi expressways, adopted an anti-car rhetoric which hinged on a vigorous critique of air and noise pollution, as well as the threat to green spaces posed by continued road and parking expansion. ‘Toulouse, traffic sick,’ was a typical leaflet headline, demanding that the opinions of Toulousains be taken into account. There was also, from a more radical left, a link made between the car and capitalist materialism, ‘the cult of the car for all.’37 For its part, the municipality initially justified the projects as simply necessary for the relief

36 For example, The 1974 presidential elections saw the first ecologist candidate, René Dumont (1.3% of votes nationally, 1.6% in Toulouse, 2.7% in Grenoble).
37 Interview with Jean-Pierre Amalric.
of extreme congestion.\textsuperscript{38} It did not engage on the environmental questions, and some suspected the influence of lobbies such as the \textit{Automobile Club du Midi}.\textsuperscript{39}

\textbf{Environmental movements}

The anti-road coalition was spearheaded not just by \textit{comités de quartier}, but also by two fledgling environmental groups specific to Toulouse, \textit{Environnement et Humanisme} and the \textit{Association toulousaine d'écologie} (ATE).\textsuperscript{40} The increasingly ecologist PSU also played an important role and will be discussed further below.

\textit{Environnement et Humanisme} was essentially a pressure group dedicated to challenging the direction taken by advanced industrialised society. It incorporated environmental defence into a wider ‘humanist’ manifesto which emphasised the importance of personal fulfilment in an increasingly frenetic world. Founded in 1973, \textit{Environnement et Humanisme} stayed out of the party political fray, refusing to become involved in the electoral process. Instead, it dedicated itself to campaigns in Toulouse, working in particular with the \textit{Comité des Berges de la Garonne} and the \textit{Comité des Berges du Canal du Midi}. It used both non-violent direct action techniques and more conventional devices, such as pamphlets and lobbying. The group gradually declined in the late 1970s before being incorporated into a local section of \textit{Les Amis de la Terre}, established in Toulouse in 1981.

In sociological terms, \textit{Environnement et Humanisme} was not typical of the ‘post-materialist’ social movements with which environment groups are usually equated, nor the PSU-style ecologists. The association was created by Henri Bouchard, a lycée teacher in his early thirties with no prior activist experience but frustrated by the urban environment of Toulouse. If his discontent pre-dated 1968, the events of May proved crucial for a substantial associative engagement: ‘I drew on the impetus of 1968 [...] We were bolder in our actions and criticism, some of which was directly linked to the direction of the system and of civilisation [...] We probably would not have dared go

\textsuperscript{38} See, for example, the presentation of the Berges de la Garonne project in \textit{Capitole Informations} 4 (June 1974).

\textsuperscript{39} Interview with Louis Daffos.

\textsuperscript{40} There is little local work on the ecologists in Toulouse. A brief analysis is available on D. Forneris, ‘Les écologistes et la politique. Un exemple: les écologistes toulousains’ (Mémoire, IEP de Toulouse, 1985), but this deals mainly with ATE.
that far before.\(^\text{41}\) *Environnement et Humanisme* activists were fairly heterogeneous -- retired people, young students and many middle-class professionals in their thirties like Bouchard (see Appendix 13b). In contrast to the profile of the 1977 *Autogestion-Occitanie-Ecologie* list, one should note the presence of several ‘establishment’ figures, including an *adjoint* of Pierre Baudis, several members of the judiciary and an agent of the *renseignements généraux* (internal security services).\(^\text{42}\) There were relatively few engineers or technicians and an almost total absence of *animateurs*, artists, musicians and the unemployed.

In contrast, ATE was very much part of post-1968 left-communitarian currents, and initially focused on biological food production and distribution. It subsequently developed into a meeting point for a range of activists from anti-nuclear (particularly *Mouvement pour le Désarmement, la Paix et la Liberté* - MDPL) to alternative medicine. Philippe Dufatelle, the founder of ATE, was a young doctor (born 1953) with a Catholic associative background (JEC), who developed a great interest in the counter-culture and the hippie wave.\(^\text{43}\) Indeed, ATE was composed primarily of those under the age of 30, this generational base reflecting an ideological field of reference not as apparent in *Environnement et Humanisme*. Bouchard qualifies his activists as ‘Mr Everybody’ in comparison to the ‘more marginal younger currents’ within ATE.\(^\text{44}\)

In addition to its activities relating to biological food, ATE engaged strongly in Toulouse with the anti-road campaigns, and was also a member of the UCQ-ADACVT. It, too, avoided direct electoral involvement in the 1977 municipal elections, refusing to support any of the political parties. However, a year later, Dufatelle was a candidate in the 1978 legislatives (*Collectif Ecologie ‘78*) and in the 1979 Europeans (*Europe-écologie*).\(^\text{45}\) Indeed, he subsequently left ATE to found MIDEP (*Midi-Pyrenées Ecologie Politique*), which attracted those from both ATE

\(^{41}\) Interview with Henri Bouchard.

\(^{42}\) The *adjoint* in question was Alphonse Mazet, formerly an SFIO councillor in Bazerque’s administration (1965-71) and now labelling himself an ‘Independent Socialist.’ It is unclear how long he was in the group and what activities he participated in.


\(^{44}\) Interview with Henri Bouchard.

\(^{45}\) Both *Collectif écologie ‘78* and *Europe-écologie* were typical of the kind of temporary non-structured electoral organisation used by the ecologists during this period. They reflected the refusal either to become a party or a permanent national movement. See G. Sainteny, *Les Verts*, Second ed. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1992), pp. 14-15.
and Environnement et Humanisme who wished to engage in the electoral process. Since 1983, Dufatelle has been adjoint responsible for environmental affairs in three successive Baudis (Dominique) administrations. His co-option was typical of attempts by both the Baudis’ to create a ‘non-political’ municipal authority, mirroring wider practices (particularly on the centre and right) in French local government.

The role of the PSU

Considerable support for anti-road activities also came from PSU members who were increasingly moving in the direction of an environmental platform, mostly under the influence of the younger activists who joined in 1968, although this was much more marked after the departure of the Rocardians to the PS in 1974 (Assises du socialisme). PSU figures were present, often prominent, in all the urban quality of life campaigns of the period, reflecting the national pattern. In the case of the Berges de la Garonne, while there was certainly a genuine and strongly-felt desire to save what is indisputably one of the most beautiful parts of the city, many were also looking for a chance to engage the establishment. ‘There was a real desire for conflict,’ according to Julien Savary, PSU member and first president of the Comité des Berges. ‘For us Grenoble was a reference, but we wanted to be more left-wing. We wanted to be pure. We wanted to fight.’

The party itself served at this point as a collective intellectual resource, providing a base for activists who were engaged in a diverse range of protest politics. Indeed, the local PSU was heavily marked by conflicts beyond the city, most particularly the Larzac dispute, which pitted a broad coalition of smallholding (sometimes hippie) farmers, unions and social movements against the army. If the Grenoble post-Assises PSU had been given a major impetus by the anti-nuclear protests in nearby Creys-Malville (Isère), the equivalent in Toulouse was Larzac, about ninety miles away in the department of Averyon. For the PSU, Larzac was part of an eclectic agenda -- pro-rural, pro-regionalist and anti-militarist:

‘The struggle of the Larzac peasants has become the symbol of the fight to live and work in the countryside so that the land belongs to those who work there, the fight

46 Interview with Julien Savary.
against the exploitation and desertification of Occitanie and the fight against the militarisation of our society.  

Unlike the highly mobilised PSU, few PS activists can be found in the quality of life movements of the 1970s, the balance of power amongst Toulouse Socialists (Mitterrandist) meant that the party was not in the hands of those currents most sympathetic (primarily Rocardians) to associative politics and citizen participation. Furthermore, the fact that the Socialists still had a powerful electoral machine in Haute-Garonne, despite losing Toulouse in 1971, meant that well-established existing networks made it harder for new arrivals to penetrate the party machinery. The traditional anti-clericalism of the old SFIO was still rooted in the PS, making it difficult for Catholics (mainly Rocardian and CERES) to assimilate into the new party. This stands in stark contrast to the situation in Grenoble, where Left Catholics were a powerful driving force in the local party.

A typical experience is recounted by a Rocardian PS activist and *Vie nouvelle* member who lives in Cugnaux, a largely middle-class commune in the west of the Toulouse agglomeration:

'What was clear in the section here was that I was the Left Catholic. It was obvious. I was a declared Rocardian, I was a practising Catholic and known in the commune of Cugnaux. Perhaps I was a bit naive but everything was a question of power. What struck me was that they could not envisage the idea of my participation without thinking that I would take over. This was not my goal. For example, I had some associative commitment, having created a cultural association in Cugnaux dedicated to Occitan issues. When I undertook this project, the councillors said: "What does he want to do? He is going to run for office." Straightway: "What is behind all of this?"'

These suspicions were exaggerated, if only because the Catholic non-Communist Left was by no means a homogeneous bloc. If one takes three of the most prominent associative activists in Toulouse -- Marc Miguet (PSU, president of the CODIQUANT, president CUTC, president UCQ), Julien Savary (PSU, first president of *Comité de Défense des Berges de la Garonne*) and Jean-Pierre Amalric (PS, president of *Comité de défense contre l’autoroute rocade sud*), there are very different outlooks. Miguet represents an older PSU tendency, emerging out of *Jeune République* and the UGS. Amalric was a JEC organiser in the 1950s, but found the PSU too ideological, passing instead through UNEF and the CAPT. Savary was much

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Structuring contention: the creation of the Union de Comités de Quartier et des Associations de Défense et d’Action pour le cadre de vie à Toulouse (UCQ - ADACVT)

At the end of 1976, a number of unions de quartier, together with the three anti-road committees and several other quality of life associations, created the UCQ-ADACVT. Originally consisting of thirteen associations, the group grew to twenty-one by 1978 and formalised a number of networks of co-operation that had already been established (see Appendix 13c). Politically, the neutrality claimed by this group was even harder to maintain than that of the UCQ. Indeed, the inner core (identified through interview data and regular attendance of meetings) consisted of five associations whose leaders were all politically engaged on the Left. This clearly discouraged some comités de quartier from becoming involved.

Structurally, the UCQ-ADACVT represents a very different kind of grass-roots quality of life mobilisation to that of the Grenoble GAM or the ADTC. In the latter case, specific networks resulted in the creation of unitary associations. In Toulouse, however, while the UCQ-ADACVT was built on a pre-existing activist network, its federative structure betrays the fact that this network, while dense was not as multistranded. In other words, while many of the activists did know each other, they were not necessarily coming into contact in a number of different associative contexts. The group was intended to act as a coordinating force between different neighbourhood committees, as well as the wider associative world, and such a structure made it easier to house a diversity of currents. There was virtually no personnel overlap between key activists in the PSU and ATE, for example.

48 For a useful collection of articles on this question, see Esprit 4-5 (1977), 'Les militants d’origine chrétienne.'
49 Although officially the UCQ-ADACVT was supposed to cover the agglomeration, only two member associations were specifically representative of communes outside Toulouse.
50 The inner core consisted of representatives from Comité du Quartier Nord, Association des résidents de la ZUP de Rangueil, Comité de défense des berges de la Garonne, Comité de défense contre la Rocade Sud, Groupe d’information et d’aménagement.
51 To return to terminology used in Chapter Two, from C. S. Fischer, To Dwell Among Friends: Personal Networks in Town and City. See p. 97.
The 1977 municipal elections

Although the UCQ-ADACVT proclaimed its political neutrality in its publications prior to the 1977 municipals, it issued a highly critical press statement of the Baudis administration, and about half of its core members appeared as candidates on a left ecologist-regionalist list (although not explicitly in their UCQ-ADACVT capacity).

Autogestion-Occitanie-Ecologie, a further contention cycle structure in Toulouse, grew out of two principal organised groups: the remains of the post-1974 PSU and Lutte Occitane, a gauchiste regionalist movement created in the aftermath of May 1968. An assortment of other activists were also included (for example, feminist groups), but in terms of ecologists, both ATE and Environnement et Humanisme were somewhat suspicious of the political process and avoided the elections altogether.

Following the elections, Autogestion-Occitanie-Ecologie was transformed into a permanent structure, the Convergence pour l'autogestion, l'occitanie, l'écologie.

While similar in spirit, the programme proposed by Autogestion-Occitanie-Ecologie was slightly different from that of Grenoble-Ecologie in its greater emphasis upon social movement priorities and quality of life campaigns in Toulouse (for example, Berges de la Garonne). While both lists emphasised themes such as decentralisation of power, radically reformed urban planning and protection of the environment and quality of life in the city, Autogestion-Occitanie-Ecologie also placed as central priorities the struggle for abortion, contraception, womens' rights and alternative forms of health care. There was also the regional dimension which added a distinct flavour, with reference both to Larzac and Occitan culture.

This programme reflects the eclecticism of a list ranging from Lutte Occitane to UCQ-ADACVT figures. Indeed, in Grenoble, while some neighbourhood committee

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52 For a useful basic account of the election, particularly on the new sectoral electoral system in Toulouse and the composition of the lists, see L. Dumas, 'La Genèse et les Elections Municipales des 14 et 20 mars 1977' (Memoire, IEP de Toulouse, 1977).
53 'L'union des comités de quartiers estime que les promesses n'ont pas été tenues,' La Dépêche du Midi, 3 March 1977.
54 The list did not designate the party or associative label of candidates. Most UCQ-ADACVT core activists were PSU and were hence marshalled into the election by the party.
activists were present on the **Grenoble-Ecologie** list, there was less sense of the participation struggle being necessarily connected to the kind of battles ('luttes') promoted by **Autogestion-Occitanie-Ecologie**. The existence of a progressive left administration in Grenoble meant of course that the theme of participatory democracy was already strongly associated with the PS). Many Socialist councillors were active in their local *unions de quartier*, certainly not the case amongst PS candidates in Toulouse. As we have seen he dichotomy between non-Communist Left and Left Ecologist was thus less pronounced on this theme in Grenoble.

There was, unsurprisingly, a substantial variation in emphasis within the programmes of the Union of the Left lists in the two cities, headed by Hubert Dubedout and Alain Savary.\(^\text{56}\) While Savary’s outline included five lines on participation, limited to stating the desirability of allowing *Toulousains* to participate in decision-making, the Dubedout programme was far bolder (despite the fact that the PCF had exerted enormous pressure to prevent a commitment to directly elected decentralised sectors). The intention to dynamise local democracy is printed in large characters, occupying a central position.

If one compares the Savary documentation (only mentioning improved information as a specific measure) to the PS’s national programme (invoking such measures as questionnaires, broad-scale enquiries, referenda, extra-municipal committees), one can see that the minimum level of commitment was being given. Savary had beaten the Gaullist Alexandre Sanguinetti in the 1973 legislative election in Toulouse’s Northern constituency, but was still regarded by many Toulouse Socialists as a ‘parachuté’ with few local ties. In terms of participation, neighbourhood activists confirmed in interviews that Savary was relatively well-disposed towards them, but was constrained by his somewhat fragile position in the local PS.

It is interesting that Baudis, for his part, barely mentioned participation in his general campaign material. Ahead of the game in his 1971 promises to create ‘true

\(^{56}\) Savary was confirmed as head of list in May 1976 by 58% of the votes of the local federation, after a long battle with André Meric (Vice-President of Senate). Savary had beaten the Gaullist Alexandre Sanguinetti in the 1973 legislative election in Toulouse’s Northern constituency, but was still regarded by many Toulouse Socialists as a ‘parachuté’ with few local ties. In terms of participation, neighbourhood activists confirmed in interviews that Savary was relatively well-disposed towards them, but was constrained by his somewhat fragile position in the local PS.
local democracy’, he now pulled back, preferring to employ a traditionalist, apolitical rhetoric of ‘sound and rigorous management.’ His list name, P.B.A.U.D.I.S, stood for ‘Pour Bien Administrer dans l’Union et Développer les Initiatives Sociales’ (To carry out good administration in conditions of unity, and to develop social initiatives’).

What seems to have happened is that the growing politicisation of municipal election campaigns had prompted a defensive reaction, particularly that of Toulouse in 1977 which the Left saw as a barometer of its prospects for the legislative elections of the subsequent year. With Savary heading his programme with the question of unemployment, Baudis preferred to return to basics, emphasising above all his achievements in the social domain. Given his failure to implement the 1971 programme, he also had to be careful not to make promises on improved democracy.

Conflict over the POS

Shortly after the re-election of Pierre Baudis in March 1977 (for results, see Appendix 14), the activities of the recently-created UCQ-ADACVT began to accelerate, partly a consequence of a new organisation finding its way, partly also stimulated by the victory of its bête noire. Its immediate priority was to exert pressure for participation in the elaboration of urban planning schemes, particularly the important POS (Plan d’occupation des sols), with which Toulouse was somewhat behind for technical reasons. To this end, in April 1977, the UCQ-ADACVT established an Atelier populaire d’urbanisme (APU) which aimed to provided an alternative urban development forum in the quartiers of Toulouse. At the outset, however, the association firmly anchored its ideas within the framework of urban conflict (‘luttes urbaines’). A major exhibition on the theme was organised in May 1977, with the diversity of presentations illustrating the range of associations represented within the committee -- against existing social housing policy, against housing schemes with excessive population concentration, against urban expressways and current transport policy, in favour of independent MJC.

The POS campaign took the form of both non-violent direct action (invasion and disruption of municipal council meetings) and of constructive counter-proposals developed through the APU. It stood out in comparison to other previous or ongoing
local conflicts (such as those over public transport or the Berges de la Garonne) not only due to the appearance of the UCQ-ADACVT as an organisational unit, but because it went beyond sectoral issues. The POS decided the future shape of the city, planning five years ahead for the level and location of housing, industry and leisure facilities as well as public infrastructure, such as roads. As such, it constituted a focal point for many comités de quartier, engaged associations and the municipal opposition. However, anxious to avoid institutionalisation, the UCQ-ADACVT generally kept its distance from newly-elected Socialist councillors.

In terms of public involvement in the POS, the re-elected Baudis administration did undertake a certain number of initiatives. A questionnaire was issued in the municipal magazine late in 1977, and exhibition centres were set-up in individual quartiers to inform inhabitants of the plans. There was also a chance for Toulousains to give their opinions to a public enquiry, although this was a requirement of the POS legislation and not at the behest of local councils. These procedures were, however, derided by the UCQ-ACADVT as nothing more than cosmetic. The association pointed out that the results of the questionnaire were never published, that the opening hours of the public enquiry made it impossible for those who were at work all day to attend, and claimed that the main proposals of the POS had been drawn-up in advance of any public participation.

However justified these criticisms of the POS consultation may have been, there were elements within the UCQ-ACADVT which clearly would not have accepted the POS even with improved local input. The GIAM, in particular, was offering a Marxist critique of urban planning which was uncompromising in its demands:

57 Under a plan, largely designed to ensure the re-election of Pierre Baudis, Toulouse had been divided into three sectors for the 1977 municipal elections. Winning any two would provide an overall majority on the council. In 1977, a PS-PCF-MRG list was able win the central-southern sector of the city, giving them 17 councillors out of 49 total seats on the council.

58 The UCQ-ADACVT bulletin of September 1977 expressed the fears of recuperation felt within the association: 'Several members want to establish contact between the UCQ and opposition councillors, but this kind of institutionalisation is opposed. We should avoid having the UCQ seen as part of the Left opposition, an infiltrated satellite organisation. We need to remain faithful to our platform; the UCQ should depend on its own resources [...] Relationships should be developed as and when necessary.'

59 See 'Toulousains, aidez-nous à faire l'occupation des sols', Capitole Informations 18 (October-November 1977).

60 See various UCQ-ADACVT tracts, PSU Haute-Garonne Federation Archives. For a recapitulation of UCQ-ACADVT opinion, see C. Béringuier, 'Pour un autre urbanisme à Toulouse': positions de l'Union des comités de quartier, Revue géographique des Pyrénées et du Sud-Ouest, 54/1 (1983), 159-68.
‘The act of situating our activity within the framework of a revolutionary strategy implies the rejection of a certain ‘boy-scout’ mentality as well as the systematic use of the ‘counter-project’ as the outlet for conflicts. The problem is not the planning of our living conditions, but the exposure of the inherent contradictions of capitalism.’

This kind of attitude reflected the politicisation of a part of the geography faculty at Toulouse’s Mirail university, which provided the core of GIAM members. These ideological assumptions are also identifiable in urban planning analysis undertaken at the faculty during this period.

The momentum behind the UCQ-ADACVT and the Convergence alliance started to slow towards the end of the POS campaign in 1979, for reasons related to the general factors outlined in Chapter One rather than specific local variables. Certainly, Toulouse activists experienced the kind of fatigue and over-commitment that Hirschman had pointed to in *Shifting Involvements*. The leader of the post-Assises PSU in Toulouse commented that one of the great difficulties in sustaining the dynamic in the late 1970s was the level of time and energy required. Multistranded, dense networks meant that the same people were simultaneously involved in the PSU, neighbourhood associations and the Convergence.

**Socio-professional profiles within the Toulouse contention cycle**

Given the wider literature and the findings already presented in this thesis, it is not surprising that the UCQ-ADACVT was dominated by specific sections of the middle class, most specifically teachers. Of seven key activists interviewed, six were teachers (three university, two middle school, one secondary school) and one was an engineer. In terms of religion, five described themselves as Left Catholic and two were from a secular tradition. None could recall any tension or difficulty caused by the religious cleavage. This professional and religious profile is what one would expect,
although the Catholic presence is high. Further data on individual associations, generally unavailable, would be needed to see if this extended into the rank-and-file membership. The average age is also relatively high at 38 (born 1939).

The candidates on the Autogestion-Ecologie-Occitanie list were somewhat younger, though, with an average age of 34 (born 1943). Indeed, 44% were under the age of thirty, which fits with Inglehart’s first ‘postmaterialist’ generation (born 1945-55). In occupational terms, the profile was wholly comparable to that of Grenoble-Ecologie, as one would expect: a disproportionate number of teachers, several animateurs and éducateurs, and those that tended generally not to figure on electoral lists, such as students and artists (see Appendix 15). While one should be careful about drawing candidate inferences from material such as lists which may not be fully representative of the organisation’s membership, this is fully in line with the work of Bidou, Mendras and Reynaud.

In comparison to Grenoble though, it is striking that UCQ-ADACVT interviewees identified the urban conflicts of the 1970s as, above all, the preserve of toulousains. Particularly so since only two (both Catholic) had actually been born in the city, the others being migrants from the Midi-Pyrenees region, commonly arriving as university students. An interesting anthropological issue beyond the scope of this thesis arises here. Those associative activists interviewed in Grenoble who had arrived from Isère or Rhône-Alpes in similar circumstances, did not see themselves as grenoblois, identifying with the ‘new’ Grenoble, rather than the old. The explanation for this remains unclear, but one can hypothesise that the stronger regional identity of Midi-Pyrenees and its central city, Toulouse, created a sense of ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ that was somewhat different.

However, public action by newcomers was certainly felt in the Toulouse agglomeration, particularly in the rapidly growing south-east close to the Rangueil scientific complex. In certain semi-rural communes of this area, many of which

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66 R. Inglehart, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*, p. 85. For the parallel in Grenoble, see Chapter Three, p. 154.
67 The socio-professional composition of the Occitan movements was quite similar to that of the ecologists, with a particularly marked presence of teachers. See R. Beer, *The Unexpected Rebellion: Ethnic Activism in Contemporary France*, p. 93.
68 See above p. 88.
doubled in size in less than a decade, the professional, salaried middle class sometimes represented fifty percent of the population.\textsuperscript{69} Through associative life and, politically, through the composition of the local section of the PS, one can discern a ‘new’ middle class phenomenon of the kind seen in the municipality of Grenoble ten years earlier. Perhaps the best-known example is Claude Ducert, mayor of Labège (1971-1989, an engineer who was the driving force behind the SICOVAL (Syndicat Intercommunal d’aménagement et de développement des coteaux de la vallée de l’Hers), an inter-communal development board created in 1975.\textsuperscript{70}

Statistics, though, suggest that the reason for the lack of penetration by a ‘new’ migrant middle class into Toulouse politics (and this absence extends beyond the contention cycle into the mainstream parties) needs to be explained by more than just different residential patterns.\textsuperscript{71} Although we do not know have exact socio-professional data on migrants, the general socio-professional statistics for Toulouse shows a level of 26.3\% in 1975 for the professional, salaried middle class (18.3\% in 1962) compared to 28.6\% in Grenoble (21.3\% in 1962). Clearly, there was a sizeable, if not precisely measurable, ‘new’ middle-class population in the centre commune, yet it was not visible on the political scene. Activists interviewed (unsurprisingly) expressed the view that it was an accidental phenomenon; for example, ‘it is not that we wanted it to remain amongst ourselves. It just happened like that,’ or ‘it wasn’t deliberate, but there was a certain form of conviviality.’\textsuperscript{72} One activist born in Toulouse did, nonetheless, describe a ‘certain chauvinism which sometimes made it difficult for outsiders to be accepted.’\textsuperscript{73}

\textsuperscript{69} As in footnote 4 above (p. 190), included here are INSEE groups 3 (Professions libérales et cadres supérieurs) and 4 (Cadres moyens), without liberal professions.

\textsuperscript{70} Ducert had been a young activist in Vie nouvelle, working with the CAPT in 1967, and represented the combination of a technical and Left Catholic vision. In addition to being mayor of Labège, he was elected PS député for the local constituency (Toulouse III) in 1988, remaining until the 1993 elections which he did not contest. For more on Ducert, see J. Ferret, Paroles d’élus (Paris: Erès, 1996), pp. 213-20.

\textsuperscript{71} The residential configuration is the main reason given by a leading Toulouse geographer for the absence of a phenomenon ‘that one might have expected...in a city said to be a technology centre.’ G. Jalalbert, Toulouse: Metropole incomplète (Paris: Anthropos, 1995), p. 168.

\textsuperscript{72} Interviews with André Boudou and Jean-Pierre Amairic, both born in the Midi-Pyrénées region.

\textsuperscript{73} Interviews with Louis Daffos.
Conclusion

In both cycles, the experience of Toulouse was fundamentally different from that of Grenoble. The latter's exceptionality in electing an innovative reformist municipality in 1965 facilitated the evolution of a political agenda that moved in a similar direction to the contention cycle on crucial questions of local power structures. While this did not save the Dubedout administration from difficulties over other issues, such as the nuclear question, the situation in the the city was far removed from the stand-offs and confrontation that characterised the relationship between Toulouse city hall and many of the quality of life and neighbourhood associations during the 1970s.

The legacy of the reform cycle for the Toulouse quality of life and participation movements in the 1970s was minimal in terms of structure or activists. The coincidence of May 1968 with growing infrastructural difficulties served to boost the development of frequently confrontational organisations which found themselves without any real political relay outside the PSU. Where pro-associative Left Catholic reform cycle currents had successfully penetrated the local party in Grenoble at the expense of the SFIO old guard, an organisation such as the UCQ (and later UCQ-ACADVT) in Toulouse did not find sympathetic echoes beyond a small faction of the Toulouse PS and, even here, there were reservations about some of the tactics used.

In the aftermath of the contention cycle, the UCQ-ADACVT did not disappear. On the contrary, it continued and currently continues to exercise a presence in Toulouse. But the falling away of the gauchiste groups such as the GIAM and ADUA, and the more sober climate of the 1980s has transformed the association into more of a 'responsible' pressure group with a growing emphasis on technical expertise. Drawing on extensive contacts with Silvardière and the ADTC in Grenoble through the national pressure group, the FNAUT (*Fédération nationale des associations d'usagers de transports*), the UCQ challenged Dominique Baudis' flagship metro project, preferring the tramway. In an interesting (but not specifically acknowledged) parallel with the GAMs' similar emphasis on a mastery of the technical questions as a pre-requisite to effective action, the current president of the UCQ notes that the
tramway campaign: 'could only be carried out with facts and figures,' and not using the direct action strategies or radical rhetoric of the 1970s.\footnote{74 Interview with Christian Béringuier.}
Conclusion

In exploring how citizen politics mobilisations occurred in Grenoble and Toulouse, this thesis has developed a multi-layered argument. Firstly, it has elaborated distinctive patterns at the national level, influencing and influenced by local activity. Secondly, within the context of the wider cycles, it has explored specific local configurations which shape mobilisation in individual cities. From this analysis, two central findings emerge which form the basis of this conclusion: one empirical, contributing to our understanding of French associative life, the other conceptual, addressing the utility of the term ‘new middle class’ as an explanatory variable. A final section considers the question of participation in terms of contemporary developments.

The importance of associations

French associative life is conventionally portrayed as inherently weak in the face of an overbearing state. The reasons for such a view are well rehearsed and need little elaboration here. Since all rights before 1789 were in the nature of privileges, accruing to estates or corporations of one sort or another, the Revolution, in its attempt to create citizens equal before the law, abolished the intermediary corporate bodies embodying the privileges of the old regime, which were incompatible with a common citizenship. Combined with Rousseauian conceptions of democracy, hostile to any group that obstructed the direct relationship between citizen and state and the crystallisation of the general will, this militated against the construction of a republic where associative life was encouraged. The autocratic and illiberal regimes that spanned the nineteenth century until the Third Republic had no intention of allowing, much less encouraging, local autonomy or freedom of association in contrast -- as

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1 This is a position explained by P. Grémion, 'Les associations et le pouvoir local', Esprit, 6 (June 1978), p. 19; P. Hall, 'Pluralism and Pressure Politics', in P. Hall, J. Hayward, and H. Machin (eds.), Developments in French Politics (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994).
Tocqueville famously observed -- to the American models which saw the local freedom and the associative vitality as the best defence of democracy.2

The prevailing impression of weakness in recent decades has largely come from a tendency to conflate associative life with interest group activity, and analysis has concentrated too narrowly on intermediary structures representing economic interests, that is to say trade unions or employer associations.3 In reality, associative life in France has never been moribund, and certainly not since the 1901 liberal association law. As far as the early years of the Fifth Republic are concerned, the traditional view was already an anachronism: 'the associative life of the stalemate society has been transformed,' wrote Hoffmann in 1963.4 As other contemporaries, such as Mendès France and Rovan had noted, it is clear that local sporting, cultural, educational and neighbourhood associations were thriving across France. Joffré Dumazedier’s (founder of Peuple et Culture) sociology team in Annecy found 260 social, cultural and leisure associations operating in the town in the early 1960s.5 In Toulouse a few years later, Raymond Ledrut, as we have seen, counted 114 associations active in the Quartier Nord.6

The more sophisticated hypothesis advanced by MacRae in the 1960s was that French associative endeavour was bedevilled by the same national cleavages that fed multipartism: church vs. state, an isolated working class, communist vs. anti-communist: so there were three main trade union confederations - Communist (CGT), Socialist (FO) and Catholic (CFTC/CFDT); competing Catholic action and Communist peasant and student movements, and at least five separate boy scout organisations. Ideological competition in a centralised state was based on and transmitted to local associations seeking to organise the same constituencies and

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2 A. de Tocqueville, De la démocratie en Amérique, particularly Part One, Ch.4, 'De l'association politique aux Etats-Unis.'
3 For the most recent example, see J. D. Levy, Tocqueville’s Revenge: State, Society and Economy in Contemporary France (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1999), Levy bases his definition of civil society on what he admits to be a 'limited set of institutions' (p. 16): employer associations, financial establishments and elected local government.
4 S. Hoffmann, 'Paradoxes of the French Political Community', p. 70. For a view from engaged observers, see P. Mendès France, La République moderne, pp. 217-21; J. Rovan, Une idée neuve: la démocratie, p. 130ff.
5 R. Aubin et al., Communes et démocratie, Vol.2, p. 19. Although there is no indication of the proportion of local and national associations in this figure.
incapable of cooperating with each other. So local groups with similar concerns, competed for attention, rather than cooperating to achieve results.\(^7\)

As the empirical studies have shown through an exploration of the non-economic associative sphere, although these national cleavages continued to impact upon the public-action cycles, associations were crucial facilitating structures, particularly in the reform cycle. Furthermore, at the grassroots level in the city, the notion of participation in local government facilitated the development of associations, notably the neighbourhood committees, which superseded supra-territorial divisions, particularly the religious cleavage. This brought France closer to what MacRae defines as the American associative model, characterised by groups that cut across wider cleavages to make decisions at community level, at least in some localities, if not in others.\(^8\)

The importance of associations in the public action cycles can be seen in two distinct areas: that of ideas and that of mobilisation. Certainly, in the case of the reform cycle, it would not be an exaggeration to claim that much of the rethinking that marked certain currents of the future PS was taking place in associations, notably the sociétés de pensée. The publications and tracts of the Club Jean Moulin, Citoyens 60 or smaller local associations such as CIFAS in Grenoble or the CAPT in Toulouse are all evidence of the process of discussion and experimentation that was taking place (see Chapter One). Intellectually, the Rocardian element of the Epinay party and the broader deuxième gauche drew heavily on the thinking of the these kind of clubs - Rocard was, of course, himself a member of the Club Jean Moulin.

Ideological input from a specific group of associations was less striking in the contention cycle where there was no comparable organisational and intellectual core and where a far more diffuse range of influences were at work; for example, elements of the extreme Left were active in a way quite distinct from their self-exclusion from the reform cycle. Nonetheless, the participation debate within the contention cycle was influenced by a small number of national associations - most notably ADELS

\(^7\) D. MacRae, Parlement, Parties, and Society in France 1946-58, pp. 29-30.

\(^8\) Ibid., pp. 29-30.
(through *Correspondance Municipale*), and, to a lesser extent, CSCV and CARNACQ. These associations were able to have a voice, not just through their own publications, but also through a wider sympathetic periodical literature in the mid-1970s.\(^9\)

However, the presence of the new Socialist Party, the PS, was critical in removing the distinctive ground occupied by the *sociétés de pensée* and shifting the centre of gravity in the engaged associative world. If the absence of credible political parties had shaped the departure into the clubs of the early 1960s and created a distinct new public sphere, this was not the case a decade later. Many reform cycle activists had joined the PS and, while sometimes a target of contention cycle activity, the party had also been constructed with a large influx of young members who had been heavily influenced by the events of May 1968. The gradual interest in participation taken by the PS and the Giscard administration meant that the debate was carried out very differently. Groups such as ADELS, CSCV and CARNACQ occupied a position closer to sectoral pressure groups.

**Associations and mobilisation**

Associations provided the structure for a variety of significant non-partisan civic and political engagement, whether intellectual discussion or neighbourhood improvement. The citizen participation movement within the two cycles was built on the combination of a national debate and the ability of associations to dynamise individuals in their cities, towns and neighbourhoods. Although membership levels of para-political or neighbourhood groups were rarely particularly high if measured as a proportion of total population, they were not insignificant. A SOFRES poll of 1977 found that 7% of those questioned in a country-wide poll claimed to be a member of a neighbourhood association or municipal committee (although the inclusion in the question of the municipal committee prevents a totally accurate picture of the purely associative dimension).\(^{10}\)

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\(^9\) See p. 61.

There were of course significant variations in activity, and two central variables go some way towards explaining the diverging experiences of Grenoble and Toulouse during the reform cycle (see Chapters Two and Four). Firstly, the cities were at different stages of economic development, which affected their socio-professional composition and the level of difficulty they were facing in managing urban growth. Secondly, associative traditions were not at all similar. In the neighbourhoods, the *unions de quartier* had emerged in Grenoble the 1930s, establishing a paradigm which could be developed in the post-war period. At the same time, the city was marked by Resistance experiences which had stimulated the implantation of discussion and study groups, such as *Peuple et Culture* or *Economie et Humanisme*, which played an important role in the reform cycle debates. These elements were crucial in shaping the distinctive reform climate of the early 1960s.

However, to transform associative dynamism into effectively mobilised political movements requires some level of individual entrepreneurship. In the case of the Grenoble GAM, Hubert Dubedout had the impulse to engage electorally and was able to tap into a strong associative network that possessed the intellectual capacity to construct a coherent alternative agenda in his *Groupe d'action municipale*. What this network did not possess was the political drive to have become an election-fighting organisation by itself. Dubedout had characteristics that both reduced the potential antagonism towards him in the associations and might appear more reassuring to a wider less-engaged electorate. The unsuccessful role of the entrepreneur can be seen through the GAM experiences of Henri de Lassus in Toulouse a few years later, where the associative networks were less in evidence, and those that were most sympathetic to political action (the CAPT and elements of *Vie nouvelle*) were suspicious of his intentions and more preoccupied with the reconstruction of the Socialist Party.

Contention cycle patterns in the two cities (see Chapters Three and Five) were strongly influenced by reform cycle outcomes. In Grenoble, the presence of an innovative GAM-PS-PSU administration (later becoming largely PS between 1971 and 1977 as many GAM and PSU councillors gradually entered the new party), willing to experiment with new forms of relationship between citizen and local state,
served to dampen the kind of grassroots participative political pressure that was widely seen elsewhere. Nonetheless, the presence of nuclear research establishments in the city and of a fast-breeder reactor nearby at Creys-Malville, served to stimulate a strong ecologist movement. In agreement with the municipality over the principles of citizen participation and decentralisation, division was very evident over environmental issues.

For Toulouse, in contrast, the contention cycle took place in the context of a reform cycle activity that left no real legacy either in terms of political achievement or structures, and relatively conservative administrations (both in the case of the Socialist Bazerque and the centrist Pierre Baudis). The 1970s saw a sustained series of urban campaigns which combined demands for improved participation in local government with an increasingly critical approach to the management of the urban environment. The politicisation of the main federating body representing the comités de quartier, the UCQ (Union des comités de quartier), meant that the Baudis administration (1971-1983) was specifically targeted for its political colour as well as its practical policy decisions.

The role of religion

Despite the differences between Grenoble and Toulouse, a common strand is provided by the role of religion. In both cities, as more widely in France at this time, the pivotal role of Left Catholics in French reform cycle associative activity is very clear. The dominant influence of both Left Catholics and Protestants (many part of the Uriage and Resistance currents) in Grenoble’s post-war associative world was decisive for later events that led to the establishment of the GAM, and even marked conflicts such as Neyrpic. In Toulouse, where the anti-clerical freemasonic complex (SFIO and Radicals) was far stronger in the post-war period, the climate was less conducive to such developments and it was a marginalised Left Catholic fringe that dominated structures such as the CREPT and CAPT.

Somewhat paradoxically, while religion tended to be an important variable in identifying key public-action cycles activists, the decline of the religious cleavage as a
polarising force in local associative life is clear when one examines the growth of the
neighbourhood association as a territorial unit in both cities. In Toulouse and
Grenoble, as elsewhere, the post-war urban infrastructure crisis and the public action
cycles stimulated the development of organisations built on the basis of local needs
for the *entire* population, in contrast to the myriad of competing social and cultural
associations divided by the cleavages identified by MacRae.11 That they developed at
different speeds has much to do with different context - Grenoble, of course, had a
longer history of such structures, although it was not until the late 1950s that a
comprehensive network developed across the city.

In terms of patterns of activism, the continued presence of a large number of
activists who describe their inspiration as coming from the Church or para-Church
organisations provides great potential for testing rational choice models which seek to
explain civic and political participation in associations or movements outside
conventional party structures. While this is not the focus of the thesis, from the
limited data available in this study it seems that rational choice theory is wholly
inadequate for explaining the kind of morally-motivated politics that was frequently in
evidence in both the 1960s and 1970s. Furthermore, this is not a phenomenon that is
confined to one country. Comparable situations, particularly in relation to social
movements such as the pacifist and anti-nuclear movements, can be found in other
European countries: for example, the considerable influence of religion in the British
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament.

**The middle class and ‘new politics’**

Whether in Grenoble, where participation was institutionalised, or in Toulouse, where
the citizen politics movement never really achieved substantial concessions from the
municipality, it is clear that the theme was largely, but not exclusively, the domain of
specific middle-class groups. However, despite the frequent attempts to link ‘new
politics’ agendas to a ‘new middle class’,12 such sociological terms are deeply

12 Most notably, K. Eder, *The New Politics of Class: Social Movements and Cultural Dynamics in
Advanced Societies*; H. Kriesi, ‘New Social Movements and the new class in the Netherlands’,
unsatisfactory. Firstly, as we have seen in the introduction, the term ‘new middle class’ is semantically problematic even as a starting point. Professions are very rarely new, and even if the relative weight or changing status of groups is used as a yardstick, highly selective ‘new middle class’ definitions, which frequently omit large numbers of expanding technical, business or commercial occupations make no sense if one is trying to identify ‘new’ classes in terms of the patterns of occupational evolution within shifting economic paradigms (i.e. post-industrial or service-oriented societies).

Secondly, the empirical evidence has demonstrated that there are somewhat different clusters of occupations at the centre of public-action in the two cycles. During the 1960s, the teaching professions and some of the forces of economic modernisation - particularly engineers and technicians - were the most distinct occupational groups represented. Indeed, attention was explicitly focused upon the latter in the expectation that they would be dynamic, even revolutionary. Yet by the early 1980s, it was the teachers, animateurs, éducateurs and social and cultural professionals who became central. Some of the best-known empirical French work on the question, that of Catherine Bidou, simply excluded professions linked to the modernisation of production from the ‘central core’ of the ‘new salaried middle class.’

That certain occupational groups might have certain common interests is not in question here. The problem, rather, is with the label ‘new middle class’ and what it signifies. Beyond shifting definitions and the question of when a group can be counted as ‘new’, a further difficulty arises with different age cohorts. For example, an engineer or teacher, aged thirty in the reform cycle of the early 1960s could easily have found themselves in conflict ten years later with individuals of a similar profession or class and indeed did in Grenoble, as several GAMists interviewed have testified. Political outlooks were not the same. While activists could of course evolve,

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and one prominent Grenoble GAM figure is now very active in the Greens,\textsuperscript{14} more often there were collisions (we have already seen how Dubedout came under attack in 1977 over his views on nuclear power).\textsuperscript{15}

In short, it begins to appear more plausible to qualify middle class firstly in terms that reflect value systems and political ideas. The reform cycle is probably better described as the product of a ‘reformist’ or ‘modernist’ middle class, which indeed included a heavy proportion of expanding professions, such as the advanced technical and pedagogical sectors. On the other hand, the environmental movements of the 1970s attracted other kinds of activists. As Mendras points out, part of the 1968 generation had difficulties integrating into mainstream jobs and tended to occupy posts such as animateur or éducateur, which were themselves partly created in response to the May movement.\textsuperscript{16} These individuals were staple fixtures of the ‘alternative’ culture of the period, well represented in the ADCVs. At the same time, one still found many teachers and a substantial presence of engineers from various age cohorts involved in the defence of the environment. Clearly, there are no simple terminological short-cuts.

Moreover, the criticism could be made (with some justification) that ‘reformist’ or ‘modernist’ can be used during many periods of history with reference to middle-class politics. In order to address such a problem, one needs secondly to qualify middle class in terms of the generational divisions outlined in the course of this thesis. The ‘reformist’ middle class of the 1960s can be identified by generation: it was largely, but not exclusively, composed of members of a ‘resistance’ and ‘cold war’ generation. The disappointed hopes for a renewed, reformed France and the dashed ambitions, even the despair and anger of many in these age groups, triggered the ‘reform cycle’ during the political crisis of the late 1950s. The events of May 1968 were sparked by the frustrations of different groups: primarily the first post-war or, in Inglehart’s terms, post-materialist generation, led by veterans of the Algerian War student

\textsuperscript{14} Interview with François Lalande, former GAM member and Dubedout’s general secretary at city-hall from 1965-1974.
\textsuperscript{15} See p. 153.
movement, many assistants in or on the margins of a notionally democratised but overcrowded and still pompously hierarchical university system.

**Political activism and the possibility of new cycles**

This research has shown that the demand for improved citizen participation should not be treated simply as an adjunct or support for other more substantive issues, but as a substantive demand in itself. Participation as the desire for a pro-active and continual exercise of citizenship must be distinguished from participation as a way of getting one’s immediate goals fulfilled. NSMs may certainly be characterised as advocating opportunities to take part in decision-making affecting one’s life, but the aims of the peace or anti-nuclear movement, for example, were clearly not primarily related to this priority, even if many of their members supported participationist goals, and would not have accepted non-participationist structures.

Furthermore, the cyclical conceptual framework developed here is part of an argument which seeks to show how a theme has evolved and ebbed in terms of intellectual potency and profile. The commonly held view simply points to problems of representative government in Western Europe during the late 1960s as the catalyst for a new emphasis on participation. It is unusual for any analysis of new social movements or participation to consider the previous decade in any real detail. One needs to avoid a broad brush approach to a phenomenon whose development is far more complicated than the literature usually suggests.

The conventional chronological perspective is unfortunate, since in the case of France, the first relevant crisis of government came in 1958 and the case for new forms of participatory democracy was clearly enunciated by groups such as *Citoyens 60* or *Club Jean Moulin* in the early 1960s. The notion of 'participation' then evolved considerably. Not only does the intensity and organisational structure of the participation debate fluctuate over time and place, but even during the years in which

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18 For an example of this, see A. Mabileau et al. (eds.), Les citoyens et la politique locale. Comment participent les Britanniques et les Français, p. 267.
citizen participation was a key national issue, its meaning and significance changed considerable. The contribution of the opaque notion of autogestion post-1968 is perhaps the classic example of a term which, while a rallying cry on the Left in France during the 1970s, had played no real role in structuring the debate in the early 1960s.

Since the early 1990s, participation has once again been an issue that has caused substantial comment in French political circles, with interesting developments once again in Grenoble. In 1995, a citizen action group, Grenoble Objectif 95 (GO95), whose ideological agenda and socio-professional profile bore a substantial resemblance to that of the GAM, came to power in the city as part of a wider coalition with the PS, PCF and ecologists. Basing its claims on the incapacity of political parties to act as effective linkage structures between citizens and state, GO95 seeks to reinvigorate a participation ideal that had not been at the forefront of the local political agenda for some twenty ears.

However, GO95 is an exceptional example and may not be an enduring phenomenon even in Grenoble, where it has had difficulties in sustaining momentum since the 1995 election in the face of a well-organised local Socialist Party. There is little sign of a wider new reform or contention cycle developing in France and a growing literature is seeking to explain why contemporary France seems far less marked by the kind of highly organised para-political associative activity that characterised the 1960s and 1970s. It is not that there is any decline in the actual numbers of new associations being created - quite the contrary, the annual figure is now over 60,000, compared to just over 20,000 in the early 1970s. The issue is, rather, qualitative in terms of the shape of the public sphere.

The crucial question for the emergence of further cycles is whether, given a new crisis comparable with that of May 1958 or May 1968, one could expect individuals to

\[19\] GO95 has seven councillors out of a total of 46. However, unlike the GAM in 1965 which was able to exert substantial leverage, the PS is indisputably pre-eminent in the current municipality.


mobilise in similar associative structures. For if it is true that a substantial political shock has been needed to trigger public action cycles, as this thesis has suggested, it is also true that activism within these cycles is dependant upon certain conceptions of public engagement on the part of individuals. Ion’s persuasive model, which posits the notion of individual citizens increasingly distanced from the public sphere using association as a specific tool or in time-limited fashion, suggests that the reform and contention cycles may well have been the product of specific notions of activism. In other words, they are the consequence of the differing experiences of different generations, a concept we have become familiar with in the analysis of the different political outlooks of successive age cohorts in electoral sociology.

Given the relative decline of Catholic action organisations and especially of others of Catholic inspiration that had been prominent in the first three post-war decades -- such as the JAC, JEC, JOC, Vie Nouvelle and the myriad of family structures -- part of the explanation for what Ion observes in the 1990s may well to some extent lie with increasing secularisation. For example, Vie Nouvelle’s membership peaked at just over 5,000 in 1968, falling to 1,200 in 1991. The association is also no longer anywhere near as politicised as it had been in the 1960s and, particularly, the 1970s, preferring to concentrate on the interlinking spheres of personal development, family and work.

Since the 1970s, participation declined on the agenda, becoming a word for all seasons, almost a banality in political vocabulary. That citizen participation politics is essentially a minority pursuit gives ammunition to its detractors and provides consistent cause for debate amongst its supporters. It is all too easy for critics to invoke the will of the majority, as expressed through periodic universal suffrage, against interests expressed by a relatively small section of the population (however well intentioned or informed that section might be). Indeed, while almost all parties across the French political spectrum have since the 1970s embraced the notion of improved participation as a general concept, there has in reality been little enthusiasm

24 Interviews with Paul Bernard and Jean Buades.
for introducing any reform that would substantially shift the balance of power away from municipal councils towards representative bodies of local inhabitants.

As the Dubedout administration realised, little short of directly-elected sectors, in other words a sub-tier of local government, could overcome the criticisms of often socially unrepresentative neighbourhood committees. But here again, significant problems arise. Firstly, for the political parties, there is the risk of a confrontation between the majority on a municipal council and opposition-held sectoral committees (paradoxically, the reason that persuaded a PS government to introduce the conseils d'arrondissement in Chirac's Paris in 1982 and to cover its tracks by imposing it also on Defferre’s Marseilles). Secondly, there is the problem of coherent city-wide planning versus vested interests in specific sectors - the so-called NIMBY ‘not in my backyard’ issue. This is a question that also arises at the national or regional level with tensions between different levels of representative government.

The recent upsurge in interest in the question is interesting to the extent that some of the central problems evoked -- depoliticisation and the end of (socialist) ideology -- mirror preoccupations at the end of the 1950s. However, the response bears no comparison. Consultation via polls, panels or electronic town halls via computer terminals is not the equivalent of the face-to-face participation and continuous holding-to-account of elected official demanded by the GAMs. The era of the demands for citizen participation as active ‘daily’ democracy -- of the kind evoked by Mendès (in Choisir) or Delors (through Citoyens 60) evoked in the 1960s, and some partisans of autogestion in the aftermath of 1968 -- passed with the end of the two public action cycles.
Appendices
APPENDIX 1: Urban population change in post-war France.

Appendix 1a: Urban population of France, 1936-1968


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total population 1000s</th>
<th>Urban 1000s</th>
<th>% Urban</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>41,907</td>
<td>21,972</td>
<td>52.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>40,503</td>
<td>21,551</td>
<td>53.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>42,297</td>
<td>23,947</td>
<td>56.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>46,243</td>
<td>28,486</td>
<td>61.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>50,840</td>
<td>33,644</td>
<td>66.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix 1b: Population change in the twenty fastest growing communes >100,000 inhabitants (in 1962), 1954-62


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Municipal population</th>
<th>Variation 1954-62</th>
<th>Migration total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1954</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Absolute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenoble</td>
<td>111,371</td>
<td>153,447</td>
<td>42,076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Villeurbanne</td>
<td>80,905</td>
<td>103,675</td>
<td>22,770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rennes</td>
<td>115,912</td>
<td>146,410</td>
<td>30,498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montpellier</td>
<td>91,349</td>
<td>114,634</td>
<td>23,285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brest</td>
<td>106,581</td>
<td>132,788</td>
<td>26,207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dijon</td>
<td>106,685</td>
<td>132,193</td>
<td>25,508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toulouse</td>
<td>258,805</td>
<td>316,898</td>
<td>58,093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toulon</td>
<td>129,325</td>
<td>157,779</td>
<td>28,454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nice</td>
<td>240,111</td>
<td>287,798</td>
<td>47,687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Mans</td>
<td>107,819</td>
<td>128,837</td>
<td>21,018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marseilles</td>
<td>647,414</td>
<td>764,600</td>
<td>117,186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metz</td>
<td>84,950</td>
<td>100,251</td>
<td>15,301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clermont-Ferrand</td>
<td>106,509</td>
<td>124,192</td>
<td>17,683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amiens</td>
<td>88,910</td>
<td>103,401</td>
<td>14,491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Havre</td>
<td>157,133</td>
<td>181,899</td>
<td>24,766</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strasbourg</td>
<td>193,671</td>
<td>224,068</td>
<td>30,397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angers</td>
<td>97,296</td>
<td>112,343</td>
<td>15,047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reims</td>
<td>116,365</td>
<td>131,781</td>
<td>15,416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boulogne-Billancourt</td>
<td>93,315</td>
<td>105,335</td>
<td>12,020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limoges</td>
<td>101,617</td>
<td>114,459</td>
<td>12,842</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>3,037,997</td>
<td>3,638,840</td>
<td>600,843</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Paris            | 2,821,337 | 2,744,610 | -76,727 | -2.7 | -195,402 | 254.7 |
Appendix 1c: Population change in the twenty fastest growing communes >100,000 inhabitants (in 1968), 1962-68

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Municipal population 1962</th>
<th>Municipal population 1968</th>
<th>Variation 1962-68 Absolute</th>
<th>Variation 1962-68 % increase</th>
<th>Migration total Absolute</th>
<th>Migration total % increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Montpellier</td>
<td>116,377</td>
<td>159,075</td>
<td>42,698</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>35,895</td>
<td>30.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nîmes</td>
<td>97,949</td>
<td>121,461</td>
<td>23,512</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>19,114</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clermont-Ferrand</td>
<td>125,971</td>
<td>146,643</td>
<td>20,672</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>13,572</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rennes</td>
<td>148,565</td>
<td>177,498</td>
<td>28,933</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>15,687</td>
<td>10.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nice</td>
<td>290,611</td>
<td>319,937</td>
<td>29,326</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>30,681</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marseilles</td>
<td>773,011</td>
<td>881,698</td>
<td>108,687</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>80,373</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Besançon</td>
<td>94,441</td>
<td>112,599</td>
<td>18,158</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>9,717</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limoges</td>
<td>116,699</td>
<td>130,885</td>
<td>14,186</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>11,319</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toulouse</td>
<td>321,314</td>
<td>369,200</td>
<td>47,886</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>30,963</td>
<td>9.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reims</td>
<td>133,581</td>
<td>152,254</td>
<td>18,673</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>10,618</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Villeurbanne</td>
<td>105,156</td>
<td>119,516</td>
<td>14,360</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>7,530</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amiens</td>
<td>104,756</td>
<td>117,191</td>
<td>12,435</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>6,528</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brest</td>
<td>135,621</td>
<td>153,625</td>
<td>18,004</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>6,894</td>
<td>5.1</td>
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<td>Angers</td>
<td>113,973</td>
<td>127,544</td>
<td>13,571</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>5,710</td>
<td>5.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Toulon</td>
<td>180,321</td>
<td>173,795</td>
<td>13,474</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>5,901</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strasbourg</td>
<td>226,703</td>
<td>247,918</td>
<td>21,215</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>7,551</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mulhouse</td>
<td>107,989</td>
<td>115,685</td>
<td>7,696</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>2,875</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Havre</td>
<td>184,676</td>
<td>198,863</td>
<td>14,187</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>3,925</td>
<td>2.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>St-Etienne</td>
<td>200,842</td>
<td>212,939</td>
<td>12,097</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>3,542</td>
<td>1.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nantes</td>
<td>237,887</td>
<td>256,857</td>
<td>18,970</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>3,933</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>3,798,405</td>
<td>4,297,151</td>
<td>498,740</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>312,328</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Grenoble          | 155,677                   | 161,240                   | 5,563                      | 3.6                           | -5,420                    | -3.5                       |
| Paris             | 2,782,576                 | 2,580,920                 | -201,656                   | -7.2                          | -276,593                  | -9.9                       |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date of creation</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Initial goals</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Groups which did not adopt a specific political engagement</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association pour la démocratie et l'éducation locale et sociale (ADELS)</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Promote the study of local government questions; train those working in educational and cultural associations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre de réflexion et d'études politiques de Toulouse (CREPT)</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Toulouse</td>
<td>Discussion of regional development and more general national and international political questions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positions</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>Moulins, Vichy Montluçon</td>
<td>Regenerate département of Allier; information and exchange of ideas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rencontres</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Paris</td>
<td>Discussion point for individuals of different political and religious tendencies</td>
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<td><strong>Groups which would clearly position themselves in the political arena</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association des jeunes cadres</td>
<td>March 1961</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Bring together young cadres who wish to reflect on current issues; encourage democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cercle Tocqueville</td>
<td>May 1958</td>
<td>Lyon and Grenoble [2]</td>
<td>Protest against torture in Algeria; cultivation of citizenship and democratic values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre d'information politique, économique et sociale (CIPES)</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Clermont Ferrand</td>
<td>Dissemination of information on Algerian War not available in mainstream media; public conferences on topical themes of interest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citoyens 60 (Vie Nouvelle)</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Exploration of wide-range of political, social and economic issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Club Jean Moulin</td>
<td>May 1958</td>
<td>Paris</td>
<td>Defence against attack on the Republic; denunciation of torture and abuses in Algeria; protection of democracy and encouragement of participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Démocratie Nouvelle (Centre d'études et de recherches politiques et économiques)</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Marseilles and Aix-en-Provence</td>
<td>Promotion of a modern democracy with exploration of general political, social and economic issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groupe de recherches ouvrier-paysan (GROP)</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Established by the CFTC and CNJA as a centre for study and the promotion of political action. Aimed particularly to link the rural milieu to wider debates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technique et démocratie</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Build bridge between the technical and political, rethinking politics without Left or Right a priori position.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[1] This is the classification used by Mossuz in *Les clubs et la politique en France*. I have adjusted it to include the GROP and, unlike Mossuz, place the CREPT in the category of 'pure' discussion.

[2] Although the Grenoble group was created slightly later than the founding group in Lyon.
APPENDIX 3: Comparative socio-professional evolution of middle class professionals: Grenoble, Toulouse, France.

Appendix 3a: 1954-1962
Source: Calculated from INSEE statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Profession Category</th>
<th>1954-62</th>
<th>Actual figures</th>
<th>Real increase 1954-62</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of active population</td>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GRENOBLE 1954-62</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professions libérales et cadres supérieurs</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>1962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professions libérales</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1.1</td>
<td>1,522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>4.9</td>
<td>3,910</td>
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<td><strong>Cadres moyens</strong></td>
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<td>10.8</td>
<td>9,136</td>
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<tr>
<td>Instituteurs, professions intellectuelles diverses; Services médicaux et sociaux</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2,540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Techniciens; cadres administratifs moyens</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>6,596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOULOUSE 1954-62</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professions libérales et cadres supérieurs</td>
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<td>5.6</td>
<td>8,917</td>
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<td>1.1</td>
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<td>1.3</td>
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<td>3.2</td>
<td>4,968</td>
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<td>9.5</td>
<td>16,181</td>
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<td>2.6</td>
<td>4,846</td>
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<td>6.8</td>
<td>11,335</td>
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<td><strong>FRANCE 1954-62</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professions libérales et cadres supérieurs</td>
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<td>0.6</td>
<td>125,057</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1954-62</th>
<th>Real increase</th>
<th>Relative increase</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Professions libérales et cadres supérieurs</td>
<td>62.9</td>
<td>40.8</td>
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<td>50.9</td>
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<tr>
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<td>62.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Techniciens; cadres administratifs moyens</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>46.4</td>
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[1] A change in the method of categorising the data between 1954 and 1962 has meant that some groups (for example, ingénieurs / cadres administratifs supérieurs) have to be presented together in order to compare the census information. For a comprehensive explanation, see INSEE, Recensement de 1962. Résultats du sondage au 1/20è pour la France entière. Population active (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1964).
Appendix 3b: 1962-1968
Source: Calculated from INSEE statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GRENOBLE 1962-1968</th>
<th>% of active population</th>
<th>Actual figures</th>
<th>Real increase 1962-68</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>1968</td>
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<td>2.2</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3.6</td>
<td>2,532</td>
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<td>1.0</td>
<td>1,040</td>
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<table>
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<th>Real increase 1962-68</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>6.9</td>
<td>13,120</td>
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</tr>
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<td>5.6</td>
<td>8,496</td>
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<table>
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<th>FRANCE 1962-1968</th>
<th>% of active population</th>
<th>Actual figures</th>
<th>Real increase 1962-68</th>
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<td></td>
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<td>1962</td>
<td>1968</td>
</tr>
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<td>2.2</td>
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<td>0.6</td>
<td>172,748</td>
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<td>Techniciens</td>
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<td>1.8</td>
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<td>3.3</td>
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1962-1968

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Real increase</th>
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</thead>
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<td>8.5</td>
<td>19.8</td>
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<td>22.5</td>
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<td>31.5</td>
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Appendix 3c: 1968-1975
Source: Calculated from INSEE statistics

<table>
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<th>% of active population</th>
<th>Actual figures</th>
<th>Real increase 1968-75</th>
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<td>1,740</td>
</tr>
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<td>5.5</td>
<td>4,165</td>
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<td>5.9</td>
<td>4,310</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOULOUSE 1968-1975
Professions libérales et cadres supérieurs | 10.8  | 9.0   | 16,750| 13,120| 3,630 | 27.7  |
Professions libérales                      | 1.3   | 1.2   | 2,085 | 1,776 | 309   | 17.4  |
Professeurs, professions littéraires et scientifiques | 4.4   | 3.1   | 6,795 | 4,520 | 2,275 | 50.3  |
Ingénieurs                                   | 1.6   | 1.4   | 2,405 | 2,100 | 305   | 14.5  |
Cadres administratifs supérieurs             | 3.5   | 3.2   | 5,465 | 4,724 | 741   | 15.7  |
Cadres moyens                                 | 16.8  | 14.8  | 26,080| 21,704| 4,376 | 20.2  |
Instituteurs, professions intellectuelles diverses | 3.9   | 3.5   | 6,025 | 5,124 | 901   | 17.6  |
Services médicaux et sociaux                 | 2.2   | 1.4   | 3,365 | 2,028 | 1,337 | 65.9  |
Techniciens                                   | 4.8   | 4.1   | 7,400 | 6,056 | 1,344 | 22.2  |
Cadres administratifs moyens                 | 6.0   | 5.8   | 9,290 | 8,496 | 794   | 9.3   |

FRANCE 1968-75
Professions libérales et cadres supérieurs | 6.7   | 4.9   | 1,459,285| 994,716| 464,569| 46.7  |
Professions libérales                      | 0.8   | 0.7   | 172,025 | 140,572| 31,453 | 22.4  |
Professeurs, professions littéraires et scientifiques | 1.7   | 1.0   | 377,215| 213,420| 163,795| 76.7  |
Ingénieurs                                   | 1.2   | 0.9   | 256,290| 186,184| 70,106 | 37.7  |
Cadres administratifs supérieurs             | 3.0   | 2.2   | 653,755| 454,540| 199,215| 43.8  |
Cadres moyens                                 | 12.7  | 9.8   | 2,764,950| 2,005,732| 759,218| 37.9  |
Instituteurs, professions intellectuelles diverses | 3.4   | 2.8   | 737,420| 562,096| 175,324| 31.2  |
Services médicaux et sociaux                 | 1.4   | 0.8   | 298,455| 172,748| 125,707| 72.8  |
Techniciens                                   | 3.5   | 2.6   | 758,890| 530,716| 228,174| 43.0  |
Cadres administratifs moyens                 | 4.5   | 3.6   | 970,185| 740,172| 230,013| 31.1  |

1968-75
Real increase
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Profession</th>
<th>Grenoble</th>
<th>Toulouse</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Grenoble</th>
<th>Toulouse</th>
<th>France</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professions libérales et cadres supérieurs</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professions libérales</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professeurs, professions littéraires et scientifiques</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>76.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ingénieurs</td>
<td>-7.2</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cadres administratifs supérieurs</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cadres moyens</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instituteurs, professions intellectuelles diverses</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services médicaux et sociaux</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>65.9</td>
<td>72.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Techniciens</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cadres administratifs moyens</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 4: Comparative data on industrial structures in the agglomeration of Grenoble and Toulouse.

Appendix 4a: Main sectors of industrial employment. Source: INSEE (1963)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Grenoble</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Toulouse</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Building and public works</td>
<td>11393</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>Building and public works</td>
<td>17594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical construction, electronics</td>
<td>5172</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>Aeronautic construction</td>
<td>8781</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smelting, boilers, engines, pumps</td>
<td>3372</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>Chemicals</td>
<td>4976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine construction for agriculture, industry, transport</td>
<td>3100</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>Clothing</td>
<td>4569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leather</td>
<td>2160</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>Print and publishing</td>
<td>2290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various metallurgy</td>
<td>2149</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>General engineering</td>
<td>2116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity, gas</td>
<td>1760</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>Electricity, gas</td>
<td>1922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing</td>
<td>1527</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>Shoes</td>
<td>1272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Print and publishing</td>
<td>1385</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>Electrical construction, electronics</td>
<td>1038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baking, patisserie</td>
<td>1342</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>Textile-related</td>
<td>972</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Employees</th>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sud-Aviation</td>
<td>6,600</td>
<td>Aviation</td>
<td>Nationalised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONIA</td>
<td>3,150</td>
<td>Chemicals</td>
<td>Nationalised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cartoucherie</td>
<td>2,800</td>
<td>Munitions</td>
<td>State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latécoère</td>
<td>1,350</td>
<td>Aviation</td>
<td>Private (local until WWII, then head office in Paris)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air France</td>
<td>820</td>
<td>Aviation</td>
<td>Nationalised</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Employees</th>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Merlin-Gerin</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>Electrical</td>
<td>Private (local)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neyrpic</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>Hydraulics</td>
<td>Private (local)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caterpillar</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>Construction vehicles</td>
<td>Private (American)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bouchayer-Viallet</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>Pipelines</td>
<td>Private (local)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valsière</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>Lingerie</td>
<td>Private (local)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

GRENOBLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PC</th>
<th>PSU</th>
<th>SFIO</th>
<th>Rad Soc</th>
<th>MRP</th>
<th>UDSR</th>
<th>RPF/UNR</th>
<th>IND</th>
<th>Former POWs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% 1947</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Councillors</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% 1949</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>28.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Councillors</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% 1953</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Councillors</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% 1959 1st ballot [1]</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td></td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% 1959 2nd ballot</td>
<td>30.56</td>
<td>19.73</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>49.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Councillors</td>
<td>11 UNR, 5 RRRS - Parti Républicain Radical et Radical Socialiste, 12 CNI, 8 MRP, 1 Other Right.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[1] In towns of less than 120,000 inhabitants, the 1959 system was two ballot with electors allowed to favour individual candidates (although not to rank them by preference). In towns with a population greater than 120,000, proportional representation was maintained.

TOULOUSE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PCF</th>
<th>PSA / UGS</th>
<th>SFIO</th>
<th>MRP</th>
<th>Rad</th>
<th>Ind.</th>
<th>Diss. Rad.</th>
<th>RPF / UNR</th>
<th>RGR</th>
<th>UDSR</th>
<th>PSD</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% 1947</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Councillors</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% 1953</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.6 [1]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Councillors</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% 1959</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7.2 [2]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Councillors</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[1] Ex-RPF
# APPENDIX 6: Professional composition of the Conseil Municipal in Grenoble and Toulouse after the municipal elections of 1959 and 1965.

## GRENOBLE

### 1959 Municipal council

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Profession</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small commerce, artisans</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>UNR, Rad.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>(5 SFIO, 1 PSU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale commerce</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>4 CNI</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctors, dentists, vets</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>2 MRP, 1 UNR, 1 CNI, 1 Rad.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>1 SFIO, 1 PSU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyers, solicitors</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>2 CNI, 1 MRP, 1 Rad., 1 UNR, 1 Other Right</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>Rad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Architects</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>MRP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>GAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>5 [2]</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>2 UNR, 1 CNI, 1 MRP, 1 Rad.</td>
<td>6 [5]</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>4 PSU, 2 SFIO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cadres moyens</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>UNR</td>
<td>6 [6]</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>3 SFIO, 2 GAM, 1 PSU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social services</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>MRP, CNI</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>UNR</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>2 SFIO, 1 PSU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>PSU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>SFIO</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>SFIO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No profession</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>GAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3 [3]</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>GAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>37</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>17 UNR, 12 CNI, 8 MRP, 5 Rad., 1 Right.</td>
<td>37 [7]</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>17 SFIO, 10 PSU, 9 GAM, 1 Rad.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[1] 2 engineers, 3 cadres, 1 civil servant.  
[4] 5 engineers (4 GAM, 1 PSU), 3 cadres  
[5] 2 university (PSU), 2 secondary school (PSU), 1 primary school (SFIO), 1 adult education (PSU)  
[6] 3 technicians (GAM, PSU, SFIO), 2 accountants (SFIO, GAM), 1 cadre administratif moyen  
[7] Head of building co-operative (GAM)

## TOULOUSE

### 1959 Municipal council

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Profession</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small commerce, artisans</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>1 PCF, 1 MRP, 2 SFIO, 1 UNR</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>4 SFIO, 1 MRP, 1 Ind.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale commerce</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>Ind.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctors, dentists</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>1 PCF, 2 SFIO, 1 UNR, 1 Ind. Rad.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>2 Rad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyers, solicitors</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>1 PCF, 1 UNR, 1 MRP, 1 SFIO</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>1 Rad., 3 SFIO, 1 Ind.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cadres supérieurs [non teaching, non lib. professions]</td>
<td>3 [1]</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>1 CNI, 2 UNR</td>
<td>6 [3]</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>1 Rad., 3 SFIO, 2 Ind.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>7 [2]</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>3, PCF, 3 PSU, 1 SFIO</td>
<td>4 [4]</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>2 Ind., 2 SFIO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cadres moyens</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4 [5]</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>3 MRP, 1 SFIO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>1 PCF, 2 UNR, 1 SFIO</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>3 SFIO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>2 PCF, 2 PSU, 1 UNR</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>3 SFIO, 1 CNI</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>2 SFIO, 2 Ind., 1 Rad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No profession</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 [6]</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>SFIO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>37</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10 SFIO, 9 PCF, 8 UNR, 5 PSU/UGS, 2 MRP, 2 CNI, 1 Ind. Rad.</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>19 SFIO, 9 Ind., 5 Rad., 4 MRP.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[1] 2 civil servants (including Pierre Baudis), 1 engineer.  
[2] 5 primary school teachers (3 PCF, 1 PSU, 1 SFIO), 1 secondary school (PSU), 1 grande école (PSU).  
[3] 1 civil servant (Ind.), 2 cadres (SFIO), 3 engineers (1 SFIO, 1 Rad., 1 Ind.), 1 teacher (SFIO).  
[4] 3 university teachers (2 Ind., 1 SFIO), 1 secondary school (1 SFIO).  
[5] 1 journalist (SFIO), 1 accountant (MRP), 2 administrators (MRP)  
APPENDIX 7: Data on Grenoble GAM members.

Appendix 7a: Grenoble GAM membership statistics by occupation [1]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Engineers</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>32.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University professors / assistants</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technicians</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers (of which 5 work in lycées)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctors, dentists</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cadres administratifs supérieurs</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyers</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cadres administratifs moyens</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Researchers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Architects</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalist</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employee</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property developer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary-General of Baticoop, Grenoble</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewives</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>75</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[1] On a GAM membership list with 85 names, occupations for 75 members has been established. While this data is for 1967, GAM members confirm that it reflects the situation in 1965.

Appendix 7b: Principal non-political public activities of the Grenoble GAM candidates for the 1965 municipals (9 running under the label GAM and 1 as PSU)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hubert Dubedout</th>
<th>Creator of the Syndicat des usagers de l'eau</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denise Belot</td>
<td>Secretary of l'Association syndicale des familles, active in Union de quartier des Alliés Alpins; formerly MLP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maurice Blanc</td>
<td>Local leader of Vie nouvelle and member of Horizon 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pierre Coli</td>
<td>Branch secretary of the CFDT at EDF and Regional Delegate; former SFIO member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yves Cuny</td>
<td>President of AGEG (Association générale des étudiants de Grenoble)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yves Droulers</td>
<td>Head of UD- CFDT Commission économique et politique and one of the founders of the Union de quartier de Paul Mistral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louis Liénard</td>
<td>Previously head of CGT branch at Baticoop, Paris. Heavily involved in the Alpins experiment, MLP then PSU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aimé Maurin</td>
<td>Secretary of UD-CFTC, 1954-62. Member of UD Bureau, 1962 onwards and of Commission économique et politique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean Rolland</td>
<td>Active in the Maisons de jeunes; CFDT responsibilities at Noyrpic. Member of Vie nouvelle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Bernard Gilman (PSU)</td>
<td>Member of national and federal bureau of Peuple et Culture</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 8: First ballot election results for the Left in Grenoble 1959-1965.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year &amp; Type</th>
<th>SFIO</th>
<th>PSU</th>
<th>PCF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1959 (municipals)</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canton Nord</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canton Est</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canton Sud</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962 (legislatives)</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>7.2 [1]</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canton Nord (Grenoble component)</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canton Est (Grenoble component)</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>No candidate</td>
<td>29.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canton Sud (Grenoble component)</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>23.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964 (cantonals)</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>6.6 [2]</td>
<td>27.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canton Nord: Grenoble component</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>24.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canton Nord</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>24.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canton Est - Grenoble component</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>No candidate</td>
<td>36.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canton Est</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canton Sud: Grenoble component</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>24.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canton Sud</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>30.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965 (municipals)</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>allied to SFIO</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canton Nord</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canton Est</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canton Sud</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[1] Although it is to be noted that as the PSU did not present a candidate in the Canton Est. This statistic is therefore calculated from a percentage of total PSU votes in the Canton Nord and Canton Sud order to have an approximate idea of the the relative strength of Communist and non-Communist Left.


GRENOBLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LISTS</th>
<th>Liste d'Entente Municipale (UNR, Ind., Rad., MRP)</th>
<th>Liste d'Union Socialiste et d'Action Municipale (SFIO-PSU-GAM)</th>
<th>Liste Communiste (PCF)</th>
<th>Abstentions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Head of list</td>
<td>Michallon (UNR)</td>
<td>Martin (SFIO)</td>
<td>Perinetti (PCF)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Ballot (%)</td>
<td>45.16</td>
<td>32.36</td>
<td>22.48</td>
<td>32.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[1959</td>
<td>55.17 (UNR/MRP..)</td>
<td>19.2 (SFIO)</td>
<td>25.63 (PCF)</td>
<td>37.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Ballot (%)</td>
<td>48.16</td>
<td>51.84</td>
<td></td>
<td>31.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Result: Martin list elected on second ballot: Hubert Dubedout (GAM) replaces Albert Michallon (UNR, elected 1959) as mayor.

TOULOUSE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LISTS</th>
<th>Union Democratique et Sociale pour les libertes et l'expansion communales (SFIO, Ind., Rad., MRP)</th>
<th>Liste pour le Renouveau Economique et Social (UNR + non party)</th>
<th>Liste d'Union de la Gauche Democratique et Laique (PCF-PSU)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Head of list</td>
<td>Bazerque (SFIO)</td>
<td>Sarramon (UNR)</td>
<td>Llante (PCF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Result: Bazerque list elected on first ballot: Louis Bazerque (SFIO) remains mayor.
APPENDIX 10: Age, birth place, residence, political experience and profession of Martin and Michallon candidates in the municipal elections of March 1965.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DUBEDOUT TEAM [1]</th>
<th>MICHALLOON LIST</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GAM</td>
<td>PSU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average age</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in Grenoble</td>
<td>1/9</td>
<td>1/10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past political experience</td>
<td>1(PSU, city council)</td>
<td>18 (outgoing; 7 pre-1959)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROFESSION</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineers</td>
<td>5 (4 GAM, 1 PSU)</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small commerce / artisans</td>
<td>6 (5 SFIO, 1 PSU)</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cadres administratifs moyens</td>
<td>3 (2 SFIO, 1 GAM)</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cadres administratifs sup.</td>
<td>3 (SFIO)</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technicians</td>
<td>3 (1 GAM, 1 PSU, 1 SFIO)</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees</td>
<td>3 (2 SFIO, 1 PSU)</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>1 (PSU) [5]</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctors, vets</td>
<td>2 (1 SFIO, 1 PSU)</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyers</td>
<td>1 (Radical)</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Architect</td>
<td>1 (GAM)</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale commerce</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>1 (SFIO)</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No profession</td>
<td>1 (GAM)</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1 (GAM - Co-op director)</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[1] 9 GAM, 10 PSU, 17 SFIO, 1 Radical
[2] South is defined in terms of living below the main boulevards in the areas of most rapid growth, 1954-62
[3] 1 university (science), 2 secondary school, 2 primary school (of which 1 headmaster), 1 adult education.
[4] 2 university (arts, law), 1 CRDP (Centre régional de Documentation Pédagogique), 1 primary school
[5] Figures based on current occupation, not professional background (on implications for GAM analysis, see p.*)

**GRENOBLE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HEAD OF LIST</th>
<th>FIRST BALLOT (%)</th>
<th>SECOND BALLOT (%)</th>
<th>Abstain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dubedout (GAM)</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabanel (non-party)</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giard (PCF)</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Result:** Hubert Dubedout (GAM) re-elected as mayor.

**TOULOUSE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HEAD OF LIST</th>
<th>FIRST BALLOT (%)</th>
<th>SECOND BALLOT (%)</th>
<th>Abstain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baudis (CNI)</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bazerque (SFIO)</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Llante (PCF)</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>38.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Segond (UNR)</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Result:** Baudis list elected at second ballot. Pierre Baudis becomes mayor replacing Louis Bazerque (SFIO, elected 1958).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GAM</td>
<td>PSU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in Grenoble</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0/10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residence in south of city[3]</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past political experience</td>
<td>17 (city council)</td>
<td>5 (city council of which one also conseiller général)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROFESSION</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>6 (3 PSU, 3 PS)[4]</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>3 [5]</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animateurs</td>
<td>2 (1 PSU, 1 GAM)</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineers</td>
<td>9 (4 PS, 2 Obj 72, 3 GAM)</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small commerce / artisans</td>
<td>3 (2 PS, 1 PSU)</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cadres administratifs moyens</td>
<td>1 (PS)</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cadres administratifs sup.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technicians</td>
<td>2 (1 GAM, 1 PSU)</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees</td>
<td>4 (2 PSU, 2 GAM)</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>1 (PSU) [6]</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctors, dentists, vets</td>
<td>2 (1 PS, 1 GAM)</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyers</td>
<td>1 (CIR)</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Architect</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale commerce</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>3 (PS)</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No profession</td>
<td>2 (1 GAM, 1 PSU)</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1 (GAM - Co-op director)</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[1] 10 GAM, 10 PSU, 14 PS, 2 Objectif 72, 1 CIR
[2] 19 non-party (including Cabanel), 4 Centre Democrat, 3 Democrat et Progres, 2, Union des Jeunes pour le Progres, 4 Republicain Independant, 5 UDR
[3] South is defined in terms of living below the main boulevards in the areas of most rapid growth, 1954-62
[4] 4 university, 1 primary school (of which 1 headmaster), 1 adult education
[5] 1 university (science), 1 secondary school, 1 primary school.
[6] Figures based on current occupation, not professional background
APPENDIX 13: Data from Toulouse neighbourhood and quality of life associations.

Appendix 13a: Analysis of CODIQUANT membership in 1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Adherents (1968)</th>
<th>Population of the quartier</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers / cultivators</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service staff</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cadres moyens</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cadres supérieurs et liberal professions</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artisans and small shopkeepers</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merchants and industrialists</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police, army</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inactive</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Appendix 13b: Membership profile of Environnement et Humanisme

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lycée students</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University students</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cadres moyens</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher civil servants [1]</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctors, dentists, vets</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technicians</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cadres administratifs sup. (non civil servant)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intellectual liberal professions</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magistrates</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animateurs / educateurs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small commerce / artisans</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Architect</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No profession</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Personal archives of Henri Bouchard. Calculated from membership returns over a period of six years (1973-1979)
Appendix 13c: Founding associations of the UCQ-ADACVT, December 1976

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Association</th>
<th>Meetings attended December 1976 - April 1982 (total of 45) [1]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Neighbourhood committee</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CODIQUANT</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comité de quartier Saouzelong</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comité de quartier des Amidonniers</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association des résidents de la ZUP de Rangueil</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comité de quartier Saint-Georges</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comité de quartier Terrasse</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association de défense des locataires du Récébédu</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-road</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comité de défense des berges de la Garonne</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comité de défense contre la Rocade Sud</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comité de sauvegarde des berges du canal</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association toulousaine d’écologie (ATE)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association de Démocratisation de l’urbanisme et de l’architecture (ADUA) [2]</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groupe d’information et d’aménagement (GIAM) [3]</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[1] Calculated from minutes published in the Bulletin de l’UCQ-ADACVT. Although officially the UCQ-ADACVT was supposed to cover the agglomeration, only two member associations were specifically representative of communes outside Toulouse.

[2] ADUA, like the GIAM, was gauchiste in orientation established by architects who sought a new approach to urbanism in the aftermath of May 1968.

[3] GIAM was a gauchiste group formed by academics and students primarily in the geography faculty of Toulouse in the early 1970s. It aimed to develop an alternative to capitalist planning structures both in urban areas and more widely.
APPENDIX 14: Municipal elections in the communes of Grenoble and Toulouse, March 1977

GRENOBLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lists</th>
<th>Liste d'Union de la Gauche (PS-PCF)</th>
<th>Liste &quot;Union pour Grenoble&quot; (RI, RPR, CDS, PST, CNI, MPL, MSD)</th>
<th>Grenoble Ecologie (PSU, Ecologists)</th>
<th>Liste &quot;Pour le socialiste, le pouvoir aux travailleurs&quot; (LO, LCR)</th>
<th>Liste &quot;Grenoble Bon Sens&quot; (centrist)</th>
<th>Abstain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Head of List</td>
<td>Dubedout (PS)</td>
<td>Pariaud (RPR)</td>
<td>No head</td>
<td>No head</td>
<td>Pascal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Ballot (%)</td>
<td>49.20</td>
<td>37.09</td>
<td>9.13</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>3.13</td>
<td>32.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Ballot (%)</td>
<td>56.24</td>
<td>43.76</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Result: Hubert Dubedout (GAM) re-elected as mayor.

TOULOUSE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Head of List</td>
<td>Baudis (CNI)</td>
<td>Savary (PS)</td>
<td>No head</td>
<td>Segond (Diss. RPR)</td>
<td>No head</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First ballot (%)</td>
<td>46.51</td>
<td>45.78</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>33.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second ballot (%)</td>
<td>51.91</td>
<td>48.09</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>27.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Result: Pierre Baudis re-elected as mayor.

[1] Toulouse was divided into three sectors for the municipal elections of 1977. Two sectors were decided in the first ballot (Centre-South, West-South), a third had to go to a second ballot. Baudis won two of the three sectors.
APPENDIX 15: Professional composition of Union of the Left and Left-ecologist lists for the municipal elections in the communes of Grenoble and Toulouse, March 1977

| Profession                        | Other | Unemployed | Wholesale commerce | Professionals | Teachers (professeurs) | Researchers (chercheurs) | Engineers, educators | IT Specialists (informaticiens) | Artists, actors | Lawyers | Retired | Workers | Doctors, dentists, vets | Cadres moyens (administration) | Cadres administratifs supérieurs | Cadres moyens (health, education) | Cadres industriels | Cadres commerciaux/industries | Cadres administratifs | Cadres administratifs | Cadres moyens (administration) | Cadres moyens (health, education) | Cadres administratifs supérieurs | Cadres moyens (health, education) |
|-----------------------------------|-------|------------|-------------------|---------------|-----------------------|--------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------|----------------|----------|---------|---------|------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1977 Municipalities                |       |            |                   |               |                       |                           |                        |                           |                  |          |         |         |                  |                             |                             |                             |                             |                             |                             |                             |                             |                             |                             |                             |
| Toulouse                          |       |            |                   |               |                       |                           |                        |                           |                  |          |         |         |                  |                             |                             |                             |                             |                             |                             |                             |                             |                             |                             |                             |
| TOULOUSE                          |       |            |                   |               |                       |                           |                        |                           |                  |          |         |         |                  |                             |                             |                             |                             |                             |                             |                             |                             |                             |                             |                             |
| Union of the Left                 |       |            |                   |               |                       |                           |                        |                           |                  |          |         |         |                  |                             |                             |                             |                             |                             |                             |                             |                             |                             |                             |                             |
| Autogestion-Occitanie             | 163   | 0          | 3                 | 3             | 2                     | 1                         | 0                      | 0                         | 7               | 2        | 0        | 1       | 6             | 10                         | 12                         | 12                         | 12                         | 5                           | 4                           | 1                           | 1                           | 1                           | 1                           |
| Union of the Left                 |       |            |                   |               |                       |                           |                        |                           |                  |          |         |         |                  |                             |                             |                             |                             |                             |                             |                             |                             |                             |                             |                             |
| Grenoble                          |       |            |                   |               |                       |                           |                        |                           |                  |          |         |         |                  |                             |                             |                             |                             |                             |                             |                             |                             |                             |                             |                             |
| Union of the Left                 |       |            |                   |               |                       |                           |                        |                           |                  |          |         |         |                  |                             |                             |                             |                             |                             |                             |                             |                             |                             |                             |                             |
| Grenoble-Ecologie                 |       |            |                   |               |                       |                           |                        |                           |                  |          |         |         |                  |                             |                             |                             |                             |                             |                             |                             |                             |                             |                             |                             |
| 1977 Municipals                   | 34    |            | 46                | 46            | 3                     | 1                         | 0                      | 0                         | 4               | 3        | 0        | 2       | 7             | 10                         | 12                         | 12                         | 12                         | 5                           | 4                           | 1                           | 1                           | 1                           | 1                           |
| Overall average                   | 45    |            | 45                | 45            | 45                    | 45                        | 45                      | 45                        | 45             | 45       | 45       | 45      | 45            | 45                         | 45                         | 45                         | 45                         | 45                          | 45                          | 45                          | 45                          | 45                          | 45                          |
| Average party groups              |       |            |                   |               |                       |                           |                        |                           |                  |          |         |         |                  |                             |                             |                             |                             |                             |                             |                             |                             |                             |                             |                             |
| PS                               | 43    |            | 43                | 43            | 43                    | 43                        | 43                      | 43                        | 43             | 43       | 43       | 43      | 43            | 43                         | 43                         | 43                         | 43                         | 43                          | 43                          | 43                          | 43                          | 43                          | 43                          |
| PCF                             | 36    |            | 36                | 36            | 36                    | 36                        | 36                      | 36                        | 36             | 36       | 36       | 36      | 36            | 36                         | 36                         | 36                         | 36                         | 36                          | 36                          | 36                          | 36                          | 36                          | 36                          |
| MRG                             | 45    |            | 45                | 45            | 45                    | 45                        | 45                      | 45                        | 45             | 45       | 45       | 45      | 45            | 45                         | 45                         | 45                         | 45                         | 45                          | 45                          | 45                          | 45                          | 45                          | 45                          |

[1] Includes current or former GAM members on the list (PS, PCF, MRG) as well as those not having run as Left candidate, who had to run under the label of 'sincere republican'.
List of interviews

The list of those interviewed is divided by city and then alphabetically. The role and occupation of interviewees during the period in question is given, followed by occupation and any further information of relevance. A total of 57 interviews were undertaken, 31 in Grenoble and 26 in Toulouse.

Grenoble interviews

Founding member of the GAM, University professor.

Georges Boulloud (22 January 1998)
PSU (pre-Assises) and CGT activist. Municipal councillor (PSU), 1965-1971. Worker.

Joseph Briant (20 August 1998)
PSU (pre and post-assises) activist. Lycée teacher.

Pierre Coli (19 January 1998)
CFDT activist. Founding member of the GAM. Municipal councillor (GAM then PS), 1965-1977. Technician.

Annie Deschamps (13 December 1995)
Subsequently: Senior figure in Grenoble PS. Municipal councillor since 1983, première adjoint since 1995; elected conseiller général (Canton 6, Grenoble), 1985.

Gilbert Desseux (6 February 1998)

Michel Destot (5 September 1998)

Yves Droulers (9 February 1998)

Pierre Ducros (23 February 1998)
PSU (pre-Assises) and SNESUP activist. Founder member of the GAM. University professor.
Pierre Frappat (29 November 1995)
PSU (pre-Assises) activist, Municipal councillor (PSU then PS), 1971-1977.
Journalist and later university professor.

Jean Giard (27 November 1995)
PCF Grenoble secretary in the mid 1960s. Municipal councillor since 1977 (PCF, then GO95). Worker.

Michel Gilbert (12 December 1995)
Ecologist activist during the 1970s. Animateur.
Subsequently: Municipal councillor (Association Démocratie, Ecologie, Solidarité) since 1995; adjoint responsible for transport and the environment.

Bernard Gilman (18 September 1998)
PSU (pre-Assises) activist. Leading figure locally and nationally in Peuple et Culture. Municipal councillor (PSU then PS), 1965-1977; adjoint responsible for cultural affairs. Teacher.

Daniel Hollard (20 February 1998)
Subsequently: President of GO95, 1995-.

François Hollard (2 February 1998, 2 September 1998)
Local PSU (pre-Assises) activist. Local president of Peuple et Culture in the mid-1960s and member of Economie et Humanisme. President of the CLUQ, 1971-1972. Founding member of the GAM. Municipal councillor (GAM, then PS), 1971-1983; adjoint responsible for liaison with the unions de quartier. Employee.

Michel Hollard (24 August 1998)
Senior local PSU (pre-Assises) activist, member of national committee during 1960s. University professor.

Geneviève Jonot (3 September 1998)
PSU (pre and post-assises) activist. Middle-school teacher.
Subsequently: Ecologist councillor since 1983 (Ecologie, Alternatives Autogestion, then Association Démocratie, Ecologie, Solidarité)

François Lalande (29 January 1998)
Founding member of the GAM. Secretary-General at City Hall, 1965-1974. Administrator.

Henri Lecoz (12 January 1998)
PSU (pre-Assises) activist, subsequently prominent figure in Isère PS federation. Lycée teacher.

Louis Liénard (3 February 1998)
PSU (pre-Assises) and CGT activist. Founding member of the GAM. Municipal councillor (GAM then PS), 1965-1977. General-Secretary of local building cooperative.

Pierre Mas (2 February 1998)
Member of the Isère CFTC/CFDT Commission Politique et Economique, 1964-1974. Member of Vie Nouvelle. Founding member of the GAM. Engineer.

Jean Philippe Motte (7 December 1995)
PS member. Sociologist. 
Subsequently: Municipal councillor (GO95) since 1995; adjoint responsible for urban policy and solidarity.

Jean François Parent (14 December 1995)
PSU (pre-Assises) and PS member. Urbanist. 
Subsequently: Central figure in local Mouvement des Citoyens; municipal councillor since 1995 (GO95).

Bernard Pecqueur (20 December 1995)
MRG activist. 
Subsequently: Municipal councillor (attached to PS) since 1995. Researcher (CNRS).

Jean Louis Quermonne (6 December 1995)

Charles Roig (10 February 1998)
Member of the Isère CFTC/CFDT Commission Politique et Economique in the early 1960s. Founding member of the GAM. University professor.

Jean Rolland (26 January 1998)
PSU (pre-assises) activist. Member of Vie Nouvelle and Citoyens 60. Founding member of the GAM. Municipal councillor (GAM), 1965-1971. Engineer.

Albert Rousseau (18 February 1998)
Founding member of the GAM. Engineer.

Marc Serratrice (16 January 1998)
Senior local and national PSU (pre-assises) figure. Member of national PSU bureau during the 1960s. Technician.

Jean Silvardière (10 August 1998)
Founder and President of ADTC, 1974-1983. Engineer.

Bruno Vigny (25 August 1998)
Senior figure in ADTC; President, 1983-1993. Lycée teacher.
**Toulouse interviews**

**Jean Pierre Amalric** (13 May 1998)
CREPT and CAPT activist. Local PS office-holder during the 1970s. University professor.

**Henriette Anglade** (8 June 1998)
PSU (pre and post-assises) activist. Housewife.

**Christian Béringuier** (21 April 1998)
PSU (pre-assises) activist. Founding member of the GIAM. Leading figure in UCQ-ADACVT. University professor.

**Paul Bernard** (12 May 1998)
Neighbourhood committee activist. Vie Nouvelle member. Engineer.

**Gérard Bérut** (8 September 1998)
CREPT and CAPT participant. Vie Nouvelle member. PS activist. Engineer.

**Henri Bouchard** (7 July 1998)
Founder of *Environnement et Humanisme*. Lycée teacher.

**André Boudou** (4 June 1998)
Founding member of the GIAM. Leading figure in UCQ-ADACVT. University professor.

**Jean Buades** (16 May 1998)
Vie Nouvelle member. PS activist. Architect.

**Jacques Christol** (25 May 1998)
Founder of the CREPT. Activist in CAPT. Doctor.

**Jacques Curie** (10 June 1998)
Participant in CREPT and activist in CAPT. PS activist. University teaching assistant.

**Louis Daffos** (25 May 1998)
PSU (pre and post-assises) activist. Leading figure in UCQ-ADACVT. Middle-school teacher.

**Henri De Lassus** (11 September 1998)

**Jean Jacques Fournié** (10 June 1998)
Leading figure in UCQ-ADACVT. PSU (post-assises) activist. Lycée teacher.

**Jean Froidure** (14 September 1998)
Vie Nouvelle leader during the 1960s. PSU (pre-assisises) activist. *Lycée* teacher.

**Helios Gonzalo** (8 July 1998)
Currently president of the Fédération des Oeuvres Laïques (FOL).

**Bernard Kayser** (9 July 1998)
CREPT and CAPT participant. University professor.

**Yves Labrousse** (6 July 1998)
CREPT and CAPT participant. Vie Nouvelle member. University teaching assistant.

**Jean Lauzeral** (7 September 1998)
CREPT and CAPT participant. Vie Nouvelle member. Businessman.

**Robert Lopin** (9 July 1998)
Senior CIR figure. Printworks manager for *La Dépêche du Midi*.

**Marc Loubet** (16 May 1998)
Senior CFTC/DT official during the 1960s. Aerospace worker.

**Marc Miguet** (30 May 1998)
Co-founder and president of the CODIQUANT; co-founder and president of the CUTC; co-founder and president of the UCQ and UCQ-ADACVT. PSU (pre and post-assisises) activist. Middle-school teacher.

**Remy Pech** (6 July 1998)
PS activist. Leading figure in the FOL. Univeristy professor.

**Paul Pistre** (8 July 1998)
CREPT and CAPT participant. Active in local Amicales Laïques. *Lycée* teacher and historian.

**Geneviève Rayal** (3 July 1998)
CREPT and CAPT participant. Vie Nouvelle member. PS *conseiller général* (Canton IX) since 1977. University teaching assistant.

**Julien Savary** (7 July 1998)
PSU (pre and post-assisises activist). Leading figure in UCQ-ADACVT. University professor.

**Bertrand Verdier** (9 June 1998)
PSU (pre and post-assisesest activist). Local PSU leader, 1974-1981. Leading figure in UCQ-ADACVT. Engineer.
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   39 J 2  PSU, 1962-76
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   39 J 10 Religious Life
   39 J 14 Trade Union activity
   39 J 38 Municipality, 1962-75

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   50 J 173 PSG (Parti socialiste de gauche), 1958-60
   50 J 207 Documents on 1962 legislatives, particularly campaign literature
   50 J 221 Collection of literature and letters on 1965 municipals
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   4349-W-1 Elections (1945)
   4349-W-2 Elections (1947)
   4349-W-3 Elections (1953)
4349-W-4 Elections (1953)
4349-W-5 Elections (1959)
4349-W-6 Elections (1965)
4349-W-7 Elections (1965)
4349-W-8 Elections (1965)
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PER 1526 Cooperation (later Echo-Régions)
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PER 1505 Eaux-Claires Infos
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1O184 Associations de quartier
1O185 Associations de quartier
1O186 Associations de quartier
97-W-44 Associative life
97-W-31 Quartier life
47-W-27 Socialist Party, Grenoble committee.
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2113-W-100 Activities of the PSU: 1960
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2221-W-153 Political / philosophical associations: 1951-9
2221-W-154  Political / philosophical associations: 1951-58
2221-W-23  Trade unions as Sud-Aviation: 1948-61
2221-W-282 Activities of associations: 1953-60
2273-W-206 Activities of the Parti Communiste (Haute-Garonne): 1960
2273-W-207 Activities of the Parti Communiste (Haute-Garonne): 1956-58
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2273-W-51  Political / philosophical associations: 1952-54
2358-W-130 Activist of the SFIO (Haute-Garonne): 1952-59
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2358-W-17  Municipal elections (Haute-Garonne): 1953-54
2692-W-1   Activities of Radical-Socialist Party (Haute-Garonne): 1960-61
2692-W-112 Activities of SFIO (Haute-Garonne): 1960-61
2692-W-113 Activities of PSU (Haute-Garonne): 1960-61
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