

Who Governs Now?

The Politics of Power in the Applied Sciences NYC Initiative

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Abstract

This thesis explores the politics of power in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC, an economic development initiative under the administration of Mayor Michael Bloomberg (2002–2013) in New York City. I seek to understand the politics of power in policy decision-making processes of both data-driven governance and public participation. The literature on the politics of power in public policy decision-making processes does not adequately address public policy decision-making processes of both public participation and data-driven governance. What power dynamics explain the policy decision-making processes in Applied Sciences NYC? And, given the norm of data-driven policy decision-making under the Bloomberg administration and the Applied Sciences NYC power dynamic, why also include public participation in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC?

New York City governmental officials intimated and publically professed that a multiplicity of non-governmental actors possessed power in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC. Via process-tracing methodology, I provide nuance to this suggestion of pluralist power. I observe that mayoral agency—and in particular the mayor's definition of economic development, his norm of data-driven policy decision-making, and his personal background—played a decisive role in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC. In so doing, mayoral agency closed the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC such that only certain ideas were considered and only certain participants were included. I maintain that New York City governmental officials nonetheless included processes of public participation in Applied Sciences NYC with three primary goals: to generate ideas and validate their hypotheses; to mitigate future criticism; and to catalyze support. These research findings may inform conversations on public trust, openness, and inclusivity in American democracy. Further empirical work is necessary to understand if my findings with regard to power dynamics in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC also apply to other cases.

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List of abbreviations

ACS – Administration for Children's Services
Bain – Bain & Company
CCNY – City College of New York
CET – Center for Economic Transformation
CEO – chief executive officer
CMU – Carnegie Mellon University
Columbia – Columbia University
Cornell – Cornell University
CUF – Center for an Urban Future
CUSP – Center for Urban Science and Progress
DM – deputy mayor
FIRE – finance, insurance, and real estate
FOIL – Freedom of Information Law
Forum – World Economic Forum
FS – financial services
GDP – gross domestic product
HHC – Health and Hospitals Corporation
ICE – intellect, culture, and education
McKinsey – McKinsey & Company
MIT – Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MRB – Michael R. Bloomberg
MTA – Metropolitan Transit Authority
NAE – National Academy of Engineering
NIMBY – not in my backyard
NYCEDC – New York City Economic Development Corporation
NYPD – New York City Police Department
NYSE – New York Stock Exchange
NYU – New York University
OMB – Office of Management and Budget
PPB – Procurement Policy Board
RETS – Real Estate Transaction Services
RFEI – Request for Expressions of Interest
RFP – Request for Proposals
RICC – Roosevelt Island Community Coalition
RIOC – Roosevelt Island Operating Corporation
RIRA – Roosevelt Island Residents Association
SF – square foot; square feet
SPLAN – Strategic Planning
Stanford – Stanford University
STEM – science, technology, engineering, and math
Technion – Technion–Israel Institute of Technology
ULURP – Uniform Land Use Review Procedure
VC – venture capital
VP – vice president

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WHO GOVERNS NOW?

The lessons that other places should learn from New York's Applied Sciences undertaking have less to do with the result and everything to do with the process of inquiry.

—Katz & Bradley, *The Metropolitan Revolution*

One

1. Introduction: A case study of urban political power in the 21st century

Two, contemporaneous factors increase attention on local, particularly urban, government in the United States: One: the number and proportion of urban dwellers in the U.S. continue to increase. Two: in the U.S., both the partisan gridlock in Congress and the recent and ongoing policy decision-making of President Donald Trump (2017–present) and his cabinet further spur local action. Now, therefore, is a momentous opportunity for urban public policy to shape the lives of urban dwellers. Many scholars view U.S. cities as sites of promise in the 21st century. Yet, the literature is polemical: It does not adequately reflect on complexities in U.S. cities in the 21st century. Public policy enthusiasts and other engaged urban dwellers especially should investigate the processes by which urban governmental officials make decisions. In particular, two 21st century trends in public policy decision-making processes—i.e., the increased prevalence of both data-driven governance and processes of public participation—seem to differ sharply in terms of their power dynamics. In epitomizing both trends, the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC (2008–2012), an economic-development initiative in New York City under Mayor Michael Bloomberg (2002–2013), provide a poignant example of a major puzzle regarding the politics of power in public policy decision-making in U.S. cities in the 21st century, a puzzle that has ramifications for American democracy.

1.1 The context: The promise of United States cities in the 21st century and its urgency

Many—scholars, investors, foundations—have focused their attention over the last three decades on U.S. cities. Since the 1990s, following periods of high crime and disinvestment, scholars have viewed U.S. cities as sites of promise broadly because of the benefits of in-person interactions, the demand for creative classes in the new economy, and/or the demand for intermediate services. Porter (1995), for example, writes about the competitive advantages—i.e., strategic location, local market demand, integration with regional clusters, and human resources—for locating a business in the inner city. Florida (2002) traces the growing role of creativity in the economy and describes it as an urban phenomenon since creative people generally gravitate to the diversity and tolerance of urban areas. Sassen (2009) maintains that the growing demand for intermediate services spurs an economy that is also distinctly urban and that, amid globalization and digitization, firms benefit from knowledge that cities can provide. This literature on the promise of contemporary U.S. cities tends to be descriptive: It identifies their different positive characteristics.

The aforementioned two, contemporaneous factors alter the impetus of more recent scholarly literature on the promise of U.S. cities in the 21st century and increase attention on them. First, the number and proportion of urban dwellers continue to increase in the U.S., boosting interest in cities and their governments. In 2010, urban areas accounted for approximately 82% (~254 million people) of the U.S. population. By 2030, approximately 87% (~313 million people) of the U.S. population will live in urban areas. The greatest population growth in the U.S. will occur in smaller and mid-sized cities. In 2030, there will be 53 urban areas with more than 1,000,000 people; in 2010, there were 41. From 2010 to 2030, the percentage of total U.S. population growth in U.S. cities with populations between 300,000 and 2,500,000 people will be greater than their 2010 population share. From 2010 to 2030, the percentage of total U.S. population growth in U.S. cities with populations greater than 2,500,000 people will be less than their 2010 population share but they will experience population growth too. In fact, the 10 largest U.S. urban areas in 2010 differ only slightly from the 2030 projections. Only four of the 50 most populous cities in 2014 will be among the 20 fastest growing cities from 2010 to 2030.[1]

Second, unprecedented or unanticipated federal public policymaking, or lack thereof, has shifted emphasis to local public policymaking in the U.S. In June 2017, for example, President Trump announced that the U.S. government would cease to participate in the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change mitigation. In July 2017, Climate Mayors—a network of 402 U.S. mayors—responded by adopting the commitments of the Paris Agreement in their cities. As another example: governmental officials in the Trump administration have used rhetoric hostile to people who lack documentation and have enacted policies that substantiate that perspective. Governmental officials in U.S. cities have responded, for example, by terming their cities—or reinforcing their commitment to their status as—"sanctuary cities," which connotes that they, in some way, do not cooperate with federal immigration enforcement. As a final example: governmental officials in the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB), which serves the president in the implementation of his policy, budget, management, and regulatory objectives, recently revealed that the 2019 federal budget proposal calls for an 18.3% ($8.8 billion) reduction in funding for the Department of Housing and Urban Development. Such a reduction would affect funding for rental assistance programs, which account for the majority of the department's spending, and place the burden

[1] Recent U.S. Census Bureau estimates indicate a slowed rate of population growth in urban areas in the U.S. One hypothesis for the slowed rate is the increase in the number of first-time homebuyers, as Generation Y reaches home-buying age, combined with the increased price of real estate in U.S. cities: Generation Y, therefore, may be more likely to buy real estate outside of urban areas relative to prior generations. That said, the number and proportion of urban dwellers continue to increase.

of response on state and local governments. Not only do the actions and inactions of the Trump administration spur local policymaking but the partisan gridlock in Congress also provides impetus for a shift in focus to local public policymaking.

Both the continued growth of urban areas broadly in the U.S. and federal public policymaking, or lack thereof, increase attention on U.S. cities and their governments in the 21st century. Amid the context of these occurrences, more recent scholarly literature on U.S. cities in the 21st century no longer tends to be predominately descriptive but also laudatory. Titles include: *Cities Are Good for You: The Genius of the Metropolis* (Hollis, 2013), *Happy City: Transforming Our Lives Through Urban Design* (Montgomery, 2013), and *The Triumph of the City: How Our Greatest Invention Makes Us Richer, Smarter, Greener, Healthier, and Happier* (Glaeser, 2011). This literature broadly discusses cities in the U.S. (and internationally) in the 21st century as sites of promise for urban dwellers' quality of life. Some scholars focus on the promise of urban governments in the 21st century by broadly contrasting the pragmatism of local government with the partisan gridlock of the U.S. federal government.

However, contemporary literature on the promise of U.S. cities in the 21st century is polemical. In general, it fails to acknowledge difficulties particularly as a result of urban economic development and—as I examine—urban public policy decision-making processes in the 21st century. The lack of critical thinking stems in part from the starting points that scholars assume: for example, amid the generally poorer health outcomes of rural populations, urban dwelling can appear preferable; or, in contrast to the stark governance difficulties at the federal (and, sometimes, state) level in the U.S., urban governments can appear exceptional. A subtitle of more recent literature illustrates this tension regarding the baseline: *Dysfunctional Nations, Risings Cities* (Barber, 2013). The praise of U.S. cities in the 21st century, however, is, and ought to be, more nuanced.[2]

1.2 A complicating factor: A difference in public policy decision-making processes in United States cities in the 21st century

In particular, two 21st century trends in public policy decision-making processes—i.e., the increased prevalence of both data-driven governance and processes of public participation—are not adequately accounted for in the literature on the promise of cities. These trends have the potential to complicate the narrative. They are not necessarily limited to urban—or local—governance but they are particularly noticeable in 21st century cities.

[2] Within the past year especially, scholars have begun to acknowledge a more complicated picture of (economic) opportunity in U.S. cities in the 21st century, especially with regard to increasing urban inequality (e.g., Florida, 2017; Katz & Nowak, 2017).

First, data-driven governance is increasingly common in the 21st century. Data-driven governance is a policy decision-making process that prioritizes data collection and data analysis. This mode is not new: In the mid-19th century, the U.S. Navy, for example, amassed data on the conditions (i.e., water, weather, wind) of the Atlantic Ocean from its many crossings in order to assess optimal sea-lanes and, later, to help lay the first transatlantic telegraph cable. Digitization, however, is new as of the early 2000s and has changed data-driven governance in two important ways. First, simply put, computers and other new technologies have reduced the cost of data collection and data analysis and, thereby, have increased the prevalence of data-driven decision-making. As an indication, "big data," which could very well also refer to an aspect of the historic data-driven governance of the U.S. Navy and other entities, did not become a common term until the 2000s. Second, digitization has changed the utility of data. Prior to digitization, entities likely collected data for a sole purpose; now with digitization, they can be more creative with the same data. Data collected today as a result of a housing inspection, for example, might provide information on the likelihood of fires by unit and, therefore, also might be used to alter the allocation of firehouse resources. The ability to use data for multiple purposes also increases its prevalence in policy decision-making processes.

Data-driven decision-making particularly in urban governments rose as private-sector organizations—e.g., IBM, Siemens, General Electric, and Cisco Systems—pitched their services to resource-deficient governments with a promise of greater efficiency generated from their data expertise. IBM's Smarter Cities initiative, for example, addresses energy optimization and intelligent transportation. The Siemens City Performance Tool, as another example, guides governmental officials on the achievement of environmental targets. Current—a General Electric organization—also advises on energy efficiency and productivity. Cisco, like many of the aforementioned companies, has platforms to help urban governments lower energy consumption, mitigate environmental damage, make parking more time-efficient and cost-appropriate, protect against crime, improve traffic management, and better manage waste.[3] Many urban governments—New York City's under Bloomberg included—keep processes of data collection and data analysis in-house. In 2011, Mayor Rahm Emanuel, for example, hired John Tolva, formerly at IBM for over 12 years, as chief technology officer in Chicago, Illinois.[4]

[3] Another manifestation of data-driven decision-making in urban governments is "benchmarking," or the practice of comparing a city's policy initiatives and policy outcomes against those in peer cities. Again, benchmarking is not new, but a variety of factors—i.e., the need to compete with other cities amid globalization and digitization among them—increase its prevalence in public policy decision-making processes.

[4] I place aside a normative conversation around technocratic governance but note that such a conversation is also not new and likely increases in prevalence as data-driven governance in public policy decision-making processes does.

Second, concurrently, processes of public participation are increasingly prevalent in the 21st century. As with data-driven governance, processes of public participation in urban public policy decision-making are not new. In fact, town hall meetings can be synonymous with visions of American democracy. Rationales for the increased prevalence of processes of public participation in public policy decision-making vary. One possibility is governmental officials are reacting to a decline in citizen engagement by increasing the opportunity for citizen engagement via processes of public participation. Another possibility is technological improvements more easily facilitate processes of public participation, though I note that not all mechanisms are technology-based. A third possibility is an increasingly vocal electorate has spurred a need for a new approach to public policy decision-making.

The mayoral administration of Thomas Menino (July 1993–January 2014) in Boston, Massachusetts, epitomized the trend towards processes of public participation in urban policy decision-making. In 2010, for example, Menino created the Office of New Urban Mechanics, an office that builds civic technologies based on human-centered design. Menino and the New Urban Mechanics initiated the first youth-focused participatory budgeting initiative, Youth Lead the Change, in which young Bostonians decided how to deploy $1 million in city resources. More broadly, U.S. governmental officials in the 21st century are implementing processes of public participation that include: citizen juries, deliberative polling, hackathons, open space, participatory budgeting, serious games, visioning, and world café. Online and digital citizen engagement tools can complement and facilitate these mechanisms, but not necessarily.[5]

1.3 The empirical puzzle: Power dynamics in public policy decision-making processes of both data-driven governance and public participation

As the two public policy decision-making processes become more prevalent in the 21st century independently of each other, I foresee that they will also come together more frequently or, put more softly, governmental officials will consider the possibility of their coming together in policy decision-making processes more frequently. Yet, the literature on the politics of power in public policy decision-making does not address adequately processes of both data-driven governance and public participation. Independently, at the interpersonal level, these processes of public policy decision-making suggest differing power dynamics: fundamentally, in both contracted and in-house models of data-driven governance, experts—i.e., data collectors and data analysts—appear to play a prominent role in public policy decision-making. In processes of public participation, on the other hand, participants

[5] Again, I place aside a normative conversation around direct or deliberative democracy but note that such conversations are also not new and likely increase in prevalence as processes of public participation in public policy decision-making do.

or non-governmental stakeholders appear to play a prominent role in public policy decision-making.

A discussion of power dynamics also moves beyond interpersonal power: Scholars of the politics of power in public policy decision-making discuss structural power, namely the existence of the private market and the ability for capital accumulation, the need to compete against other cities, the prominence of a dominant coalition, and the mayor and her agenda. (For detail, see the literature review in chapter two.) Structural power also influences public policy decision-making processes, and it is unclear how it does so for processes of both data-driven governance and public participation. Particularly as the confluence of these public policy decision-making processes is likely to occur more frequently and the literature does not adequately address its interpersonal or structural power dynamics, public policy enthusiasts and other engaged urban dwellers might ask: What are the power dynamics in public policy decision-making processes of both data-driven governance and public participation?

Assuming that public policy decision-making processes of data-driven governance and public participation will come together more frequently, a secondary puzzle concerns the rationale of governmental officials for such policy processes. Independently, both data-driven governance and processes of public participation appear to have value for governmental officials in providing information for policy decision-making: Data-driven governance provides information about the world, evidence; processes of public participation provide information about what people think, opinion. Yet, the information from both public policy decision-making processes likely does not perfectly align: for example, participants in processes of public participation are not perfectly rational and, therefore, may mistake preference for fact; participants are also selfish and, therefore, may not adequately consider public policy ramifications broader than those that affect them; data collection methodology may bias the data in data-driven governance; data analysts are also not perfectly rational or selfless. It is unclear, therefore, how governmental officials benefit in policy decision-making processes from two types of data that likely come into tension with each other. Public policy enthusiasts and other engaged urban dwellers might ask: Why design public policy decision-making processes of both data-driven governance and public participation?

A reasonable reader might also wonder why she should focus on a puzzle that is a quasi-outlier, in the sense that public policy decision-making processes of both data-driven governance and public participation are likely to occur more frequently but do not yet occur normally. First, puzzles with infrequent characteristics are interesting because they allow for the observation of factors that would not

otherwise be observable. Second, given that I project that public policy decision-making processes of both data-driven governance and public participation will become more normal, the findings of this research project may become more broadly applicable. Finally, if the stake is as grand as I claim, solving even an outlier puzzle could be valuable. (For detail on the stake, see section 1.5.)

1.4 The research design and methodology for solving the empirical puzzles

This section outlines how I intend to solve the empirical puzzles. To reiterate them briefly: Public policy enthusiasts and other engaged urban dwellers might wonder about the power dynamics in public policy decision-making processes of both data-driven governance and public participation and why governmental officials design policy decision-making processes of both data-driven governance and public participation. To solve the empirical puzzles, therefore, I seek to determine the factors of power (causes) that took a decisive role in public policy decision-making processes of both data-driven governance and public participation that resulted in an initiative (effect). I present and justify the research design and specify the research questions.

1.4.1 A qualitative single-case study

Amid the three general techniques—i.e., statistical methods, experimental design, and case study approaches—for investigating causal relationships in the social sciences, a qualitative single-case study best fits the research project. I quickly eliminated the possibility of statistical methods from consideration: The technique does not fit the research project. Practically, the paucity of public policy decision-making processes of both data-driven governance and public participation also begets a small-n study. A larger-n (statistical) research project may be more likely to occur as a result of an increase in public policy decision-making processes of both data-driven governance and public participation. I eliminated the possibility of an experimental design, as it was also impractical.

A case study approach, therefore, remained. Put positively, however, a case study approach fits the research project well. A case is "a specific phenomenon (a unit) that is spatially and temporally delimited;" a case study "looks at the sequence of events that produced an outcome, rather than just the outcome" (Ulriksen & Dadalauri, 2016, p. 224; Peters, 1998, p. 141). In other words, case studies facilitate the analysis of the causes of an effect, as opposed to the analysis of an effect of a cause, which a statistical study might facilitate (Goertz & Mahoney, 2012, pp. 37–44). In fact, amid the existing literature on the politics of power in public policy decision-making, case studies, particularly single-case studies, are the norm: In *Community Power Structure* (1953), for example, Floyd Hunter focuses on unnamed city believed

to be postwar Atlanta, Georgia; in *Who Governs?* (1961), Robert Dahl observes New Haven, Connecticut, in the 1950s; in *Regime Politics* (1989), Clarence Stone also studies postwar Atlanta; in *A Phoenix in the Ashes* (1992), John Mollenkopf examines New York City under Mayor Edward Koch (1979–1989).

A single-case study has a clear strength: It permits the researcher to test the fitness of many possible explanatory theories to a case that she knows in great detail. Gerring (2004) acknowledges the virtues of "depth of analysis:" "One may think of depth as referring to the detail, richness, completeness, wholeness, or degree of variance that is accounted for by an explanation" (p. 348). Hall (2003) adds: "As Campbell (1975) noted some years ago, because they allow for more careful measurement and the tracing of causal processes, which statistical methods cannot normally accommodate, single case studies can be superior to aggregate analysis for testing some theories" (p. 396). In other words, single-case studies in particular can have a high degree of internal validity (Peters, 1998).

I must note, however, that a single-case approach sacrifices representativeness and generalizability, which cross-case designs can permit, for a standard of "comparability" (Gerring, 2004). Given the research project, however, I do not understand limited generalizability as a weakness so much as both an outcome of the research objectives and an opportunity for further research, as I discuss in sections 6.2.2 and 6.3.1. I aim to increase or decrease my confidence in the hypotheses of the literature on the politics of power in public policy decision-making as they apply to the single case. Further research, via "replication logic," would be necessary to test the generalizability of my research findings to other cases (Yin, 1989, p. 44). Additionally, careful case selection can enhance the explanatory scope of a single case (Bennett & Elman, 2006).

1.4.2 Case selection

The selection of the single case, therefore, is particularly key to this research project. I chose to study the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC, an economic-development initiative under the Bloomberg administration and, more particularly, led by the New York City Economic Development Corporation (NYCEDC), which self-identifies as the "City's primary engine for economic development."[6] The initiative culminated in the building of a higher education institution in the technology sciences in New York City.

[6] NYCEDC is a not-for-profit corporation subject to mayoral control. NYCEDC receives funding and operates under a master contract with the City's Department of Small Business Services (SBS). The mayor controls the appointment of a majority of the Board of Directors, including the Chairperson.

First, at the most fundamental level, the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC are appropriate as the single case study for this research project because they provide episodes of public policy decision-making processes of both data-driven governance and public participation. In the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC, I observe three episodes that combine processes of public participation with the norm of data-driven policy decision-making under the Bloomberg administration: (1) deciding on a so-called game-changing idea to improve the New York City economy, (2) deciding on the specifications of the Request for Proposals (RFP) for the Applied Sciences NYC competition, and (3) deciding on the primary award for the Applied Sciences NYC competition.[7]

Second, the absence of a predetermined output for the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC was also a necessary condition. The presence of a predetermined policy output would not have presented an opportunity to study the politics of power in public policy decision-making. I ensured that the outcome of the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC was not predetermined in two ways: first, I observed that, in practice globally, there is more than one answer to the broad policy question; second, I ascertained that, in the specific policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC, New York City governmental officials and other stakeholders considered many policy alternatives.

In practice globally, governmental officials answer differently the broad question of the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC: How can governmental officials improve an urban economy? Frug and Barron (2008) would contend that the answer depends on the aspects of economic development that governmental officials prioritize; Frug and Barron (2008) describe four "city futures:" the "global city," the "tourist city," the "middle class city," and the "regional city." Additionally, the policy output of Applied Sciences NYC—i.e., the building of a higher education institution in the technology sciences—is not without its set of controversial assumptions. The assumptions include: the belief that talent would remain in New York City for work after graduation (i.e., simply, New York City's quality of living is high enough and its cost of living is low enough to justify a decision to remain in New York City); the prioritization of investment in higher education as opposed to, for example, secondary education; and the prioritization of investment in physical infrastructure for higher education amid increased online education. I take no stance on these assumptions but argue that their existence mitigates the concern

[7] A RFP is a document that solicits proposals for the procurement of a commodity, service, or asset. It is one method for source selection in the procurement process. In New York City, an agency must issue a RFP in accordance with the Procurement Policy Board (PPB) rules. As a result, among other criteria, a RFP in New York City must be publicly accessible at the time of issuing the solicitation and an award, if made, must optimize quality, cost, and efficiency.

regarding a sole answer to the policy question: Other governmental officials could have weighed the assumptions differently. Finally, in the specific policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC, the policy output was not predetermined. As I detail in chapters three through five, New York City governmental officials and other stakeholders considered many policy alternatives.

Finally, three factors further support my selection of the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC as the single case: (1) the large amount of data related to the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC and my access to it, (2) the norm of data-driven policy decision-making under the Bloomberg administration, and (3) the opportunity for further scholarly discussion about Applied Sciences NYC and its policy decision-making processes.

First, the large amount of data related to the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC and my access to it was crucial given the necessity of my detailed knowledge of the single case. More particularly, the relatively large scale of the processes of public participation in Applied Sciences NYC and the general willingness of stakeholders to discuss the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC because the initiative is broadly well-received contributed to the large amount of data. Additionally, my personal connection to various current and former governmental officials in New York City contributed to my ease of access to the documentary sources related to policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC.

Second, the Bloomberg administration did not traditionally prioritize processes of public participation in policy decision-making. Its norm of data-driven policy decision-making perhaps makes more interesting its decision to design a policy decision-making process of both data-driven governance and public participation. Bloomberg had established himself in business at the confluence of data analytics and financial markets and, so, it is unsurprising that an emphasis on data analysis pervaded his mayoralty too. In 2013, for example, Bloomberg as mayor established the Office of Data Analytics and, in so doing, appointed the first Chief Analytics Officer to lead it. Additionally, Bloomberg as mayor voiced concerns with social media as a process of public participation: "Long-term urban planning requires leadership, and standing up, and saying, 'You know, you elected me, this is what we're going to do,' and not take a referendum on every single thing" (Grynbaum, 2012). Given such an emphasis, incorporating public participation in the policy decision-making processes would seem to suggest that New York City governmental officials understood some value in doing so or, at least, in the confluence of processes of data-driven governance and public participation. Put differently, the deviation from the norm of data-driven policy decision-making under the Bloomberg administration to processes of both data-

driven governance and public participation may reveal more considered thought on the role of processes of public participation than if they too were a norm of policy decision-making under the Bloomberg administration.

Finally, the extent of scholarly literature on Applied Sciences NYC is limited. Katz and Bradley (2013) punctuate it with their chapter overview of the initiative in the context of a broader "metropolitan revolution." I have the opportunity through my research, therefore, to make a large contribution to the scholarly knowledge of Applied Sciences NYC and the fields that relate to it.[8]

1.4.3 Research questions

We have asked: What are the power dynamics in public policy decision-making processes of both data-driven governance and public participation? Why design public policy decision-making processes of both data-driven governance and public participation? My case selection of the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC, therefore, prompts the research questions:

1. What power dynamics explain the policy decision-making processes of identifying a goal, defining its terms, and selecting an institutional partner to achieve them in Applied Sciences NYC?
2. Given the norm of data-driven policy decision-making under the Bloomberg administration, why also include public participation in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC?

Answering these research questions solves the empirical puzzles regarding the politics of power in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC and contributes to our understanding of the politics of power in public policy decision-making processes of both data-driven governance and public participation.

What power dynamics explain the policy decision-making processes of identifying a goal, defining its terms, and selecting an institutional partner to achieve them in Applied Sciences NYC? is deliberately broad: It is unfettered by the literature on the politics of power in policy decision-making processes. In other words, I formed preliminary hypotheses for the politics of power in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC as the literature suggests (see chapter two) but allowed for the discovery of alternate hypotheses through detailed observation of the case. In this way, I mitigated concerns regarding selection and confirmation biases.

[8] The legacy of Bloomberg as mayor rests, in part, on the success of the output of the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC, particularly because of New York City government's large financial commitment to the initiative and its timing in Bloomberg's final mayoral term. I view this factor most positively: Even though the research project does not concern the implementation or impact of Applied Sciences NYC, a discussion of its power dynamics may become relevant to a discussion of its success or failure. However, I discuss a possible concern with this timing consideration in the limitations section (6.3.1) of the concluding chapter.

Given the norm of data-driven policy decision-making under the Bloomberg administration, why also include public participation in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC? is also deliberately unfettered by the literature on public policy decision-making processes. The literature does not consider processes of both data-driven governance and public participation and, so, would not be particularly useful. Instead, the framing of the research question allows me to take advantage of a distinct combination of features in the research project: a rich body of interviews, a norm of data-driven policy decision-making under the Bloomberg administration, and the inclusion of public participation in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC. Yet, I made one key assumption in the second research question: The inclusion of public participation in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC was intentional.

I recognized that there are many possible combinations of outcomes with regard to the first and second research questions. I remained open to the possibility that each of the three episodes of policy decision-making processes of both data-driven governance and public participation in Applied Sciences NYC would have different power dynamics. Similarly, within an episode of policy decision-making processes of both data-driven governance and public participation in Applied Sciences NYC, I found a set of rationales for the confluence of data-driven governance and processes of public participation and again remained open to the possibility that the set would differ from episode to episode.

1.4.4 Process-tracing methodology

Process-tracing methodology facilitated my answering the research questions. Process tracing is "the analysis of evidence on processes, sequences, and conjunctures of events within a case for the purpose of either developing or testing hypotheses about causal mechanisms that might causally explain the case" (Bennett & Checkel, 2015, p. 8). Process tracing, therefore, augments a chronology of events with a narrative of forgone alternatives, policy decision-making rationales, and a deep understanding of the context for the policy decision-making processes in order to draw a conclusion about the presence or absence of hypothesized causal links via the presence or absence of their "observable implications," or manifestations that, if present in the case, would increase confidence in the hypothesis (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p. 4). In other words, process tracing is a methodology for examining in-detail the factors that take a decisive role in an outcome and why, how, when, or generally under what conditions. In these ways, the methodology fits well with my aim to examine power dynamics in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC.

Process tracing is not a new methodology. Process tracing has become more widely used particularly in fields, such as political science and international relations, that examine decisions and decision-making, but the methodology broadly preceded the recent surge in popularity. Campbell (1975), for example, describes "pattern matching," and George and McKeown (1985) discuss "process tracing." Hall (2003) contends that the methodology has evolved as views about ontology do. He maintains that scholars increasingly view ontology as less determined and that process tracing matches this ontological belief.

Process tracing continues to evolve as a methodology. In describing the practice, scholars use differing terminology, for example: "causal variables," "causal factors," or "causal mechanisms;" "diagnostic evidence" or "causal process observations;" "causal narratives" and others (e.g., Collier, 2011; Collier, Brady, Seawright, 2010; George & Bennett, 2005; Gerring, 2007; Hall, 2003; Sewell Jr., 1996). Additionally, scholars of process-tracing methodology differ in their use of the Bayesian approach. Some scholars use Bayesian inference as a metaphor for process tracing: It can provide language to discuss updating the existing literature (Bennett, 2008). Other scholars attempt to assign numerical values (i.e., priors) to theories (Humphreys & Jacobs, 2015). Generally, process tracing is not yet well-developed in comparing alternative hypotheses and, more broadly, the methodology lacks a precise implementation guide (cf. Ricks & Liu, 2018).

Amid the various approaches, I conceive process tracing principally as Hall (2003) does. Hall (2003) writes that process tracing involves "a theory, its principal rivals, and sets of observations" (p. 392). I refer to Bennett and Checkel (2015) for concrete advice on process tracing as an analytical tool. In other words, using Bayesian language, I update my confidence in a theory after careful consideration of the evidence available. I seek a detailed understanding of the literature and a detailed understanding of the case in order to construct reliably—and principally chronologically—a narrative of events and test the fitness of hypotheses from the literature as they apply to the case.

More concretely, as illustrated in chapter two, I began with a detailed understanding of the literature on the politics of power and derived from it preliminary hypotheses about power dynamics in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC. Bennett and Checkel (2015) demand that no "major theoretical categories of social explanations" are neglected or excluded (p. 23). I then formulated evidentiary tasks and empirical tests—which rely on observable implications—in order to evaluate the preliminary hypotheses. A causal mechanism is unobservable but its presence or absence can be understood via the mapping, or lack thereof, of observable implications onto "causal process observations." A causal process

observations—as distinct from a "data-set observation," which are more typical of large-n quantitative studies—is "an insight or piece of data that provides information about context or mechanism and contributes a different kind of leverage in causal inference;" it is the foundation for process-tracing methodology (Collier et al., 2010, p. 184).

Van Evera (1997) articulates a framework for altering confidence in hypotheses as they apply to a case. His hypothesis tests are based on two criteria: "certitude" and "uniqueness." He outlines, therefore, four types of tests—i.e., "hoop tests," "smoking-gun tests," "doubly-decisive tests," and "straw-in-the-wind tests"—"differing by their combinations of strength and weakness" of certitude and uniqueness (Van Evera, 1997, p. 31). Hoop tests involve "[p]redictions of high certitude and no uniqueness" and, therefore, "[t]o remain viable the theory must jump through the hoop this test presents" (Van Evera, 1997, p. 31). Smoking-gun tests involve "[p]redictions of high uniqueness and no certitude" and, hence "are decisive positive tests" (Van Evera 1997, pp. 31–32). Doubly-decisive tests involve "[p]redictions of high uniqueness and high certitude" and, hence, are "tests that are decisive both ways: passage strongly corroborates an explanation, a flunk kills it" (Van Evera, 1997, p. 32). Straw-in-the-wind tests involve predictions of mostly "low uniqueness and low certitude, and hence [are] tests that are indecisive both ways" (Van Evera, 1997, p. 32). My empirical tests involved only hoop tests. Smoking-gun tests and doubly-decisive tests are difficult to formulate *a priori* and/or are rare to observe. Straw-in-the-wind tests are not robust enough to formulate *a priori* but might, all other things equal, play a role in altering my confidence in a hypothesis.

It is important to note some prominent possible concerns with process-tracing methodology. First, confirmation bias: process tracing can merely confirm or refute hypotheses in the existing literature as opposed to allowing researchers the flexibility to move beyond them. My empirically driven first research question tempers this prospect, however. In fact, if executed correctly, a strength of process-tracing methodology is the ability for the researcher to be transparent and reflexive, acknowledging her assumptions and processes and returning to adjust her premises, given new information, before proceeding. Second, process tracing affords little external validity. As discussed earlier, I do not perceive the little external validity that the methodology can provide to be a limitation of process tracing, however. Rather, in section 6.2.2, I detail the opportunity for further research in order to understand how the findings of this research project apply to other cases. Process tracing seeks to achieve only internal validity. Third, the most salient concern is that of "infinite regress," or a situation in which the researcher examines "steps between steps in a hypothesized process at ever-smaller increments of time and more detailed levels of analysis" (Bennett & Checkel, 2015, p. 11; King, Keohane, & Verba,

1994, pp. 85–87). I approached this concern principally as Mahoney (2012) does: I observed processes in detail "sufficient" to draw conclusions about the observable implications of interest. In other words, when causal process observations became repetitive and I was unlikely to revise my understanding of the causal narrative, I stopped pursuing data (Bennett & Checkel, 2015, p. 28). Lastly, process tracing requires as complete a dataset as possible. Missing data presents great concern for the ability to capture the causal narrative of the case accurately.

1.4.5 Data collection and data analysis

I collected causal process observations as evidence of the presence or absence of observable implications. I broadly used two types of evidence—i.e., primary source documents and interviews—to evaluate power dynamics in the processes of policy decision-making of both data-driven governance and public participation in Applied Sciences NYC. The first stage of the empirical work related to documentary analysis. Again, I used two types of primary source documents: public-facing and internal New York City governmental materials and publicly available research reports. Governmental materials helped to reveal the "official" rhetoric and positioning regarding Applied Sciences NYC. Public-facing governmental materials include but are not limited to: the Request for Expressions of Interest (RFEI) for the Applied Sciences NYC competition, the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition, and press releases related to the initiative.[9] Internal governmental materials include but are not limited to: presentation materials for the Game Changers initiative, lists of attendees at various events, internal presentations on the initiative, the strategic plan for the initiative, detailed selection criteria for the Applied Sciences NYC competition, and documents with various talking points on the initiative.

In total, I obtained over 100 documents from employees of NYCEDC and others. Employees of NYCEDC granted me access to the hard-copy-only materials to which Katz and Bradley (2013) were privy in writing their chapter on Applied Sciences NYC. Upon request, employees of NYCEDC provided me with additional materials on the initiative. Many of these documents are PowerPoint decks, containing a variant of "confidential" or "do not distribute" on the slides, for presentations at non-public meetings. Some of the PowerPoint decks are different drafts of the same content, allowing me to draw conclusions about the evolution in thinking. Employees of NYCEDC checked all documents to ensure that the materials were not sensitive. That said, I am under the impression that employees of NYCEDC did not sanitize or intentionally omit materials. Although, at the time of my fieldwork, many employees of NYCEDC who were involved with the policy decision-making processes of

[9] A RFEI is a document that assesses interest in the procurement of a commodity, service, or asset. It can also be used to refine the vision for an initiative. It is often a precursor to a RFP but a RFEI is not necessary in the procurement process in New York City.

Applied Sciences NYC had since left office, I did not face great difficulty in accessing their documents. I opted not to access governmental materials via the state Freedom of Information Law (FOIL), which facilitates access to state and local government records for members of the public, for risk of alienating members of the administration—whose cooperation I needed to access the primary source documents and whom I also interviewed—with the often arduous task of responding to a FOIL request.

The second stage of the empirical work related to interviewing. Interviews helped reveal a more detailed narrative of the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC. I can again subdivide the type of interviewees in two groups: governmental officials involved in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC and non-governmental stakeholders involved in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC. Governmental officials involved in the policy decision-making processes include but are not limited to: employees of NYCEDC, employees of City Hall, and governmental representatives of relevant communities. Non-governmental stakeholders involved in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC include but are not limited to: participants in the Game Changers conversations and workshops, members of the advisory committee of the Applied Sciences NYC competition, members of the university teams for the Applied Sciences NYC competition, and members of Roosevelt Island community groups. Some of these interviewees were dissenters.

I began the interviewing process by contacting sources related to the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC with whom I had had contact in prior work and by emailing sources that Katz and Bradley (2013) identify in their chapter on Applied Sciences NYC. I identified further interviewees through a "snowballing sampling" technique, in which interviewees suggested and sometimes helped to recruit further interviewees. I conducted over 60 interviews not including informal or off-the-record conversations. All interviews were conducted in-person when possible and were recorded and transcribed, given the consent of the interviewee. The interviews were semi-structured, with a topic guide tailored to the particular interview, in order to attempt to confine the scope of the interview while providing room for flexibility. I maintained a research journal throughout my fieldwork, noting, for example, new, confirmatory, and puzzling information immediately after the interview. Access to interviewees did not present great difficulty. As mentioned earlier, many employees of NYCEDC involved with the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC had since left the office; therefore, perhaps they proved slightly more difficult to contact but, when they agreed to an interview, it is possible that they felt more comfortable speaking openly about their involvement in, and thoughts on, the initiative. In order to encourage a truthful representation of

events and opinions, I alerted the interviewee prior to the interview that all interviews would be made anonymous in my dissertation.

Process tracing is both inductive and deductive: It relies, for example, on in-depth understanding of the literature in order to derive preliminary hypotheses and, then, on a detailed observation of the case in order to revisit and modify them. It both tests theories and builds on them (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). To that end, I analyzed each causal process observation from the primary source documents and interviews at least twice: first in order to formulate a narrative of the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC and, second, in order to carry out the empirical tests for my hypotheses of the power dynamics in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC. I triangulated over a variety of sources in order to increase the validity of the results, specifically by minimizing concerns of source reliability, or lack thereof, and selection bias. Multiple sources, whether of the same type or of different types, confirmed each observation: A "hallmark of process tracing…is that multiple types of evidence are employed for the verification of a single inference" (Gerring, 2007, p. 173). The process of data collection and data analysis, therefore, was iterative.

1.5 A stake in the matter: Public trust in American democracy

Solving the puzzle of the politics of power in policy decision-making processes of both data-driven governance and public participation has the potential also to contribute to broader conversations on American democracy. At its core, American democracy is both representative and transparent: Voters expect to have power in public policy decision-making through elections and voters expect openness and honesty in order to hold governmental officials accountable.[10] Put differently, in American democracy, the expectation is elected officials represent voters' interests in public policy decision-making processes and that elected officials act openly and honestly.

Representation and transparency have the potential to become complicated, however, in two ways with regard to public policy decision-making processes of both data-driven governance and public participation: first, because appointed officials play a large role in data-driven governance and, second, because of the processes of public participation. First, when appointed officials play a large role in public policy decision-making processes—as in instances of data-driven governance—a "democratic deficit," or at least the perception of it, threatens the notion of representation in American democracy. A democratic deficit refers to the lack of direct voter representation in the appointment of governmental officials and,

[10] Democratic theorists debate the merits of representation and the means to achieve it but I largely place aside those conversations.

therefore, the lack of direct voter representation in the public policy decision-making of appointed officials. In their possible subversion of an expectation of American democracy, public policy decision-making processes that include data-driven governance have the potential to threaten trust in American democracy and perhaps contribute to a decline in public political participation—and civic engagement—more broadly.

Second, when governmental officials include public participation in policy decision-making processes, the expectation of representation in American democracy becomes a more robust expectation of participant power in public policy decision-making processes. The expectation becomes one of openness to ideas and inclusivity of participants. That said, as discussed earlier, the power dynamics in public policy decision-making processes of both data-driven governance and public participation are unclear. If the inclusion of processes of public participation is a veneer for process, it has the potential to threaten the trust that voters have in the transparency of their governmental officials—and, again, perhaps contribute to a decline in public political participation and civic engagement.

In other words, the power dynamics in public policy decision-making processes of both data-driven governance and public participation matter to preserving and fostering trust in American democracy. If appointed officials play a large role in said policy decision-making processes—and, in so doing, increase the democratic deficit—and/or participants in the processes of public participation do not play a large role in said policy decision-making processes—and, therefore, the inclusion of processes of public participation is a veneer for process—public policy decision-making processes of both data-driven governance and public participation jeopardize trust in American democracy. Alternatively, if processes of both data-driven governance and public participation afford participants a large role in policy decision-making, such processes may help to spur further public political participation and civic engagement and, in so doing, strengthen American democracy. My solving the puzzle of the politics of power in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC helps to further these important conversations.

1.6 Conclusion

I have now presented the theoretical problem, the empirical puzzles, the research design and methodology for solving them, and the stake of the research project. I began the chapter with an overview of U.S. cities in the 21st century as sites of population growth and of perceived promise. I then focused on a complication: a difference in 21st century public policy decision-making processes, namely the increased prevalence of both data-driven governance and processes of public participation. I maintained that the confluence of these public policy decision-making

processes is likely to occur more frequently. In so doing, I invited more critical investigation of U.S. cities in the 21st century particularly with regard to public policy decision-making processes. I detailed two empirical puzzles in U.S. cities in the 21st century with regard to the politics of power in policy decision-making, with the assumption that the literature does not adequately address the interpersonal or structural power dynamics in public policy decision-making processes of both data-driven governance and public participation. In so doing, I established the object of the research. I then set out the research design and methodology. In so doing, I made clear how I have studied the research questions and how I have solved the empirical puzzles. Finally, I detailed how public policy decision-making processes of both data-driven governance and public participation have the potential to complicate the expectation of representation and transparency in American democracy and, thereby, erode trust in American democracy. In so doing, I established the significance of the research project.

The next chapter (2) details the literature on the politics of power in order to establish the theoretical framework and outline hypotheses for power dynamics in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC. In the subsequent three chapters (3–5), I narrate the three episodes of policy decision-making processes in Applied Sciences NYC that combine the norm of data-driven policy decision-making under the Bloomberg administration with processes of public participation and analyze their politics of power: In chapter three, I discuss deciding on a game-changing idea to improve the New York City economy; in chapter four, I discuss deciding on the specifications of the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition; and, in chapter five, I discuss deciding on the primary award for the Applied Sciences NYC competition. In the concluding chapter (6), I review the findings from the three empirical chapters and introduce the possibility of a comparison across the three episodes of policy decision-making processes of both data-driven governance and public participation in Applied Sciences NYC. I then delineate implications of my research findings for the literature and for further research. I examine two important limitations of the research project and, finally, reflect on the policy relevance of my research findings, suggesting a pragmatic approach to processes of public participation and a need for election reform. In so doing, I demonstrate how this research project on the politics of power in policy decision-making could influence public policy decision-making processes and local policy priorities, in addition to being instructive to public policy decision-makers, voters, and non-voters on the power dynamics in urban public policy decision-making processes.

Two

2. Approaches to the study of urban political power

In this chapter, I describe and analyze the literature on the politics of power in public policy decision-making processes. My empirical focus for the dissertation is power dynamics in public policy decision-making processes in U.S. cities in the 21st century, a topic of increasing relevance, as I discuss in section 1.1, and changing character, as I describe in section 1.2. I observe a particular case—i.e., the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC under the Bloomberg administration in New York City, as I justify in subsection 1.4.2—in order to identify the causal mechanisms of its policy decision-making processes and, in so doing, increase or decrease my confidence in existing theories of urban power in public policy decision-making processes.

I maintain that, as public policy decision-making processes of data-driven governance and of public participation become more prevalent in the 21st century independently of each other, they will also come together more frequently. Yet, the literature on the politics of power in public policy decision-making does not address the confluence of such processes adequately, as I begin to describe in section 1.3. The literature on the politics of urban power is messy: Theories of urban power dynamics have evolved since the mid-20th century. Some theories build on prior literature, while others contest one another. Many scholars define power differently and, thereby, arrive at different conceptions of the causal mechanisms of urban public policy decision-making processes. Simply put, at the interpersonal level, in public policy decision-making processes of data-driven governance, experts appear to play a prominent role; in public policy decision-making processes of public participation, on the other hand, participants or non-governmental stakeholders appear to play a prominent role. Importantly, these initial observations fail to take structural power dynamics into account, particularly amid the confluence of the two types of public policy decision-making processes. This literature review, therefore, proceeds thematically to discuss the literature on the politics of urban power in public policy decision-making processes so that my subsequent empirical study can improve overall understanding.

Specifically, I create a typology of the literature on the politics of urban power in order to illustrate both that scholars do not adequately consider public policy decision-making processes of both data-driven governance and public participation and that scholars propose multiple theories for power dynamics in public policy decision-making processes. In sections 2.1–2.3, I detail, principally in chronological

order, complexities, in the literature and in practice, of power dynamics in public policy decision-making processes. Existing scholars can be categorized as relational theorists, structuralists, or neo-structuralists. In section 2.1, I summarize relational power as understood via the debates between elite theorists and scholars of pluralism. In section 2.2, I detail the movement beyond understanding power principally in relational terms to viewing it within an economic and social context: I outline frameworks for neo-elitism and neo-pluralism and discuss neo-Marxism and public choice theory. In section 2.3, I review the literature that synthesizes elements of relational theories and structural theories: I describe dominant coalition theory and mayoral agency theory. In section 2.4, I summarize the theoretical framework for the empirical inquiry and propose preliminary hypotheses for power dynamics in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC given the literature on the politics of power in urban policy decision-making processes.

In sum, in this chapter, I provide context and propose preliminary hypotheses for the research questions:

1. What power dynamics explain the policy decision-making processes of identifying a goal, defining its terms, and selecting an institutional partner to achieve them in Applied Sciences NYC?
2. Given the norm of data-driven policy decision-making under the Bloomberg administration, why also include public participation in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC?

2.1 Relational power


The literature on the politics of urban power begins with the "community power debates"—i.e., an exchange between elite theorists and scholars of pluralism—in the mid-20th century. Broadly speaking, scholars of the community power debates define power as involving a relationship between or among individuals or groups (henceforth, "relational power"). Interactions of relational power dynamics are typically "actual," but also can be presupposed (or, as C. Stone (1980) would later describe, "anticipated") (Dahl, 1961). Dahl (1957), for example, articulates his understanding of individual relational power: "*A* has power over *B* to the extent that he can get *B* to do something that *B* would not otherwise do" (pp. 202–203). In the literature on relational power, therefore, scholars situate loci of power in individuals or groups; particular individuals or groups are the causal mechanisms for public policy decision-making processes. The literature of the community power debates has two prongs, however: Elite theory and pluralism differ in terms of who comprise the loci of power.

2.1.1 Elite theory

Hunter (1953) initiates the discussion on the politics of urban power, employing a case study of "Regional City"—widely believed to be Atlanta from 1950–1951—

which he believes can inform understanding of power dynamics in American communities broadly. The purpose of his research on "power leadership patterns" is "to clarify…who our real leaders are and something of how they operate in relation to each other" (Hunter, 1953, p. 1). Power for Hunter (1953) is "a word that will be used to describe the acts of men going about the business of moving other men to act in relation to themselves or in relation to organic or inorganic things" (pp. 2–3).

Figure 1: A map of scholars of the politics of power



Hunter (1953) implements a sociological approach—namely a reputational methodology, relying on individuals' classification of others, in this case, according to perceived amount of power—to identify loci of power in Regional City. Hunter (1953) discovers that a small group of people—often also businessmen—holds power in public policy decision-making processes in Regional City. He writes: "A group of men have been isolated who are among the most powerful in Regional City" (Hunter, 1953, p. 74). He continues: "The personnel factor has been isolated to a definite group. One of the critical tests of membership in the policy-making group is prior membership in one of the commercial or industrial bureaucracies in the community" (Hunter, 1953, pp. 87–88).

Hunter (1953) describes the distribution of power as "power pyramids" to explain the concentration of power in an elite group and, then, the dispersal of power to many others (p. 62). He claims that the top of the pyramid sets the agenda and

makes public policy decisions and the base of the pyramid becomes involved in implementation. He writes: "[T]he 'men of independent decision' are a relatively small group. The 'executors of policy' may run into the hundreds. This pattern of a relatively small decision-making group worming through a large under-structure is a reality" (Hunter, 1953, p. 65). Hunter (1953) notes, however, that multiple power pyramids exist, depending on the type of public policy. He writes: "There are *pyramids* of power in this community which seem more important to the present discussion than *a* pyramid" (Hunter, 1953, p. 62, emphasis original). The numerous power pyramids relate to businessmen's interest levels on a particular public policy issue: "On specific projects one leader may allow another to carry the ball, as a leader is said to do when he is 'out front' on a project which interests him. On the next community-wide project another may carry the ball. Each may subordinate himself to another on a temporary basis, but such a structure of subordination is quite fluid, and it is voluntary" (Hunter, 1953, p. 66). Despite variation at the top of the power pyramid, Hunter (1953) demonstrates that the businessmen reinforce their own, and one another's, power. Hunter (1953) contends: "It has been shown that they [businessmen] interact among themselves on community projects and select one another as leaders." (p. 74). In other words, despite changing particulars in terms of who among the elite group play a decisive role in public policy decision-making processes, Hunter (1953) claims that power is confined to, and reinforced by, the (business) elite.

The research findings in Regional City typify the claims of an elite theory of urban power: A small subset of the population defined by status, economic or otherwise, plays a decisive role in public policy decision-making processes. Despite observing only Regional City, Hunter (1953) broadens his claim: "Business men are the community leaders in Regional City as they are in other cities" (p. 81). Hunter (1953), thereby, focuses on a relational understanding of who plays a decisive role in public policy decision-making processes. He does not, however, interrogate deeply why these actors play a decisive role.

2.1.2 Pluralism

Many—scholars of pluralism in particular—have denounced the Hunter (1953) reputational methodology for its potential biases. Scholars of pluralism—despite their similar understanding of power as relational—take issue with an elite theory of urban power, believing, optimistically, in system openness and responsiveness. Classic scholars of pluralism, therefore, emphasize the ability for many groups to control resources—or the lack of well-researched empirical evidence that one group controls sufficient resources—such that a multiplicity of individuals or groups play a decisive role in public policy decision-making processes.

Dahl (1961) leads early discussions of pluralism as a theory of urban power.[11] He begins by mapping the evolution of the political system from oligarchic to pluralist, claiming the catalyst to be a shift from inequalities concentrated in a single group to "dispersed inequalities," or inequalities in resources that are spread over various groups (Dahl, 1961/2005, p. 11). Dahl (1961) claims that this trend disperses power away from solely the elite to, in part, the self-made man and the proletariat: Social status, wealth, education, and political influence are no longer united in the same patrician families. His research question follows: "In a political system where everyone has a vote but where resources that can influence that vote are unequally distributed, who governs?" (Dahl, 1961/2005, p. 1).

Dahl (1961) refers specifically to the case study of New Haven between 1957–1959, which he also believes does well to be representative of American cities. He employs a methodology of decision analysis, examining public policy decision-making processes and deducing their power dynamics from observation. Dahl (1961/2005) argues that a few people have "great direct influence" (i.e., the ability to initiate or veto public policy proposals successfully), and most others have little "direct influence" but have the potential for "indirect influence" (p. 101). His observation of popular influence is an important shift away from an elite theory of urban power.[12]

Dahl (1961) attributes indirect popular power to a couple of characteristics of the American political system: the democratic creed and elections.[13] Dahl (1961/2005) posits that the American creed of democracy and equality implies that "most Americans believe in democracy as the best form of government, in the desirability of rights and procedures insuring a goodly measure of majority rule and minority freedom, and in a wide but not necessarily comprehensive electorate" (p. 316). Dahl (1961/2005) claims that this widespread acceptance necessitates that political leaders engage in "democratic rituals" or "democratic ceremonials" in order to legitimize their government and governance (p. 89). Dahl (1961/2005) acknowledges, however, that democratic ceremonials can make it difficult to determine whether the indirect influence is a "ritual" or "reality:" "To some, a pluralistic democracy with dispersed inequalities is all head and no body; to others it is all body and no head" (p. 89). Yet, Dahl (1961/2005) is optimistic about the reality of indirect popular power: For him,

[11] Other scholars with foundational texts on pluralism include Banfield (1961) and Sayre and Kaufman (1960).

[12] Notably, Dahl (1961) in his observation of "indirect influence" also foreshadows a regard for non-relational (particularly, "indirect" and "situational" as C. Stone (1980) would describe) considerations in discussions regarding power dynamics in public policy decision-making processes. Scholars of pluralism typically did not account for these power dynamics.

[13] It should be noted that elections, in the manner Dahl (1961) conceives them, cannot be understood as a causal mechanism in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC because Bloomberg could not be re-elected as mayor due to term limits.

democratic ceremonials "are not devoid of consequences for the distribution of influence" (p. 163).

Dahl (1961) also credits the role of elections with giving indirect influence to the people. He emphasizes the desire of elected officials to maintain the loyalty and support of constituents via rewards and policies. In other words, if democratic ceremonials were ritualistic, they would not achieve the desired transactional result of loyalty to, and support for, elected officials. Taken together, therefore, Dahl (1961) argues that these two characteristics of note—i.e., the democratic creed and elections—give (indirect) power to the people and observes, in his study of New Haven, that many interest groups play a decisive role in public policy decision-making processes.[14]

2.2 Structural power

As with elite theorists, scholars of pluralism, however, did not generally focus on non-relational power. Their accounts of power dynamics in public policy decision-making processes may have fit in the 1950s and early 1960s, but the political mobilizations in the 1960s and the fiscal crisis of the 1970s revealed a need for further observation. Pluralism appeared anachronistic.

Therefore, beginning in the 1970s, scholars of neo-elitism and neo-pluralism attempted not only to reconcile the divergent perspectives of the community power debates but also to develop an understanding of power that better fit the political reality. They indentified varied flaws in both elite theory and pluralism but agreed that scholars of elite theory and pluralism focused too narrowly on relational power and, in so doing, disregarded other factors that provide a more complete understanding of power dynamics in public policy decision-making processes. In other words, scholars of neo-pluralism and neo-elitism took issue with the "power over" approach of elite theory and pluralism, believing that a command-obedience relationship is too narrow a definition of power: Power is not solely a question of who rules whom (C. Stone, 1980, p. 980). If scholars of relational power situated loci of power in particular individuals or groups, scholars of neo-elitism and neo-pluralism also included the economic and social context in their discussions.

Scholars of neo-elitism and neo-pluralism differently situate precise loci of power in public policy decision-making processes, however. They may agree on a definition of power beyond relational power but their empirics do not yield the same findings or

[14] Examples of entrenched and other interests playing a decisive role in public policy decision-making processes led some scholars of pluralism to develop a more critical strand that mediates between elite theory and classical pluralism. For more on scholars of pluralism and how they diverge from one another, see Waste (1986). For examples of scholars who espouse a more critical pluralism, see Lowi (1967b), McConnell (1966), and Schattschneider (1960).

theories. This section, therefore, begins with a discussion of the frameworks for power of first-wave structuralists and then outlines two prominent theories of urban power—i.e., neo-Marxism and public choice theory—that apply a structuralist definition of power in their analysis. In so doing, I consider the political economy as a factor of urban power in public policy decision-making processes. These theories of power also build on, and contest, one another.

2.2.1 First-wave structuralism

Bachrach and Baratz (1970) were among the first scholars to respond to the perceived shortcomings of the community power debates. They write: "[P]luralists themselves have not grasped the whole truth of the matter; that while their criticisms of the elitists are sound, they, like the elitists, utilize an approach and assumptions which predetermine their conclusions" (p. 4). Bachrach and Baratz (1970) contend that there are two "faces of power," the second of which both elite theorists and scholars of pluralism overlook:

> [T]hey [Elite theorists and scholars of pluralism] have overlooked the equally, if not more important area of what we have called nondecision-making, that is, the practice of limiting the scope of actual decision-making to 'safe' issues by manipulating the dominant community values, myths, and political institutions and procedures. To pass over this is to neglect one whole 'face' of power (p. 18).

In other words, Bachrach and Baratz (1970) argue that scholars of the community power debates unduly confine themselves to instances of "actual" public policy decision-making processes and do not consider how the processes have been influenced prior to the involvement of broader interest groups.

Lukes (1974) builds on the theory of Bachrach and Baratz (1970), outlining a third "face of power" that scholars of the community power debates also did not consider. Lukes (1974) summarizes: The first "face of power" (i.e., the focus of the community power debates) "involves a focus on *behaviour* in the making of decisions on issues over which there is an observable *conflict* of (subjective) *interests*, seen as expressing policy preferences, revealed by political participation" (p. 15, emphasis original). In other words, scholars of the community power debates emphasize "actual" relational power. The second "face of power" (i.e., the addition of Bachrach and Baratz (1970)) involves "[the exercise of] power in the manner the one-dimensionalists favour, but also by controlling the agenda, mobilizing the bias of a system, determining which issues are 'key' issues, indeed which issues come up for decision, and excluding those which threaten the interests of the powerful" (Lukes, 1974, p. 9). In other words, the second "face" also acknowledges covert conflict, potential issues, and policy control.

Lukes (1974) adds a third "face of power" that "also allows that power may operate to shape and modify desires and beliefs in a manner contrary to people's interests" (p. 10). He claims:

> The effects of power seem clearly to bear some relation to intention and will: someone whose actions regularly subvert his intentions and wants can scarcely be called powerful. The outcome of resistance is certainly relevant where comparisons of power are at issue. Affecting behaviour is certainly a centrally important form of power, though not all such affecting is power and not all power is such affecting. The co-operative and communicative aspect of empowerment certainly requires attention, as do the ways in which power maintains social systems and advances conflicting collective interests within them (Lukes, 1986, p. 4).

Lukes (1974), however, claims that no scholar incorporates all three "faces of power;" he finds no scholarly definition of power adequate.

C. Stone (1980) further develops scholarly understanding of power, creating a typology of power relationships. Notably, the four power relationships in his typology do not perfectly map onto the three "faces of power" plus a C. Stone (1980) addition. C. Stone (1980) identifies three dichotomies of power relationships: "interpersonal" and "intergroup;" "intentional" and "situational;" and "direct" and "indirect." The "interpersonal" versus "intergroup" distinction overlays the typology; it characterizes each power type as either a relationship among individuals or a relationship among groups. The distinction between "intentional" and "situational" power acknowledges "[p]ower [as] not only a matter of *intention* [but] also a matter of context, of the nature of or 'logic' of the *situation*" (C. Stone, 1980, p. 979, emphasis original). Finally, a "direct" power relationship involves the parties in competition in a situation common to all, whereas an "indirect" power relationship involves a change in ability to act because of a knock-on effect, not common competition.[15]

C. Stone (1980), therefore, describes four types of power relationships—i.e., "decisional," "anticipated reaction," "nondecision-making," and "systemic"—using a 2x2 matrix (C. Stone, 1980, p. 980). Decisional relationships are "intentional" and "direct," as scholars of the community power debates principally discussed, though Dahl (1961) might have used the term "actual;" anticipated reaction relationships are "situational" and "direct," as scholars of the community power debates also discuss, albeit less prominently; nondecision-making relationships are "intentional" and "indirect," as Bachrach and Baratz (1970) first contend; and systemic relationships are "situational" and "indirect," as C. Stone (1980) adds. Systemic power is "that dimension of power in which durable features of the socioeconomic system (the *situational* element) confer advantages and disadvantages on groups (the *intergroup*

[15] C. Stone (1980) utilizes the terms "direct" and "indirect" in a more precise manner than Dahl (1961) does.

element) in ways predisposing public officials to favor some interests at the expense of others (the *indirect* element)" (C. Stone, 1980, p. 980, emphasis original).

Scholars of neo-elitism and neo-pluralism such as Bachrach and Baratz (1970), Lukes (1974), and C. Stone (1980), therefore, established frameworks that they believed would better capture power dynamics in public policy decision-making processes. In keeping with their tradition, in my research project, I adopted a definition of power that includes not only a "direct" element but also an "indirect" one that can be "intentional" or "situational." In particular, I examine the political economy as a factor of urban power or, put differently, how the political economy catalyzes or constrains public policy decision-making processes and indirectly bestows benefit or does harm to individuals or groups and their ability to act in public policy decision-making processes.

2.2.2 Neo-Marxism

Beginning in the 1960s and 1970s, neo-Marxists were frontrunners in adopting a more expansive definition of power. The literature is broad, but common themes include: capitalism plays a decisive role in social and political relationships within the state; governmental officials necessarily intervene to guarantee the possibility of capitalism by regulating the conflicts that it produces; and governmental officials protect and support the interests of capital-holders at the expense of the working class. Neo-Marxists, therefore, also maintain that capitalism mars public policy decision-making processes.

Logan and Molotch (1987) discuss one way in which capital plays a decisive role in public policy decision-making processes.[16] They emphasize a state's reliance on private investment for public revenues as a catalyst for the relationship between governmental officials and a "place-based" (business) elite. Logan and Molotch (1987) term the relationship "an urban growth machine:" a "political coalition of private and public power holders that promotes capital accumulation via land-use intensification and local economic development" (Kirkpatrick & Smith, 2011, p. 478). Logan and Molotch (1987) observe that a "growth consensus" can extend beyond governmental officials and the business elite—e.g., real-estate developers—to other stakeholders with place-based interests such as local media companies, utility companies, universities, arts institutions, professional sports teams, and organized labor.

Logan and Molotch (1987), thereby, attempt in their investigation not only to identify "who governs?" but also to answer "for what?" (p. 50). On the one hand, a growth

[16] Castells (1978), Harvey (1973), Lefebvre (1974/1991), and Manley (1983) are chief among other scholars of neo-Marxist theories of urban power.

machine, through the public policy decision-making that it perpetrates, can improve the economic position of place-based capital-holders. Logan and Molotch (1987) write: "For those who count…[a growth machine] can increase aggregate rents and trap related wealth for those in the right position to benefit" (p. 50). On the other hand, governmental officials engage in the growth machine principally for their re-election possibilities: "[C]andidates of both parties, of whatever ideological stripe, have to garner the favor of such persons, and this puts them squarely into the hands of growth machine coalitions" (Logan & Molotch, 1987, p. 67). In other words, as Kirkpatrick and Smith (2011) write: "The growth machine is both a facilitator and a beneficiary of a 'détente' between 'otherwise antithetical' urban actors" (p. 479; quoting Zukin, 1980, p. 593). Capitalism—and, more particularly, the relationship between private investment and public revenues—undergirds the relationship between governmental officials and a place-based elite.

Logan and Molotch (1987) that contend that a growth machine fosters a set of possible public policy responses and eliminates the consideration of others. They write:

> Although they may differ on which particular strategy will best succeed, elites use their growth consensus to eliminate any alternative vision of the purpose of local government or the meaning of community. The issues that reach public agendas (and are therefore available for pluralists' investigation) do so precisely because they are matters on which elites have, in effect, agreed to disagree. Only under rather extraordinary circumstances is this consensus endangered (Logan and Molotch, 1987, p. 51).

Logan and Molotch (1987) delineate a "good business climate" and "taxation, labor legislation, unemployment compensation, scale of government, and public indebtedness" as possible resulting public policies (p. 59).

The neo-Marxist argument regarding an urban growth machine, therefore, goes beyond a relational understanding of power and also incorporates "situational" and "indirect" considerations, namely the presence of a pro-growth coalition. Capital is a locus of power in public policy decision-making processes. The symbiotic relationship between government and a place-based (business) elite limits possible public policy responses to those that aid economic development, either directly or through infrastructural preconditions. The growth machine confers benefits to those in the coalition and (indirectly) harms those outside of it, or those not in the position to benefit from pro-growth policies. In other words, Logan and Molotch (1987) contend that the public policy agenda is partially set prior to relational power being a factor of power in public policy decision-making processes.

Neo-Marxist theories of urban power are early advancements from the community power debates to neo-elitism and neo-pluralism. Judge, Stoker, and Wolman (1995)

write: "[Neo-Marxists] led both pluralists (in neo-pluralism) and elite theorists (in the literature on growth machines) to consider the wider socioeconomic and state contexts and constraints within which local decision makers had to operate" (p. 6). Broadly, neo-Marxists understand power through a lens of class relationships and interests.

2.2.3 Public choice theory

Public choice theorists also employ economic rationale in analyzing political behavior. In particular, they apply a theory of free markets to the context of public policy decision-making. Peterson (1981) epitomizes this logic as applied to the urban context.[17]

Peterson (1981) premises his discussion on rational individuals and groups operating to maximize self-interest. He contends that members of a city share an interest in maintaining or enhancing the attractiveness of their city relative to other cities through public policies that target economic position, social prestige, or political power. Peterson (1981) focuses on economic position as the most important objective. He contends that local governmental officials have an incentive to maximize the economy of their city in response to competition from other cities. In other words, according to Peterson (1981), local governmental officials seek to prevent voter-consumer "exits" to another city (p. 121). Peterson (1981) delineates the efficient use of land, labor, and capital and discusses three types of public policies—i.e., developmental, redistributive, and allocational—as having an impact on the economic vitality of cities. He writes:

> [C]ities, like private firms, compete with one another so as to maximize their economic position. To achieve this objective, the city must use the resources its land area provides by attracting as much capital and as high a quality labor force as is possible. Like a private firm, the city must entice labor and capital resources by offering appropriate inducements (Peterson, 1981, p. 29).

The vitality of the export industry, accordingly, is an indicator of a city's competitive edge.

Peterson (1981) acknowledges, however, that urban governmental officials are limited jurisdictionally in their public policy responses to improve the economic position of their cities. They, for example, do not have regulatory power to control labor and capital flow. Nonetheless, they are expected to work within these constraints to protect their fiscal base, cultivate their political image, and attend to their community responsibility. Governmental officials, for Peterson (1981), have sets of "policy choices [that] over time will be limited to those few which can plausibly be shown to be conducive to the community's economic prosperity" (p.

[17] Other public choice theorists include: Forrester (1969) and Tiebout (1956).

30). Particularly, Peterson (1981) argues that the need to attract capital and talent limits the set of potential public policy responses:

> City politics is limited. Because cities have limits, one explains urban public policy by looking at the place of the city in the larger socioeconomic and political context. The place of the city within the larger political economy of the nation fundamentally affects the policy choices that cities make. In making these decisions, cities select those policies which are in the interests of the city, taken as a whole. It is these city interests, not the internal struggles for power within cities, that limit city policies and condition what local governments do. […] I find the primary interest of cities to be the maintenance and enhancement of their economic productivity. To their land area cities must attract productive labor and capital (p. 4; p. 15).

Peterson (1981) discusses a favorable benefit-to-tax ratio as an example of a policy response that urban governmental officials can (co-)implement to protect a city from "net outward flow" (p. 46).

Public choice theorists, therefore, go beyond a relational understanding of power to one that also considers "indirect" and "situational" factors. The need to compete with other cities is a locus of power in public policy decision-making processes. It limits the set of possible public policy responses. Peterson (1981) does not address different possible criteria of that set, even though a definition of economic improvement or a hierarchy of "exit" prevention would appear to matter to public policy decision-making processes. Peterson (1981) also does not discuss the impact of relational, or other factors of, power once free-market rationale defines a set of public policy responses. That said, he argues that economic principles subordinate governmental officials and necessitate public policy responses that improve the ability of the city to capture new investment and capital and, thereby, support business and economic development.

2.3 Neo-structural power

Structuralists, therefore, do well to incorporate the economic and social contexts that relational theorists had largely neglected in their discussion of power dynamics in public policy decision-making processes. However, many others—myself included—contend that the assumption of economic determinism makes theories of structural power flawed. In other words, many scholars do not agree with the complete subordination of agency and politics to an economic and social context. Power is not only relational, but it is also not only structural. This section, therefore, describes two attempts—i.e., dominant coalition theory and mayoral agency theory—to mediate between a relational and structural understanding of power dynamics in public policy decision-making processes.

2.3.1 Dominant coalition theory

Dominant coalition theorists, also referred to as regime theorists, have been at the forefront of the analysis of power dynamics in public policy decision-making processes for over two decades.

C. Stone (1989) established urban regime theory. He defines an urban regime as "a set of arrangements or relationships (informal as well as formal) by which a community is governed" (C. Stone, 1989, p. 27). C. Stone (1993) premises urban regime theory on the notion that government alone is "inadequate" to bring about public policy change because of its lack of resources (p. 17). Therefore, in analyzing power dynamics in public policy decision-making processes, C. Stone (1993) claims "it is necessary to go beyond the composition of the governing coalition" (p. 17). C. Stone (1993) continues: "[T]he nature of the relationship among the coalition members matters. It is particularly significant that this relationship includes the resources members bring to bear on the task of governance" (p. 17).

C. Stone (1993) delineates four types of urban regimes that vary in composition according to the need for resources, the magnitude of which, in turn, varies according to the difficulty of enacting the public policy pursued. Simplistically, governmental officials require the existence of more resource-rich urban regimes as they endeavor to accomplish more challenging public policy agendas. C. Stone (1993) writes: "In order for a governing coalition to be viable, it must be able to mobilize resources commensurate with its main policy agenda" (p. 17). Ranging from a less challenging to a more challenging corresponding public policy agenda, the four regime types according to C. Stone (1993) are: "maintenance regimes," "development regimes," "middle class progressive regimes," and "regimes devoted to lower class opportunity" (pp. 18–22). C. Stone (1993) writes: "Maintenance regimes represent no effort to introduce significant change" and, therefore, require "no extensive mobilization of private resources;" "Development regimes…are concerned primarily with changing land use in order to promote growth or counter decline. Therefore they represent efforts to modify established social and economic patterns and they involve the linking of private investment to public action;" "Middle class progressive regimes focus on such measures as environmental protection, historic preservation, affordable housing […] Because exactions are part of the picture…[u]nlike the development regime, the government-business relationship in a progressive regime is not a largely voluntary relationship;" and "Regimes devoted to lower class opportunity expansion would involve enriched education and job training, improved transportation access" (pp. 18–20). C. Stone (1993) argues

"regimes devoted to lower class opportunity expansion" are "largely hypothetical" (p. 20).[18]

C. Stone (1993) observes that development policy can be controversial, leading to the inducement of resource-holders into a regime. C. Stone (1993) writes:

> [Development projects] provoke opposition and contain risks for public officials who back them. […] [They are] advanced easiest when the public is passive. What they do require is coordination between institutional elites. Coordination may involve some inducements, but little coercion. A set of actors must move in concert, but the number is small (pp. 18–19).

C. Stone (1993) notes that a development regime can ameliorate controversy through the benefits of a development policy: "Development activity not only gives rise to controversy, it also generates an abundance of selective incentives and small opportunities: jobs, contracts, fees, new schools, parks, theater facilities, and many more. These can help enormously in managing conflict and softening or dividing the opposition" (p. 19). C. Stone (1993) summarizes the resources necessary in a development regime:

> In terms of degree of difficulty of the governing task, development does not rank very high. It calls mainly for elite coordination and, to help manage conflict, insider transactions. Insofar as the mass public is concerned, all that is required is that they not inflict electoral defeats. The resources needed are those of legal authority (principally the power of eminent domain), private investment monies, development expertise, transaction links within the business sector, and public funds for various forms of subsidy (p. 19).

The interaction between governmental officials and other resource-holders—often again in the business sector—is central, therefore, to understanding power for C. Stone (1989). For C. Stone (1993), power involves "bringing cooperating actors together, not as equal claimants, but often as unequal contributors to a shared set of purposes" (p. 8). He writes: "City hall has to deal with a powerful business sector and sharp limitations on its own authority. Thus, public officeholders have to come to terms with private interests, especially business interests. That process is the core of what I call the urban regime" (C. Stone, 1989, p. ix). Therefore, the limited resources of government—and resultant need for urban governmental officials to maintain relationships with resource-holders in order to be effective—create a locus of power in public policy decision-making processes in a regime. By its very existence, a regime limits the possible public policy responses, prioritizing the interests of the few who are members of the regime. A regime thereby confers benefits to the resource-holders and/or (indirectly) confers harm to the non-resource-holders.

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[18] According to the C. Stone (1993) definitions, the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC have the potential to align most closely with a public policy initiative involving a development regime; therefore, I detail this type further.

Deviating from relational theorists and structuralists, C. Stone (1993), therefore, observes a "two way" relationship between the economy and politics:

> [Regime analysis] recognizes the enormous political importance of privately controlled investment, but does so without going so far as to embrace a position of economic determinism. In assuming that political economy is about the relationship between politics and economics, not the subordination of politics to economics, regime analysts explore the middle ground between, on the one side, pluralists with their assumption that the economy is just one of several discrete spheres of activity and, on the other side, structuralists who see the mode of production as pervading and dominating all other spheres of activity, including politics (p. 2).

In other words, C. Stone (1993) and other dominant coalition theorists do well to combine elements of both relational and structural power. Davies and Imbroscio (2009) summarize: "Regime theory portrays political power at the urban scale as characterised by neither pluralist fluidity and openness nor elite domination and control, while incorporating both political and economic influences on city politics" (pp. 6–7).

2.3.2 Mayoral agency theory

Structuralists and neo-structuralists tend to focus on the economic and social context in their discussions of factors of power in public policy decision-making processes. Flanagan (2004), however, contends that scholars neglect the office of the mayor as a factor of power.[19] He writes, "Interestingly, and perhaps incongruously, scholars of the city do not take mayoral politics as seriously as the newspapers, think thanks, and the public. In a search for the laws of behavior that shape the city, the social sciences typically bypass city hall and look toward more fundamental factors of urban life like demography and economy" (p. 1). Broadly, existing literature on mayoral agency conceives power in terms of a binary—i.e., its residing with the mayor or its residing outside of the mayor—but otherwise is not very well-developed.[20] Flanagan (2004), on the other hand, summarizes three, key theses of mayoral agency and urban power:

> The first camp advances the personality thesis. In this vein, mayoral personality or skill is viewed as the deciding factor in determining political success, and mayoral personality is largely locked in before assuming office. The second camp of theory is the failure thesis. In this formulation, mayors are creatures of the conditions they face. Since the urban condition is usually poor, the possibilities for effective leadership tend to fade over time. The third

[19] The literature on the mayor as a factor of urban power emerged concurrently with the literature on relational, structural, and neo-structural power. This subsection, therefore, diverges from the prior chronological treatment of the literature.

[20] In New York City, power in public policy decision-making processes can reside with the mayor. New York City is a "strong mayor" government (i.e., one in which the mayor possesses great jurisdiction, often as compared to that of the city council). Bellush and Netzer (1990) write:

> The mayor of New York has so much power and is so central a figure in the everyday life of the city in this media age, that his or her leadership style is an independent factor in the way the city is governed and how city politics are played out. Mayors can and do shape, to some extent, the ways in which groups compete and they can affect, at the margin, the nature of the clusters of power that are, for a time, the real decision makers (p. 15).

> camp, the most sophisticated of the three, is the context thesis. Work in this tradition tries to balance the individual agency of mayors against the context in which they operate (p. 3).

I elaborate on these theses of mayoral agency as a factor of power in public policy decision-making processes.

Sayre and Kaufman (1960) advance the personality thesis. They describe the office of the mayor as a multi-faceted position, delineating four particular roles—i.e., "chief of state," "chief executive," "chief legislator," and "chief of party"—and they place great importance on the execution of these roles (pp. 658–661). Sayre and Kaufman (1960), however, also describe limitations that hamper the mayor's ability to execute his policy strategies, calling him a "handicapped leader" (p. 661). They write: "The Mayor's public status, his constitutional and statutory powers, and his managerial assistance are all much more modest than those of his fellow executives [presidents and governors]. […] [The office of the New York City mayor] is not yet an office richly endowed with the powers and the supporting institutions usually associated with chief executive offices" (Sayre & Kaufman, 1960, p. 662).

Sayre and Kaufman (1960), therefore, claim that the "personality" of the mayor dictates relative success in negotiating the different responsibilities of the office. They write:

> The performance of Mayors in office depends upon several factors: What is their conception of the office? Do they perceive it as having great or small dimensions? Are they impressed with its opportunities or with its limitations? What personal style and skills do they bring to office? In what ways do they try to create an image of themselves which would add to the strength of the office? What is their degree of skill in the strategies and tactics of politics? What other political assets do they bring to the office or acquire while in office? Do these assets exceed their liabilities, and do they increase or decrease during the term in office? What kinds of problems, governmental and political, do they confront while in office? How sharply do they perceive these problems? How do they define the Mayor's role in handling these problems? Finally, and in summary, to what extent are they innovators and initiators? to what extent arbitrators between the proposals of others? to what extent merely mediators and presiding officers? (Sayre & Kaufman, 1960, pp. 689–690).

Sayre and Kaufman (1960) observe that "[m]ost Mayors find themselves compelled by the nature of the office, their political posture, and their personalities to be mediators more often than arbitrators, and to be arbitrators more often than innovators" (p. 658). Sayre and Kaufman (1960), therefore, posit that the individuality—specifically the personality—of a mayor matters in public policy decision-making processes. Context, in other words, confines the power of mayors, yet they have a potential for agency that differs based on the person holding office. The mayor has the potential to be a locus of power in public policy decision-making processes, and the personality of the mayor is a causal mechanism for the realization and execution of that power.

Yates (1977), however, assumes a more deterministic approach to urban politics in his failure thesis: He views the city as "ungovernable" (p. 5). He defines "ungovernable" as: "[T]he urban policy-making system is incapable of producing coherent decisions, developing effective policies, or implementing state or federal programs" (p. 5). Yates (1977), nonetheless, views the mayor as central to urban politics, with a task of "making an increasingly ungovernable city governable" (p. 146). Yates (1977) delineates a well-known typology of mayoral governance styles according to the amount of political and financial resources mayors possess and their degree of activism and innovation (p. 146). He writes:

> One style [the crusader] is that of the mayor who possesses weak political and financial resources but who exhibits a strong desire to solve urban problems and produce significant policy innovations. […] The crusader emphasizes a symbolic politics and crisis management because he does not have the resources to govern and control the city consistently through the force of political or financial clout. […] A second style [the entrepreneur] tends toward the mayor who possesses strong political and/or fiscal resources and who also takes a strongly activist posture toward urban policy making. […] The entrepreneur uses his available political and fiscal resources to provide large-scale public projects and other new public services to build and consolidate political support. […] A third style [the boss] is that of the mayor who possesses strong political and/or fiscal resources but who assumes a passive attitude toward urban problem solving. […] The boss uses his political resources to maintain political control. […] The final style of political leadership [the broker] is that of the mayor who possesses relatively weak political and/or fiscal resources and who also assumes a passive role in urban policy making. […] The broker accepts the limitations of his power and seeks to keep peace in the city by carefully balancing and adjusting conflicts, demands, and interests (Yates, 1977, pp. 146–147).

Yates (1977) argues that most mayors are likely to become brokers or crusaders because of increased political fragmentation in cities.[21] Yates, therefore, places less emphasis on the mayor as a locus of power in public policy decision-making processes, deferring instead to loci of power associated with the urban political economy.

Lastly, Ferman (1985) and C. Stone (1995) separately put forward context theses that attempt to reconcile the prior two conflicting conceptualizations of mayoral agency and power in public policy decision-making processes. Ferman (1985) writes: "[T]he political system and the political culture influence the resources and opportunities of a mayor, but…an executive may succeed or fail according to how skillfully he or she manipulates the political context" (p. 8). C. Stone (1995) contends:

> [M]ayoral performance is more complicated than is usually acknowledged. […] Economic competition among cities constrains urban actors, without a doubt—but the quest for business investment is not the complete picture. The point made here, drawing heavily on biographical material, is that, despite the structural constraints

[21] Yates (1977) would likely characterize Bloomberg as an entrepreneur.

> imposed by a global economy, mayors pursue a variety of aims; and their relationship to the corporate interests of their cities is extremely complex. The imperative to respond to economic competition is not so all-encompassing or even so clear on many occasions as to dictate a mayor's actions. Thus mayors have room to pursue a variety of aims, *some of which may derive from personal wants and ambitions* (p. 112, emphasis original).

Ferman (1985) and C. Stone (1995), therefore, acknowledge both the urban political economy and the mayor as loci of power.

2.4 A theoretical framework for the empirical inquiry

New York City governmental officials intimated and publically professed that a multiplicity of non-governmental individuals and groups possessed power in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC. Katz and Bradley (2013) relate, for example: "An economic development official from another city asked him [Seth Pinsky, president of NYCEDC] [at a forum about Applied Sciences NYC in late 2012] for advice on what city government could do to help small companies merge into large, more robust companies. Pinsky replied, 'Ask them'" (p. 38). "Ask them" suggests that, in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC that involved both public participation and internal research and data analysis, "they" had power. The proclamation suggests a pluralist power dynamic in policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC.

The reader will recall, however, that relational theorists, scholars of pluralism among them, fail to consider adequately economic and social contexts in their theories of power, as, I argue, New York City governmental officials also failed to do in their suggestion of a pluralist power dynamic in policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC. I derived, therefore, the following structural and neo-structural hypotheses by applying the theories of the literature to the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC:

Table 1: A summary of the suggested power dynamics and my hypotheses for the power dynamics in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC	
H_0	*The power dynamics in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC allowed for a multiplicity of (non-)governmental individuals and groups to compete because the market is open and responsive.*
H_1	*The power dynamics in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC privileged those with capital because the existence of the private market and the ability for capital accumulation compelled New York City governmental officials to reinforce the system of class inequalities.*
H_2	*The power dynamics in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC privileged businesspeople, private investors, and other resource-holders because New York City governmental officials are constantly competing against governmental officials in other cities to attract and retain capital and other resources.*
H_3	*The power dynamics in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC*

	privileged a dominant coalition because New York City governmental officials have two primary interactions—with their political electoral base and with their economic environment—and a dominant coalition plays a central role in both.
H_4	*The power dynamics in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC privileged the mayor and his agenda because New York City mayors and other governmental officials have agency within an economic and social context.*

These structural and neo-structural hypotheses suggest causal mechanisms in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC different from each other and from the suggested one. In chapters three, four, and five, I examine policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC and conduct rigorous empirical tests to establish whether the posited factors of power played a decisive role in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC.

2.5 Conclusion

I have discussed and analyzed the literature on urban power in policy decision-making processes and have provided context and proposed preliminary hypotheses for the research questions of this dissertation. The literature on urban power in policy decision-making processes is complicated: Scholars place different emphases on factors of power that play a decisive role in public policy decision-making processes. They, thereby, place different emphases on causal mechanisms of public policy decision-making processes too. The literature on urban power is also inadequate. Scholars do not discuss public policy decision-making processes of both data-driven governance and public participation. This research project seeks to increase or decrease confidence in the theories of urban power particularly in public policy decision-making processes of both data-driven governance and public participation.

I sought to be as exhaustive as possible in my literature review. If my examination of the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC were to have led me to deduce a factor of power that I had not covered in my literature review, I would have returned to the literature and, therefore, also reevaluated my preliminary hypotheses. I acknowledge, however, that I necessarily excluded from my literature review a parallel strand of literature on the politics of urban power: Increasingly scholars examine how communities can mobilize to alter traditional power dynamics in public policy decision-making processes. To the extent that I am able given process-tracing methodology, I discuss who is included and excluded in public policy decision-making processes and the economic and social context for their inclusion and exclusion. I suggest only in the concluding chapter (6), however, my normative stance on barriers to inclusivity in public policy decision-making processes and regret that process-tracing methodology did not afford greater opportunity to expound on

giving greater voice to communities that are currently underrepresented or inadequately heard in public policy decision-making processes.[22]

[22] For examples of this literature, see Banks (2000), Brown and Wellman (2005), Browning, Marshall, and Tabb (1990), Kaufmann (2007), Preston, Henderson Jr., and Puryear (1982), and Sonenshein and Drayse (2006).

Three

3. Deciding on a game-changing idea to improve the New York City economy

Applied Sciences NYC began, approximately around the 2008 financial crisis, with the question "What can/should we [New York City governmental officials] do to increase economic activity [in New York City]?" and came to a conclusion in December 2011 when employees of City Hall and employees of NYCEDC granted the primary award jointly to Cornell University (henceforth, "Cornell") and the Technion–Israel Institute of Technology (henceforth, "the Technion") to construct a higher education institution in the technology sciences on Roosevelt Island in New York City. There! You have a narrative of Applied Sciences NYC in a single sentence. Why read on?

You continue in order to determine whether my analysis of the politics of power in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC is ultimately convincing. More particularly, your evaluation of my narrative—e.g., its completeness and its biases—and your discovery, through my narrative, of the factors that took a decisive role in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC are crucial to my ability to persuade you to sympathize with my analysis of the politics of power. Process-tracing methodology, as I indicate in section 1.4.4, necessitates that the researcher demonstrate in-depth knowledge of a case and maintain an openness to, and reflexivity about, different causal narratives. In chapters three through five, I aim to do both. I clarify actors, their networks, their interests, and their context; I elucidate public policy decision-making rationales and public policy alternatives considered; I describe the dependent variable, not possible explanatory factors; and I do so largely chronologically to minimize biasing your—and my—views of the explanatory factors, as might occur if I were to organize the chapters principally according to actors, institutions, or other possible factors of power. I state beliefs and construct arguments—and clearly signpost them both—and I delay my discussion and analysis of the politics of power in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC to the latter portion of the chapters, after I have outlined the narratives of the policy decision-making processes.

I recount the narrative of Applied Sciences NYC, which ranges from the stage of public policy problem definition to the stage of public policy output decision, by way of its two principle phases: the Game Changers initiative, from June 2008 or January 2009 to December 2009 (chapter three), and the Applied Sciences NYC competition, from December 2010 to December 2011 (chapters four and five). The

former consists of a phase of idea brainstorming and/or hypothesis testing for a so-called game-changing idea in response to the question "What can/should we [New York City governmental officials] do to increase economic activity [in New York City]?" It culminates on 30 December 2009 when employees of NYCEDC briefed the mayor on their sole game-changing idea of building in, or attracting to, New York City a higher education institution in the technology sciences. The latter phase—i.e., the Applied Sciences NYC competition—consists of a competition among U.S. and international universities for an award to construct a higher education campus in the technology sciences in New York City. It culminates, on 19 December 2011, in Bloomberg's granting the primary award jointly to Cornell and the Technion.[23]

The greater-than-two-year arc of the narrative from public policy problem definition to public policy output decision is far from straightforward. The reader can recall, from chapter two, scholars of the politics of power and their theories of power in public policy decision-making processes. (See figure 1 and sections 2.1–2.3.) New York City governmental officials intimated and publically professed that a multiplicity of non-governmental individuals and groups possessed power in the public policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC. Yet, the reader can also recall from chapter two that relational theorists fail to consider economic and social contexts in their theories of power, as, I argue, New York City governmental officials also failed to do in their suggestion of pluralist power in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC. I derived, therefore, in chapter two, structural and neo-structural hypotheses by applying the theories of the literature to the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC. (See table 1.) My structural and neo-structural hypotheses suggest causal mechanisms in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC different from each other and from the suggested one.

In chapters three through five, I discuss the data, test my hypotheses for the politics of power in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC via their observable implications, make arguments for whether the case of Applied Sciences NYC increases or decreases my confidence in the literature on the corresponding theories of power, and add to the literature by proposing factors that played a decisive role in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC. I do

[23] I use "Applied Sciences NYC" to refer to the policy decision-making processes from the stage of public policy problem definition to the stage of public policy output decision. That said, this term is fully suitable only *post hoc*. New York City governmental officials did not refer to the initiative as such until they decided on their sole game-changing idea of building in, or attracting to, New York City a higher education institution in the technology sciences. In fact, employees of NYCEDC first used the term as late as 5 October 2010 as the title to the PowerPoint presentation for a briefing meeting for Robert Steel, the incoming deputy mayor for economic development.

so by examining power dynamics particularly in three episodes of policy decision-making processes in Applied Sciences NYC that combine "asking them"—i.e., involving processes of public participation—with the norm of data-driven policy decision-making under the Bloomberg administration. These policy decision-making processes are: deciding on a game-changing idea to improve the New York City economy (chapter three), deciding on the specifications of the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition (chapter four), and deciding on the primary award for the Applied Sciences NYC competition (chapter five). I invite the reader to join my exploration of the politics of power in public policy decision-making processes and to begin to evaluate me as a process tracer. To do both, a single-sentence narrative would hardly suffice.

3.1 Prior to the Applied Sciences NYC initiative

I ought to contextualize the genesis of Applied Sciences NYC: Both ideas for diversifying the New York City economy and for building or attracting a "great engineering school" germinated prior to the so-called start of Applied Sciences NYC.[24] I include contextualization of these particular ideas in this chapter for their potential bearing on the suggestion of pluralist power in deciding on a game-changing idea to improve the New York City economy and/or for their contribution otherwise to our understanding of the power dynamics in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC. As we will discover in subsequent sections of this chapter, the narratives of New York City governmental officials downplay—by neglecting to highlight—the pre-existence of the idea for constructing a "great engineering school."

3.1.1 The pre-existence of ideas for diversifying the New York City economy

Bloomberg assumed the position of New York City mayor in January 2002, in the wake of the dotcom bubble and the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks and amid the economic downturn of the early 2000s. The New York City economy—particularly strong in sectors of finance, insurance, and real estate (FIRE) and previously growing in technology via "Silicon Alley"—was under stress. Already, the need to diversify it was evident: Both governmental officials in the Bloomberg administration and the broader New York City urban policy community were conversing about this issue.

In my interviews, multiple sources in the Bloomberg administration cited an unpublished report, which McKinsey & Company (henceforth, "McKinsey"), a global management consulting firm, helped to produce, as an example of the broad

[24] Chapter one provides other contextualization, for example, of 21st century trends in data-driven governance and processes of public participation and of Bloomberg and the Bloomberg administration. The contextualization in this section is specific to Applied Sciences NYC.

conversation about the need for economic diversification in New York City. The report documents the existing New York City economy, the future of the global economy, and the mismatch between the two. An employee of NYCEDC recalled of the report: "We were looking for the biggest mismatches between competitive advantage[s] [of New York City] and realized commercial activity [in New York City] to see where we had opportunity to diversify—not to diminish the FIRE sector but to diversify and grow other sectors, [to] create some balance." In the so-called Bloomberg-Schumer report on the health of the broader New York State economy, which McKinsey also helped to produce and made publically available in January 2007, the authors replicate some of the findings from the prior, unpublished, city-centric report. In the 2007 report titled "Sustaining New York's and the US' Global Financial Services Leadership," McKinsey details trends in financial services and potential difficulties for New York City in remaining the global leader in financial services.

An awareness of the need to diversify the New York City economy extended beyond the Bloomberg administration to the broader New York City urban policy community. The Center for an Urban Future (CUF), an independent, nonpartisan organization conducting research on New York City, published a report titled "Engine Failure: With Economic Woes that Go Well Beyond 9/11 New York Needs a Bold New Vision to Renew the City's Economy." In the 2003 report, CUF documents the decline in the New York City economy and proposes an agenda for economic growth. The growth agenda moves beyond the financial-services sector and highlights the potential for entrepreneurialism in New York City.

These select instances in, and external to, the Bloomberg administration are indicative of the broad conversation—one that began before Applied Sciences NYC—about economic diversification in New York City. The beginning of the Bloomberg administration coincided with a series of events—among them, the dotcom bubble, the terrorist attacks, and the economic downturn—which already emphasized to New York City governmental officials and to the broader New York City urban policy community a need to focus on, and diversify, the New York City economy.

3.1.2 The pre-existence of the idea for constructing an engineering school in New York City

Building a "great engineering school" in, or attracting one to, New York City was a proposed public policy output to diversify the economy.[25] Both governmental

[25] The Bloomberg administration surely did not envision the implementation of solely one strategy for economic diversification in New York City. In my discussion of the Game Changers initiative in subsequent sections of this chapter, I elucidate this notion. I focus, in this subsection, on

officials in the Bloomberg administration and the broader New York City urban policy and business communities also conversed about this particular idea early in the administration. A leader of the New York City business community recalled:

> One of the reoccurring themes of that [Bloomberg] era in terms of economic development for New York City was the need for a great engineering school. There were a series of questions: Do we build a great engineering school, or would that take too long? Could we attract a great engineering school? Those conversations really had grown from constant feedback that we, and the [Bloomberg] administration, were receiving from the business community.

Another leader of the New York City business community recalled: "I am one of many people who have made the point for a long time that investing in, and increasing, the number of tech universities is now becoming one of the most important things you can do for a city. […] And so what the Bloomberg administration did very early on was say, 'Is there anything we could do to bring one here?'"

The desire to build or attract a great engineering school permeated the New York City urban policy community as well as the Bloomberg administration and the local business community. In a report, titled "Engineering a Tech Sector," CUF used the opportunity, which the proposed merger between New York University (NYU) and Polytechnic University presented, to discuss the need for a great engineering school in New York City. CUF writes in the 2007 report:

> While New York City boasts a dazzling array of top-flight scientific research institutions, from Columbia University to NYU to Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center, the city has never come close to having an equally robust engineering presence. Silicon Valley and the Route 128 Corridor in and around Boston—two regions whose natural high-tech ecology every other community in the U.S. wishes to study and clone—both grew in tandem with large and dynamic science and engineering programs at Stanford and MIT, respectively.

In other words, the idea for a great engineering school in New York City was an idea of local policymakers, business leaders, and policy researchers prior to the Game Changers initiative.

I emphasize these conversations about economic diversification and about a great engineering school in order to contextualize Applied Sciences NYC and particularly the Game Changers initiative. Contextualizing Applied Sciences NYC in this way may introduce further nuance to the governmentally professed narrative of brainstorming ideas through the Game Changers initiative and, therefore, also to the suggestion of pluralist power in the Game Changers initiative. That said, it would be incorrect to assume that, because the idea for a great engineering school existed prior, its fruition was inevitable. Additionally, independently of how my contextualization may differ

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contextualizing only the idea of building a "great engineering school" in, or attracting one to, New York City because doing so was the public policy output of the Game Changers initiative.

from, or introduce nuance to, other narratives, such contextualization may be useful as we consider the politics of power in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC. We move now to the so-called start of Applied Sciences NYC with this context in mind.

3.2 June 2008–December 2009: The Game Changers initiative

Sources disagree on a starting point—if there can be such a definitive marker—for the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC. I would expect them to do so. Broadly, depending on personal perspective or personal allegiance, there are two main camps; for ease, I call them "Team Strauss" and "Team Robertson." The former camp situates the beginning of Applied Sciences NYC with sub-initiatives—branded NYC 2020—that began soon after the appointment, in June 2008, of Steven Strauss as senior vice president, or head, of business development at NYCEDC and, two months after, also as executive vice president, or head, of economic strategy and policy development at NYCEDC. The latter camp—i.e., Team Robertson—situates the beginning of Applied Sciences NYC at a meeting on 5 January 2009 at which Pinsky, president of NYCEDC, tasked Euan Robertson, senior vice president, or head, of strategic planning (SPLAN) at NYCEDC, with creating a process to diversify the New York City economy.[26, 27]

Both camps employed contemporaneously two primary levers to generate and select a game-changing idea to improve the New York City economy: processes of public participation, at an unprecedented scale and predominantly involving participants external to NYCEDC; and internal—to NYCEDC—research and data analysis, a norm of policy decision-making processes under the Bloomberg administration. I mediate the tension regarding the starting point of the processes of public participation in the Game Changers initiative by proceeding chronologically in my narrative, beginning at the earlier of the two possible starting points, so that we can ascertain for ourselves whether the seven months from June to December in 2008 contributed significantly to the trajectory of the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC. Specifically, I recount the narrative of events from June 2008 so that we can investigate the extent to which the NYC 2020 initiatives of Team Strauss influenced, or even could be considered part of, the idea-generation processes of the Game Changers initiative, given our primary goal of evaluating the

[26] In order to differentiate the public policy initiatives of Team Strauss and Team Robertson with regards to the Game Changers initiative, I henceforth refer to those of Team Robertson as the "SPLAN Game Changers initiatives" and, as suggested prior, those of Team Strauss as "NYC 2020 initiatives," or a sector-specific variant of that term.

[27] Katz and Bradley (2013) begin their narrative of Applied Sciences NYC largely with Team Robertson in 2009. In order to substantiate their thesis of a "metropolitan revolution," this starting point makes very good sense. For the completeness of my research project, however, it was important to consider context and initiatives prior to 2009.

power dynamics in deciding on a game-changing idea to improve the New York City economy. I believe that, as I detail in subsection 3.3.1, we will learn together that the narrative of the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC ought to begin in June 2008 and that even members of Team Robertson, if pressed, would have to recognize this argument as consistent with their own narrative of Applied Sciences NYC.

I believe, however, that the discrepancy in the so-called start of the internal research and data analysis for the Game Changers initiative is less consequential for our understanding of the Game Changers initiative than that of the so-called start of its processes of public participation. Members of the economic research and analysis team at NYCEDC predominately conducted the research and data analysis for the initiative. In this way, although the timing of what they knew by virtue of the internal research and data analysis may be different, members of Team Strauss and members of Team Robertson largely shared the same knowledge pool. I therefore proceed not to divide the narrative of the internal research and data analysis by camps but to discuss it chronologically. I clearly signpost if I discuss internal research and data analysis particular to Team Strauss, or the NYC 2020 initiatives, or to Team Robertson, or the SPLAN Game Changers initiatives. Employees of NYCEDC often conveyed their research on, and subsequent short listing of, possible game-changing ideas via PowerPoint presentations. I primarily use PowerPoint presentations and other documents internal to NYCEDC as indicators of the research and data analysis that employees of NYCEDC conducted during the Game Changers initiative.

I, therefore, begin this section with the processes of public participation of Team Strauss; I recount them from June 2008 when Pinsky hired Strauss. I follow this subsection with one on the processes of public participation of Team Robertson; I describe them from the 5 January 2009 meeting. I conclude the narrative of public participation in the Game Changers initiative with a subsection on processes of public participation over the entire period of the Game Changers initiative that members of both camps acknowledge as a critical part of the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC. I then recount the processes of internal research and data analysis in the Game Changers initiative and conclude with a subsection on briefings in order to elucidate both whom employees of NYCEDC perceived as necessary to brief and who knew what when in the Game Changers initiative. The ultimate goal of the narrative of the Game Changers initiative is the evaluation of the power dynamics in deciding on a game-changing idea to improve the New York City economy.

3.2.1 Team Strauss and its processes of public participation

Let us first understand the relevant organizational context for Strauss's joining NYCEDC so that we can then turn to his vision for, and implementation of, processes of public participation in the NYC 2020 initiatives.

3.2.1.1 The New York City Economic Development Corporation and Steven Strauss

Pinsky—whom Bloomberg appointed president of NYCEDC in February 2008—hired Strauss in June 2008. Strauss had worked as a director at the World Economic Forum (henceforth, "the Forum")—an international organization perhaps most notable for convening an annual meeting in Davos-Klosters, Switzerland—and, prior, as a consultant and in financial services. Such background fit well with Pinsky's evolving vision for NYCEDC.

Andrew Alper, president of NYCEDC from the beginning of the Bloomberg administration (2002) to 2007, had organized NYCEDC according to industry desks in keeping with an investment-banking model, which he knew well from his 21 years in the investment-banking division at Goldman, Sachs & Company. An employee of NYCEDC recalled of such organizational model: "His [Alper's] observation was that companies have no one to call at City government who understand[s] what they do, so he set up desks [at NYCEDC] that were focused on different industries. What that eventually evolved into was each of these desks would try to chase after companies. 'Let's get this bank to move this many jobs here.' 'Let's get this airline to move this many jobs here.'" The subsequent president of NYCEDC, Robert Lieber, and his successor, Pinsky, however, took a different approach to economic development in New York City, one that shifted away from placing bets on particular organizations.

The Lieber/Pinsky vision for economic development can be distilled to thinking strategically, as opposed to thinking tactically.[28] This strategic vision dovetails with the expansive agenda of Daniel Doctoroff, the deputy mayor for economic development from the beginning of the Bloomberg administration to January 2008. Doctoroff espoused investing in neighborhoods, not just a single structure, and building large-scale infrastructure projects. The evolution of the Alper group—referred to as "Client Coverage"—to the Pinsky Business Development group reflected the shift in vision from Alper to Lieber and Pinsky. An employee of NYCEDC recalled: "Toward the end of Andy Alper's time, or maybe it was the

[28] Lieber's presidency at NYCEDC was short-lived: Bloomberg appointed him to succeed Alper as president in January 2007 but then appointed Lieber as deputy mayor for economic development in December 2007. The shift in vision for economic development in New York City and the organizational changes at NYCEDC, therefore, may have begun approximately under Lieber but broadly continued, and came to fruition, under Pinsky, who was president of NYCEDC from February 2008 until July 2013.

beginning of his successor's, Bob Lieber's, time, there was the decision that [chasing after particular companies] was an inefficient way of doing economic development. It [the Alper strategy] was very tactical." The same employee of NYCEDC continued, having referred to an internal study about how to transform the Alper organizational model: "The [Alper Client Coverage] group was changed from a group that focused on desks and [on] concierge-like services to specific businesses to a group that was much more akin to an internal consulting firm for the City, that would look at different industries but would think more strategically rather than thinking tactically." Strauss led the group, Business Development, and, two months after he began, also oversaw three other groups as head of Economic Strategy and Policy Development.

3.2.1.2 The vision for processes of public participation and its initial implementation

In my interviews, several employees of NYCEDC recalled the Forum's methodology—in addition to, and more so than, Strauss's background in consulting and financial services—as instructive for why Pinsky hired Strauss and for how Strauss operated at NYCEDC. The Forum tends to bring together diverse stakeholders around a common agenda in order to effect change. Part of its mission statement reads: "We believe that progress happens by bringing together people from all walks of life who have the drive and the influence to make positive change." The Forum describes itself as unique, with respect to its role, because it is impartial, global, holistic, and forward-looking: "Deeply anchored in the public and private sectors, the Forum is the only global organization serving this role, bringing together the world's foremost CEOs [chief executive officers], heads of state, ministers and policy-makers, experts and academics, international organizations, youth, technology innovators and representatives of civil society in an impartial space with the aim of driving positive change." An employee of NYCEDC recalled: "He [Strauss] was brought in [to NYCEDC] to interestingly transform not just the City's economy but the group itself." I agree that one can draw significant parallels—particularly with regard to the diversity and authority of stakeholders and the practice of asking and answering large-scale questions—between the Forum's methodology and Strauss and his team's processes of public participation in the NYC 2020 initiatives.

The processes of public participation in the NYC 2020 initiatives began, at least informally, soon after Strauss assumed his role at NYCEDC in June 2008. Strauss interpreted the strategic vision for NYCEDC—given the New York City economic context and given his professional background—as necessitating a series of sector-specific conversations and workshops, the former often one-on-one and the latter group-based, around an agenda of how best to strengthen the future in New York City of the industry in question. The language of "game changer" was not yet in the NYCEDC vocabulary, but the sentiment behind the NYC 2020 initiatives was similarly strategic.

In June 2008, Business Development encompassed the industry desks, which had remained from the Alper era, with a new strategic as opposed to tactical mandate. The industry desks included media, financial services, fashion, green, and industrial. Strauss convened conversations and workshops—which NYCEDC would brand as part of the NYC 2020 initiatives—to advance thinking, by sector, on the strategic questions: Where are we [i.e., the sector in question in terms of the contemporary economy]? Where are we going [i.e., the sector in question in terms of the future economy]? and How are we going to get there? A workshop attendee recalled:

> It [a NYC 2020 workshop] worked because the mission was very specific. It was not 'let's talk about our business' or 'what's new?' It was a very specific challenge with a very specific result requested. CEOs are good on the strategic stuff. They may not be good in the weeds but they are really good at strategic thinking so most of them understood what was wanted of them. It was not their money. It was not their time. It was simply to forge some good ideas.

Strauss and his team did their best to convene workshops, by sector, of only industry decision-makers to aid the workshops' effectiveness. The same workshop attendee as quoted just prior recalled of the media workshops:

> I think the interaction [in the media workshops] worked because [we] were peers. You could not transfer your invitation. 'No, your executive for community affairs is not invited. [If] you cannot come, you cannot come.' There was no substitution. Everyone at the table was equal. Some of them may have had small media businesses. Some of them may have had massive media businesses. They all felt they were with peers.

Strauss initiated these conversations and workshops in the NYC 2020 initiatives at a scale and with a structure that sources in the Bloomberg administration recalled, in my interviews, as unprecedented. Conversations with industry leaders had existed, of course, prior to, and prior in, the Bloomberg administration. The unprecedented scale and unprecedented workshop structure, however, necessitated resources. Lieber, as deputy mayor for economic development, supported Strauss with the resources necessary to contract with consultants to assist him and his team. An employee of NYCEDC recalled: "Lieber…authorized the initial funding for all this. […] Yes, money is precious. Yes, people are prudent with money. But, by the same token, if you have got something that is a good idea, money can be found to move things forward. Bob [Lieber], I think, was key in finding the initial money to move things forward."

Conversations and workshops with industry leaders in financial services, media, and fashion assumed priority.[29] Employees of NYCEDC first developed publically

[29] Strauss and his team held conversations and/or workshops with leaders related to all industry desks of Business Development, though employees of NYCEDC incorporated only those with media and fashion leaders into the form of a published report and corresponding initiatives. Edutech.NYC.2020 also culminated in a report—though it is no longer publically accessible—published in March 2012. An employee of NYCEDC recalled the various NYC 2020 initiatives via the consultants with whom

intelligible initiatives from the financial-services-sector conversations and workshops, which Ann Li led. Strauss had brought Li, his former colleague at McKinsey, to run the financial-services desk within Business Development at NYCEDC. Given the financial crisis, employees of NYCEDC unsurprisingly expedited the announcement of financial-services-related initiatives. On 18 February 2009, Bloomberg announced 11 initiatives to support the financial-services sector and encourage entrepreneurship in New York City. The initiatives were: incubators for start-up businesses; the New York City Angel Fund; an annual international financial-services business-plan competition; VC Connect, an online information portal and services provider that enables venture-capital support; FastTrac, a program to help New Yorkers start entrepreneurial businesses; JumpStart NYC, free job training and a New York City job placement program for workers laid off from the financial-services sector; attracting and growing new financial-services utilities; an international recruitment campaign; a financial-services advisory committee; and regulatory advocacy. Members of Team Strauss contended these initiatives were based on the knowledge gained from the NYC 2020 financial-services-sector conversations and workshops.

Ostensibly as a result of a need for expediency, employees of NYCEDC did not apply, at the same scale, the Forum's methodology of workshops to the financial-services sector and did not issue a public report on its findings. An employee of NYCEDC recalled these initiatives: "Our first response [after the financial crisis] was a series of relatively small, I would say, not-all-that-meaningful initiatives that we were able to pull together quickly so that the mayor had something to announce. […] Some things that we kind of took off the shelf." An employee of NYCEDC recalled these initiatives as "tactical responses." Yet the financial-services-sector initiatives already indicate a focus on themes—ones that members of Team Strauss claim emerged in its conversations and workshops—of the need for entrepreneurialism and talent in order to improve the New York City economy.

3.2.1.3 Media.NYC.2020 and Fashion.NYC.2020

The media- and fashion-sector conversations, workshops, and resultant initiatives may be a better example of the NYC 2020 approach as Strauss had originally envisioned it than that related to the financial-services sector. The media-sector conversations and workshops—which NYCEDC branded, along with the resultant suite of initiatives, as "Media.NYC.2020"—also began soon after Strauss assumed his role in June 2008. NYCEDC issued a RFP for Media.NYC.2020 in late 2008, and

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NYCEDC contracted: "The [consulting] firms that I remember as being involved heavily were: Bain & Company, which did the financial services study for the City in this period; Bain & Company, which did the Fashion NYC work; Oliver Wyman, which [did] Media NYC; Bain, which did the Game Changers workshop; Bridgespan did Edutech; and, I think, BCG [The Boston Consulting Group] did Green."

Oliver Wyman, a global management consulting firm, won the award to consult on the initiative. In February 2009, Strauss hired Kristy Sundjaja—who, as an associate partner specializing in media and technology, had been part of the Media.NYC.2020 pitch team at Oliver Wyman—as vice president, or head, of the media desk within Business Development at NYCEDC. Sundjaja, therefore, managed Media.NYC.2020.

Fashion.NYC.2020 took longer to come to fruition formally. Strauss hired Bain & Company (henceforth, "Bain"), a global management consulting firm, to work with employees of NYCEDC on this initiative, and Fashion.NYC.2020 launched officially in January 2010. That said, as with other sector-based conversations, those with the fashion industry began largely when Strauss assumed his role at NYCEDC in June 2008. An employee of NYCEDC recalled:

> Fashion.NYC.2020 was the brand name given when the City decided to launch a fashion report. But…we have got people in [the main Game Changers workshop on 9 September 2009] from the [Solomon R.] Guggenheim Foundation [and Museum], Brooks Brothers; [we] had the chairman [of Brooks Brothers] there. J.Crew already was in the room [in a prior NYC 2020 conversation(s) or workshop(s)]; LVMH [Moët Hennessy Louis Vuitton] USA [was] already in the room; Kenneth Cole was already in the room. These were all people we had already met with at least once before we would invite them into a meeting like [the main Game Changers workshop]. […] So, we had already, before Fashion NYC kicked off, thought about the fashion industry. Something to keep in mind: There is a lot more that went on at [NYC]EDC in this period than what actually got published into reports.

Employees of NYCEDC deployed a structured series of conversations and workshops as part of Media.NYC.2020 and Fashion.NYC.2020. The official kick-off event of Media.NYC.2020 occurred at Gracie Mansion, the official residence of the New York City mayor, on 18 February 2009, though, in interviews, members of Team Strauss acknowledged that conversations with industry leaders preceded the official kick-off event, if only to ensure that there was sufficient interest in the initiative. In a press release dated 20 February 2009, the Office of the Mayor reports that "more than 75 top industry executives" attended the Gracie Mansion event, including Lee Bollinger, president of Columbia University (henceforth, "Columbia"); Jerry Hultin, president of the Polytechnic Institute of NYU; Jon Klein, president of CNN; Martin Kon, head of the global media and entertainment practice at Oliver Wyman; Peter Price, president of the National Academy of Television Arts and Sciences Foundation; Emily Rafferty, president of the Metropolitan Museum of Art; Garrick Utley, president of the Levin Graduate Institute of International Relations and Commerce of the State University of New York; and Kathryn Wylde, president and CEO of the Partnership for New York City.

In addition to the kick-off event, in "Media.NYC.2020: Final Report"—which employees of NYCEDC wrote and did not release until January 2012—employees of

NYCEDC list a West Coast executive workshop at Oliver Wyman in San Francisco, California, on 26 March 2009, a East Coast executive workshop at Oliver Wyman in New York City on 30 March 2009, a first progress update at Thomson Reuters on 13 April 2009, a CEO workshop at the Metropolitan Museum of Art on 28 July 2009, an interactive entertainment roundtable at Oliver Wyman in New York City on 29 September 2009, a "written word" roundtable at Oliver Wyman in New York City on 14 October 2009, and a CEO workshop hosted by and at Time Warner on 10 November 2009 as "major Media.NYC.2020 events" prior to 30 December 2009.[30] Employees of NYCEDC also report in "Media.NYC.2020: Final Report" that they "canvassed the opinions of 200+ media executives" on how best to strengthen the future of the media industry in New York City. In the report appendix, however, employees of NYCEDC list many more than 200 stakeholders, either as members of the "Media.NYC.2020 CEO advisory committee" (64 people) or as "additional Media.NYC.2020 participants" (nearly 500 people).

In "FashionNYC2020: An NYCEDC Study"—which NYCEDC wrote and did not release until April 2012—employees of NYCEDC note that they conducted over 500 surveys and interviews with fashion industry leaders. They list the "CEO advisory board" (68 people) and "additional Fashion.NYC.2020 participants" (28 people).[31] From the media- and fashion-sector conversations and workshops, employees of NYCEDC distilled themes for the economic development of both sectors and applied them in a resultant series of NYCEDC initiatives. In "Media.NYC.2020: Final Report," employees of NYCEDC discuss four strategic areas—i.e., "connectivity," "innovation," "talent and education," and "turning NYC into a bi-lateral media gateway"—that emerged from the Media.NYC.2020 conversations and workshops. On 7 July 2009, the mayor announced eight initiatives to begin to realize these visions. The initiatives were: NYC Media Lab, a research center for media companies and universities; the media-technology bond program; a media and technology fellowship; the New York City start-up procurement initiative; the New York City BigApps competition; Hive@55, a center for media freelancers;

[30] In "Media.NYC.2020: Final Report," employees of NYCEDC list events until 31 March 2011 as major Media.NYC.2020 events. I focus, however, on the ones that preceded 30 December 2009 since we are interested particularly in the influence of Media.NYC.2020 on the Game Changers initiative. Employees of NYCEDC do not list, in "Media.NYC.2020: Final Report," the main 9 September 2009 Game Changers workshop, discussed subsequently, as one of the major Media.NYC.2020 events, so it is reasonable to assume that even the initiative leaders of Media.NYC.2020 understood Media.NYC.2020 and the Game Changers initiative as distinct in some respect.

[31] As in "Media.NYC.2020: Final Report," employees of NYCEDC also list "major events" in "FashionNYC2020: An NYCEDC Study." I do not include these events in my narrative since the official kick-off event for Fashion.NYC.2020 postdates 30 December 2009 (i.e., postdates the Game Changers initiative), and we are particularly interested in the influence of Fashion.NYC.2020 on the Game Changers initiative.

JumpStart New Media, a training program in new and digital media; and the international and domestic recruitment of media players.

In "FashionNYC2020: An NYCEDC Study," employees of NYCEDC indentify two themes—in addition to supporting New York City's existing competitive advantages in the fashion industry—which they deduced from the Fashion.NYC.2020 conversations and workshops. Not too dissimilar from the Media.NYC.2020 themes of education and talent and entrepreneurialism, the fashion-sector-specific themes were: "developing the next generation of management and merchant leaders" and "becoming a hub of innovation for specialty and multi-channel retail experiences." On 2 November 2010, Bloomberg announced six initiatives—based on the conversations and workshops in Fashion.NYC.2020—that would work to achieve these goals. They included: the NYC Fashion Fund; Project Pop-up, a competition to promote new and innovative retail concepts; the New York City Fashion Draft, a structured week of job interviews with fashion businesses in New York City; Fashion Campus NYC, a program to provide young professionals with additional opportunities in the fashion industry; New York City Fashion Fellows; and Designer as Entrepreneur, a entrepreneurial boot camp for fashion designers to learn business skills.

The employee of NYCEDC who described the financial-services initiatives as "off the shelf" also characterized the financial-services-sector initiatives as pilot initiatives. The sentiment regarding pilot initiatives does not appear to me as if it needs to be confined to the financial-services-sector initiatives. By the logic of the employee of NYCEDC, each initiative tested a hypothesis for economic development in New York City that, if confirmed, could prompt New York City governmental officials to devote more resources to that initiative, or to the policy area of the initiative. The employee of NYCEDC recalled:

> They were pilot-sized because, at that time, there just were not a lot of resources because of the [economic] downturn. But, they were also pilot-sized because we believed that rather than announcing big initiatives and going all-in on them, it makes more sense to test things and see what works and the things that do not work [to] shut them down at a relatively low cost and the things that do work [to] scale them up and devote more resources to them.

The same employee of NYCEDC continued:

> A couple of [the pilot initiatives] proved to be quite successful. We started to scale a couple, and in particular the incubators, and get a lot of positive attention for those. Out of that, not only did we come to believe that our thesis about the entrepreneurial opportunities in New York was correct but we also started to notice that a lot of the businesses that were being set up in these incubators and were taking advantage of the capital were businesses with a technology focus. That was surprising because, at the time, New York was not considered a particularly cutting-edge place for technologically-based businesses. That piece of information also eventually fed into the Applied Sciences initiative.

Another employee of NYCEDC recalled:

> Applied Sciences was going to cost a fair amount of money. Bob Lieber [said] something to the effect of: 'If you want $50,000 that is a relatively easy conversation. If you want a few hundred million dollars, that is a much bigger conversation.' So, some of these [initiatives] were just proving 'look, this has legs; we know what we are doing. Things are coming up when we say they are going to come up.' […] So, some of this also was proving to the City: 'Look, we can identify a problem, solve a problem, come in under-budget or on-budget.'

An employee of NYCEDC and member of Team Strauss referred to Media.NYC.2020 as "the grandfather" of the main Game Changers workshop on 9 September 2009. I have emphasized Strauss and the processes of public participation of the NYC 2020 initiatives because they may be crucial to the narrative of the Game Changers initiative. An uncharitable view might see merit in our consideration of Strauss and the NYC 2020 initiatives if only to decide against their inclusion in the narrative. A charitable view might consider the methodology, themes, and pilots of the NYC 2020 initiatives to have influenced, or even to be part of, the methodology, themes, and policy output of the Game Changers initiative. Any view has bearing on the power dynamics in deciding on a game-changing idea to improve the New York City economy.

3.2.2 Team Robertson and its processes of public participation

Members of Team Robertson downplay the role of Strauss and the NYC 2020 initiatives in the generation and selection of a game-changing idea to improve the New York City economy and, so, it is interesting and important to understand their narrative before adjudicating. In this subsection, let us first understand the relevant organizational context for Robertson's and other members of SPLAN's involvement in the Game Changers initiative so that we can then turn to their implementation of processes of public participation via the SPLAN Game Changers initiatives.

3.2.2.1 The New York City Economic Development Corporation, Strategic Planning, and Euan Robertson

Pinsky hired Robertson in September 2008, and Robertson began work on 15 September 2008, the day that Lehman Brothers—the fourth largest U.S. investment banking company at the time—declared bankruptcy. Members of SPLAN were one of four groups that reported to Strauss in his capacity as the executive vice president of economic strategy and policy development. The other three groups, in organizational parallel to SPLAN within Economic Strategy and Policy Development, included: Business Development, which Strauss also led, Energy Policy, and Economic Research and Analysis.

For members of Team Robertson, the financial crisis—that the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 epitomized—was a primary catalyst for the Game

Changers initiative and, therefore, for the beginning of Applied Sciences NYC.[32] I employ a timeline of Applied Sciences NYC (henceforth, "the Team Robertson internal timeline" or "the timeline"), which a member of Team Robertson constructed for internal use, as a primary proxy for the narrative of members of Team Robertson. According to the timeline header for the year 2008, the context for Applied Sciences NYC is: the "economic crisis stimulates need for bold thinking." To that end, the first item on the timeline is: "Sept 15 [2008]: NYSE [the New York Stock Exchange] falls on news of Lehman Bros. bankruptcy." The second item on the timeline reads: "Sept [2008]: SETH PINSKY DISCUSSES POSSIBLE RESPONSES [to the financial crisis] WITH MAYOR BLOOMBERG (MRB)." Notably, the timeline does not refer to the NYC 2020 initiatives in 2008.

In my interviews, members of Team Robertson corroborated that the Game Changers initiative materialized from conversations held in response to the financial crisis. An employee of NYCEDC and member of SPLAN recalled: "I am sure that it [the Pinsky directive to members of SPLAN that, members of Team Robertson would say, led to the Game Changers initiative] is a result of conversations [Pinsky] had certainly with Bob Lieber, who was the deputy mayor at the time [and] undoubtedly also [with] the mayor." Another employee of NYCEDC recalled: "Shortly after the collapse of Lehman brothers, the mayor gathered the economic development team and said that we needed to be doing something. And I think his wording was not a whole lot more specific than that."

The Team Robertson internal timeline pinpoints a meeting on 5 January 2009 between Pinsky and members of SPLAN as the beginning of the response to the financial crisis that the mayor demanded. The timeline reads: "Jan 5 [2009]: [NYC]EDC CEO Seth Pinsky directs CET [the Center for Economic Transformation] team to design a process for a 'bold, long-term initiative to diversify the NYC economy.' Project dubbed 'Game Changers.'"[33] An employee of NYCEDC and member of SPLAN recalled of this meeting:

> When I came back [from vacation] in January, Seth called me in and said, 'Okay, as we develop these short-term [financial-services-related] solutions, we also want to make sure that we are thinking about something that is big and bold and long-term, and I want you to go design a process; work with the strategic planning team…[and] go design a process for doing that, for generating ideas.'

[32] This claim is not to imply that members of Team Robertson would contend that the City was not contemplating how to diversify its economy prior. Instead, members of Team Robertson might contend that the financial crisis hastened those conversations.

[33] The Team Robertson internal timeline uses the nomenclature "Center for Economic Transformation" or "CET" to refer to Economic Strategy and Policy Development. The Center for Economic Transformation (CET) launched in January 2010. Strauss was its founding managing director. CET is the reorganization and reworking of Economic Strategy and Policy Development, which Strauss oversaw from August 2008 to January 2010.

3.2.2.2 The Strategic Planning Game Changers initiatives

The SPLAN Game Changers initiatives came to fruition from conversations following the 5 January 2009 meeting. The Team Robertson internal timeline header for the year 2009 reads: "2009—'Game Changers' Idea Generation Leads to Applied Sciences Concept." More particularly, the timeline specifies, "Feb–Jul [2009]: brainstorming workshops and individual interviews held with 300+ participants from government, think-tanks, and industry."[34] The timeline again does not make any direct mention of the NYC 2020 conversations and workshops that were occurring concurrently in 2009. It does reference JumpStart NYC, one of the 11 initiatives that Bloomberg announced on 18 February 2009 to support the financial-services sector and encourage entrepreneurship, which, members of Team Strauss maintained, had developed from their conversations and workshops with the leaders in financial services. The timeline reads: "Sept–Dec [2009]: NYCEDC Center for Economic Transformation (CET) engages McKinsey to develop short-term solutions. Generates first 'entrepreneurship' initiative (FS [financial services] Jumpstart), launched Oct 2009." Yet, there is no direct mention of Strauss, his team, or their work. An employee of NYCEDC and member of SPLAN recalled: "I feel like those conversations [led by Strauss and his team] were a little separate. […] We [members of SPLAN] were trying to get away from [focusing on specific sectors]."

Members of SPLAN held at least five workshops—not including the main Game Changers workshop, which I discuss in section 3.2.3.1—prior to 30 December 2009 with the aim of generating game-changing ideas to improve the New York City economy. Among them, they hosted at least three workshops for employees of NYCEDC or employees of City Hall. On 11 February 2009, members of SPLAN held an Economic Strategy and Policy Development workshop in which 37 coworkers participated. On 10 March 2009, members of SPLAN held a City Hall brainstorming session. On 31 March 2009, members of SPLAN held the "second"—ostensibly with the first being on 11 February 2009—workshop for employees of NYCEDC. Members of SPLAN also held a series of "community roundtable discussions." Members of SPLAN held this type of event at least on 23 June 2009 and 7 July 2009.[35] At the 7 July 2009 event, for example, attendees—according to an internal NYCEDC briefing document—included: Miquela Craytor, executive director at

[34] I will argue that members of SPLAN's insistence that the Game Changers initiative consisted of over 300 participants in conversation and workshop necessitates the inclusion of the NYC 2020 initiatives in the narrative of the Game Changers initiative.

[35] I omit from our discussion the community roundtable events that employees of NYCEDC held after the 30 December 2009 since we are interested particularly in the influence of the community roundtable events on the Game Changers initiative. I believe anyhow that the mandate of community roundtable discussions changed after employees of NYCEDC elected to move forward with the game-changing idea of building in, or attracting to, New York City a higher education institution in the technology sciences. The inclusion of different content in the community roundtable presentations on 20 January 2010 and 5 April 2010 substantiates my view.

Sustainable South Bronx; Emmaia Gelman, senior policy organizer at the Center for Working Families; Chris Jones, vice president for research at the Regional Plan Association; Lisa Kersavage, senior director of advocacy and policy at the Municipal Arts Society; Christopher Kui, executive director at Asian Americans for Equality; Roland Lewis, president and CEO, and Cortney Worrall, director of programs, at the Waterfront Alliance; James Parrott, deputy director and chief economist at the Fiscal Policy Institute; Anne Seifried, acting executive director at the New York Industrial Retention Network; Peggy Shepard, executive director, and Cecil Corbin-Mark, deputy director/director of policy initiatives, at WE ACT for Environmental Justice; and Paul Sonn, legal co-director at the National Employment Law Project.

The format of each SPLAN Game Changers workshop remained consistent: a welcome from a senior employee of NYCEDC, if there were attendees external to NYCEDC or City Hall, as at the community roundtable discussions; an introductory presentation given by a member(s) of SPLAN; a brainstorming session, whether as breakout sessions or as an entire group; and a wrap-up session led by a member(s) of SPLAN. Of these elements, for our analysis of the politics of power in policy decision-making processes, the welcome is largely perfunctory; the brainstorming sessions are fascinating as a tool but are relatively straightforward in terms of implementation; and the wrap-up session also seems relatively uncomplicated. I focus instead on two aspects that may augment our understanding of the power dynamics of the SPLAN Game Changers initiatives; I focus on the content of the introductory presentations for how it frames and influences the brainstorming sessions and, then, on the long lists of ideas discussed in, and generated from, the SPLAN Game Changers conversations and workshops for their indication that the brainstorming sessions had material consequence and for an understanding of who generated particular ideas and when.

3.2.2.2.1 The introductory presentations

My survey of the five SPLAN Game Changers workshop presentations—including multiple versions of the same presentation—reveals that the content of the presentation that a member(s) of SPLAN gave to introduce the SPLAN Game Changers workshops varied, seemingly according to the attendees and, likely, the objectives of each workshop, but the general format of the presentation remained consistent. Some presenter's notes for the slides reveal that a member of SPLAN would often begin the presentations with a variation of: "This presentation is very short; most of the work today is going to be done by you." Four of the presentations include an agenda slide with time allocations. The total time that members of SPLAN allotted to the workshops varied from 45 minutes to 90 or 95 minutes, with the later presentations corresponding to the longer times. The agendas indicate that members of SPLAN devoted at least half of the workshop to

"brainstorming." They allotted five minutes to the introduction in the 45-minute introductory presentations and 15 or 20 minutes to it in the 90-or-95-minute introductory presentations. A brief welcome, if applicable, and a relatively lengthy—but still shorter than the brainstorming period—wrap-up session filled the remaining time.

Members of SPLAN used a PowerPoint presentation to guide the introductory presentations in all workshops. A member of SPLAN typically began the presentations with what was termed the "current situation" of economic activity in New York City. In the case of presentations to employees of NYCEDC or employees of City Hall, this section was brief: Members of SPLAN summarized, on a single slide, the shrinking U.S. economy, projected job loss in New York City, projected wage earnings decrease and, therefore, projected tax revenue decline in New York City, made more problematic by the fact that New York City governmental officials faced both a budget gap that they wished to close and constraints—with regard to funding and a need for immediate impact—on City government initiatives. In the case of community roundtable discussions, the discussion of the current economic situation was more extensive, yet the themes of a shrinking U.S. economy, projected job loss in New York City, and projected wage earnings decrease were the same. In the community roundtable discussions, members of SPLAN detailed, in eight or nine additional slides, these themes: trends over six decades in New York City total private employment; New York City's gross domestic product (GDP) as a share of world GDP, particularly by comparison to China's and India's growing shares; the growth of the New York City services sector offsetting the decrease in FIRE employment; the decline of the industrial sector; the growth and growth potential of the university sector; the fact that New York City's largest sectors demand educated workers; and the fact that 48% of employed New Yorkers are foreign-born.

Following the discussion of the current economic status of New York City, a member of SPLAN transitioned the introductory presentation to "what we'll be doing today." In the earliest presentations, members of SPLAN included on a slide "the question," "guidelines," and "process." The former two categories persisted in all presentations. "The question" evolved from one question to one question with many sub-questions. It reads in all presentations: "Imagine there are no funding constraints, what can/should we [New York City governmental officials] do to increase economic activity [in New York City]?" In community roundtable presentations, members of SPLAN included sub-questions. They read: "How can NYC best retain and attract the talented people who make it thrive?" "What are the key aspects of our physical infrastructure holding back growth?" "How can we do

things differently to get more out of our limited resources?" and "How can we employ our existing community resources to create good jobs for New Yorkers?"

Members of SPLAN also included "guidelines" in all presentations: "No big ideas are off the table;" "Try not to focus on barriers / complications in implementation;" and "Try to capture all ideas before focusing on one or two." An employee of NYCEDC and member of SPLAN recalled:

> We wanted people to get the message that they [participants in the SPLAN Game Changers workshops] should not be constrained in their thinking by 'that is too big; that is too hard; that is too expensive; that was tried before,' right? We wanted people to know that. Some of this is classic brainstorming stuff: No idea is off-the-table, no idea is stupid, no idea is going to be shot down before it has been given consideration, because we wanted to tap as wide and deep a pool of potential of ideas and concepts as we possibly could, because you are looking for something that, by definition, is not completely obvious, and you are trying to solve a problem that is really hard. So, you need to open up the funnel before you then start to close it down again, otherwise you end up with a suboptimal result.

In the "process" category, members of SPLAN presented their methodology and intention for the brainstorming process. This category, however, was subsequently removed entirely. In the later presentations to employees of NYCEDC or employees of City Hall, members of SPLAN substituted into the presentation a "hypothesis" category. It reads: "The major determinants of NYC's ability to stay ahead of the curve are the capacity to innovate and the availability of human capital;" "These determinants are conditioned by the quality of three production factors: labor, infrastructure, and technology/knowledge;" and "Do you agree? Disagree? Why?" The community roundtable presentations do not include the hypothesis category.

In presentations to employees of NYCEDC or employees of City Hall, a member of SPLAN concluded with a slide of "some potential areas [of economic development] to consider." In the community roundtable presentations, members of SPLAN included this slide as their sole back-up slide and, therefore, it is unclear if attendees saw it. The categories for this slide include "labor," "infrastructure," and "knowledge." Under the labor category, for example, the slide reads: "How can we increase the quality of the labor supply" with a bullet point that reads "attract domestic skilled works to NYC." Also under the labor category, the slide reads: "How should we increase worker supply for high demand industries?" with a bullet point for "education." Members of SPLAN listed questions and bullet points in a similar manner for each category.

3.2.2.2.2 The lists of game-changing ideas

Members of SPLAN tabulated the responses from conversations and workshops to the question: "What can/should we [New York City governmental officials] do to

increase economic activity [in New York City]?" From the first workshop for employees of NYCEDC, members of SPLAN listed 14 possibilities. Members of SPLAN already included—at the top—in the list dated 18 March 2009 "establish[ing] a strong tech and engineering university." Other ideas range from "creat[ing] a regional transportation plan" to "provid[ing] logistical support for NYC ethnic food manufacturers." The tabulated responses from the second workshop for employees of NYCEDC, on 31 March 2009, are more extensive. Members of SPLAN included 55 ideas, some of which are present on the prior list. Among the ideas is "creat[ing] a whole new campus for an existing college / university," though, notably, not necessarily in the technological sciences or focusing on existing New York City institutions.

Members of SPLAN tabulated in a subsequent list, dated 16 April 2009 and noted as version 13, responses from SPLAN Game Changers conversations and workshops, including but not limited to workshops for employees of NYCEDC or employees of City Hall. Unlike the other tabulations, this list links each idea to its source. Members of SPLAN attributed "establish[ing] [a] strong tech and engineering university (perhaps build[ing] off of [a] existing medical space)" to Robertson. The list also contains the ideas—that members of SPLAN attributed to Michael Mohr from the second workshop for NYCEDC staff, Jonathan Bowles, director of CUF, and Maria Gotsch, president and CEO of the Partnership Fund for New York City, respectively—of "creat[ing] a whole new campus for an existing college / university," "creat[ing] a major research / business park in NYC," and "creat[ing] a cleantech manufacturing park." Members of SPLAN discussed, in the "rationale" section, the latter two ideas as "very related to [a] tech and engineering university." The April list includes 98 possibilities, though only 33 are ones that members of SPLAN categorized as "ones to take forward" and, of those 33, members of SPLAN marked six, including the Robertson university, Mohr campus, Bowles park, and Gotsch park ideas, in a different color, ostensibly as a shortlist of possibilities that they perceived as more promising. Members of SPLAN elected against marking roughly two-thirds of the 98 ideas as ones to take forward, principally because, as the rationale section suggests, they were redundant to other ideas, were too vague, should be delegated to another City agency because they were not directly related to economic development, were already underway within NYCEDC or another City agency(ies), or were too "incremental" in their forecasted impact.

Members of SPLAN also collated the ideas from the first and second community roundtable discussions on 23 June 2009 and 7 July 2009, dividing the ideas by topic area (i.e., "transit," "education," "small businesses, start-ups, and non-profits," "green," "zoning," "quality of life," and "miscellaneous"). Members of SPLAN listed in the documents—dated 13 July 2009 and an updated version, dated 3 August 2009—

31 possible initiatives, including "build[ing] a top tier tech and engineering university."

3.2.3 Both camps: Processes of public participation

We have observed that members of Team Robertson did not acknowledge the role of the NYC 2020 initiatives in the Game Changers initiative. Yet, members of Team Strauss did not acknowledge that the SPLAN Game Changers conversations and workshops played a significant role in the Game Changers initiative either. An employee of NYCEDC and member of Team Strauss recalled: "I do not think they [members of SPLAN] were involved [in the Game Changers initiative], or maybe they were doing something small on the side that I missed. […] Euan [Robertson] ran what was actually the strategy team [SPLAN], more the in-house strategy and consulting group for [NYC]EDC." The same employee of NYCEDC instead acknowledged the role of members of SPLAN later in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC, particularly around the consideration of Governors Island as a site for the campus, as I discuss in section 4.1.1.

However, in addition to the aspects of the narrative of Applied Sciences NYC on which members of Team Strauss and members of Team Robertson disagreed, other aspects were less disputed between members of both camps. This subsection delineates the primary area of overlap—i.e., the main Game Changers workshop on 9 September 2009—in terms of processes of public participation between members of Team Strauss and members of Team Robertson.

3.2.3.1 The main Game Changers workshop

Members of both camps acknowledge the importance of the main Game Changers workshop, which Bain facilitated, on 9 September 2009. Members of Team Robertson understood it as a culmination of their SPLAN Game Changers conversations and workshops that began in January 2009; members of Team Strauss understood it as a cross-sector workshop that further elucidated sector-specific themes that they had heard in the NYC 2020 conversations and workshops. For members of both camps, the workshop was the main event of the Game Changers initiative. In fact, despite hosting other conversations and workshops during the Game Changers initiative, it was the only event that members of both camps referred to as "the Game Changers workshop."

For the event, employees of NYCEDC gathered at the Metropolitan Museum of Art. According to an internal guest list, there were 68 attendees, all of whom were presidents, CEOs, or other decision-makers at their organizations. The workshop involved representatives from many sectors, including academia, the arts, fashion, finance, law, media, and pharmaceuticals. In its only listing of a specific workshop, the

Team Robertson internal timeline reads: "Sept 9 [2009]: with Bain, CET runs 'Game Changers' event at Met Museum with 50+ CEOs from various business sectors, including presidents of NYC academic institutions. Concept of 'applied sciences campus' is one of a handful tested in breakout sessions."

Employees of NYCEDC circulated a "pre-read" document prior to the main Game Changers workshop instead of giving an introductory presentation. The pre-read document and a video shown at the event combined to approximate the intent of the introductory PowerPoint presentation from prior SPLAN Game Changers workshops.[36] The pre-read document begins with a slide that graphically illustrates New York City's history of reinventing its economic focus and raises the question of what its economic focus will be in 2050. In the document, employees of NYCEDC acknowledged New York City's current strength in its four leading sectors—i.e., FIRE; information and media; apparel and fashion; and intellect, culture, and education (ICE). They then noted pressures, specific to New York City and from competitor cities, on these industries. Employees of NYCEDC contended that these pressures demonstrated a need for employment growth in other sectors. They suggested "IT software" and "biotech/medtech" as two "high-growth, knowledge-intensive" possibilities but also noted New York City's challenges to pursuing growth in those sectors, particularly relative to San Francisco, California, and Boston, Massachusetts, with their higher-ranking academic institutions that bolster these sectors. The document, then, contains a page titled "'Game changers' can come in a variety of forms." On this page, employees of NYCEDC suggested 14 possibilities, categorized according to "infrastructure," "quality of life," and "human capital & ventures." The first item under "human capital & ventures" reads: "Top-tier research university: Create top engineering university or build scale & reputation in existing school to develop talent for growth industries." At multiple points in the document, employees of NYCEDC acknowledged that New York City governmental officials' approach to improving the economy would require a focus both on existing strengths and new sectors. The pre-read document ends with the question: "What 'game changing' investments today will define NYC in the 22nd century?"

To reinforce this document, at the main Game Changers workshop, prior to the brainstorming sessions, employees of NYCEDC showed a short, meant-to-be-slightly-humorous video. The video, narrated by Bill Baker, president emeritus of WNET-Thirteen, a public television station serving the New York metropolitan area, sketched two scenarios for the future of the New York City economy with the intention of stimulating thought for the subsequent brainstorming sessions. One

[36] Employees of NYCEDC did not, however, use the same slides in the pre-read document for the main Game Changers workshop on 9 September 2009 as they did in the introductory presentations for the SPLAN Game Changers workshops. They included different content.

scenario portrayed New York City poorly in 2025 if it did not adapt its economy; the other scenario portrayed New York City successfully, having adapted its economy. Employees of NYCEDC asked, through the video, what would be necessary in order to achieve a successful economic outcome.

Depending on the narrative, the NYC 2020 conversations and workshops or the SPLAN Game Changers conversations and workshops, or both, culminated in the main Game Changers workshop on 9 September 2009. Yet, the primacy in terms of size and grandeur of the main Game Changers workshop does not necessarily correspond to the primacy of the ideas generated from the final workshop. An employee of NYCEDC and member of Team Strauss recalled:

> It is helpful to realize also that, by the time we had gotten to that point [the main Game Changers workshop on 9 September 2009], we had a good idea of where this train was going, or at least I had a good idea where I thought the train was going. Part of that workshop was just to see if we could get some support for this, whether people agreed with us or not.

As earlier, these observations may have bearing on our understanding of the Game Changers initiative broadly and as a process of idea brainstorming and/or hypothesis testing and, therefore, also on our understanding of the politics of power in the policy decision-making processes of the Game Changers initiative.

3.2.4 Internal research and data analysis

Employees of NYCEDC conducted research and data analysis simultaneously with the processes of public participation to answer "What can/should we [New York City governmental officials] do to increase economic activity [in New York City]?" Members of both camps acknowledged this narrative; internal research and data analysis was a norm of policy decision-making processes under the Bloomberg administration.[37] The members of the division of economic research and analysis within Economic Strategy and Policy Development at NYCEDC led the research and data analysis regarding the generation and selection of game-changing ideas to improve the New York City economy and reported their findings to the relevant other groups.

Of the ideas that received research consideration, I believe that we will observe that the idea to cultivate an ecosystem for entrepreneurship and innovation in New York City and the idea to build in, or attract to, New York City a higher education institution in the technology sciences almost always assumed primacy. My goal for this subsection is the documentation of the internal research and data analysis in the Game Changers initiative so that we can evaluate—predominately by looking at the chronologies of both the internal research and data analysis and the processes of

[37] I introduce, in section 1.4.2, the norm of data-driven policy decision-making under the Bloomberg administration.

public participation—how the internal research and data analysis informed the generation and selection of a game-changing idea and, in so doing, better understand the power dynamics in the policy decision-making processes of the Game Changers initiative.

3.2.4.1 Generating an entrepreneurial ecosystem

At the outset, the internal research and data analysis regarding possible game-changing ideas were relatively broad. The Team Robertson internal timeline reads: "Feb–Jul [2009] [the same period given for the processes of public participation]: in parallel [to the SPLAN Game Changers conversations and workshops], CET team carries out research/due diligence on multiple 'game changer' ideas generated, including 'applied sciences.' Iterative filtering and shortlisting." Employees of NYCEDC categorized, in a "concept tree," dated 27 February 2009 and noted "for SS [Steven Strauss]" in its file name, "ideas…according to how they contribute to increased economic activity in NYC." Employees of NYCEDC already listed on the slide, as one of 10 "examples," "increase[ing] talent" via "educat[ing] NYers" via a "science/tech university." The other ideas were: "lobby for immigration reform," "fund start-ups / provide space," "promote VC [venture capital] community," "increase construction by investing in infrastructure," "increase tourism by improving airports and transit," "tax incentives for hedge funds," "nurse training program," "lobby for financial regulatory authority in NYC," "support FS industry to attach regulatory authority," "target carbon exchange through tax incentives," and "support FS industry to attach carbon exchange." In other words, in February 2009, ideas for increasing economic activity in New York City were wide-ranging, with themes of entrepreneurship and the precise idea of a higher education institution in the technology sciences among them.

From the wide-ranging ideas that employees of NYCEDC conveyed in the concept tree, the focus of internal research and data analysis shifted to placing priority on how to generate an entrepreneurial ecosystem in New York City. At first, employees of NYCEDC focused on the "culture" of an entrepreneurial ecosystem and not exclusively on building in, or attracting to, New York City a higher education institution in the technology sciences. Employees of NYCEDC asked in an internal, draft (version 12) PowerPoint slide deck dated 28 April 2009, saved with the file name "Entrepreneurship Desk," and titled "Game Changers: Impact of Universities on Local Innovation:" "What is the ecosystem required to create results like this [the Massachusetts Institute of Technology does]?" In the slide deck, employees of NYCEDC characterized success in terms of "creat[ing] entrepreneurs," "retain[ing] people and companies," "creat[ing] economic development," and "leading the future." Employees of NYCEDC came to the conclusion—as demonstrated particularly through the cases of the Massachusetts

Institute of Technology (MIT), Stanford University (henceforth, "Stanford"), and Columbia—that "culture," defined as an "ecosystem for academia-industry-VC collaboration," has a "disproportionate impact on innovation and entrepreneurship." They acknowledged, giving nuance to their prior claims, that "top-tier research institutions with large research expenditures and academic eminence do not necessarily spur local economic development (e.g. Johns Hopkins)" and "institutions successful at direct technology transfer (i.e. patenting and licensing) do not necessarily spur local economic development (e.g. NYU, Columbia)." Employees of NYCEDC highlighted that New York City lacks a forum—both physical and abstract—for collaboration and innovation but that it has a strong industry base and offers young companies access to capital. They proposed "game changers" in order to further this so-called culture of entrepreneurship including: a consortium lab, the Entrepreneurship Club of NYC, the NYC Future of Technology Summit, the NYC Business Venture Contest, and the NYC Innovation Exhibit. Their game-changing ideas, therefore, moved beyond that of a higher education institution in the technology sciences in April 2009.

Employees of NYCEDC continued to examine the idea of generating an entrepreneurial ecosystem in New York City by hypothesizing why it was lacking in the first place. In a draft PowerPoint deck dated 7 May 2009 and titled "Next steps for Game Changers," employees of NYCEDC asked: "What is the question we were trying to answer?" Employees of NYCEDC noted, in the slides, that "What type of universities are most successful at knowledge transfer?" is the "question we were answering." They articulated, however, that "What is required to capture knowledge spillover from a university in the local community?" is the "question we want to answer." They proceeded to set forth four hypotheses—i.e., insufficient volume, low-quality knowledge, environment, and insufficient channels or forums—for why the New York City economy was not capturing the knowledge spillover from its existing universities. In so doing, employees of NYCEDC created the possibility for the prioritization of the game-changing idea of building in, or attracting to, New York City a higher education institution in the technology sciences, an idea now grounded in their hypothesis that the entrepreneurial ecosystem of New York City was lacking, in part, because of its existing universities.

Employees of NYCEDC focused in their research and data analysis on the hypothesis that existing technology and engineering universities produce an insufficient volume of knowledge. Employees of NYCEDC "examin[ed] the scale factors of a university" in a draft PowerPoint deck for Pinsky dated 20 May 2009. Employees of NYCEDC used a comparative approach to illustrate that existing New York City technology and engineering universities—e.g., the City College of New York (CCNY), Columbia, and NYU-Poly—produced an insufficient volume of knowledge relative to

other institutions such as Carnegie Mellon University (CMU), Cornell, Georgia Institute of Technology, MIT, and Stanford. More particularly, employees of NYCEDC identified a correlation between inputs and outputs. They focused on "quantitative inputs," namely research and design expenditure, facility size and quality, faculty size and quality, and student size and quality, as correlated with the volume of knowledge produced. Employees of NYCEDC detailed, on a slide titled "NYC trails other high-tech cities in several key input / output indices, especially those related to academia," the inputs and outputs of New York City compared with those of San Francisco, California; Boston, Massachusetts; Raleigh-Durham, North Carolina; and Austin, Texas. New York City lagged all cities in almost all categories. On another slide, employees of NYCEDC focused on the few top-100 engineering programs in New York City relative to San Francisco and Boston and the comparatively small research and design expenditure in New York City's programs. They concluded the PowerPoint slide deck by asking "Are there other game-changing ideas you [Pinsky] would like us to work up in further depth?" as if to indicate that the idea of building or attracting a higher education institution in the technology sciences was not yet chosen as the game-changing idea, even if the volume of the internal research and data analysis on it suggests that it was, at least, a frontrunner.

Employees of NYCEDC moved to solidify, via internal research and data analysis, their rationale for building in, or attracting to, New York City a higher education institution in the technology sciences. They expanded, in a PowerPoint presentation for Pinsky—saved as "Final University Deck," titled "Game Changers: Final Recommendations: Tech-Engineering University," and dated 9 July 2009—the hypothesis for why the New York City ecosystem is "not currently capturing the knowledge spillover from local tech and engineering universities" from "insufficient volume" to both "insufficient volume" and not "qualitatively meaningful knowledge." In the slide deck, employees of NYCEDC articulated their "emerging hypothesis" as "even allowing for the quality / quantity expansion of Columbia, NYC could benefit from the addition of a tech university or the expansion of an existing university." They elaborated: "We lag key competing clusters in quality, relative size, and absolute size" and "further, our existing cluster is very bio-med focused and would benefit from diversification."

Employees of NYCEDC subsequently expanded their research and data analysis on an entrepreneurial ecosystem to include Israel. They looked closely at the Yozma Group program, a government-led initiative with many direct investments in the high-technology industry, which had produced positive economic development returns. According to a PowerPoint deck on the Yozma Group program dated 10 August 2009, Israeli governmental officials had allocated $100 million, for a share of

40% of the total capital to the fund of funds. Employees of NYCEDC cited, on a single slide dated 21 July 2009, that 15 years after the establishment of the fund in 1993, there were "~80 venture capital funds operating in Israel, with the total capital raised at $10.6B," the "average size of the leading Israeli VCs fund jumped from $20M in 1993 to >$250M," and "over 1000 Israeli start-up companies, many in the high-tech industry, have received VC funding." Employees of NYCEDC also included this slide in a detailed discussion of the Yozma Group program in a PowerPoint presentation for Pinsky dated 24 July 2009 and titled "Game Changers: Selecting the Top 2 Initiatives." The detail of the PowerPoint presentations in July and August 2009 suggest that employees of NYCEDC were seriously considering the idea of building in, or attracting to, New York City a higher education institution in the technology sciences.

3.2.4.2 Other game-changing ideas

Internally, employees of NYCEDC were still considering other game-changing ideas. In the 9 July 2009 slide deck, they included the possibility of a transportation infrastructure game-changing idea. On the final slide, they detailed the "next steps:" a "more detailed analysis" on "upgrading inter-borough transportation," a "multi-modal transport network," "fast rail links to upstate / other geographies," or "improving accessibility to airports." Employees of NYCEDC examined, in a PowerPoint deck dated July 2009, titled "Game Changers: Transportation Infrastructure," and saved with the file title "ghost deck," the possibility of halving New York City's air, rail, and traffic congestion as a game-changing idea. In its "backup" slides, however, the July 2009 transportation presentation contains "slides from the university deck" on which employees of NYCEDC described New York City as "'under-universitied' relative to other tech centers in terms of total quantity and quality of inputs." The game-changing idea of improving transportation infrastructure did not appear to assume greater primacy going forward.

3.2.4.3 Short-listing

Although the focus of internal research and data analysis suggests that employees of NYCEDC had placed priority on the idea of an entrepreneurial ecosystem and, then, on constructing a higher education institution in the technology sciences, employees of NYCEDC had not yet officially eliminated the possibility of other game-changing ideas. In a PowerPoint presentation dated 17 July 2009, employees of NYCEDC acknowledged a scoring, or short-listing, process. A graph with "feasibility" on the x-axis and "impact" on the y-axis provides insight into how employees of NYCEDC deliberated among the many game-changing ideas for improving the New York City economy. Employees of NYCEDC placed, in a single slide dated 17 July 2009, 52 ideas on the graph, noting that the upper-right quadrant was "most desirable" but also not placing a single idea in that area. Employees of NYCEDC ranked the idea of

a "campus for [an] existing university," for example, highest on the "impact" axis but below the median line on the "feasibility" access. They ranked the idea of a "new tech/engineering school" slightly below a "campus for [an] existing university" on both axes. From the slide, it is unclear how employees of NYCEDC selected the 52 ideas for inclusion and how it placed them along the axes.

NYCEDC documented a scoring process in a spreadsheet dated 24 July 2009. It indicates that employees of NYCEDC found the idea of building in, or attracting to, New York City a higher education institution in the technology sciences attractive relative to other possibilities but not definitively so. The spreadsheet contains instructions given to least six senior employees of NYCEDC including Li; Pinsky; Tokumbo Shobowale, chief operating officer at NYCEDC; Strauss; and Maria Torres-Springer, chief of staff at NYCEDC. The instructions were: "Please rate the potential impact and the feasibility of each of these projects on a scale of 1-10, with 1 being lowest impact and lowest feasibility, and 10 being highest impact and highest feasibility. You can give the same rating no more than 5 times per column." Employees of NYCEDC listed, in the spreadsheet, 43 total possible game-changing initiatives in "arts," "business," "economy," "education," "green," "healthcare," "transportation," and "zoning / infrastructure." The scorers awarded eight initiatives greater than an 8.0 average on the impact scale: "new tech/engineering school" (9.4), "interborough subways and express trains" (9.1), "bus rapid transit" (8.9), "retiree benefits liability" (8.9), "congestion pricing" (8.6), "K-12 math / science education" (8.6), "regional transportation plan" (8.6), and "campus for existing university" (8.3). On the feasibility scale, the aforementioned eight initiatives ranged from an average score of 6.6 (bus rapid transit) to 2.3 (interborough subways and express trains), with the idea for a new technology and engineering campus scoring 4.9, second highest on the feasibility scale among the eight aforementioned initiatives.[38] Employees of NYCEDC also examined the standard deviation of the impact and feasibility scores; only three ideas had scores with ranges greater than 3.0 standard deviations from the mean, and none of those instances corresponded to an initiative with a top-eight impact score.

In a PowerPoint presentation for Pinsky also dated 24 July 2009 and titled "Game Changers: Selecting the Top 2 Initiatives," employees of NYCEDC attempted to narrow the possibilities for game-changing ideas to improve the New York City economy. From the PowerPoint presentation, employees of NYCEDC appear to

[38] The absence of New York State involvement would likely have been a key component in assessing the feasibility of the various initiatives. Building a higher education institution in the technology sciences could fall fully under City government purview whereas, for example, proposed transportation-related initiatives, including "interborough subways and express trains," "bus rapid transit," "congestion pricing," and a "regional transportation plan" would require State government participation and approval.

include the "university proposal" in their top two initiatives: They discussed in the presentation a potential structure for a memorandum on the proposal. The other top initiative remained under discussion. The presentation also contains a "2 x 2 matrix [to] select [the] final 'middle-class' game-changer to be worked up in further detail." This mention is the only one of a game-changing idea targeted specifically at the middle class.

Subsequently, employees of NYCEDC expanded the shortlist beyond the notion of two ideas. The Team Robertson internal timeline reads: "Aug [2009]: Short list narrowed to 4 ideas." In a draft PowerPoint presentation for Pinsky, saved as "Narrowing the List" and dated 6 August 2009, employees of NYCEDC referred to a prior decision to "create straw men" for four game-changing ideas to improve the New York City economy. The four ideas were: "new or expanded tech / engineering school," "regional approach to economic development," "reduced bureaucracy / open government (e.g. 1 stop permit shop)," and "bus rapid transit / inter-borough subways (i.e. get anywhere in 30mins)." The agenda items in the PowerPoint presentation include a discussion of the one-pagers generated for the four game-changing ideas, further information on the idea for a new or expanded institution in the technology sciences, an overview of the Yozma Group program, and a discussion of possible next steps. In other words, according to their agenda, employees of NYCEDC focused in-depth on only the idea of a new or expanded institution in the technology sciences despite the fact that the shortlist ostensibly included three other possibilities. On the "next steps" slide, employees of NYCEDC proposed two options: The first option is "for all 4 ideas, a *very high level* 3-4 page document which sets out the vision, how it works, the benefits, the costs, and who needs to be involved;" the second option is "we pick 1 idea now (probably the university) and work it up in greater detail over the next 2 months."

Identical PowerPoint presentations for a check-in meeting with Pinsky dated 11 and 14 September 2009—and the general dearth of internal PowerPoint slide decks on the other possibilities for game-changing ideas to improve the New York City economy—imply that employees of NYCEDC opted largely for the latter option. In the September PowerPoint presentations, employees of NYCEDC focused exclusively and in great detail on the idea of higher education in the technology sciences. In the appendix of the identical presentations, they listed options for the pursuit of this idea: "new grad school," "new research institute," "improve local school," "expand local school," "regional connectivity [between New York City and existing schools (e.g., Princeton University, Cornell, and Yale University) outside of New York City]." Employees of NYCEDC also indicated in the appendix that they had undertaken considerable work to evaluate both the economic impact of universities of various sizes and remits and Governors Island as the leading potential

site for a campus. In fact, in a "supplemental deck" for Pinsky dated 30 September 2009, employees of NYCEDC outlined the "Governors Island Proposal." The idea of building a higher education institution in the technology sciences—now referred to as the Governors Island proposal—was the only idea detailed in the PowerPoint slides. Employees of NYCEDC provided in a single slide dated 8 December 2009, three options for a campus site: "350K SF [square foot] Liggett Hall [on Governors Island] at nominal cost + $50M capital + ferry;" "equivalent parcel on Governors Island + $50M capital + ferry;" and "capital only, bidder provides alternate NYC site." On the single slide, employees of NYCEDC also estimated the new economic activity, new construction jobs, new spinouts, and new tax revenue as a result of the initiative. They detailed a proposed timeline: It projected that New York City governmental officials would announce an "initiative to build a world class STEM [science, technology, engineering, and math] center in NYC" in January 2010, launch a "formal RFP with global marketing effort" in Summer 2010, announce the primary award winner, which would begin construction in Summer 2011, and open the campus on-site between Fall 2015 and Fall 2017.

3.2.4.4 External validation

Employees of NYCEDC validated the game-changing idea of building in, or attracting to, New York City a higher education institution in the technology sciences via internal research and data analysis. They extended their internal research and data analysis to conversations with university presidents, deans, and other high-ranking academics.[39] The Team Robertson internal timeline reads: "Sept 2009 - Feb 2010: [phone] calls to various university presidents to test applied sciences concept."[40] Employees of NYCEDC indicated in the identical PowerPoint presentations, dated 11 and 14 September 2009, for a check-in meeting with Pinsky that, of the "potential foreign/US partners," they had conducted: one interview, with the University of Oxford; were scheduling one interview, with EHT Zurich; were awaiting response from eight universities; and were gathering contact addresses for roughly 40 other institutions. Employees of NYCEDC also cited on the PowerPoint slide that, in terms of "potential local partners," they had contacted NYU-Poly and were scheduling an interview with Columbia. Employees of NYCEDC finally mentioned,

[39] The conversations with university presidents, deans, and other high-ranking academics were different from the NYC 2020 and SPLAN Game Changers conversations and workshops. The conversations with university presidents, deans, and other high-ranking academics did not answer "What can/should we [New York City governmental officials] do to increase economic activity [in New York City]?" They, instead, verified the merit of the particular game-changing idea of building in, or attracting to, New York City a higher education institution in the technology sciences and/or helped employees of NYCEDC assess the interest levels of said universities in the initiative if New York City governmental officials were to proceed with it.

[40] The conversations with university presidents, deans, and other high-ranking officials span beyond 30 December 2009 and, in so doing, expose a blurry division between the so-called end of the Game Changers initiative and the so-called start of the next phase of Applied Sciences NYC.

on the same PowerPoint slide, their ambition to interview "research institutes" too. By the time of the mayoral briefing on 30 December 2009, employees of NYCEDC revealed in a PowerPoint presentation that they had "vetted [the concept] with regional, national, and international universities with enthusiastic responses." Employees of NYCEDC listed, on the PowerPoint slide, 11 interviews. The slide reads:

> President Lee Bollinger, Columbia University; President Jon Sexton, New York University; President Jerry Hultin, NYU-Poly; President John Hennessy, Stanford University; President David Skorton, Cornell University; Dean Pena-Mora, Head of Fu School of Engineering, Columbia University; Dr. Alfred Sommer, Dean Emeritus, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health; President Su Guaning, Nanyang Technological University (Singapore); Dr. Heather Bell, Director of International Strategy, University of Oxford (UK); Dr. Tim Westlake, Director [of] International Development, University of Manchester (UK); Prof. Gerhard Schmitt, VP [Vice President] [of] International Development, ETH (Swiss Federal Tech Institute).

Therefore, by 30 December 2009, and arguably much earlier in the calendar year, the idea of building in, or attracting to, New York City a higher education institution in the technology sciences, had gained specificity and primacy in the research and data analysis of NYCEDC, with consequences—based largely on timing and sequencing—for our understanding of the power dynamics in the Game Changers initiative.

3.2.5 Briefings

Briefing meetings external to NYCEDC comprise a third aspect of the Game Changers initiative when combined with the two parallel processes of public participation and internal research and data analysis. Briefing meetings are valuable as we evaluate the politics of power in the policy decision-making processes of the Game Changers initiative not only as another indicator of the research and data analysis of NYCEDC but also as an indicator of who knew what when and whose opinion employees of NYCEDC valued, or wanted to appear to value.

Members of Team Robertson listed on their internal timeline four briefing meetings in 2009, two of which were with Lieber.[41] The timeline reads: "Sept 1 [2009]: DM [Deputy Mayor] Lieber briefed on Game Changers with 2 projects—applied sciences, and regional economic development" and "Sept 17 [2009]: follow up

[41] Employees of NYCEDC listed on the Team Robertson internal timeline a meeting with the New York City OMB—the City's chief financial agency—as one of four briefings external to NYCEDC: "Nov 12 [2009]: 1st OMB briefing." I discuss in section 4.1.2 other meetings with employees of OMB. Beyond information deduced from the timeline, however, I am not certain that the 12 November 2009 meeting actually happened. If it did occur, the timing of the meeting substantiates the narrative that employees of NYCEDC had narrowed, by 12 November 2009, their list of possible game-changing ideas enough to involve another governmental agency and consider financing options. I discuss the other external briefings in this subsection.

briefing with DM Lieber; introduction of a 'global competition' concept." Other sources do not substantiate the occurrence of the 1 September 2009 meeting with Lieber, but internal documents suggest that the 17 September 2009 meeting did occur and that employees of NYCEDC covered then the topics that the timeline lists for both meetings.

Employees of NYCEDC addressed, in the 17 September 2009 PowerPoint presentation for Lieber, both the idea of a technology and engineering institution and the idea of regional economic development. They placed priority in terms of ordering and emphasis on the idea of a research institute. Employees of NYCEDC began the PowerPoint presentation by explaining the "situation" with a slightly different vocabulary than in prior presentations on the topic. The slide notes read: "As industries of the future increasingly demand knowledge workers and new technologies, how will NYC position itself to meet that demand? In particular, given innovation and adaptation is the key to survival, where is our engine for innovation in the City?" The language on the next slide responds to those questions: "NYC is underweight in sci-tech: 'do nothing' is not an option." The slide notes read: "New York needs to do something dramatic that would be a catalyst for people to come together." In the PowerPoint presentation, employees of NYCEDC then addressed "a new, top-tier research institution for NYC" and their vision for the "NYC Wright Challenge." Employees of NYCEDC articulated the "NYC Wright Challenge"—a name that they appear to have subsequently dropped—as a "bold initiative galvanizing government, academic, non-profit and business communities, bringing an engine for innovation to the City which constantly re-invents itself."[42]

In the Lieber briefing, employees of NYCEDC also discussed the game-changing idea of regional economic development. They summarized the "situation" as "regional competition sees economic development as zero sum," with the implication that this scenario is not necessarily true. They continued: "Key infrastructure issues [are] best addressed at a regional level." Although the discussion of the idea for regional economic development is detailed, employees of NYCEDC did not focus on it in the PowerPoint presentation. Employees of NYCEDC, for example, focused in the appendix solely on the idea of constructing a higher education institution in the technology sciences in New York City and its justification.

[42] Employees of NYCEDC also explained in the PowerPoint presentation the nomenclature of the Wright Challenge: In 1909, Wilbur Wright took off from, and landed at, Governors Island on the first powered flight over American waters. Employees of NYCEDC reported that the flight "demonstrat[ed] to the money-men of Wall Street that New York was ready to bring the best of US innovation and technology to the world." Employees of NYCEDC sought to do so also via Applied Sciences NYC.

The Game Changers initiative concluded on 30 December 2009 when employees of NYCEDC briefed the mayor on the sole game-changing idea of building in, or attracting to, New York City a higher education institution in the technology sciences. The Team Robertson internal timeline reads: "Dec 30 [2009]: 1st MRB Briefing re: Applied Sciences (still with Gov. [Governors] Island as site)." Employees of NYCEDC titled the presentation "A Path to a 21st Century Economy." Employees of NYCEDC articulated in the presentation the "challenge," as many prior presentations had; the executive summary reads: "NYC needs more and stronger research institutions for growth and diversification;" it is "underweight in science/engineering/math;" and "existing universities [are] space constrained and [there are] no new entrants." Employees of NYCEDC listed in the executive summary their solution as: "support NYC as a 21st C. innovation center by developing Governors Island research campus" and "launch first phase in 2010: international competition to develop 350K SF, world-class, sci-tech institute in historic Liggett Hall [on Governors Island] or as ground-up construction [on Governors Island]." Employees of NYCEDC cited, in the PowerPoint presentation, a "consistent message to NYCEDC: [the] City needs more and stronger research institutions to support its economic growth." More particularly, employees of NYCEDC claimed that they had heard this message "in public-private dialogues [with] 300+ CEOs, 20+ community groups, [and] 10+ University Deans/Presidents." The slide reads that employees of NYCEDC "consistently heard:" "Building our tech capacity is critical to future growth;" "strong research institutions help create these jobs;" and "NYC is weak in academic tech research." Employees of NYCEDC cited, in particular, two quotes, the first from a CEO of a start-up: "We need more places where entrepreneurs and researchers can deeply engage with each other […] [M]ore structured resources to bring the groups together will generate significant yield." The second, from a CEO in the media industry who participated in the Media.NYC.2020 kick-off event, was: "Education is the focal point of developing a hub of innovation […] [C]omputer scientists take their training and transition to the lab, where ideas become businesses." Employees of NYCEDC then continued in the presentation to: justify their claim regarding the current, underweight state of science, engineering, and math programs and research in New York City; detail their vision for Governors Island as the location for the campus; outline a timeline for the initiative and of the City's financial contribution to it; and describe the projected economic benefits of the initiative.

In their PowerPoint presentation to the mayor, employees of NYCEDC did not propose any options beyond the university idea nor did they list further ideas in the appendix: They detailed the sole idea of building in, or attracting to, New York City a higher education institution in the technology sciences. By 30 December 2009, employees of NYCEDC had selected their game-changing idea to improve the New

York City economy via processes of public participation with "300+ CEOs, 20+ community groups, [and] 10+ University Deans/Presidents" and internal research and data analysis. The lack of further research into other ideas indicates that the mayor approved of the idea.

3.3 Power analysis

Having detailed the narrative of the Game Changers initiative, I now discuss and analyze the power dynamics in deciding on a game-changing idea to improve the New York City economy. To do so, I examine relational power, structural power, and neo-structural power in the Game Changers initiative. Specifically with regard to relational power, I investigate the nature of participation in the Game Changers conversations and workshops. I argue that the Game Changers conversations and workshops moved from the suggested brainstorming—i.e., "asking them"—to also testing the hypotheses of employees of NYCEDC. I, therefore, decrease my confidence in the hypothesis of pluralist power in the Game Changers initiative.

With regard to (neo-)structural power, I argue that mayoral agency played a decisive role in deciding on a game-changing idea to improve the New York City economy. In particular, the Bloombergian definition of economic development, the norm of data-driven policy decision-making under the Bloomberg administration, and Bloomberg's personal background confined the range of ideas considered and the type of participants included in the Game Changers initiative. I maintain, in this subsection, that industry leaders—though not in language of a neo-Marxist or a dominant coalition theorist—had power to propose game-changing ideas and to validate the game-changing ideas that employees of NYCEDC researched and proposed but only in a context where ideas assumed greater importance if they elided with the Bloombergian vision of New York City as a global city, the norm of internal research and data analysis particularly using metrics of competitiveness with other cities—in the language of public choice theorists—or the mayor's technology background.

Before examining the power dynamics in deciding on a game-changing idea to improve the New York City economy, I adjudicate between the narratives of Team Strauss and Team Robertson. I pay particular attention to the chronology, methodology, and themes of economic development of the NYC 2020 initiatives and the SPLAN Game Changers initiatives to understand the extent, if any, of continuity or influence between the two. My research findings have implications for my understanding of the power dynamics in the Game Changers initiative.

3.3.1 Adjudicating between the narratives of Team Strauss and Team Robertson

Over the course of her research, a process tracer encounters both expected and surprising divergences in narratives. I had expected the different narratives of Team

Strauss and Team Robertson with regard to the Game Changers initiative. Not only do members of such camps tend to aggrandize their own involvement in a positive event, as seems to be the case with the Game Changers initiative, but people also tend to emphasize events and protagonists more familiar to them. Pinsky hired Robertson after the NYC 2020 initiatives had begun and, so, Robertson and, perhaps, also members of Team Robertson likely undervalued—consciously or subconsciously—the NYC 2020 initiatives. Additionally, tension in the organizational structure of NYCEDC may have exacerbated the differences in the narratives of Team Strauss and Team Robertson: As mentioned earlier, SPLAN was one of four groups that reported to the executive vice president for economic strategy and policy development, Strauss. The other three groups in organizational parallel to SPLAN included: Business Development, which Strauss also led, Economic Research and Analysis, and Energy Policy. As a result, it could have been difficult to differentiate Strauss in his role as manager of SPLAN from Strauss in his role as head of Business Development. Put differently, the group—i.e., SPLAN or Business Development—with the primary role in the Game Changers initiative could have been unclear. Members of Team Robertson believed that SPLAN was the group with a primary role in the Game Changers initiative, whereas members of Team Strauss believed that the industry desks within Business Development played such a role.

Contrary to the narrative of Team Robertson, I am of the view that the NYC 2020 initiatives are a part of the Game Changers initiative. Therefore, I believe that the NYC 2020 initiatives are relevant to the power dynamics in deciding on a game-changing idea to improve the New York City economy. In other words, for three primary reasons that I explain in this subsection, I side with members of Team Strauss and choose to begin my narrative of the Game Changers initiative, and of Applied Sciences NYC, in June 2008.

First, particularly with regard to the diversity and authority of stakeholders and the practice of asking and answering large-scale questions, I believe that we observed that the SPLAN Game Changers conversations and workshops appear similar to the NYC 2020 conversations and workshops and the Forum's methodology but at a cross-sector level.[43] Second, I maintain that, in the main Game Changers workshop on 9 September 2009, employees of NYCEDC largely replicated the methodology of Media.NYC.2020 and other NYC 2020 initiatives, included many of the same participants, and repackaged some of the sector-specific hypotheses—particularly around talent, education, and entrepreneurialism—as cross-sector hypotheses.

[43] The SPLAN Game Changers conversations and workshops also appear to have expanded the type of participant from the NYC 2020 conversations and workshops to include, in at least two community roundtable discussions, leaders from community groups.

Finally, the inclusion of the NYC 2020 initiatives appears necessary for the consistency of the narrative of employees of NYCEDC regarding the Game Changers initiative: The number of participants—i.e., "300+ CEOs, 20+ community groups, 10+ university deans/presidents"—that employees of NYCEDC claimed to have involved in the Game Changers initiative and the number that the members of Team Robertson appears to have involved are at odds without the inclusion of the participants in the NYC 2020 initiatives. In a SPLAN Game Changers workshop with the internal economic strategy and policy development team, members of SPLAN involved, according to an internal document, 37 coworkers; in a community roundtable discussion, members of SPLAN listed, on an internal document, 11 people, representing 7 community groups, as attendees. The reader will recall that, prior to 31 December 2010, members of SPLAN held at least five workshops total: three for employees of NYCEDC and employees of City Hall and two community roundtable discussions. The reader will recall, on the other hand, that members of Team Strauss claim to have involved, in Media.NYC.2020 alone, "200+ media executives," with an advisory committee of 64 people and additional participants of more than 500 people. In other words, in order for employees of NYCEDC to have canvassed over 300 stakeholders, as they claim, they appear to need to include participants from the NYC 2020 conversations and workshops in their count.

In my interviews, employees of NYCEDC corroborated my argument for the inclusion of the NYC 2020 initiatives in the narrative of the Game Changers initiative. An employee of NYCEDC and member of Team Strauss recalled: "They [the 330+ people] are definitely not [SPLAN] Game Changers alone. I mean what was Game Changers and what was Media NYC and what was Fashion NYC?" Another employee of NYCEDC and member of Team Strauss recalled:

> If you ask me, they [the 330+ stakeholders] came from Media NYC. They came from all those industry projects [the NYC 2020 initiatives]. The lack of talent is not a new topic that came up during the Game Changers projects, because that was the hypothesis going in backed by hundreds, if not tens of hundreds, of interviews that had been prior to the launch of the project.

The inclusion of the NYC 2020 initiatives in the narrative of the Game Changers initiative only furthers the instances in which employees of NYCEDC "asked them." At first blush, therefore, it may also appear to further the suggestion of pluralist power in deciding on the game-changing idea to improve the New York City economy.

3.3.2 Relational power: Brainstorming and hypothesis testing

While the inclusion of the NYC 2020 initiatives in the narrative of the Game Changers initiative increases the count of non-governmental individuals and groups who participated in the public forums for game-changing ideas to improve the New York City economy, I argue that all did not always "compete" equally, as a theory of

pluralist power would suggest. More specifically, I maintain that the Game Changers conversations and workshops moved from the suggested brainstorming—i.e., "asking them"—to also testing the hypotheses of employees of NYCEDC. The processes of testing hypotheses in Game Changers conversations and workshops, I argue, gave disproportionate power in deciding on a game-changing idea to improve the New York City economy to employees of NYCEDC and, therefore, in terms of relational power, more closely evoked the power dynamics of elitists, as opposed to scholars of pluralism.

To begin, the conversations prior to the so-called start of Applied Sciences NYC, among governmental officials in the Bloomberg administration and the broader New York City urban policy and business communities, about ideas for diversifying the New York City economy and constructing a "great engineering school" suggest that employees of NYCEDC may have held preconceived notions entering the Game Changers initiative of "What can/should we [New York City governmental officials] do to increase economic activity [in New York City]?" that related to the construction of a higher education campus in the technology sciences in New York City. This possibility already calls into question the suggestion of pluralist power in deciding on a game-changing idea to improve the New York City economy.

Even if we place aside this possibility, I observed that the Game Changers conversations and workshops moved quickly from brainstorming—i.e., "asking them"—to also testing the hypothesis of employees of NYCEDC. From the NYC 2020 conversations and workshops, particularly those of Media.NYC.2020, which began informally around June 2008 and formally in February 2009, employees of NYCEDC were already cognizant of themes of talent, education, and entrepreneurialism as means to improve sector-specific economies in New York City. Members of SPLAN echoed these findings in their SPLAN Game Changers workshops, which began in February 2009: In the content of the introductory presentations of the SPLAN Game Changers workshops, members of SPLAN already conveyed a need for educated talent in New York City and the attractiveness of the university sector and raised the possibility of attracting talent through education. This framing appears to suggest that employees of NYCEDC held disproportionate power in deciding on a game-changing idea to improve the New York City economy.

However, I detailed the lists of game-changing ideas from the SPLAN Game Changers conversations and workshops to emphasize, in part, that the sessions had consequence in terms of brainstorming ideas: Employees of NYCEDC appear to have at least heard and recorded the game-changing ideas of participants in the SPLAN Game Changers conversations and workshops. Yet, I also detailed the lists of game-changing ideas from the SPLAN Game Changers conversations and workshops

to convey who generated particular ideas and when. I observed that, in March 2009, members of SPLAN already listed, from an internal workshop, the idea of "establishing a strong tech and engineering university." Employees of NYCEDC also listed, for example, in March 2009 PowerPoint presentations for internal workshops, the "capacity to innovate and the availability of human capital" as "major determinants of NYC's ability to stay ahead of the curve" and "education" as a tool to "increase worker supply for high demand industries." Finally, in the pre-read document for the main Game Changers workshop on 9 September 2009, employees of NYCEDC listed, among 13 other suggestions: "top-tier research university: Create top engineering university or build scale & reputation in existing school to develop talent for growth industries." Although I also observed that the SPLAN Game Changers workshops and conversations continued through July 2009 and that the introductory presentations of the SPLAN community roundtable discussions did not include a slide in the main presentation—only in the back-up section—of hypotheses for game-changing ideas regarding education, as they did in later presentations for employees of NYCEDC and employees of City Hall, I maintain that the SPLAN Game Changers conversations and workshops and the main Game Changers workshop were not processes of unfettered brainstorming but often also—overt or covert—processes of testing the hypotheses of employees of NYCEDC.

The content of internal research and data analysis during the Game Changers initiative only furthers my argument that employees of NYCEDC placed emphasis, for the majority of the Game Changers initiative, on the idea of constructing a higher education institution in the technology sciences in New York City. In a February 2009 internal document, employees of NYCEDC already listed "increas[ing] talent" via "educat[ing] NYers" via a "science/tech university" as an "example" of "ideas…according to how they contribute to increased economic activity in NYC." In April 2009, employees of NYCEDC devoted an entire PowerPoint presentation to the idea of a university and its role in entrepreneurship. Although employees of NYCEDC suggested in their PowerPoint presentations that they also considered internally other game-changing ideas, they focused their research and data analysis early in, and throughout, the Game Changers initiative on the idea of constructing a higher education institution in the technology sciences in New York City.

In my interviews, some employees of NYCEDC corroborated my argument regarding the Game Changers initiative as also a process of hypothesis testing. An employee of NYCEDC recalled:

> Did I know that [lack of engineering talent] was a problem coming into the media workshop? Did I know talent would be a problem? […] I do believe I knew it. Lack of talent, lack of investors, lack of entrepreneurs who have the track record to build a billion-dollar company in New York: We knew it. […] So we do have a hypothesis

> going into the project, and the process itself helped validate and helped come up with solutions in terms of how we can solve them.

An employee of NYCEDC and member of SPLAN recalled:

> While we were sort of moving ahead with this [brainstorming], we kind of preselected [game-changing ideas]. 'This idea really makes sense. Let's start following it. Let's start seeing what can happen here.' It looked like Governors Island was something that Bloomberg and others in the administration had identified as the location, so we started saying, 'Okay, Governors Island sort of makes sense for this science-tech thing.' At the same time, we were clearly having more community roundtables around Game Changers and trying to understand if there were other Game Changers or better Game Changers to pursue.

In particular, it appears that employees of NYCEDC had a good understanding coming into the main Game Changers workshop of the primacy of the game-changing idea to construct a higher education institution in the technology sciences in New York City. An employee of NYCEDC recalled: "Although I will say going into this [the main Game Changers workshop], at least me personally…I was already thinking that [the idea around higher education and technology sciences] is the one in that sweet spot of it-will-have-impact and we-know-how-to-get-this-done."

In my interviews, in keeping with the suggestion of pluralist power, however, other employees of NYCEDC unsurprisingly contradicted my argument. A City Hall employee recalled:

> All that the City is doing is shaping guidelines based on what they get from feedback. None of these [game-changing] ideas were our ideas. These were all ideas that came from these rooms [of NYC 2020 and SPLAN Game Changer conversations and workshops]. […] You have got to listen. You have got to be willing to listen and you have got to be willing to respond. I think that was the hallmark of the Bloomberg administration is that it was driven by data but it was also driven by the market. They would say, 'Let's listen. If the dogs do not like the dog food, we got to change up what they are eating. Right, so let's be responsive: What don't they like?'

An employee of NYCEDC recalled:

> It was a thread throughout the Bloomberg administration: Let the market speak; do not get too wedded to your own ideas. Let the market speak. That was absolutely a thread throughout the whole administration, not just those [Game Changers initiative] exercises. Have these roundtables, do not go in and tell the CEOs what is wrong with their business, let them talk amongst themselves, and you just listen and pick it up: That was a fundamental premise of almost all the work we did [at NYCEDC].


Employees of NYCEDC suggested a pluralist power dynamic in deciding on a game-changing idea to improve the New York City economy; yet, the relational power dynamic does not appear to be pluralist as a result of the disproportionate power of employees of NYCEDC. That said, despite possible preconceived notions and early hypotheses regarding talent, education, and entrepreneurialism, employees of NYCEDC persisted with conversations and workshops until September 2009 and

did not decide formally on the sole game-changing idea to improve the New York City economy until December 2009.

3.3.3 (Neo-)structural power: Confining the range of ideas considered and the type of participants included

I argue that a neo-structural power dynamic in the Game Changers initiative fostered policy decision-making processes for deciding on a game-changing idea to improve the New York City economy in which only certain ideas were considered and only certain participants were included. Mayoral agency—particularly the Bloombergian definition of economic development, the norm of data-driven policy decision-making during the Bloomberg administration, and Bloomberg's personal background—played a decisive role the policy decision-making processes. In this subsection, I address, in turn, the three factors of mayoral agency that served as closing mechanisms in deciding on a game-changing idea to improve the New York City economy. I also comment on a structural power dynamic regarding public choice in the Game Changers initiative.

Figure 2: The pathway for deciding on a game-changing idea to improve the New York City economy



3.3.3.1 Mayor Bloomberg's definition of economic development

The mayor's—and thereby his administration's—definition of economic development confined the range of ideas considered for how best to improve the New York City economy. Employees of NYCEDC prioritized game-changing ideas that aided industry growth, particularly by creating private-sector jobs in global-facing economies. I observed, for example, in the introductory presentation for a SPLAN community roundtable discussion, that employees of NYCEDC framed the brainstorming session about game-changing ideas with facts that contextualized New

York City in Bloombergian economic development terms. The slides include: trends over six decades in New York City total private employment; New York City's GDP as a share of world GDP, particularly by comparison to China's and India's growing shares; the growth of the New York City services sector offsetting the decrease in FIRE-sector employment; the decline of the industrial sector; the growth and growth potential of the university sector; and the fact that 48% of employed New Yorkers are foreign-born.

The mayor's definition of economic development in New York City also permeated the research and data analysis of NYCEDC: Employees of NYCEDC researched and analyzed only game-changing ideas that elided with his definition. Constructing a higher education institution in the technology sciences, improving transportation infrastructure, and prioritizing regional development, among other short-listed ideas, each furthered the mayor's particular vision for economic development in New York City. I also observed that employees of NYCEDC included, in a PowerPoint presentation dated 24 July 2009, the idea of a distinct "'middle-class' game-changer to be worked up in further detail." The fact that employees of NYCEDC conceived a so-called middle-class game-changing idea as distinct from the "university proposal"—and from the other game-changing ideas—suggests that employees of NYCEDC did not conceive the game-changing idea to construct a higher education campus in the technology sciences in New York City as intended for the middle class. Further, the fact that this is the only instance where mention is made of a middle-class game-changing idea suggests that employees of NYCEDC did not prioritize the middle class in generating and selecting a game-changing idea. Indeed, the mayor's definition of economic development did not focus on the middle class.

In my interviews, employees of NYCEDC corroborated my argument. An employee of NYCEDC recalled a focus in the Game Changers initiative on industry and industry-level ideas:

> This is the Bloomberg [New York City] Economic Development Corporation speaking, not the [Bill] de Blasio [New York City] Economic Development Corporation. I mean, as much as we care about New Yorkers and their lives, that was not our scope at the [NYC]EDC, and a lot more of what we did was trying to focus on big-picture economic transformation, stepping in, addressing market failures. […] It is our job to listen to these bigger markets, to listen to those large employers, [to] listen to our colleagues in the small-business community, and [to] sort of aggregate that to large policy responses that we can put in place to address market failures, because no one else can do that in the City and that is sort of the magic of the [New York City] Economic Development Corporation. […] I would say the audience in that case and the person we [employees of NYCEDC] are solving for is industry, not necessarily the people employed by industry, although we are helping them, but definitely working with our industry partners and hearing about their businesses and problems and challenges of doing business in New York City.

Another employee of NYCEDC recalled a focus in the Game Changers initiative on improving the global-facing economies in New York City:

> The other thing that was baked in [the Game Changers initiative] very early, that I think also came from the mayor and the kind of people around the mayor, was a kind of global perspective. He [Bloomberg], because he had run and built an international business, was always very conscious of the fact that New York City is an international city; it is a global hub; the problems that were arising were because of the global financial crisis, so we should just always think globally in terms of solutions. I think that was something that was always inherent in policymaking, economic-development policy, and other policy in the City. It is a sort of acute awareness of the global nature of not just the economy but life. […] With a different administration, a different policy mindset, we would have come at that [concept] from a different perspective.

Yet another employee of NYCEDC recalled a focus on private-sector jobs in the Game Changers initiative:

> You are looking at how do you solve what is primarily a private-sector issue. We want private sector jobs. […] What is the question New York City should be asking? […] You could say, if you ask some people, and I am not being pejorative to anyone here, they might tell you economic development should be reducing the number of people in poverty. They might tell you it is about increasing median income. The current administration [under de Blasio], and I am not saying wrongly, has decided it is around affordable housing. If you look at the situation we were in, the economy was in freefall. The unemployment rate in my first 15 months at [NYC]EDC doubled in New York City. So part of what was driving that particular set of conclusions of what is happening in the economy [is] we are losing private sector jobs very rapidly. We need private sector jobs. […] There is some place or another where its [NYCEDC's] mission statement is either said by some statute or law, but it is something about promoting jobs, private sector employment in New York City.

The same employee of NYCEDC continued: "I think for us, at least my little piece of the puzzle, and there might be others in City government who had very different assignments, it [economic development] was about private-sector employment growth. We needed jobs for the City. We wanted things that would ideally would generate jobs."

In addition to confining the range of ideas considered, the mayor's—and thereby his administration's—definition of economic development also confined the type of participants included in the public forums for a game-changing idea to predominately industry leaders. Employees of NYCEDC wanted to know how best to improve the New York City economy only from those on whom a Bloombergian economy focused and relied. I observed that the Game Changers conversations and workshops involved only decision-makers, particularly from industry. In many internal documents, employees of NYCEDC professed that they involved "300+ CEOs." In the same internal documents, employees of NYCEDC also indicate that they involved "20+ community groups," and guest lists from the SPLAN community roundtable discussions suggest that they did so. The comparative sizing of the two

groups and also the industry-focused rhetoric of the Game Changers initiative, however, suggest that industry leaders had disproportionate power in deciding on a game-changing idea to improve the New York City economy.

In my interviews, sources corroborated my argument. A leader of the New York City business community recalled: "I think it [the Game Changers initiative] was pretty close to the vest. There were not many people involved. […] It was a pretty limited group. The dinners involved 50, 60 people from the given sectors: fashion and retail, media and technology, a couple others." An employee of NYCEDC recalled:

> [In choosing whom to involve in the interviews and workshops] sometimes it was actually fairly obvious. We were certainly looking for who were important players in New York, granted 'important' can mean many things. An accrued metric could be: How many people do you employ in New York City? How many people do you represent in New York City? So, you know, we did do one workshop at Gracie Mansion with a bunch of the union guys, the major unions. We went with a lot of public lists. I think *Crain's* produced a public list of New York City's top employers; *Business Insider* produces a list every year of Silicon Alley 100. […] Sometimes it was people volunteering other people: 'You should speak to my friend. He knows this or that.'

The decisive role of the mayor's definition of economic development in confining the range of ideas considered and the type of participants included in the public forums for a game-changing idea for how best to improve the New York City economy increases my confidence in the hypothesis of neo-structural power regarding mayoral agency in the Game Changers initiative.

3.3.3.2 Mayor Bloomberg's norm of data-driven policy decision-making

The norm of data-driven policy decision-making during the Bloomberg administration not only necessitated that internal research and data analysis complement processes of public participation in the Game Changers initiative but it also further confined the range of ideas considered for how best to improve the New York City economy. I observed that, in short-listing their game-changing ideas, employees of NYCEDC constructed a two-by-two matrix of "feasibility" and "impact." Undoubtedly, the scoring of the game-changing ideas according to these criteria led employees of NYCEDC to favor certain ideas—likely the ones that were more easily quantifiable and met both criteria moderately well as opposed to, say, one criterion very well but the other not well at all—over others.

In my interviews, employees of NYCEDC recalled the data-driven decision-making processes by which they adjudicated among the game-changing ideas. An employee of NYCEDC recalled: "Immigration policy is very hard for the City to have any traction on. We can do some things [i.e., an immigration-policy initiative would be feasible in some respects]. It is also an issue of—if you think of this as a matrix—

both what can have impact and what can we actually move the needle on." The same employee of NYCEDC continued: "There is always in my mind the question of impact versus our ability to deliver." Another employee of NYCEDC recalled:

> There were some initiatives, in fact, I remember one of them was about making New York City more pedestrian friendly, but the City had already done a lot of that, so it seemed incremental to focus on that. And a lot of the things that we had already been working on were extremely quantifiable: Taxis and hybrid taxis were such an easy cost-benefit.

I do not intend to imply that employees of NYCEDC relied exclusively on quantifiable metrics in deciding on a game-changing idea to improve the New York City economy. In my interviews, employees of NYCEDC also acknowledged the limits of data-driven policy decision-making, particularly in the context of economic forecasting. An employee of NYCEDC recalled:

> I probably should not admit [that] I do not believe any of those [economic projections]. […] So, we were very rigorous in terms of designing our programs to make sure they did what we set out for them to do, but, in terms of determining whether something seemed to be a good program or a bad program, I would say that the analysis was probably more qualitative than quantitative. Again, it was another reason why we piloted these programs [through the NYC 2020 initiatives]. Given that they were mostly qualitative, we wanted to test them out before we threw significant sums of money against them.

Another employee of NYCEDC similarly recalled:

> Unfortunately, some of these things even in the policymaking or initiative-creation process are not as quantifiable as you would like them to be. We could not say, 'Okay, well creating an engineering presence will create X amount of jobs and start-ups.' No one really knew, but it was an idea that seemed to appeal to these experts and think-tank members and the folks that we believed really had a grip on what would change New York.

Another employee of NYCEDC recalled: "I do not personally believe that that last presentation to the Mayor [regarding the selection of a higher education institution in the technology sciences as the game-changing idea] consisted of many economic projections. I am sure they were there, but I just do not think he was like, 'Oh, that is a great number!' There is a lot more that goes into it."

The acknowledgement of the limits of data-driven policy decision-making allowed processes of public participation to complement the internal research and data analysis. That said, the norm of data-driven policy decision-making under the Bloomberg administration further limited the range of ideas considered for how best to improve the New York City economy. Its decisive role in the Game Changers initiative increases my confidence in the hypothesis of neo-structural power regarding mayoral agency in deciding on a game-changing idea to improve the New York City economy.

3.3.3.3 Mayor Bloomberg's personal background

Bloomberg's personal background as a media and technology titan served as a third and final closing mechanism in deciding on a game-changing idea to improve the New York City economy. Specifically, I argue, the mayor's personal background limited both the set of game-changing ideas that employees of NYCEDC considered following the processes of public participation and the range of game-changing ideas that employees of NYCEDC researched and analyzed. In other words, employees of NYCEDC were cognizant that the mayor would have to approve the game-changing idea and, therefore, took into account what he would find particularly palatable.

In my interviews, sources corroborate my argument. An employee of NYCEDC recalled: The game-changing idea to construct a higher education institution in the technology sciences in New York City "fit well within that particular mayor's [Bloomberg's] personal political profile as a tech-entrepreneur mayor. There was a nice storyline there that I think resonated for a lot of people at City Hall." The same employee of NYCEDC also recalled: "We [employees of NYCEDC] did view this, and City Hall viewed it as well, as a project that we wanted to identify closely and personally with the mayor and Bob Steel [the deputy mayor for economic development] too. But making it clear, as I sort of allude to before, that the project was in many ways an extension of the biography of the mayor, that was compelling." The same employee of NYCEDC continued:

> I think that the City did an interesting job in sort of, yes, testing ideas with partners and setting up processes in which we could collect ideas and test them and sometimes compete them against each other to achieve good results. I think that is true. I think also, in a lot of cases, the City did take a strong role, as it should and I think always will, in framing those really hard. […] However, I do not think it just so happened that a major initiative of the third term was creating a tech campus under a mayor that prided himself on being a tech entrepreneur. That just did not happen to be the one that rose through a free market of ideas to the top. Did it really happen that way?

A leader of the New York City business community recalled: "Mike Bloomberg's marketing genius and marketing focus contributed as much to that [Game Changers] process as anything. And, so, the Game Changers thing was playing to what they knew to be Mike Bloomberg's interest." I again, therefore, increase my confidence in the hypothesis of neo-structural power regarding mayoral agency in Game Changers initiative.

3.3.3.4 Structural and other neo-structural power dynamics

Mayoral agency confined the type of participants included in the public forums for a game-changing idea predominately to industry leaders. My observations, however, decrease my confidence in the hypotheses of neo-Marxist structural power and dominant-coalition neo-structural power in the Game Changers initiative. The

mayor's definition of economic development—not a classist compulsion, as a neo-Marxist theorist would argue, or an acknowledgement of the mayor's political electoral base and his economic environment, as a dominant coalition theorist would argue—confined the type of participants included in the public forums predominately to industry leaders.

I did observe, however, that employees of NYCEDC emphasized benchmarking in their research and data analysis that informed the generation and selection of game-changing ideas to improve the New York City economy: Employees of NYCEDC positioned New York City in relation to competitor cities and evaluated its and their strengths and weaknesses. In other words, the perceived need to compete with other cities to attract and retain capital and other resources—as a public choice theorist would argue—further confined the range of ideas considered for how best to improve the New York City economy.

In my interviews, employees of NYCEDC and employees of City Hall corroborated my argument. An employee of NYCEDC recalled:

> [T]he economy is a competitive game. We [employees of NYCEDC] recognized that, if other places were prospering, that was probably prosperity that we may have the opportunity to share in but were not sharing in. I think the competition, in Game Changers in particular, was most focused on this question of the competition for talent—and this [focus] really came from the very top, from the mayor. I think his [Bloomberg's] most important insight into economic development was that ultimately success in an economy depends on the attraction of talent.

Another employee of NYCEDC recalled: "I also spent almost six years at [a management consulting firm], and all consulting projects have three pieces: What is the current situation? Where are you trying to go? How are you getting there? In terms of process, I came in [to the Game Changers initiative] wanting to answer those three questions for New York. […] So, you start benchmarking try to understand what the environment is and where we are." The same employee of NYCEDC as quoted just prior recalled:

> So that kind of was like, 'This is where we are. Where do we think this is going?' So we started saying, 'What are some growth industries?'…and you rapidly look at the things that are projected to be growth industries where New York City had a plausible story to tell. You come pretty quickly to tech and entrepreneurship. That rapidly emerged on our radar screen in 2008, as this-is-interesting, this-seems-to-be-where-the-future-is-going. So, now how do we get into this game? And, then, we started doing benchmarking. We looked at Boston. We looked at California, very heavily [at] Silicon Valley, and, really, those were our two benchmarks, saying, 'What do they have that we do not have? How do we look compared to them?'

Using language to indicate further that economic development policy in New York City accounted for competitor cities, a City Hall employee recalled of the Game Changers conversations and workshops:

> 'What are the things the City can do for you as money investors here to fund businesses in New York, as opposed to what is being done up on Route 128 [in Boston, Massachusetts]?' We drafted in some of the universities here to figure out how are we capturing the right kind of intellectual property here and tech-transfer businesses so the ideas at these universities can be nurtured more aggressively in New York, a la what Stanford does in the Silicon Valley.

The same City Hall employee, however, also claimed that the need to compete with other cities did not impact the policy decision-making processes in deciding on a game-changing idea to improve the New York City economy:

> Other than that [ensuring that the legal environment for businesses in New York remains preferable to London and Asia], we never focused on how we would compete against Boston, how we would compete against Washington, or LA, or Chicago. Frankly, New York does not think it competes against them. New York is the greatest place in the world.

I argue that the need to compete with other cities further confined the range of ideas considered for how best to improve the New York City economy. It played a decisive role in deciding on a game-changing idea. Importantly, however, the mayor's definition of economic development informed the character of the need to compete with other cities and, therefore, also informed its role in the policy decision-making processes of the Game Changers initiative. I, thereby, increase my confidence in the hypothesis of structural power regarding public choice in the Game Changers initiative but also provide the caveat that the need to compete with other cities constrained internal research and data analysis in keeping with the mayor's definition of economic development.

3.4 Conclusion

I believe that the employees of City Hall and the employees of NYCEDC who were involved in the NYC 2020 and SPLAN Game Changers conversations and workshops were well-intentioned: They do not appear to have set out to confine the range of ideas considered or the type of participants included in the Game Changers initiative. They appear to have wanted the conversations and workshops to be, as advertised, public forums for all ideas regarding how best to improve the New York City economy. Employees of NYCEDC wished, for example, as they professed in an introductory presentation to a SPLAN Game Changers workshop, for participants in the Game Changers initiative to "imagine there are no funding constraints," that "no big ideas are off the table," to "try not to focus on barriers / complications in implementation," and to "try to capture all ideas before focusing on one or two." A governmental representative of Roosevelt Island disagreed with my charitable perspective, arguing instead that employees of NYCEDC created public forums for game-changing ideas in which only one idea could succeed; the governmental representative recalled: "My opinion is that it [the Game Changers initiative] was biased from the beginning. They knew what they wanted to do. Often times—and I

can show you other examples of this—[in] these studies or brainstorming sessions, they know the outcome they want to get to, and, then, it is finding the things to get there."

Employees of NYCEDC also generally believed that they canvassed a sufficiently large and diverse group of stakeholders. They appear to have wished to "ask them" broadly. An employee of NYCEDC recalled:

> We [Pinsky and members of SPLAN] came to the conclusion that we wanted to make it [the Game Changers initiative] a very broad process, so we started to think about categories of people. We knew, obviously, that we wanted to have conversations with people within [NYC]EDC and some of those across City government to tap into all of their expertise, but we also wanted to engage smart people in the private sector, we wanted to engage people who think about policy, so think tanks and those type of folks, civic people, and people who are active in that space.

Another employee of NYCEDC recalled: "It was tech leaders [engaged in the Game Changers initiative]; it was business leaders; it was academic leaders; it was community leaders. It really was the full range."

Surely achieving an appropriately representative participant group poses practical difficulties. A City Hall employee recalled: "Consulting with community groups and stakeholders is something that you can never get an A+ in; you can never be done; you can never get 100% because there is always someone else you could talk to or another perspective you could hear." In my interviews, however, some sources viewed the limited set of participants in the Game Changers initiative as flawed. A leader of the New York City business community recalled:

> I would say in a city of 8.5 million people, engaging 400 people from basically leadership of industry sectors, I would not call that broad engagement, would you? So, no, I do not think it had broad engagement. It was pretty much an insider baseball thing. They had these dinners, like two per year, where they got a little bit of feedback. […] I think that the Bloomberg administration had their finger on the pulse of the business community and got the message, but, in terms of the actual process and undertaking the competition etcetera, the engagement was pretty small, pretty limited.

An employee of NYCEDC recalled:

> That [the involvement of community groups and other non-profit stakeholders] was probably a weak point [in the Game Changers initiative]. […] Engagement at a grassroots level with those types of community groups, or whatever, was something that was usually tacked on at the end as opposed to something that was integrated to an upfront process and, so, from that perspective, we probably did not fully meet our own stated objectives of having that very wide perspective. I would have to go back and look through the list, but, I think, we did, in the end, include some kind of people who I would consider to be not in that classic large philanthropy, large not-for-profit [category]…but it is a very different thing from the community-based not-for-profits that are representing a particular agenda, policy-wise, or a particular demographic of the city. That was not so much a part of this.

Another employee of NYCEDC recalled:

> Looking back on it, if I had to run this all over again, would I have liked to maybe engaged more with some of the more neighborhood based community organizations? Maybe. […] Frankly I think we spoke to the ones we felt this most impacted. […] Should we maybe have tried talking to some in the outer boroughs? Maybe, but I am not sure we would have heard something dramatically different. I think some of them would have said the same thing, 'This is a great idea. Do it' or 'Well, we would prefer one of these other things,' but it was not clear we would get a dramatically different answer.

I have discussed and analyzed the power dynamics in deciding on a game-changing idea to improve the New York City economy. Processes of hypothesis testing in the Game Changers initiative decreased my confidence in the hypothesis of pluralist power in the Game Changers initiative, and the decisive role of the Bloombergian definition of economic development, the norm of data-driven policy decision-making under the Bloomberg administration, and Bloomberg's personal background increased my confidence in the hypothesis of neo-structural power regarding mayoral agency in the Game Changers initiative. I also increased my confidence in the hypothesis of structural power regarding public choice in the Game Changers initiative and decreased my confidence in the hypotheses of neo-Marxist structural power and dominant-coalition neo-structural power in the Game Changers initiative.

Four

4. Deciding on the proposal specifications for the Applied Sciences NYC competition

We move now to delineating the narrative of the RFEI and RFP processes in Applied Sciences NYC and to my discussion and analysis of the power dynamics in deciding on the specifications of the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition. I continue to test the hypotheses for the power dynamics in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC via their observable implications, make arguments for whether the case of Applied Sciences NYC increases or decreases my confidence in the literature on the corresponding theories of power, and add to the literature by proposing factors that played a decisive role in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC. I begin the chapter, however, with a discussion of the interim period between the policy decision-making processes in deciding on a game-changing idea to improve the New York City economy and deciding on the specifications of the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition since the interstitial events may be relevant to understanding power dynamics in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC.

4.1 January–November 2010: An interim period of difficulties

According to the header for the year 2010 of the Team Robertson internal timeline, employees of NYCEDC engaged in "Applied Sciences concept validation." While this descriptor is an accurate summary of the year, the narrative of the period between the Game Changers initiative and the Applied Sciences NYC competition is more fraught than immediately apparent. Employees of NYCEDC made fitful progress in 2010 on the game-changing idea of building in, or attracting to, New York City a higher education institution in the technology sciences. They spent the year: assessing the feasibility of Governors Island as the site for the Applied Sciences NYC campus, especially given a reluctant leader of the Trust for Governors Island; justifying their proposal, particularly to the typically reluctant employees of the New York City OMB, the City's chief financial agency; and in a leadership transition at the position of deputy mayor for economic development. Given these difficulties, the activity of the initiative slowed. As an indication, employees of NYCEDC listed on the Team Robertson internal timeline fewer bullet points for events in 2010 than in either 2009 or 2011.

In this section, I continue the chronological account of Applied Sciences NYC by discussing in detail the tripartite difficulty in 2010 for building in, or attracting to, New York City a higher education institution in the technology sciences. The slower pace of progress for the initiative during 2010 does not negate the potential

importance of the year for our understanding of the politics of power in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC. Indeed, as scholars of the community power debates also maintain, conflict can be a particularly helpful analytical opportunity for the analysis of power dynamics in policy decision-making processes.

4.1.1 Assessing the feasibility of Governors Island as the site for the Applied Sciences NYC campus

Employees of NYCEDC originally envisioned Governors Island as the site for the construction of the Applied Sciences NYC higher education campus. An employee of NYCEDC recalled: "I think it was in 2010 where Kyle Kimball [executive vice president, or head, of real estate transaction services (RETS) at NYCEDC] came to me and said, 'I have a project I want you to work on: It is Governors Island.' […] They called it [Applied Sciences NYC] 'Governors Island' to me." As I alluded in section 3.2.4.3, the game-changing idea of building in, or attracting to, New York City a higher education institution in the technology sciences became known as the "Governors Island proposal" in late 2009.

New York City officially acquired Governors Island from New York State in April 2010, after negotiating the deal for more than a year. Governors Island is a 172-acre island in the East River, with 87 acres of park and public space, located roughly between the southeast tip of Manhattan and Red Hook, Brooklyn. New York City and New York State had jointly operated Governors Island since 2003, when the federal government had handed over the closed military base on the island. At the time, Governors Island contained historic buildings and open space; ferry service facilitated visitors' access. In 2010, members of the Bloomberg administration considered what to do with this newly acquired piece of real estate, particularly given its proximity to Manhattan and its central business district. For employees of NYCEDC, the two questions—i.e., what to do with Governors Island and where to construct a higher education institution in the technology sciences—provided an answer to each other.[44]

[44] Sources differ on how the two questions, or the two initiatives, informed each other. Members of Team Strauss and members of Team Robertson would likely agree that the idea of building in, or attracting to, New York City a higher education institution in the technology sciences emerged independently of the question of what New York City should do with Governors Island. An employee of NYCEDC, however, recalled: "The first time I ever heard about Applied Sciences—what I now know as 'Applied Sciences'—was in the context of 'what are we going to do with Governors Island?'" Related to that narrative, when New York City took control of Governors Island in April 20010, sources already acknowledged the possibility of constructing a higher education institution on the island. A *New York Times* article from April 2010 reads: "The city also plans to add [to Governors Island] a high school, some commercial development and potentially a satellite campus for New York University."

Employees of NYCEDC, therefore, conducted extensive research and data analysis regarding the Governors Island site. The Team Robertson internal timeline reads: "Jan–Aug [2010]: Due diligence on Gov. Island site, inc. engineering cost estimation for infrastructure." Even members of Team Strauss attributed most of this work to Robertson and other members of SPLAN, despite members of Team Strauss's dismissals regarding the prior involvement of Robertson and other members of SPLAN, as mentioned in section 3.2.3. An employee of NYCEDC and member of Team Strauss recalled: "They [members of SPLAN] also came into this whole thing when the question was: how do we evaluate Governors Island? That became much more of a SPLAN project because it just fit into [SPLAN's remit]: we have a defined real estate problem; what does this thing mean?" The same employee of NYCEDC continued: "Poor Euan [Robertson]. One thing I do remember is he was the lead on the Governors Island site, and he became the world's leading expert on that, which in the end is an obscure piece of knowledge I am not sure has ever done him much. But, he did a huge amount of really excellent work on that." Another employee of NYCEDC and member of SPLAN recalled: "We did, I think, a year or six months of study to understand what the infrastructure cost would be, working with some outside firms, to make Governors Island useable [as the site for the campus]. It was extraordinarily expensive, but we got that information gathered."

Due diligence is standard practice, but its length for the Governors Island site in Applied Sciences NYC indicates difficulty. Not only was Governors Island complicated in terms of its viability as a site for an educational institution, but sources also recall that the members of the Trust for Governors Island, led by president and CEO Leslie Koch, were reluctant to support the construction of a higher education institution on Governors Island. The same employee of NYCEDC and member of SPLAN quoted just prior recalled:

> There was a lot of back and forth for about [the] year we lost on the Governors Island conversation because we at [NYC]EDC and City Hall were very fixated on [Governors Island] being the location. Leslie [Koch] at TGI, Trust for Governors Island, was really strongly opinionated that [Governors Island] was not the right choice. […] She had a plan for the island that had nothing to do with this campus.

Another employee of NYCEDC also recalled:

> It [Governors Island] looks like an Ivy League campus and sort of wants to be an Ivy League campus. It has definitely huge infrastructure problems in terms of potable water and Internet and access and that kind of thing, but, from a physical layout, it wants to be a campus. […] The person [Koch] who was running Governors Island at the time did not want it to be a campus. There was a bit of tension between her vision—so, Leslie Koch—and the vision of Seth Pinsky. […] There were personality tensions between the person who was in charge of Governors Island [Koch] and the person [Pinsky] who had some ideas for the island.

Another employee of NYCEDC recalled:

> The initial idea for this [the Applied Sciences NYC competition] was that we were going to offer everyone the opportunity to build a campus on Governors Island,

> because part of this also was designed to solve the Governors Island conundrum: What do you do with Governors Island? The woman [Koch] who up until very recently ran Governors Island was strongly resistant to that. Her point was that we had, at that point issued, at least one [other] RFP for development on Governors Island, and it had been a failure. She said, 'I do not want to tarnish the Island by issuing yet another RFP that nobody responds to. How do you know that universities want to be here?' It was very frustrating. We had lots of fights and meetings with high-level people in the administration who were trying to broker some sort of compromise. I went out with her—Leslie Koch is her name—we went out for drinks after work one night to try to see if we could work this out. In the course of the conversation, I realized that it was not that she was opposed to the Applied Sciences competition as a concept; she was concerned about its impact on Governors Island. What I had heard her saying, which was probably a mishearing on my part, was that she did not think the Applied Sciences competition was a good idea at all, and so I was very frustrated; as the head of Governors Island, who are you to tell us, the City, not to do this competition that really has nothing to do with Governors Island other than the location? When I realized what the true concern she had was, I said to her, 'Are you saying that if we made this a RFP where we gave people multiple locations to choose from rather than just Governors Island, you would then be okay with this competition?' She said, 'Yes' and that is what finally got this thing unstuck, and it had been stuck for like a year and a half.

Site-specific and personality difficulties, therefore, had slowed the progress of Applied Sciences NYC in 2010, but the difficulties subsided when employees of NYCEDC thought to include multiple site options for the campus in the RFEI. The Team Robertson internal timeline reads: "Early September [2010]: Josh Wallack, COO [Chief Operating Office] of [NYC]EDC, recommends Roosevelt Island as potential site" and, then, "September 21 [2010]: Decision to include 3 sites in [the] multi-site RFEI. RFEI drafting starts." An employee of NYCEDC recalled of the decision to include Roosevelt Island as a potential site for the Applied Sciences NYC campus:

> Other city agencies had started to look up [NYC]EDC to do some [capital projects] work. The Health and Hospitals Corporations was one of them. So, in conversation with the Health and Hospitals Corporation, sort of as an aside, they mentioned they were due to relocate the Goldwater Hospital campus [on Roosevelt Island] and were going to have to replace it, and that was just one of those things that stuck with me. […] So, when it became clear that we [employees of NYCEDC] wanted to offer a number of sites [for the Applied Sciences NYC campus], and not just one, that [site] sort of popped back into my head as one that we should think about.

The same employee of NYCEDC continued: "There are moments in government where you get a fortunate confluence of events and you hope that you have good teams that are ready to capitalize off of them. This was a moment where they just happened to be closing down a hospital, that does not just happen every day […] We were able to get in there sort of at the right moment." As I discuss in a subsequent subsection (4.2.1.2), employees of NYCEDC, in fact, made available fours sites for the potential construction of the Applied Sciences NYC campus, in addition to allowing respondents to choose their own site. The promise of the inclusion of

multiple sites in the RFEI and RFP placed less emphasis on the Governors Island site appraisal and, more importantly, placated Koch.

4.1.2 Convincing employees of the New York City Office of Management and Budget

In 2010, employees of NYCEDC also conducted further research and data analysis on other anticipated and completed university expansion projects. The Team Robertson internal timeline reads: "Jan–Aug [2010]: CET team develops detailed case studies on applied sciences university expansion." The internal research and data analysis was useful to several stakeholders involved in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC, yet the case studies were especially useful in contentious discussions that employees of NYCEDC had with employees of the New York City OMB.

Employees of NYCEDC needed to convince reluctant employees of the budget office of the merit of financing the City's commitment in the Applied Sciences NYC competition. An employee of NYCEDC recalled:

> One [critic] [was] the budget office, which is always rightfully concerned about open-ended commitments on the public fisc. They [employees of OMB] were concerned that we [employees of NYCEDC] were going out publically with a project without understanding [it], even though we had put numbers to it and said we would hold ourselves to it. Rightfully, I think they [employees of OMB] always worry about the creep of a project once you make a public commitment to [it]. So, they were clearly persistent skeptics and critics.

Another employee of NYCEDC recalled:

> There were people there [at OMB] that had a very conservative view of economic development. Essentially, it [funding the City's commitment in the Applied Sciences NYC competition] is a bet that the $100 million investment [i.e., the amount of the City's primary award] [plus] whatever the value of the land [leased by the City for a nominal amount to the university for the site of the campus] is underneath the old hospital, that that [amount] is going to be worth more in tax revenues in the future than other uses. So, there was some pushback there.

The existence of two PowerPoint presentations—in addition to multiple draft versions of the same presentation—that employees of NYCEDC created for briefing meetings with employees of OMB suggests that employees of NYCEDC met with employees of OMB at least on 5 February 2010 and 31 March 2010 to justify their case for a capital budget allocation to help finance the construction of a higher education institution in the technology sciences in New York City. In the 5 February 2010 slide deck, employees of NYCEDC also refer to a prior meeting between employees of OMB and employees of NYCEDC.[45] The content of the PowerPoint

[45] As I mentioned earlier, employees of NYCEDC listed on the Team Robertson internal timeline the "first" briefing with employees of OMB as occurring on 12 November 2009. Beyond information deduced from the timeline, I am not certain that the 12 November 2009 meeting actually happened.

presentations to members of OMB is pragmatic; employees of NYCEDC justified the game-changing idea of building in, or attracting to, New York City a higher education institution in the technology sciences not by demonstrating why the idea is good given the economic context of New York City and the conversations and workshops in the Game Changers initiative, as they had done in prior presentations, but by illustrating why the initiative would be successful, often with reference to university expansion projects elsewhere.

In the 5 February 2010 slide deck, employees of NYCEDC summarized the key "questions" from the prior meeting: "case studies of phased development in STEM (non-bio) universities and research parks;" "framework for targeting/excluding sub-disciplines within STEM;" "propensities for spin-out/start-up activity by academic discipline or program;" "segmentation of potential respondents institutions;" and "cross-checks on full capital plan—capacity assumptions." Employees of NYCEDC, then, responded to these requests in the presentation: They detailed nine case studies of STEM development in universities and research parks in order to illustrate common practices, themes, and factors for success.[46] Employees of NYCEDC defined STEM on a slide titled "What is *not* STEM for NYC?" as if to imply possible sectors of competitive advantage in New York City. Employees of NYCEDC maintained that STEM in New York City could be biological sciences, chemistry, computer science, engineering, environmental science, mathematics, and physics/astronomy. They believed that it was not, in New York City, agricultural sciences or geosciences. Employees of NYCEDC also listed three categories of rationale for potential respondents to a RFEI and/or RFP to construct a higher education institution in the technology sciences in New York City. They were: "regional expansion," "East Coast strategy for [a] West Coast player," and "foreign market entrant." Employees of NYCEDC contended, after categorizing them by rationale, that "21 of the global top 50 engineering schools appear to [be] potential RFP respondents." In the "backup" slides, employees of NYCEDC listed rationales for why the other 29 top institutions "may not necessarily be a good fit for NYC." Employees of NYCEDC also included, in the backup slides, further case studies: CMU on how it "be[came] a world class university" and four other instances of STEM development in universities and research parks.[47]

[46] The case studies of university development in the 5 February 2010 slide deck are: Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Indian Institute of Technology Bhubaneswar, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, the Technion, and the University of California, San Francisco, Medical Center at Mission Bay. The case studies of research parks in the 5 February 2010 slide deck are: Daedeok Science Town, Rensselaer Technology Park, and the Research Triangle Park in North Carolina.

[47] The four case studies—in addition to CMU—in the "backup" slides of the 5 February 2010 presentation are: the Max Planck Florida Institute for Neuroscience, Montclair State University, the New York Structural Biology Center, and the Scripps Research Institute in Jupiter, Florida.

Employees of NYCEDC continued to justify the game-changing idea of building in, or attracting to, New York City a higher education institution in the technology sciences by illustrating instances of growth or expansion at other universities. In a 31 March 2010 PowerPoint presentation for a briefing meeting with employees of OMB, employees of NYCEDC detailed their key findings, which the additional case studies or further detail of prior case studies, both included in the slide deck, helped to corroborate. These case studies came from CMU, Cornell, the science and engineering quadrangle at Stanford, the Technion, and the University of California, San Francisco, Medical Center at Mission Bay. The findings included the importance of "phased construction" and "private donors." Employees of NYCEDC also noted that "in high-level conversation, several universities ha[d] expressed broad interest for having a potential research campus in NYC (Technion, Stanford, IIT, Bombay)."

Finally, in a September 2010 PowerPoint slide deck titled "STEM Case Studies: To Inform Potential Phase 1 Development," employees of NYCEDC furthered their portfolio of case studies. In addition to the 16 discrete case studies that employees of NYCEDC had included in the 5 February and 31 March slide decks for the briefing meetings with employees of OMB, employees of NYCEDC included 11 new case studies and a summary slide comparing the facilities and funding at all the case-study institutions.[48] In the addendum to the September 2010 slide deck, there are also four additional case studies.[49] All case studies included sections on "background," "stakeholders," and "key elements of success," and most included a timeline for the expansion. Employees of NYCEDC had spent considerable time researching and analyzing university expansion projects, both as common research practice but also in response to criticism from employees of OMB.

4.1.3 Overcoming a leadership change

In progressing with the game-changing idea of building in, or attracting to, New York City a higher education institution in the technology sciences, employees of NYCEDC did not meet frequently with the deputy mayor for economic development, yet Lieber had overseen the initiative since its inception. Bloomberg appointed Robert Steel as deputy mayor for economic development in June 2010.

[48] The additional 11 case studies in the September 2010 slide deck are: the Allston Science and Engineering Complex at Harvard University, the Bossone Research Center at Drexel University, the East Carolina University science and technology building, the MIT Media Lab, the North Campus Research Complex at the University of Michigan, the Rutgers University tripartite "science expansion," the University of Illinois electrical and computer engineering building, the University of Portland science and engineering building, the Van Andel Institute, the Weill Cornell Medical College research building, and the Yale University expansion project.

[49] The four case studies in the addendum to the September 2010 slide deck are: the CCNY science building and Advanced Science Research Center, the Fraunhofer Society research centers, the Nebraska Innovation Campus, and the North Carolina State University Centennial Campus and Keystone Science Center.

Lieber's departure from the position, therefore, necessitated briefing the incoming deputy mayor on the initiative and garnering his support for it.[50]

It took over three months from when Steel assumed the position of deputy mayor for employees of NYCEDC to brief him formally on Applied Sciences NYC. The Team Robertson internal timeline reads: "October 5 [2010]: 1st DM Steel Briefing re: AppSciences." Employees of NYCEDC provided Steel with a full overview of Applied Sciences NYC in both a main PowerPoint presentations and an appendix, beginning with high-level information and ending with more granular detail. The main presentation began with an executive summary that is evocative of prior PowerPoint presentations. Employees of NYCEDC stated their hypothesis: "future growth industries will be knowledge based and University research will be a key factor for success." Employees of NYCEDC continued to discuss New York City's weak position in applied sciences especially relative to the "Boston Benchmark." Employees of NYCEDC summarized: "Even after allowing for NYC University growth plans [e.g., of Columbia and NYU], we project NYC will still face Quality, Quantity, and Per Capital Gaps against a Boston Benchmark." In the main presentation, employees of NYCEDC stated their vision: "NYC should commit to [the] holistic vision to be [an] innovation capital of the 21st century" and "an important part of this vision is meeting the Boston Benchmark in applied sciences by 2030." Employees of NYCEDC acknowledged that their vision was a "challenging stretch goal" and they enumerated many actions—including, for example, improving public schools and committing to immigration reform—in order to help to achieve it. Employees of NYCEDC unveiled their "commitment to creating an applied sciences campus comprised of one or many institutions in NYC, by launching an international $50M New York City Challenge (RFEI) to develop phase I (~300K–~1M SF)" as an "immediate next step." They then proceeded to detail their justification for the game-changing idea by citing their internal research and data analysis and processes of public participation from 2009, in addition to their further internal research and data analysis from 2010.

In the 30 December 2009 mayoral briefing that marked the culmination of the Game Changers initiative, employees of NYCEDC conveyed that they had hoped to announce the Applied Sciences NYC competition in January 2010. The tripartite difficulties in the year 2010 thwarted that goal. The consistently positive momentum exhibited in the policy decision-making processes in the Game Changers initiative had fluctuated and slowed for most of 2010. The Governors Island site posed difficulties; employees of OMB raised concerns about the initiative; and employees of

[50] All sources suggested that Steel supported Applied Sciences NYC. I intend to convey only that the top-leadership transition necessitated that employees of NYCEDC take time to update Steel on the initiative, in addition to furthering its progress.

NYCEDC needed to inform Steel of proceedings. Yet the year as a result is not necessarily less instructive for the politics of power in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC. Beginning in December 2010, the momentum of the initiative returned to being consistently positive; employees of NYCEDC largely returned to their desired timeline as stated in the December 2009 mayoral presentation.

4.2 December 2010–July 2011: The Request for Expressions of Interest and Request for Proposals processes

The Applied Sciences NYC competition consisted of a competition among U.S. and international universities for the award to construct a higher education campus in the technology sciences in New York City. The yearlong process of the competition was a relatively typical tendering process. The Team Robertson internal timeline reads for the year 2011: "Applied Sciences RFEI and RFP." The Applied Sciences NYC competition culminated on 19 December 2011 in Bloomberg's granting the primary award jointly to Cornell and the Technion. Sources recalled the yearlong process encountering limited opposition. However, I argue that the Applied Sciences NYC competition included a set of skeptics and naysayers that we ought to explore.

In this section, therefore, I continue the chronological account of Applied Sciences NYC by discussing the RFEI for the Applied Sciences NYC competition and its response period and the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition. I examine in detail the language of the RFEI and RFP in order to understand the content and intent of the documents. I emphasize the outsized—relative to other tendering processes—public affairs events over the course of the Applied Sciences NYC competition in order to illustrate how the initiative is unique and conclude with a subsection on the skeptics and naysayers of Applied Sciences NYC. In so doing, I differentiate my narrative from a typical high-level narrative of Applied Sciences NYC. Each of these examinations has bearing on our understanding of the politics of power in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC.

4.2.1 The Request for Expressions of Interest

Preparing and issuing a RFEI is a typical governmental process when tendering for services. The process can elicit important information from the respondents without requiring the RFEI issuer to procure services. In the case of the Applied Sciences NYC competition, the tendering process was no different in this respect: Employees of NYCEDC aimed to gather information through responses to the RFEI for the Applied Sciences NYC competition. More particularly, employees of NYCEDC aimed to learn from respondents both about the characteristics of a higher education institution in the technology sciences that should be constructed in New

York City and about the interest level of universities in the Applied Sciences NYC competition.

4.2.1.1 Emphasizing learning

On 16 December 2010, employees of NYCEDC briefed Bloomberg on Applied Sciences NYC in anticipation of the release of the RFEI that day. The Team Robertson internal timeline reads: "MRB briefing re: Applied Sciences (multi-site)." In the PowerPoint presentation for the mayoral briefing, employees of NYCEDC emphasized the learning process that they hoped to achieve through the RFEI, particularly with regard to the potential interest level of universities. Employees of NYCEDC wrote, in the slide deck titled "NYC Applied Sciences Initiative: A Path to a 21st Century Economy," that their goal was to "test [the] market through a RFEI being launched today."

In my interviews, multiple sources reiterated the sentiment of a learning process via the RFEI. An employee of NYCEDC recalled: "They [employees of NYCEDC] said, 'We need to do a RFEI, Request for Expressions of Interest.' That is a more traditional economic development tool to gain knowledge on how to shape a RFP. It is also a very useful publicity tool, getting public awareness." A City Hall employee recalled of the rationale for a RFEI: "I think that we did not think we were qualified to scope it [the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition]. If we were going to build public housing, we know how to do it; we do it all the time. My view was that we did not have adequate skills to scope with specificity what it [the RFP] should be." A member of the Cornell team for the Applied Sciences NYC competition recalled: "They [employees of NYCEDC] were pretty clear that they wanted to learn from us, so those responses to the RFEI would inform the RFP, which it clearly did. We could see some of our own work in the RFP." In my interviews, multiple sources recalled Steel's analogy of inviting guests to a party as a way to underscore the uncertainty of employees of NYCEDC and employees of City Hall regarding the interest level of universities in the Applied Sciences NYC competition. A City Hall employee recalled jokingly: "So [NYC]EDC ran this [the Applied Sciences NYC competition]; they were the organizers and, when we punched send in December [2010], I had….It is like sending out invitations to a party. Hopefully someone will come: I am not that popular; I do not have that many friends; I found a lot of these people on Facebook, and I hope they come."

Employees of NYCEDC did have some sense of the interest level of universities in the Applied Sciences NYC competition prior to issuing the RFEI. They indicated in the PowerPoint for the mayoral briefing on 16 December 2010 that some universities had signaled interest in partaking in the Applied Sciences NYC competition. Employees of NYCEDC listed on a slide, titled "The level of interest in

[NYC]EDC's RFEI is further validated by conceptual conversations [NYC]EDC has held with universities," 13 institutions as "examples of schools [NYC]EDC consulted;" they were: Columbia, Cornell, Drexel University, ETH Zurich, Indian Institute of Technology, Max Planck Florida Institute for Neuroscience, Nanyang Technology University, NYU/Polytechnic Institute of NYU, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Stanford, the University of California, San Francisco, the University of Manchester, and the University of Oxford. Employees of NYCEDC wrote on the same slide: "Key officials [ostensibly from the 13 institutions listed] have said a challenge [the Applied Sciences NYC competition] from NYC would merit serious consideration with several schools indicating that NYC expansions have been independently mooted."

4.2.1.2 The pitch

The main events on 16 December 2010 regarding the RFEI for the Applied Sciences NYC competition were Steel's policy speech and the issuing the RFEI for the Applied Sciences NYC competition.[51] In his first public speech since his appointment in June 2010, Steel proclaimed, at Google's Manhattan offices, New York City governmental officials' intent to construct a higher education institution in the technology sciences. Ric Burns, co-writer of the eight-part history of New York City, *New York: A Documentary Film*, introduced Steel at the event. A City Hall employee recalled: "It [Applied Sciences NYC] really began with the speech that we framed at Google. That was really the public launch of Game Changers; that was trying to take the Game Changers [initiative] and what we learned and put it into a narrative. We worked hard on that."

Employees of NYCEDC articulated the Applied Sciences NYC pitch to potential respondents in the RFEI, titled "Your opportunity to build a campus and a legacy: Applied Sciences Facility in New York City: Request for Expressions of Interest." Members of SPLAN and members of the real estate transaction services division (RETS) at NYCEDC, who more typically led a RFEI process, were instrumental in the writing and release of the RFEI. The RFEI begins with a letter from the mayor, inviting institutions to participate in the Applied Sciences NYC competition, outlining New York City's strengths, and reinforcing his and his administration's commitment to the initiative. The letter reads: "We are committed to this exciting new project, and we hope that you take part in the historic effort to develop your institution in New York City and contribute to our expanding science and research industry."

[51] The Office of the Mayor issued a press release on 16 December 2010 titled "Mayor Bloomberg Announces Initiative to Develop a New Engineering and Applied Sciences Research Campus to Bolster City's Innovation Economy." It is notable, however, that, at this stage, ostensibly given the uncertainty about the success of the RFEI for the Applied Sciences NYC competition, Steel, not Bloomberg, spoke publically about the REFI release and the vision for a higher education institution in the technology sciences in New York City.

Employees of NYCEDC outlined the goals for the Applied Sciences NYC competition in the executive summary. They were: "create a world-class Applied Sciences Research/Education Facility," "contribute to the diversification of the City economy by growing its applied sciences base," "develop a financially self-sustainable campus," "develop research that will lead to the formation of new companies in emerging industries," and "continue to grow one of the largest scientific research populations in the country." Employees of NYCEDC detailed the submission requirements and their key priorities. Their priorities were: "institutional quality," "use/type of Applied Sciences proposed," "demonstrated incremental Applied Sciences to the City," "impact on local communities," "economic impact on the City," "financial feasibility," "development team qualifications," "design," and "timeline."

The language of the RFEI is, however, deliberately unspecific. In the RFEI, employees of NYCEDC acknowledged their expected learning process from the RFEI. The RFEI reads: "NYCEDC anticipates that the future RFP will be based in part on responses to this RFEI." Employees of NYCEDC also did not, for example, specify a size for the "full build-out" of the campus. They also broadly articulated the "City support" as willingness to make a "significant contribution" of capital, land, and other considerations to the initiative, in addition to assistance with "publicity and public relations efforts" and "myriad intangible benefits of making the City the location for an Applied Sciences Facility." Employees of NYCEDC did not specify a site for the campus, which is a notable shift away from a typical real-estate-driven model of economic development and from early conversations about the initiative, which focused on Governors Island. An employee of NYCEDC recalled:

> They [employees of NYCEDC] realized it [the RFEI for the Applied Sciences NYC competition (and RFP)] did not have to be property-specific. To me, that was very interesting because, coming from the real estate side of things and also having done public-private work in New York for about 10 years before that, I always thought it was really specific. […] They [employees of NYCEDC] turned it [the model] around and they said, 'We have an idea; maybe there is some land for it.' And, once they turned it around, they also realized they did not have to do the traditional let-us-pick-a-piece-of-land-and-say-it-has-to-be-there.' […] I thought it really flipped the economic development model that I had been familiar with in New York and in school and everything.

In particular, employees of NYCEDC offered, in the RFEI, as potential sites for the Applied Sciences NYC campus, the Navy Hospital campus at the Brooklyn Navy Yard, development sites on Governors Island, the Goldwater Hospital campus on Roosevelt Island, the Farm Colony on Staten Island, and the option to propose a "privately owned site."[52]

[52] A City Hall employee acknowledged that the inclusion of Staten Island in the RFEI amounted to "politics." The same employee recalled: "So, Navy Yard [is] Brooklyn; Governors Island is in the middle of two places [Manhattan and Brooklyn] you can count for that [site]; and, then, we had

Employees of NYCEDC guided respondents in the RFEI but also remained uncommitted to particular facilities or programs. The RFEI reads: "Respondents may propose non-educational uses such as faculty and student housing, restaurants and/or retail space." Employees of NYCEDC continued in the RFEI: "Of particular interest will be proposals which include co-located space for related commercial activity such as business incubators, corporate R&D facilities, and spin-out companies." Employees of NYCEDC included in the RFEI that they were particularly interested in submissions regarding "applied engineering" but that "additional programs may include environmental science, mathematics, chemistry, physics, and computer science."

4.2.1.3 Interested parties

The partygoers of Steel's metaphor materialized in response to the RFEI for the Applied Sciences NYC competition. Employees of NYCEDC scheduled a two-day event in New York City that was designed primarily to provide information to potential respondents, encourage synergies among them, and display the high level of interest in the Applied Sciences NYC competition to the respondents and to the naysayers. The Team Robertson internal timeline reads: "Feb 8 [2011]: MRB attends reception for RFEI respondents at Met Museum" and "Feb 9 [2011]: potential respondents gather at NYSE Board Room for information session followed by tours of four city-offered sites." By 17 December 2010—i.e., the day after employees of NYCEDC issued the RFEI—according to an internal list, employees of NYCEDC had already confirmed the attendance, at the events on 8 and/or 9 February 2011, of representatives from 23 academic institutions, in addition to representatives from five organizations associated with the Applied Sciences NYC competition, City Hall, and the offices of Senators Kristen Gillibrand and Charles Schumer.[53] Employees of

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Roosevelt Island, and we could not find a place in the Bronx, so we found Staten Island. So, you are just trying to tick boxes. The odds of someone going to Farm Colony were not high, but we could say to people that we provided a suite of possibilities." An employee of NYCEDC and member of RETS recalled, on the other hand:

> For this initiative to be successful, it was always going to require the support of the entire city. It could not be a borough initiative; it had to be a City of New York initiative. We did not end up with sites in all five boroughs. We did scour all five boroughs and, eventually, elevated the five [*sic*] best sites. […] Honestly, the site selection was more about supply than anything else, than the politics.

[53] Employees of NYCEDC listed the following institutions on their guest list for the events on 8 and 9 February 2011: the American Technion Society, Australia National University, Brooklyn College/Steiner Studios, CMU, Columbia, the Cooper Union for the Advancement of Science and Art, Cornell, the City University of New York, École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, Fordham University, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, MIT, Nanyang Technological University, the New York Genome Center, NYU, the Pennsylvania State University, the Polytechnic Institute of NYU, Purdue University, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, the Rockefeller University, Stanford, the Technion, and the University of Oxford. In addition to attendees from NYCEDC, City Hall, and the offices of New York State senators, employees of NYCEDC also included on the guest

NYCEDC, in multiple versions of the guest list, detailed not only relevant biographical information about the attendees and logistical information on which events he or she would be attending but also the rank, in the U.S. and internationally, of the academic institution that he or she represented and the institution's engineering research expenditure in 2009.[54]

The two-day event was ostentatious. The first day—i.e., 8 February 2011—consisted of an evening reception with the mayor at the Metropolitan Museum of Art. A City Hall employee recalled: "The MET was a bit of a show. We had it [the event]…in the big rooms in the back […] It was kind of a road show presentation." A member of the Cornell team for the Applied Sciences NYC competition recalled: "There were a good number of people there from all around the world. I remember the mayor spoke, the deputy mayor for economic development [Steel] spoke, and the [NYC]EDC president [Pinsky] spoke. There was not a lot of Q&A. It was social, people mingling and meeting NYC government people and [NYC]EDC people, as well as other universities." On the second day—i.e., 9 February 2011—employees of NYCEDC hosted a breakfast in the Governor's Room at City Hall and an information session and lunch at the NYSE, with subsequent tours of any of the four City-owned sites included in the RFEI. According to the PowerPoint presentation for the information session, the agenda items for the two-and-half-hour session included: "why this [Applied Sciences NYC] is important for NYC," "advantages of participating in [the] RFEI," "site briefings," and "Q&A." The same member of the Cornell team as quoted just prior recalled of the information session:

> It was formal. It had PowerPoint. It had a lot of information. […] I found it both inspiring as well as helpful in thinking about the future. If I remember correctly, it talked about their vision of the city, how it had gone through different 50-year periods from a port city to manufacturing to finance, fashion, and media and, then, they were hoping the next 50 years would be, at some point, the tech sector.

By the 16 March 2011 RFEI submission deadline, employees of NYCEDC had received 18 responses from 27 institutions.[55] In my interviews, multiple sources

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list an attendee from: Greenhill & Co., the SUNY Levin Institute, the Metropolitan Museum of Art, NYC & Company, and SecondMarket.

[54] Senior members of the institutions attended the 8 and 9 February 2011 events. For example, employees of NYCEDC listed on their guest list, among the Cornell attendees: Kent Fuchs, provost, and Cathy Dove, associate dean for administration at the College of Engineering. Employees of NYCEDC listed, on their guest list as the Technion's attendee, Paul Feigin, senior executive vice-president.

[55] The Office of the Mayor revealed, in a press release dated 17 March 2011, that the following institutions had submitted responses to the RFEI for the Applied Sciences NYC competition: Abo Akademi University; Amity University; CMU with Steiner Studios; Columbia and the City University of New York; the Cooper Union; Cornell; École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne; Indian Institute of Technology; Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology; the New York Genome Center with Albert Einstein College of Medicine, Columbia Medical Center, Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center, Mount Sinai School of Medicine, NYU, the Rockefeller University, and the Jackson

recalled that the volume of submissions to the RFEI and the caliber of respondents helped validate the Applied Sciences NYC competition especially to employees of the New York City OMB. An employee of NYCEDC recalled, having referred to Applied Sciences NYC as a "smashing good idea:" "A lot of the work we had to do internally was convincing people that this was the case, and quelling the people that were arguing that it was not. […] It was the RFEI itself [that did so]. […] It was really after those results [the volume and quality of the submissions] came in that the remaining critics sort of had to withdraw." The Office of the Mayor issued a press release on 17 March 2011 that seemed to bind employees of NYCEDC and employees of City Hall to the initiative, if there were any doubts remaining. Bloomberg said in the press release:

> We were enormously optimistic that this once-in-a-generation opportunity would draw the interest of top caliber universities from New York City, the region and the world, and the number and breadth of responses [to the RFEI] is as strong an endorsement of the idea as we could have hoped for. […] The day when a new campus opens its doors is still far down the road, but the quality of the initial responses is an incredibly promising sign that it can and will become a reality.

On 30 March 2011, employees of NYCEDC briefed the mayor on the perceived success of the RFEI. The Team Robertson internal timeline reads: "Mar 30 [2011]: Update meeting with MRB on RFEI responses and next steps." Employees of NYCEDC plotted, on a graph in the slide deck, the RFEI submissions along the axes "attractiveness to City" and "feasibility of institution proposal." On the graph, employees of NYCEDC highlighted the institutions of the nine submissions that they found most promising given these metrics.[56] Of these nine submissions, employees of NYCEDC indicated in the slide deck that "respondents were interested in a variety of sites; [there was] strong interest in RI [Roosevelt Island] and BNY [Brooklyn Navy Yard]." Of the 18 total submissions, none, however, expressed interest in the Staten Island Farm Colony; the slide reads in relation to the Farm Colony site: "Low interest expressed in the Farm Colony." According to employees of NYCEDC, the submissions varied widely in terms of the capital required—from New York City government and elsewhere—for the expansion project, their "population size," and their projected square footage. Employees of NYCEDC identified in the slide deck that the key issues for further consideration were: "scope and cost of infrastructure upgrades required (City-owned sites)," "purchase price/internal transfer cost (if any) of City sites," and "total City capital investment."

Laboratory; NYU with CMU, the City University of New York, the University of Toronto, and IBM; Purdue University; Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute; Stanford; the Stevens Institute of Technology; the Technion; the University of Chicago; and the University of Warwick.

[56] The institutions of the nine submissions to the RFEI that employees of NYCEDC found most attractive were: CMU with Steiner Studios; Columbia with the City University of New York; the Cooper Union; Cornell; Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology; NYU with CMU, the City University of New York, the University of Toronto, and IBM; Purdue University; Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute; and Stanford.

That said, Applied Sciences NYC was "on track," as employees of NYCEDC conveyed in the executive summary of the 30 March 2011 mayoral briefing: The numerous responses to the RFEI for the Applied Sciences NYC competition had validated the initiative and had given employees of NYCEDC a better understanding of the characteristics of a higher education institution in the technology sciences in New York City that universities would propose and find attractive to construct.

4.2.2 The Request for Proposals

Employees of NYCEDC crafted a RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition based on information that they had gleaned from submissions to the RFEI and in conversations with experts. The Team Robertson internal timeline reads: "Apr–July [2011]: RFEI response evaluation and RFP creation." It continues: "May 13 [2011]: DM Steel and CET team travel to D.C. to meet with Chuck Vest, President of NAE [National Academy of Engineering, and president emeritus of MIT], to discuss key criteria for [the] RFP." A City Hall employee recalled of the meeting with Vest:

> Basically it [the meeting] was 'Hey, you [Vest] ran one of the two best universities focused on these issues [i.e., science, technology, and engineering] in the world.' […] 'What do you think?' He [Vest] talked to us about the rigor and what it [the initiative] needs and who could execute. What we ended up saying was we thought that there were three parameters to selection: What was the project proposed? Who did we think had the ability to execute it? and Who did we think had the ability to fund it? Those were the three vectors of review. Chuck [Vest] helped us think about all those things.

Although, the conversation with Vest is the only conversation with an expert that employees of NYCEDC listed on the timeline, they canvassed various expert opinions in order to inform the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition.

On 18 July 2011, employees of NYCEDC briefed the mayor on the progress of Applied Sciences NYC and their next steps. As was typical, employees of NYCEDC recapitulated, in the PowerPoint slides, the rationale for Applied Sciences NYC, including the number of responses to the RFEI and the projected economic development figures for the initiative. In the slide deck, employees of NYCEDC proposed both selection criteria for the Applied Sciences NYC competition and members of an expert advisory committee. Employees of NYCEDC articulated the selection criteria as: "quality," "academic record," "economic impact," "cost to the city," "community impact," "financials," and "real estate." Employees of NYCEDC proposed an advisory committee of Paul Gray, former provost and dean of engineering at University of California, Berkeley; Alan Patricof, founder and managing director of Greycroft; Kevin Ryan, founder and CEO of Gilt Groupe; and Vest.

Employees of NYCEDC also acknowledged, in the slide deck, the need for $250 million in further assets, in addition to the $100 million that they had already acknowledged as necessary for site infrastructure upgrades. Employees of NYCEDC

stated that respondents required the "provision of minimum site infrastructure," for which $100 million had already been discussed, a "date certain for site availability," for which employees of NYCEDC would need to budget an additional $150 million in order to help facilitate the move of the Goldwater Hospital to Harlem, an "additional contribution of city capital," for which employees of NYCEDC suggested a reserve fund of $85 million, and "zero site acquisition cost," which the aforementioned $150 million would make feasible. Employees of NYCEDC noted on the slide that in addition to the $150 million for the "HHC [Health and Hospitals Corporation] relocation," they required $100 million in "other RFP costs" to total $250 million in "new need." In so doing, employees of NYCEDC also indirectly suggested the possibility of a "silver medalist" in the Applied Sciences NYC competition: As a proposed resolution to respondents' seeking financial contributions in addition to infrastructure upgrades, employees of NYCEDC wrote in the slide deck that they could "provide a reserve of ~$85MM from FY 12-13 ([which] if unneeded, could be for a 'silver medalist' or returned to general fund)."

4.2.2.1 Greater specificity

The RFP, titled "Applied Sciences Facility in New York City: Request for Proposals," was a detailed document with much greater specificity than employees of NYCEDC had conveyed in the RFEI for the Applied Sciences NYC competition. If length is an indicator of detail, the RFEI was 18 pages, whereas the RFP was 163 pages. The RFP contained a letter from the mayor, an executive summary, sections titled "Project Context: the Value of the City," "Project Guidelines," "City Support," "Submission Requirements," "Selection Criteria," "Review & Disposition Process," "Developer Due Diligence," "Q&A / Information Sessions / Site Visits," "Conditions, Terms and Limitations," "How to Submit," and "Further Information," and appendices titled, "Brooklyn Navy Yard, Hospital Campus," "Roosevelt Island, Goldwater Campus," "Governors Island, Development Sites," "Alternate Site," "Economic Development Benefits," "NYCEDC Background Investigation Form," "HireNYC Program Plan," "Doing Business Data Form," "Predevelopment Agreement," "Statement of Agreement," "Conditions, Terms and Limitation," "U.S. News and World Report 2011 Rankings: U.S. Graduate Engineering Schools," "U.S. News & World Report 2011 Ranking: World's Best Engineering and IT Universities," and "Academic Ranking of World Universities: Engineering/Technology and Computer Sciences—2010."

In the RFEI for the Applied Sciences NYC competition, employees of NYCEDC had not indicated a desired square footage for the project beyond offering City-owned sites for the campus ranging from roughly 10 to 70 acres. In the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition, however, employees of NYCEDC made it clear that they sought a large-scale project and provided specifics: "Respondents are encouraged to include a critical mass of development in the First Phase (i.e. at least

250,000 square feet; enough space to support a significant number of faculty and students) and include at least 1,000,000 square feet of development in the Full Build, with a corresponding increase in the number of faculty and students." According to a the slide deck from the 30 March 2011 mayoral briefing, of the nine most feasible and most attractive RFEI submissions, only the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Purdue University, and Stanford submissions met the RFP size criteria.

From the issuing of the RFEI to the issuing of the RFP, employees of NYCEDC also adjusted their preferences regarding respondents. In the RFEI, employees of NYCEDC had welcomed submissions from all institutions. In the RFP, employees of NYCEDC specified that any respondent to the RFEI could respond to the RFP but institutions that did not respond to the RFEI had to rank in the top 50 of the 2011 *U.S. News & World Report* rankings for U.S. graduate engineering schools, in the top 100 of the 2011 *U.S. News & World Report* rankings for engineering and IT universities worldwide, or in the top 100 of the 2010 Academic Ranking for engineering/technology and computer sciences worldwide. In the case of consortia, the lead institution had to fit these criteria. Employees of NYCEDC also did not include the Staten Island Farm Colony as one of the proposed City-owned sites in the RFP. The sites within the Brooklyn Navy Yard, on Roosevelt Island, and on Governors Island and the option to propose an alternate site of the respondents' choosing remained constant from the RFEI to the RFP.

4.2.2.2 The rollout and issuance

On 19 July 2011, employees of NYCEDC issued the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition. The Team Robertson internal timeline reads: "July 19 [2011]: RFP Issuance. MRB hosts breakfast event [at Google] and gives keynote speech at Crain's conference." Employees of NYCEDC listed in an internal document the attendees at the breakfast at Google's Manhattan headquarters: Russell Carson, general partner at Welsh, Carson, Anderson & Stowe; Louis Coletti, president and CEO at the Building Trades Employer's Association; Sam Cooper of Senator Gillibrand's office; Stuart Ellman, co-founder of RRE Ventures; Edward Glaeser, professor of economics at Harvard University; Harry Heymann, chief technology officer at Foursquare; Eric Hippeau, general partner at Lerer Ventures; Charlie Kim, founder and CEO at Next Jump; Michael Laskawy, senior economic advisor to Senator Schumer; Christine Quinn, speaker of the New York City Council; Bruce Ratner, chairman and CEO at Forest City Ratner Companies; Valerie Reidy, principal at Bronx High School of Science; Bill Rudin, vice chairman and CEO at Rudin Management Company; Danny Schultz, co-founder and managing director at DFJ Gotham Ventures; Alfred Spector, vice president for research and global initiatives at Google; Steve Spinola, president of the Real Estate Board of New York; Marc Tessier-Lavigne, president at the

Rockefeller University; Jed Walentas, vice president at Two Trees Management Company; Ellen West, director of global communications and public affairs at Google; Sandra Wilkin, president emeritus at the Women Builders Council; and Mortimer Zuckerman, co-founder and board chairman at Boston Properties.

Later that day, the mayor attended the conference "Future of New York City," hosted by newspaper *Crain's New York Business*. The mayor, in his prepared remarks, recapitulated his long-term vision for New York City and announced the release of the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition. The text of the prepared remarks reads:

> This morning, we released a request for proposals to universities near and far. Our offer is straightforward: We will provide prime New York City real estate—at virtually no cost, plus up to $100 million in infrastructure upgrades, in exchange for a university's commitment to build or expand a world-class science and engineering campus here in our city. We are offering sites at three possible locations, all of them under-utilized, and all of them overflowing with potential: Governors Island; the Navy Yard; and Roosevelt Island.

The mayor lamented that New York City is not the "world capital of technology start-ups," bestowing Silicon Valley with that title, but praised New York City for passing Boston in 2010 to "become the second largest recipient of venture capital funding for technology start-ups." The text of the prepared remarks concludes by championing Applied Sciences NYC: "But we know that until we do more to attract world-class engineers and scientists, there will be barriers here [in New York City] that lead entrepreneurs and investors elsewhere and that block out the jobs of tomorrow we need to remain the world's greatest city." With these remarks on 19 July 2011, Bloomberg publicly embraced the specifications of the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition.

4.2.3 Resistance or lack thereof

In my interviews, multiple sources recalled the Applied Sciences NYC competition as an initiative of little resistance. A City Hall employee recalled:

> It is funny when you get into these projects. [In this instance] no one was against us. Everyone said, 'I'd like to help!' Sometimes you work on projects where everyone wants to help, and other times no one wants to help, but it [Applied Sciences NYC] was one of those projects—and I have had both kinds in life—where everyone wanted to help. You would call someone and say, 'Hi, do you have a second? Can I talk to you about this [initiative]?' and everyone would say, 'Yeah, come see me!'

An employee of NYCEDC recalled: "I do not think there was a lot of dissent. I think we uncovered something, or put into words something, that everyone was thinking. I do not remember hearing about anyone who said it was a terrible idea or 'that is not what we need.' There might have been people that said different ideas in terms of what we would do for a Game Changer." I argue that the Applied Sciences NYC competition, however, had a set of skeptics and naysayers—in addition to the

employees of the New York City OMB and the president and CEO of the Trust for Governors Island—whom we ought to explore.

4.2.3.1 Existing New York City higher education institutions

University leaders at existing New York City institutions—i.e., Columbia and NYU in particular—posed opposition to the Applied Sciences NYC competition: Existing local institutions would have preferred that New York City governmental officials give them funds directly without opening up the competition to other institutions. A City Hall employee recalled:

> I had one week of meanness from NYU and Columbia where they were furious. They felt that [someone] had promised that it [the award] would be given to them, and they were really angry. But it lasted about a week, and they realized that there was no outcome from their anger; they were not going to change anything. […] [They would say] 'so, this is crazy. Let me get this straight. You are going to take taxpayer money and give it to someone who is not in New York to come to New York, when you could just give it to me? So, explain to me that these places have, in some cases, tens of millions in endowments, why do they need our money? You should just give it to me. That is a misapplication of taxpayer dough.'

Despite this pervading sentiment among local university leaders, at least one also came to acknowledge a benefit of Applied Sciences NYC. Another City Hall employee recalled:

> I will never forget, as long as I live, when…Lee Bollinger [president of Columbia] stood up [during one of the Game Changers workshops] and said, 'The most important thing for Columbia's future successes, and to be as competitive as we can, is that NYU needs to be more competitive.' […] He said, 'No, no, we need to grow the system here. We need to be a better popular place like MIT and Harvard, like Stanford and Cal. We need to do more to make first-class educational institutions here that we can use to nurture and recruit. It is not the best students, really; it is the best faculty, to bring the best ideas and, then, derivatively come the students.'

4.2.3.2 The Roosevelt Island community

Members of Roosevelt Island community groups also were concerned about constructing the Applied Sciences NYC campus on Roosevelt Island.[57] The particular legal standing of Roosevelt Island made these concerns more intricate. New York City leased Roosevelt Island to New York State's Urban Development Corporation

[57] I note that, particularly during the Uniform Land Use Review Procedure (ULURP), a mandatory public review process associated with land use and zoning, the narrative of participation of Roosevelt Island community groups may be different. I place aside that discussion, however, since the proceedings around ULURP began after December 2011. A community leader on Roosevelt Island recalled:

> Initially what happened was there was a lot of confusion, as with anything, and, when you are trying to do something like this, it is extremely difficult because all the different groups on the Island, it is very hard to round them all together. I think, at some point, one of the things that helped was this land use process [ULURP] came into place, and it was like whether we agree on anything at all, we agree we need to review this. I think that is when it started to come together. […] That is when RICC [the Roosevelt Island Community Coalition] came together very nicely.

for 99 years in 1969. The Roosevelt Island Operation Corporation (RIOC), a New York State public benefit corporation, oversees the operation, maintenance, and development of Roosevelt Island. Roosevelt Island property owners pay taxes for RIOC services. RIOC provides, for example, a public safety department and a waste disposal system for the 11,661 people, according to the 2010 U.S. Census, living on Roosevelt Island. A governmental representative of Roosevelt Island recalled: "Roosevelt Island is this very unique community. I used to joke that it was 10% of my district, but 90% of my time. The residents there were very concerned about how this [the Applied Sciences NYC competition] was going to change the shape of Roosevelt Island." The same governmental representative of Roosevelt Island recalled:

> I do not think there was ever unequivocal support on the Island for it [the Applied Sciences NYC campus on Roosevelt Island]. I think they were always looking at something with a side-eye. So many projects on the Island had been built without community input. There was a feeling they [residents] were going to get screwed once again and they were very concerned that this was going to be something completely separate [from the existing community].

Shortly after the issuing of the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition in July 2011, Jeffrey Escobar, president of the Roosevelt Island Residents Association (RIRA), and others formulated the idea for a community group, which cycled through many names but was referred to in its early days as the Silicon Island group and, finally, as the Roosevelt Island Community Coalition (RICC). The original vision for the community group was to unite disparate community groups on Roosevelt Island in order to achieve a community benefits agreement regarding the construction of a higher education institution in the technology sciences on Roosevelt Island. A community leader on Roosevelt Island recalled:

> It [the formation of what finally came to be known as RICC] was out of the recommendation of myself at the Roosevelt Island [Residents] Association and from the outgrowth of a subcommittee that existed within the residents association, which basically was charged with the development of the project and dealing with Cornell. At that point in time, I was a member of the subcommittee, and the subcommittee held a talk about the public benefit agreement and the advantages of leveraging communities for purposes of achieving certain benefits for the public and community at large. What I thought was important was having an agreement being binding and enforceable. In a public benefit agreement, you cannot just be a discrete group of the community; you have to be representative or be a coalition that is representative across the board of all stakeholders, or at least show you have made an outreach [to them]. […] It [RICC] is truly comprised of every plausible organization on the Island. It is up to them to continue to participate and to send a representative to the coalition meetings, but I think, at the outset, there was over like 50 representatives who were actively part of the initial grouping of the coalition.

The concerns of members of the Roosevelt Island community were varied; among them, a community leader on Roosevelt Island recalled: "We were asking for a bunch of different things. We were asking for air monitoring, a construction task

force, the school to be adopted with the coding program. We were asking for programs with the seniors."

The community group, however, had numerous difficulties. For one, members did not agree on the intent of the group. The community group originally involved community leaders from Queens, in addition to those on Roosevelt Island, but their ambitions were misaligned. The same community leader on Roosevelt Island as quoted just prior recalled:

> So, it was sort of confusing in the beginning because we did not really know what we were going to do. I believe at one time we were going to work with Jukay Hsu. […] But he was at Coalition for Queens. At the time, he was competing to get the university in Queens. […] We were going to try and combine forces and, then, we decided that was not the best. What I wanted was different communities [involved in the coalition], but Queens was this enormous thing and Roosevelt was this tiny thing. It was hard enough to round this up together […] Queens has certain interests and Roosevelt Island has certain interests, so it is kind of difficult. He [Hsu] wanted to do something more tech-oriented, and we were more trying to do something more for our community. That is why we shifted [away from a coalition with community leaders from Queens].

The community group came to involve only community leaders from Roosevelt Island; however, it was still disorganized: Community leaders on Roosevelt Island had different priorities. A governmental representative of Roosevelt Island recalled:

> They [members of RICC] were not well organized, no. The one thing the community was not was well-organized. They put together this working group to make demands. […] And one of the things that was not clear was: 'what is your number one demand?' […] When you talk[ed] to different people within this working group, they would tell you different things were their number one demand, and that was one of the problems, and that is probably why they did not get as much for Roosevelt Island. They did not have a unified voice.

Members of RICC also lacked urgency to organize around their concerns regarding the Applied Sciences NYC campus. The inclusion, in the RFEI and RFP, of many possible sites for the Applied Sciences NYC campus may have delayed and weakened Roosevelt Island community members' organizing efforts. A community leader on Roosevelt Island recalled:

> We [members of RICC] were sort of like this like this little bell that was ringing and no one could really hear us. […] I think most of the time it was a real long shot that we were getting picked for the site. I think the consensus was that the Brooklyn Navy Yard was probably the best in everybody's mind. Roosevelt Island was like…it does not make any sense. […] But I think in the beginning, because I was very excited about this [possibility of the Applied Sciences NYC campus on Roosevelt Island], I think most people said to me, 'It is not going to happen. Why are you even trying to do anything?'

Further, another community leader on Roosevelt Island recalled:

> I think people really just saw it [the Applied Sciences NYC campus] as a benevolent project coming in. It was not going to be that huge [they thought]. The Island continues to change economically and socially [they thought]. Having a major

> university attached to the Island was something a lot of people thought was good. I think a lot of the old timers really encouraged it not thinking fully what that truly means. There is a lot of greatness and pride, I think, they have, and any type of attention the Island gets they are all about it. As time progressed, people started realizing who the players were and how large of a project this was going to be. At that point, people really started to backtrack, but, by then, it was too late.

Yet, another community leader on Roosevelt Island recalled:

> And why did we not think of [organizing earlier]? I think, first of all, we did not know that Roosevelt Island was going to win. That was a whole process in itself. They were thinking of here; they were thinking of Brooklyn. So, they had places to choose from and they finally chose Roosevelt Island. It did not happen right away, and we kind of put it behind us. There were other things going on in the community that we were thinking of. I think it was only when Roosevelt Island was chosen [on 19 December 2011] that we started actually saying, 'Oh no. We have to find out what is going on.'

Additionally, in comparison to other possible future uses of the Goldwater Hospital campus, a higher education institution in the technology sciences may have appeared benign to residents on Roosevelt Island. A community leader on Roosevelt Island recalled:

> Everyone was concerned it [the Goldwater Hospital campus] was going to become this huge luxury high-rise where you had people commuting out of the Island. Because of that, it [the Applied Sciences NYC campus] was a no brainer. You had very few people…there were some people that did have a concern with it. For the most part, the majority of people were for it. That was not too difficult. Everybody saw this as our chance to choose what happens when the hospital is gone, what replaces it.

Finally, governmental representatives of Roosevelt Island voiced support for Applied Sciences NYC and may not have prioritized community concerns. On 12 April 2011, members of RIOC sent a letter—signed by Leslie Torres, president and CEO, and Jonathan Kalkin, chair of the real estate development advisory committee and member of the Board of Directors—to Pinsky and copied to Eugene Lee, senior policy advisor to Steel, in order to express their support for Applied Sciences NYC and the inclusion of Roosevelt Island as a potential site for the campus and to convey their eagerness to work with employees of NYCEDC on the initiative. The letter reads: "We are excited at the prospect of a world class research university on Roosevelt Island. […] As this process moves from the idea phase to the planning and development phase, we are eager to work with you to develop a plan that enhances both our community and your university."

Jessica Lappin, the councilperson representing Roosevelt Island, also promoted the Island as the site for the Applied Sciences NYC campus. On 27 July 2011—i.e., eight days after employees of NYCEDC released the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition—Lappin, Assemblyperson Micah Kellner, Congressperson José Serrano, and some Roosevelt Island community members held a press conference at the

Roosevelt Island Tram to voice their support for the construction of the Applied Sciences NYC campus on Roosevelt Island. A governmental representative of Roosevelt Island recalled:

> It did not hurt that councilmember Lappin was all in on this [initiative]. She wanted this as a legacy project too. She was running for [Manhattan] Borough President and thought this would be something really great, to the point where she was making demands in terms of getting subsidies and projects for other areas of Manhattan, thinking it would help her get votes in her race for Borough President.

New York City governmental representatives typically are not intimately involved in such policy decision-making processes until the uniform land use review procedure (ULURP), a mandatory public review process associated with land use and zoning; yet, when she did become involved, Lappin also did not feel it necessary to canvas the opinions of members of the Roosevelt Island community. A community leader on Roosevelt Island recalled: "She [Lappin] was trying to be the brave person who brought Cornell, thinking it was going to be a triumph and not caring [about the Roosevelt Island community]. I do not think she gave a damn about what happened to the community. She just wanted to get them [Cornell] here." A governmental representative of Roosevelt Island recalled the presumption of the community members' positive position regarding an Applied Sciences NYC campus on Roosevelt Island:

> We did not [gauge the community before forming an opinion on Applied Sciences NYC]. We knew that, ultimately, the majority of the community would be supportive of the project. It is not like 'Oh, we are going to put a 60-story building down,' like they are trying to do now on 58th street, on a midblock building, where it is residential tenants and it is in a very active community association. We knew it was not going to be that. We knew this was such a sexy project for the City and would bring so many benefits to Roosevelt Island. […] But…it was a bit of the cart before the horse.

Another governmental representative of Roosevelt Island recalled:

> I do not remember much [community outreach that preceded the decision to support the higher education institution coming to Roosevelt Island]. I am sure, knowing me, I made a couple of calls to some local leaders to both solicit their opinions and inform them of mine. I think this was, to me, something pretty clear-cut how I felt. Sometimes you really genuinely are torn and want to get different perspectives. That was not the case for me. I really felt strongly that this would be a positive thing and I wanted to lead. […] I have had an interest for a long time in trying to diversify the economy of the City. It seemed like an obvious response. […] The other piece of this is just, in a more parochial fact: What do we think there should be here? and What do we not want to have here? […] It was pretty clear the City was starting to think about what they would do with that parcel [i.e., the Goldwater Hospital campus]. So, since this was something I thought was a great idea, that was an aspect of this as well.

Numerous factors contributed to RICC's lack of significant action despite their reservations about, or opposition to, the Applied Sciences NYC competition.

Concern regarding the Applied Sciences NYC competition, therefore, may have been present among various skeptics and naysayers, but it never became loud during. In 2012, after the competition ended, RICC formed officially, with the intention of "advocat[ing] for the health and well being of the Island community and its organizations during the Cornell development."

4.3 Power analysis

In this section, I discuss and analyze the power dynamics in deciding on the specifications of the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition. To do so, I again examine relational power, structural power, and neo-structural power. With regard to relational power, specifically, I investigate the RFEI process. I argue that participants in the RFEI process informed the specifications of the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition. I, therefore, increase my confidence in the hypothesis of pluralist power in deciding on the specifications of the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition.

With regard to neo-structural power, I argue that mayoral agency played a decisive role in deciding on the specifications of the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition. In particular, the Bloombergian definition of economic development again confined the type of participants included in the public forum. I maintain, in this section, that the members of Roosevelt Island community were excluded from proposing ideas for the specifications of the RFP, though again not in language of a neo-Marxist or a dominant coalition theorist. I also observe that the need to compete with other cities confined the range of ideas considered for the specifications of the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition. I thereby increase my confidence in the hypotheses of neo-structural power regarding mayoral agency and structural power regarding public choice in deciding on the specifications of the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition.

4.3.1 Relational power: Learning from respondents to the Request for Expressions of Interest

"Asking them" more accurately describes the processes of employees of NYCEDC in deciding on the specifications of the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition than it did in deciding on a game-changing idea to improve the New York City economy. Employees of NYCEDC again created a public forum for ideas, this time for the specifications of the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition. They again coupled processes of public participation with internal research and data analysis on the specifications of the RFP, yet the ideas generated from the processes of public participation demonstrably informed the policy output. In other words, employees of NYCEDC intended to learn from respondents to the RFEI, and respondents to the RFEI informed the specifications of the RFP for the

Applied Sciences NYC competition. The intention and its execution increase my confidence in the hypothesis of pluralist power in deciding on the specifications of the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition.

In particular, I observed that employees of NYCEDC chose to issue a RFEI, in part, to seek respondents' help in deciding on the specifications for the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition. A member of the Cornell team for the Applied Sciences NYC competition recalled: "They [employees of NYCEDC] did not know going into it where they were going from the RFEI, and [then after the RFEI] they came to the conclusion and, when they did, it was backed up by a real discussion across the industry." Employees of NYCEDC sought advice through the RFEI on the square footage of the higher education campus, its subject-matter focus, and its location, among other specifications. An employee of NYCEDC recalled of the decision not to specify a location:

> So we said, 'Let's let the market decide. Let's find City assets that we own, assets that we control, City assets, and give the market the opportunity to say, 'This is what we want.' […] So we found places we control. The offer also said in the RFEI, 'You can bring your own location.' […] We did not want anyone to say we had just decided, so we decided to let the market decide where they want to go.

A City Hall employee corroborated this intention:

> I do not think it would have made sense for us to have just that one site. We looked at different sites, and the sites that made it onto the list helped to diversify the offering that we had. […] It was this idea again of testing things, putting things out there and seeing how they work and how the market reacts and how institutions would respond. We did not prejudge whether a university should go to Governors [Island] or not. We were just putting information out there about potential sites. Even the language around 'if you have a private site and you want to bring that to us, then that is great,' the whole process of having institutions telling us what they were interested in every way, programmatically, size-wise, site-wise, that was [in keeping with] the general theme of we are not going to be out there forcing, dictating, what an institution should or should not do. We just want them to tell us what they would like to do.

However, some sources disagreed with my argument in my interviews: They did not perceive the public forum for ideas for the campus location to be as open as I argue it was. Some believed that the appearance of openness to ideas for the campus location was politically prudent. An employee of NYCEDC recalled: "It also is important to make sure each borough…had an offering, so it was not just decided it was going to be in Queens. I guess Governors Island was Manhattan. […] We did a five-borough." Although the statement is factually incorrect in that employees of NYCEDC did not include, in the RFEI, a City-owned site in either the Bronx or Queens, the source suggests that politics—and not only the respondents—played a role in deciding on a location for the Applied Sciences NYC campus. A governmental representative of Roosevelt Island goes further in maintaining that the campus location was preordained:

> I was always sure it was going to end up on Roosevelt Island just because of the New York City land use process [ULURP] and the amount of land they controlled there, as well as the fact that the transportation was there, and any university was going to want to be in Manhattan or as close to Manhattan as humanly possible. […] Thirdly, you had a unique situation…in terms of sort of being able to get through different levels of local government because you had an influence, in terms of the Roosevelt Island Operating Corporation, because the mayor has two seats upon it that made Roosevelt Island a unique place where they could rezone very easily. […] There is a large amount of housing that was onsite already built. Also, there were new buildings that were going to be built. You already have a lot of empty units on the Island. All other sites were remote.

I disagree with the critique that the public forum for ideas for the campus location was merely a façade for a pre-established decision. I believe that employees of NYCEDC were open to whatever location the education institutions proposed for the Applied Sciences NYC campus, even if they also knew that only so many sites in New York City would suit the respondents' needs. Employees of NYCEDC readily acknowledged that, at the outset of the initiative, they had specified Governors Island as the location for the Applied Sciences NYC campus. I argue that, when they moved away from the idea of a pre-specified site, employees of NYCEDC genuinely moved toward the idea of a public forum for ideas for the campus location, and they executed on it.

Employees of NYCEDC proposed other specifications, however, in the RFEI, as internal research and data analysis dictated. The language of the RFEI, for example, was open-ended but suggestive regarding programmatic focus: "NYCEDC is particularly interested in development of an Applied Sciences Facility with a strong focus on applied engineering; however, research fields may also include, and are not limited to, environmental science, mathematics, chemistry, physics and computer science." A City Hall employee recalled:

> Purposefully there were two or three decisions [that employees of NYCEDC took in the RFEI] but there was also a lot of open space in terms of how they got filled in. I would say the main ones were: We were going to put in as much as $100 million; we had four different sites we proposed; and we were willing to be technically assisting, and that it [Applied Sciences NYC] was not about biomedical. [Those] were the big things that we had to decide before the RFEI.

The specifications that employees of NYCEDC made in the RFEI were not very strict or numerous. The language of the RFEI emphasized that respondents and employees of NYCEDC were intended to "compete" equally—or even with deference to the respondents—in the public forum for ideas for the specifications of the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition.

Employees of NYCEDC then executed on their intention to "ask them" regarding the specifications of the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition: The language of the RFP demonstrates that employees of NYCEDC learned from the

RFEI processes. The RFP reads: "The response to our Request for Expressions of Interest were outstanding, and the feedback we received helped to shape the contents of this RFP." As an example, employees of NYCEDC included, in the RFEI, the Staten Island Farm Colony as one of its proposed sites for the Applied Sciences NYC campus but excluded it from the list of proposed sites in the RFP after none of the 27 respondents to the RFEI indicated interest in the Staten Island site. A member of the Cornell team for the Applied Sciences NYC competition recalled of a non-specified point in its RFEI submission: "I remember thinking, 'Man, they [employees of NYCEDC] picked up on that [from our RFEI submission]. Now we are really going to have to do it." Another member of the Cornell team recalled:

> Oh, the City learned so much during the RFEI process. The RFEI was written in a way that showed that whoever wrote it did not really know how universities worked. The RFP really tightened up a huge amount of that. […] They did not understand [in the RFEI] the relationships between education and research. […] They did not really understand the role of private philanthropy and how universities operate. They did not really understand that universities lose money on everything. […] It [the RFEI] was written very much like they were going to be dealing with a for-profit business: that if they increased their activity, they would make more profit and have money to invest in something new, and that is just not the financial model of universities at all. […] I think spending time with a bunch of top institutions, they pretty quickly caught onto the issues that were pretty universal.

As I observed, other industry experts also influenced the language of the RFP. A member of the advisory committee of the Applied Sciences NYC competition recalled: "Much of the RFP represented my advice and, I am sure, advice from many other folks." Employees of NYCEDC had given power to participants in deciding on the specifications of the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition.

4.3.2 (Neo-)structural power: Confining the range of ideas considered and type of participants included

I argue that a neo-structural power dynamic in deciding on the specifications of the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition, however, confined the type of participants included in the public forum. More specifically, mayoral agency—particularly the Bloombergian definition of economic development—again played a decisive role in the public policy decision-making processes. I also argue that the need to compete with other cities confined the range of ideas considered for the specifications of the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition. In this subsection, I substantiate both arguments.

4.3.2.1 Mayor Bloomberg's definition of economic development


Employees of NYCEDC did not invite all to participate in the public forum for ideas for the specifications of the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition. They invited participants in accordance with the mayor's definition of economic development. More particularly, employees of NYCEDC wanted input on the

specifications of the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition only from those whom they wished to participate in the Applied Sciences NYC competition. A City Hall employee recalled:

> Applied Sciences, the RFEI was [a question of], 'Is the academic community interested in doing something really big in New York?' That was the market we were most interested in. Everything else—corporates and other stakeholders and other academics—were all things we could figure out later. But, would a university president, would a university board, be interested in making a large-scale investment in New York? That was the market that we were testing.

Employees of NYCEDC alternatively could have asked in the RFEI: What ideas does the community, broadly defined, have for a higher education institution in the technology sciences in New York City? Such a question would have involved a broader group of participants in the public forum for deciding on the specifications of the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition. Instead, NYCEDC invited the participation of only university leaders and other industry experts in deciding on the specifications of the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition.

Figure 3: The pathway for deciding on the proposal specifications for the Applied Sciences NYC competition



Employees of NYCEDC did not invite the participation of the members of the Roosevelt Island community, again in accordance with a Bloombergian understanding of economic development. Roosevelt Island was the site proposal of the frontrunner respondents—i.e., Cornell and Stanford—to the RFEI for the Applied Sciences NYC competition. That is to say, New York City governmental officials must have surmised in Spring 2011 that the Applied Sciences NYC campus would be located on Roosevelt Island with a very high likelihood, regardless of the institutional victor. An employee of NYCEDC recalled: "Roosevelt Island was a clear winner [from the RFEI responses]." Yet, New York City governmental officials did not include Roosevelt Island governmental representatives or community groups, people on whom the Applied Sciences NYC campus would have a direct impact, in the public forum for ideas for the specifications of the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition.

In my interviews, community leaders on the Roosevelt Island recalled finding out about Applied Sciences NYC no earlier than when employees of NYCEDC issued the RFEI and, in many instances, not until employees of NYCEDC issued the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition. By the time they found out about the initiative, they had been excluded from participating in the public forum for ideas for the specifications of the RFP. A community leader on Roosevelt Island recalled: "The first [time hearing about Applied Sciences NYC] was from the Bloomberg administration's announcing its intent to bring applied sciences to the City and, of course, Roosevelt Island when it was named. […] We had not even realized the Island was up to that point." Another community leader on Roosevelt Island recalled:

> I know exactly when that [finding out about Applied Sciences NYC] happened. Jessica Lappin asked me to show up somewhere. She did that, asking people in the community that she knew to show up at places for press conference. She asked me to come for a press conference. So, I came for a press conference. Surprise! The press conference [on 27 July 2011] was: We want the City to build on Roosevelt Island.

Another community leader on Roosevelt Island recalled: "We have said among ourselves so many times that everything we did was reactive. We got on the job so late. […] We were constantly pushing against what Cornell had already envisioned." Another community leader on Roosevelt Island recalled: "We found out [about the Applied Sciences NYC competition] after the fact [after the RFEI had been issued] so it had already [been written]. As you know, it was a shortened competition, really quick considering all the stuff that happened." The language of the RFP corroborates the feeling of an afterthought: "Roosevelt Island is a relatively low-density area—about two-thirds are devoted to open space. The business community resembles a small town, with most commercial activity located on the main street. Businesses are mostly neighborhood services."

As I observed in section 4.2.3.2, community leaders on Roosevelt Island also did not play a role in deciding on the specifications for the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition for multiple reasons in addition to the fact that the mayor's definition of economic development confined the type of participants included in the public forum to industry experts: The primary goals of the Roosevelt Island community were not well-articulated; organizing efforts lacked urgency; and governmental representatives of Roosevelt Island may not have prioritized community concerns. As a result, employees of NYCEDC did not alter its lack of prioritization of members of the Roosevelt Island community in deciding on the specifications of the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition. The concerns of community leaders on Roosevelt Island were largely unheard and unincorporated in deciding on the specifications of the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition.

4.3.2.2 Structural and other neo-structural power dynamics

Mayoral agency confined the type of participants included in the public forum for ideas for the specifications of the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition predominately to university leaders and other industry experts. My observations, however, decrease my confidence in the hypotheses of neo-Marxist structural power and dominant-coalition neo-structural power in these policy decision-making processes. As before, the mayor's definition of economic development—not a classist compulsion, as a neo-Marxist theorist would argue, or an acknowledgement of the mayor's political electoral base and his economic environment, as a dominant coalition theorist would argue—confined the type of participants included in the public forum.

Employees of NYCEDC, however, took into consideration, in their research and data analysis, case studies of university expansion projects in other cities. In other words, the perceived need to compete with other cities to attract and retain capital and other resources—as a public choice theorist would argue—confined the range of ideas considered for the specifications of the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition. The PowerPoint presentations to employees of New York City OMB in particular illustrate how the need to compete with other cities informed the research and data analysis of employees of NYCEDC. In the 5 February 2010 PowerPoint presentation to employees of OMB, for example, employees of NYCEDC detailed best practices, common themes, and factors of success among nine primary case studies and five back-up ones. I also observed that employees of NYCEDC developed case studies for a 31 March 2010 PowerPoint presentation to employees of OMB, and the case studies in a September 2010 slide deck were explicitly "to inform potential phase 1 development."

In particular, the need to compete with other cities confined the range of fields considered within Applied Sciences, square footage considerations for the higher education institution, and the range of permissible respondents to the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition. I observed, for example, that employees of NYCEDC defined, in the 5 February 2010 PowerPoint presentation, what aspects of STEM they did and did not consider advantageous for the New York City economy, ostensibly taking into account the comparative advantages of New York City relative to other cities. In the 5 October 2010 Steel briefing, employees of NYCEDC made explicit their intention to confine the range of permissible specifications in the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition in relation to competitor cities, particularly the "Boston Benchmark." For example, they compared the top engineering program in New York City (i.e., Columbia, ranked 18 according to *U.S. News & World Report*) to the top engineering program in Boston (i.e., MIT, ranked two according to the same report). The slide also reads regarding the square footage

of the proposed campus: "As a first step on this journey [to meeting the Boston Benchmark in applied sciences by 2030] we recommend a commitment to creating an applied sciences campus comprised of one or many institutions in NYC, by launching an international $50M New York City Challenge (RFEI) to develop Phase I (~300K-1M SF)." In other words, despite a broader range of square-footage proposals from respondents to the RFEI, employees of NYCEDC confined the range of permissible sizing specifications in the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition such that the policy output would make New York City competitive with other cities in the technology sciences.

Finally, employees of NYCEDC confined the set of permissible respondents to the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition such that the New York City economy would stand a chance of being competitive in technology and engineering with other cities as a result of Applied Sciences NYC. Employees of NYCEDC had not confined the set of respondents in the RFEI for the Applied Sciences NYC competition. In the RFP, however, employees of NYCEDC acknowledged that they sought high-caliber institutions: institutions in the top 50 of the 2011 *U.S. News & World Report* rankings for U.S. graduate engineering schools, in the top 100 of the 2011 *U.S. News & World Report* rankings for engineering and IT universities worldwide, or in the top 100 of the 2010 Academic Ranking for engineering/technology and computer sciences worldwide.

Bloomberg reinforced the perception of a need to compete with other cities in his prepared remarks at the 19 July 2010 *Crain's* conference at which he announced the issuing of the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition: "But we know that until we do more to attract world-class engineers and scientists, there will be barriers here [in New York City] that lead entrepreneurs and investors elsewhere and that block out the jobs of tomorrow we need to remain the world's greatest city." Employees of NYCEDC, thereby, gave university leaders and other industry experts power in the public forum for deciding on the specifications of the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition but also used internal research and data analysis, which recognized the need to compete with other cities, to inform their policy decision-making. I, therefore, increase my confidence in the hypothesis of structural power regarding public choice in deciding on the specifications of the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition.

4.4 Conclusion

I have discussed and analyzed the power dynamics in deciding on the specifications of the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition. The RFEI processes increased my confidence in the hypothesis of pluralist power in deciding on the specifications of the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition: Participants in the processes

of public participation informed the policy outcome. I also recognized the decisive role of the mayor's definition of economic development in confining the type of participants included in the public forum for ideas for the specifications of the RFP to university leaders and other industry experts at the expense, most notably, of community leaders on Roosevelt Island. I thereby increased my confidence in the hypothesis of neo-structural power regarding mayoral agency in deciding on the specifications of the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition. Finally, I increased my confidence in the hypothesis of structural power regarding public choice and decreased my confidence in the hypotheses of neo-Marxist structural power and dominant-coalition neo-structural power in deciding on the specifications of the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition.

5. Deciding on the primary award for the Applied Sciences NYC competition

We move finally to delineating the narrative of the selection processes in Applied Sciences NYC and to my discussion and analysis of the power dynamics in deciding on the primary award for the Applied Sciences NYC competition. I continue to test my hypotheses for the power dynamics in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC via their observable implications, make arguments for whether the case of Applied Sciences NYC increases or decreases my confidence in the literature on the corresponding theories of power, and add to the literature by proposing factors that played a decisive role in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC. Again, I begin the chapter with a discussion of an interim period, this time the response period for the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition. These interstitial events may also be relevant to understanding power dynamics in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC.

5.1 July–October 2011: The response period for the Request for Proposals

During the RFP response period from mid-July to the end of October 2011, employees of NYCEDC executed a public affairs strategy for Applied Sciences NYC. In a mayoral briefing PowerPoint from 18 July 2011, employees of NYCEDC suggested that the mayor send out letters on 20 July 2011 to "RFEI respondents & top schools," ostensibly to encourage their submissions to the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition. Employees of NYCEDC also noted, on the same slide, that, from 19-31 July 2011, they would engage in "follow-up calls & outreach to schools" and, from July to September 2011, in "local & national media outreach." In an internal document with the heading "Applied Sciences NYC Strategic Plan," employees of NYCEDC detailed "critical milestones" for the Applied Sciences NYC strategic plan to occur from 17 July to 31 December 2011 and who would be responsible for achieving them. Employees of NYCEDC categorized the milestones according to "mayoral involvement," "ed [editorial] boards," "local vs. int'l coverage," "expand and diversify private sector coalition," "surrogate activation," "meetings & briefings," "social media community," and "key events & conferences" and sub-items related to local and national radio, television, print press, interviews, and op-eds. Employees of NYCEDC also included other sub-items that targeted specific individuals for "surrogate activation" or "meetings and briefings."[58] An

[58] The individuals listed on the internal document included: Ken Adams, Empire State Development Corporation; Robert Atkinson, Information Technology and Innovation Foundation; Gale Brewer, New York City councilmember; Daniel Garodnick, New York City councilmember; Gillibrand; Mark Heesen, the National Venture Capital Association; Bruce Katz, Brookings Institute; Micah Kellner,

employee of NYCEDC recalled: "Euan [Robertson] and his team [SPLAN] did a huge amount of word-of-mouth…type work: calling people, having meetings about the project, explaining what we were trying to accomplish."

During the RFP response period, employees of City Hall and employees of NYCEDC also coordinated agencies within New York City government regarding Applied Sciences NYC. The Team Robertson internal timeline reads "Oct 3 [2011]: DM Steel chairs briefing with NYC Commissioners on project details." In the meeting's PowerPoint presentation, Steel emphasized the need for "significant inter-agency cooperation" in order to meet the "accelerated timeframe" for the commencement of building by the end of 2013.[59] Steel discussed the "requested assistance and timing" for each relevant agency at each of the three City-owned locations offered in the RFP but focused in particular on the potential need to move the Goldwater Hospital campus on Roosevelt Island. Steel ended the presentation by asking that "each agency designat[e] a point person on Applied Sciences" and by informing the agency representatives that "City Hall [would] convene [a] meeting of point people monthly" and "[NYC]EDC [would] provide monthly status updates to commissioners." In so doing, Steel signaled the high priority that he had placed on Applied Sciences NYC.

Concurrently, from July to October 2011, university teams for the Applied Sciences NYC competition formulated their RFP submissions. Sources recalled Cornell's and Stanford's partnership announcements and Cornell's alumni support campaign as key moments over the course of the RPF response period. Employees of NYCEDC had encouraged partnerships via the language of the RFP. Additionally, I argue that it must have been evident to both Cornell and Stanford that their competitive disadvantages relative to each other were Cornell's lack of highly regarded technology and engineering program and Stanford's lack of knowledge of, and experience in, New York City and New York State. On 11 October 2011, therefore, Stanford announced a partnership with CCNY. A week later, on 18 October 2011, Cornell announced a partnership with the Technion. A member of the Cornell team for the Applied Sciences NYC competition recalled: "One of the interesting and important aspects, I think, to the process that happened between the RFEI [submission] and the RFP [submission] was us forming a partnership with Technion."

New York State assemblyperson; Karen Koslowitz, New York City councilmember; Gary LaBarbera, Building and Construction Trades Council of Greater New York; Lappin; Joseph Lentol, New York State assemblyperson; Stephen Levin, New York City councilmember; Carolyn Maloney, U.S. congressperson; Marty Markowitz, Brooklyn borough president; Helen Marshall, Queens borough president; Christine Quinn, speaker of the New York City Council; Ydanis Rodriguez, New York City councilmember; Bill Rudin, Association for a Better New York, Schumer; Nydia Velázquez, U.S. congressperson; James Van Bramer, New York City councilmember; and Wylde.

[59] The end of Bloomberg's term-limited mayoralty was 31 December 2013.

Many others, internal and external to the Cornell team, agreed with this assessment in my interviews.

Additionally, two Cornell alumni took the initiative to circulate a signature campaign to signal alumni support for the proposed campus in New York City. A member of the advisory committee of the Applied Sciences NYC competition recalled: "I give the alumni of Cornell and Technion a lot of credit too. They put on a campaign to beat the band." A member of the Cornell team for the Applied Sciences NYC competition recalled:

> There was a lot of cheerleading and emotional support [from Cornell alumni]. The Cornell living alumni pool is around 260,000 and about 20% of them roughly live in New York City or the greater metro area. That is a lot of people. That number alone does not indicate the strength of the alumni pool because of the connections they have, the prominence of some members, like any Ivy League school. Once having found out about our decision to compete with Technion, the alumni were—I think the most appropriate description would be—insufferable. I remember being at a dinner where I was at a table with Bob Steel and I happened to be sitting next to him, and he said something to the effect, 'Can we just agree tonight we are not going to talk about this competition, just have dinner, and enjoy ourselves.' I said, 'Yes, that is totally fine with me.' Minutes after that had happened, a prominent Cornell alumn[us] came up, threw his arm around Steel, right in front of me, and said, 'Do you know we have a competitive program for this [competition]? We are going to apply for this.'

By 28 October 2011—the deadline for submitting responses to the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition—employees of NYCEDC had received seven submissions. Bloomberg held a press conference on 31 October 2011 at Next Jump, a technology company in New York City, to announce the respondents: Amity University; CMU with Steiner Studios; Columbia; Cornell with the Technion; NYU with the University of Toronto, the University of Warwick, the Indian Institute of Technology, the City University of New York, and CMU; the New York Genome Center with the Mount Sinai School of Medicine, the Rockefeller University, and SUNY Stony Brook; and Stanford with CCNY.

In my interviews, multiple sources recalled Stanford as the clear frontrunner, from the beginning of the Applied Sciences NYC competition, in what essentially amounted to a two-horse race between Cornell and Stanford. A member of the advisory committee of the Applied Sciences NYC competition recalled: "It was Stanford's to lose that competition because Stanford symbolized instant gratification for those that wanted to see New York turn into Silicon Alley truly." A member of the Cornell team for the Applied Sciences NYC competition recalled:

> [From the beginning] it really seemed like the City was pretty happy about Stanford and that everything was really intended to...while I knew from my time in the City it does not work this way and it is not like the whole thing was set up to get Stanford

> here, but they had such an advantage. The mayor seemed really focused on Stanford; there was a lot of talk about Stanford; so, it was just all-Stanford all the time.

An employee of NYCEDC recalled of the RFP submissions: "I think what made people marginally more excited about Stanford was the 'net-newness.' You were truly pulling something from the West Coast. The symbolism of pulling something from the West Coast to New York City, the tidal shift…as opposed to another great school [Cornell] that was sort of already in New York [made people excited]." That said, an employee of NYCEDC and a member of RETS recalled: "I think that article [in *The New Yorker*] made it seem like it was Stanford; it had to be Stanford. I never felt that. No one ever said to me, 'We want you to pick these people or anything.' It was a very fair process."

5.2 November–December 2011: The selection process

The selection process for the Applied Sciences NYC competition took nearly two months, although it was expected to take longer, as the Office of the Mayor revealed in its 31 October 2011 press release. The Team Robertson internal timeline reads: "[October]–Dec [2011]: document review, interviews with respondents, negotiations, and selection." Employees of NYCEDC relied on an advisory committee, a selection committee, in-person interviews with a shortlist of the RFP respondents, and parallel negotiations, also with a shortlist of the RFP respondents, in order to grant the primary award for the Applied Sciences NYC competition. In this section, therefore, I continue the chronological account of Applied Sciences NYC in order to understand how and by whom the winner of the competition was selected.

5.2.1 The advisory committee

Members of Team Robertson listed two meetings for the advisory committee on their internal timeline: "Nov 10 [2011]: 1st meeting of Advisory Committee" and "Dec 13 [2011]: 2nd meeting of Advisory Committee."[60] In the 18 July 2011 PowerPoint presentation for a mayoral briefing, employees of NYCEDC had listed Grey, Patricof, Ryan, and Vest as members of the advisory committee. In the 19 July 2011 PowerPoint presentation for the breakfast at Google at which the mayor announced the issuing of the RPF, employees of NYCEDC included on the advisory committee: Mark Burstein, executive vice president of Princeton University; Charlie Kim, founder and CEO of Next Jump; Joseph McShane, president of Fordham University; Parag Saxena, CEO of Vendanta Capital and New Silk Route; and Wylde in addition to Grey, Patricof, Ryan, and Vest. The Office of the Mayor issued a press

[60] Beyond information deduced from the Team Robertson internal timeline, I am not certain that the 13 December 2011 meeting actually happened. It is possible that the accelerated timeline for granting the primary award for the Applied Sciences NYC competition—precipitated by the Stanford withdrawal, as I discuss in subsection 5.2.4—altered the planned sequence of meetings for the advisory committee and, possibly, for the selection committee too.

release on 31 October 2011 that included an 11-member advisory committee comprised of the aforementioned nine members and Greg Gunn, Entrepreneur in Residence at City Light Capital, and Duncan Niederauer, CEO and director of NYSE Euronext.

Some members of the advisory committee have a more fluid or low-impact conception of their participation in the Applied Sciences NYC competition than employees of NYCEDC and the Team Robertson internal timeline suggest. A member of the advisory committee of the Applied Sciences NYC competition recalled: "They [employees of NYCEDC] just called me up after a series of conversations—I may have had like a dozen conversations like that—and, then, they said, 'We are going to go into the RFP process and would you be willing to be on the advisory committee?' Another member of the advisory committee of the Applied Sciences NYC competition recalled of the duties:

> It [the involvement of the advisory committee] was pretty limited. There were two or three meetings of the group to review. The City screened the initial applications and presented their findings, and the group commented. […] It was not an intensive process. It was getting briefed, giving our two cents on the applications that [NYC]EDC thought were the strongest. [It] ended up that it was pretty clear that Stanford's and Cornell's applications were relatively strong.

The agenda, according to the PowerPoint presentation, for the two-hour advisory committee meeting on 10 November 2011 at Fordham University was: "arrival and dinner seating," "opening remarks: Robert K Steel," "agenda & introductions: Seth W. Pinsky," "overview of responses and pre-poll: Euan Robertson," "moderated discussion: Seth W. Pinsky," and "synthesis & conclusion: Euan Robertson." Employees of NYCEDC revealed, in the PowerPoint presentation, insights into the selection criteria—i.e., "academic program," "feasibility and speed of implementation," "relationship to the community and entrepreneurial ecosystem," and "economic development potential for NYC"—on which they had evaluated the submissions. In the PowerPoint presentation, employees of NYCEDC also included charts of the results of the pre-polling of the advisory committee on each criterion, in addition to a chart on whether to recommend the submission for short-listing for the Applied Sciences NYC competition. The four charts of the selection criteria lacked units but plotted the "average response" on a scale from "very strong" to "very weak" for each submission. In terms of academic program, Stanford and CCNY ranked first, with Cornell and the Technion behind them. In terms of feasibility and speed of implementation, Cornell and the Technion ranked first, with Columbia second and Stanford and CCNY third. In terms of relationship to the community and entrepreneurial ecosystem, Columbia and Stanford and CCNY tied for first, with Cornell and the Technion in second. In terms of the economic

development potential for New York City, Stanford and CCNY ranked first, with Cornell and the Technion ranked second.

Overall, 11 out of 11 advisory committee members recommended for short-listing Cornell and the Technion and Stanford and CCNY, seven members did so for Columbia, five for NYU and its consortium, one for CMU and Steiner Studios, and zero for both Amity University and the New York Genome Center and its consortium. In my interviews, multiple members of the advisory committee recalled Stanford as a favorite in the discussion portion of the advisory committee meeting. A member of the advisory committee of the Applied Sciences NYC competition recalled: "And, then, we got to the meat of the conversation, which was Stanford and Cornell-Technion." The same member of the advisory committee recalled: "I think we left the conversation, at least I left the conversation, expecting that, if Stanford could better understand the constraints of the City, that they would [be] the selected proposer." Another member of the advisory committee of the Applied Sciences NYC competition recalled:

> I remember walking away from that [advisory committee] meeting thinking that Stanford was the clear choice. I do not think, or I do not recall, that we did anything like take a vote. I do not recall that, but I do recall walking out thinking that the vast majority of opinions that were expressed, that were strong, were in favor of Stanford. But I do recall that there was some that favored Cornell.

5.2.2 The selection committee

The Team Robertson internal timeline reads with regard to the selection committee: "Nov 11 [2011]: 1st meeting of Selection Committee" and "Dec 6 [2011]: 2nd meeting of Selection Committee."[61] An employee of NYCEDC recalled: "We basically spent the weekend [after we received the submissions] in the office reading the RFPs and putting together summary sheets. […] Part of our job [was] enabling other people [the selection committee] to do the judging, which means helping them to compare across different proposals and effectively giv[ing] them the tools to put their thinking caps on." The same employee of NYCEDC continued:

> That [the selection committee] [was] a big crew. There were probably 15 people on it. I do not remember exactly, but we took great pains in assembling the committee to make sure it represented a cross-section of expertise, so both on the programmatic side, which was really the Center for Economic Transformation, on the real-estate side, which was us [members of RETS], on the construction side, which was the Capital team, and on the city planning side, [which was] Tom McKnight and his crew. He played a big role as well, and some of the executive office as well. I think Maria [Torres-Springer] was on the committee too. [It was] a big group and a cross-section so that we would have differing ideas, differing inputs.

The same employee of NYCEDC recalled of the process of the selection committee:

[61] Beyond information deduced from the Team Robertson internal timeline, I am not certain that the 11 November and 6 December selection committee meetings actually happened.

> It was go home, think on your own, form your own opinion. And, then, we would have structured selection committee meetings where we would talk out the proposals, the pros and cons, weaknesses. We would together come up with questions we wanted to go back to people [respondents] on, which was an important part of the process because, any time someone puts something in writing, there is just stuff they forget or as the reader you are like, 'What about this? What about that?' The question and answer process was, [as] on all RFPs but this one especially, really, really important to digging into grey areas to understanding things that were not as clear in the beginning and fill gaps in the proposals.

5.2.3 Interviews

Steel, in conjunction with employees of NYCEDC, also conducted in-person interviews with a shortlist of respondents—i.e., CMU and Steiner Studios, Columbia, Cornell and the Technion, NYU and its consortium, and Stanford and CCNY—to the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition. The Team Robertson internal timeline reads: "Nov 19–Dec 2 [2011]: Interviews with respondents." The same employee of NYCEDC as quoted just prior recalled:

> Those interviews were an important part. The deputy mayor [Steel] was there and Seth [Pinsky] was there. We had 20 people on our side of the table, and the presidents of the universities came. It was a pretty intense and serious process. The interviews were like three hours each. We had scripted questions. We had sent questions in advance that folks were asked to speak to. They were asked to speak to the core criteria of the RFP.

In my interviews, multiple sources called attention to the interview with Cornell and the Technion on 2 December 2011. To close Cornell and the Technion's carefully scripted presentation, David Skorton, president of Cornell, announced a $350 million gift—i.e., sufficient to fund the first phase of Cornell and the Technion's proposal in-full—from Cornell alumnus Charles Feeney via The Atlantic Philanthropies. A member of the Cornell team for the Applied Sciences NYC competition recalled:

> At the very end of the presentation—it was about as dramatic a moment as I have ever seen in a presentation—David Skorton came back and just said, 'One more thing—30 seconds.' And he, then, told the group that yesterday or the day before he was authorized by an anonymous donor [Feeney] to mention at this presentation that he was going to contribute $350 million for the first phase of the project. And 30 jaws dropped; I watched every single face on the other side, and every single one of them [was] in a state of shock, because the first phase was fully funded.

The same member of the Cornell team recalled, putting the gift into context: "So, I think, there was a sense—at least that is what I have heard in retrospect—that Cornell did want [to win] this thing and was prepared to do what it took in order to get it. […] So that combined with the $350 million gift made it pretty clear that we were the right party, combined with the third element, an amazing proposal."

5.2.4 Stanford University's withdrawal and the aftermath

Employees of NYCEDC conducted the selection process by negotiating in parallel with multiple respondents. They sought to ascertain who would offer the best deal for New York City. Multiple sources recalled Pinsky as a "tough negotiator," and employees of NYCEDC briefly investigated the possibility of bringing both Cornell and Stanford to New York City, if one were willing to accept a site other than Roosevelt Island, the focus of both of their proposals for the Applied Sciences NYC campus. A City Hall employee recalled:

> We had started the back-channel discussions of how do you have two winners? The vocabulary was 'gold' and 'silver' and 'what can we do to accomplish both?' That was preliminary, having-a-cup-of-coffee thinking as opposed to on-a-piece-of-paper whatever, because we thought that both of these [Cornell and Stanford] were very attractive horses to have in the race.

On 16 December 2011, however, Stanford withdrew from the negotiations and, therefore, from the Applied Sciences NYC competition to the surprise and disappointment of many. In *The New Yorker*, Ken Auletta detailed a salacious narrative of Stanford's withdrawal. Auletta is not alone in his provocative account; however, I attempt to place aside the drama in my narrative. Ultimately, multiple sources recalled in my interviews that employees of NYCEDC and representatives of Stanford had reached an impasse in their negotiations, causing Stanford to withdraw from the Applied Sciences NYC competition to the chagrin of employees of NYCEDC and others in the Bloomberg administration. The same City Hall employee as quoted just prior recalled:

> We were surprised; [we] did not see it [the withdrawal] coming. I prefer not to speculate on why they [Stanford] decided [to withdraw]. […] I remember where I was standing when I got the phone call. We spent a morning just making sure they were serious [about the withdrawal], that this was what they were going to do, and I think we pretty quickly determined that this was decided. It was not appealable; they were not negotiating for a better [deal]; they were not going to go forward. And once you determine that, the great news was that we had a fantastic second horse [Cornell and the Technion], and that horse became the only horse and, then, we moved to complete [the deal].

In my interviews, multiple sources recalled that Stanford university leaders never had campus-wide support for the Applied Sciences NYC campus: They faced opposition from members of the Board of Trustees, faculty, and students. Several sources also highlighted Stanford's negotiating tactics, particularly in contrast with those of Cornell, as cause for difficulty. An employee of NYCEDC and a member of RETS recalled of the negotiations with Stanford: "Oh my God, I feel like everything [was a sticking point in the negotiations with Stanford] and that is what was so disturbing. They [members of the Stanford team for the Applied Sciences NYC competition] did not like the whole premise of how we were doing it [the negotiations]." The same employee of NYCEDC and member of RETS recalled of the Cornell team, on the

other hand: "I think Cornell just said, 'Okay' and I think they also said, 'Okay,' even though it was scary, and signed." The Cornell team for the Applied Sciences NYC competition included Cathy Dove, associate dean for administration at the College of Engineering; Kent Fuchs, provost; Joanne DeStefano, executive vice president and chief financial officer; and James Mingle, university counsel, in addition to external lawyers and consultants who knew New York City and New York City policy decision-making processes well. On the other hand, Debra Zumwalt, Stanford's vice president and general counsel, led the negotiations for the Stanford team for the Applied Sciences NYC competition. The same employee of NYCEDC and member of RETS as quoted just prior recalled: "Their [Stanford's] general counsel led their negotiations; she [Zumwalt] was very tough and had a negotiating stance that was not collaborative or getting-to-'yes.' There was no getting-to-'yes.' Whereas Cornell had more of a team from New York who knew how to do these kind of deals and definitely were more about getting-to-'yes.'"

When Stanford announced their withdrawal on Friday 16 December 2011, employees of NYCEDC sped to finalize their agreement with Cornell and the Technion over the weekend. The same employee of NYCEDC and member of RETS as quoted just prior recalled:

> We had a press issue we had to manage [after Stanford withdrew]. So Josh [Wallack] and Seth [Pinsky] and David [Lombino] took me into the office, and they were like, 'Can you do a deal?' […] It was Friday morning. They [Stanford] were going to announce it [their withdrawal from the Applied Sciences NYC competition] at 1pm on Friday. 'Can you do a quick deal with Cornell over the weekend?' I said, 'Well, if they do not re-trade, yes.'

Employees of NYCEDC and employees of City Hall asked, on the same day that Stanford notified them of their withdrawal, that Cornell make public the $350 million gift from Charles Feeney and The Atlantic Philanthropies. A member of the Cornell team for the Applied Sciences NYC competition also recalled employees of NYCEDC and employees City Hall asking, on the final weekend of negotiations, that the Cornell team approach MIT one more time to investigate the possibility of a partnership: "The mayor's office very much wanted for it to be as big of announcement as possible on Monday [19 December 2011], so they, even over the weekend, approached us about whether or not we could bring in another big name university, for example MIT."

On 19 December 2011, Bloomberg granted the primary award jointly to Cornell and the Technion. A member of the Cornell team for the Applied Sciences NYC competition recalled: "We ended up working all weekend because we were pretty close, just dotting some i's, and, on Monday, the rest of our team came back…and we were able to announce it [the agreement], and it was just wonderful." Employees of City Hall, Cornell, and the Technion held a press conference at Weill Cornell

Medical College in New York City to make the announcement. In addition to the mayor, Skorton, and the Technion president Peretz Lavie, the attendees included: Lappin, Congressperson Carolyn Maloney, Pinsky, Serrano, Steel, Manhattan Borough President Scott Stringer, and other civic and business leaders.

5.3 Power analysis

In this section, I discuss and analyze the power dynamics in deciding on the primary award for the Applied Sciences NYC competition. To do so, I again examine relational power, structural power, and neo-structural power. With regard to relational power, specifically, I investigate the roles of the advisory committee and the selection committee of the Applied Sciences NYC competition. I argue that participants in both had limited power in deciding on the primary award for the Applied Sciences NYC competition: I argue that the mayor ultimately decided. I, therefore, decrease my confidence in the hypothesis of pluralist power in deciding on the primary award for the Applied Sciences NYC competition. In terms of relational power, the policy decision-making processes in deciding on the primary award for the Applied Sciences NYC competition more closely evoked the power dynamics of elitists, as opposed to scholars of pluralism.

With regard to neo-structural power, I argue that mayoral agency played a decisive role in deciding on the primary award for the Applied Sciences NYC competition. In particular, the Bloombergian definition of economic development and the norm of data-driven policy decision-making during the Bloomberg administration again confined the range of ideas considered and the type of participants included in the policy decision-making processes. Members of the Roosevelt Island community, for example, were again excluded from deciding on the primary award for the Applied Sciences NYC competition. I maintain that industry leaders and other members of the "chattering class"—i.e., industry leaders and other top people of influence in New York City—possessed disproportionate power in the policy decision-making processes. I do not observe the necessary observable implications to substantiate the language of a neo-Marxist or a dominant coalition theorist. I also observe that the need to compete with other cities confined the range of ideas considered for the primary award for the Applied Sciences NYC competition. I thereby increase my confidence in the hypotheses of neo-structural power regarding mayoral agency and structural power regarding public choice in deciding on the primary award for the Applied Sciences NYC competition.

5.3.1 Relational power: Ultimately the mayor

Once again in Applied Sciences NYC, employees of NYCEDC created a public forum for ideas, this time for deciding on the primary award for the Applied Sciences NYC competition. The public forum, however, was the most limited instance of public

participation—in terms of the number of people consulted and the time allocated—in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC: Members of the advisory committee had a limited role in deciding on the primary award for the Applied Sciences NYC competition.

Members of the advisory committee corroborated my argument regarding their limited power in deciding on the primary award for the Applied Sciences NYC competition. A member of the advisory committee of the Applied Sciences NYC competition recalled: "I would say that the advisory committee was not particularly important to the process." Another member of the advisory committee of the Applied Sciences NYC competition recalled: "I do not remember them [employees of NYCEDC] doing anything [after the meeting to keep the advisory committee involved]. […] I do not think the committee got a lot of updates. […] You are not the board of directors, which they would have to share [information with] and make sure you are up-to-date and know everything." Another member of the advisory committee of the Applied Sciences NYC competition recalled:

> It kind of felt like we did the one dinner, we said our piece, we had written our evaluations, and that was pretty much it. I do not recall anything after that. They kind of kept us appraised, you know, when a press release went out about this thing [the Applied Sciences NYC competition], they copied us, stuff like that. […] You know, the whole process that went on after that meeting, we were not, at least I was not, significantly engaged in that.

In fact, several members of the advisory committee after its meeting(s) believed that New York City governmental officials would grant the primary award for the Applied Sciences NYC competition to Stanford not Cornell. A member of the advisory committee of the Applied Sciences NYC competition recalled: "I would have put money on it that it was going to be Stanford."


Ultimately, the mayor possessed power in deciding on the primary award for the Applied Sciences NYC competition. A member of the advisory committee of the Applied Sciences NYC competition recalled in response to the question of whose voice mattered in deciding on the primary award: "The mayor, advised by Bob Steel and Seth Pinsky. […] How Mike Bloomberg went was how everybody was going to go. He always gave credit to Pinsky and Steel, but I think everybody considered this the Bloomberg legacy project. Everybody thought that his view was the most important." A City Hall employee recalled: "Seth [Pinsky] and Bob [Steel] had lots of help on their staff, but, ultimately, it was Seth and Bob. And, ultimately, the decision-maker was the mayor, in terms of who the winner ought to be. That was based on recommendations from Seth and Bob but, ultimately, at the end of the day, the mayor is the decision-maker and, to use President [George W.] Bush's term, the decider." Another City Hall employee recalled: "I am on-message: The mayor is an insider; the mayor is amazing. We used to play what we called 'Bloomberg bingo,'

[which was], whenever you made a speech, how many times you could say the word 'Bloomberg.' […] But the real truth is that I think that it would have been [that] [Steel] and Seth [Pinsky] would take a recommendation to the mayor, and the mayor would decide."

5.3.2 (Neo-)structural power: Confining the range of ideas considered and the type of participants included

I argue that a neo-structural power dynamic confined the range of ideas considered and the type of participants included in deciding on the primary award for the Applied Sciences NYC competition. Mayoral agency—particularly the Bloombergian definition of economic development and the norm of data-driven policy decision-making during the Bloomberg administration—again played a decisive role in the policy decision-making processes. I also argue that the need to compete with other cities further confined the range of ideas considered for the primary award.

Figure 4: The pathway for deciding on the primary award for the Applied Sciences NYC competition



5.3.2.1 Mayor Bloomberg's definition of economic development

The mayor's—and thereby his administration's—definition of economic development confined the type of participants included in the public forum for deciding on the primary award for the Applied Sciences NYC competition. Again, it did so by engaging only those on whom a Bloombergian economy focused and relied, namely industry leaders and, in cases where they differed from industry leaders, members of the so-called chattering class. Employees of NYCEDC engaged 11 individuals who represented business, finance, higher-education institutions, and technology in a public forum for ideas—i.e., the advisory committee—as part of their policy decision-making processes in deciding on the primary award for the Applied Sciences

NYC competition. Again, despite the RFP selection criterion of "institutional connections to the city" and the fact that both Cornell and Stanford had proposed, in the their RFEI submissions, the Roosevelt Island site as the potential campus location, members of the Roosevelt Island community were excluded from participating in the public forum for deciding on the primary award for the Applied Sciences NYC competition.

Sources corroborated my argument in my interviews. A member of the Cornell team for the Applied Sciences NYC competition recalled: "I do not think the City paid a whole lot of attention to them [community members on Roosevelt Island] and I do not think we were required to pay a whole lot of attention. […] I do not think they [employees of NYCEDC] felt it was very important to canvas the people living on the Island about whether they thought this was good. I think the City decided they wanted to do it, and the community input came later." A community leader on Roosevelt Island recalled: "We did not know what they [Cornell and Stanford] were actually offering beyond outward presentation, which was not very helpful. And we had no input in the decision-making anyway." In fact, of the Roosevelt Island community members who were engaged in deciding on the primary award, many preferred Stanford to Cornell. Another community leader on Roosevelt Island recalled: "Stanford was doing just about everything right. They sent the right people here. The President [John Hennessy] came. There was a long discussion with him and others that I recall. They really were applying a high level of executive manpower to friending the Island as it were and getting ready to make this pitch to the City, whereas Cornell, as I saw it, sort of stumbl[ed]."

In my interviews, members of the Cornell team for the Applied Sciences NYC competition furthered my argument regarding the limited set of participants in the public forum for deciding on the primary award. As part of their bid strategy, members of the Cornell team for the Applied Sciences NYC competition made members of the chattering class aware of, and sympathetic to, their efforts. A member of the Cornell team for the Applied Sciences NYC competition recalled:

> We also positioned so that Cornell had a presence in all the chattering class of New York. When you work in government and you go to events, it is like the same 800 people who show up to events. But it is the chattering class, it is people of influence [that matter], and that ends up translating a lot into the civic and public discourse. If the Association for a Better New York [ABNY] has an event, Cornell having a table and being a regular presence there is a very New York, civic business thing to do. Going and meeting with the Partnership for the City of New York is an old school, big, finance, real estate, corporate crowd. Whatever the constituency was, we did a lot of that.

Another member of the Cornell team for the Applied Sciences NYC competition recalled:

> I remember we were training Cornell on how to play in the big leagues. We forced them to buy three tables at a *Crain's* breakfast, and they filled them with trustees. Some of those trustees are amazing. We had big hitters and rich people. One of the trustees…made these buttons for everybody that said, 'Go Big Red,' and each of the three tables was filled with very senior Cornell administrators, deans, trustees. Cornell realized it had to play in the big leagues, and this [competition] was going to be a very political process, as well as trying to win on merit.

I do not intend to imply that members of the chattering class, beyond the advisory committee, played a direct role in deciding on the primary award for the Applied Sciences NYC competition. Rather, I intend to convey that the Cornell team for the Applied Sciences NYC competition believed that persuading members of the chattering class that Cornell was a worthy contender in the Applied Sciences NYC competition might have made possible the mayor's choosing of Cornell given his definition of economic development. A member of the Cornell team for the Applied Sciences NYC competition recalled:

> I do not think there was ever a moment where we made a decision because of what the chattering class is doing, but there is a vibe, an aura that I think is helpful. I never voiced it to anyone outside of our group but I wanted us to give Mike Bloomberg the ability to be courageous and say, 'I am taking the less prestigious [option].' I mean Cornell is obviously a great institution but [it is] the not-Stanford option. […] I spent 5 years in the Bloomberg administration, including working very closely with the mayor, and never saw a decision made because of noise made from the chattering class. It does not mean there were not things like so and so, who is representative of the chattering class, is on the board of some institution and Mike ended up giving to it, but, for our stuff, we never went to him and had an outcome different than what we wanted because of that. The goal for positioning Cornell was…I wanted for that world [the chattering class] to make this—the decision [to grant Cornell the primary award]—safe and a success for the mayor. I did not think getting the chattering class behind Cornell would change the mayor's mind about the substance.

The mayor's definition of economic development—particularly his approach to institutional partnering—also confined the set of submissions to the RFP considered for the primary award for the Applied Sciences NYC competition. The mayor believed in institutional partnerships that catalyzed long-term economic development but did not require continual City investment. Many credit Cornell and the Technion's successful bid for the Applied Sciences NYC campus, therefore, to the $350 million pledge from Charles Feeney and The Atlantic Philanthropies. Multiple members of the Cornell team for the Applied Sciences NYC competition recalled the climatic announcement of the gift as a critical moment in the Applied Sciences NYC competition:

> So to the turning point: I will tell you the moment when I knew this [award] was going to happen, which was related to the gift. It was when we went into the formal interview after we submitted our proposal to the City. We had David Skorton and Peretz Lavie and the team and all the folks you mentioned, and it was great. At the very end, David said, 'We have the funds for the first phase, a $350 million gift.' There was this moment of silence and that was when I knew, unless we royally fuck

> this up, there was no way we were not going to get it. It was very clear. In hindsight, there were other signals before then in which you could sort of decipher the public discourse because there was so much about it. You could feel the Stanford story was starting to get a little desperate. But I think for me the moment where I said, 'Okay, we are going to do this' was then.

The $350 million gift demonstrated that Cornell was invested in the success of the project and assuaged New York City governmental officials that they likely would not have to contribute to the initiative beyond their initial investment. A City Hall employee recalled:

> Think about it this way: Imagine you are selling a house and you have got multiple people bidding on your house, and one of them says, 'I want to pay a million dollars for your house and I expect to get a mortgage from my bank, and my parents will lend me the rest of the down payment. I am good for the money. I will figure it out.' Whereas if someone shows up and says, 'I am willing to pay a million for the house, and here is a million dollars in my wallet, I can show it to you right now, would you like to close?' It is a powerful thing in a competitive process to say, 'I am fully financed,' which is not to say the other institutions could not have financed it—I am sure the endowment that the other institutions have is staggering—but they [members of the Cornell team for the Applied Sciences NYC competition] had a specific check that could only be cashed for the purposes of winning the competition. It was a very, very powerful statement.

A member of the Cornell team for the Applied Sciences NYC competition recalled: "But the greatest influence of all, I think what tipped the hat on the whole project, was when we were able to come to the table with a gift of $350 million. That assured the City that the project was going to happen and, as it turned out, it was true. It is going to open in nine months or 10 months, and it is because of that gift that we were able to make all of that happen."

5.3.2.2 Mayor Bloomberg's norm of data-driven policy decision-making

Employees of NYCEDC outlined, in the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition, the selection criteria for deciding on the primary award. They were: "economic impact and feasibility" (40%), "respondent's qualifications & track record" (40%), and "institutional connections to the city" (20%). A City Hall employee recalled that "program, ability to execute, ability to finance" were the key criteria in evaluating the proposals. The norm of data-driven policy decision-making during the Bloomberg administration, therefore, quickly enabled employees of NYCEDC to shortlist the candidates for the primary award for the Applied Sciences NYC competition to Cornell and Stanford. In so doing, it confined the set of submissions to the RFP considered for the primary award for the Applied Sciences NYC competition. Members of the research and data analysis team at NYCEDC, however, did not factor hugely in deciding on the primary award for the Applied Sciences NYC competition once they had determined that the Stanford and Cornell proposals were effectively equivalent in terms of what inputs and outputs New York City governmental officials could reasonably expect. An employee of NYCEDC recalled:

> At a certain point, because it is impossible to predict the future, and we can all make bets, I think, if you look at their track record, Stanford was maybe a little bit stronger. Technion being a partner of Cornell was a big advantage because they, in particular, are known for the application of the research. […] And, then, the fact that both of them were not already in New York was big because it is 100% net-new. So they were pretty even for first place, and that is when reality comes into play.

5.3.2.3 Structural and other neo-structural power dynamics

My observations decrease my confidence in the hypotheses of neo-Marxist structural power and dominant-coalition neo-structural power in deciding on the primary award for the Applied Sciences NYC competition. The mayor's definition of economic development—not a classist compulsion, as a neo-Marxist theorist would argue, or an acknowledgement of the mayor's political electoral base and his economic environment, as a dominant coalition theorist would argue—confined the type of participants included in the public forum to industry leaders and other members of the chattering class. I do observe, however, that employees of NYCEDC emphasized the brand and track record of respondents to the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition. In my interviews, multiple sources recalled the Stanford brand as important to the high estimation of the Stanford proposal or, put differently, as a reason that Cornell was the underdog in the competition. New York City governmental officials also did not consider seriously submissions to the RFP from non-top universities. An employee of NYCEDC recalled, "When there were some bold face names in there like Stanford, I think everyone was like, 'Oh shit.'" The need to compete with other cities, therefore, played a decisive role in the policy decision-making processes: New York City governmental officials prioritized submissions from respondents that would increase the likelihood for New York City to compete with existing technology and engineering clusters. I, therefore, increase my confidence in the hypothesis of structural power regarding public choice in deciding on the primary award for the Applied Sciences NYC competition.

5.4 Conclusion

In some respects, my discussion and analysis of power dynamics in deciding on the primary award for the Applied Sciences NYC competition are limited: Stanford's decision to withdraw from the Applied Sciences NYC competition left employees of City Hall and employees of NYCEDC with effectively only one choice—i.e., Cornell—for the primary award. That said, in this chapter, I was able to discuss and analyze the policy decision-making processes for narrowing the field for the primary award to Cornell and Stanford and why many involved in the competition perceived Stanford as the front-runner between the two.

The policy decision-making processes involving the advisory committee of the Applied Sciences NYC competition decreased my confidence in the hypothesis of

pluralist power in deciding on the primary award. Again, I recognized the decisive role of the mayor's definition of economic development and his norm of data-driven policy decision-making in confining both the type of participants included in the public forum to industry leaders and other members of the chattering class and the range of ideas considered for the primary award for the Applied Sciences NYC competition. I thereby increased my confidence in the hypothesis of neo-structural power regarding mayoral agency in deciding on the primary award for the Applied Sciences NYC competition. Finally, I increased my confidence in the hypothesis of structural power regarding public choice and decreased my confidence in the hypotheses of neo-Marxist structural power and dominant-coalition neo-structural power in deciding on the primary award for the Applied Sciences NYC competition.

Six

6. Conclusion

I have explored the politics of power in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC, an economic-development initiative under the Bloomberg administration in New York City. In particular, I have evaluated the politics of power in policy decision-making processes of both public participation and data-driven governance. The literature on the politics of power in public policy decision-making processes does not adequately address public policy decision-making processes of both data-driven governance and public participation. What power dynamics explain the policy decision-making processes of identifying a goal, defining its terms, and selecting an institutional partner to achieve them in Applied Sciences NYC? And, given the norm of data-driven policy decision-making under the Bloomberg administration and the Applied Sciences NYC power dynamics, why also include public participation in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC?

In this concluding chapter, I review the findings from the three empirical chapters (3–5) and introduce the possibility of a comparison across the three episodes of policy decision-making processes of both data-driven governance and public participation in Applied Sciences NYC. I delineate possible implications of my research findings for the literature on the politics of power and for other mayoral administrations in New York City, mayoral administrations across the U.S., governmental administrations nationally, and governmental administrations globally. I then discuss two important limitations of the research project. I conclude with reflections on the public policy relevance of my research findings, suggesting a pragmatic approach to processes of public participation and an emphasis on mayoral election reform. In so doing, I demonstrate how this research project could influence public policy decision-making processes and local public policy priorities, in addition to being instructive for public policy decision-makers, voters, and non-voters who are interested in power dynamics in urban public policy decision-making processes.

6.1 A summary of the research findings

New York City governmental officials intimated and publically professed that a multiplicity of non-governmental actors possessed power in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC. Via process-tracing methodology, I provided nuance to this suggestion of pluralist power, in addition to observing that New York City governmental officials included processes of public participation in Applied Sciences NYC with three primary intents: to generate ideas and validate their hypotheses; to mitigate future criticism; and to catalyze support.

In the first of three episodes of policy decision-making processes of both public participation and data-driven governance in Applied Sciences NYC—namely, deciding on a game-changing idea to improve the New York City economy—processes of hypothesis testing in the Game Changers initiative decreased my confidence in the hypothesis of pluralist power: Testing the hypotheses of employees of NYCEDC—as opposed to solely brainstorming a game-changing idea to improve the New York City economy—gave disproportionate power to employees of NYCEDC or, put differently, limited the power of participants in the public forum.

Additionally, the decisive role of the Bloombergian definition of economic development, the norm of data-driven policy decision-making under the Bloomberg administration, and Bloomberg's personal background increased my confidence in the hypothesis of neo-structural power regarding mayoral agency in the Game Changers initiative. Mayoral agency closed the policy decision-making processes in the Game Changers initiative such that only certain ideas were considered and only certain participants were included. Specifically, industry leaders had power to propose game-changing ideas and to validate the game-changing ideas that employees of NYCEDC researched and proposed but only in a context where ideas assumed greater importance if they elided with: the Bloombergian vision of New York City as a global city, the norm of internal research and data analysis particularly using metrics of competitiveness with other cities, or the mayor's technology background. I also decreased my confidence in the hypotheses of neo-Marxist structural power and dominant-coalition neo-structural power in the Game Changers initiative and increased my confidence in the hypothesis of structural power regarding public choice: The perceived need to compete with other cities to attract and retain capital and other resources further confined the range of ideas considered for how best to improve the New York City economy.

In the second of three episodes of policy decision-making processes of both public participation and data-driven governance in Applied Sciences NYC—namely, deciding on the specifications of the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition—the RFEI processes increased my confidence in the hypothesis of pluralist power: Respondents to the RFEI informed the definition of the terms of the RFP. I also recognized, however, the decisive role of the mayor's definition of economic development in confining the type of participants included in the public forum to industry experts at the expense, most notably, of community leaders on Roosevelt Island. I also thereby increased my confidence in the hypothesis of neo-structural power regarding mayoral agency in deciding on the specifications of the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition. Finally, I decreased my confidence in the hypotheses of neo-Marxist structural power and dominant-coalition neo-structural power and increased my confidence in the hypothesis of structural power regarding

public choice in deciding on the specifications of the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition: In delineating the specifications for the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition, employees of NYCEDC considered the specifications of technology and engineering campuses in other cities because of the perceived need to compete with them to attract and retain talent.

In the third of three episodes of policy decision-making processes of both public participation and data-driven governance in Applied Sciences NYC—namely, deciding on the primary award for the Applied Sciences NYC competition—the policy decision-making processes involving the advisory committee decreased my confidence in the hypothesis of pluralist power. The advisory committee represented the most limited public forum in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC: Members of the advisory committee did not have much power in deciding on the primary award. Instead, the mayor, ultimately, made the decision to grant Cornell and the Technion the primary award in the Applied Sciences NYC competition.

I again recognized the decisive role of the mayor's definition of economic development and his norm of data-driven policy decision-making in confining both the type of participants included in the public forum to industry leaders and other members of the so-called chattering class and the range of ideas considered for the recipient of the primary award. I thereby increased my confidence in the hypothesis of neo-structural power regarding mayoral agency in deciding on the primary award for the Applied Sciences NYC competition. Finally, I decreased my confidence in the hypotheses of neo-Marxist structural power and dominant-coalition neo-structural power and increased my confidence in the hypothesis of structural power regarding public choice in deciding on the primary award for the Applied Sciences NYC competition: New York City governmental officials prioritized submissions from respondents that would increase the likelihood for New York City to compete with existing technology and engineering clusters.

Process-tracing methodology does not allow me to evaluate the weight of each decisive factor in policy decision-making processes easily. Therefore, I cannot systematically compare the decisiveness of a factor across public policy decision-making processes. The ability to do so might have provided guidance on where to intervene in order to facilitate more open and inclusive public forums in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC. That said, in a subsequent section (6.4), I propose how we ought to continue toward more open and inclusive public forums in policy decision-making processes. If we reflect anecdotally on how different each of the three episodes of policy decision-making processes in Applied Sciences NYC is from my suggestion for public forums, then the findings that I have

articulated in my empirical chapters may also have bearing on where I would argue that we have the most to gain in terms of openness and inclusivity in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC.

6.2 Implications of the research project

Although I cannot systematically compare the decisiveness of factors of power in a single policy decision-making process or across multiple policy decision-making processes, I observed that, in all three episodes of policy decision-making processes in Applied Sciences NYC, the mayor had agency within an economic and social context, and the need to compete with other cities played a role.[62] My research findings have implications both for the literature on the politics of urban power and for further research.

6.2.1 Contributions to the literature on the politics of urban power

I have contributed to the literature on the politics of urban power particularly through my finding that mayoral agency played a decisive role in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC. As I illustrated in chapter two, the literature is messy: Scholars define power differently and, even when they define it similarly, they can disagree on the factors of power that play a decisive role in public policy decision-making processes. I mediate both tensions in the literature on the politics of power.

First, my research finding that a factor of power with both a relational and structural component—i.e., mayoral agency—played a decisive role in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC lends support to a neo-structural definition of power. In order to understand power dynamics in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC fully, I had to observe both power dynamics among individuals and groups and power dynamics as a result of the economic and social context. Failure to examine either aspect would have skewed my analysis.

Second, I particularly bolster the strand of mayoral agency theory that delineates a "context thesis," as I describe in section 2.3.2. As Ferman (1985) and Stone (1995) advocate, my research findings invite discussions of both a mayor's "personality"—as Sayre and Kaufman (1960) discuss—and the economic and social context in which she operates in analyzing power in urban policy decision-making processes. Additionally, my research findings add nuance to this literature in two ways: First, I

[62] Additionally, I note that, in all three episodes of policy decision-making processes in Applied Sciences NYC, neither a classist compulsion, as a neo-Marxist theorist would argue, nor an acknowledgement of the mayor's political electoral base and his economic environment, as a dominant coalition theorist would argue, appeared to play a role.

identified specific factors of mayoral agency—i.e., the Bloombergian definition of economic development, the norm of data-driven policy decision-making during the Bloomberg administration, and Bloomberg's personal background—which encouraged and influenced policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC. Second, I outlined a particular relationship between the neo-structural power dynamic regarding mayoral agency and the structural power dynamic regarding public choice in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC: The Bloombergian definition of economic development influenced the need to compete with other cities. Both instances of nuance should be kept in mind in future research in the event that similar power dynamics occur. Finally, in espousing mayoral agency theory, I cast doubt on the relevance of dominant coalition theory, despite its preeminence, and other theories of power in public policy decision-making processes in New York City.

6.2.2 Opportunities for further research

Further research is necessary to understanding if my findings also apply to other cases. Yet, a variety of implications are possible: mayoral agency could play a decisive role in policy decision-making processes of both data-driven governance and public participation in other mayoral administrations in New York City; mayoral agency could play a decisive role in such policy decision-making processes in mayoral administrations nationally; mayoral agency could play a decisive role in such policy decision-making processes in mayoral administrations globally; "lead-elected-official agency"—i.e., my term for referring to the power, within an economic and social context, of the top elected official at a level of government—could play a decisive role in such policy decision-making processes in governmental administrations nationally; and lead-elected-official agency could play a decisive role in such policy decision-making processes in governmental administrations globally.

I am most interested in further research as it aims to assess the validity of my findings in policy decision-making processes of both data-driven governance and public participation in other mayoral administrations nationally. As I alluded in the discussion of mayoral agency theory (section 2.3.2), New York City is a "strong mayor" government (i.e., one in which the mayor possesses great jurisdiction, often as compared to that of the city council). Further research is necessary to understand the degree to which the structure of government—i.e., "strong mayor" versus "weak mayor"—influences mayoral agency as a factor of power in public policy decision-making processes. That said, the other opportunities for further research are interesting too: I am confident that my findings would be relevant to other mayoral administrations in New York City; speaking anecdotally, mayoral agency appears to play a decisive role in the policy decision-making processes of the current administration under Bill de Blasio (2014–present). I look forward to further

research that examines if my findings are relevant to mayoral administrations globally and if lead-elected-official agency plays a decisive role in public policy decision-making processes of both data-driven governance and public participation. My intuition is that public policy decision-making processes of both data-driven governance and public participation have significantly different qualities in non-American and/or non-urban settings and, therefore, I anticipate that they would have different power dynamics there too. A more general understanding of mayoral agency in public policy decision-making processes of both data-driven governance and public participation in the U.S. is the greatest opportunity that this research project leaves unresolved.

6.3 Limitations of the research project

I wish to address two important limitations of the research project. First, I consider the generalizability of my research findings on power dynamics in public policy decision-making processes of both data-driven governance and public participation. Second, I acknowledge that I was unable to consider adequately potential interests and potential public policy alternatives in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC: Process-tracing methodology allowed me to focus only on manifest interests and manifest public policy alternatives.

6.3.1 Generalizing the research findings

As I discuss in subsection 1.4.4, I do not perceive the limited external validity that process-tracing methodology affords as a limitation of the research project. Instead, I view it as an opportunity: Further empirical work is necessary to demonstrate if my findings with regard to power dynamics in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC also apply to other cases. I am confident that my findings would be relevant to other cases. In other words, I am confident that the scope conditions of the case study are sufficiently broad.

However, two conditions of the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC may give a reasonable reader pause in terms of the generalizability of my research findings. I acknowledge that I may be unable to assuage the reader of these concerns fully but I understand their causing some skepticism, so I aim to outline them. First, I imagine that the mayor's personal wealth may be a concern to the reader as it relates to the generalizability of my research findings. I cannot fully placate the reader, but I can say confidently that I do not believe that the mayor's personal wealth played a significant role in my research finding that mayoral agency played a decisive role in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC. The mayor's personal wealth, for example, surely played a decisive role at other points in his political career, perhaps most notably during his self-funded campaigns. That said, neither the financing of the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC nor the public policy outputs of Applied Sciences NYC was

dependent on the mayor's personal wealth or that of special interests. Mayoral agency played a significant role in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC, but I have no reason to believe it did so because of the mayor's personal wealth.

Second, I also imagine that two aspects of the timing of the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC may be a concern to a reasonable reader considering the generalizability of the research project. First, many consider Applied Sciences NYC to be a legacy project of the Bloomberg administration: The policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC occurred predominately in the third and known final—due to term limits—term of the Bloomberg administration. Second, to some extent, the 2008 financial crisis was an impetus for the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC. Either aspect of timing, or both, might suggest that the mayor could have been extraordinarily involved in public policy decision-making processes and, therefore, could raise doubts about the generalizability of my research findings to cases in which neither of these timings aspects are present.

While here again, I cannot fully assuage the reader of her concern regarding the specificity of scope conditions and, therefore, a limitation to the generalizability of my research findings, I do not believe that these timing considerations significantly affected my findings. Perhaps the mayor's personal background played a more significant role in the public policy decision-making processes than it would have otherwise given the possible desire for a legacy project, as I allude in section 3.3.3.3. However, in my discussion, I placed greater importance on the mayor's definition of economic development and the norm of data-driven policy decision-making under the Bloomberg administration and I have no reason to believe that timing considerations altered the magnitude of the role of these factors of mayoral agency in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC.

6.3.2 Discussing potential interests and potential public policy alternatives

My greatest frustration throughout the research project was my inability to reflect adequately on the actors and policy alternatives not present in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC. In other words, process-tracing methodology allowed me to focus only on manifest interests and manifest policy alternatives in the public policy decision-making processes not potential interests or potential policy alternatives.

For example, in chapters three, four, and five, I described the narrative of Applied Sciences NYC as I understood it from various actors who had played a role in the public policy decision-making processes and from primary source documents. I then

considered the factors of power that closed the policy decision-making processes such that only certain ideas were considered and only certain participants were included. I was limited, however, in my ability to discuss actors who were not included, or who could not otherwise play a role, in the public policy decision-making processes. I lamented in chapters four and five, for example, that employees of NYCEDC did not include community leaders on Roosevelt Island in the public policy decision-making processes, but I could consider these actors only because they attempted to play a role in the public policy decision-making processes. However, given my methodology, I was unfortunately unable to identify actors not present in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC and, even if I could have done so, I would have been uncertain in what capacity I could interview them and what authority their accounts would have in my understanding of the narrative. Therefore, as a result of process-tracing methodology, I acknowledge that my dissertation largely relied on insiders' perspectives.

I was similarly limited in my ability to discuss policy alternatives that were not considered in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC. Put differently, I could not evaluate the full suite of knowable opportunity costs of Applied Sciences NYC. I could describe the narrative of Applied Sciences NYC as a process of deliberation between proposed policy alternatives—e.g., a higher education institution in the technology sciences versus a regional development plan or Cornell versus Stanford—but, given my methodology, I could not easily discuss those policy alternatives that factors of power precluded from consideration in the policy decision-making processes.

As an example of a possible policy alternative not considered in the Game Changers initiative: I am not aware that employees of NYCEDC considered an early childhood education initiative in deciding on a game-changing idea to improve the New York City economy and, yet, at the time of the Game Changers initiative, scholars of education reform already emphasized the importance of early childhood education. In 2006, for example, the New York City Administration for Children's Services (ACS), a municipal agency that promotes the safety and well-being of New York City's children, recognized the importance of early care and education and developed a strategic plan—titled "Rethinking Child Care: An Integrated Plan for Early Childhood Development in New York City"—to serve young children and families better. Others make an economic argument for, say, full-day universal pre-kindergarten, and I could also make an argument for its feasibility and its impact on the New York City economy, as were the criteria of the Game Changers initiative.[63]

[63] The subsequent mayor, de Blasio, negotiated to expand full-day pre-kindergarten education to all four-year-olds in New York City. The initiative began in 2014.

Without wanting to speculate further on the characteristics of such groups, an early childhood education initiative likely prioritizes a different subset of New Yorkers than does a higher education initiative in the technology sciences. I speculate that the former stakeholders were not given much weight according to a Bloombergian definition of economic development and, therefore, an early childhood education initiative and other economic development initiatives that prioritize similar constituencies were likewise given little-to-no consideration in the Game Changers initiative. These policy alternatives, however, are important, and, in some respects, I regret that I cannot address them and their lack of consideration in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC. Perhaps as a result of this limitation, I also do not have the ability in this research project to reflect on the possible limitations of the mayor and his administration. Broadly, I believe that my inability to discuss and analyze potential interests and potential policy alternatives has negative consequences for my ability to reflect on the social and racial injustices too often apparent in power dynamics in public policy decision-making processes. I refer to scholars who reflect on these aspects of power in the concluding section (2.5) of my literature review.

6.4 The public policy relevance of the research findings

I can, however, consider the public policy relevance of my research findings regarding the decisive role of mayoral agency in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC. I do so in two ways: First, I reflect on what processes of public participation could instead aim to achieve, particularly given that they are increasing, as discussed in chapter one; second, I reflect on the need for mayoral election reform. In both instances, I maintain that, despite structural and neo-structural power considerations, governmental officials should strive to facilitate open and inclusive public forums in public policy decision-making processes: Governmental officials do not always know best and can benefit from the experiences and expertise of relevant stakeholders in conceiving and implementing successful public policy initiatives. Both reflections assume that my research findings regarding the decisive role of mayoral agency are relevant beyond the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC.

6.4.1 Processes of public participation with requirement-setting intentions

"Asking them" suggested that employees of NYCEDC intended to be open to all public policy ideas in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC. Yet, given an understanding of power that also accounts for economic and social contexts and my analysis of power dynamics in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC, I maintain that this intention was impractical. Additionally, over successive occurrences of unfulfilled expectations, I suspect that participants in such processes of public participation would become increasingly skeptical or even

cynical. As a result, particularly given that processes of public participation are increasing, I propose that governmental officials instead should, first, recognize that factors of power—i.e., mayoral agency, specifically—act as closing mechanisms in processes of public participation and, second, tailor their implicit and stated intentions for processes of public participation accordingly. I, therefore, propose a pragmatic solution: Governmental officials should consider engaging relevant stakeholders in processes of public participation in order for participants to propose a set of policy requirements, given a particular policy initiative, that would, in the stakeholders' estimation, facilitate the best possibility of success. This intention falls between the stated one—i.e., brainstorming or idea-generation—in the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC and the one largely achieved—i.e., hypothesis testing.

Let me first explain my shift to processes of public participation with requirement-setting intentions from processes of public participation with brainstorming intentions. I believe that processes of public participation with requirement-setting intentions better utilize the respective skill sets of governmental officials and stakeholders than do processes of public participation with idea-generating intentions. Governmental officials do comparatively well to understand the landscape of a public policy problem and, to that end, do comparatively well to set a public policy goal. In other words, governmental officials, in their representative capacity, ideally do well to avoid difficulties of personal interests or not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY) politics. Stakeholders, on the other hand, based on their localized knowledge and relative expertise, do comparatively well to know what needs to occur or what needs not to occur in order for a public policy initiative to achieve its goal. Processes of public participation with requirement-setting intentions, therefore, achieve targeted feedback and input from stakeholders on what is minimally necessary in order for the policy initiative to be successful.

However, I do not intend for processes of public participation with requirement-setting intentions to preclude stakeholders' idea generation necessarily. Just as it is important for governmental officials to interrogate stakeholders' suggested public policy requirements, recognizing that stakeholders' relative strengths can sometimes be fallible, I believe that so too is it vital for governmental officials to recognize that they are not always comparatively better at setting a public policy goal. Some of the best public policy initiatives arise from grassroots organizing. Governmental officials ought to remain open to the possibility that a stakeholder can offer not public policy requirements but a better public policy goal in processes of public participation. Additionally, acknowledging the potential for path dependency in public policy decision-making processes, I place particular emphasis on having processes of public participation toward the beginning of public policy decision-making processes, when

the possible solution set is the broadest. Finally, I note that just as processes of public participation with brainstorming intentions likely tempered future criticism and catalyzed support by involving stakeholders in the public policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC, so too could processes of public participation with requirement-setting intentions.

In the case of Applied Sciences NYC, my proposal for processes of public participation with requirement-setting intentions would have altered each episode of public participation. The policy sub-goals of Applied Sciences NYC were deciding on: a game-changing idea to improve the New York City economy, the specifications for the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition, and the primary award for the Applied Sciences NYC competition. As such, in processes of public participation with requirement-setting intentions, at each step, employees of NYCEDC should have sought to understand the minimum criteria for: a game-changing idea to improve the New York City economy (e.g., one-stop permitting processes or increased technology and engineering talent), the requirements for the specifications for the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition (e.g., a specific number of square feet of development or a specific number of graduates by set milestones), and the requirements for the primary award for the Applied Sciences NYC competition (e.g., a legacy of collaboration with industry), while maintaining openness to the possibility that they had set the wrong goals. Instead through the Game Changers initiative, the RFEI for the Applied Sciences NYC competition processes, and the advisory committee of the Applied Sciences NYC competition, employees of NYCEDC intended for processes of public participation to generate ideas more broadly. I note, however, that, in deciding on the specifications for the RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition, employees of NYCEDC did well to maintain openness to the possibility that they had set the wrong goals: They stated that they would have reconsidered the policy initiative if they had received few-to-no responses to the RFEI.

Processes of public participation ought always to be for the purpose of feedback and input, where governmental officials can hear and consider that feedback and input given structural and neo-structural power dynamics. If governmental officials do not listen in processes of public participation, their actions have the potential to erode trust in our democracy; skepticism and cynicism enter, and, over successive occurrences, stakeholders have less incentive and desire to participate in processes of public participation. In order to consider feedback and input from processes of public participation appropriately, governmental officials must acknowledge the constraints, particularly of mayoral agency, and, in so doing, limit the feedback and input to that on policy requirements for predetermined policy goals. I believe that processes of public participation with requirement-setting intentions tend to better

respect the individual and better acknowledge her comparative strengths than processes of public participation with brainstorming or hypothesis-testing intentions.

6.4.2 Mayoral election reform

If mayoral agency plays a decisive role in public policy decision-making processes—and assuming that the public policy platform of a candidate largely informs her and her administration's policy decision-making once she is an elected official—then we ought to acknowledge the limits to openness and inclusivity in processes of public participation in public policy decision-making and place redoubled emphasis on open and inclusive mayoral elections.

Policy reform is necessary, however, to make mayoral elections open and inclusive. To begin with those in New York City, the Campaign Finance Board has done well to make New York City elections a model of openness in terms of who can run for election. The Campaign Finance Board's matching fund program works effectively to promote non-incumbent or otherwise non-politically-connected candidates. Briefly, through a small-dollar matching fund program, participants may qualify to receive public matching funds at a $6-to-$1 rate for contributions up to $175 from individuals who reside in New York City, with a maximum public funds payment equal to 55% of a candidate's spending limit per period. In the 2017 mayoral elections, for example, the Campaign Finance Board imposed the following additional stipulations for qualification: participants must have raised $250,000 minimum in contributions up to $175 from individuals who reside in New York City; participants must face opposition on the ballot; and participants must abide by a spending limit of $328,000 in non-election years, $6,969,000 during the primary election spending period, and $6,969,000 during the general election spending period, in addition to the rules on contribution limits that bind all candidates. Surely, there is work to be done to create a level playing field for all candidates who wish to run for New York City mayor but, compared to other cities, there are fewer barriers to entry in New York City.

New York City does poorly, however, with regard to the inclusivity of voters in municipal elections. As an indication, I look briefly at the past two mayoral elections: In 2013 and 2017, New York City voters elected de Blasio as mayor. Yet, in the 2017 mayoral election, only 17% of the voting-age population in New York City and only 23% of registered voters voted overall, with only 11% of the voting-age population and only 15% of registered voters voting for de Blasio. The 2013 election presents a similar picture. In New York City, barriers to voting limit the inclusivity of mayoral elections. The state, for example, does not allow no-excuse early voting or no-excuse absentee voting; additionally, it does not permit early voting, have automatic voter registration, or electronic poll books. Conversations and legislation

focusing on early voting, same-day registration, consolidated primaries, automatic registration, and open primaries would do well to move towards more inclusive elections.

Barriers to the openness and inclusivity of mayoral elections are not particular to New York City, however. Traditional campaign strategies do not generally strive to expand the voter pool. Simply put, given limited resources, candidates are more likely to target—both with their campaign rhetoric and platform and with their ground initiatives—"likely voters" as revealed by voter records.[64] Therefore, rational campaign strategy typically is an unfortunate reinforcing mechanism for prioritizing those who have voted regularly or, put negatively, further alienating non- or infrequent voters. Additionally, governmental officials have a low incentive to reform voting laws since they were voted into office according to the status quo. As a result, in New York City and New York State, the best chance of election reform may depend on term-limited leaders, a Constitutional Convention in New York State, or a New York City Charter revision commission.

I have focused my reflections on the importance of election reform, but surely there are other ways, perhaps more indirect, to achieve more open and inclusive public policy decision-making processes given the decisive role of mayoral agency in policy decision-making processes. Checks and balances within municipal government and term limits particularly come to mind. Finally, we can also be heartened: If my examination of the public policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC had revealed, say, solely structural power dynamics, we would place less value on the mayor and his administration's ability to act within an economic and social context. However, since mayoral agency plays a decisive role in public policy decision-making processes, then our voices—through our votes—do too.

6.5 Conclusion

I concluded my narrative of the policy decision-making processes of Applied Sciences NYC on 19 December 2011, when employees of City Hall and employees of NYCEDC granted Cornell and the Technion the primary award for the Applied Sciences NYC competition. The Cornell Tech campus was the primary policy output in response to the formulated policy question: "What can/should we [New York City governmental officials] do to increase economic activity [in New York City]?"

Yet, the initiative continued beyond my narrative, particularly with regard to secondary awards for the Applied Sciences NYC competition, a possibility that I mentioned in section 4.2.2. On 23 April 2012, Bloomberg announced that a

[64] Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez's successful Democratic primary race in 2018 in New York's 14th congressional district provides an important counterexample.

consortium of institutions, which NYU and NYU-Poly led, would create a new applied sciences center called the Center for Urban Science and Progress (CUSP) in downtown Brooklyn. CUSP would locate at 370 Jay Street, a 460,000 square-foot site—not explicitly suggested as a site for the Applied Sciences NYC campus in the RFEI or RFP for the Applied Sciences NYC competition—that the City owned and that both the Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA), a New York State public benefit corporation, and the New York City Police Department (NYPD), a municipal agency, occupied. The secondary award consisted of up to $15 million in benefits, including public funding sources and abatements of amounts otherwise due.[65] Additionally, on 30 July 2012, Bloomberg announced that Columbia would also receive $15 million in benefits to construct a new Institute for Data Sciences and Engineering at its Morningside Heights and Washington Heights campuses and, on 21 November 2013, Bloomberg announced CMU as the winner of the fourth award in conjunction with Applied Sciences NYC. CMU received $3.5 million in benefits to construct its new Integrative Media Program at Steiner Studios in the Brooklyn Navy Yard. In Fall 2017, Cornell Tech opened on Roosevelt Island, and construction and expansion continue to this day. Further research is necessary to examine the implementation and effectiveness of the Applied Sciences NYC campuses, and I anticipate that, when scholars conduct such research projects, my research findings regarding the factors of power that played a decisive role in the policy decision-making processes and the role of processes of public participation will again be relevant and instructive.

Mayoral agency played a decisive role in policy decision-making processes of both data-driven governance and public participation in Applied Sciences NYC. We can debate whether it would do so in other mayoral administrations in New York City. We can debate whether it would do so in other U.S. cities. We can debate whether it would do so in cities globally. We can debate whether leaders at other levels of government in the U.S. also play a decisive role in policy decision-making processes of both data-driven governance and public participation. Further research is surely necessary. Michael Nutter, the former mayor of Philadelphia (2008–2015), however, claims in *Mayor* (2018) that the mayoralty is the best job in politics. I would tend to agree. Nutter experienced personally and conveys anecdotally what I have observed empirically in this dissertation: Within an economic and social context, it is the mayor who governs now.

[65] The MTA had held a long-term lease—of $1 per year—on 370 Jay Street from New York City. In 2012, NYU paid the MTA $50 million and the NYPD $10 million in relocation expenses and leased the property from New York City for $1 per year.

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