


The Royalist Army in the First Civil War

by Ian Roy



Summer, 1963^{MT}

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Abbreviations

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D.Phil. Thesis
Abstract

The Royalist Army in the First Civil War

The army under discussion is that which was directly under Charles I's command, and was based at Oxford during the war, not the forces stationed permanently in the North or West. This army, the chief strength of the Royalists, was raised in the Midlands in the summer of 1642, by loyal nobility and gentry, who recruited volunteer regiments in the counties where their "interest" was greatest. Attempts to use the existing militia system were largely unsuccessful at this stage of the war. The prospect before the King at first seemed unhopeful, but improved as arms from the continent, private financial contributions and Welsh recruits reached him; the army at Edgehill was strong in infantry and was well-paid, but was short of personal weapons.

The Council of War became the chief executive and administrative committee for the organisation of the army. The King presided at its meetings, which dealt with a wide range of topics. The papers of the secretary-at-war, Edward Walker, help us to see it at work. Civilian and military elements were combined in the Council, and its mixed character allowed it to act successfully as a mediator in disputes between army units and the civilian population. Sub-committees of the Council were charged with specialist tasks.

Other committees were set up at Oxford. The defence of the city, in the absence of the King and the field army during the summer campaigns, was in the hands of a body known as the "Lords Commissioners". In 1644 the King summoned a counter-Parliament to Oxford, and this

assembly, and the committee of its members it left behind when it was not in session, played some part in decision-taking.

There was a constant tug-of-war between the Oxford authorities and local commanders, who aspired to independent positions. The basic unit of Royalist administration was the county committee: several counties were "associated" together, and colonel-generals were put in command of them. Each provincial general had his agent at Oxford, who looked after his interest there.

The High Command most probably did not formulate any grand strategy for 1643, which would bring the armies of the North and West to blockade London. Instead, military policy-making seems to have been flexible and unco-ordinated. Decisions were made from day to day by the Council of War, and this worked quite well in 1643 and 1644. However, the character of the King - stubborn and vacillating by turns, giving way to favourites - allowed political factions in the court and army to grow, and the War Council was soon by-passed by juntas, or dominated by rival personalities. The quarrel of Rupert and Digby was the culmination of this process.

The Royalist army "establishment" consisted of the horse, dragoons and foot, the several financial and commissariat departments and the Office of Ordnance. The horse was considered the most important part of the army. It was difficult and expensive to raise, but was gradually built up, in 1643, until it was almost equal in numbers to the foot. The cavalry was socially superior to other arms; it was, on the field of battle, occasionally indifferent to the fate

of the infantry, and, towards the end of the war, its politically-influential officers resisted necessary reform and amalgamation of regiments.

The Royalists had quickly acquired a large body of infantry in 1642. It was, however, unstable. At the end of each campaigning season, many infantrymen returned home; in the following spring the permanent regimental cadres recruited them again. Despite the bringing over of the government troops from Ireland (mainly foot), on the whole the tendency was for the infantry to decline in numbers, but this was compensated for by the increasing professionalism of this arm. Amateur colonels were replaced, as the war dragged on, by career soldiers. The Naseby foot was much admired by friend and foe alike as a veteran, well-officered force.

The High Command attempted to augment the foot by introducing conscription, making use of militia forces and setting up auxiliary regiments in the main garrisons, which would release regular units for field duty. In the spring of 1644, also, with the co-operation of the Oxford Parliament, it undertook a formal "reformation" of the army, an abortive attempt to "new model" the King's forces. After Second Newbury (autumn 1644) a reorganisation of the cavalry was, however, carried through. This was not so much a reformation - the foot was not involved - as an attempt to take account of the new military situation caused by the loss of the North, and the arrival of the horse which had survived Marston Moor. It was also influenced by the political divisions in the High Command. Rupert became

Captain-General of the main army, and his rivals helped to create Goring's army as a counterweight; many old horse regiments were given to Goring for the 1645 campaign.

The other headquarters departments were also reviewed in 1644. The pay of the army was dependent mainly upon the weekly assessments which the counties had agreed to provide. The main drawback to this tax was that the Oxford authorities tended to lose control of it. To counteract this tendency other taxes were agreed to by the Oxford Parliament in spring 1644: principally, loans raised by private subscription, and the excise, both to be paid to Oxford. But it was still found that money raised locally tended to be spent locally.

Similarly, while the commissariat officials at Oxford were often experienced men, and reasonably efficient, as much, in the way of provisions, was taken from the countryside where the army was quartered, as was supplied direct from the central Oxford magazines. It was, in any case, difficult to transport perishables any great distance from the King's headquarters. The best that the commissaries could do was to regulate, so far as they were able, the taking of food, shelter and clothing by the soldiery in quarters or on the march. The soldiers' staple diet was bread and cheese. Promissory notes ("tickets") were authorised for their use, and the rates to be paid for provisions laid down. Such a situation was, however, open to abuse, and there was much plundering, especially in the last year or two of the war. While the Royalist soldier lacked regular pay and supplies of food, he was never destitute.

Probably the most important headquarters department was the Ordnance Office, which organised the provision of arms and ammunition. Most of its papers have survived. To keep the army and the train of artillery supplied the Office brought the iron industries of the Midlands and the Forest of Dean under contribution, and developed Oxford, Bristol and other garrisons as centres of military production. From the beginning of the war, in addition, great quantities of armaments were imported from abroad, at first through Newcastle, and from the summer of 1643 through Bristol and other Western ports. Wealthy City Royalists helped to pay for these activities, and once the initial shortages had been overcome, the main army and its train were reasonably well supplied for most of the war.

In general, material shortages were not a continuing or critical factor in the defeat of the Royalist army. Lack of money, provisions and arms at Oxford may, however, have weakened the authority of the High Command, which controlled the central magazines, and allowed too much latitude to provincial commanders and individual regiments. The political divisions at Oxford were more decisive in ensuring that the Royalist army resisted reform in 1644 and was unable to make the best use of its still formidable strength in the following year.

Introduction

In a paper of August 1643, concerning the pay of the King's army, the forces under discussion were said to be those not "in the North, or constantly in the West".⁽¹⁾ The document, in other words, was dealing with the main field army directly under the King. The distinction is a useful one: for the purposes of this study "Royalist army" means that central army raised at York in 1642, brought to Oxford quarters, and led on campaign by the King each year until the end of the war. The other Royalist forces - in the North, the West, or elsewhere - are peripheral to this main theme.

The Royalist army, unlike Jason's men, did not spring fully armed from the ground. It was of slow growth, and very much the product of its age. Although the situation of 1642 was, in many ways, without precedent, neither King nor Parliament could ignore the traditional machinery which existed for raising armed forces in England, nor the legal forms and customary procedures which accompanied it. As such problems as the use that could be made of the militia organisation, the extent of the Crown's rights and the subject's obligations in the matter of military service all influenced the early development of the King's forces, something must be said about them before we can approach the Royalist army proper.⁽²⁾

(1) British Museum, Harleian MS. 6852, f.175.

(2) The main secondary authorities, on which this brief introduction is based, are G.S. Thomson, Lords Lieutenants in the Sixteenth Century (1923); G.H. Firth, Cromwell's Army, 3rd edn. (1921), Chapter I; Musters, Beacons, Subsidies, Etc., ed. J. Wake, Northamptonshire Record Society, Vol. 3 (1926); The Lancashire Lieutenancy under the Tudors and Stuarts, ed. J. Harland, Chetham Society, O.S., Vols. 49, 50 (1859), and P. Harding, "Defence and Security Measures in the County Palatine", Durham University Journal, March, June 1955, pp. 75-83, 110-118.

It had long been the duty of the subject to serve the crown in a military capacity when the need arose. The form this service took had developed over the centuries. In theory every able-bodied man between 16 and 60 was liable to serve, and this national levy was organised on a county basis. In fact it was found more convenient to select certain men from the total "posse comitatus" for periodical mustering and training, in the hope that they would prove effective in an emergency. The trained bands, as they were called, were thus non-professional, part-time soldiers: the foot recruited from the commonalty of the shire, the horse from the more substantial men and the gentry.

Responsibility for the arming, equipping and paying of the militia also devolved on the county. According to his degree and financial ability every gentleman was charged to supply horse, arms and armour in addition to personal service. Each county had its own store of military material, which was drawn upon for general musters. To pay the men during training the county was laid under contribution by the militia officials.

Statutory obligations had been laid by Act of Parliament in the reign of Philip and Mary, both on the individual, assessed according to his rank, and on the local authorities. This Act was repealed under James I, and apparently the ancient Statute of Winchester (1285), in default of any later legislation, remained as the chief guide to a Caroline Englishman's military duties. The invalidity of the Act of Philip and Mary was, however, disputed in 1642, as we shall see.

As a corollary to these military obligations were certain limitations on the power of the Crown. Prelates, peers and Privy Councillors were exempt from the general musters. The clergy, although they had to supply

money and equipment when called upon, were not liable to go to war themselves. The trained bands themselves were immobile and unwieldy; it was widely held that they could not serve beyond the county boundaries except when a foreign invasion had taken place.

The militia were required to train on certain days of the year, usually after Sunday morning service. If there was a general muster of the county trained bands, warrants would be sent down from the Privy Council to the Lords Lieutenants, and instructions passed on from them to the Deputies. The Lieutenant had replaced the Sheriff as the chief military official in the county under the Tudors: he might be a Councillor himself, and was normally a peer - the man with most weight among his fellows in the shire. The Deputy Lieutenants, who had emerged during Elizabeth's reign to aid the Lord Lieutenant, were drawn from the county gentry, experienced in local affairs. They would decide on the places for the array, and the various problems connected with the financing, arming, officering and equipping of the bands. As these officials rated themselves and their equals for such expensive items as horse, family rivalries in a county might often be exacerbated by disputes over what was a reasonable rate of arms.

When all these questions had been settled warrants would be sent to the high constables of every Hundred, which remained "the unit of the fencible men" down to the end of the Napoleonic Wars. Eventually it was the business of the petty constables in the parishes to produce the quota of men, arms and money for which each was rated. Defaulters were listed, and proceeded against: if vacancies occurred they had to be filled.

The trained bands were for the defence of the realm only. When an army was to be raised for foreign expeditions, the Crown officers in the

shire were asked (as for Buckingham's exploits), to select numbers of men from the county and raise "coat and conduct" money, to provide for their clothing and upkeep till they joined their regiments at agreed rendezvous. Normally these recruits were impressed from the criminal and unemployed classes, for service abroad in the conditions of the time was usually fatal. From the depredations of such soldiers, especially in the Southern counties, arose the complaints against billeting and martial law.

Charles I worked hard to improve the armed forces of the kingdom. He seems to have been himself interested in guns and gunnery, and during his reign the Council of War issued orders to establish uniformity of arms in the militia, and for perfecting and regularising musters. It sent into the provinces muster masters and provost marshalls, professional soldiers, introduced under the Tudors, who had important commands in the county trained bands. Other experienced officers were sent out when the situation demanded it: in readiness for the Scots War Sir Jacob Astley and Sir Thomas Morton were employed by Charles to inspect military arrangements in the counties. The Council ordered the exercising of horse according to modern discipline. Charles's advisers took their duties seriously; Wentworth, when Lord President of the North, was anxious to punish severely those who defaulted in their duty of finding arms.

The militia system, however, like other Tudor creations, was a heterogeneous organisation dependent on the willing co-operation of the county gentry, and whatever the monarchy and its council decreed was effective only insofar as it had the support of the gentry. Charles lost their support by his policies, and his schemes for the "settling of a perfect militia" foundered on the rocks of political controversy, in the

same way that naval improvement was lost sight of in the opposition to ship-money. When he wished to raise an army against Scotland we are not surprised that there should be "unimaginable difficulties".

It is also probably true to say that the militia, despite Charles's efforts, was in decline during his reign. It had reached the height of its efficiency when monarchy and gentry had worked together under the threat of Spanish invasion. Caroline England, however, was at peace, and the great military developments of the seventeenth century, born in the heat of long and bloody continental wars, owed nothing to England, and she gained little by them. The new flexible Swedish tactics, and their attendant changes in drill, discipline, armaments and military organisation, required greater skill and increased professionalism on the part of the soldier. Such developments left the English week-end soldier woefully out of date.

Evidence for the defects in the trained bands leads up to, and beyond, the Scots Wars, although they remain the most telling indictment of Charles's policies. The county levies were unskilled and ill-led; the magazines poorly equipped and even occasionally ruinous. In early 1642, when the Irish rebellion made the defence of North Wales - only eight hours sail from Ireland - vital, it was reported that the trained bands of Anglesey were not exercised nor would be, for there was now allowance made for an officer to do so. Powder and shot were not ready, and no-one would provide a guard for Beaumaris castle. ⁽¹⁾

The shortcomings of the militia system were most fully displayed in the Bishops' Wars. Then Charles had to mobilise an army without the help of

Parliament, and Parliamentary subsidies, or the support of the upper classes opposed to the war. Lacking the money to raise a "regular" army, as for service overseas, he was forced to appeal directly to the peers, prelates and even the great city corporations, for money and horse. He summoned them personally to appear before him at York, "cum equis et armis", or compound for a sum of money. Charles was thus "exercising a feudal right" of some antiquity: the attendance on the King at war of his personal supporters and their retinues.

It was thought 1200 horse could be mustered by this appeal. Many peers responded well, but others at first refused altogether to support the King. A stronger impediment to the effectiveness of such a force was the military inexperience of the majority of the Caroline aristocracy. Their duties in the trained bands had never been onerous or exacting. Although many adventurous younger sons had sought their fortunes in the continental wars, the nobility as a whole were unacquainted with arms. Edward, Lord Montagu of Boughton, for instance, required to attend the King in February 1639, could not go himself, being elderly, was not certain how many horse to send, and found his arms and armour were not "of the modern fashion". He admitted to being a "poor countryman", ignorant of how men should be properly arrayed for war, and the different forms that armour and equipment might take. Yet Lord Montagu, anxious to do his share but frankly puzzled by things military, was no exception. "No man was more knowing in the Country [i.e. county] affaires", and he was shortly to be appointed Lord Lieutenant of Northamptonshire and, in the opening year of the Civil War, receive the King's Commission of Array. (1)

(1) H.M.C., Buocleugh, I, pp. 276-307, D.N.B., G.E.C.

The trained bands of the northern counties were called upon to supply most of the foot for the war of 1639. Despite the opposition of the Yorkshire officers in the militia, the men were probably willing to do battle with their old enemies, but there was great shortage of money and equipment. The year before it had been reported that the arms in the North were defective, and there was no means of repairing them. To fill vacancies in the levies commissions were issued to the Lieutenants to impress men for service; they were to be selected from the trained bands, put into readiness and marched to the rendezvous, fully equipped, at the charge of the county. In May 1639, Sir Edmund Verney wrote: "Our men are very raw, our arms of all sorts naught, our victual scarce, and provisions for horses worse..."⁽¹⁾

For the war of 1640 Charles abandoned the idea of personal service but still sought urgently for private financial contributions, as the Short Parliament failed to vote a subsidy. He changed his commanders and drew mainly from the Southern counties for his army. The chaos, if possible, was worse than before. The pressed men from the South had no desire to fight the Scots; many districts, especially London and the Home Counties, refused to pay the "coat and conduct" money to the levies required for the North; the militia officials and officers could not control the men raised. The levies from all counties lacked discipline as well as arms and pay. Some mutinied and killed their officers. The Puritans among them despoiled churches.⁽²⁾ Their cost to the counties which raised them was very great for, not only had they to be mustered, trained and equipped and kept in readiness, but if they ran away, as they did frequently, they had to

(1) quoted in C.N. Firth, Cromwell's Army, p.13.

(2) S.R. Gardiner, History of England from the Accession of James I to the outbreak of the Civil War, IX, p.172.

be replaced. (1) A war could not be fought with such troops, and they deserted at no more than the prospect of a fight at Newburn.

The Treaty of Ripon ended Charles's immediate military problems. The ill-success of his conscripted levies in the critical years, 1638-9, no doubt prejudiced him against any extensive use of the county militia and trained bands when the need arose. Their shortcomings had been cruelly exposed. On the other hand, as the King's conflict with the Long Parliament broadened and deepened, he realised the vital importance of retaining the basic machinery for military organisation, and in particular the stores of arms and ammunitions, in loyal hands. The Parliamentary leaders, by 1641, were equally concerned to extend their control over all armed forces. They were rightly apprehensive of plots to use the English arm, which was, still under arms in the North, for political purposes, and executed Stafford partly on the grounds that he had planned to do the same thing with the army then in Ireland.

Supporters of the King were not slow to suggest desperate measures which would place him in a strong military position. An attempt was made to seize the Tower, the main arms depository in the Kingdom. When this failed the King appointed first the notorious Sir Thomas Lunsford as Lieutenant, and then the loyal Sir John Byron. For their part Parliament had the Tower besieged until their own nominee, Sir John Conyers, was accepted. (2) The Commons were specially fearful of the professional officers and soldiers, "these ruffians" surrounding the King. (3)

(1) Townshend, I, pp. viii, ix, 1-5.

(2) G. F. Gardiner, op.cit., LX, pp. 348-9, X, pp. 108, 112, 165.

(3) D'Ewes's comments on the King's bodyguard. The Journal of Sir Simonds D'Ewes, ed. S. Coates, (1942), p. 383.

The possession of the Tower, Hull and Portsmouth, and other key ports and armouries, was disputed in the following months, and King and Commons put forward rival claims to control the militia system. The House took an important step towards an independent position in legislative matters by naming the Lords Lieutenants to command in each county and presenting a bill to secure the militia.⁽¹⁾ In March 1642, it conferred what authority it could on the resulting Militia Ordinance, from which the King had withheld his consent.⁽²⁾ The need to gain control of the militia had led Parliament to claim sovereignty for itself and hence legality for its actions.

The legal advisers of the King launched a rival scheme to combat the pretensions of Westminster. Charles (at York since March 1642) began in June to issue Commissions of Array to his leading supporters in the counties. The Commission had a long history. It evolved in the reign of Edward I and was most fully used by Henry IV and Henry V. It had continued in use during the fifteenth century until replaced by Tudor innovations in the organisation of the militia. The main authority normally quoted for its legal form and status was a statute of Henry IV. Couched in Latin, it had usually been sent to two or more recipients and it required them to take musters and view arms, and report their findings to the King.⁽³⁾

(1) The Lords Lieutenants were named by the Commons on 10 and 11 February 1641/2, C.J., II, pp. 424, 426.

(2) S.R. Gardiner, The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution 1625-1660 (1906), pp. 245-7.

(3) For the Commission of Array see the authorities listed on p.1, and J. Rushworth, Historical Collections (1721), Part III, Vol.1, pp. 655-688, Clarendon, V, 9 364, and R.A. Newhall, Muster and Review (1940), passim.

In 1642 this out-of-date and anachronistic administrative instrument was disinterred from the archives. It proved a useful legal device to gain support and authorise the preparation of forces for the defence of the King's cause in the localities. It was simply an attempt by the crown to take over the existing framework of militia organisation, personnel and stores. Frequently Lords and Deputy Lieutenants, Sheriffs and other county officials were named in the commissions.

Hyde, and the constitutional Royalists, defended the Commission of Array and the course of action its use implied. A number of shots in the "paper-skirmishes" of the summer were attempts to reinforce its validity.⁽¹⁾ Parliament's lawyers were as busy defending the Militia Ordinance.⁽²⁾ A royal proclamation of June attacked Parliament's proceedings and dwelt on the ancient lineage of the Commission of Array, which had many precedents since the thirteenth century. The defence of the realm, the proclamation continued, had ever been a royal prerogative: and the commissions granted followed exactly the old form authorised by the statute of Henry IV. Finally it declared that, on the question of the military service owed the King, the Act of Philip and Mary defining the individual's obligations was "in full force".⁽³⁾ The London press answered that the commission ("offensive and destructive") was against the fundamental laws of the land.

(1) Clarendon, V, §§ 365-71.

(2) E.g., John Marsh, An Argument on Debate in Law of the question concerning the Militia, as it is now settled by Ordinance of Parliament (September 1642), TT: E.119 (13). The author was a commoner of Lincoln's Inn.

(3) Steele, No. 2194, printed in J. Rushworth, Historical Collections, Part III, Vol. I, pp. 659-61.

It was being used not for defence against a foreign invasion, but to foment civil war.⁽¹⁾

Both sides, by midsummer 1642, had marked out their legal claims to the militia system of the kingdom. Both were busily constructing paper empires, one based on York, the other on London, But the real struggle for power was about to take place in the shires, between the supporters of the Commission of Array and of the Militia Ordinance. In the counties, and by the King's commissioners, the first steps were taken which led to the mobilisation of his main army.

(1) The Commission of Array arraigned and condemned (September 1642), TT: E.118 (3). This pamphlet reproduces the commission to the Marquis of Hertford, and a warrant of Lord Strange, with hostile commentaries.

CHAPTER I.

The Making of the Army.

Hyde recorded that the Commission of Array was issued "to all counties".⁽¹⁾ This was substantially true. Beginning with Leicestershire on 11 June 1642, commissions were sent from York to most English and Welsh counties in the following two months. Even Puritan-inclined shires, such as Middlesex and Suffolk, did not escape. The commission took the form of a writ, in Latin, issued under the Great Seal, and accompanied by instructions in English to persons named in the writ. A copy of that to Leicestershire fell into the hands of Parliament, and was printed by order of the Lords and Commons together with their votes against its legality.⁽²⁾ Copies of the commissions or related documents sent to Lancashire, Worcestershire, Lincolnshire and Devon have also survived.⁽³⁾

It is our good fortune that this antiquarian device made a natural appeal to contemporary historians and heralds, who preserved records of it among their archives. Gervase Holles, the antiquary, was involved in the issuing of a commission to his native Lincolnshire, and helped to draw up a list (still extant) of loyal gentry fit to be commissioners.⁽⁴⁾ Sir William Dugdale, the herald, recorded the names of all those who had received the commission in each county, with, very often, the date of its issue.⁽⁵⁾

(1) Clarendon, V, 6 364.

(2) J. Rushworth, Historical Collections, Part III, Vol. I, pp. 655-8

(3) Lancashire, 11 June, The Farington Papers, ed. S. Farington, Chetham Society, Q.S., Vol. 39 (1856), pp. 76-7; Worcestershire, instructions sent with the commission, 21 June, Bodleian, Tanner MS. 63, f. 84; Devon, 19 July, Bellum Civile, pp. 103-7; Lincolnshire, a revised commission of 27 December, British Museum, Additional MS. 6118, ff. 238-43.

(4) Ibid., and British Museum, Egerton MS. 2541, f. 362.

(5) Northamptonshire Record Office, Fitch-Hatton MS. 133. The volume is not paginated, but the English counties are listed alphabetically, and the Welsh counties grouped together at the end. Dugdale also lists, side by side with the Commissioners of array, the Parliamentary committee men for each county.

Dugdale's lists provide a remarkably complete picture of the potentially Royalist peers and gentry in England and Wales in 1642. The commissions were on occasion revised or reconstituted, to omit some names and add others, as more information on the behaviour of his supporters and his enemies reached the King during the summer. These too were, in many cases, noted by Dugdale.

The commissioners of array - a dozen or so gentlemen only in the smaller Welsh counties, 70 or 80 strong in Kent and Yorkshire - were the backbone of the support for the King in 1642. The greatest "array men" were the powerful and noble families in the North and West. In the South and East most Royalists were not in a position to aid the King. Those who attempted to put the Commission of Array into effect in predominantly hostile areas were soon imprisoned: those who attempted to leave home and join the King were often captured. Sir John Oglander in the Isle of Wight, Sir Roger Twysden in Kent and Thomas Knyvett in Norfolk, have all described how they found themselves marooned in their own counties.⁽¹⁾ Sir John Lucas was prevented at his native Colchester from bringing a body of horse to the King.⁽²⁾

In the South-west, South Wales and the four Northern counties the situation was quite different. There the King had the support of great aristocratic houses, which provided focal points for the activities of the commissioners of array. William Seymour, Marquis of Hertford, was commissioned on 2 August to be Lieutenant General of all the King's forces in the Western counties.⁽³⁾ The Seymour family had great influence and power in

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- (1) J. Oglander, A Royalist's Notebook, ed. F. Banford (1936), pp. 105-7.
R. Twysden, Certain Considerations upon the Government of England, ed. J. Kenble, Camden Society (1849), pp. xlix-lxxvii. The Knyvett Letters, ed. B. Sheffield (1949), pp. 32, 109-10.
- (2) M. Cavendish, The Life of William Cavendish Duke of Newcastle, ed. C. H. Firth, 2nd edn. (1907), p. 163 n.
- (3) J. Rushworth, Historical Collections, Part III, Vol. 1, pp. 672-4, Clarendon, V, 9 385. He was already in the West when the commission was issued.

Wiltshire and Somerset: Hertford had been Lord Lieutenant of the latter, and now headed the Commission of Array sent to each.⁽¹⁾ The Seymour estates were estimated as worth over £4,500 per annum in 1648, and they controlled Marlborough castle. Through his mother, Hertford had a substantial interest in Dorset.⁽²⁾

Included in his commission were some of the gentlemen "of the prime quality and interest in the western parts, and who were like to give as good examples in their persons, and to be followed by as many men, as any such number of gentlemen in England could be."⁽³⁾ The chief of these were Lord Poulett, who had both military and naval experience, and estates in Somerset and Devon; Francis, Lord Seymour, Hertford's brother, whose own patrimony in Wiltshire was substantial; Sir Ralph Hepton, of whom there is no need to speak here, except to recall that through his Parliamentary seat at Wells he could command some respect in Somerset; and many of the local knights and baronets, such as Sir John Berkeley, Sir Hugh Pollard and Sir John Stowell (knight of the shire for Somerset).⁽⁴⁾ While Hertford was active in Somerset, the Earl of Bath, "thought then to be of notable power and interest in Devonshire" was sent into that county for the King; but he opposed the Parliamentary party only "out of the morosity of his own nature." He was captured and taken to London in August.⁽⁵⁾

(1) Merchants. R.O., F.H. 133.

(2) G.E.C., under Dukedom of Somerset, D.N.B., C.C.C., pp. 1329-30. J. Weylen, A History of the Town of Marlborough, (1854), pp. 142, 145-7.

(3) Clarendon, V, § 443.

(4) Ibid., and § 385, Seymour, Hepton, Pollard and Stowell or Stawell in M. Keeler, The Long Parliament (1954), Poulett and Berkeley in D.N.B.

(5) Clarendon, V, § 385, VI, § 36. His elderly and careful hypochondriac was more concerned to preserve his estates and delicate health than aid either King or Parliament. See his Civil War letters, Kent Record Office, Sackville Papers, Earl of Bath MSS.

Hertford and Hopton did not prosper as much as they had hoped. They were opposed by the county militia and volunteer forces, and many of the gentry and the weaving towns in Somerset and Wiltshire.⁽¹⁾ Hopton, who had expected no difficulty in their work, was no doubt unpleasantly surprised at the turn of events.⁽²⁾ At the end of September Hertford retreated to Minehead, and transported himself and his small force in coal boats over to South Wales, while Hopton, with Sir John Berkeley and others, marched with a few horse and dragoons into Devon and Cornwall.⁽³⁾ There they were to build up a formidable force, but one which did not impinge on the main army until the following year. The only contribution which the West Country commissioners made to the King's marching army before Edgehill was the regiment of foot raised in Somerset by the Lunsford brothers.⁽⁴⁾

South Wales and Monmouthshire were dominated by the Somersets, the Earl of Worcester and his son Edward, known as Lord Herbert, later famous as the Earl of Glamorgan. Their chief rival, the Puritan-inclined Earl of Pembroke, remained in 1642 at Westminster. The largest landowner in the area (his seat was at Raglan) Worcester's "whole estate ubique was esteemed twenty four thousand pounds per annum;"⁽⁵⁾ and Herbert claimed later that in the Civil War his father had spent over £900,000 in the service of the King.⁽⁶⁾

(1) E. Green, "On the Civil War in Somerset", Somersetshire. Archaeological and Natural History Society, Vol. 14 (1867), pp. 43-71, Bellum Civile, pp. 1-18.

(2) Ibid., p. 1n.

(3) Ibid., pp. 18-19. J. Phillips, Memoirs of the Civil War in Wales and the Marches (1874), II, pp. 23-5.

(4) Bellum Civile, pp. 2-3.

(5) Symonds, p. 205.

(6) Warburton, III, p. 530.

Perhaps because of their well-known Catholicism - the King did not withdraw the ban on Catholics bearing arms until September - neither Worcester nor his son was included in commissions of array sent down to South Wales and the Marches.⁽¹⁾ But their religion heightened their influence in "popish" Monmouthshire, and a Puritan observer noted that the people there "were at the devotion of the Earle of Worcester, almost an universall land-lord in that county."⁽²⁾

Worcester and Hertford were aided in their efforts to raise men for the King by commissioners in neighbouring counties. 29 were named for Glamorgan; their number included Sir Edward Stradling, the baronet of St. Donats and M.P. for Glamorgan, and William Herbert, M.P., for Cardiff.⁽³⁾ The foot regiment they raised reached the main army before Edgehill.⁽⁴⁾ In Herefordshire the King had the support of Lord Scudamore, placed at the head of the Commission of Array, in Gloucestershire - largely Puritan in temper - of Lord Chandos, the owner of Sudeley castle.⁽⁵⁾ But the large army which Worcester's men and Hertford, with the support of the local gentry, hoped to bring to Oxford was destroyed on its home ground.⁽⁶⁾

An equally important aristocrat took charge of the King's affairs in the North. The command of Northumberland, Durham, Cumberland and Westmorland,

- (1) The King had earlier, however, granted both a special exemption from this general ban, A.H.Dodd, "Wales in the Parliaments of Charles I," Part II, 1640-2, Transactions of the Honourable Society of Cymmrodorion (1946-7), pp. 60, 81-2.
- (2) Ibid., and J. Corbet, "An Historical Relation of the Military Government of Gloucester" (1645), in Bibliotheca Gloucestrensis, ed. J. Washbourn (1825), p. 32.
- (3) Northants. R.O., F.H.133.
- (4) J.F. Rees, Studies in Welsh History (1947), pp.62-3
- (5) Northants R.O., F.H.133, G.E.C. for both, H.M.C. 5th Report, p.346.
- (6) J.Phillips, Memoirs of the Civil War in Wales, I, pp.132-3, II, pp.38-41.

and the town of Newcastle, was given to William Cavendish, Earl of Newcastle. The port was vital to the Royalist cause: it was the only good harbour on the East coast in the King's hands, "an easy Receptacle for Foreign Forces" and arms, and it controlled the coal trade with London. ⁽¹⁾

The earl was well-fitted to dominate the North and its port. He was a great landowner, and through his mother had inherited large estates in Northumberland, near Newcastle. ⁽²⁾ From his Midlands and Yorkshire estates he derived £22,000 per annum, and altogether he may have spent over £800,000 in the King's service. ⁽³⁾ He arrived at Newcastle in mid-June, collected the local trained bands, and "sent into Northumberland, to his friends and tenants to come into the town with what horse and foot they could make, and he would arm them". ⁽⁴⁾ He was given much support by the commissioners of array and the many recusant squires of those parts, but it was reported that some of the tenants of the Royalist gentry came in "much against their will". ⁽⁵⁾ Newcastle, however, was easily able to keep the port open and send on to the King at York, and later at Nottingham, the men and arms which came over from the continent. ⁽⁶⁾

In the main, however, these centres of Royalist strength were too distant from the King and his temporary court to help in the creation of his first-raised forces. Each, in fact, became largely independent of central

(1) L.J., V, p.170.

(2) D.N.B., Sir H.Ogle, Ogle and Bothal (1902), pp.72, Appendix, xxvi.

(3) M.Keeler, The Long Parliament, under Cavendish, D.N.B., M. Cavendish, The Life of William Cavendish Duke of Newcastle, ed.C.H.Firth, pp.73-9, Lloyd, p.672.

(4) Sir John Marley's account of proceedings at Newcastle, Bodleian, Clarendon MSS., Vol.26, ff.118-25.

(5) L.J., V, p.170.

(6) J.Rushworth, Historical Collections, Part III, Vol.II, pp.89-90.

control, and the powerful general of each raised his own army. The counties which were to contribute most to the main army were those of the Midlands, and to them the King had sent the earliest Commissions of array. In one or two counties it is possible - with the aid of local records - to see the working of the commission in some detail.

Worcestershire is such a case. The commission was issued on 18 June, and the royal instructions to the commissioners, requiring them to summon the county militia and secure the magazines, three days later.⁽¹⁾ Prince Charles, only twelve years old in 1642, nominally headed the commission, and the "quorum" of six consisted of the Prince, Edward Lord Dudley, Thomas Lord Coventry, Sir Thomas Littleton, Sir John Packington and Sir William Russell.⁽²⁾ Eighteen others - mostly knights and esquires - were named in the commission of June; it was revised in July, when, among other changes, Henry Townshend, esquire, was added to the list.⁽³⁾ It is to Townshend that we owe the records of the Civil War proceedings in Worcestershire.⁽⁴⁾

Neither of the peers took an active part on the King's behalf, and the work of the commission fell upon the substantial gentry. Sir John Packington, member of the Long Parliament until disabled, came from a wealthy and august family in the county: his composition fine was one of the largest among ex-M.P.'s, and he was connected by marriage to Lord Coventry.⁽⁵⁾ Sir

(1) Northants R.O., F.H.133; instructions of 21 June printed in Townshend, II, pp.63-4. Further instructions issued on the following day, Tanner MS. 63, f.84.

(2) Northants R.O., F.H.133.

(3) Ibid.

(4) His so-called "Diary", edited by J. Willis-Bund, referred to here as Townshend.

(5) D.N.B., M. Keeler, The Long Parliament.

William Russell was also of old family; he was Sheriff of Worcester in the first year of the war and Governor of Worcester.⁽¹⁾ Also named in the June commission was Samuel Sandys, M.P. for Droitwich, who was given command of the county's horse, when it should be raised; his family was of "power and greatness" in the shire.⁽²⁾

The commissioners decided to act, as in other shires, at the Midsummer Quarter Sessions, and so settle what was for most people still a legal problem - the validity of the Commission and the Ordinance.. The case for both sides was argued in court: and no doubt to influence the decision, the commissioners summoned the trained bands of the county to assemble during the Sessions at Worcester Town Hall.⁽³⁾ The House of Commons, however, was not idle. They summoned the Sheriff to answer for his conduct, and sent down the two knights of the shire, Sergeant -at-law John Wilde and Humphrey Salway, who intervened successfully in the proceedings of the Royalists.⁽⁴⁾ In a letter to the Speaker, they explain that when they arrived at Worcester they found great preparation had been made for the execution of the Commission of Array, and great "distempers" caused by Sherrington Talbot. But, they conclude, "our coming down... hath wrought (we hope) so effectually that the Commission of Array was this day quite deserted by the whole countie... and the minds of the people...are now (we believe) fully settled."⁽⁵⁾ Talbot and Lord Dudley both withdrew, when support failed. A petition of the Grand Jury at the Sessions,⁽⁶⁾ praying Parliament might put the Militia Ordinance

(1) Townshend, II, passim.

(2) Townshend, II, p.63, M.Keeler, The Long Parliament.

(3) Warrant to the High Sheriff, undated, Tanner MS. 63, f.88.

(4) C.J., II, pp.661, 634, 711.

(5) Townshend, I, pp.xviii-xix.

(6) Ibid., p. xix.

into execution in the county, shows how well the members did their work.

At the next assembly of the county, the Grand Assizes of 3 August, the Royalists did the manipulating, and the Grand Jury and gentlemen of the county repudiated the Grand Jury of July, promising to put the county in a "posture of arms for the defence of His Majesty".⁽¹⁾ Meanwhile, more practical steps were being taken: the commissioners summoned the trained bands, and sent letters requiring the recipients to bring in "such horse or horses, arms and array... that you have been heretofore charged withal", both to meet at Pitchcroft, near Worcester, on 12 August.⁽²⁾ In preparation for the muster the commissioners secured the county's arms. The contents and whereabouts of the magazines were made known to the Grand Jury then sitting, and warrants were issued to the constables to search houses for arms.⁽³⁾ At the meeting at Pitchcroft the county gentry listed themselves to maintain 95 horse for the King's service, for three months from 14 August; and proposed to call for volunteers for the Royalist cause from the trained bands.⁽⁴⁾

Throughout these proceedings the Worcestershire commissioners had kept in touch with the King and his advisers. They had informed Charles of their actions, sent a copy of the favourable declaration of the August Grand Jury, and had received encouraging replies from both Nicholas and Falkland.⁽⁵⁾

(1) Townshend, II, p.68.

(2) Ibid., pp.66,67.

(3) Ibid., pp. 69, 70. Some Droitwich men removed the Earl of Shrewsbury's armour from his house, C.I. II, p.711.

(4) Townshend, II, pp.70-2.

(5) Townshend, II, pp.76-9.

The King, at Stoneleigh Abbey in Warwickshire (20 August), ordered that "papists and others ill-affected persons" within the city and liberties of Worcester, should be disarmed, and that a troop of horse and the foot that had been raised in the county should be sent to the Earl of Northampton and Lord Dunsmore, who were making little headway in Puritan Warwickshire.⁽¹⁾

Charles was only reinforcing the plea for help the Warwickshire commissioners had already made,⁽²⁾ and that Lord Dunsmore had made personally to Sir Thomas Littleton, prosperous recusant and leading Worcestershire Royalist.⁽³⁾

The Worcestershire commissioners seem to have been chronically short of arms and munitions, for they asked that the King might extend the authority for disarming to the whole county.⁽⁴⁾

After Charles had raised his standard he wrote again to the county, authorising the raising of further troops and expressing his willingness to grant any commissions necessary, and his desire for the introduction of a money subscription (to which the clergy would contribute) to pay these forces.⁽⁵⁾ He realised the key position of Worcestershire and its proximity to the Earl of Essex's large army, then camped at Coventry. The commissioners had already drawn up propositions for rates of pay, appointments, scale of arms in their locally-recruited forces,⁽⁶⁾ and now (30 August) made arrangements with the Worcester city authorities for billeting of horse and foot there, the making of armaments and enlisting the volunteers.⁽⁷⁾ The

(1) Townshend, I, pp. 78-9.

(2) Ibid., pp. 72-4.

(3) H.M.C., 2nd Report, Appendix, p. 36.

(4) Townshend, II, p. 75

(5) Ibid., pp. 80-1.

(6) Ibid., p. 72.

(7) Ibid., pp. 81-82.

sympathies of the city, however, lay with Parliament. A petition presented by the citizens to the Mayor (with which he complied), asked that the "unlawful" commission of array should not be enforced in the city. (1)

By September the Royalists in Worcestershire had abandoned their attempts to proceed solely through legal forms, and by reliance on the county militia and stores. The King, at Nottingham and soon to march west, gave authority for his supporters in the shire to raise volunteers for its defence, and appointed Sir Thomas Littleton as Colonel over all the horse and foot. (2)

Littleton may have employed this command to take some of these local recruits to Charles at Shrewsbury, and other Worcestershire regiments - for example, Samuel Sandys's - joined the main army at times during the war.

Worcestershire was typical of those Midland counties which put themselves into a "posture of defence," and were able, after such effort, to send troops to the King's army. Events in Shropshire, guided by prominent Royalists such as Sir Francis Ottley, proceeded along the same lines as these in Worcestershire. The Mayor of Shrewsbury and the Sheriff were "Array men", who "packt" the Grand Jury and raised horse and foot for the King. (3) In other shires the commissioners fought an uphill battle: in Warwickshire and Staffordshire there was dogged opposition, and the Earl of Northampton and Lord Dunsmore, the leading commissioners, although they brought in some

(1) Townshend, pp. 87-89.

(2) Ibid., pp. 85-87.

(3) Speciall Passages, 23-30 August 1642, TT: E.114. H. Beaumont, "Events in Shropshire at the Commencement of the Great Civil War", Transactions of the Shropshire Archaeological Society, Vol. 51, pp. 11-39.

horse and foot, made little progress.⁽¹⁾ In the South Midlands Parliament's influence was preponderant. The elderly Lord Montagu of Boughton, the same peer who had been so doubtful in military affairs three years before, received the Commission of Array for Northamptonshire.⁽²⁾ He was little helped by his fellow commissioners; the Earl of Westmorland, although extremely rich, was a lukewarm Royalist, and went over to Parliament in 1644.⁽³⁾ The Earl of Northampton was occupied in Warwickshire, and Montagu's own son was a Roundhead.⁽⁴⁾ Montagu was seized by the local Parliamentarians and sent up to London.⁽⁵⁾ Similarly, in Oxfordshire John Hampden was able to prevent the commissioners of array from mustering^{er} the county militia. The leading commissioners were captured, and their recruits dispersed.⁽⁶⁾

In Nottinghamshire, Lincolnshire and Leicestershire the balance between the King's and Parliament's forces was about equal. Newark became Royalist, Nottingham Puritan; Lincolnshire was divided between two spheres of influence, the Berties (the Earl of Lindsey and his son) for the King, Lord Willoughby of Parham against.⁽⁷⁾ In Leicestershire the strong aristocratic front, called into being by the Commission of Array for the county, was illusory.⁽⁸⁾ The Earl of Huntingdon was elderly and took no part in the

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- (1) Warwickshire Commission of Array issued 17 June 1642; it was said to be "in hand" on the same date, Northants R.O., F.H.133, C.S.P.D., 1641-3, pp.342-3. For events in these counties see D.Guttery, The Great Civil War in the Midland Parishes [1950], pp.1-21.
- (2) Issued on 18 June, Northants R.O., F.H.133, H.M.C., Bucclough, I, p.307.
- (3) G.E.C.
- (4) M.Keeler, The Long Parliament, under Edward Montagu.
- (5) H.M.C., 13th Report, I. p.60, C.S.P.D., 1641-3, p.384.
- (6) Oxfordshire Commission issued 4 July 1642, Northants R.O., F.H.133. For the events following, see Tanner MS.63, f.125, J.Rushworth, Historical Collections, Part III, Vol.I, pp.684-5, 759, C.S.P.D., 1641-3, p.373.
- (7) A.C.Wood, Nottinghamshire in the Civil War (1937), V.C.H., Lincolnshire II, p.281.
- (8) Northants R.O., F.H.133, J.Rushworth, Historical Collections, Part III Vol.I, p.655.

proceedings, the Earl of Devonshire, although with the King at York, was inactive, and only Henry Hastings, of the "quorum" named in the Commission, gave the lead. (1) Hastings, Huntingdon's younger son - his elder was a Parliamentarian captain - was stoutly opposed by a rival Leicestershire family now on the popular side, the Earl of Stamford and his son, Lord Grey of Wroby. Clarendon remarked that between the two families, Huntingdon and Stamford, "the county was divided passionately enough, without any other quarrel". (2) Hastings, later Lord Loughborough, brought some horse to the main army for Edgehill, and then raised and maintained, throughout the war, his own "flying army" based at Ashby-de-la-Zouch. (3)

One further area could be counted on to lend support to the Royalist cause. Lancashire, Cheshire and North Wales formed a strategic whole, presided over by Lord Strange, soon to be Earl of Derby in succession to his father. (4) The Stanleys were dominant in Lancashire, "esteemed by most about them with little less respects than Kings." (5) The family's large possessions gave it great numbers of dependant gentry and tenantry. Strange, in Lancashire and in Cheshire, was given close support by other important figures, such as the Earl of Rivers, Cheshire magnate with estates in other shires, who was High Steward of Macclesfield; (6) and Viscount Cholmondeley and Viscount Kilmorey, who both possessed estates in Cheshire of varying worth, and remained loyal from the beginning to the end of the war. (7)

(1) G.E.C., for Huntingdon and Devonshire, D.N.B., for Hastings.

(2) Clarendon, VI, 99 274, 275.

(3) Ibid.

(4) Strange or his father headed the commissions sent into these counties, Northants. A.O., F. 1.133, The Parlington Papers, ed. S. Pfarington, Chetham Society, O.S., Vol. 39, pp. 76-7.

(5) A Discourse of the War in Lancashire, ed. J. Beaumont, Chetham Society, O.S., Vol. 62 (1864), p. 63.

(6) G.E.C., C.C.C., pp. 914-6

(7) G.E.C., Rep. both, H.M.C., 13th Report, I, pp. 46-50, C.C.C., pp. 1233-6, 1479-80.

In Lancashire, Lord Molineux,, wealthy landowner and hereditary Constable of Liverpool castle, although very young in 1642, was of great assistance to Strange. ⁽¹⁾ As important was the backing of the influential gentry.

Sir John Girlington and Sir Gilbert Houghton (Sheriffs of Lancashire in 1642 and 1643 respectively), Sir Thomas Aston and Thomas Tildesley (both main army colonels in 1643), and Orlando Bridgeman, M.P. for Wigan and Duchy official, played an important role in organising military preparations. ⁽²⁾

Many of the Royalists were Catholic, and based their strength on the loyalty of the country people: the "Popish" gentry of Amounderness, wrote a hostile commentator, called on the support of their "Tenants in Arms, the Trained Bands, and the Clubmen of the Field (Fylde) and other parts". ⁽³⁾ In September the King replied favourably to a petition from Lancashire recusants allowing them to arm themselves and their dependents in his service. ⁽⁴⁾ Many of the towns, however, such as Manchester and Salford - "the Geneva of the North" - were strongly Puritan.

The commissions of array were sent to North Wales in August. ⁽⁵⁾ The few substantial gentry families of those parts were the recipients: they took the lead when the peers nominally involved were too occupied elsewhere to be active in Wales. ⁽⁶⁾ In Caernarvonshire the Griffiths, a leading family who occupied usually one of the county's seats, and the Sheriff, Thomas Cheadle,

(1) G.E.C., D.N.B., under Sir Richard Molyneux, G.C.C., pp. 1343-7.

(2) E. Broxap, The Great Civil War in Lancashire (1910), Chapters I and II, A Discourse of the War in Lancashire, ed. W. Beaumont, Chetham Society, O.S., Vol. 62, pp. 6-21.

(3) Ibid., p. 21.

(4) Ibid., pp. 12-14.

(5) Northants R.O., F.H. 133.

(6) Men of esquire rank were less numerous in the poor Welsh counties than in England. Fewer were named as commissioners, and they were supported by men listed as "gentlemen" only, ibid.

enforced the commission. Denbighshire was more divided, but the influence of the Royalist families of Salusbury and Wynne prevailed. Similarly the Mostyns and Owens kept Flintshire for the King, supplying the two greatest Royalist leaders, Roger Mostyn and John Owen of Clenenny, and men, arms and money to back them. ⁽¹⁾ The Sheriff of Flint, George Hope, helped to organise Royalist support. ⁽²⁾ Anglesey was ruled by the only substantial landowner there, Thomas Bulkeley, who was Sheriff in 1642, and received the Commission of Array for the island in September. ⁽³⁾

Anglesey's defence was ruptured by the feud of Bulkeley and Cheadles ⁽⁴⁾ we have already seen how inadequate it was in 1641. Very often it was the quarrels of the Royalist Welsh gentry among themselves that divided and weakened their support for the King, and gave the Puritans their first chance. In Caernarvonshire Wynne of Gwdyr carried on an "hereditary feud" with the Griffiths. ⁽⁵⁾ It is probable too, that service in Ireland seriously depleted the recruitment for the King's army in Wales. Nevertheless, when Charles came to the borders of North Wales in September he was substantially reinforced from these counties, as he was from Lancashire and Cheshire. ⁽⁶⁾

(1) A.H. Dodd, "Wales in the Parliaments of Charles I," Part II, 1640-2, Transactions of the Honourable Society of Cymmrodorion (1946-7), passim.

(2) G.C.C., p. 1241.

(3) A.H. Dodd, "Anglesey in the Civil War", Transactions of the Anglesey Antiquarian Society and Field Club (1952), p. 8.

(4) B. Roberts, "Cheadles against Bulkeleys", Transactions of the Anglesey Antiquarian Society and Field Club (1945), pp. 25-37.

(5) M. Keeler, The Long Parliament, under Wales.

(6) See above, p. 5.

While his commissioners of array were mustering support, the King remained at York until August 1642. Yorkshire provided the background for the first steps he and his advisers took towards the raising of the main army. The county was divided in the summer: some of the leading gentry - such as the Fairfaxes - and the West Riding towns were hostile to the King. Hull, an important arms depot, was governed for Parliament by Sir John Hotham and his ambitious son, known as "Captain" Hotham; the citizens resisted first the Royal emissaries, and, in April, the King himself, who was formally refused entrance while the Prince of Wales dined within the walls.⁽¹⁾ Charles retired to York and began to recruit a bodyguard that would serve as the nucleus of a "marching army" in the event of hostilities breaking out.

The few courtiers who had left London with the King were joined, in the course of the summer, by many of their fellows, and a substantial part of both Houses of Parliament. The peers who waited on the King, and had no service to perform in their counties, formed the substantial retinue which accompanied him on his journeys into the adjacent counties. In the pamphlets of the day they were known as the "Cavaliers", the originals of the many who were to bear that name. Militarily they were of little importance, and to render him more substantial protection the King's advisers sought the aid of the local gentry and militia.⁽²⁾ The close inter-relation of the county families in Yorkshire, as elsewhere, and their official positions and commands in the levies (which were 13,000 strong in 1640),⁽³⁾ helped the King's service considerably. For the moment Charles had to rely on these amateur forces.

(1) B. Beckitt, Charles the First and Hull, 1639-1645 (1952), Chapters III, IV.

(2) Edysion Porter, one of the courtiers closest to Charles, schemed with some local gentlemen to persuade the King to take a guard, The Hotham Papers, ed. E. Peacock, Philobiblion Society (1884), p.14.

(3) The Memoirs of Sir Hugh Cholmley (1787), p.62.

On May 14 1642, he issued warrants to the county gentry to attend him at York "in such Manner and Equipage as will be convenient for the Guard of Our Person".⁽¹⁾ The polite fiction was observed, and later persisted in, that any mobilisation on the part of the King was simply to raise a protective bodyguard. It was hoped in this way to allay the fears of Parliament.

At the same time it was decided to raise the county's trained bands: at Hull, Hotham had already made use of those of the East Riding. Sir Henry Slingsby of Scriven, M.P. for Knarborough, was given the command of the York city regiment, and Sir Robert Strickland was commanded to master his regiment of foot, recruited from the district round his seat, Thornton Bridge, and constituency, ^dAlborough in the North Riding. Both these men were typical of the best royal supporters in the county: they were substantial landowners and members of the Long Parliament: both were suspected of recusancy, and certainly their many relations and friends among the local gentry included several open Catholics. They were well-connected, not only with Yorkshire families, but many in the North generally, and their estates and interests were not confined to the county. Before the Civil War both had held commands in the county militia, which were easily revived in the emergency of 1642.⁽²⁾

The result of the warrants and commissions issued in May was that a troop of horse and a regiment of foot were selected for the King's service, the first from the great number of local gentry who volunteered in obedience to

- (1) Report (with enclosures) of the committee sent by Parliament to York to negotiate with the King. L.J., V., p.74.
- (2) M. Kessler, The Long Parliament, Special Passages, 17-24 May 1642, Bodleian, Wood 374(5), C.S.P.D., 1641-3, pp.322-3. The Diary of Sir Henry Slingsby (1836), ed. D. Parsons, pp.75-83. Slingsby's wife was daughter of Lord Fauconberg, and through his sisters he was connected to the Fenwicks (of Northumberland), the Stapletons, Ingrams, Metcalfs and Bethels. Strickland was related to the influential Cumberland family of Musgrave. See in general, J. Clay, "The Gentry of Yorkshire at the Time of the Civil War". The Yorkshire Archaeological Journal, Vol.23 (1915), pp.349-94.

the royal summons, and the second, 800 strong, brought in to York by Strickland from the trained bands under his command. Slingsby's soldiers proved "backward", and did not materialise,⁽¹⁾ and we have no evidence of any other militia regiment mobilised at this early date, though other commissions, now lost, may have been issued. To increase the esprit de corps of the horse the young Prince of Wales was made their Captain, and they subscribed to the Oath of Allegiance and Supremacy, following the practice of earlier forces raised for the service of the Crown.⁽²⁾

This locally recruited force, and the retinue of "Cavaliers" remained the sole armed strength with the King until July. Meanwhile the commissions of array were being issued, and some of the peers who had been with Charles returned to their counties to perform this service. Those who remained signed the Engagement of 13 June to defend the King's person, to which 36 peers subscribed.⁽³⁾ Before the end of June most of the "Engagers" listed themselves to maintain numbers of horse, for three months (it was not expected the war would last longer), or as long as His Majesty required. Altogether 1750 horse were subscribed for, "every one", according to Clarendon, "paying down what the three months' pay would amount to into the hands of a treasurer appointed to receive it".⁽⁴⁾ The numbers varied from the Duke of Richmond's pledge to support 100 horse, to Lord Grey of Ruthin's 10.⁽⁵⁾ But the money subscription, if paid, was not immediately converted into cavalry. The gentry

(1) The Diary of Sir Henry Slingsby, ed. D. Parsons, pp. 75-83.

(2) Special Passages, 17-24, May 1642.

(3) Clarendon, V, § 346.

(4) Ibid., V, § 375.

(5) Peacock, pp. 7-10.

of Yorkshire, whose "prise members" already served in the King's only troop of horse, may have entered into a similar bet to maintain horse, and this method of pledging support was imitated in other counties. (1)

The Commission of Array for Yorkshire was issued on 18 June; (2) it named most of the important local gentry, but did not lead to renewed activity. The regiment of the militia, and the guards "in constant attendance" on the King, (3) were not yet reinforced, and remained in York, finding little to do except maintain the "Courts of Guard", or guardrooms, set up in the apprehensive city, get drunk, brawl among themselves, and sack the houses of Puritan Aldermen. (4)

The chief drawback to further recruitment was a general lack of arms and money. Denied the use of Hull magazine, the Royalists disbanded the militia, and accepted the arms and rents of recusants, debarred from serving personally, but, in Yorkshire as elsewhere, eager to support the monarchy. However, preparations were put in hand for raising another troop of horse from the squirearchy of the county, this time to be a Guard for the Prince of Wales. It was reported that "the Troopes of our Countrey Gentlemen for the princes Guard are ordered, and have received their Colors, and have Captaines over them". (5) Captain Thomas Byron - one of the famously loyal Byron

brothers - was given command of the troop; he was shortly to become acting

(1) E.g., Lincolnshire raised 400 horse, C.S.P.D., 1641-3, p.359.

(2) Northants R.O., F.H. 133. A revised and enlarged commission was issued on 4 July, naming in all over 80 recipients.

(3) C.S.P. Venetian, 1642-3, p.71.

(4) News in pamphlets, reprinted in G. Duckett, "Civil War Proceedings in Yorkshire," The Yorkshire Archaeological and Topographical Journal, Vol. 7 (1882), pp. 74-7, 369-73.

(5) Ibid., p.370.

colonel of the regiment when it was completed. The "young Gentlemen" began to receive pay in June.⁽¹⁾

This situation was transformed in the first week of July by the arrival of a ship sent from Holland by the Queen, which had skilfully and successfully run the Parliamentary blockade. Local trained bands, under the command of "persons of quality in the parts adjacent", were called out to secure it, and bring the supplies it carried to the King.⁽²⁾ Although the "Providence", grounded near Hull, was small, and its cargo of arms and stores limited, it worked a major change in the ranks of the Royalists.⁽³⁾ With its guns (and its seamen as gunners) Charles besieged Hull;⁽⁴⁾ and he gave out the first major commissions in his army. "He declared the earl of Lindsey, Lord High Chamberlain of England, and his general of the army... Sir Jacob Ashley [Astley] was declared major general of the foot... The generalship of the horse His Majesty reserved for his nephew prince Rupert... and all levies were hastened..."⁽⁵⁾

The King and his advisers now felt ready to call upon the loyalty of the Yorkshiresmen. Warrants were sent out for a muster at York of the gentry charged with horse (the normal military obligation of their class), and those of them who had specially listed themselves to raise and maintain horse on the King's behalf.⁽⁶⁾ More foot from the trained bands were

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- (1) Byron referred to in the paymaster's accounts, which show receipts for the Prince of Wales's troop, June-July 1642, Harl. MS.6851, ff.150-186.
- (2) Clarendon, V, § 374.
- (3) Ibid.
- (4) H.M.C., 5th Report, Appendix, p.191, The Life of James the Second, ed. J. Clarke (1816), I. p.9.
- (5) Clarendon, V, § 375.
- (6) Copy of a warrant in J. Rushworth, Historical Collections, Part III, Vol. I, p.626.

mobilized: the regiments of Sir Thomas Metham, Sir Henry Griffith (commanded by Sir Marmaduke Langdale) and Henry Belasyse were, with Strickland's, on the Royalist payroll before the end of July.⁽¹⁾ All the colonels were Yorkshiremen, and all enjoyed amateur status.

Langdale was the only one whose military career would not be confined to the defence of the county: he quickly graduated from command of trained band foot to a brigade in the later Northern Horse.⁽²⁾ Belasyse was the eldest son of the elderly county magnate Lord Fauconberg, and brother of John, who, as we shall see, raised forces for the King then and later.⁽³⁾

Commissions and commands were issued, probably too many to be adequately supported. Sir Francis Wortley, one of the best known and most active of the King's adherents in the North, and the "new made Knight," Sir Edmund Duncombe, at this time a sergeant-major in the Yorkshire militia, were "designed" to raise 800 foot and 200 horse.⁽⁴⁾ Wortley, in a declaration that he published, stated that the charge of the county was to raise and maintain for three months 3,000 foot and 300 horse.⁽⁵⁾ The regiment of Sir Thomas Metham joined that of Strickland before Hull, where it was "the first... [to give] fier in that warr", according to its Senior Captain, Sir Philip Monckton.⁽⁶⁾ The ordinary militia men, however, according to a Parliamentary source, had no taste for bearing arms against

(1) Edward Walker, the later secretary-at-war, was then paymaster of the royal guards; his accounts June-August 1642, Harl. MSS. 6851, ff. 160-202, and 6804, ff. 188-190.

(2) D.N.B.

(3) M. Keeler, The Long Parliament. For John, see below, p. 39.

(4) Yorks. Arch. and Top. Journal, Vol. 7, p. 394, 399.

(5) Ibid., pp. 395-7.

(6) The Monckton Papers, ed. E. Peacock, p. 14.

against their fellow Yorkshiremen, and despite the royal commands "the two broken Regiments" of Metham and Strickland, went "coldlie to the service against Hull".⁽¹⁾ Metham had difficulty in raising the better sort of men. The chief constables in the East Riding, where his soldiers were recruited, sent only "ignorant and untrained men", and many deserted. He asked them to summon, for the completing of his regiment, those able-bodied men "formerly set in my Muster Rolls", who had served under him before.⁽²⁾ The present mobilization was distinguished from previous general musters of the county militia by the intransigence of some of the officials and men, and by the fact that "strangers" were being appointed to some commands, in place of local squires.⁽³⁾ These were the experienced old soldiers, "ancient commanders" and gentlemen volunteers, who arrived daily at York from service on the continent and in Ireland,^{eager} to find their vocation in the defence of the royal cause.⁽⁴⁾

The Parliamentary Committee at York reported in mid-July that 3,000 foot of the county militia were gathered there, and that 2,000 horse were already levied.⁽⁵⁾ The number of the trained head foot may be correct, but it is probable that the body of cavalry existed on paper rather than in the field. The guards for Charles and his son, for which we have definite evidence, probably amounted to not more than 600 horse. They were still

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- (1) Advertisements from Yorke and Beverley, 20 July 1642, TT: E.107 (30).
 (2) Copy of Metham's warrant dated 7 July 1642, in Remarkable Passages from York, 12 July 1642, TT: 669, f.6 (51).
 (3) Ibid..
 (4) The Memoirs of Sir Hugh Cholmley, p.66.
 (5) H.M.C., 12th Report, II, p.319.

predominantly Yorkshire: John Belasyse, Sir Thomas Metham, and the Earl of Cumberland, the nominal leader of the county Royalists, enjoyed commands in the guards while the King remained at York. They, and Metham's brother, Sir William Saville, Wortley and others, were associated in efforts to raise and keep troops of horse about the King.⁽¹⁾ As well as the guards there were approximately 400 "Cavaliers" (the peers and their retinues). Further, 500 horse each were attributed to Sir John Byron and Lord Grandison.⁽²⁾ Under the stimulus of further supplies from the Queen, and the great generosity of the Earl of Worcester, these and other commands had been issued, and it was hoped that "in 3 dayes Warning", the horse to be raised would "be all in a Body" at the rendezvous at Nottingham.⁽³⁾ Worcester, among his other great services to the King, had supplied him with £5000, to enable 500 horse to be raised.⁽⁴⁾ Byron, a Nottinghamshire man and an experienced military commander who had been nominated before to the Lieutenancy of the Tower, but removed on the address of the Commons (in February 1642), was given this command.⁽⁵⁾ Both his and Lord Grandison's regiments were described as "well completed" only when they joined Charles at Shrewsbury, in September.⁽⁶⁾

It was most probably in these weeks, at the end of July and the beginning of August, that most of the commissions for horse and foot regiments for the King's marching army were sent out. Unfortunately the

(1) Advertisements from Yorke and Beverley, 20 July 1642.

(2) H.M.C., 12th Report, II, p.319.

(3) Advertisements from Yorke and Beverley, 20 July 1642.

(4) H.M.C., 12th Report, IX, pp.10-11, Warburton, III, pp.526-7

(5) Ibid..

(6) Clarendon, VI, § 66n.

central records of this activity are lost; documents or breviate of commissions issued begin only in October, after the nucleus of the main army had already been raised. But occasional commissions survive in family and other local archives. They are normally dated from York, in July or August. ⁽¹⁾

From 30 July to 15 August, Charles remained at York: Hotham, by flooding the neighbouring countryside, and with reinforcements sent by sea from London, had kept Hull intact for Parliament, and the siege was raised. Before leaving Yorkshire, the King took a final muster of the county gentry on 4 August. The warrants for this meeting, sent by the Sheriff to the high constables of the whole county, stated that His Majesty did not wish "to exact the personall services of the Gentlemen themselves", but wanted only the horse and arms they were charged with, and any extra they could bring. ⁽²⁾ The Royalist forces had "more men than arms" at the time: the trained bands, "in regard of the harvest" were excused, and only their arms were collected. The gentry were exhorted to deliver muskets and corslets to the Lord Mayor at York: all who did so would be excused musters in future, and the arms, it was promised, would be returned. The recusants of the county were called upon to supply horses, but with Protestant riders. ⁽³⁾ The meeting may have been confined to county affairs, but a statement published soon after Hsts, for ^Proaganda purposes, the strength of Royalist support not only in Yorkshire but throughout England. ⁽⁴⁾ It attempts to

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- (1) E.g., those of Stephen Hawkins (25 July), John Hauser (8 August) and Gervase Holles (13 August), Harl. MS. 6852, f. 253, National Library Wales, Bettisfield Document, 468, and H.M.C., Buccleugh, I, p. 526.
- (2) Some Speciall Passages from Hull, Anlaby and Yorke, 1 August 1642, TT: B. 108(33), The King's speech printed in J. Rushworth, Historical Collections, Part III, Vol. I, pp. 645-6.
- (3) Some Speciall Passages from Hull, Anlaby and Yorke, 1 August 1642.
- (4) A Catalogue of the Moneys, Men and Horses, York, reprinted London, 9 August 1642, TT: 669, f. 6 (64).

rationalize and group together the various promises of support made by Royalists in the counties, and even rumours of promises: it lists over 4,000 horse, and money, subscribed by county, gentry, the Universities and clergy. It has little foundation in fact. Charles left York with only "some few horse, for many commissions he had given out, but none in readiness."⁽¹⁾

During his stay in Yorkshire the King had been well supported by the loyal gentry, if not by the general militia forces. In return, and to encourage this forwardness in his service, Charles had knighted, or granted baronetcies to ten or more esquires of the county.⁽²⁾ The major contribution made by the county caused alarm when it was realised that the King might employ these locally-raised forces elsewhere and leave the county defenceless. The Grand Jury, meeting at York in August before the King's departure, made a number of requests to him which indicate the concern for their safety in the future.⁽³⁾ In particular they persuaded Charles and his advisers to leave the county's arms and munitions, the experienced local officers and some of the horse raised in the shire, especially the troop under the Earl of Cumberland. Cumberland was appointed, at their request, General of the King's forces in the North, with Sir Thomas Glenham as his Lieutenant and Governor of York.⁽⁴⁾

The royal advisers no doubt hoped that by these concessions the Royalist position in Yorkshire would be finally secured, despite the lively presence of the Hothams, and that future supplies from Holland would be safely conducted through the county to the King. But the county Cavaliers, if they desired security, also wanted peace; they dissuaded Charles from imprisoning

(1) The Diary of Sir Henry Slingsby, ed. D. Parsons, p.77.

(2) Shaw, II, p.213, G.E.C., Complete Baronetage, II, pp.174 et seq.

(3) The Presentment, J. Rushworth, Historical Collections, Part III, Vol. I, pp. 646-7.

(4) "His Majesty's Answer to the said Articles." ibid. n. 618.

Fairfax and his son before he left; ⁽¹⁾ and in September concluded a treaty of peace (known as the Pacification of Rothwell), ⁽²⁾ with the Fairfaxes and the Parliamentarians of the West Riding. This truce was broken, moreover, not by them but by Captain John Hotham, backed by the Commons, and before the year was out the Earl of Newcastle and his Northern army were obliged to march south into Yorkshire to save the ineffectual Cumberland ⁽³⁾ and ^{the} hard-pressed Cavaliers of the county.

Having acceded to the requests of the county, Charles left Yorkshire for Nottingham (16 August 1642) without the major part of the infantry, cavalry and military material which he had gathered at York since his arrival in March. The "Guard for his Person" remained under Cumberland in York, and the trained bands had previously been disarmed, mostly, and dismissed. He probably took with him some foot, however, "the scum of the Countrey, being raised by beating Drums for Volunteers". ⁽⁴⁾ None of the leading Yorkshire gentry, already mentioned, were with the King at Nottingham, nor any others of note, at this stage. Regiments raised in the county were, however, to come in later.

On 12 August Charles issued the proclamation requiring the aid of all his subjects north of the Trent and twenty miles south. ⁽⁵⁾ Nottingham was selected as the rendezvous, 22 August as the date. The one to be near to London, the other, sooner than adequate preparations could be made, to spur Goring's promised surrender of Portsmouth. ⁽⁶⁾ At this stage the Royalist

(1) Clarendon, V, § 446.

(2) Fourteen Articles of Peace..., 4 October 1642, TT: E.119(29).

(3) See his "character" in Clarendon, V, § 445.

(4) A Full Relation of all the late proceedings..., 20 August 1642, TT: E. 112(40). Foot were raised by beat of drum, horse by sound of trumpet.

(5) Steele, No. 2244.

(6) R. Bulstrode, Memoirs and Reflections (1721), pp. 71-2.

cavalry with the King were under the command of Commissary-General Henry Wilmot, who had "not then above eight hundred" horse.⁽¹⁾ This modest total probably included Byron's force, which had been with the King the day before he moved to Nottingham,⁽²⁾ but excluded Northampton's troop, under the command of Sir Nicholas Byron (an uncle of Sir John), who refused to join Wilmot.⁽³⁾ While the standard was being raised, on a number of consecutive and "melancholy" days at Nottingham, Northampton's troop, which included Richard Bulstrode, who has chronicled some of the events for us, remained in Warwickshire, where it had been raised.⁽⁴⁾ At the same time Prince Rupert arrived from the continent to take over the Generalship of the horse already reserved for him.

At Nottingham the response to the royal proclamation was gradual. The King was attended only by foot from the county trained bands, and some few volunteers.⁽⁵⁾ Recruitment was slow, but the commissions given earlier now took effect. Two of the leading Yorkshire Royalists, who had aided the King when at York and had been officers either in the horse guards then raised, or in the county militia, now used the influence of their private wealth, position and power in the county, to recruit a volunteer regiment of foot each and bring them to Nottingham.⁽⁶⁾ Sir William Pennycuik of Marske, in the North Riding, was a lawyer, M.P. for Richmond until "disabled" in August 1642, and wealthy landowner who rented profitable alum mines and bought office worth £2,000 p.a. before the war. He had been Sheriff of Yorkshire and Colonel in the trained bands.⁽⁷⁾ He brought in to Charles the

(1) Clarendon, V, § 446n.

(2) W. Dugdale, Life, Diary and Correspondence, ed. W. Hamper (1827), p.17.

(3) Clarendon, V, § 446n.

(4) R. Bulstrode, op.cit., p.73.

(5) Clarendon, V, § 449.

(6) Ibid., VI, § 62.

(7) D.N.B., M. Keeler, The Long Parliament.

"Eldest Regiment of the army"⁽¹⁾ no doubt raised from his estates and paid for by himself. At the same time John Belasyse "raised .. (at his father's charge)" and brought to full strength of 1000 at Nottingham, a regiment of foot from Yorkshire.⁽²⁾ Belasyse, the second son of Lord Fauconberg, was a wealthy recusant, and M.P. for Warwick in the Long Parliament; he became a general and a peer in the King's service.⁽³⁾ The Yorkshire regiment of foot, and the many others - of horse, and foot - which Belasyse raised, was a token of the great "interest" the family enjoyed in the county.

At the raising of the standard another foot regiment came in "complete & so with flying Colours"⁽⁴⁾ - that of Sir Ralph Dutton, the Gloucestershire knight. The commands in this regiment had been given out in July.⁽⁵⁾ Ralph, a younger son, was Gentleman of the Privy Chamber, had been a Deputy Lieutenant in the county, and was backed by the court (unsuccessfully) for a seat in Parliament in 1640.⁽⁶⁾ Unlike his elder brother he was not extremely rich,⁽⁷⁾ and there is no evidence that he raised himself all of the regiment he commanded, or maintained it at his own expense. It is perhaps more likely that he brought some officers and men to the King from the West, but that final recruitment took place in the Midlands in August. His Lieutenant-Colonel, Stephen

(1) Symonds, p.160.

(2) Life of Belasyse by J. Moore, E.M.C., Ormonde, N.S., II, p.379.

(3) D.N.B., M. Keeler, op. cit., C.C.C., pp. 366-7, 1331-3.

(4) Quoted in P. Young, "King Charles I's Army of 1642", J.S.A.H.R., Vol.17 (1938), p.102.

(5) Ibid.

(6) M. Keeler, The Long Parliament, under John Dutton.

(7) C.C.C. pp. 5, 1273-4.

Hawkins, and Sergeant-Major, Degory Collins, were both old soldiers.⁽¹⁾ It is hard to believe that a complete regiment could have marched from Gloucestershire to Nottingham in mid-August without some comment from contemporary news-sheets.

Recruitment for the King was slow and disappointing, until, in a declaration of early September, Parliament inadvertently gave a fillip to the Royalists.⁽²⁾ In the course of their reply they threatened that the "charges and damages" of a civil war, and the repayment of money lent to Parliament, would be satisfied out of the estates of "delinquents" - the King's supporters. This was sufficient to rally support round the royal banner, for many "plainly discerned that they had no safety but in the preservation of the regal power".⁽³⁾ In a speech shortly afterwards, Charles told his supporters; "Your enemies have already condemned you to ruin, for being loyal to me".⁽⁴⁾ the King's cause was imbued with a new urgency. When he left Nottingham for the loyal west, five new foot regiments appeared on the paymaster's accounts (dated Derby, 13 September 1642):⁽⁵⁾ those of Richard Feilding, Sir Robert Howard (dragoons), Lord Willoughby d'Eresby, the Earl of Northampton, and the Earl of Lindsey. Feilding and Howard were two of the many experienced military commanders in

(1) A Most True Relation of the Present State of His Majesties Army, 3 December 1642, TT: E.244(2). For Hawkins and Collins, see below, pp.184.

(2) Clarendon, VI, § 20.

(3) Ibid., § 21.

(4) His Majesties Speech and Protestation, 19 September 1642, TT:E.200(62).

(5) Reproduced in P. Young, op.cit., J.S.A.H.R., Vol.17, p.103.

the Royalist camp,⁽¹⁾ and we may surmise that the regiments over which they were placed were locally recruited while the King was at Nottingham. The regiments of Lindsey and his son were both raised in Lincolnshire, where, as we have already seen, the Berties had great interest and reputation. Willoughby's regiment also gained some recruits from Cheshire, no doubt when the army lay at Shrewsbury:⁽²⁾ his regiment became the King's foot guards, under his (Willoughby's) command; his father's regiment was "near one thousand men, very well officered".⁽³⁾ We recall that Lindsey had long experience in military and naval commands, and his son had served in the Low Countries. Lindsey had "a very great interest in his country Lincolnshire, as appeared by the supplies he and his son brought to the King's army; the several companies of his own regiment, of foot being commanded by the principal knights and gentlemen of Lincolnshire,..."⁽⁴⁾ One of these was Sir Gervaise Scrope, "who, being an old gentleman of great fortune... raised a foot company amongst his tenants, and brought them into the earl of Lindsey's regiment, out of devotion and respect to his lordship as well as duty to the King".⁽⁵⁾

(1) See above, p.33 .

(2) Restoration Petitions from maimed soldiers in Cheshire indicate this; also the career of Captain Richard Walthall, of Winstaston, Cheshire, who fought at Edgehill in Willoughby's regiment, Cheshire Record Office, Quarter Sessions Records, 1660-70, Cheshire Visitation Pedigree 1663, Harleian Society, Vol.93 (1941), p.115, and List, 142.

(3) Clarendon, VI, 862 n.

(4) Ibid., VI, 890.

(5) Ibid., VI, 897. For Scrope or Scrope see also R. Balstrode, Memoirs and Reflections, pp.78-9, C.G.C., pp.1327-8.

The many expressions of loyalty made by Wales and the Marches decided the court on its journey west. The trained bands of Nottinghamshire, Derby and Leicestershire, like those of Yorkshire before, were first disarmed and then dispensed with.⁽¹⁾ On his march the trained bands met Charles at Cavendish Bridge, near Nottingham, and 500 offered themselves and were received into the army, the rest being disarmed.⁽²⁾ The Royalists had with them now the ammunition train from York, twelve pieces of ordnance, and nearly 2,000 arms brought in from the neighbouring counties.⁽³⁾ The King's generals and courtiers were appealing eloquently for further supplies to friends and neutrals alike.⁽⁴⁾ When the army stopped at Derby the King was joined by Lord Paget and a regiment of foot raised by him partly from his estates in Staffordshire, "where his best interest was".⁽⁵⁾ The commissions for this regiment had been issued at York in August; they included one to a Flintshire gentleman.⁽⁶⁾ Paget had previously wavered in his allegiance, and was to desert the King's cause fairly quickly, but his regiment served faithfully. It was assigned to Richard Bolle, a Lincolnshire officer: the Lieutenant-Colonel was Richard D'Ewes, brother of Sir Simonds D'Ewes.⁽⁷⁾

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- (1) Speciall Passages, 23-30 August 1642, TT: E.114.
 (2) C.S.P.D., 1641-3, p.389.
 (3) Clarendon, VI, § 21, C. S.P. D., 1641-3, p.389.
 (4) Dugdale to Leverson (Nottingham, 28 August 1642), H.M.C., 5th Report, Appendix, p.175; Lindsey to Coke (Derby, 14 September 1642), H.M.C., 12th Report, II, p.322
 (5) Clarendon, VI, § 62 n.
 (6) Parchment commission to John Hanmer, of Hanmer, Flintshire, to be Captain in Paget's foot regiment, 8 August 1642, N.L.W., Hettisfield Document 468.
 (7) H.M.C., Portland, I, p.65. For Bolle and D'Ewes, see below, p.184.

During his traverse of the North Midlands and his stay at Shrewsbury, the King benefited from the efforts of his supporters in these parts previous to his arrival. The situation was favourable and had been carefully exploited. Hyde, for instance, had negotiated Shrewsbury's invitation to Charles of 15 September, and had ensured that the visit would be successful.⁽¹⁾ Warrants had already been sent to counties to muster trained bands and as many volunteers as they could. We have seen that there was some liaison - we cannot be sure how close - between the court and the Royalists of Worcestershire.⁽²⁾ Similarly in other counties commissions had been issued, and were being carried out, before Charles's arrival. Shrewsbury was normally the rendezvous. Falkland asked Sir Thomas Littleton, the Worcestershire commissioner, to make his appearance there with the troops he had raised:⁽³⁾ in the town itself Sir Francis Ottley met the King with 100 horse and three companies of militia foot:⁽⁴⁾ from the counties of North Wales were expected foot under John Owen, Roger Mostyn and Sir Thomas Salusbury; and it was reported that Sir Edward Stradling, the Glamorgan Baronet, had raised 1200 men, which he was bringing to the King.⁽⁵⁾ A troop

(1) Clarendon, VI, §62 n.

(2) See above, pp.20-2.

(3) H.M.C., 2nd Report, Appendix, p.36.

(4) H. Beaumont, "Events in Shropshire at the Commencement of the Great Civil War". Trans. Salop. Arch. Soc., Vol.51, p.27

(5) Estimate of Lord Spencer, in his letter to his wife (Shrewsbury, 21 September 1642), Letters and Memorials of State, ed. A. Collins (1746), II, p.667.

of horse (from Denbigh and Flint), without officer, came in and was given to Sir Thomas Hanmer, the Flintshire magnate, court official and professional trimmer, whose brother was already a captain of foot.⁽¹⁾ The court had issued orders to the commissioners of array for Caernarvon, for a muster of the county militia when the King should be at Shrewsbury. When there, Charles desired the county to raise a regiment of volunteers, under John Owen, and to pay him all the public money remaining in the local officials' hands (presumably from the collection of the last subsidy), together with whatever private contribution they could give.⁽²⁾ Altogether, thought the young Lord Spencer on the day after the King's arrival at Shrewsbury, the royal army was 9500 strong, 6000 foot, 2000 horse, the rest dragoons: and more were expected daily.⁽³⁾

The King and the Royalist foot remained in Shrewsbury from 20 September to 12 October 1642. While the levies of Wales were raising, Charles took the opportunity to visit Chester: on the journey he was met by the local Royalists whom we have previously discussed, the Earl of Rivers, Richard Egerton and a

(1) C.C.C., p.943; and see above, p.42 n.(6).

(2) P.B.Williams, The Tourist's Guide through the County of Caernarvon (1821), Appendix, pp.xiii-xvii.

(3) Letters and Memorials of State, ed.A.Collins, II, p.667.

force of 600 musketeers, and Lord Cholmondeley with 200 foot and 20 horse retainers.⁽¹⁾ All had been raised by their own power from their dependents in Cheshire. Sir Thomas Aston, the Sheriff of the county, commanded a troop of horse. Outside Chester the King reviewed the trained bands, and at Wrexham the local levies.⁽²⁾ The Cheshire men refused to serve outside the county, and were disarmed: the stores of the local militia, employed by the Royalists, were supplemented by the supplies held in the city and county of Chester and intended to be transported for the war in Ireland, or kept for defence against that turbulent quarter.⁽³⁾ Further, at the end of September, Lord Grandison with a party of some 200 horse, joined Lord Cholmondeley, the local Royalist leader, and deprived the Puritan citizens of Nantwich of their arms.⁽⁴⁾ The arms and ammunition they collected were sent to the Royalist camp at Shrewsbury. The King made further moves to confiscate Irish supplies: draught horses and carts, ready for transportation, were impounded for the royal artillery train.⁽⁵⁾ The Earl of Northampton's horse had already (20 August) seized over £500 worth of cloth at Coventry, en route for Chester and Ireland.⁽⁶⁾ More men and arms - it is difficult to discover

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- (1) J. Phillips: Memoirs of the Civil War in Wales, II, p. 13.
 (2) H. Beaumont, op.cit., Trans. Malop. Arch. Soc., Vol. 51, p. 31.
 (3) Ibid.,
 (4) T. Holton, Memorials of the Civil War in Cheshire, The Record Society of Lancashire and Cheshire, Vol. 19 (1889), pp. 25-7.
 (5) Clarendon, VI, 964.
 (6) C.J., II, p. 73b.

the exact number - arrived at Shrewsbury, from Lord Strange in Lancashire. Strange may have visited Charles, but was deprived of his command over the men he brought, which swelled the ranks of the main army and depleted the Lancashire Royalists.⁽¹⁾

The main body of Royalist horse had remained separated from the King, under Prince Rupert. Sir John Byron, with 200 troopers, had briefly visited Oxford at the end of August,⁽²⁾ and was now riding north. It was to protect their withdrawal from Worcester that Rupert lay between them and the advancing Essex, and skirmished with some leading troops of the Parliamentary horse at Powick Bridge (23 September). With Rupert at that engagement were his brother Maurice, Wilmot, Lord Digby, Sir Charles Lucas and Sir Lewis Dyve. Wilmot and Dyve were wounded.⁽³⁾ Wilmot, Maurice and Digby were already designated as cavalry commanders, and the horse regiments under their command (first recorded at Edgehill exactly a month later) probably had their beginnings at this time and took part in the Powick Bridge engagement. Sir Charles Lucas, and the horse he commanded, were also later present at Edgehill, in the regiment of the Earl of Caernarvon.

While the foot was gathering at Shrewsbury Rupert and most of the horse remained at Bridgnorth. It was discovered, however, that there was cavalry armour - "old backs and breasts and pots" -

- (1) The Lancashire Lieutenantancy, ed. J. Harland, Chetham Society, O.S., Vol. 50, p.281, H. Beaumont, op. cit., Trans. Salop. Arch. Soc., Vol. 51, p.31.
- (2) F. Varley, The Siege of Oxford (1932), pp. 1,24.
- (3) C. S.P. D., 1641-3, p.395.

in Shrewsbury magazine, and his colonels of horse were ordered to collect it by requisitioning waggons from the local farmers. ⁽¹⁾ The Royalist horse was augmented, though not on the same scale as the foot. The lack of esquires and good mounts, in Wales prevented cavalry recruitment, for these were the two essentials of bold Royalist horse. Sir Kenelm Digby, however, was reported to have given £1000 for horse to be raised by his kinsman, Sir Lewis Dyve, and it was at Shrewsbury that the regiments of Byron and Lord Grandison were completed. ⁽²⁾ The Earl of Northampton had come in, with his troop of "numerous" gentlemen, which was placed in the Prince of Wales's regiment. ⁽³⁾ Prince Rupert's own regiment was formed, and the "Cavaliers" - the peers and their retinue about the King - were divided into two troops, the first, the grandees themselves, under Lord Bernard Stuart, the second, their retainers, under ^{Sir} William Killigrew. They served as the King's Lifeguards of 1200 horse. ⁽⁴⁾

The List of Quarters for the foot regiments on 12 October (the day the army began its march south) is still extant. ⁽⁵⁾ There were 14 in all; and as well as the regiments already noted were those of "Col. Dives", the Earl of Rivers, Colonel Fitton and Colonel Blagge. Quartered with the infantry were the train of artillery and "His Ma^{ty}'s Guards of Dragoons".

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- (1) Warburton, I, p.451 n.
 (2) H. Tibbutt, The Life and Letters of Sir Lewis Dyve, Bedfordshire Historical Record Society, Vol.22 (1945), p.25, and see above p.34.
 (3) R. Duistrede, Memoirs and Reflections, p.53.
 (4) Clarendon, VI, s 74.
 (5) Earl. MS. 6851, f.211, printed in P. Young, op cit., J.S.A.H.R., Vol. 17, p.102.

Sir Lewis Dyve, like many other Royalist commanders, was associated with both horse and foot. A gentleman of Bedfordshire, with estates, also, in Northamptonshire, he had raised forces in his own county in the summer, although opposed by his Puritan rival, Sir Samuel Luke.⁽¹⁾ He probably brought horse to the King at York, but was given the colonelcy of a regiment of foot in August 1642. The companies for this were raised locally: a commission to raise a company of 100 foot, for instance, was granted by the Earl of Lindsey to Gervase Holles, the Lincolnshire antiquary.⁽²⁾ He raised levies at Newark, where he was then living, and brought them to Nottingham.⁽³⁾ In September Holles was promoted to be Sergeant-Major of Dyve's regiment of 1000 foot,⁽⁴⁾ from which the Colonel was still absent with the horse under Rupert. The regiment was probably completed at Shrewsbury: its Lieutenant-Colonel was Thomas Shirley, a gentleman volunteer of Sussex family.⁽⁵⁾ The Earl of Rivers had raised his foot regiment from his tenants and dependants in Cheshire, and joined the King at Shrewsbury: the same is true of Sir Edward Fitton's.⁽⁶⁾ Thomas Blagge was a Suffolk gentleman, and part of his regiment may have been derived from there;⁽⁷⁾ but it is also reasonable to suppose that all these

- (1) H.M.C., 5th Report, Appendix, p.40; for Dyve see D.N.B., and H.Tibbutt, op.cit.
- (2) H.M.C., Bucclough, I, pp.526-7.
- (3) G.Holles, Memorials of the Holles family, ed. A.C.Wood, Camden Society, 3rd Series, Vol.55 (1937), p.186, C. S. P. D., 1660-1, p.1124
- (4) Commission dated Derby, 16 September 1642, H.M.C., Bucclough, I, p.527.
- (5) A Most True Relation of the Present State..., 3 December 1642, FT: E.244(2).
- (6) Many Restoration petitioners in Cheshire claimed to have served in Fitton's and Rivers's foot, Cheshire Record Office, Quarter Sessions Records, 1660-70.
- (7) Lloyd, p.679, List, 13.

officers gained further recruits out of the numbers of Welsh and Lancastrians who joined the King at Shrewsbury. Charles Gerard, because he was a scion of an old Lancashire family, would almost certainly have been given a command over his fellow-countrymen: and his regiment of foot included at least one company from North Wales.⁽¹⁾ He also raised a troop of horse in Lancashire at his own charge. His regiment fought at Edgehill, although it is not included in the list of quarters.⁽²⁾

Not all the horse and foot that had attended the King at Shrewsbury marched in the main army to Edgehill. The loyal officers of the neighbouring counties were very often allowed to remain to defend their localities: Ottley was made Governor of Shrewsbury, Littleton of Bewdley. The regiment of John Owen, which was to have been completed and paid by penurious Anglesey and Caernarvon, stayed longer, before being ordered to join the King.⁽³⁾ The marching army was supplemented, however, by the regiment of foot from South Wales, where Lord Herbert^{and} the Marquis of Hertford were active, under Sir Edward Stradling.⁽⁴⁾ Sir Thomas Lunsford, who with his brother Henry, had been with Hertford in the West,⁽⁵⁾ brought his Somersetshire foot regiment to the King on his march south. Sir Thomas was the ex-Governor of the Tower, whose dismissal from this post had been the result of a political storm. The dragoons had been "settled" at Shrewsbury: Sir Arthur

(1) Petition of a Montgomeryshire soldier of this regiment, who was wounded at Edgehill under Capt. Lloyd, Oxford, 16 January 1643/4, PRO. 31.8. 197, f.206.

(2) D.N.B., and see below, p.211.

(3) P.B. Williams, The Tourist's Guide through Caernarvon, Appendix, pp. xvi-xvii.

(4) See above, p.16.

(5) Bellum Civile, pp.2-3.

Aston commanded "two or three regiments" which "were not above eight hundred, or a thousand at the most".⁽¹⁾

The country's militia had been employed during the summer only as a background to the serious business of raising an army.

Summoned, the trained bands could demonstrate their loyalty to the King, donate their arms and take part in local defence;⁽²⁾ but the regiments of the main army, at this stage, were not militia units. They were volunteer regiments, raised by leading Royalists often out of their own estates. Recruitment, by this and other methods, had on the whole been successful. The shortage most keenly felt was in arms rather than men, and it was the royal policy to impound the stores of the militia, while calling only for volunteers to serve. Despite these efforts, the Welsh "raw recruits" who joined Charles in the West "were very ill armed".⁽³⁾ Those under Salusbury were described as "twelve hundred poor Welsh vermin, the offscouring of the nation".⁽⁴⁾ At Edgehill "some Hundreds of Welshmen ... had no arms but Pitchforks, and such like Tools, and many only with good Cudgels",⁽⁵⁾ and in the whole body of the army "there was not one pikeman had a corslet, and very few musketeers who had swords".⁽⁶⁾ This was the situation when the Royalist army left Shrewsbury and embarked on the first major campaign of the war.

(1) Clarendon, VI, § 74.

(2) A hundred "country soldiers" were left to defend Chester when the King departed from the city, J. Phillips, Memoirs of the Civil War in Wales, II, p.15.

(3) R. Bulstrode, op.cit., p.75.

(4) J. Phillips, op.cit., I, p.128.

(5) R. Bulstrode, op.cit., p.86.

(6) Clarendon, VI, § 75.

At York in the summer of 1642 the King, having resolved on military preparations, had, according to Clarendon, "constituted a council of war, to sit every day".⁽¹⁾ The Council, of which this is the first mention, became the Royalists' chief executive committee, charged with the overall direction of military affairs and much of the detailed planning required by the main army. A list of Councillors - probably based on good information from Court - was published in August 1642;⁽²⁾ the last recorded session of the Council was in January 1646.⁽³⁾ Between these two dates there was hardly a facet of Royalist military organisation which was not influenced at some point by the War Council. As we shall see, other committees sprang up during the war for various purposes, and, latterly, individuals - from the King downwards - rather than councils made the important decisions; but, for the historian, the Council of War holds the central place in the structure of the High Command.

For our knowledge of the Council we are almost wholly dependent on Edward Walker, who had been, as we recall, paymaster of the royal guards in Yorkshire in 1642.⁽⁴⁾ His experience in this post, and as secretary-at-war to the Earl of Arundel in the Scots Wars, may have recommended him to the King.⁽⁵⁾ He was appointed secretary-at-war to Charles in September 1642.

(1) Clarendon, V, § 441 n.3.

(2) A Catalogue of the Moneys, Men and Horses, York, reprinted London, 3 August 1642, ff. 669. f. 6 (64).

(3) Earl. MS. 6552, ff. 254-5.

(4) See above, pp. 32 n.(1).

(5) Walker was a Somerset gentleman, who owed his early advancement to Arundel. He was a member of the College of Arms and rose to become Garter in 1645, the year in which he was knighted. At the Restoration he returned with Charles II to take up this office, but his enjoyment of it was marred by "controversies". He could not brook rivals, and he was known - for instance, by Hyde and Nicholas - as a stupid, pompous and quarrelsome man. D.N.B., Dodderidge, MS. Annals 423, ff. 83, 84, N.M.C., 15th Report, II, pp. 97-8.

and he combined this post, in the contemporary manner, with the secretaryship or clerkship of the War Council, ^{to} which he was appointed at about the same time. ⁽¹⁾ He recorded the minutes and orders of each session of the Council throughout the war. But his papers, as they have come down to us, are by no means complete.

It may confidently be assumed that a register or minute book of the War Council was kept, which has not survived the destruction of important records which took place before the final surrender of Oxford to Fairfax. ⁽²⁾ In the sequence of drafts of Council minutes, and of consequent orders prepared by the secretary for the royal signature, there are serious gaps; and for lengthy periods, some decisive in the fortunes of Royalist arms, there are no surviving productions of the secretary's office. At other times, usually in the middle of a strenuous and fast-moving campaign, the secretary's notes become rough and cryptic, often lacking the normal list of members attending each session. In all, over 70 meetings of the Council of War were recorded in minutes, complete or partial, found among the Walker papers or elsewhere. 54 of these list the Councillors in attendance. While the Council certainly did not "sit every day" of the War - except for crucial weeks with the army in the field ⁽³⁾ - it is obvious that we have first hand evidence of only a small proportion of the total number of the Council's meetings.

The Council of War was a feature of seventeenth century military organisation. Every army of the day possessed, in theory at least, a

- (1) MS. Ashmole 423, f.85, Earl. MS. 680a, f.63. John Bushworth held similar positions in the New Model Army, C.H. Firth, Grenville's Army, p. 57.
- (2) The Life, Diary and Correspondence of Sir William Brouncker, 1st Bt. Viscount Brouncker, p. 87. A comparable minute book, of the Council of Prince Charles at Bristol, 1645, is in the Staffordshire Record Office, S.MS. 43.
- (3) The Council met almost daily in September 1644, H.M.C., 15th August, II, pp. 101-3.

council of high-ranking officers to advise the supreme commander. The Parliamentarian and Royalists armies were no exception; and provincial (1) generals, like the main army commanders, presided over councils of this kind. There was an element of shared power in the existence of war councils; and the more autocratic the general the less likely he was to take his officers into his confidence. It was well known that both Rupert and Goring rarely called councils in the armies they commanded. Only in special circumstances - to decide a dispute, or take responsibility when defeat was imminent - did such generals consult their subordinates. (2)

But the case was slightly different with the central Council of War. Charles, a tyro soldier, needed the aid of military experts; the main army was a complex organism, and, theoretically, all Royalist-held England - outside the North and West - had to be governed from Oxford. The Council of War or some other decision-making body was vitally necessary.

Yet the Council was the King's in a personal sense. Charles was the nominal commander of all the Royalist forces - although never openly stated, this was tacitly assumed. The Lord Lieutenant General was "lieutenant" to the King. (3) Charles presided at nearly every session of the War Council: it met in Christ Church, Oxford, when he was in residence there.

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- (1) Lord Loughborough had such a council, Loughborough to Rupert (Lichfield) 30 July 1645). Staffordshire Record Office, S.MS.550.23.
- (2) Goring convened a war council of his officers "rather to please some of them than to hear them"; he called another to settle a dispute, Warburton, III, p.46n., R. Balstrode, Memories and Reflections, p.143.
- (3) The question of titles borne by Royalist commanders is a complex, and interesting one, which cannot be explored here. Lindsey and Forth were each "Lord Lieutenant General"; but Rupert, when he replaced Forth in 1644, became "Captain General"; and Astley in 1645 enjoyed the title "Field Marshall General". Provincial commanders were often known as "Colonel-Generals"; in Hasting's case this was changed to Lieutenant General when he was raised to the peerage as Lord Loughborough, Syms's notes, Harl. MS. 986, f. 91.

and accompanied him on campaign. The presence of the King gave the Council its identity and authority.

Although the Council established early in the war a secretariat, consisting of at least the secretary and several messengers,⁽¹⁾ it retained an ad hoc character. As far as can be seen, there was no machinery for calling a meeting of the Council, nor fixed procedure when it met. Its composition was not according to any formula. While it is possible that the War Council may have existed by virtue of a pre-^{war} commission, or one of 1642 which has not survived, it was not strictly comparable to established bodies such as the Privy Council, or specially commissioned advisory or executive committees, such as the large "Council of War" of the 1620's and 1630's, or the small "Committee of the Council of War" set up in 1638 to deal with Scotland.⁽²⁾ Membership of the Royalist Council of War was apparently only by invitation from the King, although the majority of War Councillors were high ranking officers, the greater officials and Privy Councillors. An exception was made of John Belasyse, on his return from Parliamentary captivity, which in itself suggests that these were the rules.⁽³⁾

The Council was not an unwieldy body. Rarely more than 17 members attended at any one session; and only after Naseby did the numbers drop below ten. Membership varied with the place and purpose of the meeting. At Oxford councils were larger and more civilian, with the field army smaller and more military. The War Council brought experts together, as they were

(1) Many of the minutes throughout are in a clerk's hand; council messengers residing in Oxford, Bodlian, MS. Add.D.114, ff.46-9.

(2) H.I. Carlyle, "Committees of Council under the earlier Stuarts", English Historical Review, Vol.21 (1906), pp. 673-85.

(3) Life of Belasyse by J. Moore, H.M.C., Ormonde, N.S., II, p.386.

required by the King or the Lord Lieutenant General. Useful junior officers or influential local grandees could be asked to attend as occasion arose. Permanent membership tended to be confined to generals, for example, Rupert, Ferth and Astley; the more prominent administrators, as Nicholas⁽¹⁾ and Hyde in Oxford only, Calpepper in Oxford and field councils; and those courtiers currently enjoying the King's favour, such as Richmond, Digby and Ashburnham. Field officers representing all arms, horse, foot, dragoons and ordnance, and colonels of tertias or brigades, as they were available, attended, as well as those holding special military positions, such as the quarter-master-general and the muster-master-general. The Governor of Oxford sat ex officio. It is noteworthy that Privy Councillors did not automatically take their place on the War Council.⁽²⁾

The Council functioned on two main levels. On the higher plane it was (at least in theory) the chief executive committee, directly under the King, which, if called upon, could formulate Royalist strategy and lay down the main lines of military policy from year to year. At a more mundane level it was an administrative body, concerned with the day-to-day running of the main army. It co-ordinated the work of the different authorities charged with the financial support, quartering, provisioning and arming of

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- (1) The Council's records of attendance bear striking testimony to the well-known industry of one secretary (Nicholas) and indifference of the other (Falkland).
- (2) Privy Councillors on the legal side were never called (e.g. Lord Keeper), except to be co-opted, in a special advisory capacity, to sub-committees, or the Council acting as a court martial (e.g. Lord Chief Justice Heath).

the Oxford Army, and provincial forces outside the North and West. Let us look first at the Council in this latter role.

In the field of administration the Council was closely related to the specialist committees and departments - such as the committee for the provision of clothing, or the Office of Ordnance - which will be discussed in more detail in later chapters. It will be sufficient here to point out the senior, co-ordinating position of the Council in these matters.

The main task of the Council, in settled quarters, was to order financial contribution from the area under the King's command, for the maintenance of the army, and to standardise the rates at which officers and men should be paid from this source. It was the War Council which negotiated agreements with individual counties for the payment of the troops quartered in each and supervised the carrying out of the contract by the county civilian commissioners. Over a third of the recorded councils at Oxford were wholly or partly concerned with the collection or distribution of local contribution.

The War Council was especially active in this direction at the end of each campaigning season, when new quarters were assigned to the main army's regiments, and the assessments for each county were consequently adjusted. As Oxford was the King's headquarters, the counties nearest to the city were those first brought under contribution, and those over which the Council exercised most jurisdiction. The "Agreement", with Oxfordshire, was negotiated in December 1642, and published in the following month.⁽¹⁾ In the autumn of 1643 the Council concluded new agreements with that county,

(1) An Explanation of the Agreement... betwixt His Majesty and the Inhabitants of the County of Oxon., Oxford, 16 January 1642/3.

Berkshire and Wiltshire.⁽¹⁾ The last recorded meeting of the Council, in January 1646, was concerned with the redistribution of the contribution money.⁽²⁾

Further afield individual local commanders - or detachments and garrisons of the main army - took the initiative and, as we shall see, often paid scant attention to Oxford's directives. But although the commissioners for Gloucestershire, for instance, negotiated separately with Prince Maurice, much was referred to headquarters.⁽³⁾ The Sheriff of Worcestershire was held to be accountable, in financial matters, to the Council of War.⁽⁴⁾ Once the Council had informed itself of the state of monetary contribution in the main army quarters, it could decide on the rate of pay to be allowed. These were laid down, from time to time, in a full council.⁽⁵⁾

Pay and provisions were both dependent upon the taking of adequate quarters. It was the business of the Council to handle the army's logistics problems, whether the difficulty was the sixteen Irish wives of Life Guardsmen, lodging in Oxford without permission,⁽⁶⁾ or the quartering of the 16,000 men of the combined armies of the King and Prince Maurice in pursuit of Essex in Cornwall. On campaign the Council worked with the commissariat departments, arranging the taking of provisions and transporting supplies. The reports of the various commissaries, exploring the countryside for 'diet and entertainment', were correlated by the Council. In the Cornish campaign the quartermaster-general and the officers of the

(1) F. Madan, *Oxford Books*, II (1912), Nos. 1458, 1476, 1496.

(2) Council [Oxford] 15 January 1645/6, Harl.MS.6852, ff.254-5. Henceforth all the councils referred to in footnotes in this chapter were held at Oxford, unless otherwise stated.

(3) Their undated petition to the King, Harl.MS.6804, ff.128-9.

(4) Council, 14 March 1642/3, Harl.MS.6851, ff.133-4.

(5) Council, 13 October 1643, Harl.MS. 6852, ff.184-5.

(6) They were allowed to remain: Council, 19 January 1642/3, Harl.MS.6851, f.95.

commissariat received their orders from the Council, which planned the movement of the armies for at least three days ahead.⁽¹⁾ For this purpose the secretary minuted that "The King...[would] have notes of the Quarters daily from the Quarter-Master Generall".⁽²⁾ With such information, and daily consultation between the King and all the principal officers, including the quartermaster-general, it was possible for the central Council to combine the Oxford and Western armies harmoniously,⁽³⁾ and deny quarter and provision to the trapped Parliamentary forces.

The day-to-day administration of the army on the march lay in the hands of the War Council, or a small committee of its more senior military members. In June 1643, for instance, before the campaign proper opened, seven generals were nominated to such a committee.⁽⁴⁾ Similarly, in the summer of the following year, when the King's forces were already in the field, a quorum of high ranking officers and some civilians was set up "for the better government of the army."⁽⁵⁾

The composite character of the War Council - civil and military elements were usually present in roughly equal parts - made it a suitable court of appeal when disputes between soldiers and civilians arose in the Royalist quarters. The Council adjudicated in cases where there was disagreement over the local assessment. It received petitions and heard complaints,⁽⁶⁾ and brought before it officers who had, contrary to the agreement, taken

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- (1) Councils, held in the Western counties, 19, 24 and 28 Sept. 1644 H.M.C., 15th Report, II, pp.101-3
 (2) Ibid., p.102.
 (3) Although there were initial difficulties: see ibid., pp.102,103.
 (4) Secretary's notes, 13 June [1643], Harl.MS. 6802, ff.223, 233
 (5) Two lists of this committee, of June 1644, exist. Walker was the author of both, but they differ slightly in the generals they name, Walker, pp.23-4, Harl.MS. 6802, ff.221-2.
 (6) Petition of Worcestershire commissioners, undated, Harl.MS.6804, ff.139-141.

free quarters, and countrypeople and local officials who had defaulted in their payments.⁽¹⁾ The case of Thomas Blagge, Governor of Wallingford, and the inhabitants of Harwell, heard before the Council in March 1643, was typical of many.⁽²⁾

Other matters involving discipline were the concern of the Council. It issued numerous proclamations throughout the war, enjoining obedience to the contribution agreements, prohibiting desertion in the King's quarters or the loss of arms, and prescribing penalties for offenders. An investigation of any military problems might be most conveniently undertaken by the Council, or a sub-committee of its members, and result in a proclamation issued by the King, acknowledging "the advice of the Council of War."⁽³⁾

The borderline between the War Council sitting as a disciplinary body, enforcing decisions and hearing disputes, and the Council as a court martial, was not clearly drawn.⁽⁴⁾ The Council acted, on occasion, as the supreme court of war. In such cases law officers were co-opted to give advice; and the membership of the Council became more military. It investigated the conduct of high-ranking officers, where this was required. Governors of recently-surrendered garrisons were tried, some, like Rupert himself after the fall of Bristol in September 1645, at their own request, in order to clear their names before a full military tribunal. Sir Richard Cave, the Governor of Hereford, was acquitted for his yielding of that city,

(1) Council, 24 March 1642/3, and instructions for Herefordshire and Oxfordshire commissioners, Harl.MSS. 6851, f.146 and 6804, ff.133, 152.

(2) Council, 24 March [1643], Harl.MS.6802, f.40.

(3) E.g., proclamation of 13 March 1643/4, Harl. MS. 6852, f.35.

(4) The terms "council of war" and "court of war" were interchangeable.

in June 1643.⁽¹⁾ Other serious breaches of the military code were dealt with by the Council or its sub-committees. Information concerning an officer's criminal behaviour in Worcester was sent up to Secretary Walker,⁽²⁾ no doubt in readiness for a trial at Oxford. The case of Sir Nicholas Crispe, who had killed another officer in a duel, was heard before the Council.⁽³⁾ The War Council could also draw cases on appeal from brigade and regimental courts martial. It was hindered in such attempts, however, by the independent spirit of local commanders, which extended, as we shall see, to the borders of Oxford itself.

The full War Council, with the generals of all arms, great officials, Privy Councillors and secretaries of state attending, could acquire an overall picture of the war. Reinforced by the reports and requests sent from distant armies to the secretaries, the communications of other committees, the accounts of central military departments, and even the information of spies and scouts on the movements of the enemy,⁽⁴⁾ the Council was in a position to become a clearing-house of information and military intelligence. The "interests" of commanders were represented by agents at court and members of the War Council; their demands could be debated in Council, and if approved by the King, passed, and action taken. Rupert, returned from the

(1) Steele, No. 2449.

(2) Case of May 1643. Harl. MS. 6852, f. 70.

(3) Council, 2 October 1643, W. Sanderson, A Compleat History of the Life and Reign of King Charles (1658), pp. 634-5.

(4) Councils 21 and 22 January, and 12 March 1642/3, Harl. MS. 6351, ff. 104, 110, 132.

forces in Northamptonshire in November 1643, reported a shortage of army doctors, who were too busy clamouring for their pay at Oxford to attend their patients. An order of the Council was immediately made.⁽¹⁾

Deliveries out of the central stores and armouries were frequently the result of the Council's deliberations.⁽²⁾ It could quickly remedy grievances. Having received, in May 1643, the nine-point petition (known as "the Humble Desires") of the officers of foot assembled in the camp on Culham hill, the Council met their demands, on at least four points, providing pay, equipment and transport from Oxford, and quarters for the treatment of the sick.⁽³⁾ Properly used, the Council was ideally placed to make a fair distribution of available supplies to all the King's forces.

The Council of War, although something of a cuckoo in the nest, was not the only administrative body at Oxford. The Privy Council met on occasion, and part of its register for these years survives.⁽⁴⁾ It was, however, too large and civilian to have such military importance, and its debates were in the main confined to questions of trade and the abortive peace negotiations with Parliament.⁽⁵⁾ Many of the most influential generals and courtiers were not Privy Councillors.⁽⁶⁾

(1) Council, 27 November 1643, Harl.MS. 6851, ff.229-30.

(2) E.g., a delivery of match to Banbury agreed in council, and authorized by the King, Walker to Heydon, - March 1642/3, W.O.55, 423, f.104.

(3) "The Humble Desires", undated, Harl.MS.6804, ff.92-3; Councils, 29 May, 5 and 14 June 1643, Harl.MS.6852, ff.79, 75 and 85; Percy to Heydon, 29 May 1643, W.O.55, 459.

(4) Public Record Office, P.C. 2.53, pp.213-33.

(5) Ibid.

(6) Or joined the Privy Council only late in the war; e.g., the Earl of Perth sworn a member after his retirement from high command, 13 April 1643, ibid., p.232.

Another committee at Oxford was more effective. This was the body, styled variously "The Lords and other His Majesty's Commissioners" or "The Lords Commissioners", which was brought into being in the spring of 1643 (by a commission renewed in succeeding years) and charged with the defence of the royal headquarters in the absence of the King, Council of War and main army.⁽¹⁾ As early as November 1642, when Charles was at Reading, some lords of the Privy Council had discharged routine business, printing proclamations and communicating with the court.⁽²⁾ In April following, when the King left Oxford briefly, a formal commission was issued to the Lord Keeper, the Marquis of Hertford, the Earl of Dorset and other prominent men requiring them to "safeguard" the city.⁽³⁾ They immediately made an order concerning arms and munitions,⁽⁴⁾ and commanded a neighbouring village to be fortified.⁽⁵⁾ When the army was on campaign, in this and following years, the "sitting council" at Oxford took over the ordering of transport and supplies,⁽⁶⁾ the central magazines, the negotiations with county commissioners for contribution and the drafting of commissions.⁽⁷⁾ Even when the Council of War was present, the Lords Commissioners continued to act as a co-ordinating and central directory for the work of the various minor committees set up to improve

(1) Black, pp. 30, 220, 256.

(2) Warburton, II, p. 72.

(3) Black, pp. 30-1.

(4) 24 April 1643, W.O. 55, 457.62; see below p. 330.

(5) Nicholas (secretary to the Lords Commissioners) to Charles (Oxford, 28 April 1643), Add. MS. 18980, f. 53.

(6) Many of the warrants of the Lords Commissioners are among the waggon-master-general's papers, Stevens, *passim*.

(7) C. S. F. D., Add. 1625-49, p. 662; Black, p. 66; Lords Commissioners to Berkshire commissioners for the contribution, 1 July 1644, Reading Corporation Archives, Box Z/W; Commissioners ordered to draft the first commission for the conscription of recruits, Council of War, 1 November 1643, Harl. MS. 6852, f. 193.

Oxford's defences. ⁽¹⁾ From 1644 to 1646 they issued their own proclamations. ⁽²⁾
 The most active commissioners in these years were Privy Councillors and courtiers such as Lord Cottington, the Earl of Dover, Lord Dunsmore, Nicholas and Hyde: it was Nicholas who continued to communicate the views of the Lords to the King.

Royalist administration was further complicated by the meeting of the Oxford counter-Parliament in 1644. The King had summoned members of the Long Parliament to this rival assembly which sat, in its first session, from January to April 1644, and in its second from November 1644 to March 1645. ⁽³⁾
 It was not a tactical success; as will be seen, M.P.s were highly critical of Royalist military organisation and some commanders. ⁽⁴⁾ But, under the guidance of the War Council, the Parliament and its sub-committees may have effected some administrative reforms. It wished to see the local agreements for contribution "punctually observed", and, sitting daily or sometimes twice a day, pressed ahead with other schemes to raise money and streamline the army. ⁽⁵⁾

(1) Such as the committee for fortifying, victualling and cleansing Oxford, appointed in January 1644, Black, p.121, Bodleian, MS. Add. D.114, f.73.

(2) Steele, Nos. 2579, 2580, 2591, 2615, 2657, etc..

(3) Royal summons, December 1643, Steele, No.2517.; prorogation of March 1645. The Life, Diary and Correspondence of Sir William Dugdale, ed. W. Hauser, f.78. 45 peers and over 100 commoners attended the opening session in January; more arrived later. See list of members and account of proceedings, J. Rushworth, Historical Collections, Part III, Vol. II, Chapter XV: cf. numbers attending in February 1644, Harl. MS. 2135, f.44.

(4) See below, p.87.

(5) Order of a committee of the Lords and Commons, March 1643/4, Harl. MS. 6852, f.24, Mercurius Aulicus, Oxford, February 1643/4, p.833, T. Carte, The Life of James Duke of Ormond, Oxford (1851), VI, p.47, and see below pp. 238-9, 245-6.

The Council of War aided these processes. Generals had been enabled to take their place in the Upper House, and two War Councillors, Culpepper and Hyde, sat in the Commons. It was Culpepper who "represented" to the Commons the wishes of the Council of War, particularly the need for money and credit.⁽¹⁾ Parliament created a committee or committees of Lords and Commons to negotiate with the court, on which members of the War Council were prominent. It remained in being when both Houses were prorogued in April 1644. Later in the year Sir Henry Slingsby, the Northern Cavalier, found it in the Schools, sitting "not upon any publick business, but for ye regulating of ye army, or advance of mony".⁽²⁾ Proposals for reform (of tax collection, disposal of arms, etc.) were presented by the committee to the King, debated in War Councils and largely accepted.⁽³⁾ The Council acted upon the advice of the committee, and with its greater authority, confirmed or ordered much that the committee requested.⁽⁴⁾ Culpepper, the Earl of Dover, Lords Percy and Wilmot, were most active in the co-operation of Council and committee, as members of both.⁽⁵⁾

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- (1) Council, 14 April 1644, Harl. MS. 6802, f. 86. At a war Council of 19 April he was ordered to recommend to the committee of the House of Commons a payment out of the money Parliament had raised, *ibid.*, f. 104.
- (2) The Diary of Sir Henry Slingsby, ed. D. Parsons, p. 140.
- (3) Councils, 14 April and 23 May 1644, Harl. MS. 6802, ff. 88-9, 183. Latter Council of War considered part of the "Desires of the Committee of the Lords and Commons", Harl. MS. 6804, f. 156-7.
- (4) Committee's proposals on contributions, March 1643/4, Harl. MS. 6852, f. 24. Resulting orders, April 1644, F. Madan, Oxford Books, II, No. 1622, and proclamation, May 1644, Steele, No. 2562.
- (5) Harl. MS. 6852, f. 24, and Wilmot to Rupert, 22 February 1643/4, Catalogue of the collection...formed...by A. Morrison, comp. A. W. Thibaudau (1889-92), VI, p. 424.

The committees at Oxford were at the apex of an administrative pyramid which embraced all of Royalist-held England, outside the North and extreme West. At the base of this complex structure were the organs of local administration, the county committees: half-way up, the regional commanders and their councils. There is a wealth of material (largely unknown), on their activities. ⁽¹⁾

We have already seen how commissions of array were sent into each county in the summer of 1642. ⁽²⁾ The commissioners established themselves as the chief executive committee in every loyal shire, the Royalist counterpart of the Parliamentary county committee. The county remained the basis for military organisation and taxation: the commissioners of Glamorgan, for instance, were concerned, in their daily administration, with recruitment of local and main army regiments, the improvement of the county's defences, the collection and distribution of the local weekly assessment and other imposts ordered by Oxford. ⁽³⁾ As these tasks multiplied and grew in complexity the original commissions were renewed and enlarged, and other county committees were created for special purposes - to "safeguard" the county, to sequester delinquents' estates, to impress recruits and to collect the excise. ⁽⁴⁾ Very often the same stalwart gentlemen - the original commissioners

(1) For county committees, principally the order book of the Glamorgan Commissioners of Array, National Library of Wales, Ll.MB.17, the papers of the Sheriff of Debnighshire, N.L.W., Crosse of Shaw Hill MSS., Nos. 1092-1125, and of the Midlands Commissioners, Townshend and Ottley. For regional commands, the minute book of the Council of Prince Charles at Bristol, 1645, Staffordshire Record Office, S.MS.45, the correspondence of Henry Hastings and other Midland officers, with Rupert, Staffs R.O., S.MS.479-564 and H.M.C., Hastings, II, pp.83-137.

(2) See above, p. 12 et seq.

(3) Order Book of Glamorgan Commissioners of Array, N.L.W., Ll.MB.17, passim.

(4) Mack, pp.162, et seq.

of array - sat on every committee.

Although the county was the basic administrative unit, it was not viable in a military sense. The forces each county could maintain on its own were small, and the defence of each could not remain for long in isolation from its neighbours. Although the Royalists never achieved a powerful territorial unit such as the Parliamentarians evolved in the Eastern Association, continuous and partly successful attempts were made throughout the war to create unified blocks of counties. The King encouraged counties to associate and pool their military resources: proposals of this kind were put to Worcestershire and neighbouring counties in the summer of 1642.⁽¹⁾ They were carried out, in hesitant fashion, in the East Midlands, North Wales, the West Country and elsewhere, at various times.⁽²⁾ Over each association was set a provincial commander, usually styled Colonel-General. Lord Capel, for instance, set up his headquarters at Shrewsbury in 1643, and established a council of war which consisted partly of representatives from the counties under his command.⁽³⁾ The Glamorgan commissioners, similarly, sent one of their number to attend Sir William Vavasour's council at Hereford.⁽⁴⁾

The counties were, however, afraid of losing their autonomy, and such attempted unification was ramshackle and impermanent. Those of South Wales, supposedly drawn together in 1643, and placed under Charles Gerrard's command in 1644, only succumbed to a formal association after Naseby, under pressure

(1) Townshend, II, pp.82-4.

(2) Black, p.9, H.M.C., Hastings, II, p.94. N.L.W., Crosse of Shaw Hill MSS., No.1102 and Add. 1595.E.

(3) Capel to Sheriff and commissioners of Denbighshire (Shrewsbury, - June 1643), N.L.W., Crosse of Shaw Hill MSS., No.1102; Ottley, Vol.7, pp. 303-4.

(4) Glamorgan commissioners' letter, in their order book, 25 July 1643, N.L.W., Ll.MB.17,p.16.

from the King and the imminent Scots invasion.⁽¹⁾ Some colonel-generals had, however, an effective command, good military organisation and substantial forces - a "flying army"⁽²⁾ and several garrisons - raised and maintained in the area over which they presided. Their administrative machinery was a reflection of that at Oxford. The Prince of Wales's council at Bristol, like the central Council of War, undertook such matters as the taxation of the counties under its command, the recruitment of the armies in the West, and the organisation of arms supply.⁽³⁾

Once established, the colonel-general, if his independent command was to remain intact, had to spend as much time resisting Oxford's pretensions and the claims of rival officers, as fighting the enemy. Many matters were constantly in dispute: could an officer, tried by local court martial, appeal to Oxford?⁽⁴⁾ Were prisoners to be ransomed at Oxford or locally? Were the new taxes, collected in the area under his command, to be paid to the general or the King? The original commission and instructions given him had probably obscured rather than clarified the limits of his authority.⁽⁵⁾ They left much to his own discretion, so long as he kept Oxford informed "from time to time".⁽⁶⁾

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- (1) Charles to North Wales commissioners, recommending them to associate in the same way (Baglan, 20 July 1645), M.L.W., Clarendon Letters, No. 585.
- (2) The term used by, for example, Philip Warwick of the forces in the Midlands under Charles Cavendish and Henry Hastings, Memoires of the reigns of King Charles I (1701), p. 258.
- (3) Minute book of the Council, Staffe & Co., SMMS.45.
- (4) The case of an officer at Banbury, October 1645, Add.MS.29,570, ff.55,57, 60,62.
- (5) E.g., instructions to Earl of Carbery, General in South Wales, Earl.MS.6852, ff.63-4.
- (6) Ibid.

Much depended on his personal standing at court and his local influence. Most provincial commanders employed agents and friends to look after their interests at Oxford. How useful such a man could be can be seen from the account of his services made by the agent of the young Earl of Northampton, Governor of Banbury. ⁽¹⁾ "I designed ye getting ye absolute Comānd of Northton and Warwickshire and Banbury to ye Late Earle...I procured ye sentinuance of all his fathers comānds to this Lord...Warrants obtayned and gott for Subscription Money Contributions arrears of Contributions...Banbury and Bloxham hundreds procured by me to be assigned to ye Castle". Northampton was also aided, in the carving out of his little empire, by friends in high places at court. ⁽²⁾

It is clear that the authority of the Council was confined to the counties nearer Oxford. In Wales, most of the Midlands and the West, local commanders were largely free to make their own financial arrangements. Rupert, at Shrewsbury in 1644, took control of the Worcestershire contribution. ⁽³⁾ The communications between the Oxford Council and the commissioners of Gloucestershire, Herefordshire and Worcestershire were not always in practice as strong as their written instructions suggested. Similarly, in disputes over contribution, the power of the Council was not universally recognised. The quarrel between the governors of Lichfield and Dudley - over the area in which both levied taxes - came before Hastings, the local colonial-general, Rupert and Newcastle in turn for solution. Only when each of these had failed to resolve the dispute was the case decided upon at "a counsell of

(1) Philip Willoughby to Fr Dowager Countess of Northampton (Oxford, 5 June 1645), Add. MS. 29,570, f.17.

(2) He acknowledged the help of Lord Hatten in strengthening his position at Banbury, Northampton to Hatten (Banbury), 26 February 1644/5, ibid., f.7

(3) See, for example, Rupert's orders of 10 February 1643/4, Townsend II, pp. 160-3.

of warre at w^{ch} was present both his Ma^{tie}", Rupert and "most of the officers of the field". But the resulting decision was "most contemptuously disobeyed" by one of the parties. (1)

The High Command, however, in administrative matters made itself felt at a number of points. Most of the powers in connection with the imposition of new taxation were kept in the King's hands. (2) Commissions to local commanders could be withdrawn or curtailed, (3) and although the typical colonel-general had the power to appoint to junior positions in the army or garrisons he controlled, a vigorous Oxford commander such as Rupert placed his own officers there regardless. (4) Royal proclamations were current in all parts of the country loyal to the King. (5) Above all, the High Command exercised a large measure of control over the movement of the provincial "flying armies", and many were called upon to contribute, as occasion arose, to the main army.

To turn from an examination of the solid foundations of central and local administration to answer the question - which of these bodies, or what persons, determined military policy? is to make a leap in the dark. Too much that would help us to understand how strategy was formulated, is intangible.

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- (1) Leveson to Rupert (Dudley, 1 December [?] 1644/7), Staffs R.O., S.MS.346
 (2) See below, pp. 240-1.
 (3) Sir Francis Ottley was refused an "absolute Patent of Governour" of Shrewsbury, Ottley Vol.6, p.55.
 (4) Governor of a garrison appointed his own junior officers, Ottley, Vol.7, p.290. Prince Maurice's commission to a major, January 1644/5, Lancashire Record Office, . . . DD:Ho:MP:1167. Rupert and Loughborough clashed over an appointment made by the Prince, Warburton, III, p.146n.
 (5) Copy of a proclamation in Townshend, II, pp.199-200. One or two local commanders did publish their own in addition, e.g., Capel's proclamation, April 1643, Steele, No.2403.

Many decisions were made by the King in private, with the advice of few individuals; their deliberations were secret and could not be "set down in writing". The most important influence in deciding a particular point of policy might be a courtier or general who had the King's ear while playing pique, hunting at Woodstock or strolling in the gardens at Christ Church. We shall never certainly know.

As we should expect, there is little on matters of high policy in the Walker papers; and virtually nothing in the slim Privy Council register.

Walker himself enjoyed a position of trust close to the King, which was midway between the court and the army; but he remained a minor figure.⁽¹⁾

In a military capacity he was only "Captain" Walker; in his secretarial role he lacked the ability to develop his office into something comparable to a secretaryship of state.⁽²⁾ He was not allowed to share in, far less to record, top-level debates. To some extent, as will be seen, this exclusion from the "inner circles" of the High Command extended to the full War Council, of which he was secretary. For its part, the Privy Council was too cumbersome and civilian to be of much importance.

(1) His position, half-soldier, half-civilian, is illustrated in the anonymous composite portrait of the King and himself in the National Portrait Gallery. Walker, in "uniform", is writing a despatch on a drumhead, at the dictation of Charles. He was not familiar with the King's greatest councillors: Hyde confessed in 1646 that he did not know him well enough to ask a favour, T.H. Lister, Life and Administration of Edward, First Earl of Clarendon, (1629-81), III, p.39. Walker was, however, entrusted with the task of writing what might be termed the Royalist "official history" of the war. He used his official papers to compile, within a year of the events, his Historical Discourses, an accurate if pedestrian guide to the years 1644/5. The account of 1644 was corrected by the King himself; it circulated widely in manuscript and was used by Clarendon when writing his History. The Discourses were not published till 1705.

(2) For the office of secretary-at-war in general, see O. Anderson, "The Constitutional Position of the Secretary at War, 1642-1855," J.S.A.H.R., Vol. 36 (1958).

We are forced to rely, for an account of military policy and the influences which shaped it, upon the correspondence of the court and the army commanders. ⁽¹⁾ From this and other sources it is possible to say something about Royalist strategy and strategy-makers for each year of the war.

The aims of the King and his advisers in 1642 seem to have been fairly uncomplicated. If an army could be assembled - and this was by no means a certainty in the early summer - it should be used in a direct attack on London. By October, the Royalists had become highly optimistic, the King enjoyed an initial advantage in having the services of a much larger number of professional officers than Essex, and his regiments were well-recruited if not well-armed. A courtier was able to write that Charles had a good if not a great army. ⁽²⁾

In military affairs the King was an interested amateur. He left the running of the war, at this stage, to his professional advisers. They quarrelled over the way in which the army should be drawn up at Edgehill, ⁽³⁾ and over the decision not to press the attack on London after the battle. ⁽⁴⁾ The generals were obviously in charge, and the element of caution in the latter decision may be attributed to the elderly and experienced Earl of Perth

- (1) The Rupert papers, in Warburton, Add.MSS.18980-3, Staffs R.O., S.MSS.479-564, and transcripts in Bodleian, MSS. Firth, C.6-8. The correspondence of Henrietta Maria is in Letters; some of her letters to the King, and copies of his replies, were taken by Fairfax at Naseby, and several, politically the most damaging, were printed by Parliament in The King's Cabinet opened, London (1645). This pamphlet was reprinted in the Harleian Miscellany, ed. W. Oldys (1808-12), Vol.7. Digby's correspondence was captured in Yorkshire in October 1645, and published by Parliament as The Lord George Digby's Cabinet..., London (1646), FF: E.329-(15). The letters of the King to Secretary Nicholas are in Evelyn, Vol.IV.
- (2) Lord Spencer's opinion, Letters and Memorials of State, ed. A. Collins (1746), II, pp.667-8.
- (3) Clarendon, VI, § 78. p.17.
- (4) According to the so-called "Diary" of Prince Rupert, Wiltshire Record Office, Pyt House Papers, "MSS. A".

who became Lord Lieutenant General upon Lindsey's capture and death at Edgehill. (1) It is possible, too, that some courtiers were of his way of thinking. (2)

Charles assumed near-independence in his great generals. To raise an army he had^{had} to rely on the goodwill of his most powerful aristocratic supporters. England north of the Trent was virtually the Earl of Newcastle's kingdom, where only the King's fine holograph letters, or a special emissary of the court could penetrate. (3) The West had a succession of more or less self-willed commanders for much of the war. The King was always anxious, no matter what the military situation required, not to impair the independent power of the Marquis of Worcester at Raglan. (4) Closer at hand, he often, at this stage, deferred to his nephew's opinions. In the first of a long series of ambivalent instructions to Rupert, the King asked him to follow the advice of the Council of War, including the Lord General, but also to "advise... as you think fit." (5)

In these circumstances it was hardly possible for the King seriously to put forward, as a practical proposition, a nation-wide plan which would unite all these disparate forces. Yet the traditional thesis that the King had a

(1) Clarendon, VI, 98.
(2) Rupert's Diary, p.17.
(3) Charles's letters to the Earl, 1642-4, Harl.MS.6988, ff.125-178. Philip Warwick, the courtier, sent north, see below, p.73.
(4) E.g., Charles allowed Worcester and his son to ignore even royal commands if such "might prove prejudicial" to them, H.M.C., 12th Report, II, p.13. See also Lord Herbert's paper, April 1644, M.L.W., Add. 4549.B, f.203.
(5) Charles to Rupert, sign manual (Nottingham, 27 August 1642); only known from an entry in Sotheby's sale catalogue, 14 June 1852, lot no.107.

grandiose strategy for 1643, which would co-ordinate the movements of Newcastle's, Hopton's and his own army, and culminate in a three-pronged attack on London has taken firm root.⁽¹⁾ This view has many attractions; in particular it helps to simplify a complex military situation and give form to a series of otherwise unrelated contests. But its defects are greater.

There is little evidence of a "complete plan" for 1643. The primary source, the report^{of the Venetian ambassador,} is a second-hand account of court gossip, and anything but a clear statement of the King's war aims for the coming summer.⁽²⁾ The King's letters to Newcastle convey pious hopes rather than clear commands.⁽³⁾ There is no doubt that he wished the Northern army would come to his aid, but he was in no position to dictate to the Earl; he variously recommended that Newcastle should join him (November 1642), secure the East Midlands (December 1642), or simply march south (April 1643).⁽⁴⁾ In June Philip Warwick was sent from court to persuade Newcastle to move from Yorkshire,⁽⁵⁾ and the Earl advanced as far as Gainsborough.

The King had as little real control over Hopton's Cornish army. His advice to that commander, battling in Devonshire in the spring of 1643, shows

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- (1) This is the textbook version, based on S. R. Gardiner's more tentative appraisal of the King's intentions; see History of the Great Civil War, I, pp. 83, 104, 135, 163, 195.
- (2) Agostini was reporting in January 1643 what Herne, the messenger who brought a royal answer to the City of London in that month, had heard: that the King would field 40,000 men in the spring, to close the Thames traffic and so starve London into submission, C.S.P. Venetian, 1642-3, p. 251. Gardiner cited this report, op. cit., p. 83.
- (3) "I may propose many things to you, but I shall not impose anything upon you", Charles to Newcastle (Oxford, 29 December 1642), Harl. MS. 6988, f. 131.
- (4) His letters to Newcastle (Reading, 2 November, Oxford, 15 December 1642 and 23 April 1643), ibid., ff. 127, 130, 135.
- (5) P. Warwick, Memoires of the reign of King Charles I., pp. 242-3.

more concern for the Parliamentary activity in the West Country, where much of the main army was quartered, than anything further east.⁽¹⁾ He ordered Hopton (in March or April) to draw into Somerset for mutual protection.⁽²⁾ There is no evidence in Hopton's own detailed narrative⁽³⁾ that he received instructions at this time to advance further.

There was nothing in the moves of the main army in the centre to show that the Royalist forces were acting in concert, as part of an overall plan. His cavalry raided the West Country, and Rupert took Lichfield in April. By then the King was far from taking the initiative; his position was perilous. His men were still - as they had been since Edgehill - short of arms and munitions.⁽⁴⁾ Essex had brought a formidable army to within striking distance of the Royalist headquarters, and Reading, despite the efforts of the King to relieve it, fell in April. What the King most required in these months was material assistance from the North and West, not a hypothetical blockade of London.

The most that can be said of the "plan" of 1643 was that the court indulged in some boastful speculation in January: that the King hoped the forces raised on his behalf by Newcastle and Hopton would make some impact in the centre by the spring; and that he encouraged them to advance in the only direction open to them if they were to make any progress at all. It is unlikely that major strategic decisions were taken until the shortage of armaments at Oxford was remedied in May and June, and in fact the movements of the main army and its detachments bear the stamp of improvisation rather than

(1) The King's letter to Hopton, undated, captured by Parliament's forces in April 1643 and printed, Speciall Passages, 25 April-2 May 1643, TF:E. 100(17).

(2) Ibid., cited by Gardiner, op.cit., I, p.131.

(3) Bellum Civile.

(4) Clarendon, VII, 531, and see below, p.336.

lengthy deliberation.

Immediate military policy was the result of conciliar advice.⁽¹⁾ It was the decision of the King and the Council of War, no doubt following the advice of the eight commissioners specially charged to consider the security of garrisons, to abandon Reading.⁽²⁾ When Sir John Urry, the Scots renegade, defected to the King from Essex's army, advantage was quickly taken of his inside knowledge to mount the Chalgrove raid.⁽³⁾ The committee of generals to "govern" the army, already mentioned, began to function at this time.⁽⁴⁾ But the lack of any settled policy encouraged the haphazard production of ideas, and independent action. The spring of 1643 witnessed the beginnings of a tendency towards less formal discussion. The events of the winter, such as the abortive peace negotiations, may have helped to produce political groupings at Oxford. Already in May 1643, there are hints that cabals are being formed, and that a smaller junto of the King's personal advisers was arrogating work to itself. Nicholas, who was indubitably a member of the War and Privy Councils, complained to Rupert that he was "none of the close Committee att Court".⁽⁵⁾ In the autumn another junto, of courtiers, was created by the King, "where all Matters were to be consulted, before they should be brought to the Council Board".⁽⁶⁾ In this case the Privy Council was meant and the committee consisted of prominent members of that body, such as the Duke of Richmond, Cottington,

(1) Warburton, II, p.17.

(2) Draft commission to eight members of the War Council, 30 March [1643], Harl.MS.6802, f.51.

(3) Clarendon, VII, § 75.

(4) See above, p.58.

(5) Nicholas to Rupert (Oxford, 11 May 1643). Add.MS.18980, ff.59-60, ~~inserted~~ ^{inserted}ately printed in Warburton, II, pp.188-90. The secretary was referring to Western affairs and news.

(6) E.Hyde, Earl of Clarendon, The Life of Edward Earl of Clarendon, Oxford (1760), I, p.131.

the new secretary Digby, Culpepper and Hyde. The wily Cottington - "Volpone" to his friends - convened its meetings in his lodgings at Oriel College.⁽¹⁾

There was little co-ordination of ideas, good or bad, this summer. The King put his proposals for military action - unfortunately he did not state what they were - to Forth and Rupert only.⁽²⁾ He asked Rupert to engage Waller rather than attack Bristol,⁽³⁾ but the Prince wisely continued with his successful siege of the city, which fell to the Royalists in July. Newcastle was recommended to advance into the Eastern Association; but the Queen openly discouraged this plan, writing to the Earl of Oxford courtiers: "the truth is, that they envy your army".⁽⁴⁾ The decision to besiege Gloucester - a colossal blunder - was apparently taken in haste, in the belief that Massey, the Governor, was about to come over to the King. When this did not happen, everyone disclaimed responsibility for the decision, which was much criticised at the time.⁽⁵⁾ So aimless seemed the Royalists' movements once the siege was raised that even the court newspaper fell silent on the King's actions.⁽⁶⁾ The plan to have Hopton raise a new army after First Newbury, which would "point forward as far as he could go towards London",⁽⁷⁾ may well have been influenced by the gentry of the Southern counties who were clamouring at Oxford for such a move.⁽⁸⁾ It was probably the important junta of courtiers, presided over by Cottington and sitting regularly at Oriel College, which gave Hopton instructions in connection with his new forces.⁽⁹⁾

(1) State Papers collected by Edward, Earl of Clarendon, ed. R. Scrope and T. Monkhouse (1767-86), II, pp. 286, 290.

(2) Charles to Rupert (Oxford, 12 and 20 July 1643), Bodleian, MS. Firth. C. 6, ff. 195, 197.

(3) Ibid.

(4) Letters, p. 225

(5) Clarendon, VII, §§ 158, 164, 238, 239, Warburton, II, p. 278n. The approval of the design in the very partial "Diary" of Prince Rupert would seem to indicate that the Prince did not oppose it, Diary, p. 23, Wilts R.O., Pyt House Papers, "MSS. R".

(6) It had to be prompted by the King to give an explanation of the proceedings later, Walker to Nicholas, September 1643, Harl. MS. 6804, f. 233

(7) Bellum Civile, p. 61.

(8) Clarendon, VIII, §§ 2-5.

(9) Bellum Civile, p. 61.

The appearance of cabals behind the scenes, and the apparent lack of any strong overall direction of the Royalist forces, which we have noticed, was the result of two factors, both of which became of increasing importance after 1643. One was the character of the King himself; the other the growth of warring factions at headquarters.

The King, in the summer of 1643, was becoming more self-confident in the business of war. He had seen it at first hand for a year. While remaining diffident towards Rupert, he was clear about the value of his own opinions. He proudly styled his proposals for action - already referred to - as "ay oven shyld";⁽¹⁾ he had no doubt spurned the lawful process - the War Council - to produce this offspring of his own fancy.

As an advisory body, and even in its useful administrative capacity, the Council could be bypassed by the King. Once the procedures for allocation of supply had been tightened up, no large issues from stores could be authorised except "by the immediate finger of the King".⁽²⁾ On its own authority the Council could order only minor amounts.⁽³⁾ While the King found it convenient to refer certain demands from outside or from main army departments to the Council, which remained well-informed on what was available and whose need was greatest, he was not obliged to do so. His signature could be procured not only by the secretary-at-war, following his consent to a project agreed on at a Council or a meeting of generals, but by courtiers and personal suitors.

The division in the High Command of February-May 1644, when Rupert was based.

(1) Charles to Rupert (Oxford, 12 and 20 July 1643), MS. Firth, C.6, ff. 193-197.
 (2) Abstract of a letter from Trevor to Rupert (Oxford, 11 April 1644), Warburton, I, p. 324.
 (3) This is clear from the case of a delivery of match to Banbury, W.O. 55, 423, f. 104. Such things as, for example, powder-bags could be issued on the Council's order, 29 May 1643, W.O. 55. 459.

at Shrewsbury, Charles at Oxford, and Forth and Astley joined with Hopton in Hampshire, promoted such tendencies. The Oxford War Council was left predominantly civilian, and dealt with matters of only secondary importance. But the agents of the various army groups were active, and many orders for supply were made independently by the King, without reference to the Council. Consequently, there was a considerable bias in the supplying of Hopton's army, at the expense of Rupert's. Rupert's agent at Oxford wrote: "I find they that act my Lord Hopton's interest are almost ashamed to see all things pass for him, and nothing for your Highness."⁽¹⁾ Lack of co-ordination resulted also in royal warrants conflicting with Rupert's demands. Percy, General of the Artillery, berated by the Prince for such a case, replied: "I did desire the King...that he would referre the consideration of this to his privy [sic] counsell."⁽²⁾ Percy's persuasion, or Rupert's successful relief of Newark, had some effect, and the atmosphere at Oxford became much more favourable to the Prince.⁽³⁾ The War Council and procedures for fair distribution of supply were temporarily reinstated as a result.

The King was as unwilling to take the advice of the Council in the determination of military policy. He seems to have reserved a whole area of strategy from debate. The royal directives, communicated by the secretaries

- (1) Warburton, II, pp. 387-8n. This assertion is supported by a cursory investigation of the records of the Ordnance Office. There are many issues for Hopton and the South, none directly to Rupert.
- (2) The Pythouse Papers, ed. W.A. Day (1879), p.60. It is most likely that Percy was referring to the War Council sitting at Oxford, which at this period was composed mainly of Privy Councillors.
- (3) Jernyn to Rupert (Oxford, 26 March 1644), Add.MS.18981, ff.107-8.

of state or secretary-at-war, went out to local commanders, governors and county officials, as well as departments of the Oxford army, independently of the Council of War. His growing confidence was reflected in his preference for fewer and less orthodox advisers. The devious personality of Charles could not find complete satisfaction in a large and semi-formal council composed of honest officials and straightforward soldiers. This would not have affected the Royalist cause adversely had the King been a Gustavus. If Charles had developed personally as an outstanding soldier and statesman, the machinery evolved for running the war could have been jettisoned with impunity. If he had chosen his counsellors wisely, listened judiciously and acted firmly he would have brought all the advantages he enjoyed - a centralised command based on his own authority, the advice of experienced generals - to fruition; and the outcome of the war would never have been in doubt. But his favourites were wayward; individually brilliant, they were incompatible as a group. The royal court, particularly towards the end of the war, was like a basket of crabs, where each member struggled for survival against the rest.

Nor did the King use the advice preferred his shrewdly. He was stubborn and vacillating by turns. He was influenced most by the opinion he had heard latest, and this was more likely to come from a groom of the bedchamber than a War Councillor. The Queen and Rupert realised this, and saw the need to be in constant attendance on the King when crucial decisions were about to be made. In 1643 Rupert had got his way through his personal intervention at court; removed to Shrewsbury in 1644 his influence faded, and he had reinforced his authority by his own presence whenever possible, travelling to Oxford in April and Sherborne in October.

Unrestrained by the King, three main factions emerged in the Royalist camp - the Swordsmen, the Courtiers and the Civilians. Their lines of

division, never clear-cut, bore some relation to the political groupings of the 1630s, and those of the Royalists in exile later.⁽¹⁾ The factions were strongest from 1644 to the end of the war.

The Swordsmen were the professional military element in the army, who looked to Rupert for leadership. In a sense all the King's active supporters were under arms, but there was a clear distinction between those who were career soldiers and those who were amateurs in arms. From the first days of the war a gulf was fixed between, for example, those, like Rupert and William Legge, who knew what a petard was, and those, like Digby, who did not.⁽²⁾ Yet Digby was a colonel of horse before he was secretary of state.

As many observers, including Fairfax's chaplain, noted, the Royalist army had an abundance of "old soldiers".⁽³⁾ Numbers had come over in 1642 from the German Wars, "the great Nursery of our English Gentlemen".⁽⁴⁾ Rupert brought many. As the Civil War dragged on the plain squires and noble amateurs tended to drop out, and be replaced by vigorous and experienced professionals. The rise, by merit and long service, of men such as George Lisle, Charles Lloyd and Henry Tillier will be traced in a later chapter.⁽⁵⁾ The tendency towards increasing professionalisation was helped by the arrival of many "regulars" from Ireland, after the Cessation in 1643, and of foreign mercenaries from the continent.

Rupert's affinities were with those who had seen action abroad. He quickly developed a friendship for William Legge, the pre-war Master of the

(1) I have borrowed the term "Swordsmen" from the description given to Rupert's group of the 1650s: see D. Underdown, Royalist Conspiracy in England 1649-1660, Yale (1960), p.11.

(2) Incident of August 1642, recounted in Warburton, I, p.462.

(3) J. Sprigge, Anglia Mediviva (1687), p.41.

(4) Lloyd, p.551.

(5) See below, pp. 184, 195.

Armoury and veteran of the Dutch and Swedish service,⁽¹⁾ and Charles Gerrard, the Lancashire gentleman (later Earl of Macclesfield), who had been "trayned up in the Discipline of War...in the United Provinces".⁽²⁾ Such men looked to the Prince for their advancement.

The nature of patronage in the Royalist army inspired this community of interest. Each general or local commander, enjoyed a certain amount of independence from central control, and had rewards and favours he could bestow. Every popular commander thought it wise to keep a good table, to entertain and promote his subordinates and so develop his own minor "court". His officers in return would uphold his interest and share their fortunes with him. Wilmot, for instance, was popular with his officers, and they vigorously protested when he was removed from his command.⁽³⁾ There were several such courts below the royal court, and Rupert's was the greatest of them.

Not all old soldiers were members of the Prince's court; and Rupert could detect ability, and promote it, in a promising amateur. His supporters ranged from John Russell and Sir William Compton, the brothers of earls, to Henry Bard, the impoverished commoner whom he advanced to an Irish peerage.⁽⁴⁾ The Swordsmen, or "Cumberlanders" - Rupert had been created Duke of Cumberland early in 1644 - were a strong party in Royalist politics from 1644 to 1646. Their aims were to help the King defeat his enemies, but at the same time to promote their own careers. They believed that they alone were competent to

(1) D.N.B.

(2) H. Dugdale, The Baronage of England (1675-6) II, p.418, D.N.B.

(3) The Petition of the Old Horse [August 1644], Warburton, III, p.17n.

(4) As Viscount Bellemont: Rupert had seen his "large Spirit penned within a narrow Fortune", Lloyd, p.668, G.E.C., under Bellemont, D.N.B.

run the war, and attacked, indiscriminately, the loyal civilians who were attempting to keep some share of the local commands - over regiments and garrisons - for themselves,⁽¹⁾ and the courtiers who intervened at the highest level in military policy. Their enemies accused the Swordsmen of wishing to prolong the war, in order to make their fortune out of loot and plunder.⁽²⁾ In fact Rupert and his entourage, as we shall see, would continue to fight only so long as it seemed militarily worth while to do so; when the situation became hopeless most professionals, like good mercenaries, sought the best composition possible with the other side in order to pursue their military careers elsewhere.⁽³⁾ At the end of the war Rupert placed many of his friends and associates in the French service.⁽⁴⁾

The Courtiers, as a group, were not numerous; their strength lay in the offices they held and their influence with the King. They were individually important, but did not present a united front against all outsiders. The Queen had her own court, and her confidant, Henry Jermyn, was at times a warm supporter of Rupert.⁽⁵⁾ The "grandees" about the King, such as the Duke of Richmond and Lord Treasurer Cottington, occasionally sided with the Prince.⁽⁶⁾ But only unyielding hostility could be expected from the Courtiers par excellence, George Digby and John Ashburnham. Both came to power in 1643. Digby, secretary of state upon Falkland's death, quickly consolidated his

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- (1) Rupert's officers replaced local mayors as governors in key strongholds in the Midlands: e.g., Sir Gilbert Gerrard, uncle of Charles Gerrard, took over from Sir William Russell at Worcester.
- (2) See, for example, the caricature of Sir Thomas Lunsford, one of the most unsavoury of the career officers, Warburton, I, facing p.428.
- (3) Marcus Trevor, brother of Rupert's faithful agent, Arthur Trevor, urged Hopton in 1646 to treat with Fairfax, "to save what we could for foreign employments", T. Carte, A. Collection of Original Letters, I, p.117.
- (4) Warburton, III, p.237n.
- (5) Trevor to Rupert (Oxford, 16 and 19 February [1644?], Add.MS.18981, ff.44, 47.
- (6) Ibid., and Nicholas to Rupert (Oxford, 30 October 1643), Add.MS.18983, f.136, incompletely printed in Warburton, II, p.323.

position close to Charles. Ashburnham, as treasurer-at-war and groom of the bedchamber, brought to bear on the King all the persuasive talents which he had long employed at court. He first attended a Council of War in November 1643.⁽¹⁾

The aims of the Queen, Digby, Ashburnham and their satellites, although often differing in detail, were broadly similar. They were to win the war outright, by whatever means could be found. All peace proposals should be rejected: most of the Courtiers were from the first excepted from pardon by Parliament, and so had all to lose from a compromise settlement. They placed most confidence in foreign alliances, and spent much time in negotiations with continental powers. They were prepared to use Irish Catholics as a last resort; one of their distinguishing marks was their outright or fellow-travelling Catholicism. All were extreme Royalists, hostile to the moderate civilian and hard-headed military elements in the King's camp. The more desperate his cause became, the more Charles turned to those - such as Digby and Ashburnham - who were prepared to go to any lengths to stave off defeat, and who unrealistically offered Catholic and foreign assistance.

The third faction - more amorphous and difficult to identify - was the group of Civilians. They were the moderate courtiers and peers, some, like Hyde and Culpepper, converts from the popular party of 1641. They were firmly attached to the Protestant cause, were increasingly unhappy about the conduct of the war, which they wished to bring to a speedy end by means of a compromise settlement, and were as fearful of the Courtiers and Catholics as of the Swordsmen. Hyde disliked equally Ashburnham, his rival in financial affairs, and Goring, the ruthless general. The Earl of Berkshire expressed

(1) War Council, 27 November 1643, Harl. MS. 6851, ff. 229-30. For Digby and Ashburnham, who had been an active courtier since the 1620s, see D.N.B.

the general view of this group when he wrote with exasperation to another Civilian (the Earl of Bath) late in the war that the soldiers on both sides were determined to make their fortunes out of the earls' estates.⁽¹⁾

Many and otherwise diverse Royalists agreed with these criticisms. The Earl of Sunderland and other Protestant lords feared the influence of the Papists at court;⁽²⁾ the Earl of Bath felt the Irish Cessation would harm the King's cause;⁽³⁾ Lord Saville and Berkshire's eldest son were so strongly for peace that they were disgraced.⁽⁴⁾ They were representative of much widespread if unorganised feeling in the country at large. The local commissioner of array resented the machinations of the distant court and the depredations of the army in his own district.

But because of their moderation and diversity the Civilians did not make a strong impact at Oxford. For much of the time they lacked leadership: such figures as Berkshire and Bath were totally ineffective. As unwilling soldiers they had little to contribute in the military sphere,⁽⁵⁾ and they were out-maneuvred at court by their rivals.

They did, however, exert some influence through the bodies on which they were most strongly represented. The Privy Council and Oxford's defensive

- (1) Berkshire to Bath (Bridgwater, 3 June 1645), Kent Record Office, Sackville Papers, Earl of Bath MSS., C.292.
- (2) Letters and Memorials of State, ed. A. Collins (1746), II, p.667.
- (3) Bath to the Countess (Oxford, 22 October 1643), Kent R.O., Bath MSS., C.267.
- (4) See below, p.90n(5), for Saville: Lord Andover was deprived of his commands, see below, p.114.
- (5) A London broadsheet put the following sentiments in the mouth of the Earl of Dorset, a typical Civilian: "I cannot act a soldiers part/ Nor freezing lie in Trenches;/ But wish myself with all my heart/ At Chelsey with my wenchies." The Sense of the Oxford-Junto / 6 March 1644/, TT:669.f.10.(20). This lampoon is an accurate and amusing guide to the personnel and aims of the factions at Oxford in the spring of 1644.

committee, the Lords Commissioners, had an easy majority of Civilians, and both councils tended to express their views. The defence of Oxford seems to have fallen into their hands towards the end of the war. Above all, the Oxford Parliament was a forum in which the spokesmen of Civilians - at court and from the provinces - could be heard. The Civilian element formed what might be termed a "country party", highly critical of rapacious soldiers and militant courtiers, and urging the King to begin peace negotiations.

We have already seen how some of the events of 1643 were being influenced by the growth of cabals which reflected political groupings. The interplay of factions - principally those referred to above - threatened to dictate the Royalist conduct of the war from 1644. The influence of the War Council was bound to decline as a result. In fact the Council mirrored the changes which were taking place in the King's headquarters. In the councils of November 1642 to June 1643 a hard core of ordinary colonels had been present, acting as a counterweight to the civilian elements. At most meetings three or four of these officers attended; Colonels Richard Feilding, Henry Westworth, Sir Richard Cave and John Innes among the earlier, John Byron and Lewis Kirke among the later councils. On some occasions the military section, including General officers, was more numerous than the civilian. But military circumstances gradually removed these junior members from Oxford. Feilding went to Reading, Cave to Hereford, and both to disgrace. Byron took command at Chester in late 1643, and Kirke removed to the government of Bridgnorth. They were not replaced. The War Council lost useful officers capable of presenting expert advice to the King, or carrying out conciliar orders in the army.

The Council declined in numbers, and prominent Courtiers, such as Ashburnham, made their appearance. With the disappearance of "neutral" members this and other committees could be more easily "captured" by the

protagonists of the factions at Oxford.

But this tendency was gradual. If formal debate was becoming outmoded in 1644 for strategic and political decisions, it was still useful to get the advice of the experienced soldiers on tactical matters. In the spring, with Rupert and his forces based at Threwsbury, and Essex and Waller threatening Oxford, the King consulted the principal officers of the field, on the movements of the army. He met Forth, Astley and others at Abingdon, "where many Debates passed, and Resolutions were taken how to oppose the Rebels with the best Advantage".⁽¹⁾ The policies agreed on before Rupert left Oxford were modified from day to day, or abandoned, as circumstances dictated. A plan to strengthen the defensive garrisons round Oxford was reversed, and there was a phased withdrawal before the superior forces of Parliament. The detailed arrangements for this were in the hands of a small committee.⁽²⁾

If the recommendations and instructions sent to Rupert must have appeared to him contradictory and confused, the tactical changes made were fundamentally sound. He was assured that the final plan - calling for a series of skilful and co-ordinated manoeuvres, which allowed the royal forces to pass safely between Essex and Waller - was based on "mature deliberation" to await his success in the North or Prince Maurice's before Lyme.⁽³⁾ As we have seen, the War Council and its expert sub-committees conducted the detailed planning of the campaign in the West with brilliant success.⁽⁴⁾ From March to November 1644, indeed, was the period of the best and fullest use of the Council in this limited capacity.

But in general the jealousies and disputes of the Swordsmen, Courtiers and

(1) Walker, p.14.

(2) *Ibid.*, pp.13,23-4, *C.S.P.D., 1644*, pp.156, 166.

(3) Digby to Rupert (Oxford, 26 May 1644), Add.MS.18981, f.182.

(4) See above, pp.57-8.

Civilians were given freer rein in this year than before. The Civilians enjoyed their moment of power on the calling of the Oxford Parliament in January. The provincial commissioners of array and county officials who assembled at Oxford in that month combined with the moderate court lords to present their proposals for action to the King. The reforms they desired constituted a typical "country party" programme: retrenchment of the economy, taxation and military spending to be more regulated, better discipline in the army and less power to the generals, and, as a corollary, greater discretion to be allowed local civilians in military matters. ⁽¹⁾ Parliamentary committees examined critically certain army departments, commanders and governors. ⁽²⁾ Lord Percy and the Office of Ordnance did not escape unscathed, ⁽³⁾ and the Governor of Wallingford - whom even his brother officers agreed was "a notable griper" - may have been castigated. ⁽⁴⁾ Above all, Parliament wanted the King to conclude peace with his enemies.

Although the High Command did not take the advice of the Parliament very seriously, the Civilians at Oxford still had one or two cards to play. A standing committee of the Parliament remained in being during the summer, and both it and the Lords Commissioners were consulted on the movements of the main army in June. ⁽⁵⁾ The plan to set up Prince Charles at Bristol, with a

(1) J. Rushworth, Historical Collections, Part III, Vol. II, Chapter XV. Chester's representatives pressed for greater civilian control there, letters to Rupert and the Mayor of Chester (February 1644), Add. MS. 18981, f. 53, Harl. MS. 2135, ff. 46, 52, Warburton, II, pp. 375-6.

(2) Angry speeches were delivered against some colonial-generals, notorious in their neighbourhoods: Lord Loughborough was condemned for his methods, H. M. C., Hastings, II, p. 121. See also C. S. P. D., 1644, p. 20.

(3) Trevor to Rupert, two letters (Oxford [1 March 1644]), Add. MS. 18981, f. 73, and Warburton, II, pp. 377-8. The letter is misdated by Warburton.

(4) Same to same (22 February 1644), Add. MS. 18981, ff. 57-8; Astley's opinion of Blagge, Warburton, II, p. 330.

(5) Walker, pp. 28-9.

large Council and a semi-independent command was successfully resisted by the Privy Council and the War Council in May 1644.⁽¹⁾ The Civilians in each correctly perceived that it was a scheme to remove many of the most able and moderate councillors from Oxford, in order that the King and the Courtiers might press on unhindered with their uncompromising policies, which included an alliance with the Irish Catholics.⁽²⁾ The Bristol project was postponed till the following year. As the executive committee directing Oxford's defence in the absence of the King on campaign, the Lords Commissioners were able to conserve the military resources of the garrison against the demands of the main army.⁽³⁾

The summer of 1644 saw a sharpening of the conflict between the Swordsmen and the Courtiers, one led by Rupert, the other by Digby. Increasingly opinion in the Royalist camp was divided between the two poles, Rupert in the North, Digby in the South. We have seen how allotment of supply was affected; policy decisions and appointments to office were similarly made for partisan reasons. Rupert, with his own army and arrangements for financial support, did not take kindly to the attempts of Digby, in March and April, to influence strategy.⁽⁴⁾ He did, however, fall in with the courteous recommendations of the King - to relieve Newark, and, later to enter Lancashire.⁽⁵⁾ While the Prince was distant from Oxford, Charles took care to consult the War Council,

(1) It was proposed in the Privy Council, and debated by Lords and "soldiers": P.C. 2. 53, p.227, Richmond to Rupert (Oxford, 26 May 1644), Add.MS.18981, f.184.

(2) It was reported in March 1644 that Hyde and Culpepper, the two most influential Civilians, were "suspected to be something rigide in the busines of the Irish", T. Carte, The Life of James Duke of Ormond, VI, p.70.

(3) Nicholas's letters to Forth (Oxford, 26 June 1644), the King (2 October 1644) and Rupert (2 November 1644), Q.S.P.D., 1644, p.278, Add.MS.18981, ff.276, 317.

(4) T. Carte, The Life of James Duke of Ormond, VI, p.87.

(5) Clarendon, VII, 99 415-6, VIII, 9 17; The Pythouse Papers, ed. W. Day, p.4.

with its military advisers, in the hope that he would more easily accept the decisions there arrived at. Rupert worked with the Council rather than against it, until he achieved supreme command and it became dominated by Courtiers: in 1644 it was the only instrument which could counteract his enemies' influence over the King, and convert Charles to his own views.

After his success at Newark the King wrote to him, "How to follow this...I will not prescribe you; yet I cannot choose but send you, by my Lord Digby, the thoughts of that Committee which I call yours."⁽¹⁾ Digby confirmed that the Council ("his Majesty, and those whom he is pleased to trust") would not deliver "any positive opinion" how to proceed: but the secretary was free with his own opinions.⁽²⁾

Other proposals were not presented to the Council board, however.

Civilian "lobbies" grew strong at court and influential with the King. It is reasonable to assume that the decisions on the relief of York, pressed by two petitioners from the beleaguered city, and the disputed colonel-generalship of the Western counties, were taken not by the Council but elsewhere.⁽³⁾

One of the claimants in the latter case, Sir William Vavasour - a Swordsman - complained to Rupert of the "obstructions" and constant "uncertainties at Court", and linked his own misfortune with that of the Prince: the Courtiers, he said, endeavoured "ill offices" against them both.⁽⁴⁾ In the context of summer 1644 the famous letter of the King to Rupert, instructing him "to beat the Scots" before York, was more probably the result of the court's than the War Council's advice; and it was also, although this does not entirely free

(1) Oxford, 25 March 1644, Warburton, II, pp.397-3.

(2) Digby to Rupert (Oxford, 25 March 1644), Add.MS.18981, ff.99-102: Incompletely printed and misdated in Warburton, II, pp.398-9.

(3) The petitioners, and Western generals, known to be at Oxford, but never recorded at a Council of War: Loughborough to Rupert (Tutbury, 13 April 1644), Staffs R.O., S.M.550.18. Vavasour to Rupert (Berkeley, 1 March 1643/4), Add.MS.18981, f.76.

(4) Ibid., and Vavasour to Rupert (Bristol, 4 and 9 December 1643), Add.MS.18980, ff.155, 157.

Rupert from responsibility for Marston Moor, a much more direct and imperative command than even at first sight appears. (1)

Relations between Rupert and the Courtiers could not have been worse. It was reported in June that it was a matter of indifference to Digby, Percy, Culpepper and Wilmot "whither the parliament or prince Rupert doth prevayle". The Prince, for his part, asked for the dismissal of Digby, Percy, Wilmot and others, from their position of influence. (2) These grandees were not, of course, a united group; Wilmot and Percy - both of whom had their own "courts" of hangers-on - were in fact allied to none of the major factions. They faced the hostility of both Rupert and Digby, and fell from power in the autumn of 1644. (3) The deliberations of the Council of War before Second Newbury were seriously impaired by the intrigue of Digby. (4)

From October 1644 till the end of the war the quarrel of Rupert and Digby overcame more rational counsels. All other factors were brushed aside. The Oxford Parliament, sitting in its second and last session (November 1644 - March 1645), produced further Civilian complaints; and the peers who led the Protestant peace party clamoured for a settlement with Westminster. (5) The

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- (1) Charles to Rupert (Tickenhall, 14 June 1644), Warburton, II, pp. 437-9. The Council of War sat at Newbury on the day the letter was sent, Walker, pp. 23-4. When the "peremptory commands" contained in the letter are considered in the light of Charles's statement to Rupert three months earlier ("an earnest desyre to you is as much as a peremptory command to others"), the force of the order may be appreciated: The Pythouse Papers, ed. W. Day, p. 4.
- (2) T. Carte, The Life of James Duke of Ormond, VI, pp. 151, 167.
- (3) Warburton, III, p. 13a., Walker, pp. 57-8.
- (4) The Life of James the Second, ed. J. S. Clarke (1816), I, p. 24.
- (5) Their principal spokesman was Lord Saville, since May 1644, Earl of Sussex. The King identified the peace party, then and later, as "that Sussex factiousness." There is no doubt that Saville and others were chiefly fearful of the outcome of the Earl of Glamorgan's negotiations with the Irish Catholics: Saville had opposed the use of Papists since the beginning of the war, "The King's Cabinet opened" (1645), Harleian Miscellany, ed. W. Oldys, Vol. 7, p. 553, Evelyn, IV, p. 167, "Papers Relating to the Delinquency of Lord Saville", London Miscellany, Vol. 8 (1883), pp. 5-7.

Uxbridge negotiations, in March 1645, were grinding to a halt; the "moderate lords" blamed Digby for this, and accused him of being an incendiary.⁽¹⁾ But the King quickly stepped in to prorogue the assembly, which he described unlovingly as "base and mutinous", a "mongrel parliament".⁽²⁾ He thereby saved Digby from being questioned before it and stopped the general cry for peace. At the same time the Western project - to set up Prince Charles at Bristol - was revived, and on this occasion brought to a successful conclusion. In March 1645 Hyde, Culpepper and Capel, among other sober and influential councillors, were removed from Oxford to Bristol. While this gave freer rein to the Swordsmen and Courtiers in the main army, it placed the government of the West in responsible hands. Until the Western army was, in its turn, racked by divisions the Prince of Wales's Council had an active and useful part to play.⁽³⁾ The last representatives of the Civilians, the Lords Commissioners - their continuing importance resting on their control of Oxford headquarters in the King's absence - were crushed by the King when they attempted to influence military policy. "I much wonder at the letter...the Lords brought", he wrote to Nicholas: "It were a strange thing if my marching Army...should be governed by my sitting Council".⁽⁴⁾ The rout of the Civilians seemed complete.

Rupert had replaced Erth as commander of the army in November 1644. Immediately he set about the consolidation of his power. He placed officers of his entourage in high commands, without consulting King or Council of War,

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- (1) Mercurius Civicus, 13-20 March 1644/5, TT:E.274(8), A. Wood, Athenae Oxonienses, ed. P. Bliss (1817) II, p. 1101.
 (2) Harleian Miscellany, ed. W. Oldys, Vol. 7, p. 553.
 (3) Its activities recorded in the minute book, Staffs R.O., S.MS.45.
 (4) Daventry, 11 June 1645, Englyn, IV, pp. 161-2.

or, in the provinces, the local colonel general.⁽¹⁾ For the best part of a year he had a direct share in the government of Oxford, the direction of its forces and supplies, through his associate, William Legge, who was Governor of the city from December 1644 to October 1645. Many other Swordsmen rose, and in the following year fell, with Rupert. It was, perhaps, to counteract his predominance in the main army that a semi-independent army which contained a number of Oxford units - was set up in the West under Lord Goring.⁽²⁾

The personal feud of Digby and Rupert forced conciliar procedure from its central place in the structure of the High Command. The normal channels of information and communication were superseded. Digby had his own confidential (and Catholic) informant at Oxford while he was on campaign, who reported that Rupert wrote only to Legge, and that Legge consulted only a junta of "malcontents". A member of this Oxford junta used his brother in the army to spy upon Digby and get information from the court.⁽³⁾ Rupert had taken the precaution, before embarking on the Naseby campaign, of strengthening Legge's authority against Civilian interference.⁽⁴⁾

"At Oxon we are at great faction", was a comment of April 1645.⁽⁵⁾ But despite the deep divisions in the Royalist ranks there was a mood of buoyant optimism among the King's supporters, of whatever party. The military situation did not seem unpromising. While Digby and the court were at first fearful for Oxford's safety, threatened by the New Model, Rupert, Maurice and the Northern Horse - the cavalry which had survived Marston Moor - were

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- (1) The case of the Governor of Lichfield, E. Scott, Rupert, Prince Palatine (1899), p.166, Harburton, III, p.146a, Staffs R.O., S.MSS.495 and 550.22.
- (2) Goring's army was "designed to counterpoise the other", i.e., Rupert's, according to Balguy's biographer, H.M.C., Ormonde, N.S., II, p.385.
- (3) Walsingham to Digby (Oxford), 12 and 16 August 1645, C.S.P.D., 1645-7, pp. 58, 72-3.
- (4) Harburton, III, p.83.
- (5) T. Carte, A Collection of Original Letters, I, p.80.

winning victories and recruiting their strength in the Midlands. Once freed from Fairfax's tightening grip on his headquarters, in May, and joined with his whole army, the King was hopeful, and wrote cheerfully to the Queen, then in France. ⁽¹⁾ The ensuing defeat took even the cautious Hyde by surprise; he had believed the King's position was at its strongest. ⁽²⁾ Having briefly rendezvoused in May, the forces of Goring, and Garrard (from South Wales) were released for their separate purposes, so confident was the King of the main army. Only the political cleavage in the High Command remained to endanger the Royalists' progress.

In the spring and early summer of 1645 Digby still attempted to use the War Council - now, however, much more the Courtiers' instrument - as a buffer between himself and the Prince. To soften the news of a change of plan, which might be ill-received by Rupert, he wrote that it was done "upon a full debate at the Committee, w^{ch} your High^{ns} was wont to honour with your presence". ⁽³⁾ Digby employed the Council to defeat Rupert's plans and it became a battlefield between the two.

During the summer campaign the complaints of the secretary were insistent. Rupert pressed a northward march on the King, before Naseby, "contrary to the advice of so many", i.e. the majority opinion of the War Council, led by Digby. ⁽⁴⁾ On the day of battle, according to Digby, Rupert acted without prior consultation. ⁽⁵⁾ The evidence seems to suggest, however, that Rupert shortly before had prudently advised against engaging Fairfax while the forces under Goring,

(1) Charles to Henrietta Maria (Droitwich, 14 May, and Daventry, 8 June 1645), Harleian Miscellany, Vol. 7, pp. 551, 553-4. In the latter he declared, "My affairs were never in so fair and hopeful a way."

(2) C. Clar. S. P., I. No. 1904. A Royalist officer later recalled that Parliament's New Model had been despised as a fighting force, Colonel Joseph Banfield's Apologie (1685), p. 12.

(3) Digby to Rupert (Oxford, 5 March 1644/5), Add. MS. 18982, ff. 38-9, inaccurately printed in Warburton, III, pp. 65-7.

(4) Digby to Legge, undated [June 1645], Warburton, III, pp. 125-8.

(5) Ibid.

and Gerrard, were separated from the Oxford army: and that Digby and the Council had decided otherwise.⁽¹⁾ The defeat itself raised the secretary's hopes: "The King promises that Rupert shall take all military resolutions upon Council and debate".⁽²⁾ Certainly the councils of July and August 1645 were active in attempts to raise new forces, in sending despatches to Royalist commanders and planning future moves.⁽³⁾ The decision not to unite the remnant of the main army with the forces under Goring in the West was taken by the King "sitting in Council".⁽⁴⁾ His immediate advisers in council varied now from six to twelve in number, and the most consistent attenders in this attenuated group included Richmond, Astley, Digby and Ashburnham. Rupert, at Bristol, was present on two recorded occasions, and Charles was still prepared to listen to him before anyone else. Digby wrote to Jermyn: "The crown has been absolutely given away to Rupert, a chance of destroying the rebels - had the unanimous advice of his Council been followed - lost to the King."⁽⁵⁾

While Rupert was still able to overrule Digby's optimistic projects in July and August, he was growing further and further apart from the King. At the beginning of the year he had seen a good deal of merit in the Uxbridge negotiations, where Charles had seen none.⁽⁶⁾ The Prince, like a realistic mercenary, believed there was little to be gained in continuing to fight, once Naseby had extinguished all hopes of victory. He preferred to remain at Bristol - where he was honoured by his youthful admirer, the Prince of Wales - than

(1) Walker, p.129.

(2) Digby to Jermyn (10 July 1645), Add.MS.33596, ff.9-10, inaccurately printed in Warburton, III, pp.35-6.

(3) Councils of June-August 1645, held in South Wales Marches, Warburton, III, p.119 n., Harl.MS.6852, ff.120,145-6, and House of Lords Record Office, Walker Papers, f.97.

(4) "Iter Carolinum", 24 July 1645, Somers Collection of Tracts, ed.W.Scott 2nd ed. (1809-13), V, p.271.

(5) Digby to Jermyn (5 August 1645), Add.MS.33596, ff.11-12.

(6) E.Scott, Rupert, Prince Palatine, p.163.

march with the main army and Digby.⁽¹⁾ From there he urged the King to make peace.⁽²⁾

Charles was outraged. The more his cause declined the more stubborn, morose and distrustful the King became. He sermonized the Council of War, rather than took its advice:⁽³⁾ his text at this time was, "God will not suffer rebels to prosper."⁽⁴⁾ The royal view of the military situation was not a practical one: faced with the King's unreasonableness, Digby's hostility and the hopelessness of the strategic position (Goring had been defeated at Langport in July), Rupert decided to throw in his hand. There can be little doubt that his decision to surrender Bristol (10 September 1645) was political rather than military. Untypically, he had called a council of war of garrison officers - mainly Swordsmen - to share the responsibility for his action.⁽⁵⁾

The loss of Bristol seemed treachery to the King, and Rupert was deprived of his commands a few days later.⁽⁶⁾ A number of other Swordsmen feared for their commissions, and with justification. Charles Gerrard had been removed from the Generalship of South Wales, partly, as he believed, at Digby's insistence.⁽⁷⁾ Legge was replaced at Oxford by Sir Thomas Glenham, a professional soldier acceptable both to the Courtiers and the Lords Commissioners.⁽⁸⁾ Another Swordsman, Henry Tillier, who had been with Rupert at Bristol,

(1) Warburton, III, p.156.

(2) Using the friendly Richmond as intermediary, Warburton, III, p.149, and Richmond to Rupert (Cardiff, 3 August 1645), Add.MS.18982, f.79.

(3) Ibid.

(4) Clarendon, IX, § 70. Charles, however, revealed the more realistic, and attractive, side of his nature when he wrote to the Prince of Wales that they should prepare for the worst; if threatened by the Parliamentary forces the Prince was to sail for France; he was to do this "without grumbling", 5 August 1645, ibid., § 74.

(5) Warburton, III, pp.166-9, 175.

(6) Warburton, III, p.162.

(7) Symonds, p.269.

(8) Evelyn, IV, pp.173-5. D.N.B., for Glenham.

was denied any further command after the fall of the city: ⁽¹⁾ and the commissions of Rupert's appointees were critically examined. ⁽²⁾ It was hardly surprising that in September and October 1645 a large party of discontented soldiers gathered round Rupert, Maurice and Gerrard. They and over 200 officers - mainly of cavalry - assembled at Newark; the written demands of the leading officers were presented to the King there. ⁽³⁾ The swordsmen, like typical career soldiers, asked for trial by Council of War where officers had lost their commissions, or else leave to enter foreign service. ⁽⁴⁾ Rupert had already received partial satisfaction of this sort: he had been acquitted of some of the charges against him by a military tribunal. ⁽⁵⁾ The Prince and many of his party were later reconciled to Charles, but they remained powerless.

The Courtiers had won a complete victory over their rivals; but their triumph, in the hour of Royalist defeat, was a fruitless one. Nothing more could be achieved for the King after Naseby. Digby was routed in Yorkshire in October 1645, and passed over to Ireland: the King left for the Scots, in the company of Ashburnham and a chaplain, in April 1646, and the final decisions - on the surrender of Oxford in June 1646 - were in the hands, not of the Courtiers, but of trusted administrators, such as Nicholas and Cottington, the civilians among the Lords Commissioners, or even those lords at Oxford sympathetic to Rupert. ⁽⁶⁾

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- (1) C.S.P.D., 1645-7, p.142, The Nicholas Papers, ed.G.Warner, Camden Society, N.S., Vol.40 (1886), I, p.67.
- (2) Sir John Owen, whom Rupert had appointed Governor of Conway in December 1644, had his commission examined, but renewed, in September 1645. Walker to Owen (Denbigh, 28 September 1645), N.L.W., Clonmacnoise Letters, Appendix II, Nos.11 and 12.
- (3) Walker, p.148, Symonds, pp.270-1.
- (4) Ibid.
- (5) Warburton, III, pp.201-3.
- (6) Evelyn, IV, pp.173-5, 179-81, C.S.P.D., 1645-7, pp.142, 144-5, 160-1. They met some opposition, in their negotiation with Fairfax, from the soldiery in the city, The Life, Diary and Correspondence of Sir William Dugdale, ed.W.Hamper, pp.86-92.

The Royalists had begun the war with the advantage of a unified High Command. The War Council was created to advise the King, who marched at the head of his army, and a number of specialised subsidiary committees were set up, whose work was correlated by the central Council. The Walker papers reveal the Council concerned, in Oxford, with the day-to-day government of military affairs, and, during the summer campaigns, the detailed management of the army in the field: a wide variety of matters fell within its competence. The Lords Commissioners, the Privy Council and even the Oxford Parliament's committees aided the Council in its complicated administrative tasks.

It is less easy to determine how Royalist strategy was made. In matters of high policy the King's great advisers seem to have led a hand-to-mouth existence: in spite of customary views to the contrary, it is probable that no overall plans were ever really worked out. At best, Royalist military thinking was flexible, at worst muddle-headed; it was throughout frankly expedient. In 1644 this opportunism was eminently successful; in 1645 it invited disaster.

The forces of Parliament suffered initially from a cumbrous machinery for relaying commands and a remote political executive. Realizing the urgent need for reformation, Parliament developed an executive committee which could take over the central command of military activities. The Committee of Both Kingdoms, in 1644-5, used its powers to direct the reconstruction of finances and the "new modelling" of the Parliamentary forces. The distance between the politicians in Derby House and the generals in the field still led to confusion, but on the whole the Committee created the conditions in which final victory could be achieved. The King, on the other hand, more completely than Parliament, retained ultimate authority in his own hands, "he must bear the main responsibility for the developments - the growth of political factions, of

"close committees" and personal rivalries - which vitiated his High Command at the very time that his enemies reformed theirs.

The aim of this and the following chapter is not to retell the campaigns of the Civil War, nor to provide a complete regimental history of the Royalist army. It is to trace in outline the development of all arms from the point (immediately before Edgehill) reached in Chapter I, until the end of the war. In doing so it will be possible to examine the strength and composition of the King's forces, and the problems of organisation, recruitment and desertion faced by the King's generals. The framework for such a discussion - the indispensable muster rolls, orders of battle, etc. - have been confined, as far as possible, to appendices at the end of each chapter.

In the history of the royal cavalry the summer of 1644 is a watershed. At the beginning of the main campaign of that year the King assembled his army at Aldbourne Chase in Wiltshire; the muster indicated the shape of the cavalry developments till then; and this shape was maintained very largely in the summer campaign. But in the 18 months between Second Newbury, in the autumn of 1644, and the end of the war, all was changed, and the old distinctions in the horse were submerged. From the point of view of 1644 the Naseby horse was almost unrecognizable.

The cavalry at Aldbourne consisted of two main components, which have been christened here the "Old Horse" and the "Sheriffs' Army." The first was the group of regiments which formed the hard core of the Oxford cavalry. They were the earliest-raised and, generally speaking, the strongest units central to the main army: they should be distinguished, as they were in practice at the time, from more peripheral regiments. The second, the "Sheriffs' Army," was that force of cavalry mainly raised for

Hopton's new army of 1643/4, by the local Royalist gentry and office-holders of the Southern counties.

The Old Horse consisted of 21 regiments, raised in the earliest part of the war. The original troops of horse guarding the King in the summer of 1642 had been provided by the loyal squires of Yorkshire, aristocratic and other patronage enabled a number of full or partly-recruited regiments to be raised before the main army left Shrewsbury in October on its march south. Six horse regiments have already been identified⁽¹⁾ as constituting the cavalry at this time; and a further five officers - all present under Rupert, the commander of horse, at the earliest skirmish at Powick Bridge - were noted as potential regimental colonels, with some troops under their command. At Edgehill a month later,⁽²⁾ all six regiments appeared intact, and three of the officers at Powick Bridge, Prince Maurice, Lord Digby and Henry Wilnot, each had command of a regiment. A fourth - Sir Charles Lucas - provides a connection with the sole addition to the cavalry at Edgehill, the regiment of the Earl of Caernarvon. The fifth, Sir Lewis Dyve, did not develop any horse he may have had earlier, and is known mainly as a colonel of foot.

(1) In the course of Chapter I.

(2) See Appendix I for details: the order of battle of the horse and dragoons has been reconstructed from de Gonne's plan of the battle, the recollection of Sir Richard Bulstrede, who was an officer in the Prince of Wales's regiment, and, with caution, from the inaccurate description of the King's army given shortly afterwards to Parliament by a Royalist deserter, and published in December 1642 under the misleading title of A Most True Relation..., TT: E.244(2).

Of the total mounted force which fought at the battle of Edgehill, all - with the possible exception of Caernarvon's regiment - were those regiments or troops which had been drawn from the North and West during the summer's recruitment. With the King, but not previously identified, was his troop of Gentlemen Pensioners; the first and last time it was recorded as fighting on a Civil War battlefield as an independent unit.⁽¹⁾ Three dragoon regiments, raised, like the horse, in the North, were present.⁽²⁾

Excluding the dragoon strength, the cavalry at the battle consisted of ten regiments or roughly 50 troops, totalling 2500 horse. The Edgehill veterans provided the core of the Old Horse thereafter, but their number was small. Compared with the cavalry of his enemies the King had achieved parity in strength and undoubted superiority in performance, as Rupert's success showed. Yet his cavalry was only a fifth of the whole army which fought the battle; at Shrewsbury the King had been more fortunate in

- (1) The Pensioners (usually about 50 strong) were the traditional "nearest guard" of the King's person, first raised in the sixteenth century. They do not appear to have fought as a troop in any other Civil War battle, but some members achieved independent commands, e.g., Sir Nicholas Selwyn. In 1667, when their abolition was proposed, they claimed to have played, as individuals, an important part in the war. J. W. Fortescue, A History of the British Army (1910) I, p.124, H. Brackenbury, The Nearest Guard (1892), S.P.29.215, No.115.
- (2) See Appendix I. Of these only Usher's was identified (through the presence of its Lieutenant-Colonel, Henry Washington) by the authorities cited there; but the presence of the others may be assumed, for they had been raised earlier and were with the main army in November and December 1642, R. Bulstrode, Memoirs and Reflections, pp.77,80; for Duncombe and Grey, see above, p. Shaw, II, p.213 and C.C.C., p.1409; arms deliveries, 21 and 24 November, and 19 December 1642, W. O.55, 423, ff. 211,216, 239, and list of army quarters, 9 December 1642, P.Young, "King Charles I's Army of 1642," J.S.A.H.R., Vol.17, pp.107-8.

the recruitment of foot than horse. The proportion of mounted to foot soldiers was to increase considerably and significantly later; but immediately after Edgehill the cavalry, despite some further recruitment⁽¹⁾, was of modest proportions for the decisive push towards London which followed, when a strong and mobile force was most needed.

The Council of War was aware of this deficiency. While, so far as pay and equipment were concerned, the cavalry was left to fend for itself, in October and November 1642 both horse and foot were rebrigaded, and battle casualties made good.⁽²⁾ Several commissions were given out to supplement existing regiments and raise new ones. Three or four troops of the Prince of Wales's regiment - that elite and nobly-led corps first raised among the Yorkshire gentry five months before - were each, under its aristocratic commander, made the nucleus of a new regiment. Lord d'Aubigny, one of the Stuart brothers and an officer in the regiment, had been mortally wounded at Edgehill. His troop - known as the Duke of York's - and that under Charles Cavendish, the younger son of the second Earl of Devonshire - the troop known as the Earl of Newcastle's - were to be amalgamated under Cavendish to form a new regiment, named the Duke of York's⁽³⁾.

- (1) Letter of M[atthew] S[allwood], Appendix to G. Davies, "The Battle of Edgehill," English Historical Review, Vol. 36, p.42.
- (2) Commissions to fill vacant commands, and new tertis appointments, in Walker's note of commissions, Harl. MS. 6804, f.221.
- (3) Bulstrode claimed that "Colonel Cavendish" commanded Newcastle's troop at Edgehill, R. Bulstrode, Memoirs and Reflections, p.76. Walker's note of the rearrangement is not entirely clear: Cavendish was to be Captain of a troop of horse, void by the death of Lord d'Aubigny, in the regiment of the Duke of York ("Prince" deleted), 30 October (1642), Harl. MS.6804, f.221.

This was Cavendish's reward for his outstanding bravery at Edgehill⁽¹⁾. Two other troop commanders in the Prince's Horse were commissioned as Colonels, the Earl of Northampton and the Earl of Crawford⁽²⁾.

These commissions were part of the "ten or twelve new regiments," which, it was reliably reported, were being formed in November, apparently, all cavalry⁽³⁾. Of the whole number most were intended to strengthen the forces in the provinces rather than the main army; in any case, the efficacy of parchment commissions, without financial support or supplies of arms and equipment, was severely limited⁽⁴⁾. The speed of the Royalists' advance on the capital, and their repulse, overtook these long-term measures to increase the striking power of the army, but the foundations for future strength were laid.

Two of the units commissioned in November appeared in a list of quarters in the month following; the regiments of Sir Arthur Aston and Lord Andover⁽⁵⁾. Aston was a general officer of dragoons and cavalry, an experienced commander of great repute, who had served without discrimination (he was a recusant) the Russians, Poles and Swedes, since 1613⁽⁶⁾. Andover was the eldest son of the highly-placed but incompetent Earl of Berkshire, whose local influence

- (1) D.N.B., under Cavendish.
- (2) Both dated 25 November 1642 in Walker's Brief of Commissions, Harl. MS. 6852, f.1. For Northampton's regiment see R. Bulstrode, op. cit., pp.92-3.
- (3) Information in a "paper of advice," an anonymous letter of 26 November 1642, Warburton, II. pp.68-70.
- (4) Ibid., Commissions issued before 26 November, the date of the "paper", and of which we have records, were all for horse or dragoons, Harl. MS. 6852, f.1. Some are mentioned in the "paper" itself.
- (5) Army quarters, 9 December 1642, P. Young, "King Charles I's Army of 1642," J.S.A.H.R., Vol. 17, pp.107-8. The list omits both the King's Lifeguards and the Gentlemen Pensioners, presumably because they would automatically be placed in the King's quarters.
- (6) D.N.B.; copies of his pre-war commissions are Harl. MS.2149, ff.148-50.

(at Oxford) may have helped in the speedy recruitment of his son's regiment.⁽¹⁾ Also in the list of quarters, for the first time, was the troop, later the regiment, of the Lord Lieutenant General, the Earl of Forth⁽²⁾.

Two further units were being raised in Oxford at this time. Rupert, the cavalry commander, had begun to recruit, in addition to his regiment of horse, a strong troop of Lifeguards. It was commanded by a Swordsman, Sir Richard Crane, who had gained the acquaintance of Rupert in the German wars, and had followed the Prince to England⁽³⁾. The regiment of Charles Gerrard, perhaps, like Gerrard himself, partly of Lancashire origin, also arrived in Oxford in these months⁽⁴⁾. It was quartered, with five others, in Oxfordshire in December 1642, where special arrangements were made for its maintenance.⁽⁵⁾ The Old Horse were being given favourable treatment in the matter of quarters.

(1) G. E. C., under Berkshire, Stevens, pp.9,49.

(2) It was 300 strong; at Aldbourne; see Appendix III.

(3) The troop noted at the taking of Cirencester, "A Particular Relation of the action before Cyrencester," 1642/3, and other newaletters, in Bibliotheca Gloucestrensis, ed. J. Washbourn (1825), pp.153-85. For Crane, see G.E.C., Baronetage, II, p.209, C.G.C., pp.2707-8, Lloyd, p.667.

(4) See above, p. 49, for Gerrard. His commission recorded, but not dated, in Walker's Brief of Commissions, Harl. MS.6852, f.1.

(5) An Explanation of the Agreement ... Betwixt His Majesty and the Inhabitants of Oxen, Oxford, January 1642/3.

In the early summer of 1643 their numbers, promoted by good pay, quartering and recruitment, were completed. Henry Percy, courtier and aristocrat, had received his commission in February, and by June his regiment had reached the optimum numerical strength.⁽¹⁾ Thomas Howard, brother of Lord Andover, given a commission in December 1642, brought his regiment to Cirencester in March, and was active in the West during the summer.⁽²⁾ A regiment raised in Wiltshire and Oxfordshire, whose Colonel was Gerrard Croker, a local squire, was ordered to join the Earl of Northampton at Banbury in January; commissions had been issued for it as early as November-December previously, and it was still being recruited in June 1643⁽³⁾. Lastly, when the Queen reached Oxford from the North, in July, there were, among 1000 horse accompanying her, her own regiment

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- (1) Harl. MS. 6852, f.2. and arms delivery to Percy's regiment, 500 strong, 12 June 1643, W.O.55. 459.
- (2) Harl. MS. 6852, f.1; draft royal warrants to Lord Grandison and Colonel Innes (22 and 30 March/1643), *ibid.*, f.258, and Harl. MS. 6802, f.50; Clarendon VII, § 94, 103.
- (3) Draft royal order (22 January 1642/3), Harl. MS. 6851, f.105. Croker's commissions, Harl. MS. 6852, ff.1-2. Draft royal warrant to Croker (11 June 1643) *ibid.*, f.81. Three of Croker's officers were from Oxfordshire, and a number of Wiltshire Royalist ex-soldiers claimed to have served in this regiment, *list*, 34, and Wiltshire Record Office, Quarter Sessions Petitions, 1660-5. For Croker, see below p. 107.

and a troop of Lifeguards⁽¹⁾. The troop left Oxford when Henrietta did, in 1644, but her regiment remained as part of the main army; it included in its ranks many French and other foreign mercenaries, as well as Lancashire volunteers⁽²⁾.

These four regiments can claim, on the grounds of seniority and nearness to the King and court, to be Old Horse; they bring the number of regiments so classified to 21, an increase of eleven on the original regiments which fought at Edgehill⁽³⁾. The strength of the Old Horse had been gradually doubled within eight months of the battle.

This select group of senior regiments had certain special characteristics. Unlike most horse or foot regiments the units of the Old Horse were not raised in a particular district by local squires. The creation of good cavalry required a large outlay of capital and equipment, and the recruitment of gentlemen with well-found mounts. These requirements, in the summer and autumn of 1642, could only be found among the courtiers and other gentry from all parts of the country, who rode with the King. They had the money, the horses and the equestrian skill. The bond between Old Horse officers was not a county or other local one, as in ordinary regiments, but the ties of class or the membership of the court. Their leaders

- (1) Note by C. H. Firth in J.S.A.H.R., Vol.3, p.105, Clarendon, VII, § 122.
- (2) French at Cheriton, Bellum Civile, p.102, and Symonds, p.146.
- (3) The 21 were the King's Lifeguards, Prince of Wales's, Queen's, Duke of York's, Prince Rupert's, Prince Maurice's, Lord Lieutenant General's, Earl of Caernarvon's, Lord Grandison's, Lord Digby's, Earl of Northampton's, Earl of Crawford's, Lord Percy's, Lord Andover's, Henry Wilmot's, Sir John Byron's, Sir Arthur Aston's, Sir Thomas Aston's, Thomas Howard's, Gerrard Croker's and Charles Gerrard's.

were prominent courtiers or well-known generals. Many became Courtiers or Swordsmen later.

The essence of this group of cavalry officers was their aristocratic lineage, large fortunes and close connection with the royal family. Of the 21 colonels who were the effective commanders of the Old Horse regiments when first raised,⁽¹⁾ 13, almost two-thirds, were members of the aristocracy. They included the nephews of the King, and the brothers of the Duke of Richmond and the Earl of Devonshire. Six colonels were either holders of knighthoods or baronetcies themselves, before the war began, or the sons of holders. Some were officers of great reputation, such as Wilmot and Sir Arthur Aston. Only two were plain squires and thus exceptional; Croker, of Steeple Barton, Oxfordshire, whose family had been established in the county in the sixteenth century,⁽²⁾ and Sir John Campsfield, Colonel of the Queen's horse and knighted in 1644, who came of Lancashire recusant gentry⁽³⁾.

The Old Horse were staffed, as well as led, by those closest to the

- (1) Four regiments were nominally those of members of the royal family, but were in effect commanded by ordinary colonels; the King's Lifeguards by Lord Bernard Stuart, the Queen's by Sir John Campsfield, the Prince of Wales's by Sir Thomas Byren, and the Duke of York's by Charles Cavendish; the de facto colonels are included in this group.
- (2) Visitations of Oxfordshire, 1566, 1574 and 1634, Harleian Society, Vol.5 (1871), p.185, O.C.C., pp.1639-40; his will proved 1647, P.C.C. Files 220.
- (3) V.C.H., Lancashire, VIII.8, pp.219-20, J. Gillow, Bibliographical Dictionary of the English Catholics (n.d.), I, p.397, Miscellanea, IV, Catholic Record Society, Vol. 4 (1907), p.167, Shaw, II, p.218.

King. In particular, as we have seen, the troops of the Prince of Wales's regiment were given to several of Charles's leading supporters. The so-called "Shew Troop," of the Lifeguards, was similarly a haven for noble courtiers lacking in military experience⁽¹⁾. But in the selection of the actual commanders, although age was immaterial, some slight acquaintance with war was required. Some were very young - Bernard Stuart was 20, Cavendish and Thomas Howard, not to mention Rupert and Maurice, in their early 20's - but all had some knowledge of military affairs, acquired in a year or two's service as gentlemen volunteers in the German or Dutch wars. The average age of ^{the} Old Horse colonels was 36.

Wilmot and Rupert controlled the destinies of the Old Horse from the beginning of the war until 1644. Wilmot was the son of an Irish peer, who had been in the Dutch service before becoming Commissary-General of the Horse in the Scots Wars⁽²⁾. He retained this position at first in the Royalist army; at Edgehill he commanded the left wing of horse, Rupert the right. Most of the early campaigning of the cavalry was under their joint or individual leadership. The West Country fell a prey to cavalry raids; Marlborough was taken in December 1642, Cirencester in the new year; and the trade of the Puritan clothiers and graziers was harassed⁽³⁾. The Oxford horse were

(1) Philip Warwick was in this troop: "When wee valued the estates of the whole troop," he wrote, "wee reckoned there was 100000 l. per ann. in that Body". P. Warwick, Memoires of the reigne of King Charles I, p.231.

(2) D.N.B.

(3) Accounts of the cavalry involved, J. Rushworth, Historical Collections, Part III, Vol.II, pp.82-3, Bibliotheca Gloucestrensis, ed. J.Washbourn, pp.153-85, Harl.MSS. 6852, f.258 and 6802, f.50.

drawn together in April 1643, however, for the unsuccessful bid to relieve Reading, hard pressed by Essex's forces from London. At the skirmish at Caversham Bridge 53 cornets of horse (and the King's Lifeguards) were noted⁽¹⁾. The forces there assembled were an early sign of the increase in the strength of the Old Horse which had been achieved.

In May Sir Ralph Hopton and his Western forces, having won the victories of Braddock Down and Stratton, advanced into Somerset. His army of Cornish, although a good one, was mainly infantry, and to give him a more balanced force the King dispatched Prince Maurice and the Marquis of Hertford (who had retired from active service in the West in 1642) from Oxford with 1500 horse, some foot and several cannon. Charles had promised this support to Hopton before he moved from Cornwall⁽²⁾. Hertford commanded his own regiment, and the Old Horse in this strong party were Maurice's, Thomas Howard's and the Earl of Caernarvon's regiments. They joined Hopton, who had only 500

(1) Each troop of horse carried one cornet or colour, so that this number should be an indication of the number of troops present. 50 troops would be an easy majority of all the Oxford cavalry. The account of the action is by Sir Edward Dering, Stowe MS. 184, ff.53-4.

(2) Speciall Passages, 25 April - 2 May 1643, TT: E.100 (17).

cavalry, at Chard on 4 June⁽¹⁾.

The combination of Oxford cavalry and Cornish foot was an effective one; but Waller was their equal. After a difficult and hard-fought battle at Lansdown (5 July 1643) the Parliamentary General was forced to withdraw, but a few days later was able to block up Hopton's forces in Devizes. Maurice and Hertford brought out the horse and sought reinforcements at Oxford. For most of the Old Horse still in Oxford quarters this was the start of the season's campaign: the King ordered all the cavalry readily available to march under Wilmot to join Hopton⁽²⁾.

The combined Oxford and Western army triumphed over Waller at Roundway Down on 13 July. Three brigades - Wilmot's, Sir^{John} Byron's and the Earl of Crawford's - were noticed at the battle, but it is not certainly known how the Old Horse was arranged under these commanders⁽³⁾. The same is true of the main campaign of the year, which followed this success. For the sieges of Bristol and Gloucester, and the First Battle of Newbury - all fought by the main army with the addition of some but not all of the Western forces - the records are pitifully inadequate. At Bristol the Oxford cavalry was divided into two wings, under Sir Arthur Aston and Charles Gerrard⁽⁴⁾; an arrangement which may have been perpetuated until Newbury and the return to Oxford quarters. A right and left wing are discernible in pamphlet

(1) Bellum Civile, pp. 46-50.

(2) Ibid., pp. 52-8; some of the cavalry did not relish the prospect of moving from settled quarters into action; a proclamation was drafted, but not published, against desertion among Hertford's, Maurice's, Wilmot's and Crawford's horse, 11 July 1643, Harl. MS. 6852, f.130

(3) P. Young, "The Royalist Army at Roundway Down", J.S.A.H.R., Vol. 31, pp. 127-31.

(4) Account of Bristol siege, 26 July 1643, Warburton, II, p. 236 et seq.

descriptions of the battle, Sir John Byron's brigade and Sir Thomas Aston's regiment in one, Charles Gerrard in the other⁽¹⁾. But of the detailed brigading and placing of regiments on the march and in battle order there is no trustworthy evidence during this year.

Numbers of newly-recruited regiments, not Old Horse, were of course part of the cavalry by this stage, and will be dealt with shortly. They were kept separate when military circumstances permitted. The disposition of the army following Newbury battle was such an occasion; the more recent creations were sent to the "frontier" in Northamptonshire, while many of the old regiments remained in their usual winter quarters in Oxfordshire and Berkshire, taking up and renewing the old agreements for their maintenance there⁽²⁾. A War Council of October 1643 listed seven regiments and a troop whose establishment in those counties was authorised; it is a roster of favoured units which were inferior only to the Guards accommodated in Oxford itself⁽³⁾.

The Old Horse suffered some loss during the winter of 1643/4, however. The detachment of cavalry sent to the North in November was commanded by Sir John Byron, and included his own regiment of horse.⁽⁴⁾ There was much

- (1) Newsletters, quoted in W. Money, The Battles of Newbury, pp.44-53; Rupert's "Diary", pp.25-7, Wiltshire Record Office, Pyt House Papers, "MS.A" Seven Old Horse regiments are specifically mentioned, but there is no indication as to how they were brigaded.
- (2) E.g., The Agreements Made Between His Majesty and County of Oxford, Oxford, 30 September 1643.
- (3) Draft minutes, 13 October 1643, Harl.MS.6852, ff.184-5. The regiments were: the Queen's, Prince of Wales's, Prince Rupert's, Prince Maurice's, Lord Wilmot's, Lord Percy's and Sir Arthur Aston's; the troop was Prince Rupert's Lifeguards.
- (4) Charles to Rupert (Oxford, 11 and 13 November 1643), Warburton, II, pp.329-30, and Add. MS.18980, f.151.

confusion of command, for the cavalry was divided between Hopton's new army south of Oxford and the forces around Newport Pagnell and Towcester in Northamptonshire. Byron's brigade, after his departure, was regrouped under Charles Gerrard⁽¹⁾. At the same time as many as five Old Horse regiments may have been with Hopton in the Cheriton campaign, when his army was reinforced from Oxford⁽²⁾. All these actions over the hard and wasting winter months must have reduced the Old Horse strength. Finally, in February 1644 Rupert took up a separate command in the Midlands; with him went his regiment and troop of horse.

Like some of the regiments, the Old Horse brigadiers of 1643 were not available for the campaigning season in the following year. As well as Rupert and Byron, three others were removed from service with the marching army; Sir Arthur Aston when he became Governor of Oxford (August 1643), the

(1) Warburton, II, pp. 332-3.

(2) The Queen's, Prince Maurice's and the Earl of Caernarvon's certainly, the Lord General's and Thomas Howard's probably, fought at Cheriton, 29 March 1644. The Earl of Crawford's had joined Hopton's forces earlier; G. Godwin, The Civil War in Hampshire, pp. 143, 170, 173, and see below, p. 118 et seq.

Earl of Crawford when he left to join Montrose in Scotland (April 1644) and Charles Gerrard when he took command in South Wales (April 1644)⁽¹⁾. Some of these changes in command and in the composition of the Old Horse were reflected in the muster roll at Aldbourne⁽²⁾. The commander of the Old Horse, drawn into a single brigade, the first of the line, was Henry Wilmot, now Lord Wilmot of Adderbury. Rupert, Byron and Crawford were absent. Aston's and Gerrard's regiments were still present (at least in part), although neither would, of course, take part in the ensuing summer campaign. Four troops of Aston's regiment had been drawn from the Oxford garrison; but the Queen's regiment, quartered in villages near the city, remained behind, and so was not included in Symonds's list⁽³⁾. Neither the Queen nor the Earl of Crawford, who left Oxford at this time, took their regiments with them. Altogether, 13 regiments of Old Horse were mustered at Aldbourne; 12 constituted Wilmot's brigade, and the troop of Lifeguards (Symonds's own unit, although he failed to record it), like most personal bodyguards, was not brigaded.⁽⁴⁾

- (1) D.N.B., under Aston, Ludovic Lindsay and Gerard.
- (2) Appendix III. The list was compiled by the young Lifeguardsman, Richard Symonds, unofficially and for his own interest. Symonds, an Essex antiquarian and topographer, was an eye witness of the muster and was a reasonably accurate observer.
- (3) Appendix III.
- (4) A troop or troops of Guards was the normal appendage of a senior commander. The King's Lifeguards were usually, in battle, held in reserve.

We can account for the other "missing" Old Horse regiments. Lord Grandison's had been destroyed at Winchester in the winter of 1642, and Grandison himself had died of wounds received at Bristol siege;⁽¹⁾ Lord Andover was disgraced later in 1644, and his regiment may already have been absorbed in that of his brother, Thomas Howard.⁽²⁾

Wilmot's brigade amounted to nearly 2500 horse; an average regimental strength of 200.⁽³⁾ At Edgehill the figure had been slightly higher, an average of 250:⁽⁴⁾ in Oxfordshire quarters in the first winter much higher (350).⁽⁵⁾ But considering the 18 months of active fighting, the recent winter-in particular the defeat at Cheriton, which affected some of the Old Horse - and the number of regiments at Aldbourne (greater than at Edgehill or in Oxfordshire quarters, and so providing a greater "spread"), this was a creditable figure.

Two factors may have contributed to the maintenance of the Old Horse, midway through the war. One has already been remarked; they received favourable treatment. The old were provided for at the expense of the new: in November 1643 Byron had written to Rupert requesting "rest and pay" for his regiment and other "old tried regiments." The new levies which had recently come in could, he suggested, take over in the field.⁽⁶⁾ Most experienced commanders hoped to recoup their strength in settled winter quarters; they

(1) G. Godwin, The Civil War in Hampshire, p.44, G.E.C.

(2) C. Clar. S.P., I, No.1814.

(3) When dealing with such figures it is not always possible to decide whether they include officers (and what we would now class as non-commissioned officers) or not. In the Civil War the proportion of foot "officers," corporal and above, to common soldiers was, in theory, 1:11.

(4) Appendix I.

(5) An Explanation of the Agreement...Betwixt His Majesty and the Inhabitants of Oxon, Oxford, January 1642/3.

(6) His regiment, if "well recruited against the spring," he promised to increase to 400 horse, Warburton II, pp.328-9n.

angled not only for billets in towns or in a prosperous countryside, but for better pay, more clothing and frequent deliveries of arms and ammunition. The King, for example, looked after the interests of the senior regiments in Oxford.⁽¹⁾ Only Old Horse were quartered, as we have seen, near the city.

The second, and more doubtful factor was the attempted reorganisation and reformation of the cavalry. In February 1644 the High Command placed a scheme for recruiting eight regiments of horse before the Oxford Parliament, then sitting. The Civilians in the Commons, suspicious of the cavalry, responded by demanding some amalgamation of units, and in particular the thinning out of the "multitude" of officers involved.⁽²⁾ Evidently regiments were already top-heavy with officers, a common complaint of reformers later in the war. The Commons wished to give priority to the strengthening of the infantry, and left the ordering of the Horse to Lord Wilmot, once they had decided that the number of cavalry should be only half the number of foot.⁽³⁾ 4000 regular horse were to be arrayed in 12 regiments, four of 400, eight of 300 each, excluding officers.⁽⁴⁾ The concept of seniority - the length of service of each regiment - was kept firmly in the minds of the reformers. Existing old regiments would be the first recruited; candidates for the largest of the projected units were the Queen's, Prince of Wales's, Lord General's and

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- (1) He asked Rupert, when the Prince had taken Cirencester, to send arms for his "old regiments", Harburton, II, pp.115-6.
- (2) Trevor to Rupert (Oxford, [22 February 1644]), Add. MS. 18981, ff.55-6. And see above p. 87.
- (3) Trevor divided the 6,000 horse projected, into 4000 regular and 2000 "reformed". A number of commanders were to be displaced (few were to be allowed to command more than one regiment), and the more political and nobler arm was to be demoted. Trevor to Rupert (Oxford, [22 February 1644] and [? 1 March 1644]) ibid., ff.57-8, 73.
- (4) Wilmot to Rupert (Oxford, 22 February 1643/4), Catalogue of the collection... formed... by A. Morrison, comp. A. Thibaudau, Vol.6, p.424.

Wilmot's. ⁽¹⁾ This was the Oxford establishment for 1644, differing only slightly from the regiments which were quartered round Oxford in 1643.

Little, if any, of this urgent recruitment and reorganisation had been accomplished by the time of the Aldbourne rendezvous. Fear of discontenting officers had prevented amalgamations. ⁽²⁾ No regiment with the main army in April 1644 was 400 strong. Yet Charles, reviewing his forces at Aldbourne, expressed satisfaction at the unexpected strength of the army so soon after the Cheriton defeat. ⁽³⁾ And the Old Horse remained the backbone of his army; it was roughly half the total cavalry mustered, and the cavalry were almost as numerous as the foot. This was a far cry from either the Edgehill situation (horse a fifth of the whole), or the optimum strength envisaged by the Oxford Parliament critics. Henceforth the cavalry were to be the dominant partners.

Several changes in the command of the Old Horse regiments had occurred before Aldbourne, and some were recorded at the muster. Thomas Weston, younger brother of the Earl of Portland, had taken command of Digby's regiment, when Digby became secretary of state in September 1643. ⁽⁴⁾ Richard Neville, a Berkshire squire, had taken over the regiment of the young Earl of Caernarvon, slain at Newbury. ⁽⁵⁾ Lord Wentworth, the unpopular and bibulous son of the Earl of Cleveland, replaced Sir Thomas Byron as Colonel of the Prince of Wales's horse: Byron had been murdered by a fellow officer in the streets of Oxford. The appointment of a "stranger" to the regiment resulted in bitter disputes,

(1) Trevor to Rupert (Oxford, ¹⁶⁴⁴ 22 February), Add.MS.18982, ff.55-6.

(2) Ibid., The King's advisers had seen at first hand the reaction of the officers of the Prince of Wales's regiment to the appointment of a commander they disliked, see next page, n.1.

(3) Walker, p.8.

(4) Symonds's note on the regiment, Harl.MS.986, f.85. For Weston, see G.E.C. under Portland.

(5) Harl. MS.986, f.85.

and some of the Yorkshire officers deserted.⁽¹⁾ By contrast the change in command of the Earl of Northampton's regiment after his death at Hopton Heath was completely smooth; his eldest son succeeded not only to the title but also to both the regiments (of horse and foot) raised by his father.⁽²⁾

Wilmot's brigade was still recognisably the Edgehill cavalry. The really striking additions to the Oxford horse were contained in the three new brigades at Aldbourne. They bring the total number of horse to over 4000 and account for most of the increase on the Edgehill strength. They constituted what we have termed the "Sheriffs' Army"; the force of cavalry, raised by Hopton in the autumn and winter of 1643, which fought the Cheriton campaign in combination with some of the Old Horse. For the historian the Sheriffs' Army unfolds in three stages; the list of Hopton's horse, prepared in September 1643; the accounts of the winter campaign; and the Aldbourne muster roll.

Immediately after First Newbury, as we have seen, Hopton was instructed to raise a new army which would push eastwards through the Southern counties, towards London.⁽³⁾ A list of his projected forces was drawn up, perhaps by the committee at Oriel College which planned the operation with him.⁽⁴⁾ It indicates that some of the army would come from the West Country, where Hopton did his recruiting, some from Oxford horse, and some from newly-raised forces.

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- (1) P. Young, "The Prince of Wales's Regiment of Horse, 1642-6," J.S.A.H.R., Vol. 23, pp. 107-113.
- (2) D.N.B., under Spencer Compton.
- (3) See above, p. 76.
- (4) The section of the list which deals with the horse and dragoons has been placed at Appendix II. The fact that it appears among the Walker papers may connect it with this committee, which may have employed Walker in a secretarial capacity. For the committee see above, p. 76. The list must be considered an early and tentative statement of intentions, rather than a definitive muster roll of Hopton's new forces.

As Hopton recorded later, "to make a body of an Army, the Earle of Crafford with his Regiment of horse and dragoons, and diverse other new Regiments of horse were assigned to him [Hopton]." ⁽¹⁾ The list names twelve cavalry regiments (some combining horse and dragoons), some very small, none large, whose average strength was 130. ⁽²⁾ Only the Earl of Crawford's regiment (250 strong) was Old Horse.

Two had been raised during the summer by officers based at Oxford. Sir Nicholas Crispe was a wealthy City merchant, monopolist and leading Royalist. He had gained some militia experience in London before the war, and had been commissioned as a colonel of horse in July 1643. ⁽³⁾ There is no evidence that his regiment ever joined Hopton's army. The cavalry regiment of Sir Edward Dering, the antiquary and M.P. for Kent in the Long Parliament, included in the list, also failed to materialise. It had been commissioned in July 1643, but its Colonel had been from the beginning of the war, a lukewarm Royalist and ineffective soldier, and he retired from the King's service early in 1644. ⁽⁴⁾

More substantial and permanent were the regiments to be raised by West Country, Hampshire, Sussex (and even Kent) Royalists. The gentry of these counties had a self-interested concern in the capture of the district, and brought their horse to swell Hopton's army: to enhance their local influence -

(1) Bellum Civile, p.61.

(2) Appendix II.

(3) D.N.B., M.Keeler, The Long Parliament, Lloyd, p.627, Black, p.54. The London and Middlesex content of his regiment was strong, List, 33. A portrait of Crispe as a musketeer of the Honourable Artillery Company is reproduced in C.H.Firth, Cromwell's Army, 3rd edn., facing p.10.

(4) D.N.B., M.Keeler, The Long Parliament, Black p.54 and note of Dering's Civil War activities, Stowe MS. 184, f.73.

in most cases already considerable - the King appointed some as Sheriffs, Sir George Vaughan in Wiltshire, Sir Edward Ford in Sussex, Sir Humphrey Bennett in Hampshire.⁽¹⁾ The "Shreeve" (Sheriff) in the list could stand for many. Ford's sizeable regiment was listed in September along with that of Sir Edward Stawell, a relative of Sir John Stawell, the prominent and wealthy Somerset Royalist.⁽²⁾ "Carew" in the list was almost certainly Sir Horatio Cary, an old soldier who was raising horse at Bristol at this time. He had come over, with other professional officers, from the German wars and had recently deserted from Waller's army.⁽³⁾ All these had local connections. The other troops envisaged in the list were not of any moment.⁽⁴⁾

The largely unsuccessful winter campaign which Hopton waged can be followed in his own narrative and that of an infantry colonel who served under him.⁽⁵⁾ Other new, or fairly new, regiments, of a similar character to those already mentioned, make their appearance in these accounts. Two local grandees from Kent, Sir William Boteler and Sir William Clerke, brought in their horse.⁽⁶⁾ Boteler was a baronet, commissioner of array for Kent and substantial landowner

- (1) Black, p.67, for Vaughan; Marl.MS.986, ff.86,89. To be Sheriff, as well as a Colonel of horse, was not always an advantage, however: Bennett was absent from this regiment so much on his official duties that disorder broke out among its officers, Bellum Civile, p.69.
- (2) Stawell became a brigadier of horse under Hopton, Bellum Civile, pp.74,79,82
- (3) Warburton, II, pp.238, 291n., C.S.P.D., 1639-40, p.343, 1640, pp.92-3.
- (4) "Covert" may have been John or Thomas Covert, the sons of Sir Walter Covert, of Maidstone, Kent, J.Comber, Sussex Genealogies, Ardingly Centre (1932), pp.179-186, G.E.C., Baronetage, III, p.71, C.C.C. p.853, Black, p.63. "Hamilton" was no doubt Sir James Hamilton, whose regiment was based in Worcestershire.
- (5) Bellum Civile, and Colonel Joseph Bamfeild's Apologie (1685). The latter, despite the interval of time between its composition and the events it describes, is an accurate and detailed account.
- (6) Ibid., pp.8-9, Bellum Civile, p.72.

there: ⁽¹⁾ Clerke was of old family, and had been knighted in 1642. ⁽²⁾ The regiments of Vaughan and Bennett were active. ⁽³⁾ Neither was really new: Vaughan's had served previously in the West, at Lansdown and Roundway Down, ⁽⁴⁾ and Bennett's had been commissioned in March 1643. ⁽⁵⁾ At Aldbourne it was as strong ("9 Troops in the feild almost full") as Vaughan's was weak. ⁽⁶⁾

Hopton's army was joined by reinforcements under Forth in the early spring, and it was this combined force which was defeated, but not routed, by Waller at Cheriton in March 1644. The army drew off in good order: and, with the horse from Oxford, was reviewed by the King at Aldbourne on 10 April. Symonds's list ⁽⁷⁾ incorporates these known regiments, and identifies one or two others of the Sheriffs' Army for the first time.

The Sheriffs' Army was drawn up in three brigades: the first brigade of the three, as numbered by Symonds, was that of Sir Horatio Cary, "formerly commanded by the Lord John Stuart," ⁽⁸⁾ and Cary had also replaced Stuart as the colonel of a regiment in it. Lord John, the youngest of the Stuart brothers, had probably been only a gentleman in the "Shew Troop" of the Lifeguards, which his brother commanded, for the earlier part of the war. But he had been given

(1) G.E.C., Baronetage, II, p.96; Visitation of Kent, 1619, Harleian Society, Vol.42 (1898), pp.223-4; Lloyd, p.688; Northants R.O., F.H. 133; C.C.C., pp.1462-3.

(2) Visitation of Kent, 1619, pp.2-3; C.C.C., p.1013; Shaw II, p.213

(3) Ballum Civile, pp.65, 69, 83.

(4) P.Young, "The Royalist Army at Roundway Down", J.S.A.H.R., Vol.31, p.129. It was recruited mainly in Wiltshire, where Vaughan was Sheriff in 1643, List, 134-5, and Wiltshire Record Office, Quarter Sessions Petitions, 1660-5.

(5) Black, p.22. It was Hampshire in origina Bennett, a "man of middle rank," was Sheriff of the county, D.Underdown, Royalist Conspiracy in England 1649-1660, p.30; List, 10.

(6) Appendix III, and Harl.MS.986, f.89.

(7) Appendix III.

(8) Symonds's note, Harl.MS. 986, f.86.

command of a cavalry regiment when he came of age, and the reinforcement of Hopton's army provided a convenient opportunity for his promotion.⁽¹⁾ He quickly advanced to command a brigade of horse and in this post was killed at Cheriton.⁽²⁾ By April the brigade was under the command of Cary, the old cavalry officer, who may have added the brigade-commander's regiment to his own: the six troops of his regiment present at Aldbourne - making it the largest in the brigade - point to such an amalgamation.⁽³⁾

The five other regiments of this brigade include only one newcomer, that of Milton Fleetwood. It had been commissioned in October 1643, no doubt for the Cheriton campaign, but nothing is known of its colonel.⁽⁴⁾

Stawell's brigade, which included his own horse, was listed, although Sir Edward himself had been "wounded and taken" at Cheriton, and his regiment decimated.⁽⁵⁾ Three new regiments were named in the brigade; those of George Gunter, a Sussex gentleman, and Allen Apsley, better known as an infantry officer, were in combination;⁽⁶⁾ the third was that of Edmund Peirce, a London lawyer who had begun his military career in the Lifeguards, then recruited his own horse, before First Newbury, from among ex-London Royalists.⁽⁷⁾

(1) He led forces from Oxford to aid Hopton, in February 1644, Luke's reports, 23 February 1643/4, Egerton MS.785, f.129, Bellum Civile, p.83. "Lord John Steward" appears after Sir Richard Grenville, who deserted to the Royalists in March 1644, in the post-Restoration "List of Several Colonels," which serves as a rough guide to the chronology of commissions, S.P.29.159, No.49.

(2) Bellum Civile, pp.83,102.

(3) Harl.MS.986, f.36.

(4) Black, p.37.

(5) Bellum Civile, p.102.

(6) For Gunter, see D.Underdown, Royalist Conspiracy in England 1649-1660, pp. 54-5. For Apsley, see D.N.B.

(7) His later promotion to be Judge Marshall of the army accounts for the disappearance of his regiment as an independent unit, Grantees of Arms, Harleian Society, Vol.66 (1915), p.195, C.S.P.O., 1660-1, p.11, List, 105.

Two new regiments appeared in Bennett's brigade, the third and last of the muster. Sir Edward Waldegrave's ^{was} fairly strong; it had been raised in autumn 1643, from among Norfolk loyalists⁽¹⁾. The other was that of an obscure quarter-master-general, Andrew Lindsay.⁽²⁾

Symonds does not give the individual strength of each regiment of these three brigades, and his totals are not consistent. The first brigade, the Old Horse, consisted, he wrote of "almost...as many men and horse as did the other 3 Brigades."⁽³⁾ The Old Horse numbered 2470; but the total for the muster was only 4000. Did the new regiments provide together only 1500 horse; or equal the 2500 of the first brigade? It would perhaps be safest to guess that the three brigades, the Sheriffs' Army, were upwards of 2000 strong at Aldbourne. The average number of troopers in each new regiment was therefore little more than 140.

Whatever its exact strength, the Sheriffs' Army, despite its lack of success in the field during the winter, made a notable contribution to the main army in 1644. As a group of regiments it was unlike the Old Horse; its colonels were not aristocratic or trained in foreign wars; they were drawn from the provincial gentry, and few were Courtiers or Swordsman. Most were like Sir Edward Ford, who was described as "a gentleman of a good family and a fair fortune in Sussex," and was Sheriff of the county in 1643.⁽⁴⁾ They were amateurs in arms, whose only military service had been in the trained bands. But with the support

(1) It was commissioned in August 1643, when its colonel, who was a prominent and elderly Norfolk gentleman, received a baronetcy, Black, p.65, O.E.C., Baronetage, II, p. 213, List, 137, Harl. MS. 986, f.90.

(2) Ibid., and List, 89.

(3) Harl. MS. 986, f. 83.

(4) Clarendon, VIII, § 3, D.N.B.

of those loyal squires whose estates lay mainly in the belt of country running from Hampshire to Kent, they were able to raise and maintain, by their local influence and standing, an important force of cavalry, which, from Aldbourn onwards, was an integral part of the King's main army.

The horse of Hopton's army was not the only new cavalry which the Royalists had in the field in 1643. Until the recorded grants of commissions to raise and command new regiments virtually ended in November 1643, some 50 were issued for horse and dragoons⁽¹⁾. But these, while relating mostly to Oxford or provincial but Oxford-connected forces, are no guide to the real and much larger number given out. 85 colonels of horse were remembered after the Restoration as having received the King's commission; less than half served in the main army⁽²⁾. Many commissions were issued, of course, which were never brought to fruition; at the same time regiments existed and played some part in the Oxford army, about which we know practically nothing. Some must have escaped the records completely.

None of these regiments appeared at Aldbourn; some had been detached from the main army, some were ephemeral. Others were important elsewhere, but only occasionally and temporarily part of the Oxford forces. The regiment of Samuel Sandys, based in Worcestershire, was of this type. It was part of Lord Capel's Midland army, and was "borrowed" by the Oxford generals; it was at Roundway Down, and Bristol siege, and later at Naseby.

(1) In the Brief of Commissions, Harl. MS. 6852, ff. 1 - 2, and Black, passim.

(2) "List of Several Colonels," 1666, S.P. 29.159, No.45. Many of these commissions were, of course, given to officers to fill vacancies in old regiments, not to raise new regiments.

Most of the Lancashire, Cheshire and Yorkshire-raised horse, brought to the King under local commanders, unless they were Old Horse, were hardly more permanent than Sandys's contingent. In September 1642 the Earl of Derby had brought cavalry to join the main army; in the following summer the Queen marched to Oxford with Yorkshire Horse. Some of the former may have fought at Edgehill, and all the Northern regiments made a strong contribution to the cavalry engaged in the Newbury campaign. But before the end of the year (1643) the Irish Cessation made necessary the securing of North Wales and the North-west, the area in which the "English-Irish" forces would disembark from Dublin; and the progress of Parliament's negotiations with the Scots drew the King's attention to the North in general. The Northern regiments were detached from the main army; while Hepton's force was being raised Byron was given command of the Chester area, in place of Lord Capel, and unlike Capel, who had received little or no help from Oxford in terms of men and money, took with him his own horse and "all the other Lancashire regiments"⁽¹⁾. Byron himself, although of Nottinghamshire family, had some Lancashire connections, and many of his troopers were local men; so that the move was politically expedient⁽²⁾. At least five cavalry regiments were removed from the main army in November or later, "for Northern service". Some were to be found under Goring in the spring of 1644, and at Marston Moor in the summer⁽³⁾.

The withdrawal of the Northern cavalry left a gap in the Oxford ranks, which had to be filled immediately if Rupert was to be

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- (1) Charles to Rupert (Oxford, 11 and 13 November 1643), Warburton II, pp. 329-330, and Add. MS. 18980, f.151.
- (2) For Byron see D.N.B., Calendar of the Committee for the Advance of Money, pp.771-80, C.C.C., pp.2338-40. Sir Thomas Aston's horse (although a local Cheshire regiment) was not sent, because it had made itself "obnoxious" in those parts earlier, Warburton, II, p.327 n.
- (3) Newark commissioners to Rupert (Newark, 26 April 1644), Add. MS.18981, f.163; C.H.Firth, "Marston Moor," Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, N.S., Vol.12. A typical Lancashire trooper served at Edgehill, Brentford, Newbury, and then York (Marston Moor): Certificate, 4 May 1663, of an officer's widow claiming a pension, Lancashire Record Office, Quarter Sessions files, 259, f.38.

placated. ⁽¹⁾ The autumn and winter of 1643 saw the appearance of many new regiments of horse, commissioned previously but only now raised, and often inadequately recruited and armed. In Northamptonshire, infantry commanders, already concerned on their own account about cramped billets and short rations, were further oppressed by the arrival of several new regiments of horse, some of them "weak" and so probably unruly. ⁽²⁾

While cavalry was being recruited in England, Ireland, after the Cessation, contributed little to the Oxford horse; only two cavalry regiments of "English-Irish", those of Lord Inchequin and Sir William Vaughan, played any part alongside the main army. Inchequin left Oxford, in high dudgeon, with his officers in the following February. ⁽³⁾ Vaughan's was "brought over ... into England at Christmas 1643", but remained in the Midlands, near its point of disembarkation, until the summer of 1644. ⁽⁴⁾

None of these new regiments of 1643 made any contribution to the army mustered at Aldbourne. Already there was a proliferation of commissions given out, of small regiments raised, of supernumerary ^{er} officers seeking independent commands. The Royalist strength - as could be discerned by critical observers in the Oxford Parliament - was being dissipated, despite the efforts that were made to conserve and enlarge the oldest and strongest regiments.

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- (1) Sir Arthur Aston was sent to Rupert immediately, to negotiate the cavalry reorganisation and ensure that the Prince's force was not "diminished", Warburton, II, p.330n.
 (2) Cochrane to Rupert (Towcester, 11 December 1643), Add.MS.18980, f.159.
 (3) Trevor reported his departure, letter to Rupert (Oxford, 22 February 1644), Add. MS.18981, ff.57-8.
 (4) Symonds, p.255.

As much a phantom army as these peripheral regiments were the dragoons. Three regiments had taken part at Edgehill: and resolute steps were taken, throughout 1643, to increase the supply of dragoons; yet none were recorded at Aldbourne, and from 1644 till the end of the war dragoons of any kind were only rarely and spasmodically identified.

Their impermanence was the result of several factors. They occupied a position midway between horse and foot. Foot could easily be converted into dragoons - simply mounted infantry - if suitable horse and muskets could be found. They did not require such good mounts as the cavalry, were paid less than the horse, and carried shorter muskets than the ordinary foot soldier.⁽¹⁾ And they could as easily revert to infantry.

They rarely existed independently. Most of the commissions issued by the King for dragoons were for a troop⁽²⁾ or troops to be attached to a regiment of horse or foot. This form of defence, cavalry or infantry combined with a smaller number of dragoons, was favoured by local commanders.⁽³⁾ The relatively small bodies of dragoons were fluid, and their attachment to a full regiment of another arm - or the conversion of part of that regiment to dragoons - was often temporary. Some infantry under a local colonel in Staffordshire were described as "dragons to gett in money and foot when they kept Bagworth howse."⁽⁴⁾ Their existence depended on the needs of the moment,

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- (1) The rates of pay for bringing in horses, with or without "furnishings", muskets etc., laid down in a proclamation of 3 December 1642, Steele, No. 2316. Nags and mares could be used for dragoon work, *ibid.*
- (2) Or "company": both terms were used without discrimination to describe dragoon units, an indication of their middle position.
- (3) A typical "combination" commission was that of Sir Humphrey Bennett (dated 1 March 1643), for 500 horse and a troop of dragoons, Black, p.22. A dragoon troop also formed part of the Lifeguards (warrant to Lieutenant Hasell, 7 November 1642, Harl.MS. 6851, f.221.)
- (4) Harl.MS. 986, f.91.

and the supply of horses and short carbines or fowling pieces. They rarely survived as regiments, and never formed a brigade, either in the provinces or the main army.

Their uses were many. They could give greater mobility to the infantry; and could fetch in contributions for an otherwise stranded garrison. Dragoons were most useful for scouting enemy movements, and often took part in sallies and lightning raids like that of Rupert's to Chalgrove field.

The King's advisers quickly realised their importance. The main army, once established for the winter of 1642 in settled quarters, required defence against surprise attacks. Where the incursions were made by mounted troops, dragoons provided the best defence, and a means of retaliation. A royal proclamation of November mentioned enemy raids when it publicised the need for horses to be brought in to Oxford.⁽¹⁾ Hopton, early in 1643, was advised by the King to mount his men as dragoons, to speed his advance.⁽²⁾ The attempts of the Royalists to remedy the shortage of dragoons can be traced in proclamations and councils of war, and in the 18 separate dragoon commissions which were issued between November 1642 and August 1643.⁽³⁾

Some prominent officers were associated with dragoons. Henry Washington became justly famous for his part in the storming of Bristol.⁽⁴⁾ An old professional - Lord Wentworth - was given the generalship of this arm.⁽⁵⁾

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- (1) Steele, No. 2311. Such proclamations were declared at every Oxford pulpit and street corner, and had a good chance of success.
- (2) Speciall Passages, 25 April - 2 May 1643, TT: E.100 (17).
- (3) Mainly for use locally in Wales and the Midlands. Recorded in Walker's Brief of Commissions, Harl. MS. 6852, ff. 1-2, and Black, pp. 1-68. This number excludes one unnamed, in Walker's list, but includes one separately recorded, Harl. MS. 6852, f. 135.
- (4) Lloyd, p. 664, Stevens, pp. 39-40.
- (5) Black, p. 29.

Dragoons were active, under these and other commanders, in the cavalry raids of 1643: at Chalgrove, for instance, they found their ideal setting in the enclosed fields and hedged lanes of the country to the east of Oxford.⁽¹⁾ But dragoons were never a large, permanent or stable part of the King's forces; and after 1643 officers such as Wentworth seem to have reverted to command of cavalry only. From Aldbourne muster to 1646 dragoon regiments are hardly ever separately identified. Over the whole war fewer than a dozen dragoon colonels can be definitely attributed to the main army.⁽²⁾

Apart from the general officers mentioned, the commanders of dragoons were more like the colonels of the Sheriffs' Army than those of the Old Horse. They were men of middling rank; one indeed was a unique specimen among Royalist commanders of any arm, for he apparently began life as a tradesman. Sir Thomas Hooper, knighted in 1644, was "at first a Shoe-maker in England, at last a Souldier in the Low-Countries; where he attained so much skill...", he was invited over "to have the Command of a Regiment of Dragoons."⁽³⁾

The cavalry at Aldbourne was that which, very largely, accompanied the King on the Western campaign of 1644. Its two elements merged: there is no further point in speaking of the Old Horse and the Sheriffs' Army. After the sweeping reorganisation of late 1644 the old distinctions are completely abandoned, and in 1645 the main army cavalry is divided on quite other lines.

Few changes took place in 1644, until after Second Newbury. There were almost no additions to the cavalry, which remained, for most of the summer,

(1) Four regiments supplied with arms, J.C.55. 1661 $\sqrt{5}$, 6, 127, W.O.55, 458. 65, f.80, and 11 December 1643, W.O.55, 459. For Chalgrove, see His Highness Prince Rupert's Late Beating up the Rebels Quarters at Post-Comb and Chinner, Oxford, July 1643.

(2) 16 colonels were named in the "List of Several Colonels", as having received commissions to raise dragoons: but most of these were not for the main army, S.P. 29, 159, No.45.

(3) Lloyd, p. 681.

at the strength achieved for Aldbourne muster. As a further token of the interest shown by the Oxford Parliament, Wilmot was ordered in May to raise horse in the counties nearest to Oxford.⁽¹⁾ But conscription - employed with some success in the enlistment of foot - failed to bring in men and mounts suitable for the cavalry. The weeks in May - June offered little scope for recruitment, in any case; they were taken up with the complicated manoeuvring needed to outwit Essex and Waller. Charles left Oxford with most of his horse and skilfully avoided both armies, while his foot and baggage joined him later. According to Parliamentary scouts, dogging the King's footsteps, the cavalry were regrouped, if not materially increased. The horse were divided into six brigades before the battle of Cropredy Bridge (2) June 1644): the Earl of Cleveland succeeded to Cary's brigade.⁽²⁾

This organisation was roughly preserved for the long summer campaign of 1644, conducted for the most part in the West Country. The horse retained their Aldbourne strength, and the 23 regiments identified during the course of the summer correspond very largely to those mustered at Aldbourne. Changes at regimental level were fairly well-documented, unlike those in the following year. Colonels of horse were named by Walker, the historian of the campaign, and Symonds, who rode in the Lifeguard.⁽³⁾ A number of cavalry officers of all ranks put their signatures to a petition to the King, on behalf of their old commander, Wilmot, when he was replaced by George Goring in August; and concurrently, some of the more senior, to a formal letter to the Earl of Essex, Parliament's general, offering vague peace terms. Fortunately both

(1) Draft royal warrant to Wilmot (24 May 1644), Harl.MS.6802, ff.192-3.

(2) Luke's reports, and a Royalist deserter's account noted by him, May-June 1644, Egerton MS. 785, ff.33, 102^v. Cleveland also took over Cary's regiment, Symonds, p.102, Walker, pp.111-4.

(3) Walker, pp. 31-3, 71-2, 111-4, Symonds, pp.50, 102.

documents have survived. ⁽¹⁾ From these sources a list of regiments has been compiled, and placed at appendix IV. The list is not exhaustive, but it is difficult to believe that many colonels can have escaped inclusion in at least one of the sources quoted.

Of the regiments of horse reviewed at Aldbourne 19 were present with the King in Cornwall. ⁽²⁾ The "missing" units are almost all accounted for by the absence of the regiments which made up the brigade of Sir Edward Stawell at Aldbourne; his own, Hopton's and two others, none of which certainly appear with the main army in the summer. The majority of the regiments previously in the other three brigades at Aldbourne remained in the army, however; of the 13 Old Horse regiments, ten went on campaign, and their number was increased by two others - Sir Thomas Aston's and the Earl of

(1) The Old Horse Petition, c. 8 August 1644, printed in Warburton, III p.17n., and the Letter to Essex, 8 August 1644, in Walker, pp.60-1. Those cavalry officers who rallied to Wilmot's support styled themselves, in their petition to the King, "Your Majesty's Old Horse". They represented eleven senior regiments, including seven Old Horse by our definition, and curiously, Goring's regiment and troop. There may be other regiments represented but not identified. Their concept of "old" was simply long service in the field, whether with the main army or not; it is significant that the Sheriffs' Army was largely excluded from this category.

(2) Cf. Appendices II and IV.

Crawford's (now James Hamilton's) - so that the backbone of the 1644 cavalry was still the Old Horse, probably over half the total number. (1)

Some changes in regimental and brigade commands were recorded during the summer. Wilmot's and Percy's disgrace and removal in August made necessary the takeover of their cavalry regiments by other officers; Ames Pollard, younger brother of the Devon M.P. and soldier, Sir Hugh Pollard, succeeded to

- (1) Old Horse at Aldbourne, but not in the West later, included Sir Arthur Aston's, which remained part of the Oxford garrison, where its Colonel was Governor, Charles Gerrard's, which went with Gerrard to South Wales, and Gerrard Croker's. Croker, who had only two troops at Aldbourne, gave up his commission shortly afterwards. His retirement did not, however, prevent him from being captured by Parliamentary forces and imprisoned briefly at Gloucester (July-November 1644). His horse were no doubt easily absorbed into another regiment. C.C.C., p.1639; Luke's reports of Aston's horse at Oxford, 19 June 1644, Egerton MS.785, f.31.

Wilmot's colonelcy; and Sir Arthur Slingsby, of the loyal Yorkshire family, to Percy's.⁽¹⁾ Both had been subordinate officers in the regiments they now commanded.⁽²⁾ James Hamilton, possibly a Scottish professional, replaced the absent Earl of Crawford at the head of his regiment, and John Stewart, also obscure and perhaps of the same type, succeeded to Dutton Fleetwood's command.⁽³⁾ The two Kentish colonels, Boteler and Clerke, both fatal casualties at Opreddy, were replaced by squires of almost equal standing from the same county.⁽⁴⁾

Only three regiments were, for our purposes, new to the cavalry of the main army. Goring had joined the King from the North after Marston Moor. He was an experienced and capable - if occasionally drunken - officer, and he replaced Wilmot as General of the Horse. He brought with him his regiment and troop of Lifeguards, the former commanded by his younger brother, Lord Charles Goring. One Western regiment - that of Giles Strangways, the substantial Dorset landowner and M.P.⁽⁵⁾ - appeared with the main army.

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- (1) Wilmot's regiment retained his name for some time after his removal, G. E. C., Baronetage, II, p.23, for Pollard: ibid., III, p.17, and The Diary of Sir Henry Slingsby, ed. D. Parsons, pp.405-7, for Slingsby.
- (2) Pollard had been major to Wilmot at Aldbourne, Harl. MS. 986, f.83: Slingsby was Percy's Lieutenant-Colonel in 1643, his letter to Percy (31 March /1644/), Rawl. MS. D. 395, f.181.
- (3) Appendix IV, and ibid., note 8. Stewart replaced Fleetwood before the end of 1644. The secretary-at-war noted that a commission for Stewart to be Colonel in place of Fleetwood was necessary, paper without date, Harl. MS. 6802, f.331.
- (4) Appendix IV. The connection between Thornhill and Boteler is not stated by Symonds (as it is between Culpepper and Clerke), although Thornhill occupies Boteler's old place in Symonds's list of the brigade; but there are officers (e.g. Japtain, later Major John March) common to both, Harl. MS. 986, f.87, Walker, p.72, List, 129. For Thornhill see D. Underdown, Royalist Conspiracy in England 1649-1660, pp.37, 109-10.
- (5) M. Keeler, The Long Parliament.

Apart from these changes the main body of cavalry was little altered, and the number of horse remained steady. From our examination of the regiments involved in the 1644 campaign, it is possible to claim that the days of new commissions and of abundant newly-raised regiments were over. With a strong nucleus of Old Horse, the cavalry which fought at Cropredy and Lostwithiel was an experienced, indeed veteran force; there were few new additions to it; and more than half the regiments of the whole mounted arm were over a year old in September 1644. This may go some way to explaining the brilliant success of Charles's army in the West.

The most testing conflict of the whole summer closed the campaign of 1644; at the Second Battle of Newbury (27 October 1644) Charles's army met the Parliamentary forces under Manchester and Waller. We lack any really satisfactory account of the battle.⁽¹⁾ The Cornish cavalry under Prince Maurice fought beside the main army but were distinct from it, as Sir Richard Grenville's "county horse" had been in Cornwall earlier.⁽²⁾

The inadequate records of the battle reveal only half of the regiments which had fought in Cornwall;⁽³⁾ yet it seems likely that the King was able to draw his horse almost intact from the West. Those that he lost on the long marches of the summer - and cavalry could maintain their members in such conditions better than infantry - would be compensated for by the presence of

(1) Brief accounts in Walker, pp.111-4, J. Rushworth, Historical Collections, Part III, Vol. II, pp.724-9, Symonds, p.145, W. Money, The Battles of Newbury, p.219.

(2) Grenville's horse at Beconoc, 1 September 1644, Walker, pp.71-2.

(3) Authorities quoted; as well as individual commanders named, there are clues to other regiments at the battle in such casualties as William Leake, the Lieutenant-Colonel of Ford's regiment, and two officers (one of them the Colonel's son) of Sir Edward Waldegrave's regiment. The Earl of Cleveland was captured.

the Queen's regiment from quarters near Oxford. Probably 9000 horse and foot took part, and almost half were cavalry - the usual proportion in 1644.⁽¹⁾ Dragoons were recognised, under Sir Thomas Hooper, who had been knighted for his gallantry at Cropredy Bridge.⁽²⁾

Second Newbury was the last flourish of the old dispensation. It is possible to see there Old Horse and Sheriffs' Army, and the remnants of the old brigade division adopted in the spring of 1644. The regiments of Edgehill, and even further back, are still recognizable. But after the battle everything was altered. Newbury marks the end of a distinct period in the history of the main army; one marked also by the retirement of Forth, and his replacement by Rupert, the division of power between Rupert and Digby, the creation of Goring's independent army and the arrival of the Northern Horse.

The disaster of Marston Moor worked initially to the advantage of the Oxford forces. The King had already benefited from the arrival of Goring and his horse; in November, immediately after Second Newbury, the royal army was joined by Rupert and two brigades of cavalry, survivors of Marston Moor, which were termed the "Northern Horse". One was commanded by the dour Yorkshire loyalist, Sir Marmaduke Langdale, who had played a small part in the initial organisation of the army in the summer of 1642:⁽³⁾ - the other by

(1) A Parliamentary news-sheet's calculation of 6,000 horse seems too high. The True Informer, 19-26 October 1644, FF: E.13 (6). The smaller figure is given by A. Burne and P. Young, The Great Civil War, p.183.

(2) R. Bulstrode, Memoirs and Reflections, pp.100-1, 118.

(3) D.N.B., and see above, p.32.

Sir William Blakeston, a young Catholic squire from Durham.⁽¹⁾ Their number was variously estimated; it probably did not exceed 1500.⁽²⁾ But they were a timely addition to Charles's forces, engaged, after Newbury battle, in the manoeuvring required to draw off the ordnance which had been placed for safe keeping in Donnington castle. For this extra horse and dragoons were needed; it was reported that horses were being impounded to mount infantry "for some sudden service".⁽³⁾ The main army horse, which had suffered heavily in the battle, was temporarily strengthened by some cavalry brought from Wales by Charles Gerrard. The King was also joined, apparently, by a regiment of Old Horse which had served hitherto in the Midlands; the Duke of York's, created by Charles Cavendish after Edgehill, was now under the command of Samuel Tuke, an Essex recusant gentleman of little fortune but great ability.⁽⁴⁾

The accumulation of these forces made for a massive array at the rendezvous of the whole army which took place on 6 November. Symonds puts the number of horse and foot assembled as high as 15,000, and this is quite credible.⁽⁵⁾ Rupert was made Captain General of the army, in place of Forth, and he and the King brought it to Donnington castle, where part of it was

(1) G.E.C., Baronetage, II, pp. 187-8, C.J.C., p.2181.

(2) In September their number had been calculated as 1300, Northern colonels to Rupert, undated [September 1644], MS.Firth, C.7, f.157. This may be a deliberate underestimation by officers anxious to emphasise their plight; although Trevor, who had seen the Northern Horse at an earlier stage, remarked that they were "boiled to little or nothing" by the "Heat of their march", T. Carte, A. Collection of Original Letters, I, p.61.

(3) The London Post, 12 November 1644, FF: E.16 (28).

(4) See Appendix VI. The Restoration petition of William Bridall, ex-officer of the regiment, attested by Tuke, shows the connection between Cavendish and Tuke; there are also other officers common to both S.P.29,5, Nos. 65, 66, and List, 133, 148. For Tuke see D.N.B., G.E.C., Baronetage, III, pp.291-2.

(5) Symonds, p.147. Other estimates were lower, e.g., 6,000 foot and 5,000 horse, Walker, p.117; 10 or 11,000, Perfect Passages, 6-13 November 1644, FF:E.17 (1), The London Post, 12 November 1644, FF: E.16 (28).

drawn up, on 9 November, "in Batalia" to meet the oncoming enemy forces. (1)

There was no battle; but Rupert's youthful chief engineer and map-maker, de Gomme, recorded the disposition of the forces on that occasion, as he remembers it later. (2)

His plan is a useful guide to the evolution of the old army towards its new, post-Newbury shape: it includes the Northern Horse, for the first time brigaded with the main army, Rupert's, Gerrard's and Tuke's horse, as well as a dozen Old Horse regiments.

Donnington castle was successfully relieved by this force, and the cavalry faced the third winter of ^{the} war. The crucial decisions which were to alter radically the Royalist horse were made now, in the late autumn. The formal "reformation" of the spring of 1644, inspired by the Oxford Civilians, had failed. But in October-November, seemingly without any conscious planning, the Courtiers and the Swordsmen divided the King's military strength between them. Goring, prompted by the court, (3) was allowed to amass a semi-independent force - largely cavalry - in the West Country, while Rupert and Maurice retained the Northern Horse along with half the Old Horse of the Oxford army.

Rupert and Goring disputed power. Goring claimed that he had, in March 1645, 1500 horse and dragoons at Chard (Somerset), and 3000 pursuing Waller; there were only 1500 foot at his command. (4) His numerous squadrons, his pretended independence, the reinforcements from Oxford he received, (5) and

(1) Symonds, p.148.

(2) Add. MS.16370, ff.60-1. The relief of Donnington is sometimes known as Third Newbury. De Gomme's plan compares with the others he prepared for Edgehill, Marston Moor and Naseby. Charles Gerrard, whom he lists as "Lord Gearratt", was not made a baron until a year later: an indication that the plan was not strictly contemporary. De Gomme also misdates the order of battle as "October."

(3) See above, p.92.

(4) M.Coate, Cornwall in the Civil War, p.171, C. Clar, S.P., I No.1834.

(5) Draft royal warrants to the Earl of Northampton and Sir Anthony Green, to send forces to Goring (17 December 1644), Harl. MS.6802, f.339; undated list of regiments to join Goring, National Library of Wales, Add. 4820E.

the presence of the King's son in the West, heightened his authority and reputation. A number of Old Horse and Sheriffs' Army regiments were part of his cavalry. (1)

Rupert and Maurice recruited their forces, in the spring of 1645, in the Midlands and the Welsh Marches. There they were joined by Langdale's and Blakeston's brigades, fresh from their brilliant relief of Pontefract in February. Henceforth the Northern Horse were to be part of the main army under Rupert. Were they a good exchange for the senior regiments lost to Goring? Some 1500 horse, the remnants of 20 or more small regiments, and hopelessly overburdened with officers, they might well be described as a "rabble of gentility". (2) They were typical of Royalist cavalry in the last stages of decomposition. They had been involved in a crushing defeat (Marston Moor), they had not as yet fought a battle alongside the main army, and they were anxious to return as soon as possible to the North to protect their homes and succour their friends. Yet they were veteran troops; their officers were hardy and loyal; if they could be kept under control, they might prove serviceable. (3)

Most regiments were drawn permanently into either Rupert's or Goring's camp: some oscillated violently from one to the other. Their armies were of almost equal strength. A substantial part of Goring's horse was, of course, Western in origin. Both generals were affected by the worsening conditions which became prevalent in the winter of 1644/5. The cold season proved

(1) See Appendix VI.

(2) P. Young, "The Northern Horse at Naseby, 14 June, 1645", J.S.A.H.R., Vol. 32, pp.54-6. The Petition, from which the names of their officers and regiments can be derived, should be dated before the relief of Pontefract in February 1645, not after, as Young states.

(3) P. Young, op.cit., and the Northern Horse Petition (7 February 1645), Warburton, III, pp.70-1 n.

fatal for some regiments. A few, consistently noticed in 1644, disappeared, and this cannot be entirely attributed to defective records.⁽¹⁾ Dispersed into the countryside, parties of horse melted away; the taking of billets was becoming less well-regulated and controlled, and for this winter there are no surviving agreements between the counties and the King, of the type concluded in the two years before. Individual regiments took what they could; in Gloucestershire provisions were scanty, and the weakness of the regiments was in marked contrast to the "multiplicity" of officers.⁽²⁾ Old Horse were no longer accorded priority; indeed, under an unsympathetic general, such as Goring, in an unfavourable area, they may have suffered most. The part of Maurice's regiment associated with Goring existed in Somerset in a "miserable condition".⁽³⁾

In some areas discipline collapsed completely. The Western counties had for some time been plagued by disorderly and irregular bodies of horse, which threatened the lives and property of the countryside, and recognised no central authority. In particular they roamed the borderlands of Somerset, Gloucestershire and Wiltshire, where they plundered profitably, and escaped - for a while - retribution from local commanders by moving swiftly from one county to the next.⁽⁴⁾ Parts of six regiments - all local Western, except Rupert's - were known to be terrorising Somerset during this winter; and Oxford orders for their removal were disobeyed.⁽⁵⁾ The ringleaders were

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- (1) E.g., Sir Humphrey Bennett's and John Stewart's (ex-Dutton Fleetwood's).
 (2) MSS. Firth. C.6, ff.306-9, 7, ff.258, 63, Warburton, III, pp.56-7.
 (3) Guy Molesworth, its Lieutenant-Colonel, to Rupert (Bridgwater, 23 January 1644/5), Add.MS.18982, f.23.
 (4) This is conjecture, but it may explain the frequency with which such forces were found on the "margins" of counties.
 (5) "List of stragling Horse" in Somerset, Harl.MS.6804, ff.145-6. Draft orders of Council of War, Oxford, 16 November 1644, Harl.MS.6851, f.228.

brought to justice in the following year by Hopton's Council of War at Bristol.⁽¹⁾

But for the main bodies of horse survival intact was possible. Goring was completely ruthless in the taking of free quarters, and he was much hated by the countrypeople: but his methods ensured that his cavalry spent an active and fairly prosperous winter. They subsisted, according to Bulstrode, an officer of horse in his army, in good quarters, and there was little diminution of their strength.⁽²⁾ Rupert pressed recruits on his march and may have increased his forces; the Northern Horse maintained their numbers, despite their rapid ride into and out of Yorkshire at the height of the winter. The regiments under Langdale and Blakeston were very small, with less than 100 troopers in each, but they grew no weaker.⁽³⁾ Cavalry, as a whole, were more resilient than infantry. When a rendezvous was held at Stow-in-the-Wold, and the armies of the West and Oxford were briefly united, Goring commanded the greater body of horse, 3000 strong; almost equal to this number were the combined horse of Rupert, Langdale, and the King from Oxford.⁽⁴⁾ Charles and his advisers were favourably impressed, and as we have seen,⁽⁵⁾ there was a brief mood of optimism and hopefulness about the outcome of the 1645 campaign at Royalist headquarters. Goring was allowed to return to the West, and the army under the King and Rupert, pressed by the Northern Horse, moved northwards. At the very time that Parliament was

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- (1) H. Symonds, "A By-Path of the Civil War", Somersetshire Archaeological and Natural History Society Proceedings, Vol. 65 (1919), pp. 48-75.
- (2) There was, he wrote, "great Store of Forage for Horse". R. Bulstrode, Memoirs and Reflections, p. 120.
- (3) P. Young, "The Northern Horse at Naseby, 14th June, 1645" J.S.A.H.R., Vol. 32, pp. 54-6, and Appendix V (Naseby).
- (4) Symonds, p. 166, W. Ross, "The Battle of Naseby", English Historical Review, Vol. 3 pp. 668-79.
- (5) See above, p. 93.

reforming and unifying her armies (including those which had been victorious in the North) the Royalists divided their best cavalry between two separate commanders. And the longer-term consequences of the loss of the North were shortly to overtake the main army; it was the victors of Marston Moor who faced the King at Naseby.

The Oxford army recruited its strength, throughout May, from the Midlands garrisons, which yielded foot contingents and some parties of horse. By June the King and Rupert had, among others, part of Lord Loughborough's "flying army" based on Ashby-de-la-Zouche, part of Lord Byron's Chester army, and horse from Newark and Lichfield. The storming of Leicester, however, may have claimed some casualties and its garrisoning required men who could ill be spared.⁽¹⁾ Despite the motley character of his army, and the absence of Goring's and Gerrard's forces, the King, and his Council of War, accepted battle with the New Model at Naseby on 14 June 1645. An analysis of the cavalry at Naseby may be made from the plan of de Gomme, the list of horse at the storming at Leicester, compiled by Symonds, and the accounts of the battle by Walker (which Clarendon followed in his History), and Sprigge, the Parliamentary Chaplain. The results are placed at Appendix V.

The horse were divided into four brigades for the taking of Leicester, excluding the Guards and a few others, and roughly the same arrangement was preserved for the battle. Regiments nearest the King and his generals were not brigaded; although the Earl of Northampton's brigade had some units of this type at Leicester. The bulk of the cavalry was "four or more divisions" of Northern Horse under Langdale and Blakeston, amounting to 1500 horse; the large contingent from Newark (400-500);⁽²⁾ and the parties from garrisons,

(1) Appendix V; Symonds, p.166; W. Ross, "The Battle of Naseby", English Historical Review, Vol. 3, pp.668-79.

(2) Sir Richard Willys, commander of the Newark horse, had 1200 at Leicester, but on 4 June he took part of this force back to Newark, Symonds, p.186.

at least three divisions, under Thomas Howard (880 strong at Leicester). To all intents and purposes these groups had abandoned any pretence that they consisted of individual and recognisable regiments, and were simply formed into conveniently sized bodies or squadrons of horse which de Gomme described as "divisions". Within Howard's divisions the different contingents, and outside these groups the regiments which still existed, may, however, be identified. (1)

It can be seen how dependent the King was at Naseby on unfamiliar cavalry. The horse at the battle were more like those which fought under Rupert and the Earl of Newcastle at Marston Moor, than any assembled hitherto by the King and the Oxford generals. Only five of the regiments or troops which had taken part in the Western campaign of the previous year were certainly present at Naseby: the King's Lifeguards, Prince Maurice's, the Earl of Northampton's, Sir Moratio Cary's and Thomas Howard's. (2) Cary had apparently resumed command of the regiment which he had had at Aldbourne muster, the Earl of Cleveland, its commander in 1644, having been taken prisoner at Second Newbury. The other four regiments were, of course, Old Horse, and only two more regiments at the battle - the Queen's and Rupert's - were in this category.

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- (1) Appendix V: parties of horse from Lord Loughborough's army - Bagot (Lichfield), Leveson (Dudley), Bard (Camden House, Gloucestershire), Sandys (Worcester); and from Lord Byron's Chester army - Sir Robert Byron, Vaughan ("English-Irish" in Shropshire), Worden and a new unit, Prince Maurice's Lifeguard (both local Cheshire). The petitions of Cheshire ex-troopers confirm that many were taken from local service there to fight at Naseby: e.g. petition of Bridget, widow of John Massey: as a trooper he had served under Robert Worden, then under Sir William Vaughan at Naseby, where he had been killed: petition of Thomas Venables refers to his local service in Cheshire, at siege of Nantwich, etc., after which, it continues, he "Marched ... under Prince Morris his Command, unto the takings of Lester, and soe to Nesbay, and soe back againe unto Chester," Cheshire Record Office, Quarter Sessions Records, Epiphany 1661, No.143, and Michaelmas 1663, No.119.
- (2) The Lifeguards were still under Lord Bernard Stuart; and Guy Molesworth had returned from the West to command Maurice's regiment.

They were in a minority; the six regiments totalled less than 1000 (there were 3500 horse at the battle), and each was therefore on average barely 100 strong.⁽¹⁾

Naseby was fought by cavalry units the majority of which had served under the King for less than a year: some had been part of the main army for only a month; and these regiments which had always been the strongest and most important in previous campaigns, the Old Horse, were few and in decline. The King was caught by Fairfax and Cromwell not only with a force that was not homogeneous, but was also remarkably weak. 3500 horse was the smallest number he had assembled at any major battle since Edgehill: it was roughly half the total force available in 1645.

The horse, but not the foot, survived Naseby. Little more could, however, be attempted. Rupert retired to Bristol; Digby and Langdale in the autumn tried in vain to break through to Montrose. The cavalry scattered throughout Wales and the Midlands for the winter of 1645/6.⁽²⁾ and the last attempt, on the King's part, to gather these remnants together was easily crushed.⁽³⁾

The division of the main army in 1645 meant that the New Model could defeat the Royalist forces piecemeal. Within a month of Naseby the Western army under Goring suffered its major reverse at the battle of Langport in Somerset, at the hands of Naseby's victors, Fairfax and Cromwell.

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- (1) De Gomme's figure for all the horse is 3500, and this is accepted by W. Ross, "The Battle of Naseby", English Historical Review, Vol.3, pp. 668-79; Symonds, pp. 181-2, gives a larger number (5600) for the cavalry at Leicester, and for the individual strength of regiments. Scaling down Symonds's figures to conform to the Naseby total gives an indication of the number and proportional size of the Old Horse present.
- (2) Newark was a base for some cavalry; and the Lifeguards (including Symonds) lay deep in Denbighshire, Symonds, pp.246, 249.
- (3) Astley was defeated at Stow-in-the-Wold, 21 March 1646.

This defeat was as disastrous to the King, for the major part of the cavalry which had been painfully built up in the years previously was damaged, and the new Western "realm" founded by the Prince of Wales and his courtiers was at once in jeopardy. Parliamentary newsletters provide a list of horse regiments at Langport, from an analysis of prisoners captured, to which Sir Richard Bulstrode, now Goring's Adjutant-General, adds little. This has been reproduced in Appendix VI.

Goring commanded over 3000 horse at the battle - the number is not definitely known. He had united purely Western regiments with previously Oxford-based units, and at least five of the former, under Western commanders such as Sir Richard Grenville, were at Langport. The great majority of the other 16 regiments named were those which had been assembled for the main army in the spring and summer of 1644. Six were Old Horse,⁽¹⁾ the remainder were mostly Sheriffs' Army. Arthur Heveningham's was Waldegrave's old regiment under a new commander.⁽²⁾ An old dragoon colonel, Sir Robert Howard, apparently had horse under his command at the battle.⁽³⁾ Only one regiment can be certainly identified as new to the main army; a French regiment, possibly that of Bertrand de la Plene, who had been given a commission to command all "strangers", particularly French, in the King's army.⁽⁴⁾ It was

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- (1) Lord General's, Pollards, Sir Thomas Aston's, James Hamilton's, Sir Arthur Slingsby's and Samuel Tuke's, cf. Appendices III, IV and VI. Tuke was the "eldest Colonel of Horse" in the army in the West, R. Bulstrode, Memoirs and Reflections, p.141.
- (2) Waldegrave, over 70 in the Civil War, was one of the oldest officers serving the King; he died at Oxford in December 1644, and was succeeded by Heveningham, also from Norfolk, whose brother was a later regicide, and who had served in the regiment previously as a subordinate officer; he was captured at Langport, Harl. MS. 986, f. 90, A. Wood, City of Oxford, ed. A. Clark, III, p. 245, G. E. C. Baronetage, II, p. 213, C. C. C., p. 1517, D. N. B., under William Heveningham, authorities cited in Appendix VI.
- (3) Appendix VI. Howard was the uncle of Lord Andover and Thomas Howard, cavalry colonels, D. N. B., and M. Keeler, The Long Parliament.
- (4) Undated draft commission, Harl. MS. 6802, f. 277. His regiment did, however, include English as well as French officers, List, 82.

the forerunner of other foreign mercenary troops which came over to aid the army in the West.

There were probably other regiments at Langport as well as these, about which little is known. One or two may have been drawn from Wales. It seems likely that they were taking part in a main army campaign for the first time.

Apart from these obscure regiments nearly all the horse under Goring were battle-tried veterans, who had fought together before at Cheriton, Cropedy, Lostwithiel and Second Newbury. Their experience, unity and strength - regiments were still recognisable individually and averaged well over 100 troopers each - compared favourably with the Naseby cavalry.

Despite considerable losses the horse survived Langport defeat;⁽¹⁾ the main body withdrew further west, absorbing more locally-raised regiments. It was reported in the new year that Hopton, now the commander, had 3,300 horse, a force almost double the size of the foot.⁽²⁾ While there was little augmentation of the cavalry a good deal of reorganisation took place, in these last twelve months of the war. The case of the Prince of Wales's regiment - fairly well-documented⁽³⁾ - is an indication of the complexity of the changes, and the danger of generalising about regiments far less well known. The Prince's horse, as well as containing some of his old regiment, was strengthened by additions from at least five different commanders, and others, who "added their broken regiments."⁽⁴⁾

(1) M. Coate, Cornwall in the Great Civil War, p.178, Diary or Exact Journal, 17-24 July 1645, TT: E. 262 (31).

(2) M. Coate, op.cit., p.202.

(3) P. Young, "The Prince of Wales's Regiment of Horse 1642/48", J.S.A.H.R., Vol.31, pp.9-11. Additional to the material there quoted see the minute book of the Council of the Prince of Wales at Bristol, March-April 1645, Staffordshire Record Office, S.MS. 45.

(4) H.M.C., 12th Report, IX, p.43.

The West was full of warring factions - the courtiers of Prince Charles played a notable part in all quarrels - and in consequence changes in command were frequent. Goring, Lord Wentworth, Sir Richard Grenville and Lord Hopton at various times pretended to the leadership of the forces in the West. The only constant in a fluid situation was the slow withdrawal of the army into the Devonian peninsula. Some indecisive skirmishing was followed by the disastrous battle of Torrington (February 1646) and the collapse of any remaining will to resist. Negotiations and surrenders then took place fairly quickly, the most complete at Truro in March. There Hopton capitulated with a "brave body of horse", still some 2000 strong.⁽¹⁾ The hard-headed cavalry commanders, many of them professional officers, realised that a strongly-bargained composition with the enemy was preferable to the outright defeat which had become inevitable. The articles of surrender at Truro were generous, allowing them to preserve units in arms and take them abroad to earn a living in continental wars.⁽²⁾ The articles, with the names of the Royalist commanders who subscribed to them, were published by Parliament; they provide a fairly complete but not exhaustive tally of the mounted regiments active in the West at the end of the war (Appendix VII).⁽³⁾

At Truro the horse still constituted over 20 individual regiments, grouped in brigades.⁽⁴⁾ The cavalry in the West had retained their identity better than the Naseby horse, although their average regimental strength had ^{fallen} to less than 100. The proportion of old Oxford-based regiments declined, as

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- (1) Sir Ralph Hopton's and all his Forces coming in to the Parliament,
10 March 1645/6, FT: E. 328 (4)
- (2) T. Carte, A Collection of Original Letters, I, p.117.
- (3) Hopton's own account of events, prepared for Clarendon's use in writing his History has also been used to compile this final list of regiments.
- (4) Appendix VII.

dispersion, amalgamation and absorption of units gained momentum; horse from other theatres of war were pulled into the final Western campaign, and took their place, for the first time, in the squadrons of the main army. Of several brigades in Cornwall those of Sir James Smith and Webb, both senior officers under Hopton, consisted of local Western regiments, no doubt including some of those identified at Langport. While few Old Horse regiments were individually named at Torrington or Truro, some may be "concealed" in the brigades of Lord Wentworth and the Earl of Cleveland, as well as the Prince of Wales's Lifeguards. The councillors of the Prince of Wales brought together many old veterans from broken or disbanded units; they would constitute the regiments termed at the surrender "Lord Culpepper's" and "Lord Capel's servants". George Gunter, a Sheriff's Army colonel not identified at Langport, was an important cavalry commander in the negotiations at Truro.⁽¹⁾ Other old officers were no doubt present, but escaped the records.

Foreign troops stiffened the last resistance of the main body of the Royalist horse. After Rocroi (1643), the continental wars were drawing to a close, and French mercenaries may have viewed England as a fresh field of activity. Further reinforcements of horse and foot arrived at Western ports from the continent early in 1646.⁽²⁾ One French regiment fought at Langport, and as many as three surrendered later. De la Plene's can be certainly identified as one of these.⁽³⁾

The surrenders at Truro close the last chapter in the history of the Royalist cavalry. In tracing the development of the mounted arm we have

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- (1) According to Fairfax he did "seasonable service" in disbanding the Royalist horse, C.C.C., pp. 1237-8.
- (2) One hostile newsletter reproduced a supposed letter from a French colonel of foot, offering his services to Hopton, The True Informer, 28 February 1646, TT: E.325 (14).
- (3) Appendix VII.

focussed our attention on the two chief groups of regiments, the Old Horse and the Sheriffs' Army. Attempts to raise horse for the main army outside these two bodies were not successful. The basis of the King's cavalry was the Old Horse: it was 2500 strong at Edgehill, was brought to completion during 1643, and provided half the total mounted force, over 4000, at Aldbourne. The Sheriffs' Army was the other half, representing most of the useful additions made to the main army in 1643/4. In this period the Royalist cavalry was superior to that of Parliament.

The political decisions of late 1644 and early 1645 divided the united body of Old Horse and Sheriffs' Army on new lines, substituting for half the "old, tried regiments" of the Oxford army the volatile Northern Horse. The New Model dealt fatal blows to both sections of the old cavalry, at Naseby and Langport. The horse had, however, remarkable powers of recuperation; it survived in organised bodies, particularly in the West, until the spring of 1646.

The cavalry had certain supreme virtues, but not without attendant vices. It was socially superior to any other arm: it contained the flower of chivalry, its most senior regiments (Old Horse) manned by the aristocracy, others (Sheriffs' Army and Northern Horse) by the gentry. A typical cavalry regiment, such as Prince Maurice's horse, did not run short of good officers.⁽¹⁾ The horse enjoyed enormous prestige, for it was the queen of the battlefield. Most battles were won, not by artillery or musketry, but by the clash of men, especially those on horseback. Its importance was perceived by both sides: Rupert and Cromwell were both cavalry officers; the Royalist High Command

(1) Officers of the regiment in 1644 included William Legg's brother Robert, Guy Molesworth, a well-known old soldier, and Woolley Leigh, a substantial Surrey landowner, Harl. MS. 986, f. 83; D.N.B., under William Legge; C. Dalton, English Army Lists and Commission Registers, I, p. 80. Peacock, p. 74, H.M.C., 12th Report, I, p. 429; V.C.H., Surrey, III, pp. 53, 54, 56, 438-9.

built up its strength until it was almost half the whole army.

Yet cavalry was expensive, slow and difficult to raise and recruit. There was not as much desertion among the horse as the foot, but the natural thinning of regiments resulted in their becoming overloaded with officers. The high status of the cavalry allowed it to resist essential reformation and reorganisation: its officers were courageous, but they were jealous of their independence and privileges, and, on occasion, factious. When discipline declined, parties of horse led by "reformado" officers could terrorize the countryside. If horse were extricated from defeat in battle more easily than the foot, and survived hard winters better, it was sometimes at the expense of the less favoured arm. As we shall see, the relations between horse and foot were not always easy.

Appendix 1. CAVALRY AND DRAGOON REGIMENTS AT EDGEHILL

23 October 1642

Compiled from de Gomme's plan, Royal Library, Windsor, reproduced in P. Young, "The Royalist Army at Edgehill", J.S.A.H.R., Vol. 33, pp. 56-60; R. Bulstrode, Memoirs and Reflections, pp. 75-83; and A Most True Relation of the Present State of His Majesties Army, 3 December 1642, TT: E.244(2). An estimate of the number of troops in each regiment has been made from the same sources.

	<u>TROOPS</u>	
King's Lifeguards ⁽¹⁾	2	
Prince of Wales's ⁽²⁾	7	
Prince Rupert's	7	
Prince Maurice's	4	
Earl of Caernarvon's ⁽³⁾	4	
Lord Grandison's	4	
Henry Wilmot's	7	
Lord Digby's	3	
Sir John Byron's	5	
Sir Thomas Aston's	3	
Gentlemen Pensioners	1	
		2500 Horse
Dragoons:- Sir Edmund Duncombe's		
		Edward Grey's
		James Usher's

(1) In two troops; the gentlemen under Lord Bernard Stuart, and the servants under Sir William Killigrew.

(2) Commanded at the battle by Sir Thomas Byron.

(3) The first appearance of this regiment, apparently in reserve at the battle; Sir Charles Lucas was second-in-command.

Appendix II. CAVALRY AND DRAGOON REGIMENTS IN HOPTON'S NEW ARMY.

List among the Walker papers, dated 29 September 1643, Harl. MS. 6804, f. 224.

	HORSE
lo: Hopton	
of horse and dragons	250
Stowell and dragons	150
Hamilton	050
Carew	100
Craford	
horse and dragons	250
lo: marquis ⁽¹⁾	
horse and dragons	100
Shreeve ⁽²⁾	060
ford	260
Deering	120
Spencer ⁽³⁾	060
Crisp	100
Covert	<u>080</u>
	<u>1580</u>

(1) The Marquis of Hertford, associated with Hopton earlier in the Western army.

(2) Sheriff. Possibly Sir George Vaughan, Sheriff of Wiltshire.

(3) Perhaps Edward Spencer, who received a commission to raise horse in July 1643, Black, p. 61.

Appendix III. CAVALRY REGIMENTS AT ALDBOURNE CHASE, WILTSHIRE,

10 April 1644.

Notes of regiments and their strength by G. Symonds, Harl. MS. 936, ff. 85-91.

In four brigades: brigade commanders' names first:-

(1) Lord Siltot:	Prince of Wales's	(100)
	Prince Maurice's	(300)
	The Lord General's	(300)
	Lord Siltot's	(250)
	3rd Earl of Northampton's (ex - 2nd Earl of Northampton's)	(250)
	Lord Percy's	(300)
	Thomas Weston's (ex Lord Digby's)	(100)
	Thomas Noward's	(300)
	Richard Neville's (ex - Earl of Caernarvon's)	(200)
	Charles Gerrard's	(150)
	Sir Arthur Aston's	(120)
	Gerrard Croker's	(100)

(2) Sir Horatio Cary (ex - Lord John Stuart's):-

	Sir Horatio Cary's (ex - Lord John Stuart's)	
	Sir Nicholas Crispe's	
	Sir Edward Ford's	
	Dutton Fleetwood's	
	Sir William Clerke's	
	Sir William Boteler's	(150)

(3) Sir Edward Stawell:

	Lord Hopton's	
	Sir Edward Stawell's	

George Gunter's and
Sir Allen Apsley's united

Edmund Peirce's

(4) Sir Humphrey Bennett :

Sir Humphrey Bennett's

Sir George Vaughan's (30)

Sir Edward Saldegrave's (211)

Andrew Lindsay's

4000 Horse, ⁽¹⁾

Symonds also listed, independently, the regiment of Sir Faithful Fortescue, 200 strong, naming its officers and noting that it was "in being 23 May, 1644". To complete the list we must add the King's Lifeguards, of which Symonds himself was a member, but which he does not mention.

(1) Symonds's total: but see above, p. 122.

Appendix IV. CAVALRY REGIMENTS IN THE WESTERN CAMPAIGN,

June - September 1644.

Compiled from the following sources :-

- Account of Cropedy Bridge, 29 June 1644, Walker, pp.31-3 A
- Petition of the Old Horse, c.8 August 1644, Warburton, III,
p. 17n. B
- The Letter to Essex, 8 August 1644, Walker, pp.60-1. C
- Account of Lostwithiel surrender, 23 August - 1 September
1644, Walker, pp.71-2. D
- List of Cleveland's brigade, September 1644, Symonds, p.102. E

Regiments have been identified from the signatures of officers in the
Petition and Letter (Sources B and C). Where the connection between
regiment and officer is not obvious (from Symonds's Aldbourne list,
Harl.MS.986, ff.79-90, and the 1663 List), an explanatory note has
been appended.

King's Lifeguards					C
Prince of Wales's	A ⁽¹⁾	B ⁽²⁾			C?
Prince Maurice's		B			C
The Lord General's		B			C
Lord Wilmot's	A	B			C
Earl of Northampton's	A ⁽³⁾	B			C
General Goring's Lifeguards (Troop)		B ⁽⁴⁾			C
General Goring's					B
Earl of Cleveland's	A	B	C	D	E
(ex - Sir Horatio Cary's, ex - Lord John Stuart's)					

Sir Arthur Slingsby's	A		C		
(ex - Lord Percy's)					
Thomas Weston's	A	B	C		
Thomas Eward's		B	C		
Richard Neville's	A		C		
Sir Thomas Aston's				D	
James Hamilton's			C		E
(ex - Earl of Crawford's)					
Sir Nicholas Crispe's		B	C ⁽⁵⁾		E
Sir Humphrey Bennett's			C	D ⁽⁶⁾	
Sir Edward Waldegrave's			C		
Sir Edward Ford's			C ⁽⁷⁾	D	
John Stewart's			C	D	<u>E</u> ⁽⁸⁾
(ex - Dutton Fleetwood's)					
Thomas Culpepper's	A		C	D	E
(ex - Sir William Clarke's)					
Andrew Lindsay's			C	D	
Richard Thornhill's			C	D	E
(ex-Sir William Boteler's)					
Giles Strangway's			C		

25 regiments, 1 troop.

(1) Lord Wentworth's regiment, in Cleveland's brigade, is the Prince of Wales's under its second commander.

(2) Sir John Browne signs. He is in Walker's account of Second Newbury (p.113).

- (3) His brigade is mentioned, and this no doubt included his regiment.
- (4) Pat Barnewell signs. The connection is given in R. Bulstrode, Memoirs and Reflections, p.136.
- (5) J. Luntler signs. He is no doubt the Lieutenant-Colonel "J. Luntly" placed under Crispe in List, 33. .
- (6) Bennett's brigade mentioned, and this would include, presumably, his own regiment.
- (7) William Leake signs. He is of this regiment at Lostwithiel, Walker, pp. 72, 73.
- (8) Symonds has "John Fleetwood", one of his rare mistakes. The regiment was then under either Dutton Fleetwood or John Stewart. The confusion in Symonds's mind was perhaps caused by the presence of a John Fleetwood in quite a different regiment but with a similar name, that of Lord John Stuart/Sir Horatio Cary. (Harl.MS.986, f.86). There was no connection or family relationship between Lord John Stuart and Lieutenant-Colonel John Stewart.

Appendix V. CAVALRY REGIMENTS AT NASEBY, 14 June 1645.

Compiled from de Gouame's plan of the battle, Add.MS.16370, f.62, reproduced in Warburton, III, facing p.104; the list of horse before Leicester, Symonds, pp.181-2; Walker, p.130; J.Sprigge, Anglia Rediviva (1647), pp.33-40, and the plan of the battle by J.Streeter between pp.32 and 33.

King's Lifeguards

The Queen's

Prince Rupert's Lifeguards

Prince Rupert's

Prince Maurice's Lifeguards

Prince Maurice's

Earl of Northampton's

Lord Loughborough's

Sir Horatio Cary's

Sir William Vaughan's

Samuel Sandys's

Thomas Howard's

Thomas Leveson's

Richard Bagot's

Sir Robert Byron's

Sir Henry Bard's

Robert Worden's

Sir Marmaduke Langdale's

Sir William Blakeston's

Newark horse

3500 Horse

Appendix VI. CAVALRY REGIMENTS AT LANGPORT, 10 July 1645.

Compiled from Diary or Exact Journal, 17-24 July 1645, TT: E.262(31),
and R. Bulstrode, Memoirs and Reflections, pp.136-40.

The Lord General's

General Goring's Lifeguards (troop)

General Goring's

Lord Hopton's

Earl of Cleveland's

Sir Thomas Aston's

Sir Robert Howard's

Sir Nicholas Crispe's

Sir Allen Apsley's

Sir Arthur Slingsby's

Sir Edward Stawell's

Ames Pollard's (ex - Lord Wilnot's)

Thomas Culpepper's

James Hamilton's

Samuel Tuke's (Duke of York's, ex - Charles Cavendish's)

Arthur Heveningham's (ex - Sir Edward Waldegrave's)

French regiment

Five Western regiments

21 regiments, 1 troop.

Appendix VII. CAVALRY REGIMENTS IN THE WEST, February-March 1646.

Compiled from Perfect Passages, 18-24 February 1645/6, TT: E. 325(I)
 (Prisoners taken at Torrington); J. Sprigge, Anglia Rediviva (1647),
 pp. 214-7 (Surrenders at Truro); and Hopton's narrative, in T. Carte,
A Collection of Original Letters, I, p.121.

Brigades:-

General Goring's	5 regiments
Earl of Cleveland's	4 regiments
Lord Wentworth's	4 regiments
Sir James Smith's	3 regiments
Major-General Webb's	3 regiments
French	3 regiments

Regiments:-

Lord Hopton's
 Lord Hopton's Lifeguards
 General Goring's
 Lord Culpepper's
 Lord Capel's servants
 Prince of Wales's Lifeguards⁽¹⁾
 Sir Richard Grenville's reformadoes⁽²⁾
 Sir Arthur Slingsby's⁽³⁾
 Sir Nicholas Crispe's
 Arthur Heveningham's
 George Gunter's
 Sir Thomas Hooper's
 Other Western and Welsh regiments

Notes for Appendix VII.

(1) Many officers and units went to make up this strong regiment (700 troopers, 9 troops in all), which was the successor to the Prince of Wales's regiment of Old Horse, P.Young, "The Prince of Wales's Regiment of Horse, 1642/46", J.S.A.H.R., Vol. 31, pp.9-11.

(2) Grenville had been dismissed from his command at the end of 1645. The reformadoes would be leaderless officers and troopers whom he had drawn together, and who, in 1646, still formed at least one regiment.

(3) The regiment continued in existence although Slingsby had been taken at Langport; it was in Lord Wentworth's brigade, January 1646, according to a Parliamentary newsletter, The Moderate Intelligencer, 8-15 January 1645/6, TT: E. 316(7).

While closely allied to the cavalry and dragoons, the foot pursued an individual course through the war, which will be traced in this chapter. Changes which took place in one arm were not always reflected in the others, and the character and history of the infantry were in many respects unlike those of the horse.

The story of the Royalist cavalry was one of slow growth from small beginnings; the foot, by contrast, was strongest at the start of the war. The large force of infantry assembled for the Edgehill campaign was only equalled (temporarily) in 1643, and in later years it declined in numbers. While new regiments were raised after 1642, there was no striking addition to the original body of main army infantry (the Old Foot), as there was to the cavalry, in the shape of the Sheriffs' Army. The foot equivalent to Hopton's new cavalry of 1643/4 were not important. The contribution of the "English-Irish" infantry (brought over from Ireland in 1643 and '44) to the Oxford army was never great. In the grouping of regiments - Old Foot, Sheriffs' Army foot, "English-Irish" - the first is wholly predominant.

In the summer of 1642 the King had raised more foot than horse. Infantry regiments were easier to recruit, required less outlay and were cheaper to maintain. A score or more of regiments were raised initially for the main army. Before he left Shrewsbury the King had gathered 14 or 15 together, and three or four others met him on his southward march.⁽¹⁾ At Edgehill 16 regiments were recorded, and others were in the field, but not at the battle.

(1) 17 were identified in the course of Chapter I.

The 12,500 strong army at Edgehill contained 10,000 foot;⁽¹⁾ the infantry were four times more numerous than the cavalry. The average strength of a regiment was over 500, and while none had its full complement of 1200 (the usual theoretical establishment), probably the two Welsh regiments in the Old Foot were very strong.⁽²⁾

At Edgehill the infantry was drawn up in five tertias,⁽³⁾ the equivalent of brigades of horse. Each was made up of three or four regiments, and contained perhaps 2000 men. The tertia commanders, listed by de Gomme, were all, except for Belasyse, officers of experience. Three - Gerrard, Balasyse and Feilding - had foot regiments of their own.⁽⁴⁾ The other two, Sir Nicholas Byron and Henry Wentworth, had not, but were qualified by their seniority. Byron, the uncle of Sir John, the cavalry officer, had abandoned a command in the Low Countries to serve his King in the Scots Wars, and in 1639 had become Governor of Carlisle and a member of the Council of War. He was much prized by the King as a commander of foot.⁽⁵⁾ Wentworth was the younger brother of the Earl of Cleveland; he too had seen military service on the continent and in the Scots Wars.⁽⁶⁾

- (1) The section of de Gomme's plan dealing with the foot is placed at Appendix I.
- (2) Lord Spencer believed Stradling had raised 1200, Salisbury 1000, Letters and Memorials of State, ed. A. Collins, II, p. 667. Stradling had 500 quartered in Monmouthshire in September, Stradling to Sir William Morgan (St. Donats castle, 17 September 1642), National Library of Wales, Tredegar MS. 911.
- (3) Appendix I.
- (4) See above, pp. 32, 40, 49. Feilding's regiment was not recorded by de Gomme, at the battle; the powder delivery of 31 October 1642 seems to indicate that his and the Earl of Northampton's regiments were separated from the main body, W.O. 55, 457, 60, f. 7.
- (5) C.S.P.D., 1637-8, p. 398, 1639-40 and 1640, passim; A. Wood, Fasti Oxonienses, ed. P. Bliss, II, p. 42; for his relationship to the Byron brothers, see Visitations of Nottinghamshire, 1563 and 1614, Harleian Society, Vol. 4 (1871), pp. 9-11.
- (6) B. Burke, Dormant and Extinct Peerages (1883), p. 578; C.S.P.D., 1628-9, p. 565, 1635, p. 267, and 1639-40, pp. 532, 567.

Three regiments at Edgehill were recorded for the first time with the main army. Sir Gilbert Gerrard's and Lord Molineux's were mainly from Lancashire, either part of the large number of foot brought in under the direction of the Earl of Derby, or closely following upon its heels. Sir Gilbert Gerrard was the uncle of Charles Gerrard, the tertia commander; his twin brother was Lieutenant-Colonel of the regiment, which included other Gerrards among its officers. Lord Molineux may not have been present at Edgehill, or, if he was, returned shortly afterwards to Lancashire. The effective commander of his regiment was probably the Lieutenant-Colonel, Roger Nowell. Sir John Beaumont's foot, the third arrival, had been raised in the Midlands, where Sir John, a recusant and the second Baronet, had his estates.

At Edgehill the infantry bore the heat of the day, and casualties were heavy. The Earl of Lindsey was mortally wounded, and with his son, the commander of the royal foot Guards, taken prisoner; Sir Edward Stradling and Sir Thomas Lunsford, both colonels of foot, were captured. The ill-equipped Welsh infantrymen - "Poor Taffy" to the London news-sheet writers - suffered most, and the battle, coming as it did on top of a spell of long, hard marching for the foot, resulted in widespread desertion.

The High Command strove hard to keep together the great body of infantry it had created. It was essential, to counter battle-weariness and stop

- (1) For their Lancashire content, see List, 54, 95, the officers of the regiments named in the Culham arms delivery, 23 May 1643, W.O.55,1661 [37], and the certificate of a Salford man who fought at Edgehill in Gerrard's regiment, Lancashire Record Office, Quarter Sessions files, 220, f.6.
- (2) Barke, Dormant and Extinct Peerages (1883), p.229, J.Money, The Battles of Newbury, p.105, and W.O.55, 1661 [37].
- (3) D.N.B., G.E.C., under Molineux, W.O.55,1661 [37]. Nowell was of Rede, Lancashire.
- (4) G.E.C., Baronetage, II, pp.5-6, List, 9.
- (5) The authorities for the battle cited at Appendix I of Chapter III.
- (6) J.Phillips, Memoirs of the Civil War in Wales, II, p.36.

runaways, to feed, pay and equip the foot well in the push towards London. Before Edgehill Lord Spencer had reported that while the horse lived on the country, the infantry were reasonably well paid;⁽¹⁾ and in the month following the battle paymaster's accounts, lists of regulated quarters, and instructions for the delivery of arms and ammunition testify to the King's concern for the infantry. A week after the battle enough powder, match and shot was issued to equip fully 4,000 musketeers of the marching army.⁽²⁾ The musketeers accounted for probably just under half the total number of infantry after Edgehill. In November, 19 regiments were being paid over £3,000 a week.⁽³⁾

The pay-lists and powder deliveries indicate that the Lord General's (the Earl of Forth's, after Lindsey's capture and death), the King's Guards, Sir William Pennyman's, the "Eldest Regiment", John Belasyse's, 1,000 strong at Nottingham, and Stradling's and Salusbury's regiments were, as we might expect, still among the largest.⁽⁴⁾ Some regiments were even increasing their strength in November.⁽⁵⁾

For the winter the foot were usually placed in garrisons. Towns were preferred to villages or the open countryside: if these were denied, a small butted township would be built. Tents were rarely used. It was not expected that the infantry would stir from their settled winter quarters. November

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- (1) Letters and Memorials of State, ed. A. Collins, II, pp.667-8.
 (2) 18 regiments issued with over 2,000 lbs. of powder, so that each musketeer should have "his bandoliers full": $\frac{1}{4}$ lb. filled a bandolier, W.O. 55, 423, f.14 et seq.
 (3) Paymaster Brodley's accounts, 16 and 24 November 1642. The former is printed as appendix to G. Davies, "The Battle of Edgehill", English Historical Review, Vol.36, pp.43-4. Some of the attributions made by Davies are incorrect. The latter is in the collection of A. Lowther, Esq., Ashted, Surrey. See below, pp.226.
 (4) Authorities cited in notes (1) and (2).
 (5) Ibid.

to March was considered the close season for military campaigning, and for the first winter of the war the main army foot were billeted in Oxford and the ring of defensive strongholds - principally Reading, Abingdon, Wallingford, Banbury and Brill - which surrounded it.⁽¹⁾ The infantry quarters were protected by parties of horse, which foraged for supplies and brought in the monetary contributions agreed to by the local country-people.

The foot - unlike some of the cavalry - were not active in these winter months. The most that could be hoped for was to keep the framework of the best regiments intact; for the infantry were notoriously volatile. The common soldiers normally left the colours to return home at the end of the summer's campaign. Many infantrymen ignored the blandishments and threats of the Council of War in order to spend the winter with their families. Shortly after Edgehill the King had written to the J.P.'s of North Wales asking them to return deserters from Sir Thomas Salusbury's regiment.⁽²⁾ He published two proclamations in November against the desertion which decimated the Royalists' ranks.⁽³⁾ Yet it remained a constant feature of the autumn. But if, in each regiment, an efficient cadre of officers was kept together, it was possible to recruit it again in the spring.

The traffic to Wales was not, however, all one way. The Principality was the reputed "nursery of the King's infantry",⁽⁴⁾ and Welsh Royalists were active on behalf of the Old Foot; four regiments reached the main army in these months. The small regiment of Herbert Price, the Brecon M.P. and

(1) Quarters of the Army, 9 December 1642, printed in P. Young, "King Charles I's Army of 1642," J.S.A.H.R., Vol. 17, pp. 107-3.

(2) Copy of the letter (Oxford, 2 November 1642), N.L.W., Crosse of Shaw Hill MSS., No. 1093.

(3) 25 and 28 November 1642, Steele, Nos. 2309, 2313.

(4) According to Arthur Trevor, T. Carte, A Collection of Original Letters, I, p. 89.

courtier, joined the King after Edgehill.⁽¹⁾ It had been commissioned earlier, and was recruited in Price's native county, where he had a 'considerable estate.'⁽²⁾ The regiment of Richard Vaughan, Lord Carbery, reached Oxford in January 1643, and was for a short time part of the garrison.⁽³⁾ Carbery was, however, too important a man in his local Carmarthenshire to remain as an ordinary colonel in the main army,⁽⁴⁾ and he left Oxford - apparently with his regiment - to take command in South-west Wales in May 1643.⁽⁵⁾ John Owen's regiment, delayed in North Wales, although commissioned in the summer of 1642, was ordered to march in October, lay in Worcestershire in December and was recorded at Culham, the main army foot encampment, in May 1643.⁽⁶⁾

A fourth regiment from Wales (Montgomeryshire), under Richard Herbert, the soldier son of the neutralist poet and peer, Lord Herbert of Cherbury, had also come in before the spring; it had been commissioned in September

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- (1) Included in the pay-list of 16 November 1642, G. Davies, "The Battle of Edgehill", English Historical Review, Vol. 36, p. 44.
- (2) After the war an officer claimed to have been Sergeant-Major to Price 'at Nottingham 1642', Harl. MS. 6304, f. 197. For Price, see M. Keeler, The Long Parliament, C.C.C., pp. 360, 1203-5, 2042-3, and for his regiment, List, 108-9.
- (3) His regiment quartered in Oxford, 8 January 1642/3, Harl. MS. 6351, f. 61.
- (4) He was of the family of Golden Grove, in the county, D.N.B., under Vaughan, G.E.C., under Carbery.
- (5) Carbery made Lieutenant General in the counties of Carmarthen, Cardigan and Pembroke, 6 April 1643, Black, pp. 25-6. Last recorded arms delivery to Carbery's regiment as part of Oxford garrison, 1 May 1643, W.O. 55, 459.
- (6) See above, pp. 43-4. Copies of royal letters to Merioneth and Anglesey Commissioners (Oxford and Woodstock, 29 October 1642), and note of payment to Owen by Sir William Russell, Sheriff of Worcestershire, 24 December 1642, N.L.W., Clonenna Letters, Nos. 532, 533 and Appendix, II, No. 6. For arms delivery to Culham camp, 23 May 1643, see Appendix II of this chapter.

15. and received ammunition and equipment from Oxford magazine in the following March. (1)

Other commissions sent out to raise foot were mostly for local defence. The strengthening of provincial forces - usually more infantry were maintained locally than horse - may even have temporarily weakened the Oxford-based foot. Servase Holles, the antiquarian and M.P. for Grimsby, left his Major's command under Sir Lewis Dyve to enlist his own foot regiment in Nottinghamshire. He took with him, no doubt along with other Lincolnshire men, his kinsman, William Holles, who "quitted his Partisan" in Dyve's regiment. (2) Richard Bagot, of the well-known Staffordshire family, who had served in the foot at Edgehill and Brentford, returned to the Midlands to command local forces. (3)

- (1) Herbert's commission, H.M.C., 10th Report, IV, p.399; arms delivery, 15 March 1642/3, W.O.55, 423, ff.118-9. Herbert was M.P. for Montgomery in the Long Parliament, till disabled in September 1642; he served in the Scots and Irish wars, 1639-42. M.Keeler, The Long Parliament, D.N.B., Dictionary of Welsh Biography.
- (2) G.Holles, Memorials of the Holles Family, ed. A.C.Wood, Camden Society, 3rd Series, Vol.55 (1937), pp.137-18. The original intention, in Holles's commission of 7 December 1642, was to bring the new regiment, once raised, to the Oxford army. But the commissioners of array for Lincolnshire insisted that it remain in the county, for local defence. Holles himself did, however, divide his time between Oxford and Newark thereafter. His commissions, H.M.C., Bucclough, I, pp.526-32; see also M.Keeler, The Long Parliament, D.N.B., and C.S.P.D., 1660-1, p.112.
- (3) G.Wrottesley, "A History of the Bagot Family", Collections for a History of Staffordshire, William Salt Archaeological Society, N.S., Vol.XI (1903) pp.105-9. Bagot had been an officer in Holles's foot, W.O.55, 423, f.19.

If we include the Welsh additions, up to the spring of 1643 the King had been joined by 23 foot regiments.⁽¹⁾ Some were only of short duration, others were employed locally, and it was usually thought that, for all intents and purposes, the Old Foot consisted of a score of regiments at this time. Like the Old Horse, the Old Foot remained the backbone of the arm to which it belonged. All were volunteer regiments and had been drawn from most quarters of Royalist England, principally Lancashire, Cheshire, Yorkshire, the Midlands and Wales. They were often the product of the local "interest" of a provincial squire or peer. In this they were unlike the Old Horse, and were more comparable to the cavalry of the Sheriffs' Army. The original colonels of the Old Foot included three earls, three sons of peers and two holders of Irish peerages.⁽²⁾ But the greatest number were knights or baronets, prominent only in their own locality. All were of gentry rank or above.

The typical colonel of Old Foot - a man such as Sir Edward Fitton or Sir Thomas Salusbury - was a baronet, a product of the universities and lanes of court, and of wealth and position in his county. He had probably served as M.P. at some time, and had certainly been a Sheriff or Deputy Lieutenant before the war. In 1642 he was placed on the Commission of Array, and raised his regiment among neighbours and tenants, but despite his acquaintance with the trained bands his military experience, when the war broke out, was slight.

(1) Their commanders were the Earls of Lindsey, Northampton and Rivers; Lord Willoughby d'Eresby, John Belasyse and Richard Herbert; Earl of Carbery and Lord Molineux; Sir William Pennyman, Sir Ralph Dutton, Sir Edward Fitton, Sir Thomas Salusbury, Sir Lewis Eyve, Sir Thomas Lunsford, Sir Edward Stradling, Sir John Beaumont, Sir Gilbert Gerrard; Charles Gerrard, Richard Feilding, Richard Bolle, Thomas Blagge, Herbert Price and John Owen.

(2) The first eight named in previous note.

he was 37 years old in 1643.

The 20 or so Old Foot regiments suffered badly during the first winter and spring of the war. The skeleton of the old establishment was preserved but its substance was wasted. The desertion of the autumn had continued unabated; ⁽¹⁾ the pay and equipment of the infantry had worsened, and neither was likely to tempt the recalcitrant soldier to remain with his unit. Full pay, received for a time on the Edgehill campaign, was a thing of the past. The grievances of the foot were given striking embodiment in the petition of infantry soldiers (known as the "Humble Desires"), which they presented to the King and the Council of War, probably in May 1643. ⁽²⁾ The soldiery, they complained, were barefooted, unpaid and often unarmed; muskets were pawned to buy food, which was also in short supply. ⁽³⁾ With the better weather of April and May came the "morbis campestris", and this plague ravaged the ranks of the foot in the overcrowded and pestilential garrisons. Sick men removed from their regiments to Oxford, the officers claimed, were never seen again. ⁽⁴⁾

There were, also, movements of soldiery other than simple desertion which harmed the standing and strength of the infantry. Foot officers changed their arm, sometimes converting their companies into dragoon, or, where possible, cavalry units. Such a move at once conferred an increase

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- (1) Desertion in the Mansfords' regiment, Nicholas to Rupert (Oxford, 11 May 1643), Add.MS.13980, ff.59-60, inaccurately printed in Warburton, II, pp.188-90.
- (2) Marl. MS. 6304, ff.92-3.
- (3) Marl. MS. 6304, ff.92-3, and proclamations of January and March 1643 on sale of arms, Steele, Nos.2344, 2386; Warburton, II, p.35.
- (4) Marl. MS. 6304, ff.92-3.

in status, pay, mobility and in the ability to gather contribution and provisions. Cavalry officers, too, "poached" men from the infantry to combat the desertion from their own ranks. The King, the Council of War and the infantry commanders pronounced against these wiles, but probably in vain.⁽¹⁾

The approach of summer was the signal for a recruiting drive to make good the wastage that had occurred. The Council of War had already proposed that each of the 20 colonels of Old Foot should recruit an extra 200 men, and be paid for so doing. If this was successful, the infantry would gain 4,000 recruits.⁽²⁾ It was felt - as we have already noted in the case of the cavalry - that old regiments should be given priority; they should be "first served"⁽³⁾ with arms, pay and recruits. The new soldiers could be most quickly integrated into the old regiments, which would sooner "be made servicable than any new raised" units.⁽⁴⁾ The King and the Lord General looked after the interests of their own privileged regiments and saw to it that, for instance, they received preferential treatment in the supply of scarce arms.⁽⁵⁾ Surgeons were to be "first provided" for the oldest

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- (1) A Captain of Charles Gerrard's foot regiment was complained of at a War Council, for taking all the musketeers of his company with him into the dragoon service, minutes of Council, 17 March 1642/3, Harl. MS. 6851, f. 141. Complaints about this practice in clauses 6 and 8 of the "Humble Desires", Harl. MS. 6304, ff. 92-3.
- (2) Minutes of War Council, undated [7 February 1643], House of Lords Record Office, Walker Papers, f. 95. Blanket recruitment of this kind makes it reasonably certain that, although it is not stated, only the old infantry regiments were to be enlarged.
- (3) The phrase used about the arming of the King's footguards, W.O. 55, 423, f. 93.
- (4) This was the argument of the infantry commanders in their "Humble Desires", Harl. MS. 6304, ff. 92-3.
- (5) The King's Guards and the Earl of Forth's foot regiment received arms, W.O. 55, 423, ff. 93, 115.

regiments. (1) While the High Command wanted new regiments to be created it realised that this increased the pressure on available supplies of men and stores; it did not discourage potential colonels, but demanded an undertaking from them that their newly-recruited forces would not be a charge on central funds. (2)

The War Council proposal for recruitment of the Old Foot was in line with this policy. As many deserters had gone home, the officers in each case concentrated their efforts on their regiment's original recruiting area. Two officers of Richard Feilding's regiment went back to Herefordshire - where the regiment was first raised - to recruit their companies. (3) The county commissioners of Glamorgan were ordered to send 200 men to Stradling's regiment at Reading. (4)

Most of the Old Foot regiments were recruited on an amateur basis. Some, however, like the Lifeguards, had a high proportion of professional officers and regular soldiers, who would be more likely to remain in their quarters in and out of season, than the squires and countrypeople turned amateur infantrymen found in other regiments. The old soldiers of the Lifeguards, billeted near the King in Oxford, even had their wives and

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- (1) Council of War decision, 24 March [1643], Harl.MS.6351, f.148.
 (2) This seems to be the implication in Colonel Thomas Pert's certificate, 16 February 1642/3, Harl.MS.6351, f.123.
 (3) Draft royal warrant to Lieutenant Colonel and Captain Coningsby, 12 January [1643], Harl.MS.6302, f.9. The Coningsby's were an influential county family, M.Keeler, The Long Parliament, under Fitzwilliam and Humphrey Coningsby, D.Underdown, Royalist Conspiracy in England 1649-1660, p.260.
 (4) Charles's letter to them (Oxford, 23 March 1643), copied in the Order Book of the Glamorgan Commissioners of Array, N.L.W., Ll.M.3.17, p.2.-

families with them, and so, not surprisingly, the regiment remained over 500 strong through the depths of winter.⁽¹⁾ The regiment of Sir Ralph Dutton, one of the oldest in the army and also quartered in the city, contained many regulars. It was apparently among the largest in the spring.⁽²⁾

In April Reading, the main infantry garrison, surrendered to Essex. The regiments in the town (at least seven in number) were allowed to march out, and, with their would-be relief forces, were mustered on Culham Hill, near Abingdon, for the start of the summer's campaigning. The Ordnance Office at Oxford recorded the arms delivered "at the camp, 23 May 1643" to 15 foot regiments.⁽³⁾ The regiments previously at Brill, Abingdon and Woodstock, as well as Reading, were assembled in this hutted encampment under Henry Wentworth and Lord Grandison⁽⁴⁾ only the garrisons of Oxford (Sir William Pennyman's, the Lifeguards and Charles Gerrard's) and Wallingford (Thomas Blagge's and the Earl of Rivers's) were not fully drawn out.

The wastage suffered in the winter was immediately noticeable. It was at Culham that the officers of foot made their complaints: the old regiments they pointed out, were "much weakened by continuall service".⁽⁵⁾ Yet the situation was improving. The infantry had been armed, and in general the

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- (1) Minutes of the Council of War, 19 January 1642/3, on Irish wives of Lifeguardsmen (acquired by regulars serving in Ireland before the Civil War), Harl. MS. 6851, f. 95. Estimate of numbers from arms deliveries, 1 January and 18 February 1642/3, W.O. 55.423, ff. 75-94.
- (2) Appendix II, 10 companies in Dutton's regiment. Five of the officers named in that arms delivery were old, Scots War, veterans, Peacock, p. 73 et. seq.
- (3) See Appendix II. The Ordnance Office document, W.O. 55.1661 [3], is a lengthy and detailed account of all the companies at Culham, with the amount of arms delivered to each.
- (4) Orders for arms to be distributed to the army as they decree, 29 and 30 May and 13 June 1643, W.O. 55.459.
- (5) Harl. MS. 6804, ff. 92-3.

King's affairs were more hopeful. Supplies arrived from the North and Midlands, sickness attacked Essex's army, and Hopton's forces were ready to join up with the main army. The 14 regiments of foot taken by Rupert to besiege Bristol in July, however, were stated by de Gouze to be "all very weak".⁽¹⁾ They included most of the infantry recorded at Culham.

Rupert's foot were in three tertias, under Lord Grandison, Henry Wentworth and John Belasyse. Grandison had been made a Colonel-General of foot in June; Wentworth and Belasyse were old tertia commanders and they shared what had been substantially Feilding's tertia, Feilding himself had been disgraced for the surrender of Reading. The number of tertias, reduced from the five at Edgehill, remained officially the nucleus of three throughout the summer,⁽²⁾ but there were occasional additions or sub-divisions. It is a pity that there is no reliable estimate of the numbers of infantry engaged before Bristol; but if all the regiments were "weak" there were fewer men than at Edgehill.

In the taking of Bristol Rupert's forces were assisted by the Western army, under Prince Maurice and Hopton. The Royalist assault was obstinately resisted, and, though successful, cost many lives. Of foot commanders Grandison received a fatal wound, and Henry Lunsford (who had succeeded to the command of his brother, Sir Thomas's regiment) fell in the attack.⁽³⁾ John Owen, as he explained in a letter to his wife, was severely wounded.⁽⁴⁾ Sir

(1) Warburton, II, p.236.

(2) The infantry establishment set down, Council of War, 13 October 1643, Harl.MS.6852, f.183.

(3) Warburton, II, pp.249, 255, 266.

(4) Owen's letter, undated [August 1643], N.L.B., Clonenna Letters, No.1018.

Edward Fitton died shortly after the siege, but whether of wounds received there or not is uncertain.⁽¹⁾ For the Cornish, mostly infantry, their part in the storming of Bristol was the culmination of a triumphant campaign. Hopton was made Lieutenant Governor to Rupert, and most of the Western forces - barring Hopton's own foot, which garrisoned the city - departed after their brief union with the main army.

In the first week of August the Prince was joined by the King, the Lord General Forth and reinforcements of foot from Oxford.⁽²⁾ Rupert's original 14 regiments were added to by instalments during the summer campaign, so that at the battle of Newbury the army was almost complete. Perhaps of greater significance, from Bristol until after Newbury the Oxford-based army was sustained by locally-raised forces, mainly foot. From Worcestershire and Shropshire two regiments, the Prince of Wales's under Sir Michael Woodhouse, and that of Samuel Sandys, who was also a cavalry commander, were detached from Lord Capel's Midlands army to serve under the King.⁽³⁾ Some thousands of "Common Welsh" were probably at Bristol, and these were the precursors of a large and continuing contribution to the main army from South Wales during the year. When the King and Rupert began their investment of Gloucester, Sir Williamavasour, the local Colonel-General, brought up from the Welsh counties, principally Glamorgan, the nearest and most prosperous recruiting area, both the volunteer forces established there and the county trained bands.⁽⁴⁾

(1) G. E. C., Baronetage, I. p. 113.

(2) Percy to Heydon (Bristol, 3 August 1643), N.O. 55.459.

(3) H. M. C., 12th Report, IX, p. 40, and casualty list for First Newbury, Harl. MS. 6804, ff. 162-3, printed in P. Young, "King Charles I's army of 1643-1645", J. S. A. H. R., Vol. 13, pp. 30-1.

(4) Bibliotheca Gloucestrensis, ed. J. Washbourn, p. 207.

The latter were dubbed by the hostile news-sheets "club-men", because of their primitive weapons; they had to be properly armed from Bristol stores, (1)

Wav^aour's Welsh besieged the city from the North-west, in company with the Worcestershire detachment; (2) and at the "Vine-yard" in that quarter, where they established the "best Leaguer" old Sir Jacob Astley had ever seen, fresh militia reinforcements from Glamorgan kept arriving. (3) Richard Bassett, the county's Sheriff, brought five companies of trained bands, (4) Colonel Richard Donnell his locally-raised regiment, (5) and the Governor of Cardiff, Sir Anthony Mansell, some of the infantry from the garrison, including pressed men. (6) So successful were these efforts to recruit the foot, even at harvest time, that the county commissioners lamented that the husbandmen, and not the crops, were garnered, and as a result the county was "gleaned of people". (7) Probably over 2,000 were assembled at the "Vine-yard"; the King expressed his delight when he reviewed them by knighting the Sheriff, Bassett. (8) When the siege was raised and the royal forces embarked on the Newbury campaign, the men of the "Welsh tertia" or "army" (9)

(1) Bibliotheca Gloucestrensis, ed, J. Washbourn, p.207.

(2) Ibid., p.45.

(3) Ibid., p.212, Lloyd, pp.676-7, Order Book of the Glamorgan Commissioners of Array, N.L.W., LL.MB.17, p.38.

(4) Ibid., p.17, pp.25, 54.

(5) Ibid., p.29, and draft of Donnell's Commission for a foot regiment of trained bands or volunteers in Glamorgan, undated, Harl.MS.6851, f.153.

(6) N.L.W., LL. MB.17, pp.28, 51.

(7) Ibid., p.32.

(8) Ibid., p.29.

(9) Thus described in orders for arms deliveries, 4 and 7 September 1643, #.O.55, 1661 [12/ and #.O.55. 459.

under Vavasour marched alongside and acquitted themselves well; Charles wrote to the Glamorgan commissioners in October of his admiration for their courage.⁽¹⁾ Parliamentary observers, it must be added, had a different view of their qualities.⁽²⁾

The Earl of Essex's army - which included regiments of London trained bands - relieved Gloucester on 5 September, after almost a month's siege. A fortnight later the two armies met at First Newbury (20 September 1643). There the King achieved a great and rare concentration of his available forces, particularly infantry. The regiments with Rupert at Bristol siege were all present;⁽³⁾ the Lifeguards and others drawn from Oxford and Wallingford by the King and the Lord General were recorded, as were the Worcestershire contingent, and the Welsh trained bands.⁽⁴⁾

If we accept the principle that all the foot not in garrison at this time must have been at the battle, then a number of new regiments should be accounted part of the King's Newbury forces. The Queen had sent before her - with supplies of ammunition from the North - and brought with her, bodies of Yorkshire and Lancashire infantry, which were placed under Oxford commanders in the summer of 1643. All but one of these regiments, which will be referred to later, augmented the Old Foot at the battle.⁽⁵⁾ The exception was the Queen's Lifeguards, under her favourite, Henry Jermy, which, as a privileged regiment, did not stir from Oxford garrison until 1645.

(1) N.L.W., Ll. MS.17 p.48.

(2) E.g., Bibliotheca Gloucestrensis, ed. J. Washbourn, pp.62-3.

(3) Casualty list Newbury, in P. Young, "King Charles I's Army of 1643-1645", J.S.A.H.R., Vol.18, pp.30-1; not all are named in the list, but it is almost certain that those not mentioned individually were in Sir Gilbert Gerrard's tertias.

(4) Ibid.; the list includes Colonel Blagge's, from Wallingford, and Vavasour's tertias, known as "Lord Herbert's 5 Readgements". Herbert, Worcester's son, had helped to raise them.

(5) See below, pp.182 . Percy's and Pinchbeck's regiments in the field, supplied from the Ordnance Office, 10 and 12 September 1643, W.O.35. 1661 (12).

except on minor defensive expeditions.⁽¹⁾

Two Old Foot regiments remained, with the Queen's, in Oxford while Newbury was fought.⁽²⁾ Perhaps as many as 30 were in the field, including the five Welsh regiments, some five or six in Sir Gilbert Gerrard's tertias,⁽³⁾ and the new additions discussed above but not recorded at the battle. At least five tertias are visible in contemporary accounts.⁽⁴⁾ In all, the foot must have totalled over 10,000 - twice the number of horse, and a greater number than at Edgehill.⁽⁵⁾ Many old regiments must have recovered from their weak position of the early summer (it is known that many sick returned to the colours),⁽⁶⁾ and powerful contributions were made by the North (through the Queen's infantry), the Midlands and South Wales. The Welsh militiamen, unlike their London counterparts, had no publicist to cry up their heroic exploits, and so do not figure largely in contemporary narratives of the Newbury campaign and battle. It is also possible that they were never heavily engaged in the course of the conflict.⁽⁷⁾ As usual, their regiments served only till the end of the campaigning season, then

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- (1) Payment to Colonel "Jermins" regiment, part of the city garrison, 11 and 19 September 1643, Add. MS.5752, ff.214, 213.
- (2) Ibid.. The latter pay-warrant lists the Queen's, Pennyman's and Charles Gerrard's. Gerrard himself, and foot under his command, were, however, at the battle, W. Money, The Battles of Newbury, pp.44-53, and casualty list, P. Young, op cit., J.S.A.H.R., Vol.18, pp.30-1.
- (3) Casualties in the tertias seem to indicate this number, ibid..
- (4) Ibid., W. Money, op cit., pp.44-53, and H.M.C. Ormonds, N.S., II, pp.382-3.
- (5) Lord Spencer, now Earl of Sunderland, who was killed at the battle, though the King's forces, horse and foot, were 20,000 strong in mid-September, Letters and Memorials of State, ed. A. Collins, II, pp.670-1.
- (6) Warrant for 469 soldiers "recovered of their sickness", to be paid, 29 July 1643, Harl. MS.6852, f.163.
- (7) Their fairly light casualties seem to show this, casualty list, P. Young, op cit., J.S.A.H.R., Vol.18, pp.30-1.

melted away. By mid-October most of the Welshmen had gone home.⁽¹⁾

The trained bands had been rejected by the King as a fighting force in 1642; but it is a common mistake to believe that the country's militia played no part, on the Royalist side, in the Civil War thereafter. Newbury was not the only occasion on which they were used. Detachments of the main army sometimes called upon local militia forces with their "public arms"; Newport at Lichfield had Lord Capel's civilian levies from Shropshire.⁽²⁾ It was often in the interests of the commanders of regular troops in certain areas to keep the trained bands ready for local defence, and even, in emergencies, try to conjure up the whole strength of the shire, the "posse comitatus" made up of every able-bodied male between the ages of 16 and 60. Colonel-generals and governors of hard-pressed garrisons had this second line of defence. Midlands Sheriffs were ordered to raise the posse when the Scots invaded their counties after Naseby;⁽³⁾ the governors of Dudley and Sudeley castles, and the Sheriff of Gloucestershire, used the militia on occasion;⁽⁴⁾ and the North Wales commanders made good use of the trained bands to protect strategic points.⁽⁵⁾ When the royal army was campaigning in Cornwall and Devon the county militia were called up to augment the foot, and the whole posse was alerted.⁽⁶⁾ Trained band foot gave support to Hepton in the West in the last months of the war.⁽⁷⁾ Finally, the militia

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- (1) Order of 16 October 1643, concerning Glamorgan deserters, N.L.S., LL.M.S. 17, p.43.
- (2) H.M.C., 12th Report, II, p.39.
- (3) Draft royal warrant to Shropshire, Worcestershire and Herefordshire Sheriffs, 7 July 1645, Harl.MS.6352, f.276.
- (4) H.M.C., Hastings, II, p.119, and (for Sudeley), draft royal warrant to Captain Jones, 18 April 1644, Harl.MS.6302, f.102.
- (5) N.L.S. Clonmannau Letters, passim.
- (6) Commissioners of Devon to Lord Digby (Exeter, 12 September 1644), Harl.MS. 6352, ff.179-80; draft royal letters to Sheriff of Cornwall (Okehampton), 17 September 1644, House of Lords Record Office, Walker Papers, f.5.
- (7) Hepton's narratives in T. Carte, A Collection of Original Letters, I, p.109 et seq.

could be used to maintain local discipline behind the Royalist lines: in Wiltshire they helped to protect the countryside from marauding bands of "disorderly" horse.⁽¹⁾

The King was careful to keep the militia in loyal hands wherever possible, a sign of their continuing importance. He gave out commissions in the trained bands to replace absentee or disloyal commanders, and these commands were kept as much under review as those in the regular army.⁽²⁾ The existing militia system was preserved, where circumstances permitted, and proved useful in other ways. The regiments of auxiliaries (citizen levies), which were raised in 1644 to defend certain towns, were very largely based on this structure.⁽³⁾ The impressment of 1644 and '45 conducted by the Sheriffs and J.P.s, also employed the same pre-war framework. The county officials no doubt knew from their old peacetime muster rolls which men were available for conscription,⁽⁴⁾ and used the machinery in existence to raise them by parish and hundred. The most effective intervention by the trained bands remained, however, that of the five Welsh regiments at Newbury.

There had been few permanent alterations to the main army infantry in 1643. The great majority of infantry regiments were Old Foot. Apart from the Queen's reinforcements, the additions to its summer strength fell away in the autumn. As well as the casualties sustained at Newbury, the main body

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- (1) Draft royal warrant to Sheriffs of Wiltshire and Somerset, 30 April 1644, Harl. MS. 6802, ff. 147-8.
- (2) E.g., copy of royal warrant to Arthur Bassett to be Colonel of a regiment of Devon trained bands, in place of Sir Samuel Roles, 5 August 1642, Tanner MS. 63, f. 124. Two draft commissions to Sir Thomas Hole of Devon, 20 February 1642/3, and undated, Harl. MS. 6851, f. 127, and 6804, f. 61.
- (3) See below, p. 189 *et seq.*
- (4) An example of the close connection which existed between impressment and the militia is the royal order to Cornwall of 17 September 1644, House of Lords Record Office, Walker Papers, f. 5.

of foot was diminished by the removal of some regiments and companies to provincial forces and outlying garrisons, a repetition of what had happened at the end of the 1642 campaign. Garrisons as far afield as Ludlow and Worcester received their complement of Old Foot; regiments and colonels sent there were lost to the main army.⁽¹⁾

In the winter of 1643 the foot, like the horse, were divided between two fronts: one in Northamptonshire, the other south of Oxford. A strong infantry base was set up at Towcester, and in September 1643, after Newbury, Hopton was instructed to raise his new army.⁽²⁾ The creation of this force did not call forth a strong body of infantry comparable to the Sheriffs' Army, the cavalry brought in to Hopton in these months: "for foote there was noe meanes to helpe him, but that he was to drawe what he could out of his owne quarters."⁽³⁾ Although the splendid body of Cornish foot, after its triumphs of the summer, had returned to duties nearer home, there were other groups of infantry in Somerset and Wiltshire, at Bristol and other garrisons, which could be called upon, as the document of 29 September 1643 suggests.⁽⁴⁾ Hopton, as Lieutenant Governor of Bristol and with his own regiment as nucleus, was to raise levies thereabouts; Prince Maurice and the Marquis of Hertford, Oxford commanders associated with the Cornish army,⁽⁵⁾ and local officers, such as Conyers Griffin (Governor of Langford house in 1644) and

(1) Sir Gilbert Gerrard became Governor of Worcester; his regiment rejoined the marching army only for Naseby: Richard Herbert took his regiment to Ludlow when he was appointed Governor, T. Carte, A Collection of Original Letters, I, pp.23-4, Black, p.77.

(2) See above, pp.76 .

(3) Bellus Civile, p.61.

(4) See Appendix III, the part of the speculative list of Hopton's new army which deals with the infantry proposed, Harl.MS. 6804, f.224.

(5) They had joined Hopton with horse and foot early in June 1643, see above, pp.109-10.

Edward Windham (Governor of Bridgwater) were to make contributions.⁽¹⁾ It was hoped Worcestershire might provide foot, and that use could be made of the regiment of Allen Apaley, commissioned early in 1643 and serving, no doubt, in the West Country,⁽²⁾ and the regiment of Sir John Poulett, newly-arrived at Bristol from Ireland.⁽³⁾ In this way 2000 men could be scraped together.

But Hopton's recruitment of foot, dependent on such a haphazard collection of individual commanders, at first "utterly failed".⁽⁴⁾ Eventually, however, a sufficient force of infantry was raised from various sources, for the Cheriton campaign. His foot, by the spring of 1644, was an amalgam of Old Foot, from Oxford and Reading, Western regiments from Maurice's army (besieging Dartmouth and Lyme at this time), and a party derived from those forces, which lay between Bristol and Oxford, and were neither wholly of the King's army nor of the Western army.⁽⁵⁾ In all Hopton's foot numbered 3000.⁽⁶⁾

The mixed character of the new army was neatly indicated by Sir Henry Bard, who served under Hopton as colonel of one of the regiments brought from the North by the Queen: he looked forward to a battle, he wrote, in which his "Northern musqueteers" would show up Hopton's "strangely-admired Cornish".⁽⁷⁾ The wished-for battle, however, was the crushing defeat of Cheriton, and Bard was taken prisoner.⁽⁸⁾ The army, then under Hopton and Forth, as we have seen, was extricated and most of it brought to the April rendezvous at

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- (1) Appendix III, Walker, p.106.
 (2) The seniority of the regiment referred to, Philip Walker to Edward Walker (Cirencester, 27 January 1644/5), Harl.MS.6802, f.12. Apaley, who also had a regiment of horse, was the eldest son of Sir Allan Apaley, Lieutenant of the Tower in the 1620's, D.N.B.
 (3) Poulett was an M.P., the eldest son of Lord Poulett, the wealthy and powerful Somerset peer, D.N.B., M.Keeler, The Long Parliament, B.Harbin, Members of Parliament for the County of Somerset (1939), pp.151-2, Bellum Civile, p.62.
 (4) Ibid., p.64.
 (5) Bellum Civile, pp.62-4, 66, 67, Colonel Joseph Bamfield's Apologie (1645), p.7, Nicholas to Rupert (Oxford, 9 November 1643), Add.MS.18980, f.148.
 (6) Bellum Civile, p.66.
 (7) Bard to Lord Percy (Andover, 17 March 1643/4), Harl.MS.4712, f.204: for Bard's regiment see below, p.182.
 (8) Bellum Civile, pp.101-2.

Aldbourne; the foot retired to Reading, where it waited to be incorporated in the King's army for the summer campaign.⁽¹⁾

The foot, whether in action or not, had as usual been seriously weakened during the winter. There had been some exchange of infantry between Hopton's army and Rupert's in Northamptonshire. Regiments were transferred from one front to the other, few were in settled quarters.⁽²⁾ The infantry based at Towcester had been plagued with sickness, kept on continual service and forced to exist in cramped quarters.⁽³⁾ Rupert in February had gone to command at Shrewsbury - taking foot, including the Lunsfords' old regiment, with him - and the main army infantry were further reduced.⁽⁴⁾

Distinctions between Cheriton and Northamptonshire infantry, or between Old foot and new, were apparently not observed at Aldbourne. Nor were all the foot regiments at the rendezvous: in particular, a large part of the marching infantry remained at Reading. Symonds, however, as well as recording the Aldbourne muster, also noted those regiments in Reading garrison in the same period. There is some overlap between the two lists, and a combined list has been compiled, and placed at Appendix IV.

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- (1) Bellum Civile, p.84.
- (2) Movements of foot, Nicholas to Rupert (Oxford, 23 and 30 October 1643), Add. MS.18980, ff.135, 136. Five regiments were mustered in Oxford, 13 February 1644 (Harl. MS.986, f.75, printed in P. Young, "King Charles I's Army of 1643-1645," J.S.A.H.R., Vol.18, p.32); but shortly afterwards a thousand foot were taken out of Oxford and Reading quarters to join Hopton, Bellum Civile, p.77, and Luke's scouts reports, 23 February 1643/4, Egerton MS.785, f.129.
- (3) Cochrane to Rupert (Towcester, 11 and 16 December 1643, 16 January 1643/4), Add. MSS.18980, ff.159, 163, and 18981, ff.9-10.
- (4) Rupert had taken command of Sir Thomas Lunsford's regiment after the death of its second colonel, Henry Lunsford, at Bristol in July 1643, Symonds, pp.165-6.

The regiments which had come to the main army with the Queen or from the North earlier, appeared at Aldbourne and Reading. Those of Lord Percy and Sir Henry Bard were recruited from Yorkshiresmen who had convoyed a train of ammunition to Oxford in May or early June 1643.⁽¹⁾ Bard's regiment had been commanded by one Colonel Pinchbeck, until his death at Newbury.⁽²⁾ The regiments of Sir Thomas Blackwall, a Nottinghamshire knight, and William Eure, brother of Lord Eure, had probably accompanied the Queen from Yorkshire. Both were very small by the spring of 1644, and disappear shortly afterwards.⁽³⁾

Symonds records other new regiments and changes in the Old Foot. The Duke of York's was the earliest of the "English-Irish" foot to appear in the ranks of the main army.⁽⁴⁾ "Talbot", who had a large regiment of yellow-coats at the muster, cannot be certainly identified, although he may have been a brother of the active Worcestershire Royalist, Sherrington Talbot.⁽⁵⁾ "Vaughan" indicates the regiment of Sir Henry Vaughan, Carmarthenshire M.P., who was also a commander in South Wales for the King.⁽⁶⁾ At Aldbourne and in Reading were the foot raised for Hopton's army: Bernard Astley, Sir Jacob's son, commanded what was the Marquis of Hertford's old regiment;⁽⁷⁾ Allen Apsley's regiment was recorded; and probably the regiment of Francis Cooke, who was noted by Symonds as of Essex family, had been recruited for the Cheriton campaign.⁽⁸⁾ Hopton's own regiment of blue-coats was the

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- (1) Symonds's notes, Harl. MS. 986, f. 82. Percy's regiment paid at Oxford, 8 June 1643, Add. MS. 5752, f. 215.
- (2) Appendix IV, Harl. MS. 986, f. 82, W. Money, The Battles of Newbury, p. 105.
- (3) Appendix IV: C.C.C., p. 1277, Shaw, II, p. 215; Lloyd, p. 670.
- (4) The regiment commanded by William St. Leger, Appendix IV, n. (1). For "English-Irish", see below, pp. 194-8.
- (5) Visitation of Shropshire, 1623, Harleian Society, Vol. 29 (1889), II, p. 453, V.C.H., Worcestershire, III, p. 207, Shaw, II, p. 220.
- (6) D.N.B., M. Keeler, The Long Parliament.
- (7) Bellum Civile, p. 64.
- (8) Harl. MS. 986, f. 80. Cooke's father, a Parliamentarian, disinherited his Cavalier son, C.S.P.D., 1660-1, p. 247, Visitations of Essex, to 1634, Harleian Society, Vol. 13 (1878), I, p. 381.

second regiment of the muster. These were the meagre equivalent in foot of the Sheriffs' Army.

Changes in the senior regiments were widespread; some were unremarkable. The hierarchical structure of the officer class, the localised nature of regimental recruitment, and the dependence upon family ties, ensured that very often the successor to an original colonel of Old Foot was his kinsman or Lieutenant-Colonel or both. Sir William Pennyman, who died in Oxford in August 1643, was replaced as Colonel by his cousin, Sir James Pennyman.⁽¹⁾ The family succession operated in the case of Northampton's foot as it did for his cavalry regiment. The fate of Sir Edward Stradling's regiment, first after his capture at Edgehill and later from his death at Oxford in 1644, is obscure; but it is certain that his two brothers remained senior officers in it.⁽²⁾

Other regiments, however, were not the preserve of single families; and changes in leadership have a certain significance. Sir Edward Fitton's was taken over by Anthony Thelwall, an officer whose main claim to advancement was not local influence or close kinship to the previous colonel, but military experience.⁽³⁾ Theophilus Gilby "left his command in Brabant" in 1640 to serve the King, and became Colonel of John Belasyse's old regiment when Belasyse was appointed to a Northern command.⁽⁴⁾ Sir Ralph Dutton's

(1) Symonds, pp.160-161, G.E.C., Baronetage, III, pp.287-8.

(2) Warburton, II, p.237, G.E.C., Baronetage, I, p.7, Lloyd, p.654, B. Burke, Extinct and Dormant Baronetcies (1844), p.510.

(3) Major Leigh common to both Fitton and Thelwall, List, 47, and W.O.55. 1661 [3] Thelwall had served at Rochelle (1628), in the German Wars and against the Scots, C.S.P.D., 1628-9, p.357, 1638-9, p.387, 1639-40, p.548, Peacock, p.90. Fitton had been killed at Bristol, see above, p.173.

(4) C.S.P.D., 1660-1, p.428, H.M.C. Ormonde, N.S., II, p.383, List, 55.

regiment (from the spring of 1644 permanently stationed at Oxford) this date, a new Colonel in the old soldier, Stephen Hawkins, and as Lieutenant-Colonel, Degory Collins, a "mere" professional.⁽¹⁾ When Bolle was killed, serving with Hopton's forces, in the winter of 1643/4, much of his regiment was destroyed; and his Lieutenant-Colonel, Richard D'Ewes, brother of the diarist, had been killed previously.⁽²⁾ The regiment was therefore reconstituted under a completely new Colonel, George Lisle, who was an experienced infantry officer but without any claim to gentle birth.⁽³⁾ When captured at Colchester in the Second Civil War he was considered by Fairfax "a mere soldier of fortune", and summarily executed.⁽⁴⁾ Similarly, Sir Thomas Salusbury was replaced, on his death, by a "stranger" (although another Welshman): this was the expert military engineer, Charles Lloyd, who had learnt the art of fortification in the Netherlands and had returned to England to serve as quarter-master-general in the Scots Wars. He was knighted in 1644.⁽⁵⁾

Such men, unlike the colonels they replaced, were career officers rather than country gentlemen. Few left any money or estate on their death.⁽⁶⁾

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- (1) Hawkins's petition states his service, Harl. MS. 6852, ff. 253, 253^r; Peacock, p. 89; Collins had risen from the ranks in the expeditions of the 1620's; he obtained his own command later in the Civil War, C.S.P.D., 1628-9, p. 488, Add. 1625-49, p. 283, List, 29, Westminster Abbey Registers, ed. J. Chester, Harleian Society, Vol. 10 (1875), p. 178.
- (2) Bellum Civile, pp. 70-1, Alumni Cantabrigienses, Part 1, to 1751, ed. J. Venn, under D'Ewes.
- (3) The Bolle-Lisle connection is stated by Symonds, p. 160. For Lisle and his father, a London monopolist, see D.N.B., C.S.P.D., 1619-23, p. 161, 1629-31, p. 290, 1660-1, p. 396, H.M.C., Ormonde, I, pp. 124, 128, Lloyd, pp. 478-9.
- (4) D.N.B.
- (5) D.N.B., Dictionary of Welsh Biography, C.S.P.D., 1660-1, p. 302, 1661-2, p. 223. Officers common to Salusbury and Lloyd, W.O. 55, 1661 [3] and Warburton, II, p. 237.
- (6) Gilby's will, proved 1667, P.C.C. Carr 141, Hawkins's, proved 1658, P.C.C. Wootton 54; for Lloyd's impoverishment, see authorities cited in previous note, and the will of his sister and executrix, Blanch Lloyd, proved 1662, P.C.C. Laud 51.

There was a distinct shift towards greater professionalism in the body of the Old Foot, by the spring of 1644: the leadership of the infantry was passing from amateurs - necessary to raise the regiments in the first place - to experienced veterans. If the foot were declining in strength, they were probably gaining in quality. The foot were less political than the cavalry, but the changing character of the infantry cannot have been pleasing to either the Civilians (at court or in the shires) or the Courtiers. Some of the new men in command of foot were Rupert's followers.

24 regiments of foot were ready for the field in spring 1644. 5000 infantry-men were mustered at Aldbourne, 3000 at Reading later: at least half the latter had not been at Aldbourne, so that it may be roughly estimated that some 7000 foot were available for the main campaign of the year. The regiments at the muster averaged only 300. The strength of the infantry, principally the Old Foot, a feature of 1642 and '43, was ebbing, and there is evidence to suggest that it was shortage of men, rather than any other commodity which caused the High Command most anxiety at this stage.⁽¹⁾

To counter these tendencies the Oxford Parliament, in consultation, as we have seen, with the Council of War,⁽²⁾ determined upon two courses of action. The first was conscription, the second - particularly dear to the Royalist Parliament's Civilians - the creation of auxiliary regiments. The critics of the army placed most emphasis on building up the foot; the Oxford Parliamentarians agreed that 12,000 should be the optimum strength of the main army infantry, and in March 1644 they determined on the immediate raising of half that number.⁽³⁾ Conscription by civilian commissioners in

(1) More arms than men at Reading, draft royal warrant to Sir Jacob Astley, 24 April 1644, Harl. MS. 6802, f. 136.

(2) See above, pp. 63-4.

(3) Trevor to Rupert (Oxford, 22 [February] and [? 1 March 1644]), Add. MS. 18981, ff. 57-8, 73. Commissioners to recruit 6,000 sent out, Jermy to Rupert (Oxford, 18 March 1643/4), *ibid.*, ff. 92-3.

the counties was obviously the method of recruitment least offensive to them. Hand in hand with this scheme went the need to reduce the number of superfluous officers: some attempt was made to weed out Oxford garrison.⁽¹⁾ These moves constituted the formal "reformation" of the army, of spring 1644: it failed with the cavalry; it had little, but not much, more success with the infantry. Let us look at conscription and the auxiliaries in turn.

At the local level, where all recruitment, in the final analysis, took place, there had been piecemeal impressment by constables and officer-squires of tenants, able-bodied vagrants and village n'er-do-wells since the beginning of the war.⁽²⁾ But this had not been officially recognized: all the regiments of the Oxford army were held to be "voluntary".

By the autumn of 1643, however, with the certain prospect of a long war, fought with increasing commitment by both sides, the King had to use every available source of manpower. Hopton was given power, in his commission of October, to impress men in five counties for his new forces.⁽³⁾ The question of conscription was brought up at a Council of War in the following month, where it was no doubt felt that the Parliamentary example should be followed.⁽⁴⁾ Commissioners were appointed in each county to press recruits, sometimes a specific number. Oxfordshire was the first to receive such a commission,

(1) [Jermy] to Rupert (Oxford, 12 March 1643/4), *ibid.*, ff.86-7: the writer proposed that a recent arrival in Oxford from the continental wars, Henry Gage, should be sent to Rupert, "upon the reduction of officers". It was typical of this attempted reformation that Gage remained in the city and eventually became Governor.

(2) This is clear from the evidence of many ex-soldiers at the Restoration, who claimed to have been pressed in the period before November 1643: e.g., certificate of Syson Davie, N.L.W., Chirk Castle Accounts, Denbighshire Quarter Sessions Records, 1663 (A), and the certificates reproduced in the Order Book of the Glamorgan Commissioners of Array, N.L.W., LL.MB.17, pp.28, 51.

(3) Commission dated 10 October 1643, Black, p.35.

(4) Minutes of Council, 1 November 1643, Harl.MS. 6852, f.195.

directed to the Sheriff and other experienced officials, in November 1643.⁽¹⁾

Before the end of the year Gloucestershire, Berkshire and some Welsh and Marches counties had similar commissions, and in 1644 pressing was undertaken in most counties to which the King could make some claim.⁽²⁾

In the main, impressment was used to strengthen existing units, not to create new forces; and only infantry regiments or companies with a good supply of arms could most benefit, for the pressed men were untrained, unarmed and on foot.⁽³⁾ They were not reliable, and so were brought in to old and, it was hoped, steady regiments serving locally, or with the main army. The five North Welsh counties were ordered co-operatively to reinforce a local regiment, first raised early in 1643, by impressment.⁽⁴⁾ And other conscripts from the same area were specially allotted to the Queen's Lifeguard of foot at Oxford. The commissioners of Denbigh and Flint, in February 1644, received instructions to send their men to Wrexham, and from there they marched to Oxford, where they remained, as part of the garrison, until the surrender of the city.⁽⁵⁾ Conscripts from Gloucestershire were to join Bristol garrison, a regiment operating locally, and the Duke of York's foot, part of the main army.⁽⁶⁾ The Southern counties provided the reinforcements for Basing garrison and Hopton's army on the Cheriton campaign and after.⁽⁷⁾

(1) Black, pp.97-8.

(2) Ibid., pp.102-3, 110-11, etc.

(3) The original order of the 1 November Council of War was to dispose conscripts in "such Companies as have spare Armes", Harl.MS.6852, p.193.

(4) Charles to Sheriffs of North Wales (Oxford, 1 January 1643/4), N.L.W., Hope MS., Add.320 D, p.37. The regiment was being raised in January 1643, Harl.MS.6851, f.67.

(5) Commissioners named [7 February 1644], Harl.MS.6804, f.142. Arms deliveries to the Queen's Guards for new-raised men, 18 March 1643/4, W.O.55, 459. A case history of a Denbighshire yeoman, pressed for this regiment by his local constable and serving in Oxford till the end of the war, contained in Sampson Griffith's petition, N.L.W., Chirk Castle Accounts, Denbighshire Quarter Sessions Records, 1664-5(C).

(6) Draft royal warrant to Sheriff of Gloucestershire (Oxford, 3 January 1643/4), Harl.MS.6852, f.9.

(7) E.g., impressment in Hampshire and Oxfordshire for Basing garrison, January 1644, Harl.MSS.6852, ff.13,15, and 6804, f.50.

Hopton had been authorised to press ever since his new force was authorised, and according to Parliamentary scouts, he was active in this direction. He showed some discrimination, taking up landowners of £100 p.a., and only where young and able recruits ran short conscripting married men.⁽¹⁾ As a proportion of his army was made up of unwilling conscripts he had constantly to be on his guard against wholesale desertion. Not surprisingly, many left his command, no doubt to retrieve either their estates or their wives.⁽²⁾ One solution was to quarter pressed men as far as possible from their former homes; the King advised that recruits for the garrison of Winchester should be drawn from distant parts, so that they would have less chance of returning easily to their "place of birth and habitation".⁽³⁾

By the spring and summer of 1644, under the aegis of ^{the} Oxford Parliament,⁽⁴⁾ impressment was countrywide, and it remained general on the Royalist side throughout the war. The King looked particularly to the West and Wales to replenish his army and weakened Oxford garrison for the 1644 campaign. He chided Rupert (at Shrewsbury) for interrupting the new foot levies destined for the Oxford forces.⁽⁵⁾ Charles Gerrard, on taking up his charge in South Wales, removed his regiments of horse and foot from the main army.⁽⁶⁾ They were ordered to be replaced by men from Bristol, and during this period the parliamentary scouts noted the arrival in Oxford of recruits - many

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- (1) Luke's reports, March and June 1644, Egerton MS.785, ff.15^v, 30^v. That unmarried men were preferred was an axiom of military recruitment long before the Civil War. Henry V, according to Shakespeare, had wished no widow's or orphan's curse. The normal Royalist stipulation in commissions of impressment was that youthful bachelors should be first recruited, e.g., undated draft warrant to Oxfordshire Sheriff, Harl.MS.6804, f.50.
- (2) Luke reported that "they run away dayly," 23 March 1643/4, Egerton MS.785, f.15^v.
- (3) Draft royal warrant to Hopton, 22 April 1644, Harl.MS.6802, f.122.
- (4) The conscription in Somerset, of autumn 1644, was "by order of Lords and Commons assembled at Oxford", draft royal warrant to the Sheriff, September 1644, House of Lords Record Office, Walker Papers, f.9.
- (5) Charles to Rupert (Oxford, 17 April 1644), MS.Firth.C.7, f.50.
- (6) Draft royal warrant to Forth, 1 May 1644, Harl.MS.6802, f.153.

conscripted - from Bristol and the West.⁽¹⁾ Gerrard's forces were themselves to be increased by the impressment of 2000 men in South Wales.⁽²⁾

Despite this great activity over a long period, it is probable that conscription was not a success. Few quotas in the counties can have been fulfilled.⁽³⁾ Certainly the 6,000 recruits proposed by the Oxford Parliament did not join the field army in 1644: the 7,000 foot ready for the summer campaign did not include more than a few hundred conscripts.

It was important, as their numbers were declining, that the best use should be made of the regular infantry available to the King. The Oxford Parliament adopted, and expanded, the idea of auxiliary regiments, civilian foot units composed of part-time citizen soldiers, which would be used solely for local defence. Their great virtue was that their presence in garrisons of the King during the summer would release the field regiments of the marching army for more active service.

The first auxiliary regiment, that of Oxford city, had been set up in the summer of 1643. In July its Colonel, Sir Nicholas Selwyn, was commissioned,⁽⁴⁾ and in August it was being recruited among Oxford inhabitants, and armed and paid for by the city council.⁽⁵⁾ A number of local worthies served as officers in the regiment.⁽⁶⁾ In 1645 it became Governor William Legge's.⁽⁷⁾ Unfortunately, the career of the regiment was hampered by a

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- (1) Draft royal warrant to Forth, 1 May 1644, Harl. MS. 6802, f. 153, and Luke's reports of 300 Cornish to Oxford, 16 May, and 600 foot from Bristol to Oxford, 22 May 1644, Egerton MS. 785, ff. 107^v, 104.
- (2) Order Book of the Glamorgan Commissioners of Array, N.L.W., Ll. MB. 17, p. 72.
- (3) Report of difficulties in Glamorgan and Somerset, N.L.W., Ll. MB. 17, p. 81, House of Lords Record Office, Walker Papers, ff. 9, 10.
- (4) 17 July 1643, Black, p. 57.
- (5) Oxford Council Acts, 1626-1665, ed. M. Hobson and H. Salter, Oxford Historical Society, Vol. 95 (1933), Appendix III, pp. 376-8.
- (6) Officers listed by Symonds, Harl. MS. 986, f. 76.
- (7) Ibid., and see connection between the two, in List, 83, 118.

long and bitter wrangle between the city authorities and Selwyn, who was a courtier and Gentleman Pensioner, and a "stranger" to Oxford.⁽¹⁾

The Civilians of the Oxford Parliament, however, gave the idea of auxiliaries a new impetus. In March and April the House of Commons proposed, at the prompting of the representatives of those localities,⁽²⁾ to raise volunteer auxiliary regiments to defend Oxford, Bristol and Reading. Perhaps with the example of Oxford Council's unhappy relations with Selwyn in mind, they demanded autonomy for these civic forces, insisting that they should be independent of the normal military authorities in their personnel, arms supply and pay. In each case the regiment formed was never to be "Commanded out of the City"; its duties were simply watch and ward of the town's defences.⁽³⁾

A regiment was established at Bristol by direction of the Council of War in March.⁽⁴⁾ Two royal proclamations, of April and May, ordered the recruitment of two further auxiliary regiments in Oxford, to supplement the city regiment.⁽⁵⁾ One, under the Earl of Dover, consisted of "scholars and strangers" in the city, and because of its recruitment of gowmen became known as the university regiment, a veritable "militia academica".⁽⁶⁾ It was

(1) For Selwyn, who had stood as a Crown nominee in the elections to the Long Parliament, see Kershaw, "The Elections for the Long Parliament 1640", English Historical Review, Vol. 38, p. 497, and Visitations of Sussex, 1530 and 1633-4, Harleian Society, Vol. 53 (1905), pp. 108-9; the course of the quarrel may be traced in Hobson and Salter, op cit., pp. 117, 123, 126, 383, and Councils of War, 2 May and 11 December 1644, Harl. MS. 6802, ff. 155, 338.

(2) E.g., the case of Bristol discussed in Council of War, 13 March 1643/4, Harl. MS. 6852, ff. 37-8.

(3) Ibid.

(4) Ibid.

(5) Steele, Nos. 2560, 2568.

(6) The copy of the proclamation of 28 April 1644 (Steele, No. 2560) in the Oxford University Archives, Harl. MSS. Notes which describe the regiment in this way, University Archives, W.P., Y 26 (1), f. 530.

within a short time over 600 strong.⁽¹⁾ The other was commanded by Lord Keeper Littleton and drawn from gentlemen of the Inns of Court resident at Oxford.⁽²⁾ Most of the inhabitants of the city had to list themselves in either of these regiments, or the city regiment under Selwyn, which was brought up to its full complement of 800 men at this time.⁽³⁾

The new citizen levies did not serve with the main army infantry, and they were unpopular with professional soldiers.⁽⁴⁾ But they proved useful in halting, if not reversing, the tendency of regular units to remain in garrisons when needed on campaign. The two field regiments established in Oxford - Hawkins's (ex-Dutton's) and the Queen's Lifeguards - remained there during 1644 and '45;⁽⁵⁾ but no other regiment joined them permanently, and the presence of auxiliaries in the garrison allowed them to be used on sallies and raids, and to be part of the main army when it relieved Donnington castle in November 1644.⁽⁶⁾ In that month the King publicly commended the Earl of Dover's and the Lord Keeper's regiments⁽⁷⁾ on their performance at Oxford in his absence (Selwyn's was not prospering at the time),⁽⁸⁾ and they were further recruited at the end of the year.⁽⁹⁾

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- (1) The birth and growth of Dover's regiment were probably typical of these auxiliary forces: 13 April, proposed in Parliament; 16 April, agreed to by Council of War; 24 April, arms delivery ordered; 28 April, proclamation published; 14 May, the regiment was first mustered and inspected and numbered "630 or thereabouts", Harl. MS. 6802, ff. 99-100, 134, University Archives, W.P. Y 26 (1), f. 530.
- (2) Proclamation, 24 May 1644, Steele, No. 2568.
- (3) Ibid., and order of Council of War concerning Selwyn's regiment, 19 April 1644, Harl. MS. 6802, f. 118, printed in Hobson and Salter, op. cit., p. 385.
- (4) Order of Oxford Parliament, 10 December 1644, upon the petition of a member of Dover's regiment, ejected from his lodging in "Cat streete" by a regular officer, Harl. MS. 6802, ff. 345, 346.
- (5) Symonds, p. 147; but some of the Queen's were at Naseby, see below p. 205.
- (6) Symonds, p. 147.
- (7) In royal proclamation, 5 November 1644, Steele, No. 2590.
- (8) Its pay in arrears, Council of War, 11 December 1644, Harl. MS. 6802, f. 338.
- (9) Proclamation, Steele, No. 2590, and warrant of 16 December 1644, Tanner MS. 61, f. 209.

They remained as part of Oxford garrison as long as the war lasted.⁽¹⁾

Neither expedient, of conscription or auxiliaries, was visible in the foot of the marching army in the summer of 1644. The King took with him on the Western campaign probably little more than the 7,000 noted in the spring at Aldbourne and Reading. His army in Cornwall and Devon was greatly increased by its temporary union with Maurice's forces there, so that the Royalists were thought to have 16,000 horse and foot in the field in August.⁽²⁾ Most of the infantry of the main army (not Maurice's) were listed by Symonds, in his Diary, at this stage; and the letter to Essex of 8 August, which, it may be remembered, named officers of horse,⁽³⁾ is helpful also for officers of foot. A list of the foot regiments derived from these sources has been placed at Appendix V.

Unlike the Aldbourne muster, as noted by Symonds, the disposition of the foot in Cornwall took account of the natural divisions and groupings which we have observed in the main army foot. The infantry were divided into three tertias, each of three brigades.⁽⁴⁾ The first and second tertias were largely Old Foot, although each contained three more recently-raised regiments. The second - George Lisle's - was known as the Reading tertia,⁽⁵⁾ for most of the regiments in it had been drawn from Reading garrison. The third tertia was Sir Bernard Astley's,⁽⁶⁾ and it consisted of the foot equivalent to the Sherriffs' Army. Hopton's own regiment heads the list of

(1) Draft commission to Sir Thomas Glenham, Governor of Oxford, [?] November 1645/7, mentions Dover's and Duke of York's (ex-Littleton's), Harl. MS. 6804, ff. 28-9. Lord Keeper Littleton's regiment "now... the Duke of York's", 7 August 1645, C.S.P.D., 1645-7, p. 51.

(2) Symonds, p. 49.

(3) See above, pp. 129-30.

(4) See Appendix V.

(5) E.g., at Second Newbury, according to Mercurius Aulicus, Oxford, 27 October - 2 November 1644, p. 1234. et seq.

(6) Newly-knighted this summer, Shaw, II, p. 217.

this tertia, and Symonds names four others. All had been at Aldbourne except Sir William Courtney's, which was not, however, a new regiment. It had been raised in the first winter of the war and served under Hopton in 1643/4. Courtney was a Hampshire gentleman of middle rank. (1)

Unfortunately, the list of the third tertia is not complete. Probably Symonds was not sufficiently familiar with these hitherto non-Oxford regiments to know their names, and concluded the muster with an etcetera. (2)

It is possibly to this tertia of Sheriffs' Army foot that the other regiments, which appear with the main army in the summer, should be assigned. Astley must have had his own regiment in the tertia he commanded. (3)

Bartholomew Jukes, a veteran of the Scots Wars, succeeded to the command of a Somerset regiment which he brought to the main army. (4) William

Murrey, about whom little is known, probably had his regiment in this campaign. (5) The other signatory to the Essex Letter whose regiment was

not recorded was Henry Shelley of Sussex. He had no doubt brought his foot from his native county to serve Hopton in the Cheriton campaign. (6)

Three regiments were neither recorded by Symonds nor identified from

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- (1) Arms delivery to the regiment, 31 January 1643, W.O.55. 423, f.73: in Cheriton campaign, Bellum Civile, pp.28, 31, 69. Courtney was a Hampshire recusant, D. Underdown, Royalist Conspiracy in England 1649-1660, p. 30.
- (2) Appendix V.
- (3) Ibid..
- (4) He replaced Sir Francis Doddington as Colonel of the regiment, which Doddington had had in Hopton's army, 1643/4; the connection is apparent in the royal warrant to Jukes, House of Lords Record Office, Walker Papers, f.21; Harl.MS.4712, f.33; Peacock, p.89. Jukes's signature to the Essex Letter is printed as "Jenkes" in Walker, p.61.
- (5) Appendix V. Murrey was a Swordsman, and his regiment was at Naseby, Warburton, III, pp.169, 175, and Appendix VI.
- (6) Peacock, p.69, C.C.C., pp.339, 2370, for Shelley: List, 119, for his regiment.

the Essex Letter, but were almost certainly part of the infantry and possibly in Astley's *tertia*.⁽¹⁾ Philip Walker was the brother of the secretary-at-war, and he may have owed his late and conscripted regiment to his brother's influence, as well as his local interest in Somerset, where the recruits for the regiment were pressed.⁽²⁾

The two other regiments were "English-Irish", those government troops now being withdrawn by the King from service in Ireland to help his cause nearer home. Sir John Poulett's has already been noted.⁽³⁾ Appleyard had lately succeeded to the command of his regiment, in which he had previously been Lieutenant-Colonel.⁽⁴⁾

The "English-Irish" were to become more important later. The Duke of York's, of Irish origin, already served with the Oxford army.⁽⁵⁾ But the majority, in 1644, were with Lord Byron and Rupert in the North. A number joined the King in the next year for the Naseby campaign.⁽⁶⁾

The King's representatives had concluded the Cessation of hostilities with the rebel Confederate Irish in September 1643. As Parliament was negotiating with the Presbyterian Scots with a view to using their excellent

- (1) Appendix V.
- (2) Walker's regiment, one of the last raised, was to consist of newly conscripted men, draft royal warrant to Francis Windham, 3 August 1644, and Edward Walker's undated notes, Harl. MS. 6802, ff. 254, 254^v. His is the final name in the "List of Several Colonels", 1666, S.P. 29.159, No. 45.
- (3) See above, p. 180.
- (4) The previous Colonel, Sir Charles Vavasour, brother of Sir William - the Colonel-General in Gloucestershire - had died in Oxford in March 1644, G.E.C., Baronetage, II, p. 78. For Appleyard, see D.N.B., Peacock, p. 82.
- (5) See above, p. 182. List 1.
- (6) See Appendix VI of this chapter.

army against the Royalists, Charles no doubt felt quite justified in bringing back, to fight for him, the army raised in England and sent in 1641 to quell the Ulster rebellion. The royal commanders in Ireland, the Marquis of Ormonde at Dublin and Lord Inchequin in Munster, began the shipment of troops in the autumn of 1643, and landings in Bristol and the West, in North Wales and Cheshire were frequent late in that year and in the early part of 1644.⁽¹⁾ Thousands were involved, and these forces made if undistinguished a permanent contribution to the Royalist cause.

The greater part of the "English-Irish" army, as it was called, was sent from Leinster, through Dublin to North Wales, where it joined Lord Byron at Chester. In November and December 1643 several foot regiments, commanded in the main by career officers such as Sir Fulk Hunckes, landed in the North, together with a few horse.⁽²⁾ In the new year two other regiments, under Henry Tillier and Robert Broughton, disembarked from Ireland; and some smaller contingents followed these.⁽³⁾ Byron squandered part of this strong fighting force, principally in his defeat at the hands of Brereton before Nantwich, and only Rupert's intervention, after February 1644, made certain that the "English-Irish" would be usefully employed.⁽⁴⁾

In March the Prince included Broughton's and Tillier's strong regiments of

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- (1) T. Carte, The Life of James Duke of Ormond, III, p. 33. J. Lowe, "The Campaign of the Irish Royalist Army in Cheshire, November 1643 - January 1644", Transactions of the Historic Society of Lancashire and Cheshire, Vol. 111 (1959), pp. 47-76. Muster rolls of the army in Ireland, from 1641, are printed in H. M. C. Ormonde, I, p. 120 et seq.
- (2) J. Lowe, op. cit., pp. 55-9, Symonds, pp. 234-5. Hunckes had held high command in the Scots Wars, C.S.P.D., 1640-1, pp. 98, 105, 276, 326.
- (3) J. Lowe, op. cit., p. 72, T. Carte, The Life of James Duke of Ormond, VI, p. 11. Broughton and Tillier brought 1700 foot, Warburton, II, p. 374. Both were old soldiers: Dictionary of Welsh Biography, under Broughton family of Denbighshire; Lloyd, p. 666, C.S.P.D., 1628-9, p. 407, 1640, pp. 174, 339, for Tillier's military service before the Civil War.
- (4) J. Lowe, op. cit., p. 69 et seq.

greencoats, and the remnant of Hunckes's in the force he led to the relief of Newark: ⁽¹⁾ and at Marston Moor (July 1644) were foot under Broughton, Tillier and others. ⁽²⁾ Having suffered almost constant defeat in the North, these "English-Irish" regiments thereafter settled down in Midlands garrisons, or moved south to join the main army; some appear with the King in 1645, and will be noted in due course. ⁽³⁾

More immediately effective for the reinforcement of the Oxford-based army were the landings of "English-Irish" in South-west England. Lord Inchequin transported from Munster the foot regiments of Sir Charles Vavasour and Sir John Poulett in October 1643, of William St.Leger and Nicholas Mynne in November, and other units, including the cavalry which he himself commanded and brought to Bristol, before the middle of February 1644. ⁽⁴⁾ St.Leger's and Mynne's (800-1000 foot) were sent into Gloucestershire, and both were recruited by impressment in the county during the winter. ⁽⁵⁾ St.Leger's regiment, known as the Duke of York's, was soon brought into the main army. It was reinforced from Ireland in May. ⁽⁶⁾

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- (1) R.Young, "The Royalist Army at the Relief of Newark", J.S.A.H.R., Vol.30, p.147.
- (2) C.H.Firth, "Marston Moor", Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, N.S., Vol.12, pp.18-19.
- (3) See below p.205 and Appendix VI.
- (4) T.Carte, The Life of James Duke of Ormond, III, p.35, V, p.498, Bellum Civile, p.62. Bibliotheca Gloucestrensis, ed.J.Washbourn, pp.67-8, etc. (frequent notice of Inchequin's horse). Inchequin was in Oxford by 10 February 1644, T.Carte, op.cit., VI, pp.35-7.
- (5) Bibliotheca Gloucestrensis, ed.J.Washbourn, pp.67-8. T.Carte, A Collection of Original Letters, I, pp.23-4. Draft royal warrant to Sheriff of Gloucestershire (Oxford, 3 January 1643/4), Harl.MS.6852, f.9.
- (6) Draft royal warrant to Thomas Bushell (Reading, 17 May 1644), to clothe two foot companies sent from Ireland to join the Duke of York's regiment, Harl.MS.6802, f.169. It marched in the first tertias in Cornwall, Appendix V.

The two other Munster regiments (Vavasour's and Poulett's) were more quickly absorbed into the King's central forces. They had been drawn out of Bristol to serve in Hopton's Cheriton army, and so were comparable to the foot of the Sheriffs' Army.⁽¹⁾ Their regiments consisted, according to Hopton, of "bold, hardy men, and excellently well officer'd, but", he added, "the common-men verie mutenous and shrewdly infected with the rebellious humour of England".⁽²⁾ Vavasour's was especially troublesome; a mutiny had to be put down, and the ringleaders executed, before it could be drawn into Hampshire.⁽³⁾ But by February 1644 Inchequin, who had once commanded them, could boast that these two regiments were "a considerable part of my lord Hopton's army".⁽⁴⁾ By the summer both regiments, like the Sheriffs' Army foot, were integrated into the King's army on the Western campaign. The "English-Irish", it should be noted, contributed to the growth of professionalism in the Royalist infantry.

Only three "English-Irish" regiments, therefore, were in the main army in Cornwall. Charles and his advisers, during this year and the next, made many attempts to gain further recruitment from Ireland, and not simply of government troops. They resorted to negotiations with the Confederate Irish,⁽⁵⁾ in the hope of bringing over native Irish troops to aid the King; and

(1) Bellum Civile, pp.62-3.

(2) Ibid..

(3) Ibid., p.65. It formed part of the garrison of Winchester in January 1643/4, Harl.MS.4712, f.33.

(4) T. Carte, The Life of James Duke of Ormond, VI, p.36.

(5) News of attempts to recruit "native Irish", Trevor to Rupert (Oxford, 28 February 1644), Add. MS.13981, ff.71-2.

freelance officers were allowed to drum up volunteers in Ireland, to ship to England.⁽¹⁾ These activities were largely fruitless, and Charles gained only the odium of seeming to be prepared to use Catholic rebels in his fight against Englishmen. Hitherto the forces brought over from Ireland consisted in the main of old regulars, veteran English soldiers; the court newspaper could make a patriotic claim on their and the King's behalf, that they had been engaged in combatting the Papist insurrectionists for two years and were sturdily loyal.⁽²⁾ Those serving in Leinster and brought to Chester were, according to Digby, "most Welsh and Cheshiremen".⁽³⁾ The "English-Irish" army had been recruited in 1641, in good part at least, in North Wales;⁽⁴⁾ some deserted to their homes, or to Parliament, when they set foot again on their native soil.⁽⁵⁾ Two years service in Ireland may have diluted their English stock, however, and their camp-followers were certainly "Irish queans".⁽⁶⁾ But by 1645, after Charles's later attempts to recruit real "native Irish", Parliamentary propagandists could dub these predominantly English troops Papists, and Roundhead captors hanged them out of hand.⁽⁷⁾

In the summer of 1644 the main army contained 29 identifiable regiments,

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- (1) Colonel Anthony Willoughby raising men in Ireland, H.M.C., Ormonde, II, p.17. He and 150 were captured on the way to Bristol and half were thrown into the sea, T.Carte, A Collection of Original Letters, I, pp.48-9.
- (2) Mercurius Aulicus, Oxford, 21 November 1643, p.668.
- (3) T.Carte, The Life of James Duke of Ormond, VI, p.33. See also an "English-Irish" officer's protestation, Warburton, II, p.366n.
- (4) Denbighshire provided 1000 men for the Irish wars, N.L.W., Crosse of Shaw Hill MSS., No.1118. Many restoration petitioners from this county certify Irish service.
- (5) But for a useful corrective to the view that there was wholesale desertion, see J.Lowe, op.cit., pp.72-3.
- (6) Some Irish came over with Tillier's greencoats, Symonds, pp.254-5. Irish women at Naseby mentioned by Nicholas, in his letter to Rupert (Oxford, 11 July 1645), Add.MS.18982, f.68.
- (7) Warburton, II, pp.390-1.

an increase of five on those listed in the spring.⁽¹⁾ But the total strength of the infantry does not seem to have been greatly augmented, despite the use of conscription, auxiliary regiments and "English-Irish" forces. The number of foot, which remained constant in 1644 only with the utmost expenditure of energy and vigilance, was less than that of previous years.

Accounts of Second Newbury, and de Gomme's plan of Dennington relief add nothing to our knowledge of the foot at this juncture.⁽²⁾ The sweeping changes that followed the battle, and transformed the cavalry, did not affect the foot. The infantry was not reorganised, nor was it notably increased by the Northern disaster. Rupert brought mainly the Northern Horse; his foot consisted ^{only} of his own regiment and some "English-Irish" survivors of Marston Moor. The body of infantry assembled for 1644 was kept together as far as possible: its backbone continued to be the Old Foot.

Some piecemeal reforms, however, were carried out. Regiments were not divided between Goring's and Rupert's armies, although the setting-up of the Prince of Wales's Council at Bristol, drew some West Country (Sheriffs' Army foot) regiments from the King: Lord Hopton's foot followed Hopton to the West.⁽³⁾ The problems of the infantry were not political - interference by Courtiers or Swordsmen - but the old and persistent ones of previous winters, poor conditions, lack of pay and continual desertion.⁽⁴⁾ At the

(1) Cf. Appendices IV and V.

(2) For both, see above, pp.133,136. Thelwall, of Fitton's and St.Leger, of the Duke of York's, were both killed at Second Newbury. W.Money, The Battles of Newbury, p.219.

(3) The regiment was at Langport, Diary of Exact Journal, 17-24 July 1645, FF: E.262(31).

(4) Desertion was general in all quarters, and continued into the spring of the new year, Governors of Hereford and Shrewsbury to Rupert (Hereford, 16 October 1644, Shrewsbury, 21 October 1644), MS.Firth C.7, ff.201,212.

end of the summer campaign many Welsh, particularly of Stradling's regiment, had decided to go home along with Charles Ferrard's foot, which had briefly rendezvoused with the main army in November and had then returned to South Wales. (1) Stradling's, once one of the largest regiments, faded away this winter.

The besetting sin of the foot, along with desertion, was the tendency of marching regiments, when assigned to garrisons for winter quarters, to stay there indefinitely. Many became permanently separated from the field army: Blagge's did not stir from Wallingford, nor Dyve's from Sherborne. Sir Charles Lloyd established his foot for the rest of the war at Devizes. (2) Garrison regiments soon lost good officers, who were replaced by local gentry, anxious only to preserve the regiment for local defence. (3)

The main body of infantry settled into quarters "about Faringdon", in the area midway between Bristol and Oxford. (4) Cirencester became the main infantry base, and, as well, foot under George Lisle and Theophilus Gilby lay in Wiltshire until the following spring. (5) Doubtless it was hoped that in this fertile segment of Royalist-held territory there would be both security and adequate provisions. Neither, however, could

(1) J. Astley to [?] Rupert (Faringdon, 25 November 1644), MS. Firth C.7, ff. 236-9. Other regiments were affected by this particular form of desertion.

(2) Symonds, p. 161.

(3) This process may be traced in Dyve's foot, originally one of the most senior regiments, but eventually staffed, when at Sherborne, mostly by Dorset gentlemen, H. Fiebert, The Life and Letters of Sir Lewis Dyve, Bedfordshire Historical Record Society, Vol. 27 (1948), pp. 147-8.

(4) Symonds, p. 159.

(5) Lisle to Rupert (Faringdon, 6 December 1644), MS. Firth C.7, f. 248.

be obtained in December and January at Cirencester, for the rich hinterland of the town was overawed by the Parliamentary garrison at Gloucester.⁽¹⁾

Cirencester contained over 1700 foot in at least nine regiments, together with some horse to fetch in contribution; the Governor was Sir Jacob Astley.⁽²⁾

The garrison was in such plight that before Christmas he and the chief infantry officers petitioned Rupert to remedy their grievances.⁽³⁾

Their main problems - and the solutions they offered - were typical of the foot in the winter. They lacked every necessity, desertion was rife, and as usual there were too many officers, too few common soldiers in each regiment.⁽⁴⁾

The Cirencester officers admitted that their regiments were weak, but explained that it was essential to preserve the officer cadres intact and at full strength, so that the regiments could be quickly recruited again when conditions were more favourable.⁽⁵⁾

The soldiers, they wrote to Rupert, "are only gon to their places of habitation in ye west and are in some short time to be brought againe together without much difficulty."⁽⁶⁾

They requested the Prince that they might go and recruit them once more.⁽⁷⁾

As we have already seen, this was standard practice among the infantry before the summer campaigns opened.⁽⁸⁾

But it was

(1) Astley to Rupert (Cirencester, 27 December 1644), MS. Firth C.7, ff.281r.

(2) Astley to Rupert (Cirencester, 10 December 1644), and officers at Cirencester to Rupert (Cirencester, 23 December 1644), *ibid.*, ff.251-3, and Add. MS.18981, f.342.

(3) *Ibid.*, . . . Three colonels delivered the petition to Oxford, and a few days later Astley sent his son, Sir Bernard, to reinforce their case, *ibid.*, and Astley to Rupert (Cirencester, 23 and 27 December 1644) MS. Firth C.7, ff.275-7, 281-4.

(4) Add. MS.18981, f.342. The soldiery were already "disbanding" because of lack of pay in November, Astley to Rupert (Faringdon, 26 November 1644), MS. Firth C.7, ff.241r.

(5) Letter from Cirencester to Rupert, [7 January] 1644/5, Add. MS.18981, f.344.

(6) *Ibid.*

(7) *Ibid.*

(8) E.g., the recruitment of Feilding's regiment in early 1643, p.170 above.

perhaps unduly optimistic, in 1645, the third year of war, to expect all those men previously enlisted, some of whom had been forcibly pressed into service, to return willingly to the colours.

Probably these arguments did not weigh heavily with the High Command, and necessary reform seems to have been pressed with more/usual vigour than

The garrison of Cirencester was thinned out, Bard taking the three largest regiments with him to Camden in Gloucestershire, and a move was made to "reduce" five of the smallest, which would probably involve their amalgamation and the disbanding of most of the officers. This was carried out; Jukes's and the Lord General's made no further appearance in the records.

The King took steps to reduce the number of officers crowding Oxford garrison, and sent one or two so "reformed" to take up commands in the West. "Reformado" officers occur with increasing frequency in the army lists of 1645. It was easier to disband foot than horse, but not much easier. (1)

At the same time efforts were made to recover deserters. In December 1644 a proclamation was drafted - there is no evidence that it was issued - which called on runaway soldiers to rejoin their regiments. (2) Most deserters lay in the Western counties, the chief area for recruitment in the previous summer. Those regiments raised in Wales and the West were obviously the greatest sufferers in the winter of 1644/5. (3) Even the hardy "English-Irish" did not escape decimation; an officer of the Duke of York's regiment had to be given permission to go to Bristol to bring in deserters. (4)

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- (1) Royal letters to Prince Charles at Bristol, recommending such officers (Oxford, 24 March 1644/5 [two letters]), Harl. MS. C.125, ff. 9, 10.
 (2) Draft proclamation, December 1644, Harl. MS. 6802, f. 217.
 (3) *Ibid.*, and the letter from Cirencester to Rupert, [?] January 1644/5, Add. MS. 18981, f. 344.
 (4) Draft royal warrant to Captain Daniel Smith (Oxford, 7 December 1644), Harl. MS. 6802, f. 336.

Rupert, Maurice and Langdale made vigorous attempts to recruit both their horse and foot in the spring of 1645. A hostile source noted that they "impreſſe men in great abundance in Hereford, Monmouth, Worceſterſhire", and drained the neighbouring garrisons.⁽¹⁾ Probably, however, it was Charles Gerrard's army, based in South Wales/^{but} at this time temporarily attached to Rupert's forces, which benefited most from this activity:⁽²⁾ and, like Goring's cavalry, Gerrard's infantry was not retained by the King for the Naſeby campaign.

The Oxford army commanders were forced, when the campaign opened in May 1645, to rely on the veteran foot they could persuade into the field for a further ſummer's fighting. The loſs of old regiments to garrisons and the virtual diſappearance of others, the continuous deſertion from the main foot quarters during the winter, and the only partial benefit the Oxford army derived from the new recruitment of the ſpring, meant that the number of infantry available for this campaign had once again declined. In May the King and Rupert drew out the old regular units, including Bard's from Camden houſe and Liſle's from Faringdon, and aſſembled 5000 foot, which Sir Jacob, now Lord Aſtley, commanded.⁽³⁾ This was a modest total compared with, for inſtance, the 7000 muſtered at the beginning of the previous ſummer, but it was not diſaſtrouſly low; and it conſiſted largely of veteran ſoldiers. The foot were battle-hardened professionals, and well-officered: they were admired by friend and foe alike.⁽⁴⁾ The Royaliſts, as we have ſeen, were reaſonably optimistic.⁽⁵⁾

(1) Bibliotheca Glouceſtrenſis, ed. J. Waſhbourn, pp.142-146.

(2) Ibid.

(3) W. Roſs, "The Battle of Naſeby", E.H.R., Vol. 3, pp.668-79, Symonds, pp.165-6; and news of "George Leſley" (= Liſle), Warburton, III, pp. 80-1n.

(4) T. Carte, A Collection of Original Letters, I, pp.83-7, 88-90. The Puritan chaplain, Joshua Sprigge, agreed the King had the advantage of experienced officers, Anglia Rediviva (1647), p.41. The Royaliſt, Sir John Oglander, was impreſſed by the Naſeby foot, A Royaliſt's Notebook, ed. F. Bamford, p.117.

(5) See above p.93 .

In the course of the short campaign preceding Naseby, however, the strength of the foot was not maintained. Some deserted, many were lost in the storming of Leicester, and the garrisoning of the captured city required others; they were not replaced by the detachments of foot called up from Midlands strongholds or the new levies made by Lord Loughborough, the King's General in those parts.⁽¹⁾ On 4 June the King wrote to Nicholas at Oxford, that his army consisted only of 4000 foot and 3500 horse;⁽²⁾ and these are the figures generally accepted by modern historians as the number brought by the King to Naseby field.⁽³⁾

Details of the infantry at Naseby have been placed at Appendix VI; Symonds is less informative than usual; his battle-order and de Gomme's plan are supplemented by a list of prisoners (which names their regiments) published by Parliament after the battle. The foot had been divided into three tertias, commanded by Sir George Lisle, Sir Bernard Astley and Sir Henry Bard, before the assault on Leicester, and was so brigaded at the battle.⁽⁴⁾ It is probable that this arrangement roughly preserves the disposition of regiments in the months previously. Lisle's tertia may have contained those units with him during the winter at Faringdon, Astley's those at Cirencester, but the lists are incomplete⁽⁵⁾ and even contradictory, and we cannot be certain. Both Astley and Lisle had been tertia commanders in 1644, and there was some continuity in the makeup of their brigades.⁽⁶⁾

(1) W. Ross, op.cit., The Diary of Sir Henry Slingsby, ed. D. Parsons, p.148.

(2) Evelyn, IV, p.158.

(3) W. Ross, op.cit..

(4) Symonds, pp.180, 194.

(5) De Gomme's plan places Sir John Owen's regiment in Bard's tertia, Symonds in Lisle's tertia.

(6) Cf. Appendix V and Symonds, p.194.

The core of Royalist infantry at Naseby was the Old Foot: eight regiments were at the battle, seven of which had fought at Edgehill.⁽¹⁾ Added to these were the Midlands detachments, the foot equivalent of the parties of horse brought in by local commanders such as Bagot and Leveson. The "English-Irish" were strongly represented: the regiments of Hunckes, Broughton and Tillier (in 1644 under Rupert in the North) had joined the other regiments, such as Poulett's and Appleyard's, which had been in the main army longer. They were known to de Gomme as the "Shrewsbury Foot", because that town had been the Prince's headquarters.

The Naseby lists indicate other changes and additions. There are several references to a Colonel Thomas at the battle, and while he cannot be certainly identified, it is probable that his command was a detachment of the Queen's Lifeguards from Oxford.⁽²⁾ Some of the Queen's colours were captured at Naseby.⁽³⁾ The regiment of Colonel St. George also makes a first appearance with the main army, and the identity of this officer - who had been slain at the storming of Leicester - is equally uncertain.⁽⁴⁾

The oldest regiment of foot was under a new colonel at Naseby; Sir Richard Page, knighted at Leicester, had succeeded Sir James Pennyman in his command late in 1644.⁽⁵⁾ Page was a typical "mere" soldier, who had

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- (1) Cf. Appendices I and VI.
 (2) Appendix VI, Walker, p.131, misprinted as '115'; Rhys Thomas was a Major in the Queen's regiment in 1643 and 1644, W.O.55.1661 [7], and he is credited with an independent command in List, 128.
 (3) J. Sprigge, Anglia Rediviva (1647), p.40.
 (4) Appendix VI, Symonds, p.181, List, 114.
 (5) Symonds, pp.161, 185.

begun the war as a junior officer in the regiment he now commanded.⁽¹⁾ In the absence of Sir John Owen, now Governor of Conway castle, Owen's regiment was commanded at Naseby by its Lieutenant-Colonel, Roger Burgess.⁽²⁾

22 foot regiments have been certainly identified at Naseby; on average each had less than 200 men, and some must have had considerably fewer. Roughly half the 4000 foot present served in regiments which had been an integral part of the main army for over two years,⁽³⁾ and nearly half of the remainder were the experienced "English-Irish" regulars. Despite constant desertion, there was a good deal of continuity in the personnel of the more senior regiments, and this added to their strength.⁽⁴⁾ The foot as a whole acquitted themselves well at Naseby. They were overwhelmed in the end by superior numbers and the passivity of their own cavalry.

Some 3500, nearly all the foot, were taken prisoner; as a fighting force the main army infantry was almost totally destroyed.⁽⁵⁾ The Colonel, Lieutenant-Colonel, Major and most of the junior officers of Sir Richard Page's regiment were captured; Burgess, the commander of Owen's regiment, was taken prisoner; and most units suffered comparable losses.⁽⁶⁾ The captives were respected; some were recruited, after the battle, for the service of France and Spain.⁽⁷⁾

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- (1) Symonds, pp.161, 185. Grantees of Arms, Harleian Society, Vol.66 (1915), p.188, C. Clar. S. P., II, pp.157-8, 209, 322, III, pp.361, 364.
- (2) Symonds, p.194.
- (3) Taking into account the greater strength of old regiments.
- (4) Restoration petitions of ex-Royalist infantrymen testify to this.
- (5) W. Ross, op.cit..
- (6) Peacock, p.94 et seq.
- (7) A Royalist's Notebook, ed. F. Bamford, p.117.

The King retired to South Wales with an army which was almost entirely horse; some few colonels and perhaps a small party of foot were the only token of the old infantry body which had perished. If the King was to continue in the war his first task would be the recruitment of these skeleton regiments, to create a new army of foot which would match the cavalry he still had. Rupert took command in Bristol; Charles and his advisers lay at Raglan and sent out commissions to the counties of South Wales to impress and muster as many able-bodied men as possible.⁽¹⁾

Conscripts were to fill the ranks of the shattered Naseby regiments: numbers of men, supplies of powder and money from each county were allotted to the different units available.⁽²⁾ As well as some local regiments 14 broken ex-Naseby units were to be so recruited and provisioned.⁽³⁾

In early July the King and some at least of his Council of War remained optimistic: "I have good hopes of my Welsh levies," Charles confided to Nicholas at Oxford.⁽⁴⁾ There were other, hopeful, signs. A number of experienced commanders were in the vicinity: Herbert Price, who had once had a foot regiment in the main army, was Governor of Brecknock;⁽⁵⁾ Sir Thomas and Sir Herbert Lunsford, veteran infantry officers, commanded at Monmouth.⁽⁶⁾ Sir Thomas Glenham, who had/yielded Carlisle to Parliament, was on his way to the King with a party of 300 foot.⁽⁷⁾ The surrender of Leicester on articles, shortly after Naseby, released 1500 disarmed men, in

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- (1) The numbers of men, "the ablest & fittest persons both for bodies & Courage", to be raised in each county were listed in a draft commission, 27 June 1645, Harl.MS.6852, f.265.
- (2) Disposal of foot, 5 July 1645; powder supplies, 21, 22 July 1645; financial contributions, undated [July 1645]; Harl.MS.6852, ff.273, 145, 145, 283.
- (3) Harl.MS.6852, f.275.
- (4) Evelyn, IV, p.163. The confident arrangements of a Council of War minuted, 8 July 1645, Harl.MS. 6852, f.120.
- (5) Symonds, p.208.
- (6) Ibid., p.204.
- (7) Astley to Rupert (Newport, 30 July 1645), MS.Firth C. 8, f.7.

the same way.⁽¹⁾ The threatening advance of the Scots down the Severn valley lent urgency to the King's pleas to the Welsh to associate together and raise an army on his behalf.⁽²⁾

But all this activity came to nothing. The King was faced with a counter-attack by the provincial Civilians of South Wales, who demanded local control of arms and men and locally-appointed officers.⁽³⁾ The King's musters failed, and the countryside formed themselves into a self-styled "Peacable Army", more eager to defend their homes than serve the King.⁽⁴⁾ This army, which consisted of the peasantry and minor gentry of Glamorgan, negotiated with Charles as an equal, offering its services in return for the acceptance of its typically "country party" demands.⁽⁵⁾ No new infantry could be raised for the King on these terms.

Royalist plans were further confused by Goring's defeat at Langport, the New Model's capture of Bridgwater - one of the scheduled points of disembarkation for the Welsh forces.⁽⁶⁾ - and the disillusionment of Rupert with the King's cause. Only Colonels Henry Tiller and William Murrey, probably with their regiments, were sent to reinforce Rupert at Bristol.⁽⁷⁾ It was a sign of the King's total failure to raise a new army of foot in Wales that the only party of infantry available to act as his

- (1) Symonds, pp.203-4.
 (2) Draft royal letter to Sheriffs of Anglesey, etc. (Englan, 20 July 1645) Harl.MS.6852, f.141, Warburton, p.121 n.
 (3) Symonds, pp.212, 213; agreement between the King and the Glamorgan commissioners, 17 July 1645, and the desires of the county inhabitants, with the King's answers, 30 July 1645, Harl.MS.6852, ff.287, 308-9.
 (4) Ibid., Astley to Rupert (Newport, 30 July 1645), MS.Firth C 8, f.7, and draft royal warrants to local commissioners about desertion from the new levies, 10 July 1645, Harl.MS. 6852, f.279.
 (5) Symonds, pp.212, 213.
 (6) Symonds, p.211. Draft instructions to Sir Thomas and Sir Herbert Lunsford, 8 July 1645, Harl.MS.6852, f.119.
 (7) Ashburnham to Rupert (Ruperry, 28 July 1645), MS.Firth C.7, f.447. Both Tiller and Murrey were with Rupert at Bristol when the city surrendered, Warburton, III, p.169.

Lifeguard was that brought by Glenham from the North.⁽¹⁾ It marched with Charles and the cavalry when he left South Wales for the Midlands in August. In the last futile campaigns of the war mainly cavalry were involved. The King had signally failed to recreate the main army infantry after Naseby, despite the survival of a number of field officers. The battle must be accounted the coup de grace of the great body of foot which the King had once commanded.

The Royalist infantry had, as we have seen, several individual characteristics. It was raised comparatively quickly and cheaply, and the regiments of Old Foot remained the largest part of the whole infantry body until Naseby. Although notoriously volatile, the foot - by means of permanent regimental cadres - retained some, at least, of its strength and much of its skill and experience.

As we have noted, the foot was the socially inferior arm. It became increasingly professional in its composition, many senior commands, latterly, falling to career soldiers of low birth. Its officers had less political influence than cavalry commanders: Irish peerages, which, as rewards, would not have satisfied the aristocrats of the Old Horse, were deemed "meat for the foot".⁽²⁾ A gulf was fixed between the "English-Irish" regulars, the minor West Country gentry in a foot regiment long quartered there, or the tradesmen and professional men who officered the Midlands detachments of foot at Naseby,⁽³⁾ on the one hand, and the Old Horse colonels on the other.

(1) Symonds, p.219.

(2) In Trevor's opinion, T. Carte, A Collection of Original Letters, I, p.90.

(3) Symonds noted the background of many of the officers of Lord Loughborough's army, part of which joined the King for Naseby, Harl. MS.986, ff.91-6.

In a military society that valued order and degree, and was highly nepotistic, the result of this social cleavage was that the foot were allowed fewer privileges. In quarters, on the march, in battle, it was easier for the horse to survive, and the number of infantry slowly declined for most of the war, despite the efforts of Civilians and others to check this tendency. There was little co-operation or fellow-feeling between the horse and foot. The two fought separately in battle. At Edgehill, according to an officer of horse, the King's cavalry "left our Foot naked to their Horse and Foot".⁽¹⁾ Lord Byron, with his horse at Nantwich, lost a great number of the experienced "English-Irish" foot, and later blamed them for his resounding defeat.⁽²⁾ At Naseby the King and his "Shew Troop" looked on helplessly as the infantry were forced to surrender.⁽³⁾ Defeat in battle spelt disaster for the foot; but the horse were usually extricated. The Northern Horse survived Marston Moor, but Newcastle's "Whitecoats" did not. After Naseby and Langport neither the King nor Goring had any foot left, worth speaking of. And both found, in the closing months of the conflict, that the general war-weariness in the Royalist quarters, and the final refusal of the Civilian elements to co-operate, prevented a new army of foot from being raised again.

(1) R. Bulstrode, Memoirs and Reflections, p.83.

(2) J. Lowe, "The Campaign of the Irish Royalist Army in Cheshire November 1643- January 1644", Transactions of the Historic Society of Lancashire and Cheshire, Vol. lll (1959), pp.71-3.

(3) Warburton, III, p.109.

Appendix I. INFANTRY REGIMENTS AT EDGEHILL, 23 October 1642.

Compiled from de Gomme's plan of the battle, in the Royal Library, Windsor, reproduced in P. Young, "The Royalist Army at Edgehill", J.S.A.H.R., Vol. 33, pp. 56-60.

In five tertias; tertia commanders' names first:-

- 1) Charles Gerrard: Charles Gerrard's
 Sir Lewis Dyve's
 Sir Ralph Dutton's
- 2) John Balasyse: John Belasyse's
 Thomas Blagge's
 Sir William Pennyman's
- 3) Richard Feilding: Sir Thomas Lunsford's
 Richard Bolle's
 Sir Edward Fitton's
 Sir Edward Stradling's
- 4) Sir Nicholas Byron: The King's Lifeguards⁽¹⁾
 The Lord General's⁽²⁾
 Sir John Beaumont's⁽³⁾
- 5) Henry Wentworth: Lord Molineux's⁽³⁾
 Sir Gilbert Gerrard's⁽³⁾
 Sir Thomas Salusbury's

16 regiments: 10,000 foot.

- (1) Under the command of Lord Willoughby d'Essex, taken prisoner at the battle and, on the death of his father shortly afterwards, Earl of Lindsey.
- (2) The Earl of Lindsey, mortally wounded and captured at the battle.
- (3) The first recorded appearance of this regiment.

Appendix II. INFANTRY REGIMENTS AT CULHAM CAMP, 23 May 1643.

Compiled from the record of arms deliveries, W.O.55. 1661 [3]

	<u>Companies</u>
The Lord General's	3
John Belasyse's	10
Sir Ralph Dutton's	10
Richard Feilding's	8
Earl of Northampton's	[blank] (1)
Richard Bolle's	8
Sir Edward Fitton's	8
Sir Thomas Salusbury's	10
Sir Lewis Dyve's	8
Sir Edward Stradling's	8
Henry Lunsford's	[blank] (1)
(ex-Sir Thomas Lunsford's)	
Sir Gilbert Gerrard's	9
Lord Molineux's	7
John Owen's	8
Richard Herbert's	6

(1) The regiment listed, but no delivery made.

29 September 1643.

Harl. MS. 6804, f. 224.

foote

Out of Bristol garison	
Prince Maurice	250
Washingtons Regim ^t (1)	200
lo: marquis & Griffin (2)	400
hamilton (3)	050
Apsley (4)	300
More ye lo: Hopton wyll spare of his own out of Bristol	500
To be scrambled up, amongst Pawletts, Stowells, Windams, et ⁱ by my lo: Hoptons lers (5)	300
	<u>2000</u>

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- (1) Henry Washington, dragoon commander and later Governor of Worcester.
- (2) Lord Marquis Hertford and Conyers Griffin.
- (3) Sir James Hamilton, Worcestershire Colonel. Neither his nor Washington's regiment materialised in Hopton's army.
- (4) Allen Apsley.
- (5) Hopton's letters were to raise men from the foot under the command of Sir John Poulett, Sir Edward or Sir John Stawell (the latter was Governor of Taunton), and Sir Francis or Edward Windham.

Appendix IV. INFANTRY REGIMENTS AT ALDBOURNE CHASE, WILTSHIRE,10 April, and READING, April-May 1644.

Compiled from Symonds's notes, Harl.MS.936, ff.79-82, 97, printed in P. Young "King Charles I's Army of 1643-1645", J.S.A.H.R., Vol.18, pp.33-4.

The number of men in each regiment, where given, refers to the Reading list, except in the case of Gerrard's and Bard's: Symonds noted the number present in every unit at Reading by rank, and the totals are mine. They differ slightly from those given by Young.

A = Aldbourne list R - Reading list

A	The King's Lifeguards	
A	Lord Hopton's	
A	Allen Apsley's	
A	(? Henry) Talbot's	
A	Bernard Astley's	
A	Francis Cook ^e 's	
A & R	Sir Jacob Astley's and John Stradling's	
	(ex - Sir Edward Stradling's) united	7227 + 351
A & R	Sir James Pennyman's	
	(ex - Sir William Pennyman's)	488
A & R	George Lisle's	
	(ex - Richard Belle's)	270
A & R	Anthony Thelwall's	
	(ex - Sir Edward Fitton's)	196
A	Sir Lewis Dyve's	
A	Charles Gerrard's	a contingent, 150
A	Lord Percy's	

A	Sir Henry Bard's (ex - Pinchbock's)	176
A	Duke of York's at Marlborough ⁽¹⁾	
R	Sir John Owen's	155
R	Theophilus Gilby's (ex - John Belasyse's)	375
R	Charles Lloyd's (ex - Sir Thomas Salusbury's)	409
R	Stephen Hawkin's (ex - Sir Ralph Dutton's)	275
R	Sir Thomas Blackwall's	86
R	William Eure's	91
R	Sir Henry Vaughan's	260
	The Lord General's ⁽²⁾	

24 regiments.

(1) Commanded by William St. Lege; "Sellinger" according to Symonds.

(2) This regiment was part of the garrison in April, but was moved out before the muster of 17 May: warrant to Astley, 6 May 1644, Marl. MS. 6802, f. 157.

August 1644.

Compiled from Symonds, pp.155-160; the Letter to Essex, 8 August 1644,
Walker, pp.60-61.

Symonds: Foot in three tertias, each of three brigades.

(1) Thomas Blagge: The King's Lifeguards

The Lord General's

Sir Jacob Astley's

Sir Henry Bard's

Duke of York's

Sir James Pennyman's

Lord Percy's

Sir Lewis Dyve's

(2) George Lisle: Charles Lloyd's

George Lisle's

Anthony Thelwall's

Sir John Owen's

William Eure's

Sir Thomas Blackwall's

Theophilus Gilby's

John Stradling's

Sir Henry Vaughan's

(3) Sir Bernard Astley: Lord Hopton's

Allen Apsley's

(? Henry) Talbot's

Francis Cooke's

Sir William Courtney's

"&c."

The Letter adds:

Sir Bernard Astley's

Bartholomew Jukes's

William Murrey's

Henry Shelley's

Other sources ⁽¹⁾:

Matthew Appleyard's

(ex - Sir Charles Vavasour's)

Sir John Poulett's

Philip Walker's

29 regiments.

(1) Authorities cited above, p. 194.

Appendix VI. INFANTRY REGIMENTS AT NASEBY, 14 June 1645.

Compiled from de Gomme's plan of the battle, Add.MS.16370, f.62, printed in Warburton, III, facing p.104; Symonds, p.194; list of prisoners in Peacock, p.94 et seq.

The King's Lifeguards

Duke of York's

Prince Rupert's (ex - Henry Lunsford's)

Lord Astley's

Sir Richard Page's

(ex - Sir James Pennymann's)

Theophilus Gilby's

Sir George Lisle's

Radcliffe Gerrard's

(ex - Sir Gilbert Gerrard's)

Sir John Owen's

Sir Henry Bard's

Sir Bernard Astley's

Sir Edward Hopton's

(ex - Sir Allen Apsley's)

Sir Matthew Appleyard's

[? Rhys] Thomas's

William St. George's

Sir John Poulett's

Richard Bagot's

Thomas Leveson's (1)

William Murrey's

Robert Broughton's

Henry Millier's

Sir Falk Huncke's

22 regiments

4,000 Foot.

- (1) "Col. Lewsey" in Peacock's list is probably a misprint for Thomas Leveson, (pronounced "Lewson") Governor of Dudley garrison, whose regiment, like Bagot's, was at least in part drawn out for the battle. One of "Lewsey's" captured officers, according to Peacock (p.98) was Lieutenant Cole, who may be the same with either of the two Captain Colles under Leveson in List, 84.

This chapter will attempt to answer the question: how were the troops of the main army paid, clothed, quartered and fed, and how were essential supplies (excluding armaments) transported to them? Consideration of the financing and moving of arms, ammunition and military equipment will be left for separate treatment in the next chapter.

Materials for a history of the Royalist finance and commissariat departments are scanty. Virtually no Exchequer records survive, and paymaster's accounts are rare. Some of the papers of the treasurer-at-war and a waggon-master-general, do, however, cover part of the ground for an understanding of central organisation; and for a picture of local monetary contribution the published agreements with the counties are invaluable.

"Moneys are the Nerves of War", Charles told the Oxford Parliament in 1644.⁽¹⁾ The wherewithal to pay and equip the armies of both sides in the Civil War was raised, principally, in three ways: by loans, by the weekly tax, and by sequestration of the estates of opponents.⁽²⁾ One or two other measures - such as excise - were introduced in the course of the war, but these remained the chief sources of revenue. As they were introduced in roughly that chronological order, they can be dealt with in turn.

When discussing the development of the horse, foot and artillery, we have seen how the King, in the summer of 1642, was divorced from London/^{and} the central machinery of government, and was forced to rely on the provincial militia and private aid. Similarly, the King, cut off from the normal means of financial supply, became dependent upon the support of his wealthiest subjects. The

(1) J. Rushworth, Historical Collections, Part III, Vol. II, p. 601.

(2) See The Committee at Stafford 1641-1645, ed. D. Pennington and I. Roots, Collections for a History of Staffordshire, Staffordshire Record Society, 4th Series, Vol. 1. (1957), pp. xxvi-xi.

peers at York had subscribed money, according to their means, to pay for horse.⁽¹⁾ Many regiments were financed by personal contributions, particularly of the gentry who commanded them. Above all, the wealthy Earl of Worcester opened his coffers to the King: his son later claimed that, but for the Earl's generosity, the army would never have been raised at all.⁽²⁾ We have seen that he spent £5000 for the recruitment of Sir John Byron's horse, and his son negotiated many other loans.⁽³⁾

In August, the Sheriff of Yorkshire lent £1500 and spent a further £750 in the King's service, and loyal subscribers headed by Sir John Sackville were paying money into the hands of the treasurer-at-war, Sir William Uvedale.⁽⁴⁾ Dr. Goffe, later a Royalist agent on the continent, was authorised at this time to collect contributions or loans of money and plate.⁽⁵⁾ In October, in response to the King's personal appeal, Salopians brought in money and plate, and much came in from Wales, Cornwall, Chester and Shrewsbury both gave purses to members of the royal family on their arrival.⁽⁶⁾ Clarendon reported that the army, at Shrewsbury, was contented with the "free loans" made by the Shropshire gentry.⁽⁷⁾

The King continued throughout the war, to receive loans or direct gifts. Leading Oxfordshire Royalists lent their own money and goods, and stood surety for other loans which the Crown raised. Sir William Walter, David Walter and Sir Thomas Chamberlain, the Sheriff, were among those who promised to repay the money subscribed in the "Oxford Engagement" of July 1643, when approximately

(1) Peacock, pp.7-10.

(2) Warburton, III, p.515 et seq.

(3) See above, p.34, and H.M.C., 9th Report, II, p.434.

(4) C.S.P.D., 1641-3, pp.365, 368. Uvedale was a courtier and MP., and had been treasurer during the Scots Wars, M.Keeler, The Long Parliament.

(5) His warrant, dated 3 August 1642, H.M.C., 13th Report, I, p.47.

(6) J. Phillips, Memoirs of the Civil War in Wales, II, pp.14-19.

(7) Clarendon, VI, § 72.

£27,000 was borrowed by the King from 84 subscribers, mostly local citizens.⁽¹⁾

The first two had already been mentioned as possible sureties in November 1642.⁽²⁾

They, and other county knights, served on the King's fiscal committees, acted as Receivers of the county's weekly contribution and as commissioners for taxes.

Oxford city was as helpful in raising or negotiating loans. In June 1643 £2500 was lent by the city on the surety of the Mayor's bond and the city's seal.⁽³⁾

The Engagement was implemented by the citizens: and in October 1644, the Common Council of Oxford complained that "divers citizens have disbursed and are engaged neare £3000 to make up arreares of Taxes", in addition to all the other charges laid by the Royalists on the unwilling city.⁽⁴⁾ The chief inhabitants were going into the country to avoid taxation.⁽⁵⁾

The clergy also hastened to aid the monarchy: in February, 1643, the diocesan clergy of Worcester were thanked for "their readiness to contribute a good summ of money towards the raising of a troope of horse."⁽⁶⁾ The diocese of Oxfrd contributed to the Exchequer's resources, though not handsomely, and many, such as the Bishop of Peterborough, were asked to contribute tithes.⁽⁷⁾ Of the Bishop's compliance or refusal we have no record.

The King also resorted to the practice of his father and sold titles and honours for ready money. Sir Richard Newport gave £6000 for a peerage in October 1642.⁽⁸⁾ Knighthoods might be had for a purse of gold: and throughout the war peerages and even honorary degrees were given as a reward for financial

(1) Calendar of the Committee for the Advance of Money, pp.996-1005.

(2) C.Clar. S.P., I, No.1637.

(3) Oxford Council Acts 1626-1665, ed. M.Hobson and H.Salter, Oxford Historical Society, Vol.95 (1933), p.113.

(4) Ibid., p.126.

(5) Ibid., p.125.

(6) H.M.C., 14th Report, VIII, p.203.

(7) The King's letter to Peterborough (Oxford, 28 December 1642), H.M.C., 13th Report, I, p.83.

(8) Clarendon, VI, § 66.

contribution to the King's cause.

Much of the wealth of loyal institutions and private individuals was in the form of plate, and family silver everywhere was melted down. The King's men were foiled in their attempt to carry off Cambridge's treasures, but the Oxford colleges, as is well known, paid a heavy and inescapable contribution.⁽¹⁾ Charles had asked the Vice-Chancellor in July 1642 for the University's money and plate;⁽²⁾ but the main burden fell on the colleges in January 1643. Most of their plate was then requisitioned and melted down.⁽³⁾ Apparently only Exeter and St. John's Colleges objected, the Rector and fellows of the former, making much of their obligations under the founder's statutes, petitioned the King that they might retain their plate. Charles rejected their pleas, but not without a stirring reference to his defence of "the Commonwealth of learning."⁽⁴⁾ The King, promised, "as soon as god shall enable us", to repay the plate which had been "lent", at rates which were laid down; and to repay all the money privately subscribed at 8% interest.⁽⁵⁾

To employ the gold and silver so acquired a mint was essential. The Tower Mint was, of course, taken over by Parliament, and the King had to resort to the smaller subsidiary mint at Aberystwyth, run by Thomas Bushell. Bushell was a remarkable adventurer and "prodigall", but he was to prove energetically loyal to the Royalist cause.⁽⁶⁾ Charles summoned him to Shrewsbury in October 1642, and his mint duly arrived.⁽⁷⁾ It was put to work coining plates. Bushell himself, as lessee of the Cardiganshire silver mines, contributed £100

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- (1) C.C.C., pp. 881, 895, F. Varley, The Siege of Oxford, pp. 35-41.
 (2) Ibid., p. 23, H.M.C., 14th Report, VIII, pp. 202-3, C.S.P.D., 1641-3, p. 359.
 (3) F. Varley, op.cit., pp. 38-41.
 (4) Petition, and Answer (Oxford, 28 January 1642/3), P.R.O. 31.8.197, ff. 342-4.
 (5) F. Varley, op.cit., pp. 37-41.
 (6) D.N.B., and J. Gough's short biography. The Superlative Prodigall, Bristol (1933). Charles listed his services to him, in his letter of thanks to Bushell of June 1643, printed in J. Phillips, op.cit., II, pp. 31-2.
 (7) Ibid.

worth of "fine silver" each week to the work, which would otherwise have fallen much short of the demands of the army even at that stage.⁽¹⁾ Bushell was active in every direction; he helped later to clothe the army, and was to appease the mutinous soldiery of 1643 by supplying uniforms, part of their arrears of pay and "badges of silver" at his own expense.⁽²⁾

From the first efforts were made to tempt officials and workmen from the London Mint.⁽³⁾ Briot, the Graver of the Mint, was asked by Nicholas to come to York as early as June 1642.⁽⁴⁾ The Controllers of the Tower Mint, Sir William Parkhurst, became Warden of the King's Mint with Bushell, and together they supervised it when it was brought, in the wake of the Royalist army, to Oxford, and set up at New Inn Hall.⁽⁵⁾ The Oxford Mint coined the college plate (1,610 lbs.), and the personal plate brought in by Royalist supporters.⁽⁶⁾ It also struck medals and commemorative-pieces for the army.⁽⁷⁾ But probably the Mint's chief value was to increase the prestige of the King's cause.⁽⁸⁾

How much was needed by the army? Leaving aside the heavy capital expenditure in raising regiments, and buying arms and ammunition, the payment of the officers and men of the main army at standard rates would be an enormous burden. The pay of a company of 200 foot (including officers) cost roughly £50 a week; of a cavalry troop, 80 strong, £80. Where there were more officers than the theoretical establishment - and this was usually the case - the sums would be greater. In an army the size of that assembled for/Edgehill

(1) J. Gough, op.cit., p.60.

(2) J. Phillips, op.cit., pp.31-2.

(3) F. Varley, op.cit., pp.42-3; C.C.C., p.863.

(4) C.S.P.D., 1641-3, pp.344, 347.

(5) F. Varley, The Siege of Oxford, pp.41-7.

(6) Ibid., pp.38-9.

(7) Ibid., pp.43-7, Steele, Nos.2353, 2425.

(8) Clarendon believed it was, in the early stages at least, "more for reputation than for use", VI, § 69.

campaign the weekly payments would in theory amount to well over £5000.

The rates of pay for the Royalist soldiery, however, never seem to have been securely established, and they varied with the money available. At the beginning of the war the terms of service were quite handsome - and no doubt quite unrealistic. A royal proclamation of December 1642, calling for recruits in Oxford, offered 6/- per week to musketeers, 12/10 to dragoons and 17/6 to harquebusiers, the normal light cavalryman or trooper of this war.⁽¹⁾ These rates of pay were fixed for recruits bringing their own weapons and furnishings with them. An earlier proclamation, addressed to miners, offered 5/- for joining up, and 6/- a week thereafter.⁽²⁾ Symonds calculated "a Weekes Pay for 200 Saldjers of Foot", 240, and this is nearer 7d. a day, 4/1 a week.⁽³⁾ The rate for common soldiers laid down in the establishment for Oxford garrison in 1645 was 4/- weekly.⁽⁴⁾ The normal infantryman could expect 7d. or 3d. rather than 10d. a day, although a distinction might be made between musketeers and pikemen.⁽⁵⁾ The three Sergeants of a foot company might be paid 1/2 a day each, the Captain would receive 8/- a day. The 17/6 weekly paid to the trooper was normal in both the King's and Parliaments armies, and points the distinction between cavalry and "groundling" infantry. Pay for other ranks was correspondingly higher. The governor of an important garrison might receive up to 23 a day, a general £10.⁽⁶⁾

But these rates of pay were, in the state of Royalist finances at the beginning or at any other stage of the war, impossible to maintain. The 12,500

(1) Proclamation, 3 December 1642, Steele, No.2316.

(2) Proclamation, 15 August 1642, Steele, No.2248.

(3) Harl.MS.986, f.96.

(4) Oxford establishment, 11 March 1644/5, Harl.MS. 6802, ff.27-8.

(5) This was the case among Parliamentary forces in Staffordshire, The Committee at Stafford 1643-1645, ed. D.Peanington and I.Boote, Staffs Record Society, 4th Series, Vol.1, p.xli.

(6) C.Clar. S.P., I, No.1642, Warburton, I, p.429n.

strong Edgehill army was not paid £5000 weekly. Money, however, was available in 1642, and was distributed at first, to the trained bands at York, by Edward Walker, the later secretary-at-war, who had been a paymaster in the Scots Wars.⁽¹⁾ By September, when the payment of the Royalist infantry seems to have become regular, Matthew Brodley, a wealthy London jeweller, experienced in this office, was paymaster-general.⁽²⁾ He remained in this post for at least a year, and half-a-dozen royal warrants, for payments to regiments, addressed to him have survived.

Brodley's pay-lists of September-November 1642 show that the main army infantry only were being paid in full, but that this alone amounted, in the month after Edgehill, to over £3000 weekly. Depending on its strength a regiment of foot might be paid anything from £60 to £300 a week: the average for a reasonably complete regiment, was £250. The pay-warrant of 16 November (for 19 regiments) shows a disbursement of £3390, besides additional payments.⁽³⁾ In the following week 13 regiments were paid a total of £3630.⁽⁴⁾ We might compare these figures with the £30,000 a month thought sufficient for the 10,000 strong army of the Earl of Essex, as reorganised in March 1644.⁽⁵⁾

In fact, the amounts Brodley received from the Exchequer in this period, or later, could not defray all the army's expenses. In the summer of 1643 his warrants - those that have come down to us - are concerned mainly with the three or four regiments of Oxford garrison.⁽⁶⁾ For the nine weeks, 1 April - 3 June

(1) See above, p. 32 n. (1).

(2) C.S.P.D., 1639, p. 283, 1640-1, passim, O.C.C., p. 1572, W. Jordan, The Charities of Rural England, 1480-1660, p. 249.

(3) Printed as Appendix to G. Davies, "The Battle of Edgehill", English Historical Review, Vol. 36, pp. 43-4.

(4) Royal warrant (Reading, 26 November 1642), in the collection of A. Lowther, Esq., Ashted, Surrey.

(5) C.H. Firth, Cromwell's Army, p. 183.

(6) Warrants, 8 and 13 June, 11 and 19 September 1643, Add. MS. 5752, ff. 213-6.

1643, Brodley received only £1100, which was part of £20,000 assigned for the payment of the King's army.⁽¹⁾ Other army officials, Legge for the armoury, Heydon for the Ordnance Office, were paid by the Exchequer only a small proportion of the sums they needed for their departments.⁽²⁾

It was already reported after Edgehill that, although the foot were tolerably well paid, the cavalry were not.⁽³⁾ On the march, in November 1642, the army supplemented Brodley's efforts by demanding money and provisions from the countryside it passed through.⁽⁴⁾ Like most armies of the seventeenth century the King's was forced to subsist on the country. The best that could be done, by the central authorities, was to regularise this process and place it on an agreed footing: the result was the weekly assessment, the principal tax employed by both sides.

Eym laid an assessment on London in this month, and the tax became general in Parliamentary counties in the following year.⁽⁵⁾ For its part, the King's Council of War, once the army was settled in winter quarters, began negotiations with Oxfordshire in December 1642 for a monetary contribution to be paid weekly to the horse troops quartered there. Agreement was reached with the county's commissioners, and the terms governing the assessment were published in January 1643.⁽⁶⁾ It was no doubt hoped that this Agreement would serve as a model for other shires, and in fact the arrangements made with Oxfordshire were followed in agreements concluded by the Council of War with

(1) Exchequer Receipts and Issues, Clarendon MSS., Vol. 22, ff. 66-7.

(2) Exchequer Receipts and Issues, 28 September 1644 - 4 January 1644/5, Clarendon MSS., Vol. 24, f. 3. And see below, pp. 293-4.

(3) See above, p. 163.

(4) Rupert ordered money and cloth to be brought in, An Extract of Several Letters, 5-12 November 1642, TT:E.127(6). Later the King authorised the colonels of horse to take provisions from their immediate quarters, or "hundreds and parishes adjacent", Warburton, II, pp. 70-1.

(5) Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum, 1642-1660, ed. C.H. Firth and R. Rait, I, pp. 38-40, 85-100.

(6) An Explanation of the Agreement... betwixt His Majesty and the Inhabitants of the County of Oxon, Oxford, 16 January 1642/3. As this and other agreements were published at Oxford, it will be convenient to refer to them by a shortened title and the number given each in F. Madan, Oxford Books, An Explanation is Madan, II, No. 1187.

Berkshire and Wiltshire, and by local colonel-generals in their own areas. (1)

The distinctive characteristics of the weekly assessment, which was otherwise comparable to pre-war taxation on goods and estates and was collected "as other public payments are usually made", (2) was that it was administered by the county committees, that it was directly related to the number of troops quartered in the area to be taxed, and was paid, indirectly, to them, and that part of the tax was payable in provisions, foodstuffs and the like.

The assessment was viewed as a weekly "loan" or contribution, and the revenue it brought in was normally referred to as the "contribution money". The amount to be raised by the county was calculated from the subsistence rate of pay allowed each soldier. This was the proportion of his weekly pay which, it was thought, he would be obliged to spend on food and lodgings or "diet and entertainment", as it was called. For a captain and above this amounted to 10/-, for a lieutenant or cornet 7/-; 3/- was believed sufficient for a trooper, 2/6 for an infantryman. The horse of the trooper required a further 7/- for its maintenance. (3) These figures varied slightly during the course of the war.

Oxfordshire had agreed to maintain 23 troops of horse, and there were 80 men in each troop. Each trooper was to be provided for at 10/6 a week (3/6 the man, 7/- the horse); the county's contribution therefore amounted to £1178. (4) It was to be collected by the constables from the parishes, who paid it to General Receivers appointed for each Hundred. (5) They in turn gave the money

(1) See below, pp.234-5.

(2) An Explanation of the Agreement, January 1642/3, Madan, II, No.1187.

(3) Orders Presented To His Majesty, Oxford [7 early May] 1644, Madan, II, No.1622, and An Explanation of the Agreement, January 1642/3, Madan, II,

(4) Ibid. No.1187.

(5) They were local gentlemen such as Sir William Walter, and Henry Stephens, late wagon-master-general.

collected (the amount for the different Hundreds was stated) to the army commanders whose regiments were billeted therein.⁽¹⁾ The commissioners of array supervised these arrangements. The Oxfordshire committee sat regularly in the Audit House, Christ Church, keeping in touch with the secretary of the War Council, on matters connected with the contribution.⁽²⁾

Provisions were accepted as payment towards the contribution, in lieu of money. The assessment had arisen from the taking of food and shelter at agreed rates, and it was natural that such an arrangement should be made. The market price of various commodities was set down, to aid the calculations of the farmers and the tax collectors. At the same time "tickets" (i.e. promissory notes), issued by officers or soldiers in payment for food or quarter they had received in the county, were "esteemed as ready money", if presented instead of cash payments towards the contribution. The Oxfordshire assessment was to begin on 21 December 1642, and continue for three months.⁽³⁾

The Agreement was a somewhat delicate arrangement, and was soon abused: in February 1643, the inhabitants petitioned the King that more troops of horse than had been agreed to were quartered in the county, and that consequently supplies and cattle stocks were dangerously low.⁽⁴⁾ They asked for some centralisation of the system of collection, to eliminate, no doubt, the rapacity of local commanders: and that a central Receiver General, if appointed, might repay to the suppliers the cost of any provisions supplied over and above the contribution assessment. Charles consented and appointed Sir Thomas Chamberlain, the Sheriff, to be Receiver General. Order was also given to the quarter-

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- (1) An Explanation of the Agreement, January 1642/3, Madan, II, No. 1187.
 (2) Undated instructions for the Oxfordshire commissioners together with a list of their names, Harl. MS. 6804, f. 152.
 (3) An Explanation of the Agreement, January 1642/3, Madan, II, No. 1187.
 (4) The Humble Petition, Of The Inhabitants Of The County of Oxford to His Majesty, Oxford, 21 February 1642/3, Madan, II, No. 1249.

master-general to limit the number of troops in the county. At this date, in any case, the contribution was "behind and unpaid".⁽¹⁾

In June other abuses were complained of. While the inhabitants continued to pay the weekly contribution, the soldiery did not keep to the agreement. Women and children were boarded along with the troops, at the householder's expense. Soldiers would not give tickets for what they took, and let their horses spoil the crops.⁽²⁾ At the same time, as John Ashburnham, now treasurer-at-war in succession to Uvedale,⁽³⁾ explained, it was difficult to collect the contribution money, and some of the troops were a month behind in pay. He suggested they might accept clothing in lieu of money.⁽⁴⁾

Other counties began to make arrangements for maintaining the forces within their boundaries: in January 1643 an agreement was made with Worcestershire, for the payment of £3000 monthly.⁽⁵⁾ The Sheriff of the county was held accountable, for much of his expenditure, to the Council of War.⁽⁶⁾ Regiments of the main army received contribution money in Berkshire at this time, although there is no record of a formal agreement with the county until the autumn of 1643.⁽⁷⁾ After the capture of Cirencester, in February 1643, and the settling of Royalist forces in the area, Gloucestershire was laid under contribution for their upkeep. Lord Chandos and other leading men of the county agreed to raise £3000 for putting men into the garrisons, and

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- (1) The Humble Petitions Of The Inhabitants Of The County of Oxford to His Majesty, Oxford, 21 February 1642/3, Madan, II, No.1249.
 (2) Proclamation, 3 June 1643, Steele, No.2429.
 (3) Uvedale wavered in his allegiance to the King; he was readmitted to the Parliament at Westminster in 1644, M. Keeler, The Long Parliament.
 (4) Ashburnham to Rupert (Oxford, 1 July 1643), MS. Firth. C.6, f.191.
 (5) Proclamation, 12 January 1642/3, together with the Worcestershire Agreement, Oxford, reprinted London, Steele, No.2350.
 (6) Minutes of Council, 14 March 1642/3, Harl. MS.6851, ff.133-4.
 (7) Ibid..

£4000 a month for their upkeep.⁽¹⁾ The sum was divided proportionately among the Hundreds of the county: provisions, at rates quoted, were accepted for up to half of the contribution. An attempt to regulate the Gloucestershire assessment and see it fairly apportioned was made in March: a proclamation "for the better Government of the County of Gloucester"⁽²⁾ ordered obedience to a body of commissioners who had been appointed to oversee the raising of money. It included Prince Maurice, Lord Chandos, the county Sheriff and others.⁽³⁾ Other commissions "for the safe-guarding of the county" and supervision of the contribution, were set up for Wiltshire and Worcestershire.⁽⁴⁾

The difficulties attending the collection of sufficient contribution, especially in country divided by contending armies, and from a recalcitrant population, were great. At the General Sessions for Worcestershire, at Easter 1643, it was found that the monthly levy of £3000 for the past three months was mostly "unsatisfied".⁽⁵⁾ It was agreed that the assessment should be continued for a further quarterly period, and rated as for Parliamentary subsidies before the war. Sir William Russell, the Sheriff, was Receiver General, and the money collected was for the use of locally-raised forces, under Samuel Sandys.⁽⁶⁾ In Gloucestershire there was a dispute over the assignment of Hundreds to commanders.⁽⁷⁾ Trouble was especially certain

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- (1) Order of Chandos to Westminster Hundred, Gloucestershire, 6 February 1642/3, C.S.P.D., 1641-3, pp.442-3.
- (2) Proclamation, 3 March 1642/3, Steele, No.2379.
- (3) Commission dated 2 March 1642/3, Black, pp.12-13.
- (4) Worcestershire 8 March, Wiltshire 10 March 1642/3, ibid., pp.14-15, 16.
- (5) Worcestershire County Records, The Quarter Sessions Rolls, Part I, ed. J. Willis-Bund, Worcestershire Historical Society (1899), p.710.
- (6) Ibid..
- (7) The Gloucestershire commissioners complained that too many men were quartered in Cirencester and were demanding contribution from the county; that enemy garrisons interfered with the collection of ^{the} assessment; and that the soldiers seized the farmers' horses. Their undated petition to the King [7 March 1643], Harl.MS.6304, ff.128-9.

when a garrison lay on the borders of two counties, and attempted to take contribution from each. ⁽¹⁾

Despite the activities of the first winter of the war, aimed at providing for the army by means of loans and the assessment, now countrywide, there is enough evidence to show that the soldiery, in the spring and summer of 1643, were being paid with less regularity than on the Edgehill campaign. The grievances of the infantry officers, expressed in their "Humble Desires", included lack of pay. ⁽²⁾ Many of the regimental officers had remained unpaid since the army left Nottingham. ⁽³⁾ The troubles in Oxfordshire have already been alluded to, but probably the cavalry, dependent mainly upon the county contribution, were not in as serious a plight as the foot, who looked to Oxford and the paymaster-general, rather than ^{to} the local assessment, for their pay. A Council of War of June 1643 ordered Brodley to allow infantry captains half-pay, more junior officers full pay, and all common soldiers a subsistence rate of 4/- a week. The latter was to consist of 3/- in money, and 1/- worth of bread and cheese. ⁽⁴⁾ But, as we shall see when we come to consider the supply of provisions, it was not possible to deliver food regularly to regiments far from Oxford, and for the most part the soldiers received their 4/- weekly in cash. ⁽⁵⁾

The situation was not improved when the summer campaign opened. The weekly assessment was obviously more suitable for troops in settled quarters than an army in the field. The Agreements covered mainly the winter months,

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- (1) Hines, on the border of Gloucestershire, Wiltshire and Oxfordshire, to Rupert (Lechlade, 30 May 1643), Add. MS. 18980, f. 73.
 (2) 2 May 1643, Harl. MS. 6804, ff. 92-3.
 (3) Ibid.
 (4) Minutes of Council, 5 June 1643, Harl. MS. 6852, f. 75. A number of payments to individual officers were made at this time, by the treasurer-at-war, Ashburnham, II, ^{Appendix} pp. xxxi-xxxii.
 (5) Royal warrant to Brodley (Oxford, 13 June 1643), Add. MS. 5752, f. 216.

but the Council of War and the county commissioners valiently attempted to adjust the contributions levied to the movements of regiments into and out of each locality. The main pressure on quarters and provisions was transferred, during the summer, from the Oxford area to Bristol and Gloucestershire. The King ordered Rupert to settle the assessment on the county and obtain money from the city.⁽¹⁾ The Gloucestershire contribution of £4000 a month was stepped up to £6000, to provide for the garrison at Bristol and the army quartered in the county to besiege Gloucester. The commissioners for "safeguarding" the county assessed each Hundred, ordered payments to begin early in August and appointed a Bristol merchant as Receiver General.⁽²⁾ But within a fortnight Hopton at Bristol complained to Rupert that he had received only £300, and the garrison was mutinous through lack of pay. He could not get contribution from Somerset because other Royalist commanders were issuing their own warrants for supply up to "the gates of this cyty".⁽³⁾ Perhaps as a result of Hopton's complaints, the Berkeley division of Gloucestershire (on the Severn estuary) was assigned to Bristol, and no soldier could be quartered there without the consent of the Governor of Bristol.⁽⁴⁾ But the garrisons in Berkeley itself were complained of in January 1644, for taking contribution from unauthorised areas.⁽⁵⁾

By 1643 the weekly assessment had taken over from private loans of money and plate as the main financial prop supporting the main army. As we have

(1) Warburton, II, p.268.

(2) H.M.C., 5th Report, p.346.

(3) Hopton to Rupert, 1643, MS.Firth.C. 6, f.294.

(4) The Agreements Made Between His Majesty And... Berkeley division in the County of Gloucester, Oxford, 29 December 1643, Madan, II, No.1505.

(5) Sir William Vavasour to Rupert (Tewkesbury, 31 January 1643/4), Add. MS. 18981, f.16.

seen when discussing the High Command, the central Council of War and the local committees of commissioners of array were equally taken up with matters relating to the assessments. The Oxford War Council had exercised some control over the contribution of the nearest counties from the start. In the course of 1643 it extended its supervision further afield. The commissioners for Herefordshire were instructed to inform the King and Council of the state of their accounts and the names of defaulters. ⁽¹⁾

The Oxford authorities were anxious to make the agreements work. They reinforced the power of the county commissioners wherever possible, by issuing proclamations, summoning civilian defaulters, restraining officers who took free quarter, and hearing disputes between aggrieved parties. ⁽²⁾ The Council of War quartered troops of "unsanctified horse", as a matter of policy, on villages which had failed to pay their share of the assessment. ⁽³⁾ Over questions of detail which arose, it was customary for a member of the Council to consult with the local Sheriff. ⁽⁴⁾ On the collection and disposal of the contribution less was left to local initiative: in October 1643 treasurer-at-war Ashburnham was instructed to associate his office more closely with the Sheriffs and county commissioners, where the assessment was concerned. ⁽⁵⁾ The treasurer took a further and greater share of responsibility, under the aegis of the War Council, in the following year. ⁽⁶⁾

The Council of 13 October 1643, which gave its precise instructions to Ashburnham, was also probably that which concluded the first recorded agreement with Berkshire, for a contribution of £1000 weekly. The county was already

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- (1) Undated instructions, Harl. MS. 6804, f. 133.
 (2) See above, pp. 58-9, on the work of the War Council in these directions.
 (3) Order of Council, 13 November 1643, Harl. MS. 6804, f. 82. The phrase is Sir Henry Bard's, in another but very similar context, Warburton, III, p. 221n.
 (4) Order of Council, 23 May 1644, Harl. MS. 6802, f. 186.
 (5) Council, 13 October 1643, Harl. MS. 6352, ff. 184-5.
 (6) Council, 23 May 1644, Harl. MS. 6802, f. 183.

paying this sum towards the upkeep of the garrisons there, and the gentlemen of the shire agreed with the Council to continue the contribution at that level. The payments to be made to the regiments of horse in Berkshire were laid down by the Council.⁽¹⁾ The rate for subscribers was increased because of the withdrawal of five Hundreds (in East Berkshire) from the contribution of the county as a whole, and their special assignment to the Reading garrison.⁽²⁾ Sir Jacob Astley, the Governor of Reading, was chronically short of pay for his men, and was constantly troubled by the activities of a rival governor, Thomas Blagge - the "notable griper" - at Wallingford.⁽³⁾

The end of the campaigning season and the return to winter quarters saw the re-negotiation of the agreements in other counties.⁽⁴⁾ As with Berkshire, it is probable that Wiltshire was under contribution for part of the King's army before the Council of War of November 1643, at which county delegates promised to pay £1200 per week.⁽⁵⁾ A committee for Wiltshire had been in existence since March.⁽⁶⁾ As the summer campaigning ended arrangements were renewed by regiments returning to old quarters to refresh and recruit themselves. Oxfordshire's contribution was increased to £1400 a week (half in money, half, if preferred, in provisions, at prices lower than those of January) for a month from 20 September:⁽⁷⁾ by December, however, it was back to £1200.⁽⁸⁾ The Oxfordshire assessment and Berkshire's £1000 weekly were

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- (1) Council, 13 October 1643, Harl. MS. 6352, ff. 184-5, and The Agreements Made Between His Majesty and... Berks. Oxford, 19 October 1643, Madan, II, No. 1476.
- (2) Ibid.
- (3) Astley to Rupert (Reading, 13 and 14 January 1643/4), MS. Firth. C. 6. ff. 44-6, 48. And see above, p. 87, for Blagge. 50.
- (4) Commissions, to negotiate the agreement for contribution in several counties, issued in August and September 1643, Black, pp. 66-73.
- (5) The Agreements Made Between His Majesty and... Wilts. Oxford 1 December 1643, Madan, II, No. 1496.
- (6) See above, p. 231.
- (7) The Agreements Made Between His Majesty and... the County of Oxford. Oxford, 30 September 1643, Madan, II, No. 1458.
- (8) This is stated in a proclamation of 1 December 1643 prohibiting free quarter in the counties (Oxon, Berks, Wilts) where the contribution was paid, Steele, No. 2514.

being paid regularly in December, and much was expected of Wiltshire.⁽¹⁾

Other counties fairly near Oxford were probably contributing to the upkeep of the field army: a paper of this date⁽²⁾ includes Buckinghamshire, Hampshire, and Northamptonshire among contributors, and estimates the total payments as £7600 weekly, divided between 10,000 foot and 4000 horse at the usual subsistence rates (10/6 a week horse and trooper, 4/- foot soldier) with the remainder paying for ordnance and stores.

While these figures were probably never consistently achieved, the area under Royalist control - and therefore under contribution to the King's forces - was being increased at this time. Trevor gave one explanation for this, when he described the situation of December 1643: "The Army is drawing into their winter-quarters, and disperse themselves at as great a distance as they can with security: which I suppose is done for the ease of this country and the saving of the contribution of these countries (i.e. counties) for the King to live upon".⁽³⁾ As we have seen, only the senior regiments of horse, and one or two Old Foot regiments, were allowed to quarter in the central area nearest Oxford.⁽⁴⁾

The frontier was pushed forward, therefore, in Hampshire and Northamptonshire. Hopton and the Sheriffs' Army no doubt took what they could in Hampshire during the winter. In default of regular pay Hopton established free quarter in his armies: under a good commander and disciplinarian, such as Hopton, this was not necessarily more of a burden on the countryside or a less

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(1) Steele, No.2514.

(2) Propositions for the settling of the contribution in seven counties, Oxford, 17 August 1643, Harl.MS.6852, f.175.

(3) T. Carte, A Collection of Original Letters, I, p.23.

(4) See above, p.111 etc..

regulated proceeding than any other that could be devised. Free quarter meant the giving of tickets, properly authorised, not unlicensed plunder. Hepton, in Somerset earlier, had got both payments of money and the right to have free quarter "soberly taken".⁽¹⁾ To finance his new army he had been promised £6000, but, this largely failing, he was forced "to pawne his contribution of Bristol for 20. weekes for 3000l. to enable him to drawe forth".⁽²⁾ Probably, too, he lived off the country during the Cheriton campaign.⁽³⁾

Hampshire was not, however, brought under contribution by a formal agreement until March 1644. It was agreed then that the county should pay £1400 weekly, for one month, a third part of which was acceptable in the form of provisions.⁽⁴⁾ Stricter enforcement of payment - a feature, as will be seen, of the spring of this year - was introduced in the Hampshire agreement. Defaulters were threatened with distraint of their goods and property.⁽⁵⁾

In Northamptonshire regiments and rival commanders struggled for lebensraum and a share of the contribution. The desire that each Hundred, and every regiment, should be treated equally according to a county-wide formula, was unattainable. There was a fight for the best quarters: regiments in need encroached on the preserve of others, and garrisons of foot were deprived of contribution money and provisions by parties of fast-moving and ruthless cavalry. The Governor of Worcester requested Rupert to remove Royalist horse elsewhere: the best country was being spoilt, the richest Hundred had been allotted them, and the encroachment of the enemy prevented the collection of the contribution.⁽⁶⁾

(1) Bellum Civile, p.47.

(2) Ibid., p.61.

(3) See below, p.256.

(4) The Agreements Made Between His Majesty and... the County of Southampton, Oxford, 20 March 1643/4, Madan, II, No.1559.

(5) Ibid..

(6) Cochrane to Rupert (Worcester, 11, 16 and 30 December 1643, and 1 January 1643/4), Add.MS.18980, f.159, Warburton, II, pp.335-6, Add.MSS.18980, f.168, 18981, f.1.

The winter of 1643/4 was something of a crisis for the system of county assessments. The complaints of both parties - civilian and military - were insistent. The Governor of Reading wrote that the citizens, because of the loss of trade and the expense of fortification for the town, could not pay the contribution, and that the Hundreds assigned to him brought in little money.⁽¹⁾ For their part the Reading inhabitants in 1643 and 1644 were terrorized by Blagge at Wallingford, and his Deputy Governor, William Lower. Claiming that they were behindhand in payments, Lower at one point had the Mayor seized and held as a hostage until they should pay in full.⁽²⁾ Sir Gilbert Gerrard in Worcester, where the commissioners levied £3000 monthly, had received only one week's pay (£300) in two months. The "forwardness" of the commissioners to raise money, and the county gentry to lend, was offset by the unspecified "distractions" caused by Sir William Russell, the Receiver General and Sheriff.⁽³⁾

It was, therefore, with a mind bent on reform that the Oxford Parliament met early in 1644. Many of its members were county commissioners, most had seen the weekly assessment working at first hand: they were well aware of the abuses which had arisen. The Civilian lobby in the Parliament was active, pressing in this matter - as it had in others - for better discipline and greater local autonomy. The results of Parliament's work were embodied in the Orders, for the regulation of the contribution, which were published "By Advice of the Lords & Commons" probably in May.⁽⁴⁾ The Orders restated many of the warnings against free quarter, billeting of "women & boys" with the army, and

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- (1) Astley to Rupert (Reading, 13 and 14 January 1643/4), MS.Firth, C.6, ff.44-6, 48-50.
 (2) Letters of Blagge and Lower to the Mayor and Aldermen of Reading, June 1643, June-July 1644, and of the Mayor to the Aldermen [? June 1644], Reading Corporation Archives, Boxes W and Z/W.
 (3) Gerrard to Rupert (Worcester, 21 December 1643, 22 January and 22 February 1643/4), Add.MS.18980, f.165; MS.Firth, C.6, ff.52, 105-6.
 (4) Orders Presented To His Majesty, Oxford [? early May] 1644, Madan, II, No. 1022, 1622.

wanton impressment, which were the usual grievances alluded to in former agreements. The commissioners for the county contribution were to have the oversight of its collection and distribution: the rates of assessment had to be generally approved by the inhabitants, and any complaints or differences were to be heard before the commissioners. Under their supervision the constables were to set the taxes, the collectors receive them and pay them to the treasurers of the county, who in turn would pay the army officers authorised. Lists of billets were to be given to the constables and in the same way were to reach the treasurer, who would enable the soldier to pay for diet and entertainment according to the rates laid down. These were, as we have noted already, 3/6 weekly for troopers, 2/6 for foot soldiers and pioneers. This attempt to tighten up the levying of money was enforced by a proclamation, commanding the Orders to be read and obeyed, issued at Oxford in May 1644.⁽¹⁾ At the same time a committee of the Lords and Commons had been deliberating on the contribution of Oxfordshire and Berkshire: again, there was further regulation.⁽²⁾ The contribution was to be solely for the maintenance of cavalry, and everything taken from the civilians had to be paid for immediately.

The effectiveness of these reforms may be doubted. The Royalist commanders, in 1644 and 1645, were beginning to find that the countryside had been bled white.⁽³⁾ In May 1644 Oxfordshire was "much in arrear" with

(1) Proclamation, 8 May 1644, Steele, No.2562.

(2) Undated paper [? March 1644], Harl.MS.6852, f.24.

(3) At Shrewsbury, however, Rupert was successful in maintaining an adequate contribution, H.M.C., 6th Report, p.472, 15th Report, VII, 307-9, X, pp. 39, 65; C.S.P.D., 1644, pp.282-3.

the weekly contribution of £1200, and a royal proclamation⁽¹⁾ directed that those defaulting should pay in corn at rates quoted, and, when this proved difficult, in dairy produce.⁽²⁾ While, near Oxford at least, the contribution continued to be paid at roughly the old levels wherever possible, throughout the war,⁽³⁾ it was with increasing difficulty and hardship that this was accomplished. The villagers of Oxfordshire complained, in the spring of 1645, that the land was depopulated - many having fled from their estates to escape the assessment - and that they were plundered, over-taxed and reduced to penury.⁽⁴⁾

Faced with these known and continuing defects in the weekly contribution - which remained, however, the centrepiece of Royalist taxation - the King and his advisers began to explore other sources of revenue in 1643. Some, as will be seen, were brought to fruition with the aid of the Oxford Parliament in 1644. The contribution had one outstanding characteristic which made it imperative that it should be supplemented by other means: despite the efforts of the Council of War, and the intervention of the treasurer-at-war in counties near Oxford, it remained essentially a locally-administered tax. Oxford Parliament reinforced the tendency towards decentralisation, which, as we have seen, the local colonel-generals fostered. The loans and private subscriptions of the first part of the war, on the other hand, had gone direct to the King, and the treasurer-at-war's full accounts for 1642 and 1643 show that such money was spent on the main army, as the Oxford authorities directed, not on

(1) Proclamation, 14 May 1644, Steele, No.256.

(2) Proclamation, 24 May 1644, *ibid.*, No.256.

(3) Cf. the amounts paid by Bampton Hundred, Oxon., in 1645, and, under the original agreement, in 1642, P.R.O. 31.8.197, ff.245 and An Explanation of the Agreement, January 1642/3, Madan, II, No.1187. The Council of War's last recorded meeting was concerned with the contribution from Oxford quarters, minutes of the Council, 15 January 1645/6, Harl.MS.6352, ff.254-5.

(4) See the representative petitions of the inhabitants of Dodington, Kidlington and Bampton Hundred, April and May 1645, P.R.O.31.8.197, ff.236, 245, 247.

local forces.⁽¹⁾ It was essential to strengthen, in 1643 and 1644, the financial competence of the King's headquarters, and to raise money which Oxford, not the localities, would dispose of.

To this end, strenuous efforts were made in 1643 to reorganise the fiscal machinery of the Crown, which had broken down - so far as the King was concerned - when he left London in the year before. It was hoped that some of the accustomed sources of revenue could in this way be salvaged. The financial and legal courts, still in London, were adjourned to Oxford, where the Commissioners of the Treasury and the Chancellor of the Exchequer were with the King.⁽²⁾ The Exchequer was set up in Oxford in February 1643, and immediately proclamations were issued for the payment into the Receipt of customs and other duties,⁽³⁾ royal rents and revenues,⁽⁴⁾ instead of to the Parliamentary Exchequer, which had already been outlawed by the King.⁽⁵⁾

At the beginning of each legal term Charles ordered the courts to stand adjourned at Oxford but, although we lack evidence, it would seem that he had little success in using the old courts and re-establishing his authority over ordinary revenue. It was complained, in January 1644, that no business could be done and no money collected by the Court of Wards and Liveries, because the officers would not attend.⁽⁶⁾ The Exchequer, similarly and as a result, partly failed. A proclamation of March 1644, complained that royal receivers, fee farmers, Sheriffs and farmers of recusants' lands, and other Crown tenants had not paid in their accounts to the Oxford Exchequer.⁽⁷⁾ Some business

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- (1) Ashburnham, II, Appendix, pp. xvii-xi. Half the money disbursed by the Treasurer was paid to the paymaster-general.
- (2) Proclamation, 27 December 1642, Steele, No. 2336.
- (3) Proclamation, 23 February 1642/3, *ibid.*, No. 2376.
- (4) Proclamation, 8 February 1642/3, *ibid.*, No. 2363.
- (5) Proclamation, 16 December 1642, *ibid.*, No. 2326.
- (6) Proclamation, 15 January 1643/4, *ibid.*, No. 2523.
- (7) Proclamation, 25 March 1644, *ibid.*, No. 2547. For the difficulties of receivers, see C.S.P.D., Add. 1625-49, pp. 653-4, and C. Clar. S.P., I. No. 1661.

was transacted under the Chancellorship of Hyde (appointed in March 1643), but not much. The receipts of a normal pre-war year had amounted to nearly £500,000: during the Civil War the receipts and issues actually recorded were only a tiny fraction of this. (1)

The exact functions of the financial offices and officers at Oxford were not clearly defined. The administration of revenue was ad hoc and military; the greatest expenditure was on the field army and the Office of Ordnance. Over these the treasurer-at-war, Ashburnham, exercised direction. £180,000 passed through his hands up to October 1643, mainly to be spent on military purposes of one kind or another. (2) His importance was great and it was hardly surprising that he clashed with Chancellor Hyde over the duties assigned to each. (3)

Whatever the circumstances, it was still essential to uncover new sources of revenue to carry on the war, and reinforce Oxford's authority over Royalist-held England. Both Parliament and King had resorted to loans at the beginning of the conflict; and the assessment was introduced by both sides simultaneously. The third main contribution to Parliament's financial strength - the sequestration of enemy estates - was, however, first initiated by Pym. It was authorised by Parliament in March 1643, (4) and quickly became a primary source of revenue. The first steps on the King's side were not taken until June,

(1) F.C. Dietz, The Receipts and Issues of the Exchequer, Smith College Studies in History, Vol.13, No.4 (1928); Civil War receipts and issues, C. Clark, S.P., I, Nos.1694, 1811.

(2) Ashburnham, II, Appendix, pp.i-xl.

(3) Ibid., I, pp.17-29.

(4) Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum 1642-1660, ed.C.H.Firth and R.Rait, I, pp.106-17.

Then Charles, with his enemies' activities in mind, asked the Council of War to investigate the possible confiscation of delinquents' estates in areas under his control. ⁽¹⁾ A committee was appointed to consider this, ⁽²⁾ and within a week the first commissioners for sequestration, for Oxfordshire, were given their instructions. ⁽³⁾

While action against delinquents proceeded on a county basis, the money obtained was intended for Oxford's use. ⁽⁴⁾ The rents from these estates, or the sums exacted from those compounding for them, were earmarked for the maintenance of the army. But the Royalists lacked the great central committees for the administration of these resources which Parliament had, and as with other forms of revenue, delinquents' rents were prizes striven for among local commanders. In Worcestershire the "malignant estates" were allotted to Rupert for his army's subsistence, but they were taken over by rival officers. ⁽⁵⁾ As the counties administered the estates it was a constant temptation to them to spend the profits on local defence. The King wrote angrily to the Glamorgan commissioners, apparently guilty of this, pointing out that the estates there (probably the Earl of Pembroke's) were for the upkeep of the main army. ⁽⁶⁾ While sequestration made an important contribution to the counties' finances, it does not seem to have made much impact at Oxford. The Crown did not develop

(1) The King's propositions, undated [June 1643], Harl. MS. 6804, f. 158.

(2) Minutes of Council of War, 20 June 1643, Harl. MS. 6852, f. 89.

(3) Draft instructions, 25 June [1643], Harl. MS. 6851, ff. 157-62.

(4) Ibid..

(5) Gerrard to Rupert (Worcester, 28 February 1643/4) and Jermyn to Rupert, (Oxford, 12 and 26 March 1643/4), Add. MS. 18981, ff. 63, 86-7, 107-8.

(6) Copy of his letter (Oxford, 25 January 1643/4), in the Order Book of the Glamorgan Commissioners of Array, N.L.W., LL. MS. 17, p. 63. And see ibid., pp. 21, 23, 36.

this device on the same scale as Parliament.

Other sources of supply were uncovered. The regulation of trade had been a fruitful field for royal taxation in the past: but in the Civil War the Royalists were faced with a cruel dilemma. If the trade of Reading with London, for instance, was stopped, Reading might suffer more than the capital; if it was sanctioned, the King's enemies would prosper. At first the traffic in the Thames valley was allowed to continue,⁽¹⁾ but in 1643 the sporadic seizure of clothiers' goods by army detachments was eventually made general, and trade with London was forbidden except under licence.⁽²⁾

The undermining of their livelihood, however, disabled, for example, the Reading clothiers and the maltsters of Henley from contributing to the assessments imposed on them.⁽³⁾ The interruption of trade because of the war was a constant complaint of the civilians in these years. The solution was to create new marts in Royalist held ports, and draw trade away from London.⁽⁴⁾ Bristol was developed as much as possible, and the treasurer-at-war received⁽⁵⁾ supplies from the customs dues of the city almost immediately after its capture. In March 1644 the King and the Council of War laid down the rates at which duties should be imposed in loyal ports, and ordered their payment to the Oxford Exchequer.⁽⁶⁾ Bristol's accounts reveal how much the main army and its⁽⁷⁾ generals, as well as local commanders, benefited from its commercial activity.

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- (1) Proclamation, 8 December 1642, Steele, No.2318.
 (2) Minutes of War Council, 8 July 1643, Harl.MS.6852, f.117, proclamation, 17 July 1643, Steele, No.2455.
 (3) Their cases reviewed by the Privy Council at Oxford, 9 December 1643, 4 May 1644, P.C. 2. 53, pp.219, 226.
 (4) Ibid..
 (5) Ashburnham, II, Appendix, pp. xii-xiii.
 (6) Order of King and War Council, 17 March 1643/4, Harl.MS.6852, f.44.
 (7) Bristol City Archives, Audit Books, Vols.21 and 22, covering the years 1643-5.

In December 1643, again following a Parliamentary precedent, a committee of War Councillors considered the proposal of army officers to levy an excise towards the support of the army.⁽¹⁾ The initiative for this new impost seems to have lain with the ordinary commanders who were no doubt finding it increasingly difficult to provide for their forces out of the weekly assessment. The excise was energetically taken up by the Oxford Parliament in the spring of 1644. Commodities, both foreign and imported, and native, on which duty was charged were listed, together with the amounts payable on each.⁽²⁾ A central office of excise was to be set up in Oxford, and each county and city, where necessary, was to have excise commissioners. A proclamation was issued, in April 1644, to enforce their orders.⁽³⁾

So long as the western ports remained in Royalist hands the excise probably made a useful contribution to the upkeep of the army. In the main garrisons it yielded "a reasonable supply, for the provision of arms and ammunition, which for the most part it was assigned to."⁽⁴⁾ In Oxford in October 1644, the excise was described as "a greate weekly Some",⁽⁵⁾ and a year later the Lords Commissioners in the city extended the tax to other home-produced goods, in an attempt to raise more money for the main Ordnance Office magazines.⁽⁶⁾ In 1645 Rupert was able to make good use of the very

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- (1) Minutes of a committee, 28 December [1643], Parl. MS. 6852, f. 323. That this was the first consideration of such a scheme on the Royalist side was confirmed in the printed A Commission of Excise, Oxford [7 May 1644], Madan, II, No. 1638. Parliament had authorised the imposition of excise in July 1643, Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum 1642-1660, ed. C.H. Firth and R. Rait, I, pp. 202-14. It could be truly said, in the eighteenth century, that "Excise is the Scarf of our late Civil War": quoted in E. Turner, "Early Opinion about English Excise", American Historical Review, Vol. 21, p. 315.
- (2) A Commission of Excise [7 May 1644], and The Schedule, Oxford [7 May] 1644, Madan, II, Nos. 1638, 1639.
- (3) Proclamation, 24 April 1644, Steele, No. 2559.
- (4) Clarendon, VII, § 396. In Worcestershire, for instance, the excise-master held sums of money for Rupert's use, Sir Gilbert Gerrard to Rupert (Worcester, 20 October 1644), MS. Firth. C.7, ff. 209-10.
- (5) Oxford Council Acts 1626-1665, ed. M. Hobson and H. Salter, p. 125.
- (6) An Order Concerning the Excise, Oxford, [7 12 October] 1645, Madan, II, No. 1819.

productive excise at Bristol.⁽¹⁾

The Oxford Parliament also placed the giving of private loans to the King on a more formal and regulated footing. Lords and Commons agreed to raise £100,000, for the maintenance of the main army, by asking wealthy loyalists to lend plate or sums of money. In February 1644 printed warrants were sent out under the privy seal, signed by the Speakers of both houses, to "all the gentlemen of estate, and other persons who were reputed to be rich"; lists of recipients were no doubt supplied by the M.Ps from their local knowledge.⁽²⁾ The amount asked for was to be paid to the local Sheriff, who would send it to the treasurers appointed (they included Ashburnham), sitting at Corpus Christi College, Oxford.⁽³⁾ Commissions were issued, from March to June 1644, to the Sheriffs of 27 counties and two cities, mostly in the West and Wales, to receive the subscription, privy seal or letter money, as it was variously called.⁽⁴⁾ The spring campaign of 1644 was financed partly from this source.⁽⁵⁾ But like other centrally-inspired endeavours, the collection of the £100,000 by Oxford was not unopposed by the localities.⁽⁶⁾

A paper of 1644 summed up the various sources of financial supply open to the army commanders - in this case, those of the West Country.⁽⁷⁾ In order of importance they were, the weekly contribution, the excise (which filled the gaps which occurred in the assessments), the profits of delinquents' estates,

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- (1) Warburton, III, p.154, and draft royal warrant to Bristol excise commissioners, 23 July 1645, Harl.MS.6852, f.299.
- (2) Clarendon, VII, § 395. Several of the letters sent out survive. See, for example, Steele, No.2529, and H.M.C., 5th Report, p.295.
- (3) Ibid.
- (4) Black, p.173, et seq.
- (5) Warburton, II, p.375.
- (6) Rupert took charge of the Midlands letter money; the Earl of Northampton's agent obtained the local "Subscription Money" for the earl; Jersey to Rupert (Oxford, 12 and 26 March 1643/4), Add.MS.18931, ff.86-8, 107-8; and see above, p.68.
- (7) Clarendon MSS., Vol.23, ff.8-9.

the residue of the letter money still left in the counties, and the remainder of the royal subsidy. The last was that part of the 1642 subsidy, voted by the Long Parliament, which still remained in the hands of the local collectors. It was of little importance by 1644.⁽¹⁾

The combined effect of these different taxes, imposts and loans was sufficient to maintain the Royalist forces till the end of the war. Neither the Naseby army, nor that of Goring in the West in 1645, was destitute: both were regarded as well-equipped and well-disciplined. We lack evidence as to their pay, and it is very probable that because, as we have seen, the central authorities failed to regain full control of monetary supply, little could be expected from the treasurer-at-war, or, through the paymaster-general, the Oxford Exchequer. For much of the war officers and soldiers alike subsisted without pay altogether, or on only a small proportion of the amount due.⁽²⁾ Yet it was possible for the marching army to maintain itself by taking the weekly contribution from the areas through which it passed, or by taking free quarter. For arms and armaments, which did require ready money, the new taxes of 1644 were a sufficient supply, at least in the short term.

The provision of food, shelter and clothing, whether in settled quarters or on the march, was directly linked to the contribution. The agreements with the counties, as we have seen, authorised the use of tickets, and the acceptance of provisions in part-payment of the assessment. We must now consider

(1) The King had attempted in 1642 to get it brought in, H.M.C., 13th Report, I, p.83, C.S.P.D., 1641-3, p.416.

(2) At the senior level the sister of the quarter-master-general, Charles Lloyd, petitioned at the Restoration for his arrears of pay, apparently almost wholly unsatisfied; C.S.P.D., 1661-2, p.223. At the lowest level a Cheshire ex-trooper, pleading in 1663 for a pension, remarked that in four and a half year's service he had "in all that time received but little pay"; Cheshire Record Office, Quarter Sessions Records, Epiphany 1663, No.125.

in more detail how the taking of these commodities and services was regulated, and attempt to answer the question: was the Royalist soldier better provided with victuals and clothes, than he was with pay?

These matters were the concern of the commissariat department, which seem to have been established in the main army at least since Edgehill. The responsibility for the supply of food fell on the commissary-generals for the horse and foot: these posts were held respectively by Thomas Jay and Leonard Pinckney, probably for the whole of the war.⁽¹⁾ Jay had connections at court, and was an experienced royal servant: he was commissioned by the King, as commissary-general for the provision of the horse, in October 1642.⁽²⁾ Pinckney was of similar standing. His family included several servants of the Crown, and he himself had been a commissary in the Scots Wars.⁽³⁾ He was already commissary for the foot in September 1642.⁽⁴⁾

There was some overlap, in their duties, with the business of quartering: diet and entertainment could not be separated.⁽⁵⁾ While the army had quarter-master-generals, the two most famous did not confine themselves to logistics: Charles Lloyd and Bernard de Gomme were both known, and more active, as military engineers.⁽⁶⁾ The day-to-day billeting of the army was in the hands of regimental quarter-masters.

Each regiment also had its waggon-master, and, in theory, its own supply of carts. The overall direction of transport was in the hands of a waggon-

- (1) Both were in Oxford at its surrender, and compounded on Oxford articles, C.C.C., pp.1569, 1582.
- (2) C.S.P.D., 1641-3, p.353; his draft commission, dated at Woodstock, 29 October 1642, Harl.MS.6851, ff.215-6.
- (3) M. Toynbee, "Some Royal Servants of the Name of Pinckney", Notes and Queries, Vol.203, January and August 1958, pp.2-5, 336-41.
- (4) Ibid., p.336.
- (5) Pinckney was asked to assign quarters for a troop, minutes of Council, Lambourn, 11 November [1644], Harl.MS.6802, f.283. Clarendon described him as a quarter-master-general, IX, § 110.
- (6) Both were knighted during the war: see D.N.B., for both.

master-general. At the beginning of the war this was Winter Graunt, an old-established royal official who came of Warwickshire recusant stock.⁽¹⁾ In November 1642 he was confiscating carts for the army's use.⁽²⁾ A year later Henry Stevens, a minor Oxfordshire gentleman, succeeded to his post and continued in it at least until the end of 1644.⁽³⁾ Most of our knowledge of the Royalist commissariat derives from the collection of papers Stevens acquired as waggon-master-general.⁽⁴⁾

The clothing of the army did not call for separate officials; instead, a special commission was appointed early in the war, the members of which included prominent City men such as Sir George Strode and Sir Nicholas Crispe.⁽⁵⁾ This committee was much like the more important civilian committee which undertook the ordering of the train of artillery in its early stages.⁽⁶⁾ The clothing commissioners were so active in other directions, however, that it was more usual for other civilians and commissariat officials to undertake this work.

A special central committee was also set up to aid the commissary-generals for provisions. It was essential, in the task of providing for the army from the produce of the countryside, that the liaison between military and civilian elements should be good. The commission for the regulation of

(1) V.C.H., Warwickshire, III, pp.92,94. C.S.P.D., 1637-8, p.472; his will proved in 1660, P.C.C. Nabbs 311.

(2) Stevens, p.14.

(3) Stevens, pp.15-18.

(4) Edited by Miss M. Toynbee, and cited here as Stevens.

(5) Strode's services were listed in the Restoration petition, S.P.29,66.No.46. For this petition, see below, p.280 n.(1). See also Ottley, Vol.7, p.273.

(6) See below, pp.280. Strode was a member of both.

provisions therefore included prominent administrators - such as secretary-at-war Walker and Ashburnham - as well as civilians.⁽¹⁾ Various other committees, usually offshoots of the Council of War, were active in making arrangements for provisions, in co-operation with Pinckney and Jay.⁽²⁾

With this array of officials and committees - no doubt more imposing than effective - the High Command was able to control the victualling of the field army in winter quarters, and even, briefly, in the field, from magazines established in Oxford headquarters. In preparation for the first winter of the war stores of corn were laid in:⁽³⁾ the city council agreed to set up "a Magazin of Sheate and Maralin" mixed grain, wheat and rye in January 1643.⁽⁴⁾ The commissioners who had been appointed to fortify and victual Oxford were instructed to take subscription, in May, for the establishment of a corn magazine,⁽⁵⁾ and this was probably the "Common Magazine" later referred to.⁽⁶⁾

For greater security, and better regulation of supply, the farmers of Oxfordshire and Berkshire were ordered to bring in their surplus corn to the city repository, where they could either store it in safety or sell it for ready money (at agreed and published rates) for the use of the garrison.⁽⁷⁾ In April 1644, with the start of the summer campaigns and the threat of siege, royal proclamations enforced these orders to local farmers,⁽⁸⁾ and warned all

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- (1) Six sign the undated "desires" of the commissioners [? October 1643], Harl. MS. 6804, f. 216.
- (2) Walker to Nicholas, September 1643, *ibid.*, f. 233.
- (3) "At Gildhall, wheat; and oates and corne was laid up as it were in granaries in the Lawe Schole & Logicke Schole &c, one... Davis, a townesman, ... havinge the oversight of these corne-provisions", A. Wood, *The Life and Times*, ed. A. Clark, Oxford Historical Society, Vol. 19 (1891), I. p. 74, under date 15 December 1642.
- (4) *Oxford Council Acts 1626-1665*, ed. M. Hobson and H. Salter, p. 111.
- (5) Royal instructions to the commissioners, 15 May 1643, Bodleian; MS. Add. D. 114, f. 5.
- (6) *Stevens*, pp. 26, 33.
- (7) Proclamation, 29 March 1644, Steele, No. 2549; found only in Black, p. 180.
- (8) Proclamation, 15 April 1644, Steele, No. 2558.

Oxford residents to store sufficient provisions for a three-month siege.⁽¹⁾ Cattle was to be placed in Christ Church meadow and the fields round Magdalen College, for safe-keeping.⁽²⁾ Much of the corn brought in for safety from the neighbouring countryside was stored not in the public magazine but in private houses.⁽³⁾ The commissioners, sitting at the Audit House, Christ Church, attempted to keep account of these private stores, and of the amounts handed in. Constables of district from which supply was drawn were asked to co-operate in this task.⁽⁴⁾

Drink, as well as food, was regulated in the Oxford garrison. The brewing of beer was confined to the cheaper varieties, and the prices the soldiers might be asked to pay for it laid down.⁽⁵⁾ Both for discipline and economy the provision of weak beer was preferable to stronger and more expensive liquids. Wine was scarce in Oxford taverns,⁽⁶⁾ and it does not seem to have been necessary to ban late-night revellers until the last year of the war.⁽⁷⁾

In November 1642 the King and the Council of War took the first steps towards a good supply of clothing for the soldiers, as winter approached. As the royal army lay at Reading cloth was ordered to be brought in from Abingdon and the town, enough, at 2½ yards a suit, for over 2500 men.⁽⁸⁾ Clothiers

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- (1) Proclamation, April 1644, not given in Steele; draft in Harl.MS.6802, f.92.
 (2) Minutes of War Council, 27 May 1644, Harl.MS.6802, f.196.
 (3) Proclamation, 24 May 1644, Steele, No.2570.
 (4) Proclamation, 24 May 1644, ibid., No.2569.
 (5) Proclamation, 12 June 1643, ibid., No.2437.
 (6) A.Wood, op.cit., I, p.84.
 (7) All persons to leave inns at "Tap-toe"; proclamation, 3 February 1645/6, Steele, No.2641.
 (8) Minutes of War Council, Reading, 5 November 1642, Harl.MS.6851, f.219; royal warrant, 9 November [1642], Reading Corporation Archives, Box.W.

and tailors in Reading and within six miles of the town, were "impressed and retained" for this employment, "making clothes for the King's army".⁽¹⁾ A thousand suits of jacket and hose were to be delivered to the badly-clothed and ill-equipped soldiery.⁽²⁾ The burden of paying for the cloth fell on the townspeople of Reading. When further orders for making suits were placed, they petitioned that the cost should be borne by all the county.⁽³⁾ The War Council agreed.⁽⁴⁾ When the royal forces had retired to winter quarters the clothing towns of the Thames valley were still occupied supplying uniforms.⁽⁵⁾

Anthony Wood noted, in January 1643, that as magazines for arms, victuals and corn had been established in Oxford, so a magazine "for cloth for soldiers' apparrell and coates" was set up in the Music and Astronomy Schools; and "a great many of taylers...set on worke to cutt out these coates, to the number of 4000 or 5000".⁽⁶⁾ Local industry obviously provided many of the soldiers' wants. The capture of some of the West Country clothing towns, the encouragement of convoys from there to Oxford, and the direction of the cloth trade away from London to Bristol, improved matters further.⁽⁷⁾

At the same time the indefatigable Thomas Bushell, Warden of the Oxford Mint, contracted with Strode, Crispe and other commissioners for clothing, to supply clothes for the army.⁽⁸⁾ He continued with this activity in 1644.

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- (1) Copy of royal warrant to Mayor of Reading, etc. (Reading, 8 November 1642), Reading Corporation Archives, Box W.
 (2) Royal warrant, 9 November 1642, *ibid.*
 (3) Undated petition [November 1642], *ibid.*, Box 2/3.
 (4) Secretary-at-war's answer to the petition (Reading, 28 November 1642), *ibid.*
 (5) Minutes of Council of War, 19 January 1642/3, Harl. MS. 6851, f.95.
 (6) A. Wood, *op.cit.*, I, p.83.
 (7) *The Pythouse Papers*, ed. W. Day, p.1, Warburton, II, p.115.
 (8) Bushell's contract, 6 March 1642/3, Ottley, Vol.7, p.273.

after he had left Oxford, for he was called upon to clothe the half-naked "English-Irish" troops as they landed in the West.⁽¹⁾

As in other matters ~~xxxxxxx~~ there was in clothing a distinction between more and less privileged regiments. While the infantry officers at Culham camp complained that their men lacked shoes and stockings,⁽²⁾ and the foot commanders in garrisons distant from Oxford appealed desperately for some form of clothing, for want of which, in the winter months, their men were mutinous,⁽³⁾ the senior regiments in Oxford (in 1643 and 1644) paraded in blue and red.⁽⁴⁾ Several of the Old Foot and other privileged regiments had uniforms: the Lifeguards of the King and Queen were clothed in red suits and moneros (steel caps lined with fur), Percy's in white, Charles Gerrard's and Hepton's in blue.⁽⁵⁾ Prince Rupert's men were clad in livery.⁽⁶⁾ But the wearing of uniform does not seem to have extended beyond the fringes of this group.

Once the stores of various kinds had been established at Oxford it was possible, though not always convenient, to supply the main army in the field. Much of the campaigning of 1643 and 1644 was in country not too distant from the Royalist headquarters. In September 1643 the army, moving east from Gloucester siege, was sent £80 worth of the provision that Oxfordshire and

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- (1) Draft royal warrant to Bushell at Bristol (Reading, 17 May 1644), Harl. MS. 6802, f. 169.
- (2) The "Humble Desires" [7 May 1643], Harl. MS. 6804, ff. 92-3.
- (3) Astley to Rupert (Faringdon, 25 November 1644), and Cirencester, 17 December 1644), MS. Firth, C.7, ff. 236-9, 258-63. Henry Gage, at Basing, wrote that the "want of cleaths, shoes and stockings" was likely to cause a mutiny; his letter without direction (Basing, 22 November 1644), Add. MS. 18981, f. 323.
- (4) A. Wood, The Life and Times, ed. A. Clark, I, p. 103; Oxford musters in New Parks, 13 February 1643/4, Harl. MS. 986, f. 75.
- (5) Ibid., ff. 75, 79; Earl of Bath to the Countess (Oxford, 11 October 1643), Kent Record Office, Sackville Papers, Earl of Bath, MSS., C.267.
- (6) Warburton, II, 379n.

Berkshire contributed weekly under their agreements.⁽¹⁾ It was received by Plackney and his deputies, under order from a special provisions sub-committee of the Council of War:⁽²⁾ this committee took over from the commissioners for provisions, who remained at Oxford, when the army was in the field.⁽³⁾ In November, after First Newbury, Rupert and the horse, as we have seen, moved into Northamptonshire, but still within victualling distance of Oxford. The commissariat and the Ordnance Office were able to supply all his needs. £50 worth of provisions were sent to Bicester, under escort from Oxford, to await him: £35 worth of bread and 2400 lbs. of cheese were sent a few days later to Brackley.⁽⁴⁾ From the grain in Oxford stores it was undertaken to bake bread when Rupert should require it.⁽⁵⁾ The Prince, however, sent an officer to order the corn to be baked into biscuit.⁽⁶⁾

It was one of the duties of Henry Stevens, wagon-master-general, to grind meal and bake it into bread or biscuit, suitable for immediate supply to the army.⁽⁷⁾ He was ordered to bake £40 worth of bread ready to be sent to the army at Chipping Norton, after it had left Oxford, in July 1644.⁽⁸⁾ This was probably the most convenient form in which food could be supplied to an army continually on the move. In October 1644, 8000 lbs. of biscuit was sent to the

(1) Walker to Nicholas, September 1643, Harl. MS. 6804, f. 233.

(2) Ibid..

(3) Ibid..

(4) Nicholas to Rupert (Oxford, 1 November [two letters] and 3 November 1643), Add. MS. 18980, f. 138, and Warburton, II, pp. 325, 326n. For the transport of these food consignments, see Stevens, p. 23.

(5) Nicholas to Rupert (Oxford, 1 November 1643), Add. MS. 18980, f. 138.

(6) Nicholas to Rupert (Oxford, 5 November 1643), ibid., f. 143.

(7) Stevens, pp. 32-5.

(8) Ibid., p. 29.

army, then fighting Second Newbury, from the stores in the Schools at Oxford; immediately afterwards Stevens was ordered to replenish this amount by baking fresh quantities of meal, in readiness for the soldiers "now drawing into this Garrison" from the Western campaign.⁽²⁾

The field army, however, could be supplied from the Oxford magazines only to a limited extent. The commissary-generals did not have the equipment or the organisation to provide a full marching train of provisions. Supplies were sent from Oxford very often by requisitioned "country carts".⁽³⁾ In the autumn of 1643 a move was made by the committee for regulating provisions to have 30 covered wagons with teams of horse or oxen assigned for the carriage of victuals, but probably this was not accomplished.⁽⁴⁾ There does not appear to have been a permanent and established train of provisions, either at Oxford or with the army in the field, as there was of artillery.

Instead, when supplies from Oxford failed, the commissariat arranged that provisions should be taken from the country through which the army passed. The commissary-generals' main task was to regulate the free quarter taken on the march and to requisition food supplies in advance of the army. Jay, Pinckney and Stevens (often styled "Commissary Generall of the Victualls")⁽⁵⁾ were present in the field with the other headquarters department as often as they were stationed at Oxford.⁽⁶⁾ They alone could authorise the "tickets" by which the soldiery paid for the provisions they took from the farmers.⁽⁷⁾

(1) Stevens, p. 32.

(2) Ibid., p. 33.

(3) Ibid., p. 29.

(4) The desires of the commissioners [7 October 1643], Harl. MS. 6804, f. 216.

(5) Stevens, p. 25.

(6) Stevens's dual role made him much in demand, C.S.P.D., 1644, p. 117, and Stevens, p. 30.

(7) The desires of the commissioners [7 October 1643], Harl. MS. 6804, f. 216.

In the autumn of 1643 Pinckney requisitioned loads of bread from the villages near the army's quarters.⁽¹⁾ In November Jay, as commissary-general for the horse, accompanied Rupert's cavalry to Northamptonshire. He arranged their supply locally, and one of the Prince's warrants, for "mans meat and horse meat" (provender) to be brought to Jay, was captured and printed by Parliament.⁽²⁾

All three commissary-generals attended the Earl of Forth, when Oxford sent reinforcements to Hopton for the Cheriton campaign. Pinckney had the Sheriff of Berkshire deliver £200 worth of provisions to Andover, for distribution to the army.⁽³⁾ Jay negotiated with the Sheriff for supply of fodder for the horse in Hopton's army.⁽⁴⁾ They were active as the King's forces manoeuvred in Berkshire and Wiltshire following Second Newbury. Pinckney was sent ahead of the army to take up cheese and salt, and have the corn he could find ground into meal for baking.⁽⁵⁾ Letters were sent out to all the neighbouring towns and villages for food to be brought in.⁽⁶⁾ Stevens took the necessary provisions (dairy produce, as well as corn) from the local farmers, in return for tickets; and, in his role of wagon-master-general, impressed the carriages needed to transport these supplies with the army.⁽⁷⁾

Once again, as in 1643, members of the War Council supervised this activity. A high-ranking committee co-operated with Pinckney in November,⁽⁸⁾ and it remained in being, when the army returned to Oxford, to advise and report on the establishment (of victuals, etc.) required by the garrisons in the West.⁽⁹⁾

(1) Warrant to constables of Chipping Norton [? September 1643], Harl.MS.6804, f.147.

(2) The Copy of a Warrant under Prince Ruperts hand to the Officers of the Hundred of Winnershly in the County of Northampton, 1 November 1643, ff: 669, f.8 (34).

(3) C.S.P.D., 1644, pp.70, 162-3.

(4) Ibid., p.78.

(5) Notes of Council of War, Lambourn, 11 November [1644], Harl.MS.6802, f.283.

(6) Ibid., Stevens, p.65.

(7) Ibid., pp.34, 65.

(8) Harl.MS.6804, f.283.

(9) Minutes of the committee, 25-26 November [1644], Harl.MS.6802, ff.310-3.

Three of its members combined with the Lords Commissioners in the city to order food supplies for the Royalist headquarters before the winter set in.⁽¹⁾

When the army was about to march to Worcester in the campaign of the following year (April 1645), preparations were hurriedly made in the locality by Prince Maurice, with the aid of detailed instructions from Pinckney.

Warrants were sent to the local constables to bring in to the magazine at Worcester "good, sweet, sound and marketable wheat" from their divisions, exempting those areas already under contribution to a loyal garrison,⁽²⁾ and to impress carts and teams for necessary transport.⁽³⁾ In this case

materials and tools (for entrenching) were requested, for the use of the army.⁽⁴⁾ Pinckney's memoranda for this service include lists of provisions

needed for the numbers expected, and calculations of the market prices for each item.⁽⁵⁾ Where such lengthy advertisement of the King's coming was

made, it is hardly surprising that the Roundhead commanders of Warwick intervened, and forbade obedience to the Royalist warrants.⁽⁶⁾

Supply from Oxford, on such occasions, was usually too difficult; "in regard of the distance and difficulty to procure carriages", and "y^e hazard of y^e weather, w^{ch} may spoil provisions", it was more advisable to be locally supplied.⁽⁷⁾ Local commanders arranged for provisions to be brought in from

(1) Stevens, pp.33-4.

(2) Townshend, II, p.225.

(3) Ibid., pp.226-7.

(4) Ibid., p.225.

(5) Ibid., pp.225-6.

(6) Ibid., p.229 .

(7) Nicholas to Rupert (Oxford, 1 November 1643), Add.MS.18980, f.138, and Warburton, II, p.323.

the districts under their control: ⁽¹⁾ so, in July 1644, the Governor of Bridgnorth drew on provincial resources for supply of the army advanced to Evesham ⁽²⁾. Every campaign was influenced by the availability of provisions. Where supplies were short the army was forced to abandon its quarters or disperse widely over the countryside ⁽³⁾; it lingered, sometimes with little regard for the tactical consequences, where provisions were plentiful ⁽⁴⁾. Careful management by the Council of War, which co-ordinated the work of the commissariat officials, allowed the Royalists in Cornwall to starve Essex's army into submission ⁽⁵⁾.

One of the most pressing problems of an army on the march was the provision of, and maintaining large numbers of draught horses and carriages. Oxen were often used, horses being scarce and difficult to provide for ⁽⁶⁾. For the transport of both victuals and other materials, and trains of artillery, the wagon-master kept a strict control of the carts and teams at his disposal. No one was allowed to dismiss wagons or wagoners without his permission ⁽⁷⁾. For the transport he took from civilians he paid at an agreed rate ⁽⁸⁾. Royal edicts attempted to protect farmers who brought their goods to Oxford markets and stores from unauthorised seizure of their carts

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- (1) For local supply during the 1644 campaigns, see Walker, pp. 47, 87, 99, 119.
 (2) Otley, Vol. 8, pp. 247, 253.
 (3) C.S.P.D., 1644, p. 163, Symonds, pp. 62-3.
 (4) In the Western campaign (September 1644) "in expectation [of local supply of money and clothing] we possibly spent a Day or two more in Dorsetshire, than otherwise we should have done", Walker, p. 96.
 (5) N.M.C., 15th Report, II, pp. 101-3; C.S.P.D., 1644, p. 456.
 (6) Stevens, pp. 14, 18, 29.
 (7) Proclamation, 1 May 1643, Steele, No. 2415.
 (8) Stevens, pp. 23-4.

and horses⁽¹⁾. In a garrison city the officers responsible found difficulty in keeping large numbers of horses supplied with fodder. Cavalry units were almost invariably forced to quit beleaguered towns; similarly horses for draught purposes were dependent on access to outlying countryside. For the horse of Oxford garrison, the citizens of Oxford and the tenants of Wolvercote leased Portmead and Wolvercote Common to the King to provide hay⁽²⁾. Stevens kept careful accounts of the fodder brought from there⁽³⁾.

The commissary-generals and their officials were paid sums by the Oxford Exchequer and the treasurer-at-war for their work⁽⁴⁾. In 1644, for example, Pinckney received £1000 "towards the victualing" the army and garrisons⁽⁵⁾. But nothing like enough money was supplied to these central agents for all the provisions taken from the countryside to be paid for immediately. As we have seen the agreements made with the counties supplied the deficiency: the counties agreed to the use of tickets which would be redeemable "whom the King should be able". In fact few were ever honoured. At the same time the rates were negotiated which would govern the taking of provisions, or the commutation of the weekly assessment.

The printed Oxfordshire Agreement included the following rates; per bushel, oats were 1/8, beans 2/-, and straw by the load was 6/8⁽⁶⁾. During the war, depending on the market price, these rates varied. A comprehensive

- (1) Proclamations, 20 November 1644 and 18 January 1644/5, Steele, Nos. 2591, 2595.
 (2) Oxford Council Acts 1626-1665, ed. M. Hobson and H. Salter, p.118; P. Varley, The Siege of Oxford, p.105.
 (3) STEVENS, p.32.
 (4) ASHBURNHAM, II, Appendix, pp. xvii, xxiii, xxx.
 (5) G.S.P.D., 1644, p.91
 (6) An Explanation of the Agreement, Oxford, January 1642/3, Madan, II, No.1187.

list of all the food and horse-fodder the Royalists allowed for is extensive.

The most important was wheat. During the harvest of 1643 it was 4/- per bushel⁽¹⁾, in a proclamation of May 1644, it was 5/-⁽²⁾. This latter was "higher by much than at present the Markets of the Country doe beare".

Normally the rates reflected accurately current prices. The price of wheat remained at about 30/- per quarter (3/9 per bushel) during the war years⁽³⁾.

The price paid by Royalist forces in Worcestershire and Shropshire was 4/- per bushel⁽⁴⁾.

The provisions required were aimed to provide the staples of the soldier's diet. These were bread and bisouit, beer and cheese. It was calculated that, as the subsistence rate allowed him was 3/6 weekly, less than 6d. a day could be spent on his diet. Commissary Pinckney and his deputies based their calculations of the cost of victualling large numbers of men on this daily ration. An anonymous and undated document⁽⁵⁾ - perhaps a product of one of the commissariat departments or committees in Oxford - set the cost of basic rations, for 3000 men at 6d. each daily, for three months, at £6,300. For the 6d. allowed him in this paper, the soldier received 2d. worth of bread, the remainder in cheese, butter and bacon.

This was probably an optimistic survey. In general butter, along with meat, was too expensive to be supplied to the army. The "usual rate", which

- (1) The Agreements Made Between His Majesty and ... County of Oxford, Oxford, 30 September 1643, Madan, II, No. 1458.
- (2) Proclamation, 14 May 1644, Steele, No. 2565.
- (3) W. Beveridge, Prices and Wages in England from the Twelfth to the Nineteenth Century, Vol. I, Price Tables: Mercantile Era (1939), p.81. The price at Winchester, 1642-5.
- (4) Price of provisions during the siege of Worcester (1646), and Shropshire rates in 1644, Townshend, I, p.169, II, p.164.
- (5) Bodleian, MS. Add. D.114, f.94.

Stevens, as commissary-general of the victuals, was instructed to provide, was 1 lb. in bread or hard-baked biscuit, $\frac{1}{2}$ lb. in cheese⁽¹⁾. The regulations governing the brewing of beer at Oxford kept its price down: it could be had for 1d. a quart⁽²⁾. An estimate for provisioning troops in Ireland, dated 1644, allowed only 4d. a man daily, "the rates formerly usual"⁽³⁾. This supplied the usual 1 lb. of biscuit and $\frac{1}{2}$ lb. of cheese for each man. The allowance of bread or biscuit and cheese was the most economical and widely used. Pinckney authorised this ration for the investment of Gloucester in August 1643, and it was copied for the troops in Worcester during its final siege⁽⁴⁾. For 1 lb. of biscuit and $\frac{1}{2}$ lb. of cheese daily to each man, the 1600 soldiers defending Worcester could be supplied from the city magazine for only £86 weekly⁽⁵⁾. Where short rations of bread and cheese only were provided the army could be supplied more easily, and more cheaply than at the rate of 3/6 weekly each.

It is difficult to say how typical these conditions were. The rations available to the ordinary soldier varied with time and place, but he rarely went hungry. Oxford was, apparently, well-stocked for most of the war, although few can have eaten as well as those who dined at the King's table⁽⁶⁾. The reported comment⁽⁷⁾ of the sentry during the city's final siege - "Round-head, fling me up half a mutton and I will fling thee down a lord" - is

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- (1) Stevens, p.25.
 (2) Proclamation, 12 June 1643, Steele, No.2437.
 (3) H.M.C., Ormonde, N.S., I, p.82
 (4) The rations to last the siege, discussed in detail, March-July 1646, Townshend, I, pp.169-73.
 (5) Ibid.
 (6) The King's table and cellar book at Oxford, 1643-4, H.M.C., Ormonde, N.S., II, pp.406-12.
 (7) Sir John Oglander recorded it, A Royalist's Notebook, ed.F. Bamford, p.117.

probably more indicative of the political atmosphere in Oxford than its straitened circumstances⁽¹⁾. The main army, while good discipline prevailed, was provided for by the central magazines and, in a regulated manner, from the localities. When the commissariat authorities could no longer preserve order the soldiers seized what they wanted: the constant stream of royal proclamations against plunder and free quarter is testimony of this.

Just as the Royalist soldiers were often unpaid, but not destitute, so, in the matter of clothing, shelter and food, they were (with the probable exception of some privileged regiments) never handsomely supplied, but managed to subsist. The taxable capacity of North and West England was less than that of the South and East, and much of the country was poorer in provisions. But by various means the money was raised to maintain the King's army: and by comparable organisation on the part of the commissariat departments and local officials the soldiery for most of the war, and in most places, were sufficiently provided for.

(1) Before the surrender "there was not less than six months' provisions" in Oxford, Warburton, III, p.231 n.

Chapter VI.

The Office of Ordnance

The Ordnance Office was one of the most important of the headquarters departments at Oxford during the war, and it is fortunate that many of the papers of the Office and its officials have survived. It undertook tasks which in a modern army occupy several different departments. In arms, ammunition and equipment it catered for all the needs of the King's main army, and in doing so, as we shall see, brought half of England under contribution.

The requirements of seventeenth century armies were still relatively unsophisticated. Personal weapons and equipment had become standardised in the decades preceding the Civil War: one third of the infantry carried pikes, the rest muskets; the cavalry (almost invariably light) were armed with swords and pistols; and dragoons were equipped normally with carbines. New developments in firearms came late to peaceful and militarily backward England, so that the ordinary Civil War musketeer was more likely to have a matchlock than a flintlock musket, and his equipment therefore included (as well as a bandoleer hung with twelve charges of powder, a bag of shot and a musket rest), a coil of slow-burning match. The military art was, however, sufficiently advanced for the King to reject the petition of the bowyers and fletchers of the Midlands who, in a last effort to revive a dying craft, requested him to fight the war with bows and arrows.⁽¹⁾ Gunpowder had forced the archer's retirement: artillery played a minor but not unimportant role in warfare. Large, destructive cannon were present at sieges, and a train of

(1) Petition presented to the King at Derby, 15 September 1642,
P.R.O. 31. 8. 197, f. 328.

field-pieces, of varying sizes, as well as such curiosities as hand-grenades and mines, accompanied most marching armies. Personal armour had been reduced to a minimum, and most soldiers, whether mounted or on foot, wore as protective clothing at most only a buff leather jerkin or metal "back and breast", with, as headpiece, a simple helmet or "pot".

Each nation-state of Europe hoped to become self-sufficient in these essentials, and developed, so far as it was able, its own armaments and munitions industries: the first based largely on the supply of iron, the second on that of gunpowder. Caroline England was no exception. In the case of iron, the best-known centres of production were in Surrey, Sussex and Kent. The Wealden iron industry was ancient, and still pre-eminent: the ore and good supplies of timber used, in the form of charcoal, as fuel to smelt it, lay side by side.⁽¹⁾ The deposits of iron, and the easy communication with the Tower, the central arms repository, encouraged the growth of cannon-founding and the casting of shot.⁽²⁾ Even in peacetime England the manufactures of the Weald had great military value, and were an important export. The government, custodian of the national interest, protected the industry and commissioned its products. The most famous of the local ironmasters, John Browne, became King's Gunfounder, and in Charles I's

(1) E. Straker, Wealden Iron (1931) and V. C. H., Sussex, II, pp. 241-9. In general, see T. Ashton, Iron and Steel in the Industrial Revolution (1951), Chapter I.

(2) Ibid., p.5. Early cannon had been "built-up" guns, i.e. forged iron bars bound with hoops. But since before 1500 guns had been cast in iron and other metals in Sussex foundries.

reign enjoyed monopolies in connection with the supply of iron and brass ordnance, and cannon for the navy.⁽¹⁾ He also exported to the Dutch, until he felt the stiff breeze of competition from Swedish guns in the 1630s.⁽²⁾ He cast a cannon in the presence of Charles himself⁽³⁾ - the King took a lively interest in modern gunnery - and in 1640 was bringing old and disused foundries back into production.⁽⁴⁾ The Brownes formed syndicates with a number of other important local families to produce ordnance on a large scale for the government, during much of the seventeenth century.⁽⁵⁾

But the Southern counties had no monopoly of iron: while cannon-founding was most highly developed in the Weald, other areas at this time supported a growing iron industry. In particular, the Forest of Dean, South Wales and the West Midlands were noted by observers as rivals to Sussex. Shortage of timber, or a restriction of its use, may have prompted ironmasters to leave the Weald and set up elsewhere; some migrated to South Wales, and Browne himself made claims in the Forest of Dean which brought him into dispute with local developers.⁽⁶⁾ Speculative enterprise in the Forest was, however, curtailed by the activities of the free miners, anxious to resist any infringement of their ancient liberties, and the Crown, which claimed control of iron-mines in a royal forest and sold mining contracts to courtiers

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- (1) V. C. H., Sussex, II, p.248; The Journal of Sir Simonds D'Ewes, Vol. 1, ed. W. Notestein, pp. 503-4; and references given by G. Aylmer, The King's Servants, (1961), p.341 n.
- (2) C. Ffoulkes, The Gunfounders of England (1937), p.75; proclamation of 1635, Steele, No.1708.
- (3) This piece may be seen today in the Tower armouries.
- (4) C. Ffoulkes, op. cit., p. 76, and the memorial of Browne (? 1640), S.P. 16. 475, No. 42.
- (5) A. R. Hall, Ballistics in the Seventeenth Century (1952), pp. 26-7.
- (6) T. Ashton, op. cit., p. 15, and V. C. H., Sussex, II, p.244. Browne's claims, 1641, and dispute with Sir John Winter, 1642, C.S.P.D., 1641-3, pp.233, 360-1.

and local landowners.⁽¹⁾ Sir John Winter was both at once: secretary to the Queen, and with his seat at Lydney, he became one of the foremost royal contractors and bought extensive rights in 1640⁽²⁾.

The furnaces of Gloucestershire produced a remarkably fine and pliable iron; because of this they were linked with the ironworking regions of the West Midlands. The Forest iron was sent up the Severn to the forges and workshops of Warwickshire, Worcestershire and Staffordshire, which also received supplies of iron from Shropshire⁽³⁾. The plentiful coal of the Black Country was not yet successfully employed in the primary process of smelting,⁽⁴⁾ but was extensively used in the manufacture of ironware, one of the principal occupations of the area⁽⁵⁾. The metalworkers of such centres as Birmingham, Dudley and Stourbridge were becoming as important as the foundrymen of Shropshire, who at the end of the century were to surpass all rivals in output of iron.⁽⁶⁾ Midlands production could easily be put on a war footing; when necessary pike-heads, swords and muskets would replace nails and domestic ironware. The Forest of Dean and South Wales were probably

(1) H. Nicholls, Ironmaking in the Forest of Dean (1866), passim; V.C.H., Gloucestershire, II, pp.215-25.

(2) Ibid., p.225, and D.N.B.

(3) W. Court, The Rise of the Midland Industries (1953), pp.5-6, 81-3; T. Ashton, op. cit., p.14.

(4) Despite the claims of various seventeenth century "inventors" to have used mineral fuel in the smelting of iron. The most famous of these was Dud Dudley, the bastard son of Lord Dudley, who obtained royal patents for this purpose in 1621 and 1638, and claimed, in his Mettallum Martis (1665), which contained a description of his industrial operations, that his experiments were successful. During the Civil War he served as a Royalist officer, and, according to his own account, helped to organize military supplies for the King. See his Restoration petition listing his war services, S.P.29.II, No.54; for confirmation of his Royalist commission, List, 146; D.N.B.; T. Ashton, op. cit., pp. vii, 10-12.

(5) W. Court, op. cit., pp.24-32.

(6) Ibid., pp. 174-5.

capable of cannon-founding in the period before the Civil War.⁽¹⁾

In general the iron industry was made up of large units. The processes by which iron ore was finally turned into malleable bar-iron - the complex of mines, furnaces, bloomeries, chafferies and forges - required heavy capital expenditure.⁽²⁾ There were a few main centres of production in each of the iron-bearing areas described. As well as capital they needed isolation; each large plant had to be set apart from others, if supplies of neighbouring timber and iron ore were not to be quickly expended. The industry in the eighteenth century, according to Professor Ashton, was scattered throughout the kingdom;⁽³⁾ and this was becoming true a century earlier. Wealthy private individuals exploited the country's natural resources where they occurred, and, while the government found it convenient to grant monopolies in ordnance manufacture to Sussex gunfounders, and to assert its rights in the Forest of Dean, it had no hold over the whole industry as such.

On the other hand, the making of gunpowder was, in the same period, a royal monopoly. Two processes were involved in its manufacture: saltpetre had to be extracted from the "earth" found in decomposing organic matter in cattle-sheds, dovecotes, etc., and refined; it was then blended in the correct proportion with charcoal

(1) H. Nicholls, op. cit., p. 32, and T. Ashton, op. cit., p. 8.

(2) Typical furnaces, etc. in H. Nicholls, op. cit., pp. 32-7.

(3) T. Ashton, op. cit., p.22.

and brimstone, and the mixture finely milled. The final product was considered too valuable to national security, and too dangerous to life and limb, to be manufactured privately, and, as in France, production came under state supervision.⁽¹⁾ Various arrangements were tried, and by the 1630s a number of saltpetre commissioners, who provided the raw material, and the sole powder patentees, the Evelyn family, were under the supervision of one or two courtiers.⁽²⁾ Free import or unlicensed home manufacture was forbidden. The monopoly was unpopular and restrictive - the powder was sold at inflated prices - and there were many attempts at evasion. Authorised production was largely confined to the same region of South-east England as the original gunfoundries, within easy reach of the Tower.⁽³⁾ The Evelyns had their powder mills at Long Ditton in Surrey, and in 1636 the main works were established at Chilworth, near Guildford, by two new patentees with money loaned by the government. Stricter measures were taken against illicit powdermaking in the provinces and the smuggling of foreign powder or petre.⁽⁴⁾ The Scots Wars and the increased demand by the Office of Ordnance for powder, and the growth of political opposition, finally undermined royal control. In 1641 the Long Parliament, supported by London merchants, bitterly attacked it as "a most pernicious Monopelie",⁽⁵⁾

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- (1) J. Nef, Industry and Government in France and England, 1540-1640 (1957), pp. 59-68, 88-98.
- (2) Ibid., pp. 88-98.
- (3) V. C. H., Surrey, II, pp.306-29.
- (4) J. Nef, op. cit., p.95; proclamations of 1637, Steele, Nos.1739,1744.
- (5) The Journal of Sir Simonds D'Ewes, Vol. 1, pp.299-300. The engrossing of gunpowder, its sale at exorbitant rates, and the "vexation and oppression" caused by saltpetre men, were all grievances included in the Grand Remonstrance, The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution, ed. S.R.Gardiner (1906), pp.211-2.

and in August finally swept away this restriction of private enterprise, as it had others. In future "every man that will might make gunpowder", and it could be imported freely.⁽¹⁾

The iron industry, where its production was of military importance, and the gunpowder industry were guided by the Ordnance Office at the Tower, which was the central channel through which military supply flowed and was regulated. Officials there negotiated with ordnance manufacturers, gunsmiths, powdermakers and purveyors of equipment of all kinds, and received and stored their products which they paid for at agreed rates.⁽²⁾ They assessed the quality of arms and munitions, and standardised them as best they could,⁽³⁾ before issuing or reselling them to the military (e.g., county magazines) and the navy.⁽⁴⁾ Naval gunnery and stores were an important part of Ordnance Office business. The Office was presided over by a titular head, the Master, and a de facto head, the Lieutenant, and there were four

- (1) C. S. P. D., 1640-1, pp.486, 521. The Act abolishing the monopoly was 16 Charles I, c. 21.
- (2) Accounts of the Office and officials in G. Aylmer, The King's Servants, pp. 41-2, 208, 480, and A. Forbes, A History of the Army Ordnance Services (1929), I.
- (3) No two cannon were exactly alike, for the mould for each had to be broken up on completion of the casting. Small-arms passing through the Tower were marked with the letters "C. R.", ibid., p.55.
- (4) E.g., Monopoly gunpowder was sold at 1/6 per lb., proclamation of 1637, Steele, No. 1739.

other principal officers whose duties were connected with the reception, storing and issuing of supplies.⁽¹⁾ A small independent department, the Armoury, dealt mainly with small-arms.

The procedures of the Ordnance Office had been set down and examined carefully in 1630, but despite the efforts of the Privy Council the pre-war administration of the Office was grossly and notoriously inefficient. The Master was defied by his subordinates, disputes were frequent, the officers rarely received their fees, and because of the incomplete method of accounting and auditing, were able to resort to widespread peculation. The recommendation that a comptroller should be appointed, who would save much of the money lost in this department, was successfully resisted.⁽²⁾ The total cost of the Office (including the stores bought) was about £6,000 p.a.⁽³⁾

The main arsenals of the kingdom, where the bulk of the military stores were kept, were the Tower, Greenwich and Woolwich, Portsmouth and Hull. As well as these, the ships of the navy were stocked with guns and munitions, and of the country's shore defences some thirty forts,

(1) G. Aylmer, op. cit., p. 480

(2) Description of the working of the Office in 1630, SP. 16. 179, No. 51. There was a principal accountant but no comptroller, and it was reported that the officers "are averse to all new propositions which meet their inveterate frauds and defects", Paper (January 1640/1), C.S.P.D., 1640-1, pp.448-9. See also Edward Sherburne's petition for money owing to his father, Clerk of the Ordnance in the '30s, ibid., 1661-2, p.229; and G. Aylmer's example of an outrage in the department, op. cit., p.290.

(3) SP. 16. 179, No. 51.

"sconces" and "bulwarks", along the coast from Essex to Cornwall, were supposedly in a state of continual readiness.⁽¹⁾ The militia of each county had its own store of arms.

But few arsenals, on the eve of the Civil War, can have been in a satisfactory condition. Inconsistent government policies had led to a fall in the munitions received. Independent powdermakers had been suppressed by the King, and because of this, and the high price of the monopoly product, stocks of gunpowder were low in public and private armouries.⁽²⁾ The reversal of this policy by the Parliamentary opposition apparently only worsened the situation. In March 1641 the patentee warned that if the monopoly was abolished he and his works would be ruined.⁽³⁾ The Act may have had the effect of closing down his business before others could properly begin, and, according to the Ordnance officials, a difficult change-over period, in which there was little or no powder production, occurred before the outbreak of war.⁽⁴⁾

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- (1) G. Aylmer, op. cit., pp.42-3. They and their contents are listed in an inventory of 1623, Harl. MS, 1326.
- (2) Hampshire county magazine, for example, contained only old and decayed powder, because the new was too expensive to buy, C.S.P.D., 1640-1, p.119.
- (3) Petition of Samuel Cordewell, 31 March 1641, ibid., p.521. This, of course, was a common complaint by monopolists.
- (4) Petition, 10 February 1641/2, noted that "the saltpetre-works being suppressed, no powder has been delivered into the magazine these 13 months", SP. 16. 489, No. 18, printed C.S.P.D., 1641-3, p.280. The supply of saltpetre to the patentee's mills was drying up in 1641, as the petreemen waited for the opening up of a free market (and higher prices), ibid., p.152.

The disruption of manufacture coincided with the Northern Wars and the fitting out of an army to suppress the Irish rebellion. In March 1641 powder held at the Tower and Portsmouth amounted to 248 lasts.⁽¹⁾ By June the stock had fallen to 190 lasts, and in February of the following year it was forecast that after all commitments had been met only four lasts would remain in store at the Tower.⁽²⁾ There were similar shortcomings in the supply of match and arms.⁽³⁾ England had never been as forward in the making of small-arms as in cannon-founding, and the Crown was forced to buy muskets in the Low Countries.⁽⁴⁾

In the country at large a long period of internal peace and government parsimony had led to the general decay of private and local magazines. In Charles's reign a few conscientious Lords Lieutenants had improved the county militia and its stores, although both usually

- (1) C.S.P.D., 1640-1, p.486. One last = one ton. The usual annual production received by the Ordnance Office pre-Civil War varied considerably, from 100 to 200 lasts. A. R. Hall, Ballistics in the Seventeenth Century, p. 23, puts the average delivery at the Tower at 10 lasts per month.
- (2) C.S.P.D., 1641-3, pp. 2, 280. Particulars of supplies sent from the Ordnance Office to the army resisting the Scots noted, ibid., 1640-1, p. 365.
- (3) Ibid., 1641-3, p. 280.
- (4) A. R. Hall, op. cit., pp. 22-23. The main producers of small-arms for the Tower before the Civil War were apparently the London gunsmiths, see debentures, 1638-40, ibid., W. O. 49. 69.

remained meagre and ill-equipped.⁽¹⁾ Still, too, in the provinces a great and wealthy nobleman may have preserved and even modernised his private arms, and retained trained men, to keep up his social position. Some family and a few county armouries were therefore worth bidding for in 1642.

As we have seen, when Charles abandoned London, the capital and the South and East of the kingdom mobilised against him, the North and West rallied to his support. This geographical division of the country was preserved, more or less, during the Civil War. It has been held that the King had, therefore, fewer military resources than his opponents, and that his cause was bound to fail as a result. Our brief survey of the distribution of these sources and their central administration may lead to some qualification of such a deterministic view. In 1642 the iron industry was not confined to the South-east, and many of the most important centres of ironware manufacture in the Midlands were Royalist, as were the iron-producing areas in Wales and Gloucestershire. Surrey was the centre of gunpowdermaking, but the monopoly may not have stopped illicit provincial manufacture entirely, and was in any case overthrown in 1641.⁽²⁾ The main Surrey works of the ex-royal powdermaker were "pulled down" by Sir Richard Onslow, the local Parliamentarian, who "carried away the materials for making powder" when the King's army advanced on London.⁽³⁾ Charles retaliated by ordering

- (1) E.g., the Earl of Newcastle was anxious to put the arms of Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire in order, C.S.P.D., 1628-9, p.362, and *ibid.*, 1633-4, p.281.
- (2) Unlike cannon-founding, powdermaking did not require a large capital outlay. The gunpowder could be milled cheaply in a small way by hand.
- (3) H.M.C., 11th Report, V, p.3. £2000 had been expended on the Chilworth mills, C.S.P.D., 1639-40, p.512.

their destruction when his army withdrew from the area in November 1642,⁽¹⁾ and they were probably not repaired until 1644, when production was restarted.⁽²⁾

Most of the existing stocks of arms and munitions fell into the hands of Parliament. The navy deserted the King's Admiral, Sir John Pennington. The dispute over the Governorship of the Tower was resolved in Parliament's favour, and the Ordnance Office came under its control. The movement of stores involved in the Scots Wars had increased the importance of the Hull and Portsmouth magazines, and the King failed to secure either.⁽³⁾ Many of the militia arsenals, and the South coast forts, were taken by his opponents, and much was seized elsewhere; a good haul was made, evidently, in the royal armoury at Greenwich.⁽⁴⁾

On the other hand the King was able to take over county magazines in areas where his supporters were predominant; and local great men came to his aid with military supplies. Many of the national arsenals seized by Parliament were depleted by 1642, and as important, in the long run, was the control of seaports, through which arms might be imported. Newcastle and, after its capture in 1643, Bristol were of immense benefit to the Royalists.

The fate of the Ordnance Office illustrates well the power which both sides exercised as the war drew closer. The duel to command the Office

(1) W. O. 55 . 423, f.52.

(2) There seems to be no evidence of Chilworth production before 1644, C.S.P.D., 1644, pp.92,108,483, V.C.H., SUFFOLK, II, p.321.

(3) George Goring, the Governor of Portsmouth, unashamedly negotiated with both sides, then yielded the town to Parliament and joined the King. London stiffened the resistance of Hull by sending reinforcements of professional soldiers.

(4) The Master Workman at Greenwich was plundered of £200 worth of arms, according to the petition of his widow, 3 October, 1643, P.R.O. 31.8.197, f.373.

and the allegiance of its officers developed quickly from a wrangle over procedure to violent action. In June 1642 the King urged Sir John Heydon, the Lieutenant, to send to York or Newcastle as much of the military stores in the Tower as possible.⁽¹⁾ The warrant was intercepted and the supplies never sent. Charles ordered the principals to obey only royal directives; Parliament's General, the Earl of Essex, countered with his own requisitions for supplies. The three senior officers - Heydon having joined the King before - were summoned before the Lords, and, refusing to submit, were committed to Black Rod. Within a month they were released, and two of them, Richard March and Edward Sherburne, shortly afterwards joined the King. Their houses were ransacked for stores and their families expelled from the Tower.⁽²⁾ Similarly, the stocks of the separate department, the Armoury, were impounded by Parliament, while the Master escaped to serve as a distinguished Royalist.⁽³⁾

Of the nine pre-war principal Ordnance and Armoury officials six remained loyal to the King; a higher proportion than in the royal civil service generally.⁽⁴⁾ But although the flight of senior officers from London brought a number of humbler officials in their train - secretaries followed their masters, gunsmiths brought their tools to Oxford - many more preferred to remain in their old places of work and

(1) C. S. P. D., 1641-3, p. 343.

(2) Lesls., V, pp. 298-9, 308, 345, 448; W.O. 55. 1754.

(3) William Legge, later Governor of Oxford (1645), and Master of the Armoury again at the Restoration, D.N.B.

(4) G. Aylmer, op. cit., p.405

to serve Parliament.⁽¹⁾ The Royalist train of artillery was at first seriously undermanned,⁽²⁾ and in March 1643 the King had to issue a general pardon to all the gunners and artificers still at the Tower, in the hope of enticing them to Oxford.⁽³⁾

Here, as in other fields, geography was as important as political allegiance. Only very senior officials made the physical effort required to leave London; ordinary craftsmen stayed on. The location of their industry was the main factor determining the loyalty of gunpowermakers and ordnance manufacturers. The King's Gunfounder was tied to the ironmines and woods of the Weald, and to the Tower which, after his overseas trade declined, took most of his output. When war broke out Browne may have wished to remain loyal - he and his son were suspected of Royalism later - but he had little choice in the matter of allegiance.⁽⁴⁾ His predicament was well-expressed by a Royalist: "The rebels have no guns nor bullet but from him, . . . which he is forced to provide else they would put others into his works."⁽⁵⁾ The ex-royal powder monopolist was forced to follow

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- (1) Heydon's clerk, Edward Stephens, followed him, P.R.O. 31. 8. 197, f.249. Some of John Browne, the Gunfounder's, workmen went to Oxford, E. Straker, Wealden Iron, p. 164. Other petitions testify to the loyalty of some London craftsmen.
- (2) Evidence recounted by Sir Nicholas Strode and John Wandesford in their petition [? 1663], S.P. 29. 66, No.46.
- (3) Proclamation, March 1643, Steele, No.2383. Only the title is known.
- (4) Browne was examined by various Parliamentary committees in 1645, but was allowed to continue his work, C.J. IV, p.183; C.S.P.D., 1644-5, pp. 607-8, 619; and ibid., 1645-7, p.27.
- (5) Intercepted letter brought as evidence against Browne in June 1645, ibid., 1644-5, p. 608.

his example, and contracted with Parliament to supply its forces.⁽¹⁾ By contrast it was the provincial ironmasters and the "pirate" powder-makers whose mills the Crown had attempted to break up in 1636 and '37, who found that they and their works were in Royalist-held territory and that the King's army was their only market.⁽²⁾ Only the Puritan metalworkers of Birmingham were more valorous than discreet; they expressed their political sympathies by supplying swords for Parliament, and were made to suffer for it.⁽³⁾

The possession by the Parliamentarians of many resources should not allow us to overlook the difficulties with which they were faced in 1642. They were dependent upon a cannon-founder who was allegedly lukewarm towards them; their powder-mills and stocks of gunpowder were run down; they were denied one important commodity, coal, the shortage of which interrupted the production of firearms in London in 1643.⁽⁴⁾ At the beginning of the war the organisation of Parliament's arms supply was most probably amateurish. When the senior officials of the Ordnance Office defected to the King, the Committee of Safety had to fill their places by the promotion of an army paymaster and the appointment of one described as "late Cittizen and hoeler of London".⁽⁵⁾ In general, however, it may be said that during the years following, the Parliamentary forces, so long as they preserved good contact

(1) Ibid., 1644, pp. 103, 483.

(2) A good example is William Baber, the Bristol powdermaker: his works were suppressed in 1637, he set up mills in Oxford during the war, V.C.H., Surrey, II, p. 319, C.S.P.D., 1637-8, p. 32. For his Civil War activities see p. 301 below.

(3) The town was sacked by Prince Rupert in the spring of 1643, W. Court, The Rise of the Midland Industries, p. 46.

(4) W. Court, op.cit., p. 142.

(5) W.O. 55. 1754.

with London, were well-supplied.⁽¹⁾

As war approached, in the summer of 1642, the Royalists had to make use of what stocks of arms and munitions remained to them. We have already seen how the King, in the North, disarmed the trained bands, secured the port of Newcastle and ordered his commissioners of array to seize the county magazines.⁽²⁾

The first supplies began to arrive from the Queen in Holland in July, and the train of artillery, at first "destitute of all things necessary for motion," was able to march from Shrewsbury "in very good order".⁽³⁾

Alongside these developments the command and organisation of the train were put in order. The titular Master of the Ordnance was the Earl of Newport, but while he listed himself as a supporter of the King he did little towards the foundation of the train. His post was little more than a sinecure, and he seems in any case to have lost it at least before the end of 1642.⁽⁴⁾ When the field army departed from Yorkshire he remained with

(1) E.g. a list of brass ordnance "fit for service", compiled in August 1642 shortly before Essex's army set out, shows that a fairly complete and extensive range of field-pieces was available. W.O. 55. 457.51, ff. 1-2.

(2) See above, Chapter I.

(3) Clarendon, VI, 66, 64, 71.

(4) His dismissal was rumoured in December 1641, C.S.P.D., 1641-3, p.201.

the Earl of Newcastle in the North, where his loyalty soon became suspect. The effective commander of the Ordnance, from its inception at York and Shrewsbury, was Newport's pre-war second-in-command, the Lieutenant of the Office, Sir John Heydon. He had succeeded his brother as Lieutenant in 1627, and was a professional soldier of great experience, who had been conspicuously active in the Scots Wars. He appears to have left the Tower, and his house in the Minories, to join the King at York at some time in July or early August 1642.⁽¹⁾ He worked with the aid of Ordnance commissioners appointed then, and remained as Lieutenant-General throughout the war. Others were made Generals of the Artillery, but he served them faithfully and won golden opinions for his conduct.⁽²⁾

His chief assistant was Captain Henry Younger. Younger was not a Tower official before the war, but probably a professional soldier who became Comptroller of the train of artillery in the South of England in 1640. Armed with this service, and in the absence of other senior Ordnance officers, he was promoted Comptroller of the whole train, next in command to Heydon, in the summer of 1642.⁽³⁾

The normal means of supplying the train were, of course, disrupted, and many official contractors remained in London. A new organisation had to be

- (1) Heydon's career, and the fortunes of his family, are traced in D.N.B., H. Trevor-Roper, The Gentry, 1540-1640, Econ.Hist. Review supplement, p. 19, G. Aymer, The King's Servants, pp.290-1, and Stevens, pp. 57-9. Transport for munitions seized at his house on Essex's orders, 27 August 1642, W.O. 55. 1754. The King wrote to him at the Tower on 20 June, but his letter was intercepted, C.S.P.D., 1641-3, p. 343.
- (2) Clarendon thought highly of him, VI, § I. He was almost capable of reconciling the warring factions in the Royalist Camp, later in the war: his candidature for the Governorship of Oxford was canvassed by Digby's agent, and as a professional he was not displeasing to Rupert, C.S.P.D., 1645-7, p. 59.
- (3) C.S.P.D., 1640-1, pp. 187, 270 and W.O. 55. 457. 60, f.2.

constructed, and to aid the Ordnance officers Charles turned to those prominent refugees from the City who had thrown in their lot with him, and who, as commercial patentees or holders of office, were familiar at court. The supply and conduct of his small but growing train was entrusted by the first Council of War which he held to a committee of wealthy and able men, consisting of Sir John Pennington, Sir Bryan Palmes, Sir George Strode and John Wandesford, together with Sir John Heydon.⁽¹⁾ They were constituted Ordnance or Artillery Commissioners with power to order the train and contract for its provision. The choice of committeemen was unremarkable, similar to those appointed by a Council of War in November 1642 to supply clothing for the Army.⁽²⁾ Pennington was the elderly, and experienced Admiral of the Fleet, unemployed since his charge had deserted him. His association with the Ordnance Office was brief, however, for he later resumed his naval activities on behalf of the King at Bristol.⁽³⁾ Palmes, son of a Rutland knight, had been a member of the Short Parliament. He was active for the King as Commissioner of array and military commander in the Midlands, and with his father was very wealthy.⁽⁴⁾ Probably Governor of Belvoir later, he is lost sight of in the Ordnance papers after March 1643.⁽⁵⁾

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- (1) Information contained in the post-Restoration petition of Wandesford and Strode's eldest son [? 1663] S.P. 29. 66, No.46. As the death of Sir George Strode is referred to in the petition, it must be dated some time after June 1663, and not earlier as in C.S.P.D., 1661-2, pp. 614-5. The date of the first Council of War, mentioned by Wandesford, is not known exactly, but from its context in Clarendon, V, § 44In., was probably July 1642.
- (2) Harl.MS. 6851, f.219. A typical member of the latter was Sir George Bynion, successful City mercer, and later also involved in arms administration. See below, p.333.
- (3) See Harl.MSS. 6852, f.58 and 6802, f.144.
- (4) D.N.B., V.C.H., Rutland, II, p.109, A. Wood, Fasti Oxonienses, ed. P.Bliss, II, p.41.
- (5) He compounded on Newark articles, C.C.C., p. 1316. See also A.C.Wood, Nottinghamshire in the Civil War, pp. 116, 220.

The two most prominent members, who remained as Commissioners with increasing powers and duties throughout the war, were Strode and Wandesford. Sir George Strode was a pious and successful City business man who was connected with both the court and the ruling circles in the City, a friend of Sir William Russell, Treasurer of the Navy, and related by his own and his daughter's marriage to Sir Nicholas Crispe.⁽¹⁾ A strong Royalist, he had been bailed out in May 1642 by Crispe and Russell after his summons before Parliament to answer articles of impeachment accusing him and a Kentish neighbour ("Brothers in Iniquity") of being part authors of a dangerous petition. He forfeited his bail by joining the King shortly afterwards.⁽²⁾ He was one of the most active and dedicated of Charles's civilian supporters, applying his great wealth and ability not only as the leading figure in the Ordnance Committee, but in the purchase of clothing for the army, the regulation of excise and the defence of Oxford. He abandoned Oxford late in the war and went abroad.⁽³⁾

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- (1) D.N.B., Clarendon, VI, § 94, Stevens, pp. 68-9. His will, proved 3 June 1663, P.C.C. Juxon 76, included legacies to courtiers John Ashburnham and Sir Orlando Bridgeman. His piety, wealth and philanthropy are evident in his will, which also contains some details of a quarrel with Crispe, whom he accused of "unnaturall dealings".
- (2) C.J., II, pp. 543, 549, 565, 700, L.J., IV, p. 676, V, pp. 59-62, 367-8, P.Laslett, "The Gentry of Kent in 1640", Cambridge Historical Journal, Vol. 9, No.2.
- (3) For his other activities during the war, see Black, pp. 142, 188, 259, S.P. 29. 66, No.46, Bodleian, MS. Add. D.114, f.73, and Otley, Vol.7, p.273. He was heavily fined at a half, in 1649, but the comparatively modest amount he paid is not a reliable guide to his actual wealth, C.C.C., p. 2049. His estate had been sequestrated in 1643 and he had spent much in the royal service; both before and after the war he was a notable benefactor in Somerset and the City, C.J., III, p.258, V.C.H., Somerset, II, p.457, W.Pinks, History of Clerkenwell (1881), pp. 45, 48, 601-2, and W. Jordan, The Charities of London (1960), p.240. The date of his leaving Oxford is discussed below, p.305.

John Wandesford was a member of the Yorkshire gentry family of Kirklington in the North Riding; his elder brother was Christopher Wandesford, Lord Deputy to Strafford in Ireland, who died in 1640. John was born in 1593, educated at Gray's Inn, and was an M.P. in 1624-5 and 1640 (Short Parliament). In 1629 he was appointed Consul at Aleppo, and remained there until 1633.⁽¹⁾ Although friendly with Pym, on his return to England he joined with other members of loyal Yorkshire families in helping the King when he came North, advanced himself in the royal service during the war and, like Strode, was appointed to other committees.⁽²⁾ He stayed in Oxford until its final surrender, went into exile on the continent, and at the Restoration survived Strode by not more than one or two years.⁽³⁾

The activities of the Ordnance Commissioners were at first confined to the conduct of the artillery train and foraging for arms. By their efforts the Royalist army met Essex at Edgehill with twenty pieces of cannon, and these, as has recently been shown, played no small part in the battle.⁽⁴⁾

(1) V.C.H., North Riding, Yorkshire, I, pp.152, 373; Dugdale's Visitation of Yorkshire, ed. J.W. Clay (1899), I, p.344; H.B.M'Call, Story of the Family of Wandesforde (1904), pp. 66, 284; J. Foster, Alumni Oxonienses, Early Series, IV, p. 1567; M. Epstein, The English Levant Company (1908), p.215.

(2) C.S.P.D., 1637-8, p.571; C.J., II, p.543; Black, p.259.

(3) At Oxford in 1646, #O.55. 1661 [1]; H.M.C., Ormonde, N.S., I, pp. 176, 183, S.P. 29.66, No.46. He signed the petition [1663], ibid., claiming a grant of park, but his step-brother William Wandesford was receiving the rents by 1666, C.S.P.D., 1665-6, p.151. He was recorded as deceased, without issue, by Dugdale in 1665 visitation.

(4) P.Young, "The Royalist Artillery at Edgehill", J.S.A.H.R., Vol.35, p.145.

The Venetian ambassador had reported eighteen to twenty guns in the Royalist train on its march from Shrewsbury, and seven more were captured from Essex's army. ⁽¹⁾ At the battle Strode was wounded, and Wandesford, according to his remembrance of it twenty years later, "alone brought off the train to Oxford". ⁽²⁾ The Oxford antiquarian, Anthony Wood, then a boy, noted its arrival in the city. "The ordinance & great guns were driven into Magdalen college grove, about 26 or 27 peices, with all their carriages". The Grove was henceforth the main artillery park. A few days later "the town was disarmed, and a cart loade of muskettis, and another cart loade of powder and shott, beinge loaded out of Yeeld [Guild] hall, were carried to the Schooles, and lodged in the uppermost rooms of the Schoole Tower by such as the kinge's counsell of warre had appoynted". ⁽³⁾ The basis for this magazine, which became the Ordnance Commissioners', was arms and ammunition requisitioned from the city of Oxford. It served both as an armoury and a munitions workshop. Strode and Wandesford were termed by the end of 1643 Keepers of the Schools stores ⁽⁴⁾ The central magazine, the Royalist successor and rival to the Tower of London, was set up at New College in

(1) C.S.P.Venetian, 1642-3, pp.172, 181; Young, opcit.

(2) Clarendon, VI, s 94, and S.P.29,66, No.46.

(3) A. Wood, ^{The} Life and Times, ed. A.Clark, Oxford Historical Society (1891), I. pp. 68, 70.

(4) Warrant of 25 December 1643, W.O. 55. 459.

the cloisters and Tower, the scholars having been moved, according to Wood, to "dark nasty" quarters elsewhere. A third armoury lay at Peckwater Inn, where the arms of the county were stored. ⁽¹⁾

It is at this point (the establishment of the army and its trains at Oxford, which became the Royalist headquarters) that the papers of the Ordnance Office begin to illumine the scene. There are over twenty journals recording the incomings and outgoings of the Oxford magazine, and nearly a thousand original warrants and letters of the Office, 1642-6. The orderly recounting of receipts and issues is an indication of the arrival of some of the chief officers from the Tower, and the establishment of a permanent office at Oxford. Richard March and Edward Sherburne, two such officers, began to sign warrants at Oxford in December 1642. ⁽²⁾ As Keeper and Clerk of the Stores, respectively, they were established there after Edgehill to organise the base magazine. It is probably to Sherburne that we owe the survival of the Royalist Ordnance papers. ⁽³⁾

The ad hoc body of Ordnance Commissioners which, acting in concert with Sir John Heydon, had taken charge of all the train's activities until December 1642, confined itself more to the organisation of supply for the train. The pre-war officers and clerks resumed their old positions. But the customary organisation of the Office was altered as a result of its removal from London and its possession of multiple functions as artillery arm and armaments manufacturer, supplier and transporter to all the Royalist

(1) A. Wood, op.cit., pp.69-71.

(2) W.O.55.457.60, f.27.

(3) In his Restoration petition he claimed to have preserved the papers, C.S.P.D., 1661-2, p.229. Sherburne was a minor literary as well as military figure, see D.N.B.

forces (but principally the main or Oxford army), South of the Trent.⁽¹⁾ The need to supply an army in the field, and to provide the main and bye-trains of artillery, dictated the shape of the new arrangements.

The duties of the six principal officers before the war were not exactly reflected in the ordering of the Royalist Office. The organisation of manufacture, and the reception of arms into store, remained largely in the hands of civilian commissioners. The post of Surveyor (of stores received) disappeared, and the senior officers, Heydon, the Comptrollers, March and Sherburne, were all, to begin with, indiscriminately concerned with the keeping, issuing and transporting of supplies. But at least in theory there was some division of responsibilities. An undated document among the surviving Ordnance papers indicates that there were different departments.⁽²⁾ At this stage the Office was usually referred to as the train of artillery and the document suggests the order to be observed in marching with the train.

In the first section are the ordnance and accompanying ammunition and equipment; in the second, the munitions for the army proper, both horse and foot; in the third, the standing magazine. In 1643 March, the Keeper of the Stores, was also Commissary for the munitions of the artillery, and Sherburne, Clerk of the Ordnance, was Commissary for the munition of the army.⁽³⁾ They still retained their old positions, recording the states of

(1) North of the Trent Newcastle was independent Commander-in-Chief. His General of the Ordnance was Sir William Davenant, the Poet Laureate, M. Cavendish, The Life of William Cavendish Duke of Newcastle, ed. C. Firth, 2nd edn. (1907), p. xiv.

(2) W.O.55. 457. 60, f.3.

(3) This division is apparent only from the summer of 1643.

the magazine and the proportions for bye-trains.

But the distinction between army and artillery train was often observed in the field, if it is not obvious in the subsequent activities of March and Sherburne. In the orders for a large bye-train to attend several pieces of ordnance, and which would normally convey arms and ammunition for the troops, two subordinate commissaries would be appointed, one to supervise the cannon and its supplies, the other to see to the army's supplies. ⁽¹⁾ Where a large number of guns, waggons, carters and horses were involved, a further division might be made between the draught of the cannon and the draught of the munition in carts.

Heydon remained effective head of the Ordnance Office until May 1643. In that month Henry Percy was appointed General of the Artillery, the equivalent of the post Newport had vacated, the pre-war Mastership of the Ordnance. ⁽²⁾ Percy was the younger brother of the Earl of Northumberland, who was Charles I's Lord High Admiral but who adhered to Parliament in 1642; he was a successful courtier and confidant of the Queen, and after his involvement in the Army Plot, aided her on the continent at the outbreak of the war. ⁽³⁾ He returned to England and served as a cavalry colonel at Oxford before his appointment as General. ⁽⁴⁾ Although she was influential in Percy's promotion, ⁽⁵⁾ the Queen was quite aware of his defects of

- (1) E.g., a marching train of 28 May 1643, Rawl. MS. D. 395, ff. 133-5.
- (2) Draft of Percy's commission, Harl. MS. 6804, ff. 41-2. The Mastership of the Ordnance was preserved as a sinecure appointment; it was offered to the Earl of Forth as such in January 1644, C. Clar. S. P., I, No. 1747.
- (3) D. N. B.
- (4) His cavalry commission dated 2 February 1642/3, and he himself took part in a Council of War at Oxford in January, Harl. MSS. 6852, f. 2. and 6851, f. 104.
- (5) Letters p. 97.

character: she admitted that "he has his weak points", and objected that he was overloaded with honours which might have been used to satisfy other claimants.⁽¹⁾ Nevertheless, he was created Baron Percy of Alwick in June 1643. According to Clarendon, "he was generally unloved, as a proud and supercilious person",⁽²⁾ and was a largely ineffective General of the Artillery. Unlike Heydon he accompanied the King on campaigns, transmitting orders for supply to Oxford;⁽³⁾ but he was never an important member of the War Council and the impression left by the Ordnance papers is that Heydon was the real organiser. Percy was a born intriguer, and as a result of his support for Lord Wilmot in that General's quarrel with the King, lost office in August 1644. He left England for France early in the following year.⁽⁴⁾

Percy was replaced as head of the Ordnance Office by the dependable Lord Hopton, who had made his reputation in the Western campaigns of 1643. But by 1644 Hopton was too senior a commander to take an undivided interest in the Artillery and even before he became Field Marshall in the West in the later stages of the war the command of the train had fallen almost entirely upon Heydon again.

A general picture of the members of the train and their duties is provided by a list of the chief "officers and ministers" made shortly after Percy became General.⁽⁵⁾ This old establishment was increased for the

(1) Letters, pp. 139, 211.

(2) Clarendon, VIII, § 97, quoted in D.N.B.

(3) E.g., his orders to Heydon from the camp at Gloucester, 23 August 1643, W.O.55.459.

(4) He died in 1659.

(5) Undated list [?] June 1643], Rawl. MS. D. 395, ff. 203-9. It was compiled after Percy's appointment (May, 1643) and before the capture of Bristol (July 1643), when Busy, the Master Gunner's mate, named in the list, was killed, Warburton, II, p. 246.

summer campaign of 1643; 'by reason of "newly made" brass and iron pieces an extra comptroller and four more gentlemen of the Ordnance were taken on strength,⁽¹⁾ and a further and more complete list, composed and added to in the early months of 1644, represents the train probably at its fullest extent.⁽²⁾ In the latter 17 gentlemen of the Ordnance (subordinate officials who had charge of individual batteries and magazines), several engineers and battery masters, and the rank and file of conductors (who conducted the marching trains), gunners and matrosses (assistant gunners) were ranged under the principal officers. The 1643 list includes the hundreds of lowly pioneers and carters who were part of the train. Most of the personnel were concerned with the maintaining, transporting and using of artillery; and the majority of the craftsmen attached to the train were employed on repair-work or in the making of materials rather than in the manufacture of arms and ammunition.⁽³⁾ The supply of these was in the hands of civilian commissioners and private industrialists. The two lists of personnel show that the train was roughly the strength of an ordinary foot regiment, and enjoyed the same services; its payroll therefore included a chaplain, surgeon, messenger, commanding officer's secretary and provost marshall.⁽⁴⁾

It is noticeable that a good part of the establishment was concerned with transport. The senior officers of this department, the Waggon-Master

(1) This was revealed when the Oxford Parliament investigated the train's activities. The state of Lord Percy's business, paper of early 1644, Rawl. MS. D.395, f.198; cf. S.P.16.500, No.40A (see next note), which is explicitly a "former establishment".

(2) A list of the Officers, ibid.

(3) Among the wheelwrights and carpenters was only one gunsmith. There were, however, nine gunfounders, Rawl. MS. D.395, ff.208-9.

(4) Ibid.

and the commissary of the draught horses, made all the arrangements for conveying military stores, and for this purpose deployed the men - conductors, carters and drivers - waggons and beasts under their command. The carts and tumbrils belonging to the train - or impressed into service by the Waggon-master - were kept in the artillery park at Magdalen College Grove, together with much of the equipment needed. ⁽¹⁾ Normally artillery and munition conveyances would be fitted out there. On occasion, however, the Waggon-master-General of the army was called in to provide transport. Supplies to garrisons down the Thames, such as Abingdon, Wallingford and Reading, could often be most conveniently taken by river. In these cases the army's waggon-master provided boats. ⁽²⁾ A barge brought much-needed powder to Reading garrison when it was besieged in April 1643. ⁽³⁾ For the Naseby campaign the King, having chosen fourteen field pieces for his train, had the same number of boats built for them and tried them out in the Isis. ⁽⁴⁾ Where extra carts were required, presumably because of a shortage in the train, the waggon-master-general was ordered to impress them, with teams of horse or oxen, and carters, from the neighbouring countryside. ⁽⁵⁾ Some of the ammunition convoys of 1643 and 1644 from Oxford were sent in this way the

(1) Carts returned there, W.O.55. 1661 f27.

(2) Winter Graunt, waggon-master-general, to the Mayor of Abingdon (19 December 1642), and to Heydon (undated, but May 1643), W.O.55.423, f.256, and W.O.55.459.

(3) Warburton, II, p.173.

(4) The Diary of Sir Henry Slingsby, ed. D.Parsons, p.142.

(5) Stevens, pp. 21, 22, 23 etc.

"by country teams", and paid for by the waggon-master at the rate of sixpence a mile for each cart.⁽¹⁾

For every train and convoy the Ordnance Office had carefully to calculate the numbers of carts, horses and drivers, and where cannon was to be sent, the correct quota of gunners and pioneers, required by each. The military manuals of the time were helpful and informative on such problems, setting out tables to show how many horses were needed to draw what weight of gun or size of waggon.⁽²⁾ A team of eight to twelve draught animals - horses or oxen - was expected to draw a medium-sized field piece, five or six a cart laden with four barrels of gunpowder.⁽³⁾ Numbers of beasts were quartered near the train⁽⁴⁾, but some of the horses were kept at Iffley, for it was difficult to maintain many within the city walls.⁽⁵⁾ Occasionally surplus or unfit animals were rounded up and, if not claimed, sold off at market prices in Christ Church meadow.⁽⁶⁾ More often there was a lack of good draught animals, which seriously impeded the movement of the artillery and munitions trains. Before the campaigning season of 1644 there were only 260 animals belonging to the Ordnance Office, many having died or been sent away.⁽⁷⁾ Similarly, the shortage of draught horses in the following year

(1) Endorsement of two orders, March 1644, W.O.55.459. Rates of pay in Stevens, pp.21,23, etc.

(2) E. g., Markham's Five Decades of War (1622).

(3) Cf. Markham's figures with a "marching train", Rawl.MS.D.395, ff.133-5.

(4) There were 400 horse and oxen belonging to the train at the end of 1643, ibid., f.198.

(5) Heydon to subordinates, February 1642-3, W.O.55.423, f.123, and March 1643, W.O.55. 459.

(6) Oxen, "found not to be so useful as horses", to be sold, draft royal warrant to waggon-master-general, 23 March 1643/4, Harl.MS.6852, f.50.

(7) Rawl.MS.D.395, f.193.

delayed the King's departure from Oxford on the Naseby campaign.⁽¹⁾

Kidlington, a few miles north of the city, provided many of the horses, and the district was also the main winter quarters for the train. The ordinary artillerymen lived (and died) there and in the neighbouring villages.⁽²⁾

The list of "officers and ministers" of 1643 includes the pay due to each member of the train, from Percy's 34 a day to the pioneer's shilling.⁽³⁾

The cost of the Ordnance Office was heavy, and in common with all other soldiers in the King's employ, artillerymen never received full pay. Henry Sherburns's complaint of hardship among the Ordnance officers at Reading may stand for many.⁽⁴⁾

Although, according to the 1643 list, the wages payable to the Ordnance personnel amounted to twice as much,⁽⁵⁾ the weekly payment made to the train on the old establishment was only £236 weekly.⁽⁶⁾ This sum included the satisfaction of all wages and fees, and other regular charges incurred by the train, such as transport.⁽⁷⁾ It was increased when the new and larger establishment was set up after Percy became General, but the enquiry by the Oxford Parliament into the Office's accounts probably

(1) Warburton, III, pp.80-1.

(2) Petition of the inhabitants of Kidlington, 7 May 1645, P.R.O. 31.8.197, f.247, and royal warrant to them, 30 January 1643/4, Rawl.MS.D.395, f.19. Burial recorded in Yarnton Parish Register, Yarnton, Oxfordshire.

(3) Rawl.MS.D.395, ff.208-9.

(4) His letter to Percy (Reading, 9 March 1643/4), ibid., f.119.

(5) Ibid., ff.208-9.

(6) Paper without address, 11 March 1643/4, ibid., f.121: this was a questionnaire for the Ordnance officials to answer, almost certainly prepared by the Oxford Parliament, then sitting.

(7) The paymaster to the train was John Stanforth; his duties were to pay all personnel attached to the train, including those temporarily hired. Carters paid, Percy to Stanforth (Oxford, 15 May, 1644), ibid., f.74.

revealed some extravagance, for the old sum was reintroduced in 1644.⁽¹⁾

By May of that year Heydon was receiving £240 weekly out of the excise for the use of the train.⁽²⁾ This new source of revenue may have led to more regular payments of the Ordnance officers; previously in a period of two months in 1643, for which there are records, only two-thirds of the estimated amount was being received from John Ashburnham, the treasurer-at-war.⁽³⁾

There were, however an increasing number of calls upon the Excise for other purposes, and probably the artillerymen fared no better than any other arm towards the end of the war, in the matter of pay.⁽⁴⁾

During the winter of 1642/3 the Royalists began to make financial preparations for a supply of arms and munitions, if the war should continue. The original train of artillery, it may be remembered, was an amalgam of foreign purchases, provincial impressments and cannon captured from the enemy; but from its establishment at Oxford the Ordnance Office had to make more lasting arrangements. The King's armies needed the support of iron and gunpowder industries, and the Ordnance Office, cut off from its pre-war contractors in South-east England, looked to the Midland ironmasters, provincial powder-makers and foreign exporters for munitions supply.

The Officers found that they could not supervise the whole military output of Royalist-held England, and that there was competition for the limited stocks produced. They were chronically short of money, and

(1) Ibid., f.121.

(2) Paper of 23 May (1644), Harl. MS.6304, f.156.

(3) £1392 received, 1 October-23 November 1643, Rawl. MS.D.395, f.25.

(4) The Oxford members of the train were maintained, at the end, as garrison soldiers; see below, p.341.

expenditure on arms throughout the war fell as much outside as within the scope of the Office. It is difficult to arrive at any conclusions about Royalist finance, and nothing like full or trustworthy accounts of the Office survive, among the Ordnance Papers or elsewhere. But at some stages of the war there are indications of the amounts involved. A distinction was made between the regular weekly payment of the train to cover wages, etc.,⁽¹⁾ and the sums set aside to purchase supplies for the central magazines.⁽²⁾ The latter, known as the "Emption Money",⁽³⁾ was the amount, calculated by the King, Council of War and Ordnance officers, thought likely to be enough to cover all the disbursements for raw materials and manufactured goods needed. Each winter sums were agreed upon to set up the armouries and train for the coming spring. In 1642/3 the estimated cost was £4,500, and later, with the enlargement of the train, an increased budget was allowed of over £6,000.⁽⁴⁾ The normal peacetime expenditure on the Ordnance and Armoury departments together, including the payment of officials, had been approximately £6,000 per annum.⁽⁵⁾

These sums were to be paid by the Oxford authorities to Heydon, who, with the officers of the magazines, undertook the purchase of supplies.⁽⁶⁾

(1) See above, pp. 291-2.

(2) That the two were kept distinct may be seen in the surviving accounts; cf. regular payments for October-November 1643, and the statement in 1644 that no money for provisions had been paid since the winter of 1642/3, Rawl. MS. D. 395, ff. 215, 198.

(3) Ashburnham, II, Appendix, p. x.

(4) Undated paper of estimates, Rawl. MS. D. 395, f. 224.

(5) See above, p. 270. Cf. the expenditure given in F. C. Dietz, The Receipts and Issues of the Exchequer..., Smith College Studies in History, Vol. 13 (1928), pp. 162-5.

(6) Rawl. MS. D. 395, f. 193, and small part of a payment to Heydon from the Oxford Exchequer recorded, Receipts and Issues, 28 September 1644-4 January 1644/5, Clarendon MSS., Vol. 24, f. 3.

and the estimates on paper were hardly ever fulfilled. Of the initial amount of ~~4000~~ only 12200 was issued: of the second estimate (26000), almost nothing was paid before the Oxford parliament began to sit: ⁽¹⁾ then (January-February 1644) 21000 was provided but, as Commissary March lamented, this was nowhere near enough to prepare the train and supply the magazines for the spring. ⁽²⁾ Those responsible for buying arms, such as Heydon and the Ordnance Commissioners, had in consequence to meet some obligations out of their own pockets; Heydon was repaid for this and other services by the Crown grant of profits from delinquents' estates, late in the war. ⁽³⁾

The Exemption Money which was controlled by the Ordnance officers, had therefore to be supplemented, and the Exchequer and the treasurer-at-war made payments direct to manufacturers or agents for armaments. The Ordnance Office had no cognisance of these, but they bulked large in the narrow Royalist budget. Ashburnham's accounts include payments to Oxford artificers, the Master Fireworker to the train and a powdermaking syndicate, which were apparently extra to the disbursements for the Office. ⁽⁴⁾ The Exchequer, similarly, was instructed to pay large sums to William Legge, the Master of the Armoury, the Ordnance Commissioners and other arms manufacturers and importers. ⁽⁵⁾

(1) Rawl. Ms. D. 395, ff. 195, 224. Ashburnham's accounts seem to confirm that Heydon had to return part of the Exemption Money he received, Ashburnham, II, Appendix, p. x. 24000 had been allotted to Heydon out of the Oxford Exchequer in November 1643, but little can have actually been paid, Privy Seal warrant, 23 November, 1643, S.P. 16.493, No. 3, p. 13.

(2) March to Mason, Percy's secretary (Bristol 5 February 1643/4), Rawl. Ms. D. 395, f. 104.

(3) Black, p. 407. For the Commissioners' outlay see below, p. 302.

(4) Ashburnham, II, Appendix, passim.

(5) S.P. 16.493, No. 3; some of the actual payments are recorded in the surviving Exchequer accounts, Clarendon MSS. Vol. 24, f. 3. 11.

Where the allowance from central funds fell short, as it usually did, various shifts and expedients were attempted by the Ordnance officials to satisfy their creditors. Percy's agents or local officers on the spot (at Bristol, Worcester, Weymouth, etc.,) organised the defrayment of charges from local sources available to the Royalists: the weekly contribution in money from the city or neighbouring area, customs dues at port, special local assessments and, when introduced, the excise. The King's men were not in a strong bargaining position, however. Arms shippers wanted ready money for their cargoes and, unlike the hard pressed farmers forced to billet and feed a penurious soldiery, they were in a position to demand it. They were able to extort far more than pre-war prices for arms supplied, and gained extensive concessions, such as freedom from customs duties.⁽¹⁾ It was cheaper to have arms made locally, but often the materials for this had to be imported; and a good part of the armaments needed had to be brought in from abroad. Expenditure on arms was recouped, on occasion, by selling stocks to local army commanders.⁽²⁾ Sometimes the bill was paid by a wealthy individual.⁽³⁾ By whatever method military stores were acquired, in default of payment by the Oxford authorities, the local people acted as "Paymasters".⁽⁴⁾

Once Oxford had been chosen as the King's headquarters, and the train of artillery and the central magazines set up there, the best solution to supply problems was the development of the city itself as a centre of manufacture. The chief organisers of Oxford production were the Ordnance Commissioners. Since the general administration of the train was taken over by the regular

(1) See below, p. 320.

(2) Sir John Stawell to pay for arms delivered to him from Bristol magazine, draft Royal warrant to Sir F. Hawley (Liskeard, 4 August 1644), Harl. MS. 6802, f. 257.

(3) T. Carte, The Life of James Duke of Ormond, V, pp. 506-8.

(4) Trevor to Rupert (Bristol 30 April 1645), Add. MS. 18982, f. 51.

Ordnance officials, the Commissioners, chiefly Strode and Wandesford, confined their activities to the organisation of supply.

Their work at Oxford began in December 1642, when the Council of War asked them to co-operate with Heydon over the repair and supply of small-arms, particularly muskets.⁽¹⁾ They employed gunsmiths and metal-workers, many of them in the Schools Tower, where their own armoury lay, repairing muskets, pikes and other equipment for the army. In February 1643 three-foot long carbines were being new-stocked for a dragoon regiment.⁽²⁾ At frequent intervals throughout the war defective weapons were taken from the New College armoury and the army to be repaired in the Schools or by private craftsmen in the city who were under contract to the Commissioners.⁽³⁾

The Council of War in January 1643 directed the Ordnance officers and the Commissioners to make further joint preparations. The officers were "to treat with several workmen to complete everything ready for an estimated train of 40 pieces"; the Commissioners were to attend the Council to give an account of the provision of powder and match.⁽⁴⁾ Workshops, foundries and mills were established to supply the armouries before the summer campaigning season. Artificers from the Tower took over the places of industry in Oxford, and enlisted the help of local craftsmen. A city blacksmith provided the forge and tools for the King's Master Smith, Michael Bastian, who worked

(1) Copy of the minutes of Council of War, 14 December 1642, W.O.55.457.60, f. 30; and draft minutes of a Council, 20 June 1643, Harl.MS.6852, f.88.

(2) An inventory of cleaned and repaired muskets, 22 February 1642/3, W.O.55.457.60, f.80. Payments for this work, W.O.55.423, f.136.

(3) E.g., W.O.55.1661 [2.117].

(4) Draft minutes of Council of War, undated [January 1643], House of Lords Record Office, Walker Papers, f.95.

throughout the war for the train.⁽¹⁾ With the shortage of regular workmen the Ordnance officers turned their hands to manufacture.⁽²⁾ As well as Oxford gunsmiths, the craftsmen of the neighbouring villages contracted with the central magazine or the Commissioners to supply weapons, cannon shot, armour, and equipment for the artillery train and its transport - cart-wheels, horse-harness, etc. In the journals of receipts kept at New College, an Abingdon ironmonger, a Dorchester blacksmith, a Leicester armourer, and wheelwrights at Wheatley and Burford made their appearance.⁽³⁾ So also did foreign workers; the "almain" (German) armourers, whose employment at the Tower of London dated from at least the sixteenth century, complained to the Council of War that they received no pay for the work they were doing in Oxford.⁽⁴⁾

The craftsmen attached to the train, and who worked in or near the artillery park in Magdalen College Grove, were a mixture of foreign technicians and members of English families long in the royal service. Continental skills had aided the development of English gunnery and military engineering over many years, and both King and Parliament brought over foreign experts when war broke out. Among the members of the train listed in 1643 and 1644 were a number of French and Low Country mechanics. Two of the most senior posts were held by Frenchmen: M. Fleury was Chief Engineer to the train, and M. Mountgarnier was a Comptroller in 1643.⁽⁵⁾

(1) Petition of Thomas Adams of Oxford, blacksmith, 31 January 1645/6, P.R.O., 31.3.197, f.253. Bastian continued his trade, in Whitehall, at the Restoration, H.M.C., 15th Report, I, p.3.

(2) Greene, a conductor, cast musket shot, Add.MS.34325, f.6.

(3) W.O.55,1661 and Add.MS.34325.

(4) Draft minutes of Council of War, 27 November 1643, Harl.MS.6851, f.229; C.Foulkes, Inventory and Survey of the Armouries of the Tower of London (1916), I. pp.49, 50.

(5) Rawl. MS.D.395, ff.208:9.

Other engineers attached to the artillery were Captain Shebis (or Shebith) and Doderick Beckman, a Dutchman who was particularly valuable to the Royalists. ⁽¹⁾ The two most famous continental technicians at Oxford were Bartholomew de la Roche, Master Fireworker to the train, ⁽²⁾ and Bernard de Gomme, the Walloon defensive expert and map-maker. ⁽³⁾ Both were followers of Rupert and were knighted for their services. They worked beside English craftsmen who had provided the royal armouries before the War, and were to again at the Restoration. Sherman, the Master Armourer, had held his post for a long period previously. ⁽⁴⁾

The "train of 40 pieces" envisaged for the summer of 1643 was ambitiously large; new cannon would have to be cast at Oxford. A foundry was set up at Christ Church, and in the artillery park at Magdalen College Grove workshops and forges were equipped with men, tools and quantities of fuel. ⁽⁵⁾ The Grove housed timber, for the building and repair of waggons, and stocks of "sea-coal" which had been requisitioned locally or brought to Oxford from other parts of the country, and was used in the making of ironware and in casting brass ordnance. ⁽⁶⁾ The Ordnance Commissioners had authority to

(1) Ibid., and S.P.16.500, No.40A. A draft of Beckman's commission, Harl. MS. 6804 f.24. He was held in captivity at Abingden in 1645 and strenuous efforts were made by Royalist High Command to have him exchanged, C.S.P.D., 1645-7, p.60.

(2) See below, pp. 306-7.

(3) D.N.B.

(4) Petition of his widow, P.R.O. 31.3.197, f.373. Sherman died in Oxford and was buried at St. Peter in the East, 9 August 1643, A. Wood, City of Oxford, ed. A. Clark, III, p.257.

(5) Goods for the foundry, 17 September 1644; the Ladlemaker had "his shopp in ye Grove", S.O.55. 1661 1 and 27.

(6) Coal and timber kept in "the storehouse behind Magdalen Colledge", and smith's coals received, 21 April 1645, from a Wiltshire boatman, ibid., 11

seize supplies of metal wherever they could be found.⁽¹⁾ Iron and lead were taken from private owners in the city and county, and Oxford inhabitants were encouraged to bring in kettles, pots, pans and other brassware to be melted down.⁽²⁾ Old cannon, very small ornamented guns and others of an inconvenient size, were rendered down and converted in this way.⁽³⁾ In other parts of the city equipment for a train of heavy ordnance was produced. Foundries supplied cannon shot and all kinds of iron implements. The city parishes subscribed towards making cannon "baskets" and hurdles, as well as "Tools for the works" (spades and shovels), in the mills at Holywell, Folly Bridge and Osney.⁽⁴⁾ The process of boring the ordnance, which followed the casting, was carried on at a city mill, probably one of these.⁽⁵⁾ Oxford production of cannon was never large but the city defences benefited from the supply of iron six-pounders.⁽⁶⁾

The mill for boring ordnance was fitted out, by order of the Council of War in the summer of 1643, with the tools to grind sword-blades.⁽⁷⁾ A separate mill for sword-making was found to be necessary later, and its construction and control were entrusted to Captain William Legge, the Master of the Armoury and close associate of Rupert. It was to be raised at

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- (1) Draft minutes of a Council of War 20 June 1643, Harl. MS. 6852, f.88. Metal belonging to those in rebellion against the King was deemed "lawfull prize", Rawl. MS.D.395, f.179.
- (2) Metal seized, Harl. MS. 6802, ff.138, 333. A note of brass handed in, 4 April 1643, Oxford City Council Acts, 1626-1665, ed. Hobson and Salter, Oxford Historical Society, Vol.95, Appendix III, p.372.
- (3) Draft royal warrant to Percy, 29 July 1643, for eight guns to be melted down, Harl. MS. 6852, f. 158.
- (4) Account of money disbursed 14 August 1644, Bodleian, MS. Add. D.114, f.92. One of the mills was at "The fryers", no doubt the mythical "Friar Bacon's study" on Folly Bridge. Baskets and hurdles were used in the construction of gun emplacements.
- (5) Harl. MS. 6852, f.83.
- (6) 38 pieces in the works at Oxford's capture, Warburton, III, p.231n.
- (7) Harl. MS. 6852, f.38.

Wolvercote and fully equipped.⁽¹⁾ The complementary process of forging the blades was undertaken at Gloucester Hall in the city, also by Legge. Production of swords and belts was stepped up in February 1644, and enough money to pay for 4000 of each was laid aside.⁽²⁾

For powder, the most expensive and valuable of all the commodities needed by the Ordnance Office, new mills were built and old adapted along the banks of the Isis and Cherwell, just within the city walls and the new lines of defensive earthworks and bastions then being constructed. The presence of flour and powder-mills complicated the laying out of the fortifications on the south side of the city.⁽³⁾ Their success was vital; the Chief Engineer to the army dug wider channels from the rivers to provide more water-power, and local and imported blacksmiths and carpenters were employed in erecting and repairing them.⁽⁴⁾ Gunpowder could be milled on a small scale by hand or by using horses, but the danger of explosions, frequent in the Civil War, limited the number of powder workshops and placed them as far as possible from living quarters. In the overcrowded city production was probably confined to several large mills on the river boundaries and to selected villages nearby.⁽⁵⁾ A converted fulling mill at Osney was used.⁽⁶⁾

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- (1) Order for an Exchequer payment to Legge, 20 November 1643, S.P.16.498, No.8, p.13.
- (2) Similar order, 26 February 1643/4, *ibid.*, p.29.
- (3) Draft minutes of Council of War, 19 June 1643, Harl. MS.6852, f.82.
- (4) Spades and shovels issued to Colonel, later Sir Charles Lloyd, the engineer, for this purpose, 29 May 1643, W.O.55. 1661 [77]; petition of a blacksmith who worked on the mills, 1 May 1645, P.R.O.31.8.197, f.243.
- (5) Only two mills reported by Parliamentary newsletter to be in the city at the surrender, Warburton, III, p.23In. There is an impression of rather more than two in the Ordnance records, and it is likely that some were put out of action before the city surrendered.
- (6) A.Wood, The Life and Times, ed. A.Clark, I, p.74.

The industry was organised in its early stages by William Baber, the Bristol powdermaker who had been proscribed by the King in 1637. With the aid of his son, his uncle, who had also been outlawed in the 1630s, and another Bristol man, he set up his works and started production by January 1643.⁽¹⁾ He may have employed the others as agents, for he was simultaneously active in powder manufacture in the Midlands.⁽²⁾ At first his output was modest, but it probably attained greater proportions later, for his powder works were taken over as a source of profit to themselves by the Ordnance Commissioners in February 1644.⁽³⁾ Baber was allowed compensation of only £500, although their erection and maintenance had cost him £3000.⁽⁴⁾ After this reorganisation he still produced saltpetre for store, but later in 1644 may have returned to Bristol to establish and strengthen powder-making there, and to provide powder by contract with the Oxford Commissioners.⁽⁵⁾

The Commissioners - Strode and Wandesford - had been gradually tightening their grip on Oxford war production. They obtained supply principally by contracting with private manufacturers, buying the stores produced at an agreed rate. Most contractors were dependent on the Commissioners for payment,⁽⁶⁾ and the Royalist High Command found itself increasingly in their debt. For the purchase of munitions - especially for the expense of buying

(1) V.C.H. Surrey, II, p.319; Baber's petition of 1668, S.P.29.232, No.193; his uncle, Randolph Thomas, mentioned there, was one of the pirates of 1634, C.S.P.D., 1633-4, p.493; a Mr. Thrupp of Bristol was also involved in powder production, Ashburnham, II, Appendix, pp.xxiii, xxxi.

(2) Townshend, II, p.141.

(3) Powder received, January-February 1643, Add. MS. 34325, ff. 6-12.

(4) His petition, C.S.P.D., 1660-1, pp. 154, 493.

(5) Saltpetre delivery, June 1644, W.O.55. 1661 [2]; Baber's petition, January 1668, C.S.P.D., 1667-8, p.177.

(6) Hence the interest of Baber and a gunsmith, Henry Horner, in the Royal grants made to the Commissioners, C.S.P.D., 1667-8, p.177, and (Horner's Petition), ibid., 1665-6, p.151.

gunpowder - the Exchequer made a number of payments to them. 35000 was made available, in October 1643, "for provision of powder, match, bullet, muskets, pikes and other implements of war for our army".⁽¹⁾ But the royal treasury was chronically short of money, and much of the expenditure on essential supplies fell on the private purses of the Commissioners, who, if they did not meet it, passed it on as debt to the manufacturers. The sums owing to Strode and Wandesford by January 1644 must have been considerable, for in that month a grant of parks was made to Strode, and in the following year extensive rights over royal parks, manors and woods at Marylebone were gifted to both. The reimbursement of the local smiths and gunmakers was also apparently included in these agreements.⁽²⁾

The increasing indebtedness of the Ordnance Office to its civilian commissioners may have prompted the King to make a further extension of their power and privileges. Baber was ousted from his powder works, and, in February 1644 the Commissioners were particularly named as solely responsible "for making of Saltpetre and Gunpowder". By letters patent they were given the privilege of prospecting for and seizing saltpetre, and the exclusive right to manufacture gunpowder for the royal armouries.⁽³⁾ With this monopoly Strode and Wandesford combined the duties of both the pre-Long Parliament petre commissioners and the gunpowder patentees.⁽⁴⁾ There

(1) Ibid., 1641-3, p. 493.

(2) Black, pp. 371-2, 405, and petitions quoted in note (6), previous page.

(3) Black, p.150. That they were the "sole" powdermakers in England was the opinion of the usually well-informed Arthur Trevor, then at Oxford; see note (2), next page.

(4) J. Nef, Industry and Government in France and England, 1540-1640, pp. 88-98.

is little doubt that it was meant to be profitable,⁽¹⁾ a repayment of their outstanding debts, and it is hardly surprising that this sweeping and monopolistic rearrangement provoked intense resentment at Oxford. The original powdermakers, reported Trevor, Rupert's agent in the city, refused to hand over their equipment to the Commissioners, and were imprisoned. Worse still, on the morning after the patent was sealed, "the Drying Howse & some Six Men blew up", perhaps as a result of sabotage.⁽²⁾ Trevor no doubt expressed a common view when he remarked of the monopoly, which, he said, would be worth £100 a week at once and probably more later, "this had been fitter for some body else".⁽³⁾

It is all the more remarkable that this grant to two men, however competent, who might legitimately be regarded as court favourites, should have gone through while the Oxford Parliament was in session and attacking just such holders of high office. The Commons were, for instance, "hott" against Lord Percy's tenure of the Generalship.⁽⁴⁾ In fact the King may have proposed, and the Commons consented to the monopoly in the knowledge that they were deeply indebted to Strode and Wandesford. It is probable

(1) The privilege had been granted, it was recalled by Wandesford later, to indemnify them for any loss incurred in supplying powder and arms previously, S.P. 29. 66, No.46.

(2) Trevor to Rupert (Oxford, 29 February 1643/4), Add. MS.18981, ff.71-2. The event was also reported by Parliamentary scouts, Luke's Diary, 29 February 1643/4, Egerton MS. 785, f.125.

(3) Add. MS. 18981, ff. 71-2.

(4) Trevor to Rupert [7 Oxford, 1 March 1644], ibid., f.73.

that the monopoly powder was to be sold at 1/- per lb., which at the current rates would yield a profit to the makers of some 60%. Over 50 barrels (100 lbs. each) would need to be produced and sold weekly for the patentees to obtain the estimated £100 profit.⁽¹⁾

These may have been the calculations which mollified the "reforming" Commons and incensed the critics and private contractors. But it is impossible to believe, whatever the speculation and dismay attendant on its inception, that the patent was workable. The gunpowder monopoly had been difficult to maintain in peacetime, in war it was a complete anomaly. The small petre-workings and powder mills which had sprung up over the country to meet the needs of the Royalist armies could not easily be brought under one authority. There is little evidence to suggest that Strode and Wandesford imposed central control and direction over local manufacturers. Only in the main centres of production were their agents active. While powdermaking flourished independently in the West and the Midlands, Strode's factors were permitted to buy supplies of raw material: at Bristol a consignment of brimstone, on the instructions of the King, was offered first to Strode.⁽²⁾

In Oxford the Commissioners' magazine at the Schools did, however, occupy a central place in powder reproduction. From 1644 the New College

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- (1) The normal price of gunpowder was 7½d. per lb.. The patentees' profit was therefore 4½d. in the lb.. That the powder was probably marketed at 1/- is clear from the Restoration Petition already referred to, SP. 29.66, No.46. Wandesford claimed the right to sell powder at this price for the space of one year after the War.
- (3) Minutes of Council of Prince Charles at Bristol, 22 March 1644/5, Staffordshire Record Office, S.MS.45. Royal warrant to Prince Charles at Bristol (Oxford 9 March 1644/5), Hawl. MS. C.125, f.10.

armoury received most of its munitions - especially powder, match and shot - from the Schools. But the receipt books are very incomplete for these years, and it is difficult to say whether the engrossment of powder ever reached the proportions hoped for. Baber's works had been flourishing, but the total Oxford output fell short of the 50 barrels weekly envisaged, and it is unlikely that the greater total was made up from other sources. The records of receipts at New College from April to August 1644 (a period of four months following the new patent) show that 258 cwt. of powder was transferred from the Commissioners' armoury.⁽¹⁾ If this amount was the total Oxford production (which is not necessarily the case) then only a fraction of the estimated output was being achieved. A year after the patent was granted it was thought that Oxford powder manufacture would stop completely, for lack of raw materials.⁽²⁾

But there can be no doubt of the increasing importance of the Commissioners, their magazine and their private funds, both in home manufacture, principally at Oxford and (as will be seen) in import. The Schools armoury remained a busy and varied arsenal until the city's surrender. Late in the war Sir George Strode may have abandoned Oxford and gone abroad, leaving Wandesford in charge of the magazine.⁽³⁾ The latter continued to regulate munitions production and the supply of the central armoury. The last dated entry in the Ordnance Papers is a delivery from Wandesford of 12 June 1646.⁽⁴⁾

(1) W.O.55. 1661 [2].

(2) Rawl. MS. C.125, f.10.

(3) Strode's wife, Lady Rebecca, was buried at St. Mary's the Virgin, Oxford, in October 1645, and he may have left shortly afterwards. Stores were received from Wandesford only, into the central magazine, May-June 1646. When Strode came to compound, in 1649, he did not claim, and so did not benefit from Oxford Articles, stating that he had been abroad, A. Wood, *City of Oxford*, ed. A. Clark, III, p.246, W.O.55.1661. [1], C.C.C., p.2049.

(4) W.O.55. 1661 [1].

had

Both men spent large sums in the King's service, and if the powder monopoly was intended to repay this debt, it was a failure. In all, claimed Wandesford at the Restoration, he and Strode had spent £18,000 on "all sorts of arms for the field and garrisons", of which £5,000 was still owing to them at the end of the war.⁽¹⁾ The estimate of the Lord Treasurer in 1646, when he examined their accounts, was rather less, at £2,318.⁽²⁾ In the end the families of both men enjoyed the rents of Marylebone Park until their claims were satisfied in full.⁽³⁾

The tally of Oxford manufacturers would not be complete without further mention of M. de la Roche. In some "little houses" beside Magdalen College and the artillery park la Roche, Master Fireworker to the Train, had his workshops.⁽⁴⁾ He and his assistants advanced the powdermaking of Baber and the Ordnance Commissioners a stage further, producing the explosive weapons and devices (i.e., "fireworks") in use by the army. To some extent his department was independent of the Office of Ordnance; he was not included in the office's payroll, and was paid by the treasurer-at-war direct.⁽⁵⁾ Like de Gonne, he was a protégé of Rupert, who brought him to England on the outbreak of the war.⁽⁶⁾ In July 1643 he was given the honorific title of Captain-General of all masters of artificial fires and fireworks, and his fee

- (1) Some exaggeration must be allowed for in a petition twenty years after the event, although the accounts could evidently be produced, S.P.29.66, No.46.
- (2) Calendar of Treasury Books, I, 1660-7, p.718.
- (3) Ibid., pp.106, 718-9. A third estimate may be made from the rents received: £667 p.a. from December 1660 to March 1666, when the debt was repaid, amounts approximately to £3,500.
- (4) Trevor reported a visit to him there; Trevor to Rupert (Oxford, 22 ¹⁷ February 1644), Add.MS.18981, ff.57-8.
- (5) £840 was paid him up to October 1643, Ashburnham, II, Appendix, pp. xviii, xxxix.
- (6) Warburton, I, p.461.

of £600 p.a. was made an annuity for life by letters patent in December.⁽¹⁾
 La Roche and his inventions were highly prized by the Royalists who,
 however, found difficulty in paying for his expensive devices.⁽²⁾ He was
 knighted in May 1645.⁽³⁾

The Ordnance Office and allied departments, and the Ordnance Commissioners, had made the best possible use of Oxford's resources. The city was probably the most productive centre of Royalist powder manufacture; its output of cannon, small-arms and explosives was evidently considerable; and the repair and furnishing of the artillery train employed not only the Ordnance craftsmen but the men and materials of the city and the surrounding villages. Individual citizens, colleges and the city corporation joined in contributing personal weapons to the depleted main armoury.⁽⁴⁾ Some of this activity, however, bore the stamp of masterly improvisation; the main army could not rely for long solely on the efforts of Oxford blacksmiths and on the supplies of metal to be got from the city's copper kettles and domestic brassware.

For the large-scale production of cannon, the carriages on which they were mounted and the shot they fired, a mature iron industry was required. The ironworks in the Forest of Dean and along the Upper Severn in Shropshire and Worcestershire were brought under contract to the Ordnance Office and other Royalist agencies. As early as December 1642 the Governor of Worcester,

- (1) Public Record Office, Signet Office Book 12; Black, p. 371.
 (2) And, unpaid, he had "no more motion than a stone", reported Trevor to Rupert (Oxford, 22 ⁷ February 1644), Add MS.18981, ff. 57-8.
 (3) Shaw, II, p.219.
 (4) Proclamations of March and April 1643 ordered Oxonians to bring in arms, Steele 2391a, 2411. Both are found only in manuscript, Harl. MS.6304, f. 83, and 6852, f.67.

with the money he received from the county contribution, private loans and other sources, was making payments to ironmasters for casting ordnance and shot, and to other craftsmen for providing cannon-carriages.⁽¹⁾ In 1643 a regular traffic in military stores was established between the city and Oxford. Horses were impressed in the county to draw the ordnance, and the carriage of iron and shot to Oxford was paid for locally.⁽²⁾ Many "timely supplies" from Worcester reached the magazines of the main army. In particular, a train of ammunition which arrived at Oxford in April attracted notice and commendation: some 95 carts carried an immense amount of cannon shot, grenades and pikeheads to the New College armouries.⁽³⁾ The Worcester-shire authorities did, however, object to sending small-arms to Oxford, when they were badly needed locally.⁽⁴⁾

Some of these munitions may have originated further North and West, for Worcester was as much a staging-point and arms depot as a manufacturing centre. The iron-working regions most important to the Royalists were in Shropshire. The chief foundries of the county were at Bouldon, near Ludlow, and Leighton, eight miles from Shrewsbury in the Coalbrookdale district, both well-known in the next century.⁽⁵⁾ Ordnance was also cast at Bridgnorth,⁽⁶⁾

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- (1) The accounts of the Governor, Sir William Russell, are reproduced in a garbled form in Townshend, II, pp.133-141. A few detailed items are preserved in the Worcestershire Record Office, Russell Papers, ff.9,10, 12,14. See also J. Willis-Bund, Civil War in Worcestershire (1905), p.5.
- (2) Percy to conductors (Oxford), 15 June 1643, Rawl. MS. D. 395, f.33, Townshend, II, p.129; Constables' accounts, Worcestershire Record Office, HCC.587.
- (3) Wood noted its arrival, The Life and Times, ed. A. Clark, I, p.98; received into stores, 22 April 1643, Add.MS. 34325, f.30.
- (4) County Commissioners to Falkland, (Worcester, 18 March 1642/3), Commissioners' copybook, Rawl. MS. D.918, f.145.
- (5) W. Court, The Rise of the Midland Industries, p.175.
- (6) Harl. MS. 6802, f.230.

and the products of all three centres were brought to Worcester, where transport was prepared for the journey to Oxford; or were distributed direct, on the instructions of the High Command, to Midlands and Western garrisons.

Francis Walker, Shropshire cannon-founder, was established at Bouldon and it was probably he who undertook to cast the 44 iron pieces which the King's advisers thought necessary to complete ^{the} defences of the Royalist garrisons. ⁽¹⁾ Iron ordnance was normally used for defensive work, brass cannon for field-trains. By September 1643, when Walker was paid nearly £1000 for his work by the Oxford Exchequer, most of the guns were ready; but the ammunition for them was delayed, and some of the pieces were detained at Worcester until the following spring. ⁽²⁾ He was then instructed to send his cannon to Oxford, Evesham and other Midland garrisons. ⁽³⁾ The foundry-men at Leighton also supplied these places with shot, cannon and grenades, using the Severn if need arose. ⁽⁴⁾ Their agent provided the ammunition which accompanied a bye-train of artillery from Chester to the King's General in the East Midlands. ⁽⁵⁾ In April 1644 iron "round shot and granado shells" from Leighton forge were shipped down the Severn to Worcester to be brought

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- (1) Payment to Walker, 28 September 1643, tallies with the number of cannon required for garrisons, S.P. 16. 498, No.8, p.19, and undated paper [?] early 1644/, Harl. MS.6804, f.226.
- (2) S.P.16. 498, No.8, p.19; Cannon at Worcester, 26 April 1644, Harl. MS. 6802, f.138. A train of ammunition from Worcester, received into Oxford stores on 18 May 1644, may have been the expected supply from Walker, W.O.55. 1661 [2].
- (3) Harl. MS. 6802, ff.72, 84, 113, 138.
- (4) Chester, Shrewsbury and Oxford supplied, March 1643, Ottley, Vol.7, pp. 288-292. A certain Mathias Gervase was responsible for production at Leighton, *ibid*; probably he as well as the foundrymen was in Oxford to negotiate with the King in 1644, Harl. MS. 6804, f.226.
- (5) Ottley, Vol.7, pp. 291-2.

to Oxford, where there was a great lack of them. (1)

Walker was associated, in his work for the King, with Richard Foley, one of the founders of a famous family of Worcestershire ironmasters. (2)

Like Walker he entered into contracts with the King and Rupert to produce arms. He provided ammunition, pikeheads, and later in the war, iron guns, as well as raw materials such as bar-iron and timber, for the Royalist forces. (3)

In the Forest of Dean the King had from the beginning loyal and influential supporters who could make use of the local iron deposits and workshops. Sir John Winter of Lydney's privileged position, in Herefordshire and at court, has already been mentioned; (4) no less important was the presence of the Herbert family at Raglan. Early in 1643 Lord Herbert, the son of the Marquis of Worcester, reported to Oxford that there was "very good iron from the forrest of deane when it shalbe reduced", and for this purpose he needed more workmen. (5) Forges and foundries were set up, and the reserves of metal in the area, especially those in rebel hands, were taken in. (6) Unlike the Midlands ironworks the Forest industry does not appear to have sent its products to Oxford; but at the siege of Gloucester in August 1643 the main army was supplied with over 400 iron cannon balls

(1) Digby to Rupert (Oxford, 4 April 1644), Add.MS.18981, f.130.

(2) Harl. MS.6802, f.84. For Richard Foley (1580-1657) and his sons, see The Genealogist, Vol. 6 (1882), pp. 117-22.

(3) Payments to Foley, 15 March 1643/4, and 3 July 1645, S.P.16, 493, No.8, pp. 25, 47. Instructions to him to provide shot for Sudeley garrison, 19 April 1644, Harl.MS.6802, f.114.

(4) See above, p.266.
Memorandum

(5) / [? February 1643], Harl.MS.6804, ff.160-1. The Forest iron had the reputation of being of high quality, "pliable and soft", see above, p.266.

(6) Draft royal warrant to Herbert, to seize iron (Oxford, January 1644/5), Harl.MS.6802, f.1.

from Sewdley furnace alone, as the Ordnance Papers record.⁽¹⁾ No doubt the major part of the Forest's military production was used locally, and to good effect in this hard-fought area. According to a Gloucester Parliamentarian, Winter's "iron mills and furnaces were the main strength of his estate and garrison."⁽²⁾ At the end of the war the ironworks were destroyed by Parliament.⁽³⁾

The value of the Midlands and Gloucestershire was not confined to their iron manufacture. They produced match and gunpowder, which the Ordnance Office urgently required. Both were in especially short supply in the spring of 1643, and when the central armouries found they could not furnish Rupert with match,⁽⁴⁾ Shrewsbury was called upon to send flax, hemp and tow to Worcester by water, from where it would be conveyed to Oxford.⁽⁵⁾ In the same critical months the King ordered the Commissioners of Worcestershire to set up at least one powder-mill and supervise the making of gunpowder, of which he had great need.⁽⁶⁾ But perhaps as a result of the pre-war suppression of independent powder manufacture, at Shrewsbury and Chester, there were hardly enough powdermakers to go round.⁽⁷⁾ The few who were expert

(1) Shot from "Sowley", W.O.55. 1661 [16]. Sowdley was one of the leading Forest ironworks in the seventeenth century, and remain^{ed} of some importance later, H. Nicholls, Ironmaking in the Forest of Dean, pp.33,59.

(2) Bibliotheca Gloucesterensis, ed. J. Washburn, p.89.

(3) H. Nicholls, op.cit., p.41.

(4) Warburton, II, pp.155-6.

(5) Ottley, Vol.7, p.316.

(6) Townshend, II, p.106, and Commissioners' copybook, Rawl.MS.D.924, f.148.

(7) Ottley, Vol.6, p.49.

were in great demand; according to the Governor of Worcester's accounts the first powder-mills in the city were established and run by the Bristol ex-pirate, William Baber, who also started Oxford production⁽¹⁾. The county of Worcester had to bear the expense of saltpetre extraction and powder-making⁽²⁾. Similarly, the Mayor of Shrewsbury was ordered by Oxford to pay all the money he had to the Governor of the town, "to be employ'd in the buying of Arms" which would be sent to Oxford⁽³⁾. There was some resistance to these proposals⁽⁴⁾. The corporation naturally preferred to spend the revenue from heavy taxation in fortifying the town⁽⁵⁾.

Like Worcester, Bristol was a centre of manufacture and a point of entry into the Royalist supply lines for the military products of a wide area. The outlook for the Ordnance Office and its magazines had been transformed by the conquest of the West Country by Hopton in spring 1643, and the capture of Bristol in July. The Office recognised the importance of the city by sending Commissary Richard March, one of the principal officers, to reside there⁽⁶⁾. His task was two-fold; to organise manufacture locally, and to supervise the import of arms. Many of his letters to Oxford are preserved among the Ordnance papers.

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- (1) Townshend, II. p.141. Even production at Shrewsbury may have been organized by Baber; there is a reference to a powdermaker "from Bristol" in Ottley, Vol. 6, p.49, and Baber later claimed that he made powder there as well as at Oxford, S.P.29. 232, No.193.
- (2) Townshend, II. pp.140-1.
- (3) Ottley, Vol. 6, pp.59-60.
- (4) Ibid., pp.71-2.
- (5) Corporation accounts, ibid., Vol. 8, pp.242-3, and Mayor's accounts, 1643-4, H.M.C., 15th Report, X, p.39.
- (6) His first letter to Oxford is dated 6 September 1643, Rawl.MS.D.395, f.140. March had previously taken charge of the arms at Cirencester, which Rupert had stormed in February 1643, Warburton, II, p. 116 n.

Although there were considerable stocks of armaments in the city at its capture not all were immediately usable; nearly 100 cannon were posted in the city's defences, but most were small "hammered" (i.e. built-up) guns not suitable for field service⁽¹⁾. At first there were not enough small-arms for the soldiers needed to garrison the city. Hopton reported in August that they "rise very slowly", but that once the initial shortage was overcome 200 muskets a week could be provided for others⁽²⁾. By the new year the position was healthier. March had arranged for the projected number of muskets with bandoleers to be made weekly in the city, and he was negotiating the manufacture of powder, musket shot and drums⁽³⁾. Like the Oxford authorities those of Bristol developed local resources; March began to bring the men of the neighbouring towns under contract, to produce firearms and gunpowder. Their endeavours were limited by lack of resources, and, in one case, by bad weather. Plans to manufacture match at Devizes were foiled by the absence, in January, of sun strong enough to dry it out; and there was a general shortage, in Wiltshire, of the metal needed to make muskets⁽⁴⁾.

The potential output of Bristol, Bath, Wells and Devizes was, however, great, and the main difficulty was in guaranteeing supplies of ready money with which to pay the manufacturers. A ton of musket shot could be cast

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- (1) Bristol cannon listed, Rawl MS. D. 395, ff.138, 202r3.
 (2) Hopton to Rupert (Bristol, 21 August 1643), Add MS.18980, f.109.
 (3) March to Percy (Bristol, 29 January and 3 February 1643/4), Rawl MS. D.395, ff.145,102. The date of the first letter is certainly January, and not October, as written.
 (4) The resourceful Governor of Devizes in 1645 was Sir Charles Lloyd, ex-Chief Engineer of the army; his letters to Rupert (Devizes, 4 and 6 January 1644/5), Add. MS. 18982, ff. 1,7.

weekly at Bristol, but the cost would be £16. Permission was granted by Oxford, and work began in March 1644⁽¹⁾. A fortnight's production of muskets and bandoleers at Bristol was bought for £310; and powder, in the city and at Wells, varied in price from £4.10.0 to £5 a barrel⁽²⁾. At least 15 barrels of powder could be made weekly, but none could be produced without regular cash payment⁽³⁾. March complained to Oxford in January that he received no money to satisfy the gunmakers or other artificers, who "will be forced to sell their Musketts and Bandoleers to other men"⁽⁴⁾.

From local sources of taxation March received a weekly sum, from £200 to £300, with which to purchase supplies⁽⁵⁾. But this amount, like the arms brought to the city, was often in dispute between March and the local authorities. "He tells me...", wrote the Deputy Governor with asperity, "he has none, and pretends the money designed is not paid".⁽⁶⁾ In a port the size of Bristol the excise, when it was introduced in 1644, could be expected to yield a sizeable amount. At first most of it was earmarked for local defence, but in the summer of that year the corporation was asked to apply any surplus to the provision of armaments⁽⁷⁾. By 1645 revenue

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- (1) March to Mason, Percy's secretary (Bristol, 28 March I 1644 I), Rawl. MS. D. 395, f.177.
 (2) Ibid., f.145.
 (3) Ibid., and March to Mason ([Bristol] 5 February 1643/4), ibid., f.104.
 (4) March to Percy (Bristol, 24 January 1643/4), ibid., f.100.
 (5) Cf. the sums mentioned in Sir F. Hawley to Digby (Bristol, 23 January 1643/4), Add. MS. 18981, f.11, and Rawl. MS. D.395, f.184.
 (6) Add. MS. 18981, f.11
 (7) Draft royal warrant to the Mayor and others (Moniton, 26 July 1644), Harl. MS. 6802, f.250.

from the excise was being used to pay arms importers⁽¹⁾; and as the yield from both the customs and the assessment was falling, March pleaded that the excise money be made available to satisfy the local manufacturers, the arrears for whose work amounted to £1200⁽²⁾. By July this had been accomplished, and Rupert, commanding in Bristol after Naseby, was given (or gave himself) power to order powder and small-arms making out of the excise revenue there⁽³⁾.

If money could be had, March promised in May 1645 an annual output of 15,000 muskets and 5,000 pikes, a larger number than in the previous year⁽⁴⁾. His magazines were, in any case, quite well-stocked in this year, probably through the import of arms rather than manufacture, and it was still possible to remedy particular shortages in the army from Bristol stores. After the Naseby defeat arms and powder were desperately needed if a new army was to be equipped. But if the King benefited at all from the increased production that March promised, there was hardly sufficient time for it to take effect before the city was surrendered, largely for political and not military reasons, by Rupert himself, in September 1645.

Despite the widespread and intensive development of munitions industries, it was probably impossible to maintain the Royalist forces solely on native resources. The modest requirements of the pre-war militia had not been

- (1) An Antwerp merchant's accounts, 20 February - 26 March 1645, C.Clar.S.P., I. No.1844.
- (2) March to Nicholas (Bristol, 22 May 1645), C.S.P.D., 1644-5, p.511. His letter was intercepted by Parliament.
- (3) Draft royal letters to Rupert, and Excise Commissioners, both July 1645, and draft minutes of War Council, 21 July 1645, Harl. MS. 6852, ff.270,299 145; Ashburnham to Rupert (Ruperry, 28 July 1645), Beddeman, MS.Firth. C.7, p.447.
- (4) C.S.P.D., 1644-5, p.511; cf. 1644 production of 200 muskets a week.

satisfied by domestic manufacture, and from 1642 the swollen demand for arms sent royal agents to the continent in the search for supplies. The import of military stores touched on international politics at many points. The willingness of foreign powers to aid the King was intimately connected with their attitude to the two combatants. The Orange dynasty was sympathetic to the royal cause: Frederick Henry was related to Charles by marriage, and saw his own difficult position reflected in the English monarch's struggle against rebellious subjects⁽¹⁾. The States-General, on the other hand, received Parliament's agent with marked respect⁽²⁾. The Elector Palatine, the dour elder brother of Prince Rupert, and Charles's nephew, allowed himself to be entertained at Westminster; an equally close relative, the King of Denmark, on the contrary, was believed by the Royalists to be the foreign prince most likely to help them⁽³⁾. In France, Mazarin remained cautious and made overtures to both sides: French envoys divided their time equally between London and Oxford⁽⁴⁾. But the confused political situation at Paris allowed the Royalist agents some scope, and the faction attached to Conde negotiated with the King's representative direct⁽⁵⁾.

France and the Low Countries were the principal exporters of arms. In 1642 Henrietta Maria had bought stores from the Dutch, and by the following year, when she left for England, there was a complete network of Royalist

- (1) P. Geyl, "Frederick Henry of Orange and King Charles I", English Historical Review, Vol. 38.
 (2) Ibid., and Letters, pp.101-2, 115, 153.
 (3) Ibid., p.152.
 (4) Ibid., pp.264, 286; the despatches of one, M. de Sabran, may be read in Add.MS.5460.
 (5) Evalyn, IV, p.330.

agents and dealers in Paris and the Channel and North Sea Ports, negotiating with governments and bargaining with merchants⁽¹⁾. The correspondence of some, concerning arms shipments to England, and mention of others is to be found among the Ordnance Papers. Royalist negotiations at the French court were strengthened by the arrival of the Queen - Henry IV's daughter - and her associates in 1644, after little more than a year in England. Her letters and those of Lord Jermy, and the King's replies, almost all captured by Parliament and many published near the end of the war⁽²⁾, carry the story of arms import to the very eve of Royalist defeat.

Until the autumn of 1643, the Royalists had been dependent, for the landing of foreign arms, on the port of Newcastle. Henrietta Maria sent her purchases to the North of England in the wake of the first important gun-runner, the "Providence" of July 1642⁽³⁾. She was instrumental in raising men and munitions in Holland⁽⁴⁾, and shipping them to the King, by this route, until she herself landed on the Yorkshire coast in the following February, closely pursued by the ships of Parliament⁽⁵⁾. Her

- (1) One such was Sir Richard Browne, ambassador at Paris for both Charles I and Charles II, D.N.B. His despatches of the 1640s are Add. MS. 12184.
- (2) The Kings Cabinet opened, London, 1645, reprinted in the Harleian Miscellany, ed. W. Oldys (1808-12), Vol. VII; some of the correspondence of Jermy and other Royalists on the continent, with Lord Digby was published by Parliament in The Lord George Digby's Cabinet...., London, 1646. See ~~Chapter III, p.~~ above, p. 71 n. (1).
- (3) See (p. 231 above).
- (4) She raised money on the Crown jewels to buy arms, pledging them for about a quarter of their value; they included the "great collar" of precious stones, which is frequently mentioned in contemporary accounts, C. Clar. S. P. I, No. 1947, Letters pp. 92, 93-4, 99, 113-4, 153, The Lord George Digby's Cabinet...., London, 1646, pp. 32, 44.
- (5) Letters, pp. 166-8.

vessel was probably commanded by the Captain John Strachan who had been the skipper of the "Providence"⁽¹⁾. In July she brought cannon and large stocks of arms and ammunition with her to Oxford, most of which were continental in origin⁽²⁾. The passage from the North to Oxford was perilous, however, and the prospect for arms import was immensely improved by Rupert's capture of Bristol, the leading port after London, and the fall of other Western harbours to the Royalists in the summer and autumn of 1643. By December Hopton had cleared much of the country south and west of Oxford, although pockets of resistance, such as Plymouth and Lyme Regis, remained.

As well as Bristol, where Captain March was sent, Exeter, Dartmouth, Falmouth and Weymouth were put in a state of readiness. Their defences and protective shipping were improved, and letters and agents from the Ordnance Office arrived to warn the governors of the approach of merchantmen⁽³⁾. The sea-captain, John Strachan, was sent to supervise operations at Weymouth, and his letters to Percy in the winter of 1643/4 give an excellent picture of the whole business of importing arms⁽⁴⁾. Sir John Pennington, the Admiral who was an original Ordnance Commissioner for the King in 1642, was seconded to Bristol to organise Royalist shipping. He fitted out vessels to keep the

(1) This is probably the meaning of Strachan's references to the Queen, Rawl. MS.D.395, f.131 etc.

(2) Queen's stores received, 19 July 1643, Add. MS.34325, f.58. The cannon were Dutch and Danish.

(3) Hopton ordered a fort to be built at Weymouth in October 1643 according to Secretary Nicholas, H.M.C., 6th Report, Appendix, pp.13-14. Engineers were sent there, Marl. MS.6852, f.236; and the defences of both Dartmouth and Weymouth included a large number of cannon, Rawl. MS. D.395, ff.143,214. Bristol was asked to co-operate in clearing the Severn of enemy shipping, draft royal letter to the Mayor (Oxford, 24 March 1643/4), Marl. MS. 6852, f.58. The Governor of Weymouth, Ashley Cooper, received royal instructions on the disposal of arms about to be landed, 4 October 1643, Rawl. MS. D.395, f.49.

(4) Rawl. MS.D.395, passim.

Severn open for trade with the continent and Ireland, and communication with South Wales and the Midlands⁽¹⁾. For this purpose he was paid £2000 by the treasurer-at-war in 1643, and in February 1644 an imprest of £40,000 was made to him⁽²⁾. He directed the seizure of hostile, and even neutral, shipping, taking the cannon from one London merchantman for the city of Bristol's defences⁽³⁾. Sir George Strode, the Ordnance Commissioner, and Sir Nicholas Crispe, the wealthy City merchant, were also engaged in Royalist gun-running; Strode, along with his other interests, evidently had a share in some shipping⁽⁴⁾, and Crispe, his associate, was one of the chief organisers of the Royalist "navy". Crispe helped in the transport of men and stores from Ireland to the West coast, and he and others, armed with letters of marque, fitted out vessels as freebooters to attack enemy shipping⁽⁵⁾. Admiralty Commissioners presided at Oxford over all doubtful cases of misprision by these "adventurers".⁽⁶⁾ The Western ports were instructed to furnish the King's fleet with provisions and armaments⁽⁷⁾.

(1) Harl. MS. 6852, f.58

(2) Ashburnham, II, Appendix, p.xxx; C.S.P.D., 1644, pp. 16-17.

(3) The Deposition Books of Bristol, Vol. I, 1643-7, ed. H. Nott, Bristol Record Society, (1935), I, pp.162-3. See also draft royal letter to Pennington, 27 April 1644, Harl.MS. 6802, f.144.

(4) A ship at Bristol part-owned by Strode, ibid.

(5) For Irish trade see below (pp.322-3). Letters of marque gave royal authority for piratical actions against the King's enemies; Crispe's activities mentioned in Nicholas's letter, H.M.C., 6th Report, Appendix pp. 13-14. A prize vessel was set out as a freebooter by Strachan at Weymouth, Strachan to Percy (Weymouth, 18 January 1643(4)), Rawl.MS.D.395, f.96.

(6) H.M.C., 6th Report, Appendix, pp.13-14.

(7) E.g., royal order to the Governor of Dartmouth, 1 December 1643. H.M.C., 15th Report, VII, pp. 67-8.

On the whole, however, arms were shipped across the Channel in foreign bottoms. Most of the merchantmen active in the trade were from Dunkirk and Le Havre, Amsterdam and Hamburg. At these ports the King's agents negotiated with the local merchants, agreed the price of the goods to be bought, engaged the crews and delivered the lading instructions⁽¹⁾. Very often, while all the detailed bargaining in connection with the shipment had been conducted by the agent before the vessel put to sea, the cargo was paid for only when the ship arrived at its destination⁽²⁾. The Royalist envoys were constantly hampered by shortage of money: Browne complained that he could not afford to keep himself in the state thought proper to the King's ambassador⁽³⁾. Despite these difficulties, great quantities of arms were brought over from the continent to English ports by foreign shippers⁽⁴⁾.

The merchants were tempted to Royalist ports by concessions offered them, even if actual payment was dilatory. They were allowed to land their cargoes without customs charges; special bonuses were promised to the sailors.

The King encouraged clothiers and grasiers to send their goods to Royalist

- (1) A typical cargo list and master's instructions, Rawl. MS.D.395, f.174. Contracts concerning the price of arms, ibid., f.213, and C. Clar, S.P., I, No.1823.
- (2) "The most part of this Amunition belongeth to merchants", wrote Strachan of stores landed at Weymouth which he had to buy, Rawl. MS.D.395, f.106. See also ibid., ff.114, 213.
- (3) Evelyn, IV, p.336. Browne makes the interesting point that his own private income had diminished, his estate "lying all in Kent and Essex", and therefore "yielding little or nothing". The money he was forced to borrow carried a high interest rate.
- (4) Quantities to be sent, listed by Browne, Evelyn, IV, p.334.

entrepots instead of to London, in the hope that arms shippers would exchange their cargoes for native products⁽¹⁾. "Wee must strive....", wrote Strachan, "to have cloth, wooll, and all other sorts of commodities ready heere."⁽²⁾ An agent sent over ships from Dunkirk and Rotterdam, laden with arms, but advised Strachan that the merchants would require licences to bring back wool and grain from England, if the trade was to continue⁽³⁾.

Whatever the inducement, shippers brought "large supplies" to the West, at least in the period for which we have adequate records, the winter of 1643/4. One of the earliest consignments landed at Weymouth was 250 barrels of powder⁽⁴⁾, and an equal amount was carried to the port two months later⁽⁵⁾. Many of Strachan's letters indicate the size of the shipments he was receiving, and they included match, chests of pistols, muskets and pikes as well as gunpowder⁽⁶⁾. Up to the end of February 1644 he had delivered from Weymouth nearly 5000 muskets and 314 barrels of powder⁽⁷⁾. Raw materials for munitions making - tow and brimstone - were also landed⁽⁸⁾.

- (1) Proclamations July, December 1643, Steele, Nos. 2455, 2515.
 (2) Strachan to Percy (Weymouth, 7 February 1643/4), Rawl. MS.D.395, f.106.
 (3) W. Sandys to Strachan (Dunkirk, 15 January 1644), ibid., ff.164-5.
 (4) Charles to Percy (Oxford, 30 September 1643), ibid., f.43.
 (5) Strachan to Percy (Weymouth, 26 November 1643), ibid., f.151.
 (6) E.g., ibid., ff. 96, 106, 114, 116, 118.
 (7) Strachan to Percy (Weymouth, 26 February 1643/4) ibid., f.114.
 (8) Strachan to Percy (Weymouth, 18 January and 9 March 1643/4), ibid., ff. 96, 118.

To aid the importers, and help share the burden of paying for foreign arms, the Ordnance Commissioners, Strode and Wandesford, were commissioned by the King to ship powder and match, and the raw materials to make it. In February 1644 Strode was instructed to employ his agents abroad to purchase these and send them to Western ports.⁽¹⁾ Powder was taken up at Bristol upon his account⁽²⁾. For his trading activities the Exchequer was to advance him £4000, and in June of 1645 he and Wandesford were to be paid a further sum⁽³⁾. But it is unlikely that they ever received the amounts they disbursed on buying continental arms, and the grant of Marylebone park, already mentioned, was made in acquittance of this debt as well as others.⁽⁴⁾

There are fewer indications of the import of arms beyond the winter of 1643, for the original correspondence of March, Strachan and the agents abroad after April 1644 is not found among the Ordnance Papers. The activities of the Queen and Royalist envoys in France, however, made it certain that supplies were continued⁽⁵⁾. And from Ireland, too, after the Cessation of September 1643, quantities of arms, as well as English troops, were brought to reinforce the King's armies. Ormonde, the Royalist commander at Dublin, shipped munitions to North Wales, Chester, and, briefly, Liverpool,

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- (1) Reference to a previous order in royal warrant of 17 February 1643/4, C.S.P.D., 1644, p.17
- (2) March to Percy (Bristol, 8 February 1643/4), Rawl. MS.D.395, f.108.
- (3) C.S.P.D., 1644, p.17, and ibid., 1644-5, p. 612.
- (4) See above, (p. 302).
- (5) Their correspondence may be seen in the authorities cited in (note (2), page 317 above.)

and as in the South, merchants were able to exchange their cargoes of arms for English and Welsh products, principally corn and foodstuffs but also coal.⁽¹⁾ While few arms of Irish origin appear in the Oxford records, Rupert was fairly well-equipped from this source⁽²⁾.

The Royalists, however, suffered setbacks in both the North and the West in the summer of 1644. Rupert was defeated at Marston Moor, the port of Newcastle was cut off from Oxford and Liverpool was lost⁽³⁾; on the South coast Poole and Lyme remained in Parliament's hands, and after Prince Maurice was forced to raise the siege of the latter, Weymouth's position, between the two, became increasingly dangerous. It fell, eventually, in June 1644. The loss of one of the most important of the Royalist harbours⁽⁴⁾, and one of the nearest to Oxford, increased the pressure on the supply lines from Bristol and the ports remaining in the King's hands.

It was partly in the hope that the trade of Bristol and the West could be reorganised and improved that the Council of the Prince of Wales was set up in the city in the spring of 1645. Hitherto, despite March's co-ordinating influence, the points of entry for foreign arms had remained disparate, and the relations of Oxford agents with the local authorities, as we have seen,

- (1) H.M.C., Ormonds, N.S., I, pp.81-3; T. Carte, A Collection of Original Letters, I, pp. 48-9, 67-70; T. Carte, The Life of James Duke of Ormond, V., pp.502-3.
- (2) Ibid., VI, p.44. The Oxford High Command, however, fully realised the importance of Irish supplies, and Digby promised Ormonds help in purchasing arms even if, as he put it, "wee were to sell our shirtes for it", ibid., p.118.
- (3) Marston Moor was fought on 2 July 1644; Newcastle surrendered in October, Liverpool in November 1644.
- (4) Its importance was stressed by Nicholas, in his letter to the Governor, H.M.C., 6th Report, Appendix, pp.13-14, and his opinion would seem to be confirmed by Strachan's letters.

were sometimes strained. The military commanders of the West spurned Percy's orders, and took their share of imported munitions bound for Oxford⁽¹⁾. "Ye Governours heere[are] all like kings" was Strachan's verdict⁽²⁾. The great quantities landed in the winter of 1643, however, had ensured that good supplies did percolate to the central magazines and the main army⁽³⁾.

The Council at Bristol worked with Commissary March: it examined his accounts and no doubt took his opinion in arranging the import of arms⁽⁴⁾. Both cheerful energy and misplaced optimism can be detected in the Council's minute, of March 1645, for "some fit man to goe nimbly over to France" and engage shipping.⁽⁵⁾ In fact, the trade in munitions was falling off, and no new arrangement could halt the decline. The Prince's councillors remained hopeful: Culpepper wrote to Oxford in May 1645 with the "excellent news" that 200 barrels of powder had arrived, and 800 more were expected⁽⁶⁾. Trever, at Bristol in the same month, gave a similar impression, but added that the French merchants were not sufficiently "courted" by the Royalists⁽⁷⁾; and shortly afterwards he remarked that "not much" munition was brought from France⁽⁸⁾. He placed his trust in the endeavours of Montrose in Scotland

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- (1) Percy was apparently given the power to order local Governours in this field, March to Percy (Bristol, 29 [January] 1643/4), Rawl. MS. D. 395, f. 145. But his commands were ignored; the Deputy Governor of Bristol, for instance, detained most of a shipment brought from Weymouth, despite the King's warrant, March to Percy (Bristol, 20 February 1643/4), *ibid.*, f. 112.
- (2) Strachan to Percy (Weymouth, 18 January 1643/4), *ibid.*, f. 96.
- (3) See, for example, deliveries from the West to Oxford of cannon, powder and small-arms, *ibid.*, ff. 214, 114.
- (4) Staffordshire Record Office, S. MS. 45, at [?21 March 1645], 25 March 1645, 28 March 1645.
- (5) *Ibid.*, at 25 March 1645.
- (6) G. S. P. D., 1644-5, p. 511.
- (7) T. Carte, *A Collection of Original Letters*, I, p. 87.
- (8) Writing probably from Wales in the middle of May 1645, *ibid.*, p. 90.

and "supply from Ireland. If they fail, especially the last, we shall do nothing."⁽¹⁾

The arms trade, and Royalist naval activities, continued after Naseby (June 1645): the last hope of the remnants which survived the defeat was in Irish aid. Arms were expected from Ormonde which would be landed at Bristol and the ports of South Wales, where the King and Rupert were attempting to recruit new forces⁽²⁾. Neither men nor munitions came up to expectations, and although arms were still being urgently solicited from Lord Jermyn in August 1645⁽³⁾, the fall of Bristol in the following month, the "misgyuded zeall" of the Earl of Glamorgan, the King's special representative in Ireland, and the increasing dominance of Parliament at sea defeated all the Royalist plans⁽⁴⁾.

Bristol had been the key to the success of the Ordnance Office in supplying the army. It was a centre for both manufacture and import, and its surrender made the continuation of the war futile. Nicholas noted, as one of the reasons for the King's suing for peace, "That his Ma^{tie} having lost Bristoll, hath no meanes to be supplied from forraigne partes wth armes or munition, or materialls for making of either"⁽⁵⁾. The verdict of the secretary-at-war was similar: the loss of the city was "the loss of all our Magazines and Warlike Provisions, and so by Consequence in very short time of South Wales, the West, and all other Places in the Kingdon"⁽⁶⁾

(1) Ibid. (2) C.S.P. Ireland, 1633-47, p. 407, and T. Carte The Life of James Duke of Ormond, V, p.14. Rupert provided from Bristol, Warburton, III, p.134.

(3) The Lord George Digby's Cabinet...., London, 1646, pp. 51-2.

(4) The King's verdict on Glamorgan, T. Carte, The Life of James Duke of Ormond, V., p. 16; Charles had foreseen early in 1645 the possibility that the "rebels" would eventually become "masters of the seas", ibid., V, pp.8-9.

(5) Evelyn, IV, p.188.

(6) Walker, p.137. Incorrectly numbered as p.129.

Once supplies had been received - from whatever source - into the central magazines, the main business of the Ordnance Office began; their distribution to the King's field forces and garrisons. Most of the Ordnance officials were employed at this task, and the majority of the Ordnance Papers - the warrants, inventories of trains and copy-books of deliveries made - are concerned with the issue of stores.

Before the war the King had tightened up the system by which issues were made, hoping to eliminate the known "irregularities" frequently complained of: he had ordered, in January 1642, the enforcement of the "accustomed authorisation" for every delivery, i.e. a warrant immediately from the King or under the hands of six or more Privy Councillors⁽¹⁾. The loyal officers of the Ordnance used this command to resist the instructions of the General of Parliament, and the Houses were forced to imprison the loyalists and impose new procedures⁽²⁾. Similarly, the Royalist Office, once established, had to undergo revision. From November 1642 the issuing of arms and ammunition out of the central stores conformed to a set procedure. The royal sign manual or the warrant of the main army commander (the Lord Lieutenant General), Prince Rupert (the cavalry Commander-in-Chief), or the Sergeant Major General, addressed to the General or Lieutenant General of the Ordnance, was necessary. A promise to obtain a warrant from the King or General, especially when they were out of Oxford, or their verbal order transmitted by one of the Secretaries

(1) Charles to Newport (Whitehall, 7 January 1641/2), W.O.55, 423, f.13.

(2) L.J., V, pp. 298-9, 308.

or senior officers, might suffice in some cases⁽¹⁾. But a committee of Privy Councillors, or the Council of War itself, had no authority per se over the magazine. A delivery of match ordered by the War Council, which both Charles and Heydon attended, was made only when it was known that the royal signification would follow immediately⁽²⁾.

The King wrote normally to Heydon until May 1643; but on his appointment as General of the Artillery Percy became the intermediary between the decisions of court and Council (in which he took part), and the Office. His commission instructed him to obey the King, the Lord Lieutenant General or the Sergeant Major General⁽³⁾. Hopton, as General of the Artillery, received the royal instructions for a few months following Percy's disgrace in August 1644, but for most of the duration of the war Heydon once again conveyed the High Command's orders to the magazine.

The procedure was not significantly altered by changes in command; whoever the General of Artillery a warrant in correct form together with the signature of the officer who had received the stores issued, was a "sufficient discharge" for the New College clerks. Small amounts of personal arms, and less important issues, such as tools and materials for fortification, could be taken on lesser authority. The Ordnance Commissioners, Strode, Wandesford and, briefly, Palmes

(1) "Notwithstanding some mistakes in y^e draught of this direction, from Sr Jac^b Asteley & in y^e receipt I was this day so well satisfied y^t his Ma^{ty} had give y^e order expressed in this paper as I desire y^e officers & clerks of his Ma^{ty}s stores at Newcollege ... to issue the requirements." Heydon to Ordnance clerks, 11 March 1642/3, W.O. 55. 423, f.155. Cf. Percy's commission, W.O. 55. 459. : royal orders delivered "verbally or under our signett or signe Manuall" were to be obeyed. Drafts of Percy's commission are among the secretary-at-war's papers, Harl. MS. 6804, ff.41-4.

(2) Edward Walker to Heydon, and the latter's comment, March 1642/3, W.O. 55, 423, f.149. The royal warrant for this delivery, of the same date, *ibid.*, f.151. For the Council's authority, see above Chapter II, pp. 77.

(3) Commission, dated 22 May 1643, W.O. 55. 459.

signed warrants to regulate the issue and repair of small arms, which were recognised by the New College magazine.⁽¹⁾

It was no doubt hoped that the arms administration of most of the Royalist forces would be centralised in Oxford Headquarters; the Office would control all issues to the army in the field and to garrisons. It would seem that, in the winter of 1642-3, most regiments and many of the strongholds around Oxford, and others further afield, received supplies⁽²⁾. The vigilance and caution apparent in the Ordnance accounts, and especially in the instructions of Heydon, may, however, be misleading. The Oxford magazine did not hold undisputed sway over all supplies. There was little co-ordination of authority, and an investigation, conducted probably by the Ordnance Commissioners early in 1643, revealed a number of defects in the supply of small-arms⁽³⁾. The Royalist High Command had insisted on the need for arms discipline in a number of royal proclamations since the beginning of the war. That of January 1643, addressed to the inhabitants of Oxfordshire, was to be read from the pulpit of every parish church in the county, and was incorporated in the printed Military Orders which were supposed to regulate the behaviour of the King's troops⁽⁴⁾. The unpaid soldiery quartered in

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- (1) E.g., Warrant of 20 March 1643/4, W.O. 55. 423, f.179.
- (2) List of garrisons supplied, 1 January - 24 March 1643/4, ibid., f.148.
- (3) Memorandum (? February 1643), Harl. MS. 6804, ff. 160-1. This document contains the proposals of the committee, with annotations by the secretary to the Council of War.
- (4) Proclamation, 5 January 1642/3, Steele, No.2344; Military Orders and Articles, Oxford (1643).

Oxfordshire for the winter had evidently sold or pawned any equipment on which they could raise money. The chief of these were arms and horses. The proclamation ordered all weapons so bought by civilians to be returned to Oxford⁽¹⁾.

But the investigation of 1643 showed that these and other malpractices continued, and a new proclamation, embodying most of the investigators' recommendations, was published⁽²⁾. The issue of powder and shot had been found "disorderly",⁽³⁾ and the proclamation ordered that all arms should pass through the central magazine and be issued by indenture to commanders who were to be accountable to Oxford for their disposal. Armourers were to be appointed to each regiment to view its arms regularly and repair those that were defective; returns were to be made to Oxford of arms needed⁽⁴⁾. The Council of War, in May 1643, improved on this proposal by ordering the appointment of a new officer to perform these duties for every company in the field army⁽⁵⁾. He was given the title of "Sergeant of the arms". In the following year a further edict repeated the injunctions against selling arms, and ordered all arms henceforth to be marked for identification purposes with the King's

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- (1) Arms handed in which were sold or abandoned by soldiers, W.O., 55. 1661 [17], and Add. MS. 34325, f. 52.
- (2) Proclamation, 10 March 1642/3, Steele, No. 2386.
- (3) Harl. MS. 6804, ff. 160-1.
- (4) Steele, No. 2386.
- (5) Copy of minutes of a Council of War, 11 May 1643, Add. MS. 5752, f. 217. Arms received from a company's armourer a month later, Add. MS. 34325, f. 48.

stamp, the letters 'C.R.', a reversion to pre-war practice⁽¹⁾.

The Council of War was used to advise the King of the needs of every commander and to recommend suitable deliveries. But, as we have seen, this procedure was sometimes ignored, and the King on occasion made allocations of supply unfairly and without proper consultation⁽²⁾. Provincial generals who lacked the power to order the provision of arms and ammunition locally were often left vainly suppliant at Oxford. A delivery of muskets to Hastings, the King's General in the Midlands was cancelled because the officers at Oxford claimed priority; he complained that his men were "forced soe often to Cudgells", by their lack of proper weapons.⁽³⁾

The command of the Ordnance Office was complicated by the need to appoint specially-commissioned bodies or persons with limited power over arms supply. It was unclear, for instance, what authority the Governor of Oxford enjoyed over the stocks in the magazine there, although it was known that he was able to order the weekly supply of the garrison.⁽⁴⁾ In the absence of the King the Lords Commissioners undertook the arming of the city and neighbouring garrisons, and of any defensive sorties.⁽⁵⁾ When the King left Oxford in June 1644 they immediately required an account of the horses remaining for the

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- (1) Proclamation of 13 March 1643/4, Steele, No. 2542; found only in manuscript, Harl. MS. 6852, f.35. Cf. (p.269 n.(3)) above.
- (2) See above, pp.77-8.
- (3) H.M.C., Hastings, II, p.101, and Hastings to Rupert (Lichfield, 22 (April) 1643), Staffordshire Record Office, S.MS. 550.12
- (4) See Heydon's comments, on the authority of Sir William Pennyman as Governor, 9 April and 1 May 1643, W.O.55. 457.62, and W.O.55. 459.
- (5) Their order to the Ordnance officers, 24 April 1643, W.O.55.457.62.

draught of the Artillery train⁽¹⁾. In 1644 and 1645 they had almost as much control over the Oxford magazines as the King and the Council of War, with the result that political rivalry and dissensions broke out when stocks were low in the central armouries and there were too few arms for both the field army and the garrison⁽²⁾.

These difficulties were increased by the establishment of other and separate magazines and sources of supply outside Oxford as the war progressed. The setbacks which the Ordnance Office suffered in the West have already been touched upon: there are many other examples. The Queen's supplies were not wholly integrated - at least on an accounting basis - with the other stores in New College magazine, and, typically, she retained some control over their disposal. Her nominees, especially Lord Jermy and the senior officers of her regiments, could order arms out of those reserved for her.⁽³⁾ The magazine of the Ordnance Commissioners at the Schools was ordered exclusively by Strode and Wandesford, and the royal sign manual was required to have stores removed from it. There was some confusion over its command, for in June 1643 the relation of the Commissioners to the new General of the Artillery, Percy, was clarified. The former were to yield obedience to the General, and were to make provision of match and powder to the New College magazine when required.⁽⁴⁾ Percy employed royal warrants, which he countersigned, to transfer these and other commodities from the Commissioners' stores to his own⁽⁵⁾.

(1) C.S.P.D., Add. 1625-49, p.662.

(2) E.g., the unwillingness displayed by the Lords Commissioners when complying with the King's order to send arms, their letter to him (Oxford, 3 July 1644), Northamptonshire Record Office, F. H. 2865.

(3) E.g., warrant of 24 November 1643, W.O.55, 459.

(4) Charles to Percy (Oxford, 21 June 1643), Rawl.MS.D.395, f.77.

(5) E.g., royal warrant to Strode and Wandesford for delivery of powder and match from the Schools to New College, and to order the casting of shot, 25 December 1643, W.O. 55. 459.

Subsidiary armouries were established in several Royalist garrisons, and all tended to diminish the overall importance of the Ordnance Office. One of the earliest was Reading magazine, set up under an Ordnance clerk in November 1642⁽¹⁾. It developed into a large and well-stocked armoury, and in the winter of 1643/4 was important enough to be commanded by Henry Sherburne, brother of the Commissary⁽²⁾. The decentralisation of the Oxford stores can be traced in the 1644 list of officers of the trains: of 17 gentlemen of the ordnance on the new establishment only four were permanently based at Oxford⁽³⁾. Conductors and gunners were distributed from Weymouth to Wallingford; Richard March was at Bristol, where two of the chief clerks of the Office were also seconded⁽⁴⁾.

New magazines quite independent of the Ordnance Office were the product of an enquiry into the workings of the Office by the Oxford Parliament⁽⁵⁾. It advocated the demilitarisation of some part of the arms holding, and the putting into commission of Percy's office, as "see great a trust" for one man⁽⁶⁾. The King gave way to political pressure on the first point, but not on the second, and by the agency of the Oxford House of Commons some arms administration was removed from the Ordnance Office and placed in local civilian hands. Town armouries were established in Oxford and Bristol, paid for by the corporations and to be used only for local defence.

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- (1) Bachelor's stores to remain at Reading, 24 November 1642, W.O.55.457, 60, f.17.
 (2) His letters of 1 November 1643 and 9 March 1644, W.O.55.459 and Rawl.MS.D.395, f.119.
 (3) S.P. 16.500, No. 40A. (4) Ibid.
 (5) See above, p.87, 303.
 (6) Trevor to Rupert ("Friday" [1 March 1644]), Add.MS.16981, f.73.

The Oxford city stores were commanded by Sir George Bynion, the ex-London mercer, and one "Mr. Nevill", and the Oxford Parliament assigned special funds for its equipment⁽¹⁾. The contents were reserved from the orders of the ordinary army commanders, and were used solely by the auxiliary regiments then being raised for the city's defence. The Bristol city regiment had its own magazine commanded by four Aldermen, which took some of the arms manufactured at Bristol by Commissary March⁽²⁾. In Reading and Chester similar moves were made⁽³⁾. The special purpose of these armouries was respected, and, although that at Reading was still-born, most lasted for the duration of the war. In March 1645 the Prince of Wales's magazine was set up at Bristol, another armoury which competed with Ordnance officials for supplies⁽⁴⁾.

Subsidiary and independent magazines were, however, useful in supplying local forces without resort to Oxford, and even the main army in the field. The one good movable field-piece at Banbury was successfully employed by the Governor of the town at the battle of Hopton Heath;⁽⁵⁾ and his armoury helped to furnish an armed sortie from Oxford.⁽⁶⁾ During the campaign in the West in 1644 the field army was able to call upon local stores of arms, while

(1) Draft royal warrant to Sheriff of Oxfordshire, 24 May 1644, Harl.MS.6802, f.191, propositions of Parliamentary committee, 23 May 1644, Harl.MS.6804, f.156; muskets for Bynion and Nevill bought by the Oxford Parliament, Rawl.MS.D.395, f.76.

(2) This was the Mayor's intention in February 1644, according to March, Rawl.MS.D.395, f.102. Imported munitions were also bought for the city armoury, payments of 1 and 22 June 1644, Bristol City Archives, Audit Books, Vol.21, pp.304-5. For details of the city magazine see the proposals presented to the Council of War, 13 March 1643/4, Harl.MS.6852, ff.37-8.

(3) Draft minutes of Council of War, 14 April 1644, Harl.MS.6802, f.88, and records of Chester in the Civil War, Harl.MS.2315.

(4) Staffordshire Record Office S.MS.45, at 24 March 1644/5.

(5) P. Young, "The Battle of Hopton Heath", *J.S.A.H.R.*, Vol.33.

(6) Rupert's force for an attack on Cirencester supplied, W.O.55,423, f.149.

Essex's forces were starved of supplies in a predominantly Royalist area. When the King's army ran short of match in Cornwall the nearest magazines were contacted, and supplies were sent from Bristol, Bridgwater and Minehead by sea⁽¹⁾.

Worcester and Bristol had, of course, substantial magazines, and successive commanders in both cities were obliged to distribute reserves they had stockpiled. The Governor of Worcester in May 1644 complained that only 50 barrels of powder remained in his keeping,⁽²⁾ and his successor in 1645 found that he was unable to supply Rupert's army, because so much had been issued previously to other forces⁽³⁾. At Bristol Commissary March was asked to supply the generals at Chester and Shrewsbury, on the mediation of the King⁽⁴⁾.

But these provincial magazines, as well as weakening the central authority, were inevitably a drain on the resources of the Ordnance Office. Banbury, with less than half-a-dozen cannon, required a Keeper of the Magazine and gentlemen of the ordnance, fourteen gunners and matrosses, and a gunsmith and his mate⁽⁵⁾.

Almost none of the records of the subsidiary armouries have survived

(1) Draft royal warrants to Bristol and Bridgwater (Bocannon, 23 August 1644), Harl.MS.6802, f.264; and the same, of 28 August 1644, to the Governor of Dunster Castle, concerning match in a ship at Minehead, *ibid.*, f.266.

Exeter was also asked to supply match, but had none to spare, Sir. J.

Berkeley to Walker (Exeter, 25 August (1644)), Add.MS.15750, f.60.

(2) Sir Gilbert Gerrard to a Lord (Worcester, 1 May 1644), Add.MS.18981, f.166

(3) Letters concerning Sandys, February 1645, MS. Firth, C.6, ff. 328, 329, 331.

(4) Hawley to Digby (Bristol, 23 January 1643/4), and Jernyn to Rupert (Oxford, 18 and 24 March 1643/4), Add. MS.18981, ff.11, 92-3, and MS.Firth C.6, f.155; and letters to Rupert in summer 1644, Warburton, II, p.438, and III, p.12.

(5) Propositions for Banbury (? early 1644), Harl.MS.6804, ff. 176-7.

among the Ordnance Papers⁽¹⁾, which are concerned in the main with supplies issued by the central magazine. The Royalist army was largely dependent upon stores from Oxford, and the records of deliveries are therefore a most valuable source of information about the King's forces and the whole course of the war generally.

The state of the artillery train at Edgehill and just after, when it was brought to Oxford and lodged in Magdalen College Grove, has already been mentioned⁽²⁾. An inventory of the magazine after the battle confirms that the King had 27 field-pieces, ranging from the demi-cannon, which fired a 27 lb. ballet, to the very smallest, the robinet⁽³⁾. There were over 17 tons of powder in store to supply the artillery, horse and foot,⁽⁴⁾ and powder, shot and match - a ton of each - were delivered to the 18 regiments of foot of the field army within a week⁽⁵⁾. But the stocks of ammunition for both the infantry and the cavalry were low⁽⁶⁾ as the King's forces pushed towards London through the towns of the Thames valley accompanied by cannon and bye-trains, shot was cast en route and enough provided for 4000 musketeers⁽⁷⁾. The movement of artillery and stores during this brief campaign - the King returned to Oxford at the end of November - is well documented: and the Royalists, though forced to withdraw at Turnham Green, captured more cannon at Kingston⁽⁸⁾. In preparation for the winter,

- (1) An exception is the journal of receipts at Reading magazine, October-November 1643, W.O. 55. 1661 (4).
 (2) See above p. 283.
 (3) State of the magazine, 25 October 1642, W.O. 55, 457.62, ff.3-4.
 (4) Ibid..
 (5) W.O. 55. 423, ff.14 et. seq.; as $\frac{1}{2}$ lb. powder gave each musketeer "his bandilliers full", a delivery of 2000 lbs. indicates a force of 4000 musketeers: cf. note (7).
 (6) W.O. 55. 457.62, ff.3-4.
 (7) Ibid., and train of 15 November 1642, W.O. 55, 457.60, f.13.
 (8) Letters of M(atthew)S(mallwood) printed as Appendix to G. Davies, "The Battle of Edgehill", English Historical Review, Vol. 36.

magazines were set up in the garrisons which formed a defensive ring round Oxford; Reading, Banbury and other towns received many supplies⁽¹⁾.

Although Rupert, for instance, was active in January and February 1643, when he captured Cirencester with the aid of four field-pieces⁽²⁾, the army as a whole was inhibited by the shortage of supplies which persisted throughout the first winter of the war. The Royalists had, potentially, a sizeable share of the country's military resources; but until these were developed (and this required some months) they were largely dependent upon imports. The major part of the arms purchased abroad came to Oxford via the King's commanders in the North of England, who controlled the port of Newcastle. The passage from Yorkshire to Oxford was the precarious lifeline which kept the royal forces in being⁽³⁾. "The great want at Oxford....," according to Clarendon, "was ammunition; and the only hope of supply was from the north; yet the passage from thence [was] so dangerous that a party little inferior in strength to an army was necessary to convey it"⁽⁴⁾. The King wrote to the Earl of Newcastle: "I have no greater want then of Armes, nor meanes to supply my selfe then from you."⁽⁵⁾ And on his rounds of inspection of the Oxford garrison, Charles noted that even his own Lifeguards were short of arms. Their re-equipment was given first priority by the Ordnance Office⁽⁶⁾. In April 1643 the King urged Rupert to bring

(1) Garrisons supplied, 1 January - 24 March 1642/3, W.O.55,423,f.148.

(2) Train of 21 January 1642/3, W.O.55. 457.60, ff. 58-9.

(3) E.g., arms received from the North at Oxford magazine, 16 May 1643, Add.MS. 34325, f.40.

(4) Clarendon, VII, §.31.

(5) Oxford, 15 December 1642, Marl. MS. 6988, f.130.

(6) Astley to Heyden (Oxford, 1 January 1642/3), W.O.55, 457.60, f.75.

powder and match from the Earl of Newcastle, "for", he wrote, "I may be distressed for want of such munition"⁽¹⁾. The infantry officers, mustering their men in the next month at Culham camp in preparation for the summer's campaign, complained of the shortage of bandoleers among the musketeers⁽²⁾.

Despite the loss of Reading and almost all its stores in these months,⁽³⁾ the situation was improving. As we have seen, good supplies came from the Midlands manufacturers and from the North; the Queen and her extensive train arrived at Oxford in July⁽⁴⁾. The Oxonians rang their bells and lit bonfires as much for the security to be derived from her cannon and mortars as for the pleasure of her company⁽⁵⁾. The appointment of Percy as General of the Artillery coincided with the expansion of the Ordnance Office and the casting of new field-pieces⁽⁶⁾. Lists showing "the present state of His Majesty's magazine" were drawn up, doubtless for Percy's inspection, at the time⁽⁷⁾. There were 21 pieces of brass ordnance mounted and ready for service. Some were recently assigned, and sent to Prince Maurice and the Marquis of Hertford, who were fighting the series of battles with Waller that ended at Roundway Down⁽⁸⁾. The proportions of powder, shot and match

(1) Warburton, II, pp.165-6.

(2) "The Humble Desires" (May 1643), Harl. MS.6804, ff.92-3; this shortage was overcome by the end of the month, delivery of powder-bags, 29 May 1643, W.O.55.459.

(3) The King had bought 9 cannon - including the four largest - and nearly all his strength of horse and foot to relieve Reading, in vain; two small field-pieces were, however, salvaged from the town, Add. MS.34325 ff. 33-4: 2 minions "from Reading".

(4) Queen's stores received, 19 July 1643, W.O.55.459, Add. MS.34325, f.58.

(5) She later became very unpopular with the townspeople, Luke's Diary, 23 April 1644, Egerton MS.785, f.19^v.

(6) See above, pp. 287-8.

(7) E.g., state of the magazine, 22 May 1643, W.O.55.459.

(8) Guns assigned for the West, 8 May 1643, *ibid.*, and small trains sent, 10 and 16 May 1643, *ibid.*.

with the numbers of waggons, teams, officers and men to go with the marching train of 19 pieces, were also set down⁽¹⁾. The Ordnance Office was able to furnish the infantry, at Culham camp in May 1643, with great quantities of arms and ammunition⁽²⁾. And in the following month the foot regiments returned defective arms to store⁽³⁾. In July Rupert left to besiege Bristol with a train which included 8 cannon and many "engines of war"⁽⁴⁾.

The capture of Bristol in time assured the Royalists of constant supply. Thereafter shortages, when they occurred, were temporary and not general. Powder was still scarce in the central magazines, and the King asked Rupert to see to its manufacture at Bristol⁽⁵⁾; but for most other commodities the field army before Gloucester in August was well-supplied from Oxford and local armouries⁽⁶⁾. The artillery train received ammunition, powder, and spare wheels from New College and the Schools, as well as replacements; a mortar that burst in bombarding Gloucester was quickly exchanged for a sound one⁽⁷⁾.

While the Royalist cannon at Newbury battle (17 or 18 guns) may have run short of ammunition or powder, this was due to a failure in communication rather than shortages in the central magazines⁽⁸⁾. Five days after the battle the return of the full train to Oxford was recorded⁽⁹⁾.

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- (1) 28 May 1643, W.O.55.459.
 (2) W.O.55. 1661 [3].
 (3) Add. MS.34325, ff.47-52.
 (4) Warburton, II, pp.237-8, 246-50.
 (5) [July 1643], Add.MS.18983, ff.4-5.
 (6) Oxford deliveries, August 1643, W.O.55.459, and shot from the Forest of Dean, W.O. 55, 1661 [16].
 (7) Nicholas's note of 14 August 1643, W.O.55, 458.65, f.55; and entry of 15 August in the Order Book of the Glamorgan Commissioners of Array, National Library of Wales, Ll.MB.17, p.37.
 (8) Little use was made of the artillery according to Clarendon, VII, 6, 212; but the warrant to replenish the army's stores from Oxford was not sent till the day of the battle (20 September 1643). The supplies asked for arrived at Newbury, 26 miles from Oxford, two days later, W.O.55.458.66, ff.42,43; W.O.55. 1661 [16].
 (9) Cannon returned from Western service, 25 September 1643, Bodleian, MS. Add.D.114, f.131, printed in A. Burne and P. Young, The Great Civil War (1959) p.107.

The issues made by the Ordnance Office in the following spring are well-documented; Hopton's forces on the Cheriton campaign, the infantry of the main army based at Reading, the Marquis of Winchester's stronghold at Basing, the troops under Sir William Vavasour in the Welsh Marches, and many other "flying armies" and loyal garrisons were supplied, some from the stocks of arms and munitions then being imported in great quantities⁽¹⁾. Rupert's forces at Shrewsbury, however, despite the Prince's frequent requests, were almost entirely dependent upon Bristol and Midlands armouries, for little could be obtained from Oxford⁽²⁾. Parliamentary scouts noted too that the new recruits conscripted for the main army were desperately short of small-arms⁽³⁾. While the marching train of artillery was fairly well-equipped with good brass cannon, and a "competent" amount of shot was ready for it,⁽⁴⁾ the means of transporting both were apparently defective: of the 30 field-pieces available only 16 or 17 accompanied the army at the beginning of the summer, and it was found necessary to requisition large numbers of carts from the countryside to carry the munitions⁽⁵⁾.

It is at this point - May 1644 - that the records of issues among the Ordnance Papers dry up almost completely, and we are forced to rely on other and less authoritative sources for an account of the army and its supplies

- (1) E.g., Rawl. MS.D.395, ff.13, 17, 21, 23.
- (2) Letters to Rupert, February-April 1644, Add.MS.18981, ff.31 et. seq.. See above, pp.78.
- (3) Luke's Diary, 21 May 1644, Egerton MS.785, f.102^v.
- (4) The train was better off than the Oxford batteries, and some field-pieces were temporarily loaned to the city defenses, Harl.MS.6802, f.138; supplies of shot were adequate [? early 1644], Harl.MS.6804, f.226.
- (5) The Oxford Parliament found a shortage of draught animals and the mounted cannon "impaired", as well as other "defects" in the train [? February 1644], Rawl. MS.D.395, f.198; estimate of cannon for 1644 campaign, ibid., f.121; actual numbers given by Symonds, p.45, and Luke's Diary, 22 June 1644, Egerton MS.785, f.32^v; movement of guns, May-June 1644, W.O.55. 459; carts impressed, Egerton MS.785, ff. 32^v, 102^v.

in the summers of 1644 and 1645. Particular shortages afflicted the King's forces on campaign in 1644; in June Charles complained of the lack of gunpowder,⁽¹⁾ and in October of the shortage of small-arms⁽²⁾. Their success in Cornwall augmented the Royalists' train in most departments, however; they captured at Lostwithiel "34 the best brasse gunns of England",⁽³⁾ and after the drawn Second Battle of Newbury - 27 October 1644 - a special expedition brought the field ordnance, left at Donnington castle for safe-keeping at the end of the campaign, back to Oxford⁽⁴⁾.

Only seven warrants of 1645 survive among the Ordnance Papers, the last dated 15 March; they deal with local deliveries of stores to Woodstock, Banbury and Blechingdon House⁽⁵⁾. The Papers thus tell us nothing of the main army on the Naseby campaign. From letters and diaries we know that the War Council apparently decided on a smaller and perhaps more mobile train of artillery for the summer; of the 20 or 30 field-pieces ready for the march the King made choice of only 14.⁽⁶⁾ Probably, too, the difficulty of providing adequate transport influenced this decision⁽⁷⁾. The cannon proved useful at the siege of Leicester in May, six of the largest making a breach in the city walls⁽⁸⁾. The field army, so far as we know, was

(1) T. Carte, The Life of James Duke of Ormond, V, pp.6-7.

(2) Warburton, III, pp.26-27.

(3) T. Carte, op.cit., VI, p.199; cf. Symonds, p.66.

(4) Received into store, 9 November 1644, W.O.55. 1661 [14].

(5) W.O. 55. 423, ff. 279-91.

(6) Digby to Rupert (Oxford, 2 April 1645), Add.MS.18982, ff.44-5; The Diary of Sir Henry Slingsby, ed.D. Parsons, p.142; 12 cannon left at Oxford, Warburton, III, p.100.

(7) Ibid., pp.80-In.

(8) The Diary of Sir Henry Slingsby, ed.D.Parsons,p.147; Symonds, p.180.

well-equipped, and the disaster of Naseby cannot be attributed to faulty gunnery or a shortage of arms, powder and ammunition. The defeat undid all the work of the Ordnance Office; every field-piece and most of the military supplies of the army were captured⁽¹⁾. There was little hope that Oxford could replace these stores, and in August it was noted that the King marched with only the remnant of his supply trains, carried on a few pack-horses and in "three or four carts"⁽²⁾. The Lords Commissioners at Oxford kept together what remained in the city, although it was obvious the war could not be continued; at Oxford's surrender in June 1646 26 brass cannon were among the 38 pieces found within its walls⁽³⁾.

The main theatre of hostilities shifted westwards after Naseby, and, according to the testimony of Edward Sherburne, the Ordnance Office at Oxford was reduced until "the ministers and members of theTrain (who would otherwise have been dispersed)" were gathered by Sherburne himself into an ordinary troop, which was allowed to remain as part of the garrison⁽⁴⁾. The New College and Schools magazines, with the craftsmen attached to each, survived to the end, supplying the city batteries on the orders of the Lords Commissioners⁽⁵⁾.

The Ordnance papers reviewed in this chapter have shown that the Royalists, for most of the war, were successful in producing military

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- (1) 300 carriages, including 12 cannon, taken, Warburton, III, p. IIIIn.; Clarendon, IX, S.41.
 (2) Symonds, p.225.
 (3) Warburton, III, p.23In.
 (4) Sherburne's Restoration petition, S.P.29.48, No.119.
 (5) W.O.55, 1661 (11.)

supplies in that half of England which they possessed. The two commodities essential for seventeenth century warfare, iron and gunpowder, were in good supply. The Midlands manufactured ironware, and Oxford and other loyal garrisons maintained powder-makers, gunsmiths and swordmakers; in addition, great quantities of powder and small-arms were purchased on the continent and in Ireland, and brought to Royalist-held ports. At the same time, the King had a good number of foreign technicians and Ordnance Office professionals at Oxford to make the best use of these materials.

As a result of this activity the main army - if not the provincial forces - usually had the arms, munitions and equipment it required. Initial shortages lasted until the spring of 1643; they were then overcome, and the organisation of the Ordnance Office was put on a sound footing. Late in 1645, after the fall of Bristol, the position again became untenable. But between these two dates, for the campaigns of 1643, '44 and '45, the King's army was as well-supplied as that of Parliament..

Conclusion

As we have examined, in the preceding chapters, the various components of the King's army, we have had as much cause to dwell on the virtues as on the defects of each arm or department. It has long been known, of course, that certain parts of the Royalist army were formidable in battle. Rupert's and Goring's cavalry were greatly feared; the Naseby foot was stubbornly heroic. But we have seen that, over a lengthy period, Royalist military organisation, from the High Command to the supply departments, conducted the war with a fair measure of competence, and it had the wherewithal to do so.

Even on the economic side the King was not hopelessly outdistanced by his enemies. The taxable capacity of the King's half of England was less than Parliament's, but his resources were still great. His supporters were wealthy: Newcastle and Worcester each spent enormous sums in his cause. Great City merchants - Strode, Crispe, Bynion - contributed much. Many gentry families raised regiments at their own charge. The wealth and commerce of Bristol fertilised a whole segment of Royalist-held England. It must not be forgotten that it was Royalist estates, through sequestration, composition fines and the decimation tax, which later helped to finance Cromwell's army and navy.

Mercantile wealth was, however, easier to realise than landed wealth. We have seen how, in all the headquarters departments, the Royalists suffered from a shortage of ready money. But the principle was accepted in the seventeenth century, that bellum se ipsum alit: where the central organisation fell short - in the giving of pay, the

buying of provisions, the supply of equipment - the King's forces simply lived off the countryside and took what they wanted. Free quarter supplemented the weekly assessment; food and transport were requisitioned locally as often as they came from Oxford. Arms were taken up from local sources as well as from the central magazines.

If the Royalist soldier's arrears of pay were rarely satisfied, neither were those of his rivals in Waller's and Essex's armies. So long as that part of England which the King controlled was not economically ruined, or struck by famine, the garrisons and marching units which it supported would continue to subsist. The need to bring a wide area under contribution did mean, however, that the King's forces tended to spread out at some distance from headquarters, and central control was consequently more difficult to maintain.

In the mobilisation of its strictly military resources - cannon, powder, shot, etc. - the Crown kept pace with Parliament. South and East England, by mid-century, had no monopoly of arms and munitions manufacture. The iron industries of the Midlands and Gloucestershire were brought under effective contribution; Oxford and other garrisons were made centres of military production. Bristol, the harbours of the West and South coasts, and Newcastle, imported great quantities of arms from the continent. Because of the lack of money at Oxford the Ordnance Office had to compete for arms with rival authorities, provincial commanders and their independent magazines. Despite the efforts of the Ordnance Commissioners the organisation of manufacture and import was never centralised. On the whole, however, the main

army was well furnished with the instruments of war; the shortages which had existed at Edgehill, and grew acute during the first winter of the war, were overcome in the summer of 1643. With the doubtful exception of First Newbury the army was not impeded, in any battle or campaign, by a serious lack of armaments. In this respect it fought on equal terms with the enemy at most engagements.

In the organisation of their war effort King and Parliament evolved similar methods, the Royalists very often following Parliamentary examples. Both made the weekly assessment, run by county committees, the foundation of their taxation system. Both introduced forced loans, conscription, confiscation of enemy estates, and the excise. Both made good use of trained bands and part-time auxiliary regiments, and brought in mercenary armies from outside.

The result of this equality was stalemate. On the field of battle the Royalists, by the end of 1644, had won as much as they had lost. If Rupert and Newcastle had been defeated in the North, the King himself had triumphed at Cropredy and Lostwithiel. His main army, and those of Waller and Essex were very similar. They were roughly equal in range, competence and striking power. With such forces neither side could deliver a really decisive blow. Edgehill and both battles of Newbury were drawn; the King's army lost at Cheriton, but was successful thereafter. In 1642 it could not press home its advantage and enter London; in 1643 it captured Bristol but failed to take Gloucester. Neither side had any master plan which would effectively crush the other.

The result of this military stalemate, apparent to both sides in 1644, was the "reformation" of its war machine each carried out in the course of the year. Here the similarity ends, and the differences become significant. For while, in late 1644, the win-the-war party at Westminster triumphed over the aristocratic moderate leadership of the Parliamentary armies, and under its political inspiration the New Model was created out of the three separate field armies of Essex, Waller and Manchester, the formal Royalist reformation, begun in the spring of that year, did not take root. The sensible proposals put forward then met with too much opposition, and became the prey of rival factions. The Civilians of the Oxford Parliament wanted a reduction in the number of supernumerary officers; the Swordsmen resisted this. The provincial Civilians, in any case, pressed for the decentralisation of taxation, military command and arms holding - the opposite of what was required. The numerical establishment envisaged by the reformers was never achieved, and the new taxes of 1644, aimed to benefit Oxford, did so only with much resistance on the part of local commanders.

The main army was little affected by the reformation of the spring. When the reorganisation of late 1644 did occur, it was on rather different lines. Intended to take account of the new military situation (the loss of the North and the absorption of the Northern Horse into the Oxford army), it was fatally influenced by political manoeuvring. Rupert had gained control of the main army, and the Courtiers helped to create Goring's army, which took half the Old Horse from the Prince. The Civilians were sent, in 1645, to coexist with Goring in the West, as the Prince of Wales's Council.

Too much, however, must not be made of the King's failure to implement reform, as his enemies were doing. With the foot, in the winter of 1644/5, there was some amalgamation of regiments, and useful reorganisation. In every arm the most senior units were accorded privileges to maintain their strength. The King already had some of the advantages Parliament was striving for - a unified central command, and one large field army. The optimism of the King and his advisers before Naseby was not wholly misplaced. Unknown to them, a new set of factors operated in the summer of 1645. An army, well run on the old lines, faced one reorganised from top to bottom. The Royalist forces of 1645 (if we include Gerrard's and Goring's armies) did not lack numbers, skill and experience. They were not conspicuously short of food, clothing, arms and other necessities. The total number of men in the field was not much less than in previous summers. The King's Army, in this year, would have been adequate to the tasks presented in earlier campaigns. But the summer of 1645 was different; the King was overtaken by events. Naseby was the first, as it was the last, great military disaster he suffered as a participant.

What were the weaknesses that prevented the King's army from developing into a fitting rival for the New Model? The obstacles to reform were, it must be concluded, in the main political. Edward Walker, the King's secretary-at-war, suggested some of the answers in a paper he prepared for Prince Charles in the 1650's.⁽¹⁾ His "Short

(1) Undated Paper, House of Lords Record Office, Walker Papers, f.109.

View of the Inconveniencies of the Go^{vt} of his Ma^{ty}s Armes" was intended as a warning to the future King.

Walker made seven points: firstly, Charles I, "out of Indulgence ... did ... too much dispute his power by makeing many L^t Gen^{ls}, Marshalls, & Col^s Generall in seuerall Q^{rs} of the Kingdome." These petty governments "were uselesse", and most of the local officers "being of equall authority would not willingly ioyne or obey each other for any designe".

Secondly, Charles "haneing constituted a Prince of so neere a relation to himself as P: Rupert was Generall of the Horse", nepotism among commanders became widespread, following the royal example.

Thirdly, the old army was weakened by the creation of new forces, which sapped its strength, and left "multitudes of Colonels and other officers" in small regiments.

Fourthly, the Council of War, and so the government of the army was "mixt" (between civilian and military elements) and hence "Animosities ensued betweene the interests", and "the faylings being obiected from one to the other few were punished for any neglects or offences".

Fifthly, "some persons of litle Conduct or Experience by fauor got high Commands and their faylings being rather imputed to ignorance then neglect (whence no punishment ensued) others presumed to doe the like".

Sixthly, "Contributions and other Moneys for pay^t of the Armes and Garrisons were negligently collected, and such as were, many officers

and Gouvernors disposed [for] their owne aduantage without giueing any accompt". In this way the people were oppressed.

Lastly, "Military discipline was neglected and all kind of Insolency debauchery and neglect of Duty conuiued at by many officers in the Army".

Walker's criticisms can be substantiated or qualified at every point, from the examination of the army departments which we have made. We have seen that local colonel-generals aspired to independent commands, and that the efforts of the Oxford authorities to impose their control over taxation - whether the contribution or other taxes - and over discipline, were often frustrated. To some extent the difficulties of Oxford were the result of definite shortages there, for which the King and Council of War cannot be blamed. If country garrisons and the remoter field quarters of the army had been dependent on the Council for the provision of pay, victuals and arms, their obedience to the High Command would have followed naturally. But too much had to be left to local initiative. In this sense, material shortages at Oxford did play some part in the weakening of the army.

The dependence of the King on the goodwill of his greatest supporters, and the character of the initial recruitment to the army, sufficiently explain the presence of nepotism, favouritism and amateurism in his forces, and the proliferation of officers. The ordinary regiments of horse and foot were raised by courtiers and country gentlemen, whose relatives and neighbours - whether possessing military experience or not - inevitably became officers under them. The Royalist

army was the military expression of the hierarchical society it was called upon to defend. But it was also true, as we have seen, that some groups of regiments and the technical departments were staffed by professionals.

Above all, as the secretary-at-war noted, the political divisions in the court and army undermined the royal cause. The War Council came to be racked by disputes, and rivalled by political juntas. Charles tolerated the growth of faction, and warring parties with divergent aims and leadership helped to weaken the Royalist war effort. The quarrel of Rupert and Digby in 1645 was the culmination of this process. The cleavage in the High Command in that year can account, in part, for the small numbers the King brought to Naseby, and for Rupert's largely political surrender of Bristol. The opposition of the provincial Civilians prevented the King from raising a new army of foot to replace that lost at Naseby.

The more closely the Royalist army is studied, the less certain it becomes that the outcome of the Civil War was inevitable. In fact, as we have seen, there was no overriding technical or material defect which prevented the growth at Oxford of a considerable military organisation; actual shortages, in arms, men or money, were largely overcome. It must be our conclusion, therefore, that the result of the war cannot be attributed to one general and simple cause; instead, there are several particular reasons for the King's defeat. The historian who wishes to identify and explain these causes must seek them as much on the Royalist as on the Parliamentarian side.

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MANUSCRIPTS

Main groups

Three main groups of documents may be distinguished.

(a) Walker Papers. The Civil War papers of Edward Walker, secretary-at-war (mainly drafts or copies of official documents, in his own hand) were preserved after his death by the Clopton family, into which his daughter had married. From his manuscripts the family published the Historical Discourses, in 1705. The papers were then divided: part, probably the majority, were obtained for the Harleian Collection, now in the British Museum in four volumes. The rest remained for a time at Clopton House, Warwickshire, were there or elsewhere damaged by damp, and were apparently dispersed in the sale room when the House passed from the original owners in the nineteenth century. In 1897 papers from this source, now lost, were in the possession of J. Eliot Hodgkin, and calendared by the Historical Manuscripts Commission (15th Report, II, pp. 93-107). Other Walker Papers, of a similar character, have been deposited within recent years in the House of Lords Record Office and the National Library of Wales, from three separate private collections.

British Museum:

Harl. MSS. 6802, 6804, 6851-2.

House of Lords Record Office:

Walker Papers (2 volumes, together containing less than 50 documents).

National Library of Wales:

Add. 4849.D. (A few documents only.)

(b) Rupert Papers. Colonel Bennett, of Pyt House, Wiltshire, Rupert's secretary, collected the letters which the Prince received during the Civil War, and may have compiled the "Diary" of Rupert's actions, which is still extant. These papers were preserved at Pyt House until the 1840's, when the publisher, Richard Bentley, bought them and asked Eliot Warburton, an Anglo-Irish lawyer and man of letters, to make use of them. The result was Warburton's Memoirs of Prince Rupert and the Cavaliers, 3 Volumes, published by Bentley in 1849. For this work Warburton had the majority of the letters transcribed, and these copies, in three volumes, were deposited in the Bodleian by C.H. Firth. The originals were sold at Sothebys by Bentley shortly after the publication of the Memoirs. Most were obtained for the British Museum and are now in four volumes of the Additional Collection. Those of Midlands interest came into the possession of the William Salt Library, Stafford, now deposited in the Staffordshire Record Office. The whereabouts of the remainder is unknown.

Some letters not printed by Warburton, and the "Diary", partly printed by him, remained at Pyt House. In 1879 W. Day published the letters in his Pyt House Papers. These papers were deposited in the Wiltshire Record Office in 1957.

British Museum:	Add. MSS. 18980-3.
Staffordshire Record Office:	S.MSS. 479-564.
Wiltshire Record Office:	Pyt House Papers, Letters and Rupert's "Diary", "MSS.A."
Bodleian:	MSS. Firth.C.6-8. Transcripts.

(c) Ordnance Papers. The papers emanating from the Ordnance Office at Oxford, and its officials, were probably preserved by the clerk, Edward Sherburne, after the surrender of the city. They are of three kinds: journals of issues and receipts, original warrants, and the correspondence of the officials, principally with Lord Percy. While Sherburne may have kept the papers together during his long tenure of office at the Tower, from the Restoration until his death in 1702, there was at least a partial dispersal thereafter. Rawlinson, the "universal collector", had acquired the volume of Percy's warrants and letters (now in the Bodleian) by 1713, when he showed it to Hearne (Collections, Oxford Historical Society, Vol. 4, p.235). One volume was purchased for the British Museum in the saleroom, in 1893. The bulk of the papers, however, appear to have remained at the Tower, and so migrated, eventually, to the Public Record Office. Although the Rawlinson volume was known to C.H. Firth, none of the Ordnance Papers has appeared in print.

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W.O.55.457. 60 and 62. 2 volumes, both
journals of issues.

W.O.55.458. 65 and 66. 2 volumes, both
journals of issues.

W.O.55.459. Mainly original warrants for
issues.

W.O.55.1661. Volume containing over 20
journals of issues and receipts.

S.P.16.500, 40A, List of Ordnance Office
personnel, 1644.

Bodleian: Rawl.MS.D.395. Original warrants and
correspondence, mainly of Lord Percy.

British Museum: Add.MS.34325. Journal of receipts.

Other manuscripts

British Museum: Harl.MSS.986
2135
4712
6988.

Stowe MS.184

Egerton MSS.785
2533
2978-9, 2986.

Add.MSS.5460-1
5752
6118
15,750
16,370
29,548-9, 29,570
33,590
33,596.

Public Record
Offices: S.P.16.498, 8
S.P.29.159, 45.
P.C.2.53
P.R.O.31.8.197
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