Revolutionary Discourse and Policy Process: The complexities of Operation Production in Mozambique, 1962–1992

Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Development

By

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Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to my parents, Pita Khembo and Adesta White, and my sons Ntsholo, Kwamy and Immanuel Khembo. Your existence encouraged me to continue to the end.

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The DPhil is a long, daunting, tortuous and nuanced process where a combination of fear, despair, solidarity, companionship, determination, encouragement, discipline, consistency and various types of assistance come together to make it happen. In such a process, it is possible to forget those whose help was decisive. Thus, I would like to start by apologising to so many of those who provided their support but who are not mentioned here. I remember when my mother, Adesta White, was about to pass away, a close friend told me: "giving up your studies will not change the fate of your mom". I do not remember how I digested that advice. Today, as I hope to be providing my contribution to knowledge, I remember those sage words from Teodato Xavier Chimundi. Thanks to him, I did not give up even if sometimes I doubted myself.

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There is no way I could manage to finish this thesis without the encouragement, constructive criticism and suggestions for further reading of Jocelyn Alexander, my supervisor, who did a wonderful job throughout the process.

Though listening to each of my peers from the "loft" typing his own thesis was sometimes annoying, it was also a way of pushing me back to work. Through your valuable inputs during the DPhil seminars, I gained many insights that are articulated here. Typical of a DPhil trajectory, sometimes I felt desperate to continue trying to understand something in a way that others wanted, without apparent reason. The DPhil seminars helped me to keep strong, by reminding me that what I was studying was worthwhile.

I would like to express my thanks for the financial support I have received from many different institutions. Without it, I could not have afforded this expensive enterprise. The product is the result of of many people's efforts that I have tried to assimilate and and make them reasonable and readable.

Abstract

In 1983, the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frelimo) adopted Operation Production (OP), aiming, at least in discourse, at transforming the "unproductive people" deemed to be the cause of urban chaos into "productive people", largely through agriculture in rural Mozambique. At its end in 1988, between 40,000 to 100, 000 people had been sent to rural Mozambique. Based on the analysis of the Frelimo leadership's ideology and values, triangulated with oral stories of those subject to OP, information from the local and international press, in-depth interviews with members of the Frelimo leadership, mid-low-level state officials, Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo) members, workers from state companies, and observation from the field, this thesis tells the story of the making, implementation and end of OP through a retrospective analysis. It starts with a discussion of the colonial-period ideological construction that led to its urban management model. Then, it explores the trajectory of the Frelimo leadership, the origin of their ideas before tackling the ways in which this past shaped Frelimo's imaginary of urban order that led to OP. The thesis then explores the relationship between ideology, imaginary and policy choice, and its implementation. Finally, it addresses the ways in which OP ended. I argue that the Frelimo leadership's ideas, values and imaginary, shaped by their experience of colonial order, by their military experience during the liberation struggle, and by the socio-economic and political context of the 1970s and the 1980s, was decisive in the making and implementation of OP. It resulted from the Frelimo leadership's ideology and imaginary, framed in their discourse, associated with the context of economic crisis and war of the late 1970s and the 1980s. More than increased production, emphasized in discourse, the main goal of OP was to achieve Frelimo's urban order (the "socialist city"), which was inspired by the historical trajectory of its leadership. The way OP ended, against the Frelimo leadership's wishes, reveals the limitation of ideology and values to maintain policy. The thesis demonstrates the importance of understanding the social and historical origins of the Frelimo leadership, their experiences and history, their ideological predisposition, and the context in which they constructed and used discourse to disentangle African politics, particularly in a highly centralized and ambitious party-state with no strong bourgeoisie or independent state bureaucracy, such as "socialist" Mozambique. The Frelimo leadership had their own perception of urban development, which can be explained through a retrospective and contextualized analysis of their discourse.

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Acronyms

APIE: Mozambican Housing Authority/ *Administração do Parque Imobiliário do Estado*

CAN: Mozambican Negro Association

CDA: Critical Discourse Analysis

CEDIMO: Mozambican Documentation Centre/ Centro de Documentação de Moçambique

CMCM: Maputo City Council/ *Conselho Municipal da Cidade de Maputo*

COC: Central Operative Command/*Comando Central Operativo*

CONCP: Conference of Nationalist Organizations of the Portuguese Colonies/ *Conferência das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colónias Portuguesas*

CPHLLN: Centre for Research on the History of the Liberation Struggle/ *Centro de Pesquisa sobre a História da Luta de Libertaçäo Nacional*

DHA: Discourse Historical Analysis

EMU: Eduardo Mondlane University/*Universidade Eduardo Mondlane*

FPLM: People's Forces for the Liberation of Mozambique/*Forças Populares de Libertação de Moçambique*

Frelimo: Front for the Liberation of Mozambique/ *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique*

GD: Mobilising groups/*Grupos dinamizadores*

ILO: International Labour Organisation

INE: National Institute of Statistics/ *Instituto Nacional de Estatística*

LEMA: Anti-imperialist Mozambican Students League/*Liga dos Estudantes Moçambicanos Anti-Imperialistas*

LM: Lourenço Marques

MAC: Matama Agricultural Company/ *Empresa Agrícola de Matama*

MANU: Mozambique African National Union/União Nacional Africana de Moçambique

MDM: Democratic Movement of Mozambique/ *Movimento Democrático de Moçambique*

MPLA: People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola/ *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola*

NESAM: Nucleus of Secondary Students of Mozambique/ *Núcleo dos Estudantes Secundários de Moçambique.*

OAU: Organisation of African Unity

OECD: Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development

OPEC: Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries

OJM: Mozambican Youth Organisation/ *Organização da Juventude Moçambicana*

OMM: Mozambican Women's Organisation/ *Organização da Mulher Moçambicana*

OP: Operation Production/*Operação Produção*

PAIGC: African Party for Independence of Guinea and Cap Verde/*Partido Africano para Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde*

PDA: Political Discourse Analysis

POC: Provincial Operative Command/*Comando Operativo Provincial*

PPM: People's Police of Mozambique/ *Polícia Popular de Moçambique*

Renamo: Mozambican National Resistance/*Resistência Nacional Moçambicana*

SNASP: National Security Service/*Serviço Nacional de Segurança Popular*

TANU: Tanzanian African National Union

TMR: Military Revolutionary Court*/Tribunal Militar Revolucionários*

UAC: Unango Agricultural Company/ *Empresa Agrícola de Unango*

UDENAMO: National Democratic Union of Mozambique/União Democrática de Moçambique

UNAMI: National Union for Mozambican Independence/União Africana de Moçambique Independente

UN: United Nations

ZANU-PF: Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front

Chapter 1: Positioning Operation Production in its field of knowledge

In this first chapter, I explain what Operation Production (OP) was, how it worked, how many people were affected, and the violence used and the consequences it had. I also present a chronology of OP. Then, I establish the research questions, undertake a literature review, describe the thesis contribution and relevance, the argument, and explain the research methods. Lastly, I set out the chapter outline and the contribution of each chapter to the thesis argument.


1.1. What Operation Production was

OP was a policy adopted by Frelimo in April 1983 during its fourth congress. Its main purpose, in official discourse, was to transform "urban unproductive and useless people" into "rural productive and useful people", largely through making them peasant cultivators, who would produce food for themselves, instead of creating chaos in cities. For the Frelimo leadership, OP was also to contribute to one of the main goals of Frelimo's revolutionary project: bringing about a "new" and "developed" urban society, the so-called socialist city, free from the vices of the colonial system. By the Frelimo leadership I mean those members of Frelimo's Political Bureau who were directly engaged in the struggle for independence and came to control the course of politics in from 1969 (after Eduardo Mondlane's death), as we will see in chapter 3. Mondlane was the first president of Frelimo, born in 1920 in Manjacaze, Gaza province of southern Mozambique. He was one of the founding members of the Nucleus of Secondary Students of Mozambique (NESAM) where some of the key members of the later Frelimo leadership (Joaquim Chissano and Armando Guebuza) gained political insights and a certain degree of political maturity (Roberts, 2016:17). My approach to the Frelimo leadership includes exploring their trajectory, their ideas and their experience in colonial Mozambique and particularly during the liberation struggle. For this leadership, the uncontrolled, and in fact uncontrollable urban influx, in a context of war, floods, drought and general economic crisis that affected the country at the end of the 1970s and early 1980s, was perceived as a challenge to its nation-state building and consolidation process, because it increased the pressure on already scarce public services in urban spaces, particularly in Maputo, the capital. According to their historical values and ideologies, "urban unproductive people" were deemed the cause of urban disorder in general, and particularly of increased crime, prostitution and other deviant activities. Evacuating them, keeping them in rural areas, and controlling their mobility through the *guia de marcha* was ideologically constructed as the the best solution for the the intended urban society.

1.2. The practicalities of Operation Production

OP was implemented in two phases, voluntary from June to July 1983 and coercive from July to May 1988. During the first phase, which lasted about 15 days, those who saw themselves as “unproductive” were to volunteer for evacuation to rural areas. As most people did not see themselves as such, few volunteered. As a result, most of the subjects of OP were coercively evacuated during the second, coercive, phase of the Operation. People were forcibly evacuated from cities, mainly Maputo, and Beira, the second largest city, to rural areas, mainly in Niassa and Cabo Delgado provinces (see map 1).

Map 1: The route of "unproductive people"



By the time OP ended in 1988, between 40,000 to 100,000 people, depending on the source, had been sent to rural Mozambique. According to *Primeiro de Janeiro* (12 July 1984:10), a newspaper published in Lisbon, about 40,000 people were sent to Niassa and Cabo Delgado up to July 1984. Vivet (2015:58) mentions that 50,000 to 100,000 people were evacuated from Maputo, Beira and other cities to rural Mozambique, mainly to Niassa and Cabo Delgado, and that 38 checkpoints and 6 evacuation centres were built for that purpose. Serra (1990:15) states that up to 15 July 1983, about

10,000 people were evacuated from different cities, 5,413 being from Maputo city. It is hard to find the exact number of affected people for many reasons. During evacuation, the Central Operative Command (COC) of the Ministry of the Interior did not keep records of those who were evacuated. The identification documents of those evacuated remained at evacuation centres. According to Rungo, a police officer during OP (Interview, 2 November 2015), the checkpoints and evacuation centres were dismantled by the state after OP. The Ministry of the Interior, the main state institution in charge of OP, has no records of people affected by OP. This is certainly due to the Frelimo leadership's acceptance of their own mistakes. It is also due to the unpopularity and controversy generated by Operation Production, and to the desire of the Frelimo leadership to eliminate the remains of such an unpopular policy.

Evacuees such as Tembe, a resident of Unango, Niassa, one of the destinations of OP subjects (Interview, 13 July 2016), Sabune (Interview, 11 August 2017) and Celestino, (Interview, 9 August 2017) only remember that there were about two to three planes arriving each day in Lichinga, between June 1983 and July 1984, with about 200-300 people on board. André (Interview 19 August 2017)[1] mentioned that in Pemba, the capital of Cabo Delgado province, three planes arrived between June and August 1983. The first had 180 people; the second 176 people and the third came with only 50 "unproductive people". Despite the difficulties to quantify OP evacuees, the testimonies of the interviewees show clearly that a significant number of people were affected by this Operation.

1.3. The violence used and its consequences

Contrary to its stated aims, OP had serious effects on the lives of those it touched. It disrupted families and diverted young students from school. Some of those who attempted to escape were killed by wild animals in the bush or ended up in the hands of Renamo. Those who remained in rural areas claim that they were marginalised and rejected by the party-state that was supposed to protect their lives. Operation Production's economic and social costs contributed to political exclusion and disaffection, which the Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo) capitalized on to claim its legitimacy as a political party representing the excluded and marginalised. Renamo is a movement that fought against the government soon after independence. In the end, OP did not contribute to increased production. Most of the so-called unproductive people remained out of the formal labour market, as before.

[1] N. André is the wife of the commander Sumail Chingo.Veteran of the liberation struggle, Chingo was commander soon after the Lusaka Accord, in 1974. First he worked at the re-education centre in Canda, in Gorongosa district, Sofala province. Later he was moved to Sacuze re-education centre in the same district. Then he was transferred to another re-education centre in Carico, Zambézia province, before working at the Nangororo Production Centre, in Pemba city, Cabo Delgado province. Here "unproductive people" sent to Cabo Delgado stayed before being transferred to the districts. In 1984, commander Chingo was sent abroad by Samora Machel for further training. In 1987 he returned to the country and was placed at Nguri, one of the places where many "unproductive people were placed. Now he lives in Milamba neighbourhood, Mocimboa da Praia,Cabo Delgado. He was sick when I met him and was not able to provide complex details and information of what happened more than 3 decades ago. For this reason, I relied on the details provided by his wife Neli André. They have been married for more than 4 decades and were already together in 1974.

Production crisis and food shortages continued in both towns and countryside and, despite the stated objectives of OP, it helped fuel the informal sector in urban Mozambique.

The synthesis of the 12th Session of the People's Assembly, in April 1984 (Assembelia Popular, 1984), which considered the impact of state activities, reports without giving exact numbers the reduction of delinquency, robbery and other crimes, particularly in the cities, as one of the outcomes of Operation Production. Sitoe, a police officer during OP (Interview, 29 October 2015), also mentions the connection between Operation Production and the reduction of crime in the cities. For him, 'after OP the cities, especially Maputo, became quiet and safe with no issues of drugs and people could move freely and safe at any time of the day'. The president of the Executive Council of Nampula put the reduction of crime at 50%, and the reduction of long queues at state-owned shops in that city because of Operation Production (Donaldo, 1983).

Crime and other "social deviations" might have reduced in the years following Operation Production. A report on the activities of the Ministry of the Interior produced by Serra (1990:25) seems to demonstrate such a reduction. At the national level, crime fell from 22,776 cases in 1983 to 13,204 in 1984, 12,684 in 1985 and 13,177 in 1986. However, the causal nexus between this reduction and Operation Production is questionable. First, the data refer to the national level, including rural areas. Operation Production was supposed to deal only with urban crime, at least from its discourse. Second, Operation Production was not meant to target actual criminals but would-be criminals, for being "unproductive people". Therefore, these numbers tell little about Operation Production's subjects. Third, to deal with crime and other "social deviations", the state had other measures in place, such as police raids, re-education camps and Identification campaigns.

Contrary to the official position and some of the then serving police officers, Operation Production made many evacuees vulnerable. On their arrival, "unproductive people" had no proper food, shelter and clothes. When evacuated they had no time to take their belongings. Subject to hunger and cold, and not integrated in the supposed "productive activities", many "unproductive people" became involved in irregular activities to survive in Nampula province (Ribas, 1983). As mentioned by Samson (figure 1), one of the OP's subjects (Interview, 13 July 2016), after evacuation from Maputo he and his fellow evacuees spent months at *Feira do Niassa-FENI* (figure 2), a local market in Lichinga, before being sent to rural Niassa. It was a month of suffering, as the following extract tells:

> …We left Maputo city by plane and they delivered us to FENI, in Lichinga. When we arrived, there were many others. There were no blankets. We had to find paper, and cut it in order to make our bed and sleep. Mosquitos bit us. It was so cold [Niassa is the coldest place in Mozambique and June and July is the winter] that we shivered. To eat we had to cut paper and make our plates and the food was hot. As we suffered like prisoners, other people looked for other means to survive outside FENI…




Figure 1: M. Samson (left) and M. Mucambo (right)

Though the extract does not say what the “unproductive people” exactly did outside FENI to find means to survive, as most of those evacuated were not integrated into the supposed “productive activities”, they had to survive on their own. This situation made them more likely to engage in marginal activities. Machanguane (1984) described how some “unproductive people" used to hang around Lichinga dirty, like beggars:

> … The “unproductive people” who are in Lichinga waiting to be placed in rural areas are people who look dirty. They wear torn trousers or blankets and they look like outlaws. Some of them hardly touch the ground when walking because they are infected by tungiasis. Many of them do not even have a place to sleep in this cold Niassa province. For that reason, some of them sleep in a broken airplane at the Lichinga garden where kids used to play …

The first and the second deputy ministers of the Interior, Tomé Eduardo and Teodato Hunguana, respectively, also witnessed their suffering, when they visited Niassa in September 1983 (Ribas, 1983:2).

If the aim of the Operation was to solve social deviation in urban Mozambique, it did nothing but transfer those “deviations” to rural areas. Most of the “unproductive people” continued to be

unemployed. Frangoulis, then a police brigadier in Maputo (Interview, 12 April 2016), emphasizes this. For him, the objective of Frelimo was to purify the cities, without looking to an effective solution to the problem of "social deviation" and its causes in general. If the potential criminals were far from cities, particularly from Maputo, there was less reason for concern.

Displacement, destruction of social relations and identity, and separation of families were important consequences of Operation Production. People were evicted from their familiar social environment and placed in a strange environment to which they had no previous link. Due to the arbitrarities that marked OP's execution, people were separated from their wives/husbands and/or children, and young students from their parents. Josini, who saw his pregnant wife staying in Maputo while he was evacuated, Vilanculos, who left his wife and two kids, and Mulungo, sent to Niassa with her 6 children and whose husband remained in Maputo, are a few examples of many (*Primeiro de Janeiro,* 1984:10). As argued by Gregory and Urry (1985) spatial structure is not merely an arena in which social life unfolds, but rather a medium through which social relations are produced and reproduced. The sense of belonging of the victims of OP was disrupted, forcing them to develop new social relations and identities without replacing those they were forced to leave behind. As Cole (1985:78) argues, 'the human need to belong is more than one for development. It is normally a strong human need, the satisfaction of which is conducive to individual and social well-being and the denial of which is conducive to suffering'. People are formed by physical propinquity, a native soil and a shared history that has formed common beliefs and values and conferred on it a profound identity. Most of the OP's evacuees lost it.

Even if some people tried to find their family members later, this effort was mostly in vain, and families remained divided. As argued by Warner (1994), the relation between individual and group is not related to physical space. It is the relations with other people that ground man in his existence. According to Matusse (1983:3), Maputo's Central Operative Command met to discuss the possibility of sending the families of those evacuated to join them. *Notícias* (1 March 1984:4) reports that about 400 families, among them husbands, wives and children, were enlisted to join their parents in Niassa and Cabo Delado. However, this did not materialize. One of the reasons is that the evacuation process was so disorganized that it became almost impossible to know who was where. The documents of those evacuated remained in the cities, coordination between central, provincial and district level of the implementing institutions was poor, and many people were sent without their family knowing. Thus, the promise of reunification of families was mere propaganda. As a result, *Notícias* (12 April 1984:4) reported many women who were evacuated to Niassa waiting, with their children, in vain, for their husbands to join them at FENI. People such as Uate (Interview, 3 August 2017), who still leaves in Lioma, Zambezia province, never again saw his children and wife, who was pregnant when he left Maputo, more than 30 years ago. Mucambo, one of the OP's subjects (figure 2), told his story:

> …When they arrived, I was at home with my two kids. My wife was away. They asked for my ID, which I provided, and they said it was outdated. They asked why I had not renewed it. I told them that I had already taken pictures and provided them to my company [he was working for Mozambican Railway Company], but my company had not renewed it yet. They asked me to follow them. I begged them to wait for my wife to arrive before I left. They insisted that I follow them, and I did so accordingly. Since then, I am here in Unango, I never went back home. It has been more than 30 years. I cannot even remember the name of my kids. I only know that the first is a boy and the last is a girl, who was less than a year old when I was evacuated. My children do not know me, and if we come across each other, none of us will recognize each other. They were so small… (Mucambo, Interview 13 July 2016)

Operation Production thus destroyed family ties. Frelimo later tried to reunite families. It produced a list of wives, husbands and children who were to meet their parents in rural Mozambique, as reported by *Notícias* above. Nevertheless, few were effectively sent to rural areas for that purpose. Those who were sent never met their parents. Some "unproductive people" managed to return home during and after the Operation (*Notícias*, 12 April 1984:2) but were unable to reunite with their family members. Many others remained in rural Mozambique, despite the state's later attempt to send them back home. As reported by *Notícias* (15 December 1988:3) about 70 people left Cabo Delgado to Maputo in December 1988. Ngovene (figure 3), one of OP's subjects (Interview, 13 July 2016) who was evacuated from Maputo, is still in Niassa, like many others. Apart from those who were already mentioned in the interview, many other "unproductive people" are still in the rural areas. They are João Benedito, Montepuez- Cabo Delgado, João Viriato, in Matama-Niassa, Ana Pungue Ntsingano, in Cabo Delgado, Salazar Nombora, in Matucuta-Niassa, Daúdo Celestino, in Gurue-Zambézia, Aissa Charle, in Gurue-Zambézia, Henrique Jonas, in Unango-Niassa, Carlos Sevene, in Unango-Niassa, Miqueias Ananias Manjate, in Unango-Niassa, Cecília Matusse, Lichinga-Niassa, Sebastião Manhique, Lichinga-Niassa, Madalena Fernando Muzonda Massinga, Lichinga-Niassa, Lázaro Maculuve, who died in Matama-Niassa, Moisés Samson (who died in April 2017 in Unango-Niassa), Sábado Jorge Tembe (currently affected by a mental disease), António Domingos Hobjuana, in Lichinga-Niassa, Silvestre Andrade, Unango-Niassa, Faustino Ernesto Tete, Unango-Niassa, etc (Tembe, Interviewed 8 August 2017). Tembe arrived in Unango in 1981, two years before Operation Production. He is well aware of the suffering of so many "unproductive people" people that arrived in Niassa and know most of them by heart. In fact, he received many of those who were sent to the Unango Agricultural Company.



Figure 2: The entrance of the local market of Lichinga (FENI)



Figure 3: J. Ngovene, Operation Production subject

Other "unproductive people" died during Operation Production. Not as a direct affect of Operation Production itself but because of the suffering to which they were subjected in rural areas, mainly after Renamo attacks. 'Those who died we buried them here in Unango', said Tembe (Interview, 13 July 2016). Samson who I interviewed in July 2016 was assassinated in April 2017 when he was working on his *machamba* (normally, a small parcel of land for family agrculture). Samson's assassins and its cause remain unclear. Rumours point to a robbery.

> …Those who assassinated Samson believed that he kept a lot of money in his house. They killed him, went to his house, and took his belongings and money afterward. Samson kept saying to everyone that he met that he was saving money to go back to Maputo and reunite his family. He lived alone, had no kids and no wife. He farmed the land, sold his crops and kept all the money'. Those who killed him knew that he kept a lot of money in his house. He was killed because of his mouth…, said Tembe (Interviewed 8 August 2017).

Wild animals in the bush killed some of them in their attempt to escape the Operation. 'We only found the heads of our comrades, those who had tried to flee, in the bush', said Jossias, one of the OP's subjects (Interview, 13 July 2016). Figure 4 is one of the graves of one of the victims of Operation Production who died in Unango.

Interviewees were angry that they were ripped away from their social environment with no clear explanation, mistreated during their passage from evacuation centre, spending nights in the open in the coldest province of the country, with no proper clothing, and finally left in the dark to start life from scratch. In desperation, some would try to return home even without knowing the way back. Manjate (Interview, 18 July 2016), one of the subjects of Operation Production sent to Unango, told me what he knows:

> …Many others just entered the bush without knowing where they were going. We slept together, woke up the next day, and noticed that some had gone. Months after, we would learn that one or other of those who had gone was found dead in the bush. Many had the same fate. We escaped by accepting the lesser fate of staying here in Unango. However, it was not a good thing. Frelimo ruined our life and we are still suffering. To survive each one of us does the best he can. Some sell *catcholima*. Those who can and still have strength, farm the land. This is how we live here. The easiest thing is to farm the land. We were forced to become cultivators. Even if it is not enough, one can eat for a few days after harvesting…

The heart-breaking story told by Manjate reveals how Operation Production affected the lives of its subjects. These feelings still exist though most of them have decided not to talk about it, because it hurts. Some of them like Samson (Interview, 13 July 2016), shed tears during the interview.



Figure 4: Grave of Eugénio Munguambe, OP subject

Some evacuees had decided to remain in rural Mozambique. Cleofas Viagem, a journalist from a local private TV station, Soico TV, produced a documentary where some of the "unproductive people" give their testimonies (https://www.youtube.com, retrieved on 20 July 2016). Some of them said:

> …We no longer want to return, we became people of Niassa and we are already too old to return. What we will do in Maputo! We hear that life is hard in Maputo and we have been here [in Niassa] for long time, we have our new families here [meaning new wife, husband, or child]. The only thing we wanted was to see our old families, which we left more than 30 years ago and we no longer know where they are. We do not know if they are still alive. Some of them may have died. Alternatively, some of them think that we are dead, but we are here with our suffering...

Matusse, one of OP's subjects (Interview, 20 July 2016), was able to go back to Maputo and visit part of her family after evacuation. Then, she decided to return Niassa. Refusing to return home, as

indicated in the extract above, and as the case of Matusse reveals, does not necessarily mean that the "unproductive people" were effectively integrated in rural Mozambique. Because they have been living in rural Mozambique for more than 30 years, they no longer know the city they left behind. They believe themselves to be more prepared to cope with life in rural Mozambique than to return to Maputo or Beira. They are uncertain about coping strategy in cities. Additionally, most of them are not educated. Their connection to rural Niassa or Cabo Delgado is dominantly economic. 'Here at least one can farm the land or ask a neighbour for salt or oil, if one doesn't have it. In the city one cannot do that', said Benedito, one of the OP subjects (16 August 2017). Their long-distance social reference remains their former home, a place that they were forced to abandon, because of a policy that they knew little about. As argued by Kibreab (1999) the identity people gain from their association with a particular place is an indispensable instrument to a socially and economically fulfilling life. Jonas, one of the OP subjects (Interview, 16 July 2016), gives testimony of such uncertainty:

> ...I would like to return to Maputo and see my family. The Catholic Church came here and helped some of us to return home. Some went back indeed. But most of us refused to go back. What the Church provided us with was not enough to restart life in Maputo. In addition, we are uncertain about what life looks like now in Maputo. It has been more than 30 years since we left Maputo. I would rather stay here where I can at least get food for myself...

The fear and uncertainty of what their home became after more than three decades is the main reason they decided to remain in rural Mozambique. As pointed out by Voigt, et al (2014: 32) in a situation requiring decision, those faced with uncertainty tend to weigh potential losses stronger than potential gains. "Unproductive people" lost their social milieu and ways of generating income in a way that was impossible to reconstruct, at least from their perceptions. For them, though being part of their long-distance social reference, places like Maputo, Beira and Nampula became strange and hard to navigate in later decades. Their home was stuck in a distant past, their families had become strangers, and neither was accessible for them anymore. As a result, most of them would rather farm their piece of land in rural Mozambique than to return home.

There are sources that indicate that Renamo recruited some OP subjects. According to FBIS-AFR-88-090 (1988:1), Renamo recruited many of their members from places where "unproductive people" were sent. Robinson (2006: 43) argues that Operation Production reinforced Renamo. Geffray (1990: 132) argues that certain sectors, particularly rural male youth, saw in Renamo an opportunity to escape the frustration and despair of their daily lives. Many young men in the area he studied, in Nampula province, saw their attempts to make a new life for themselves in the cities frustrated, both because of the failure of sufficient economic opportunity to materialize and because of government initiatives, such as Operation Production, in which "unproductive people" were sent back to their origins in the countryside. In their original homes, they suffered the hostility and suspicion of local

party and government officials and the constraints imposed by lineage elders. Thus, Geffray (1990: 132) argues, 'when some of these youths happened to cross paths with groups of Renamo soldiers, they were not always averse to staying with them, once their initial fear had passed'. More information about the relationship between Renamo and OP is in chapter 6.

Operation Production, a policy intended to transform a segment of Mozambican society in the national interest along socialist and modernising lines produced unexpected results. It was constructed as a policy that aimed at dealing with a social phenomenon that was much more complex than its representation in the discourse. Its implementation was dislocated from the issues it purported to solve. It was based on Frelimo's own overestimation of its capacity to transform people and the society as a whole, inspired by the years of the liberation struggle. Yet it had terrible effects on the lives of those subject to its dictates. Most of the so-called "unproductive people" continued to be so, as defined by Frelimo state. Most of them were simply left without support in rural Niassa and Cabo Delgado and forced to become peasants and continued without a work card, the main reason why they were evicted from cities. What the subjects of OP have become, after evacuation, is not only the result of Operation Production. But the fact that they were left in rural Mozambique in a context of economic crisis and in the middle of armed conflict spreading in mostly rural areas left them with few options other than to become peasants, it is a clear indication that OP ended in 1988 without achieving its goals. In cities, it shattered the relative order and stability that preceded it. It heightened levels of poverty, crime and social disintegration by undermining livelihoods, shelter and security for most of impoverished urban dwellers.

1.4. Chronology of Operation Production

1975, 16-21 February: The Mocuba meeting. Mocuba is a district of Zambézia province in central Mozambique. On the eve of independence, Frelimo held a meeting to discuss the pressing issues of the country. For the first time the issues of urban disorder, which justified Operation Production (OP) was officially put as a result of the presence of the "undesired urban people", the so-called unproductive people.

1975, 25 June: Independence of Mozambique

1975, 3 November: More than 3,000 women and men arrested in Lourenço Marques (Maputo), Beira, Nampula and Chimoio cities as a result of Frelimo's attempt to clean the cities from "urban disorder". This one of the first manifestations of what would become Operation Production eight years later.

1977, 3 - 7 February: Frelimo's third Congress where it officially adopts Marxism-Leninism as the guiding political ideology to conducts its revolutionary project.

1979, 26 February - 3 March: Frelimo's first National Meeting of Cities and Communal Neighbourhoods. This meeting decided the main elements of what would be called the socialist city.

1982, 15 June: Frelimo's Central Committee announces the introduction of a "pass law" and residence cards to halt a "massive" rural exodus to the cities.

1983, 26-30 April: Frelimo's fourth Congress decided officially to implement Operation Production.

1983, 21 May: Samora Machel announces the Frelimo 4th Congress' decision to implement Operation Production to the public at Independence Square, Maputo city.

1983, 15 June: Frelimo's Ministerial Directive announces the practicalities of Operation Production.

1983, 20 June: the first, voluntary, phase of Operation Production begins. Few people volunteered during this phase.

1983, 20 July: the second, compulsory, phase of Operation Production begins. Most of the OP subjects were affected during this phase.

1984, March: Frelimo begins attempts to reunite family members of Operation Production evacuees.

1984, May: evacuation of "unproductive people" begins to slow down.

1986: Samora Machel, president of Frelimo and of Mozambique, died in a plane crush. Machel was a key figure in the decision-making of Operation Production and the way it was implemented.

1988, May: Joaquim Chissano officially ends Operation Production during a presidential visit in Niassa province where most of the "unproductive people were.

1.5. The research question

Based on the case of OP, this thesis uses discourse as a method and theory (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002; Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012; Fairclough, 2015) to understand the relationship between ideology and values, and the policy process. Ideology is concerned with the ways in which beliefs and concerns, which are connected with the interests of a particular social group, become general beliefs and how they have a practical manifestation in social life. It is part of the way in which the dominance of social groups is achieved, maintained and reproduced through a particular direction of social change. The capacity of doing so relies on its ability of self-naturalisation or of becoming part of common sense (Fairclough, 1989:12). In this sense, ideology, though being different from discourse, which is a way of representing and present reality to ground decision (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012), is related to it and helps to explain how political leaders engage in a particular policy, such as Operation Production. Decisions and actions of political leaders are also constrained by their ideology and values as argued by Grindle and Thomas (1991). In this research, I explore the Frelimo leadership's revolutionary discourse to capture their ideology and values, which associated with the context, explain their engagement in Operation Production. The thesis does this by focusing on the social and historical origins of political leaders that shaped their ideology and values, which led to policy adoption. Specifically, the thesis explores the important role of the Frelimo leadership's ideological construction in the making of OP and the way it was implemented, and particularly the importance of understanding the history and the context in which their ideology was constructed and

used. As Wodak (2011) argues, the interpretation of policy process also requires considering the historical conditions of political leaders, and the socio-economic context in which their ideology is grounded. What was the Frelimo leadership's ideal of urban order that grounded OP and the way it was implemented? How was it framed in Frelimo's discourse? What are the historical conditions that shaped their ideology? What does the implementation of OP tell us about Frelimo's aims? What does the demise of this policy tells us about the legitimisation function of ideology? These questions will be addressed by this research in different chapters.

Mozambique is a former Portuguese colony located in southern Africa. Following a ten-year liberation struggle, led by Frelimo, the country gained its independence in June 1975. In its third Congress, in 1977, Frelimo became officially a party oriented ideologically by Marxism-Leninism and embraced a revolutionary project. Its goal, of which Operation Production is part, was to establish a new modern "socialist society", free from the vices of its colonial predecessor, at least in discourse. In the same context, Renamo (the Mozambican National Resistance) began a war against the Frelimo government that ended in 1992 with a peace agreement that established a multi-party system. According to the 1980 census, Mozambique was divided in 10 provinces, three in southern Mozambique, Maputo (where the capital city, Maputo, is located), Gaza and Inhambane; four in the central region, Sofala (where the second largest city, Beira is located), Manica, Zambézia and Tete, and three in the northern region, Nampula (where the third largest city, Nampula, is located), and Niassa and Cabo Delgado, to where most of the targets of OP were sent. In 1980, there was 12,146,000 inhabitants (Instituto Nacional de Estatística, 1980). Most lived, and are still living, in rural areas. Due to the war between Renamo and the government, and other factors, many people migrated to cities in the 1980s. Maputo and Beira were the most affected. In the Frelimo leadership's views, this migration increased the number of already existing "unproductive people" in cities, where they were consuming and "doing nothing" but creating "chaos". They had to be stopped no matter what. Through OP, "unproductive people", ideologically constructed as the main cause of urban disorder, had to be sent to rural areas to become useful and decent people who contributed to the Frelimo revolution.

In the academic world, most of Frelimo's revolutionary projects were interpreted as a failure without a careful analysis of the meaning it had to its leadership. In 1983, due to the failure of policies such as communal villages and the socialisation of the countryside, the Frelimo government began to shift its economic approach by providing more room to the private sector to operate. During its fourth Congress in April 1983, the Frelimo leadership decided that the state should withdraw from the market (Partido Frelimo, 1983:35), though it did not necessarily change its political approach. Paradoxically, at the same time as the leadership moved toward reducing its intervention in the economy, the government put in place a policy, OP, driven by the state's central role in its implementation. The seeming ambiguity of this strategy and the fact that the media reported that many affected by OP were

still living in Niassa and Cabo Delgado decades later triggered my curiosity as a historian and political scientist. I wanted to understand the complexities that led the Frelimo leadership to engage in OP. I also wanted to understand how those people affected by OP were still in places where they were taken in the 1980s, if most of Frelimo's revolutionary policies were assumed in the literature to be a failure. What was the Frelimo leadership's view of causes and remedies of urban order? How was this view framed in discourse and how was it related to OP? What was the trajectory of these ideas? In what context were they produced and used? How much does the end of OP tell us about the legitimisation function of discourse? Unpacking these questions would allow me to better understand African politics in general, and in particular, Frelimo's.

The study covers the period from 1962 to 1992. This period is chosen for several reasons. First, to understand the Frelimo leadership's ideology, as argued by Wodak (2011), it is relevant to conduct a retrospective analysis of the historical conditions in which they are embedded. These are the experience of its leadership in colonial cities, colonial ideas of the city, order and control, the formation of Frelimo itself, the governance of "liberated zones" during the liberation struggle, Frelimo's internal conflicts, the nature of its state, and its decision-making machinery. The social trajectory and the background of the leadership is relevant to understanding the ways in which it processes information required to take decisions and the ways in which policy is implemented. For this reason, the thesis explores the experience of the Frelimo leadership in the colonial period, and how it contributed to shaping their ideology and values. Second, though OP ended officially in 1988, it was only four years later that some of those who were authorised to return arrived at their destination, with support from the Catholic Church. Pushing the date of OP's demise to 1992 is a way to challenge the legitimisation function of ideology. As will be demonstrated, the Frelimo leadership's ideology and values were relevant in the adoption of OP and its implementation. However, it had a limited function in shaping the reality it wanted to address, and in maintaining legitimacy. The evacuation of the "unproductive people" from cities ended and some of them returned home against the Frelimo leadership's wish.

The next section situates the theoretical debate in which the thesis is engaged. It addresses the determinants of policy choice and policy intervention, in general, and in developing countries, such as Mozambique, in particular. By adopting an approach that focuses on the political leadership, and by exploring the dynamics of policymaking and implementation, I argue that OP is a policy that resulted from the ways in which issues such as crime, prostitution and increased production were historically represented by the Frelimo leadership, associated with the socio-economic and political context. The way it was adopted and implemented resulted from the dominant ideology about order and control and the ways in which Mozambican urban society ought to be organised. The Frelimo leadership's ideology of urban order that is framed in their discourse resulted from their colonial and military experiences, and the context in which it was embedded throughout the 1970s and the 1980s.

1.6. Understanding policy process

My thesis speaks to a broad debate about policy process, particularly about what determines policy choice, which I argue is relevant to understanding African politics. Scholars in this field suggest different ways of inquiring into the ways in which policy choice occurs. I argue that in a specific socio-economic context, political leaders' ideology and values, which are manifest in their discourse and related to their social and historical origins, are key to understanding policy process. I also argue that the leadership's ideology, though determinant in shaping policy choice, is limited in its capacity to maintain political legitimacy. The way policy is interpreted by non-state institutions and the context in which policy is implemented are decisive in explaining policy demise.

Allison and Zellikow (1999), Krasner (1978), and Skocpol (1985) take the state, a conglomerate of large organisations and political actors, as the key unit of analysis. Allison and Zellikow (1999) argue that policy choice is a result of innumerable, and often conflicting, small actions by individuals at various levels of organisations in the service of a variety of only partially compatible conceptions of independent organisational pre-defined goals. For them, government perceives problems through organisational sensors, its routine and standard patterns of behaviour, which go beyond the political elite's will, and are resistant to societal pressure. Like Allison and Zellikow (1999), Skocpol (1985) argues that the state, an analytical category separable from society and political leaders, has its habitual ways of diagnosing and remedying problems, and the organization of staff responsibilities and resources. At times, policy outcomes might suit one or another societal group, as argued by Amin (1977), dos Santos (1970), Cardoso and Faletto (1979), and Nordlinger (1987), but its achievement is not a result of the pressure or influence of that group, but instead, reflects pre-existing state interests and organisational behaviours. At other times, the state might adopt policies that have harmful consequences for a dominant class. Skocpol (1985) and Allison and Zelikow (1999) argue that the state is not only an arena of conflict of different societal groups but also an actor in its own right. Thus, in what Allison and Zelikow (1999) call governmental politics, to understand policy choice, it suffices to explore organisational context, procedure and standard organisational operating behaviour, and the state's pattern of acquiring and processing information, defining feasible options, and implementation strategies.

By seeing the state as an inflexible institution that follows rigidly pre-defined state goals in the policy-making process, the governmental politics approach restricts the rationality of the political leaders to organizational behaviour. It dismisses ideology, values and social and historical origins of political leaders and the way they penetrate state machinery and its decision-making machinery and determine policy outcome. Thus, the governmental politics approach provides little insight into ways

in which the historical experiences, ideologies and values of political elites "penetrate" the state and determine policy choice.

Without rejecting entirely the merit of this approach, I argue that the ideology and values of political leaders, which can be found in their discourse, play an important role in determining policy choice, particularly in a highly centralized and ambitious party-state where there is no strong bourgeoisie or independent state bureaucracy, such as in Mozambique in the 1980s. Political leaders, who sit atop organizations, are not monolithic. Rather, each of them is a player with bargaining skills, perceptions, ideas and history that can be deployed in ways that shape policy content and its implementation.

Before adding to this point, I will explain the concept of political leaders as used in this research. As argued by Zuckerman (1977) the literature on political leadership is characterized by conceptual confusion and research divorced from theoretical questions. Many researchers have applied different terms in answering the same research question. For example, some have used terms such as power elite, defined by Mills (1959) as the men in positions to make decisions having major consequences, who are in command of the major hierarchies and organizations of modern society. Others refer to ruling elite, defined by Dahl (1961) as a controlling group less than a majority in size that is not a pure artefact of democratic rules. Still others describe political leadership as the minority of individuals whose preference regularly prevails in cases of differences in preferences on key political issues or as the minority within a social group, which exercises a preponderant influence within that group (Roberts, 1971).

The concepts listed above give an idea about power holders and their influence in policy choice and its implementation. Nevertheless, they do not consider ways in which ideology and values of leaders affect policy process. They do not consider the permanent effort of the leadership to produce and reproduce their legitimacy, what Mosca calls the struggle for power. As noted by Livingston (1939), the concept of political leadership is used in this research in the way argued by Mosca and Lasswell (1961). Though Mosca preferred the concepts of political class, ruling class or governing class, rather than political leadership, he helped to reduce the confusion of the use of the term by arguing that it should find its meaning within a theoretical system and be put to work in the analysis of specific research problems. Thus, for this research, political leadership means what Mosca calls a political class. It is a group of select people who exercise political power and are directly engaged in struggles for political leadership and its legitimacy within a specific decision-making forum, e.g. the Frelimo's Political Bureau (see table 3 in chapter 3). It is also what Lasswell (1961) calls the power holders of a body politic. It includes their social and historical origins and experiences. By social origins, I mean the social experiences of political leaders through history, the context in which they produce, gain and use ideology and values, which shape policy choice and its

implementation. The Mosca and Lasswell concept of political leadership is applicable for this research because it considers not just the power to decide or shape decisions but also the social and historical origins and experiences of the leaders (Wodak, 2011) that shape their ideology. As my research also explores the history of the Frelimo leadership and of their ideas, manifest in discourse, the Mosca and Lasswell concepts are more applicable. Their concept also considers the struggle for power and the ways in which political leaders find creative ways to legitimise it. It is important for my research as I discuss the ways in which the Frelimo leaders used ideology and values through discourse to engage in OP and their struggle for power since the liberation struggle. Mosca and Lasswell define political leadership in ways that consider the importance of the socioeconomic and political context in which ideology occurs to interpret its role in policy choice and implementation. This is fundamental for my approach to the Frelimo leadership's discourse to capture their ideology and interpret its role in the adoption of OP and its implementation.

Unlike the governmental politics approach, proponents of Marxist class analysis argue that policy choice is a reflex of conflictual relationships existing within classes, which are separable from the state in each system. In this approach, the view of the dominant class will shape policy choice and policy intervention, as the state is not autonomous, as argued by the governmental politics approach, but an instrument captured by the dominant class. Unlike the governmental politics approach, in Marxist analysis, the autonomy of the state only occurs when the dominant classes are profoundly at odds with each other, and unable to establish a ruling coalition, or when the interest of the dominant class is threatened. Thus, to explain policy process, the conflicting relationship amongst classes must be seriously considered. In this sense, Nordlinger (1987) sees many constraints on the role of the political leadership in determining policy outcome. Like Nordlinger (1987), Olson (1982) sees dominant classes' bargaining skills as the key unit of analysis to understand policy outcome. For him, the dominant class will shape policy process by using either votes, political connections, lobbying activities, or the imposition of rewards or sanctions on public officials, depending on the context. Thus, for Amin (1977), dos Santos (1970), Cardoso and Faletto (1979) and Nordlinger (1987), the interpretation of policy outcome must focus on understanding the nature of the conflicting relationship amongst classes and the positioning of the dominant class.

As in the governmental politics approach, in Marxist analysis ideology and values of political leadership and their social and historical origins and experiences are less important to explain policy process than class dynamic. The Marxist approach sees the dominant class, which sees policy process as a way of asserting their common goals, as the key unit of analysis. In this sense, for Marxists the goal of a policy choice and its implementation is to fulfil the material interests of the dominant class, the bourgeoisie. This interpretation follows the trends of the Marxist explanation of state. As argued by Carnoy (1984), in the Marxist view, the state is a structure of political power used by a group of people (dominant class) to serve their own economic goals. The state does not come from a social

contract, as defined by liberals. The state is a demand from material evolution of the society where those holding the means of production required a superior political power to subject those without means of production. Thus, the purpose of the state (and of politics), in Marxist terms, is not to serve a common purpose of the whole society but to fulfil the interest of a small group of people, the bourgeoisie.

Though Marxists acknowledge the role of political leaders, who put in place policies in favour of specific interest groups to remain in power, they tell us little about the trajectory of political leaders and its relation to policy process. Though conflicting interests of societal classes may be useful to disentangle the way policy choice occurs, the Marxist approach ignores the occasions when political leaders initiate policy and the extent to which their ideology, values, and historical experiences penetrate decision-making mechanisms and shape policy content. By limiting the determinants of policy choice to class interest, Marxists ignore that policy demise can occur against class interest, as in the way Operation Production ended, as will be discussed in chapter 6. The Marxist approach is limited in explaining policy choice in contexts such as in Mozambique, where, in many cases, policy was not discussed outside government structures and the bourgeoisie was weak and did not necessarily control the state. As will be demonstrated in chapter 3 and 4, policy choice and policy intervention relied heavily on the historically formed ideology and values of the Frelimo leadership that were channelled through discourse, and the way this elite was positioned within the state machinery, particularly its decision-making forum, such as Frelimo's Political Bureau.

Unlike the Marxist analysis and the governmental politics approach, Grindle and Thomas (1991), who studied policy choice and policy implementation in developing countries, argue that policy outcomes are significantly determined by ideological predispositions, power resources, and the trajectory of political leaders. Political leaders are embedded in historical, political, and social contexts that should be considered to interpret their ideology and how it shapes policy content. As argued by Jervis (1968), Hall (1993), Fischer and Forester (1993), Rochefort and Cobb (1994) and Stone (2001), the beliefs and values of political leaders determine the ways in which information is processed, and thus the way problems and their remedies are perceived. As they are in a privileged position to take the initiative in the orientation and leadership of policy-making and policy intervention, the answer to what determines policy outcome must be sought, at least in part, at that level.

For Grindle and Thomas (1991), the interests of social classes, organized groups, international actors, or international economic conditions are factors that determine the outer boundaries of policy choice but, regardless of the issue, political leaders appear to have significant room for manoeuvre and the capacity to influence and shape the content, timing, and sequence of reform initiatives. This room for manoeuvre defines a "policy space" for any given issue, a space that is determined by the ability of the political leaders to introduce and pursue reform. Within their perceptions of what constitutes the

available space for any issue, political leaders play an important role in defining the content of policy and its implementation. Their perceptions and preferences are central to which reforms are introduced, when they are initiated, and how they are carried out.

As argued by Howlett and Ramesh (1995), identifying political leaders and understanding their beliefs and motivations, their judgments of feasibility, and their perceptions of the political context, goes a long way toward explaining how policy choice occurs, especially in developing countries, such as Mozambique. The political network developed amongst the Frelimo leaders through the liberation struggle, their alliance during their passage by NESAM in Lourenço Marques (now Maputo), and the way they ascended to and centralised power from the late 1960s, gave them significant space to shape policy content. There was an almost non-existant bourgeoisie and a weak state system. Newly independent Mozambique was under a one-party system with the Frelimo leaders, and particularly its president, Samora Machel, controlling most of the decision-making process, as we will see in chapter three.

Political leaders are not isolated from societal pressure or influences, as argued by the Marxists. Often, they are aware of dividing conflicts among classes. Nevertheless, class or group interests are contextual factors within which political leaders manoeuvre to produce solutions to what they perceive as the major problems. Thus, in the face of any problem, the political leaders can define what the best response to it is. This understanding and representation of cause-and-effect relationships (e.g. urban disorder is caused by the presence of "urban unproductive people") is fundamental in terms of the nature of interventions adopted (e.g. evacuation of "unproductive people" to rural areas). Thus, an important aspect of unpacking a policy process is to explore political leaders' social and historical origins and experience that shape their ideology and values, and the context in which they emerge and operate.

Often, political leaders' ideology and values are manifest in their discourse, what Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) call practical reasoning. The emergence of Political Discourse Analysis (PDA), a method and theory of analysis that explores the power of language (discourse, as defined above) in shaping policy choice and policy intervention, prompted new ways of analysing policy process. PDA is part of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), an interdisciplinary methodology and theory that emerged in the 1970s and gained prominence at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s with works like Fairclough's (1989) *Language and power*, Wodak's (1989) *Power and ideology* and van Dijk's (1993) journal *Discourse and society*. Though not referring specifically to the African context, Fairclough and Fairclough (2012), Fairclough (2015), Wodak (2011) developed an approach to policy process that is useful for exploring the role of political leaders' ideology and values to explain policy process, in the way argued by Grindle and Thomas (1991). This approach is not just relevant, but I argue that it is the best way to disentangle the Frelimo leadership's ideology. I argue that

understanding this policy requires tracing the Frelimo leaders' revolutionary discourse (Wodak, 2011) back to the context in which it was produced and developed. As we will see in chapters three and four, the Frelimo leadership, particularly Samora Machel, the then President of the party and of the country, made extensive use of discourse in politics during the liberation struggle and after independence. As argued by Darch and Hedges (2013), discourse was the main political communication platform that Frelimo relied on to communicate to the people their views about problems and solutions to address them. With a weak state and in the absence of a strong bourgeoisie, discourse was translated into policy mostly without challenge.

Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) argue that ideology and values, which are the ways in which social reality is represented, is the major mechanism for legitimisation of power within a given system. Thus, the production, naturalisation and control of ideology, which is made through discourse, is a fundamental component of policy process. Discourse channels ideology and values in ways that transform human beings into subjects, and to the production of disciplinary society for the sake of welfare. That is why discourse analysis is useful to unpack the policy process, particularly when a researcher takes into account non-discursive aspects such as experiences, representations, values and feelings. For Fairclough and Fairclough, discourse analysis is a way to capture the role of ideology in shaping power relations in society because ideology creates abnormalities, which should be treated and reformed, leading to specific kinds of intervention. For Fairclough (2015), social reality entails beliefs and ideas about, and representations of that reality, which are manifest in discourse. Wodak (2011) emphasizes what is called a retrospective analysis. This is the ability to critically reconstruct the past, the effects of which are still relevant to the present, and simultaneously criticise the existing social reality, by looking to continuities and changes in discourse. Wodak calls this way of exploring the role of discourse in shaping policy choice a Historical Discourse Analysis (HDA).

Other theoretical explanations on policy choice, such as Schneider and Ingram (1997), have stressed the importance of integrative approaches, which sees it as a combination of a variety of aspects (organizational behaviour, class interest), instead of focusing only on the political leaders' ideology and values, and their historical experiences. They see it as a complex process that involves many other aspects, such as the organizational network, class influence, state capacity and limitations, and even sometimes international players. However, as I will show, the context of Mozambique makes discourse analysis the best method and theory to unpack why the Frelimo leadership engaged in OP.

Before the 1990s, particularly during Machel's leadership, most of the decisions, such as OP, were not necessarily written into law or formal policy. What Frelimo and particularly Samora Machel said was taken for granted and transformed into policy by lower level Frelimo party-state officials. As we will see in chapter three, Machel also led most of the decision-making forums and his words were barely contested by other Frelimo leaders. Bureaucracy, social class pressure, organisational networks are also relevant to understand how policy occurs. But in the case of Mozambique, under a one-party

system directed by Frelimo, the ways in which the Frelimo leaders' ideology and values were framed in discourse, their social formation, history and trajectory, and the context in which it was produced and used, is key to unpacking the complexities of Operation Production. At that time, unlike democratic Mozambique (1990s onwards), the Frelimo leadership controlled and decided the fate of politics in Mozambique.

By paying attention to the role of Frelimo's party decision-making institutions, such as the party's Central Committee, Frelimo's Political Commission, and Frelimo's fourth Congress in 1983, discourse analysis allows an exploration of Frelimo's historical ideological construction of urban order. By making a retrospective analysis of the Frelimo leaders' discourse, and by paying attention to its interplay with the socio-political and economic context of Mozambique from the 1970s to the 1980s, as suggested by Fairclough (2015) and Wodak (2011), I unpack changes and continuities of the Frelimo leadership's ideology and values. By tracing the policy cycle, from decision-making to its end, the thesis also addresses the limitations of the legitimation function of ideology in maintaining policy legitimacy.

For the case of Mozambique, this approach is relevant because most of the policy process, such as OP, occurred inside the political leadership's network, which had significant control over state machinery. In fact, before the 1980s there was no clear distinction between the state and the party. The state was dominated by the party, and thus by the Frelimo leadership who dominated the party. Therefore, I explore the Frelimo leadership as a particular phenomenon with a distinctive relation to the state and policy, resulting from Mozambique's conditions of a weak state and bourgeoisie.

I now turn to the literature on African politics and discourse analysis, and outline the thesis contribution to this debate.

1.7. Understanding African politics through ideology

While studies that used discourse as method and theory to explain the relationship between ideology and policy process proliferated in Europe (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012; Fairclough, 2015; Wodak, 2011; Mayr, 2008; Wodak and van Dijk, 2000 and Jorgesen and Phillips, 2002) there has been relatively little such research on Africa. Ferguson (1994) is one of the emblematic analyses on that relationship on Africa. I will bring other few studies on Africa, particularly on Mozambique, that explore the same relationship. This research builds on the works such as Bragança and Depelchin (1986), Brito (1991), Buur (2010), Darch and Hedges (2013), Meneses (2015) and Machava (2018), who also explored Frelimo's ideology through the prism discourse. While advancing my interpretation of Operation Production from this angle, I also illuminate different interpretations of Operation Production made by scholars such as Hanlon (1984), Saul (1985), Cravinho (1998) and Morton (2015), though they have not specifically adopted the same approach. I contribute to demonstrate the

role of African leadership's historical ideology, imaginaries and values in the way they understand causes and remedies of developmental challenges, associated with the context in whih they operate, to explain policy process.

Authors such as Hanlon (1984), Saul (1985), Cravinho (1998) and Morton (2015) acknowledge the intention of Frelimo to model its urban society but they see OP simply as a result of Frelimo's failed revolution. In this sense, without paying attention to the social and historical origins and experiences that shaped the Frelimo leadership's ideology, which led to Operation Production, they explained OP as a policy that emerged in the 1980s. Without denying the merit of these interpretations, by exploring the Frelimo leadeship's ideology through the analysis of their discourse, I put emphasis on the experience of the Frelimo leadership during colonial era, the trajectories and complexities of the liberation struggle and the governance of the so-called liberated zones (those that came under Frelimo's influence during the struggle) that made order, discipline and control paramount for Frelimo's urban governance. Even the term Operation itself comes from Frelimo's militaristic culture and practice that developed during the years of the liberation struggle. Thus, I see OP as a result of a combination of the Frelimo's leadership historical experiences that dates back to the colonial era and the ideology and values that were shaped by the same experience in a specific socio-economic and political context.

Studies done by Ferguson (1994) in Lesotho, Tendi (2014) in the case of ZANU-PF and the UK Labour party, Masakure (2016) on Zimbabwe and Burton (2007) and Miti (1985) on Tanzania are some examples of research that explores the relationship between ideology and policy process through the prisme of discourse. Ferguson's (1994) study of Lesotho explored the ways in which development agencies' perceptions, which were channelled through their discourse, led to the implementation of the *Thaba-Tseka* project to address poverty. In his account, Ferguson argues that development agencies' ideology was distant from the reality they wanted to address. Their ideology had more to do with justifying the policy they intended to adopt. Nevertheless, their ideology interpreted development challenges in Lesotho in ways that presented the *Thaba-Tseka* project as the best solution to address poverty in Lesotho.

Tendi (2014) used a constructivist approach to explore what he calls the demonization discourse, which led to non-engagement practices between Mugabe's ZANU-PF and Blair's Labour party through a perfomative effect. Masakure (2016) explores the use of discourse in Zimbabwean politics and shows how the ideology it entailed led to the implementation of urban "clean-up measures" in Zimbabwe in 1983, the same year as OP in Mozambique, though in a different political context. Like Masakure, Burton (2007) and Miti (1985) explored the role of discourse in the production, confirmation and control of the ideology that shaped the implementation of Nguvu Kazi, a social engineering policy adopted by the Tanzanian government in 1983. These studies were done in different countries and in different political, economic and social contexts than Mozambique (when

Operation Production was implemented in 1983 Mozambique was under a one-party system and at war, not the case in these other countries). However, in all of them the authors demonstrate that ideology channelled through discourse leads to policy choice and its implementation. Tendi argues that the demonization discourse, though having different reasons for ZANU-PF (an instrumental purpose) and Blair's Labour Party (for normative reasons), led to non-engagement practices between the British and Zimbabwean governments, which circumscribed their policy options to aggressive measures, such as Blair's plan of military intervention in Zimbabwe, even if in the end there was no intervention. As in the case of OP, Masakure, Burton and Miti show how developmental ideology led to social engineering policies in Zimbabwe and Tanzania respectively. In line with these authors, by exploring the Frelimo leadership's discourse, I demonstrate how their ideology of urban order, associated with historical experiences and their social formation led to the adoption of OP, though in a completely different socio-economic and political contexts. Based on the case of OP I adopt a new approach that sees the Frelimo leadership's ideology, experiences and trajectory reflected in a form of argumentation (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012), which was channelled through discourse to authorise Operation Production and the way it was implemented. Based on Historical Discourse Analysis, I also trace historically the Frelimo leadership's ideology and values and situate them in context to explore their relation to OP.

Regarding Mozambique, there have been some studies on ideology and policy process. Bragança and Depelchin (1986) adopted a historical approach to explain the contradictions inherent to Frelimo's revolution. For them, its nature is not isolated from its past. The authors argue that scholars such as Hanlon (1984) and Saul (1985) used Frelimo's discourse uncritically to build arguments about Mozambican "socialist" politics. De Bragança and Depelchin's approach is useful because they call attention to the need to critically reconstruct Frelimo's discourse and explore the historical conditions of its production in order to interpret Frelimo's politics, as my research does. Indeed, without reconstructing the origins of the discourse, Hanlon (1984) and Saul (1985) translated the Frelimo leadership's discourse as *de facto* policy intentions. As a result, they assumed that OP's main goal was increased production, as stated in discourse and that this goal was not achieved because of external factors such as aggression by the South African apartheid regime, natural calamities, and so on. Without denying the relevance of production for Frelimo's revolution, I argue that the notions of order, discipline and micro-level control of people gained through the military experience of the Frelimo's leadership, mattered most for their views of urban governance. Even production was perceived as part of political education in which order and control were paramount. Thus, OP was to create a new urban model in which micro-level control over people was key for its governance. The Frelimo leadership's militaristic experiences during the liberation struggle, their military training in exile, and the need to manage internal conflict during the liberation struggle made discipline, order and control the cornerstone of Frelimo's politics. With OP, the Frelimo leadership wanted to produce

the same urban discipline and order of the "liberated zones", where for them there was no social deviation or, where it existed, it was severely condemned with policies such as re-education camps (Machava, 2018:) or Operation Production. Frelimo rejected the existence of "abnormal" people in urban spaces, such as Maputo, the capital, that escaped their control, the so-called unproductive people. Most of these operated in the informal market. They were not registered and threatened Frelimo's strict urban model. As will be demonstrated in chapter five, Frelimo managed to successfully evacuate a large number of the "unproductive people" to rural areas. Many of them are still there.

As far as OP is concerned, it is possible to identify the ways Hanlon and Saul's interpretations follow and reproduce the analyses presented in Frelimo's own discourse, in the absence of a retrospective analysis of discourse production and its historical determinants. In effect, they reproduce the ideological constructions in the Frelimo leadership's discourse, and thus they contribute to legitimising Frelimo's own policy-making and policy intervention as they are put in discourse.

Morton (2015), who tells the story of Frelimo's socialist politics through housing policy, without doing a retrospective analysis of discourse, interprets OP as a desperate state measure, in which the state resorted to draconian measures in the face of crisis to make cities self-sufficient. Unlike Morton (2015), I argue that OP results from the Frelimo leadership's shared historical values and representations of causes and remedies of urban order and control mechanisms, and how its society ought to be organised to achieve the intended urban society. The Frelimo leadership believed in their capacity to transform the way people should think and act, and their ability to exert micro control over the people. Constrained by the socio-economic and political context of the late 1970s and the 1980s, and inspired by their historical vision of urban society, the Frelimo leadership saw in OP a way to achieve the puritan urban society that they always wanted. In this sense, therefore, OP cannot be interpreted as a desperate measure. It results from historical experiences of the Frelimo leadersip. The fact that there were similar measures introduced immediately after independence reveals the historical tendency of Frelimo to implement tight social control over the populace as part of their urban politics.

Brito (1991) explores Frelimo's ideology of unity and the way it was used to present Frelimo as a party that emerged out of a perfect marriage of three nationalist movements, which has been highly contested. In his account, Brito challenges this ideology by demonstrating that unlike the discourse that frames it, Frelimo, in fact, was formed from a conflicting merger of different political organisations having significant divergences which the merger did not dissolve. In this case, discourse was instrumental. It was used to build unity by supressing diverging views inside the movement for the sake of the liberation struggle. It was the ideology of unity in opposition to regionalism, which grounded Frelimo as the sole, legitimate party to govern Mozambique after independence. Brito (1991) argues that this discourse of 'transformation' was the only tool that the Frelimo leadership

could count on to legitimise its nation-state building process. He demonstrates how the Frelimo leadership relied heavily on discourse to produce its legitimacy in a context of conflict during the liberation struggle and in the first years of independence. Because Frelimo's origins were diverse, as chapter 3 will demonstrate, and most of those who joined the movement did not share the same past and the same views about many issues, such as the nature of the struggle, the nature of the enemy, and of the society to be aspired to after independence, it was crucial for Frelimo to produce a discourse that intended to unite people with diverging views to what was framed as the common goal. In this case, the Frelimo leadership produced a discourse containing an ideology of unification. This ideology presented Frelimo as the movement of unity because it was relevant not just to fight the colonial state but also as a source of their legitimacy during the struggle and after independence, and to make sense of their own dominance.

Unlike Brito, I argue that Frelimo's ideology is notsimply instrumental. In fact, it results from the way its leadership perceived urban order and the solution for it. It is normative and shaped by the history and trajectory of its leaders. In this sense, the Frelimo leadership used ideology not just to legitimate decisions and their interventions, but also to make sense of their own politics. Their ideology and values affected the way they processed information required to take decisions regarding urban order, as we will see in chapter 4. Nevertheless, Brito's (1991) interpretation is useful for my research because it also emphasizes the need to critically reconstruct discourse in order to explore the role of ideology in politics, as I do.

Buur's (2010) work, which tackles ideology of treachery and of the "internal enemy", demonstrated how it explains the engament of Frelimo in re-education camps right after independence. Like Brito (1991), Darch and Hedges (2013), by exploring Samora Machel's speeches in the Mozambican city of Beira in 1975, demonstrated how Frelimo construed the idea of national unity and legitimised it as the only acceptable vision to be established across the country. As pointed out by Darch and Hedges (2013), the Mozambican socialist ideology, channelled through discourse, was the means to legitimate policy and its implementation. In the absence of television stations, censored radio broadcasting, and with only a few Portuguese-language newspapers with limited circulation, Frelimo relied heavily on discourse, mass meetings and speeches to get its message accross. Similarly, I argue that the Frelimo leadership's ideology of urban order was decisive in the making and implementation of OP, and discourse was significantly used for that purpose. They relied heavily on it to inform people about their view of the problems affecting the country and its solutions.

Meneses (2015) discusses the ideology of the "new man". For her, this ideology, which is overwhelmingly present in Frelimo's discourse, is mobilised to justify Frelimo's nationalist project based on ideological homogeneity, which, after independence, should be imposed nationwide. Based on their experience during the liberation struggle, especially in the "liberated zones", aiming at breaking with the colonial legacy and projecting the new "socialist" society, Frelimo idealised how the

Mozambican citizen should be constituted. The "new man", the ideal, was fully committed to the goals of the "socialist" revolution, and principally "a productive man". Recently Machava (2018) has discussed profoundly the origins of Frelimo's reformist ideology, which inspired policies such as re-education camps and in some way OP. For Machava (2018), Frelimo's project grew out of older aspirations of modernity and civic virtue that dominated the political landscape of early-twentieth-century Lourenço Marques, where the party leadershiporiginated. The urban clean-up campaigns against the so-called anti-socials and their internment in re-education and labour camps were inspired by this ideology. Though Machava (2018) does not directly use Political Discourse Analysis to approach Frelimo's reformist ideology, his account of it helps to trace the origins of the Frelimo leadership's experiences that shaped the way they perceived how its society ought to be organized after independence. In this sense, it provides insights to understand certain dimensions of Frelimo's policies such as Operation Production.

Like Machava (2018), I also situate Frelimo's discourse in its historical context by exploring the passage of the Frelimo leadership in Lourenço Marques, the experience in exile in the military camps, mainly in Algeria and Tanzania, and during the liberation war, particularly in the "liberated zones". Concerning OP, Machava (2018) sees it as a result of the failure of Frelimo's social engineering policies such as re-education camps, as Morton (2015), Cravinho (1998), Hanlon (1984) and Saul (1985) do. While recognising a certain link that exists between OP and re-education camps, I see OP not as a result of the failure of re-education camps but as a continuation of it through other means. Though they took different forms in the way they were implemented, both OP and re-education camps are part of the same ideological construction. I argue that order and control are an essential dimension of OP and re-education camps. There is a connection between OP and Frelimo's previous social engineering policies. However, as I argue, there is no causal nexus between them.

The accounts of these scholars is useful in the sense that they demonstrate the importance of understanding Frelimo's revolutionary politics through its leadership's ideology. Each with a different focus, e.g. the ideology of unity for Brito (1991), re-education camps for Buur (2010) and reformist ideology by Machava (2018), the ideology of the "new man" for Meneses (2015), and the Beira speech analysis for Darch and Hedges (2013), they argue that most of Frelimo revolutionary policies resulted from the Frelimo leadership's ideological construction. Ideology was a key aspect of Frelimo's decision-making process and policy implementation in all these accounts. Based on the case of OP and building on the work of these scholars, I demonstrate that OP also resulted from the Frelimo leadership's ideology on urban order, which is constrained by the context in which it evolved and was used.

Based on the case of OP, this thesis argues that ideology, exercised by powerful people in a specific socio-economic context, led to OP and the way it was implemented. The thesis shows that OP ended up targeting people who were in the informal sector, which, though able to provide for

themselves, escaped Frelimo's control mechanisms. They were not the reason for urban disorder. In contrast to Frelimo's ideology, this research demonstrates that urban "disorder" resulted from Frelimo's failure to achieve its own urban development program, based on the communal neighbourhood, which if achieved would have absorbed urban unemployed people, and control who did what, where, with whom and for which reason. The thesis argues that increasing production and fighting urban crime and prostitution, emphasized in Frelimo's discourse as the main goal of OP, do not imply necessarily the coercive removal of the "undesired people" from cities, as OP did in practice. This thesis also shows that the way OP ended reveals the limitation of ideology and values to enforce and maintain policy. While being decisive for policy-making, it did not ensure the enforcement and continuation of Operation Production. Even though Frelimo still wanted to continue removing people from cities, Renamo's attacks, which targeted specifically rural areas, resistance and contestation of OP by the Catholic Church and OP's victims, the death of Samora Machel, and the economic changes that occurred from the mid-1980s were determinant in stopping the eviction of the "unproductive people" long before the Operation's formal end in 1988. The next section explores the sources, methods and the challenges faced while doing this research.

1.8. Source, methodology and challenges

To answer what the relationship between ideology and values, and the policy process was, I needed to develop a detailed picture of the Frelimo leadership's discourse that entails their ideology. For this, I used different sources. First, I used contemporary textual sources and, second, I used oral discourse and interviews.

The Frelimo leadership's discourse can be found in political manifestos, TV interviews, policy papers, press reports on interviews and audio recordings. Most of these sources can be found in national media, such as the Mozambican daily *Notícias* and weekly *Tempo,* which are available in the Mozambique History Net website (http://www.mozambiquehistory.net/). Colin Darch, a librarian at the University of Cape Town, created this website. Information gathered here was useful to reconstruct the official Frelimo discourse from the 1970s to the 1980s. *Tempo,* a weekly magazine that published accounts of political, social and economic events affecting the country, was one of the most effervescent publications of the pro-Frelimo press during the "socialist" experience in Mozambique. *Tempo* was founded in September 1970, produced by a group of progressive colonial Portuguese journalists. In 1975, after independence, it was nationalised and from that moment onward, it became one of the voices of Frelimo's discourse. It is an important source to obtain an official view of the Frelimo leadership on major issues and its remedies. To access the leadership's discourse, I also used Frelimo's own publications, such as *A Voz da Revolução, Palavras de Ordem,* the reports of the third and fourth congresses and Frelimo's guiding papers (*Directivas Económicas e Sociais*). *Palavras de*

Ordem and *Estudos e Orientações* are Frelimo publications of Machel's discourse. Some documents produced by state institutions, e.g. the Ministry of the Interior, were also used to obtain Frelimo's perspective on OP.

Based on Fairclough and Fairclough's (2012) Political Discourse Analysis (PDA) and Wodak's (2011) Historical Discourse Analysis (HDA) discourse analysis, the Frelimo leadership's discourse was evaluated and interpreted analytically. I paid attention to ways in which the leadership's ideology was articulated in their discourse and how it led to action, in the form of the policy, OP. I focused on how ideology as a form of representation provided state institutions with reasons for action, meaning its enacting capacity.

Based on Wodak's (2011)'s approach, which appeals for a retrospective analysis of discourse, I also traced the origins of the Frelimo leadership, their experience and social formation. I interpreted the discourse in its wide socio-economic and political context. I moved from a simple description and interpretation of the role of ideology in society to an explanation of how and why ideology, embedded in discourse, shaped policy choice and policy implementation. Thisrequired showing connections and causes that are not apparent (Fairclough, 1989) and an exploration of the context in which ideology is construed and used. Learning from the approaches of Wodak and Fairclough, I explored how ideology created and perpetuated power relations.

There are other ways to approach ideology, such as Content Analysis, which is concerned with analysing qualitative data without considering its context and how it leads to policy-making (Schreier, 2014). There is also Narrative Analysis, which focuses on the language in use by two or more people interacting with each other (Toerien, 2014), Conversation Analysis, which focuses on people and how they tell their stories (Esin, et al., 2014). Without denying the merit of these methods, I argue that for understanding the making of Operation Production and its execution, the analysis of the content of the Frelimo leadership's ideology itself is not enough. One needs to capture how the context and its changes have shaped ideology. How the policy was implemented and its relation to other political initiatives is useful to unpack the process that led to Operation Production. It is important to look to the role of past events whose effects are still present in the "socialist" Mozambique and the role of the Frelimo state institutions. The role of Frelimo's Central Committee and its congresses was also put in perspective to disentangle Operation Production.

Like any other social science method, however, Political Discourse Analysis (PDA) and Historical Discourse Analysis (HDA) have their limitations. Breeze (2011) points to some of them. They tend to use different theories of language and society without clearly defining them. There is a tendency to draw on a mix of concepts that are not necessarily compatible. As language analysis is not an easy enterprise, researchers who adopt these methods do not always follow thoroughly the steps that the method presupposes: identification of a theory, operationalisation, discourse analysis and interpretation. There is a tendency to mix the steps or simply skip some of them, and to produce an

interpretation that reflects the chosen theory, instead of what the language reveals. Critical discourse analysts tend to move quickly from language data to interpretation and explanation, in terms of social theory. It is hard to gather enough data to validate an interpretation. This is a limitation faced by most of the social sciences. In addition, though Critical Discourse Analyses have always widened their field of vision to the macro context, sometimes they have paid insufficient attention to the features of the immediate context, leading to inappropriate interpretations of ideology.

To overcome some of the limitations of the PDA and HDA, this thesis has borrowed theoretical approaches from policy analysis such as the one developed by Grindle and Thomas (1991), discussed above. Care has been taken to collect enough empirical data from the field to validate the interpretation made here. My interpretation is based on the information and observation from a diverse array of informants, collected in the field, as indicated below. The research has endeavoured to do justice to the texts explored, so that its interpretation is well grounded. The specific features of the immediate context, such as armed conflict between Renamo and the government, natural calamities and economic crisis in the 1980s, were thoroughly considered in the analysis of the Frelimo leadership's ideology that led to Operation Production.

Frelimo's discourse was placed in a wider set of discourses, coming from the private TV broadcaster STV (*Soico Televisão*), and the international press, such the *Guardian* and *Afrique-Asie*. *Soico* is the most liberal TV station in Mozambique. It usually seeks to explore beyond official discourse by bringing other voices into play. *Afrique-Asie*, which is a monthly French magazine founded in 1969, is focused on the political, economic and social dynamics of Africa and Asia.

To have views that are more recent on and from the Frelimo leadership, and to avoid relying only on the contemporary written and spoken materials, I conducted interviews with some of them. I interviewed some members of the Frelimo Central Committee, who attended the 4th Congress, such as Marcelino dos Santos, the president of the People's Assembly, Mariano Matsinhe, the minister of Justice during OP, Jacinto Veloso, a senior member of Frelimo, Joaquim de Carvalho, the then minister of Agriculture, Graça Machel, the then minister of Education, and Salomão Munguambe, the then minister of Finance. The information they provided complemented the existing written and spoken discourse with insights into the context and institutions. Information provided by Joaquim de Carvalho was fundamental in exploring connections between ideology and OP's actual implementation dynamic. Graça Machel, apart from having been the minister of Education and delegate to the fourth congress, is the widow of Machel. In the absence of Machel, who died in 1986, she was crucial in exploring the backstage of the political economy of OP. Like official discourse, the interviews from different members of the Frelimo leadership were compared with other sources. Though the context has changed after more than three decades, most of the Frelimo leaders maintained their vision as expressed in their discourse of the 1970s and the 1980s. However, some of them looked at Operation Production critically. For example, Salomão Munguambe and Joaquim de Carvalho

identified the contradictions of OP, concerning its production dimension and its articulation with other state institutions, such as the ministry of Finance and of Agriculture, to which they were respectively responsible at the time.

Information gathered from those who implemented OP were key to provide context for what came from interviews with the Frelimo leaders, and from contemporary official discourse. The research targeted mid-level state officials, mainly from the Ministry of the Interior, Justice and Defence. People such as Carlos Rungo and Aifiliado Sitoe, who were police officers during OP, Judge João Carlos Trindade, judge president in Maputo, who tried those detained before evacuation under OP and António Hama Thai, a General in the Defence Ministry, were interviewed.

To understand more about the dynamics of implementation, I interviewed some of those subjected to OP in Maputo, Sofala, Quelimane, Niassa and Cabo Delgado provinces. This information, alongside secondary literature, provided many insights into the institutions that were created, and the context and the execution of OP. For the same purpose, I also used information provided by the Catholic Church, which was deeply concerned with OP through its whole process. The Church was fundamental in identifying the problems generated by the Operation and in contesting its rationale. The Church also helped many "unproductive people" who wanted to return home after the end of OP in 1988.

With the targets of OP, I used unstructured interviews to allow the interviewees freedom to talk about their stories. Open questions allowed them to mention more than what I asked about directly. Other relevant questions were generated from what I was hearing during interviews, which were not predicted in my guide. For that reason, each interview was unique on the richness of the information provided. It also produced much more information than may be found in the newspapers such as *Notícias* and *Tempo*. This was insightful because initially I had based my questions on the information collected in the newspapers. Speaking freely with the interviewees was a learning exercise. It allowed me to enrich my interview guide and understanding.

However, the research did not go smoothly. I encountered many difficulties interviewing Frelimo senior members. My fieldwork started in August 2015, after the $2 billion Mozambican secret debt had been revealed. It triggered an economic crisis while armed and political conflict between Renamo and government resumed. Many key Frelimo leaders, who had been in power since independence, such as Armando Guebuza, became very cautious about speaking outside Frelimo circles. The crisis context also made Frelimo people less critical of the events I was asking about. These unforeseen and unforeseeable events played against my research. Being unable to interview some key figures, such as Guebuza, the research had to rely on their published discourse to enable me to catch Frelimo's reasoning on urban ills and their remedies. As most of what the Frelimo leadership have said about Operation Production in the 1970s and 1980s is available in the media (*Notícias* and *Tempo*), as mentioned above, it seemed reasonable to make this move. However, I continued to knock

on their door to get them to speak, which is how I managed to interview some of those mentioned above. Though I could not interview most of the Frelimo leadership, there is some original and relevant data gathered for this research.

The use of diverse sets of data, associated with the combination of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and political science theories, has contributed to the building of an original interpretation of the process that led to OP. The analysis adopted here also allowed me to revisit the theories of discourse studies and how they explain power relations. I now turn to an outline of the thesis chapters.

1.9. Chapter outline

This thesis is divided into 6 chapters and a conclusion. The second chapter is about colonial experience of urban order and its legacy. Its focus is on the exploration of colonial ideology about causes and solutions for urban order, which shaped the views of some of the members of the Frelimo leadership who grew up in colonial cities, particularly Lourenço Marques. Based on Historical Discourse Analysis, I reconstruct this past and explore ways in which it remains in the Frelimo leaders' perceptions of urban order, which is framed in their discourse. Exploring this past allows me to understand ways in which the Frelimo leadership's ideology and their social formation was influenced by this past. I argue that Frelimo's ideas of causes and remedies of urban order were partially shaped by the experience of its leaders in urban colonial Mozambique. For example, access to cities in colonial Mozambique was reserved for those who had a job recognised by the state. Those who did not possess such jobs, most of them in the informal sector, had to be deported to rural areas where would become "useful" and produce food for themselves and for their society. The rationale behind these attitudes is certainly different between the colonial and post-colonial state, but both states related urban order and control mechanisms to formal employment, and the absence of it to social deviation. The chapter demonstrates the importance, which should be assigned to social and historical origins of a political leadership to understand politics in Africa, particularly in Mozambique during its "socialist" period.

Like chapter two, the third chapter also provides background significant for understanding Frelimo's ideology through the origins and trajectory of its leadership. It argues that important aspects of this trajectory include their military experience in exile and during the liberation struggle, particularly the experience of management of the so-called liberated zones. These zones were the areas that came under Frelimo's partial influence during the struggle. The first appeared in the second half of the 1960s in Cabo Delgado province, where the liberation struggle started (Christie, 1972). The chapter argues that the Frelimo leaders' military experience were important in shaping their ideology and values, which explain their engagement in OP. As argued by Wodak (2011), exploring the past, the effects of which are still present, is essential to comprehending the role of ideology in shaping

policy process. To understand the origins of these ideas it is thus necessary to trace back the trajectory of the Frelimo leaders, their background, and the contacts they forged in the anti-colonial struggle. The chapter also explores the nature of the Frelimo state and its decision-making mechanisms to understand how the positioning of the Frelimo leaders within its state machinery and the nature of their power gave them almost exclusive room for manoeuvre to determine policy outcome. The chapter demonstrates the role that social origins and military background play in African politics. OP reflects the military background of the Frelimo leadership who had the opportunity to meet before and continued during the liberation struggle and after independence.

The fourth chapter explores the connection between the Frelimo leaders' ideology and OP. It explores ways in which it was compelling to the Frelimo leaders. Before discussing the relationship between ideology and OP, the chapter explores different measures put forward by Frelimo directly after independence to eradicate what they perceived as 'the colonial legacy'. The chapter argues that the failure of these policies, associated with crisis in the 1980s, war and natural calamities, made the Frelimo leaders's ideology compelling in ways that legitimised OP. More than the "abnormalities", such as crime and prostitution, evoked through discourse, OP resulted from the Frelimo leadership's ideology and values, which were shaped by their social and historical origins and experiences. These experiences, associated with the context of the late 1970s and early 1980s explain why OP was adopted and the way it was implemented, as demonstrated in chapter 5. Chapter 4 demonstrates the relevance of a retrospective analysis of political discourse to trace back ideological predisposition, values and imaginary of political leadership and the ways it penetrates policy process in Mozambican context.

The fifth chapter explores the dynamic of the execution of Operation Production. It argues that the way OP was executed demonstrates the Frelimo leadership perceived urban issues and their remedies. OP was executed in a way to evict from urban areas those who were ideologically constructed as the problem to Frelimo's intended urban order. Thus, while significant changes were made in the repressive machinery of the state to achieve Frelimo's intended urban order, almost nothing was done to achieve the production dimension of OPthat the discourse also emphasized. This chapter shows that ideology, values and imaginary of political leadership does not only determine policy adoption but also the way is executed. The rejection of the "unproductive people" in cities through a militaristic approach such as OP, results from the Frelimo leadership's ideological constrction, which is significantly marked by their experience in colonial Mozambique and during the liberation struggle.

The sixth chapter brings back the discussion about ideology and its limitations to maintain policy legitimacy. It does that by exploring the way OP ended, and the factors that brought about its end, such as the economic shift from a centrally planned economy to a market economy from the mid-1980s, the death of Machel in October 1986, and the resistance that OP generated. The making of OP

was very much to do with the role of the Frelimo leaders, particularly of Samora Machel. Machel was simultaneously the president of Mozambique and of Frelimo. As such, he chaired the main decision-making forums of Frelimo, such as its Central Committee and its Political Commission. Machel's views were key in the making of OP and the way it was implemented. His death was fundamental in the formal demise of OP. Additionally, Frelimo's economic shift toward a liberal economy, which had already started in the early 1980s, and which was associated with Renamo's increasing attacks in rural areas, left Frelimo with no means to continue exercising its control over the "unproductive people". The fact that OP ended against Frelimo's will demonstrates the limits of ideology to maintain policy legitimacy. The chapter shows that the maintainance of policy legitimacy goes beyond a political leadership's ideological construction, social and historical origins. Socio-economic and political internal and external dynamics and the way subjects react to policy, is relevant to explain policy legitimacy.

In the conclusion, I restate the objectives of this research present the findings and discuss their implications in relation to the historiography. The combination of retrospective analysis of discourse, its critique, exploring not just policy choice but also the details of its implementation, as seen by its targets and by state officials, and the way it ended, allowed a reinterpretation of Operation Production. Regarding the determinants of policy choice, this research shows that values, imaginaries and ideas of African political leaders, which are historically formed, are decisive in shaping the content of policy and the way it is implemented.

Chapter 2: The Colonial urban order and its legacy

Introduction

This chapter is about the colonial ideology of urban order and its legacy, and shows the importance of historical experiences in the formation of ideas and their relation to policy choice. Its focus is on the exploration of colonial ideological construction of order and the policies that emerged from it. Here I argue that most of those who came to be the Frelimo leadership lived in colonial cities, mainly Lourenço Marques, and experienced the way colonial administration governed urban areas and defined criteria to access it. Despite the Frelimo leadership's discourse of rupture with the colonial legacy in the aftermath of independence, their views of urban order were shaped by the colonial city where they lived and gained political insights that were later consolidated. As argued by Hall and Young (1997), Frelimo's political experience and thinking were formed and shaped by the Portuguese colonial views channelled through its civilizational discourse. Their centre of "civilisation" was the city. After independence, though Frelimo preached the validity of accessibility to cities in the first years, they imposed conditions on its access that mirrored that of their colonial predecessors. Later, in the 1980s, with Operation Production (OP) Frelimo would implement policies similar to those of their colonial predecessor, to the extent of prohibiting the permanence of "undesired people" in cities. The reconstruction of this past, the effects of which are still relevant to postcolonial Mozambique, demonstrates the role of the social and historical origins in shaping ideology. The chapter starts with an analysis of colonial urban views. Then, it addresses the nature of the city that would be inherited by Frelimo, particularly concerning African 'influx' in cities. Finally, the chapter explores urban "unemployment" in late colonial Mozambique, and demonstrates how this history formed one part of the historical experience that was to shape the Frelimo leadership's ideology.

2.1. Colonial ideology and urban control mechanisms

This section explores the relationship between colonial ideology of order and the ways in which it led to action in terms of policy. It addresses the ideas behind colonial urban policies and how these ideas led to urban segregation policies. It explores the parallels that can be drawn with the Frelimo leadership's ideology. As argued by Wodak (2011), exploring the past sheds light on the role of history in shaping ideas and values that lead to action in terms of policy and its implementation. Most of the Frelimo leadership lived in urban Mozambique, especially Lourenço Marques. Thus, their powerful reference for urban order was the colonial city where most of them lived or aspired to.

Colonial ideology portrayed cities as a privileged space for the production and reproduction of colonial modus vivendi, and thus for white people first. Cities were segregated. Access to urban space required a certain social and economic status that Africans did not have and had to acquire by passing through a difficult and humiliating process of transformation. First, they had to get a job that was

accepted as such by colonial authorities. Given the fact that the best jobs were reserved for white people, as argued by Penvenne (1995), such access for most Africans was a mirage. As a result, few Africans had access to cities. Most of them remained in rural areas and those who could access cities were still subject to humiliation, discrimination and continuous checks on their "correctness".

In colonial ideology, African urban "influx" was the cause of social disorder in cities, as stated below:

> …The growing influx of natives into urban centres in search of employment creates a problem of social discipline whose resolution requires a rigorous control over the activity of the native population in these centres, not just to hinder vagrancy and criminality but also to correct the misconduct of workers while carrying out their jobs… (Penvenne, 1982:87).

This view demonstrates how the colonial state conceived the nature and place of Africans in their governance. Because they were conceived of as lazy and uncivilized, their presence in cities was a danger to the nature of urban order intended by the colonial state. They were the cause of crime. As Penvenne (1983) argues, colonial urban policy was designed on the assumption that Africans were criminals. The city was an area for white people first and, at a second level, for other racial groups, such as Asians and "coloured", i.e. mixed-race people. A small part, in the periphery, was for the *assimilados.* These were those natives that had successfully gone through a process of "civilisation", which included but was not limited to completing primary school, speaking and "behaving" like a Portuguese. João Albasini, who was leader of the social group and political lobby called the *Grémio Africano* and an editor and a leading contributor to the group's newspaper, *0 Africano*, often denounced the ways in which the colonial government's strategy tied citizenship to race in a manner that severely compromised African interests.

The colonial ideology view of Africans as criminals who must go through a process of transformation to be eligible to live fully in urban areas led to measures of segregation that established eligibity criteria for Africans to be entitled to stay in these areas. As argued by Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) and Fairclough (2015) referred to in chapter 1, the way causes and remedies of social phenomena are perceived by powerful politicians lead to specific policy and action to deal with such phenomena. For example, as argued by Vivet (2015:78), Africans were not allowed to build permanent residences in cities, particularly in Lourenço Marques. Portugal's first pass law in 1891, which applied only to Lourenço Marques, aimed mainly to restrict the mobility of African labour to avoid it moving around freely, in search for better employment opportunities (Hedges et al, 1999:11). According to its article 1, the "native population" could not remain in cities unless they were useful for the reproduction of colonial capitalism, such as serving as forced labour in the emerging railway sector (Muchangos, 1987, Conselho Municipal da Cidade de Maputo/Direcção de Construçao e Urbanização, 1999, Exposição: 2005). In 1904, the new regulation for native labour, *Regulamento dos*

Serviçais e Trabalhadores indígenas, in Lourenço Marques, consolidated the restriction of African access to cities. It stated that only Africans possessing property rights, or who owned a commercial or industrial establishment, or who worked for state or local authority institutions, had the right to stay in cities. Temporary access was also granted, exceptionally, for those who were looking for a job or who had an authorization for a restricted number of days for a specific reason that could not be performed in rural Mozambique (Oliveira, 1987).

Based on its ideology, the colonial administration further tightened restrictions on African men's mobility, especially in urban areas over time. In 1914, a new regulation on native labour stipulated that a system of native passes should be put in place. From 1917 onward, any change of residence was subject to authorization from local authorities. In 1918, Africans without a pass were forbidden to circulate in Lourenço Marques. The lack of a pass could result in forced labour, such as *xibalo*, or being driven back to one's original residential place, which in most of cases was in a rural area. A year later, any "native" man was obliged to move around with his identity card and pass and to register at the local authority on arrival in the city. In 1922, Africans could not stay in cities for more than 3 days without a pass. To get a pass, a job or a temporary authorization to seek for one, was required. In 1946, an identity card was introduced for women living in urban areas. To travel, women had to apply for a special travel pass and had to get authorization from their husband, guardian, parents, or customary authorities (O'Laughlin, 2000:14).

To tighten its control over African people's mobility, the Salazar New State, in power after the 1926 military coup, issued more laws (Penvenne, 1982). José Bettencourt, governor of Mozambique (1940-1944), issued a new native labour code in 1944. All Africans aged between 14 and 60-years-old, with either temporary or permanent residence in the city, including women, had to be registered at the local police station. All of them had to possess an indigenous book and working card and could not circulate in town after 9 PM. failing to meet those demands implied either forced labour or "repatriation" to a rural area (Oliveira, 1987, Hedges et al, 1999:99-100).

In 1949 the *Regulamento dos Serviçais e Trabalhadores Indígenas* was revised to include further restriction in the African labour registration system. According to the new dispensation, every African arriving in the city looking for a job had to register at the city council in 3 days. If a job was not found, a declaration to the same council was demanded or a return to the place of origin. As before, if found without a proper registration, an African was subject to forced labour (Penvenne, 1982). According to Schaedel:

> …Lourenço Marques and Beira had special rigid mechanisms for registration, control and possible expulsion of Africans. The regulations on indigenous domestic servants of 1949 empowered the native administrations or the police of these cities to repatriate individuals or to subject them to forced labour, elsewhere, if they were unable to find employment within a few days. Furthermore, the administration could restrict the number of natives admitted for any

> type of urban paid employment activities; it could declare individual Africans to be "undesirable" elements and thereupon deport them. For all those who did work in the city there were a great number of ways to control and discipline them. (Schaedel, 1984:8]Restrictions to access cities were so tight that Africans called Lourenço Marques *"Xilonguine"*, which, in *xironga,* the language spoken in southern Mozambique, and particularly in the Maputo region, means the place where white people live… (Penvenne, 1995, chapter 2).

The Frelimo leadership reproduced the association that the colonial administration made between access to cities and possession of a formal job or being useful to the urban environment after independence (Petrucci, 1976, República Popular de Moçambique, 1979). Frelimo controlled mobility through the *guia de marcha,* a sort of internal passport used to manage urban mobility. The *guia* had to be held by everyone who wanted to travel and had to be presented to local authorities at the destination. Like the colonial pass, the *guia* possessed information such as the place of origin, destination, purpose, duration and more. The g*uia de marcha* was adopted first during the liberation struggle and continued after independence to control the mobility of people as part of Frelimo's urban politics. Seemingly, in parallel to colonial system, Frelimo's *guia de marcha* required that Africans had to ask for permission to move around (Petrucci, 1976). It demonstrates how the social and historical of the Frelimo leadership, particularly of those who spent significant part of their lives in Lourenço Marques, such as Armando Guebuza, Joaquim Chissano, and Samora Machel, shaped their perceptions of urban order and rights. The same reasoning would shape Operation Production, as we will see in chapter four.

As pointed out by Bowen (2000) and Pinsky (1985), despite regime changes both colonial and post-colonial government produced policies that aimed at expelling poor people from cities. Frelimo's politics were conceived as a rupture with the past, but its urban development model, mainly its ordering and control mechanisms, reproduced some of the colonial practices, in the sense that it segregated cities. Those not absorbed by the formal labour market, which was partially Frelimo's responsibility, were not entitled to live in cities. The way the colonial pass system operated had parallels in Frelimo's establishment of control over mobility. Furthermore, as in the Portuguese New state, the work card was the main document used by Frelimo to distinguish between "productive people" who had the right to stay in urban areas, and "unproductive people" who did not. As in the colonial context, the work card had to be complemented by other documents, such as an ID, residence card or student card, as will be demonstrated in chapter 5. In this regard, and despite its discourse of rupture with the colonial legacy, there was some degree of continuity between the Portuguese and the Frelimo's urban governance.

Frelimo's urban social control mechanisms tell a lot about the Frelimo state's reproduction of colonial urban governance (Young, 1994). However, although there were some continuities this is not

to say that Frelimo policy was a copy of that of the colonial administration. As argued by Wodak (2011), referred to in chapter one, understanding the past is relevant to interpret the role of ideology in shaping policy process. Under the colonial government, the informal sector was perceived as backwardness, which stood in the way of economic development and modernisation. The informal sector put in question the capacity of the colonial government to control its population. In the colonial era, "unemployed" indigenous people were viewed as alien to urban areas, which were reserved for the white population.

In postcolonial Mozambique, we find the same connection being established between formal employment and access to cities. In Frelimo leadership discourse, "unproductive people" are those who do not have a job recognized as such by the state. As for their colonial predecessors, for Frelimo a job does not necessarily mean generation of income but the relevance of work for the production and reproduction of state institutions. The absence of such work, which resulted from the incapacity of both colonial and postcolonial states to generate employment, and not from laziness, as stated in the discourse before and after independence, meant being discursively construed as a criminal. In this sense, "unproductive Mozambicans" are not dissimilar from "lazy" Africans from the colonial era. This paradox demonstrates the power of ideology to create abnormalities that need to be fixed, as argued by Fairclough (2015). It has the capacity of "naturalisation", to the extent that is accepted as such without reservations.

Some Frelimo members praised colonial urban management. As argued by Mucuapera (interview extracted from Quembo, 2017), a senior police officer during OP:

> …Even during colonial times, people did not just come to cities. There were rules that had to be strictly followed before entering cities, and especially if one planned to stay permanently here. Most of us (African Mozambicans) could only stay on the periphery of the cities. The centre of the city was only for white people…

In describing colonial policy regarding mobility control, Mucuapera showed his agreement with the way people's mobility from and to cities should be treated. In general, it shows the perception among the Frelimo leadership, as interviews revealed. Vieira (a senior member of Frelimo, interviewed on 6 August 2015), mentioned, without hesitating, the following:

> …Even today, we look at Maputo city and we see street vendors selling a *Mont Blanc* pen, for 150 Meticais [the Mozambican currency equivalent to two pounds]. It is clear that it is a fake pen or that the person stole it somewhere. The fact that this happens means that we have lost control of our city and the way it should be organised. Today, anyone can come in here, do whatever he wants, and nothing will happen. That is why the city is not safe. It was not like that in the colonial period. We should perhaps think about another OP...

Like many other Frelimo leaders interviewed, Vieira's reference for urban order is still the colonial city, "ordered", "controlled", "clean", "with no crime" and so on. This sort of colonial mobility control marked the views of some of Frelimo leadership, as argued by Hall and Young (1997), particularly those who grew up in Lourenço Marques. Though born in rural areas, most of those who came to constitute the Frelimo leadership were educated in Lourenço Marques first. They were employed near the centre of the colonial system and possessed a level of formal education sufficient to engage the colonial system. Their view of urban governance was also shaped by this social and historical experience. As argued by Hall and Young (1997), Frelimo's ideology was certainly shaped by its trajectory, and most importantly the specific trajectory of its leadership. The next section explores the nature of the city inherited by Frelimo.

2.2. The inherited city

Paradoxically, although colonial cities were segregated, the number of Africans never ceased to increase, particularly in Lourenço Marques. This section provides an account of the status quo of the cities inherited by Frelimo at independence. It is important to provide this snapshot to understand the degree of continuity between the colonial and the Frelimo leadership's urban politics.

In general, the period after World War II saw urban population increasing in most African colonies, and Mozambique was not an exception (Fouchard, 2011:11). Many reasons explain this reality. Despite restrictions, cities continued to be perceived by indigenous people as the place that could better meet their expectations in terms of jobs and social mobility. For those who acquired some education, like many of the key members of the Frelimo leadership, the rural labour market was very limited. Africans looked to jobs in cities that suited their age and stage in life within the parameters of their health, sex, abilities, social networks, and constraints placed upon them by the state bureaucracy. After World War II, as Mozambican rural areas began to experience rapidly deteriorating conditions, cities became the alternative. In the same period, job opportunities expanded in cities (Penvenne, 1983:38).

Jobs in cities could also allow people to save money to invest in social reproduction in rural areas, where other members of the family remained. With the increase of Portuguese colonial settlement, especially after World War II, demand for domestic labour also increased in urban areas (Mondlane, 1975:63). As pointed out by Schaedel (1984:2), Africans worked in different areas in urban Lourenço Marques, such as ports, railways, household refuse collection and disposal, the construction industry and the service sector. Africans did most of the low paid jobs, such as in docks, refused by white people because of class and race prejudices.

Though Portuguese authorities limited access by indigenous people to professional and skilled jobs in urban areas, men and women were able to find jobs in urban industry and make their own

informal jobs in the informal sector (O'Laughlin, 2000:25) Nevertheless, residence in the main cities was insecure for those who failed to acquire the relevant documentation, as one could be sent for forced labour or deported to rural areas, as we have seen. According to Schaedel (1984:9): 'It was risky to live as an illegal immigrant in Lourenço Marques', 'but it was not impossible'. 'During the 1950s, several thousand non-registered Africans, some of them unemployed, hid in the 'suburbs'.

In 1950, Lourenço Marques had about 93 265 people of which more than half, 57 755, were Africans. In 1960 the number rose to 178 546, of which 122 460 were Africans. Despite segregation, the African population was increasing in cities. This happened because industrial capital needed a permanent and adequate labour reserve, to be able to choose, and to exchange male workers with females, illiterates with literate workers or vice-versa, according to its short-term demands, as well as to be able to discipline the total workforce with the pressure of competition (Schaedel, 1984).

The fact that the number of Africans continued to increase in colonial urban Mozambique shows the limitations of ideology in shaping reality. The nature of colonial capitalism demanded the periodical presence of cheap African labour for its reproduction. The nature of the colonial urban labour market, and the existence of a significant number of colonial capitalists aware of the quality and relatively cheap African labour, partially explains the failure of the segregation measures. Africans could often find jobs once in cities, especially domestic service, which according to Penvenne (1983:81), absorbed more than half of the African urban labour force. Because of new incentives in industry after World War II, the expansion of established industries and the sustained demand for semi-skilled labour (Penvenne, 1983:82), Africans had access to middle level occupations in industrial service, business, and civil service in town. Men in industrial jobs could earn between $200 to $500 escudos (Portuguese colonial currency) per month in 1946, depending upon job category, experience, and length of tenure. In 1952, the average salary increased to $450 and $700 escudos per month and 10 years after to between $525 to $1000 escudos.

Jobs in cities were well paid when compared to arduous and less well-paid jobs and the obligation to pay hut tax in rural areas. As argued by Vail and White (1980:15-17) and Mosca (2005:23), hardship in rural areas pushed Africans to urban areas. During and after World War II, and as result of the implementation of António Salazar's New State, colonial exploitation was reinforced and Mozambique was no exception. Apart from producing for their own subsistence, Africans in rural Mozambique were also forced to produce cotton, sisal, rice and other crops to feed the colonial economy. Though relevant in the shaping of the content of restrictive urban policies, colonial ideology was far from determining the reality of colonial capitalism that relied on the existence of cheap African labour force for its existence and reproduction. In addition, state institutions were limited in their capacity to enforce segregation measures.

The changes at an international level also explains the increase of Africans in cities. Contestation of the colonial system by international organisations, such as the United Nations (UN)

and International Labour Organisation (ILO) gained momentum after World War II. The principle of self-determination was becoming more and more accepted. Upheaval in Goa led Portugal to negotiate its admission to the UN. Indeed, its colonial system was slightly changed. In 1951, Portugal's colonies, such as Mozambique, became overseas provinces (Mondlane, 1975:51). The independence of French and British colonies from the late 1950s, the beginning of the anti-colonial struggle in Angola in 1961 and in Mozambique in 1962, and the establishment of the Organisation of African Union (OAU) in 1963, also forced Portugal to change some of its segregation measures. In 1961, the - *indigenato* system was abolished and an identity card, like that possessed by Portuguese, was introduced for Africans. The measure gave the right to free movement all over Mozambique to those who had become "assimilated". Henceforth, though discrimination continued, all native-born in Mozambique were portrayed as Portuguese citizens (O'Laughlin, 2000).

At the end of the 1950s and in the 1960s, unlike the first half of the 20th century, the solution to labour problems in cities did not encompass the limitation and restriction of African mobility but its liberalisation (Schaedel, 1984:7). Additionally, from 1961 onward, due to the reforms mentioned above, Africans could freely choose to adopt civil law, without going through the process of petitioning and passing tests of cultural assimilation. Influx control had become both undesirable and impractical in this new political, social and economic dispensation. "With the repeal of the "native" statute, the legal basis for the restriction of the free movement of African labour also disappeared. At first, the administration shrank from totally abandoning control over the urban influx of Africans but, after a period of hesitation, the restrictions on mobility were no longer applied. Even the simple registration of workers could no longer be maintained, at least in Lourenço Marques" (Schaedel, 1984: 9).

According to Penvenne, quoted by O'Laughlin (2000:23), the abrogation of the *indigenato* system had the following impact: "for the first time since 1904, Africans could legally quit a job. For the first time Africans could take more than one job, including self-employment in the informal sector. The abolition of the registration of Africans when arriving in cities meant that it became easier for them to enter the city and move between town and country", which became common. The new regime allowed greater urban mobility, which accelerated the increase of the African population in urban areas as Table 1 demonstrates for the case of Lourenço Marques. The colonial capital's African population increased from 9445 (out of 20642) in 1920 to 122460 (out of 178546) in 1960. In 1973, the number of Africans in Lourenço Marques reached 347754 (Schaedel, 1984, Mendes, 1985, Rita-Ferreira, 1970).

Table 1: Inhabitants of Lourenço Marques, 1940-1973

Year	African	Non –African	Total
1920	9445	8304	20642
1925			20000
1940	45632	22591	68223
1950	57755	35510	93265
1955			175000
1960	122460	56086	178546
1970			271000
1970			347778
1973	347754		

Source: adapted from Schaedel (1984:10) and Mendes (1985:76)

In other cities, the number of Africans also grew, the most notable of these being Beira. The peri-urban area (where most informal houses existed) of the city were home to 34000 Africans in 1960. Ten years later, they had 91000 Africans. Around towns like Quelimane, Vila João Belo, Tete, Nacala, António Enes, Porto Amélia and Vila Pery, suburbs of reed and wood structures, so-called *caniços*, saw the number of African residents expanding. "In 1960 some 228000 Africans, 3.5% of the total, lived in citie. In 1970 there were 607000 urban residents or 7.4%, half of them living in the capital, Lourenço Marques" (Schaedel, 1984:10).

Colonial cities were segregated. On one hand, the "cement" area was characterised by being essentially white, vertical and planned, with essential infrastructures and services, and on the other, the peri-urban area, where most of the African population lived, was made up of shanty houses, not planned, with no infrastructures and services (Araújo, 2003). The "dual" cities were strictly divided between a well-planned white area, and an unplanned and growing suburb. The key members of the Frelimo leadership grew up at the borderline with and partly within the white colonial "clean", "ordered" and "disciplined" cities. They aspired with some urgency to live there, until they rejected the colonial order and engaged in the liberation struggle. This is the mirage of an ordered, clean, disciplined and free from "unproductive people" cities, which the Frelimo leadership aspired to live in, that they would want to achieve through Operation Production after independence. This view of a puritan city imagined by the Frelimo leadership came to be enhanced by their military experience in exile and during the liberation struggle, as we will see in chapter three. The following section will address urban "unemployment" in the late colonial period.

2.3. "Unemployment" in late colonial urban Mozambique

In general, late colonial urban Mozambique, and particularly Lourenço Marques, was characterised by increasing "unemployment". Frelimo discourse later blamed "unproductive people" of laziness and deliberately abandoning rural areas to fix themselves in cities doing nothing but creating chaos. Tracing back the history of "unemployment" from the late colonial period enables critical

reconstruction of Frelimo's discourse, and the empirical accuracy or inaccuracy of Frelimo claims. I argue that the fact that "unemployed", who were framed as "unproductive people" in Frelimo's discourse predated OP, reveals that Frelimo's discourse blamed "unproductive people" for creating problems of which they were also victims. The section shows that interpretation of discourse requires a thorough digestion of the context in which it is produced and used.

According to Schaedel (1984:45), the destabilisation of family agriculture and the dismantling of administrative barriers to job seeking from the early 1960swas not accompanied by a sufficient increase of job opportunities in urban areas, and colonial cities thus came to be affected by "unemployment". Schaedel (1984:45-46) noted that when the 4th and last colonial development plan, for 1974-1979, was being written the colonial development planners acknowledged the growing number of "unemployed" urban Africans in cities, particularly Lourenço Marques. There were about 8,168,333 people in Mozambique at that time. Less than 10% lived in urban areas. Lourenço Marques alone had 375,875 inhabitants, more than half of the total urban population (Medeiros, 2008). Of this, most were not employed in the formal sector, the majority having no professional qualifications.

Most of those who were not absorbed in the official labour market became self-employed in craft shops and informal trade. In 1971, the employment administration of the colony was restructured with the creation of the Employment Services of Mozambique, *Serviço de Emprego de Moçambique-SEM* as an independent administration. The brief history of this institution is an important source of information on the extent and the structure of unemployment and the motivation of the colonial administration, as the following extract from Schaedel shows:

> …"*SEM* was given three different tasks: facilitating the migratory labour movement between the metropole and Mozambique, particularly the recruitment of skilled labour from Portugal, for which there was an urgent demand in the colony; institutionalization of a public employment bureau within Mozambique, to be ready by 1976, to replace private recruitment agencies; finally, coordination of professional training activities in the colony, and the execution of a vocational training programme by the colonial state"…

In the short time of its existence, the SEM did not have much success either in the recruitment of skilled colonial labour, or in the vocational training program. In 1973, 24 skilled workers from Portugal were recruited via SEM. The first courses of vocational training had just started when the colonial regime collapsed. Thus, the main activity of SEM turned out to be its function as a public employment bureau within the colony. In August 1972, the first office was opened in Lourenço Marques. In 1973, offices in Beira and Machava were added and in mid-1974, further offices existed in João Belo (Chimoio city after independence), Inhambane, Maxixe, Quelimane and Nampula. Already at the opening of the first office in the capital, a wave of urban unemployed people flooded

the new institution. On the basis of data for the eighteen months to the end of 1973, Schaedel also gives the following figures (Table 2):

Table 2: Unemployment in Lourenço Marques in 1973

Average registration of unemployment per month	3150
Average notices of open positions per month	1102
Average job arrangements effected per month	539
Average number of male work seekers at the end of the quarter who had not found a job.	9259
Of the above:	
In employment	1668
Looking for first employment ever	680
Unemployment after previous paid job	6911
Of the above	
Office workers	1141
Artisans, skilled labour	815
Domestic servants & similar jobs	4523

Source: Schaedel (1984:147)

Moreover, Schaedel goes on to argue:

> "Unemployment" in Lourenço Marques would have reached even greater dimensions in the 1960s and early 1970s, if a substantial labour export from the urban area to South Africa had not taken place. For decades emigration and the urban labour market had stood in close mutual interaction. At first, Lourenço Marques had been for most mine labour migrants a transit station for the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA) transport. After a while, some migrants settled there. Some of those repatriated from South Africa stayed in Lourenço Marques six months or more until their next mine contract. They might settle there definitely, if the link to their rural areas of origin had broken. (Schaedel, 1984:48)

In its first national meeting on urban matters in 1979, the Frelimo leadership placed "unemployment" at the most important issue to be resolved (República Popular de Moçambique, 1979:15). Nevertheless, as this section has demonstrated, urban "unemployment" predated the independent Mozambique. Despite the leadership's discourse, the continued existence of "unemployment" was in fact due to the failure of Frelimo to create new jobs especially in urban areas and the failure of its rural development project that led many people to urban areas (Hanlon, 1984), and not to the "laziness" of urban dwellers, as discourse contended. This discourse would feed into the leadership's idea that urban problems resulted from the colonial legacy, which dominated even in the aftermath of independence, as we will see in chapter four.

Conclusion

The historical analysis of colonial urban governance is relevant to explore continuities and changes between colonial and postcolonial urban politics. Despite the changes that occurred from the 1960s with the abolition of the *indigenato* system, the colonial cities remained segregated. White people lived in the cement area and the *assimilados* in the periphery. The chapter also shows the importance of social and historical origins shaping the political leadership's ideology. The Frelimo leadership, through OP and other measures such as the *guia de marcha,* also segregated Mozambican cities in the sense that a certain segment of its population, the "unproductive people", were not considered entitled to stay in urban areas unless certain criteria were met. Indeed, if they were "unemployed", they were deemed generically the cause of urban "disorder" and removal to rural areas was the remedy, as in colonial Mozambique. This reasoning of the Frelimo leadership resulted partially from their own experience in the colonial cities, the city they aspired to live in. As argued by Machava (2018), the Frelimo leadership campaigns against alcoholism, the condemnation of prostitution and vagrancy in urban areas, and the attempts to control urban mobility were built on the colonial perceptions that shaped restrictive policies in Lourenço Marques and other cities like Beira and Nampula. The military experience that they had in exile and during the liberation struggle reinforced these views that had political implications in the shaping of policy to deal with ideologically construed problems.

Chapter 3: The Frelimo leadership, state apparatus and decision-making

Introduction

By exploring the social and historical origins of Frelimo and its leadership, particularly their experience in exile and during the liberation struggle, the way the party leadership functioned in the 1980s and the Frelimo state apparatus, this chapter seeks to substantiate my argument about the relationship between ideology and values, and policy process historically. Chapter 2 has also identified historical influences on the leadership ideology, particularly the colonial experience of urban management. While Chapter 2 explores the colonial urban order and its continuity and changes in the postcolonial era, this chapter focuses on military experiences that shaped the ideology and values of the Frelimo leadership, which also explains their engagement in OP. It addresses the passage of Frelimo leaders through the *Núcleo de Estudantes Secundários Africanos de Moçambique* (NESAM). NESAM was the Black Secondary Students Nucleus formed in 1949 by Eduardo Mondlane, the first president of Frelimo. Before joining Frelimo in Tanzania, some of the key members of the Frelimo leadership, such as Joaquim Chissano, Armando Guebuza and Mariano Matsinhe joined NESAM (Negrão, et al., 1983, Saul, 1985, Hall and Young, 1997). It also explores personal trajectories of the key members of the Frelimo leadership. The chapter argues that the social background and military experience of the Frelimo leadership influenced their decision to deploy OP. Like Chapter 2, this chapter also uses a retrospective approach to explain the relationship between historical experiences and policy process. It demonstrates the role of military experiences in African politics, particularly in Mozambique. The chapter starts with an account of the origins of Frelimo and its leadership. It then addresses the internal conflicts within Frelimo that marked Frelimo's trajectory from the beginning. Finally, it tackles the way the Frelimo leadership functioned in the 1980s between a strong president and the Political Bureau, in a party state apparatus.

3.1. The origins of Frelimo and its leadership

This section is about the formation of Frelimo, in general, and particularly of its leadership and their ideology. It is not a complete account of the complexities of Frelimo history. It focuses on those aspects that help us interpret Frelimo's ideology on urban order, and its relationship to policymaking and its implementation. It is argued that the military experience of the key members of the Frelimo leadership in exile and during the liberation struggle set the way they perceived the role of order and control mechanisms in politics. Means of ordering and controlling people were developed by Frelimo during this stage as organizational methods to pursue their goals. Military discipline was also used to manage conflict and govern the so-called "liberated zones" during the liberation struggle.

Broadly speaking, the founding members of Frelimo came from different social and political backgrounds. Amongst them, the were children of black colonial chiefs (*régulos*), former seminarians, nurses, school teachers, technocrats, secondary-school students, artisans, industrial workers, and peasants educated by religious or colonial state institutions. They can be placed into two different groups: first, those who were in exile in neighbouring British colonies and who founded the three first nationalist movements in the early 1960s (Munslow, 1983). The movements were the *União Democrática de Mocambique (UDENAMO)*, the most influential, founded in Southern Rhodesia by Mozambican migrant workers from central and southern Mozambique, led by Adelino Gwambe (Munslow, 1983). The second is the Mozambique African National Union (MANU), founded in Tanzania by Mateus Mmole. Most of its members came from Cabo Delgado province in Northern Mozambique who were migrants in Tanzania and Kenya. MANU had support from and was influenced by the Kenyan African National Union (KANU) and the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU). The third movement was the *União Africana de Moçambique Independente* (UNAMI) founded in Nyasaland. It was partly the result of the Club Africano de Tete, with southerners included (Mondlane, 1975:23, Roberts, 2016:14).

Frelimo resulted from the coming together of the three previous movements for the strategic purpose of liberation from colonial rule. The formation of the new Front did not necessarily mean unification, still less the end of the conflicting views of the three previous movements. Nationalist movements across Africa, particularly those of former British colonies, influenced the views of the founders of the three Mozambican movements, which were formed in exile in the former Southern Rhodesia and former British colonies in eastern Africa. Their moderate political programmes and petitioning tactics originated in the diverese exile experience of the decolonisation process (Derluguian, 2012). These tactics differed significantly from the views of those who joined Frelimo in Tanzania after its formation, such as Samora Machel, Joaquim Chissano and Armando Guebuza. The views of this late group were rooted in their experience of Portuguese colonial segregation (Cahen, 2010, van Butselaar, 1984, Roberts, 2016:16). Because of colonial repression, most, if not all of them, fled Mozambique and joined Frelimo in Tanzania in the early 1960s (Munslow, 1983). While in Mozambique, most of them were *assimilados* who had access to education. Those who lived and studied in Lourenço Marques, were influenced by the writing of Africans in newspapers such as *O Africano* (1908- 1918), *O Brado Africano* (1918-1974) and *Clamor Africano* (1932-1933), published under the sponsorship of the *Grémio Africano* (the first "nativist" association in Lourenço Marques). These writings, particularly those written in Ronga, the language spoken by "natives" of the bay area of Lourenço Marques, were dedicated to criticism and self-promotion. The discourse appealed to Africans to avoid alcohol, to combat prostitution, and other social deviations. They preached moral reforms (Penvenne, 1996 and Machava, 2018). Some of these ideas and ways of understanding and interpreting society shaped their ideology and values of order and control and its relevance in politics.

Their ideas were also influenced by their experiences of associativism in the *Nucleo dos Estudantes Secundários de Moçambique (NESAM)*, founded in Lourenço Marques in 1949 by Eduardo Mondlane, later the first president of Frelimo.(Cruz e Silva, 1998). Most of its members were secondary school students from relatively well-off African families already associated with the *Centro Associativo dos Negros (*Mozambican Negro Association (CAN), previously known as the *Instituto Negrófilo*), a civic movement authorised by the colonial government in the 1930s. Despite its origin as a student organisation operating under the umbrella the *Centro Associativo dos Negros*, NESAM came to be a a place of burning political debate as the 1950s wore on. It was an important factor in the political development of some of the key members of the Frelimo leadership, such as Joaquim Chissano and Armando Guebuza, who were successively presidents of the *Núcleo* in the early 1960s. NESAM was formed by a very small group of youth who had access to secondary school. Most of this elite of young Africans left Moçambique for Dar-es-Salaam to join Frelimo and rapidly gained leadership positions, under the leadership of Eduardo Mondlane. They came from the African petit bourgeoisie and were *assimilados* in the colonial system, who had access to education in Mozambique and continued it abroad to a certain degree (Derluguian, 2012 and Cruz e Silva, 1998). Despite having different social backgrounds, their common experience of colonial segregation, military training in exile, particularly in Algeria, and of the liberation struggle shaped their perceptions of order, discipline and control that explains why and how they engaged in Operation Production. These experiences and trajectories were reflected in an argumentation (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012), which was channelled through discourse to form Frelimo politics, as the case of OP demonstrates.

3.1.2. Social and historical origins of the Frelimo leadership

This section explores the historical experiences of the key members of the Frelimo leadership (see table 3) in colonial Mozambique, in exile and during the liberation struggle. It focuses on those aspects that contributed to shaping their ideology and values. I argue that the Frelimo leadership's engagement in Operation Production also resulted from these experiences, which influenced their perceptions of order, control and discipline that can be seen in Operation Production.

Table 3: Members of the Frelimo Political Bureau in 1983

Name	**Year and place of birth**
Samora Machel	1933, Chilembene-Gaza province
Marcelino dos Santos	1929, Lumbo-Nampula province
Joaquim Chissano	1939, Maleíce-Gaza province
Alberto Chipande	1939, Mueda-Cabo Delgado province
Armando Guebuza	1943, Morrupula-Nampula
Jorge Rebelo	1940, Lourenço Marques
Mariano Matsinhe	1937, Cazula-Tete province
Sebastião Mabote	1941, Chicumbane-Gaza
Jacinto Veloso	1937, Lourenço Marques
Mário Machungo	1940, Maxixe-Inhambane
José Óscar Monteiro	1941, Lourenço Marques

Source: Pachinuapa, 2011; Africa Confidential, Vol 19, no 20, October 6, 1978; Notícias, 1 May 1985:3

Most of the key members of the Frelimo leadership attained political consciousness in the moralist debates about civic virtue that populated the pages of *Grémio's* papers in Lourenço Marques, in which alcoholism, prostitution, and vagrancy were condemned. As argued by Machava (2018), they grew up listening to and believing that urban social ills like prostitution, drunkenness, and idleness were not only a sin, but also a serious harm to the motherland and its prospects as a "civilized" and prosperous nation. These moralist concerns, associated with the experiences of the liberation struggle shaped their ideology and values that enacted policies such as OP. As argued by Harries (2001) these ideas shaped the way the Frelimo leadership envisioned how Mozambican society should be organized and what were the guiding principles of modernity and development. As expressed by Hall and Young (1997), Frelimo's ideology was certainly shaped by its trajectory, and most importantly the moralistic trajectory of its leadership. As members of the Frelimo Politiburo in the 1980s, Marcelino dos Santos, Samora Machel, Joaquim Chissano, Armando Guebuza, Alberto Chipande, Mariano Matsinhe and Jorge Rebelo played a key role throughout the process that led to creation and deployment of Operation Production in 1983.

Marcelino dos Santos was born on 20 May 1929 in Lumbo, Nampula province in a Catholic family. He grew up in Lourenço Marques, along with other "revolutionaries", in a politically active family. He was central to bringing Frelimo closer to the *Conferência das Organizações Nacionalistas Portuguesas (CONCP)*, from which many supporters came (Brito, 1991). CONCP was a political organisation of nationalists from Portuguese colonies based in Algeria, where many of the military figures of Frelimo, such as Machel, Chipande and others trained. Dos Santos was its permanent secretary (Pachinuapa, 2011). Dos Santos brought many of his ideas to Frelimo from his experience as the secretary general of CONCP. He drew up the founding constitution of Frelimo where "revolutionary" ideas significantly shaped by the comrades from Algeria, such as ordered and modern society, the correctness of the "new man", were dominant. The first constitution of Frelimo presented

it as a “revolutionary movement” and the transformational ideology, which we find in Frelimo’s discourse, was present from this very first stage. Its programme states as a main objective the following: “To reconstruct the economy and development of production in order to transform Mozambique and Mozambicans from a colonial and under-developed country to a developed and modern, prosperous and strong country” (FRELIMO, 1962:5).

Dos Santos soon went to Portugal, and then France for further education, where he met Joaquim Chissano, shortly to become another key member of the Frelimo leadership. This common social and political network associated with ideas of civic virtue that populated the pages of *Grémio’s* papers in Lourenço Marques, drew them closer as ideas circulated. The fact that they shared common ideas before the formation of Frelimo, made them supportive of each other’s political view, and helps explain their cohesion around shared transformative ideas, particularly during the moment when ideological conflict emerged within Frelimo, as we will see in the following pages. In Paris, dos Santos studied political science and, throughout the 1950s, attended various youth festivals in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Drawing from his contacts and leadership of CONCP, dos Santos was a key figure in bringing the Frelimo leadership access military training. As Frelimo’s Foreign Affairs Secretary, dos Santos was in a position to arrange travel from places like Portugal, France and Tanzania to Algeria for military training (Pachinuapa, 2011). People such as Machel and Chipande who played a significant role in the making and implementation of Operation Production, had military training in Algeria.

When, as mentioned above, Frelimo was formed in Dar-es-Salaam in June 1962, Eduardo Mondlane was elected president of the movement and Urias Simango, from *UDENAMO*, the vice-president (Roberts, 2016:17, Jesus, 2010). As soon as the news about the formation of Frelimo, under the leadership of Mondlane, reached Mozambique, many young people, including Samora Machel, Armando Guebuza, Mariano Matsinhe and Alberto Chipande, who came to be part of the Frelimo leadership, began to arrive in Dar-es-Salaam to join Frelimo.

Before the formation of Frelimo, some of them had already previous contact. For instance, Joaquim Chissano had contact with Mondlane and dos Santos before Frelimo was founded. Like Mondlane, Chissano was born in Gaza province, southern Mozambique. He enjoyed a privileged youth and education, and was elected president of NESAM in 1958. During his one-year leadership, together with his deputy Pascoal Mocumbi, he revitalized the study and tutorial sessions much inspired by those of the 1940s in the Mozambican Negro Association (Chissano, 2011:76). Like Mondlane and dos Santos, Chissano also left the country and went to Portugal for further studies. Here, together with dos Santos, he helped to establish a nationalist student movement among Mozambican migrants. In 1962, Chissano went to Tanzania to take part in the foundation of Frelimo

and became special assistant to Eduardo Mondlane. Before Tanzania, Mondlane and Chissano met in the US as part of their preparation for the formation of Frelimo. Chissano was primarily involved as Frelimo's chief representative in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania. In the two Frelimo military camps in Nachingweya and Kongwa, Tanzania, Chissano worked closely with Machel and Chipande (Carvalho, 2003). During the liberation struggle, Chissano was responsible for security affairs (Partido Frelimo, 2012). After Mozambique's independence accords, in Lusaka, Zambia in September 1974, Chissano became the prime minister of the transitional government, up to June 1975, when independence was proclaimed. After that, he was appointed the minister of Foreign Affairs. After Machel's death, in 1986, he became the president of Mozambique (Chissano, 2011). Like other key Frelimo leaders, Chissano's imaginary of the ways in which Mozambican society should be organized after independence contained much from his experience in Lourenço Marques, in NESAM, in exile and during the liberation struggle.

Chissano, Mondlane, dos Santos, Chipande, Guebuza, Matsinhe and Machel were all *assimilados* who had access to education in colonial Mozambique. They all belong to the tiny social group of the *assimilados*, which make them relatively closer and united. They experienced urban segregation during their passage by Lourenço Marques and aspired a certain level of social status, which they gained through education. Chissano, Guebuza and Mondlane were members of NESAM. On July 1962, Mondlane wrote a letter to Chissano, who was still in France, where he promised to arrange money for Chissano to return to Tanzania for the first congress of Frelimo, which was held in September 1962 (Mondlane, 1962). The letter demonstrates the links that pre-existed between Mondlane and Chissano:

> Just before leaving for Africa last June I wrote to you to tell you that I was going to Dar-es-Salaam, to help develop a common front in the Mozambican political parties. You must have heard by now that my trip was a success. My wife and I have just returned from Tanganyika and the following is a summary of what happened…I shall do everything to find money to ship you to Dar –es- Salaam. I will give you further information on this proposal. I have heard recently that Adelino Gwambe [the founder of *UDENAMO*] has invited you to a student conference in Dar –es- Salaam sometime this year. What kind of conference is this and who is sponsoring it? Would you please inform me of whatever plans you are making concerning these things. How your studies are and what are your plans for next year? (Mondlane, 1962).

Chissano, Rebelo, Mondlane and dos Santos passed some time in Lisbon, where they interracted with nationalists from other Portuguese colonies who worked for CONCP in Algeria, the nationalist organisation where dos Santos was general secretary. Dos Santos met Mondlane for the first time in 1949 after Mondlane's expulsion from South Africa. They worked together in NESAM. When Mondlane went to Lisbon, he met and worked together with dos Santos and other nationalists from

Portuguese colonies mentioned above (Pachinuapa, 2011). Chissano and dos Santos worked together in Paris in gathering support for their anticolonial project in Mozambique.

These pre-existing contacts between Chissano, Rebelo, Mondlane and dos Santos, and others continued throughout the period of the liberation struggle and were fortified during the years of persistent conflicts inside Frelimo. As argued by Machava (2018), the community that these young southerners formed in Tanzania was a convergence of brothers and sisters, cousins and uncles, couples, long-time friends, schoolmates, and neighbours. It was the equation that produced the political cohesiveness that defined the Frelimo leadership after 1970 and the party's political culture, and, I add, the Frelimo leadership's ideology that led to Operation Production in 1983. The social background of political leadership is relevant to understanding the ways in which it processes and perceives information required to take decisions in a particular context. That is why this thesis adopts a retrospective analysis to trace the social origins of the Frelimo elite and their trajectory in Lourenço Marques and in exile.

Later, other nationalists who fled Mozambique to join Frelimo in Dar-es-Salaam also joined this small elite of key Frelimo leaders. Amongst them were Samora Machel, Armando Guebuza, Alberto Chipande and Mariano Matsinhe. They trained together in Algeria, and Kongwa and Nachingwea (the two Frelimo training camps in Tanzania). Some of them, like Machel and Chipande were in the same platoon in Algeria. Here they were much influenced by military discipline which, associated with their experience in segregated colonial Mozambique, would affect their understanding of urban order and control, as argued by Matsinhe (minister of Justice during OP, Interview, 9 January 2018). The idea of urban centralized planning, communal neighbourhoods, establishing commissions of inhabitants, composed of secretaries of neighbourhoods, chiefs of 10 houses, mobilising groups, as defined in the *Plano Geral de Acção das Cidades, 1970-80,* was influenced by the colonial urban order, as discussed in chapter 2, and from their experience in exile in Algeria, Tanzania and other countries where they had military training. Chissano, dos Santos, Samora Machel and Matsinhe were strongly influenced particularly their experience of Tanzania where they trained together and Frelimo was founded. Dos Santos and Rebelo became the ideologues of Frelimo during liberation and after independence. Rebelo, who had the opportunity to study law in Portugal, became Frelimo's information and propaganda secretary, and the editor of Frelimo's *Mozambique Revolution* during the liberation struggle. After independence, he played a role as Frelimo's political ideologue up to 1990 (Pachinuapa, 2011:89).

Guebuza played a key role in the implementation of Operation Production as the minister of the Interior. Though born in Nampula province, he moved to Lourenço Marques for his secondary education and became involved with NESAM. In 1963, he was elected its president, replacing Joaquim Chissano who left for Portugal. The following year Guebuza left Mozambique to join

Frelimo but was arrested and jailed in Southern Rhodesia. Throughout 1964, he tried to leave Mozambique, continued to engage in anticolonial activities, and was repeatedly questioned by the Portuguese secret police. In May 1965, he finally managed to get to Lusaka, Zambia, where he contacted Frelimo members in exile. In Tanzania, Guebuza did military training in Nachingwea where Machel was in charge. In 1966, he worked as Eduardo Mondlane's personal secretary while teaching at the Mozambican Institute, Frelimo's political school based in Dar-es-Salaam. The following year he was named secretary of Frelimo's Department of Education and Culture and became a member of the Frelimo Central Committee, the main decision-making body between congresses. After Mondlane's death in 1969, Guebuza was named national political commissioner in 1970 and continued his leadership role in the liberation struggle. During the transitional government, he became the minister of Home Affairs (later ministry of the Interior) and was crucial in setting up the first police service in Mozambique. After independence, Guebuza became the minister of the Interior (Matusse, 2004:78), the main state institution that implemented Operation Production.

The other key Frelimo elite member is Machel. Like Mondlane and Chissano, Machel was born in Gaza province, on 29 September 1933. Though his family was associated with the Free Methodist Church, Machel was effectively coerced to undergo Catholic baptism so that he could sit for the exams that were the prerequisite for admission to secondary education and civil service employment. Machel passed the exams but refused to continue his education in the Catholic seminary. Instead, he moved to Lourenço Marques, where most of the Frelimo leadership grew up. Here, he started a "native" nursing program at Miguel Bombarda Hospital (now the Central Hospital of Maputo). In the early 1960s, Machel and thousands of others glimpsed the possibility for change through the leadership of Eduardo Mondlane. Machel and others, like Chissano, who attended Mondlane's public and private meetings during his visit in 1961 as an employee of the UN, quickly found themselves in the cross hairs of the Portuguese secret police, subject to harassment and arrest. In 1963, he fled Mozambique and joined Frelimo in Tanzania, a year after its formation. Soon he was sent to military training in Algeria with other people, such as Raimundo Pachinuapa and Alberto Chipande, who also became influential leaders in Frelimo after independence. Algeria is where the CONCP headquarters was, with dos Santos as its secretary general. Machel returned to Tanzania in 1964 with Chipande. His personal discipline combined with the creativity he demonstrated as a social leader and military strategist, distinguished him at Frelimo training camps in Kongwa and Nachingwea. In these military camps, he trained many future Frelimo guerrillas and worked closely with Chissano and Chipande, as mentioned above. Machel, Chipande and Chissano became very close during the years of the liberation struggle. After the Lusaka Agreement, in 1974, Machel appointed Joaquim Chissano to lead the Transitional Government, still nominally under the Portuguese until formal independence in June 1975 when Machel could assume presidency of the country after his and

Frelimo's lengthy departure from Tanzania. According to Chissano[2], he was appointed because Machel was sure that he would follow strictly the beliefs that both shared.

Machel emerged as an influential military leader during the months of training in Algeria and after his return to Tanzania in 1964. After Frelimo's launch of the armed insurgency in September 1964, Machel led the front in eastern Niassa Province. In October 1967, he was appointed military commander and secretary of defence, after the death of Filipe Magaia who was shot by a colleague during a night time march in Niassa. As argued by Machava (2018) though Machel was a good military commander, his appointment had more to do with the social and ethnic relationship that connect him with Mondlane than to his military skills. Together with dos Santos and Chissano, Machel helped restructure Frelimo's military and political positions and brought to it more systematically "revolutionary" terms. Mondlane was assassinated in Dar-es-Salaam in February 1969, and Frelimo's Central Committee elected Machel president of Frelimo in 1970. At independence, Machel remained the president of Frelimo and of the People's Republic of Mozambique up to 19 October 1986, when he died in the presidential plane crash in South Africa (Thay, 2016, Dava, et al, 2011, Partido Frelimo, 2012).

The other key member of the Frelimo leadership is Joaquim Chipande, born in Mueda in Cabo Delgado, northern Mozambique. Like others, Chipande was also *assimilado* who had access to education during colonial Mozambique. Like Machel, Chipande also joined Frelimo in Tanzania in 1963 and both were sent to Algeria in the same group for military training. In Algeria, the group was divided into platoons, each with three sections. Military training was accompanied by political education where issues such as the nature of the struggle and of the enemy, which emerged in the process of the formation of Frelimo, continued to be debated. As before, different opinions were expressed leading to division of Frelimo trainees in groups. People who shared similar views composed these groups. Machel and Chipande were in the same platoon, in which Machel was the commander and Chipande led one of the three sections (Christie, 1996, Carvalho, 2003).

The dynamics of military training and debates during sessions of political education in Algeria brought Machel and Chipande closer. They first met in Dar-es-Salaam and were sent together to Algeria. Both returned to Tanzania in 1964 and founded the first Frelimo military training camp in Kongwa in the same year. The camp was directed by Machel who worked closely with Chipande, in charge of military discipline, and Chissano, the secretary of Mondlane, the president of Frelimo. In 1965 Nachingwea, the second Frelimo camp was created. Machel, Chipande and Chissano continued working closely there. When Machel became the Secretary of Defence of Frelimo in 1967, he worked closely with Chipande. After independence, Chipande became the minister of Defence (Christie, 1996,

[2]See his interview: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GbIMBY_jkhc, consulted on 21st October 2016.

Carvalho, 2003).

People such as Mondlane, Chissano, Guebuza, Matsinhe, Rebelo, dos Santos, Chipande and Machel, who represented (and some still represent) the Frelimo leadership, had different backgrounds and came from different regions of Mozambique. However, they shared some common experiences, such as spending a significant part of their life in Lourenço Marques where they experienced the way the colonial state managed urban access and mobility, as explained in chapter 2. The idea of *guia de marcha* that is inspired by the colonial urban management would replicated in the "liberated zones", as we will see below. Most of them were educated at religious institutions, some at the Swiss Mission and others, like Chipande and Machel, at Catholic missions. Chissano, Mondlane and Guebuza passed through NESAM. All of them went through military training in Algeria, the Soviet Union (Chissano) or Tanzania and gained a military discipline that resembles the way Operation Production was implemented. Their survival, in a context of intense and persistent internal conflict, also relied on their ability to maintain strict mechanisms of order and control. As argued by Brito (1991), in the context of anticolonial struggle and faced with conflicts within Frelimo, discipline, order, control and a discourse of unity became the weapons for the continuation of the struggle and the consolidation of the power of the the Frelimo leadership, the so-called revolutionaries.

3.2. Conflict, Mondlane's death and the rise of Frelimo leadership

Frelimo's origin was dominated by internal conflicts from its origins and aggravated from 1965-66 onwards. This section will focus on Frelimo's internal conflicts, the way it was handled and its impact on Frelimo's ideology and values related to order and discipline. It argues that conflicts within Frelimo increased the importance of military discipline and of those who embodied and exercised it. Frelimo's experience of conflict management through military means led Frelimo leaders to inscribe its practice in post-colonial in post-colonial politics, as the nature of Operation Production demonstrates.

Though different people came together to form Frelimo, claiming that the liberation struggle demanded unity, as the anticolonial struggle unfolded, the survival of the Frelimo leadership relied on their capacity to manage internal conflicts over central issues, such as the nature of the struggle and of the society to be built after independence. The views of the Frelimo leadership, the "revolutionaries", clashed with the views of the so-called chairmen. Lazaro Nkavandame, a traditional leader from Cabo Delgado, and the chief of a peasant cotton society in Cabo Delgado, founded in 1957, became the face of the "chairmen", a group within Frelimo that became a focus for anti-colonial activity on the Mueda

plateau, Cabo Delgado province. Through the cotton society, led by Nkavandame, the "chairmen" had significant capacity to mobilise peasants to join the struggle, and controlled the busy cross-border trade with Tanzania, a significant source of income from within the country for Frelimo during the anticolonial struggle.

The "chairmen" argued that an attack in main cities would be be enough to destroy the colonial state and bring independence. Their view was for a general and spontaneous insurrection against the colonial settlers, their main target. They proposed an urban warfare as against a protracted war, the continuation and success of which depended on the people's involvement at all levels. The "revolutionaries" opposed this tactic. In response to the "revolutionaries" opposition, through the cotton society, in which Nkavandame was very influential, the "chairmen" mobilised Makonde people against the "revolutionaries", exhorting them not to provide food for the guerrillas and labour for the transport of war materials (Munslow, 1983).

During its first congress in September 1962 in Dar-es-Salaam, most of the key members from the three founding movements, such as Gwambe, Mole and Changonga were not elected to the Frelimo leadership. Seen as a *persona non grata* by other Frelimo members, Gwambe was forced to quit Tanzania. He was too revolutionary and socialist as well as too much aligned to the Ghana of Kwame Nkhrumah, hence, inconvenient to Tanzania and Frelimo's newly elected leadership (Morier-Genoud, 2012). In the following months those who were not happy with the merging of the three movements to form Frelimo, were expelled from their posts or forced to quit Frelimo (Brito, 1991, Munslow, 1983).

The survival of Frelimo also depended on the use of military strategies to maintain a rigid discipline and control mechanisms. *Guia de marcha* would be a key control mechanism that wouldbe used in the liberated zones to control individual mobility. This sort of internal passport would be replicated after independence, particularly to control new arrivals and removal of "unproductive people" from cities. As explained by Matsinhe (Interview, 9 January 2018), "during the first years of Frelimo, mainly when conflicts began, as we didn't know very well one another, and we were not sure about the intentions of our people, military means, such as order, control and discipline became our only strategy to continue the struggle the way we wanted".

In the context of divergence and conflict, the importance of military commanders increased. Frelimo needed to bring the diverse parts together to continue the struggle against the Portuguese. It was at this stage that people with a strong military background (Machel, Chipande, Guebuza, Matsinhe) and balanced views (dos Santos and Chissano), ascended to the Frelimo leadership. After returning from Algeria, Machel became Frelimo's main military instructor in Kongwa first and then Nachingweya. As mentioned above, Machel was appointed chief of Frelimo's Defence Department after Filipe Samuel Magaia's death. Now an important military figure in a context of mounting conflicts that gave more importance to the military struggle over politicians, Machel was key in

shaping the direction of the party. The second Congress re-elected Mondlane as the president of Frelimo and Urias Simango the vice-president. The resolutions on military strategy adopted a prolonged people's war, thereby subordinating all spheres of activity to war efforts (Hall and Young, 1997).

Military discipline became key to regain Frelimo's war initiative against the colonial domination, as argued by Machava (2018). As argued by Matsinhe (Interview, 29 March 2016 and 9 January 2018), in the context of struggle and conflicts that shaped the appearance of the "liberated zones", military discipline (order and control) was key for the survival of Frelimo, and particularly of its leadership. As a result, Frelimo created an Executive Committee, which apart from the president (Eduardo Mondlane) and vice-president (Urias Simango) comprised the nucleus of Mozambique's post-independence leadership, including mainly the "revolutionaries" (Hall and Young, 1997). The re-election of Mondlane to the presidency of Frelimo, associated with the expulsion and defection of many members of the three previous movements consolidated the leadership of the "revolutionaries". As argued by Munslow (1983), after the re-election of Mondlane it became more difficult for their opponents, the "chairmen", to continue influencing and shaping Frelimo's politics. Therefore, the Frelimo leadership gradually became a select group of people who knew each other and became more engaged on their hold on power through the struggle and after independence.

The period from June 1968 up to May 1970 was decisive for the victory of the "revolutionaries", which was achieved through their control over the army (Brito, 1991). Less than a year after the second congress, Mondlane was assassinated by a parcel bomb in Dar-es-Salaam. Mondlane's death, according to Munslow (1983), and Hall and Young (1997), was a perfect combination of the work of the Portuguese International Security Police (PIDE) and the internal opposition. After Mondlane's death in 1969, instead of appointing Urias Simango, the vice-president, as president, Frelimo's Central Committee formed a triumvirate comprising Machel, dos Santos and Urias Simango to lead Frelimo. In 1970, Machel became the president of Frelimo and dos Santos, the vice-president. With no success, given his lack of internal support, Simango attempted to regain the leadership of the movement. Simango and Nkavandame were expelled in the same year. Their departure meant the loss of influence for the "chairmen" inside Frelimo's politics (Hanlon, 1984). It also represented the triumph of the "revolutionaries" and their vision of the revolutionary transformation, where order, discipline and control were emphasized.

With Nyerere's support, Machel and dos Santos led Frelimo from 1970 up to independence. Several other people abandoned Frelimo. Those who supported other views were marginalized and forced to remain in silence or to quit. Some of them, including Urias Simango, Adelino Gwambe, and Paulo Gumane, were executed extra-judicially after independence, leaving the "revolutionaries" with more room to decide the fate of Frelimo, and thus the political dynamic in independent Mozambique. As argued by Machava (2018), the conflict between the "two lines" paved the way to power for the

small group of select southern *assimilados* under the leadership of Machel. Their views shaped politics and determined the way the struggle was conducted and the nature of society in independent Mozambique. The conflicts led to the centralisation of power by military means in the hands of the guerrilla commanders led by Machel and like-minded civilian allies. As Hall and Young (1997) argue, it was a moment of convergence of interests between the fighters and young military commanders, many of them Makonde peasants from the north, and the mainly southern *assimilados* grouped around Mondlane and the External Affairs Secretary, dos Santos. The southerners staffed the bureaucracy and controlled the upper echelons of the military apparatus. This allowed them to establish an alliance with the soldiers against the "chairmen" and to impose their politico-military notion of struggle and of the future society after independence.

3.3. The "liberated zones" as the laboratory of Frelimo politics

The "liberated zones" created inside Mozambique were important in forging and exercising Frelimo politics even before the death of Mondlane. This section argues that such "liberated zones" constituted key areas where Frelimo's ideas about postcolonial governance were put into practice and gained momentum. Frelimo's order and control mechanism, and its military discipline were exercised in these zones first. Its replication through OP shows the relevance of military experience in Frelimo policits.

The continuation of the war demanded a certain degree of political and administrative organisation as Frelimo gained control of some parts of Cabo Delgado and Niassa provinces. As the armed struggle advanced, Frelimo established so-called popular power, divided into five levels: circle, locale, district, province and nation. Apart from the circle and locale where its people chose the leaders, trusted people nominated by the party leadership led the districts and provinces. The national leadership of the party was elected by the congress (Brito, 1991). In 1971, the liberated zones were restructured to adopt a more military approach. Schools, health services and the Army became central players to disseminate Frelimo's ideology. Political and military work were intensified at all levels. In 1973, a Party Committee was created inside the army, the People's Force for the Liberation of Mozambique-FPLM. Under Machel's leadership, the party opened its political school in Nachingwea - Tanzania in 1974 with the first 40 students from around the country. The school emphasized a political and military education through labour (*Tempo,* 12 September 1976:7), which for Frelimo, which was basically agricultural production and was also a political and military activity. This practice would be implemented in the way agricultural production was organised in Frelimo's "green zones" after independence, as we will see in chapter 4.

> By creating a new structure of power, the "revolutionaries", under the leadership of Machel and those who had a strong military background, imposed their political project in these zones. It was the beginning of what would be projected as the Frelimo state after independence (Brito,

> 1988, Brito, 1991, Kruks, 1987). The "liberated zones", the place where new relations of power were being imposed, are the first experiences of ruling of the Frelimo leadership (Machel, 1975). In an interview by Burchet, published in *Tempo* (12 September 1976:3), Samora Machel said that: "The "liberated zones" were not just geographical areas liberated from colonial domination. They were our political, economic and social laboratories where new forms of life were created. The necessity of organising our life in these zones provided us with concrete answers that we apply today to reconstruct our life in the independent Mozambique".

This is how Machel and other "revolutionaries" perceived the the "liberated zones" as a model for what Mozambique should be after independence. These experiences of military discipline, micro-level social and mobility control in the "liberated zones" were the source of Frelimo's inspiration, a reference for the control and order they would aspire construct in urban areas by adopting Operation Production (OP).

That these experiences were consolidated during a victorious liberation struggle led Frelimo believe in their relevance to organisation of Mozambican society after independence. During the tenth anniversary of the FPLM, Machel emphasized that the military discipline crucial in the governance of the liberated zones and in Frelimo's victory over colonial domination should be maintained in independent Mozambique (Machel, 1974). At this anniversary, Machel did not just praise the military but also made a clear statement about the priority of the military in Frelimo's postcolonial politics. In fact, the military and the police played a significant role in the enforcement of social control policies that were implemented right after independence, such as police raids, re-education camps, and the *guia de marcha.* They also played a significant role in the implementation of Operation Production. The task of identifying the so-called unproductive people was delegated to the police and military, as will be demonstrated in chapter 5.

As Brito (1991) indicates, though the Marxist inspiration within Frelimo flourished mostly with the ingress of new members joining directly in Tanzania, rather than from the membership of MANU, UDENAMO and UNAMI the experience of the armed struggle, and especially the creation of the liberated zones, was determinant in consolidating the importance of order, discipline and control in Frelimo politics. The defence and survival of the liberated zones gave to the Frelimo leadership cause to believe that their ideology and values about ordered and modern society were not utopian, but the result of concrete experience from the field. The *Guia de Marcha,* adopted by Frelimo to control people's mobility and which was later decisive in the execution of OP, was used first in the "liberated zones" to govern them. Its implementation in post-colonial Mozambique reflects the social background and military trajectory of the "revolutionaries" that gained control of Frelimo politics. In these zones the transformative ideology of the Frelimo leadership, which is echoed in the discourse that grounded OP, was already present.

When Frelimo assumed power in 1975, it encountered a situation not entirely dissimilar from the one they experienced during the years of the liberation struggle. Drawing from the experiences of the management of the liberated zones, the Frelimo leadership sought to apply to the whole country controls on movement such as those essential to Operation Production, as reflected in its state apparatus.

3.4. The functioning of the Frelimo leadership in the state apparatus

This section explores the relationship between state institutions and the Frelimo leadership, and how their position within state apparatus gave them significant space of manoeuvre to shape policy process. The section argues that there was no clear distinction between the state and the party. Decisions were taken at party level and the state implemented, and state was literally the Frelimo leadership. It was a partisan state. The section demonstrates that ideology and values of political leadership is relevant in shaping policy process depending on their position within the state machinery. The Frelimo leadership, which was at the top of the party and had a centralised power, controlled state institutions. Thus, their views, which were shaped by their social and historical origins, were decisive in the making of policies to address issues affecting the country. Because of the centralised power they held and the absence of a strong bourgeoisie, their views were translated into policies, which were implemented by the state without challenge.

The nature of Frelimo and its state is interpreted differently. Authors such as Pitcher (2002), Cahen (1993), Brito (1991), Darch and Pacheleke (1987), challenge Frelimo's claims to be socialist. Authors such as Saul (1985), Kruks (1987), Hanlon (1984), Christie (1988), Munslow (1983), Negrão, et al. (1983) and Negrão (2001), argued that it was. The latter see Mozambique's independence, and particularly the Frelimo's third congress (1977), as the moment when it embraced the socialism. The congress was interpreted as the country's transition to socialism. Frelimo's internal practices were now to be regulated by democratic centralism, which would direct the state and the wider society in the construction of a new political order.

As argued by Bragança and Depelchin (1986), this interpretation is based on Frelimo's own triumphalism. The fact that the liberation struggle produced independence led these authors to take Frelimo's discourse about its ideological orientation at face value. Frelimo portrayed itself as the party that adopted a socialist character of transformation, a people's character of power, and the worker-peasant class nature of state.

In practice, Frelimo endowed itself with a Central Committee and an Executive Committee, the latter constituted by key members of the party leadership, such as Machel, Chissano, Matsinhe, Guebuza and Chipande. Unlike its discourse, I argue that the Frelimo state was not truly socialist. The

fact that Frelimo defined its state as socialist party does not make it such. As argued by Cahen (2003), a state is not defined by the official orientation of the party that controls it, but by the nature of the social relations that it regulates. Considering the way Frelimo structured state apparatus and production relations, it is arguable that it was more a peripheral capitalist state than socialist. Despite the discourse of rupture, Frelimo maintained many features of their colonial predecessors. The centralisation of the political-administrative structure remained intact. The territorial administrative framework remained the same, without any relation to cultural and ethnic diversity. Corporatism, based on production committees, was maintained. Frelimo adopted an authoritarian and paternalist relationship with its population.

As we have seen, Frelimo came to be led by select group of people who came from similar backgrounds and had been associates before its formation. This continued after independence. With the centralised power that they possessed from the late 1960s, this group controlled the state's institutions and its decision-making machinery. The People's Assembly, formed in 1977, was at the apex of a pyramid of indirectly elected assemblies. Direct people's voting only took place at the lowest (local and city) level. District and provincial assemblies were indirectly elected from below. Provincial assemblies then elected the National Assembly. The assemblies were to operate according to the prescriptions of democratic centralism, which meant that they functioned as a channel for central directives downwards. Thus, in practice, national deputies did not serve the interest of their constituencies. Rather, they served the Frelimo leadership's interests (Hall and Young, 1997). In this context, the Frelimo leadership had significant space of manoeuvre to shape policy content and its implementation.

In the economy, Frelimo adopted policies that were hostile to its society. Rural population was displaced from their original land and placed in communal village where they were supposed to farm the land and leave collectively (Morton, 2015). Land taken from African peasants during the colonial era and now abandoned, was not returned to their owners. Instead, land was transferred en bloc to state farms on which they were to become wageworkers. Frelimo had a growing commitment to villagisation but without any economic foundation (Mosca, 1999). In urban areas, no incentives were given to production cooperatives to take the place of the Portuguese-owned enterprises, which were abandoned right after independence. Instead, most of these companies were nationalised. In some cases, the right of the owners was maintained in case they returned (Cahen, 1993, Pitcher, 2002). As we will see in chapter 4, most public services, which were not connected with the means of production, were nationalised. This was motivated by the intention of Frelimo to restrict the emergence of fractions of the petty bourgeoisie (notably the Indian-Pakistani community) with greater investment in business than the bureaucratic elite.

Looking for these reforms adopted by Frelimo during the first years of independence, one may

find difficult to argue that it was ideologically oriented to socialism. Because the Frelimo leadership feared opposing views and was aware that the ideological conflict that pre-existed the independence did not end, it centralised power in their hands and put the party above the state. The Academic Association, a dynamic student organisation, was dissolved and replaced by the party youth organisation. The old corporate unions democratised after 1975, were also dissolved in 1979, having been progressively replaced since 1976 by production groups. This way, they consolidated the power they already enjoyed from the late 1960s. The extract below from Machel's interview in 1976, indicates Frelimo's priority after independence and the position of the party in relation to the state:

> Once independence was obtained, what is our task now? It's not just national reconstruction. No. It is about building a new society free from man by man exploitation, where everyone can provide his or her contribution. Our current struggle of establishing communal villages, the communes, is already an expression of the advanced stage of our strategy. The only power capable of leading this task is the popular power and its party [Frelimo]... The party represents the interest of these people and can design a program to achieve its goals (Petrucci, 1976:12).

From this extract, it is possible to understand that Machel saw Frelimo as the only representative of the people's interest and the sole agent capable of leading the country to the intended modern society. This view and the actions that resulted led to the inexistence of an overt opposition in Mozambique and to a weak bourgeoisie. It also meant that those who controlled the party, the Frelimo leadership, also controlled the state apparatus.

In the course of the negotiations, which led to the Lusaka Agreement of on 7 September 1974, Frelimo succeeded in being recognised as the sole legitimate representative of the people of Mozambique. It managed to determine the terms of independence and most importantly, the terms of its access and control of power. Though defining its state as socialist, as the process of its construction and consolidation unfolded, the practices revealed otherwise. Once installed in Maputo, Frelimo became a statist autocracy of urban elites controlled by its leadership (Morton, 2015, Cahen, 1993, Brito, 1991). Once its leaders realized that the consolidation of their power could be acquired through the occupation of key positions within the Party and the state apparatus, they slowly transformed these institutions to serve their own interests rather than those of the peasants. The best illustration of this transformation is the way the state bureaucracy was more easily circumvented by members of the Frelimo leadership than by peasants. As Newitt (2009) points out, after independence Frelimo changed the nature of the state but imposed its military discipline, with its vision of a puritanical society with no crime and prostitution, inspired by their social, historical, and particularly military experiences. The party itself was to become a so-called vanguard with a relatively restricted leadership. It also retained a tight control over the newly created democratic institutions. For example, the members of the

People's Assembly, the country's law-making parliament, were nominated by Frelimo's Central Committee. At the same time, the party shifted from regarding the peasantry as the main revolutionary force to putting their trust in the proletariat that had been, and would be, created by the expansion of the modern sector of the economy. This shift led to an authoritarian, top-down approach to decision-making process. After independence, these popular democratic procedures tended to be circumvented. The party leadership gradually changed their role from mobilising, motivating and creating political consciousness to issuing orders and carrying out centrally decided party dictates.

The Frelimo state, with its logic of administration and imposition, where discourse was frequently used in policy making process (Brito, 1991), became the privileged site of power in the nation-state building process while maintaining its ambitious transformational project based on micro-level control of people's life. The party became a place for the reproduction of its leadership. Traditional leaders, such as *régulos* and *chefes das povoações* (local chiefs), most of them members of the community that were part of Frelimo's governance of the "liberated zones", were replaced by party secretaries to govern the new Frelimo structures, such as circles, cells and locals (Brito, 1991). As Herbst (2014) argues, ordering and control people is an essential part of statecraft in an African context. In this perspective, Frelimo developed ways to control its people, such as communal villages in rural areas, re-education camps for renegades and other people who had opposing ideas, and police raids in urban areas, as we will see in chapter four.

As a vanguard party, inspired by their experience, particularly of the liberated zones , Frelimo wanted to regulate the lives of all Mozambicans to a considerable degree. Its leadership insisted on the necessity of the party cells to be active in all the most important spheres of social life. Contary to what authors such as Saul (1985), Kruks (1987), Hanlon (1984), Christie (1988) and Munslow (1983) argue, the adoption of micro-level control measures, such as Operation Production, has less to do with Frelimo's socialism than with their social and historical origins. This micro-level control, which dominantes Frelimo politics throughout the liberation struggle, is related to their experience of colonial urban management and military discipline in exile and during the liberation struggle. These experiences led them to develop military techniques of micro surveillance of individuals, such as the *guia de marcha*, police raids and Operation Production. Machel and his like-minded Frelimo leaders expected everyone to bring the same energy, discipline, and clarity to their work as in the liberated zones. They expected people to behave in ways that reflected the past that they praised and admired. They adopted mechanisms to control their people to fulfil that expectation. Frelimo wanted everyone to comply with Frelimo's vision of society, "new, "modern", and free from "social deviation". It expected everyone to become the so-called new man. That was the main reason why mobilising groups were set up as soon as the transitional government was put in charge of the state, to mobilise the whole population to join the revolution. This party structure was established at all work places, study and residential areas. Though it had other functions, its main duty was to provide political

education and watch over the participation of the whole population in the revolutionary process. It also had the task of fighting against what Frelimo called backward behaviour and obscurantism, such as lobola (dowry), laziness, Indiscipline, alcoholism, and prostitution (Brito, 1991).

All these transformations operated at state level gave significant manoeuvre to the Frelimo leadership to channel their ideological predispositions and values, social and historical origins through discourse to shape policies Mozambican politics, such as the case of OP elucidates. As argued by Hall and Young (1997), Newitt (2009), Pitcher (2002), Cahen (1993), Brito (1991) and Morton (2015), the nature of Frelimo's origin, its internal conflicts and the experience from the liberated zones were determinant in shaping their perceptions of order and control, which had implications in the policy process. Its discourse, entailing ideology and values of the Frelimo leadership, constructed and idealised account of the colonial urban order, their experience in exile and in the liberated zones as nurseries for the Mozambican society in the independent Mozambique. In this context, the Frelimo leadership, particularly Machel, was key in the decision-making process.

3.5. Machel, the Frelimo leadership and decision-making

This section tackles the extent to which the Frelimo leadership, particularly Machel controlled Frelimo's decision-making mechanisms. It demonstrates that the way problems and remedies are discursively constructed by the political leadership, associated with their positioning within policy-making forums, is crucial in determining policy outcome. Machel, as the president of the country and of the party, played a decisive role in Mozambican politics, particularly in the process that led to Operation Production.

Within Frelimo, discursive construction occurring inside key decision-making institutions (the Frelimo Central Committee, Political Bureau and Congresses) was the main source of political intervention. As Derthick (1972) argues, policy is made by the actions of individuals navigating through institutional constraints. The values, choices, and actions of these individuals have an important impact on the policy that results, as argued in chapter 1. In this case, discourse made by Machel was considered a blueprint for party and wider political and public discourse.

As we saw in the previous section, with the state structure put in place right after independence, the Frelimo leadership managed to get control of the decision-making machinery. Henceforth, decisions were taken at the top level, even if matters were discussed at the lowest, local and city, levels. As the president of the party and of the country, head of the government, and commander-in-chief of the Army, Machel was on top of the main decision-making forums (Marcelino dos Santos, senior member and ideologue of Frelimo, Interview, 25 May 2016, Machel, 1975, Bragança, 1975, Partido Frelimo, 1979).

As mentioned in the previous section, the way Frelimo organised its decision-making process resulted from its leadership's wish to impose their views without giving room for discussion of the nature of the political order. Frelimo leaders were aware of diverging views that marked its origins and that persisted, and exacerbated during the struggle. These conflicting views did not end with independence. Thus, the Frelimo leadership was aware of its existence and feared any parallel mobilising power that could emerge, even if did not challenge directly its political order. That is why, right after independence, Frelimo prohibited the existence of free social activism, leaving only sport organisations. Trade unions, for example, were incorporated in state structures and their activities reduced to simple bureaucratic functions, such as dealing with pensions (Brito, 1991).

Frelimo's politics was thus dominated by its leadership group, essentially the party politburo and some of Machel's close associates, among whom there was a remarkable degree and capacity of consensus for the sake of "party discipline" and who, over a long period, rotated all the key offices of the party between themselves. Within the leadership group, as argued by Newitt (2009), Machel was the central figure and the voice of the regime. Machel's top-down instructions, mostly provided during speeches at the Independence Square, in a context of centralised power and weak bourgeoisie, had to be implemented unchallenged, as we will see in the following chapter.

Conclusion

This chapter shows the place of the military experiences in Mozambican politics. It also demonstrates how the positioning of individuals within state apparatus determine their level of influence in policy outcome. The experience of the Frelimo leadership in exile, the context in which Frelimo emerged as a liberation movement and the way they managed internal conflicts, led to the perception that military discipline, micro-level of social and mobility control, manifest in the revolutionary discourse, were necessary to achieve the transformative goal they wanted. Their ideology and values were significantly influenced by social and historical origins, and military experiences. These structuring trajectories, which began in Lourenço Marques, were consolidated in the exile in Tanzania and during the struggle. This trajectory provided a significant theoretical framework to articulate the existing perceptions of an ordered and disciplined urban society within the Frelimo leadership who had excessive power within the state machinery. The Frelimo state was organised in ways that provided, to its leadership, particularly Machel, significant room for manoeuvre in the decision-making process and in determining the ways in which policies ought to be implemented. Owing to the high level of centralization of power, people such as Machel, Chissano, Matsinhe, dos Santos, Guebuza, Chipande and Rebelo, members of Frelimo's Political Bureau, and Frelimo's Central Committee, were key in determining policy choice and policy intervention. The dominance of the "revolutionaries", and the conditions in which they accessed power at independence was decisive in consolidating the control that they had over decision-making process in Mozambique. This way, their ideology had a significant role in the making of social engineering policies that we will explore in the next chapter.

Chapter 4: Ideology, values and Operation Production: from "green zones" to evacuation

Introduction

After exploring the social and historical origins and experiences that shaped the Frelimo leadership's ideology and values in chapter 2 and 3, this chapter taps into the ways in which their ideology and values explain their engagement in Operation Production. The chapter does it by exploring the Frelimo leadership's discourse in the mid and late 1970s and the 1980s, its changes and continuities. To explain the relationship between ideology and policy process through discourse analysis, the chapter considers also the context to which discourse was produced and used, the form it took and the reasons why it was compelling to the Frelimo leadership. The chapter argues that more than the problems evoked in the discourse, such as crime and prostitution, OP resulted from the Frelimo leadership's ideology and values about urban order and control, shaped by their social and historical origins and experiences. It demonstrates the role of ideological predisposition, values and imaginary of political leaders in African politics, particularly in Mozambique. African leaders, who sit atop organizations, are not monolithic. Rather, each of them is a player with bargaining skills, perceptions, ideas and history that can be deployed in ways that shape policy content and its implementation. The chapter starts by addressing urban policies that were implemented by Frelimo before OP to demonstrate the historicity of the Frelimo leadership's intention to exert micro-control over the people. Then, it explores the urban context in the late 1970s and early 1980s, before tackling the link between ideology and values and OP.

4.1. Curbing the colonial legacy and Mozambicanising urban spaces

In the first years of independence, the Frelimo leadership's discourse on urban ills and their remedies was very much marked by its anti-colonialism, which blamed the apparent abnormalities of the newly independent state on the colonial legacy. Thus, urban issues identified at this stage were framed as a result of the exploitative and corruptive Portuguese colonial state. Henceforth, every solution to those "anomalies" implied dismantling the colonial legacy and producing what was perceived as the "new order". While exploring the Frelimo's anticolonial ideology, this section addresses the way it led to policies such as the "Mozambicanisation" of urban areas and communal neighbourhoods. By "Mozambicanisaton" of urban areas I mean the political intention (which was not achieved in practice) of the Frelimo leadership to promote the establishment of Mozambicans in urban areas as a way of changing the colonial legacy in which Mozambicans had mostly been denied access to urban areas. It also means the policies that resulted from this intention. The section shows the relationship between ideology and policy process in a particular Mozambican context.

As argued by Brito (1991:77), Frelimo's perception of urban problems and their remedies in the first years of independence, was shaped by its anticolonial euphoria, which blamed the colonial exploitative system for ills. Thus, even before having a clear vision of its urban development model, as argued by Morton (2015), the Frelimo leadership rushed to blame the colonial state for its urban predicaments and saw the dismantling of its legacy as the "magic" solution for most urban issues. One of the results of this reasoning (Fairclough, 2015) was the policy that encouraged Mozambicans to occupy the houses in urban areas. As argued by Grindle and Thomas (1991), the lens through which political leaders perceive social phenomena is decisive in shaping the nature of political intervention to address it.

Months before Independence Day, the first National Meeting of District Committees was held from 16 to 21 February 1975. About 401 delegates, representing 110 districts of the country, attended. It was chaired by Joaquim Chissano, the then prime minister of the Transitional Government and one of the members of the Frelimo's politburo. Armando Guebuza, the then political commissar and a very influential figure within the Frelimo leadership, who later became the minister of the Interior, the key institution in the execution of Operation Production, also attended the meeting. For the first time the issue of urban crime, prostitution and vagrancy was clearly elaborated in a national meeting. Based on the discussions of this meeting, urban disorder, such as prostitution and crime, were perceived as products of the colonial legacy, as can be seen below:

> In a capitalist society, where exploitation of man by man exists [meaning the colonial capitalist system], the attraction exercised by the apparent easy life in cities, to rural young women, aggravated by the need to survive, the colonial domination, the laziness, idleness, the absence of their husbands, who were forced to emigrate to seek for better life, together with the irresponsibility and corruption exercised by men, were amongst the causes of prostitution. Presented this way, prostitution diverted people from "productive" labour and contributed to the infiltration of the enemy (*Tempo*, 4 May 1975:5).

Exploitation of man by man, which for the Frelimo leadership was the main aspect of colonial capitalism, was perceived as the main cause of urban ills. The other causes were also related to the colonial legacy. Frelimo blamed economic sabotage by colonial settlers, the closure of industrial and commercial enterprises and infrastructure, and farms due to their abandonment by colonists on the eve of and right after independence, as well as the lack of financial reserves due to the weak economic capacity of the Portuguese colonial state, and decreased production of economic enterprises (*Tempo*, 4 May 1975:6). As a result, the discursive construction of the Frelimo leadership held that young women subject to the legacy of the colonial system would inevitably become prostitutes in cities, given their need to survive in the absence of income. This perception, which is clearly articulated in the extract

above, represented the lens through which the Frelimo leadership understood the urban world, its problems and solutions.

One of the first of Frelimo's measures after independence, adopted on 24 July 1975, was the nationalisation of public services, a month after independence. At the first stage, nationalisation affected only the land, the health and education systems, and funeral services. Months later, during the celebration of the Heroes' Day (3 February), the first of its nature after independence, Machel announced the nationalisation of infrastructure such as housing and commercial and industrial units left by the departing colonists (Partido Frelimo, 1976). As a result of Machel's instructions, on 24 July 1974, about 40,000 residential units, commercial and industrial buildings came under control of the State Housing Authority, *Administração do Parque Imobiliário do Estado- APIE* (Morton, 2015).

Though Frelimo justified its intervention as a preventive measure to avoid economic collapse in general, in fact, the nationalisation policy reflects the way the Frelimo leadership perceived the cause of urban problems and their remedies. These perceptions, according to which urban ills were caused by the nature of the colonial system, associated with the context, is, in Fairclough's (2015) and Wodak's (2011) terms, the practical argument that grounded the "Mozambicanisation" of cities.

While presenting the nationalisation of the buildings in cities as a way of reversing the colonial legacy, Machel's announcement also defined the terms in which cities would be made available, the same way the colonial state defined criteria based on which Africans would access urban areas, as seen in chapter 2. According to his words, cities were available only for those who could, through their rent, afford to maintain its physical condition, as inherited from the Portuguese (Partido Frelimo, 1976:23). His words were nevertheless quite ambiguous. Frelimo wanted to produce a new order and at the same time, it reproduced the logic of segregated cities, as did their colonial predecessor. As soon as 1976, less than a year after independence, Frelimo was already making clear who had the right to city, echoing some of the ways the colonial state did. Despite its discourse of "rupture" with the colonial legacy, Frelimo was reproducing it by denying the right to the city to Mozambicans who did not earn enough to afford maintaining the physical condition of the houses, as required by *APIE*.

This apparent ambiguity can be explained if we take into consideration that the source of the Frelimo leadership's perceptions and reformist ideology (Machava, 2018) owed much to do their experience in colonial times of the cities they aspired to live in. It results from their experience of colonial urban mobility control, particularly the pass laws. As explained in chapters 2 and 3, despite the fact that they found colonial restrictive measures unjust, they saw in it the way urban society should be organised. During the years of the *Instituto Negrófilo-Centro Associativo dos Negros,* the African elite condemned as shameful the discriminatory colonial order, yet they adopted the colonial life style as the standard for a decent man. While condemning the injustice of the colonial system the elite aspired, nevertheless to manage access to cities as the colonial state did.

Frelimo cities came to be segregated, like the colonial cities. The cement area of the city was occupied by the Frelimo leadership itself and its network, including the military and mid-level state officials. They were also reserved for foreign diplomats and foreigners, including those called *cooperantes,* Frelimo sympathizers who arrived in Maputo to offer their skills for what they saw as a socialist cause. Many blocks of apartments in the cement areas were requisitioned by ministries for use not just as offices but also as housing for employees. Some parts of the cement area, mostly distant from the presidential area, were open to regular citizens. Most of those who came from rural Mozambique continued on the periphery of the city, as in the colonial period (Mendes, 1989:67).

As part of the nationalisation policy, house rents were kept low, apparently to increase urban access for Mozambican families to good quality, inner city houses. The *APIE* was formed to manage the newly nationalised buildings. The name of the capital was changed from Lourenço Marques to Maputo (Mendes, 1985, *Tempo,* 1 August 1976, Partido Frelimo, 1976). The state also subsidised houses for Mozambican families. The rent was tailored to the income of the family. Ironically, the fixing of rents was accompanied by a definition of standards of living in the city, mainly in its cement area. For example, the use of charcoal stoves or large mortars and pestles to make corn meal was outlawed in apartment blocks, as it would compromise the structure and condition of the buildings. Moreover, rent was not the only cost. One had also to count on the cost of electricity and water. As a result, most residential units in formalized urban areas had a head of household who worked in the service sector, and the majority of these were government workers. According to Morton (2015), a survey in 1980 determined that less than 8% of the country's working class (factory workers who lived almost exclusively in urban areas) lived in cement cities. Access to the cement area of the city continued to be a privilege, as during the colonial era. Frelimo thus reproduced social segregation in the cities, though with different criteria.

The nationalisation of buildings partially contributed to the increasing number of black Mozambicans in cities, compared to the colonial era. In general, the Mozambican urban population grew, especially in Maputo. Some of those who lived in the city's periphery during the colonial period had access to salaried jobs, and who knew how to navigate the urban environment, moved to the cement area. Those in rural areas moved to the periphery of cities. As Rita-Ferreira (1988) points out, in 1974 of about 60,000 residents of the cement area, the large majority were Europeans. In 1976, more of the cement urban population were Africans. About 250,000 Mozambicans moved to cities between 1976 and 1983 (Araújo, 2003, Partido Frelimo, 1983, *Tempo* 1 May 1983, Direcção Nacional de Estatística, 1980). Concerning Maputo, the numbers went from 505 inhabitants in 1975 to 739,077 in 1980 (Penvenne, 1993:75). From October 1981 to June 1982, the number of inhabitants of Maputo increased from 750,000 to 850,000 (*The Guardian*, 15 June 1982:4). In 1970, Beira, the second largest city, had 46,293 inhabitants. In 1980 it counted 214,613 inhabitants (Vivet, 2015:95, Rodrigues, 1983:47). Nampula had 23,072 inhabitants in 1970 and in 1980 145,772 people (Araújo, 2003:14).

Between 1970 and 1980, the urban population increased 7.5 times and the annual urban population growth rate exceeded 20% all over Mozambique, excluding Quelimane and Beira. Table 4 shows the evolution of the urban population in Mozambique, from the 1970s to the 1990s.

Table 4: Urban Population Growth, 1970-1990

City	**1970**	**1980**	**1991**	**1997**	**Annual growth rate (%)**		
					1970-80	**1980-91**	**1991-97**
Lichinga	3,011	39,004	62,995	85,758	29.2	4.5	5.3
Pemba	3,629	41,166	66,352	84,897	27.5	4.4	4.2
Nampula	23,629	145,772	232,670	303,346	20.2	4.3	4.5
Nacala	4,601	75,038	125,208	158,248	32.2	4.8	4.0
Quelimane	10,522	60,151	145,398	150,116	19.1	8.4	0.5
Tete	4,549	45,119	94,369	101,984	25.8	6.9	1.3
Chimoio		68,125	105,818	171,056		4.1	8.3
Beira	46,293	214,613	294,197	397,368	16.6	2.9	5.1
Inhambane	4,975	56,439	70,892	52,370	27.5	2.1	12.8
Maxixe				93,985			
Xai-Xai	5,234	43,794	87,935	99,442	23.7	6.5	2.1
Chokwé		10,871	55,387	56,291		16	0.3
Matola	101,754	755,300	1,209,015	424,662	22.2	4.4	2.4
Maputo				966,837			
Total	207,600	1,555,342	2,550,236	3,060,602	22.3	4.6	3.1

Source: Araújo, 2003:14

The dramatic growth of the urban population was not just a result of the nationalisation policy. The first years of independence were marked by changes in the region that affected population mobility in urban areas. Between 1975 and 1976, Apartheid South Africa reduced the number of Mozambican labour migrants in that country (Covane, 1996). As a result, many of them settled in Maputo city, as we have seen in chapter 3. According to Egero (1992:93), the number of Mozambican migrant workers in the South African mines declined from 118,000 in 1975 to 48,000 in 1977. The impact of this event was twofold. On the one hand, it increased the population in Maputo city and on the other, it increased rural unemployment, especially in southern Mozambique, as some former mine workers returned home (Covane, 1996:31; Mahoudeau and Dennetière, 1989). Natural calamities, which affected production in rural areas, and the absence of state investment in family sector, also drove many rural people to urban Mozambique.

The war with Renamo, which displaced about 3,7 million people (Pitcher, 2002), also drove many peasants to urban areas (Mendes, 1989:81), from where they would subsequently be evacuated on the implementation of OP. According to Elias (1988) and Vivet (2015:56), about 5,635 families who had arrived from Maputo, Gaza and Inhambane provinces settled in the urban district 2, in Maputo's periphery, as a result of the war.

The failure of Frelimo's own development agenda, associated with the conflict between Renamo and the government, also drove many people to urban areas. Frelimo's rural development program did not enjoy much support from the peasantry. Most of the rural population did not adhere to Frelimo's hegemonic and authoritarian modernist (Scott, 1998) development project, based on the communal villages. Shortly after independence, the state paid much attention to state farms and ignored the family sector, leaving them economically vulnerable (Bowen, 2000, O'Laughlin, 2000, Partido Frelimo, 1983, Hanlon, 1984, Mosca, 2015 and Negrão, 2001). With no means to continue producing for their own survival, in a context of war and faced with natural calamities, peasants had little choice than to migrate to urban areas. Frelimo's attitude toward colonial settlers also contributed to the urban influx. The jobs lost on the settler farms were partially absorbed by state farms. However, the breakdown of the rural commercial network, as most of the colonial settlers fled the country on the eve of and t after independence, seriously affected peasants' living conditions. The result was a rapid urban "influx, difficult to control (Pinsky, 1985:70).

Mozambican cities continued with a visibly dual structure. The intention of changing the colonial legacy and bringing about a completely new urban order remained a myth, as argued by Dinerman (2006). The cities gained more black people. However, class and infrastructural distinction between the cement area and its outskirts remained as visible as in the colonial era. As the increase of population was not followed by much investment in infrastructure and services, material conditions in the cities began to deteriorate. Problems of sanitation and planning, which existed before were aggravated (Araújo, 2003:15). According to Muchangos (1987:76), in the 1980s Maputo became the most degraded city in the region. Services such as transport, health care, education, and sanitation became scarce for many people, mostly for those outside the cement city.

Unemployment increased. According to Mendes (1985:96), when the transitional government was formed, on 20th September 1974, urban unemployment and underemployment was already high. At independence, it worsened. Before and following independence, about 250,000 Portuguese qualified professionals and entrepreneurs left the country, leaving many of their factories, industries, and hotels without skilled management in a changed commercial environment; even opportunities for domestic work suffered. As a result, by 1976 the unemployment crisis was exacerbated. Frelimo's decision to adopt the UN sanctions against Southern Rhodesia in March 1976, by closing the border with that colony, aggravated the unemployment crisis further, as much of the activities at the port of Beira were stopped.

Additionally, the cities faced other problems, such as a deficient food supply chain, caused mainly by the rupture of the commercial network due to the departure of settler farmers. The government tried to solve this problem through the reorganisation of the internal trade network. It started by nationalising commercial infrastructure and created the so-called people's shops (*lojas do povo*). There were 8 of these at the time of independence (Mendes, 1985). By 1978, about 133 commercial infrastructures had closed, as table 5 below shows:

Table 5: Evolution of commercial infrastructures in Maputo, 1973-1978

Neighbourhood	**Existing cantinas 1973**	**Closed cantinas 1976**	**Open cantinas 1978**
Munhuana	99	8	91
Chamanculo	99	30	69
Chinhambanine	28	2	26
Jardim	101	5	96
Infulene	22	11	11
Laulane	10	3	7
Tlhabane	93	7	86
Xipamanine	134	12	122
Malhangalene	51	13	38
Lagoas	34	30	4
Mahotas	29	3	26
Benfica	51	9	42
Total	751	133	618

Source: Mendes, 1985: 59

At the same time, small traders in the urban informal sector started to emerge as a result of the continuing and growing urban influx, which was not being absorbed by the creation of new jobs. The situation was aggravated by the ongoing fall in production and closing of industrial companies, as Table 6 below shows.

Table 6: Industrial situation in Maputo, 1978

Industry	**In 1973**	**Nationalised**	**Closed**	**Private**	**In 1978**
Food products	93	15	60	18	33
Textiles	90	19	61	10	29
Wood	82	21	55	6	27
Chemical products	50	12	29	9	21
Minerals and machinery	112	42	57	13	55
Paper industry	37	6	4	27	33
Construction and transportation material	7	7			7
Others	6	2	4		2
Total	481	128	270	83	211

Source: Mendes, 1985: 87

In this context of crisis, as Munslow (1983) states, the major problem of the Frelimo state was how to feed its population, particularly those in urban areas. In March 1981, a rationing policy was introduced for eleven basic products (Munslow, 1983). Frelimo began to ponder how to stop rural-urban

migration by advising people about the dangers of migrating to cities and by raising their awareness on the relevance of agricultural activities in countryside for the nation, as can be seen:

> One of the solutions to fight vagrancy, prostitution, laziness and drunkenness is to develop campaigns against the influx of young people to cities, by showing them the danger of migrating to cities and raising the awareness about the relevance of agricultural activities in the countryside (Frelimo, 1975:39).

In addition, APIE lacked financial capacity and resources to maintain the physical condition of the houses. Income from the rents paid did not fund its urban development program. Indeed, when *APIE* was formed, its task was not clear; the revenue coming from rents were channelled to the central state institutions, such as the ministry of Planning and was used for other purpose than housing. From the beginning, *APIE* had trouble collecting rent. After the first year, some 30 percent of tenants in the city of cement were in arrears. Though *APIE* began listing overdue renters in the newspaper to shame them into payment, by 1980 the rate of non-compliance remained almost the same. People had various reasons for not paying. Some, compelled to make their own repairs to *APIE* properties, unilaterally discounted their costs from the rent. Others, as *APIE* acknowledged, interpreted the mozambicanisation of cities as meaning free occupation of the houses (Morton, 2015).

In this period the Frelimo leadership discourse held that, although there were other factors, such as uncontrolled urban influx, the main cause of urban problems continued to be identified as the colonial legacy. For example, during the 3rd session of the Popular Assembly on 3 August 1978, Machel specifically identified economic sabotage at the end of the colonial period as the main cause of urban degradation. (*Tempo,* 3 August 1978:5).

This allowed Frelimo to avoid analysing its own nationalisation politics and the lack of capacity of its institutions to maintain the physical condition of the buildings and improve urban social services, such as transportation, health, education, and sanitation.

The party called its First National Meeting of Cities and Communal Neighbourhoods (referred to below as First National Urban Meeting), in February 1979 to discuss urban issues, which took place in Maputo and was chaired by Óscar Monteiro, the then minister of Information. One of the solutions that came out of the meeting was the "socialist city", which will be explored in the next section.

4.2. Discourse of rupture and new order: the "socialist city"

The idea of a "socialist city" came about in the context of Frelimo's post-colonial euphoria, to use Brito's term (1991:56). Building from their own experience and trajectories, Frelimo expected to solve all urban problems created by the colonial state, as identified by the First National Urban Meeting.

They expected to be able to order urban life, control urban mobility, overcome unemployment and underemployed and end social deviation, all the "abnormalities" that were assumed to be inherited from the colonial state. As in rural areas, where Frelimo forced people to live collectively in communal villages after independence, it projected the "socialist cities" for urban Mozambique. This section will explore the relationship between Frelimo's post-colonial euphoria and the adoption of the "socialist city". In fact, Frelimo itself never used the term "socialist city"; it is found in Lachartre's (2000) *Enjeux urbains au Mozambique: de Lourenço Marques a Maputo.* To refer to the urban model, Frelimo used the term "communal neighbourhood".

As argued by Brito (1991:57) and Morton (2015), in the immediate aftermath of independence Frelimo devoted its attention to expanding the party structure in rural areas nationwide. Urban Mozambique was left in the hands of the mobilising groups, the *grupos dinamizadores*. Only in the late 1970s, particularly in in 1978 and 1979 did Frelimo turn its focus determinedly towards urban areas.

One of the decisions of the First National Meeting of Cities and Communal Neibourhood, held in 1979, was the adoption of the term "communal neighbourhood" to address discursively constructed urban issues. Apart from ordering and controlling its people by different means, Frelimo's urban model established the so-called "green zones", a term often used by the party-state to refer to those areas surrounding the cities, where agricultural production, mainly for family subsistence was promoted and practiced. The "green zones" were conceived as the main solution to cope with all urban issues, such as crime, prostitution, unemployment, underemployment, laziness, vagrancy, drunkenness, and food shortage.

When addressing the opening session of the 3rd session of the People's Assembly, in August 1978, Machel gave instructions to the deputies to deal with what had been identified as the main urban issues. The following is an extract of his speech:

> It is necessary that the city council organise the life of its urban population and promote the solution for their concrete problems, such as sanitation, public transportation, the markets, the census of the active populations and the means to fight unemployment. The creation of green zones around cities, where vegetables and livestock can be produced, is the solution for most of these problems (*Tempo*, 3 August 1978: 4).

Though Machel was speaking to the MPs and members of the executive council of Maputo city, such instructions concerning problems affecting cities were to be followed all over the country. Given his position within state apparatus, Machel's words were turned into actions without challenge, exemplifiying the role of a political leader's perceptions and his positioning within state apparatus in the policy process, as argued in chapter 1. In this case, Machel's words had a direct impact in policy and institutions in an unmediated way. Following the 1978 speech, an urban commission was formed to deal with the issues highlighted. Echoing Machel, Marcelino dos Santos, the president of the

People's Assembly, another key figure in the Frelimo's Politburo, gave similar instructions to the members of the newly created commission (Brito, 1991:60). In the aftermath of Samora's speech Frelimo organised the First National Meeting of Cities and Communal Neighbourhood, in 1979, which was chaired by Óscar Monteiro. Here, problems such as unemployment, underemployment, urban-rural migration, prostitution, vagrancy, food shortage, lack of education and health services, sanitation, etc. were widely discussed, and solutions put forward. Alberto Massavanhane, representative of the Maputo City Council, and members of the mass democratic organisations, such as Mozambican Women's Organisation (MWO) and Mozambican Youth Organisation (MYO) gathered together. Crime and prostitution were mentioned, again, as one of the main urban problems, as the following extract from Monteiro reveals:

> The members contributed for the meeting denouncing problems inherited from the past, that still persist, and also issues such as robbery, prostitution, banditry, alcoholism and unemployment, enemy's actions and others (Partido Frelimo, 1979:25).

These words pronounced during the First National Urban Meeting that discussed specifically urban problems in Mozambique are used in the context of the Frelimo anticolonial euphoria (Brito, 1991). The outcome of this meeting was published in "The Revolution", one of Frelimo's main publications. According to Darch (1981), "The Revolution", Frelimo's newspaper published in Dar-es-Salaam in the years of the liberation struggle began as "Mozambique Revolution" in 1967. After independence, it continued to be one of the key Frelimo's publications. In 1978 its name changed to the Portuguese version, *A Voz da Revolução,* a loose translation would be The Voice of the Revolution. Another Machel speech interpreted urban issues as the follwing:

> Cities, places not affected by the anti-colonial struggle, were subject to colonial influence. In cities, colonialism promoted the consumption of drugs, pornography, and prostitution. To promote moral degradation, in the former Lourenço Marques, there were places such as Pinguim, Luso, Tamila, where women were sold to colonial soldiers. This is what we found at your [the city that could be imagined as part of Frelimo's order] Lourenço Marques (Machel, 5 November 1981: 10).

Thus, dealing with these problems implied dismantling the "corrupting urban colonial order" and building a new one, as Monteiro stated in 1979 during the National Urban Meeting:

> We reject cities as the place of wellbeing for a minority, as the centre of unemployment, of racial discrimination, as zones of prostitution and banditry, as centre for diffusion and dissemination of practices inherited from the colonial capitalist system. Thus, to solve these issues, there is a need to break the colonial vices in order to build a socialist society, free of exploitation of man by man, that allows crime, prostitution and vagrancy to flourish in cities (Partido Frelimo, 1979:6).

For Frelimo, cities were also the foundation of the "socialist revolution". Thus, organising them was assumed a fundamental step toward the consolidation of state power to achieve its transformational goal, according to a resolution of the First National Urban Meeting below:

> It is in the city where the central party-state institutions are located. Thus, the cities must reflect the interest of our revolution. They must be a basis where the popular democracy is built and consolidated, in a straight collaboration with the countryside. They have a critical role in the consolidation of our revolution (República Popular de Moçambique (1979:23).

Inspired by their anticolonial euphoria and their own experiences the Frelimo leadership envisaged cities free from unemployment, ordered, and developed and with no crime and prostitution, a puritanimaginary that had its origins in the years of the the *Instituto Negrófilo,* NESAM, exile, and the liberation struggle, as showed in chapters 2 and 3. Every adult male who lived in urban areas should have a formal job, as in colonial cities. Crime and prostitution should be eradicated.

Unlike later events associated with OP, at this stage the solution envisaged by the Frelimo leadership was to organise and mobilise unemployed people and transform them into "productive workers", in cities, by farming in the "green zones", and not to evacuate them to rural areas. The next section explores the role of the "green zones" in Frelimo's cities.

4.3. The green zones: the magical remedy to urban diseases

To reverse urban ills, and particularly the unemployment problem, discursively constructed as a colonial legacy, Frelimo created institutions to deal with these problems. It promoted the so-called green zones to cope with urban unemployment. Here, as in communal villages in the rural areas, food production would be developed collectively. The "useless people" such as the lazy, drunk men, single women, and other apparently unproductive individuals would be allocated a portion of land in the peripheral area of the city, such as the Infulene valley in Maputo, to produce food. The green zones were discursively constructed as a nursery that would transform deviant people into good citizens dedicated to the cause of the revolution. However, the green zones, and most importantly that production should be practiced collectively, constituted a means of exercising control over people in order to achieve Frelimo's urban model, as Machel's discourse demonstrates:

> The creation of the green zones, around cities, and organisation of urban life in communal neighbourhoods are the strategic lines defined by the party and the President of the party and of the Popular Republic of Mozambique. Its implementation will allow the party to know its own citizens and how each of them contribute to our revolution through production. Production is a way of educating our people about the goals of our revolution and how to achieve it (*Tempo*, 1979:7).

In addition to Machel, other Frelimo members also construed urban agricultural production in the "green zones" as the main solution to both urban governance of mobility and unemployment. Abiatar Sansão Muthemba, a veteran of the liberation struggle, for example, suggested that "green zones" should effectively be implemented in urban areas all over the country. His suggestion was based on the example of the city of Xai-Xai in southern Mozambique, which became self-sufficient in the late 1970s, as a result of agricultural production in the green zones (Partido Frelimo, 1985). According to him, this example should be followed in other cities all over the country. Sérgio Vieira, a senior member of Frelimo, shared the same vision (Interview, Vieira, 6 August 2015).

By analysing the Frelimo leadership's discourse, it is possible to see how the ideological construction about causes and solutions to urban ills shared amongst them shaped policy choices and led to the creation of institutions. As argued by Hammond, Keeney and Raiffa (1998), 'the way a problem is framed can profoundly influence the choices made to cope with it'. Without denying the potential role of Portuguese colonialism, we have seen that many of the urban problems resulted from or were worsened by the options that Frelimo adopted right after independence, as mentioned above. However, for the Frelimo leadership, at this stage, they resulted from the colonial legacy. As a result of this perception, associated with the context and the experience of Frelimo leaders, they devoted their efforts to curbing the colonial vestiges through the adoption of measures such as "green zones" to reverse the scenario. Frelimo also wanted to control urban people, something that was intrinsic to its revolutionary politics, which comes from the years of Lourenço Marques, of military discipline in Algeria, Kongwa and Nachingwea, and of the liberation struggle. Morton (2015) argued that the main goal of Frelimo when implementing its communal neighbourhood policy was to gain control of its urban population, in the face of a generalised crisis. Defined as a geographical space that concentrated many people, and where power was forged and consolidated, controlling who did what, where, for whom, for how long and why, was paramount for Frelimo. It was also the mean by which a new collective consciousness would be formed, as Monteiro said during the First National Urban Meeting:

> Places where people live with a high level of organisation [meaning urban areas], where a collective consciousness is consolidated. Where we fight against disease and illiteracy, where new revolutionary values are inculcated. Where our personality is constructed and we organise our leisure time in a healthy and educational way, by promoting the popular culture, sport and recreational centres (Partido Frelimo, 1979:24).

The Frelimo leadership's discourse entails their social and historical origins, experiences and trajectories that rendered order and control mechanisms relevant to their politics. Thus, at this stage, their policies aimed at controlling its people to create the urban order it wanted. They were determined to control and order its urban areas and population, which were subject to "chaos", according to its discourse. Following the orientations of the 3rd Congress, in 1977 city assemblies were elected in all

ten cities of Mozambique. These assemblies were to establish and monitor socio-economic programs, which would be carried out by the City Executive Councils, which were created in 1978. The National Urban Meeting would produce solutions that reflected Frelimo's discursive construction of urban order.

Contrary to Frelimo's plan, the "green zones" did not solve the "ills" of urban life because Frelimo's own policies placed more emphasis on social control than the realities of production. As in the communal villages, in the "green zones" people were forced to produce together and follow a routine that was not always suitable for production. They had to mix production and political activities. As argued by Ngula (a resident in Infulene, one of the areas identified for agricultural production, Interview, 18 January 2018), 'in the green zones we spent more time on political activities, such as singing the national anthem, learning about the guiding principles of the revolution, than farming the land. The secretaries of the neighbourhood decided the farming schedule'. Unable to produce enough in the "green zones", many urban dwellers entered the informal sector to make a living. This is what in fact contributed to the urban ills that the Frelimo leadership blamed on "unproductive people" later.

4.4. The 1979 National Meeting and urban control

At the heart of Frelimo's policies that emerged from the 1979 National Meeting was the intention of enhancing its control mechanism as a way to achieve its urban order. As part of this, Frelimo leaders, such as Machel, Monteiro and others, decided to mobilise the state apparatus inside the city, which would work in collaboration with the City Council. The Frelimo leadership's ideology, associated with the post-colonial context, led to the production of a particular set of institutions, as argued in chapter 1. The new structure consisted of the Cabinet of the Executive Council and various directorates according to the needs of each city (República Popular de Moçambique (a), 1979).

As we have seen, the resolutions of the Meeting constituted a blueprint for the "socialist city", and the main characteristic of Frelimo's city was what Frelimo called the communal neighbourhood. In Samora's interview in 1976, published by Petrucci (1976:13), he already made clear his preoccupation:

> The making of popular power is in the communes that we are building both in rural and urban areas. It is the collective life that replicates the power of our people. Why are the cities so relevant for our nation? Because they concentrate a lot of people. [At present] there is no collective life in the cities. People ignore each other. Individualism and narcissism are dominant. To change things, it is necessary to establish a collective life in cities. Because only

collective life will solve all the problems and allow society to become strong enough to avoid decaying.

What the Frelimo leadership was doing at this stage resulted from their own imaginary, inspired by their past, about how society should be organised to achieve their revolution. In the first years of independence, they instituted mobilising groups such as secretaries of neighbourhoods and chiefs of blocks, party-state organs - which had a key role in materializing Frelimo's social control mechanisms. Apart from disseminating the party's political ideology, they were also responsible for ensuring that everyone who entered and lived in cities was known. Who lived where, doing what with whom, and for how long was the nature of the information that they had to gather in order to inform Frelimo's social control mechanism through *guia de marcha* (Brito, 1991).

In its "socialist city", Frelimo also decided to control the food supply. As a result, the 1979 National Meeting decided to create a particular institution, the Food Ration Coordination Committee, which was headed by Jacinto Veloso who was also the minister of Security and a member of the Frelimo's Political Bureau throughout Operation Production. Its task was to rationalise the food supply system and ensure price stability especially in urban areas. Each family had to possess a food ration card (figure 5). For that, data about the size of each family member needed to be collected. The local structure and the central government should know how many people lived in each neighbourhood, how many houses existed in each neighbourhood, how many stores, the capacity of each store, how many people in each house, and how many people worked in each house (Brito, 1991:).





Figure 5: Ration card

To enhance its control, the city government organs, such as the City Council, had to conduct a census of all companies and productive units existing in the cities, so as to know their financial conditions and create cooperatives for carpenters, tailors, mechanics, etc. (República Popular de Moçambique, 1979:31).

To exert rigorous control, the Meeting decided that each city be divided into communal neighbourhoods, each comprising 2,500 families, with a maximum of 12,500 people, with one communal unit of 400 families, comprising a maximum of 2000 people. The communal unit was something between a communal neighbourhood and a block that allowed the mobilising groups to operate efficiently in controlling the population and mobilising them for political, economic and social activities. Below the communal unit, there was a block, with 50 families comprising 250 people organised in residential commissions. Depending on the complexity and size of each city, some of them were made a functional organ called a zone. This had a similar structure as the City Council and comprised two or more neighbourhoods. These structures were put in place from June 1979 by the Ministry of State in the Presidency, and the Minstries of Agriculture, Public Infrastructure, Health, Defence, Education and Industry. In addition, in 1980 Frelimo carried out a census to enable control of urban influx and thus reduce urban problems, such as unemployment, crime, and prostitution. In each neighbourhood, the census would give the exact number of residents and their activities (República Popular de Moçambique, 1979). These measures and institutions were formed with the purpose of enhancing Frelimo's control mechanism to achieve its urban model, inspired by the social and historical origins, and experiences of its leadership, as seen in chapter 2 and 3.

"Vigilance groups" (grupos de vigilância) were also instituted, involving the Ministry of the Interior, together with the City Assembly, Executive Councils and mobilising groups. Their main task was to control people's mobility to and from urban areas (Partido Frelimo, 1979). Though Frelimo's discourse presented it as a measure to create new labour and social relationships, based on collective work, the main goal of the communal neighbourhood was to control people's mobility in a context of urban crisis, as argued by Morton (2015:). That is why a *guia de marcha* (figure 6) was introduced to control people's mobility and people's life, as discussed in chapter two and three.



GUIA

Nº 4/DA/77

Em obediência às determinações transmitidas pelo Secretário particular de Sua Excelência o Ministro da Indústria e Comércio, cargo a apresentar-se no respectivo Ministério, o Técnico-director destes Serviços, ANTÓNIO RITA PEREIRA.

Por despacho de Sua Excelência o Ministro, de 8 de Março de 1977, foram-lhe concedidos 47 dias de licença disciplinar, a gozar interpoladamente, tendo ainda direito a 42 dias e meio (quarenta e dois dias e meio).

11 Abril

Figure 6: *Guia de marcha*

In 1982, a year before Operation Production, a resident card (figure 7) was introduced (*Notícias*, 23 de Junho de 1982:3; Mavanga, 1982). On 29 February 1983, the Ministry of the Interior published a circular concerning the movement of people. Henceforth, every resident had to possess his or her respective card and request a *guia de marcha* if they wanted to move from one place to another. Those who came to the city for a temporary visit, as in the colonial period, were issued with an authorization. Once at their destination, a person had to present himself or herself to local authority within 48 hours, accompanied by a family member living in the city, who had to present his or her resident card and ID. If changing residential area, one had to inform the local authority within 48 hours. The absence of a *guia de marcha* was reason enough to deny entrance to the city (*Notícias*, 1 March 1983:3).



Figure 7: Resident card

Frelimo's socialist city failed. According to Morton (2015), one of the reasons for failure was the lack of a specific course for government intervention. There were no drawings or plans visualizing what an ideal neighbourhood ought to look like, for instance. Rather, the communal neighbourhood was a figurative device: the place that resulted when an urban area was given precise boundaries and political definition within party and state structures, and then its residents mobilised toward collective goals. As in the case of communal neighbourhood and the green zones, the failure of the socialist city was not attributed to Frelimo itself. Instead, blame was put on the unproductive people and their removal to rural areas was the solution, as we will see in the following section.

4.5. Same problems, different causes and remedies: from green zones to evacuation

In the 1980s, the Frelimo leadership changed its discourse over the causes and solutions to urban problems. If in the 1970s, it related urban ills to the colonial legacy, in the 1980s urban ills were attributed to those who were considered "unproductive", discursively constructed as excess people. Perceived as such, their evacuation to rural areas was the solution deemed appropriate by the Frelimo leadership to bring about the historically intended urban order. This section in two parts explores the discourse shift and its causes, and ways in which the ideology it entailed led to the adoption of Operation Production. The section demonstrates how the context helps to understand the relationship between ideology, imaginary and values, and policy process.

4.5.1. Discourse shift: the context from the late 1970s to the 1980s

As argued by Wodak (2011) discourse shapes and is shaped by the socioeconomic and political context that helps to interpret its role in policy process. The section explores how discourse is formed by the twin elements of context or pressures and the historical bank of ideas shared among the Frelimo leadership.

Though also used in the 1970s' discourse, the term "unproductive people" became dominant in the 1980s' discourse and replaced the terms unemployed and underemployed people. Unlike the colonial legacy and post-colonial measures, the cause for urban ills focussed on the "unproductive people" and their removal to rural areas was the solution .

As Machel's 1983 speech stated:

> We will populate the districts of Matutuine, Moamba, Namahacha, Manhiça, Marracuene and Magude. Those from Gaza and Inhambane province will return to their original district [applause]. Thus, the food will be enough for those who work and live in the cities. The excess people [meaning the unproductive] will produce in the countryside, we will give them hoes, machetes, seeds and capulanas [a typical Mozambican women's dress dominant in the rural areas]. We will support them. They will build cities in the countryside and not here. Do you understand my friends? (Partido Frelimo, 1983:32).

This discursive shift can be explained, partially, in terms of Wodak's (2011) approach on discourse, as indicated in chapter 1. This approach emphasizes the role of context in shaping discourse. According to Wodak, discourse shapes and is shaped by the context in which it is produced and used. As this section shows, the context in which discourse operates and is used is relevant to understanding the ideology it entails and to explain policy that results from it. In the 1980s, after the triumphalism and euphoria of the first years of independence, Frelimo's revolutionary project was under pressure, especially its urban development project, which had the communal neighbourhood as its ultimate goal. The country was in severe crisis. The war between Renamo and the government, which started in 1976, intensified in the 1980s. As we will see in chapter 6, Renamo advanced significantly in rural areas, pushing people to urban areas, which were already facing services shortage, at a faster rate (Hanlon, 1984, Cabrita, 2000). Renamo's attacks on economic and social infrastructures devastated agricultural production, the main source of income and food for the peasants. In the 1980s, the attacks intensified, destroying health and education infrastructures, roads, communal villages and state farms, the backbone of Frelimo's development agenda. Its urban infrastructure was poorly connected to its surrounding countryside, where most of the population lived. Shortly after independence, the conflict merged into an armed struggle and people began moving from their homes seeking better conditions for living. In the face of deteriorating urban conditions, growing numbers of people resorted to

informal income activities and unregulated access to land, housing and services. The introduction of neoliberal economic policies from the mid-1980s on further eroded the living conditions of many and propelled a rapid expansion of the urban informal economy. All these represented constraints for a poor state, which had scarce resources to exercise its political power in a relatively vast territory (Kamete and Lindell, 2010:13).

In the 1980s, the Frelimo leadership realized its limited capacity to continue supplying food, transport, education, health and all other urban public services as envisaged in the National Urban Meeting of 1979. The urban population increased rapidly, as did unemployment (Vivet, 2015:45), as we have seen above. From 1970 to 1980, the urban population increased in an average of more than 20% (Direcção Nacional de Estatística, 1980; Rodrigues, 1983). In 1982, a year before OP, according to Machel, Quoted in *Noticias* (1982:3), Maputo had about 900,000 inhabitants. As Morton (2015) argued, the influx into cities deepened the more widespread crisis Mozambique had been weathering since independence. As a result, the state did not have the infrastructural capacity for so many people, and the sudden population growth exacerbated food and water shortages and worsened levels of urban unemployment and crime, a reality reflected in Frelimo's discourse.

Apart from war, the country was hit by severe drought in 1982 and 1983, which affected about 670,000 tons of cereals. According to Pitcher (2002), in the 1980s the trade of Mozambique's cash crops, such as sugar, cotton and cashew nuts decreased, as did international prices for such commodities. The reduction of export income and increased imports intensified the deficit in the country's balance of payments. Most industry, considered as the mainstay of development, collapsed. State farms, plagued with administrative, economic and technical problems, became less and less productive and unable to meet the higher demand. The combination of these economic problems gave futher impetus to the Frelimo leadership to act decisively to avoid what was construed as urban chaos, the blame for which was attributed to "unproductive people".

In this context perceived chaos, "unproductivity" was portrayed as closely related to urban crime and prostitution, thus justifying an intervention that would relocate the "unproductive people" to rural areas in the north of the country. For them, this would not only address the "corruption" they brought to cities; it would also increase national production and shape the mentality required of the workers and citizens in Frelimo's early socialist vision for the country. The context of the 1980s, associated with the Frelimo leadership's views of urban order and control explains why they engaged in policies such as OP. As argued by Grindle and Thomas (1991) and Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) under circumstances of perceived crisis like that affecting Mozambique in the 1980s, there is often a sense amongst the political leadership of an urgency to act and a consensus that failure to act may lead to even more serious economic and political difficulties. Their concerns were driven by the necessity of political stability and control. The Frelimo leadership blamed the "unproductive people"

for the discursively constructed urban ills, which in fact already existed and were previously attributed to the colonial legacy, as we saw above.

The fact that the "unproductive people" were interpreted as excess people, as Machel's discourse reveals, made the idea of their evacuation appealing as a means to return to normality, meaning the capacity of the state to control and order urban society. In this context of generalised crisis, production in rural areas, especially in Niassa and Cabo Delgado, the northern provinces where land was abundant, became appealing to the Frelimo leadership as the solution to cope with urban problems,.

4.5.2. The "unproductive people" and the making of Operation Production

Embedded in a wider socioeconomic and political context, the Frelimo leadership produced a particular discourse that blamed "unproductive people" ("excess people) for urban ills and thus, justified their removal from cities through Operation Production. This section demonstrates the relationship between the Frelimo leadership's ideological construction of "unproductive people" and its political implications. On 18 March 1980, Samora Machel addressed the nation from Independence Square. The full content of Samora's speech, entitled "*Desalojamos o Inimigo do Nosso Aparelho do Estado* ("Dislodge the Enemy from our State Apparatus"), was published by CEDIMO (1981:10-12). Critical issues affecting the nation and its remedies were outlined. After giving a brief on the colonial legacy and a detailed account of the political, economic and social juncture in which the country was, Machel told the crowd how he perceived the causes of urban problems and the solutions to them:

> When we proclaimed our independence, we took over from the Portuguese. Most of the working class, particularly those from Gaza and Inhambane provinces, Manhiça, Moamba, Matutuíne, Namahacha, Magude districts [meaning rural areas] had their wives there. Had their children living there. They were paid 500 Escudos [Portuguese colonial currency] … Once their salaries were increased, they brought their wives and kids here, to live and study here [meaning Maputo city]. Unhappy with only their wives and chidren, they brought their brothers. Still unhappy, they brought their mothers and now all are living here in Maputo … Some are ministers and did the same thing. They brought their families from Cabo Delgado, Beira and Nampula. That is why Maputo city is full of people and food is not enough. We will stop it. Those who produced maize in rural areas came to live here. Cassava, fish, beans, everything came from rural areas, where they lived. They left those areas to stay here and are no longer producing. We will give them hoes and tractors to produce in Manhiça, Matutuíne, Moamba and Namahacha.

According to Machel's practical reasoning (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012), which was also shared by other key members of the Frelimo leadership, uncontrollable urban "influx", epitomised by

bringing family members to cities, created "excess people" in cities and it led to urban ills such as crime and prositution. It was the fault of household heads, who deliberately abandoned their tasks of rural production to fix themselves in urban areas "doing nothing but creating chaos". What the discourse defined as urban disorder was perceived neither because of Frelimo's failure to meet its development programme as we saw, nor because of the failure to realize its urban vision of communal neighbourhoods, as defined by the 1979 National Urban Meeting. As Machava (2011:12) and Vivet (2015:96) argue, the Frelimo leadership did not blame itself. Rather, responsibility was attributed to the people 'who deliberately abandoned rural areas where they were useful, to come to cities, where they were useless and consumed food and services, at the expense of others'. In the cities, they contributed to increased crime and prostitution. Blame was also attributed to those who were already in cities but did not possess formal jobs, and thus, called "unproductive people" (CEDIMO,1981:10-12).

This reasoning, though convincing enough for the Frelimo leadership to act in the form of Operation Production, had more to with justifying their intervention. In the same speech, already quoted above, Samora Machel said:

> Twenty people in one family and only one is working. Those who do not produce we will create conditions for them to produce. They are deviant people who must be integrated into productive activities. They will be sent to production centres here in Marracuene. They are people who are not productive. They are paid but are not able to produce their own salary. The "unproductive labour" has also to be sent to production centres. There are unemployed and delinquent people, the parasites. We will give them tractors, and money to produce. This is part of the political and organisational campaign, which we are launching today, 18th July 1980. This a new stage of our struggle (Machel, 18 July 1980:5).

While revealing the ubiquitous nature of production for Frelimo's revolutionary project, this quote also reveals Frelimo's ambiguity towards its own urban development plan. Though the way evacuation was executed ended up targeting the informal sector, as those operating there had no work card (only those with formal jobs could have one), it was not clear who in fact "unproductive people" were, and who should be relocated. Another of Machel's speeches in 1983 reveals this ambiguity and lack of clarity:

> The chauffeur of the chauffeur of the president will have to go to the countryside. Those directors with two secretaries, one of them will go to the countryside. Only those whose job is really needed will remain in the city. Those who destroy state infrastructures, vehicles, go to the countryside… Let's clean the city a little bit, don't you think!!! When I speak about the chauffeur, I mean those who do not produce. There are a lot of them in the cities: delinquents, alcoholics, etc., will go to the countryside (Machel, 21 May 1983:2).

This meant that virtually anyone could be targeted in the name of Operation Production. In the same speech, Machel announced measures to restructure the state to best serve socio-political and economic goals, especially in cities. Machel argued:

> We must be organised. We must know how many people live in each neighbourhood. Food supply for the families in the cities should be done through the ration card. Each family should have one. For that, the local structure and the central government must know how many people live in each neighbourhood. How many houses exist in each neighbourhood, how many stores, the capacity of each store, how many people in each house, how many people work in each house... We must know how many houses exist in the cities, how many buildings, how many homes in each building. Who lives in those buildings? We will create a new state institution that has a specific task of controlling the houses of the state. This is the only way we can plan the correct and just distribution of products for each zone. We will start first in Maputo, Beira and Nampula and then we will extend it to other cities. Each neighbourhood must control the new arrivals in the cities. Whoever comes to the city needs to present himself to the local authority. This measure will allow us also to identify and stop vagrants, criminals, prostitutes (Machel, 18 July 1980:4).

The discursive and institutional connection between Frelimo's historical order and control mechanisms and the state building and consolidation process is clear in this quote. Controlling people was the cornerstone of Frelimo's politics, most importantly for its nation-state building and consolidation process, which started during the liberation struggle, particularly in the liberated zones as we saw in chapter three. As Machel said, the liberated zones should invade the cities" (*Tempo*, 12 September 1976:7). It meant that the experience and discursive construction of military discipline and micro-level social control exercised in these zones had to be reproduced in cities. This is what happened with OP, as we will see in chapter five.

In 1982, another speech was made by Machel at Independence Square. The content was about how to consolidate popular power. As a milestone for that goal, Maputo, the centre of political power, had to be transformed into a "liberated zone". By transforming Maputo into a "liberated zone" Machel meant:

> Not just eradicating the colonial influence and establishing a new political order, as happened during the liberation struggle, but, essentially, freeing Maputo from its vices, amongst them crime, prostitution, drugs and vagrancy. To accomplish that there was a need to halt the rural exodus and provide popular militia and mobilising groups with guns to patrol the city. After that, all the citizens of Maputo will be given guns to clean the cities from: thieves, bandits, child rapists, smugglers, drug dealers and consumers, criminals, murderers, agitators, rumour

> mongers… In 3 months, we will clean-up the cities. We will detain all these people and punish them with labour… The popular militia is the best way to organise the people to fight against "urban disorder" (*Noticias*, 1982:2).

Though citizens were never given guns mentioned in here, this speech, made in during preparation for the fourth Congress, framed problems and solutions and had strong political implications. It paved the way for Operation production a year later. Built from the pervasive military experience of its leadership, the tone of the language used in these discourses is violent; it criminalizes "unproductive people", identifying them as unsuitable to remain in cities but suitable for rural life. There, they would be useful for the goals of the revolution.

On 21 May 1983, Samora Machel gave a remarkable speech in Maputo at Independence Square. This speech took place a month after the fourth Congress was held. Thousands of people attended the meeting. It was a Saturday; all members of government were present. The president was received by members of the Political Bureau, such as Marcelino dos Santos, Joaquim Alberto Chissano, Jorge Rebelo (also the 1st secretary of the party for Maputo city). The meeting was received with enthusiasm from the people that attended, who were shouting words such as: "Friend Samora we, the people, are with you". Here, Operation Production, one of the decisions, orientations and tasks determined by the 4th congress, was announced to the people. This announcement was a continuation of a speech given on 1st May 1983, on worker's day. Samora Machel started the speech by mentioning the fact that even "delinquents", "lazy people" and "saboteurs" came to hear the decisions, orientations and tasks determined by the 4th Congress. He mentioned the Congress as the moment where Frelimo's main decisions were taken, and where the guiding principles of the revolution were defined. Operation Production was presented thus:

> The delegates highlighted how uncontrolled and disorganised urban influx intensifies vagrancy, criminality and prostitution. They mentioned how the existence of those who do not work is affecting those who do work. We will control the urban influx. Only those who work will have access to the city. It means that work is the criteria to be become an urban resident. We will comb from house to house... Comb the cities of all those who don't work. This task is for the Ministry of Interior, Defence and Security (Partido Frelimo, 1983:10, Machel's 21 May 1983 speech).

Frelimo's discourse thus held that disorder was caused by "unproductive people". Using Fairclough's (2015) words, it embodied the ideology of means of subsistence, assuming formal work as right to city as in the colonial era. According to this discursive construction, "urban unproductive people", meaning those in the informal market, would perform criminal and deviant activities to survive. In rural areas, the urban "unproductive people" would inevitably become "productive people" simply by

farming the land, with no need for additional training or investment, apart from hoes and machetes. As plenty of land was available in the underpopulated provinces of Niassa and Cabo Delgado, simply sending people there provided a solution to urban ills. To produce, in rural areas, only fertile land, labour and willingness were required, according to Machel's discourse. And, according to this discourse, those resources were abundant throughout Mozambique. In this way, to use van Dijk's (2006) argument, the discourse identified "production", a ubiquitous aspect of Frelimo's revolutionary project, as the driving issue of Operation Production. It fitted perfectly in the existing ideology. But, before production, as we will see in chapter 5, first came social control. In any case, for Frelimo production was essentially a political process, a way of educating people, of transforming people, as mentioned by Alberto Chipande, a key member of the Frelimo leadership, during an interview with Carvalho (2003). As argued by Hall and Young (1997), the Frelimo development model was inseparable from social discipline, order and control. During the liberation struggle, production had already been defined as a priority not only for economic recovery, but mainly to foster new labour relations and build class consciousness (Mondlane, 1975:65). It was a tool for consciousness raising and political education, as we have seen in previous sections.

Frelimo's discourse went through a process of naturalization and rationalization (Fairclough, 1989) conducted by the dominant revolutionary group inside Frelimo, which believed that controlling and stopping rural-urban migration and removing "urban unproductive people" was key also for the consolidation of the state and organisation of production, as the following extract from Machel reveals:

> In the last few years, we have seen how the number of those abandoning the countryside and settling in the cities, especially Maputo, is increasing. It is the main cause of rising crime and prostitution. It has to be stopped in order to solve those problems...(Partido Frelimo, 1976:13).

Frelimo politics relied on the organisation of its surveillance and information gathering system, hence the *guia de marcha*. Controlling who did what, when, how and with whom was fundamental for Frelimo. The circumstantial and value premises about crime, prostitution and its relation to production, that fed the practical reasoning used to ground Operation Production, were already established in the First National Meeting of the District Committee, between 16-21 February in 1975, as we saw above.

The reinvention of unemployed and underemployed people of the 1970s (Quembo, 2017) who now, in the 1980s, became "unproductive people", served to demonize and criminalize them (Fairclough, 1989) and it legitimized their eviction through Operation Production. The discourse was used in the same way that Fairclough (1989) calls ideological creativity, the process through which a discourse fabricates a sort of abnormality that requires political intervention in the form of policy. The expression "unproductive people", which appears often in the 1980s' discourse had an experiential meaning in the sense that it represented a "danger" for the social order intended in Frelimo's

"socialist city". The danger posed by these people lost its force once they were placed in rural areas. Thus, Operation Production results from the Frelimo leadership's historical experience that shaped their ideology and values about causes and remedies of urban order, control and social deviation as the next section will demonstrate.

4.6. Frelimo's ideology and the making of Operation Production

Contrary to the Frelimo leadership's claim that Operation Production aimed at transforming "useless people" into "productive people" through agriculture in rural Mozambique, in this section I argue that OP is a policy that intended to strengthen Frelimo's control and order mechanisms as part of its historically intended "socialist city".

Some authors, such as Morton (2015) seem to give a different interpretation about the nature of the process that led to OP. Morton (2015) explores Frelimo's power structure and their autonomy to argue that Frelimo's revolutionary policies concerning urban development, including OP, were bottom-up. Though we both agree on the importance of perceptions, imaginations and expectation in policy choice, Morton argues that Frelimo's urban governance was not only shaped by the Frelimo leader's perspective. For Morton, one should not assume that everything that unfolded in Maputo after independence can be understood through government initiative but also, by what its citizens expected it to be, what he calls grassroot policy-making. As Morton puts it, "in ways that have never been acknowledged in Mozambique's historiography, and underexplored in African urban historiography in general, the nature of urban governance was shaped by residents of the *subúrbios* themselves – people who through imaginative acts of citizenship sought to make the state something real in their lives". Thus, for Morton, while Frelimo's decision to nationalize the cement area of cities was a result of its heavy-handed top-down approach, the nationalization of its peripheral areas resulted from suburban dwellers' expectations of Frelimo itself. After listening to Machel's 3 February 1976 speech about nationalisation of the buildings, the GDs began also to nationalize the buildings in the suburban areas. Though making little sense for the Frelimo leadership to nationalize the buildings in those areas, it had to do it as a response to GDs' translation of Machel' speech into action at neighbourhood level, where they were very influential.

In fact, the example that Morton uses to illustrate his argument reemphasizes the role of the Frelimo leadership's ideology in policy-making, as I argue. As Morton acknowledges, GDs were part of Frelimo's state machinery acting at local level, being Frelimo's voice. However, despite being at different levels, I argue that separating them from Frelimo and calling this grassroot politics, can be misleading. Frelimo nationalised the peripheral areas of the city as a manifestation of its historical desire to micro-control the lives of its people to create its "socialist city". GDs, secretaries of neighbourhoods, chiefs of blocks, which were part of Frelimo government's structure, were all

installed at all residential local level from the very beginning, including suburbs, to exercise its control over people through the *guia de marcha*. Thus, it is hard to argue that GDs were something separated from Frelimo's structure. Morton does not see the extent to which the GDs were in fact nationalizing buildings. For his account, he relies on an interview with Júlio Carrilho, the then minister of Public Work and Housing in the first years of independence, and José Luís Cabaço, the then minister of Information. He did not interview any of the GDs involved in such nationalisation. My interpretation of Morton's argument is that he uses the example of Frelimo's local authorities to demonstrate that the people at lower levels of the party-state interpreted Frelimo's discourse in a way not exactly intended at the top level. In chapter 5, I make a similar argument about lower level state-party authorities using the Frelimo leadership's discourse to sort gender competition and class conflict.

I argue that OP resulted from the Frelimo leadership's social and historical origins, their experiences and trajectories, and perceptions about causes and solutions for urban order that is framed in their discourse. For Machel, the president of the country, the concerns such as crime and prostitution that justified the adoption of OP were brought to the Congress by the delegates who took a year in their constituencies listening to the people, as a preparation for the 4th congress. The delegates mentioned that the people of Mozambique were alarmed with the increase of urban crime and prostitution, falling production in the countryside, and the emergence of the informal market. As a result of these complaints, Frelimo decided to implement OP. Machel argued:

> The delegates of the congress emphasized how urban influx increases vagrancy, crime and prostitution. They mentioned how those who do not work affect the life of those who do work. As a result, we will control urban influx. Only those who are employed, who really have a job have the right to remain in the cities (Partido Frelimo, 1983:16).

As my interviews with Matsinhe (one of the key members of the Frelimo leadership and minister of Justice during OP, 29th March 2016), Veloso (another member of Frelimo's Politburo and director of Security Service during OP, 31 January 2016), Vieira (a member of Frelimo and governor of Niassa during OP, 6th August 2015), dos Santos (key member of the Frelimo leadership, vice-president of Frelimo from 1970 and minister of Planning during OP, 25th May 2016) and Hama Thai (military defence officer during OP 17 March 2016) revealed, the Frelimo leadership believed that OP was a social benefit implemented by the party, the sole representative and the legitimate guide of the people of Mozambique, to solve problems that affected the people of Mozambique, which were identified by the people. The leadership believed OP was a functionalist measure, in the way put by George and Wilding (1984), which would benefit the whole society. It was a policy full of humanity that resulted from the demand of the people, Matsinhe (Interview, 29 March 2016) said:

> We did what we could do to solve the problems of the urban population. There were a lot of people in the cities and people suffered because they could not get food. Even if they had money, there were long queues in the cities to get food. At the same time, those "unproductive people" had nothing to do. They were just hanging about in the cities and suffering. We gave them something to do in the countryside. It was not just agriculture. It could be any other job. Because in the countryside they could, at least, produce food for them.

Machel argued in the same way during his 21 May 1983 speech:

> It was mentioned by many delegates that most of the coffee shops in Maputo are full of people that do not work. In the queues, there are many people whose job is only queuing. In the cinema, there are many people who do not work but manage to get money to buy ticket. In the shops, there are full of people that do not work. They go there to buy food to speculate in the black market. In the buildings of our cities, many people live there but do not pay the rent. Our houses are robbed while we are working, and when the thief is caught we usually realize that is someone who does not work (Partido Frelimo, 1983:3).

Mariano Matsinhe, Sérgio Vieira, Jacinto Veloso, Marcelino dos Santos and António Hama Thai were all delegates to the 4th Congress, which endorsed Operation Production. Some of them (Matsinhe, dos Santos and Veloso) were members of the Politburo, which played a key role in the decision-making about OP. The quote above reveals the Frelimo leadership's ideology and values about the relationship between formal unemployment and means to survive. For them, there is no other way to explain how unemployed people or in fact, people in the informal sector, could afford to make a living if not by committing crime for men, or becoming a prostitute for women. It also reveals how they defined a decent job. Buying goods in the state's shops and then selling them outside (the main characteristic of the informal sector) was deviant, and thus not a respectable job, but something that eroded a Mozambican "developed" and "ordered" urban society.

Some people, especially those who attended the 21 May 1983 speech, when interviewed about Operation Production, acknowledged that it was a good speech, which may be in line with what Machel argued in his 21st May discourse. For example, Eusébio Samuel Ngwenya, who was a chief of *Círculo* (one of Frelimo's organs at local level), argued that amongst some of the new arrivals from the rural areas were unemployed people who caused robbery in the neighbourhood. Thus, removing them to rural areas where they could produce for themselves was the best political solution. Antonio Munguambe and Olga José, command of Popular Militias and civil servant at the city council of Inyagoia (one of Maputo's peripheral neighbourhoods), respectively, also argued in favour of the removal of the "unproductive people" from cities. Eusébio Ngwenya, and Alfabeto Welissene were also amongst those who agreed with Operation Production. (*Notícias*, 4 June 1983:4) Júlio Ubisse, a

member of the mobilising group (*Grupos* Dinamizadores) and secretary of the *círculo* of Hulene, quoted by Donaldo (1983), argued that unemployed people were the main cause of crime and prostitution in the cities. These opinions do not necessarily make Operation Production a policy that resulted from the people's will, as argued by the leadership, particularly Machel. First, most of those quoted above were civil servants with duties at different levels of the party-state. In fact, most of the civil servants at the time were affiliated with Frelimo, as it was the sole political party, which assumed itself as a vanguard party. In those days, the distinction between the party and the state was obscure and fluid, as seen in chapter 3. Second, those opinions reveal the power of ideology, channelled through a discourse, in shaping the minds of the people (Habermas, 1984). It is also of course a very public performance of loyalty to Frelimo.

I argue that persuasive discursive methods had been applied in the way that Machel and other Frelimo leaders, such as Óscar Monteiro and Mariano Matsinhe, formulated their speeches regarding urban crime and prostitution and its solution. For them, OP meant providing a job for those who did not have one and needed one, according to their logic. In their view, OP provided dignity for the "useless people" and in the end transformed them into "useful people" for themselves and their own society. This discourse also fitted the logical perceptions of the Frelimo leadership about the place of the countryside for development in a context of crisis, as identified in the section above. For Frelimo's state-centred development programme, the rural areas were defined as the focus for planning and development of agriculture, in turn the basis for development as a whole. Thus, all development initiatives should start from the rural areas (Partido Frelimo, 1985). Increasing investment and production in the midst of the fight against hunger and the protection of our nation and revolution are the cornerstone to transform our economy, said António Branco, then minister of Industry and Energy and a delegate to the 4th Congress (Partido Frelimo, 1985). 'Given the context in which most of our population lived (and still live) in the rural areas and are peasants, investing in agricultural production is key for our development and to boost industry', said Manuel da Silva, Minister of Internal Trade and a delegate to the 4th Congress (Partido Frelimo, 1985). In a crisis context, these elements of developmental discourse together constituted acceptable premises to legitimise Operation Production. Instead of flowing to cities, rural people should stay in rural areas and build cities there (*Tempo*, 21 August 1977:8).

Considering the trajectory of the Frelimo leadership's ideology and values, which date back to the colonial era and the liberation struggle, which placed micro level control as central for their politics, I demonstrate how OP is connected to the visions and perceptions shared within the Frelimo leadership, were framed in its revolutionary discourse. The ideas used in their discourse to ground Operation Production, are intrinsic to its revolutionary project, as we saw above. These ideas emanated from the dominant revolutionary ideologues of Frelimo where Machel was a pillar. In the privileged spaces of reproduction and contestation of power, discursive exercises occurred and the

content of what would be OP was made clear, long before the 4th congress. Those targeted by this Operation were always unwanted by Frelimo. As Vivet (2015:109) argues, their presence in cities was assumed as temporary.

The detention and quick trial of those deemed to be renegades and sending them for rehabilitation had been used to implement policies similar to OP, such as re-education camps, introduced before OP, which had a similar discursive pattern. Machel himself mentioned, during the 21 May 1983 speech that the Political Bureau, which met on the 1st of April, had already agreed on Operation Production, before the 4th Congress. They agreed that the Ministry of the Interior should be transformed into a "machete", in order to stop uncontrolled urban influx. For this specific issue, the fourth Congress only stamped what had been decided already (Partido Frelimo, 1983).

OP's ideology provided an overt justification for another of the Frelimo leadership's historical intention, which was to order its urban society and control its mobility to materialize its urban development model. OP falls under what Scott (1998) describes as the effort of the state to make society legible. For that, politicians implement high-modernist projects in an authoritarian manner in the context of war, revolution, to project revolutionary design for its people. OP was to evict from cities the undesired people over whom Frelimo state did not have control, and who had become a "problem" for the intended "socialist city". Undesired people were all those that escaped Frelimo's ordering and controlling mechanisms. Most of them migrated to cities because of the war (Vivet, 2015:99, Hanlon, 1984, Cabrita, 2000) and others were already in cities making a living from the informal sector.

Though Frelimo's discourse mentioned almost the entire state apparatus, including the Ministry of Finance and Agriculture involved in the implementation of OP, changes occurred only in the repressive state apparatus. The Frelimo leadership clearly prioritised its main concern, which was to expel those it was unable to bring within its political and administrative reach in urban spaces, to place them where they could be controlled, and also keep in the city all those conceived as "good citizens", those who had a "decent life", who were controllable by mechanisms such as the work card, residents card, ID and so on. As we have seen above, Frelimo envisaged the communal neighbourhood as one free from "colonial vices", free from unemployment, crime and prostitution, the "ordered", "modernised" and "developed" cities under OP. The solution for those who escaped and compromised this high modernist authoritarian governance project was eviction and placement where the state would be able to control them. In this sense, as far as OP is concerned, production is not an end *per se*. It was a way of achieving Frelimo's urban development model that was being compromised by the presence of the so-called urban unproductive people. That is why the Frelimo state was more preoccupied with making changes to its repressive machinery, as will be demonstrated in chapter five.

Conclusion

The chapter demonstrates that the Frelimo leadership's ideology and values concerning causes and solutions for urban issues, such as crime and prostitution had political implications. They were decisive in the choice of OP as a solution to cope with them. As argued by Wodak (2011) and Fairclough (2015) their leadership position gave them significant space for manoeuvre in the context of the Mozambican revolution. The context of economic crisis, war and natural calamities also contributed to make OP appealing inside Frelimo and to the public, as we saw in the beginning of the Operation. However, as this chapter shows, OP is a result of historical ideas, perceptions and representations of urban order that go back to the colonial era in which most of the Frelimo leadership gained their education, social formation and military training. The actual level of urban disorder, such as crime and prostitution, is difficult to measure, as it depends on the categories defined. Thus, Operation Production must be understood in the context of a distinctive discursive regime that ordered the conceptual apparatus of official thinking and planning, inserted in a wider historical project about urban development. The structured discourse of planning, such as that of OP, and its corresponding field of knowledge are important, but only as part of a larger apparatus, meaning the way that concepts and discourses link up with social institutions and processes without determining the form or defining the logic of the outcome (Ferguson, 1994). The actual transformation brought by OP did not match its discourse. The way it was implemented, the changes that were made in the state structure and the new institutions that were formed to realise the Operation reveals the importance that the Frelimo leadership attached to order and control for the achievement of its ideal urban society. The execution of OP confirmed that though production was important for Frelimo, it could not happen without controlling and ordering the people first, as the next chapter will demonstrate.

Chapter 5: More evacuation than production: the execution of Operation Production, 1983-1988

Introduction

This chapter demonstrates the role of political leaders' values, imaginary and perceptions in policy implementation, as argued in chapter 1. The way Operation Production was implemented reveals the Frelimo leadership's perception of urban development issues. As the main goal of OP was to control people, Frelimo restructured the state to order and control Mozambican urban society, while almost nothing was done to achieve production. The chapter explores which state institutions oversaw the implementation of OP, what resources were allocated for implementation of OP, and how decisions were made during its implementation. The execution of OP followed the synthesis (hybrid) approach (Goggin et all, 1990). This approach argues that implementation of a policy is a dynamic process that changes in the course of its duration as a result of the interactions and power dynamics between the top and the bottom. Though decision-making of OP occurred at the top level, its implementation did not always follow the same pattern. Low-level government officials used OP to sort out gender and social competition. Further, this chapter argues that though Frelimo's discourse emphasized increased production, the way OP was executed demonstrates that the focus moved to ordering and controlling of the urban population for historical reasons. Thus, production did not increase but, with the key role played by defence and security institutions and local authorities, by blaming and criminalizing the victims for their own failure as "unproductive people", Frelimo legitimised their eviction. People were effectively evicted from cities and placed in the far north, in remote areas. By controlling their mobility through the *guia de marcha*, these people were kept far from urban spaces, though some returned. The chapter starts with a detailed account of measures introduced by Frelimo before Operation Production to fight urban disorder. It then explores the implementation of the Operation in its two phases, voluntary and coercive. Then I demonstrate how Operation Production was more focused on evacuation and control than on production. At the end, the chapter discusses the lack of linkage between OP and Frelimo's development project.

5.1. Before Operation Production: *Campanhas Selectivas and Operação Limpeza*

Before giving an account of the two phases in which Operation Production (OP) was executed, I start by exploring two measures implemented by Frelimo before OP, which were intensified on the eve of its inception. These policies, *Campanhas Selectivas* (Identification Campaigns) and *Operação Limpeza* (Operation Clean-up), were designed to rid the city of those discursively constructed as deviants and thus, the enemies of the revolution. These measures reflected the imaginary that the Frelimo leadership had of themselves. This imagination and its associated social aspiration resonated with their experience in colonial Mozambique. As argued in chapters 2 and 3, the Africans who came to be part of the leadership of Frelimo condemned what was deemed shameful behaviour in colonial

Mozambique. They believed that good behaviour, meaning avoiding alcohol, and making a living in a "decent way", was a status that to be attained in order to get their citizenship recognised by their colonial masters. Detention in the re-education camps, as Machava (2018) argues, served as a form of purification in order to become citizens of Mozambique committed to the goals of the revolution. It was so intrinsic to Frelimo's politics that the leadership believed that to achieve it the only resource that was required was willingness to so. Thus, those who did not behave in in the manner determined by Frelimo were viewed as saboteurs, thus deserving punishment, as happened in colonial Mozambique.

In the aftermath of independence and before Operation Production, the new government, through the Ministries of Defence and of the Interior, introduced two measures, *Campanhas Selectivas* and *Operacão Limpeza,* aimed at fighting urban ills such as crime, prostitution, vagrancy and other constructed social deviations. Police raids targeted those considered deviant from social norms in cities, such as people loitering late at night (after 9 pm) without ID, drinking in the streets, women appearing in public in mini-skirts, prostitution, and begging. As a result, over 3000 men and women were accused of theft, drug pushing, prostitution and vagrancy, and some of them were detained in November 1975 in different parts of the country, such as Maputo province, Sofala, Nampula and Manica. They were supposed to go through a process of transformation in camps created for that purpose (Vieira, Interview, 6 August, 2015; *Daily News,* 1975). Many people interviewed in Niassa and Maputo (Durua, 21 July 2016, Chichava, 15 July 2016, Cadeira, 20 July 2016, Muchanga, 18 July 2016, Ntivane, 21 July 2016 and Marrime, 9 October 2016) were imprisoned, between 1976-1979 and sent to re-education camps in Gorongosa, Sofala province, and in Majune, Misawize and Unango in Niassa province, simply because their behaviour was perceived by the Frelimo leadership to be renegade. Chichava (Interview, 15 July 2016) told his story:

> I was in the *Feira* [market] of Maputo having fun with a woman. After disappearing for a while, she returned with police officers. Suddenly they asked, 'what are you doing with this woman?' I answered that she was my partner and that we were having fun together. They asked for my ID. At that time, I did not have it with me. They forced me to go with them claiming I was annoying that woman. I could not resist, they took me to *Cadeia Civil* [a civil jail in the Maputo city]. From there, where I stayed a month, they took me to Mavalane International Airport straight to Lichinga [the capital city of Niassa province]. Here I stayed two weeks in jail before being sent to Majune, in the re-education camp. From Majune, we were moved to Unango in 1979.

Chichava's case reveals Frelimo's unclear implementation of its policies to solve what were discursively constructed as urban ills. It also demonstrates the arbitrariness of its implementation. There is no apparent crime that was committed by Chichava apart from not having his ID at the

moment he was asked to produce one. There was no trial before his committal to the re-education camp in Majune. Many other people arrived in different camps across the country the same way.

Though differing from Operation Production, in the sense that these measures did not target only urban residents, they resulted from the same ideological construction. They also reveal Frelimo's intention to coercively transform people in order to produce what they called a new man, in opposition to *Xiconhoca* – the officially promoted cartoon prototype of a counter-revolutionary in Frelimo's view, and as such someone to be transformed into a revolutionary or removed from society (Burr, 2010). During the socialist period in Mozambique, people were subject to re-education for anything that sounded like deviation in Frelimo's terms. For example, Brito (Interview, 14April 2016), a lecturer at Eduardo Mondlane University, is a revealing example of the arbitrariness of these policies. Amidst a political ideological conflict within the Faculty of Marxism and Leninism at the Eduardo Mondlane University (EMU), where he was a lecturer and director, he decided to resign to avoid positioning himself on one of the sides of the divide amongst different views of socialism (there was at least a divide between Marxist socialism and African socialism). His resignation was perceived by the Frelimo leadership as the behaviour of a reactionary, a recurrent word in Frelimo's vocabulary to describe those who did not comply with their vision of political order. That was enough for Brito to be sent to one of the re-education camps in Niassa. Marrime (Interview, 9 October 2016), another example, was taken to a re-education camp in Sacuze, Gorongosa district, in Sofala province, on 4 May 1977. Holding the post of financial officer at the Ministry of Finance, he bypassed financial procedures to approve a 100 Million *escudos* budget (the Escudo was the Portuguese colonial currency used in Mozambique up to 16 June 1980) for investment in the Limpopo valley. In fact, Marrime was following strictly financial rules for budget approval. It cost him 2 years in a re-education camp.

From the end of the 1970s, Frelimo intensified its campaign against what it regarded as social ills. For this purpose, the Permanent Commission of the People's Assembly decreed the Law 2/79 on 1 March, *Lei dos Crimes contra a Segurança do Povo e do Estado Popular* (Law for Crimes against the Security of the People and of the People's State). This law, said to protect the gains of the socialist revolution, introduced the death penalty by firing squad and sentences of 8 to 30 years' imprisonment for all those who had committed a crime against the state and people's safety. It also envisaged 2 to 8 years' imprisonment for petty crime. According to this law, re-education should always be considered before imprisonment or the death penalty. This law, and particularly the death penalty, was meant to fill a void in the defence of the Mozambican revolution for, as was claimed by the Frelimo leadership, 'a revolution incapable of defending itself, of repressing and punishing its enemies, of discouraging their actions, is a revolution incapable of surviving' (*Tempo*, 18 March 1979:10).

To judge crimes against the 'people and the people's state', institutions were created. For example, the decree law 3/79 of 29 March 1979 created the Revolutionary Military Court (*Tribunal Militar Revolucionário-TMR*). This exclusive militarised court had no contact with the civil judiciary

system (the People's Courts). According to Trindade (a judge president of Maputo province during OP, Interview, 15 January 2016), the TMR 'was constituted by five magistrates appointed by the Ministry of the Defence. He mentioned that people feared doing anything that could be associated, by the Frelimo leadership, with deviation. If caught, people were severely punished and/or sent to re-education camps by the TMR.

In May 1982, the Ministry of the Interior implemented another anti-crime and prostitution campaign in cities. The People's Militia was created on 31 July 1982, to patrol the cities (*Notícias,* 9 March 1982:3). Now vigilance groups, People's Militia and individual citizens participated in denouncing crime and in local patrols to make sure that crime did not occur, especially in urban areas. As a result, some 77 people, among them unemployed people and vagrants, were detained and escorted to court by the police. Also detained at the 25 de Junho, Xipamanine, Liberdade neighbourhoods were 81 undocumented people, mainly those with no ID or residence card (*Notícias,* 3 June 1982:3).

Instructions to intensify control over mobility also came directly from the state. The Secretariat of the Central Committee of Frelimo issued a notice informing people that residence cards would be introduced in cities to control urban influx (*Noticias,* 10 April 1982:4; The Guardian, 5 June 1983:6). To fulfil this measure, Jorge Rebelo, the secretary of the Central Committee met with secretaries of party cells, mobilising groups (*Grupos Dinamizadores-GD*) and members of Mass Democratic Organizations (Frelimo's women's and youth league) to define procedures. The meeting was also attended by the 1st Secretary of the City Committee, António Hama Thai, the Minister of Internal Trade, Aranda da Silva, the deputy-Minister of the Interior, Raposo Pereira and other senior members of the party (*Noticias,* 3 June 1982:3). In June 1982, the police extended its selective campaigns to other peripheral neighbourhoods of Maputo city, such as Luís Cabral and Inhagoia. As part of this campaign, some 32 people accused of "vagrancy" and crime were detained (*Noticias*, 3 June 1982:3). In the same month, the Provincial Court of Maputo city tried twelve people suspected of theft. These were caught sleeping rough around Maputo city. According to *Noticias* (3 June 1982:3), about 61 people were detained by police in Mafalala and Mavalane, peripheral neighbourhoods of Maputo city, and accused of vagrancy. In August 1982 the president judge of Maputo province was reported by *Noticias* (2 August 1982:4) to have argued that unemployed people should return to their origins in rural areas, where they had families and could produce. The same message was delivered to vagrants caught in other peripheral neighbourhoods. In the beginning of August 1982, Major-general António Hama Thai announced a campaign to patrol state-owned housing in Maputo city. This activity would be carried out by People's Militias in zone 5 of the city (Aeroporto, Angola Avenue, Urbanização and Mavalane neighbourhoods). The aim was to evict vagrants and those who did not pay rent from state-owned housing (*Notícias,* 2 August 1982).

In other cities, Frelimo officials campaigned to stop urban influx and what they considered its result – increasing urban disorder. For instance, in Angoche, one of the cities of the northern province of Nampula, Frelimo district committee members conducted this activity (*Notícias*, 2 August 1982). Based on data collected in the press, mainly *Notícias* and *Tempo*, some 3263 people were detained in Mozambican cities for being a cause of such urban disorder under Frelimo's anti-urban ills campaigns. Most of these people were detained in the peripheral neighbourhoods of Maputo, where many people fleeing the war in rural areas lived. They were detained either in the streets or in their houses or pubs. After being tried, most of them were sent to re-education camps.

Campanhas Selectivas and *Operação Limpeza* were effective in reducing the level of what Frelimo construed as urban disorder, such as prostitution and crime. Thousands of those deemed deviant were evicted from cities and placed in re-education camps (Machava, 2018). Those who were potentially "deviant people" feared acting as such in Frelimo's view to avoid re-education camps. Despite Frelimo's discourse, when OP started, such urban issues were not as alarming as the party claimed. Even so, Frelimo went ahead with Operation Production. Its implementation, which benefited from the same machinery installed for the execution of the *Campanhas Selectivas* and *Operaçao Limpeza,* occurred in two stages, the voluntary and coercive. The main goal, I argue was to evict people that threatened Frelimo's "socialist city". The Frelimo leadership wanted to ensure that none of those they identified as undesired people escaped this Operation, as we will see in the following sections.

5.2. Mid-June 1983: getting ready for Operation Production


This section addresses the institutional arrangements made at the state level to execute OP. I argue that the modifications that were made in the state machinery were to ensure that the evacuation dimension of Operation Production was accomplished no matter what. However, almost nothing was done to accomplish increased production as the Frelimo leadership's discourse suggested. Once again it reveals the militaristic nature of the Frelimo leadership, resonating with their experience, particularly during the liberation struggle.

Though OP's discourse pointed to the involvement of almost all the state apparatus, the main changes for OP occurred in the repressive machinery of the state, such as the police, the defence and justice ministries. Official documents, such as working cards, ID or DIRE (residence permit for foreigners), residence cards, and ration cards were demanded to control mobility and behaviour. Most rural migrants in the informal market, being new comers to the city, with no job and no right to permanent residence, did not have these documents. Though not clearly stated, OP ended up targeting those in the informal sector. The absence of those documents became the main criteria to remove the allegedly "unproductive people" from cities. While ID, DIRE and workcards were used to identify

unproductive people living in cities, the *guia de marcha* and residence cards became important to stop further urban influx. The combination of these forms of control ensured that none of the "unproductive people" should remain in cities.

Following Machel's speech of 21 May 1983, at Independence Square, a joint ministerial directive (from the Ministry of Defence, of Justice, of Security and of the Interior) was issued on 15 June 1983 (figure 8), defining the modus operandus of OP. The full version of the directive was published in *Notícias* (20 June 1983:3-4). It mentioned new institutions to be formed, and the implementation period of the legislation, its nature and its goals. A Central Operative Command (COC), the main governing body for OP, was created and headed by the Ministry of the Interior. According to the directive, amongst its staff would be officials from other state institutions, such as the Ministry of National Defence, of Security, of Justice, of Finance, of Ports and Rail Way, of Agriculture, of Trade and of Information, National Planning Commission, State Secretariat of Labour, Civil Aircraft and Road Transport. Almost the entire state machinery was to be involved in the Operation, at least from Machel's discourse. A similar structure would be replicated at provincial and district level.

At the beginning of the Operation, the COC would be responsible for mobilising "unproductive people" to join it. In each city, its council staff would join the Provincial Operative Command (POC) to do the following activities: 1) select and register the "volunteers" who did not have means for transportation, 2) collect, analyse and provide solutions for issues arising from the 1st phase of the Operation, 3) check the *guia de marcha* of those leaving cities and confiscate their food ration cards, 4) report its activities to the Central Operative Command and 5) coordinate with the checkpoints during the implementation process and solve its related problems. In addition, illegal foreigners caught should be sent to their country of origin (*Notícias*, 4 July 1983:3-4, *Notícias*, 21 July 1983:3).



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Noticias, Maputo, 20 de Junho de 1983, pág.3

Directiva ministerial sobre evacuação das cidades

No dia 21 de Maio de 1983, Sua Excelência o presidente da República, de entre as decisões do IV Congresso que transmitiu ao Povo, anunciou medidas para pôr cobro ao atual descontrolado do campo para as cidades e proceder à evacuação e recolocação no campo da população excedentária e improdutiva que se concentra nas cidades.

Estas medidas inserem-se na larga ofensiva que se teve e cabo contra a fome, contra o subdesenvolvimento e, por uma melhor organização da economia e direcção da Sociedade.

Por outro lado, o excesso de população concentrada nas cidades sem produzir da origem às mais diversas formas de marginalismo e de criminalidade, constituindo uma séria ameaça à ordem e tranquilidade pública. Por termo a esta situação e criar uma condição fundamental para o respeito da legalidade da ordem e segurança das pessoas e bens.

Tendo em vista a implementação das medidas referidas, os Ministros da Defesa, do Interior, da Segurança e da Justiça determinam o seguinte:

ARTIGO 1

É criada um Comando Central com a função de dirigir todo o processo de evacuação da população excedentária das cidades e sua recolocação no campo. Comando que passa a designar-se Comando Central Operativo.

ARTIGO 2

O Comando Central Operativo funciona no Ministério do Interior, é presidido pelo ministro do Interior e é composto por representantes permanentes das estruturas seguintes:

— Ministério da Defesa Nacional
— Ministério do Interior
— Ministério da Segurança
— Ministério da Justiça
— Ministério das Finanças
— Ministério dos Portos, Caminhos de Ferro e Marinha Mercante
— Ministério da Agricultura
— Ministério do Comércio Interno
— Ministério da Indústria e Energia
— Comissão Nacional do Plano
— Ministério da Informação
— Secretaria de Estado do Trabalho
— Secretaria de Estado da Aeronáutica Civil
— Secretaria de Estado dos Transportes Rodoviários
— Secretariado Nacional dos Conselhos de Produção

ARTIGO 3

1. A nível de cada capital provincial é criado um Comando Provincial Operativo com estrutura idêntica à definida no número anterior adaptada às condições locais.

2. O Comando Provincial Operativo é presidido pelo Governador da cada Província e integra ainda os Presidentes dos Conselhos Executivos das cidades capitais. Nas demais cidades onde as circunstâncias o exigem criar-se-á uma estrutura própria para dirigir o processo.

3. A nível dos Distritos de principal incidência de operação deverá criar-se uma estrutura adaptada às necessidades de mesma.

ARTIGO 4

Os Comandos Provinciais bem como os Distritais trabalharão em estreita ligação com os Grupos Dinamizadores dos Bairros e com as estruturas de cada empresa.

ARTIGO 5

A operação de evacuação deverá processar-se nas seguintes fases:

1) Fase voluntária com a duração de 15 dias e durante a qual as pessoas que desejem regressar aos seus locais de proveniência ou desejem escolher outros locais para se fixarem, poderão inscrever-se em locais que serão indicados para o efeito.
Esta fase tem início a partir do dia 20 do corrente mês.
2) A fase compulsiva, durante a qual se utilizarão os meios de coerção próprios para obrigar os renitentes a observar a determinação do IV Congresso do Partido Frelimo.
3) Para análise e decisão das situações que exijam ponderação, funcionarão, em cada bairro, brigadas integradas por juízes indicados pelo Ministério da Justiça e por membros dos Grupos Dinamizadores ou residentes indicados pelos Grupos Dinamizadores.

ARTIGO 6

1. São documentos principais para o controlo da situação das pessoas os seguintes:

1) Cartão de Residente
2) Cartão de Trabalho
3) Bilhete de Identidade ou Passaporte
4) B.I.R.E. (Documento de Identificação de Residência para Estrangeiros)

2. No controlo e que as pessoas serão sujeitas, analisar-se-á em cada caso qual ou quais os documentos necessários para a correcta definição da situação de pessoa.

3. Se a falta de um ou mais documentos ou a falta de outro sítio que prove o modo de vida da pessoa levar à conclusão de que ela se encontra em situação irregular, as Autoridades poderão detê-la imediatamente e conduzirla aos locais previamente determinados para a verificação da situação.

ARTIGO 7

1. Pela sua composição, tanto o Comando Central Operativo como os Comandos Provinciais e Distritais garantirão não só que a evacuação decorra de forma mais ordeira e correcta como garantirão ainda o apoio necessário, sobretudo, em meios de produção e na utilização e disponibilização das terras mais propícias à produção agrícola.

2. Será observado o princípio de garantir o exercício da sua de respectiva profissão àqueles que a tenham, nos locais para onde forem evacuados.

ARTIGO 8

1. Fica temporariamente suspensa a admissão de novos trabalhadores nas unidades de produção e serviços localizadas nas cidades, assim como nas estruturas do Aparelho do Estado.

2. As necessidades excepcionais de admissão de trabalhadores, de que depende a realização dos planos das unidades de produção, deverão ser colocadas aos organismos de tutela que as centralizarão para os Comandos Central, provinciais e Distritais conforme os casos.

3. A violação do disposto neste artigo, para além das demais sanções legais aplicáveis, será punida com descontos no salário dos dirigentes responsáveis das unidades de produção onde se verificarem.

ARTIGO 9

1. A entrada de uma pessoa no Centro Urbano ou zona para cuja estadia se exija cartão de residente depende da apresentação de guia de marcha passada pelo Grupo Dinamizador ou pela autoridade Administrativa da área da sua residência habitual, conste consta o objectivo da deslocação, tempo provável de permanência, local de residência.

2. A guia de marcha referida no número anterior deve ser apresentada no prazo de 48 horas aos Serviços competentes do Ministério do Interior (Posto da Direcção de Identificação Civil mais próximo do local onde se vai instalar) que autorizarão ou não a permanência pelo tempo que fixarem.

3. Estas autorizações poderão ser renovadas a requerimento dos interessados.

4. A permanência não autorizada nos termos deste artigo dá lugar à detenção imediata e evacuação para o local de proveniência ou para outro local que, face às circunstâncias do caso, as autoridades considerem mais conveniente.

ARTIGO 10

As dúvidas que surgirem na execução da presente directiva serão resolvidas pelo Ministro do Interior.

Maputo, 15 de Junho de 1983

Figure 8: Ministerial directive published in Notícias, 20 June 1983:3

This top-down approach to institutional changes tells us a lot about what OP aimed at achieving. Besides Maputo, other cities, such as Beira and Nampula, also prepared for OP. *Notícias* (10 June 1983:4) reports the preparation of the Operation in Beira. José Marra, the first Secretary of Frelimo in the city explained that the Operation would be preceded by a census of all "unproductive people". Days after the start of OP in Beira, Armando Guebuza, the minister of the Interior, arrived in Beira and clarified that all state institutions should be involved in OP (*Noticias*, 1 July 1983:3). In Manica province, the Operation was introduced slowly. First it started in the city of Chimoio only, and two weeks after the creation of the Provincial Operative Command, it spread to all neighbourhoods of Chimoio city and the districts (*Noticias*, 5 July 1983:3).

The directive mentioned that the Operation would be implemented in two phases. The first was voluntary. It would start on 20 June 1983 and last 15 days (until 4 July 1983). During this period, all those who recognised themselves as "urban unproductive people" should present themselves, voluntarily, at the appropriate local state institution (chief of the block, secretary of the neighbourhood, cell of the party) to be sent to rural Mozambique. Before eviction, they would be taken to checkpoints (*Postos de Verificação-PVs*). According to Sitoe (1983), it was for these points to decide, after a quick "formal trial", the "unproductive" condition of the volunteers. Once in the checkpoints, the options were:

1) Free the person, if his or her "productive activity" was confirmed and the person could produce the required papers. The papers were a work card, residence card and ID or DIRE. In this case, there was a strict deadline to be observed;
2) Issue a *guia de marcha* for a temporary right to remain in the city;
3) Issue a work card and other relevant document, in case the person's "productive activity" was confirmed, and
4) Issue a *guia de marcha* for those who were sentenced to evacuation (*Noticias*, 7 July 1983:4).

At the end of the 1st phase, on 5 July, the second, coercive phase would start to target all those "unproductive people" who escaped the first phase, regardless of the reason. To identify and detain them, joint brigades composed by police officers, in direct collaboration with local neighbourhood officials (chief of the block, secretary of the neighbourhood), members of the Mass Democratic Organisations and other members of the mobilising groups would be deployed in cities (República Popular de Moçambique, 1979:45). Confronted with potentially "unproductive people", the brigade should ask for a residence card, working or student card, ID, passport or DIRE, for foreigners. In the absence of one of those, one had to be detained and sent to check points (*Noticias*, 7 July 1983:3). Local authorities, who knew the residents, thanks to the social control exercised via *guia de marcha,* were key in providing information about potential "unproductive people". Amongst these

papers, the work card was the most important. According to the State Labour Secretary, as in Lourenço Marques and other colonial cities, all workers in public and private institutions should possess a valid work card, with all endorsements required. The heads of private companies were responsible for making sure that their staff had valid work cards. Moreover, they should denounce all workers who had left their jobs without returning their cards (*Notícias*, 20 June 1983).

To make OP effective, enforcement measures were taken. Resident cards were to be issued only to those who could confirm their "productive activity" through a work card. To enter urban areas, one had to provide a *guia de marcha*, to be obtained at the point of departure. On 12 July 1983, the COC issued an order reinforcing the need for possession of the *guia de marcha* for everyone who intended to move, especially from rural areas to the cities. Though introduced before, the *guia de marcha* gained a new significance in the context of OP. Its possession became paramount and decisive for limiting urban influx and gathering information about people, mainly in cities. The *guia* contained information such as the reason for displacement, the period and the destination. It had to be presented to the local branch of the Ministry of the Interior within 48 hours of arrival. Failing to do so meant evacuation to rural Mozambique (*Noticias*, 9 July 1983:4).

As part of the Operation, a census of the "unproductive people" was done in Maputo, Beira, Nampula, Angoche and Nacala-Porto, over 45 days (9 July *Noticias*, 1983:4). As a result, according to António Chicumbe, director of the Provincial Directorate of Labour in Sofala, more than 10,000 unemployed people were registered in Beira (Sitoe, 1983:4). For other cities, I did not find statistical data of "unproductive people" produced by this census. People's courts, created in 1976, during the 8th Session of Frelimo's Central Committee, as part of an anti-crime campaign (Partido Frelimo, 1976:20), and judges from the Ministry of Justice, were allocated to checkpoints to quickly try the potentially "unproductive people" before evacuation (Interview, Trindade, 15 January 2016). The *GDs* were responsible for identifying and confirming those who though working, had no contract or working card to prove it, such as carpenters, bricklayers, plumbers and electricians (*Noticias*, 4 April 1983:3). To ensure supply of food and good physical conditions in the evacuation centres, multiple commissions composed of staff from the Ministry of Health and State Housing Authority, in collaboration with the Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs, would be formed (*Notícias*, 5 June 1983:4). Below are the instructions from Samora Machel, on how OP should unfold:

> The first action that will be taken and which will be executed by the popular militias [*Milícias Populares*], vigilance groups, police, mobilising groups, National Defence Forces, is to comb the cities. We will comb house by house, building by building, block by block, neighbourhood by neighbourhood. Another mission to be executed by the National Defence Force, Ministry of Home Affairs and the National Service for Popular Security (SNASP) is to undertake a census of the people. Only those who work will be allowed to stay in Maputo and other cities. The others go to the rural areas (Partido Frelimo, 1983:17).

For Samora and other Frelimo cadres, “combing” the cities meant to “clean” them, which is another way of saying to get rid of those who they believed had no right to stay in cities, the “excess people”. This task was to become a priority of the Ministries of Defence, Interior, Justice, the State Intelligence Service (SNASP) and Frelimo’s Youth League. According to Machel’s discourse, “unproductive people” were to be given hoes, axes, seeds and clothes to produce food in rural Mozambique. But, this did not happen, as we wiil see. At a later stage, according to Machel, OP would also evacuate “lazy” state officials. All those “incompetent”, “incapable”, “careless”, “lazy”, “wrongful”, “undisciplined” and “rogue public servants”, should also be sent to rural areas. This also did not happen, as will be demonstrated in the following sections.

In practice, OP was largely assigned to the repressive machinery of the state in direct collaboration with local urban authorities (secretary of neighbourhood, chief of blocks, Frelimo’s youth and women organisation, mobilising groups), as can be seen from this extract of a speech by Machel 21 May 1983:

> This task is the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior, of Defence, SNASP and of Justice. The Ministry of Justice will judge the cases as quickly as possible and sentence them. In addition to the sentence of *chicotada* [lash], they will go to the farms, they will not be imprisoned. They will produce for all of us. The Mozambican Youth Organisation will also participate in this campaign (Partido Frelimo, 1983:19)

De Carvalho (minister of Agriculture between 1975-1978, Interview, 26 April 2017) and Mosca (who worked at the department of planning at the Ministry of Agriculture at the time of OP, Interview 17 May 2017) confirmed that the Ministry of Agriculture had only a minimum role in OP. ‘If there was any role to be played by the Ministry of Agriculture, I would have known’, said Mosca. Instead, new figures were appointed in the security ministries. Armando Guebuza, who was resident minister in Sofala province, was appointed the new minister of the Interior in 1983. He replaced Mariano Matsinha, who became the minister of Public Security. Óscar Monteiro was appointed minister of Justice (*La Suisse,* 1983:5) in the same year. As his first action regarding OP, Guebuza met staff members of the party and delegates of the Ministry of Justice, Security and Defence, to define the implementation strategy. Guebuza echoed Machel’s orientations (*Noticias,* 5 July 1983:4).

These new appointments reveal much about the repressive machinery of the state in OP. First, Samora Machel needed to be sure that Operation Production would be implemented by loyal people. Guebuza’s appointment as the minister of the Interior seems obvious. Apart from being from the African petit bourgeoisie and having his passed through NESAM, Guebuza’s trajectory in Frelimo was mainly associated with order and control enforcement institutions. After returning from military training and during the liberation struggle, Guebuza was appointed the Secretary for Education and

Culture in 1966 and two years after became inspector. When the Transitional Government was formed in 1974, Guebuza became the minister of the Interior, the first of its nature in independent Mozambique. In 1977, he was appointed deputy minister of Defence and six years later was reappointed the minister of Interior, just before the start of OP. Guebuza created the People's Police of Mozambique, which became the key player in the execution of Operation Production (Matusse, 2004:34; Filimone, 2015:18). Second, the fact that the appointments only happened at the Ministry of the Interior, Security and Justice, reveals the military background of the Frelimo leadership, and of Operation Production as a result. Though mentioned in discourse, other ministries were not relevant for this Operation. Third, it shows that the state made the necessary institutional arrangements to ensure that Operation Production did not fail in its evacuation dimension, while almost nothing was made to achieve increased production. As Munguambe (the minister of Finance during OP, Interview, 3 May 2017) explained, Operation Production was the task of the Ministry of the Interior. The Ministry of Finance had no role in it and there was no additional state investment to implement the production dimension of Operation Production because the goal was to control the "uncontrollable" by placing them in rural areas and use the *guia de marcha*. Third, the way OP was executed reveals the militaristic nature of Frelimo and its leadership, as seen in chapter 3. Because of their successful experience of the liberation struggle, the military skills and practice became a need for Frelimo's political project. As argued by Halpern (1962) in the case of Midle East, the army had become the key actor and instrument of the middle class. In Mozambique, military approach to politics such as imprisonment, punishment, detention, evacuation became part of everyday form of governance. Policies such as re-education camps, Operation Production, are some examples of such techniques used by Frelimo to rule. Pye (1962) argues that the forms of traditional orders are the ones that allowed the dominance of the military in underdeveloped countries. The Mozambican case demonstrates that it was circumstances and history that resulted in the promotion of military officials to determine the course of politics since the liberation struggle. After Mondlane's death in 1969, Machel became the president of Frelimo. His choice was partially due to his military and leadership capacities gained during the years of training in Algeria (Martins, 2001: 87) and of the liberation struggle. During the struggle, military figure determined not just the way in which independence would be achieved but also the character of the nation and government to be developed in independent Mozambique.

5.3. Between privileges and threats: the voluntary phase begins to mobilise

As mentioned above, Operation Production had two phases. Though there was a mobilisation campaign from the Ministries of the Interior and of Defence, from the City Council and from local authorities, among those I interviewed few people were aware of the voluntary phase of OP. Most of

them were caught and evicted during the second, coercive, phase, which was in fact more intense. Amongst those who became aware of the voluntary phase, few volunteered. As they were able to provide for themselves and for their families, albeit through the informal sector, most of the targets of OP did not see themselves as "unproductive people". Moreover, the definition of who the "unproductive people" were was not clear, as seen above. Like the previous section, this one restates the repressive nature of Operation Production.

Frelimo was aware that few people would adhere to OP voluntarily. This phase was short (it lasted only 15 days), and the coercive phase was predicted from the beginning. In practice, Frelimo's mobilisation for the voluntary phase was a mixture of threat and promise, as can be seen in this pronouncement by Armando Guebuza, the head of COC:

> The "volunteer unproductive people" would have certain privileges. They will be issued a *guia de marcha*, to be properly integrated into "productive activities" once in the rural area of their own choice or of their origin. They will be integrated in state companies that are faced with labour shortages. They will get means of production, and transport to destination, if they chose to return to their origins. **These privileges will not exist in the coercive phase of the operation. Those who attempt to return, after evacuation, will face punishment** [highlighted by the author], said the representative from the COC (*Notícias*, 1 July 1983:2).

Indeed, Frelimo's mobilisation put emphasis not on the advantages of OP, for instance the fact that it would effectively render "useless people", "useful", but on the threats so that people would fear the punishment that they were likely to be subject to if they resisted volunteering for OP, as was evident from the recurrent use of intimidating words such as punishment in the mobilisation campaign.

Immediately after Samora's 21 May 1983 speech, the members of the COC started mobilising "unproductive people" to leave cities, especially in Maputo. According to public pronouncements, "unproductive people" would be transported by different means, depending on their destinations. For closer lolcalities, such as those in the provinces of Maputo, Gaza and Inhambane, buses or trains would be used. Transport to distant provinces, such as Niassa and Cabo Delgado, would be by plane. Thus, planes from the Mozambican Airline would be allocated (*Noticias*, 23 July 1983:4). Twelve buses or lorries from the company *Camionagem de Moçambique* would be arranged to transport the "unproductive", in addition to others from the Mozambican Transportation Company in the south, central and northern regions (*Noticias*, 23 July 1983:3).

Detention and evacuation for rehabilitation had started long before OP, as we saw in previous sections. But with Operation Production, the purpose and the destination of the volunteers and detainees would not be re-education camps. With few exceptions, most of them were delivered to rural Niassa and Cabo Delgado. They could even continue doing the same activity, which would be considered "unproductive" in cities but, as long as it was done in rural Mozambique, it did not concern

the Frelimo leadership, as Alberto Massavanhane, the president of Maputo City Council (*Notícias*, 8 July 1983:3), explained.

Amândio Zandamela (commander of the People's Police in Maputo city), following instructions from Armando Guebuza, in a meeting in Xipamanine, one of the most populous neighbourhoods of Maputo and where the main evacuation centre was located, is quoted by *Notícias* (9 June 1983:5) appealing to the "unproductive people" to abandon Maputo city and return to their origins. According to *Tempo* (10 June 1983:7), this voluntary enlistment of "unproductive people" had started in Hulene, a peripheral neighbourhood of Maputo. For that purpose, some 38 checkpoints and 6 evacuation centres were installed in Maputo city, all of them headed by the Maputo City Council (Vivet, 2015:100). On the 20 June 1983, the 1st phase began in Mafalala neighbourhood, where the 2nd deputy minister of Home Affairs, Teodato Hunguana, mobilised "unproductive people" to register voluntarily for evacuation (*Noticias*, 23 June 1983:4). Armando Guebuza held a public rally in Mavalane neighbourhood on the 21 June 1983 for OP (Tivane and Gue, 1983:3). According to *Noticias* (1 July 1983:4) some 1500 "unproductive volunteers" registered in Maputo city. From these, 237 were from Mahotas neighbourhood, 143 registered in Polana Caniço, 57 in Mikadjuine, 16 in Trevo, 15 in Inhagoia "A", 11 in Polana Caniço "B" and 10 in Xipamanine and 10 from Malhangalene "B".

There are no complete figures of the total number of the volunteers for this first phase. But judged against the total population of Maputo city, it seems that few people adhered in the first phase. According to the 1980 census, Maputo city had 739077 inhabitants. Out of these, 225587 were employed, 9260 unemployed who had previously worked, 8369 had never worked, 89070 were students, 108690 were domestic workers, 18692 were involved in other activities and 2864 had unidentified occupations (República Popular de Moçambique, 1983:77-80). Students and domestic workers were also targeted by OP if found without a student or work card. Thus 236945 were not actively employed in productive activities who would eventually have to show documentation to prove their right to stay in the city according to OP planning. 1500 of the 236945 is about 0.63% of the number that would potentially fall under the category of "unproductive people".

In other cities, such as Quelimane and Beira, the 1st phase started relatively late. In Quelimane for instance, the Provincial Operative Command (POC) was created only on 1st July 1983, more than 10 days after the 1st phase had begun in Maputo. Mário Machungo, the minister of Planning and governor of Zambezia was the director. The Zambezia POC was composed by the provincial secretary of Frelimo, provincial commander of the police, president of the City Council and the provincial director of Security. Before then, 1,326 "unproductive volunteers" had registered at the *GDs* and 1,226 at the provincial directorate of labour (*Noticias*, 18 July 1983:3). In Beira, the 1st phase began in mid-July 1983 (18 July *Noticias*, 1983:3), while the coercive phase was already taking place in Maputo. Marcelino dos Santos, who was governor of Sofala province, encouraged local authorities to work


hard in order to successfully implement the Operation (*Noticias*, 19 July 1983:3). According to Cambezo, the then president of the City Council of Beira (Interview, 20 April 2016), there, as in Maputo, the City Council started mobilising the "unproductive people", mainly from peripheral areas to join voluntarily. Lourenço Mara, 1st secretary of Frelimo in Beira, led the meetings. As part of the Operation, the local POC issued an order for mandatory possession of a *guia de marcha* for everyone moving around (*Noticias*, 20 July 1983:5). As in Maputo, the Operation would last 15 days, from 15th to 30 July 1983 (*Noticias*, 3 August 1983: 3). According to *Noticias* (3 August 1983:4) about 6,099 people joined the 1st phase in Beira. According to Castanheira (1983), most of them were taken to rural Sofala, and integrated into the work force of the Buzi Sugar Company. Sofala province had 954,928 inhabitants. Its capital, Beira, had 55,859 inhabitants. Of these, 453,495 were employed, 5,906 unemployed that had previously worked, 7,032 never worked, 63,790 students, 39,403 domestic workers, 22,128 with undefined occupation and 6,092 whose occupation was unknown (República Popular de Moçambique, 1983:77-80). As in Maputo, few people, about 4.23%, volunteered for OP's voluntary phase in Beira. Some volunteers chose to go to the districts of Sussundenga, Manica, Mossurize and Chimoio in Manica provinces. Others chose to return to their origins such as Sofala, Tete and Zambezia provinces. Others left the respective POC to decide on their destination (*Noticias*, 3 August 1983:2). The number of people who joined OP during the first phase in Maputo and Matola, Beia and Quelimane is shown in table 7.

Table 7: People who joined OP during voluntary phase

Cities	**Quantity**
Maputo and Matola	1,500
Quelimane	2,552
Beira	6,099

Source: Notícias (3 August 1983:3)

Though OP had a voluntary phase, its coercive dimension was present from the beginning. Voluntarily adhering to Operation Production was not in fact a choice. Frelimo's message was clear. Those who would resist this phase would be compelled to leave the city anyway. A day before the end of the voluntary phase, 4 July 1983:3, a press statement in *Notícias* (see figure 9) read: "Unemployed [meaning "unproductive people] in the cities: the last opportunity not to be coercively removed" (translated from Portuguese by the author). In addition, they had no chance of choosing where to go. The mobilisation campaign for the first phase was thus a way of threatening people to force them to join the Operation. However, most of those defined as unproductive did not respond. As will be demonstrated in the following section, the coercive phase of the Operation was the most intense and identified most of those resettled by the two phases of OP.



Desempregados nas cidades

Última oportunidade para não serem retirados à força

"Operação Produção"

N. 4/7/83

A menos de 24 horas do termo do período de 15 dias, estabelecido pela Directiva Ministerial para a inscrição de desempregados e improdutivos em geral que voluntariamente queiram regressar às respectivas zonas de origem ou se prestem a fixar-se noutros locais, os abrangidos têm hoje a última oportunidade de se dirigirem às sedes dos Grupos Dinamizadores ou Células dos Bairros onde serão registados.

A primeira fase da «Operação Produção» termina hoje, à zero hora.

Arrancou no passado dia 20 de Junho, com a inscrição dos abrangidos que queiram abandonar voluntariamente as cidades do País.

Desempregados, excedentários e improdutivos apresentaram-se ao longo dos últimos dias nas sedes das estruturas políticas dos locais de residência para serem integrados em multiformes sectores de produção no campo

trata-se da resposta à franqueza idoneidade patenteada pelos cidadãos registados.

Apercebendo-se da dimensão política, económica e social do processo, os Grupos Dinamizadores e Células dos Bairros souberam canalizar questões prementes colocadas pelos voluntários, o que confere àqueles órgãos de Poder, uma posição-chave na «Operação Produção».

Os membros das estruturas políticas dos locais de residência, exercem com clareza as suas funções, num esforço em que participam representantes das FDS's, ODM's e serviços vários, chamados para darem o seu apoio necessário ao sucesso da operação.

Na segunda fase da «Operação Produção», que amanhã arranca em todo o espaço nacional, será exigida a responsabilização a todo o cidadão que, sabendo que está abrangido, não se prontificou a inscrever-se voluntário

Figure 9**:** A title from *Notícias* (4 July 1983:3)

5.4. Failed consent and forced removal: the second phase begins

The coercive phase of OP was divided into two. The first was based on street raids, where officials from the COC detained people in the streets and sent them to checkpoints for evacuation. In its second moment, it reached state-owned housing to target those who did not pay rent and those who "sabotaged" houses. This section deals with the dynamics of the coercive phase of OP. By exploring the dynamics of the implementation of the coercive phase of Operation Production, I argue that the evacuation of the "unproductive people" was intrinsically authoritarian. It relied on the militaristic nature of Frelimo, which comes from the military experience of its leadership, as seen in chapter 3.

Though this phase should have started all over the country at the same time, Maputo city was the first. That is because Maputo was the centre of the revolution and of power as pointed out by Machel in the extract above. As ordering and controlling was key for Frelimo's revolutionary project, starting from Maputo in a context of scarce resources and limited state capacity to enforce its law and policy simultaneously and nationwide (*Notícias*, 7 July 1983:3), was strategic for the leadership. Also, the Frelimo leadership lived in Maputo.

During this phase, to tighten the process and avoid more people escaping the Operation, Frelimo decided to centralize the issuing of work and resident cards. Henceforth, the State Secretariat of Labour would no longer issue such cards. It became the sole responsibility of the police, military and local authorities allocated to checkpoints (*Notícias*, 6 July 1983:4). Thus, getting a work card became challenging, even for an employee. On the 6 of July 1983, the Ministry of the Interior decided

to increase the amount of time that the party staff, such as the Women's organisation, the Youth's organisation, the mobilising groups, the secretary of neighbourhood and chief of blocks, allocated to Operation Production. They had to stop their tasks at state companies to work on a full-time basis for OP. Apart from confirming or not the "unproductive" condition of the detainees, their task would also be to provide justification and explanation for those who had been sentenced for evacuation (*Notícias*, 6 July 1983:5).

Neighbourhood courts were also allocated to checkpoints in cases where the definition of "unproductive people" was unclear. This was the case with single mothers, widows, married women with husbands who were away (for example, working as a migrant in South Africa), students attending night classes, people with work cards but without other documents, such as a residence card or ID.

Though the suspects had a right to be tried before evacuation, according to instructions coming from the top of Frelimo, the judgement and sentence relied heavily on the information provided by local authorities at bottom level (*Tempo*, 17 July 1983:8). For the leadership, the trial was one of the procedures to ensure fairness before evacuation, and local authorities were the legitimate source of information concerning the "unproductive" status of the detainees (Naroromele, 1983:3 and Donaldo, 1983:4). A communique from the COC, from 2nd July 1983, determined that local party staff allocated to checkpoints on a full time basis had the responsibility to ensure the success of OP, by identifying the "unproductive people". .

These practices undermined the role of judges. They had no time to seek more information to confirm the "unproductive" condition of the suspect. The trial had to be quick. In fact, the trial became a mere formality. Though having clear instructions about who should be considered "unproductive people" (*Tempo,* 24 July 1983:9), in practice, members of the COC intercepted anyone who looked suspicious. As a result, some women, elders and students who were not necessarily "unproductive", as defined by the ministerial directive, were detained, as identified by Armando Guebuza, the head of COC, when visiting some checkpoints in Maputo (*Primeiro de Janeiro*, 12 July 1984:6, *Notícias*, 14 July 1983:4).

As Morton (2015) seems to argue, local authorities situated at the bottom level of policy implementation had significant space for manoeuvre to manipulate OP to fulfil their own goals. There were cases of abuse of power (Hanlon, 1984) and of gender and class competition during the execution of OP. The ministerial directive, which defined the practicalities of Operation Production, allocated too much power to police officers and local authorities, such as the chief of block (*chefe de quarteirão*), chief of ten houses (*chefe de dez casas*) and secretary of neighbourhood. These people did not always follow thoroughly the instructions in the directive. At the same time, state institutions such as the COC had little human capacity and resources to monitor OP on the ground. Thus, being in the position to determine the outcome of the trial of detainees, aware of the rapidity in which the trial

should occur, and of the state limitations to cross check information provided by them, those in local charge of the Operation could take the opportunity to get rid of people they did not want to see in cities for their own reasons.

Notícias (24 August 1983:3) reported the case of Alberto Luís and Dinísio Jackson, two police officers, sentenced to two months imprisonment and 15 lashes for an attempt to rape two girls sent to Inhambane police station as a result of Operation Production. Some "unproductive people" were beaten up in the evacuation centres, according to Ribas (1983:5). During the 12th Session of the People's Assembly, in April 1984, deputies acknowledged that this was the case. In Beira, during a meeting with Marcelino dos Santos, the then governor, it was reported that young students under 18 years old and elders were evacuated (*Noticias*, 9 August 1983:5) though they should not have been. During the 3rd session of the Maputo City Assembly, those who attended, such as Luis Fraga, Livi José and Beatriz Tembe, denounced cases of women unfairly accused of being prostitutes or parasites and who were thus evacuated. The case below, in the city of Tete, central Mozambique, reported by Salimo and Valy (1983:5), is elucidative:

> There was a woman who happened to have a sexual relationship with two men: her husband and another man. Caught by the staff of the police brigade the woman was taken to a checkpoint. The two men appeared and claimed to be the husband. The interesting thing is that the three of them were aware of the affair. After trial, the three of them were sentenced for evacuation. The husband for collecting money brought by his wife, through the sexual relationship with her second partner and thus, accused of promoting prostitution. The second partner for paying for sex, which was defined as prostitution, and the woman for being a prostitute.

Some people did not have a trial (Castanheira, 21 August 1983:4). Silvestre Josini, like many other young men, told *Notícias* of his experience:

> In Maputo, I was working for the Mozambican Railway Company… I was waiting [for] my *guia de marcha* to be able to move around in my neighbourhood, *Mavalane*, when suddenly a truck from the vigilance group came and I was taken with no right to any explanation (*Noticias*, 7 October 1983:4).

Fernandes (Interview, 15 July 2016) mentioned that the only reason he was evacuated was because he was a successful shoemaker who made a lot of money. As he saw it, the secretary of the neighbourhood was jealous of him. Nguenha (Interview, 15 July 2016) was sent to Niassa only because he had forgotten his student card. *Noticias* (27 July 1983:3) reported many women being detained simply because they became pregnant before getting married and were still living at their parents' house. As Vieira (Interview, 6 August 2015) mentioned, in some cases local officials would use the power they had to produce false information just to get rid of someone who they did not like

for whatever reason. Thus, many cases of abuse of power and unfair evacuation occurred simply as a result of the bad faith of a secretary of neighbourhood or a chief of block. Ngovene (Interview, 13 July 2016), one of the victims of Operation Production, indicated that even skilled workers were sent with them, and mentioned that a pilot was included because he was disliked by the secretary of neighbourhood. 'The secretary was jealous of the pilot who was living a fancy life', Ngovene explained.

In other cases, like that of Iassido, (Interview, 15 July 2016), people escaped evacuation based on the information provided by local officials. Iassido (figure 10), who had been caught and sent to a police station for evacuation, escaped because the secretary of her neighbourhood recognised her. She was the wife of the chief of the police station of Xinavane, in Maputo province. Although unproductive in the sense that she did not have a formal job and did not have a work card, Iassido was not sent to an evacuation centre owing to her marriage to the chief of a police station. Years later, Iassido divorced and married Moisés Tembe (a worker at Unango Agricultural Company, Unango-Niassa, interviewed on 13 July 2016 and 8 August 2017) who moved to Unango-Niassa in 1981. Later, Iassido joined her new husband in Unango.



Figure 10: Rosa Iassido

Apparently, the victims could appeal for justice in case of unfair evacuation, according to Armando Guebuza (*Notícias*, 4 August 1983:6). Nevertheless, in reality this was not generally possible owing to lack of resources, time and distance. After the sentence, "unproductive people" were

immediately (not longer than 3 days) sent to rural areas, more than 1000 miles from Maputo or Beira. In those years of armed conflict, where land transport was scarce and most did not have money to pay for a flight, appealing within the stipulated period was not possible. As Rungo (Interview, 2 March 2015), a police officer during OP, said:

> I remember that some people appealed to the court, and, in some cases, the sentence was changed. But, these few cases happened for people who had resources or were from influential families [meaning connected to the Frelimo leadership] that could access the Ministry of the Interior to contest a court decision for evacuation. Most of the people had no chance to appeal the court decision. I remember that though the Ministry of Justice was part of Operation Production, to ensure justice, it was not powerful enough to accomplish it.

In fact, as part of the Operation, courts of appeal were installed at neighbourhood level. However, on the one hand, the action of the courts was limited because they were not autonomous from the Ministry of the Justice. The judges were appointed and dismissed by the minister if they did not act in line with revolutionary principles, as defined by the Frelimo leadership. In the context of Frelimo's revolution and where the existing legal framework did not fit Frelimo's moral ideology to use Machava's (2018) term, Frelimo adopted "revolutionary legality" to solve issues. Teodato Hunguana, who was one of the two vice-ministers of the Interior and then minister of Justice, explained that "revolutionary legality" was the justification that Frelimo used to commit many human rights violations during the "socialist" period (Hunguana, Interviewed on 10 November 2019). Judges had no other option than to implement such "legality". On the other hand, most of the people subject to OP had little information about the possibility of appeal. Even in the few cases where there was such information, resources, time and distance were a constraint. As noted above, in those days of war money to pay the costs of the appeal was hard to find (Quembo, 2017:65). These circumstances affected the capacity of the courts to act independently, as Trindade (Interview, 15 January 2016), judge president during OP, maintained.

5.4.1. Strengthening the state's capacity to ensure evacuation

Frelimo continued strengthening the capacity of the state to ensure that none of the "unproductive people" escaped the Operation. To avoid falsifications, the government compelled all state companies and public services to provide a full list of their workers who had been trained and quit their jobs afterwards. Such people were considered parasites and thus subject to evacuation. They were accused of using the skills provided by the state to serve their own illicit purposes (*Notícias*, 13 July 1983:4).

In the compulsory phase, many people were detained and sent to checkpoints, for evacuation. According to Vivet (2015: 134) and *Notícias* (2 August 1983:4), some 40,000 to 100,000

"unproductive people" were expelled from cities. *Notícias* (7 July 1983:6) reported 200 people detained and escorted to checkpoints in Maputo, at the beginning of the phase. In Xai-Xai, Gaza province, about 20 people were detained and tried daily, since the phase started (*Notícias*, 16 July 1983:7). About 10 foreign people were to be evacuated after being detained as illegal migrants. Some of them had expired DIRE or visas, others were unemployed or were engaged in the informal sector. This was the case of Elias Abdul Khalek, a 33 years old young Indian tradesman, who returned to Mozambique after being deported in 1978 for gambling (*Notícias*, 21 July1983:5).

The discrepancies of the number of the "unproductive people" evacuated is explained by the lack of reliable sources. The process of evacuation was marked by arbitrariness and secrecy. The checkpoints did not keep a record of the people who were detained and evacuated, mainly because they were not meant to return home. The documents of those evacuated remained at the checkpoints as they were taken to rural Mozambique. After OP, these documents simply disappeared. Those evicted travelled only with a *guia de marcha* for their identification and placement, as noted by Ngovene (sent to Unango-Niassa in OP, Interview 13 July 2016). Evacuation centres were packed with people and police officers were very strict, as mentioned by Alfiliado Sitoe (police officer during OP, Interview, 29 October 2015). The COC the POC have no records on the detainees and those resettled. The institutions created to execute OP no longer exist in the Ministry of the Interior. The only reliable source that is used to calculate the number of the "unproductive people" affected by OP is from press releases (*Notícias* and *Tempo*) and the Mozambican Airline Company (LAM). The latter source does not provide an accurate number because not all "unproductive people" were sent by plane to their destination, as we saw in previous section.The numbers referred to in the press cannot be accepted as more than a visual estimate reported to or made by a journalist.

The central COC took measures to capture those who attempted to escape the Operation. Thus, from 25 August 1983, they fixed to three the maximum of work cards that could be issued for domestic workers in each family and the measure was later extended to those self-employed. The COC also started a campaign to detain those possessing fake work cards (*Notícias*, 25 August 1983:6). Most of the domestic workers that received work cards worked for the Frelimo leadership members or those people who were influential in Frelimo, said Carlos Rungo (police officer during OP, Interview, 2 November 2015).

During his 21 May 1983 speech, Samora Machel mentioned that Operation Production would also target those "lazy state officials" and those who did not pay rent and sabotaged state housing, at a later stage. For this purpose, the Council of Ministers published the decree 2/83, according to which all such officials were to be evacuated (*Notícias*, 20 July 1983:4). Based on the 1980 census (República Popular de Moçambique, 1983:82), there were about 157,406 houses in Maputo. Out of these, 75,124 were of conventional material (e.g. bricks), 23,314 made of wood and zinc, 1,308 were made of mud houses, 55,589 made of reed and 1,981 made of other materials. The first two types of

houses were in the centre of the city and the rest in peripheral areas, where most of informal and temporary settlements were located. After independence, as a result of post-colonial euphoria and the context, the Frelimo state nationalised housing, as seen in chapter 4. Only the first two types of houses, those made of bricks and wood and zinc, were nationalised and thus belonged to *APIE*. The rest were assumed precarious and temporary housing, which should be destroyed and replaced, at a later stage, by conventional and permanent houses (Araújo, 2003: 23).

Despite the content in Samora's 21 May 1983 speech, evacuation of "lazy" state officials and those who did not pay their rent or maintain their houses in good conditon did not happen (Sitoe, Interview, 29 October 2015). In fact, multi-institutional brigades (Ministry of Interior, Defence, Justice, local authorities, Frelimo's youth and woman organisations) entered state houses to check for rent payers and how the tenants were taking care of the houses. Some of them were evicted from their houses but they were not necessarily sent to rural Mozambique. That was the case for Fernando Massane who was accused of not paying his rent and subletting a state house (*Notícias*, 28 July 1983:7). In 1983, house-to-house checks began in Polana, Coop, Malhangalene, Central and Alto Maé neighbourhoods of the capital city. According to *Notícias* (2 August 1983:5), hundreds of houses were checked, and some tenants were evicted from their houses. Checks also took place in Matola city, about 7 miles from Maputo (Matusse, 1983:76). In Beira city, more than 80 people were evicted from their houses in Matacuane, Baixa, Ponta-Gea, Pioneiros and Palmeiras neighbourhoods (*Notícias*, 30 May 1984:6). However, these people were not sent to rural areas as happened to those without work cards.

Most house owners were formally employed and had a work card. Most state officials also had a work card. As demonstrated in chapter 4, after independence, despite the discourse of rupture, urban space remained dualistic as in the colonial era. Most houses, mainly in cement areas, targeted by OP were occupied by state officials. As such, they possessed a work card, and thus, despite not paying rent, they were not "unproductive people", as defined by Frelimo.

5.4.2. Niassa and Cabo Delgado as strategic place for the "unproductive people"

Contrary to Frelimo's promises, some people targeted by OP, even during the first phase, were not sent to "their origins". Instead, they were sent to Niassa and Cabo Delgado. Jossias (Interview, 13 July 2016) is one of these cases. He was a migrant worker in South Africa who was detained in Maputo while on his way to Johannesburg in June 1983. Initially, he was to be sent to his home province, Manica. But he ended up in Unango, Niassa. Like Jossias, many of the "unproductive people" interviewed in Niassa and Cabo Delgado, such as Ngovene (Interview, 13 July 2016) and Fumo (Interview, 13 July 2016) came from Maputo city. Before migrating to Maputo, they had lived in Gaza and Inhambane respectively, but they were not returned there when caught up in OP. For Frelimo,

sending “back to origins” did not necessarily mean the place where the “unproductive people” or their ancestors were born. It meant that people had to acquire a formal job to be entitled to cities, as happened during the colonial era. It targeted mostly people in the informal sector and peasants who did not possess a work card or other papers used to identify “unproductive people” such as an ID, student card or resident card. In fact, “back to origins,” meant rural areas. In this sense, any people living in cities without a formal job and/or without a work card, belonged to the rural area. Such people were considered useless in cities and only useful in rural areas where they could produce food for themselves and for the wider Mozambican society. Thus, individuals such as Jossias, Ngovene and Fumo who were born in Manica, Gaza and Inhambane respectively, after being caught in Maputo, were sent to rural Niassa.

Frelimo had chosen Niassa and Cabo Delgado to place most of these people, arguing that they were underpopulated and with potential for agriculture (Interview, Munguambe, 3 May 2017). Indeed, these provinces are vast, were underpopulated and had potential for agriculture. Niassa, the largest province, has an area of 122 827 Km² had only 507,816 inhabitants (República Popular de Moçambique, 1983). However, being vast, underpopulated and with potential for agricultural production does not mean that settling people there, with no investment or access to markets, they would necessarily become “productive”.

In general, Mozambique is a vast and underpopulated country. There are many other places with potential for agricultural production closer to where the “unproductive people” were living before evacuation. Those people could produce in the “green zones”, places already identified and located in cities, as projected by the communal neighbourhood before OP. If that was the case, the state could have saved the funds used to transport “unproductive people” from the extreme south to the extreme north in a context of generalised economic crisis, war and natural calamities. Instead, the Frelimo leadership chose to spend scarce money to place these people far away, just to make sure that they would not return home after evacuation. Throughout its execution, OP remained stuck to its main goal, evacuating the “undesired people” from cities, ordering and controlling for the sake of its “socialist city”. Thus, the possession of a work card and other documents continued to be the main criteria to evict people from urban areas. Though Frelimo made institutional efforts to ensure that people were “fairly” evacuated from cities, the fact that attribution of the status “unproductive people” rested in in practice in the hands of local authorities made the process arbitrary and marked by class and gender conflicts and abuse. These practices were not effectively corrected because the main concern, evacuating the “undesired people” from cities was being achieved. As a result, OP remained essentially a coercive policy that had less impact in the increased production.

People were sent to where Frelimo wanted them to remain, rural Niassa and Cabo Delgado. In cases where labour shortages had been identified, such as the Marracuene Agrícola (Maragra), in Maputo province, Mafambisse Sugar Company (Açucarreira de Mafambisse) and Sena Sugar

Company (Marromeu Sena Sugar) in Sofala province, I found no evidence that "unproductive people" were sent there in the second phase of OP. These places were much closer to where the "unproductive people" lived before evacuation than the Northern provinces. As the Frelimo leadership's intention was to discourage mobility and avoid "unproductive people" from returning after being evacuated, placing them in Niassa and Cabo Delgado, which were far enough from Maputo and Beira, fit perfectly the intention, as Table 8 below shows.

Table 8: Distance between cities in Mozambique

Origin	Destination	Distance(Km)	Distance(Miles)
Maputo	Lichinga	2240	1392
Maputo	Pemba	2442	1517
Maputo	Manjacaze	291	181
Maputo	Maxixe	472	293
Beira	Lichinga	1162	722
Beira	Pemba	1363	847
Nampula	Quelimane	547	340

Source: http://www.distanciascidades.com/distancia_entre_cidades-mocambique

5.5. Operation without production: the lack of a link

The essence of Operation Production, from its discourse, was to transform "urban unproductive people" into "rural productive people", largely through making them peasants. This section explores the link between OP and its production dimension. I argue that there is a lack of link between OP and its production dimension. In fact, OP was counterproductive to Frelimo's own development agenda. While many people were effectively evacuated from urban areas, this did not lead to more production.

The Ministry of Agriculture was the main state institution responsible for agricultural production. It had however no key role in the implementation of Operation Production, despite Frelimo's discourse. Instead, as we have seen above, the Ministry of the Interior, together with the Ministry of Defence, were the key players. This did not mean that Frelimo was unconcerned with increased production. But controlling and ordering was paramount for Frelimo and thus production was conducted with the ultimate goal of enhancing Frelimo's surveillance mechanisms. OP was executed in a way that put more emphasis on ordering and controlling than on production itself.

However, there is information about the government's initiative to integrate some of the voluntary "unproductive people" into state companies in rural Mozambique. *Notícias* (20 July 1983:4), without mentioning the companies and in which activities, reports some "unproductive people" who were integrated into "productive activities" in rural Nampula. *Notícias* (20 July 1983:4) reported the integration of most of those evacuated from the 1st phase in Maputo city for food production in rural Maputo. The Provincial Operative Command (POC) received a certain amount of money (not specified) to invest in food production. As mentioned above, people were evicted from Maputo and Beira, and sent to Niassa and Cabo Delgado. In July 1983, about 200 people evacuated

from Maputo arrived in Cabo Delgado to start working at the Agricultural Company of N'guri. Others were sent to Nangololo, an old sisal company, about 40 Km from Pemba. The Matama Agricultural Company (*Empresa Agrícola de Matama*-EAM) also received some "unproductive people", according to *Notícias* (23 July 1983:4). The Agrarian Company of Chipembe in Cabo Delgado received about 2000 "unproductive" coming from Maputo city (*Notícias*, 9 January 1984). About 250 "unproductives" were taken to Unango, in Niassa and joined some of those who were there as part of the re-education policy (*Notícias*, 7 October 1983:4). *Notícias* (21 July 1983:4), without specifying the companies, also mentioned evacuees who started working at different cotton companies in Nampula province. However, the way these initiatives occurred reveals the lack of coordination and articulation between different levels of the implementation of OP. The fact that this lack of coordination only occurred in the production dimension of OP and not during evacuation, reinforces my argument that Frelimo put more emphasis on controlling and ordering than actual production.

In the few cases where "unproductive people" were incorporated in state companies in rural Mozambique, the lack of planning and coordination was evident. Tembe (Interview 13 July 2016), an agricultural technician who arrived in Unango to work for Unango Agricultural Company (*Empresa Agrícola de Unango*) in 1981, mentioned that the company in fact received some of the "unproductive people" who were sent to Unango. However, 'when they came, we were not informed in advance that they were to work for the company. 'Therefore, we placed them in a fertilizer store, where they were to sleep until they built their own houses', said Tembe. Mr Tembe remembered when the "unproductive people" started coming, around July 1983. They looked like homeless people and delinquents. Most of them were dirty and had no clothes, or blankets to protect themselves from the winter coldat Unango. 'As we were not aware of their arrival, we did not know how many people were coming and for what purpose. That is why we just decided randomly what to do and where to place them. We just gave them what we could', said Tembe.

Most of those who went to state companies were placed in unskilled jobs, such as farming the land and harvesting. Marta (Interview 14 July 2016) told the story of her husband Lázaro Maculuve, who was placed at MAC - Matama Agricultural Company (*Empresa Agrícola de Matama*), in Niassa, in 1983. 'When they got to Niassa they stayed about two weeks without doing anything. They were placed at a local church. Then my husband became a peasant cultivator at that company. Others, who went together with him, stayed there with no job. They had to find their own piece of land and start farming to get something to eat', said Marta.

Institutions responsible for promoting production, like the Ministry of Agriculture, were not part of Operation Production planning and were not aware of the different steps of its implementation. As a result, it had to accomplish functions for which they were not prepared, such as integrating "unproductive people" into agricultural activity that did not exist and which they had no financial capacity to create. In April 1984, Armando Guebuza, the minister of the Interior and the president of

the COC, visited Niassa. According to Maninguane (1984:4), Guebuza remarked that after almost a year of implementation of the Operation in Matucuta, one of the districts of Niassa, there was deficient articulation between different levels of state institutions involved in the implementation of OP, such as the Provincial Operative Command, District Operative Command and Frelimo's youth and women's leagues (*Notícias,* 10 April 1984:4). As a result, most of the "unproductive people" were not yet integrated into "productive activities" and did not have places to live. They ended up at the local police station. This situation was also acknowledged by Arlindo Moisés, the judge-president of Niassa, in an interview published by Maninguane and Bango (1984:4), and by the third session of Frelimo's Central Committee, which took place in April 1984 (*Notícias*, 23 April 1984:6).

Even those few "unproductive people" who were sent to state companies were sent at a time when most of them were already in crisis. Managers of these companies had to comply with top-down Frelimo orders to employ unnecessary labour brought by OP, which worsened the situation of those companies. Some of them ended up closing just after OP (Partido Frelimo, 1985:10). The labour in these companies, including OP people, had to rely on small-scale farming to survive or return to urban areas.

Because there was no effective link between OP and agricultural development, most of the subjects of OP were sheltered by local families on their arrival in rural Mozambique, particularly in Niassa and Cabo Delgado. They had to build their own houses, start farming their own land from scratch to feed themselves and eventually, later, some started working in companies, as mentioned above. According to Manuel (1983:4), about 1300 "unproductive people" landed in Cabo Delgado in July 1983. Only then was the local government told what to do with those people. Alberto Chipande, a senior member of Frelimo and the then governor of Cabo Delgado instructed the provincial officers to send them to local families to start a "new" and "decent" life without specifying what this meant (Manuel, 1983). Vieira (Interview, 6 August 2015), reported:

> People were sent to Niassa with no clear instructions. Thus, I did not know what to do with them. I had to fly to Maputo to meet Machel and tell him to stop sending people to Niassa. Some governors from other provinces refused to receive "unproductive people". There was no coordination and collaboration between the evacuation centres, the Central Operative Command and the provincial governors about what to do with "unproductive people", where and how these people should be integrated. Once, when a plane coming from Maputo arrived with "unproductive people", I stood at the door and started asking each one of them about their professional skills. Based on their answers, I decided, randomly, where to allocate them. It is true that we needed labour to develop Niassa. But not the ones that were sent by OP. We needed skilled labour. Unskilled labour we had here in Niassa.

The story told by Samson, a victim of OP (Interview, 13 July 2016), also reveals how the execution of OP lacked planning and coordination between different levels of government:

> I was home when they came. They only wanted me and no one else. They came with someone that knew me and who showed them my house. They wanted to take me, and I asked where to? They said: you will find out there. I took my ID and went with them to the *círculo* (the neighbourhood Frelimo organ). I did not know why they were taking me, and I could not complain as there was a police officer and at that time no one complained. Then someone came and started taking our personal details: names and so on. From the *circulo,* I was taken straight to the airport and was taken to FENI, in Lichinga. There, I stayed about three weeks before being sent to Unango, in Sanga district. Once there, they took us to the *Empresa Agrícola de Unango,* where Paulo Zucula was the director. No one told us what to do. That first day we slept without knowing the reason why we were there. The next day they gave us axes and told us to start tilling the soil. That is how I ended up here.

In their effort to meet Machel's instructions and Guebuza's replication of those instructions, provincial governors went to rural areas and mobilised directors of the companies and local families to accommodate "unproductive people". José Moiane, governor of Maputo province, is cited by *Notícias* (13 June 1983:3) appealing to local families of Magude district to accept and integrate "unproductive people" into "productive activities". According to *Notícias* (8 July 1983:5) the provincial government of Inhambane created brigades for the integration of "unproductive people" coming from Maputo immediately after their evacuation sentence had been pronounced. 'They were meant to start working in a construction cooperative, which did not exist yet', said Pascoal Zandamela, the head of Inhambane Provincial COC. In mid-July 1983, the first volunteers were leaving Maputo city (*Tempo* 19 July 1983:9). At the same time, brigades were sent to rural Gaza and Inhambane to mobilise local families to integrate them into "productive activities".

According to Frelimo, those who could not fit into any state company, were to be provided with means of production, such as seeds, hoes, axes and land (*Notícias*, 23 July 1983:5). Several of my interviewees with OP subjects revealed that nothing was provided, apart from the help of local families to help them find their way. Manhique (Interview, 13 Juy 2016), was simply dumped in rural Niassa. That was also the case of Ngovene (Interview, 13July 2016.):

> When we got here in Unango (rural Niassa), we were dropped from the trucks and escorted to a soccer pitch. We were about 300 people and the local families came and started picking who they wanted to be their new son, amongst us, like that: "I will stay with this one, I will choose that one, that one there is my son, that one is my daughter". After that, the police officers that

> accompanied us disappeared and we stayed with our new parents. A family received me, and my new father gave me a hoe and showed me the land. From that moment on I became a peasant and had to farm the land to produce food to eat. That is how I was received here in Unango.

Mucambo, a victim of OP (Interview 13 July 2016), and Samson, also a victim of OP (Interview 13 July 2016), had a different path, as they started working at the UAC- Unango Agricultural Company (Empresa Agrícola de Unango). That did not mean that their routine differed much from the others who could not be integrated into a state company. They had to start building their own houses, made of reed and handmade bricks. They woke up early in the morning to harvest at the company's farm or take care of its cattle. At the end of the day, they would sleep together (200-300 people) in an improvised warehouse, before they had finished their own houses. They were also farm labourers, like their fellows, though they had a tiny monthly salary.

The lack of planning for OP was at such level that those evacuated ended up staying for many days doing nothing and with no proper living conditions, lacking food and blankets during winter, in Niassa, one of the coldest provinces of the country. The visit of the deputy minister of the Interior, Teodato Hunguana, reported by Ribas (1983:6), identified these examples. As Rungo, a police officer during OP (Interview, 2March 2015), said:

> Our mission was to catch "unproductive people" and send them to checkpoints, then escort them from evacuation centre to the airport. We were not necessarily informed of how those people were to be integrated into "productive activities", once at their destination.

Trindade, judge president of Maputo province during OP (Interview, 15 January 2015) reported:

> We sentenced people for evacuation. That was our job. It was not our concern, as judges, to know where those people would be sent. After sentencing them, the responsible institution for following steps was the Central Operative Command.

Another example of disconnection between OP and Frelimo's development program is the Unango development program. Unango, located in the district of Sanga in Niassa was the main destination of most of the "unproductive people". It had a great potential for agriculture and was underpopulated (Souto, 1981; Marmelo, 1981). From 1965, when it became a zone of intense military confrontations between Frelimo and the Portuguese, its population had fled to "liberated zones", or to neighbouring countries, such as Malawi or Tanzania. Only an administrative Portuguese post, with a few soldiers and a small village remained before being destroyed in 1974. Up to October 1979 the area was abandoned, until Machel decided to transform it into a re-education camp, to place about 500 re-educated people there, transferred from Naisseco-Niassa. The re-educated were to build the future city

of Unango from scratch (Souto, 1981; Marmelo, 1981). This plan of Samora Machel was confirmed by some "re-educated people" interviewed in Unango, such as Chichava (15 July 2016), Durua (21 July 2016), Fernandes (15 July 2016) and Muchanga (18 July 2016), who, after the closure of Unango re-education camp in 1979/80, were integrated into the project to build the city of Unango.

According to Marmelo (1981:5), the construction of the city should have started in 1981 and was intended to serve, initially, 4000 people. In that year, a mechanical workshop, a mechanized carpentry, houses for expatriates and a pigsty were to be built. An electricity generator and water pump would be installed. For agricultural production, a pilot project in the Lucheringo valley was supposed to start in 1981, to produce vegetable, maize, fruits and livestock on 70,000 ha. From 1982 Frelimo's party headquarters, executive council, a school, a consumer cooperative and a centre to train people in social communication would be built (Mavanga, 1982:5). The work force and the first beneficiaries of the city were those formerly taken for re-education. The others were supposed to come later, in principle attracted by the opportunities that the city would offer.

Paradoxically, this ambitious Unango development program, which had been planned less than 4 years before OP and which was still ongoing when OP came, did not incorporate "unproductive people", even though the Frelimo leadership's ideas, which inspired OP, already existed when Unango program was being designed. In July 1983, when the first "unproductive people" arrived in Unango, they were not integrated into the city building activities, according to Cuinica (appointed by Samora Machel to be responsible for the Unango development program, Interview, 16 July 2016).

According to Mavanga (1982:3), Machel visited Unango in 1982. Immediately after Machel's visit, improvements were made to the Unango development program:

> Skilled technicians from the Ministry of Agriculture arrived to further agricultural production. As a result, maize production increased from 200 to 800 tons in the state farms (the main state agricultural company in Unango was the Empresa Agrícola de Unango-EAU), and from 60 to 200 tons in the cooperative sector. It became possible to organise production cooperatives. Now, we have cooperative of carpenters, of tailors and barbers, apart from the polyvalent cooperative composed by livestock and construction. 126 out of 500 those from re-education were employed by the agricultural company EAU. Those from re-education assure most cropping activity. Others were allocated to different cooperatives. There is no labour shortage. Problems identified are lack of building material (cement and iron) and social problems, such as physical violence and excessive alcohol consumption caused by those from re-education.

Mavanga's (1982:3) account may be exaggerated. But the fact that Cuinica (Interview, 16 July 2016) also referred to some improvements in the Unango development program in the early 1980s corroborates what Mavanga says. Machel's visit to Unango occurred about a month before the 22nd June 1982, when he addressed a speech to the nation, at the independence square, as mentioned in

chapter 4 (*Notícias*, 28 July 1982:4). This speech announced what would become OP less than a year later. It means that Machel knew that OP subjects would be sent to Unango when he visited the place. Less than a year after the visit, the 4th Congress, which adopted OP, was held. On the 21 May, again less than a year after the visit, Operation Production, was announced to the nation at Independence Square in Maputo. This demonstrates that both Unango development program and OP was conceived at the same moment. Yet OP subjects were not integrated in the Unango development program.

In fact, when "unproductive people" were being sent to rural areas to produce, Frelimo knew already of its limitations to drive the development process. Frelimo knew that it could not absorb large number of people into its rural enterprises. In 1982, Frelimo produced a report on the country's economic crisis and solutions to overcome it. As part of it, from 1981 some development projects were envisaged. The Agricultural Complex of Lioma (CAPEL), in Zambezia province, of Angónia, in Tete province and of Matama, in Niassa province, which was already producing 25,000 tons of maize, and would increase its production over the decade, were amongst them. Frelimo planned to build new complexes in Nampula, Cabo Delgado and Manica provinces. In Limpopo and Incomati valleys possibilities to rationalise the use of irrigation systems and building other systems in the same valleys, to increase rice production, had been projected. A textile factory in Mocuba, in Zambezia province, a capulana (a type of sarong worn primarily in Mozambique) factory in Montepuez in Cabo Delgado province and a blanket factory in Pemba, the capital of Cabo Delgado, were planned.

Apart from these, Frelimo also envisaged finishing the Texmanta factory in Pemba and the Texmoque factory in Nampula province, and cloth factories in Niassa and Tete provinces. A centre-north electricity line to supply Zambezia, Nampula, Cabo Delgado and Niassa provinces with the electricity produced in the Cahora Bassa dam, in Tete province, which was already supplying Moatize and Tete cities was expected. In Manica province a paper factory, to supply the country was planned. Even a truck, bus and tractors factories were part of Frelimo's strategy to attain development. Dams such as Corromane and Pequenos Libombos, in Maputo province were part of the strategy also. This last would be crucial to supply water to Maputo city (Partido Frelimo, 1982: 76-79). Chissano reported, in an interview in 2016 to STV SOICO, a local private television station, (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GbIMBY_jkhc, consulted on 28 October 2016) that from 1981 the government also planned to start an agriculutral project in 400,000 hectares of land in areas of Niassa, Cabo Delago and Zambezia provinces. Table 9 below shows some of the development projects envisaged by Frelimo, from 1981 onward.

Table 9: Development projects envisaged by the PPI, 1980-1990

	Project	**Start-end date**	**Product per year**	**Province**
1	Montepuez Textile Factory	1981-1985	21.000.000 Kg of fabric	Cabo Delgado
2	Mocuba Textile Factory	1981-1984	34.000.000 Kg of fabric	Zambezia
3	Agrarian Complex of Lioma	1981-1990	100,000 Tons of maize	Zambezia
4	Forest Concession of Manica	1982-1986	36,000 Tons of paper	Manica

Source: Partido Frelimo, 1982: 76-79

Most of these projects failed even before starting (Galli, 2003). Most importantly, the state was giving up most of its companies and farms, as most of them were not viable and Frelimo was shifting its economic approach as a result of the crisis, as seen in chapter four. Those that were viable were facing difficulties. The kind of input they required was not at any rate the "unproductive people" that were being sent. Unskilled labour existed already in rural areas, as mentioned by Vieira (Interviewed 6 August 2015), the governor of Niassa.

If OP was to produce "producers" in the countryside, then it can be said that this intention was both unrealistic and unrealised. In fact, OP undermined production. First, the companies that received "unproductive people", like Matama Agricultural Company and Unango Agricultural Company in Niassa province, were not in need of that extra labour force, let alone "unproductive people". There was no coordination between the companies and the Central Operative Command in the distribution of labour, as we have seen above, and as a result, companies had to accommodate an unnecessary extra labour force, as mentioned by Tualibo, ex-worker at UAC during OP (Interview, 10 August 2017), Eugénio, ex-worker at MAC during OP (Interview, 11August 2017), Iaquete, ex-worker at MAC during OP (Interviewed,11 August 2017) and Sabune, ex-worker at UAC and MAC during OP (Inteview, 11 August 2017). This increased the companies' cost with wages for workers who did not necessarily contribute to increased production. Second, people sent were not necessarily "unproductive". They were people engaged in the informal sector and had their own way of generating income for themselves and their families. Some of them, as mentioned by Regimento, an ex-worker at Matama Agricultural Company (MAC) during OP (Interview, 8August 2017), Celestino, worker at MAC during OP (Interview 9 August 2017) and Sabune (Interview, 11 August 2017), were carpenters, painters, drivers, electricians and mechanics. Being forced to quit cities meant losing their source of income. Once in rural areas, they were not provided the necessary tools for their trade or for agricultural production. Thus, they were forced to become peasant cultivators on their own (*Notícias*, 4 August 1984:6). OP thus often represented a constraint for development.

Even in a period of crisis, Mozambican Airlines (LAM), Mozambican Transportation Companies, such as ROMOS, ROMON, ROMOC and private transportation companies were obliged to send "unproductive people" to rural Mozambique free of charge. However, no additional investment was made to increase rural production. As pointed out by Cabrita (2000), OP had in fact negative economic consequences for the finances of the state. In two months, the country's fuel aviation reserve for 1983 almost disappeared as a result of the extra flights made to transport "unproductive people" from Maputo to distant Niassa or Cabo Delgado. The transport of people by road, from Lichinga or Pemba to rural Niassa or Cabo Delgado also increased the consumption of fuel, which was not planned. As a result, petrol and diesel rationing was implemented in October 1983. Additionally, the state had to supply food, provide temporary shelter and other resources for

"unproductive people" while in transit from checkpoints and evacuation centres to rural Mozambique. According to Castanheira (1983:4) the third session of Maputo City Assembly acknowledged this.

Almost every state official was engaged in Operation Production. The decision taken by the Central Operative Command, in July 1983, to engage all full-time party staff at local level to work in checkpoints contributed to reducing the capacity of the state to provide public services. In addition, the party staff continued to get their salary while not doing the job for which they were hired (*Notícias*, 4 July 1983:5). Furthermore, a major drought in the south and floods in the north hit Mozambique in the years of Operation Production. It was unrealistic to send people to rural areas and resettlement areas in a year of severe natural calamities, which affected drastically agricultural activities.

OP drove people to start farming, an activity to which they had no previous experience and for which they were not provided training. To overcome the crisis of production, the fourth Congress decided to make use of the few experienced, though unskilled, urban informal workers, such as carpenters and blacksmiths (Frelimo, 1983). Paradoxically the same Congress decide to get rid of these same people and dump them in the countryside. In April 1984, Armando Guebuza, the minister of the Interior and the president of the COC, visited Niassa to follow upon Operation Production. According to Maninguane (1984:5), Guebuza remarked that after almost a year of its implementation, production, the core aspect of the Operation, at least in Frelimo's discourse, was still low. However, when the deputies of Maputo city met in August 1983 to evaluate and monitor the implementation of OP, one of the observations was that the Operation was a success as cities had become quiet. This referred to the accomplishment of the evacuation achieved by OP and not to its production dimension. Increases of production in the rural areas were not mentioned during the meeting (Castanheira, 1983:5). This remark by Frelimo staff emphasizes that the main purpose of OP was to control people in order to achieve Frelimo's urban order, which to judge from the observation made in the Maputo city assembly was perhaps its only achievement at a cost economic disruption and dissatisfaction caused by coercive displacement, destruction of social relations, identity, and separation of families.

Conclusion

As Operation Production unfolded, it became clear that the state had been effectively mobilised to fulfil the evacuation of "unproductive people" from cities, while almost nothing was done to increase rural production. In fact, many of those evacuated became "useless", to use Frelimo's term, in a completely strange social environment. Taken out of their families in urban areas, where they could provide services (even in the informal sector), generate income, and provide food for themselves and their families, these people could not perform the same social and economic activities in rural areas. In rural Mozambique, most of the houses had no electricity, no running water and vehicles were scarce. Therefore, being an electrician, plumber or mechanic in this context was actually "useless". In practice, most of those evacuated were simply transported to rural areas and left with rural families, who were already facing difficulties to produce their own food. To make it worse, Frelimo's

agricultural development agenda had already undermined the relevance of the family sector and invested more in state farms (Brito, 1991; Negrão, 2001; Cravinho, 1998; O'Laughlin; 2002; Castelo-Branco, 1994 and Wuyts, 1987). The fact that Frelimo was evicting people from urban to rural areas, with no conditions to make them "productive people", seems to show that the effect of OP was ultimately evicting people from urban to rural Mozambique to achieve Frelimo's urban model, which reflects their own imagination of what was a modern urban development looks like. In a cynical way, Frelimo acknowledged its own mistakes. On 6 July 1986 *Notícias* published an article where Machel acknowledged that people should be trained before being sent, they should be provided with means of production, for at least 6 months, before being socially and economically integrated in rural areas. It would avoid them continuing in the *candonga,* a local name for informal business, even after getting to the intended rural areas. A policy of the magnitude of Operation Production required material, financial, and human resources to be achieved. The Frelimo leadership knew that the state did not possess these resources. Yet, they insisted on implementing OP because, for Frelimo ordering and controlling was paramount even to achieve production goals. As a result, instead of making people "productive", as claimed in discourse, OP became counterproductive for Frelimo's own development agenda. Disconnected from Frelimo's own rural development program Operation Production still managed to disrupt families and divert young students from school, among many other terrible things, which generated frustration and contestation.

Chapter 6: An unplanned end: Operation Production goes against Frelimo's will

Introduction

While decisive in shaping policy choice, this chapter shows that ideology and values are limited in their capacity to enforce and maintain policy, as I argued in chapter 1. The chapter proceeds by exploring the way Operation Production ended and the factors that contributed to its demise. Rather than approaching the end of OP as a single one-way event, it explores the combination of different events over time that together led to OP's closure. A state in crisis, facing a prolonged war, which caused severe and drastic human and material loses, displaced people and pushed many Mozambicans to neighbouring countries, was unable to maintain a policy implemented in the name of "revolution", which had lost its significance and was highly criticised, even from within. As OP unfolded, it did not enjoy support from its intended beneficiaries. Throughout its implementation, its targets and non-state institutions such as the Catholic Church looked for creative ways to resist it. The chapter argues that the way OP was interpreted by non-state institutions, the economic crisis that intensified in the 1980s, the war between Renamo and the government, and the death of Machel undermined the capacity of Frelimo to control its people through the *guia de marcha* and in the end significantly reduced the room for manoeuvre of the Frelimo leadership to shape the policy process. The chapter starts by addressing the ways in which the "unproductive people" and the Catholic Church resisted OP. It then tackles the ways in which Renamo's incursions affected the capacity of the state to maintain control over the "unproductive people" in rural areas. Finally, the chapter discusses the impact of Machel's death and economic changes in the 1980s in the ending of OP. As demonstrated in chapter 1 and 3, ideological construction, social and historical origins and the experiences of Machel and his like-minded colleagues played a central role in the making of OP. The death of Machel in 1986, the main figure in the making of OP, along with economic crisis and changes ongoing in the 1980s, undermined the capacity of the Frelimo leadership's ideological constructions to maintain Operation Production, a policy contested from the beginning to its end in 1988.

6.1. Resisting and denouncing the Operation: The "unproductive people", the Catholic Church and Frelimo's auto-critique

This section addresses the ways in which OP's subjects and the Catholic Church interpreted and reacted to Operation Production, and how their actions undermined it. I demonstrate that the way the "unproductive people" found ways to escape OP and the actions led by the Catholic Church to denounce the atrocities of OP contributed to stop evacuation of the "unproductive people" from urban areas, which in the end led to the demise of OP.

According to Donaldo (1983: 3), the public received the launch of Operation Production on 21 May 1983 with much enthusiasm. In principle, most of the people who were interviewed in the

aftermath of OP were happy and believed that it would achieve its goal as stated in the discourse. However, as soon as its implementation began to unfold, those who were targeted and other players realised that OP was dominantly coercive, and had more to do with evacuating, ordering and controlling people for the sake of the Frelimo's urban model rather than making people "productive". Moreover, the so-called unproductive people never saw themselves as such. Indeed, though Frelimo mobilised people to join the voluntary phase of the Operation, most of those who were sent to rural Mozambique did not do so as volunteers, as I demonstrate in chapter 5. As it became clear that OP had less to do with production than with controlling people and that it was arbitrary and coercive, the "unproductive people" looked for ways (Scott, 1985) to escape it.

As seen in chapter 5, most of the people who were identified as "unproductive" were caught during the coercive phase of OP. The fact that they were sent to rural Mozambique does not of course mean that they agreed with OP. The way they reacted to OP can be explained in terms of what Scott (1985) calls everyday forms of resistance. Scott's (1985) book *Weapons of the weak: everyday forms of resistance* concerns peasants' prosaic but constant forms of struggle with their exploiters in Sedaka, a Malaysian village. It may look irrelevant to use his thoughts in a discussion about urban dwellers' resistance to a policy, in a completely different political, economic and regional landscape. However, if one considers the trajectory and social characteristics of the "unproductive people", Scott's case and the "unproductive people" have something in common. The original social milieu of most of the "unproductive people" was the rural areas; most of them were peasants who fled the unsafe and harsh conditions of these areas because of war, and established themselves in urban Mozambique in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s. Most of them were not educated and operated in the informal sector. Some of the ways they used to resist Operation Production, such as desertion, false compliance and avoiding direct confrontation with authority, fit with what Scott considers everyday forms of resistance. Most importantly, in the rural areas where the "unproductive people" were taken, they resisted Operation Production in ways suggested by Scott, as will be indicated below. Scott's definition of resistance as any individual or collective action aiming at mitigating claims made by superordinates, including state or class on a subordinate class, or to advance subordinate claims vis-à-vis superordinate classes, which focus more on the intentions rather than consequences, is appropriate to explain the resistance of the "unproductive people". They were individual rather than coordinated ways of resistance, and did not include outright confrontation.

Inspired by Scott's approach, I argue that the individual techniques applied by the "unproductive people", such as desertion, bribery and solidarity were forms of resistance to the Frelimo state's hegemonic claims on a subordinate people. Those forms, even though they were uncoordinated and not organized, became regular and consistent patterns throughout Operation Production. In the mid- and long-term, associated with the socio-economic context of the 1980s, they contributed to halting the evacuation of the "unproductive people" from urban areas. As evacuation,

control and order were the main features of OP, I argue that these forms of resistance, which disrupted Frelimo's control mechanisms, were key for OP's demise.

The authoritarian ways in which OP was implemented imposed fear on people. As most of those I interviewed stressed, they were taken from their houses without any explanation, leaving behind their families. In addition to local authorities, the police escorted them. In these circumstances, and aware of the repressive state apparatus, they knew that it was useless to confront the state. The minimum they would achieve is to be beaten up in addition to evacuation. The implementation strategy of OP left little choice to "unproductive people" other than to resort to discrete forms of resistance. One example, amongst many, is of Rafael, (an OP subject Interview on 17 August 2017):

> I was at home with my family, 3 children and my wife, when they came with the secretary of neighbourhood [by "they", he means the brigade of OP where there was always a police officer] ... They asked for my ID and after I told them that I had forgotten it at my workplace, they asked me to follow them. I asked the reason why I had to follow them if I was not an "unproductive man" and I had my work card, which I could show them, if they allowed me to get back to work and get it. It was useless. They insisted that I had to follow them. I did accordingly, as I feared being beaten up in front of my family... I arrived here in Balama [a district of Cabo Delgado province] against my will. There was no motivation for me to cooperate with an unjust policy such as OP.... The only reason I am still here is because I found no way to return home [Maputo]. It was hard, and the authorities continued to control our mobility via the *guia de marcha.* Even to get to Pemba [capital of Cabo Delgado], one had to request a *guia de marcha,* explaining the reasons and indicating a place to stay there. As I had no apparent reasons nor a family member in Pemba, I couldn't get a *guia de marcha*...I just found ways to survive myself, by selling at a market in Pemba, which had nothing to do with OP, hoping to return home one day.

Rafael is a revealing example of many other "unproductive people" who in the face of Operation Production and the threat it imposed, found ways to escape Operation Production, thus resisting it. Rafael was caught in Maputo and sent to Balama district in Cabo Delgado without explanation. He had a work card, which means he used to have a formal job in Maputo. Though not agreeing with OP, he decided not to confront the authorities on account of fear. Once in Balama, he found ways of subverting OP's main goal, escaped to Pemba where he traded at a local market to make a living. The option taken by Rafael had nothing to do with the intentions of OP. In fact, it was a way of surviving that at the end undermined OP. As we have seen in chapter 4, Operation Production's goal was to remove "undesired", "excess" and "unproductive" people from urban areas and place, control and keep them in rural Mozambique. Rafael escaped to Pemba. Being here, an urban area, and not in Balama, a rural area, as the authorities wanted undermined Frelimo's ability to keep an eye on him.

Many other people, such as Manhique (Interview, 14 July 2016) did the same. Soon after being

deported to Unango-Niassa, Manhique managed to escape and went to Lichinga where he started selling vehicle spares at FENI, a local market in the city (see figure 7). Thus, both Rafael and Manhique ended up being informal urban traders in Pemba and Lichinga respectively rather than in Maptuo. A significant number of other OP subjects followed the same pattern. Some of them sold *catcholima,* a local alcoholic drink. Others managed to escape to Lichinga and Pemba and to become small traders just as they were before Operation Production. These activities, often conducted in an urban environment, along with other factors, jeopardised state ability to control them and thus weakened the Operation.

Every day forms of resistance used by Rafael and Manhique were the viable strategies used by some of the "unproductive people", who were unhappy with OP. It was a way of resisting while avoiding the state's repression mechanism and direct confrontation. Once at their destination, evacuees tried to find ways to make a living that were not necessarily related to OP and that were hidden from the state's control mechanisms. In the mid- to long term, these different ways of concealed resistance played against OP. When the war intensified in the 1980s, many of those already unhappy with OP used the new context to find their own ways either to escape and return to their origins, or to avoid the conflict and possible death and continue in rural areas, even if it meant staying under Renamo's dictates.

As in some of the cases described by Scott (1985), other people chose to desert. When the Operation started in Maputo, some people fled the city and returned later when the dust had settled (*Notícias,* 7 July 1983:3, *Notícias*, September 1983:4). Others fled from evacuation centres, such as that in Matola "G", where five people disappeared, as reported by *Notícias* (1 August 1983:3). Some tried to bribe state officials involved in the implementation of Operation Production. For example, Isaias Naftal Gomes tried to bribe the judge president and the members of the brigade of Operation Production from Mahota neighbourhood to avoid being sentenced for evacuation (*Notícias,* 21 July 1983:4). Another case of attempted bribery concerning Benedito António Zimba occurred in Central neighbourhood. António Chicumaba, judge-president said that Zimba gave money to a police officer to avoid being taken to a checkpoint (*Notícias,* 21 July 1983). Though it was impossible to know from the press if these cases succeeded or not, they demonstrate some of the tactics used by the "unproductive people" to resist the state's hegemonic top-down projects to make them legible, to use Scott's terms.

Others tried to escape the Operation by getting fake work cards and other relevant papers. Three cases, involving a woman and two men, were reported by *Notícias* (6 July 1983:6) at the second, fifth and eighth police stations in Maputo. Samuel Malate was another "unproductive man" who managed to get a fake document to escape the Operation, in Chamanculo neighbourhood (*Domingo*, 25 September 1983:12). Solidarity amongst people to avoid Operation Production also occurred. For example, Filipe Mahunguanhane Nhampazo, secretary of George Dimitrovi

neighbourhood in Maputo, provided a work card to Bento José, an unemployed man, to helping him escape OP (*Notícias*, 1 August 1983:3).

These different, unspectacular (Scott, 1985) ways in which the "unproductive people" reacted to Operation Production from the beginning were often at an individual level and intended to meet the self-interests of those seeking to avoid the negative effects of being evacuated from the cities on their lives. Such methods may not be considered a way of resisting state hegemonic and authoritarian projects according to some approaches to the logic of collective action, such as those of Ostrom (1990) and Olson (1965), who argue that resistance implies, at some point, individual sacrifice for middle or long-term collective gains. Nevertheless, the cases mentioned above reveal that "unproductive people" chose not to confront the state when caught and sent to rural Mozambique but once in rural areas, they did what it took to make a living, not necessarily what the state wanted them to do. In some cases, even before evacuation they found ways to escape, as described above. As far as as possible, the state continued to exercise its control over mobility via the *guia de marcha*, as demonstrated in chapter 5, but within the limited areas where they remained, evacuees survived in ways that often undermined the spirit of OP.

This form of resistance, combined with the Catholic Church's activism, contributed to undermine OP. Eventually, they contributed to stop evacuation from cities. Indeed, evacuating people from the cities became more and more difficult for Frelimo, as different individuals and institutions began to contest it. As a result, though Operation Production ended officially in 1988, evacuation of the "unproductive people" from cities stopped by the end of 1984 (*Notícias*, 15 May 1984:7).

By April 1984, the Frelimo leadership began to publicly acknowledge that they had gone too far with Operation Production, as people were suffering in those places where they were taken. The 3rd Session of the Central Committee held in April 1984 stated that there was a need to humanize the Operation. The "unproductive people" should be treated decently (*Notícias*, 23 April 1984:5). Rungo, a police officer during Operation Production (Interviewed, 2 November 2015), confirmed that by 1984 the Frelimo leadership had started to acknowledge that OP was an error and that the state was not sufficiently prepared to accomplish its production dimension, as its discourse had originally claimed. Aware that Renamo could take advantage of this, and faced with increasing contestation, mainly from the Catholic Church, the evacuation of "unproductive people" was stopped in late 1984.

Matsinhe (Interview, 9 January 2018) mentioned that Frelimo reversed OP because of opposition coming from inside Frelimo, but he put things in a way that suggests a link between the end of evacuation and its wider unpopularity and the Catholic Church's positioning. He acknowledges that the war diverted Frelimo's attention from most of its "socialist" projects, such as communal villages, re-education camps, and OP. He admits that in the new socioeconomic and military dispensation of war and economic crisis, those policies were no longer justifiable. He avoids mentioning resistance and contestation. He even denies that there had been any, a denial typical of the Frelimo leadership

when it decides on a change of course. Because of resistance, Frelimo leaders gained a sense that the coercive dimension of OP was not working as they wanted. Additionally, contestation from non-state institutions, such as the Catholic Church, put more pressure on Frelimo to stop sending people to rural Mozambique, particularly to Niassa, as we will see in the following section.

6.1.2. The impact of the Catholic Church's resistance

An important aspect that contributed to OP's demise was the resisitance of the Catholic Church to OP from the very beginning. The Catholic Church's resistance to state policies is not relevant only to Mozambique. In his book *Politics and religion*, Bruce (2003), explained the example of the Catholic Church in Latin America challenging various forms of dictatorship. Amidst war in Nicaragua, 4 bishops issued a letter calling the guerrilla forces to abandon the armed struggle and return home and work on religious duties. Faced with land conflict in Chile, the Chilean bishops wrote a collective letter "The Church and the Problem of the Peasantry", in 1962. They wanted the state to acquire land and redistribute it equitably to the peasants. In some countries in southern Africa, the Catholic Church had a crucial role in undermining policies perceived as unjust, immoral, like Apartheid, and racist segregation in Rhodesia (see Tutu, 1991, Hallencreutz, 1991). However, in Mozambique it played a role in bolstering and legitimising the colonial state, which partially explains why Frelimo was suspicious of church criticism to its policies in general.

In Mozambique, Morier-Genoud (1996: 35-36), without mentioning particularly the case of OP, has demonstrated the reaction of the Catholic Church to Frelimo's political choices after independence. For the author, the Catholic Church, without being necessarily reactionary, as accused by the Frelimo leadership, denounced many of Frelimo's political choices through their expositions. For example, in the first meeting they had with Machel, the Bishops of the Catholic Church presented a document criticising the implementation of re-education camps. In June 1976, the Episcopal Conference published a Pastoral Letter entitled "To live one's faith in today's Mozambique," one part of which dealt with the nationalisation process. The letter declared that, although the Church accepted nationalisation, the process had gone too far. In another section, the letter declared that the atheism propagated publicly as well as the efforts deployed to form a society without God and without any opening to the supernatural constituted one of the gravest errors of Frelimo at that time. In 1980, the Mozambican bishops wrote a Pastoral Letter about the prophetic mission of the Church; that it was its duty to speak out for the poor and the oppressed. In relation to socialism and the atheism promoted by the new state, the Church not only engaged in private criticism, it also went public with its views and openly questioned some of Frelimo's political choices.

One of the results of the Catholic Church's activism was that the Frelimo state changed its approach toward the Church. As noted by Morier-Genoud (1998:35-36), by the end of 1979, an

internal state document admitted that the government's anti-religious campaign had produced many negative side effects, including reinforcing people's faith, antagonizing those who had been favourable to the revolution, and alienating international allies. As a result, in 1980 Frelimo stepped down its hostility and began to move toward a new model of church-state relations in 1981. According to Morier-Genoud (1998:35-36), the new model would enlarge the areas of agreement with the Churches while reducing grounds for disagreement.

The Church was not neutral to the dictates of OP. Almost a year after it began, the Episcopal Conference, which met in Niassa, wrote a Pastoral Letter, *A Urgência da Paz* (The Urgency of Peace) on 7 May 1984 to the government denouncing the atrocities of the Operation (Conferência Episcopal de Moçambique, 1984, *Primeiro de Janeiro*, 1984). Another Letter condemning Frelimo's policies, *inter alia*, Operation Production, was written by the Bishop of Nampula, Dom Manuel Vieira Pinto (Pinto, 1984). According to the two Letters, Operation Production was increasing the suffering of many Mozambicans who were already subject to a prolonged war between Renamo and the government. The Bishops appealed to the government to stop immediately the evacuation of "unproductive people", as it was clear that its stated intentions were not related to the way it was being implemented. Inspired by ideas of morality and justice (Oakeshott, 1993), Bishops from the Catholic church in Niassa, Nampula and Sofala found unacceptable the removal of people from cities and leaving them to their own fate in provinces distant from their homes. They repudiated the suffering of the "unproductive people" that they were witnessing.

According to Matsinhe (9 January 2018), Frelimo had no access to the Letter and thus did not react to it. However, there is evidence of Frelimo's reaction to the Letter. Frelimo obliged the main Bishops to attend a meeting in August 1984 to demand explanation about the purpose of the Letter. The minutes of the meeting were written by the Episcopal Conference on 4 August 1984. According to the minutes, which may have been written by Dom Jaime Gonçalves, the Bishop of Beira and the President of the Episcopal Conference, the meeting was attended by 30 people. It included the then minister of Information and of Justice, the national director of the Department of Religious Affairs and two companions. Dom Jaime Pedro Gonçalves and its other members represented the Episcopal Conference. The government was not happy with the Letter and became very defensive about its content. The minister of Information, who spoke in the name of the government, blamed the Church for diverting people from Frelimo's socialist project and misinforming the people. He also blamed the Church for being too pessimistic about the political and socio-economic development in Mozambique, particularly concerning the outcome of the war. Concerning Operation Production, the government continued to argue that its intention was not to submit people to suffering and that the blame for hunger and other human rights violations did not lie with Frelimo but with those who sabotaged its development project, Renamo.

Frelimo would hardly admit their errors especially to the Catholic Church with which it had been at odds since independence. But, considering the course of the events after the Letter, associated with other socio-economic developments such as the war and economic reforms, it can be argued that the Letter was important in halting the evacuation of "unproductive people" from cities. The letter was written in a context of war, when Frelimo leaders began to have a sense that their revolutionary project was not working as planned, and that the state had to make significant changes to the nature of those policies that were predominantly coercive, such as OP. The war with Renamo was intensifying and affecting significantly rural areas, where the "unproductive people" were. In the months following the letter, according to Antunes, a priest based in Lichinga (Interview, 21 July 2016), none of the "unproductive people" arrived there after their Letter.

The Frelimo state started disguising the violent side of Operation Production. Monitoring and evaluation of OP started, to "make sure that justice was applied" (*Notícias,* 7 July 1983:6, *Notícias* 14 July 1983:6). The state promised to help the wives of those "unproductive people" who went to Niassa but returned without finding their husbands. In July 1984, some 13 Maputo women travelled to distant Niassa hoping to find their husbands who had been evacuated. They returned to Maputo disappointed and frustrated as they did not find their husbands and had to sell their belongings to get enough money to buy the ticket and return home alone. In return, however, the government provided nothing but clothes and food (*Notícias*, 12 July 1984:3). Frelimo also tried to unite families by sending the wives of OP subjects to Niassa and Cabo Delgado (*Notícias,* 12 April 1984:4). Nevertheless, most of the cases were unsuccessful because the state had no way to identify who was where. Thus, around May 1984, some of these women returned to Maputo alone. Most of the cases seem to have been mere propaganda and camouflage. However, while Frelimo aimed at disguising its Operation by pretending to reunite families and bring justice to them, maintaining Operation Production was becoming an unsustainable enterprise.

In addition, a government reshuffle happened after presentation of the Letter. In June 1984, Machel dismissed the minister of the Interior, Armando Guebuza and the minister of Security, Mariano Matsinhe, two key members of the Frelimo leadership most implicated in the implementation of the Operation (*Primeiro de Janeiro,* 1984:2). Guebuza and Matsinhe were appointed "resident ministers", another name for provincial governor, in Nampula and Niassa, respectively.

Matsinhe (Interview, 9 January 2018) did not accept the conclusion that the reshuffle of ministerial positions resulted from the Episcopal Conference's Letter or from the Catholic Church's denunciation of OP. Cabrita (2000) argues that Machel dismissed Guebuza and Matsinhe because they were dissidents in relation to his politics. Amidst intense ideological conflict inside Frelimo, as the impact of the war with Renamo on the state's capacity was being significantly felt, the Frelimo Political Bureau of which Machel was chief, had to choose between a diplomatic or military solution to the war, and between its alliance to the Eastern bloc or a strategic shift to the Western bloc. Earlier

events were a sign of the pressures on Machel. In 1982 Aquino de Bragança, one of Machel's main political advisers, escaped death by a letter bomb, that killed Ruth First. According to Cabrita (2000), in 1983, the Frelimo Political Bureau members, mainly Matsinhe and Guebuza, conspired against Machel. Joaquim Chissano and Alberto Chipande supported Guebuza and Matsinhe, who were in favour of a diplomatic solution to the war, and for liberalisation of the economy. Machel, who advocated the military solution to defeat Renamo, had almost no support. Faced with this challenge and with lack of support from his entourage, Machel was isolated in his approach to the war, and had to accept the diplomatic solution he had been resisting. It led to the Nkomati Accord with Apartheid South Africa in March 1984. The accord aimed at South Africa and Mozambique ceasing support for the Renamo and the African National Congress-ANC respectively. After the Accord, Machel decided to remove dissidents in the Political Bureau. Guebuza and Matsinhe were dismissed from their ministerial functions as a result, according to Cabrita (2000). This argument is hardly tenable. First, nothing would prevent Machel from dismissing Guebuza and Matsinhe from the Political Bureau during the tension if necessary to maintain his position. Second, Guebuza and Matsinhe remained members of the Political Bureau at least up to the fifth Congress (*Notícias*, 7 July 1989:7).

The Catholic Church not only wrote Pastoral Letters denouncing the atrocities of Operation Production: it also resisted Operation Production on the ground. According to *Primeiro de Janeiro* (12 July 1984:8), a Lisbon based newspaper, the Bishop of Lichinga provided shelter to a 17 year-old boy, Thomas Nguenha, to Marta Mulungo, sent to Niassa with her six children and to Pedro Vembane, an old man. Because of the intervention of the Catholic Church in Niassa, these three people remained in Lichinga, the capital city of Niassa and were not sent to rural Mozambique, which was the intention of Operation Production. When the Operation ended in 1988, the Church helped some of the victims of OP to return home, as reported by Lerma (1997), the Bishop of Inhambane and by Sitoe (*Noticias*, 15 December 1988:1). By doing so, the Church was showing practical support for those falling victim to Frelimo's hegemonic project and contributing to its lack of credibility.

I argue that resistance and contestation of Operation Production from its initial phase are amongst the factors that contributed to its demise in the mid- to long term. As Pitcher (2002) argued, the existence of social forces that contested and shaped every Frelimo measure, such as OP, eroded its projects over time. The way Operation Production victims responded to it, by defecting, bribing state officials, evading evacuation centres, and returning home after evacuation, along with the denunciation and resistance by the Catholic Church, undermined OP and led to its formal abandonment in 1988.

The section shows that the actions of these non-state actors revealed the limitations of ideology and values in maintaining and enforcing the policy. While the Frelimo leadership presented OP as a political action needed to cope with the challenges of its revolution and was thus full of humanity, other actors interpreted it differently. This set of responses led to actions that in the mid- to long-term

caused the end of Operation Production. The Renamo presence in rural areas, where most "unproductive people" lived, also significantly contributed to the end of the Operation by undermining Frelimo's control mechanisms in rural areas and recruiting some "unproductive people" during attacks or when they tried to escape from such areas, as the following section shows.

6.2. Renamo, the weakness of control mechanisms and Operation Production

By focusing on Renamo incursions, mainly from 1984 onward, this section demonstrates the ways in which they contributed to end OP. I argue that Renamo interventions, which took place mainly in rural areas where the "unproductive people" were, contributed to weaken Frelimo's control and order mechanisms, including the *guia de marcha,* which were the core of Operation Production. Some "unproductive people" were recruited during or after attacks. Left on their own, a significant number of people abandoned the places where they were placed by the Operation. On their attempt to flee OP, some of them fell into Renamo's hands. These events associated with resistance to OP by the Catholic Church, the death of Machel and the socioeconomic context, also contributed to OP's demise.

By attacking, recruiting and occupying significant parts of rural Mozambique, Renamo had a devastating impact on the capacity of the state to exert its control over its territory in general and rural areas in particular. Its incursions privileged rural areas for many reasons. Renamo avoided facing Frelimo in urban areas, as it was aware that Frelimo had superior military capacity there, mainly in the areas surrounding the capital, Maputo (Cabrita, 2000). From 1983 onward, including the whole period of the implementation of Operation Production, Renamo intensified its attacks (Cabrita, 2000 and Cahen, 2018). In central Mozambique, it attacked the road and railway traffic between the port of Beira and Malawi, undermining safety along the Beira corridor and the capacity of the state to control those areas, access to which became difficult for the authorities. Maringué town fell under Renamo's control in September 1983. The Chimoio-Tete road also became unsafe due to Renamo's incursions (Cabrita, 2000). The attacks diverted the government's attention away from the "unproductive people" and the state's scarce resources to war efforts (Hanlon, 1984). To mount a counter-attack against Renamo, the government, with the aid of a team of Soviet military advisers, started planning *Operação Cabana* in 1982 to be implemented in three phases in central and southern Mozambique. Their mission was to identify Renamo's positions and report to Frelimo's Armed Forces (Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique-FAM). Frelimo's Operation failed to halt Renamo. It continued to operate and in July-August 1983, there were reports of Renamo attacks on roads in Gaza and northern areas of Maputo province (Cabrita, 2000 and Emerson, 2014).


According to Cabrita (2000) Renamo, with 150 men under Rocha Paulino's command, entered Niassa province in August 1983, and established a base near Muacanha. At this stage, some of the "unproductive people" were already in rural Niassa. Renamo attacked roads and railway traffic. The

Cuamba-Lichinga railway, the main transportation infrastructure in Niassa, was destroyed on 23 August 1983 (Cabrita, 2000). Until the end of the war, Renamo had about 1,300 men in Niassa. Its attacks spanned throughout all the districts' capitals, except Lichinga and Metangula, where there was a Frelimo Navy Base. Mavago district, where many "unproductive people" lived, remained in Renamo's hands up to the end of the war, in 1992 (Cabrita, 2000). As pointed out in FBIS (10 May 1988), state farms, foreign backed farming projects, and communal villages, where thousands of "unproductive people" were deployed, began to come under direct attack of Renamo from 1984 onward (Marshall, 1992:45). Renamo attacks thus denied government access to much of the interior of the country where most "unproductive people" had been placed.

In 1984, even after the signing of the Nkomati accord, Renamo continued to expand its activities throughout rural Mozambique, and by the end of the year, it was present in almost all of rural Mozambique, as map 2 shows. In May, Renamo entered rural Cabo Delgado (where many "unproductive people" were) via Nampula, led by Rocha Paulino, the same man who led Renamo into Niassa. Over the years, Renamo expanded its activities in Cabo Delgado, from Muikho to Namuno in the west, and to Meluco and Muidumbe in the north. In 1986, it claimed it had raided Montepuez, where there the Cotton Agricultural Company of Cabo Delgado was situated and where some of the "unproductive people" were working. This information was confirmed by André, the wife of Sumail Chingo, commander during Operation Production in Nangororo, the main production centre in Cabo Delgado (Interview, 9 August 2017). In 1987, Renamo attacked Meluco and occupied Chiúre. In 1988 Mueda, which also received some "unproductive people", according to Ngula (Interview, 18 January 2018), was raided (Cabrita, 2000: 92).

Map 2: Renamo Incursions

Renamo Military Regions by the end of 1984



Source: Cahen (2018):110-111

Renamo targeted not only schools and hospitals, but also tea, cotton, and sugar companies companies where some "unproductive people" were working or living in their surroundings. At the end of the war, approximately 1.6 million people, including some of the "unproductive people", fled to neighbouring countries or to Mozambique's provincial capitals (República de Moçambique, 1995:13, Hanlon, 1996: 85).

Renamo attacks were determinant in reducing Frelimo's capacity to implement the *guia de marcha*, one of the government's principal mechanisms to keep the "unproductive people" in rural Mozambique and control their mobility. In this situation, the *guia de marcha* lost its usefulness. As mentioned by Ngovene (Interview, 13 July 2016) and Tembe (Interview, 13 July 2016), 'when Renamo came to Unango, it became ungovernable. We were left on our own. That is why many people disappeared from Unango at that time. Renamo came to control Unango for some time'. In other cases, "unproductive people" fled to the cities. The example of Nombora (Interview, 9July 2017), another of OP's evacuees, who was taken to Matucuta in Niassa, is typical of many others who fled to Lichinga because of Renamo attacks. Nombora explained:

> I remember Renamo's attack, it was in 1986. They attacked first Majune [another district of Niassa] and then they came to Matucuta [a district of Niassa, between Lichinga and Sanga]. The government lost control of everything. We fled to survive. In my case, I fled to Namwanika. Renamo also came to Namwanika. They burnt everything, and 6 people were killed. I started looking for a safe place. That is how I got to Lichinga, where the government put us in the same place. Living conditions were very poor. After that, because the government could not afford to feed us, they sent us to Matama, where I am still living.

Renamo also recruited some "unproductive people" in the course of its attacks. This recruitment was crucial in diverting the Frelimo state's attention from OP to war efforts. Some Operation Production targets and ex-workers of state companies that received "unproductive people" gave their testimonies. Samson (Interview 13 July 2016), Ngovene (Interview, 13 July 2016) and Tembe (Interview, 13 July 2016) mention some of their comrades who ended up in Renamo bases in Xilocote, in Sanga district, Niassa. These people were captured by Renamo troops in the course of their attempt to return home. Later, they returned as Renamo soldiers and attacked Unango Agricultural Company in 1986. 'That is why during the attack they screamed our names. They knew us by name. And, some of us when hearing their names stopped and were caught', said Ngovene. Machie (Interview, 3 August 2017), sent from Moamba, Maputo to work in Gurue-Zambézia, in 1979, Uate (Interview, 3 August 2017), a subject of OP sent to Ruace, Zambezia and Lumpua (Interview, 3 August 2017), a community leader in Ruace since 1984, remember that Renamo attacked the Complexo Agro-Industrial de Lioma (CAPEL) on the 12th July 1986. CAPEL is an agricultural company, part of the government's agricultural project of 400,000 hecrares, ranging from Nguri, in Cabo Delgado, Unango and Matama, in Niassa and Ruace, in Zambezia. Some of the "unproductive people" were sent to CAPEL. 'When Renamo attacked in 1986, some of them were recruited by Renamo', said Machie. Liala (Interview, 3 August 2017), a commander and later a worker at EMOCHA (Mozambican Tea Company established in Gurue district, Zambezia province), mentioned two attacks of Renamo on CAPEL, the first in 1982 and the second in 1986, three years after Operation Production. Daudo (Interview, 5 July 2017), a

subject of OP taken to Gurue, was more precise in his account on how Renamo might have contributed to end Operation Production:

> ...Yes, Renamo attacked the company in 1986/7. They destroyed the compamy and some of those who came with me were recruited by Renamo. Actually two of them were recruited: Domingo Landezo, who came from Quelimane and Francisco Chuva. Others died here, e.g. Angelo Mugina...

"In 1986 the Matama Agricultural Company was attacked by Renamo and we all fled to Lichinga" (the capital city of Niassa), said Marta (Interview, 14 July 2016), a wife of Lazaro Maculuve, a subject of OP. In these attacks, Renamo soldiers occupied the company's property for 3 days before being forced out by government troops. During their occupation, they took trucks and cattle belonging to the company. As told by Ngovene and Tembe, Renamo attacked the Unango Agricultural Company in 1986. It also attacked other places where "unproductive people" were sent, such as the Matama Agricultural Company, in Niassa, in October 1984 (Interview, Iaquete, 11 July 2017), Napió, Najua and Taratara, close to Nangororo production centre, Cabo Delgado, in 1987 (Interview, 19 August 2017). During or after the attacks, Renamo recruited workers, one of Renamo's strategies to reinforce its numbers (Manning, 2000:).

By putting people in rural Mozambique and leaving them without support, vulnerable as they were, Frelimo made life easier for Renamo. As Geffray (1990: 95) argues, when some of the evacuees crossed paths with groups of Renamo soldiers, they were not always averse to staying with them, once their initial fear had passed. The general perception that "unproductive people" had of Renamo was that of a rebel movement that worsened their lives. For this reason, given that Renamo came unannounced, their first contacts were fearful. Nevertheless, the fact that they were virtually abandoned by the state led some of them to accept capture by Renamo without resistance.

By occupying a significant portion of rural areas and recruiting some of those subjected to OP during its attacks, Renamo helped disrupt the intended purpose of OP. It also reduced the capacity of the state to maintain its control over the mobility of people through the *guia de marcha.* These events, coupled with resistance to OP and with economic reforms that the country undertook, led to the end of Operation Production.

6.3. Liberalism, Machel's death and Operation Production

This section analyses how the economic reforms that occurred from the mid-i1980s and the death of Machel contributed to the end of Operation Production. I argue that these events resulted in the limitation of the state's role in the economy, reduced the need to restrict mobility, which was the cornerstone of OP, and diminished the room for manoeuvre of the Frelimo leadership to shape policy

content. Machel's death also pushed Frelimo further away from its revolutionary project. The new socio-economic dispensation made policies such as Operation Production unnecessary and disadvantageous.

The failure of Frelimo to meet its "socialist" goals led to internal economic reforms and to negotiations with the Bretton Woods' institutions (Hanlon, 1984). As seen in chapter 4, Mozambique was in a severe crisis from the mid-1980s. In this context, heavy pressure for further economic reform came from international financial institutions. By 1982 external debt payments reached crisis proportions while Mozambican credit worthiness had expired, leaving the country in a state of economic collapse. The balance of payments deficit through the decade stood at over $400 million (Marshall, 1992). Eastern-Bloc assistance, on which the country had relied, dropped significantly, and the Soviet Union was reluctant to admit Mozambique in Comecon, the main Eastern bloc economic assistance platform (Cabrita, 2000: 96).

Simultaneously, as we have seen in the previous section, the war intensified. The Frelimo leadership decided to take measures that are more pragmatic. The step forward was to approach the Western block. Faced with economic crisis and shrinking support from Eastern countries, Mozambique had to look somewhere else if it wanted to continue to exert its basic state functions. The country that had refused to sign the Berlin Clause, to benefit from economic support from the western bloc, had to reconsider (Cahen, 1993: 34). Resisting the conditions imposed by the IMF and World Bank became more difficult. During an interview on a local private television station in October 2016 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GbIMBY_jkhc, consulted on 28 October 2016), Chissano argued that the Frelimoleadership, with emphasis on Machel, soon realized that it could no longer benefit from socialist countries' support: 'we realised that we should start changing our economic structure in order to open the market for the western countries and grasp their support'. As the need for a shift became clear, in October 1983 both Chissano and Machel went on a diplomatic tour to western countries, where amongst several western leaders, they met Ronald Reagan (The Republican US president) and Margaret Thatcher (the UK prime Minister), and obtained some emergency assistance as a result (Marshall, 1992). The offer of long-term economic relief depended on Mozambique's agreement with the International Monetary Fund. In January 1984, Mozambique effectively declared bankruptcy, requesting its creditors to reschedule its debts, deferring principal and interest due in 1983-86 until 1991-98 (Marshall, 1992: 71).

Conditions to join those financial institutions were created and in September 1984, Mozambique joined them (Cabrita, 2000: 98, Marshall, 1992:56, Landau, 1998). In the following months, there was limited rescheduling of Mozambican debt by the Paris Club of the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) government creditors. Debts with the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) were renegotiated until 1985. But the more long-term debt was not resolved. Thus, 'by 1987 the debt achieved $3.2 billion, of which arrears on debt payments

totalled $1.4 billion. Annual debt service was two and half times the total of exporting earnings, with interest payments alone exceeding annual foreign-exchange earnings' (Cabrita, 2000: 105, Pitcher, 2002:78 and Marshall, 1992: 98). To avoid complete economic collapse the country started shifting its economic approach. After identifying and accepting significant policy errors, Frelimo's fourth Congress called on the private sector and family sector to play a much greater role in the economy. As pointed out by Pitcher (2002: 79), Frelimo started allowing the private sector to operate. In 1987 the country adopted its first structural adjustment program, PRE (Mosca, 2005), furthering the limited economic reforms that had been initiated after the fourth Congress. Henceforth, the country would rely more and more on the private sector, foreign investment, and World Bank loans, rather than direct state management of factories and farms (Pitcher, 2002). In June 1987, Mozambique received favourable rescheduling terms by the Paris Club of international lenders: 20 year's for debt repayment with a 10-year grace period (Marshall, 1992: 100). Western aid to Mozambique jumped from $360 million in 1985 to $700 million in 1987 and over $1 billion in 1990 (Hanlon, 1996:76).

This economic shift reduced the room for manoeuvre of the Frelimo leadership in the shaping of policy choice and implementation. As we have seen in chapter 3, the Frelimo leadership had previously enjoyed significant space to shape the decision-making process and policy execution, such as that required for OP because of its top-down control of the state machinery, and a weak opposition and bourgeoisie. This room diminished significantly from the mid-1980s, partially because of the economic shift that was gradually implemented. Owing to this shift under crisis economic conditions, coupled with continued warfare, contestation within Frelimo and the death of Machel, a key figure in the making of OP, the Frelimo's ideological construction gave way, ceasing to convince the Party and the broader public. Pre-existing ideology and its associated values lost their meaning to the Frelimo leadership and to its various constituencies because it became divorced from reality (Ferguson, 1994: 99). As argued by Bluter (2015:87), liberals may disagree on the extent to which freedom of the labour force should occur but they argue that it is one of its essential building blocks. They assert priority of individual freedom in social, political and economic life, arguing that individual freedom should be maximised and the use of force minimised. Unlike the Frelimo leadership's earlier views, liberals see the individual as more important than the collective. They argue that forcing people to do things against their will is costly and damaging and produces perverse results. It is true that the economic changes that Frelimo was undertaking at this stage did not mean political freedom, as argued by Cahen (1993:76) but the fact that they were embracing liberal economic reforms made irrelevant policies implying highly centralized orientation by the state such as Operation Production.

The death of Machel also contributed to the closure of Operation Production. On 19 October 1986, Machel died in a plane crush on his return from a Front-Line State summit meeting in Zambia (Cabrita, 2000:43, Vines, 2013:45, Hanlon, 1991:74). As argued in the introduction, a political leader has a key role in the decision-making process. Machel was the pre-eminent figure of the Frelimo

leadership. Frelimo's decision-making process relied heavily on the ideas, perceptions and representations of its leadership in which Machel was central. Without overemphasizing the role of one individual, I demonstrate that Machel's death had a significant impact on the policies adopted as part of the Mozambican revolution, particularly on Operation Production. Joaquim Chissano, the minister of foreign affairs, and number three in Frelimo's Politburo (Cabrita, 2000: 99), took over as President. The move towards liberalism benefited from Chissano's openness to reform. Even if Chissano agreed with many of Machel's ideas, he realised that the survival of the country relied on its ability to adapt to new political and economic circumstances. Faced with increasing Renamo attacks, and pressure from international financial institutions, he continued with the economic trends that the country had already embraced after Frelimo's fourth Congress. Two years after Machel's death, and less than a year after the inception of Mozambique's first structural adjustment program, President Chissano announced the official end of OP during a visit to Niassa in 1988 (*Indian Ocean Newsletter*, 14 May 1988:5, *Notícias* ,15 December 1988:3).

The Operation was concluded without any clear explanation and no concrete plan to arrange the life of those who were subject to it. According to Chissano, after testifying to the long suffering to which the "unproductive people" were subject, for reasons that no longer made sense, those affected could return home (FBIS, 10 May 1988). However, they would have to do so on their own, as the government would not provide means for their transportation. Frelimo's reaction to the end of OP suggests that the decision to allow the return of the "unproductive people" was not made willingly but resulted from from diverse pressures , such as resistance, denunciation, crisis, war, economic reforms and the death of Machel. Operation Production was meant to be permanent, as stated by Alberto Massavanhane, the president of Maputo City Council (*Noticias*, 23 September 1983:4). People sent to rural areas were supposed to remain there and not to return home. Most of those who managed to return did so on their own or were helped by the Catholic Church (Sitoe, 1988:1). One would not expect Frelimo to support the return of people they never wanted in urban areas. Policies that resemble Operation Production are still being implemented by Frelimo after more than 30 years. Eneas Comiche the President of the Maputo City Council, one of the cities most affected by OP, started removing informal dwellers and street vendors from the City's Business District (CBD) to place them in the peripheries (https://cartamz.com/index.php/sociedade/item/4646, consulted on 14 April 2020). Though such individuals are not being sent to rural Mozambique, the rationale behind this recurrent initiative is the same as of that of OP: clearing from the city centre those who compromise its order and control mechanisms.

From 1992, after the General Peace Agreement, the Catholic social organisation, Caritas, and other Non-Governmental Organizations tried to reunite families by helping a number of "unproductive people" to return home. On the 3 August 1997, some 100 people, among them men, women and children, left Lichinga for southern Mozambique. With them were Sister Teresa Balela and Sister

Carmen, of the Catholic Church. It took four days for them to reach home, after a long and complex 2,000 kilometre journey by bus. As resources were scarce and most Mozambican roads were severely damaged owing to almost 16 years of war, the journey was a mixture of suffering and anxiety after more than a decade in rural Mozambique. Sister Teresa Balela and Sister Carmen reported that the bus they used stopped several times to fix blown tyres, and that 3 children and a man died on the way. When they reach Vilanculos, those who stopped there could not believe that they had reached home (Lerma, 1997).

Chissano, like many other members of the Frelimo leadership, was aware that maintaining policies such as OP after the adoption of economic changes made little sense. Moreover, the death of Machel also meant a significant shift in the power relations amongst the members of the Frelimo leadership. As most of the previous decision-making process relied heavily on the power of Machel and his like-minded colleagues, their reduced power within the Political Buerau meant less relevance was attached to their ideas and the policies that resulted from them.

Conclusion

The chapter argues that the closure of Operation Production was a result of a combination of different economic, political and social changes that in the mid- to long-term undermined the capacity of the state to control and maintain the "unproductive people" in rural Mozambique as part of its urban vision, which was the main purpose of OP. As seen in chapter four, the Frelimo leadership's practical argument (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012) was that urban "chaos", such as crime and prostitution resulted from "unproductive people" in cities. Thus, the party-state adopted OP to create a new urban order, intended to be a fundamental achievement for the Mozambican revolution. As OP unfolded, diverse forms of resistance practised by the "unproductive people", combined with the Catholic Church's active denunciation and resistance to the Operation, the war, economic crisis and policy shifts, as well as the death of Machel, reduced both the efficiency of Frelimo's control mechanism and the importance of policies such as OP. For those who wanted but did not manage to escape the Operation and were thus forced to remain in rural Mozambique, Renamo attacks destroyed Frelimo's ability to control them. Amidst Renamo attacks, they had to rely on their own capacities to survive. Exiting from rural areas became the main solution. Most of them fled to the capitals of the provinces most affected by the Operation, such as Lichinga and Pemba. Renamo recruited some of them during or after its attacks. For those who continued in rural areas, contact with government structures was minimal or non-existent particularly in the areas fully controlled by Renamo. Amidst continuous economic crisis in the 1980s, the adoption of more liberal economic policies, intensified after Machel's death, led to radically different religious and constitutional politics, a process consigning post-independence revolutionary socialism into oblivion. They also reduced the room for manoeuvre of the Frelimo leadership in the policy process. These events thus demonstrated finally the limitations

of the leadership's ideology and values in Operation Production, and illustrate the contextual determinants and spirit of Frelimo's reformist ideology in the 1980s (Machava, 2018)

Conclusion

Based on the case of OP, this thesis used Political Discourse Analysis and Discourse Historical Analysis to tackle the Frelimo leadership's ideology and values in order to explain their importance in Frelimo's engagement in Operation Production.

The thesis demonstrates that the social origins and experiences of political leaders shape their understanding of order and control, which leads to policy adoption and the way it is implemented. My analysis of OP shows that it was part of a broader and historical project of the Frelimo leadership, which placed order and control as a means to achieve their urban governance, as an essential part of the vision of a "socialist city". In this rationale, activities that escaped Frelimo's hands and compromised their project, such as the "unproductive people", had to be captured or at least, driven far away to not disturb what was discursively constructed as the normal, as in the colonial era. In urban areas, "unproductive people" were a problem for the imaginary urban society to be achieved. In rural areas, even if they continued with the same activities, which had justified their eviction from urban areas, they were not a problem for the Frelimo leadership. In rural areas, it was in theory easy to control their mobility through the *guia de marcha*.

Based on the historical analysis of political discourse, I have demonstrated the historicity of ideology and its significant role in policy process. The thesis argues that ideology and values are not simply an instrumental tool of power, but that it necessarily reflects history, context, and the way political leaders perceive problems and solutions to address them. OP resulted from the historical ideologies and values of the Frelimo leadership, a consequence of their social and historical origins, and their military experience during exile and the liberation struggle. Given their position within Frelimo and the power they acquired from the late 1960s, they managed to transform their ideology and values into general beliefs that had practical implications in the policy process, which led to Operation Production. The historical context ensured that ideology went through a process of self-naturalisation in a way that was assumed without challenge. In the case of OP, the idea according to which urban disorder was caused by the presence of "unproductive people" in cities and that their removal to rural areas was the solution to return to normality became acceptable as the legitimate solution to deal with urban issues. The socioeconomic and political context in which these ideas emerged and were used in their history made them compelling for the Frelimo leadership.

It is true that Frelimo faced various urban issues, as many societies face (Anderson & Ishwaran, 1965). Nevertheless, a thorough analysis of the Frelimo leadership's discourse reveals much specific detail. On one hand, Frelimo had already acknowledged the reduction of "social deviation" such as crime and prostitution in cities before the implementation of OP. In his speech to the fourth congress, in 1983, Samora Machel mentioned the reduction of crime and prostitution. For him, though six nonviolent robberies and two violent aggressions had occurred, there had been no homicide, and no armed or violent robbery in Maputo city. All over the country, the number of house fires and

violence against people had halved. Robbery, assault and other crime had reduced by about 20% (Partido Frelimo, 1983). This reduction, according to Machel was due to the reinforcement of the popular vigilance, police raids and selective campaigns, soldiers and police raids, introduced before Operation Production. On the other hand, the same urban issues that had diminished in importance as a result of these repressive measures, justified the adoption of Operation Production, at least in discourse. Concerning the adoption of measures against urban disorder, one can argue that it is government's duty to implement them, as Anderson & Ishwaran (1965) do. In fact, this reasoning was used in the Frelimo leadership's discourse to justify OP. As Vivet (2015) argues, by blaming the "unproductive people" for urban chaos, Frelimo was rejecting its incapacity to address key development issues in the urban context, such as food shortage, unemployment, underemployment, the rupture of the urban trade network, lack of urban social services, such as education and health, sanitation, etc. Frelimo did not see itself as part of the urban problem. It blamed the city dwellers for their own unemployment and thus justified their eviction to rural areas against their will. Crime and prostitution had reduced before OP (Quembo, 2017), not only as a result of police and army actions but also due to the kind of social controls adopted by Frelimo all over the country since independence. Some police officers interviewed confirmed this information. For example, Frangoulis (Interview, 22 April 2016), a senior police officer during OP, said:

> There was no generalised crime and prostitution in Maputo or other cities. One could talk about small crime, such as those who stole chickens. However, really crime did not exist. Even prostitution did not exist as it exists today. People were scared to commit crimes or to engage in prostitution. There were police everywhere. In the neighbourhood, the secretaries, chiefs of the blocks, and mobilising groups controlled people. They knew everyone. It was not possible to commit crimes without being caught.

Sitoe (a police officer during OP, Interview, 29 October 2015), confirmed that crime was not as large in the 1980s as to justify a coercive measure such as Operation Production. In Maputo, Beira and Nampula, places were crime could be significant; the police were better equipped, with transport and very well trained officers, to control crime at this period. Paradoxically, Frelimo introduced OP, an essentially coercive measure to deal with issues that it had declared insignificant in the same period.

The case of Operation Production suggests new ways of inquiring into and reinterpreting postcolonial Frelimo politics. Scholars who have approached Mozambican socialist politics without considering the historical dimension of Frelimo's discursive construction have interpreted OP as a simple consequence of Frelimo's failed revolution. For instance, Morton (2015) argues that Frelimo resorted to desperate measures in face of urban crisis, aggravated by the war in the 1980s. By seeing OP as a desperate measure, Morton suggests that OP is a policy that emerged in the 1980s to deal with urban problems of that time. By making an historical analysis of Frelimo's revolutionary discourse,

the colonial legacy, and the context in which discourse was produced and used, I demonstrate that the social and historical origins of political leaders are more important in explaining policy process than ideological orientation on its own. The explanation of the engagement of Frelimo in Operation Production has to be sought in their historically rooted perceptions, values, military experience that shaped their understanding of urban chaos and its remedies.

My interpretation is not the only one possible. Not everyone will find it useful nor, certainly, will it be useful in all contexts. There is great value to be found in many other ways of understanding Frelimo's postcolonial politics. Many of the ideas suggested in this research are still the subject of continuing exploration. My interpretation should therefore be taken as part of on-going research.

By telling the story of Operation Production (OP) through the analysis of Frelimo's revolutionary discourse in its dynamic relationship with institutions and context over time, this research has contributed to illuminate Mozambican "socialist" politics and to reinterpret it. It demonstrates the importance of political leaders' ideology in the formulation of policy interventions, seeing ideology as a continously evolving and relevant product of the history and experience of the the Frelimo leadership, tied together in resolving the problems of nationalist political unity and military liberation. Based on the findings of this thesis, it is possible to see how African leaders make extensive use of discourse to legitimise policy interventions, by normalising and moralising issues such as urban chaos. To unpack African politics, one needs to historically explore the frame of ideas in discourse, in what context the discourse was produced and used, the historical trajectory of discourse and of the political leaders, and how it changes over time. Finally, how history and experiences shape ideology in ways that lead to policy choice and its implementation.

Although this thesis demonstrates the power of ideology in determining policy choice and policy implementation, it also shows its limitations in building and maintaining legitimacy. To use Fairclough and Fairclough's (2012) term, the practical argument, which is framed in the dominant discourse of political leaders about causes and solutions of a specific problem, will determine the nature of the policy that will be adopted to deal with it. By using a theory of decision-making process, which emphasizes the role of perceptions, ideas and representation of political leaders, which are manifest in discourse (Grindle and Thomas, 1991), combined with Discourse Historical Approach (Wodak, 2011), the thesis shows not just the relationship between ideology and policy but also how non-discursive factors can determine policy demise in an African context.

My approach to OP allowed me to engage in academic dialogue about African politics in general and on Frelimo's politics in particular. I identified ways in which political leaders' perceptions relate to the socio-economic context in which ideology emerges and is used, and the way political leaders are positioned within state institutions, as well as the nature of these institutions, determine policy outcome.

This analysis of the interaction between discursive and non-discursive practices sheds further

light on the ways in which Operation Production constituted a moment in the formation and consolidation of the post-colonial Mozambican state. The issue of control over individual movement, as argued here, is central to the state-making processes, as recently discussed by, for example, Vigneswaran and Quirk (2015) and Herbst (2014). The role that the notion of national production and control over people's mobility played in defining OP, in the context of a political and economic crisis in recently independent Mozambique, is a fruitful avenue of further research.

This approach to OP opens other ways of inquiring about and interpreting Frelimo's political history. I shifted the focus from governmental politics (Skocpol, 1985 and Allison and Zellikow, 1999) and Marxist analysis (Carnoy, 1984 and Nordlinger, 1987) to focus on the history of ideas and perceptions (Grindle and Thomas, 1991; Wodak, 2011 and Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012) that shape policy choice and policy implementation. As argued by Hall (1993), ideas determine policy choice and policy implementation. The example of OP and of other countries, such as Zimbabwe and Tanzania, noted in the introduction, suggests that African leaders are actors who had ongoing concerns about their society, which can be traced through their discourse. Their ideas about cause and remedies of their perceived problems are historically determined. By exploring the history of discourse, as suggested by Wodak (2011), this research demonstrated that reformist ideology, such as OP, is historically determined. It is important therefore to approach African politics through the prism of political leaders' ideas, the way they process information required to take decisions, the historical determination of their perceptions, and their positioning within the state apparatus. It is useful to build on a careful historical exploration of the trajectory of political leaders to interpret African postcolonial politics.

My approach to OP has proven fruitful in producing empirical research on similar topics in Mozambique and other countries. This perspective, which goes beyond discourse analysis, allows us to see policy more fully not only from its intentions, as stated in its discourse but also the limitations of political leaders' ideology in maintaining a policy's legitimacy. This approach to Mozambican revolutionary politics is useful in the sense that it produces new interpretations for what has been assumed as a closed debate. The same approach can be used in other political contexts as was indicated above in the work of Tendi (2004), Massakure (2016), Burton (2007), Miti (1985) and Ferguson (1994).

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