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

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A B S T R A C T

THE PRESBYTERIAN PARTY IN THE LONG PARLIAMENT, 2 JULY 1644 - 3 JUNE 1647

MICHAEL PATRICK MAHONY



Submitted for the degree of D.Phil. Oxford 1973.

ABSTRACT

It is not surprising that most detailed analysis of parliamentary politics during the mid to later 1640s has been directed at the so-called Independent Party. In particular, the work of Mrs. Pearl and David Underdown has achieved a great deal in revealing a clearer picture of the character, personnel and objectives of that party; and in so doing they have also improved our general knowledge of party politics at Westminster.

Even so, the detailed character of this recent research has created the need for a similar analysis of those politicians or grandees who constituted the Presbyterian Party. No clear appreciation of party divisions in the two Houses of the parliament is possible without restoring a balance in our understanding of both parties. Indeed, I feel that such a study is essential to enable us to reappraise certain interpretations and to propose different ones where concentration on one area of party politics has resulted in distortion or misleading conclusions.

Consequently it has been my purpose in this study of the Presbyterian Party to follow its career from late 1643 to the early autumn of 1647, as well as revealing something of the political background to the alliance of the Scots Commissioners and the Earl of Essex's group. I have also

sought to illustrate the conflict in its broadest context by investigating not only how the character of the two 'parties' was affected by the parliamentary tactics they employed, but also the extra-parliamentary contacts and strategy of the Presbyterian party or alliance. Without an understanding of political and religious developments in the City of London, and the intricacies of Montereul's mission, only a partial view of the activities of such leaders as Denzil Holles and Sir Philip Stapleton would be obtained.

Chapter 1 serves as an introduction to the thesis, and attempts to provide a critical indication of the current state of research into the development of parties in the Long Parliament. I recognise the significance of local and regional interests as factors affecting political activities at Westminster, whilst emphasising the importance of a developing national consciousness amongst the 'grandees' of both Houses in the formation of party groups.

I also examine the emergence of religious terms to describe these groups, seeking to ascertain how and why they were adopted and to what extent they reflected the importance of religious differences as the basis of party division. The application of religious terms to political groups is traced to royalist confusion, clerical concern for a settled church government in both the Assembly and the City of London, and

in particular the preoccupation of the Scottish allies with presbyterianism. Parliamentary sources tend to restrict the political use of the terms 'presbyterian' and 'independent' to the years 1646 and 1647, but I show that the realignment of groups at Westminster which provided the reality behind these terms occurred considerably earlier in the autumn of 1644. Finally I include in Chapter 1 a brief analysis of the Earl of Essex's group or party designed to reveal the political role of the earl and the character of his relationship with his leading advisers in the House of Commons.

The purpose of Chapter 2 is twofold: to provide an analysis of the state of parliamentary politics prior to the creation of the Presbyterian Alliance, and as part of that analysis to emphasise the importance of the Scottish alliance in determining the development of party groupings at Westminster.

In order to illustrate this development I investigate the circumstances of the creation of the Committee of Both Kingdoms. The value of this particular example, together with its repercussions in military affairs, relations between the two Houses and matters of peace, lies in the revelation on the one hand of very close political relations between Oliver St. John, Sir Henry Vane, jnr., and the Scots Commissioners, and on the other hand of the consequent emergence of Essex's group as a more distinct political group or party. We see that during the first half of 1644 the Lord General's party found themselves at a serious

disadvantage in the face of the political alliance that controlled the new Committee of Both Kingdoms, and that the lack of trust between them resulted in a direct confrontation during the campaign.

Chapter 3 investigates the creation of the Presbyterian Alliance, brought about largely by the disillusionment of the Scots Commissioners with their allies at Westminster, the Vane-St. John group. The reasons for that disillusionment, both religious and political, are investigated, as are the stages by which the Scots Commissioners came to ally with their erstwhile opponents. The initial reluctance of Essex's group, the importance of French influence and the limited nature of the new alliance in terms of common objectives are noted. I argue that the basis of the Presbyterian Alliance for Essex's adherents was political rather than religious, whilst recognising that a greater commitment to a presbyterian system of church government was the necessary price they had to pay.

Apart from the major issue of peace terms and negotiations, I also seek to provide an indication of the impact of the new alliance upon the Vane-St.John group both at Westminster and in the field: political equilibrium at Westminster and the threat of the military superiority of the Presbyterian Alliance. I take advantage of my study of the

Uxbridge Treaty to question the picture of the 'peace party' as committed to negotiations even to the point of virtual surrender, a reflection, it has been said, of their touching belief in the King's integrity. When one looks at the role of Essex's group in peace moves, both official and unofficial, one is struck by the prominence of concern for security. I show that the failure of peace negotiations and the passage of the new model and self-denying ordinances in early 1645 had the effect of tying Essex's group more closely to Scottish policies until early 1647.

My investigation of the Savile Affair in Chapter 4 has the purpose of questioning a recent interpretation of this important political battle between the two parties at Westminster. I show that, by early June 1645 the promoters of the New Model were in a weak position as a result of the loss of Leicester, and that the revelation of Lord Savile's contacts with Lord Say and his small sub-committee was an obvious attempt on the part of the Presbyterian Alliance to reap the maximum advantage from the setback. Particular attention is devoted to the tactics employed by both groups in the Commons, to the role of Scottish contacts in the City of London, and to the impact of the victory at Naseby which finally broke the political equilibrium at Westminster.

Chapter 5 seeks to investigate more thoroughly those political and religious connections of the Presbyterian Alliance in the City revealed by the Savile Affair. I stress the close inter-relation of concern at sectarianism and the conservative concern for public order both in the City and in the two Houses. The clerical representatives of the Scottish kirk played an important part in fomenting this anxiety in the former through their contacts amongst the presbyterian ministers of the City. We see that during 1646 the close relations between the government of the City and the Scots Commissioners contrasted sharply with the deteriorating relations between both of them and the majority in the House of Commons. Two features of this period are investigated: concentration of authority within the Common Council into the hands of a 'presbyterian' committee, and the growing interest of the Presbyterian Alliance in the City militia as a possible counter-weight to the army. Outside the two Houses and the Common Council we catch a glimpse of the social channels through which contacts between leading citizens, members of Essex's group and the Scots Commissioners were conducted.

Montereul's mission and the aftermath of its failure to achieve an agreement between the king and the Presbyterian

Alliance are the subjects of Chapters 6 and 7. I show that the growing difficulties of maintaining the Scottish interest in the Commons and the prospect of the king's capture by the New Model, led Essex's group to support Scottish negotiations, via Montereul and France, for the king's withdrawal into the Scots army.

The successful accomplishment of this scheme certainly improved the showing of Essex's adherents at Westminster for a time, but the failure of the Scots to exact an agreement from Charles soon converted the mood of their allies into frustration. Out of this exasperation came a drastic change of policy on the part of Holles. The failure of the attempt to eliminate the New Model in July 1646 taught an obvious lesson: the Scottish army and garrisons would have to leave England before their allies could recapture the initiative at Westminster.

Chapter 8 reveals the successful outcome of this change of policy. The New Model found itself in a very vulnerable position as uncommitted opinion in the Commons moved towards Holles's group, who seemed to offer a swift settlement with the king, a disbanding of forces in England and an effectual prosecution of the war in Ireland. I investigate the importance of the shift of executive authority

at Westminster from the Committee of Both Kingdoms to the Committee for the Affairs of Ireland, and show that in both the City and the two Houses the 'independent party' was forced onto the defensive, apparently incapable of preventing the fulfilment of their opponents' plans.

The stages in the failure of these plans are told in Chapters 9 and 10 and the first part of the Conclusion. The refusal of the army radicals to accept the rules of parliamentary politics negated the fundamental basis of Holles's strategy: the sanctity of parliamentary votes and ordinances. Not only was his design disrupted, but I seek to show why the initial consternation of many moderate members at army recalcitrance was gradually replaced by a more conciliatory mood. Despite impressive military preparations, the fiasco of June and ineffectual show of resistance in early August indicated that the real chance of success for Holles had passed in March 1647.

My analysis of the Presbyterian Party ends in 1647 because I believe that the second civil war and the consequent growth of anti-monarchism in the army during 1648, eliminated the short-term differences of party policies and personalities as members were faced with the fundamental issue of Charles, or no Charles, monarchy or no monarchy. Confronted with this army revolution the basic conservatism

of the politicians of both 'parties' combined in a common attempt to achieve a settlement with Charles.

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Abbreviations

Addit.MSS.	Additional Manuscripts
Amer.Hist.Rev.	American Historical Review
Beds.Hist.Assoc.	Bedfordshire Historical Association
Bodl.	Bodleian Library
Bodl.Pamph.	Bodleian Pamphlet
Brit.Mus.	British Museum
Bull.Inst.Hist.Res.	Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research
C.J.	Journal of the House of Commons
Cal.S.P.Dom.	Calendar of State Papers, Domestic
Cal.S.P.Ven.	Calendar of State Papers, Venetian
Clar.MSS.	Clarendon Manuscripts
Cornwall R.O.	Cornwall Record Office
Eng.Hist.Rev.	English Historical Review
Godw.Pamph.	Godwin Pamphlets (Bodleian)
Guildhall Libr.	Guildhall Library, City of London
Harl.MSS.	Harleian Manuscripts
Herts. R.O.	Hertfordshire Record Office
Hist.Jour.	Historical Journal
Hist.MSS.Comm.	Historical Manuscripts Commission
Huntingdon Libr. Quarterly	Huntingdon Library Quarterly
Hunts R.O.	Huntingdonshire Record Office
Jour.Brit.Studies	Journal of British Studies
J.Co.Co.	Journal of Common Council
Jour.Mod.Hist.	Journal of Modern History
L.J.	Journal of the House of Lords
Nat.Lib.of Scotland	National Library of Scotland
Nat.Lib. of Wales	National Library of Wales
P.R.O.	Public Records Office
Rep.	Repertories of the aldermanic Bench
Scot.Hist.Soc.	Scottish History Society
Somersetshire Arch. & National History Soc.	Somersetshire Archaeological and Natural History Society
Trans.Royal Hist.Soc.	Transactions of the Royal Historical Society
Univ.Coll.of N.Wales, Bangor	University College of North Wales, Bangor

Notes on Chronology

There are two points to be noted in particular:

1. In the seventeenth century the English new year commenced on the 25 March, and in order to avoid confusion I have shown both the old and new style year for dates falling between the 1 January and the 24 March, e.g., the 12 February 1644 old style is shown as the 12 February 1644/45.

2. While protestant states, including England, retained the Julian calendar, diplomatic correspondence from catholic ambassadors or catholic states in the seventeenth century used the Gregorian calendar. Where such correspondence has been used, or where contemporaries have employed both dates, I have given the Julian and Gregorian dates, e.g., whereas the Julian date 6 June 1644 is the 16 June 1644 in the Gregorian calendar, I have shown it as the 6/16 June 1644.

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CHAPTER I

THE CONCEPT OF PARTY

There has been much recent research into the politics and personalities of the Long Parliament, and especially into the character and causes of the 'Presbyterian'-'Independent' dichotomy that came to dominate contemporary discussion of the parliamentary scene after 1645. In the main, the detailed study of the parliamentary groupings of the Civil War has centred upon the 'Independent' party, with the result that the character, policies and methods of their opponents, the 'Presbyterian' group, have either received little attention or been misunderstood.

Although the 'Whig historians' view of Long Parliament politics as being a struggle between two all-embracing religious parties, has largely been superseded since J.H. Hexter's article on the 'Presbyterian Independents',[1] it is not till recently that historians have come to emphasise the influence of non-religious factors upon the members of the two Houses. Hexter's analysis of the breakdown of the 'godly party' in 1645 still occurred within a religious framework. More recently, George Yule has taken an even stronger religious line in his study of the political Independents, creating the impression that the religious issue was the overriding

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1. J.H. Hexter, 'The Problem of the Presbyterian Independents', Amer.Hist.Rev., xliv (1938), 29-49.

determinant of party allegiances. His concern to emphasise a basic religious unity of the Independent members has led Yule to overlook the true significance of the political criteria he uses to identify them.[1]

David Underdown has done much to rectify this distorted picture by emphasising the political factors also affecting the parliamentary situation, as well as the fragmentary character of the 'parties', and the existence of a sizeable majority of uncommitted members. He correctly reasserts Hexter's point that many members shifted their political positions during the 1640s, especially with the emergence in 1647 of the Army as a distinct political force, together with the fundamental constitutional issue of monarchy.[2] Mrs. Pearl has analysed the split of the political Independents over these issues in 1647-48, thus emphasising the existence of a distinct 'middle group' standpoint within that 'party', as well as the political bases of their alliance with the radicals.[3]

The attempt of Stephen Foster to resurrect the direct correlation between religious and political attitudes at Westminster has been promptly dispelled by a telling counter-

1. G.Yule, The Independents (Cambridge, 1958).
2. D. Underdown, 'The Independents Reconsidered', Jour.Brit. Studies, iii (1964), 66-8, 76-7,79.
3. V.Pearl, 'Oliver St. John and the "Middle Group" in the Long Parliament, August 1643-May 1644', Eng.Hist.Rev., lxxxi (1966), 490-519.

attack.[1] Of course, one would expect to find a broad correlation between radical puritanism and political radicalism, but it does not follow that all political radicals were religious Independents, nor that the problem of religious toleration became more than one ingredient amongst many that exacerbated parliamentary politics.

Following on from the earlier recognition by himself and Mrs. Pearl that the Independent party represented an alliance of radicals and moderate members, who did not necessarily share the same ultimate political or religious objectives, David Underdown has recently produced a more detailed discussion of party during the 1640s, which merits closer attention.[2] Once again, he emphasises the limited numerical composition of the 'parties', the existence of a large body of uncommitted back-benchers, whilst his Namierite breakdown of the interests of members provides a useful indication of the complexity of motives that lay behind votes, although such a categorisation could be misleading if applied too rigidly.

Underdown rightly stresses the necessity of appreciating the importance of local politics and interests

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1. C. Foster, 'The Presbyterian Independents Exorcised. A Ghost Story for Historians', Past and Present, xliv (1969) 52-75. See the replies and Foster's defence in Past and Present, xlvii (1970), 116-146.
2. D. Underdown, Pride's Purge (Oxford, 1971), esp. chapter 3.

for a full understanding of Long Parliament politics. He is also correct in detecting a regional rather than a national response to the increasing pressures of war; a tendency that is also noted by Clive Holmes in his work on the Eastern Association.[1] Yet as they recognise, there is a danger in applying this assessment to those politicians or 'grandees', who did view the war in national terms. Where these members were concerned, I prefer to emphasise Underdown's further point that something like a national political consciousness began to develop at Westminster in the 1640s.[2] Despite the mass of local and provincial petitions, squabbles and partisanship which constituted the bulk of parliamentary activity, there were members who also had an appreciation of the more fundamental political and constitutional issues involved in the war, and who sought to influence the two Houses accordingly.

The methods of exercising such influence upon Clement Walker's 'honest middle men of the House' had considerable impact upon the shape of political groupings at Westminster. Walker laid great stress upon the importance and power of

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1. C.A. Holmes, 'The Eastern Association' (Cambridge Univ. Ph.D. thesis 1969 , pp.240, 249, 259 note 1.
2. Underdown, loc.cit., p.24.

committees,[1] and it was upon control of the deliberations of the leading ones that much of the political fortune of the 'grandees' depended. The effectiveness of Pym's 'middle group' had depended heavily upon the Committee of Safety, while his successor, St. John, in alliance with the younger Vane and the Scots Commissioners, was able to secure considerable advantage against the more pacific politicians by controlling the Committee of both Kingdoms. In turn, this advantage was seriously reduced by the formation of the Presbyterian alliance towards the end of 1644. Finally, the onslaught of Holles upon the Army in early 1647 was engineered through the 'Presbyterian'-controlled Committee for Irish Affairs, which replaced the Committee of both Kingdoms upon the withdrawal from England of the Scottish army and garrisons.

In his discussion of the 'peace party', Underdown has miscalculated somewhat its true character. Despite his addition of the clients of noblemen to Namier's categories,[2] he does not do full justice to the importance of the Earl of Essex's interest in the pre-1645 'peace party'. In addition, he does not perceive the important accretion of strength to the Lord General's group represented by Sir John Clotworthy

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1. Clement Walker, The Mysterie of the Two Juntoes, p.4. All references to Walker's works relate to the collected edition, Relations and Observations, Historical and Politic, upon the Parliament begun Anno Dom. 1640 (London, 1661).
2. Underdown, op.cit., p.47.

and Robert Reynolds, an Irish interest dissatisfied by the role accorded to the Scots in Ulster.

It is misleading to assume that the older peace party of pre-1644 continued unchanged as a component of the Presbyterian Party.[1] If Sir Simonds D'Ewes and Sir John Holland typified the older peace party their subsequent careers hardly rendered them typical of Essex's party. The peace party of mid-1643 was a less well-defined political group than its successor. It is probable that the former group revolved around the Earl of Holland and promoted the abortive peace efforts at Westminster in the late summer of 1643. D'Ewes's diary indicates that not only was Holles closely involved with the Earl of Holland, but that the diarist himself was also amongst the pacific members who attended the earl.[2]

To my mind, the failure of Holland's peace plans and his subsequent withdrawal to Oxford disrupted the older peace party. Holles sought permission to go abroad, and when that failed retired to the country as did Sir William Lewis.[3] Sir John Holland used his wife's health

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1. Ibid., p.69.
2. Brit.Mus., Harl.MSS. 165 (Sir S. D'Ewes, Journal of the House of Commons), f.97.
3. Ibid., ff.151v, 152v.

to justify his residence abroad throughout 1644. Although D'Ewes always retained his moderate stance and promoted the attempts to reinstate the Earl of Holland in late 1643,[1] the character of his subsequent activities in the Commons reveals him as a backbencher concerned with his region's interests, seemingly unaware of the political realities of Westminster politics, and even walking out of debates upon military matters of considerable importance to the Earl of Essex and his party.

It was this party which emerged in early 1644 as a combination of the Earl of Essex and those grandees who had worked with Holland. Holles and Sir William Lewis now figured as advisers to Essex with Holland still very much present in the background. Rather than regarding D'Ewes as a member of this new party, I regard him as being typical of those more pacific and conservative country members upon whom Essex's advisers could often rely, but who remained outside the deliberations of that party.

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1. Ibid., ff.223v, 228-229v., 230-230v.

Any assessment of the character of party in the 1640s must depend upon the testimony of contemporary sources. But the task of evaluating these sources is rendered difficult by their varied nature and widely differing conclusions. Royalist commentators tended to reflect the undue prominence accorded to religious differences at Westminster in the calculation of Charles's advisers. Sir Philip Warwick referred to the Presbyterian and Independent parties by mid-1644, and whilst mentioning Presbyterians in conjunction with the Scots, and Cromwell as a leading Independent, with his Army full of fanatic humours, he went no deeper into the framework of the two groups. Warwick saw the purpose of the Presbyterians in the manoeuvring over the Uxbridge Treaty to be the reform of the church according to their model - he did not question the presbyterianism of the political Presbyterians.[1]

In October, 1644, Secretary Nicholas wrote to Charles of the great disagreement between the Earl of Manchester and Cromwell, largely explaining it by the simple assertion that the former was a presbyterian and the latter an independent.[2] Yet, as we shall see, the issue between them

1. Sir Philip Warwick, Memoires of the Reigne of King Charles I (London, 1701), pp.281-2.
2. Brit.Mus., Addit.MSS. 18981 (Rupert Letters), f.276: Nicholas to Charles I, 2 Oct.1644.

was as much one of military and political commitment.[1] Royalist intrigues and feelers with the Scots and parliamentary groups were also bedevilled by their emphasis upon religious differences. There was good reason to stress this issue where the Scots were concerned, but events proved that the king and his advisers were wrong to do so in their dealings with the 'Presbyterian' and 'Independent' parties.

Although the attempts of Lords Digby and Lovelace to reach a political understanding with Independent divines and the younger Vane were vitiated by preoccupation with religious concessions, the Instructions for the Duke of Richmond and the Earl of Southampton, sent to London in December, 1644 with the king's answer to peace propositions, still included an order for them to approach the Independents with a promise to preserve them in the liberty of their conscience in matters indifferent.[2] Again, Charles's approach to Sir Henry Vane, jnr., in March 1646, was restricted to the religious issue, offering to join with him to root out presbyterian church government in the event of his being forced to accept its establishment as a condition of peace.[3]

In a letter from Lord Jermyn and Lord Culpepper to the king, dated the 18 September, 1646, whilst viewing the

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1. Infra, pp.119-122, 131. This is not to deny the importance of the religious issue, v. infra, pp.114-5.
2. Bodl., Clar.MSS.23, ff.219-220.
3. Clar.MSS.27, f.77: Charles I to Sir Henry Vane, jnr., 2 March 1645/6, v. infra, pp.258-9.

Independents in a more political if distorted light, they still applied a mistaken religious interpretation to the English Presbyterians, who, they maintained, would not assist the Scots unless encouraged thereto by the authorising of the church government they desired.[1] Although Sir Edward Hyde was less well informed about the character of politics at Westminster after 1645, his comments evidenced a greater appreciation of it than that of many of his colleagues. He wrote to Secretary Nicholas in November 1646 that many who adhered to one side or the other were, indeed, of neither, but that those who abhorred presbytery in the Church, joined with the Independents, and those who trembled at Independency in the State, joined with the Presbyterians.[2]

Royalist sources, then, talked in terms of two broad parties, whose political activities were directly related to a basic religious conflict. Yet, when we turn to the Memorials and diaries of actual members of the Long Parliament, a different picture emerges. It becomes clear that although the terms 'Independent' and 'Presbyterian' were used generally outside the two Houses by the time of the crisis of 1647, they were a gross over-simplification of

1. Clar.MSS.91 (Select), ff.35-35v.: Jermyn and Culpepper to Charles I, 18 Sept.1646.
2. Clar.MSS.28, ff.286-286v.: Hyde to Nicholas, 15 Nov.1646.

the true position. Hyde emphasised the fact that from the beginning the parliament was guided by a small knot of influential lords and commoners,[1] and as Clement Walker's comments upon the grandees show, this type of control was to continue throughout the 1640s. The sweeping references of prejudiced or ill-informed observers to Independent and Presbyterian parties missed the true character of those groupings, as being alliances of leading parliamentarians, entered into for limited political ends, and whose firm adherents represented only a minority of the Members.

Whilst the Memorials of such members as Denzil Holles, Bulstrode Whitelocke and Sir William Waller are to some extent suspect, they still cast a revealing light upon the political structure of the Long Parliament. It is not until relating the events of the Army revolution, that Holles resorts to the term 'Independent' with any regularity, whilst his use of the term 'Presbyterian' is very scanty, and again connected with the crisis of 1647.[2] In much greater evidence are such political terms as 'extremists', 'incendiaries', 'boutefeus', and 'violent party' describing his opponents.[3] The terms he uses to describe his own

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1. Clarendon, History of the Rebellion (edited by W.Dunn Macray, Oxford, 1888), Book III, para.24-36,55 note 1.
2. D.Holles, Memoirs of Denzil Lord Holles 1641-1648 (ed. J. Toland, London, 1699), pp.72, 108.
3. Ibid., e.g. pp.10,66,67,69.

adherents are the 'moderate party', and the 'peace makers'.[1] Further, Holles shows no preference for a presbyterian church settlement, indicating instead a conservative concern for authority in church and state, and that the English leaders of the 'Presbyterian' alliance remained committed to the cause of peace.[2]

Whitelocke's testimony, both printed and manuscript, is of considerable importance, in that the course of his political career during the 1640s can be regarded as a barometer of moderate, legally trained opinion in the Commons. He was shocked at the outbreak of civil war, and figured as a pacific member and supporter of the Earl of Essex until late 1644. The creation of the Presbyterian alliance at that time produced strong antipathy against the Scots, on his part and that of like-minded members, and caused a breach between them and Essex's party. Whitelocke's accounts of the extremists' efforts to rid themselves of the Earl of Essex, and their success with the New Model and Self-denying Ordinance, the attempt of the Lord General's advisers and the Scots Commissioners to impeach Cromwell, the attempts of the faction leaders to incriminate each other of correspondence with Oxford,[3] do much to dispel the myth of

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1. Ibid., pp.66, 130.
2. Ibid., pp.20-1, 69, 70-1.
3. B. Whitelocke, Memorials of the English Affairs (London, 1682), pp.103, 111-2, 114-5, 148-56.

two broad parties, contending upon the basis of differing religious principles.

Sir William Waller's 'Vindication' can be misleading in that it refers to politics at Westminster in terms of a two-party division, but it must be remembered that he was writing with the events of 1647-48 in mind. Even so, he does provide one interesting piece of information concerning the character of party. He appears to have viewed the adoption of the terms 'Independent' and 'Presbyterian' as the applying of new labels to old bottles.[1] Although this is an over-simplification, and overlooks the changing role of the 'middle' group, it is clear that there was a marked element of continuity in the personnel of the leading factions. This adds weight to Lord Say's assertion that the real political change of 1644-45 was not on the part of the English groups in the two Houses, but on that of the Scots Commissioners.[2]

Whilst not going so far as David Underdown in largely attributing the confusing of the two parties to Clement Walker's 'History of Independency',[3] it is true that this

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1. Sir William Waller, Vindication of the Character and Conduct of Sir William Waller, Knight (London, 1793),p.9.
2. Bodl., Art.4°.811.BS., The Scots Designe Discovered or Vindiciae Veritatis (London, 1654), pp.72-3. This work is attributed to William, Lord Viscount Say and Sele, or to his son, Nathaniel Fiennes.
3. Underdown, Jour.Brit.Studies, iii,64.

work is open to misrepresentation. It is important to realise that it represents three distinct works, produced at different stages of the conflict between the Army and their opponents at Westminster, and so enables us to follow the shifting position of an initially uncommitted member. 'The Mystery of the Two Juntoes....', published in 1647, is the most significant work for investigating the constitution of the two 'parties' prior to the crisis of that year. In setting himself up as the spokesman of back-bench opinion, Walker emphasised the continued existence of a moderate, uncommitted standpoint, to which both Whitelocke and Holles also alluded. Whitelocke described the struggle between the two 'parties' in terms of personal alliances and antagonisms.[1] Holles never maintained that the two opposing factions were all-embracing, and although he did not mention specifically an uncommitted element, it is clear that he viewed the tactics of the extremists concerning the Scots as being designed to win the support of just such a body, so that ' ... many honest well meaning men were cozen'd & stood at gaze, knew not what to think of their Brethren of Scotland.'[2]

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1. Whitelocke, Memorials, pp. 3, 113, 133, 140, 150.
2. Holles, Memoirs, p.52.

Although Clement Walker's attitude towards the Grandees and Junto-men is prejudiced, much can be gleaned from the invective of this 'country' member, with his suspicions of the motives and methods of the leading figures at Westminster and in the counties. It is to be noted that Walker, in his 'Mystery of the Two Juntoes', criticises both factions, but particularly the Presbyterians for their selfish policy against the Army.[1] Underdown appears to miss the significance of the change of emphasis between this work and the two subsequent ones, in which Walker's invective was wholly levelled against the Independents.[2]

The picture which emerges from the printed works of actual members is not one of an inflexible two-party structure, but rather one of several alliances of leading politicians and interests seeking to attract uncommitted opinion to their policies. Of course for those members who were committed to a particular system of church government, the alliance of Essex's group with the Scots Commissioners could be of considerable importance, although members of presbyterian inclinations did not necessarily give their support to the Scottish interest.[3]

But, there are strong indications that the English leaders of the Presbyterian alliance never accepted the

1. Walker, The Mysterie of the Two Juntoes, pp.12-13.
2. Underdown, Jour.Brit.Studies, III, 65; idem., Pride's Purge, p.54.
3. e.g., Brit.Mus., Addit.MSS. 10114 (Diary of Mr. John Harington), ff.13, 16, 20.

aspirations of the high presbyterians as an integral part of their platform. It would have been surprising if any sizeable body of members had supported a fully-fledged presbyterian system of the Scottish model, for the whole course of the Reformation in England, as a parliamentary, lay-controlled process, militated against this.[1] I believe that Hyde's comment upon the leaders of the Presbyterian Party is a correct assessment of their religious position:

> 'the most considerable persons who in the contest with the other faction were content to be thought Presbyterians, were so only as they thought it might restore the King, which they more impatiently desired than any alteration in the government of the Church.'[2]

The alliance with the Scotts Commissioners was for Holles and the Earl of Essex a political move for political ends, although one of its conditions was their support for a Presbyterian church settlement.

One source of confusion for royalists and some modern historians has been the clerical writings upon the religious conflict in the Assembly of Divines and the City of London, both of which witnessed a growing virulence in the controversy over church government. An important factor in this development was the works of Thomas Edwards, a leading

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1. H.R. Trevor-Roper, 'Scotland and the Puritan Revolution' in Historical Essays 1600-1750 presented to David Ogg (edited H.E.Bell and R.L. Ollard, London, 1964), pp.83-4.
2. Clarendon, Rebellion, Bk.X, para.161; for illustrations of this attitude v. infra, pp.111-2, 142-3, 145.

Presbyterian propagandist. In June 1644, Robert Baillie welcomed the publication of a tract by Edwards in answer to the 'Apologetical Narration' of the five dissenting brethren in the Assembly.[1] In another of his works, Edwards casts light upon the astute attempts of these Independent ministers to take advantage of the erastianism of members by suggesting to them how prejudicial the Scottish church system would be to their parliamentary power.[2] By 1647, Edwards's three parts of 'Gangraena', as the title suggests, evidenced a far more bitter dichotomy between the two religious standpoints, as well as the great extent to which they had broken into the political confrontation.[3]

The most important clerical influence in the matter of party terminology was the Scottish ministers, who resided in Westminster as commissioners of the Scottish kirk. They asserted their advocacy of rigid high presbyterianism by a ready use of the printing press, and by their considerable influence with the City clergy. Robert Baillie's letters clearly illustrate the application of initially religious terms to the political scene by an observer preoccupied with a church settlement. Hyde indicates the impact of Scottish attitudes in discussing the joint declaration of

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1. The Letters and Journals of Robert Baillie, ed. D.Laing (Edinburgh, 1841-2), ii, 190.
2. T. Edwards, Antapologia (London, 1644), p.189.
3. Idem., Gangraena (London, 1646-7).

England and Scotland in early 1644 - 'they were now both equally inspired with the Scotch dialect and spirit.'[1] As we shall see, Scottish insistence upon the establishment of a Presbyterian church system not only exacerbated divisions at Westminster and in the City, but also in the Earl of Manchester's Eastern Association army through the head-on collision of Cromwell and Crawford.[2] Mrs. Pearl has correctly emphasised the importance of the Scots in reaching any appreciation of the shifting diplomatic manoeuvres at Westminster, and the fact that this has been under-estimated by historians.[3] I hope that this present study will go some way to remedying this deficiency.

Like the printed works of members, the manuscript diaries of proceedings in the Lower House during the civil wars are very reticent about using the terms 'Presbyterian' and 'Independent' in describing the political factions with which the diarists were well acquainted. Indeed, only two of the four parliamentary diaries of the period use these terms in a political context. D'Ewes's diary is misleading in that his first reference to the 'violent spirits' as Independents occurred in August 1643; but the difficulty caused by such an early appearance is resolved by a

1. Clarendon, op.cit., Bk.VII, para. 383.
2. Infra, pp.114-5, 117.
3. V. Pearl, 'The "Royal Independents" in the English Civil War', Trans.Royal Hist.Soc., 5th series, xviii (1968), 91 note 4.

recognition of the fact that this passage was written long after that date, and so reflects the political features of a later period.[1]

The diary of John Harrington, a recruiter member, covers the period 31 March 1646 to Christmas 1653, and while clearly illustrating the existence of the Presbyterian-Independent conflict within the Assembly, the disagreement between the Presbyterian majority of the Assembly and the majority of the House of Commons, and between the latter and the Scots with their supporters in the House,[2] he does not use religious terminology in any political context until 28 May, 1647, in the voting of officers for Ireland.[3] The first use of both religious terms occurs only on 3 June, 1647, when Harrington writes that,

> 'ye p^r sbiterians would pay al areres to ye com: soldiers ye indep^s oppose it for y^t might set division between ye officers and soldiers.' 4

Lawrence Whittaker's diary runs from 12 October, 1642 to the crisis of June, 1647. Although this source provides evidence of the use of religious terms as early as December, 1644, it is to be noted that it is concerned with military

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1. L. Kaplan, 'Presbyterians and Independents in 1643', Eng.Hist.Rev., lxxxiv (1969), 244-5.
2. Addit.MSS. 10114, ff.11-13, 15-18, 21.
3. Ibid., f.24v.
4. Ibid., f.25., infra, p. 408.

affairs within a religious context.[1] I have alluded to the religious conflict that developed in the army of the Earl of Manchester, and which came to assume an immediate importance that it never enjoyed within the parliament. This army in particular provided sizeable audiences for the preaching efforts of ministers and soldiers - Richard Baxter emphasised the close relation between the spread of sectarian principles amongst the soldiers, and the withdrawal of orthodox ministers from the rigours of military life.[2]

Whittaker shows that the use of the terms 'Presbyterian' and 'Independent' in the petition of forty of Manchester's officers in January 1644/5, desiring his continuance in command, was still restricted to a religious conflict within his army.[3] The same is true of the debate on 3 May, 1645, upon the recommendation of Colonel Russell to the governorship of Ely, for Whittaker writes that Colonel Russell was much opposed 'because he was by some Conceived to be an Independent & a very young man.'[4] Indeed, this diarist makes no use of religious terms to denote political factions in the House of Commons, even during the crisis of 1647, although, like Harrington, he provides ample evidence of opposition to the

1. Brit.Mus.Addit.MSS. 31116 (Diary of Lawrence Whittaker), f.178.
2. Reliquiae Baxterianae, ed. M. Sylvester, (London, 1696), p.51.
3. Addit.MSS. 31116, f.185v.
4. Ibid., f.208.

Scots, of the Presbyterian temper of the City's governors, of the general antipathy of the parliament to Scottish or high Presbyterianism, and of the conflict between opponents of the Lord General and a pro-Essex group within the Houses.[1]

One can detect the same absence of religious terms being used as political epithets in the important diary of Walter Yonge. Although it does not extend beyond December, 1645, the detail it provides of debates prior to that date reveals, as we shall see,[2] the antagonism of Essex's group towards the Committee of both Kingdoms in the first half of 1644, the support of the younger Vane and St. John for that committee, and the struggle between the groups over the reforming of the Lord General's army and his relationship to the new Committee. Unfortunately the period in which the Presbyterian alliance was being formed coincides with a gap in Yonge's diary, but the period April-December, 1645, which is covered, enables us not only to witness the increasing importance of the religious issue, the accusations and counter-accusations of the Savile Affair, and the growing jealousy of the Scots; but also to ascertain something of the impact of these issues upon the diarist himself.

It is clear from the sections that Walter Yonge underlined or wrote in large italics that he felt strongly

1. Ibid., e.g., ff. 66-7, 123v, 163v.
2. Infra, chapter 2, passim.

about the 'jure divino' claims of the high Presbyterian clergy, and that he agreed with the legal reasons offered by the lawyers of the House, such as Selden, St. John, Glynn, Wilde, Whitelocke, Maynard, Samuel Browne and Sir Thomas Widdrington, for keeping the clerical power of suspension from the sacrament firmly under ultimate parliamentary control.[1] This was the erastianism bemoaned by Robert Baillie, and bound up with this, although also reflecting social and economic interests, was the general adherence of members to the concept of a national church, as distinct from the separatist view of the sects. In practical terms, these majority views meant that in the central issue of church government, there was often a closer affinity betweeh members of moderate Presbyterian and Independent leanings, than between either and the extreme positions of the high Presbyterian clergy on the one hand, or those of the sects on the other.

The diary of John Boys, recruiter knight of the shire for Kent, covers the period 7 September, 1647-16 May, 1648.[2] Although it deals with a constitutional crisis which was very much in the background during the preceding three years, it does possess a retrospective importance, in that Boys

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1. Brit.Mus.Addit.MSS. 18780 (Diary of Walter Yonge), ff.8, 88, 89v., et seq.
2. D. Underdown, 'The Parliamentary Diary of John Boys, 1647-8', Bull.Inst.Hist.Res., xxxix (1966), 141-164.

underwent a political metamorphosis, common to several other political independents, in the face of the increasingly anti-monarchical flavour of the Army revolution. In addition it also provides the non-religious context within which this change occurred. Like Whittaker and Yonge, Boys uses no religious terms to denote political factions, which strengthens the impression that the prevalence of such terms in contemporary political discussion was the result mainly of factors external to the parliament, particularly the Scots Commissioners, the differences within the Assembly of Divines, and those within the New Model.

If we were to rely upon the appearance of the terms 'Presbyterian' and 'Independent' as evidence of the existence of two distinct political groupings at Westminster I have shown that we could choose any year between 1644 and 1647 depending on the source consulted. Yet there is a strong likelihood that the conflict at Westminster in mid-1646 over the fate of the parliamentary armies, coinciding with concern at the state of religious affairs,

did much to make religious terms current in political discussion. In July 1646, Sir Thomas Peyton, a disabled member, wrote from London that 'names are now changd wth things for all are now Presbyterians or Independents....'[1] A month later saw Colonel Edward Massey writing of the 'I.P.' in the parliament, in a context which indicates that these letters were an abbreviation for Independent Party.[2]

Yet, this evidence of the appearance of these labels in 1646 does not tell us the point at which the reality behind them appeared. As I hope to show in my next chapter, the political groupings behind these terms occurred much earlier, and their adoption owed much to the key political element in the realignment of groups in the two Houses: the Scots Commissioners.

Although beyond the scope of this paper, the reaction of individual leaders to the events of 1647-48 goes far to indicate both the fragmentary character of the Presbyterian and Independent 'parties', and the limited role of religious factors as a divisive political issue. In the autumn of 1647, intelligence letters and personal correspondence begin to refer once more to the moderates of both Houses. One writer states that,

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1. Brit.Mus.Addit.MSS.44846 (Letter Book of Sir Thomas Peyton, Bart.), f.34: Peyton to Bargrave, 16 July 1646.
2. Brit.Mus.Loan 29/175 (Harley Papers, part ii, f.41: Massey to Edward Harley, 8 Aug.1646.

> 'I speake of moderate men, because I finde there are many of them even among the Independ^ts who desire Monarchie, & are not ill effected to the Kings psn.....'[1]

This indication of the 'middle group' constitutional position can be matched by signs of division within the 'Presbyterian' fold in 1648.

The fundamental issue of monarchy split both parties in 1648, a process illustrated by private correspondence concerning the treaty in the Isle of Wight (September-October). The refusal of Charles to accept the complete abolition of episcopacy revealed the inherent division within the 'Presbyterian Party' and amongst other moderate members, between religious and political wings. Indeed, the political wing of the old 'Presbyterian Party', including its leaders, combined with crypto-royalists, moderate members who yearned for a settlement, and with the 'Royal Independents',[2] in seeking to smooth the path of the treaty at Newport and Westminster. Amongst those who were willing to forego a strict Presbyterian church settlement or to accept a moderate one for the

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1. Bodl.Clar.MSS.30, f.144v.: anonymous letter of intelligence, 18 Oct. 1647.
2. Pearl, Trans.Royal Hist.Soc., 5th series, xviii, 90-1; Underdown, Pride's Purge, pp. 111, 113.

sake of a political settlement were members drawn from the whole spectrum of partiamentary politics, apart from the radical or war party members, and even the younger Vane's course during the crisis of 1648 was a chequered one.[1]

Henry Marten's comment upon Clement Walker's 'History of Independency', although it refers to the Independents, can be applied to both factions. Marten maintained that the members were so numerous, so mingled in temper and education, age and interests, that so great a party as Walker called Independent could not have driven on any project of that bulk with sufficient secrecy.[2] At the heart of partiamentary intrigue and manoeuvring lay the close-knit group of politicians or 'grandees', seeking to

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1. e.g. Clar.MSS.29, f.226: Bowman to - , 22 May 1648; Clar. MSS. 34, f.8: Lawrans to Hyde, 4 Dec. 1648; Bodl., Tanner MSS.57(2), ff.313, 359, 369, 371, 385, 395: letters to Sir John Potts, 26 Sept.-30 Oct.1648; Brit.Mus.Loan 29/176, f.47: Grimston to Harley, 21 Oct. 1648; Hist.MSS.Comm. 13th Report, append., part i (MSS. of Duke of Portland), p.593; Underdown, Pride's Purge, pp. 110-111, 114.
2. Hist.MSS.Comm. 13th Report, append. part iv (MSS. of Captain Loder-Symonds), p.400.

direct policy through the Committee system, and to secure back-bench support by a combination of procedural expertise, and emphasis upon issues guaranteed to arouse strong feelings, such as the inactivity and exactions of the Scots army, which provided the younger Vane and St. John with a considerable advantage at Westminster in the period 1645-early 1647.

It seems appropriate to conclude this discussion of the character of party in the two Houses during the civil war period with a passage from Clement Walker, which should serve as a salutary warning to researchers into that complex situation:

> 'What Historian can find a method in so universal a Chaos?' 1

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1. C. Walker, History of Independency, part 2, p.2.

The Earl of Essex and His Party

'Fato functus est infelicissimus Robertus Comes Essexiensis.' Thus noted the excluded minister of Radwinter in his journal on the 14th September 1646.[1] How important a political event was the demise of Robert Earl of Essex? What had been his authority and influence at Westminster? Who had been his colleagues, advisors and allies? To what extent had they been organised, and to what extent were they affected by Essex's death?

Not surprisingly studies of parliamentary politics during the 1640s and earlier in the seventeenth century have concentrated upon the actions and membership of the House of Commons, but recently a useful corrective has been provided.[2] I do not wish to create the impression that I view the House of Lords as the power-house of the parliamentary cause. It cannot be denied that the pressures of civil war and constitutional uncertainty led to an erosion of its influence and privileges, but the very awareness of this process rendered the lords at times obstinate and sensitive. The Earl of Essex was well suited, in both personal prestige and political attitude, to direct the concern of his fellow peers towards particular ends.

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1. Bodl., Rawlinson MS. D.158, f.11.
2. I would not go so far as Dr. Farnell in his assertion of aristocratic management: J.E.Farnell, 'The aristocracy and leadership of Parliament in the English Civil Wars', Jour.Mod.Hist., xliv (1972), pp.79-80, passim.

Contemporary comment upon the death of the earl leaves one in no doubt about his political significance in 1646 as a leading figure in the Presbyterian Alliance. In particular his Scottish allies were perturbed by this untimely occurrence. According to Robert Baillie, Essex was 'the head of our partie here', who 'keeped all together, who now are like by that alone to fall in pieces'.[1] Sir Robert Murray maintained that 'all agree in the heavy losse our friends have made in Essex death'.[2] The Scots Commissioners wrote to their principals of the 'unvaluable losse to both Kingdomes'.[3]

But the Scots were not alone in stressing the significance of Essex's death - royalists, foreign agents and parliamentarians all agreed upon this. A significant indication of Essex's personal importance is provided by Colonel Bamfield who appears to have been working with the 'presbyterian' leaders in mid-1646 to secure moderate peace terms, and who attributed to Essex's death the harsher character of the terms offered to Charles. Bellièvre also thought that the attempt to moderate these proposals was less advantageous after the Earl's death.[4] Bamfield's description of his character is worth quoting - '(he) was

1. Baillie II, p.401.
2. Cam.Soc., N.S. XXVII (1880), Hamilton Papers, p.114.
3. B.M., Addit. MS. 37978, f.117: Scots Council to both Committees, 15 Sep.1646.
4. Montereul II, p.276.

animated, resolute, would hazard more than all the others, had credit, and was every moment incited by .... his sister, the late Duchess of Somerset.'[1]

The Venetian agent in London stated that the 'Presbyterian' party had lost one of its strongest leaders,[2] while Philip Bellièvre referred both to the regret of 'his party' and to the immediate affect of Essex's death upon the House of Lords.[3] Edmund Ludlow, a hostile member of the Lower House, made the same point about his death being 'a great loss to those of his party'.[4]

These comments and reactions reveal the Earl of Essex as an influential political figure and the recognised leader of a 'party'. The character of that 'party' and of Essex's leadership must now be investigated, since they are central to the present study of the 'Presbyterian Party'. From the outset I must make it clear that it is no part of my purpose to attempt a namierisation of Essex's 'party'.

Namierisation

I am not convinced that attempts to allocate sizeable numbers of members to a particular party at Westminster fulfil any useful purpose. To allocate is to imply a considerable degree of inflexibility in a political situation

1. Bamfield, p.15.
2. C.S.P. Ven. 1643-7, p.284.
3. Montereul II, p.272.
4. Ludlow I, p.144.

that was fluid. It was the 'grandees' or political leaders who provided the constant and definable factors within a much broader network of interest, personal connection, concern for office and political and religious conviction, all of which could operate to incline members towards particular 'parties' of grandees. But most members cannot thereby be called party men. Priorities could change, allegiances could be altered in relation to particular issues. Clearly the bonds that tied together groups or parties of grandees to some extent could also extend to less elevated members, but to ascertain who they were would involve a great deal of research without adding much to a study of the Presbyterian Party. My concern lies with the leading advisors and colleagues of Essex both inside and outside the two Houses.

Contemporaries then appear to have been in no doubt about the existence of the Earl's party in 1646. But the dating of its original formation poses a much more difficult problem, and it must be confessed that it has proved impossible for me to arrive at an exact point in time for this development. At some point between late August 1643 and the establishment of the Committee of both Kingdoms in February 1644 Holles and the Earl of Essex moved into a closer political relationship. It is possible that the formation of Essex's group or party owed something to the

return of the Earl of Holland from Oxford in early November 1643. By early 1644 we meet with references to Denzil Holles, Sir Philip Stapleton and Sir William Lewis as the spokesmen of Essex's party. Whitelocke's testimony makes frequent references to Essex's party, and by May 1644 it reveals Holles and Stapleton as two of the Earl's most secret counsellors. Typical is Whitelocke's mention of

> 'the Earle of Essex, Mr. Hollis, Sr Philip Stapleton, S^r^ Wm. Lewys, & the rest of that party'.[1]

There is no reason to doubt that they were the 'very suspect counsellors' of Essex to whom Robert Baillie alludes.[2]

References to Essex's party continue into 1645, and evidence of their activity can be found in the parliament journals and members' diaries. For instance, Robert Reynolds, Holles and Stapleton came very close in mid-December 1644 to securing the exemption of Essex from the Self-denying Ordinance.[3] The Savile Affair of June and July 1645 was described at length by Whitelocke entirely in terms of Essex's party and its opponents,[4] and Lord Savile's own correspondence substantiates this account.[5]

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1. B.M., Addit.MS. 37343, ff.239,297.
2. Baillie II, pp.136, 187.
3. Addit.MS.31116, f.180; CJ III, p.726.
4. e.g., Addit.MS. 37343, ff.397,405.
5. Baillie II, appendix, p.490.

What was the relationship between the Earl of Essex and such members of the Commons as Holles, Sir Philip Stapleton, Sir William Lewis, Sir John Meyrick, Walter Long, John Glynn, Robert Reynolds, Sir Oliver Luke and Sir Samuel Luke? Whitelocke's account and Sir Samuel Luke's letter-books reveal all of them, sooner or later, as adherents of the earl.[1] Do all the references to Essex and his 'party' merely reflect a conventional tendency to exaggerate aristocratic involvement in politics; a tendency that owed nothing to political reality? Was Essex anything more than a prestigious figure-head for a group of members in the Lower House? I do not think so. Although the picture one gathers of the earl during these years is a patchy one, one can at least see that he was a man experienced in parliamentary affairs, a man of considerable personal prestige, a man who could command a sizeable following and evoke considerable loyalty amongst members of both Houses.

Examples of his debating ability and personal leadership are limited, but we can gain a clear impression of them from the few extant references. Baillie reveals that the astute attempt of Essex's party to secure the king's return to London in the spring of 1644 was initiated by the earl himself in the House of Lords.[2] The attempt to delay

1. HMC. JP4, pp.40,52,190,208,513,548. Addit.MS. 37344; Memorials, pp.83, 111, 152.
2. Infra, p. 83.

the Lord General's departure in the spring of 1644 at a time when peace propositions were being prepared provides a further indication of the personal influence upon which his adherents depended.[1]

Agostini, the Venetian ambassador, shows Essex rallying the peers at the end of that year in the face of threatening rioting over their obstruction of Laud's execution.[2] In early 1646 he was at the centre of a successful scheme involving both Houses to secure a pass for Montereul in order to enable him to finalise plans at Oxford for the king's withdrawal into the Scots army.[3] At the time of that withdrawal it was Essex who delivered an impassioned harangue against the voting of Charles to Warwick Castle by the Commons, a harangue that was seconded by Sir Philip Stapleton and secured the revocation of the offending vote.[4]

The Lord General also came to embody the traditional powers and privileges of the peers, whose depleted numbers at Westminster now came to regard him as the bulwark against the encroachments of the Commons. Hence their readiness to spring to his defence whenever his authority was challenged. This influence continued until Essex's death despite the

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1. Infra., pp. 81-2, 87, 92-4.
2. C.S.P. Ven. 1643-7, p.161.
3. Montereul II, pp.142-3.
4. Bodl., Tanner MS. 59(1), f.161: Sancroft to father, 11 May 1646.

setback of the New Model Ordinance, and the examples given above indicate that he was able to give voice to the moderation of the lords in such a way as to render the Upper House an effective aspect of 'presbyterian' strategy.

Sir Samuel Luke's assertion in November 1644 that Essex was 'the man that must redeem this nation from slavery',[1] the Earl of Pembroke's claim to Hyde at Uxbridge a little later concerning the disastrous effects for the king if Essex should be removed from his military command,[2] the attempts of the lords to limit the authority and to alter the composition of the Committee of both Kingdoms during 1644:

> 'because divers of that Committee... were apprehended not to be so much the General's friends as others who were desired to be brought in',[3]

all of these indicate the marked degree of personal respect he enjoyed and political influence he exercised.

But does personal respect and political influence add up to a view of Essex as a party leader and policy maker? This question raises the central issue of his relations with his leading advisors. Having decided that Essex was no mere aristocratic figure-head for the activities of his advisors in the Commons, it would also be incorrect to regard the latter as mere subordinates whose function was solely that of implementing the will of the Lord General.

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1. HMC.JP4, p.89.
2. Infra, p. 113.
3. Memorials, p.83.

This political party operated on the basis of mutual dependence with Essex relying heavily upon the advice and political expertise of his advisors in the Lower House. On the other hand Holles needed the Lord General's prestige and authority, and consequently had to take account of his views in the formulation of plans and policies. This limitation on Holles's initiative was possibly most clearly revealed by its removal upon Essex's death in September 1646.[1]

It is most probable that the significant framers of policy in Essex's party were probably Holles and the Earl of Holland. Indeed it seems to me that Holland was the focus of pacific opinion and action at Westminster rather than Essex until the late summer of 1643, and he continued to be a significant force within Essex's party after his return to London.[2]

The picture of the internal operation of Essex's party that emerges from the scattered sources enables some reasonably firm conclusions to be drawn. Whitelocke reveals that the task of advising Essex in such matters as the Lovelace Plot or the projected impeachment of Cromwell was part of a broader social relationship, which does seem to have given a greater degree of cohension to the party.[3] It was within this social context that Whitelocke became

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1. Infra, pp. 41-2, 308.
2. Infra, pp. 110, 133.
3. e.g. Addit.MS. 37344, ff.25,25v; Bodl. Ashmole MS.421, f.200.

familiar with the Earl of Holland.[1]

The task of ascertaining the circumstances of the formation of this distinct group or party is rendered the more difficult by the absence of party discipline in the modern sense. Personal connection did not invariably carry with it an inflexible political adherence to the patron, particularly in the early stages of the war. Sir Philip Stapleton appears to have had a connection with Essex before the outbreak of hostilities, probably in a legal capacity,[2] and was commissioned by the earl as Colonel of his own Lifeguard in 1642. And yet, he could display political sympathies which were out of tune with those of the Lord General. For instance, during late 1643 he does seem to have supported the Scottish alliance, which Essex and Holles opposed.[3] On the other hand, together with Holles he advised the earl about the Lovelace revelation, and appears to have entered into an early association with his co-advisor.[4] Elsewhere I comment upon the relationship between John Glynn and the Lord General in early 1644 as revealed in D'Ewe's diary, and it is interesting to see him acting on Holles's behalf after the failure of the Earl of Holland's peace schemes in mid-1643.[5]

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1. e.g. Addit.MS. 37344, ff.13,17v,20,27v.
2. V.Snow, p.203; v.infra, pp.58-9.
3. Baillie II, p.141.
4. Memorials, pp.135-6.
5. B.M., Harl.MS.163, f.151v; v. infra,pp. 54-55, 79.

The coincidence of personal connection and political allegiance would be much more pronounced with such a member as Sir John Meyrick, who represented a close connection between the Meyrick and Devereux families dating from the late sixteenth century.[1] What of the other leading advisors of Essex? I have been unable to unearth any long-standing relationship between the earl and Sir William Lewis, but there are several possibilities concerning the former's contacts with Denzil Holles, one of the leading figures in Essex's party.

Undoubtedly Holles experienced profound disillusionment with the war at some point before early 1643. We have his experience at Sherborne and the decimation of his regiment at Brentford in the previous year, which must have played a part in his 'shamefull desertion'.[2] But how did this disillusionment lead to a close association with Essex? One possibility could have been a connection that went back to their campaigning days on the Continent during the 1630s. The observation in April 1642 that since Holles had 'married a bitch wife' he was 'not so violent in the House as he was',[3] provides another possibility that his marriage to the daughter of Sir Thomas Sherley of Sussex introduced him into the family connections of the Earl of Essex.

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1. V.Snow, p.16.
2. Baillie II, p.62.
3. HMC. Cowper II, p.314.

The third and most likely possibility I have already mentioned. It arises in the person of the Earl of Holland, whose good offices had been sought by Holles' father, the first Earl of Clare, to lighten the burden of royal displeasure upon his son after the excesses of 1629.[1] By mid-1643 it was the turn of Holles's brother, the second Earl of Clare, together with Denzil himself, to be involved in Holland's peace manoeuvres. Clarendon tells us that it was their intention to win over Essex to their design only to have him detached from it by John Pym.[2] It was Pym's ability which kept under control the potential for factionalism inherent in the political connections of the Long Parliament. The failure of Holland's scheme, with the consequent political eclipse of that earl in the Upper House was probably an important factor in concentrating the attention of pacific members upon the Lord General, who was already being regarded as the leader of a moderate 'party' in the two Houses.[3]

It was only with the military crises and political developments of later 1643 and early 1644 that the divisive tendencies at Westminster demolished the facade of a common front maintained by Pym. In its place there emerged more

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1. Nottingham Univ. Pelham-Holles MSS. NeC 15404, f.229; NeC 15405, f.64.
2. Hist.Rebellion, Bk.VII, para.173-4.
3. Tanner MS. 62(1), f.262. Wm. Merley to - 5 Aug.1643.

clearly defined antagonistic political groups or parties, at least amongst the 'grandees'. Sir Philip Stapleton found himself acting more frequently with Holles to safeguard the interests of Essex, Glynn was moved to complain about the delaying tactics of the younger Vane and St. John with reference to the earl's army, Sir John Clotworthy and Robert Reynolds moved closer to the Lord General in response to the Scottish alliance. It was presumably to the emergence of this distinct group that Lord Say referred when he maintained that those with whom the Scots Commissioners joined towards the end of 1644 were

> 'such as had fallen off from a vigorous fierceness against the Court in the Parliaments first engaging...'[1]

The consistent involvement of Holles, Stapleton, Lewis and others in the political activities investigated in subsequent pages, the constant references to Essex and his party by friends and foes before 1646, his leadership of the Upper House, the complementary activity of Essex and his colleague the Earl of Holland, as leading figures in the Presbyterian Alliance, and the testimonies to Essex's political significance at the time of his death - all of these factors evidence the existence and importance of a group of 'grandees' in the Commons who, over a period of time, came to co-operate inder the practical leadership of the Earl of Essex.

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1. Vindiciae Veritatis, pp.73,97.

Finally, if Essex's influence was so important at Westminster, did his death have an effect upon the political situation there? I have already noted the response of contemporaries, who clearly regarded this event as being of major significance. There were immediate problems such as the failure of Holles to have Essex replaced by the Earl of Northumberland in the important office of Lord Lieutenant of Yorkshire.[1] There are signs that the resolve and solidarity of the majority in the House of Lords was shaken by the removal of the one figure who had sustained them. Would the by-passing of the Upper House by the Commons and Sir Thomas Fairfax over the disbanding of Massey's Brigade have occurred quite so easily if Essex had been alive?[2] The attempts of the Earls of Warwick, Northumberland and Manchester to secure the readmittance of the Earl of Holland into the Upper House in early 1647 might have succeeded, as in 1644, if Essex had been present.[3] The leadership of his party passed to members of the Lower House, despite the continued preoccupation of the French ambassador with the above-named lords.

One can only conjecture as to whether Holles's change of direction in later 1646 would have occurred in the form

1. Addit.MS.10114, f.18.
2. Infra, p.292.
3. Infra, pp.57-8.

it did if Essex had lived. A policy which subordinated attempts to reach a settlement with Charles to a determination to eliminate the New Model might well have conflicted with the earl's sense of honour and political priorities.

By this, I do not mean to imply that the design against the New Model materialised only after the earl's death. There are signs that it went back to 1645 and that the manoeuvring of Holles against Fairfax's forces in mid-1646 was an abortive attempt to implement the scheme.[1] Rather, it is my impression and that of certain contemporaries that whereas Essex viewed these military plans as part of a broader policy involving the persistent search for an accommodation with Charles, Holles during the later months of 1646 came to concentrate his attention on the design against the New Model almost to the exclusion of negotiations with the king.[2]

But it was probably at the height of the crisis of mid-1647 that Essex's prestige and personal authority were most missed by his former advisers. The collection of peers who had come to fill the vacuum in the Upper House after September 1646 proved unequal to the strain of Holles's confrontation with the army. Undoubtedly, if he

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1. Infra, pp.219-220.
2. Infra.,pp.295-321, passim.

had agreed with this policy, Essex's presence would have greatly facilitated the creation of a viable military counter to Fairfax's forces. But this is conjecture and no matter how significant it adds little to the reality of Essex and his party of 'grandees' during the years 1644-1646.

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A Note on Terminology

In order to avoid confusion I will explain my use of the terms 'party', 'group' and 'faction'. In particular, 'party' can be a misleading label to apply to civil war politics, although contemporaries employed it repeatedly. This seventeenth-century usage was synonymous with faction or even with a reasonably distinct group of politicians and adherents, and it is this usage that I have adopted in this study of the Presbyterian Party. In order to emphasise this limited application of 'party' I have freely employed the other terms mentioned.

It must be admitted that 'party' in its seventeenth-century sense does have its drawbacks in that it could be applied to any political group whether it was a limited number of politicians attached to one man, such as Essex's party, or a broader based coalition of interests or 'parties', such as the later Independent and Presbyterian parties. Clearly the description of both these types of organisation as 'parties' conceals a significant political development. I have tried to indicate the causes and characteristics of this development whenever it has arisen in the course of this study, but it would perhaps be helpful for me to outline the political alterations and groups which underline my use of the term 'party'.

From Pym's death in December 1643 there occurred a polarisation of 'grandees' at Westminster, which by mid-1644 had largely eliminated the middle ground of Pym's allies, the so-called 'middle group'. Instead, his successors tended to gravitate towards the more radical stance of the younger Vane in a common support of the Scottish alliance. It is to this conjunction of grandees that I attach the label 'Vane/St.John group', and it was this group which was to be called the Independent Party after the alteration of alliances by the Scots in later 1646. The continued use of the term 'middle group' relates to those members who had been close to Pym and subsequently remained close to Oliver St. John in the matter of war aims.

The emergence of Essex's party or group probably dates from about the end of 1643. It is likely that the Earl of Holland was the focus of pacific opinion at Westminster earlier in that year, but with his withdrawal to Oxford, the Scottish alliance and the struggle over the Committee of both Kingdoms, Essex emerged as the new focal point for such members as Holles and Sir William Lewis. The political conjunction between this party and the Scots Commissioners I have called the Presbyterian Alliance, whilst the term Presbyterian Party has been applied to the English members within the alliance. It would not be correct to identify

them all as members of Essex's party for the emergence of religious differences secured the support of members of high presbyterian inclinations, such as Zouch Tate and Francis Rous.

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CHAPTER II

THE LORD GENERAL AND THE SCOTS ALLIANCE

The year 1644 opened with tremors consequent upon Pym's alliance with the Scots still running through the two Houses of Parliament. The invitation to the Scots even shook his own group of supporters,[1] for the employment of a Scottish army in England offended the deepest national prejudices of the political nation. The City of London at first also appears to have responded in a lukewarm fashion to the alliance.[2] Apart from its religious and constitutional repercussions, the alliance represented an unmistakable escalation of the war, which was regarded with dismay by many moderate members, and none more so than the Earl of Essex and his advisers.[3]

In fact, general acceptance of the alliance was only secured by the efforts of Charles to prevent the opening of a second front in the north, and to take advantage of the disarray in the parliamentary ranks. It is difficult to overstress the impact of the cessation of arms concluded between Ormonde and the Irish rebels in September 1643. In

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1. Pearl, Eng.Hist.Rev., lxxxi (1969), 496.
2. The Journal of Thomas Cuningham of Campvere, ed. F.J. Courthope (Scottish Hist.Soc., 3rd ser., xi, 1927), p.71.
3. Clarendon, Rebellion, Bk.VII, para. 135. v. supra, pp.37-9 for discussion about Essex's advisers.

discussing this cessation, Clarendon maintained that

> 'the calumnies and slanders raised to his Majesty's disservice and dishonour made a more than ordinary impression upon the minds of men, and not only of vulgar-spirited people, but of those who resisted all other infusions and infection.'[1]

The timing of the revelations of his designs at Westminster helped to strengthen the readiness of the majority of members to accept the assistance of the Scots, and to implement the crucial measures introduced by Sir Henry Vane, junior, and Oliver St. John in early 1644.

Before dealing with these measures, it is necessary to attempt an analysis of Westminster politics at the turn of 1644, and more particularly to reveal the attitude of the Earl of Essex and his adherents to the problems of war and peace, and to the alliance with the Scots.

The State of Politics

Whilst accepting the existence of the three broad political divisions that Hexter recognised in mid-1643: a peace party, a war party and a 'middle group',[2] I feel that valuable light can be shed upon this matter by looking more closely at leading individuals, their particular interests,

1. Ibid., Bk.VII, para.340; v. also Bodl., Ashm. 721 (2): J. Vicars, Gods Arke Overtopping the Worlds Waves (London, 1646), p.68.
2. J.H. Hexter, The Reign of King Pym (Harvard Univ.Press, second printing, 1961), ch.3.

regional or official, their immediate political colleagues or adherents, and their methods in attempting to secure the initiative at Westminster.

By adopting this approach we can see that the occasional votes of men like Glyn and Sir John Clotworthy against their normal 'middle group' allies, were not eccentric,[1] but reflected the existence of distinct interests which qualified their adherence to broader policies. Even the exercise of personal conscience could result in strange companions as when Sir Simonds D'Ewes lined up beside the younger Vane, St. John and Sir Henry Mildmay in a vote concerning forces in Ireland.[2]

The impact upon the broader issues of war and peace of localised military interests with the creation of Association armies during 1643, and the imminent entry of a Scots army is now recognised, but it can be exaggerated. Whereas one would expect those members, who lay outside the inner circle of grandees, to respond to the military needs of their respective counties and boroughs, it would perhaps be mistaken to assume that men like the younger Vane, St. John, Prideaux and Haselrig operated upon such a narrow basis.[3] Rather, they may well have sought to further a common policy in those areas of special concern and knowledge to them.

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1. Pearl, op.cit., 493 and note 3.
2. Harl.MSS. 165, ff.254-255v.
3. Holmes, 'The Eastern Association', p.241.

One aspect of this common military policy was the continued encroachment upon the authority of the Lord General, and although there might have been differences of opinion between the more radical leaders and the 'middle group' members in this matter, I would describe them in the short term as differences of degree rather than of kind. On the military side, the 'middle group' have been described as 'fervent "Essex" men',[1] whilst also being concerned to strengthen the whole war machine. The more radical members had long recognised the contradiction in this dual policy, and the activities of St. John indicate that Pym's successors also recognised this well before the latter part of 1644. Perhaps the leading figures of this alliance were closer together in their attitude to Essex than has been thought, the standpoint of Violet Rowe in her study of Sir Henry Vane the younger.[2] For either political or military reasons, the younger Vane, as well as St. John, recognised the need for the continuance of Essex as Lord General, but they both did so under certain stringent conditions.[3]

What was the political position of Essex's group at the turn of 1644? I have already mentioned that this group

1. Pearl, op.cit., p.494.
2. V.A.Rowe, Sir Henry Vane the Younger (London, 1970), p.34 et passim.
3. Supra, pp.64-76-7.

was not a broad 'peace party' - rather, we are dealing with a body of members who were closely allied to Essex, either militarily or personally. Their prime task was to protect the political and military interests of the Lord General, while also sharing and representing his more conservative and moderate attitude towards the conduct of the war, and the settlement of a peace. In the main, these members could rely upon a much broader support from the moderate, uncommitted members of the Lower House - hence, D'Ewes estimated in December 1643 that those who supported the Lord General almost equalled the combined forces of the pro-Scots and pro-Associations members. That these 'parties' were not so precise as Thomas Erle's description represents is perhaps indicated by D'Ewes' own unawareness of such divisions.[1]

The formation of Essex's group as a recognisable political entity owed much to the increasing tempo of the political struggle at Westminster, the military neglect of his army, and the preparations for the entry of the Scots. The last matter in particular resulted in their inclination towards a peaceful settlement being emphasised even further, although the picture of them as a 'peace at any price' group does not do them justice.[2] Hence, although the Lord

1. Harl.MSS. 165, ff. 233-233v; Holmes, op.cit., p.245.
2. Underdown, Pride's Purge, p.60; v. supra, pp. 127-8, 142-3.

General wrote to the parliament in mid-1643 desiring the sending of propositions to the king, we have seen that he rejected the Earl of Holland's scheme to join Charles as a means to further the imposition of a settlement upon both sides.[1]

The Lord General certainly revealed a less than total commitment to any aggressive purpose in his campaigning, for he believed that peace should be the first priority, not the ultimate goal, of the war; but he also believed that it should be an honourable peace. Most of the Lords seem to have veered in the same pacific direction in response to the invitation to the Scots. Indeed some withdrew to Oxford, men of similar political attitude and close personal connection to the Lord General. The resultant closing of ranks amongst the remaining Lords coloured the conflict over the Committee of both Kingdoms and the recruitment of Essex's army in early 1644, and had a considerable bearing upon the political tactics of Vane and St. John. Essex's military influence was deliberately restricted so as to pressurise the lords into accepting the sweeping reorganisation of the machinery at Westminster for managing the war. On the other hand, Essex and the Lords recognised that his and their political authority were involved in the maintenance of his military power.[2]

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1. Supra, p.39.
2. Cal.S.P. Venetian, 1643-7, p.78. V. Rowe, op.cit., pp.39-40; V. infra, p.75; supra, p.34.

Throughout the later months of 1643, the army of the Lord General was left to stagnate, whilst the attention of the Commons turned towards the more dynamic campaigning of Waller and Manchester. Dissatisfaction with the existing machinery and agents for conducting the war was also aroused by the declining effectiveness of the unwieldy Committee of Safety. One attempt to replace it by a Council of War in October 1643 faded away,[1] and by November the more radical supporters of Waller had turned their efforts to the Committee of Safety once more, with the addition to it of Haselrig and Wentworth.[2] Yet, this was a stop-gap measure, for men such as Vane and St. John already must have been thinking in terms of the new committee that the arrival of the Scots Commissioners would necessitate.

On the 20 November, a petition from the City Militia emphasised the problems of providing both men and money for the army, and called for the recruiting of Essex's army.[3] The immediate result was the passing of votes for the Committee of Safety to provide £5,000 for Sir William Waller's forces out of various taxes in Kent, including sequestrations which had been earmarked for the Scots. This last source earned the opposition of both the younger Vane and St.John, promoters of the Scottish alliance.[4] Further, the same

1. Add.MSS. 31116, f.84v.
2. Commons Journal, III, p.299.
3. Ibid., p.315-6.
4. Harl.MSS. 165, f.213v.

committee was appointed to consider means for recruiting the Lord General's army. The stance adopted by the City, indicates an attitude different to that of Vane and even St. John - certainly, the Common Council was unhappy about the state and character of the army, but it also came to lose patience with the politically motivated delaying tactics employed in the Commons.

The activity of Recorder Glyn throughout the prolonged conflict over Essex's army, reflects this mood of impatience. In this matter, we find him consistently working against St. John. It was he who introduced the recruitment ordinance in November, involving a projected army of 10,000 foot and 4,000 horse. Whitelocke confused the riginal figures with the lower figures which were finally voted. He was undoubtedly correct in maintaining that Essex was discontented by the lower estimate, but this had nothing to do with Glyn.[1] Our next glimpse of the Recorder occurs towards the end of the month, when he presented an ordinance from the City Militia, authorising Colonel Browne and his officers to discover, imprison and levy fines upon malignants in Surrey and elsewhere. On a broad 'party' assessment, such a measure would tempt us to

1. Ibid., ff.231,231v-232, 233-233v, 242v.; Whitelocke, Memorials, pp.76,77.

place Glyn alongside a radical like William Strode, except that even he opposed these arbitrary powers.

Of course, the explanation of Glyn's position is local - this time an early indication of the antagonism between the City and the outparts.[1] A month later, D'Ewes believed that a petition presented from the City government for hastening the Lord General's ordinance, had been procured largely by Glyn.[2] Apart from recruitment, this petition also emphasised the need to reform Essex's officers,[3] a claim that was amply justified by the facts revealed in the subsequent reports and debates of this matter. Glyn's association with this petition indicates that it would be premature at this time to allocate him to Essex's group.

There was another factor which tended to weaken the close accord between City and 'middle group' that had characterised their relations in 1643: the election of a more moderate Mayor, Sir John Wollaston. On the 22 January 1643/44 a formal expression was made of the concern of the new leadership of the City to restore the conventional authority of the Mayor, Aldermen and Common Council. An order was made against any presuming, in the name of the

1. Harl.MSS.165, ff.253v-254; L. Glow, 'Pym and Parliament: The Methods of Moderation', Jour.Mod.Hist. xxxvi (1964), 387-8.
2. Harl.MSS. 165, f.284.
3. Lords Journal, 6, pp.395-6.

City, to procure any ordinance or to prefer any petition to the Houses without the consent of that assembly.[1] Thus, financial exhaustion and a desire for a peaceful settlement resulted in the City governors pressing for all the parliament's military resources to be mobilised for a final effort. As the City press shows, this attitude also found expression, paradoxically, in support for the moves of the anti-Essex element at Westminster to create the Committee of both Kingdoms, as a means of co-ordinating military and financial policies, and of overcoming the crippling jealousies of commanders.[2] Hence, the temper of the City government appears to have lain between the more precise attitudes displayed by the two main groups at Westminster.

A major problem in interpreting the political alignments in the House of Commons at this time of considerable political flux, is the fact that personal conflicts and particular interests were so easily concealed by the broader appeal of the grandees to the privileges of the House. Yet in the main, the position of the Earl of Essex and his group is clear, because the changes that members such as Vane and St. John were seeking to introduce

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1. Journal of Common Council, vol.40, f.87.
2. Brit.Mus., Thomason Tracts, E 37 (2), Mercurius Britanicus no.26, pp.204, 206; E 37(7), The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer No.47, p.380; E 37(24), The Scottish Dove, no.22, p.176.

were regarded by Essex and Holles as directly impinging on the Lord General's military and political standing, as indeed they did. Of course, they did not lose sight of the broader implications of these changes upon the issue of war and peace.

Were there any concrete indications of a propensity for peace on their part in the first half of 1644? Rumours and slanders abounded against the Lord General. At the end of November 1643, Essex, Holles and Sir Philip Stapleton were named amongst the papers of Sir Henry Anderson in connection with certain peace propositions.[1] In December, Baillie was interpreting the moves to strengthen Essex's army, as a design to enable a 'strong party' to command a peace on their own terms. An indication that military influence and political power were never far divorced in the calculations of politicians, and that the attitude of the Scots was far from friendly towards the Earl of Essex in early 1644.[2]

His part in engineering the return of the earls of Holland, Clare and Bedford from Oxford was received with very mixed feelings, especially the return of Holland, whom the opponents of a compromise peace recognised as an

1. L.J. 6, p.318; Hist.MSS.Comm.5th Report (House of Lords MSS.), p.108.
2. Baillie, Letters, ii, 118-9.

influential and able politician, who, at all costs should be kept out of the parliament. Since the Upper House took the opposite view over his admission, the apprehensions of Vane, St. John and others came to be voiced in the context of a confrontation between the two Houses, which helped them to swing opinion in the Commons against his re-entry.[1] On the other hand, the constant support of Holles and Stapleton for Holland in the Lower House bears testimony to the personal and political interest of the Lord General in the reinstatement of his colleague.[2]

This prolonged episode concerning the Earl of Holland figured as one ingredient in a series of unpleasant accusations and counter-accusations that seriously damaged parliamentary unity in late 1643 and early 1644, and did much to harden the factions already discernible amongst the leading members at Westminster. Again, one is struck by the highly personal character of much of the manoeuvring for political advantage in the 1640s. The spate of accusations laid against several lords who held military commands[3] need not detain us further, but other intrigues were more central to Essex and his group in the parliament.

The imprisonment of the two Hothams probably did much to alienate Sir Philip Stapleton from Pym's group, and

1. Harl.MS.165, f.230v.
2. e.g., CJ III, p.308.
3. Stamford, Denbigh, Grey and Willoughby.

it is highly likely that he was involved in the attempt to use Nathaniel Fiennes, who had surrendered Bristol to Prince Rupert, as a pawn in the struggle to save his kinsmen.[1] On the 6 January came the revelation of the Brooke Plot by young Vane, St. John and Hazelrig, and of the design of the king and his advisers to summon a parliament at Oxford. There was an apparently universal condemnation of Charles's duplicity.[2] On the 30 January, the Lords presented to the Commons a letter sent from the members at Oxford to the Lord General, which was committed to twelve members, including the leaders of both factions. It was Holles who reported their opinion that since it was subscribed by traitors, and did not mention the parliament at Westminster, it should not be communicated to the Houses. Walter Yonge tells us that the letter was supposed to be an invitation to peace.[3]

How is one to interpret the attitude of Essex's group? It is just possible that the reaction of Essex's adherents reflected a more intimate response to the king's scheming, for on the 8 January young Vane revealed that Sir John Clotworthy had been involved in the release of Colonel Read, a leading figure in Sir Basil Brooke's design.[4]

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1. Fiennes, Vindiciae Veritatis, pp.46-7; also v.supra, p.37.
2. Addit.MSS.18779, ff.41v-45v.
3. Ibid., f.58v.; CJ III, pp.382, 383.
4. Addit.MSS.31116, f.106.

The name of Colonel Edmund Harvey also figures in the testimonies, a City officer closely associated with Essex's army and with his political followers at Westminster.[1] In view of the revelations of royalist approaches to the Independent ministers, Nye and Goodwin, and the designs on Aylesbury, it is very probable that Lord Digby had also made an approach to the more pacific leaders of Essex's group, and that unlike their opponents, this group had reacted more favourably in the hope of reaching a settlement before the entry of the Scots. We should not ignore Agostini's references to the desire for peace prevailing among several leading citizens,[2] which Brooke's design was meant to further, and its revelation by Vane and St.John to diminish.

If the allies of Essex had been so involved, then they must have felt in an exposed position, especially with his involvement in the Earl of Holland's return, and the attempts of Holles to reduce the impact of the suspicions voiced by young Vane against the mission of the French ambassador, the Prince d'Harcourt. The debate concerning Harcourt occurred on the 23 December, 1643, and it is of interest in that it provides us with a rare glimpse

1. Brit.Mus.Addit.MSS.37344 (Whitelocke's Annals), f.25; Holles, Memoirs, p.210.
2. Cal.S.P. Venetian 1643-7, pp.61,67.

of Holles's attitude to the crucial issue of peace. In response to Harcourt's desire for a pass to go to Oxford, Vane produced evidence of French attempts to dissuade the Scots from marching into England on the grounds that Harcourt was resolved to propound such conditions of peace as might secure the subjects of England in the full enjoyment of all their privileges and liberties. Holles immediately expressed his concurrence with the French position as being 'the profession of all honest hearts', and that they desired such a peace as might restore Prince and People to their ancient, true and undoubted rights, and secure them for the future.[1] Whittaker shows that Vane emphasised Harcourt's negotiations in London,[2] and it is highly likely that Essex's group was involved in them, especially bearing in mind their continuing contact with the successive French ambassadors and agents between 1644 and 1647, Sabran, Montereul and Bellièvre, with all of whom the Earl of Holland in particular appears to have had an intimate connection.[4]

The Lovelace 'plot' provided the Lord General with an opportunity to turn the tables on the younger Vane.[3]

1. Harl.MSS.165, ff.256-256v.
2. Addit.MSS.31116, f.103v.
3. Baillie, Letters, ii, 135-6.
4. v. infra, pp.133,134, 233

As one of many royalist designs hatched at this time, the Lord Lovelace had contacted Vane with expressions of royal favour towards him and 'his party'.[1] Vane's use of Moses Wall, chaplain to the Earl of Warwick, as his agent in this design, provides a connection between the revelation of these contacts and the efforts of Essex's group to achieve the reinstatement of the Earl of Holland. Indeed, Baillie tells us that Vane and St. John were approached to support Holland in return for 'fair quarter',[2] while the City press also referred to some who had deserted the parliament as having put on this business.[3]

There could not have been a better time for the revelation of the communications between Vane and Lord Lovelace. Essex reported his intelligence thereof to the Upper House on the 17th, but the younger Vane played his cards with unerring skill, and forestalled the impact of a message from the Lords by laying bare the whole purpose and character of his negotiation to the Commons and securing its approbation on the same day.[4] The Lord General's bombshell had failed to explode, and Holles was faced with a renewed onslaught against Holland, led by Vane himself,

1. Addit.MSS.18779, f.49v.
2. Baillie, Letters, ii, 135.
3. E30, The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer, no.41, p.315.
4. L.J. 6, p.318; C.J. III, p.369; Addit.MSS.18779, f.49v.

aided by a series of severe votes passed by Samuel Browne's committee. Essex's attempt to make further capital by examining the agents employed in the contacts with Lord Lovelace was opposed by 'Sir Philip Stapleton, Mr. Hollis, & others, of the Generall's partie',[1] and, indeed, Vane and St. John were enabled by this rash action to convert the struggle into one of Commons' privileges,[2] a favourite tactic of theirs for arousing the support of the Lower House over issues which met with the opposition of the Lords.

In some ways, the political conflicts and antagonisms that marked the turn of the year can be regarded as a jockeying for place on the part of the leading politicians at Westminster in preparation for the entry of the Scots. In particular, this is true of the younger Vane and St.John, the inheritors of Pym's alliance with the Covenanters. Their acute appreciation of the temper of the Commons and their superior tactical ability enabled them to stifle the pacific reaction to the alliance, to brush aside the attempt of Essex's group to taint them with treachery, and to use the issue of recruitment as a means of forcing through a radical reorganisation of the machinery for managing the war.

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1. Baillie, Letters, ii, 136.
2. C.J. III, pp.375-6.

The Committee of Both Kingdoms

The struggle over the creation and powers of the Committee of both Kingdoms was recognised by all concerned at Westminster as involving a radical change in the relations between the military and civil authorities - in military terms it involved the ordained authority of the Earl of Essex as Captain General of the parliament's forces; in civil terms, the desire of many members and citizens for a firmer parliamentary grip on the planning and conduct of the war than the Committee of Safety had exercised hitherto. In simple terms, it was the Lord General's political influence and military independence of action which were in jeopardy, and his supporters in both Houses conducted a prolonged battle against this threat, which it is necessary to look at in some detail.

The creation of the Committee of both Kingdoms represented the major objective of Vane, St. John and their adherents in early 1644, and they undoubtedly planned their strategy very carefully, using every technique of parliamentary management and propaganda open to them. It was clear that such a committee would need to be voted, but they were determined to prevent a mere addition of the Scots Commissioners to the existing Committee of Safety with its sizeable complement of pacific members. The

Scots and their English allies were concerned to secure the creation of a committee which in size, composition and authority would reflect and further the greater commitment to a vigorous conduct of the war against the king inherent in the Scottish alliance.[1]

These various characteristics of the new committee clearly involved issues that transcended narrow faction politics, but I would maintain that the predictable opposition of Holles and his colleagues, which emerges clearly from records of the debates, necessitated the employment by Vane and St. John of tactics of a 'party' complexion. Although the broader issues of policy are touched upon in this chapter it is my prime concern to analyse the tactics and manoeuvring involved in the voting of the Committee of both Kingdoms. Of course such an analysis runs the risk of creating an exaggeratedly conspiratorial picture of events. But, I would contend that the analysis I offer is inherently feasible, it does not do injustice to the evidence such as it is, and it certainly fits in with the accounts and suspicions of Essex's group.

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1. C.V. Wedgwood, The King's War 1641-1647 (London, 4th edn., 1967), p.294.

On the 29 January, Mr. Chiesley, the secretary to the Scots Commissioners, reported the entry of the Scots army into Northumberland, and on the following day John Crew fired the first round in the struggle for control of the new joint committee, and an ordinance was introduced for establishing it, twice read and committed.[1] The failure to appreciate the importance of this ordinance has led some historians to misread the strategy of Vane and St. John.[2] Judging by the description of the ordinance in the Commons Journal, its proposals were relatively mild.[3] Having broached the matter in the Lower House, a much more extreme ordinance was introduced into the Upper House, perhaps by Lord Say, and according to Baillie passed with little difficulty.[4]

It is true that there are variations in the accounts of the progress of these two ordinances. But the differences are more apparent than real, for an underlying unity of purpose can be discerned if one emphasises the techniques of parliamentary management. Some confusion perhaps has been created by the fact that although D'Ewes

1. CJ III, p.382; Harl.MSS. 165, f.287.
2. W. Notestein, 'The Establishment of the Committee of Both Kingdoms', Amer.Hist.Rev., xvii (1912), 482. This analysis has been followed in some recent studies, e.g. L. Mulligan, 'The Scottish Alliance and the Committee of Both Kingdoms, 1644-46', Historical Studies, xiv (1970), 173; V.F. Snow, Essex the Rebel (Univ.Nebraska Press, 1970), pp.418 and note 36, 419.
3. CJ III, p.382.
4. Pearl, Eng.Hist.Rev., lxxxi (1966), 509.

and Walter Yonge show that Crew set the wheels in motion two days before the more extreme Lords' ordinance, the former matter was immediately referred to the Committee for Foreign Affairs, and so its significance possibly concealed. We can assume that Crew was not acting alone, but in conjunction with his colleague, St. John. It is possible that Baillie was unaware of the different character of the two ordinances when he stated that St. John and Vane had drafted the Lords' ordinance together with the Scots Commissioners. Yet both ordinances may have been aspects of a common design, to secure an ordinance with authority sufficient for their political purposes, which they did. Baillie tells us that the Scots were satisfied with the outcome of this struggle,[1] and even if Vane did not get all he wanted, the fact that he did not figure at all in accounts of the lengthy debate of the 3 February perhaps indicates that he was willing to cut his losses.[2]

Essex's group was completely out-manoeuvred by the pro-Scottish group in the two Houses. They were led to direct their vehemence against the ordinance from the Lords,[3] thus providing Crew's ordinance with a smoother passage. Where the Lords' ordinance was concerned, the Scots

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1. Baillie, Letters, ii, 142.
2. Addit.MSS. 18779, ff.61-62v.
3. V. infra, pp.69-70.

Commissioners astutely approached Essex himself to inform the Houses of their instructions to treat with commissioners of the parliament about managing their joint affairs.[1] The ordinance obviously was already prepared, and passed the House perhaps when it was thinly attended, or it might even have secured Essex's support because he was named. Baillie maintained that the Lord General only turned against it when men like Holles convinced him that the new committee would be detrimental to his authority.[2]

The important debate in the House of Commons on the 3 February dealt with the crucial issue of the powers to be invested in the new committee, and particularly with the power of making war and peace without reference to a parliamentary vote. But, the unfavourable response of the Commons revealed in Walter Yonge's diary[3] had the effect of highlighting the tactical manoeuvring of St. John and Vane. Both aspects of this debate upon Lord Say's ordinance must be considered.

If Vane and St. John were parties to the preparation of this ordinance what role did the inclusion of the power over 'whatsoever may concern the Peace of His Majesty's Dominions' play in their calculations? Although there is

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1. L.J. 6, p.405.
2. Baillie, op.cit., 141. Sir Philip Stapleton was also named.
3. Addit.MSS. 18779, ff. 61-62v.

no reason to doubt that they would have welcomed the investing of such a power in the Committee of both Kingdoms, they must have been aware of the likely hostility of the Commons. It is possible that the inclusion of this clause in Lord Say's ordinance prepresented primarily the position of the Scots Commissioners, an interpretation that gains some credence from St. John's use of the Scottish system as an example of the advantages of an executive committee,[1] and from Baillie's reference to the involvement of the Scots Commissioners in the preparation of the Lords' ordinance.[2]

Of course, it is possible that Vane and St. John hoped to secure a swift acceptance of Lord Say's ordinance in the Commons after its rapid passage through the Upper House, but they came up against powerful opposition, particularly from lawyers concerned about the privileges of the House. This concern was augmented by the political antagonism of Holles, Sir William Lewis and Robert Reynolds. Sir William Lewis, a constant adviser of the Lord General, directed suspicion at the Lords' ordinance implying that there had been collusion with the Scots Commissioners,[3] and

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1. Ibid., f.61.
2. Baillie, Letters, ii, 141.
3. J. L. Mulligan, 'Peace Negotiations, Politics and the Committee of Both Kingdoms, 1644-46', Hist.Jour., xii (1969), 5: Mrs. Mulligan accords to the Scots a moderate role, which separated them from such members as the younger Vane from the Committee's inception, and made them acceptable to the 'peace party'. I disagree.

accusing its promoters of attempting to manage the Commons by getting it passed by the Lords first. Reynolds was even more astute, recognising the probable connection between the two ordinances of Lord Say and John Crew.[1]

The response of St. John to the distaste expressed in the Commons can result in very different interpretations of his role in the establishment of the Committee of both Kingdoms. Having referred to the Scottish system, he proceeded to cast doubt not only on the extent of the power granted to the new committee by Lord Say's ordinance, but also upon the number voted by the Lords: 'we may finde inconveniences in soe numerous a number'. St. John then concluded by recommending the referral of the ordinance to a select committee.[2] What is the significance of this contribution to the debate of the 3 February?

At first sight it would seem to weaken the claim that Lord Say's ordinance was the outcome of the joint deliberations of the Scots Commissioners and Vane and St. John. And yet, it is also possible that St. John was here reacting to the mood of the House at a point when the going was getting rough for Lord Say's ordinance.

1.Addit.MSS. 18779, f.61; Addit.MSS. 31116, f. 113v.
2.Addit.MSS. 18779, ff. 61-62v.

Is it not possible that in drawing attention to the numerical composition of the projected committee and in urging the consideration of the Lords' ordinance by a committee, St. John was directing the attention of the House towards Crew's ordinance and attempting to prevent any precipitate votes? It does seem that both before and after his contribution to the debate the attention of some leading opponents was attracted to Crew's ordinance.[1] Hence, I would argue in favour of a direct connection between the unfavourable response of the Commons to Lord Say's ordinance, the ambiguous contribution of St. John to the debate on that ordinance, and the subsequent emphasis by the House on John Crew's ordinance.

Whether or not Vane and St. John were parties to Lord Say's ordinance, the fact that the names of the members

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1. Infra, p. 72.

of the new committee were not expressed in Crew's ordinance became crucial to their strategy, because thereby it became an attractive alternative to the Lords' ordinance. We find even Holles urging that the House should proceed with Crew's ordinance. Whitelocke also recommended the appointment of a committee to consider of another way 'by the first ordinance or otherwise.'[1] On the 7 February, it was Crew's ordinance which passed, together with amendments reported from a committee chaired by Crew himself.

These amendments represented a further aspect of Vane's strategy, for not only did they include the same numbers as the Lords' ordinance and an improved ratio of Commons to Lords for the quorum, but they also involved the voting of the same members of both Houses named in the Lords' ordinance. Because Crew's ordinance had not named the members, Holles had preferred it, as still offering the opportunity of his being appointed, but now the committee, of which Crew was the chairman, simply transposed the names in the Lords' ordinance by means of an amendment, which passed the Commons after a 'hott debate', and against the opposition of both Holles and Sir William Lewis.[2] One cannot help but sympathise with Holles's comment upon the strategy of his opponents concerning the Committee of both Kingdoms -

1. Addit.MSS.18779, f.61.
2. C.J. III, p.391; Harl.MSS.166, f.9.

> 'in packing whereof, and keeping out some persons whom our Masters did disaffect, they used such juggling, as never was heard of before in Parliament.....'[1]

Rather than representing a real 'middle group' compromise,[2] it is possible that this ordinance approximated closely to that which Vane, St. John and the Scots Commissioners had determined to get through the two Houses, falling well within the two limits they themselves had set: Lord Say's ordinance and Crew's ordinance.[3]

An anti-Essex flavour to the composition of the new committee is not readily discernible, but an analysis of the political attitudes and other interests of its members does reveal such a flavour. As we have seen, even a deceptive deference for Essex's interests was involved with the nomination of Stapleton.[4] The City was another interest that could not be ignored - hence the inclusion of Recorder Glyn, although apparently sympathetic to Essex. As Treasurer of the Lord General's army, Sir Gilbert Gerard could be regarded as yet another Essex man, but his support for the Scottish alliance indicates that he was not an intimate of the Earl. Apart from these concessions, the political character of the other members was not favourable to Essex.

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1. Holles, Memoirs, p.14.
2. Pearl, op.cit., 513.
3. v. infra, p.100 for further comment on this interpretation.
4. v. supra, p. 68, note 2.

It is perhaps even more instructive to look at those leading men of the Committee of Safety who were now omitted from the new committee, especially Holles, Sir John Meyrick and possibly Sir John Clotworthy. The Earl of Pembroke was also omitted, and was to figure in later attempts by Essex's group to alter the composition of the Committee of both Kingdoms.[1] The Scots Commissioners probably had a hand in the exclusion of Clotworthy, but their English allies would have needed no prompting to drop Holles and Meyrick, both leading figures of Essex's circle.

The balance of military and civil members of the committee must also have been a major consideration for Vane and St. John, since they were very much concerned to bring under its control the directing of the war.[2] During the campaigning season, Vane could hope to secure a balance of eight members favourable to him,[3] as against two sympathetic to Essex.[4] Amongst the lords, there would be three regular attenders, only one of whom might be politically close to the Lord General,[5] whilst the quorum only called for the presence of one of them. In other words, none of Essex's close advisers would be present to obstruct the committee whilst campaigning was in progress. These advisers were only too well aware of the significance of this unfavourable

1. L.J. 6, p.562. xxxxxxxx
2. Addit.MS.18779, f.65v.
3. The two Vanes, Pierrepoint, Armine, Crew, Wallpp, St.John and Browne.
4. Glyn and Sir Gilbert Gerard.
5. Earl of Northumberland.

balance - it explains their action, after failing to prevent the preparation of peace propositions by the Committee of both Kingdoms, in attempting to secure their passage through that committee before the Lord General left London.[1]

There was still one hurdle for the pro-Scottish group to surmount - since the Commons had laid aside the Lords' ordinance, it was now necessary for Crew's ordinance to receive the concurrence of the Upper House. Whatever the reasons for the Lords passing the more extreme ordinance on the 1 February, by the 8th realisation of the import of the strategy of Vane and St. John had dawned both on the House and on Essex himself. A prolonged struggle ensued between the two Houses, marked by several distinct issues concerning the authority and continuation of the new committee. Whitelocke rightly maintained that the Lords opposed the Committee

> 'because divers of that Committee, especially of the Commons, were apprehended not to be so much the General's friends as others who were desired to be brought in.'[2]

The confrontation also spread into the military field impeding the ordinance for associating the four southern counties under Waller, and the renewal of the Earl of Manchester's ordinance, as well as affecting preparations for Essex's army.

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1. infra, pp.87-8.
2. Whitelocke, Memorials, p.83.

Much of this confrontation was conducted under the guise of parliamentary privilege, which helped Vane and St. John to maintain their majority in the Commons. On the 12 February, the Lords dropped three of their four amendments to the Commons' ordinance,[1] and concentrated upon the amendment for leaving out the words 'order and direct'. But, despite the efforts of certain members to safeguard the Lord General's freedom of action in the field, we are told that the 'Solicitor, Prideaux & other violent spirits' carried it to adhere to the former resolution of the House.[2]

The Lords' votes of the 14th and 16th February apparently indicated a progressive surrender, but appearances were deceptive. On the 14th, the Lords voted a new ordinance accepting the words 'order and direct' provided the time-limit for the committee was halved to six weeks. The Commons recognised the intention of this measure introduced from a select committee by Essex himself, to be the prevention of the Committee of both Kingdoms from exercising its authority over him by ensuring that it lapsed before he took the field with his recruited army.[3] D'Ewes was amazed by the lords' 'submission' in this matter two days later, and maintained that 'the Lord Generall did hereby

1. L.J. 6, p.422.
2. Harl.MSS. 166, ff.2v-3v.
3. Addit.MSS. 31116, f.116v.

receive much discontent and discouragement'.[1] If he had known what Sir Peter Wentworth was to discover a fortnight later in the Lords Journal,[2] both his amazement and assessment of Essex's response would have found no place in his diary. For, on the 14th, the Lords framed an order of their House that if Essex disagreed with a direction from the Committee of both Kingdoms, he could suspend the execution of it until he had acquainted the two Houses. Thus it was with this proviso safeguarding the Lord General's independence of action that the Commons' ordinance passed the Upper House 'unanimously'. Again, it was to be Sir Peter Wentworth who discovered their declaration of the 21 February, maintaining their privilege to attend any committee of both Houses, and particularly the Committee of both Kingdoms.

The revelation of the Lords' votes of the 14th and 21st February caused considerable resentment in the Commons,[3] and they were attacked by both radicals and middle groupers who were particularly concerned with the vote diminishing the power of the committee to order and direct Essex.

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1. Harl.MSS.166, f.3v.
2. C.J.III, pp.411-2.
3. Addit.MSS. 31116, ff.120-120v.

Indeed, the matter was revived once more by the Commons in the struggle between the two Houses over peace propositions in March.[1]

Whether one views the ordinances introduced by Lord Say and John Crew as representing two ingredients in a common recipe or as unconnected responses to the Scottish alliance, it cannot be denied that the younger Vane and St. John used the reaction of the Lower House to Lord Say's ordinance to secure a crucial tactical victory over Essex's group and the more pacific members of both Houses. Despite their apparent preference for a smaller Committee of both Kingdoms, Crew's ordinance and the reintroduction by Crew's committee of the names specified by Lord Say, indicate that the Vane-St. John group accepted from the beginning the number and probably the names in the Lords' ordinance. The outcome was the prevention of a mere reconstituting of the Committee of Safety with the addition of the Scots Commissioners; possibly a course which Essex's group mistakenly took for granted.

Although the Lords conducted a lengthy campaign of obstruction after the Commons had passed the ordinance, the Vane-St. John group were able to wear down their obstinacy by utilising City opinion, the concern of the Lower House for its privileges, and by obstructing

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1. L.J.6, pp.477-8, infra, p.85.

preparations for the Lord General's army. Important as it was, the establishment of the Committee of both Kingdoms represented only a partial victory for the allies of the Scots. In the military field the implementation of its orders would depend to a great extent upon Essex's readiness to obey them. I must now devote some space to an analysis of the military situation after February, and the extent to which the revival of peace moves influenced the tactics of Essex's group in the matter of military preparations.

War and Peace

The extent to which military matters had been eclipsed by the struggle over the Committee of both Kingdoms is indicated by the fact that the first matter that the Commons ordered to be referred to it was the speedy preparation of all parliamentary forces for action.[1] Two days later, on the 19 February, Scawen reported the Ordinance for recruiting Essex's army, and again St. John was amongst those who attempted to obstruct it, moving 'new & impertinent objections' possibly with a view to persuading the Lords to pass the oath of secrecy. And once more Glyn was found on the opposite side, together with Sir Philip Stapleton and Sir Henry Cholmeley.[2] The ordinance passed except

1. C.J. III, p.402.
2. Harl.MSS.166, f.15.

for the names of the commissioners to attend the army, and with a reduction of its monthly pay by £1,500. The 26th saw the appointment of a committee, sympathetic to Essex, to arrange with the Commissioners of the Excise for the speedy payment of £20,000 for the recruitment.[1]

It is clear that at this stage Essex and his adherents were working to effect the recruitment of his army, and this important vote owed much to pressure exerted from the Lord General's camp, and the counties in which his forces were quartered, especially Hertfordshire.[2] On the 26th D'Ewes tells us that the news of a mutiny at St. Albans 'made us all damp & sad', but it produced the intended result, in that Glyn was called upon to report that the £20,000 could be found by the Commissioners of the Excise, which was ordered to be paid in accordingly.[3] Yet, Essex's victory in this matter was to be marred by his opponents' emphasis upon another aspect of the City's petition of the 29 January - that of reforming the Lord General's army.

On the same day that the committee was appointed to consult with the Commissioners of the Excise, another committee was voted to present out of the lists of Essex's

1. C.J. VII, p.408;
2. L.J.6, pp.440-1.
3. Harl.MSS.166, f.18v.

army, the names of the officers for his reduced number of regiments. This committee included several leading opponents of Essex's interests, such as Tate, Gurdon, Prideaux, Sir Peter Wentworth and St. John, and not one of his own adherents. The scene was set for yet another prolonged struggle, but two external factors were to intervene. The first was the revival of interest in peace propositions stimulated by the receipt of a royal message and the arrival of the Dutch ambassadors, and the second the capitulation of Sir John Meldrum's army to Rupert before Newark. But at first Vane and St. John were determined to exercise control over the selection of officers for Essex's new army, even if it meant holding up its preparations to march. Their determination must have been greatly strengthened by the revelation of the Lords' vote on the 14 February concerning the independence of the Lord General.[1]

On the 5th the Lords informed the Lower House of their receipt of letters from the king.[2] The arrival of these letters was to change the priorities of Essex's group, for the subsequent referring of the preparation of peace propositions to the Committee of both Kingdoms made it imperative that the Lord General, Sir Philip Stapleton and the moderate peers in that committee should be in London,

1. V. supra, p. 77.
2. C.J. III, p.416.

and thus able to influence its deliberations and the response of the two Houses. This was the position Essex's adherents were finally forced to adopt, but only after a strenuous attempt to by-pass the Committee of both Kingdoms altogether in this crucial matter.

The debate on the 5 March concerning the faulty superscription on the king's letters, clearly indicated the opposed positions of the two factions, with St. John urging that the House should refuse to open them, and Sir John Clotworthy urging the opposite.[1] It was the 'Oxford faction'[2] who won this battle, and the following day Essex reported from a committee of the Lords a draft of the sense of the Upper House on the king's letter to be delivered to the House of Commons. Essex was also appointed to manage the conference, from which Holles reported to the Commons.[3] The Lower House accepted the Lords' recommendations, which had been astutely drafted to fit the mood of the Commons. The crux of the Lords' recommendations was the setting of a day for the king's return to London, for thereby both the Committee of both Kingdoms and the Scots Commissioners would have been by-passed. This purpose was disguised by an

1. Harl.MSS.166, ff.25-25v.
2. Baillie, Letters, ii, 187.
3. L.J. 6, pp.451-2; C.J.III, p.418.

expression of the Lords' desire for a declaration to be prepared, concerning the artifices of Charles's letter, by the Committee of both Kingdoms, 'because that, thereby, the Counsel and Advice of the Scots Commissioners may he had.'[1]

The naming of a day for the king's return, first voiced by Essex himself in the Lords, secured considerable support, and not just within the parliament, for 'the City was filled with the applause of that resolution'.[2] Not surprisingly, it caused great anxiety to the Scots Commissioners, who recognised the avoidance of their authority in this ploy and the power given to the two Houses to adopt an alternative means of settlement in the event of the king's refusal. After consultation with 'our best friends in private', the Scots Commissioners decided to agree to the sending of a letter from the Houses, provided that the naming of a day was deferred, a proviso that was accepted both by the Committee and by the two Houses.[3] Instead, the Commissioners proposed at the Committee of both Kingdoms that Articles and Propositions should be

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1. C.J. III, p.419.
2. Baillie, Letters, ii, 150; v. also Correspondence of the Scots Commissioners in London, 1644-1646, ed. H.W. Meikle (Roxburghe Club, Edinburgh, 1917) p.10.
3. Mulligan, Hist.Jour. xii (1969), 5,7: I do not know where Mrs. Mulligan finds evidence for the Scots sending their own moderate answer to the king, or that it was the Committee of both Kingdoms which insisted on naming a day for his return.

prepared, but they were persuaded to lay this aside on the grounds that the Commons would refuse to treat until they were acknowledged to be a free and full parliament.[1]

Yet one week after this assertion, we find Zouch Tate moving that the House should consider grounds for establishing a firm and safe peace. We are told that Tate was 'set on' by the younger Vane and the Solicitor, who, it would seem if true, were forced to change course by the report that the Dutch ambassadors intended to interpose for a peace.[2] The resolution was taken to refer the preparation of propositions to the Committee of both Kingdoms before the ambassadors' paper was read, allegedly 'to prevent the mediation of strangers',[3] but Vane and St. John undoubtedly had Essex's group in mind also. The latter had come close to carrying the Commons with them in their scheme for naming a day to Charles, and now the urge for a settlement was being revived from another quarter. Although it would seem that the allies of the Scots would have preferred to lay aside thoughts of propositions at the beginning of the campaigning season, their hands were forced by external circumstances. It now became their object to secure control of the process of preparing propositions by

1. Meikle (ed.), op.cit., p.11.
2. Harl.MS.166, f.33.
3. Meikle (ed.), op.cit., p.13.

the Committee of both Kingdoms, and this they did by emphasising the need for mutual advice with the Scots Commissioners.[1]

Neither Essex's group nor the majority of the peers were willing to accept the preparation of peace proposals by the Committee of both Kingdoms, and there ensued yet another prolonged struggle when the Lords proposed instead the appointment of a new committee for that purpose, consisting of 9 Lords and 18 Commons, to advise with the Scots Commissioners.[2] More heat was generated by the two Houses referring the Dutch ambassador's papers to the respective committees they favoured,[3] resulting in the revival of the previous differences over the Committee of both Kingdoms: the oath of secrecy and the Lords' vote of the 14 February in Essex's favour.[4] In addition, the Commons recognised the continuing attempt of the Lords to limit the say of the Scots Commissioners in the preparation of peace proposals. Also inherent in the opposition of the Upper House was concern at the necessary absence of many members of the Committee of both Kingdoms upon military service, and although this concern could only be voiced in numerical terms, Essex and his adherents were far more concerned with its political implications.[5]

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1. C.J.III, p.429.
2. L.J.6, p.472.
3. Ibid., pp.476, 477.
4. Supra, pp.77-8.
5. C.J.III, pp.433, 450.

On the 30th March, after two weeks of deadlock, the Commons divided evenly on the vote for concurring with the Lords in referring the Dutch ambassadors' paper to their committee of nine, and only the Speaker's casting vote carried it for the Noes. The Scots regarded this motion as an attempt to exclude them from any treaty,[1] but it is possible that more significance has been placed upon this vote than it merits. It can be regarded as representing the split of the 'middle group' over Scottish involvement,[2] but I believe that it represents rather a readiness on the part of many members to eliminate a secondary cause of obstruction when the Lord General made it clear that accepting the Lords' committee involved no surrender over the crucial issue of peace propositions.[3] It might well be that Essex, together with Holles and Stapleton, who were tellers for the Yeas, hoped that such a concession would be a means to secure the ultimate compliance of the Commons in the more important matter, but it would seem that on the lesser issue, concern for privileges was evenly balanced by concern for compromise in the Lower House.

In fact, a compromise was reached concerning the Dutch ambassadors on the 8 April, largely through the

1. Baillie, Letters, ii, 155.
2. Pearl, Eng.Hist.Rev., lxxxi (1966), 514.
3. C.J.III, pp.442-3.

efforts of Vane and St. John, whereby the Commons thought 'to bring themselves offe from the rocke with the Lo[rds]...', whilst seeking to satisfy the impatient ambassadors.[1] It is probable that the two men were attempting, at least in part, to repair the damage caused by a letter from the Scots Commissioners to the House of Lords, read there on the 4 April, which had led the Lords to question the competence of the commissioners to conclude peace proposals with the two Houses.[2]

But time was running short for the Lord General if he was to have any influence upon the peace propositions. Paradoxically, the defeat at Newark had both strengthened and weakened the hands of his adherents - strengthened them in pressing through the military preparations for his army, but weakened their political position in the struggle over peace proposals as the expectation of his departure grew. The significance of this was not lost on either faction, and it occasioned a dramatic reversal of roles, with Vane and St. John seeking to pressurise Essex into marching, whilst he now sought to delay this until the peace proposals had been prepared.

This reversal became clear on the 13 April when the Lords abandoned their position, and sent down an ordinance

1. Harl.MSS.166, ff.47-47v.
2. L.J.6, pp.500,501.

referring the business of peace propositions to the Committee of both Kingdoms.[1] But a proviso in their vote clearly indicated the reasons for this change of heart: the propositions had to be prepared by the 17 April. The Committee of both Kingdoms had already appointed the 19th to be the day for the general rendez-vous at Aylesbury, and the connection between these two dates was not lost on observers.[2] It is highly probable that St.John figured with Vane and Haselrig amongst 'those who were against the peace', and put off the second reading until the 15 April, thus rendering the Lords' proviso impossible.[3] The Commons voted that the propositions should be brought in by the 26th, or sooner if possible, which the Lords accepted.[4] The anxiety of Essex's group at the prospect of peace propositions is reflected in a letter from Holles to Sir John Potts, in which Holles referred to the order for the Committee to bring them in on the 26 April, and urged Potts to come up to Westminster as quickly as possible - 'The sooner you come before that time the more you shall meritt.'[5]

I left the military preparations of Essex's army at the beginning of March, 1644, with the appointment of a

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1. C.J.III, p.459.
2. Ibid., p.452; Meikle (ed.), op.cit., p.18.
3. Harl.MSS.166, f.48v.
4. C.J.III, pp.460,461.
5. Tanner MSS.61,f.14: Holles to Potts, 16 Apr.1644.

committee to select officers from the list of his existing officers. The Lord General impeded the committee, and was assisted by the reluctance of the Commons to follow the lead of more radical members. This enabled Essex's group to secure a series of concessions, culminating in the abandonment of the committee's efforts after the news of Newark. First, the articles offered by the committee were laid aside until they had consulted Essex, in accordance with the recommendation of Sir William Lewis.[1] Then the House adopted the motion of Sir Philip Stapleton and Sir Henry ~~Hugh~~ Cholmeley, after a hot debate, that the committee should advise Essex to compose one of his six horse regiments of reformado officers from his present forces.[2]

Essex won another victory over the committee on the 18 March when the Commons voted that he should appoint the officers of his own regiment, but the debate on the 20th revealed the continuing apprehension of Vane and St.John about the Lords' vote of the 14 February. Against the opposition of Sir Philip Stapleton and Glyn, they secured the addition to the recruitment ordinance of a proviso that the army should be subject to the order and direction of both Kingdoms.[3] The exasperation and suspicions of

1. Addit.MSS.18779,f.72.
2. Harl.MSS.166,f.27.
3. Addit.MSS.18779, f.79.

Essex's opponents had been voiced earlier to D'Ewes by Haselrig, who had stated 'That hee did not know whether it weere better That the L.Generall had an army or not, for they would obey no bodie.'[1]

On the 21 March, the committee for Essex's list, supported by Vane and Haselrig gave further expression to their suspicions by seeking to secure the appointment of the Earl of Manchester and Lord Robartes as Lieutenant General and Field Marshal respectively of Essex's army.[2] The object of this manoeuvre was presumably to strengthen the degree of control over Essex exercised by the Committee of both Kingdoms. The same committee was also ordered to advise with the Lord General concerning the list of his officers, but on the 26th the House voted that the whole matter should be left to him. It is not surprising to find Glyn speaking in favour of this motion, but it is against all expectation that it also received the support of young Vane. D'Ewes provides the reason for this reversal of attitude: 'Now value (of) L.Generrall taught by Newarke losse.'[3] This was reflected in the readiness of the Committee of both Kingdoms to remove all impediments to the recruitment of his army.[4]

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1. Harl.MSS.166,f.36.
2. Ibid., f.36v.
3. Ibid., f.40; v.also Cal.S.P.Ven., 1643-7, pp.87-8.
4. Cal.S.P.Dom., 164 ,p.70.

It was now imperative militarily for this army to march as quickly as possible, but as I have already stated, political reasons were soon to appear for the Lord General to delay his departure.[1] With the removal of the blocking tactics of Vane and St. John the whole parliamentary process accelerated appreciably in the matter of preparing the army; a development which was furthered by news of Waller's victory against the Earl of Forth and Sir Ralph Hopton.[2] On the 8 April, Sir Philip Stapleton reported the decision of the Committee of both Kingdoms to draw all the parliamentary forces together at Aylesbury on the 19th to fight with the king's forces 'to hoped to add an end'.[3] A new mood of optimism swept through both Houses and the City - a Common Hall was summoned to hear this resolution and to contribute to it, and we find that besides Vane and Waller, even leading moderate members, including Holles, urged the assistance of the City to put a speedy end to the war.[4] The City governors responded vigorously, hoping thereby to bring 'these calamities to an end, as the people desire.'[5]

Essex did not fail to take full advantage of the disaster at Newark, and his Remonstrance, presented to the

1. Supra, pp.81-2,87.
2. C.J.III, p.445.
3. Harl.MSS.166,f.47.
4. Whitelocke, Memorials, pp.81-2.
5. Cal.S.P.Ven., 1643-7, p.94.

Lords on the 8 April, amounted to a total indictment of the military policies of the Committee of both Kingdoms, and the political tactics of his opponents, which had rendered him 'altogether disenabled to move'. Yet, he did offer an expedient whereby the parliament could still see their 'Endeavours crowned with a happy and glorious Peace': to appoint a committee of both Houses to enlist the City's assistance in recruiting his army.[1] As we have seen, this was done,[2] and so it would seem that in early April Essex was seeking the same ends as Vane and St.John. But the Lord General was fully aware both of the political disadvantages of a departure from Westminster before the peace propositions had been settled, and also of the justification for delay that the problems of recruitment would provide. In a depressing account written on the day assigned for the general rendez-vous, Baillie maintained that 'the Generall will be recruiting till doomsday....'[3]

Serious financial difficulties, a constant problem facing the parliament, now operated in favour of Essex's determination to delay his departure. On the 17 April, a vote of the Committee of both Kingdoms was agreed to by the Commons, that those of his forces which were ready and could be supplied with money, should march towards the

1. L.J.6, pp. 505-6.
2. Supra, p.91.
3. Baillie, Letters, ii, 167.

rendez-vous.[1] Three days later, we discover that the contributions of the cities of London and Westminster towards Essex's army were already five weeks behind. Faced with this financial problem, the Lord General could ignore the call of men like Haselrig for his speedy advance.[2]

There was no lack of other issues to justify this delay, such as differences in the City over his army, and between the two Houses concerning the renewal of Manchester's ordinance. The antagonism of certain elements in the City towards Essex was expressed in several ways, not least by the difficulty experienced by the Commissioners of the Excise, who maintained that if he was upon his march, they would be able to secure the necessary money.[3] When notified of this on the 27 April, the Lord General stated that he would consult with his Council of War and return answer on the 29th,[4] no doubt bearing in mind that the two Houses had appointed the 1 May for the report of the peace propositions from the Committee of both Kingdoms.

In London there was also strong concern at the abandonment of the attempt to reform Essex's army upon the defeat before Newark. On the 25 April, Essex complained to

1. C.J.III, p.463.
2. Harl.MS.166, f.50v.
3. C.J.III, p.470.
4. Ibid., p.471.

the Upper House of speeches prejudicial to the recruitment and payment of his army, and on the 27th the Lords voted that a committee of both Houses should examine the business.[1] The examinations revealed in particular the activity of two citizens of Westminster at a meeting of the Militia Committee on the 18th, and again at the Guildhall on the following day, where they sought to counter the propositions for raising 20,000 men to recruit Essex's army by attempting to renew the call for reforming it.[2] Vane's attempt to revive the scarecrow of privilege over the Lords' committal of a member failed on this occasion, and the Commons appointed a committee to join with the Lords.[3]

Again, Essex was able to take advantage of the need to renew Manchester's ordinance to insist, as he had done with Waller's ordinance, that recognition of his supreme command be written into it. Once more, Vane and St.John worked together, this time in attempting to avoid the Lords' obstructionism.[4] The peace propositions were reported on the 29 April, and the next day the Commons were informed that Essex and many of his officers had attended the Committee of both Kingdoms, and had undertaken to march on the 4 May at

1. L.J.6, pp.527,529.
2. House of Lords MSS., Main Papers, 5 April-3 May 1644 (Victoria Tower, H. of Lords), ff.91-103v.
3. Addit.MSS.18779, f.97v.
4. Harl.MSS.166, f.53v.

the latest.[1] The struggle over Manchester's ordinance continued with the Lords giving full emphasis to the Lord General's supreme power over the militia as an expression of their own authority,[2] whilst St. John and Vane whipped up resentment against the Lords' reasons in the face of opposition from such moderates as D'Ewes and Sir Dudley North, as well as Holles and Stapleton.[3]

It would seem that Holles was anxious that the peace propositions should be debated as quickly as possible, and voiced his concern at the inconvenience of having them concluded by the Scots first, and so finding that nation engaged to them before they could be concluded at Westminster. That this fear of Scottish influence was well founded is indicated by the fact that the articles agreed upon unanimously by the Committee of both Kingdoms, were drafted mainly by Lord Warriston, one of the Scots Commissioners.[4]

The propositions themselves clearly reflected this Scottish influence in two areas. The first was the characteristic prominence of the religious propositions with their emphasis upon the abolition of episcopacy and endeavours for uniformity. The second involved the powers

1. C.J.III, p.473.
2. Cal.S.P. Ven., 1643-7, p.100.
3. Harl.MSS.166, ff.54, 54v., 55v-56.
4. Baillie, Letters, ii, 178.

of the Commissioners to be appointed by the parliaments of England and Scotland to supervise certain aspects of royal government. The peculiarly Scottish feature was the authority accorded to the Commissioners of both Kingdoms to participate in matters that solely related to one of the kingdoms.[1]

On 16 April 1644 the Committee of both Kingdoms had appointed a sub-committee to join with the Scots Commissioners in the preparation of the propositions. Of the seven English members only the Recorder was sympathetic to Essex on past showing,[2] and yet by 1646 the erstwhile allies of the Scots on the sub-committee were to reveal their adamant opposition to the joint nature of the propositions of 1644.[3]

The first proposition was passed on the 3 May, but in a thin House St. John and Prideaux were able to defeat the attempt of Holles and Stapleton to ensure the continuation of the debate on the following day.[4] On the 7 May the Commons agreed to the religious articles with only one amendment, but one which summed up the differences of religious outlook between the majority of the Commons and the Scots.[5] Ironically, the desire of Essex's group to conclude the peace propositions was

1. Rushworth VI, pp.850-55.
2. Cal.S.P.Dom., 1644, p.122
3. infra, pp.285-6.
4. C.J.III, p.478.
5. C.J.III, pp.483-4, esp. the replacement of the word 'Advice' by the word 'Consultation' in the passage, 'That Reformation of Religion, according to the Covenant, be settled by Act of Parliament, in such manner as both Houses shall agree upon, after Advice from the Assembly of Divines.....'

obstructed by the conflict between the two Houses over Manchester's ordinance, and the ordinance for excluding members who had deserted the Parliament.

Even more damaging to their designs for peace was the revival of the conflict concerning the Committee of both Kingdoms. On the 6 May, the Commons voted that Prideaux bring in an ordinance presently for continuing that committee for a further three months. This was probably meant to have the dual purpose of diverting the attention of the uncommitted members from the peace propositions and of forestalling the Lords and Essex's group as the timespan of the committee drew to a close.

The immediate response of the Lords to the news of this vote was the presentation of another ordinance by the Earl of Stamford for establishing a new committee consisting of 12 Lords and 24 Commons.[1] This ordinance was rather the expression of the general concern of the Lords for their privileges and for a greater say in the Council of State, than the result of any design by Essex's group. We can be misled in this, for there were two Lords' ordinances drawn up at this time. D'Ewes refers to Holles, as well as Glotworthy and Reynolds, amongst the new members nominated in the Lords' ordinance; but, in fact, Holles was not named in Stamford's ordinance.[2]

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1. L.J.6, p.542.
2. Harl.MS.166, f.58v; L.J.6, p.542.

Yet perhaps we would expect a man like Sir John Clotworthy to have supported Stamford's ordinance as being an improvement on the existing Committee. Why then do we find Clotworthy acting as teller with Haselrig against the question for reading Stamford's ordinance on the 7 May?[1] Does it indicate his support for the original Committee? I think that this is highly questionable, for his reaction should be gauged in relation to a vote of the 6 May for the consideration of the peace propositions the first thing the following morning.[2] It was Haselrig who was supporting the original Committee of both Kingdoms, whilst Clotworthy was seeking to implement the vote of the previous day, thus revealing once more his constant desire for a speedy peace settlement.

Indeed, after the voting of the propositions concerning religion on the 7 May, apart from a revealing vote in the Lords on the 24th on the divisive 17th proposition about the militia,[3] the propositions faded away before the growing concentration of attention upon the military campaigning, and the prolonged clash between the two Houses

1. C.J.III, p.483: it should be noted that neither of the tellers in favour of reading Stamford's ordinance were leaders of Essex's group.
2. Ibid., p.482.
3. L.J.6, pp.566-7: Lincoln, Stamford, Willoughby and Hunsdon dissented from the proposition for permanent control of the militia by commissioners nominated by the two Houses.

over the second ordinance voted by the Lords on the 10 May for a new Committee of both Kingdoms. It was this ordinance that represented the challenge of Essex's group, and Clotworthy was named, along with Holles and Reynolds, amongst its supporters.[1] It named only the Lords, since Stamford's ordinance had antagonised the Commons by naming their members also.[2]

But time was running short for Essex, a fact which enabled Vane and St. John once more to out-manoeuvre his adherents. The Lord General could not put off his departure much longer - indeed, on the 11 May he informed the Lords of his intention to join his army on the 13th. The air of expectancy in the City also militated against the successful elimination of the lapsed Committee of both Kingdoms. The same day that Prideaux reported the Lords' second ordinance to the Commons, a petition was presented to the Upper House by certain aldermen and citizens urging them to agree with the Commons. This was followed on the 16th by a more urgent petition to the House of Commons for the re-establishment of the Committee.[3]

By the 14 May Essex was with his army, and it now became a major object of the Lords' obstructionism to

1. Baillie, Letters, ii, 154-5.
2. Harl.MSS.166, f.58v.
3. L.J.6, p.550; C.J.III, pp.490,495.

secure his freedom from the 'order and direction' of the lapsed Committee of both Kingdoms. If so, his freedom of action was short-lived, for on the 22nd William Strode took advantage of the Commons' exasperation to reintroduce Lord Say's ordinance of the 1 February, which had then been laid by as being 'too monstrous & vast in power'.[1] Holles, Reynolds, Whitelocke and Maynard were amongst those who opposed it, but in the event,'rather than .... we should want ye service of yt Ctee', it passed by 43 voices.[2] Perhaps it is indicative that Crew's ordinance in February had been the real object of the design of Vane and St.John, that on Pierrepoint's recommendation[3] an ordinance was proposed and passed placing in the Committee of both Kingdoms only its previous powers, plus an oath of secrecy, and restoring the description of its relationship with the Scots Commissioners in accordance with their desires.[4]

The failure of Essex's attempts either to alter the composition of the Committee or to obstruct its authority over him did not bode well for the approaching campaign. With Manchester's return into the north expectations for the southern campaign came to be concentrated on the armies of the irreconcilable Lord General and Sir William Waller.

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1. Supra, pp.68-71 for the attitude of the House in February.
2. Addit.MSS. 31116, f.139v.; C.J.III, p.503.
3. Harl.MSS. 166, f.64v.
4. C.J.III, pp.505-6; Meikle (ed.), op.cit., p.31; v.supra, p.73.

Their appointed task was to defeat the king's army at Oxford if possible - if not, then Waller was to march into the West. The question was whether Essex would be willing to abide by the orders and directions of the Committee, against which he had fought so tenaciously. Although the Lord General possibly did not realise it, his military future was to depend upon the answer he gave during the campaign of 1644.

The Committee went to considerable lengths to secure the co-ordination of military activity throughout England,[1] only to find its plans and delicate financial arrangements disrupted by Essex's response to the king's escape from Oxford on the 3 June. In embarking upon the role assigned to Waller, the Lord General effectively burned the last of his bridges, and based the outcome of his conflict with the Committee of both Kingdoms solely upon the criterion of his military success.

Although the exigencies of military affairs resulted in the Commons' acceptance of Essex's insistence on continuing in the West, there can be little doubt that Vane and St. John were completely alienated from him by this flouting of the orders of the Committee of both Kingdoms. The Lord General's letters to that Committee, like his

1. Cal.S.P.Dom., 16[illegible], pp.197-8.

earlier Remonstrance,[1] made his inflexible antagonism towards it absolutely plain. For instance, his letter of the 14 June made slighting references to their contradictory commands, gave a condescending explanation of the military realities in the West, bitterly attacked Waller and the independence accorded him by the Committee - 'pardon me, if I make bold to order and direct[2] my own Major (General)' - and finally maintained that for him to follow their directions would result in disaster. At Westminster the great mistrust that some had felt at the time of Essex's departure[3] was now heightened by his disobedience, reports of the lethargic strategy of his commanders,[4] and by disquieting indications that Charles intended to approach him for their joint promotion of a peace settlement.[5]

By July 1644, then, the Scots alliance had provided the justification for the creation of the Committee of both Kingdoms, the establishment of which had been opposed vigorously by the Earl of Essex and his adherents in both Houses. They recognised in it constitutional, military and political developments, which threatened to postpone attempts to secure peace, to render the Scots arbiters of any

1. Supra, pp. 91-2.
2. My underlining: the heavy sarcasm is obvious.
3. Cal.S.P.Ven., 1643-7, p. 102: Harl.MSS.166, ff.61v-62.
4. Harl.MSS.166, f.77v.
5. Cal.S.P.Dom., 1644, pp.314-5, 317.

settlement, and to restrict severely the independence and initiative of the Lord General in the field and at Westminster.

I have traced the tactics adopted by his opponents in effecting the creation of the new Committee, and the extent to which they were able thereby, with the assistance of the Scots Commissioners, to counter the attempts of men like Holles and Clotworthy to achieve a swift settlement devoid of Scottish participation and influence. Peace propositions were prepared, but by the Committee of both Kingdoms, and reflected Scottish aspirations to a marked degree, and after their despatch to Scotland Vane and St.John succeeded in concentrating parliamentary attention on military affairs. On his part Essex expressed his political antagonism towards the Committee of both Kingdoms by his march into the West, thereby casting his future as Lord General into the uncertainties of a campaign.

The next chapter will be concerned with analysing both the political reversal of alliances as reflected in the Treaty of Uxbridge, and the military repercussions of Essex's western campaign culminating in the Self-denying Ordinance.

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CHAPTER III

THE PRESBYTERIAN ALLIANCE

The months after Essex's march into the west were ones of crisis for his adherents in both the army and at Westminster. They were also ones of political realignment for the two leading factions opposed to each other in the Houses; a realignment which reflected a shift of alliances by the Scots Commissioners. By the spring of 1645 the political and military situation had been completely altered, with both the Vane-St.John group and Essex's group apparently losing on the swings what they gained on the roundabouts. For, although Essex and his fellow peers lost their military commands, a consequent political eclipse was averted by their alliance with the Scots. It will be the purpose of this chapter to investigate these important developments with special reference to Essex's group and its relations with the Scots Commissioners.

1. The Alliance is formed

I have shown that once the Scottish Alliance had been arranged, royalists began to interpret the divisions amongst their opponents in religious terms, and laid great store by this in their approaches and intrigues with the factions.[1]

1. *v. supra*, pp.8-10 ; *v.* also L. Kaplan, 'Presbyterians and Independents in 1643', *Eng.Hist.Rev.*, lxxxiv (1969), 245-7.

The same tendency can be detected in the attitude of the Commissioners of the Scottish Kirk and Parliament. Robert Baillie revealed the essential difference between the English and Scottish attitudes to the war in his description of the English mission to Scotland in 1643 - 'The English were for a civill League, we for a religious Covenant.'[1] Bringing such a religious commitment with them to London, it is not surprising that it came to colour the Scots Commissioners' interpretation of parliamentary politics in general. By the end of April, 1644, Baillie was drawing a significant connection between the religious Independents and many officers and soldiers in the parliamentary armies.[2] This Scottish use of religious terms to distinguish parties in those armies was a central factor in their adoption as political labels, a process that was much enhanced by the protracted dispute within Manchester's army between Cromwell and Crawford, and the jealousies aroused by the reports of the battle of Marston Moor which gave most of the credit to Cromwell. It is clear that he was being singled out, largely on religious grounds, as the opponent of the Scots. But Cromwell was also a member of the House of Commons, and a political ally of the St.John-Vane group, some of whom held similar

1. Baillie, Letters, ii, 90.
2. Ibid., 170.

religious views. It did not take much for Scottish insistence upon religious distinctions to be transferred to parliamentary politics.

I have already shown that the currency of a political epithet is no sure guide to the origin of the political reality it reflects. The reality of the Presbyterian alliance came about in September-October 1644, and was largely the result of the disillusionment of the Scots with their erstwhile English allies, the Vane-St.John connection. Whatever were the details of the younger Vane's mission to the armies before York in June 1644, it seems clear that his proposals startled both Manchester and the Scots' commanders.[1] Again, the Scots were alarmed by the open support given to Cromwell's Accommodation Order with its concern for tender consciences by the younger Vane and St. John both in the Houses and subsequently in the Committee for Accommodation.

Baillie's reaction to this shock is interesting in view of Underdown's assertion that the peace party turned towards the Scots - 'We must seek for new friends at last, when our old ones, without any the least cause, have deserted and half betrayed us.'[2]

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1. Rowe, op.cit., pp.52-4.
2. Baillie, Letters, ii, 230-1, 235-7; v. G. Gillespie, Notes of Debates and Proceedings of the Assembly of Divines and Other Commissioners at Westminster, Feb.1644-Jan.1645 (ed. D.Meek, Edinburgh, 1846), pp.106-7.

It is probable that the Vane-St.John group had also become disillusioned with their Scottish allies, not merely over the limited topic of toleration, but also over the character and emphasis of the peace propositions prepared in the Committee of both Kingdoms. One only has to compare the prominence given to the settlement of presbyterianism in the propositions with Lord Say's attack on David Buchanan about this very issue, to recognise the fundamental difference of attitude between that group and the Scots.

Lord Say maintained that the true cause of the Scots falling off from their erstwhile allies was their failure to persuade them to change the state of the quarrel into a contention about establishing their Kirk government in England, 'as if the Parliament either had, or could justifie the taking up of Arms and fighting with the King, upon such a ground'.[1]

In the spring of 1644 the Vane-St.John group were probably forced to adopt the Scottish overture to advise on propositions by apprehension at the Dutch ambassadors, and persistent rumours of the king's coming to London after this had been moved by the Earl of Essex. On the other hand, the Scots do seem to have been genuinely concerned to offer propositions to Charles, although they agreed with their allies about the necessity of conducting the war vigorously.

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1. Fiennes, Vindiciae Veritatis, p.73.

Even if relations between the Scots Commissioners and the Vane-St.John group were becoming strained during the summer of 1644, it is clear that the former did not regard an agreement with Essex's group as a viable alternative until the autumn. Before September, it is obvious that the Scots greatly distrusted them, and vice-versa. In August Baillie was casting doubt upon the purpose of Essex's unauthorised march into the West, but news of the Lord General's rejection of the king's overture to him elicited a warmer response later in the month.[1] By the end of October the Scottish minister was describing the 'Independent' plot, and indicating a greater degree of understanding between the Scots and Essex's group. Indeed, he tells us that the Independents sought to lay aside Essex and the remnant of his forces, but that 'God helped us to guard it so', xxx that he retained his place and credit.[2] This claim may well refer to the debate on the 21 September, which resulted in a vote for the joining of Manchester's and Waller's armies while the efforts of Sir Philip Stapleton and Holles to have Essex's army included, met with rejection.[3] Yet, on the 1 October, the Committee of both Kingdoms reported to the House that they had directed Essex to join with Manchester and Waller.[4] It is true that this

1. Baillie, Letters, ii, 217, 222.
2. Ibid., 234-5.
3. Harl.MSS.166, f.123v.
4. C.J.III, p.648.

move was accompanied by a decision to have the authority of the committee represented in the field by two of its members; but it presumably owed something to the advice of the Scots Commissioners.

At this time, the Scots Commissioners described their purpose as being one of reconciling all the parliamentary factions and commanders,[1] in itself a significant move towards the political centre. But there is evidence, other than Baillie, indicating that they had moved further towards Essex's group by the end of October. It is clear that this political development owed something to the arrival in London of the Lord Chancellor of Scotland, the Earl of Loudoun.[2] On the same day as the report of the decision to join Essex's army to the other two, Baillie wrote of the Lord General being accorded more trust than before, 'for which he may thank our Chancellor'.[3] The information given to John Burdon by Lord Savile in mid-1645 sheds interesting light upon this shift of political emphasis by the Scots, for it would seem that Holles informed Charles in November 1644 of their change of heart. He also maintained that it was indeed the Scots who had made the first move, only to meet with a month of suspicion from Essex's group, suspicion

1. Meilke (ed. , op.cit., p.43.
2. Holmes, 'The Eastern Association', p.421, note 3.
3. Baillie, Letters, ii, 231.

which was largely overcome by the Earl of Loudoun.[1] A letter written in early November by the French ambassador, Sabran, reveals Loudoun, the Earl of Holland, Holles and Stapleton proposing that he should approach the king to consider the terms to be offered as a basis for peace.[2]

The arrival of the Lord Chancellor and his fellow commissioners also reopened the issue of peace propositions. The amendments of the Scottish parliament to the propositions were passed speedily by both Houses with only minor alterations. Although several factors had forced the Vane-St.John group earlier in the year to involve themselves in the preparation of propositions, by mid-August, the explosion of religious strife in the Assembly and Manchester's army had caused a considerable increase of Scottish pressure for the establishment of presbyterianism, and a corresponding wariness by Vane and St.John. Marston Moor had not only witnessed the commencement of a more open hostility between the Scots and Cromwell, but also a major stepping up of their religious pressure. The letter from the three generals at York of the 18 July bears the hallmark of the Scots, and must have antagonised their allies on the Committee of both Kingdoms on two counts: first, the desire for the House to

1. Bodl., Dep.C.166 (Nalson MS), f.112.
2. Bodl., Carte MSS.84 (Sabran's Negotiations, 1644-5), ff.254v-255v; Sabran to de Brienne, 1/10 Nov. 1644.

give pride of place to the settlement of church government; and second, the request for the renewal of endeavours for peace.[1] Indeed, there were several indications at this time of Scottish desires for a peaceful settlement. On 23 October, Lord Sinclair wrote from the Scots army to the Committee of both Kingdoms stressing further/two points made in the generals' letter. This letter presumably received the support of Essex's group, since it was Holles who was appointed to carry up to the Lords the favourable votes thereupon. Thus, by the end of November, Holles could assure the king that the Scots were very cordial to procure him a just peace.[2]

Essex's group was more impressed by the negative aspects of the Scots' attitude towards the terms of an ultimate peace settlement, than by their positive commitment to a high presbyterian system. Their readiness to compromise over the constitutional safeguards demanded by the 'middle group' in the interests of such a church system was the key factor in persuading Holles and his 'party' to join forces with their erstwhile enemies. It is probable that this decision was greatly facilitated by a softening of the Scottish position

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1. Cal.S.P. Dom., 1644, pp.359-60.
2. Dep.C. 166, f.112.

in the 'jure divino' dispute which lay at the heart of their clash with the majority of members of the Lower House in religious matters.[1] Sabran maintained that by early November the leaders of the new alliance required only one concession from the king: some appearance of his willingness to abandon episcopacy, and "reduire la conduite Ecclesiastique à des Ministres et à une règle uniforme et puritaine'.[2] On the other hand, Essex and Holles could not have found a greater degree of commitment to a presbyterian settlement, which their new alliance entailed, too difficult to adopt, since the developing struggle over church government was placing some of their leading political opponents on the other side of the religious divide. Even so, it would be premature to overstress the degree of commitment of Essex's group to presbyterianism at this time, despite their statement to Sabran.

2. The Self-denying Ordinance

If it is the case that the Presbyterian alliance was in being by November 1644, then the Self-denying ordinance acquires an added significance in the strategy of the Vane-St.John group.

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1. J. Rushworth, Historical Collections (London, 1659-1701), vii, 178. Addit.MSS. 18780, f.78v: Holles confessed that he had maintained at Oxford in November 1644 that the Scots were for a rigid presbytery but were taken off; f.79: Whitelocke also stated that there was some discourse of presbytery 'jure divino' which they thought the Scots did not hold.
2. Carte MSS.84, ff.254v-255v.: Sabran to le Brienne, 1/10 Nov. 1644.

The appearance of the new alliance between the Scots Commissioners and Essex's group cannot have been missed by St. John and Vane; nor, therefore, could the probable political and military repercussions of that alliance. On the political side, the new alignment threatened to undo their painstaking work in establishing the Committee of both Kingdoms, and ensuring their control of that essential body. The linch-pin of that control was their alliance with the Scots Commissioners, but this was now being knocked away. Instead of clear control, Vane and St. John were faced with a much more even division of interests in that committee; a fact which was to strain the political ingenuity of their group to the limit in the coming months.

At first sight, the Self-denying ordinance did little to rectify this new political threat. One has to recognise the close connection between military power and political influence to appreciate fully the true significance of that measure. Pembroke's discussion with Hyde at Uxbridge indicates that contemporaries recognised this only too clearly.[1] In the light of the Presbyterian alliance and other disquieting factors Vane and St. John must have foreseen a rather bleak political future for them, unless a drastic military reorganisation was carried through. Apart from the

1. Clarendon, Rebellion, bk.VIII, para. 243; v. supra, p.35.

homogeneous army of the Scots in the north, it is clear that Essex's reputation had been considerably repaired by his absence from the severe anti-climax of second Newbury and its aftermath. Furthermore, he was still Lord General of all the parliament's forces, with a considerable army under his immediate command. Sir William Waller's army could not be regarded as a credit entry on the military balance sheet, for that general was a renowned supporter of the Scots, an advocate of presbyterianism, and he had revealed to Sabran in July, his great displeasure with the state of affairs and his esteem for the person of Charles.[1] The one sizeable English force with which Vane and St.John had been intimately involved from its very inception was the army of the Earl of Manchester. But, as we have seen, it was this army which had experienced the full brunt of religious strife with the consequent disruption of the unity of its high command. Scottish influence was already strongly entrenched in the Eastern Association army at this level in the person of Major General Crawford, whose quarrels with Cromwell came to attract the attention of the Scots Commissioners and the Committee of both Kingdoms, and ultimately to contribute to the confrontation between

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1. Baillie, Letters, ii, 115; Carte MSS. 84, f.50: Sabran's relation of his journey to Charles I and Henrietta Maria. v. Waller's own account of the principles of his involvement in the war: Vindication, pp.7-8, 20, 24-5.

Cromwell and Manchester on the parliamentary stage in late November, 1644.

I would maintain, then, that by early December the Vane-St.John group was threatened by a shift in the military balance of power to the new Presbyterian alliance, and that this must have had some bearing upon their strategy concerning the Self-denying ordinance and the New Model. Although Holles's chronology is suspect, it is not difficult to recognise the military significance of the alliance which he maintained was opposed to the extremists -

> 'they saw there was a strong party in the House against them, between whom and the Soldiers who were under Command of my Lord of Essex, there was a good Correspondency; and these two, together with the Scots, were as a threefold Cord not to be broken by them: therefore they would untwist it, and so destroy them one after another'.[1]

I accept the contention that Vane and St. John were concerned about the unity of the parliamentary cause,[2] but one should not lose sight of the political significance of the changes instituted in the winter of 1644/45. With the surrender of their commissions in early April by Essex, Manchester and Denbigh, the final stage of a strategy to prevent an overwhelming military advantage being placed in the hands of the new alliance, was successfully concluded.

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1. Holles, Memoirs, p.21.
2. Holmes, op.cit., p.423.

What was the role of Essex and his adherents in these important events? The circumstances surrounding the Cornish disaster revived all the old jealousies, both at Westminster and in the armies. Even before the capitulation, the Committee of both Kingdoms had written to Essex not to join with Waller's army, fearing the possible consequences.[1] Not surprisingly, the relations between these two armies now reached rock bottom, and when the Committee was forced to order the union of his Horse with those of Waller to impede the King's advance eastwards, it was the turn of the Lord General to cast doubt upon the practicability of such a move.[2] The complexity of the rivalries and jealousies between parliamentary commanders is amply revealed by the concerted attempt of the Council to settle them. Letters to this end were dispatched to Manchester, Waller, Behr, Skippon, Middleton and Cromwell, as well as to Essex.[3]

The regional and personal antagonisms between the parliamentary armies were of long standing; of more immediate concern to the Committee of both Kingdoms was the internal conflict within Manchester's army, the one considerable force available to obstruct Charles's advance.

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1. Cal.S.P.Dom., 1644, p.412.
2. Ibid., p.480; Harl.MSS.166, f.123v.
3. Cal.S.P.Dom., 1644, pp.487-8.

On the 7 September, the Earl was ordered to march speedily into the West, and the Committee expressed the hope that all differences would be laid aside, a hope which was echoed in a letter from John Crew to Manchester two days later.[1] The letters of the Committee mentioned above were sent on the 10 September, but the reply to these exhortations to unity was the appearance of Manchester, Cromwell and Crawford at Westminster on the following day to prosecute their differences.

Where Essex and his army were concerned, the initial sympathy expressed towards them was of short duration. I have already mentioned their exclusion from the vote on the 21 September for the joining of Waller's and Manchester's forces, although the sinister interpretation placed upon this by D'Ewes is possibly misplaced.[2] It was probably Manchester's hesitant advance and the efforts of Loudoun to rehabilitate Essex which led to a reversal of that vote on the 1 October.[3] It is unlikely that the Vane-St.John group acted for other reasons, for on the 27 September, Pierrepoint, Crew and St.John had reported details of Colonel Butler's treachery in Cornwall. These details reflected most unfavourably upon all Essex's commanding officers, including

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1. Hist.MSS.Comm., 8th Report, appen.part 2 (MSS. of the Duke of Manchester , no.343.
2. Harl.MSS.166, f.123v.; supra.p.116. D'Ewes believed that the exclusion of Essex was a deliberate slight engineered by the Lord General's opponents.
3. v. supra,pp. 108-9.

Sir Philip Stapleton, for not one of them had informed the Committee of both Kingdoms of the instructions that the Colonel had dispersed in the army for his treating to join Essex's army with the king's forces.[1] These were the instructions given to Richard Harding by the king on the 6 August to be offered to Essex, who it would seem had refused to confer with the royal agent.[2] The resurrection of Tate's Committee for the Reformation of the Lord General's Army indicates that Whittaker and D'Ewes did not exaggerate the concern of the House at this revelation of royalist intrigue, and the sinister overtones it placed upon the disaster in the West.

Slowly and laboriously the Committee of both Kingdoms assembled the forces at its disposal to face the advancing army of the king, and on the 22 October the House was informed of the joining of their forces, and the selecting of a site for a battle. The City press evidenced a mood of optimism in reporting this news, expecting a conclusion that would conduce to a speedy peace.[3] On the 25th, news reached Westminster that Newcastle had fallen to the Scots army, and four days later the younger Vane informed the House of 'the great Victory' achieved by their forces near Newbury. But

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1. Ibid., ff.125v-126; Add.lit.MSS.31116, ff.162v-163.
2. Hist.MSS.Comm., 6th Report (House of Lords MSS.), pp.21-2; L.J. 6, p.669.
3. Brit.Mus.E 14(2), Mercurius Civicus, no.74, p.691; E 14 (13), Mercurius Britanicus no.55, p.438.

the great expectations upon this battle were soon dispelled by the king's relief of Donnington castle and recovery of his ordnance in full view of the parliamentary army. The deep disappointment felt at Westminster was expressed to commanders in no uncertain manner by the Committee of both Kingdoms.[1]

An investigation of the volte-face executed by such commanders as Cromwell, Waller and Haselrig would add little to an understanding of the Presbyterian alliance at this time, so I shall resume my political analysis at the height of the conflict between Manchester and Cromwell, which began with an order of the House of Commons on the 22 November for the Committee of both Kingdoms to provide an account of the Newbury campaign on the following day, which task it committed to Cromwell and Waller.[2] In explaining the political upheavals which followed this order, one must be wary of accepting the references of Holles and Baillie to deep-laid plots by the Independents or extremists.[3] It is possible that both Cromwell and his colleagues were caught unprepared by the vehemence of feeling caused by the reverse at Donnington, and that his charges against Manchester dangerously exposed him. There is some indication that

1. Cal.S.P.Dom., 1644-45, pp.117, 118.
2. Ibid., p.139.
3. Holles, Memoirs, p.29; Baillie, Letters, ii, 234-5.

Cromwell attempted to mend his bridges with Manchester and possibly the Scots earlier in November, but if so, it must have failed.[1] On the 22nd, he and Waller had met with a cool reception in the House,[2] and on the following day it had passed the crucial vote for the Committee of both Kingdoms to consider a new 'Model' for the whole militia.[3]

It is difficult to determine whether this vote precipitated Cromwell's attack upon Manchester, or whether it represented a design of Cromwell's colleagues, which the accusation was meant to further. If it was the latter, it was a curiously crude tactic, and one which could prove as damaging to the accuser. Of course it is possible that the whole furore was deliberately created in order to facilitate the passage of a self-denying ordinance, although I would favour an interpretation of short-term expediency. Hence the delay in the report of the miscarriages at Newbury by Cromwell and Waller might not have been occasioned by a fear of reviving divisions in the army, but by the need to concert plans to attack Manchester as a means of safeguarding their reputations with the Commons.[4]

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1. His.MSS.Comm., Joint Publication 4, The Letter Books of Sir Samuel Luke, 1644-5 (ed.H.G. Tibbutt, 1963), p.89.
2. Harl.MSS.166, f.166.
3. C.J.III, p.703, v.infra, p.149.
4. S.R. Gardiner, History of the Great Civil War (London, 1893), ii, 79 and note 4.

Indeed, it would seem that their accounts were well-received by the Lower House, and the examination of their charges was once again referred to the over-worked Committee chaired by Zouch Tate. It would also seem that the Commons received sympathetically Cromwell's answer to Manchester's counter-charges, reacting with the familiar concern for their privileges. What was of much greater concern to Cromwell and his allies was the clear indication afforded by this crisis of the operation of the Presbyterian alliance. It is likely that the revelation to Cromwell of the discussion at Essex House concerning his removal was a direct cause of the introduction of a self-denying ordinance. If their opponents' scheme was successful, Vane and St. John would be faced with the prospect of entering 1645 without Cromwell, but with two generals who now stood close to the Scots, and a third who was sympathetic towards them.

It is because of his close proximity to the Scots by the end of 1644 that I would query the Venetian ambassador's assertions that Essex adopted an antagonistic stance towards Manchester, as well as Cromwell, at this time.[1] The plotting of the Presbyterian alliance against Cromwell is very clear, on the part of both the Scots and Essex's group, whilst no instances at this time of an anti-Manchester attitude by

1. Cal.S.P.Ven., 1643-7, p.159.

the latter can be detected, although there are obvious signs of Scottish support for him during this crisis and earlier. A letter written by Robert Baillie on the 1 December reveals the impact upon the Scots of Manchester's charges against Cromwell, which made public the latter's antagonism towards them. It would seem that they embarked upon a 'present difficill exercise', namely the removal of Cromwell, 'that darling of the Sectaries', from the army.[1] The day after Cromwell's accusations, the Scots Commissioners wrote to the committee with their army that they were confident that Manchester would clearly justify himself and be able to prevent all designs of his enemies.[2] It is clear that the Scots Commissioner also sought the sanction of the Committee of Estates for the projected political attack against Cromwell, the course of action revealed to Whitelocke and Maynard at Essex House on the 3 December, and that this was given.[3] But by the time this sanction reached the Commissioners, the situation at Westminster had altered as their opponents strove successfully to avert the impending blow.

It is noteworthy that on the 2 December, the members who were appointed to report a conference with the Lords concerning Manchester's relation were Holles, Glyn, Whitelocke and Sir William Lewis, probably an indication that they had already been briefed upon the contents of that relation.[4]

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1. Baillie, Letters, ii, 245.
2. Meikle (ed.), op.cit., pp.49-50.
3. Ibid., p.51-2; Whitelocke, Memorials, p.111; v.supra p.12.
4. C.J.III, p.711.

But Holles's report of the conference resulted in the Commons adopting an intransigent stance over their privileges. Inevitably, the two Houses were once again moving into a position of deadlock, aggravated by other issues under consideration. The military impact of this developing political struggle was considerable.[1] The parliament appeared to be more exposed to royalist incursions than at the beginning of the year, and the Vane-St.John group were quick to recognise the political and military potential of the consequent disillusionment and frustration that they detected amongst moderate and uncommitted back-benchers, and to utilise this mood to carry through a radical reorganisation of their armies, which cut the ground from under the feet of the Presbyterian alliance.

The implementation of this initiative was heralded by the dispersing of a scandalous pamphlet about the streets of the City during the night of the 8/9 December. It was a scurrilous attack upon Essex and Manchester - 'Neither of them work, but make work; when they should doe, they undoe, and indeed to undoe is all the marke they aime at'.[2] The support of John Lilburne for Cromwell during this crisis might explain the source of this pamphlet, especially since

1. Clarendon, Rebellion, bk.VIII, para.190.
2. Brit.Mus.E 21 (9).

it is possible that Nicholas Tew and Robert Overton, also of 1647 Leveller fame, were involved.[1]

On the 9 December, Zouch Tate reported from his committee its conclusion that the chief causes of their divisions were pride and covetousness. The ensuing debate had much of the anti-placemen attitude, which Underdown rightly recognises as the hallmark of the independent members.[2] It reflected concern at office-holding and the poor attendance in the Houses, which had been recently expressed in the Commons. It was this mood of concern for the reputation of the parliament which Tate successfully took advantage of on the 9th, together with their consternation at the dismal showing of their armies during the year. It was this last point which Cromwell stressed when he emphasised the need for remodelling the army and prosecuting the war vigorously - 'Therefore waving a strict inquiry into the cause of these things, let us apply ourselves to the remedy; which is most necessary'.[3]

Whitelocke tells us that Tate was set on by that 'party' which contrived the ousting of Essex, maintaining that some of them confessed this to him.[4] This testimony

1. L.J.7, pp.142, 185; Hist.MSS.Comm., 6th Report, p.46; Bodl., C.14.12 Linc.(18), J. Lilburne, 'Jonah's Cry out of the Whale's Belly' (1647), pp.8,9.
2. Underdown, Pride's urge, p.57.
3. W.C.Abbott, The Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell (Harvard, 1937), I, 314.
4. Addit.MSS.37343, f.347.

is strengthened by the fact that it was the younger Vane who seconded Tate's motion for a self-denying ordinance.[1] They had gauged the mood of the Commons correctly for it was finally voted that such an ordinance should be brought in. Colonel Lambert's comment to Sir Thomas Fairfax on the 10th that this was 'a very unexpected vote' is probably a fair description of the reaction of the elements of the Presbyterian alliance.[2] Indeed, so unexpected was this move that even after the Commons had passed the ordinance, Baillie was still completely bemused by it - ' ... as yet it seems a dream, and the bottom of it is not understood: we pray God it may have a good success'.[3]

Possibly the Scots regarded the ordinance as a mixed blessing, but with one over-riding advantage: it would effect the removal of Cromwell from his military command. Although, then, the comprehensive character of the self-denying ordinance concealed the true purpose of the measure for many, this was not true of Essex's group. On the 17 December they sought to exclude their leader from the provisions of the ordinance. Reynolds introduced this proviso, and after a debate 'from morn till night', it was Holles and Stapleton who acted as tellers in favour of it.

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1. J. Rushworth, Historical Collections (London, 1659-1701), viii, 4.
2. Brit.Mus., Sloane MSS. 1519, f.37: Colonel Lambert to Fairfax, 10 Dec. 1644.
3. Baillie, Letters, ii, 247.

But they were defeated by only 7 votes in a total count of 193.[1] Even so, 100 votes against the retention of Essex as Lord General was a surprising result, and one which requires explanation.

Clarendon maintained that many who had long professed their devotion to Essex seemed to concur in that ordinance.[2] It is not likely that any of his close adherents deserted him, so we are probably faced with the persuasion of many moderate members that the political and military chaos of late 1644 called for new measures and new men, and that the self-denying ordinance would provide an impartial and honourable means of eliminating the jealousies between commanders and the consequent factionalism at Westminster, Others might have been persuaded by the contention that such a clean sweep of members would improve the chances of a successful campaign and speedy peace settlement.[3] It is even possible that some were concerned at evidence of closer relations between the Scots and the Lord General. So, for one reason or another, the support of the Commons for the ordinance had become so strong that by the 11 January that it was resolved that the whole House should accompany Pierrepoint to the Lords to press for its speedy passage.

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1. Addit.MSS. 31116, f.180; C.J.III, p.726.
2. Clarendon, Rebellion, Bk.VIII, para. 247.
3. v. the account of the debate in Rushworth, op.cit., vii,p.5.

The ordinance passed the Commons on the 19th, the day after the Fast Day, when the House had been well primed by the preachers. Vane and Cromwell immediately took up the mood of their sermons. To the reproaches of self-seeking Vane added another topic that had concerned members - the thinness of attendances at Westminster - and he pressed home his arguments with an offer to lay down his office. Cromwell followed suit in proffering his commission.[1] These tactics worked, and not only did the ordinance pass, but the earlier attempt of Sir John Potts to introduce a proviso making the Covenant and acceptance of the system of church government settled by parliament obligatory for employment, was rejected the same day, although this was not to be the last of this issue.[2] Henceforth, the fate of the self-denying ordinance became inextricably involved with preparations for the New Model, and so I shall return to both after investigating the role of the Presbyterian alliance in the peace moves of late 1644, which culminated in the Treaty of Uxbridge.

3. The Treaty of Uxbridge

> 'Through all the shocks to their faith provided by repeated disclosures of Charles I's duplicity .... they clung to this touching belief in the King's integrity ... Negotiate, negotiate, even in conditions of military weakness in which the results would be virtual surrender: such was the policy of the peace party.....'[3]

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1. Clarendon, Rebellion, bk.VIII, para.192-6.
2. Addit.MSS.31116, ff.180-180v.
3. Underdown, Pride's Purge, p.60.

It will be my purpose in this section to examine Underdown's judgment upon the 'peace party' in the light of the part played by Essex's group and the Scots Commissioners in the preparation of peace propositions in the latter half of 1644. The two comments quoted above are not necessarily complementary to each other, for the leading figures of the Presbyterian alliance, both within and outside the two Houses, were not so short-sighted in their dealings with Charles as Underdown implies. Holles, Stapleton, Holland and Loudoun were first and foremost politicians, who had as little reason to place blind trust in the king's fidelity as their opponents, and their actions in matters of peace were just as coloured by an appreciation of the political and personal realities of the situation. Of course that appreciation was radically different to that acted upon by their opponents, but it was no less valid in the context of the upheavals of the 1640s.

Whitelocke maintained that the Earl of Essex 'was a Lover of Monarchy and Nobility, which he suspected some designed to destroy, together with Gentry, Ministry and Magistracy....'[1] Holles stated that the aims of his group were 'only to reform, not to alter: to regulate, and so to save, not to destroy'.[2] At first glance this position does

1. Whitelocke, Memorials, p.103.
2. Holles, Memoirs, p.20.

not seem very far from that of the middle group, as explained by Lord Say: 'We resolve therefore to keep the three estates co-ordinate equally to poyse and ballance each other; and by a due interposition to be a just boundary and limit one to the other to prevent extreams'.[1] In fact, the two positions were very different.

After the outbreak of war, some politicians and uncommitted members became apprehensive of an appeal to the people, and their concern for the social order and traditional methods of government led them to rest satisfied with the reforms of 1641, although, as we shall see, some of them still insisted upon certain additional conditions. Others felt that Charles had proved his lack of integrity and therefore the need for further practical constitutional controls upon him - 'Onely he himself hath brought this necessity upon us, not to trust him with that power whereby he may do us and himself hurt; but with so much alone as shall be sufficient to inable him to do us good... .'[2] Thus there would appear to be an obvious difference in the degree of trust the two groups reposed in Charles, but it is questionable whether trust was the key factor in the attitude of Essex's group. Was it not rather the fat and the fire situation? Given their social conservatism, their concern

1. Fiennes, Vindiciae Veritatis, p.6.
2. Ibid., p.6.

at the break-up of the traditional fabric of local government, their apprehension at the possible consequences of persistence in the war, the alternative to relying upon the king was considerably more unpalatable. It was not a matter of 'touching belief', but sheer social necessity.

Again, there are indications that Holles and his allies acted upon an astute assessment of Charles's personality. Possibly they recognised the essential obstinacy of Charles over constitutional issues, and that to strive for safeguards substantially beyond those wrested from him in 1641 could only lead to a mutually damaging impasse. If this was part of the thinking of Essex's group, it could be argued that such an assessment was more perceptive than that of the middle groupers.

The crux of the king's attitude was the inflexible belief that ultimately the parliament would have to accept his terms, or at least terms far more favourable than those offered by them. This royal inflexibility was also reflected at Westminster in the attitude of the most pacific members, who viewed with distaste the unreasonableness of the propositions prepared by the Committee of both Kingdoms. At one point, D'Ewes stayed away from a conference upon them because he had 'no stomacke to tast anie moore of those dreadfull propositions' wch I conceived impossible for the King to grant'.[1] This

1. Harl.MSS. 166, f.108.

same constitutional conservatism was present in the armies, whose generals in the main regarded the war as essentially defensive. Manchester's contention at the time of the relief of Donnington castle that a defeat would render them traitors did much to alienate his erstwhile middle group supporters.[1]

Holles's attitude towards the peace propositions prepared in 1644 was very close to that of D'Ewes, but the leader of Essex's group was a politician, and so could not afford to turn his back on them. His political activities in the mid- to late 1640s revolved around the search for the means of achieving a settlement. The terms offered at Uxbridge in no way represented Holles's views of what would be acceptable, and yet his group was instrumental in urging a treaty upon them, in the hope that they could induce Charles to concede sufficient ground to enable them to steal the initiative from their opponents and lead the Commons into a more conciliatory mood.[2] In other words, they sought to short- circuit the procedural and executive advantages enjoyed by the middle group and the radicals by means of a treaty or, if possible, the return of Charles to London. Holles detected the groundswell of intimidated pacificism in

1. Clarendon, Rebellion, bk.VIII, para.183-4.
2. Ibid., p.203.

both parliament and City, and realised that once the king was set in its midst, no amount of political manoeuvring by his opponents would prevent the attainment of a settlement.[1]

The tremendous political and procedural advantage enjoyed by Vane and St. John, especially after the establishment of the Committee of both Kingdoms, together with the very different aims of the two groups, led to a real difference of style in their activities concerning matters of peace. At the risk of grossly over-simplifying this distinction, one could say that Vane and St. John stressed the constitutional approach, insisting on the unconditional acceptance by Charles of all the terms agreed upon by the two parliaments. In the main, their commanding position at Westminster enabled them to make the most of the king's ill-advised intrigues, to maintain a climate of opinion that made it difficult for more pacific members to speak their minds fully. The likelihood of Essex's group being able to make any appreciable impact by legitimate means on the crucial issue of peace terms was very slim. This parliamentary disadvantage played an important part in establishing the character of the political activity indulged in by Holles and his colleagues.

While Vane and St. John could rely on the recognised tactics of managing the Commons, backed by executive control

1. Dep.C.166, f.112; Holles, Memoirs, p.108.

through the Committee of both Kingdoms, Holles came to rely upon the time-worn methods of court intrigue and personal contacts, of seeking to utilise every opportunity of bringing pressure to bear at Westminster in the cause of moderation. Thus, in order to acquire a full appreciation of the extent and character of his peace policy, one must devote attention to his group's contacts and activities outside the two Houses. By the end of 1644, one can detect a few crucial individuals involved in co-ordinating this external manoeuvring with Essex's group at Westminster; in particular, the Earl of Holland and the Countess of Carlisle. With the assistance of such 'courtiers', contacts with the French ambassador were opened, and the first tentative soundings between the Scots Commissioners and Essex's group were made.[1] The role of these two aristocratic intriguers in the Montereul negotiations, together with the Countess of Devonshire, is investigated elsewhere.[2]

In the light of such activities and meetings, 'sometimes at this Court-(Ladies)house, sometimes at that Court-(Ladies) chamber',[3] I must ascertain the true purpose of Holles's support for moves to tender the propositions to Charles in November, 1644, and assess to what extent the

1. Carte MSS.84, ff.133v-4, 170, 196v, 232v, 246v-7, et seq.: Sabran to de Brienne, 2/11 Aug.-24 Sep./3 Nov.1644.
2. v. infra, pp. 134, 180, 211-2, 233, 238-40.
3. Fiennes, Vindiciae Veritatis, p.73-4.

formation of the Presbyterian alliance brought about a change of policy on the part of both the Scots Commissioners and Essex's advisers. As we have seen the propositions under debate during 1644 were very much the product of Pym's alliance with the Scots,[1] and as such were at first vigorously opposed by Holles's group.

After May 1644 the matter of peace propositions was kept in abeyance by the fact that the Houses had to await the deliberations of the Scottish Parliament. Before their re-emergence at the end of July, there arrived in London yet another ambassador sent to mediate. With Sabran was resurrected the ancient understanding between the Scots and France; an important development since he was instructed to aggravate the first stirrings of suspicion of the Scots at the ultimate constitutional intentions of their erstwhile allies. The decision to adopt this policy, which was to play an important part in cementing the Presbyterian alliance, probably owed much to the political analysis communicated to Sabran by the Earl of Holland and Countess of Carlisle. Sabran, then, was instructed to make full political capital of Scottish discontent, and also to deal with Holland 'et si vous pouviez former un tiers parti'.[2]

On the 1 August, the House resumed its consideration of the propositions, partly as a result of pressure from the Scots. In addition, the letter of the three generals and the knowledge of another approach from Charles, enabled the moderates to carry a motion for considering the issue.[3]

1. v. supra, pp. 95-6.
2. Carte MS. 84, ff. 146-146v, 147: Sabran to de Brienne, 10/20 Aug. 1644.
3. Whitelocke, Memorials, p. 92, v. supra, pp. 110-111.

Pierrepoint delivered from the Committee of both Kingdoms on the 16 August the propositions together with the Scottish amendments, and on the next day D'Ewes tells us that they were 'consented to by us almost as fast as it could be read', although he and others unsuccessfully pressed for their mitigation.[1] It is likely that Holles, unable to achieve any significant softening of the terms, decided to support them as the only means of re-opening official contacts with Oxford and maintaining the urge towards a settlement at Westminster. As Holland and his colleagues indicated to Sabran in early September, they hoped that Charles would receive the propositions and then recommend a treaty between commissioners for both sides, which they maintained would most favour those who desired more moderate terms.[2]

Essex's failure in Cornwall does seem to have engendered a more moderate spirit at Westminster, for the Commons overlooked the dubious title accorded to the two Houses in another message from Charles, and adopted the Lords' motion of a joint committee to consider it, and D'Ewes tells us that Holles and many other 'well-wishers to the peace of the kingdom' were amongst those nominated.[3] The report from this committee was made by Holles, and it fitted well

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1. Harl.MSS.166, f.107v.
2. Carte MSS.84, ff.172-172v.: Sabran to de Brienne, 29 Aug./8 Sept.1644.
3. Harl.MSS.166, ff.114-114v.

with the policy Essex's group had decided to follow. The two recommendations of the committee stole the thunder of the more radical members by emphasising the irregular title used by the king, and then proceeded to urge the perfecting of the propositions and their dispatch to him. Both Houses accepted these points on the 18 September, but it was not until the 7 November that the propositions passed both Houses. On the following day, the two Houses chose their commissioners to deliver the propositions to the king, amongst whom were Holles and Whitelocke.[1]

Clarendon makes it clear that the only way in which pacific members could achieve agreement to a treaty was for Charles to make the first approach.[2] This was the recommendation urged upon him by Holles and Whitelocke at Oxford in late November, when they maintained that they were confident that if the king offered to treat upon the propositions, and that it might be at London, then the more moderate members would be able to carry it. Whitelocke told Charles that his presence at his parliament 'would sooner put an end to our unhappy distractions than any Treaty'.[3] Holles was correct in arguing that the 'violent party' feared nothing so much as the king's coming to London, but he

1. C.J. III, p.691.
2. Clarendon, Rebellion, bk.VIII, para.189.
3. Whitelocke, Memorials, p.178.

never had the opportunity of putting his assertion to the test, since, according to Lord Savile, Charles was too apprehensive of adventuring himself in London.[1]

Up to the end of November, I feel that the return of Charles to London was the prime purpose of the political activity of Essex's group, and it is doubtful whether the Scots Commissioners were consulted about this; but the king's reluctance eliminated this central aspect of their policy, and gave the propositions themselves a greater prominence than perhaps they had intended. This made Holles's task much more difficult, but having progressed so far towards a treaty, he could not afford to relax his efforts, especially when the introduction of the self-denying ordinance and moves to remodel the militia carried an obvious threat to the future political position of the Lord General and his adherents at Westminster.

The next obstacle successfully surmounted by Holles and his adherents was the voting of the safe-conduct for the Duke of Richmond and the Earl of Southampton to convey the king's answer to the propositions, although it involved the necessity of according the two Houses at Westminster their full title.[2] Despite the voting by both Houses that no members should visit or be visited by the two royal

1. Dep.C.166, f.112.
2. C.J. III, pp.713, 718-9.

messengers or any of their attendants, it is clear that means were found of communicating with them. The king's instructions to Richmond and Southampton indicate how well-founded were the suspicions of the City governors at the recourse to them at Somerset House.[1] Apart from seeking a treaty, at London if possible in accord with the advice of Holles and Whitelocke, they were to approach both the Independents and the Scots Commissioners, as well as sounding out the temper of the leading citizens of London. One factor that did not figure in the instructions was the Scots' concern for a presbyterian system. They were to be won over instead by emphasising the interest of that kingdom in the maintenance of a largely unchanged monarchy in England, a point which was also being pressed upon them by Sabran.[2]

On the 19 December Holles reported the opinion of the committee for considering the king's message, that there should be a treaty, which was accepted by both Houses.[3] Essex's group was coming under increasing pressure in other matters, and was anxious to promote the treaty as quickly as possible. The appearance of Sir William Lewis as a messenger to the Lords over their usual resistance to the

1. Ibid., p.727; Addit.MSS.37343, f.348; Clarendon, Rebellion, bk.VIII, para.202-3.
2. Clar.MSS. 23, f.219v.; Carte MSS.84, ff.263-263v.; Sabran to de Brienne, 7/17 Nov. 1644.
3. C.J. III, p.729.

Committee of both Kingdoms in matters of peace, probably indicates this concern of Essex's adherents in the Lower House to commence the treaty.[1]

Although the Lords accepted the report of the manner of treating on the 3 January 1644/45, the Commons did not nominate their commissioners until the 14th, for military reorganisation and the self-denying ordinance were coming to divert the attention and energies of the House. The commissioners who were appointed on that day could hardly have inspired confidence in the outcome of the treaty, since they were mostly middle groupers and radicals.[2] Similarly the report from the Lords on the 22 January could have done little to engender optimism, but it does provide us with an opportunity to observe a significant political shift on the part of many of the Lords.

Why is it that the Earl of Essex recommended from the Lords that the royal propositions should be referred to the Committee of both Kingdoms, so that they could be communicated to the Scots Commissioners?[3] There are indications that the Lords were coming to recognise the

1. Ibid., IV, p.4.
2. C.J. IV, p.19: the commissioners appointed were Lord Wenman, Holles, Pierrepoint, Whitelocke, Sir Henry Vane, jnr., St. John, Trideaux and Crew.
3. Ibid., p.27; L.J. 7, pp.151, 152.

danger of radical constitutional change and of their increasing vulnerability, and the Earl of Holland maintained to Sabran that they 'se joindroient plustot aux Ecossois'.[1] Perhaps as important in explaining this new understanding were the more immediate issues of the accusations against Manchester and the voting of Sir Thomas Fairfax to be the commander-in-chief of the new modelled army. Their insistence upon consultation with the Scots Commissioners concerning any alterations in the jointly agreed instructions for the treaty provides yet another indication of this shift of the peers towards the Scots.[2] The final decision upon the preference to be accorded to the religious articles appears to have satisfied the Scots Commissioners, but if Whitelocke is to be believed, the need for prior Scottish agreement in matters of peace was beginning to arouse resentment amongst erstwhile supporters of Essex's group.[3]

Most of those at Westminster and Oxford must have known that there was little chance of any agreement on the propositions offered by the parliament. I have shown that Holles hoped to secure sufficient royal concessions to encourage a more conciliatory spirit in the Lower House.

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1. Carte MSS.84 f.233: Cheylieu to de Brienne, 17/27 Oct.1644.
2. C.J.IV, p.34.
3. Meikle (ed.), op.cit., pp.58-59; Whitelocke, Memorials, p.121.

What were the concessions for which he was hoping? I have already noted that by early November Holles, Stapleton, Holland, Loudoun and probably Maitland, were pressing Sabran to persuade Charles to accept the abolition of bishops and the establishment of a presbyterian system, as a means of furthering a more moderate settlement.[1] From this we might assume that Essex's group had accepted totally the Scottish position, but there are indications that Holles was too wily to lay all his eggs in one basket, at least for the time being.

In the public relations exercise which the treaty rapidly became, the royal commissioners rightly recognised the articles on religion to be one of the most vulnerable points in their opponents' armour. As we have seen, the Scots Commissioners were very much concerned to achieve a settlement, provided Charles agreed to presbyterianism. The Earl of Loudoun informed Hyde at Uxbridge that this being once granted, the Scots would not concern themselves in the other demands, but the Lord Chancellor received no comfort from that quarter. Nor did he from the parliaments' commissioners in this matter, for it was left almost entirely to the representatives of the Scottish Parliament and Kirk to explain and justify the presbyterian system, whilst many of

1. v. supra. p.[illegible]2.

their English colleagues agreed with the comment of the Marquis of Hertford: '... for my part, I think that neither the one nor the other, nor any Government whatsoever is "Jure Divino" ....' [1]

It would appear that the more moderate English commissioners, including Holles, were more concerned with the articles on the militia and the general issue of security. They appear to have been as insistent as the more radical members upon the king's full acceptance of the terms offered for the militia, a stance that they adopted in private discussions as well as formal debate.[2] Perhaps Holles recognised that any willingness to compromise on the part of the two Houses depended upon the king's acceptance of those articles, but it is possible that he also believed that such a safeguard was essential for peace. If this was the case, then his attitude would have been very close to that expressed by Sir Samuel Luke, yet another member closely allied to Essex: 'if they have agreed on the militia I hope they will not stick on anything ....'[3] So, I share Hyde's scepticism about the future performance of those commissioners who maintained that if Charles accepted the

1. Clarendon, Rebellion, bk.VIII, para.221-4; Whitelocke, op.cit., p.123.
2. Clarendon, Rebellion, bk.VIII, para. 233, 249; Addit. MSS. 37, 343, f.364.
3. Hist.MSS.Comm. J.P.4, op.cit., p.138

propositions, they would recover for him all that he should concede.[1]

Hyde's reply to the parliament's articles on the militia dissatisfied both the Scots Commissioners, whose position he ignored altogether, and those from the parliament. Then the royal commissioners once again proceeded to probe the potential source of discord represented by the arrangements for joint Anglo-Scottish control of the militia and the vesting of command over all the forces in Ireland in General Level.[2] The failure to make any headway in the three principal demands, and particularly that of the militia, destroyed moderate hopes. The last attempt to salvage something from the wreckage of the treaty by inducing the royal commissioners to make some concessions concerning the militia, just fizzled out.[3] Even by the 18 February, the Scots Commissioners were reporting that neither they nor their English colleagues believed that there was any hope of peace from the treaty,[4] and the attempt of the royal commissioners to divert attention to finding an expedient for the King's repair to Westminster, the initial aim of Essex's group, now stood no chance of being accepted by the two Houses.

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1. Clarendon, Rebellion, bk.VIII, para. 243.
2. Whitelocke, op.cit., p.125; Rushworth, Historical Collections, vi, 931, 936-7.
3. The terms of this concession were to reappear in May 1646 in another struggle at Westminster over Peace Propositions, v. infra, p.281.
4. Meikle (ed.), op.cit., p.60.

Not only did the return of the commissioners on the 24 February from their fruitless negotiations represent the failure of Holles's design in general: it was also a profound personal blow to the political standing of Essex and his adherents. We have seen that the military failures and quarrels of late 1644 had resulted in the passing of the Self-denying ordinance by the Commons, followed by their preparation of a new-modelled army. The failure of the treaty set the seal on the fate of the old military leadership. There can be no doubt that Essex's group realised the extent to which their future credit and influence were involved in the outcome of the treaty.

In political terms, the failure of their peace strategy and its consequent military repercussions, deprived them of much of their ability to retain an independent position in the Westminster spectrum. Between October and February, Holles had been able to regard the Scottish connection as yet another avenue to peace, but he had not been absolutely committed to it, since we find him emphasising the militia rather than presbyterianism at Uxbridge But, after February, his options were no longer open. Instead, he was forced to bind himself more closely to the Scots, their religious priorities, and their

intrigues with the French and Henrietta Maria. Hyde maintained that Holles 'was no otherwise affected to the Presbyterians than as they constituted a party upon which he depended to oppose the other....'[1] If one includes the Scots amongst the Presbyterians, then that dependence was made virtually absolute by the failure at Uxbridge.

4. The New Model Army

During the month of February 1644/45 the mood of the Commons had become increasingly receptive to the call for military preparations in anticipation of the failure of the treaty. Sir Samuel Luke's comment upon the imminent end of negotiations sums up this mood - 'I hope we shall prepare for a war'.[2] The desire for military reorganisation had already been expressed before the introduction of the self-denying ordinance, and when the Lower House met with determined resistance from the Lords over that ordinance, the leaders of the Vane-St.John group wisely directed attention to the new modelling of the armies. At first the Committee of both Kingdoms was given the task of preparing details of the numerical establishment of a new army on the 24 December, and it lost no time in doing this.[3]

1. Clarendon, Rebellion, bk.VIII, para.248.
2. Hist.MSS.Comm. J.P.4, op.cit., p.15.
3. C.J.III, p.734.

The threat posed to their generals had an unfortunate impact upon the discipline of the soldiery, which in turn strengthened the resolve of members to reform the existing forces.[1] Ironically, the situation in early 1645 had many similarities to that maintaining in early 1647. In both cases parliament was faced by disgruntled forces, antagonised by moves to disband and or re-employ them under new commanders. Again, in both cases these moves occurred after prolonged political battles at Westminster, which left the officers in no doubt about the personal conflicts involved in the proposed changes. But here the similarity ended, for whereas in early 1645 an ugly confrontation was averted by the commanders finally accepting the rules of the parliamentary game, and conceding defeat,[2] this was not to be the outcome of the conflict in 1647.

On the 21 January Tate's committee presented the names of 12 Colonels of Foot and 10 Colonels of Horse, and the Commons voted Sir Thomas Fairfax to be commander-in-chief of the new model. This vote reinforced their passing of the self-denying ordinance, and there was to be no second Newark to obstruct the Commons. Essex's group and the majority of the peers hoped that the peace treaty would fill

1. Addit.MSS.37343, f.365v.
2. Holles, Memoirs, pp.31-2.

this role, but its failure confirmed the victory of their opponents. The struggle between the Houses continued throughout February although the eventual outcome could not be avoided. On the 27 January the new model ordinance passed the Commons unanimously,[1] but the reply of the Lords was the astute introduction of the divisive religious issue. In addition, they also played upon the concern at independent armies by offering a proviso for the nomination of Fairfax's officers by the Houses. Although the nomination was vested in the General, Sir Philip Stapleton and Robert Reynolds were successful tellers for subjecting that power to the approval of the parliament, thus securing a say in the appointment of officers.[2]

Again the Lords achieved considerable success in their insistence upon the inclusion of a religious test to be imposed upon all prospective officers. This test was to consist of acceptance of the Covenant and submission to the 'Form of Church Government, that is already voted by both Houses of Parliament', conditions which were obviously directed against the religious independents and sectaries in Manchester's army. While the majority of the Commons accepted the Covenant as a condition of employment, they

1. C.J.IV, p.31; L.J. 7,p.159.
2. C.J.IV, p.43.

rejected the second condition. D'Ewes and Whitelocke show that Waller's reference at that time to the obedience of Cromwell's Horse, 'who were scrupulous', strengthened the resolve of the Commons to urge the Upper House to drop that clause.[1] Although the Lords refused to bend to the argument of expediency concerning officers who would have 'our chiefest Military Power in their Hands', they did offer an amendment replacing their clause rendering refusers incapable ever after, with one excluding them until they had taken the Covenant. Against the opposition of the 'violent' this clause was accepted by the Commons on the 15 February.[2]

The failure of the treaty left Essex's stronghold, the House of Lords, in an exposed position for the last stage of the battle over the new model. The first half of March was taken up with a conflict between the two Houses over the approval of Fairfax's list of officers. The Commons agreed to the list with little alteration,[3] but it was at this point that the apprehension of the Scots Commissioners at the military reorganisation became openly expressed. On the 4th, John Glyn delivered a paper from them desiring that the Houses would be careful to name

1. Harl.MSS.166, f.177v.; L.J.7, pp.193-4.
2. L.J.7, pp.194-5; C.J.IV, p.50; Harl.Mss.166, f.178.
3. Harl.MSS.166, ff.180v-181: Colonel Rich was dropped in favour of Colonel Sir Robert Pye.

officers well affected to the uniformity of church government, and constitute experienced soldiers to be commanders. This letter reveals the probability that the decision to allow Fairfax to name his officers was designed to overcome the interference of the Scots Commissioners in this task, which had resulted from the earlier order for the Committee of both Kingdoms to prepare the frame and model of the militia.[1] The opposition of such men as the younger Vane, Prideaux and Strode to the Scots desires was predictable, as was the support given to them by Holles, Stapleton and Glynn; but, in the event, the issue was laid aside.[2]

The suspicion of the peers at certain officers of Manchester's army was revealed on the 10 March, when they returned the list with 'some' alterations.[3] Both D'Ewes and Whittaker particularised the putting out of Colonels Pickering, Montague and Rainsborough.[4] Yet this resolve was broken down by the tactics of the Commons, the weight of public opinion and the absence of any positive alternative after the breakdown of the treaty. This process had gone

1. L.J.7, pp.261-2, v. supra, p.120.
2. Harl. MSS.166, f.181v.
3. C.J.IV, p.74.
4. Harl.MSS. 166, f.183; Addit.MSS.31116, f.198. Whittaker also mentions that the Lords put out about 50 captains, f.198v.

so far by the 17th, that an even division upon the question for agreeing to the list enabled Lord Say to secure a majority in favour of it by tendering the proxy of the Earl of Mulgrave, although the outcome was delayed until the 18th by a query concerning the proxy.[1]

Before that outcome was announced, a letter from Sir Oliver Luke to his son indicated the interaction of religion and politics that the struggle over the new model involved. He maintained that if the proxy was accepted, then 'all the Independents will be allowed, & God knows what an Army we shall have ... If this go on (which is very likely) then I believe his Excellency will lay down his commission....'[2] Indeed, this is what happened, for the Lord General signified to the Upper House on the 1 April his desire to lay down his commission,[3] after a motion for the inclusion of a clause in Fairfax's commission for preserving the safety of the king's person had twice failed to secure a majority. Even the voting of their adherence to that clause on the afternoon of the 31 March did not deter him. He must have been shaken by the whittling away of his long-standing majority in the House;

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1. L.J.7, p.277.
2. Hist.MSS.Comm.J.P.4, op.cit., p.479.
3. L.J.7, p.298.

a development which added weight to the advice of some of his friends that a refusal to deliver up his commission might cause contests.[1] With the resignation of their commissions by Essex, Manchester and Denbigh on the 2 April, the last obstacle to the self denying ordinance was removed, and the Lords passed it on the following day.

The result of the new model army and self-denying ordinance was to complete the military reorganisation that had been postponed in earlier 1644 by the grave condition of affairs after Newark. By the end of the year, the defeat of Essex, the conflict within Manchester's army, and the dismal showing of the combined armies before Donnington castle, had once more raised the issue of military reorganisation. Where Vane and St. John were concerned, the over-riding political development of later 1644 - the growing understanding between Essex's group and the Scots Commissioners - gave an added impetus to their efforts to achieve a reform of the armies. On the other hand, Essex's group had sunk their political credit in the moves to initiate a peace treaty, taking advantage of the various pressures working towards that end: the Dutch ambassadors, the French ambassador and the Scots Commissioners, as well as moderate back-bench opinion.

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1. Whitelocke, Memorials, p.135.

After the failure of Charles to act upon the advice of Holles and Whitelocke for him to offer to treat upon the propositions at London, Essex's group concentrated their energies on securing a treaty, in the hope of persuading the king to make concessions so as to produce a similar mood at Westminster. As appears to have been recognised universally amongst politicians, the failure of the treaty directed the energies of the Commons into the preparation of the new model, and forced the Lords into a slow and reluctant compliance. Probably the most important consequence of the failure of the strategy of the Presbyterian alliance was the loss of their independent military power-base by Essex and his adherents. The consequent loss of personal political power was expressed in a rather exaggerated manner by Lord Savile in mid-1645 when he maintained that 'Essex is now of no power at all of himself to do anything'.[1] From the spring of 1645 until the early months of 1647, Holles and his colleagues were committed to essentially Scottish policies and interests, and their political standing at Westminster was very much at the mercy of the reviving antagonism towards the Scots, and the success or otherwise of their army.

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1. Baillie, Letters, ii, appendix, 4 0.

CHAPTER IV

THE 'SAVILE AFFAIR'

Although deprived of their own military power-base by the self-denying and New Model ordinances, the creation of the Presbyterian Alliance prevented the political eclipse of Essex's group. True, after the early spring of 1645, its leaders were dependent upon the Scots Commissioners as senior partners, but at Westminster they continued to operate as a potent political group. The Savile Affair is the most important indication of the continued power of Essex's group at Westminster before the equilibrium between the Presbyterian Alliance and the Vane-St.John group was finally upset in the latter's favour by the New Model victory at Naseby. In addition, the 'Savile Affair' of mid-1645 provides a valuable insight into more than one of the central factors which were operating to intensify the political divisions at London For a brief period in the life span of the Long Parliament, the shadowy thrust and parry of the political duel between its leaders was revealed on a more public stage - at least, this is the impression created for the modern historian by the accidental survival of official and personal material relating to the Affair.

The varied political factors revealed or elucidated by the Affair, range from the personalities, aims and methods

of factions within Parliament, to the political temperature in the City of London, with special reference to the activities of the Scottish Commissioners. Above all, its true significance lies in the light it sheds upon the Scots as the most disruptive force operating at London. This is a role which a recent study has categorically denied to their Commissioners. Instead, the Scots are viewed as a negative factor, the victims of an 'intrigue' which extended across most of the English political spectrum as represented in the Committee of both Kingdoms.[1] Whereas I view the Scots as very much a positive factor, leading a carefully planned and co-ordinated assault, in conjunction with the Earl of Essex's faction, against their common opponents in Parliament. I reject the thesis that during the course of 1645 the factions within the Committee of both Kingdoms united to oust the Scottish Commissioners from any say in a future peace settlement. In this section I wish to reveal some of the errors, inconsistencies and misconceptions which, in my opinion have led Mrs. Mulligan to misinterpret the true significance of the affair.

First, it is necessary to say something about her application of party labels to the English members of the

1. L. Mulligan, 'Peace Negotiations, Politics and the Committee of Both Kingdoms, 1644-1646', Hist.Journ. xii (1969), 14 and note 67. Mrs. Mulligan appears to exclude only the Earl of Essex from the intrigue.

Committee of both Kingdoms. Mrs. Mulligan regards these members as being divided into radicals and moderates, with only the Earl of Essex qualifying as a 'pacific' peer.[1] Her identification of the radicals and moderates appears arbitrary in the extreme. Adding to the confusion is her further unfounded contention that all radicals and moderates were inherently opposed to the Scots. Hence, while Mulligan claims the moderate Sir Henry Vane, senior, to be both no friend of the Scots nor of Presbyterianism, we find the Scots Commissioners referring to 'his constant assistance in the House of Commons in everything which concernes our nation.....'[2] In identifying Pierrepoint and Crew as radicals, Mulligan provides no explanation why their swing to the left over the terms of a peace settlement should render them more radical than St. John and Samuel Browne, who experienced the same swing, and yet are allocated to the moderates. I should imagine that Sir Philip Stapleton and John Glyn would have been surprised to find themselves grouped with St. John and Browne, and separated from Denzil Holles. Extant material relating to the Saville Affair allows no doubt that these two pairs belonged to bitterly opposed political factions in the House of Commons.

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1. Ibid., 4-5.
2. Ibid., 14 and note 67; Meikle (ed., op.cit., p.93.

Mrs. Mulligan is apparently unhappy about the role of religion in the political conflict within the Committee of both Kingdoms and Parliament. At times, she seems to fall into the error which she imputes to the Scots, and confuses political with religious allegiances. In the case of John Crew, he is deemed a possible religious presbyterian on the strength of his later supposed 'political Presbyterianism'.[1] In fact, it seems most likely that Crew was an episcopalian.[2] Yet, upon the strength of this possible presbyterian, Mulligan constructs her thesis that the Affair was a combined English attempt to oust Scottish influence. She maintains that Lord Say omitted from his sub-committee only the Scots, whilst he included, in Crew, a representative of the English presbyterians - ipso facto, the sub-committee represented a plot of all English elements in the Committee of both Kingdoms against the Scots with the exception of Essex.[3] In fact, this sub-committee omitted not only the Scots, but also their English allies, the 'political presbyterians'.

Mrs. Mulligan's discussion both of the place of religious differences in Parliament, and of the religious affiliations of the members of the Grand Committee, is unconvincing. She seems to misinterpret the prevailing

1. Mulligan, op.cit., 14.
2. Pearl, Trans.Royal Hist.Soc., 5th Series, xviii (1968),84.
3. Mulligan, op.cit., 15-16.

secular temper of the two Houses towards the question of Church Government - under the term 'presbyterian', in its religious sense, are included Glyn, the Earls of Warwick and Manchester, Sir Gilbert Gerrard, Stapleton, Browne and Holles.[1] Although it would seem that Mrs. Mulligan here rightly detects a basic attitude which underlies their outlook towards Church Government, her use of the label 'presbyterian' to describe this, can only be misleading. For this basic attitude was that which Baillie describes as 'erastian': the opinion that the Church must be subordinate to the Civil State in all matters of authority.[2] If this is so, then Mrs. Mulligan needs to explain upon what grounds she distinguishes her erastians, St. John and Pierrepoint from her presbyterians.

There are two serious misreadings of the situation within the Committee of both Kingdoms, which provide the foundation for her erroneous interpretation of the Savile Affair. The first is that the dislike of a majority of English members of Parliament for the Scottish Kirk system, inevitably precluded close co-operation between the Scottish Commissioners and any of the English factions. The second is her misreading of the shape of parliamentary politics: her misleading application of the political titles, moderates and radicals.

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1. Ibid., 11 note 52; 14 note 67, 16, 17.
2. Baillie, Letters, ii, 265, 336.

1. While agreeing with Mrs. Mulligan's warning that we must be careful to distinguish between the political aspirations of English and Scottish presbyterians, it does not inevitably follow that only those primarily concerned with the religious settlement were likely to be wholehearted supporters of the Scots. This might well be so in the long term, but in the short term, support of strict presbyterianism on the Scottish model was not the sole criterion of a political alliance with the Scottish Commissioners.[1] Indeed, one of the most valuable aspects of the Savile Affair is the light it sheds upon the existence and political workings of just such an alliance.

I hope to prove that the Affair did not represent an attempt of the English radicals and moderates in the Committee to oust the Scots from any influence upon peace negotiations with the king. Rather, I shall contend that it represented an attempt, largely engineered by the Scots Commissioners, with the assistance of their English political allies in the House of Commons, to discredit their common opponents.

2. I believe that Mrs. Mulligan's analysis of the division within the Committee of both Kingdoms grossly distorts the situation as it really existed. The conflicts at Westminster tended to take place within the context of

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1. Mulligan, op.cit., 16, 18 xxx note 86.

factions controlled by what contemporaries called the 'Grandees' of the two Houses. It is b failing to note the importance of personal alliance and connection as a prime moulder of the shape of political activity in the Long Parliament that Mrs. Mulligan is able to place St.John and Browne in a different category to Lord Say, Crew and Pierrepoint. Instead they are to be found with Gerrard, Glyn and Stapleton. Such an alignment is nonsense, and ignores the testimony of contemporaries of all shades of political opinion.

I think it likely that Mrs. Mulligan would not have so seriously misinterpreted the Affair if she had been able to consult the important manuscript sources,[1] or even compared the political testaments of Denzil Holles and Lord Say, which would have dispelled any likelihood of a political alliance between them against the Scottish interest, no matter how temporary. Lord Say himself makes it clear that Holles and his colleagues were the political allies of the Scots in this matter.[2]

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1. These sources are: House of Lords, Main Papers, 24 June- 9 July 1645. Brit.Mus., Addit.MSS. 32093 (Malet Collection - State Papers, 1087-1762, vol.III). Addit.MSS. 18780; Bodl.MSS. Dep.C. 166, ff.124-135v.
2. Fiennes, Vindiciae Veritatis, pp. 96, 137.

Having indicated my disagreement with this recent interpretation of the Savile Affair, I must now put forward an alternative thesis. I have already noted the political developments in early 1645 which served to strengthen a significant political alliance that had already begun to take shape during the latter part of 1644: the transformation of the enmity between Essex's party and the Scottish Commissioners into a close alliance.[1] If one adds to these the concern of the Scottish Commissioners for the growing boldness of the Independents in the Assembly of Divines, and the support they received from the erstwhile allies of the Scots, Lord Say and Sir Henry Vane, jnr., the background is set for the intrigue which surrounded Lord Savile.

The contact between Lord Say and Lord Savile went back well before April, 1645, if the charge drawn up against the latter at Oxford has any validity.[2] He was accused by Charles of sending intelligence to Lord Say by means of his

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1. v. supra, pp.144-152 passim.
2. Clar.MSS. 24, ff.22-3: 'Concerning the Earl of Sussex, Sept. 1643'.

daughter, Lady Temple - the Savile Affair certainly revealed her as a close adherent of Lord Say. But the main purpose of the royal charge against Lord Savile was not so much to eliminate a high ranking defector, but rather to provide a plausible excuse for Savile's withdrawal to London, and thereby a convenient cover for an approach by Lord Digby to both the leading parliamentary factions. In effect, the trial of Lord Savile at Oxford converted him from an intelligencer on Lord Say's behalf into a negotiator for Lord Digby. This did not involve any 'volte-face' on Savile's part, since both activities fitted in with his desire for a settlement between King and Parliament. That this was Savile's real mission is indicated by the letters from him to Oxford, which the Scots Commissioners revealed to Parliament at the height of the crisis.[1]

Having ascertained the purpose of Savile's withdrawal from Oxford, I shall now move on to investigate the activities of Lord Say's sub-committee, the existence of which was connected directly to Savile's arrival in London. The sub-committee of the Committee of both Kingdoms, nominated on the 12 April, 1645,[2] ostensibly to manage negotiations for the surrender of enemy garrisons and forces, was a consequence of the renewed contact between Lord Say

1. Baillie, Letters, ii, appendix, 490-92.
2. House of Lords, Main Papers, 24 June-9 July, 1645, f.229.

and Lord Digby's agent. What was the true purpose of this sub-committee? The answer to this question lies partly in its membership, and partly in the peace propositions sent by Savile to Oxford. The activities of this sub-committee were directed almost solely by Lord Say, with the advice of a closely knit group of political colleagues. All the original members of the sub-committee were of this faction: St. John, Crew and Pierrepoint. By means of the sub-committee, Lord Say had both temporarily institutionalised his faction and also vested them with the authority of the parent Committee.

The revelation before the examining Committee of the House of Commons of Savile's peace propositions, provide a much more interesting possibility as to the purpose of the sub-committee than the assertion of Lord Savile and its members that they were concerned solely with a design for the surrender of Oxford and the bringing over to Parliament of Goring's cavalry. It is possible that the peace propositions were the real object of the exercise, whilst the negotiations for the surrender of Oxford were conducted

largely as a cover. Furthermore, it is likely that the contacts with Oxford were finally broken off, not because the king was informed of the design to surrender his headquarters, as Lords Say and Savile maintained,[1] but because the Scots Commissioners got wind of the real purpose of the sub-committee. Indeed, those Commissioners maintained just that.[2] This interpretation is given weight if it was indeed Lord Digby who was represented by the letters 'Ld.D:' in Lord Savile's intercepted letter. Certainly, the Committee examining the Affair regarded Lord Digby as being involved.[3] It is difficult to believe that Digby would contrive such an elaborate scheme merely to raise the possibility of the surrender of Oxford. Furthermore, the wording and tone of the intercepted letter conveys the impression of a much greater issue at stake. A further support for this thesis can be found in the tenor of the peace propositions themselves, which represented the constitutional aspirations of the 'political Independents', and underlined the gulf between their peace aims and those of the Scots, which had gained pride of place at Uxbridge.[4]

1. Brit.Mus. Addit.MSS.32 093 (Malet Collection - State Papers, 1087-1762, vol.iii), f.212v.; Fiennes, Vindiciae Veritatis, p.137.
2. Baillie, Letters, ii, appendix, 495.
3. Addit.MSS. 32093, f.214v.
4. Ibid., f.218.

According to Holles, there was evidence, which he saw, that the Independent leaders in fact went further than peace propositions, and pressed for the leading offices under the Crown.[1] This may well be a figment of his imagination, since no other mention of this is to be found in the sources. The strongest proofs of the real purpose of Savile's activities lie in his own confession that he had a commission from the king to treat of peace,[2] though he denied revealing it to anyone, and in his papers communicated to the Committee of both Kingdoms and the House of Commons in July. In the light of this evidence, Savile's assertion that nobody knew of the peace propositions that he sent to Oxford, and the disclaiming of any knowledge thereof by the members of the sub-committee, appear rather unconvincing.[3]

Mrs. Mulligan does not seem to be well acquainted with these intercepted papers of Savile, for while she asserts that we cannot know what terms Holles and Lord Say offered the king, these letters do reveal something of Say's terms. As for any terms offered by Holles, Mrs. Mulligan has not proved that he did negotiate, unless she is referring to the information brought against Holles on the 2 July, the examination of which proved to be unconvincing. According

1. Holles, Memoirs, pp.39-40.
2. Addit.MSS.32093, f.214v.
3. Ibid., f.221; Main Papers, ff. 193, 235, 236v, 242.

to one of Savile's papers, it would seem that he first approached Essex's faction, and the Scots Commissioners were likewise visited, but finding little response, was won over to the 'Independents' by their readiness to treat with him about peace.[1] This is the letter which refers to 'Ld.D.' quoted by Mrs. Mulligan, although she draws from it the inference that Essex's faction had made its own approaches to the king - the text does not support such an assertion.[2]

By the time the Affair was revealed, Savile's papers give the impression that he was turning, in sentiment at least, towards Essex and the Scots again, following upon the failure of the negotiations between the king and Say's group. His reference to the former being wiser than before would imply that the 'Presbyterian alliance' had rejected his earlier approaches, an implication confirmed by the paper of the Scots Commissioners presented to the Committee of both Kingdoms on the 24 July.[3] Whether or not the members of Essex's faction would have been willing to take a less uncompromising position than the Scots over the propositions offered at Uxbridge, the extant material does not prove Mrs. Mulligan's thesis that the English 'political presbyterians' were seeking to exclude Scots influence like their opponents, but rather that they were following the Scottish lead.

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1. Baillie, Letters, ii, appendix, 490, 493.
2. Mulligan, op.cit., 16.
3. Baillie, Letters, ii, appendix, 491-2, 496.

Having investigated the purpose of the 'Independent' sub-committee, and its dealings with Lord Savile and Oxford, I now turn to the means by which the Scots Commissioners and their English allies sought to make full political capital out of the revelation. I shall then investigate the reaction of Lord Say and his adherents, and their attempts to create a diversion. As I have already stated, the activities of the Scots Commissioners are central both to the revelation of the Affair, and to the manipulation of various political weapons so as to gain maximum advantage. An investigation of their political methods and contacts provides an invaluable insight into London politics.

The Cranford Affair of June 1645 represented an attempt by the Scots Commissioners to circumvent the obstacles in parliamentary procedure which their opponents utilised to avoid a revelation of their negotiations with Lord Savile and Oxford. The means chosen echoed the extra-parliamentary activity of the period 1640-42, and more significantly, looked forward to the similar tactics employed by the 'political presbyterians' in 1647-48.

On the 13 June the Scots Commissioners in London wrote to their colleagues with the Scots Army that on the 4 June intercepted letters had been delivered to the Committee of both Kingdoms, one of which, from the Lord Digby, mentioned

propositions. They stated that a Committee of 7 Lords and 14 Commons was appointed to examine this business, to which was added the matter of Lord Say's sub-committee.[1] Robert Baillie's letter of the 10 June to Mr. Dickson and the paper of the Scots Commissioners to the Committee of both Kingdoms reveal only too clearly that the Scots had good intelligence of the 'Independents'' activities.[2] They undoubtedly expected the intriguers to be politically devastated by this revelation, and regarded it as an important step in the direction of a peace along Scottish lines.

The temper of the Commons appeared ripe for taking full advantage of the intercepted letters, for the ineffectual siege of Oxford by the New Model and the loss of Leicester to the king's unopposed army, aroused considerable criticism of the Committee of both Kingdoms. Despite an attempt to direct this criticism against the 'disobliged persons' in the Committee, such as Sir Philip Stapleton and the Earl of Manchester, the direct connection between the decision to besiege Oxford and the negotiations between the 'Independent' sub-committee and Lord Digby seemed obvious to such members as D'Ewes.[3] The political capital that

1. Meikle (ed.), op.cit., pp.85-6.
2. Baillie, Letters, ii, 277-8, appendix 493-4.
3. Harl.MSS.166, ff.214v-215, 216, 218-9; Addit.MSS.18780, f.35.

could be made from this connection was not ignored by the Scots Commissioners and their English allies. It is not surprising therefore that the Scots Commissioners should have been angered and frustrated when by the 10 June the Committee appointed to examine the Affair had not met even once. Presumably their allies in Parliament could do little to overcome the obstructing tactics of their opponents, so the Commissioners turned to their allies in the City.

Mrs. Mulligan dismisses Baillie's part in the Cranford Affair as that of a mere gossip,[1] an assessment which pays scant justice to the leading propagandist amongst the Commissioners of the Scottish Kirk. Cranford's information to the House of Commons, and even Baillie's own moderate statement, indicate that he was indulging in more than idle chatter.[2] James Cranford was a City minister, a close confidant of Baillie, and an important figure in the religious Presbyterian movement in the City, by virtue of being a Licenser for theological books and tracts. It was to Cranford that Baillie gave the task of divulging in the City the details of Digby's letter, and of the activities of the sub-committee, with the object of procuring a petition to the two Houses for the thorough examination of the business.[3]

1. Mulligan, op.cit., 15.
2. Main Papers, ff.199, 202, 225-6.
3. Ibid., f.199.

It is significant that the first citizen to whom Cranford sought to impart this news was Captain John Jones, a vestryman of St. Bartholomew Exchange,[1] and one who was to figure as a leading City opponent of the Army in 1647, as well as a champion of religious presbyterianism.[2] Two other militia officers whom Cranford singled out for personal accounts of Baillie's information were also to be members of the 'presbyterian' Militia Committee of mid-1647: Captain Richard Venner and Colonel Thomas Gower. Colonel Gower's information alluded to a meeting at Captain Jones's house after Cranford's disclosure upon the Exchange, whilst it was Captain Venner, another vestryman of St. Bartholomew Exchange, who persuaded him to report the business to the Lord Mayor, Thomas Atkins.[3]

Venner's information provides a further indication of the temper of City politics and, incidentally, clearly separates Recorder Glyn from Solicitor St. John in the minds of contemporaries. He maintained that after writing down Cranford's information, the Lord Mayor said that he would send it to Mr. Recorder. At this, somebody present said, 'No, not to him'. But, Cranford answered, 'Yes, you may send it to him, he is none of them'.[4] We find yet another

1. The Vestry Minute Books of the Parish of St. Bartholomew Exchange in the City of London, 1567-1676, ed. E.Freshfield (London, 1890), e.g. part 2, pp.4, 10.
2. J.Co.Co.40, f.153v.; Bodl., Rawlinson Letter, 108, f.85; Mason to Pierson, 25 March, 1660, v. infra, pp.190.471, note 3.
3. Main Papers, ff.199, 214, 215-215v.
4. Ibid., ff.215-215v.

City 'presbyterian' leader of 1647-48, Alderman John Langham, sending his two sons to Cranford to verify the information that he had divulged upon the Exchange,[1] and yet another account reveals these two men passing on the details in the City streets.[2]

Although Cranford's excessive enthusiasm brought him to the bar of the House of Commons, and the naming of Baillie as his source of information embarrassed the latter, and enforced him to write a vindication to the House, yet the excitement aroused by Baillie's tactics achieved his desired end: the Savile Affair was brought to the attention of the House.

Now we must move on to examine the reactions of Lord Say's group to this revelation. The accusation against Denzil Holles as being a regular intelligencer to Oxford was introduced into the House of Commons on the 11th June by the accused himself.[3] The inference that Mrs. Mulligan draws from the manner of this report to the House is very suspect. Holles informed the House that Lord Savile had reported the receipt of a letter from Oxford, which charged him with holding intelligence with Digby. Neither Holles, nor Lord Savile, nor any of his 'Independent' opponents made any mention, at this stage, of his negotiating with Oxford.

1. Ibid., f.199.
2. Fiennes, Vindiciae Veritatis, pp.163-4.
3. C.J.IV, p.172.

Why, then, did Holles raise the matter in the House? Wounded innocence may have been a factor, but it is most likely that his true purpose was to secure the revelation and thorough examination of Savile's connection with the sub-committee. By all appearances, Holles had little to lose and everything to gain by insisting that the accusation be examined. The accusation could not be divorced from Lord Savile's correspondence with Oxford and his relations with Lord Say. Indeed, it was Holles who moved that Lord Savile be examined.[1]

The timing and the circumstances of the revelation of the information against Holles, indicates strongly that Lord Say both regarded it as a desperate measure to avert possible disaster, and that he also recognised the great weakness of the charge itself. It may not be going too far to suggest that Lord Say's report on the 5 June to Lord Warriston of the letter incriminating Holles was designed at least to moderate the reaction of the Scots Commissioners and their English allies to the revelations of the intercepted letter from Digby to Legge. Lord Say must have sighed with relief when it was agreed that for preventing jealousies and misreports of the sub-committee, a report should be made to the Committee with a desire to vacate the order establishing it.[2] But, as we have seen, the Scots

1. Addit.MSS.18780, f.35v.
2. Baillie, Letters, ii, appendix, 489.

were not prepared to let the matter rest there. Holles must have been reassured in his design to revive the whole issue before the House, for Lord Warriston and Lord Say had agreed at their meeting that nothing should be said of the letter incriminating the 'presbyterian' leader, because they conceived it did not constitute a sufficient ground to call any man's name in question, or to prove it.[1] It is not necessary at this stage to decide whether Holles was or was not holding intelligence with Digby, or whether the letter naming him was authentic - the fact was that Lord Say knew it could not be produced as evidence.

But once the activities of Baillie in the City and Holles in the House of Commons had brought the whole Affair into examination, the accusation against Holles proved the only weapon with which Lord Say and his adherents could defend themselves and seek to avert the impending blow. Thus, merely because Holles reported the accusation against a member (and incidentally, he did not report from the Committee of both Kingdoms, nor was the member charged by Digby), it does not follow that Baillie was incorrect in his assertion that 'It was the Independents' study to cast all the odium of trinketing with Oxford on Holles'.[2] In fact, this quotation comes from a letter to Lauderdale

1. Ibid., 489; Main Papers, f.231v.
2. Mulligan, op.cit., 17; as I show Mrs. Mulligan appears to confuse the two stages of the Affair, the 'presbyterian' attack of June, and their opponents' counter-attack of July.

written on the 15 July, and so refers to the new accusation against Holles reported on the 2 July.[1] The letter referring to Holles and Digby figured largely in the information of Lord Savile, Lord Say and Lady Temple, and Savile also added information about a letter from the Earl of Lindsey that he had delivered to Holles when he first came to London. Holles maintained to the Committee that this was merely un unsigned note of introduction on Savile's behalf.[2] If so, it corroborates the evidence from Savile's own papers and the information of the Scots Commissioners that Savile's initial advance was to Essex's party and their allies, the Scots.

On the 18 June Savile was committed to the Tower for repeatedly refusing to divulge the source of his information against Holles. Thus, during June, 1645, the Scots Commissioners and their allies had got the better of the

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1. Baillie, Letters, ii, 303.
2. Addit.MSS. 32093, ff.218v., 227-8.

the encounter, but by early July several factors had intervened to allow their opponents to assume the offensive. On the 16 June news reached Parliament of the New Model's overwhelming victory at Naseby, an event which greatly strengthened the position of the 'Independents' at Westminster. Secondly, the circumstances of the surrender of Carlisle on the 28 June to the Scots Army, which had marched north instead of following instructions to come south, greatly weakened the reputation of the Scots Commissioners, bewildered their allies, and strengthened anti-Scottish feeling in the House of Commons.[1]

Yet another factor which helped to weaken the prestige and influence of the Scots Commissioners in London was the successful campaigning of Montrose in Scotland. On the 2 July, the Covenanters' army under Baillie was broken at Alford, one of an impressive series of victories, which were to culminate in the royalist victory at Kilsyth on the 15 August. The inactivity of the Scots army in England, and their occupation of Carlisle were both directly related to the deteriorating situation in Scotland. Robert Baillie explained the failure of the exposure of the Savile Affair to remove their opponents in terms of bad timing: the latters' double victory (Naseby and Langport) and the inactivity of the Scots army.[2] St. John also testified later

1. Baillie, Letters, ii, 301; Meikle (ed.), op.cit., p.92.
2. Baillie, Letters, ii, 304.

to the impact of Naseby upon the flagging fortunes of the 'Independent' group, when he wrote to Cromwell in February 1646: 'Truely, your good freinds here are reduced to the same condition as before Nasby Fielde'.[1]

On the 2 July, John Gurdon laid before the House a second information from Lord Savile against Holles, which also implicated Bulstrode Whitelocke, the chairman of the committee which had examined the Affair during June.[2] The timing of this information was most opportune, occurring as it did just before that very committee was to report its findings to the House. Lord Say shows that Gurdon was advised herein by the 'Independents', who undoubtedly saw in it a much more effective weapon than the original charge against Holles.[3] Savile's new information charged Holles and Whitelocke with advising the King at Oxford upon his answer to the Parliament's peace propositions, and, doubtless Savile's naming of the Duchess of Buckingham as the source of his previous information against Holles was designed to increase the credibility of the new charge.[4]

The partiality of the attack upon Holles came to be recognised, despite Lord Say's claims that he and his adherents were motivated by an impartial sense of duty.[5]

1. A Collection of the State Papers of John Thurloe, Esq., ed.T. Birch (London, 1742), I, 75.
2. C.J.IV, p.194.
3. Fiennes, Vindiciae Veritatis, pp.138-9: Lord Say confuses the two informations of Lord Savile against Holles.
4. Addit.MSS.18780, f.60.
5. Fiennes, op.cit., p.139.

The evidence from all sides of the bitterness of the 'Independents'' attack, and the spirited defence conducted by the 'presbyterians', render meaningless both Mrs. Mulligan's analysis of the party structure of the Committee of both Kingdoms, and her assertions that the Commons did not pay much attention to Savile's attempts to implicate Holles and Whitelocke and easily exonerated them.[1] Whitelocke testifies to the severity and partiality of Samuel Browne, St. John's agent, and now chairman of the committee appointed to examine the new information.[2]

It would appear that Holles was caught off-guard by this new revelation, and to the annoyance of Whitelocke, who was absent from the House on the 2 July, he admitted that a paper was given by them to the Earl of Lindsey, whereas a denial would have left Lord Savile, for a second time, without proof of his charge.[3] Holles was now in an extremely vulnerable position - Baillie stated 'Hollis's friends hes been in great feare for his undoeing by it'.[4] Whitelocke shows that after Holles' reply to Savile's information on the 2 July, some members fiercely moved that this being a charge of High Treason, both Holles and

1. Mulligan, op.cit., 16.
2. Addit.MSS.37343, f.400v.: v. Browne's notes of the examinations in Bodl.MSS.Dep.C.166, ff.124-135v.
3. Ibid., f.394.
4. Baillie's Letters, ii, 303.

Whitelocke should be committed to the Tower. This extreme motion was blocked by Holles' adherents, but their opponents then adopted the same tactics as the Scots Commissioners and their English allies had used at the beginning of June, and succeeded in getting a committee appointed, ostensibly to clear Holles and Whitelocke, but in reality, to get the maximum political advantage from the information. Again, Whitelocke tells us that those who were opposed to the Earl of Essex's party set their interest upon this committee to ruin Holles, 'a great pillar of that party'.[1] There can be no doubt that the 'Independents' aimed at Holles rather than Whitelocke; indeed, it would seem that the latter was promised preservation and reward if he would desert Holles.[2] Holles likewise maintained that he was prosecuted with much more vigour than Whitelocke whom, he stated, St. John attempted to safeguard.[3]

Three factors operated to the advantage of Holles and Whitelocke - the first was the fact that Lord Savile had delayed so long before revealing this new information, even though his previous information against Holles had been examined thoroughly during June by the committee appointed to examine Cranford's assertions. The second factor was

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1. Addit.MSS.37343, ff.397v,398.
2. Ibid., f.401.
3. Holles, Memoirs, p.40; v.also Harl.MSS.166, f.243v.

Whitelocke himself, whose chairmanship of that committee enabled Essex's group to discredit this sudden information as a means to take off Whitelocke's testimony in favour of Holles.[1]

Of much greater assistance were the Scots Commissioners, who on the 14 July stated that certain intercepted letters and papers of the Lord Savile had been communicated to them. According to the anonymous letter which accompanied them, they had been found amongst the papers of Mr. Howard, whom Savile had named as his messenger to Oxford.[2] In Baillie's words, they evidenced Lord Savile's trafficking with Oxford 'by my Lord Say and the Independent parties advyce'.[3] The fact that these papers, which were designed for Oxford, sought information from thence as to whether Holles and Whitelocke kept intelligence with any of the King's party, did much to weaken the suspicions which Savile's information had aroused against Holles and Whitelocke, especially when Savile conceded that he was authorised and encouraged therein by Lord Say. As Whitelocke explains,

> 'The designe... against us, was by these papers & examinations made the more apparent, which tooke off the edge of divers gentlemen, who thought this prosecution, not ingenious nor hansome against us'.[4]

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1. Addit.MSS. 37343, f.397v.
2. Baillie, Letters, ii, appendix, 490.
3. Ibid., 303.
4. Addit.MSS.37343, ff.403-403v.; v. Rushworth, Hist. Collections, vii, 179.

The publication of these papers in Parliament must have played an essential part in the eventual acquittal of the two members, for Whitelocke states that their friends made good use of it, both at the committee and afterwards in the House.[1]

The 17-21 July witnessed the climax of this tortuous struggle between the two major factions in the parliament. On the 17th, the reports of both committees examining the Affair were made, and Holles and Whitelocke were examined again before the House.[2] The fact that the same treatment was not accorded to Lord Say and his fellow members of the sub-committee may indicate the stronger position of the 'Independent' faction. Their tactics had succeeded in making the information against Holles and Whitelocke the most important business before the House. It hardly needs mentioning that the dictates of justice played little part in the endeavours of the two groups to further their own political interests.

On the 18 July, Holles and Whitelocke were examined again - suspicions against Holles must have been further aroused by the report on the 17th of Savile and Say's information about the inquiry after Holles made by a royalist, one Mullins, upon his arrival in London, and subsequent

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1. Addit.MSS.37343, f.403v.
2. Addit.MSS.18780, ff.77v-79.

meetings at the Lady Devonshire's house![1] Now further information was reported to the House of letters between Holles and Sir John Mounson at Oxford. The examinations indicate that Lt.Colonel John Lilburne was the leading light in the unearthing of this new material. It would seem that Lilburne acted upon his own initiative in informing Colonel Bosseville thereof, for both the witnesses to this new information and the parliamentary leaders of the'Vane-St.John group' seemed to be ill-briefed on their roles. If anything, this attempt to strengthen further the suspicions of Holles' pro-royalist activities had an opposite effect. On the 19 July we find Sir Henry Vane, jnr., denying Lilburne's contention that he had informed Vane of this correspondence three months previously.[2] This denial does not seem convincing, and it is probable that the revelation of the information at this juncture in the proceedings against Holles, so long after its first disclosure to his opponents, merely served to strengthen the impression of a design against him. The evidence did point to a relationship between Holles and Mounson, but Lilburne's main charge could not be proved: that of writing to make his peace with the king after the loss of Bristol. Indeed, Mr. Robinson, the source of Lilburne's information, denied that he had

1. Main Papers, ff.244-244f, 246-246v.
2. Addit.MSS.18780, ff.79-80v.; Main Papers, f.262.

said this.[1] The fate of both Cranford and Lilburne, the leading extra-parliamentary agents in the Savile Affair, indicates the fine balance which prevailed in the House of Commons. On the 19 July Cranford paid for his zealous report of the sub-committee's activities with the imposition of a £500 fine to each of the injured parties, and imprisonment in the Tower during the pleasure of the House. This was followed, on the 21 July, by the committal of Lilburne to the Sergeant for his aspersions upon Holles.[2]

The votes of the 19 and 21 July in relation to Holles and Whitelocke illustrate the moderate temper of the majority of members. It is not without significance that Whitelocke noted that generally the gentlemen of best interest and quality were for their acquittal.[3] The crucial importance of parliamentary tactics in the struggle between factions is revealed during the climax of the Affair. On the 19 July Holles was acquitted of holding intelligence with the enemy, and although his adherents failed in their attempt to bring on the rest of the business, they did succeed, against strong opposition, in getting a vote for its resumption at the next sitting of the House. Finally, on the 21 July, after long debate, Holles and Whitelocke were acquitted of doing any disservice to Parliament at Oxford.[4]

1. Main Papers, f.260.
2. C.J.IV, pp.212-3.
3. Addit.MSS.37343, ff.406-406v.
4. Ibid., ff.405v-406.

It is clear that even the social habits of members could have important effects upon the fortunes of the factions. It is probable that the extremely unusual persistence of the moderate members in attending debates during the onslaught against Holles and Whitelocke, wrecked a deliberate calculation on the part of the 'Independent' leaders. This persistence of the moderates was itself no mere chance, but largely the result of the devoted work of such friends of the accused as Mr. Osbaldston, who acted as 'Whips' in securing their constant attendance.[1]

So, after two months of information and counter-information, neither the 'presbyterians', consisting of the Earl of Essex's faction in alliance with the Scots Commissioners, nor the 'independents' and anti-Scots members had destroyed their rivals. Yet, this is not to say that the conflict was without lasting significance. In the first place, it both revealed and confirmed a most important alteration in the composition of the political structure at Westminster: the construction of the 'Presbyterian' alliance referred to above. As we have seen, the agitation for the New Model and the passing of the Self-denying Ordinance had greatly reduced the authority and influence of the Earl of Essex's party in the Parliament.[2] The

1. Ibid., f.406v.
2. Supra. pp.144-5.

weakening and subsequent disappearance of the military foundation of this influence, accelerated the creation of the 'Presbyterian' alliance, already well under way by the end of 1644.

The 'Savile Affair', besides indicating the existence of this alliance, also revealed its mode of operation. Both the initial design to expose the activities of the 'middle group' sub-committee, and the subsequent defence of Holles and Whitelocke, witnessed the close association between Holles' adherents in the House of Commons and the Scots Commissioners, who provided much of the important evidence for the 'presbyterian' faction. Of greater significance is the fact that it was the Scots Commissioners who came to assume the leading role in the alliance. It was not only the bitterness with which the two factions had sought to destroy each other that set the tone for the future conduct of parliamentary politics; the actual tactics adopted by the Scots Commissioners in revealing the operations of the sub-committee also left an indelible mark. These tactics included the utilisation of contacts within the City of London to bolster the allies of the Scots in parliament. From thenceforth, this policy, largely under the direction of the Scots, came to be a central feature of the 'presbyterian' strategy. Activity was

concentrated upon taking advantage of the growing disillusionment within the City as the war dragged on, bringing in its wake economic problems and crippling taxation. The character of this exploitation of City dissatisfaction is yet another indication of the leading role taken by the Scots Commissioners, who worked through their allies, the City clergy amongst whom Cranford remained an important figure.

As for Essex's faction, the Savile Affair served to demonstrate to them their vulnerability and consequent dependence upon the Scots alliance. This faction became the parliamentary side of a complex Scottish policy, which included intrigues with the King, the exiled court of the Queen, and Mazarin, as well as subversive activity in the City of London. The primary object of all this was a settlement incorporating the establishment of strict presbyterianism in England. For Holles this was a necessary price to pay for a constitutionally moderate peace with the king, and one negotiated by them rather than their 'independent' opponents.

The significance of the 'Savile Affair' was far greater than that of the earlier Lovelace plot. In both timing and preparation, the revelations of mid-1645 posed a much more dangerous threat to the Vane-St.John group.

It would be misleading to regard the failure of the Uxbridge treaty and the removal of Essex and Manchester from their military commands as confirmation of their opponents' ascendancy. During April and May the Vane-St.John group found themselves in a vulnerable position in that their political victory had not yet been afforded the sanction of military success. Until such time as the new model army justified its creation, its promoters at Westminster knew that the 'Presbyterian alliance' would be ever vigilant to take full advantage of any errors of judgment.

The negotiations between Lord Savile and Lord Say, whether primarily concerned with the surrender of Oxford or with peace propositions, can be regarded as an attempt by the 'middle group' to break the uneasy equilibrium which had resulted from the political and military convulsions of early 1645. Similarly, the appointment of the 'middle group' sub-committee to handle the negotiations was designed to circumvent the impact of the 'Presbyterian alliance' upon the political complexion of the Committee of both Kingdoms.

In the event, Lord Say's almost personal negotiation with Oxford, and the deliberate exclusion of the Scots Commissioners from any knowledge of it, proved to be a serious miscalculation. The revelation of this negotiation in

intercepted correspondene enabled the Scots Commissioners and their allies to make full capital of the loss of Leicester. The probability that this serious military reverse was the direct result of decisions taken in the Committee of both Kingdoms based upon the 'middle group' negotiations, placed Lord Say and his colleagues at a serious disadvantage at Westminster.

Only the decisive victory of the new model army at Naseby prevented an important political success for the 'Presbyterian alliance' under the direction of the Scots. Not only did Naseby enable the 'middle group' to counter-attack with Savile's accusations against Holles and Whitelocke but, more important, it broke the political equilibrium decisively in favour of the Vane-St.John group.

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CHAPTER V

THE CITY AND THE 'PRESBYTERIAN PARTY'

The 'Savile Affair' shows that no effective assessment of the character and influence of the 'presbyterian party' at Westminster can be reached without devoting attention to the political complexities of the City of London. Therefore in this chapter I intend to examine the political character of the City's governors and the wider political activity of the City in relation to the Scots and 'presbyterian' group in the parliament.

To estimate the religious and political temper of the City in the mid-1640s is difficult but necessary. Of course the citizens did not think as one, but an assessment of the general mood can be made, especially that of the propertied elements, led by the members of the Courts of Aldermen and Common Council. Where religious issues were concerned, the compromise arrangement reached between the ministers of the City and the erastian members of the House of Commons tended to lessen the conflict between them over church government[1] - the battle between 'jure humano' and 'jure divino' had been largely decided in favour of traditional lay supremacy. The stages by which this compromise was achieved will need to be referred to only

1. v.Baillie, Letters, ii, 377.

insofar as they relate to the wider political situation within the City.

Toleration and Social Order

During 1646 the vexed problem of toleration and the attendant problems of effective government became issues of prime importance. This is not to say that they had not been important before, but the question of toleration now came to have political and social significance - political largely in relation to the army of Sir Thomas Fairfax, and social in relation to the internal government of the City. To state the problem in another way, the question had become, in the religious field, one of enforcing the church government as established by parliament.

In this task, the City governors and ministers enjoyed a greater degree of sympathy amongst members of the House of Commons. Whereas many members displayed a greater acceptance of religious Independency than the majority of City ministers and many citizens, most of them drew the line at toleration of sectaries. Sir Nathaniel Barnardiston provides us with a most revealing example of this position in a letter to John Winthrop, dated 19 March, 1647, which clearly illustrates the attitude of a sincere, erastian presbyterian layman. Sir Nathaniel declared his reverence for Independent ministers as found in New England, but he

severely criticised their English counterparts for their advocacy of complete toleration. He also declared himself to be a presbyterian because this suited the constitution of England, whilst maintaining that as yet no system of church government was 'jure divino'.[1]

The problem of order was common to members of parliament, ministers and City governors, and disorder in the national church could affect all three. During 1646 the distinction between sectarianism and social radicalism appeared to be narrowing, with the growing notoriety of John Lilburne, Henry Overton and other extremists who increasingly made use of the printing press. Implicit in the existence of the sects was a refusal by men of low birth, to obey the injunctions of the civil magistrate. Hence it is not surprising that much of the literature against them tended to emphasise the social and political threat from below, rather than the religious basis of their beliefs.

Sectary and subversion were almost synonymous terms in Thomas Edwards's 'Gangraena', and his deliberate inclusion of Independency amongst the sects was designed to smear it with the same social revulsion as the propertied meted out to the Anabaptists and Antinomians.[2] As the title of

1. Winthrop Papers, v. Massachusetts Hist.Soc. (1947), pp.144-5.
2. Bodl., Th.4°.M.14.BS (5), E. Drapes, 'A Plain and Faithfull Discovery of a Beame in Master Edwards His Eye' (1646), pp.2,3,6-7,13.

Edwards's vitriolic book indicates, sectarianism was regarded by many as a cancer disrupting the traditional social hierarchy of political power, whether within the parish, the City or the kingdom as a whole. This apprehension was clearly revealed in a letter from a north country minister to Lord Wharton in early 1647. The minister opposed liberty of conscience on the grounds that

> 'if it be graunted in matt^rs of religion, why not in matt^rs of regiment of the republike, if lib^rty in the great^r, that imediately concerneing god, why not in the lesser & if one be approved the oth^r must be allowed'.[1]

Captain John Jones summed up the feelings of many citizens when he wrote that 'never were those precious jewels of peace and order more needfull, and lesse valued'.[2]

It would be too cynical to suggest that concern for property and maintenance of social rank and authority were the only factors determining opposition to the sects. Genuine concern for safeguarding souls from the cancer of heresy must not be discounted as a factor of importance in the seventeenth century. But where the higher social levels in the City were concerned, the saving of souls and maintenance of order were never far apart.[3] Thus as early as 22 January,

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1. Bodl., Rawlinson Letters 52, f.82: Henry Masy to Lord Wharton, 8 Feb. 1646/47.
2. Brit.Mus., E 350 (11), 'Plain English: or, The Sectaries Anatomized' (1646), p.17. Thomason attributes this tract to Captain John Jones.
3. The connection between religious presbyterianism and concern for social order in the City is also recognised by R. Brenner, 'The Civil War Politics of London's Merchant Community', Past & Present, lviii (1973), 87-8.

1643/4, the Common Council was taking steps to petition Parliament for the speedy settlement of Church government, and for prohibiting private assemblies, which exercised church discipline without the warrant of the civil power. It was maintained that such assemblies tended to disturb the peace of the church, city and kingdom.[1]

Lawrence Whittaker provides us with an excellent parliamentary example of the way in which problems of church discipline could assume important secular implications of social and economic order. On 5 May, 1646 a petition was presented against payment of tithes from Hertfordshire and Buckinghamshire. John Harrington stated that this was disliked because it was against the established law, but Whittaker explained this dislike on the part of members in more colourful terms, which revealed the thinking behind this emphasis on the law: he writes that many alleged that if this petition was entertained, they might then expect a petition against the payment of rents to landlords,

> 'it being conceived yt ye 10th part of men's Revenues, were as Due to ye Ministers as the Other 9 parts to the Owners'.[2]

Now I wish to reach some estimate of how important religious differences were amongst the City governors in

1. J.Co.Co.40, ff.86-86v.
2. Addit.MSS.10114, f.15; Addit.MSS.31116, f.268.

determining political action. I begin this estimate with the committee of Common Council which organised the official activity of the City after the 20 October, 1645, in support of the ministers' objections to the erastian Presbyterian system established by ordinance. A comparison of the personnel of this committee with the consistent support it gave to the attitude of the ministers, will go some way to lessen the significance of religion as a really divisive political issue at least amongst the Aldermen.

Of the 6 Aldermen appointed to this committee, 3 were to work with Holles' group at the height of the crisis in 1647: Langham, Bunce and Avery; whilst the other 3 were either to side with the Army or fell into line with its supporters by early August: Thomas Atkins, Sir John Wollaston and John Warner.[1] None of these last named was radical in religious preference, and they presumably participated in the decisions of this committee. Amongst 5 additions to this committee made on the 17 November, 1645, there figured 3 other citizens who adhered to the Army by the height of the crisis of mid-1647, and yet who were presbyterian or conservative in religion: Alderman Foulkes, Alderman William Gibbs and Francis Allen.[2] Other committees appointed to deal with religious matters /

1. J.Co.Co.40, ff. 148-148v.
2. Ibid., f.151.

during 1646, reveal the same consistency of attitude. Of course the degree of commitment to a presbyterian church system was not uniform, but they all appear to have opposed complete toleration. Thus we can detect a tendency upon the part of most aldermen towards support of a presbyterian form of church government. But it is far more difficult to decide whether they did so because they regarded this form of government as being the best absolutely, or merely as the best obtainable under the circumstances, in that it secured the continued existence of the parochial system, the foundation of City government. For Common Councilmen personal contact with their parish ministers must have done much to strengthen their commitment to presbyterianism. But the desire for order and the reimposition of the traditional hierarchy of obedience, also had its part to play; one element in a broad desire for a return to normality in all spheres, which had gradually been gathering momentum since 1643-4.

What impact did the great expansion of sectarian activity have on the City governors? During 1646 the conflict over toleration, concern for effective government, and the desire for a final peace settlement all deepened in the City. Thomas Edwards's 'Gangraena' was as much a symptom of the deteriorating situation in the City as a cause of that situation.

The 'Betés noires' of Edwards's volumes were undoubtedly Hugh Peters, the Independent minister, and John Lilburne, the radical. Edwards's description of Peters's activities reveals several issues which worked to heighten tensions within the City, and between the City governors and the Army of Sir Thomas Fairfax. Apart from attacks upon the presbyterian system and the Assembly of Divines, Peters was accused of such political acts as attacking the City and Common Council, and acting as an emissary of the sectaries in the countries, preaching and influencing the choice of burgesses for parliament.[1] The third and final part of 'Gangraena' bears witness to the fierce antagonism which had developed between the City and the Army - Hugh Peters was again attacked for his part in this deterioration of relations, and while some light is shed upon the part played by the City's Remonstrance of May 1646 in arousing the antagonism of the Army,[2] Edwards's own attacks upon the latter could have done little to improve matters.[3]

Captain John Jones provides substantiating evidence for the picture drawn by Edwards. We find the same concern for good government; criticism of sectarian activities headed by Lilburne, and the consequent threat to

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1. Edwards, Gangraena, i, part 1, pp.60-1; Ibid., i, part 2, pp.106-7; Ibid., ii, pp.50,69; Ibid., iii, p.121.
2. Ibid., iii, pp.25, 45, 106, 274.
3. Ibid., i, pp.13-14,44,64-5; Ibid., ii, pp.4-5.

social rank; attack on the electoral activities of Hugh Peters; and the same championing of presbyterian government and the City's Remonstrance.[1] Yet there was one important distinction between the two works, which goes some way to revealing the close connection between lay support of presbyterianism and lay concern for order and regularity in social and political activities. Although we have already seen John Jones as a figure in the 'presbyterian' group revealed by the Savile Affair, and like Edwards he devoted part of his work to vindicating the Scots, yet he qualified his attack on toleration with an allowance for pious men who could not come up to the rule in all things, to worship peaceably.[2] This was a concession that Edwards and his associates in the ministry of extreme presbyterian views, could never really accept, judging by the book 'Jus Divinum Regiminis Ecclesiastici', published on the 1 December 1646.[3]

The mayorality of Thomas Adams witnessed a more vigorous policy against the sects than had occurred under his predecessor. It would seem that the cautious Thomas Atkins had detected which way the wind was blowing and had stopped attempting to take action against sectaries.[4] The new Lord Mayor set about reasserting his authority over such matters,

1. Jones, Plain English....', pp.1-19 passim.
2. Ibid., p.25.
3. Baillie, Letters, ii, 411.
4. Edwards, Gangraena, i, part 2, p.37.

and was probably supported by the Scots Commissioners who now came to exert far more influence upon City counsels. Thus in February 1645/6 the Common Council took action against Hugh Peters and other preachers, who had reproached that Court in their sermons.[1] Action was also taken against Larner for his pamphlet 'London's Last Warning', Colonel Washington was questioned before the Mayor for publicly criticising a sermon of Thomas Edwards, and we hear of the trial of 'a great Sectary' before Adams in July, 1646.[2] In November, 1646, we learn that a suit had been commenced against Adams by one John Hallam, a parishioner of Christ Church, for committing him to prison for non-payment of tithes and oblations.[3]

It was not only the Army that was offended by the activities of the City ministers and governors in the religious sphere. The House of Commons were also antagonised by this activity. A petition from the Assembly of Divines in March, 1645/6, which bluntly stated the outright opposition of that body to the county commissioners appointed by parliament, was met by a vote of the Commons that the petition was a breach of privilege.[4] A complementary petition from the Common Council fared no better.[5] Whittaker's comment upon the City's Remonstrance, presented upon the 26

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1. J.Co.Co.40, f.166v.
2. Edwards, op.cit., ii, p.130, iii, p.24; L.J.8, pp.240-5 passim; Drapes, op.cit., p.11.
3. Repertory 58, part 2, f.5. (City of London Record Office).
4. Baillie, Letters, ii, p.365.
5. J.Co.Co. 40, f.174.

May was something of an understatement - he maintained that the House much disliked it.[1] As we shall see, this Remonstrance coincided with other factors of a more political nature, which had already caused a serious deterioration in relations between City and Commons.[2] At the end of the year, and during the early months of 1647 there was another flurry of presbyterian petitions and committees of Common Council to consider them,[3] but by that time the major issues concerning Parliament and the City were decidedly political in character.

Before moving on to investigate these political activities of the City, I wish briefly to demonstrate that concern for order also operated in the secular sphere, and that where it did, it again evoked almost complete unanimity of action. Issues that could be trusted to arouse such a response included the privileges of the City, the authority of the Lord Mayor and Aldermen, the powers and privileges of the City companies. They were not safeguarded by the City Fathers merely as matters of principle - as with the problem of sectarian growth in London, these constitutional factors were inextricably bound up with the overriding issue of order within the City. Laxity in protecting the essential privileges of the City and its corporations, could endanger its whole

1. Addit.MSS. 31116, f.271; for details of the Remonstrance, see infra, pp. 216-7.
2. v. infra, pp.200, 207-214.
3. J.Co.Co.40, ff.199-203v.

social, economic and political framework. The year 1645 was a year when the traditional modes of government had come under attack, ranging from an internal struggle over the negative voice of the Lord Mayor and Aldermen in Common Council,[1] to interference in election of officers for the Stationers' and Weavers' Companies.[2]

At the beginning of 1646 ill feeling between City and Parliament was aroused by an issue that was designed to cause maximum concern in the Common Council. In the second half of 1644 the City had secured the inclusion in the peace propositions treated upon at Uxbridge, of their claim to control their own Militia, and to have complete judicial and military authority over the suburbs and outparts of London.[3] But in November, 1645, when the Commons came to debate the 26th Proposition for peace, they voted the City's desire for an Act to confirm all its charters and liberties, but not their desire that all the suburbs might be under the government of the London Militia.[4]

On the 15 December the Court of Common Council expressed its desire to have the same military power as that included in the earlier propositions. This course of action was recommended to the Court by a Committee appointed

1. Ibid., ff.121, 123, 126; Rep.57, part 2, f.45v.
2. Rep.57, part 2, ff.146v, 201v-202.
3. J.Co.Co.40, f.115.
4. Baillie, Letters, ii, 352; Addit.MSS.31116, f.243v.

to confer with a committee of the House of Commons about the City's propositions concerning the Militia, and the signatures of those who accorded with this advice illustrate the great degree of unanimity that such threats to the privileges and powers of the City could create.[1] Amongst the signatories were men of very different political views - radicals like Pennington, John Warner, Samuel Warner, Rowland Wilson, jnr., Owen Rowe, Robert Tichbourne and Thomas Player, adopted the same attitude as such moderates and pro-Scots citizens as John Langham, John Bellamy, Edward Hooker, Richard Glyde and Richard Young.

Concern for social order and regular government within the City coloured the attitude of many citizens towards the religious differences of the later 1640s. It was an important factor in producing the apparently powerful support for a presbyterian system of church government amongst the more eminent citizens, although adherence to high presbyterianism was much more limited. Similarly, the concern of the aldermen for the privileges of their court, their companies and the City itself also manifested their apprehensions about social order and regular government. Such sentiments strengthened the urge towards peace in London during 1646, arousing the suspicions of the Independent group

1. J.Co.Co.40, f.158.

at Westminster, and providing their opponents, together with their allies, the Scots Commissioners, with an opportunity to enter into closer relations with the governors of the City. It is this development that I must now investigate.

The 'Presbyterian' Alliance and the City

The decision of the House of Commons that the outparts should be omitted from the City's military control, created a grievance within City government which was to reappear in the Remonstrance of May, 1646.[1] The point made in that document that this alteration implied that the City deserved less trust from the House than twelve months previously, in fact indicated the real cause of the alteration. It was not only that the City, in its close connection with the Scots Commissioners, had offended the prevailing temper of the House, but also there was a real concern about the strength of royalist feeling in London, especially under such a Mayor as Thomas Adams.[2]

Now I wish to turn to an investigation of the City government's connection with the Scots Commissioners and the nature of this connection. In particular, I wish to look at the Court of Aldermen, whose members fall into two groups

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1. Ibid., f.180.
2. e.g., see Sir Henry Mildmay's report to the Commons made on the 7 Jan.1645/46; Addit.MSS.31116, ff.252v-253.

for the purposes of this investigation - first the small group of Aldermen who provided the leadership of the 'Scots' party' within the City government; and second, the majority who tended to support the Scottish line during 1646 because this happened to accord with their own particular interests and desires.

An investigation of the first group will also throw some light upon the activities of the 'presbyterian party' in Parliament. The second group is something of an unknown quantity, which seems to have accepted the generally conservative drift of events in relation to religious and political activity until the crisis of mid-1647. Even earlier, some displayed a certain reticence about particular policies, such as Alderman Foulke who, although he acted as the mouthpiece of the Common Council to Parliament on two occasions in relation to presbyterian government,[1] also showed concern about the repercussions of City actions. In March 1646 Robert Baillie named Foulke as the person who prevented a committee of Common Council from disavowing the county commissioners voted by Parliament for trying unenumerated scandalous offences, an arrangement which aroused adamant opposition in the City and amongst the Scots Commissioners.[2] The fact that he was able to influence the

1. J.Co.Co.40, ff.174-174v.
2. Baillie, Letters, ii, 358.

committee would indicate that he was not alone in his moderation. It was to be this less committed element amongst the Aldermen, and their counterparts amongst the Commons of the City, who were to defeat the attempted coup of Holles and his adherents in mid-1647.

But under the mayoralty of Thomas Adams the general political temper of the aldermen was revealed by an event, insignificant in itself, but of importance in its implications. On the 14 October the Court of Aldermen had stopped, on financial grounds, the customary communication of the weekly Bills of Mortality to the king. On the 4 December this order was revoked and the accustomed course resumed.[1]

There were three Aldermen who appear to have concerted action with the Scots Commissioners - John Langham, Thomas Adams and James Bunce. Although Adams was Lord Mayor in 1646 (until November) it is likely that Langham was the most important of the three. In the autumn of 1646, an attempt by the Scots to ensure his election as Mayor in succession to Thomas Adams, was frustrated by the election of Sir John Gayer, 'a greater malignant than Sectarie'.[2] By mid-June news of Langham's endeavours in the City Remonstrance

1. Rep.57, part 2, f.235v.; Rep.58, part 1, f.30.
2. Baillie, Letters, ii, 400;

and on behalf of the king, had reached Pisa in Italy - a letter from a merchant, Philip Williams stated that

> 'Ald^{er}man Langham is a cheife person in this busines & stands to it wth much resolution'.[1]

The explicit distinction that Baillie drew between Langham and Gayer, and the reference to Langham's part in furthering the Remonstrance and working on behalf of the king, leads me to attempt an estimate of the motives which induced these three Aldermen to ally with the Scots. Was their main motive religion? For Langham and Adams one can answer categorically that it was not. Langham appears to have been a moderate in religion who, we are told, was both generous to the sequestered clergy and, after the Restoration, to those ministers who were then ousted.[2] Again it is indicative of a certain lack of commitment to a high presbyterian model that both Langham and Adams refused to act as Trustees for the sale of bishops' land.[3]

If we discount religion as a motivating force in the creation of close contact between the two Aldermen and the Scots, we are left with political factors. In politics Langham and Adams were as royalist inclined as Gayer. Indeed,

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1. Sloane MSS.3299, f.169v: Williams to his uncle, 15 June, 1646.
2. B.Dobell, 'Memoirs of Sir J. Langham, Baronet', Notes and Queries, 11th Series, viii, (1913), 281-2.
3. Addit.MSS.31116, f.208.

Adams was said to have conveyed £1,000 to Charles at Hampton Court in 1647.[1] The distinction between them lay not so much in their aims, as in the means they adopted to achieve them. In fact until 1647 Gayer appears to have remained almost entirely in the background, preferring to proclaim his royalism by non-involvement. But Langham and Adams adopted a more active role in the search for an accommodation with the king. By 1646 this search had brought them into contact with the Scots Commissioners.

Before I proceed to offer an explanation of this development, I must devote some space to James Bunce, whose career in the earlier 1640s was different to those of his two colleagues. At the beginning of the decade he appears to have been far more committed to the parliamentary cause, being an enthusiastic supporter of the Protestation,[2] an active member of the City's Militia Committee and a Treasurer for Adventurers for Irish lands. It is true that Langham was appointed a Commissioner and Treasurer of the Excise Office, but it is questionable whether he ever acted in that capacity, since his name was dropped from three further ordinances to do with the excise, whilst all the other

1. Bodl., Ashmole MSS.421 (Life of William Lilly), f.205v.
2. N.Wallington, Historical Notices of Events Occurring Chiefly in the Reign of Charles I, ed. R.Webb (London 1869), 1, 292.

Commissioners were re-named.[1]

As for Bunce's religious convictions, one cannot rule out so categorically a preference for a presbyterian system, although one can, perhaps, question whether he was strongly committed to a high presbyterian one. He appears to have shared the characteristic reformist mood of the City parliamentarians in the early 1640s, with its negative features of opposition to innovations and the Laudian episcopacy. We know that in February, 1643/4 Bunce wrote to his kinsman, Sir William Brockman, advising him to take the Covenant and stressing the innocence of Parliament's just cause. The reply shows that he had arranged for three divines to visit Sir William, to appease his conscience over this matter.[2] Another indication of a presbyterian inclination on the part of James Bunce was his inclusion in the Ordinance of 20 October, 1645, as a Trier of Elders nominated for the proposed 4th Classis of the Province of London.[3] These activities do not indicate any commitment to Scottish presbyterianism, although he was clearly more committed to the presbyterian system put into operation in August 1646 than many parishioners of his own church, St.Benet

1. C.H.Firth and R.S. Rait, Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum, 1642-1660 (London, 1911), i, 203,208,366, 578,611.
2. Addit.MSS. 42586 (Brockman Papers, i), f.15v: Brockman to Bunce (no date); f.16: Bunce to Brockman, 9 Feb.1643/4.
3. Firth and Rait, op.cit., i, 794.

Gracechurch, which consistently failed to elect Elders.[1] Clearly the importance of religious conviction cannot be ignored as a possible factor in cementing Bunce's connection with the Scots.

Yet, with all three Aldermen, religion is not sufficient to explain this alliance. Instead, the most likely explanation is that the Scots Commissioners inherited this important City connection when they changed their parliamentary alliance from St.John and Sir Henry Vane, jnr., to Essex's group in the two Houses in the autumn of 1644. Langham and Adams naturally would have been drawn to ally with the moderate group in the parliament.

Three explanations offer themselves for Bunce's connection with Essex's group: he may have been won over by his brother-in-law, John Langham;[2] he may have experienced the growing disillusionment that can be detected developing in the City by 1643,[3] or he may have had a personal regard and sense of allegiance to the Earl of Essex . A combination of all three is not unlikely. It is possible that Adams and Bunce had acquired some personal bond to Essex in their

1. The Register-Booke of the Fourth Classis in the Province of London, 1646-59, ed.C.E. Surman (Harleian Soc., lxxxii and lxxxiii, 1952-3), pp.2,45,47-8,61.
2. v. Langham's genealogy in The Visitation of London, A.D. 1633, 1634 and 1635 (Harleian Soc., 1883), p.44.
3. V.Pearl, London and the Outbreak of the Puritan Revolution (Oxford, 1961), pp.283-4.

capacities as officers in the City Trained Bands at the outbreak of war. Bunce at least displayed in 1644 his opposition to the attempts of more radical members and citizens to diminish the military authority of the Lord General.[1] Where Bunce was concerned, it is possible that a military link with the Earl of Essex continued into 1646, for his positions as President of the Society practising arms in the Artillery Garden,[2] and as one of the committees for the City Militia must have made him an important figure in the plans of Essex's group, which began to materialise in mid-1646.

So much for the leaders of the 'presbyterian party' in the City government. Now it is necessary to trace the major issues that occurred in the political sphere during 1646, and to uncover the relations between the City 'presbyterian' leaders, the Scots Commissioners and the Earl of Essex's party in both Houses. Besides this connection we can also catch a glimpse of royalist activity and French intrigue, but these must be reserved for closer investigation in the next chapter.

The year 1646 opened with the continued growth of ill-feeling between the English Parliament and the Scots. It was an aspect of this deteriorating relationship that the

1. House of Lords, Main Papers, 5 April-3 May, 1644, f.101.
2. Rep. 57, part 2, f.94.

House of Commons came to view the City with grave suspicion. In particular, the resentment of the Lower House was aroused by the blatant flaunting, by the City governors, of their close relations with the Scots Commissioners. Consequently whenever the City appeared to be acting too independently, or to be pressing for measures which would increase its independence, it was met by suspicion and opposition in the House of Commons. I have already described something of the united reaction of leading Aldermen and Common Councilmen to the delaying tactics employed by the House at the turn of the year, in its consideration of the City's militia.[1] It was no coincidence that this hesitation and final rejection of the extended powers granted to the City in 1644, coincided with several displays of the City's sympathy with the Scots.

On the 24 and 29 January, 1645/6, further force was given to the rumours of Scottish intrigues with the Queen by the revelation, in the House of Commons, of letters from France, subscribed by one Robert Wright, along with other informations. According to the Scots Commissioners, these letters had first been revealed to the Committee of both Kingdoms on the 17 January by Oliver St.John,[2] but it is clear that two earlier letters from Robert Wright had been

1. Supra. pp. 198-9.
2. Addit.MSS.31,116, f.53v.: Scots Commissioners to the Lord Chancellor and others, 20 Jan.1645/6.

discussed by the English members of the Committee of both Kingdoms in November and December, 1645.[1]

The method adopted by the Scots Commissioners to combat these adverse rumours and revelations was to utilise the printing presses and their connections amongst the citizens and ministers of the City. On the 14 November order was given to the Committee of Examinations to examine the printer of the book called 'A Collection of divers Papers, presented unto the Houses of Parliament, by the Commissioners of Scotland, since May last 1645'.[2] It is no surprise to find that Robert Bostock, stationer, James Cranford, the clerical friend of Robert Baillie, and the Scotsman, David Buchanan, were all involved in this publication.[3] It would seem that this work had been prepared as early as July or August, 1645, for release at the right moment.[4] Despite Bostock's assertion that he believed the printing of this pamphlet was undertaken without the knowledge or consent of the Scots Commissioners, it is clear that the initiative for this action came from the Commissioners themselves.[5]

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1. Carte MSS.80 (Wharton MSS.), ff.354-354v: At Committee of Members of both Houses that are of the Committee of Both Kingdoms, 24 Jan.1645/6.
2. C.J.IV, p.342; v. infra, p.247.
3. Ibid., p.348.
4. Cal.S.P.Dom. 1645-47, p.343.
5. Baillie, Letters, ii, 322.

In addition, the Scots Commissioners adopted two other courses. The first was to deliver a paper of vindication to the House of Commons, and the second was to sponsor the publication in November 1645 of a pamphlet called 'Truth Its Manifest', again written by Buchanan.[1] Besides Buchanan, examinations revealed that Bostock and Cranford were again involved.[2] As we shall see this was not to be the end of Scottish use of the City's printing presses.[3]

The examination of the vindication presented by the Scots Commissioners to parliament provides us with an important insight into the extent of Scottish influence within the City. Amongst the State Papers, there is an examination relating to this vindication which substantiates the suspicions of many members towards the Scots and the City. The examinee was Alderman James Bunce, and his testimony indicates that this Scottish paper had been

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1. Brit.Mus. Thomason Tracts, E.1179 (5). D. Buchanan, Truth Its Manifest (London, 1645), v. infra, pp.252,260.
2. Cal.S.P.Dom. 1645-47, p.330.
3. Infra, p.237, 281.

communicated to the City's Militia Committee. This illustrates the importance that the Scots placed upon retaining the goodwill of this influential body in City politics. In addition, Bunce maintained that the original paper had been given to Sir John Wollaston by the Earl of Lauderdale at Lady Devonshire's house, upon which occasion Bunce himself was also present.[1]

This mention of the Countess of Devonshire has interesting political possibilities - her name was mentioned during the examination of the Savile Affair in 1645 in connection with a royalist agent and with meetings between the Scots Commissioners and certain members of the two Houses.[2] The fact that she was an important link between the Scots and English 'presbyterian' members of the Parliament is evidenced by a letter from Montereul to Mazarin, written in September, 1645, in which Montereul maintained that the Earl of Holland and the Countess of Devonshire 'are the most trusted confidants of the Scots and of the English Presbyterians, and through whom the correspondence between them is carried on'.[3] On the strength of this evidence we are justified in regarding the Countess of Devonshire herself

1. Cal.S.P.Dom. 1645-47, pp.329-30.
2. House of Lords, Main Papers, 24 June-9 July, 1645, ff.244, 246v.
3. Montereul Correspondence, 1645-48, ed. J.G.Fotheringham (Scott.Hist.Soc., 1st Series, xlix and xxx, 1898-9), i,p.14.

a Scot as a central figure in the 'presbyterian' connection, which included the Scots Commissioners, the Earl of Essex's group in Parliament, and the political presbyterians of the City. Although the details of this connection might not have been known to the generality of members, it is not surprising that their awareness of its existence should have led to concern about the communication of the Scottish paper to the Militia Committee of the City.

With this background of intrigue and suspicion, the hesitation of the House of Commons to include in the new peace propositions the extensive jurisdiction of the City Militia granted in 1644 becomes more understandable. The City was unmistakably the stronghold of Scottish influence in religion and politics. As if to underline this fact, the Common Council and the Scots Commissioners retook the Covenant on the 14 January 1645/6,[1] and a month later the Common Council ordered an enquiry to ascertain which members had refused to take it, followed on the 11 March by the order to acquaint the two Houses with the refusals.[2] Hence the vigorous reaction of the House to the letter from the Scots Parliament to the Court of Common Council, delivered by the Earl of Lauderdale on the 11 February 1645/6.[3] The

1. Clar.MSS.26, f.199: Montereul to Charles I, 15 Jan.1645/6.
2. J.Co.Co.40, ff.166v, 174.
3. Ibid., f.170.

House was especially irritated by the independent status afforded to the City by the Parliament of Scotland, and by the assumption of such independence by the City itself in its reception of the letter, and in its failure to deliver the original letter to the two Houses in a proper manner.

The letter commended the efforts of the City for the establishment of the presbyterian system, and expressed the gratitude of the Parliament of Scotland for its assistance to the Scottish army. This expression of mutual sympathy was in sharp contrast to the letters that the English Parliament was receiving at the same time from Scotland, pressing for the settlement of religion, the rejection of toleration, the revelation of the identities of informants against the Scots, and the presentation of the Uxbridge propositions to the king.[1] The consequent confrontation between the parliament and the City over the action of Francis Allen, a member of the House of Commons and a Common Councilman, in reporting the contents of the Scots letter and the Earl of Lauderdale's speech to the lower House,[2] led to a serious deterioration of relations between Westminster and the Guildhall, and strengthened royalist hopes of a split between the Scots and Parliament.[3]

1. Rushworth, Historical Collections, vii, 233-7.
2. J.Co.Co.40, ff.170v-173; Addit.MSS.31116, ff.255, 256.
3. Clar.MSS.26, f.202: Montereul to Nicholas, 26 Feb.1645/6.

And so, as relations between these two declined, so did those between the House of Commons and the City. The quarrel with the Scots Commissioners over the peace propositions was matched by the quarrel with the City over church government and the militia. The voting of the petition of the Common Council against the county commissioners for scandalous sins to be a breach of privilege has been noted.[1] Robert Baillie, writing on the 17 March, 1645/6, mentioned the resentment of the City at this vote, and laid great store on the zeal of the City. But by the postscript to this letter, written on the 31 March, it is clear that the City governors had faltered in their resolution.[2] He attributed this to a few fair words from the House but, perhaps it was partly attributable to the persuasiveness of Alderman Foulke and the ill-success of the City ministers' petition on the same subject, presented to the House of Commons on the 23 March and which Whittaker tells us was conceived to be as much a breach of privilege as the late petition of the City.[3] April 1646 was a bad month for the Scottish interest where Baillie was concerned, but problems of City government and the suspicions of the House of Commons towards the Lord Mayor, Thomas Adams, both served to stiffen the backbone of the Common Council.

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1. Supra. pp.196-7.
2. Baillie, Letters, ii, 361.
3. Addit.MSS.31116, ff.261-261v.

On the 14 April a committee of the Common Council was appointed to consider the many scandalous pamphlets, heresies and sects, all causing contention amongst the people, and all of which, it was claimed, resulted from the want of church government. This committee was to draw a petition and remonstrance to be presented to the two Houses. At the same time, it was ordered to consider means for vindicating the Lord Mayor against the jealousies expressed towards him.[1]

The personnel of this committee is of some significance since it is the same as that of several committees appointed between mid-February and the end of June to consider matters of considerable importance.[2] There is strong reason to regard this committee as representing the 'presbyterian' power-house of the Common Council.

As the parliamentary net closed around Charles in Oxford during the early months of 1646, speculation became rife about his intentions. It was clear that he would not remain at Oxford, but where would he go? London or the Scots

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1. J.Co.Co.40, f.176.
2. Ibid., ff.171v, 173v, 186v.

army were the obvious alternatives open to the king. On the 24 March 1646 the House of Commons received a letter from the king, desiring that he might come to London, but it was concluded that a letter should be written forbidding his coming, and informing him of their intention to send propositions.[1] It was generally recognised that the king's arrival in the City, before his acceptance of the propositions, would irreparably weaken the parliament's position. Despite this denial, there was great fear that Charles would come to London of his own accord[2] - his followers in the City were numerous, and even Thomas Adams did not escape suspicion. Strong resentment was felt in the City at the examination of the Lord Mayor, at an unreasonable hour, by Lord Say, St.John and other members concerning alleged information from Oxford of a design on his part to protect the king, and to remove all his enemies in the parliament.[3]

It was during the aftermath of this crisis that the City's Remonstrance burst onto the political scene. It is not surprising that the House of Commons disliked this lengthy rehearsal of all the City's grievances and desires, including church government, toleration, defence of the king's

1. C.J.IV,p.490; Brit.Mus., Egerton MSS.2545 (Nicholas Papers), f.25v: Letter of intelligence, 25 March, 1646.
2. e.g., see E 332 (4), Mercurius Civicus, no.149, pp.2096, 2101, 2102.
3. Baillie, Letters, ii, 365, 368; Sabran maintained that Adams was examined twice: Public Records Office, PRO 31/3/79 (Foreign Transcripts), ff.34, 41-2.

just rights, peace, support of the Scots, abatement of taxation, repayment of loans, abuse of parliamentary privilege over debt and Ireland. Particular emphasis was laid upon the mark of the House's displeasure inherent in its retention of the Scots' letter to the City; the lack of trust implicit in the curtailment of the City's power over the militia of the outparts; and the dishonour afforded the City by the questioning of the Lord Mayor upon general information.[1]

In its representation of the City's desires over church government, the Remonstrance displayed a strongly secular character. It is true that emphasis was laid upon the Covenant, and 'the golden Reynes of discipline and Governement in the Church', but the major concern of the Common Council was at the 'Swarme of Sectaries', who, if they should get into places of trust in martial or civil affairs, might tend much to the disturbance of the public peace.[2] Thomas Edwards provides ample proof of the immediate aggravation of the religious and political conflict within the City as a result of the Remonstrance, and very soon the Common Council had to act to suppress a cross-petition, organised by some citizens, including a few members of the Court.[3]

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1. J.Co.Co.40, ff.178v-180v.
2. Ibid., f.178v.
3. Ibid., f.183v.

The House of Commons remained suspicious of the City over the matter of the king's letter, which had been delivered to Thomas Adams on the 25 May. It was read before the Common Council on the 26th, and the king's gracious favour expressed therein was humbly acknowledged by the Court.[1] As already stated, the same committee that drew up the Remonstrance, was appointed on the 30 June to prepare a petition to be presented to the king if Parliament so approved. While the petition displayed a genuine regard for the king and a desire for a final settlement, it did not progress beyond emphasising the necessity of his accepting the propositions to be presented to him by Parliament. On the 11 June, the House of Commons finally voted that the City was included in the Propositions, and was not to send any petition to the king. Further, a committee was appointed to inquire after the principal contrivers of the City Remonstrance, and such as had sought to disaffect the City and people from Parliament.[2]

The coupling of this denial with an examination into the Remonstrance was a clear indication of the House's distrust of the City's tendency to act as an independent body. Perhaps it was no coincidence that this refusal closely followed yet another display of Scottish amity with the City. On the 20 July, the Marquis of Argyle

1. Ibid., f.183.
2. C.J.IV, pp.615-6. The attitude of the Lower House was in marked contrast to the favourable response of the House of Lords, v. infra, p.227.

and other Scots Commissioners presented to the Common Council a letter from the Scottish Kirk, to which very hearty thanks were returned.[1]

At this peak of the crisis in the relations between the City and Parliament, it is worth looking at the City militia, for it is clear that the English 'presbyterians' and the Scots Commissioners sought to harness it to their chariot in the political battle.

With the flight of the king to the Scots army at Newark, and the presenting of the City's Remonstrance, distractions increased at London, and a general muster of the City and suburbs occurred under the Earl of Essex, as supreme commander, and Edward Massey as Major General - a revealing indication of Essex's influence in the City and also a preview of events to come in 1647. It is probable that James Bunce played an important part in this show of strength and it is likely that he was amongst the many citizens who, together with the Earl of Essex, kissed the hands of the Duke of Gloucester, the youngest son of the king.[2]

It is perhaps possible to put forward, at this point, a tentative connection between a Memorandum amongst Robert Baillie's correspondence, dating from the time of the Savile

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1. J.Co.Co.40, ff.188-188v.
2. Clar.MSS.28,f.40: Letter of intelligence, 21 May 1646. v.infra, p.268.

Affair, the presence of the Earl of Essex and Edward Massey at the head of the City's militia in May, 1646, and the reliance of Holles and his group in 1647 upon the City militia. The Memorandum raised the possibility that the Scots Commissioners were already thinking in terms of constructing in the City a military counter-balance to the New-modelled Army, using the prestige and influence of the Earl of Essex, their political ally.[1] The presence of Essex and Massey at Hyde Park in May 1646 perhaps indicates that the Scottish plan had been implemented successfully. If this thesis is tenable, then the next move occurred on the 31 July, with the motion that 4 Regiments of Foot and 2 Regiments of Horse of Sir Thomas Fairfax's Army should be sent into Ireland. This was defeated by only one vote, with Holles and Sir Philip Stapleton acting as tellers in support of the motion.[2] Chapter Seven will reveal how important was this division in shaping the future policy of the English 'presbyterians' in Parliament.[3]

Bellièvre provides us with the ultimate object of these plans - on the 13 September, 1646, he wrote to de Brienne that many Lords and several members of the House of Commons were endeavouring to induce the Mayor and Common

1. Baillie, Letters, ii, 278.
2. C.J.IV, pp.631-2.
3. v.infra, pp. 289-95.

Council to pay Fairfax's army in ord r to have it disbanded.[1] It would appear, then, that the object was to serve the interest of several birds by removing one potentially dangerous stone: by removing Fairfax's army, the different interests of the Scots Commissioners, Essex's group in Parliament and of the City would be greatly enhanced. The death of Essex in September, 1646, and continued suspicion of the Scots, were severe blows to these plans. Even so, it was basically the same design that was to be relied upon by Holles and Sir Philip Stapleton in early 1647: disbanding of Sir Thomas Fairfax's army and reliance upon the military and financial support of the City.

August 1646 saw the beginning of the battle over the financial terms of the withdrawal of the Scots army. It is significant that Recorder Glyn, the obvious linkman between the Common Council and Essex's group in Parliament, was present on the 12 September, when the Common Council ratified the security for the loan of £200,000, as well as upon two previous occasions when this loan was under consideration.[2] Bellièvre again indicated the close relationship between this loan and the disbanding of Fairfax's army in the minds of the City governors.[3]

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1. Montereul Corresp., i, p.251.
2. J.Co.Co.40, ff.191, 191v, 192; for further discussion of the preparations for the withdrawal of the Scots army, v. infra, pp. 300-8.
3. Montereul Corresp., i, p.259.

The last four months of 1646 were full of intrigues and uncertainties for the 'presbyterians' in City and Parliament, but I must leave investigation of the fate of contacts with the king till later,[1] and restrict myself here to an assessment of the City's political temper during the last months of 1646. The adoption of new tactics by Holles's group, preparations for the withdrawal of the Scots army and conflicting interpretations of developments at Westminster and in the City make this task difficult.

Some observers saw a weakening of Scottish influence in response either to a growing frustration amongst Holles's group,[2] or to an increasing spirit of moderation towards the king.[3] At the beginning of October 1646 Baillie complained of the sudden decline in the fortunes of the Scottish interest, and blamed amongst other factors the election of Sir John Gayer instead of John Langham as Lord Mayor. This in itself is perhaps an indication that there was a movement away from the Scottish interest in the City at that time. The death of the Earl of Essex was a considerable blow to the fortunes of the 'Presbyterian alliance', the different elements of which, according to Baillie, depended upon him:

> 'He wes the head of our partie here, keeped all together, who now are like by that alone to fall in pieces'.[4]

1. V. infra, pp. 314-320.
2. The Hamilton Papers, ed. S.R. Gardiner (Camden Soc., New Ser., xxvii 1880), p. 120.
3. Montereul Corresp., i, p. 341.
4. Baillie, Letters, ii, 401.

If there was a faltering in the extent of Scottish influence in the autumn of 1646, by the end of the year it would seem to have recovered. Although Bellievre maintained in December that the City was so well disposed towards the king that it was to send a petition to the parliament,[1] the tenor and contents of the petitions and representation of the Covenant-engaged citizens at that time appear to support Baillie's statement in early November that the City's leaders still adhered firmly to the Propositions and Covenant.[2] For they left the task of bringing the king home to the two Houses, and devoted more attention to the pressing political problems of disbanding the army and strengthening moderate or 'presbyterian' control of the Militia Committee.[3] These requests accorded so well with the designs of Holles in early 1647 that it is more than likely that his group and the Scots Commissioners were involved in their promotion in the City. Indeed, Baillie maintained that they represented the wishes of the Scots.[4] It could have been no coincidence that Recorder Glyn was present at the Common Council when they were first presented, and again when they were reported from a committee for presentation to Parliament.[5] Nor is it

1. Montereul Corresp., i, p.341.
2. Baillie, Letters, ii, 408.
3. J.Co.Co.40, f.200.
4. Baillie, Letters, ii, 412.
5. J.Co.Co.40, ff.199, 199v.

surprising that Sir William Lewis and Sir Philip Stapleton acted as tellers for the majority in favour of considering every part of those papers.[1]

Finally, it is necessary to investigate the parliamentary side of the 'presbyterian' connection between the Earl of Essex's group and the City. In the House of Commons, the names of tellers clearly indicate the consistent support of the 'presbyterian' leaders for the actions and desires of the Scots and the City governors. Where the City was concerned, in January 1645/6, Sir Philip Stapleton and Robert Reynolds figured as tellers in favour of an Ordinance sent down from the Lords for Martial Law in the City of London.[2] The Lords were to press again in June that the City's desires concerning its militia should be satisfied.[3] This close co-operation between the City and the House of Lords is significant in relation to the design that I have already mentioned.[4]

The support of the 'presbyterian' leaders in the House of Commons did not extend only to political activities, but also covered the religious desires of the

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1. C.J.V, p.25.
2. C.J.IV, p.412.
3. Addit.MSS. 31116, f.272v.
4. V. supra, pp.219-220.

City governors and ministers. In April 1646 we find Holles and Sir Philip Stapleton unsuccessfully opposing the moves to vote a petition of the Assembly of Divines a breach of privilege,[1] and Holles and Sir William Lewis were probably instrumental in prompting the compromise alternative to political lay commissioners.[2]

It is probable that the parliamentary 'presbyterians' were involved in the City's Remonstrance and Petition in May 1646,[3] and again, the division upon them revealed their support for the City, as did their opposition to a counter-petition on 2 June.[4] The next division concerning the City occurred on the 28 August and found Sir John Clotworthy and Sir John Trevor acting as tellers opposing a motion for reproving the Sheriffs of London for a petition they had presented.[5] On 18 November, Holles and Sir Philip Stapleton supported an Ordinance for the taking of the Solemn League and Covenant throughout England and Wales, but the division went against them.[6] In addition, on the 22 December Sir Philip Stapleton and Sir

1. C.J.IV, p.506.
2. Ibid., p.552, 553.
3. Tanner MS.59(1), f.161: anonymous letter, 11 May 1646; Whitelocke, Memorials, p.212.
4. C.J.IV, pp.555-6, 561.
5. Ibid., p.657.
6. C.J.IV, p.725.

William Lewis were tellers in favour of considering the City Petitions and Representation. When this Petition was debated on the 31 December, we catch sight of the 'presbyterian' methods of 1647 with Whitelocke's reference to the multitudes of citizens at the doors of the House. Such consistency must evidence an intimate relationship between the 'presbyterian' leaders in Parliament and the City governors.

The very nature of the House of Lords - its greater conservatism and severely restricted numbers - meant that it proved to be a much more reliable vehicle of 'presbyterian' influence as the year progressed, due mainly to the power of the Earl of Essex. Hence, the growing tendency of 'presbyterian' measures to originate in the House of Lords. It became noticeable that the City's governors were moving towards a greater degree of understanding with the Lords. On the 29 January/8 February 1645/6, in a debate upon the Lords' ordinance for martial law in the City, Mr. Lisle, 'one of the Independent leaders', maintained that the City was about to cause much harm to the kingdom through its too close understahding with the Lords. It was the City's Recorder, John Glyn , 'who is a Presbyterian', who replied that their Parliament had also caused great disorders through its inability to limit their authority.[1] Reference has already

1. Montereul Corresp., i, p.125.

been made to the importance of Recorder Glyn as the direct link between Essex's group and the Common Council and the representative of the City's rights and privileges in the lower House.[1]

In March Montereul wrote of the 'Scottish party' being greatly strengthened in the House of Lords and principally in the City.[2] At the end of May the flattering answer of the Lords to the City's Remonstrance contrasted sharply with the suspicious response of the Commons, as did their approval of the City's request to send a petition to Charles in reply to his letter to the Common Council.[3] I have already mentioned the support given by the House of Lords in early June, 1646, to the desires of the City concerning the Militia.[4] It was this close connection which prompted Sir William Davenant to write at the beginning of June of information that maintained that the 'Presbyterian Party' in London were so much countenanced by the entire House of Lords that they might prevail to make the Militia of the City divert the 'Independent' armies from interrupting the retreat of the Scots army.[5] Davenant was correct about the Lord's interest in the City Militia, but mistaken about the end they had in view.

There were other sources of pressure in the City that could influence leading lords. In March we find Baillie writing to Francis Roberts, one of his intimates amongst the

1. v. supra, pp.54-5, 221.
2. Montereul Corresp., i, p.176.
3. v. supra, p.218, n.2.
4. v. supra, p.224.
5. Clar.MSS.28, f.42: Davenant to Hyde, 2 June 1646.

City clergy, to urge Simeon Ashe to approach the Earl of Manchester, the Speaker of the House of Lords, for view of an important ordinance in his hands. Ashe was to be accompanied by Samuel Clarke and by Roberts himself if necessary, and they were to recommend alterations to the ordinance if any should be needed.[1] Simeon Ashe had been one of Manchester's chaplains in the Army of the Eastern Association, and such a contact with the Speaker of the House of Lords must have proved a very useful means of influencing the fate of presbyterian measures.

Finally, the turn of the year witnessed the removal of the major obstacle to the English 'presbyterians' in Parliament: the Scottish army. This important development had far-reaching political repercussions both in parliament and in the City. By the beginning of February, Bellièvre could write that several leading members of the nobility, both within and outside the House of Lords, were combined in a design, in conjunction with the City officers and Bellièvre, to bring the King to London or Theobalds, upon his granting the presbyterian religion for three years and guaranteeing their security by authorising the possession of their privy seal.[2] The general drift of the two Houses and of the City governors now tended towards a greater desire for a settlement with Charles, and away from the frustrations and complications of the Scottish connection.

During 1645 and 1646 several pressures were operating to

1. Baillie, Letters, ii, 359.
2. Montereul Corresp., i, pp.430-1.

render the temper of the City's governors increasingly sympathetic to the objectives of the Scots Commissioners and their English allies. The reassertion of constitutional regularity within the City, which placed the initiative once more in the hands of the more moderate and conservative citizens. Concern at the social threat of sectarianism, and at its repercussions upon the parochial foundations of government and order in the City. The understandable desire for a peaceful settlement with the King, and the end of the heavy burden of taxation. All these factors rendered the City government susceptible to the influence of the Scots Commissioners and their clerical associates, a development which was furthered by the extension of parliamentary suspicion of the Scots to the City.

Apart from the substantial pressures that London could bring to bear upon the two Houses by means of its pulpits, printing presses and petitions, it could also provide a military basis for the political recovery of Essex's group. This possibility became of prime importance in the calculations of Holles in the autumn of 1646, but the cultivation of close relations with the Militia Committee clearly had a longer history. The study of the influence of the 'Presbyterian' alliance upon the political temper of the City confirms even further the impression gained from the Savile 'Affair' that the Scots were the senior partners of that alliance.

The details of Montereul's mission in no way contradict this impression.

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CHAPTER VI

MONTREUL'S MISSION, JULY 1645-APRIL 1646

By the end of August, 1645 the fortunes of the Scots and their English allies had taken a serious turn for the worse. The early success of the attempt to discredit the 'Independent' leaders in the Savile Affair had evaporated with the resounding victory of the New Model at Naseby in June. The political influence of the Scots was further diminished by the news of Montrose's success at Kilsyth and their abandonment of the Siege of Hereford. Renewed vigour was injected into the anti-Scottish sentiment of the English Parliament and the credit of the 'Presbyterian' party virtually disappeared before the rising tide of influence enjoyed by their opponents.

This then was the unhappy situation of the Earl of Essex's group at Westminster during the autumn of 1645. Yet, by early 1646, this group was to achieve a position of apparent supremacy within the parliament, with its leaders ready to implement a scheme which promised to destroy the New Model, the military basis of their opponents' influence, leaving them in control of the final peace settlement. The purpose of the next two chapters is to attempt an explanation of the fluctuating fortunes of the 'presbyterian' party during the period August 1645-December 1646, and in particular to reveal the significant change of policy

undertaken by them during the course of 1646, upon which their remarkable political recovery was based.

The Character of Negotiation October 1645-May 1646

One of the most important political activities in which Essex's group were engaged during this period was the attempt to reach a settlement with Charles I by means of French mediation. In relation to this long negotiation, I shall need to trace the part played by the English allies of the Scots, in order to estimate the importance of their place vis-à-vis the Commissioners, Army and Parliament of Scotland, and also to reveal the important effects upon them of their increasing frustration during the latter half of 1646, in response to the growing awareness that there was no prospect of a Scottish-style peace settlement.

My interpretation of the character of the changes in the fortune of the English 'presbyterians' is as follows. The later months of 1645 found them totally dependent upon the political reputation of the Scots, and committed to their policies, although as we shall see, Essex's group was not always kept informed of their details.[1] This situation began to change in early 1646 in response to the approaching end of the first civil war, and a corresponding increase in the expectancy of peace which was reflected in the growing

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1. Infra, pp. 236-7, 239-40.

strength of Essex's influence in the House of Lords and of religious and political 'presbyterianism' in the City of London. Having already dealt with this development within the City,[1] I shall be devoting more attention in the present chapter to the two Houses of Parliament. By the autumn of 1646 the City presented the 'presbyterian' group with a military alternative to the Scots Army, at a time when the latter had become the main obstacle to the elimination of their opponents' source of power: the army of Sir Thomas Fairfax. Frustration with the political difficulties caused by the Scots army, and disillusionment at the failure of the Scots negotiation with Charles induced Essex's group to adopt a more independent line which came close to paying handsome dividends in early 1647.

The eclipse of this group in the later months of 1645 necessarily limited the scope of their activity, and tied them even more closely to the senior partners of the alliance, the Scots Commissioners. Only in 1646 did the tensions inherent in this alliance become clearly apparent to the 'presbyterian' leaders themselves. Then they came to recognise that the Scottish approaches to Charles, far from ensuring a peace settlement dominated by the Scottish 'interest' was rather strengthening the position of the 'Independents' in the House of Commons by providing ample cause for jealousy and suspicion.

1. Supra, chapter 5, passim.

Although the activities of the English members of the Scottish 'interest' must be my prime concern I must also, of necessity, devote considerable attention to the Montereul negotiation, in order to estimate the degree of their involvement and influence. The broad outlines of the contacts between the Scots and the king, the French Court and Henrietta Maria are well known, but the role of the English 'presbyterians' has been largely neglected. Presumably it has been felt that they automatically adopted the same course and ends as the Scots but, as I hope to show, this was by no means the case.

Montereul appeared on the English political scene as the agent of Cardinal Mazarin in July 1645, and during the first six months of his mission he had not one, but two negotiations in hand. They were essentially complementary, and the more important of the two from his point of view was his contact with the Scots Commissioners at London, conducted largely through Lord Balmerino. The other negotiation throws a revealing light upon the character of the Scottish 'interest', for it was conducted with the Earl of Holland, a leading figure in the 'presbyterian' group, although excluded from the House of Lords. I shall return to the significance of this second negotiation[1], but for the present it is necessary to assess the attitude of the Scots Commissioners towards their contacts with Montereul and Mazarin.

1. Infra, pp. 238-9.

In August 1645 there were many factors operating to dispose the Scots Commissioners towards a settlement through the mediation of France. After Naseby the 'Independents' took advantage of the wave of enthusiasm and exploited the king's correspondence taken at the battle of Naseby[1] to swing the mood of Parliament towards a more intransigent position over peace terms and the method of pursuing them. On the 6 August in response to the approaches of the Scots Commissioners concerning the renewing of peace propositions,[2] the House of Commons voted unanimously against treating with Charles, and adopted, without division, the motion that the peace propositions should be sent in the form of bills.[3] The House of Lords presented no obstacle to the passing of these votes.

This response worried the Scots Commissioners, not only because they evidenced a more radical temper at Westminster but also because, in the present mood of the Commons, they posed a dire threat to the Scottish style of settlement represented by the Uxbridge propositions.[4] The Scots Commissioners feared that whereas the two Houses desired positive answers to the propositions on the Militia and Ireland, they were inclined to contemplate a treaty upon

1. Meikle (ed.), op.cit., p.104.
2. Tanner MSS. 60 (1), f.227: Chiesley to House of Lords, 28 July 1645.
3. Addit.MSS. 18780, f.92v; C.J.IV, p.232.
4. v. supra, pp.95-6.

the proposition on Religion.[1] They used all means to reverse this ominous development - both in representations to the two Houses and in private debate with their allies,[2] the Scots Commissioners pressed for the previous propositions to be presented presently to the king so as to avoid delay. The result was a compromise in that the Commons voted to send both the Uxbridge propositions and Bills upon them to the king.[3]

What was the nature of the relations between Essex's group and the Scots Commissioners? The Savile Affair had revealed the Commissioners managing the case against Lord Say, providing Essex's group in the Lower House with its brief, and finally protecting Denzil Holles from the counter-charge of Lord Savile. This picture of close co-operation was repeated on the 14 August over the Scots paper urging the adoption of the Uxbridge propositions.[4] Yet Naseby and Kilsyth exposed the vulnerable position of the 'presbyterian' group, dependent as they were upon the political and military strength of the Scots. Poor communications hampered their efforts to protect the reputation of the Scots army after Naseby,[5] and it is possible that the further blow to that

1. Addit.MSS.37978, f.9v: Scots Commissioners to Army, 29 Aug.1645.
2. Ibid., f.9v; Meikle (ed.), op.cit., p.105.
3. Addit.MSS.18780, f.101v.
4. Addit.MSS;37978, f.9v.
5. Meikle (ed.), op.cit., p.99.

reputation afforded by the abandonment of the siege of Hereford, was the result of a decision reached without reference to them. This tendency of the Scots to act without the advice of their English colleagues at times of political stress, was to cause Essex's adherents considerable embarrassment during the period prior to the withdrawal of the Scots army.

A revealing indication of the character and extent of communications between the Scots Commissioners and their English allies is provided by Montereul's correspondence. As for their character, I have referred in my previous chapter to the importance the French agent attached to the Earl of Holland and the Countess of Devonshire as channels of communication between the English 'presbyterians' and the Scots Commissioners.[1] Whitelocke provides us with glimpses of Holland acting as host to the Earl of Essex, Holles, Sir Philip Stapleton and Sir William Lewis on several occasions in the autumn of 1645.[2]

As for the extent of the communications between the Scots Commissioners and their English allies Montereul reveals that the Earl of Holland and his colleagues remained

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1. v. supra, pp. 211-2.
2. Add. It. MSS. 37, 344, ff. 13, 27v; also v. supra, pp. 36-7.

ignorant of the details of the Scottish representations made to the French Court by Sir Robert Murray, at the particular request of the Commissioners, until January 1646.[1] An indication that the presbyterian alliance was one of political convenience rather than of conviction, and that as such it did not provide a basis for complete confidence.

As late as December, 1645 it would seem that the Scots Commissioners would only permit Holland and his colleagues to know that the Queen of England was well disposed to peace, and that it was believed she would follow his advice.[2] Indeed, Montereul was worried that the 'presbyterian' leaders were showing a preference for the rumoured proposals of certain lords at Oxford to deliver up Charles to the parliament.[3] There was indeed ample cause for disillusionment on the part of Essex's group as their position became almost impossible under the weight of calumny and invective against the Scots army. Yet it should not be forgotten that Essex's group had urged the king's return to London before the Uxbridge treaty, and there are indications that they continued to favour this course whenever political circumstances permitted.

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1. Montereul Corresp., i, p.53.
2. Ibid., p.73.
3. Ibid., p.74.

Although in October, 1645, upon the defeat of the royalists before Chester, Holland urged that Charles should throw himself into the Scots army,[1] by the beginning of 1646 he was advocating the king's coming to London, contrary to the Scots Commissioners who continued to favour his retirement into their army.[2] There can be little doubt that Holland's position at this time represented the desires and preference of the English allies of the Scots, and although thereafter political realities forced them to conform to the Scottish desires, the king's messages in early 1646 to be allowed to come to London exercised some influence upon them. In January we learn that the 'presbyterians' had commissioned Sir Peter Killigrew to assure the king of their good intentions and to press him to London.[3] The fact that Charles proved disinclined to the latter course probably played a part in their subsequent adherence to the negotiations for his withdrawal into the Scots army.

I have already indicated a very real difference between the Scots and their English allies in their attitude to religious presbyterianism.[4] Thus while recognising the necessity of the king's accepting a presbyterian church system,

1. Thurloe State Papers, i, p.72.
2. Montereul Corresp., i, p.83.
3. Ibid., p.90; Sabran made the same point, PRO 31/3/78, ff.105-6: Sabran to the Plenipotentiaries 6/16 March 1645/1646.
4. Supra, pp.15-16, 111-2, 141-2.

Holland sought to persuade Charles thereto by describing it as a means of restoring his political position, after which there would be little obstacle to reverting to the previous system of church government.[1] The limited commitment of the English members of the Scottish alliance to 'jus divinum' presbyterianism was widely recognised by contemporaries, including Charles himself.[2] It would seem that this attitude was not lacking amongst the Scots Commissioners,[3] but they were not free agents. As representatives of the Scottish parliament they were as insistent on imposing kirk government upon Charles as he was on resisting it. Consequently much of Montereul's negotiation can be regarded simply as a persistent, but unsuccessful attempt to achieve a compromise between these two irreconcilable positions.

Although Holland and his colleagues came to accept the danger of the king's coming to London during January, 1645/6, it is clear that they still knew nothing of Sir Robert Murray's proposals, upon which Montereul's negotiation was now based. It was Montereul, presumably desiring to simplify his task, who proposed to Mazarin that Sir Robert Murray and the Earl of Holland should meet,[4] and indeed,

1. Montereul Corresp., i, pp.39, 73.
2. Clar.MSS.26, f.195: Charles I to Montereul, 10 Jan.1645/6.
3. Montereul Corresp., i, p.67.
4. Ibid., p.90.

soon after we find both of them pressing the necessity of Charles granting the three Uxbridge propositions and his joining the Scottish army as quickly as possible.[1] It was this course that Montereul advocated to Charles at Oxford in January 1645/6, but he found him adamant in his refusal to desert episcopacy.[2]

This was the position in January and it was still the position in December 1646, for the king was concerned with exploiting the divisions at London and between the kingdoms, not with reaching a settlement of a lasting constitutional nature. The intervening year was to see all the hopes and schemes of the Scots and their allies confounded by this crucial personal factor. The king's message of the 29 January shook the confidence of the Scottish interest with its blatant offer of liberty of conscience to their opponents.[3] Montereul warned Charles of the likely results of his failure to grant the demands of the English 'presbyterians', and of his attempts to oblige the 'independents'.[4] By February the success of the negotiation seemed to hang on Henrietta Maria, who was expected to drop her obstructionism and to press her husband to accept presbyterianism.[5] The futility of this

1. Ibid., p.102-3.
2. Ibid., pp.104-5.
3. PRO 31/3/78, f.55: Sabran to Mazarin, 5/15 Feb. 1645/46; Rushworth, Hist.Collections, vii, 222-3.
4. Clar.MSS.26, ff.200-200v: Montereul to Charles I, 5 Feb. 1645/6.
5. Montereul Corresp., i, p.123.

design is now only too clear but it took much longer for the English 'presbyterians' to recognise and accept it. The failure of the king's flight to the Scots army either to produce a settlement or to restore the political fortunes of the Scots and their allies, finally revealed the impossibility of achieving a solution along Scottish lines.

The beginning of 1646 and the approach of the campaigning season created a sense of urgency - apart from the 'independents'' intrigues with those at Oxford, the prospect of the king falling into the hands of the New Model Army loomed near. The removal of the king to the Scots army appeared to be the only means of ensuring the ascendancy of the Scottish 'interest' in any agreement with Charles. Montereul found him already disposed to retire into the Scots army, although, as we shall see, the king had not given up his hopes of maintaining the interest of the 'independents'. It was because of these contacts with their opponents, and suspicion that his more immediate advisers were pro-independent, that the 'presbyterians' in March urged Montereul to attend the king again.[1] In contrast to their English allies the Scots Commissioners now displayed extreme caution, refusing to provide a written guarantee of the king's security in their army.[2] Apart from the fact that Charles

1. Ibid., pp. 141-2, v.infra, pp.267, 400-401.
2. Ibid., pp. 177, 192-3.

had conceded nothing to make them more zealous in the design, there can be no doubt that the Commissioners and the Scots Parliament were seriously concerned at the increasingly anti-Scottish temper of the House of Commons and anxious to avoid providing a pretext for military conflict between the two kingdoms. This concern of the Scots was fully revealed by their response to the king's arrival in their army, which was reported to the English parliament on the 6 May. They immediately advised the parliamentary commissioners before Newark, sent a letter of exoneration to the two Houses and then swiftly marched to Newcastle to avoid any confrontation with Fairfax's army.

Problems at Westminster, October 1645-May 1646

At this point, with the king at Newcastle, and the Scots attempting to demonstrate their unswerving commitment to the terms of the Solemn League and Covenant, it is convenient to investigate the fortunes of the 'presbyterian' group in the two Houses of Parliament during the previous period. Their task of representing the Scots and of attempting to guide them in accordance with the prevailing temper at Westminster became increasingly ~~more~~ difficult as the burden of the Scots army aroused widespread antagonism. In the House of Commons, the 'independent' grandees came to enjoy a marked advantage over their opponents, by directing a

constant flow of rumour and correspondence damaging to the reputation of the Scots. Much of this came through the Committee of both Kingdoms, where the adherents of the younger Vane and St. John still constituted an influential body. The mood created and sustained by this stream of information provided a fertile ground for the seeds of suspicion sown by the 'independents'.

The major cause of difficulty for Holles and his colleagues in the Lower House was the Scottish army. With its march into the northern counties after Kilsyth, the previous displeasure at its inactivity developed into a general atmosphere of dissatisfaction, constantly fed by reports of their ill-carriage and their continued retention of English garrisons.[1] Yet it was the English 'presbyterians' in mid-September 1645 who advised the Scots against withdrawing all their army into Scotland. The reasons they gave to the Scots Commissioners for the retention of at least part of their forces in the northern counties clearly illustrated their recognition of the extent to which their political fortunes were determined by the continued military presence of the Scots.[2] Not surprisingly, their opponents were also aware of this, and in October 1645 both Baillie and the Scots Commissioners wrote that their enemies were working to get

1. e.g. Addit.MSS.18780, ff.113,130-40, 142v-143v, 165v-166v.
2. Addit.MSS. 37278, ff. 16, 17: Scots Commissioners to Army, 16 Sep.1645.

rid of their forces.[1] But it was not long before Essex's group were aware of the tremendous political harm caused by the continuance of Leven's army in the North. Hence we find them by the end of September pressing in the Commons for it to march to assist in the siege of Newark, which course was finally decided upon.[2]

Having achieved a minor success in the choice of Newark, the 'presbyterians' were hamstrung by the dilatory response of their allies. On the 30 September the Scots Commissioners wrote to their army of the jealousies aroused, and the representations of their best friends concerning the obstruction of all business relating to the army: 'Wee meit neither with freind nor unfreind who doeth not extremly dislyke your stay in the northerne Counties'. Only their speedy march south would prevent those inconveniences.[3] The 6 October found Sir Henry Vane, jnr., complaining of the unilateral activity of the Scots army which, he maintained, was to be governed by both kingdoms.[4] In response to the growing volume of criticism, the 7 October witnessed a more forceful representation from the 'friends' of the Scots, via their Commissioners at London, complaining of the tremendous advantage the army's stay gave to 'all such as

1. Baillie, Letters, ii, 319; Addit.MSS.37978, ff.16,29: Scots Commissioners to Army, 16 Sep. and 15 Oct.1645.
2. Addit.MSS.37978, f.21: Scots Commissioners to 23 Sep.1645.
3. Ibid., ff.24-24v: Scots Commissioners to Army, 30 Sep.1645.
4. Addit.MSS.18780, f.136v.

wish the Kingdomes embroyled in new quarrells & controversies'.[1] The temper of the House of Commons was further revealed on the 13 October when, in response to letters from the north, several votes were passed against the levying of taxes by the Scots army, for the repayment of unauthorised exactions from the monies designed for that army, and for the removal of the Scots garrisons. It would seem that even these resolutions were mitigated by means of the private solicitations of the Scots Commissioners.[2]

There were other causes, besides the burden of the Scots army, which served to exasperate the Lower House such as the interference of the Commissioners of the Kirk in religious matters. On the 28 October a report was made of a sermon of Samuel Rutherford delivered at Covent Garden, in which he affirmed that the parliament had nothing to do with the church.[3] Chance and rumour also served the turn of the 'independents' - Montereul feared that the capture of Lord Digby's correspondence at Sherburne in October would reveal the negotiations between the Scots and the Queen of England.[4] The disbelief of Robert Baillie[5] was not shared by many of the English members. To this cause of jealousy the Scots

1. Addit.MSS.37978, f.26; Scots Commissioners to - 7 Oct.1645.
2. C.J.IV, p.305; Addit.MSS.37978, f.30: Scots Commissioners to - , 15 Oct.1645.
3. Addit.MSS.18780, f.154.
4. Montereul Corresp., i, p.54.
5. Baillie, Letters, ii, 320.

Commissioners, in mid-October further listed certain depositions, intelligence from Oxford, former informations of the meeting of some of the Scots army with the enemy in Herefordshire and their unwillingness to engage the enemy.[1] On the 30 October, an intercepted letter from Newark was read in the House of Lords which revealed a negotiation between that garrison and the Scots army.[2]

Thus the weight of evidence continued to grow, making the task of the 'presbyterian' group increasingly onerous. Even Sabran, the French ambassador, indulged in the habit of entertaining other guests dining at the Countess of Carlisle's house with irresponsible revelations of the negotiations between the Scots and the king through the mediation of France.[3] It is no wonder that Whitelocke wrote of early October that 'here the discontent towards the Scots began to grow among the Parliament men'.[4]

During November 1645 the battle over the Scots garrisons in the northern counties intensified, giving ample opportunity for the enflaming of national prejudice. To this was added a demand for the rendition of Belfast to the English Commissioners in Ulster.[5] The deteriorating

1. Addit.MSS.37978, ff.29-29v: Scots Commissioners to - 15 Oct.1645.
2. L.J.7, p.668.
3. Montereul Corresp., i, pp.69, 91.
4. Whitelocke, Memorials, p.169.
5. L.J.8, p.14.

political position of the English allies of the Scots was not assisted by an incident that I have already looked at with relation to Scottish influence in the City of London: the printing of the Scots Commissioners' papers to the Houses presented since May 1645. This tactic may have improved the reputation of the Scots in the City, but it did nothing to promote their friends in the House of Commons.[1] A letter from the Earl of Northumberland to one of the English Commissioners to Scotland referred both to the serious cause of jealousy provided by the Scots' retention of English towns and castles, and to the votes of both Houses against the oppressions of the Scots, decided upon in reply to the printed papers of the Scots Commissioners.[2]

December witnessed a return to the fundamental issue of peace propositions, occasioned by the receipt of the king's letter on the 8th, desiring a safe conduct for four Commissioners to attend parliament with his propositions.[3] In response to the harsh answer of the two Houses the Scots Commissioners presented several papers recommending the alteration of controversial passages, and echoing their paper of the 14 August in agreeing that there be no further treaty on those propositions already agreed upon by the two

1. Supra., p.209.
2. Bodl.MSS.Dep.C.164 (Nalson MSS.), f.264: Northumberland to - , 4 Nov.1645.
3. L.J.8, p.31.

kingdoms which they desired to send without delay. The reply of the Commons was a resolution to adhere to their letter, although it was agreed that the English members of the Committee of both Kingdoms should hear the reasons of the Scots Commissioners.[1] In relation to this difference over the propositions, Whitelocke commented that parliament 'found great interruption in their affairs, by the mixt Counsels of both Kingdoms'.[2]

The Scots army continued to create problems for Essex's group in Parliament. At the beginning of December, the two Houses agreed to appoint a committee to reside in the Scots army before Newark. In the Commons we find Holles supporting the appointment of a moderate member, Sir Anthony Irby, as one of the Commissioners,[3] but Essex's group appear to have taken an opposite point of view with regard to the moderate Lords so appointed. At a meeting upon the 21 December the Earl of Essex, Holles, Sir Philip Stapleton, Sir William Lewis and Walter Long attempted to persuade Whitelocke to advise his kinsman, Lord Willoughby of Parham, not to go as a commissioner to the Scots army. On the same occasion a similar request was made to the Earl of Rutland.[4] These approaches were not successful, but they should be

1. Ibid., 39-40; Addit.MSS.31116, ff.248-248v.
2. Whitelocke, Memorials, p.190.
3. C.J.IV, p.366.
4. Addit.MSS.37344, f.31v.

explained. It does not seem that the English 'presbyterians' were averse to the sending of a committee, but rather that they were acting in the case of the two Lords, from concern for parliamentary tactics. The removal of two moderate peers would seriously have depleted the likely support for the Earl of Essex in the Upper House. The failure of an attempt to strengthen their position in that House by having the offence of the Earl of Holland remitted, and the passing of a vote in the Lower House repealing the Earl of Leven's command over the Scottish and British forces in Ireland,[1] indicates the continuing weakness of the Scottish 'interest'.

So strong were suspicions of the Scots, that one member of the Commons, Mr. Hatcher, was instructed to treat and capitulate with the enemy without any notice of the Scots generals.[2] Even so, it would appear that although the offer made by the king in January 1645/6 to come to London to treat was rejected, the Scots Commissioners were able to exercise their influence to modify the reply.[3]

At the beginning of 1646 there was only one bright spot upon the political horizon for the battle-weary adherents of the Earl of Essex: the growing unity of interest between the Scots Commissioners and the City of

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1. Addit.MSS.31116, ff.249-249v.
2. Nat.Lib. of Scotland, Wodrow MSS., Folio lxvi, no.97: Alex. Henderson to Lord Wariston, 1 Dec. 1645.
3. Addit.MSS.37378, f.52v: Scots Commissioners to Lord Chancellor and others, 13 Jan.1645/6.

London, based to some extent upon a common concern for a presbyterian system of church government, but also, according to the Earl of Holland, upon a very great and growing desire of the leading citizens for a settlement with the king.[1] As we have seen the 'presbyterians' in both Houses fostered this important alliance by supporting the City's demands concerning the Militia and Church Government.[2] The character of this alliance and the suspicions it aroused in the House of Commons have already been dealt with and so need not detain us now further than to comment upon its importance in providing another political prop to Essex's group, a prop which was to become the crux of their alteration of policy during the course of 1646.

The rumours circulating in January 1645/6 of the king's intention to come to London were utilised by the radicals in the Commons to tighten control over delinquents in the City,[3] whilst the general position of the Scottish 'interest' continued to deteriorate. In a letter of the 15 January Robert Baillie drew a black picture of the political situation, maintaining that the desires of the Scots were viewed with contempt. In addition he referred to the prevalence of the party averse to peace, the many bitter

1. Montereul Corresp., i, p.83.
2. Supra, pp.224-7.
3. Addit.MSS.31116, ff.252, 252v, 253.

debates between the Scots Commissioners and the Houses over the answers to the king's messages, incriminating letters produced in the Committee of both Kingdoms, and the report of the king's intention to go into the Scots army.[1] The typical 'independent' tactic of disclosing evidence of royal duplicity was used to destroy sympathy for the series of royal messages pressing for a personal treaty: after the reading of the king's message on the 16 January, some of the Archbishop of Tuam's papers were read, discovering Charles's transactions with the Irish rebels.[2]

Against this weight of suspicion and prejudice, Holles, Sir Philip Stapleton and their colleagues strove largely in vain to uphold the interest of the Scots. The task was made even more difficult by the increasing preference displayed by the House of Commons for referring important issues to the members of both Houses or of the Commons alone, who were of the Committee of both Kingdoms, rather than to that Committee. The intention was to exclude the Scots Commissioners from their place of involvement in the decisions of the English Parliament,[3] and as such

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1. Baillie, Letters, ii, 337-8, 341; also v. supra, pp.242-3.
2. Addit.MSS.37344, f.35v.
3. e.g. C.J.IV, pp.395-6.

reflected the same sentiment that was to lead to the major dispute over the degree of constitutional unity between the kingdoms to be written into the peace propositions.

The end of January gave rise to even greater antagonism towards the Scots with the ill-feeling between David Lesley and the English Commissioners before Newark over the outrages of the Scots at Tickhill and elsewhere.[1] An indication of this ill-feeling can be detected in the case of William Pierrepoint, an eminent and respected member of the Commons who had not been averse to assisting the Scots at Westminster.[2] Yet his experience before Newark did much to strengthen his commitment to the anti-Scots 'party' in the Lower House. The situation was not improved by the publication of Buchanan's 'Truth Its Manifest'.[3]

Further emphasis was placed upon suspicion of Scottish negotiations with the Queen of England by the apprehending of William Murray at Canterbury in February 1646, and Montereul's seizure of intercepted letters from France.[4] Murray had been named in the information of the

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1. Carte MSS.80 (Wharton MSS.), ff.423-423v: the Commissioners' Protestation, 4 May, 1646.
2. Addit.MSS.37978, f.46v: Scots Commissioners to Lt.Gen. Lesley, 20 Dec.1645.
3. v. supra, p.210, note 1. For the sequel, v. infra, p.260.
4. Montereul Corresp., 1, p.130.

'unknown knight' as an agent of the Scots in France and, indeed, his journey to England at this time was to assist in the attempt to persuade Charles to accept the Uxbridge propositions. His presence was demanded by the Scots Commissioners, the English 'presbyterians' and the Countess of Devonshire, whose personal contacts with Murray went back before the 1640s.[1] Montereul described his arrival as the last hope, since Murray was much in the confidence of the Scots and the English of their party, and had considerable influence over the king.[2]

Charges and counter-charges concerning the Scots forces in the North continued to arouse national prejudices during February,[3] and when the two Houses fell to particulars in drawing up the propositions, an opportunity was provided for the anti-Scots sentiments of members to be fully expressed. Thus, although the Lords attempted to amend the 5th proposition on church government by the inclusion of the clause 'in pursuance of that which is already agreed upon by both Houses of Parliament',[4] the Commons resolved to adhere to it without any addition.

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1. Letters from Christian Countess of Devonshire to Thomas, 2nd Earl of Haddington and to William, 7th Earl of Morton About the Year 1639: Miscellany of the Maitland Club, iii,(1843),part 2, p.362.
2. Montereul Corresp., i, p.125.
3. e.g., Tanner MSS.60(2), f.411: Scots Commissioners to Speaker of the House of Lords, 3 Feb.1645/6; Ibid., ff.415-415v: Yorkshire Committee to Speaker of the House of Commons, 7 Feb.1645/6; Addit.MSS.37978, f.62v: Scots Commissioners to Lt.Gen.Lesley, 17 Feb.1645/6.
4. CJ.IV, p.448.

Prideaux's report upon this matter indicates how concerned were the members of the Lower House to preserve the ultimate authority of the parliament in religious affairs.[1] The 3rd proposition provided more opportunity for expressing national prejudice, for this involved the Militia, which by the Uxbridge Propositions was to be vested in the two nations jointly. Baillie maintained in January that ever since Naseby the opponents of the Scots had talked of altering the propositions agreed upon by both kingdoms,[2] and now they changed the 3rd one so as to remove the interests of the Scots and their allies, the City, in the militia of England (in the latter case in the militia outside the bounds of the City proper).

Yet pressures outside parliament began to increase against the more radical members of the two Houses, especially the growing rapprochement between the City and the Scots Commissioners, and the re-emergence of the religious issue as a major political problem. Perhaps even more important in terms of affecting the parliamentary position of the'Vane-St.John group' was the emergence of an independent spirit in the House of Lords in the form of a greater readiness to provide support for the City, the Scots and for moves towards a final settlement; a development

1. Ibid., pp.454, 455.
2. Baillie, Letters, ii, 338.

noted by both Montereul and Sabran.[1] Henceforth the House of Lords became a much more effective agent of moderation, acting as a counter-weight to the supremacy of the more radical members in the Lower House.

March 1646 provides an interesting example of the way in which the Earl of Essex and his colleagues in the Upper House put this growing independence to good use in furthering Montereul's negotiation. This particular instance also sheds some light upon the techniques of faction politics in the Long Parliament, as well as upon the identity of some of Essex's adherents in the House of Lords. The problem was to get a passport for Montereul to enable him to attend the king at Oxford for the purpose of finalising arrangements for his withdrawal into the Scots army. In brief, the design was that the Earl of Manchester was to be required to facilitate the business by proposing it, and thereafter auguments for and against were to be offered by adherents of Essex, including Lord Robartes. Finally Essex himself was to join in to the effect that since Montereul caused such jealousy, they should take this opportunity to rid themselves of him by putting on the passport that he should go on from Oxford to Scotland.[2] A similar plan was to be

1. Montereul Corresp., i, p.176; PRO 31/3/79, f.79: Sabran to Mazarin, 28 May/7 June 1646. Sabran wrote, 'il est ayse de descouvrir le concert entre Londres l'Escossois et les moderes de la Chambre Basse et presque tous ceux de la Haute'.
2. Montereul Corresp., i, pp.142-3.

adopted in the House of Commons and, not surprisingly, we find Holles and Sir William Lewis involved in the management of this matter there.[1] In this way the 'presbyterian' group was able to achieve the desired end.

With the revival of the religious issue in connection with differences over the peace propositions, it is necessary to estimate where the so-called 'presbyterians' at Westminster stood in relation to the problem of church government. In the spring of 1646 this issue was centred in the controversial Ordinance on Church Government, and in particular on the 14th Article establishing lay commissioners in every county for examining unenumerated scandalous offences. As we have seen, this Article had antagonised the religious presbyterians in the City.[2] Although Holles and Sir Philip Stapleton, acting as tellers in a division as to whether a proviso should be added, were defeated by their opponents, yet it was Holles who carried this erastian measure to the House of Lords accompanied by the whole House of Commons.[3] It is possible that the 'presbyterian' leaders in the Commons were willing to accept the 14th Article if they could achieve no amendment. The fate of this

1. Ibid., pp.143, 160, 162; C.J.IV, p.463.
2. Supra., p.196, n.5.
3. C.J.IV, pp.463, 467.

ordinance in the House of Lords possibly indicates a similar attitude on the part of several 'presbyterian' lords, for of the ten lords who asked leave to enter their dissent if the vote on the 14th Article went against them, only four entered their Protestation after it had passed without alteration, for being against the Solemn League and Covenant.[1]

If commitment to a presbyterian form of church government was not the prime factor in the revived independence of the House of Lords, what was the cause of this important political development? One factor of importance was the re-assertion of the natural conservatism of the Lords, and their desire for a settlement with Charles, produced by the approaching end of hostilities. Hence their tendency to support the political position of the Scots, who seemed to offer the best means of attaining such a settlement. Their support for the City of London can be explained on similar grounds, since religious presbyterianism and political conservatism tended to become closely inter-related amongst the leading citizens. The Lords' desire for peace was demonstrated by their letter inviting the Prince of Wales into the Parliament's quarters,[2] and by their favourable response to a letter from the King, read on the 24th March, offering to disband his forces and return

1. L.J.8, p.208: the four dissenting lords were Manchester, Bolingbroke, Essex and Bruce.
2. Ibid., pp.216,221,222,226.

to parliament, if they would secure his person and pass an Act of Oblivion.[1] The gulf between the two Houses is illustrated by the defeat in the Commons of the motion to agree with the lords' letter to the Prince, and by the Lord's rejection of the Commons' desire that a committee appointed to attend the Common Council should communicate the king's letter to them, with their own observations on it. The reason for this rejection was probably the fact that Samuel Browne, the close colleague of St. John, was to have particular care of this.[2]

Other problems continued to aggravate the temper of the House of Commons - the difference over the northern garrisons continued, the City petition against the ordinance for church government, followed by a petition from the Assembly of Divines, and the exclusion of the Scots from any authority over the militia of England.[3] Added to this was the increasing speculation over the future course of the king as the grip of the New Model tightened around Oxford, heralding the imminent collapse of the royalist resistance. On the 31 March the Commons appointed a committee to secure the king if he should come to London[4] - I have already noted the two letters written by Secretary Nicholas on behalf of

1. Ibid., pp.233,235.
2. C.J.IV, p.485; L.J. 8, p.236.
3. Baillie, Letters, ii, 352-3, 357,361.
4. Ibid., ii, 362.

Charles to Sir Henry Vane, jnr., in the same month, in which his desire to come to London was clearly shown.[1]

While Montereul was making final arrangements for the reception of the king into the Scottish army, and expressing his distrust at their lack of co-operation, the English allies of the Scots were faced with a crisis over the peace propositions. Upon their being passed by the two Houses, they were sent to the Scots Commissioners, and the complaints of the latter were debated by the Commons on the 6 and 7 April. The response of the House was a vote that the Scots be desired to join in presenting the propositions to the king.[2] The Scots Commissioners themselves felt acutely uncomfortable in offering their objections to the English propositions - they wrote to the Committee of Estates with their army that the little appearance of the Houses receding from them put them in great straits, for they had to take account of their instructions and constant principles, and also their enemies' endeavour to lay the whole blame for hindering a peace upon Scotland and particularly the Commissioners.[3]

The four papers containing the Commissioners' formal reply insisted upon Religion having precedence amongst the propositions, and desired that the general one concerning

1. Supra., p.9.
2. Addit.MSS.10114, f.12.
3. Addit.MSS.37978, f.73: Scots Commissioners to Army, 7 Apr. 1646.

church government should be set out in detail. As for the Militia, they declared their preference for the Uxbridge propositions upon this matter, but agreed to the new proposition on the condition that it be altered so as not totally to exclude the king and his posterity. Further, they opposed the 13th proposition for the English Parliament to command all the forces in England and Ireland as a breach of the Treaty of November 1643.[1] Such answers did not improve the relations between the Scots and the House of Commons.[2]

A further blow was dealt to these relations by the printing of the Scots Commissioners' papers before the two Houses had answered them. On the 13 April, this publication was excepted against by the Lower House and voted to be false and scandalous, despite the opposition of the 'better partie'.[3] To add fuel to the fire the examinations concerning Buchanan's 'Truth Its Manifest' were reported, and 'all' counted him an incendiary.[4] On the 14th, this anti-Scots temper deepened with the revelation that Buchanan was also the publisher of the Commissioners' papers, and 'yt ye Scotch Comissioners (were) privy to it'. Further it was resolved that a Declaration should be published to vindicate the

1. Rushworth, Hist.Collections, vii, 253-7; v. infra, pp. 281-4 for further investigation of this matter.
2. Addit.MSS.31116, f.264.
3. Baillie, Letters, ii, 367. Similar antagonism was to be aroused in October 1646 by the publication of further papers, infra., p.306.
4. v. supra, p. 252.

parliament in its constant resolution for religion, peace, unity with Scotland, and the ruling of the kingdom by Charles. There was not much that Holles and his friends could do to alter the temper of the House, but at least one voice was heard recommending that the good words of the Commons should be seconded by their actions.[1]

The incident of Buchanan's publication provides another indication of the growing strength of moderate opinion in the House of Lords, and its consequent activity in modifying the excesses of the Commons. For on the 18th, the Lords passed the Commons vote against Buchanan's pamphlet, but excluded from the censure that part which consisted of the papers of the Scots Commissioners.[2] This is evidence enough of a moderate temper, but a letter from the Scots Commissioners reveals that even this amended vote only passed by means of Lord Say's proxy for the Earl of Mulgrave, while half of those present voted against any part of the book being burnt.[3] On the 22 April the Commons concurred in the Lords' amendment, and the Epistle and State of the Question was separated from the rest of the book and publicly burnt.

An indication of the extent of damage caused in the Lower House to the 'presbyterian' cause by Buchanan's publication is provided by two divisions upon the Declaration

1. Addit.MSS.10114, f.12v.
2. L.J.8, p.277.
3. Addit.MSS.37978, ff.77-77v: Scots Commissioners to - 22 Apr.1646.

on the 17 April in which the 'presbyterian' element was defeated by majorities of 26 and 28 respectively.[1] Besides these two divisions no others took place on the votes against Buchanan's book or on other aspects of the Declaration, even though the latter represented an outright reversal of Scottish desires as illustrated by the Uxbridge propositions. It rejected the claim of the ministers to an arbitrary power in church government, a position which was given practical expression in the vote against the petition of the Assembly on the 21 April;[2] it also asserted the right of the English Parliament to be the sole judge of what was for the good of that kingdom in the way of Propositions; and it justified, upon the grounds of wisdom or commonsense, the exclusion of the king from any authority over the Militia, 'the first and chiefest Grounds of the Parliament's taking up Arms in this Cause'.[3] This last claim, apart from being a blatant denial of the Scots' assertions that Religion was the chief ground for the war, also presents in a nutshell the fundamental difference between the attitudes of the two parliaments towards the struggle with Charles, and indicates the limited religious significance of the terms 'presbyterian' and 'independent' as applied to political groups within the Long Parliament.

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1. CJ.IV, p.512.
2. Addit.MSS.10114, f.13v.
3. Rushworth, Hist.Collections, vii, 257-60.

The end of April 1646 witnessed an intensification of the confusion and uncertainty at London as speculation about the king's intentions ran rife. Robert Baillie expressed his disbelief of reports that the king had resolved to break through to the Scots army and expected to see him in London in a few days.[1] Even the Scots Commissioners at London wrote to their army asserting their ignorance of Charles's intentions at the time of his departure from Oxford.[2] In informing the parliament of the king's departure, Colonel Rainsborough also predicted that he would probably come to or near London.[3] Both Houses reacted strongly to this threat,[4] for on the 4 May the Lords agreed with two votes of the Commons concerning any who did not reveal the king's whereabouts if they knew it. I have already described the expression of suspicion felt towards the City governors at this period of crisis.[5] So strong was distrust of the Scots army at this juncture that on the 23 April a hard debate had taken place as to whether Sir Thomas Fairfax should be

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1. Baillie, Letters, ii, 368.
2. Addit.MSS.31978, f.80v: Scots Commissioners to Committee with Army, 30 Apr.1646. This official ignorance should be compared with Michael Hudson's information of their complicity - Hist.MSS.Comm.13th Report, part I (1892) (Duke of Portland MSS.), p.376.
3. L.J.8, pp.291.
4. Ibid., pp.294,299,304; C.J.IV, p.532.
5. Supra., p.216.

commanded to take Newark into his consideration. Despite the objection that it might cause a quarrel between the English and the Scots, and the desire of many for longer consideration of the motion, it was voted 'contrary to mindes of ye most peaceable' that it should be presently commended to him.[1] Finally on the 6 May, speculation was ended by information that the king had entered the Scottish army before Newark.

The Importance of Charles I

At this point in the political developments of 1646 it is perhaps convenient to look at the king's contacts with the Scottish 'interest' and the fortunes of the 'presb terian' group at Westminster as an inter-related pattern. The presence of the king in the Scots army gave the Scots and their allies a significant advantage, but they were quickly to learn that it was a remarkably short-lived one, in that benefit could only be reaped from it if Charles were to accept the proposals desired by them with a minimum of delay. If this expectation did not materialise, then possession of the person of the king by the Scots could, and did, become a political liability.

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1. Addit.MSS. 10114, f.13v.

Essex's group had fully supported Montereul's negotiation for the king's withdrawal into the Scots army after being informed of its scope. Secretary Nicholas, in a letter to the French agent dated the 24 April, referred to the desire of the English 'presbyterians' at London for the king's conjunction with the Scots and expressed a hope that their earnestness would increase the zeal of the Scots.[1] There are several reasons why the 'presbyterians' should have desired the presence of Charles amongst the Scots - perhaps the most pressing one was to remove him from the influence of the 'independents' in the peace settlement stakes. Montereul's negotiation was not the only one that Charles attempted to keep on the boil even with the Scots. It would seem that Charles had also treated directly with the Scots army as early as the autumn of 1645 when it was before Hereford. He had sent a messenger to ask for leave to retire into their army.[2] In May 1646 Robert Swawen and Thomas Pury were informed of an examination shedding light upon contacts at that time between Sir William Fleming for the king and Lords Montgomery, Sinclair and Livingston.[3] In a letter of the 4 January 1646 Charles referred to 'that which I have begun

1. Clar.MSS.27, ff.150-150v: Nicholas to Montereul, 24 Apr.1646
2. Carte MSS.83 (Treaties with France, etc.), f.86v: Montereul to de Brienne,2/12 Oct.1645.
3. Hist.MSS.Comm., 13th Report, part 1, pp.362-3; MSS.Dep.C. 172 (Nalson MSS), ff.411-2: Examination of William Barry, 16 May 1646.

with David Lesley'.[1] What it was that Charles had begun with Lesley is partially revealed in a letter of John Ashburnham, of the 13 December 1645, referring to a letter from Lord Sinclair and David Lesley earnestly inviting the king to come to their army. Ashburnham's comment is an interesting indication of the king's priorities: 'Wee resolve (if they will not admitt us at London) to drive y^t nayle home'.[2] Charles wrote in January 1646 that a man sent to him from Lord Sinclair and David Lesley had known all the details of the Scots treaty,[3] but it is improbable that they were involved at this time in the Scots' Commissioners' plans for the king's retirement into the Scots army, since Montereul maintained in February that the Commissioners were jealous of their army and Sinclair's visit to the king.[4]

The king's contacts with the 'independents' were a source of constant worry to the 'presbyterian' group at Westminster and the fluctuating nature of Montereul's negotiation in part reflected the strength of this concern. Initial impetus was given to this negotiation, not only by Kilsyth, but also by the nervous response of the Scots Commissioners to rumours of the 'independents' scheming with

1. Brit.Mus., Addit.MSS.28857 (Letters of Charles I to Henrietta Maria, 1646), f.1v.
2. Clar.MSS.26, f.80v: Ashburnham to Culpepper, 13 Dec.1645.
3. Addit.MSS.28857, f.6v.
4. Montereul Corresp., i, p.126.

Prince Rupert.[1] In November we find the Earl of Holland pressing Montereul to attend the king in order to further a settlement with the Scots, because their opponents were also treating with him.[2]

The pro-'independent' inclinations of the king's leading counsellors provided further cause for concern, which was strengthened by the concessions made to the advocates of toleration in his messages at the beginning of 1646.[3] Charles's two letters to Sir Henry Vane, jnr., in March 1646 evidenced the continuation of royal scheming.[4] Montereul frequently made the point, when pressing the Scots Commissioners to modify their proposals, that the king's aversion to a presbyterian system and the abolition of episcopacy inclined him towards attempting a settlement with their opponents.

Up until the last moment it would seem that Charles's own preference was to come to London, and that only after failing to make an arrangement with the 'independents' did he go to the Scots army.[5] Sabran quoted the Earl of Warwick's contention that Charles had come within a few miles of London and had turned towards the Scots army only after the vote against those who should conceal him. The French

1. Ibid., p.16.
2. Ibid., p.59.
3. Supra. p.240.
4. Clar.MSS.27, f.77: Charles I to the younger Vane, 2 March 1645/6. v. supra, pp. 9, 258-9.
5. Montereul Corresp., 1, p.192.

ambassador also wrote that if this was the case,

> 'ce n'estoit pas sans intelligence icy ny le rettardement qui fust alors de la reveue de la millice sans subject.....'[1]

The review of the militia referred to here was the one presided over by the Earl of Essex and Massey in Hyde Park,[2] and Sabran's comment raises an interesting, if unsubstantiated possibility that the review was not unconnected with the uncertainties surrounding the king's intentions. Although the review or general training did not take place until the 19 May, it should be noted that it was originally set for the 5th, and was postponed by the two Houses on the 4 May.[3] I cannot maintain that Essex's group had arranged for Charles's return behind the backs of their allies, but it is possible that they were aware of the likelihood of such an attempt and took the appropriate action to promote a scheme so much in accordance with their own preference.

In this chapter I have been concerned to investigate the relationship between the Scots Commissioners and Essex's group within the context of Montereul's mission. After Naseby and Kilsyth the influence of the Scottish 'interest' in the Lower House underwent a steady decline, and even the Lords wavered at times. The successes of the New Model and the political strength of the 'independent' group posed two inter-related problems for the 'Presbyterian' alliance. One was the character and timing of peace propositions, and

1. PRO 31/3/79, f.82: Sabran to Mazarin, 28 May/7 June 1646.
2. Supra, p.219.
3. v. Wedgwood, The King's War, p.552.

the other involved the physical possession of the king. In both cases the Vane-St.John group had a considerable advantage. In the matter of propositions, antagonism towards the Scots was expressed in opposition both to the Uxbridge proposals, which had largely reflected Scottish priorities, and to any treaty with Charles. The danger of his falling into the hands of their adversaries was obvious as the military net closed around Oxford.

Despite their earlier preference for the king's return to London his precarious position during the early months of 1646, and their own declining influence at Westminster, left Essex's group with little alternative but to participate in the negotiations for his removal into the Scots army. At least this would still guarantee them some say in settling the terms of a peace, although it would mean greater prominence being accorded to Scottish priorities than perhaps they would have wished.

With the withdrawal of Charles into the Scots army in April 1646, Essex's group tied their political future to the successful achievement of a swift settlement between the Scots and the king. The purpose of the next chapter will be to reveal the extent to which this expectation was fulfilled.

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CHAPTER VII

THE CHANGE OF PLAN

As soon as Charles had entered the Scots army every effort was made to make him consent to the propositions and presbyterian church government. Essex's group were as anxious as the Scots Commissioners to achieve a swift agreement with Charles - this was the whole purpose of the design to secure him in the Scots army. Once the king was placed outside the reach of the 'independents' and his suspected advisers, it was hoped that he would quickly overcome his scruples. The failure of this accommodation to materialise, and Scottish nervousness at the prospect of war with the English parliament served to intensify both the pressure exerted on Charles at Newcastle, and also the frustration of the Scots and their allies at the dilemma in which his obstinac placed them.

Another factor serving to increase the frustration of the English 'presb teriah' group, not only against the king, but also against their Scottish allies, was the reduction of their ability to influence the course of events in the Scots army. The political interests that constituted the 'presbyterian' alliance at London consisted of Essex's group and the Scots Commissioners, and it was with them that Montereul had conducted his initial negotiations. As the

French agent found when he visited the Scots army in April, 1646, the Scots Commissioners at London did not represent the views of their army in which the Argyle faction held sway.[1] Added to this political estrangement, was the estrangement of distance when the Scots army marched to Newcastle. These two factors must have appreciably lessened the influence that the Earl of Essex and his adherents could hope to have exercised upon the course of the treaty with Charles. But on the other hand, they had to face the political storm that developed at Westminster with their failure to achieve a settlement. My first concern is to investigate the political repercussions of the failure of presbyterian strategy after May 1646.

False Expectations

Reaction to the news of the king's arrival in the Scots army was mixed. As usual, the radical members of the Commons were able to produce incriminating evidence of Scottish intrigue with the king to counter the good words of the Scots.[2] In the subsequent resurgence of suspicion and national prejudice, two votes were passed - the king ought to be disposed to such place as the Parliament of England should appoint; and that the place to which the person of the king should be disposed should be Warwick Castle.

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1. v. Lotte Mulligan's account of this difference in 'The Scottish Alliance and the Committee of Both Kingdoms, 1644-46', Historical Studies, xiv (1970), 183-6; v.supra. p. 266.
2. Addit.MSS.10114, f.15.

The different reception accorded these votes by the House of Lords on the 8 May illustrates the growing strength of the 'presbyterians' and, indeed, the limits of aristocratic radicalism, in that House. Both votes were defeated, but whereas the first vote was defeated by only 4 votes, the second vote naming Warwick Castle was defeated 'nemine Contradicente'. The Protestation signed by the 11 Lords who supported the first vote of the Commons clearly reflected similar nationalist sentiments to those predominant in the Lower House.[1]

Why did the 15 Lords[2] who voted against the first vote oppose that assertion of the right of the Parliament of England to dispose of the King of England? It was not because they were opposed to this assertion in principle, or because they were religious presbyterians, but because first and foremost they desired peace, and the Scots appeared to be the closest to achieving it. The change of political allegiance by several peers in mid-1647 can probably be explained by a similar calculation, this time working to the advantage of the army and its supporters.[3] Of course amongst the 15 Lords there were several who were to some extent politically attached to the Scots: the Earls of Essex and Manchester, and Lord

1. L.J.8, p.309. The Protestation was signed by the Earls of Denbigh, Northumberland, Pembroke, Kent, Salisbury, Middlesex and Nottingham, and Lords Say, Grey, Howard and Wharton.
2. Addit.MSS.37378, ff.83-83v: Scots Commissioners to Committees at Edinburgh and in the Army, 10 May 1646.
3. Infra, pp. 451-2, 461-2.

Bruce, the nephew of the Countess of Devonshire. The others should be classified as moderates, whose numbers expanded as peace seemed to loom near, and served to strengthen the influence of the Earl of Essex.

The subsequent conference between the Houses on the 9 May revealed both the 'presbyterian' leaders at work, and the improvement in their position. This conference was managed by the Earl of Essex, who made a long harangue about the king accomplishing what they had fought for by his deserting his evil counsellors and freely offering himself. He went on to assert that it only remained now to disband the armies and conclude a peace; a statement which summed up the policy that his adherents were to strive to implement until August 1647. Sir Philip Stapleton resolutely seconded his political leader and the Commons dropped their vote naming Warwick Castle.[1] But not surprisingly an argument developed between the two Houses over the Lords' rejection of the vote asserting the Parliament's right to dispose of the king's person.

The 11 May witnessed some intricate manoeuvring in the Lower House upon a debate concerning the remaining royalist garrisons. An attempt by the 'independents' to make the delivery of the king by the Scots a pre-condition of the

1. Tanner MSS.59 (1), ff.161-161v: Wm.Sancroft to his father, 11 May 1646. v. supra, p.34.

demand for these garrisons was defeated by 12 votes in a total count of 218. This 'presbyterian' success was short-lived, for their opponents managed to secure the passage of an obstructive vote when attendance in the House had fallen off.

The reason for the coupling of the king's delivery with the fate of his remaining garrisons may lie in the succeeding vote. The vote was partly to the effect that a demand be made to the king, and his positive answer, without treaty, required, for the immediate delivery to the two Parliaments of all garrisons held by his command and for the immediate disbanding of all his forces.[1] It may well be that the 'independents' recognised that the disbanding of the remaining royalist forces could have only one sequel - the disbanding of Fairfax's army, and consequently the confirmation of their opponents' control of the king and, therefore, of the peace.

This danger was heightened by the growing 'presbyterian' influence in the City and, more ominously, in its Militia. In 1647 Holles and his colleagues were to look to this force to provide the necessary military backing to ensure their political ascendancy in the peace settlement and its aftermath.[2] This simple scheme came increasingly to dominate the thinking of the English 'presbyterians', but the task of implementing it was to prove more difficult. The fact that the Scots became the main impediment to this scheme, I believe, goes

1. C.J.IV, p.542.
2. Infra, pp.420-3.

far to explain the changing character of the relation between Essex's group and their Scots allies after mid-1646.

The 'independent' grandees continued to feed the fire of discontent against the Scots in the House of Commons. As the Scots Commissioners maintained in their letter to the Lords, it was no mere accident that their messenger was stopped on the 7 May and their letters opened.[1] The involvement of Colonel Rowland Wilson and Stephen Estwicke is sufficient indication of 'independent' instigation. One of these letters critical of both Houses and certain members, and written by John Chiesley was read in the House of Commons on the 8th, and resulted in a vote requiring the Scots Commissioners to secure their Secretary to answer the objections against him. Another suspicious letter with passages in code was voted to be read, but the 'presbyterian' group probably much to their relief succeeded in preventing it from being deciphered.[2]

The character of the political situation within London during the first weeks after the king's flight reflected the rising credit of the 'presbyterians'. Although Robert Baillie was wrong about the innocence of the Scots in this matter, he did recognise that many were joyful of it, and that the credit of the 'faction' was falling, with many in the Lower House falling off 'our unfreinds'.[3] William

1. L.J. 8, pp.316-7.
2. Addit.MSS.10114, f.15.
3. Baillie, Letters, ii, 370.

Sancroft wrote that the 'independents' were exceedingly crestfallen, and that if the Scots continued their fair correspondence the former were likely to lose all -

> 'All mens eyes are upon them (Scots), to see what course they will take; for that's the hinge upon wch all turnes'.[1]

Yet, paradoxically, the 'independents' were in the stronger position, for as we have seen, the success of the plan of the Scottish 'interest' depended entirely upon one unattainable factor - the swift agreement of Charles to the propositions. Thus, while they vainly strove to achieve the impossible, the political advantage inexorably moved back to their opponents, as the dead-weight of anti-Scots prejudice reasserted itself in response to the incessant reports of the exactions of the Scots army in the North, and the paper war waged at Westminster over the peace propositions.

As early as the 19 May Baillie was writing of the adverse impact of the daily complaints from the North against the Scots army and the advantage the king's obstinacy was giving to the 'faction' who were stealing votes every day:[2] the moderate inclination of many members, which had reasserted itself with the prospect of imminent peace, now began to subside before the frustration of their hopes and the increasing burden of the Scots army. [illegible]

1. Tanner MSS.59 (1), f.161: Sancroft to his father, 11 May 1646.
2. Baillie, Letters, ii, 372-3.

May 1646 witnessed a spate of letters from the northern counties containing grievous complaints against the Scottish forces.[1] In response to a letter from the Committee of Yorkshire of the 15 May, the Commons voted on the 19th that this kingdom had no further use for continuing the Scots army within England, and that £100,000 should be forthwith provided for it, half to be paid upon their delivery of the garrisons, and the other half when they were in Scotland. William Pierrepoint's report of the negotiations of the commissioners at Newark added a further boost to the long tale of woe at the end of May.[2] It was with reference to this point in time that Whitelocke wrote:

> 'Thus the matter of discontent began to increase betwixt the two Kingdoms, the Presbyterian Party here fought as far as modestly they could, to support the interest of their Brethren of Scotland. Others did not spare to aggravate matters against them.....'[3]

These complaints of Scottish exactions and of their enlisting ex-royalists and levying more men in Scotland,[4] provided the 'independents' with excellent means of manipulating the temper of the Lower House in their favour,

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1. Tanner MSS.59 (1), ff.133-266 passim.
2. Addit.MSS. 31116, f.271v.
3. Whitelocke, Memorials, p.212.
4. Addit.MSS. 31116, ff.272, 276v; Tanner MSS.59 (1), ff.278-278v: Anon. Letter to Tho.Challoner, 2 June 1646; Tanner MSS. 59 (1), ff.351-351v: Committee at York to Lenthall, 19 June 1646; Tanner MSS. 59 (2), ff.428-428v: Committee at York to Lenthall, 25 July 1646.

especially since the 'presbyterians' were again suffering from a lack of information from the Scots army.[1] On the 2 June the Scots Commissioners at London wrote to the Committee of Estates at Newcastle that 'the Independents for the present carry all before them. Our freinds are much discouraged, nothing will revive them till a good Message come....'[2] The dependence of the English 'presbyterians' upon a favourable response on the part of Charles is here clearly stated, and the failure of one to materialise explains much of their subsequent activity.

In the House of Lord the Earl of Essex and his colleagues had an easier task in retaining the initiative. This House continued to exert a moderating influence upon the overtly anti-Scottish measures of the Commons. Their blocking of the two votes passed by the Lower House on the 6 May,[3] led to a confrontation between the two Houses and the Commons appointing a committee to prepare a declaration asserting the rights and privileges of the Parliament of England. The Upper House also hung fire on the vote expressing no further use for the Scots army,[4] whilst the committee appointed to examine the opening of the Scots Commissioners' letters of the 7 May, apart from the Earl of

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1. v. the letters of the Scots Commissioners at London to both Committees of Estate in Addit.MSS.37978, ff.88-8 v (26 May 1646), f.91v (2 June 1646), f.94v. (16 June 1646).
2. Ibid., f.91: Scots Commissioners to Committee at Newcastle, 2 June 1646.
3. Supra, pp. 272-3.
4. L.J.8, pp.361, 419, 422, 434.

Salisbury, was solidly 'presbyterian' or moderate in composition.[1]

There was also a great difference between the two Houses in the reception given to the king's message on the 25 May. Whereas the Lords discovered in it a great change in the king's opinions of the proceedings of the two Houses which, they maintained, laid the surest foundation for hopes of securing a peace, a majority of the Commons viewed the king's offers with grave suspicion.[2] Four days later the Lower House voted against agreeing to the vote of the Lords for sending the letter from the king to Sir Thomas Glenham for the surrender of Oxford. A speech of Sir John Holland, a moderate member who supported the Lords' vote shows that the main cause of this rejection was suspicion of the king's intentions.[3]

Other sources of irritation and suspicion against the Scots continued to be discovered, such as an intercepted letter from Charles to Ormonde, upon the reading of which the Commons voted that it appeared from the letter that the king had gone into the Scots army under the design to set divisions between the two kingdoms, and to continue the war against the Parliament of England.[4] At the same time the

1. Ibid., p.318.
2. Ibid., p.328; Whitelocke, Memorials, pp.212-3.
3. Bodl., Tanner MSS.321 (Speeches of Sir John Holland), ff.9v-10.
4. C.J.IV, p.570.

proceedings of the Scots army were recapitulated, but a paper of the Scots Commissioners served to get the projected Declaration referred to a committee.[1]

In addition, the leading 'independents', as members of the Committee of both Kingdoms, continued to receive evidence from France of the true objectives of the king's retirement into the Scots army.[2] This information was corroborated by the intelligence provided by Sir Thomas Hanmer of his conversations with a Scots Commissioner and the latter's brother-in-law in April and early May.[3] The Commissioner was Sir Charles Erskine, and his brother-in-law, Sir Alexander Hope, a cup-bearer to Charles, whose release from restraint had been procured largely by Sir Charles Erskine. It is probable that Hanmer's information was correct, but it seems that he was unable to prove his assertions.[4] Even so, it must have made a considerable impact in the situation of suspicion and resentment towards the Scots which had so quickly revived with the dashing of expectations for a swift settlement during May 1646.

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1. Baillie, Letters, ii, 375; Addit.MSS.37978, ff.93-93v: Scots Commissioners to Committee of Estates at Edinburgh, 9 June 1646.
2. Tanner MSS.59 (1), ff.191-192v: Letter of Intelligence, 15/25 May 1646; ff.233-4; Letter of Intelligence, 22 May 1646.
3. Ibid., ff.325-6: Information of Sir Tho.Hanmer, 12 June 1646.
4. The Diary of Sir James Hope, 24 January-1st October 1646, ed. P. Marshall (Scot.Hist.Soc., 3rd Ser., 1, 1958), pp. 187-191. cf. Sir Charles Erskine's denial in Hist.MSS. Comm.4th Report (MSS. of Mrs. Isabella Erskine-Murray), p.522.

Between Two Stools

a) The Struggle for the Propositions

The Scots and their English allies had repeatedly pressed upon the king before his flight into the Scots army the necessity of his agreeing to the Uxbridge propositions of early 1645. It is clear that they expected to hear of this agreement upon Charles's entry into the Scottish quarters before Newark, and I have already noted the political repercussions of the failure of a royal message to arrive before the 25 May.[1]

When that message did arrive it both greatly disappointed Essex's group and revived the struggle over the peace propositions. These propositions were to engage the attention and activity of Essex and Holles for most of May and June 1646. Their disappointment with the king's message read on the 25 May was due to the fact that although it offered to accept the terms he had rejected at Uxbridge, it went no further than the compromise arrangement over the Militia which had been offered as a last-minute inducement at the very end of that treaty.[2] By the early summer of 1646 acceptance of the king's offer to vest control of military appointments in the parliament for only seven years was out of the question.

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1. Supra, pp. 276-8.
2. v. Rushworth, Hist.Collections, VI, pp.853,893 for details of the relevant Uxbridge propositions and the compromise proposal; Wedgwood, The King's War 1641-1647, p.557; cf. v.supra, p.143.

The original Uxbridge proposition involved the total exclusion of royal authority from military affairs, and so Holles and Sir Philip Stapleton were faced with the unenviable task of attempting to persuade the Commons to moderate their position upon the crucial issue of the Militia. In fact, a combination of shrewd manoeuvring in the Commons and the 'presbyterian' majority in the Lords enabled the allies of the Scots to achieve a considerable degree of success, but only at the expense of their patience both with the Scots Commissioners and Charles.

The House of Lords continued to provide a secure foundation for Essex and his adherents in this matter. On the 30 May the Lords ordered that a committee should think of an expedient for the proposition on the Militia. This expedient was to be modelled on the position that the Militia be in the two Houses absolutely for a certain time, and thereafter in the king and both Houses, and in case of emergencies, the two Houses to have power to raise and finance forces by their own authority in the event of royal refusal to comply.[1]

On the 4 June Lord Willoughby reported the expedient which was almost identical in wording with the instructions of the 30 May, and it was passed. The Lords' measure was

1. L.J.8, p.340.

clearly a compromise between the Uxbridge proposition, which Charles would never accept, and the Uxbridge compromise, which the Commons would never accept. The certain time to be inserted into the expedient was left blank, probably to render it more attractive to the Lower House.

Of the 11 Lords who desired leave to dissent if the vote went against them, 9 were consistent supporters of the 'independent' line, but two were moderate peers, the Earl of Manchester and Lord North. Only these two Lords of the 11 failed to sign the protestation against the expedient, indicating thereby their support for it.[1]

This success in the Upper House certainly appears to have strengthened Holles's attempts in the Commons to have the original Uxbridge proposition upon the Militia toned down. At the beginning of April, before the king's flight, Sabran had referred to Scottish concern at the increased severity of the English parliament over the Militia.[2] It would seem that on the same day that the Lords' Committee was appointed to consider the expedient, a similar motion was made in the Lower House by the 'friends' of the Scots without success. Indeed it was voted that no alterations should be made in the propositions concerning the Militia.

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1. Ibid., p.355.
2. PRO 31/3/79, f.8: Sabran to Mazarin, 26 March/5 Apr.1646.

And yet, by the 17 June Holles and Stapleton had secured the adoption of the Lords' compromise measure.[1]

Their allies had informed the Scots Commissioners at the end of May that the expedient was the most they could hope to obtain, and desired their consent to it. The refusal of the Commissioners to commit themselves further than to send the expedient to their counterparts at Newcastle 'troubled' their allies. The difference of opinion between these two components of the Scottish 'interest' is indicated by the Commissioners' request for a speedy resolution,

> 'for wee doe find, that if this passe both houses, all our freinds wilbee unanimously of the opinion that so farre as concernes the Militia, a peace should be accepted on these termes.'[2]

There is every indication that the 'presbyterian' leaders in the House of Commons had to fight hard to get this measure adopted between the 13th and 17th June, and the naming of Holles alongside Whitelocke, Nathaniel Fiennes and Sir John Evelyn as a manager to deliver the completed expedient to the Lords,[3] is an indication that the Scots Commissioners were correct in believing their allies would not fight to the extreme to safeguard the royal authority over the Militia.

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1. C.J.IV, pp.559, 575-6, 578-9.
2. Addit.MSS.37978, f.89v: Scots Commissioners to Committee at Newcastle, 31 May 1646.
3. C.J.IV, p.579.

Apart from the proposition concerning the Militia, there was one other major point of difference over peace terms: the constitutional relationship between England and Scotland to be written into them. On the 14 May the House of Commons considered four papers of the Scots Commissioners giving their reasons for dissenting from the propositions agreed upon by the two Houses. The major bone of contention was the alteration of the Uxbridge propositions so as to exclude Scottish involvement in the affairs of England. In the subsequent debate it was maintained that it should be voted that in propositions concerning England only, no judgment belonged to the Scots.[1] In fact Holles and Stapleton, in a narrow division, were able to obtain the addition to the question of the clause 'in order to Peace'. In effect this clause brought the weight of the Solemn League and Covenant to bear against the 'independents' so that the question was defeated.[2]

Yet the general distrust of the Scots continued unabated, and at the end of June 1646 the 'presb terians' in the Lower House were unable to obstruct the passing of the Declaration asserting the liberties of the Parliament of England. Its purpose was to emphasise the completely separate interest of the two kingdoms in the propositions and the distinct nature of their legislative powers.[3]

1. Addit.MSS. 10114, f.15v.
2. C.J.IV, p.545.
3. v. supra, p.262.

A further indication of this mood in the Commons resulted from the Lords' message on the 22 June that they had passed all the propositions. Although the Lower House accepted the desire of the Lords that they should be speedily communicated to the Scots Commissioners for their consent, continued opposition to any measure involving a joint interest was revealed by the passing over of the Lords' vote on the propositions for Ireland, which declared that they did not alter, nor infringe any of the engagements made to Scotland.[1]

At this point I must devote some space to an analysis of the changing attitude of Essex's group towards their Scots allies as revealed by their attempts to secure more moderate terms during May and June 1646. I have already noted their concern to impress upon the Scots Commissioners the need for them to accept the expedient concerning the Militia.[2] Once all the propositions were agreed upon by both Houses the Scots Commissioners were again pressed by their allies to accept them speedily.[3]

On the 25 June the Marquis of Argyle delivered a speech before a grand committee of the two Houses and the Scots Commissioners, and returned the propositions with

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1. C.J.IV, p.584.
2. Supra, p. 284.
3. Addit.MSS. 37978, f.94v: Scots Commissioners to Committee at Edinburgh, 16 June 1646.

their consent. The paper delivered in by the Scots on this occasion, while agreeing that the propositions should be sent to the king as a means of ending the war, also made it clear that they disagreed with many particulars, and that they consented to their being sent only on the understanding that it should not prejudice or impede the articles of the Solemn League and Covenant, nor any treaty between the kingdoms.[1] On the 27 June the Scots Commissioners explained their agreement on the grounds that they had been unanimously advised thereto by all their 'friends' as being absolutely necessary.[2]

The attitude of Essex's group towards the propositions in mid-1646 involved more than the authority of the king. In addition it also revealed a readiness to accept the weakening of the Scottish interest as expressed in the Uxbridge propositions in their quest for a settlement while Charles was still under the control of their allies. The fact that the expedient over the Militia originated in the Lords and was promoted by Holles and Stapleton in the Commons would indicate that having failed to secure the retention of the joint involvement in the Militia, Essex's group apparently worked for a compromise geared to the political

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1. Rushworth, Hist.Collections, vii, 298-301.
2. Addit.MSS. 37978, f.97: Scots Commissioners to both Committees, 27 June 1646.

realities at Westminster. Direct Scottish involvement was out of the question although Holles and Stapleton were able to safeguard the continued role of their allies in the preparation of all the propositions. The compromise offered in the Lords' expedient did not appertain to the Scots but to the degree of security the Commons could be persuaded to accept. The decision to admit the king to a joint control of the Militia over a period of twenty years was a considerable success for Holles achieved under trying circumstances, and it is no wonder that the allies of the Scots pressed for their acceptance of this proposition.[1]

Obviously the political situation had altered considerably since February 1644/45, but a similar concern with security can be detected at Uxbridge in Holles's adoption of the same line as Pierrepoint in pressing for the king's acceptance of the proposition on the Militia.[2] At that time the Earl of Loudoun had expressed a readiness to ignore the other propositions provided the one for establishing a presbyterian church system was accepted. But by mid-1646 the Scots had become very sensitive about the attempts of their opponents at Westminster to revoke the joint character of the propositions. It was now the turn of their English allies, at a time of considerable

1. Supra, pp. 284, 286.
2. Supra, p. 142.

political frustration, to indicate a readiness to accept this revocation where the Militia was concerned in the interests of promoting a secure peace. It was possibly in relation to this development that Sir Charles Erskine, one of the Scots Commissioners, wrote on the 10 June of

> 'eurie hour produsing streng effects and changes in affaires, so that honest men can hardlie knŏe what way for to walk....'[1]

Once again we see that the 'Presbyterian' alliance was based upon political expediency rather than any firm commitment to the same ends.[2] The difference of agreement between the two elements of this alliance in May and June 1646 provided the first clear indication of that impatience on the part of Essex's group which led them to change their policy later in the year.

b) Military Setback

The month of July 1646 witnessed the reintroduction of the issue, which together with the king's obstinacy caused the adherents of the Earl of Essex to adopt a radical change of policy. The issue was that of military power, which began with a vote of the House of Commons of no further use for the Scots army, and the tussle thereupon with the Lords. It then progressed to the relationship

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1. Hist.MSS.Comm., 4th Report, p.522.
2. e.g.v. supra, pp. 111-2, 236-7, 238-9.

between the needs of Ireland and the growing pressure for disbanding part of the parliament's forces in England. Finally, this issue became involved in the negotiations for the withdrawal of the Scots army and the return of the northern garrisons.

The one constant lesson that the 'presbyterians' learned during the vicissitudes of this struggle, was the immediate connection between the continued presence of the Scots army on English soil, and the support of the majority of the Commons for the army of Sir Thomas Fairfax, the backbone of the 'independent party'. The need to eliminate this army as the essential first step in defeating their opponents at Westminster became the prime factor in the 'presbyterian' change of plan in the autumn of 1646.

There appears to have been a conscious narrowing of objectives on the part of Essex's group. While war was still in progress, the political allies of the two national armies were largely concerned with protecting their respective interests, and conducting negotiations with the king and his leading advisers, with an eye to gaining the ascendancy in any peace settlement or, at least, to preventing their opponents from doing so. With the end of hostilities and the flight of Charles to the Scots army, the

presbyterians mistakenly believed that they had achieved this ascendancy. The political impasse they found themselves in necessitated a change of plan, and so they came to concentrate increasingly on removing the military basis of their opponents' influence.

The general situation seemed well suited to such a policy - the end of royalist opposition and the necessities of Ireland promised an early disbanding of parliament's forces; while the influence of the 'presbyterians' in the City would leave them subsequently in a powerful position. We have seen that the 'independents' were no less aware of the dependence of the 'presbyterians' upon the Scots army, and in the autumn of 1646 they were able to use jealousy of Scots intentions to apply this scheme against the 'presbyterians'. The lesson of this setback was obvious - the Scots would have to go - hence the paradox of 'presbyterian' leaders coming to advocate a policy in relation to the Scots which earlier had been the hallmark of the 'independents'.

The last two days of July taught a hard lesson to the 'presbyterians', which did much to bring about this change of policy. On the 30 July relation was made by members of the Committee for Irish Affairs of the lamentable condition of Ireland, which was followed by a debate on how it might be

relieved. Thereupon the 'presbyterians' nobly offered that 5,000 of Fairfax's army should be sent, rather than forces from other parts of the kingdom! But, according to Lawrence Whittaker, there was

> 'a Gen(era)l unwillingness appeareing in ye ho: yt yt Army Should be deminished till ye Scottish Army were gon Out of ye Kingdome'.[1]

Instead, to the chagrin of Essex's group their arguments were used against them, and the Committee for Irish Affairs and the Committee of the West were ordered to consider such of Colonel Massey's Brigade as were willing to serve in Ireland.[2] The 31st witnessed a concerted attempt by Holles and his colleagues to destroy the New Model, again by means of the Irish crisis. Whereas on the 30th it had been referred to the Committee for Irish Affairs to consider what forces were necessary for the immediate service of Ireland, on the following day the 'presbyterians' were able to procure a snap decision to have this question debated by a Grand Committee instead. There was good reason for this move, since the Committee for Irish Affairs had recently received a sizeable addition of 'independent' members.[3] It is not difficult to imagine the careful planning that must have gone

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1. Addit.MSS.31116, f.279.
2. Ludlow, Memoire, i, 141.
3. C.J.IV, p.549.

into achieving this success - uncharacteristically 'the vigilant active Independent party' was caught unprepared over this one vote, but they displayed their usual skill in fillibustering the motion to send 4 Foot and 2 Horse regiments of Fairfax's army to Ireland forthwith, long enough to muster support. Finally, the measure was defeated by only one vote and concentration was fixed on county forces to provide men for Ireland.[1] On the 11 August it was ordered that all forces not of Fairfax's army or of necessary garrisons, should enlist for Ireland or be disbanded.

Suspicion of the Scots was evident throughout the debates of these two days - John Harrington maintained that many suspected a plot to weaken the English army so as to be able to force the parliament to accept any conditions, while we find Holles eagerly excepting against Gurdon's assertion that the motion was upon a plot of some who were not of the parliament. Counter-allegations were made of the cashiering of presbyterian officers from the New Model, which was denied except for the case of Colonel Gray, a Scot who was dismissed, it was claimed, for divulging letters from Scotland in the army. Yet on the 14 July the Scots Commissioners wrote that Fairfax's army had lately been much recruited, and great endeavour used to turn out presbyterians.[2]

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1. Addit.MSS.10114, f.16v.
2. Addit.MSS.37978, f.101: Scots Commissioners to both Committees, 14 July 1646.

This failure to make any impression upon the strength of the New Model must have greatly demoralised the 'presbyterian' leaders, and thereafter political calamities began to fall upon them in rapid succession, especially those in the House of Commons.

The impetus of the debate upon the military needs of Ireland was maintained by Fairfax's account of the outrages of Colonel Massey's Brigade in Somerset and his offer to reduce them. Despite Massey's claim that severe justice was executed on offenders, and his complaint of the long omission of their pay, it was ordered on the 7 August that his regiment be reduced and employed for Ireland.[1] Heath maintains that this was a deliberate design by Cromwell and his adherents to eliminate the forces of Massey 'as too much an Essexian'.[2]

Cromwell's interest in the disbanding of Massey's regiment is evidenced by his letter informing Fairfax that the money for that purpose had been acquired, and that he would speedily receive directions from the House of Commons.[3] The speed with which this money was obtained and the mention of orders from the Commons alone, would indicate the existence of a partisan spirit in the pursuit of this measure.[4]

1. Addit.MSS.10114, f.17.
2. J.Heath, Flagellum: or the Life and Death,Birth and Burial of Oliver Cromwell the Late Usurper (London, 1663), p.44.
3. Sloane MSS.1519, f.131: Cromwell to Fairfax, 10 Aug.1646.
4. v. supra, p.41. It is probable that Edward Massey had a close family connection with the Earl of Essex in the person of Thomas Massey, Yeoman of the Wardrobe and Groom of the Chamber to the earl, Longleat, Marquess of Bath MSS. Box 3, xvi, f.60. v. the Massey pedigrees in G.Ormerod, The History of the County Palatine and City of Chester (3 vols) (London 2nd.edn., 1882), II, 732; The Visitation of London, A.D.1633,1634 and 1635, ed.J.J.Howard (Publns. Harleian Soc., xvii, 1883), II, 88.

The Change of Course

It would seem that the struggle over the propositions and the failure to secure the removal of part of the New Model to Ireland, both reflecting the antagonism of the majority of members to the Scots, produced a rapid change of policy. Negotiations with Charles were to continue but no longer was Holles to depend upon that tenuous connection alone. He now set about settling old scores with his political opponents at Westminster by engineering the removal of the Scots army from England. Such a move would and did render the New Model and its 'independent' supporters much more vulnerable to the political manoeuvring of Essex's group. It is to this dual policy between August and December 1646 that I shall devote my attention in the remainder of this chapter.

By the middle of July 1646 the two Houses and the Scots Commissioners had sent their commissioners to present the remodelled propositions to the king at Newcastle. The allies of the Scots regarded his consent to all of them as essential. At London an air of expectancy could be detected - almost a will to peace.[1] Just how fruitless these expectations were is evidenced by a letter from Charles to Henrietta Maria dated the 1 July. In this he expressed his inability to grant the propositions and indicated his

1. Addit.MSS.44846, f.34: Sir Thos. Peyton to Tho. Bargrave, 16 July 1646.

intention to avoid a flat refusal for as long as possible by pressing to come to London to be better informed of the parliament's reasons and to give his own.[1]

As if to heighten the sense of futility, with which Essex and his colleagues were coming to regard their Scottish connection, their expectation of a satisfactory answer to the propositions from the king was frustrated at the beginning of August. It would seem that they had only been induced to further the king's message delivered at the beginning of June by the assertion of Lord Balcarres that Charles might be persuaded to give full satisfaction.[2] And now, after the tremendous struggle to get the propositions passed in the parliament, and accepted by the Scots Commissioners, the failure of the king to return a positive answer plunged the 'presbyterians' into the depths of despair. Instead, Charles carried out the scheme that he had described to Henrietta Maria and indicated his constant preference for coming to London to clear his doubts, and also his intention to refuse measures destructive to his just power, while assenting to all Bills that were really for the good and peace of his people.[3]

The king was the constant flaw in the 'presbyterian' strategy - the last thing he wanted was a peace based on either the Uxbridge propositions or those offered to him at Newcastle in July 1646. Two possible courses had directed his

1. Addit.MSS.28857, f.33: Charles I to Henrietta Maria, 1 July 1646.
2. Addit.MSS.37978, f.8[illegible]: Scots Commissioners to Committee at Newcastle, 26 May 1646.
3. Rushworth, Hist.Collections, vii, 320-1.

thoughts and designs since the autumn of 1645, and they both entailed the promotion of conflict between the two 'interests' on the parliamentary side: his own preference was to come to London where he intended to take his pick of those who courted him, and if that proved impossible then to do everything he could to further the clash betweeh the Scots and the English parliament. Charles must have been confirmed in taking this course by the opposition of Henrietta Maria to the propositions.[1]

Robert Baillie was not exaggerating when he wrote in mid-July that all eyes were fixed on the peace propositions.[2] By the end of that month he was predicting that any delay on the king's part would lead to his being totally rejected by the English,[3] and, indeed, the reaction to his answer threatened to be as extreme as this prediction. The allies of the Scots were extremely dissatisfied with it and expected extreme resolutions to be taken in parliament after the return of their Commissioners. To prevent this, they desired the prior return of Loudoun and Argyle to enable preparations to be made for opposing such courses as might threaten war. More significantly they also maintained that it was necessary for them to have full instructions concerning the disposal of the king, the surrender of

1. Montereul Corresp., i, pp.235-6.
2. Baillie, Letters, ii, 379.
3. Ibid., 382-3.

garrisons and the return of their army into Scotland.[1] The condition to which the 'presbyterians' were reduced by the king's answer is illustrated by a letter from Sir Robert Murray to the Duke of Hamilton, dated the 8 August - he wrote that none of their friends dared to say anything there that could be taken as being favourable to the king for fear they should be thought accessory to the refusal of the propositions. It was no wonder that they were 'discouraged & infinitely displeased'.[2]

The instructions that Essex's group desired the two Scots Lords to bring with them indicate the direction in which their minds were veering. They were now primarily concerned with the need to remove the main obstacle to the implementation of their designs against the 'independents': the Scots army and garrisons. The fact that this desire concerning the instructions was complied with by the Scots indicates that the latter were not averse to withdrawing from the dangerous political entanglement with England, especially when it carried with it the promise of a removal of the factor which created this danger: the New Model Army. In September 1647 Robert Baillie provided a concise summary of the arguments used by the 'presbyterians' to persuade the

1. Addit.MSS.37978, f.105v: Scots Commissioners to Lord Chancellor, Argyle and others, 4 Aug.1646.
2. The Hamilton Papers, ed. S.R. Gardiner (Camden Soc., New Ser., xxvii, 1880), pp.106-7.

Scots to withdraw their forces from England and to deliver the king to the English Parliament - that this was the only means to get the army disbanded and the king and peace settled according to the mind of the Scots.[1]

With the return of the English Commissioners from Newcastle, the 'presbyterians' and the Scots Commissioners worked to soften the temper of the House of Commons. On the 14 August Holles reported from a conference with the Lords the Earl of Pembroke's report approving the Scots' carriage. The favourable response of the Commons to the report of their own Commissioner on the 12 August was immediately strengthened by the presentation of a paper by the Scots Commissioners indicating their willingness to disband their army, and to give up the garrisons upon reasonable satisfaction, and their desire for taking a common course for settling the kingdoms. This paper was generally approved despite the suspicions of Sir Henry Vane, jnr.[2] From the point of view of Essex's group the effect of these two indications of Scottish fidelity was something of a mixed blessing. On the one hand an ordinance for punishing the printers and contrivers of all scandalous pamphlets against the Scots was read twice. On the other hand, the offer of

1. Baillie, Letters, iii, 16.
2. Addit.MSS.10114, f.17; Baillie, Letters, ii, 391.

the Scots concerning the withdrawal of their army and garrisons strengthened the support for Fairfax's army, for

> ' the Houses now saw the advantage of keeping up their Army; as that which the more inclined the Scots to come to this Offer'.[1]

Yet the immediate purpose of this 'presbyterian' strategy was successful: the diverting of a probably extreme reaction to the unsatisfactory answer of the king to the propositions. Instead attention was concentrated upon the offers of the Scots Commissioners concerning their forces in England.

An interesting feature of the subsequent bargaining over the financial terms of the Scots withdrawal was the activity of the 'presbyterian' leaders as advocates of this policy, both in parliament and with the Scots Commissioners.[2]

Jealousies and antagonisms towards the Scots were still prevalent, and the 'independents' sought to take advantage of them - on the 25 August the Committee for the North presented an account of all the monies paid to the Scots army and of its exactions in the northern counties, which totalled £1,460,000. This account was presented in accordance with an order prompted by a Scottish estimate of

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1. Whitelocke, Memorials, p.224.
2. e.g. Addit.MSS.10114, f.17; Addit.MSS.37978, f.108: Scots Commissioners to both Committees, 18 Aug.1646. S.R. Gardiner seems to have viewed the decision to remove their army from England and to offer consultations on the disposal of Charles as being purely Scottish: Gardiner, Great Civil War, iii, 137.

£1,300,000 nett due to Scotland. The negotiations between the Commons and the Scots Commissioners about the total amount due to the Scots need not detain us, except to emphasise that their English allies played the most conspicuous role in bringing both parties to agree upon the sum of £400,000.[1]

But this agreement was only half the battle - now the problem of the arrangements for the payments arose and, again, the 'presbyterians' in the House of Commons strove to achieve an amicable settlement. The assertion of the Scots Commissioners, on the 2 September, that they were instructed to accept no less than £200,000 upon the removal of their army, aroused much resentment and bred jealousies that their offers were not real.[2] Another factor that might well have led the House to adhere to their former vote on this subject was the necessity there would be of approaching the City for £200,000 which, it was thought,

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1. Addit.MSS. 37978, f.111: Scots Commissioners to Committee with Army, 2 Sept. 1646; C.J.IV, pp.655, 659, 663.
2. Addit.MSS. 10114, f.18.

would be lent only if Fairfax's army was disbanded.[1] Distrust of the Scots in the Lower House was still too great to contemplate such a condition, a fact which was illustrated by another vote of the 2 September requiring to know whether the Scots would relinquish the northern garrisons. Harrington's terse comment upon the reaction of the leader of Essex's group in the Commons - 'Mr. Hollis netled' - provides an indication of the strain he and his colleagues were under in the autumn of 1646.[2]

A conference between the Scots Commissioners and the House of Commons on the 3 September again evidenced suspicions of Scottish intentions, which their enemies sought to further by concluding, in a private meeting, that no money should be paid until the garrisons were surrendered. The reaction of the 'presbyterians' indicates the strong influence these suspicions exerted upon the House, for they were unanimous in maintaining to the Scots Commissioners that unless these jealousies were removed and satisfaction was given concerning the surrender of the garrisons before the receipt of the money, they would find it impossible to get anything done in the House towards the advancing of the desired sum. Under this pressure, and in the absence of instructions from the north, the Commissioners again followed

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1. Montereul Corresp., i, p.259.
2. Addit.MSS. 10114, f.18.

the advice of their English allies, and expressed their confidence that, the sum being agreed upon, the Scots would agree to its receipt after the delivery of Newcastle.[1]

On the 5 September Holles and Sir William Lewis succeeded in preventing the question being put for adhering to the former votes concerning the time and manner of paying the £400,000. It was then voted to send a committee to the City for borrowing £200,000, although the resolution that the object of this loan was not to be mentioned, indicates that the House was still averse to the disbanding of Fairfax's army.[2] Philip Bellièvre rightly maintained that this was a prime object of the 'presbyterian' leaders whom, he maintained, were trying to induce the Mayor and Common Council to pay off the New Model.[3] The Commissioners used all possible means with their friends in the House and the City to procure the £200,000, fearing that the 'presbyterian' leaders would acquiesce if the City refused. The reaction of Essex's group to the desire of the Scots Commissioners to deliver in a paper of conditions concerning the king, again revealed that the concentration of this group was now on the removal of the Scots forces from English soil, for they adamantly insisted that such desires would serve only to increase jealousies unless prior assurance

1. Addit.MSS.37978, f.113: Scots Commissioners to both Committees, 9 Sept.1646.
2. Ibid., f.113.
3. Montereul Corresp., i, p.251.

was given of their rendering the garrisons and removing their army without any other condition.[1]

The controversy over the disposal of the king's person got under way again in mid-September, and the fact that Holles and Sir Philip Stapleton acted as tellers in a division for considering the debate concerning the king's person, indicates that Essex's group were now seeking to implement their design for getting the king delivered to their safe-keeping.[2] A Committee of both Houses was appointed to treat with the Scots Commissioners and the position the latter adopted, as represented in three speeches of the Earl of Loudoun, severely strained relations between the Commissioners and the House of Commons. Their drift was

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1. Addit.MSS.37978, ff.114-116, 117v: Scots Commissioners to both Committees, 9, 13, 15 Sep.1646.
2. C.J.IV, p.672; Gardiner, Great Civil War, iii, 144.

to uphold the right of the kingdom of Scotland to an equal say in disposing of the king, to advise the latter's coming to London, to maintain their inability to render the king in response to any demand destructive to his honour, and finally to desire, in the event of the Houses disliking these expedients, that commissioners again be sent from both kingdoms to the king in order to explain the propositions and to hear his desires, and with power to tell him, if he gave no satisfaction, that the two kingdoms would take another course for their peace and security.[1]

The Scots Commissioners acted herein according to their instructions, but saw no likelihood of agreement unless the king gave satisfaction in the propositions, and maintained that most were opposed to any further application to him.[2] This impasse also jeopardised the payment of the £200,000, and added weight to the general cry that England could no longer lie under the burden of maintaining great armies. As for the English 'presbyterians', the Commissioners wrote on the 3 October,

> 'our freinds are altogether impatient & desperat & say they have neither strenth to wrestle with the difficulties they meet with, nor prevent the evills they see approaching, and therfor must give over all hopes of Reconciliation'.[3]

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1. Rushworth, Hist.Collections, vii, 329-336.
2. Twenty-Four Letters of Sir Thomas Hope, Bart. of Craighall, 1627-1646, ed. Rev. R.Paul (Scot.Hist.Soc., 1st Ser., xv, 1893), p.135 note 1.
3. Addit.MSS.37978, f.120v: Scots Commissioners to both Committees, 3 Oct.1646.

It is questionable to whom these 'freinds' were referring in the matter of dropping hopes of reconciliation, but it is probable that it refers to Charles I, in which case we have a clear indication of the changing priorities in 'presbyterian' strategy which occurred after the death of the Earl of Essex.

In reply to the Scots Commissioners' desires concerning the king's coming to London the two Houses insisted that this was of such latitude that it could not be admitted.[1] The suspicions aroused by the contrast between the king's delay in answering the propositions and the desire of the Scots to have him admitted to London, depressed even further the design of Essex's group against the New Model, for it was voted by the Houses that Fairfax's army was to be continued for six months longer and that the king's name was to be omitted from all commissions thereafter.[2] So grave were the suspicions of the Scots that their allies at Westminster dared not appear against this motion, so that it passed without anyone objecting to it.[3] And matters were not improved by the unfortunate impact on the parliament of the publication, by the Scots Commissioners, of their papers from their conferences with the two Houses at the beginning of October. It is not surprising that such activities caused the Commons to apprehend very ill intentions on the Scots' part[4]

1. Ibid., f.122: Scots Commissioners to Committee at Edinburgh, 6 Oct.1646.
2. Ibid., f.123v: Scots Commissioners to Committee at Edinburgh, 8 Oct. 1646; Baillie, Letters, ii, 403.
3. Montereul Corresp., i, p.[illegible].
4. Supra, p.260, n.3; Addit.MS.10114, f.21.

The votes of the Lower House on the 18 September provide an interesting indication of the differing degree of pressure operating within the two Houses upon the 'presbyterian members. The first vote was that the person of the king was to be disposed of as the Parliament of England should think fit, and the second vote, that whatever conference should be had with the Scots Commissioners concerning the disposal of the king's person, it should not be understood to be any capitulation in relation to retarding the march of the Scots armies out of England, or of any treaty regarding the same.[1]

To the second vote there appears to have been little opposition - there was no division in the Lower House, no dissenters in the House of Lords. Even the Committee of Estates decided that the treaty for removal from Newcastle was to proceed irrespective of whether their Commissioners could work the parliament to their desires.[2] Accordingly, the Scots Commissionere declared that the treaty concerning the king should be no hindrance to the return of their army.[3]

But what of the first vote? We have seen that it was the 'independents' who led the Commons earlier in the year in voting that the disposal of the King rested in the Parliament of England.[4] Had the situation changed by mid-September? Not appreciably in the Lords, for although this

1. C.J.IV, p.672.
2. Twenty-Four Letters (Scot.Hist.Soc., 1st Ser., xv), p.135.
3. Addit.MSS. 3707, f.120: Scots Commissioners to both Committees, 3 Oct. 1646.
4. v. supra, p. 271.

vote was passed there on the 22nd, six peace lords entered their dissent.[1] Yet both these votes were brought up to the Lords by Denzil Holles and neither of them had produced a division in the Lower House. A letter of the Scots Commissioners, written the day after the debate, reveals that these votes were passed unanimously by the Commons. During an ensuing discussion about them and the king's coming to London, their 'friends' insisted that until Charles gave satisfaction over the propositions they would never consent to his coming to London with freedom. They went on to say that they knew no man in either House of another opinion.[2] These assertions represented an important departure from the previous preferences of Holles and his colleagues for the king's return to London. It is possible that they were merely taking account of the impossibility of persuading the Lower House to accept such a course; but I am inclined to believe that a combination of Essex's death[3] and the failure of their strategy in the spring and summer of 1646 as a result of the king's intransigence caused them to drop this preference and to concentrate upon the task of eliminating the New Model.

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1. L.J.8, p.499: the dissenters were Lincoln, Suffolk, Berkeley, Willoughby, Hunsdon and Maynard.
2. AdditMSS. 37978, f.118: Scots Commissioners to both Committees, 19 Sep. 1646.
3. V. supra, pp. 36, 41-2.

With the agreement upon the broad terms of the removal of the Scots army, the main point of interest at London in October 1646 reverted to the problem of the peace propositions and the king. Charles was involved, as usual, in correspondence and negotiations with several 'interests'. Bellièvre maintained that he had achieved an understanding with an element in the Scots army, which promised to put the king at the head of 4,000 cavalry upon his granting presbyterianism.

The French ambassador regarded this arrangement as more promising for the king than resuming negotiations with the English 'presbyterians' upon whom he did not lay much store after the death of the Earl of Essex on the 14 September and the improvement in relations between the City and the House of Commons. Although Philip Bellièvre at London believed that matters were still in a good condition there, Montereul's assessment coincided far more with that of President Bellièvre at Newcastle.[1]

Again the lack of sincerity on the king's part reduced the 'presbyterians' to near impotence and re-awakened the deep sense of frustration evident in August. The return of Montereul did not produce the expected results, while the continued exactions of the Scots still

1. Montereul Corresp., i, pp.266, 269, 276, 279, 283-4.

played into the hands of their enemies, as did rumours of Scots intrigue and their claim to an equal share in any decision concerning the disposal of the king.

All these developments merely served to repeat the lesson of mid-1646: that while the Scots remained in England their English allies would be too vulnerable to assume the initiative at Westminster. The last months of 1646 saw the 'presbyterians' at a low ebb and Philip Bellièvre's comment that something always happened of advantage to the 'independents'[1] summed up the experience of Essex's group throughout the year.

During the second half of 1646 the House of Lords continued to function as the protector of the Scots 'interest', and the initiator of 'presbyterian' measures as the desire for peace, the reappearance of an old face, and even the transfer of a proxy,[2] strengthened moderate influence in the Upper House in the Earl of Essex's favour.

The death of the Earl of Essex appears to have had no immediate impact upon the general political temper of the Upper House, despite the gloomy forecasts of foreign observers. The majority of peers were naturally sympathetic to the 'presbyterian' scheme to remove the Scots as a necessary means to the end of a final settlement, and some such as Lord Willoughby could be depended upon to promote the

1. Ibid., p.303.
2. L.J.7, p.685; L.J.8, p.319.

interests of the Scots in the execution of this design. As I have noted in the short run Essex's death was probably more important within the context of the detailed character of the 'presbyterian' strategy and its priorities. Looking further ahead to 1647 there are indications that Essex's death both loosened the bonds between Holles and the Upper House, and removed a source of prestige and loyalty which would have greatly furthered Holles's military preparations against Fairfax's army.[1]

The autumn of 1646 witnessed several conflicts between the two Houses, which revealed a growing conservative spirit amongst the Lords at Westminster, a desire for a return to normalcy, a temper which the 'presbyterians' did not hesitate to utilise. Hence the attempts of the Lords to remove the arbitrary and 'plebian' County Committees, to restore the traditional

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1. Supra, pp. 42-3; infra, pp.344-5, 379-80.

roles of the Lords Lieutenant and Deputy Lieutenants as leaders of county politics, to seek to remove the functions of the Great Seal from members of parliament, and to insist upon the inclusion of Lords upon the Committee at Goldsmiths' Hall.[1] One can detect the conservative spirit behind all these measures, but one can also recognise the ways in which they could favour the 'presbyterian' interest.

On the 14 October the Lords were informed that the Commons had ordered the disbanding of Colonel Massey's forces. On the 16th they resolved that forces raised by ordinance of both Houses could not be disbanded except by an order of both Houses.[2] So effective had the obstruction of the 'presbyterian' Lords become that their opponents in the Commons and Fairfax's army could only proceed against

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1. C.J.IV, p.667; L.J.8, pp.467-646 passim.
2. L.J.8, p, 530.

Massey's Brigade by over-riding their vote. Again, the action of the Commons upon passing their Declaration in answer to the Scots Commissioners' papers published in October, displays their recognition of the pro-Scots temper of the Upper House, for reference to the Lords was excluded from the title, and a motion for desiring their concurrence failed.[1]

In the final preparations for the withdrawal of the Scots army, and the transference of the king to English hands, the Lords continued to represent a more moderate attitude towards the Scots, although they displayed the desire, common to both Houses and both 'parties' for the removal of the Scots army. On the 22 December, in response to the petitions from the City, the Lords voted that the king should come to Newmarket, to remain there, 'with respect had to the safety and preservation of his person, in the preservation and defence of the true Religion & the liberties of the Kingdoms'.[2] This section passed the House of Commons on the 25 December, with the addition of a clause 'according to the Covenant', after a division in which Sir Philip Stapleton and Sir Anthony Irby were successful tellers.[3] Another clause of the Lords' vote

1. C.J.IV, p.730.
2. L.J. 8, p.622.
3. C.J. IV, p.28.

failed to pass on the 26th, probably because it smacked too much of the Scots claim to a joint interest in all measures for peace - 'And then the Two Kingdoms are mutually to consider & determine, What is necessary for the common Peace'. Yet the 'presbyterians' in the House of Commons were able to prolong the debate, and managed to get a committee appointed to consider a clause touching both kingdoms employing their joint endeavours with the king after he had come to Holdenby. The price of this compromise was the soothing of fears of Scots' duplicity by the addition of the clause - 'and that the Scots Forces shall be gone out of this Kingdom'.[1]

Finally it is necessary to complete the story of the negotiations between Charles and the Scottish 'interests' through the French ambassador and, more particularly, William Murray in the later months of 1646. It is difficult to believe that the English allies of the Scots still had any confidence that Charles would accept the propositions after the months of his prevarication. Yet in the autumn another reply was expected in London from the king, and the intriguing that surrounded its preparation and contents must have been almost the last straw for the 'presbyterians' at Westminster. A letter to be written from the king to the 'friends' of the Scots was to be sent to the Earl of Lauderdale and the Marquis of Argyle,[2] but this was abandoned

1. Ibid., p.30.
2. The Hamilton Papers (Camden Soc., New Ser., xxvii), p.114.

by the king in response, it was maintained, to letters from the 'independents'.[1] Before the end of October the king sent his instructions to William Murray for his approach to the English 'presbyterians', in which he gave Murray some latitude in everything except religion. Sir Robert Murray's comment - 'See how fatally he stickes to his principles'[2] - was reflected in the attempts of Lords Jermyn and Culpepper and John Ashburnham to persuade the king of the impossibility of uniting the Scots and English presbyterians with him against the independents unless he authorised the church government they desired.[3] The same letter maintained that good sources at London advised that if Charles gave satisfaction in presbyterianism, the Covenant could be moderated, and he would not be pressed much in the militia nor on his party.

This emphasis upon presbyterianism by the French ambassadors and the royalist exiles as the 'sine qua non' of any agreement with the Scottish 'interest' was misguided. Where the Scots were concerned, this was undoubtedly one, if not the main, of their prime objectives. The impasse reached over religion at the Treaty of Newport in late 1648

1. Ibid., p.115.
2. Ibid., pp.119-120.
3. Clar.MSS. (Select) 91, ff.35-6, 46: Jermyn and Culpepper to Charles I, 18 Sep., 2/12 Oct.1646; Clar.MSS.97, ff.37-8, 41: Charles I to Jermyn, Culpepper and Ashburnham, 12 and 31 Aug. 1646.

also indicates that some of the English members had a similar commitment, but for the leaders of the 'presbyterian party' at Westminster it was only one amongst several objectives, and not the most important of them. As Montereul discovered, the English 'presbyterians' were not exactly generous towards the king in the concessions they were willing to make - the militia was to be placed in the two Houses and then to revert to the king and the two Houses jointly, and he was not to be compelled to make any new law against his party, but was to leave them to the Houses.[1]

William Murray's mission at London provides another indication of the rift in attitude and objectives between the Scots and their English allies. The king's Answer met with a rather mixed reception - in a letter to Henrietta Maria Charles wrote that Murray had made no public use of what he had sent by him, alleging that the Scots Commissioners had deterred him because of the little hope he could give them of the king ratifying the Covenant. It would seem that Murray then proceeded to report to the king, 'that he finds none of the English Presbyterians do care for the Covenant', and that if they could have concession in religion and reasonable security in the militia, he believed a considerable party would declare for the king's coming to London with honour, freedom and safety.[2]

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1. Montereul Corresp., i, p.283; Clar.MSS. (Select) 91, f.46: Jermyn and Culpepper to Charles I, 2/12 Oct.1646.
2. Addit.MSS.28857, f.51v: Charles I to Henrietta Maria, 14 Nov.1646.

This was not the only indication of impatience with the inflexibility of the Scots. Robert Baillie referred to the fact that not only the chief of the 'Sectarian party' but some others seemed, in private, ready to welcome the king without the Covenant if the other propositions were granted.[1] Whereas Baillie believed the City would never support Charles without full satisfaction in the Covenant, Philip Bellièvre believed it could be more easily satisfied, and maintained that had it not been for the Scots, it would have been satisfied with the king's reply brought by William Murray.[2] Although the French agent regarded the Scots and the English presbyterians as being united in a desire for the king to grant all that they had asked Murray to represent to him, the Scots themselves were not sure of their English allies. William Murray was not the only Scot to provide an indication of this, for on the 9 November Sir Robert Murray wrote to the Duke of Hamilton that those in the Houses they used to call their friends began to look to themselves.[3] On the 14 November Sir Robert wrote that the king intended to send another message to the Parliament in England making no mention of the Covenant or

1. Baillie, Letters, ii, 408.
2. Mûntereul Corresp., i, p.341.
3. The Hamilton Papers (Camden Soc.), p.120.

abolition of episcopacy. He attributed this to the king's getting 'independent' language spoken to him 'by unsuspected ways.'[1] Ironically, as we have seen, the culprit was Sir Robert's own cousin[2] and although the former appears to have been writing largely of the 'independents', his points referred equally to the English 'presbyterians', and provide us with a useful assessment of the leaders of both groups - he maintained that the most zealous of those who meddled in State affairs looked at something else more intently than Religion; secondly, that no Englishman would ever in his heart hold it a necessary condition of the peace of England that Scotland must be satisfied with it, far less than it should be of the Scots' framing.

The amended message, drawn up by Charles after Murray's first abortive mission to London,[3] was never sent, not so much because the Scots Parliament had declared its dissatisfaction, but because Henrietta Maria declared her adamant opposition to its concessions.[4] Instead a general message was sent adhering to his former message of the 1 August. The fact that the reaction of the 'presbyterian party' at London was not violently hostile to this further indication of royal intransigence may well evidence the

1. Ibid., p.123.
2. Supra, p.316.
3. Montereul Corresp., i, p.330.
4. Clar.MSS. (Select) 91, f.73: Charles I to Henrietta Maria, 5 Dec.1646.

change of tactics that I maintain became evident during the last months of 1646. They were now more concerned to get the king into English hands and the Scots army out of England, so as to enable them to settle the old score with the 'independent' grandees. Thus the king's general message, which reached London at the end of December resulted in no outright condemnation by the 'presbyterians'. Instead they kept their opinions secret, only complaining in general terms to their most intimate friends.[1] Presumably they did not want to cause a severe reaction towards the king which would disrupt the preparations for the removal of the Scots army and garrisons.

Where the political temperature at Westminster was concerned, this royal message appears to have had curiously little effect - there were those who supported it and others who thought such an answer, after long expectation, would disgust those who were expecting something precise.[2] In the House of Commons, although no one dared to undertake to make the most of the answer, it did not cause the House to change its vote of 24 December for the king to come to Holdenby, where he was to have security, but not liberty and was to be invited to come there, not in order to treat but merely to remain there until he should grant what was required of him.[3] It is instructive

1. Montereul Corresp., i, p.354.
2. Ibid., p.371.
3. Ibid., pp.378-9; C.J.V, p.28.

that although Philip Bellievre believed that the 'presbyterians' were then in the ascendant, he envisaged no relaxation of these votes, but rather thought that they would be insisted upon.[1] The problem of Charles was to be put on ice, while the more immediate political confrontation within parliament was settled.[2]

Thus having assisted substantially in removing the military presence of the Scots, and transferring the person of the king into the hands of parliamentary commissioners,[3] the English 'presbyterians' were able to commence the implementation of a scheme which had hitherto floundered upon the rocks of national prejudice and justifiable apprehension against the Scots. Holles and his colleagues could now hope to attract the moderate or uncommitted members who, during 1646, had proved very vulnerable to the anti-Scots atmosphere both inside and without parliament. At last the 'presbyterian party' was able to take advantage of the general desire for peace and a return to normalcy which became increasingly evident in the country at large. Ireland called for reinforcements, England expected the removal of military burdens, both fiscal and physical. For the 'presbyterians' the remedy was obvious - the disbanding of Fairfax's army - and without the Scottish presence, this

1. Ibid., p.390.
2. Ludlow correctly maintained that the 'presbyterian party' had promised the Scots to bring Charles to London in honour and safety, but only after the disbanding of the army: Ludlow, Memoirs, i, 146.
3. Gardiner, Great Civil War, iii, 188. Charles passed into English hands at Newcastle on 30 January 1646/7 when his Scottish guards were replaced by English ones.

force was in a much more vulnerable situation. The political events of January to August 1647 largely reflected the attempt of Holles and his group to effect this elimination of the military mainstay of 'independent' political influence.

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CHAPTER VIII

THE SWING OF THE PENDULUM: DECEMBER 1646 - MARCH 1647

I left Holles and his colleagues at the turn of the year working for the completion of arrangements for the removal of the Scottish army from English soil. The fact that this was an astute political gamble on their part has already been noted - now I must seek to describe the character of the transformation at Westminster, which this gamble did so much to bring about.

The 'presbyterian' leader himself testified to the transformation of the scene in the House of Commons upon the removal of the Scots from the Northern Counties.[1] Thereupon his main task became that of utilising all means available to create suspicion and distrust towards the army amongst moderate members, to exploit their growing desire and expectation of a settlement with Charles and to take advantage of the war-weariness of the kingdom at large and of the City in particular. Hence Holles and his colleagues in the parliament and City undertook an apparently concerted attack against their military and political opponents on the broadest front.

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1. Holles, Memoirs, pp.68-9.

The anti-sectarian fervour of the high presbyterians in London also reached new heights and became increasingly directed against the army. The City governors maintained a continuous pressure upon the two Houses for the disbanding of that force. Within the House of Commons the less committed members began to veer towards Holles, and perhaps more significantly, absentee members began to display a readiness to attend in the cause of moderation.[1] In the realms of parliamentary policy, the 'presbyterian' leaders secured their inclusion upon a committee which, during the spring and summer of 1647 came to replace the Committee of both Kingdoms as the most important policy-making agency at Westminster. All of these agents and methods of 'presbyterian' activity will need to be investigated.

The City and the Army

A convenient point of departure for this investigation is the City of London, for the temper and activity of London, whether official or unofficial, could not fail to influence the parliament. On the clerical side in the City the third part of Thomas Edwards's 'Gangraena' represented the high presbyterian attack on the army, as the nursery of heresy and

1. The relationship between the prospect of peace and rising attendance in the period 1646-48 has been noted by V.F. Snow, 'Attendance Trends and Absenteeism in the Long Parliament', Huntingdon Libr.Quarterly, xviii (1954-5), 304.

sectarianism. In its concentration upon the army this third part was distinct in character and intention from the first two parts. In the earlier sections Edwards was mainly concerned with revealing sectarian activity in the City and its environs and with seeking to discredit independency by associating it with the sects. As we shall see, this aspect of clerical activity, with its concentration upon opposition to liberty of conscience, and the demand for a full presbyterian system, continued unabated throughout the period now under discussion. Indeed it also had a place in the third part of Edwards's work, as did vindications of the Scottish army and the City Remonstrance, but in addition, one is struck by the amount of space devoted to criticising the army.[1] Whitelocke indicated the existence of a receptive audience for this tract by his reference to a commotion in London caused by the preaching activities of soldiers and the lack of concern displayed by the Council of War.[2]

Edwards cried 'alarm' at the political, as well as purely religious, threat from that quarter, with the purpose of strengthening popular support, particularly in the City, for the policy of disbanding Fairfax's forces and as such it represented an important and influential part of the

1. Edwards, Gangraena, iii, 21-2, 24-5, et seq.
2. Whitelocke, Memorials, p.238.

'presbyterian' programme. In his investigations of the activities and publications of Lilburne, Overton, Walwyn, Larner, Peter and Dell, Edwards's prime purpose was to emphasise the political and social threat represented by sectarianism. In particular he worked upon the fears and suspicions of the citizens by his repeated examples of army antagonism towards the City as a result of its Remonstrance of May, 1646,[1] whilst also advising them of the pressing needs of the protestants in Ireland.[2] It did not take much imagination to recognise the obvious opportunity of killing two birds with one stone.

This new direction of attack by the lecturer at Christ Church did not pass unremarked by the supporters of the army. Towards the end of January 1646/7 Henry Overton published 'A Just Apologie for An Abused Armie', in which the author recognised only too well the purpose of the last part of 'Gangraena' as being the disbanding or remodelling of Fairfax's army.[3] Certainly proof of its impact upon the army itself was revealed as late as May 1647, when one of its Declarations specifically mentioned 'Gangraena' as being designed to render the army odious to the kingdom.[4]

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1. Edwards, op.cit., 24-5, 45, 174, et seq.
2. Ibid., 227-8, 239-40.
3. Brit.Mus., E 372 (22), 'A Just Apologie for an Abused Armie', by W.G. (1646/7), pp.14-15, 20.
4. Rushworth, Hist.Collections, vii, 486.

I shall return to another clerical device for exerting pressure, the Fast Day Sermons,[1] but first I intend to look at the temper of the City governors at the turn of the year. On the 19 December 1646 the Common Council presented a petition to the two Houses, together with a Representation of grievances. This Representation had accompanied two petitions presented to the Common Council on the 10 December, in the name of many Covenant-engaged citizens of London. These documents had then been referred to the consideration of a strongly 'presbyterian' committee,[2] and it was the draft of a petition prepared by that committee that was accepted by the Common Council for presentation to parliament. Not surprisingly it had much in common with the earlier Remonstrance - delinquents' estates, City control of its militia, the Covenant, suppression of unordained preachers and separate congregations, concern for Ireland, the problem of protections, and the desire for continued unity of England and Scotland.[3]

But there were also important new features which indicated a close sympathy between the temper of the City government and that of the third part of 'Cangraena' as well as with the direction of Holles's political programme.

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1. v. infra, pp. 336-340.
2. J.Co.Co.40, f.194; 12 of its 18 members were to be closely involved in the City militia during the critical months of May-August 1647.
3. Ibid., ff.199v-200v.

Thus the request for the dissolution of committees throughout the kingdom reflected and reinforced the activity of the Lords; while the request for the filling of vacancies in the Lower House by free election, and for the examination of undue elections, probably reflected that concern for the influence of the army and its agents to which Edwards drew attention.[1] The most significant of the new demands was that for the disbanding of the parliament's armies - naturally it reduced even further the temperature of relations between the army of Sir Thomas Fairfax and the City. This position was overtly adopted in the Representation of the citizens' grievances, but the petition of the Common Council was limited to advocating the removal of those officers and soldiers who were disaffected to the Covenant and the system of Church Government enacted by the parliament. As with the last part of 'Mangraena', the supporters of the army recognised only too well the main purpose of this City Petition - Cromwell wrote to Fairfax of this Petition in terms of its being a threat to the army.[2]

The last grievance of the Representation concerning the arrest of three citizens, although at first sight being of little more than local interest, does in fact provide us with a valuable insight into the continuity of personnel and

1. Edwards, op.cit., 47,146.
2. Sloane MSS. 1519, f.150: Cromwell to Fairfax, 21 Dec.1646.

organisation at the heart of presbyterian activity in the City. It also goes far to show that the real strength of fervent presbyterianism, whether religious or political in character, resided at the parochial level rather than in the City government. Although it came to exert a powerful influence within the latter, especially the Common Council, it proved to be too diluted there when the real crisis occurred in mid-1647. Further, this last clause also creates the impression that this presbyterian activist element within the City owed its success as much to organisation as to numbers. This grievance consisted of a complaint against Sir William Strickland for signing an allegedly illegal warrant on the 4 December for the commitment of Patrick Bamford, Nicholas Widmerpole and Valentine Figg.[1] They were undoubtedly the three citizens that Philip Bellièvre referred to in a letter of the 20 December as being imprisoned for collecting signatures to the City Petition.[2] Sir William Strickland was presumably acting as a member of the Committee for Complaints, authorised on the 2 December to stop the distribution of the printed petitions. Both Widmerpole and Figg featured as signatories of the City presbyterian petitions of late 1645; Valentine Figg was also an Elder of St. Bride's, Fleet Street,[3] while

1. J.Co.Co.40, f.203.
2. Montereul Corresp., i, 354.
3. Guildhall Libr.MSS.6554/1 (Vestry Minutes of St. Bride's, 1644-1665), e.g. f.37.

Widmerpole was an anti-army contributor to Edwards's 'Gangraena'.[1]

The arrest of these citizens clearly indicates the suspicious reaction of the House of Commons to this politically disruptive activity in the City at such a delicate time. Members were not only concerned at the likely effects but also at the possible source of this agitation. Whitelocke regarded the great endeavours to collect signatures for the petition as being part of a design to create divisions endangering the peace of the parliament and City.[2] Its source he believed to be royalist, and as we shall see, there is some reason to sympathise with this assessment.[3]

Undoubtedly there was strong concern at this time for the large numbers of malignants and delinquents, let alone parliamentary reformado soldiers who were flocking to the City. Yet the petitions presented to the Common Council, and the petition of the latter to the two Houses, were not royalist in content. Indeed, those who had had great expectations of a positive stand by the City on behalf of Charles were greatly disappointed by its referring of this issue to the parliament.[4] It is true that Sir Edward Hyde

1. Edwards, op.cit., 63.
2. Whitelocke, Memorials, p.233.
3. v. infra, p.333.
4. Montereul Corresp., i, 341; Cal.S.P.Ven., 1643-47, pp.297-8.

viewed the Petition in a more favourable light, as displaying 'a bold opposicon of ye most violent desi_nes'.[1] This assessment probably provides an accurate indication of the reason why most of its signatories signed it. It expressed the desire of a sizeable proportion of 'considerable citizens of known worth' for a return to normality in all realms of government and public order. In these general desires the great majority of aldermen and Common Councillors joined, especially after January 1646/7 when the elections to Common Council returned a considerable 'presbyte ian' or moderate majority.[2] The House of Commons was left in no doubt about the prevailing temper of the City displayed in these elections, for the turn of the year witnessed the revival of mob pressure at Westminster, while the response of the Common Council to the poor reception of its petition was uncharacteristically strong.[3]

What part did the parliamentary 'presbyterian' party play in the organisation of this petition and Representation? There is little in the way of direct evidence, but there are several pieces of circumstantial information. First, there is the presence of Recorder John Glyn at the Common Council on two occasions that it dealt with this issue.[4]

1. Clar.MSS.29, f.42v: Hyde to Lord Treasurer, 1 Jan. 1646/7.
2. Montereul Corresp., i, 372.
3. J.Co.Co.40, f.204v.
4. Ibid., ff.199, 199v.

At first sight this might appear, at best, inconclusive, but we have already seen that his attendances at the Court were not casual in character. The demands upon his time were considerable, and his presence was very intermittent - when he did attend it usually coincided with developments of importance to the 'presbyterian' group.[1] On the 10 December it was Glyn who, upon the direction of the Court, returned to the petitioners the hearty thanks of the Common Council, and he was again present on the 18 December when the committee reported their draft of the petition to both Houses.

Second, there is evidence of support for the Petition and Representation by Holles's group in the Commons debates.[2] Third, there is the unsubstantiated claim by a royalist letter-writer that the City had been acting in consultation with its friends in both Houses.[3] Finally, there is the stronger evidence that Holles and his adherents were deeply concerned in organising the petitions of the Eastern Association counties, which were closely modelled upon the City Petition and designed to strengthen the pressure upon the two Houses for disbanding the New Model.[4]

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1. Ibid., ff.170v, 172, 187, 191, 191v, 192.
2. C.J.V, pp.25, 34; Clar.MSS.29, f.161v: Letter of Intelligence, 23 Dec. 1646/7.
3. Clar.MSS. 29, f.67: Intelligence from London, 7 Jan. 1646/7.
4. Brit.Mus. Egerton MSS.2533 (Nicholas Papers), f.415v: Thompson to Robinson, 18 Feb.1646/7; Clar.MSS.29, f.72v: Intelligence from London, 18 Jan. 1646/7.

The more immediate aftermath of the arrest of the three citizens provides us with yet another indication of the character of 'presbyterian' propaganda. On the 16 December Sir David Watkins was examined before the Commons for allegedly maintaining that Sir John Evelyn of Wiltshire, a leading 'independent' member, had asserted that 'it was time to send for the Army, to curb the Pride and Insolency of the mechanick Citizens'. The nature of this information, and the fact that it was divulged upon the Exchange, calls to mind both the scare-mongering tactics against the army adopted by Thomas Edwards, and also the presbyterian methods of the Savile Affair.[1]

The informations concerning this affair reveal the same group of committed presbyterians operating against the army in 1647 as sought to achieve the establishment of a full presbyterian church system in mid-1645. We have already seen two signatories of the City petitions of 1645 involved in organising the City petition of December 1646. Now, in the task of associating political independency at Westminster with the military threat of the New Model, we find seven signatories of the same petitions,[2] while two more citizens involved can be connected with the presbyterian system established in the City, by their election as delegates to

1. C.J.V, pp.15,16.
2. Josiah Ricraft, William Drake, Lawrence Brinley, Thomas Browne, Colonel William Barton, Valentine Figg and the Major Leigh mentioned was probably Walter Lee.

the Provincial Assembly.[1] Another person who figured in the informations concerning this statement by Sir David Watkins was a Mr. Beard. If we look ahead to the political activities of the City presbyterians in July, 1647, we shall find him being singled out by an agent of the army as one of the leading contrivors and actors, along with two other citizens who both signed the petitions of 1645 and were involved in the rumour concerning Sir John Evelyn.[2]

Yet if Dr. Awdlyn is to be believed, it is possible that this occurrence evidences the workings of royalist influence taking advantage of the apprehensive mood of the City towards the army. The Mr. Thompson of Cambridgeshire, who first introduced this rumour into the presbyterian circle, may well have been the royalist intelligencer, Robert Thompson. This is not altogether improbable since the latter himself referred to another contact being involved in the anti-army petitions of Suffolk, Norfolk and Hertfordshire.[3]

There was then a suspicious reaction in the House of Commons to the organisation of the City petitions of December 1646 - relations were strained, and the House did nothing to improve the ill-feeling by its studied failure to

1. Dr. Awdlyn: v. Sion College MSS. Arc.L40.2 $\frac{E}{F}$[illegible] 'Records of Provincial Assembly of London, 1648 - 1660), f.13.
2. Worcester College, Oxon., Clarke MSS., MSS.110, f.148v: Letter of Intelligence, n.d., the other two citizens were Mr. Browne and 'young Drake in Cheapeside'.
3. Egerton MSS.2533, f.415v: Thompson to Robinson, 18 Feb. 1646/7. Indeed, there are indications that royalist elements in the City became more intimately involved in the 'Presbyterian' movement during 1646. v. V.Pearl, 'London's Counter-Revolution' in The Interregnum: The Quest for Settlement, 1646-1660, ed. G.E. Aylmer (London, 1972), pp.36, 38,48.

consider the particulars of these petitions. But by early February 1646/7 the scene had altered radically, as witness the fate of an intended 'independent' counter-petition.

Philip Bellièvre maintained that the 'independents' had thought to present a petition against the City petition, but that this had fallen through.[1] His statement is verified by a letter to Colonel Alban Cox of St. Albans, written on the 2 February by three eminent opponents of presbyterianism in Hertfordshire.[2] The letter indicates that Colonel Cox was actively engaged in organising a counter-petition in that county, but that his three colleagues declined to engage in it after consultations with their friends at London who had decided to desist and had 'for the present determined to stand still, & see the salvation of god'. We are also told that their friends in parliament thought it an inconvenient time to pursue such a project when the 'other party' carried on their petition with such a high hand. Instead they advised those in the country to 'waite the mind & providence of god in this case'. The wisdom of this advice was demonstrated in March by the hard measure meted out by the two Houses to just such a counter-petition and its contrivers.[3]

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1. Montereul Corresp., i, 390.
2. Herts. R.O., MS.70556: Barbor, Turner and Peake to Cox, 2 Feb. 1646/7.
3. C.J.V, pp.112, 118; L.J. 9, p.86.

There could be no clearer illustration of 'presbyterian' supremacy at London.[1] In marked contrast to its reception of the petition of Lilburne's anabaptist colleagues, the House gave a friendly reception to a petition from the Common Council pressing first for the removal of malignants from the City, so as to better dispose the king to taking the Solemn League and Covenant, and to accepting the Propositions of both Kingdoms; and second, for the quartering of the army further from the City and its speedy disbanding.[2] This petition was drawn up by the same committee that had prepared the December petition, and it was again undertaken in response to external pressure in the form of two petitions from covenant-engaged citizens. We have already seen the close connection between the religious presbyterians of 1645 and the political presbyterian activity against the army at the end of 1646 and now, another royalist letter-writer referred, in connection with the City petitions of February, to a hothouse of high presbyterian activity: Sion College.[3]

A copy of the sectarian petition was attached to this petition from the Common Council, and it is not surprising that the House of Commons were confirmed in their community of interest with the City in the face of such an outright

1. v. Lilburne's account of the divisions at London reflected in the letter to Colonel Cox: Bodl., C.14.12.Linc.) (18), 'Jonah's Cry Out of the Whale's Belly', pp.5-6.
2. J.Co.Co. 40, ff.207v-208.
3. Egerton MSS.2533, f.417v: Thompson to Robinson, 4 March, 1646/7.

threat to the social, political, religious and economic status quo. At last the Lower House recalled to mind an ordinance concerning the City Militia, sent down by the Lords in response to the City Petition of December.

Fast Day Sermons

Having investigated the character of pressure upon the parliament from the City I must now devote some space to look at another probable means of influence upon the two Houses utilised by the presbyterian clergy.[1] An investigation of the Fast Day Sermons and particularly their dedicatory epistles at the turn of the year again reveals a close connection between the temper of the Common Council and that of a significant element amongst the City clergy. Where the House of Lords was concerned, the ministers were, in general, preaching to the converted, in that most of the peers were conservative in matters of social order - a threat to church government could involve a threat to social stability, a point that was made repeatedly by the City ministers, and one that was brought home to the Lords by the pamphlets of the future Leveller leaders. In December, 1646, the sermons concentrated upon the growth of heresy and the need for further reformation, a constant theme in these sermons before the two Houses. It is perhaps no coincidence that two days after hearing sermons by Charles Herle and Francis

1. No precise indication can be given of the influence of the Fast Day Sermons upon the members of the two Houses, but I include them as a vehicle of City presbyterianism situated at the heart of the political process.

Roberts, the Lords gave three readings to an ordinance against lay preaching, agreed to it, and sent it down to the Commons all in one day.[1] Another regular theme in these sermons both reflected the general desire for a return to normality, and complemented the attempts of the Upper House to replace County Committees and their arbitrary proceedings: the need to reform oppression and injustice.

On the 27 January, 1646/7 two leading City ministers, closely involved with Sion College preached to the Lords: Lazarus Seaman and William Jenkyn. Again, the content of the sermons was largely religious - vindicating the ministerial function, criticising lay encroachment upon it, and condemning toleration. Yet there were other aspects which revealed a close sympathy with the City petition. In the Epistle Dedicatory to his printed sermon, Seaman referred to the desirability of disbanding the armies and dismantling garrisons, settling the Militia, paying the debts of the kingdom and punishing delinquents. In the body of his sermon he also drew attention to corruption and injustice in the exercise of government.[2] Jenkyn's sermon, predictably, ventured even further into the political arena. In the Epistle he referred to the plight of the oppressed, heavy

1. L.J.8, p.605.
2. E 372 (11): L. Seaman, 'The Head of the Church, the Judge of the World', pp.14-5.

taxation, the suffering caused in the City by protections, and to the City petitions. In the sermon itself Jenkyn criticised the slow response of the parliament to those petitions and to the needs of Ireland.[1]

The growing pressure in February against the army and for a peaceful settlement with Charles likewise found expression in a sermon before the Lords by another City minister, Nathaniel Hardy, preacher of St. Dionis Backchurch. He shrewdly laid particular emphasis upon the close connection between religion and propriety, the government of the Church and public order - 'it is true devotion towards God that keeps us in orderly relation one to another'.[2] Apart from advocating the same religious points as his colleagues, Hardy also followed Jenkyn in seeking to further the Lords' action against Committees, and in recommending the search for a remedy to the burdens of the army and a reunion of king and parliament.[3]

Where the House of Commons was concerned, preachers had a tougher task, but even there they probably furthered the more conservative or moderate temper, which was to enable the 'presbyterian group' to assume the political initiative during early 1647. Again, the concern of the preachers was

1. E 372 (10): W.Jenkyn, 'A Sleeping Sickness the distemper of the Times', p.29.
2. E 377 (25): N.Hardy, 'The Arraignment of Licentious Libertie, and Oppressing Tyrannie', p.8.
3. Ibid., pp.29, 38-9, 40.

largely to achieve the intervention of the parliament against the sects, and to denounce attempts at a toleration; but they also were not averse to adopting a more political stance. Attention was drawn to the condition of Ireland, the continuation of endeavours for peace was urged, whilst the danger of heresies to the social order was emphasised repeatedly.

On the 24 February John Greene referred to many soldiers who had jeopardised their lives in the parliament's service, who were almost destitude for want of pay; but he affirmed his confidence that the petitioners would soon receive relief.[1] These soldiers did not belong to Fairfax's army, but were disbanded members of Major General Massey's brigade, who had petitioned the Lords on the 4 February, and whose petition had been recommended by them to the Lower House. In addition, Greene spoke against privilege over debts and urged the return of justice to its ordinary course. John Lightfoot, on the same day, emphasised the great political and financial debt that the parliament owed to the City of London, and then went on to criticise oppressions and unjust fiscal exactions.[2] The two sermons preached before the Commons on the Day of Public Humiliation

1. E 377 (26): J. Greene, 'The Churches Duty, for Received Mercies', pp.29-30.
2. E 377 (27): J. Lightfoot: 'A Sermon Preached Before the Honourable House of Commons'.

for the growth of Heresies, naturally concentrated upon that problem, but even so Richard Vines could not refrain from involving 'our military men' in the spread of error.[1]

Thus from the end of December, 1646 to the end of March 1647 the House of Commons was subjected to a barrage of sermons against heresies, pressing for their suppression, and urging the implementation of the coercive powers of the civil magistrate in support of a presbyterian system. The opponents of political and religious presbyterianism had to resort to Cambridge to provide themselves with a minister willing to undertake the task of pressing the Commons to adopt a more moderate course.[2]

Having investigated the character of presbyterian activity within the City at the turn of the year 1647, and attempted some indication of its impact upon the two Houses, I must now turn to an examination of the 'presbyterian' group's activity at Westminster.

The House of Lords

The House of Lords continued to provide several indications of a growing strength of moderation, concern for social normality and a desire for a settlement with Charles.

1. Bodl. Pamph.D.78 (25): R. Vines, 'The Authours, Nature and Danger of Haeresie', p.26.; Pamph.C.78 (23): T.Hodges, 'The Growth and Spreading of Haeresie'.
2. E 383 (7): Ralph Cudworth, 'A Sermon Praached Before the Honourable House of Commons'.

On the 22 December the City Petition was considered, upon which the Lords ordered that Sir Thomas Fairfax should give an account of the implementation of the ordinance for tendering the Covenant to all the officers and soldiers in the army. The same day it was resolved that the king should come to Newmarket, and that then the two kingdoms should decide what was necessary for the common peace.[1]

Yet there was a limit to the extent to which the Lords were willing to return to Charles - on the 24 December they reacted to a letter from the king desiring to come to or near London, and to be heard concerning the propositions, with a vote that the decision of two days previously should stand and that there should be no treaty upon the Propositions. Only the Earl of Lincoln dissented from this decision.[2] Another indication of sympathy with the City's attitude was provided on the 29 December, when it was decided to draw up an ordinance incorporating the desire in the City's Petition for control of its own militia. This task was referred to the Earl of Lincoln, Lord Robartes and Lord Wharton, and the same day Lord Robartes reported the ordinance, which immediately received three readings. Nothing could be more out of character with the suspicious response of the House of Commons to the same requests of the City.

1. L.J.8, pp.621-2.
2. Ibid., p.630.

The reassertion by the Lords of their traditional roles in the operation of government both in the provinces and at Westminster continued into 1647. At the same time they began the process of undermining Fairfax's army by adopting delaying tactics so as to jeopardise the authority and machinery for paying it.[1] On the 25 January a letter and declaration from the Parliament of Scotland were read and debated, and the Lords displayed a readiness to assure the Scots of their adherence to the monarchy and the Stuart succession. They also remained loyal to the Covenant, in that they accepted the necessity of joint application to Charles and of a joint peace settlement. The Lords agreed to authorised Scottish access to the king, and to reciprocal assistance in case of national danger. But significantly, they drew the line there and returned a non-committal answer to the Scottish requests concerning a competent maintenance for their forces in Ireland, and the granting of access to the king for Scots who had places about him.[2]

This then was the situation as revealed in the Journal of the House of Lords, but there are other indications that opinion amongst the Lords was more complex. At the same time as the Scots were vacating the northern garrisons,

1. Ibid., pp.665, 677.
2. Ibid., p.686.

the French ambassador was claiming significant advances in his relations with the Lords.[1] He referred to a group of 'presbyterian' lords who wanted a king and were willing to dispense with the Covenant, a description which echoed the information of William Murray to the king.[2] It would seem that they prepared a Memorandum of what Charles ought to send to the parliament when he reached Holdenby. Bellièvre's description of this design poses difficulties in interpreting the political situation for, besides this reference to presbyterians abandoning the Covenant, it would also appear that some 'noted persons of the opposite party' were involved in drawing up the recommendations to the king. All those mentioned by the French ambassador were Lords, so presumably the political attitudes of many of the Lords softened once it was clear that the Scots would withdraw and hand over Charles to the Parliament of England. The way was now clear for a group of influential peers to move towards a common ground of agreement upon certain conditions as the basis for a settlement with the king.

What was this common ground? In essence it can be summed up in one word: security. The Memorandum reveals a greater concern with securing royal recognition of their Privy Seal (Great Seal?) than with achieving any particular

1. Montereul Corresp., i, 451.
2. Supra, p.316.

type of Church settlement. They accepted the king's offer concerning Ireland as brought by William Murray, and even appeared to be willing to reach a compromise over the Militia.[1] It would also appear that the officers of the City were involved in this apparent change of front - Bellièvre spoke of them engaging without any question of the Covenant or other matters of the Scots interest. At the very least this development at the turn of the year 1647 must engender caution in attaching inflexible party labels to individual Lords.

Besides the impetus given to desires for peace created by the transference of Charles to parliamentary hands, there were also personal factors that could, and did limit the application of a presbyterian/independent interpretation of the political situation within the Upper House. One instance was the prolonged attempts to secure the re-entry of the Earls of Holland, Bedford and Clare into the House of Lords. To judge from Montereul's correspondence Holland acted as a leading spokesman for the 'presbyterians', ~~[illegible]~~, and yet the light that the Earl of Leicester's journal throws upon the voting patterns of the Lords, in response to this blatantly political design, again renders such a simple interpretation of political division amongst

1. Montereul Correspo., 1, 431.

the Lords at best, highly questionable. Thus political advantage presumably was not enough to remove the personal antipathy of such moderate peers as the Earls of Rutland and Middlesex and Lords Willoughby, Hunsdon, Robartes and Maynard, most of whom nevertheless were involved in 'presbyterian' activity against the army in mid-1647. On the other hand the Earls of Northumberland, Salisbury and Warwick, previously regarded as pro-'independent' lords, worked to secure the success of this measure.[1] Northumberland and Warwick were presumably among those 'of the opposite party' involved in drawing up the Memorandum to Charles.[2]

The general extension of the moderate temper of the Upper House and its desire for a constitutional settlement became increasingly manifest, with the speedy passing of the remainder of the Confession of Faith, the favourable acceptance of the Suffolk Petition, and the blocking of a presumably 'independent' attempt to concentrate all Irish affairs in the Irish Committee sitting in the Star Chamber, a move that illustrates an awareness of the grave threat to the army represented by the Committee at Derby House.[3]

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1. Hist.MSS.Comm.77, De L'Isle and Dudley MSS., vi, ed. C.D.Owen (1966), pp.562-3, 565, 566-7.
2. Montereul Corresp., i, 430, v. supra, p. 343.
3. L.J.9, pp.17-8, 43.

The House of Commons

Now I shall chart the course of growing 'presbyterian' superiority in the House of Commons during the early months of 1647. This House represented a far tougher nut to crack for Denzil Holles and his adherents. As late as November 1646, Philip Bellièvre had written of the increasing influence of the 'independents', and there had even been rumours of the 'presbyterian' leaders seeking an agreement with their opponents.[1] During December, distrust of Scottish intentions and suspicion of presbyterian activity in the City continued to place Holles's group at a serious disadvantage in the Lower House. On the 14 December Holles and Sir Walter Erle were defeated as Tellers in a motion concerning a paper from the Scots Commissioners. They were more successful at the end of the month, a development which reflected it would seem, a significant increase in the attendance of members. Bearing in mind the shortcomings of division figures, yet perhaps some explanation is called for by appreciable variations. From the beginning of November, 1646 until the 19 December, there were only two occasions when divisions reveal an attendance of 200 or over, and probably represent greater efforts by both factions to secure the advantage over important issues.[2]

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1. Montereul Corresp., i, 317.
2. C.J.IV, p.725: 18 Nov. 1646, 248 votes; ibid., p.730: 28 Nov. 1646, 200 votes.

A division on the 19 December reveals an attendance of 260, with Holles and Sir William Waller securing 168 votes,[1] and on the 22 December the 'presbyterian' group won an important victory when they gained a majority of 57 out of a total vote of 255, in favour of considering the City's Petition and Representation in course as they lay.[2] This significant increase of members attending the House clearly reveals the importance to the 'presbyterian' faction of those members who were so moderate that they hardly ever appeared except when important issues of peace were under debate. Yet it would be premature to maintain that the swing of the political pendulum had occurred by the end of 1646. Distrust of the Scots still acted as an impediment to the 'presbyterian' advance.

Yet despite 'presbyterian' difficulties the showing of the 'independent' faction at the end of December and beginning of January faded considerably. On the 31 December a clause was added to the Declaration against lay preachers, which included lay expounders of the Scriptures - its inclusion was voted by 105 to 57, despite the opponents of this measure prolonging the sitting till after midnight.[3] Of greater significance, and more apt for the opening week of a year that witnessed the climax of the 'presbyterian'

1. C.J.V, p.20.
2. Ibid., p.25.
3. Ibid., p.34; Montereul Corresp., i, 390.

attack upon the army, was the crucial vote of the 5 January which defeated the motion for the delivery of Charles into the custody of Major General Skippon by 130 votes to 69. Not surprisingly Holles and Sir Philip Stapleton were Tellers against army control of the king.

Possession of the king was of crucial importance for both political groups - it would exert considerable influence on a far from negligible element in both Houses, and would also, it was believed, provide the successful group with a great advantage in arranging the final settlement. It would be surprising if the 'presbyterian' leaders had not learnt a lesson from their abortive attempts to secure a settlement with Charles along Scottish lines during the last seven months of 1646. With the decision that the king should be delivered to parliamentary commissioners I believe that the 'presbyterian' leaders were not so concerned with ensuring a monopoly of negotiations with Charles, as much as removing him from the clutches of their opponents and placing him on ice until they had completed their more immediate task: the elimination of Fairfax's army. This is not to say that they were averse to presenting the Propositions to him, but they no longer based their political future on that weak foundation alone.

The parliamentary commissioners were directed to pay all respect to Charles despite the opposition of more radical members.[1] The presence of the Earl of Pembroke, Sir Walter Erle, Sir John Cook, Sir John Holland and Major General Browne gave the 'presbyterian'- moderate group a strong representation at Holdenby.

Thus by January 1646/7 the political scales were beginning to turn against the 'independents' in the House of Commons. Despite Sir Edward Hyde's confidence that the Scots would not remove from England,[2] preparations went ahead for their withdrawal. All sources of pressure against the army and the sects were exploited, while the increasing weakness of the 'independent' interest in City and the parliament was furthered by Cromwell's illness.[3] So sudden was this reversal that some felt that the 'independents' were merely allowing their opponents 'to crow awhile' in order to reap more advantage once the Scots had left.[4] But, as we have seen, it was their opponents who reaped the advantage upon the Scots withdrawal.

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1. Clar.MSS.29, f.67: Intelligence from London, 7 Jan.1646/7.
2. Ibid., f.38: Hyde to Nicholas; f.46: Hyde to Jermyn, 1 Jan.1646/7.
3. Egerton MSS.2533, f.415v: Thompson to Robinson, 18 Feb. 1646/7.
4. Clar.MSS.29, f.68: Intelligence from London, 14 Jan. 1646/7.

Where military affairs were concerned no doubt of 'presbyterian' intentions is admitted by Colonel Thomas Gallopp's information concerning a discussion with Colonel William Strode at the beginning of February 1646/7, in which the latter described in vivid terms the intended fate of Fairfax's army.[1] The 'presbyterian' advance in this field was marked by the votes of the 17 and 19 February whereby the number of Horse and Dragoons to be kept up in England was stipulated and the number of Foot limited to the amount requisite for maintaining garrisons - in effect this was a vote for the disbanding of the bulk of the army and was recognised as such by the 'independents'.[2] Finally on the 6 March the situation in Ireland was firmly joined to the future of Fairfax's army when, upon a report from the Irish Committee at Derby House it was voted, without a division, that the forces already voted for Ireland should be taken out of the army.[3]

Although the 'presbyterians' failed in their attempt to replace Sir Thomas Fairfax by Colonel Greaves as the commander of the forces to be kept up in England,[4] the situation reached by mid-March 1646/7

1. Hist.MSS.Comm;, 13th Report, appendix part 1 (Portland MSS.), pp.447-8.
2. Montereul Corresp., ii, 18.
3. C.J.V., p.107.
4. Rowe, 'Sir H.Vane', p.93.

represented the climax of their design, and at first their opponents were lost for an effective answer to Holles and his adherents. It is not surprising to find Lord Wharton, a colleague of the 'independent' leader Lord Say, writing to the Earl of Denbigh upon the occasion of these votes.

> 'My lord, the times and I grow worse and worse'.[1]

Yet there was one unknown factor - the attitude of the army to the onslaught directed against it from the parliament and the City. Even at this time Sir Philip Percival wrote to Lord Inchiquin that many thought that the army was not to be removed easily[2]- how right they were! From mid-March onwards a combination of unforeseeable complications and political miscalculations served to remove the prize from the grasp of Holles's group.

The 'Presbyterians' and Ireland

Finally, to set the scene for the policy of destroying the New Model Army, we must turn to the situation in Ireland. Here one is struck by the fact that although the party labels current at Westminster came to be adopted in Ireland, the issues which divided men there were not the

1. Hist.MSS.Comm., 4th Report (MSS. of Earl of Denbigh, 1874), p.274.
2. Brit.Mus., Addit.MSS.46931A (Egmont Papers), f.82: Sir Philip Percival to Inchiquin, 9 March 1646/7. Printed in Hist.MSS.Comm., 16th Report, Egmont, i, part 2 (1905), p.369.

same as those operating in England. War had broken out in Ireland, not over constitutional matters, or distrust of Charles, but because of deep-seated antagonisms between the catholic Irish and the protestant English. It was largely differences of attitude towards this conflict which brought about the somewhat unreal division into parliamentary and royalist camps.[1] In some instances, the jealousies and antagonisms of the Straffordian era and the immediately succeeding period, subsequently operated to determine the political connections between the parliamentary element in Ireland and the factions in the two Houses in England.

An investigation of this area of 'presbyterian' activity can be divided broadly into two sections: the situation in Ireland, and the parliamentary machine at Westminster for controlling affairs in Ireland. Where Ireland itself is concerned I shall at present restrict myself to the situation there at the turn of 1647, and attempt to illustrate its importance for the designs of Holles's group at London. With the end of the first civil war in England we have seen that attention came to be focussed upon the necessities of Ireland, and in particular upon three areas:

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1. e.g. Brit.Mus.Addit.MSS.42063 (Marquis of Clanricarde Memoirs, 1643-47), ff.30v-33: letters 22 July - 29 Aug. 1644.

the Scottish army in Ulster, and especially their garrison in Belfast, the fate of Dublin held by the Earl of Ormonde, and the situation in the province of Munster. For my purposes, the first of these issues was the least important, for although the problem of the Scottish garrison in Belfast caused concern at Westminster and was a major reason for the continued employment of parliamentary commissioners at Edinburgh in early 1647,[1] it did not cause the same degree of antagonism as had the presence of a Scottish army in the Northern Counties of England, holding the person of the king. The attention of the contending factions at London was concentrated far more on the situations at Dublin and in Munster.

The real significance of the Irish rebel threat to Dublin and Ormonde's consequent approach to the parliament to negotiate its surrender, lay in the sense of urgency it created at Westminster for the present relief of Ireland. It was the immediate cause of the establishment of the Committee for the Affairs of Ireland at Derby House,[2] and it also enabled Holles to pursue his design against Fairfax's army more purposefully once the Scottish impediment had been removed.

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1. C.J.V, p.74.
2. Ibid., IV, pp.690, 693.

There is little evidence of the party division at Westminster having had a direct bearing on the course of negotiations with Ormonde. It is true that Sir John Clotworthy was one of the parliamentary commissioners sent to Dublin in October 1646, and that we find in a letter from Sir Philip Percival to the Countess of Ormonde, the assertion that Clotworthy, together with two other commissioners, Sir Thomas Wharton and Sir Robert King, were willing to serve her and that she should press those concerned in the negotiation to be guided by them.[1] It is also true that the army's charge against the eleven members in mid-1647, included the accusation that Sir John Clotworthy had maintained a secret correspondence with both Ormonde and Lord Digby during the negotiation.[2] But Clotworthy's denial is substantiated by the testimony of Robert Slingsby, the alleged intermediary.[3]

Again there is no evidence amongst Ormonde's papers to substantiate the Earl of Leicester's claim that the former's vacillation in the negotiation was a device to avoid vacating Dublin to Lord Lisle, the parliamentary Lord

1. Hist.MSS.Comm., Egmont, i, part 1, p.325.
2. Bodl., F.2.63.Linc. (51): 'A Particular Charge or Impeachment' (1647), p.19.
3. F.2.63.Linc.(52): 'A Full Vindication and Answer of the XI Accused Members' (1647), pp.23-4; Bodl., Carte MSS. 21, f.294: Slingsby to Ormonde, 13 July 1647.

Lieutenant of Ireland.[1] At Westminster there appears to have been no overt conflict of immediate interests between the grandees of the two factions - they were both concerned to ensure the security of Dublin, to which priority the Committee at Derby House responded with a determination that earned the praise of Ormonde's commissioners and agents.[2] Between Ormonde's renewed approach to the parliament in February 1646/7 and his withdrawal from Dublin at the end of July 1647, it does seem that he came into closer contact with the 'presbyterian' leaders; so much so that the reversal of 'presbyterian' fortunes in mid-1647 was regarded as possibly jeopardising the implementation of the terms agreed upon with him.[3] Yet even this alignment can be drawn too sharply, for in the autumn of 1647 we meet with Major Richard Salwey, an opponent of the 'presbyterian' faction, Arthur Annesley, a friend of Sir John Clotworthy, and William Pierrepoint, a moderate member, esteemed by both factions but who tended to support the 'independent' group, all seeking to secure the performance of the conditions on Ormonde's behalf.[4] Yet it does seem that the 'presbyterian'

1. Hist.MSS.Comm., De L'Isle and Dudley, vi, p.564.
2. Bodl., Carte MSS.19, ff.175, 191-191v: Commissioners to Ormonde and Council of Ireland, 13 and 16 Oct. 1646.
3. Addit.MSS.42063, f.131: Graunt to Clanrickarde, 5 Aug. 1647.
4. Carte MSS.21, ff.393-4: Geo.Lane to Ormonde, 24 Aug. 1647; f.399: Annesley to Lane, 30 Aug.1647; f.427: Annesley to Ormonde, 10 Sep.1647; f.474; Smith to Ormonde, 2 Oct.1647.

leaders did undertake an active policy of cultivating the Earl,[1] and given their successful exclusion of Colonel Algernon Sidney from the governorship of Dublin in April,[2] their purpose was probably that attributed to Ormonde: the exclusion of the Sidney interest from Dublin.

The political divisions at Westminster were most clearly reflected in the province of Munster where the main conflicting interests were represented by Lord Inchiquin, the Lord President of that province, and Philip, Lord Lisle, a member of the House of Commons. The latter had been appointed Lord Lieutenant of Ireland in January 1645/6, through the offices of the 'independent' group at Westminster,[3] and so had recovered the office that his father had enjoyed so briefly after Strafford's fall. The departure of Lord Lisle for Munster at the beginning of February 1646/7, one year after his appointment, was interpreted by some as yet another indication of 'presbyterian' supremacy.[4] But the Earl of Leicester blamed the delay upon the slow proceedings of the parliament, and maintained that his son had also waited for the withdrawal of the Scots.[5] That such a

1. Ibid., f.119: Leigh to Ormonde, 18 May 1647; f.243: Holland to Ormonde, 20 June 1647; Carte MSS.20, f.613: Giffarde to Ormonde, 15 Apr.1647.
2. Hist.MSS. Comm., De L'Isle and Dudley, vi, p.565.
3. Addit.MSS. 46931A, f.70: Smith to Percival, 25 Feb.1646/7.
4. Montereul Corresp., i, 412. The editor has mistakenly translated 'Milord Laille' as Lord Langley.
5. Hist.MSS.Comm., De L'Isle and Dudley, vi, p.561.

political calculation did figure is indicated by 'Lady Clotworthy's' exasperation in October 1646 at his continued presence in England.[1] If the departure of the Scots was a major factor in Lord Lisle's decision to leave for Ireland, then the significance of their ally's withdrawal for 'presbyterian' fortunes is clearly demonstrated.

It is certainly difficult to ascertain what Holles's group could have hoped to have gained from Lord Lisle's presence in Munster, for when he arrived there he lost no time in displaying his distrust of Lord Inchiquin and his officers, by excluding them from the ranks of his closest advisers. Inchiquin accused him of neglecting them for their not adhering to the 'independent' party and of taking more care to destroy Presbyterians than Papists.[2] Again it would be difficult to explain the blatant intention of the 'presbyterian' leaders to ensure that Lord Lisle's commission should not be renewed, if they were the cause of his initial departure. So the recall of Lord Lisle, 'a creature of Cromwell's',[3] was much more the result of 'presbyterian' superiority than his departure.

There is no doubt about Lord Inchiquin's political allegiance - through Sir Philip Percival he was in constant contact with Holles and the 'presbyterian' group, and kept

1. Clar.MSS.28, f.301: Lady Clotworthy to Annesley, 21 Oct. 1646.
2. Hist.MSS.Comm., Egmont, i, part 2, pp.367-8.
3. Baillie, Letters, iii, 16.

them informed of Lord Lisle's affronts.[1] Yet whether intentional or not, Lord Lisle's departure proved to be another blow to the strength of the 'independents' in the two Houses, for with him went members of both the House of Commons and the army - such as Sir John Temple, a dependent of the Sidneys, Colonel Algernon Sidney and Major Thomas Harrison, who were also recruiter members, and Colonels Needham and Sir Hardress Waller. It is true that this small reduction of numbers had little impact upon the floor of the House of Commons although their presence would have prevented the crucial vote of the 17 February against the motion for considering county garrisons and forces before the parliamentary armies, which Holles and Sir Philip Stapleton secured by only 2 votes out of a total of 292.[2]

Of greater significance was the effect of their absence upon the parliamentary committee which gradually came to replace the Committee of both Kingdoms as the power-house at Westminster: the Committee for the Affairs of Ireland sitting at Derby House. A committee with the same title, sitting in the Star Chamber, was already involved in securing men for Ireland from county forces at the end of July 1646, but the Committee at Derby House, consisting of the English members of the Committee of both Kingdoms,

1. Hist.MSS.Comm., Egmont, i, part 1, pp.312,316; part 2, p.380 et seq.
2. C.J.V, p,90.

together with a few additional members, did not come into being until October 1646 when the Earl of Ormonde made his first approach.

Although the appointment of Holles, Sir William Lewis and Sir John Clotworthy to this committee was balanced at the time by Lord Lisle, Sir John Temple, Nathaniel Fiennes and Robert Goodwin, the importance of their entry must not be underestimated, for at last the 'presbyterian' leadership was fully represented upon the most important parliamentary committee. Their position was further strengthened by the removal of Lord Lisle and Sir John Temple, probably the leading spokesmen of the 'independent' group upon Irish affairs. With the negotiations for the withdrawal of the Scots army from England, and the expectation of the King's answer to the propositions, the activities of this committee tended to fade into the background until the end of January when the finalising of arrangements with the Scots concerning their forces and the person of the king, resulted in an order to the Committee for the Affairs of Ireland to bring in a report upon the size and establishment of the army necessary for waging an offensive war in Ireland.[1] Thenceforth, this committee came to dominate the direction of parliamentary activity as the Irish question and the fate of the army rose to prominence at Westminster.

1. Ibid., p.68.

By the end of February 1646/47 the political pendulum had swung xxxxxxxxxx against the 'independent' group at Westminster and their military allies in the New Model. As Holles had calculated, the withdrawal of the Scottish army had eliminated the raison d'être of Fairfax's army and had removed the barrier to a full expression of the desire for an end to the burdens of war by moderates in both the City and Westminster. Concern of the leading citizens at the social consequences of sectarianism, and the financial burdens of political instability was both reflected and promoted by such ministers as Thomas Edwards; a process which was also extended more discreetly to the two Houses in the Fast Day Sermons. The increasingly receptive atmosphere at Westminster was enhanced by the return of more moderate members to the Lower House, the appearance of a compromise position over peace terms amongst certain influential peers and by the crying needs of Ireland. A practical expression of this moderate spirit was the friendlier relations between the City and the Commons apparent by March, following upon a long period of estrangement which had still been in evidence in December at the time of the City's Petition and Representation. The strengthening of the 'presbyterian' party's position owed much to the replacement of the Committee of both Kingdoms by the Committee

for the Affairs of Ireland as the effective Council of State. After an absence of over two years from the crucial parliamentary Committee Holles was once more at the heart of parliamentary decision-making. In both the City and the two Houses the 'independent' group were forced onto the defensive as the tide of war-weariness, pacificism, social conservatism and the natural desire for a return to normality swept around them.

Having described the character of the 'presbyterian' revival in the City and the parliament I shall investigate next the course of Holles's design against the army. By the end of February 1646/7 everything appeared ready for the successful implementation of this design, but appearances were to prove deceptive.

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CHAPTER IX

FROM POLITICS TO MILITARY CONFRONTATION

I have traced the recovery of the fortunes of the 'presbyterian' group by the spring of 1647, and now I must continue the investigation of these fortunes as the tide began to turn once again in the favour of Holles's opponents at Westminster. In particular I will be concerned with this process within the two Houses and the City of London.

At Westminster the prime task for Holles had become the destruction of the Army under the command of Sir Thomas Fairfax. This chapter will be devoted largely to the character and course of this attack upon the Army. More particularly it will be my aim to reveal that the picture drawn by Holles himself is distorted. It is indeed easy to view the first six months of 1647 as witnessing the steady extension of 'presbyterian' power within the two Houses and the City; an extension that was to be shattered only by the irresolution of the latter in June, and its desertion of Holles and his adherents in the two Houses at the beginning of August. This was Holles's own explanation of the failure of his strategy.[1]

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1. Holles, Memoirs, pp.107, 163.

In the place of this interpretation I shall contend that the peak of 'presbyterian' fortunes was reached in March, not July 1647, and that thereafter the unexpected refusal of the Army to disband and the obvious political and military threat represented by this new source of power, disrupted Holles's designs and pressurised him into precipitate reactions and ill-conceived expedients. Undoubtedly Holles grasped the threat of Army opposition to his political position at Westminster as clearly as the royalist letter writer, who wrote at the beginning of April of the sedulity of the 'presbyterian' party to disperse an Army which, if it would, could now give the law.[1] In deciding to withstand this opposition with force the 'presbyterian' group slowly undermined one of the main stays of their political recovery: the promise of an early peace. Instead of this prospect Holles and his adherents adopted a policy which appeared to be leading the kingdom into a new war; a point which the Army politicians and their colleagues in the two Houses later emphasised to good effect.

The reason for this miscalculation lies in the fact that when the Army refused to stop its petitioning or to disband as the Parliament ordered, it destroyed the main assumption upon which all groups at Westminster based their

1. Clar.MSS. 29, f.165v: Intelligence from London, 1/11 Apr. 1647.

political strategy: that a parliamentary vote was the last word. Had not the armies of the Earl of Essex and Sir William Waller, and the brigade of Colonel Massey all accepted their fate when decreed by the two Houses? Even the leading 'independents' at Westminster revealed their acceptance of this fundamental axiom of parliamentary politics in early 1647, and it was some time before lawyers like Oliver St. John and Samuel Browne were able to bring themselves to accept this violation of the rules. By refusing to obey the orders of the parliament the levellers and radical officers of the Army rendered futile the success of the 'presbyterians' in achieving ascendancy within the two Houses and within the Committee at Derby House.

'Presbyterian' Advance - The Situation at Westminster

Throughout the latter part of March pressure was steadily increased against the Army by the 'presbyterian' leaders at Westminster, with the assistance of their colleagues outside the parliament. On the 11 March the House of Lords received a petition from the county of Essex complaining of the Army quartering in the Eastern Association, expressing suspicion of a design against the necessary measures for disbanding it and settling church government, and pressing for the relief of Ireland with a part of the Army. If we add to this petition the evidence presented to the House of Commons by Robert Reynolds on the 6 April of

another anti-Army petition organised in the same county from London, we acquire a telling picture of 'presbyterian' influence in the Home Counties.[1] The 'presbyterian' City petition of the 17 March re-emphasised this concern at the quartering of the Army so close to London, and the Lords acted upon this by appointing a committee to prepare reasons for the removal of the Army, and by passing those reasons, which included a repetition of the suspicions voiced in the Essex petition and a strong plea for the disbanding of the Army.[2]

The extent to which the Army leaders were placed on the defensive by this 'presbyterian' onslaught is clearly illustrated by letters from Cromwell to Sir Thomas Fairfax. The former advised a strict adherence to the vote of the Commons that the Army should not come within 25 miles of London.[3] In another letter Cromwell revealed the temper of the City and Westminster:

> 'there want not in all places men whoe have soe much malice against the Armie as besotts them... Never were the spirits of men more imbittered then now, suerly the Devil hath but a short tyme.'[4]

At the same time he attempted to reconcile the differences between the parliament and the Army, maintaining that the

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1. L.J.9, pp.71, 72; C.J.V, p.134.
2. L.J.9, pp.86, 89-90, v. infra, pp.385-6 for a radical petition of mid-March.
3. Abbott, Writings and Speeches, i, 430-1. The part played by Sir William Masham indicates the constitutional conservatism of some civilian 'independents'.
4. Sloane MSS.1519, f.129: Cromwell to Fairfax, March 1647; also printed in Abbott, op.cit., 430.

latter would disband, although it was averse to the Irish service.[1] There is no reason to believe that Cromwell was here providing anything other than his considered judgment, and the sincerity of his attempts at conciliation is avouched by his condemnation by John Lilburne for betraying the Army into the 'Hamon-like tyrannical clutches of Holles & Stapleton, and the rest of that bloody & devouring faction'.[2]

A royalist intelligencer wrote on the 25 April of Cromwell and all the Independent party being exceedingly sunk in spirit,[3] and by the end of that month it would seem that Sir Henry Vane, jnr., Cromwell and the two Pierrepoints were frequent absentees from the House.[4] During the crisis over the Army petition a month earlier, advice was also reaching the headquarters that Fairfax should comply with the vote against the petition and that no attempt should be made to hinder soldiers going with the '17 undertakers' for Ireland, because their opponents sought an excuse to get advantage.[5] Thus it is clear that at this time the leaders of the 'independent' group at Westminster were severely handicapped

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1. Egerton MSS. 2533, f.422: Thompson to Mons. Cairon, 24 May 1647.
2. Lilburne's 'Jonah's Cry.....', pp.3-4.
3. Clar.MSS. 29, f.193: Intelligence from London, 25 Apri. 1647.
4. Ibid.,f.203: Intelligence from London, 23 Apr.1647.
5. The Clarke Papers, ed. C.H. Firth (Camden Soc., New Ser., xlix, 1891), i, p.1; v. supra, pp. 367,415 for further references to the '17 undertakers'.

in their attempts to cope with the 'presbyterian' design against the Army by their continued adherence to the rules of parliamentary conflict.

To return to the 'presbyterian' pressure against the Army, the voting of Colonel Charles Doyley, the brother of a 'presbyterian' member of the Lower House, to be governor of Bristol was an important victory for Holles.[1] More important was the Committee at Derby House which lost no time in implementing the votes for dispatching a sizeable element of the Army to Ireland. In accord with a vote of the Commons it appointed four of its members to attend the headquarters to further this service. Not surprisingly, Lord Wharton did not go, and Richard Salwey soon returned, so that Sir John Clotworthy and Sir William Waller remained as the promoters of their group's policy.[2]

On the 27 March they made to the House a rather disquieting report of the temper of the Army. On the credit side it is true that certain officers had subscribed a paper expressing their willingness to comply with the votes of the parliament - the above-mentioned '17 undertakers'; but on the debit side was the information of a petition being organised by some officers in the Army. This was the first indication that Sir Philip Percival's reservations were well founded about the Army's readiness to go into Ireland.[3] The

1. C.J.V, pp.115-6.
2. Waller, Vindication, pp.44,51.
3. Supra, p. 351.

reaction of the 'presbyterian' leaders indicates that they recognised in this petition the beginnings of a movement that could reverse all their hard-won successes and destroy their political strategy.

After this report the House voted that a letter be sent to Sir Thomas Fairfax desiring him to suppress the petition. On the 29 March Colonel Rossiter and Colonel Harley provided yet further information of the organisation of the Army petition, involving certain senior officers,[1] and confirming Sir William Waller's accusation against Ireton.[2] Defence of the petition by Nathaniel Fiennes and others proved abortive.[3] The reaction of Holles and his adherents to this verification of organised opposition in the Army indicates their apprehension, but it is also clear that similar concern was felt by members outside the 'presbyterian' circle at Westminster.[4] Four 'presbyterian' members were appointed to prepare a Declaration concerning the petition, one of whom was Denzil Holles and it was Holles who reported it.

The content of this Declaration and the circumstances of its passing the House made it a crucial factor in the

1. C.J.V, pp.128-9.
2. Waller, op.cit., pp.56-9.
3. Rushworth, Hist.Collections, vii, 447.
4. Whitelocke, Memorials, p.245; Addit.MSS. 10114, f.22v.

relations between the Army and its opponents at Westminster. The clause rendering those who persisted in that petition enemies to the State, had little regard to justice but rather was obviously intended to crush that first sign of independent political action within the Army. The partisan character of the Declaration was emphasised further by the fact that it was introduced into a thinly attended House and passed late at night.[1] This over-reaction by the 'presbyterian' leaders proved to be a serious miscalculation, for the only results of the Declaration appear to have been the strengthening of apprehension within the Army, and the furthering of the leveller movement amongst the Horse Regiments. Its impact upon the Army made the Declaration the watershed of 'presbyterian' fortunes - henceforth there was to be little basis for trust in the relations between the parliament and Army whilst the 'presbyterian' group retained their ascendancy in the former. Increasingly Holles was forced into preparing for a physical confrontation, in which the odds were heavily against him, despite his preparations in the City and amongst the reformadoes.

Preparations for this confrontation began immediately, and in response to this serious development one can detect a definite deterioration in personal relations between the

1. F.2.63.Linc.(51): 'A Particular Charge or Impeachment', pp.10-11; Ludlow, Memoirs, i, 149-50.

leaders of the two factions within the Commons. Holles and Ireton came close to fighting a duel over the Army petition.[1] On the 30 March the Lords' ordinance concerning the City Militia was read twice, and on the 2 April it was committed, not to a Committee of the whole House as desired by the 'independent' members, but to a select committee, with care particularly referred to Mr. Recorder, Mr. Gott and Mr. Reynolds,[2] the first two of whom were still firmly committed to the 'presbyterian' line. Lawrence Whittaker tells us that this ordinance occasioned a great dispute between Recorder Glyn and Alderman Pennington,[3] both of whom must have known only too well its political and military significance.

The increasing sense of urgency that Holles mentioned after the Army petition,[4] also made itself felt in votes concerning Ireland and for providing the necessary finances for his designs. The 30 March witnessed a vote for borrowing £200,000 from the City, and two days later it was voted that the civil power in Ireland should be entrusted to two Lords Justices and the managing of the war there to commissioners. Again the partisan character of this voting

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1. Addit.MSS.10114, f.22v; Clar.MSS. 29, ff.165v, 193: Intelligence from London, 5 & 25 Apr.1647.
2. C.J.V, p.132.
3. Addit.MSS.31116, f.306v.
4. Holles, Memoirs, p.80.

is revealed by the tellers, with Sir Arthur Haselrig and Sir John Evelyn of Wilts, the veteran 'independent' tellers, being defeated by Holles and Zouch Tate.[1]

The atmosphere in the House was not improved by the voting of military commanders for Ireland. Sir Philip Percival wrote to Lord Inchiquin that Sir William Waller and Colonel Massey were in nomination by one party, and Major General Skippon and Cromwell by the other.[2] Sir William Waller was definitely a 'presbyterian' nominee for the command of Leinster and Ulster, but his nomination was blocked on the 31 March. The division upon this motion is interesting since one of the tellers against Waller was Colonel Jephson, a confidant of Lord Inchiquin whom we have already seen as an ally of the 'presbyterian' group. The explanation may lie in personal animosity or the military aspirations of Lord Inchiquin, but whatever it is, this division provides another indication of the 'patchwork' character of the 'presbyterian' group.

Major General Skippon does not fit into the 'independent' camp so convincingly - it was Sir William Waller who, after the defeat of the motion in his favour, proposed Skippon to be the commander of the English forces in Ireland.[3] It would

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1. C.J.V, p.131.
2. Addit.MSS.46931A, f.156: Percival to Inchiquin (draft letter), 2 Apr. 1647.
3. Addit.MSS.10114, f.22v.

also seem that Holles did not regard him as being involved in 'independent' counsels at this time.[1] Yet it is possible that the opponents of Holles decided to nominate the apolitical Skippon in the hope of blocking Sir William Waller's appointment, and in the realisation that a more politically committed officer from the Army would stand no chance at Westminster. Thus Skippon's nomination can be regarded as a compromise, an interpretation that is strengthened by the fact that it was approved by all in both Houses.[2]

In the struggle between the two factions over the appointment of the cavalry commander for Ireland, there was no room for compromise. If Skippon was an apolitical commander, Cromwell and Massey were not, and the 'presbyterians' made no mistake in the voting of Massey to that command. To add insult to injury Sir Gregory Norton's motion was adopted for sending a letter to Lord Lisle to notify him of these votes which effectively sounded the retreat for the Sidney interest in Ireland. The final blow to this interest was the vote of the 8 April appointing Colonel Jones as the governor of Dublin instead of Colonel Algernon Sidney. Not surprisingly, it was Recorder Glyn who carried this vote to the Lords after playing the major role in persuading a

1. Holles, Memoirs, p.88.
2. Addit.MSS.10114, f.22v.

thin House of Commons to appoint Colonel Jones.[1]

In response to the increasing evidence of opposition within the Army, greater attention was also devoted to military preparations in England. On the 29 March a debate upon disbandment resulted in a vote that the regiments of Colonel Poyntz, Colonel Bethel and Colonel Copley were to be part of the 5,400 Horse to be kept up.[2] The political allegiance of these officers is indicated by the fact that supporters of the Army viewed this vote as the turning of the tide against them.[3] This was followed, on the 8 April, by votes adding to those three regiments those of Colonel Greaves, Colonel Rossiter, Colonel Whalley, Sir Thomas Fairfax and Lieutenant General Cromwell, together with a mixed regiment under Colonel Needham. Holles subsequently maintained that the voting of 5,400 Horse was more than was generally desired and was only accepted to placate the opposing faction.[4] It is not difficult to deduce which of the six regiments were approved against the wishes of the 'presbyterian' group. The subsequent history of these votes is very difficult to explain, for although they were reported to the House of Lords on the 13 April, they were not

1. Hist.MSS.Comm., De L'Isle and Dudley, vi, p.565.
2. C.J.V, p.128.
3. Clarke Papers, i, p.4.
4. Holles, Memoirs, p.74.

passed by that House until the 28 May.[1] It is possible in regard there were no representations from the Commons concerning them, that the 'presbyterians' were averse to utilising such a marginally advantageous measure until circumstances forced their hand.

With the preparations in Ireland completed Holles and his adherents turned their attention once more to weakening the Army, and also to laying the groundwork of a professional military counterweight, by exploiting the divisions within the Army revealed by the activity of Sir John Clotworthy and Sir William Waller at Saffron Walden.

On the 9 April the Committee at Derby House was empowered to grant commissions to officers approved for the Irish service by both Houses. More ominous for the 'independent' group was the empowering of that committee to dispose of those forces of the Army which had engaged for Ireland into distinct regiments.[2] Although Holles maintained that this was necessary for the ease of conveying them into Ireland, Sir William Waller leaves us in no doubt that this manoeuvre was also decided upon with the English military scene very much in mind.[3] From the beginning the Army

1. L.J.9, pp.135, 217-8, 221. Holles only refers to these votes as taking place in May, and offers no explanation for the delay: Memoirs, pp.73-4.
2. C.J.V, p.139.
3. Holles, Memoirs, p.82; Waller, Vindications, p.65.

opposition was in no doubt about the likely purpose of those elements of the Army that accepted the Irish service, and viewed the officers concerned with the gravest suspicion. Indeed it would seem that one of them, Captain Dormer, left his men in no doubt that they were being drawn out to go against an Independent Army.[1]

It was the Lords who once again directed attention to the ordinance concerning the City Militia and, on the 15 April, Sir Philip Stapleton and Recorder Glyn were successful tellers in a vote for adding a clause to this ordinance which restored to the City Militia Committee authority over the suburbs. An 'independent' attempt to have the implementation of the powers granted by this ordinance deferred until the 25 December was also defeated, and on the 16 April the Lords passed the ordinance with the 'presbyterian' alterations.[2] The importance and energy of Holles himself became increasingly apparent during this month, during which he acted as a consistent reporter to the House from the Committee at Derby House and as the most important parliamentary organiser of the City loan of £200,000 for disbanding the Army.

As Holles's reports from the Committee at Derby House indicate, 'presbyterian' control of that body became

1. Clarke Papers, i, pp.16-17.
2. L.J.9, pp.142-3.

increasingly secure during April 1647. The record of attendance indicates an impressive superiority for the anti-Army group. On the 7 and 8 April the Committee appointed six of its members to go to the Army in order to draw out and treat with such regiments as were to go to Ireland. Of the 12 members present on those two days, only three cannot be closely associated with the group around Holles.[1] On the 12 April the Committee added two ultra-moderate peers, the Earls of Lincoln and Suffolk to the sub-committee for receiving propositions from officers to go for Ireland. Of the 11 present, only Sir William Armine was an opponent of Holles's group.[2] The end of the month saw a similarly weighted committee authorising Holles to report Skippon's acceptance of the chief military command in Ireland.[3]

Now I must return for a look at the Lords. I have shown that the temper of the Upper House became more moderate after the withdrawal of the Scots Army, a development perhaps personified by the Earl of Pembroke although his conversion started somewhat earlier at Newcastle.[4] This is not to say that there was an overwhelming preponderance of peace peers - indeed some divisions were very close. Yet, because of the

1. P.R.O., SP.21/E 26 (Committee for both Kingdoms), ff.34-6. The three members were Sir William Armine, Robert Reynolds and Major Richard Salwey.
2. Ibid., ff.40-3.
3. Ibid., ff.50-1.
4. Clar.MSS.29, f.193: Intelligence from London, 25 Apr. 1647.

small numbers involved the tendency of uncommitted members to move towards the 'presbyterian' position, which must have occurred also in the House of Commons, had a more immediate impact upon the Lords.

The ascendancy of the peace peers is clearly revealed by the dissents entered against several votes concerning the 'presbyterian' design. On the 4 March the Lords aimed a serious blow at the financial stability of the Army, when it voted against an ordinance for continuing the assessment for it. Ten lords entered their protestation against this vote; a number that is partly explained by the wording of the protestation which was not against disbanding, but against disbanding without prior pecuniary satisfaction to the soldiers. The end of the month saw the Lords falling into line with the reaction of the 'presbyterian' leaders in the Commons at the news of continued activity concerning the Army petition. They passed Holles's Declaration, the vote for sending for Skippon, the vote against drawing the Army into closer quarters, and for drawing out those forces going to Ireland. During April the Upper House continued to act in close sympathy with the Commons in their votes concerning the Army and Ireland, although at times attitudes appear to have been almost evenly balanced. The vote for the separation of civil and military affairs in Ireland passed by only one

voice, while Colonel Massey's appointment as Lieutenant General was accepted by a majority of only two, with Lord Wharton acting as teller for the Noes.[1]

Certain Lords also had an important part to play in the Committee at Derby House and as we have seen, April was the month when the 'presbyterian' group gained secure control of that committee. This was largely achieved by the addition of certain members of both Houses. Although the new members from the Commons were evenly balanced between the two factions, the fact that Sir Philip Stapleton was the messenger to the Lords with this vote, indicates that it was a 'presbyterian' design. On the one hand the leaders of this group in the Commons were added: Denzil Holles, Sir William Lewis, Sir John Clotworthy and Colonel Massey,[2] and on the other hand their influence in that committee was confirmed by the addition of a solid block of moderate Lords: the Earls of Lincoln, Middlesex and Suffolk and Lords Dacres, Willoughby and Maynard.[3] The Lords went even further and ordered the preparation of an ordinance for revoking the Irish Committee in the Star Chamber, and transferring all its powers to the Derby House Committee, possibly in response to obstruction from that

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1. L.J.9, p.122.
2. C.J.V, p.155.
3. L.J.9, p.127.

quarter.[1] Henceforth the latter committee became the power-house of the 'presbyterian' design against the Army. It was presumably from this time that the 'independent' members of the Committee at Derby House began to absent themselves from it and so finalised 'presbyterian' control.[2]

Yet there was one crucial matter over which it would appear the moderate element within the two Houses did not see eye to eye. The delay over the propositions for securing the loan of £200,000 from the City lost much valuable time for Holles in his design to pay off the Army. As early as the 6 April a committee of the two Houses attended the Common Council where Holles and the Earl of Northumberland delivered weighty arguments for the loan.[3] But not until the 13 May was the final ordinance brought up to the Lords by Holles and passed by them. This delay was occasioned by disagreement over the type of security to be offered, with the Lords probably for family and their own vested interests, being averse to the inclusion of delinquents' estates, and preferring instead the inclusion of all the compositions at Goldsmiths' Hall. On the other hand the Commons rejected the addition of compositions since, it was claimed, they represented the only reservoir of ready money for the parliament. The only change in this impasse

1. Ibid., p.142.
2. Holles, Memoirs, p.82.
3. J.Co.Co.40,f.212.

by the end of April 1647 was the addition by the Lords of the estates of papists in arms, and it was not until the 1 May that the Lords adopted the Commons' attitude towards Goldsmiths' Hall.[1]

Yet the way was still not clear for Holles to acquire the financial resources to eliminate the Army. He now discovered that the Common Council was no more inclined than the Lords had been to sacrifice financial considerations for speedy political advantage.[2] On the 3 May the 'presbyterians' sought to utilise the City's fears and suspicions of the Army in order to achieve its agreement to the propositions. The Earl of Pembroke made dark assertions to a Common Council about royalist influences in the Army and its contacts with the king.[3] On the 6 May Holles reported to the Lords that the City had insisted upon the security of Goldsmiths' Hall, whereupon the Upper House agreed to join with the Commons in adding half of the compositions to the security. Finally, upon the 8 May, the Common Council accepted this improved offer.[4]

Something like six weeks had been lost in the essential task of providing money for the elimination of Fairfax's Army, and this breathing-space had not been wasted

1. L.J.9, p.170.
2. J.Co.Co.40, f.216.
3. Clarke Papers, i, pp.24,26.
4. J.Co.Co.40, f.217v.

by the radical officers and soldiers. On the 27 April the Earl of Warwick presented to the Lords an account of the employment of the Commissioners sent to draw out those soldiers who were willing to go to Ireland, and he provided evidence of considerable organised obstruction to that service in the Army,[1] extending even to the printing of two pamphlets, one of which was directed against the 'presbyterian' petition promoted in Essex.[2] Holles had already made use of both these pamphlets, presumably forwarded to him by the commissioners at Saffron Walden, to launch an attack upon the whole Army in the Lower House on the 23 April.[3] In response to Warwick's report, the Lords resolved it to be necessary speedily to provide money for disbanding of those forces not engaged for Ireland with six weeks' pay of arrears; a resolution which the Commons accepted without a division.

Deceptive Supremacy

At first sight the political scene at London and Westminster by the beginning of May may not seem to support my contention that the apex of 'presbyterian' fortunes had been reached in March. One royalist intelligencer had written in early April that 'all is held cocksure by the Presbyterians',[4] while Bellièvre maintained, in mid-April

1. L.J.9, pp.152-6; also in Brit.Mus., Loan 29/175 (Harley Papers V), ff.49-54.
2. Bodl., Pamph.D.80 (16): 'A New Found Stratagem Framed in the Old Forge of Machivilisme' (1647), p.7.
3. C.J.V, p.153; Clarke Papers, i, p.15.
4. Clar.MSS.29, f.165v: Intelligence from London, 5 Apr. 1647.

that the 'presbyterians' were masters of the City, had settled the affairs of Ireland in their own fashion, and that the 'independents' were divided.[1] It is easy to see what they based these assessments upon - was it not true that Holles had gained control of the Derby House Committee with considerably extended powers, eliminated the Sidney interest in Ireland, regulated the composition of the forces to be kept up in England to his advantage and embarked upon the process of constructing a military counterweight to the Army with elements drawn from it? Indeed, the situation seemed even brighter with the passing of the ordinance on the 4 May endorsing the remodelled Militia Committee elected by the Common Council.

In fact the situation at London provided only half the political picture. For the other half we need to look to Saffron Walden, where the likelihood of the Army disbanding was becoming increasingly remote. To set against the above reports of 'presbyterian' strength in London, we must take account of this development within the Army. A letter of intelligence, of the 20 April, referred to the unrest of the soldiers over their petition, and to their printing of papers with bitter language against the parliament, and in particular against Sir Philip Stapleton, Sir Walter

1. Montereul Corresp., ii, p.109.

Erle and Holles.[1] On the 26 April a royalist wrote of the Army generally declaring against going to Ireland except under their present commanders, and with satisfaction in their late desires. More ominously for Holles, the writer reported further that the Army was also insisting upon first seeing the kingdom settled.[2]

This increasing radicalism in the Army forced the 'presbyterians' to proceed even further in their determination to crush it. Such a policy, if persevered in, could only place a severe strain upon those moderate elements in City and Parliament which comprised the main strength of Holles's group in 1647. This was not immediately apparent, for the 'presbyterian' position at Westminster was sustained for a time by the concern of many members at the affront to parliamentary authority, and at the obstacle to a return to normality represented by the Army's opposition to the votes of the two Houses. A clear example of this attitude is provided by Colonel William White, the recruiter member for Pontefract, who wrote to Sir Thomas Fairfax on the 28 May concerning the votes for disbanding the Army. He expressed the hope that the votes would be implemented peaceably, for

1. Hist.MSS.Comm., 14th Report, append., part 2 (Portland MSS.1894), pp.155-6.
2. Clar.MSS.29, f.195v: Intelligence from London, 26 Apr. 1647.

although he recognised that there was cause for the Army's apprehension, he believed that if it disobeyed the Parliament then the ruin of the Commonwealth would inevitably follow.[1] But as we shall see, concern gradually gave way to a more conciliatory attitude on the part of some moderates, especially after the Army's seizure of Charles in early June.[2]

I have not, as yet, directed much attention to the situation in the City. It has already been seen that the growing influence of the 'presbyterian' group at Westminster had led to an increasingly favourable relationship between the City and the parliament. In his increasing reliance upon the City, Holles read too much into the moderate tone of the Common Council. It is true that the City governors were jealous of their jurisdictions, concerned at the economic dislocation caused by the war, and alarmed at the problems of law and order created by religious and political radicalism. Perhaps Holles cannot be blamed for his miscalculation, for this concern was marked, after mid-1646, by a pronounced antagonism towards the Army. As we have seen there were also certain aldermen and common councilmen who were deeply committed to the 'presbyterian' group,[3] and until mid-1647

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1. Clarke Papers, i, p.103; v. also Colonel White's letter to Lord Fairfax: Bell, Memorials, i, 342.
2. v. infra, pp.409-10, 435-6, 441-2.
3. v. supra, pp.202-7.

they were able, like Holles at Westminster, to take advantage of the peaceable aspirations of the majority to further the design against the Army. But concern and moderation were to prove a poor foundation upon which to build an aggressive policy that involved commitment to the point of military conflict. This was the dilemma of the 'presbyterian' leaders - with the Army's refusal to abide by the rules rendering parliamentary methods ineffectual, they were forced to gamble upon just such a foundation.

The 'presbyterian' leaders at Westminster worked closely with the City governors to suppress the allies of the Army in London. The Committee for considering Unordained Preachers, chaired by Colonel Leigh, became a major agency for achieving that end. It was to this committee that the petition promoted at Lamb's congregation was referred in mid-March and it is clear that a clash occurred between the petitioners and Holles and Sir Philip Stapleton who were both members of the committee.[1] As a result of this the Lower House approved the commitment of two of the petitioners, albeit against the opposition of many who maintained the lawfulness of petitioning.[2]

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1. C.J.V, pp.118, 162.
2. Bodl., Godw.Pamph. 1116 (15): 'Prima Pars de Comparatis Comparandis', p.3.

The persistence of the radical citizens was not abated by these discouragements and their activities came to be viewed with increasing disfavour by the Commons in the light of evidence that their petition delivered on the 15 March was being canvassed outside London.[1] Indeed one Army supporter in May referred to it as 'the great Petition that is gone out into the Kingdom'.[2] Yet another radical petition was delivered to the Commons at the beginning of May, and was met by the disapproval of the House, with Holles and Sir Philip Stapleton acting as the tellers for the majority.[3]

A much harsher line was adopted towards the petitioners on the 20 May when the 'presbyterians' took occasion to settle old scores with this troublesome element within the City. The petition of the 4 May was first voted to be a high breach of privilege, to be insolent and seditious, and to be burnt by the hangman. The vehemence of the 'presbyterian' suppression of this petition is explained by the fact that it cast aspersions upon the Recorder, the Common Council, Holles, Sir Philip Stapleton and Sir Walter Erle. Then attention was directed towards the petition presented in March. The obvious vindictiveness of the vote to

1. Tanner MSS.58(1), f.14: Committee at Salisbury to Holles, 27 March 1647. v. supra, p.365 for the City 'presbyterian' petition of the same period.
2. Clarke Papers, i, p.92.
3. C.J.V, p.162.

burn this petition also after such a long delay perhaps explains the small majority secured by Holles and Sir Walter Erle.[1]

The fact that Holles and his adherents had not reacted so vigorously at the beginning of May is an indication of the pressure that Army intransigence was to exercise upon the deliberations and temper of the Lower House. The 29 April had witnessed a further strengthening of the 'presbyterian' position with the report of Skippon's acceptance of the chief military command in Ireland, and his consequent addition to the Committee at Derby House. But the events of the next day seriously marred this month of successes for Holles. For the first time the organisation, audacity and danger of the leveller movement in the Army was impressed upon members at Westminster by the reporting of letters from the Agitators of several Horse Regiments to Skippon, Cromwell and Fairfax, and by the bearing of three of these Agitators before the House. Whitelocke conveys the sense of indignation felt by some members in the following terms:

> 'Here it was observed by some, that a Victorious Army, out of imployment is very inclinable to assume Power over their Principals'.[2]

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1. Ibid., pp.179-80; Addit.MSS.31116, f.310.
2. Whitelocke, Memorials, p.248.

Following upon the Earl of Warwick's detailed report of obstructions to the Irish service within the Army, the 'presbyterians' could not have failed to grasp the significance of this development, but they were forestalled from adopting harsh measures by Skippon's motion for moderation.[1] Instead, resolution was taken to send Skippon, Cromwell, Ireton and Fleetwood to quiet all distempers in the Army. It was further decided that these commissioners should acquaint the Army of the Commons' decision to bring in speedily an ordinance for their indemnity, and of their resolution to pay a considerable proportion of their arrears. The resolve of the Commons had visibly softened in the face of radical activity within the Army. The truth of a comment by a royalist writer need not be doubted, that the 'presbyterians' were troubled by the boldness of the Army 'independents' at this time although, he added, they were hopeful of overcoming these difficulties.[2]

Hence the month of May did not commence very auspiciously for the 'presbyterian' group - the final step that would ensure political success, the disbanding of the Army, eluded them. The further they probed into the character of the opposition in the Army, the more they became aware of

1. Addit.MSS.10114, f.23; Holles, Memoirs, pp.88-90; Ludlow, Memoirs, i, 147-8.
2. Clar.MSS.29, f.219: Intelligence from London, 6 May 1647.

its organisation and the involvement of leading officers. The Earl of Warwick's report had revealed the obstructionism of Colonel Lilburne, and now Sir Robert Harley's minutes of the committee appointed to consider 'A New Found Stratagem....' indicated the strong connection between this pamphlet and Colonel Lambert's regiment.[1] A letter from the Earl of Warwick to Sir William Waller also hinted at the sergeant, who had delivered that pamphlet, being briefed at the headquarters, upon his summons to attend the parliament.[2]

In other ways as well Holles's plans were suffering from setbacks. The country was becoming disillusioned at the continued failure of the two Houses to relieve its fiscal and military burdens. On the 1 May the Lords received petitions from the Grand Inquests of Devon and Somerset, both of which emphasised the great burden of free quarter and the levying of great sums by soldiers intended for Ireland.[3] The refusal of the Lords to accept Colonel Rainsborough as commander of the expedition against Jersey resulted in the prolonged presence of his soldiers around Portsmouth, while Oxfordshire appears to have been troubled by the forces of Colonel Midhope. A similar story came from Lord Herbert of Cherbury concerning disorders in Montgomery-

1. Brit.Mus., Loan 29/122, misc.8.
2. Loan 29/123, misc.35: Warwick to Waller, 9 May 1647.
3. L.J.9, pp.171-2: the probability of radical organisation should be noted in these counties.

shire. Pressure was growing for the dispatch of these forces into Ireland, but Holles could not contemplate this while the rest of the Army remained undisbanded.

The position of the 'presbyterian' group in Munster was also threatened by the disparaging reports of Lord Lisle and Sir John Temple upon their return in early May.[1] But here the situation was restored and a fresh emphasis was placed upon the design against the Army by news of Lord Inchiquin's successes, and by his request for reinforcements and provisions. Among the votes of the 18 May was the crucial one for referring to a Committee the time and manner of disbanding all forces not going to Ireland or voted for England. The 'presbyterian' tellers, Sir William Lewis and Harbottle Grimston secured a majority of 39 voices in a total vote of 239. With the referring of this business to the Committee at Derby House it seemed that Holles once again had his prime objective within his grasp. The improved situation in Munster restored to the 'presbyterian' design against the Army the momentum that opposition in the Army itself had done much to reduce.

By mid-May the financial machinery was being constructed to enable the 'presbyterian' Committee at Derby House to implement the final stage. After considerable

1. C.J.V, p.166.

activity between the parliament and Common Council, conducted largely under the guidance of Denzil Holles, a committee of London members of the House of Commons was appointed, on the 14 May to acquaint the Common Council of the ordinance concerning the loan of £200,000 and to urge them to execute it speedily.[1] The crux of this ordinance was the institution of a treasury at Weavers' Hall with treasurers appointed by the Common Council. Both in its duties and in its personnel, this treasury became closely connected with the Committee at Derby House. Three members of the new Militia Committee were appointed by the Common Council as treasurers, and Alderman Bunce was the most eminent of them; a citizen whom we have already seen to have been intimately connected with the 'presbyterian' leaders and the Scots Commissioners.[2] Under his supervision the treasury at Weavers' Hall was to finance the attempt by Holles to create a viable military counter to the Army in the summer of 1647.

The report of Cromwell and Fleetwood on the 21 May that the Army was quiet, appears to have created, for a time at least, a more conciliatory tone at Westminster. All agreed that the Army was to receive justice, to have full pay with

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1. Ibid., p.172.
2. Supra, pp.204-7; the other two treasurers were Richard Glyde and Lt.Col.Bromfield.

security for the part deferred and to have their other reasonable desires granted. But this tone did not last for long - it was probably the 'presbyterians' who led the House in refusing to approve all the carriages of the Army, by defeating the motion for a declaration that they were satisfied of the Army's good affection to the parliament. Thus the debate ended with a storm after 'our fair day'.[1]

On the 25 May Holles opened what would hopefully be the final attack on the Army, with a report from the Derby House Committee upon the time and manner of disbanding. The committee had decided that the disbanding should begin with Fairfax's regiment of Foot at Chelmsford as early as the 28 May.[2] Of the six members present, only Sir John Temple was an ally of the 'independents'.[3] In the House the motion for disbanding Fairfax's regiment first was passed after a long debate, with Sir William Lewis and Harbottle Grimstone acting as tellers in favour. Further it was voted that the rest of the regiments should be disbanded in the same manner, and that the £40,000 voted for that service should be conveyed under the combined direction of the Derby House Committee and the Committee of the Army. Whitelocke tells us that Holles, Sir Philip Stapleton, Glyn '& others of that party' eagerly

1. Addit.MSS.10114, f.24v; Hist.MSS.Comm., 9th Report, part 2 (MSS of Alfred Morrison, 1884), p.439. Sir William Constable to Lord Fairfax, 24 May 1647.
2. infra, p.406.
3. S.P. 21/E 26, f.62.

pressed the disbanding of the Army, whilst others opposed it as being dangerous to the Parliament party, and because they believed the Army would not submit to it.[1] This apprehension about the Army's reaction must have been strong, since the vote passed by only 21 votes. It was certainly voiced by the regicide, Sir William Constable, who wrote that he did not think that any expected the soldiers to obey after recent provocations. His concluding comment soon proved to be correct - 'I fear we shall too soone see ye issew, wch God prevent'.[2]

Sir William Lewis carried these votes to the Lords, together with an order restoring to Sir Walter Erle, a 'presbyterian' leader, the important military place of Lieutenant General of the Ordnance. Only three Lords entered their dissents to the vote for disbanding Fairfax's regiment first - the Earls of Denbigh and Mulgrave and Lord Say; although one intelligencer maintained the division was 12 to 11 on every vote.[3] The partisan nature of this vote in the Upper House is revealed by Lord Robartes' note upon the three dissenters - 'these Lords were ye prime ringleaders of ye Independent faction & would not have yt Army disbanded wch afterwards overthrew ye Governmnt'.[4] The 'presbyterian'

1. Whitelocke, Memorials, p.252.
2. Hist.MSS.Comm., 9th Report, part 2 (Morrisson MSS), p.439.
3. L.J.9, p.207; Clarke Papers, i, p.112.
4. Brit.Mus., Harl.MSS.2238 (Extracts from the Journal of the Lords House of Parliament, 10 July 1646-25 April 1648), f.73.

advance continued with the votes of the following day authorising the Committee at Derby House to grant commissions to the officers of certain regiments who had engaged for Ireland. In the debates upon these officers, it would seem that both Dormer and Greaves were opposed by the 'independents'.[1] The 'presbyterians' were obviously anxious to implement this vote, for it was taken up to the Lords immediately by Sir Robert Pye, together with a vote upon the Lords' Declaration concerning the Army.

This Declaration sought to justify the decision to disband the Foot, and emphasised the various measures adopted for the benefit of the soldiers and officers, which, it stated the two Houses hoped would dispose the Army to comply with their resolutions;[2] a hope which was to be very quickly blasted. But in the meantime, a solidly moderate committee, with the exception of Lord Delaware, was appointed to assist in the disbanding, while a further resolution was also taken for disbanding the Train of Artillery. The Committee at Derby House acted quickly in preparing the instructions for these commissioners, with only the presence of Nathaniel Fiennes on the 30 May to break the 'presbyterian' monopoly.[3]

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1. Addit.MSS.10114, f.24v.
2. L.J.9, p.222.
3. SP 21/E 26, ff.68-73.

Again Holles had secured a significant victory at Westminster, but once again it could only be transformed into effective political power if the Army would submit to the votes for disbanding. As I have shown, there was a strong feeling at the end of May that the Army would not do so. In that event the 'presbyterians' would be left with very little alternative but to resort to arms, an eventuality that they had recognised with the first signs of Army opposition and for which they had striven to prepare. In these military matters the role of the City became of extreme importance and so I must now devote a little space to this aspect of 'presbyterian' activity.

At the end of April the Common Council used its newly restored jurisdiction in militia affairs to remodel its powerful Militia Committee, so as to bring its political complexion into line with that of the City government in general. The 'presbyterian' character of this nomination was clearly revealed on the 23 April when the Common Council appointed its members to attend the church of St. Lawrence Jewry at 8 a.m. on the morning of the nomination, to hear prayers and a preparative sermon by the high presbyterian minister, Anthony Burgess, and to renew their Oath and Covenant.[1] In the event the result could not have been more favourable for the 'presbyterian' group at Westminster - not

1. J.Co.Co.40, f.215.

even radical citizens, who were members of the House of Commons, were spared in this important purge.

Although the new Militia Committee members were all separately voted by the House of Commons it would appear that a certain degree of disquiet was expressed over the removal of Alderman Pennington. Both the Lord Mayor and Alderman Thomas Adams were questioned closely.[1] In fact the first signs of the new order of things in the City militia were seen at the end of March, when a strongly 'presbyterian' committee was appointed to consider what forces were needed for the safety of the City and the lines of communication.[2] By the end of May a vote by the House of Commons to furnish the Militia Committee with a further £12,000 for the maintenance of their guard, was correctly regarded by an intelligencer as being intended to make war against the Army.[3]

Cromwell and Charles: Lost Opportunities

The events of the first fortnight of June 1647 were to reveal fully the weakness of 'presbyterian' preparations undertaken since March in the face of growing opposition in the Army. It would also seem that by June the 'presbyterians' were beginning to lose the advantage they had gained from two sources: the divisions and uncertainty amongst their opponents, and also the popular belief that they were more

1. Addit.MSS.10114, f.24; Clarke Papers, i, p.25.
2. J.Co.Co.40, f.211v.
3. Clarke Papers, i, p.112.

committed to securing a peaceful settlement with Charles I. To conclude this chapter I shall illustrate these disconcerting developments.

As with the 'presbyterian' group there is much difficulty in identifying the 'independents' at Westminster and in the City. Outside the parliament the quarrel between Lilburne on the one hand and certain members of John Goodwin's congregation and the Hertfordshire radicals on the other, reveals the uncertainty even of this group in the face of 'presbyterian' successes. Inside the two Houses the spring of 1647 also revealed a very real division between the republican members, such as Henry Marten, and the more conservative grandees who led the 'independent' group. Marten was closely involved with Lilburne's activities in the City, although even he flagged at one stage much to Lilburne's disgust.[1] On the other hand Cromwell had no sympathy with the effects of Lilburne's influence and activity in the Army, but at some time in May he made the decision to align himself with the opposition in the Army.

On the 22 May Sir Thomas Gayer, the Lord Mayor, received information that certain 'independents' who up till that time had been against it, had now decided to take advantage of the discontent in the Army to make head against

1. Lilburne, 'Jonah's Cry.....', pp.9,16.

the parliament. The information also purported to provide the reason for this change of policy, a reason which is extremely reminiscent of Cromwell's known attitude towards Divine Providence - these 'independents' maintained that God had put an opportunity into their hands and they would not let it slip.[1] We have other evidence that Cromwell was at this time coming to accept the advisability of recovering his place in the esteem of the Army which had been jeopardised by his attempts at conciliation and promises of disbandment.

On the 24 May Sir Lewis Dives wrote to Charles that Cromwell had been the principal man, who had laboured to the utmost of his power to reconcile the differences between the Army and the House of Commons and had even sought to disband it, but who now had been forced to adhere to the Army's interest.[2] Another royalist intelligencer associated this reliance of the 'independents' upon the Army with the harsh reaction of the parliament to the petition of the radical citizens against the 'presbyterian' leaders.[3] Whatever the cause all these sources pinpoint the latter part of May as the time when the 'independent' grandees of the Army assumed the leadership of that Army opposition which had prevented a

1. Hist.MSS.Comm., 13th Report, part 1 (Portland MSS), p.421.
2. The Tower of London Letter Book of Sir Lewis Dyve, 1646-47, ed. H.G.Tibbutt (Beds.Hist.Assoc., xxxviii, 1958), p.57.
3. Clar.MSS.29, f.227: Intelligence from London, 24 May 1647.

total 'presbyterian' political victory. The removal of the constitutional inhibitions of these members represented a considerable threat to the 'presbyterian' position at Westminster, as did the second development that I mentioned above. Not only had the Army blocked the fulfilment of Holles's prime objective but, by June, it was coming to rival Holles and his adherents in the peace settlement stakes. As early as Easter week we learn that a petition was presented to the king in the name of the whole Army, for him to place himself under its protection.[1]

I left Charles, together with the activities of the royalist agents and the Scots, at the most favourable point for the 'presbyterian' party in early 1647, with the king at Holdenby in the charge of either moderate or 'presbyterian'-inclined commissioners. The Parliament of Scotland had secured the promise of a joint representation of the peace propositions to the king and of continued co-operation, and had then departed from the Northern Counties. Thereafter the attention of the 'presbyterian' leaders had shifted away from Charles to the more pressing design against the Army. Indeed, a leveller pamphlet at the beginning of July made that very point.[2]

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1. Carte MSS.20, f.630: King's Answer to the Petition of the army, 21 Apr.1647.
2. 'Prima Pars de Comparatis Comparandis', p.43.

Yet although the 'presbyterians' believed that they had eliminated Charles for the time being as a complicating factor on the political scene, royalist agents had no intention of marking time and were still able to communicate with the king during his strict confinement.[1] There always appears to have been a strong preference amongst certain royalist circles for the 'independents', and an equally strong suspicion of 'presbyterian' motives; an attitude that must have been strenghtened by the inactivity of the 'presbyterians' during the spring while the king was under their control although it is not unlikely that the 'presbyterian' leaders remained in contact with the Queen.[2] So it is not surprising to discover indications at this time that royalists and the Army were in contact.

The temper of the Army was certainly favourable towards the king during the spring and early summer of 1647. Royalist agents were concerned about the greater harshness of 'presbyterian' propositions which they predicted would result from the disbanding of the Army, and believed that if the Army proved refractory then the Houses would hasten to an accommodation to forestall it.[3] Sir Lewis Dives and de Bellièvre reveal the most important factor impeding a

1. Dr. Peter Barwick, The Life of the Reverend Dr. John Barwick, D.D. (London, 1724), p.73.
2. 'A Particular Charge or Impeachment', p.5.
3. Clar.MSS.29, f.193: Intelligence from London, 15 Apr.1647.

rapprochement between the king and the 'independent' grandees - personal distrust of the king.[1] Yet as Sir Lewis Dives maintained, it is possible that Charles's consistancy at this time to his principles in the matter of the peace propositions, as revealed by his answer of the 12 May, went some way towards closing this gap although Bellièvre disagreed with this assessment.[2]

By the end of May, then, there is evidence of definite contacts between royalist agents and leading Army officers. Sir Lewis Dives was approached by 'powerful persons in the Army' to send propositions to the king.[3] Within the two Houses there were also indications that the moderate 'independents' were more favourable to the sending of propositions. The House of Commons had decided on the 4 March to await the arrival of authorised commissioners from Scotland before considering the propositions,[4] and only on the 8 April was the matter revived, presumably in response to the report from Holdenby of the delivery of a letter to the king by a royalist officer. On the 14th, the commissioners with the king were appointed to join with the Scots

1. Tower Letter Book of Dyves, p.57; Montereul Corresp., ii, 109.
2. Montereul Corresp., ii, 145.
3. Tower Letter Book of Dyves, p.58.
4. Brit.Mus.Addit.MSS.22620 (Norwich Collection), f.56: Atkin to Watts, 4 March 1646/7; Clar.MSS.29, f.158: Advertisements from London, 18 March 1646/7.

Commissioners in desiring his answer to the Newcastle Propositions and the sale of bishops' lands. It is to be noted that of the committee appointed to draw up the instructions, the member to whom particular care thereof was entrusted was John Lisle, an 'independent' lawyer.[1] Yet it was Holles who carried those instructions to the Lords on the 23 April, having delayed a day probably to co-ordinate his activities with the Scots Commissioners, who delivered a letter from the Parliament of Scotland to the Lords on the same day.

Apparently this whole matter receded into the background as the more crucial battle at Westminster over the Army intensified, only to re-emerge on the 11 May when a small committee was appointed to prepare a report upon the subject. 'Independents' again figured prominently upon this committee, and it was John Lisle who carried up the propositions and instructions to the Lords two days later.[2] On the same day the Upper House received from the Earl of Denbigh an intercepted letter from Ashburnham to the king, which was referred to a committee to be deciphered. As matters moved towards the crisis between the Army and the parliament at the beginning of June, the receipt of this letter, and the delivery of the king's Answer to the

1. C.J.V, p.142.
2. L.J.9, p.189.

Propositions on the 18 May, moved some of the Lords to act more vigorously in favour of Charles.

It was at the instance of Lord Willoughby of Parham that the king's message was read on the 18th, although it would seem that the attention of most Lords was upon effecting the disbanding of the Army.[1] Not that Lord Willoughby was unaware of the danger of the Army, for when the king's letter was read again on the 20 May, he acted as teller in favour of the successful motion to debate the king's removal from Holdenby nearer London, before considering the whole matter of his letter.[2] The place decided upon was Oatlands, against the strong opposition of the Earl of Denbigh, Lord Say and others. Lord Willoughby again spoke in favour of this, maintaining that they could not be sure of the Army.[3] Finally, on the 21 May the moderate Lords acted to prevent the communication of the deciphered letter from Ashburnham to the Lower House, presumably because of the damaging impact it would have had on any vote concerning the king.[4]

Thus during the spring of 1647 the 'presbyterians' had never been able to keep their monopoly of the king complete

1. Clar.MSS.29, ff.227, 229: Intelligence from London, 24 & 27 May 1647.
2. L.J.9, p.199.
3. Clar.MSS.29, f.229; Egerton MSS.2533, f.424: Thompson to - , 27 May 1647.
4. L.J.9, p.202.

- distrust of the intentions of this group upon the part of royalist agents, disillusionment at the failure of Holles to work for a settlement with Charles, and increasing contacts between the royal party and the Army, had whittled away their initial advantage and now, by the end of May, the Army's discontent had developed to the extent of threatening even their control of the king's person. The moderate Lords at least sought to prevent such a coup, but the Commons did not follow suit, probably because Holles was laying all his eggs in the one basket of the votes for disbandment.

Yet perhaps not all his eggs, for it is possible that Holles also looked towards the Scots once more to provide a military force. Rumours were already in evidence at the end of April to the effect that the City was turning towards them again.[1] In their charges against the 11 members the Council of War accused the leading 'presbyterians' of having invited the Scots and other foreign forces into England.[2] Not unnaturally, the members concerned denied this charge, as they did most of the others. That there was contact between the 'presbyterians' and the Scots can hardly be denied, and

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1. Clar.MSS.29, f.195v: Intelligence from London, 26 Apr. 1647.
2. 'A Particular Charge or Impeachment', p.6; Rushworth believed that Holles would have called in the Scots Army if he had gained control of Charles: Bell, Memorials, i, 353.

it is clear that there was some scheme concerning the removal of the king from Holdenby. There were proposals to send Charles to Scotland, to head a Scottish army,[1] but it seems more likely that the English 'presbyterians' were thinking of bringing him to London. An Army pamphlet of early June accused Holles's group of designing to abduct Charles, and referred to the suspicious activities of Colonel Greaves, the officer commanding at Holdenby, and a Scottish Lord, presumably the Earl of Dunfermline.[2] Cornet Joyce justified his seizure of Charles at Holdenby by maintaining that the 'presbyterians' were intending to convey the king to London,[3] and it is difficult to visualise their attempting a more ambitious scheme at that time of crisis.

It is to this crisis that I must now turn, and despite the strength of the 'presbyterian' position at Westminster, the signs did not augur well for their approaching conflict with the Army.

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1. C.Hill, God's Englishman: Oliver Cromwell and the English Revolution (London, 1970), p.88; Clarke Papers, i, Introduction, p.xxv.
2. Rushworth, Hist.Collections, vii, 513.
3. Addit.MSS.10114, f.25.

CHAPTER X

THE FIRST TRIAL OF STRENGTH

The departure of the parliamentary commissioners for Chelmsford at the end of May[1] was the final stage of the 'presbyterian' attempt to effect the peaceful elimination of the army. They were preceded by a letter to Fairfax from the Committee at Derby House stating the expectation of the Houses that the Army would give a punctual obedience in their disbanding. Not surprisingly that letter was signed by a solid group of 'presbyterians'.[2] Yet on the 1 June hasty resolutions were passed for the recall of the commissioners, for instead of providing an example of obedience to the rest of the army the Foot Regiment of Sir Thomas Fairfax had refused to disband. In rapid succession a series of calamities befell Holles and his colleagues at Westminster.

There are some indications that the moderate members experienced considerable consternation at this blatant denial of parliamentary authority, a mood that undoubtedly owed something to the 'presbyterian' members. Presumably it was the latter who pressed for vigorous counsels,[3] and moved that

1. v. supra, p. 392.
2. Worcester College, Clarke MSS., MSS.110, f.77: Holles, Stapleton, Jephson, Lewis, Waller and the Earl of Lincoln.
3. Waller, Vindication, p.130.

10,000 men be raised to compel a disbanding.[1] But it appears that the mood quickly altered to one of conciliation in response to Skippon's exhortation for the House to meet the desires of the Army, which would otherwise be upon them before they were aware. Thereupon, Holles maintained, '... we instantly fell as low as dirt'.[2] The Declaration against the projected army petition of March was expunged, the common soldiers were voted their full pay, and the officers a month more, upon disbanding or engaging for Ireland. Whitelocke did not miss the constitutional significance of the first vote - 'here the Parliament began to surrender themselves and their power into the hands of their own Army'.[3]

Yet we must not take Holles's claims too literally for he seems to have exaggerated the slump in the fortunes of the 'presbyterian' group. It is true that there was something of a shocked reaction in the two Houses, and that Holles failed in his attempt to prompt a military intervention against the army, yet the votes that passed were conciliatory, not a surrender. Even the revocation of the Declaration against the army petitioners was only achieved in a relatively thin house of 175 members late in the sitting of the 3 June.

1. Clarke Papers, i, p.117.
2. Holles, Memoirs, pp.104-5, 107.
3. Whitelocke, Memorials, p.253.

Disbanding remained the aim of the majority of members, whilst the fact that Lord Wenman and Harbottle Grimston were the successful tellers would indicate that the voting of full pay to the common soldiers was a device to detach them from their officers. This was not lost on the Agitators, nor the 'independent' members.[1]

The first three days of June produced something of a balance between the contending groups at Westminster - although Holles's hold over the moderates had slipped, he was still able to utilise their apprehension and desire for disbandment to secure several important votes. Again, they succeeded in obstructing the attempt of the Irish 'interest' within the 'independent' group to have Sir Philip Percival suspended from the House, but their counter-attack against Sir John Temple failed.[2]

Despite signs of continuing 'presbyterian' influence, the 3 June also witnessed the first obvious indication that the radical commanders and agitators were in the process of wresting the political initiative from Holles. John Harris's information to the Lords of the army's intention of seizing the king,[3] jeopardised one of the mainstays of 'presbyterian' influence: possession of the person of the king, albeit

1. Supra, p.19.
2. Addit.MSS.31116, ff.311-311v; Addit.MSS.10114, f.25.
3. L.J.9, pp.232, 235.

under the disguise of parliamentary commissioners. It is instructive that the messenger was sent to the 'presbyterian' Speaker of the House of Lords, the Earl of Manchester and to Denzil Holles, not Speaker Lenthall, in the Commons. Inquiries by the two Houses about the possibility of getting Charles to London[1] were rendered futile by the report, on the 4th, of the success of Cornet Joyce's mission.

At first the news of the king's removal did not have serious repercussions at Westminster, although it did give added emphasis to the measures for sweetening the army. The following day a committee of four members was appointed to prepare a letter to Sir Thomas Fairfax, only one of whom, Sir John Evelyn of Wilts, was not a leading 'presbyterian' and it was Sir Philip Stapleton who reported the letter. On the other hand, it was during this sitting that an ordinance was passed annulling Holles's Declaration against the army. The vote in the House of Lords upon the latter ordinance revealed a shift in the position of less committed peers, for a majority was obtained for agreeing to have the Declaration expunged, whilst a solid bloc of 'peace' peers dissented.[2] In addition, the Lords agreed to the Commons' vote improving the financial incentives for disbandment, and to the conciliatory letter to Fairfax brought up by Sir

1. Clar.MSS.29, f.229v: Intelligence from London, 31 May 1647.
2. L.J.9, p.239: Stamford, Suffolk, Lincoln, Middlesex, Willoughby and Maynard.

Philip Stapleton. An interesting indication of the looser relations between Holles and the Upper House after Essex's death is possibly afforded by the fact that the two 'presbyterian' peers, Willoughby and Hunsdon, dissented from the letter to Fairfax which represented a modification of tactics on the part of their allies in the Lower House.[1]

'Presbyterian' Military Resources

Of greater significance for the events of June and July 1647 was the growing reliance of Holles upon the various military forces that lay at hand in and around the City. He seriously envisaged a military conflict with the army, and it will be a main purpose of this chapter to investigate his military contacts and preparations. In general this will involve reference to three sources of military support: the reformadoes in London, his allies in the armies of Sir Thomas Fairfax and Colonel General Poyntz, and the City Militia. I shall need to devote some space to outlining developments within these three areas of 'presbyterian' military influence before mid-1647.

1. The Reformadoes

We have already recognised the envy and political rancour that accompanied the formation of the New Model in early 1645, and we are told that prominent amongst those who supported the report upon disbanding Fairfax's Foot Regiment

1. Another indication of this looser connection is afforded by the unsuccessful attempts to secure the Earl of Holland's re-entry into the House of Lords in early 1647, v. supra, pp.344-5.

at the end of May 1647, were many who had been excluded from the army by the Self-denying Ordinance.[1] The tendency of reformado officers to congregate in London to press their claims for the payment of their arrears is well documented, and the 'presbyterian' leaders sought to utilise this military reservoir in creating a viable counter-weight to Fairfax's army.

Although Colonel William Strode's estimate in February that the 'presbyterian' group could rely upon an army of 40,000 in and about London was an exaggeration, it probably provides a general indication of the significance of the reformadoes in Holles's calculations.[2] Apart from their military potential they were also a useful weapon for pressurising the parliament to adopt 'presbyterian' measures. In January 1647 many of Colonel Massey's reformadoes thronged into Westminster Hall and acted insolently towards certain members - the fact that Lord Wharton was particularised as a recipient of such abuse would indicate that the soldiers were acting in a politically selective manner.[3]

The petition presented by several reformado Colonels and Lieutenant Colonels to both Houses on the 22 March is

1. Whitelocke, Memorials, p.252.
2. Hist.MSS.Comm., 13th Report, part 1 (Portland MSS), p.447.
3. Clar.MSS.29, f.72v: Intelligence from London, 18/28 Jan.1646/7.

significant on several counts. We shall discover some of the signatories at a later date involved in various aspects of the 'presbyterian' strategy which, together with the content of their petition, with its call for the establishment of church government, the abolition of County Committees, and for their employment in the Irish service, suggests a very close political connection with Holles's group at Westminster.[1] The presence of a few London citizens amongst the signatories reminds us of the many who had served under the Earl of Essex and Sir William Waller, and opens the probability of contact between the reformadoes and the City Militia during the crises of mid-1647. For instance, Lieutenant Colonel Jeremy Baines of Southwark was an active participant in the presbyterian church system in London,[2] Indeed the minutes of the Provincial Assembly shed light upon his political commitment to Holles's group, for we find after the crisis of August, that the 10th Classis delegated a Joseph Collier to replace Baines because of the latter's imprisonment.[3] Another signatory of the petition of the 22 March, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Caryll presumably can be identified with the Thomas Caryll, who with several others was to be indicted of

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1. L.J.9, pp.93, 95-6; Addit.MSS.31116, f.305v.
2. Sion College MSS. Aec.L40.2/E 17, f.4v. v. Baines's attempt in Dec.1646 to acquire an able minister for a Westmoreland village: Hist.MSS.Comm., 7th Report, part 1 (MSS. of Rev.Webb, 1879), p.687.
3. Aec.L40.2/E 17, f.7.

High Treason by the House of Commons on the 25 September.[1]

The part played by Sir Philip Stapleton and Sir Samuel Luke in April and May in furthering the claims of reformadoes before the House raises the possibility of 'presbyterian' scheming.[2] Ludlow's contention is probably correct that this group encouraged the reduced officers to press for their arrears in order to provide them with funds for military preparations.[3] That the 'presbyterian' leaders were thinking along those lines is indicated by Holles, who maintained, after the disturbing developments at the beginning of June, that the two Houses could have adopted a firmer stance towards the army since they had a stock of £200,000, and many cashiered officers and soldiers in London.[4]

2. The Standing Armies

Next I need to look at the influence exercised by the 'presbyterian' leaders in the standing armies of Fairfax and Pointz. Where the former is concerned, I can best do this by adhering to the chronology of Holles's attempts to secure its disbandment or employment in Ireland. The guarding of Charles and the commissioners was entrusted to Colonel Richard Graves, an officer who had formerly commanded the Earl of Essex's own regiment of Horse,[5] and a letter from

1. C.J.V, p.317.
2. Ibid., pp.138, 173.
3. Ludlow, Memoirs, I, 146-7.
4. Holles, Memoirs, p.106.
5. Graves Memoirs of the Civil War, ed. F.A.Bates (London & Edinburgh, 1927), p.12.

him to Sir Philip Stapleton in June indicates that his appointment to this crucial post could have been no mere accident. After reporting upon the fate of his regiment, he added in a postscript, 'I beseech you p[re]sent mee in my reall honoring of Mr Hollis & Sr Will Lewis'.[1] Another officer who shared the responsibilities of Greaves's mission was Colonel Sir Robert Pye, son of the 'presbyterian' member of the same name, and he also was to be an important figure in the plans of Holles.

There were other officers who were either members of the Lower House or near relatives of members, who appear to have opposed the activities of the army radicals up to mid-1647. Ludlow couples Colonel Francis Russell, the recruiter member for Cambridgeshire, with Colonel Sir Robert Pye as officers who were converted by the presence of the king.[2] Colonel Edward Harley, recruiter member for Herefordshire, was the son of another 'presbyterian' member, Sir Robert Harley and the brother of yet another recruiter member, Robert Harley. He was also a close friend of Colonel Massey, a leading force in the military preparations of the 'presbyterian' group in London. We have already seen Colonel Rossiter providing information concerning the army petition. Colonel

1. Tanner MSS.58(1), f.141: Graves to Stapleton, n.d.
2. Ludlow, Memoirs, i, 151.

Charles Doyley, the 'presbyterian' choice for the governorship of Bristol, was the brother of John Doyley, the recruiter member for Oxford and a supporter of Holles.[1] Another 'presbyterian' officer was Captain Francis Dormer, who was probably the brother of John Dormer, the recruiter member for Buckingham.[2]

When Sir William Waller and Sir John Clotworthy were sent to Saffron Walden in March they used the opportunity to discover those officers who accepted the votes of the parliament. These '17 undertakers' were regarded with considerable suspicion by the army radicals. 'All our friends here think these 17 undertakers will prove very knaves in their designs....'. Worthy of special mention by this correspondent were Colonel Fortescue, Colonel Harley, ~~xxxxxxxxxxx~~ Colonel Sheffield, Sir Robert Pye, Lieutenant Colonel Jackson and Quarter-Master General Fincher.[3] In particular, Colonel Sheffield appears to have been quick off the mark in attending the Committee at Derby House to offer his regiment and himself for the Irish service.[4]

The distrust and ill-feeling within the army of Sir Thomas Fairfax, revealed by the activities of the two

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1. e.g. C.J.V, pp.115, 128, 211. v. supra, p. 367.
2. G.Lipscombe, The History and Antiquities of the County of Buckingham (London, 1847), I, 119.
3. Clarke Papers, i, p.1-2. Harley incorrectly spelt Harvey.
4. C.J.V, p.140.

'presbyterian' commissioners had in fact a longer history. It is interesting to find that in his list of commanders who suffered affronts for opposing Independency, Thomas Edwards mentions Major Fincher and Lieutenant Colonel Jackson, together with two other officers who were to figure in 'presbyterian' plans: Adjutant General Gray and Lieutenant Colonel Kempson.[1] The employment of the Irish issue as a divisive factor within the army had a dual purpose: to provide the 'presbyterian' group with a military force of their own, and to divide the counsels of the army. I have already mentioned the significance of the vote for drawing off from the rest of the army those forces that had accepted the Irish service.[2] The implementation of this vote was under way by the 26 April when the commissioners attending the army delivered a list of officers who had engaged for Ireland.[3]

This list indicates that in the Horse Regiments the 'presbyterians' gained only a slight response, apart from Colonel Sheffield's regiment, where the Colonel himself headed the list of 10 officers who subscribed. Judging from the commissioners' information, none of the Horse had been drawn off at that time - a sad omen for the future

1. Edwards, Gangraena, iii, 273.
2. v. supra, p.374.
3. Rushworth, Hist.Collections, vii, 465-7.

effectiveness of 'presbyterian' military opposition to the army. The votes of the parliament received a readier acceptance amongst the less politically motivated Foot Regiments, the most heavily subscribed being those of Sir Thomas Fairfax, Colonel Hammond, Colonel Sir Hardress Waller, Colonel Fortescue, Colonel Lilburne and Colonel Herbert. Where these regiments were concerned, the 'presbyterian' commissioners appear to have had more success in organising the withdrawal of particular elements. According to their estimate, more than 1,500 soldiers were on their march into Worcestershire, whilst a company under Ghara was quartered in the counties of Northampton and Bedford, presumably as a covering force against the rest of the army. The probability that many of the officers who accompanied these forces were aware of the real purpose of their withdrawal ffom the army has already been noted.[1]

By the latter half of May 1647 relations between the officers had become so strained that conflicting information upon the army's grievances was given to Field Marshal Skippon from the Foot Regiment of Sir Thomas Fairfax, and the Horse Regiments of Colonels Sheffield and Graves. The ensuing acrimonious debate almost resulted in Colonel Sheffield and Colonel Whalley challenging each other.[2] A more impressive

1. Supra., p.375.
2. Clarke Papers, i, pp.80-2; E 390 (7): Perfect Occurrences, no.21, p.135.

indication of the divided character of the army was provided on the 23 May, when 115 officers presented a petition to the General, vindicating the authority of the parliament and expressing their belief that the army ought to defend, not direct, the proceedings of the authority that had raised them.[1] Significantly, Whitelocke later described this petition as having been subscribed by Colonel Sir Robert Pye, Graves, Sheffield, Butler, Fortescue, '& others of Hollis his party'.[2]

Holles now moved to secure the passage of the votes for disbanding the army regiment by regiment so as to avoid the dangers of a general rendezvous, but when they were read at the headquarters on the 29 May only four officers of the General's Foot Regiment expressed their satisfaction, one of whom was Lieutenant Colonel Jackson.[3] The Leveller leaders were sufficiently apprehensive of the loyalties of Fairfax's Foot Regiment to take precautions to prevent the commissioners meeting it at Chelmsford, and to evict Lieutenant Colonel Jackson and the other officers of that regiment who supported the Irish service.[4] As we have seen, these precautions succeeded in their object, and by the 4 June Jackson and his loyal officers were in London.[5] This Leveller

1. Brit.Mus., 669.f.11 (15): 'A Petition of divers Officers'.
2. Whitelocke, Memorials, p.252.
3. Clarke Papers, I, p.111
4. Ibid., p.106.
5. Clarke MSS., MSS.110, f.96: Derby House Committee to Fairfax, 4 June 1647.

activity was also operating on a broader scale to eliminate 'presbyterian' influence within the army - soldiers were petitioning to cast out the dissenting officers, and threatening to do it themselves. Indeed by the end of May they had already dismounted those of Colonel Sheffield's regiment, while Sir Robert Pye's attempt to force back his soldiers to their obedience with drawn sword failed ignominiously. More significantly, the same intelligencer wrote that Colonel Greaves's dragoons at Holdenby had engaged with the army, a statement that was amply verified during the first week of June.[1]

The failure to disband the General's Foot Regiment, and the seizure of the king by Cornet Joyce clearly revealed the futility of the design to promote division within the army. The few remaining 'presbyterian' officers were deprived of their influence and the polarisation of the divergent elements in the army that had begun with the drawing off of the forces designed for Ireland, was now finalised and the Committee at Derby House prepared for the approaching conflict.

There was still one standing army which the 'presbyterian' group viewed as an essential ingredient in those preparations: the army of the Northern Association, commanded by Colonel General Sydenham Pointz. We have already

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1. Clarke Papers, i, p.113.

noted the votes of the 29 March rendering the regiments of Colonels Pointz, Bethel and Copley part of the 5,400 Horse to be kept up in England. With the final defeat of Holles's attempt to eliminate Fairfax's army, the importance of the northern army in his plans was heightened. The fact was also recognised by the Levellers and it can be no mere coincidence that their successful attempts to spread disaffection amongst Pointz's forces should have begun with the regiment of Colonel Lionel Copley,[1] erstwhile Commissary General of the army under the Earl of Essex, xxx the unsuccessful opponent of the Fairfax candidate for the recruiter place at Pontefract where he enjoyed the support of Points,[2] and an intimate of the 'presbyterian' leaders, particularly Sir Philip Stapleton, influential amongst the northern forces and the ex-officers of the Earl of Essex.[3]

3. The City Militia

Finally I must describe briefly the military developments that had taken place in the City by June 1647. The new Militia Committee came to represent the real strength of the 'presbyterian' element within the City government, and

1. Memorials of the Great Civil War, 1642-52, ed.H.Cary (London, 1842), i, pp.233-6.
2. Bell, Memorials, i, pp.318-9.
3. The military significance of contacts between Stapleton and Pointz was emphasised in the articles presented against the latter: Clarke Papers, i, pp.166, 169.

it also provided Holles with a support that remained remarkably firm despite the increasingly moderate temper of the Common Council during June.

From a military point of view this important development within the City had had a late start, and so the Militia Committee had to work fast. Hence we learn towards the end of May that it had been sitting almost every day, commissioning officers.[1] A newsletter of the 3 June reveals the political character of this activity, stating that the Committee had voted all the 'Godly party' out of the Commission of the trained band, and had also radically remodelled the Guards of the City.[2] On the 5th we find the Committee sitting 'very close' upon the military affairs of the City.[3]

This political and military activity within the City still had strong overtones of religious controversy. Thus on the 2 June William Levett was appointed Lieutenant Colonel of the Red Regiment of the Tower Hamlets under Colonel William Chapman.[4] His appointment probably owed much to the fact that Levett was a leading parishioner of St. Botolph, Aldgate, and had marked presbyterian inclinations, as

1. E 390 (7): Perfect Occurrences, no.21, p.135.
2. Clarke Papers, i, p.118.
3. Rushworth, Hist.Collections, vii, 504.
4. Brit.Mus.Addit.MSS. 19399 (Royal & Noble Autographs), f.23: Commission to Levett from the Militia Committee, 2 June 1647.

evidenced by his appointment as one of the delegates for the Provincial Assembly in 1648.[1] Again, in an information of early July concerning the abuses committed by the Militia Committee, it was claimed that as early as the beginning of May officers were being appointed to 'fight against all malignants, sects & sectaries & all Godly persons that shall come to oppose the City'. Even Alderman William Gibbs was involved in the re-modelling of the Militia at this early stage. The same source reveals that a Lieutenant Colonel Shambrook was put out of his command towards the end of June for belonging to a particular congregation, as were a Captain Wilkes and a Lieutenant Curtis, the Committee asserting that they would have none of that judgment in command. The sub-committee for the Militia of Southwark was also purged on the same grounds as probably was that of the Tower Hamlets. Incidentally, the same document indicates that the Militia Committee was not averse to using officers from the army to strengthen the City's forces, such as Captain Wayne, one of the signatories of the petition of the 23 May to Sir Thomas Fairfax.[2] The army was well aware of the religious presbyterian sympathies of many in the City, and of the advantage it gave to their political opponents at

1. Guildhall, MSS.9234/8 (St.Botolph Aldgate: Parish Clerks Memoranda 1616-25, Vestry Minutes & Orders 1642-71), e.g. ff.272, 292; Aec.L40.2, f.16v.
   E 17
2. Clarke Papers, 1, pp.152-6.

Westminster. Hence the care of the Council of War and others to disclaim any intention of hindering the settlement of a presbyterian system or of enforcing an independent one.[1]

The Crisis of June

The task of utilising the sizeable reservoir of reformado strength was now seriously taken in hand. In response to a reformado petition of the 4th June the Lower House established machinery that was ostensibly designed to facilitate the payment of £10,000 to them but, in fact, provided the 'presbyterians' with a means of enlisting them for service against the army. Auditor Broad, Auditor Wilcox and Commissary Dudenny were appointed to sit at Christ Church and there to list and state the accounts of all private soldiers within the Lines of Communication, who had served in the armies of the Earl of Essex, Sir William Waller, Lieutenant General Massey and Major General Browne.[2] At the same time financial arrangements were made to secure the payment of those forces that had withdrawn from the army. The treasurers of the army were subordinated to the Derby House Committee and the treasurers at Weavers' Hall.[3]

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1. F.2.63.Linc.(23): 'A Letter sent from His Excellency..... to ... the City of London' (1647), p.4; F.2.63.Linc.(25): 'A Declaration or Representation from His Excellency....' (1647), pp.12-3; Bodl., Godw.Pamph. 682 (11): J.Saltmarsh, 'A Letter from the Army' (1647), p.3.
2. Malachi Dudenny had served under Sir William Waller as Commissary, whilst Henry Broad and Richard Wilcox had been Auditors for Essex's army, Cal.S.P.Dom., 1644, p.289; 1644-1645, pp.168-70.
3. C.J.V, pp.195, 197.

Three days later the reformadoes were back at the doors of the House of Commons and virtually forced it to vote a further £10,000, with the House adding the proviso that they should list themselves at Christ Church before 10 a.m. on the following Friday.[1] The same day saw Massey and Sir William Waller presenting petitions and lists of reformadoes for the consideration of the House. The increased sense of urgency apparent in this activity probably reflected the ominous actions of the army - on the 5 June the House heard of the king's removal from Holdenby,[2] whilst the same day witnessed the Solemn Engagement of the Army at Newmarket. Matters now rapidly moved towards the first climax in the military trial of strength between the 'presbyterian' leaders and the army.

In contrast to this determined action on the part of Denzil Holles and his adherents, the general temper of the Lower House and Common Council was uncertain and vacillating. At Westminster moderate members were confronted by the rude addresses and actions of the reformadoes, the obvious threat posed by the army, the propaganda of both factions, and by

1. Rushworth, Hist.Collections, vii, 548; Whitelocke, Memorials, pp.254-5.
2. This news was confirmed by the Earl of Dunfermline: Bodl. MSS.Dep.c.157 (Nalson MSS.), ff.93-4: Dunfermline to Lenthall, 5 June 1647.

conventional political and constitutional attitudes. The relative strengths of these factors depended very much upon changing circumstances. With the failure of the army to disband, the initial response of the House had been one of conciliation, backed by military preparation at London. Hence the curious mixture of apparently 'presbyterian' and 'independent' measures that lie cheek by jowl in the Journal Book.[1]

So strong was the pull of concern for constitutional regularity in the case of Sir John Evelyn of Wilts that we find him acting alongside 'presbyterian' grandees in opposition to the army's actions. On the 5th he was named to the committee to prepare the letter to the General, alongside the 'presbyterian' leaders Sir William Lewis, Recorder Glyn and Sir Philip Stapleton. Two days later Sir Henry Vane, jnr., was added to this committee to draw up letters to the General and the commissioners. The 8th saw a confrontation between the erstwhile allies, Sir Arthur Haselrig and Sir John Evelyn, when they acted as opposing tellers in a vote as to whether the House should give any further answer to the particulars in the summary from the army, than the amended Declaration repealing that of March.

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1. *e.g.*, C.J.V, pp.198, 200, 201.

Sir John Evelyn was teller with Sir William Lewis for the Noes, who gained a majority of one voice.[1] It would seem that not all the middle group leaders were able to overcome their scruples at this stage of the conflict, yet it would be mistaken to maintain that Evelyn had thrown in his lot with Holles's party, for over the issue of bringing the king towards London he opposed the 'presbyterian' group.[2]

In the City the contrast between the Common Council and the Militia Committee was as marked as that between the two Houses and the Committee at Derby House. One of the rare displays of purposefulness on the part of the Common Council occurred on the 3 June, and was far from encouraging for Holles and his colleagues. In response to news from Holdenby it resolved unanimously that it would have no more war,[3] and the failure of the 'presbyterians' at Westminster to gauge the strength of this commitment played a major part in rendering their strategy futile.

For a time the Militia Committee continued to guide the deliberations of the Common Council. On the 5 June the latter accepted its recommendations to replace Colonel Randall Mainwaring with Colonel William Webb, as an Adjutant for ordering the trained bands and auxiliaries.[4] Three days

1. Ibid., p.202.
2. Ibid., p.203.
3. Clar.MSS.29, f.235: Intelligence, 8 June 1647.
4. J.Co.Co.40, f.218.

later the Common Council accepted a petition from the Committee which was presented to the House of Commons the same day, and to the Upper House on the 10th. In that this petition reflected the same concern as that displayed by Holles at Westminster to placate the rank-and-file of the army while furthering military preparations, it is possible that it was, in fact, devised by the 'presbyterian' leaders.[1] On the one hand it desired the giving of all just satisfaction to the army and all other soldiers, and on the other hand pressing for the disposing of the king so as to enable the joint addresses of both kingdoms to be presented to him. More significantly, it also pressed for the renewal of part of an earlier ordinance that empowered the Militia Committee to raise Horse and make searches. The petitioners sought to justify these demands by referring to the danger of tumults to the City and the parliament;[2] but if the account of a royalist letter writer is true, the 'presbyterian' leaders were instrumental in creating such tumults, for he maintained that on the 6 June Colonel Massey proceeded through the City exhorting the citizens to defend themselves against the 'Mad Men in the Army', claiming that Cromwell had betrayed them all, and had fled from London without leave.[3]

1. Clar.MSS.29, f.240: Intelligence from London, 10 June 1647.
2. J.Co.Co.40, f.218v.
3. Clar.MSS. 29, f.236: Intelligence from London, 7 June 1647.

This activity was supplemented by the orders of the Committee at Derby House. On the 5th a solidly 'presbyterian' Committee voted a month's pay for the forces engaged for Ireland, as well as sums to the soldiers of Colonel Graves and Lieutenant Colonel Jackson.[1] The records of the Committee at Derby House shed further light upon Holles's military preparations - on the 6 June the Committee gave orders for Colonel Graves's troopers to be quartered at Islington and Highgate, those of Colonel Sir Robert Pye at Mile End, Whitechapel, Stepney and Hackney, and those of Lieutenant Colonel Jackson at Putney and Mortlake. In addition, the regiments of the army that had been withdrawn into Worcestershire were now ordered to march to Reading, ostensibly to be paid more conveniently. In its charge against the 11 members, the army maintained that the latter order was first issued on the 1 June by the 'presbyterian' leaders with intent to begin a new war.[2] Despite the denial of Holles and his colleagues that this move had any military intent,[3] there can be little doubt that the various votes of the 6th represented an attempt to concentrate their physical resources in and around London and to provide protection for the City.

1. SP 21/E 26, f.75: Suffolk, Lincoln, Lewis, Stapleton, Gerard and Glyn.
2. 'A Particular Charge or Impeachment', p.17.
3. 'A Full Vindication and Answer of the XI Accused Members', pp.19-20.

The week of the 10-17th witnessed the first climax in Holles's military confrontation with the army. On the 10th, the latter rendezvoued at Triploe Heath, met the commissioners and votes of parliament on the following day with cries for justice and decided upon its march towards London. The adoption of this more aggressive purpose by the army caused consternation both at London and even within the army, for the decisions taken at Triploe Heath probably played a significant part in inducing many of the General's own Lifeguard to withdraw from the army.[1]

The two Houses reacted vigorously to this information - on the 11th both Houses voted that £10,000 be issued by order of the Committee at Derby House and the Committee of the Army jointly to those that should come off from the army. That this vote was another 'presbyterian' attempt to cause the disruption of the army is indicated by a letter from the commissioners with the army, of the 14 June, which related the General's concern at the clandestine dispersal of those votes throughout his regiments.[2] The sense of consternation and crisis that pervaded the Commons was to the advantage of Holles's group, and they lost no time in strengthening it. Thus, on the 11th some of the reformado

1. C.J.V, p.210; L.J.9, p.264.
2. Brit.Mus., Addit.MSS.34253 (Civil War Papers, 1640-47), f.59: Nottingham and Delaware to Manchester, 14 June 1647.

officers who has presented the petition on the 22 March informed the Lower House that Fairfax's Horse would be at London by midday on the 12th.[1]

The response of the members was entirely to the liking of the 'presbyterians' for the Committee of Safety was revived, to join with the Militia Committee for ordering the forces at their disposal for the safety of the parliament and City. Four members were appointed to prepare a letter to the General, for the army to march back at least 40 miles from London, and again Sir John Evelyn of Wilts was found amongst 'presbyterian' members, including Holles. The ordinance enabling the Militia Committee to conduct searches and raise Horse was also passed, although its operation was now limited to one month. By capitalising upon the apprehensions and constitutional susceptibilities of members, Holles had succeeded in restoring the ascendancy of his faction. The Committee of Safety was ordered to confer with the Militia Committee, and to call into the City, if they thought fit, the forces that had come off from the army. Not surprisingly, it was the staunch 'presbyterian', Edward Bainton, who carried up this vote to the Lords.[2]

An even greater sense of urgency was created by the presentation to the two Houses, by Sheriffs Edmonds and

1. Rushworth, Hist.Collections, vii, 553.
2. C.J.V, pp.207-8.

Cullum, of copies of a letter sent to the City governors from the General and his Council of Officers at Royston. The letter vindicated the actions and intentions of the army, condemned the 'few self-seeking men' who were scheming to embroil the kingdom in another war, and warned the City of its likely fate if it should oppose them in their quest for the common good.[1] Holles and Sir William Waller refer to the indignation caused by this letter,[2] and both Houses implemented the desire of the City's representatives for the army to be ordered to remain at a certain distance from London.

In the Lower House Sir Robert Harley had already carried the vote for a Committee of the two Houses to join with the Militia Committee and to meet with it that night, before the delivery of the General's letter to the Common Council. A similar course of action had also been adopted by the Lords, who had accepted an ordinance referring to the Committee at Derby House the task of securing the kingdom, Parliament and the City, with power to raise Horse and Foot, and to consult with the Militia Committee and other Committees. The 'presbyterian' character of this ordinance is revealed by the fact that it was presented by Lord Hundson, and dissented to by the Earl of Denbigh, the Earl of Mulgrave,

1. Abbott, Writings and Speeches, i, 459-61.
2. Holles, Memoirs, p.109; Waller, Vindication, pp.148-9.

Lord Delaware, Lord Grey and Lord Say. In the event, the powers voted in the Lords' ordinance were combined with the Committee voted by the Commons, the composition of which still provided the 'presbyterian' leaders with a convincing majority.[1] It was this Committee that sat in debate with the Militia Committee throughout the night of the 11th/12th,[2] The picture of feverish activity is heightened by the transcript of a pamphlet amongst the Thomason Tracts which indicates that royalist elements were also quick to take advantage of the crisis. The pamphlet called upon 'the renowned Apprentices of this famous City' to rise in the cause of King Charles, and Thomason tells us that copies were scattered in the streets during that night.[3]

An army intelligencer provides us with details of the abortive attempt of the 'presbyterian' leaders at Westminster and in the City to mobilise their forces in response to the threat from the army. Although officers were listed at the Derby House Committee during the 11th and 12th June, the attempt to muster the trained bands on the morning of the 12th failed abysmally. By the end of the day the only result of this 'presbyterian' activity was the setting of stronger guards.[4] In addition, disquieting news was received from the

1. L.J.9, pp.255, 256, 258; C.J.V, p.207.
2. Rushworth, Hist.Collections, vii, 553.
3. E 392 (7): no title.
4. Clarke Papers, i, pp.132-3.

North, the army and the City itself. A letter was presented to the House of Commons that Alderman Adams had received from John Cosens of Newcastle warning of the deportment of the officers there towards the parliament and City in the absence of Skippon. From the army came a letter from the General advising of its march to St. Albans and a letter from the parliamentary commissioners confirming this. It was presumably in connection with the presentation of these letters to the House that Holles accused Robert Scawen of reporting the Triploe Heath rendezvous in a 'ghastly manner only to terrifie us & make us more sup le'. Holles maintained that it caused 'poor Presbyterians hearts' to fall lower, and that the 'Independents make themselves merry with it'.[1] From the City came the Common Council's reply to the General's letter of the 11th, which the Lower House approved to be sent to him.

The manner of its preparation and presentation, together with its contents, illustrate the increasing timidity of the City government in general, and an important change of attitude within the Common Council on the part of moderate members. The Journal of the Common Council first clearly indicates this on the 11 June, for the 12-man committee appointed to deliver Fairfax's letter to the Houses included

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1. Holles, Memoirs, p.108; v. also Bell, Memorials, i, p.355.

no members of the Militia Committee apart from the two Sheriffs who always figured in such deputations.[1] The committee appointed on the following day to advise on the reply and what further action was necessary, did include two Militia committeemen - Alderman Gibbs and Deputy Packe; but they were by this time extremely cool 'presbyterians'.[2] It was this committee that was appointed to convey the reply to the General, and it became the resident representative of the City with the army. As such it also came to rival the influence of the 'presbyterian' Militia Committee by advocating the case for moderation. Thus we find them, by the 14th, impressing upon Fairfax and the parliamentary commissioners at St. Albans their great desires for peace and the unanimous detestation of a new war felt by the Common Council.[3]

The answer to the General's letter was presented to the Lower House by Alderman Foulke, an opponent of the 'presbyterian' group, who had last figured on a Common Council committee of any political significance in September 1646.[4] Holles, in bitterly decrying the 'defection' of the City at this time, particularly mentioned 'some false Brothers in the City, as Alderman Foulks & Alderman Gibbs' who played a

1. J.Co.Co.40, f.219v.
2. Ibid., f.220v.
3. Addit.MSS.34253, ff.59-59v: Nottingham and Delaware to Manchester, 14 June 1647.
4. J.Co.Co.40, f.191v.

part, he claimed, in lulling the citizens into a sense of security.[1] Sir William Waller presumably also had them in mind when he wrote of some of the City's commissioners charming the Common Council and Militia into believing the army was all goodness and integrity, and thereby securing the laying aside of all defensive measures and even the dissolution of the Committee of Safety.[2]

As for the reply itself, the tenor was markedly more conciliatory and moderate than that of the petition of the 8 June. Whilst emphasising the economic reasons for the army not quartering within 30 miles of London, it also emphatically denied any intention of engaging in a new war, and disavowed any raising of forces to hinder the army from obtaining their just demands which, indeed, it maintained they had pressed the parliament to grant.[3] Sir William Waller maintained that the parliament's acceptance of the reply greatly encouraged the 'party of the Army' and cooled the ardour of those best affected to the service.[4] The two Houses also sent instructions to their commissioners to 'endeavour to know fully the particulars which the army would insist upon for their satisfaction. Since it was Sir Robert Pye who carried up the instruction to the Lords, and Sir

1. Holles, Memoirs, p.110.
2. Waller, Vindication, p.162.
3. J.Co.Co.40, ff.221-221v.
4. Waller, Vindication, pp.151-3.

Walter Erle the vote for appointing two more commissioners, it is possible that the 'presbyterian' leaders recognised the need to comply with the more moderate mood of the Commons for the time being.

The 14 June was a minor watershed in the relative influence of the two political groups at Westminster. The assembling of reformadoes near the parliament with the intention of pressing the Houses for their arrears, aroused a determined response from the Commons. Orders were issued for the immediate attendance of elements of the trained bands, and a committee was appointed to convey the displeasure of the House to the reformadoes. In addition, the Lower House appointed another committee to prepare a declaration of their measures for the satisfaction of the soldiery and prohibited all assemblies upon pain of death. The six members appointed had a decidedly 'independent' bias - Oliver St. John and Nathaniel Fiennes reappeared after prolonged absences from the Journal. On the same day the Lords sent down a vote for a committee to be appointed from both Houses to prepare a declaration to clear the parliament's proceedings and intentions for the ease of the subject, satisfaction of the army and the peace and safety of the kingdom. Again the composition of the resultant committee reveals a significant revival of 'independent' participation in both Houses. Thus

the monopoly of important committees by the 'presbyterian' leaders was challenged, with the involvement of men like St. John, Fiennes, Sir Arthur Haselrig and Samuel Browne.

Yet it would be premature to read into these votes the restoration of 'independent' fortunes at Westminster, for although the response of the Commons to the threat of the reformadoes had been determined, it had not been effective. Significantly it was Holles and Sir Philip Stapleton, with others, who were first sent out to appease them with a promise of a further £10,000 which quietened the tumult. But this was followed by a more threatening assembly of soldiers who abused members and threatened to cut some in pieces, and 'by name Sir H.Vane jnr.'.[1] In response to this force, the Commons adopted a more conciliatory tone to the petition of the reformado officers, sent down by the Lords, and as formerly, sent out 'presbyterian' members to inform the petitioners of the votes of the House.[2]

For a brief period the 'independents' who had braved the wrath of the reformadoes, held their own in a debate upon appointing a fit place for the king to be brought to receive the joint applications of the two kingdoms. On the 20 May the Lords had first voted the removal of the king to

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1. Clarke Papers, 1, p.136.
2. C.J.V, p.210.

Oatlands, and on the 6 June the matter had been revived in response to the representations of the Scots Commissioners about the army's seizure of Charles.[1] The 'presbyterians' had urged that the king should be brought towards London, maintaining that he feared the designs of the 'independents', but they had been defeated in a division.[2] Now, on the 14th, they again sought to regain their control of the king, and in the ensuing debate the leading figures of both factions argued their cases - Sir Philip Stapleton pressed for the king to be brought to the south side of the Thames, and was supported by Holles and Sir William Lewis, while opposition was voiced by the Solicitor, Nathaniel Fiennes, and finally Sir Arthur Haselrig who spoiled the 'presbyterian' game and secured an adjournment of the debate.[3] Presumably the royalist intelligencer was mistaken who wrote of a vote passing that the king was at liberty and could come to any of his houses, and that they who detained him were enemies to the state;[4] but it is possible that these were the sentiments expressed in the debate by the 'presbyterian' leaders. This success of the 'independents' was only temporary, for on the following day Sir Philip Stapleton's design was adopted in the votes of the Houses for the conveying

1. L.J.9, pp.243, 244.
2. Clar.MSS.29, f.240: Intelligence from London, 10 June 1647; C.J.V, p.203.
3. Clarke Papers, i, p.135.
4. Clar.MSS.29, f.241: Intelligence from London, 14 June 1647.

of Charles to Richmond under the supervision of the original commissioners and the guard of Colonel Rossiter's regiment.

The granting of more monies to the reformadoes on the 14th can be regarded as one aspect of the continuing military activity of Holles and his group. Other aspects were also evident, for on the 15th they took steps to improve their serious shortage of Horse and to strengthen their financial position. The following day saw a comprehensive move to implement the previous ordinances for the payment of reformadoes in and around the City. It is instructive to note that of the eight reformado officers appointed to supervise the payments at Christ Church, five had signed the petition of the 22 March.[1]

Despite these indications of continuing 'presbyterian' ascendancy the two props of their position, the two Houses and the Common Council, remained insecure under the gaze of the army now at St. Albans. In fact this threat came considerably closer on the 15th when the army's concern at the continued levying of soldiers in London was conveyed by the commissioners of the parliament and City to their respective principals.[2] Indeed, the parliamentary commissioners stated their fear that failure to give immediate

1. C.J.V, pp.212-3. On the 15 June Rushworth wrote of Stapleton and Holles courting the reformadoes to lay a foundation for an army: Bell, Memorials, i, p.357.
2. L.J.9, p.266; J.Co.Co.40, f.222.

satisfaction would result in the army marching towards London. Accompanying their letter was a Representation of the Army which heralded the incursion of the soldiery into constitutional matters. It proposed the purging of the parliament, the choosing of a new House of Commons and the disabling of those who had acted unjustly towards the army.[1] The Commons replied that they would consider it when the whole matter was before them, but it is noticeable that the committee appointed to prepare the reply was not 'presbyterian' in composition. It would appear that the advantage was again swinging towards the opponents of Holles, although the sense of insecurity and vulnerability felt by the 'independent' members at Westminster was revealed by an order that the City Militia be desired to send 4 companies to guard the parliament by 7 a.m. the following morning.[2]

Holles's preparations received a more serious blow from the reaction of the Common Council to the news from the headquarters. It is clear that with the continuing threat from St. Albans, the Militia Committee came to be overshadowed by the Committee attending the army. On the 15th the Common Council appointed the latter to draw up their

1. F.2.63.Linc. (25): 'A Declaration or Representation from His Excellency.....'. pp.5-6, 10.
2. C.J.V, p.212: the committee consisted of Whitelocke, Evelyn, Allen and Samuel Browne.

reply complying with the demand of the army that no forces should be listed within the City, except the regular trained bands and auxiliaries.[1] The new committee went even further, for on the 16th when Alderman Foulke presented copies of letters from the army, he also expressed the dissatisfaction of the Common Council at a warrant issued by the clerk of the Militia Committee at the height of the 'presbyterian' military activity on the morning of the 12 June. The warrant had been issued upon votes of the joint Committee of Safety and Militia Committee, for the raising and listing of forces under Colonel Dalbier, Sir Thomas Cooke, Colonel Sanderson, Colonel Wiltshire and Colonel Midhope.

Foulke's information that the Militia Committee had already annulled that order, and his delivery of an Act of Common Council for stopping the listing of soldiers and discharging those already raised, had an immediate impact upon the House of Commons.[2] It ordered the annulment of the order of the 12 June and also of the orders made by the Committee of Safety for listing and drawing together any forces of the counties. Further the House endorsed the proceedings of the Common Council and its commissioners, and gave leave to the City to send letters to the army, provided

1. J.Co.Co.40, f.222.
2. It is difficult to accept S.R. Gardiner's point that municipal jealousy played a part in this action by the Common Council: Great Civil War, iii, 298.

they received the prior approval of the Commons. Another indication of the altered mood of the Lower House was the defeat of Holles and Sir Philip Stapleton over a motion for paying a month's pay to the army.[1] Finally the charges in the Representation from the army received definition in papers forwarded by the commissioners, which levelled accusations against 11 members of the House of Commons,'the principle men of the Presbyterian faction'.[2]

It is probable that this direct political assault by the army upon their leading opponents in the Lower House, with its obvious constitutional significance touched many of the members on a sensitive spot. The 17th saw the House agree to the request of the Scots Commissioners for a pass to attend the king, to an order for sending to Colonel Rossiter the votes for the king's coming to Richmond and to an adjournment of the debate upon the army's charge, with clear indications of concern for constitutional propriety. Sir Walter Erle carried up a vote for the withdrawal of the army to at least 40 miles from London, together with a more forceful letter to the General. Lastly the Commons also amended and passed an ordinance for the indemnity of those soldiers who had come off from the army, which the Lords had passed on the 16th.[3]

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1. C.J.V, p.214.
2. Tower Letter Book of Dyves, p.60.
3. C.J.V, p.215; L.J.9, p.269.

The 'presbyterians' sought to maintain this mood at Westminster with the relation by a Mr. Reymes concerning recent discussions that he had had with the king. He had first reported this to the Militia Committee and by their order, now presented it to the Lords on the 17th. It is no surprise to find that his means of access to the king had been Major General Browne, one of the parliamentary commissioners and a member who was now acting for the king.[1] It would seem that Charles had asserted his unwillingness to comply with the army's proceedings and Browne had desired him to warn the parliament and City of how much the army was animated with hopes of spoil, and enraged with hatred to the parliament. The king was probably seeking to effect his conveyance to London and the re-opening of negotiations with Westminster -

> 'therefore tell all those whom you thinke fit Communicants of this businesse that I desire nothing more passionately, then to be with my Parliament'.[2]

No doubt the 'presbyterians' were in accord with these desires, but they probably also sought to counter by means of this information the reports of the City's commissioners

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1. Barwick, Life of Barwick, p.79.
2. E 392 (31): 'A Narration of Severall Passages....', p.5. The visit of Colonel Reymes to Charles at Newmarket, and the use made of his relation by the 'presbyterians', evidences contacts between certain royalists and Holles's group: H.A. Kaufman, Conscientious Cavalier (London, 1962), p.162-4.

with the army which were weakening the resolve of the citizens to oppose it.

The halt of the army at St. Albans had provided Holles and his colleagues with an opportunity to recover their composure after the crises of the first two weeks of June. Although we have caught glimpses of a possible revival of 'independent' strength, they were still suffering from the intimidation of the reformadoes and citizens, and by the 18th the 'presbyterian' group at Westminster appears to have reconsolidated its hold. In the City fear of the army had weakened 'presbyterian' influence in the Common Council, but the Militia Committee continued to operate as the strong-point of their activity. This fact was not lost on the Council of War which, on the 17th voted for the resumption of the army's advance towards London, and for its insistence upon three demands: the suspension of the 11 members, trial by a Council of War of those who had deserted the army, and the replacing of the present Militia Committee of the City.

In the City the 'presbyterian' financial machinery was strengthened and extended. On the 18th two of the original treasurers for paying reformado officers, who had stayed at their posts, were afforced by two more citizens and their

treasury was situated at the Guildhall. The treasury at Christ Church was now placed in the hands of four new treasurers, Colonel Thomas Gower, Anthony Bickerstaffe, James Story and Maximilian Beard. Of these eight treasurers, four and possibly five figure as delegates of Classes at the Provincial Assembly in the period up to 1650 [William Greenhill, Colonel Gower, Anthony Bickerstaffe, who was also a signatory of the City presbyterian petition of November 1645, and James Story. It is also possible that Mr. Blackwell, the treasurer, was the Thomas Blackwell of the 5th Classis].[1] Colonel Gower was also an influential citizen in the military field and figured in 'presbyterian' activity during the crises of late May and early August 1647.[2] Maximilian Beard might well have been the 'Berd' referred to by an army intelligencer as a leading actor in pressurising the Common Council during July.[3]

The conciliatory tone of the Common Council itself was something of a contrast. On the 17 June, after Alderman Foulke had reported the answers of the two Houses to its votes upon the desires of Sir Thomas Fairfax, the Common Council appointed the new committee to move the House to

1. Aec.L40.2, ff.3v. 4, 9,16,17,21,25v,26,101,101v,105v.
   E 17
2. P.R.O., SP.28/237 (Commonwealth and Exchequer Papers), ff.23,46.
3. Supra., p.333.

consider the immediate removal of those reformadoes and soldiers that remained unpaid to their own counties.[1] Again it was Foulke who presented this motion to the Commons on the 18th, with a letter to the General for the approval of the House. It would seem that the letter was obstructed by the opponents of the army,[2] and consequently it was amended and presented again on the following day, together with a further motion for the discharging of any soldiers listed upon the votes of the Committee of Safety and the Militia Committee.

This pressure from the Common Council almost succeeded, for the 'presbyterians' only managed to defeat it by four voices, two of which were cast after Mr. Bulkeley and Mr. Maynard had attempted to avoid doing so.[3] This is an indication of the growing predicament of moderate members - Bulkeley had opposed the motion for bringing the king to Oatlands, and had favoured providing a month's pay for the army and yet he was also obviously concerned at the physical and constitutional threat posed by that force although preferring to conceal it. Although Foulke failed in both Houses to secure the removal of the reformadoes, he did secure the important concession that letters from the City

1. J.Co.Co.40, f.224.
2. Ibid., f.225.
3. C.J.V, pp.216, 217.

to the army no longer needed the approval of the Houses.

Having beaten off this assault on their military resources, the 'presbyterian' leaders proceeded to strengthen them by enlisting more reformadoes and voting pay to others. Thus on the 20th the Committee at Derby House issued an order for the payment of £3,063.18.0. to certain soldiers 'come off the army'.[1] But the ever-present spectre of the army at St. Albans continued to hamper Holles. On the 21 June the Representation of the Army was again debated, resulting in the re-emergence of a vote of the 10th, which no doubt Holles and his adherents had tried quietly to smother. This was the vote against any person presuming to sit in the House who had fought or acted against the parliament. The concern of the 'independents' with the dubious political position of recently elected recruiter members, particularly those from Wales and the West Country,[2] found expression both in the House of Commons and in the demands of the army. In the debate on the 21st it was presumably the 'presbyterian' group that censured the Parliament for their 'low votes' and resolution to comply with a mutinous army; but those who counselled prudence[3] secured the appointment of a committee for preparing a declaration of the proceedings of the House in the matter of

1. Cal.S.P.Dom., 1625-49, p.710.
2. v. Appendix for a brief discussion of the recruiter elections.
3. Whitelocke, Memorials, p.258.

elections and a vote for the consideration of all informations on the 25 June.

The army itself was not disposed to stand idly by whilst its opponents strengthened their position in and around the City. The Lords received from the Committee of the Admiralty papers concerning an unsuccessful approach by army officers to Trinity House soliciting its support against the parliament. There was also a disconcerting drift of soldiers, who had accepted the Irish service, back to the army,[1] and on the 21st a vote was passed forbidding this without due authority, in which particular mention was made of Sir Robert Pye's troop. We are also informed that by this time the army had taken possession of all places of access around London.[2] Printed propaganda was another weapon used by the army radicals in the war of nerves within the City. For instance on the 21st appeared 'The Last Newes from the Armie....', which on the one hand emphasised the peaceful desires of the soldiers but on the other confronted the citizens with what was claimed to be the statistical facts of the situation: that they were faced by over 20,000 soldiers to whom the train of artillery had just been added. Finally to heighten the impact of this warning, the author

1. Godw.Pamph. 682 (13): T.Michel, 'The Last Newes from the Armie', p.4; L.J.9, p.286.
2. Clar.MSS.29, f.246: Intelligence from London, 21 June 1647.

cast doubt upon the constancy of the 'presbyterian' leaders.[1]

The 22 June brought information from Pointz of the subversive activity of radicals from the southern forces amongst his soldiers.[2] The Commons reacted energetically, voting £10,000 from Weavers' Hall, and the like terms upon their disbandment or engaging for Ireland as had been voted for the southern army. Pointz was also authorised to keep quiet those regiments formerly under his command, and to apprehend disturbers of those forces.

The pressures experienced by moderate members are expressed in the draft of a letter, written by Sir Robert Harley to one of the commissioners with the army, dated the 22 June, in which we find him promoting a scheme for reconciling the parliament and army. The basis of his scheme was essentially the restoration of mutual confidence between the two contenders, by each making concessions to what were judged to be the fundamental grievances of the other. One is impressed by the unrealistic aspect of Sir Robert's analysis of the political conflict, as representing an impasse between soldiers' grievances and obedience to the parliament. Consequently his remedy consisted of paying the army, disbanding it and then re-forming it into an army of 10-12,000

1. 'The Last Newes....', p.5.
2. Cary, Memorials, i, pp.233-7; v. also Bell, Memorials, i, p.357.

upon the same establishment, to garrison England and subdue Ireland under its own officers. If the army accepted this scheme, then the parliament's honour would also be secured by the army's obedience to its desires.[1]

In fact the conflict between the army and the 'presbyterian' leaders had never involved such a simple conflict of narrow interests, but this letter indicates that the broader political struggle, inherent in the confrontation, had little to do with the reaction of many moderate members to the actions of the army. Indeed Sir Robert Harley's analysis reveals that concern for constitutional regularity which, I have maintained, continued to provide Holles with parliamentary support after the disruption of his initial design against the army. The drafting of this letter might well have been prompted by grave concern at the army's demand for the suspension of the 11 members, a concern that was evidently felt by other members because the Commons refused to implement it, even in the face of an advancing army.[2]

This same constitutionalism was revealed again in the debate of the 23rd upon the Army's Representation. The Lower House voted against considering the 3rd and 4th propositions, which concerned the frequency and duration of the present and

1. Brit.Mus., Loan 29/122, misc.16: Harley to M.M., 22 June 1647.
2. Rushworth wrote of this charge not taking well with the members - 'the privilege of Parliament is so tender a thing that they will not suspend a member on a general charge'. Bell, Memorials, i, p.357.

future parliaments. Instead they elected to consider the constitutionally more acceptable 5th proposition which concerned the right of petitioning parliament. But their resolution was badly shaken on the 24 June with the presentation of 'An Humble Remonstrance from Sir Thomas Fairfax and the Army', a much tougher and uncompromising document, which included a time limit for the parliament to accept the demands of the army.[1] It also criticised the inactivity of the Houses in the charge against the 11 members and the continued raising of new forces under the countenance of its enemies in the Committee of Safety, demanded reform of the abuse of parliamentary privileges, and requested that the king should be no nearer London than the army itself.

Predictably the result was a shift in the balance of power at Westminster as the trimmers turned away from the 'presbyterians'. The Upper House voted to send a letter to the king requesting him to remain at Royston or Newmarket only three days after furthering the votes for his coming to Richmond. The Earl of Manchester, as Speaker, prepared the new letter which was accepted by the House. In both cases the declining fortune of the 'presbyterian' group was reflected in the dissents of a substantial minority of 10 peers.[2] Of the slightly larger group of Lords who voted

1. F.2.63.Linc. (36), 'An Humble Remonstrance....', p.14.
2. L.J.9, p.289: the dissenters were Lincoln, Suffolk, Rutland, Stamford, Hereford, Middlesex, Hundson, Willoughby, Maynard and Berkeley.

for the acceptance of the army's request, the balance must have been held by such peers as the Earls of Pembroke and Warwick who had already shown signs of their change of political course. A royalist intelligencer maintained on the 10 June that 'The Ea: of Pembroke now begins to say he is not soe much Presbiterian as the world conceaves'. In the circumstances one must agree with Sir Edward Hyde's cryptic comment upon this news: 'for wch I say he is ye wiser'.[1] On the 14th the Earl of Warwick had also indulged in repairing his relations with the army with a complimentary letter to the General.[2]

According to the French Ambassador these votes of the Lords scotched a 'presbyterian' scheme for forcing the hands of the Council of War over the matter of bringing the king to Richmond. He maintained that in the event of a refusal by the army, Points' army together with levies kept ready in the provinces and those in London, were to have marched against Fairfax.[3] Such a scheme sounds like 'presbyterian' wishful thinking, but there may have been an element of fact in it. In a letter to the Common Council sent on the 22nd, the General noted the continuing underhand levying of men in London, the dispatching of agents into several parts of the

1. Clar.MSS.29, f.240: Intelligence from London, 10 June 1647.
2. Clarke Papers, i, p.137.
3. Montereul Corresp., ii, p.177.

kingdom to levy forces, the appointment of Worcester as a general rendezvous for the forces engaged for Ireland, and attempts to bring in forces from Ireland, France and Scotland.[1] The stopping of Colonel Birch by soldiers of the army as he attempted to reach his regiment, ostensibly to convey them into Ireland, indicates fully the suspicions of the army.[2]

The impact upon the Lower House of the Lords' votes on the 24th was confirmed by Alderman Foulke's presentation of letters from the army, together with the desires of the Common Council for the sending of some of its members to reside in the army, for putting the reformadoes out of the Lines of Communication, and for the discharging of all forces listed by the Committee of Safety and Militia.[3] All were agreed to, although according to Whitelocke the last desire was only consented to after a 'hard Debate'.[4] Despite this obvious weakening of Holles's position, the following day saw the Commons adhering rigidly to constitutional regularity in the face of further demands from the army for the suspension of the 11 members. It was voted that legally they could not be suspended without proofs and, more pointedly, that the members concerned had said or done nothing within the House for which they could justly be suspended.

1. J.Co.Co.40, ff.225v-226.
2. C.J.V, p.221.
3. J.Co.Co.40, ff.227, 228.
4. Whitelocke, Memorials, p.258.

The sense of vulnerability experienced by members in their proximity to the City was again expressed in the order for a company of the Westminster trained bands to guard Westminster forthwith until relieved the next morning by four companies of the City trained bands. These votes probably owed something to the reformado disturbances at Christ Church over the payment of arrears which the Lord Mayor and Sheriffs were unable to quieten, because the City trained bands were suspicious of their call to muster. The same source also tells us that the attempt to call out the Westminster trained bands during the night met with a similar response.[1] Again we have the picture of turmoil in the City in response to the advance of the army and, perhaps more significantly where the 'presbyterians' were concerned, an indication of apprehension and division within the regiments of the City trained bands.

In the face of the army's advance the mood of the two Houses became even more amenable and measures were taken to empower their commissioners to start serious negotiations with the army for a settlement of its desires. Not surprisingly, it was Samuel Browne who carried up this vote to receive the agreement of the Lords. A reaction similar to that of two days previously occurred in the Lords, with the 'presbyterian' peers striving unsuccessfully to stem

1. Clarke Papers, i, pp.141-2.

the drift towards the army. They vainly attempted to obstruct a motion for considering the latest demands from the army by making it conditional upon the army obeying the former order to remove 40 miles from London. The eight Lords who dissented from the vote agreeing to the Commons' order for enlarging the powers of the commissioners with the army had all figured amongst those who had dissented from the vote of the 24th concerning the king.[1] The position of the 'presbyterian' leaders had now become untenable and on the 26 June the 11 members desired, and were granted, the leave of the House to absent themselves.[2] It is difficult to assess whether this decision represented an abject admission of failure, as implied by Bellièvre, or a modest withdrawal to free the House from danger,[3] or an astute political manoeuvre to prevent the army occupying the City, the essential factor in any 'presbyterian' revival.

That such a revival was still possible was displayed in the Common Council on the same day, when a committee was appointed to consider 'The Humble Petition of Divers Peaceable & Well-affected Citizens...' It would seem that in the absence of the pro-army leaders of the Council at

1. L.J.9, p.296: Lincoln, Suffolk, Stamford, Middlesex, Rutland, Willoughby, Hunsdon and Maynard.
2. Montereul Corresp., ii, p.179.
3. Walker, History of Independency, part 1, p.35.

Uxbridge, the 'presbyterian' group was able to reassert something of its previous influence, for amongst the 12 citizens appointed, 8 were members of the Militia Committee and two more had been associated with the religious presbyterian activity in the Common Council during 1646.[1]

It was clear that not all was lost in the City, although for the time being the situation at Westminster looked bleak. Both Walker and Whitelocke refer to the withdrawal of 'presbyterian' members at this time.[2] The referring of information to the Committee of the Army concerning the raising of men at London to recruit Colonel Greaves's regiment, indicates that the opponents of Holles had assumed the political initiative, a development that was also reflected in the attendances at the Committee at Derby House - on the 20 June those present had been the Earl of Lincoln, Holles, Sir William Waller, Colonel Jephson, Sir William Lewis and Sir John Clotworthy; but on the 28th they had been replaced by Nathaniel Fiennes, Sir Arthur Haselrig, Sir John Temple and Richard Salwey.[3]

The outcome of the first open confrontation between the army and the 'presbyterian' grandees was a defeat for Holles. Despite his military preparations and initial support from moderate members in response to the army's

1. J.Co.Co.40, f.230v.
2. Walker, op.cit., p.37; Whitelocke, Memorials, p.260.
3. SP 21/E 26, ff.82,83.

disobedience, the conversion of that disobedience into a blatant physical threat led to an abandonment by moderates of the 'presbyterian' hardline policy in favour of a more conciliatory approach. This development probably owed something to the erosion of the 'presbyterian' groups' standing at Westminster as the 'party' of peace. Contacts between the army and Charles, its seizure of him in early June, the uncompromising stance adopted by Holles even to the point of military conflict in mid-June - all these destroyed the promise of an imminent settlement inherent in his policy of parliamentary control of the king and disbandment of the army.

The withdrawal of Holles and his colleagues from the Lower House in late June seemed to involve the eclipse of 'presbyterian' fortunes and to herald a reconciliation between the army, the two Houses and the City.

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CONCLUSION

The Coup de Grâce

June 1647 may seem a rather strange point in time to conclude a study of the 'presbyterian' party in the Long Parliament during the 1640s. Surely August 1647 or even December 1648 would be more appropriate. The final act of their struggle with the army and its adherents during 1647 did not occur until two months after the 3 June. Again the final act of the constitutional conflict of the 1640s did not close until the army revolution of December 1648-January 1649. During the preceeding months had not the leaders of the 'presbyterian' party re-emerged to further the renewed attempts to secure a peaceful settlement with Charles? So why June 1647?

It seems to me that Holles had devised for 1647 an apparently foolproof strategy which consisted of two courses of action. The most important was to utilise the expected pacific response of moderate opinion at Westminster to the withdrawal of the Scots to disband the New Model army and so emasculate the 'independent' group in the two Houses. I have shown how close to success Holles came during the early months of the year, only to be thwarted by radical opposition in the army. Cracks began to show in the facade of this particular 'presbyterian' edifice during March.

It was at this point that the second aspect of the 'presbyterian' strategy came into play, although it had its roots in the political and military developments of 1645. It involved the construction of a military force to act as a counter to the army, and I have also investigated this feature of Holles's plans during the spring and early summer of 1647. On paper the military force available to him by the end of May indeed appeared formidable, including as it did elements of Fairfax's army itself, reformadoes, Points' army in the north and the militia of the City of London. More uncertain, but even more threatening was the prospect of assistance from a Scottish army or even foreign forces.

The 'presbyterian' group also appeared to have the machinery to organise its preparations, particularly the treasuries at Weavers Hall and Christ Church, while the nomination of the new Militia Committee confirmed their influence in that quarter. And yet by the end of June the leaders of the 'presbyterian' group had been forced to withdraw from the Lower House after the demolition of their strategy by the advance of the army upon the City. Whilst March had witnessed the defeat of Holles's political designs against the 'independents', June saw the frustration of his military preparations against the army. By July the initiative at Westminster had passed to the 'independent'

group as moderate opinion had moved away from consternation towards conciliation. Of course the threat of bloodshed had done much to bring about this change of mood, but another factor of crucial importance had also played a part, the control of the person of the king.

The designs of the 'Presbyterian Alliance' during 1646 had been vitiated by the intransigence of Charles and his preference for keeping open all channels of negotiation. It was made abundantly clear to Holles at that time that the achievement of a settlement with the king depended upon the prior elimination of the Vane-St.John group as serious contenders. In the meantime the 'presbyterian' group would need to keep the king out of the way of temptation, and this is what his transfer from the Scots to parliamentary commissioners achieved. Even after the breakdown of the attempt to secure the disbandment of Fairfax's army Holles still held an asset in the person of Charles at Holdenby. Indeed it was now even more important that he should continue to do so, especially with the return of Commissioners from Scotland with instructions to treat with him. Hence the discussions between the Scots and Holles's group about the removal of the king to London or Scotland when the threat from the army became increasingly political in tone.[1]

1. Gardiner, Great Civil War, iii, 259.

It was the arrival before Holdenby of a party from the army on 3 June which finally destroyed the strategy that Holles had sold to the Scots Commissioners after the failure of the attempt to break up Fairfax's army in mid-1646. Not only was the king restored to the centre of the political stage from which he had been excluded by the 'presbyterian' group, but his transference to army control struck a serious blow at their following amongst moderates, at a time when it was already being weakened by their military preparations and the threat of renewed conflict. It is possible that the attempt to mould the apprehension of members and citizens into a viable military opposition to the army would have fared much better if 'presbyterian' plans for the king's conveyance to London had succeeded. Instead their elaborate preparations were robbed of the promise of a peaceful settlement that his presence would have bestowed upon them. The political initiative began to pass to Holles's opponents at Westminster who, after a period of constitutional heart-searching joined their fortune to that of the army. Reconciliation became the order of the day in both the two Houses and the Common Council.

There are indications that certain members of both Houses responded to the treating between Charles and the army's leaders by abandoning the 'presbyterian' cause in

expectation of a settlement. This was the very explanation given by Hyde for the defection of Manchester and Warwick, 'the two pillars of the Presbyterian Party'.[1] It is also clear that by the 19 July Speaker Lenthall had changed sides for a similar reason.[2]

In the light of this disintegration of the 'presbyterian' strategy by the end of June it is necessary to reach an assessment of the events of late July and early August. It was now the turn of the 'independent' leaders to learn that ascendancy at Westminster did not necessarily guarantee control of the general political situation. Whereas it had been the army that had brought home this lesson to Holles, it was the City that demonstrated the same to the army's supporters.

There was little to raise the hopes of the 'presbyterian' leaders at Westminster in early July. On the 8th a royalist intelligencer wrote that the votes of the House were 'independent' and that 'scarse in House or Citty any man dares owne himselfe to be Presbiterian'.[3] The Commons continued to attack their bastions one after another. At the end of June the 'presbyterian' pretence of service in Ireland was converted into 'independent' reality by a

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1. Clarendon, History, bk.X, para.110.
2. Sloane MSS., 1519, ff.104-104v: Lenthall to Rushworth, 19 July 1647.
3. Clar.MSS.30, f.3: Intelligence from Hatfield, 8 July 1647.

resolution implementing the desire of the Common Council for the disbanding or sending into Ireland of all forces that had come off from the army. In addition, those reformadoes who were not inhabitants of the City were ordered to leave the Lines within ten days. At the beginning of July relations between the two Houses and the army appeared to be returning to a calmer level with the entry into a treaty and the withdrawal of the army to Reading. In response to army concern the treasury at Weavers Hall was wound up and financial authority once more vested in the Treasurers at Wars.[1]

In the provinces also July witnessed the disruption of Holles's military preparations. On the 6th letters from Colonel General Pointz were read concerning unrest amongst his forces, but the votes for sending £10,000 and adding Commissary General Copley to the Northern Committee came too late to prevent Pointz' seizure by his own soldiers. This action also probably forestalled more immediate military plans in the north for an army intelligencer wrote from York of the return from London of certain officers, 'all creatures of the accused especially to Massey.....'[2] 'Presbyterian' soundings in the West[3] fared no better with the failure of

1. C.J.V, pp.234, 240, 244, 248-9.
2. Clarke Papers, i, p.163.
3. Clar.MSS.29, f.263v: Intelligence letter, 5 July 1647; v. also the Narrative of Mr. Harrison in Bell, Memorials, ii, pp.359-65, esp. pp.362-3.

Colonel Doyley's attempt to secure control of the port and castle of Bristol.[1] In effect both the political and military potential still remaining to Holles's group was becoming narrowly confined to London.

It is true that the City remained a 'presbyterian' strongpoint both in religion and politics. Despite the timidity of the Common Council during most of June, the Militia Committee continued to exert considerable influence upon City counsels. Yet one must not be misled into exaggerating the military chances of the 'presbyterian' group in July 1647. Despite the marked failure of parliamentary votes against Holles's preparations to be implemented in the City, the continued listing of reformadoes and apprentices and their threatening presence at Westminster, and the dubious loyalty of the City Militia, it must be recognised that he now had his back to the wall. Not only was the crisis for the 'presbyterian' group in both military and parliamentary standing demonstrated by the voting by both Houses of Fairfax as commander of all forces,[2] but they also found themselves at a great disadvantage in negotiations with Charles, despite their contact through Colonel Joseph Bamfield[3] and the special position of the Scots Commissioners and the Earl of Dunfermline.

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1. Clarke Papers, i, p.162; Bell, Memorials, i, pp.370-1.
2. C.J.V, p.248; L.J.9, p.338.
3. J.Bamfield, Colonel Joseph Bamfield's Apologie (1685), pp.23-4.

It would seem that only after the king's unfavourable response to the army's proposals did he resume meaningful discussion with its opponents, and it was presumably as an aspect of these renewed contacts that the 'presbyterian' leaders promoted the complementary activity of the Common Council. The crux of the deteriorating relations between the City and the army was the Militia Committee. On the 19 July the army's commissioners presented several particulars to their opposite numbers, including one calling for the return of the militia and Militia Committee into the hands of those whom the army could trust.[1] The consequent resentment in the City enabled the 'presbyterian' group to set about attempting to recapture something of the initiative they had lost, and perhaps to persuade Charles that they were still a viable alternative to the 'independent' interest.

In any case Holles could not afford to allow a vote implementing the army's demand concerning the Militia Committee to pass unchallenged because it involved the very political existence of the 'presbyterian' group. It is highly likely that the leaders of that group were intimately involved in the organisation of the Solemn Engagement, signed at Skinners Hall on the 21st by a large body of apprentices, watermen,

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1. v. Rushworth's account of the army's suspicion of the Militia Committee in Bell, Memorials, i, p.367.

reformadoes and commanders of the Militia.[1] Its recommendations concerning the king accorded very well with what we know of the plans of the 'Presbyterian alliance'.

The call for the City to endeavour the king's coming to London echoed the attempts of the 'presbyterian' alliance to extract him from the army's control during June. A promise to endeavour this had also figured in 'presbyterian' approaches to Charles.[2] The Solemn Engagement also urged the City to procure the king's restoration on the terms offered by him on the 12 May. The fact that these terms reflected the four propositions presented to him through de Bellièvre and the Queen in January further indicates 'presbyterian' involvement, especially since Lauderdale had brought instructions with him in April to rest content if Charles would accept these four propositions.[3]

Not even the presence of its commissioners to the army could contain the antagonism towards the army aroused in the Common Council by the move to re-establish the old Militia Committee.[4] Again we are told that the 'presbyterian' leaders were involved in the preparation of the Common Council petition to the Houses against the ordinance to

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1. Brit.Mus., Pressmark 669.f.11(47): Thomason has written on the pamphlet that the Solemn Engagement was presented to the City commanders.
2. Bamfield, Apologie, pp.28-31.
3. Gardiner, Great Civil War, iii, 252.
4. J.Co.Co.40, ff.235v, 240.

that effect.[1] It was the circumstances surrounding the presentation of this petition that precipitated the final hectic stage of the crisis of 1647, the coup de grâce of 'presbyterian' plans.

Despite the denials of Holles and Waller the presence of the 'presbyterian' leaders in the vicinity of Westminster at the time of the City petition's presentation on the 26 July implies more than mere coincidence.[2] And yet one is hesitant to regard all events of that day as aspects of the 'presbyterian' design. It is probable that Holles accepted the need to pressure the Houses into restoring the 'presbyterian' Militia Committee, but to force them to vote the king's coming to London forthwith with freedom as well as honour and safety could only play into the hands of the army. Of course it is possible that the 'presbyterian' leaders deliberately created the consequent confrontation so as to ensure the unavoidable involvement of the City governors. Holles and his colleagues certainly acted energetically once the die had been cast.

Yet perhaps one should cautiously note Clement Walker's statement that the extraction of these final votes from the Commons was the work of sectaries and friends of the army.

1. Bamfield, Apologie, pp.31-3.
2. Holles, Memoirs, pp.153-4; Waller, Vindication, pp.104-5.

Walker particularly mentioned a citizen named Highland, presumably the Samuel Highland who figured as one of the presenters of the 'independent' petition burned on the 20 May.[1] A comparison between different accounts of these proceedings clearly reveals the bias of Walker's description, but this possible indication of radical citizens pushing the 'presbyterians' further than they desired to go in order to secure the intervention of the army is perhaps seconded by the fact that no such demands concerning the king had been imposed earlier upon the Lords. It should also be noted that the proposed declaration presented to the Common Council on the 27 July contained no mention of the king coming to London in freedom but only called upon the Houses to summon him with honour and safety, where he should enact what he had granted in his message of the 12 May.[2] This recommendation reflected both the earlier decision of the 'Presbyterian Alliance' to accept the proposals made in that message,[3] and the contents of the Solemn Engagement.

Depending upon which interpretation of the activities of the citizens one favours, the military preparations in the City during the following nine days can be regarded as

1. Walker, History of Independancy, part 1, p.40; v. also Waller's suspicions of radical involvement in Vindication, pp.102-4.
2. J.Co.Co.40, ff.240v-242.
3. Gardiner, Great Civil War, iii, 253.

either a gallant and premeditated determination to steal the initiative from the army, or a feverish attempt to forestall its reaction. A close analysis of the period tends to favour the latter explanation, for both the military and political position of the 'Presbyterian Alliance' was not strong enough to contemplate a deliberate conflict with the army. On the 21st the Lords had agreed to the Commons vote for disbanding the forces that had left the army, and Colonel Kempson's petition of the 23rd indicates that the opponents of those forces lost little time in implementing the vote.[1] The votes of the 1 August for the organisation of forces and the collision between some of Sir Robert Pye's troopers and a detachment from the army at Deptford indicate that Holles could still call upon a sizeable body of reformadoes and soldiers, but time was not on his side in the task of organising them. In addition, there was insufficient time to sound out the possibilities of securing the assistance of a Scottish army. Despite the activities of Alderman Cosens of Newcastle,[2] the readiness of Lauderdale to further this after a meeting with Charles,[3] and the claim of the City Scoutmaster to the Militia Committee on the 30 July that 30,000 Scots were marching

1. L.J.9, p.349. The disbanding was not completed as Gardiner seems to imply: Great Civil War, iii, 327.
2. Clarke MSS., MSS.110, f.138: Letter of Intelligence, 1 July 1647.
3. Gardiner, Great Civil War, iii, 334.

to their assistance,[1] there was never any real likelihood of an invasion at that time.

The state of 'presbyterian' contacts with the king also indicates that Holles was not yet ready for the critical conflict with the army. It is true that Charles had reacted unfavourably to Ireton's proposals, but he refused to commit himself to the 'presbyterian' group even after the force on the two Houses when its leaders sought to secure his approbation of their actions.[2]

At least one might assume that the withdrawal of Ludlow and Sir Arthur Haselrig into the army, together with over sixty members from both Houses, must have restored Holles's control of the two Houses. To a certain extent this was so, but it was never complete in the Lower House. Some members indicated their continuing distrust of the king when they amended the declaration from the Lords for his coming to London. Even then there was a division over agreeing with the declaration which was passed by 44 voices to 22, with the 'unpresbyterian' John Ashe and Sir William Strickland as tellers against it.[3]

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1. Clarke Papers, i, p.220 and note a: C.H. Firth gives the name of the Scoutmaster as Ryley, but in the MSS. the name has been altered, probably from Rycraft. We know that Josiah Ricraft was a scoutmaster in mid-1647, and that he was closely associated with the City 'presbyterians': Clarke MSS., MSS.110, f.232v; P.R.O., SP 28/237 (Commonwealth and Exchequer Papers): a bundle of 92 unfoliated Militia Committee warrants covering the period 14 July-13 August 1647.
2. Bamfield, Apologie, pp.32-3.
3. C.J.V., p.262.

Only in response to the complaints and recommendation of the Scots Commissioners at the army's exclusion of Lauderdale from the king's presence did the Commons finally vote on the 2 August to invite Charles to London. Sir Lewis Dyves was probably correct in maintaining that by this time many of the 'presbyterian party' thought their security lay in declaring for the king without limitation.[1]

On the other hand the withdrawal of members to the army provided an obvious justification for action against the 'presbyterian' group. Furthermore, the fact that those members did not consist solely of known 'independents' enhanced the reputation of the army's cause and actions.[2]

The strength of 'presbyterian' support within the City was once more to prove deceptive. The initial surge of resentment at the threat to its privileges did not provide a sufficient foundation for determined resistance to the army, despite the reinstatement of the 'presbyterian' Militia Committee and the Committee of Safety. We know that the leading adherents of the 'presbyterian Alliance' amongst the citizens sat on the former committee throughout the crisis;[3]

1. Tower Letter Book of Dyves, p.75.
2. Clarendon, History, bk.X, para.110.
3. SP 28/237: of the 92 warrants only 13 relate to the crucial period 27 July-5 August, but they do reveal the consistent attendance of the 'presbyterian' Adams, Langham, Cullum, Colonel Hooker, Colonel John Bellamy, Lt.Colonel Edward Bellamy, Colonel Gower, Captain Venner and Captain Jones.

but their energy could not prevent the growing mood of apprehension, which even led certain militia officers to lay down their commissions, such as Colonel Camfield 'hoping it will save his stake'.[1] On the 2 August the limitation of 'presbyterian' attempts to mobilise the forces of the City was revealed by the presentation of a petition for peace by a large crowd, which was attacked by Massey and Points and their reformado officers.[2]

The same process operated within the high presbyterian clergy of the City, who at the beginning of the crisis had urged the citizens from their pulpits to prepare for their defence.[3] The ministers of the Assembly presented a paper desiring a mediation, but more significantly 20 ministers of the City presented a petition calling for the prevention of bloodshed by entering into a treaty as well as adopting a posture of defence.[4] Amongst its signatories were such eminent ministers as Calamy, Ashe, Burgess and Case and an indication of the blow this dealt Holles's preparations can be gathered from the bitter criticism levelled by Baillie and Holles himself against

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1. Clarke Papers, i, pp.220 note a, 221.
2. L.J.9, pp.401-2; Hist.MSS.Comm., De L'Isle and Dudley, vi, p.569.
3. Hist.MSS.Comm., De L'Isle and Dudley, vi, p.569.
4. F 444 (3): C. Burgess, 'Sion College, What It is, and Doeth', pp.22-3.

Stephen Marshall, the organiser of this clerical plea.[1]

It was only fitting that this last flicker of Holles's aspirations should be extinguished finally by Charles. The ambiguous stance of the king throughout the crisis both reflected the varied advice he was receiving from his advisers and also caused a confusion of attitude amongst his adherents and agents in the City. At the very height of the confrontation, when the army lay outside London, the king was persuaded to throw his weight on the side of Holles's opponents. His letter to the army probably had the effect that Bamfield mentioned, namely that the royalist element in the City now worked to dissuade the citizens from opposing the army.[2] By the 4 August the will to resist had collapsed in both the Common Council and the two Houses, and the 11 members were left to shift for themselves. The experiences of Holles's group after the 3 June went far to substantiate Conrad Russell's analogy of Charles to a king on a chessboard: 'he had virtually no power of his own, but control of him tended to confer control of the board'.[3]

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1. Baillie, Letters, iii, 16: Holles, Memoirs, p.107.
2. Bamfield, Apologie, p.35; Berkeley, Memoirs, pp.38-9.
3. C.Russell, The Crisis of Parliaments (Oxford, 1971), p.380.

General Conclusion

1. The Course of Disillusionment

In its construction the 'presbyterian party' was the result of disillusionment experienced by various individuals and groups at Westminster at different stages of the conflict between the parliament and the king. At first there was the reaction of the more pacific and conservative members to the outbreak of war, and their consternation soon came to be guided by a group of more influential members in both Houses. Politicians like Denzil Holles and the Earl of Holland were alienated from the political leadership at Westminster by concern for the social status quo and apprehension at the escalation of the war.

Disillusionment was also operating amongst the more radical members, for despite the successful relief of Gloucester in the autumn of 1643 they remained dissatisfied with the cautious campaigning of their Lord General, the Earl of Essex. The dissatisfaction was mutual, and in Essex's case was furthered by his own constitutional conservatism, personal friendships and connections with pacific members, and the frustrations of military campaigning against a background of suspicion and criticism.

It is not surprising that Essex became the focal point of the so-called 'peace party' by early 1644 as the

bitterness of political differences in both Houses deepened in response to Pym's projected alliance with the Scots. One result of this was the addition of a small group of members with Irish interests to the adherents of Essex. Of these Sir John Clotworthy became a leading figure in the 'Presbyterian Alliance'. This process of polarisation was furthered considerably by the political manoeuvring that coincided with the entry of the Scots army in early 1644. In particular there was the personal attack of Essex's group upon the younger Vane represented by the Lovelace plot; but of far greater political significance was the replacement of the Committee of Safety by the Committee of Both Kingdoms.

The part played by Oliver St. John and other 'middle groupers' in carrying through this sweeping change in the machinery for directing the war, their obstruction of moves to recruit Essex's army so as to force acceptance by him and his fellow peers of the authority vested in that committee, their support of the Association armies which again were regarded by Essex as deliberate moves to diminish his military authority - all these developments went far to demolish the position that the 'middle group' under Pym's leadership had sought to maintain: that of promoting the unity of the parliamentary cause by working to prevent the alienation of the Lord General by the rising crescendo of radical criticism and frustration.

The Scottish alliance removed the last vestiges of unity at Westminster. St. John and Vane recognised prior to the summer of 1644 that they could not dispense with the military services of the Earl of Essex, but they seem to have determined that those services should only be employed under the supervision of a joint committee, the very existence of which was a denial of his view of the purposes and scope of the war. The summer campaign of 1644 revealed that the combination of Lord General and the Committee of Both Kingdoms was not a workable one.

The final group to be disillusioned before the formation of the 'presbyterian party' or 'alliance' were the Scots Commissioners. The shift of alliances in the autumn of 1644 and the subsequent character of 'party' conflict at Westminster very much reflected Scottish apprehensions and their reaction to them. The outcome of this disillusionment with their original allies in the English parliament, the Vane-St.John group, led to a gradual recognition by both the Scots Commissioners and Essex's group of areas of compatibility in their respective attitudes towards the final settlement to be sought with the king. The result of this mutual recognition was the formation of the 'Presbyterian Alliance'.

The task of achieving an understanding of the mainsprings of the 'presbyterian party' has involved an examination of

Essex's group prior to mid-1644; although it is recognised that the rift between the Scots Commissioners and their erstwhile allies, the younger Vane and St. John, provided the basis of the new 'party'. Hence my selection of the date of the battle of Marston Moor as the starting point for this study. Not that the rapprochement between Essex's group and the Commissioners conveniently occurred on the 2 July 1644. Rather the antagonisms between the Scots and Cromwell, and the heightened conflict over religious matters which occurred as a direct result of the battle or during its aftermath, were important factors in the growing sense of disillusionment which finally led the Scottish representatives at Westminster to approach their erstwhile opponents in the two Houses.

2. Means to an End: The Role of Parliamentary Tactics

It is very easy to lose sight of the broad differences of policy of which 'party' distinctions at Westminster were a reflection, amongst the continual manoeuvring for political advantage, exploitation of procedures and even members' social habits, and the highly personal character of much of the political confrontation at Westminster. The very character of parliamentary membership heightened the importance of such tactical activity: the factional nature of 'parties' representing several interests and even different long-term aims, their limited numbers and therefore the presence of a

sizeable uncommitted element in the Commons. It was this element that held the balance of power and therefore largely determined the tactics of the opposing grandees.

In the narrow context of the House of Commons itself tactics would include the timing of motions, the employment of select or general committees, the revelation of informations damaging to opponents and emphasising the privileges of the House. In the broader context of controlling the direction of the war, tactics mainly involved securing a majority voice on the key committees at Westminster: the Committee of Safety, the Committee of Both Kingdoms and the Committee for the Affairs of Ireland.

The Committee of Both Kingdoms was a rather special case in that the changing allegiance of the Scots Commissioners during the course of 1644 converted the early control of their original allies into a state of equilibrium with their new allies. The Savile Affair revealed the main tactical alteration by the opponents of the 'Presbyterian Alliance', the restriction of important business to the English members of the Committee of Both Kingdoms so as to avoid the participation of the Scots. With the growing unpopularity of the Scots during later 1645 and 1646 this course was adopted by the Lower House itself.

In their broadest context parliamentary tactics were closely involved with the basic objectives of the 'parties',

and included the whole spectrum of interests, both civilian and military which constituted the parliamentary cause. The playing off of military commanders and their forces, and the reorganisation of armies were often prompted by local or regional considerations or by genuine concern for military results; but such developments unavoidably exacerbated 'party' or factional divisions in the two Houses. The relationship between political influence and military power was not lost on the grandees. Hence the prolonged struggles over the reforming of Essex's army in the spring of 1644, the heightened importance of the Scottish alliance to Essex's group once his command had been terminated, and their insistence that the Scottish army should not withdraw entirely into Scotland at the time of Kilsyth.

This fact of political life renders all the more daring Holles's decision in later 1646 to work for the withdrawal of the Scots army. The strategy of the 'presbyterian party', of which this was the first step, very nearly succeeded in its object: the elimination of the New Model and political eclipse of the 'independent party'. It was defeated in the first instance not by Holles's opponents at Westminster, who accepted the parliamentary rules by which he was playing and came close to conceding the victory to the 'presbyterians'; but by the army radicals and their mentors in the City.

The recovery of the initiative in City counsels by moderates during 1644 was another factor of great tactical importance to Essex's group. In particular the Scots Commissioners, both lay and clerical, came to exercise considerable influence in London, influence which came to be viewed with grave suspicion by the Commons during the course of 1646. From the autumn of 1645 there are indications of Scottish and 'presbyterian' interest in the City militia, which by early 1647 had developed to the extent of providing Holles with a military support independent of the Scots.

Religious differences also had considerable tactical significance for both major 'parties' at Westminster. Holles's group and the clerical allies of Robert Baillie were able to make much political capital by emphasising the threat to law and order and the social status quo believed to be inherent in the spread of sectarianism. The 'presbyterian party' in the Lower House also sought to promote the demands of the presbyterian clergy, although they never abandoned the erastian position regarding church government for the jure divino claims of the ministers. The scope for co-operation was broadened considerably once the main issue of contention became toleration. Individual clerics such as Thomas Edwards were invaluable in strengthening the ties between the 'Presbyterian Alliance' and the City by their activities in both pulpit and press.

All of these tactical factors were of considerable importance both for the continued political existence of the 'parties' and in the constant manoeuvre for political advantage. Yet tactics could only be means to an end.

3. The Quest for Peace

Disillusionment had brought together the various 'interests' that constituted the Presbyterian Alliance, but in order to function effectively as a political force capable of influencing parliamentary policy or even determining it, from this negative factor had to emerge not only tactical skill but most important of all, positive policies relating to the terms of the final peace settlement. Despite the constitutionally conservative attitude of both the English and Scottish wings of the alliance wherein lay its essential common ground in the matter of peace terms, there were very real differences of emphasis which were never really resolved. The course of 1648 was to reveal similar differences between the radicals and 'middle group' who together constituted the 'independent party'.

There is no difficulty in ascertaining the Scottish priority: the establishment of a presbyterian church system in England and its acceptance by Charles; but there is uncertainty about the attitudes of Essex's group towards both religious presbyterianism in particular and the general

character of any settlement. Although none of the leading English members of the 'Presbyterian Alliance', with the probable exception of Sir William Waller, was a convinced religious presbyterian, their conservatism was expressed in a readiness to accept a presbyterian system, albeit a 'lame erastian' one, and in a firm opposition to sectarianism and the proposals for a broad toleration. Thus there was room for a general standpoint upon the religious terms to be demanded, but I have shown that whenever serious negotiations were entered into with the king or certain difficulties were experienced at Westminster in the preparation of peace propositions there was a marked readiness on the part of Holles and his colleagues to compromise on the religious issue.

This flexibility over a presbyterian system of church government seems to strengthen the likelihood that Essex's adherents and advisers were a 'peace at any price' group. In fact in one matter they displayed a surprising degree of consistency, that of security. This was perhaps not so much the result of constitutional considerations, but rather of the practical realities of their situation. The Earl of Manchester had sounded the note of caution in the military confrontation with the king with his warning that defeat would render them traitors. As rebels, all politicians in the two Houses must have been aware of the need to ensure that

Charles was rendered incapable of retaliation after the conclusion of a settlement.

Of course the degree of independence open to Holles in such matters depended very much on the over-all political situation at Westminster. For instance it was limited by the failure of the Uxbridge treaty, and then even more so by the victory of the New Model at Naseby. Thereafter Essex's group became more dependent on the Scots and their designs for pressuring Charles to accept their propositions by negotiating through Montereul and Sir Robert Murray with the French court and Henrietta Maria.

In the spring of 1646 a new dimension was added to the vexed problem of peace propositions: the struggle for the possession of Charles. His flight to the Scots army was a considerable triumph for the 'Presbyterian Alliance', although it represented the Scottish solution and not that persistently advocated by Essex's group: the king's coming to London. We find the latter course being pressed on Charles at Oxford in November 1644 by Holles and Whitelocke, and then being advocated by the Earl of Holland in January 1646. Force of circumstances caused the English 'presbyterians' to accept the Scottish preference since it would still provide them with a definite advantage in negotiating a settlement with him. In fact, the obstinacy of the king, the growing

burden of the Scots army and a rising tide of anti-Scottish feeling in the Commons caused grave problems for Essex's group, especially the successful moves to eliminate the joint character of the Uxbridge propositions. Largely without guidance from the Committee of Estates the Scots Commissioners gave way to the pressure of their English allies and reluctantly accepted the amended propositions.

The failure of Charles to respond either to these Newcastle Propositions or to the clandestine negotiations conducted with him through William Murray and de Bellièvre, despite promises of an acceptable message, confirmed Holles's decision to change his political priorities. Previously the prime objective of the 'Presbyterian Alliance' had been the achievement of an agreement with the king; but in the autumn of 1646 the English grandees of the alliance decided to concentrate on overcoming their opponents at Westminster by eliminating the New Model. The essential prerequisite for this policy was the removal of the Scots army, and this they now worked to achieve. The Scots Commissioners were persuaded of the wisdom of this course by Holles's correct estimate that the withdrawal of their army would engender a receptive atmosphere in the two Houses to proposals for the disbandment of Fairfax's army.

The final preparations for the removal of the Scots were accompanied by a certain degree of independent action by 'presbyterian' lords who offered de Bellièvre proposals for an agreement with Charles far more moderate than earlier approaches. Not surprisingly they emphasised the need for immediate security to facilitate the achievement of a permanent settlement over a period of time. As for religious proposals, they recommended the king's acceptance of a presbyterian system for only three years, and dropped the Covenant. By April these proposals had also been endorsed secretly by the Scots and they formed the basis of the king's reply of the 12 May 1647 to the parliamentary propositions.

It is possible that a distinction can be drawn between the lords involved in this approach at the beginning of 1647 and the 'presbyterian' leaders in the House of Commons. The Upper House had contained a 'presbyterian' majority for much of the preceeding year, so that the pacific lords had not experienced at first hand the frustrations of their colleagues in the Commons. Indeed Holles had had to rely heavily upon the House of Lords to bolster his weak position at Westminster. It was Holles's strategy of mid-1646 designed to take advantage of the approaching end of hostilities and the offer of propositions to Charles, which had foundered on the twin rocks of the Scots army and royal

obstinacy. Only with the arrival of Lauderdale in April 1647, coinciding as it did with the refusal of the army to abide by parliamentary rules in the matter of disbanding, did the 'presbyterian' grandees resort once more to the uncertainties of negotiations with the king. So engrossed were Holles's adherents in the struggle against the army that little was done to promote the agreement with Charles until after his seizure by Cornet Joyce. This loss of possession proved to be a fatal flaw in the negotiations conducted largely by Lauderdale, for Charles was restored to a commanding position in the peace stakes. Holles cannot have been unduly surprised that the final blow at his attempt to salvage something from the wreckage of his strategy was delivered by the king.

4. The Aftermath

Having already attempted to justify my choice of the 3 June rather than the 4 August 1647 as the concluding date for this study of the 'presbyterian party', I must now very briefly comment upon the radically altered character of 'party' politics in 1648.

The arrival of the army as a powerful political force in 1647 had already delivered a considerable blow to the previously accepted rules of the parliamentary contest. Fairfax's regiments were both an unavoidable and unpredictable

factor in political calculations after August 1647. Circumstances had forced the 'middle group' members, besides many moderates, to rely upon the army at that time; but they never really felt comfortable with this relationship. It had been the army officers who in June and July 1647 had played the major role in negotiations with the king, but at least both they and even the agitators had at that time not moved beyond acceptance of the objective sought by the parliamentary 'parties': the achievement of a settlement with Charles.

By the time the 'presbyterian' leaders were able to re-occupy their positions at Westminster in 1648 the mood of the army had altered in its attitude towards the king. Knowledge of his agreement with the Scots and the outbreak of the second civil war convinced even Cromwell finally that Charles and monarchy would have to go. Republicans like Henry Marten and Edmund Ludlow might welcome this change of heart, but the constitutionalists of the 'middle group' were unable to accept such a radical step. The main political issues facing politicians in the autumn of 1648 were no longer when, by whom and on what terms a settlement would be reached with the king; but rather the fundamental issue of whether monarchy should survive. The 'parties' which had formed in response to the former issues did not outlast their eclipse by the more revolutionary demand of the army.

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APPENDIX

The 'Presbyterian Party' and the Recruiter Elections

Space will not allow more than a very brief assessment of the role of Essex's group in particular and of party management in general in the recruiter elections. My purpose is to query Underdown's contention that it was the radicals who first indulged in the central management of elections for 'party' purposes, only to be followed a year later by the 'peace party' which had belatedly awoken to the need for such preparations.[1] It seems to me that in 1646 the latter group sought to incorporate the elections into a broader political strategy against their opponents at Westminster. In contrast to this design the weak attempts of Prideaux to further radical candidates in the West Country fade into near insignificance.

During the two years after August 1645 most of the seats in the Commons rendered vacant by death or disablement were refilled by 'recruiter' elections. They occurred at a time when the conflict between the Vane-St.John group and the 'Presbyterian Alliance' was increasing in intensity, and both 'parties' must have been well aware of the possible repercussions of such elections upon their relative strengths at Westminster. It is clear that St. John's 'middle group'

1. D. Underdown, 'Party Management in the Recruiter Elections, 1645-1648', Eng.Hist.Rev., lxxxiii (1968), 256.

promoted the appointing of the by-elections, and equally clear that Holles's group opposed them at the time of the Southwark petition in August 1645. Opposition came from less committed moderates and old 'peace party' men such as Maynard, Selden, Whitelocke, Knightley and Sir John Coke upon grounds of prudence, the constitutional being of the parliament and the existence of a state of 'tempus belli'.[1]

Holles was probably correct when he maintained that his opponents began to mistrust the House,[2] for we have seen that Lord Say and his colleagues came close to disaster in the Savile Affair. Not only had the news of Naseby enabled them to turn the tables on their opponents, but it now also provided them and their allies in the New Model with an opportunity to break the equilibrium in the Lower House to their advantage. There was also a more positive reason for the advocacy of new elections at this time by such members as St. John, Samuel Browhe and John Crew. Peace moves were in the air again, largely as a result of Scottish pressure, and elections would strengthen the hand of the Vane-St.John group both against the Scots and the king. As one supporter of the Southwark petition maintained, it was safer to choose their new members before the conclusion of a peace rather

1. Addit.MSS.18780, ff.97v-98, 104-108v.
2. Holles, Memoirs, p.41.

than after, when an Act of Oblivion would allow malignants to be returned.[1] It is not surprising that some observers believed the new elections would not facilitate peace.[2]

David Underdown's study of party management in the recruiter elections clearly reveals the very considerable tactical advantages enjoyed during the first year of elections by Holles's opponents in the shape of Edmund Prideaux, a Commissioner of the Great Seal until October 1646, Postmaster-General and chairman of the Committee of the West.[3] Underdown recognises that despite this advantage the 'party' at Westminster could only influence a minority of elections. In most cases elections followed the traditional pattern whether radicals, moderates or pacifists were returned. In Leicestershire the influence of Haselrig overcame that of Grey,[4] whilst in Huntingdonshire the long-established Montague interest defeated the aspirations of the lower social orders of parliamentarians who supported John Pickering for the borough seat.[5]

An essential ingredient in the network of influence was close contact with the politically predominant group in

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1. Addit.MSS. 18780, f.106v.
2. Montereul Corresp., i, p.7.
3. D. Underdown, op.cit., 253-5.
4. Bodl.Rawlinson D.116 (Notebook of Nicholas Strelley), ff.18v, 19.
5. Hunts. R.O., Manchester MSS., dd M.28, bundle 1: Bernard to (Earl of Manchester), 22 Sep. 1645 (incorrectly attributed to 1622).

any particular county. Prideaux certainly utilised his closeness to Colonel John Pyne, the radical M.P. and leader of the County Committee of Somerset, in an attempt to secure the return of Sir William Selby for Ilchester. Selby's nomination also reflected yet another influence present in the West Country in late 1645 and early 1646: the New Model Army. Apparently then, arrangements in those counties were well suited to radical hopes.

Yet I think it is questionable to what extent the elections were a departure from the traditional variety. It is true that there were new agencies of local government, both civil and military but only in a rather peripheral way did they allow 'party' management to be exercised. The real advantage that Prideaux's offices and prestige gave the radicals in the elections in Somerset, Devon and Dorset was not so much in the form of central management, but in that of responding to local circumstances and promoting the electoral efforts of like-minded men in the provinces. We have the example of Prideaux and Haselrig hindering the examination of miscarriages at the election of the radical Thomas Scott for Aylesbury.[1] In this process, election tactics were primarily a matter of the timing and control of

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1. Addit.MSS. 37344, f.15v.

the writ, hence Prideaux's importance as a Commissioner of the Great Seal.[1]

This control of the Great Seal by their opponents caused sufficient concern to Essex's group to prompt them in September 1646 into initiating a successful move to appoint new Commissioners. Even so, we should not follow Holles in exaggerating the influence that Prideaux exercised,[2] for the delivery and implementation of the writ depended on two men, not one. If the Commissioner raised the possibilities of central management in elections, the High Sheriff very often represented the traditional, provincial opposition to centralisation, whether exercised from Westminster or from the controlling groups in its agents, the County Committees.

The examples that Underdown cites seem to highlight the advantage that the High Sheriff enjoyed through his physical control of county and small borough elections. The one example he gives of direct soliciting by Prideaux concerning the seat for Sir William Selby at Ilchester merely reveals the limitations of his influence both in Somerset and at Westminster. It should be noted that the all important writ was sent not to Pyne but to the High Sheriff, Sir John Horner who had already misused his authority to secure the return of his son in the County election.[3] Again Horner

1. Underdown, op.cit., 253.
2. Holles, Memoirs, p.42.
3. Addit.MSS.18780, f.178v; Hist.MSS.Comm., 13th Report (Portland MSS.) p.348.

did not direct the writ to the County Committee but to the Bailiff of Ilchester, who despite the seizure of the writ, proceeded with the election and returned Colonel Pyne's most outspoken opponent, the religious presbyterian Colonel William Strode, together with Thomas Hodges, 'a relatively obscure moderate'. Notwithstanding Pyne's subsequent producing of the original writ and the election of Sir William Selby and Alexander Pym, the Committee of Privileges at Westminster, under the chairmanship of the moderate Sir Robert Harley upheld the return of Strode and Hodges.[1]

Another factor that served to limit the hopes of electing pre-arranged 'party' candidates was the innate antipathy of the electors to strangers, to which John Ashe referred on his mission of supervising the elections. At Weymouth 'a poor, simple townsman', Matthew Allen, was returned in preference to outside candidates.[2] John Rushworth's reference, at an earlier stage of the search for a seat for Sir William Selby, to the difficulty of getting support when men had already engaged their interests for other

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1. D. Underdown, 'The Ilchester Election, February 1646', Somersetshire Arch. & Natural Hist.Soc., cx (1966), 51. Underdown perhaps goes too far in maintaining that the Committee of Privileges was under the control of moderates, judging by the outcome of Sir Charles Shirley's appeal concerning the election at Stafford, and the example given by Thomas Edwards of at least one radical's confidence that the Committee could be managed: Gangraena, iii, 255.
2. Hist.MSS.Comm., 13th Report, part 1 (Portland MSS.), p.307.

candidates is a further indication of local electoral arrangements and the problems they posed for any 'party' strategy.[1]

Even the influence of the army, which at least was on the spot, appears to have been remarkably limited. Several officers were returned in the three counties, but apart from Major General Skippon, elected for Barnstaple of which he was governor, they were mostly local commanders and all of them were local men, including the New Model colonel Robert Blake. It is possible that Prideaux's personal involvement in the Ilchester candidacy resulted from his inability to comply with Rushworth's suggestion that the writ for Tiverton should be sent quickly so as to enable Sir William Selby to stand while Sir Thomas Fairfax was himself present in the borough.[2] Even when Sir Thomas Fairfax was nominated together with Colonel Rich for Cirencester in Gloucestershire, the complaint of the burgesses to the House of Commons about pressure being exerted by officers of the army forced Lord Fairfax to disclaim any desire on the part of his son to be chosen. It is clear that once again the High Sheriff together with at least one representative of the leading local gentry acted against this intrusion.[3]

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1. Bell, Memorials, i, p.268.
2. Ibid., p.267.
3. Addit.MSS.31116, f.297; E 371(5): Perfect Occurrences, 8-15 Jan. 1646/7, p.13.

Rather than a central group of radicals managing a minority of provincial elections, it would seem that even in those cases it was the local interests that called the tune. For the radical County Committee leaders and the Army it was useful to have a direct access to Prideaux, but the apparent failure of such an advantage to produce electoral results must make us wary of reading into it anything as grandiose as 'party' management.

Dr. Morrill's study of Cheshire during the 1640s and 1650s reaches a similar conclusion from an analysis of Underdown's main example of central management, the contacts between Sir William Brereton in the North-west and John Lisle, Prideaux and Sir Peter Wentworth at Westminster.[1] The recruiter elections in Staffordshire are of considerable interest, not only because of the support given by Brereton to the radical leaders of the Committee at Stafford against the leaders of the Earl of Denbigh's interest of 1644, but because of the involvement of the Earl of Essex in those elections.

Stafford was the borough nearest to Chartley, Essex's leading provincial residence, and he certainly brought his influence to bear there in late 1645. The manoeuvring and tactics employed in the election of two members for that

1. J.S.Morrill, 'The Government of Cheshire During the Civil Wars and Interregnum' (Oxford Univ., D.Phil. thesis 1971), pp.232-8.

borough provide an interesting example of the conflict between the new and the old in local political power.[1] Ranged on one side were the new men who had risen to control the new parliamentary machinery for local government; on the other side were the representatives of traditional authority within the shire and borough: the High Sheriff and the Town Clerk.

Behind the former stood Sir William Brereton, the parliamentary commander of the region, who exercised his influence in favour of his brother-in-law, Sir Richard Skeffington and his close ally, John Swinfen.[2] Behind the opponents of this group stood the Earl of Essex, who in the past had enjoyed the nomination of one of the Stafford members. His influence before the election was limited to two letters to the Mayor and Borough, and to canvassing by his park-keeper.[3] Essex's main nominee was Sir Charles Shirley, his brother-in-law while the fourth candidate, Colonel Edward Leigh, also received the support of Colonel Rugeley, the Sheriff, and the Essex interest.

Again we see the advantage enjoyed by the Sheriff who, in this instance, appointed and held the election without informing Brereton. According to one witness when the

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1. v. Addit.MSS.28716 (Committee of Privileges 1646), ff.iv-29; also D. Brunton & D.H.Pennington, Members of the Long Parliament (London 1954), append.iii, pp.192-4, and D.H. Pennington & I.A. Roots, The Committee at Stafford 1643-1645 (Manchester, 1957), pp.lxxxi-lxxxii.
2. Addit.MSS.28716, ff.18v, 23.
3. Ibid., f.19; Addit.MSS.11332 (Letter Book of Sir William Brereton), f.46: Brereton to John Lisle (n.d.)

burgesses were asked to cry their choice only Shirley and Leigh were named, but it is clear that the menacing aspect of the Governor and Captain Foxall also had an impact. On a poll the leading contender for each faction was defeated, and their second-string candidates were returned. It is interesting to note that on this occasion the Committee of Privileges found against Essex's nominee, perhaps as a result of the revelation of his letters to the borough.

Although the Stafford election was fought within the context of county politics, rivalries and patronage, it can be seen how in some instances the members returned to Westminster could be absorbed into the 'party' conflict there without the operation of 'party' management. The Staffordshire elections of 1640 provided further indications of Essex's influence in all the other boroughs as well as in the selection of the Knights of the Shire,[1] but the recruiter elections evidenced a strengthening of Brereton's position as well as of localism. About the same time as the Stafford election another ally of Brereton, a Mr. Bradshaw, was defeated at Newcastle-under-Lyme by a locally born London merchant Samuel Terrick.[2] With the possible exception of George Abbott, returned for Tamworth,[3] the other recruiters must have restored Brereton's spirits.

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1. Snow, 'Essex the Rebel', pp.225-6, 238.
2. Addit.MSS.11332, f.45: Brereton to Prideaux (n.d.).
3. Snow, loc.cit., p.226.

An important factor in this improvement in the electoral showing of his Staffordshire allies must have been the replacement of Colonel Rugeley as High Sheriff by Edward Mainwaring, presumably upon the approach of Brereton's group in the Committee to William Lenthall in November 1645.[1] This only serves to emphasise further that the mainspring of tactics and the choice of candidates lay in the county, not at Westminster.

In fact the combination of a deepening political division at Westminster and the extension of elections into the more conservative and royalist counties of Wales and Cornwall, provided much more opportunity for 'party' management, but by the 'presbyterian' group not the radicals or 'middle group'. This was particularly true of the last batch of elections, those for Cornish boroughs. The traditional sources of political power in Cornwall had obviously been shaken and disrupted by the war, but they had not been superseded by a strongly antagonistic County Committee. Indeed the ability of ex-officers of the Duchy such as Anthony Nicholl and Thomas Gewen to influence elections was enhanced by their influence in the County Committee, the membership of which was of the same class as the royal administration prior to 1640.[2]

Although the army blindly accused Nicholl of using his

1. Bodl., MSS.Dep.C. 156 (Nalson), f.47: Committee at Stafford to Lenthall, 14 Nov.1645.
2. M. Coate, Cornwall in the Great Civil War and Interregnum 1642-1660 (2nd ed., Truro, 1963), p.221.

power in the West to procure the return of about 28 members for Cornwall to carry on 'presbyterian' designs, it is clear that local political moderation played the most important part.[1] Many of the members returned came of long-established families amongst the Cornish gentry, but there are some indications that in a few of the elections to replace the 22 disabled royalists there was some degree of 'party' management involved, at least to the extent of securing the return of men close to the 'presbyterian' group in the two Houses, and with an eye to Westminster politics.

The clearest example is Lionel Copley, a Yorkshireman whose importance in Holles's strategy in 1647 has been noted.[2] Having failed possibly to overcome Sir John Potts's commitment to his step-son at Castle Rising in Norfolk[3] and the Fairfax interest at Pontefract,[4] Copley finally found a seat at Bossinney with the assistance of either Anthony Nicholl or the Earl of Pembroke or a combination of both.[5] In addition, the return of Frances Holles and Sir John Maynard for Lostwithiel must have had something to do with the close connection of Lord Robartes with that borough.[6] Likewise the

1. F.2.63 Linc.(51): 'A Particular Charge....', pp.25-6.
2. Supra, p.420.
3. Addit.MSS.31116, f.243; Brunton & Pennington, Members, p.108
4. Bell, Memorials, i, pp.318-9.
5. Nicholl sat for Bossinney in the Short Parliament; V.A. Rowe, 'The Influence of the Earls of Pembroke on Parliamentary Elections, 1625-41', Eng.Hist.Rev., 1 (1935),253.
6. Lord Robartes was made Recorder of Lostwithiel in November 1646: Hist.MSS.Comm., Various Collections, I (1901), p.335.

election of Thomas Waller at Bodmin probably owed something to Anthony Nicholl. The return of Sir Philip Percival for Newport can be associated at least with the Irish interest in Holles's group, although it was secured by traditional family means.[1]

Wales and the Marches were other areas where royalism was strong, and in some counties the network of family connections appears to have retained considerable vitality despite the division between parliamentarians and royalists. One Welshman of particular interest in any study of 'presbyterian' influence in the recruiter elections is Richard Vaughan, earl of Carbery. His father had been a close associate of the 2nd earl of Essex[2] but had escaped his fate and that of Sir Gelly Meyrick, his father-in-law, whose son, Sir John, was the close adviser of the 3rd earl and M.P. for Newcastle-under-Lyme.

It was not only the army in 1647 which expressed suspicions at the close family friendship between the Vaughans and Devereux.[3] Amongst the papers of Sir Edward Walker there is a paper of queries addressed to royalist commanders at Swansea which clearly reveals distrust of the king's General of South Wales.[4] The queries concerned Carbery's

1. Addit.MSS.46931B, f.122: Percival to Lord Pres. of Connaught, 23 July 1647.
2. F.Jones, 'Golden Grove', Ceredigion-Jour.Cardiganshire Antiq.Soc., iv (1962), 260.
3. Clarke Papers, ii, (1894), p.157.
4. Nat.Lib.Wales, MSS.4849D (Sir Edward Walker), ff.102-3.

treating with the rebels in Pembrokeshire, using such intermediaries as Rowland Meyrick and Francis Meyrick, brother of Essex's adviser. Other questions concerned his protecting of Essex's interests in Carmarthenshire and Pembrokeshire, and those of the leading rebels in the latter county. Amongst those rebels figured Major General Rowland Langhorne, who had once been secretary to the Earl of Essex,[1] and who in conjunction with Sir William Lewis now used his influence to soften the blow for Carbery when he came into the parliament.[2]

There can be little doubt that this network of Devereux connections was strengthened by the policies and personnel of the County Committees in South Wales and the South Wales Committee at Westminster. The interest of Sir William Lewis, another close adviser to Essex, controlled the Breconshire Committee, and it would seem that the army was correct in accusing him of causing the appointment of ex-royalists to it, including Howell Gwynn, one of the commanders to whom the queries concerning Carbery had been directed.[3] It is no surprise to find that Sir William's son, Lewis Lewis, was returned as a recruiter member for Brecon. Howell Gwynn was also a committee-man for Carmarthenshire,

1. F.Peck, Desiderata Curiosa (London 1732, 1735), ii, bk. XII, p.17.
2. F.2.63 Linc. (52): 'A Full Vindication.....', p.26.
3. A.H.Dodd, Studies in Stuart Wales (Cardiff, 1952), p.134.

where the Carbery interest was strongly represented, including the earl's cousin, Sir Edward Vaughan.[1]

The same note of moderation was sounded in Montgomeryshire where Edward Vaughan was the most influential committeeman.[2] In October 1645, Brereton had predicted the return of a 'good man' by that county but nothing materialised of his suggestions for the pricking of a sheriff and sending of the writ.[3] When the elections finally took place over a year later the results must have been very different to Brereton's expectations. Edward Vaughan secured the county seat and George Devereux the borough place, possibly with the aid of soldiers.[4] The latter, clearly a 'party' choice,[5] was suspended from sitting when he was accused of being a royalist under sequestration, while the nature of Vaughan's politics perhaps can be gauged from the fact that Cromwell and Haselrig acted as tellers in November 1646 for dropping him from the Committee for Montgomeryshire.[6]

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1. Ibid., pp.132-3.
2. Ibid., pp.113, 116, 128.
3. Addit.MSS.11332, f.8: Brereton to Ashurst, 21 Oct.1645.
4. Cornwall R.O., MSS.BC/24/2 (Buller Papers Historical), f.112: Robert Pooley to Francis Buller, 25 Nov.1646.
5. Clarke MSS., MSS.110, f.15: Heads of Demands to be made to the Parliament (n.d.). v. also W.R. Williams, The Parliamentary History of the Principality of Wales from the Earliest Times to the Present Day, 1541-1895 (Brecknock, 1895), p.149. It should also be noted that the Earl of Essex had been Lord Lieutenant of Montgomeryshire, and that George Devereux had already been appointed a Deputy Lieutenant of that county in February 1645: L.J.7, p.216; C.J.IV, 56.
6. C.J.IV, p.726.

Although Arthur Annesley had strong ties with Carmarthenshire and was appointed to the Committees of that county and Pembrokeshire, his election as Knight of the Shire for Radnorshire clearly owed much to the influence of Sir Robert Harley, whose younger son was returned for New Radnor.[1] The Harley interest was particularly strong in Herefordshire where it clashed with the aspirations of Colonel John Birch, the governor of Hereford. The election of Colonel Edward Harley as Knight of the Shire was indeed largely the outcome of a local struggle between traditional influence and intruding military power,[2] but one can still detect a hint of 'party', not so much in the management of the election or the differences between the contestants, but in the political allegiance of Colonel Harley's friend, Colonel Edward Massey who used his influence in the county. Massey was close to Essex's group and indeed there does seem to have been an electoral connection between Sir Robert Harley and the earl.[3]

The conclusion to be drawn from this rather cursory look at the 'presbyterian' involvement in the recruiter elections reinforces Underdown's point that they had less need of organising electioneering, at least in the localities; yet

1. Underdown, 'Party Management.....', Eng.Hist.Rev., lxxxiii, 258.
2. Ibid., 245.
3. Brit.Mus., Loan 29/82 (Harley), file 2: Dr.Wm.Sherborne to Colonel Edward Harley, 7 Nov.1646; Loan 29/84, file 5: Richard Wigmore to Colonel Harley, 2 Oct.1646.

this was so not only because constituencies in Cornwall and Wales were more likely to return moderates, but also because the established parliamentary members and commanders from those areas tended to be more conservative. Major General Mitton had a reputation for moderation in his dealings with royalists in North Wales, and was closely associated with John Glyn at Westminster.[1] Furthermore, Glyn played a major role in securing the suspension of sequestrations in North Wales, a charge that was levelled by the army mainly against Sir Robert Harley and Sir William Lewis in South Wales.[2] It is likely that Sir Thomas Middleton, together with Colonel Roger Pope, recruiter M.P. for Merionethshire was converted to the king's cause[3] and through his offices were returned his son for Flint, and possibly Sir Richard Price for Cardiganshire.[4]

It is clear that the political character of recruiters became more conservative during the course of 1646 and early 1647 as elections were held in conservative counties, which also coincided with areas of political influence exercised by leaders of Essex's group at Westminster. There certainly

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1. Univ.Coll. of N. Wales, Bangor, Penrhyn Castle MSS.421; Archbishop Williams to (Lord Bulkeley), 4 Feb.1646/7; Nat.Lib.Wales, MSS.9063E (Wynn of Gwydir Papers), no. 1817: Colonel Bodvel to (Maurice Wynn), 9 Feb.1646/7.
2. Nat.Lib.Wales, Mytton MSS. 1597-1690 (Sweeney Hall), f.32: T.Ed. to Mitton, 9 Apr. 1647; Clarke Papers, ii, p.157.
3. Barwick, Life of Barwick, pp.49-52.
4. Dodd, op.cit., p.132.

seems to have been a general 'party' strategy - the removal of Prideaux and his fellow Commissioners has been mentioned, and just before this Massey wrote to Edward Harley that 'we' were moving for the writs for several counties.[1] Underdown is correct in regarding Massey's correspondence at this time as evidence of 'presbyterian' electoral management, but I wonder if it was belated, as he suggests.[2] I see the leaders of Holles's group biding their time, probably because they had no alternative while active hostilities against the king continued in those very counties where their greatest electoral influence lay. By mid-1646 the situation seemed ripe for a 'presbyterian' advance on the broadest front.

The approaching end of the war seemed to offer them the opportunity for eliminating the New Model, attracting the moderates in the Commons by the prospect of a settlement with Charles, and increasing their voting strength by pressing for the last sizeable block of recruiter elections. The letters of Massey referred to above, the presence of Sir William Lewis in Breconshire in July 1646 with the writ for Brecon,[3] the raising of the issue of the Cornish boroughs in August,[4] the removal of the 'independent' Commissioners of the

1. Hist.MSS.Comm., 14th Report, part 2 (Portland MSS.), p.144; original in Brit.Mus.Loan 29/175 (Harley), part 3, f.41: Massey to Colonel Harley, 8 Aug.1646.
2. Underdown, 'Party Management.....', Eng.Hist.Rev., lxxxiii, 258.
3. F.2.63 Linc.(52): 'A Full Vindication.....', p.29.
4. Addit.MSS.10114, f.17.

Great Seal, the expectations of Essex's group concerning a satisfactory answer from the king to the Newcastle Propositions, and their moves against the New Model seem to me to be too close in time to be regarded as mere coincidence. The return of the writ by Sir William Lewis was possibly not unconnected with this strategy. The reason he gave in his reply to the army's accusations was that Worcester was only on the point of being delivered and that royalists still held their county offices. This might well have been so, but one wonders whether the presence of a large detachment of the New Model army on the doorstep of Breconshire was not the real reason. There was no need for haste since that complicating factor was soon to be no more.

By the time the new members for Wales and Cornwall began to enter the House the 'presbyterian' strategy of mid-1646 had foundered on the problem of the Scots. Instead many were in time to reinforce Holles's new policy of negotiating the withdrawal of the Scots, a policy which also succeeded in attracting the support of the more moderate recruiters already sitting, whose suspicions of the Scots had propelled many of them into the arms of the Vane-St.John group.[1] In this 'presbyterian' design it would appear that the general strategy was decided upon and directed from

1. Holles, Memoirs, p.44.

Westminster, whilst the favourable political situation in those counties allowed the election tactics to be controlled on the spot by individual members of Essex's group, compliant Committeemen, family networks, or a combination of them.

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