The Rally-Intensive Ground Campaign: Electioneering and Party Adaptation in Tanzania

Dan Paget
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Abstract

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This thesis is about election campaigning in sub-Saharan Africa. It argues that the central feature of many African ground campaigns is the prominence assumed by the rally. Where aggregate rally attendance is high, ground campaigns are 'rally-intensive'; this rally-intensiveness is key to understanding how parties electioneer and organise. These assertions complicate comparative typologies of election campaigns.

Part I examines under what circumstances ground campaigns become rally-intensive. It draws on historic studies of electioneering in both Western and African countries to show that campaigns became more rally-intensive after the proliferation of electronic amplification. Thereby, it illustrates that many rally-intensive campaigns emerged in the twentieth century and across continents. Next, it analyses Afrobarometer data to examine African rally attendance. It reveals that rising Internet, newspaper and television penetration reduces rally attendance. While this suggests that media penetration dampens rally attendance, there is evidence that other factors buoy it.

Part II examines electioneering in Tanzania. It analyses a survey conducted before and after the 2015 general election, and reveals some evidence that rallies have mobilisational and persuasive effects. Next, it draws on extensive participant observation of rallies and demonstrates that parties expend enormous efforts 'producing' rallies. Finally, it shows that canvassers alter who they contact in anticipation of who will attend rallies. Local actors' roles in these tasks make them crucial auxiliaries in rally-intensive campaigns.

Part III uses qualitative evidence to demonstrate that Tanzanian parties have developed new, capital-intensive means of producing rallies. Inter-candidate and inter-party competition drove processes of rally capitalisation. Accordingly, parties fostered closer relationships with financiers to raise more funds. Thereby, the rally became a vehicle of party adaptation. These findings are instructive about party electioneering and organisation in Tanzania, but they are applicable by degrees wherever rally-intensive ground campaigns can be found, both in sub-Saharan Africa and further abroad.

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List of acronyms

CCM	*Chama cha Mapinduzi* (Party of the Revolution)
Chadema	*Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo* (Party of Democracy and Development)
CPP	Convention People's Party
CUF	Civic United Front
FORD-A	Foundation for the Restoration of Democracy-Asili
FORD-K	Foundation for the Restoration of Democracy-Kenya
KANU	Kenya African National Union
KPU	Kenya People's Union
MC	Master of ceremonies
MP	Member of Parliament
NCNC	National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons
PA	Public address (system)
RDA	*Le Rassemblement Démocratique Africain* (African Democratic Rally)
SFIO	*La Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière* (the French Section of the Workers' International)
TANU	Tanganyika African National Union
TACCEO	Tanzania Civil Society Consortium of Election Observation
TEMCO	Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

Chapter 1. Introduction

One afternoon, a great crowd stood in Kirumba Stadium in Mwanza, Tanzania. It had gathered to see Dr. John Pombe Magufuli, the presidential candidate of *Chama cha Mapinduzi* (CCM). It was the eve of the 2015 general election, and CCM was holding its final campaign rally. When Magufuli arrived, it was with great pomp. He was escorted by an honour guard of cars and motorcycles, and entered the stadium to the accompaniment of a fanfare of party songs. As he mounted the stage, he was greeted by a phalanx of cabinet ministers and party leaders, dressed in CCM yellow and green, and was bathed in cheers from an adoring crowd. While the audience's attention focussed on Magufuli, around him, the auxiliary components of the rally were at work. Security guards patrolled the grounds. The edges of the stage teemed with camera crews whose feeds were being broadcast nationwide. Overhead, a drone hummed as it sought out the best shots of the burgeoning crowd. Among the spectators stood thousands of party activists adorned in party regalia. They had worked to assemble the audience and their presence paid colourful testament to the party's mass base. In short, it was a feat of electioneering on an incredible scale.

This spectacle of mass campaigning was just the tip of the iceberg; that day, Tanzania was abuzz with campaign activity. In Dar es Salaam, on the same afternoon, the leading opposition coalition was also holding the final rally for its presidential candidate, Edward Lowassa. The venue, Jangwani Grounds, had hosted Magufuli just the day before. In fact, these two rivals had been passing each other like this for two months as they criss-crossed the country, addressing sometimes as many as seven public meetings in a day. These presidential candidates were not campaigning alone. Each day of the campaign, rival slates of hundreds of parliamentary candidates and thousands of councillor candidates took to

the stump. On the eve of the 2015 general election in Tanzania, one could hear a candidate for elected office speak in almost every ward and district in the country.

That afternoon, I watched most of Magufuli's address from a television screen at Mwanza Airport, five miles away. My eight months of field research were drawing to a close. My intention from the outset had been psephological; as a PhD student, I had decided to contribute to the much-neglected field of election campaigning in sub-Saharan Africa, and I had resolved to focus on the ground campaign in particular. Across much of the world, the canvass is the most common and important aspect of the ground war.[1] At first, I assumed that the same would be true of Tanzania, but as my research proceeded, I realised that I had been mistaken. The most important aspect of the ground campaign in Tanzania was the rally.

Tanzania's experience of electioneering is not uncommon. Thousands of rallies are convened during election campaigns across much of sub-Saharan Africa. In Ghana, President Mahama closed his 2016 campaign by addressing crowds in four regions in 24 hours.[2] During Kenya's 2017 election campaign, politicians blurred the boundary between ground and air campaign as they pressed more and more helicopters into service to carry them from one rally to the next.[3] In Zambia, President Lungu began his 2016 re-election campaign with a rally at Heroes Stadium which 'overflowed with all the stands, pitch and outside full rising to an estimated crowd of 120,000.'[4] In each of these cases, rallies

[1] Rasmus Nielsen. 2012. *Ground Wars: Personalized Communication in Political Campaigns*. Princeton University Press.
[2] Billie McTernan. 2016. "Ghana's Ruling Party Wins Accra's Battle of the Rallies as Election Nears." *The Africa Report*, December 6.
[3] Jacob Ngetich. 2016. "Leaders Acquire Choppers as 2017 Duel Shapes up." *The Standard*, Nairobi, September 26.
[4] Staff reporter. 2016. "PF Pulls Record Crowd as It Launches Its 2016 Campaigns, Inonge Wina to Be Running Mate." *Lusaka Times*, Lusaka, May 21.

matched their Tanzanian counterparts in scale and equalled them as spectacles. They became both the defining image and the premier platform of the campaign.

Given the palpable presence of the rally, it is remarkable how little attention it has received in recent research. Plenty of studies acknowledge mass rallies in passing. One discussion of campaigning in Uganda recites a list of all the campaign methods that a party might use: 'Rallies and other public meetings, parades, and marches, ubiquitous posters and banners, radio and television advertisements, and house-to-house canvassing.'[5] Others examine mass rallies in detail, but only as a lens to other subjects. For example, some study rallies as gateways to politicians' rhetoric,[6] or more broadly, their appeals to voters;[7] others still examine where politicians convene mass meetings to make inferences about targeting strategy;[8] others still have explored all number of issues by examining public meetings, ranging from the supervision of bureaucrats[9] to gendered clientelism.[10] Therefore, in most studies in which the rally has featured prominently, it has been not an object of study, but a medium through which to understand other phenomena, a site at which something else can be examined. Therefore, the causes and consequences of the rally at large have gone largely neglected in the literature.

[5] Jeffrey Conroy-Krutz. 2016. "Electoral Campaigns as Learning Opportunities: Lessons from Uganda." *African Affairs* 115(460):516-540.
[6] Miles Larmer and Alastair Fraser. 2007. "Of Cabbages and King Cobra: Populist Politics and Zambia's 2006 Election." *African Affairs* 106(425):611–37; Foucher, Vincent. 2007. "Blue Marches: Public Performance and Political Turnover in Senegal." in *Staging Politics: Power and Performance in Asia and Africa*. London: IB Tauris.
[7] Nic Cheeseman and Miles Larmer. 2015. "Ethnopopulism in Africa: Opposition Mobilization in Diverse and Unequal Societies." *Democratization* 22(1):22–50; Elena Gadjanova. 2013. "Who Plays the Ethnic Card? Types of Ethnic Appeals in Political Campaigns and Their Determinants in Centralized Multiethnic States." Princeton University.
[8] Jeremy Horowitz. 2016. "The Ethnic Logic of Campaign Strategy in Diverse Societies: Theory and Evidence from Kenya." *Comparative Political Studies* 49(3):324–56; Mascha Rauschenbach. 2017. "Mobilizing Supporters: The Allocation of Campaign Rallies in Ghana's 2012 Elections." Manheim University; Danielle Resnick. 2013. *Urban Poverty and Party Populism in African Democracies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[9] Euclides Gonçalves. 2013. "Orientaçôes Superiores: Time and Bureaucratic Authority in Mozambique." *African Affairs* 112(449):602–22.
[10] Lisa Gillman. 2011. *The Dance of Politics: Gender, Performance, and Democratization in Malawi*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

This thesis examines the circumstances under which the rally becomes central to election campaigning, and how parties' campaign strategies and organisation change when it does. In this opening chapter, I lay the theoretical foundations of the project. In the next section, I introduce the comparative literature on election campaigning and political mobilisation at large. I set the Africanist literature on election campaigning in contrast to the comparative literature and expose the former's shortcomings. Thereby, I set out the primary literatures to which this thesis contributes. In the second section, I outline my points of departure from these literatures. I introduce the concept of the rally-intensive ground campaign as a distinct ideal type and develop the theoretical space to accommodate it in existing typologies. In the third section, I describe the approach that I take in this thesis. I explain why I choose to study one case, why that case is Tanzania, and which methods I employ to study it. In the fourth section, I outline the argument of this thesis, and how it builds outwards from the concept of the rally-intensive ground campaign.

Understanding and categorising election campaigns

In competitive election campaigns, political parties grapple with the challenge of how to win citizens' support, and ultimately, their votes. How parties get votes in Western countries has been studied by voluminous literatures on political parties and political communication. In part, winning voters' support is a matter of honing messages. Parties choose policy positions to narrow the distance between them and voters' most preferred positions, relative to other parties' positions. [11] Equally, they compete to present themselves as the best providers of widely desired public policies.[12] To make the most of these appeals to voters, they dedicate their communication with voters to four tasks above others. They

[11] Anthony Downs. 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy." *The Journal of Political Economy* 65(2):135–50.
[12] Donald Stokes. 1963. "Spatial Models of Party Competition." *American Political Science Review* 57(2):368–77.

inform voters about these positions, filling in information that voters do not have, and contesting information that they might have. They *persuade* them by bringing voters' policy preferences closer to their own.[13] They *prime* issues on which they hold an electoral advantage over their rivals to make them more salient in voters' minds.[14] Lastly, they *frame* debates by reinterpreting them and emphasising alternative issues within them.[15] All the while, the effectiveness of these messages depends on how they are delivered. Politicians attune their rhetoric,[16] play to voters' biases,[17] and fashion their visual images[18] to win every extra vote.

Whatever messages parties choose, they must convey them to voters to win their support. Parties wage 'air wars' through mass media. They strive to influence what is written in the press, what is reported on radio and television, what appears on social media and how voters' attention moves between them.[19] They lobby journalists, buy adverts, issue statements and dispatch spokespeople to media outlets, among other things.[20] Simultaneously, parties wage 'ground wars', in which they make contact with individuals by dispatching mail, holding meetings, and deploying canvassers.[21] All the while, parties are joined by numerous local actors. Some join a 'campaign assemblage'[22] and explicitly lend

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[13] Gerald Kramer. 1970. "The Effects of Precinct-Level Canvassing on Voter Behavior." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 34(4):560.
[14] Dietram Scheufele and David Tewksbury. 2007. "Framing, Agenda Setting, and Priming: The Evolution of Three Media Effects Models." *Journal of Communication* 57(1):9–20.
[15] James Druckman. and Kjerstern Nelson. 2003. "Framing and Deliberation: How Citizen Conversation Limits Elite Influence." *American Journal of Political Science* 47(4):729–45.
[16] Thomas Nelson. 2004. "Policy Goals, Public Rhetoric, and Political Attitudes." *Journal of Politics* 66(2):581–605.
[17] Kevin Arceneaux. 2012. "Cognitive Biases and the Strength of Political Arguments." *American Journal of Political Science* 56(2):271–85.
[18] Gabriel Lenz and Chappell Lawson. 2011. "Looking the Part: Television Leads Less Informed Citizens to Vote Based on Candidates' Appearance." *American Journal of Political Science* 55(3):574–89.
[19] Andrew Chadwick. 2013. *The Hybrid Media System: Politics and Power*. Oxford: Oxford University Press; David Swanson and Paolo Mancini. 1996. *Politics, Media, and Modern Democracy: An International Study of Innovations in Electoral Campaigning and Their Consequences*. New York: Praegar; Daniel Hallin and Paolo Mancini. 2004. *Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[20] ibid; Chadwick, *The Hybrid Media System*; John Sides, Daron Shaw, Matt Grossman, and Keena Lipsitz. 2012. *Campaigns and Elections: Rules, Reality, Strategy, Choice*. New York: W.W. Norton and Company.
[21] Nielsen; John Sides and others.
[22] Nielsen.

their services to parties. Others operate beyond the yoke of party coordination, ranging from online activists to civil associations.[23] Through these various forms of campaign contact, parties multiply the iterations of their messages that voters receive. Thereby, they convince voters to turn out and vote for them. As Shanto Iyengar and Adam Simon put it, 'adequate exposure is all that candidates need; the more people they reach, the more likely they are to win.'[24]

Each party's challenge of imparting their messages to voters is in turn compounded by voter heterogeneity. Some voters are likely to turn out; others are not.[25] Some voters' support can be assumed; others' cannot.[26] The effect of a message upon a recipient's voting intentions depends upon her prior partisanship,[27] her political knowledge, her rates of information retention,[28] and her interest in politics, among other things.[29] Likewise, the effectiveness of campaign contact with a voter depends upon the messenger,[30] and the conversations that voters have, among numerous other factors.[31] Therefore, if campaign contact is not targeted, it is likely to have limited effects.[32] For this reason, winning votes is

[23] Cristian Vaccari. 2013. *Digital Politics in Western Democracies*. Baltimore, Maryland: John Hopkins University Press; Chadwick. *The Hybrid Media System*; Rachel Gibson. 2015. "Party Change, Social Media and the Rise of 'Citizen-Initiated' Campaigning." *Party Politics* 21(2):183–97; Robert Huckfeldt and John Sprague. 1987. "Networks in Context: The Social Flow of Political Information." *The American Political Science Review* 81(4):1197–1216.
[24] Shanto Iyengar and Adam Simon. 2000. "New Perspectives and Evidence on Political Communication and Campaign Effects." *Annual Review of Psychology* 12(8):727–32.
[25] Kaat Smets and Carolien van Ham. 2013. "The Embarrassment of Riches? A Meta-Analysis of Individual-Level Research on Voter Turnout." *Electoral Studies* 32(2):344–59.
[26] Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes. 1960. *The American Voter*. Chicago: Chicago University Press; William Mayer. 2008. "What Exactly Is a Swing Voter?" in *The Swing Voter in American Politics*. Washington: Bookings Institution Press.
[27] Paul Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet. 1948. *The People's Choice. How the Voter Makes up His Mind in a Presidential Campaign*. New York: Colombia University Press; John Zaller. 1992. *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[28] Dennis Chong and James Druckman. 2010. "Dynamic Public Opinion: Communication Effects over Time." *American Political Science Review* 104(4):663–80.
[29] Kevin Arceneaux and David W. Nickerson. 2009. "Who Is Mobilized to Vote? A Re-Analysis of Eleven Randomized Field Experiments." *American Journal of Political Science* 53(1):1–16.
[30] Iyengar and Simon.
[31] Druckman and Kjersten; Baker, Andy, Barry Ames, and Lucio Renno. 2006. "Social Context and Campaign Volatility in New Democracies: Networks and Neighborhoods in Brazil's 2002 Elections." *American Journal of Political Science* 50(2):382–99; Huckfeldt and Sprague, "Networks in Context".
[32] Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet; Lance Bennett and Shanto Iyengar. 2008. "A New Era of Minimal

not just about developing the right messages or about multiplying campaign contact; it is about targeting it too,[33] the very two tasks that Ben Epstein identifies as common across political communication tools and orders.[34]

The importance of multiplying and targeting campaign contact may be common across competitive election campaigns. However, the methods that parties use to multiply campaign contact are not. Neither are their targeting strategies. The literature on Western countries distinguishes between campaigns by reference to their modernity or their professionalisation. Across these campaign types, parties contact voters using different methods, and they adopt different targeting strategies. Further still, they organise differently. Pippa Norris, David Farrell and Paul Webb, and with some qualifications, Farrell all advance remarkably similar typologies of election campaigns with commensurable categories, separated by equivalent boundaries and criteria. [35] Furthermore, Jay Blumler and Dennis Kavanagh distinguish between equivalent 'ages of political communication',[36] and Epstein distinguishes between four 'political communication orders'.[37] Some authors emphasise cultural processes of Americanisation or professionalisation as the driving force behind changes in campaigning. [38] However, to a considerable extent they agree on the broad changes that have taken place. Even putting

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Effects? The Changing Foundations of Political Communication." *Journal of Communication* 58(4):707–31; Joshua Kalla and David Broockman. 2017. "The Minimal Persuasive Effects of Campaign Contact in General Elections: Evidence from 49 Field Experiments." *American Political Science Review* 112(1):148–66.

[33] Sides and others; Herrnson, Paul. 2000. *Congressional Elections: Campaigning at Home and in Washington*. Washington DC: QC Press.

[34] Ben Epstein. 2018. *The Only Constant is Change: Technology, Political Communication, and Innovation Over Time*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[35] Pippa Norris. 2000. *A Virtuous Circle: Political Communications in Post-Industrial Societies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; David Farrell. 1996. "Campaign Strategies and Tactics." in *Comparies Democracies: Elections and Voting in Global Perspective*. Los Angeles: Sage Publications; David Farrell and Paul Webb. 2000. "Political Parties as Campaign Organizations." *Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies* 102–28.

[36] Jay Blumler and Dennis Kavanagh. 1999. "The Third Age of Political Communication: Influences and Features." *Political Communication* 16(3):209–30.

[37] Epstein.

[38] William Field. 1994. "On the Americanization of Electioneering." *Electoral Studies* 13(1):58–63; Fritz Plasser and Gunda Plasser. 2002. *Global Political Campaigning: A Worldwide Analysis of Campaign Professionals and Their Practices*. Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group.

aside the congruence between these particular typologies, they are largely in agreement with the comparative literature on this subject.[39] Altogether, as Andrea Römmele summarises, 'Despite these differences in nomenclature [about modernity or Americanisation], there is considerable agreement between these scholars'.[40] I introduce these works by taking Norris' typology of election campaigns as my entry point, for simplicity's sake.

Norris distinguishes between three types of campaign: the 'pre-modern', the 'modern' and the 'post-modern'.[41] This is illustrated in Figure 1 below. I have taken the liberty of appending alternative names in brackets to each campaign type, that unlike Norris' terms do not carry modernist baggage. To do so, I borrow in part from Andrew Chadwick's concept of hybrid media systems.[42] These fundamental differences in political communication environments underpin the variation in methods of campaign contact, targeting strategies and party organisation which I have described.

Figure 1: Pippa Norris' schema of election campaigns

Pre-modern (ground-intensive) campaign	Modern (television-intensive) campaign	Post-modern (hybrid) campaign

Norris' 'pre-modern campaign' is a ground-intensive one. In pre-modern campaigns, mass media, in particular television, either have shallow penetration, or have not yet proliferated. Consequently, communication through those media plays a supporting role in the campaign. The mainstay of campaign activity is local, face-to-face campaign contact such as

[39] Leon Epstein. 1980. *Political Parties in Western Democracies*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers; Ralph Negrine and Stylianos Papathanassopoulos. 1996. "The 'Americanization' of Political Communication: A Critique." *The International Journal of Press/Politics* 1(2):45–62; Robert Dinkin. 1989. *Campaigning in America. A History of Electoral Practices*. New York: Greenwood Publishing.
[40] Andrea Römmele. 2003. "Political Parties, Party Communication and New Information and Communication Technologies." *Party Politics* 9(1):7–20.
[41] Norris. *A Virtuous Circle*.
[42] Chadwick. *The Hybrid Media System*.

'torchlight parades, barbecues, glee clubs, and mass meetings'.[43] As a consequence, political communication is dominated by parties' agents and is often deeply partisan; there is little that homogenises debate or moderates voters' views.[44] These conditions enable parties to capture and seal off segments of the electorate. In pre-modern campaigns, parties concentrate on mobilising these partisan blocs and rarely mobilise support across them.[45] Cadre and mass parties, as conceived of by Maurice Duverger,[46] are pre-eminent in pre-modern campaigns. They are best suited to mobilise the resources to run the energetic ground campaigns which are key to victory.[47]

In the 'modern campaign', direct and local campaign contact is 'supplemented, but not replaced' by mass media.[48] Face-to-face campaign efforts 'become ancillary in general elections to mediated channels of party-voter communication'[49] such as the newspaper, the radio and most of all, television. Indeed, in the modern campaign, Norris writes that 'national television becomes the principal forum of campaign events, supplementing other media.'[50] However, in the modern campaign, mass media channels are few in number, and their audiences are passive recipients of information. Mass media reception is concentrated into the hands of a small number of broadcasters and news outlets that form media oligopolies. Therefore, these channels of mass communication are gatekeepers to political opinion-making, and parties strive to influence their content. Equally, the influence of mass media moderates political debate; it exposes large, heterogeneous audiences to the same

[43] Norris. *A Virtuous Circle.*
[44] ibid.
[45] Richard Katz and Peter Mair. 1994. *How Parties Organize: Change and Adaptation in Party Organizations in Western Democracies*. London: Sage Publications; Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan. 1967. *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives.* Free Press; Blumler and Kavanagh.
[46] Maurice Duverger. 1954. *Political Parties: Their Organisation and Activity in the Modern State*. London: Methuen & Co.
[47] Norris. *A Virtuous Circle.*
[48] ibid.
[49] ibid.
[50] ibid: 134.

terms of debates, and draws political discussion into orbit around the same set of issues.[51] Accordingly, parties focus less on communicating with their partisan bases and more on voters beyond them.[52] These changes in mass media underpin not only differences in how parties multiply campaign contact and who they target; they also alter how they organise. As mass media penetration deepens and campaigns become modern, parties shed their mass bases and take on the character of catch-all parties. Others writing in this literature echo these conclusions,[53] although some stress the limitations of media influence on party organisation[54] and others stress the complication of intervening factors.[55]

In contrast, the post-modern campaign involves the proliferation of mass media channels and the supplementation of conventional mass media by cable television, social media and internet news.[56] Norris' work on these subjects has been supplemented and in some respects superseded by later works that have reviewed and responded to further developments in political communication. These proliferating channels and new media provide voters not only with a menu of media forms and channels, but new avenues through which they can participate.[57] Norris suggested that these participatory avenues would reinforce existing patterns of partisanship and participation.[58] However, subsequent works have found that they have also produced new generations of independent 'citizen campaigners'[59] and 'party campaigners.'[60] This has provided avenues for dissent and new

[51] Epstein; Blumler and Kavanagh.
[52] Otto Kircheimer. 1966. "The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems." in *Political Parties and Political Development*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
[53] Richard Katz and Peter Mair. 1995. "Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party." *Party Politics* 1(1):5–28; Katz and Mair, *How Parties Organize*; Epstein; Kircheimer; Dinkin; Blumler and Kavanagh.
[54] Vaccari. *Digital Politics in Western Democracies*.
[55] Alan Ware. 1985. *Breakdown of Democratic Party Organization, 1940-80*. Oxford: Clarendon Press
[56] Norris. *A Virtuous Circle*; Farrell and Webb; Farrell.
[57] Pippa Norris. 2003. "Preaching to the Converted?: Pluralism, Participation and Party Websites." *Party Politics* 9(1):21–45; Vaccari, *Digital Politics in Western Democracies*; Chadwick, *The Hybrid Media System*.
[58] Pippa Norris. 2001. *Digital Divide: Civic Engagement, Information Poverty, and the Internet Worldwide*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[59] Gibson.

voices in electoral politics,[61] and given voters and smaller voices the ability to influence mass media.[62] This leads to greater differentiation between voter engagement and voter learning.[63] Equally, it has affected voter partisanship[64] and the partisan content of the news that they receive.[65] It has also made voters' engagement with and reception of news more critical, exemplified for example by the phenomenon of dual-screening political debates.[66] Indeed, news media and in particular their news cycles become more interconnected. Andrew Chadwick characterises these media systems as 'hybrid'.[67] These changes in turn have been mediated by context. Cristian Vaccari, among others, illustrates the extent to which these changes in citizens have been refracted through national context,[68] contexts such as party systems, cultures of journalism and patterns of news consumption.[69]

Accordingly, parties have changed their behaviour, influencing the content of these media, but also differentiating messages between them, adjusting their messages in response to these diverse audiences.[70] In the 1990s and early 2000s, change seemed incremental and even lacklustre. Online campaigning was largely confined to the development of

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[60] Cristian Vaccari and Augusto Valeriani. 2016. "Party Campaigners or Citizen Campaigners? How Social Media Deepen and Broaden Party-Related Engagement." *The International Journal of Press/Politics* 21(3):294–312.
[61] Chadwick. *The Hybrid Media System*; Vaccari. *Digital Politics in Western Democracies*; Luzia Helfer. 2016. "Media Effects on Politicians: An Individual-Level Political Agenda-Setting Experiment." *The International Journal of Press/Politics* 21(2):233–52.
[62] Chadwick. *The Hybrid Media System*.
[63] Markus Prior. 2005. "News vs. Entertainment: How Increasing Media Choice Widens Gaps in Political Knowledge and Turnout." *American Journal of Political Science* 49(3):577–92; Paula Chakravartty and Srirupa Roy. 2013. "Media Pluralism Redux: Towards New Frameworks of Comparative Media Studies 'Beyond the West.'" *Political Communication* 30(3):349–70.
[64] Yphtach Lelkes, Gaurav Sood, and Shanto Iyengar. 2017. "The Hostile Audience: The Effect of Access to Broadband Internet on Partisan Affect." *American Journal of Political Science* 61(1):5–20.
[65] Heinz Brandenburg and Marcel Van Egmond. 2012. "Pressed into Party Support? Media Influence on Partisan Attitudes during the 2005 UK General Election Campaign." *British Journal of Political Science* 42(2):441–63; Matthew Levendusky. 2013. "Why Do Partisan Media Polarize Viewers?" *American Journal of Political Science* 57(3):611–23.
[66] Cristian Vaccari, Andrew Chadwick, and Ben O'Loughlin. 2015. "Dual Screening the Political: Media Events, Social Media, and Citizen Engagement." *Journal of Communication* 65(6):1041–61.
[67] Chadwick. *The Hybrid Media System*.
[68] Vaccari. *Digital Politics in Western Democracies*.
[69] Blumler and Kavanagh; Richard Davis, Jody Baumgartner, Peter Francia, and Jonathan Morris. 2008. "The Internet in US Election Campaigns." in *Routledge Handbook of Internet Politics*. London: Routledge; Philip Howard. 2005. *New Media Campaigns and the Managed Citizen*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[70] Vaccari. *Digital Politics in Western Democracies*.

professional but largely static websites, primarily by large parties.[71] Gradually, online campaigning became more prominent and more central. Howard Dean's 2004 primary campaign and Barack Obama's 2008 presidential campaigns became trail-blazers.[72] Parties have also gradually taken advantage of 'Web 2.0' platforms.[73] However, the evidence suggests that this new age has not precipitated universal changes.[74] Instead, the extent to which parties campaign online varies, in line with theories of adaptation outlined by Rachel Gibson and Andrea Römmele.[75] Some parties have used online campaigning to supplement their existing activities,[76] while others have diverted enormous resources to online campaigning.[77] Others still, especially new parties, have come to resemble in some respects 'cyber parties' which have greater presence online than on the ground.[78] In sum, Norris and the literatures on election campaigning identify distinct types of campaigns and enumerate various ways in which electioneering and party organisation differ within them.

This nexus of works on political parties and political communication makes up the literature on election campaigning. While this literature is sometimes characterised as comparative, in fact, it is dominated by studies of economically advanced countries in the Western world. Indeed, many of the studies which I have described above explicitly limit their domains of application to the West. A small but growing literature has sought to

[71] Rachel Gibson, Michael Margolis, David Resnick, and Stephen Ward. 2003. "Election Campaigning on the WWW in the US and the UK: A Comparative Analysis." *Party Politics* 9(1):47–75.
[72] Chadwick. *The Hybrid Media System*; Andrew Chadwick and Philip Howard. 2008. *Routledge Handbook of Internet Politics*. London: Routledge.
[73] Augusto Valeriani and Cristian Vaccari. 2017. "Political Talk on Mobile Instant Messaging Services: A Comparative Analysis of Germany, Italy, and the UK." *Information Communication and Society*:1–17; Vaccari, *Digital Politics in Western Democracies*; Chadwick, *The Hybrid Media System*.
[74] Vaccari. *Digital Politics in Western Democracies*.
[75] Rachel Gibson and Andrea Rommele. 2001. "Changing Campaign Communications: A Party-Centered Theory of Professionalized Campaigning." *Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics* 6(4):475–507.
[76] Nick Anstead and Andrew Chadwick. 2008. "Parties, Election Campaigning, and the Internet." in *Routledge Handbook of Internet Politics*. London: Routledge.
[77] Chadwick. *The Hybrid Media System*.
[78] Reinhard Heinisch and Oscar Mazzoleni. 2016. *Understanding Populist Party Organisation: The Radical Right in Western Europe*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

examine political communication and election campaigning beyond this realm of cases.[79] In this thesis, I study election campaigning in sub-Saharan Africa. In the process, I draw extensively and creatively on the comparative literature which I have just described.

I am far from the first to connect the comparative and Africanist literature on electoral politics. Indeed, the Africanist and comparative literatures are already tied by numerous links. The Africanist literature on electoral mobilisation has focussed on what messages or appeals parties impart to voters, rather than how they impart those messages. A vast body of studies argues that African parties engaged in clientelist exchanges with voters.[80] Others contend that parties attract voters' support by delivering or presenting themselves as most fit to deliver public goods;[81] in other words, they argue that parties make valence appeals.[82] Further studies examine how parties, particularly opposition parties, depend upon charismatic leaders to level the playing field against better-resourced ruling parties.[83] Others identify occasions on which parties invoke rival policy promises or even rival ideologies to solicit voters support.[84] Most notably, a variety of authors have discussed the rise and fall of populism in some corners of the subcontinent.[85] Many of these discussions explicitly draw

[79] Daniel Hallin and Paolo Mancini. 2012. *Comparing Media Systems Beyond the Western World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Silvio Waisbord. 2010. "Knocking on Newsroom Doors: The Press and Political Scandals in Argentina." *Political Communication* 11(1):19–33; William Hachten. 1971. *Muffled Drums: The News Media in Africa*. Ames: Iowa State University Press; Kenneth Greene. 2011. "Campaign Persuasion and Nascent Partisanship in Mexico's New Democracy." *American Journal of Political Science* 55(2):398–416; Jonathan Becker. 2004. "Lessons from Russia: A Neo-Authoritarian Media System." *European Journal of Communication* 19(2):139–63.

[80] Nicolas van de Walle. 2003. "Presidentialism and Clientelism in Africa's Emerging Party Systems." *Journal of Modern African Studies* 41(2):297–321.

[81] Robin Harding. 2015. "Attribution and Accountability: Voting for Roads in Ghana." *World Politics* 67(4):656–89; Robin Harding and David Stasavage. 2014. "What Democracy Does (and Doesn't Do) for Basic Services: School Fees, School Inputs, and African Elections." *Journal of Politics* 76(1):229–45.

[82] Jamie Bleck and Nicolas van de Walle. 2011. "Parties and Issues in Francophone West Africa: Towards a Theory of Non-Mobilization." *Democratization* 18(5):1125–45.

[83] Resnick. *Urban Poverty and Party Populism in African Democracies*; Nic Cheeseman and Marja Hinfelaar. 2009. "Parties, Platforms, and Political Mobilization: The Zambian Presidential Election of 2008." *African Affairs* 109(434):51–76.

[84] Lindsay Whitfield. 2009. "'Change for a Better Ghana': Party Competition, Institutionalization and Alternation in Ghana's 2008 Elections." *African Affairs* 108(433):621–41.

[85] Larmer and Fraser; Cheeseman and Larmer; Resnick. *Urban Poverty and Party Populism in African Democracies*; Alastair Fraser. 2017. "Post-Populism in Zambia: Michael Sata's Rise, Demise and Legacy." *International Political Science Review* 38(4): 456-472.

on the theoretical framework developed by Herbert Kitschelt.[86] Many dissenting voices question whether what appear to be clientelist or programmatic appeals are truly ethnic appeals, or *visa-versa*.[87] They do so in terms that are in congress with the addition of ethnic appeals to Kitschelt's schema which have already been proposed in the literature.[88]

This emphasis on parties' appeals to voters has assumed a prominent and sometimes a dominant position in interpretations of African electoral politics. In particular, ethnicity and clientelism are often taken as definitive. Jean-François Bayart's *The State in Africa,*[89] Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz's *Africa Works,*[90] and van de Walle's conception of party politics[91] all place particular conceptions of clientelism at the centre of their theories of African politics. While no attempts have been made to categorise election campaigns in sub-Saharan Africa, to the best of my knowledge, a number of scholars have tried to categorise political parties. Some study party system institutionalization.[92] While these authors are concerned with whether parties have 'roots in society',[93] they do not explicitly consider how parties mobilise and their pertinence to this discussion ends there.

Many studies which do examine political mobilisation take clientelism or ethnicity as definitive features of political parties. These authors draw on a grand scheme of political

[86] Herbert Kitschelt. 2000. "Linkages Between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic Polities." *Party Politics* 33(6):1–35.
[87] Staffan Lindberg and Minion Morrison. 2008. "Are African Voters Really Ethnic or Clientelistic? Survey Evidence from Ghana." *Political Science Quarterly* 123(1):95–122.; Dominika Koter. 2016. *Beyond Ethnic Politics in Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Daniel Posner. 2005. *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[88] Elena Gadjanova. 2015. "Measuring Parties' Ethnic Appeals in Democracies." *Party Politics* 21(2):309–27.
[89] Jean-François Bayart. 1993. *The State in Africa: Politics of the Belly*. London: Longman.
[90] Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz. 1999. *Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument*. Oxford: James Curry.
[91] van de Walle. "Presidentialism and Clientelism in Africa's Emerging Party Systems".
[92] Rachel Riedl. 2014. *Authoritarian Origins of Democratic Party Systems in Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Michelle Kuenzi and Gina Lambright. 2001. "Party System Institutionalization in 30 African Countries." *Party Politics* 7(4):437–68.
[93] Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully. 1995. *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

parties advocated by Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond.[94] Each 'species' of party in their schema is defined by their relationship to the political system (pro- or anti-), their organisational form and the sort of appeals that link them to voters. However, even though attempts to categorise political parties in sub-Saharan Africa have explicitly built on this schema, they have developed typologies in which the party appeal is the decisive characteristic in categorising parties. Gero Erdmann, for example, categorises African parties as ethnic parties and ethnic congress parties.[95] Sebastian Elischer builds on Erdmann as well as Gunther and Diamond by distinguishing between ethnic, ethnic congress and catch-all parties in sub-Saharan Africa.[96] For them, ethnicity is the criterion that separates both parties in Africa from parties elsewhere, and African parties from one another. From this criterion flow other characteristics of African political parties. Therefore, at times electoral appeals have become definitive in the study of African political parties. To the best of my knowledge, only Adrienne LeBas develops categories of parties (strong and weak ones) which privilege any aspect of the ground campaign. For her, parties' 'ties to popular constituencies' are a key pillar of their strength.[97]

In this respect, the Africanist literature differs markedly from the comparative literature. The latter examines parties' appeals, their methods of campaign contact and their targeting strategies; the former primarily examines their appeals. Most references to the ground campaign have been fleeting.[98] Only a handful of published studies examine the ground

[94] Richard Gunther and Larry Jay Diamond. 2003. "Species of Political Parties: A New Typology." *Party Politics* 9(2):167–99.
[95] Gero Erdmann. 2004. "Party Research: Western European Bias and the 'African Labyrinth.'" *Democratization* 11(3):63–87.
[96] Sebastian Elischer. 2013. *Political Parties in Africa: Ethnicity and Party Formation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[97] Adrienne LeBas. 2011. *From Protest to Parties*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[98] Cheeseman and Hinfelaar; Larmer and Fraser; Danielle Resnick, *Urban Poverty and Party Populism in African Democracies*; Adrienne LeBas, 'Polarization as Craft: Party Formation and State Violence in Zimbabwe' (2006) 38 Comparative Politics 419.

campaign in detail,[99] with others under development.[100] In other words, the Africanist literature on election campaigning has largely neglected the ground campaign. It is limited in scope compared to the comparative literature, and occupies only a portion of the conceptual space. This is my point of departure from the Africanist literature. I seek to restore the prominence of the ground campaign to the study of electoral mobilisation in sub-Saharan Africa.

One might suppose that the ground campaigns conceptualised in the comparative literature are fundamentally different from those found in sub-Saharan Africa, precisely because, supposedly, programmatic politics is so frequently absent, while clientelism and ethnicity are so frequently present. However, the comparative literature on election campaigning provides an analytical framework that can be readily extended to the analysis of countries where parties employ a variety of appeals. Through campaign contact, parties can impart clientelist and charismatic appeals just as they can impart programmatic ones. For example, parties can not only give out gifts; they can inform voters about their ability to do so in the future. Equally they can prime some aspects of their candidates' character, just as they can frame them. In short, they can inform, persuade, prime and frame in the service of clientelist and charismatic appeals just as they can with programmatic ones. I set this out systematically in Table 1. This conclusion is pertinent, because it extends the universe of cases to which the central tenets of the comparative literature of election campaigning apply. Parties in competitive elections beyond the Western world should share the impetus to multiply and target campaign contact. Therefore, the execution of the ground campaign

[99] Horowitz; Conroy-Krutz; Nic Cheeseman, Gabrielle Lynch, and Justin Willis. 2017. "Ghana: The Ebbing Power of Incumbency." *Journal of Democracy* 28(2):92–104; George Bob-Milliar. 2012. "Political Party Activism in Ghana: Factors Influencing the Decision of the Politically Active to Join a Political Party." *Democratization* 19(4):668–689.

[100] Rauschenbach; Sarah Brierley and Eric Kramon. 2017. "Party Campaign Strategies: Rallies, Canvassing and Handouts in an African Election." *Self-published working paper.*

is as pertinent to the study of competitive electoral politics in sub-Saharan Africa as it is anywhere else.

Table 1: Communicating electoral appeals

Method	**Mechanism**	**Party appeal**		
		With programmatic appeals	**With clientelist appeals**	**With charismatic appeals**
Informing	Present new information or misinformation about:	The party's policies to the voter	The party's delivery of particularistic goods	The candidate's attributes
Persuading	Change voters opinions of:	Policy preferences	Kinds of particularist goods	Particular charismatic attributes
Priming	Emphasise particular:	Policy issues	Kinds of particularist goods	Particular charismatic attributes
Framing	Offer new ways to interpret:	The party's policies	The party's delivery of particularist goods	The candidate's attributes

In the next section I engage with the typologies of election campaigns advanced in the comparative literature. I discuss the ways in which rallies are marginalised in the study of election campaigns, and I propose new concepts that restore rallies to the study of campaigns. These new terms make it possible to articulate and explain variance in how parties make campaign contact, target it, and adapt. This makes it possible to capture how parties campaign and organise in much of sub-Saharan Africa, but also elsewhere.

The rally-intensive ground campaign

In the comparative typologies of election campaigns described above, the rally is regarded as one of several face-to-face campaign methods. As such, it is treated as one of the methods which are most widely used in the pre-modern campaign. The level of aggregate rally attendance, for all this literature tells us, is high in pre-modern campaigns, and low in modern and post-modern campaigns. These authors are clear that their schemas should be

able to conceptually accommodate all election campaigns. Farrell and Webb state that 'our threefold typological device is therefore essentially a heuristic device, a classificatory scheme of ideal types'.[101] Campaigns should only sit displaced from that continuum as real examples deviate from ideal types. They continue that their conception of campaigns should 'be seen as a continuum along which organizations are moving'.[102] Similarly, Norris states that 'contests can continue to be arrayed from the premodern to the postmodern'.[103] Therefore, these authors' frameworks build-in strong judgements about which sorts of variation in campaigns to privilege and which sorts to trivialise, which to treat as significant and which to treat as insignificant. Among other things, they trivialise the rally; for them, the incidence or absence of the rally is only pertinent to the categorisation of election campaigns as a constitutive part of the ground campaign. In effect, ground campaigns are homogenised in these schemas.

This is my point of departure from the comparative literature on election campaigning. In some ground campaigns, rallies are small events which are marginal to the campaign as a whole. In these campaigns, candidates can only hope to present themselves at mass meetings to just a slither of their electorates. In others, the rally is the centre-piece of the campaign and the primary means throughout which parties interact with voters.

The rally can serve various purposes in the campaign. It can serve as a pseudo-event which gains access to coverage through mass media. In this sense, the rally constitutes an early example of media hybridity. It can serve as a performative tool, a site of and a mode of action through which parties dramaturgically bring discursive messages to life. Equally, it can serve to enthuse a party's activists, a means of mobilising the base. I take interest in the

[101] Farrell and Webb: 106.
[102] Farrell and Webb.
[103] Norris. *A Virtuous Circle.*

rally as a form of direct party-voter campaign contact, a means of making and targeting campaign contact, putting aside the indirect communication which the rally can serve as a gateway to. In this regard, I turn my focus to what David Farrell and Paul Webb describe as the 'mechanics' of campaigning.[104]

At this juncture, the definition of the rally merits attention. I do not use the term 'rally' as an umbrella term for all 'mass political events'. However, the terms rallies, protests, parades and festivals are often used interchangeably. Equally, the dividing line between rallies and, variously, canvassing, internal party meetings, lectures and deliberative assemblies often become blurred. I define a rally as a public event at which speakers address an audience with the intention of politically mobilising that audience. The publicness criterion distinguishes the rally from party branch meetings and other private events. The format criterion, that a rally is an event at which speakers address an audience, distinguishes the rally from other forms of politician-citizen interaction, such as a participatory assembly, and the canvass. Format serves as way of encompassing size, as small group interactions rarely take the form of a speaker and audience. Format also serves as a way of sorting between rallies and other mass political events. Parades, protests, marches and festivals are rallies insofar as they involve speakers addressing audiences, but not, insofar as they do not. The last criterion, concerning political mobilisation, distinguishes the rally from other mass interactions which are not political, such as a public lecture or a religious sermon.

Nowhere is the preponderance of the rally greater than in sub-Saharan Africa. In the countries surveyed in the Fifth Round of the Afrobarometer, the average country rate of pre-rally attendance among them is 40.6%. In thirteen countries, it was 45% or greater. A breakdown of these results is presented in Figure 2. Despite the possibility that social

[104] Farrell and Webb.

desirability bias inflates these answers, this scale of rally attendance cannot be stressed enough. Across the 30 sub-Saharan countries surveyed, on average, more than three times as many people attended a rally at the last election as asked a government official for help in the last year. Equally, more than three times as many people attended a rally at the last election as took part in a demonstration or protest in the last year.[105] By focussing on the appeals that parties employ, the Africanist literature has not only neglected to study the ground campaign in general. It has overlooked, and implicitly denied the fundamental role assumed by the mass rally.


The high levels of rally attendance in African campaigns stand in stark contrast to those in the Western world. In the United States, for example, just 5.6% of respondents reported attending 'political meetings, rallies, speeches, dinners or things like that' combined during the elections of 2012.[106] Similarly, just 7.4% of respondents of the seventh round of the European Election Survey reported attending a public meeting or rally prior to the 2014 elections to the European Parliament.[107] In other words, aggregate rally attendance in African ground campaigns distinguishes them unambiguously from ground campaigns in Western countries.

Norris' three-part schema does not adequately capture the profound differences between these election campaigns. To express these fundamental features of electioneering, I propose a new ideal type of *ground* campaign, as understood in Weberian terms:[108] the rally-intensive ground campaign, or the rally-intensive campaign for short. The higher that

[105] These figures are also from the Fifth Round of the Afrobarometer.
[106] This point estimated is weighted, and has lower and upper 95 per cent confidence intervals of 4.8 per cent and 6.5 per cent. Data is from the American National Electoral Survey of 2012.
[107] European Social Survey. 2014. "European Social Survey Round 7 Data. Data File Edition 2.1."
[108] Fritz Ringer. 2009. *Max Weber's Methodology: The Unification of the Cultural and Social Sciences*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press; Rolf Rogers. 1969. *Max Weber's Ideal Type Theory*. New York: Philosophical Library.

rally attendance climbs, the more rally-intensive the ground campaign becomes. The ground campaign is a component of every election campaign, and so 'rally-intensiveness' is a dimension along which any sort of campaign can be placed. In this respect, rally-intensiveness is definitive of the ground campaign, but not always of the campaign in general. While ground campaigns vary in rally-intensity, it would be false to contend that variations in aggregate rally attendance dictate variations in media penetration, media channel proliferation, cultures of journalism, social media platforms, media system hybridity or citizen participation. These features of the campaign, and others, appear in numerous combinations across different campaigns. Therefore, I limit the domain of this ideal type to the ground campaign.

Figure 2: National rates of rally attendance in sub-Saharan Africa



Source: Afrobarometer[109]

[109] Afrobarometer. "Afrobarometer Data. Round 5. All Countries Surveyed in Sub-Saharan Africa." Retrieved (http//www.afrobarometer.org/).

In this thesis, I argue that parties in rally-intensive ground campaigns behave differently than they do in rally-light ground campaigns. Rally-intensive ground campaigns alter the activities that parties undertake to multiply face-to-face campaign contact and the ways in which they target campaign contact. Equally, in such ground campaigns, innovations in methods of rally production drive parties to adapt organisationally. Thereby, the rally becomes a vehicle for party organisational change. By drawing links between campaign type, parties' campaign strategy and campaign organisation, I borrow from Norris and others in the comparative literature on types of election campaigns. However, I complicate these typologies by privileging rather than trivialising rallies. Thereby, I develop an account of how electioneering works in much of sub-Saharan Africa. However, I do so not by developing an Africa-specific or Africa-bound framework. Instead, I draw on and contribute to the comparative literature which I have introduced in this chapter.

Projects that build outwards from Western-centric theory are prone to what Mahood Mamdani calls 'history by analogy'.[110] His critique is representative of a wider literature that objects to the explanation of African phenomena by reference to Western phenomena.[111] Works in this canon contend that theories are too often couched in terms that frame African behaviour as deviance from Western behaviour. Sometimes this takes the form of modernist social ideas that place African states along some developmental path in which some abstraction of contemporary Western states are the final destination.[112] In these cases, deviance of African cases from Western norms is measured in terms of progress, and

[110] Mahmood Mamdani. 1996. *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the History of Late Colonialism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
[111] James Ferguson. 1999. *Expectations of Modernity: Myths and Meanings of Urban Life on the Zambian Copperbelt*. Berkeley: University of California Press; Dipesh Chakrabarty. 2000. *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
[112] Walt Rostow. 1960. *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; James Coleman and Richard Sklar. 1994. *Nationalism and Development in Africa: Selected Essays*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.


African characteristics are traditionalised.[113] In other cases, African trajectories are traced back to some moment of difference at which they diverge from Western ones.[114] In those cases, African *trajectories* are conceptualised in terms of their deviance from Western ones.[115] While these approaches may have more to recommend them than works that orientalise or exoticise,[116] they take Western experience as universal, and African experience as variations from Western paths which deserve special explanation.

At first glance, one might worry that this thesis suffers from these very intellectual afflictions. I borrow heavily from comparative literatures which are dominated by not only Western scholars but Western cases. Many of the literatures that I refer to as 'comparative' are confined in scope to high-income countries in all but name. However, while many rally-intensive campaigns can be found in Africa, the concept is not Africa-specific. I believe that rally-intensive election campaigns can be found in parts of the Caribbean, South Asia, East Asia and Latin America. The rally is already recognised as an important aspect of the election campaign in parts of Latin America.[117] The Third Wave of the Asia Barometer shows that aggregate attendance of 'rally or political party meeting' reaches peaks of 42 per cent in Cambodia, 50 per cent in Thailand, 55 per cent in Mongolia and 65 per cent in Vietnam.[118] While any portion of these figures may represent in-door or member-only party meetings, rather than public rallies which are open to all, they nonetheless offer a strong initial indication of rally attendance. Indeed, I draw upon a scattering of studies of rallies across these regions.

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[113] Michael Cowen and Robert Shenton. 1996. *Doctrines of Development*. London: Routledge; Rita Abrahamsen. 2003. "African Studies and the Postcolonial Challenge." *African Affairs* 102(407):189–210.
[114] Jeffrey Herbst. 2000. *States and Power in Africa*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
[115] Chakrabarty.
[116] Edward Said. 1978. *Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
[117] Paula Muñoz. 2014. "An Informational Theory of Campaign Clientelism." *Comparative Politics* 47(1):79–98; Mariela Szwarcberg. 2012. "Political Parties and Rallies in Latin America." *Party Politics* 30(3):456–66.
[118] Asia Barometer. 2012. "Asia Barometer Third Wave Data." Taipei. Retrieved August 23, 2016.

Figure 3: National rates of rally attendance in Asia



Source: Asia Barometer, Third Wave[119]

In fact, rally-intensive campaigns can not only be found across the world, but across time. As I illustrate in the next chapter, between the 1920s and the 1940s, European and North American ground campaigns enjoyed resurgent rally-intensiveness. Therefore, far from caricaturing Western experience to explain African difference, I seek to revise theories of Western election campaigns and stress the occasional similarities between African and Western electioneering. I identify parallels, as well as explain differences. I do not develop the concept of the rally-intensive campaign only to find a theoretical home for African cases. I also use African experience to shed new light on Western experience. Therefore, I do not just borrow from theory about the West; I speak to it too.

[119] ibid.

Exploring Tanzania's rally-intensive ground campaigns

As African campaigns have been understudied to date, they need to be not just analysed, but explored. Basic features of the campaign need to be observed, constructed and documented, rather than taken for granted. For that reason, this thesis is a case study of election campaigning in Tanzania, and ground campaigning in particular. At first glance, Tanzania might seem like an unusual choice of case. Tanzania, after all, has a paramount dominant party system. Its ruling party, CCM, was formed in 1977 by the amalgamation of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) which ruled mainland Tanzania, and the Afro-Shirazi Party, which ruled the semi-autonomous archipelago of Zanzibar. Whether one counts from the ascension to power of TANU at Tanganyikan independence in 1961 or the ascension of the Afro-Shirazi Party to power after independence and the revolution in Zanzibar in 1964, CCM is the longest ruling party in sub-Saharan Africa. Since transition to a multiparty regime in 1992, CCM has remained electorally dominant.[120]

However, over time, elections in Tanzania have become more competitive. One opposition party, *Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo* (Chadema) underwent a transformative process of opposition party-building.[121] While the Civic United Front has all but monopolised political opposition on the isles of Zanzibar, beyond it, Chadema has become far and away the best organised and most prominent opposition party on the mainland. Between 2005 and 2015, it cut CCM's presidential candidate's margin of victory from 63% to 18%.[122] Statistics aside, CCM makes extensive efforts to defend its shrinking electoral advantage. I illustrate time

[120] Barak Hoffman and Lindsay Robinson. 2009. "Tanzania's Missing Opposition." *Journal of Democracy* 20(4):123–36; Alexander Boniface Makulilo. 2012. "Unleveled Playfield and Democracy in Tanzania." *Journal of Politics and Law* 5(2):96–106; Yonatan Morse. 2014. "Party Matters: The Institutional Origins of Competitive Hegemony in Tanzania." *Democratization* 21(4):655–77.
[121] Dan Paget. 2017. "Tanzania: Shrinking Space and Opposition Protest." *Journal of Democracy* 28(3):153–67.
[122] Paget. "Tanzania: Shrinking Space and Opposition Protest".

and again in this thesis that the enormous efforts that CCM goes to are not only palpable, but demonstrable. Therefore, Tanzania's election campaigns have become competitive. Both government and opposition strive to acquire a greater share of the votes than their rivals.

Tanzania is not only a suitable case; it is an ideal one, in more than one sense. Tanzania has the best attended election campaign rallies in sub-Saharan Africa, and to the best of my knowledge, the world. Data from the Fifth Round of the Afrobarometer shows in 2010, 74% of Tanzanians attended rallies, a higher rate than anywhere else on the continent. Similarly, original survey data presented in this thesis shows that 69% of all Tanzanians attended rallies in the last month of the election campaign in 2015 alone.[123] Nationwide, that amounts to 15.76 million of the country's 22.75 million registered voters.[124] This giddy proportion is only marginally smaller than the 77% of respondents that report regularly receiving radio news, and much less than the proportion that receive regular news from any other mass medium.[125] In other words, political parties in Tanzania reached almost as many people in the campaign through rallies as they did even through radio. Therefore, Tanzania is perhaps the exemplar case of rally-intensive campaigning.

This extreme case is theoretically useful. In Weber's conception, an ideal-type is an abstraction that distils the definitive features of some phenomenon. As such, it consists of only the relevant features of some phenomenon, and those features exist in the most extreme possible forms; it is a rarefied concept taken to the theoretical extreme.[126] In Weber's own words:

[123] Upper and lower bound 95 per cent confidence intervals of 65.6% and 73.0%.
[124] Upper and lower bound 95 per cent confidence intervals of 14.92 and 16.60 million voters.
[125] Upper and lower bound 95 per cent confidence intervals of 74.4% and 79.1%.
[126] Max Weber, Edward Shils, and Henry Finch. 1949. *The Methodology Of The Social Sciences*. Glencoe: Free Press.

> 'An ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view…. In its conceptual purity, this mental construct (Gedankenbild) cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality. It is a utopia.'[127]

While cases deviate from ideal-types as realities differ from abstractions, I hope to distil the features of a rally-intensive campaign in its ideal form by examining electioneering in Tanzania, where the rally is so prominent. My intention in doing so is comparative. By drawing out the essential features of the rally-intensive campaign, and binding them together using modest assumptions, I hope to extend the theoretical reach of my theory. While I study one set of rally-intensive ground campaigns, my intention is to outline features which may be found in other rally-intensive ground campaigns, whether in Africa or elsewhere.

Inevitably, the features which I elucidate will be refracted by peculiarities of the Tanzanian case. Where possible, and theoretically interesting, I draw out the role that these features play. The enduring dominance of the ruling party is one such feature. Through this thesis, I repeatedly unpick the role that dominance plays in driving differences between CCM's and Chadema's behaviour. Nonetheless, by studying one case, I weaken my ability to generalise. In this respect, my thesis has both the depth of a theory-generating case study, and its shorter reach.[128] However, as I go on to discuss, there are signs that the essential aspects of the rally-intensive ground campaign which I draw out in Tanzania can be found in election campaigns close by in sub-Saharan Africa, in campaigns further abroad, and in historic election campaigns alike.

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[127] Rogers; Thomas Burger. 1976. *Max Weber's Theory of Concept Formation*. Durham: Duke University Press.
[128] John Gerring. 2007. *Case Study Research: Principles and Practices*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

In pursuit of this project, I employed a mixture of methods. Some writings on methodology propose a division of labour between methods, assigning exploration to qualitative research and rigorous analysis to quantitative research.[129] In my research, I eschew this division of roles. I used both qualitative and quantitative methods to build an empirical picture of electioneering in Tanzania. In fact, at times descriptive statistics were particularly important, because many basic aspects of Tanzanian ground campaigns are unknown. They shed light on phenomena that qualitative methods could not. In this respect, blending methods made my study empirically multifaceted. Equally, I used both qualitative and quantitative methods to generate considerable evidence in support of causal claims. The strength of my research rests on this balance of methods.

I conducted approximately eight months of field research in Tanzania between January and December 2015. My first months of research were exploratory. I spent two months holding interviews in Dar es Salaam, the commercial capital, and Dodoma, the political capital. Across the year, my research became gradually more focussed and analytic. Between June and August, I examined election campaigning in specific constituencies. On August 21st, the official election campaign began for the coterminous presidential, parliamentary and councillor elections, which took place on the 25th of October 2015. During the campaign itself, I observed parties' campaigns first-hand. After the election, I returned to follow up selectively for a further six weeks. I commissioned a pre- and post-election survey, which forms the mainstay of my statistical analysis. I scripted this between June and August, refining the wording as my qualitative research progressed.

Much of my field work was ethnographic. I concentrated on campaigning in eight constituencies, spread across four regions in Tanzania. Details of those constituencies can

[129] Alexander George and Andrew Bennett. 2005. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.

be found in Table 2 below. In this multi-site[130] research design, I spent approximately two months across these constituencies familiarising myself with the candidates and assemblage of party offices, activists and extra-party local actors around them. I followed candidates to their rallies, at which I was a participant observer, albeit a passive one.[131] By attending these meetings first-hand, I was able to explore the rally afresh. I observed them with a 'heightened sense of awareness' and while 'taking in a much broader spectrum of information.'[132] I wrote copious field notes, which I refer to frequently in the text. I supplemented these records by interviewing other attendees. By taking this 'panoramic' approach, I was able to construct rich accounts of rallies and the ground campaign at large. This not only girds my research with empirical detail. This exploratory, open-minded method lent itself to theory generation.[133] In total, I attended 34 rallies which were arranged for parliamentary or councillor candidates across these eight constituencies. Table 2 offers further details. In addition to those mass meetings, I attended a further eight rallies arranged by national level campaigns. I followed canvassing teams making their rounds on five occasions and I witnessed a number of other campaign events including church visits, processions, internal meetings, and press conferences. In total, I clocked several hundreds of hours of participant observation.

[130] George Marcus. 1995. "Ethnography In/of the World System: The Emergence of Multi-Sited Ethnography." *Annual Review of Anthropology* 24(1995):95–117.
[131] James Spradley. 1980. *Participant Observation*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
[132] ibid: 55-6.
[133] George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*.

Table 2: Field work locations

Part of the country	Region	Constituency	Chadema candidate	Number of Chadema rallies attended	CCM candidate	Number of CCM rallies attended
North Western Tanzania	Mwanza	Sengerema	Hamis Tabasam	2	William Ngeleja	1
		Ilemela	Highness Kiwia	2	Angeline Mabula	1
		Kwimba	Babila Shilogela	1	Hanif Mansoor	1
Central Tanzania	Singida	Iramba	Jesca Kishoa	5	Mwigulu Nchemba	3
		Ikungi	Tundu Lissu	3	Jonahan Njau	1
	Dodoma	Dodoma Town	Benjamin Kigaila	3	Anthony Mavunde	1
Southern Highlands	Mbeya	Vwawa	Fanuel Mkisi	5	Japhet Hasunga	2
		Momba	David Silinde	3	Luca Jelas Siyame	0

While participant observation lends itself to theory generation, *generating* theory was not my only objective. I provide *evidence* in support of the theories that I propound. To this end, I complemented my participant observation by conducting 148 semi-structured interviews. I had two research assistants conduct a further 24 structured interviews on my behalf. Many of these interviewees were high-ranking politicians and commentators, but the lion's share of them were party activists and officials at the ward level and below. The grand majority of these interviewees gave me their permission to quote them and attribute those quotes to them by name. However, in light of the authoritarian situation in Tanzania at the time of the submission of this thesis, I have anonymised all interviewees for their protection, except journalists, politicians and other officials who hold positions in government or political parties at the district level or above. Interviewees in this excluded category who did not consent to be quoted by name have also been anonymised, in accordance with their wishes.

I use the material gathered from this participant observation and roster of interviews to conduct extensive process tracing, or as James Mahoney has called it 'the new methodology of qualitative research.[134] The term 'process tracing' has been used to refer to a variety of methods. By some conceptions, the umbrella of process tracing methods extends to include 'detailed narratives'.[135] Methodologically rigorous process tracing involves the researcher explicitly evaluating how likely it is that a proposed causal process is at work.[136] It involves presenting qualitative evidence, expressing the basis for causal inference, and assessing the likelihood that the causal process is at work from that basis. I employ process tracing methods in three of the six empirical chapters in this thesis. I follow the process tracing methodology developed by Mahoney,[137] as follows: I develop and postulate a causal process or mechanism in the abstract which I wish to demonstrate was at work in the cases in question. Of course, causal processes cannot be observed directly. To determine whether the postulated processes were at work in my cases, I develop tests, expressed as hypotheses. These hypotheses stipulate certain phenomena which – deductively or inductively - *should* be observable if the causal process in question were at work. I then present evidence to show that these phenomena were indeed at work and therefore, that it can be inferred probabilistically that the posited causal process was at work too.

Not all such tests have equal value. I follow Mahoney's three types of tests. 'Straw in the wind' tests offer signs that the stipulated process was at work which are ultimately inconclusive. 'Hoop tests', if failed, offer conclusive evidence that the posited causal process was *not* at work. If passed, they yield some evidence that it was. These prove to be

[134] James Mahoney. 2010. "After KKV: The New Methodology of Qualitative Research." *World Politics* 62(1):120–47.
[135] George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*.
[136] David Collier. 2011. "Understanding Process Tracing." *PS: Political Science & Politics*, 44(4): 823–30.
[137] James Mahoney. 2012. "The Logic of Process Tracing Tests in the Social Sciences." *Sociological Methods and Research* 41(4):570–97.

particularly helpful to exclude rival explanations. The most desired are 'smoking gun tests' which, if passed, constitute sufficient evidence that the causal process in question was at work. In this thesis, none of the tests which I present meet this lofty standard, *independent* of all other evidence. However, I generate bundles of process tracing tests, which if all passed, constitute sufficient evidence that the posited causal process took place. The inferential power of the evidence which supports each of these hypotheses is *dependent* on the evidence which supports the others. By adopting these process tracing methods, I make transparent the assumptions, reasoning and inference involved in my research by bringing them into the text.

Descriptive statistics are used numerous times in this thesis, but I also used advanced quantitative methods to make causal inferences. I spend one chapter analysing a cross-country dataset from the Fifth Round of the Afrobarometer. In two chapters, I use statistical models to analyse data from the panel survey which I commissioned. Fieldwork for the first round of this survey ended on September 22nd 2015, just over a month before the general election. In that round, 2,000 respondents were interviewed face-to-face. Fieldwork for the second round began on November 1st and was completed nine days later, during which a randomly selected subsample of 1,000 of the original respondents were interviewed again by phone. Interpreting survey data involves numerous hazards in measurement, phrasing, question order and identifying biases in respondents' answers. I discuss these issues and how I responded to them in the main body of the thesis.

Altogether, this constitutes a multifaceted, empirically detailed study of a much understudied phenomenon: the rally-intensive ground campaign.

Argument and plan of the thesis

This thesis is divided into three parts. In Part I, I examine under what circumstances ground campaigns become rally-intensive. This is in effect a study of what makes parties convene rallies and voters attend them in aggregate. I begin by drawing on the comparative literature. The overarching conclusion of *most* histories of election campaigning in Western countries is that as mass media penetration deepened, aggregate rally attendance declined in absolute terms.

In Chapter 2, I argue that this modernist understanding of campaign 'evolution'[138] neglects fluctuations in the prominence of the rally over time. I argue that the electoral potential of the rally was transformed by technologies of amplification. Until the invention and proliferation of microphones and stereos, speakers were encumbered with severe constraints on how frequently they could speak and how great an audience could hear them. The severe limitations on the human voice were exacerbated by all manner of noises which threatened to drown them out.

To demonstrate this, I turn to two sets of historic cases: a set of Western countries - France, Britain and the United States - principally in the inter-war period, and a set of African countries – Ghana, Guinea, Kenya and Nigeria - in the late colonial and post-independence periods. These two regions and periods represent some of the first places and times that election campaigns became truly rally-intensive. I organise and interpret together secondary sources using process tracing tools. I disentangle the effects of amplification on aggregate rally attendance from the numerous other changes that these societies were undergoing at the time. Thereby, I complicate the relationship between

[138] Norris. *A Virtuous Circle.*

technological progress and the marginalisation of the rally. I show that the rally-intensive ground campaign, far from being an artefact of the past, is a modern phenomenon made possible by developments in sonic amplification in the twentieth century.

In Chapter 3, I interrogate whether the contention of the comparative literature that rally attendance falls as mass media penetration deepens holds true in Africa. Drawing on the Fifth Round of the Afrobarometer, which covers 34 countries, I examine the causes of individual rally attendance. Country-level determinants alter aggregate levels of rally attendance, and so do individual-level causes that vary in aggregate across countries. The analysis strongly supports the conclusion that national penetration of television, newspaper and the Internet reduces rally attendance. In particular, it shows that television drives this effect. This partially supports the comparative literature, and suggests that rally-intensive campaigns will become things of the past as these media become more common. However, I also complicate this literature. I show that radio penetration increases rally attendance. Thereby, I illustrate that 'mass media' obscures heterogeneous relationships between each medium and aggregate rally attendance.

I also reveal that a series of other factors stimulate and retard aggregate rally attendance. These include factors such as community participation and partisanship. They also include other long, slow-changing features which, like mass media penetration, have lasting effects on aggregate rally attendance. Principally, the longer a country has been a democracy, the higher rally attendance becomes; and the longer a country spent under a competitive one-party democracy in the past, the higher rally attendance is in the present. The explanation which I propose is that both of these features inculcate cultures of rally attendance. They habituate voters to attend rallies, and shape normative expectations among politicians and voters alike about duties to convene and attend rallies respectively. All of these conclusions

militate against the modernist assumptions adopted by Norris and others in the comparative literature. They show that while mass media penetration reduces rally attendance, rallies remain critical parts of election campaigns under a variety of circumstances, and that some such factors even strengthen rally attendance with time.

In sum, I study the much-neglected subject of what affects aggregate rally attendance. Thereby, I shed light on the circumstances under which ground campaigns are likely to become rally-intensive. This offers an empirical frame of reference for what comes next in this thesis. It is beyond my means to offer a worldwide taxonomy of election campaigns, identifying exhaustively which are rally-intensive and which are not. However, by outlining in Part I under what circumstances ground campaigns are likely to become rally-intensive, I indicate where in the world and over time they are likely to be found.

In Parts II and III of this thesis, I focus my attention on Tanzania. In Part II, I examine how parties' campaign strategies and activities change when election ground campaigns become rally-intensive. Foundational to this entire enterprise is the stipulation that rally attendance is a form of party-voter campaign contact, similar conceptually to the canvass, the mail-shot or radio advert, for example. Everything that follows in this thesis depends on the supposition that, like these other methods, when voters attend a party's rally they become more likely to turn out and vote for that party. While a large comparative literature described above attests to the effect of many of these methods of campaign contact,[139] few studies attest to the effects of rally attendance, and none in Africa to the best of my knowledge. In fact, many of the most recent studies about rallies in Latin America stress the ulterior purposes that rallies play other than changing voting behaviour, such as

[139] Donald Green and Alan Gerber. 2008. *Get Out the Vote*. Washington: Brookings Institution Press.

projecting popularity and solving principal-agent problems between parties and clientelist intermediaries.[140]

In Chapter 4, I analyse the panel survey data described above using a variety of fixed effects models. I show that attending rallies makes voters more likely to turn out to vote. I also show that someone who attends a ruling party's rally becomes more likely to hold a positive opinion of that party and more likely to hold a negative opinion of the other main party. The analysis hints that opposition parties have similar effects, but the data is ultimately inconclusive. More intriguing still, I show that these effects are strongest among non-partisans, and weakest among partisans. This is the opposite of what one might expect, based on the conclusions found in the literature.[141] It is also the opposite of what one might expect if these effects were driven by unobserved changes in partisanship over time which might create spurious positive correlations between rally attendance and positive opinions of a party. Therefore, I offer significant evidence that rallies do not have 'limited effects'. On the contrary, they have both persuasive and mobilising effects.

In Chapter 5, I return to the causes of rally attendance, but this time I examine what parties do to increase rally attendance. I contend that where parties have ties to mobilisationally strong local actors, the attendance of their rallies improves. I turn to process tracing, numerous interviews and my first-hand experience of rallies across Tanzania to substantiate these claims. I illustrate that audiences are susceptible to dynamics of crowd formation and dispersion which humiliate parties. I reveal that parties rely on local actors to protect them from these crowd dynamics by mobilising voters to attend their rallies. I show that when parties cannot turn to local actors for assistance in some areas, they avoid going to those areas altogether. Instead, they concentrate their rallies elsewhere. Indeed, I illustrate that

[140] Muñoz; Szwarcberg.
[141] Zaller; Iyengar and Simon.

when parties insist on going to areas where they lack the support of local actors, they employ a series of techniques to compensate for their absence. All these observations point to a relationship between local party strength and rally attendance. In the process of elucidating this relationship, I show that rally-intensive ground campaigns change what activities parties undertake. Rather than deploying their efforts to multiply campaign contact by canvassing as many voters as possible, they concentrate their resources on drawing voters to their rallies.

In Chapter 6, I examine how parties target canvassing. The comparative literature on campaign contact targeting is dominated by debates about whether parties contact their supporters, or swing voters, or both. I complicate this debate by showing that in rally-intensive ground campaigns, the role of the canvass changes. Canvassers' role ceases to be multiplying campaign contact. Instead it becomes targeting it, in particular, adjusting parties' overall patterns of campaign contact left by the footprints of their rallies. In this respect, canvassing becomes auxiliary to the rally.

The way in which parties alter patterns of rally attendance depends in turn on the type of party system in which they operate and their location within it. Dominant parties seek to spread campaign contact across the domain of target voters. They canvass voters that do not attend their rallies. In contrast, opposition parties adjust who they canvass in light of asymmetries in aggregate rally attendance. More voters attend dominant parties' rallies. In fact, even swing voters and opposition parties' supporters are likely to attend them. In response, opposition parties adopt defensive targeting strategies; they canvass their own supporters. In both Chapters 5 and 6, I show ways in which local actors remain persistently important in rally-intensive campaigns. Even though politicians acquire ways of speaking to

voters unmediated by local actors, local actors remain essential both to draw voters to rallies, and to reach voters that do not attend them.

In Part III, I show that rally-intensive ground campaigns alter how parties organise. In Chapter 7, I set out this argument theoretically. I begin by reviewing the literature on organisational adaptation. I show that processes of selection, retention, and competition drive organisations to change to respond to their circumstances, and that these changes involve drawing actors that they need into relations of mutual exchange or dependence. I then go on to show that these theories pervade, often implicitly rather than explicitly, the comparative literature on party organisation. While early works in this canon emphasise changes in formal organisational structure, more recent works have stressed the importance of cultivating relationships with a variety of actors in civil society and the state.[142]

I draw on these modes of explanation and advance an argument about party adaptation in rally-intensive campaigns. Specifically, I distinguish between labour-intensive methods of producing rallies, and capital-intensive methods. As more effective, capital-intensive methods are developed, parties and their candidates become caught in cycles of capitalising rally production as they seek to outdo one another. These competitive pressures drive parties to develop increasingly close relationships with private financiers in order to raise requisite funds. In sum, innovation in methods of rally production changes how parties relate to financiers, and thereby, how they organise.

In Chapter 8, I trace this process in Tanzania. I develop empirically the categories of labour-intensive and capital-intensive rally production, and show that rally production in Tanzania was gradually capitalised between 1995 and 2015. I show that campaign

[142] Katz and Mair. *How Parties Organize*; Epstein; Ware.

expenditure rose in Tanzania, and that capital-intensive rally production accounts for a significant portion of this expenditure. I show that parties met these expenses by raising funds from private sources, and that in exchange, parties granted them influence, positions and government rents. To demonstrate that competition drove parties to develop steadily more capital-intensive methods of producing rallies, I trace the innovation and proliferation of the most capital-intensive methods of mobilising rally attendance currently employed in Tanzania: the helicopter. I show that helicopters were used to lend candidates speed and to mobilise rally attendance. Moreover, the proliferation of helicopter travel mirrored processes of mimicry, horizontal contagion, and trickle-down vertical contagion. These patterns all suggest that the causal chain of competitive fund-raising and capital-intensive rally production described in Chapter 7 were at work.

Together, Parts I, II and III forge a chain of causality detailing what makes election ground campaigns rally-intensive, how the rally-intensiveness of campaigns alters party election campaign activity, and how this in turn drives changes in party organisation. In other words, the three parts of this thesis link together to form one coherent account of the causes and consequences of rally-intensive campaigning. Therefore, they all build on the concept of the rally-intensive ground campaign developed in this chapter. Ultimately, this thesis rests on insights which I gained during my field work in Tanzania during its 2015 election campaign, which was coming to a close as CCM held that final rally in Mwanza on October 24th. Therefore, while the theory developed in this thesis is about rally-intensive campaigns, it stems from the study of rally-intensive campaigns in one country.

In Chapter 9, I conclude by discussing the application of my findings to rally-intensive ground campaigns elsewhere in the world. I set out a series of radial scope conditions that express the limits of the reach of my arguments. I curate and present a selection of

qualitative evidence from other cases and studies which all indicate just how far the findings of this thesis travel. Inevitably, the theory which I develop here will be complicated as it applied to other cases, and it will be complicated further as cases become more unlike contemporary Tanzania. I look forward to this further research, and not just because it will test the findings which I lay out in the following chapters. It will help to refine the concept of the rally-intensive campaign, which I have observed in Tanzania, but which can be found in iterations and variations across the world.

Part I: The determinants of aggregate rally attendance

Chapter 2. Amplification and the rally-intensive campaign

In the introductory chapter, I showed how high aggregate rally attendance climbs in much of sub-Saharan Africa. In this chapter and the next, I begin to explain these enormous rates of rally attendance. In the process, I outline general determinants of aggregate rally attendance. The comparative literature holds that as mass media penetration rises, rally attendance falls, other things being equal. The more important the air campaign is, the more marginal the ground campaign becomes, and by extension, the more marginal the *rally* becomes.[1] In this view, the rally belongs to the past, to a bygone age before the dawning of the mass media era. The implication is that if rally attendance is high in parts of sub-Saharan Africa, this is a product of the shallow development of mass media communication on the continent.

In this chapter, I study historic changes in rally attendance. I argue that, other things being equal, the propagation of amplification technologies which magnify speakers' voices dramatically increased rally attendance. In fact, I contend that while numerous factors affected aggregate rally attendance, electronic amplification no less than transforms the frequency and scale of the rally in the election campaign. On the face of it, this claim might seem not only intuitive, but trivially so. An amplified voice travels further than an unamplified voice. Therefore, an amplified speaker can be heard by more people than an unamplified speaker. If speakers are amplified, more people come to rallies, and consequently, politicians spend more time convening them.

[1] Norris. *A Virtuous Circle*; Dinkin; Epstein; Herrnson.

However, this position receives little acknowledgement or support in the comparative literature on campaigning or the historic country-specific literatures. In Britain, for example, the high tide of platform speaking is widely thought both in popular memory and much of the academic literature to have spanned the period from 1878 until the First World War, before the proliferation of electronic amplification.[2] Similarly, scholars of election campaigning in the United States broadly agree that the high point of public meetings was in the nineteenth century. Robert Dinkin writes of the period between 1880 and 1920 that 'surely, campaign speaking did not retain the same vitality and importance that it had in former times.'[3] In fact, the literature on the United States and Western Europe in general concludes that mass rallies were in decline from early in the twentieth century or earlier, before electronic amplification.[4]

To revise this literature and substantiate the argument that amplification augments rally attendance, I turn to two sets of historical cases. The first includes three Western countries in the inter-war period: France, Britain, and the United States. While this geographic and periodical excursion strays from the self-imposed regional boundaries of this thesis, this trespass is necessary for one reason: public address systems (PAs) first became technologically viable during the 1920s and the early 1930s. To best trace the effect of amplification technologies, one should examine countries that held competitive national elections both before and after this moment of invention. France, Britain, and the United States all meet that criterion, and enjoy some of the greatest attention in English-language histories of election campaigning.

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[2] Joseph Meisel. 2001. *Public Speech and the Culture of Public Life in the Age of Gladstone*. New York: Colombia University Press; Collin Matthew. 1987. "Rhetoric and Politics in Britain, 1860-1950." in *Politics and Social Change in Modern Britain*. Brighton: The Harvester Press.
[3] Dinkin.
[4] Meisel; Matthew; Dinkin; Alan John Percival Taylor. 1975. *Essays in English History*. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

In this chapter, I argue that the development of amplification in these countries made their election campaigns much more rally-intensive. However, this brief ascent of the mass rally coincided with watershed developments in radio and television. In histories of election campaigning that followed, it was treated as anomalous to both the grand arc of campaign change and the future that mass media was to bring.[5] Therefore, the effect of amplification on rally attendance has gone largely unrecognised. I owe the empirical strength of my objections herein to lone dissenting voices in this literature writing about particular countries.

The second set of cases returns to the area explicitly under study in this thesis. It consists principally of Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea and Kenya during the late colonial period and the early post-colonial period. Across these periods, the aforementioned countries played host to a series of national campaigns for colony-wide self-government in British colonies and territorial assembly elections in French colonies. These campaigns were the first national elections to be held on universal franchises in sub-Saharan Africa. They were then followed by a series of elections in newly independent states, before the curtain fell on multiparty democracy on most of the continent. This set of cases, like the first, is an important testing ground for the theory that I postulate here. These campaigns were held firmly after the invention as well as the propagation of electronic amplification. In the 1950s, when the first of these campaigns took place, PAs had become cheap and portable. While they still remained scarce in some parts of sub-Saharan Africa, I show that many parties proved capable of acquiring PAs and affixing them to vehicles or stages.[6] They were also campaigns in which the onus lay on the ground war, not the air war. Low literacy and radio ownership meant that face-to-face contact was the lynchpin of the campaign. Likewise,

[5] Norris. *A Virtuous Circle*; Dinkin; Farrell and Webb.
[6] W. Mackenzie and Kenneth Robinson. 1960. *Five Elections in Africa*. Oxford: Clarendon Press; Dennis Austin. 1964. *Politics in Ghana 1946-60*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

there were vibrant cultures of open-air public meetings. Based on these facts alone, if election campaigns should have been rally-intensive anywhere, they should have been in these countries and at this moment.

Thereby, I find an empirical anchor for the conceptual work undertaken in the last chapter. I illustrate that ground campaigns in these countries and periods were rally-intensive. Norris' schema of election campaigns, which I described in the last chapter, repeatedly refers to Britain, France and the United States, and she categorises their campaigns in the interwar period as 'pre-modern'. Therefore, by making this argument below, I illustrate the limitations of her case-by-case categorisation. By applying the ideal-type which I have developed in the introductory chapter to those cases, I not only try to elucidate something that has gone overlooked in the past. I hope to draw out deep parallels between how parties campaign across these cases.

To examine whether electronic amplification increased the size and scale of rallies, I employ the process tracing methods which I described in the opening chapter.[7] To begin with, I determine whether amplification technologies were available to politicians in the periods in question. Then I determine whether politicians held rallies more frequently and whether more voters came to hear them. If this were not the case, the argument that that amplification technologies increased the frequency and size of rallies would fail at the first hurdle. Therefore, this is a 'hoop test' in James Mahoney's terms; if the evidence did not support it, the argument would not have passed through a figurative hoop, and the stipulated causal mechanism could be discounted. In this chapter, I show that the frequency and size of rallies rose steeply, in some cases enormously after the proliferation of electronic amplification. As records of rally attendance and the number of rallies

[7] Mahoney. "After KKV".

conducted are scarce, demonstrating this empirically is a serious undertaking that concerns much of my attention of this chapter.

I also study the immediate effects of amplification. I examine whether speakers were inaudible to large crowds without electronic amplification but were audible to large crowds with amplification. Once again, if this were not the case, it would constitute significant evidence *against* the causal link proposed here. Therefore, this is another hoop test. I document that in the absence of amplification, speakers strained their voices and could not be heard by large crowds. I further demonstrate that these vocal impediments were relieved by electronic amplification. In sum, these two causal tests provide evidence of a cause, an effect and a mechanism linking them. Together, they constitute sufficient evidence that the stipulated causal mechanism was at work. In other words, the two hoop tests together amount to a smoking gun test, in Mahoney's terms.

As records of rally attendance and the number of rallies conducted are scarce, demonstrating empirically that rally attendance rose in these cases and in the periods specified is a serious undertaking that concerns much of my attention of this chapter. The challenge of estimating past rally attendance is compounded by the unreliability of estimates of crowd sizes.[8] The grand majority of such estimates are made without rigorous or consistent methods; often they are little more than guesses. As such, they are prone not only to inaccuracy, but bias; various sources had reasons to inflate or deflate rally attendance figures. Accurate measures of rally attendance improved as methodologically rigorous methods were introduced, and further as opinion surveys began to record

[8] Leon Mann. 1974. "Counting the Crowd: Effects of Editorial Policy on Estimates." *Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly* 51(2):278–85.

aggregate rally attendance.[9] I treat such estimates with caution, but I focus primarily on trends. While individual estimates are terribly vulnerable to error or prejudice, consistent and large changes in the size and frequency of rallies reported in various sources constitute much stronger evidence that aggregate rally attendance changed. I rely on a thorough survey of the secondary literature to construct these accounts. My research for this chapter extended beyond comparative and country-specific literatures to numerous political biographies and other grey literature material to substantiate the brief depictions of the campaign offered in each section. However, ultimately the evidence which I present below rests upon the primary research of others.

In sum, I complicate the history of election campaign innovation in this chapter. I also illustrate that the rally-intensive ground campaign is a recent phenomenon. It was given a lease of life by technological innovations that began to mature in the third decade of the twentieth century. Equally, I illustrate that the rally-intensive campaign is not uniquely African. On the contrary, the first ground campaigns to merit the label were Western ones. I proceed in the next section by outlining the comparative literature on election campaigns and situating the rally within it. In the second section, I detail the impediments that public speakers suffered before the emergence of electronic amplification in 1919. In the third section, I examine election campaigns in France, Britain and the United States between 1919 and 1948, when rallies were most central to the campaign. Lastly, in the fourth section, I examine a selection of election campaigns in sub-Saharan Africa in the late-colonial and early post-colonial period.

[9] Clark McPhail and John McCarthy. 2004. "Who Counts and How: Estimating the Size of Protests." *Contexts* 3(3):12–18.

Amplification as a campaign technology

The introduction of each mass medium affects the mixture of methods that parties use to communicate with voters. When political communication was confined to 'speech and the printed word'[10] the newspaper created a 'national debate'.[11] Indeed, grand theories of nationalism credit the newspaper with a crucial role in the development of imagined communities.[12] Nonetheless, when the newspaper was the primary mass medium, face-to-face methods of campaigning were crucial to political communication.[13] These face-to-face methods included the local canvass, the street parade, and the partisan fete, but also the rally.

As radio and cinema newsreels were invented, they supplemented the newspaper and the share of party efforts dedicated to face-to-face campaigning decreased.[14] Matthew and Dinkin both argue that rallies declined as press briefings to newspapers and radio addresses in turn superseded the set-piece public speech. Radio provided a way for party leaders 'to speak directly to voters over the heads of their party colleagues'.[15] Nonetheless, the declining importance of the ground campaign was gradual. Norris writes that 'despite the introduction of wireless broadcasting in 1922, this pattern [of face-to-face, direct campaigning and party organisation] continued in a recognizable form until at least the late

[10] Matthew: 41.
[11] Bernard Anderson. 1983. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*. Lonn: Verso.
[12] ibid.
[13] Norris. *A Virtuous Circle*; John Hilpert. 2015. *American Cyclone: Theodore Roosevelt and His 1900 Whistle-Stop Campaign*. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi; Lawrence; Charles Calhoun. 2008. *Minority Victory: Gilded Age Politics and the Front Porch Campaign of 1888*. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas; William Harpine. 2005. *From the Front Porch to the Front Page: McKinley and Bryan in the 1896 Presidential Campaign*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press; Meisel.
[14] Matthew; Dinkin.
[15] Matthew.

1950s.'[16] Evidently, these media were potent enough to supplement face-to-face campaigning, but not enough to displace or replace it.

Most agree that face-to-face campaigning, and in particular the rally, was depressed by the introduction of the television. Rally attendance declined in Western countries, apparently terminally after the 1950s. David Swanson writes of American campaigns in 1972 that 'only a minority of the voters ever hear a candidate deliver a speech in a presidential campaign'.[17] Writing almost three decades later, Dalton, Ian McCallister and Wattenberg offer a starker assessment. 'The trends for participation in party meetings or campaign rallies are down in virtually every nation. This is a clear indication of how elections have shifted from mass-based participation to vicarious viewing of the campaign on television.'[18]

However, these accounts have overlooked important changes in rally attendance over time. At least in part, these accounts suffer from the bias of retrospection. Most of the literature in question was published since the coming of the television age. Writing from that perspective, their analyses are prone to teleological mistakes. Most take the television age and the modern campaign as the end-point, and they construct historical campaign trajectories that converge on that destination. As they do so, they tend to dismiss or term as anomalous deviations from those trajectories, including the rise and fall of the rally. In the process, they under-emphasise and in some cases write-out altogether a moment in which 'the monster rally' took on a much greater role in mass political communication.

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[16] Norris. *A Virtuous Circle*.
[17] David Swanson. 1972. "The New Politics Meets the Old Rhetoric: New Directions in Campaign Communication Research." *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 58(1):31–40.
[18] Russell Dalton, Ian McAllister and Martin Wattenberg. 2000. "The Consequences of Partisan Dealignment" in *Parties without partisans: Political change in advanced industrial democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

The size of the audience that attends a rally is impeded by the reach of the speaker's voice. The audibility of the speaker, in turn, is dampened by a number of factors, which are laid out in detail in the next section. The consequence is that aggregate rally attendance is severely constrained when orators speak unaided. No matter how 'leather-lunged' the speaker, the volume of the human voice is limited and easily interrupted by all manner of impediments. However, these impediments were thrown off, at first partially and with time almost altogether, by the introduction of electronic means of amplification. Live magnification of the speaker's voice using microphones and amplifiers means that a potentially unlimited number of spectators can hear her.

Naturally, this complicates the connections drawn between communication technologies and rally attendance in the literature. Rally attendance will be highest when electronic amplification is widely available but mass media penetration is very shallow, other things being equal. By this reasoning, the rally-intensive campaign is a modern phenomenon, only made possible as technology lifted orators' voices over interruptions and noise. Comparative accounts which stress the role of mass media do not acknowledge this role for amplification. Therefore, they simplify histories of election campaigning and in the process, they deny that there was a moment in which election campaigns became rally-intensive. Ironically, the literature is all but silent on the transformative effect of amplification.

Below, I trace this crucial effect of electronic amplification amid a host of factors that individually inflate or deflate rally attendance. As the following sections occasionally detail, these factors include the invention and spread of rail travel, especially in Britain, France and the United States, which made literal whistle-stop tours possible. They include the spread of motor travel through the first decades of the twentieth century that enabled

candidates to reach ever more rally sites, especially in rural areas. Extensions of the franchise through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in both sets of cases drove politicians to reach ever larger sets of voters; so did population growth. Cultures of stump oratory, hustings and protest affected the scale of rallies and the forms that they assumed. Similarly, popular changes in understanding of politics led to mass moments of political mobilisation in which millions that had felt excluded in politics participated anew, such as the *Front Populaire* in France and the rise of the Labour Party in Britain. I go on to identify further factors in Chapter 3 which inflated or deflated aggregate rally attendance, including interest in politics, wealth, and partisanship. However, among all these competing causes and across these cases, one can detect an important, perhaps even a dramatic effect of electronic amplification.

Seen, but not heard: Public meetings in the United States and Western European elections before 1919

Rallies were important features of electioneering in the United States, France and Britain before 1919. In Jacksonian election campaigns in the United States of the 1830s and 1840s, rallies 'could run for hours, resemble religious revivals, and even move from town to town'.[19] These only increased in size as the franchise in the United States was extended to all white adult men in most states and counties.[20] In the election of 1860, there were parades and 'monster rallies'.[21] Contemporaneous newspaper reports estimate that some meetings were attended by as many as 50,000 voters.[22] Later, as technologies of transportation improved, party leaders embarked upon nation-wide tours by train. Whistle-

[19] Robert Roberts, Scott Hammond, and Valerie Sulfaro. 2012. *Presidential Campaigns, Slogans, Issues and Platforms. The Complete Encyclopaedia*. Santa-Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO, LLC.
[20] Dayna Cunningham. 1991. "Who Are to Be the Electors ? A Reflection on the History of Voter Registration in the United States." *Yale Law & Policy Review* 9(2):370–404.
[21] Reinhard Luthin. 1944. *The First Lincoln Campaign*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
[22] ibid.

stop tours in 1896 and 1900 by Democrat presidential nominee William Bryan and Republican vice-presidential nominee Theodore Roosevelt respectively were cases in point.[23]

The literature attests to the variation in the effort that British politicians dedicated to mass meetings across the country. It also attests to how much it varied over time.[24] Public speaking rose with the hustings. It fell with the Great Reform Act of 1832, subsequent extensions of the franchise which made small indoor hustings unviable, the abolition of the hustings in law, the removal of pocket boroughs, and the closure of the space for clientelism through a spate of reforms. All these changes increased the electoral task facing parliamentary candidates; it drove them to reach ever more voters and made many of the old ways of securing their support increasingly unviable. [25] Gradually, platform speaking emerged as one way to mobilise voters which involved speaking to public audiences outdoors, normally from a raised platform, or in other words, a rally. This style of public speaking was pioneered by politicians such as George Cannings, William Russell and John Bright.[26] It was refined and propagated by William Gladstone during his first and second Midlothian campaigns in 1879 and 1880.[27] Subsequent reform which further extended the franchise only sharpened these pressures to undertake lengthy campaign tours. Therefore, the importance of rallies in electioneering came and went before the proliferation of electronic amplification, as various determinants made it rise and fall in popularity.

Some scholars, including Joseph Meisel and Colin Matthew, consider the 20 years following Gladstone's Midlothian campaigns to be the pinnacle of British public speaking, after

[23] Hilpert.
[24] Meisel; Lawrence; Matthew.
[25] Jon Lawrence. 2009. *Electing Our Masters*. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Meisel.
[26] Lawrence; Matthew.
[27] Meisel.

which it steadily declined. Matthew writes that 'the complex structure of extra-parliamentary national debate, which had, of course, been largely suspended during the First World War, never recovered its rude, late-Victorian health.'[28] Alan John Percival Taylor agrees. He writes in his history of England between 1914 and 1945 that 'Men and women heard the voices of leading statesmen in their own homes. They ceased to attend meetings, except those held by the advocates of minority views which were denied expression over the airways.'[29]

However, while rallies were a routine part of campaigning before the propagation of electronic amplification, they were not a means to reach large portions of the electorate directly for one simple reason: few spectators could hear the speaker. Returning to the United States, William Harpine offers this description of the presidential campaign of Bryan in 1896:

> 'Bryan was apparently overwhelmed by the enormous crowd, their numbers defeating his attempts to make himself heard. As a practical matter, many in the crowd may not have heard the various speakers at all.'[30]

Therefore, the size of audiences gives a deceptively optimistic impression of how many voters were in a direct way 'reached'. Matthew gives this account of an address by Gladstone:

> 'At the Bingley Hall meeting in May 1877 when Gladstone spoke to the National Liberal Federation, he noted in his diary: 'A most intelligent and duly appreciate audience – but they

[28] Matthew.
[29] Taylor.
[30] Harpine.

> were 25,000 and the building I think of no acoustic merit'; in fact the speech was inaudible to about half the audience.'[31]

While almost any number might attend and catch a glimpse of the speaker in the distance, most would not hear what she said. One should keep this in mind when reading, for example, that Abraham Lincoln addressed 50,000 people at one meeting in 1860.

Writing on just this subject, *The Daily Telegraph* commented that 'in the open air, it is questionable whether more than 1000 to 1500 persons, in a gathering which may possibly exceed 30,000, will catch all that is said.'[32] This assessment may be unduly pessimistic. Meisel reports first-hand witnesses who insist that audiences numbering in the tens of thousands could hear every word.[33] Some acoustic simulations designed specifically to examine the travel of the human voice and to interrogate the supposed crowd sizes addressed by nineteenth century preachers shed light on the matter. The researchers suggest that under *perfect* acoustic conditions, with no disturbance from wind or rain and in complete silence, audiences of 30,000 might have heard a speaker if they were formed into a sufficiently dense crowd.[34]

However, politicians rarely enjoyed such ideal conditions for public speaking. Describing an address by Lord Rosebery, Matthew writes that 'the speech, given in a vast echoing railway repair shed, was completely inaudible to all but the big-wigs sitting on the platform (it was inaudible to the stenographer)'. This problem of acoustics was not a uniquely British one. Woodrow Wilson's Western Tour in 1919 got off to 'a shaky start in a building "not

[31] Matthew: 41-42.
[32] Hogan.
[33] Meisel: 262.
[34] Braxton Boren and Agniezska Roginska. 2012. "Computer Simulation of Benjamin Franklin's Acoustic Experiment on George Whitefield's Oratory." *The Journal of the Acoustic Society of America* 132(2085).

intended for speech-making'".[35] Similarly, at the German National Socialist party's first Germany Day celebrations in 1923, the speakers were unable to make themselves heard. 'There were some technical difficulties, for the hall was utterly inadequate acoustically… only the people sitting near the rostrum were able to follow the speeches.'[36]

Even when the acoustics of the place of assembly were favourable, other sources of background noise could make a speaker inaudible. A good shower could figuratively drown not only a speaker but her voice.[37] Matthew describes that 'At the Blackheath open air meeting, between ten and fifteen thousand people were present, but little could be heard of the speech for the rain on the umbrellas'.[38] Orators had to speak over more than rain. One account of London speech-making in 1921 describes 'the Arsenal main gate, where street-corner orators had to shout into [non-electronic] megaphones to make themselves heard above the clanging of the trams.'[39]All these constraints dampened the effect of oratory.

Even if a speaker enjoyed good acoustics, the number of times per day, and the number of days in a campaign in which they could deliver such speeches was limited by the endurance of the speaker's voice. Describing an event in the midst of Theodore Roosevelt's 1900 campaign, John Hilpert writes that 'He was so hoarse that he was unable to make his voice audible to more than half the audience.'[40] He was not alone. Meisel concludes that 'the efforts of speakers to be heard by so many of those assembled must have been a great strain' and that 'travel could only have added to the strain'.[41]

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[35] Michael Hogan. 2006. *Woodrow Wilson's Western Tour: Rhetoric, Public Opinion, and the League of Nations*. College Stadium: Texas A&M University Press.
[36] Hamilton Burden. 1967. *The Nuremberg Party Rallies: 1923-39*. London: Pall Mall Press.
[37] Meisel: 262.
[38] Matthew: 41.
[39] Lawrence.
[40] Hilpert.
[41] ibid: 263.

Equally, the speaker relied upon the good will of the audience. When addressing an auditorium in San Francisco, Woodrow Wilson was heckled so badly that 'For fifteen or twenty minutes the president could not speak at all'.[42] Disturbances of this kind were common. In his 1900 whistle-stop tour, Theodore Roosevelt regularly encountered 'organized effort… to prevent his making a speech'.[43] Audiences had such power collectively to obstruct or mock speakers that 'making hustings speeches was a considerable ordeal for candidates in Gladstonian Britain'.[44] In some cases, sympathetic audiences had as little interest in letting speakers address them as hostile ones. At a Labour Party meeting in 1924, 'The hall was overflowing and the speakers could barely make themselves heard as 'The Red Flag' was sung with gusto.'[45] Ultimately, a speaker might have the advantage of speaking from a raised platform, but she could rarely raise her voice over other members of the audience. These examples all attest to the challenges of audibility that haunted public speaking. By extension, they all serve as evidence of the importance of electronic amplification. By illustrating the severity of the shortcomings of the human voice, they illustrate just how much amplification could empower it.

As a consequence, public meetings before the end of First World War were smaller than they might otherwise have been. Matthew judges that even though the pinnacle of public speaking lies in the late nineteenth century, 'It would be misleading to suggest that huge meetings were characteristics of late-Victorian speechmaking.'[46] A close reading of the secondary literature reveals that public oratory was often to small crowds in the United States. In 1900, Bryan and Roosevelt occasionally drew crowds in the tens of thousands,

[42] Hogan: 107.
[43] Hilpert: 145.
[44] ibid.
[45] John Bew. 2016. *Citizen Clem*. London: riverrun.
[46] Matthew: 41.

but typically they attracted audiences that numbered in the hundreds or low thousands.[47] During his Western Tour of 1919, Wilson spoke to crowds of a similar size.[48] Similarly, in Britain, Gladstone reckoned that in a two-week speaking tour during which he spoke for 15 and a half hours, he addressed a sum total of 90,000 voters, a paltry sum by modern standards.[49] During the 1869 elections in the French Second Empire, thousands of public assemblies were held,[50] but typically, the spectators numbered in the hundreds or low thousands.[51] In fact the rally's limitations were so great that many leaders did not take to the stump at all. In the 1880s and 1890s, Benjamin Harrison and William McKinley both ran 'front porch campaigns', in which they barely left their home states.[52]

Theodore Roosevelt succeeded in addressing more voters than most of his contemporaries. His tour of the western States in 1896 lasted 71 days, and by the end he was thought to have addressed approximately 500,000 people.[53] However, even if these estimates were accurate, all the attendees heard him, and they were all turned out to vote, Roosevelt alone would have spoken to just 3.6% of all people that voted in that presidential election.[54]

In fact, there is considerable agreement that before the 1920s the rally's primary use was as a gateway to press coverage. In late nineteenth century Britain, important extra-parliamentary speeches were reported verbatim or in summary form in newspapers.[55] The rally was a means to secure access to the press. Harpine remarks with telegram and the press in mind that in the United States 'A presidential candidate in 1896 could speak in

[47] Hilpert.
[48] Hogan.
[49] Meisel.
[50] Paula Cossart. 2013. *From Deliberation to Demonstration. Political Rallies in France, 1868-1939*. Colchester: ECPR Press: 101.
[51] ibid: 101.
[52] Calhoun; Harpine.
[53] Hilpert: 161.
[54] John Wolley and Gerhard Peters. 2017. "Election of 1896." *The American Presidency Project*. University of California: Santa Barbara. Retrieved June 1, 2017 (http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu).
[55] Matthew: 41.

person only to a small portion of the electorate, but technology could spread the candidate's words across the land in short order'.[56] This is an interesting example of what Andrew Chadwick describes as media 'hybridity' before the proliferation of analogue media.[57]

Indeed, the unaided voice was so emasculated before the dawn of electronic amplification that rallies were often overshadowed by other mass political events in which oratory featured less prominently. Consider this account of a parade in the United States campaign of 1860:

> 'The Springfield Turner band led off, followed by some three hundred ladies and gentlemen on horseback; then came seventy-five or eighty wagons loaded with old and young of both sexes, each carrying some banner or flag on which "Old Abe" could be seen; again came some fifty or sixty horsemen, followed in turn by a decorated wagon in which were thirty-three young girls, all dressed in white, with pink and blue sashes'.[58]

The attraction was the train of novel, entertaining and exciting acts. This parade was designed to be eye-catching, attention drawing and ultimately, a festival. In a quite different context, left-wing demonstrations in peri-urban and rural France took on a similar form.

> 'In the Loir-et-Cher the festival organized by the Amsterdam committee on July 14 began with bands and sporting competitions; in the afternoon there were fairground games, including coconut shy with effigies of 'fascists' as targets; in the evening there were fireworks.'[59]

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[56] Harpine: 39.
[57] Chadwick. *Hybrid Media Systems*.
[58] Luthin.
[59] Cossart.

Many mass rallies incorporate festivities of the sorts described above. In fact, rallies at which speakers address spectators unaccompanied by assorted festivities or entertainment are almost certainly in the minority, both in historic Western cases and contemporary sub-Saharan African ones. However, barbecues, parades and the like which do not include a live address by orators to those assembled do not constitute rallies. Many mass political events during the nineteenth and early twentieth century in Western Europe and the United States were not rallies.

In sum, elections before 1919 varied between those fought on the doorstep and those fought from the stump. In some, candidates campaigned from their offices or homes. In others, it was an electoral necessity to hold meetings in every waking moment. Changes in the franchise, in electoral law, the invention of the train, the telegram, and the motorcar all affected the electoral potential of the rally. Yet across these cases and across this period, the potential of the rally was tempered by the audibility of the speaker.

Amplified: The rally in the United States, France and Britain from 1919 until 1948

In this section, I show that from 1919 onwards, electronic amplifiers became gradually more effective and more readily available. Politicians began to employ these technologies to address public meetings. As they did so, speakers became less impeded. Consequently, the size of the meetings increased, and so did the number of meetings that politicians held. This is not the place for a comprehensive history of the development of electronic amplification. I leave it to other, more qualified writers to weave together the accumulative technological advancements in sound recording, radio, telecommunications, medical aids

for the deaf and dumb, sound reproduction and finally live sound amplification.[60] Suffice to say that a working public address (PA) system called the Magnavox had been invented by 1915.[61] Woodrow Wilson was the first president and among the first politicians to use a PA system. He addressed 40,000 to 50,000 people at San Diego in 1919. However, in 1919, the Magnavox was barely technologically viable. Michael Hogan writes that 'only part of the crowd could hear the president and that there were "many empty seats" by the time he finished.'[62] Electronic amplification gradually became cheaper, more mobile and more effective through the 1920s. As it did, it became a staple and indeed a vital tool in electioneering.

Across the Atlantic, Lloyd George was the first British politician to use the Magnavox in the general elections of 1922 and 1923.[63] He addressed crowds of between 30,000 and 40,000, which Lawrence remarks were numbers that even Gladstone could never have hoped to reach through outdoor oratory.'[64] Stanley Baldwin first used it in 1924 and 'could be heard by larger audiences than had ever been possible before'.[65] In 1929 he addressed an audience of an estimated 200,000.[66] Evidently, amplification was possible by then, albeit for an important set-piece planned far in advance.

Lawrence finds that in Britain, public meetings 'became a staple of the leaders' itinerary in the late 1920s'.[67] Stanley Baldwin's biographer writes that as Prime Minister, Baldwin gave

[60] Richard James Burgess. 2014. *The History of Music Production*. Oxford: Oxford University Press; David Lewis. 1981. "Peter Jensen and the Amplification of Sound." in *Technology in America: A History of Individuals and Ideas*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
[61] ibid; Andy Coules. 2014. "The History Of PA." *ProSoundWeb*. Retrieved May 11, 2017 (http://www.prosoundweb.com/channels/live-sound/the_history_of_pa_part_1/).
[62] Hogan.
[63] Lawrence: 105.
[64] ibid.
[65] ibid.
[66] ibid.
[67] Lawrence.

many more extra-parliamentary speeches than his predecessors.[68] Moreover, in this period, the necessity of public speaking extended from party leaders to parliamentary candidates and even councillors. In the judgement of a study of the British general election of 1931, 'The public meeting remained the most prominent feature of campaigning.'[69] This was perhaps the first election in which parliamentary candidates regularly used amplification. Onerous constituency tours became routine for parliamentary candidates in the period. Lawrence writes that:

> 'Individual candidates often faced even more gruelling schedules [than party leaders]. A typical example was Sir Arthur Steel-Maitland, who addressed two or three meetings every day in the two weeks up to polling. In Wansbeck, 82 Labour meetings were held between 10 and 27 October, the majority being addressed by the candidate; in Cambridgeshire the figure was 94.'[70]

Lawrence goes as far as to suggest that the interwar period represented a 'golden age of the meeting' in Britain. He writes that 'the inter-war period witnessed the heyday of the election meeting thanks to technological innovations such as amplification, instantaneous relay, and more reliable modes of transport'.[71] An opinion poll in Britain in 1951 found that as many as 30% of British voters claimed to have attended at least one indoor or outdoor political meeting during the General Election of that year.[72] This is almost as high as the average country rate of rally attendance in sub-Saharan Africa today, and it is indicative of the potential of electronic amplification.

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[68] Williamson: 153.
[69] Andrew Thorpe. 1991. *The British General Election of 1931*. Oxford: Clarendon Press 188.
[70] ibid: 191.
[71] ibid: 103.
[72] ibid: 143.

These trends in Britain were mirrored in France's Third Republic. Paula Cossart describes 'the massive rallies typical of the [interwar] period' and 'impressive gatherings of the 1920s and 1930s'.[73] The most iconic such meeting was the *Rassemblement Populaire* on the 14th of July 1936, convened to mark the formation of the *Front Populaire*, or of the Popular Front, which united the Communist, Socialist and Radical parties. This 'rally-cum-demonstration', in Cossart's words, drew an unparalleled crowd; it may have been attended by over one million people.[74] It is described by one spectator as 'the most immense procession Paris had ever seen'.[75] The event both began and ended with public addresses to the marchers by the party leaders at la Place de la Bastille. It was preceded and followed by similar events in adjoining years, attended by crowds of 500,000 or 600,000.[76] Secondary sources indicate that rallies grew in size and scale as electronic amplification became widespread. Cossart, for example, writes that in interwar France, rallies 'often take the form of massive gatherings and are equipped with loudspeakers'.[77] Photographs of the *Rassemblement Populaire* described above shows that politicians addressed the enormous crowd with the assistance of microphones.[78]

Other factors also increased the number and scale of mass political events in France in this period. There was a long culture of mass political protest borne of the revolutions of the late eighteenth century through to the mid-nineteenth century.[79] This culture had been re-appropriated repeatedly, and was re-appropriated again in the first decades of the twentieth

[73] Cossart: 228, 243.
[74] Cossart.
[75] Julian Jackson. 1988. *The Popular Front in France Defending Democracy, 1934-38*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
[76] ibid: 114.
[77] Cossart: 256.
[78] Cecile Meadel. 2005. "La Radio, Une Affaire Politique." *Histoire Image*. Retrieved April 10, 2017 (https://www.histoire-image.org/etudes/radio-affaire-politique).
[79] George Rude. 1959. *The Crowd in the French Revolution*. Oxford: Clarendon Press; Micah Alpaugh. 2015. *Non-Violence and the French Revolution: Political Demonstrations in Paris 1787-1795*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Richard Cobb. 1970. *The Police and the People: French Popular Protest, 1789-1820*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

century.[80] In the 1930s in particular, France experienced a moment of intensely mass politics. Fascist demonstrations were followed by waves of strikes, counter-demonstrations and marches by forces on the left of French politics.[81] The Popular Front in particular brought a series of changes in the culture of mass politics. One account of just this phenomenon writes that:

> 'The Popular Front's most glorious moments were lived in the street – in demonstrations, rallies, marches… Politics became a pageant.'[82]

I make no pretence that electronic amplification is the sole or even always the dominant factor in altering rally attendance. However, I maintain that its effects can be detected throughout these cases. It made rallies more effective and more common, and in France in particular, it altered the nature of mass political events, tempting politicians to turn demonstrations into rallies at which they addressed huge crowds on an unprecedented scale.

Returning to the United States, after Wilson's trial of the Magnavox in 1919, amplifiers became gradually more common. Archival video footage shows that they were used in every Democratic Convention between 1924 and 1936.[83] The change in practice was gradual. As late as 1924, while amplification was still in its infancy, Calvin Coolidge went to the stump very little.[84] In 1932, Roosevelt's running mate John Garner did not make a

[80] Cossart; Jackson.
[81] Duverger; Jackson.
[82] ibid.
[83] Historycomestolife. 2011. "Democratic Convention 1932." *YouTube*. Retrieved (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tv8OECIFGzM); Historycomestolife. 2011. "Democratic Convention in Houston 1928." *YouTube*. Retrieved May 11, 2017 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mbLHhpeLJ-Y); Historycomestolife. 2011. "Democratic Convention in New York City 1924." *YouTube*. Retrieved May 11, 2017 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AjlCPCwtpY4)
[84] Edward Ranson. 2010. *The American Presidential Election of 1924*. Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press

single public address at a public rally.[85] However, he was among the last candidates on the top or the bottom of a presidential ticket to do so for the next twenty years.[86] In 1928, Herbert Hoover undertook a national tour; in 1932, he travelled 10,000 miles, and addressed numerous meetings.[87] However, his opponent Franklin Roosevelt made even more public addresses than him.[88] Both Roosevelt and Republican nominee Alf Landon undertook equally onerous speaking tours in 1936. In 1940, Roosevelt initially hoped to avoid taking to the stump, but Wendell Wilkie the Republican nominee, gave over 500 speeches in 50 days, and eventually forced Roosevelt into a late campaign tour.[89] The most impressive of this sort of long presidential campaign tour by train was the last: the campaign tour undertaken by Harry Truman in 1948. Describing the campaign of 1948, Gary Donaldson writes that 'Truman often spoke to as many as fifteen audiences a day'[90] and that 'between his first unofficial trip in June until he finally arrived home in Independence on October 31, Truman had travelled some 31,700 miles and delivered well over 350 speeches'.[91] The trail of presidential whistle-stop tours may have been blazed in the 1890s by Bryan and Roosevelt, but their heyday in the United States was between 1928 and 1948, when the campaign impact of a presidential tour became too large to neglect.

Likewise, in this period, the scant evidence available in the secondary literature suggests that other candidates for public office held more mass rallies too. Describing the beginning of the twentieth century, Dinkin writes that 'Even if latter-day stump speakers proved less dynamic than earlier ones, the parties still employed great numbers of them, particularly

[85] Donald Ritchie. 2007. *Electing FDR: The New Deal Campaign of 1932*. Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press.
[86] Dinkin: 136.
[87] Paul Boller. 1996. *Presidential Campaigns*. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 234-5.
[88] ibid.
[89] Richard Moe. 2013. *Roosevelt's Second Act. The Election of 1940 and the Politics of War.* Oxford: Oxford University Press: 287, 291.
[90] Gary Donaldson. 1999. *Truman Defeats Dewey*. Lexington: Kentucky University Press: 183.
[91] ibid: 179.

during national campaigns.'[92] Robert Caro's biography of Lyndon Johnson shows that his succession of underdog election campaigns were successful because of his vigorous and well attended campaign tours. By the time that a by-election campaign began for the Democratic Nomination for the Texas 10th District, a congressional seat, 'Johnson had already completed a tour of the entire district, and was holding his rally in Old Main'.[93] In short, the secondary evidence suggests that congressional candidates, like presidential candidates began to hold more meetings over the period in question, and that they did so with the aid of electronic amplification.

Accounts across the secondary literature testify consistently that in the inter-war period, rally attendance grew. When presidential candidates visited major cities in campaigns from 1932 and onwards, they could regularly expect crowds of over 100,000.[94] This amounted to a step change in the size of rallies, which made the meetings of politicians such as Bryan and Theodore Roosevelt seem paltry by comparison. During his 1940 campaign, Wilkie addressed an estimated 12 million voters at public meetings on his whistle-stop tour, far in excess of Theodore Roosevelt's 500,000 in 1896.[95] Dinkin argues that the rally was in decline in this period along with other aspects of the ground war. However, even he concedes that 'campaigning by presidential candidates generally expanded during this period' from 1920-1948.'[96] In all these accounts of election campaigns, there is little acknowledgement of the contribution that amplification made to these large rises in the scale and frequency of rallies in the United States. The only observation to the best of my knowledge is a throw-away sentence in a study of contemporary election campaigning.

[92] Dinkin: 98-9.
[93] Robert Caro. 1982b. *The Years of Lyndon Johnson. The Passage to Power*. London: Collins: 413.
[94] Boller: 243, 247; Donaldson: 183.
[95] Dinkin: 153.
[96] ibid: 136.

'Even something as simple as the microphone allowed candidates and their surrogates to address larger crowds'.[97]

Across France, Britain and the United States, rallies got larger and politicians dedicated increasing time and resources to convene them through the nineteen twenties, thirties and early forties. Above, I have presented three particularly compelling forms of evidence that the rise in rally attendance was due at least in part to the proliferation of amplification. First, I have shown that rallies were hindered by issues of audibility and that electronic amplification resolved these problems. Second, as amplification became available, politicians began speaking more frequently and spoke to larger crowds. Third, this change was no coincidence; on the contrary, speakers that convened frequent meetings and addressed large crowds at them used amplification to do so. Together, this shows that amplification made election campaigns more rally-intensive.

In the process, I have shown that the format of the rally and the social rules surrounding it varied from place to place. In Britain, a culture of public political oratory can be traced back to the hustings.[98] After the hustings was dissolved, rallies developed through a new culture of platform speaking.[99] In the United States, stump speaking evolved alongside and often accompanied by barbeques, fetes and parades.[100] In France, mass political gatherings took two forms in the nineteenth century: the protest, borne of the French Revolution and subsequent mass riots in the early nineteenth century,[101] and the 'contradictory assembly', which flourished in the first years of the Third Republic.[102] The emergence of the rally in France was itself a 'hybrid' form in France. Politicians drew on both of these formats and

[97] John Sides and others: 68.
[98] Lawrence.
[99] Matthew.
[100] Dinkin; Boller.
[101] Rude.
[102] Cossart.

convened 'rally-cum-demonstrations' at which mass protests culminated in the assembly of demonstrators to hear their leaders speak.[103] This illustrates that while amplification may have had homogenous on rally attendance, the rallies themselves still varied. Furthermore, it reveals that the format of the rally was affected by amplification. A variety of mass political events were adjusted to incorporate the magnified reach of oratory, leading to a partial convergence in the style of mass events across these countries.

Late colonial and early post-colonial sub-Saharan Africa

The rise of the rally was not a uniquely European or North American phenomenon. Rallies became important across much of sub-Saharan Africa in the late colonial and early post-colonial period. Across much of the continent, nascent political parties began to coalesce from the 1940s onwards.[104] In the following decades, they competed against rival parties in elections, first under colonial supervision and then in newly independent nations. They did so under conditions of shallow mass media penetration and indeed in societies with low literacy rates. This position is taken up by Kenneth Post in his study of the Nigeria general election of 1959:

> 'In Nigeria, however, the majority of the population could not read in 1959, either in English or a vernacular tongue…. it is possible to consider the two main channels through which ideas were circulated – the newspapers and the campaign meetings in the constituencies.'[105]

This shallow mass media penetration was shared across much of the continent. In 1960, radio penetration was shallow, when compared both to contemporaneous radio use

[103] Cossart; Jackson.
[104] Frederick Cooper. 2002. *Africa Since 1940: The Past of the Present*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[105] Kenneth Post. 1963. *The Nigerian Federal Election of 1959*.

elsewhere and the extremely high rates of radio penetration in much of contemporary sub-Saharan Africa. Radio ownership ranged from a paltry 63 per thousand people in South Africa to the almost negligible 0.2 per thousand in Rwanda and Burundi.[106] Even allowing for the fact that radios were often shared in families or communities, some of these ownership rates meant that in effect, only a slither of the electorate could be reached over the airwaves.

These countries in turn had few stations to receive radio signals from. In 1960, there were seven medium-wave radio stations and 19 short-wave stations in Nigeria, a country of approximately one million square miles.[107] This was on the advanced end; in Mali, there was only one medium-wave station in operation in 1960.[108] While radio penetration was limited, television penetration was nascent at best. In 1960, there were estimated to be only 22 television transmitters across the entire continent, less than one for every two countries, and these were concentrated in north and southern Africa.[109] This meant that there were imperatives for parties to campaign on the ground, especially opposition parties that were denied access to these media.

While newspaper circulation was much higher, penetration was limited in turn to the literate. There are few continent-wide literacy statistics available for the 1950s and the 1960s.[110] However, numerous sources attest to the low levels of literacy across many colonies in sub-Saharan Africa. In reference to late-colonial Nigeria, J. Price writes that in 'any predominantly illiterate community the conventional mass media of communication touch only a comparatively small proportion of the population, especially when wireless

[106] UNESCO. 1963. *Statistics on Radio and Television 1950-1960*. Paris: 52.
[107] ibid: 41.
[108] ibid: 41.
[109] ibid: 21.
[110] World Bank, 2017. "World Development Indicators." Retrieved September 20, 2017 (https://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators).

sets are beyond the means of the average man'.[111] Illiteracy and its impact on campaign communication has been stressed by numerous scholars of popular politics in sub-Saharan Africa in this period, not least James Coleman,[112] Dennis Austen,[113] Elizabeth Schmidt,[114] Thomas Hodgkin,[115] and Post.[116]

Therefore, young political parties that began to mobilise popular support across African colonies in the years before independence were driven to campaign on the ground, rather than in the air. They did so long after the development of means of amplification had been invented. As I show in this section, politicians often gained access to amplification technologies. In this respect, these cases form an important body of test cases. If the theory outline above were correct, political parties should have concentrated on the ground war, and the ground wars should have been rally-intensive.

Below, I present secondary accounts for election campaigns in late-colonial or early post-colonial Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea and Kenya as short cases-studies. First and foremost, I establish that election campaigns in this period were rally-intensive. To do so, I turn to numerous accounts of campaigns and public meetings in the secondary literature. These accounts depend extensively on a small collection of election studies in the Nuffield mould, but also numerous biographies, contemporaneous studies and other volumes that touch on election campaign methods tangentially.

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[111] J. H. Price. 1960. "The Eastern Region of Nigeria March 1957." in *Five Elections in Africa*. Oxford: Clarendon Press: 131.
[112] James Coleman and Carl Rosberg. 1964. *Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa*. Berkley: University of California Press.
[113] Austin.
[114] Elizabeth Schmidt. 2005. *Mobilizing the Masses. Gender, Ethnicity and Class in the Nationalist Movement in Guinea, 1939-1958*. Portsmouth: Heinemann.
[115] Thomas Hodgkin. 1956. *Nationalism in Colonial Africa*. London: Frederick Muller.
[116] Post, *The Nigerian Federal Election of 1959*.

However, below, I go on to offer further evidence to support my contention that electronic amplification makes election campaigns rally-intensive. Further evidence is necessary, because there are various other conditions that are commonplace in these cases which also augment rally attendance. For example, in many of the countries in question, there is a culture of mass meetings, such as the *Kgotla* in Botswana[117] and the *baraza* in Kenya.[118] In such countries, politicians and voters alike may well have had preconceived notions of both the realm of campaign possibilities and their obligations towards them. As there were numerous other factors that might explain high rally attendance, process tracing is crucial to determine that electronic amplification was among those factors.

In this section, I apply two process tracing tests. First, if amplification increased rally attendance, then where politicians could not afford amplifiers, their rallies should have been small. I show that in campaigns where electronic amplification was too expensive, rallies were significantly smaller in scale. Second, if amplification increased rally attendance by making politician audible, then at rallies where large audiences formed, politicians should have used amplifiers. I show that at large rallies, politicians were amplified. Thereby, I contribute further evidence which shows that the presence of amplification made election campaigns more rally-intensive. While this evidence alone is not conclusive, it complements the evidence offered in the preceding sections and shows that this causal mechanism was at work not only in Western countries, but Africa too.

In the Gold Coast, the territory that now constitutes Ghana, political mobilisation in the 1930s and 1940s took the form of 'cocoa hold-ups' and small protests.[119] Political agitation was illegal and there were few legitimate channels for politicking or electioneering in

[117] Patrick Molutsi and John Holm. 1990. "Developing Democracy When Civil Society Is Weak: The Case of Botswana." *African Affairs* 89(356):323–40.
[118] Angelique Haugerud. 1995. *Politics of Culture in Modern Kenya*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[119] Austin: 10.

particular. The riots of February 29th, 1948 were typical of this era.[120] Protesters gathered at a small rally of just 2,000 people, before proceeding to march into Accra, confront the police and riot. The public address was not a major part of the proceedings; instead, the march itself was the main event. However, just a year after the riot of 29th February 1948, the Convention People's Party (CPP) was formed, which marked the beginning of a new era of electoral mobilisation. By April 1950, the CPP had acquired 'the first propaganda vans, equipped with loudspeakers'.[121] In a colonial-sponsored general election in 1951, these propaganda vans were at the centre of nationwide campaigning. Dennis Austin writes of the 1951 elections that 'The CPP used its local rallies and propaganda tours'.[122] Drawing on newspaper records, he presents the summary of CPP events in that 1951 election campaign in the first nine days of July. [123] This record shows that virtually every day of this campaign contained one or more mass rallies.

Various first-hand accounts and historical accounts affirm that large public meetings became a staple of the election campaign in late colonial Ghana. Jean Allman writes of the National Liberation Movement's first major rally in 1954 that 'the September 5 rally was nonetheless significant … it was the first large rally in opposition to the CPP held in Asante'.[124] She also attests to their size. She describes the National Liberation Movement holding a 'mass rally' at which orators addressed a 'mammoth crowd'[125] which might number 30,000 or more. Scholars of this period also affirm the frequency of the rally. There were 'countless rallies'[126] in the words of one, 'numerous inaugural rallies'[127] in those of another. In his autobiography, Kwame Nkrumah himself writes of the 1954 election that

[120] ibid.
[121] ibid: 117.
[122] ibid: 111-2.
[123] ibid: 128.
[124] Jean Allman. 1993. *The Quills of the Porcupine: Asante Nationalism in an Emergent Ghana*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
[125] ibid.
[126] Basil Davidson. 1973. *Black Star: The View of the Life and Times of Kwame Nkrumah*. Oxford: James Curry: 79.
[127] Allman, *The Quills of the Porcupine*: 68.

'I don't think I have ever made so many speeches in one month in my life!'[128] In short, political parties in Ghana held vast rallies regularly, and did so with the assistance of PA systems mounted on propaganda vans.

In Britain's largest colonial possession in West Africa, Nigeria, the rally was even more ascendant. In his study of electioneering in Nigeria, Post records that Action Group had acquired loudspeakers as early as 1954.[129] Another description reads 'The two leaders each went out with a group of vehicles, including Volkswagen vans and 'minibuses', some equipped with loudspeakers'[130] Another states that 'Where loudspeakers were available, they were generally used'.[131] In fact, one study of five elections in late colonial Africa even includes photographic evidence of Nnamdi Azikiwe holding a microphone at a public meeting.[132] Thus equipped, Nigerian politicians began to conduct more and more mass meetings.

Famously, Nnamdi Azikiwe, leader of the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) led a national tour in 1946. Ostensibly, this schedule of meetings was arranged to raise funds to send a delegation to Britain, but in and of itself it was an 'unprecedented venture' because 'it was the first time in the history of Nigeria that large numbers of people were made conscious of Nigerian unity'. During this tour, Azikiwe – or Zik, as he was popularly known - addressed audiences as large as 100,000 strong.[133] The focus on rallies sharpened in the 1950s as competitive legislative elections were held. As before, Azikiwe 'used the technique of frequent mass meetings in Lagos.'[134] In the regional legislative

[128] Davidson.
[129] Post: 118-9.
[130] Philip Whitaker. 1960. "The Western Region of Nigeria, May 1956." in *Five Elections in Africa*. Oxford: Clarendon Press: 59.
[131] ibid: 65.
[132] Mackenzie and Robinson.
[133] James Coleman. 1971. *Nigeria: Background to Nationalism*. Berkeley: University of California Press 291.
[134] ibid: 291.

elections held in 1956 and 1957, both the NCNC and their main rivals, the Action Group arranged rival tours during which party leaders addressed large crowds. One contemporaneous account of the latter's campaign reads 'The two groups travelled through the constituencies by road or by launch, whichever was appropriate, holding mass rallies in the larger centres and more informal meetings in smaller villages.'[135] Both campaigns convened many rallies and attracted crowds which were so large that they could only have been addressed with amplification. They are documented speaking to one 'enthusiastic crowd of 30,000'[136] and another 'mammoth crowd of 100,000'[137]. Even when audiences did not reach these peaks, they normally spoke to at least 5,000. [138]

Large-scale rallies were not the duty of party leaders alone. As early as 1956, 'Particularly on the N.C.N.C. side, other party notables, especially federal ministers, addressed large campaign meetings, and were stationed at strategic points throughout the Region.'[139] There is every sign that the frequency and scale of rallies increased in the next national elections of 1959, held on the eve of independence. In the final stretch of this race, Chief Awolowo embarked upon a Herculean tour in which he addressed 81 meetings in 27 days.[140] Equally, the evidence suggests that parties reached more voters through public meetings than they did through other face-to-face methods. Describing this election, Post writes that 'Meetings were virtually the only direct contact between the politicians and the electorate.[141] Much like their Ghanaian counterparts, Nigeria's late colonial elections constitute a set of rally-intensive campaigns *par excellence*. By independence, the 'Land Rover cavalcade'[142] and the

[135] Price: 139.
[136] Coleman: 292.
[137] ibid: 292.
[138] Whitaker.
[139] ibid: 61.
[140] Post: 326.
[141] Post: 327.
[142] Price: 142.

mass rally had already become a centre-piece of the election campaign. Moreover, they only achieved these great feats of electioneering with the help of electronic amplification.

The ascent of the rally in Ghana and Nigeria was not mirrored equally across the continent. Many African colonial administrations pursued policies of political suppression or held no elections until the eve of independence. Accordingly, the French colonial state imposed deeply repression measures. Consequently, when Elizabeth Schmidt listed the 'new methods of communication' that Guinean nationalists used in this period, she did not include the rally in her list.[143] Instead, she lists the tools of the underground political activity: secret meetings, street-corner conversations and 'songs, symbols, and uniforms'.[144] In 1956, the *Rassemblement Démocratique Africain* (RDA) was legalised and the franchise was extended. In the national election that year, rallies became frequent,[145] but they remained determinedly small. The largest estimated crowd to my knowledge was 4,000 strong. Only thereafter in the referendum campaign of 1958 did rallies grow in size. Without further primary research, one can only speculate what the reasons were, but it is likely that no party could afford PA systems in 1956. By contrast, in 1958 the RDA held political office and enjoyed the resources that it brought, which gave them the wherewithal to purchase vehicle-mounted PA systems. Indeed, in the referendum campaign of 1958, politicians are described using microphones at public meetings.[146] Accordingly, Schmidt describes that there were 'countless RDA rallies'[147] in 1958, in marked contrast to her description of earlier political activity. Repression of this kind temporarily suppressed the role of the rally

[143] Schmidt: 2.
[144] ibid: 2.
[145] ibid.
[146] ibid: 179.
[147] ibid: 181.

in French Cameroon, where the largest crowds that are documented in the secondary literature were reported to be only 1,000 or 2,000 in strength.[148]

Similar changes can be found at work in colonial and post-colonial Kenya. Elections were held for much of the formal colonial period in Kenya, but the franchise was restricted first to white settlers, and it was only slowly extended to those that were educated, wealthy and loyal.[149] What's more, public meetings were only licensed when they took place in publicly authorised halls and 'this ruling effectively limited meetings to about 600.'[150] In contrast, during subsequent elections, in which the franchise was universal and political activity was liberalised, the rally became one of the prime methods of communication in the election campaign. In the general election campaign of 1961, George Bennet and Carl Rosberg's account illustrates that public meetings became a staple part of electioneering. At the largest meeting, politicians addressed a 'crowd of over 40,000'.[151] In some constituencies, parliamentary candidates addressed as many as 80 licensed meetings between them, as well as further unlicensed ones, and individual politicians such as Tom Mboya repeatedly addressed meetings to crowds of 20,000 or more. Moreover, Bennet and Rosberg's volume includes photographic evidence that politicians used electronic amplification.[152] They describe that 'some official candidates had the use of a party van'.[153] The photographs in this book show that these vans often bore mounted PAs, just as they did in late colonial Ghana. In 'the little general election' of 1966, during which 29 seats were contested, the incumbent Kenya African National Union (KANU) convened 22 rallies.[154] In 1968,

[148] ibid: 268.
[149] Daniel Branch. 2006. "Loyalists, Mau Mau, and Elections in Kenya: The First Triumph of the System." *Africa Today* 53(2):27–50.
[150] G. F. Engholm 1960. "African Elections in Kenya, March 1957." in *Five Elections in Africa*. Oxford: Clarendon Press: 441.
[151] George Bennett and Carl Rosberg. 1961. *The Kenyatta Election: Kenya 1960-1961*. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 127.
[152] ibid plates.
[153] ibid: 149.
[154] Cherry Gertzel. 1970. *The Politics of Independent Kenya 1963-8*. London: Heinemann: 80.

individual parliamentary candidates spoke at 20 rallies each, and Kenyan People's Union tried to compete with KANU by also holding 'a series of large rallies'.[155]

In other countries, where there was less political suppression and elections were held, the rise of the rally was more noticeable still. Accounts of elections in the protectorate of Sierra Leone make clear that frequent rallies were the staple component of electioneering. Indeed, 'at the most conveniently placed of them the U.P.P [the United Progressive Party] regularly claimed audiences for its weekly meetings of some 5,000'[156] It is also clear from secondary accounts that amplifiers were regularly used to project speakers' voices at those meetings. [157] Similarly, in early postcolonial Zambia, the rally came to assume great importance in the election campaign. In the 1968 elections 'Both parties held mass rallies and indoor meetings… rallies were attended by large crowds'.[158]

I have offered a patchwork overview of election campaigning in sub-Saharan Africa in the late colonial and early post-colonial period. While the coverage of the subcontinent is incomplete and it depends on scant secondary sources, I have presented compelling evidence that election campaigns in this period were rally-intensive whenever political repression did not prevent the convening of mass meetings. I have further shown that rallies became central to the campaign with the aid of electronic amplification, and only when electronic amplification was available.

[155] ibid: 113.
[156] J. R. Scott 1960. "The Sierra Leone Election, May 1959." in *Five Elections in Africa*. Oxford: Clarendon Press: 208.
[157] ibid: 213.
[158] William Tordoff. 1974. *Politics of Zambia*. Manchester: Manchester University Press: 184.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have begun to specify the conditions under which ground campaigns become rally-intensive. I have emphasised the role of amplification because its effect is structural. Unlike many other determinants of rally attendance, the effect of electronic amplification applies to a wide universe of cases. Indeed, in this chapter, I have shown that it is relevant across cases spanning three continents and at least fifty years. Wherever the election campaign is being held, the number of voters that the rally can reach directly is constrained by the limitations of the human voice, unless electronic amplification liberates it of those limitations.

In the process of borrowing from the comparative literature on election campaigning, I speak to that literature as well. While public meetings have always played a part in election campaigning, there was a late golden age of rallies across Britain, France and the United States between the world wars. It was propelled by the invention and development of electronic amplification and came to an end with the coming of television. Therefore, in a sense, the rally-intensive campaign is a modern phenomenon. This late ascendance of the rally has gone largely unacknowledged and often it has been expressly contradicted in both country-specific studies and in comparative works alike. The works of Jon Lawrence and Paula Cossart prove notable exceptions to the literature as a whole. In this chapter, I have questioned the modernist conception of campaign evolution. I have challenged the accounts that present the development of campaign methods as unidimensional path from past to present. The search for explanations of high rally attendance in sub-Saharan Africa, then, reveals something about past election campaigns in France, Britain and the United States too.

The cases which I have presented here constitute a proof of concept of the rally-intensive ground campaign. The changes in the scale of American presidential candidates' rallies, the rate at which British parliamentary candidates had to convene rallies, the manner of mass mobilisation during the time of Popular Front and the unforgettable image of the Nuremberg rallies are testament to how much mass mobilisation was changed by the development of electronic amplification. So too are the changes from protests to mass meetings in the Gold Coast, the frantic public tours by party leaders in Nigeria's elections in the late colonial period, the impressive size of the meetings held by Zik and Awolowo, and the shift from underground campaigning to mass rallies in Guinea by the referendum in 1958.

The election campaigns on the eve of independence, and those after the dawn illustrate just how central the rally can become to electioneering. When political parties were not repressed and their campaign activities were not curtailed, parties in Africa relied on the rally to reach the masses. Describing the 1957 campaign in Sierra Leone, Scott writes that 'Attendance at party meetings in Freetown was throughout remarkably high.'[159] Likewise, Kenneth Robinson writes of Senegal that 'The most striking feature of the campaign as a whole, from the point of view of methods, was its concentration on oral propaganda and meetings.'[160] Post puts it most authoritatively. Writing about Nigeria, he judges that 'the main means of campaigning in 1959 as in previous elections was the meeting'.[161]

[159] Scott: 207.
[160] Kenneth Robinson. 1960. "Senegal: The Elections to the Territorial Assembly, March 1957." in *Five Elections in Africa*. Oxford: Clarendon Press: 377.
[161] Post: 325-6.

Chapter 3. From the anthill to the screen: Determinants of rally attendance in sub-Saharan Africa

In the last chapter, I established that electronic amplification transforms the electoral potential of the rally, and led to rally-intensive ground campaigns on a scale not possible hitherto. However, I did not offer an explanation of variation in rally attendance across African countries. Indeed, while electronic amplification marks the beginning of the era in which rally-intensive campaigns became possible, it does little to explain why some election campaigns since that point have become rally-intensive, while so many others have not. Across sub-Saharan Africa, rates of rally attendance vary dramatically. At one extreme, just 23.5% of Nigerians attended election campaign rallies in the 2011 elections.[1] At the other, 74% of Tanzanians attended them in the 2010 election.[2]

In this chapter, I examine what makes people attend rallies in sub-Saharan Africa. At first glance, this might appear to a question of individual behaviour, but in fact, rally attendance is the culmination of choices by multiple actors. It is the product of how much voters wish to attend them and how many resources parties dedicate to convening them. Factors which affect this 'supply and demand' of rallies alter the rate of rally attendance at the national level. In short, rally attendance has any number of causes. Rally attendance is not only complex; it is also chronically understudied. The only prior work known to the author that considers it in an African context in any depth is Kenneth Post's study of the 1959 Nigerian election.[3] Put another way, in this chapter, I am starting from scratch.

[1] "Afrobarometer Data. Round 5. Nigeria." 95% confidence intervals of 20.3 and 23.6%.
[2] "Afrobarometer Data. Round 5. Tanzania." 95 per cent confidence intervals of 70.2 and 73.8 per cent.
[3] Post.

I propose a slew of possible causes of rally attendance, but there is one fundamental cause of rally attendance that cuts through the others, a structural determinant which alters the space in which other causes work: television penetration. The literature holds that as the penetration of mass media in general deepens, rally attendance falls, other things being equal. This contention is well established in studies of election campaigning in economically developed countries, but it has not been tested in an African context. While the experience of economically developed countries might seem tangential to sub-Saharan African circumstances in numerous ways, it spans a period of more than two hundred years, in parts of which rallies were important. The long vantage point of this literature proves insightful. This literature puts mass media penetration at the centre of election campaign methods. In these writings, face-to-face campaign methods, the rally included, are conceived of as 'old' ways of campaigning. This literature writes that as the printing press, the radio and most importantly the television rose in turn, face-to-face campaign methods declined gradually, and the rally most of all. In other words, the ground war was superseded by the air war. However, the particular contention of this literature is that television penetration is the key force that marginalises ground campaigning. Television brings politicians into intimate contact with voters and domesticates their evening leisure. It provides voters with both an alternative source of information, and an alternative source of entertainment. This makes individual voters less likely to attend rallies. It also makes politicians less likely to convene them. In other words, it reduces both the demand for and supply of rallies. By these means, television news becomes the dominant medium of political communication at the expense of the rally.

In one regard, I embrace the modernism that pervades the comparative literature. In this chapter, I present evidence that television penetration depresses rally attendance. Two corollaries of this theory are that 1) high rally attendance in much of sub-Saharan Africa is

a product in part of low television penetration, and 2) if television penetration continues to rise in the future, rallies will become a thing of the past in sub-Saharan Africa. In that regard, my conclusions seem to affirm Pippa Norris' view of campaign technology 'evolution' from face-to-face campaigning to mass media communication.[4]

In another regard, I confound the modernism of this literature by stressing the limitations of technological explanations of rally attendance. By delving deeper into the effects of media, I demonstrate that while television penetration diminishes rally attendance, there are no discernible effects of Internet and newspaper penetration on it. Further still, radio penetration buoys it. The implication is that high radio penetration across much of sub-Saharan Africa is a major driver of the high rates of rally attendance. This offers a broader lesson, which is that each mass medium is distinct, and that conflating them obscures their diverse effects on rally attendance. In this regard, the comparative literature may have been too simplistic in the relationships that it has ascribed between 'mass media' and the rally.

Equally, I show that there are not only technological determinants of rally attendance, but non-technological determinants. Specifically, I identify three variables that have large-scale effects on rally attendance. First, the level of partisan identification alters how many people go to rallies. Party supporters are more likely to attend rallies than independents, so in countries where more voters support parties, rally attendance is higher in aggregate. Second, the number of years that a country has been holding multiparty elections affects how many people attend rallies. If rally attendance is routinised, habits of rally attendance develop which persist over time. Third, and similarly, one-party states with competitive parliamentary elections develop cultures of rally attendance that endure over time. I demonstrate that in countries where competitive one-party regimes habituated voters to

[4] Norris. *A Virtuous Circle.*

attend rallies, rally attendance is higher in the present. In other words, in this chapter, I identify path-dependent determinants of rally attendance deep in countries' pasts. This is particularly pertinent to the study of rally attendance, because it shows that the effects of structural factors like television are not only buffeted by contemporary factors with short-term effects, but historical ones with long-term effects. Altogether, these three factors are important qualifiers to technological determinist accounts of rally attendance.

Below, I present multilevel models that identify both individual- and country-level causes of individual rally attendance. Individual-level causes explain why some individuals are more likely to go to rallies than others, but when those individual-level characteristics vary in aggregate across countries, they become the drivers of cross-national variation in rally attendance. Together with country-level determinants, these factors contribute to explaining why rally attendance is higher in some African countries than others. The data and hypotheses which I analyse here are geographically bound to Africa. However, *a fortiori*, the central causal relationship posited here linking television penetration and rally attendance is applicable to economically developed countries. Indeed, I have borrowed the hypothesis linking the two from the comparative literature. In this chapter, then, I extend the scope of this causal claim from economically developed countries to include Africa, while complicating and qualifying the content of this claim.

Causes of rally attendance: Mass media penetration, partisanship and rally cultures

In the previous chapter, I summarised the role attributed to mass media penetration in the comparative literature. Mass media penetration reduces rally attendance. However, I did not describe the mechanisms by which the two might be related. As I discuss below, the

causal relationship between the two is realised both through individual- and national-level mechanisms. Media-use affects individuals' interests in attending rallies for two reasons. First, mass media present an alternative source of information. One might stipulate that voters are information-seekers which take actions to acquire news about their politics. Insofar as that were the case, voters might attend rallies to learn about their politicians. Insofar as mass media present an alternative, a more convenient and a superior source of information, voters might switch from rallies to mass media if the latter becomes available. One might also stipulate that voters are entertainment-seekers. Insofar as that were the case, voters might attend rallies because they were enjoyable. Insofar as mass media present an alternative, a more convenient and a superior source of entertainment, voters might switch from rallies to mass media if the latter becomes available. Whether voters are information- or entertainment-seekers, the ramifications for the effects of mass media are the same for the purposes of this chapter. This demand for rallies, which operates at the individual level, may in aggregate drive changes in the supply of rallies. Parties which determine that fewer voters attend rallies and more receive news from mass media may dedicate less effort to convening rallies, reducing the number or desirability of rallies which voters can attend, and thereby, leading to a national decline in their supply. Therefore, individual media *use* may affect the probability of a voter attending a rally. However, national media *penetration* may affect the probability of a voter attending a rally, even holding constant that individual's media use.

In the previous chapter, I also did not describe in detail which mass media have the greatest effect on rally attendance. The comparative literature agrees that across the Western world, 'the 1960s witnessed the beginning of a new style of campaigning.'[5] They

[5] Krid Deschouwer. 1994. "The Decline of Consociationalism and the Reluctant Modernization of Belgian Mass Parties." in *How Parties Organize: Change and Adaptation in Party Organizations in Western Democracies*. London: Sage Publications: 99.

refer, of course, to the coming of the 'television age'.[6] The propagation of television began in the United States in the late 1940s and at various points in the 1950s in Western European countries. The transformative effects of television stem from its power to broadcast a single message to such a large audience. As Jay Blumler and Dennis Kavanagh put it 'Nightly, the programs delivered large, national, politically heterogeneous audiences to the candidates and officials to whom coverage was granted.'[7] The sizes of audiences reached in television broadcasts soon dwarfed the comparative numbers of voters that parties could reach using face-to-face alternatives. As Leon Epstein puts it, 'it would be surprising if a television appeal by the candidate in the voter's living-room did not reach more voters than the aggregate of canvassing visits by local party activists.'[8] As a consequence, the ground campaign becomes a less effective way for a party to expose voters to its message. In other words, the ground campaign receives a smaller portion of parties' campaign resources, as resources are redirected to new campaign techniques instead.[9] In other words, parties altered the supply of rallies and other ground campaign activities in response to changing potential of mass media.

Television affected the campaign in a way that preceding mass media had not. Something about the addition of the *image* of the candidate made a deeper impression than the *sound* of the candidate could, alone. Stephen and Barbara Salmore conclude that 'Television would make "image" campaigns possible in a way that was never possible before. Viewers could see candidates in the flesh with no mediating influences – not through the lenses of party workers or those of a partisan press.'[10] 'Emotional appeals' could be made through this

[6] Farrell and Webb: 110.
[7] Blumler and Kavanagh: 1267-8.
[8] Epstein: 237.
[9] Epstein; Blumler and Kavanagh; Martin Wattenberg. 1982. "From Parties to Candidates: Examining the Role of the Media." *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 46(2):216–27.
[10] Stephen Salmore and Barbara Salmore. 1989. *Candidates, Parties and Campaigns. Electoral Politics in America*. Washington Congressional Quarterley: 41.

medium in a way that had not been possible in the past.[11] Fittingly, face-to-face methods were only superseded once voters could see candidates' own faces on the screen at home. Thereby, television became in some respects a superior and convenient source of news for voters, who turned to it at the expense of attending rallies. In other words, individual television use reduced rally attendance. This compounded parties' changing calculus and gave them still fewer reasons to dedicate scarce resources to convening rallies. Therefore, in aggregate, television penetration also reduced the supply of rallies, and thereby, aggregate rally attendance.

Television also reordered leisure in post-war America and Western Europe. It fed into sweeping cultural changes that made social life more private, domestic and indoor. Radio had altered social life in similar ways, but the impression that television made was deeper.[12] This not only made television audiences larger; it changed peoples' other outdoor habits more.[13] Richard Butsch found of post-war America that 'Television has a strong magnetic pull on people, keeping them home and drawing them away from activities outside the home'.[14] Therefore, television also offered a more desirable source of entertainment, which voters turned to at the expense of attending rallies. In other words, individual television use displaced the rally as a source of entertainment. This compounded parties' changing calculus and gave them still fewer reasons to dedicate scarce resources to convening rallies. Therefore, in aggregate, television penetration further reduced the supply of rallies, and thereby, aggregate rally attendance.

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[11] Herrnson: 248.
[12] Richard Butsch. 2000. *The Making of American Audiences: From Stage to Television*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[13] Lynn Spigel. 1992. *Make Room for TV: Television and the Family Ideal in Postwar America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
[14] Butsch.

The implication of the literature is that other mass media have similar but smaller effects. In this regard, television is understood as the most important component of a bundle of other interchangeable media. However, there are reasons to think that radio has a different relationship with rallies. While mass media are rivals for peoples' attention, offering competing sources of entertainment and news, they are also channels that can convey information about rallies. The sociological literature about crowd formation emphasises the importance of assembly instructions that notify people when and where events will be held and why they may wish to attend. Local media are particularly likely to convey information about forthcoming local events. While in principal any medium might be local, most African media outlets with concentrated, subnational reach are radio stations. The low station costs and the wide audiences of radio contribute to a rich topography of local radio across many of sub-Saharan African countries.[15] Therefore, radio penetration may increase rally attendance.

In this regard, media have heterogeneous relationships with the rally. The newspaper, the Internet and in particular the television, one might stipulate, dampen rally attendance. In contrast, radio magnifies rally attendance. I express these propositions in Hypotheses 1 and 2 below. Each of these hypotheses has two parts. Part A refers to individual consumption of each mass medium, and Part B refers to national penetration of each mass medium. The relationship proposed in Hypothesis 1, Part A about individual media consumption is particularly controversial, because it is at odds with what one might infer from the comparative[16] and Africanist[17] literatures on political participation, in which news consumption is widely found to have a positive relationship with participation. Hypothesis

[15] Elizabeth Gunner, Dina Ligaga, and Dumisani Moyo. 2011. *Radio in Africa: Publics, Cultures, Communities*. Oxford: James Curry.
[16] Norman Nie, Sidney Verba, and Jae-on Kim. 1974. "Political Participation and the Life Cycle." *Comparative Politics* 6(3):319–40.
[17] Michelle Kuenzi and Gina Lambright. 2011. "Who Votes in Africa? An Examination of Electoral Participation in 10 African Countries." *Party Politics* 17(6):767–99.

1, Part B is particularly important, because it suggests that the effect of each medium on rally attendance is not just the aggregation of individual changes in habit. Instead, it proposes that a rise in the national penetration of each medium reduces the probability of an individual attending a rally, even if the individual in question does not receive any more news from mass media herself.

Hypothesis 1. **Television, newspaper and Internet news**

a. **Individual level:** The more television, newspaper and Internet news that an individual consumes, the less likely she is to attend a rally, other things being equal.

b. **Country level:** The deeper that television, newspaper and Internet penetration is, the less likely that an individual is to attend a rally, other things being equal.

Hypothesis 2. **Radio news**

a. **Individual level:** The more radio news that an individual consumes, the more likely she is to attend a rally, other things being equal.

b. **Country level:** The deeper radio that penetration is, the more likely that an individual is to attend a rally, other things being equal.

These claims are potentially modernist in nature. The qualifications which I advanced in the last chapter underline the emergence of rally-intensive campaigns in the 1920s and 1930s; therefore, they stress that the rally-intensive campaign is a modern phenomenon. Nonetheless, the pattern proposed by Hypotheses 1 and 2 are of aggregate rally attendance fading through time if and when television, newspaper and Internet penetration deepen and radio penetration recedes. Even if one puts the modernism to one side, this hypothesis remains prone to the charge that it is technologically determinist, a criticism of the

literature raised by Susan Scarrow.[18] However, while the hypotheses outlined above identify causal relationships between technology (mass media penetration) and campaign method choice (rally attendance), they do not deny that there are other determinants of rally attendance. In the models that I set out in this chapter, the effects of mass media penetration can be outweighed by other variables. Put another way, I advance arguments which give a strong – but not deterministic – role to mass media penetration. Ultimately, while there are many accounts that emphasise the role of non-technological factors in campaigning, almost none deny that political communication technology has a significant effect.[19] As Negrine and Papathanassopoulos put it, 'politicians as well as the public will inevitably interact differently once a new medium of communication is inserted between them.'[20] Therefore, there is every reason to think that changes in mass media penetration underpin changes in election campaign strategy and the political parties that undertake them.

I propose that there are three other significant drivers of rally attendance that bound and further qualify the technological hypotheses set out above, which affect aggregate rally attendance by other means. Firstly, people attend rallies because they support political parties. They may believe, with good reason, that the success of their party's rally depends on it being well attended, a point already made in the Latin American literature.[21] They may consider it a duty to attend their party's meetings. Equally, voters may place greater value on the potential information or entertainment that they gain from attending a meeting if that meeting is convened by the party which they support. Therefore, I argue that in countries where levels of party affiliation are higher, rally attendance is higher, because

[18] Susan Scarrow. 1994. "The 'paradox of Enrollment': Assessing the Costs and Benefits of Party Memberships." *European Journal of Political Research* 25(1):41–60.
[19] Ware; Swanson and Mancini; Scarrow.
[20] Negrine and Papathanassopoulos.
[21] Muñoz

party supporters are likely to go to more rallies than non-supporters. I express this sentiment in Hypothesis 3 below. A corollary of this hypothesis is that the national rate of rally attendance will be higher in countries where more voters are partisan.

Hypothesis 3. **Partisanship**

A party supporter is more likely to attend a rally than a non-party supporter, other things being equal.

The second and third of these additional features concern a national, rather than an individual, variable: culture. A 'culture' of rallies may increase rallies through a variety of mechanisms. It may shape individuals' preferences for information and entertainment at rallies. It may invest the rally with meaning and value in ways which cannot be categorised as 'preferences'. It may create a shared sense of civic duty to attend rallies which individuals subscribe, and which may also be enforced through social norms. Alternatively, it may create non-rational 'habits' of rally attendance.

Some authoritarian regimes developed cultures of rally attendance in the past that affect rally attendance in the present. A burgeoning literature documents the wide variety of authoritarian regimes that ruled over most of sub-Saharan Africa in the postcolonial period.[22] In particular, Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle differentiate between single-party democracies and military regimes, and between single-party regimes in which there were competitive legislative elections – competitive one-party regimes – and those in

[22] Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg. 1982. *Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant*. Berkley: University of California Press; Chris Allen. 1995. "Understanding African Politics." *Review of African Political Economy* 22(65):301–20.

which there were not – plebiscitary one-party regimes.[23] These distinctions are particularly relevant to the study of the causes of rally attendance.

In competitive one-party regimes, parliamentary candidates competed against one another in regular elections. This involved election campaigns, and those campaigns typically involved schedules of rallies. In Kenya, multiple candidates competed for the Kenya African National Union (KANU) nomination in primaries as part of the de facto one-party system.[24] In Tanzania, the Tanganyika African National Union and its successor, *Chama cha Mapinduzi*, permitted two parliamentary candidates to run for parliamentary office in each constituency on its platform.[25] In Zambia, the United National Independence Party allowed three to run.[26] What is more, these single-party elections institutionalised rallies. In Kenya, candidates normally toured their constituencies, holding rallies in each town, continuing a style of campaigning which had emerged during the competitive elections of the 1960s.[27] In Zambia and Tanzania, a formal programme of public meetings was arranged and approved by state bodies.[28] Candidates travelled together, accompanied by supervising state officials, and spoke to large audiences at meetings.[29] In Tanzania, 'campaign meetings were thus well attended',[30] especially in rural areas. These campaigns were high-stakes events for the candidates, during which their performance might determine their success or defeat. They were also often popular among voters. Attendance declined in Zambian single-party

[23] Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle. 1997. *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[24] Goran Hyden and Colin Leys. 1972. "Elections and Politics in Single-Party Systems: The Case of Kenya and Tanzania." *British Journal of Political Science* 2(4):389–420.
[25] Lionel Cliffe. 1967. *One-Party Democracy: The 1965 Tanzania General Elections*. East African Publishing House.
[26] Cherry Gertzel, Carolyn Baylies, and Morris Szeftel. 1984. *The Dynamics of the One-Party State in Zambia*. Manchester: Manchester University Press; Sishuwa Sishuwa. 2016. "'I Am Zambia's Redeemer': Populism and the Rise of Michael Sata, 1955-2011." University of Oxford; Nic Cheeseman. 2006. "The Rise and Fall of Civil-Authoritarianism in Africa: Patronage, Participation, and Political Parties in Kenya and Zambia." University of Oxford.
[27] Bennett and Rosberg; Gertzel.
[28] Engholm; Bennett and Rosberg; Gertzel.
[29] Sishuwa; Cliffe.
[30] Hyden and Leys: 414.

elections during the 1980s,[31] but by in large, turnout was high and so was parliamentary turnover. Studies consistently found that the rate at which incumbent MPs were defeated was high, often especially cabinet members.[32] In these states, competitive one-party democracy gradually ingrained the rally in political culture.

These conventions of public meetings in one-party regimes often built upon pre-colonial and colonial legacies. In Kenya, for example, the *baraza* had been a part of political culture in some parts of Kenya, and it was institutionalised under British colonial rule as a means for district officers and other colonial officials to interact with their subjects. The *baraza* was drawn on after colonial rule; MPs in one-party Kenya often addressed *barazas*, which retained the same name and many of the customs that had characterised them under colonial rule.[33] Where they existed, colonial and pre-colonial cultures of mass meetings augmented rally attendance under single-party rule. Not only did these cultures yield recognised social forms to draw on, but because they tapped into social patterns of authority. In Tanzania, 'Attendance at meetings, which had been officially called by the party or government representative, was still, in line with old traditions, considered compulsory in the rural areas.'[34] Likewise, attendance at meetings called by government officials during the one-party state in Kenya remained compulsory.[35] These procedures and practices conspired to routinise public meetings. My argument is that an unwitting consequence of these institutionalised public assemblies is that they culturally inculcated the rally, establishing and embedding it as a custom which endures over time. I express this

[31] Cheeseman, "The Rise and Fall of Civil-Authoritarianism in Africa"; Gertzel, Baylies and Szeftel.
[32] ibid; Gertzel; Hyden and Leys; Cheeseman, "The Rise and Fall of Civil-Authoritarianism in Africa"; Joel Barkan and John Okumu. 1978. "'Semi-Competitive' Elections, Clientelism, and Political Recruitment in a No-Party State: The Kenyan Experience." in *Elections Without Choice*. London: Macmillan; Joel Barkan. 1994. *Beyond Capitalism vs. Socialism in Kenya and Tanzania*. London: Lynne Rienner.
[33] Haugerud.
[34] Hyden and Leys: 414.
[35] Haugerud.

in Hypothesis 4 below. As the proposed causal process concerns habituating rally attendance, the strength of the effect increases with the length of single-party rule.

Hypothesis 4. **Competitive single-party rule**

The longer that a country had a competitive single-party regime in the past, the higher that rally attendance will be, other things being equal.

Moreover, while historic experiences can routinise rally attendance, so can recent experiences. The longer that a country has been a multiparty democracy in which political parties convene rallies, during election campaigns but also between them, the more that public cultures of rallies may have been fostered through some of the same mechanisms proposed for Hypothesis 4 above. I express this notion in Hypothesis 5 below.

Hypothesis 5. **Democracy**

The longer that a country has had uninterrupted multipartyism, the higher that rally attendance will be, other things being equal.

If Hypotheses 3, 4 and 5 were confirmed, they would constitute important qualifiers to the mass media drivers of rally attendance found in the comparative literature and expressed in Hypotheses 1 and 2. These findings would go beyond the claim that rally attendance has multiple determinants. They would show that there are recent and historical legacies which draw the rally towards the centre of the campaign or drive it towards the periphery. These cultural and in some cases legal institutions would shape rally attendance from the past, and critically, they would help rally attendance to persist in spite of the deleterious effects of high television, newspaper and Internet penetration.

Control hypotheses

While the five hypotheses above propose several causes of rally attendance, there are numerous other possible causes which I treat as controls in this chapter. However, very little has been written on the causes of rally attendance in sub-Saharan Africa. Therefore, there are few straightforward indications about which variables should be selected as possible controls in an analysis of rally attendance. In lieu of a well-developed literature, I develop a series of original control hypotheses. I develop some of these from first principles. I collect others from proximate literatures with are relevant in some way or other to rally attendance.

In one respect, it would be wrong to characterise the hypotheses outlined below as just controls. To the best of my knowledge, I am the first to propose that these variables affect rally attendance in Africa. Likewise, each of these controls is tested in this chapter for the first time, and these tests are original contributions in their own right to a nascent field. However, for the sake of brevity and simplicity, these variables assume secondary roles as controls in this chapter.

While little has been written about the causes of rally attendance directly, the most theoretically relevant scholarship to the causes of rally attendance is the literature on political participation. Going to a rally is a form of political participation; it is a form of 'civic engagement' in the terms used by Russell Dalton,[36] not unlike reading a newspaper or listening to the news on the radio. Moreover, the act of going to a rally bears particular similarity to the act of going to the polling booth; each requires time and resources, and

[36] Russell Dalton. 2008. "Citizenship Norms and the Expansion of Political Participation." *Political Studies* 56(1):76–98.

each might be done for similar motives, such as civic duty and interest in politics. Therefore, rally attendance ought to be affected by some of the individual factors that affect political participation, and turnout in particular.

Much of the literature on political participation holds that resources endow voters with the autonomy to both participate in politics and turnout to vote, just as it enables them to bear the costs of travel to polling booths. This resources paradigm pertains to a variety of reasons that voters may have for attending rallies, including seeking information and seeking entertainment as already discussed, but also the fulfilment of civic and partisan duties. By virtue of this reasoning, the better educated a voter is, the more likely she will be to turn out, as found elsewhere in the comparative[37] and Africanist[38] literatures. Therefore, the more likely that she will be to attend rallies. By the same reasoning, the wealthier that a voter is, the more likely she will be to attend rallies.[39]

By a related logic of costs and resources, urban voters should be more likely to vote because urbanity closes the distance between citizen and rally.[40] However, urban residents live in closer physical proximity to any number of other events and activities to which they might dedicate their time. Therefore, the overall effect of urban-rural location on rally attendance is unclear. Insofar as remoteness from public services is an indicator of remoteness from the sites of public meetings, this should have a negative effect on rally attendance. Each of these causes operates at the individual level. However, insofar as these causal factors vary in the aggregate across countries, the sums of these individual characteristics might explain cross-national differences in rally attendance too.

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[37] Verba, Schlozman and Henry; Smets and van Ham; Dalton; Daniel McFarland and Reuben Thomas. 2001. "Influence Adult Political Participation." 71:401–25.
[38] Kuenzi and Lambright. "Who Votes in Africa?"; Bratton; Isaksson.
[39] Nie, Verba and Kim; Isaksson; Kuenzi and Lambright. "Party System Institutionalization in 30 African Countries."
[40] Kuenzi and Lambright. "Who Votes in Africa?"

Lastly, in contradiction with these hypotheses, voters may attend rallies not because they have resources, but because they seek them. Voters may go to rallies because they are gift-seeking. Therefore, bribery is a possible cause of rally attendance. Though this does not appear in the literature on political participation, it is widely believed that in many African countries, parties offer people rewards, gifts or payments in exchange for attending rallies. Assuming that some proportion of people offered bribes by politicians are offered them on the condition that they go to rallies, being offered a bribe should be positively correlated with rally attendance.

There are a series of other possible individual causes which are do not fall within this resources paradigm. The more interested in politics that voters are, the more likely they are to be information seekers. Therefore, the more likely they are to be to attend rallies. This stipulation is in agreement with the comparative[41] and Africanist literatures on political participation.[42] Participation increases with age, although the mechanism linking the two is complex. Therefore, probable rally attendance may increase with age as well.[43] The early comparative literature found that being a woman had a negative effect upon political participation and turnout.[44] Recent comparative studies find that this relationship has disappeared,[45] but the Africanist literature finds that empirically, it persists.[46] Gender may affect rally attendance in sub-Saharan Africa for a plethora of reasons, not least commitments in the home, the immobility that dependents endow, the political risks of

[41] Alan Gerber, Gregory Huber, et al. 2011. "Personality Traits and Participation in Political Processes." *The Journal of Politics* 73(3):692–706; Smets and van Ham; Verba, Schlozman and Henry.
[42] Michael Bratton. 1999. "Political Participation in a New Democracy." *Comparative Political Studies* 32(5):549–88.
[43] Nie, Verba and Kim; Smets and van Ham.
[44] ibid.
[45] Ronald Ingelhart and Pippa Norris. 2003. *Rising Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural Change Around the World.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[46] Bratton; Kuenzi and Lambright, "Who Votes in Africa?"; Ann-Sofie Isaksson. 2014. "Political Participation in Africa: The Role of Individual Resources." *Electoral Studies* 34:244–60.

attending rallies, and the resource poverty that it typically entails, as discussed above. Therefore, women may be less likely to attend rallies, other things being equal. Equally, turnout may reflect a disposition to be civically active in general. Therefore, citizens that participate in non-political community action may be more likely to attend rallies.

From the very same literature on political participation, a number of national-level causes of rally attendance can be developed, many of which concern political institutions. Some institutional variables alter rational voters' incentives to turn out. Some alter parties' incentives to expend campaign effort, and some alter both. First, the competitiveness of an election affects rally attendance. Voters' ballots matter more in close elections. This may make voters seek information more by attending rallies. Equally, parties may expend more resources on convening rallies. Therefore, the more competitive an election is, the higher that rally attendance should be, other things being equal.[47] Second, in unicameral legislatures, fewer candidates run for office than in bicameral legislatures. Therefore, parties should convene fewer rallies, and so aggregate rally attendance should be lower. Third, the effective number of parties may affect rally attendance. The comparative literature does not find conclusive evidence that the effective number of parties affects election turnout;[48] but the higher the effective number of parties, the more parties that voters have to choose from, and so the more voters may seek information about parties. Therefore, the greater the effective number of parties, the higher rally attendance should be.

Fourth, the choice of electoral system may affect rally attendance. In particular, two aspects of list-based electoral systems may affect rally attendance: the presence or absence of lists, and proportionality. List-based electoral systems are those in which multiple candidates

[47] Robert Jackman. 1987. "Political Institutions and Voter Turnout in Industrial Democracies." *American Political Science Review* 81(2):405–23.
[48] Blais.

appear in lists, both in majoritarian block votes and in closed list proportional representation systems. In such systems, parliamentary candidates should have reduced incentives to campaign for themselves and therefore, the supply of rallies should be lower. This should lower rally attendance. Putting lists to one side, the more proportional voting systems are, the less that voters can ever conclude that they are in safe seats constituencies, and therefore, the more likely their votes are to count. Therefore, the more proportional the electoral system, the higher turnout should be, and by extension, the higher that aggregate rally attendance should be.[49] However, rally attendance is mobilised. Therefore, campaign effort, including efforts to convene and draw voters to rallies, may be higher in majoritarian electoral systems than in proportional ones.[50] Therefore, it is unclear what the overall effect of proportionality will be.

Putting these strictly institutional effects to one side, there are a number of other country-level variables which may affect the national rate of rally attendance. I propose briefly several further causal relationships by building on first principles. First, local parties play significant roles in supply rallies and mobilising rally attendance. Therefore, the stronger that local party presence is, the higher rally attendance should be. [51] Second, electoral authoritarian regimes' menus of manipulation include preventing opposition parties from holding rallies and scaring voters away from attending them. On the other hand, they also involve social carrots and sticks for voters to attend ruling party rallies. This will make gift-seekers attend rallies more, and it will make coercion-responsive voters attend rallies more. Therefore, the extent to which a regime is authoritarian is likely to affect rally attendance,

[49] Jackman; Bingham Powell. 1982. *Comparative Democracies: Participation, Stability and Violence*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
[50] Jeffrey Karp, Susan Banducci, and Shaun Bowler. 2008. "Getting out the Vote: Party Mobilization in a Comparative Perspective." *British Journal of Political Science* 38(1):91–112; Jeffrey Karp, Shaun Bowler, and Susan Banducci. 2003. "Electoral Systems, Party Mobilization and Turnout: Evidence from the European Parliamentary Elections." *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion & Parties* 13(1):210–25.
[51] Jackman; Powell.

but the overall effect is ambiguous. Thirdly, while civil war creates distrust, there are some studies that offer tentative evidence that they also make citizens, and particularly victims of violence, politically active, who are more likely to be politically engaged and to turn out to vote.[52] This may make voters greater information-seekers. Therefore, civil war in the past may increase rally attendance in the presence. Of course, civil war is not binary, and so the length of civil war is controlled for in the analysis below, rather than the incidence of civil war.

Altogether, these hypotheses and control variables constitute a plethora of possible drivers of rally attendance. If some or all of them are supported by the evidence, they will illustrate, at a minimum, that people attend rallies for many reasons. They go in search of information, entertainment, gifts, solidarity and proximity to their parties. They go to fulfil civic duties, partisan duties. They may go from habit. Some may go rather than others because their resources enable them to bear the costs of doing so. The picture of rally attendance that this chapter proposes is therefore a complex one. However, the determinants of rally attendance which I wish to underscore at those outlined in Hypotheses 1 to 5 which partially confirm and partially complicate the modernist proposals found in the comparative literature.

Data and measurement

I analyse data from the Fifth Round of the Afrobarometer.[53] This survey was conducted in 30 countries below the Sahara and four above it. I keep the four North African countries in the dataset in order to not prejudice the analysis by their exclusion, and to increase the

[52] John Bellows and Edward Miguel. 2009. "War and Local Collective Action in Sierra Leone." *Journal of Public Economics* 93(11–12):1144–57; Christopher Blattman. 2009. "From Violence to Voting: War and Political Participation in Uganda." *American Political Science Review* 103(2):231–47.
[53] Afrobarometer. "Afrobarometer Data. Round 5. All Countries Surveyed in Sub-Saharan Africa."

number of observations in the dataset. However, the analysis is robust to their exclusion. Swaziland is excluded because it is an absolute monarchy. I have no choice but to also exclude Guinea and Madagascar, which had both experienced long authoritarian interruptions which leave me no valid answers for a number of the control variables in the analysis that follows. After these exclusions, there are 38,102 observations in the dataset.

I analyse this multi-country dataset using multilevel models. I operationalise the dependent variable, rally attendance, using answers to the question 'at the last national election, did you attend a rally?' Strictly the answers to this are binary, and so logistic multilevel models should be used to analyse the results. However, regrettably, the software which I use does not enable me to generate predicted probabilities based on logistic multilevel models, and I wish to present predicted probabilities. Therefore, I present a regression analysis and predicted probabilities here which models these answers as continuous variables from zero to one using maximum log-likelihood estimation. However, this model yields equivalent results to logistic multilevel models which does not substantially differ in any way that is relevant to the analysis. For transparency's sake, the annex presents a summary of an equivalent logistic multi-level model.

I measure the independent variable representing partisanship using the binary answers to the Afrobarometer survey question 'do you feel close to any particular political party?' I constructed the independent variable representing the time spent under a competitive one-party regime by borrowing from Bratton and van de Walle's categorisation of regimes.[54] I amended it to include Kenya as a *de facto* competitive one-party regime from 1969 onwards on the evidence provided above. To improve the basis for inference, I transformed the

[54] Bratton and van de Walle.

indicator into a continuous variable by taking the number of years that each country had such a regime.

I count the length of time that a country has been a multiparty democracy in years, starting from the most recent change to a regime that included multiparty elections. In a separate control variable, I measure the quality of democracy. Prior to counting the number of years that a country has had a democratic regime is deciding how to code democratic regimes. The critical feature for my purposes is the regimes in question involve the holding of regular multiparty elections in which parties campaign, and so in which they convene rallies. Therefore, in this analysis, I include all regimes which are placed between 10 and -5 on the Polity IV scale, which marks the point between an electoral authoritarian regime or an 'anocracy' in the terms of the Polity IV Project, and an autocracy. I count the age of the regime from the end of the most recent interruption by a coup, a civil war that postponed elections or a dip below -5 on the Polity IV scale. I count up until the year in which the Fifth Round of the Afrobarometer survey was taken, which varies by country between 2010 and 2013. I measure the quality of democracy in a separate variable.

I generate independent variables that operationalise individual and national measures of each mass medium using answers to Afrobarometer questions. This has the disadvantage of importing the subjectivity of respondents' answers to the question. There are several other measures of mass media penetration that could be used which enjoy a freedom from survey respondent subjectivity. These include aggregations of government census and survey data reported in the World Bank's African Development Indicators, expert survey

measures such as those found in V-Dem, or alternative survey data which carries the same problems as Afrobarometer data, such as DHS.[55]

However, I prefer the measures of mass media penetration generated from the Afrobarometer. Firstly, in one respect, these objective measures are less accurate. Many of the independently available sources, such as Africa Development Indicators, are only available for countries at irregular intervals as far as ten or fifteen years apart. Secondly, they are more prone to other sources of bias. Most rely on governments' own household surveys or censuses, which are conducted using distinct methodologies and therefore import country-level biases into the measures. Thirdly, they are less specific. The corresponding V-Dem measure, for example, does not distinguish by different types of mass media, which are of theoretical interest in this chapter.[56] Equally, they are binary. Most such measures aggregate household ownership or radios, television, household connection to the internet, and household receipt of newspapers. In contrast, the Afrobarometer data measures individual *use*, rather than *ownership*. Its questions are standardised, and it does not use binary categories, but sliding scales which distinguish between meaningful differences in frequency of use.

The Afrobarometer question which I use to measure the independent variables reads 'How often do you get news from the following sources: [television/radio/newspaper/the Internet]. Every day, a few times a day, a few times a month, less than once a month or never.' I used answers to this question to construct four scales for individual consumption of television, radio, newspaper and internet news respectively. Each of these scales runs from zero to one with intervals at 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and 1 to accommodate the five question

[55] Demographic and Health Surveys. *MEASURE DHS*. Rockville. Retrieved (http://dhsprogram.com/what-we-do/survey-types/dhs.cfm).
[56] Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, et al. 2016. *V-Dem Codebook v6*. Gothenburg and Paris. Retrieved (https://www.v-dem.net/en/).

answers. I used the answers to these questions to generate country-level variables too. I used the national-level means to generate four indexes of the depth of national penetration, one for each of these four media, which also run from zero to one. If 1% of respondents changed their answer to one of these questions from never getting news from that medium to getting it every day, the measure of national penetration would increase by 0.01. On this basis, this scale can be treated as a measure of the proportion of the population that get their news from the mass medium in question every day. However, this index also takes into account less frequent mass media use. If 1% of respondents changed their answers from never getting news from some mass medium to getting it once a month, the index would increase by 0.0025.

I constructed country-level variables as follows: The incidence of civil war is operationalised by measuring the length of the longest civil conflict since independence. I drew this data from the Armed Conflict Dataset produced by the Uppsala Data Conflict Program and the Peace Research Institute of Oslo.[57] Authoritarianism is measured using the Liberal Democracy index from Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem), though the results are much the same if other measures of authoritarianism or democracy such as Polity IV or other V-Dem measures are chosen instead.[58] Party strength is taken from the unadjusted expert survey measure in the V-Dem database.[59] Proportional electoral systems were categorised in accordance with Norris' trinary schema of proportional, majoritarian and mixed systems.[60] Electoral systems with lists are categorised to include proportional systems as well as majoritarian systems with block lists. Electoral competitiveness is

[57] Peace Research Institute of Oslo and Uppsala University. "Armed Conflict Dataset." *Peace Research Institute of Oslo and Uppsala Conflict Data Program*. Retrieved January 11, 2017 (https://www.prio.org/Data/Armed-Conflict/).
[58] Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, Frida Andersson, et al. 2016. *V-Dem Methodology V6*. Gothenburg and Paris. Retrieved (https://www.v-dem.net/).
[59] ibid.
[60] Pippa Norris. 2004. *Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

measured as the margin of the victory of the presidential candidate in the most recent election. Lastly, the effective number of parties is calculated using the Golosov Index, a measure designed to improve on the Laakso-Taagapera Index's weakness in expressing numbers of parties in dominant party systems.[61] It divides each party's share of the seats by the share of the largest party and sums the number of parties, thus weighted.

Individual 'control' variables introduced in the previous section are measured using Afrobarometer data as follows. I operationalised remoteness from public services by creating an index of five measurements by Afrobarometer surveyors of the distance from the respondent's house to five different public utilities: a post-office, a school, a police station, a health clinic and a market. I generated the measurement of wealth by inverting the living poverty index, which I generated in turn from measurements of deprivation, following Robert Mattes, Michael Bratton and Yul Derek David.[62] Finally, I generated the measurement of community participation by aggregating respondent reports of how often in the last year they have attended a community meeting, joined with others to raise an issue, joined a protest or demonstration, and used force or violence for a political cause. Removing 'using force' from the index has no substantial effect on the results. These question wordings can be found on the Afrobarometer website. Remaining control variables are coded using Afrobarometer questions in straight-forward and self-explanatory ways. I do not specify further details here for brevity's sake.

In a preliminary analysis, I identified which independent variables, if any, co-vary. There is high collinearity between the variables that measure individual consumption of television, newspapers and Internet news, and between the variables that measure national penetration

[61] Grigorii Golosov. 2010. "The Effective Number of Parties: A New Approach." *Party Politics* 16:171–92.
[62] Robert Mattes, Michael Bratton, and Yul Derek David. 2003. "Poverty, Survival and Democracy in Southern Africa." Afrobarometer: *Afrobarometer Working Paper* 23.

between television, newspapers and internet news. This may inflate the standard errors of the coefficients of these variables. Any statistically significant relationships which the analysis below yields are in spite of this collinearity.

Analysis: The prominence of television and other main determinants of rally attendance

Table 3 describes mass media penetration across Africa. It shows that radio penetration stands high above other mass media, including television. The average country rate of daily radio news consumption is 45%. The average country rate of weekly or more frequent radio news consumption is 70%. By comparison, the average country rate of daily television news consumption is 36%; the average rate of weekly or more frequent television news consumption is 50%. Moreover, television consumption is concentrated in a small number of middle-income countries. By contrast, Internet and newspaper penetration is much lower.

Table 3: Summary statistics about rally attendance and mass media penetration

		Country rate mean	Lowest country rate	Highest country rate	Standard deviation between country rates
Rally attendance		37.3%	7.6%	72.0%	16.1%
Television	Every day	36.6%	5.3%	85.6%	25.1%
	A few times a week	50.4%	9.3%	97.8%	27.3%
	Never	39.9%	11.6%	87.5%	25.7%
Radio	Every day	45.6%	21.0%	82.8%	11.8%
	A few times a week	70.0%	12.3%	28.3%	96%
	Never	18.5%	1.8%	60.6%	10.4%
Newspaper	Every day	9.0%	7.5%	32.3%	7.4%
	A few times a week	21.3%	3.0%	70.0%	15.3%
	Never	61.9%	11.9%	92.7%	19.8%
Internet	Every day	6.7%	10.1%	21.3%	5.7%
	A few times a week	12.9%	2.3%	32.9%	8.6%
	Never	80.2%	11.2%	56.9%	94.4%

Figure 4 and Figure 5 present scatterplots of the national rates of rally attendance against national television and radio penetration respectively. These relationships deserve attention, because they offer a first glance into the hypothesised causal connections in question. Figure 4 offers prima facie evidence that television penetration reduces rally attendance in accordance with Hypothesis 1. It illustrates a strong and clear negative relationship between the two variables. Figure 5, on the other hand, offers prima facie evidence that radio penetration increases rally attendance, in accordance with Hypothesis 2. Similar scatterplots for newspaper penetration, Internet penetration and overall mass media penetration are presented in the annex, which all show tentative evidence in favour of negative relationships between them and rally attendance.

Figure 4: Scatterplot of national rally attendance against national television penetration




Figure 5: Scatterplot of national rally attendance against national radio penetration





Figure 6 below presents the most important coefficients from Model 1, a model of individual rally attendance, using specification and model types described in the data and measurement section above. Table 5 summarises all the coefficients of this model and measures of model fit and can be found in the annex. An equivalent logistic multilevel model – Model 2 – is summarised in the same table.

In both of these models, the independent and control variables have been standardised. In other words, they have been centred, so that they have means of zero; and rescaled, so that they all have standard deviations equal to one. Therefore, the coefficients afforded to the variables in the model below represent the effect that one standard deviation of the variable has on the probability of rally attendance, measured between zero and one. I have done this in order to make the size of the variables' effects comparable to one another. In

the discussion that follows, I describe meaningful changes in variables' values, rather than standard deviations.

Figure 6: Plotted coefficients from Model 1, which predict individual rally attendance



Concentric error bars represent 1%, 5% and 10% confidence intervals of the coefficients, respectively.

This model offers clear and strong evidence that television penetration decreases rally attendance, in accordance with Hypothesis 1. Individual television consumption and national television penetration both have negative effects on the probability of rally attendance which are statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The effect of individual television news consumption is small; a voter that gets news from television every day is 3.5% less likely to attend a rally than a voter that never gets news from television. This

supports Hypothesis 1A. However, the effect of national television penetration upon rally attendance is large. A 10% rise in television penetration alone reduces the likelihood of individual rally attendance by 2.9%. This is particularly important, because it means that if a nation as a whole watches television less, is make an individual who watches just as much television less likely to attend a rally. This supports Hypothesis 1B. In other words, television brings about a change in rally culture that extends beyond the aggregation of individual habits. This is illustrated in the first panel of Figure 7 which shows predicted probabilities based on the fixed portion of Model 1, holding other variables at their means. As that figure illustrates, as television penetration rises from 0 to 100%, the predicted probability of individual rally attendance falls from 55.0% to 27.2%, holding other variables at their means. This is putting aside the effect of individual television news consumption. These predicted probabilities fall are distinct at the 0.05 level. In contrast, there is little evidence that Internet or newspaper penetration affect rally attendance. Individual newspaper use has no statistically significant effect, and neither does national newspaper penetration. The same goes for individual Internet news and national Internet penetration.

The evidence also suggests that radio penetration increases the probability of rally attendance, in accordance with Hypothesis 2. In the model, the measures of national radio penetration are not statistically significant. However, individual radio consumption has positive effects which is statistically significant at the 0.001 level. Predicted probabilities calculated using the parameters of Model 1 show that someone who never gets radio news has a predicted probability of attending a rally of 36.6%. In contrast, someone who gets radio news every day has a predicted probability of 41.9%. These results are statistically distinct. These results are illustrated in the first panel of Figure 8. In aggregate, this individual effect of radio consumption contributes to national rates of rally attendance. Therefore, there is greater support for Hypothesis 2A than 2B.

Figure 7: Predicted probabilities of individual rally attendance





Figure 8: Predicted probabilities of rally attendance by individual news consumption



The model also offer support for Hypotheses 3 to 5. Both models offer strong evidence that partisanship increases the probability of rally attendance. Partisanship has a negative effect on rally attendance that is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Based on predictions from Model 1, a partisan is 21.1% more likely to attend a rally than a non-partisan. This supports Hypothesis 3.

The models also offer some support to the postulated causal relation between prior regime and rally attendance set out in Hypothesis 4. Each year spent under a competitive one-party regime has a positive effect on rally attendance which is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. The predicted probabilities are not distinct at the 0.05 level across years spent under a competitive one-party regime, but they are at the 0.1 level. This is illustrated in the third panel of Figure 7, which also illustrates that they are large in scale. In a country that spent 24 years under a competitive one-party regime, the predicted probability that an individual will go to a rally is 46.6%, holding other variables at their means. In a country that spent no years under such a regime, is it 37.7%. In short, the models offer some cautious support the conclusion that during competitive one-party regimes, regular one-party legislative elections or primaries inculcate habits of rally convening and attendance that persist through time.

Concordantly, there is support for the proposed relationship between years of multiparty regime and rally attendance expressed in Hypothesis 5. In each of the models, the age of the multiparty regime has a statistically significant effect on rally attendance, which is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. This effect is large in scale. In a country with no years of democratic experience, an individual would have a predicted probability of 31.9% attending a rally. By contrast, such an individual in a country with 20 years of democratic

experience would have a predicted probability of attending a rally of 42.9%. These effects are illustrated in Figure 7 below. This figure shows that the predicted probabilities are statistically distinct at the 0.05 level. Therefore, there is strong evidence that democratic experience inculcates rally cultures.

These results affirm that while mass media penetration has large and resounding effects on rally attendance, mass media penetration alone does not determine how rally-intensive election campaigns become. A number of variables, individual and national, short-term and long-term drive and dampen individual rally attendance, and in aggregate, national rally attendance.

This evidence all sheds light on the variation in rally attendance across Africa. These findings can be used to explain why some countries have particularly rally-intensive election campaigns. Table 4 presents data about the 12 countries included in the Fifth Round of the Afrobarometer with the highest rates of rally attendance. For each country, it details the values and country averages of the five independent variables which this chapter has shown have large and statistically significant effects on rally attendance, namely national television penetration, national radio penetration, years spent under a competitive one-party regime, the number of consecutive years of that a country has been a multiparty regime and national rate of partisanship. It also states the mean rate of the countries in the sample.

At a glance, it is apparent that these most rally-intensive campaigns are all closely correlated with the five variables. With the exception of Cape Verde, they all have shallower than average television penetration. Equally, with the exceptions of Benin and Zambia, they all have higher than average rates of partisanship. Only a small portion of the countries spent any time under competitive one-party regimes, but in the cases of both Kenya and Zambia,

those experiences compensate for the levels of partisanship and television penetration, which hover close to the sample average. Radio is the only determinant which varies significantly across the subsample. Cape Verde is a notable outlier in the sample. This may be at least in part because it is a microstate. In its 2011 elections, Cape Verde had 298,567[63] registered voters and a National Assembly composed by 72 seats, which yields 4,145 voters per seat. Therefore, it is no surprise that candidates could hold enough rallies to address a high proportion of their voters. These summary statistics also show that Tanzania has experienced a perfect storm of circumstances that foster high rally attendance. Not only was it home to a competitive one-party regime for longer than any African country other than Cote d'Ivoire, but it has shallow television penetration, shallow Internet penetration, one of the longest experiences of uninterrupted multiparty elections (since 1992) the highest rate of partisanship in the sample.

[63] International IDEA. 2017. "Voter Turnout Database." *International IDEA*. Retrieved September 26, 2017 (http://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/voter-turnout).

Table 4: Countries with highest rally attendance by key variables

(these variables are not weighted)

	Rally attendance	Television penetration scale	Radio penetration scale	Years of competitive one-party regime	Years of uninterrupted multiparty democracy	Partisanship
Tanzania	72.0%	33.6%	73.8%	28	20	86.2%
Uganda	62.3%	21.2%	83.1%	0	5	76.6%
Zimbabwe	61.8%	41.2%	58.0%	0	22	67.6%
Malawi	57.2%	14.7%	66.6%	27	18	60.4%
Benin	55.6%	41.6%	70.8%	0	20	38.4%
Cape Verde	53.2%	83.9%	67.8%	0	20	62.9%
Niger	49.8%	23.2%	60.3%	0	1	81.8%
Kenya	48.0%	48.9%	82.1%	23	20	60.1%
Liberia	48.0%	17.5%	82.1%	0	7	71.1%
Sierra Leone	47.4%	16.4%	72.8%	0	10	81.3%
Guinea	45.5%	33.6%	70.7%	0	3	57.9%
Zambia	45.0%	47.6%	67.1%	19	23	51.7%
All 34 countries mean	**37.3%**	**50.7%**	**70.0%**	**6.3**	**16.4**	**56.3%**

Conclusion

In Part I of this thesis, I have sought to establish election campaigns with high rates of rally attendance as the subject of study. In this chapter, I have examined what makes people go to rallies in Africa. Thereby, I shed light on what makes many people go to rallies in some countries, but not others, and therefore what makes some election campaigns more 'rally-intensive' than others. I paint a picture of the many causes of rally attendance. I identify partisanship, time spent under competitive authoritarian regimes, and the age of a democracy as determinants of rally attendance, alongside a raft of individual causes including urbanity, community participation, poverty, remoteness from public facilities and

gender. Far from offering a mono-causal explanation, in this chapter I emphasise the multitude of factors at play.

However, my primary argument is that television penetration is the key retardant of rally attendance. This conclusion echoes the experience of high-income countries in decades gone by, and the similarity between these findings has important ramifications for the scope of the argument presented here. While the subject and the data which I present in this chapter both pertain to Africa, the parallels between African and Western experiences suggest that the effect of television penetration on rally attendance in multiparty democracies may extend to a much larger set of countries. There is little evidence that other mass media dampen rally attendance. However, the evidence also suggests that radio penetration magnifies rally attendance. This argument has gone unmade in the Western literature to the best of my knowledge, but it is not entirely at odds with Western experience. As I detailed in the preceding chapter, aggregate rally attendance rose in Western countries during the interwar period, just as radios proliferated.

Despite the array of factors identified above, the natural conclusion from this analysis is that rally attendance will fall as television penetration deepens and if radio penetration recedes. That conclusion is important for this thesis as a whole, because it locates the phenomena under the microscope in these pages. This thesis is the study of electioneering and party organisations in election campaigns in which rallies are well attended. My findings suggest that by and large, the sorts of election campaigns under study here will gradually cease to exist as television penetration rises. Therefore, in this thesis, I am studying a mode of electioneering that may one day pass or at least fade as countries enter their own 'television ages'. These conclusions all remain bounded by the findings of the previous chapter. The rally-intensive campaign only becomes feasible after the proliferation

of electronic amplification. Insofar as these technological determinants are dominant, the rally campaign is reserved for election campaigns in which television penetration is low, and amplification technologies are widely available.

The important qualifier that I offer here is that other contemporary variables alter the level of rally attendance, and so do particular legacies of the past. The particular institutional forms that authoritarian rule took in a handful of countries developed cultures of rally attendance that are connected to higher rally attendance across time. Whether these effects are strong but fading through time, or whether rally cultures are reproducing themselves anew with each passing campaign cannot be gleaned from this data. If the latter, then rallies may persist as important aspects of electioneering in path-dependent trajectories. Whether or not this is the case, these findings show that the prominence of rally attendance is not only a product of contemporaneous factors, but also features which are peculiar to nations' pasts. Therefore, high levels of rally attendance in some African countries may persist into the future even if mass media penetration rises.

That concludes Part I of this thesis. Herein, I have demonstrated that numerous election campaigns across space and time have been rally-intensive. This illustrates the value of the concept of the rally-intensive ground campaign. Equally, in Part I, I have tried to explain why election campaigns become rally-intensive. With the conclusions summarised above in mind, one can speculate which other ground campaigns have been, are or will be rally-intensive. Numerous countries beyond sub-Saharan Africa, which can be found as far and wide as the Caribbean, South America and Central America; and travelling West, the Asia-Pacific, South-East Asia, South Asia, Central Asia and parts of the Middle East display many of the factors described above which are conducive to the emergence of rally-

intensive campaigns. In this respect, Part I not only reveals that rally-intensive campaigns exist; it offers some preliminary indications of just how common they may be.

Annex

Table 5: Models that predict the probability of individual rally attendance

Variable	Model 1: Continuous dependent variable multilevel model	Model 2: Logistic multilevel model
Individual-level variables		
Age	-0.005*	-0.0259*
Female	-0.0313***	-0.1686***
Education	0.0041	0.028*
Wealth	-0.0175***	-0.0993***
Remoteness from public services	-0.0067***	-0.0414***
Interest in politics	0.0434***	0.2271***
Urban	-0.0103***	-0.058***
Community participation	0.0934***	0.5087***
Offered a bribe	0.0469***	0.244***
Partisanship	**0.082*** **	**0.4359*** **
Individual radio consumption	**0.0198*** **	**0.1071*** **
Individual television consumption	**-0.0155*** **	**-0.084*** **
Individual newspaper consumption	**0.0061** **	**0.0413** **
Individual Internet consumption	**-0.0084*** **	**-0.0382** **
Country-level variables		
Effective number of parties	-0.004	-0.0084
Length of civil war in years	0.0595***	0.3868***
Liberal democracy (quality of democracy)	0.0449*	0.314**
Party strength	-0.0035	-0.0421
Unicameral legislature	0.0291*	0.1076
Electoral competitiveness	-0.0227	-0.1107
Proportionate electoral system	0.0158	0.0797
Electoral system with lists	0.0194	0.1375
Years of competitive one-party regime	**0.0406** **	**0.2339** **
Age of democracy in years	**0.0543** **	**0.3617*** **
National radio penetration	**-0.0252**	**-0.1118**
National television penetration	**-0.0723** **	**-0.3728** **
National newspaper penetration	**0.0251**	**0.1054**
National Internet news penetration	**0.0072**	**0.0097**
Constant	0.406***	-0.5242***
Fit statistics		
N	38,102	38,102
Log likelihood	-120.1159	-0.0385
AIC	240.2319	0.0751
BIC	240.2319	0.0751
Inter-class correlation	0.0233	0.0396

* p < .1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01

Emboldened rows indicate independent variables of most theoretical interest.

Further scatterplots

Figure 9: Scatterplot of national rally attendance against national newspaper penetration




Figure 10: Scatterplot of national rally attendance against national Internet penetration





Figure 11: Scatterplot of national rally attendance against national mass media penetration (including radio penetration)



Part II: Electioneering in rally-intensive ground campaigns

Chapter 4. Moving the crowd: Mobilising and persuading at rallies

This thesis is predicated on the contention that rallies matter. It may be impressive, for example, that Tanzania's rate of campaign rally attendance is more than twice that of Ghana's, or that Michael Sata addressed more voters in an hour than William Gladstone could in a fortnight. However, the pertinence of these facts rests on the presumed power of the rally to move the audience. In this chapter, I argue, with some provisos, that mass meetings change the subsequent political behaviour of their attendees.

This claim is far from self-evident. Many suggest that rallies draw either the politically disengaged who come searching for entertainment, or parties' most ardent supporters who are already convinced. Thus, there appears to be a general sympathy for the view that rallies have minimal effects.[1] In the scarce recent work on mass rallies, authors repeatedly argue that rallies serve ulterior purposes beyond altering voters' behaviour.[2] An implication of these studies, not articulated explicitly, is that if rallies serve these purposes, perhaps they have negligible effects on voter behaviour but are convened regardless in pursuit of other objectives. These conjectures are among the best evidence that we have to go on, because to date, there have been just a few rigorous analyses of the effects of rallies on voters, and almost all in the United States. While a burgeoning literature has examined the effects of other modes of campaign contact, the rally has been somewhat neglected.

Studies of campaign contact effects distinguish between mobilisation and persuasion. Mobilisational effects are those that parties have on the probability that voters turn out to vote. Persuasive effects are those that parties have on the probability that voters cast their

[1] Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet.
[2] Muñoz; Szwarcberg. "Political Parties and Rallies in Latin America".

ballots for the party contacting them.[3] There are additional grounds for doubting that rallies have persuasive effects in an African context. It has become a cliché to suggest that African electoral politics is devoid of public policy and ideology, and instead is dominated by ethnicity and clientelism.[4] Against this backdrop, it seems at least plausible that rallies are not sites at which politicians seek to persuade voters, at least not in the conventional sense reserved for policy preferences and programmatic appeals.

The dearth of research on the rally is a consequence at least in part of the methodological challenges of studying it. Canvassing, leafletting and a plethora of campaign methods are relatively easy for researchers to control and randomly distribute as treatments in field experiments. By contrast, rallies are extremely difficult to simulate, not least because, unlike fairs and other mass events, their effects hinge upon the inclusion of politicians who host the events and address the audiences. To analyse these questions, therefore, different methods are needed, methods which trade some of the rigour of the random control trial in exchange for greater feasibility. To this end, I designed a panel survey during the 2015 election campaign in Tanzania. This data-set was purpose-designed to enable analysis using pseudo-experimental methods. In this chapter, I present the results of a variant of fixed effects models in order to interrogate these questions. I show that there is qualified evidence that rallies both mobilise and persuade. Voters are more likely to turn out and vote after attending a mass meeting, and they are more likely to hold a better opinion of the party which convened the meeting. The evidence is stronger for dominant party rallies than opposition party rallies, but there are strong signs that the null findings for opposition rallies are due to limitations in the data rather than differential effects between dominant and opposition party rallies.

[3] John Blydenburgh. 1971. "A Controlled Experiment to Measure the Effects of Personal Contact Campaigning." *Midwest Journal of Political Science* 15(2):365-81.
[4] Vicky Randall and Lars Svåsand. 2002. "Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Africa." *Democratization* 9(3):30–52.

In this chapter, I move beyond these basic questions to reveal findings that reach beyond the grand contours of this debate and move into the specifics. In particular, I speak to the comparative literature about the relationship between partisanship, conceived of as enduring, slow-changing attachments to parties, and the effect of campaign contact on voters' opinions of parties. I show that contrary to what one might expect *a priori*, the persuasive effects of dominant party rallies are strongest not among its supporters, but among those that do not support it. More surprisingly still, parties' strongest supporters leave their rallies with worse opinions of their party than they started with. In effect, I present evidence that non-supporters can be impressed at rallies, but for the strongest of partisans, in-the-flesh exposure to their party is most likely to tarnish its impeccable image in their eyes.

This is the first chapter of my thesis in which I narrow the empirical scope of enquiry to Tanzania. In this regard, I prepare the ground for the chapters to come.

Effects of campaign contact

A large body of work examines the effect of campaign contact on voter behaviour. Successive generations of scholars have used survey respondent attribution,[5] single-shot surveys,[6] election outcome models,[7] panel surveys[8] and field experiments,[9] among other

[5] Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet.
[6] Kramer; David Price and Michael Lupfer. 1973. "Volunteers for Gore: The Impact of a Precinct-Level Canvass in Three Tennessee Cities." *Journal of Politics* 35:410–38; Robert Huckfeldt and John Sprague. 1992. "Political Parties and Electoral Mobilization: Political Structure, Social Structure, and the Party Canvass." *American Political Science Review* 86(1):70–86; Huckfeldt and Sprague. "Networks in Context".
[7] Paul Whiteley and Patrick Seyd. 2003. "How to Win a Landslide by Really Trying: The Effects of Local Campaigning on Voting in the 1997 British General Election." *Electoral Studies* 22(2):301–24; Munroe Eagles. 2004. "The Effectiveness of Local Campaign Spending in the 1993 and 1997 Federal Elections in Canada." *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 37(1):117–36; Karp, Bowler and Banducci; Karp, Banducci and Bowler.

things, to measure the effects of numerous methods of campaign contact.[10] Among the personal contact or ground campaign methods that researchers have examined are canvassing,[11] direct mail,[12] leafletting,[13] robot phone messages,[14] phone canvassing,[15] and election day fairs. Altogether, this literature has grown so large that it cannot be cited comprehensively here.

A few studies have examined the effects of candidate visits in the United States using non-experimental methods.[16] One study randomly distributed election fairs,[17] and, remarkably, one randomly distributed a candidate's visits.[18] However, beyond the United States, mass rallies are conspicuous by their absence from this literature.

The few recent studies that have examined rallies beyond the United States suggest that rallies serve ulterior purposes. For example, Maria Szwarcberg argues that rallies in Latin America serve as a means for party leaders to resolve principal-agent dilemmas by

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[8] Daniel Romer, Kate Kenski, Kenneth Wineg, Christopher Adasiewicz, and Kathleen Jameson. 2006. *Capturing Campaign Dynamics: The National Annenberg Election Survey*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[9] Green and Gerber. *Get Out the Vote*.
[10] Iyengar and Simon; Gary Jacobson. 2015. "How Do Campaigns Matter?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 18(1):31–47.
[11] Kramer; Blydenburgh; Donald Green and Alan Gerber. 1999. "Does Canvassing Increase Voter Turnout." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of American* 96(19):10939–42; Donald Green, Alan Gerber, and David Nickerson. 2003. "Getting Out the Vote in Local Elections: Results from Six Door-to-Door Canvassing Experiments." *Journal of Politics* 65(4):1083–96.
[12] Alan Gerber and Donald Green. 2000. "The Effects of Canvassing, Telephone Calls, and Direct Mail on Voter Turnout-A Field Experiment." *American Political Science Review* 94(3):653–63.
[13] Green and Gerber. *Get Out the Vote*.
[14] ibid.
[15] David Nickerson. 2006. "Volunteer Phone Calls Can Increase Turnout: Evidence from Eight Field Experiments." *American Politics Research* 34(3):271–92.
[16] Jeffrey Jones. 1998. "Does Bringing out the Candidate Bring out the Votes?" *American Politics Quarterly* 26(4):395–419; Thomas Holbrook. 2002. "Did the Whistle-Stop Campaign Matter?" *PS: Political Science & Politics* 35(1):59–66; Boris Heersink and Brenton Peterson. 2017. "Truman Defeats Dewey: The Effect of Campaign Visits on Election Outcomes." *Electoral Studies* 49:49–64.
[17] Elizabeth Addonizio, Donald Green, and James Glaser. 2007. "Putting the Party Back into Politics: An Experiment Testing Whether Election Day Festivals Increase Voter Turnout." *PS: Political Science & Politics* 40(4):721–27.
[18] Daron Shaw and James Gimpel. 2012. "What If We Randomize the Governor's Schedule? Evidence on Campaign Appearance Effects from a Texas Field Experiment." *Political Communication* 29(2):137–59.

monitoring how well local bosses mobilise rally attendance.[19] Similarly, Paula Muñoz argues that rallies in Peru are ways for candidates to project popularity and wealth.[20] Neither of these authors explicitly suggests that rallies have no direct effects on voter behaviour. However, an implication of their work is that if rallies serve these alternative purposes, the convening of rallies is scarce evidence that they have direct impacts on voter's behaviour. Perhaps parties convene them to serve these alternative purposes in spite of their negligible direct impacts.

The findings are not the only reasons to believe that rallies might have negligible effects on voter behaviour. Arguments about the minimal effects of political communication are not new. On the contrary, scholars have argued for seventy years that mass media have 'minimal effects' on voters, and recurrently since then.[21] Paul Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson and Hazel Gaudet, some of the earliest proponents of this view, argue that political messages transmitted through mass media cannot be tailored to the individual or adjusted *ad lib* in response to how they are received, as they can during canvassing, for example.[22] They argue that messages transmitted through mass media cannot create social obligations and raise the prospect of social norm monitoring which might motivate voters, as personalised contact can.[23] Furthermore, as citizens choose which mass media they receive, they self-select media that confirm their own prejudices, leading to the reinforcement of, rather than change in, pre-existing opinions. At first sight, all three of these arguments are applicable to rallies. First, speakers at mass meetings cannot tailor their messages to each spectator, though they can tailor them to the particular audiences. Second, they cannot

[19] Mariela Szwarcberg. 2012. "Uncertainty, Political Clientelism, and Voter Turnout in Latin America: Why Parties Conduct Rallies in Argentina." *Comparative Politics* 45(1):88–106.
[20] Muñoz.
[21] Robert Wyatt. 1998. "After 50 Years, Political Communication Scholars Still Argue with Lazarsfeld." *Journal of Communication* 48(2):146–56; Bennett and Iyengar; Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet.
[22] Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet: 15.
[23] Robert Bond et al. 2012. "A 61-Million-Person Experiment in Social Influence and Political Mobilization." *Nature* 489(7415):295–98; Alan Green, Donald Green, and Christopher Larimer. 2008. "Social Pressure and Voter Turnout: Evidence from a Large-Scale Field Experiment." *American Political Science Review* 102(1):33–48.

witness promises to turn out and vote by everyone in the audience. Third, politicians often end up literally preaching to the converted. Therefore, there are plausible reasons why rallies may have minimal effects on voter behaviour.

The effects of campaign contact on voter behaviour are conventionally divided into mobilisation, that is, changing whether voters go to vote on election day, and persuasion, that is, changing who the voter casts their ballot for. Going to vote is time consuming and often costly, and so mobilisation is in part about motivation. Rallies motivate voters to turn out because at mass meetings, politicians can enthuse voters. The emotive power of public speaking to a large crowd is illustrated by various instances and anecdotes. Zambian President Michael Sata was famous for his ability to work crowds with his sharp tongue and evocative language and symbols.[24] Gladstone was regarded as a 'Mesmer'.[25] Indeed, many orators in Victorian Britain reportedly 'exerted extraordinary emotional and psychological power over their audiences.'[26] Furthermore, crowds are themselves enthusing; joining one is invigorating, something I experienced myself at numerous rallies in Tanzania. I articulate a plausible corollary of these insights in Hypothesis 1 below.

Hypothesis 1. **Mobilisation.** Attending a party rally has a positive effect on the probability of voter turnout.

Turnout aside, there is evidence that partisan campaign contact alters voters' opinions of parties.[27] While at its broadest, the term 'persuasion' is used as a catch-all term for attempts to change citizens' vote choice. However, more specifically it refers to attempts to change

[24] Larmer and Fraser; Fraser.
[25] Meisel.
[26] ibid: 264.
[27] David Doherty and Scott Adler. 2014. "The Persuasive Effects of Partisan Campaign Mailers." *Political Research Quarterly* 67(3):562–73; Alan Gerber, Daniel Kessler, and Marc Meredith. 2011. "The Persuasive Effects of Direct Mail: A Regression Discontinuity Based Approach." *Journal of Politics* 73(1):140–55.

their vote choices by appealing to policy programmes, rather than appealing to clientelism or charisma, for example. More specifically still, it refers to attempts to either change what public goods or policy positions voters desire in their politicians, or to change what public goods they think their politicians will provide or what policy positions their politicians hold.[28] In other words, persuasion is about changing opinions, rather than framing, priming and informing, as these terms were defined in Chapter 1. Persuasion in this strict sense is often thought to play a marginal role in politics in sub-Saharan Africa, because politics is frequently characterised as primarily clientelist and ethnic.

However, a growing body of work argues that citizens cast their votes in response to government performance[29] and a further body argues that parties make not only clientelist or ethnic appeals, but also valence appeals about their aptitude to deliver public policies.[30] Writers about politics in Tanzania have documented the prominence of particular public policy issues in elections.[31] Indeed, in my own work, I describe the preponderance of public policies in national political debate in Tanzania.[32] If these studies are correct, then it is plausible that in sub-Saharan Africa and specifically in Tanzania, parties seek to persuade voters of their ability and commitment to deliver public policies as they make campaign contact. I express a corollary of this proposition in Hypothesis 2 below.

Hypothesis 2. **Persuasion.** Attending a party rally has a positive effect on the voter's opinion of that party relative to her opinion of other parties.

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[28] Price and Lupfer.
[29] Harding; Harding and Stasavage; Michael Bratton, Ravi Bhavnani, and Tse-Hsin Chen. 2012. "Voting Intentions in Africa: Ethnic, Economic or Partisan?" *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 50(1):27–52.
[30] Bleck and van de Walle.
[31] Anne Mette Kjær and Ole Therkildsen. 2013. "Elections and Landmark Policies in Tanzania and Uganda." *Democratization* 20(4):592–614; Marie-Aude Fouéré and Cyrielle Maingraud-Martinaud. 2015. "Une Hégémonie Compétitive Contre Vents et Marées : Les Élections Générales de 2015 En Tanzanie et À Zanzibar." *Politique Africaine* 140(4):145–63.
[32] Paget. "Tanzania: Shrinking Space and Opposition Protest".


These are my two primary hypotheses in this chapter. However, the campaign contact literature shows at length that the effects of campaign contact are heterogeneous. Chief among the many factors mediating the effects of campaign contact is partisanship. In arguments that go back to at least Lazarsfeld,[33] voters' partisanship mediates to what extent they trust messages conveyed during campaign contact and to what extent they accept their conclusions. [34] By extension, one might expect that the effect of rally attendance on voters' opinions of that party would be stronger for supporters of that party than non-supporters.

Based on these arguments, I propose in Hypothesis 3 below that partisan identity affects the strength of the relationship between rally attendance and opinions of parties.

Hypothesis 3. **Mediation by partisanship.** The effect of attending a party rally on a voter's opinion of that party increases with the strength of that voter's partisan identity.

[33] Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet.
[34] Zaller.

Figure 12: Partisan identification by country in sub-Saharan Africa



Source: Afrobarometer[35]

This hypothesis is particularly important not only because partisanship transpires to be a crucial control variable, but because it is congruent with minimal effects theory; insofar as it is correct, rallies will most persuade voters that are already persuaded, and least persuade voters that matter. If it were unsupported, or indeed contradicted in the analysis below, this would show that on the contrary, rallies' persuasive effects are not concentrated where they are of least use.

For ease of reference, I have compiled these three hypotheses below.

Hypothesis 1. Mobilisation. Attending a party rally has a positive effect on the probability of voter turnout.

[35] Afrobarometer. "Afrobarometer Data. Round 6. All Countries Surveyed in Sub-Saharan Africa."

Hypothesis 2. Persuasion. Attending a party rally has a positive effect on the voter's opinion of that party, compared to other parties.

Hypothesis 3. Mediation by partisanship. The effect of attending a party rally on a voter's opinion of that party increases with the strength of that voter's partisan identity.

Dataset and model specification

To test the hypotheses which I have outlined above, I commissioned a two-round panel survey in Tanzania during the election of 2015. Field work for the first round of the survey ended on September 22nd, 32 days before the election in Tanzania on October 25th. The second round was conducted between November 1st and November 10th, just a week after the election took place. In short, there was just over a month between data-collection for both rounds of the survey. In the first round of the survey, 2,000 respondents were interviewed as part of an omnibus survey conducted face-to-face. 200 primary sampling units were generated from a national sampling frame. Respondents were selected in these primary sampling units using a random-walk procedure. In the first survey round, respondents were asked whether they would be willing to be contacted again by phone, and whether they would provide a primary phone number, a secondary phone number, and the phone number of another person in their household. The second round of the survey was conducted using computer-aided telephone interviews. A subsample of 1,000 respondents was selected from the first round sample and re-contacted. Hypothetically, this might raise serious issues about the randomness of the second round sample. However, computer-aided repeated calling was used to reach as many in the sample as possible, and the overall re-contact rate was 82%.

To determine whether there were systematic errors in who was sampled for the first round, I compared the answers given by the full sample in response to questions asked in the first round, to those given by the subsample of respondents contacted for the second round. Those results and the differences in means are summarised in Table 11 in the annex. There, I show that there is no statistically significant difference between the sample and second round sub-sample in gender, urbanity, mass media consumption, marital status, opinions of CCM, opinions of Chadema, or closeness to Chadema as defined below. There are statistically significant differences in age and support for CCM, but these are small in scale, constituting only a fraction of a standard deviation.

The conventional method used to analyse the effects of campaign contact is the randomised field experiment. By ensuring that the distribution of a treatment across subjects is stochastically random, the field experiment permits the researcher to ensure that the average treatment effects can be measured without bias. If one surveys the large literature dedicated to get-out-the-vote field experiments, one might be forgiven for thinking that field experiments have been used to study the effects of every method of campaign contact imaginable.[36] However, the mass meeting presents a peculiar challenge to experimental methods. A partisan rally is particularly difficult to replicate in a field experiment. Unlike other election day fairs, which have been examined in field experiments,[37] the participation of leading politicians is central to the appeal and effect of the rally. Randomly distributing rallies would require the acquiescence of politicians to convene and speak at them, and for other politicians not to adjust where they held rallies in response. What is more, field experiments normally rely on publicly available registers of individual, or at least area-aggregated voter turnout. However, in many such countries, electoral fraud makes these registers

[36] Green and Gerber. *Get Out the Vote.*
[37] Addonizio, Green and Glaser.

unreliable. These issues of feasibility will drive researchers to examine the effect of partisan rallies in sub-Saharan Africa using non-experimental methods.

Observational methods constitute a poor basis for the analysis of the effects of rally attendance too. There are numerous factors that drive voters to attend rallies. The tendency of party supporters to attend their own parties' rallies, for example, means that rally attendance, vote choice, partisanship and other variables are almost certainly connected. Worse still, even after controlling for observable confounding variables, there very well may be further unobserved variables which cannot be controlled for, which means that the estimates of the effects of rallies may suffer from omitted variable bias. To analyse the effects of rally attendance in a way that is both feasible and analytically rigorous, I employ quasi-experimental data in this chapter. Specifically, I construct a series of models which belong to the family of fixed effects models.

In a typical fixed effects model, data is structured as a panel, with data about particular instances, such as individuals, in multiple time periods. This is how the data that I analyse in this chapter is arrayed. In such a fixed effects model, the dependent variable changes across individuals and time, or between- and within-individuals. This dependent variable is modelled as an additive function of individual features which change over time, individual features which are constant across time, time period-specific dummy variables, and a normally-distributed error term. Dummy variables or 'fixed effects' are specified for each individual. In a true[38] fixed effects model, separate models are estimated separately for each time period simultaneously. However, an equivalent model with the same pseudo-experimental properties can be estimated by expressing time-changing dependent and independent variables as time-specific

[38] Paul Allison. 2009. *Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences: Fixed Effects Regression Models*. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications.

deviations from their individual-level, time-constant means.[39] In either circumstance, the models will estimate individual-level dummies at values which account for all variation between individuals which is time-constant. In effect, the fixed effects 'absorb' the time-constant variations between individuals. Therefore, this analysis insulates the model from any bias generated by the omission of unobserved time-constant variables. Any such omitted time-constant variables will be absorbed into the fixed effects too. This makes it possible to estimate the effects of variables that change over time without bias.[40]

The draw-back of the fixed effects model is that it excludes time-constant variation between individuals from the analysis. That variation is also absorbed into the fixed effects. This reduces the degrees of freedom and therefore the statistical power of the model.[41] It also leaves the researcher unable to examine the effects of time-constant variables, which may be of theoretical interest.[42] Given my interest in the effect of slow-changing variables such as partisanship, this is a major shortcoming of the fixed effects model for my research. However, Paul Allison,[43] and separately, Andrew Bell and Kelvyn Jones,[44] show that if the groups are randomly selected, the model can be transformed and re-specified using the Mundlak formulation. This formulation protects the analysis from omitted time-constant variables as fixed effects models do, but allows for the analysis of variation both within individuals (ie, across time) and between them.

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[39] Josh Angrist and Jörn-Steffen Pischke. 2009. *Mostly Harmless Econometrics: The Empiricist's Companion*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
[40] The estimates of coefficients of time-changing variables remain vulnerable to the omission of unobserved time-changing variables.
[41] Allison.
[42] Andrew Bell and Kelvyn Jones. 2015. "Explaining Fixed Effects: Random Effects Modeling of Time-Series Cross-Sectional and Panel Data." *Political Science Research and Methods* 3(1):133–53.
[43] Allison.
[44] Bell and Jones.

This transformation involves reorganising the data as individuals at particular points in time (level one instances) nested not in time periods but individuals (level two groups). To retain the unbiased estimates of within-individual effects that the fixed-effect model affords, each time-changing (level one) variable is decomposed into two parts. The first is the average value that it takes for each individual, the individual-level mean, which is constant across time. The second is the deviation of each instance from that individual-level (level two) mean at a particular time period, which therefore varies across time. If random effects are specified for each individual (level two random effects), and each individual at each instance (level one random effects), the model matches the specifications of a multilevel model, with group-centred means. A panel survey of randomly selected individuals interviewed twice, such as mine, can be modelled using this Mundlak formulation. It is reasonable to specify the individual (level two groups) fixed effects as stochastically random and normally distributed if the individuals have been randomly sampled. An equation of this form, with random effects specified, is spelt out algebraically below:

$$y_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_1(x_{ij} - \bar{x}_j) + \beta_2(\bar{x}_j) + \beta_3(z_j) + \beta_4 w + u_j + e_{ij}$$

In this equation, y_{ij} represents the dependent variable of each individual j at instance i. The variable x is divided into two component parts. The first component is the part which remains constant across time periods, the individual j mean x_j^-. The second component is the deviation of the variable x in any instance i from the individual-level mean, $(x_{ij} - x_j^-)$. In the equation above, y_{ij} is expressed as a linear function of x_j^-; $(x_{ij,} - x_j^-)$, which I have just specified; z_j, which is individual-level variable which is constant across time; a dummy variable for time period, w; and random effects for the individual u_j and the individual at each instance e_{ij}, which are stochastically random, with mean of zero and a variance to be estimated. $\beta_0, \beta_1, \beta_2, \beta_3$ and β_4 are coefficients.

Any relationship that was modelled between the first part of the variable and the dependent variable would represent time-constant between-individuals effects, which would be vulnerable to the omission of individual-level variables. Any relationship that was modelled between the second part of the variable and the dependent variable would represent the within-individual, across-time effect, which would be free from any bias generated by omitted individual-level time-constant variables. These within-individual effects are those of interest in the analysis below. In short, this model combines the advantage of unbiased estimation afforded by the fixed effects model while including the between-individuals effects that a multilevel model provides.[45] This means that unbiased within-individual effects can be estimated without sacrificing degrees of freedom, as fixed effects models do, and while permitting cross-level interactions, which fixed effects models do not. For a more extensive discussion of this model type, see Bell and Jones.[46]

The data set includes 1,000 respondents interviewed which were interviewed twice. As per this model specification, the models below include 2,000 instances (individuals at each point that they were interviewed) grouped into 1,000 groups (individuals), making 3,000 observations in total.

Variable measurement

Some independent variables are time-constant and some are time-changing. As per the model specification, these time-changing variables are decomposed into two variables each,

[45] Allison; Bell and Jones.
[46] ibid.

one which expresses variation between individuals which is constant over time, and another which expresses variation within individuals across time. In the analysis that follows, the time-constant between-individuals component of these variables is not of theoretical interest. It captures correlations between campaign contact and time-constant differences in turnout and rally attendance. If there are any unobserved variables which, for example, make an individual both more likely to attend a rally, and more likely to give particular answers to turnout questions in both the first and second survey rounds, this variable will capture that variation. Instead, in the analysis I concentrate my discussion on the time-changing components of these variables.

Dependent variables

Respondents were asked questions about both dependent variables in each survey round. Therefore, their first and second round answers can be expressed as deviations from their individual-level means. I operationalise changes in turnout by referring to a question from the first round in which respondents were asked 'How likely is it that you will turn out to vote on election day? Very unlikely, somewhat unlikely, neither likely nor unlikely, somewhat likely or very likely?' I referred to a second round question asking respondents 'Did you vote in the recent election? Yes or no?' This provides one answer on a five-point scale and another binary answer. In the models below, I make the answers to these questions commensurable by collapsing the first round answers into a binary answer by combining the 'somewhat likely' and 'very likely' answers into one category and the other answer categories into another. However, moving the 'neither likely nor unlikely' answers from one category to another has no substantial effect on the results of the models which I present below. Neither does transforming the second round answers into a five-point scale with all responses at either end. No doubt, answers to this question suffer from social

desirability bias which produces biases in the answers. However, this a better way to generate measures of changing turnout intention than relying on observable turnout data, because this data is tremendously difficult to access in Tanzania and, due to serious concerns about electoral fraud, it is not altogether trustworthy.

Ideally, these variables would be modelled as binary variables taking the distinct values of zero or one and specified as logistic multilevel models. However, as I described in Chapter 3, the software which I use does not permit me to generate predicted probabilities using logistic multilevel models. As I wish to present such predicted probabilities, in the main body of this chapter, I present linear multilevel models which treat the dependent variable as though it varies as a continuous variable between zero and one. I present equivalent, logistic multilevel models in the Annex, which generate equivalent results in each respect.

To operationalise voters' opinions about parties, respondents were asked 'How much do you trust [party name] to handle each of the following issues? Completely, a lot, somewhat, a little or not at all?' They were asked this question twice, once about CCM and once about Chadema and they were asked it in both survey rounds. To avoid bias in survey design, I did not use my discretion to select which policy areas respondents would be asked about. Instead, I referred to the Fifth Round of the Afrobarometer, the round which had most recently been released at the time of survey design. Tanzanian respondents to that survey round were asked 'in your opinion, what are the most important problems facing this country that government should address?' Tanzanian respondents mentioned the following six issues the most: the economy; education; water supply; health; corruption; and roads and infrastructure.[47]

[47] Due to an error on my part in the survey scripting, a seventh issue, electricity which was ranked by voters among Tanzanian respondents was unintentionally excluded from the survey script.

To generate a measure of individuals' opinions of parties in comparison to other parties, I aggregated respondents' responses to each of these questions to form two 0 to 24 point scales, one for their answers about each party. Some will inevitably have sunnier dispositions than others and be inclined to evaluate any party more generously than others. To control for this variation in disposition, I subtract respondents' opinions of Chadema from their opinions of CCM. This generates a measure of opinion from pro-Chadema (negative) to pro-CCM (positive) theoretically bound from -24 to +24. By subtracting net appraisals of both parties, I control for variation in respondents' optimistic or pessimistic dispositions. This is the version of this dependent variable of choice in the analysis below.

Arraying opinions along a spectrum like this is justifiable because of the nature of the party system in 2015. Tanzania's party system used to be a dominant party system with one pole – CCM – with small opposition parties scattered around it. However, between 2005 and 2015 opposition support gravitated to Chadema, and in 2015, Chadema's presidential candidate won 40% of the vote, behind the winner's 58%. As I have argued elsewhere, this represents the development of an incumbency-opposition cleavage and a second pole, with party politics understood through its relation to these two parties and individuals' positions between them.[48] Therefore, I use this spectrum of opinions about parties as the dependent variable of choice. However, I summarise similar models in the annex using measures of opinions about CCM and Chadema and find very similar results.

Ideally, I would have examined not only the effect of campaign contact on opinion change, but the relationship between opinion change and vote intention. This would provide stronger evidence that opinion change of the sort described is consequential. However, in the Tanzanian context, this question was sensitive in nature. The 2015 election was

[48] Paget. "Tanzania: Shrinking Space and Opposition Protest"; Paget, "The Authoritarian Origins of Well-Organised Opposition Parties: The Rise of Chadema in Tanzania". *African Affairs* forthcoming.

contentious; the results were annulled in the semi-autonomous archipelago of Zanzibar, and the losing presidential candidate alleged that the results have been rigged. Therefore, I deemed that asking this question would both engender a high non-response rate and possibly put myself and the survey company in jeopardy. Therefore, unfortunately, I cannot examine this directly.

The first round of the survey asked respondents for their opinions about political parties face-to-face, and the second round asked this and other questions by telephone. This may drive changes in respondents' answers to the same questions across survey rounds. This in turn could bias the results. In order to mitigate this possible source of bias, as I described above, I stipulate a dummy variable to represent survey round. This will capture any uniform changes in answers across survey rounds, although not heterogeneous effects of survey responses, which remain a source of bias which I cannot eliminate.

Independent and control variables

Turning to independent variables, I generated continuous variables of three kinds of ground campaign contact based on questions from the second round of the survey. Firstly, to generate a measure of canvassing, they were asked 'Agents from which political parties have spoken to you face-to-face in the last month, if any', and for each party that they gave, they were in turn asked 'How many times were you spoken to face-to-face by a [Party X] agent in the month before election day? One, two, three, four, five or more, or not at all?' Secondly, to generate a measure of rally attendance, they were asked 'Which political parties have you attended the rallies of recently, if any?' For each party they mentioned, they were then asked 'How many times did you attend a public rally in the month before election day at which: …' They were asked this question for five categories of rallies. Their answers

were record as one, two, three, four, or five or more. Thirdly, I generated a measure of private closed-door group meetings. Meetings of this sort are a common-place means of party-voter contact in Tanzania. No statistically significant results were produced for this category of meetings, but they are included in the models as relevant controls.

There is a methodologically important question regarding whether campaign contact with each party has effects of the same amplitude. If the effects of rally attendance differ by party, then aggregating the effects by multiple parties into one variable would make the coefficient for rally attendance a weighted average of the party-specific effects, which might obscure party-specific statistically distinct results. This possibility seems less likely in models of turnout, but particularly likely in models of opinions of parties, as the messages must be innately partisan in character. The confounding potential of aggregating measures of campaign contact in models of opinion change seems even more acute once one considers that the mediating effect of partisanship is of theoretical interest. However, as there are numerous political parties in Tanzania, and there are three types of campaign contact and numerous further interactions in question, I wish to limit how many models I present and how many variables they contain. In light of this, I specify one model of turnout in which campaign contact is aggregated across parties, and another in which the measures are disaggregated by ruling party and opposition parties. In models of opinion, I only include measures of campaign contact disaggregated by party. As expected, the relationship between aggregate measures of campaign contact and turnout prove to be statistically significant.

I generate a measure of partisanship by using answers to the question 'Which political party do you feel closest to, if any?' I combine these with answers to the follow-up question 'How much do you support that party? Would you say completely, a lot, somewhat or a

little?' This question was asked in the first round of the survey and therefore measures of individuals' partisanship used in the analysis below remain fixed across time. By combining the results, I generate measures of support for each party. While the mediating effects of partisanship on opinion change are of particular theoretical interest, they are also important controls for the measure of turnout.

I also generate a number of further control variables from responses to other survey questions. I control for time-changing interest in politics using responses to the question 'How interested are you in politics? Would you say not at all interested, a little interested, somewhat interested, or very interested?', which was asked in both rounds. I control for the effects of time by including a dummy variable for round. I also control for mass media news using responses to the question 'How often do you get news from the following sources? Would you say every day, a few times a week, a few times a month, less than once a month, or never?' Respondents were asked this question about radio, television, newspaper, and social media and internet news. I aggregated individuals' responses to generate a continuous 0 to 16 point measure of mass media news consumption. While mass media is measured as a time-constant variable, in all likelihood its effects vary over time. In light thereof, I include an interaction of mass media and round to measure this effect. I also control for gender, wealth, education, attendance of local discussion groups (*vijiwe*) and age. Question wordings for these control variables can be found in the annex.

Mobilising and persuading: Analysis

The first and headline conclusion of this chapter is that parties have vast contact with voters on the ground. Through face-to-face methods, parties have regular contact with

voters. Summary statistics for rally attendance and canvassing are presented in Table 6 below.

I ran two models of turnout which I present here. In Model 1, each type of campaign contact is aggregated across parties. In Model 2, each type of campaign contact is decomposed by party. The size and statistical significance of the independent variable coefficients are represented graphically in Figure 13 below. Further details about the control variables and model fit can be found in Table 7, in the annex. The analysis of the data suggests that attending rallies has a positive effect on the probability of an individual going to vote, with some caveats. Therefore, the data supports Hypothesis 1, that rally attendance has a positive effect on turnout. In Model 1, attending any party's rally has a within-individual effect of 0.6% on the probability of turnout which is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. This suggests that attending any party's rally has an effect on turnout. In Model 2, where rally attendance is broken down by party, attending an opposition party rally has a within-individual effect on the probability of turnout of 0.7% which is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. The within-individual effect of attending a CCM rally is statistically insignificant. However, this may be due to the loss of degrees of freedom involved in dividing rallies into smaller groups, or noise in the data. The p-value of the ruling party rally term is 0.13, so just beyond standard conventions of statistical significance. Therefore, given the results of Model 1, there remains evidence that attending any party's rally raises the probability of turnout.

Table 6: Summary statistics of the rally and canvassing contact received per voter[49]

Campaign contact method (in the last month of the campaign)	Proportion of population contacted			Mean number of contacts per voter			
	Point estimate	Lower bound 95% confidence interval	Upper bound 95% confidence interval	Point estimate	Lower bound 95% confidence interval	Upper bound 95% confidence interval	Standard deviation
Rallies							
Total	69%	65.6%	73.0%	7.25	6.70	7.81	8.5
CCM	56.9%	55.8%	63.4%	4.42	4.01	4.83	6.57
Chadema	35.9%	32.6%	39.1%	2.24	1.97	2.50	4.34
Other	9.1%	7.2%	11.0%	0.49	0.34	0.64	2.45
Canvassing							
Total	20.0%	17.2%	22.7%	0.57	0.47	0.66	1.53
CCM	10.0%	8.1%	1.9%	0.25	0.19	0.31	0.94
Chadema	11.8%	9.5%	14.1%	0.28	0.21	0.22	0.34
Other	2.2%	1.3%	3.0%	0.04	0.02	0.07	0.34


It is possible that these statistically significant results are the product of associations between the tendency to attend a rally and the tendency to turnout. However, any such association would be captured by the between-individuals measure of rally attendance which is time-constant. The association which I have reported above captures a correlation between rally attendance and a *change* in reported turnout within individuals between the first and second rounds. The same goes for social desirability bias objections. While voters are almost certainly subject to social desirability biases to report turnout intentions, there would have to be some special theoretical reason to expect this variation in turnout reporting to change across survey rounds.

An effect of 0.6% is small. Studies of canvassing in the United States report effects of between 6% and 4%, larger than the effect found here.[50] In fact, 0.6% is just larger than many of the point-estimate effects of social media treatments, which range from nil to

[49] These statistics have been weighted to be representative of the population of Tanzania as a whole by gender, age and region.
[50] Green and Gerber. *Get Out the Vote,* Chapter 2.

0.4%.[51] However, 69% of Tanzanians attended one or more rallies in the last month of the campaign. Furthermore, Tanzanians went to many rallies. Tanzanians reportedly attended 7.3 rallies in the last month of the campaign on average. Therefore, while an effect of 0.6% might seem small, if these estimates were correct then rallies would be responsible for huge changes in aggregate turnout nationally. The analysis offers no evidence that being canvassed has within-individual effects on the probability of turnout.

Figure 13: Models 1 and 2, showing the within-individual effect of campaign contact methods on the probability of turnout




Concentric error bars represent 1%, 5% and 10% confidence intervals of the coefficients, respectively.

[51] Green and Gerber. *Get Out the Vote,* Chapter 7.

The effects of campaign contact on voters' opinions of parties are more complex. Model 3 examines the effects of campaign contact disaggregated by party on the spectrum of opinions about parties which runs from net pro-Chadema to net pro-CCM. As the spectrum of net opinions about parties runs from negative to positive, the most natural results would be for CCM campaign contact to have positive effects and for opposition campaign contact to have negative effects. The within-individual effects of campaign contact from this model are illustrated in Figure 14 below, and the model parameters and fit statistics can be found in Table 8 in the annex. The main CCM rally term has a within-individual positive effect of 0.87 on opinions of parties, which is statistically significant at the 0.001 level. However, this effect is contradicted by a negative coefficient of the interaction between CCM partisanship and CCM rally attendance, which is also statistically significant effect at the 0.001 level. The Chadema rally and partisanship interaction term is statistically significant at the 0.01 level, but the main Chadema rally term has a p-value of 0.12, and therefore, I cannot be confident that the effects are not due to sampling error. I discuss this further below.

Figure 14: Model 3 showing the within-individual effects of campaign contact on a spectrum of opinions about parties ranging from pro-Chadema (-) to pro-CCM (+)




Concentric error bars represent 1%, 5% and 10% confidence intervals of the coefficients, respectively.

The consequence of these conflicting CCM rally terms is illustrated in Figure 15, which plots predicted probabilities derived from the fixed portion of Model 3 across CCM rallies and CCM partisanship. The first frame in this figure shows that when a non-CCM supporter attends a CCM rally, his predicted opinions move from being net pro-Chadema to being net pro-CCM. These effects are strong in size and are statistically significant. Each rally moves net opinion by approximately 0.9 points along the 24-point spectrum, and there is clear space between the 95% confidence intervals of different rallies. In other words, among non-CCM supporters, I can be confident that CCM rally attendance has a strong

and positive within-individual effect on voters' opinions. Within the category of 'CCM non-supporters', one might wonder whether these effects are strongest among Chadema supporters or non-partisans, supporters of neither party. I control for Chadema partisanship in Model 3, which has a strong negative effect on net opinions. If an interaction between Chadema partisanship and CCM rally attendance is added to the model, it has no statistically significant effect. Therefore, both non-partisans and Chadema supporters' opinions shift towards CCM if they attend its rallies. This is, with some qualification, support for Hypothesis 2.

However, the third panel in Figure 15 shows that the within-individual effect of CCM rally attendance on voters that describe themselves as 'complete' supporters of CCM is not positive, but negative. Strong partisans' net opinions move from net pro-CCM towards net pro-Chadema by just under 0.6 points with each CCM rally they attend. These results do not support Hypothesis 3; instead, they directly contradict it. It seems that, though CCM can woo non-partisans and opposition supporters at its rallies, the more it reveals itself to its most ardent supporters, the worse they think of it. These findings about rallies and persuasion which I have described above are mirrored almost in their entirety by models which take opinions of CCM or opinions of Chadema as the dependent variable, instead of a spectrum of opinions about Chadema and CCM. These models are displayed at length in the annex in Figure 18 through to Figure 23, and Table 8 and Table 9.

Figure 15: The effect of CCM rally attendance on predicted probable opinions of parties, by non-partisans and complete CCM supporters. Results from Model 3



The explanation that I would like to offer for these unexpected findings is as follows: the strongest CCM supporters had uncritical, adulatory impressions of their party. As they were brought into close and immediate contact with it, they were reminded of its flaws. In other words, at rallies, CCM's most ardent supporters came face-to-face with the inevitable imperfections of their party.

Evidence in support of this explanation can be found by examining the changes in voters' opinions about CCM. Figure 16 and Figure 17 present histograms of opinions of CCM along the 0 to 24-point scale described in the data and measurement section, subdivided by support for CCM. Figure 16 presents opinions of CCM from the first survey round, before the last month of campaign activity. Respondents that were not contacted again in the second survey round are excluded from these results to avoid creating a spurious picture of change. Figure 17 presents the results from the second round, after the campaign.

The panel of most interest in each figure is the last, which summarises the opinions of CCM among self-described 'complete' supporters of CCM. Figure 16 shows that strong supporters of CCM had overwhelmingly positive opinions of CCM's ability to handle issues before the last month of the campaign. Indeed, 37.8% of this group of strong CCM supporters told interviewees that they trust CCM completely on all six issue areas. These high numbers are not a product of a small subsample size of strong CCM support. Strong CCM supporters make up 35.5% of the sample of respondents surveyed in both rounds. If one compares this category to 'complete' CCM supporters across survey rounds, one can see that the centre of opinions of CCM drifted from the high to the low teens. To be precise, mean opinions of CCM among 'complete' CCM supporters fell from 19.3 to 14.0 across survey rounds. Figure 22 in the annex shows strikingly similar patterns of movement

in attitudes towards Chadema. It is likely that only a portion of this movement is the product of rally attendance. Nonetheless, the most plausible explanation of the negative effect of CCM rally attendance on strong CCM supporters is that these rallies tempered their uncritical views of their parties by bringing them into close contact with them. While this contradicts the literature and Hypothesis 3 which I advanced above, it is also refreshingly unexpected.

Figure 16: Before: Opinions of CCM *before* the campaign by how much voters support CCM





Figure 17: After: Opinions of CCM *after* the campaign by how much voters support CCM



An important shortcoming of this analysis is that it is applicable only in its entirety to CCM. Opposition party rallies do not have statistically significant persuasive effects. This remains the case if campaign contact is disaggregated further by opposition party. It also remains the case if one also takes opinions of Chadema as the dependent variable, rather than the spectrum of opinions of parties.

There are several reasons to think that the null result for Chadema rallies should be attributed to noise in the data, rather than evidence that Chadema rallies indeed have negligible effects. The first is that strong evidence is required to 'prove a negative' of this kind. While large and well-specified field experiments provide a means to reasonably

eliminate the possibility that some method campaign contact has no effect, my pseudo-experimental methods do not.

The second is that while Chadema coefficients are not statistically significant, they are close to being so. The Chadema rally term in Model 3 has a p-value of 0.12. The Chadema rally terms mirror their CCM counter-parts in direction too; the main term is negative and the interaction with partisanship is positive and statistically significant. It is possible that if the measures were more accurate or the data were less noisy, it might reveal a similar relationship. In fact, I ran fixed effects Models 9 to 11 – which include no cross-level interactions. In these models, Chadema rallies have both persuasive and mobilisational effects. These models are presented in the annex in Figure 24 and Table 10.

The third is that, in general, respondents self-censor in answer to questions about the opposition in authoritarian countries. Tanzania's national elections became competitive by 2015. However, there remained an authoritarian dimension to its politics. This authoritarian atmosphere has intensified since 2015,[52] but there is plenty of evidence that petty authoritarian methods were used to punish opposition supporters before then too.[53] There are signs that this authoritarian atmosphere makes Tanzanian survey respondents self-censor when asked about the opposition. This seems particularly plausible, given that Tanzanians are more likely to believe that surveyors are sent by the government than respondents in other countries. Based on the Fifth Round of the Afrobarometer, 64% of Tanzanian respondents said that they believed that the surveyor had been sent by one government agency or another, in comparison to 53% across the entire range of countries sampled.[54]

[52] Paget. "Tanzania: Shrinking Space and Opposition Protest".
[53] Hoffman and Robinson, "Tanzania's Missing Opposition".
[54] Afrobarometer. "Afrobarometer Data. Round 5. All Countries Surveyed in Sub-Saharan Africa."

There is contextual evidence of this sort of survey respondents censoring in Tanzania. Survey respondents systematically underreport their likelihood of voting for the opposition. For example, a pre-election survey released by Twaweza just over one month before the 2015 election showed that after weighting for representativeness, 22% of voters intended to vote for the opposition presidential candidate, while 66% intended to vote for Magufuli.[55] When they voted a month later, they in fact split 40% to 58%; almost half of voters that eventually voted for Chadema's candidate did not report this as their intention a month before the vote. Indeed, Kevin Croke finds concrete evidence that survey respondents answer various politically sensitive questions differently if local CCM officials are present during the interview.[56] This sort of self-censorship may well have been a source of noise that obscures correlations between Chadema rallies and the dependent variables of interest. Therefore, the most reasonable conclusion to draw from the analysis in this chapter is not that attending Chadema rallies does not have persuasive effects. Instead, it is that the data offers some positive but ultimately inconclusive signs about the persuasive effects of Chadema rallies.

Even if one were to dismiss this evidence of noise in the data, there are not sufficient grounds to proceed in this thesis on the basis that there are differential effects between CCM and Chadema rallies. Apart from the higher standards of evidence required to prove a negative, the evidence that I present in the proceeding chapters illustrates *ad nauseum* that Tanzanian political parties, including Chadema, go to enormous efforts to produce rallies. This suggests very strongly that whether they truly have effects on voters, Tanzanian politicians are convinced that they do.

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[55] Sauti za Wananchi. 2016. "Mobile Phone Survey Round 12 Second Panel." *Twaweza*, September. Retrieved January 2017 (https://www.twaweza.org/go/sauti-za-wananchi-english).
[56] Kevin Croke. "Tools of Single Party Hegemony in Tanzania".

Similarly, in Model 3, as in Models 1 and 2, none of the canvassing terms have statistically significant within-individual effects. The only exception is the effect of Chadema canvassing on turnout, which is statistically significant at the 0.1 level. Therefore, I cannot conclude from the data in this chapter that canvassing has within-individual mobilisational and persuasive effects. However, this is not sufficient evidence that canvassing has no effects. As above, I cannot prove a negative. The statistical insignificance of canvassing terms, especially once interactions are included, may be an issue of the statistical power of the model.

Conclusion

The most important conclusion of this chapter is that, with some provisos, rallies both mobilise and persuade. There is strong evidence that ruling party rallies have these mobilisational and persuasive effects. There is not conclusive evidence that opposition rallies have these effects, but as I have argued, this is not reason to conclude that opposition rallies have minimal effects. Limitations in the data make it plausible, if not likely, that effects of opposition rallies are obscured by data noise. The analysis which I have presented here constitutes significant evidence that after people go to rallies, they are enthused to turn out and vote, and are persuaded to think better of the parties whose representatives they have heard. This is an important contribution to filling a considerable empirical hole in past research. It is also an important corrective to conclusions that one might be tempted to extrapolate from other academic research on the uses of rallies. While rallies are doubtlessly convened for multiple purposes such as monitoring brokers and projecting popularity, they also fulfil parties' bread-and-butter purposes of convincing voters to turn out and vote for them.

In this chapter, I have further shown that the persuasive effects of rally attendance are not, as one might have expected, confined to the strongest of supporters. If they can be enticed to attend, rallies provide an opportunity to preach to the 'unconverted'. Indeed, as I have shown, the 'converted' could even be lost through excessive exposure. One might conclude from this that parties have reasons to keep supporters away from rallies, and that if too many supporters come, rallies are unproductive. Under particular circumstances, that might be the case. However, rallies also have positive effects on turnout. What is more, while rallies worsen strong supporters' opinions of their parties, this is unlikely to lead to lost votes, given that strong supporters have the highest opinions of those parties to begin with. In exchange for rising probabilities of turnout, one can understand why politicians across Tanzania find this trade-off an acceptable one.

At a grander level, in this chapter I have illustrated how campaign persuasion is both complex and surprising. I have also, I hope, provided some evidence of the ideational basis of Tanzanian electoral politics. I have shown that rallies affect voters' opinions of parties' ability to deliver public policies. This is no trivial finding. If electoral politics were a matter of clientelist exchanges, as many believe it is, then one might expect no such thing. Instead, I offer a contribution to a growing body of evidence that politics is very much about public policy, even if valence issues – questions of trustworthiness, commitment and ability - are the terms of debate, rather than rival sets of policies.

Annex

Question wording

Education

'What is the highest level of education you completed?'

Age

'How old are you?'

Attendance of local discussion groups (*vijiwe*):

'How often do you get news from the following sources: at an open coffee or discussion group? Would you say every day, a few times a week, a few times a month, less than once a month, or never?'

Wealth

This was generated from an index of objects owned by the household.

Female

Gender was coded as female, based on observation rather than a question.

Results

Table 7: Turnout models 1 and 2

Variable	Model 1: Turnout	Model 2: Turnout, contact disaggregated by party
Within-individuals (over time) effects		
Rally	**0.0056*** **	
Canvass	0.008	
Private meeting	-0.0027	
CCM rally		**0.0045**
Opposition rally		**0.0072** **
CCM canvass		-0.0078
Opposition canvass		0.0217*
CCM private meeting		-0.0135
Opposition private meeting		0.0025
Interest in politics	0.0179	0.0184
Cross-level interactions		
Mass media*time	0.006**	0.0057*
Between-individuals effects		
Rally	0.0011	
Canvass	0.005	
Private meeting	0.0113	
CCM rally		0.0033
Opposition rally		-0.0011
CCM canvass		0.0199**
Opposition canvass		-0.0099
CCM private meeting		0.021
Opposition private meeting		0.0058
Interest in politics	0.0405***	0.0394***
CCM partisan	0.0023	0.1191
Chadema partisan	0.0087*	0.0101**
Wealth	0.0033	0.0032
Female	-0.0265*	-0.0258*
Education	0.0066	0.007
Mass media news	-.0156***	-0.0153***
Attendance of local coffee groups	-0.0043	-0.0046
Age	-0.0989	-0.0939
Rural	-0.0204	-0.0215
Disapproval of clientelism	0.004*	0.0039*
Time	-0.0412	-0.0386
Constant	0.822***	0.8249***
Between-individual variance	0.0033	0.1022
Within-individual variance	0.1025	0.1022


Fit statistics

N	2686	2686
Log likelihood	-794	-788.8
AIC	1634	1636
BIC	1770	1807
Inter-class correlation (ICC)	0.0312	0.0297

*p<.1 ** p<.05 *** p<.01

Emboldened rows indicate independent variables of most theoretical interest.

Figure 18: Models 3, 4 and 5 showing the effect of campaign contact and interactions on opinions of parties



Concentric error bars represent 1%, 5% and 10% confidence intervals of the coefficients, respectively.

Figure 19: The effect of opposition rally attendance on predicted probable opinions of parties, by non-partisans and complete Chadema supporters, from the fixed portion of Model 3




Table 8: Models of opinions of parties (with interactions)

Variable	Model 3: Spectrum of opinions of parties	Model 4: Opinions of CCM	Model 5: Opinions of Chadema
Within-individuals (over time) effects			
CCM rally	**0.8789*** **	**0.4243*** **	**-0.4706*** **
Opposition rally	**-0.1684**	**-0.0551**	**0.1157***
CCM canvass	0.1698	0.4339	0.0741
Opposition canvass	0.2498	-0.2734	-0.2955
CCM private meeting	0.1693	0.26	-0.0505
Opposition private meeting	-0.5469	0.1003	0.5136**
Interest in politics	0.4864	0.4583**	-0.0524
Cross-level interactions			
CCM rally*CCM partisanship	**-0.3627*** **	**-0.177*** **	**0.1792*** **
Opposition rally*Chadema partisanship	**0.0657**	**-0.0368**	**-0.0787**
CCM canvass*CCM partisanship	0.1284	-0.0044	-0.0522
Opposition canvass* Chadema partisanship	0.1413***	0.0594**	-0.0864***
CCM private meeting*CCM partisanship	-0.2141	-0.0687	0.1054
Opposition private meeting* Chadema partisanship	0.3663*	0.1243	-0.2768**
Mass media*time	0.0987	-0.0401	-0.141**
Between-individuals effects			
CCM rally	0.2854***	0.1673***	-0.1732***
Opposition rally	-0.2419**	-0.1265**	0.1602***
CCM canvass	0.4673*	0.3045**	-0.1875
Opposition canvass	-0.5665**	-0.2701*	0.2815*
CCM private meeting	0.7194	0.4625*	-0.1964
Opposition private meeting	-0.7637**	-0.5695***	0.0405
Interest in politics	-0.1649	0.0639	0.118
CCM partisan	3.046***	1.735***	-1.158***
Chadema partisan	-2.375***	-0.7979***	1.565***
Wealth	-0.0717	0.0476	0.0665
Female	0.1059	-0.1717	-0.4102
Education	-0.4325***	-0.258***	0.1882*
Mass media news	-0.0724	0.1341*	0.2242***
Attendance of local coffee groups	0.127	-0.0269	-0.0796
Age	-0.0898	-0.0133	-0.0093
Rural	0.0385	0.445	0.1612
Disapproval of clientelism	-0.0536	-0.0694*	-0.0341
Time	-2.474*	-0.0932	2.855***
Constant	3.578	11.28***	7.445***
Between-individual variance	4.0168	0.1221	1.8206
Within-individual variance	70.4267	29.6575	28.5625
Fit statistics			
N	2071	2478	2148
Log likelihood	-7401	-7721	-6713
AIC	81.897	87.3570	70.9776
BIC	81.897	87.3570	76.4374

Inter-class correlation (ICC)	0.0539	0.0041	0.0599

*p<.1 ** p<.05 *** p<.01

Emboldened rows indicate independent variables of most theoretical interest.

Figure 20: Graphs depicting the marginal effect of rallies on opinions of parties. Results from the fixed portions of Models 4 and 5




Figure 21: Before: Opinions of Chadema *before* the campaign by how much respondents supported Chadema before the campaign






Figure 22: After: Opinions of Chadema *after* the campaign by how much respondents supported Chadema before the campaign



Results of models of opinions of parties, without interactions between campaign contact and partisanship

Figure 23: Models 6, 7 and 8 showing the effects of campaign contact on opinions of parties, without interactions with partisanship variables



Concentric error bars represent 1%, 5% and 10% confidence intervals of the coefficients, respectively.

Table 9: Models of opinions of parties (without interactions with partisanship variables)


Variable	Model 6: Spectrum of opinions of parties	Model 7: Opinions of CCM	Model 8: Opinions of Chadema
Within-individuals (over time) effects			
CCM rally	**0.1713**	**0.0578**	**-0.1202***
Opposition rally	**0.1476**	**0.0768**	**-0.0728**
CCM canvass	0.7857**	0.5867***	-0.3514
Opposition canvass	-0.569*	-0.54***	0.1764
CCM private meeting	0.4302	0.2849	-0.2125
Opposition private meeting	-0.0527	0.2714	0.2132
Interest in politics	0.3829	0.4586**	0.0237
Between-individuals effects			
CCM rally	0.3644***	0.1707***	-0.2164***
Opposition rally	-0.2517***	-0.1318**	0.162***
CCM canvass	0.4808*	0.3146**	-0.1992
Opposition canvass	-0.6676**	-0.302*	0.3387**
CCM private meeting	0.4799	0.48*	-0.0719
Opposition private meeting	-0.5568	-0.5289***	-0.0668
Interest in politics	-.01522	0.0705	0.1316
Mass media*time	0.1397	-0.023	-0.157**
CCM partisan	3.078***	1.722***	-1.181***
Chadema partisan	-2.387***	-0.8027***	1.555***
Wealth	-0.0586	0.0544	0.068
Female	0.0701	-0.1492	-0.3834
Education	-0.4384***	-.263***	0.1833*
Mass media news	-0.1229	0.1149	0.2456***
Attendance of local coffee groups	0.138	-0.0161	-0.0819
Age	-0.0017	-0.0128	-0.0082
Rural	0.0255	0.4767*	0.1635
Disapproval of clientelism	-0.0496	-0.0732*	-0.0416
Time	-3.27**	-0.3875	3.208***
Constant	4.458*	11.57***	7.058***
Between-individual variance	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Within-individual variance	78.8404	30.9065	31.6814
Fit Statistics			
N	2071	2478	2148
Log likelihood	-7461	-7767	-6759
AIC	81.897	87.3570	76.4374
BIC	81.897	87.3570	76.4374
Inter-class correlation (ICC)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

*p<.1 ** p<.05 *** p<.01

Emboldened rows indicate independent variables of most theoretical interest.

Fixed effect models

Figure 24: Models 9 to 11, fixed effects models showing the effects of campaign contact on opinions and turnout



Concentric error bars represent 1%, 5% and 10% confidence intervals of the coefficients, respectively.

Table 10: Models 9 to 11, fixed effects models showing the effects of campaign contact on opinions and turnout

Variable	Model 9: Within-individual effects of all-party measures of campaign contact on turnout	Model 10: Within-individual effects of CCM and opposition campaign contact on turnout	Model 11: Within-individual effects of CCM and opposition campaign contact on opinions of parties
Rally	**0.0065*** **		
Canvass	**0.008**		
CCM rally		**0.006****	**0.7188*** **
Opposition rally		**0.0072*** **	**-1.246*** **
CCM canvass		**0.003**	**1.57***
Opposition canvass		**0.0142***	**-0.5813**
Interest in politics	0.0183*	0.0185*	0.3008
Private meeting	-0.0019		
CCM private meeting		-0.0152	-0.0071
Opposition private meeting		0.0039	-0.0695
Constant	0.0053	0.0073	2.156**
Fit statistics			
N	868	888	553
R^2	0.0238	0.0296	0.0703

* p < .1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01

Emboldened rows indicate independent variables of most theoretical interest.

Table 11: Comparison of full first round sample and second round subsample

Round 1 variable	Entire sample mean or proportion	Sub-sample contacted for Round 2, mean or proportion	Standard deviation of sample	Range of variable	T-test of alternative hypothesis that means are not equal
Female	0.428	0.469	0.497	0-1	0.06
Age	36.57	34.25	13.625	18-95	0.00
Rural	0.71	0.707	0.455	0-1	0.88
Mass media	11.48	11.45	3.89	4-20	0.86
Married	0.582	0.575	0.494	0-1	0.75
Opinion of CCM	12.63	12.28	7.95	0-24	0.36
Opinion of Chadema	10.39	10.74	8.021	0-24	0.37
Close to CCM	1.72	1.44	1.83	0-4	0.00
Close to Chadema	0.808	0.837	1.55	0-4	0.67

Chapter 5. *'Amsha, Amsha'*: How crowds form and parties draw them

In this chapter, I examine the efforts to which parties go to make voters attend their rallies. I argue that the attendance of parties' rallies rises steeply when they have ties to strong local actors, be they party branches or extra-party networks. Local actors' presence raises rally attendance, because they are stores of geographically concentrated mobilisational capacity. I show that parties' local actors increase rally attendance because they use these mobilisational capabilities to draw people to their parties' rallies. In the process, I also advance a corollary of this argument, which is that in rally-intensive campaigns, parties' local actors dedicate more of their campaign effort to mobilising rally attendance and less to canvassing than in other ground campaigns. In other words, their tasks shift from *making* campaign contact, to *facilitating* it by increasing rally attendance.

Local actors' efforts have particularly strong effects on rally attendance because they intervene in dynamics of audience formation and dispersion. Joining crowds is social; the likelihood of any person joining a crowd depends on how many other people are already in the crowd. The consequence of these interdependent decisions to join an audience is that small changes in crowd composition can precipitate large changes in total crowd size. The arrival or departure of a few people can make a crowd begin to gather or disperse. These dynamics make crowds fickle, and can leave a popular candidate with a small audience or no audience at all. Local actors have such large effects on audience size because they can intervene decisively in these dynamics. They can protect rallies from dynamics of audience dispersion, and they can drive audience formation.

While local actors can serve this purpose, parties also raise political finance and employ a series of expensive methods to mobilise rally attendance. I examine these alternate means in Chapters 7 and 8. The reason for this division of the subject matter is that these capital-intensive methods are not only relevant to understanding how rally-intensive campaigns alter campaign strategy; they are also relevant to understanding how rally-intensive campaigns alter party organisation.

To make these arguments, I turn to the Tanzanian case in detail. Chapter 4 built on data from Tanzania, but in this chapter and onwards, I engage in much greater detail with the specificities of Tanzania. For that reason, I dedicate extensive time in this chapter to characterising election campaigning in Tanzania in greater depth. Methodologically, I employ processing tracing in this chapter to link party ties to local actors and rally attendance in Tanzania.[1] I develop a series of hypotheses which, if supported by the evidence, would provide a strong basis to infer that parties' ties to local actors raise rally attendance.[2] Some of these hypotheses directly test parts of the stipulated causal mechanism advanced above. Other parts test corollaries of the theory.

In the next section, I develop the argument that parties' ties to local actors increase rally attendance and I generate six process tracing hypotheses which constitute tests of that argument. In the second section, I introduce election ground campaigns in Tanzania. In the third section, I show that dynamics of crowd formation and dispersion can be observed at rallies in Tanzania, in accordance with three of those hypotheses. In the fourth section, I show that local actors expend great effort mobilising rally attendance, and that candidates change their behaviour when they have no local actors to assist them, in accordance with the remaining three hypotheses.

[1] Mahoney. "The Logic of Process Tracing Tests in the Social Sciences".
[2] Collier.

Mobilising audiences and the dynamics of crowd formation and dispersion

In this chapter, I examine what local actors do in Tanzania's rally-intensive ground campaigns. 'Local actors' is an umbrella term used to refer to any organisations or interpersonal networks that marshal campaign labourers on a party's behalf over a limited geographic area. These gatherings of party and extra-party actors form what Rasmus Nielsen calls a 'campaign assemblage'.[3] In sub-Saharan African contexts, local actors, thus defined, often also include priests, imams, chiefs and civil associations.[4] Indeed, local leaders,[5] local elites,[6] electoral intermediaries or big men[7] are often regarded as a central to the study of politics in Africa. The term 'local actors' is intended to encompass all of these groups.

I argue that in Tanzania, local actors raise rally attendance. They spend time drawing voters to rallies, which creates a causal link between local actors' strength and rally size. As local actors mobilise rally attendance, in areas where parties have ties to local actors, more voters attend their rallies. This is the primary contention which I seek to substantiate in this chapter.

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[3] ibid.
[4] Leonardo Villalón. 1995. *Islamic Society and State Power in Senegal: Disciples and Citizens in Fatick*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; John Mccauley. 2013. "Africa's New Big Man Rule? Pentecostalism and Patronage in Ghana." *African Affairs* 112(446):1–21; Kate Baldwin. 2013. "Why Vote with the Chief? Political Connections and Public Goods Provision in Zambia." *American Journal of Political Science* 57(4):794–809; Jean-Pascal Daloz. 2003. "'Big Men' in Sub-Saharan Africa: How Elites Accumulate Positions and Resources." *Comparative Sociology* 2(1):271–85.
[5] Koter. *Beyond Ethnic Politics in Africa*.
[6] Riedl. *Authoritarian Origins of Democratic Party Systems in Africa*.
[7] Daloz.

In the process of demonstrating that local actors raise rally attendance, I reveal that parties dedicate substantial effort to mobilising rally attendance in rally-intensive campaigns. I show that mobilising rally attendance becomes a major task for parties' local actors. This is significant, because in other ground campaigns, electioneering is 'locally oriented, involving politicians, party workers, and citizens in direct, face-to-face contact through activities like town-hall hustings, canvassing, and branch party meetings'.[8] In campaigns such as these, party activists 'rang the doorbells, posted the pamphlets, [and] targeted the wards'.[9] In other words, campaign labour was distributed between numerous tasks. Insofar as one task is dominant, it is normally the canvass. Personal campaign contact at voters' doorsteps or places of work is time-consuming, but it is also widely considered to be one of the most effective methods of campaign contact,[10] with some important caveats.[11] Therefore, in this chapter, while showing that local actors increase rally attendance, I substantiate a broader point: rally-intensive campaigns shift parties' efforts from canvassing and other activities to drawing voters to rallies. Local actors not only help to make contact with voters directly; they also help candidates to reach voters at rallies.

Local actors' efforts to mobilise rally attendance are so vital in part because rally attendance can sometimes be stunted by interruptions in processes of audience formation and dispersion. While joining a rally is a choice made by individuals, it is also an inherently social choice. The decision to join an audience is affected by how many other people are in that audience.[12] In this respect, the social dynamics of rally attendance reflect the dynamics

[8] Norris. *A Virtuous Circle*: 134.
[9] Norris. *A Virtuous Circle*: 141.
[10] Green and Gerber, "Does Canvassing Increase Voter Turnout"; Green and Gerber, *Get Out the Vote*; Price and Lupfer; Blydenburgh.
[11] Arceneaux and Nickerson.
[12] Clark McPhail and David Miller. 1973. "The Assembling Process: A Theoretical and Empirical Examination." *American Sociological Review* 38(6):721–35.

of other forms of crowd assembly that can be found at demonstrations and riots.[13] The same mode of explanation might be applied to explain those who gather to watch street performers, those who gather around orators at Speaker's Corner, or those who enter an empty restaurant. Some early analyses of the dynamics of crowd formation and similar phenomena express dynamics in game theoretical terms, in which crowd formation is understood as a variation on the 'Prisoner's Dilemma'.[14] People writing in that canon conceive of a one-shot, two-player game between rational actors. Participating yields a benefit to each player if the other participates, but it yields a cost to one player if the other does not participate. The payoff grid of such a game is shown below.

Table 12: Rally attendance game theory grid

	Player 2	
Player 1	Participate	Do not participate
Participate	(1,1)	(-1,0)
Do not participate	(0,-1)	(0,0)

When the activity in question is a riot, the costs come in the form of risk of arrest or sustaining harm; when the activity is storming the Bastille, the risk is the likelihood of being shot by its defenders. When the activity is joining a rally's audience, the most modest costs might include the conspicuousness or the embarrassment of being alone, and receiving the attention of the speaker. Worse costs, especially in authoritarian dominant party systems, might include punitive action by state or parties. The perceived benefits of joining might also rise if the size of the audience affirms that the speaker is worth listening to, or that one enjoys solidarity with the other members of that crowd. The critical feature they all share is that the probability of suffering the costs of participation shrink with each additional

[13] Clark McPhail and Ronald Wohlstein. 1983. "Individual and Collective Behaviors within Gatherings, Demonstrations and Riots." *Annual Review of Sociology* 9:579–600.
[14] Roger Brown. 1965. *Social Psychology*. New York: Free Press.

participant, while the benefits that each participant receives do not shrink. Therefore, the balance of costs and benefits shifts towards the latter as more people participate. There are two Nash-equilibria in this game: one in which both players choose to join the rally, and another in which both players choose to not join the rally. In this formulation, if an audience is not formed, but the problem is one of coordination. If players could communicate, or otherwise signal their intention to join the crowd, then both would choose to join the crowd.

One of the brave assumptions of game theoretical approaches like the one sketched out above is the homogeneity of preferences between players. They do not make space to accommodate, for example, that the bold might discount the risks, that some might be more risk averse than others, or that the audacious might seek conspicuousness. This assumption is relaxed in the sort of 'threshold model' laid out by Mark Granovetter.[15] In his model, each person weighs the cost-benefit analysis of whether to join a rally audience differently. Any number of such factors might affect each individual's preferences, but for the purposes of this argument, what matters is that the individual's evaluation of the costs and benefits of joining a rally audience are affected by the number of other people already in it. Therefore, for any individual considering joining some audience, there will be some number of people in the audience which at which her decision tips from not joining to joining. In Granovetter's formulation, this tipping point is called a 'threshold'.

Granovetter's discussion of threshold models demonstrates that audiences or crowds can form gradually over time as more people trickle into the crowd. Imagine a group of 100 people near a rally location with different thresholds of participation, spread evenly between thresholds of 'zero other participants' and '99 other participants'. In the first time

[15] Mark Granovetter. 1978. "Threshold Models of Collective Behavior." *American Journal of Sociology* 83(6):1420–43.

period, the person with a threshold of zero would join the audience. In the second time period, the person with a threshold of one would join the audience, in response to the first person that joined, and so on, until all 100 people had joined. In other words, a virtuous cycle of crowd formation would begin. Equally, in this conception, audiences are vulnerable to the exact distribution of thresholds among the group. If the person with a threshold of zero was taken out of the example above, then the crowd would not form at all, even though no-one else's preferences would have changed. If the person with a threshold of '20 other participants' was removed, then a crowd would form until it reached the size of 20, but the person with a threshold of 21 would not join, and so crowd formation would freeze at that level. Equally, if that crowd formed 100 strong, but then the person with a threshold of zero was removed, the crowd would disperse. First, the person with a threshold of 99 other people would leave. This would cause the person with a threshold of 98 to leave, and so on. In effect, a vicious cycle of crowd dispersion would begin. As a distribution of people with thresholds spread so evenly is very unlikely, a more generalisable stylised conclusion of this framework is that rally audience formation and dispersion are both vulnerable to the dispositions of those in and near the audience.

A second stylised conclusion can be extracted which is true across much of this literature. If a small group of people commit to join the audience or 'participate', endogenous to the model or exogenous to it, this acts as a critical mass of participants that induces others to participate. In the language of threshold models, a critical mass of participants bridges many of the gaps between other peoples' thresholds. Most importantly, it protects the event from having no audience at all.

This way of modelling human behaviour involves serious abstraction and brave assumptions about human rationality. Complexity is exchanged for elegance in this sort of

rational choice theory. Nonetheless, I find that these models shed light on processes which can often be found at work in Tanzania. My argument in this chapter is that rallies are affected by processes of audience crowd formation and dispersion that closely resemble the crowd dynamics theorised by Granovetter above. Where parties have strong ties to local actors, rally attendance goes up, and normally it goes up sharply, because local actors' mobilising actions are multiplied by the processes of audience formation that they engender. They may protect an audience from processes of audience dispersion which would prevent almost anyone coming at all. Alternatively, they may make an audience just large enough to pull in people on the margins that were almost indifferent about attending originally. When this happens, local actors indirectly make many more people attend rallies than they contact directly.

If audiences form and disperse as proposed, then when a rally starts with a small audience, others should be deterred from joining it. Similarly, if an audience for some reason looks or seems smaller than it actually is, this is likely to deter others from joining it. This is expressed in Hypothesis 1. Correspondingly, if a rally has a very small audience which is then raised by some exogenous event, then this is likely to begin a process of audience formation, the virtuous cycle described above. This is expressed in Hypothesis 2.

One plausible way to alter these incentives would be to reward those that attend rallies. Indeed, hypothetically, if the probability of an attendee being rewarded decreased with the number of people that joined the audience before her, then the incentives to attend would be inverted. If rewards were finite and the probability of receiving a gift was directly related to how early one arrived, people would be more likely to arrive before the rally started, and 'rushes' to be among the first to arrive would be more likely too. Giving gifts to attendees is a staple way of drawing voters to rallies in some parts of the world. Paula Muñoz and

Maria Szwarcberg both document people being given food, drink, clothes and even money for going to rallies in parts of Latin America, notably Peru.[16] These methods can be found in sub-Saharan Africa too. For instance, Sam Wilkins documents gift-giving at rallies in Uganda.[17] This inversion of preferences is expressed in Hypothesis 3 below.

Hypotheses about the micro-processes of audience formation and dispersion

Hypothesis 1. **Deterrence**

The smaller that a rally audience is, the less likely that people are to join, other things being equal.

Hypothesis 2. **Critical mass**

If a rally with a very small audience is increased exogenously, a process of audience formation is likely to begin, other things being equal.

Hypothesis 3. **Clientelist attraction**

If politicians are expected to give out gifts when they arrive at a rally, people will be more likely to arrive in large numbers in advance.

The above three hypotheses follow from the comparative literature summarised above. If they are supported by the Tanzanian case, this will be strong evidence that the micro-processes of audience formation and dispersion expressed in that literature can be found at rallies in Tanzania and, by extension, rallies elsewhere too. The pertinence of these dynamics is that they make parties' efforts to mobilise voters to attend rallies all the more important. This in turn makes local actors more important for the successful production of the rally, and therefore the successful execution of the rally-intensive campaign.

[16] Muñoz; Szwarcberg. "Uncertainty, Political Clientelism, and Voter Turnout in Latin America".
[17] Sam Wilkins. 2018. "The Dominant Party System in Uganda: Subnational Competition and Authoritarian Survival in the 2016 Elections." University of Oxford.

The stronger the effort that local actors are found to dedicate to mobilising voters to attend rallies, the more compelling the evidence is that strong ties to mobilisationally strong local actors raises rally attendance. This is expressed in Hypothesis 4. This involves backwards inference from party choice, as follows: as a matter of definition, effort is costly. While some local actors may be volunteers and enthusiasts whose labour is free to the party, there continues to be an opportunity cost for the party to deploy local actors to mobilise rally attendance. If these activists' efforts did indeed have a negligible effect on rally attendance, the party could have dispatched those same activists to perform other duties which have greater effects instead, such as canvassing. Therefore, the more effort that local actors expend mobilising rally attendance, the less likely it is that these activities are superfluous or just for show. Therefore, the more likely it is that this is part of efforts to raise rally attendance in the aggregate.

Hypothesis 5 concerns where candidates convene their rallies. Developing an argument from first principles, one might argue that a parliamentary candidate ought to distribute her rallies equally across the constituency, adjusting for the population dispersion across space and the dispersion of target voters across that population. The better rallies are spread out, the more people they are close to; and the closer people are to rallies, the more likely they are to attend them. Spreading out rallies evenly across the electorate would maximise rally attendance. However, candidates should only distribute their rallies across their constituency in that way if they are free to choose where their rallies should be held without constraint. If rallies which were convened without the assistance of local actors were likely to be poorly attended, then candidates would be unlikely to convene rallies where they lacked the support of local actors. Convening rallies which few people attend is not just a waste of candidates' time, it also projects images of candidate and party

unpopularity and weakness. In a study of electoral mobilisation in Peru, Muñoz writes that 'nothing is worse for a politician's campaign than an ill-attended rally'.[18] In effect, unequal ties to local actors across space within a constituency would confine where a candidate could hold her rallies. Therefore, candidates should avoid holding rallies in areas where they have no ties or only weak ties to local actors. This is expressed in Hypothesis 5.

While local actors can mobilise voters to attend rallies, there are a series of second-best methods that parties can use to form a critical mass and gather a crowd without further expenditure of resources. These include holding meetings at drinking places; holding meetings at markets; and lastly, not convening a mass meeting and embarking upon a walk-about instead. Each of these methods is explained further in a later section. When candidates proceed to convene rallies in areas where they have weak or no ties to local actors regardless, parties should make greater use of these methods. This is expressed in Hypothesis 6. The greater the change in tactics that the absence of local actors provokes, the stronger the evidence that parties depend on them to mobilise rally attendance.

Hypotheses about parties' efforts to mobilise rally attendance

Hypothesis 4. **Mobilisation**

Local actors working for parties expend great effort mobilising voters to attend rallies.

Hypothesis 5. **Avoidance**

Candidates are less likely to convene rallies in areas where they lack local actors which support them, other things being equal.

[18] Muñoz.

Hypothesis 6. **Resort to second-best alternatives**

When candidates go to areas where there are no local actors to support them, they are more likely to:

a. Convene meetings at bars or markets; or

b. Do walk-abouts rather than rallies.

These three hypotheses seek out tell-tale signs that local actors raise attendance at rallies by drawing voters to them. Their inferential power stems from the interpretation of parties' behaviour, and inference about whether this behaviour makes it more or less likely that the stipulated causal associations were at work or not. This is the task which I undertake in the following two sections.

Tanzanian ground campaign activity

In Tanzania, enormous efforts are expended electioneering on the ground. The actors that carry out this ground campaigning are local in character, and they are organised under the umbrella of formal party structures. CCM's structures include dense hierarchies of party organs at the regional, district, ward and branch level. Below them are *mabalozi* (ambassadors or ten-cell leaders) in each neighbourhood. These layers of party representatives are so dense that at times CCM can feel almost omnipresent.[19] Across the eight districts that I did research in, without fail, I found CCM ward or branch officials, typically, though not always, with an accompanying party office.

[19] Max Mmuyu and Amon Chaligha. 1994. *Political Parties and Democracy in Tanzania*. Dar es Salaam: Dar es Salaam University Press; Rose Shayo. 2005. *Parties and Political Development in Tanzania*. EISA, EISA Research Report, Johannesburg; Makulilo; Edwin Babeiya. 2011. "Electoral Corruption and the Politics of Elections Financing in Tanzania." *Journal of Politics & Law* 4(2):91–103.

CCM's local present used to be unrivalled in Tanzania. However, between 2004 and 2015, Chadema underwent an enormous programme of organisation expansion. As I have documented elsewhere,[20] Chadema raised sufficient funds to undertake a national party-building exercise. By the end of that exercise, Chadema had constructed a party apparatus that perhaps did not equal CCM's own, but which certainly challenged it. It developed its own set of zonal, regional, district, ward and branch structures with *msingi* (or foundations) to match CCM's *mabalozi*. Chadema's former Secretary General Wilbroad Slaa boasted 'we are now a party that is almost everywhere, and the results are very visible.'[21] In Zanzibar, the Civic United Front have long been able to rival CCM electorally.[22] However, since 2012, they have also gone further by going to great efforts to create a system of *washiriki* (coordinators) below the branch level.[23]

In many countries, as I described above, extra-party networks and unofficially non-partisan actors form a 'campaign assemblage' that executes ground campaigning. In Tanzania, party actors dominate this assemblage. In part this reflects Tanzania's post-colonial history, in which independent civil associations were excluded from partisan politics during the one-party period.[24] However, in part, it is a product of the integration of the campaign assemblage into parties themselves. Therefore, when one writes of 'local actors' in Tanzania, in effect one writes of local party organs and the activists that they command.

The scale of the ground campaign in Tanzania that these party actors execute is illustrated in the election survey which I described in the previous chapter. Some of these results are

[20] Paget. "Authoritarian Origins of Well-Organised Opposition Parties".
[21] Wilbroad Slaa. 2015. *Interview*. Dar es Salaam, June 5.
[22] Lisa Rickey and Stefano Ponte. 1996. "The 1995 Tanzania Union Elections." *Review of African Political Economy* 23(67):80–87.
[23] Ismail Jussa. 2017a. *Interview*, London, March 24.
[24] Mwesiga Baregu. 1995. "Dynamics of Political Change in Tanzania." in *Reflections on the Transition to Democracy in Tanzania*. Dar es Salaam: Research and Education for Democracy in Tanzania.

summarised in Table 13 below. CCM canvassed 9.9% of all voters, while Chadema canvassed 11.8%. Given that there were 22,751,292 voters in Tanzania in 2015,[25] this means that CCM canvassed an estimated 2.25 million people, while Chadema canvassed an estimated 2.68 million people. Those numbers only estimate what proportion of voters were canvassed. Respondents reported how many times they had been canvassed. If one calculates the total number of canvass contacts made by CCM and Chadema, it comes to an estimated 5.7 million and 6.4 million respectively. These canvassing efforts pay testament to the scale of the exercise undertaken by these parties' vast party apparatuses.

Table 13: Disaggregated campaign contact[26]

		Proportion	Standard error	Mean	Standard error
CCM	Canvassing	9.9%	1.0%	0.252	0.029
	National campaign rallies	39.1%	1.8%	1.053	0.065
	Local rallies	57.8%	2.0%	3.370	0.160
Chadema	Canvassing	11.8%	1.2%	0.281	0.030
	National campaign rallies	32.7%	2.3%	0.618	0.051
	Local rallies	35.0%	1.7%	1.639	0.97

Table 13 also illustrates that rally attendance dwarfed canvassing. As I described in the previous chapter, respondents were asked whether they at which the most senior speakers were presidential candidates, national leaders, parliamentary candidates, councillor candidates and other local leaders, respectively. See the annex of Chapter 4 for details. In the above table, I fold the summaries of these answers into national campaign rallies, at which the most senior speakers were presidential and national leaders, and local campaign rallies, at which the most senior speakers were parliamentary candidates, councillor

[25] Commonwealth Observer Group. 2015. *Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group. Tanzania General Elections. 25th October 2015*. London. Retrieved (http://thecommonwealth.org/sites/default/files/inline/2015%20Tanzania%20COG%20FINAL%20REPORT_PRINT.PDF).

[26] These figures have been weighted to account for discrepancies in age, gender and region between the survey sample and Tanzania population. National Bureau of Statistics of the United Republic of Tanznaia. 2016. "Online Census Database." Retrieved April 18, 2016 (http://www.nbs.go.tz/nbstz/index.php/english/statistics-by-subject/population-and-housing-census).

candidates and local leaders. CCM's national campaign rallies were attended by an estimated 39.1% of Tanzanians, while Chadema's were attended by an estimated 32.7%. In other words, attendance of national campaign rallies far exceeded canvassing.

The data also reveals that national campaign rallies were not the most important body of campaign rallies. Instead, local rallies towered above national ones. The average respondent reported attending 3.37 CCM local rallies during the last month of the campaign, and 1.64 local Chadema rallies, compared to 1.1 national CCM rallies and 0.6 national Chadema rallies. In other words, rallies in general dwarf the canvass as a means of campaign contact in Tanzania, but local rallies dwarfed national ones. In all of these respects, ground campaigns were energetic and in all respects local. It is in this context that the dynamics of rally attendance and attempts to convene rallies took place.

Tracing audience formation and dispersion

Low rally attendance is a recurrent problem for parliamentary candidates in Tanzania. When asked about the progress of particular candidates' campaigns, it is common to measure failure by poor rally attendance. One interviewee complained that 'not many people come to the public rallies'.[27] Describing a parliamentary candidate's campaign, one ward campaign manager explained, 'unfortunately very few people attended his rally'.[28] Chadema officials describe this as a problem more regularly. One said that 'you will find that in the public rallies, we have CCM supporters and so you find that you don't have many members in the meeting.'[29]

[27] Anonymous. 2015m. *Interview*, Chadema branch chairperson, acting secretary and youth secretary.
[28] Anonymous. 2015e. *Interview*, Chadema ward secretary.
[29] Anonymous. 2015m.

A particularly telling example took place on October 19th 2015 in Kisiri Village, Iramba District, Singida Region, where the Chadema parliamentary candidate, Jesca Kishoa, was holding a rally. Her campaign manager told us that in Kisiri Village there was no local Chadema branch.[30] My field notes from that meeting read that only 27 people turned up, including the candidate and her team.[31] This is a very poor level of attendance for a parliamentary candidate's rally by Tanzanian standards. Based on personal experience, a respectable minimum number of attendees at such an event in a small village is perhaps 150 or 200. The Chadema Iramba District Secretary, speaking of his parliamentary candidate's rallies like this one, explained each resident's rally attendance depends on others' attendance: 'Those meetings won't give a good image because it must be attended by residents, there are no people who will rush to do it first.'[32] The rally in Kisiri Village shows that the fear of poor rally turnout is justified; rallies are sometimes attended by almost no one.

Rally turnout in Tanzania is often so poor because dynamics of crowd non-formation and dissolution described above are at work. Those dynamics could be observed clearly at a Chadema councillor candidate's opening rally in Bwiru, Pasiansi Ward, Mwanza City, where initial turnout deterred further people from attending. Initial turnout had a particularly deleterious effect because of the nature of the meeting place. In one observer's words, 'they were in groups, some standing under trees, some under house sheds, there were no people in the middle.'[33] Nobody was in 'the middle' because of the layout of the venue; it was a playing field, and the stage was positioned so that the audience would have to stand in the field. As a consequence, as a spectator present at the meeting described, 'the setup of the

[30] George Gunda. 2015. *Interview*, Kisiri Village, Iramba District, October 18.
[31] "Rally for Chadema Parliamentary Candidate Rally for Iramba, Jesca Kishoa." *Field Notes*, Kisiri Village, October 19.
[32] Joseph Afayo. 2015. *Interview*, Iramba District, October 16.
[33] Damas Kimenyi. 2016. *Interview*, Mwanza City, June.

venue made people scatter around, so it is not easy to understand who is your audience and who is not.'[34] In short, the initial audience was small, and because it was spread out in clumps, it looked even smaller.

This made the prospect of joining the crowd uninviting. In my field notes, I wrote that 'some people walk by, come to the square, perhaps hearing the music and speeches from the PA and then seem to turn away. Nobody is going to stand in the square.' [35] As one witness described it, 'What you saw was people being scattered because there were few people.'[36] Another spectator recalled that 'when people come to a place and they find few people you will not be comfortable to stay there… That's the reason also for having fewer people [at Bwiru]'.[37] This is why a Chadema organiser concludes that 'the rally didn't go as we had planned… in other places there were many people but in that location the turnout was poor.'[38] The rally in Pasiansi Ward documents just how real the prospect of nobody attending a rally is. It also establishes that low initial rally attendance can deter further people from joining an audience, trapping a rally in a vicious circle of non-attendance. These examples closely resemble the processes of audience non-formation described above. They provide compelling evidence in support of Hypothesis 1.

My notes from another rally offer further support to Hypothesis 2. A rally in Vwawa Consituency, Mbeya Region, details how audience non-formation was confronted and overcome. Chadema parliamentary candidate Fanuel Mkisi arrived at Manyara Village. The party had no local representation in the village and, at the time of his arrival, no crowd had

[34] Anonymous. 2016g. *Interview*, independent spectator.
[35] "Rally for Chadema Councillor Candidate for Pasiansi Ward, Mwanza City." *Field Notes*, Pasiani Ward, Ilemela District, September 22.
[36] Kimenyi.
[37] Anonymous. 2016g.
[38] Anonymous. 2016e. *Interview*, Chadema branch chairperson.

been gathered in advance. Moreover, a market had been set up, which attracted people but distracted them too. My field notes document what happened:

> 'For a few minutes, it seems as if Mkisi wishes to begin the rally immediately. The vehicles are lined up in an open area, and the usual MC [master of ceremonies] is speaking through a gathering of people, imploring them to come closer, but he is for the most part ignored. Nobody comes towards the vehicles and the MC.'

In the absence of a local party, there was no crowd in the village when the candidates arrived, and in the absence of a crowd, it was hard to convene one. Fifteen minutes later:

> 'Two of the senior assistants go to the PA, which is at one end of the main street. They start to play music and dance to it. One has a mic [microphone] and invites others to join them. A dozen or so people, thrilled at the prospect of a loud and powerful PA to dance to, join them. However, after less than five minutes the crowd is not getting bigger and the two senior assistants to the candidate break away and speak to the candidate. They seem to reach a decision that their technique to gather a crowd is not working, because they change tactic. Thus, they start a parade down the main street, through one part of the market, dancing and one person waving a large Chadema flag. This seems to work. They gather a large following, some dancing, some walking. At the end of the street, they stop, and start the rally.'[39]

Mkisi's campaign team members, who he had brought from Vwawa Town, tried to attract a crowd using dance. Dancing to music played by a loud stereo is considered a rare treat by many, especially in remote villages. They then used this crowd in miniature as the base of a parade. By transforming the crowd into a procession, they drew in different people, until it

[39] "Rally for Chadema Parliamentary Candidate for Sengerema Constituency, Hamis Tabasam." *Field Notes,* Manyara Village, Vwawa District.

was large enough to constitute an audience. In this example, it seems as if the Chadema staff twice came across 'gaps in the thresholds' of people standing by, to borrow Granovetter's terms. At this point, it was unclear to me whether others were refusing to join the crowd because it was so small, or because they held the candidate or his party in disdain. However, the growth of the crowd as the parade began demonstrated that those on the edges were more hesitant to be the first to join the crowd, rather than contemptuous of the party. My field notes record how they were able to change the nature of the crowd to make it more attractive and to draw others in. Equally, one can see how after some were drawn in, others followed, and that once enough had joined, the crowd reached critical mass. This illustrates that peoples' initial reluctance was borne at least in part of the crowd's then diminutive size.

While I interviewed no other witnesses that can confirm what field notes testify to, the phenomenon documented above is widely recognised in Tanzania. One party organiser explained that:

> '…in a mass of people there is what we call stimulation [kusisimua]. That if you see a larger crowd you are stimulated to think that what's happening is also big. But if you see about 20 or 40 people you ask yourself, how many people have passed by and didn't see the reason to listen to the rally. So a large crowd stimulates.'[40]

Even bystanders that do not directly engage in politics understand that the size of the audience changes the experience of the participant. As one spectator put it, 'having a large

[40] Kimenyi.

crowd is something very good for both the politicians but also those who come to the political rally…If you are in a large crowd you automatically enjoy the rally.'[41]

Finally, another rally illustrates the potential of clientelism to invert the incentives of rally attendance and create a rush to arrive first at a meeting. At a rally in Kwimba constituency, a large crowd gathered alongside the local CCM party officials under the shade of a cluster of trees. They were waiting for the arrival of the incumbent local MP, Hanif Mansoor. I waited with them for just over an hour, when the sound of music played in the distance heralded the approach of Mansoor's convoy. Most of the crowd rose to their feet and set off towards the music at a run.

The convoy, consisting of four cars and perhaps twenty motorcycles, did not proceed directly to the cluster of trees where the local party was assembled.[42] Instead, it came to rest where it met the crowd that was bearing down upon it. People clustered around the windows to the cars, and there, numerous hats, t-shirts and kitenge were given out, sporting party paraphernalia. There was not enough for all to enjoy, and people clamoured to receive them over their peers. My field notes read: 'He gives out t-shirts and caps... People crowd around the party cadres giving out the clothes. Once somebody gets them, they fight for them.' [43] The convoy then proceeded to the rally, where yet more clothes were produced and distributed. My field notes continue 'Hats are given out. Lots of hats. MC [master of ceremonies] tells people not to crowd around. Once hats are given out, MC guys try to get people to back-off again.'[44]

[41] Anonymous. 2016g.
[42] "Rally for CCM Parliamentary Candidate for Kwimba Constituency Hanif, Mansoor." *Field Notes*, Nyamirana Ward, Iramba District, September 16.
[43] ibid.
[44] ibid.

This instance serves as a clear demonstration of the drawing power of gifts. As the gifts were finite, only the first to appear received them. One might reasonably surmise that this is one of the reasons why the crowd both gathered in advance and why so many people literally ran to be the first to great the candidate's convoy. It illustrates that the dynamics of crowd formation at work in the examples above were at least in part about the costs and benefits of joining the crowd. Once the cost structures were changed, as in this case, so did the dynamic of crowd formation.

These examples offer strong evidence in support of Hypothesis 1, and some further evidence in support of Hypotheses 2 and 3. Together, they provide compelling evidence that the dynamics of audience formation and dispersion which I conceptualised above were at work in Tanzania.

'Amsha, amsha': How local actors mobilise rally attendance, and what parties do without them

Parties, and in particularly parliamentary candidates, go to great lengths to protect themselves from the powerful and often humiliating dynamics of audience formation and dispersion described above. Given the potential draw of petty gifts, one might expect that parties would rely primarily on gift-giving to draw voters to their rallies. However, the practice of giving gifts to members of the audience at rallies, as far as I can tell, is relatively uncommon at rallies in contemporary Tanzania. Of the 42 rallies that I attended during the 2015 campaign, I only witnessed gifts being given to a significant portion of the audience on the occasion in Kwimba which I described above. It is possible that gifts were withheld at the rallies that I attended, precisely because I was attending them. I was often mistaken

for an election observer and, accordingly, acts of clientelism may have been deliberately hidden from me.

Nonetheless, there are also reasons to think that the 41 rallies that I attended at which there was little or no visible gift-giving were representative rather than unrepresentative of typical campaign rallies. There are long-standing norms surrounding morality in public life in Tanzania. These derive at least in part from the ethics of national development, thrift, sacrifice and public good propagated and popularly instilled in Tanzania during the socialist post-colonial era.[45] While electoral clientelism may be commonplace in Tanzania,[46] it is not common in all of its forms. The survey which I described in Chapter 4, offers some insight into this issue. In that survey, respondents were asked four questions about clientelism which all began 'Would you approve if someone…' The endings of those questions and the corresponding answers are presented in Table 14 below. These answers show that personal gifts were widely frowned upon. Weighted averages of 75.8% and 76.9% said that they would strongly disapprove of receiving food or drink, or money at a rally. Therefore, while some MPs may draw crowds with gifts, there are good reasons to believe that many, or even most, do not.

[45] Leander Schneider. 2004. "Freedom and Unfreedom in Rural Development: Julius Nyerere, Ujamaa Vijijini, and Villagization." *Canadian Journal of African Studies/Revue Canadienne Des Études Africaines* 38(2):344–92.
[46] Kevin Croke. 2017. "Tools of Single Party Hegemony in Tanzania: Evidence from Surveys and Survey Experiments." *Democratization* 24(2):189–208.

Table 14: Approve of four sorts of clientelism in Tanzania

	Approve a lot	Approve a little	Neither approve nor disapprove	Disapprove a little	Disapprove a lot
Accepted food or drink from a candidate at a rally?	6.9% (0.57%)	4.6% (0.47%)	14.7% (1.0%)	7.1% (0.6%)	75.8% (1.0%)
Accepted money from a candidate at a rally?	6.4% (0.6%)	4.1% (0.4%)	14.2% (1.0%)	6.5% (0.6%)	76.9% (0.9%)
Voted for a candidate because he or she gave the voter a gift?	4.1% (0.4%)	2.5% (0.4%)	11.3% (0.9%)	6.2% (0.5%)	81.0% (0.9%)
Voted for a candidate because he or she concentrated development projects in the voter's neighbourhood?	72.6% (1.0%)	7.2% (0.6%)	17.6% (1.2%)	3.1% (0.4%)	14.0% (0.8%)

(Standard errors in brackets)

Instead of giving out gifts, parties in Tanzania primarily engage local actors to mobilise voters to attend rallies on their behalf. In Tanzania, most of these local actors are local branches or are organised by party branches.[47] In Tanzania, efforts to mobilise voters to attend rallies descends deep into party structures. Specifically, neighbourhood campaigning is delegated from the district level of the party downwards. Branch leaders are particularly important because branches are the repositories of mobilisational capacity and local presence that parties rely upon to organise party efforts to draw people to rallies. Likewise, a CCM ward official made clear that 'we use branch chairmen of respective places to inform members that we shall be having a meeting'.[48] A Chadema official explained that 'I, as a ward publicity secretary, instruct a branch leader... he chairs that meeting, the meeting is opened by branch leader'.[49]

Branch leaders in turn organise various efforts to draw voters to rallies. These efforts are commonly referred to in Swahili as *amsha, amsha* or 'awake, awake'. This term is used to

[47] Paget. "Tanzania: Shrinking Space and Opposition Protest".
[48] Anonymous. 2015c. *Interview*, CCM ward focus group.
[49] Anonymous. 2015f. *Interview*, Chadema branch publicity and ideology secretary and branch elder's wing chairperson.

describe a bundle of mobilisational activities, whether employed to draw people to some non-partisan event, or to a political rally. These kinds of rally mobilisation are commonplace in Tanzania. One Chadema parliamentary campaign manager me that 'door to door campaigns are being spearheaded by the *amsha amsha* group.'[50]

Among the most common methods used by local members to draw people to rallies was an announcement by a local musician. Another CCM ward chairperson described how 'They find someone, not necessarily a party official, who can walk all over the place. He will blow a whistle and announce the meeting. He will go with bike or boda-boda. They will pay him something small to do that'.[51] Chadema employed the same practice. One branch official explained that 'We ask some young man who plays the pipe to call the people.'[52]

Music aside, branch leaders direct members to notify their neighbours, sometimes neighbourhood-by-neighbourhood, but other times street-by-street or even face-to-face. Another CCM ward chairperson explained that 'we mostly give out the information that there are people having a rally [to branch officials], they go and the citizens will have to be assembled.'[53] Often, it is CCM ten-cell leaders or *mabalozi* that mobilise in this way. A CCM campaigner explained that 'It is the branch secretary who asks ten-cell leaders to inform the electorate, the ten-cell leaders will go because they know their neighbourhood leaders.' [54]

These activities are laborious. Dispatching groups of party activists to mobilise rally attendance street-by-street consumes large amounts of party labour that could be put to other purposes. Altogether, these accounts constitute significant evidence in favour of

[50] Gunda.
[51] Anonymous. 2015a. *Interview*, CCM ward chairperson.
[52] Anonymous. 2015f.
[53] Anonymous. 2015n. *Interview*, CCM branch secretary.
[54] Anonymous. 2015c.

Hypothesis 4. It shows that parties' branches and members go to extensive efforts in many areas to mobilise voters to attend rallies. The fact that so many scarce resources are dedicated to this goal attests to its importance. Moreover, all of this evidence shows how party effort shifts from canvassing and other activities towards mobilising rally attendance in rally-intensive ground campaigns.

Equally telling is what parties do in the absence of local actors. These are the subject of Hypotheses 5 and 6. The study of what parties do in the absence of local actors transpires to be study of primarily what opposition parties do. The reason for focussing on the leading opposition party Chadema over the ruling party CCM is empirical, rather than theoretical. Even though Chadema has built a vast party machine, its local presence remains less even than CCM's. Therefore, there is greater variation in Chadema's local presence to observe.

There are two additional reasons that mobilising rally attendance is particularly important for Chadema. Firstly, the potential dangers of conspicuously attending rallies are more acute at opposition parties than for ruling parties. While one might be the centre of attention at a CCM rally, at a Chadema rally, one is likely to attract subsequent punishment by state and ruling party actors.[55] One local activist explained to me that some people 'do not want their political stand to be known because of their business concerns.'[56] Secondly, while giving attendees gifts is uncommon in Tanzania, the balance of evidence suggests that it is more common among CCM candidates.[57] For these empirical reasons, I focus on the spatial dispersion of Chadema's parliamentary candidates' rallies.

[55] Paget. "Tanzania: Shrinking Space and Opposition Protest"; Hoffman and Robinson.
[56] Anonymous. 2015c.
[57] Hazel Gray. 2015. "The Political Economy of Grand Corruption in Tanzania." *African Affairs* 114(456):382–403; Machiko Tsubura. 2014. "Accountability and Clientelism in Dominant Party Politics: The Case of a Constituency Development Fund in Tanzania." University of Sussex; Kristin Phillips. 2010. "Pater

In Kwimba, Chadema's ties to mobilisationally strong local actors varied ward by ward. The Chadema Kwimba District Chairman and parliamentary candidate Babila Shilogela said that he had three 'strongholds': Mhande Ward, Ngudu Ward and Hungumalwa Ward.[58] The following interviews affirmed this opinion. A Chadema official in the district said that 'all our branches are active and they have enough members.'[59] The strength of the party organisation was visible in its canvassing structures. Chadema 'created committees for visiting houses within our ward… committees which we established in each party branch'.[60] Regarding Mhande Ward, a Chadema official said that Chadema had 2,000 members. In her judgement 'we have stronger establishments at the grassroots'.[61] Likewise, the district party secretary confirmed that in Ngudu Town, Chadema is well organised.[62]

However, Chadema was poorly organised in other wards. Its district secretary said that to build the party 'was very hard and they started very slowly'.[63] Chadema had not completed the programme entitled 'Chadema Msingi' in some wards, notably Shilembo and Nyamilamu.[64] 'Chadema Msingi' was a program of door-to-door recruitment that is indicative of the self-confidence and energy of the branch. A CCM official corroborated this assessment of where Chadema is well organised and poorly organised.[65] One Chadema ward chairperson admitted that 'when leaders are doing this [campaigning] there is a disadvantage, others can be lazy, others more robust, the truth is that we are not all equal'.[66]

Rules Best: Political Kinship and Party Politics in Tanzania's Presidential Elections." *PoLAR* 33(1):109–32.
[58] Babila Shilogela. 2015. *Interview*, Kwimba, Kwimba District, September 13.
[59] Anonymous. 2015e.
[60] ibid.
[61] Anonymous. 2015f.
[62] Saidi Abdallah. 2015. *Interview*, Kwimba, Kwimba District, July 24.
[63] ibid.
[64] ibid.
[65] Anonymous. 2015b. *Interview*, CCM official.
[66] Anonymous J. *Anonymised interview*.

In sum, Chadema's links to mobilisationally strong local actors, chiefly its possession of strong local branches, varied from ward to ward in Kwimba.

The level of variation in Chadema local organisation strength changed how Chadema's parliamentary candidate in Kwimba dispersed his rallies. The evidence suggests that Shilogela concentrated his rallies in those three strongholds identified above, while avoiding other wards where he was organisationally weak. Chiefly, the candidate himself said that he did so.[67] Of Ngudu Town in particular, he said 'this one [Ngudu Town] I have done it to the maximum.'[68] Chadema officials confirmed that in Mhande Ward, 'we have conducted campaign meetings in all villages… We went with him [the candidate Babila Shilogela] everywhere'.[69] Nevertheless, in the same interviews those officials said that their candidate 'has not finished with Mhande Ward'.[70] The district party secretary corroborated this characterisation of where rallies were held.[71]

In sum, Shilogela concentrated his rallies in areas where he had mobilisationally strong local actors, and avoided areas where he had mobilisationally weak ones. In isolation, Shilogela's tactics might be interpreted as a sign of a strategy of mobilising the base. However, it is also consistent with the account that I advanced above and expressed in Hypothesis 5. Together with the other evidence presented in this chapter, this constitutes a further sign that ties to local actors raise rally attendance.

A corollary of the theory propounded above, which is expressed in Hypothesis 6, is that whenever candidates go to areas where they lack the support of local actors, they ought to

[67] Shilogela.
[68] ibid.
[69] Anonymous. 2015f.
[70] ibid.
[71] Abdallah.

seek other ways to cope with the absence of local actors. There is ample evidence that candidates do just this in Tanzania. One such method that candidates often use is convening their meetings in bars or marketplaces. Chadema's parliamentary candidate for Iramba constituency, Jesca Kishoa, went to a market in Mulganda Ward.[72] My notes read that 'nothing is prepared. They are gate-crashing the market.'[73] Another such candidate was Fanuel Mkisi, the candidate for Vwawa constituency, Mbeya Region. He explained that 'The only issue is to find a place where people will gather easily.' My field notes of one such Mkisi rally read 'this is an area where Chadema is neither well organised nor popular. The meeting is held at a local brewery and eatery, where people naturally congregate. 136 people present.'[74] These candidates, in the knowledge that they could not turn to branch structures to gather audiences themselves, went to areas where audiences were ready-made. Mkisi explained to me that 'we try to go to a centre where we think we can find people, where people can drink alcohol… Normally it's where rural people can be found.'[75] Further interviews revealed that many parliamentary candidates had employed strategies like this, especially in the opposition and especially when they lacked local party support. Chadema Central Committee member Tundu Lissu described how in 2008 'I went to places where there were people. I went to drinking places. I went to marketplaces.'[76]

When candidates go campaigning in areas without local actors and without any of the alternatives described above at their disposal, they do not convene rallies. They are more likely to avoid the embarrassment of poorly attended rallies by engaging in other campaigning activities. This is what bears out in Iramba West Constituency in Singida

[72] "Rally" *Field notes,* Kisiri Village; "Rally for Chadema Parliamentary Candidate for Iramba, Jesca Kishoa." *Field Notes*, Mulanga Ward, Iramba District, October 21.
[73] ibid.
[74] "Rally for Chadema's Parliamentary Candidate for Vwawa Constituency, Fanuel Mkisi." *Field Notes*, Ibembwa Village, Msia Ward, Vwawa District, September 25.
[75] Fanuel Mkisi. 2015. *Interview*, Vwawa, Vwawa District, September 25.
[76] Tundu Lissu. 2015a. *Interview*, Dodoma, June 13.

Region, where Jesca Kishoa, who was mentioned above, was Chadema's candidate. In one such meeting in Kisana Village, Kishoa visited an outside drinking place, where the field notes record that 'perhaps a hundred people are present in the square around the local brewery in total. They are quite spread out and scattered.'[77] There are signs that the candidate and her team hoped to use the natural congregation to assemble a rally audience. After they arrived, they waited by the car, playing music from loud-speakers. Just five people showed interest by breaking away from the crowd and no more followed, in part because, as Kishoa's campaign manager told us, there is no Chadema branch in this village to greet them. After almost ten minutes, Jesca Kishoa and her team decided to walk among the people there instead. The field notes describe that she and her team 'go and they speak to everyone in sight at the *kilabu cha pombe* (local brewery). She speaks to small groups for less than a minute or just over a minute … They are a little interested, but not very interested to see her.'[78] Two days later, Kishoa and her team came across a similar event that they were unaware of, a regular market. Once again, they stopped at the market, and got out to greet people, speaking to individuals that they did not know for a minute, two at most.

These events were not accidents or atypical, but part of the candidate's strategy in light of her party's weak structures. The district secretary explained that 'when she is at a ward most of the times that is a politically weak ward, the preparations are not as pompous, basically you cannot campaign properly.'[79] Not only did the lack of party organisation impede her; so did the absence of a strong personal team to compensate for it. My field notes from the Kisana Village rally state that 'They only have one car. They don't have enough people to create their own crowd. The five people in the car may lack the skill to

[77] "Rally for Chadema Parliamentary Candidate for Iramba, Jesca Kishoa." *Field Notes*, Kisana Ward, Iramba District, October 18.
[78] ibid.
[79] Afayo.

create an instant "event", something exciting, party-like to go see.'[80] In those circumstances, Chadema leaders reasoned that the best thing that they could do was to show their presence. 'So she concentrates on door-to-door campaign and street-to-street by going round the street or ward-by-ward making announcements in the areas where we don't receive more support rather than the areas where we have firm support.'[81]

The primary intention of these visits was not to use the candidate to contact individuals, but to orchestrate a 'walk-about' that broadcasts her presence while avoiding the shame of a rally that nobody attends. 'Her car has the public address system, so when we say street-to-street, she goes from street after street, announcing.[82] As her campaign manager put it, 'a place without a clear leadership structure requires the door-to-door approach'.[83] In Kwimba, the Chadema candidate coped with an uneven spread of strong local actors by concentrating his rallies where he was strongest. In Iramba West, the Chadema candidate responded creatively to the challenge of uneven local presence. She persisted in visiting rural areas, but avoided convening rallies there because when she did nobody gathered round. Instead, she made her presence known by making a show of walking around and meeting people. In these examples, local actors are noticeable by their absence. When candidates could rely on local actors, they behaved differently. Some, such as Shilogela, avoided areas where they lack local party infrastructure. Others, such as Kishoa and Mkisi, tried to compensate for the absence of local support by improvising crowds at markets and bars.

[80] "Rally for Chadema Parliamentary Candidate for Iramba, Jesca Kishoa." *Field Notes*, Kisana Ward.
[81] Afayo.
[82] ibid.
[83] Gunda.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have marshalled evidence in support of the case that as parties gain ties to mobilisationally strong local actors, rally attendance rises. I have shown that local actors exert enormous efforts to mobilise voters on candidates' behalf. Furthermore, I have shown that numerous actors in Tanzania do this with the explicit intention of mobilising rally attendance. The way in which candidates behave when they find themselves without local actors to draw upon offers more compelling evidence still. In Kwimba constituency, the opposition candidate acted, in effect, as though his choice of rally location was constrained: avoiding them in areas where he was weak and concentrating them in areas where he was strong. In Vwawa and Iramba, candidates who could not depend on local actors responded imaginatively; they correctly inferred that they could find places where people naturally congregated, like bars and markets, and they convened meetings there. Lastly, when candidates persisted in going to meetings where they could not rely on local actors, such as Jesca Kishoa in Iramba, they did not hold rallies at all. These examples are particularly telling, because in each case, there were few plausible alternative explanations about why candidates would do these things, if not because they lacked support from local actors, and local actors helped them to draw crowds. They were all innovative responses to acute campaigning challenges.

The effect of parties' ties to local actors on rally attendance is particularly large in scale, because they interrupt processes of audience dispersion and tap into processes of audience formation. The evidence presented in the third section is illustrative of how audience formation can be impeded by issues as simple as the size of the field where they meet. Equally, the effect of something so small as forming a parade can help a crowd reach

critical mass, and in some sense gain sufficient momentum. These processes amplify the effects of local actors' efforts to mobilise rally attendance. A party that mobilises thirty voters in advance might ensure that many more attend by ensuring that the audience is large enough to seem inviting.

However, I also show that party actors, and in particular candidates running for office, go to great efforts to mobilise rally attendance. Parties' local actors are called upon to get voters to rallies, often on a street-by-street basis. Candidates themselves also deploy vast resources to mobilise voters to attend rallies, but they also design rally schedules, including times and places, to maximise turn out. In these respects, this chapter documents one way in which campaign activity changes in rally-intensive campaigns. Rather than channelling resources into maximising how many voters are canvassed – as they do in many ground campaigns - in rally-intensive campaigns parties channel resources to draw voters to rallies.

This persistent importance of the local actor is a theme which recurs in the next chapter, where I examine the challenges of targeting campaign contact in rally-intensive campaigns. I find that no matter how rallies help parties to maximise campaign contact, they do not help them to target it. In fact, I show that rallies are blunt tools of campaign contact targeting at best. Indeed, local actors become all the more important to target campaign contact.

Chapter 6. 'Follow them to their houses': Canvass targeting and rallies

In Chapter 5, I argued that the more rally-intensive the campaign, the further that local actors' campaign efforts shift from canvassing to mobilising rally attendance. In this chapter I address a more fundamental question: in a rally-intensive campaign, when the mass rally provides a superior means to multiply campaign contact, why do political parties continue to canvass at all? One of the most important answers to this question is, in a word, targeting. Targeting is crucial to electioneering; in the words of Paul Herrnson, it is 'the foundation of virtually every aspect of campaign strategy'.[1] It is not readily apparent that political parties in sub-Saharan Africa always target who they canvass. Correctly discerning between voters and accurately directing canvassers on a national scale is a great feat of electioneering. Many accounts of political parties in sub-Saharan Africa characterise them as bureaucratically deficient,[2] organisationally weak[3] and without consistent local presence.[4] Some parties, they suggest, are unable to perform even the most basic organisational functions. Targeting involves collecting information about individual voters, analysing it, and choosing who to target based on it. Just a few studies offer any substantial evidence that African parties are able to do this.[5]

In this chapter I show that parties in Tanzania target who they canvass. In the comparative literature, and increasingly, in the Africanist literature, studies of targeting which I detail below focus on whether parties concentrate on reaching swing voters or supporters. The definitive feature of a party's campaign strategy, these studies claim, is whether it seeks to

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[1] Herrnson: 198.
[2] Erdmann.
[3] Giovanni Carbone. 2007. "Political Parties and Party Systems in Africa: Themes and Research Perspectives." *World Political Science Review* 3(3):57–86.
[4] Randall and Svåsand.
[5] Horowitz; Cheeseman, Lynch and Willis. "Ghana: Ebbing Power of Incumbency".

shore-up and mobilise its "base" or go on the offensive and persuade undecideds. I suggest that in a rally-intensive campaign, whichever group or groups of voters a party resolves to target, the mass meeting complicates these logics of canvass targeting. Rallies complicate canvassing because parties exercise little control over who attends their rallies, but are free to select who they canvass. Rallies put proverbial kinks in targeting strategies, and parties use canvassing to compensate for them.

However, the way in which each party alters its canvassing strategy in light of patterns of rally attendance depends on that party's location in government or opposition. I argue that dominant parties reason that once somebody has attended a party's rally, they have in some way been 'contacted'. Dominant parties canvass voters who have *not* attended rallies. This amounts to a strategy of spreading campaign contact across the domain of target voters, filling in the gaps left by rally attendance. This does not mean that parties' overall strategies of campaign *contact* targeting change in the rally-intensive campaign; it simply means that their strategies of *canvass* targeting change.

Opposition party canvassing strategy is shaped by ruling party dominance in aggregate rally attendance. In the case of Tanzania, I show that not only does the dominant party address more swing voters at its rallies in aggregate than opposition parties do; incredibly, it addresses more opposition supporters than opposition parties do. These inequalities in rally attendance make campaign contact an asymmetric game. The disadvantage that opposition parties face in rally-intensive campaigns drives them to adopt defensive targeting strategies; they focus on canvassing their own supporters.

These patterns of targeting constitute changing roles for the canvass in the rally-intensive campaign. Dwarfed by the rally, the canvass ceases to be useful as a means to *multiply*

campaign contact. However, as there are few ways to control who attends rallies, the canvass remains important, or indeed becomes more important, as a means to *target* campaign contact. Therefore, by these means, I suggest that local actors take on an auxiliary but ultimately crucial role in rally-intensive campaigns.

Targeting the canvass

It is accepted as a general truth in the campaign literature that targeting is a crucial aspect of election campaigning.[6] Accordingly, extensive academic attention has been given to who parties target. In studies of canvass targeting in the United States, the central question that was asked was whether parties targeted swing voters or supporters. This is true of both studies in the post-war period[7] and much more recent studies.[8] The division of campaign contact between partisan groups was subsequently echoed in a parallel literature about the study of clientelism in economically advanced countries. Some argued that private goods are channelled to core supporters, most famously Gary Cox and Mathew McCubbins,[9] and others argued that they were channelled to swing voters, most notably Assar Lindbeck and Jorgen Weibull.[10] That debate resurfaced again in a comparative study of clientelism in low-income countries. Once again, some, such as Susan Stokes argued that parties gave gifts to swing voters;[11] others, such as Simeon Nichter, argued that they gave gifts to their supporters.[12] Jordan Gans-Morse, Sebastián Mazzuca and Simeon Nichter adjudicated

[6] John Sides and others.
[7] Price and Lupfer; Peter Wielhouwer and Brad Lockerbie. 1994. "Party Contacting and Political Participation, 1952-90." *American Journal of Political Science* 38(1):211–29.
[8] Herrnson.
[9] Gary Cox and Mathew McCubbins. 1986. "Electoral Politics as a Redistributive Game." *The Journal of Politics* 48(2):370-89.
[10] Assar Lindbeck and Jorgen Weibull. 1987. "Balanced-Budget Redistribution as the Outcome of Political Competition." *Public Choice* 52(3):273–97.
[11] Susan Stokes. 2005. "Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina." *The American Political Science Review* 99(3):315–25.
[12] Simeon Nichter. 2008. "Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot." *American Political Science Review* 102(1):19–31.

between these competing claims by setting out a theoretical case about how a rational clientelist ruling party should target vote-buying of voters across their partisanship and turnout intentions. They contended that such a party should give gifts to the swing voters that are the most ambivalent about their vote choice, to supporters that are ambivalent about turning out, to a small number of swing voters that need to be double-bought to turn out and swing, and a small number of rival party supporters whose abstention can be bought.[13]

Most recently, this debate has re-emerged in the Africanist literature. Jeremy Horowitz argues that parties have many campaign resources which are immobile and concentrated in their strongholds. This drives parties to concentrate mobile campaign resource which can be deployed at the party's discretion, notably presidential candidates' rallies, in swing areas. Macha Rauschenbach argues that African societies mirror their earlier Western counterparts in one crucial respect; they have socially segmented populations which are captured by particular parties. Consequently, parties ought to, and do, concentrate campaign contact on their supporters.[14] In short, the question 'supporter or swing voter?' has been asked almost *ad nauseam*. The debate about partisan-independent targeting can be found in distinct iterations across a series of literatures. Evidently, numerous circumstances affect whether parties elect to concentrate on their base or on the 'undecideds' or the 'persuadables'.[15] Indeed, some studies argue that parties ought to, or do, concentrate on both.[16]

[13] Jordan Nichter, Sebastián Mazzuca, and Simeon Nichter. 2013. "Varieties of Clientelism: Machine Politics during Elections." *American Journal of Political Science* 58(2):415–32.
[14] Horowitz; Rauschenbach.
[15] Mayer.
[16] John Sides and others; Gans-Morse, Mazzuca and Nichter.

I contend that canvass targeting strategy is complicated in rally-intensive campaigns. One plausible mechanism by which the preponderance of rallies might alter canvass targeting is that canvassing and rally attendance have different effects. If canvassing had greater effects than rally attendance on mobilising turnout, or rally attendance had greater effects than canvassing on voters' opinions of parties, then parties might alter canvass targeting accordingly. However, in Chapter 4, I studied the effects of rally attendance and canvassing alike. While my results were uneven, I did not conclusively demonstrate that there was a 'natural division of labour' between canvassing and rallies, with one being better suited to mobilisation and another better-suited to persuasion.

Instead, I argue that canvassing strategies change in rally-intensive campaigns because parties exercise little control over precisely which voters attend their rallies, and indeed which voters attend other parties' rallies. No matter what efforts parties make to affect rally attendance, ultimately it is a matter of personal volition. Rally attendance is affected by the plethora of contextual and individual factors identified in Chapter 3. Consequently, while parties can draw some of their designated 'target voters' to attend their rallies, almost inevitably they cannot draw others. This creates a quandary for political parties. While rallies enable parties to multiply the total number of campaign contacts, they do not help them to target it.

The way in which parties respond to patterns of rally attendance depends on parties' locations in the party system. Dominance is widely regarded as a definitive feature of a party, and accordingly, the dominant party is a recognised category of party that ought to affect their behaviour.[17] Fewer academics acknowledge that if location in government is an

[17] Mattijs Bogaards and Françoise Boucek. 2010. *Dominant Political Parties and Democracy: Concepts, Measures, Cases and Comparisons*. London: Routledge; Renske Dorenspleet and Lia Nijzink. 2013. *One-Party Dominance in African Democracies*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

important feature of a party in a dominant party system, so too is location in opposition.[18] Below, I outline one set of dynamics that affect canvass targeting by dominant parties. After that, I outline an alternative dynamic that alters canvass targeting by opposition parties.

I argue that dominant parties rely on the canvass to make-up for the bluntness of the rally as a targeting tool. A dominant party that wishes to *contact* some group of voters, be they swing voters, supporters, or both, need not *canvass* them all. If some portion of a party's target voters attend its rallies, those target voters have already been contacted. Instead, such a party spreads its total contacts across the population of target voters by canvassing the very target voters that have not attended its rallies. In this respect, the rally and the canvass are substitutable forms of campaign contact; each is counted as a roughly equivalent moment of party-voter contact. In effect, rally attendance 'displaces' canvassing, moving it from some target voters to others. This is the primary dynamic which guides dominant party canvass targeting.

However, this strategy of target canvassing to spread campaign contact is bounded and under some circumstances overridden by another consideration. While parties try to evenly distribute campaign contact across the population of target voters, parties also rely on local actors to mobilise voters to attend rallies on their behalves, as I discussed in the previous chapter. This mobilisation involves a variety of methods, the most common of which are dispatching callers and musicians to announce the rally and producing the rally itself in a number of ways. However, another method is the canvass. Insofar as a party employs canvassing as a means of mobilising rally attendance, the canvass is subordinated to the

[18] Lise Rakner and Lars Svâsand. 2004. "From Dominant to Competitive Party System: The Zambian Experience 1991-2001." *Party Politics* 10(1):49–68.

rally, and the association between the two should be positive rather than negative; parties should canvass the voters that go on to attend their rallies, rather than those that do not.

In the abstract, it is ambiguous which of these two logics will prevail: will dominant parties' desire to spread campaign contact creative a negative association between the canvass and the rally, or will the subservience of the canvass to rally attendance mobilisation draw the two together? My argument is that the prominence of each of these dynamics depends upon the seniority of the candidate on whose behalf the rally is organised. Is a convenor of the rally running for the position of ward councillor (junior); Member of Parliament (mid-level); or President? This is not always a simple matter, as junior candidates often attend senior candidates' rallies. Councillor candidates often attend rallies organised on behalf of a parliamentary candidates, for example. However, senior candidates define the rally, because they affect who is likely to come and how the rally is organised, in ways which I explain below.

The seniority of candidates in attendance affects rallies relationship to canvassing, as follows. The more junior the candidate, the smaller their rallies will be and the more feasible it will be to mobilise rally attendance face-to-face. Equally, the candidate will have fewer alternative methods for mobilising rally attendance. Therefore, attendance of a dominant party's councillor candidates' rallies will be positively associated with canvassing. This is expressed in Hypothesis 1 below. Concordantly, the more senior the candidate, the more that attendance of her rallies and canvassing will be treated as substitutes. Accordingly, the more senior the candidate, the more negatively dominant party parliamentary candidates' rally attendance and canvassing will be associated. This is expressed in Hypothesis 2 below.

However, the national leadership is so far removed from canvassers that they exercise little oversight or control over canvassing priorities. Accordingly, canvassers are less likely to heed whether voters have attended rallies convened by their party's presidential candidates or other national leaders. Equally, their rallies are so large that, in contrast to small rallies by more junior candidates, it becomes almost impossible to identify who has attended and who has not. For both of these reasons, the most likely state of affairs is that there is no observable relationship between presidential and other national leaders' rallies and canvassing. This is expressed in Hypothesis 3. Together, these hypotheses draw out a complex set of relationships between canvassing and rallies. The most junior candidates direct canvassers to support their rallies by bringing voters to them. Parliamentary candidates direct canvassers to make-up for the gaps in attendance of their rallies by canvassing non-attendees, and canvassers simply take little notice of who attends national rallies.

Hypothesis 1. The more dominant party councillor candidates' rallies that a voter attends, the *more* likely it is that the dominant party also canvasses her.

Hypothesis 2. The more dominant party parliamentary candidates' rallies that a voter attends, the *less* likely it is that the dominant party canvasses her.

Hypothesis 3. There is no relationship between the number of dominant party national rallies that a voter attends and the probability that the dominant party canvasses her.

Opposition parties' strategies of canvass targeting follow different logics in rally-intensive campaigns. Patterns of rally attendance do not directly affect who opposition parties

canvass. However, they indirectly affect their calculus about whether to canvass swing voters or supporters. A sub-literature on political communication examines how the effects of political communication by one party are mediated by political communication from another. In this line of enquiry, Dennis Chong and James Druckman use laboratory experiments to show that prior political communication inoculates some voters to subsequent political messages from another party. For other voters, prior and subsequent political communication neutralise one another.[19] Similar outcomes about countervailing campaign messages have been documented at the macro-level in the United States, where the electoral effect of one party's campaign has been neutralised by another's.[20] The first step to understanding why opposition parties' canvassing strategy differs is to understand that one party's contact with a voter limits the effect of another party's communication with that same voter.

Explanations of target canvassing invariably appeal to parties' desire to maximise the effect of each party-voter contact on party vote-share; they choose who they canvass in order to win as many votes as possible. Parties canvass swing voters and their supporters in particular on the assumption that they are the easiest voters to convince to turn out or 'swing' their vote; they offer the highest rate of conversion of canvass to vote. However, if one party contacts a voter, this reduces the expected change in behaviour that another party might cause by canvassing them. Therefore, political parties should choose which voters to target for campaign canvassing not just by considering the characteristics of voters, but also by considering the campaign contact strategies of rival parties. In other

[19] Chong and Druckman.
[20] Adam Simon. 2002. *The Winning Message: Campaign Behavior, Campaign Discourse, and Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

words, parties should choose who to contact in the campaign after anticipating which voters other parties will contact too.[21]

In a non-dominant party system, treating campaign contact strategies interactively means analysing political parties in a largely symmetric game, in which opponents contact similar numbers of voters. In contrast, in a rally-intensive campaign, a dominant party contacts significantly more voters than opposition parties do. More voters attend dominant parties' rallies. Moreover, as I discussed in the last chapter, rally attendance is not only partisan. People attend rallies for entertainment and in response to patterns of crowd formation and dissolution. Consequently, dominant parties in particular find not only their supporters at their rallies, but swing voters and on occasion, supporters of other parties too.

What follows is that dominant parties are more likely to contact swing voters at their rallies than opposition parties. This makes campaign contact in dominant party systems with rally-intensive campaigns an asymmetric game. This dominant party advantage in campaign contact discourages opposition parties from canvassing swing voters; any contact with swing voters it makes will be likely to have a reduced probable effect, because that voter is likely to have attended a dominant party rally. It also encourages opposition parties to canvass their supporters to ensure that they are not being lost to the dominant party as they attend its rallies. Therefore, by shaping the asymmetry in campaign contact between parties, rallies indirectly alter opposition parties' canvass targeting. This is expressed in Hypothesis 4. Critically, rallies loom large in each of the strategies outlined above. The dominant party strategy involves canvassing target voters that do not attend rallies. The opposition party strategy involves canvassing supporters in response to differential rates of party rally

[21] Iyengar and Simon.

attendance by swing voters and opposition supporters. Both of these strategies are shaped by preponderance of the rally, and the rally-intensiveness of the campaign overall.

Hypothesis 4. The more a voter supports an opposition party, the more likely that party is to canvass her.

However, there are competing conceptions of support for a party. One conception is of a voter's closeness to a party, their affective tie to it.[22] However, another aspect of support for a party is a voter's opinion of that party. In the analysis below, I present one model which includes respondents' closeness to parties, and another which includes respondents' opinions of parties, for transparency's sake.

Having set out the above argument, I now proceed to present evidence to demonstrate that the argument is supported by the case of Tanzania. First, I present a series of qualitative evidence that supports each of the arguments which I have presented above. Second, I present an analysis of the two-round panel survey data, the dataset which I introduced in Chapter 4.

In the statistical analysis of CCM and Chadema that follows, I control for a number of theoretically relevant variables. These include variables which make voters more or less persuadable, and therefore affect how likely parties are to canvass them. This includes age, education, interest in politics, and mass media news consumption. I control for a series of further variables that may affect how accessible voters are to canvassers, including their wealth, their formal employment, their residence in a rural area, and their gender. I control for variables that make people more or less desirable for parties to canvass, notably

[22] Campbell and others; Bartels.

whether they support a party, are swing voters, approve in principle of politicians giving voters gifts, whether they are likely to turn out to vote, and whether they have been canvassed by another party. I further control for a series of Tanzanian-specific variables. I control for whether people attend any *vijiwe*, a Tanzanian social institution of at least nominally public community coffee or discussion groups. On the suggestion from interviewees that abstaining voters are identified at such discussion groups,[23] I include an interaction between attendance of discussion groups and turnout intention. Excluding this interaction does not affect the findings of the analysis presented here. This is shown in Model 9 in Table 19. Finally, I include several district-level control variables, to ensure that I control for varying party strength and popularity across space. To that end, I control for district-level mean secondary education, district-level mean radio ownership, the partisanship of the incumbent MP by district, the party's parliamentary candidate's margin of victory or defeat in the prior election, and their margin of victory or defeat in the 2015 election.

Party strategy and organisation in Tanzania

Tanzanian parties do not employ large databases to micro-target campaign contact, as parties do in Western democracies.[24] Instead, they rely on their local party actors' street knowledge to guide their canvassing. Local party actors are socially embedded. They typically know a large portion of local residents, and they use these ties to learn both their partisan identities and where they live. A ward level official put it like this: 'selecting a person from the locality is advantageous because as they know the residents, they would

[23] A CCM ward secretary told me that 'through a vijiwe [a street corner discussion group] you can identify them… I know because I know the people.'
Anonymous. 2015h. *Interview*, CCM ward secretary.
[24] Sides and others.

know who belongs to their party and who doesn't.'[25] Similarly, a street leader explained that 'in the branches such as this we know each other.'[26] When somebody's party loyalties are unknown, it is also possible for a local party agent to discern them.

While local party actors learn about voters, it is rare for them to know all local residents or even a majority of them. However, party members improve their targeting as they canvass. One CCM ward secretary explained that 'when a party agent reaches a household he may not be received well or when he calls for a meeting, some people may not attend. From that he will know who the party supporters are and who they are not.'[27] In fact, a face-to-face conversation often makes apparent voters' partisanship and rally attendance. 'As you talk you can tell a person's political stance. You detect if the person is respectful or shows discipline**.'**[28] In Tanzania, local party organs use initial campaign contact to identify target voters for canvassing. In the words of a CCM canvasser 'we find out about them through the door to door approach.'[29]

A local CCM official affirmed that once they identify someone as a target voter on the doorstep, it is routine to contact that person as many as three more times.[30] Another ward-level official explained that not only the number but the length of visits vary. CCM officials in particular said that once a target voter has been identified after being canvassed 'you must ensure that you go back to them time after time and talk to them in a friendly way.'[31] In short, 'it is important to visit them more.'[32] Party members 'follow up and try to convert

[25] Anonymous. 2015p. *Interview*, Chadema branch chairperson, acting secretary, youth secretary and two party members.
[26] Anonymous. 2015i. *Interview*, Chadema street leader.
[27] Anonymous. 2016b. *Interview*, CCM branch chairperson.
[28] Anonymous. 2016c. *Interview*, CCM branch chairperson.
[29] Anonymous. 2016b
[30] Anonymous. 2016c.
[31] Anonymous. 2016h. *Interview*, CCM branch chairperson.
[32] Anonymous. 2016b.

someone they have found out is not from their party.'[33] What is most important for this chapter is the sequence in the method. First, a canvasser contacts a voter, based on her best estimation of whether he or she is a target voter. The canvasser learns more about the voter's partisanship and voting intention as she contacts them. Then she decides whether to contact them again based on this improved information.

Regarding the hypotheses and particular types of rallies, there are reasons to believe that CCM's councillor candidates in particular canvass voters to draw them to their rallies. Therefore, as expressed in Hypothesis 1, canvassing and dominant party councillor candidates' rally attendance may be positively associated. Councillor candidates' meetings are the smallest in Tanzania. The average ward had just under 6,600 registered voters in 2015.[34] Based on my personal observations and extensive interviews, the typical councillor's rally is attended by perhaps 50, 100 or 200 people. Councillor candidates also have the shallowest pockets to pay for expensive entertainment to attract attendees. However, councillor candidates are in closest organisational proximity to canvassers. Indeed, incumbent councillors or councillor candidates led four of the five canvassing rounds that I accompanied in Tanzania.[35] Accordingly, councillor candidates direct canvassers to mobilise attendance of their rallies, and sometimes persuade voters to attend their rallies themselves. One councillor candidate's campaign manager relayed to me that 'we also had to visit people in *nyumba-kwa-nyumba* [door-to-door] campaign and distribute brochures and invite them in our rallies.'[36] Therefore, canvassing and councillor candidates' rally attendance are likely to be positively associated, in accordance with Hypothesis 1.

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[33] Anonymous. 2015m.
[34] Tanzania has 3,643 wards after the 2012 administrative changes and a register of 22,751,292 voters for the 2015 elections. Commonwealth Observer Group.
[35] "Canvassing Round with Chadema." *Field Notes*, Nyasaka Ward, Ilemela District, September 8; "Canvassing Round with Chadema." *Field Notes*, Vwawa Town, Vwawa District, September 27; "Canvassing Round with Chadema Advance Team before Benson Kigaila's Rally." *Field Notes*, Dodoma District, October 10; "Canvassing Round with Chadema." *Field Notes*, Dodoma Town, October 9.
[36] Anonymous. 2017j. *Interview*, Chadema ward campaign manager.

Parliamentary candidates' rallies, by contrast, are larger. Typically, parliamentary candidates can hope to draw an audience of between 300 and 600 people, more in urban areas. They also conduct more rallies. Their constituencies contain on average just over 86,000 registered voters. Accordingly, to mobilise a large portion of their audience, door-to-door and one-by-one, parliamentary candidates would need to employ several times more canvassers than councillor candidates would. However, parliamentary candidates typically have more resources to expend on expensive draws to raise rally attendance. Therefore, efforts by local actors play a smaller role in the mobilisation of voters to attend parliamentary candidates' rallies, and a smaller proportion of those local efforts involve door-to-door canvassing. Instead, dedicate more of their resources to other means of mobilising rally attendance, some of which I described in the previous chapter.

Nonetheless, parliamentary candidates are closely connected to local canvassing efforts. While parliamentary candidates rarely directly supervise or lead canvassers themselves, they are typically just one or two degrees removed from canvassing teams. These short chains of command keep parliamentary candidates' priorities foremost in canvassing strategy. One CCM MP explained to me that 'Where your own campaign team finds that this party team is not doing well, they just go there and just polish, polish where things are not moving well.'[37] Therefore, CCM is more likely to canvass voters that do not attend its parliamentary candidates' rallies, as expressed in Hypothesis 2.

Further support for Hypothesis 2 can be found in the explanations given by politicians themselves. Party campaigners are quite aware that 'many people will not attend the public

[37] ibid.

rallies'.[38] Equally, politicians agree that the way to address this challenge is to canvass those that stay away. One parliamentary candidate in Morogoro Region said 'some people come to our rallies, and some people they stay at home, so then you hold [very small] meetings to speak to those other people'.[39] A ward-level official put it most directly that those that do not attend rallies were those that were canvassed. 'There was a challenge of people coming for rallies, so we had to follow them to their houses.'[40] Another CCM MP who describes precisely this state of affairs is worth quoting at length:

> 'One group [of voters] is the one which when they hear that there is a candidate asking for their vote, they will come to hear … Group number two is the one that will not come. They won't come… This group, you have to find another way to find how to ask them [to vote for you].'[41]

In sum, party officials, especially in CCM, consistently say that they target voters that do not attend parliamentary candidates' rallies, in accordance with Hypothesis 2.

The argument that I advanced above about opposition party canvass targeting rested on a claim about the asymmetry in parties' campaign contact. Specifically, I claimed that swing voters are more likely to attend dominant party rallies than opposition rallies, and that even opposition party supporters were also likely to attend dominant party rallies. This can be demonstrated unambiguously with descriptive statistics from the panel survey which I introduced in Chapter 4, which are summarised in Table 15 below. I explain how these variables are measured in the section entitled 'Measurement and data' below. It shows that swing voters are much more likely to attend CCM rallies than Chadema rallies. Strong

[38] Anonymous. 2015p.
[39] Susan Kiwanga. 2015. *Interview*, Dodoma, June 24.
[40] Anonymous. 2015j. *Interview*, Chadema councillor candidate, ward chairperson and ward secretary.
[41] Alphaxard Lugola. 2015. *Interview*, Dodoma, June 17.

swing voters, by this measure, attended an average of 4.14 CCM rallies, and an average of just 2.12 Chadema rallies. These figures are statistically distinct.

Table 15: Rally attendance and canvassing of swing voters vs. partisans

		Mean CCM rallies attended	Mean Chadema rallies attended
Weak swing voter	Point estimate	**4.42**	**2.09**
	Lower-bound 95% confidence interval	3.39	1.44
	Upper-bound 95% confidence interval	5.44	2.74
Strong swing voter	Point estimate	**4.14**	**2.12**
	Lower-bound 95% confidence interval	3.26	1.51
	Upper-bound 95% confidence interval	5.01	2.73
Strong Chadema supporter	Point estimate	4.77	3.49
	Lower-bound 95% confidence interval	3.58	2.71
	Upper-bound 95% confidence interval	5.95	4.27

Therefore, if Chadema competed for swing voters during the campaign, it would do so at significant disadvantage to CCM, even putting aside who is canvassed. That advantage is compounded by mass media coverage. CCM has control over state media, which it uses to its advantage by granting itself preferential treatment and denying coverage to opposition parties.[42] Those state media biases are buttressed by close relations with the private media, most of which acts in a similar way.[43] Perhaps for this reason, branch and ward-level Chadema officials frequently expressed preoccupations with the struggle of not just winning but retaining swing voters. As one put it, 'those who are undecided are hotcakes, as you leave another campaigner comes… you have to make frequent visits to keep other campaigners at bay.'[44] As another Chadema ward secretary put it, 'we don't struggle so much about them [swing voters] because those are undecided and can be swayed whichever side any time.'[45]

[42] Stefan Reith. 2011. "Tanzania after the Parliamentary and Presidential Elections." *KAS International Reports,* Konrad Adenaeur Stiftung Foundation, Sank Augustin 104–19; European Union Electoral Observation Tanzania Mission. 2015. "Preliminary Statement: Highly Competitive, Generally Well-Organised Elections, but with Insufficient Efforts at Transparency from the Election Administrations."
[43] Jonas Ewald. 2011. "Challenges for the Democratisation Process in Tanzania: Moving Towards Consolidation 50 Years after Independence?" University of Gothenburg.
[44] Anonymous. 2016f. *Interview*, Chadema Youth Wing branch chairperson.
[45] Anonymous. 2016e.

Equally, Chadema cannot be sure of its own supporters. Table 15 shows that, remarkably, strong Chadema supporters attend as many CCM rallies as Chadema ones. This claim might seem little short of ludicrous to one not intimately familiar with Tanzanian politics. However, the culture of rally attendance which was inculcated in the one-party period habituated rally attendance in Tanzania. In particular, it made Tanzanians dutiful attendees of government meetings. 'Government meetings' are a special category of public assembly in Tanzania. As one CCM MP explained, 'The government meeting we can only speak about development. You speak about water. You speak about roads. Schools. You speak about hospitals.'[46] One CCM ward chairman illustrated how far these duties to attend stretch:

> '…when the Member of Parliament comes to conduct a rally, the meeting is a government meeting… So he calls upon everyone a member of the party or not a member of the party is expected to attend the rally so that he can listen to what he has to say before the elections.'[47]

This renders CCM able to draw opposition supporters to many of its meetings. Even putting aside the partisanship of state officials in Tanzania, 186 of the 239 directly elected MPs in the outgoing MPs in the 2015 election were CCM members.

While in my personal experience, dissident attendees often stand apart at CCM rallies, displaying their discontent and remaining sceptical, their very attendance would be cause for Chadema to be concerned. Indeed, despite the normal bravado that opposition figures put on in interviews, Chadema officials expressed concern to me that their supporters might be lost to CCM. In one Chadema ward chairperson's words, 'when it gets to the

[46] Mwanjale Luckson. 2015. *Interview*, Dodoma, June 16.
[47] Anonymous. 2015n.

campaigns the first thing is that you safeguard your votes, the thing is that you must safeguard the votes that you have'. This supports the Hypothesis 4, that Chadema is more likely to canvass its supporters.

If the argument so far were correct, then Chadema would not address swing voters either at the doorstep or from the stump, and so it would be natural to ask how Chadema ever expects to win new supporters. However, the hypotheses below and the survey evidence presented in this chapter are bounded to the time-frame of the campaign. The advantage in campaign contact that CCM enjoys by virtue of its rally attendance is confined to the time-span in which rallies are frequently convened. There is qualitative evidence, especially from semi-structured interviews, that Chadema behaves differently outside the campaign period. Between 2011 and 2014, local party organs were instructed and trained to conduct 'Chadema Msingi' or 'Chadema Foundation', a collection of programmes to expand party membership. Those programmes focussed on recruiting and empowering new members. One district-level campaigner explained that 'in Chadema Msingi we have initiatives such as toja uje [run here], this is aimed at those who ascribe to other parties, we invite them to leave those parties and join us.'[48] When asked 'do you try to get new members when it is not an electioneering period?' one ward secretary replied 'yes, we do get them.'[49] Several others concurred that targeting contact varied between the campaign and the period between election campaigns.[50] In sum, Chadema's targeting strategies in campaign and non-campaign periods differ. Outside the campaign period, when rallies do not disadvantage Chadema, it goes proverbially on the offensive. It seeks to advance the outer boundaries of its support by meeting swing voters. In contrast, during the short election campaign, it goes

[48] ibid.
[49] Anonymous. 2016e.
[50] Anonymous. 2016d. *Interview*, Chadema branch chairperson.

proverbially on the defensive 'to protect what you are sure of',[51] to use one ward official's words.

Measurement and data

In this chapter, I draw on the two-round panel survey, which I introduced in Chapter 4. Please see Chapter 4 for details. In this chapter, I specify multilevel models with no cross-level interactions and no random slopes. They follow this simplified form:

$$y_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_1 + \beta_2 x_2 + u_j + e_{ij}$$

In this equation, y_{ij} is a dependent variable which varies across individuals i and across districts j. This dependent variable is the product of a linear function in which x_1 is an individual variable, x_2 is a district-level variable which is constant across individuals, and u_j and e_{ij} are residual errors specified at district- and individual-levels respectively. These error terms are normally distributed, stochastically random, with a mean of zero and a variance to be estimated.

In Chapter 4, for modelling purposes, individuals were conceptualised as 1,000 instances at each point in time, organised into 1,000 (individual-level) groups, meaning that there were 3,000 observations in total. In this chapter, observations are conceptualised as individuals contacted twice, meaning that there are 1,000 in total. This explains discrepancies in the number of observations between the chapters which a watchful reader may notice.

[51] Anonymous. 2016e.

Independent variables

To generate measures of rally attendance by party and by type of rally, the survey included a bundle of questions which were put to respondents. First, they were asked 'Which political parties have you attended the rallies of recently, if any?' For each party they mentioned, they were then asked five questions. Each began 'How many times did you attend a public rally in the month before election day at which…' and each ended by specifying a separate category of rally. The five categories of rally as they appeared in the survey are profiled below:

> '…[Party X's] presidential candidate addressed the audience?'
>
> '…A national leader of [Party X] such as a member of the Central Committee addressed the audience, but the presidential candidate did not?'
>
> '…[Party X's] local parliamentary candidate addressed the audience, but national leaders did not?'
>
> '…[Party X's] local councillor candidate addressed the audience, but national leaders and parliamentary candidates did not?'
>
> '…None of the above addressed the audience, but other local leaders from Party [X]did?'

Respondents were asked about these rally categories in the order that they are displayed here. A careful reading of these rally categories reveals that respondents were, in effect, being asked whether they attended mutually exclusive categories of rallies, defined by the senior politician or candidate in attendance. The first of these two categories correspond to the national rallies referred to in Hypothesis 3. The third and fourth categories refer directly to the parliamentary and councillor candidates' rallies referred to in Hypotheses 1

and 2. The last question was included to provide a residual category to ensure that no rallies were unintentionally missed.

In practice, it seems likely that rallies which fall into this category most resemble parliamentary candidates' rallies. Most rallies which I learnt about which were convened at the district level or below but which were not addressed by parliamentary or councillor candidates were convened by the figurative lieutenants of the parliamentary candidate. This was common practice among parliamentary candidates with other duties such as government ministers and national leaders who were dispatched to perform other duties for the party elsewhere. Mwigulu Nchemba, who in 2015 was CCM's Deputy Secretary General, was a case in point. The CCM secretary for Iramba, Nchemba's own district, explained to me that the candidate was away from his constituency for large portions of the campaign. The district office arranged meetings in his absence.[52] Another example is Ikungi District, where Tundu Lissu was the incumbent MP in 2015. One of his district team explained that she and two others convened parallel sets of rallies on Lissu's behalf. As she described it 'Currently, my role in this campaign is to lead a convoy that has been organised for me.' [53] She was clear that these rallies were intended to complement and even compensate for the absence of the MP himself, who was often away addressing rallies alongside Chadema's presidential candidate during the campaign. She went on 'According to our system, even if Tundu is not around we continue with the rallies.'[54] These five categories, then, closely resemble the three types of rallies identified in Hypotheses 1 to 3.

As I described above, support for parties, and most pertinently support for Chadema, can be conceptualised in two ways. I generate one measure for each in this chapter and test

[52] Matthias Shitagisa. 2015. *Interview*, Iramba District, October.
[53] Anonymous. 2015l. *Interview*, Chadema district campaign team.
[54] ibid.

them each in turn. The conventional conception of support for a party as closeness to a party, an affective bond, is based on two survey questions. The first of these questions reads 'Which political party do you feel closest to, if any?' and the second reads 'How much do you support that party? Would you say completely, a lot, somewhat or a little?' I combined the answers to these questions to generate a five-point scale of closeness to a party. This measure was also employed in the analysis in Chapter 4. To construct a measure of respondents' opinion of parties, I turn to answers to another set of six questions from the survey. These questions are of the form 'How much do you trust [party name] to handle each of the following issues? Completely, a lot, somewhat, a little or not at all?' The six issues were those that were identified as the most important in the Fifth Round of the Afrobarometer: the economy; education; water supply; health; corruption; and roads and infrastructure. I construct an index of respondents' opinions of each party using these six questions. Further details can be found in Chapter 4, where I used the same index.

Dependent variables

As described in Chapter 4, the dependent variables – dominant party canvassing and opposition party canvassing – are generated from two survey questions. The first asked 'Agents from which political parties have spoken to you face-to-face in the last month, if any', and for each party that they gave, they were in turn asked 'How many times were you spoken to face-to-face by a [Party X] agent in the month before election day? One, two, three, four, five or more, or not at all?' I used those variables to generate a continuous six-point measure of canvassing. This variable is not normally distributed, but instead is heavily skewed to the left with many 'zero variables'. Nor do they behave as ratio variables; all values take integer form. As a consequence, it ought to be analysed using count models. However, there are reasonable grounds to believe that the relationships between

independent and dependent variables may vary across districts, products of the differences in demographic or political landscapes across space. To control for this possibility, I present multilevel models in the main body of this chapter. This involves a serious sacrifice in data, because the most appropriate models to cope with the count data are zero-inflated models. The software which I use, Stata, includes no extension which I am aware of which makes it possible to run multilevel zero-inflated Poisson or negative binomial models. Therefore, in the multilevel models that I present in the main body, I recode the data as binary measures of whether respondents are canvassed by the party in question or not. However, the reader should be assured that this transformation seems to have no serious effect on the findings. I present equivalent, single-level zero-inflated models in the annex, and there are no substantive differences in the findings of those models and their multilevel equivalents.

In order to generate predicted probabilities from multilevel models, I present linear rather than logistic multilevel models in the main body of the chapter. However, I present equivalent logistic multilevel models in the annex, and there are no substantial differences between them. Therefore, while I present models in the chapter main body which analyse binary transformations for the dependent variables of interest and use linear rather than logistic models, the equivalent models are in the annex and yield results which are the same in all the relevant respects. Each of these sets of models produces equivalent results.

In the analysis that follows, the patterns in CCM canvassing, but not Chadema canvassing become clearer if one discounts those who are canvassed only once and instead analyses those who are canvassed twice or more. This, I believe, is because canvassers make inferences and learn about the voters as they speak to them. In effect, the first contact that a canvasser makes with a voter is not only an attempt to convince them, but an opportunity

to screen them. I presented qualitative evidence to this effect in the preceding section of this chapter. In light of this, the model of CCM canvassing which I present in the main body is a model of those that CCM contacts twice or more. Practically, in the multilevel models, respondents that report being canvassed by CCM less than twice are coded as zero and those that report being canvassed by CCM twice or more are coded as one. In the count models presented in the annex, those that are canvassed by CCM less than twice are coded as zero, and those that are report being canvassed by CCM twice are coded as one, those that report being canvassed by CCM three times are coded as two, and so on up to five times. For brevity's sake, I only present a model of being canvassed by CCM twice or more in the main body of the chapter, but in the annex, I present an equivalent model of voters that CCM canvasses once or more. A comparison of these two models, which is presented in Table 17, reveals that they present similar findings, with similar, though not identical, statistical significance, but that the statistical significance of some independent variables improves marginally in the model of CCM canvassing twice or more. Patterns of Chadema canvassing remained equally clear whether single contact or contact twice or more is taken as the independent variable, and so the former is analysed in the models of Chadema canvassing presented below.

Control variables

I measure swing voters using a measure proposed by William Mayer, in which respondents' are asked to evaluate two parties on a number of issues.[55] Specifically, in Mayer's measure, respondents are asked to evaluate two parties on a number of dimensions; those answers are numerated; the difference in respondents' answers about both parties is found; those differences are summed for all such answers; and the deviation of that sum from zero is the measure of partisanship. A partisan would give answers that sum to a large number. A swing voter would give opinions that sum to zero, or close to zero, showing no bias in his opinions of each party overall. In effect, the Mayer indicator measures how evenly a respondent evaluates two parties. Respondents' answers to the questions about party competence on six issues described above in the discussion of measuring partisanship can be compared to generate just such a measure of the swing voter.

The questions which were used to generate other individual-level control variables can be found in the annex. District-level control variables were generated from data from two sources. Measures of 2010 election data are from the National Electoral Commission.[56] The winning parliamentary candidates from the 2015 election were provided by the Parliament of Tanzania. Measures of district-level radio ownership and secondary education were obtained from the 2012 census. The data was provided by the National Bureau of Statistics.[57]

[55] Mayer.
[56] National Electoral Commission of the United Republic of Tanzania. *Parliamentary Elections: 2010*. Dar es Salaam.
[57] National Bureau of Statistics of the United Republic of Tanzania. 2015. "District-Level Summaries of Data from the 2012 Tanzania Population and Housing Census." Retrieved January 2016 (http://www.nbs.go.tz/nbstz/index.php/english/statistics-by-subject/population-and-housing-census).

Three pairs of independent variables display collinearity in this analysis. CCM parliamentary rally attendance and councillor candidate rally attendance; CCM presidential rally attendance and CCM national leaders' rally attendance; and wealth and mass media news consumption. This covariance may inflate the error terms associated with these variables, but is not grounds to conclude that the model is miss-specified. The correlations that emerge between some of these variables and the dependent variables in the analysis below are in spite of that covariance. If anything, this makes the statistically significant associations that emerge all the more impressive.

Canvass targeting in Tanzania

In this section, I present and analyse the results of the statistical analysis conducted to test the four hypotheses propounded above. Table 16 presents a descriptive summary of canvassing and rally attendance from the dataset. This expands on the data presented in the previous chapter. These statistics are 'raw' – they have not been weighted to adjust for the discrepancies between average age, dispersion across region or gender between the sample and the population of Tanzania. However, it provides a snapshot of the data analysed below. The first thing that I would like to draw the reader's attention to is that a large portion of voters who were canvassed once were also canvassed a second time or more. Over two thirds of respondents who were canvassed once were also canvassed a second time or more. This means that transformation of the dependent variable to represent being canvassed twice or more does not dramatically reduce the number of instances of canvassing under examination.

The second is that parliamentary and councillor candidates' rallies are the best attended in aggregate. More respondents report attending rallies at which the most senior candidates in

attendance were parliamentary or councillor candidates than report attending rallies attended by presidential candidates, national party leaders or other local leaders. This is true of both CCM rallies and Chadema rallies. Therefore, the focus of this chapter on parliamentary and councillor candidates' rallies is particularly fitting. These types of rallies together account for 60.3% of all instances of CCM rallies attended, and 58.8% of all Chadema rallies attended. The fourth and last characteristic of this data which I would like to highlight is that many voters attend several rallies from each party, and that a significant minority attend several rallies convened by parliamentary candidates from one party. This is particularly important, because it justifies charting predicted probabilities of being canvassed across attendance of several parliamentary and councillor candidates' rallies, which I proceed to do below. Charting the effects of up to three CCM parliamentary candidates' rallies would constitute an examination of predicted probabilities between the 47th and the 80th percentiles. Charting the effects of attending three councillor candidate's rallies would constitute an examination of change between the 48th and the 75th percentiles.

Key coefficients from Model 1 are plotted in Figure 25. The full results of this model can be found in the annex in Table 17. Model 1 shows that while swing voter status and support for parties have no statistically significant effect, rally attendance does. Attending a CCM councillor candidate's rally has a positive effect on the probability of being canvassed more than once which is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. This supports Hypothesis 1. Attending a CCM parliamentary candidate's rally has a negative effect on the probability of being canvassed by CCM twice or more which is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. This supports Hypothesis 2. The possibility that the association between CCM parliamentary candidate rally attendance and CCM canvassing is a product of reverse causation can be discounted. For that to be the case, CCM canvassing would have to make voters subsequently stay away from CCM rallies, and this seems implausible. That makes

the association yielded by Model 1 particularly strong evidence that CCM canvassers think of voters who attend the party's parliamentary candidates' rallies as 'contacted', and therefore choose to canvass others instead.

Table 16: Descriptive summary of canvassing and rally attendance by CCM and Chadema[58]


		Proportion	Standard deviation	Mean	Standard deviation	90th percentile	95th percentile
CCM	Canvassed	0.116	0.32	0.291	0.944	5	5
	Canvassed twice or more	0.079	0.27	0.174	0.692	0	1
Chadema	Canvassed	0.115	0.312	0.284	0.910	1	2
	Canvassed twice or more	0.086	0.281	0.168	0.653	0	1
CCM	Presidential candidates' rally	0.366	0.482	0.612	1.01	2	3
	National leaders' rally	0.240	0.428	0.460	0.99	2	3
	Parliamentary candidate's rally	0.534	0.499	1.26	0.156	4	5
	Councillor candidate's rally	0.522	0.500	1.415	1.739	5	5
	Local leaders' rally	0.285	0.452	0.691	1.321	3	4
Chadema	Presidential candidates' rally	0.209	0.407	0.394	0.936	1	3
	National leaders' rally	0.133	0.340	0.261	0.790	1	2
	Parliamentary candidate's rally	0.307	0.461	0.669	1.233	3	3
	Councillor candidate's rally	0.309	0.462	0.756	1.392	3	5
	Local leaders' rally	0.135	0.342	0.340	1.001	1	3

These results are not only statistically significant, but large in scale. Figure 26 and Figure 27 chart the predicted probabilities of being canvassed by CCM twice or more, across the number of parliamentary and councillor candidates' rallies attended respectively. I

[58] As the purpose of this table is to reveal the breadth of data in the sample, the data shown in this table is 'raw'. I have not weighted these statistics to adjust for deviations between mean age, gender or region in the sample and in Tanzania according to census data.

generated these predicted probabilities using the fixed portion of Model 1. In these calculations, other variables have been held at their means. Figure 26 shows that parliamentary candidate rally attendance has a large effect on canvassing. While someone who attends no CCM parliamentary candidates' rallies has a probability of 11% of also being canvassed twice or more by CCM, above the sample average, someone who attends two has a probability of 5.4%, and somebody who attends three has a 2.5%. These predicted probabilities are statistically distinct across a three-rally gap. Likewise, Figure 27 shows that the association between attending a CCM councillor candidate's rally and being canvassed twice or more by CCM is large in scale. While someone who attends no CCM councillor candidates' rallies has a probability of just 3.9% of being canvassed twice or more by CCM, someone who attends three has a probability of 11.5%. While these statistics are of being canvassed twice or more by CCM, a Model 1.1, which can be found in Table 17 in the annex which presents an equivalent analysis of being canvassed by CCM *once* or more. This model produces similar results. The only two pertinent differences are that parliamentary candidates' rally attendance weakens marginally in statistical significance, while CCM local leaders' rallies become statistically significant at the 0.01 level.

Figure 25: Plotted coefficients from Model 1, which predicts the probability of being canvassed by CCM twice or more



Concentric error bars represent 1%, 5% and 10% confidence intervals of the coefficients, respectively.

Figure 26: Predicted probability of being canvassed twice or more by CCM across CCM parliamentary candidates' rallies attended





Figure 27: Predicted probability of being canvassed by CCM twice or more across CCM councillor candidates' rallies attended




Models 2 and 3 estimate the probability of being canvassed by Chadema. Select coefficients from those models are plotted in Figure 28. Curiously, these models show that rally attendance, which yields such explanatory value of CCM canvassing patterns, has remarkably little effect on Chadema canvassing. Attendance of none of the five Chadema rally categories has a statistically significant effect upon the probability of being canvassed. Chadema's activists do not, as far as I can tell from this analysis, tailor who they canvass to take into account attendance of its rallies. Repeating the analysis with 'canvassed by Chadema twice or more' does nothing to alter this. However, these models do reveal that Chadema canvasses its supporters. There are two reasonable ways in which support for parties might be conceptualised for these purposes, as I described above.

The coefficient of the 'closeness' measure in Model 2 is statistically significant effect at the 0.05 level. However, Figure 29 illustrates that the predicted probabilities of being canvassed by Chadema, based on the fixed portion of Model 2, are not statistically distinct across values of the 'closeness' measure of Chadema support. In contrast, the coefficient of the 'opinion' measure in Model 3 is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Accordingly, Figure 30 illustrates that the predicted probabilities of being canvassed by Chadema, based on the fixed portion of Model 3, are clearly statistically significant across opinions of Chadema. As it illustrates, a complete non-supporter has a 5.9% chance of being canvassed by Chadema, while someone who holds the highest possible view of Chadema has a 19% chance of being canvassed by them, a large difference. It seems then, that Chadema does indeed canvass its supporters. To be more precise, it canvasses those who hold high opinions of it. In one respect, this should be of little surprise. The argument which I laid out above stresses the concern of Chadema with losing supporters to CCM through asymmetric amounts of contact during the campaign. Those who hold high *opinions* of the party which

are *changeable* should be the ones who Chadema prioritises for campaign contact, in order to ensure that their support is maintained, rather than those with strong affiliations to Chadema that are immovable.

Figure 28: Plotted coefficients from Models 2 and 3, which predict the probability of being canvassed by Chadema



Concentric error bars represent 1%, 5% and 10% confidence intervals of the coefficients, respectively.

Model 2 uses a 'closeness' measure of party support, while Model 3 uses an 'opinion' measure.

Figure 29: Predicted probability of being canvassed by Chadema, across closeness to Chadema. Predictions derived from Model 2





Figure 30: Predicted probability of being canvassed by Chadema, across opinions of Chadema. Predictions derived from Model 3



Conclusion

In this chapter, I have explained another dimension of the dominance of the rally in the ground campaign in Tanzania. CCM dispatches its canvassers to contact the target voters that do not attend its parliamentary candidates' rallies. In a sense, rallies displace canvassing, moving it from some target voters to others. In effect, the dominance of the rally over the canvass is a product of the weakness of the former and the strength of the latter. Parties rely on the accuracy with which voters can be canvassed to make up for the limited control that they exercise over which voters attend their rallies, meaning that the canvass and the parliamentary candidate's rally are effectively substitutes.

However, in local, neighbourhood campaigns, canvass and rally behave as complements. CCM's councillor candidates lead local actors in canvassing voters before their rallies in order to increase attendance at them. Chadema's targeting strategy, meanwhile, is dominated by the asymmetry in rally attendance that they confront. The rate at which swing voters and even Chadema's own supporters attend CCM's rallies puts it on the defensive. Chadema focusses on protecting its own supporters' good opinion of it by canvassing those that think best of Chadema. The qualitative evidence suggests that Chadema's strategy shifts from defensive to offensive outside campaign seasons. Between campaign seasons, when the frequency of campaign rallies subsides, Chadema tries to expand its base. During campaign seasons, it concentrates on maintaining it.

The Tanzanian case suggests that the mass meeting re-orders ground campaign activity in the rally-intensive campaign. Altogether, the canvass has become ancillary to the rally, supporting it and making up for its weaknesses. This in turn has further ramifications for the role of local actors in rally-intensive campaigns. While rallies provide a means for

politicians to speak to voters unmediated by local actors, local actors remain crucial for the fulfilment of two roles upon which parties depend. First, as I argued in the previous chapter, parties depend on them to produce rallies, and, in particular, to bring voters to them. Second, as I have shown in this chapter, parties depend on local actors to target campaign contact. Indeed, Tanzanian parties could not have canvassed voters without local actors. A veritable army of CCM *mabalozi* and Chadema *misingi* address a significant minority of Tanzanian voters face-to-face. Furthermore, Tanzanian parties rely on their knowledge of their neighbourhoods and villages, rather than voter databases to guide who they contact. Further still, the evidence in this chapter demonstrates that they exercise discretion over who they should canvass. Canvassers in CCM and Chadema come to different conclusions about who they should reach. Given the organisational distance between the national party and canvassers, one can only conclude that the wisdom of the *mabalozi* and the *misingi* respectively is what guides these different approaches to the campaign.

The overarching conclusion of this second part of my thesis is that local actors have assumed altered, rather than diminished roles in Tanzania's rally-intensive campaign. They have remained important auxiliaries in the ground campaign. While they have been publicly overshadowed by the preponderance of the rally and the orators that speak at it, they have remained crucial to support it and supplement it. Therefore, the parties and their candidates have remained dependent upon the local to realise its campaign. However, in the third and final part of this thesis, constituted by the next two chapters, I show how local actors' roles in Tanzania are changing. Parties develop capital-intensive methods that complement or supersede some of these niches that local actors have hitherto carved out.

Lastly, in this chapter, I have illustrated how interactive the elements of the ground campaign are. Parties' design and execution of each aspect of the ground campaign depends on every other aspect. Equally, how each party runs its ground campaigns depends upon how others do. This contributes to a modest but growing Africanist literature which illustrates the complexity of the ground campaign.

Annex

Multilevel models

Table 17: Results of Models 1 to 3

Variable	Model 1: Canvassed by CCM twice or more	Model 1.1: Canvassed by CCM	Model 2: Canvassed by Chadema with partisanship as closeness to parties	Model 3: Canvassed by Chadema with partisanship as opinions of parties
Individual (level 1) variables				
Age	-0.1245	-0.0012	0.1355	0.0499
Formal employment	-0.0551	-0.0488	7.8e-04	0.0434
Wealth	0.0219***	.0226**	-0.0018	-.1429
Education	-0.0659	0.0049	-0.0161	-.0229**
Female	-0.0198	-.0425	-0.005	-0.1539
Rural	0.0383	0.0457	-0.0841**	-0.0514
Interest in politics	-0.0021	-0.0055	0.0085	-0.0696
Abstention intentions	-0.0014	-0.0043	0.0149	0.0129
Mass media consumption	0.0018	-0.0020	0.0013	0.0026
Approve of clientelism	0.0017	-0.0934	0.001	0.0019
Vijiwe attendance	0.0073	0.0114	-0.0125	-0.0143*
Contact from rival party	0.0622***	0.0826***	0.0547***	0.051***
Vijiwe*abstain intentions	0.0879	-0.0330	-0.0075	-0.0074
Party's private meeting	-0.0111	0.0185*	0.0432***	0.0456***
Swing voter	-0.0311	-0.1502	-0.1007	-0.0013
Support for CCM / Opinion of CCM	-0.0201	-0.0330	-0.0061	-0.0011
Support for Chadema / Opinion of Chadema	-0.002	-0.0019	**0.0204****	**0.005*****
Party's presidential candidate's rally	-0.0051	-0.0140	-0.0071	0.0017
Party's national leaders' rally	0.0147	0.0166	0.0077	-0.0193
Party's parliamentary candidate's rally	**-0.0285****	**-0.0261***	0.0056	0.0102
Party's councillor candidate's rally	**0.0251****	**0.0374*****	0.0133	0.0152
Party's local rally	-0.0174	**-0.0364*****	-0.0198	-0.0335*

District (level 2) variables

District rate of secondary education	-0.0385	0.0495	0.0014	0.0027
Rate of radio ownership in district	-0.0325	-0.0511	-0.2084*	-0.1357
Party won constituency in 2010	0.0291	0.0429	-0.0223	-0.0185
Party won constituency in 2015	-0.0322	-0.0478	0.0053	0.0126
Party's margin of victory in 2010	-0.0623	-0.0155	-0.0366	-0.0513
Constant	0.0745***	0.1168***	0.1174***	0.1232***

Statistics

Number of respondents	702	702	702	702
Log likelihood	-41.63	-176.6	-147.1	-103.8
AIC	143.3	413.1	354.2	277.6
BIC	279.9	549.7	490.8	436.9
Inter-class correlation (ICC)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

* p < .1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01

Emboldened rows indicate independent variables of most theoretical interest.

Count data models

Figure 31: Effect of attending a CCM parliamentary candidate's rally on the predicted probability of being canvassed by CCM more than once




Figure 32: Effect of attending a CCM councillor candidate's rally on the predicted probability of being canvassed by CCM more than once




Figure 33: Effect of attending a CCM local leader's rally on the predicted probability of being canvassed by CCM more than once




Figure 34: Predicted probability of being canvassed by Chadema across opinions of Chadema




Table 18: Zero-inflated Poisson Models 5 and 6

Variable	Model 5: Canvassed by CCM twice or more	Model 6: Canvassed by Chadema
Model type	*Zero-inflated Poisson*	*Zero-inflated Poisson*
Age	-0.0318**	0.0200
Formal employment	-0.2399	-0.0975
Wealth	-0.1559	0.0769
Education	0.0133	0.1187**
Female	0.6281	0.2582
Rural	1.9482**	0.1970
Interest in politics	-.0094	-0.0243
Abstention intentions	-0.7955***	0.1463
Mass media consumption	0.0819*	-0.0699**
Approve of clientelism	-0.0145	0.0652
Vijiwe attendance	0.2389*	-0.1093
Contact from rival party	0.5901***	0.1517*
Vijiwe*abstain intentions	0.2001***	0.0162
Support for CCM	-0.0079	0.0109
Support for Chadema	-0.0352	**0.0351****
Swing voter	0.0507***	-0.0363**
Party's private meeting	0.2033***	0.0720
Party's presidential candidate's rally	0.0059	-0.3149***
Party's national leaders' rally	0.2824**	0.1908*
Party's parliamentary candidate's rally	**-0.3293*****	0.2149*
Party's councillor candidate's rally	**0.4775*****	-0.1217
Party's local rally	**-.3837*****	-0.0601
Constant	-2.2251	0.5297
Inflation of zero counts variables		
Age	-0.0079	0.0048
Formal employment	1.1317	-0.0304
Wealth	-0.3926**	0.0995
Education	0.0607	0.2094
Female	0.7609	0.2951
Rural	1.2048	1.0583***
Interest in politics	0.2029	-0.1075
Abstention intentions	-0.6393**	-0.2799
Mass media consumption	-0.0099	-0.0371
Approve of clientelism	-0.0425	0.0332
Vijiwe attendance	0.0868	0.0348
Contact from rival party	-0.1985	-0.3685***
Vijiwe*abstain intentions	0.1484*	0.0896
Support for CCM	0.0150	0.0007
Support for Chadema	0.0295	**-0.06601*****
Swing voter	0.0195	0.001
Constant	0.1050	1.8475
Statistics		
Number of observations	715	714

Vuong test[59] *(to determine whether model should be zero-inflated)*	0.000	0.000
Alpha score of corresponding negative binomial model *(to determine whether to use Poisson or negative binomial model)*	0.000	0.000

* p < .1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01

Emboldened rows indicate independent variables of most theoretical interest.

[59] It is not possible to generate Vuong tests for zero-inflated models error terms that are clustered at the district, so Vuong tests here are those for Vuong tests for the corresponding models with unclustered errors.

Logistic multilevel models

Table 19: Models 7 to 11, logistic models

Variable	**Model 7:** Canvassed by CCM	**Model 8:** Canvassed by CCM twice or more	**Model 9:** Canvassed by CCM twice or more with vijiwe*abstain removed[60]	**Model 10:** Canvassed by Chadema	**Model 11:** Canvassed by Chadema with vijiwe* abstain removed[61]
Individual (level 1) variables					
Age	-0.0141	-0.0149	-0.0149	0.0034	0.005
Formal employment	-0.4804	-0.8781	-0.8749	0.0892	-0.1344
Wealth	0.2052**	0.2900**	0.2895**	-0.0249	-0.0129
Education	0.0209	-0.0661	-0.0651	-0.1799	-0.1797
Female	-0.4788	-0.3925	-0.3928	-0.0481	-0.0618
Rural	0.5664	0.7940	0.7930	-0.6905*	-0.7611*
Interest in politics	-0.0617	-0.0563	-0.0568	0.0961	0.0785
Abstention intentions	-0.0535	-0.0219	-0.0204	0.3078*	0.1430
Mass media consumption	-0.0124	0.042	0.0419	0.0016	0.0145
Approve of clientelism	-0.0059	0.0315	0.0314	0.0108	0.0162
Vijiwe attendance	0.1030	0.0913	0.0906	-0.1293	-0.1393
Contact from rival party	0.5349***	0.5383***	0.5372***	0.4030***	0.4074***
Vijiwe*abstain intentions	0.0031	0.0056		-0.0635	
Swing voter	-0.0077	0.0013	0.0012	-0.0114	-0.0055
Support for CCM	-0.0013	-0.0327	-0.0328	0.0089	-0.0727
Support for Chadema	-0.0196	-0.0027	-0.0028	**0.0620*** **	**0.2059** **
Party's private meeting	0.1643	0.1318	0.1313	0.3426***	0.3526***
Party's presidential candidate's rally	-0.1281	-0.0549	-0.0552	-0.0455	-0.0433
Party's national leaders' rally	0.1467	0.1863	0.1873	0.1106	0.0971
Party's parliamentary candidate's rally	**-0.2285**	**-0.4045** **	**-0.4044** **	0.0491	0.0588
Party's councillor candidate's rally	**0.326*** **	**0.3243** **	**0.3241** **	0.1264	0.1262
Party's local rally	**-0.3174** **	**-0.1550**	**-0.1546**	-0.2441	-0.2490
Constant	2.2623***	-2.8697***	-2.869***	-2.3639***	-2.343***

[60] To show that it has no substantial effect on model outcomes.
[61] To show that it has no substantial effect on model outcomes.

District (level 2) variables

District rate of secondary education	0.0046	0.0008	0.0009	.0275	0.0262
Rate of radio ownership in district	-0.7680	-0.8770	-0.8884	-5.2197	-5.6413
Party won constituency in 2010	0.3965	0.4180	0.4165	-.1031	-0.1463
Party won constituency in 2015	-0.5286	-0.4738	-0.4758	.2106	0.1836
Party's margin of victory in 2010	0.0009	-0.0057	-0.0057	-.0035	-0.0034
Constant	-14.842	-14.854	-14.691	-21.592	-19.179

Fit Statistics

Number of respondents	702	702	702	702	702
Log likelihood	-231.67	-168	-168	-211.48	-213.11
AIC	521.35	393.99	391.99	480.97	482.21
BIC	653.41	526.06	519.5	613.03	609.72
Inter-class correlation (ICC)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

* $p < .1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$

Emboldened rows indicate independent variables of most theoretical interest.

Part III: Party organisation in rally-intensive ground campaigns

Chapter 7. Organising to fundraise: Rally production, financiers and party adaptation

In Part II, I showed how important local actors are in the execution of the rally-intensive campaign. Parties rely on them to increase rally attendance and to canvass voters that do not attend rallies. In Part III, constituted by this chapter and the next, I show that parties are developing ways of fulfilling these campaign functions with the help of financiers. Announcements of rallies once done by callers are increasingly done by loudspeakers. Parades through villages by choirs are increasingly being replaced by vehicle convoys or impromptu air shows. Regarding rallies, parties can increasingly achieve with money what was once achieved with shoe leather.

These are changes in campaign methods, but they have ramifications for party organisation. To tease out these implications, I examine party organisation through the prism of parties' relationships with other actors. Studying parties' relationships is not a novel way of understanding party organisation. On the contrary, the comparative literature has historically understood party organisation as an expression of relationships with different actors both within and beyond parties.[1] Organisational form, thus conceived, empowers some actors to detriment of others, and mobilises or demobilises them accordingly. For example, mass parties empower their members; accordingly, they motivate them to aid the party. In contrast, cadre parties empower elites and business interests; accordingly, they motivate them to aid the party.

However, to date, this is not how party organisation has been analysed in sub-Saharan Africa. Instead, studies of African party organisation have been preoccupied with parties'

[1] Duverger; Kircheimer; Katz and Mair. *How Parties Organize.*

long-term electoral strength and institutional health. Numerous studies concern how well- or poorly-organised parties are.[2] Others, seeking palliatives for single-party dominance, speak of opposition parties' strength or weakness.[3] More broadly, many studies examine to what extent parties or party systems are institutionalised.[4] However, these studies study what makes it feasible to develop strong or institutionalised parties, or what historic processes make local actors available for parties to engage. Few of these studies consider that parties might wish to develop ties to some actors rather than others, or that by privileging the demands of some actors, a party might neglect others.

I marry this literature on political parties to a literature on organisational theory. This body of work favours an approach that stresses the importance of how parties adapt to their environments in order to survive.[5] I argue that the rally-intensive campaign alters political parties' environment. When ground campaigns are rally-intensive, candidates can gain electoral advantages by employing more capital-intensive methods. As new capital-intensive methods emerge, these advantages grow. This creates competitive pressures for candidates to raise funds to capitalise their rallies more than their opponents. These pressures only subside once excessive expenditure drives down the marginal returns of capital-intensive rally production. In short, innovations in capital-intensive methods drive spiralling spending in campaign finances as candidates and parties alike bid to gain the upper-hand over their rivals, or just stay competitive.

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[2] Randall and Svåsand; Carbone; Paget. "The Authoritarian Origins of Well-Organised Opposition Parties".
[3] LeBas. *From Protest to Parties*; Lise Rakner and Nicolas van de Walle. 2009. "Opposition Weakness in Africa." *Journal of Democracy* 20(3):108–21.
[4] Riedl. *Authoritarian Origins of Democratic Party Systems in Africa*; Keith Weghorst and Michael Bernhard. 2014. "From Formlessness to Structure? The Institutionalization of Competitive Party Systems in Africa." *Comparative Political Studies* 47(12):1707–37; Carrie Manning. 2005. "Assessing African Party Systems after the Third Wave." *Party Politics* 11(6):707–27; Staffan Lindberg 2007. "Institutionalization of Party Systems? Stability and Fluidity among Legislative Parties in Africa's Democracies." *Government and Opposition* 42(2):215–41; Kuenzi and Lambright. "Party System Institutionalization in 30 African Countries"; Mohamed Salih. 2003. *African Political Parties: Evolution, Institutionalisation and Governance*. London: Pluto Press.
[5] Jeffrey Pfeffer and Gerald Salancik. 2003. *The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective*. Stanford: Stanford University Press; Joel Baum. 1999. "Organizational Ecology." in *Studying Organization*. Sage Publications.

These cycles of escalation and counter-escalation drive parties to develop closer relationships with political financiers. If a party employs labour-intensive measures more, the share of campaign effort which the branch or an equivalent local actor bears increases accordingly. Under this circumstance, the effectiveness of the party's election campaign depends more upon local actors. In contrast, if the party spends more on capital-intensive measures, the share of campaign effort which the candidate and her financiers bear increases. Under that circumstance, the effectiveness of the party's election campaign depends more on the resources that the candidate and her financiers can mobilise. If a party depends on financiers more, it should also be willing to cede to more of their demands to secure and maintain their support. Therefore, capital-intensive innovations in rally production drive parties to develop steadily stronger ties of dependence to financiers. This constitutes changes in party organisation.

One of the ramifications of this argument is that the rally-intensive campaign alters which party models are electorally viable. Put simply, the centrality of the rally to the campaign affects what parties must do to win; thereby, it affects what relationships parties must nurture to win. This mode of argument, which links organisation with competition and adaptation, is one of the oldest and most frequently used in the comparative literature on political parties.[6] I hope to restore that approach to the Africanist literature.

In this chapter, I develop this argument theoretically. In Chapter 8, I provide empirical evidence in support of that argument. There, I show that a cycle of competition and rising party finance drove parties to adopt more capital-intensive methods of mobilising rally attendance in Tanzania between 1995 and 2015. I proceed in this chapter as follows. In the

[6] Duverger; Kircheimer; Epstein.

next section, I review existing explanations of parties' relationships in sub-Saharan Africa. In the third section, I examine how party organisation has been explained in the comparative literature. In the fourth section, I advance a theory about how parties' relationships with local actors change in the rally-intensive campaign; in the final section I conclude.

Political finance and party organisation in sub-Saharan Africa

Theories of party organisation in the comparative literature used to concern organisational form. Maurice Duverger for example, makes clear that, 'The distinction between cadre and mass parties is not based upon their dimensions, upon the number of their members: the difference involved is not one of size but of structure.'[7] Structure is important for Duverger because it mediates how much influence a party affords to various actors, and to what extent the party mobilises them. The mass party structure, for example, empowers its members, and in exchange, it expects those members to pay dues, donate their time during campaigns and lend their ear to party speakers. However, it privileges members at the expense of notables and businesspeople, who are not accorded special treatment in recognition of the larger contributions, financially or otherwise, which they might make individually. The cadre party, by contrast, privileges notables at the expense of the masses, and relies on the former, rather than the later, to resource the party. Thereby, for Duverger, organisational form underpins parties' relations with different actors.

However, structure has rarely expressed parties' relations to actors and the differences in their ties to various actors so neatly. In fact, in subsequent analyses, formal party structures of the sort that Duverger documented have often obscured more than they have revealed.

[7] Duverger: 40-41.

For example, many cadre parties in twentieth century Europe adopted mass party organisational forms, branches and open membership included, but continued to find ways to privilege upper- and middle-class members in party decision-making at the expense of members. Accordingly, most work on party organisation since Duverger has focussed not on structure, but relationships.

For instance, Otto Kircheimer observed that parties in post-war Europe retained the branch, the hierarchy of party organs, and the rules permitting any person to become party members.[8] Nonetheless, he argued, some such parties altered the relationship between the central party on the one hand and both the media and the party base on the other, becoming closer to the former and more distant from the latter. If these differences were expressed in structural form, they were products of institutional rules that were too diverse and complex to be the basis of parsimonious theories. Instead, Kircheimer distinguishes the 'catch-all party' from the mass party by the importance they accord to the base, the leadership and the media. Richard Katz and Peter Mair's cartel party involves increasingly distant relationships between party and civil society, but increasingly close and dependent relationships between party and state.[9] Indeed, in their review of the literature, they argue that 'various models of party can be located in terms of the relationship between civil society and the state'.[10] In sum, over the last 50 years, theories of party organisations have focussed steadily less on party structure. Instead, unencumbered by concerns with structure, they have examined directly parties' relationships with actors within the party and without. In particular, they have traced how parties' ties to local actors have strengthened or weakened compared to their ties to other actors.

[8] Kircheimer.
[9] Epstein; Ware; Martin Wattenberg. 1998. *The Decline of American Political Parties, 1952-1996*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
[10] Katz and Mair. "Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy".

There are traces of this focus on parties' relationships in the neo-patrimonial strain of the Africanist party organisation literature. Studies in this canon emphasise the role that parties play in capturing and channelling the proceeds of accumulation by states.[11] In effect, they specify particular relations between party and state. Their arguments differ about whether neo-patrimonialism is connected to strong or weak party links to local actors. Some theories of neo-patrimonial politics emphasise the importance of chains of local intermediaries in connecting the centre to the public.[12] Those relationships serve some of the same purposes that local party branches did in accounts of machine politics elsewhere.[13] Other conceptions of neo-patrimonial politics explicitly argue that politicians in Africa channel patronage through means that bypass local actors. Nicolas van de Walle, for example, argues that, 'It is more useful to think of clientelist politics as constituting primarily a mechanism for accommodation and integration of a fairly narrow political elite than as a form of mass party patronage.'[14] However, even if one insisted on a particular reading of neo-patrimonialism that connects it to the way that parties link to local actors, it would not explain variation in them. Neo-patrimonialism is a typological feature, which can – so it is argued - be found across most sub-Saharan cases. As it is present throughout, it can explain homogeneity in parties' webs of relations to other actors, but not heterogeneity.[15]

The focus of the remainder of the literature on party organisation in sub-Saharan Africa is subtly different. Numerous studies are concern with aspects of organisation that do not touch on parties' relationships with other actors directly. For example, a large body of work

[11] LeBas. *From Protest to Parties*.
[12] Randall and Svåsand; Daloz; James Scott. 1969. "Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change." *American Political Science Review* 63(4):1142–58; Dominika Koter. 2013. "King Makers: Local Leaders and Ethnic Politics in Africa." *World Politics* 65(2):187–232.
[13] Chabal and Daloz; Bayart.
[14] van de Walle. "Presidentialism and Clientelism in Africa's Emerging Party Systems".
[15] Erdmann; Nic Cheeseman. 2017. Institutions and Democracy in Africa: How the Rules of the Game Shape Political Developments. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

concerns party and, in particular, party system institutionalisation.[16] Another prime focus of attention has been the strength or weakness of parties. For example, Lise Rakner and Nicolas van de Walle take particular interest in opposition party weakness.[17] Further work has been concerned with parties' absence on the ground and poor bureaucratic organisation.[18] While these works do not expressly concern parties' relationships, if one were sympathetic, one might acknowledge that party branches and other low-level party organs are local actors, albeit ones incorporated into party structures. Therefore, works that study parties' organisational strength study, indirectly, one form of parties' ties to local actors.

A further strand of this literature focusses on historical processes that render local actors present in particular countries and absent in others. For example, Dominika Koter argues that parties choose to engage electoral intermediaries depending on whether historic processes have left religious and customary leaders mobilisationally strong or weak.[19] Likewise, Adriene LeBas traces processes of trade union incorporation which render them organisationally strong and therefore suitable partners for opposition parties in years to come.[20] Tautologically, the presence or absence of local actors affects what relationships parties develop with local actors. Kate Baldwin's work on chiefs in Zambia, [21] my own work on opposition party-building in Tanzania, [22] and recent work on Pentecostalism[23] alike all emphasise historical processes that produce local actors which parties can develop

[16] Riedl. *Authoritarian Origins of Democratic Party Systems in Africa*; Lindberg, "Institutionalization of Party Systems?"; Weghorst and Bernhard; Kuenzi and Lambright. "Party System Institutionalization in 30 African Countries"; Matthias Basedau and Alexander Stroh. 2008. "Measuring Party Institutionalization in Developing Countries: A New Research Instrument Applied to African Political Parties." GIGA: *GIGA Working Papers* 69.
[17] Rakner and van de Walle.
[18] Carbone; Rakner and Svâsand; Erdmann.
[19] Koter. *Beyond Ethnic Politics in Africa*.
[20] LeBas *From Protest to Parties*.
[21] Baldwin.
[22] Paget. "The Authoritarian Origins of Well-Organised Opposition Parties".
[23] Mccauley.

relationships with. These works all focus on the relationships that parties develop with extra-party local actors or the local actors that they build into the party through local party organs.

However, studies of parties' organisational strength and ties to external local actors alike have fixated on factors that make building these relationships *feasible*. They focus on what makes local actors *available*, and local party organisation *attainable*. What few of these studies consider in detail is what makes links to some actors over others more or less *desirable*. On the contrary, across the literature, parties are assumed to always want relations with extra-party local actors, but only able to develop them if local actors are present and strong. Equally, parties are assumed to always find local branches desirable, but only worth the initial cost of establishing if sufficient resources are available and their time horizons are sufficiently distant.[24]

This focus on the feasibility of developing ties to local actors over the desirability of developing them is a product in part of the context in which this literature has emerged. Some scholars, myself included, have written with an underlining concern for democratisation in electoral authoritarian regimes. These analyses have been affected by a concern for whether opposition parties will acquire the strength to undermine dominant parties,[25] or whether stable party relations will emerge.[26] This focus on size rather than structure[27] constitutes an almost perfect inversion of Duverger. Therefore, parties' ties to mobilisationally strong extra-party actors or their dense networks of party branches have been considered in isolation. These studies have not emphasised how parties' relationships

[24] Paget. "The Authoritarian Origins of Well-Organised Opposition Parties"; Carbone; LeBas. *From Protest to Parties*; Rakner and van de Walle.
[25] Mccauley; Amy Patterson and Tracy Kuperus. 2016. "Mobilizing the Faithful: Organizational Autonomy, Visionary Pastors, and Citizenship in South Africa and Zambia." *African Affairs* 115(459):318–41.
[26] Rakner and van de Walle; Randall and Svåsand.
[27] Riedl. *Authoritarian Origins of Democratic Party Systems in Africa*.

with local actors alter their relations with others actors or how influence granted to some actors is influence denied to others.

Missing in many of these studies are parties' relationships with financial actors. Financial actors have received little attention in the Africanist literature, in part because extraction from the state looms so large in political finance, and because political finance is clandestine, and therefore an elusive and amorphous subject for scholars to research empirically. Political donations are closely guarded secrets, and therefore must be gleaned through the unreliable medium of rumour and hearsay. Yet another reason is that 'party funders' have been treated as synonymous with 'party leaders'. Financial contributors by private sources have been folded in conceptually as 'ambitious politicians'[28] and 'hopefuls… with personal prominence and resources'.[29] In many cases, this conceptual conflation is empirically justified; party leaders are almost invariably rich and among parties' leading financial contributors. However, conceptually muddling the two loses an important point of analytical leverage.

One of the few scholars to take variation in party finance seriously is Leonardo Arriola. He traces the effect of banking sector liberalisation on opposition party funding. However, he does not suggest that finance affects internal party organisation or alters the balance of power within parties. Instead, for him finance is the glue of 'pecuniary coalition formation' which helps fragmented sets of opposition parties overcome commitment problems.[30] He studies the effect of finance on parties' relations with each other, but not on the relations between actors within parties. In sum, parties' ties to local actors have been treated in isolation, in part because past research has overlooked parties' relations to their financiers.

[28] Randall and Svåsand.
[29] Rakner and van de Walle: 111.
[30] Leonardo Arriola. 2012. *Multi-Ethnic Coalitions in Africa: Business Financing of Opposition Election Campaigns*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Dominika Koter examines how party finance can change parties themselves. Unlike the studies cited above, she makes a conceptual distinction between party leaders and party funders. Koter shows that rising costs of clientelism in Benin drove parties to recruit wealthy individuals as parliamentary candidates.[31] She argues that parties trade their stable party labels for candidates' money. Although she does not make this explicit, this is an analysis of how parties' relations to multiple actors changed. In this chapter, I seek to build on this mode of analysis. I do so by drawing on organisational theory, which outlines a quite different approach to understanding party organisation and variation in parties' webs of ties to actors.

Borrowing from the comparative literature: organisational adaptation

The comparative study of organisations emphasises their struggles to exist; those struggles affect what organisations become and how they behave. For example, Jeffrey Pfeffer and Gerald Salancik write in their opening chapter that 'this book discusses how organizations manage to survive'.[32] This literature on 'organisational ecology' examines how changes in organisations' environments induce changes in the organisations themselves. Specifically, it studies how organisations of various sorts and descriptions adapt to best survive in their environments. Therefore, it is concerned with changes that serve functional purposes. As it is concerned with such a wide range of organisations it normally generates findings that are highly abstract. This literature specifies four interrelated mechanisms which, if present, culminate in organisational adaptation in response to environmental change. The first is mechanism is *variation*. The simplest account of adaptation is one in which organisations

[31] Dominika Koter. 2017. "Costly Electoral Campaigns and the Changing Composition and Quality of Parliament: Evidence from Benin." *African Affairs* 116(465):573–96.
[32] Pfeffer and Salancik: 1.

observe changes in their external environments and deliberately respond to them by initiating internal changes. However, organisations often fail to choose beneficial ways to change deliberately; their environments are difficult to interpret. They do not know which changes matter and which will persist, and they often do not discern how best to adapt to those changes. Organisations also often change in unintended ways; blind variation occurs as products of 'accidents, chance, luck, conflict, malfeasance and so forth.'[33]

As long as there is change, intended or not, this will beget processes of *selection*, whereby organisations that undertake changes which inhibit their survival fail or die, and organisations that undertake changes that aid their survival prosper. Selection to one side, processes of *competition* for scarce resources punish and wean out ill-adapted organisation. In addition and under some circumstances instead of selection, processes of *retention* lead to organisational change. This involves two sorts of deliberate action by organisations, one by which they retain beneficial changes and shed or undo harmful ones, and another by which they imitate beneficial changes undertaken by others. In reality, these processes are intertwined. For example, one round of poor performance can not only begin a process of elimination of an unfit organisation; it can act as a prompt that helps an organisation realise its mistakes and adapt deliberately before it is eliminated. Together, these Darwinist processes drive organisations to adapt to their environments.[34] As Pfeffer and Salancik put it, 'When environments change, organizations face the prospect either of not surviving or of changing their activities in response to these environmental factors.'[35]

A crucial part of how parties adapt to their environments concerns the relationships that they develop with internal and external actors. An actor is important to a party insofar as it

[33] Howard Aldrich and Martin Ruef. 1999. *Organizations Evolving*. Sage Publications: 34.
[34] Baum.
[35] Pfeffer and Salancik: 3.

can provide particular resources that parties depend on for their survival. Parties that develop stronger relationships with actors that facilitate transfers of resources improve their chances of survival. Pfeffer and Salancik write that 'organizations survive to the extent that they are effective. Their effectiveness derives from the management of demands, particularly the demands of interest groups upon which organizations depend for resources and support. As we shall consider, there are a variety of ways of managing demands, including the obvious one of giving in to them.'[36] These become relationships of mutual dependence. Organisations need the resources that internal or external actors possess. They solicit or encourage these actors to provide them by acquiescing at least in part to their demands, ceding them voice, influence, prestige, or whatever else they desire. Thereby, organisations and actors alike come to each need the other. In sum, the organisational literature theorises what parties do to survive in competitive environments. It connects organisations' relationships with both internal and external actors to the resources they provide those organisations. Changes in their environments make some resources more important for their survival. This drives them to develop closer relations with actors that can provide those increasingly critical resources, ceding more to them in exchange if necessary.

Theories of organisational adaptation in this form are at the heart of the comparative literature on political parties. Perhaps the best example is Maurice Duverger's concept of 'contagion from the left'. He argues that the introduction of the universal franchise constituted a change in parties' circumstances. This change in circumstances made the mass party structure described above superior to the cadre party, because it made mobilisation of mass membership more electorally advantageous. Further still, he argued that after its inception, it spread as an organisational model as mass parties prospered and other parties

[36] ibid: 2.

realised the advantages that this model yielded. Duverger documents both 'the decline of the caucus'[37] and the rise of the branch in European countries after the introduction of the universal franchise. More pertinently, he describes parties deliberately adapting their organisations to reflect these new realities:

> 'The parties of the Centre and even of the Right changed their organization and replaced the caucus by the branch as a basic element. Almost all the new parties have followed these tactics, but many old parties as well: this is an interesting example of contagious organization.'[38]

Implicit in his account is that parties which do not adapt, lose. Those that lose either learn to imitate their rivals, or persist in their current forms until they are marginalised.

Duverger was the first in a series of scholars that studied party adaptation in these terms. Above, I described briefly Kircheimer's conception of the catch-all party. Kircheimer argues that the catch-all model became the most viable for parties because the societies from which they drew their support were changing.[39] As boundaries between social classes and denominational groups weakened, ties between voters and parties eroded. In response, parties changed strategy in order to solicit the support of voters beyond their partisan base. To do so, they became more flexible, more outward-facing, better funded and on-message. In other words, Kircheimer also traces changes in parties' relationships back to adaptations to changing circumstances. Alan Ware argues that gradual changes in the civil service in the United States made it increasingly costly to find patronage jobs for party workers.[40] This made clientelist machine politics gradually less effective in the post-war period. Equally, he

[37] Duverger: 29.
[38] ibid: 25.
[39] Kircheimer.
[40] Ware.

identifies changes in cultures of volunteer activism which made thick local organisation well suited in some areas. Likewise, writing explicitly in this vein, Katz and Mair declare that:

> 'The growth in state subvention [subsidies] over the past two decades, and the promise of further growth in the coming years, has come to represent one of the most significant changes to the environment within which parties act.'[41]

All of these cases describe ways in which changes in parties' environments drive changes in party organisation. Moreover, while some of these changes concern changes in organisational form, others concern changes in parties' relationships with external actors such as volunteers, financial donors and the state.

The studies in this canon that are most relevant to this thesis are those by Leon Epstein, Martin Wattenberg, Alan Ware and Morris Fiorina.[42] These authors advance accounts of party change in post-war Western Europe and the United States in which innovation in campaign technology, rising political finance and party change are intertwined.[43] These authors examine the effect of the development of new campaign technologies, principally the television, but also the phone canvass, the mail-shot, the radio advert and the opinion poll.[44] They agree that these technological innovations changed parties fundamentally because they altered the calculus of effective campaigning. As Epstein argues, the marginal gains of these new methods were much higher than their counterparts. To use Ware's

[41] Katz and Mair. "Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy": 5, 15.
[42] Epstein; Ware; Wattenberg, *The Decline of American Political Parties, 1952-1996*; Morris Fiorina. 1980. "The Decline of Collective Responsibility in American Politics." *Daedalus* 109:25–45.
[43] Wattenberg. "From Parties to Candidates : Examining the Role of the Media"; Wattenberg. *The Decline of American Political Parties, 1952-1996*; Negrine and Papathanassopoulos.
[44] Epstein.

terms, as political finances increased, labour-intensive methods were gradually supplemented by capital-intensive methods.

These authors agree that these new methods lent an advantage to better-financed parties. Epstein characterises 'business-oriented middle-class parties as the pioneers in the sense of always being the first parties to use the mass media.' [45] However, as the potential of these methods became apparent, other parties responded. They solicited business, raised funds and sought to catch-up with the trailblazers of these new methods. These 'business-orientated middle-class parties', as Epstein describes them, 'appear to have used the media more fully, and then to have been followed in this use by their rivals.'[46] As parties raised further funds in turn, the amount of money needed to be electorally successful increased. Ware argues that, 'To put the matter rather crudely: in the late 1970s candidates had to spend more money (in real terms) than their predecessors of the 1950s to get a similarly competitive level of exposure in the electorate'.[47]

These changes in campaign strategy led to changes in party organisation. In Wattenberg's terms, local parties contributed a gradually smaller proportion of campaign effort, and donors contributed an increasingly large portion. Epstein argues that after these innovations in campaign technology, 'An organizational apparatus intervening between candidates and voters may be less necessary, or at any rate less efficient, as a vote-getting device.'[48] This led to party organisational change. Parties sought to maintain close ties to branches less, and sought close ties with financial donors more. This is a process initiated by changes in mass media and campaign methods; as Morris Fiorina eloquently puts it,

[45] ibid: 257.
[46] ibid: 257.
[47] Ware: 189-90.
[48] Epstein: 233.

'The media provide the means'.[49] In other words, these authors outline arguments, each a little different, in which new campaign techniques alter parties' environments by making providers of campaign labour less important for their survival and providers of finance more important. Competitive pressures drive central parties to respond to those changes by reducing the influence of party branches, and ceding influence to financiers. Epstein contends that the success and proliferation of a party organisational model that privilege links to business constitutes 'contagion from the right'.[50]

In sum, the comparative literature of political party organisation relies on different modes of explanation than the Africanist literature. The Africanist literature focusses on party system institutionalisation, party strength, and the historical formation of local actors. In contrast, the comparative literature interprets changes in how parties organise as adaptations to changing external environments. The literature on organisations expresses in clear conceptual terms processes of variation, retention, competition and selection which underpin such pressures. It also articulates why this would drive parties to cede influence to and build stronger relationships with particular actors. I have outlined the key principles underlying this literature in detail because I take inspiration from them, and especially the work of Epstein, Ware and Wattenberg. Below, I draw upon this theoretical apparatus to develop an argument about changes in parties' ties to local and financial actors in sub-Saharan Africa.

[49] Fiorina. "The Decline of Collective Responsibility in American Politics".
[50] Epstein.

Competition, capital-intensive rally production and organisational change

Here, I advance a theory of how innovations in methods of rally production affect which actors parties need, and therefore how they must organise, employing the concepts and principles elucidated above. In the next chapter, I present empirical evidence in support of that theory. My argument concerns the production of the rally, and one aspect in particular: the mobilisation of voters to attend it. In Chapter 5, I drew out the importance of mobilising rally attendance and the dangers that candidates and parties face if they fail to do so. I illustrated that candidates go to great lengths to mobilise attendees, and alter the entire campaign strategy if they cannot rely on party members to mobilise them. The techniques that parties employ to mobilise rally attendance and the produce rallies in general can be divided into two categories borrowed from Ware: labour-intensive methods and capital-intensive methods.[51] Labour-intensive campaign methods are those that can be executed by party activists or other local actors without the aid of much equipment. Capital-intensive ones are those which involve expenditure on things other than campaign labour. In the next chapter, I elaborate on which tasks these involve, but to offer a flavour, labour-intensive methods involve announcements of rallies by callers, door-by-door notifications, party choirs and welcome committees. Capital-intensive methods include vehicle-mounted public address systems, long convoys and helicopter travel.

I contend that the marginal electoral benefits of capital-intensive methods are higher than the marginal benefits of labour-intensive ones, just as in the cases analysed by Epstein and others. However, capital-intensive methods are only made available by local innovations that, in effect, introduce particular methods to a country. After these innovations are

[51] Ware.

introduced, they incentivise candidates and parties to raise further political finance. Parties and candidates spend any such additional funds on capital-intensive methods of producing rallies. Employing capital-intensive methods improves their chances of electoral victory improve, at least at the margins. The actions by individual candidates or parties precipitate responses in others. Further candidate and parties seek to reduce the new electoral advantages of their opponents by raising further campaign funds themselves. This pattern of campaign finance one-upmanship continues until the marginal benefits of spending more on capital-intensive methods fall to equal the marginal benefits of labour-intensive methods, the costs of raising finance rise, or a new innovation restarts the entire process. In other words, in a rally-intensive campaign, an innovation in methods of rally production begins a cycle by which candidates outbid each other by spending ever more on increasingly capital-intensive methods. Every time a candidate or party raises further political finance, there is a ratchet effect. It increases the amounts that rival candidates or parties must raise to be competitive, or to be at an electoral advantage. Put another way, it raises the cost of running a competitive campaign.

These changes in rally production drive party adaptation because they strengthen parties' ties to political financiers. If the absolute amount of capital-intensive rally production increases while the absolute amount of labour-intensive rally production remains constant, then the *share* of campaign effort that financial actors bear rises. Therefore, parties gradually come to rely more and more on those financiers. Consequently, to secure and maintain their support, they cede more to their demands.[52] This amounts to the development of closer ties between parties and financiers in order to raise more funds, exchanging capital for influence. Simultaneously, the emergence of alternative means of producing rallies reduces parties' dependence on local actors; even if a party still wants local actors'

[52] ibid.

assistance, it no longer *needs* them as much. Therefore, parties' imperatives to maintain strong ties to local actors also weaken. In short, competitive fundraising and capital-intensive rally production strengthens parties' ties to finance relative to their ties to local actors.

The strength of this argument depends on the centrality of the rally to the campaign. Producing rallies is only one task of many that parties must perform during their election campaigns. Local party actors canvass, mount posters, arrange election day transportation, solicit local opinion leaders, prevent electoral fraud, and commit electoral fraud, among other activities. The more important that these other tasks are for electoral victory, the less that capital-intensive methods tie the party to financiers. However, in many countries the rally is the dominant mobilisational tool. Rally attendance dwarfs canvassing in most election campaigns in much of sub-Saharan Africa. The original survey already presented and discussed in Chapter 4 shows that in the last month of the 2015 election campaign in Tanzania, 69% of voters attended rallies, while just 20% were canvassed.[53] Under these circumstances, changes in how the rally is produced have significant ramifications for parties' contrasting ties to financiers and local actors.

By these chains of mechanisms, particular competitive pressures drive political parties to adapt organisationally to innovations in campaign technology. The introduction of new methods of producing rallies creates new opportunities to excel electorally by raising political finance. In the rally-intensive campaign, these opportunities are central to electoral success overall. The forces of competition and selection drive parties to adapt in response to these new circumstances by fostering closer ties of dependence with political financiers.

[53] Upper and lower bound 95% confidence intervals of 65.6% and 73.0% for rallies and 17.2% and 22.7% for canvassing.

This theory echoes and creatively borrows from the arguments advanced by Epstein, Ware and Wattenberg in the comparative literature. The similarity between the causal processes that they document in other contexts and the one which I have laid out lends weight to the latter. These authors show how party campaign strategies and party organisation involve shifts between one set of campaign contact methods and another. The argument which I have developed here involves just one form of campaign contact, the rally. The argument turns on changes in the way that the rally is produced. In particular, the methods that parties use to mobilise voters to attend rallies change.

These mechanisms bring adaptive forces to bear on party organisation. However, I am under no illusions that these competitive pressures have equal effects on parties across cases and time. Other scholars, such as Rachel Riedl, have already argued for the importance of historical institutionalism in explanations of party development.[54] The adaptive forces spelt out above will be mediated by parties' institutional landscape. In particular, they will involve struggles between actors within parties. In parties that have institutionalised structures, members, local organs or other bodies that cannot provide capital to the party will stand to lose out by adaptations that marginalise them in the process of accommodating financiers. They will resist attempts to marginalise them, and insofar as they enjoy institutionalised power with the party, these attempts will affect paths of party adaptation. I discuss the mediating role of political institutions further in the concluding chapter.

The theory laid out above is bound by two sets of radial scope conditions, which mediate its application. First, it is applicable to parties insofar as they depend upon private bodies

[54] Rachel Riedl. 2018. "Institutional Legacies: Understanding Multiparty Politics in Historical Perspective." in *Institutions and Democracy in Africa: How the rules of the game shape political developments*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

for finance. Second, it is applicable only to parties in multiparty democracies insofar as they are subject to processes of variation, retention, competition and selection outlined by organisational theory. I discuss both of these scope conditions in turn.

My argument is only applicable to political parties to the extent that they depend on business and private bodies for their finance. This scope condition is particularly important to highlight because it excludes many parties and countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed, many works have emphasised the neo-patrimonial character of the African state, and the central role that it plays in accumulation.[55] Concordantly, further authors, too many to cite comprehensively here, have argued that African ruling parties depend almost in their entirety on the state for their income.[56] Insofar as a party generates revenue by seizing control of the state, the dynamics that I have outlined above are inapplicable, since the party is ultimately its own financier.

However, African opposition parties cannot rely on the state for continuous funding in the same way. Indeed, numerous studies describe African opposition parties as deprived of state funds, 'poor'[57] or 'continuously short of resources, financial and otherwise'.[58] In the absence of state resources, opposition parties depend on private bodies for funding. As I have already discussed, Gero Erdmann identifies 'donations of rich individuals' as opposition parties' primary sources of funding.[59] Equally, Arriola illustrates the importance of business financing of opposition parties in sub-Saharan Africa.[60]

[55] Bayart; Chabal and Daloz; Oscar Gakuo Mwangi. 2008. "Political Corruption, Party Financing and Democracy in Kenya." *Journal of Modern African Studies* 46(2):267–85; Bratton and van de Walle.
[56] van de Walle. "Presidentialism and Clientelism in Africa's Emerging Party Systems".
[57] Rakner and van de Walle.
[58] Randall and Svåsand.
[59] Erdmann.
[60] Arriola.

In fact, not only parties which are perennially confined to opposition depend on private donations. Some studies suggest that parties which alternate in and out of government depend on business for finance. More pertinently still, these studies do not just suggest that parties seek out business finance in spite of their cyclical funding from the state. Instead, they argue that they are able to raise funds from business precisely because they are periodically in government. George Bob-Milliar argues that Ghana's two leading parties depend on rich elites that finance them, and that they do so in order to gain influence in those parties.[61] Rachel Sigman is more specific. In her thesis, she argues that business people in Ghana donate to political parties in exchange for government contacts.[62] I have already summarised the connections between wealth and candidates that Koter draws in Benin.[63]

However, while ruling parties draw on state resources, only the ruling parties most embedded in the state have truly unfettered access to state resources. Almost all African studies have de jure public financial management systems that tightly control spending.[64] While many are porous and poorly policed, they are rarely completely ineffective either.[65] Most politicians in ruling parties extract from the state illicitly, in violation of their own laws and accounting procedures.[66] Alternatively, they find creative ways to extract legally. While ruling parties may seek out moneys from the state, bureaucratic rules constrict their

[61] Bob-Milliar: 676.
[62] Rachel Sigman. 2015. "Which Jobs for Which Boys? Party Financing, Patronage and State Capacity in African Democracies." Syracuse University.
[63] Koter. "Costly Electoral Campaigns and the Changing Composition and Quality of Parliament".
[64] Matthew Andrews. 2010. "How Far Have Public Financial Management Reforms Come in Africa?" Cambridge, Massachusetts: *Harvard Kennedy School Faculty Research Working Paper Series*.
[65] Letitia Lawson. 2009. "The Politics of Anti-Corruption Reform in Africa." *Journal of Modern African Studies* 47(1):73–100.
[66] Kempe Ronald and Bornwell Chikulu. 2000. *Corruption and Development in Africa: Lessons from Country Case Studies*. London: Palgrave Macmillan; Jacqueline and Susan Rose-Ackerman. 2000. "Kleptocracy and Reform in African Regimes: Theory and Examples." Pp. 57–86 in *Corruption and Development in Africa*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

freedom to do so.[67] Therefore, most ruling parties rely on a mixture of state and private sources of finance. These studies all suggest that private sources of wealth constitute significant portions of the funds of opposition parties but also ruling and dominant parties too.

My argument is also only applicable to parties insofar as they are subject to the mechanisms of variation, retention, competition and selection which drive organisational adaptation. Organisational *variation* between political parties is common in sub-Saharan Africa. Parties range from those that boast national and consistent local presence, to 'paper parties'[68] that hang at the regional level. They vary from those which order their ties to local actors through formal structures, to those which 'subcontract mobilization to established local leaders'.[69] In every respect, from incorporation of civil associations,[70] the process of selecting party officers, national coverage,[71] the dispersion of power, bureaucratic depth, central authority, federal or unitary character, party identity, porousness of boundaries, and numerous others, they vary.

Parties often alter their methods both intentionally and unintentionally. Therefore, their attempts to capitalise on new methods that work results in processes of *retention*. The notion that parties are rational and office-seeking is often explicitly assumed in the literature.[72] There is copious anecdotal and systematic evidence that they deliberately experiment, innovate and change in order to win more votes and enter office. Whether it

[67] John Mukum Mbaku. 2007. *Corruption in Africa: Causes, Consequences, and Cleanups*. Lexington Books; Hope and Chikulu.
[68] Nic Cheeseman. 2008. "The Kenyan Elections of 2007: An Introduction." *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 2(2):166–84; Carbone.
[69] Koter. "King Makers."
[70] LeBas. *From Protest to Parties*.
[71] Michael Wahman. 2015. "Nationalized Incumbents and Regional Challengers: Opposition- and Incumbent-Party Nationalization in Africa." *Party Politics* 1–14.
[72] van de Walle. "Presidentialism and Clientelism in Africa's Emerging Party Systems".

concerns convening party primaries in Botswana,[73] bussing canvassing teams to target seats,[74] Abdoulaye Wade's Blue Marches in Senegal,[75] organising militias in Kenya,[76] parties have been nothing if not creative in their attempts to organise and mobilise. Even if this entrepreneurial spirit can only be found in a minority of parties, or among a minority of party organs, this will provide the variation on which the argument above depends.

While organisational variation and retention is commonplace, the processes of *selection* and *competition* described above are not. These mechanisms, and therefore the theory which I have outlined above, apply to parties insofar as their efforts to organise and campaign can alter electoral outcomes. Deductively, three further scope sub-conditions follow.

First, the argument will apply insofar as elections are competitive. If an election is competitive, as they are in Ghana, for instance, parties campaign efforts can decisively alter the outcome.[77] There is copious anecdotal evidence that Ghana's two largest parties have campaigned knowing that a small advantage may put them over the edge. Some of these efforts have been confined to policy promises,[78] but others have extended to organising at the ground level[79] and deploying of ground troops strategically.[80] In contrast, if elections are uncompetitive, as for example they are in Namibia, election campaigning cannot

[73] Mpho Molomo. 2000. "Understanding Government and Opposition Parties in Botswana." *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 38(1):65–92.
[74] Cheeseman, Lynch and Willis. "Ghana: The Ebbing Power of Incumbency".
[75] Foucher.
[76] David Anderson. 2002. "Vigilantes, Violence and the Politics of Public Order in Kenya." *African Affairs* 101:531–55; Cheeseman. "The Kenyan Elections of 2007"; Nic Cheeseman, Gabrielle Lynch, and Justin Willis. 2014. "Democracy and Its Discontents: Understanding Kenya's 2013 Elections." *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 8(1):2–24.
[77] Sarah Brierley and George Ofusu. 2012. "The Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Ghana." *Electoral Studies* 35(September):382–85; Bob Kelly and R. B. Bening. 2013. "The Ghanaian Elections of 2012." *Review of African Political Economy* 40(137):475–84; Cheeseman, Lynch and Willis. "Ghana: The Ebbing Power of Incumbency".
[78] Brierley and Ofusu.
[79] Bob-Milliar.
[80] Cheeseman, Lynch and Willis. "Ghana: The Ebbing Power of Incumbency".

decisively effect a single election. In Namibia, SWAPO[81] has won every election since independence, and its presidential candidate won the 2014 election with 86.72% of the vote.[82] SWAPO enjoys relative freedom from adaptive pressures in order to hone its electoral advantage. While few parties enjoy the commanding lead that SWAPO, does, electoral dominance is common, and incumbents win a high proportion of elections in sub-Saharan Africa.[83]

Second, the argument will apply more acutely still insofar as there is party system volatility. If the party system in inchoate or fluid, as it is in Benin for example,[84] then parties may not just lose elections by campaigning poorly, as they can in countries such as Ghana; they can be electorally eliminated entirely. In Benin, 17 political parties nominated candidates for the 2001 presidential elections.[85] In the 2006 election, 26 parties competed. Competition occurs not just at the national but the candidate level. In Zambia's 2001 election, there was an average of 8.1 candidates for each parliamentary seat.[86] Where parties and candidates change so frequently, they import new methods of organisation and campaigning, making the constituency a veritable laboratory of campaign methods. A by-product of this party volatility and high turnover is that the forces driving parties to adapt to their environments are acute.

[81] SWAPO used to be an acronym for South West African People's Organisation, but officially, the party's name is now SWAPO Party of Namibia.
[82] Electoral Commission of the Republic of Namibia. 2015. "Election Results from Previous Years." Retrieved January 15, 2018 (http://www.ecn.na/results).
[83] Nic Cheeseman. 2015. *Democracy in Africa: Successes, Failures and the Struggle for Political Reform*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[84] Riedl. *Authoritarian Origins of Democratic Party Systems in Africa*.
[85] Albert Nunley. 2012. "African Election Database." Retrieved July 19, 2017 (http://africanelections.tripod.com/).
[86] Electoral Commission of Zambia. "Past Election Results." Retrieved April 1, 2015 (https://www.elections.org.zm/past_election_results.php).

Third, the argument above will apply insofar as parties do not use authoritarian methods to win. Many regimes in sub-Saharan Africa are electoral authoritarian.[87] Insofar as ruling parties draw from the 'menu of manipulation'[88] to determine election outcomes, they will be insulated from competitive pressures. For example, the authoritarian measures taken by the ruling party in Ethiopia delivered it and its affiliated parties 100% of the recorded vote in the 2015 parliamentary elections.[89] Rwanda's Paul Kagame won a similarly high 98.8% of the recorded vote in 2017. The pressures which I have described above are clearly not at work in cases such as these.

At first glance, the rehearsal of these conditions might make it seem as though the competitive forces which I outlined above are only at work in just a fraction of African cases. However, African countries in many respects defy their authoritarian and uncompetitive stereotypes. Figure 35 below maps African countries in 2016 by how democratic they are, measured using Polity IV, and the margin of victory in the most recent election presidential election. The closer that each case is to the bottom right-hand corner of the graph, the stronger the competitive forces in it should be, other things being equal. The countries clustered in this corner are hard to make out in Figure 35, and so this quadrant of the graph is enlarged for ease of reading in Figure 36. As these figures illustrate, numerous African countries have competitive elections that should activate the adaptive processes described above.

[87] Andreas Schedler. 2006. *Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition*. Lynne Rienner.
[88] Andreas Schedler. 2002. "Elections Without Democracy: The Menu of Manipulation." *Journal of Democracy* 13(2):36–50.
[89] Leonardo Arriola and Terrence Lyons. 2016. "The 100% Election." *Journal of Democracy* 27(1):76–88.

Figure 35: Scatterplot of African countries by competitiveness and democracy, full dimensions





Figure 36: Scatterplot of African countries by competitiveness and democracy, showing only the most competitive and democratic



Sources: Center for Systematic Peace,[90] various.

[90] Monty Marshal, Ted Gurr, and Keith Jaggers. 2017. *POLITY™ IV PROJECT: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2016*. Vienna, VA. Retrieved (http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html).

However, there are also good reasons to think that processes of selection and competition will be present even in cases which are authoritarian or uncompetitive, or both. For instance, in dominant party systems, dominant parties themselves may be insulated from adaptive forces, but opposition parties certainly are not. In spite of uncertainty and dominant party interference, there are reasons to expect the opposition space in dominant party systems to be places where forces of organisational adaptation are the strongest. There are numerous African cases where a previously dominant party was defeated by an opposition party using innovation to achieve electoral success. The Patriotic Front in Zambia,[91] the All-Progressives Congress in Nigeria,[92] and the *Parti Démocratique Senegalese*[93], to name but a few examples, all illustrate aspects of such a story.

Moreover, dominant parties themselves are also often subject to competitive pressures by varying degrees. This principle is evidence in the work of Giovanni Sartori, who distinguishes within the domain of dominant party systems between the hegemonic and the predominant. In hegemonic party systems, opposition victory is not permitted by a hegemonic party which has authoritarian means to control electoral outcomes. In contrast, predominant party systems, predominant parties persist in power not through 'natural' advantage, but through continual electoral effort to out-compete their rivals. Many dominant parties are determined to preserve their electoral dominance in order to ward off defeat two or three electoral cycles away. An opposition party which is thirty points behind can still present a threat to a far-sighted incumbent. Their dominance is a product of their continued mobilisational superiority. Insofar as a predominant party must excel electorally

[91] Larmer and Fraser; Cheeseman and Larmer.
[92] Olly Owen and Zainab Usman. 2015a. "Briefing: Why Goodluck Jonathan Lost the Nigerian Presidential Election of 2015." *African Affairs* 114(456):455–71.
[93] Foucher; Lucy Creevy. 2005. "Party Politics and Different Paths to Democratic Transitions: A Comparison of Benin and Senegal." *Party Politics* 11(4):471–93.

to win, and win by a margin that it deems sufficient to sustain its long-term dominance, it is subject to the very competitive pressures that I described above.

Equally, authoritarianism does not always free ruling parties from competitive pressures. Authoritarian methods themselves come at a cost. Most electoral authoritarian regimes try to win power at the ballot box instead of inviting the protests, sanctions and scandal of authoritarianism.[94] Many electoral authoritarian regimes prefer to keep their powder dry, and save the most controversial items in the menu of manipulation for when they are most needed. Indeed, studies of election campaigns in Zimbabwe[95] and work on Tanzania by myself and others[96] reveal that dominant parties in electoral authoritarian regimes strive to win votes using democratic methods as well as undemocratic ones. Altogether, many studies of dominant parties reveal that their dominance is preserved with constant electoral effort.[97] Therefore, ruling parties in electoral authoritarian regimes are also subject to pressures to adapt, even if these pressures are less existential than those experienced by their counterparts in opposition.

Even if these competitive forces are weaker at the national level in dominant party systems, many dominant parties that are secure nationally are subject to acute electoral threats at the subnational level. For instance, dominant parties in sub-Saharan Africa remark on the high rates of turnover among MPs, in spite of the consistency in support for their parties. A portion of this turnover takes place in party primaries, but another takes place in

[94] Staffan Lindberg. 2009. *Democratization by Elections: A New Mode of Transition*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press; Andreas Schedler. 2002. "The Nested Game of Democratization by Elections." *International Political Science Review* 23(1):103–22; Cheeseman. *Democracy in Africa*.
[95] LeBas. "Polarization as Craft"; Julia Gallagher and Stephen Chan. 2017. *Why Mugabe Won: The 2013 Zimbabwean Elections and Their Aftermath*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[96] Paget. "Tanzania: Shrinking Space and Opposition Protest"; Kjær and Therkildsen; Fouéré and Maingraud-Martinaud.
[97] Dorenspleet and Nijzink.

competitive inter-party elections.[98] Opposition parties that struggle to compete nationally offer dominant parties stiff competition for individual parliamentary races and municipal government elections in particular localities.[99] This stiff subnational electoral competition creates pressures for subnational dominant party units to adapt accordingly.

In sum, the strength of competitive pressures varies in sub-Saharan Africa, both between countries and within them. Opposition parties are subject to them almost everywhere, while, competition, authoritarianism and party system institutionalisation bound these adaptive forces. However, only in a minority of cases are these competitive pressures truly absent. Even dominant parties strive to excel electorally, in some cases to preserve their electoral position, in others to preserve authoritarian methods for elections to come. In yet other cases, they are free of electoral threats nationally, but affected by them locally. The argument which I have advanced in this chapter is applicable to African cases insofar as they are subject to those adaptive forces.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have advanced a theory about rallies and party adaptation in rally-intensive ground campaigns. Innovations in campaign technology drive the capitalisation of rally production. Competitive pressures drive parties to solicit financiers, and consequently, financiers bear an increasing portion of parties' campaign effort. Therefore, parties' ties of dependence to financiers strengthen in comparison to their ties to local actors. Through these means, the rally becomes a vehicle for party organisational change. The implication of this argument is that in rally-intensive campaigns parties are driven to develop increasing

[98] Richard Volkes and Sam Wilkins. 2016. "Party, Patronage and Coercion in the NRM's 2016 Re-Election in Uganda: Imposed or Embedded." *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 10(4):581–600.
[99] Wahman; Elliot Green, Johanna Söderström, and Emil Uddhamer. 2016. *Political Opposition in Sub-Saharan Africa*. London: Routledge; Rakner and van de Walle.

close relationships with financiers. Thereby, they enter into increasingly close relations of exchange with business, much as they did in the Western world to varying degrees over the last fifty years. In other words, rally capitalisation drives grand changes in political economy. This pays testament to why the study of election campaigning matters. Some readers might not be interested in campaign strategy for its own sake, but the character of the campaign affects the character of the party, and the character of the party affects the character of the polity.

The effects of innovation in rally production apply to parties in rally-intensive campaigns insofar as they depend on private bodies for finance and election campaign efforts can alter outcomes; they therefore apply to parties insofar as elections are competitive, the party system is fluid and the regime is liberal. Consequently, they apply least to dominant parties in authoritarian states which have access to unlimited state finances and most to opposition parties in liberal democracies. These scope conditions are radial; they refer to characteristics which exist along spectra, and correspondingly, they apply to parties by degrees. However, I have laid out theoretically why even the cases which might seem most immune from these processes, such as dominant parties in electoral authoritarian states, may not be as free from these competitive pressures as one might expect. In particular, insofar as authoritarian methods are themselves costly and insofar as candidates do not have unfettered access to state finances to fund their campaigns, even dominant parties will be subject to these pressures to adapt.

Party campaign expenditure is rising in successive in elections across much of sub-Saharan Africa. Studies testify to this in Uganda,[100] Kenya,[101] Nigeria,[102] Ghana,[103] and Tanzania,[104]

[100] Jeffrey Conroy-Krutz and Carolyn Logan. 2012. "Museveni and the 2011 Ugandan Election: Did the Money Matter?" *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 50:625–55; Rita Abrahamsen and Gerald Bareebe. 2016. "Uganda's 2016 Elections: Not Even Faking It Anymore." *African Affairs* 115(461):751–65.

among other countries. There are numerous reasons for this, not least the rising costs of clientelism that Dominika Koter has outlined.[105] However, in this chapter I identify another mechanism that fuels rising campaign costs: innovations in capital-intensive methods of rally production. This mechanism is not confined to a clientelist universe. The implication of this theory is that if innovations in rally production continue, party finance will continue to rise and party financiers will become more central to election campaigning.

As the changes wrought to party organisation depend on the rally-intensiveness of the campaign, they will be mediated by changing mass media penetration. While scholars should avoid the sophistry of overstating the predictive power of their theories in a complex world, it seems incumbent upon me to reconcile the implications of the theory of this chapter and the evidence about rally attendance and mass media penetration which I presented in Chapter 3. Assuming that parties continue to discover or invent successively capital-intensive methods of rally production, and that mass media penetration continues to deepen, the theory which I have outlined suggests that election campaigns in sub-Saharan African countries will become less rally-intensive and more mass media-intensive. This ought to dampen the processes which I have described here. However, mass media opens up other capital-intensive means of campaigning. Therefore, the speculative implication of this argument – assuming that media and finance change as hypothesised – is that political parties will start by being beset by one set of competitive pressures to privilege financiers, and which will gradually be replaced by another. Therefore, the organisational changes

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[101] Cheeseman, Lynch and Willis. "Democracy and Its Discontents"; Cheeseman. "The Kenyan Elections of 2007".
[102] Owen and Usman; Peter Lewis and Darren Kew. 2015. "Nigeria's Hopeful Election." *Journal of Democracy* 26(3):94–109.
[103] Kelly and Bening; Paul Nugent. 2001. "Winners, Losers and Also Rans: Money, Moral Authority and Voting Patterns in the Ghana 2000 Election." *African Affairs* 100:405–28.
[104] TEMCO Election Observation Mission 2015. 2015. *Interim Statement on Tanzania 2015 General Election*. Dar es Salaam; TEMCO Election Observation Mission 2010. 2010. *An Interim Report on the Performance of Tanzania's 2010 General Elections in Tanaznia*. Dar es Salaam; Paget. "Tanzania: Shrinking Space and Opposition Protest".
[105] Koter. "Costly Electoral Campaigns and the Changing Composition and Quality of Parliament."

which have been precipitated by innovations in rally production will only be amplified if mass media penetration deepens.

In this chapter, I have been careful not to over-extend the claims that I make. I do not argue that the process outlined above leads to the deterioration in party structures or local actors in politics in absolute terms. I have only argued that this is one factor which drives the relative increase in the share of campaign effort borne by financiers in rally-intensive campaigns. By virtue of this, other things being equal, it entails an increase in the relative importance of financiers for election campaigning and therefore stronger ties between parties and financiers in comparison to their ties to local actors.

Equally, I have deliberately made no claim that other things are always equal; the two causal effects described here could be lost amid other and more sizeable effects in any particular case. I have also constrained the argument to the efforts that parties make to achieve one of the tasks of the campaign, producing rallies. Parties have other tasks to realise, some of which local actors are often contributors to. The process laid out here applies to only this one task. It matters insofar as this task matters to election campaign success; in this chapter I have made the case that in rally-intensive campaigns it matters a great deal. While I have dealt in theory in this chapter, in the next, I present evidence in support of this argument.

Chapter 8. Callers, dancers, stereos and choppers: The capitalisation of rallies and parties

In the previous chapter, I developed a theory of party adaptation. That theory postulates that innovations in rally production initiate a cycle of competition, rally capitalisation and fundraising that strengthens the ties between political parties and their financiers. In this chapter, I present empirical evidence in support of that theory. To this end, I turn my attention to how the rally is produced. The complexity of producing rallies has been widely overlooked and sometimes denied in the literature. Numerous tasks are undertaken to make rallies work. To make sense of this plethora of tasks, I develop a distinction between labour-intensive and capital-intensive methods of rally production. Labour-intensive methods include tasks such as notifying residents and forming welcome committees; capital-intensive methods include arranging convoys of vehicles into parades, and commissioning helicopters to transport candidates between events. While these methods are distinct, the purposes which they fulfil are the same. I demonstrate that capital-intensive methods are used to complete the same tasks, and therefore, that they supplement labour-intensive methods. While they are typically used in tandem, capital-intensive methods are sometimes also used to replace labour-intensive methods.

The mixture of methods that parties use affects which actors they need to contribute to their campaigns the most. Local actors supply the local volunteers and activists for labour-intensive methods; financiers provide the funding for capital-intensive methods. As competition drives parties and their candidates to adopt increasingly capital-intensive methods of producing rallies, parties become steadily more dependent upon financiers, and correspondingly, they develop stronger ties to them. This conclusion supports the argument which I developed in the previous chapter.

In this chapter, I also make a theoretical contribution to the comparative literature on campaign technologies. I further complicate the typologies of 'pre-modern' direct, face-to-face methods of campaigns and 'modern' indirect campaign contact proposed by Norris.[1] The categories of 'old' and 'new' campaign technologies applied to OECD countries[2] do not travel well to sub-Saharan Africa. Many studies have focussed on the uptake of conventional 'new' technologies like radio and mobile phones in sub-Saharan Africa, and some have suggested that it would transform political communication altogether. I show that innovation in campaign methods also comes from the oldest form of election campaigning: the rally. Parties still reach voters through rallies, but as they shift from labour-intensive to capital-intensive methods of producing rallies, rallies become sites of innovation and change.

After a brief reprise of the relevant theory in the first section, in the second I develop a thick conception of what constitutes labour- and capital-intensive methods of producing rallies in the second. I then proceed to argue that labour-intensive methods were the conventional methods of producing rallies in Tanzania in the 1990s, but have been gradually supplemented and in some cases replaced by capital-intensive methods over time. In the third section, I tease out the ramifications of rally production capitalisation in Tanzania for campaign expenditure. I demonstrate that campaign expenditure has risen, and that the costs of capital-intensive rally production constitute a large share and in some cases an overwhelming share of candidates' campaign expenditure. Thereby, I show that rally capitalisation drove rising campaign expenditure in Tanzania. Party finance in Tanzania is cloaked in rumour and is contested by political actors. Nonetheless, as far as

[1]Norris. *A Virtuous Circle*.
[2] Römmele. "Political Parties, Party Communication and New Information and Communication Technologies"; Iyengar and Simon; Ware.

possible, in the fourth section I show empirically that rally production has made parties cede positions, influence and rent-seeking opportunities to their financiers. In the fifth section, I show that a cycle of competition drove rally capitalisation. I show this by following the emergence of the helicopter as a campaign tool. I reveal that patterns of innovation, contagion, mimicry and competitive response were at work in the proliferation of the helicopter, which attest to the causal chain connecting innovation, competition and rally capitalisation as a whole. Altogether, this evidence provides a strong empirical basis to infer that rally capitalisation strengthens parties' relationships with their financiers.

Tracing a competitive process of rising fund-raising and capital-intensive rally attendance mobilisation

In the scarce accounts of rallies in sub-Saharan Africa, little is documented about the actors that the rally involves or the activities that they undertake at it. Existing studies of rallies write as if they were undertaken by solitary actors.[3] Horowitz writes of rallies that are 'held' by presidential candidates, for example.[4] Other writers also describe the convening of rallies without interrogating further how they are convened.[5] This masks or at least neglects the complexity of the rally. Any intelligent observer who has attended a party rally will attest to the sheer number of tasks that are performed in the course of a rally and the variety of actors and techniques that are used to complete them. In Chapter 5, I already underscored the importance of one important and at times dominant part of producing a rally – mobilising people to attend it. However, in Chapter 5, I confined my discussion to the efforts of the local branch to mobilise rally attendance, and thereby, contribute to

[3]Horowitz; Resnick. *Urban Poverty and Party Populism in African Democracies*.
[4]Horowitz.
[5] Resnick. *Urban Poverty and Party Populism in African Democracies*; Resnick. "Continuity and Change in Senegalese Party Politics"; Cheeseman and Hinfelaar.

producing the rally. In this chapter, I widen my field of vision to consider a range of tasks that parties complete in order to make rallies work.

The activities which parties undertake to produce rallies can be divided into two categories. The first category is labour-intensive methods of rally production. These labour-intensive methods involve large numbers of campaigners, be they party members organised by the branch or the lowest echelons of informal campaign networks organised outside the party by other local actors. Labour-intensive methods of producing rallies range from calling out rallies, mounting posters, knocking on doors, staffing parades, joining choirs and cheering candidates as they arrive, among other things. As a matter of definition, labour-intensive methods are also capital-light. This does not mean that they are conducted without any equipment at all. Rather, it is the *proportions* of labour and capital that is definitive. The second category is capital-intensive methods of producing rallies. Capital-intensive methods range from announcements by vehicle-mounted stereos; buying stages or other equipment; travelling with ostentatious motorcades; and arriving by helicopter. As a matter of definition, these methods are labour-light, but again, this does not mean that they will be executed without any labour at all.

These activities are used to fulfil the following five tasks: notifying people about forthcoming rallies, mobilising people to attend them, preparing rally sites and forming points at which audiences gather, fostering festivity, and performing celebration. Each of these tasks contributes to the production of rallies. In this chapter, I show that any of the tasks fulfilled using a labour-intensive method can be fulfilled using a capital-intensive method instead. This means that while capital-intensive methods can be used to supplement labour-intensive methods, they can also be used to replace them.

These concepts underpin the theory which I developed in Chapter 7. To briefly reiterate, in this theory, change begins with the introduction of some new capital-intensive method which is more effective than previously available methods, at least at the margins. Some candidates shift resources from other methods to this new one, and the best funded candidates most of all. This makes the mixture of methods more capital-intensive overall. This yields those candidates an electoral advantage, and that electoral advantage drives other candidates to respond by raising more money and following suit. Candidates that do not raise more money perform steadily worse in elections vis-à-vis their competitors until they respond or are electorally eliminated from the process. In short, the introduction of new methods kick-starts a process of competitive fund-raising so that candidates can out-spend their rivals in rally attendance. That in turn makes parties and their candidates need more funds in order to compete electorally. This puts their financiers in positions of power. Accordingly, parties cede their financiers influence, government rents, or positions of power within the party. If they do not, those financiers can threaten to withhold those funds. These exchanges of funds for influence constitute parties' ties to their financiers, and the greater the exchanges, the closer the ties. By applying this argument to the Tanzanian case, I borrow from Edwin Babeiya.[6] Babeiya argues that CCM has met its campaign costs by raising funds from businesspersons. What I add to his account is that these campaign costs have grown as rally production has been capitalised.


In this chapter, I argue that this process was at work in Tanzania between 1995 and 2015. I use process tracing methods to substantiate these claims empirically. To make this possible, I render the causal process propounded above as a simple series of steps, as follows:

[6] Babeiya. "Electoral Corruption and the Politics of Elections Financing in Tanzania".

A. Some candidates consider using a capital-intensive method of producing rallies for the first time.
B. These candidates infer that the method in question is effective.
C. These candidates are politically well-funded already, or they develop closer ties with political financiers by ceding them positions, rents or influence.
D. They raise funds from these financiers.
E. These candidates spend a portion of those funds employing the capital-intensive methods of rally production and spend a greater portion of their funds on capital-intensive methods overall than they otherwise would have.
F. Candidates produce better, and in particular better attended, rallies. This gives them an electoral advantage.
G. Because of E, other candidates revise the effectiveness of the method by observing its use. Because of F, other candidates come under greater pressure to become more electorally competitive by raising funds and adopting the method. These candidates become the new subjects of the process in B through F, and through these connections the causal sequence becomes a chain.

Through multiple cycles of this process, candidates individually and parties in aggregate develop stronger ties to political financiers and employ more capital-intensive methods, as they respond to new information and greater competition from their rivals. This process is laid out in Figure 37.

Figure 37: Causal chain



To demonstrate that this process was at work in Tanzania, I employ process tracing. I propound a series of hypotheses which test whether individual steps in the process posited above were at work, as follows. If the stipulated process had been at work in Tanzania between 1995 and 2015, then the following would have occurred. First, CCM's and Chadema's use of capital-intensive methods of producing rallies would have grown across that period, in accordance with point E in Figure 37. This is expressed in Hypothesis 1. Second, CCM's and Chadema's campaign expenditure would have risen, in accordance with point D in Figure 37. This is expressed in Hypothesis 2. Third, rises in CCM's and Chadema's campaign expenditure would have been driven by increasing capital-intensive campaign expenditure, in accordance the link between points D and E. This is expressed in Hypothesis 3. Fourth, CCM and Chadema should have raised more funds from private

financiers, in accordance with points C and D. This is expressed in Hypothesis 4. Fifth, CCM and Chadema should have given financiers rent-seeking opportunities, posts in the party or government, or influence, in accordance with point C. This is expressed in Hypothesis 5.

These hypotheses test whether rally capitalisation drove expenditure, that expenditure drove business funding, and that business funding drove increasingly close ties between parties and their financiers. However, they do not yield reasons to conclude that rally capitalisation itself was driven by interparty competition, in accordance with points C to G in Figure 37. Nor do they reveal that innovation in campaign methods began the process, in accordance with point A in Figure 37. To demonstrate these points, I follow the introduction and proliferation of one particular capital-intensive method of election campaigning: the helicopter.

Travelling by helicopter is perhaps the paramount capital-intensive methods of rally production. Helicopters not only lend candidates speed; they are spectacles, and therefore, they draw crowds, as I demonstrate later in this chapter. Therefore, it seems fitting to focus on them. The helicopter also provides two key advantages to the researcher. First, helicopters are so expensive to hire or purchase that only a small number are employed as tools of electioneering in Tanzania. This makes their proliferation over time easy to track. Second, they are also widely spoken about and reported in the press. This means that there are ample sources of evidence about their use. By studying how the use of the helicopter developed over time, broader inferences can be made about the connection between innovation, capital-intensive rally production and competition.

Tracing the role of competition and innovation in the causal process which I developed above involves tracing diffuse and often intangible effects. Accordingly, I develop creative tests which involve careful inference. The first of these tests concerns mimicry. My theory emphasises the inferences that candidates must make about the effectiveness of the helicopter as a means of mobilising rally attendance. In Tanzania over the period in question, the helicopter was used as a campaign tool for the first time. This was a moment of innovation which maps onto point A in Figure 37 above. Before the helicopter was used for the time, candidates could not reliably infer how effective it would be as a means to mobilise rally attendance with a high degree of certainty. Until then, the causal chain should have been broken at points A and G, separating the chain that links points F and B, as illustrated in Figure 1. When a helicopter is used for the first time, it is effectively introduced to the country as a political tool. After being introduced, candidates with similarly high levels of political finance should be able to make inferences about its effectiveness and should then adopt the helicopter as well. If they do not, that would constitute a deviation from the causal chain outlined above between points E and B. In other words, if the causal process propounded above were correct, a process of horizontal contagion that should follow innovation in the use of the helicopter. This is expressed in Hypothesis 6.

The empirical scope of this chapter extends across five elections over a 20-year period. Elections offer clear moments in time over which changes in political finance and helicopter use can be tracked. Therefore, there are several cycles of the process described above to observe, both within elections and over them. Like Hypothesis 6, Hypotheses 7 and 8 concern who adopted helicopters and in what order. In particular, Hypothesis 7 concerns how parties respond to the number of helicopters used by other parties. If the process outlined above were correct, a party would not only respond to the innovating

party as described in the mimicry test above. Competitive pressures would drive it to raise further funds and seek to outdo the innovating party in order to gain an electoral advantage. In anticipation or in reaction to that, the innovating party would also try to raise further funds and employ more helicopters too. In the terms of Figure 37 above, parties would go several cycles of the causal loop that links points F, G, C, D and E. Therefore, after the initial use of a helicopter, helicopter use and party funding would have increased incrementally in each election as each party sought to compete with the other. This is expressed in Hypothesis 7. If two or more parties were hiring more helicopters election after election, each in response to the other, this would indicate that the competitive cycle outlined in Figure 37 were at work.

Hypothesis 8 concerns the order in which candidates begin to fly by helicopter. The helicopter should be adopted as a campaign tool by the richest candidates in descending order over time as candidates increasingly far down the income distribution become rich enough to afford them. If politicians did not begin to use helicopters only as they became better funded, it would constitute a deviation from the causal process outlined in Figure 37 between points B and G. This then is a test about the sequence in which candidates begin to use the helicopter, which Table 20 presents below. Once again, it would be remarkable if the process propounded above were not at work if helicopters were first used by the richest candidates, and were gradually adopted by the next best funded candidates in turn as their funding improved. The fifth section of this chapter tests each of these hypotheses in turn.

Individually, these process tracing tests are hoop tests, in the sense which I described in Chapter 1. If the evidence did not support any of these tests, one could conclude with confidence that the stipulated causal process *was not* at work. However, the issue in

question is what evidence would be sufficient to conclude that the stipulated causal process *was* at work. To determine what would be sufficient, one should consider the plausible alternative.

There is one notable plausible alternative explanation of why rally capitalisation, campaign expenditure, fund-raising and ties between parties and financiers rose in tandem in the way described by Hypotheses 1 to 5. This alternative theory, is, in fact, the most widely accepted explanation in the literature to date. Theories in this canon understand the relations between parties and financiers in rent-seeking terms.[7] As CCM is electorally dominant in Tanzania, this literature has focussed on CCM. In the view of these works, businesspeople have used their wealth to acquire positions and influence within the party and to exercise the power this brings to accumulate illicitly. For these authors, actors' wealth enables them to bribe public officials and to buy or otherwise win the support of those that control the appointment of party officials. One of the leading voices in this literature, Hazel Gray, draws together extensive evidence from cases of grand corruption that came to light in Tanzania between 1999 and 2015.[8] She shows that numerous public officials, including civil servants, attorney generals and government ministers indeed received bribes and kick-backs. In exchange, wealthy businesspeople in CCM won generously-priced government tenders, and received payments and other government rents in connection with large-scale corruption.[9] She writes, for example, that 'part of the considerable kickbacks paid… was used to bribe senior government'[10] and that 'firms that

[7] Gray. "The Political Economy of Grand Corruption in Tanzania"; Michael Lofchie. 2014. *The Political Economy of Tanzania: Decline and Recovery*. Philadelphia: University of Pensylvannia Press; Edwin Babeiya, "Electoral Corruption and the Politics of Elections Financing in Tanzania".
[8] Gray. "The Political Economy of Grand Corruption in Tanzania".
[9] ibid.
[10] ibid: 388.

received the money belonged to prominent business people with strong links to CCM and to senior members of CCM'.[11]

In these accounts, the increasingly close ties between business and the dominant party do not serve a function for the party as a whole. Indeed, CCM's electoral interests do not feature prominently in these accounts at all. Instead, the driving force in these analyses is the desire for self-enrichment of politicians and businesspeople alike. These accounts depict the capture of a dominant party by private interests, irrespective or even to the detriment of the interests of the party. While these accounts focus on CCM's electoral expenditure on peripherally, an argument that one might extract from these accounts is that rally capitalisation and campaign expenditure are effects, rather than causes, of campaign expenditure. One might, for example, argue that campaign expenditure rose as a by-product of the penetration of CCM by business interests. Once they had risen to positions of power within CCM, well-financed candidates may have capitalised their rallies simply because money was a plentiful, rather than a scarce, resource.

In reality, it is almost certainly the case that the relationship between process of campaign capitalisation and the changing political economy of CCM described above are endogenous, that rally capitalisation drove change in parties and that change in parties drove further rally capitalisation. However, if Hypotheses 1, 2, 3, 6 and 7 were supported by the evidence, the *strong* version of the alternative explanation described above, that rent-seeking *alone* drove rally capitalisation, would be improbable. If the strong version of the alternative explanation were true, it would account for rally capitalisation and rising campaign expenditure by CCM, but not by Chadema. While one might plausibly argue that campaign funding is a plentiful resource in CCM, no such claim can plausibly made about

[11] ibid: 392.

Chadema. Indeed, as my own research has shown, Chadema depended on its funding to build the party between elections.[12] If rally capitalisation were superfluous to the outcome of the campaign, it is improbable that Chadema would have expended such large sums on it regardless. If the evidence shows that Chadema capitalised its rallies, that campaign expenditure rose over time and that a large portion of that campaign expenditure was constituted by capital-intensive methods of producing rallies, it would serve as evidence against the strong version of this alternative explanation.

If the evidence supports Hypotheses 6 and 7 too, this will provide further grounds to conclude that the strong version of the alternative explanation is not applicable to CCM either. If CCM rally capitalisation were the product of expenditure on excess funding on superfluous ends, there would be no reason for CCM to respond to innovation by Chadema by mimicking it. Nor would there be a reason for Chadema and CCM alike to each employ more capital-intensive methods each time their rival did so. Altogether, Hypotheses 1, 2, 3, 6 and 7, if passed, not only serve as direct evidence that the causal process advanced in this chapter. They also help to discount the alternative explanation.

If the evidence in support of Hypotheses 1, 2, 3, 6 and 7 exclude the alternative explanation, my stipulation is that evidence in support of Hypotheses 1 to 8 are sufficient to demonstrate that the stipulated causal process was at work. In this case, one could conclude that the stipulated causal process in part drove the increasingly close relationships between parties and financiers in Tanzania, but one could not conclude that it was the only such driver.

[12] Paget. "Authoritarian Origins of Well-Organised Opposition Parties".

An implication of this argument is that in one sense at least, the rally is not an 'old' form of campaigning. To date, work on political communication and mass media in the comparative literature and the Africanist literature alike have associated innovation in campaigning with 'new' media. The Africanist focus on mobile phones and the Internet in particular is typical of this mode of thought.[13] In this chapter, I show that in Tanzania, the rally is home to innovation, re-appropriation and experimentation. In each of these ways, the rally represents not just the past, but the near future as well.

[13] Herman Wasserman. 2011. "Mobile Phones, Popular Media, and Everyday African Democracy: Transmissions and Transgressions." *Popular Communication* 9(2):146–58; Simplice Asongu and Jacinta Nwachukwu. 2016. "The Mobile Phone in the Diffusion of Knowledge for Institutional Quality in Sub-Saharan Africa." *World Development* 86:133–47; Guy Grossman, Macartan Humphreys, and Gabriella Sacramone-Lutz. 2014. "'I Wld like U WMP to Extend Electricity 2 Our Village': On Information Technology and Interest Articulation." *American Political Science Review* 108(3):688–705.

Table 20: Process tracing hypotheses

	Hypothesis	**Subject evidence is about**	**Evidence against alternative explanation?**	**Corresponding points in Figure 1**
Hypothesis 1	CCM and Chadema's use of capital-intensive methods of producing rallies rose over time.	Rally production	Yes	E
Hypothesis 2	CCM and Chadema's campaign expenditure rose over time	Campaign expenditure	Yes	D
Hypothesis 3	CCM and Chadema's rises in campaign expenditure were constituted by spending on capital-intensive methods of rally production.	Campaign expenditure	Yes	D-E
Hypothesis 4	CCM and Chadema's funding from private sources increased.	Party funding	Yes	D
Hypothesis 5	CCM and Chadema's developed closer ties to financiers by ceding them positions, rents and influence.	Parties' ties to financiers	No	C
Hypothesis 6	After the helicopter was used for the first time by one candidate, other equally and better funded candidates adopted the helicopter.	Mimicry or horizontal contagion	Yes	A-E and E-B
Hypothesis 7	Every time a major party increased how many helicopters it uses, other major parties responded by increasing how many they used.	Competitive outbidding	Yes	B-G
Hypothesis 8	Helicopter travel was adopted by the richest candidates first, followed by the next richest and so on, in sequence.	Trickle-down or vertical contagion	No	B-G

Labour- and capital-intensive methods of mobilising rally attendance

As I discussed at length in Chapter 5, the conventional means of producing rallies and mobilising people to attend rallies in particular is through local actors. Specifically, in Tanzania they do so through local party actors. Local branches produce rallies first by *notifying* local residents, as described in Chapter 5. Conventionally, announcements are rudimentary. The party asks callers to announce the meeting at the top of their lungs or they 'find a young man who will play the pipe/whistle.'[14] Others distribute banners and leaflets.[15] Second, beyond notifying people, local party actors *mobilise* them to attend the rally by canvassing them, as described in Chapter 6.

Third, branches physically *prepare* the grounds for the rally, erecting flags, bunting and if necessary, a stage. In the process, they *create congregation points* for rallies that gather crowds in advance. At a rally for CCM parliamentary candidate Hanif Mansoor in Kwimba constituency, Mwanza Region, a local CCM troop assembled in advance. They had set out chairs, erected a small stereo, and assembled a small choir, decked out in CCM regalia. However, this did not mean that the rally was about to start. It was more than an hour before the parliamentary candidate arrived.[16] This was not accidental or atypical. At rallies in Dodoma Town, Mwanza Town, Sengerema District, Iramba District and Ikungi District, local organisers began their work similarly early. The purpose of these early arrivals was to muster a crowd before the candidate arrived.

[14] Anonymous. 2015f.
[15] Anonymous. 2017i. *Interview*, Chadema district campaign team.
[16] "Rally for CCM Parliamentary Candidate for Kwimba Constituency Hanif, Mansoor." *Field Notes*, Nyamirana Ward.

Fourth, local party actors arrange and participate in various activities designed to *foster festivity*. These entertainers range from praise singers, to poets, hip hop artists, dancers and choirs. Large women's choirs or dancing groups called *ngoma* are most typical. Often these groups are officially affiliated to parties. I saw these groups perform almost everywhere I went. Often, they are one of the most enjoyable parts of a rally which carry on long after the politics has finished. At one rally convened by a Jesca Kishoa, a Chadema parliamentary candidate, my notes read:

> '16:13 Mwenyekiti [The chairperson] is asked to close the meeting. Women dance and sing…
> 16:41 The dancing continues! It's 16:41, and it's basically turned into a free-for all party. The music has sped up and a variety of people have joined in...'

One Chadema parliamentary campaign manager was explicit about the purposes of these festivities; 'we played music to attract people'.[17] This was the conclusion reached by domestic observers of the 2010 election too. They believe that entertainers serve both to create congregation points and to make rallies enjoyable:

> 'The use of performing arts forms such as drama, comedy, poetry and dance shows …Their key function was often to pull crowds and entertain them while waiting for the main speakers for the day to arrive.'[18]

Fifth, local parties arrange for euphoric and sometimes ritualised greetings of candidates which are designed as *performed celebrations* of candidates. I attended a rally in Vwawa at which CCM exemplified these performances of welcome. My field notes record that the CCM parliamentary candidate Japhet Hasunga was:

[17] Anonymous. 2017a. *Phone Interview*, Chadema constituency campaign manager.
[18] TEMCO Election Observation Mission 2010: 54.

> '…greeted by a large procession dressed in CCM paraphernalia... the entire village is here. We walk with the procession into village centre. There, another parade starts, involving costumes, and hand hoes like the one in the CCM symbol. This carries on for five minutes. The MP is incorporated into that procession.'[19]

These celebrations serve to lend status to the candidate, and to add to the momentousness of the event. All of the conventional methods of mobilising rally attendance described above are linked. Each is labour-intensive; it requires large quantities of campaigners' time. Equally, each is capital-light; it requires little equipment at all.

Some in Tanzania speak as if the branch is the only organisation that can summon a crowd. One ward chairman told me 'we go there physically and announce that there will be a meeting; there is no other way.'[20] This is certainly how things were done in the past. One account of the election campaign of 1995 read 'when the campaigns finally got underway, they entailed rallies, posters, flags, songs, dancing, political messages delivered over megaphones from cars, and 'door to door' campaigning.'[21] However, a close examination of rallies in contemporary Tanzania reveals that new methods have been devised and deployed to draw voters into audiences. Parties have turned gradually to these methods since 1995.

The efforts of branch members to *notify* residents about forthcoming rallies have been supplemented by capital-intensive methods. First, in an interesting example of campaign hybridity, parties pay for advertisements on local radio channels to announce forthcoming

[19] "Rally for CCM's Parliamentary Candidate for Vwawa Constituency, Japhet Hasunga." *Field Notes*, Unknown Village, Vwawa District, September 27.
[20] Anonymous. 2015q. *Interview*, Chadema ward chairperson.
[21] Rickey and Ponte: 82.

rallies. A Chadema parliamentary candidate's campaign manager explained that 'Radio is the easier way I can say, because you reach a lot of people'.[22] Another parliamentary candidate's campaign manager reported that 'we used a radio… they helped us with announcements [of rallies].'[23]

Beyond radio, candidates announce their rallies using public address (PA) systems: a stereo, normally mounted on a vehicle. Needless to say, stereos were not new campaign tools in Tanzania in 1995. However, their role has changed. In 1995, if a parliamentary candidate had a PA system, he probably had only one, which followed the candidate and was used to amplify his address to the audience. In 2015, many candidates fielded several vehicles with mounted stereos simultaneously, and while one was reserved for speakers, others were deployed to make all aware of a rally. As one CCM official explained, 'we get a vehicle mounted with a public address system which we use to go around the community announcing that there will be a rally'.[24] Such is the advantage of the PA that candidates undergo great labours to keep it. One campaign manager described that 'when we reach a point at which there is no road we leave the car behind, take the horn speaker and march by foot.'[25]

The advantage of a PA is its volume. A Chadema district secretary explained that 'they can't miss because the music they hear; they know she has come and this attracts even those in the neighbouring villages.'[26] Supplementing callers and musicians with PAs is an unambiguous case of rally production capitalisation. Dispatching callers and musicians to announce rallies is labour-intensive, dispatching vehicles with mounted PAs to announce

[22] Anonymous. 2017a.
[23] Anonymous. 2017a.
[24] Anonymous. 2015c.
[25] ibid.
[26] Afayo.

rallies is capital-intensive, and both fulfil the same task. As parties have supplemented the former with the latter in Tanzania, the mixture of methods that parties use has become more capital-intensive overall.

Vehicle-mounted PAs were used not only to notify residents but to *prepare* grounds for a rally and to *form congregation points*. In the simplest cases, a van with a PA is dispatched to the site of a forthcoming rally, where it will play music and become a visible - indeed, an audible – sign that a rally is soon to begin. I witnessed this happen at countless rallies.[27] However, often candidates dispatch not just a vehicle with a mounted PA, but an entire mobile stage. At their most modest, these consist of scaffolding or a small platform which is erected on site.[28] However, richer parliamentary candidates and presidential candidates often travel with trucks that have been especially converted so that they can be quickly transformed into mobile stages that stand on the base or the roof of the truck.[29] These trucks come equipped with far superior and louder public address systems, as well as generators.

This assortment of capital-intensive methods allowed candidates to convene several rallies in tandem that they were free to then move between rapidly. In Sengerema constituency, the Chadema candidate, a local businessman explained 'we have eight zones with three wards. Each zone has a vehicle fitted with a public address system, the vehicle goes around the wards announcing that there will be a rally in one of the three wards, in a separate zone a similar announcement is made, my task is then to… [move from zone A] to B then to

[27] "Rally for CCM Parliamentary Candidate for Iramba, Mwigulu Nchemba." *Field Notes*, Kinampanda Village, Iramba District, October 22.
[28] "Rally for Chadema Parliamentary Candidate for Sengerema Constituency, Hamis Tabasam." *Field Notes,* Buyagu Village, Vwawa District, September 20.
[29] "Rally for Chadema Vice Presidential Candidate Juma Duni." *Field Notes*, Dodoma, October 9.

C.'[30] CCM PA trucks worked to a similar rhythm in Iramba.[31] By working in relay, PA trucks make it possible for candidates to form several congregation points at once.

Further still, the PA is used to *foster festivity*. The PA brings the promise of loud music. While radios and televisions are relatively common in contemporary Tanzania, citizens rarely get the chance to dance to music with such volume or base. At one rally in Vwawa constituency, many people seemed to have come more for music than to hear the candidate speak. Between each speaker taking to the stage, music would play and people rushed to dance in the interim.[32] Altogether, the spread of the vehicle-mounted PA system is an archetypal example of how methods of rally attendance mobilisation have changed over time in Tanzania. The gradual increase in the use of the stereo has supplemented and in some cases replaced the role of branch in a number of tasks, including notifying residents, preparing the site of the rally, forming congregation points and fostering festivity.

Leaving PAs to one side, the use of vehicles in general has increased since 1995. Vehicles are used to transport voters to the site of the rally. This technique was first used at presidential candidates' rallies to transport those from far-flung towns and villages that the candidate would otherwise not see. However, since then, this means of drawing voters to rallies has been imitated by parliamentary and councillor candidates too. My field notes record trucks carrying voters in Vwawa, Ikungi, Iramba and Mwanza.[33] A CCM district campaign manager said that they employed twenty vehicles in addition to buses in order to

[30] Hamis Tabasam. 2015. *Interview*, Sengerema Town, Sengerema District, September 21.
[31] "Rally for CCM Parliamentary Candidate for Iramba, Mwigulu Nchemba." *Field Notes*, Kinampanda Village.
[32] "Rally for CCM Parliamentary Candidate for Vwawa Constituency Japhet Hasunga." *Field Notes*, Ilolo Ward, Vwawa District, September 28.
[33] "Rally for CCM's Parliamentary Candidate for Vwawa Constituency, Japhet Hasunga." *Field Notes*, Unknown Village, Vwawa District, September 27; "Rally for Chadema Parliamentary Candidate for Ikungi Constituency, Tundu Lissu." *Field Notes*, Ikungi Town, Ikungi District October 23; "Rally for CCM Parliamentary Candidate for Iramba, Mwigulu Nchemba." *Field Notes*, Kinampanda Village.

transport voters.[34] Sometimes those that are transported to rallies are reportedly paid, other times, they are reportedly not. This is a means of mobilising voters to attend rallies, in this case by lowering the cost, not altogether unlike the efforts made by local actors to *mobilise* people to attend rallies. By this means, candidates can in effect address people from several villages or neighbourhoods at one meeting.

Equally, candidates travel to rallies at the head of large convoys of vehicles. These convoys *foster festivity* and a sense of excitement at rallies. In effect, by forming convoys, candidates constructed travelling carnivals to accompany them. Whether there were a local choir to greet them or not, they could rely on the noise, size and colour of their motorcade to create a travelling sense of jubilation. I describe in my field notes that at one such rally, 'Five or six cars arrive with more *boda boda* [motorcycle taxis] all carrying Chadema flags. There is excitement and people and in particular children and young men chase them around the grounds excitedly'.[35] Experienced campaigners thought that the excitement that a large convoy created was important to draw people to the rally. Chadema Central Committee member Mwesiga Baregu remarked on precisely this subject that 'You must give a lot of that. Create energy.'[36]

These motorcades are also designed to achieve the momentousness and excitement of *performed celebrations*. In particular, the convoy is a display of status, with each vehicle in the train adding to the status of the candidate. Thus Hanif Mansoor, the CCM MP for Kwimba, arrived in a convoy led by four cars and approximately twenty motor-bikes.[37] Equally, when CCM's newly nominated presidential candidate John Pombe Magufuli visited Mwanza in late July, he was accompanied from the airport to the CCM regional

[34] Anonymous. 2017d. *Interview*, CCM district campaign team.
[35] 'Rally for Chadema Vice Presidential Candidate Juma Duni'.
[36] Mwesiga Baregu. 2015a. *Interview*, Dar es Salaam, August 9.
[37] "Rally for CCM Parliamentary Candidate for Kwimba Constituency Hanif, Mansoor."

office by perhaps a hundred cars and several hundred motor-bikes, CCM flags streaming behind them. Describing his motorcycle convoy, one councillor candidate remarked that 'Mine was huge; I can say that boda-boda [motorcycle taxis] contributed on my victory'.[38] In these ways too, the effects that were achieved in the past by the branch were progressively achieved, often on a grander scale, by the centre using capital-intensive methods.

The most capital-intensive vehicle used to produce rallies is the helicopter. Candidates fly in part for speed. Numerous helicopters in Tanzania can reach speeds of between approximately 120 and 150 miles per hour,[39] far faster than Tanzania's 50 miles per hour speed limit on trunk roads. This enables candidates to multiply how many rally sites they can reach in a day, and how far apart they might be. A member of CUF's national secretariat, Ismail Jussa, explained that 'It helped us to reach out to many areas. For example, almost seven to eight meetings per day'.[40] One Chadema candidate that flew by helicopter explained 'it is not possible to reach all of them [the rally sites] by driving, which is why I use a chopper; there are far-flung places which we will use a chopper to reach.[41] Evidently, this mobility is of enormous use.

Helicopters also *foster festivity* by lending the candidate status and giving the rally a sense of momentousness. It has this effect because the helicopter effuses modernity; it combines elegance in design with the power of flight. Chadema Central Committee member Tundu Lissu remarked that 'For a lot of people, aeroplanes are things you see up in the sky.'[42] Equally, it conveys an immediate and palpable sense of power that anyone who has felt the

[38] Anonymous. 2017i.
[39] Everett Aviation. 2017. "Everett Aviation." Retrieved March 13, 2018 (http://www.everettaviation.com/index).
[40] Ismail Jussa. 2017b. *Skype Interview*, December 6.
[41] Tabasam.
[42] Tundu Lissu. 2015b. *Interview*, Dar es Salaam, August 9.

air vibrate with the beating wings of a helicopter will understand. One Chadema leader told me that the helicopter 'suggests power and importance'.[43] This extraordinary dimension of the helicopter *mobilises* voters to attend rallies. One Chadema parliamentary candidate remarked that 'The chopper attracts masses, people come to rallies to see it'.[44] Baregu agreed that 'it's also a major rallying tool'.[45] Its power to excite makes it not altogether unlike the other efforts that parties and candidates go to in order to *mobilise* people to come to the rally.

The evidence for this exciting quality of the rally extends beyond third-party accounts. At one illustrative rally in 2005, Chadema Chairman Freeman Mbowe arrived by helicopter. A local newspaper reported that 'The helicopter hovering within the Usa-River caused major stir in the township as thousands of people left their regular tasks and rushed towards the open air venue'.[46] I witnessed the draw of the helicopter first-hand. At a rally for a CCM parliamentary candidate in a small village in Iramba, my field notes read as follows:

> '13:42 Helicopter can be heard. It is approaching.
>
> 13:45 It lands. People stream into the field.
>
> 13:51 439 people are presented, and more are coming. They have come in large numbers.'
>
> 13:55 More people have come. On a second count, 510 people.'[47]

In total, approximately 600 people arrived in just twenty minutes of the helicopter landing.[48] Of all the parliamentary candidates' rallies that I witnessed during the election campaign, I never saw a crowd gather at a faster rate.

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[43] Baregu. 2015a.
[44] Tabasam.
[45] Baregu. 2015a.
[46] Staff reporter. 2005. "Mad Rush to View Mbowe's Chopper at Usa-River." *Arusha Times*, Arusha, December 3.
[47] "Rally for CCM Parliamentary Candidate for Iramba, Mwigulu Nchemba." *Field Notes*, Kinampanda Village.

Helicopters' pilots seemed to understand that they were a spectacle, and they pandered to their audiences. I witnessed this first-hand. Chadema's presidential candidate flew by helicopter to the rally in Singida Town. My field notes record that:

> 'A helicopter arrives. It makes three passes past the mikutano [rally], over that period. On the third pass, it lands. Everyone rushes over to where it lands.'[49]

The pilot flew the helicopter in a long elliptical orbit around People's, the square on the outskirts of Singida Town where the rally was to be held. The pilot may have been deciding where to land the helicopter, but she was also putting on a show. Her orbital path was unnecessarily wide. It took the helicopter far past the grounds and over the body of Singida Town. Altogether, as my field notes record, this impromptu air show lasted eight minutes. The pilot was *notifying* all in the town that Chadema's presidential candidate had arrived. These tactics are commonplace in Tanzania. One campaign veteran said that 'the chopper would hover around the city, town and village, and that way draw people to go the rally.'[50]

In this regard, the helicopter can fulfil many of the core tasks normally undertaken using other means. While it is typically, and perhaps ideally, used in conjunction with a series of measures, it draws voters to rallies in large numbers without them. It is also evident in presidential candidates' rallies. In combination with mobile truck stages, presidential candidates carry the lion's share of the burden of mobilising rally attendance. For this reason, Lissu suggests that the helicopter can be conceived of as a substitute or even an alternative to conventional methods of campaigning:

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[48] ibid.
[49] ibid.
[50] Baregu. 2015a.

> '…door-to-door campaigning, and they [CCM] have a lot of people doing that, but that's no substitute for someone who comes in and for the first time in the life of that village, there is a chopper.'[51]

In fact, such is the excitement induced by the arrival of a helicopter that often it can be used in place of local efforts to draw a crowd altogether. In Mbowe's presidential campaign of 2005, he travelled to each rally by helicopter, and this compensated for Chadema's patchwork set of branches. Lissu said that the helicopter:

> '…covered up quite a few of our weaknesses. We didn't have party structures on the ground. Without a chopper, we wouldn't have been able to organise rallies. We simply wouldn't have been competitive… [because they flew by helicopter] we were able to get a huge number, to compensate for the lack of ground troops.'[52]

The substitution of helicopter for local preparation was most stark in a description of the rally in 2005 described above. A reporter remarked that:

> 'Even the CHADEMA officials in Arumeru, seem to have totally invested their hopes in the chopper, as they made little effort to announce the meeting and didn't even bother to equip the venue with proper sound system or respectable stage. Mbowe had to address the rally from a tiny and shaky wooden platform.'[53]

In these instances, Chadema abandoned all other means of attracting a crowd, but was nonetheless still able to gather a sizeable audience; this illustrates the power of the draw of

[51] Tundu Lissu. 2015b.
[52] ibid.
[53] Staff reporter. 2005. "Mad Rush to View Mbowe's Chopper at Usa-River."

the helicopter. All of this evidence shows that Chadema actively used helicopter where they lacked other means of mobilising rally attendance. This makes it especially clear that helicopters fulfil the same rally production tasks as labour-intensive methods; in these cases, helicopters were used in the absence of local party actors altogether.

In sum, I have outlined five tasks that parties and their candidates undertake to produce rallies and to draw voters to them: notifying voters, convincing voters, forming congregation points, fostering festivity and performing celebration. I have shown that conventionally, parties relied on local actors to fulfil these tasks using labour-intensive methods. However, I have shown that parties have devised increasingly capital-intensive methods of completing them. While their technologies are not new in and of themselves, they have put them to increasingly innovative uses. As they are used to complete the same tasks, capital-intensive methods can be used to supplement labour-intensive methods, or replace them if necessary. For ease of reference, I have summarised the labour- and capital-intensive ways of doing each of these tasks which I have discussed above in Table 21. Moreover, I have shown that both CCM and Chadema turned to them increasingly over time. This constitutes substantial support for Hypothesis 1.

Table 21: Labour- and capital-intensive methods of mobilising rally attendance, by task

Tasks to produce rallies	Labour-intensive methods	Capital-intensive methods
Notify voter	Announce by calling, announce with an instrument, mount fliers or posters.	Dispatch vehicle-mounted public address systems; radio broadcasts.
Mobilise attendance	Convince voters to attend by speaking to them face-to-face.	Put on vehicles to transport voters to the rally.
Form congregation points and prepare the site	Gather party members; erect flags, bunting and a stage.	Dispatch a vehicle-mounted public address system; dispatch a mobile-stage truck
Foster festivity	Gather a choir or dance group; find a local performer	Hire a choir or dance group; hire professional performers; hire celebrities; dispatch a mobile-stage truck or other vehicles with loudspeakers.
Perform celebration	Form a welcome group.	Arrive with a convoy of vehicles.

Rising election campaign expenditure

In the previous section, I showed that between 1995 and 2015, parties' methods of producing rallies became more capital-intensive in Tanzania. In this section, I show that over the same period, campaign expenditure rose across parties, which supports Hypothesis 2. I proceed to show that these rises in expenditure were made up of higher spending on rally production capitalisation, which supports Hypothesis 3.

There are few publicly available sources that aggregate parties' campaign spending. However, numerous qualitative accounts form a picture of low campaign expenditure in 1995, especially opposition campaign expenditure. One unsuccessful opposition parliamentary candidate from the 1995 election, Tundu Lissu, recalled that 'in 1995 when I

first contested, and I had nothing to my name, I didn't have a car, I didn't have money.'[54] These conditions were common across opposition parties in 1995.[55] Ismail Jussa, CUF's Director of Foreign Affairs and International Relations told me that 'In 1995...the new parties then had a lot of issues with financing'.[56] While the state provided a small subsidy for each parliamentary candidate, this covered only a portion of campaign costs.[57] A briefing of the 1995 election states that 'few rallies took place in the first weeks of the campaign' because opposition candidates could not afford to travel for the entire campaign period.[58] Years later, in 2004, one MP narrated that 'Some money had to be found, and the party didn't have money.'[59] Testaments such as these to opposition poverty in Tanzania during the first years of multiparty elections are commonplace.

Many accounts stress the wealth of CCM candidates in the 1990s *relative* to their opponents in the opposition as early as the 1990s.[60] However, while CCM was relatively well-funded even then, both CCM's and Chadema's campaign expenditure rose between 1995 and 2015. Describing 1995, a CCM councillor recalled 'all the campaigns we conducted in 1995, as he [another interviewee present] has said were not as strong'.[61] Describing the 2005 general elections, Chadema former chairman Edwin Mtei writes that 'so much money was spent by the ruling party… that it began to seem futile for the other parties to remain in the race.'[62] The evidence of rising spending became stronger still in the 2010 election. Domestic election observers judged that in 2010:

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[54] Lissu. 2015a.
[55] Mmuya and Chaligha; Shayo.
[56] Ismail. 2017. *Skype Interview*, December 6.
[57] One million Tanzanian Shillings
[58] Rickey and Ponte: 81.
[59] Lissu. 2015a.
[60] Mmuyu and Chaligha; Shayo.
[61] Anonymous. 2015r. *Interview*, CCM ward councillor.
[62] Edwin Mtei. 2009. *From Goatherd to Governor: The Autobiography of Edwin Mtei*. Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota: 217.

> '…the campaign materials for the bigger parties, especially the ruling CCM, are clearly more elaborate and expensive in this than in previous elections. Even a casual observer of these campaign materials will not fail to conclude that this was a very expensive election and that some parties and candidates have spent fortunes.'[63]

These increases in party finance continued from one election to the next. A separate report by domestic election observers in 2015 concluded that 'it is obvious that the spending by some of the candidates and political parties was above the required ceiling under the 2010 election expenses law.'[64]

Equally, from 2005 and onwards, Chadema spending rose steadily too. Describing the 2010 election, the European Union Observation Mission wrote that 'the main parties [which were unambiguously CCM and Chadema] did not seem to have problems to finance their campaigns'.[65] They describe in detail 'the huge investments during campaigns in material goods and money'.[66] Tanzanian politicians give similar first-hand accounts of recent changes in campaign expenditure. Politicians agreed that 'The 2015 election was very expensive.'[67] Equally, Tanzanian politicians agreed that the increases had been incremental. One CCM ward account attested that 'the last election the spending increased'.[68] When one Chadema councillor was asked whether he believed the campaign spending increased between 2005 and 2015, he succinctly answered 'yes'.[69] In sum, this amounts to significant evidence in support of Hypothesis 2.

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[63] TEMCO Election Observation Mission 2010: 8.
[64] TACCEO. 2016. *Report on the United Republic of Tanzania General Elections of 2015*. Dar es Salaam: 305.
[65] European Union Election Observation Mission. 2010. *Tanzania. General Election October 2010. Final Report*: 24.
[66] European Union Election Observation Mission. 2010. *Tanzania. General Election October 2010. Final Report*: 138.
[67] Anonymous. 2017h. *Interview*, Chadema district campaign team.
[68] Anonymous. 2017k. *Interview*, Chadema branch accountant.
[69] Anonymous. 2017l. *Interview*, Chadema councillor candidate.

Five candidates and campaign managers gave me estimates of the total costs of their parliamentary campaigns in 2015. These estimates, converted into United States Dollars using the mid-market rate of exchange of 25th October 2015, and then rounded to the nearest hundred, ranged between $16,100 and $92,200, and cluster at $46,000.[70] Two councillor candidates placed their total campaign expenditure at $3,200 and between $4,100 and $4,600 respectively. These figures are high. As a point of reference, GDP per capita[71] in Tanzania stood at $836 in 2015. Given the sensitive nature of the questions, it is plausible, if not likely that these sources underestimated their campaign costs. As some of these estimates exceed the legal campaign limits, I will preserve the anonymity of these interviewees.[72]

These estimates, however crude, provide a benchmark against which to measure the proportion of their campaign expenditure that candidates dedicated to capital-intensive methods of rallies in 2015. Various interviewees gave the price of hiring a car for one day at between $23 and $69,[73] depending on the vehicle specifications. These estimates are slightly lower than, but are commensurate with, the price quotes I received from small car-rentals in Mwanza City.[74] For all 64 days of the official election campaign in Tanzania, this amounts to between $1,472 and $4,416 respectively. Taking the $46,000 as a parliamentary candidate's campaign budget, at these prices, a single car would account for between 3.2% and 9.6% of total budgeted expenditure. Campaign managers and candidates estimated the daily price of hiring a vehicle complete with a PA system at between $46 and $115,[75] and so

[70] The five estimates were as follows: 1) between $16,100 and $23,100; 2) $27,700 and $36,900; 3) $46,000 or more; and 4) between $46,000 and $69,156; and 5) between $46,000 and $92,200
[71] I do not use a purchasing power parity measure here, because the cost estimates were also given in Tanzanian Shillings and then converted at market rates.
[72] Anonymous. 2015d; Anonymous. 2017a; Anonymous. 2017b; Anonymous. 2017c; Anonymous. 2017d.
[73] Anonymous. 2017b; Anonymous. 2017c; Anonymous. 2017l.
[74] Dan Paget, 'Receipt for Car and Driver Hire' 24 October 2015.
[75] Anonymous. 2017a; Anonymous. 2017b; Anonymous. 2017g; Anonymous. 2017i.

a cross-campaign price of between $2,944 and $7,360, between 6.4% and 16% of typical budgeted campaign expenditure.

These numbers are large themselves, but I demonstrated at length above that parliamentary candidates normally hire not just one vehicle or two vehicles, but small squadrons of them. For example, one Chadema parliamentary candidate's campaign manager relayed that 'we hired not less than four or five cars'.[76] Most rely on at least two vehicles with mounted PA systems. I saw several that relied on five or more. PA vehicles aside, candidates travelled with between three and six vehicles, and sometimes as many as 20.[77] The sum of the cost of hiring and fuelling these vehicles is enough to consume the majority of a candidate's budget.

Finally, helicopters dwarf other campaign expenditures. A quote which I received from a Tanzanian aviation company put the price of helicopter hire for each hour of flight at $3,250 exclusive of landing and pilot fees. While this quote might inflate the cost, it is commensurable with estimates which a Tanzanian politician gave me, of $2,000 per hour. To protect the commercial and legal interests of both company and politician concerned respectively, I leave these sources unnamed. At the lower of these prices, one four-hour day of flight would make a serious dent in the typical $46,000 parliamentary candidate's campaign cost. Twelve four-hour days' flight would exceed this typical campaign budget altogether.

These figures alone should make clear that capital-intensive methods of producing rallies made-up a significant portion and often a majority of parties' electoral expenditure in 2015. If total campaign expenditure rose significantly between 1995 and 2015, and a majority of

[76] Anonymous. 2017a.
[77] ibid.

2015 spending was on capital-intensive rally production, it is a mathematical necessity that at least a portion of those rises in total expenditure were driven by rising expenditure on capital-intensive rally production. The fact that rally production became much more capital-intensive over the same period makes it all but certain that rising campaign expenditure was driven by capital-intensive rally production.

Interviewees themselves attest to this at length. Chadema ward campaign manager said 'that the most expensive things were equipment and transport for making public announcements.'[78] Similarly, a CCM ward-level official reported that 'the most expensive things were the transport and music systems'[79] These sentiments were echoed at the parliamentary level. A Chadema parliamentary candidate's campaign manager told me that 'The most expensive thing was transportation'.[80] Another affirmed that 'in campaigns you must use cars, and PA systems, all of those are hired, and they are expensive'.[81] Similarly, when a CCM parliamentary candidate's campaign manager was asked what the most expensive campaign parts of the campaign were, he replied 'The public announcement and music truck, and traditional dance group as the candidate was moving around with them and so had to be transported.'[82]

This evidence all attests to the great burden that rallies place on candidates' expenses. Ismail Jussa of CUF told me that 'most of the funds that we have used go into the rallies in the campaign… the rallies come at the top.'[83] When asked 'which was the most expensive thing during that exercise [the campaign]?' one ward councillor campaign manager replied

[78] Anonymous. 2017j.
[79] Anonymous. 2017k.
[80] Anonymous. 2017h.
[81] Anonymous. 2017e. *Phone Interview*, Chadema district management team.
[82] Anonymous. 2017g. *Phone Interview*, CCM district campaign team.
[83] Jussa. 2017b.

'Basically the rallies' costs are very high'[84]. Another went so far as to confess that 'Sometime you minimise the number of your rallies to reduce costs'.[85] More specifically, I have demonstrated that in 2015, a large portion of parliamentary and councillor candidates' expenditure was dedicated to capital-intensive methods of producing rallies. It follows necessarily that a large portion of the rises in campaign spending between 1995 and 2015 came from increasingly capital-intensive methods of rally production. Competition has driven campaign spending, but more specifically, it has driven it through the causal process of rally production capitalisation described above. One Chadema official described the change over time as follows:

> '…there has been a cost increase in the past elections. Science and technology use was not common, compared to contemporary elections, in which we evidently make use of modern technology, like helicopters, social medias, radio, and other modern facilities. I believe to attain all these, a lot of money is needed.'[86]

Similarly, a CCM MP told me that 'The techniques used in 1995 can't be used again in this era even science and technology is different from 1995 and so during this era we are forced to do campaigns scientifically.'[87] In sum, there is compelling evidence in support of Hypotheses 2 and 3.

Parties' funding and ties to financiers

In the preceding section, I demonstrated empirically that as rally production becomes more capital-intensive, it becomes more expensive. In this section, I turn to the effect of rally

[84] Anonymous. 2017m. *Interview*, Chadema branch chairperson.
[85] Anonymous. 2017j.
[86] Anonymous. 2017i.
[87] Lugola.

production capitalisation on parties' ties to financiers. Party finance in Tanzania is notoriously opaque, and politicians jealously guard the confidentiality of their funding. Nonetheless, as far as possible, I seek to show in this section that parties have met these rising expenses by turning to private sources of finance, primarily to Tanzania's domestic business sector. One might conclude that evidence of both rising expenditure and rising business donations is sufficient to reasonably conclude that parties' ties to business are strengthening. Regardless of whether it can be demonstrated that parties offer business something in exchange for funding their campaigns, it can be confidently inferred from those facts. However, in this section, I go on to present further evidence which also shows that parties have ceded influence to their financiers in Tanzania.

CCM has numerous financial assets.[88] It also receives the lion's share of government subventions, which are allocated to political parties in proportion to their MPs and their share of the vote in the most recent presidential elections. However, beyond these sources of income, CCM relies on financiers to fund its election campaign expenditure, and this reliance has grown over time. A number of Tanzania's richest businesspersons have openly donated to CCM. These include Mohammed Dewji, Reginald Mengi, Rostam Azizi, Said Salim Bakhresa, Abdulaziz Abood, and Salim Turky, among others.[89]

Beyond these famous businesspeople, which have given to the party nationally, numerous interviewees confided that parliamentary and councillor candidates' campaigns are often funded with the support of business too. One CCM official said that 'Most of the time,

[88] Mmuyu and Chaligha; Morse; Richard Whitehead. 2011. "Historical Legacies, Clientelism and the Capacity to Fight: Exploring Pathways to Regime Tenure in Tanzania." *Democratization* 19(6):1–31; Tsubura.
[89] Gray. "The Political Economy of Grand Corruption in Tanzania"; Gray. "Industrial Policy and the Political Settlement in Tanzania": 185; Mfonobong Nsehe. 2017. "Ten Tanzanian Multi-Millionaires You Should Know." *Forbes*, New York, May 9.

politicians are close to business people… the costs [of campaigning] are huge.'[90] A CCM parliamentary candidate's campaign manager said that during the 2015 campaign:

> '…we used business people, through business associations fundraising, also individual business people who are not in the associations contribute, but most of the time there is a formulated system for business people fundraising to the candidate.'[91]

A campaign manager said that his parliamentary candidate was funded by a 'mix of people, including business people, friends, and family members.[92] A leading figure from another party told me that the CCM 'has links with big businessmen. They have always been getting support from the big businessmen in Dar es Salaam'.[93] While these donations are often in cash, sometimes they were in kind. One parliamentary campaign manager said that 'Most of the time we get help from sponsors. For example, Coca Cola gave us a truck'.[94] This all supports Hypothesis 4, that parties' raised more funds from private sources over time.

CCM not only receives donations from businesspeople. It incorporates many of them directly into the party, making them its candidates and its office holders. Of the list of seven businesspeople cited above four – Dewji, Azizi, Abood and Turky – have been CCM MPs at some point or other. These individuals are indicative of a wider trend. Gray writes that 'An increasing number of CCM MPs also came from the private sector'.[95] My sources agree; a Tanzanian journalist, Erick Mwakibete, told me that:

[90] Anonymous. 2017g.
[91] Anonymous. 2017d.
[92] Anonymous. 2017g.
[93] Jussa. 2017b.
[94] Anonymous. 2017d..
[95] Gray, 'Industrial Policy and the Political Settlement in Tanzania: Aspects of Continuity and Change since Independence'.

> 'There are so many MPs from CCM who are very wealthy. And no-one can say that they got their positions or their posts for working hard, for being long supporters of CCM, things that they know like ideology. No; it was their money.'[96]

The wealth of CCM politicians themselves is significant, because by incorporating Tanzanian businesspeople directly into the party, CCM cedes them power and influence directly. One Chadema official went so far as to say that 'a Tanzania election is rich people's election; everything is costly.'[97]

Beyond the direct incorporation of the wealthy into the party, there is further evidence that businesspeople contribute to CCM campaign war chests in exchange for influence or particular goods. One of the CCM campaign managers referred to above said that 'Business people, as most of them expect a return…many business people fund the candidates with conditions.'[98] One interviewee said that 'some people they fund because they know that you will be Diwani [a ward councillor] or minister so they are looking for a return or favour in their businesses'.[99] Another remarked that 'some sponsors [of candidates] are negative; they give you money in order to escape from paying tax or for any other business favour'.[100] Putting aside rent-seeking opportunities such as these, there was a consensus that large campaign contributors exercised power in CCM. Mwakibete told me that 'these wealthy individuals are very, very influential in the direction of how these parties act or behave.'[101] This supports Hypothesis 5, that parties ceded positions, rents and influence to private financiers in exchange for funding. Thereby, they developed closer ties to them.

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[96] Erick Mwakibete. 2017. *Skype Interview,* December 12.
[97] Anonymous. 2017h.
[98] Anonymous. 2017d.
[99] Anonymous. 2017f.
[100] Anonymous. 2017l..
[101] Mwakibete.

Similar phenomena can be observed within Chadema. Admittedly, Chadema has always relied on businesspeople for support. Chadema was founded by a small elite group in Dar es Salaam's Legion Club.[102] Nonetheless, the party was in fact notoriously poorly financed in the 1990s, as I set out in the previous section. As a consequence, in the 1990s and through much of the next decade, Chadema candidates asked the public for petty donations at rallies. One Chadema politician recalled that 'At the end of the rally, candidates could ask the public, for the public to give small, small contributions… This was our strategy'.[103]

Chadema's large-scale contributions from the private sector increased over time. At first sight, the reasons that businesspeople might fund CCM are inapplicable to Chadema. While CCM exercises control over the Tanzanian state and therefore can provide access to government rents, Chadema does not. However, Chadema provides a home and source of leverage for various businesspeople that are excluded from CCM. Equally, while Chadema exercises no control over the national state, it controls numerous local councils. In the 2015 election, it won 26 of them.[104] Mwakibete explained that 'if you control a local government in a certain district, it means all tenders have to be approved by politicians from the political party that is in control in that particular area'.[105] Therefore, while Chadema cannot offer national government rents, it can sometimes offer local ones.

Setting rent-seeking to one side, one of the most likely reason that many donors gave to Chadema is that many were excluded or otherwise alienated by CCM. The paramount such case if that of Edward Lowassa. Lowassa has become, to some, a symbol of money politics

[102] Mtei: 195.
[103] Deogratias Munishi. 2017. *Phone Interview*, December 11.
[104] I have this count from a confidential source.
[105] Mwakibete. 2017.

in Tanzania. He was a CCM Prime Minister, he was implicated in Richmond Scandal,[106] he supposedly led the so-called *Mtandao* (The Network) of nefarious businesspeople that brought Jakaya Kikwete to power, and he is reputedly very wealthy himself. After he narrowly lost an attempt to win CCM's presidential nomination, he left the party and joined Chadema, bringing a series of former government officials and donors with him.[107]

Chadema's funding began to rise in 2004, when Freeman Mbowe became chairman. Chairman Mbowe played a particularly important role in bringing new finance to the party. Mbowe adopted the role of 'financier in chief'.[108] Lissu said 'one of the most important contributions that Chairman Mbowe has brought to Tanzanian politics is to make the opposition financially competitive… He brought his own money.'[109] Moreover, Mbowe and other businessmen's support for the party provided a basis from which to borrow to smooth spending. Baregu explained that 'what they [party funders] have done from time to time is to lend money. The party has borrowed.'[110] Importantly, their ability to borrow has benefited from 'his [Mbowe's] guarantee, and those of the founders'.[111] In short, Mbowe brought money to the party as he was elected in 2004. So did other businesspeople that he recruited for the party.

By 2015, Chadema's candidates relied on private funding to finance their campaigns at all levels. At the national level, Chadema hosted three televised fund-raisers. Chadema's Deogratias Munishi told me that:

106 Gray. "The Political Economy of Grand Corruption in Tanzania".
107 Paget. "Tanzania: Shrinking Space and Opposition Protest"; Emmanuel Nyamajeje. 2015. "Tanzania in Focus: Lowassa Defects to CHADEMA as Election Fever Rises." *Africa UpFront,* London.
108 Lissu. 2015a.
109 Lissu. 2015b.
110 Baregu. 2015a.
111 Baregu 2015a.

> 'As for presidential candidate, much of the resources would come from our fundraising campaigns. We had, we hosted three dinner fundraisings in Dar es Salaam… We raised money.'[112]

In 2015, Chadema was able to direct sizeable sums of money from the centre to parliamentary candidates in competitive races.[113] At the parliamentary level, just as in CCM, Chadema's candidates are often, although not always, wealthy. One Chadema parliamentary candidate's campaign manager remarked that 'candidates must have private funds.'[114]

Chadema officials at the district level repeatedly stressed the importance of donations by businesspeople. A councillor candidate recounted that 'I talked to the businessmen of that particular area, asked for their support and some of them donated'.[115] Chadema interviewees in particular stressed the role of trust and personal networks in raising funds. Speaking about candidates in general, one parliamentary candidate's campaign manager said that 'they use their close friends.'[116] Another parliamentary campaign manager, said that funders 'include your friends, colleagues, or relatives, who will support you'.[117] Another parliamentary campaign manager, speaking about his campaign specifically, said that 'most of our funders, were close friends, [for] example we approached them and they gave us a car, and also our community leaders, who contributed fuel'.[118] Yet another said that 'some gave us a car, also friends from far and close ones, supported us through various means, like Mpesa, etc.'[119] Therefore, Chadema's funding from private sources has increased over time, and many of those private sources have personal ties to candidates. When a Chadema

[112] Munishi. 2017a.
[113] ibid; Jussa. 2017b; Baregu. 2015b.
[114] Anonymous. 2017e.
[115] Anonymous. 2017l.
[116] Anonymous. 2017e.
[117] Anonymous. 2017a.
[118] Anonymous. 2017h.
[119] ibid.

parliamentary campaign manager was asked 'do you think that Tanzanian politicians depend on funders to raise money for them less or more than ten years ago?' he replied 'Yes, in a big percent.[120] This constitutes further evidence in support of Hypothesis 4.

Like in CCM, the dependence of Chadema upon private financiers within and beyond the party has led to strong ties of exchange in which financiers win influence with the party. Chadema's richest contributors have risen to the highest ranks within the party. One of Chadema's largest donors – Mbowe – is its national chairman. Another – Lowassa – was its presidential candidate in 2015. Mwakibete remarked that 'yes, these individuals, wealthy individuals do have a huge say…With the opposition I think that the situation is even worse, because that unlike CCM, the opposition parties have even far fewer [independent] sources of incomes'.[121] The potential influence that financiers exercise in Chadema is illustrated by the case of Philemon Ndesamburo. Ndesamburo was one of the founding members of Chadema. He did not only spend money on his own campaigns within Chadema. He became, as *The Citizen* described him in his obituary, a 'kingmaker and financier of last resort in northern regions'.[122] Chadema candidates turned to Ndesamburo during their campaigns. One of his proteges, Munishi, described the process:

> '…maybe when they run out of resources in the middle of campaign, they would even travel to reach out to Ndesamburo, to his home place, and these are deep friends... sometimes you'd find people queuing to his [Ndesamburo's] house. These are candidates'[123]

[120] Anonymous. 2017a.
[121] Mwakibete.
[122] Zephanie Ubwani. 2017. "Kilimanjaro Opposition Stalwart Who Perfected Art of Persuasion." *The Citizen*, Dar es Salaam, June 17.
[123] Munishi. 2017a.

As a consequence, Ndesamburo acquired status and influence. Not only did he become Chadema's chairperson in the Northern Region. He became a member of the party's Central Committee. Mwakibete judges that 'He [Ndesamburo] had become a godfather'.[124] Munishi agrees; he told me that Ndesamburo's 'opinion influenced the party'.[125] This amounts to further evidence in support of Hypothesis 5.

The proliferation of helicopters as campaign tools

So far, I have shown that the mixture of methods used to mobilise rally attendance became more capital-intensive. I have shown that campaign expenditure rose and that capital-intensive rally production made up a large portion of that expenditure. I have further shown that parties raised funds from private sources to meet rising expenditure, and that they ceded them influence, positions and rents in exchange. This establishes clear causal links between rally production capitalisation, rising campaign expenditure and parties' ties to private finance. However, I have not explained what drove parties to adopt capital-intensive methods of producing rallies. While I have presented extensive qualitative evidence that capital-intensive measures are more effective, I have not offered evidence of a mechanism that links innovation in capital-intensive methods and their proliferation.

Interviewees repeatedly stressed that climbing campaign expenditure has been driven by rises in electoral competition. This competition has driven parties and their candidates to exert further effort in order to best their rivals. A CCM official explained that 'Elections

[124] Mwakibete.
[125] Munishi. 2017a..


especially 2015 were very competitive and we had to use a lot of energy in order to win.'[126] Another made an explicit comparison with the election of 2010.

> 'The 2015 campaigns were costly, as it was a very competitive election, many political parties, nominated candidates, from almost all levels, so as a political party we increased the effort to reach, as much people as we could; it was a campaign with high political friction comparing to 2010 campaigns.'[127]

However, electoral competition in Tanzania has waxed and waned. Figure 38 illustrates graphically that electoral competition actually declined in 2000 and 2005, before increasing rapidly in the elections in 2010 and 2015. The summaries of parliamentary seats won by each party tell a similar story. While these national averages mask increasing competition in many parts of Tanzania, nonetheless, the relationship between electoral competition and campaign expenditure is evidently complex.

[126] Anonymous. 2017a.
[127] Anonymous. 2017k.

Figure 38: Margin of victory in Tanzanian presidential elections



Source: National Electoral Commission of the United Republic of Tanzania

In this section, I argue that electoral competition drove rising campaign expenditure through the process of competitive rally capitalisation and fundraising which I described above. The intervening role of rally capitalisation explains why campaign expenditure steadily rose even though electoral competition dipped between 1995 and 2005. This process of rally capitalisation was diffuse; it played out in each presidential, parliamentary, councillor over five rounds of national elections over a 20-year period. However, it can be traced clearly in the proliferation of the helicopter as a campaign tool in Tanzania, which provides evidence in support of Hypotheses 6 to 8.

Mbowe was the first *presidential* candidate in Tanzania to fly by helicopter during his campaigns, but he was the second Tanzanian politician to do so; the first was Philemon Ndesamburo, the Chadema 'political godfather' of Kilimanjaro Region described above. Between 2000 and 2015, Ndesamburo was a Chadema MP for Moshi Town. He flew by helicopter in 2000, and Mbowe followed suit in 2005. Both of them were well-financed.

Ndesamburo was a 'business tycoon'.[128] Presidential candidates' campaigns are almost always the best funded, and Mbowe's was no exception. In fact, Chadema went to special efforts to raise the funds to pay for his campaign by helicopter.[129] Mbowe also displayed an appetite for fresh thinking. Chadema's Director of Publicity and External Affairs explained 'when Freeman came in, he was young and energetic, and so, that's when he started major party reforms.'[130] As with many technological developments, once its virtue was demonstrated, it was imitated by others. A Chadema Central Committee member told me that 'it put CCM completely on the wrong foot. Afterwards, they realised they could maybe draw on our example.'[131] In 2010, both Chadema's presidential candidate Wilbroad Slaa and CCM's sitting president Jakaya Kikwete travelled by helicopter. This imitation, first of Ndesamburo by Mbowe, and second of Chadema by CCM was a form of lateral contagion. The tactics employed by one presidential candidate were mimicked by another. This supports Hypothesis 6 above.

However, CCM went further than matching Chadema's helicopter use; it sought to exceed it. In 2010, CCM arranged for not one but three helicopters to transport its presidential candidate and other national leaders across the country.[132] Chadema continued to engage two helicopters in the 2010 campaign: one for its presidential candidate, and another for Ndesamburo.[133] However, having been outdone in 2010, it sought to improve its game in 2015. In the 2015 election, Chadema hired one helicopter for its presidential candidate Edward Lowassa.[134] Three more were put at the disposal of Chadema parliamentary candidates. Perhaps anticipating this improvement on Chadema's part, CCM candidates

[128] Deogratias Munishi. 2017b. *Whatsapp Conversation*. May 31.
[129] Mtei.
[130] John Mrema. 2016. *Interview*, Copenhagen, September 26.
[131] Baregu. 2015a.
[132] TEMCO Election Observation Mission 2010: 54.
[133] European Union Election Observation Mission. 2010. *Tanzania. General Election October 2010. Final Report*.
[134] Tabasam.

hired at least six helicopters between them.[135] The overall trends in helicopter use are summarised in Table 22 below. Therefore, the Tanzanian case supports Hypothesis 7, which stipulates that campaigning increased incrementally as each party responded to the increases in rally-intensive campaigning by the other.

Table 22: Helicopter use in Tanzania across election campaigns

	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015
Chadema	None	1	2	2	4
CCM	None	None	None	3	6 or more

Helicopters were used by among the richest candidates first, and subsequent users were among the next richest. This way, helicopter proliferation has proceeded from the wealthiest candidates and down. Chadema hired helicopters for the party as a whole, but the individual candidates were obliged to contribute substantially to the running costs.[136] Therefore, there was a degree of central coordination in helicopter use, but it also depended on the wealth of individual candidates. This is evident in which candidates used helicopters. Businessman Ndesamburo was followed by a number of other rich candidates. Some of these were sitting MPs, such as CCM's Deogratias Filikunjombe and Mwigulu Nchemba, and Chadema's Godbless Lema, Ezekiel Wenje and Freeman Mbowe. Others included first-time candidates like Hamis Tabasam, who owned a chain of petrol stations and fee-paying schools, among other assets in Mwanza Region. Moreover, poorer parties did not imitate their better funded rivals. Ibrahim Lipumba, the former chairman of the Civic United Front, explained that 'we could not afford to hire helicopters [like Chadema

[135] Zephanie Ubwani. 2015. "The Kenyan Factor in Tanzania's 2015 General Election." *The Citizen*, Dar es Salaam, October 23.
[136] Tabasam.

and CCM] and therefore [we] only used motor vehicles.'[137] All this attests to Hypothesis 8, that helicopter use begins with the wealthiest candidates and then spreads to the next wealthiest and so on. Together, the evidence of mimicry, competitive outbidding and vertical contagion demonstrate that innovation in campaign methods and ensuing competitive pressures drove the capitalisation of rally production in Tanzania.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have sought to empirically substantiate the argument set out in the preceding chapter, that innovation in rally production initiates a cycle of campaign capitalisation that strengthens parties' ties to their financiers. I have used process tracing methods to demonstrate that this process was at work in Tanzania between 1995 and 2015. I have demonstrated that CCM's and Chadema's methods of producing rallies became more capital-intensive over time. I showed that in total, their campaign expenditure rose over time. I revealed, relying on extensive estimates from interviewees and third parties, that capital-intensive methods made up a large portion of parliamentary and councillor candidates' campaign expenditure 2015. Therefore, I demonstrated that the capitalisation of rally production drove the rises in total expenditure. I proceeded to show that CCM and Chadema met these campaign expenses by raising funds from private sources. I showed as far as reasonably possible that they offered their businesspeople influence, positions and rents in exchange for their funding. Lastly, I traced the proliferation of helicopters as campaign tools in Tanzania to illustrate that this entire process was initiated by innovation in campaign technologies and driven by competitive pressures on parties and their candidates.

[137] Ewald: 241-242.

The capitalisation of rallies and the rises in campaign expenditure by Chadema as well as CCM make it particularly unlikely that rally capitalisation was an effect, rather than also a cause, of parties' closer ties to financiers. If rally capitalisation was driven alone by the expenditure of excess funds by parties which enjoyed plentiful finance after penetration by private interests, rally capitalisation ought to have been confined primarily to CCM. The extent to which Chadema went to capitalise its rallies in spite of its relative poverty is sufficient evidence to discount the strong version of the alternative explanation, that rally capitalisation was driven only by penetration of parties by financiers. This conclusion is only strengthened by the patterns of competitive outbidding documented in support of Hypothesis 7. With this alternative explanation dismissed, the evidence presented in support of Hypotheses 1 to 8 is sufficient to conclude that the stipulated process was at work. Therefore, this process was one of the causes, although not necessarily the only cause, of the increasingly close relationships between political parties and financiers which emerged in Tanzania between 1995 and 2015.

In this chapter, I have also quietly advanced a conceptual development in the study of election campaign contact. The comparative literature on election campaigning differentiates between different methods or 'technologies' of election campaign contact. Mail-shots, canvassing, TV ad-buys, leafletting, parades and all the rest are treated as distinct methods of reaching voters in a burgeoning literature.[138] With notably exceptions,[139] the execution of these techniques is not problematised. I have shown that examining the production of the rally is analytically useful. Rallies can be produced using a variety of different methods by a variety of different actors. One 'technology' of campaign contact – the rally – is in effect delivered using a variety of different 'technologies' of rally attendance

[138] Green and Gerber. *Get Out the Vote*; Iyengar and Simon.
[139] Nielsen.

mobilisation. Understanding which actors can employ those methods sheds light on which actors parties need the most.

Chapter 9. Conclusion

In this thesis, I have stressed at length the magnitude of the rally. Such is its scale that it is the dominant feature of the election campaign in much of sub-Saharan Africa. Such is its size that other component parts of the election campaign are drawn into its orbit. There is a sizeable literature on election campaigning in sub-Saharan Africa, but few of these studies examine the ground campaign in detail. Fewer still acknowledge this gravity of the rally, its ability to reorganises things around it. Nor do they consider that the centrality of the rally might be the definitive feature of these campaigns. In this thesis, I have argued that the rally-intensive campaign is an ideal-type of ground campaign, distinct from others detailed in the comparative literature. In this thesis, I have examined what makes a ground campaign rally-intensive, and how campaign strategy and party organisation change when it is.

While I have presented copious evidence in support of the argument in the preceding chapters, almost all of it comes Tanzania. Therefore, while there are strong grounds that the rally-intensiveness of Tanzania's campaign has altered how parties electioneer and organise, inevitably there are questions about whether the theory postulated above is applicable elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa, or indeed further abroad.

In this final chapter, I discuss just how far and well my findings travel. In the next section, I offer a summary of the argument which I have set forth in the preceding chapters. In the second section, I summarise the scope conditions that define the domain of cases that I expect my theory to apply to. Next, I discuss the application of my findings to other rally-intensive campaigns in sub-Saharan Africa. There is tentative but as yet inconclusive evidence of whether canvass targeting in rally-intensive

campaigns in sub-Saharan Africa mirror the patterns documented in Tanzania. Further research must test the reach of this dimension of the theory. However, there is copious evidence that parties in Africa and further afield divert extensive resources to mobilising rally attendance. In the third section, I review the evidence in the secondary literature that the rally serves as a vehicle for party adaptation across sub-Saharan Africa in the same way it does in Tanzania. I present a short case study of Kenya, which is like Tanzania in many respects, but is host to a different institutional environment. I show that there are signs many of the key dynamics that were postulated in Part III appear to be at work in Kenya, albeit translated through these different party institutions and party system. Lastly, in the fourth section, I consider the application of my theory to rally-intensive campaigns elsewhere in the world and the associated challenges that this task brings.

The argument

In Part I of this thesis, I showed that the rally-intensiveness of an election campaign is the product of many causes. However, chief among them are two technological factors. In Chapter 2, I discussed the findings of the comparative literature that mass media penetration, and in particular television penetration, reduce rally attendance. Mass media penetration makes the air campaign supersede the ground campaign, and ultimately the rally is a component of the ground campaign. Therefore, the deeper the penetration, the lower the rally attendance. However, a rally only becomes an important component of the ground campaign, or indeed the dominant component, if it is an effective means of reaching voters. In Chapter 2, I draw on historical cases to show that the electoral potential of the mass meeting is multiplied many times over by amplification. It is the

conjunction of these two technological circumstances that leads to the most rally-intensive election campaigns.

In Chapter 3, I test the conclusions of the comparative literature using data from contemporary Africa cases. I show that mass media penetration does indeed reduce the probability of rally attendance, and that this effect is driven primarily by television penetration. However, radio penetration increases rally attendance, and therefore the category 'mass media' obscures differences in the relationships between each mass medium and aggregate rally attendance. My analysis also attests to the path dependency of rally cultures. In particular, the longer the experience of prior competitive one-party regimes, the higher that national rally attendance becomes. There is tentative evidence that longer experience with multipartyism also raises aggregate rally attendance. Likewise, the breadth and depth of national partisanship drives voters to their parties' meetings. Altogether, in Part I, I make clear that there are numerous other factors that amplify or dampen aggregate rally attendance. However, I focus attention on these technological and historic conditions, because they constitute the underlying causes of rally-intensive campaigns. Therefore, they represent structural conditions that serve as the greatest commonalities between rally-intensive campaigns. Whichever other contributing causes come and go, these slow-changing national features set the base levels of aggregate rally attendance.

In Part II of this thesis, I elucidate how parties behave in a rally-intensive ground campaign. In Chapter 4, I examine whether rallies have persuasive and mobilising effects on voters. I show that non-partisans' opinions of CCM improve after they attend its meetings, but that CCM's strongest supporters' opinions of their party deteriorate. I cannot show conclusively that the same applies to Chadema rallies, but there is some

speculative evidence that it does. I also show that people become more likely to turn out to vote after attending mass meetings. This in turn shows that rallies function as means of party-voter contact not unlike canvassing or leafletting. It further shows that rallies are not simply sites for the promising or making of clientelist exchanges. Instead, voters' opinions of parties' fitness to govern change after attending rallies.

In Chapter 5, I show that in rally-intensive campaigns, local actors' efforts shift from canvassing to mobilising rally attendance. In a rally-intensive campaign, the number of voters that parties can canvass is dwarfed by the number that attend their rallies. Therefore, the challenge of multiplying face-to-face contact becomes first and foremost the challenge of drawing voters to meetings. The importance of mobilising rally attendance is only augmented by the dynamics of crowd formation and dispersion that see crowds melt away. In this chapter, I deployed process tracing methods to document the lengths that parties go to in order to mobilise rally attendance.

In Chapter 6, I demonstrate that the challenges of targeting face-to-face contact become all the more acute in rally-intensive ground campaigns. While rallies enable parties to reach many voters, they offer limited control over who attends them. Therefore, the onus falls to further local actors, principally canvassers, to make amends for the shortcomings of the rally. For ruling parties, this involves spreading campaign contact across the domain of target voters by canvassing those that do not attend parliamentary candidates' rallies. For opposition parties, this involves narrowing the band of target voters in response to the uneven rates at which swing voters and even their supporters attend dominant party rallies. Accordingly, they canvass their supporters during the campaign. Therefore, both dominant and opposition parties adjust who they canvass in light of who attends rallies. Through both Chapters 5 and 6, the persistent importance

of local actors is a recurrent theme. Rallies do not liberate parties from local actors. While politicians can speak unmediated to voters at rallies, they depend on local actors to draw voters to rallies and canvass those that do not. However, the roles that local actors perform become ancillary to the mass meeting. While candidates assume literally on-stage roles, local actors assume literally back-stage ones.

In Part III of this thesis, I argue that changes parties' campaign activities in turn change parties themselves in turn. By extension, they change nations' political economy. I lay out this argument theoretically in Chapter 7. The main dimension of change lies in parties' and politicians' relationships with political financiers. I ground this argument in the principles of organisational theory. The central tenets of this literature are that organisational adaptation is driven by the necessity to survive in competitive environments. Organisational adaptation involves the development of stronger relationships with actors that provide resources that are crucial to organisations' survival. These ties involve reciprocal exchanges between organisations and the actors that yield them resources. I show that these principles run through the comparative literature on political party change, from Maurice Duverger to Richard Katz and Peter Mair.

In Chapter 7, I build on these authors by developing a theory about party adaptation in rally-intensive campaigns. At the centre of this theory is the production of the rally. I advance a distinction between labour-intensive and capital-intensive methods of producing rallies. As capital-intensive methods are invented, a process of competitive rally capitalisation takes place, in which rival candidates and parties develop closer ties to financiers in order to gain competitive advantages over their rivals. Thereby, innovations in rally production drive parties to develop steadily closer ties to private financiers.

In Chapter 8, I use process tracing methods to demonstrate that this causal chain was at work in Tanzania between 1995 and 2015. Rally production became more capital-intensive over time. Campaign expenditure rose over this period, and capital-intensive rally production made up a significant and sometimes a majority of these costs. Parties came to depend more on business and other private sources to finance this rising expenditure. Parties ceded them influence, positions and rents in exchange. Lastly, by tracing the proliferation of the helicopter as a campaign tool, I show that this process was underpinned by competitive pressures. Thereby, I show that the capitalisation of the rally drove parties closer to their financiers. In this respect, it became the vehicle party adaptation.

I advance the arguments found in Part I by drawing on evidence from a range of countries past and present. However, I make the arguments found in Parts II and III primarily through an examination of the Tanzanian case. Empirically, Tanzania is the clearest case to explore these trends. I have studied phenomena that are ill-understood by prior research conceptually and empirically, such as methods of mobilising rally attendance, the roles of different actors in the campaign and the rally-intensive campaign itself. I have also sought to examine phenomena that are difficult to observe empirically, not least patterns in rally attendance, patterns in rally locations and changes in the shares of campaign effort contributed by different sorts of actors. Tanzania holds some of the most rally-intensive election campaigns in the world. Therefore, it offers an environment in which the effects of the rally-intensive campaign can be observed most starkly and clearly. I develop and apply concepts to these elusive phenomena by examining the Tanzanian case, in which they are so accentuated. As rally attendance is so high in Tanzania, it comes closest to approximating the ideal-type of a rally-intensive

ground campaign. By studying it, I can best elucidate the causal effects that stem from rally-intensiveness.[1]

Focusing on a single case was a fruitful research method because the case study is exploratory in nature. Long periods of first-hand observation, documenting everyday but little-known phenomena, investigating pertinent phenomena in-depth, and seeing the ground campaign afresh were all essential parts of this research. Without them, it would not have been possible to piece together such a wide-ranging view of the ground campaign. Equally, without these methods, it would not have been possible to garner the insights presented in this thesis. This wealth of material made it possible to trace causal processes at work. In this respect, I do not just explore Tanzania's rally-intensive ground campaign. Nor do I only generate theory; I produce evidence upon which that theory is based.

For all of these advantages, the study of one country ultimately raises questions about how far the findings of this thesis travel. Issues of external validity are made more acute still because Tanzania has the most rally-intensive election campaigns in all of sub-Saharan Africa. They are sharpened still further because in so many ways Tanzania is exceptional. Her past is unusually peaceful. She is remarkably free of national ethnic politics. She is home to a dominant party *par excellence*, and is host to well-organised political parties. Her legacies of authoritarian rule, villagisation and the extension of state authority are all unusual. The imprint of past state-building efforts is particularly strong, and the life of nationalism in contemporary discourse is striking. In all of these respects, Tanzania stands out already, and these exceptionalisms all threaten to complicate the extension and application of the findings of this thesis to other cases. In this concluding

[1] Rogers; Ringer.

chapter, I return to the question posed at the beginning of this thesis: how does the scale and frequency of rallies alter election campaign strategy and party organisation *in general*?

Scope conditions

The propositions of this thesis are bounded a series of scope conditions, many of which are radial, rather than binary. In other words, they are applicable to numerous cases to varying degrees, rather than in absolute to some cases not at all to others. The effects on electioneering and party adaptation are applicable to election ground campaigns insofar as they are rally-intensive. Therefore, they are applicable insofar as aggregate rally attendance is high. It is best to understand rally-intensity as a spectrum, and attempts to collapse such a spectrum into binary distinction are reductive. However, if one wished to operationalise a boundary between rally-intensive ground campaigns and rally-light ground campaigns nonetheless, one might distinguish between campaigns in which aggregate rally attendance is higher than aggregate canvassing and campaigns in which it is not.

Alone, this is little help, because the canvassing rate is not known in many countries. However, I have shown that the canvassing rate in Tanzania was 20%. Sarah Brierley and Eric Kramon have shown that the canvassing rate in the Ghanaian 2012 election was 33%,[2] and Ghana is reputed to have some of the most ground-intensive campaigns in sub-Saharan Africa waged by densely-organised parties.[3] This is as high as the canvassing rate reached in historic election campaigns in the United States, at least since

[2] Brierley and Kramon.
[3] Bob-Milliar.

reliable election polling began.[4] Therefore, in all likelihood, every ground campaign in which aggregate rally attendance exceeds 33% is rally-intensive, by the aforementioned measure. 21 of the 30 sub-Saharan African countries surveyed in the Fifth Round of the Afrobarometer meet this criterion.[5] So do four of the countries surveyed in the Third Wave of the Asiabarometer, Vietnam, Thailand, Mongolia and Cambodia.[6]

While this sheds light on countries in East Asia and Africa for which there is relevant survey data, it reveals little about other countries. As I discussed in Part I, there are numerous conditions that augment and diminish aggregate rally attendance. However, Chapter 3 showed that above all else, mass media penetration dampens rally attendance, while radio penetration, partisanship, histories of competitive single-party rule, and experience under multiparty regimes increase it. Therefore, wherever these factors can be found, it is likely that ground campaigns are more rally-intensive, other things being equal. Across time, rally-intensive ground campaigns are more likely to be found after the proliferation of electronic amplification in the 1920s.

Within the domain of rally-intensive campaigns, the propositions in this thesis about both electioneering and party organisation are applicable to any case insofar as the parties concerned are driven to win as great a share of the votes as possible. Deductively, only under this condition will the prominence of the rally meaningfully affect parties' campaign behaviour. While hypothetically this condition might be met under numerous circumstances, a series of probabilistic criteria follow from this. Typically, the theory of this thesis is applicable to election campaigns insofar as they are competitive. The more competitive the election, the more that parties have reasons to

[4] Norris. *A Virtuous Circle.*
[5] Afrobarometer. "Afrobarometer Data. Round 5. All Countries Surveyed in Sub-Saharan Africa."
[6] Asia Barometer. 2012. "Asia Barometer Third Wave Data."

maximise their vote share. Equally, in practice, the theory is applicable to campaigns insofar as the countries that host them are not authoritarian. The more that a ruling party turns to the 'menu of manipulation'[7] to win election campaigns, the less that election campaigns affect election outcomes. However, as I discussed in Chapter 7, it is also plausible that far-sighted parties wish to augment their vote shares in party systems that are uncompetitive, or authoritarian, or both.

In addition to the criteria set out above, the organisational adaptive propositions developed in Part III of this thesis are only applicable to rally-intensive ground campaigns when those ground campaigns are particularly important for electioneering. This is a crucial stipulation, because in many election campaigns, the ground war has been superseded by the air war. When ground campaigns are rally-intensive but ground campaigns are marginal to campaign success, changing methods of rally production will not alter the organisational form that parties must assume to win. The centrality of the ground campaign aside, the adaptive forces specified in Part III are applicable insofar as parties rely on private sources for finance.

The question then, is whether aspects of electioneering and party organisation that I have elucidated in this thesis can be seen at work in election campaigns that display these features. First, I turn to sub-Saharan Africa.

Rally and campaign strategy across sub-Saharan Africa

Part II argued that patterns of canvassing are adjusted in rally-intensive ground campaigns. It also argued that parties distribute more ground efforts to producing rallies

[7] Schedler. "Elections Without Democracy."

and less efforts to canvassing. There is almost no evidence to test the propositions about canvass targeting advanced in Chapter 6. Jeremy Horowitz finds that parties are more likely to canvass their co-ethnics in Kenya, but his data does not permit him to determine whether canvassing is focussed on those that do not attend rallies.[8] Sarah Brierley and Eric Kramon[9] find that Ghana's ruling party canvasses more people in swing districts while opposition parties canvass people in its stronghold areas. This is congruent with the theory advanced in Chapter 6, that ruling parties canvass those that do not attend its rallies while opposition parties canvass their supporters, but its logic operates on the district rather than the individual level. Therefore, it does not confirm its findings exactly, but it offers some tentative evidence that these phenomena bear out elsewhere. In sum, there is only early and tentative evidence that the patterns of canvass targeting which I described in Chapter 6 can be found elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa.

However, there is widespread evidence that in rally-intensive campaigns, local actors' activities shift from making face-to-face contact to producing rallies, as in Tanzania. This evidence can be found both in the present and in the past. There was a spate of electoral studies in the 1950s and 1960s, which showed that parties went to great effort to energise and entertain audiences at rallies. For example, one commentator wrote of Botswana that 'the first local Freedom Squares [rallies], incorporated songs, often composed for the occasion'.[10] Song and dance seem to have been almost universally present at rallies in this period. Describing one Convention People's Party rally in Ghana, Dennis Austin recounts that 'the Women's Section members danced and sang in the courtyard'.[11] Just like in recent Tanzania, large groups of women were reserved the role of entertaining early-comers at rallies. A description of a typical Senegalese meeting

[8] Horowitz.
[9] Brierley and Kramon.
[10] Jeff Ramsay. 1993. "The 1962 BPP Split." *Botswana Notes and Records* 25:79–87.
[11] Austin: 121.

reads 'women, who are sitting together in a solid phalanx, wearing headscarves or dressed in the party colours, may advance in ones or twos into the open space in the centre and execute a dance'.[12]

For all these similarities, there is ultimately a great diversity in the forms that this music-making and entertainment took. A nation-wide tour by the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons in 1946, for instance, was 'accompanied by brass bands, flute bands, cowhorn bands, dancers and soldiers'.[13] Authors also often agreed that these performances were purposeful. They were to celebrate speakers, draw people into the audience, and to heighten the sense of momentousness as well. One description of Kenya African National Union meetings in Nairobi in 1961 reads 'Every public meeting was carefully planned to accentuate the drama and significance of the occasion. Traditional dances by Kikuyu, Kamba and Luo became a part of nearly all meetings.'[14] Evidently, parties used not only dances, but a series of further labour-intensive methods to notify residents that rallies were being convened. A description of the start of the typical election campaign in Senegal reads 'drummers beat out intermittent messages'.[15] A primary source describing early election campaigns in Ghana was more direct about the purpose of such activities: 'Some times we would hire a band *to attract the people* [emphasis added]'.[16] Accounts of labour-intensive efforts such as these are common in detailed descriptions of election campaigning in late-colonial and early post-colonial Africa.

[12] Robinson: 378.
[13] Coleman: 291.
[14] Bennett and Rosberg.
[15] Robinson: 378.
[16] ibid: 132.

While these sources all testify to the efforts that parties went to produce rallies in the past, there are also signs that parties use the same methods in the present. In Malawi, women are engaged in clientelist relationships to dance and sing at political rallies much as they are in Tanzania.[17] In Ghana, party 'foot soldiers' are involved in convening and arranging rallies.[18] Rallies in Senegal as late as the 1990s 'require the presence of drummers and praise singers' and 'up to ten praise-singers may perform during a single political meeting'.[19] Techniques such as these can be found far and wide across the continent, often picked up in the periphery of studies of other aspects of mobilisation.[20] In sum, there is ample evidence that other campaign labours are altered by the rally-intensive campaigns much as in Tanzania. In particular, parties dedicate great effort to the tasks of producing rallies, and in particular mobilising voters to attend them across much of the continent.

Other countries' experiences also support the arguments which I have advanced about how rallies affect parties themselves. Firstly, there is a gradual trend for rally attendance mobilisation to become more capital-intensive. The efforts described above to mobilise rally attendance are labour-intensive. Capital-intensive methods have been in use, albeit scarce use, since the first multiparty elections in the 1950s. In preparation for Ghana's first ever national elections in 1951, the Convention People's Party bought several vans and installed public address systems in them. They put them to use publicising and amplifying public meetings across the country.[21] Similar patterns can be seen in Nigeria. One account of the 1957 election campaign in the Eastern Region of Nigeria in 1957 read:

[17] Gillman.
[18] Bob-Milliar.
[19] Foucher: 116.
[20] Sandrine Perrot, Marie-Emmanuel Pommerolle, and Justin Willis. 2016. "La Fabrique Du Vote: Placer La Matérialité Au Cœur de L'analyse." *Politique Africaine* 144(December):5–26.
[21] Austin.

> 'Small propaganda teams, consisting of party organizers and sympathizers, travelled from village to village throughout the bush… These teams, in hired canoes or Land Rovers, would on arrival in each village, gather a crowd together by playing gramophone dance-music over the amplifier systems mounted on the Land Rovers or by beating drums.'[22]

Many accounts detail that candidates travel with impressive vehicle caravans through major towns and cities reminiscent of the convoys that parliamentary candidates in Tanzania would use almost sixty years later.[23]

Some capital-intensive methods were first used early on. At a glance, this might suggest continuity rather than change over time. However, there are clear signs that election campaigns have become gradually more capital-intensive. Capital-intensive methods are becoming more common and are used by members at increasingly low levels of the party. When vans with PA systems were used in the late colonial period, they were as precious commodities reserved for the party leaders and strategic priorities. Now, they are almost ubiquitous, and a well-financed parliamentary candidate typically employs a squadron for her campaign alone. Likewise, in Zambia, the Patriotic Front drafted ten helicopters into service in Zambia in the 2016 elections.[24] Helicopters have not just become more common; they are being used by more common, or lowly, candidates. Steadily, helicopters are being used not just by presidential candidates, but by lower echelons of politicians. Middle-ranking politicians in the present are mobilising rally attendance more and more like presidential candidates have in the past. These examples all illustrate that rally attendance mobilisation has become more capital-intensive still. It

[22] Price: 140.
[23] ibid.
[24] Staff reporter. 2016. "PF Hires 10 Helicopters, to Distribute 8 Million Units of Regalia as Its Campaigns Hit Top Gear." *Lusaka Times*, Lusaka, June 15.

also shows that in many countries, rallies have become more capital-intensive than those in Tanzania.

Rallies, party organisation and party finance in Kenya

An implication of the theory which I postulated in Part III is as follows: parties can mobilise in the absence of party branches and local leaders if they use capital-intensive methods of producing rallies to supplement or replace labour-intensive ones. Their ability to do so increases as they become better-financed. However, I traced this phenomenon through a particular and in many respects peculiar institutional environment. Tanzania has institutionalised parties and a dominant party system. To examine the extent to which the theory developed in Part III travels to other contexts, I examine party organisation in the rally-intensive campaigns of Kenya. Kenya makes for fruitful comparison with Tanzania. On the one hand, it is similar to Tanzania in many respect. It shares a border with it, it is similar in size, and it too was governed by a (*de facto*) competitive single-party regime between 1969 and 1992.

On the other hand, in other crucial respects, it differs from Tanzania. Firstly, its politics have been noticeably more ethnic than Tanzania's since independence. Since the return to a multiparty constitution in 1992, it has been markedly less authoritarian than Tanzania, despite its many democratic shortcomings.[25] Furthermore, across time, Kenyan political parties have taken different institutional forms to its Tanzanian counterparts. Unlike Tanzania, where various social groups were incorporated into the

[25] David Throup and Charles Hornsby. 1998. *Multi-Party Politics in Kenya: The Kenyatta and Moi States and the Triumph of the System in the 1992 Election*. Athens: Ohio University Press.

ruling party, in Kenya they remained outside it.[26] In many respects, Kenyan African National Union (KANU)'s rule as an authoritarian party approximated the pragmatic-pluralist tendency identified by James Coleman,[27] while TANU and CCM in turn approximated the revolutionary-centralising tendency. Since the return to multipartyism, Kenyan parties have become fragmented and fluid.[28] They have been dominated by individuals, lacked institutional solidity and formed an inchoate party system of shifting alliances. Therefore, while in many respects similar, Kenyan provides a different institutional environment for the adaptive forces that I described in Part III.

Post-colonial Kenya is illustrative of how political parties can thrive without strong local organisations if they marshal sufficient funds to produce relatively capital-intensive rallies. The Kenyan Africa National Union (KANU) was well-organised on the ground. Nonetheless, the party's infrastructure was unevenly spread across the country. In 1966 and 1968, two 'little general elections' were triggered by clusters of KANU MPs, who resigned to stand on opposition tickets. Of the constituencies where the 'little general election' of 1966 was fought, Gertzel writes that KANU's "District organization was virtually non-existent, so that no constituency candidate found a party machine that could be swung into action behind him'.[29] In 1966, as KANU MPs defected to join newly created Kenya People's Union (KPU), often they took the scattering of local branches and social networks with them. Nonetheless in the 'little general elections' of 1966 and 1968, KPU was poorly organised. It only enjoyed local presence in small pockets, often formed of party branches lifted directly from KANU structures. Gertzel's

[26] Cheeseman. "The Rise and Fall of Civil-Authoritarianism in Africa"; Barkan.
[27] Coleman and Rosberg.
[28] Daniel Branch, Nicholas Cheeseman, and Leigh Gardner. 2010. *Our Turn to Eat Politics in Kenya Since 1950.* Afrikanische Studien.
[29] Gertzel: 81.

judgement is that in 1966, beyond two particular constituencies, the opposition 'lacked a strong party machine.'[30]

Kenyan parties used relatively capital-intensive rallies led by party leaders to overcome these organisational shortcomings. Rallies were certainly common. In the 1966 election 'The East Africa Standard carries [carried] reports of twenty-two KANU rallies compared with six KPU.'[31] In the little general election of 1968, the rate of rally convening increased still further; individual candidates are reported to have held twenty rallies a piece.[32] What is more, politicians went to great expense to draw voters to attend them. Candidates travelled by car, decked with decorations and attention-seeking paraphernalia.[33] A description of the election campaign in Nairobi in 1957 reads 'Every public meeting was carefully planned to accentuate the drama and significance of the occasion. Traditional dances by Kikuyu, Kamba and Luo became a part of nearly all meetings.'[34] Most ostentatiously, Tom Mboya used a plane for effect in his Nairobi campaign of 1961.[35] In further testament to the theory advanced in this thesis, contemporaneous observers believed that rallies were being used deliberately to compensate for their weak spots on the ground. Gertzel writes that 'KANU attempted to compensate for their weakness at location level by holding full-scale rallies throughout the district as a means of communicating their stand and Government views on the contest.'[36] This interpretation of KANU's tactics by Gertzel, made in 1970, further illustrates how capital-intensive methods enabled parties to produce rallies

[30] ibid: 81.
[31] ibid: 80.
[32] ibid: 113.
[33] ibid: 157.
[34] Engholm.
[35] Bennett and Rosberg: 179.
[36] Gertzel: 116.

without local party assistance if necessary. Politicians to compensate for their weak spots by using capital-intensive rallies.

When opposition parties were legalised in 1992, new parties faced blank slates, and a range of organisational choices. There are many reasons that new parties might have chosen not to develop strong formal links to local actors in Kenya. For one, they may have found it expedient to develop informal ties to extra-party actors such as networks of chiefs and big-men that patterns of patronage during the one-party period had strengthened.[37] For another, the vulnerability of KANU, the ruling party, may have shortened the time horizons of opposition leaders and convinced them to forgo the arduous task of developing party institutions that privileged local organs. However, in part, the presence of strong financiers made another mode of organisation and campaigning possible.

Kenya has a strong capitalist class, one which has been intertwined with electoral politics since the independence struggle.[38] Unlike in Tanzania and other countries, the period of one-party rule did not involve the curtailment of the private sector. In many respects, the capitalist class was privileged during this period.[39] Consequently, on the eve of the return to multipartyism, a host of businesspeople were available to fund candidates in both government and opposition. They were among the founders of Foundation for the Restoration of Democracy-Asili (FORD-A), Foundation for the Restoration of Democracy-Kenya (FORD-K) and the Democratic Party. While many figures that joined opposition parties were former government ministers, they

[37] Cheeseman. "The Rise and Fall of Civil-Authoritarianism in Africa".
[38] Daniel Branch. 2011. *Between Hope and Despair, 1963-2011*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
[39] Barkan.

themselves were rich and enjoyed ties to businesspeople too.[40] Indeed, in the elections of 1992 and 1997, a grand majority of candidates in both government and opposition were rich themselves.[41] While Kenyan politics has always involved extensive expenditure by politicians,[42] the evidence suggests that the role of money in Kenyan electoral politics has only increased since the return to multiparty democracy in 1992. Furthermore, campaign finance in Kenya has only increased with time. Several studies attest to steep rises in political finance in consecutive elections since 1992.[43]

Political finance enabled Kenyan parties to operate despite limited and often uneven help from local actors because it empowered them to produce rallies. The rally had remained an important aspect of political life during the *de facto* one-party state and under the *de jure* one-party state created in 1982. Through the institutional form of the *baraza*, government officials and MPs often met with local communities in highly regulated and controlled rallies.[44] Since the return to multiparty democracy in 1992, Kenyan parties have relied heavily on rallies to reach voters. One account of the 1992 election reads 'Ministers and MPs fanned out across the country to organise campaign meetings for KANU candidates and President Moi …. the first series of 16 rallies extended from Kisumu to Wajir'.[45] It went on 'During the campaign, all the Presidential candidates and their entourages criss-crossed the country, attending major rallies and walkabouts.'[46] More compellingly still, Afrobarometer data shows that 48 per cent of Kenyans attended rallies during the election campaign of 2007,[47] rising to 50% in 2013.[48]

[40] Throup and Hornsby: 96.
[41] Throup and Hornsby: 94-5.
[42] Branch, Cheeseman and Gardner.
[43] Mwangi; Cheeseman, Lynch and Willis. "Democracy and Its Discontents".
[44] Haugerud.
[45] Throup and Hornsby: 299.
[46] ibid: 384.
[47] Afrobarometer. "Afrobarometer Data. Round 5. Kenya". 95 per cent confidence intervals of 46 and 50 per cent.

These rally-intensive campaigns enabled new parties to choose organisational forms that privileged leaders and financiers rather than members because they enabled them to produce capital-intensive rallies. In Tanzania, rallies have typically supplemented the work of local party actors. Only opposition parties entirely bereft of local party structures have used capital-intensive methods to produce rallies without local actors' assistance, as I described in Chapter 8. In contrast, in Kenya, rallies have produced using more capital-intensive methods and they have frequently used capital-intensive rallies as substitutes for party actors. Jeremy Horowitz has documented how presidential candidates' rallies concentrated on areas where parties did not have strong sets of local actors. He argues that presidential candidates deliberately convened rallies in areas in which their local parties were weak, much as Gertzel found in elections of the 1960s.[49] In other words, Kenyan parties campaigned in areas where they lacked local presence. They did so by using their financial weight and the pull of presidential candidates to produce capital-intensive rallies.

The capital-intensiveness of Kenyan rallies is evident in the use of the helicopter, which has increased exponentially.[50] The helicopter was first drafted into service in Kenya in 1992, when two were put at the service of President Moi and his Vice President. Incredibly, in 2017, more than 50 helicopters were pressed into service in the 2017 campaign, more than five times as many as were used in Tanzania's 2015 campaign. In this respect, the Kenyan case illustrates not just how the rally enables politicians to reach voters over the heads of local actors. It is also a leading example of how politicians' ability to do so increases as they solicit more money from business.

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[48] Afrobarometer. "Afrobarometer Data. Round 6. Kenya". 95 per cent confidence intervals of 48 and 52 per cent.
[49] Horowitz.
[50] Ngetich.

Kenyan parties developed organisational forms that privileged financiers and leaders rather than local actors. The privilege that financiers and leaders enjoy in these parties is evident in the patterns of party switching. Party institutions have amassed little authority in Kenya since 1992. Individual politicians have moved rapidly and regularly between parties, taking networks and entourages of political actors.[51] LeBas has interpreted this explicitly as a sign of their organisational weakness, referring, among things, to their 'organizational reach and cohesion' and their 'means of resolving conflict within their organizations, preventing party fragmentation and keeping local party cadres "on message"'.[52] Kenyan parties have become leader-centric or candidate-centric, in many respects mirroring the candidate-centric organisational forms documented in the United States and elsewhere.[53]

In sum, Kenyan parties have adopted privileged candidates and their personal ties, including those to their financiers. Kenyan party development is the product of historically-contingent pathways by which sources of mobilisation and capital emerged independent of the state in the colonial and post-colonial periods. These features of the political landscape affected the organisational choices that Kenyan politicians made as they formed political parties, both in the 1960s and again in the 1990s. These organisational choices were made in some respects independent of the potential of rallies. However, they have been sustained and made possible because of the conjunction of political finance and the electoral potential of rallies. The reach of rallies enabled Kenyan politicians to interact with huge swathes of Kenya's electorate. Capital-intensive methods enabled them to do so without the assistance of local actors when

[51] Sebastian Elischer. 2008. "Ethnic Coalitions of Convenience and Commitment: Political Parties and Party Systems in Kenya." GIGA: *GIGA Working Paper* 68.
[52] LeBas. *From Protest to Parties*: 24.
[53] Wattenberg. *The Decline of American Political Parties, 1952-1996*.

necessary. The independence from local actors that capital-intensive methods grant candidates is illustrated in the concentration of presidential rallies in areas where the party lacks local support documented by Jeremy Horowitz.

This interpretation of the Kenyan experience, built from the secondary literature, illustrates that the propositions developed in Part III of this thesis about capital-intensive rallies and party adaptation travel well to other cases in sub-Saharan Africa. However, it also shows that institutional context mediates the effects that they have. The pressures to adapt organisationally played out more quickly and decisively in Kenya than they did in Tanzania. Kenyan parties readily embraced organisational forms that privileged candidates and their financiers. Tanzanian parties have ceded financiers influence, positions and government rents, but they did so incrementally and without shedding their organisational forms altogether.

Rally-intensive campaigns the world over

The rally-intensive ground campaign is not a uniquely African phenomenon. It can be found elsewhere in the world, both in the past and in the present. A perusal of other cases shows that across the world, in rally-intensive campaigns, parties dedicate extensive efforts to mobilising rally attendance. They often use uncannily similar methods to those documented in Tanzania to do so. They have also supplemented labour-intensive methods with capital-intensive ones over time. Firstly, the role of music and dancing seems almost universal in rallies. In the 1900 election campaign in the United States, Theodore Roosevelt was escorted to the speaking venue by 'by the Lennox and Rock Rapids bands, more than thirty-five marching clubs, and a company

of mounted cowboys'.[54] Franklin Roosevelt's speeches from the rear platform of a train car in 1932 did not allow for such grandiose festivities. However, a description reads that 'Each tank stop followed the same pattern. The train would pull into a station, a band would play, and the newspaper correspondents and photographers would get off to gather on the station platform with the local onlookers. A local dignitary would climb aboard and give welcoming remarks … The atmosphere reminded the reporters of a family party'.[55] During Lyndon Johnson's first congressional campaign in Texas, he put on "'barbecues" (political rallies highlighted by "speakings").'[56] At his events, crowds were drawn by 'a band, a hillbilly band.'[57]

While Americans were great exemplifiers of carnival in politics, they were not unique. In Edwardian Britain, 'parties were encouraged to lay on professional musical entertainment to liven up their meetings and encourage enthusiasm.'[58] Later, in Bristol, British Labour politician Keir Hardie 'agreed to pay a guinea to two professional singers who would be advertised as performing at the beginning and end of the meeting.'[59] At rallies of the CPF under France's Third Republic, proceedings began with the singing of *L'Internationale* 'by a singer or a choir'.[60] While these practices differ in their particulars, they share much in their essentials. Each contributes to the production of the rally by making it enjoyable and festive, and thereby, each helps to draw an audience.

The striking parallels between the production of mass meetings in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere in the world do not end with music-making. Candidates

[54] ibid: 66.
[55] Ritchie: 139.
[56] Caro: 407.
[57] ibid: 211.
[58] Lawrence: 81.
[59] Lawrence: 82-3.
[60] Cossart: 230.

were escorted by parades in the United States. The shows of popularity and the deliberate attempts to draw crowds echo the practices that I have described in Tanzania. One such description of an escort of Theodore Roosevelt reads:

> 'A typical frontier demonstration and a rousing welcome from Rough Riders, cow punchers, and citizens of all classes, white, black, and red, were accorded today to Governor Theodore Roosevelt... He rode a black charger in the procession'.[61]

The importance of cavalry in this case is reminiscent of the importance of motorcyclists and car convoys in Tanzania. Another such description reads:

> '…more than one hundred mounted horsemen in Rough Rider attire, detachments of Civil War and Spanish War veterans, several Republican clubs, and American Indians who had painted their faces and clad themselves in blankets and feathers. Dozens of marchers held lighted Roman candles and shot rockets.'[62]

Across time and space, political parties and their candidates have used all manner of methods to make rallies work and get people to attend them. In Britain, 'local parties were advised to decorate meeting halls with flags, posters, and even plants to help make the whole experience more 'attractive' to the public.'[63] Democratic presidential nominee William Bryan leant on local supporters to make his rallies possible.

[61] Hilpert: 42.
[62] ibid: 67.
[63] Lawrence: 82-3.

> 'Arriving in town for his speeches, Bryan usually discovered a platform especially erected for him and often also found Bryan banners on display. Local political clubs and other campaign organizations were ready to greet him with ceremony.'[64]

In France, an organiser in the socialist party, *la Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière* (SFIO) explained that:

> 'In the days leading up to the demonstration or rally, we will organise teams of cyclists going round the surrounding villages, or the industrial suburbs to announce rallies using placards. We can also study the use of trucks decorated with placards inviting workers to take part in rallies…[65]

The unifying theme in all of these activities is that when rallies have mattered, parties have striven to draw voters to them and make them sites of festivity, ceremony, and drama, just as they do in Tanzania. This can be seen by reading into what is implicit in these cases, as well as by reading into what is explicit in the secondary literature and primary sources. One account of French politics reads that 'The use of this variety of ways to announce rallies testifies to the effort made by activists to assure that it will assemble a large public and the mastery of a savoir-faire for mobilising numbers.'[66] A report by a communist committee in France reads 'We need to make noise before the report to bring in the crowds. To guarantee the success of a rally, particularly the presence of a large audience, organisers work hard to ensure good publicity.'[67] In his history of electioneering in Britain, Jon Lawrence writes that 'By the 1900s some political parties were experimenting with the technology in an effort to make it more

[64] Harpine: 17.
[65] Cossart: 226.
[66] ibid: 226.
[67] ibid: 222.

suitable for elections… There was also pressure to make indoor meetings as pleasurable as possible.'[68] Similarly, in her description of public assemblies in the France's Third Republic, Paula Cossart writes that 'From the 1920s, both parties observed [*Le Parti Communiste Française* (CPF - the French Communist Party) and the SFIO] develop a mobilising exercise and a body of mobilising mechanisms is used in the big cities in particular, such as posters, notes in the press, and distribution of leaflets.'[69]

For all this diversity in methods, one underlying trend is that they became more capital-intensive over time. The grand parades that formed part of the preamble to public meetings in the United States were replaced by convoys of vehicles. One historian of American election campaign writes that during the 1920s the parties began arranging '"motor caravans," later called motorcades, where dozens of local dignitaries in open cars accompanied the candidate'.[70] A description of Johnson's first congressional campaign in 1928 reads that 'a honking of horns from the hills above the town, and the face of Lyndon Johnson came down out of the Hill Country on a long, lone line of rattling old cars – the longest caravan to come out of the Hill Country in fifty years.'[71] In 1930s France, 'There are other, rarer, techniques for announcing rallies, such as driving a car or truck with loudspeakers in the environs of the place where it will be held…'[72] Indeed, in this period, 'Mobile loudspeakers—built into cars, vans, and small lorries—began to be used to facilitate outdoor speaking almost as soon as the technology became widely available.'[73] This trend bears striking similarity to pattern which I have documented in Tanzania in detail, but also in much of sub-Saharan Africa more broadly.

[68] Lawrence: 82.
[69] Cossart: 226.
[70] Dinkin: 136.
[71] Caro. 1982b: 402.
[72] Cossart: 226.
[73] Lawrence.

There are many drivers of these changes, and many explanations of these underlying patterns in why parties mobilised rallies and why the methods that they used became increasingly capital-intensive over time. However, one case seems particularly pertinent to the processes described in this thesis, which binds together political finance, capital-intensity and innovation in the production of the rally: the 1948 senatorial primary campaign of Lyndon Johnson. Johnson's rise in the United States was deeply intertwined with his relationship with his financiers, notably Haroldson Hunt and Clinton Murchison.[74] His first congressional campaign was 'one of the most expensive congressional races in Texas history up to that time.'[75] So too was his senatorial campaign of 1948. Just like innovators in Tanzania, he began as an outsider to an incumbent senator, and lacked state-wide local support. Like innovators in Tanzania, he turned exuberant finance to his advantage. His biographer judges that 'Johnson's expenditures dwarfed those of any of his opponents.'[76] He put his money to use by buying radio adverts, but he also advanced the frontier of rally attendance mobilisation. In 1948, the United States played host to its last rally-intensive campaign to date. [77] It was in this campaign season that Harry Truman snatched the election from his opponent with an energetic national tour by train.[78]

Johnson pioneered the use of the most capital-intensive of rally production technologies: the helicopter. In fact, to the best of my knowledge, he was the first politician ever to campaign by helicopter. He raced across rural Texas at a rate that others could not equal, and just like in Tanzania, the helicopter offered a spectacle that produced audiences. One account reads:

[74] Robert Caro. 1982a. *The Years of Lyndon Johnson. The Means of Ascent*. London: Collins
[75] ibid: 409.
[76] ibid: 409.
[77] Andrew Busch. 2012. *Truman's Triumphs. The 1948 Election and the Making of Postwar America*. Lexington: Kansas University Press.
[78] Donaldson.

> 'to the astonishment of even his most hardened aides, he wanted a band, a hillbilly band. Was a helicopter a drawing card? Well, so was a band. A band playing at the landing site for an hour or so before the landing would help attract a crowd'[79]

Not only does the employment of the helicopter echo patterns of campaign innovation in Tanzania; the way that the helicopter was coupled to other capital-intensive techniques does too. Johnson's staff arranged teams to go to each rally location ahead of the candidate. There, 'they lined up a greeting committee, jotted down items of local interest and rounded up volunteers to contact each voter by phone. They also arranged for articles and ads in the local paper.'[80] Robert Caro writes that:

> 'The sound truck had left as soon as the helicopter appeared, of course, racing off, not for the next town – two or three trucks were "leapfrogging" towns in order to keep up with the helicopter – but for the town after that or the one after that. Some of the cars carrying advance me would have left before Johnson finished shaking hands, to get a head start.'[81]

In short, Johnson's teams mobilised rally attendance using just the techniques that I have described at use in Tanzania. Speaking of the Democratic primary campaign of 1948, one of Johnson's aides said later that 'I don't think we consciously realized that we were starting a brand new era of advance men'.[82]

The helicopter can be found at use elsewhere too. Candidates as far and wide as Ghana, India, and Peru have flown between their rallies.[83] However, the striking parallel

[79] ibid: 211.
[80] James Chiles. 2016. "Campaign by Helicopter." *Air and Space Magazine*, April.
[81] ibid: 218.
[82] Robert Dallek. 2004. *Lyndon B. Johnson: Portrait of a President*. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 61.
[83] Chiles; Austin Brakopowers. 2016. "I Use Road, You Fly Helicopter, Who Knows the Ground Better?

between Johnson's campaign and those in Tanzania is the connection between money and innovation. Johnson led experimentation in how to attract an audience because he was desperate, but also because he was formidably well-financed. Johnson's story is about how money, innovation and campaign success became intertwined in the United States. It is also one about the decreasing importance of the party.[84] Lyndon Johnson's experience attests to this process, but so do patterns of innovation and finance in post-war United States at large. A history of election campaigning in the United States writes that:

> 'Traditional campaigning, centered on party identification and organization, was first modified in presidential campaigns; the new style of electioneering worked its way down to lower offices only gradually'.[85]

In all of these regards, the Tanzanian story echoes the American one, and indeed the one which can be found across much of the developed world in the post-war era. Not only does innovation trigger cycles of fundraising and campaign method capitalisation. Innovations begin with the richest and trickles down to candidates lower down the income distribution as they mobilise new finances.

A thorough examination of the facts for all of these cases is beyond the scope of my research in this thesis, but the secondary literature, cited here, illustrates the reach of the theory which I have advanced. The ways in which rally production drives party adaptation can be glimpsed at work in other rally-intensive campaigns across the world.

– Akufo-Addo." *My Joy Online*, Accra, November 30; Staff reporter. 2015. "Heli-Campaigns Much in Vogue in Bihar Election." *Times of India*, Mumbai, October 6; Staff reporter. 2016. "Tarapoto: César Acuña Seguro de Pasar a La Segunda Vuelta." *RPP Noticias*, Lima, February.

[84] Ware.

[85] Salmore and Salmore.

A natural implication of this theory is that wherever, election campaigns are rally-intensive, the decline of local actors will begin before the coming of the television era. As long as the rally is central to campaigning, it provides a medium in which parties and candidates can gradually supplement the efforts of labour-intensive methods organised by local actors with capital-intensive methods funded by private financiers.

In sum, many of the patterns of behaviour which I have documented in Tanzania can be found in other rally-intensive campaigns across the world. There will doubtless be limits on the reach of this theory, beyond the scope conditions which I have set out above. Equally, there will no doubt be numerous intervening factors that complicate the extension and application of this theory to other cases merit. The investigation of just how far this theory travels and the exact nature of these complicating factors should be the subject of further research. In this respect, my thesis is dedicated to a broad comparative project. While my research has primarily concerned Tanzania, it identifies a series of phenomena that are relevant elsewhere. Indeed, I have written and developed much of the theory described here with travel in mind. I have developed it with the intention of rendering is as applicable as possible to rally-intensive campaigns elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa. Equally, I have written it to provide a model that is applicable to rally-intensive campaigns across the world. While there are numerous perturbations that any such theory must undergo to be transferred to another case, I have written it with transferability in mind. Throughout, I have sought to recognise the rich and contextually-specific nature of the phenomena in question. Yet simultaneously, I have sought to capture them in theories with modest assumptions and pithy logic that makes it as simple as possible to lift, transfer and apply the theory elsewhere. I leave it to others to take up this task.

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Interviews

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Anonymous. 2015c. *Interview*, CCM ward focus group.
Anonymous. 2015d. *Interview*, Parliamentary candidate.
Anonymous. 2015e. *Interview*, Chadema ward secretary.
Anonymous. 2015f. *Interview*, Chadema branch publicity and ideology secretary and branch elder's wing chairperson.
Anonymous. 2015g. *Interview*, Chadema branch secretary, branch youth chairperson and branch youth secretary.
Anonymous. 2015h. *Interview*, CCM ward secretary.
Anonymous. 2015i. *Interview*, Chadema street leader.
Anonymous. 2015j. *Interview*, Chadema councillor candidate, ward chairperson and ward secretary.
Anonymous. 2015k. *Interview*, CCM branch secretary.
Anonymous. 2015l. *Interview*, Chadema district campaign team.
Anonymous. 2015m. *Interview*, Chadema branch chairperson, acting secretary and youth secretary.

Anonymous. 2015n. *Interview*, CCM branch secretary.
Anonymous. 2015o. *Interview*, CCM district secretary.
Anonymous. 2016a. *Interview*, Chadema ward chairperson.
Anonymous. 2016b. *Interview*, CCM branch chairperson.
Anonymous. 2016c. *Interview*, CCM branch chairperson.
Anonymous. 2016d. *Interview*, Chadema branch chairperson.
Anonymous. 2016e. *Interview*, Chadema branch chairperson.
Anonymous. 2016f. *Interview*, Chadema Youth Wing branch chairperson.
Anonymous. 2016g. *Interview*, independent spectator.
Anonymous. 2017a. *Phone Interview*, Chadema constituency campaign manager.
Anonymous. 2017b. *Interview*, Chadema district campaign team.
Anonymous. 2017c. *Interview*, Chadema district campaign team.
Anonymous. 2017d. *Interview*, CCM district campaign team.
Anonymous. 2017e. *Phone Interview*, Chadema district management team.
Anonymous. 2017f. *Interview*, Chadema councillor candidate.
Anonymous. 2017g. *Phone Interview*, CCM district campaign team.
Anonymous. 2017h. *Interview*, Chadema district campaign team.
Anonymous. 2017i. *Interview*, Chadema district campaign team.
Anonymous. 2017j. *Interview*, Chadema ward campaign manager.
Anonymous. 2017k. *Interview*, Chadema branch accountant.
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Jussa, Ismail. 2017b. Skype Interview, December 6.
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Kiwanga, Susan. 2015. Interview, Dodoma, June 24.
Lissu, Tundu. 2015a. Interview, Dodoma, June 13.
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Field notes

All field notes refer to events witnessed and recorded in 2015

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