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On being internally the same

Abstract:

Internalism and externalism disagree about whether agents who are internally the same can differ in their mental states. But what is it for two agents to be internally the same? Standard formulations take agents to be internally the same in virtue of some metaphysical fact, for example, that they share intrinsic physical properties. Our aim in this chapter is to argue that such formulations should be rejected. We provide the outlines of an alternative formulation on which agents are internall...

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Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

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Files:
Publisher copy:
10.1093/oso/9780198845850.003.0011

Authors


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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
HUMS
Department:
Philosophy Faculty
Role:
Author
ORCID:
0000-0002-8951-4600
More by this author
Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
HUMS
Department:
Philosophy Faculty
Role:
Author
ORCID:
0000-0002-4244-4879

Contributors

Division:
HUMS
Department:
Philosophy Faculty
Role:
Editor
More from this funder
Name:
John Templeton Foundation
Grant:
RG73416/120486
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
Host title:
Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind
Volume:
1
Chapter number:
11
Pages:
315-340
Publication date:
2021-03-31
Acceptance date:
2020-04-28
DOI:
EISBN:
9780191880995
ISBN:
9780198845850
Language:
English
Keywords:
Subtype:
Chapter
Pubs id:
1102312
Local pid:
pubs:1102312
Deposit date:
2020-04-29

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