Journal article icon

Journal article

Information disclosure and dynamic climate agreements: shall the IPCC reveal it all?

Abstract:

This paper examines the role of public information communication in dynamic self-enforcing climate agreements. We consider a framework with implicit contracts but also a dynamic coalition formation context. In a stochastic game, where the social cost of Greenhouse Gasses (GHG) is an unknown random variable, an information sender, such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), controls the release of verifiable information about the unknown state variable to the countries. The e...

Expand abstract
Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

Actions


Access Document


Files:
Publisher copy:
10.1016/j.euroecorev.2022.104042

Authors


More by this author
Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
SSD
Department:
Economics
Oxford college:
St Edmund Hall
Role:
Author
Publisher:
Elsevier
Journal:
European Economic Review More from this journal
Volume:
143
Article number:
104042
Publication date:
2022-02-10
Acceptance date:
2021-10-29
DOI:
ISSN:
0014-2921
Language:
English
Keywords:
Pubs id:
1226886
Local pid:
pubs:1226886
Deposit date:
2022-01-12

Terms of use


Views and Downloads






If you are the owner of this record, you can report an update to it here: Report update to this record

TO TOP